This dissertation titled
Atavism and Modernity in Time's Portrayal of the Arab World, 2001-2011

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ABSTRACT

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Atavism and Modernity in Time's Portrayal of the Arab World, 2001-2011

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This study builds on research that has documented the persistence of negative stereotypes of Arabs and the Arab world in the U.S. media during more than a century. The specific focus is *Time* magazine’s portrayal of Arabs and their societies between 2001 and 2011, a period that includes the September 11, 2001, attacks; the ensuing U.S.-led “war on terror;” and the mass “Arab Spring” uprisings that spread across the Arab world beginning in late 2010. Using a mixed-methods approach, the study explores whether and to what extent *Time*’s coverage employs what Said (1978) called Orientalism, a powerful binary between the West and the Orient characterized by a consistent portrayal of the West as superior—rational, ordered, cultured—and the Orient as its opposite—irrational, chaotic, depraved. A quantitative content analysis of 271 *Time* feature stories and photographs revealed that *Time*’s coverage focused predominately on conflict, violence, and dysfunction. Nations that received the most frequent coverage were those where the United States was involved militarily, such as Iraq, as well as those that receive the most U.S. foreign aid or are strategically important to U.S. interests. These findings coalesce with the study’s qualitative portion, a critical discourse analysis of approximately 20 percent of the data set that employs metaphor and framing theory. This thread of the study reveals an overarching Orientalist binary where Arabs are portrayed either as “atavistic” or “modern.” As “atavistic,” they are backward and irrationally violent, possessing corrupt and failed leaders and terrified, preyed-upon...
women; as “modern,” they strive to look, dress, act, and think like Westerners. Arab moderns oftentimes apologize for their societies’ atavistic ways. Media scholars have noted an apparent shift in coverage of Arabs after the events of September 11, with more favorable or complex portrayals found in journalism, television, and film. However, this study revealed no such shift in \textit{Time}. In fact, as \textit{Time}, a weekly, struggles to compete amid a transformed media environment of cable channels and 24-hour news cycles, the 90-year-old icon of American journalism now appears to cling ever more tightly to sensationalism and longstanding negative stereotypes of America’s perceived enemies.
DEDICATION

For Loren, Olivia, and Rachel
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The cover of *Time* magazine’s February 28, 2011, issue features a group of beaming young Egyptian activists. Raising a fist in victory or flashing a peace sign, they are jubilant in the wake of the recent toppling of longtime ruler Hosni Mubarak. Bright red text runs atop the photograph, declaring the youths “the generation changing the world.” Inside the magazine, a photograph of Egyptians throwing stones at Mubarak supporters is spun positively, linked to the headline “How Democracy Can Work in the Middle East.” Part of the so-called “Arab Spring”—the grassroots push for democracy that swept through the Arab world beginning in late 2010—young activists like these instigated uprisings that brought down dictators not only in Egypt but also Tunisia and Libya. Armed with Twitter accounts and fueled by rap songs, they emerged upon the global stage as the Arab world’s fresh, new hope, vibrant harbingers of change in a region long portrayed as plagued by backwardness (Said, 1978; Suleiman, 1988). As this dissertation will show, the cover and story package are highly unusual—agitating Arab youths depicted in a positive light by the mainstream U.S. media, as agents of positive change rather than dangerous threats.

Scholars have noted that the U.S. media have historically portrayed Arabs, Muslims, and the Arab world in an overwhelmingly negative light, employing dehumanizing, one-dimensional stereotypes. Shaheen’s (2009) comprehensive study of Arab images in more than 1,000 Hollywood films found that “filmmakers have collectively indicted all Arabs as Public Enemy #1—brutal, heartless, uncivilized religious fanatics and money-mad cultural ‘others’ bent on terrorizing civilized Westerners, especially Christians and Jews” (p. 8). Hollywood’s Arabs are “brute
murderers, sleazy rapists, religious fanatics, oil-rich dimwits, and abusers of women” (p. 8). Some Arab Americans have taken to calling these portrayals “the ‘three B syndrome’ … bombers, belly dancers, or billionaires” (Qumsiyeh, 2004). Recent scholarship, however, has identified a curious shift. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the demeaning depictions of Arabs that have for so long been the norm have given way to portrayals that are seemingly more sympathetic—or at least more complex (Weston, 2003; Michalak, 2010; Alsultany, 2012). Thus, the horrific events of September 11, carried out by 19 Arab Muslim men and seemingly ripe like no other for renewal of the Arab terrorist stereotype, instead became a sort of turning point, however counterintuitive. “At such an opportune moment for further stereotyping—a moment of mourning, fear, trauma, anger, and presumably justifiable racism against the entire Arab and Muslim population—this wave of sympathetic representations seemed both unprecedented and unlikely” (Alsultany, 2012, p. 2).

Alsultany (2008) found that this period ushered in new and sympathetic portrayals of Arabs and Muslims on prime-time television. “Instead of presenting Arabs and Muslims as justifiable targets of hate, violence, and discrimination, some TV dramas represent Arab and Muslim Americans as unfair targets of misdirected fear and anger” (p. 206). She cited two episodes of the legal drama The Practice that were ground-breaking. One Arab-American character was prevented from boarding an airplane due to his ethnicity; another was held without charge in federal custody as part of a terrorism investigation. Both characters were portrayed as victims of a post-9/11 America where those of Arab and Muslim background suffered unfair treatment and loss of civil rights.
However, despite these new portrayals, Alsultany noted that the overall conclusion of both episodes justified and reinforced U.S. government policy for detention without charge of terrorism suspects, as well as the right to curtail civil liberties. Michalak (2010) surveyed 24 American movies about Arabs and Muslims between 1999 and 2010 and found 11 of them positive. The film *Kingdom of Heaven* (2005), for example, depicts the Crusaders as “the bad guys,” and Muslims as “the good guys.” In *The Kingdom* (2007), a story about the investigation of a terrorist attack on an American compound in Saudi Arabia, a Saudi police officer is featured as one of the film’s “heroes” (Michalak, 2010). Negative stereotyping has not been the exclusive framework in journalism either, as demonstrated by studies of newspaper coverage of Arabs and Muslims post-September 11. Pollock, Piccillo, Leopardi, Gratale, & Cabot (2005) looked at newspaper coverage of Islam in 19 U.S. cities during the year following the September 11 attacks and found most of it either favorable or neutral. Weston (2003) found that after September 11, Arabs and Arab Americans were portrayed favorably, with several themes emerging across newspapers, such as Arab Americans as “double victims,” (p. 97) horrified and aggrieved by the attacks yet targeted with hate crimes and government surveillance, and as “loyal and patriotic” (p. 99) members of society, condemning the attacks and pledging allegiance to America.

It would be premature to conclude from these examples that the new coverage marks the beginning of the end of Arab and Muslim stereotypes as we know them in the U.S. media—too much evidence to the contrary abounds. Alsultany (2012) noted that despite her findings of improved portrayals of Arabs and Muslims on a number of U.S.
television programs, longstanding negative stereotypes persisted on a host of other shows. Meanwhile, *Newsweek*’s September 24, 2012, “Muslim Rage” cover regurgitated the all-too-familiar depictions of crazed, turbaned Muslim men “wild-eyed, bearded, [and] saliva-flecked” (Mirkinson, 2012) that have long been a staple in U.S. media reportage of the Arab world (Said, 1981). The apparent tendency among media to rely upon the usual stereotypes about Arabs or Muslims is so strong that they oftentimes are invoked even when news about these groups is positive (Ali, 2007). In 2007, for example, a Pew Research Center poll found Muslim Americans to be “largely assimilated, happy with their lives, and moderate with respect to many of the issues that have divided Muslims and Westerners around the world” (Pew Research Center, 2007). Yet, when CNN interviewed young Muslims about the poll, the crawl across the bottom of the screen read: “Supporting Terror?” Similarly, CBS News online ran the factually incorrect headline “26 percent of Young U.S. Muslims OK Bombs;” and USA Today trumpeted, also falsely: “Poll: 1 in 4 Younger U.S. Muslims Support Suicide Bombings” (Ali, 2007). These media outlets chose to frame encouraging news in negative terms, even if it meant harnessing “misinformation and scare tactics” to do so. In actual fact, the poll asked Muslims “Is suicide bombing justified?” and found that “very few Muslim Americans—just 1 percent—say that suicide bombings against civilian targets are often justified to defend Islam” (Ali, 2007).

Thus, it seems *Time*’s “Arab Spring” cover and the positive portrayals mentioned above persist alongside longstanding, negative portrayals, raising the question of what this incongruity actually means. Does the positive coverage witnessed recently in a
magazine like *Time* indeed indicate a departure from the deeply ingrained patterns of negative media portrayals of Arabs and the Middle East? Are they instead anomalies, artifacts of a unique historical moment that will disappear or give way to the basic negative tendency? Or, are they neither departures nor anomalies but rather variants of the negative portrayal pattern that reinforce its basic underlying dichotomy of “good Arabs” who are “modern” and “bad Arabs” who violently reject modernity?

**Purpose of the Study**

This study builds on the pioneering research cited above and below that has documented the persistence of Orientalist dichotomies and images in U.S. news coverage of Arabs and the Middle East during the past century. The specific focus is *Time* magazine’s portrayal of Arabs and their cultures and societies between 2001 and 2011. Little research currently exists that examines American magazine coverage of the Arab world¹ during this period. This study begins to fill that gap by focusing on the extent to which *Time* magazine perpetuated or departed from longstanding negative stereotypical portrayals of Arabs in light of the apparent shift to more nuanced coverage after the events of September 11. Studying U.S. foreign news reporting is important for several reasons. Scholars have long critiqued the United States and other Western media for dominating the flow of international news in favor of the “developed world” and distorting coverage of developing countries (Kim & Barnett, 1996; Elliott, 2000),

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¹ I use the term “Arab world” as a short-hand to indicate the 23 Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. I realize full well the limitations of the term—that it does not take into consideration the vast diversity and numerous ethnic and linguistic communities who reside in this geographical area but who are not, in fact, “Arab.” It should be noted, as well, that this study does not include Israel, despite its sizable Arab Palestinian minority population. Nor does it include Iran, Turkey, or Somalia, which are linked to the Arab world but are not Arab countries.
reinforcing stereotypes and leading to disparaging images of vast regions of the world (Matta, 1979; Skurnik, 1981). Because news reports are oftentimes news consumers’ only exposure to faraway places and differing cultures, the media can play a powerful role in how audiences think about them (Perry, 1990; Rill & Davis, 2008). Coverage also can play a role in bolstering or justifying U.S. government aims abroad, where, for example, metaphors and news frames generate support for war (Pancake, 1993; Entman, 2004; Lule, 2004; Meadows, 2007; Steuter & Wills, 2008). Additionally, the study is composed of both quantitative and qualitative portions. Combining methods from differing research paradigms reflects scholars’ increasing interest in “mixed methods” research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2006; De Lisle, 2011) and was done in order to achieve a complementary set of results that would reinforce one another and, thus, make the study’s overall findings stronger.

Orientalism

Thirty-five years ago, in his path-breaking work Orientalism, Said (1978) described the development and entrenchment of a powerful binary between Europe (the West) and the Orient (the East) characterized by a consistent portrayal of the West as superior—rational, ordered, cultured—and the Orient as its opposite—irrational, chaotic, depraved. Orientalism, Said argued, has served as a lens through which Westerners see and know the Oriental “other” as if there were “an absolute and systematic difference between the West … and the Orient” (pp. 300-301). Orientalism, thus, has allowed the West—particularly the French and British, but later Americans, too—to construct an identity and define itself over time using the Orient as its perpetual foil, a haunting
repository for all the West is not. “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self” (p. 3), with the Arab (and Muslim) providing one of the most powerful and enduring symbols of threat to the West since at least the Crusades.

Said offered three definitions of Orientalism that are to be understood not as discrete categories but as deeply interwoven and interconnected. The first is that of Orientalism as an academic field that emerged in the mid-18th century with the work of ethnologists, philologists, historians, archeologists, and others who studied the Orient with the goal of generating a “systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient, knowledge reinforced by the colonial encounter as well as by the widespread interest in the alien and unusual” (p. 40). The 19th-century philologist Ernest Renan described his own work on the history of Oriental languages as a “vivisection” (Gourgoûris, 1996, p. 131), a revealing metaphor that touches upon the very power imbalance at play in the Western generation of “facts” about the East. “Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world” (Said, 1978, p. 40).

Perhaps this is why Napoleon’s 1798 invasion of Egypt was, for Said, Orientalism’s “inaugural moment.”2 Said noted that Napoleon not only brought an army of soldiers to conquer and loot; he also brought an army of scientists. Those scientists were instructed to perform a different kind of conquest—to scour the country

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2 Said’s critics have noted a contradiction in his writing about the origin of Orientalism. In one instance, he wrote that it began with the Ancient Greeks, but he later referred to Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt as the starting point.
documenting its every trait and publishing their findings in giant tomes titled, appropriately, Description de L’Égypte. The book signifies the marriage of colonial power, in the form of a military invasion, with the steadfast collection of scientific “knowledge” about the Orient.³

Such conquest opened the way to others, such as the British writer Edward William Lane who spent two years in Egypt researching his An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (1836). The book—still available in university libraries—is a painstakingly compiled description of the Egyptian life cycle, from birth and early childhood education, to festivals, rites, laws, character, death, and burial. Lane’s work sheds light on the imbalance of power between the Western researcher and his Oriental subjects. In a final episode of Manners, for example, Lane dons Muslim garb and pretends to pray at a mosque, side by side with his Egyptian interlocutor, Sheikh Ahmed. His prose retains an outsider gaze as he condescendingly describes Ahmed, assigns to him bizarre behavior like glass-eating, and conflates that behavior with the behavior of all Egyptians. Indeed, Western scholars such as Lane used their formidable expertise, as well as their power and privilege to analyze, describe, catalogue, and classify the East for a Western audience. Along the way, they built an unshakable canon

³ Napoleon’s army of scientists garnered knowledge that was used in the service of France to enhance its standing as a colonial power. France had the power to be in Egypt, to conquer, explore, dissect, and describe it. Said pointed out, rightly, that there is no similar Egyptian study of France. Interestingly, the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Army have launched similar projects in Iraq and Afghanistan through their Minerva Initiative and Human Terrain System, respectively, which utilize the expertise of social science scholars in gathering data about local communities to help military troops better understand the “the social, cultural, behavioral, and political forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to the U.S.” (The Minerva Institute, see http://minerva.dtic.mil/overview.html). For information about the Human Terrain System, see http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/
of knowledge about the Orient, reinforced by generations of subsequent scholars, artists, and statesmen, all of it based upon the assumption “that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by, the West” (p. 41).

But Oriental knowledge was not confined to academe. Said’s second definition of Orientalism described what he called a “style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’ ” that was readily adopted by a legion of travel writers, poets, artists, philosophers, political theorists, economists and imperial administrators (p. 2). These writers used the Orientalist binary described above as their “starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny, and so on” (p. 3). Said focused primarily on 19th-century French and British literary figures who created a “repertoire” of recurring Orientalist themes and images. For example, French novelist Gustave Flaubert’s mid-19th-century trip to Egypt put him in touch with the belly dancer Kuchuk Hanem. Watching Hanem dance, and later bedding her, Flaubert came away from his Oriental travels with an image of the Orient that was both exotic and feminine and later utilized this experience in developing the female characters in several of his novels.

The academic discipline of Orientalism, combined with Orientalism as it was generated in French and British literature, constitutes an “Oriental knowledge” that provides fodder for Said’s third definition—Orientalism as a hegemonic discourse. Said adopted French theorist Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse as the link between knowledge and power. Said demonstrated how Orientalist knowledge, far from innocent,
has gone hand-in-hand with European power, particularly 18th- and 19th-century imperialist and colonialist expansion into the Middle East. The drastically uneven power relationship between West and East has become so tightly woven into the fabric of Western culture that it has shaped the dominant, hegemonic discourse about the Middle East that has been internalized by Westerners as taken-for-granted, common knowledge over a period of centuries.

Said demonstrated this fact by showing how the rhetoric of British colonial officer Alfred Lord Balfour in a speech before the British House of Commons in 1910 (urging the need for Britain’s continued colonial presence in Egypt) eerily resembled that of Henry Kissinger during the 1970s. Both men alluded to the depraved and inferior status of “Easterners” in similar ways. Balfour and others in the 19th and early 20th centuries saw this depravity issuing from the fossilized backwardness of the East, a condition that emerged in stark clarity when comparisons were made with a dynamic, modernizing West. In similar fashion, Kissinger spoke of a “post-Newtonian” First World characterized by an objective, rational conception of politics—a view that allowed detachment and consequently the capacity to create rule-governed polities. By contrast, according to Kissinger, the so-called Third World, which was “pre-Newtonian,” had never developed this capacity for scientific detachment and thus continued to mistake political realities for expressions of a transcendent “prophetic” will (pp. 46-47). Like the earlier Orientalists, Kissinger concluded that the West had to act preemptively to contain this irrational proclivity of the Third World “before a crisis imposes it as a necessity” (quoted in Said, 1978, p. 47). For Said, such continuities as the one between Balfour and
Kissinger demonstrated how the core of Orientalist discourse, predicated on the East-West binary—a world made up of “two unequal parts” (Said, 1981, p. 4)—had essentially gone unchanged over time; indeed, this core feature continues to reproduce similar styles of dichotomous thinking that has rationalized and reinforced the subjugation of the “East” to the “West” from one historical moment to the next.

Variations on a Theme: American Orientalism

Even as its basic assumptions have remained consistent across the centuries, Orientalist discourse has nevertheless taken diverse forms within different national cultures. Orientalism has its particularly American version, for example. Little (2002) noted that the Puritans “who founded ‘God’s American Israel’ on Massachusetts Bay” nearly 400 years ago brought with them both a “passionate fascination with the Holy Land and a profound ambivalence about the ‘infidels’—mostly Muslims but some Jews—who lived there” (p. 9). In the decades that followed their arrival in the “New World,” these Protestant settlers and their descendants would imagine a mythical Orient based upon romanticized biblical imagery and translations of the classic *A Thousand and One Nights*—with fantastic tales of Aladdin’s magic lamp and Ali Baba’s 40 thieves. Pilgrims and missionaries who ventured to the Eastern Mediterranean during the early- to mid-1800s returned with accounts that glorified the Christian holy sites but oftentimes denigrated the region as corrupt, dirty, and despotic (p. 9).

One such pilgrim was none other than the writer and satirist Mark Twain who undertook a several-month cruise of Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean aboard the steamship “Quaker City” and later published a detailed, often mean-spirited, and
sometimes racist account of the trip in his 1869 book *The Innocents Abroad*. Twain had few kind words to say, depicting Muslims as hostile toward and intent on harming Christians such as himself and his fellow travelers. In Syria, he wrote: “[Damascus] is the most fanatical Mohammedan purgatory out of Arabia. … The Damascenes are the ugliest, wickedest looking villains we have seen” (Twain, 1869, p. 205). In Turkey, Twain noted with disgust the living conditions of the local population. Their homes were “heavy and dark, and as comfortless as so many tombs.” Inhabitants also smelled bad, “a combination of Mohammedan stenches” (pp. 140-141). He also made a telling comparison between the members of an Arab village outside Jerusalem and Native Americans. “They sat in silence, and with tireless patience watched our every motion with that vile, uncomplaining impoliteness which is so truly Indian, and which makes a white man so nervous and uncomfortable and savage that he wants to exterminate the whole tribe” (pp. 223-224). In his assessment of the region’s general inferiority, Twain often used American landmarks as superior comparisons. The Sea of Galilee was a mere puddle, he wrote. Standing at its shores, he could not possibly fathom Christ’s majestic walk across its waters. The sea was “dismal and repellent” and no match for the beauty of Lake Tahoe, for example, which Twain found “cheerful and fascinating” (p. 365).

*Innocents* sold 100,000 copies, and it has been hailed as “the most popular travel book ever written by an American” (Michelson, 1977, p. 385). Cooley (1981) noted that Twain’s work played a pivotal role in shaping “a kind of collective American subconscious” about Arabs—whom Twain referred to disparagingly as “Ay-rabs” (p. 468). Twain “simply didn’t care for the people he saw and met, so he mercilessly
caricatured them in ways which stubbornly survive in our newspapers, magazines, books, and films today” (p. 468).⁴

Additionally, scholars point to an outpouring of American Orientalist art, dating from 1870 to 1930, as possessing an “abundance of visual evidence of American attitudes” about the Middle East (Edwards, 2000, p. 16). This period saw the United States emerging traumatized from the Civil War only to face rapid urbanization and industrialization, the erosion of Victorian ideals, and a headlong attempt to join the world’s “civilized” nations. Edwards argued that artists painted idyllic scenes of the Orient and of Arabs that served to deliver stability amidst the chaos and offered a touch of escapism (p. 4). Frederic Edwin Church’s “Jerusalem from the Mount of Olives” (1870), for example, showed a parallel between the “Promised Land of the Bible and the Promised Land of the New World,” (p. 23) as if to assure American viewers of their country’s moral and spiritual uprightness. Others depicted an exotic Orient, such as John Singer Sargent’s “Study of an Egyptian Girl” (1891), a rendering of a young woman, slender and naked, braiding her long, dark hair; and Jean-Léon Gérôme Ferris’ “The Favorite” (1890), a lush, colorful portrait of an Arab female reclining on a leopard-skin blanket. Such imagery served a prevalent post-bellum psychological need for a “masquerade away from normal and real life” (p. 8).

⁴ One might argue that Twain’s view of the Orient is more than 100 years old and that Americans who read the book now would find its descriptions of Arabs and the Middle East outdated, not to mention deeply problematic. What, then, to make of a February 2009 issue of People magazine where best-selling author John Grisham placed The Innocents Abroad among his top five favorite books, calling it “perhaps the funniest book ever written by the funniest man who ever lived” (Grisham, 2009, p. 48).
Perhaps these factors are partly what drove millions of visitors at the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair to the “Street in Cairo” exhibit to stare agog as a scantily clad Syrian dancer, known as “Little Egypt,” swiveled and shimmied her hips and torso in solo-improvised movements that both horrified and captivated Victorian audiences (Carlton, 1994, p. 15). The term “belly dance” had not yet been coined, but at the Fair, this danse du ventre⁵ “rocketed into American popular culture,” becoming the most-visited exhibit (p. 15) and serving as a sort of ground zero for American Orientalist notions of the Arab “low other” (Deagon, 2007, p. 37). The dance embodied by Little Egypt (and later her numerous imitators) provided U.S. spectators with their very first live glimpse of Arab culture—specifically Arab womanhood. It introduced images of a primitive, unruly, amoral, and oversexed Orient that would come to be seen as a threat to the fabric of U.S. society (p. 37). Such an exhibit was in keeping with the Fair’s theme, “A Century of Progress,” which showcased American industrial ingenuity and technological achievement alongside what was considered the backwardness of lesser-developed peoples. It played upon popular theories of the time like Social Darwinism to construct “a binary of advanced (colonial) powers and primitive (colonized) peoples, the latter to serve as a benchmark against which progress would be measured” (Jarmakani, 2008, pp. 27-28). Indeed, as the Chicago Tribune reported at the time, the exhibit and others like it “afforded the American people an unequaled opportunity to compare themselves scientifically with others” (Rydell, 1984, p. 65).

⁵ This was the French term, literally “dance of the stomach,” derived from France’s colonial foray into North Africa. Americans later dubbed it the “hoochy-coochy.”
From its début at the World’s Fair, belly dance spread to amusement park venues across the country, such as Coney Island, and into department store window displays. Belly dancers quickly became the focal point of early 20th-century advertisements for upscale, Turkish-blend Omar, Murad, and Fatima cigarettes, selling customers “a piece of the exotic Orient” with every puff (Jarmakani, 2008, p. 107). Such advertisements combined “commodification with printing technologies that enabled Orientalist images to reach consumers en masse” (p. 106), powerfully selling the notion of the Arab world as exotic and sensual. Even Thomas Edison seized upon the belly dance craze. In 1897, he made a short silent film entitled “Fatima,” featuring the World’s Fair sensation “Little Egypt” shaking her thunderous hips. The film was subsequently censored (Shaheen, 2009, p. 214).

Orientalism and the Depiction of Arabs in the U.S. Media

Orientalist ideas and imagery brought to a widespread U.S. audience by Twain’s book and later the World’s Fair belly dancers, inevitably found their way into mainstream film, television, and print journalism. Shaheen (2009) found that the negative portrayals of Arabs in Hollywood films date to the silent-movie era, exemplified by such films as The Sheik (1921) and Son of the Sheik (1926), featuring a turbaned Rudolph Valentino as “Sheik Ahmed,” a bandit with a fondness for abducting Western women (p. 454). Here, the Arab world was a place of vast, forbidding deserts, magic carpets, and pashas, where it was not unusual for a group of belly dancers suddenly to flutter by or for two Arabs to brandish scimitars and break into a duel. Shaheen referred to these images as “the Ali Baba kit” (Jhally, 2006). Over time, they have not gone away. Disney’s popular 1992
animated film *Aladdin* opened with a magic carpet sweeping across desert sands while a spooky voice sings: “Oh, I come from a land, from a faraway place, where the caravan camels roam. Where they cut off your ear, if they don’t like your face, it’s barbaric; but hey, it’s home” (Shaheen, 2009, p. 57).

During the Arab oil embargo of the 1970s, one of the primary negative Arab stereotypes became that of the oil-rich sheikh in sunglasses, a turban, and long robes, and by the 1980s, it had evolved into the Arab terrorist, a violent, bloodthirsty hijacker or bomber (Shaheen, 2009). These stereotypes were readily available on the silver screen, with little exception. The comedy *Father of the Bride II* (1995) features a crooked Arab billionaire who screams gibberish (meant to be Arabic?) at his cowering wife, while paying cash for the mansion of the main character (Steve Martin). Box office sensation *True Lies* (1994) has government agent Harry Tasker (Arnold Schwarzenegger) kidnapped by inept Islamic terrorists who threaten to set off nuclear weapons. *The Siege* (1998), starring Denzel Washington, featured Palestinian Muslim terrorists who rampage through New York City, killing hundreds. The 1999 remake of the classic 1932 film *The Mummy* introduced Arab characters—Egyptians—who were “hostile, sneaky, and dirty caricatures” (p. 359).

Shaheen’s (1984) study of American television programming during the mid-1970s to early 1980s yielded similar results. In monitoring entertainment programs such

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6 In response to outcry from the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee that the lyrics were racist, Disney changed them in 1993, omitting “where they cut off your ear, if they don’t like your face” but keeping the word “barbaric” (James, 2009).

7 Some exceptions do exist. Shaheen (2009) noted that the 1962 film *Lawrence of Arabia*, for example, featured some strong and favorable Arab characters, such as Lawrence’s best friend, Sherif Ali, played by Omar Sharif.
as *Sonny and Cher*, *Cagney and Lacey*, *Happy Days*, *Scooby Doo*, and even *The Electric Company*, he found portrayals of Arabs that were uniformly negative, perpetuating “four basic myths about Arabs: they are all fabulously wealthy; they are barbaric and uncultured; they are sex maniacs with a penchant for white slavery; and they revel in acts of terrorism” (p. 4).

Shaheen’s studies echo the findings of Said (1981) in his *Covering Islam*, a critique of the U.S. media’s coverage of the Islamic world that was written in the wake of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis. Using that crisis as a case study, Said wrote: “Muslims and Arabs are essentially covered, discussed, apprehended either as oil suppliers or as potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab-Muslim life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Islamic world” (p. 26). As Karim (2003) argued, the persistence of such anti-Arab stereotypes demonstrates the resilience of core Orientalist images in the Western media. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Muslims and Islam have emerged as the West’s “deadly enemy” (p. 80) and a prime obstacle to peace and global security.

In magazine journalism, perhaps no other publication exemplifies the dynamics of Orientalism better than *National Geographic*, which has long enjoyed a reputation as a scientific and objective information source, a trusted purveyor of “the facts worth knowing about the world” (Lutz & Collins, 1993, p. xiii). Lutz and Collins found that the magazine consistently created “only two worlds—the traditional and modern” (pp. 110-111), where the West was superior and the non-West inferior. Photographs of non-Westerners tended to depict “an Other who is strange … but beautiful” (p. 90), their
exotic cultural difference underscored through the use of ritual costumes, spears, headdresses, masks, and nudity. In her study of *National Geographic*’s coverage of the Arab world over a century, Steet (2000) found a pattern of deliberately constructed Orientalist stereotypes where Arab women, for example, were portrayed not as individuals but as idealized, exotic “types” (p. 54) bedecked in traditional gowns, gold-coin headdresses, and veils. Arabs, in general, were depicted as backward and primitive, thus invoking “classic colonialist discourse” (p. 100) that lauded the advancement of the French and British and implicitly recommended their continued presence in the Middle East. Steet cited a story about a missionary project that introduced the baby carriage to Palestinian women who carried their babies on their backs. The story underscored the idea that Arab women were in need of Western help to obtain a modern standard of motherhood, and it praised those who adopted these practices. Another story criticized Arabs who eschewed silverware and scooped up their food using flat bread. Readers were told this practice represented backwardness. The story was accompanied by a photograph, taken from overhead, of Arab men huddling, animal-like, around a shared tray of meat and rice. The implicit message was that on the hierarchy of human types, Arabs occupied a lower rung, closer to savages (pp. 86-88).

Additionally, Steet found stories that tended to “essentialize” Arabs and Arab culture. She found plenty of examples where, for example, “the Mohammedan mind” (p. 61) was explained for a Western audience, as if all Arabs thought in a similar, inscrutable fashion, wholly different from those in the West. In one story, a French officer described the reaction of an Arab peasant when he encountered his fields being destroyed by
locusts. The officer noted that instead of acting quickly and decisively, like a Frenchman, the peasant instead sat and contemplated a God who would create such a powerful insect and then wrote a poem about it. The story instructed audiences about the fatalistic, ruminating “Arab character” (p. 63) and its inability for rational action. And finally, National Geographic was fond of depicting Westerners playing dress-up in Arab garb, providing the Western dabbler the chance to wax poetic about the difference between West and East. Steet described a Mrs. Jean Shor who reported that she felt wrapped in an “aura of mystery” (p. 108) while donning a veil but had trouble breathing through the fabric that went across her face. Such stories contrasted Western women, who wear the clothing of freedom and do not have to submit to veiling, with Arab women, oppressed “others” who suffocate beneath their compulsory costumes. Steet concluded that the Western missionary and the colonial official or diplomat had the power to be in the Orient and engage in native dress-up, then share these tales—this knowledge—with millions of readers at home via National Geographic. It is a power not shared by those they imitate, analyze, and describe.

Arabs, the Arab World, and their Contributions

The negative stereotyping detailed above is destructive not only because it defames an entire people but also because it ignores the realities of the Arab world and its historic contributions to civilization. The Arab world is a vast and diverse region, encompassing 23 countries, from North Africa to the Arab Peninsula. It is home to some 265 million people and the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The unity of this wide swath of territory has everything to do with the rise and spread of Islam during
the 7th-13th centuries, which joined together peoples of diverse languages, religions, and ethnic backgrounds. Today, the vast majority of Arabs are Muslims of various types; but 15 million are Christian, belonging to the Chaldean, Coptic, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Melkite, and even Episcopalian and Roman Catholic sects. Still others adhere to faiths such as Bahaiism, Druze, Gnosticism, and Zoroastrianism. In addition to religious diversity, these regions also feature numerous ethnic and linguistic differences. For example, Amazigh (“Berber”) groups who speak Tifinagh are predominant across North Africa; Nubian communities are found in southern Egypt; and Kurds live in areas cutting across the boundaries of modern Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey (Hourani, 1991).

In addition to effacing this linguistic, ethnic, and religious complexity, negative stereotyping ignores the tremendous Arab contributions to civilization. Sponsors of a massive translation project that rendered Greek texts into Arabic—many of the translators were Arabic-speaking Christians—Arab scholars in the great cities of Islam such as Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, and Cordoba, commented on and developed further the philosophical and scientific knowledge of ancient Greece. Ibn Rushd’s (Averroes’s) brilliant 12th-century commentaries on Aristotle would later be translated into Latin and transported to European centers of learning where they would have an immense impact on the emerging scholastic thought of such great theologians as Thomas Aquinas. The 11th-century scientific and philosophical writings of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) would also be rendered into Latin. His medical treatise, “The Canon of Medicine” (al-Qanun fi al-Tibb), a revision of Galen’s pioneering work, would remain an authoritative text in Europe for centuries. Equally important were the advances made by Muslim scientists
writing in Arabic in the fields of astronomy, mathematics, engineering, and architecture, among many other areas. Nearly all of the names of the stars of the Milky Way galaxy are Arabic or Arabicized Greek designations, evidence of the impact of Arabic-speaking scientists on astronomy (Hourani, 1991; Dallal, 1999; Fakhry, 1999). Arabic-speaking peoples also contributed to the advancement of musical theory, technique, and instrument making. The guitar is believed to have its origins in the `oud, a medieval lute-like instrument that remains important to musical performance in the Middle East today (Browning, 1984).

