Islam Hadhari: An Ideological Discourse Analysis of Selected Speeches by UMNO President and Malaysia Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi

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ABSTRACT

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Islam Hadhari: An Ideological Discourse Analysis of Selected Speeches by UMNO President and Malaysia Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi

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This research study explored the problem the Malay identity and society in the discourse of Malay politics. The purpose of this study was to understand how the discourse of Islam Hadhari as spoken by prime minister and UMNO president Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in the years 2004-2008 demonstrated the hegemony of his administration and party.

This study assumed that discourses function within society and is only understood in the “interplay of social situation, action, actor and societal structures” (Meyer, 2001, p. 21). The study also assumed ideologies as the social representations that have specific social functions for social groups (van Dijk, 2001). van Dijk (2001) proposed that discourse is privileged in the (re)production of ideologies as, unlike other social practices, properties of text and talk “allow social members to actually express or formulate ideological beliefs” (p. 192).

For the purposes of this study, the critical discourse analysis approach of ideological discourse analysis was used to observe the micro level of ideological (re)production being expressed by UMNO President Badawi in speeches. 19 speeches given by Badawi in various communicative events throughout 2004-2008 were selected to infer the ideological discourse of Islam Hadhari, the UMNO ideological approach to
Islamism of the Malays, in this study referred to variously as Malay Islamism or Islamist Malayness.

The study found that UMNO sought to persuade and influence the divided Malay constituency by engaging PAS in the discourse of the Malay Islamist state through the party ideology of Islam Hadhari. The study advanced two conclusions: First, Malayness is the constant conflict and correspondence with ethnicity and religiosity, Malay and Muslim; and second, a theory of Malay identity should extend to describe Malayness as a civilization, as proposed by Milner (2007).

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DEDICATION

In memory of Dato’ Yahaya Yeop bin Ishak (1932-2007) and Dato’ Zakiah binti Laidin
(1938-2011), my parents.
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This dissertation while written alone was not done in isolation. Select people contributed to the completion of this study. I am indebted to my doctoral committee members whose scholarly guidance, comments, and advice proved invaluable in attaining my objective. Dr. Drew McDaniel, co-director of dissertation, was supportive of my research interest which was, by its nature, innovative. Dr. Karen Riggs, co-director of dissertation, was instrumental in having me reflect on what it meant to be Malay. Dr. Benjamin Bates introduced me to Foucault, whose philosophical perspective was constructive to my understanding Malay political discourse. Dr. Habibah Ashari advised me on a social Malayness I would have otherwise neglected.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Overview

This research study was done to explore the Malay identity and society in the discourse of Malay politics. The purpose of this study was to explore how the discourse of Islam Hadhari as spoken by UMNO president and Prime Minister Badawi in the years 2004-2008 demonstrated the hegemony and domination of the party in Malay politics and society.

In studying Malay political discourse it was assumed that “discourses take place within society, and can only be understood in the interplay of social situation, action, actor and societal structures” (Meyer, 2001, p. 21). The study also assumed that ideology served as the interface between social structure and social cognition, as proposed by van Dijk (1998). van Dijk (1998) theorized that ideologies are “social representations that have specific social functions for groups” (p. 191), and that language use, text, talk and communication—subsumed under the term of “discourse”—are used by group members to learn, acquire, change, confirm, articulate, and persuasively convey ideologies to other ingroup members, to foster them in novices, defend or conceal them from outgroup members, or to propagate them among infidels.

This study used the approach of ideological discourse analysis. A discourse analysis of ideologies is conducted to observe the micro level of ideological (re)production that is actually being achieved by actors in social situations (van Dijk, 1998). van Dijk (1998) proposed that discourse is privileged in the reproduction of
ideologies as, unlike other social practices, “various properties of text and talk allow social members to actually express or formulate abstract ideological beliefs, or any other opinion related to such ideologies” (p. 192).

This study was done to extend the ideological discourse analysis study by Ghazali (2006) of the keynote UMNO General Assembly speech on Islam Hadhari given by Badawi in September 2004. In the study that used the van Dijk IDA indexes of “Category,” “Positive presentation,” “Lexicalization or vocabulary style,” “Evidentiality, Presupposition,” “Norm expression,” “Comparison,” and “Disclaimer,” Ghazali (2006) found that Badawi sought to categorize UMNO with Islam, persuading his audience to “accept his leadership through group mental representations of Islam” (p. 141) in the ideological platform of Islam Hadhari. This study analyzed 19 speeches over the years 2004-2008 rather than one speech in 2004, and was removed from Ghazali (2006) in its IDA design (discussed in Chapter 3).

This chapter is the introduction to the study. Following the overview, the chapter begins with (a) background and context of the study; (b) problem statement; (c) statement of purpose and research questions; (d) research design; (e) assumptions; (f) researcher background and reflexivity; and, (g) study rationale and significance. The chapter concludes with definitions of the key terminology used in this study.

**Background and Context**

In September 2009, Mohd. Azizuddin Mohd. Sani, Norhafezah Yusof, Azahar Kasim and Rusdi Omar conducted the comparative analysis of the “concepts” of Asian
values, Islam Hadhari, and 1Malaysia and proposed that there were similarities between the ideologies, “even though they were propagated by the different prime minister[s] of Malaysia, Mahathir, Abdullah [Ahmad Badawi], and Najib respectively” (p. 117). Mohd. Sani et al. (2009) found that

Asia[n] values more or less tried to promote and strengthen the Malay values which were based on Islam. Islam Hadhari, similarly, attempted to blend Islam with traditional Malay values. 1Malaysia, however, has some added values in trying to promote quality performance by the government and unity among Malaysians since the end of [the] 2008 general election. Therefore, some elements of these concepts especially in promoting the Malay-Islam agenda were not actually dissimilar. (pp. 117)

Nonchalantly, Mohd. Sani et al. suggested the concepts were used purposefully to “maintain UMNO’s agenda of neo-feudalism and ensured it to stay in power and protect Malay rights” (p. 117).

The 2005 March issue of the Dewan Masyarakat was novel for its coverage of the state of Islamist Malayness. A government magazine published in Malay, the Dewan Masyarakat March issue profiled the UMNO state ideology of Islam Hadhari, editorializing the vicissitudes of lived Islam, or Islamism, of Malays at the time.

In the article entitled Islam Hadhari: Gagasan Pembangunan Negara [Islam Hadhari: Nation-Building Concept], the Head of the Islamic Philosophy and Civilization Department at the Institute of Language and Literature Wan Abdul Hamid Wan Teh
tautologically advanced that Islam Hadhari was the government concept, [“and thus needed to be assimilated by all members of society regardless of religious affiliation, race, or culture.”] Anecdotally, the Malaysian government had been demonstrating its hegemony in the discourse of Islamist state, by advocating and propagating the UMNO ideology of Islam Hadhari.

In *Penghayatan Islam Hadhari* [Internalizing Islam Hadhari], International Islamic University Malaysia Professor Dr. Sidek Baba rationalized that Islam Hadhari was necessary to counter 1) an Islamism that was the inherited socio-religious practice of Malays; 2) Islam as a tariqah or religious method; 3) Islam as a form of politics; 4) Islam as a (solely) a religion of rituals; 5) Islam as tabligh, or a ritualistic way of life as defined by the Jamaat al-tabligh, an Islamist sect originating in India; and, 6) Islam as a sectarianism. Apparently, contemporary Malays had been adhering to a multiplicity of Islamisms, and that the government had unilaterally resolved to narrowing the discourse of Islam to that defined in Islam Hadhari.

In the op-ed, *Islam Hadhari: Pandangan Orang Bukan Islam* [Islam Hadhari: A Non-Muslim View] by Khoo Kay Kim of University Malaya, Islam Hadhari was likened to the “modern Islam” advocated by the *Kaum Muda* (a Malay Islamist movement that demanded the total reform of Malay society, Abdullah, 2003), which was ironic, given that the *Kaum Muda* counts among its many members Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy, a member of Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM), and the third president of PAS, UMNO’s strongest opponent.
Notwithstanding its elitism, the issue was notable for its candor summation of the situation on the ground with regard to Islam Hadhari. In the article entitled Islam Hadhari: Antara Konseptual Dengan Perlaksanaan [Islam Hadhari: Relating concept to application], Chairman of the National Fatwa Council Datuk Dr. Ismail Ibrahim found that members of Malay society a year later still failed to find Islam Hadhari’s relevance in akidah (faith), syariah (Islamic legal code), and akhlak (personal bearing), and confused the UMNO Malay Islamism as a new Islam [agama baharu]. The Malay society was confused about what Islam Hadhari should mean in social realities. Evidently, Islam was an important feature in the negotiation and discourse of Malayness.

Stuart Hall (1996) argued that while cultural identities invoke an origin in history with which they continue to connect, identities are really about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being; less ‘who we are’ or ‘where we come from’ than what we might become, how we have been represented and how that affects how we might represent ourselves. Hall (1996) proposed that identities are constructed within discourse, and needed to be understood as produced “in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies” (p. 4). Identities emerge within the play of specific modalities of power and are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion than they are the sign of an identical, naturally constituted entity:
Throughout their careers, identities can function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’, abjected. Every identity has its margin, an excess, something more. The unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as foundational is not a natural, but a constructed form of closure, every identity naming as its necessary, even if silenced and unspoken other, that which it ‘lacks’. (Hall, 1996, pp. 5)

Anthony Milner (1994) investigating ideological conflict in contemporary colonial Malayan texts proposed that the modern Malaysian state had inherited an unresolved dispute between kerajaan, umat (or ummah), and bangsa, and a discourse of politics derived from colonial “post-Enlightenment Western thought” (p. 292). In the state of kerajaan, Malays owed their primary allegiance not to a territorially defined state, or an ethnic or religious group, but rather to a royal personage in the kerajaan: Built on the Malay language ke... an construct, kerajaan “has the literal meaning of the ‘condition of having a raja’” (Milner, 1994, p. 16):

If we are today to attempt to appreciate the kerajaan perspective, it is necessary to be as cautious of the concept of ‘individual’. . . In such a society of what Richard Sennett has referred to as ‘Public Men’, the old Malay dictum that “life is contained within custom (adat)” would have possessed a profound significance. (Milner, 1994, p. 22)
Islam fomented “deep religious division” (Milner, 1994, p. 161) over the concept of kingship, the division increasingly apparent during the 19th century (Milner, 1994). By the early 19th century Islamic scholars sought to establish a community based primarily on religious affiliation not royal allegiance (Milner, 1994). Raffles reported of “hajies and other religious persons” who were in “constant struggle” against the Malay royal courts (Milner, 1994):

Phrases such as “strict attention to the Mohomedan customs” and the “ancient usages of the Mohomedan” are reminiscent of Raffles’ reference to the “Laws of the Arabs” which he believed those Islamic spokesmen were trying to impose all over the archipelago. (Milner, 1994, pp. 161)

By the end of the 19th century, a colonial liberal conceptualization challenged the Malay royal courts: a nationalism in bangsa. The elevation of the status of the Malay race in bangsa “contrasted strongly with the hierarchical, ceremonial kerajaan” (Milner, 1994, p. 89), “as an alternative Malay focus of loyalty and basis of social organization” (Milner, 1994, p. 90), further marginalizing the sultanate.

Harold Crouch (1996) argued that the democratic and authoritarian characteristics found “in many Third World regimes” (p. 5) as Malaysia do not necessarily contradict each other but can often be mutually supporting and thus be responsive and repressive at the same time. The constitutional framework of the Malaysian political system is essentially democratic. Elections “have been held regularly,
the government is responsible to an elected parliament, and the judiciary is constitutionally independent” (Crouch, 1996, p. 5). But

the democratic framework is accompanied by a wide range of authoritarian controls that greatly limit the scope for effective political opposition and make it very difficult to envisage the defeat of the ruling party at the polls. (Crouch, 1996, pp. 5)

If it is hard to place Malaysia in a category between democracy and authoritarianism, “it is even more difficult to perceive the direction in which its political system is moving” (Crouch, 1996, p. 6) as the Malaysian political system has been balancing between repression and responsiveness since Malaya, as it was known then, obtained its independence in 1957. That balance, however, has not remained unchanged. At times the government has been inclined to resort to authoritarian measures, while at other times it has adopted a relatively liberal attitude. Nevertheless, these oscillations have taken place within a limited range and do not fundamentally change the nature of the political system. In essence, the regime continues to exhibit simultaneously a repressive and responsive character. (Crouch, 1996, pp. 7)

The ruling coalition in Malaysia constitutes a distinct entity with its own constitution and rules (Crouch, 1996). At its core is the alliance between the dominant Malay party, UMNO, and the parties representing the non-Malay communities, the
Chinese MCA and the Indian MIC (Crouch, 1996). The original Alliance was the product of the “exigencies of electoral competition” (Crouch, 1996, p. 32) in local government elections introduced by the British in 1952. UMNO was founded in 1946 “to fight exclusively for Malay interests” (Crouch, 1996, p. 17) in response to the British project to create a Malayan Union out of nine Malay states and two crown colonies in the peninsula. Under the proposed Union “the Malays would lose their special status as the indigenous community, and non-Malays would acquire the same citizenship rights as Malays” (Crouch, 1996, p. 17).

The UMNO leadership nonetheless realized the imperative to come to some understanding with moderate non-Malay leaders: “The British had made it clear that they did not intend to grant independence to an exclusively Malay government that would have little chance of guaranteeing stability in the future” (Crouch, 1996, p. 17):

In the Kuala Lumpur municipal elections of 1952, UMNO joined with a conservative Chinese body, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), in an alliance against a Malay-led multiracial party. This alliance met with great success and later admitted the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) to its ranks. Known as the Alliance, it won every national election between 1959 and 1969. The secret of its success lay in its ability to win votes from all three communities, while the appeal of opposition parties was usually limited to only one community in each case. (Crouch, 1996, pp. 17-18)
The Alliance formula worked well for its constituent parties for the first 12 years after independence. Although there was no shortage of political conflicts involving the interests of racial communities, the Alliance arrangements facilitated their settlements through compromise within the cabinet. “Certainly UMNO’s dominance was not doubted; but its leaders, headed by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, were usually sensitive to the interests represented of their MCA and MIC partners” (Crouch, 1996, p. 33).

The Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) was the product of “conscious deliberation” (Crouch, 1996, p. 33). After the racial riots of May 13, 1969, Abdul Razak who succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as prime minister in 1970 believed that steps had to be taken to reduce the level of open political competition, “which inevitably led to heightened emotions when political leaders sought votes on the basis of appeals to one race or another” (Crouch, 1996, p. 33). The scheme was implemented gradually to evolving circumstances:

In December 1970, a broad state-level coalition was formed in Sarawak, followed in 1972 by a coalition with the Chinese-based Gerakan in Penang and the small People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in Perak. Then the main Malay opposition party, PAS, joined the coalition on 1 January 1973. This network of separate coalitions, together with the ruling Sabah Alliance in Sabah, was consolidated in the BN, which was officially registered as confederation of parties in June 1974, two months before the August 1974 national election. (Crouch, 1996, p. 33)
The formation of the BN served two main purposes:

First, by bringing former opposition parties into the government, BN leaders hoped that the conflicts could be settled behind closed doors in ways that did not inflame passions, as had occurred so often during the 1960s. The constituent parties would be guaranteed appropriate representation in cabinet, Parliament, and state assemblies and would therefore not need to espouse communal causes so openly or vigorously. Second, the formation of the BN allowed UMNO to consolidate further its control over the government. By bringing the main Malay opposition party into the government, the new coalition protected UMNO from encroachments from the Malay opposition. (Crouch, 1996, pp. 33)

Crouch (1996) found that the BN was essentially a coalition between the core party UMNO and the peripheral parties that allied themselves with it. Despite the formal equality of party representation in the Front’s organizational structure, “there was no question of non-UMNO parties ganging up against the dominant party” (p. 34):

Parties joined the BN on UMNO’s terms; and when they could not accept those terms, they were forced out, as the expulsion of PAS showed. In the Alliance, the MCA and MIC, sole representative of their communities, have substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis UMNO; but their influence was greatly diluted in the broader BN. . . While the Alliance could have been characterized as a partnership (although an unequal one), the BN was in effect a façade for UMNO rule. (Crouch, 1996, pp. 34)
UMNO is “not a mere political party but has become the major socio-political organization of the Malay community, the self-avowed defender of all the values, privileges and symbols that define Malay identity and unity in the multi-ethnic society” (Chee, 1989, p. 212, as quoted in Abdullah, 2003, p. 115). UMNO was the first “true Malay national political organization” (Abdullah, 2003, p. 116). Formed in 1946 in resistance to the Malayan Union, UMNO tended “towards maintaining ethnic identity and status rather than defending the ideological bonds that compelled the Malays to confront the British administration” (Abdullah, 2003, p. 116):

The idea of abolishing the symbol of “Malayness” i.e. the Sultans, created a fear of cultural and economic inferiority. The Malay economic position was already below par to that of the immigrants. The royal institution, they believed, can be used as a shield or an umbrella against the intrusion of the Chinese and Indians. In other words, it was only the Sultans who could protect their interests. (Abdullah, 2003, pp. 116)

UMNO’s first task was to seek support from the royal circle. “The ruling elites, fearing that their status would be jeopardised if the Malayan Union did materialize, not only supported UMNO but were also directly involved in its activities” (Abdullah, 2003, p. 117). UMNO defending Malay interests akin to other Malay political parties and organizations as PKMM and Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) was more articulate:

UMNO’s Malay nationalism was based on the concept of *Ketuanan Orang Melayu* (Malay Supremacy) (Funston, 1980). The concept entailed the idea of
hak (rights), kedaulatan (sovereignty), and keistimewaan (privileges) of the Malays as owners of the Malay Peninsula of Malaya (later Malaysia). (Abdullah, 2003, pp. 117)

UMNO’s narrowed ethnic political struggle was repulsed by a group of ulama representatives in the party through the Persatuan Ulama Sa-Malaya (Pan Malayan Movement of Religious Learned):

As a result, UMNO was divided into two camps, the nationalist-cum-secularist and the religious inclined group. The latter group formed the Parti Islam Se Malaya or Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP). (Abdullah, 2003, pp. 118)


Onn Ja’afar established the principle that the essential character of the nation must be Malay. Onn led the struggle to defeat the Malayan Union project. His success enabled the Malays “to recover their identity and eventually assert their dominance over the political and cultural landscape of the country” (Hng, 2004, p. 148).
Tunku Abdul Rahman coaxed the nation to reconcile to the fact of a multiethnic society. Tunku persuaded the Malays that their identity would not be diminished by the participation of the other races. The social contract (also called Merdeka Compact) he negotiated continues to define the management of the different races in the country (Hng, 2004, p. 148).

Abdul Razak Hussein found the need for economic equity as part of the nation building agenda. Razak rationalized that no nation could be sustained if there is wide economic disparity among its people. The problem is aggravated when this disparity falls along ethnic lines, as had been the case with the racial riots on May 13, 1969. Hussein instituted the affirmative action policy in favor of the Malays (called the New Economic Policy, NEP) to dismantle the colonial “dual economy” system that identified race with economic function (Hng, 2004, p. 148).

Hussein Onn focused on building the moral basis of civil society. He stressed that nations must have strong ethical foundations, “and the first requirement of all democratic societies is commitment to the rule of law” (Hng, 2004, p. 148).

Mahathir Mohamad advanced that a nation is defined not only by its representations at home but also by the positions it adopts abroad. To that end, Mahathir sought to project an international identity for Malaysia that reflected its Islamic heritage, its solidarity with the oppressed, and its commitment to economic resilience and modernity (Hng, 2004). Khoo Boo Teik (1995) offered that Mahathir’s
ideas constitute a coherent political ideology of “Mahathirism” consisting of five core components of nationalism, capitalism, Islam, populism, and authoritarianism.

Expelled from the cabinet for four years beginning May 1987 for his complicity in the 1987 fissuring of UMNO, Badawi was elected by Mahathir to replace Anwar Ibrahim as his deputy in January 1999. Political observers “found it hard to believe” (Abd. Samad, 2008, p. vi) that Badawi who conspired to topple Mahathir in the 1987 UMNO crisis was given the mandate as deputy prime minister. However,

Mahathir himself would admit that Abdullah [Badawi] was chosen as his deputy because of the latter’s impeccable Islamic credentials which could be used to help win over the hearts and minds of rural voters. (Md. Khalid, 2008, pp. 145)

After enduring 22 years of entrenched Mahathirism, Badawi inherited the office of the chief executive of the government on October 31, 2003. In office, Badawi’s “most important contribution” (Md. Khalid, 2008, p. 145) to Malaysian politics was “his own personal imprint of a form of Islam acceptable to all Malaysians” (Md. Khalid, 2008, p. 145):

*Islam Hadhari*, or civilisational Islam, can be interpreted as an attempt by prime minister Abdullah to disassociate himself from the type of Islam promoted by Mahathir, a practice of faith that was apparently far too biased towards the idea of material development with inadequate attention to matters spiritual (Md. Khalid, 2008, p. 145).
Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani (2010) argued that Islam Hadhari introduced on September 23, 2004 by UMNO president and Prime Minister Badawi was merely an extension of the “Asian values” (p. 20) concept advocated by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in response to advancing Westernism. Mohd Sani found both “Asian values” (p. 20) and Islam Hadhari were conceptually alike:

Asian values more or less tried to promote and strengthen the Malay values which were based on Islam. Islam Hadhari similarly attempted to blend Islam with traditional Malay values. Therefore, both concepts were not actually dissimilar, except for their names or concepts. (Mohd. Sani, 2010, pp. 20)

Notwithstanding the cultural relativism was a constant party agenda of perpetuating a Malay elite power: both were considered attempts to retain UMNO’s agenda of neo-feudalism (Mohd Sani, 2010).

Badawi introduced Islam Hadhari at the 55th UMNO General Assembly in September 2004 in the discourse of a Malay Islamism¹:

1. The 11th General Elections were held on 21 March 2004 and UMNO was very successful. UMNO won 109 from the 117 parliamentary seats that it was allocated and 303 from 338 state assembly seats. Collectively, Barisan Nasional captured 199 out of 219 seats in Parliament and 452 out of 505 state seats. As a result, Barisan Nasional once again succeeded in forming the

¹ The quotes reproduced in this study were originally spoken in Malay. This study analyzed English translations of speech texts, obtained from the book Islam Hadhari (2006), and from the Speech Collection Archives of Chief Executives in the official portal of the Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia at http://www.pmo.gov.my/ucapan/?t=2009&b=all&m=s&p=paklah
Federal Government and the government in 12 states. Terengganu returned to the Barisan Nasional fold after we won 28 out of 32 seats in the state assembly – a magnificent victory. Barisan Nasional in Kelantan has become a dynamic political force after winning 21 out of 45 seats and is no longer deemed to be a marginal and inconsequential presence. (para. 8)

2. The election results indicate that a progressive and moderate approach will defeat a conservative ideology and extremist ways. The election results gives us confidence that, in facing PAS, there is no need for us to alter our philosophy, we do not need to change our methods, we do not need to be alarmed. We must not fall into the trap of using religion for political gain. The light of truth cannot be obscured forever by the fog of falsity. (para. 11)

3. UMNO’s success is the success of moderation. It is the success of a struggle that gives priority to development and a realization that Muslims must become an advanced people. To succeed, Muslims must achieve success in this world as well as equip themselves to face the Hereafter. UMNO has now proven to the world the success of a progressive approach to Islam. UMNO must therefore enhance its understanding of the concept of development that we propagate through Islam Hadhari. (para. 12)

Islam Hadhari was disclaimed as a new religion for an Islamism of the Malays:

Islam Hadhari is not a new religion. It is not a new teaching nor is it a new mazhab (denomination). Islam Hadhari is an effort to bring the Ummah back to
basics, back to the fundamentals, as prescribed in the Quran and the Hadith that form the foundation of Islamic civilization. If Islam Hadhari is interpreted sincerely and understood clearly, it will not cause Muslims to deviate from the true path. It is not UMNO’s culture to trivialize religion. UMNO has never allowed religion to be used as a political tool. UMNO staunchly opposes the use of Islam as an instrument to manipulate people’s beliefs. UMNO has always ensured that Islam and Muslims are protected from such abuse of religion. (para. 18)

Islam Hadhari aimed to achieve ten main principles:

1. Faith and piety in Allah
2. A just and trustworthy government
3. A free and independent people
4. Mastery of knowledge
5. Balanced and comprehensive economic development
6. A good quality of life
7. Protection of the rights of minority groups and women
8. Cultural and moral integrity
9. Safeguarding the environment
10. Strong defenses (para. 20)

In his discoursing Islam Hadhari, Badawi implied its ethnic trajectory: Islam Hadhari “complete and comprehensive, with an emphasis on the development of the economy
and civilization,” was “capable of building Malay competitiveness” (para. 22). Badawi reckoned that Malays needed “a change in mindset,” stressing “Any thinking that confuses and is inconsistent with Islamic beliefs must be rejected in order to allow Malay resilience and thought to be built” (para. 24).

Islam Hadhari was “definitely a politically astute strategy that succeeded in Islamizing UMNO, with the result of nullifying the attraction of ‘PAS Islam’” (Mohd Sani, 2008, p. 55). Kamila Ghazali (2006) found the concept to be an extension of Mahathir’s _penerapan nilai-nilai Islam_ (inculcation of Islamic values). Clive Kessler (2008) regarded Islam Hadhari “discursively underdeveloped and intellectually impoverished” (p.73):

Instead of original creative thought in authentic, historically informed Islamic terms, all that is offered substantively is “ten key values” of the utmost blandness, generality, and unexceptional conventionality. Ten years ago people were obsessed with defining “Asian values”; now in Islam Hadhari we see the latest phase of an intellectually banal preoccupation with “Islamic values”. All this talk about “values” is the expression of a crippled, even defunct, sociology that is intellectually vacuous. It is circular, since it explains social reality in terms of supposedly determining values that are simply “shorthand” summaries of realities that they are invoked to explain. It is also politically impotent. As current Malaysian experience shows, this approach cannot generate a new Islamic sensibility, an effective human agenda, an authentic and plausible politics, certainly not one to rival the Islamist dynamism of PAS. (Kessler, 2008, pp. 75)
UMNO confident in 2004 was humbled at the 12th General Elections in March 2008. The UMNO-led BN suffered “severe losses” of five of 13 state governments—Kelantan, Kedah, Perak, Penang, and Selangor—82 seats in the 222-seat national parliament, with 50.6 percent popular votes compared to 49.4 percent received by the opposition (Mohd Sani, 2010). Mohd Sani (2010) blamed the losses of the incumbent administration on its declining economic legitimacy and a “shocking record” (p. 50) of managing ethnic relations “as rising Malay chauvinism went unchecked within Abdullah’s party” (p. 50):

In fact, he harnessed racial identity to buttress his position within the party, rejuvenating the racially implemented affirmative action policy of the New Economic Policy (NEP), and lost the confidence of the non-Malay community in the handling of the sensitive expansion of Islamic governance through Islam Hadhari. (Mohd. Sani, 2010, pp. 50)

PAS resisted Islam Hadhari in government. On May 27, 2008 the mass media reported that the state of Selangor under PAS had banned the Islam Hadhari program due to its “confusing Muslims” (“Selangor tidak wajar,” 2008). It was to be the first of the dismantling of the UMNO Islamism in the discourse of the Malay Islamist state begun by PAS.

Problem Statement

On September 23, 2004, at the 55th UMNO General Assembly, UMNO president and Prime Minister Badawi announced that “UMNO is the largest political party in the
country, with 3.2 million members” (para. 4). UMNO “truly the first Malay national political organisation” (Abdullah, 2003, p. 116) is “not a mere political party but has become the major socio-political organization of the Malay community, the self-avowed defender of all the values, privileges and symbols that define Malay identity and unity in the multi-ethnic society” (Chee, 1989, p. 212, as quoted in Abdullah, 2003, p.115). The party is influential allowing Badawi to claim the

Malays, UMNO and Islam in this country cannot be separated. Together, the elements form a distinct culture and identity. Through its words and actions, UMNO has the responsibility of building an Islamic culture that balances the needs of this world and the next, an Islam that balances fardhu kifayah [communal obligation] and fardhu ain [individual obligation]. (para. 27)

This study explored the problem of the Malayness or Malay identity in the discourse of Malay politics. That UMNO was the focus of this study followed from Kamila Ghazali (2004), who analyzed 15 UMNO General Assembly speeches given by UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir in the years 1982-1996 to find “the power and ideology that is behind the discourse in the Prime Minister’s speeches” (p. 145). Ghazali (2004) proposed that “more studies should be made in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric on speeches of not only the dominant but also the opposition parties” (p. 145):

An area of study would be an analysis of the production and reproduction of ideology, and consequently society, as discourse is distributed through the
media. This knowledge would be invaluable for people who are interested to find out how a multiracial, multicultural, and multi-religious society can live in peace and harmony in a country that is run by a multi-party and multi-racial coalition government. (Ghazali, 2004, pp. 145)

Critical discourse analysis centers on “authentic everyday communication in institutional, media, political or other locations rather than on sample sentences or sample texts constructed in linguists’ minds” (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Leibhart, 1999, p. 8). Critical discourse analysis regards both written and spoken “discourse” as a form of social practice:

It assumes a dialectical relationship between particular discursive acts and the situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded: the situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and, in turn, discourses influence social and political reality. In other words, discourse constitutes a social practice and is at the same time constituted by it. (Wodak, et al., 1999, pp. 8)

The aim of critical discourse analysis is to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use. (Wodak et al., 1999, pp. 8)
In contrast to other types of discourse and conversation analysis, critical discourse analysis “does not pretend to be able to assume an objective, socially neutral analytical stance” (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 8):

Indeed, practitioners of Critical Discourse Analysis believe that such ostensible political indifference ultimately assists in maintaining an unjust status quo.