Negative stereotypes also mask the reality that most inhabitants of the Middle East are not so different from their Western counterparts. Shaheen (2009) wrote that during his extensive travels and time spent living and teaching in the Middle East, he encountered Arabs that were nothing like those the U.S. public constantly encountered in Hollywood film:

I came to discover that like the United States, the Arab world accommodated diverse, talented, and hospitable citizens: lawyers, bankers, doctors, engineers, bricklayers, farmers, computer programmers, homemakers, mechanics, businessmen, store managers, waiters, construction workers, writers, musicians … Their dress is traditional and Western. The majority are peaceful, not violent; poor, not rich; most do not dwell in desert tents; none are surrounded by harem maidens; most have never seen an oil well or mounted a camel. Not one travels via “magic carpets.” Their lifestyles defy stereotyping. (p. 9)
And yet, U.S. public opinion poll data in the years following September 11 suggest that Arabs and Muslims, whether living in the United States or the Middle East, tend not to be viewed favorably by Americans. Thirty-three percent of respondents in a September 2002 CBS/New York Times poll believed that Arab Americans had more sympathy for terrorists than Americans of other ethnicities. Forty-four percent of respondents in a Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll, also from September 2002, expressed distrust toward Arabs living in the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks (cited in Sides & Gross, 2011, p. 8). In an analysis of public sentiment toward Arabs, Muslims, and Islam, Panagopoulos (2006) found that “Americans possess lingering resentment and reservations about Arab and Muslim Americans” and that while Americans knew little about the tenets of Islam, they nonetheless experienced “growing anxiety about Islam’s (especially Islamic fundamentalism’s) compatibility with Western values” (p. 613). Finally, a 2010 survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that the U.S. public remained deeply conflicted in their attitudes toward Muslims, with 30 percent expressing unfavorable views, as opposed to 41 percent registering positive opinions. Republicans and the less well-educated among the respondents were overwhelmingly negative toward Muslims and Islam (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2010).

The Relationship of the United States to the Middle East Historically

In describing the unique character of American Orientalism, Said stressed that it was more “abstract,” “less dense,” and more instrumental than the British and French variants. In the British and French case, the experience of long-term colonial rule had
produced an Orientalism rooted in extensive empirical knowledge of the places—the Middle East, India, the Far East—in which European armies had established their dominance. Although the United States eventually supplanted the Europeans as the main global power after World War II, it never developed the same type of colonial enterprise, as did the European powers (Jhally, 1998). More interested in exercising indirect control, reinforced at times through direct military interventions, as in Vietnam, the United States focused primarily on blocking what it saw as the threat of Communism emanating from the Soviet Union (Khalidi, 2013).

In the Middle East, the resulting Cold War led the United States to pursue policies aimed at strengthening and expanding its influence at the expense of the U.S.S.R. Two broad patterns emerged in these policies. First was a concern to create and support client regimes that would do the U.S. bidding in the region and to resist and topple regimes

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8 Said made these observations in Jhally’s documentary film entitled Edward Said - On Orientalism (1998), as well as in Said (1978, pp. 1-2). He elaborated further in the closing chapter of the latter publication, noting that American Orientalism placed emphasis on area studies and social-scientific approaches rather than on the philological and literary interests that had characterized European writing on “the East.” The peculiar features of American Orientalist knowledge reflected the post-World War II rise of scientific sub-specialization and technocratic and bureaucratic methods of organization and control. Nevertheless, American Orientalism however reconfigured in terms of “Middle Eastern Studies” or diffused across the new social scientific disciplines absorbed and perpetuated the basic binary logic underlying its European variant. In this fundamental respect, American Orientalism represented a continuation of, not a departure from, deeply engrained European assumptions concerning the innate inferiority of “Easterners.”

9 The distinction between the various instances of direct U.S. military interventions and occupations (Cuba, Haiti, Vietnam, Grenada, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) and British and French colonialism in North Africa or the Indian subcontinent, for example, has to do with the mode of control and degree of integration of the subjugated region into the metropole. In North Africa, during the Second Republic (1848-1870), France annexed Algeria, making it one of its departments. Similarly, the British Raj (1858-1947) transformed India into a royal British dominion following the transferal of authority over the British East India Company’s territorial holdings to the British state in the name of the reigning Queen Victoria—who was proclaimed Empress of India in 1876. Since the closing of the western frontier, with the exception of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, the United States has preferred to exploit the resources of other countries not by absorbing them but rather by installing and maintaining friendly regimes willing to grant U.S. corporations favorable terms of operation and to provide the U.S. military with access to bases from which to project its power (Galeano, 1997; Chomsky, 1999).
perceived as opposing U.S. strategic interests. In Iran, the United States, in cooperation with Britain, supported the Pahlavi shahs, training their feared secret police, the Savak, and arming them with sophisticated weaponry. In 1953, after Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh attempted to nationalize the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, British and American intelligence agencies orchestrated a coup—one of the first successful “regime change” efforts dubbed “Operation Ajax”—that overthrew Mossadegh and reinstated the Shah despite the overwhelming popular support for the deposed prime minister. The Shah remained a staunch client of the United States until the 1979 revolution that inaugurated the Islamic Republic of Iran, an event that effectively ended U.S. influence entirely in the country (Keddie, 2003). The revolution became the occasion for a violent backlash against Middle Easterners in the U.S. According to Said (1981), images of the fanatical and violent Muslim dominated the media during this period, a phenomenon exacerbated by the holding of U.S. hostages in Tehran in the final days of the Carter administration.

Control of oil also has featured centrally in the relationship of the United States to another important client regime, Saudi Arabia. U.S.-Saudi relations date back to the early decades of the 20th century. Following U.S. diplomatic recognition of the Ibn Saud family as the legitimate rulers of the Saudi Kingdom in 1931, the California firm that came to be known as ARAMCO began exploration for oil. Saudi Arabia has since remained heavily reliant on the United States for technical expertise and military and diplomatic support. The one instance in which the Saudi regime sought to exercise a degree of independence—the 1973 oil embargo launched in solidarity with Egypt during the Ramadan/Yom Kippur War—ultimately did not alter the basic clientelistic relationship.
The embargo did, however, stoke an anti-Arab backlash in the United States replete with a revival of media stereotypes of the rich, conniving oil sheikh. This image of the oil sheikh has proved durable despite the importance of the U.S.-Saudi relationship to U.S. strategic dominance in the region. The alliance has done little to change the image of the Arab in American popular culture (Said, 1978, pp. 285-287; Khalidi, 2009; Khalidi, 2013).

The second major pattern governing the U.S. policy in the Middle East, historically, has been the uniquely close relationship of the United States to the State of Israel. Seeking to shore up Jewish support for his election bid, Truman announced U.S. recognition of the State of Israel just minutes after its declaration of statehood in 1948 (Khalidi, 2013). Ever since, the United States has served as Israel’s primary political, military, and economic backer; the two countries have developed close ties extending well beyond diplomatic connections to include civil society organizations of all sorts, as well as extensive economic and technological cooperation. Israel remains the recipient of the largest portion of U.S. foreign aid and military assistance: $3.1 billion, annually—compared with Afghanistan at $2.3 billion and Pakistan, $2.1 billion, in second and third place, respectively (ABC News, 2012). The military aid to Israel represents 60 percent of total U.S. Foreign Military Financing (Sharp, 2013).

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10 American diplomats serving in the Middle East attempted to remind Truman of the promises made by his predecessor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to King Ibn Saud to the effect that the United States would not act in a “hostile” or prejudicial manner toward the majority Palestinian Arab population or without first conferring with Arab leaders as well as with Jewish leaders. Truman responded by saying: “I’m sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents” (quoted in Khalidi, 2013, p. xxii).
Analysts differ as to the degree to which the pro-Israel lobby organization, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), is responsible for shaping the policies of U.S. administrations, primarily through political pressure in Congress and during elections (Chomsky, 2006; Hitchens, 2006; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, 2008). What is quite clear, however, is the long-standing diplomatic and military support for Israeli actions. Despite the costs of these actions—for example, the 750,000 Palestinians who were forced from their land by Zionist militias during and after the 1948 war that brought Israel into existence or the 18,000 to 50,000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians killed in Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon—U.S. support has never wavered (Kimmerling & Migdal, 1994; Khalidi, 1997; Said, 1998). Indeed, the massive economic and political backing has facilitated Israel’s further territorial expansion since the 1967 war. Whether viewed as necessary to the projection of U.S. power and dominance in the Middle East, especially during the Cold War, as a moral obligation in the aftermath of the Holocaust, or as a domestic political requirement, support for Israel by the United States has effectively meant support for a regional power that continues to occupy and colonize Palestinian lands and to attack states—such as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967; Iraq in 1981; and Lebanon in 1982 and 2006—that it perceives to be threats. At times, as Chomsky (1983, 2006) has argued, these Israeli actions serve U.S. interests, as during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which ended in the destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s presence in that country. At other times, however, Israel has acted in ways arguably contrary to long-term U.S. concerns for stability, as during the 1956 Suez crisis that ended only when the Eisenhower administration issued an ultimatum to Israel,
Britain, and France to withdraw their forces from the Sinai Desert, or in the steadfast resistance of Israel to allowing a viable Palestinian state to emerge in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (Khalidi, 2013).

Although the reasons for the unique U.S.-Israel relationship are many and complex, a key component in the support for Israel in the United States is the persistence of powerful anti-Arab stereotypes in the U.S. media and the corresponding perception of Israel as a democracy struggling to survive in a region seething with fanaticism and hatred of Jews and the West (Said, 1981). These stereotypes powerfully support a public discourse that undermines understanding and sympathy for Arabs and Arab historical experience. Absent from such stereotypical portrayals, for example, is recognition of the long history of European colonial domination and, specifically, of the consequences of Israel’s establishment for the Palestinian people and for the Arab states that have borne the brunt of the conflicts that have followed in the wake of the destruction of Palestinian society.

Why this Time Frame?

The decade 2001-2011 brought Americans into a sharp collision with Arabs and Islam. The attacks of September 11, 2001, perpetrated by men from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, and Egypt, struck two symbolic icons of U.S. power—the World Trade Center and the Pentagon—resulting in the loss of more than 3,000 lives. The mug shots of the 19 Arab Muslim perpetrators, all of them members of the group al-Qaeda, as well as grainy shots of their mastermind Osama bin Laden, brought menacing images of Arabs into American homes and provided the seemingly logical targets for
American revenge. In response to September 11, President George W. Bush promptly declared a U.S.-led “war on terror” that has included a series of armed interventions in Central Asia and the Middle East dedicated to fighting an elusive foe: Islamic terrorism. In 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan in a hunt for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda members. Although bin Laden was found in Pakistan and killed in May 2011, as portrayed in the 2012 film Zero Dark Thirty, at this writing the Afghanistan conflict drags on, surpassing Vietnam as America’s longest war. In 2003, the United States launched a preemptive war in Iraq justified by the Bush administration’s insistence that Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, possessed a cache of nuclear, chemical, or biological armaments—“weapons of mass destruction”—that Hussein, whom Bush depicted as a mad man, could hand off to terrorists like al-Qaeda (Khalidi, 2004). The war proceeded despite strong evidence to the contrary and despite the fact that Iraq had nothing to do with the events of September 11 (p. 4). This writing marks the invasion’s tenth anniversary, and although the war was declared officially over in December 2011, no weapons of mass destruction ever were found (National Public Radio, 2013). But the costs have been steep, both in loss of human life and in taxpayer dollars. The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts combined have claimed the lives of approximately 6,500 Americans (National Public Radio, 2013; Bengali, 2013) and tens of thousands of Iraqi and Afghan civilians (Iraq Body Count, 2013; Costs of War, 2013). The Iraq War alone has cost $2 trillion (National Public Radio, 2013).

The chosen time frame also includes popular uprisings, dubbed the “Arab Spring,” which spread across the Arab world toppling dictators and instilling a sense of
empowerment among ordinary people. The “Spring” began in late 2010 and continued through 2011. This period of study, 2001-2011, was unique because of the direct and extended intervention of the United States in majority Arab and Muslim societies. This engagement had an inevitable impact on media coverage of Arabs, including in magazines like *Time*.

**Time Magazine**

First published in 1923, *Time* is the oldest and largest news magazine in the world, with a paid circulation of 3.3 million (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2012). It is also the most widely read news publication in the United States, boasting 17 million readers (2012 *Time* U.S. Reader Profile). With its storied, nearly 90-year history, *Time* has attained legendary status as “an American institution” (Smolkin, 2007), contributing a host of innovations to the field of journalism and considered among the most “influential purveyors” of national and international news (Yu & Riffe, 1989).

*Time* was the brainchild of Henry Robinson Luce and Briton Hadden, two hard-charging graduates of Yale University still in their early 20s when the first issue hit newsstands. *Time* was the first-ever “news magazine” (Luce and Hadden coined the term and the concept), a pioneering journalistic genre that not only distinguished *Time* from the torrent of American magazines at the time but also “revolutionized the magazine market worldwide” serving as a model for the creation of hundreds of publications around the globe (Angeletti & Oliva, 2004, pp. 15-16). A weekly, *Time* efficiently packaged the news of national and world affairs into short, instructive summaries, organized them by “department,” then provided interpretation and opinion. *Time* sought
to be a truly “national” publication, going beyond the limited reach of local and regional newspapers and niche magazines to address readers from coast to coast. Originally devised under the name *Facts*, *Time* targeted the nation’s “busy professional people,” young executives and members of the rising professional-managerial class who needed to stay informed about current affairs but had little time to do so (Brinkley, 2010, p. 138). Luce and Hadden played to this audience, promising a product that could be read within an hour, an experience made all the more enjoyable because of *Time*’s lively style and irreverent tone. The publication shunned the notion of objectivity and the dull news writing that often accompanied it, believing it hindered writers’ voices and bored readers. Through the use of rhyming, alliteration, metaphor, and compound adjectives gleaned from Homer, as well as made-up words crafted by Hadden (“eccentrician,” “cinemactress”), the magazine became known for its unique literary style, dubbed “Testyle,” or “Timese” (pp. 125-128).

*Time*’s focus on an entire American audience, elite though it initially was, coincided with the ethos of post-World War I America, a period of “nationalization” characterized by an overarching sense of a common, middle-class worldview that saw Americans increasingly turning from local to national affairs. It also seized upon a growing American consumer culture that began to turn to magazines and their four-color ad pages in pursuit of an ever-burgeoning selection of brand-name goods. Items like Quaker Oats, Pears soap, and Gillette razors signified upward mobility and status for an emerging middle-class audience. Early “mass media” like *Time* tapped into the growing desire for these goods, as well as the magazines that so beautifully packaged them.
(Ohman, 1996). As its circulation grew, it became clear that Time was a success. “It made a hit among the young managerial classes in the urban Northeast, but also in places such as Cincinnati and Denver. Its founders had tapped into precisely the national market they had hoped to reach” (Lears, 2010, p. 24).

Soon Time grew from a digest of news compiled from elsewhere into a publication that did reporting in its own right. Here, too, the magazine was pioneering. Time instituted the journalistic convention of “fact checking,” or double checking reporters’ work for maximum accuracy. With the proliferation of its national and international bureaus during the 1930s and 1940s, it created the routine of “group journalism,” a process whereby correspondents’ copious reports were sent to editors who wrote and rewrote the copy in accordance with the magazine’s signature style (Angeletti & Oliva, 2004, pp. 32-46). All the while, the magazine prized readability and “brilliantly played to the public’s appetite” by turning news into “saga, comedy, melodrama” (p. 33). As will become apparent later, this penchant for dramatic narrative presentation of the news manifests clearly in Time’s reporting on Arabs during 2001-2011. In these stories, the reader encounters a world in which a violent Arab atavism threatens Western modernity. This compelling conflict dramatizes not only the perceived threat the Middle East poses after the events of September 11, but also confirms the identity of Time’s readers as modern and ultimately on the right side of history.

Time’s tendency to portray events in dichotomous and dramatic terms and its opinionated writing coincided with a growing proclivity to serve as a vehicle for the views of its founder. Hadden’s untimely death in 1929, at 31, left Luce at the helm of a
ship steaming toward success. He went on to found the wildly successful *Fortune*, *Life*, and *Sports Illustrated* magazines, creating the publishing dynasty Time, Inc. Luce’s tight and opinionated editorial control became legendary. His publications frequently served as conduits for his Republican beliefs and anti-Communist sentiments, particularly with regard to his birthplace, China (where he had been born in 1898 to missionary parents), earning him status in some quarters as a “propagandist” (Lears, 2010, p. 29).

From its beginning, *Time* covered foreign news, but it was not until 1939, with the onset of World War II, that Luce began to weigh in heavily on foreign coverage, taking a public position against isolationism. “Luce was in effect announcing a new phase of his career in which he would use his magazines, and his personal influence, to shape public policy and national opinion” (Brinkley, 2010, p. 252). A notable example was his influential 1941 *Life* essay, titled “The American Century,” which called for unfettered U.S. interventionism and made a plea for the remaking of the world in America’s image. Luce also appointed foreign desk editors notorious for their opinionated takes on international issues, such as such as Laird Goldsborough, an admirer of Mussolini who served as foreign news editor from 1925-1938, and the infamous Whitaker Chambers who succeeded him. Reviled by his colleagues, Chambers was known for overhauling correspondents’ copy to fit his anti-Communist worldview. Luce also used *Time*’s covers to give prominence to individuals and causes he held dear, such as his “close connection” to China (Elliott, 2000). Between 1927 and 1955, for example, he featured anti-Communist Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek on the cover ten times, including the choice of Chiang and his wife, Soong Mei-ling, as “Couple of the Year” in 1937.
Today the Luce era is long past, and the media landscape has changed radically. The advent of Internet-based news sites and cable channels that deliver continuous breaking news have forced weeklies like *Time* to re-think their role and reposition themselves in an attempt to stay relevant. “The Internet and cable created a 24-hour news cycle and [the news magazines] are weekly,” says former *Time* stringer Paul Cuadros. “How do they compete when they can’t break any news?” (P. Cuadros, personal communication, April 11, 2013). Cuadros lost his job with *Time* in 2006, after the magazine dismissed all of its stringers and closed multiple bureaus. It was a move that reflected the flagging magazine industry as a whole. During the past decade, print magazines have experienced waning advertising sales and circulation declines. News weeklies, such as *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *The Atlantic*, have been particularly hard hit. In 2012, ad sales dipped on average 10.4 percent and sales of single-issue copies fell by an average of 16 percent (Pew Research Center, 2013). The introduction of portable electronic devices like “tablets” and “smart phones,” along with “apps” that deliver media content at the touch of a screen, has only added to the challenge. Additionally, the past 15 years or so has seen the rise of online social networking tools—blogs, Facebook, and Twitter, for example—that circumvent traditional media outlets by providing quick access to alternative sources of news and opinion. The grim environment has prompted *Time* competitors *U.S. News and World Report* and *Newsweek* to abandon print in favor of a strictly online format. *Time*, however, has managed to hold out. Despite sizable layoffs and bureau closures during the past decade (Smolkin, 2007), *Time*’s weekly print edition has reportedly redoubled efforts to do what newsmagazines do best: serve as a
reflective digest of the week’s events, “a trusted guide” enabling readers to “sort out the wheat from the chaff” in an oversaturated news environment (Richard Stengel, *Time*’s managing editor, as quoted in Smolkin, 2007). *Time* claims it has attempted to maintain a commitment to in-depth, longer-form reporting—long the province of the weekly news magazine with its six-day reporting cycle—as well as a steady diet of “reported analysis” that offers analysts’ reporting and perspectives on the news (Smolkin, 2007).

But *Time*’s ability to stay afloat during difficult times has drawn criticism from some quarters that it has done so through sensationalism. Cuadros recalled his reports sometimes getting changed to reflect editors’ preconceived notions about a story. “There was pressure,” he said. “Sometimes editors wanted a jazzier, sexier story … you’d have to tell them ‘No, it’s just not like that’ ” (P. Cuadros, personal communication, April 11, 2013). *Time* has been known to resort to provocative covers in an apparent attempt to stay relevant, garner brand attention, and spike sales in an increasingly competitive news environment. Such was the case with the May 2012 breastfeeding cover that featured a young mother nursing her 3-year-old son with her shirt pulled down and her breast clearly visible, alongside the cover language “Are You Mom Enough?” The day the issue was released, the photograph “went viral,” setting off a flurry of Twitters and Facebook “likes,” became the No. 1 Google search term, and dominated radio and TV talk shows. *Time* saw weekly subscription rates double (Haughney, 2012). If some readers found the cover in poor taste, columnists and industry analysts trumpeted its success, with magazine guru Samir Husni calling it “a stroke of genius” (Lynch, 2012). If nothing else,
the cover demonstrated something vitally important to news magazines—that their cover stories can still get “the entire nation talking” (Lynch, 2012), even if through shock value.

Not a day goes by without someone rambling on about the decline of the traditional media and the rise of digital. But *Time*’s cover proves that print can still be king if it steals from digital’s playbook—by becoming the conversation starters (not the followers), choosing relevant, edgy subjects and then tackling them in a visually arresting way. (Lynch, 2012)

Whether an occasional “stroke of genius” such as the breastfeeding cover is enough to keep *Time* going is another question. The magazine now holds the dubious honor of being “the last of the mass-market general interest news weeklies to survive in print form” (Pew Research Center, 2013)—and it is not clear how long it will enjoy that fragile title. Last year, *Time* experienced declines in newsstand sales, number of subscriptions, as well as total circulation, and its ad pages dropped 12.2 percent. *Time*’s online readership also faltered. After encouraging climbs—5 million unique monthly visitors in 2010 and 7.7 million in 2011—readership flattened in 2012 (Pew Research Center, 2013). In January, Time, Inc. announced it would cut 6 percent of its global workforce, or 500 jobs, citing insufficient advertising (Hagey & Trachtenberg, 2013). Then, in March, parent company Time Warner announced that plans to sell off its Time, Inc. magazines, including longtime icons *Time, Sports Illustrated,* and *Fortune,* fell through and that it would “spin off” those and other titles into a separate, publicly traded company (Chozick, 2013). As of this writing, the future of the venerable, 90-year-old *Time* remains unknown. Already some gloomy forecasts have emerged, such as this one from a former
Time.com editor: “It's hard to imagine that there will be much left of the brand 36 months from now” (Macht, 2013).

The Decline of Foreign News Coverage

*Time’s* shift toward sensationalism as a strategy to shore up slipping sales is a symptom of a broader phenomenon—the transformation of news analysis into titillating entertainment. The past 25 years have seen a drastic decline in foreign affairs reporting as it has been traditionally practiced in the U.S. media. Serious slumps in advertising revenue and media organizations’ resultant belt-tightening have led to closures of international bureaus and journalist layoffs on a massive scale. As of 2011, 20 major U.S. newspapers and newspaper companies had shuttered their foreign bureaus (Kumar, 2011), with only “a handful of traditional news organizations,” such as *The New York Times*, continuing to devote substantial resources to foreign news (Livingston & Asmolov, 2010). Television’s foreign bureaus have taken a similar beating. Networks that once stationed experts in destinations abroad have now largely opted for “a generic traveling reporter” who can be quickly dispatched to a crisis area (Fleeson, 2003). “The edifice of foreign newsgathering appears to be disintegrating,” wrote media scholar John Maxwell Hamilton, “rather like a massive building demolished by internal detonation” (Hamilton, 2009). Hamilton noted the “obliteration” of once-respected foreign bureaus at the *Baltimore Sun,* the *Boston Globe,* *Newsday,* and the *Philadelphia Inquirer* and the

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11 But even those organizations that maintain overseas bureaus have had to make cuts. Of the *Washington Post’s* 16 foreign bureaus, for example, 12 consist of only one reporter; the other four consist of two journalists each. Eight of the *Los Angeles Times’* 10 bureaus also house just one reporter (Martin, 2012).
recall in late 2008 of full-time correspondents in Iraq by the three major broadcast networks (Hamilton, 2009). In some cases, news organizations have coped by outsourcing foreign reporting. The New York Daily News, for example, now contracts with GlobalPost, a Boston-based startup that makes available foreign news reports through its stable of part-time correspondents (Adams & Ovide, 2009). Having eliminated all of its foreign bureaus, the Chicago Tribune relies on sister publication the Los Angeles Times for its foreign news. Longtime Tribune correspondent Colin McMahon now sits in Chicago’s Tribune Tower editing and packaging these international stories into homogenous news “modules” that are then distributed to the Tribune Company’s six other newspapers (Enda, 2011).

Not surprisingly, the closure of foreign bureaus also has been accompanied by an overall decline in the space, or “news hole,” allotted to foreign news. An American Journalism Review study of eight prominent U.S. newspapers found that foreign news coverage had dropped by 53 percent since 1985. The amount of “staff-produced” stories fell as well, from 15 percent in 1985 to 4 percent in 2010 (Kumar, 2011). Television networks, too, have confined overseas coverage almost exclusively to “war zones” (Enda, 2011).

The trend has been apparent in news magazines, as well, with international news coverage in Time, Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report dropping almost in half between 1985 and 1995 (Seaton, 2001). Before U.S. News and World Report went completely digital in 2008—a move that resulted in the end of its permanent foreign correspondents—Hamilton noted that the “W” in World on the cover’s masthead had
grown smaller and smaller (Hamilton, 2009). Time has increasingly moved away from international coverage—and hard news in general—toward pop-culture and service pieces. “In the 1960s, few could have imagined that Time would come to regularly publish cover stories like “The Power of Yoga,” “How to Raise a Superchild,” “What Jesus Saw,” or “The New Thinking on Breast Cancer” (Angeletti & Oliva, 2004, p. 74). The shift has prompted more than a few jabs, including a Slate.com blogger who asked, “Does Time Magazine Think Americans Are Stupid?” (Anderson, 2012) Such critics have pointed out how the magazine has watered down its U.S. edition cover stories in contrast with its international editions. For example, in December 2011 readers in Asia, Europe, and the South Pacific received a story about Arab Spring protests, while Americans got a story about the benefits of anxiety (Gershon, 2011). In February 2012, while the rest of the world was served up a serious cover story on Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, American readers got a piece about animal friendship that featured two dogs against a hot-pink background (Anderson, 2012). The cover subjects reveal a slide in foreign reporting at Time that is openly acknowledged by its editors. “The only way Time would publish a story on Russia or China is if it would be memorable,” explained former managing editor James Kelly. “If not, it’s not justified” (Angeletti & Oliva, 2004, p. 74). Time’s disappearing foreign bureaus underscores Kelly’s point. In 1980, the magazine’s masthead boasted 21 foreign bureaus. Today, in the most recent issue of Time available at this writing, not a single bureau—domestic or international—was listed. Although Time devoted considerable space to the September 11 attacks and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, its flagging foreign coverage overall has still inspired
critique: “Time’s conviction that Americans only want to read feel-good puff pieces appears to be far stronger than any desire on the publisher’s part to sell itself as an important U.S. news source” (Anderson, 2012).

The decline of foreign news reporting, the shift to sensationalism, and Time’s long-standing penchant for dramatic narrative and opinionated writing make a study of negative stereotypes about non-American others—especially those with whom the United States is in conflict—timely and important. This study documents whether such stereotypes recur in Time’s stories about Arabs and the Middle East. To what extent has Time succumbed to longstanding Orientalist portrayals of the Middle East, invoking us/them binaries that perpetuate stereotypes of Arabs and the Arab world as threatening, backward, dangerous, and wholly “other” than the United States? What are the metaphors that make their way into news coverage, framing a faraway region and its peoples in powerful, persuasive, and ideologically laden ways?
CHAPTER 2: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Related Studies

*Western News Coverage of the Developing World*

Since World War II, scholars have noted the imbalance of news flow between developed countries and the developing nations of the so-called Third World (Schramm, 1964; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Ostgaard, 1965; Galtung, 1971). Western industrialized nations have been criticized not only for their domination of world news coverage, but also for the ways in which they have covered less-powerful nations (Rosenblum, 1979; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1981; Wilhoit & Weaver, 1983; Kim & Barnett, 1996). During the late 1970s, proponents of a “New World Information Order” (Masmoudi, 1979) argued that Western coverage distorted the image of Third World countries, home to 75 percent of the world’s population, by either failing to write about them altogether or by focusing coverage solely on negative aspects “stressing crises, strikes, street demonstrations … or even holding them up to ridicule” (Masmoudi, 1979, p. 174). Western news agencies have historically sought stories that concerned “violence, war, crime, corruption, disaster, famine, fire, and flood” (Smith, 1980, p. 70). Widespread dissemination of such negative coverage—or “bad news”—about the Third World served only to solidify damaging stereotypes that such countries and regions were unstable and chaotic (Masmoudi, 1979; Skurnik, 1981).

U.S. reporting has been no exception, narrowly focusing coverage of developing nations on “the violent, the bizarre, and the conflictual” (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1981, p. 55). Riffe and Shaw’s (1982) study of the Chicago *Tribune* and *The New York Times*, for
example, found that “published news items about the Third World were more likely to deal with conflict or upheaval than were published accounts from First and Second World nations” and that the “consonance” of story topics between the two papers was at its highest when it came to Third World coverage, suggesting that American journalists exercise similar news judgment with regard to foreign news (p. 624). Kamalipour (1995) noted that since World War II, when the United States replaced Britain and France as the major imperial power in the Arab world, U.S. news from that region tended to be a “constant barrage of disasters, coups, uprisings, conflicts, and terrorist activities,” fostering “a gross misimpression of the Middle Eastern peoples and cultures” (p. xx). In a content analysis of New York Times coverage of the Arab world between 1917 and 1947, Mousa (1984) found that reporting tended not only to be linked to conflict but also filtered through a colonialist lens, where Western sources were quoted far more than Arab ones.

These findings are in keeping with Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) theory that U.S. journalists frequently use “deviance”—events such as terrorism—as a measure of the newsworthiness of international events. In examining the various influences on media content, the authors created a five-tiered hierarchical model (p. 223) that placed deviance within the realm of “ideological” influences. Media gatekeepers, working from this realm, make choices about how certain events and groups are portrayed based on widely agreed-upon social norms and “familiar cultural themes that resonate with audiences” (p. 222). Drawing upon Shoemaker’s previous research with others, the authors defined deviance in two ways, as “the extent to which the event threatens the status quo in the
country in which the event occurs,” such as a riot or coup, and “the extent to which the event, if it had occurred in the United States, would have broken U.S. norms” (Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987, p. 400). Other factors, along with deviance, that determine U.S. media coverage of international events include whether the United States is involved in the event in question and whether the “event country” is significant to the United States politically, economically, or culturally (Shoemaker, Danielian, & Brendlinger, 1991, p. 785; Chang & Lee, 1992; Riffe, 1996). Shoemaker, Danielian, & Brendlinger (1991) assessed political significance by whether the U.S. military has a presence in the event country, as well as U.S. economic and military aid to the event country (p. 785).

These factors are particularly pertinent to this study, which includes Time’s coverage of the U.S. war in Iraq, for example, and they are supported by previous research. Hashem’s (1995) study of Time and Newsweek coverage of the Middle East between 1990 and 1993 found that both magazines confined their reporting to areas of interest to the United States. The vast majority of stories were concerned with oil prices, the Persian Gulf War, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ignoring Arab cultural and social developments that might serve to educate American readers about the Arab world. Similarly, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been shown to affect coverage. Asi (1981) found that after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977—a move encouraged by U.S. peace negotiators—U.S. coverage of Egypt’s leaders rose to 100 percent favorable portrayals. Hashem (1995) found that Arab leaders who supported U.S. goals in the region were deemed “moderates,” while those who were critical of U.S.
policies were called “radicals” (p. 157). Other studies demonstrated how, in stories or editorials about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, U.S. newspapers prioritized Israel, the U.S.’s foremost ally and top aid recipient in the Middle East, while marginalizing coverage of Arab nations (Barranco & Shyles, 1988; Batarfi, 1997). Adams and Heyl (1981) found that on U.S. network television, “the primary story [was] of Israel’s survival” (p. 12). Additionally, scholars have found that when criteria such as conflict and U.S. involvement are not present, coverage of foreign nations drops dramatically or stops altogether. Larson (1982) found this to be the case in his study of international coverage on U.S. network television news. Between 1972 and 1975, the Southeast Asian countries of North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos received high levels of coverage on all networks due to the Vietnam War. But once U.S. troops withdrew from the region in 1975, the number of stories plummeted. The shift was dramatic since “all of those nations dropped from relatively extensive levels of coverage to hardly measurable amounts” (p. 31). The above research prompts two research questions and two hypotheses.

**RQ1**: How will Time’s interest in the Middle East rise and fall, as judged by the frequency of stories by year?

**RQ2**: What are the primary story topics found in Time’s coverage of the Arab world?

**H1**: Story topics will primarily reflect the media’s penchant for covering “deviance,” including war, terrorism, and civil unrest.

**H2**: Story topics will reflect U.S. direct involvement, such as the war in Iraq.
Differential Coverage of Nations

Yet another aspect of U.S. foreign news coverage is the lack of coverage—and sometimes sheer invisibility—of certain nations deemed non-newsworthy. Golan (2008) found that despite numerous important stories on the African continent between 2002 and 2004, such as the AIDS epidemic and ethnic cleansing in Darfur, U.S. television news coverage of Africa was minimal. Similarly, Besova and Cooley (2009) noted that coverage of Africa constituted only 5.6 percent of the international news generated by the U.S. media, offering woefully “little depth” in coverage of such a vast region (p. 219). Such marginalization may well be due to a country’s place in what scholars using a world system perspective have defined as three global spheres—core, semi-periphery, and periphery (Kim & Barnett, 1996; Chang, 1998; Chang, Lau, & Hao, 2000). Core nations are those with the most economic, political, and military power globally (Kim & Barnett, 1996)—countries such as the United States, Germany, and Japan, for example. These powerful nations are considered more newsworthy than less powerful nations. Thus, they receive more news coverage than countries from the semi-periphery, such as those of Eastern Europe, and the periphery, comprising much of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Lack of foreign news coverage may have detrimental consequences for the nations that are ignored (Perry, 1990). In a study that examined the agenda-setting power of foreign coverage, Wanta, Golan, and Lee (2004) found that only nations that received higher rates of media coverage were those deemed by the public to be of key importance to the United States. Lack of coverage has arguably worsened during the past 25 years, as U.S. media companies have dedicated increasingly fewer resources toward foreign news
and allotted it increasingly less space and time, or “news hole” (Fleeson, 2003; Hamilton, 2009; Enda, 2010; Kumar, 2010). Eke (2008) argued that inadequate television reporting on the Darfur crisis potentially contributed to the prolonging of the genocidal violence because a lack of public awareness of the scale and urgency of the killing resulted in a corresponding lack of public pressure on the international community to intervene.

Additionally, Ware and Dupagne (1994) pointed to the negative effects of U.S. television programming on foreign audiences, particularly its role in fostering imperialism and cultural dependency. The above research suggests one research question and prompts three hypotheses:

**RQ3:** Which Arab nations receive the most frequent coverage? Which are covered very little or not at all?

**H3:** Aside from Iraq and Palestine, nations that receive the most frequent coverage will reflect U.S. foreign policy as defined by receipt of U.S. foreign aid.

**H4:** The Palestinians will receive a large amount of coverage due to their conflict with Israel, a top U.S. ally and number one recipient of U.S. foreign aid.

**H5:** The U.S. will rank prominently as a non-Middle Eastern nation in *Time* coverage.

**Orientalism and Arab Stereotypes**

The apparent U.S. media penchant for deviance and conflict as determinants of newsworthiness in foreign news coverage provides important predictors of what might be expected in its coverage of the Arab world. Said (1978, 1981) argued that coverage of the Middle East has been carried out through the lens of what he termed Orientalism (see Chapter 1), a powerful binary between Europe (the West) and the Orient (the East) characterized by a consistent portrayal of the West as “rational, developed, humane, superior” and the Orient as “aberrant, undeveloped, inferior” (Said, 1978, pp. 300-301).
Orientalism has served as a lens through which Westerners see and know the Oriental “other” as if there were “an absolute and systematic difference between the West … and the Orient” (Said, 1978, pp. 300-301). Suleiman (1988) wrote that Orientalism has led to “a general picture of Arabs which … is distorted and incorrect and almost invariably negative, at times bordering on racism” (p. 7). The origins of that “picture” began before the advent of Islam (622-710) but were solidified in Medieval Europe when papal leadership sought to unite warring Christian nations by turning their animosity toward Muslims and Islam. “An anti-Muslim ideology was developed which painted a dark and evil picture of Islam, the Prophet, and Muslims in general, including, of course, the Arabs” (p. 8).

Numerous scholars have argued that Orientalism has played a role in the perpetuation of negative Arab stereotypes in the U.S. media throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, from film and television shows (Shaheen, 1984, 2000, 2008, 2009; Alsultany, 2008, 2012) to print journalism (Said, 1978, 1981; Ghareeb, 1983; Hashem, 1995; Suleiman, 1988; Steet, 2000). Based on a study of U.S. magazine coverage of the July-December 1956 Suez crisis in *U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek, Time, Life, The Nation, the New Republic, and The New York Times*’ “News of the Week in Review,” Suleiman (1988) found an overall American “mindset” regarding Arabs and the Arab world, where Arabs were seen as rich, primitive, hateful toward women, bloodthirsty, and cunning. In times of crisis, he found, such stereotypes tended to reappear in the media and affect public opinion. “The negative image Americans have of Arabs and Muslims makes it easy for anyone hostile to the Arabs to whip up public sentiment against them or
against any Arab leader, country, or people” (p. 2). Writing against the backdrop of the 1973 Israeli-Arab War and the OPEC oil embargo, Ghareeb (1983) interviewed several prominent members of the U.S. media, many of whom candidly acknowledged the prevalence of negative Arab stereotypes in coverage of the Arab world. Arabs were viewed by Americans as “backward, scheming, fanatic terrorists who are dirty, dishonest, oversexed, and corrupt” (p. 17).

Stereotypes can be thought of as “images of sameness, repeated over and over again, with no deviation” (Shaheen, 2012). Because of the mass media’s influence (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996) and power as “trend-setters, taste-makers, labelers” (Browne, Firestone, & Mickiewicz, 1994, p. 8) and because of their capacity to “disseminate strong messages to mass audiences” (Wanta & Leggett, 1989), they are, in a sense, ideal conduits for the perpetuation of stereotypes. Lippmann (1922) was the first scholar to discuss the role of media stereotyping: “We are told about the world before we see it. We imagine most things before we experience them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception” (pp. 88-90). According to Lippmann, journalists depend on stereotypes and, in so doing, reinforce them. This is likely the result of what Shoemaker and Reese (1996) called media “routines”—“patterned, routinized, repeated practices and forms that media workers use to do their jobs” (p. 105). Routines allow for story completion within constraints such as deadline pressure, but the authors noted that in an attempt to quickly make sense of a news event and package it into a story, journalists can fall into a reliance on stereotypes that serve almost as a short hand.
Visual Portrayals

One way that scholars have studied stereotypical portrayals of different groups in the media, such as African Americans and women, is through an analysis of visual images. For example, studies have documented the ways that African Americans have been associated with criminality, poverty, and violence (Entman, 1994; Bird, 1996; Martindale, 1996) and how women have been depicted in a negative fashion as weak and submissive and as assuming only traditional family roles (Goffman, 1976; Tuchman, Kaplan Daniels, & Benet, 1978). These and other such studies suggest that stereotypes can be harmful if they perpetuate negative distortions of a particular group. In a study on gender in sports journalism, for example, Wanta and Leggett (1989) asserted that negative portrayals serve “to denigrate individuals and groups in the eyes of audiences and to encourage gender stereotyping by reinforcing distorted images” (p. 105).

This influence can happen particularly if the group in question is one with which media audiences typically have had little or no direct contact. One could argue that Arabs from the Middle East—the subject of this study—fall into this category. *Time* correspondent Bobby Ghosh perhaps unwittingly acknowledged this tendency in the lead to his February 14, 2011, article about Arab Spring protesters in Egypt. “You think you know what Arab rage looks like,” he wrote, “wild-eyed young men shouting bellicose verses from the Koran as they hurl themselves against authority, armed with anything from rocks to bomb vests. So who were these impostors gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir (Liberation) Square to call for the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak?” (Ghosh, 2011).
Through an analysis of *Time* images that appear in its print editions, this study endeavors to track how Arabs and the Arab world are portrayed visually. What images are found in the photographs? Do those images present longstanding negative Orientalist stereotypes? In a closely related study that looked at depictions of Afghan women in *Time.com* between 2001 and 2002, Fahmy (2003) found that the magazine’s web site used a “clash of civilizations” framework that led readers “to interpret war as a moral clash between good and evil, and between persons who are essentially reasonable [Americans] and people who are fundamentally irrational [Afghans]” (p. 291). This frame underscored Said’s Orientalist critique of media coverage of the Middle East, where the Arabs, the Arab world, and Islam are treated as categorically different from and subordinate to the West. This research suggests two hypotheses:

**H6:** The majority of images that accompany *Time* magazine feature stories will depict scenes of Arabs and the Arab world in the categories of “Death/Destruction/Chaos” and “Militancy/Protest.”

**H7:** A minority of images will depict Arabs through the “Human Interest” category, which includes more sympathetic portrayals.

Scholars in media studies have noted how camera distance mimics the real-life dynamics of personal distance or boundaries. Where mid-shots and close-ups maintain a comfortable distance between viewer and subject, so-called extreme close-ups bring the subject so close as to be highly uncomfortable, even threatening. Extreme close-ups are characterized by a camera frame that cuts off part of the subject’s head or face and give the impression that a stranger has stepped too closely into one’s personal space. In describing the discomfort associated with the extreme close-up, Fiske (1997) called it the “code of the villain” (pp. 6-7). In an analysis of *Time* and *Newsweek* magazine covers,
Kang and Heo (2006) found that extreme close-ups were used most often on covers that dealt with negative news. Extreme close-ups also tended to feature non-U.S. political leaders, for example leaders from what the U.S. might consider a “rogue” state. Additionally, Yu and Riffe (1989) asserted that the way the media portray a nation’s leader(s) can “signal that nation’s status as friend or foe” (p. 913). This research evokes two questions:

**RQ4**: In photographs or images that focus on an individual person, what is the camera shot most frequently used?

**RQ5**: How frequently are Arab leaders photographed using extreme close-up shots?

**Method**

This study employs content analysis to examine the depiction of the Arab world in *Time* magazine print-edition coverage from 2001 through 2011. The Arab world is defined here as countries where Arabic is the predominate language, in a geographic area spanning from Southwest Asia to North Africa.¹² The unit of analysis is the individual *Time* feature story. The 271 articles that make up this study were found through a search of *Time* articles using the Academic Search Complete database. My database search used the following key words: “islam* or arab* or "middle east" or mideast or m?sl?m or palestin* or algeria* or egypt* or iraq* or jordan* or leban* or libya* or moroc* or "west bank" or gaza or syria* or kuwait* or tunisi* or saudi arab* or oman* or saudi or united arab emirates or qatar* or yemen* or bahrain* or sudan*.”

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¹² Although stories about Israel proper were excluded, coverage of the Israeli-occupied Palestinian West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip—whose populations are majority Arab—were included.
Once this search was completed, it was further narrowed by choosing articles that were at least one page in length and were accompanied by at least one photograph. The goal was to assemble a collection of articles of a similar type—i.e. feature-length stories—in order to gauge a number of factors (headlines, subheads, leads). Photographs were included in order to analyze the extent to which negative stereotypes appeared in *Time*’s visual depictions of Arabs. News briefs as well as shorter stories of one-half or one-quarter of a page or smaller were excluded. Future research might include these smaller items. Also omitted were essays and opinion pieces, such as articles from *Time*’s “Viewpoint” section, since the goal was to assemble stories reported by *Time*’s Middle East correspondents.

I also narrowed the sample by specific topic focus. The articles are confined to those that feature Arab individuals, groups, or societies. Such stories might include profiles of leaders like Yasser Arafat or Saddam Hussein. They might also include in-depth analyses of groups like Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip or the Shi’ites of Iraq. I thus excluded articles that merely mention an Arab society or group or individual in the context of a story about another topic such as U.S. government war strategy in Iraq or the life of U.S. soldiers serving in the Middle East. Although not irrelevant to my research interest, such stories are not centrally focused on Arabs per se. My interest is in the discourse and imagery that appear in those stories in which Arabs constitute the primary topic of discussion. These stories include the most direct, conscious engagement with Arabs as Arabs; the most direct and systematic Orientalist stereotypes; and perhaps also
alternative images stemming from reporting that allows Arabs and Arab lives to challenge these stereotypes.

Three coders were involved in the study. For each *Time* feature story, they read the headline, subhead, and lead/nutgraf (typically the first several paragraphs of the story). Then, using a numbered list of Arab countries and other choices, they chose up to two countries that were most prominently featured in the article. For stories that were analyses of multiple countries or the Middle East as a region, coders could select “Multiple Countries/Regional Focus.” For those that were general analyses, such as articles about al-Qaeda, and did not mention any specific country, coders could select “None.” Coders were also asked to indicate whether the United States was prominently featured in the article by checking “yes” or “no” on the code sheet. To indicate story topic, coders chose two topics from a numbered list of eleven topics that best described what the story was about. The code book provided tips and examples of stories to aid coders in choosing story topics. Coders then were asked to analyze the main photograph/dominant image on the first page of the story or on the opening two-page spread. The main photograph/dominant image was defined as the largest one on the page or pages. The conventions of magazine layout and design typically ensure that if more than one photograph appears on a page or a two-page spread, one of them will be larger than the rest (Harrower, 2009; Keith & Schwalbe, 2010); thus, the dominant image was easily identified. On rare occasions, two photographs of the same size were juxtaposed, together comprising the largest image on the page. In this case, coders were asked to code both photographs. Coders determined whether the photograph or image was a “scene” or
a profile of an individual person. For “scenes,” they chose at least one (and no more than two) categories that best described the photograph or image. Those categories were: 1) “Destruction/ Death/Chaos”; 2) “Militancy/Extremism”; 3) “Human Interest”; 4) “Other.” The categories were arrived at by thoroughly perusing every dominant photograph/image in the sample and determining recurring themes around which the vast majority of photographs could be grouped. Coders used the story’s headline, subhead, and the photograph’s caption as a guide for clarifying the content of the image.

If the image or photograph was of an individual person, coders indicated whether the camera shot of this individual was a 1). “mid-shot” 2). “close-up” 3). “extreme close-up” or 4.) “other.” Mid-shots are camera shots that include a good deal of the subject’s body, such as the head, torso, waist, and even part of the legs. Close-ups are head shots where often the shoulders and head are seen and facial features and details are clearly visible. Extreme close-ups are camera shots that bring the subject of the photograph so close that part of the subject’s head or face is cut off. Sometimes only the subject’s eyes are showing. Coders then indicated whether the person pictured was an Arab leader. Arab leader was defined broadly and included town mayors, Islamic clerics with large followings, top al-Qaeda leaders, like Osama bin Laden, heads of state, such as Saddam Hussein, Yasser Arafat, or Muammar Qaddafi, and “interim” presidents and prime ministers. Coders indicated whether the photograph or image depicted an Arab leader by marking yes or no. If “yes,” they provided the name and title of the person. If “no,” they wrote in who is pictured, i.e. “an al-Qaeda fighter.” (The code sheet and code book are found in Appendices I and J.)
An intercoder reliability test was carried out with the three coders. Reliability among variables was extremely high, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Percentage of Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation 1</td>
<td>97.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation 2</td>
<td>97.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Mentioned</td>
<td>95.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story Topic 1</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story Topic 2</td>
<td>86.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image</td>
<td>95.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene 1</td>
<td>87.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene 2</td>
<td>97.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Camera Shot</td>
<td>93.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Leader</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results

RQ1: How will *Time*’s interest in the Middle East rise and fall, as judged by the frequency of stories by year?

Table 2: Frequency of Stories by Year shows *Time*’s interest in the Middle East through a distribution of the 271 *Time* stories over an 11-year period, from 2001 to 2011. Stories are distributed as follows: 2001: 23 stories, or 8 percent; 2002: 35 stories, or 13 percent; 2003: 54 stories, or 20 percent; 2004: 31 stories, or 11 percent; 2005: 28 stories, or 10 percent; 2006: 30 stories, or 11 percent; 2007: 15 stories, or 6 percent; 2008: 12 stories, or 4.4 percent; 2009: 5 stories, or 2 percent; 2010: 6 stories, or 2.2 percent; 2011:
29 stories, or 12 percent. Story distribution is further illustrated in the line graph, Figure 1. The largest peaks in Middle East coverage occur in 2002, 2003, and 2004, during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq and the height of the subsequent Iraq War. By 2007, story count begins to fall off, reaching a low of five stories, or 2 percent, in 2009. Story count rises again in 2011, with 32 stories, or 12 percent, with the onset of the “Arab Spring.”

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13 %</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4.4 %</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.2 %</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RQ2: What are the primary story topics found in *Time’s* coverage of the Arab world?

Table 3: Frequency of Story Topics shows that “War/Conflict/Terrorism” is by far the most frequent story topic in the data set. That topic occurs 207 times and accounts for 38 percent of total story topics. “War/Conflict/Terrorism” stories are those that focus on war between the United States and Arab nations, U.S. attacks on Arab cities and villages, and Arab violence against the United States. This category also includes stories about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as well as stories about al-Qaeda violence and suicide bombings. The next most frequent story topic category is “Domestic Arab Politics” with a count of 111, representing 20 percent of total story topics. “Domestic Arab Politics”
stories include reports about national elections, Arab regime violence, regime corruption, Arab leaders and their families, including insurgent leaders, crime, police, and civil war.

As noted in the Method section, two story topics were chosen for each of the 271 stories in the *Time* data set, for a total of 542 story topics. If only one story topic could be identified for a given story, coders chose “Other” for the second topic. The “Other” category accounts for 14 percent of all story topics. All story topic frequencies are found in Table 3.

**H1:** Story topics will primarily reflect the media’s penchant for covering “deviance,” including war, terrorism, and civil unrest.

Table 3 shows that 38 percent of story topics—the largest category—fall into the “War/Conflict/Terrorism” category. This finding is in keeping with what scholars have noted about the mainstream U.S. media’s use of “deviance” as a primary determinant of international news coverage (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). “War/Conflict/Terrorism” stories fall within this definition of “deviance.” Because more than one-third of story topics in the data set are “War/Conflict/Terrorism” stories, H1 is confirmed.
Table 3

*Frequency of Story Topics, Time Middle East Coverage, 2001-11, N=542*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Story Topic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War/Conflict/Terrorism</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>(207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Arab Politics</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>(111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Politics</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>(53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture/History/Society</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics/Energy</td>
<td>0.7 %</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Aid/Development</td>
<td>0.7 %</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.4 %</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration/Immigration</td>
<td>0.4 %</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>0.2 %</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14 %</td>
<td>(78)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Coders chose two story topics per story, for a total of 542 topics. If only one story topic could be identified for a given story, coders chose “Other” for the second topic.

**H2:** Story topics will reflect U.S. direct involvement, such as the war in Iraq.

Table 4: Distribution of Nations Covered shows that Iraq is the top nation covered. A total of 114 stories about Iraq were identified in the data set, comprising 38 percent of the total. Of those 114 Iraq stories, 100 pertained to “War/Conflict/Terrorism.” Thus, 89 percent of stories about Iraq have to do with “War/Conflict/Terrorism.” This finding confirms H2’s assertion that story topics will reflect U.S. direct involvement, such as the war in Iraq.

**RQ3:** Which Arab nations received the most frequent coverage? Which were covered very little or not at all?
Table 4 shows that the Arab nations that received the most frequent coverage are ranked as follows: Iraq, with 114 stories, or 38 percent; Palestine/Occupied Territories, with 53 stories, or 18 percent; and Israel, with 23 stories, or 8 percent. U.S. allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia figure less prominently in *Time’s* coverage. Egypt is the subject of 14 stories, or 5 percent, Saudi Arabia only nine stories, or 3 percent. Oman and Qatar were each written about only once, while Algeria, Bahrain, and Kuwait received zero coverage. In coding for “nations covered” for each *Time* story, coders chose *up to two* countries to promote greater inter-coder agreement. Thus, some stories were coded for two countries, while others were coded for only one.
Table 4

*Distribution of Nations Covered, Time Middle East Coverage, 2001-11, N=297*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine/Occupied Territories</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4.4 %</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1.6 %</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.7 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>0.7 %</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.3 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.3 %</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Countries/Reg. Focus</td>
<td>4.4 %</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Coders chose up to two nations. Some stories were coded for two countries, while others were coded for only one. Thus, N=297.*
H3: Aside from Iraq and Palestine, nations that receive the most frequent coverage will reflect U.S. foreign policy as defined by receipt of U.S. foreign aid.

Table 4 shows that top recipients of U.S. foreign aid are also those that receive the most coverage, after Iraq and Palestine. Stories about Egypt total 14, or 5 percent of the data set. Israel, though it is not an Arab country, ranks even higher, with 23 stories, or 8 percent, reflecting its status the top recipient of U.S. foreign aid. Thus, H3 is confirmed.

H4: The Palestinians will receive a large amount of coverage due to their conflict with Israel, a top U.S. ally and number-one recipient of U.S. foreign aid.

Table 4 shows that Palestine/Occupied Territories is covered in 53 stories; this equals 18 percent of the data set and represents the second-largest category in the distribution of nations covered. Time stories about Israel were excluded in this study; however, coders were given the option of choosing Israel as one of the “nations covered” because of its likely prominence in Arab-world stories. Of the 53 articles that focus on Palestine, Israel receives significant attention in 23, or 43 percent, of them. Thus, in almost half of the stories about Palestine, Israel is prominently mentioned, perhaps suggesting that when it comes to coverage of the Palestinians, Israel is highlighted because of its status as a prime U.S. ally in the Middle East region.

H5: The U.S. will rank prominently as a non-Middle Eastern nation in Time coverage.

For each of the 271 Time stories in the data set, coders were asked to decide whether or not the United States was featured prominently in the story, and a count was taken. Results show prominence in 51 stories. This comprises 19 percent, or approximately one-fifth, of the total number of stories. This frequency does not strongly
suggest that the United States was featured prominently in *Time* data set; therefore, H5 is disproven.

*Images*

**H6:** The majority of images that accompany *Time* magazine feature stories will depict scenes of Arabs and the Arab world in the categories of “Death/Destruction/Chaos” and “Militancy/Protest.”

As shown below in Table 5: Distribution of Images and in Figure 2, the frequency of “Death/Destruction/Chaos” images is 51, or 24 percent, and the frequency of “Militancy/Protest” images is 56, or 27 percent. Taken together, these categories comprise 107 images, or 51 percent of the total for “scene type.” Images of “Destruction/Death/Chaos” are those that depict destroyed buildings or people destroying property; dead bodies; skulls and bones; people running from an explosion; or an unruly crowd. “Militancy/Protest” images are those that depict people with guns or weaponry; people fully masked; soldiers in uniform; “jihadists” prostrate in prayer; police activities; protesters waving banners or wielding weapons. For each photograph designated a “scene” (rather than an “individual”), coders chose whether that scene depicted 1) “Death/Destruction/Chaos”; 2) “Militancy/Protest”; 3) “Human Interest”; or 4) “Other.” If a scene depicted more than one of these categories, coders could choose up to two categories. The categories “Death/Destruction/Chaos” and “Militancy/Protest” combined comprise 51 percent of photographs, a majority. Thus, H6 is supported.

**H7:** A minority of images will depict Arabs through the “Human Interest” category, which includes more sympathetic portrayals.

Table 5 shows that the frequency of “Human Interest” images is 100, or 47 percent of the total for “scene types.” The “Human Interest” category is comprised of
images of people engaged in everyday activities such as shopping, driving, working in an office or a hospital; scenes of children playing; and families at home or at restaurants. This category includes shots of Arab individuals and leaders who are presented in non-menacing ways, smiling or standing with hands folded, for example. It includes images that may provoke sympathy from the audience—people mourning, scared, suffering, or with anguished expressions. Table 5 and the accompanying pie chart, Figure 3, and bar graph, Figure 4, indicate that the percentage of “Human Interest” images, 47 percent, is less than half. Thus, H7 is supported.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene Type*</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Death/Destruction/Chaos</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militancy/Protest</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Interest</td>
<td>47 %</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For each photograph that was designated a “scene,” coders chose whether that scene depicted “Death/Destruction/Chaos”; “Militancy/Protest”; “Human Interest”; or “Other.” If a scene depicted more than one of these categories, coders could choose up to two categories. Thus, N=211.
**Figure 2.** Distribution of images, *Time* Middle East coverage, 2001-11.

**RQ4:** In photographs or images that focus on an individual person, what is the camera shot most frequently used?

There is no clear winner when it comes to most-frequent camera shot. Table 5: Distribution of Camera Shot Type shows that each of the three main camera shot types—mid-shot, close-up, and extreme close-up—account for either a quarter or one-third of the total number of shot types, where N=76. Mid-shots, with a frequency of 25, account for 33 percent; close-ups, with a frequency of 24, account for 32 percent; and extreme close-ups, with a frequency of 20, account for 26 percent. The “Other” category, with a frequency of 7, or 9 percent, was established for those shots that did not fit any of the above-mentioned categories.
Table 6

*Distribution of Camera Shot Type, Time Middle East Coverage, 2001-11, N=76*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camera Shot</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-shot</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close-up</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Close-up</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RQ5:** How frequently are Arab leaders photographed using extreme close-up shots?

Similarly, Table 7: Frequency of Extreme Close-ups of Arab Leaders shows that Arab leaders do not tend to be photographed predominately in one camera shot over another. Mid-shots and close-ups, both with a frequency of 12, are the most common camera shots used, each of these categories accounting for 32 percent of the total, where N=37. Extreme close-ups are used 10 times, accounting for 27 percent of the total. Here, too, the “Other” category, with a frequency of three, or 8 percent, was established for those shots of Arab leaders that did not fit any of the above-mentioned categories.

Table 7

*Frequency of Extreme Close-ups, Time Middle East Coverage, 2001-11, N=37*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camera Shot, Arab Leaders</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-shot</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close-ups</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Close-ups</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion

The findings from RQ1 indicate high frequencies in *Time*’s coverage of the Middle East during outbreaks of war and conflict in the region and extreme dips in reporting when war and conflict wane. The greatest number of stories—54—is found in 2003, the first year of the Iraq War. This coverage includes the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, as well as stories that describe the violence that broke out in the invasion’s aftermath. During 2003, violence- and conflict-laden Iraq stories are apparent in headlines such as “Terror at a Shrine” (Ghosh, 2003b) and “On the Road to Death at Najaf” (Lacey, 2003). Even when the topic is not Iraq, however, the focus remains on terrorism and struggle, as is the case with “Architect of Terror” (Saporito & McGirk, 2003), a story about al-Qaeda “bigwig” Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and “Walling off the Peace” (Rees, 2003c), a piece about the construction of a barrier wall between Israel and the West Bank.

The second greatest number of stories is in 2002, a year that dealt with the continued fall-out from the September 11, 2001, attacks; the second Palestinian Intifada and Yasser Arafat’s faltering leadership; and the run-up to the war in Iraq, including assessments of Saddam Hussein’s weapons capability. The 35 stories that ran in 2002 include pieces such as “Iraq and al-Qaeda: Is There a Link?” (Ratnesar, 2002); “Arafat’s Last Stand” (Robinson, 2002); and “What Does Saddam Have?” (McGeary, 2002).

Coverage remains somewhat high during 2004-2006 as well, likely because of the ongoing war in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, and the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, resulting in heavy bombardment of Lebanon in July 2006. But beginning in
2007, *Time’s* reporting on the Arab world begins to fall off. That year, the number of stories dips to 15; and by 2009, coverage hits a low of five stories. Tellingly, the stories that appear during this period deal almost exclusively with Iraq or Palestine.

The relative decline in coverage combined with the continuing myopic focus on conflict zones in which the U.S. military or an important U.S. ally (Israel) were involved are perhaps among the reasons for the magazine missing entirely a major Arab world news event—the genesis of the so-called Arab Spring. The Arab Spring began December 17, 2010, when 26-year-old Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set himself aflame in protest of police mistreatment; his act set off a wave of popular uprisings that quickly spread across the region. Up to that point, Tunisia had received zero coverage in *Time*. But by the following year, with the conflicts and violence generated by Arab Spring protests rocking the Arab world, *Time’s* coverage shot up again, with 32 stories, three of which were about Tunisia. One of those stories, “Postcard: Sidi Bouzid” (Abouzeid, 2011), features Bouazizi’s grieving mother, Mannoubia, holding a picture of her deceased son. The piece ran on February 7, 2011. *Time’s* U.S. print edition had missed the story by nearly two months.

This overall trend is in keeping with the findings of RQ2, H1, and H2. RQ2, which explores dominant story topics, demonstrates that the most frequent topics (38 percent) were those that dealt with “War/Conflict/Terrorism.” As stated above, “War/Conflict/Terrorism” stories were those that focused on war between the United States and Arab nations and included stories about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and al-Qaeda-related violence. This focus also reflects the media’s penchant for using

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“deviance” as a determinant of international news coverage, a finding that is confirmed in H1. Chang, Shoemaker, and Brendlinger (1987) defined deviance as anything that undermines the status quo and is perceived as breaking U.S. norms. A focus on deviance also is found in the second most frequent story topic category, “Domestic Arab Politics” (20 percent). In reporting on “Domestic Arab Politics,” Time rarely shows readers what is working in a given Arab country but rather covers subjects like national elections and profiles of Arab leaders and societies in ways that highlight dissension, regime violence and corruption, crime, and civil war. The story “Can He Stop the Killing” (Rees, 2005), for example, focuses on Arafat’s likely successor, Mahmoud Abbas, and how he will deal with Palestinian militants. Additionally, the results confirm H2, that story topics would reflect U.S. direct involvement in conflict, such as the war in Iraq. This finding emphasizes that U.S. foreign policy and military initiatives serve as the primary guide and focus of Time’s coverage of the Middle East. This fact further accounts for the lack of interest in and coverage of trends and settings beyond this narrow compass.

The broad trends noted above continue in the findings for RQ3, dealing with Arab nations that receive the most frequent coverage. The findings pertaining to this question show that Iraq (38 percent); Palestine/Occupied Territories (18 percent); and Israel—not an Arab country but nevertheless heavily mentioned in coverage of Palestine (8 percent) receive the overwhelming majority of Time’s coverage of the Middle East. Coverage of the rest of the Middle East is negligible to non-existent. These findings are not surprising, given what numerous scholars have long known about U.S. coverage of international news, specifically the Arab world—that it is focused almost exclusively on conflict,
violence, and disaster (Masmoudi, 1979; Smith, 1980; Skurnik, 1981; Riffe & Shaw, 1982; Kamalipour, 1995). This narrow focus has been shown to lead to a failure to develop a fuller understanding of these societies and cultures (Hashem, 1995; Kamalipour, 1995). This study confirms this point, but it also shows its consequence—that important emerging stories, in this case the story of the Arab Spring’s very beginning, can be missed entirely.

Conflict, however, is not the only determinant of journalistic coverage of international news. H3 predicted that, aside from Iraq and Palestine, those nations granted the most frequent coverage by *Time* would reflect U.S. foreign policy as defined by receipt of U.S. foreign aid. The results confirm this hypothesis, showing that Israel and Egypt, recipients of high levels of U.S. aid, receive the greatest amount of coverage after Iraq and Palestine. Egypt may also have received frequent coverage due to the longstanding U.S. fascination with and study of ancient Egypt, from its hieroglyphics to King Tut. H4 predicted, further, that the inordinate amount of coverage in *Time* of Palestine/Occupied Territories would correlate with a concern for Israel, a primary U.S. ally and by far the top recipient of U.S. foreign aid among countries in the Middle East. The results confirm this hypothesis, demonstrating that in 43 percent of articles pertaining to Palestine, Israel is prominently covered. Moreover, nearly all of the articles on Palestine focus narrowly on war, conflict, terrorism, and internal political dysfunction. Very few articles explore Palestinian society and culture beyond the conflict frame. This fact further underscores how the U.S. foreign policy concern with the “war on terror” and
its impact on its main regional ally, Israel, provide the primary guide for Time’s coverage of Palestine.

Finally, H5 predicted that the U.S. would feature prominently in Time’s coverage of Arab countries especially given the prominence of the Iraq War during the period under analysis. Results do not support this hypothesis, revealing that the U.S. is featured in only 19 percent of the 271 stories in the study’s data set. This finding may be the consequence of having excluded from the data set articles that focus mostly or exclusively on U.S. military actions, strategy, or personnel as opposed to articles that focus on Arabs and Arab societies, specifically. Had these types of articles centering on the U.S. military been included in the study’s data set, the percentage of stories featuring the United States would have increased substantially. Moreover, the relative absence of emphasis on the United States in stories focusing primarily on Arabs and Arab societies is likely due to the heavy emphasis on the United States in those other articles that focus on the U.S. military and U.S. political strategy in the Middle East.

With regard to the images that accompanied Time feature stories in the data set, H6 predicted that the majority of images would depict scenes of Arabs and the Arab world in the categories of “Death/Destruction/Chaos” and “Militancy/Protest.” The first category features images of destroyed buildings or bodies, as well as chaotic scenes, such as unruly crowds. The second category is comprised of images of militants with masks and/or weaponry, soldiers or police in uniform, “jihadists,” or protesters waving banners or wielding weapons. H7 predicted that a minority of images would depict Arabs through the “Human Interest” category. This category includes more sympathetic portrayals—for
example, families or individuals engaged in everyday activities such as shopping, driving, playing, working in an office, or eating at a restaurant. “Human Interest” portrayals also include shots of Arab individuals and leaders presented in a non-menacing manner, as well as images of people mourning, scared, suffering, or grieving. Both hypotheses are confirmed, with 51 percent of images falling into the categories “Death/Destruction/Chaos” and “Militancy/Protest,” and 47 percent of images featuring “Human Interest” scenes.

The higher frequency of negative images conveyed by the “Death/Destruction/Chaos” and “Militancy/Protest” categories is perhaps not surprising, given that *Time* Arab world coverage focuses consistently on violence, conflict, and deviance and that media coverage of Arabs historically has tended to focus almost exclusively on negative stereotypes of the Arab as violent, bloodthirsty, and fanatical (Ghareeb, 1983; Suleiman, 1988; Shaheen, 1984, 2009). What was less expected, therefore, is the relatively high frequency of sympathetic images, those from the “Human Interest” category. Although 47 percent is technically a minority of images, it nevertheless represents nearly half of all images that ran in the data set. This perhaps tempers the impact of the high frequency of conflict- and violence-oriented stories in that not all stories about Arab violence are reinforced with images of Arab violence. For example, although the story “When the War Hits Home” (Rees, 2002b) is about the “lethal exchanges between Israelis and Palestinians” (p. 34), the photographs that accompany the piece feature nonthreatening images of Palestinian and Israeli mothers.
In a similar vein, RQ4 sought to ascertain what type of camera shot—mid-shot, close-up, or extreme close-up—is used most frequently in photographs of Arab individuals. Scholars have found that the use of the extreme close-up—a shot so tight that part of the subject’s face is typically cut off and intricate facial details are highlighted—tends to convey the discomfort associated with the invasion of one’s personal space and is the shot most often used to portray someone negatively, for example as a villain or rogue (Fiske, 1987; Kang & Heo, 2006). RQ5 asked how frequently Arab leaders were photographed using this type of shot, since Yu and Riffe (1989) found that the way a nation’s leader is portrayed by the U.S. media signals whether that nation is a “friend or foe” (p. 913). Did *Time* photographs tend to choose this shot more frequently in its depictions of Arab leaders and individuals, thereby subtly vilifying them? The findings indicate that overall, extreme close-ups are used with less frequency than mid-shots and close-ups, camera shots that are not associated with vilification. Extreme close-ups are used only 26 percent of the time, compared with mid-shots (33 percent), close-ups (32 percent), and other types of shots (9 percent). Similarly, when Arab leaders appear alone in photographs, they are depicted in extreme close-ups only 27 percent of the time. Mid-shots (32 percent), close-ups (32 percent) and other types of shots (8 percent) account for the rest. These findings indicate that although *Time* uses the extreme close-up roughly one-third of the time, this shot is by no means the default mode of depicting Arab individuals, especially Arab leaders, despite the fact that the stories that run with these photographs are oftentimes critical or negative.
When the extreme close-up is used, however, it creates the demonizing image that may have been intended. The piece “Architect of Terror” (Saporito & McGirk, 2003), for example, features a bearded, turbaned Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, one of the reported September 11 masterminds, in a tight head shot with the words “caught” stamped across his face. The story “The Biggest Fish of Them All” (Elliott, 2003) runs with an oversized and grainy extreme close-up of Osama bin Laden, suggesting his status as evil incarnate. The story “The Chic Sheik” (MacLeod, 2006) presents a full-page, in-your-face extreme close-up of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Several stories about insurgents and suicide bombers also employ the extreme close-up to depict these individuals. Stories such as “Meet the New Jihad” (Ware, 2004); “Professor of Death” (Ghosh, 2005b); and “Inside the Mind of an Iraqi Suicide Bomber” (Ghosh, 2005a) all feature extreme close-up shots constructed from the same ingredients: a man wearing a scarf wrapped tightly around his head, revealing only a pair of dark eyes and the hint of thick, dark eyebrows. Though these men are wrapped in mystery, each story promises to reveal something dastardly about them—how insurgents plan to create an Islamic state (Ware, 2004); how bombers are trained and sent on missions (Ghosh, 2005); and what weapons constitute the insurgents’ deadliest (Ghosh, 2005a). Photographs and text such as these illustrate Shaheen’s (2012) point about the repetitive “images of sameness” that are so much a part of negative media stereotyping. They are quite literally the lens through which Westerners see and know the Oriental “other” (Said, 1978).
CHAPTER 3: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Related Studies

This thread of the study seeks to analyze the use of metaphor as a framing device in *Time* magazine articles that report on the Arab world from 2001 to 2011. The following analysis is connected to the role that framing and metaphor can play in stigmatizing marginalized populations and creating “out groups” and the consequences of this tendency not only for ethical journalism but also for domestic and international peace-building. As noted above, U.S. media coverage oftentimes engages in a type of “othering,” whereby news selection is governed by “dimensions of deviance, including the controversial, sensational, prominent, and unusual” (Shoemaker, 1984, p. 66) and where groups that seemingly threaten the status quo are portrayed in ways that highlight their deviance (Gitlin, 1980; Gans, 1979; Boyle, McCluskey, Devanathan, Stein, & McLeod, 2004). This propensity is pronounced in international news coverage, where events that make their way into an increasingly narrow international news “hole” are those that are deviant in nature, such as terrorism (Shoemaker, Chang, & Brendlinger, 1987).