Critical Discourse Analysis, which is committed to an emancipatory, socially critical approach, allies itself with those who suffer political and social injustice. Its aim is therefore to intervene discursively in given social and political practices. (Wodak et al., 1999, pp. 8)

This study operationally defined discourse as the spoken and/or written product of a communicative event and assumed discourse analysis focusing on the “systematic account of the complex structures and strategies of text and talk as they are actually accomplished (produced, interpreted, used) in their social contexts” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 198). This study did not reduce ideologies to discourse and discourse analysis. Rather, it recognized the status of discourse in the reproduction of ideologies:

Unlike most other social practices, and in a more explicit way than most other semiotic codes (such as photos, pictures, images, signs, paintings, movies, gestures, dance and so on), various properties of text and talk allow social members to actually express or formulate abstract ideological beliefs, or any other opinion related to such ideologies. (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 192)
Statement of Purpose and Research Questions

The purpose of this study was to explore in 19 speeches how the discourse of Islam 
*Hadhari* as spoken by UMNO president and Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in 
the years 2004-2008 demonstrated the hegemony of his administration and party in 
Malay politics and society. From this study was anticipated the understanding of “how a 
multiracial, multicultural, and multi-religious society can live in peace and harmony in a 
country that is run by a multi-party and multi-racial coalition government” (Ghazali, 
2004) and knowledge of the Malay identity. To investigate the problem, the following 
research questions were directed: In the discourse of Islam *Hadhari*,

1. How did Badawi represent UMNO?
2. How did Badawi describe the opposition party PAS?
3. How did Badawi explain the Islamic approach of Islam *Hadhari*?
4. How did Badawi associate himself with former UMNO president and Prime 
   Minister Mahathir?

Research Design

In order to explore Badawi’s ideological discourse of Islam *Hadhari* in the years 
2004-2008, this study used the applied critical discourse analysis of ideological discourse 
analysis (henceforth IDA). The IDA in this study consisted of four stages. First, 
identification of the research problem and purpose of study, research questions, and 
research methodology were done concomitantly with the review of literature. Second, 
as an end of literature review, the conceptual framework (henceforth CF) was
manufactured. Third, an analytical guideline for processing speech text material was constructed. Finally, each speech text was analyzed for ideological discourse.

Having identified the research problem, the review of the literature divided into two areas of a) Malayness as ideology complex, and b) the discourse of Malay politics, focused on the Malay-Muslim dialectic, narrowed the purpose of the study, research questions, and research methodology. The review of the literature ended in the manufacture of the CF of the IDA.

The CF was the scaffolding of the IDA, “a working tool consisting of categories that emanate from the literature” (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008, p. 58). As the CF “become the repository for reporting the findings and guiding data analysis and interpretation” (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008, p. 58) in qualitative research, in this study these categories rationalized the indexes of the “instrumentarium (toolbox)” (Jager, 2001, p. 54) in the analytical guideline for processing speech material.

Six indexes and three “ideological discourse structures” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 263) comprised the IDA “instrumentarium” (Jager, 2001, p. 54) of this study. In this study, the IDA was first informed by the CF. The CF was then related with the IDA instrument indexes used in the van Dijk (1998) study of the book The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society by Dinesh D’Souza (1995). In that study, van Dijk applied the indexes of “Our ideological and social enemies and Us,” with the sub-indexes, “The ideological enemy” and “The social enemy;” “Us;” “The conflict and the ‘crisis’;” “Reconstructing ideologies,” with the sub-indexes, “Conservatism,” “Ethnocentrism/modern racism,”
and “Ideological structures;” “Attitudes,” with the sub-indexes, “Attitudes about racism,” “Affirmative action,” “Multiculturalism,” “Afrocentrism,” and “The IQ debate;” and, “Models” (1998). From that study I inferred the indexes indicative of the IDA and others which were formulated with regard to the subject matter being explored.


Three “ideological discourse structures” were drawn from van Dijk’s theory of Ideology (1998) and deployed in this IDA. First was context, consisting of type of communicative event and participant type. Second was “semantic macrostructure” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 10), or topic. And the last was local meaning.

The 19 speeches that discoursed Islam Hadhari at length were given in various communicative events in the years 2004-2008 and were collected from the Speech Collection Archives of Chief Executives of the Official Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia (http://www.pmo.gov.my/ucapan/?t=2009&b=all&m=s&p=paklah), and from the book Islam Hadhari: A model approach for development and progress (2006). The Speech Collection Archives lists 19 speeches past September 2004, 81 in 2005, 74 in 2006, 90 in 2007, 48 in 2008, and 15 in 2009. Of the corpus of speeches, I selected 19 that discussed Islam Hadhari in the years 2004-2008 (Badawi barely acknowledged the ideology in 2009,) for analysis which I reflexively assumed would be
sufficient to build a “complex, holistic, picture” (Creswell, 1998) that included multiple dimensions of the problem in enough complexity, as, in CDA, “we must make choices, and select those structures for closer analysis that are relevant for the study of a social issue” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 99).

Of the corpus of speeches, only speeches that discussed at length aspects of the UMNO ideology with regard to the speech topic of the discourse of the Malay Islamist state were selected. Of the 19 speeches, eight were given in Malaysia (2004, 2005, 2006, 2006, 2007, 2007, 2008), two in United Kingdom (2004, 2007), and once in India (2004), Saudi Arabia (2005), Pakistan (2005), Australia (2005), Germany (2005), Japan (2006), Indonesia (2006), Egypt (2006), and Russia (2007). Four of the speeches were delivered at the UMNO General Assembly (September 2004, July 2005, November 2006, and November 2007). Because of the nature of IDA, I indexed speeches first by index and then by date. Badawi spoke in English abroad and in Malay at home. Where not in English, I opted for the official English translation archived online at the Prime Minister’s Office portal and in the book Islam Hadhari (2006).

The speech texts were individually processed and analyzed with regard to the research study questions.

Assumptions

The Malay identity or Malayness is the complicated association of many ideologies, in this study referred to as the Malay ideology complex. Of the many general theories of Malayness proposed in literature, four are relevant and assumed for the
purposes of this IDA study: First, in the British colonial era, an “invention” of Malay politics as a new *adat* or custom in the dialogue of three distinct ideological orientations of community in Malay society—the sultanate or *kerajaan*, the Islamic community or *ummah*, and the Malay race or *bangsa* (Milner, 1994); second, postcolonial Malay politics are defined by the conflict and correspondence of Islam and race or ethnic nationalism (*or Malayism,* in the Islam-Malay ethnicity dialectic (Mutalib, 1990), in this study called the Malay-Muslim dialectic; third, sociologically, the Malays are ideologically tended to the incorruptibility of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions, including Islam (Tham, 1977); and last, concepts of modern Malayness are drawn on a British Orientalist-colonial knowledge (Shamsul, 2004).

*The Researcher*

This qualitative study was considered a native ethnography for the researcher’s Malay ethnicity. As researcher I brought to this study a unique Muslim Malay reflexivity. Reflexive thought takes place through internal conversation (Archer, 2007):

Quintessentially, reflexivity involves a subject considering an object in relation to itself, bending that object back upon itself in a process which includes the self being able to consider itself as its own object. . . Reflexive thought is synonymous with internal conversation because reflexivity is *not* vague self-awareness but a *questioning* exploration of subject in relation to object, including the subject as object, one which need not have any practical outcome or intent. (Archer, 2007, pp. 72-73)
Our internal conversations are a necessary property; without it, “it is very difficult to initiate ideas, develop thought, be creative, and respond intelligently to discourse, plan, control our feelings, solve problems, or develop self-esteem” (Tomlinson, 2000, p. 123, as quoted in Archer, 2007, p. 64).

Reflexivity as a mental activity is first-person in kind. Its consequences for this study are significant:

Its consequences are that no communality of social background, no similarity in social circumstances, and no uniformity of stimulus, opportunity or constraint will be reflected upon in the same way: involving the same considerations, entailing the same evaluations or proceeding according to the same deliberative schema. (Archer, 2007, pp. 75)

Internal conversation is “rich in personalized meanings, ones deriving from an individual’s history” (Archer, 2007, p. 79). Our internal conversations are context dependent. In cases, internal conversations have the same contextual references, such as history, biography, geography. For the purposes of this study, I would share “contextual continuity” with fellow Malaysians on the problems of the UMNO Malay hegemony and domination in general, and the ideological discourse of Islam Hadhari in particular, holding that ideology “form the ‘axiomatic’ basis of the shared social representations of a group and its members” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 126), being both mental and social phenomena, affording group members to organize the multitude of social beliefs such as identities, events, norms, and attitudes, and to act accordingly (van Dijk,
An event of “contextual continuity,” but whose reflexive is novel to me, was my father’s involvement in the PAS Memali Incident in 1985, that arose from the discourse of the Islamic state between UMNO and PAS.

An important Mahathir initiative was the Islamization of the federal government, which included a program to standardize Islamic practices and doctrines in the country. Federal authorities became more involved in defining Islamic orthodoxy. To facilitate the state capacity to deal with issues of controlling religious activities, the government passed constitutional amendments and statutory revisions to the penal and criminal procedure code that afforded it absolute rights to interpret Islamic precepts, tenets, and Sharia law. By these acts, the federal government effectively transferred Islamic authority from the Malay rulers and the state governments to the federal government and the prime minister. At the federal level, Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Islamic Advancement Department, JAKIM) became the institution responsible for the enforcement of Islamic orthodoxy. In 1999, the director-general of JAKIM reported that 195 books and leaflets in Malay and 80 in English had been banned for content “contrary to Islam” (Means, 2009, p. 129). The government invoked the doctrine that “there is only one Islam” (Means, 2009, p. 129) and advanced to assert what constituted the “one Islam” (Means, 2009, p. 129) with the explicit conclusion that all other beliefs were deviant (Means, 1999).

PAS had been a member of the ruling BN coalition led by UMNO from 1973 to 1977 before Mahathir became prime minister. By the time of Mahathir’s tenure in 1981,
PAS had again, since the 1960s, become the main political opponent to UMNO and Mahathir’s Islamization policies had intensified the conflicts between the two parties. By the 1982 elections, the contest for the Malay constituency became even more contentious (Means, 1999). PAS accused UMNO being a *kafir* (infidel) party. In August 1984, UMNO accused PAS Vice-President Ustaz Abdul Hadi Awang for the two-*imam* incident that divided the Malays. PAS members refused to pray behind UMNO *imams* (prayer leader). PAS and UMNO members contemplated “burying their dead in separate cemeteries, refusing to eat food cooked by rival supporters, and breaking up marriages, all because of their allegiance to different parties” (Mutalib, 1990, p. 123). In November of that year, UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad challenged PAS to a televised debate to resolve the issue of “who is more Islamic than the other” (Mutalib, 1990, p. 123).

The federal government denounced PAS as a deviationist party that warranted arrests of its leaders under the Internal Security Act (ISA). In 1985, my father was tasked by then Home Minister and Acting Prime Minister Datuk Seri Musa Hitam to act on the ISA warrant of PAS member and sect leader Ustaz Ibrahim Mahmud (also known as Ibrahim Libya,) and five of his associates for deviationist Islamic teachings. He had months earlier resisted arrest and had instigated an armed rebellion against the state, holding out in the remote village of Memali, in Baling, Kedah. In an exchange recorded and later televised nationally on Radio Televisyen Malaysia (RTM) 1, Mahmud and his some 400 followers retaliated against the 200-man unit of the Federal Police Reserve
that resulted in the deaths of 14 civilians, including Mahmud himself and four security personnel.

A Malay Muslim and the son of the officer that led the charge, I was not an objective ethnographer to this study. My father was a proud Malay who had been sympathetic to the ideals of UMNO and the *kerajaan*. His Islamism was well defined, and he was undeterred in executing his orders to arrest Islamist sect leader Ibrahim Mahmud. While my father and I rarely discussed Malay politics, his involvement in the Memali incident that risked his life elicited in me an epiphany: I realized how Malay Islamisms, contested and politicized, were so interiorized in common Malay society to the cost of human life. This ethnography, however, was supervised by members of my doctoral committee, only one of which is Malay, to qualify my subjectivity and afford a constructive study.

*Rationale and Significance*

The rationale for this study came from the researcher’s desire to extend present knowledge of the Malay identity. A better understanding of the Malay Islamist state would benefit academic research and theory. This study was done as a progression of the critical and ideological discourse analysis studies (2004, 2006) by Ghazali.

More broadly, this study should be significant in its focus on state politics. On September 7, 2007, US President George W. Bush commented at the APEC business summit that an ideology was better defeated by another ideology:
Prime Minister Lee of Singapore says “the fight against terrorism is a long-term ideological struggle.” He is right. We must bring the terrorists to justice, and to prevail in this struggle, we must also defeat them in the battle of ideas. Our enemies are followers of a violent and narrow ideology, a political vision that despises freedom, rejects tolerance, and crushes all dissent. Their goal is to impose this ideology on millions across the world. For there to be peace, we must promote an alternative vision of human dignity and human liberty—a hopeful vision far stronger than the dark appeal of resentment and murder. And that is precisely what leaders across the Asia Pacific region are doing (Bush, 2007, para. 24, as quoted in Sina, 2007, September 14).

Bush (2007) regarded the Malaysian state ideology with approval:

In Malaysia, Prime Minister Badawi is working to promote what he calls “Islam Hadhari”—or “Civilizational Islam”—and he has called on his fellow Malaysians to “show by example that a Muslim country can be modern, democratic, tolerant, and economically competitive (para. 26, as quoted in Sina, 2007, September 14).

The Malays as the “standard bearers of Islam, in this country and internationally” (Badawi, 2005, para. 17), Malaysia was elected to chair the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 2003-2007. The OIC formed in 1969 is the second largest inter-governmental organization after the United Nations consisting of 57 member states spread over four continents. The Organization as the collective voice of the Muslim
world, has been mandated to ensuring to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world (Organization of Islamic Conference, OIC, 2010). Malaysia proposed the reformation of the OIC, specifically by first, settling the Israeli-Arab conflict, 2) increasing economic cooperation among Muslim countries, and second, advocating Islam Hadhari, a modernist approach to Islam advocated by Badawi (Sinanovic, 2009).

As the prime minister promoted Islam Hadhari as an approach “compatible with modernity and yet firmly rooted in the noble values and injunctions of Islam” (Badawi, 2005, para. 8) that channels the compulsion to act because of religion (Badawi, 2004), this study was intended to show that the government ideology ostensibly responding to the “terrorists’ hateful ideology” (Bush, 2007, para. 24, as quoted in Sina, 2007) was designed to demonstrate the hegemony of UMNO. This study was done to explore the interstitiality of Malayness that is simultaneously racial and Muslim, an in-between-ness that has been capitalized by the major opposing Malay political parties UMNO and PAS, to afford a better understanding of the Malays and the Malay society.

Definitions of Key Terminology Used in This Study

BN—Barisan Nasional. Founded in 1974. Unlike the Alliance that was a partnership between UMNO, MCA, and MIC, the BN was “in effect a facade for UMNO rule” (Crouch, 1996). The BN was a multiethnic coalition between the core party, UMNO, and the less influential parties that allied themselves with it (Crouch, 1996).
Critical discourse analysis (CDA)—analyzes “real and often extended instances of social interaction which take a linguistic form” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). The critical approach is distinctive in its view of (a) the relationship between language and society, and (b) the relationship between analysis and the practices analyzed. CDA sees discourse—language use in speech and writing—as a form of ‘social practice,’ implying a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) that frame it (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997).

Discourse—The verbal written (or text) and spoken (or talk) product of the communicative act (van Dijk, 1998), or “language use in speech and writing” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997).

Ideology—Broadly defined as systems of belief, ideologies are basic social beliefs of specific groups that draw from the general beliefs (including knowledge, opinions, values, and truth criteria) of societies or cultures (van Dijk, 1998).

Ideological discourse analysis (IDA)—Assuming discourse allows social members to express or formulate ideological beliefs, an IDA is the systematic account of the structures and strategies of text and talk, considering cognitive, social, political, historical and cultural functions, as they are actually realized (produced, interpreted, assimilated) in social contexts (van Dijk, 1998).

Islamism—The social practice of Islam of social groups. The central aim of Islamism is to restore Islam as the nexus for all social, cultural, economic, and political life in a Muslim society (Sayyid, 1997).
**Malay-Muslim dialectic**—The theory of the Malay identity that finds Malayness in a conflicting and corresponding binary as the Malays are simultaneously members of the umat/ummah or Muslim community that precludes racism and a racial community or bangsa (Mutalib, 1990).

**PAS**—Parti Islam Se-Malaysia [Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party]. PAS is the second largest Malay political party after UMNO. Founded in 1951 at the second meeting on Islamic Reformation sponsored by UMNO, the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) was the result of the cooperation between leaders of the Majlis Agama Tertinggi Se-Malaya (Pan Malayan Supreme Council, MATA), Hisbul Muslimin, and splinters within UMNO. PMIP changed its name to Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) in 1974 (Abdullah, 2003). In 1973, the party under Asri Hj. Muda joined in a coalition with UMNO. The coalition lasted till 1977. PAS although ideologically committed to Islam in practice campaigned mainly on Malay communal issues. The party returned to its Islamist themes after the 1982 with the resignation of Hj. Muda (Crouch, 1996).

**Reflexivity**—exercised through internal conversation, is defined as the regular mental activity, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their social contexts and vice versa (Archer, 2007).

**UMNO**—United Malays National Organisation. Founded in 1946 to oppose the British Malayan Union project, UMNO has been concerned with the protection of Malay interests. UMNO led the original Alliance comprising the Chinese MCA and Indian MIC parties in Malaya, and later Malaysia. PAS briefly joined the broader network of
separate coalitions (that included communal parties in Sabah and Sarawak,) in 1973. The Alliance was consolidated in the Barisan Nasional (BN), which officially registered as a confederation of parties in June 1974 (Crouch, 1996).
CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Overview

The last chapter was the introduction to this IDA research study. In general a study of the problem Malay identity, this study was done to analyze the “production and reproduction of ideology, and consequently society, as discourse is distributed through the media” (Ghazali, 2004, p. 145). Chapter 1 Introduction revealed the research questions, the research design and assumptions, researcher perspectives, and study rationale.

The Review of the Literature is divided into two thematic parts: First, Malayness as ideology complex, explained in general theories of Malay identity; and second, the discourse of Malay politics, describing the evolution of Malay politics, including the founding of UMNO and PAS, the two major Malay parties in structural opposition. The Review encompassing concepts, theories, histories, past research, and approaches includes author annotations. This Review concludes with a summation of research implications and an explanation of how the literature informs the development of the study’s conceptual framework. The review of literature on the methodology of this study (including how this study departed from Ghazali’s CDA studies,) is discussed further in Chapter III.

Malayness as ideology complex

Ideologies are systems of belief. Ideologies are socially acquired, shared, used, and changed by group members in social practices in general and in discourse in
particular. Ideologies form the axiomatic *basis* of the shared representations of a group and its members and are hence simultaneously mental and social phenomena (van Dijk, 1998). Ideologies are

*not* defined as wrong, misguided, false, or distorted beliefs of a group.

Epistemically, whatever their truth status for the group itself, they may be true or false. It is not their truth value, but their cognitive and social role (e.g. effectiveness, usefulness) in the management of thinking and interaction that is the criterion for their evaluation. (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 315)

The Malay identity or Malayness is the complicated association of many ideologies, in this study called the Malay ideology complex. Of the many general theories of Malayness proposed in literature, four are relevant for the purposes of this IDA study:

(a) in the British colonial era, an ‘invention’ of Malay politics as a new *adat* or custom in the dialogue of three distinct ideological orientations of community in Malay society—the sultanate or *kerajaan*, the Islamic community or *ummah*, and the Malay race or *bangsa* (Milner, 1994); (b) postcolonial Malay politics are defined by the conflict and correspondence of Islam and race or ethnic nationalism (or *Malayism*) in the Islam-Malay ethnicity dialectic (Mutalib, 1990), in this study called the Malay-Muslim dialectic; (c) the Malays are ideologically tended to the incorruptibility of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions, including Islam (Tham, 1977); and, (d) concepts of modern Malayness are drawn on a British Orientalist-colonial knowledge (Shamsul, 2004).
Anthony Milner (1994) studying Malay texts concluded that the discourse of Malay politics was an innovation—a new *adat* or custom—that evolved in colonial Malaya in the dialogue between three distinct ideological orientations of the sultanate or *kerajaan*, the Muslim community or *ummah*, and the Malay race or *bangsa*. The battle for ideological hegemony concerned not only claims or programs, but the “justificatory aspects of ideology, the underlying concepts of knowledge and reality upon which programmatic concerns are founded” (Milner, 1994, p. 6). The three ideological orientations were each transformed in the dialogue with one another, “and, what is more, the specific character of their interaction also alters during the colonial period” (Milner, 1994, p. 7). The change—what certain Malays spoke of a “new ‘awareness’ or new ‘politics’” (Milner, 1994, p. 7)—entailed the construction of a novel architecture of debate in Malay society: “It involved changes not only in the topics addressed but also in the language, rhetoric and rules by which the debate was pursued” (Milner, 1994, p. 7). Pointedly, the contest for ideological harmony itself fostered the construction of a new discourse (Milner, 1994).

Milner (1994) found that early Malayness had a societal preoccupation with rank or title, or “externals” (p. 21), than with an interiority of personal individuality, so aligned to the Malay dictum that “life is contained custom” (p. 22). Period court texts presented the Malay polity hierarchically structured by rank, the rank “defined by a certain style of dress, accommodation, and behavior” (Milner, 1994, p. 21):
Many people possessed titles and these were often associated with particular insignia. It was the boast of a successful Malay court that every subject was treated according to his or her proper rank (\textit{tara}f). To address people by the correct title, to seat them in the proper place at an audience were requirements of a good administration. A ruler had to know and respect the rank, title, the ‘reputation’ of his subject. (The term \textit{nama} was sometimes used to convey the status and reputation of an individual). (Milner, 1994, pp. 21)

In its perception of the Malay individual, \textit{kerajaan} texts signify \textit{nama}, “that is, to reputation, title, or name. The polity—the \textit{kerajaan}—is presented in terms of its capacity to satisfy the requirements of \textit{nama}” (Milner, 1994, p. 21).

In his stewardship of \textit{nama}, or title, the raja was not “engaging in a status system held in equilibrium” (Milner, 1994, p. 22). Period Malay writings suggested that the subject could elevate his \textit{nama} through loyal service to the raja that would earn him a new \textit{nama} (Milner, 1994):

In this circular arrangement, an able \textit{raja} who wished to enhance his own \textit{nama} rewarded his loyal subjects by lifting their status (by giving them higher titles) and, as a consequence, attracted large numbers of subjects to his court. . .

Through such mutuality, both subject and \textit{raja} were able to improve their respective \textit{namas}. (Milner, 1994, pp. 22-23)

Milner (1994) advanced that colonialism and its consequences “cannot obscure the genuinely intellectual dimension in Malay ideological activity” (p. 289). The Islamic
umat, as was the bangsa, signified “new things by the end of the colonial period” (288). Specific statements in Malay documents respond to and build upon one another “so that bangsa, for instance, becomes in significant respects indebted to the kerajaan” (Milner, 1994, p. 289):

That is, in order to compete with the royal ideology, bangsa’s own development—its emotive content, its role as an object of devoted service and a focus of individual identity—begins to be shaped by a kerajaan agenda. Despite the association of bangsa-mindedness with many of the tents of modernity, certain authors sought to address the concept to older-established Malay concerns. They developed and refined the concept of bangsa not just for a middle class acquiring modern values, but also for those Malays who, even when the monarchy itself was being undermined, anxiously continued to search for nama. (Milner, 1994, pp. 289)

Hussin Mutalib (1990) proposed that within Malay political culture is an inherent tension about Malay as an exclusive ethnicity and Malay as the ummah (the Muslim community) of which Malays are not generally conscious: the “Islam-Malay ethnicity dialectic” (Mutalib, 1990, p. 2). Islam and ethnic nationalism define Malay culture and identity. Islam offers the way of life and is a signifier of self-identity of the Malays. Islam is a site of political conflict not only between Malay and non-Malay parties, but also within each Malay party, “evident, for instance, in the perennial UMNO-PAS contest for
Malay support and legitimacy” (Mutalib, 1990, p. 1). The Malays are also impelled by an ethnic nationalism:

By the term ‘ethnic nationalism’ is meant the close attachment that Malays accord to the safeguarding of their Malay ethnic primordial ties or parochial interests in their dealings with others, especially non-Malays. Although this attachment may include Islamic values and universal principles. . . Malay ethnic nationalists tend to dispense with these Islamic values in defence of their ethnic, particularistic interests, and unique cultural heritage. (Mutalib, 1990, pp. 1)

The Islam-Malay ethnicity dialectic describes a relationship of ‘Islam-ness’ and Malayness not constantly dichotomous and conflicting in nature, “but one which can be mutually supportive at a given time or in a particular situation, and contradictory at another” (Mutalib, 1990, p. 2). Mutalib (1990) found that the Malays tended to perceive the problem of Islam-ness and Malayness “as one thing rather than separate elements of identity that were dialectical in nature” (p. 2).

Tham Seong Chee (1977) found that the Malays are ideologically attuned to the inviolability of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions. The Malays have sought to perpetuate the Malay political and cultural economy and Islamism. The durability of the Malay ideology has indirect implications for modernization: Its persistence and stability leads to a cognitive closure, “the tendency to reject other values and ideas because they are not generated by the ideational system of the Malays or have their motivational bases there” (Tham, 1977, p. 282).
The traditional framework of values and ideas has sustained the social order, the Malays assuming “the existing social order as basis for the evolution of a modernized Malay society. . . Modernization has not been associated with new ideological development nor with the restructuring of new symbols of prestige and status” (Tham, 1977, p. 286). Since the cognitive universe of the Malays, as exemplified by its religious and political leaders in particular, stresses the compatibility of the traditional Malay social order and the institutional framework of Islam as the bases of modernization, no substantial modification has been observed in political or religious practice. The outcome has been the tendency to implicate situational factors for non-achievement, particularly in areas of education and economy.

Shamsul Amri Baharuddin (2004) argued that modern concepts of Malay identity and Malayness were drawn from an Orientalist-colonial knowledge “informed by colonial investigative modalities, and inspired by Social Darwinism” (p. 137) that were later expressed in nationalist and anti-colonial movements. The three pillars of Malayness—bahasa, raja dan agama [language, ruler and religion]—were instituted during the colonial period within the framework of colonial knowledge. “Civilizing institutions” as schools were divided into “Chinese,” “Malay,” “Tamil,” or “English,” reifying and essentializing racial boundaries by language and cultural practice. The British constructed a “Malay historiography” in textbooks for Malay schools and introduced a “Malay literature” that imagined a historical validity. The Malay
Reservation Enactment 1913 afforded a legal definition of “Malay” affirming a popular, if conflicted, Malayness:

This particular Enactment was instituted separately in the state constitutions of each of the eleven negeri (state) on the Peninsula, and in each constitution it offered a slightly different definition of who was a ‘Malay’. For instance, a person of Arab descent was a Malay in Kedah but not in Johor; a person of Siamese descent was a Malay in Kelantan but not in Negeri Sembilan. It could be argued, then, that ‘Malay’ and ‘Malayness’ were created and confirmed by the Malay Reservation Enactment. However, there is more to this: the Act also made ‘Malay’ and ‘Malayness’ contested categories. (Shamsul, 2004, pp. 141)

The modern Malay state was thus impelled not only by an “unresolved dispute between kerajaan, umat and bangsa, but also the foundations of a new and unifying discourse of conflict,” (Milner, 1994, p. 294) a kesedaran or awareness of politics.

**Discourse of Malay politics**

The “unifying discourse of conflict” (Milner, 1994, p. 294), a kesedaran of Malay politics composed of the unresolved dispute of the ideologies of “kerajaan, umat and bangsa” (Milner, 1994, p. 294), was described by Mutalib (1990) as the Islam-Malay ethnicity dialectic. In this study, the discourse of Malay politics was problematized in the Malay-Muslim dialectic.