To what extent do these journalistic realities affect coverage of the Arab world, particularly in light of the longstanding Orientalist lens through which this region and its peoples have been portrayed (see Chapter 1)? What are the metaphors that make their way into news coverage, framing a faraway region and its peoples in powerful, persuasive, and ideologically laden ways? According to Deignan (2005), metaphors play a strong role in shaping public perceptions of social issues and international events; they
“encode particular ideological positions;” and they are especially persuasive if they provide a “strong emotional resonance for people” (p. 131). Additionally, Steuter and Wills (2008) aver that “public discourse, which relies on metaphors both obvious and tacit, can harness its power to shape opinion, set or justify policy, and direct action” (p. 3). In times of conflict and war, this effect becomes all the more pressing:

Persistent metaphors of beast or plague reduce individuals to categories and present these categories as innately dangerous to the human, linking the enemy with things beyond or beneath our own species. Further, they extend the violence of individuals to encompass an entire culture … portrayed as inherently violent, uncivilized, empty of our values and our shared concern for the worth of human life. (p. 4)

Cognitive linguists Lakoff and Johnson made an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the power of metaphor in their path-breaking book *Metaphors We Live By*. In it, the authors argue that metaphor is not “mere language” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 145)—a rhetorical flourish or figure of speech confined to the domain of poetry and literature—but basic to everyday human thought. Metaphor infuses our daily lives to such a degree that “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of how we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (p. 3). This idea became known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (also called Cognitive Metaphor Theory), the idea that metaphor powerfully shapes our interpretation of and reaction to the world because it is fundamental to cognition itself.
Lakoff and Johnson’s theory drew on pioneering discoveries about metaphor in the philosophy of language. Breaking with a tradition going back to Aristotle (Hausman, 2006, p. 215), these theorists argued that literal and figurative language was not mutually exclusive and that metaphor was not a mere substitution for more concrete speech; instead, they argued, the linking together of two terms through metaphor produced new, unique meanings not reducible to more “literal” underlying concepts or paraphrases. Richards (1936) described this phenomenon through his “interaction” theory of metaphor. Richards recognized that the dynamic relationship between the components of a metaphor generates new meaning that would be “unattainable without their interaction” (Waggoner, 1990, p. 93; see also Hausman, 2006, p. 16). Black (1962, 1978, 1979, 1993) developed the theory further, becoming one of the most influential metaphor theorists of the 20th century. Black debunked the notion that metaphor was somehow “expendable,” arguing instead that strong, or what he called “emphatic,” metaphors could not be paraphrased or replaced without a significant loss in meaning (Black, 1993, p. 27). Black also emphasized that metaphor could not be reduced to a more plain, or literal, meaning. Steen (2011) noted that it was the publication of Ortony’s (1979) *Metaphor and Thought* that marked the “cognitive turn” in metaphor theory and prepared the foundation for Lakoff and Johnson’s work (pp. 26-27). Articles that appeared in that edited volume, such as Reddy’s “The Conduit Metaphor,” demonstrated that “ordinary, everyday English is largely metaphorical” and that “metaphor is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world” (Lakoff, 1993, p. 204). Since then, numerous scholars have used Conceptual Metaphor Theory as a framework for
analysis, a guiding principle being that “If our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor” (Steuter & Wills, 2008, p. 7).13

How does this conceptual model of metaphor actually work? One must begin with Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) definition of metaphor, which is, simply put: “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (p. 5). These two “things” can be understood as two “domains” that are linked conceptually—the “source” domain and “target” domain. Source and target have no obvious link to one another, but when joined, new meanings come to light. The target domain tends to be an everyday abstract notion, such as time or argument or life, which borrows concrete attributes and characteristics from the source domain. These attributes and characteristics are “mapped,” or “projected,” onto the target domain. Such mapping is essential to our ability to understand abstract target domains. “Proponents of Conceptual Metaphor Theory argue that few or even no abstract notions can be talked about without metaphor: There is no direct way of perceiving them, and we can only understand them through the filter of directly experienced, concrete notions” (Deignan, 2011).

Lakoff and Johnson found that there are thousands of such cross-domain mappings between source and target domains. The closely intertwined relationship that Deignan pointed to can be observed in even just a few examples. In Western industrialized societies, for example, “time is money” is a common conceptual metaphor,
where “time” (target domain) is largely thought of as a resource such as money (source domain) that can be wasted, saved, spent, invested, or borrowed. Time can be budgeted or used profitably (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 7-8). These attributes are routinely superimposed onto the abstract domain of time, indicated by such commonly uttered phrases such as, “I’ve spent too much time on this;” “I’ve wasted my time;” and “Thank you for your time.”

*War/Conflict Metaphors*

Another prevalent cross-mapping is “argument is war,” where the target domain, argument, has come to be thought of in combative, war-like terms. This usage can be witnessed in phrases such as, “He shot down my every argument;” “Your claims are indefensible;” and “She attacked every weak point in my argument” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 4). Lakoff’s widely cited example of “life is a journey” is a conceptual metaphor that exemplifies just how much target domains rely upon source, as seen in such phrases as, “He got a head start in life;” “He’s without direction in life;” and “I’m where I want to be in life” (Lakoff, 1993, p. 223). Thus, for Lakoff the very word metaphor “has come to mean a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system” (p. 203, italics in original).

Writing about metaphor analysis in qualitative research, Schmitt (2005) recognized that such cross-mappings are so commonplace as to be invisible. “We as individuals, groups, and in our culture have unconscious metaphorical thinking patterns, which are simply taken as ‘givens’ ” (p. 360). The cross-mapping “time is money,” for example, is so ingrained in the culture that people are “at best superficially aware of it.” Thus, bringing these metaphors to the surface helps us understand and critique the
prevalent ideologies embedded within them (p. 360). This embedding poses a challenge because of the way that metaphoric cross-mappings, when repeated over time, begin to merge and come to be seen as inevitable. Steuter and Wills (2008) found this to be the case in their analysis of metaphor use in media coverage of the “war on terror,” where animal metaphors were frequently used to describe Muslims. “When the media repeatedly return to similar patterns of image and language, these patterns begin to appear both familiar and natural” (p. 4).

Deignan (2011) noted that Conceptual Metaphor Theory allows the researcher to analyze speech or writing “with the agenda of showing how metaphors are used to present a particular message or ideology”¹⁴ (p. 124). Metaphors are vehicles for ideology because they provide specific perspectives on reality through the associations they create between target and source domains. The choice of which source to pair with a particular target flows from the speaker’s position within a society’s power structure. Elites, especially, because of their access to major media, as well as the media’s predilection for relying on major institutional sources, have the capacity to make their metaphors dominant in public perceptions of issues and events.

Meadows’ (2007) study of the political speeches of George W. Bush during the early years of the Iraq War highlights this power that elites possess. Borrowing from Lakoff (1992), Meadows found that the war was construed early on by the Bush administration as a “fairy tale,” whereby American “heroes” were needed to rescue Iraqi

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¹⁴ Williams (1977) defined ideology as “a relatively formal and articulated system of meanings, values, and beliefs, of a kind that can be abstracted as a ‘world-view’ or a ‘class outlook’ ” (p. 109). This system of meanings, linked to differing positions within the class structure, governs the way in which we perceive ourselves and the world, influencing what we see as natural or obvious.
victims from the “villain” Saddam Hussein (p. 3). Once Iraqi resistance to U.S. occupation surfaced, thus eroding the validity of this fairy tale, Bush’s speech writers adeptly shifted their metaphors to justify continued American intervention and keep the fairy tale alive. Metaphors of “us/Them” emerged with Americans and sympathetic Iraqis on one side, and Iraqi terrorists on the other (p. 10). Meadows found Bush’s metaphor use persuasive enough to galvanize the public: “If the power structure can dictate how we categorize each other, they can mobilize large numbers of individuals to act on behalf of their ideologies” (p. 14).

Charteris-Black (2005) explored the ideological power of metaphors in his study of the political speeches of six 20th-century British and North American politicians. He defined ideology in a way similar to Williams, as “a belief system through which a particular social group creates the meanings that justify its existence to itself” (pp. 21-22). This “consciously formulated set of ideas,” when communicated through the right metaphors, is powerful precisely because of its persuasive potential and its ability to inform how one acts in the world (pp. 21-22). What makes metaphor persuasive is the way it operates at a subliminal level to influence “the value that we place on ideas and beliefs on a scale of goodness and badness … transferring positive or negative associations of various source words to a metaphor target” (pp. 13-14).

The media effects to which Charteris-Black and others refer are supported by empirical studies that demonstrate the impact of journalistic language on audiences (Dixon & Azocar, 2007; Domke, 2001; Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000). Rill and Davis (2008) used “manipulated print media stories” about the 2006 war in Lebanon to test second-
level agenda-setting effects on readers; they found “a relationship between the version of the news story read by participants and the attributes that the participants assigned to Israel and Hezbollah” (p. 609). Schemer (2012) conducted a two-wave panel study, combined with content analysis, to track the effects of negative news portrayals of immigrants on readers’ attitudes during a political campaign. He found that in audiences with “low to moderate” knowledge of the issues discussed, “negative news portrayals of immigrants increased stereotypic attitudes in the public.” Similarly, when this group was exposed to positive immigrant portrayals, their “negative out-group attitudes” improved (p. 739).

Metaphoric language is at its most powerful when it resonates emotionally—and subconsciously—inspiring action from the listener or reader. In his analysis of the speeches of Margaret Thatcher, Britain’s now-deceased “Iron Lady” and longtime head of the Conservative Party who served as prime minister from 1979-1990, Charteris-Black (2005) found that Thatcher persuasively convinced listeners of the rightness of her ideological positions through the use of “conflict” metaphors. Whether combating social and economic problems, trade unions, or the Labour Party, Thatcher construed all that she opposed as societal enemies to be thwarted militarily (p. 90). In one speech, for example, Thatcher called unemployment and inflation “conquests” that had to be fought against; in another, Thatcher personified inflation as an enemy: “Inflation is … the unseen robber of those who have saved” (p. 91). She often referred to confrontation with the opposition Labour Party in warlike terms that likely resonated strongly with her audience: “… we had to fight the battle as you know, the battle in Parliament every inch
of the way. Against Labour opposition. And against Liberal opposition” (p. 94). Charteris-Black found that in using bellicose language, Thatcher fashioned herself a modern-day “Boedicia,” a 20th-century incarnation of the ancient British tribal queen known for routing occupying Roman forces. Thus, she portrayed herself as Britain’s brave heroine, soft and feminine but also tough (p. 90). Her party’s reelection implies that U.K. citizens accepted her vision.

Metaphors are not just used to convey the ideologies of political elites, however. They can be taken up by charismatic leaders across the political spectrum. In analyzing the Civil Rights-era speeches and sermons of Martin Luther King, Jr., Charteris-Black (2005) found a preponderance of “journey” metaphors (accompanied, as well, by a host of rhetorical devices, such as repetition, contrast, analogy, etc.) that King employed to legitimate himself in the role of “messianic prophet” (p. 60) and to inspire followers to engage in the struggle against segregation and racism, oftentimes through marches (literal journeys). Although freedom was to be won in stages and suffering was an inevitable part of the struggle, King’s charismatic rhetoric held forth the promise that the journey, ultimately spiritual, would reach its desired end—the Promised Land.

In the metaphors “the Civil Rights movement is a spiritual journey” and “the historic struggle for freedom is a journey,” Charteris-Black found that “whenever [King] evaluates an action positively he uses a metaphor implying forward movement and whenever he evaluates an action negatively he uses a stopping metaphor.” This was particularly persuasive for activists who were “familiar with the sufferings entailed by these journeys … but were also aware that Civil Rights marches arrived at their chosen
destinations” (p. 67). Through the tireless efforts of activists, King repeatedly suggested, justice would prevail on earth.

*Arab World Coverage*

Because metaphor is so fundamental to our ability to understand abstractions and is, at the same time, so ideologically weighted, it is a compelling device to use in exploring U.S. media coverage of the Arab world, a region historically discussed, written about, and reported on using Orientalist binaries (see Chapter 1). In Sandikcioglu’s (2001) study of media and political discourse surrounding the 1991 Persian Gulf War, he found Orientalist conceptual metaphors that sharply distinguished Iraq/the Orient as different from and lower than the United States/the West. This “ideological categorization of the Orient” (p. 165) perpetuated a host of negative stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims who were depicted as barbaric, weak, immature, irrational, and unstable, in contrast with the civilized, powerful, mature, rational, and stable West (p. 175). In an another analysis of *Time* and *Newsweek* articles published during that war, he argued that “the West still lives by the images inherent in Orientalist metaphorical conceptualizations, polarizing the world into the Orient vs. the West, Us vs. Them” (Sandikcioglu, 2000, p. 300). Sandikcioglu called Orientalism the “traditional ‘idealized cognitive model’ the West has internalized about the Orient and the Oriental” (p. 299, italics in original). I would argue, as well, that Orientalism is so culturally entrenched that it attains the level of what Barthes (1983) called “myth.” Barthes described myth as a process by which a culture renders invisible its own norms and ideologies—in this case,
the perception of Arabs and Muslims as dangerous outsiders—such that this knowledge becomes naturalized and eludes critical analysis.

Metaphor use as an ideological conduit, whether in political speeches or in media texts, necessarily emphasizes certain aspects of reality while downplaying or excluding others. “What metaphor does is limit what we notice, highlight what we do see, and provide part of the inferential structure that we reason with” (Lakoff, 1992, p. 480). A good example is Todoli’s (2007) study of a controversial urban redevelopment project in her home town of Valencia, Spain. Todoli noted how proponents of the project—architects and urban planners—used metaphors to “mystify” or “mask” their true intentions (p. 51). They cast the redevelopment positively as an “urban operation” (p. 54), where surgery was needed to restore health to a decaying infrastructure, and glossed over the fact that longtime residents would be pushed out and numerous buildings would be demolished.15

**Framing**

This and other examples highlight the way metaphors can be reliable tools in yet another important theoretical approach to media analysis—that of “framing.” Much scholarly attention has been given to the importance of framing in journalistic discourse. Entman (1993) defined it as follows: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment

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15 Citizen groups and other critics pushed back using their own metaphors, however, stating that the project was more akin to an “amputation and extirpation of urban tissues” (Todoli, 2007, p. 55). This reaction demonstrates how differently situated actors generate diverging metaphors for the same contested issue.
recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). Salience is created by emphasizing these selected aspects, making them more evident to readers through, for example, prominent placement and repetition. Tankard (2003) described media frames as “the organizing idea on which a story is built,” metaphorizing them to the frame that is used to construct a house (p. 99). In her influential study on newsrooms and journalists, Tuchman (1978) noted how, through framing, media organizations “produce and reproduce, create and recreate” (p. 216) meaning, knowledge, and reality. Similarly, Reese (2003) described frames as “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (p. 11). Reese emphasized frames’ powerful role in not only emphasizing certain aspects of reality but naturalizing those aspects (p. 19) in a way that produces taken-for-granted knowledge about the world.

D’Angelo (2002) identified three paradigms in news framing research that dominate the communication field: cognitive, constructionist, and critical.16 The cognitive paradigm is interested in the point of contact between a news frame and an individual’s mind, or “prior knowledge” (p. 875). Studies that examine framing from this perspective (Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Iyengar, 1991; Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997) showed that when an individual receives a news frame, he or she enters into a process of cognitive “negotiation” whereby the information is organized and processed according to the individual’s prior knowledge about the topic. Thus, prior knowledge acts as a sort of mediation against the “power” of a news frame. D’Angelo noted that cognitive news frame researchers recognize that a flood of thoughts and experiences may come to mind

16 D’Angelo noted, however, that researchers oftentimes mix or “work across” these paradigms.
when someone encounters a news frame; however, these researchers are most interested in what thoughts come to mind that “mirror propositions” encoded in those frames (p. 876).

A second paradigm is that of the constructionists. This view sees journalists as interpreting and packaging news based on news gathering that relies upon “politically invested sponsors,” or sources (p. 877). D’Angelo asserted that constructionists see news frames as having largely negative consequences that, for instance, “constrain economically distressed communities from seeing their assets … constrict political awareness of individuals,” and “set parameters for policy debates not necessarily in agreement with democratic norms” (p. 877). Characterized by “co-optation,” however, constructionists view news consumers as having the ability to choose elements from news frames that they then use to inform their own opinions about issues (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gamson 1992, 1996).

Those who subscribe to D’Angelo’s third, or critical, paradigm place an emphasis on the power media frames wield (Tuchman, 1978; Gitlin, 1980; Entman & Rojecki, 1993). Thus, this group is associated with “domination,” as opposed to “negotiation.” As D’Angelo (2002) put it: “Frames that paradigmatically dominate news are also believed to dominate audiences” (p. 876). Entman (1993) clearly situated himself among this camp. “Certainly people can recall their own facts, forge linkages not made explicitly in the text, or retrieve from memory a causal explanation or cure that is completely absent from the text … but on most matters of social or political interest, people are not generally so well-informed and cognitively active” (p. 56).
In an attempt to provide further organization for framing research, Scheufele (1999) categorized news framing studies into four typologies: Media frames as dependent variable or independent variable, and individual frames as dependent variable or independent variable. In this typology, much emphasis is placed on the “structural dimensions” that influence frame formation, as defined by Pan and Kosicki (1993): “A) syntactic structures, or patterns in the arrangements of words or phrases; B) script structures, referring to the general newsworthiness of an event as well as the intention to communicate news and events to the audience that transcends their limited sensory experiences; C) thematic structures, reflecting the tendency of journalists to impose a causal theme on their news stories, either in the form of explicit causal statements or by linking observations to the direct quote of a source; and D) rhetorical structures, referring to the “stylistic choices made by journalists in relation to their intended effects” (p. 61).

This approach to framing is facilitated through the tools of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as put forth by critical discourse analysts Richardson (2007) and Fairclough (2003). Frames can be arrived at through analyzing the framing devices used to create them—these can be at the level of the individual word, in the way a sentence is structured, how metaphors are used, how “previous texts” and discourse types are woven together to form a new text. Both Richardson and Fairclough espoused the idea that everything in a media text is there because of deliberate choices made on the part of media producers. Far from being inconsequential, these choices in language merit serious analysis. “The linguistic choices that are made in texts may carry ideological meaning” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 25)—choices with far-reaching consequences. Richardson, too,
highlighted the power and social effects of how journalism and journalistic language is framed. “Through its power to shape issue agendas and public discourse, it can reinforce beliefs; it can shape people’s opinions not only of the world but also of their place and role in the world … in sum, it can help shape social reality by shaping our views of social reality” (Richardson, 2007, p. 13). Richardson asserted that professional journalists engage in practices that are meant to distance them personally from the stories they report. They use sources to offer opinions instead of offering their own and they draw on studies, reports, and other background information—“facts”—to provide context and inform their readership. And yet, even these practices are inherently subjective, as the reporter chooses whom to interview and what studies to rely upon. Additionally, the question of sourcing, or “who gets to speak,” in a news story is often answered by objective journalism’s reliance on official sources, thus tilting coverage in favor of the elite and powerful (pp. 88-89).

Metaphors as news frames have been critiqued for distorting events, particularly international events like war, and portraying certain groups as deviant. Hallin’s (1986) model of ideological spheres provides a framework for understanding how this happens. He identified three spheres—what he termed the “sphere of consensus,” the “sphere of legitimate controversy,” and “the sphere of deviance” (p. 117). In the latter sphere, an ideological realm outside American mainstream consensus, journalism “plays the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda those who violate or challenge the political consensus. It marks out and defends the limits of acceptable
conflict” (p. 117). In his study of the New Left and the anti-war movement of the 1960s, Gitlin (1980) described the various ways that media coverage of the radical student group Students for a Democratic Society framed them disparagingly by, for example, highlighting dissension, trivializing efforts, and presenting them as Communists and threats to the nation. Gitlin also critiqued media coverage for a tendency to rely on government/official sources, which framed the news in favor of the status quo. “The mass media have become core systems for the distribution of ideology … one important task of ideology is to define—and also to define away—its opposition” (p. 2).

On a similar note, Entman (2004) found that in times of national crisis or emergency, the news media often present dominant frames that are favorable toward government policy. Political issues can be framed in extremely narrow terms, such as was done during the Persian Gulf War as “war soon” or “sanctions first,” shunting aside any discussion of peaceful alternatives (p. 79). Pancake (1993) examined metaphor use found primarily in North Carolina and Virginia newspapers in the run-up to and during the Persian Gulf War, noting how the five structural metaphors generated by these newspapers appeared to be swiftly adopted from the official rhetoric of the Bush Administration and the Pentagon. When “Operation Desert Shield” morphed into “Desert

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17 TV talk-show host Bill Maher entered the “sphere of deviance” immediately after the September 11 attacks when he publicly contradicted President Bush’s designation of the 9/11 hijackers as “cowards.” Maher reportedly said on his now-defunct show, ABC’s Politically Incorrect: “We have been the cowards, lobbing cruise missiles from 2,000 miles away. That’s cowardly. Staying in the airplane when it hits the building, say what you want about it, it’s not cowardly” (Gerstein, 2001). The comments caused public outrage. Advertisers like Sears and FedEx pulled funding, and some ABC affiliates stopped airing the show. By June 2002, Politically Incorrect was canceled.

18 Lakoff and Johnson (1980) wrote that “structural metaphors” allow us to do more than just orient concepts, refer to them, quantify them, etc., as we do with simple metaphors; they allow us, in addition, to use one highly structured and delineated concept to structure another” (p. 61).
Storm,” as allied forces prepared to attack Iraq, Pancake documented how these newspapers almost seamlessly took up the structural metaphor “War is a Storm,” 19 as evidenced in headlines such as: “Bomb-laden allied warplanes thundered off the runways;” “The distant thunder of B-52s;”; and “Aircraft remains fall toward the gulf like rain” (p. 282). Similarly, Ibrahim’s (2009) content analysis of American network news coverage of Arab countries immediately following the September 11 attacks found that ABC, NBC, and CBS all framed their reports according to existing U.S. policy toward those countries—as either “enemies” or “friends.” Egypt and Saudi Arabia were portrayed as allies “despite the fact that the ringleader of the plot, Mohammed Atta, was Egyptian and 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi” (p. 279).

Analyzing texts through the lens of metaphor and frame analysis highlights the fact that the discourse of journalism—even that which adheres stringently to the professional standards of journalistic objectivity—is at the same time “inevitably value-laden” (Richardson, 2007, p. 87). Metaphors, and their resulting frames, are oftentimes carriers of these values. Although they reside in plain sight as the everyday language found in news headlines, captions, and stories, they also can be far more subtle. Fairclough (2003) cited a BBC radio report about how the Libyan government was prepared to hand over two suspects in the Lockerbie, Scotland, bombing to be tried in Scotland. Although both “sides” of the story were interviewed and given equal “space,” as dictated by the standards of professional journalism, Fairclough showed how through

19 The other four structural metaphors she identified include: “Machines are animate;” “War is a game;” “War is entertainment;” and “The war zone is the wild west.”
subtle word use, the Libyans still managed to come off as antagonistic and insincere in their claims to let the suspects go (pp. 83-84).

Rather than embracing journalism’s “watch-dog role” and challenging the ideological perspectives of dominant institutions and interests in U.S. society, such as government and corporate elites, the media all too often adopt them without question (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 224). Media, in this view, act as a key societal control mechanism where “the normal is reaffirmed by being presented routinely and in juxtaposition to the deviant” (p. 226).

**Stigmatized, Marginalized Groups**

Numerous studies have shed light on the prominent role of metaphor in the construction of frames, their tendency to adopt official government narratives, and their potential to portray marginalized groups as deviant, or threatening. O’Brien (2009) cited several pejorative metaphor themes that carry heavy ideological weight and have been used as framing devices over time. A few of these themes that are particularly pertinent to this dissertation include the “organism” metaphor; the “animal or subhuman” metaphor; and the “war or natural catastrophe” metaphor. “Each of these themes may be used either to dehumanize the group in question, describe them as an imminent threat to society against which we must defend ourselves, or a combination thereof” (p. 35).

A professor of social work, O’Brien mentioned the “welfare recipient as parasite” metaphor as an oft-used example of an organism metaphor. When the conceptual cross-mapping occurs between the source and target domains in this example, welfare recipients take on the denigrating characteristics of parasites—dependent, weak, lazy,
low, and potentially harmful to the “host” (p. 31). Similarly, the “Jew as bacillus” metaphor was employed by the Nazis to encourage a view of Jews as harmful to the nation, just as a virus is harmful to the human body. Musolff (2008) found that Hitler’s manifesto, Mein Kampf, was replete with references to Jews as parasites. Such references depicted Jews as lower life forms, far beneath the humanity and purity of Aryan Germans, and as serious threats to the German “body” (p. 3). O’Brien (2009) noted that source-target cross mappings such as these convey ideological positions vis-à-vis perceived social problems and oftentimes imply specific treatment recommendations that are expressed in public policy (pp. 31-32). “If Jews could be perceived as being like a bacillus or virus that threatened anyone with whom they came into contact, their segregation from the rest of the community in ghettos, and later their ‘disinfection,’ or mass killing, might be more easily accepted by Germans” (p. 32).

The “animal metaphor” is a popularly employed frame that is used to liken the targeted group to either subhuman status or as situated on a lower rung of the “scale of humanity.” Target groups are frequently represented as “either harmful (snakes, wolves, octopi), insignificant (ants, roaches), or both (parasites, rats, and termites)” (p. 37). Santa Ana’s (1999) oft-quoted study analyzed immigration coverage in the Los Angeles Times during the highly charged 1994 political debate over the anti-immigrant referendum Proposition 187. He found that the “animal metaphor” was repeatedly used in this coverage, casting immigrants and immigrant workers, primarily Latinos, as sub-human. Santa Ana isolated words and phrases in the news stories that demonstrated how, for
example, immigrants could be “lured, pitted, or baited” like animals, and how, like rabbits or other small creatures, they could be preyed upon (p. 200).

Once the source domain “animal” is mapped onto its target, “immigrant,” a dangerous line of reasoning can ensue. “On the hierarchy of living things, immigrants are animals. Citizens, in contrast, are humans” (p. 202). Situating immigrants as subhuman justifies denying them basic human rights and a host of social services—because, as subhuman, they do not need or deserve these things. When such racist depictions rise to the surface through metaphoric conflation, Santa Ana noted, they serve as a bellwether of xenophobic attitudes entrenched in public opinion at large. Perhaps not surprisingly, Proposition 187 passed overwhelmingly in California that year (though it was later struck down as unconstitutional).

Steuter and Wills (2008) analyzed newspaper, radio, political cartoons, and right-wing talk radio to show how the metaphors used in media coverage of the “war on terror” dehumanized the Arab/Muslim enemy and fueled pro-war propaganda. Their chapter “Rats in the Trap: Animal Metaphors in the News” documented how the news media employed symbolic vocabulary to liken terrorists to rats and vermin and to refer to their hideouts as “nests” or “lairs,” thereby constructing a “fabricated enemy” (p. 69). Similarly, the metaphor of the “hunt” is invoked, whereby hunters (i.e. American or British soldiers) “stalk, chase, track, snare, wound, kill, or bag” their prey (i.e. Saddam Hussein or Iraqis) (p. 73). This metaphor/symbol appeared in a variety of newspaper headlines such as: “As British close in on Basra, Iraqis Scurry Away;” “Terror Hunt
Snares Twenty-five;” “Coalition Forces Corral Dozens of Insurgents;” and “Pentagon Aims to Smoke [Saddam] Out” (p. 73).

Excerpts they cited from right-wing talk radio and television are perhaps even more alarming in that the hate speech put forward is broadcast to millions every day. Michael Savage, host of the nationally syndicated The Savage Nation that boasts 8.25 million listeners, has called for the obliteration of southern Lebanon, noting that the Lebanese are “sub-human” and calling for their mass executions (p. 137). Bill O’Reilly, the Fox News host of The O’Reilly Factor known for yelling “shut up” at his guests, has told his 3 million to 3.5 million viewers that Iraqis are “primitive” and “prehistoric” and likened the Koran to Mein Kampf. He also has advocated for bombing “the living day-lights” out of Iraq (p. 136).

Yet another common metaphorical frame is that of “war or natural catastrophe.” This theme employs militaristic language or language that evokes natural disasters when framing a group or an issue as threatening and worthy of emergency response. As Pancake’s study (1993), cited above, noted: “When readers see Operation Desert Storm used to name the war, they are invited to focus on those characteristics of a war that are ‘stormlike,’ ” (p. 283). Like a storm, tornado, or hurricane, the war came to be portrayed as a natural, inevitable event that could not be stopped. With protest or resistance to the war considered futile, popular support for Desert Storm grew. Pancake cited public opinion polls demonstrating that Americans quickly “got behind the troops,” suggesting a strong association with media language that may have “shaped public opinion in the Pentagon’s favor” (p. 293).
Cisneros (2008) compared television news coverage of New York state’s Love Canal environmental disaster of the late 1970s with television news coverage of immigration between September and December 2005 and found that Mexican immigrants were depicted as “pollutants” and threats to society, much like the toxic waste that oozed from the open wound of Love Canal. Echoing Lakoff and Johnson, Cisneros (2006) noted that these discursive representations of immigrants were key to understanding dominant cultural assumptions about them (p. 571). In other words, the stereotype preceded the metaphor. They also suggested implications for how to deal with the problem. “The best option to deal with the mobile threat presented in news media discourse is to corral and quarantine the pollutants,” he wrote. “The process of rounding up and deporting immigrants seems the ‘natural’ solution, just as cleaning up and disposing of the toxic waste of Love Canal seemed the only logical option” (p. 593). Cisneros noted how this stereotype apparently affected policy, such as the Secure Fence Act of 2006, which proposed building a 700-mile barrier along the U.S.-Mexico border. With repeated metaphor use of this nature, he wrote, immigrants came to be seen not like pollutants but as pollution itself, something harmful to human health that must be eradicated.

Additionally, in examining American, British, and Canadian newspaper coverage of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, which took place in 2005, Trckova (2012) found that these natural phenomena were described using the metaphoric themes of “animate being,” “monster,” and “warrior.” Such themes reinforce the longstanding Western dualism between humanity and nature, portraying nature as “deviant and as people’s enemy” (p. 149). They also mask any human responsibility for
the disasters’ impact on loss of life, as well as property and environmental damage. “The
natural disaster is wrongly depicted as something uncontrollable that could not have been
avoided. As a result, the government, officials and the society in general are void of any
blame for the event” (p. 149).

Much metaphor research has shown how when certain groups are dehumanized
through their identification with negative metaphors—of disease, rodents, insects,
pollution—or when an emergency becomes framed as a war or an inevitable storm, the
path becomes paved for dire consequences. When one thing is experienced or understood
as something else, there exists the possibility for “metaphoric transference or conflation”
(Steuter & Wills, 2008, p. 7), whereby once separate source and target domains begin to
merge. This phenomenon becomes particularly important when we consider the
dangerous potential for metaphoric transference or conflation. This is where one thing no
longer is viewed as something else, but becomes that other thing. These portrayals not
only dehumanize the groups in question but portray them as threats to society that require
and motivate action. “Metaphors may not only provide meaning about the alleged
essence of a thing, person, or group but may also carry overt or underlying messages
about the recommended modes of treating or responding to the target” (Schön, 1993, p.
154).

Steuter and Wills (2008) noted how during times of war historically the “enemy”
has been systematically dehumanized through the use of negative metaphors, for only by
dehumanizing the enemy can that enemy be destroyed. Dehumanizing language and
imagery were employed in Nazi Germany to refer to Jews as the bearers of disease that
required “hygienic cleansing” (p. 52). During World War II, the Japanese were depicted in the U.S. media as animals and insects. “The image of the Japanese as monkey was remarkably persistent, showing up repeatedly in political cartoons, along with the other dominant images of rats and bats; all three animals prominently featured pinched faces, squinty eyes, and protruding teeth” (p. 46). Reducing the Japanese to subhuman status is largely what made it possible to drop atomic bombs on them—killing hundreds of thousands—at Hiroshima and Nagasaki (p. 46).

Writing in the wake of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Dayan (2010) noted the way that nation has been described historically “as a metaphor for all kinds of bad things—degradation, demons, destruction, and dirt.” Dayan asked the crucial question of why it is that Haiti has been represented in this way. What is the purpose of these degrading metaphors? She argued that the metaphors employed to represent Haiti serve to justify the military interventions and “screen” the greed of those more powerful who have plundered Haiti and expropriated its resources. Whenever necessary, images of a “mythologized Haiti of zombies, sorcery, and witchdoctors” have been pulled out to divert attention from such abuse. Over time, these representations, based though they are on “stereotypes and sensationalism,” ossify in the public consciousness, becoming taken-for-granted knowledge.

Dayan pointed to yet another reason, as well. Echoing Said’s notion of Orientalism, which establishes the binary of a superior, rational, and civilized West, in contrast with an inferior, irrational, and chaotic East, she noted how a degraded and dehumanized Haiti has served as the perfect foil for the Western self-image of
civilization and culture. “Our selfhood is reflected, as in a distorting mirror, in our
notions of Haiti” (Dayan, 2010). Implicit in this binary relationship is the assumption that
Haiti, powerless and pitiful, is in need of rescue. “If Haiti stands as a metaphor for
misery, for helplessness, then outsiders can assume that such a nation needs the United
States to save it.”

But what if Haiti is not these things? Dayan brings us back to the basic definition
of metaphor—“understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 5). Her essay is a reminder that although metaphoric
conflation can and does take place, it is crucial to keep source and target separate.
Metaphor may describe or represent something else, but in the end it is not the thing it
describes or represents. “Precisely because a metaphor … is a representation, it contains,
it represents, it actually is a falsity” (Dayan 2010).

This is a powerful proviso that can begin to unravel the destructive metaphors
cited above. Immigrants are not pollutants who must be contained behind barriers and
fences. Arabs are not, in fact, rodents or animals; their homes are not “lairs” or “dens.”
And argument, no matter how unconsciously we may figure it as war, is not actually war.
If there is anything that motivates this study, it is precisely this need to dismantle false
depictions such as these, so that a fuller, more human understanding emerges of groups
that have been stereotyped and transformed into objects of revulsion, hate, and military
intervention.
Time’s Covers

In addition to linguistic metaphors, scholars have analyzed so-called visual metaphors, also called pictorial metaphors. These metaphors appear prominently in advertising and film but also on the covers of magazines (Forceville, 1998). One powerful example of visual metaphor is *Time’s* April 9, 2001, “Global Warming” cover depicting the earth as a fried egg in a cast-iron skillet. In this example, “earth” is the target domain, borrowing characteristics from the source domain—“fried egg”—to suggest the alarming rate at which temperatures across the globe are on the rise. Cover language further elucidates the imagery: “Climbing temperatures. Melting glaciers. Rising seas. All over the earth, we’re feeling the heat. Why isn’t Washington?” (*Time*, 2001). Visual metaphors such as this one are powerful symbols that leave impressions more enduring than images conjured solely from the written word (Dougolis, 2007).

Graber (1988) noted how pictures, particularly close-ups of individuals, are “invaluable for forming opinions about people” (p. 168). Such photographs “stirred emotions and produced feelings of positive or negative identification” with those depicted (p. 168). Editors, acting as gatekeepers, have the power to manipulate how individuals are represented visually (Moriarty, 1991). This is particularly true of magazine cover images, since covers “succinctly package an issue and prime how it ought to be viewed” (Popp & Mendelson, 2010, p. 204). Additionally, covers affect those who merely see them, even if they don’t read any accompanying articles; they are responsible for garnering new readers, keeping existing ones, and boosting subscription rates (p. 204).
Time’s longtime publisher Henry Luce was apparently well-aware of the power of the cover, long before it became the subject of scholarly attention. Under Luce, Time’s covers promoted the magazine’s editorial belief in powerful individuals as the newsmakers and shapers of history—the idea that “behind every news story was a personage and behind every personage a person” (Angeletti & Oliva, 2004, p. 33). Time helped in the making of these powerful individuals by placing them on the cover. In 1928, Time instituted its decades-long tradition of choosing a “Man of the Year” (changed in 1999 to “Person of the Year”) for the cover of its year-end issue, a distinction that was meant to single out the person who most impacted the news of the previous 12 months. The designation was not intended so much as an honor as it was a commentary on the powerful, as with the choice of Adolf Hitler in 1938 and Joseph Stalin in 1939. Popp and Mendelson (2010) found that visual images can be especially provocative because of their potential to “make journalistic statements that would not be acceptable to convey verbally” (p. 203).

One way scholars have unpacked and interpreted the meanings of visual images is through semiology and the concept of signs (also called semiotics). Manning (1987) defined semiology as “a mode of analysis that seeks to understand how signs perform or convey meaning in context” (as quoted in Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 83). Semiology has its roots in structural linguistics, pioneered by Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), the first to suggest that words were “signs,” or “signifiers,” linked to concepts or ideas that he called the “signified” (Penn, 2000, p. 228). Saussure posited that
the relationship between signifiers and the signified was not predetermined or “inevitable” (p. 228) but, rather, a result of cultural, societal, and historical construction.

Barthes (1977) applied semiology to the analysis of images, devising two levels of signification—denotative and connotative. The denotative level is the level of literal meaning, where, for example, a “fox” is defined as a “furry, reddish animal” (Penn, 2000, p. 228). That which is depicted, at this denotative level, attains significance through the decisions leading to its selection for inclusion. In choosing to depict a fox, for example, one is choosing to bring to mind this four-legged creature and not some other mammal or reptile. The selection of the subject structures and frames the reader’s understanding of that which is being presented and represented for discussion and analysis. It does so not only in what is included but also in what is excluded from the image. Analysis of denotative signification thus requires attention to questions of presence and absence just as in the analysis of metaphors in the form of verbal statements (Popp & Mendelson, 2010, p. 205).

Signification, however, exists on yet a second, connotative level. The connotative level requires of the reader or viewer something more than straightforward, denotative knowledge. At this level, “fox” is the signifier, but the signified takes on the culturally prescribed idea of a fox as sly and cunning. The sign “fox” in second-level signification, then, “becomes a vehicle for signification. It expresses a further concept not derived from the sign itself but from conventional, cultural knowledge” (Penn, 2000, p. 230). The activation of particular types of conventional knowledge and not others, however, relies on compositional clues—angles, shading, and the use of lines and shapes—within the
presentation of the image itself. Such clues will lead a viewer or reader to interpret the image of the fox as a metaphor for cunning or perhaps as a sexualized metaphor for female seductiveness. Though related, the two types of connotative signification may or may not be activated by an image. Whether they are depends on the compositional clues. Analysis at the connotative level, therefore, necessitates attention to the compositional elements that are “in essence the adjectives that qualify the subject matter, suggesting how viewers should perceive a subject” (Popp & Mendelson, 2010, p. 205). In this way, images “work metaphorically to create meaning” (p. 205).

As metaphors, images can refer the viewer to other images and in doing so draw on shared cultural memories, thereby creating “frame images” that suggest an interpretation of a present event by relating it to a commonly understood and remembered past occurrence. Popp and Mendelson (2010) recalled how illustrators during the period of the Second World War often alluded to Lincoln and the Civil War. Viewers were thus invited to interpret the present conflict in relation to the narratives and affects associated with the earlier event.

Finally, the interpretation of an image is often shaped through the adding of linguistic elements. Captions “point[…] audiences to a preferred reading” (Fiske, 1990; Hall, 1973; as cited in Popp & Mendelson, 2010, p. 206). The presence of text thus narrows the interpretive options for a viewer. Text can vary in degree and form. An “X” placed through an image can function linguistically to signal negation; it implies a “not” or “no” to the viewers. Conversely, the absence of text allows a wider set of interpretive
possibilities, allowing what is depicted to become “merely a generic symbol of a larger group” (Edwards, 1990; as cited in Popp & Mendelson, 2010, p. 206).

**Method**

A qualitative textual analysis was conducted using critical discourse analysis (CDA) as espoused by the prominent British media analysts Fairclough (2003) and Richardson (2007), as well as by scholars who have studied metaphoric language in the news media (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; van Dijk, 1988; Cameron & Low, 1999; Charteris-Black, 2005). According to these scholars, the first step involves identifying the text or set of texts to be studied—texts can include everything from transcripts of evening news broadcasts to a collection of newspaper or magazine stories. As with the quantitative portion of this study, the texts were drawn from 271 *Time* feature stories about Arabs and the Arab world that appeared in *Time*’s U.S. edition during the period 2001-2011. These stories were examined thoroughly—including headlines, subheads, captions, and accompanying photographs—with an eye toward the dominant metaphors that emerged.

After the 271 stories were perused, a smaller group of articles, totaling approximately 20 percent of the data set, was selected for closer analysis. Once the smaller set of stories was chosen, their texts, and the metaphors embedded within them, were read carefully and interpreted, then unpacked of their meanings using a multilayered approach and a variety of analytical “tools” borrowed from critical discourse analysis.

One such tool was “lexical analysis,” or a focus on word use. The nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs used in journalistic discourse merit close scrutiny for several reasons. Richardson (2007) noted that words—always appearing in the text by deliberate
choice—carry denotative as well as connotative meanings (p. 47). One type of word use is what Richardson called “naming and reference.” The choice of how to refer to an individual mentioned or featured in a story might subtly influence how readers view the individual. Thus, for example, when a leader of an Arab country is given the “dictator” label, a range of connotations may be evoked in readers’ minds that link the leader to other infamous dictators such as Hitler or Stalin who, in U.S. society and culture, signify great evil. Similarly, a second type of lexical analysis focuses on what Richardson called “predication.” Predication entails the choice of adjectival phrases that attribute “values and characteristics [to a] social actor.” These phrases can include metaphors and a range of rhetorical figures, such as puns, ironies, oxymorons, and hyperboles (p. 52). For example, Richardson referred to how a British newspaper described actress Tina O’Brien, who starred in the British soap opera “Coronation Street,” as “Coronation Babe Tina O’Brien” and a “pint-sized stunner” (p. 52). These descriptions attributed “desirability” to O’Brien’s physical appearance. Embedded in adjectives like these are metaphors that function to categorize individuals and groups in ways that carry underlying ideological assumptions. To refer to a woman as a “babe” is to place her metaphorically within the category of “pin-up girl.” The analysis of this metaphor might then probe how it naturalizes certain gendered attitudes about women as objects of sexual conquest and control by men. Words and metaphors, thus, play a key role in framing. Richardson (2007) wrote: “The words used to communicate the messages of a text—whether about an individual, a group of people, an event, or any of the subjects and themes of newspaper texts—frame the story in direct and unavoidable ways” (p. 48). This study
seeks to examine what frames are present in *Time* magazine stories and to what extent they reflect the ideological perspectives of dominant institutions and interests in U.S. society, such as government and corporate elites.

Several additional tools used in this analysis were drawn from what Richardson (2007) called the “discursive practices” (p. 75) of journalists, the practices and standards of professional journalism that shape media content. These tools include attention to sources, news values, and the absence or presence of information. Professional journalism’s deeply ingrained reliance on official sources, such as police and government, to make a story “authoritative” can result in a portrayal of reality that all too often supports, rather than challenges, the status quo. Similarly, the use of conventional “news values” such as timeliness, proximity, and conflict—values that have become common practice among professional journalists in determining what constitutes news—can have a distorting effect on media content. Richardson (2007) cited studies that showed how foreign news can become solely focused on war, violence, and deviant behavior like terrorism due to the news value “conflict” that gets employed in foreign coverage. Yet another tool for conducting a close reading of journalistic discourse is an awareness of not only what is present in the text but what is absent—what Fairclough (2003) called the “things which might have been ‘there,’ but aren’t” (p. 106). “Absences” can include lack of historical background or context in a given story, or the invisibility of certain topics, such as civilian casualties in war. Fairclough (2003) pointed out that oftentimes absence/presence is not so stark but rather entails a “scale of presence, running from ‘absent’ to ‘foregrounded’ ” (p. 106).
Finally, all of *Time’s* 495 U.S. edition covers that ran between 2001 and 2011 were obtained from the *Time.com* web site. From these, covers featuring Arabs and the Arab world were selected, totaling 33. The covers were then analyzed for their visual metaphors and meanings (Forceville, 1998), using semiology as it applies to visual images (Barthes, 1977). Covers were then categorized by theme, further illustrating and emphasizing findings from the qualitative results.

**Qualitative Interpretation**

In the qualitative portion of this study, two repetitive and competing metaphorical frames were identified: “Arabs as Moderns” versus “Arabs as Atavists.” These frames presented an overarching binary of modernity versus backwardness that persisted throughout the 11 years of coverage studied. In the first frame, Arab individuals, leaders, and societies were presented as “modern,” in as much as they resembled the West—in particular Americans—in their dress, aspirations, societal norms, use of technology, and entrepreneurial spirit, and in the ways that they distinguished themselves from the atavistic elements in their own societies, i.e. jihadists. When the modernity frame appeared, Arabs were presented in images and textual descriptions as being like “us,” in their actions, appearance, and desires. As such, they likely resembled or resonated with the readership of *Time’s* U.S. edition. In the competing frame, Arabs were presented as atavistic. Atavism is defined here as a regression to values that are opposed to modernity. These values include backwardness, authoritarianism, violence, religious fanaticism, and
oppression of women. Thus, atavism poses a threat to modern democratic societies and to groups desiring to achieve democratic reforms in their own societies. \(^{20}\)

The stories in the subset were selected because they were particularly representative of the “modern/atavistic” binary. Of these two frames, atavism was by far the more prominent. Thus, stories that exemplified atavism were further divided into four sub-categories: 1) backward societies; 2) corrupt authoritarians; 3) religious fanatics/violent sociopaths; and 4) deformed women/children/families. The results are detailed below.

*Failed Society, Pathological People*

The metaphor of “failed societies” appears repeatedly throughout *Time*’s coverage of the Middle East. It is most discernible in articles that profile “problematic” countries like Yemen or the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip. But it also appears in articles in which other metaphorical frames—corrupt authoritarians, violent sociopaths, and deformed women—are dominant. In these other articles, the “failed society” metaphor plays an explanatory role: backward or broken societies, the metaphor implies, produce pathological people. Underlying this image and the explanation it offers is the long-established Orientalist trope of “the East” as decayed and atavistic, the contrary of the progressive, modernized, and civilized West. Indeed, as *Time*’s readers encounter these descriptions of failed Arab societies, they are invited implicitly to compare the degradation of the East to the ideal social model of the West, which is understood as free,

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\(^{20}\) In using the categories “atavistic” and “modern,” it is important to note that much of what *Time* implicitly presents as atavistic is actually quite modern. Islamic fundamentalism, for example, is a modern phenomenon that accompanied the rise of 20\(^{th}\)-century nationalism in the Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, began in 1928 as a response to British colonialism (Ahmed, 1992, p. 192).
democratic, concerned for the rights of the individual, but also threatened by the violence of an East in crisis. This “East in crisis” is a danger to Westerners; but, as illustrated further below, it also threatens modernizing Arabs who desire to reform their societies to be more like the West.

The “failed society” metaphor emerges directly in articles about countries that have become the object of violent U.S. or Israeli interventions. In “An Unruly Backwater Tries Going Straight” (Radwan, 2002), Yemen is explicitly likened to a backward and crooked society whose leaders “disturbed by links to terror” can only but “flirt” with the idea of imposing order (p. 8). The first paragraph of the story provides a glimpse of this view. The reporter comes upon a wedding celebration where “a circle of turbaned men danced to a frenzied drumbeat, brandishing their silver swords and daggers” (p. 8). The revelry comes to an abrupt end when police arrive to arrest a guest who had just set off a celebratory round of automatic gunfire. The imagery is of a backward tribal society given to spasms of violence. The police can barely contain the fits of frenzy. President Ali Abdullah Saleh “claims he wants to end the country’s fabled lawlessness” because it has gotten out of hand: “It was one thing when tribesmen held foreign visitors for ransom; now it’s clear world-class terrorists have been using Yemen for major operations and recruitment” (p. 8). But Saleh faces an uphill struggle despite U.S. efforts to assist him because Yemenis are hostile to any hint of U.S. involvement. Or they are drugged-up and inept. The story features a photograph of a drug dealer, clinging to a rifle and looking high and giggly on the narcotic that he peddles. Radwan ends her story by quoting a
grandfather at the wedding celebration who tells her what he will do if the U.S. sends in troops: “I will give my grandchild a weapon to kick them out” (p. 8).

The theme of decay, backwardness, and violence also appears in profiles of Syria and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In “Postcard: Damascus” (Butters, 2008), Syria is described as “an anachronism: governed by a totalitarian regime, managed by Soviet-style central planners, and littered with the crumbling ruins of ancient civilizations” (p. 10). The Bush administration accuses it of “supporting anti-Israeli terrorists” (p. 10). But Syria is also undergoing an economic boom that has led to signs of modernization: a new art gallery, hip restaurants, cappuccino bars, and “skinny jeans” are replacing “the Baathist apparatchik look—leather jacket, bell bottoms, cigarette holder” (p. 10). This transformation may falter, however, because “the stern portraits of Assad on every block suggest that Damascus is not party central for the Middle East just yet” (p. 10). The forces of regression and totalitarian violence could cut short any chance of reform.

In “Where to Now?” (Rees, 2002d), Palestinian society is depicted as being caught in an unending spasm of nihilistic violence. The main photograph shows Ata Sarasra, a father, sitting amidst the wreckage of his destroyed home with a poster of his dead “bomber son” (p. 28), Hazim, affixed to a garbage can next to him. With money he had earned in the United Arab Emirates, Sarasra had built his seven-bedroom, concrete-and-cinder-block home in the West Bank town of Beit Jala, near Bethlehem, in the late 1990s soon after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Following the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process and start of the second Intifada in 2000, Hazim carried out a suicide bombing that injured five Israelis in Jerusalem. A day later,
the Israeli military destroyed the house, reviving the practice of home demolitions long decried by human rights groups as collective punishment (B’Tselem, 2011). Rees writes that such actions have contributed to the “escalating battle between the two sides” and that the violence of the conflict has “warped both sides” (pp. 28-29). But he concludes the discussion of Sarasra’s case by blaming him—and by extension all Palestinians: “Though it was Israeli ordnance that destroyed his house, the vicious action of his son Hazim lit the fuse. In fighting the intifadeh, the Palestinians have pulled the walls of their society down on themselves” (p. 29). Rees excludes entirely any analysis of the fundamental imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians and the fact that Israel occupies the Palestinian territories militarily. In the end, the violent backwardness of Palestinian society produces pathological actions that result in nihilistic self-destruction that the West—in this case, Israel—can only respond to through justifiable, defensive actions.

*Religious Fanaticism/Sociopathic Violence*

Another aspect of the atavism frame is that of “religious fanaticism/sociopathic violence.” This frame reveals *Time*’s penchant for covering Islam as an extremist religion associated with terrorism whose adherents are sociopaths bent on death and destruction. It includes the coverage of suicide bombers both in Iraq and in Palestine, otherwise anonymous individuals who adopt this lethal practice in the name of Islam. Stories about suicide bombers are usually accompanied by an almost stock image—a close-up or an extreme close-up of a masked face, only dark eyes and lashes showing. Palestinian and Iraqi suicide bombers exemplify a sort of sociopathic violence that *Time* reporting
repeatedly suggests is embedded in their societies. This is implied in several stories about Palestinian suicide bombers, including “Radicals on the Rise” (McGeary, 2001); “The Terror That Will Not Quit” (Rees, 2002c); “Why Suicide Bombing … is Now All the Rage” (Ripley, 2002); “Roadmap to Hell” (McGeary, 2003b); and “How to Deal with Hamas” (McGirk, 2007b). Similar themes are echoed in pieces about suicide bombers in Iraq in, for example, “Inside the Mind of an Iraqi Suicide Bomber” (Ghosh, 2005a); “Professor of Death” (Ghosh, 2005b); “Meet the New Jihad” (Ware, 2004a); and “Life Behind Enemy Lines” (Bennett & Ware, 2003).

Palestinians

The headline/subhead “Why Suicide Bombing is Now All the Rage: Among Palestinians, dying to kill has become a noble calling” (Ripley, 2002) uses catchy puns to suggest that suicide bombing is fast gaining popularity in Palestinian society.21 The phrase “all the rage” suggests that something is extremely fashionable and holds wide appeal. As a play on words, it also suggests that the widespread practice of this sociopathic violence among Palestinians is linked to a deep, irrational “rage” in the culture. This is underscored by the pun “dying to kill,” which suggests that Palestinians possess a longing for killing and a lust for shedding blood that has seemingly found its catharsis in the form of suicide-homicide. Palestinians from all walks are reportedly

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21 Although puns are common practice in magazine journalism headlines, their use here, regarding a topic so serious and gruesome, smacks of flippancy and poor taste.
scrambling to participate: “Volunteers … are coming forward faster than militant leaders can strap an explosive belt around their waist and send them off to kill and die” (p. 36).22

The dominant image accompanying the story is that of a man in a black hood and black leather jacket, unzipped to reveal two bombs strapped to his body (See Appendix A). He holds a rifle in his arms as he stares down a shadowy alleyway. The following two-page spread is a series of 24 close-ups of men and women who have committed suicide attacks. The layout is similar to that of a high school yearbook where classmates’ faces and names are accompanied by a small quote or a fanciful musing about the future. This yearbook, however, is a twisted assemblage of killers. Names and ages are provided for each individual, along with a tally of how many each one has killed or hurt and a short phrase about each one’s deadly deeds—“savaged a bar mitzvah”; “targeted a garden café”; “injured 60 at a bus stop”; “attacked a hotel on Passover”; “struck a train depot” (pp. 34-35). Presenting the material in this fashion suggests that in this society, there are no normal yearbooks. Nothing is normal, for this is a place of terror “that will not quit,” where “no matter what Israel tries, Palestinians keep blowing themselves up” (Rees, 2002).

The premise of the story is that these acts are no longer the domain of the radical fringe in Palestinian society but have been taken up by the mainstream. The profile of the Palestinian suicide bomber could once be described as a 17- to 22-year-old unmarried youth “facing a bleak future, fanatically religious, and … susceptible to Islam’s promise

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22 Suicide bombing is reportedly something of a “rage” in Iraq, as well. An Iraqi insurgent who goes by the assumed name “Marwan Abu Ubeida” gets giddy just thinking about blowing himself up. “I can’t wait. I’m ready to die now,” he told Time in “Inside the Mind of an Iraqi Suicide Bomber” (Ghosh, 2005a, p. 24). Abu Ubeida, 20, waited months to make the suicide volunteer list, and when he did, he says, “it was the happiest day of [his] life” (p. 24).
of a martyr’s place in paradise, complete with the affections of heaven’s black-eyed
virgins” (p. 36). In this initial profile, the suicide bomber is the victim of fanatical
religious indoctrination within an atavistic faith that promises sexual compensation for
the willingness to kill oneself for God. But this characterization no longer fits the
description of the kinds of individuals now signing up to die, such Raed Abdel-Hameed
Misk, 29, a “happily married” university lecturer and father of two, with a baby on the
way (McGeary, 2003b, p. 46), or Ayat Akhras, 18, a “straight-A student” who killed an
Israeli peer, prompting then-President George W. Bush to declare: “When an 18-year-old
Palestinian girl is induced to blow herself up and in the process kills a 17-year-old Israeli
girl, the future itself is dying” (Ripley, 2002, pp. 36-37). *Time* explains: “Among
Palestinians, it has become normal—noble, even—for promising men and women to
slaughter themselves in pursuit of revenge and the dignity it is thought to bring” (p. 36).
Bombers are lauded in newspaper announcements, and their families reap “cash, health
care, and prestige,” including a one-time gift of $20,000 from Saddam Hussein (p. 38).23

Because of the supposed widespread presence of sociopathic violence in
Palestinian society, all force used against Palestinians—no matter how brutal—is
seemingly justified and to be expected. This practice is reflected, for example, in how
Israeli assassinations of Palestinian leaders get covered. The sidebar “My Last Encounter
with Ismail Abu Shanab” (McGeary, 2003c) is an interview with Abu Shanab, a

23 Other stories reinforce the theme of endemic sociopathic violence, as well. The piece “Radicals on the
Rise” (McGeary, 2001) states that young Palestinian men “flock eagerly to the call of martyrdom” (p. 51)
and that the militant group Hamas has “almost too many volunteers” (p. 52). In “The Terror That Will Not
Quit” (Rees, 2002c), the subhead suggests a dogged Palestinian commitment to killing: “No matter what
Israel tries, Palestinians keep blowing themselves up,” and it echoes the theme of “willing human bombs”
that make “deterrence” impossible (p. 24).
moderate Hamas official, shortly before he was killed in an Israeli missile attack that targeted him in his car. A university professor who was educated in the United States, Abu Shanab had been a proponent of a Palestinian cease-fire, had never been a gunman, and had intimated that Hamas would accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—a departure from its charter which calls for reclaiming all of historic Palestine, including modern-day Israel. McGeary concedes that given his “softer tone,” Abu Shanab was “not the most obvious target for assassination” (p. 46).

However, McGeary injects a tone throughout the short piece that discredits Abu Shanab and undermines his perspective. She recounts sarcastically that upon arrival at Abu Shanab’s Gaza home for the interview her cell phone was “impounded” by his bodyguards before she could get “close to the boss” (p. 47). Abu Shanab attempts to give voice to a Palestinian perspective, putting suicide bombings into a context beyond a simple reduction to sociopathic violence. He explains the imbalance of power between the Palestinians who have no army and Israel, a country possessing one of the strongest militaries in the world: “We have no missiles to fire back. So we defend ourselves by the only means we have” (p. 46). McGeary takes this to show his “passionate support of violence” (p. 47). And she muses: “I wondered how a man of his sophistication and education had come to such beliefs” (p. 47). How he came to such beliefs, however, might be explained by McGeary’s own reporting. In the last paragraph of the sidebar, the reader learns that Abu Shanab spent eight years in Israel’s Ashkelon prison, two of which were in underground solitary confinement. Abu Shanab is the son of refugees from the village of al-Jayeh, near Ashkelon, ironically, who were “exiled to the miseries of Gaza”
Like millions of other Palestinian refugees, he longs to return to his home village. “If we fear Israel, that will leave them in our place,” he says. “So one of the lessons for us is never to let go of our land under fear of Israel” (p. 47). But “living by that logic has cost Ismail Abu Shanab the chance ever to go home again,” McGeary concludes. And as the caption that runs alongside a photograph of his inflamed and smoking car suggests, Abu Shanab’s death “was not a fate that should have come as a surprise to him” (p. 47).

When *Time* reporters are not injecting their own commentary into their stories, they inject a commentary of another sort through the sources they choose to rely upon and the prominence those sources enjoy. In “Why Suicide Bombing … is Now All the Rage” (Ripley, 2002), the two initial sources for the piece are Central Intelligence Agency psychiatrist Jerrold Post who, the reader is told, “has studied suicide bombings in the West Bank” (p. 36), as well as neoconservative historian Daniel Pipes, director of the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum and its web site Campus Watch, who is known for his anti-Muslim views. Pipes notes: “The suicide factory is in full tilt now. These are the rewards of having built an infrastructure” (p. 36). But *Time*’s own graphic undercuts this assertion. A table of suicide bombings by year shows zero bombings in 1999, four in 2000, then a leap to 36 in 2001 and 28 as of April 2002, when the article was published. Even though the number of bombings increased exponentially between 2000 and 2001, the actual number of bombings—36—hardly suggests that this is a widespread practice among the populace. Thirty-six suicide bombers—taken from a total of 3.8 million

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24 In addition to authoring several books, Pipes is a columnist for the *Washington Times* and has written numerous pieces disparaging Islam or calling into question those who may or may not adhere to it. Last fall, he wrote a series of articles that set out to prove President Obama was a Muslim (Pipes, 2012a, 2012b).
Palestinians living in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip (Associated Press, 2008)—represent only .000009 percent of the population, a far cry from a “full tilt” killing machine that has engulfed an entire society.

Of course, any number of suicide bombings in any society is troubling. Yet, very little context is provided to explain the conditions and complexities under which Palestinians live that might help readers understand why desperation runs deep enough to induce some to choose this destructive path. Only much deeper into the piece is there any attempt at an explanation or an alternative Palestinian view. Buried in the final paragraphs of the story, Samir Rantissi—coordinator of a group called the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition—condemns the attacks on Israeli civilians but explains them as the result of the “escalating frustration” of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. Much more could have been done to tease out this point. *Time* fails to deliver a more nuanced report of this type, however, instead reverting to the stereotypical shorthand of the “Arab terrorist,” a longstanding image in American media so commonplace and naturalized it eludes notice. Thus, sociopathic Arab violence remains the primary reason for a doomed peace between Israel and the Palestinians: “In a place where a suicide bomber—and father of two—blows up a bus with children on it,” McGeary writes (2003b, p. 45), “does Bush’s peace plan stand a chance?”

Iraqis

A similar notion is at play with respect to Iraq where the U.S. intervention aimed at overthrowing a dictatorship and bringing democracy to Iraqis faces an insurgency that also is characterized by a kind of suicidal violence. In Iraq, however, this tendency has
merged with a violent religious fanaticism. *Time’s* coverage of Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi, leader of the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq, serves as a preeminent example. Unlike rank-and-file suicide bombers whose faces are typically masked, the brazen al-Zarqawi dispenses with such coverings. He is, thus, the “face” of an insurgency fueled by radical Islam. *Time* articles refer to him as the “Face of Terror” (Ratnesar, 2004); “The Enemy with Many Faces” (Ware, 2004b); and someone with whom one is “Face to Face with Terror” (Ghosh, 2006a). Al-Zarqawi is also “The Apostle of Hate” (Ghosh, 2006b) whose death at the hands of U.S. troops in 2006 was a coup so celebrated that it merited a cover that month dedicated to the insurgent leader (See Appendix B).

The stories about al-Zarqawi are rich with metaphor. In “Face of Terror: How Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi transformed the Iraq insurgency into a holy war and became America’s newest nightmare” (Ratnesar, 2004), the metaphor of “Islam as a phantom menace” is evoked. Al-Zarqawi, representing radical Islam, is depicted as an evil spirit, a ghoulish presence elusive enough to vanish at a moment’s notice. The main image running across the opening two-page spread reinforces this metaphor. The image is a grainy, charcoal-and-ink drawing of al-Zarqawi’s staid visage. A curved scimitar, long associated with Orientalist depictions of “the East,” is suspended in the air, its blade running across his eyes like a bandit’s filmy mask (See Appendix C). Al-Zarqawi is described as a killer who “lives in the shadows” (p. 97). His identity is “obscure,” his lifestyle “ghostly” (p. 97). In “The Apostle of Hate” (Ghosh, 2006b), he is a “malevolent

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25 As the embodiment of radical Islam, al-Zarqawi himself actually becomes a metonym—standing in for the concept of radical Islam. A concise definition of metonymy comes from Jasinski (2001) who writes that this figure of speech “is a form of substitution in which something that is associated with X is substituted for X” (p. 551).
spirit” (p. 36) who is “conjure[d]” by the mere mention of his name and as such has the ability to “take any situation and bend it to his will” (p. 36). Written in the wake of al-Zarqawi’s death, the story’s accompanying image is also an illustration that perpetuates the “phantom menace” metaphor. In it, al-Zarqawi appears like an evil spirit who has descended into hell. In a skullcap worn by observant Muslim men, he is festooned with a tangle of wires—the equipment of the suicide bomber. He stares out at the reader coldly as a rendering of flames and smoke curl up behind him.

But al-Zarqawi is more than just an ethereal ghoul. He is also the quintessential atavistic religious fanatic, an apocalyptic figure exhorting a prophetic message—of hate. Al-Zarqawi is described as wanting to impose a “fundamentalist state” on Iraq, modeled after the Taliban’s “primeval strictures for Afghanistan” (Ratnesar, 2004, p. 98); he possesses the power to “lure” adherents and put them under a seeming spell (p. 98). As one Iraqi insurgent leader explained, “some just have to sit and listen to him … and they walk away committed” (p. 97). Al-Zarqawi’s ability to “exhort his followers to seek martyrdom in suicidal assaults” (p. 97) resulted in a cadre of insurgents willing to carry out a steady stream of atrocities in Iraq—a “daily horror show of suicide bombings, kidnappings, mass executions, and televised beheadings” (p. 97). Al-Zarqawi maintained street credibility among his followers through his willingness to fight alongside them. He reportedly decapitated American businessman Nicholas Berg in Iraq in 2004 with his own hands (Ghosh, 2006b, p. 36). Thus al-Zarqawi is the “jihad’s eminent fighter-superstar” who builds his reputation by “embracing and embellishing his infamy with
brazen declarations and brutal atrocities” (p. 36). Through the power of his message, he has turned Iraq into a “terrorist breeding ground” (Ghosh, 2006a, p. 40).