Period Malay writings describe a Malay sense of name, reputation, and position, of identity—called nama—around a kerajaan, literally a state of being dominated by a
raja, Hindustani for monarch (Milner, 1982). Malayness precluded an individuality for a societal disposition. The raja embodied the Indic conception of a heavenly kingdom current in Founan and borrowed probably from Founan by Sri Vijaya (Winstedt, 1953, as quoted in Omar, 1993), regarded as “Lord over the whole world” and “Shadow of God upon the Earth” (Wilkinson, 1971, p. 370, as quoted in Omar, 1993, p. 2). As arbiter of the kerajaan, the raja was protected by his daulat, an innate supernatural aura accorded by divine kingship (Omar, 1993). While the Malay kerajaan converted to Islam in the 15th century, the Melaka sultanate retained the Hindu conception of a kingdom (Winstedt, 1953, as quoted in Omar, 1993). The legitimacy and rule of the sultan was “of glorifying his magical powers, sometimes even of his daulat or divinity and the threat of retribution” (Mutalib, 1990, p. 13).

Islam localized became the foil to diffused Hinduism as Islam modernized the Malays (Al-Attas, 1972). Islam, or Submission in Arabic, offered a new layer of Malayness that checked unquestioned loyalty to the ruler and transformed the Malay worldview (Mutalib, 1990). Yet non-Islamic ethnic Malayness endures. Symbols as the keris [crooked dagger], tanjak [headgear symbolizing authority], daulat and the color yellow as signifiers of royalty attests the social reality of the popular proverb, “Biar mati anak, jangan mati adat!” (“Better the child die than adat!”) (Mutalib, 1990, p. 14).

The British colonizing the Malay Peninsula was aware of the pivotal role of kerajaan in Malay ontology. Colonial officers in treaties dealt with rulers as heads of various negeri, a sphere of influence, not as representatives of state, for “although for
administrative purposes the British saw the negeri as states, they were aware that in the minds of most Malays, it was the kerajaan that mattered” (Omar, 1993, p.4). Ormsby-Gore (1928) capitalized on kerajaan as a Malayness: The Malay Sultans are heads of state of the national religion in each State, and the traditional protectors of Malay customs which is so dearly cherished in the manners and life in all classes of Malays. The Courts of the Sultans and Rajas maintain a measure of dignity and colour loved by the masses. . . I will not labour the point but to me the maintenance of the position, authority and prestige of the Malay rulers is a cardinal point in our policy (Ormsby-Gore, 1928, pp. 18, as quoted in Omar, 1993, pp. 5).

Hugh Clifford was politic on the nature of British intervention in the kerajaan in a speech to the Federal Council in 1927:

Their States were, when the British Government was invited by their Rulers and Chiefs to set their troubled houses in order, Muhammadan monarchies. Such they are today, and such they must continue to be. No mandate has ever been extended to us by Rajas, Chiefs, or people to vary the system of government which has existed in these territories from time immemorial. . . (Clifford, 1927, as quoted in Omar, 1993, pp. 5)

In order to maintain the illusion of the ascendancy of the kerajaan, treaties and correspondences described Malay rulers who “requested” the presence of British Residents to advise them in the art of government. British administrators asserted direct
administrative control over Malays states in all matters excepting Malay custom and religion. As “advisors,” the real nature of British intervention was concealed:

Instead of outright annexation, the British decided to keep the sultan as head of his political unit, while they assumed an advisory role. The impression, as far as the Malays were concerned, was that the sultan was still the sovereign power and the sultanate still an independent entity. (Omar, 1993, pp. 6)

British interaction with Malay society was largely confined to the ruling elite, political rule taking two forms of administrative patterns. The Federated Malay States (FMS) of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang experienced extensive British involvement. The Unfederated Malay States (UMS) of Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terrenganu endured less colonial control thus retaining more traditional characteristics (Omar, 1993). Malayness as the *kerajaan* assumed a western colonization.

Charles Hirschman (1986) advanced that the present race relations in Peninsular Malaysia as “impenetrable group boundaries” (p. 330) were a byproduct of British colonialism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. While cultural barriers and hostility between Asian populations in the region predate European imperialism, colonial intervention and the creation of an export economy exacerbated the differences between the races and constructed an ideology to explain ethnic inequality as an inevitable reflection of inherent racial differences.

The colonial administration organized the Malayan society composed of the Chinese and Indian immigrants and the Malays by maintaining the Malay feudal social
structure in the countryside and a “temporary” (Hirschman, 1986, p. 356) immigrant population working in mines, plantations, and cities. The ideology of racial divisions was interiorized by the colonized:

   Once established, ideas have a life of their own. Moreover, racial ideologies tended to legitimate actions by Malay and non-Malay leaders in both colonial and postcolonial society. More than rubber and tin, the legacy of colonialism was racial ideology. (Hirschman, 1986, pp. 357)

Racism defined British imperial paternalism of the Malays—the belief that the “management of the affairs of the country or of individuals should be done in the manner of a father dealing with his children” (Hirschman, 1986, p. 342).

Anthony Reid (2004) proposed that Southeast Asian nationalism favored a core culture. The problem was whether the form of nationalism “is explicitly ethnic, thereby encouraging ethno-nationalism and marginalizing those outside the core ethnie” (Reid, 2004, p. 3) or defined in relation to shared, neutral symbols such as territory, biota, constitution, or shared history, becoming of a “civic nationalism” (p. 18).

Malay nationalism was first recorded in the first decade of the 20th century in popular media as *Al-Imam*, a monthly published between 1906 and 1908. While ethnic nationalism took the form of a critique of a decadent *kerajaan*, as in the writings of Indian-Muslim Munshi Abdullah who popularized the concept of a Malay *bangsa* or ethnic group, *Al-Imam* expressed the tentative steps of a broader Malay nationalism. It
was an irony not lost on the Malays that Malay nationalism had been propagated by mainly non-Malays (Omar, 1993).

The issue of descent (keturunan) became important after World War I (Roff, 1967). The Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (Singapore Malay Union) formed in 1926 was the first Malay political organization to assert Malay as a bangsa or community by descent against Arabs and Indian Muslims who represented Malay interests by virtue of their being Muslims. Pan-Malayan organizations attempting to build nationalist movements were impeded by state parochialism and vested interests. The second Pan-Malayan Congress in December 1940 that strove for a consensus on a takrif Melayu (definition of Malay) enabling the state associations to determine the qualification for membership was a case in point:

The Persatuan Melayu Selangor proposed: ‘he who is considered Melayu is a person who claims descent from his father who originates from the Malay Peninsula and speaks the Malay language or one of the languages in the Malay Archipelago and practices of the Malay adat as well as being a Muslim.’

However, delegates from Negeri Sembilan raised strong objections to this takrif because in the adat pepatih Minangkabau peculiar to their state, the line of descent was matriarchal (Omar, 1993, pp. 20).

The second Congress was unable to socialize itself as the Persidangan Bangsa Melayu or the Persidangan Kebangsaan Melayu, offering [“A movement is considered kebangsaan when it is directed towards self-sufficiency or independence, and it is to be bangsa if it is
applicable to the entire community or the descendents,"] (Omar, 1993, p. 20) indicating that the various associations at the time were unwilling to link community with nationalist objectives (Omar, 1993).

Omar (1993) proposed that while pre-1941 colonial Malaya had afforded an "easily recognizable and comfortable for the Malay kerajaan and the common Malays” (p. 34), World War II and the Japanese Occupation through 1945 had eroded the traditional bonds of Malay feudalism. After the war, the Malays became divided and leftist in parties as the Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM), which possessed an ideology of kebangsaan, or ethnic nationalism. Formed on October 17, 1945, PKMM was decidedly Melayu-centric. The party aim was to unite the bangsa Melayu through the fostering of a kebangsaan or loyalty to the nation:

its idea of a nation was not confined to the Malay Peninsula but encompassed all the Malay speaking peoples within one political entity, in which the bangsa Melayu in Malaya would be reunited again with their Indonesian kith and kin as had been the case during the time of the Majapahit Empire before colonialism separated them. Its cherished aim was to bring Malaya into the Republik Indonesia Raya. (Omar, 1993, pp. 39)

PKMM’s slogan was “Membela Hak dan Keadilan Putera Melayu” [“Protecting the rights and justice for the Malays”] (Omar, 1993, p. 42). The party views were publicized by Dr. Burhanuddin AlHelmy in a pamphlet entitled Perjuangan Kita [Our Struggle] 17 Oktober – 17 Oktober 1946. Dr. Burhanuddin defined the bangsa Melayu broadly to include the
Javanese, Taiwanese, Madagascans, and others in the Malayo-Polynesian ethno-
linguistic group and implied Islam as a foundation for Malay culture (Omar, 1993).

Malay nationalism was most pronouncedly expressed when the British
attempted to impose the Malayan Union, a unitary state project inaugurated on April
Fool's Day, 1946 (Shamsul, 2004). The British had three aims with the Union:

The immediate aim was to integrate the large community with the smaller Indian
one into a Malayan polity with a sense of ‘Malayanness’. Secondly, the British
wished to do away with the cumbersome pre-war administrative structure which
comprised ten government units consisting of the FMS of Perak, Selangor, Negri
Sembilan, and Pahang; the UMS of Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and
Trengganu; and the Straits Settlements comprising Penang, Singapore, and
Malacca. They wanted to integrate them into a single, centrally controlled state
with Singapore as a separate entity. The third long-term goal was to lead Malaya
to independence. (Omar, 1993, pp. 45)

The Malays opposed the Union scheme that had been signed off by their rulers, fearing
the Union would marginalize Malay identity for the creation of an inclusive bangsa
Malayan (Omar, 1993). The editorial in the November 10, 1945 edition of the Malay
newspaper Majlis was telling of the popular sentiment:

At this time can be heard cries of delight in newspapers throughout Malaya from
the anak-anak bangsa asing who will be given the same rights of citizenship. The
cheers of the anak Malayan do not only prove their delight because they will get
the same citizenship rights for entry into the Malayan Civil Service which has always been what they desired but also the extent of teasing the *umat Melayu* as if to say, ‘Now you Malays know. We, the *anak Malayan* have won in the political struggle. What we have desired all this while has been achieved’. (Omar, 1993, pp. 50)

Omar (1993) proposed that the Union brought about a change of perspective in Malayness. Malays who had lived for the rajas began to consider Malayism—a Malay nationalism—as the basis of Malay focus. He noted:

> The survival of the *bangsa Melayu* and the need to foster *kebangsaan Melayu* (Malayism) supplanted the rulers as the focal point of Malay identity. The rulers were now subordinated to the interests of *kebangsaan Melayu* and their continued function was now dependent on it rather than vice versa. Under these circumstances, important concepts such as *derhaka* (treason), *taat dan setia* (loyal and true), *kedaulatan rakyat* (people’s sovereignty), and *kedaulatan raja* (sovereignty of the raja) acquired different interpretations altogether. No longer could a concept like *taat dan setia* be applied in a one-sided manner: the Malayan Union crisis had revised even this basic concept. (Omar, 1993, pp. 53)

Malay organizations motivated to halt the Union met in the Malay Congress of organizations and consequently formed UMNO. The first Congress was held at the Sultan Sulaiman Club in Kuala Lumpur on March 1-4, 1946, attended by 152 delegates from 41 political organizations and societies of various political leanings. The Congress
considered the formation of Persatuan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (PEKEMBAR) before deciding on the English equivalent, UMNO (United Malays National Organisation). The second Congress held on 11-12 May in Johor was attended by 36 organizations. On May 11, 1946, UMNO was officially launched at the Istana Besar in Johor Bahru. Farish Noor (2004) characterized UMNO as a conservative political party that featured a “strong neo-feudal element which coloured its internal politics and management” (p. 50):

The first President was the Johorean aristocrat Dato’ Onn Jaafar. The party executive committee included a number of prominent Malay aristocrats and nobles, including Dato’ Nik Ahmad Kamil of Kelantan, Dato’ Yassin Abdul Rahman of Johor, the Dato’ Panglima Bukit Gantang of Perak, Dato’ Haji Mohammad Noah, Syed Alwi Alhadi and other prominent feudal lords from Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang and Kedah. With so many feudal lords and aristocrats among its leaders, UMNO quickly developed a reputation as a conservative-traditionalist organization that was feudalistic in character. (Noor, 2004, pp. 50)

UMNO was founded on the traditional hierarchy of Malay society, “a hierarchy that bound the lowest Malay peasant to the monarch at the very apex” (Omar, 1993). Leftist PKMM accused UMNO of defending the cause of a “degenerate Malay aristocracy” against “Malay progress and sacrificed Malay interests for the sole purpose of enriching and exalting themselves” (Omar, 1993, p. 111).
The debate of a core culture (Reid, 2004) was staged during the Union crisis, when the terms *bangsa Melayu* and *kebangsaan Melayu* [Melayu nationality] were defined differently by UMNO and PKMM (Omar, 1993). Noted Omar (1993):

To the conservatives, *bangsa Melayu* was exclusively the Malay race, unless the non-Malay *masuk Melayu* (literally, enter the Malay race) by becoming a Muslim and practicing Malay culture, while to the radicals it was a nationality that transcended race or ethnic sentiments and was not conditional on the non-Malay becoming a Muslim. (pp. 98)

The conservatives refused to consider *Melayu* as a nationality for the non-Malays--whom they considered *bangsa dagang* (literally, trading communities)—for their lodging in the Malay states. Both the radical left and the conservatives shared the view that the term Malayan was a British subterfuge intended to efface the Malays in their own country (Omar, 1993).

The sensitization of *Melayu* and Malayan was acknowledged in the deliberations of the Working Committee assembled in July 1946 in its choice of a name for the political constitution following the rejection of the Union. The Working Committee (1946) reported:

The Malayan Federal Union was rejected as its translation into Malay involved contradictory terms and also because any title including the word ‘Union’ would be most distasteful to and suspect by Malays. The Malayan Federation was also suggested but opposed by the Malay representatives on the ground that
‘Malayan’ had come to mean people who had some association with Malaya, but did not include Malays, and the Malays to the strongest objection to being called or referred to as Malayans. There was also the further difficulty that the expression ‘Malayan Federation’ could not be translated into Malay. Thus, the final choice was the Federation of Malaya which was accepted because this alternative, which is a strict translation of the Malay title ‘Persekutuan Tanah Melayu’ and is preferred by the Malay representatives, was found to be generally acceptable. (pp. 9, as quoted in Omar, 1993, pp. 107)

While the British had appeared to concede to Malayism, “the reality is indeed very different” as “neither UMNO nor the rulers obtained all that they desired in the federation proposals” (Omar, 1993, p. 108). The ruling conservatives relented to the Federation of Malaya that allowed non-Malays those rights that were supposed to be denied them only because of the terms of citizenship for the non-Malays that did not affect “the special position of the Malays” (Omar, 1993, p. 108):

- citizenship was not a nationality, nor could it be developed into a nationality. It would not affect or impair, in any respect whatever, the status of British Subjects in the Settlements all the status of subjects of the Rulers in the Malay states. It is an addition to, and not a subtraction from, nationality and could be a qualification for electoral rights, for membership of Councils and for employment in Government service, and it could confer other privileges and impose obligations. It was not possible at present to lay down precisely what
these privileges and obligations would be (Working Committee, 1946, pp. 23 as quoted in Omar, 1993, pp. 109).

Non-Malays were only given citizenship rights and not a nationality, the term Malayan not mentioned in the final Working Committee report. UMNO succeeded in reifying separate ethnic identities in the Federation of Malaya constitution: There was a legal definition of Melayu and a retraction of Malayan (Omar, 1993). The non-Malays were referred to as citizens of the Federation of Malaya and had to qualify to be subjects of the rulers. The subject of the rulers was defined as

1. any person who belongs to an aboriginal tribe resident in the State; or
2. any Malay born in that state or born of a father who is a subject of the ruler of that State; or
3. any person naturalized as a subject of that Ruler under any law for the time being in force;

and that their words ‘Malay’ should mean a person who

(a) habitually speaks the Malay language;
(b) professes the Muslim religion; and
(c) conforms to Malay custom. (Omar, 1993, pp. 110)

The Federation Proposal ended the conflict between bangsa Melayu and bangsa Malayan, “the situation that satisfied neither Malayans nor the proponents of Melayu nationalism, but the British” (Omar, 1993, p. 110). UMNO dismissed the reconciling of
Malayan and *Melayu* identities in *Melayu* as a nationality. In September, 1947, UMNO president Onn rationalized:

> If the Constitution is studied carefully, then [we see that] that representatives have endeavoured to obtain as many benefits as possible for the Malay people. The opposition of those groups that do not agree includes Malays. . . one matter which has been brought up by them from the beginning has involved an attempt to destroy the name *Melayu*, that is change the term *Melayu* and every custom of the *Melayu*. We are called *Melayu*, but the other side now proposes that we live ‘Malay’, dress ‘Malay’, and be ‘Malay’. We have been renowned for hundreds of years as *Melayu*. In the past, every person wanted to become *Melayu* (*masuk Melayu*), but now are asked to enroll or be enrolled as *Melayu*.

*Utusan Melayu*, as quoted in Omar, 1993, pp. 119)

A united non-Malay opposition to the Proposal coalesced that ultimately resulted in the All Malaya Council for Joint Action (AMCJA) in August 1947. PKMM also organized its own coalition of leftist Malay associations, called Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA). The two groups cooperated to form the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition to counter the Proposal—later Agreement—with The People’s Constitution Proposals, announced in September 1947. The establishment of the Federation of Malaya on February 1, 1948, however, obscured the Malay left. The arrest of PKMM leaders under the Emergency Regulations ended the struggle to create a *kebangsaan Melayu* that would encompass both Malays
and non-Malays for “the federation perpetuated a sense of ethnic consciousness as it did not lead to a common identity for all” (Omar, 1993, p. 122).

John Funston (1980) suggested that UMNO was ideologically attuned only to the one issue of Malay nationalism. UMNO conceding to the constitutional proposals in the 1948 Federation Agreement had shown the party’s situational practical flexibility given an ideology of racial exclusivity. The anti-UMNO left, namely the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition, intended to introduce citizenship based on nationality. The coalition had considered the Agreement inadequate as those obtaining citizenship by law “were not required to renounce their original nationality or take an oath of loyalty to Malaya” (Funston, 1980, p. 140). As UMNO had been unrelenting on this regard during Onn’s presidency, so UMNO was adamant during the tenure of Tunku Abdul Rahman, who became UMNO president in August 1951. Noted Funston (1980):

Nationality (rupabangsa), in Malay usage, assumed a degree of commitment to a common politico-cultural concept of the Malaysian nation (to which non-Malays could be admitted) and acknowledged fully equality of all nationals; citizenship (kerakyatan), in contrast, was regarded as a mere legal guarantee of certain privileges. The Tunku never conceded that nationality should be the basis of citizenship and for many years declined to talk of a nationality for the country, evidently fearing that this might pave the way for equality between Malays and non-Malays. (pp. 138)
UMNO sought to perpetuate the symbols of Malayness and the privileged position of Malays in Malayan society. Funston (1980) maintained that the primary function of the “special position” of the Malays was “not to offset Malay economic disabilities but to accord recognition that ‘only Malays are indigenes’. It summed up, in legal form, the UMNO approach to nationality” (p. 139).

The Federation of Malaya gained independence from the British on August 31, 1957 with UMNO president Tunku as the country’s first prime minister. The Federation of Malaya inherited the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarch as its head of state. Chandra Muzaffar (1987) stressed that “both feudal history and British colonialism had thus conspired to bestow privilege of power upon this group” (p. 59):

by Merdeka in 1957, there was this dual concept of Protector—the Sultans as symbolic protectors and the unknown leaders as symbolic protectors. Lest it be misunderstood it must be made very clear that the UMNO leadership was very much devoted to the concept of the monarchical system. . . What the UMNO leadership wanted, however, was the right to exercise actual power in the political process. To do this, the sultans had to be made Constitutional monarchs (Muzaffar, 1987, pp. 66).

Roger Kershaw (2001) found a “sociological symbiosis” perpetuating the Malay monarchy in Malay society:
the British had made several vital contributions to the viability of Malay
monarchy all over the Malay Peninsula: its authority in Malay society within each
individual state was strengthened and consolidated by the regularization of
succession in a single line, and by recognition of the Sultan’s authority,
untrammelled by Residential interference ‘in the twin spheres of Malay custom
and Muslim religion’. (p. 28, as quoted in Noor, 2004, pp. 135)
Funston (1980) offered that UMNO’s ideology of Malay nationalism was derived
from Western conceptualizations of a secular state:

It adhered, then, to a predominantly ‘practical ideology, though remaining
elements of the broader weltanschauung—support for secularism, free
enterprise and the ‘Western World’ (particularly the former colonial power)—
were also implicitly present. (pp. 161)

UMNO’s inclination towards a secular state was reflected in the Alliance memorandum
to the Reid Commission (commissioned to formulate constitutional proposals for an
independent Malaya) that proposed Islam be considered the religion of the country, but
religious freedom was guaranteed and Malaya regarded a secular state. Party rulers
found “great merit in the religious teachings of Islam, and were generally conscientious
in their attentions to worship,” (Funston, 1980, p. 147) yet shunned a narrow or
traditional interpretation of Islam (Funston, 1980).

Objecting all attempts to establish a department of Islamic affairs, Tunku
uncharacteristically relented in May 1968 and announced the forming of such a
Department with advisory powers only within the Prime Minister’s Department, the act appearing to be either a belated response to pressures within the party, or “perhaps more likely, another attempt to draw support away from PAS” (Funston, 1980, p. 147).

Funston (1980) proposed that the Persatuan Islam Se-Malaya (Pan-Malayan Islamic Organisation, PAS) formed on November 24, 1951, extracting from three ideological traditions: the nationalist and social approach of the PKMM (or Malay Nationalist Party, MNP) the Islamic modernism of Hizbul Muslimin and the strongly communal views of the anti-UMNO protest movement of the 1950s (p. 161). The deployment of the three ideologies was ideal. Noted Funston (1980):

An emphasis on pure ideology was also encouraged by the fact that as an opposition party PAS was not forced to compromise ideology by the dictates of actual government. . . PAS’s main commitment, therefore, was to a Melayu nationality, an Islamic state, an Islamic-socialist economy, and anti-colonialism. (pp. 161)

In the historical development of PAS, the leadership of Burhanuddin in the years 1956-1969 was significant for his developing the party from a minor, marginalized and poorly organized body into a national political party “with a broad-based ideological platform that brought together both radical nationalist and Islamist concerns” (Noor, 2004, p. 98).

Burhanuddin was invited to lead PAS by its second president, Abbas Elias. Burhanuddin was grounded on “leftist concerns as well as Islamic philosophy and
values” (Noor, 2004, p. 125) as reflected in his party policy statement in 1956 (as quoted in English from Malay in Noor, 2004):

[I believe that a political ideology is nothing more than a tool: a tool to further the aims of the nation, of nationalism, of building of Malayan nation state that is independent, democratic and sovereign. . . . The ideology of nationalism is directed towards the political, economic and social liberation of the nation and the emergence of a sovereign nation free from all influences of colonialism. . . . These isms have all emerged over the centuries of human experiences, from ancient times to the present modern age. (But) the ideology of Islam (or Islamism) is different from these other isms: The uniqueness of Islam is that it is based upon God-given fundamental principles, which come from the creator of Man and the Universe. These fundamentals are unchangeable and cannot be revised at whim. Islam therefore lays down the fundamental principles in dealing with Man's relation to society as well as his relation to God]. (pp. 129)

Noor (2004) described Burhanuddin as an Islamist who managed to reconcile his religio-political principles with the ideological struggle against neo-colonialism and imperialism. Burhanuddin thought that independence through UMNO was of no value because it meant that Malay-Muslims had failed to apply their political freedom to “radically alter their nation on their own terms” (Noor, 2004, p. 142). He noted:

[UMNO leaders have time and again repeated the claim that without UMNO Malaya will never get independence. This contention is acceptable, but the
question is: What type of independence? I said that the contention is acceptable because it is only UMNO and not in any other forces of nationalism that imperialism and imperialist interests will be guaranteed when they hand over political power in this country. The present leadership of UMNO have proven themselves to be trustworthy guardians of imperialist capitalist interests because it has consistently shown its willingness to compromise and even to capitulate to the imperialists on questions of fundamental interest to the people]. (quoted in English from Malay in Noor, 2004, pp. 143)

Noor (2004) proposed the discourse of the Malay Islamist state (“Islamization race,”) began in 1959 when election victories in the northern Peninsula states made PAS the biggest political opponent to UMNO: “The Islamist party had evolved to become a serious threat to the political viability and survival of UMNO in the heartland” (p. 156). The party began to expand its network of branches and divisions throughout the country. The PAS leaders capitalized on existing traditional structures of Malay society where religious scholars and functionaries were respected and afforded high social status. The party developed its sub-elite strata of ulama, imams, madrasah (religious school) educators, missionaries to diffuse pedagogically the party message to the masses (Noor, 2004):

PAS’s pedagogic approach was embodied in the figure of the humble PAS imam or guru who traveled from one village to another, carrying out his religious and social obligations in the masjid (mosque), surau, madrasah or homes of the
villagers, while at the same time preaching the message of the Islamist party to his captive audience. (Noor, 2004, pp. 151)

The network of PAS ulama and imams succeeded in entrenching themselves within their local communities, and had made considerable inroads into UMNO’s support base by the time of the 1959 elections: “The term ‘pemimpin PAS’ (PAS leader) soon became synonymous with ‘pemimpin agama’ (religious leader)” (Noor, 2004, p. 152).

PAS leaned extreme left on matters relating to Malay nationalism to differentiate itself from UMNO: The citizenship based on a Melayu nationality would be open to non-Malays through the process of naturalization, obviating the need for a “special position” for ethnic Malays. Considering Islam as “the remaining element in the PAS ideological mix” (Funston, 1980, p. 144), PAS was vague beyond the demand that ultimate power would be wielded by Muslims:

. . . God had decreed to each race (bangsa) its own country, hence, championing Malay nationalism was consistent with Islam; generally, PAS appears to have followed Hizbul Muslimin’s formula of subordinating Islam to Malay nationalism. (Funston, 1980, pp. 144)

The relationship between Islam and the political structure of the state was “undoubtedly the least articulated area” (Funston, 1980, p. 148) although the vision of the Islamic state was a powerful one. PAS president Yusof Rawa was defensive of the party Islamist agenda:
It’s not true for some to say that PAS’ view of Islam and the Islamic state is only relevant to backward people and those in villages only, and that our support comes only from the poor in the rural areas. To say this is not only an insult to us but to insult Islam because the faith originated and later blossomed in an urban setting, not a rural one; in the thriving city of Mecca, and not in the outback desert areas only lived by camels and some Bedouins. (as quoted in Mutalib, 1993, pp. 100)

The true purpose of PAS’s grand political and ideological project was “inherently anti-political in nature and intent” (Noor, 2004, p. 736): To create “a radically new socio-political order where stability, harmony, and peace are achieved at the cost of alterity, difference and the freedom of interpretation” (Noor, 2004, p. 736). Noor found that the PAS Islamic state project was intimately linked to its own understanding of politics and the political process itself: Islamists do not simply want to take over the governmental apparatus, but to reinvent it. The assertion by later PAS leaders Tuan Guru Nik Aziz, Tuan Guru Hadi Awang and party president Ustaz Fadzil Noor that their Islamic state was of a divine design was a political contrivance meant to forestall “the possibility of critique and interrogation of their political project” (Noor, 2004, p. 735). Simply put, by claiming that they are merely carrying out God's work on earth, PAS’s leaders have denied their own agency and responsibility for their political project while also closing it off from further contestation and enquiry (Noor, 2004, pp. 735).
The closing down of the avenues of critique and enquiry marks the closure in the modern Islamist project. “By doing so, the Islamist project is presented as a fixed, compete and irreversible project that has to be accepted in toto” (Noor, 2004, p. 735).

PAS was a model of Islamism. The central aim of Islamism is to restore Islam as the nexus for all social, cultural, economic, and political life in Muslim society (Noor, 2004, p. 711). Islamism is a project that attempts to transform Islam from a nodal point in the discourses of Muslim communities to a master signifier. In particular, the Islamist project is an attempt to make Islam the master signifier of the political order. (Sayyid, 1997, pp. 48, as quoted in Noor, 2004, pp. 711)

Succeeding PAS leaders rejected the politics of compromise and adaptability of the Burhanuddin era and the ethno-nationalist communitarian politics of the Asri era to adopt “a discursive strategy that viewed and presented Islam as a discourse of resistance and delegitimation” (Noor, 2004, p. 701). Islamism “became the vehicle for a counter-hegemonic and anti-systemic project aimed at bringing about a new social, moral and political order embodied in the Islamic state” (Noor, 2004, p. 701).