Al-Zarqawi is said to represent “the extreme Wahhabist version” of Islam. As an adherent of this version, he maintains a special hatred not only for Shi`ites, whom he would like to see “liquidated” (Ghosh, 2006b, p. 36), but also for those Sunnis who oppose him. In this willingness to kill fellow Arabs and Muslims, he departs radically even from bin Laden, who “learned to work with [Shi`ites]” (p. 37). Ghosh develops the religious fanatic theme, describing al-Zarqawi’s increasing acts of piety that model the Prophet Muhammad’s behavior, where he “took to mimicking the habits of the Prophet Muhammad recorded in Muslim texts, including the way he brushed his teeth and wore his sandals” (p. 37). His piety is further underscored in “Face to Face With Terror,” (Ghosh, 2006a) which provides an account of an al-Qaeda recruit who described an all-night prayer session with al-Zarqawi that included three hours of al-Zarqawi reciting by memory lengthy chapters from the Koran, “[breaking] into sobs and moans,” and “babbling incoherently, as if in a trance” (p. 40). After a lengthy discussion of the Prophet’s life, the session ended in the wee hours of dawn with al-Zarqawi issuing a command to launch a suicide-bombing campaign. It is presented as cause and effect, as if reading the Koran and meditating on the Prophet’s life necessarily fuels murderous acts. Al-Zarqawi possessed a lethal philosophy, supported it through a far-reaching interpretation of Islam, and carried it out through the deaths of hundreds. What is striking here, however, is that the descriptions of what makes al-Zarqawi a fanatical Wahhabist Muslim are actually practices carried out by pious Muslims around the world. His
brushing his teeth with a twig and wearing sandals like the Prophet is a kind of *imitatio muhammadii* similar to the Christian “imitation of Christ” (Schimmel, 1985; Ernst, 2003). Recitation of the Koran and a discussion of its meanings, too, are practices engaged in by mainstream Muslims everywhere. In presenting this behavior as an example of extremism, Ghosh subtly draws a link between the habits of pious Muslims and the murderous fanaticism of a small minority.

The various *Time* reporters who cover al-Zarqawi do make mention of the fact that al-Zarqawi’s “form of Islam”—Wahhabism—differs from others of which he disapproves, principally Shi‘ism and other forms of Sunnism (Ratnesar, 2004). In “Face to Face with Terror,” Ghosh (2006a) suggests that Zarqawi’s imitation of the Prophet may be a way to cast a more moderate image and appeal, to gain a respectability that has eluded him. By scrupulously mimicking the presumed practices of the Prophet, he effectively links his actions to the very model of purity and righteousness that pious Muslims seek. But in this calculated self-reinvention, al-Zarqawi—“like others who subscribe to extremist schools of Islam” (p. 41)—takes things too far. Whereas other pious Muslims might emphasize the Prophet’s “frugality, modesty, charity, and respect for elders” (p. 41), extremist Muslims will focus on minutiae that seem to miss the underlying moral principles embodied in Muhammad’s ways. Thus, a literalist like al-Zarqawi does “everything from right to left: he puts on his right shoe first, washes his right hand first after a meal, talks to people sitting on his right” (p. 41), and this literalism is evidence of extremism. Yet, what Ghosh describes as minutiae-minded literalism comprises practices that many devout Muslims might undertake in their effort to conform
their lives to the remembered example of the Prophet. Are all such Muslims to be taken as extremists supportive of al-Zarqawi and violent jihad?

Ghosh may not intend this implication—in fact his article generally focuses on al-Zarqawi’s presumed cynical motives in trying to remake himself by engaging in traditional acts of piety. Al-Zarqawi, in a sense, is meant to be seen as taking such piety overboard. However, this point is not made strongly enough; it is not so much absent but downplayed. What is absent, however, is a more thorough and nuanced background about Islam, for example, the fact that Wahhabism is itself complex, with its own variations and splits, including a “moderate” wing that argues for compatibility of Islam and democracy (Zaman & Euben, 2009). A related article entitled “Wahhabism: Toxic Faith?” (Van Biema & Crumley, 2003) does little to complicate the notions of extremism. The impact of these portrayals is a stereotyped cartoon version of Wahhabism that the reader might take to represent Islam as a whole.

Additionally, depicting al-Zarqawi as the primary cause of Iraq’s utter, violent disarray masks U.S. military responsibility for what has happened in Iraq. Ghosh blames al-Zarqawi for single-handedly “shatter[ing] the centuries-old sectarian balance in Iraq and set[ting] Shi`ites and Sunnis at one another’s throats” (p. 37). This civil war is Zarqawi’s “most poisonous legacy” (p. 37), one that will “haunt the world long after he’s gone” (Ghosh, 2006b, 36). The U.S. role in creating divisions between Sunni and Shi`ites that fed civil war in Iraq is absent from the story. Thus, the U.S. invasion and ongoing presence is implicitly justified.
Several *Time* covers reinforce the metaphors of sociopathic violence and religious fanaticism (See Appendix D). The December 15, 2003, cover “The Hidden Enemy” features an Iraqi insurgent against a shadowy background. His head and face are covered with a checked scarf, or *keffiyeh*; only his eyes are exposed. The insurgent’s rough hand grips a rocket launcher. Touted as a *Time* “exclusive,” the cover promises a story that takes readers “behind the lines with the insurgents sowing terror in Iraq.” The image assigns blame for the “terror in Iraq” squarely on the shoulders of insurgents. *Time* has decided who bears primary responsibility for Iraq’s instability and has made deliberate choices about how that threat is portrayed. Indeed, the image of the masked, angry, violent insurgent is recycled over and over again on *Time*’s covers. Angry Arabs, one in a *keffiyeh*, scream on the October 15, 2001, cover “Facing the Fury.” More screaming and angry gesticulations follow on the March 6, 2006, cover “Iraq: Breaking Point.” The dominance of these images highlights the absence of the United States’ role in the violence. U.S. soldiers are not shown committing any abuse; and normal, everyday Iraqis who are caught in the crosshairs of the violence are invisible. Similarly, the March 25, 2002, cover with the banner headline “Middle East” features an armed Palestinian man in a shoot-out with Israeli troops. In the background are other armed men, one wearing a mask similar to the Iraqi insurgent’s. The cover reads: “A Palestinian fires at an Israeli tank in Ramallah.” The reader might have been shown the Israeli tank firing at Palestinians but is not. Israeli and U.S. violence is backgrounded or made invisible on these covers, while sociopathic Arab violence and rage is highlighted. The Arab world, thus, is depicted as a dangerous place, full of masked and furious men who take aim at a
rational West, a disciplining parent who resorts to violence only reluctantly and when it must do so to quell Arab rage.

*Time* has reserved what it calls its “big-red-X treatment” (Letters, 2006) for what it apparently deems to be history’s worst war criminals. Initiated in May 1945, the red X, dripping with blood, was slashed across the face of Adolf Hitler just after his death. The X lay dormant for nearly 60 years until 2003, when it was resurrected for the April 21, 2003, cover marking the capture of Saddam Hussein. It appeared again just three years later on *Time*’s June 19, 2006, cover featuring Iraq’s insurgent leader Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi. As with Hitler and Hussein, the cover design depicts only al-Zarqawi’s head floating in a white haze, as if decapitated. The large, bloody X running across his face signifies annihilation—and victory. *Time* editors explained the Hitler/Hussein covers:

Unsure of what had happened to Hitler but certain that his rule was finished, *Time* ran on its cover a portrait of Hitler with a bloody X through it. … Like Hitler, Saddam became the target of a U.S.-led war, and like Hitler, he had a reign that collapsed before the exact circumstances of his downfall became known. … No one knows for sure whether the Iraqi ruler is dead or alive. But this much was clear last week: Saddam Hussein’s regime had been ‘X-ed.’” (“When Regimes Get the ‘X,’” 2003)

Later, on May 20, 2011, *Time* X-ed out Osama bin Laden after his capture and killing (For all “Red X” covers, see Appendix B).
Corrupt Authoritarians: Failed Leaders

Another metaphorical frame that emerged from the “atavism” category is that of “corrupt authoritarians/failed leaders.” The *Time* articles in this study provide coverage of several leaders, from Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, to the Palestinians’ Yasser Arafat. All of these leaders are portrayed, in one way or another, as failed autocrats—corrupt, inept, untrustworthy, thuggish, brutal, or all of the above.

Saleh, for example, is described in the article “The Most Fragile Ally” (Butters, 2010) as ruling Yemen “using the classic techniques of a Middle Eastern strongman—clamping down on the press, concentrating military and economic power in the hands of friends and family, and winning elections by suspiciously high margins” (p. 34). Are Middle Eastern “strongmen” somehow more ruthless than strongmen from other regions of the world? Do they have their own especially egregious “classic techniques” that set them apart from the world’s other dictators? Unwittingly or not, Butters invokes the Orientalist stereotype of the Arab “villain” (Shaheen, 2009, pp. 20-25), in this case a ruler who is outstanding in his brutality and backwardness.

And yet, Saleh’s strongman traits are perhaps matched only by his incompetence and shiftiness. Butters reports that al-Qaeda has increasingly used Yemen to train terrorists and that Salah has been “lax” (p. 34) in controlling this burgeoning threat. Despite his professed allegiance to the United States, he is a “fickle” (p. 34) leader who cannot be trusted as a true ally. Butters calls Yemen a “breeding ground” for extremism, invoking an animal metaphor; the phrase “breeding ground” can mean “the place to which animals go to breed” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary). The metaphor reduces
Yemen as a whole to a subhuman level and thereby prepares it, rhetorically, to become a legitimate target for violent intervention. The failure of Saleh to prevent this degradation of his country further reinforces the implicit claim that Yemen now represents a threat that must be controlled. Since December 2009, the Obama administration, as part of its covert warfare policy, has launched multiple drone strikes targeting putative al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen and elsewhere. These attacks, however, have also killed civilians and have been criticized for violating international conventions governing the use of force (Worth, Mazzetti & Shane, 2003; Bowcott, 2012).

*Time*’s coverage of Yemen is actually scant with only three articles appearing between 2001 and 2011, a fact that emphasizes the importance of discursive practices that rely on established metaphorical frames, in this case the “authoritarian leader” and “backward society” metaphors. Few reporting resources are devoted to Yemen, further reinforcing the temptation to draw on stock assumptions and images in lieu of actual on-the-ground reporting that seeks to go beyond the received stereotypes of a regime or society. Yet, even when *Time* invests considerably greater effort in other Middle Eastern countries than it does in Yemen, the results are nevertheless similar. For example, *Time* devotes inordinate coverage to the Occupied Palestinian Territories and to Iraq. (The quantitative portion of this study showed that 18 percent of stories were devoted to Palestine and 38 percent to Iraq). Its reporting in these locations, however, replicates the same linguistic and discursive strategies as the ones found in its Yemen coverage. These strategies become visible in its stories about Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, who died in November 2004 at age 75.
The *Time* articles about Arafat find him in the final years of his storied life, a one-time revolutionary now but a withering shadow of his former self. Founder of the secular-nationalist Fatah movement in the 1950s, Arafat served as chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) from several posts in exile during a nearly 40-year career that saw his transformation in the world’s eye from revolutionary/“terrorist” to peacemaker and finally to corrupt autocrat.26 These shifts coincided with the rise and fall of the Oslo Peace Process, which began in 1993 with the secret negotiation of a “memorandum of understanding” with Israel in Oslo, Norway. As a result of this agreement, Arafat and the P.L.O. leadership were allowed to return to the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 1994 to establish the Palestinian National Authority (P.N.A.), first in the Gaza Strip and then in parts of the West Bank. Initially skeptical of the agreement, the Palestinian populace rejoiced at the return of the P.L.O. and the creation of the new semi-autonomous P.N.A., which was given limited control in highly circumscribed areas within the Occupied Territories. The failure of the Oslo process to lead to significant Israeli territorial concessions and the formation of a sovereign Palestinian state, however, ultimately undermined the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of many Palestinians. Israeli land confiscations and settlement building meanwhile

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26 Arafat grew up in Egypt; fought against Zionist forces in the Gaza area in 1948; founded the Fatah movement during the 1950s; and eventually led a successful takeover of the Palestinian Liberation Organization soon after the 1967 war. He served as P.L.O. chairman until his death in 2004. In 1982, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon forced Arafat and the rest of the P.L.O. leadership to relocate their center of operations to Algeria and then Tunisia. The first Intifada (1987-1993) renewed the P.L.O.’s international standing, leading the organization to declare Palestinian independence and to secure the opening of an official diplomatic dialogue with the United States. Then, following the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. initiated the Madrid negotiations (1992-1993) between the Palestinians and Israel. Although denied the status of official representative of the Palestinians at the negotiations, Arafat and the P.L.O. nevertheless exploited back-channel discussions with Israel’s leaders, ultimately resulting in the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords on the White House Lawn. For their efforts, Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993.
not only continued but intensified. Arafat and the upper echelon of P.L.O. leaders, too, developed a reputation for corruption. In September 2000, widespread frustration with the Oslo process erupted into a second, much more violent uprising. Blamed by the U.S. and Israel for refusing to accept Israel’s “generous offer” for an all-or-nothing final deal, Arafat soon found himself under Israeli military siege in his headquarters in Ramallah.

Arafat is depicted by *Time* as the consummate “failed” leader (Ratnesar, 2003, p.40; Beyer, 2004, p. 53) whose personal flaws wrecked all chances for peace with Israel and an independent Palestinian state—his lifelong goal. Arafat is described as “sulky” (Rees, 2003a, p. 42) and “sullen” (Rees, 2002a, p. 45), unable to get along with even those closest to him, like his longtime P.L.O. No. 2 man Mahmoud Abbas (Rees, 2003a). His government is “corrupt” and “incompetent” (Beyer, 2002, p. 36), his financial mismanagement legendary (Rees, 2004). But Arafat’s real downfall appears to be his obstinacy (Beyer, 2004, p. 54) and rejectionism in his dealings with Israel. In the story “The Eternal Agitator” (Beyer, 2004), the subhead places the blame for a failed Israeli-Palestinian peace squarely on Arafat’s shoulders: “He shook the world by demanding justice for the Palestinians. But Arafat’s *defiance* [italics added] ruined his chances to win them independence” (p. 50).

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Arafat is further degraded by the lexical choices running throughout the stories about him that make him appear like a beggar or tramp. In “Waiting for History to Happen” (MacLeod, 2001), Arafat is presented as passive, feeble, and unfit to rule. He no longer makes history but waits for it to happen to him. Seated at a dining table in his Gaza office, surrounded by his “cronies” (p. 44), Arafat eats a late-night meal of vegetable soup, hard-boiled eggs, and flat bread with his “delicate, pasty fingers,” his lips “trembling with age” (p. 44). The room is dusty; the tablecloth is “frayed;” and the china plates are “dime-store” quality (p. 44). These descriptive choices serve to reinforce the portrait of Arafat and his leadership as dirty, threadbare, and easily breakable. Similarly, his West Bank compound, known as al-muqata, is described as “tattered” (Ratnesar, 2003, p. 40), “battered” (McGeary, 2004b, p. 46), “sorry,” “dilapidated,” and “bombed-out” (Beyer, 2004, p. 50). Readers are provided the details that in the final weeks of his life Arafat’s signature black-and-white checked ascot (companion to his signature headdress, or keffiyeh) was found to be “filthy” (Beyer, 2004, p. 50). Arafat comes across “more like a frail man surrounded by rubble than the builder of a future state” (Robinson, 2002, p. 47). The reader is given the impression that he could no more wipe the dribble off his chin than negotiate a peace deal with Israel.

A variety of devices are used in the stories about Arafat to discredit him and blame him for a botched Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. One such device is the use of an animal metaphor that likens Arafat to a rodent. Beyer (2004) writes that Arafat loves the cartoon Tom and Jerry and that this is fitting because he is very much like Jerry—the mouse—in that animated adventure, ever pursued and tormented by the cat, Tom. “All
his life, Arafat was the little guy of the Middle East,” Beyer writes, “scampering feverishly to avoid one lethal trap or another” (p. 50, italics added). He has survived these long, hard years as an embattled revolutionary because he seemingly possesses “the indestructible quality of an animated figure” (p. 50). In another piece, “Arafat’s Last Stand,” (Robinson, 2002) that animal metaphor is reiterated. Arafat is described as “trapped” (p. 46) and “penned in” (p. 47) by the Israeli military in his West Bank headquarters, “his oldest enemies once again closing in around him” (p. 46). In “Inside Arafat’s Bunker,” he “paces back and forth the 15 yards from one end of his Spartan office to the other” (Rees, 2002, p. 44), like a caged zoo animal.

Another metaphor that permeates this study is that of the “inscrutable Arab” whose mind is a seeming puzzle that must be solved by the rational Westerner. We see this in “What are they thinking? Inside the Minds of …” about Arafat and Israeli leader Ariel Sharon (Beyer, 2002) and in “Waiting for History to Happen” (MacLeod, 2001), whose sub-head reads: “Like it or not, Israel must still deal with Yasser Arafat. Here’s what makes him tick” (p. 44). This subhead suggests that by reading the article, one will gain insight into the Palestinian leader’s mental state. Perhaps this insight will be delivered, at least partially, in Arafat’s own words, for MacLeod asserts that he had “months of unparalleled access to Arafat” (p. 46). And yet, the only thing one learns about what makes Arafat “tick” is that on the eve of the Israeli elections, he is “terrified to the point of paranoia” (p. 44). Arafat is not quoted in any meaningful way anywhere else in the five-page article. Indeed, it is not clear that MacLeod spoke to him at all, except at the very end, where he mutters in poorly worded English: “I don’t care for what
everybody speaks about me … I am dealing with facts and realities, not with my dreams” (p. 48). Thus, something is promised—even hyped—then not delivered. The absence of Arafat’s “voice” in the story calls into question the integrity of MacLeod’s other reporting, such as his description of Arafat’s shoddy décor and evening meal. Was he actually in the room he describes? And if so, why did he not ask Arafat a question? The Palestinian leader was apparently sitting right there eating soup. This lack of reporting constitutes a significant omission that enables the foregrounding of the “inscrutable Arab” metaphorical frame. Arafat is hardly allowed to speak and never given the chance to have his perspective taken seriously. Instead, the Western reporter acts as analyst, his or her summations a substitute for what might have been Arafat’s own explanations. The “Arab mind,” as implied in this metaphor, operates irrationally. It is deceiving, conniving, not to be trusted. In the end, it is a failure.

Curiously, the Palestinians, specifically Arafat, are blamed for the failure of Oslo, despite the fact that Time actually explains the reasons why they could not accept peace on Oslo’s terms. Time acknowledges that Oslo required concessions that Arafat could never sell to his people, for example relinquishing claim to all or most of East Jerusalem; allowing Israeli settlements, illegal under international law, to remain in the West Bank; and denying the 1 million refugees from 1948 the “right to return” to their land and homes in Israel, a right sanctioned by the United Nations, in U.N. resolution 194. Instead Arafat “flipped” (Beyer, 2002, p. 36), walking away from the most generous offer Israel ever made and starting a violent revolution, the second Intifada. At the time, this was President Clinton’s explanation for Oslo’s failure. Thus, Time adopts and then parrots the
official U.S. government perspective. “Oslo, the greatest trophy of Arafat’s career, is history … Even if Sharon comes and goes, as Barak, Netanyahu, Peres, and Rabin did before him, Arafat must discover a new way of dealing with the Israelis. Otherwise, he will never persuade them to give the Palestinians what they want” (MacLeod, 2001, p. 48).

Time’s April 8, 2002, cover picks up on these metaphors (See Appendix E). It features an aging Arafat looking plaintively into the camera, a figure frozen in defeat. The cover language “All Boxed In” describes his plight—that of a fading revolutionary leader, now “boxed in” at his crumbling West Bank headquarters. Arafat is seated against a very dark background; seen from the knees up, he appears hemmed in by the cover’s claustrophobic borders. He is like an animal in a cage—or a prisoner in a closet or interrogation room. A stream of light from above casts a thin ray upon the aging leader who is dressed meticulously in his signature military uniform; his lapel medals shimmer, adding irony to the portrayal. It’s as if he shined them for the Time portrait, a last chance at the international media spotlight. Arafat also sports his white-and-black checked keffiyeh, a cultural scarf reminiscent of a peasant past that Palestinians recognize as a symbol of national resistance. They would see in the cover image things that typical Time readers likely would not—that Arafat wears the scarf draped across his right shoulder, in shape of historic Palestine. Most American readers, however, might see only a terrorist and be reassured by his confinement.

The linguistic and discursive strategies encountered in the coverage of Arafat produce an image of the corrupt authoritarian leader that parallels the description of
President Saleh of Yemen. Both men are weak, fickle, irrational, and prone to violence at different points in their career; ultimately, they are of little use to the United States and its allies such as Israel, who must resort to intrepid intelligence and violent interventions to defend themselves and preserve order. Precisely the same tropes structure the presentation of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Unlike Arafat or Saleh, however, Hussein emerges as an exceedingly brutal autocrat who, in the end, can only be dealt with through massive and overwhelming Western military force that unseats and replaces him with a “rational” democratic order.

As documented in the quantitative findings of this study, Iraq received by far the majority of *Time*’s coverage of the Middle East during 2001-2011. During this period, the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was targeted by the U.S. government and toppled by invading U.S.-led military forces in March 2003. Hussein’s sons Uday and Qusay, Saddam’s heir apparent, were killed in August 2003, and Saddam was subsequently captured, imprisoned, tried in court, and sentenced to death. His execution by hanging was broadcast on Iraqi television in December 2006. *Time* chronicled all of these events. However, a cluster of articles written between 2002 and 2004—just before, during, and after his downfall—focused specifically on the Iraqi president’s utterly failed leadership, from his miscalculated “bluffing” (McGeary, 2004a) over the state of his weapons stockpiles, to his brutality and thuggish tactics (and those of his sons). Stories such as “Inside Saddam’s World” (McGeary, 2002a), “Inside Saddam’s Head” (McGeary, 2003a); and “What Saddam was Really Thinking” (McGeary, 2004a) are efforts to dissect and probe the mind of an inexplicably deviant man, explaining the
seemingly unexplainable to *Time*’s readership. In these stories, the Arab mind as a metaphoric “puzzle” is repeatedly invoked, as it was in the coverage of Arafat’s final years. “The West has been trying to understand Saddam’s psyche for years,” McGeary writes (2002a, p. 28). Through the use of CIA documents, *Time* promises to put the pieces of this puzzle together, elucidating a psychological portrait of a leader with whom “Freud would have had a field day” (p. 58). A careful reading of the articles reveals a progressive deterioration over time in Hussein’s mental state, as disclosed by *Time*. In 2002, he is brutal but rational. After the U.S. invasion, Hussein remains ever brutal, though his sanity is now in question.

In “Inside Saddam’s World,” (McGeary, 2002a) some of what is revealed under the section break titled “Saddam’s Mind” (p. 28) has little to do with psychological traits: Hussein dyes his jet-black hair, smokes Cohiba cigars (supplied, significantly, by Fidel Castro, another autocrat figure who has challenged the United States throughout his career), walks with a limp, and has begun to favor a suit and tie over military fatigues (pp. 28-29). He admires Stalin and Machiavelli, and his Iraq is one where “Mussolini would have felt at home” (p. 27). Hussein was known to insulate himself with “paranoic security” (p. 29). McGeary quotes from a book by an Iraqi defector who had run Hussein’s atom-bomb program: “His way of maintaining power has always involved carrots and sticks. Club memberships, chauffeured cars, lavish houses, foreign travel … Torture, imprisonment, and execution are the lot of those who fail or offend” (p. 31). The CIA’s “psychological profile” of Hussein, issued just before the Persian Gulf War of 1991, when Iraq’s invasion of neighboring Kuwait resulted in swift U.S. military
intervention, has changed little since (p. 29). In it, CIA profilers found that Hussein was “a stable personality and a rational, calculating decision maker. They had no evidence he suffered from mental illness … but [he] was comfortable wielding absolute power, using naked force and taking risks. He was wary and opportunistic and relied only on himself to make decisions. And his sense of mission could taint his judgments” (pp. 29-31). The same arguably could have been said of his archenemy at the time, George Bush, Sr.

But by the next year, Hussein’s mental state was apparently skidding, seemingly in tandem with his vise-grip on power. By late March 2003, U.S.-led forces had invaded Iraq, and Hussein’s days were numbered. Barring an actual interview with the country’s soon-to-be deposed president, McGeary nonetheless ventures again “Inside Saddam’s Head” (McGeary, 2003a). Under the section heading “Iraq: Understanding Saddam” McGeary asks why, in the face of Hussein’s certain demise at the hands of invading U.S. troops, he didn’t know when it was time to “come clean” about his weapons-of-mass-destruction program when doing so could have saved his regime. Hussein’s obsession with unconventional weapons “seems inexplicable to many minds, but it made sense in Saddam’s” (p. 56, italics added). He was “crazy” to go on Iraqi national TV on the eve of the war to assure the public that Iraq would be victorious; even though he was “lucid enough to know his military was no match for U.S. might” (p. 57, italics added).

What gives? McGeary finds an explanation with Jerrold Post, a Central Intelligence Agency psychiatrist who points to Hussein’s hideous childhood, including his relationship with a “suicidal mother who tried to abort him;” abuse he endured at the brutal hands of his mother’s second husband; and his tutelage under the “ardent
nationalist and embittered former army officer’’ uncle who eventually raised him (p. 58). As a result of these experiences, “naked force and utter ruthlessness were Saddam’s preferred methods for staying atop his country’s turbulent politics” (p. 58). This picture of paranoia provides the basis for two other metaphors that emerge in Time’s reporting on Hussein. The first one is that of the Mafia don. Hussein in concert with his sons Uday and Qusay is said to have “operated like a Mafia family, deeply secretive and mistrustful of outsiders” (p. 58). The second related metaphor is that of biological pathology. Hussein’s paranoia acquires the quality of a genetic mutation that gets passed on to his sons in a much more virulent form, if that were imaginable, than the one that has warped the father’s personality. This metaphor of genetic mutation plays as well on the idea that Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons.29 Articles that describe his sons in detail include “Targeting Saddam’s Inner Circle” (Kher, 2003) and “The Sum of Two Evils,” (Bennett & Weisskopf, 2003). The latter notes that the “nastiest biological weapons may have been [Hussein’s] sons, Uday and Qusay” (p. 35); in his sons, Saddam found “complementary strains that reflected elements of his

29 Saddam Hussein did indeed develop weapons of mass destruction, principally chemical weapons, which he used infamously to suppress Iraqi Kurds in the north of the country and also to repel Iranian infantry advances during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. During that war, the United States facilitated Iraq’s acquisition of dual-use equipment and biological and chemical precursors necessary for developing chemical weapons. U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq eventually documented that American and German companies supplied much of this material. The Reagan administration, moreover, was aware of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops—in clear violation of international conventions banning such use—but chose not to intervene. The U.S., as the Iran-Contra Affair revealed, also sold weapons to Iran. U.S. policy appeared aimed at perpetuating the Iran-Iraq War as long as possible as a means to weakening Iran while also not allowing Iraq to win or lose. Of key importance was the close relationship between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the C.I.A., which shared important battlefield intelligence with the Iraqi military. Ultimately, the war, which claimed approximately 1.5 million lives, ended in a stalemate. See Chadwick, A. & Schuster, M. (2005, September 22). U.S. links to Saddam during Iran-Iraq War. National Public Radio. See also Black, I. (2010, September 23). Iran and Iraq remember war that cost more than a million lives: Thirty years ago this week Saddam Hussein launched a ‘whirlwind war’ that lasted eight years. The Guardian; and Associated Press. (2002, October 1). Iraq got seeds for bioweapons from U.S. Baltimore Sun.
psyche” (p. 37). Uday was a drunken, sadistic rapist; and Qusay had no problem breaking kneecaps—or worse. These “strains” (p. 37) represent genetic mutations of the father’s own violent pathology.

As if readers still did not know what Saddam was really thinking, McGeary provides it with “What Saddam was Really Thinking” (McGeary, 2004a). Again she relies upon the CIA, this time a recently released intelligence document that “sheds fresh light” on Hussein’s “inner motivations and artful deceptions” and “richly fills in the previous portrait of a paranoid and brutal dictator” (p. 50). Readers learn, for example, that Hussein was “awed by science and impressed by the way technology conveyed military power,” including his ardent faith in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which he considered “a telling symbol of strength and modernity” (p. 50). In seeking to acquire these sources of strength, he betrays his own grandiosity complex. He is said to have “always hoped to dictate how history would view him. In his mind, he was the successor to great Iraqi heroes like Nebuchadnezzar and Saladin, to be revered as a giant among them for milleniums” (p. 50, italics added). At the root of such grandiosity, however, was a deep psychological wound inflicted by a deformed and atavistic society. His psychology, readers are told, was “powerfully shaped by a deprived and violent boyhood in a village and tribal society” (p. 51).

But in all of its psychologizing about Hussein, the article “buries the lead,” backgrounding a key finding of the report, which is: “When the U.S. invaded [Iraq] in March 2003, Saddam had not been armed with WMD for a decade and … his ability to make new ones had been in a state of continual degradation” (p. 51). McGeary reports that
Hussein, master of the “big bluff” (p. 50), had “everyone outside Iraq and just about everyone inside” believing he had a secret stash of weapons of mass destruction. The question, for her, is why Hussein had played this game. “If Saddam had destroyed his WMD to escape from sanctions, why did he work so hard from 1991 until he was overthrown in 2003 to perpetuate the belief he still had them?” McGeary’s question of why Hussein was bluffing, however, a question she poses in 2004 in response to the Duelfer report that verified the lack of Iraqi WMD, serves further to “bury the lead.” It does so by redirecting attention away from the fact that regardless of what the Hussein regime was claiming in the run up to the war, U.N. inspectors had certified well before 2003 that Iraq no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, although the sidebar to McGeary’s 2004 a story mentions Colin Powell’s testimony before the U.N., it never probes the Bush administration’s decision to use what it knew to be faulty intelligence in order to create a justification for war at the Security Council. Powell’s testimony and the motivations behind it are downplayed. Rather than subject the Bush administration’s claims to scrutiny Time, in this instance, chose to go with its dominant theme: Iraq was a violent backwater ruled by a corrupt autocrat who suffered from a grandiosity complex and who possessed the will to inflict unconscionable damage on his

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30 Apparently, Time was as much a victim of Saddam’s deception as everyone else. In “What Saddam’s Got” (Tyrangiel, 2002) and “What Does Saddam Have?” (McGeary, 2002b) the authors make the case that “strong evidence” pointed to the existence of continuing biological and chemical weapons stockpiles, as well as possible nuclear weapons. In “Inspections: Can They Work This Time?” Ratnesar (2002), drawing on U.S. and British governmental sources and academic experts, raises doubts as to whether a proposed new round of U.N. weapons inspections will actually be effective, the implication being that inspections have not worked previously and that Iraq actually still possesses WMD yet to be found.

people and the world community. No other countervailing reality would be allowed to challenge this frame. The overwhelming “presence” of Saddam Hussein’s paranoid perfidy thus functions effectively to mask the Bush administration’s deceptive actions. This frame harks back to the selectivity in *Time*’s portrayal of Chiang and Mao (Yu & Riffe, 1989), whereby editors rewrote dispatches to stay in line with U.S. foreign policy on China. For example, when Mao was considered hostile to the United States, he was depicted in an “unfavorable light,” his country referred to negatively as “Communist China” and “Red China” (p. 913).

Hussein is featured on *Time* covers six times between May 2002, during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, and December 2003, after his capture by U.S. troops (See Appendix E). The May 13, 2002, cover depicts Hussein in a white Panama hat, dark sunglasses, and a thick, dark moustache. Here, he is the Mafia don extraordinaire, bolstered by cover language that trumpets: “The Sinister World of Saddam.” By the following September, the sunglasses have come off. An extreme close-up shot reveals only half of Hussein’s face and only his left eye. But that eye is shifty, and his overall expression is nervous. The cover asks the question, presumably of *Time*’s American readers: “Are We Ready for War?” But, fond of getting “inside Saddam’s head,” it could be a question *Time* editors imagined Hussein asking himself.

Among the most striking of the six covers, however, is that of March 10, 2003, which ran shortly before the U.S.-led invasion. Hussein has not yet been captured, but his visage is already being whitewashed by a muscular, young American dressed in a painter’s uniform—or a Sailor suit?—and standing on a ladder using a long-arm brush to
paint over a mural of the dictator. Here, *Time*’s cover promises an outcome—“Life after Saddam.” This outcome has not yet been realized, but *Time* makes an outspoken editorial statement in the hope that it will be, promising “an inside look at Bush’s high-risk plan to occupy Iraq and remake the Middle East.” Running along the top of this cover, however, is yet another teaser: “Captured! How a 9/11 Mastermind Got Nabbed.” The language refers to a different story inside the issue; however, its placement atop the depiction of a disappearing Hussein is suggestive. At first glance, one could easily make the association between Hussein and the “9/11 mastermind,” a link that neoconservatives, including advisors to President Bush, emphasized in the lead-up to the war, despite its falsity. Is *Time* pandering to this constituency here? At the very least, the cover is propagandistic, providing ideological support for the justifications being advanced on behalf of the coming invasion.

After the invasion, Hussein is depicted as increasingly unhinged. On the April 14, 2003 cover, “Saddam’s Last Stand,” Hussein appears in his military uniform with a deranged expression. His eyes dart to the left, his face is creased in a nervous smile. Finally, on December 22, 2003, *Time*’s cover features a bedraggled and disheveled Hussein with the triumphant language, “We Got Him!” Resembling a wild animal, he has grown a bushy, salt-and-pepper beard; his hair is long and unkempt. His eyebrows are in bad need of trimming.

*Deformed Women, Deformed Families*

As demonstrated above, the vast majority of the articles in the “atavism” frame are focused on men. Only 11 articles in the data set as a whole, just 3 percent, featured
women or women’s issues. Of those, half depicted women who can best be described as victims trapped within the confines of deviant, violent, and patriarchal societies, including the following stories about a female Palestinian suicide bomber, an Iraqi torture and rape survivor, and an Iraqi prostitute. Expanding on the theoretical understanding of metaphor described above, these women’s lives are expressed through a sort of “implied” animal metaphor, where each of them is reduced to the status of frightened animal, prey that is hunted. The articles described below imply metaphors of women as animalistic through the lexical choices used to describe them; the choices of how to quote them; and the context that is or is not provided about them. The men in these stories, by extension, are implicitly animalistic as well. They are oftentimes depicted as predators ever intent on catching, torturing, and even killing their female prey.