The PAS epistemology was a reversed Orientalism: Islam was privileged with a host of positive attributes at a higher register, than the secularism conflated with the West, possessed of a myriad of baser, negative attributes (Noor, 2004). The party represented itself as being more authentic than their “‘secular,’ ‘Westernised,’ and ‘nominal’” (Noor, 2004, p. 740) opponents, condescendingly denouncing UMNO
members as infidels (called *takfir*) during the elections in 1999, and the by-elections in 2001 and 2002 (Noor, 2004). *Takfir*

is often predicated upon such a logic of dialectical opposition which requires the presence of a constitutive oppositional Other for the Islamist project to get off the ground. Simply put, if the radical expression of Islamism requires an external enemy to oppose, one will simply have to be found. And if one is not readily available, then it has to be invented for the sake of the dialectic itself. (Noor, 2004, pp. 743)

In the PAS discourse of the Malay Islamist state, *takfir* was used to define the boundaries of the self and Other, friend and enemy, in-group and out-group, and attendant to the dichotomies is “the call for resistance and opposition, culminating in a synthesis born out of confrontation” (Noor, 2004, p. 743). Noor (2004) advanced that the discourse of the Malay Islamist state projected the stresses of the Malay social class.

Contending that the majority of PAS members were ordinary Malay-Muslims with “ordinary wants and aspirations” (Noor, 2004, p. 723), Noor (2004) described the party as a voice of the subaltern, drawing from the “groundswell of discontent and frustration of the Malays” (p. 723), rather than a fundamentalist threat that had been assumed by UMNO:

Thus far, the UMNO-led government has assumed that the vote-swing in PAS’s favour has been a genuine swing in favour of Islamisation and the Islamic state. As a result, the other arm of UMNO’s strategy is to out-Islamise PAS by creating
an Islamisation programme of its own. This has led to the introduction of Islamic laws and regulations, expansion of the Islamic bureaucracy and empowerment of religious authorities in Malaysia—all of which have contributed to the narrowing of discursive space in the country in general and the Malay-Muslim community in particular. (Noor, 2004, pp. 724)

Shanti Nair (1997) observed that the discourse of the Malay Islamist state between PAS and UMNO had diminished the variant approaches to Islam taken by the two opponent Malay parties. Nair (1997) advanced that

An analysis of UMNO’s position on the place of Islam in Malaysia might easily draw the conclusion that the party has moved from being a moderate-Muslim party to a radical one—what were once considered to be extreme demands by PAS now in fact constitute government policy. (pp. 43)

As the two opponent parties found the need to Islamize to gain the vote of the Malay electorate, Fazil Irwan (2005) proposed that it was the idea of the nation itself that created the structures of inequality in society, that Islam became the most salient feature of Malayness due to state policies of the Education Ordinance of March 1957, the product of the Razak Report 1957, and the 1971 national cultural policy that imposed the Malay character onto non-Malays.

The Razak Report 1957 covered two main conflicting issues—the cultivation of a national identity and the preservation of ethnic language and culture. Malay was chosen to be the national language and the medium of instruction in all national schools.
Chinese and Tamil vernacular schools within the national education system taught Malay as a compulsory subject in primary school and used the language as the medium of examination in secondary school (Irwan, 2005).

The 1971 national cultural policy sought to preserve indigenous cultures and Islam. Elements of other cultures were incorporated in so far as it complemented the core culture. Privileging Malay culture and Islam as the basis of national culture meant the marginalization of other cultures. Both policies had the sum effect of diminishing the exclusivity of the Malay ethnic boundary. Malay language and culture had ceased to describe just the Malays as, through the nation-building process, these had come to characterize the non-Malays (Irwan, 2005). Islam thus became “the last defining feature of Malayness” (Irwan, 2005, p. 12):

It is this reason which explains why the Malays, who were exposed to a vast array of political ideas, were easily drawn into an identity-driven Islamic orientation. Thus the necessity to maintain a definition of the Malay was the main reason for the emergence of political Islam in Malaysia. (Irwan, 2005, pp. 12)

The politicization of Islam in Malaysia has been referred to as Islamic resurgences or revivals. Mehmet (1990) described the resurgence of Islam beginning in the 1970s, linked to the urbanization of Malays, the activities of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, ABIM). Muzaffar suggested the resurgence was the outcome of industrialization and urbanization, Islam filling a
spiritual need (1986). Nagata (1982) found the 1970s resurgence to be the second “Islamic revival” (p. 43-44, as quoted in Shamsul, 1983, p. 400) following the revival in the 1920s-1930s. Milne and Mauzy (1999) argued the resurgence of Islam was motivated by “a desire to assert one’s Malay identity” (p. 81), a want at making Muslims

**better Muslims:**

The resurgence was particularly attractive to the young, and originated among students at the University of Malaya in the late 1970s, who had been affected by the events of May 13, 1969 and its aftermath. There was a connection between the reactions of such people towards the problems of the time—such as Malay poverty, Malay language and education, and corruption—and a search for what the teachings of Islam could suggest for solving these problems. (Milne & Mauzy, 1999, pp. 81)

The contrarian, Shamsul (1983) dismissed the thesis of Islamic revivals in Malay society:

It is clear that “Islamic revival” has occurred frequently in Malaysian history. In fact, it is a misnomer to call it “revivalism” when it occurs at such regular intervals. What is actually being revived here is, in effect, foreign scholars’ interest in studying Islam. (pp. 400)

He nonetheless allowed that political and religious discourses do act as ideological tools (Shamsul, 1983, p. 401), as did the federal government, which assumed the responsibility to define Islamic orthodoxy.
Under the Constitution of Malaysia, responsibility for the administration of Islamic affairs was assigned to state government, except for federal territories where the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction. However, the federal government rapidly expanded its Islamic support services to gain preeminent control of Islamic affairs, undermining the constitutional provisions affording such responsibility to state governments and to the Malay rulers. Before Mahathir became prime minister, the federal government founded the National Council for Islamic Affairs (Pusat Islam) administered by the Department of Religion (Jabatan Agama) under the Prime Minister’s Department. While Pusat Islam had representatives from all states, “the initiatives for unified action came primarily from the Prime Minister’s Department” (Means, 2009, p. 126):

By 1970, nearly all state governments had revised their Islamic laws to provide for more vigorous enforcement of Sharia law with increased penalties for violations in matters of personal behavior and public deportment. (Means, 2009, pp. 126)

Under Mahathir’s direction, the federal bureaucracy administering Islamic affairs expanded rapidly, so that By 1982, 100 ulama were working within the Prime Minister’s Department, mostly within Pusat Islam. Within the Ministry of Education, 715 ulama were employed to prepare materials on Islam and to teach courses on Islam in Malaysia’s public schools. (Means, 2009, pp.126)
The Department of Religion was reorganized and renamed the Department for the Advancement of Islam (Jabatan Kemajuan Agama Islam Malaysia, JAKIM). JAKIM formulated policy on Islam and prepared drafts of laws sent to states for enactment. By assuming increased responsibility for Islamic affairs, the federal authorities effectively standardized Muslim practices and doctrines (Means, 2009).

Operating at the federal level, JAKIM enforced Islamic orthodoxy. In 1999, the director general of JAKIM reported that 195 books and leaflets in the Malay language and 80 in English had been banned for content “contrary to Islam.” 94 versions of “deviant teachings” were identified:

Instead of permitting a wide latitude of beliefs and doctrines reflecting the diversity of Islam, the government followed the often-repeated doctrine that “there is only one Islam” and proceeded to assert what constituted that “one Islam,” with the explicit conclusion that all other beliefs were “deviant.” (Means, 2009, pp. 129)

Politically, Joseph Chinyong Liow (2009) found that the discourse of Malay Islam centered on the concept of the Islamic state, the debate being “just what kind of Islamic state Malaysia is or should be, and who has the right to define this” (p. 81). The Islamization debate intensified with Mahathir’s proclamation on September 29, 2001, that Malaysia was in fact already an Islamic state. PAS, in retort, released its Islamic State Document on November 13, 2003.
The PAS Islamic State Document reasoned that “establishing an Islamic Government is as important as establishing the other daily rituals of Islam” (“Preface,” PAS President Abdul Hadi, quoted in Chinyong, 2009). The Document consisting of four sections of “Introduction,” “The Conception of an Islamic State,” “Main Characteristics of an Islamic State” and “General Policies of an Islamic State” resembled an earlier study on the Islamic state, the “PAS Memorandum to the Malaysian People: The Understanding of Islamic Rule in the Context of 15th Hijrah/21st Century Democracy” that was presented at the May 2002 PAS Muktamar or Assembly. The Memorandum “was essentially divided into five parts” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 84): First, Introduction; second, Preliminary Observations; third, The Understanding of Islamic Rule in the 15th Hijrah/21st Century Democracy; fourth, Definitive Characteristics of an Islamic State; and last, Policies of the Islamic State. The fourth segment of the Memorandum outlined the core principles of the Islamic state as envisaged by PAS:

These were *Madani* Society (Civil Society), Equality, Sovereignty of Law based on *shari’a*, Justice Respect, Welfare, Dynamism, and Innovation. The memorandum reiterated the points that the establishment of an Islamic government was an obligation for Muslims and that this form of government will emphasize a *Madani* society and a *Hadhari* state, equality, law, justice, development, welfare, and a dynamic and innovative political system based on consensus and democracy. (Chinyong, 2009, pp. 86)
UMNO’s response to the Document was “to ratchet up the Islamization race further with its own list of principles for Islamic governance. . . Islam Hadhari (Islamic Civilization), the latest addition to the litany of Islamic terms in Malaysian politics” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 92).

The UMNO concept of Islam Hadhari, lobbied in 2003 and deployed in the election manifesto in March 2004, was first articulated at the UMNO General Assembly on September 23, 2004, “in a manner that resonated with the Malay community’s struggle for independence and development” (Chinyong, 2009, p.92). Islam Hadhari, purportedly an adaptation of the ideas of the 14th century historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun (Chinyong, 2009), was an “approach that emphasizes development, consistent with the tenets of Islam, and is focused on enhancing the quality of life” (Badawi, 2004, para. 17). It consisted of 10 principles:

11. Faith and piety in Allah
12. A just and trustworthy government
13. A free and independent people
14. Mastery of knowledge
15. Balanced and comprehensive economic development
16. A good quality of life
17. Protection of the rights of minority groups and women
18. Cultural and moral integrity
19. Safeguarding the environment
20. Strong defenses

Islam Hadhari bore

an uncanny similarity to what Mahathir had sought to accomplish for the better part of the twenty-two-year tenure as prime minister and UMNO president: a distinctly Islamic brand of modernization and industrialization built on a Quran-sanctioned work ethic, albeit without the allusions to Islamic philosophers of the past. (Chinyong, 2009, pp. 93)

Islam Hadhari, like the PAS memorandum or the Islamic State Document, was “primarily an instrument of elite political posturing” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 94). The approach operated as a top-down phenomenon; not unlike his predecessor, Abdullah attempted to carry Malay-Muslims across the threshold into modernity on the shoulders of his imagination, not to mention his creative phraseology. (Chinyong, 2009, pp. 94)

Chinyong (2009) found several “flaws in the logic” (p. 94) of Islam Hadhari that hampered its efficacy as the definitive paradigm for “progressive” Muslim politics. First, by enunciating “Faith and piety in Allah” as its opening tenet, Islam Hadhari “paradoxically constricts the very space for civil and plural discourse that it purports to open” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 94), the reference to Allah narrowing the nationalist discourse to an Islamic one. Second, by introducing Islam Hadhari as an approach “capable of building Malay competitiveness,” Badawi had leveraged again on the
fundamental longstanding issue of Malay-Muslim suzerainty, the concept “ultimately hampered by the baggage of race and communalism” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 95). Third the notions of democracy and human rights were absent from the exposition of Islam Hadhari, “perhaps even more conspicuously so” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 95) when compared to the two PAS documents. Last was the fundamental problem of operationalization:

Not unlike the PAS memorandum and Islamic State Document, Abdullah’s Islam Hadhari is so nebulous as to do little more than provide general principles drawn from classical Islamic sources. In fact, while the respective PAS models of the Islamic state did attempt to identify broad areas of government policies that needed to reflect these principles (interspersed with verses from the Qur’an), even this was lacking in Islam Hadhari. (Chinyong, 2009, pp. 95-96)

**Discourse analysis**

van Dijk (1997) defined discourse as a practical, social, and cultural phenomenon in language forms of text and talk. Language users in discourse socially interact within cultural contexts to accomplish social acts. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) maintained that discourse analysis (of which critical discourse analysis is a part,) takes a distinctive view of the relationship between language and society.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) assumes discourse as a social practice that implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) framing it. A dialectical relationship here means a reciprocal relationship: “the discursive event is shaped by situations,
institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258). Noted Fairclough and Wodak (1997):

. . . discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially influential, it gives rise to important issues of power. (pp. 258)

Hall (1996) proposed that identities are constructed within discourse and emerge within the modalities of power, “and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity” (p. 4). Islam Hadhari reducing nationalism to an Islamic discourse (Chinyong, 2009) was found merely a continuation of a discourse of Islamism by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (Ghazali, 2006).

Kamila Ghazali (2004) concerned about how ideology and relations of power come into play in the formation of discourse conducted an intertextual analysis of Mahathir’s UMNO General Assembly speeches given in the years 1982-1996 and found that the fourth prime minister and UMNO president had perceived the government and UMNO to be functioning models of political Islam. Ghazali who assumed that discourse socially informs and in turn shapes social formations used the Fairclough critical discourse analysis method to analyze the three major speech sections of UMNO,
Economy, and Islam and found extensive intertextual references to the Islamic genre in all three sections of Mahathir’s speeches. The speaker had conflated the UNMO ideology of modernization with a “true” (Ghazali, 2004, p. 131) Islamic imperative in his 1988 speech:

[The tasks of spreading the correct and true teachings of the religion as well as efforts to develop the country are part (religious) duties that are mandatory for all Muslims in Malaysia. The government will carry out its responsibility as part of a religious duty of the leadership, as a “collective” religious obligation. We must strive to ensure that even though development is achieved, the Malay people will continue to realise and be aware and hold tight to the teachings of Islam.] (Mahathir, 1988, as quoted in English from Malay, Ghazali, 2004, pp. 131)

Government policies as Look East had drawn “from the genre of sermons” (Ghazali, 2004, p. 129) by Mahathir in 1982:

[Actually, if we truly follow the teachings of Islam regarding diligence, the search for knowledge, the search for livelihood, cleanliness, abstinence, and other noble values, we need not look elsewhere. But we do not. The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) had said that we need to seek knowledge even if it takes us to China. He meant that we should follow good examples no matter the origin. This is what we are doing when we Look East.] (Mahathir, 1982, as quoted in English from Malay, Ghazali, 2004, pp. 129)
The Economy section of the 1984 speech was “exceptional” (Ghazali, 2004, p. 123) in its wide references to Islam and PAS. The speaker had used oppositional discourse in the subject regarding the sanctity of the National Unit Trust Scheme (Amanah Saham Nasional) set up for the Malays as “the legality of the National Unit Trust Scheme was brought up again by those with vested interests” (Ghazali, 2004, p. 123), and had assumed a shared perplexity with the audience in having to deal with the subject “brought up again” (Ghazali, 2004, p. 124):

[They are not embarrassed to lie about (things related to) religion, denounce other Muslims (as infidels), misinterpret, choose only those Qur’anic verses, sayings and deeds of the Prophet that support their accusations of activities that are prohibited by the religion. They sell the Qur’anic verses cheaply.] (Mahathir, 1984, as quoted in English from Malay, Ghazali, 2004, pp. 125)

The oppositional subject, namely PAS, had been negatively located as the out-group led by tok-tok guru [dogmatic religious teachers] (Mahathir, 1991, as quoted in Malay in Ghazali, 2004, p. 127) who deliberately misinterpret Islam. Mahathir (1984) had characterized PAS by drawing on the genre of Islam (Ghazali, 2004):

[The Islamic appearance is not for us. The content of Islam is more important and we will continue in our efforts to seek out and internalize the contents of Islamic teaching.] (Mahathir, 1984, as quoted in English from Malay, Ghazali, pp. 126)
Khoo Boo Teik (1995) proposed that Mahathir’s ideas constitute a relatively coherent political ideology termed “Mahathirism” consisting of five core components of nationalism, capitalism, Islam, populism, and authoritarianism. In an attempt to reconstruct the ideology of Mahathirism through textual analysis, Khoo selected literature that included Mahathir’s own writings, two of which were *The Malay Dilemma* and *The Challenge*. Khoo (1995) noted that

Most observers know *The Malay Dilemma* fairly well, at least for its Malay nationalist content: an expose of the unacceptable bases of interethnic relations in the pre-1969 period, an insistence on the Malays as the definitive people of Malaysia, an explanation of the hereditary and environmental influences on the Malays, an analysis of Malay traits which are related to their economic backwardness, an advocacy of state-provided ‘constructive protection’ for the Malays and a proposal for the ‘complete rehabilitation of the Malays’. (pp. 10-11)

*The Malay Dilemma* published in Singapore in 1970 was banned in Malaysia until after Mahathir became prime minister in July 1981. In 1984, asked if he had changed his mind about the Malays dilemma since then, Mahathir mused:

Well, that book was written in the late sixties. . . Of course the situation then was quite different and there were many things I said which were valid then.

[Question: Which [are] no longer valid today?]
That they are not valid now I cannot say. All the views are still held by me. But certainly some of them are still valid and where they need to be acted on, we do act. (Tan, 1984, pp. 78, as quoted in Khoo, 1995, pp. 25)


This is an important book because it is written by an educated, progressive Malay, and because it deals frankly with the problem of racial harmony in Malaysia, where roughly half the population is Malay and half non-Malay. We are publishing it because we believe that author’s views should be read—whether or not we share them. (pp. v)

Mahathir (1970) in the book unraveled The Malay Problem. In Chapter 8, he disclosed his positions on the Malays and the non-Malays:

This is a basic contention of the Malays which is challenged by other races. The Malays maintain that Malaya has always been, and still is, their land. If citizenship must be conferred on other races who have settled down and made their homes in Malaya, it is the Malays who must decide the form of citizenship, the privileges and the obligations. On becoming citizens, the non-Malays share with the Malays not only the ownership of Malaysia, but the specifications of what is a citizen, what is a condition of citizenship itself, and what is therefore not to be changed the new citizens. (Mahathir, 1970, pp. 121)
His bias was unequivocal:

I contend that the Malays are the original or indigenous people of Malaya and the only people who can claim Malaya as their one and only country. (Mahathir, 1970, pp. 133)

Mahathir (1970) was convinced that the social and economic ecologies of Malays were “of their own faults as much as the faults of others” (p. 60). Mahathir (1970) proposed that the Malays needed to be told the truth in no uncertain terms of the disaster that would befall them and the nation if they remained complacent:

If no impediment at all is placed in the way of total Chinese domination of the economy of Malaysia, the country would certainly be prosperous. The Malay dilemma is whether they should stop trying to help themselves in order that they should be proud to be the poor citizens of a prosperous country or whether they should try to get at some of the riches that this country boasts of, even if it blurs the economic picture of Malaysia a little. For the Malays it would appear there is not just an economic dilemma, but a Malay dilemma. (Mahathir, 1970, pp. 61)

Mahathir (1970) in Chapter 7 suggested that the Malays be rehabilitated. His prognosis concerned three forces of the essential Malay:

The first thing that comes to mind is that the vast majority of Malays are feudalist and wish to remain so. . . It is the rulers who have in the past furnished, and continue to present the Malay character of Malaya. Remove them, and the last vestige of traditional Malaya would disappear. . .
Religion is another established force with the Malays. No change, no plan and no ideology which runs counter to the religion of the Malays can succeed. Islam must therefore be left alone in the quest for Malay progress. In fact, Islam must be upheld and even further propagated if success is to be assured.

The third force with the Malays is their traditional custom or adat derived from their system of values. But adat is no longer the essential thing it once was. Adat is losing its grip on the Malays. No longer is it said that “It is far better that our children die rather than our adat.” Adat therefore can be changed or ignored in the process of progress. (pp. 104-105)

If The Malay Dilemma prescribed a “complete rehabilitation of the Malays” (Mahathir, 1970, p. 113) to enable the community to confront the challenges of new environments, The Challenge, a collection of essays on various subjects, explored a “system of values and ethics for the Malays which they might usefully imbibe” (Khoo, 1995, p. 11). Khoo (1995) found that Mahathir in The Challenge had begun to offer a reading of Islam not as an Islamic theologian but a Malay nationalist. The result was that “the Malay Dilemma was recast as a Muslim dilemma” (Khoo, 1995, p. 41). The Challenge was the second book Khoo used to trace Mahathirism:

In The Challenge, he had set out his ideas on Islam at greater length. From then on, he appeared to have worked out a personalized but coherent view of Islam which informed the ‘Islamization’ policy of his administration during the 1980s. It is therefore plausible to speak of ‘Mahathir’s Islam’ (Khoo, 1995, p. 162).
In the Introduction, Mahathir hinted at the political economy of the *The Challenge*:

One of the saddest ironies of recent times is that Islam, the faith that once made its followers progressive and powerful, is being invoked to promote retrogression which will bring in its wake weakness and eventual collapse. A force for enlightenment, it is being turned into a rationale for narrow-mindedness; an inspiration towards unity, it is being twisted into an instrument of division and destruction.

Ignorance of what constitutes spirituality, and failure to see the distinction between materialism and a healthy involvement in worldly concerns, render some sections of the Malay (Muslim) community susceptible to the notion that Islam exhorts believers to turn their back on the world. (Mahathir, 1986, pp. vii)

In the final paragraphs of Chapter 7, Mahathir (1986) proposed the construction of a system of values for the Malays. Mahathir argued that the state of the society is determined by its system of values, and that those with “training and authority” (p. 103) must play significant roles in “selecting and shaping new values and substituting these for the old” (p. 103). He added:

In Malay society, as in others, a system of values plays the main role of destiny. Today Malay values are changing without systematic study and without guidance. Anybody can attack the current system and set up new values. This
results in senseless conflict and confusion. It is time the Malays realised this and thought out the right steps to ensure that such a vital and potent tool as a system of values was properly used for the good of the Malay community.

(Mahathir, 1986, pp. 103)

UMNO and PAS were described in Chapter 13 of The Challenge. Titled “UMNO and Unity,” Mahathir (1986) disclosed that UMNO leaders “finally” (p. 157) had to accept the fact that the unity of the Malays was paramount and that change of attitude enabled the UMNO-PAS “cooperation” (p. 157) of the early 70s:

UMNO had achieved its original aim—to unite the Malays. The United Malays National Organization had had one more of its fundamental aspirations fulfilled. From the start UMNO had striven for unity. But in the practice of democracy with its elections, unity was set aside. (Mahathir, 1986, pp. 158)

UMNO had evolved from the late 1960s and early 1970s from an explicitly to a merely implicitly secular party (Kessler, 2008). UMNO under Mahathir began “the long march” (Kessler, 2008, p. 61) towards the assimilation of Islamic values into and their projection through the instrumentalities of government as it became more engaged in competition against PAS who had by the mid 1980s became an avowedly Islamist party. Mahathir in Islamizing UMNO however claimed to be an Islamist of a kind modernist, modernizing, a champion of the individual reasoning [akal, ijtihad, etc.] believer, the individual as a repository and exponent of faith [iman] against the conventional, traditional, backward-looking “clerical estate” of the ulama
with their ultimately self-aggrandizing (and not merely and purely and
disinterestedly “principled”) claims to be the “inheritors of the Prophet” [pewaris
Nabi] and of his leadership role. (Kessler, 2008, pp. 68)

Mahathir worked to break the neo-traditional clericalist Islamist stranglehold by
advocating a modernist approach that democratized Islam to all the faithful and not just
the conventionally trained scholars (Kessler, 2008). The federal government began a
program to standardize Muslim practices and doctrines. It defined “deviant acts”
(Means, 2009, p. 128) and banned publications deemed as propagating “false doctrines
deviating from true Islam” (Means, 2009, p. 128). To facilitate the federal authority’s
ability to deal with issues of managing religious activities and Islamic orthodoxy, the
government passed constitutional amendments and statutory revisions to the penal and
criminal procedure code that afforded the federal government absolute rights to
interpret Islamic precepts, tenets, and Sharia law. At the federal level, JAKIM became
the institution responsible for the enforcement of Islamic orthodoxy. These acts thus
effectively transferred the responsibility for the control and definition of Islam from the
Malay rulers and the state governments to the federal government and the prime
minister (Means, 2009).

In 1996-1997, UMNO leaders Mahathir and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim were preparing the way for Islam to become a civil religion in Malaysia. Virginia
Matheson Hooker (2004) analyzed the period press reportage of Anwar and Mahathir
and found comments on how Malays should apply the teachings of Islamic teachings expressed in language more secular than religious (2004):

The Malaysian leaders’ calls for Malays to actively apply the teachings of Islam as a solution to social problems are calls for Muslims to use their religion as a moral guide in this world. There are no references to Islam as a means to salvation in the next world—the focus is on what Islam can do for its followers here and now. (Hooker, 2004, pp. 159)

Hooker (2004) theorized the leaders’ displacing Malay traditional values for Islam was the remedy for Malay social problems:

There are several possible reasons for the federal leaders’ attention to Islam. Firstly, as I have already mentioned, it is the most basic and non-negotiable aspect of Malay ethnicity and in that context it can be, and has been, viewed as an impediment to racial harmony within the nation. Islam, in short, could be represented as a threat to national unity. However, by reconfiguring Islam and representing it as a source of ‘moral values’, and as an ethical code, it can still be acknowledged as the religion of the Malays and at the same time be presented in a manner which non-Malays (non Muslims) might find more understandable and therefore less threatening.

Secondly, presented as a ‘moral code’ Islam could serve as the basis for a civil religion which could unite rather than divide Malaysia. It has been noted elsewhere that in modern societies, it is quite common to subordinate the
spiritual (religion) to social and civic purposes. In the Malaysian context we can see it operating on two levels. On one level Islam (the spiritual) is being ‘used’ to control Malay ‘social ills’ (a social purpose). On another level, it is being presented as a civil religion in an effort to effect national unity (a civic purpose).

(Hooker, 2004, pp. 160)

Hooker (2004) suggested that the government advocacy of Islam was predicated on a religious practice that complemented its own political agenda of an industrialized and unified nation, as described by Mahathir in his Vision 2020.

Mahathir’s Vision 2020 also aimed for the creation of a bangsa Malaysia, where Malays are “no longer the pivotal race in Malaysia, the race from whose perspective ‘others’ are characterized” (Hooker, 2004, p. 161). Hooker (2004) was opinioned about the “attempt to reconfigure the nexus between Malay and Islam” (p. 163):

If those Malays believe that the Malay sense of identity is threatened by a loosening of the linkage between Melayu and Islam, so that some Islamic values could be espoused by non-Malays, then it would be very difficult for Islam to be the basis for a civil religion and serve as a unifying element in the Bangsa Malaysia. (Hooker, 2004, pp. 163)

The political rhetoric of 1996-1997 was rendered moot with the 1999 General Election when Mahathir doubted Islam as a basis for national unity (Hooker, 2004). Notwithstanding his statements in 1997 about Islam, and his Vision 2020 philosophy
with its emphasis on one *Bangsa Malaysia*, Mahathir, campaigning, cited Islam as divisive force in Malaysian society:

By describing ‘radical’ or ‘extreme’ Islam as a threat to Malaysia’s unity and progress, he effectively created two Islams. According to Dr Mahathir and the National Front, ‘radical Islam’ discriminates against non-Muslims, impedes technological development and creates racial discord. And according to the National Front, this is the kind of Islam practised and promoted by its political rival PAS. In contrast to this, Dr Mahathir claims that the ‘moderate’ Islam espoused by UMNO is tolerant, supportive of change and poses no threat to the rights and status of non-Muslims. (Hooker, 2004, pp. 165)

Hooker (2004) outlined the hazards of dichotomizing Islam:

Firstly, it undermines national unity by splitting Muslims into acceptable ad non-acceptable groups. Secondly, it continues the discourse of the ‘spectre of radical Islam’—rhetoric that is designed to make non-Muslims uneasy about being governed by a Muslim party. Thirdly, it forces Malays to question their allegiances and the expression of their ethnicity. (pp. 165)

Chinyong (2004) argued that UMNO under Mahathir had not been able to communicate a coherent message regarding its commitment to moderate Islam due to the institutional expression and bureaucratization of Islamic orthodoxy by party members in a manner favored by PAS that rendered the “dichotomy inconsistent at best, hypocritical at worst” (p. 200). UMNO’s response to the burgeoning appeal of PAS
On the discursive terrain, defined by contending discourses over the role of Islam in political affairs. . . Here, one sees concerted attempts by UMNO to differentiate itself from PAS by portraying themselves as the ‘progressive’ and ‘moderate’ protectors of ‘correct’ Islam, as opposed to the Islamic opposition who are ‘conservative’, ‘radical’, and even ‘deviationist’ proponents of ‘wrong’ Islam.

What is profoundly striking about UMNO’s strategy to capture the Islamic initiative from PAS however, is the fact that while the upper echelon of the party have attempted to confront PAS through a counter-discourse aimed at discrediting the latter’s ideology, UMNO authorities operating at state levels have actually overseen policies that have given extensive institutional expression to Islamic orthodoxy. (Chinyong, 2004, pp. 190)


By shifting UMNO’s position from ‘Malaysia cannot be an Islamic state’ to ‘Malaysia already is an Islamic state’ so nonchalantly, Mahathir’s statement might well open UMNO to further attacks by the Islamist opposition. (pp. 199)

Intending to end to debate on the state of Islam in Malaysia, Mahathir had paradoxically intensified it. His pronouncement signified a radical departure from Tunku who had
countered PAS’ insistence on the formation of an Islamic state in Malaya in the 1950s requiring “the drowning of every non-Muslim in Malaya” (quoted in Chinyong, 2004, p. 197). PAS dismissed Mahathir as a hypocrite indulging in rhetorical brinkmanship (Chinyong, 2004). Mahathir, however, spoke in context:

this ‘Islamic state’ that Mahathir implies Malaysia already is, is essentially a construction of his own administration, and is a result of his Islamisation programme over the past 20 years. Concomitantly, the immediate question is whether it will survive its progenitor. (Chinyong, 2004, pp. 198)

Kessler (2008) opined that whatever his personal religious inclinations and political intentions, Mahathir had reduced UMNO as the reluctant instrument of PAS, subject to the latter’s bidding and outbidding on matters of relations between Islam and the state. UMNO became “a de facto Islamizing, Shari’a-promoting, Islamist and hence non-secular” party” (p. 68). Prime Minister Badawi has adopted a similar strategy of seeking to appropriate and contain the discourse of Malay Islamism:

For half a century this has taken the form of an incessant and unedifying “Islamist policy auction” between UMNO and the Islamist party PAS, in which, over the long term, UMNO is forever outbid and in time compelled to match PAS’s ever escalating demands, or try to do so. (Kessler, 2008, pp 71)

Ghazali (2006) proposed that Badawi introducing the UMNO approach of Islam Hadhari in his maiden keynote address as prime minister and UMNO president at the 55th UMNO General Assembly in September 2004 sought to conflate the UMNO
hegemony with Islam. Ghazali conducted a van Dijk ideological discourse analysis (IDA) of the Assembly speech by Badawi having assumed a “neutral” understanding of ideology as a special form of social cognition shared by groups:

Ideologies thus form the basis of the social representations and practices of group members, including their discourse, which at the same time serves as the means of ideological production, reproduction, and challenge. (van, Dijk, 2001, pp. 12, as quoted in Ghazali, 2006, p. 132)

Ghazali (2006) after van Dijk defined ideology to render it “more innocuous and not necessarily negative” (p. 130), conceiving it a common “mental representation” that “regulates other mental representations” (p. 130) observable through its explicit formulation and expression via discourse. van Dijk (2001) proposed that mental models do not merely represent ‘the facts’, but typically represent the facts as people define them. Indeed, ‘defining the situation’ is what mental models do. . .

ideologically biased models form the input of discourse production, and may thus give rise to biased topics, lexical items, or metaphors, among many other (especially semantic) properties of discourse. (van Dijk, 2001, pp. 17, as quoted in Ghazali, 2006, pp. 132)

Ghazali (2006), investigating the speaker’s “mental models” of self-presentation to infer how UMNO identity and systems of beliefs are maintained or redefined as a result of the change of leadership, found that Badawi compared the social identity of UMNO with the Malay identity: [“Malays, UMNO, and Islam in this country cannot be
Members of the Assembly and other participants viewing the broadcast at home were reminded of the commitment of the party to the Malay agenda throughout its history, “glorified for self-presentation” (Ghazali, 2006, p. 136):

[Since its inception—in its struggle against the Malayan Union, during the drive for Independence, throughout the post-independence period, the introduction of the New Economic Policy, and in its other struggles—UMNO has always rejected the use of force.] (Badawi, 2004, para. 14, as quoted in Ghazali, 2006, pp. 140)

Unlike Mahathir who devoted entire sections—mostly in the section on Islam—vilifying PAS (Ghazali, 2004), Badawi made few intertextual references to PAS (Ghazali, 2006). The opposition was cast as the outgroup and afforded a negative other-presentation, such as taking time to reassure the non-Muslims that it is not in his agenda to turn Malaysia into an Islamic state in the course of outlining the main principles of Islam Hadhari, the “mental model of social construct and practice” of UMNO (Ghazali, 2006, p. 140).

Ghazali (2006) found Islam Hadhari to be an extension of Mahathir’s doctrine of the assimilation of Islamic values (penyerapan nilai-nilai Islam). Observers, however, contended that Islam Hadhari was a synthesis of various opinions of Islamic scholars and groupings of the past two decades (Ghazali, 2006). Regardless, “from an ideological standpoint, Abdullah uses this platform to define the ideology” (Ghazali, 2006, p. 140).
Chapter Summary

In summary, this chapter reviewed the literature relevant to this IDA study. For the purposes of this study, I studied books, periodicals, and academic journals to cover areas of concepts, theories, histories, and methods.

The Review of the Literature was divided into the two themes, of Malayness as ideology complex, and of the discourse of Malay politics, focused on the Malay-Muslim dialectic.

Malay identity, or Malayness, is the aggregation of many ideologies, in this study called the Malay ideology complex. Of the many general theories of Malayness proposed in literature, four are important for the purposes of this study: First, in the British colonial era, an “invention” of Malay politics as a new adat or custom in the dialogue of three distinct ideological orientations of community in Malay society—the sultanate or kerajaan, the Islamic community or ummah, and the Malay race or bangsa (Milner, 1994); second, postcolonial Malay politics is defined by the conflict and correspondence of Islam and race or ethnic nationalism (or Malayism,) in the Islam-Malay ethnicity dialectic (Mutalib, 1990), in this study called the Malay-Muslim dialectic; third, the Malays are ideologically tended to the incorruptibility of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions, including Islam (Tham, 1977); and last, concepts of modern Malayness are drawn on a British Orientalist-colonial knowledge (Shamsul, 2004).
In reviewing the literature on the discourse of Malay politics, it was found that the Malay-Muslim dialectic was regularly expressed in the discourse of the Malay Islamist state by major opponent parties, UMNO and PAS. UMNO was founded in 1946 on the traditional hierarchy of Malay society and was ideologically tended to ethnic nationalism “derived from Western conceptualizations of a secular state” (Funston, 1980, p. 146). UMNO sought to reproduce and maintain the traditional symbols of Malayness and the privileged position of Malays.

PAS was formed in 1951. The founding party leaders were members of the religious department members of UMNO who were influenced by three ideological traditions of Malay nationalism, Islam, and the anti-UMNO movement. The Islamist party began the discourse of the Malay Islamist state in 1959 when election victories made it a serious threat to the political viability of UMNO (Noor, 2004). The true purpose of PAS’ ideological project was inherently anti-political in nature and intent: Islamists wanted not only to take over the government apparatus, but to reinvent it (Noor, 2004).

In the 1980s, UMNO under the Mahathir administration began its Islamization of government. JAKIM (Department of the Advancement of Islam) was given the mandate to standardize Muslim practices and doctrines and enforce Islamic orthodoxy (Means, 2009), narrowing the discursive space of Malay Islamism, to focus on the definitive concept of the Malay Islamist state. The discourse of the Malay Islamist state between
UMNO and PAS intensified on September 29, 2001, when Mahathir determined that, in his government model, Malaysia was already an Islamic state.

In retort to Mahathir’s declaration of Malaysia as an Islamic state, PAS released the Islamic State Document in November 2003. Affirming the focus of Malay Islamism, the Document asserted that “establishing an Islamic government is as important as establishing the other daily rituals of Islam” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 89).

On September 23, 2004, at the UMNO General Assembly, UMNO President and fifth Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi introduced Islam Hadhari. Consisting of 10 principles, Badawi did what Mahathir neglected to do: articulate an identifiable UMNO ideology in the discourse of the Malay Islamist state.

The findings in the literature contributed to the construction of the conceptual framework of this study.

Conceptual Framework

The review of the literature was used to construct the conceptual framework (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008) for the design and protocol of this study. In this study, the conceptual framework (henceforth CF,) was intended to focus the research process by informing the methodological design and influencing the instruments to be used (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008). The CF provides an organizing structure both for reporting this study’s findings as well as the analysis, interpretation, and synthesis of these findings. In this way, the CF is essentially a “working tool.” (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008, pp. 61)
The CF categories directly related to this study’s research concerns and enabled the IDA. The purpose of this IDA study was to explore how the discourse of Islam Hadhari as spoken by UMNO President and Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in the years 2004-2008 demonstrated the hegemony and domination of the party in Malay politics and society. The review of the literature elicited in this IDA four research questions:

The first research study question sought to determine how Badawi represented UMNO. The conceptual category addressing this question was “The relationship between UMNO and the Malays.”

The second study question sought to discover how Badawi described the opposition party PAS. The category of “The social adversary of UMNO” was thus suitable.

The third study question sought to understand how Badawi explained the Islamic approach of Islam Hadhari. The three categories of “The ideological adversary of UMNO, The ideological conflict, Ideologies reconstructed or represented,” consistent with the ideological discourse structures proposed by van Dijk (1998), was thus appropriate.

The fourth study question sought to determine how Badawi associated himself with former UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir. The category “Models” describes how social representations are constructed and used by individual group members in social practices and in discourse (van Dijk, 1998).
The CF in this study (included in Appendix A) was presented in the “analytical guideline for processing text material” (Jager, 2001, p. 54) as indexes. The CF categories of “The relationship between UMNO and the Malays,” “The ideological adversary of UMNO,” “The social adversary of UMNO,” “The ideological conflict,” “Ideologies reconstructed or represented,” and “Models” are literally presented in the six analytical guideline indexes of “The relationship between UMNO and the Malays;” “The ideological adversary of UMNO;” “The social adversary of UMNO;” “The ideological conflict;” “Ideologies reconstructed or represented;” and, “Models,” as the categories related to the IDA indexes used by van Dijk (1998) in his IDA study. The analytical guideline for processing text material, and the IDA methodology, is explained in Chapter 3.

The implications of the discourse analyses, of speeches by Mahathir (Ghazali, 2004) and Badawi (Ghazali, 2006), and the IDA methodology, is discussed in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

Overview

In the last chapter, a review of the literature was done that encompassed the two themes of, first, the Malay ideology complex, or Malayness, and, second, the discourse of Malay politics. In the literature, Malayness was described in four theories: First, British colonialism constructed an *adat*, or custom, of Malay politics as the dialogue of three distinct ideological orientations of community in Malay society—the sultanate or *kerajaan*, the Islamic community or *ummah*, and the Malay race or *bangsa* (Milner, 1994); second, postcolonial Malay politics is defined by the conflict and correspondence of Islam and race or ethnic nationalism (also called Malayism,) in the Malay-Muslim dialectic (Mutalib, 1990); third, Malays are ideologically attuned to the incorruptibility of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions, including Islam (Tham, 1977); and last, concepts of modern Malayness are drawn on a British Orientalist-colonial knowledge (Shamsul, 2004).

Hall (1996) offered that identities are constructed within discourse and emerge within the modalities of power, “and are thus more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of identical, naturally constituted entity (p. 4). van Dijk (1998) defined discourse as a practical, social, and cultural phenomenon in language forms of text and talk. The review of the literature found that in the discourse of Malay politics, the negotiation of what constituted Malayness was resolved in the discourse of the Malay-Muslim dialectic engaged by the two major Malay parties:
UMNO defended the ethnic interests of *ketuanan Melayu* (Malay suzerainty). PAS, whose ideological project is “inherently anti-political in nature and intent” (Noor, 2004, p. 736) advanced an authentic (Noor, 2004) Islamism. With Mahathir’s dichotomizing Islam in 1999 (Hooker, 2004), the discourse of the Malay-Muslim dialectic became narrowed to a discourse of the Malay state of Islam (Irwan, 2005): UMNO advocated a “progressive and moderate approach to Islam” (Badawi, 2004, para. 11) in the ideology of Islam *Hadhari*, at structural variance with PAS’s own Islamic state.

Chapter 2 concluded with the manufacture of the conceptual framework of the IDA in this study, whose categories were represented in indexes for the “analytical guideline for processing text material” (Jager, 2001). The CF categories, as indexes, were itemized “The relationship between UMNO and the Malays,” “The ideological adversary of UMNO,” “The social adversary of UMNO,” “The ideological conflict,” “Ideologies reconstructed or represented,” and “Models.” The rationale for naming the CF categories as indexes in the analytical guideline, as is the IDA methodology, is the concern of this chapter.

This chapter describes the research methodology of this study. The purpose of the study was to explore how the discourse of Islam *Hadhari* as spoken by UMNO president and Prime Minister Badawi in the years 2004-2008 demonstrated the hegemony and domination of the party in Malay politics and society. Specifically, the speeches were chosen to address the four research questions:

1. How did Badawi represent UMNO?
2. How did Badawi described the opposition party PAS?

3. How did Badawi explained the UMNO Islamist approach of Islam *Hadhari*; and,

4. How did Badawi associated himself with his predecessor, Mahathir?

This chapter on methodology discusses the following areas: (a) rationale for qualitative research design; (b) rationale for critical discourse analysis methodology; (c) research material; (d) literature review; (e) overview of research design; (f) data-collection method; (g) method for data analysis and synthesis; and, (h) limitations of the study.

The chapter concludes with a summary.

**Rationale for Qualitative Research Design**

This research study was qualitative in design, involving “the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials. . . that describe routine and problematic moments and meaning in individuals’ lives” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p. 2). Denzin and Lincoln (1994) defined qualitative research as multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural setting, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. (pp. 2)

This definition suggests an a priori approach grounded in philosophical assumptions of the “interpretive, naturalistic” to qualitative research and the multiple materials and
narrative approaches used by the researcher (Creswell, 1998). Creswell (1998) defined qualitative research as

   an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting. (pp. 15)

This definition emphasizing a “complex, holistic picture,” refers to a complex narrative that includes the multiple dimensions of a problem and displays it in all of its complexity. Creswell (1998) proposed that a qualitative research is conducted for the following reasons:

1. The nature of the research question that often asks how or what so that initial forays into the topic describes the situation.

2. The topic needs to be explored. The variables cannot be readily identified, theories are not available to explain behavior of participants of study, and theories need to be developed.

3. The need to present a detailed view of the topic.

4. The need to study individuals in the context of their natural setting. This involves venturing out to the setting, gaining access, and gathering material.

5. The interest in writing in a literary style. The writer uses the personal pronoun “I” and engages in a storytelling narrative.
6. The **sufficient time and resources** to expand on extensive data collection in the field and detailed data analysis of “text” information.

7. Audiences who are receptive to qualitative research.

8. The researcher role as an **active learner** who can tell the story from the participant’s view rather than an “expert” who judges participants. (pp. 17-18)

This ideological discourse analysis of Islam *Hadhari*, conducted to better understand the Malays and their society, and by extension the self of the researcher, was an ethnography. Ethnography, once the exclusive domain of anthropologists who investigated distant cultures, has since become a designate of particular research perspectives as discourse studies that adapt ethnographic methods to the study of local society (Oberhuber & Krzyzanowski, 2008). Ethnographies, concerned with observing, (re)constructing, and writing the lives and experiences of Others, are biographical. In writing and representing the social world the researcher is analyzing and reproducing lives (Stanley, 1993) and in this context the researcher is the biographer of Others (Coffey, 2002).

The use of Others to know and constitute the self has its history in colonialism (Ahmed, 2000), and ethnography has been of the main methodologies by which the possessive individual could be constituted (Skeggs, 2002). The “revealing” or “returning” of the ethnographer, as the telling of the reflexive self, is an envisaged future of qualitative work (Coffey, 2002), and forms a part of the IDA process in this study.
Rationale for Critical Discourse Analysis Methodology

The object of study in social science is social life, a major issue the relationship between the spheres of social life and activity, including the political and cultural (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Approaches to social research can be understood as a particular series of explicitly or implicitly defined theoretical assumptions which are specifically linked with empirical data that offer specific ways of interpretation and thus reconnect the empirical with the theoretical field. Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) is not a single method but rather an approach (Meyer, 2001).

The differences between CDA and other sociolinguistic approaches may be established with regard to the general principles of CDA. CDA is located within a tradition of critical social scientific theory and analysis. CDA regards social life as made up of practices, which are the habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places, in which people apply material or symbolic resources to act in a society (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) posited that the ambiguity of the word “practice” refers to the “intermediate positioning of practices between structures and events, structures and agency—practices have partly the character of both” (p. 22). Each practice is located within a network of practices, and networks of practices are held in place by social relations of power, the shifting articulations of practices within and across networks linked to the shifting dynamics and struggles over power (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999).
CDA focuses on authentic everyday communication in institutional, media, political and other locations rather than on sample sentences or texts. CDA regards both written and spoken discourse as a form of social practice ((Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999):

It assumes a dialectical relationship between particular discursive acts and the situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded: the situational, institutional and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and, in turn, discourses influence social and political reality. In other words, discourse constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it. (Wodak et al., 1999, pp. 8)

The nature of the problems with which CDA is concerned is different in principle from all those methods which do not determine their interest in advance. In general CDA asks different research questions in which CDA scholars play an advocatory role for groups who suffer from social discrimination. Whatever the case, in respect of the object of investigation, it is a fact that CDA follows a different and a critical approach to problems, since it endeavors to make explicit power relationships which are frequently hidden, and thereby to derive results which are of practical relevance. (Meyer, 2001, pp. 15)

CDA assumes that all discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context. In accordance with this, CDA refers to such
extralinguistic factors as culture, society, and ideology, thereby postulating an interdisciplinary procedure (Meyer, 2001).

CDA does not take the relationship between language and society to be simply deterministic but invokes the idea of mediation. There are variant approaches to discourse (Meyer, 2001):

The paradigm of Critical Discourse Analysis is not homogenous. The British variety, represented by such figures as Gunther Kress, Robert Hodge, Roger Fowler, Norman Fairclough and Theo Van Leeuwen, has drawn upon Foucault’s theory of discourse and, in its linguistic dimension, is closely associated with the systemic linguistic theory formulated by William Firth and M. A. K. Halliday, as well as with Halliday’s social semiotics. The cognitive-oriented approach of Dutch Critical Discourse Analysis, exemplified by the work of Teun van Dijk, uses a triadic model to show how personal and social cognition mediates between social structures and discourse structures. German Critical Discourse Analysis, as practised by Utz Mass, Siegfried Jager and Jurgen Link, has been influenced even more strongly by Foucault’s concept of discourse than has the British. (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999, pp. 7)

CDA generally considers its methods and procedures used for the analysis of discourses a hermeneutic process, the method of grasping and producing meaning relations, “although this characteristic is not completely evident in the position taken by the various authors” (Meyer, 2001, p. 16). The specifics of the hermeneutic
interpretation process are not made completely transparent by many CDA-oriented studies:

If a crude distinction has to be made between ‘text extending’ and ‘text reducing’ method of analysis, then CDA, on account of its concentration on very clear formal properties and the associated compression of texts during analysis, may be characterized as ‘text reducing’. These findings disagree with the mainly hermeneutic impetus of most CDA approaches. (Meyer, 2001, pp. 16)

A further characteristic of CDA is its interdisciplinary claim and its description of the object of investigation from widely different perspectives, as well as its continuous feedback between analysis and data collection (Meyer, 2001).

There have been attempts to address the failure of discourse analysis in adequately dealing with the issue of reflexivity (Fuhrman & Keller, 1986). Fuhrman and Keller (1986) revealed their major dissatisfaction with discourse analysis to be its end result that focuses on the sociological understanding of how texts are written alone, rather than questioning how beliefs and knowledge become established. They advanced that participants (referred to in the article as “sociologists and scientists”) should be placed in the “same world” (Fuhrman & Keller, 1986, p. 304) as their texts, “thus allowing for the possibility of reflexivity” (Fuhrman & Keller, 1986, p. 304):

a reflexive sociological study of science must simultaneously reach a self-understanding of how sociologists qua researchers arrive at the beliefs they do as well as focusing on the scientists’ beliefs. Reflexivity in science studies must
pay attention to the social structures and processes under which knowledge is
produced and legitimated; such a focus precludes analyzing texts alone.

(Fuhrman & Keller, 1986, pp. 304)

Therefore, in analyzing, interpreting, and synthesizing the findings of this study
of Malay identity (discussed in Chapter 5), I found it valid to include my reflexivity, or
“internal conversation” (Archer, 2007), and to paraphrase Archer—posing questions to
myself and to answer them, to speculate about myself, and in particular, my
relationship with the Malay world.

The process of telling the stories of the subaltern has been institutionalized in
anthropology and sociology as a means by which the self of the researcher is known
(Skeggs, 2002). The lives of others can be used to extend the self, assimilated into self-
reflection (Skeggs, 2002):

So those excluded from selfhood, personhood, individuality, become the object
(often objectified) by those who have access to the subject positions of
researcher/writer which they use to constitute themselves as interlocutors.

(Skeggs, 2002, pp. 357)

In this study, being Malay I was a native ethnographer. Malayness assumed an artifact
of Orientalist-colonial knowledge (Shamsul, 2004), I personified the theoretical Malay-
Muslim dialectic (Mutalib, 1990) knowing-self of the common subaltern (bangsa). I was
socialized in the “endogenous reflexivity,” meaning the ways in which actions of
members of a given community are seen to contribute to the constitution of social reality itself (Adkins, 2002, quoting May, 1998), of the Muslim-Malay culture.

Malayness a dichotomy of ethnicity and religiosity, my ontology and epistemology was a dichotomy of ethnic Malay ideologies and Islamic knowledge. In Malay tradition, I studied Islam comprehensively: informally at home and formally at school. Outside of Malay tradition perhaps, in “contextual discontinuity” (Archer, 2007) with the broader Malay community, I also experienced non-Malay Islamisms while a university undergraduate: I settled with a tabligh (Islamist sect) community, and followed the odd activity of the Islamist political party Hizb ut Tahrir (Party of Liberation). I thus accrued novel understandings of the lexicalizations of “progressive,” “moderate,” “radical,” and “extremist” Islamisms that were used in UMNO rhetoric.

My “contextual discontinuity” (Archer, 2007) extended to the fact that my present interest in the discourse of Islam Hadhari was influenced by my father’s direct involvement in the broader discourse of the Malay Islamist state between UMNO and PAS in the controversial Memali Incident in 1985, while a teenager. At the time of the Memali Incident, PAS was found by the UMNO-led government to be a deviationist Islamic party that warranted the arrest of its leaders (described in Chapter 1). The senseless violence of the incident haunted me. I realized how Islamist ideologies, contested and politicized, were so interiorized in common Malay society to the cost of human life.
In “the comprehension of the self by the detour of the comprehension of the other” (Rabinow, 1977, p. 5, as quoted in Skeggs, 2002, p. 361), my ability to be reflexive via the experience of the Malay community was thus privileged: my subjectivity was related intertextually through the IDA. Consequently, the subaltern Malay community was present in this ethnography only in the terms of ideology and ideological discourse structures proposed by van Dijk (1998), and thus begged the question whether the subaltern would “authorize herself if she cannot speak or be heard only through the self/words of others” (Skeggs, 2002, p. 362). Skeggs (2002) was adamant:

If subaltern groups have no access to the mechanisms for telling and distribution of their knowledge, how do others even know that they exist? It is surely a matter of how we do the research rather than abdicating completely. (pp. 362)

And in “contextual continuity” and “discontinuity” (Archer, 2007), I was actively attached and detached in using the Malay subaltern as Other to constitute my subjective self as researcher in this study. My Malayness was individual as my IDA of Badawi’s discourse of Islam Hadhari was uniquely Malay.

The discourse theoretical framework used in this study is “somewhat different” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 193) from the more philosophical approach by Foucault. van Dijk’s approach to discourse and ideology is “essentially multidisciplinary, and combines an analysis of linguistic, cognitive, social and cultural aspects of texts and talk in context. . . from a critical, socio-political perspective” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 193). Nonetheless, Foucault offers “in our opinion, elements of a coherent and powerful means of understanding”
human beings, in parallel to the object of study in social science being social life (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). His philosophical analysis, “specifically concerned with promoting change that counters domination and oppression” (Taylor, 2011, p. 2):

on the one hand, seeks to identify the conditions out of which our current forms of knowledge and morality emerged and which continue to legitimize those forms, while also, and on the other hand, endeavours to “separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, and thinking what we are, do, and think.” (Taylor, 2011, pp. 2)

Foucault’s reconceptualizations of power, freedom, and subjectivity which “facilitates new ways of thinking and acting that are able to counter oppression and domination” (Taylor, 2011, p. 3) corresponded with the analytical intervention of CDA of “unmasking ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use” (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999, p. 8), and were thus considered in analyzing, interpreting, and synthesizing the findings of this IDA study.

Research Material

19 keynote speeches given by Badawi through the years 2004-2008 on Islam Hadhari were selected from the Speech Collection Archives of Chief Executives of the Official Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia and the book, Islam Hadhari: A model approach for development and progress (2006). The data collection method is
outlined below. Unlike forms of CDA that scrutinized “grammar and on isolated sentences” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 198), this IDA focused on speeches in “the systematic account of the complex structures and strategies of text and talk as they are actually accomplished (produced, interpreted, used) in their social contexts” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 198). Speeches were spoken in English for an international audience, and in Malay for Malaysians. For practical purposes, and in due consideration for an English-literate audience of this study, only speeches given in English, and English translations of speeches originally spoken in Malay uploaded on the Speech Collection Archives section of the Prime Minister’s website, were used to represent speaker discourse.

**Literature Review**

A review of the literature was done to inform this study (described in Chapter 2). CDA in all its various forms defines itself in theory. There is a wide range of theories, ranging from microsociological perspectives (Ron Scollon) to theories on society and power in the Michel Foucault tradition (Siegfried Jager, Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak), theories of social cognition (Teun van Dijk) and grammar, as well as individual concepts that are borrowed from larger theoretical traditions. (Meyer, 2001, pp. 17-18)

There is no guiding theoretical viewpoint that is used consistently within CDA, “nor do the CDA protagonists proceed consistently from the area of theory to the field of discourse and then back to theory” (Meyer, 2001, p. 18). Meyer proposed that within
the CDA approaches there may be present all the theoretical levels of sociological and socio-psychological theory:

1. Epistemology covers theories which provide models of the conditions, contingencies and limits of human perception in general and scientific perception in particular.

2. General social theories, also called ‘grand theories’, attempt to conceptualize relations between social structure and social action and thus link micro- and macro-sociological phenomena.

3. Middle-range theories focus on either upon specific social phenomena or on specific subsystems of society.

4. Micro-sociological theories try to explain social interaction or to reconstruct everyday procedures which members of a society use to create their own social order, “which is the object of ethnomethodology” (Meyer, 2001, p.19).

5. Socio-psychological theories focus on the social conditions of emotion and cognition and, “compared to micro-sociology, prefer causal explanations to hermeneutic understanding of meaning” (Meyer, 2001, p. 19).

6. Discourse theories aim at the conceptualization of discourse as a social phenomenon and try to explain its genesis and structure. (Meyer, 2001, pp. 19)
van Dijk operates on the socio-psychological side of the CDA field. He sees theory “not as the classical relationship of causal hypotheses but rather as a framework systemizing phenomena of social reality” (Meyer, 2001, p. 20):

His focus triad is construed between discourse, cognition, and society. He defines discourse as a communicative event, including conversational interaction, written text, as well as associated gestures, facework, typographical layout, images and any other ‘semiotic’ or multimedia dimension of signification. Van Dijk relies on socio-cognitive theory splints and understands linguistics in a broad ‘structural-functional’ sense. He argues that CDA should be based on a sound theory of context. Within this he claims that the theory of social representations plays a main part. (Meyer, 2001, pp. 20-21)

Social actors in discourse do not exclusively make use of their individual experiences and strategies, mainly relying on collective frames of perceptions called social representations. “These socially shared perceptions form the link between social system and the individual cognitive system and perform the translation, homogenization and coordination between external requirements and subjective experience” (Meyer, 2001, p.21). Social representations are shared amongst members of a social group and so form a core element of the individual’s social identity. Social representations are bound to specific social groups and not spanning society as a whole. They are dynamic constructs and constitute a hierarchical order of mutual dependency. van Dijk identifies three forms of social representations of knowledge (personal, group, cultural), attitudes, and
thirdly ideologies which are relevant to the understanding of discourse. “Discourses take place within society, and can only be understood in the interplay of social situation, action, actor and societal structures” (Meyer, 2001, p. 21).