In the story “Forever a Prisoner” (Ghosh, 2003a), readers step inside the ramshackle home—and the deeply destroyed psyche—of Lahib Nouman, a 48-year-old mental hospital escapee now living in filth in her Baghdad apartment. The piece can only be described as a voyeuristic romp through this woman’s horrific life. When Time catches up to her, she is apparently suffering a nervous breakdown—while Ghosh and his readers watch (See Appendix F). Nouman has spent the three weeks since her escape scrawling her life story on her living room walls, using lipstick, spray paint, and charcoal, in a frenzied attempt to free herself from her internal demons.

Once a criminal defense attorney, Nouman dared to defend a client who had run afoul of Uday Hussein, Saddam Hussein’s “barbaric” eldest son (p. 42). Her defense earned her almost two decades of torture, rape, and incarceration alternately in Iraqi
prisons and mental hospitals. With the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the mental hospital staff fled, and Nouman fled with them, clinging to her last morsel of sanity, her hair “stringy” and her face “frozen in a mask of permanent terror” (p. 42). Now she is weathering a shaky transition back to independent living at home, where “the rooms are damp and smell of rotting garbage” and her only companions are a “mangy brown pup and two molting cats” (p. 42). Like her sickly pets, Nouman appears a wounded animal, sheltering herself and licking her wounds in her dirty lair. Ghosh points out that Nouman has sunk to a sort of sub-human state where “the squalor doesn’t seem to bother [her]”—nor does the makeshift foam bed covered in animal hair on the floor of her “fetid” living room (p. 42). The story makes not one, but two references to how Nouman talks about the bodily functions of “pee-pee” and “ca-ca” (p. 42 and p. 45). One begins to feel that this deeply distraught woman is being taken advantage of, so that *Time* can provide a juicy story.

Ghosh provides background on Nouman. She is a Christian who grew up in a wealthy, large family of 13 children and attended elite schools. In addition to Arabic, she speaks English and French and once studied at the Sorbonne. As a teen, Nouman joined Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and became a loyal activist. But party loyalty meant nothing once she went up against Uday in court, where she defended an Egyptian bellhop whose only “crime” had been barring Uday’s drunk girlfriend from entering the hotel where he worked. The case was thrown out, but the regime remained focused on Nouman. When she later uttered to law colleagues “there’s no justice in this country,” someone reported her to the police. She was arrested and taken into custody where she
was tortured. Thus began a nearly 20-year cycle of arrests, imprisonment, and torture, including shock treatments. But the more she was brutalized, the more she felt she had nothing to lose if she spoke out, and so she did, ripping up Saddam posters, and making public statements against the regime. Her outspokenness earned her a reputation as “the crazy woman lawyer who dared to stand up to Uday” (p. 45).

Nouman’s calling as a defense attorney—her pursuit of democratic ideals and justice—were brutally crushed by the repressive society in which she lives. In a sense, her attempt to be modern could not survive in a society so thoroughly atavistic. The result for a woman like this is a deviant, “unhinged” state (p. 42), where no one will have anything to do with her, not even her three sisters who still live in Baghdad.

The piece entitled “Moms and Martyrs” (McGirk, 2007a) details the case of 22-year-old Reem Riyashi, a Palestinian mother of two who kissed her two young children goodbye in January 2004, strapped on an explosive belt, then detonated herself in an attack at Gaza’s Erez border crossing, killing herself and four Israeli soldiers. In the story, Riyashi is akin to a murderous and self-destructive beast, like a rabid dog; instead of nurturing the lives of others, she kills. The story suggests that this is endemic to Palestinian society. The subhead asserts that “more and more Palestinian women are signing up to become suicide bombers,” (p. 48) and the accompanying main photograph suggests that women across the age spectrum are engaging in it, to the pride and adulation of their families. The photograph features the relatives of 68-year-old Fatima Omar al-Najar, a grandmother who carried out a suicide attack in November 2006. A young boy holds a Hamas poster of al-Najar wielding an automatic weapon and smiling,
alongside the words: “al-shahida al-haja,” roughly translated as “venerable martyr.” Additionally, the story’s lead describes a Palestinian television music video that features a 4-year-old girl named Duha watching while her suicide-bomber mom gets dressed for her mission. According to the article, the girl sings: “Mommy, what are you carrying in your arms instead of me?” (p. 48). Later that day, she learns of her mother’s lethal attack and finds an extra stick of dynamite in her bedroom. McGirk writes: “The implicit message is that someday Duha will follow her mother into blazing martyrdom” (p. 48).

The reader is told that becoming a suicide bomber is now something of a trend among Palestinian women, that there is “an apparently abundant supply” (p. 50) of women ready to participate in this form of suicide/homicide, echoing the theme discussed above in the piece “Why Suicide Bombing … Is Now All the Rage” (Ripley, 2002).32 But the numbers don’t quite bear this out. McGirk reports that 88 women have attempted suicide bombings between 2002 and 2007 (though only eight have been successful). A quick calculation demonstrates that of the 1.2 million girls and women age 15 and up living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (CIA-The World Factbook, 2013), 88 represents only .007 percent of them. Such a small percentage raises the question of whether female suicide bombers actually pose the kind of threat the article claims they do and whether it is indeed true that “more and more” women are clamoring to engage in these deadly acts. Once again the “inscrutable Arab” metaphor appears: “For Israeli counterterrorism officials, understanding the mind of a Palestinian woman suicide bomber has become an urgent priority” (p. 48, italics added). A long psychoanalysis drawn primarily from Israeli counterterrorism expert Anat Berko ensues, explaining that

Palestinian women do this for a variety of reasons: not only to avenge Israeli aggression but to attain the “promise of paradise,” becoming beautiful “queens” in heaven, no matter how “old or grotesque” (p. 50) they appeared on earth.

And yet, the article raises the question: “Are they really choosing to die?” (p. 48). Do these women choose this path—or are they pushed into it by men? This was apparently the case for Wafa Samir al-Biss, 22, a burn victim who was reportedly told by suicide recruiters that she would never attract a husband, and so it was best that she become a martyr. (Her mission failed when her belt malfunctioned.) Here another animal metaphor is evoked, but this time men are the predators and women their weak victims. McGirk reports that women such as al-Biss “fall prey to male recruiters” [italics added].

We also learn that Riyashi, the bomber mother, was in fact an adulterer who was found out by her husband and thus faced inevitable death at his hands or at the hands of a male relative to restore the family honor. On the goodbye video released before her death, Riyashi, her face “chubby” and “homely,” (p. 48) is said to appear ambivalent and unconvincing about her mission. She and women like her are, thus, faced with two deadly choices: either kill and die a heroine, or simply wait be killed.

The piece “Marked Women” (Walt, 2004b) describes the plight of an Iraqi woman who goes by “Shaima” and whose family wants her dead because of her work as a prostitute. Shaima, 24, is being “hunted” [italics added] by her younger brother who “has been delegated by his parents to murder his sister and reclaim the family’s honor” (p. 42). His first attempt at killing her was thwarted when he came after her with a knife in a Baghdad market. And now Shaima, who is too afraid to reveal her entire face to the
Time photographer—we see only a sliver of it in the accompanying photograph (See Appendix F)—hides in her home, like prey dodging its predator, hoping not to become another casualty in Iraq’s rising spate of “honor killings.” Honor killings, Walt explains, are carried out by Iraqi men “against sisters, wives, daughters, or mothers whom they suspect of straying from traditional rules of chastity and fidelity” (p. 42). In Iraq, these killings come with penalties, but they are often unreported, and perpetrators who are brought to justice usually get off with very light sentences. The rise in violence since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq has only pushed the number of killings higher, making many women “virtual prisoners” (p. 45) in their homes.

*Arabs as Moderns*

The “Arabs as Moderns” metaphorical frame acknowledges the possibility that Arabs can become modern, but only as long as they attain the distinctive markings of modernity. These markings include Western-style educations; Western clothing fashions; Western entrepreneurial attitudes and careers; and Western political values, especially democratic ones. The Gulf country of Qatar, for example, is said to be “dabbling in modernity” in its efforts to forge closer ties to the United States (MacLeod, 2002). The piece opens with a description of a ceremony with Qatari and American “VIPs” in Doha, where the country’s leader Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani appears with his wife, Sheika Mouza, sporting a “loose head scarf” and “film-star looks” (p. 8) *She*, not he, gets up to deliver a speech in perfect English. In appearing together in public, the two are striking a “blow to gender apartheid in the ultra-traditional gulf” (p. 8). Qatar is “promoting modernization and friendship” (p. 8) with the United States by opening
branches of American educational institutions and playing willing host to thousands of American troops. In short, “Arabs as Moderns” display characteristics that make such Arabs appear like “us.” Moreover, just like us Westerners, these Arabs struggle against the atavistic forces of Arab societies seeking to prevent modernization.

**Iraqi and Lebanese Youth**

The story “Iraq’s Future? These Kids Want No Part of It” (Walt, 2004a), for example, profiles 21-year-old Louis Yako, a student at Baghdad University. Yako—whose name even sounds Western—“speaks five languages and cites passages from Arthur Miller and Ernest Hemingway” and will soon graduate with “high marks in English literature” (p. 52). He is “the kind of go-getter that Iraq could sorely use in the months to come,” but Yako wants out of the violent quagmire that his country has become (p. 52). And he is not alone. Thousands line up daily at Baghdad’s passport office, seeking a quick exit into graduate programs or jobs in Europe, the United States, or the Gulf countries. Walt notes that this rapid loss of talent was not what the Bush administration had predicted would be the result of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The “advocates of regime change” had claimed before the launch of the invasion that the educated elite “would flourish under new freedoms” (p. 52). Walt tempers this discordant note in the very next sentence, however, stating that “Iraq’s class of ’04 may be standing on the cusp of a booming job market, as foreign companies arrive and the interim government taking office this month begins looking to hire thousands of skilled employees” (p. 52). Still, as Walt notes, the new generation of elites sees no such prospects appearing soon and are getting out whenever opportunity to do so presents
itself. Faced with an Iraqi society that has descended into violent chaos, these Arab moderns have no choice but to seek refuge in the West, or at least in the Gulf.

Stifled Westernized youth are the focus of a second article titled “Postcard: Beirut—Sex, drugs and rock ‘n’ roll in a failing state” (Butters, 2007a). Here, again, the atavistic forces of corruption and violence, as well as “sexually repressed conservative society dominated by religion” (p. 8), overwhelm individuals struggling to be modern. Butters sets the scene, describing how despite “a recent three-month jihadist uprising, a nine-month street campaign by the Iranian opposition to bring down the U.S.-backed government, and rumors of war swirling around, it’s business as usual in Beirut’s packed nightclub scene” (p. 8). In these hip spaces of modernity, “the generic beat of computer-generated dance music” drowns out “the beat of Lebanon’s continual crises” (p.8). In one such club, “four nerdy-cool guys in tight jeans who strangle their guitars and have onstage seizures as if this were Seattle in the 1990s,” members of a band called Scrambled Eggs, sing about “the instability of their lives” (p. 8). The photo accompanying the story shows Charbel Haber, the lead singer, in a white t-shirt, black jeans, and dark aviator sunglasses, sitting at a bar with liquor bottles lining the shelf behind him. Haber’s songs give voice to a brief, failed attempt to bring democracy to Lebanon—the so-called “Cedar Revolution” of 2005. Butters writes that “the creative and intellectual frenzy that accompanied the Syrian withdrawal” came to an end when “the country’s ruling sectarian political class” turned the uprising to their own purposes and made Lebanon into a “battlefield between regional superpowers” (p. 8). Once again, failed leaders and a penchant for nihilistic violence undermine the efforts of a new
generation to embrace a modern global culture. The reader might sympathize with these modernizing youth stifled before they even have the chance to change their society. They look like the youthful “us,” after all, in their t-shirts, jeans, nightclubs, and “post-punk era Sonic Youth” angst. And, they, like “us,” confront the threat of a Middle East in chaos.

*Jordan*

A different type of youthful Arab modern—young, enlightened, and Westernized Arab leaders trying to modernize their backward countries—is the subject of two *Time* profiles: “Postcard: Jordan—Can Arab preppies save the Middle East?” (Butters, 2007b) and “Queen Rania: Helping Tradition Meet Modernity” (Stonesifer, 2004). The profile of Queen Rania begins by describing how the wife of Jordan’s King Abdullah is a “drop-dead gorgeous thirtysomething” who turns the heads of C.E.O.s and senators gathered at a “fancy dinner in New York” to hear her speak about her efforts to bring Jordan into the 21st century (p. 128). Partnering with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the queen seeks to reconcile “tradition with modernity” by promoting “computer skills for schoolchildren, micro loans for women to start their own businesses, ending child abuse and trafficking and pushing harsher penalties for honor killings” (p. 128). She is also promoting a vaccination program. The image that accompanies the story shows the queen in a trendy hairstyle and a casual jacket sitting in what appears to be a well-appointed luxury car. She is the epitome of the modernized Arab (See Appendix G). Included alongside other “Time 100” profiles, which, among others, feature John Bogle, the founder of the Vanguard mutual fund group, Yao Ming, a star Chinese basketball player who has excelled in the N.B.A., and Bill Belichick, the highly successful coach of the
New England Patriots football team—Queen Rania looks just like the elite “us.” She is elegant and generous, and like others who have succeeded financially in life, she is devoting a portion of her wealth to charitable causes that will lift others out of backwardness.

Queen Rania’s husband, King Abdullah, is the focus of the second profile, “Postcard: Jordan” (Butters, 2007b). It begins by recounting how the king attended the elite Deerfield Academy in western Massachusetts during the late 1970s. There, he underwent a process that transformed him into an Arab Modern. The “character-building crucible of dormitory life taught [the king-to-be] Yankee egalitarianism, self-reliance and how to clear dishes from the dinner table” (p. 8). Remembering this experience after taking the throne in 1999, the new king—son of the late King Hussein and his second wife, Muna, (an Englishwoman once known as Antoinette Avril Gardiner)—determined to recreate it as part of his plan to bring Jordan into the modern era. To do so, he hired Deerfield’s headmaster and some of its teachers to help start King’s Academy in the town of Madaba, 30 miles south of Amman. Modeled on the Massachusetts school, the new academy will teach students the values of democratic egalitarianism through co-ed education, “school-wide meetings,” and “the revolutionary belief that the classroom should be an intimate place that fosters discussion and critical thinking rather than rote memorization, which is the default teaching method in much of the region” (p. 8). The use of ironic sarcasm in this passage is telling of Butters’ underlying perspective toward Jordan. What is taken for granted in elite educational institutions in the United States—discussion and critical thinking—is “revolutionary” only in a backward, authoritarian
setting such as Jordan. Such a society, it is implied, prizes unthinking memorization performed at the behest of taskmaster teachers who have no intention of nurturing creativity and a critical mind.

But, lest the reader be led to think that the “revolution” at King’s Academy will transform Jordan the way Deerfield changed its monarch, Butters is quick to point out that “the campus’s Levantine-style white stone buildings—and tight security at its main gate—remind visitors that they’re not in Massachusetts anymore” (p. 8). The reference to “tight security” here implies the presence of a violence just beyond the walls that threatens to overwhelm this fragile outpost of modernity. In an effort to lessen the shock and prevent a violent reaction, the academy makes Arabic classes mandatory; humanities courses “though taught in English, draw on canonical works of many civilizations” (p. 8). Moreover, strict prohibitions against kissing and handholding between girls and boys seek to calm the anxieties of conservative parents.

The king faces an even bigger obstacle than the skepticism of his tradition-bound subjects, however: “the ever turbulent Middle East” (p. 8). The “flood of Iraqi and Palestinian refugees pouring into Jordan” threatens to engulf the monarch’s attempts to “reform education using his flagship academy” (p. 8). The aquatic metaphor that appears in this instance conveys a sense of overwhelming force: a “flood” of refugees that threatens to drown the country just as it is trying to rise above its backwardness. Butters, however, reassures his readers that the Jordanian King’s embrace of American modernity might still succeed. Quoting a Jordanian intellectual, he points out, “the one thing almost everyone in the Middle East respects is American education,” and this fact “makes the
case for this kind of school even stronger” (p. 8). With a king who looks like “us” guiding Jordan through the turbulent flood waters of crisis in the Middle East, perhaps this small nation can yet be made a shining example of what America has to offer Arab countries desiring to join the modern era.

*Palestinians*

If Jordan has yet to become the model of modernity that its king desires it to be, its neighbor, Israel, demonstrates what the West has to offer if only Arabs would desist from their destructive urges. In “Amid the Killing, E.R. is an Oasis,” Rees (2003b) introduces the reader to two Palestinians—physician Rawand Ratrout and medical technician Mohammed Assaly—who work in the ultra-modern Israeli Hadassah Hospital system in Jerusalem. Ratrout is pictured in the lead photograph directing the care of a young Jewish Israeli victim of a Palestinian suicide bombing; she and Assaly demonstrate the possibilities of reconciliation and peace that arise when Arabs decide to embrace what the West has to offer.

Ratrout received her medical training at Baghdad University well before the U.S. invasion of Iraq. After returning to her hometown of Nablus in the West Bank, she faced an “agonizing choice” (p. 37). She could either acquiesce in the pressure that Palestinian leaders were placing on her to work in understaffed Palestinian Authority hospitals or seize an opportunity to work in the world-class emergency care unit at Hadassah, where she could “improve her lifesaving skills by working with the best surgeons in the region” (p. 37). Wishing to advance in her career, she chose Hadassah and has since faced the disapproval of her neighbors and family in Nablus.
Revealingly, every person that Ratrout and Assaly tend to in the article is a Jewish Israeli victim of Palestinian violence. As Rees proceeds through the descriptions of the victims and the horrific acts that caused their grievous injuries, he portrays Ratrout and Assaly’s empathetic responses and quotes them asking the very questions that the reader might also ask: “Each time, I think,” says Ratrout, “how can this happen?” Assaly replies: “It’s a catastrophe … it’s supposed to be a time of peace, but all the violence is coming around again” (p. 37). The violence in question is Palestinian violence. Not until the very end of the story does Rees intimate that Palestinians, too, have been victims. But the victim he chooses to profile is actually a militant “who was one of 40 gunmen who took refuge from invading Israeli troops in Bethlehem’s Church of the Nativity in May last year [2002]” (p. 38). These and the other Palestinian patients all appear as recipients of Israeli altruism: even the militants are treated by a victimized yet generous Israel.

The Palestinian doctors on call in these hospitals illustrate the possibilities for co-existence and social advancement for Arabs if only they would make the choice to desist from violence and embrace what Israel has to offer. These Palestinian doctors, however, also perform another important rhetorical task in Rees’s article: they offer penance and regret for the violence of their people. They bind the wounds of the victims of this violence committed by their own, and they echo and confirm the Westerner’s own puzzlement and anger at these atavistic eruptions. In doing so, they demonstrate that embracing modernity requires, crucially, an estrangement, a conscious distancing of oneself from one’s atavistic past. Such Palestinians who undergo such a transformation effectively become honorary Israelis, honorary Westerners, and as a consequence are
made to voice “Western sentiments” and to care for “Western” victims of the very atavism that these former Arabs once had been subject to. Significantly, Rees neither reveals the fact that the number of Palestinians maimed or killed by Israeli violence exponentially exceeds the number of Israelis who have been victimized by Palestinian violence, nor does he let the reader see these victimized Palestinians—men, women, and children—as they bleed and perish in under-resourced hospitals in the Gaza Strip or West Bank. The reader is left to conclude in this absence that, but for the occasional exception, it is the Arab who originates and perpetuates the violence and it is the West, Israel in this case, that is his victim.

Occasionally, however, a different, anomalous image of the Palestinian Arab appears in Time’s coverage. In “Ninja Babe in Jerusalem” (Corliss, 2003), Corliss reviews Elia Suleiman’s hit comedic film, Divine Intervention. The film, writes Corliss, is a “pinwheeling, tragicomic” reflection on the “boiling pot” of Palestinian life, which “could explode while everyone sits and watches” (p. 78). The characters in the film are modern, “sporting their sunglasses and trim figures, smartly enduring and inventing indignities;” they are a “new breed of Palestinian: cool” (p. 78). Corliss also observes that the “underdog appeal” of these characters is “one perk of being on the weaker side.” Being among the weak allows these Palestinians to “make jokes about the mighty” because “short of a suicide bomb, what power have they?” (p. 78). This reference to how the Palestinians are “on the weaker side” and have few means at their disposal for changing their situation other than suicide bombs and jokes is one of the very few instances, among the articles included in this study, in which Time’s writers pull aside the
curtain to reveal the basic reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This rare exception, however, proves the rule that dictates the opposite as the default metaphoric frame: the presentation of the Palestinian as the quintessential atavistic Arab.

Revolutions

The default frame has remained in place despite even the appearance of a new kind of Arab Modern in 2011—the anti-regime, pro-democracy protestor. As mentioned in Chapter 1, *Time*’s February 28, 2011, cover is a jubilant depiction of young Arab Spring activists in Cairo whom *Time* dubs “The Generation Changing the World” (See Appendix H). The cover is a brief respite from the negative covers that have preceded it. For the first time, Arab women are pictured. One wears an embroidered veil and smiles widely, flashing the “V-for-victory” sign with her fingers. The other two are not veiled, and one of them wears the *keffiyeh* fashionably draped around her neck. Here, that scarf is reclaimed as a positive symbol of resistance, rather than a sign of terrorism and failed leadership. None of the four young men pictured have their heads covered, insurgent-style, and none wields a gun or a rocket launcher. They sport short haircuts and stylish glasses. The young man in the foreground wears a baseball cap—it doesn’t get more American than that. *Time* is pleased with these Arab Moderns. They look and act like Westerners.

Reinforcing this idea that the Arab youth were a harbinger of Western-style democratization, *Time*’s December 26, 2011, cover, “The Protestor—From the Arab Spring to Athens, from Occupy Wall Street to Moscow” (See Appendix H) placed this new generation of young Arab modernizers alongside activist movements that had
appeared across Europe and the United States in the wake of the sharp 2008 global economic downturn and subsequent “Great Recession.” In rising up alongside their Western peers, the Arab youth seemed to challenge deeply engrained assumptions in the West about the power and hegemony of authoritarian Arab regimes. Multiple full-length feature stories profiled the protestors, focusing especially on the effect of Western technology (smart phones) and Western social media (Facebook, Twitter) and Western-style media (bloggers in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, al-Jazeera satellite television). The youth of the so-called Arab Spring are sophisticated consumers of these devices and outlets. In a *Time 100* profile series, Nobel Laureate and Egyptian opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei writes about Egyptian social-media activist Wael Ghonim (See Appendix G), saying he “embodies the youth who constitute the majority of Egyptian society—a young man who excelled and became a Google executive but, as with many of his generation, remained apolitical due to loss of hope that things could change in a society permeated for decades with a culture of fear” (ElBaradei, 2011, p. 38). However, through his work with social media, Ghonim began to see the potential of the new technology for helping Egyptians realize their power as a peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic force for change. The image of the youthful, curly-haired Ghonim that accompanies the profile shows him sitting on the roof of his mother’s apartment building wearing hair gel, modish glasses, preppie shoes, and a sweatshirt.

Yet, coursing throughout *Time’s* coverage of the pro-democracy uprisings is a more pessimistic theme. As the dictators fall in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya or teeter bloodily in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, *Time’s* writers raise the prospect of counter-
revolution, and especially of the rise of Islamist governments. Will the protests and revolutions result in democracy, or will they give way to a new, more violent and repressive religious theocracy? The Arab Spring has indeed produced great violence and led to uncertain outcomes. *Time* has not been alone in noting these ambiguous developments. The point to be made here, however, is that *Time*’s presentation of the Arab Spring occurs within well-established metaphorical frames that, even in an instance in which Arabs seem to challenge such stereotypes, nevertheless persist within the coverage as organizing rhetorical structures. Thus, the Arab protestor is like his or her counterpart in the Occupy Movement—a modern, technology-using democrat. Yet, unlike the Occupy protestor, who is seen as a symptom of a momentary crisis in the West’s otherwise rational and tolerant social system, the Arab Spring activist is portrayed as facing the forces of atavism embedded within deeply authoritarian Arab societies.

This drama between modernism and atavism plays out in multiple *Time* stories on the Arab Spring. Often the coverage of the protests and of those manning the barricades is quite positive even as the writers for *Time* acknowledge that revolutions are “messy” and can lead in unexpected directions. In “Learn to Love the Revolution,” Elliott (2011) draws “five lessons” from the pro-democracy uprising of the Arab Spring (p. 30). First, he assures *Time*’s readers that there “is no need to panic” (p. 32). Recalling how the U.S. Constitution was not ratified until seven years after the American Revolution, he tells readers that “revolutions … don’t follow the easy logic of middle-school textbooks” (p. 32). The Arab Spring is proving to be unexceptional in this regard. The dictator fell
relatively quickly in Tunisia, took longer in Egypt, and remains, at the time of writing, still in power in Libya as protests turn to outright civil war.

From this “messiness” Elliott draws his five lessons. First, the revolts have occurred because the regimes have failed to provide “jobs, education, housing, and dignity” (p. 32). The new generation, linked to the West through social media and satellite television, now has a standard of comparison—the United States and Europe—and no longer is willing passively to accept their lot. Here, again, the teleology of modernization, in which the West represents the pinnacle of civilizational development, subtly serves to frame the Arab uprisings as an effort to overcome backwardness and achieve modernization. Second, the outcome of the revolts is uncertain and likely to take different forms because “no two places are the same.” “A region stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean is not homogenous,” writes Elliott (p. 33). He illustrates this point by describing the differences between a large country like Egypt and smaller, intensely diverse nation-states like Syria or deeply divided ones like Yemen.

The recognition of differences here is potentially an important shift away from Orientalist notions that presume a homogenous Arab character. However, in spelling out the differences, Elliott focuses on negative, regressive forces endemic to these societies that might derail any potential democratic outcomes of their youthful uprisings: in Egypt, the armed forces, with close ties to the Pentagon, remain the most powerful institutional player; in Syria, religious and ethnic sectarianism could quite possibly rear its head and Islamists might very well return as a powerful force; the Yemeni government “is threatened by two insurgencies—and the armed members of the local affiliate of al-
Qaeda” (p. 33); Jordan, meantime, must contend with a large Palestinian population that competes with a native Bedouin one. But, Elliott writes, striking a paternalistic note, the West must be “patient” (p. 34). The democratic aspirations of Arabs signal that the Middle East is not the “exception” to universal human and social development it was once thought to be. Rather, the Arab Spring shows that Arabs want what everyone else wants: “a right to choose your rulers, a hope that your children will lead better lives than you, a search for prosperity and happiness” (p. 34). But the trajectory toward these goals will take time and the outcome will depend on the strength of institutions conducive to democratic transition.

And this is Elliott’s fourth and fifth lessons, “that institutions matter” and that the West must allow the Arabs “to do it themselves” (pp. 34-35). In countries with established civil societies, the democratic shift might move more quickly than it will, if at all, in countries like Libya in which dictators have destroyed civil institutions. But, the real cause for hope regardless of the specific national context is that for the first time ever “Arabs are doing it for themselves” (p. 35). The young generation of revolutionaries “ha[s] learned tactics, technological fixes and slogans from one another” (p. 35). Through their exposure to the rest of the world, facilitated by their access to social media and satellite television, these Arabs seek to bring their societies out of their repressive backwardness. Just as it did with Eastern Europe as it emerged from Communism, the West should view this moment as positive and wait patiently, if guardedly, for the messy historical process to unfold on its own.
The idea of an indeterminate process—of forward democratic movement contending with backward authoritarian restraints—appears as a leitmotif in two other articles, “The Brotherhood” (Hauslohner & Butters, 2011) and “The Revolution” (Zakaria, 2011). In “The Brotherhood,” Hauslohner and Butters explore the possibility that the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the oldest Islamist movement in the Middle East, is itself undergoing a democratic transition as it seeks to ride the wave of revolt in Egypt. The authors begin by surveying the organization’s historical evolution from anti-colonial resistance group to a radical revolutionary one opposed to the secularist regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser to a nonviolent opposition force seeking inclusion in the political process. Hauslohner and Butters quote a Muslim Brotherhood official, who claims that his organization “believe[s] in democracy and all its rules…that the people are the origin and source of sovereignty and that the people choose their leaders in free and secret ballots” (p. 37). But other, secular Egyptians have their doubts. They still see the Brotherhood as “an enemy within that continues to preach bilious intolerance, as some members still do” (p. 37). But, there are signs of change within the movement: “the diversity of the crowds in Tahrir (the main square in Cairo) may also have an effect on the Brotherhood, exposing members to the breadth of opinion now freely visible” (p. 37). Like the rest of Egyptian society, even the Muslim Brotherhood might be undergoing a transition away from militant, atavistic fundamentalism toward moderation, tolerance, and democracy.

In “The Revolution,” Zakaria (2011) echoes this idea proposing that “fears of an Egyptian theocracy are vastly overblown” (p. 33). A more likely outcome, he writes, will
be an “illiberal democracy, in which Egypt becomes a country with reasonably free and fair elections, but the elected majority restricts individual rights and freedoms, curtails civil society, and uses the state as its instrument of power” (p. 33). Evidence for this possibility exists in a series of contradictory survey results, cited by Zakaria. An April 2011 Pew Research Center survey, for example, shows that “82 percent of Egyptians support stoning as a punishment for adultery, 84 percent favor the death penalty for Muslims who leave the religion, and in the struggle between ‘modernizers’ and ‘fundamentalists,’ 59 percent identify with the fundamentalists,” all of which, writes Zakaria, “would strike the Modern Western eye as extreme” (pp. 32-33). However, in an earlier 2007 Pew survey, a very different picture of Egyptians emerged in which “92 percent of Egyptians support freedom of religion, 88 percent an impartial judiciary and 80 percent free speech; 75 percent are opposed to censorship, and according to the 2010 report, a large majority believes that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” (p. 33). Such results suggest the “illiberal democracy” scenario, a result closer to Russia in the post-Soviet period than to Iran and its Islamic Republic. For Zakaria, then, the Arab Spring, at least as it is manifesting in Egypt, will produce a mixed outcome in which repression of the individual continues—reflecting the basic “fundamentalist” (atavistic) proclivities of Arab Egyptian society—even as democratic processes are instituted (p. 33).
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS

Scholars have noted an apparent shift in U.S. media portrayals of Arabs and Muslims that occurred in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks (Weston, 2003; Michalak, 2010; Alsultany, 2012). These portrayals were more sympathetic and complex, departing—at least momentarily—from the U.S. media’s longstanding and deeply entrenched negative stereotyping of these communities (Shaheen, 1984, 2000, 2008, 2009). That this shift would come in the wake of a massive terrorist attack, carried out by men of Arab Muslim origin, is all the more perplexing. For Americans, the attacks solidified the image of the Arab as terrorist and religious fanatic on a scale like no other, and their aftermath unleashed a surge of hate crimes and negative stereotyping targeted at the Arab- and Muslim-American community or those thought to be members (Anderson, 2002; American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 2003). Additionally, the genesis of positive or more complex Arab media portrayals took place against a backdrop of draconian government policies that followed September 11. Despite its public calls for tolerance toward Muslims (Milbank & Wax, 2001), the Bush administration sanctioned a host of discriminatory laws and practices that resulted in a “selective targeting” of Arabs and Muslims living in the United States, most of them non-citizens (Akram, 2002; Jamal, 2008), as part of its so-called “war on terror.” The targeting took the form of racial profiling, jailings, deportations, as well as infiltration and surveillance of local Arab and Muslim communities (Cainkar, 2009).

This study sought to determine if Time’s coverage of the Arab world between 2001 and 2011 followed the above-mentioned shift. Did its February 2011 cover, for
example, featuring the young, hip Arab Spring activists indicate a departure from the deeply ingrained patterns of negative media portrayals of Arabs and the Middle East? Was it merely an anomaly? Or, was it a continuation of the same basic patterns albeit in a seemingly positive mode? The findings of this study demonstrate that *Time* exhibited no marked shift in its Arab world coverage to include substantially more sympathetic or complex portrayals. Indeed, even the apparently positive portrayals of democracy activists tended to reinforce underlying negative presuppositions concerning Arabs and Arab societies. The results of the quantitative portion substantially confirmed what earlier research has demonstrated—that when reporting on foreign news the U.S. media tend to focus almost exclusively on conflict, deviance, and only those countries that are of strategic importance to the United States. Quantitative findings revealed that the highest frequency of *Time* story topics kept to a narrow focus of violence and conflict, whether associated with the Iraq War or the Arab Spring, and that the majority of *Time* photographs that accompanied these stories were scenes of death, destruction, militarism, and chaos. These stories and images are what *Time* readers encountered most—tired, negative stereotypes that offer little substantive insight into the peoples and cultures of the region. Such reporting is part of what inspired proponents of the New World Information Order to push for changes in distorted Western media coverage of the developing world more than 30 years ago. As noted in Chapter 2, those activists objected to how Western media coverage of the so-called Third World focused exclusively on crisis and chaos, thus perpetuating unfavorable, inaccurate images. How disappointed they would likely be in *Time*, for this study exhibits that the trend they critiqued in the
1970s—and that subsequent scholars have echoed in the years since—is still very much alive and well today.

The qualitative portion of the study expanded upon this negative trend. Utilizing the tools of metaphor theory and critical discourse analysis, it demonstrated the persistence of Orientalist binaries in *Time*’s reporting about the Middle East and Arabs. Analysis of the *Time* data set revealed two repetitive and competing metaphorical frames—“Arabs as Moderns” versus “Arabs as Atavists.” These frames presented an overarching binary of modernity versus backwardness. By far, the majority of stories about Arabs and Arab societies appearing in *Time* invoked the atavism frame. This frame divided into a variety of sub-themes, including societal backwardness; corrupt, failed leaders; sociopathic violence/religious fanaticism; and deformed women/children/families. The “Arab as Modern” metaphorical frame, despite seeming to challenge the atavism theme, nevertheless reinforced the default understanding of Arabs as backward by conditioning Arab modernity on emulation of Western styles, technology, attitudes, and institutions. The “Arabs as Moderns” frame portrayed Arabs as “modern” to the extent that they resembled the West and in the ways that they distinguished themselves from the atavistic elements in their own societies, i.e. jihadists.