This IDA study as an applied CDA was grounded on a theory of ideology proposed by van Dijk (1998). van Dijk (1998) worked on a theory of ideology for the lacking of a theory of the internal components, structures or organization of ideologies. He theorized ideology that related cognition, society, and discourse:

First, even among those who deny it, ideologies are at least implicitly taken as some kind of ‘system of ideas’, and hence belong to the symbolic field of thought and belief, that is, to what psychologists call ‘cognition’. Second, ideologies are undoubtedly social, and often (though not always) associated with group interests, conflicts or struggle. They may be used to legitimate or oppose power and dominance, or symbolize social problems and contradictions. They may involve social collectivities such as classes and other groups, as well as institutions, organization and other parts of social structure. . . And third, many contemporary approaches to ideology associate (or even identify) the concept with language use or discourse, if only to account for the way ideologies are typically expressed and reproduced in society. (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 5)

The new notion of ideology served as the interface between social structure and social cognition. Ideology is “the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 8) which affords people as group members to organize the
multitude of social beliefs as identities, events, norms, and attitudes, and to act accordingly. Ideologies may also influence what is accepted as true or false, especially when such beliefs are found to be relevant for the group. In that latter, epistemological sense, ideologies may also form the basis of specific arguments for, and explanations of, specific social arrangements, or indeed influence a specific understanding of the world in general. (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 8)

The structure of ideologies is the function of their role in society. Ideologies represent social struggle and function as self-serving principles that explain the world in general (as in religious ideologies) and of the social and economic in particular (as conservatism or capitalism). Ideologies have a normative dimension, determining what group members should or should not do (van Dijk, 1998):

Ideological structures have precisely been postulated as the cognitive reconstruction of the main social conditions for the existence and reproduction of various social groups. In other words, the essential conditions of existence, organization, reproduction and the social practices of groups and their members have both social dimensions and mental ones. Here, ideologies and groups mutually constitute one another. No group can socially exist and act without a group identity and shared ideological beliefs of its members. Conversely, no group identity will develop unless collectives of people start to act, co-ordinate and organize as a group. Indeed, a large part of the social practices of many
groups, and especially of teaching, communicating, and discourse, is precisely geared towards the development of a common ideology. (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 154)

van Dijk (1998) maintained that in general terms, social groups and their members may be distinguished by:

1. Membership: Who are we? Where are we from? What do we look like? Who belongs to us? Who can become a member of our group?
2. Activities: What do we do? What is expected of us? Why are we here?
3. Goals: Why do we do this? What do we want to realize?
4. Values/norms: What are our main values? How do we evaluate ourselves and others? What should (not) be done?
5. Position and group relations: What is our social position? Who are our enemies, our opponents? Who are like us, and who are different?
6. Resources: What are the essential social resources that our group has or need to have? (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 69-70)

These categories and the basic questions they pose are the fundamental coordinates of social groups and the conditions of their existence and reproduction defining both the identity as well as the interests of groups (van Dijk, 1998).

Assuming ideologies as shared social representations that have specific social functions for groups (van Dijk, 1998) language use, text, talk and communication—subsumed under the overall term of “discourse”—are used by group members to learn
acquire, change, confirm, articulate, as well as persuasively convey ideologies to other ingroup members, to foster them in novices, defend or conceal them from outgroup members or to propagate them among others who are the infidels (van Dijk, 1998).

Ideologies are evidenced by their discursive, as the adjective form of discourse, “not the adjective meaning ‘round-about, meandering’” (Hawthorn, 2000, p.), manifestations. A discourse analysis of ideologies is thus conducted to observe the micro level of ideological production and reproduction that is actually being achieved by social actors in social situations (van Dijk, 1998):

By focusing especially on the role of discourse in the reproduction processes of ideologies, I do not imply, as some current approaches do, that I reduce ideologies, or their study, to discourse and discourse analysis. . . Discourse, however, has a special status in the reproduction of ideologies. Unlike most other social practices, and in a more explicit way than most other semiotic codes (such as photos, pictures, images, signs, paintings, movies, gestures, dance and so on), various properties of text and talk allow social members to actually express or formulate abstract ideological beliefs, or any other opinion related to such ideologies. (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 191-192)

This study extended from the 2006 Ghazali study of the keynote UMNO General Assembly speech on Islam Hadhari given by Badawi in September 2004. In the study that used the van Dijk IDA indexes of “Category,” “Positive presentation,” “Lexicalization or vocabulary style,” “Evidentiality, “Presupposition,” “Norm expression,”
“Comparison,” and “Disclaimer,” Ghazali (2006) found that Badawi sought to categorize UMNO with Islam, persuading his audience to “accept his leadership through group mental representations of Islam” (p. 141) in the ideological platform of Islam Hadhari. This study that analyzed 19 speeches over the years 2004-2008 rather than one speech in 2004 was removed from Ghazali’s 2006 study in its IDA design as explained below.

Overview of Research Design

The IDA in this study consisted of four stages. First, identification of the research problem and purpose of study, research questions, and research methodology were done concomitantly with the review of literature. Second, as an end of literature review, the conceptual framework (henceforth CF) was manufactured. Third, an analytical guideline for processing speech material was constructed. Finally, each of the 19 speeches was analyzed for ideological discourse.

Having identified the research problem, the review of the literature divided into two areas of a) Malayness as ideology complex, and b) the discourse of Malay politics, focused on the Malay-Muslim dialectic, narrowed the purpose of the study, the research questions, and research methodology. The review of the literature ended in the manufacture of the CF of the IDA in this study, an IDA instrument not included in the 2006 Ghazali study.

The CF was the scaffolding of the IDA, “a working tool consisting of categories that emanate from the literature” (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008, p. 58). As the CF “become the repository for reporting the findings and guiding data analysis and interpretation”
(Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008, p. 58) in qualitative research, in this study these categories rationalized the indexes of the “instrumentarium (toolbox)” (Jager, 2001, p. 54) in the analytical guideline for processing speech material.

Six indexes and three “ideological discourse structures” (van Dijk, 1998) comprised the IDA “instrumentarium” (Jager, 2001) of this study. Ghazali in her 2006 study of Badawi’s General Assembly speech introducing Islam Hadhari used van Dijk’s instrument indexes of “Category,” “Positive presentation,” “Lexicalization or vocabulary style,” “Evidentiality,” “Presupposition,” “Norm expression,” “Comparison,” and “Disclaimer.” In this study, the IDA was first informed by the CF. The CF was then related with the IDA instrument indexes used in the van Dijk (1998) study of the book The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society by Dinesh D’Souza (1995). In that study, van Dijk applied the indexes of “Our ideological and social enemies and Us,” with the sub-indexes, “The ideological enemy” and “The social enemy;” “Us;” “The conflict and the ‘crisis’;” “Reconstructing ideologies,” with the sub-indexes, “Conservatism,” “Ethnocentrism/modern racism,” and “Ideological structures;” “Attitudes,” with the sub-indexes, “Attitudes about racism,” “Affirmative action,” “Multiculturalism,” “Afrocentrism,” and “The IQ debate;” and, “Models” (1998). From that study I inferred the indexes indicative of the IDA and others which were formulated with regard to the subject being explored.

UMNO and the Malays;” “The ideological adversary of UMNO;” “The social adversary of
UMNO;” “The ideological conflict;” “Ideologies reconstructed or represented;” and,
“Models.”

Unlike the 2006 Ghazali study, three “ideological discourse structures” were
drawn from van Dijk’s theory of Ideology (1998) and deployed in this IDA. The first was
context, consisting of type of communicative event and participant type. The second
was “semantic macrostructure” (van Dijk, 1998), or topic. And the last was local
meaning. The three ideological discourse structures are discussed further in the method
for data analysis and synthesis, below.

The analytical procedure for processing speech text material was based on the
CDA analytical guideline for processing text (specifically newspapers and magazines)
material by Jager (2001). van Dijk in his 1998 study of The End of Racism neglected to
disclose an IDA analytical guideline, as did Ghazali (2006) who omitted showing how
speech texts were processed in her study. I thus adapted Jager’s analytical guideline,
which consisted of two stages: first, processing text material for structure analysis; and
second, “processing the material for the fine analysis of discourse fragments of an
article or series of articles” (Jager, 2001, p. 55).

The 19 speeches discoursing Islam Hadhari given by Badawi in various
communicative events in the years 2004-2008 were collected from the Speech
Collection Archives of Chief Executives of the Official Website of the Prime Minister’s
Office of Malaysia (http://www.pmo.gov.my/ucapan/?t=2009&b=all&m=s&p=paklah)
and from the book *Islam Hadhari: A model approach for development and progress* (2006). The 19 speeches were individually processed, indexed, and analyzed with regard to the research study questions, thus defining the function of this study.

**Data-Collection Method**

UMNO President Badawi introduced the approach of Islam Hadhari at the 55th UMNO General Assembly on September 23 2004. As fifth Malaysian prime minister and OIC Chairman, Badawi was afforded the opportunity to speak about Islam Hadhari on numerous occasions at various locations throughout the globe. Some of his Islam Hadhari-related speeches were compiled into the book *Islam Hadhari: A model approach for development and progress* (2006). Others were archived online at the Speech Collection Archives of Chief Executives page of the Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia government website (http://www.pmo.gov.my/ucapan/?t=2009&b=all&m=s&p=paklah). I selected speeches from both sites.

complexity, noting the caveat in CDA that “we must make choices, and select those structures for closer analysis that are relevant for the study of a social issue” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 99):

Decades of specializations in the field have ‘discovered’ many hundreds, if not thousands, of relevant units, levels, dimensions, moves, strategies, types of acts, devices and other structures of discourse. . . This means that in any practical sense there is no such thing as a ‘complete’ discourse analysis: a ‘full’ analysis of a short passage might take months and fill hundreds of pages. Complete discourse analysis of a large corpus of text and talk, is therefore totally out of the question. (van Dijk, 2001, pp. 98-99)

I chose speeches that explicated the state ideology in the context of the discourse of Islamic state. Islam Hadhari-themed speeches were selected considering the purpose of the study, to explore how the discourse of Islam Hadhari as spoken by UMNO president and Prime Minister Badawi in the years 2004-2008 demonstrated the hegemony and domination of the party in Malay politics. Specifically, the speeches were chosen to address the four research questions:

1. How Badawi represented UMNO.
2. How Badawi described the opposition party PAS.
3. How Badawi explained the UMNO Islamist approach of Islam Hadhari; and,
4. How Badawi associated himself with his predecessor, Mahathir.
By way of example, in the speech entitled “Islam Hadhari and the Malay agenda” (2004), Badawi introduced the UMNO Islamist approach as “progressive and moderate” (para. 11), at variance with PAS’s “conservative ideology and extremist ways” (para. 11). He explained in “Islam, Malaysia, and the wider world” (2004) that Islam Hadhari was “modernist Islam, or progressive Islam, or even liberal Islam” (para. 30) in response to “the extremist doctrines that Islam has become synonymous with” (para. 30). He disclosed that, after the 1999 General Elections that had resulted in significant gains for the “Islamic party” (para. 45) PAS, “some” (para. 45) UMNO members felt that the party “had to become more Islamist than the opposition” (para. 45). The UMNO president stressed that Islam Hadhari was “not an approach to pacify the West” (para. 8), “nor an approach to seek approval from non-Muslims for a more friendly and gentle image of Islam” (para. 8) in “Islam Hadhari in a multi-racial society” (2005). In 2006, speaking on the “West-Islamic dialogue,” he revealed how he, upon becoming prime minister in 2003, wondered about the relevance and role of religion in political office, resulting in his administration’s outlining the “important principles of governance” (para. 10) termed Islam Hadhari. Also in 2006, in a speech entitled “Islam, modernization and globalization,” Badawi explained at length all ten principles that comprised Islam Hadhari.

I considered the “ideologically relevant context structures” (van Dijk, 1998) of the type of the communicative event, and the types of participant and participant roles. While the types of participant and participant roles were accounted for (albeit limitedly)
in the first index on the analytical guideline, “The relationship between UMNO and the Malays,” Badawi often repeated himself which negated the concern for context in type of communicative event, as exemplified in the following:

1. On October 1, 2004, at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom:

   In my country, the opposition Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party has politicised religion to the extent that it claims a monopoly on Islam. They canvass for votes by telling villagers that they would be assured of heaven if they vote for their party. They have been known to decree members and supporters of my party as infidels. (para. 44)

2. On December 21, 2004, at the Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi, India, on the conferment of the honorary doctor of letters (*honoris causa*):

   In my country, the opposition Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party, popularly known as PAS, has politicised religion to the extent that it claims a monopoly on Islam. They canvass for votes by telling villagers that they would be assured of heaven if they vote for PAS. (para. 18)

3. On October 1, 2004, at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom:

   During the General Elections in 1999, the Islamic party saw its biggest gains ever. It tripled its representation in parliament and took control of an oil-rich state. Faced with a strengthened Islamist opposition, some in my party—
which promotes an inclusive and progressive Islam—thought we had to become more Islamist than the opposition. (para. 45)

4. On April 8, 2005, at the Asia Society of Australia, Sydney, Australia:

During the General Elections in 1999, the Islamic party saw its biggest gains ever. It tripled its representation in parliament and took control of an oil-rich state. Faced with a strengthened Islamist opposition, some in my party—which promotes an inclusive and progressive Islam—thought we had to become more Islamist than the opposition. (para. 3)

Nonetheless, the type of communicative event was noted where relevant to discussion of the findings. As revealed in the following, context demanded the perfunctory rewrite:

1. On September 23, 2004, at the 55th UMNO General Assembly, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia:

Islam Hadhari is not a new religion. It is not a new teaching nor is it a new mazhab (denomination). Islam Hadhari is an effort to bring the ummah back to basics, back to the fundamentals, as prescribed in the Quran and the Hadith that form the foundation of Islamic civilization. If Islam Hadhari is interpreted sincerely and understood clearly, it will not cause Muslims to deviate from the true path. (para. 18)

2. On May 26, 2006, at the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan:

Islam Hadhari is not a new religion. It is not a new mazhab or religious order. Neither is it an effort to seek approval for a more friendly and gentle image
of Islam. Islam Hadhari is certainly not an undertaking to apologize for the so-called Islamic threat. Islam is not a threat to anyone. The ten fundamental principles of Islam Hadhari explain and summarize the centrality of Islam in the lives of its believers, the way it is to be appreciated and practiced in these modern times. (para. 10)


**Method for Data Analysis and Synthesis**

The expression of ideology in discourse is usually more than just an explicit or implicit display of an individual belief—the speaker/writer also wants to change the audience’s minds in the way consistent with his/her beliefs. The study of the “ideological discourse structures” thus has implications for the understanding of how discourse is used to “express ideologies and at the same time into processes of reception and persuasion” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 263). The notion of ideological discourse
structures is not meant to suggest that specific structures are always used in the expression and persuasive communication of ideologies:

On the one hand, we should assume that in a given text and context virtually any structure or strategy may be used in this way. On the other hand, specific structures that in one context function ideologically, may not have that function in another context. (van Dijk, 1998, p. 263)

Nevertheless, there are structures “that often or typically exhibit or imply ideological beliefs and/or those structures that typically may have ideological ‘effects’ upon recipients” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 263): context constraint, topic, local meaning, discourse schemata, style, rhetoric, and “specifically for spoken dialogues” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 273), interaction strategies. Of the discussed ideological discourse structures, three were considered relevant for the purposes of this study. Others were consolidated in the three that were used; one was found not relevant. Discourse schemata, the conventional schema consisting of regular categories appearing in specific order, was included in context, the first ideological discourse structure in this IDA. Style and rhetoric were parts of local meaning, the third ideological discourse structure used in this study. The last ideological discourse structure identified by van Dijk, interaction strategies in spoken dialogues, was not included.

van Dijk (1998) identified two types of context, the first ideological discourse structure in this IDA: type of communicative event and types of participant and participant roles. van Dijk (1998) found
the first contextual constraint, namely the type of communicative event, as well as the overall discursive intentions and goals associated with it, has implications for the production and comprehension of discourse structures, and therefore also on the ideological functions of text and talk. (pp. 264)

The second contextual constraint is the type of participant: people expect ideologically relevant social opinions from specific groups rather than others. “Thus a politician... writing or speaking about social issues is more likely to be (heard as) expressing ideologically based opinions” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 265). How Badawi identified UMNO with the Malays was the first index of the analytical guideline.

As noted before, concern for context was obviated due to the duplication of speech text regardless of the type communicative event. Type of communicative event, however, was still noted where relevant.

The second of the ideological discourse structures typically involved in the formation of ideology is semantic macrostructure, or topic. The topic represents what the discourse is about, broadly. The topic embodies the most important information of the discourse and explains the overall coherence of text and talk. It is expressed in discourse in titles, headlines, summaries, abstracts, thematic sentences or conclusions. Topics as broad or global meanings manage comprehension and influence the formation of mental models (representations in personal memory) of the event the discourse is about (van Dijk, 1998). This study of the ideological discourse of Islam Hadhari as spoken
by Badawi focused on the topic of the discourse of Malay Islamist state, and by extension, Islamism.

Ideologies as social representations or social beliefs are shared by members of social groups through a mental modeling (or simply modeling) of events and contexts, “these context models control the ‘pragmatic’ part of discourse, whereas event models do so with the ‘semantic’ part” (Meyer, 2001, p.21). Social members belonging to various social groups learn from personal experience, acquired knowledge, and models. The speaker/writer proposing select social representations of events or situations to participant types are thus attempting to influence local meanings.

Local meaning is the third structure of ideological discourse. van Dijk (1998) posited that local meanings are the content of discourse, where most ideological beliefs will be incorporated in text and talk. Representations of events or situations (or event models) are selectively constructed to form the semantic representation of text and talk. Propositions are expressed in terms the speaker/writer wants the listener to know deploying two important principles of ideological reproduction in discourse: (a) the presence or absence of information in semantic representation derived from event models, and (b) the function of expression or suppression of information in the interests of the speaker/writer. The latter principle is a strategy of ideological communication that consists of four moves:

1. Express/emphasize information that is positive about Us.
2. Express/emphasize information that is negative about Them.
3. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them.

4. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about Us. (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 267)

These four steps constituting the “ideological square” play the broader contextual strategy of positive self-representation and its outgroup corollary, negative other-presentation. The focus on participant types acting not as individuals but as group members, the ideological square suggests the third principle of ideological discourse analysis, that is, (c) as ideologies are social and group-based, so ideological opinions expressed in discourse must have implications for groups or social issues. The principles and strategies of ideological discourse are also applied to the semantic analyses of detail and level of description, of implicitness, presupposition and explicitness, local coherence, and words chosen to express a concept, or lexicalization, in rhetorical forms as mitigation, euphemism, or nominalization (van Dijk, 1998).

Ideologies are often formulated explicitly or implicitly in response against ideological opponents or adversaries (van Dijk, 1998). The ideological adversary defines for social group members the terms of ideological conflict at an intellectual abstract level. The social adversary reifies the concept. The ideological adversary of UMNO and the social adversary of UMNO was the second and third index, respectively, of the analytical guideline.

Ideological struggles are rooted in real political, social, or economic conflicts (van Dijk, 1998). The conflict not only involves arbitrary groups but also involve group
relations of power, dominance or competition for access to scarce social resources, material and symbolic (van Dijk, 1998). The ideological conflict is the fourth index of the analytical guideline.

van Dijk (1998) advanced that ideologies defined as basic social beliefs of groups are reconstructed in the interests of the writer/speaker. Social group members typically belong to a multiplicity of social groups. Assuming many of these social groups possess an ideology, individual members thus share several ideologies simultaneously thus tasking the speaker/writer to reconstruct or represent ideologies to be consistent with the ideological agenda. Ideologies reconstructed or represented is the fifth index of the analytical guideline.

The model is the theoretical construct that describes and explains how social representations are constructed and used by individual group members in and by their social practices and in their discourse (van Dijk, 1998). Models are personal interpretations and opinions of events that disclose the ideological agenda, the sixth index of the analytical guideline.

All 19 speeches were processed and analyzed with regard to the research study questions employing a variant of the analytical guideline for processing text material by Jager (2001). Jager (2001) identified two stages for processing text material: first, processing material for structure analysis; and second, “processing the material for the fine analysis of discourse fragments of an article or a series of articles” (Jager, 2001, p.
His, however, was an analytical procedure of critical discourse analysis (CDA) different from that used in this IDA.

In this IDA, I deployed the adapted form of IDA “instrumentarium” (Jager, 2001). In processing individual speech text material for structure analysis, I considered the ideological discourse constraint of context, context in this study referring to “The relationship between UMNO and the Malays,” consisting of the type of communicative event and types of participant and participant roles, and the second ideological discourse structure, semantic macrostructure, or topic. In processing speech text material for fine analysis of ideological discourse fragments in speech texts, I explored the third structure of ideological discourse, local meanings, in “The ideological adversary of UMNO,” “The social adversary of UMNO,” “The ideological conflict,” “Ideologies reconstructed/represented,” and “Models.” In this IDA, local meanings meant the presence/absence of information in semantic representation derived from event models; expression/suppression of information in the interests of the speaker; implications for the social group or social issue; rhetorical means, and, lexicalization. The form of the analytical guideline for processing material in this IDA is included as Appendix B.

**Limitations of the Study**

This study was grounded on an “outline” at “a comprehensive framework for detailed theoretical and empirical studies of ideology” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 381). The study
was undertaken following the concern to show how social groups use and abuse discourse in very specific ways. van Dijk (1998) posed the following questions:

Indeed, what kind of ideological discourse is typical for what groups, what are its properties, and how is it in turn socially and institutionally embedded? How are ideologies discursively expressed and reproduced in such important social domains as politics, the media and education? (pp. 320)

van Dijk (1998) assumed that ideologies are by definition group-based. There was a need to detail under what conditions groups develop ideologies, “and indeed how ideological groups are formed” (p. 319):

We need to pay much more attention to the organizational and institutional dimensions of ideologies and the ways they function and are reproduced in society. Ideological conflicts need to be analyzed in detail in order to understand the role of ideologies in such conflicts. (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 319)

While there was extensive detail on the cognitive aspects of ideologies, van Dijk (1998) acknowledged that there were numerous places on the mental map of the structures, contents, organization and functions of ideologies that required explaining:

We need to know much more about the ideological control of the (structures) of other social representations, such as attitudes and knowledge. We only have tentative ideas about the relations between (personal, subjective) models of experience, and the socially shared representations the group. Indeed, how and
under what conditions are mental representations personal, and when are they socially ‘shared’ or ‘known’ in the first place? (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 319)

To explore the problem of the relations between the subjective models of experience and the socially shared representations of the group, a limitation of this study, I found Margaret Archer defining reflexivity instructive. Archer claimed that all normal people talk to themselves, in reflexive deliberations about matters that are primarily and necessarily social (2007).

Archer (2007) proposed that “the subjective powers of reflexivity mediate the role that objective structural or cultural powers play in influencing social action and are thus indispensable to explaining social outcomes” (p. 5). Archer advanced that the proposition raised three questions about the nature of human action, none answerable without reference being made to people’s reflexivity:

1. Why do people act at all? What motivates them and what are they (fallibly) trying to achieve by endorsing given courses of action? Answering these questions entails an exploration of their personal concerns and inner reflexive deliberations about how to go about realizing them.

2. How do social properties influence the course of action that people adopt? This involves a specification of how objective structural or cultural influences are reflexively mediated.
3. What exactly do people do? This requires an examination of the variability in the actions of those similarly socially situated and the differences in their processes of reflexivity. (Archer, 2007, pp. 6)

Reflexivity exercised through internal conversation is the process which not only mediates the impact of social forms upon us but also determines our responses to them (Archer, 2007). Archer maintained that reflexive mediation is essential for giving an account of precisely what we do rather than a statement about probable courses of action. As “active agents,” people who can exercise governance in their own lives, individuals develop and define their ultimate concerns: “in relation to constraints and enablements, agential responses can vary greatly: from evasion, through compliance, to strategic manipulation or subversion” (Archer, 2007, p. 15). And if it is held that agential subjectivity has itself been molded by social influences, such as ideology, or discourse, “it is impossible to ascertain for whom this is and is not the case without examining their inner dialogue” (Archer, 2007, p. 15).

Archer (2007) “according reflexivity its due” (p. 21) acknowledged three points about how we make our way through the world. Archer (2007) found

1. That our unique personal identities, which derive from our singular constellations of concerns, mean that we are radically heterogeneous as subjects. Even though we may share objective social positions, we may also seek very different ends from within them.
2. That our subjectivity is dynamic, it is not psychologically static nor is it psychologically reducible, because we modify our own goals in terms of their contextual feasibility, as we see it. As always, we are fallible, can get it wrong and have to pay the objective price for doing so.

3. That, for the most part, we are active rather than passive subjects because we adjust our projects to those practices that we believe we can realize.

Subjects regularly evaluate their social situations in the light of their personal concerns and assess their projects in the light of their situations. (Archer, 2007, pp. 22)

This study, undertaken to have a better understanding of the Malays and their society, thus was affected—positively and adversely—by my “internal conversation.”

According to the historical framework of qualitative research developed by Denzin and Lincoln (2000), the academy is entering into a seventh moment, in which the qualitative inquiry is “simultaneously minimal, existential, autoethnographic, vulnerable, performative and critical” (Lincoln and Denzin, 2000, p. 1048). While including my reflexives, this study was focused on the four research questions and not tended to an autoethnography:

Autoethnography is an autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural. Back and forth autobiographers gaze, first through an ethnographic wide-angle lens, focusing outward on social and cultural aspects of their personal
experience; then, they look inward, exposing a vulnerable self that is moved by and may move through, refract, and resist cultural interpretations. (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, pp. 739)

Chapter Summary

In summary, this chapter explained this study’s research methodology. To explore the ideological discourse of Islam Hadhari as spoken by UMNO president and Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in the years 2004-2008, 19 speeches were individually processed and analyzed through the study approach of IDA.

In this study, the IDA consisted of four stages: first, the research problem, purpose of study, research questions, and research methodology were determined and done concomitantly with the review of literature; second, as an end to the review of the literature, the CF was conceived; third, an analytical guideline for processing speech material was formulated; and finally, each of the 19 selected speeches was analyzed for ideological discourse.

Six indexes and three “ideological discourse structures” (van Dijk, 1998) comprised the IDA “instrumentarium” (Jager, 2001) in this study. Borrowed from van Dijk (1998), I adapted six indexes, related with the CF, to produce “The relationship between UMNO and the Malays,” “The ideological adversary of UMNO,” “The social adversary of UMNO,” “The ideological conflict,” “Ideologies reconstructed or represented,” and “Models.” The three ideological discourse structures were drawn from van Dijk’s ideology theory (1998). The first ideological discourse structure was
context, the second was “semantic macrostructure” or topic, and the last was local meaning.

In this study the IDA analytical guideline for processing speech text material was based on the CDA analytical guideline for processing text material by Jager (2001). Jager’s analytical guideline consisted of two stages: first, processing text material for structure analysis; and second, “processing the material for the fine analysis of discourse fragments of an article or series of articles” (Jager, 2001).

19 speeches were chosen that explicated the state ideology in the topical context of the Malay Islamist state, considering the general problem, purpose of the study, and four research questions. The findings of this IDA study are reported in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER IV: ANALYZING TEXTS AND REPORTING FINDINGS

Overview

The last chapter discussed the IDA research methodology in this study. The IDA in this study consisted of four stages. First, the research problem, purpose of study, research questions, and research methodology were determined and done concomitantly with the review of literature. Second, as an end to the review of the literature, the CF was manufactured. Third, an analytical guideline for processing speech material was formulated. And last, each of the 19 selected speeches was analyzed for ideological discourse.

This study extended from the 2006 Ghazali study of the keynote UMNO General Assembly speech given by Badawi in September 2004 on Islam Hadhari. In that study Ghazali used the van Dijk ideological IDA indexes of “Category,” “Positive presentation,” “Lexicalization or vocabulary style,” “Evidentiality, “Presupposition,” “Norm expression,” “Comparison,” and “Disclaimer” to find that Badawi sought to categorize UMNO with Islam, persuading his audience to “accept his leadership through group mental representations of Islam,” in the ideological platform of Islam Hadhari.

In terms of methodology, this study was removed from the Ghazali’s study in two key areas: 19 speeches, over the years 2004-2008, were analyzed; and, to facilitate the IDA, an analytical guideline for processing speech text material was constructed.

Having identified the research problem, the review of the literature which encompassed the two areas of a) Malayness as ideology complex, and b) the discourse
of Malay politics, focused on the Malay-Muslim dialectic, narrowed the purpose of the study, the research questions, and research methodology. The review of the literature ended in the manufacture of the CF of the IDA in this study, an IDA instrument not included in the 2006 Ghazali study.

The CF was the scaffolding of the IDA, “a working tool consisting of categories that emanate from the literature” (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008, p.). The CF categories rationalized the indexes of the “instrumentarium (toolbox)” (Jager, 2001, p. 54) in the analytical guideline for processing speech text material. The CF was then related with the IDA instrument indexes used in the van Dijk (1998) study of the book The End of Racism (1995). In that study, van Dijk applied the indexes of “Our ideological and social enemies and Us,” with the sub-indexes, “The ideological enemy” and “The social enemy;” “Us;” “The conflict and the ‘crisis’;” “Reconstructing ideologies,” with the sub-indexes, “Conservatism,” “Ethnocentrism/modern racism,” and “Ideological structures;” “Attitudes,” with the sub-indexes, “Attitudes about racism,” “Affirmative action,” “Multiculturalism,” “Afrocentrism,” and “The IQ debate;” and, “Models” (1998). From that study I inferred the indexes necessarily indicative of the IDA.

reconstructed or represented,” and “Models.” The three ideological discourse structures were drawn from van Dijk’s ideology theory (1998). The first ideological discourse structure was context, the second was “semantic macrostructure” or topic, and the last was local meaning.

The IDA analytical guideline for processing speech text material, not identified in either the Ghazali (2006) or van Dijk (1998) studies, was based on the CDA analytical guideline for processing text material by Jager (2001). Jager’s analytical guideline consisted of two stages: first, processing text material for structure analysis; and second, “processing the material for the fine analysis of discourse fragments of an article or series of articles” (Jager, 2001). In processing individual speech text material for structure analysis, I considered the ideological discourse constraint of context, context in this study referring to “The relationship between UMNO and the Malays,” consisting of the type of communicative event and types of participant and participant roles, and the second ideological discourse structure, “semantic macrostructure” (van Dijk, 1998) or topic. In processing speech text material for fine analysis of ideological discourse fragments in speech texts, I explored the third structure of ideological discourse, local meanings, in the indexes of “The ideological adversary of UMNO;” “The social adversary of UMNO;” “The ideological conflict;” “Ideologies reconstructed/represented;” and, “Models.” Local meanings in this IDA meant the presence/absence of information in semantic representation derived from event models; expression/suppression of information in the interests of the speaker;
implications for the social group or social issue; rhetorical means, and, lexicalization.

The form of the analytical guideline for processing material is included as Appendix B.

This chapter presents the major findings obtained from the ideological discourse analysis of Badawi’s discourse of Islam Hadhari. I chose his speeches (described in Chapter 3) that explicated the state ideology in the context of the discourse of Malay Islamist state, following that “we must make choices, and select those structures for closer analysis that are relevant for the study of a social issue” (van Dijk, 2001).

Five major findings resulted from this study:

1. Badawi identified UMNO as a social group for the bangsa Melayu in his Assembly keynote speeches. The Malayness and Islam-ness of group members were associated with the social identity of UMNO: The party ideologically possessed of a Malay nationalism, the Malays, UMNO, and Islam inseparable elements forming a “distinct culture and identity” (Badawi, 2004, para. 27).

2. Defining Islam Hadhari as a “progressive and moderate” (Badawi, 2004, para. 11) approach to Islam, Badawi described its ideological adversary as categorically (a) the West, and (b) the Western conceptualization of Islam in Orientalism.

3. The social adversary to UMNO was PAS. PAS signified the Oriental Islam Westerners conflated Islamisms in total: radical and conservative.
4. The ideological conflict for UMNO was the Islamism of the Malays. UMNO determined that the proper social approach to Malay Islamism should be the “moderate” and “progressive” of Islam Hadhari and not the alternative offered by PAS.

5. Ideologies were reconstructed or represented in discourse. Discoursing Islam Hadhari, Badawi proposed that (a) Islam as an Arab religion only for Arabs is a “common misperception, resulting in many prejudices” (Badawi, 2006, para. 3); (b) the “clash of civilizations” is not about ideology and religion, but a clash of “fundamental interests” (Badawi, 2007, para. 11) of power, territory, and resources; (c) globalization is not inherently anti-Islam; Muslims are able to “partake in the processes of globalization yet remain faithful to the teachings and traditions of Islam” (Badawi, 2006, para. 12); (d) the Islamic theocracy is an “extreme” response to globalization “propagated by the enemies of Islam” (Badawi, 2006, para. 13); (e) modernization is not inimical to Islam, the notion that Islam is anti-democratic and inherently anti-modern is a “fallacy” (Badawi, 2006, para. 4); (f) the legal process of ijtihad (interpretation of Islamic law) be revived, and last, that (g) the Islamic lexicon, of the word jihad, be properly defined as “struggle,” not “holy war” (Badawi, 2006, para. 9).

What follows is the discussion of the findings.
Badawi introduced the Islam Hadhari at the 55th UMNO General Assembly in Kuala Lumpur on September 23, 2004. Islam Hadhari “is an approach that emphasises development, consistent with the tenets of Islam and focused on enhancing the quality of life” (Badawi, 2004, para. 17):

Islam Hadhari is not a new religion. It is not a new teaching nor is it a new mazhab (denomination). Islam Hadhari is an effort to bring the Ummah back to basics, back to the fundamentals, as prescribed in the Quran and the Hadith that form the foundation of Islamic civilization. If Islam Hadhari is interpreted sincerely and understood clearly, it will not cause Muslims to deviate from the true path. (Badawi, 2004, para. 18)

President of Islamic Da’wah Foundation Malaysia (YADIM) Datuk Haji Mohd. Nakhaei claimed that the government had in fact introduced Islam Hadhari in 2002. The concept was familiar to “more knowledgeable Muslims” (Abd. Samad, 2008, p. 298) before Badawi introduced it to the nation as “a major component of its campaign platform in the 2004 elections” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 92). The propagation of Islam Hadhari began in earnest in June 2005:

Since June 2005, the Malaysian Government and its affiliated bodies were championing a major drive to promote Islam Hadhari that derived from the highest (federal) office of the Prime Minister who headed the National Council of Islamic Religious Affairs, which also included the Menteri Besar and Chief Ministers of the states. (Abd. Samad, 2008, pp. 299)
In *Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: Revivalist of an Intellectual Tradition* (2005), al-Attas (2005) advanced that Islam *Hadhari* was first mooted by the Mahathir administration “only as a tool to swing the Malay electoral vote” (Prologue, para.) in favor of UMNO. In September 2004, Badawi appropriated for himself the Islamization process begun and managed by his predecessor:

Abdullah has since redefined the intent and purpose of the aforementioned process and has incorporated it into the intricate fabric of his administration. As a result, not only has he succeeded in lending legitimacy to an otherwise impotent political rhetoric in danger of being consigned to the realm of mere slogan, Abdullah has raised the awareness of not only the Muslims in his country, but the global Muslim community as well. His understanding and subsequent explanation has allowed the approach referred to as *Islam Hadhari* to assume a radical departure from the original intent. (Al-Attas, 2005, Prologue)

This paragraph has since been excised in successive prints of the book.

When on June 22, 2002, Mahathir announced his intent to resign from all positions in the party and government, the assumption by all members of UMNO was that the post of prime minister would be inherited by Badawi. That Badawi was chosen by Mahathir to replace Anwar Ibrahim as deputy prime minister in January 1999 was a surprise not because Datuk Seri Abdullah’s credentials were questioned, political observers found it hard to believe that a figure so prominent in the efforts to
bring down Tun Dr. Mahathir in the 1987 UMNO crisis was ultimately given the trust to be the Deputy Prime Minister. (Abd. Samad, 2008, pp. vi)

Badawi’s ouster from the Cabinet lasted about four years from May 1987 when on March 15, 1991, he was reappointed as a minister. Badawi was sworn in as fifth prime minister on 31 October, 2003. He received his own mandate on March 22, 2004 after successfully leading the BN to “glorious results” (Abd. Samad, 2008, p. vii) in the General Elections. Badawi received not only the required two-third majority that afforded him “five secure years in power” (Abd. Samad, 2008, p. vii) till March 2009, “he also managed to restore UMNO’s image as the ultimate party for the Malays” (Abd. Samad, 2008, p. vii).

Badawi as prime minister and president of UMNO inherited Mahathir’s mandate which included the discourse of Islam that centered “heavily, albeit not necessarily solely,” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 81) on the concept of the Islamic state that was begun by PAS since the party’s formation. It was ironic that it was UMNO, and not PAS, that took the initiative in the debate over the Islamic state:

Malaysia’s political discourse concerning the Islamic state took on greater urgency when Mahathir, in a move that took many by surprise, made the controversial proclamation on 29 September 2001 that Malaysia was already an Islamic state. (Chinyong, 2009, pp. 82)

It was “in effect the culmination of a number of low-key but significant government initiated discussions” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 82) on the Islamic state that resulted in the
conclusion, reached by “a number of state-linked ulama” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 82), that
the country was in fact becoming an Islamic state: “While Mahathir might have hoped to
truncate the Islamic state debate with this declaration, he had instead precipitated its
intensification” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 83).

Badawi (2004) never called the concept of “development, consistent with the
tenets of Islam” (para. 17) an ideology that others would. al-Attas (2005) described the
attempt “to elucidate one of the more problematic, potentially inflammatory ideological
approaches generally ascribed to the prominent leader” (Prologue, para. 4) done “at the
behest of the Prime Minster” (Prologue, para. 8). For the purposes of this study, Islam
Hadhari “truly mean(ing)” “a shift towards understanding the present age in the
framework of Islam” (al-Attas, 2005, p. 140) was considered an ideology. Ideologies
were operationally defined according to van Dijk (1998) as social representations, the
shared social beliefs of specific social groups.

Ideologies are founded on the general beliefs of societies and cultures.
Ideologies (a) are not arbitrary lists of propositions, but are organized along specific
social categories that constitute an ideology-schema as membership, activities, goals,
values, position or resources. These categories are the cognitive (re)construction of the
basic social criteria for groups, defining its social identity and interests; (b) have
structural characteristics such as group polarization (Us and Them); (c) as social
representations, are coherent in terms of opinions, practices, and discourses among
different social members in different social situations; (d) function cognitively to
organize the social representations of social groups; (e) are not wrong, misguided, false, or distorted beliefs of a group. Epistemically, whatever their truth value for the group itself, ideologies may be true or false. It is their cognitive and social role in the management of thinking and interaction that is the criterion for their evaluation; and, (f) may be contained in models, the interface between the social representations and personal cognitions (and then to discourse) (van Dijk, 1998).


In selecting the speeches, I considered the “ideologically relevant context structures” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 264) of (a) type of the communicative event, and (b) types of participant and participant roles (explained in Chapter 3). While the types of participant and participant roles were accounted (albeit limitedly,) in the first index on
the analytical guideline, “The relationship between UMNO and the Malays,” that Badawi often repeated himself negated the concern for context in type of communicative event:

1. **On October 1, 2004, at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom:**
   
   In my country, the opposition Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party has politicised religion to the extent that it claims a monopoly on Islam. They canvass for votes by telling villagers that they would be assured of heaven if they vote for their party. (para. 44)

2. **On December 21, 2004, at the Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi, India, on the conferment of the honorary doctor of letters (*honoris causa*):**
   
   In my country, the opposition Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party, popularly known as PAS, has politicised religion to the extent that it claims a monopoly on Islam. They canvass for votes by telling villagers that they would be assured of heaven if they vote for PAS. (para. 18)

3. **On October 1, 2004, at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom:**
   
   During the General Elections in 1999, the Islamic party saw its biggest gains ever. It tripled its representation in parliament and took control of an oil-rich state. Faced with a strengthened Islamist opposition, some in my party—
which promotes an inclusive and progressive Islam—thought we had to become more Islamist than the opposition. (para. 45)

4. On April 8, 2005, at the Asia Society of Australia, Sydney, Australia:

During the General Elections in 1999, the Islamic party saw its biggest gains ever. It tripled its representation in parliament and took control of an oil-rich state. Faced with a strengthened Islamist opposition, some in my party—which promotes an inclusive and progressive Islam—thought we had to become more Islamist than the opposition. (para. 3)

Nonetheless, the type of communicative event was noted where relevant to discussion of the findings. As illustrated in the following, context required the perfunctory rewrite:

1. On September 23, 2004, at the 55th UMNO General Assembly, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia:

Islam Hadhari is not a new religion. It is not a new teaching nor is it a new mazhab (denomination). Islam Hadhari is an effort to bring the ummah back to basics, back to the fundamentals, as prescribed in the Quran and the Hadith that form the foundation of Islamic civilization. If Islam Hadhari is interpreted sincerely and understood clearly, it will not cause Muslims to deviate from the true path. (para. 18)

2. On May 26, 2006, at the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan:

Islam Hadhari is not a new religion. It is not a new mazhab or religious order. Neither is it an effort to seek approval for a more friendly and gentle image
of Islam. Islam Hadhari is certainly not an undertaking to apologize for the so-called Islamic threat. Islam is not a threat to anyone. (para. 10)

*Finding 1: UMNO was the social group of the Malays.*

Of the 19 speeches in the discourse of Islam *Hadhari*, Badawi spoke about UMNO—its society and different ideologies, including ideologies that constitute the Malay identity—at the party General Assembly. The Assembly is “the most important political event in the country” (Ghazali, 2004, p. 29), an annual event held to debate key issues of concern to the party attended by elected UMNO representatives of states, former UMNO presidents and other UMNO members:

The UMNO general assembly is carried live on television by the national television network. . . On the following day, all major newspapers print the text of the presidential keynote address including a translated version in the English language newspapers. (Ghazali, 2004, pp. 30)

At the 2004 Assembly, Badawi admitted himself as leader of the party, the prestigious post that should entitled him to speak for the party:

The party, founded under the leadership of Dato’ Onn Jaafar, has been subsequently led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak Hussin, Tun Hussein Onn, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and the torch of leadership now passes to me. (para. 4)

UMNO was the “largest political party with 3.2 million members” (para. 4) and unequivocally Malay in sentiment:
I strongly uphold the objectives behind the formation of UMNO. UMNO was formed to fight for the rights of the Malays. I strongly uphold the nationalist agenda of the Malays. (para. 58)

In 2005, Badawi reestablished the social identity of the party as that of the Malays:

UMNO belongs to the Malays. Our legacy is now 59 years old. It has grown from strength to strength with age. The people have accepted it and they have faith in UMNO because it has successfully advanced Islamic teachings, given meaning to independence and uplifted the dignity of the community. (para. 66)

Expressing the UMNO discourse of a “distinct culture and identity” (para. 27) of Muslim-Malayness, Badawi (2004) conflated the ethnicity of Malay to the belief of Islam:

1. A consistent effort to ensure lasting success must be prepared. Any thinking that confuses and is inconsistent with Islamic beliefs must be rejected in order to allow Malay resilience and thought to be built. (para. 24)

2. Malays must be given Islamic understanding that enables the appreciation and provides the ability to inherit a vision of a global civilization, in order for Malays to be more successful global players. (para. 25)

In 2007, Badawi revealed that UMNO acknowledged the Muslim imperative, that it is not possible for Muslim societies to embrace secularism because Islam is practised not only as a religion but also a whole way of life for all Muslims. The teachings of Islam serve as their guide for doing all things, whether conducting their affairs in the public domain or practising the religion in the privacy of their
homes. It is sometimes said that society might indeed benefit by being less religious. However, such an idea cannot take root in Muslim communities because the Islamic religion and the Muslim way of life are indistinguishable and inseparable. (para. 11)

In the discourse of Islam *Hadhari*, the Malay party was found to be avowedly Islamic:

1. UMNO, too, has never practiced secularism that rejects the Hereafter and focuses solely on worldly matters. (Badawi, 2004, para. 29)
2. The government has never practiced secularism that rejects the hereafter and focuses solely on worldly matters. Islam must be lived as a system that considers both the sacred and the ordinary. (Badawi, 2006, para. 34)

In the 2004 Assembly, the UMNO president stressed that

It is not UMNO’s culture to trivialize religion. UMNO has never allowed religion to be used as a political tool. UMNO staunchly opposes the use of Islam as an instrument to manipulate people’s beliefs. UMNO has always ensured that Islam and Muslims are protected from such abuse of religion. (para. 18)

The Malay Muslim in the *kesedaran* or awareness of Malay politics (Milner, 1994) was in constant negotiation with the ideological orientations of *bangsa*, *ummah*, and *kerajaan*:

UMNO staunchly opposes the use of Islam as an instrument to manipulate people’s beliefs. UMNO has always ensured that Islam and Muslims are protected from such abuse of religion. It was on this basis that UMNO, which was directly involved in formulating the Federal Constitution, inserted Articles
that place Islam under the jurisdiction of the Heads of State. (Badawi, 2004, para. 18)

The party ideology of Islam Hadhari was intended to catalyze the social practice of Malay Islamism beyond rituals and narrow interpretations:

1. There is nothing wrong with Islam, the error lies in the misguided actions by those who fail to interpret Islam and those who fail to practice it with open minds and rational thought. Muslims should concentrate on building on what makes Islam attractive. The Government’s stand is that Islam will be respected if it develops intellectual excellence, emphasises the pursuit of knowledge and concentrates on attaining economic success. (Badawi, 2007, para. 15)

2. UMNO believes that Islam will not grow, nor will it be respected if it is confined to rituals. If we fight for Islam, armed only with slogans and rhetoric, we will not achieve excellence. Indeed, the application of Islam through the prism of shallow minds and narrow interpretations can cause discomfort not only among non-Muslims, but among Muslims themselves. Overzealous enforcement can give Islam a negative image. (Badawi, 2007, para. 14)

UMNO’s Malay Agenda was explained in the 2005 Assembly keynote speech, “A Giant Step for the Malays.” The Malay Agenda was the party agenda concerning the welfare of the Malays:
1. Malays are worried that other communities will leave them behind in terms of social status and economic achievement. During the 1960s, the income gap between Malays and Non-Malays was vast, with Malays earning less than half compared to Non-Malays. This gap created a feeling of unease among Malays. After the May 13 incident, the government realized that it was imperative to implement a program that could create socio-economic parity amongst the country’s different races. The Malays had to be given opportunities to enable them to elevate themselves so that they could equitably enjoy the fruits of economic progress. The New Economic Policy was therefore introduced as a formula to reduce the disparity in economic achievement amongst the various races in the country. (Badawi, 2005, para. 39)

2. When the Policy was first implemented, Malays only earned 44 sen for each Ringgit earned by the Non-Malays. When the NEP concluded in 1990, the Malays had narrowed this gap to earn 57 sen for each Ringgit, an increase of 30 percent. Bumiputera equity holdings increased from 2 percent when the NEP was first implemented to 19 percent by the year 2000. (Badawi, 2005, para. 40)

3. The problems we face must be tackled with a new mindset and a fresh spirit. Our dignity and our survival are at stake. The Malaysia of yesterday when the NEP was first introduced is radically different from the Malaysia of the
knowledge-based economy. Today’s economy provides opportunities to those who are knowledgeable, industrious and value-add(ed). . . . Our goal is to achieve parity of income. Malays should earn one Ringgit for every one Ringgit earned by Non-Malays. (Badawi, 2005, para. 43)

Former UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir had envisioned 2020 as the year that the Malays would be productive members of a developed Malaysia. Badawi, in succeeding Mahathir, inherited the party mission left undone:

The success of the Malays lies at the heart of UMNO’s struggle. It is the responsibility we bear and the trust that we have been given. Our objective is to see Malays play a significant and meaningful role. Vision 2020 has set the target of achieving developed nation status. The developed nation that we envision must be accompanied with progress for the Malays. There is no sense in being a developed nation when Malays are marginalized. It is not enough to ensure that Malays will not disappear from the Earth, when we lag so far behind. (Badawi, 2005, para. 64)

Malay pride was attached to the attainment of economic wealth:

When we succeed, it will not matter wherever we are, in whatever company we find ourselves—our presence will be felt and we will be respected. We will be Towering Malays. (Badawi, 2005, para. 65)
Finding 2: The ideological adversary of UMNO was the West and its conceptualization of Islam in Orientalism.

In the discourse of Islam Hadhari Badawi described its broad ideological antithesis, categorically Occidentalism, and the common Western understanding of Oriental Islam. Badawi deemed that the Muslim world was diminished due to the advancement of Westernism and imperial colonialism:

1. The Muslim world has been confronted with many challenges during its fifteen centuries of existence. Like Judaism and Christianity from which draws a common lineage, Islam was born amidst strong opposition. (Badawi, 2004, para. 5)

2. The Arab Muslim world nevertheless scaled the heights of civilization, culture and learning in the 8th to 11th centuries. It learnt much from the Greco-Roman civilization, enriched it, absorbed it and passed it on to Europe. (Badawi, 2004, para. 6)

3. Although the Crusades plunged the Muslim world into deep crisis, it was still capable of remarkable achievements under Persian, Spanish, Ottoman and Mughal leadership. Muslims nations then fell under the European colonial yoke. They lost their sovereignty, and their people lost their freedom. Their resources were exploited and plundered. Palestine was taken away from the Arabs, and many of its people became displaced and refugees from their own land. (Badawi, 2004, para. 7)
Muslim and Muslim majority countries were subject to imperial standards of postcoloniality:

1. But despite some post-colonial successes in some parts of the Muslim world, there is also much cause for dismay. The sheer weight of the problems that face the Muslim world today is tremendous. Many Muslim countries are synonymous with poverty, illiteracy and malnutrition. Some stand out because of oppression, tyranny and injustice. Globally, Muslim countries are devoid of a common voice that is taken seriously. (Badawi, 2004, para. 9)

2. Only a small minority of the 57 Muslim majority countries, five to be exact, is deemed to having high human development by the UNDP. 24 countries are in the medium developing category. The remaining 28, or half the Muslim world, are classified as having low human development. Only five countries in the Muslim world enjoy a per capita GDP above 10,000 US dollars. 30 countries have a per capita GDP of less than 1,000 US dollars. (Badawi, 2004, para. 10)

Badawi found the postcolonial Muslim world subaltern in a global order:

1. I have painted a picture of almost wretched conditions in the Muslim world. It is reality, and compounding this harsh reality is a global order that exacerbates our suffering. I am willing to engage in self-criticism, but that must be tempered with identifying what I feel are wanton violations of human dignity, natural justice, human rights and international law that have
directly affected the Muslim world. Yes, we have ourselves to blame, but that
does not absolve policies that continue to oppress, obliterate and vilify
millions of Muslims around the world. (Badawi, 2004, para. 13)

2. There are many instances of oppression. But the most obvious—and the one
that every Muslim talks about—is Palestine. The Palestinians had their land
taken away from them by the Balfour Declaration, which has been aptly
described as a “promise of one nation to give to a second nation the land of a
third nation.” (Badawi, 2004, para. 14)

3. The sentiment of gross bias against the Muslim world does not end with the
Palestinian question. The world must never forget that Iraq was illegally
invaded. The world was told before the fact that the invasion was necessary
because of an imminent threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. We
know today that this reason was baseless. (Badawi, 2004, para. 16)

4. What right does any country have to unilaterally invade another? Yes,
Saddam was brutal and oppressive, but the climate of fear created by a
doctrine of preemption and predominance is equally oppressive. It is of great
concern because there seems to be no objective criteria which determine
certain courses of action. Instead, what we see is the practice of selective
persecution on a global basis with Muslim countries bearing the blunt.
(Badawi, 2004, para. 17)
5. Iran is today (are) threatened with dire consequences because it is suspected to be enriching Uranium for nuclear weapons manufacture. Yet the dominant view of the international community avoids mentioning the 200 nuclear bombs Israel is widely believed to possess in the Dimona complex. No inspections are pressed, no sanctions threatened. Certainly no attacks on Israel are advocated. (Badawi, 2004, para. 18)

Imperialism pervaded the globe:

Globalization today has also brought about a challenge to the roles of sovereign nation states which traditionally claim exclusive authority within their own national borders. The proponents advocate globalization as a highway to modernity. The detractors oppose globalization because they see it as a lever for westernization. The extremists demonize globalization as an invasion of traditional cultures and societies. The overriding fact remains, however, that globalization and modernization are processes which cannot be stopped.

(Badawi, 2006, para. 11)

In a zeitgeist of vigorous globalization occasionally halted by Islamist terrorism, Badawi in his identities as Malay-Muslim, the descent of alim (Islamic scholar), UMNO president, prime minister of an Islamic state, and advocator of a modernist ideology of Islam in Islam Hadhari immediately found himself on the defensive. He appraised his positions at the 2005 UMNO General Assembly:
The image of Islam has been tarnished following the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York. This image has been further blemished by subsequent terrorist incidents, the latest being the terror attack in London on 7 July. In this context, I have three missions that I wish to implement. First, I will continue to stress that for all parties, especially the major powers, understanding the root causes of terrorism is the most important approach to overcome terrorism. Second, as OIC Chairman, it is my responsibility to explain to the global community that Islam is a religion of peace and is opposed to terrorism. Third, as Prime Minister of Malaysia, I am responsible for showcasing to the world that Malaysia is a modern Islamic country—a trade partner that is dynamic, responsible and trustworthy, a safe haven for investment and a safe destination for tourists. (Badawi, 2005, para. 16)

The keynote speaker lauded the efforts of the Malay community, and presented UMNO as the custodian of a moderate Malay Islamism:

1. The advances of the nation and the ummah have resulted in the Malays being seen as standard bearers of Islam, in this country and internationally. (Badawi, 2005, para. 17)

2. It is our responsibility to ensure that the use of Islam and its symbols to propagate a culture of extremism and violence does not occur in this country. We have a responsibility to protect Malays and Muslims from
becoming tools to those who want to promote their narrow agenda.

(Badawi, 2005, para. 18)

The Malaysia prime minister proposed that the West regarded the Muslim world as the next existential enemy after communism. The West required an opposite Other, a negative, in order to positively define itself: Words as “terrorism” and “extremism” were lexical to Islamism, and the Muslim world was imagined as the antithesis of the West:

1. Both Western and Muslim nations denounce the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but we sometimes have different takes on it. We both condemn terrorism, but many of us disagree on its definition, association and application. (Badawi, 2007, para. 7)

2. The portrayal of Islam as a religion of war and Muslims as fanatical terrorists by irresponsible and shallow broad brush strokes must also stop. A negative Islamic stereotype is not new or unique to the post-September 11th world. The negative profiling of Islam today, is reminiscent of western prejudices that were propounded by Voltaire and Francis Bacon in the 17th and 18th centuries. The underlying perception of Islam in the west today is not too far from Ernest Renan’s late 19th century description of a religion that “is the complete negation of Europe . . . the complete disdain of science, the suppression of civil society.” (Badawi, 2004, para. 19)

3. I believe that much of the misconception against Islam in the West stems from a lack of understanding of the true nature of Islam. For example, it has
become commonplace to characterize anything Islamic as being antithesis to everything western, and therefore prejudicial to western interests. This misunderstanding has arisen because the place religion occupies in modern Christian societies is very different from the role religion plays in the daily lives of Muslims everywhere. (Badawi, 2007, para. 19)

4. For example, when the Soviet Union imploded in 1989, a number of influential Western thinkers decided that Islam was their next existential enemy after Communism. Thus began the shaping of some of the negative western attitude and actions towards the Muslim ummah. This resulted in an equal and opposite reaction to the West from some dogmatic quarters of the Muslim world. (Badawi, 2008, para. 11)

5. The intensity of misperception and misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims, especially of the genre being disseminated in Western countries, has caused the world to slide dangerously into an era of fear and division between peoples and cultures. The greatest injustice is the partiality to associate Islam with extremism... Let me suggest to you that one of the main causes of the misperception and misrepresentation of Islam lies in the fallacy of mistaking the extreme for the norm. Al-Qaeda which preaches hate and destruction has been very wrongly taken as speaking on behalf of Muslims. Nothing is further from the truth because Islam preaches peace between nations and peoples as well as tolerance between different religions and cultures. Let me
add that the terrorists in particular must be singled out only by their acts of terror and nothing else. (Badawi, 2006, para. 2)

Western society had interiorized Oriental conceptualizations of Islam and the Muslim world to prejudice its description of Muslim nations and peoples. Edward Said argued that Orientalism was the western discourse of knowledge understanding the Other, a notion Badawi found in wide currency:

. . . I quote—“There also seems to be a strange revival of canonical, though previously discredited, Orientalist ideas about Islam, generally non-white, people—ideas which have achieved a startling prominence at a time when racial or religious misrepresentations of every other cultural group are no longer circulated with such impunity. Malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in the west”—unquote. What the late scholar and political activist, Edward Said, once wrote near ten years ago still holds true to this day. (Badawi, 2004, para. 9)

The contesting multiplicity of many Islamisms comprising the Muslim world was reduced to an ahistorical, static monolith:

. . . As diverse as the Christian world, this great monotheistic religion is treated as a monolith, with few exceptions, despite clear differences among Muslims throughout the globe. The nuances of the debate within the Muslim world are totally ignored. The breadth of different opinions among Muslims is unheard of.
The many progressive endeavours and experiments underway in Muslim societies go unreported. (Badawi, 2004, para. 10)

Western popular media popularized Orientalism in biased and sensationalist reporting of Islam and the Muslim world, regularly disenfranchising the Muslim:

1. Never before however, has the tension been as pervasive or as extensive. Whereas once their awareness as “the West” and “the Muslim world” was ill-defined, the two groups are more conscious of their identities now. The shrinking of the planet and the ubiquitous presence of modern media has something to do with this. (Badawi, 2007, para. 5)

2. To their credit, some western leaders have repeatedly stressed that ‘this is not a war against Islam’. But this appears trivial when popular sentiment is driven by a sensationalist western media that focuses almost exclusively on extremist discourse. (Badawi, 2004, para. 10)

3. The international media must share part of the blame. They have allowed disproportionately large amounts of publicity to extremist views and actions, probably unintentionally. And this has become part of the problem. It must be rectified. Equal, if not more, amounts of space should be given to publicizing truths about Islam, including the considered and authentic voices of the religion as expressed by Islamic scholars and other leaders of the Muslim community (Badawi, 2007, para. 14)
4. Islam and Muslims continue to be portrayed as ‘violent’, ‘extreme’, and ‘intolerant’. The post-September 11th world has perpetuated a negative Islamic stereotype, well-documented and now clear for all to see. The current perception of Islam continues to be fed by hidden assumptions and distortions of fact that premise even the most ‘neutral’ coverage of Muslims and events around them. (Badawi, 2004, para. 9)

5. In particular, I would like to take issue with the proposition that Islam is a problem to the world, that Islam is a religion which provides a refuge for extremism. We have such allegations made by speakers in public forums even in some parliamentary debates, and we have read writings making such a case even in reputable journals. These accusers say that conflicts involving Muslims or Muslim countries are necessarily the fault of Muslims themselves. They insist that if there are adjustments or changes to be made to ensure peaceful coexistence between cultures and civilizations, it is Islam which should make the adjustments or changes. In the daily lives of individuals, we know about the problem of profiling. For example, in many western airports, travelers will be subjected to extra checks if you carry a passport bearing a Muslim name. This way of thinking and state of mind is what we can describe as Islamophobia. (Badawi, 2007, para. 6)
Finding 3: The social adversary of UMNO was PAS.