This dichotomy illustrates Said’s (1978) Orientalist binary that pits a modern, civilized, rational West against an atavistic, uncivilized, and chaotic East. Thus, the Arab Spring cover and other positive stories and photographs that dot the data set by no means signify a substantial departure from the deeply ingrained patterns of negative media portrayals of Arabs and the Middle East. Taken in this context, they are merely brief
snapshots that do not signify a real shift because the underlying Orientalist dichotomy is still very much present. In a follow up to his seminal book, *Orientalism*, Said (1978) addressed this phenomenon of the persistence of Orientalist presuppositions and categories in various sectors of public life. He identified, in particular, a new generation of “younger ideologues and Orientalists” who had revived classic Orientalist themes in a period when U.S. involvements in the Middle East had grown increasingly violent—as with the deployment of U.S. Marines to Lebanon, an event that ended in a devastating Hizbollah attack on their base in 1983 (Hampson, 2008). Said took special aim at Daniel Pipes, founder of Campus Watch and occasional “expert” in *Time* articles, called upon to address radical Islam and suicide bombers. Referring to Pipes’ then-new book, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power*, Said (1985) commented on “Orientalism’s unique resilience, its insulation from intellectual developments everywhere else in the culture, and its antidiluvian imperiousness as it makes its assertions and affirmations with little regard for logic or argument” (p. 96).

For Said, Pipes’ book amounted to little more than anti-Muslim and anti-Arab propaganda. As such, it disregarded evidence and devalued the capacity of Muslims and Arabs to understand and represent themselves, preferring instead to highlight the opinions of outside non-Arab, non-Muslim observers whose authority rested simply on “being Western, white, non-Muslim” (p. 97). For “new” Orientalists, such as Pipes, “there [was] no question of an exchange between Islam’s views and an outsider’s: no dialogue, no discussion, no mutual recognition” (p. 97). Muslims and Arabs could not represent themselves; they had to be represented and explained by others according to well-
established understandings of what the Muslim and Arab were. Said concluded that such representation was “neither science, nor knowledge, nor understanding: it [was] a statement of power and a claim for relatively absolute authority. It [was] constituted out of racism, and it [was] made comparatively acceptable to an audience prepared in advance to listen to its muscular truths” (pp. 97-98).

The “resilience of Orientalism,” as Said described it in his critique of the new Orientalists, stems from Orientalism’s rootedness in taken-for-granted metaphorical frames through which the wider non-Arab, non-Muslim U.S. populace “knows” and “understands” Arabs, Arab society, and Islam without ever having to travel to the Middle East or engage with real, living and breathing Arabs and Muslims. Perpetuated through various media, these metaphors replace actual knowledge, allowing the news media to package stories and make sense of complex events efficiently. The media’s use of these metaphors, however, reveals not only the impact of news routines and declining reporting resources; they also demonstrate the role of the media in aligning public opinion with prevailing governmental policy in the Middle East. Whether massive U.S. aid to Israel despite the latter's ongoing occupation and colonization of Palestinian land, the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, or drone strikes in Yemen, news magazines like *Time* function less as “watch dogs” critiquing such policies and more like conveyers of Orientalist propaganda in support of U.S. actions abroad.

Orientalism has continued to experience renewal decades after Said first wrote about it with, for example, the revival of Huntington’s (1993) “clash of civilizations”
thesis. Although first concocted more than two decades ago, the thesis was revived by the Bush administration and neoconservatives (Kumar, 2010) in the wake of the September 11 attacks and the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a way to explain Muslim violence and justify actions against the Islamic world. Huntington’s theory posited that the future of global politics would be dominated by a clash not of ideologies or economics but of cultures, or civilizations. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moved out of its “Western phase,” and its centerpiece became the interaction between Western and non-Western civilizations—Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and “possibly” African (Huntington, 1993, pp. 23-25). These civilizations differ greatly in their propensity for violence, according to Huntington. Wherever Islamic civilization exists, violence would be bound to break out because “Islam has bloody borders” (p. 35). Kumar (2010) found that the “clash of civilizations” thesis has been reflected in the news since September 11, indicating a “resurgence of Orientalism” (p. 254). She identified five dominant news frames that persist: “Islam is a monolithic religion,” “Islam is a uniquely sexist religion,” “the ‘Muslim mind’ is incapable of rationality and science,” “Islam is inherently violent,” and “the West spreads democracy, while Islam spawns terrorism” (p. 257). Such frames prepare readers and viewers in advance for “the muscular truths” (Said, 1985, pp. 97-98) that U.S. administrations seek to establish as justifications for their actions toward Arabs and Arab societies.

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As the revival of the Huntington thesis demonstrates, these derogatory stereotypes are often latent but are always available for retrieval and reassertion at a moment’s notice in times of national crisis. They reemerge time and again as caricatures that reinforce the line between a “civilized” West and an atavistic, violent East. This persistence of Orientalist discourse remains a cause of concern to this day, as was seen most recently in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings. Despite measured warnings from outlets like National Public Radio not to jump to conclusions about who the perpetrators were, other media outlets engaged in sensationalist speculation. CNN’s John King reported, incorrectly, that a “dark-skinned male” may have been involved, a suggestion implying the phenotype of “Arab” or “Muslim” (Terkel, 2013). The New York Post ran two front-page pictures of supposed “bag men,” one of whom was 17-year-old Moroccan runner Salah Barhoum (Terkel, 2013). Lewison (2013) noted that the attached Post article contained an admission that it “had no idea” whether the cover was accurate. “The Post decided to run with it anyway. … Two guys with bags, one of whom looks like he might even be of Middle Eastern ancestry? Print it!” (Lewison, 2013) Similarly, taking cues from conservative terrorism “expert” Steve Emerson (Seitz-Wald, 2013), contributors to the social media site Reddit stoked rumors that the unknown perpetrator(s) was probably a Saudi national.44 Reddit apologized for its “dangerous speculation” (Stanglin, 2013).45 Arabs and people who “looked Arab” were assaulted in the aftermath

44 As it turned out, the accused bombers were white Eastern European Muslims of Chechen ethnic background who, it seems, were operating independently of any organization or wider conspiracy. The surviving bombing suspect has indicated that anger at the U.S. military invasions and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan motivated their decision to target the Boston Marathon (Fermino & McShane, 2013).

45 The falsely accused young man, a Brown University student, was later found dead in the waters of a Providence, R.I., park, although the time, motive, and cause of his death is not yet known (Stanglin, 2013).
of the bombings (Greenfield, 2013), such as the Bangladeshi man accosted in a Bronx restaurant the evening of the attacks whose assailants beat him while shouting “f--king Arab” (Ghosh, 2013) and a Syrian Muslim woman wearing a headscarf who was assaulted while out walking with friends (NewsOne, 2013). The same pattern of violence against these communities occurred after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and the September 11 attacks (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

The reactivation of Orientalist stereotypes in *Time*’s coverage of the Arab world since 2001 could be due, in part, to the impact of key changes in reporting practices during the past decade. The United States’ massive and extended engagement with majority Arab and Muslim societies such as Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, spurred new developments in how journalists and media organizations covered the events of this period. Perhaps most significant was the decision by the Pentagon to “embed” journalists within frontline military units beginning with the invasion of Afghanistan. In contrast with the Pentagon’s media policy banning journalists from directly covering the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the military’s approach to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq sought proactively to co-opt and direct coverage by allowing special but highly controlled access to combat zones. The practice has been criticized for the ways in which military control over the media resulted in skewed coverage, leading reporters to “see the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts primarily in military terms” and confining them to “a small and atypical segment of the political-military battlefield” (Cockburn, 2010).

With more than an estimated 700 U.S. and foreign journalists taking part (Calabrese, 2005, p. 160), embedding also set up a dynamic that muffled criticism of the
war effort. One television correspondent noted that the Bush administration used the embedding program as a “tool” to further its aims in the region. “Embeds were there for one reason,” she said, “that’s that Don Rumsfeld wanted them there” (Shepard, 2004, p. 61). Embedding also has raised questions about how the “enemy” was portrayed. Coverage has been critiqued as “sanitized” in that it largely excluded pictures of the dead and wounded and failed to “fully report” Iraqi realities (p. 62). Fascination with new “real-time” technologies, such as videophones and satellite uplinks, instilled reporters in the field with a “gee-whiz quality” that detracted from time that might have been spent “gathering pictures and information for more complete stories” (Friedman, 2003, pp. 29-30).

Rather than resist or criticize this policy and demand independent access, many media organizations responded favorably. *Time* apparently saw no problem with the arrangement. In a note to readers just after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Managing Editor James Kelly informed his audience that two dozen *Time* journalists were in the Middle East, ready to cover the unfolding events. One could almost hear patriotic music swelling in the background as he noted how various reporters and photographers “traveled with a combat unit of the 3rd Infantry Division”; “camped outside Basra with the 1st Marines Division”; and “watched bombers take off from the deck of the U.S.S. Constellation for runs at the Iraqi mainland” (Kelly, 2003). *Time*’s willingness to embrace the embedding program perhaps signaled a news culture in which very little distinction was made between news reporting and the U.S. administration’s goals of information control and
“messaging.” In short, Time seemed very comfortable serving as a conveyer of propaganda during the war.

But Time was not alone in its enthusiasm for the war. The invasion of Iraq took place in a climate of increasing pro-war furor exemplified by the rise of cable channel Fox News, which became the most-watched cable news show (Rutenberg, 2003). Fox unabashedly promoted a pro-war position with its “on-screen flags and lapel pins,” the “breathless embedded television correspondent describing how ‘we’ went on patrol,” and a “cheerleading, can-do tone” that prompted Smith (2003) to ask the obvious: “Did media jingoism compromise objectivity?” Studies have demonstrated the impact of Fox and other outlets in creating the misperception that Iraq was involved in the events of September 11 and that war against Iraq was therefore necessary and justified (Calabrese, 2005; Moeller, 2004). “Fox’s formula had already proved there were huge ratings in opinionated news with an America-first flair. … Fox has brought prominence to a new sort of TV journalism that casts aside traditional notions of objectivity, holds contempt for dissent, and eschews the skepticism of government at mainstream journalism’s core” (Rutenberg, 2003). As Fox garnered record viewers, other media outlets scurried to keep up. MSNBC, for example, hired more right-wing commentators in what has been called the “Fox effect” (Rutenberg, 2003).

These factors call to mind Herman and Chomsky’s “propaganda model” (1988), a critique of the mainstream U.S. media from a critical, political-economy perspective. The “propaganda model” debunks the traditional notion of the media as the so-called “fourth estate,” independent champions of the public interest that hold power in check through
their vital watch-dog role. Instead, it asserts that the media are constrained by “filter elements” such as corporate ownership and its profit motive; the primacy of advertising revenue and its impact on editorial content; a tendency to rely on news sources who represent “agents of power”; and the push back, or “flak,” generated by powerful societal interests who wield influence over news organizations. According to the authors, these and other factors are determinants of what becomes “news” and necessarily predispose news production to serve a propagandistic function (pp. 1-35).

Undoubtedly, some of these “filters,” as well as the “Fox effect” noted earlier, are at play in Time’s coverage of the Arab world, particularly as Time has struggled in recent years to boost sales and stay relevant in a news environment that has changed radically and where traditional news magazines—the very genre Time pioneered nine decades ago—have lost their edge. Time’s erstwhile competitors U.S. News and World Report and Newsweek now exist in digital form only, and as of March, Time’s parent company, Time Warner, announced it would spin off Time and other Time, Inc. titles into a separate company (Chozick, 2013). Changes to the fundamental nature of the magazine have been afoot since at least 2006, says former Time stringer Paul Cuadros. Beginning that year, Time closed multiple bureaus and let go hundreds of employees, including him. Those structural changes ushered in a new editorial direction. “They retooled the magazine to be more punditry and less a news magazine,” says Cuadros, now an associate professor of journalism at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. “I didn’t think they had done anything but destroy the ‘news’ part of the news magazine” (P. Cuadros, personal communication, April 11, 2013).
If opinion polls are any indication, it seems that such rah-rah media—short on news and long on punditry—may well impact public opinion, consequently creating a self-reinforcing loop in which media not only reflect but also reactivate latent Orientalism in the wider culture. A study of mainstream U.S. media viewers from the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland, in collaboration with Knowledge Networks (2003) found that these viewers believed the following “falsities” about the war in Iraq: that Iraq gave substantial support to al-Qaeda, or was directly involved in the September 11 attacks (57 percent); that Saddam Hussein was personally involved in September 11 (69 percent); that weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq (22 percent); and that chemical or biological weapons had been used against U.S. soldiers in Iraq during 2003 (21 percent). The study found that 80 percent of Fox News watchers had one or more of these misperceptions (p. 13).

Shortcomings, Future Research

In analyzing Time’s coverage of Arabs and the Arab world, this study considered only those stories that were at least one page in length and were accompanied by a photograph. This decision was made for the sake of manageability and to create a better standard of comparison among stories in the data set. It also excluded essays and opinion pieces, as well as coverage of Arab and Muslim communities in the United States. Future research might include smaller news items—those of one-eighth, one-fourth, and three-quarters of a page, for example, as well as stand-alone photographs and their captions. These smaller items were missed by confining the study to a one-page-or-larger limit, but they likely contained additional data that a more thorough study could unpack. Similarly,
the study excluded opinion pieces and first-person essays. Occasionally, such pieces were written by Arabs from the Middle East who were given a forum to explain an issue in more depth and challenge stereotypes in ways that *Time’s* hyped-up reported pieces did not. An excellent example is “Why We Blow Ourselves Up” (Sarraj, 2002), an essay about the cultural and political aspects that fuel Palestinian suicide bombings, written by the respected Gazan psychiatrist Eyad Sarraj.

Additionally, several stories about Arabs in United States fell outside the scope of this study. Such stories included the piece “Fighting Words,” (Padgett & Renfor, 2002) about tenured Palestinian-American professor Sami al-Arian who was fired from his South Florida university for his “pro-Muslim views” (p. 56); “Terrified or Terrorist” (Gibbs, 2009), which reported on the shooting at a military base by Arab-American army major Nidal Malik Hasan; and “Detroit’s Unlikely Saviors” (Ghosh, 2010), about how Arab-American businesses are an ongoing economic engine in Detroit and nearby Dearborn. The past decade or so has seen a rising interest in the field of Arab-American Studies, as witnessed by the creation of the Center for Arab American Studies at the University of Michigan-Dearborn in 2000; the founding of the Arab-American National Museum in 2005—the only museum in the United States dedicated to Arab-American history and culture; and the publication of works that explore Arab identity in U.S. culture, such as the edited volume “Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11” (Jamal & Naber, 2008) and “Between Arab and White” (Gualtieri, 2009). In the aftermath of September 11, scholarly interest in how media covered Arabs and Islam in the United States grew as well (Domke, Garland, Billeaudaux, & Hutcheson, 2003;
Weston, 2003; Pollock et al., 2005; Oh, 2008). There is much more room—and need—for additional scholarly work in this emerging field.

Yet another trajectory for further and more extensive research would be to go beyond the one-decade time frame of this study and examine Time coverage of the Arab world over the past several decades, similar to Steet’s (2000) Veils and Daggers, which analyzed a century of National Geographic’s representations of the Arab world. Random sampling could be used to keep the sample at a workable size. Such a longitudinal study would allow for a much broader and more comprehensive look at Arab world coverage over time. Thus, it would allow the researcher the ability to make informed claims about the pattern of Time coverage over decades, even going back to its inception in 1923. It would be particularly interesting, too, to compare coverage of Arab leaders such as Saddam Hussein by decade. For example, it is well-documented that during the 1980s the United States supported Iraq in its war against Iran even when it knew Iraq was using chemical weapons against the Iranians. Iraq started its war with Iran during the Iranian hostage crisis, and President Reagan backed Iraq as a way to pressure Iran (Borger, 2002). A 1980 Time article, written just before the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War introduced Hussein, then 43, to U.S. readers positively as “the tough and belligerent, extremely ambitious President of Iraq” (Time, 1980, p. 40). When Iraq was a friend to the United States, its leader was tough and belligerent but also ambitious. However, as this study demonstrated, that characterization of Hussein has long since evaporated. Hussein had run afoul of the United States at least since the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Thus, in
the run-up to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, *Time* coverage was seemingly obsessed with his and his sons’ sociopathic tendencies.

Another direction for future research could include an ethnographic study of *Time* Middle East correspondents and their news gathering and production processes. Ethnographic studies of news production provide a closer look into the inner workings of news organizations and can serve as a “necessary corrective to grand speculative claims and theories about the news media” (Cottle, 2007). Ethnography would entail spending an extended period of time in the field with *Time* reporters and stringers in the Middle East. Such a study could elucidate how news judgments about international events get made at *Time*, what the interaction between reporters and editors is like, as well as the inevitable tensions and challenges that come with working at a news magazine when that genre now exists on life support.

**Reasons for Hope**

One of the critiques of Said and his concept of Orientalism is the way in which his emphasis on the representation of colonized Arabs and Muslims by powerful others, stripped these populations of their own power of representation. For example, Bhabha (1983), a leading thinker in the field of postcolonial studies, critiqued Said for his failure to account for the agency of dominated, subject colonial populations. Rather than passive recipients of Orientalist representations, Bhabha argued, these populations, whether in India or Egypt, engaged in an active process of negotiating the colonial presence and colonial representations of them. They thus emerged with complex identities—not solely the conquered ones described by Orientalism. Expressing those complex identities has
been the work of what Pratt (1992) called “autoethnographic expression” that counter or
dialogue with dominant representations (p. 7).

By all indications, Arab voices and perspectives that counter Orientalist stereotypes are being heard more than ever, particularly with the help of electronic platforms and social media outlets. For example, in 2010 a loose collective of mostly Arab scholars living in the United States launched the ezine *Jadaliyya*, which means “dialectic” in Arabic. Now produced by the Arab Studies Institute at Georgetown University, *Jadaliyya* offers independent commentary, advocacy, and analysis about the Arab world in Arabic and English. Its web site touts: “Where others see only a security threat, conflict, or data on a graph, we see a region inhabited by living communities and dynamic societies” (*Jadaliyya.com*). Beginning with the Arab Spring uprisings, *Jadaliyya*’s reports and analysis were picked up by major news outlets such as *The Atlantic*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, *The Guardian*, *The New York Times*, and *National Public Radio*. Exposure as a co-editor at *Jadaliyya* helped launch Palestinian human rights attorney Noura Erakat as a commentator on national talk shows such as MSNBC’s “Up with Chris Hayes.”

Similarly, young Arab filmmakers are creating works that describe Arab and Arab-American experiences through their own eyes. Palestinian-American filmmaker Cherien Dabis’ *Amreeka*, which premiered at the Sundance Film Festival in 2009, follows a fictional Palestinian single mother and her young son from their West Bank home to the suburbs of Chicago following the September 11 attacks and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It chronicles the Arab immigrant experience in the United States during
this distinct historical moment—a time when the “war on terror” had cast Arabs and Muslims under a veil of suspicion and contempt. “I saw the way the media was stereotyping Arabs and I decided I wanted to have a hand in changing that,” Dabis told *Variety*. “I have a foot in both the Mideast and the Midwest. It gives me a unique perspective” (Jaafar, 2009). In March, the film *5 Broken Cameras* was nominated for an Academy Award for best documentary feature. Co-directed by Palestinian Emad Burnat and his Israeli collaborator Guy Davidi, the film documents the four years of popular civil disobedience taking place in Burnat’s West Bank village of Bil‘in, in the face of encroaching Israeli settlement building. One film critic called the film “a proudly defiant work, devoted to a community and created by its members,” a film that “obliquely captures so many largely unreported details: the night raids rounding up children, the torn-up olive trees, and kids’ soccer games in the battle zone” (Rothkopf, 2013).

Even as media stereotypes of Arabs persist in mainstream, U.S. journalism, Arab-American journalists have played a role in countering that trend. One extraordinary example is the late *New York Times* reporter Anthony Shadid, 43, who died in February 2012 from an acute asthma attack while covering the unfolding conflict in Syria. Shadid, who won a 2004 Pulitzer Prize for his reporting from Iraq, has been hailed as “America’s most decorated foreign correspondent” (Martin, 2012). His award-winning, 2005 book *Night Draws Near*, for example, tells the story of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its devastating aftermath through the eyes of everyday Iraqis, “offering us a much-needed look at the human face of the Iraqi people” (Webb, 2005) and sharing with readers “the
war stories we never hear” (Klein, 2005). In the wake of Shadid’s untimely death, the Arab and Middle Eastern Journalists Association had this to say about him:

There’s a media pioneer for every marginalized group in America, and he was ours. He shattered the stereotypical images of Arabs, who are often portrayed in their narrow Central Casting roles of terrorist, cleric, belly dancer, oppressed woman, or oil baron. He told his stories through Arab voices, not just urbane diplomats and politicians, but ordinary families from Baghdad to Benghazi.”

(AMEJA, 2012)

Born in Oklahoma to Lebanese parents, Shadid did not grow up speaking Arabic but learned it—and became fluent—as an adult. This facility, as well as long periods living and working in the Middle East, surely accounted for the kind of depth and empathy that he attained in his reporting.

Shadid’s colleagues joked about how several years ago editors began “plucking talented Arab-American journalists from metro beats … and dispatching them to the Middle East in hopes of cultivating ‘the next Anthony Shadid’ ” (AMEJA, 2012). Indeed, this may be precisely what needs to happen to begin to stem the tide of Orientalist media stereotypes and change a news culture that apparently still references them so automatically. Perhaps it will take many more Anthony Shadids in the profession to break down the rigid West-East binary that Said critiqued until his death in 2003.

“Journalism is imperfect,” Shadid acknowledged in Night Draws Near: “The more we know as reporters, the more complicated the story becomes, and, by the nature of our profession, the less equipped we are to write about it with the justice and rigor it
deserves” (Shadid, 2005, p. xiii). And yet even with the constraints to which Shadid alluded—media “routines” (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996) such as deadline pressure or space limitations, for example, or the propaganda model’s “filters,” such as corporate ownership and profit motive (Herman & Chomsky, 1988)—one wonders how *Time*’s coverage might have been different if Shadid had been editor. It is unlikely he would have tolerated the simplistic, sensationalistic modern-versus-atavistic binary that this study found pervasive in *Time*’s coverage of the Arab world. This dichotomy lies at the core of the Orientalist legacy. In neither case are Arabs allowed to appear as complex and dynamic individuals and communities with diverse histories and cultures, or simply as human beings who have suffered at the hands of U.S. war aims in the region.

Shadid’s reporting demonstrated that it need not be so. His writing offered scenes from Iraq that shed light on war’s human costs:

I watched an uncle swaying as he stood, cradling his nephew’s frail body. The child had been killed in the explosion of four, 2,000-pound bombs dropped in an attempt to assassinate Saddam. A small moment of anguish on the vast stage of conflict, it always represented to me the inevitable divorce between war’s aims and its reality. (Shadid, 2005, p. 468)

And yet, Shadid noted that as he traveled less and less to Iraq, he—like the rest of us—watched events unfold through the lens of mainstream, U.S. media. Inevitably, he lost track of those “small moments,” as well as a realistic account of what really was unfolding there. “Distant in so many ways, I saw what the rest of the world sees—a
collage of chaotic images, disturbing in their brutality, grotesque in their repetition. … I feel helpless and untethered,” he confessed, “unsure of what is happening” (p. 479).

Yet, as Shadid showed so powerfully, if journalism has a role to play in challenging the Orientalism it has too often promulgated, it lies in a return to basic on-the-ground reporting that resists ideology in the interest of comprehending the complexities of events and lives in the Middle East and elsewhere. The trend of closing news bureaus and slashing foreign news coverage may be irreversible. Still, the ideals of journalism as a vocation committed to reporting a story in all of its dimensions remain—even when it might lead to conclusions that call into question the goals of powerful social and political interests. For these ideals to exist, journalists must be willing to examine their preconceptions and to resist the use of entrenched racist metaphors, frames, and lexical choices in their writing about others. The hope for overcoming Orientalism lies in adherence to basic journalistic principles such as these regardless of the forms that journalism takes in the future.
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APPENDIX A: SUICIDE BOMBER

“This Why Suicide Bombing ... Is Now All the Rage,” April 15, 2002
APPENDIX B: RED X COVERS

Clockwise from upper left: Adolf Hitler, May 7, 1945; Saddam Hussein, April 21, 2003; Osama bin Laden, May 20, 2011; Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi, June 19, 2006
APPENDIX C: ABU MOUSAB AL-ZARQAWI

“Face of Terror,” December 27, 2004
APPENDIX E: FAILED LEADERS

APPENDIX F: DEFORMED WOMEN

“Forever a Prisoner,” May 5, 2003

“Marked Women,” July 26, 2004
APPENDIX G: ARAB MODERNIS

“Helping Tradition Meet Modernity,” April 26, 2004

“Wael Ghonim,” May 2, 2011
APPENDIX H: ARAB MODERNS ON THE COVER

APPENDIX I: CODE SHEET

Code Sheet—Time study

1. **Story I.D.** ____________
2. **Date (MM-DD-YYYY)** ____________

3. **Headline** (write in): ____________________________
   **Subhead** (write in): ____________________________

4. **Nations Covered**: Choose **up to two**:
   1. Algeria
   2. Bahrain
   3. Egypt
   4. Israel
   5. Iraq
   6. Jordan
   7. Kuwait
   8. Lebanon
   9. Libya
   10. Morocco
   11. Oman
   12. Palestine/Occupied Palestinian Territories
   13. Qatar
   14. Saudi Arabia
   15. Sudan
   16. Syria
   17. Tunisia
   18. United Arab Emirates
   19. Yemen
   20. Multiple Countries/Regional Focus
   21. Other
   22. None

   **United States featured?** Yes ___ No ___

5. **Story Topics**: Choose **two** topics from the list below:
   1. Culture/history/society
   2. Domestic Arab politics
   3. International politics
   4. Economics/Energy
   5. Education
   6. Human rights
   7. International aid/development
   8. Migration/immigration
   9. Religion
   10. Technology
   11. War/Conflict/Terrorism
   12. Other

6. **Images**
   **A. Scenes**
   Categorize each scene using **up to two** of the choices below:
   1. Death/Destruction/Chaos
   2. Militancy/Protest
   3. Human Interest
   4. Other
   Brief description:

   **B. Individual persons**
   Camera shot: 1). “mid-shot” 2). “close up” 3). “extreme close up” 4). Other

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Is this an image of an Arab leader? Yes ___ No ___
If yes, write in name and title of person pictured:
If no, write in brief description of who is pictured:

Notes:
APPENDIX J: CODE BOOK

Instructions for coding
1. Write in the story I.D. in the spaces provided on the code sheet. The story I.D. is the number found on the upper right-hand side of each Time feature story. The first article would be coded as 0-0-1; the second as 0-0-2, etc.

2. Write in article date in the spaces provided on the code sheet. Dates are either hand-written in the margins of each article or appear printed on the article. Dates should appear MM-DD-YYYY, i.e. 12-19-2005 for December 19, 2005.

3. Write in article headline and subhead in the spaces provided on the code sheet.

4. Nations Covered. Which Arab nations receive the most frequent coverage? Which are covered very little or not at all?

Instructions: For each Time feature story, read the story headline, subhead, and lead/nutgraf (typically the first several paragraphs of the story). Then, using the numbered list provided below, choose the country or countries that are most prominently featured in the article. Most articles primarily feature ONE country, even if passing references are made to other countries. However, sometimes more than one country is explored in-depth. Select up to two countries and write the corresponding number for the country or countries you select in the spaces provided on the code sheet. Note: Some stories are analyses of multiple countries or the Middle East as a region. In these cases, you may select #21 “Multiple Countries/Regional Focus” from the list below. Some articles are general analyses, such as articles about al-Qaeda, and do not mention any specific country. In these cases, you may select #22 “None.” Once you have made these choices, you will be asked whether the United States is prominently featured in the article. Please check “yes” or “no” on the code sheet.

1. Algeria
2. Bahrain
3. Egypt
4. Israel
5. Iraq
6. Jordan
7. Kuwait
8. Lebanon
9. Libya
10. Morocco
11. Oman
12. Palestine/Occupied Palestinian Territories
13. Qatar
14. Saudi Arabia
15. Sudan
16. Syria
17. Tunisia
18. United Arab Emirates
19. Yemen
20. Multiple Countries/Regional Focus
21. Other
22. None

United States featured? Yes ___ No ___

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5. Story Topics. What are the primary story topics found in Time’s coverage of the Arab world?

Instructions: For each Time feature story, read the story headline, subhead, and lead/nutgraf (typically the first several paragraphs of the story). Then, using the numbered list provided below, choose two topics that best describe what the story is about and write the topic’s corresponding number in the spaces provided on the code sheet. If the article is very clearly focusing on one specific topic, choose that topic for your first choice and select “other” for your second choice. The list below contains eleven topics; below each topic are hints to help you categorize the stories.

Story topics:

1. Culture/history/society
   - Arab media/antiquities/art/books/entertainment/profiles of personalities such as “queens,” “human rights attorneys,” etc./sports and sports figures/profiles of cities and places of interest/a piece that explores societal trends, i.e. how an Iraqi town is recovering from the war years/restaurants, life in the city

2. Domestic Arab politics
   - national elections/regime violence against protesters/regime corruption/Arab leaders of all stripes and their sons, families/civil war or impending civil war in an Arab country/insurgent leaders, insurgency, with regard to instability within an Arab country and threat posed to its government/crime/police, i.e. stories on Iraq’s police force/ Arab Spring and other protests

3. International politics
   - stories or analyses about the Arab world and its place in international politics/the relationship of one Arab country to another or to the United States/stories about al-Qaeda and its goals regarding the United States and/or Arab world.

4. Economics/Energy/Environment
   - oil/energy production, environmental problems, such as water shortages

5. Education
   - schools and universities/profiles about teachers/students

6. Human rights
   - civilian casualties/honor killings/torture/imprisonment/massacres/famine/hardship and suffering of civilians during war/profiles those who work for human rights/death penalty/lack of fair trial
7. International aid/development
   i.e. the work of aid and development organizations in the region

8. Migration/immigration
   i.e. immigrant and refugee stories, i.e. Iraqi refugees in Europe

9. Religion
   i.e. religious sectarian differences, i.e. Shi’ite versus Sunni/Christians as a persecuted minority/Iraq’s Jewish community/profiles of a religious leader, i.e. Ayatollah Ali Sistani

10. Technology

11. War/Conflict/Terrorism
    i.e. war between U.S. and Arab nations/ U.S. attacks on Arab cities, villages/Arab resentment, violence against the U.S./Palestinian/Israeli conflict/Hamas/terrorism/Al-Qaeda violence/ suicide bombers/

6. Images. How does Time depict Arabs and the Arab world in photographs and images? Instructions: Find the main photograph or dominant illustrated image on the first page of the story or on the opening two-page spread. The main photograph/dominant image is the largest one on the page or pages. Rarely, you might encounter two photographs of the same size that are side by side, together comprising the largest image on the page. In this case, code both photographs.

Decide whether the image is a scene or an individual person. Images of individual persons are those that feature one individual alone, where one single person is clearly the main focus. Scenes are just about everything else—those photographs or images that depict more than a head shot or photograph of one individual.

A. If the image is a scene: Read the story’s headline, subhead, and the photograph’s caption, then use these elements as a guide to help you choose up to two categories that best describe the photograph or image and mark your choices in the spaces provided on the code sheet.

Here is a detailed description of each category and what goes in them:
  1) “Destruction/ Death/Chaos”: images of destroyed buildings or people destroying property/dead bodies, corpses ready for burial, skulls and bones/people running from an explosion/an unruly crowd
2) “Militancy/Protest”: images of people with guns or weaponry/ people fully masked, only eyes showing/ youth military saluting/ soldiers in uniform/groups of men prostrate in prayer and men with long beards and/or skull caps (when caption, headline, or subhead indicate they are religious fundamentalists)/ police frisking civilians and/or stopping cars, shots of those labeled “jihadists”/groups of protesters including but not confined to the “Arab Spring” protesters.

3) “Human Interest”: images of people engaged in everyday activities, i.e. shopping, driving, working in an office or a hospital/ scenes of children playing/families at home/people in cafes or in meetings/court-room scenes. This category includes shots of Arab individuals and leaders who were presented in a non-menacing way, i.e. smiling or standing with hands folded, etc. It also includes images that may provoke sympathy from the viewer—people mourning, scared, suffering, or with anguished expressions.

4) “Other”: Those images that do not fit any of the categories above.

For scenes, write in a very brief description of what you see, i.e. women at a market; worshippers at a mosque.

B. If the image is of an individual person, indicate whether the camera shot of this individual is a 1). “mid-shot” 2). “close up” 3). “extreme close up” or 4.) “other.”

Mid-shots are camera shots that include a good deal of the subject’s body, such as the head, torso, waist, and even part of the legs. Close ups are head shots where often the shoulders and head are seen and facial features and details are clearly visible. Extreme close ups are camera shots that bring the subject of the photograph so close that part of the subject’s head or face is cut off. (See examples below). Sometimes only the subject’s eyes are showing. Choose one of these for each shot of an individual person and mark your answer on the code sheet.

Then indicate whether the person pictured is an Arab leader. By Arab leader, I mean anyone from a town mayor, to an Islamic cleric with a large following, to an al-Qaeda leader, like Osama bin Laden, to an “interim President” or “interim Prime Minister,” to “insurgent leaders,” to heads of state, such as Saddam Hussein, Yasser Arafat, or Muammar Qaddafi. If the photograph or image depicts an Arab leader, mark “yes” on the code sheet. (If not, mark “no,” and you’re finished.) If “yes,” write the name and title of the person in the space provided on the code sheet. If “no,” write in who is pictured i.e. “an al-Qaeda fighter.”

7. A space for “notes” has been left on the bottom of the code sheet, in case you need to indicate any confusion or note anything that requires more explanation.