Ideologies represent social conflict and function as “self-serving principles” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 68) describing the world in general (as in religious ideologies) and the social and economic in particular (such as conservatism or capitalism) (van Dijk, 1998). Ideological structures are postulated as the “cognitive reconstruction of the main social conditions for the existence and reproduction of various social groups” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 154):

In other words, the essential conditions of existence, organization, reproduction and the social practices of groups and their members have both social dimensions and mental ones. Here, ideologies and groups mutually constitute each other. No group can socially exist and act without a group identity and shared ideological beliefs of its members. Conversely, no group ideology will develop unless collectivities of people start to act, co-ordinate and organize in a group. (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 154)

Assuming ideologies may be represented in group schemata, the tentative format of the structure of ideologies may categorized as

1. Membership: Who are we? Where are we from? What do we look like? Who belongs to us? Who can become a member of our group?

2. Activities: What do we do? What is expected of us? Why are we here?

3. Goals: Why do we do this? What do we want to realize?
4. **Values/norms**: What are our main values? How do we evaluate ourselves and others? What should (not) be done?

5. **Position and group relations**: What is our social position? Who are our enemies, our opponents? Who are like us, and who are different?

6. **Resources**: What are the essential social resources that our group has or need to have? (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 70)

These categories and the basic questions they pose orient social groups and define the conditions of their existence and reproduction, defining both the identity as well as the interests of groups (van Dijk, 1998).

Besides an ideological adversary, the social group adversarial to UMNO was PAS. Badawi associated with PAS the Oriental Islam the West commonly defined Islamisms in total: radical and conservative. As Mahathir before him had done, Badawi (2004) dichotomized the Islam of the Malays:

1. **In my country, the opposition Pan-Malaysia Islamic party has politicized religion to the extent that it claims a monopoly on Islam. They canvass for votes by telling villagers that they would be assured of heaven if they vote for their party. They have been known to decree members and supporters of my party as infidels.** (para. 44)

2. **During the general elections in 1999, the Islamic party saw its biggest gains ever. . . faced with a strengthened Islamist opposition, some in my party—**
which promotes an inclusive and progressive Islam—thought we had to become more Islamist than the opposition. (para. 45)

3. The election results indicate that a progressive and moderate approach will defeat a conservative ideology and extremist ways. The election results gives us confidence that, in facing PAS, there is no need for us to alter our philosophy, we do not need to change our methods, we do not need to be alarmed. We must not fall into the trap of using religion for political gain. The light of truth cannot be obscured forever by the fog of falsity. (para. 11)

At the 2007 UMNO General Assembly, Badawi negatively presented UMNO’s ideological and social opposition:

We give assurance that UMNO will not endorse a narrow interpretation of Islam. UMNO opposes the culture of violence, we oppose a political culture that can disrupt the daily lives and commercial affairs of the ummah. Islam must not be downsized to fit the needs of a political organisation. Islam cannot become the exclusive domain of any single group. (para. 13)

It was disingenuous for PAS to resist the UMNO ideology:

1. There are those who try to slander Islam Hadhari by claiming it only focuses on worldly pursuits. This is patently false – the first principle of Islam Hadhari is “Faith and Piety in Allah”, which clearly confirms faith and piety in Allah as the core of Islam Hadhari and the Quran and the Sunnah as the first points of reference. This approach is not difficult to understand, if it is interpreted with
sincerity. Explanations on Islam Hadhari have been carried out overseas, beginning with my keynote address at Oxford University in October last year, and during my official visits to India, Pakistan, New Zealand, Australia and Germany. These explanations have been received well. (Badawi, 2005, para. 21)

2. UMNO is committed to strengthening Islam and will not apologise for doing so. Islam promotes moderation. During the General Assembly in 2004, I laid out the ten principles of Islam Hadhari, an approach that was understood and supported by the component parties of Barisan Nasional. This proved that the approach to Islam as promoted by UMNO is fair. (Badawi, 2007, para. 9)

**Finding 4: The ideological conflict for UMNO was the Islamism of the Malays.**

Ideologies revolve around real sociopolitical conflict. The ideological conflict for Badawi and UMNO was the social practice of Islam of the Malays. In his speeches, Badawi conceded that UMNO was Islamic, and that the party manifesto of Islam Hadhari was less an effort to proselytize non-Malays than to confront the Islamist agenda of PAS:

1. The election results indicate that a progressive and moderate approach will defeat a conservative ideology and extremist ways. The election results gives us confidence that, in facing PAS, there is no need for us to alter our philosophy, we do not need to change our methods, we do not need to be alarmed. We must not fall into the trap of using religion for political gain. The
light of truth cannot be obscured forever by the fog of falsity. (Badawi, 2004, para. 11)

2. UMNO’s success is the success of moderation. . . UMNO has now proven to the world the success of a progressive approach to Islam. UMNO must therefore enhance its understanding of the concept of development that we propagate through Islam Hadhari. (Badawi, 2004, para. 12)

3. Malaysia has acknowledged the absolute necessity of adopting a correct approach for practicing the Islamic religion in a diverse and plural society such as ours. We have therefore made the Islamic religion serve as a unifying instead of a dividing factor. We have decided to urge the Muslims in Malaysia to adopt Islam Hadhari or Civilizational Islam as the correct way of adhering to the faith. (Badawi, 2007, para. 17, italics added)

Islam Hadhari was qualified as a Malay Islamism at the 2004 UMNO General Assembly:

1. Islam Hadhari is not a new religion. It is not a new teaching nor is it a new mazhab (denomination). Islam Hadhari is an effort to bring the ummah back to basics, back to the fundamentals, as prescribed in the Quran and the Hadith that form the foundation of Islamic civilization. If Islam Hadhari is interpreted sincerely and understood clearly, it will not cause Muslims to deviate from the true path. It is not UMNO’s culture to trivialize religion. UMNO has never allowed religion to be used as a political tool. UMNO staunchly opposes the use of Islam as an instrument to manipulate people’s
beliefs. UMNO has always ensured that Islam and Muslims are protected from such abuse of religion. (Badawi, 2004, para. 18)

2. Islam Hadhari aims to achieve ten main principles:

1. Faith and piety in Allah
2. A just and trustworthy government
3. A free and independent People
4. Mastery of knowledge
5. Balanced and comprehensive economic development
6. A good quality of life
7. Protection of the rights of minority groups and women
8. Cultural and moral integrity
9. Safeguarding the environment
10. Strong defenses (Badawi, 2004, para. 20)

3. These principles have been formulated to ensure that the implementation and approach does not cause anxiety among any group in our multiracial and multireligious country. These principles have been devised to empower Muslims to face the global challenges of today. (Badawi, 2004, para. 21)

4. Islam Hadhari is complete and comprehensive, with an emphasis on the development of the economy and civilization, capable of building Malay competitiveness. The glorious heritage of Islamic civilization in all aspects
must be used as reference and become the source of inspiration for the Malay race to prosper. (Badawi, 2004, para. 22)

As UMNO possessed an ideology complex that was both secular and religious, dialectically Malay and Islamist, thus Malaysia was guided by four national ideologies varyingly secular and religious, all equally requiring assimilation:

The next 50 years must be fully optimised by the Malays, by all Malaysians. The Federal Constitution must continue to be the bedrock of our nation and the Rukun Negara our guiding principles. We want to ensure that the country remains united and society remains equitable, infused with the spirit of togetherness and power sharing. We want to build a cultured and civilised nation through the approach of Islam Hadhari, which contains universal principles. We want an advanced nation that continues to progress, steered by the National Mission. (Badawi, 2007, para. 69)

Composed of secular and Islamic imperatives, Islam *Hadhari* was the latest in a series of national ideologies, this conceptually inclusive of UMNO and PAS Malays and ambivalent of non-Malays and non-Muslims:

1. I would like to reemphasize that Islam *Hadhari* is meant for the benefit of all in Malaysia, regardless of their religious or racial identities. . . . I have always stated that the approach of Islam *Hadhari* would bring excellence, distinction and glory to all Malaysians, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. (Badawi, 2005, para. 24)
2. Underlying the whole message of Islam Hadhari is a call for tolerance towards people of other faiths, in accordance with God’s injunctions: For you, your religion, for me, my religion. (Badawi, 2005, para. 25)

3. As an approach to religion, we feel everyone should feel comfortable with Islam Hadhari because it embodies principles which are universally familiar and accepted. (Badawi, 2007, para. 29)

The ideological conflict of Islamism of the Malays was deployed in the interest of nation-building:

1. We would like to offer the Malaysian experience for study by others. Islam Hadhari is very much a part and parcel of the process of nation-building in our multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. However, the values which are being expounded through Islam Hadhari are universal in character. Islam Hadhari is a demonstration that the teachings of Islam can be used to develop contemporary models of good governance and social change. . . . For the Muslims, Islam Hadhari is a call to apply the deepest wisdom of Islam to find solutions to present day problems. (Badawi, 2007, para. 21)

2. The Malaysian experiment in nation-building, which takes a holistic view of the needs and sensitivities of its diverse population is, in many ways, faith-based. The government has used the progressive teachings of Islam as the basis for good governance to deliver benefits to all sectors of our multi-racial society without discrimination. The national philosophy is firmly rooted in
the values and injunctions of Islam but compatible with modernity. We call this approach Islam Hadhari. (Badawi, 2008, para. 26)

Finding 5: Ideologies were reconstructed or represented in discourse.

Badawi (2006) believed in the influence of religious ideology, observing that:

In more and more nations today, religion is an important and powerful force in shaping public perception. This is especially true in the Islamic world, in part because Islamic principles require social justice, equity to the people, and protecting and expanding people’s rights. The capacity to deploy religious arguments is therefore an essential tool in combating religious extremism, and in furthering development on all fronts in the Muslim world. (para. 8)

Advocating Islam Hadhari, Badawi argued that a) Islam is a not the exclusive religion of Arabs; (b) it was the conflict of “fundamental interests” (Badawi, 2007, para. 11) that catalyzed the “clash of civilizations;” (c) globalization is not inherently anti-Islam, thus (d) obviating the extremist defensive response of establishing an Islamic theocracy; (e) modernization and democracy are consonant with Islam; (f) the legal process of *ijtihad* (interpretation of Islamic law) be reinstituted, and last, that the (g) Islamic lexicon, of the word *jihad*, be properly defined as “struggle,” not “holy war” (Badawi, 2006, para. 9).

Badawi (2006) denied the Orientalism of Islam as an Arabic religion for Arabs. Islam was the way of life of billions, most of whom were non-Arabs:
It is a common misperception, resulting in many prejudices, that Islam is an Arab religion or a religion for Arabs only. The truth is that there are more than 1.2 billion Muslims spread between the Atlantic and the Pacific with an important presence in Europe and America. As a whole, Muslims make up some 19 percent of the world’s people. In fact, there are more Muslims in other countries than in Arab countries. In Southeast Asia alone, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, there are more than 300 million Muslims. (para. 3)

The UMNO president proposed that the geopolitical stresses of the west and the Muslim world that were the “clash of civilizations” were not conflicts of ideology and religion but differences in “fundamental interests” of “power, territory, and resources”:

1. This great tension between the West and the Muslim world has sometimes been described to as a “clash of civilizations.” It is indeed tempting to do so. Both consider themselves as civilizations. One is essentially European or of European origin, the other Arab or Asian. Both have a history of conflict with one another. (Badawi, 2007, para. 11)

2. But to cast the present tensions as a clash of civilizations would be to distort the nature and causes of the confrontation completely. There is nothing violently incompatible in the two civilizations that make conflict inevitable or “natural.” Indeed, there is so much common ground in the religion, values and cultures of the west and the Muslim world. (Badawi, 2007, para. 13)
3. The conflicting parties may have a distinct national, cultural or religious character. They may declare that they fight because they want to spread civilization or the word of God. They may mobilize themselves along ideological or religious lines. But at heart the conflicts are driven by the impulse for power, territory and resources, and by resistance to this. There is indeed a clash of fundamental interests. (Badawi, 2007, para. 16)

The Muslim state was obligated to manage discourse and interpret events in the interests of its citizens:

It cannot be denied that Islam has become an increasingly powerful imperative for Muslims to act today. In Malaysia, we believe that this compulsion to act because of religion can be directed towards good, towards progress, and towards development. (Badawi, 2004, para. 21)

Badawi (2006) found globalization not inherently anti-Islam:

1. Globalization today has also brought about a challenge to the roles of sovereign nation states which traditionally claim exclusive authority within their own national borders. The proponents advocate globalization as a highway to modernity. The detractors oppose globalization because they see it as a lever for westernization. The extremists demonize globalization as an invasion of traditional cultures and societies. The overriding fact remains, however, that globalization and modernization are processes which cannot be stopped. (para. 11)
2. The inexorable advance of globalization has led the critics of Islam to suggest that Muslims have no option but to embrace the system by reconciling the Islamic religion, culture, and way of life with the benefits of globalization. The truth is that Muslims can easily partake in the processes of globalization yet remain faithful to the teachings and traditions of Islam. It is of course the duty not only of Muslims but also of all peoples of goodwill to ensure that the processes of globalization bring about the eradication of inequities within societies, greater justice all round, more egalitarianism and a more caring and responsive political and economic system. (para. 12)

The establishment of a theocratic Islamic state in response to globalization was deemed “extremist,” offered by those who are bent on sowing the seeds of discord between the Islamic world and the west. They spread the propaganda that Islamic extremists are plotting to replace the system with an alternative guided by Islam as a political ideology which would be integrated into all aspects of society, including politics, law, economy, foreign policy and so on. First of all, we must recognize that these are equally extreme views propagated by the enemies of Islam. Secondly, extremists cannot be taken as speaking for Islam even if they claim to be Muslims. The truth is that Islam permits and encourages peaceful co-existence between peoples and nations. (Badawi, 2006, para. 13)
As Islamism was associated with extremism and conservatism in the west, so the Muslim world attached modernization with secular westernization. Badawi refuted the notion that Islam was an anachronism, countering that if only we rediscover the wisdom that is in Islam, we will find that it is thoroughly applicable to modern needs. It is certainly not an archaic and irrelevant vestige of a distant past. (Badawi, 2004, para. 22)

Modernization and democracy were not inimical concepts in Islam. In May, 2006, Badawi speaking at the United Nations University in Tokyo assured that another deep-seated fallacy which must be corrected is the notion that Islam is anti-democratic and inherently anti-modern. . . Let me just briefly dispel the notion that Islam is in any way incompatible with anything and everything that is modern. The problem exists because of the tendency to equate modernization with westernization, that the modern Muslim includes only those who shared western values. (Badawi, 2006, para. 4)

In July 2006, in Jakarta on the occasion of his conferment of the honorary doctorate in Islamic thought at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Badawi exhorted that modernization, in the material sense, is the process of bringing economic development and creating opportunities for the people to enjoy the benefits of scientific and technological advancements. It is very possible, not only in the material sense but also in the intellectual sense, to shape for ourselves modernizing concepts and practices which are consonant with the teachings of
Islam. It is possible to achieve a synthesis between what is modern and what is Islamic. No doubt, the linkage between modernity and western domination, especially in the form of hundreds of years of western colonialism, will be hard to break but break them we must. We must believe and accept that it is entirely conceivable to be modern without being western. Or we do not need to be western in order to be modern. Science and technology, creativity, innovation and renewal—the fundamental ingredients for modernization—are not the monopoly of any particular race or civilization. (para. 7)

He emphasized the need to modernize to compete effectively with the West:

Islamic countries must take concerted action to establish the truth that Islam is entirely compatible with modernization and definitely capable of making effective contributions to modernization and globalization. I say this not for purposes of appeasing or accommodating the West. We must do so in order to establish the Islamic world’s equality with the West. We must do so in order to secure reciprocity from the West. This is the best way of gaining the respect of the West for Islam. Equality, reciprocity and mutual respect is the only basis upon which real understanding and harmony can be established between the Islamic world and the West, together with all the attendant benefits for global peace and international stability. (Badawi, 2006, para. 6)

In the defensive in the new world order, it was the task of Muslims to alter their approach toward their religion accordingly:
1. I have always believed that by opening up the discursive space in the Muslim world, we enrich our intellectual tradition and directly challenge the extremist doctrines that Islam has become synonymous with over the last few years. Muslim political leaders, scholars and intellectuals must be courageous enough to encourage, and not stifle, voices of moderation and reason. Whether one refers to these voices as modernist Islam, or progressive Islam, or even liberal Islam, I believe they have an important contribution to make to the renewal of Islamic thought. (Badawi, 2004, para. 30)

2. Muslims must demonstrate by word and deed that Islam is no obstacle to progress and modernity, including the practice of democracy. (Badawi, 2006, para. 17)

Malaysia was modeled as the moderate, modern Islamic state by the standards of logical positivism:

1. I do not pretend that Malaysia has all the answers to the many problems of the Muslim world. I am also aware that different countries need different solutions to their problems. But I do believe that Malaysia can be a showcase of what it is to be a successful, modern Muslim country. (Badawi, 2005, para. 10)

2. At the beginning of the 1990s, at the beginning of our second generation as an independent nation, the Malaysian people took to heart the goal of
becoming a comprehensively developed nation by the year 2020, the
beginning of our third generation as an independent people. We called this
“Vision 2020.” (Badawi, 2005, para. 11)

3. Ten years later, as we entered the new millennium, Malaysia adopted the
“knowledge-based economy master plan,” which we called our “strategic
initiative of the 21st century.” This initiative is aimed at transforming a
largely input-driven production-based economy into a productivity-driven
knowledge-intensive economy. (Badawi, 2005, para. 13)

4. Why do we believe that the most important task and function of the
government of Malaysia today and in the decades to come is to develop and
secure the human resources of outstanding knowledge, skills, creativity,
innovation, energy and discipline? Our conclusion is derived from inductive
empirical evidence and deductive logic. (Badawi, 2005, para. 14)

The progressive Islamist, Badawi submitted that the legal process of *ijtihad*
(interpretation of Islamic law) be revived, and that the word *jihad*, be properly defined
as “struggle,” not “holy war.” On January 10, 2004 Badawi spoke at Magdalen College,
University of Oxford in capacities “first and foremost as a Muslim” (para. 2), “the prime
minister of a multi-religious nation where the majority are Muslim” (para. 3), and “the
chairperson of the Organisation of Islamic Conference or OIC” (para. 4) that

1. Islam must not be ossified and fossilised by blind imitation of traditional
    thought and opinion. Rigid obscurantism, exclusively literalist doctrines and
atavistic notions of a past ideal prevents Islam from being a religion for all
time as intended by Allah. We must be open to the prospect of reform or
*islah* and renewal or *tajdid*. (para. 31)

2. In this regard, I have repeatedly called for the relevance of contemporary
*ijtihad* which is the effort a Muslim jurist or scholar makes in order to deduce
a law or opinion, which is not self-evident, from the sources of the *sharia*.
The problems that contemporary Muslim societies are confronted with today
are not the problems of the 6th century. Political institutions, economic
systems and societal structures are different from what existed during the
time of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the pious caliphs and the great imams
and scholars of Islam. People are organized under nation states today and
not alliances of tribes. The world economic system has increased in depth
and breadth, and is increasingly interlinked. Science is constantly pushing the
boundaries of human achievement. Islamic thought must not be isolated
from these changes. (para. 32)

The Muslim leader and advocate of Islam *Hadhari* demanded the proper application of
*jihad*:

1. A change in attitude and culture requires *ijtihad* and *jihad* (struggle). The
concept of *jihad* must be given a broader interpretation, covering all aspects
of life, including the pursuit of knowledge, the mastery of science and
technology and economic activity. This improvement in quality (*itqan*) must
become part of our culture. *Ijtihad* that can build the *ummah* in the modern
day must be acknowledged. (Badawi, 2006, para. 30)

2. As true believers, Muslims must be firm in their conviction that Islam is a
religion which is relevant for all times and for all places. Indeed, Islam is more
than just a religion. It is a civilization, a cultural entity and a way of life all at
once. Islam provided a proper order for societies in ancient times. Islam
provides for good governance in these modern times. . . The often
misunderstood and overused term “*jihad*” literally means “struggle,” not
“holy war.” In fact, “holy war” is a term not found anywhere in the Qur’an.
(Badawi, 2006, para. 9)

Badawi (2006) urged the reconstruction and representation of ideologies for the
modern civilization of Muslim society, regardless of belief of regular Muslims:

We need to usher a change of mindset among the *ummah*. This requires actions
that are encompassing, comprehensive and systematic, regardless of sector or
partisan loyalty. It requires society to change their *tasawwur* (worldview). (para.
29)

Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the findings suggested by this IDA study. The five major
findings were arranged according to the research questions.

The first major finding of this study was that UMNO was the social group of the
Malays. Malayness and Islam-ness of group members were associated with the social
identity of UMNO: The party ideologically possessed of a Malay nationalism, the Malays, UMNO, and Islam inseparable elements forming a “distinct culture and identity” (Badawi, 2004, para. 27).

The second major finding was that the ideological adversary of UMNO was the West and its conceptualization of Islam in Orientalism.

The third major finding was that the social adversary of UMNO was PAS. PAS signified the Oriental Islam Westerners institutionally associated Islamisms in total: radical and conservative.

The fourth major finding was that the ideological conflict for UMNO was the Islamism of the Malays. UMNO determined that the proper social approach to Malay Islam should be the moderate and progressive of Islam Hadhari.

The fifth major finding was that ideologies were reconstructed or represented in discourse. Discoursing Islam Hadhari, Badawi proposed that (a) Islam as an Arab religion only for Arabs is a “common misperception, resulting in many prejudices” (Badawi, 2006, para. 3); (b) the “clash of civilizations” is not about ideology and religion, but a clash of “fundamental interests” (Badawi, 2007, para. 11) of power, territory, and resources; (c) globalization is not inherently anti-Islam, Muslims able to “partake in the processes of globalization yet remain faithful to the teachings and traditions of Islam” (Badawi, 2006, para. 12); (d) the Islamic theocracy is an “extreme” response to globalization “propagated by the enemies of Islam” (Badawi, 2006, para. 13); (e) modernization is not inimical to Islam, the notion that Islam is anti-democratic and
inherently anti-modern a “fallacy” (Badawi, 2006, para. 4); (f) the legal process of *ijtihad* (interpretation of Islamic law) be revived, and last, that the (g) Islamic lexicon, of the word *jihad*, be properly defined as “struggle,” not “holy war” (Badawi, 2006, para. 9).

In discoursing Islam *Hadhari*, Badawi modeled the 1999 and 2004 General Elections and the UMNO ideology of Islam *Hadhari*. Badawi represented the Elections to disassociate himself from the divisive politics of Mahathir. He also diminished Mahathir’s Islamization of the state, in modeling Islam *Hadhari* as the novel construct of his administration. Modeling is a function of the IDA, and is discussed in Chapter 5, Analysis, Interpretation, and Synthesis of Findings.
CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION, AND SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS

Overview

The purpose of this IDA study was to explore how the discourse of Islam *Hadhari* as spoken by UMNO president and Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in the years 2004-2008 demonstrated the hegemony of UMNO in Malay politics and society. 19 of Badawi’s speeches were analyzed with regard to the four study questions: In the discourse of Islam *Hadhari*,

1. How did Badawi represent UMNO?
2. How did Badawi describe the opposition party PAS?
3. How did Badawi explain the Islamic approach of Islam *Hadhari*?
4. How did Badawi associate himself with former UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir?

The four study questions were satisfied with the findings presented in Chapter 4. The general finding was that UMNO under Badawi sought to persuade and influence the divided Malay constituency by engaging PAS in the discourse of the Malay Islamist state through an Islamism and a Malayism of Islam *Hadhari*.

In the last chapter, five findings were reported:

1. The first major finding was that Badawi in his UMNO General Assembly keynote speeches identified UMNO as the social group of the Malays. The ethnic identity of Malay was associated with the social identity of UMNO, the Malays, UMNO, and Islam inseparable elements forming a “distinct culture and identity.”
2. The second major finding was that Badawi, defining Islam *Hadhari* as a “progressive and moderate” (Badawi, 2004, para. 11) approach to Islam, described its ideological adversary as the West and its conceptualization of Islam in Orientalism.

3. The third major finding was that the social group adversarial to UMNO was PAS. For UMNO, PAS signified the Oriental Islam the Westerners institutionally conflated Islamisms in total: radical and conservative.

4. The fourth major finding was that the ideological conflict for UMNO was the Malay Islamist state of the Malays. UMNO determined that the proper Malay Islamism was the “moderate” and “modernist” of Islam Hadhari, and not the “radical” and “extremist” alternative offered by its opposition, PAS.

5. The fifth major finding was that ideologies were reconstructed or represented in discourse. Discoursing Islam *Hadhari*, Badawi proposed that (a) Islam was not an Arab religion only; (b) the “clash of civilizations” was not about ideology and religion, but a clash of “fundamental interests” (Badawi, 2007, para. 11) of power, territory, and resources; (c) globalization is not inherently anti-Islam; (d) the Islamic theocracy is an “extreme” response to globalization “propagated by the enemies of Islam” (Badawi, 2006, para. 13); (e) modernization is not inimical to Islam; (f) the legal process of *ijtihad* (interpretation of Islamic law) be revived, and last, that (g) the Islamic lexicon of the word jihad be properly defined as “struggle,” not “holy war” (Badawi, 2006, para. 9).
This study also found a sixth major finding: In the discourse of Islam Hadhari, Badawi modeled the 1999 and 2004 General Elections and the UMNO ideology of Islam Hadhari. Badawi represented the Elections to disassociate himself from the divisive politics of Mahathir. And he diminished Mahathir’s Islamization of the state in modeling Islam Hadhari as the novel construct of his administration.

This chapter analyzes, interprets, and synthesizes the findings discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter is organized in “analytic categories” (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2008, p. 139):

1. The relationship between UMNO and the Malays.
2. The ideological adversary of UMNO.
3. The social adversary of UMNO.
4. The ideological conflict.
5. Ideologies reconstructed or represented.
6. The representation of communicative events or models.

The analytic categories correspond directly with the indexes of the analytical guideline (described in Chapter 3). Assuming as van Dijk (1998) that the ideology of a social group should be derivable from its discourse, the spoken or written product of a communicative event, the speeches given by Badawi were processed and analyzed to unravel the UMNO ideology of Islam Hadhari.

Chapter 4 presented the findings of this study having organized text fragments of 19 speeches in six indexes to produce coherent themed narratives. The purpose of this
chapter is to interpret and synthesize these findings with the relevant literature of the Malay and the Malay society, including native researcher reflexivity.

Reflexivity, as an important part of the IDA in this study, is defined as “the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relations to their social contexts and vice versa” (Archer, 2007, p. 65). Reflexivity as internal conversation is not vague self-awareness, “but a questioning exploration of subject in relation to object, including the subject as object” (Archer, 2007, p. 73). Our internal conversations are crucial to how we navigate our way through the social world (Archer, 2007). Archer (2007) contends that reflexivity accounts for our being “active agents,” people who make things happen, and not “passive agents” to whom things happen:

Internally, it is through self-talk that we define our ultimate concerns and thus our personal identities, since our singularity as persons is constituted by our particular constellation of concerns. Externally, we first seek to realize these concerns in society through further inner dialogue, which identifies those roles through which they can be expressed. Afterwards, we seek to acquire the roles in question. Finally, our social identities arise from the manner in which we personify such roles in line with our concerns. (Archer, 2007, pp. 64)

The implications of these findings are anticipated to afford a better understanding of the Malay identity, or Malayness. In comprehending “the self by the detour of the comprehension of the other” (Rabinow, 1977, p. 5 as quoted in Skeggs,
2002, p. 361), my reflexivity was privileged, related intertextually through the IDA (described in Chapter 3). As a consequence, in this study, the subaltern Malay community was present only in the particular terms of ideology and ideological discourse structures advanced by van Dijk (1998), and, in contextual (dis)continuity, I was actively detached and attached in using with the Malay community as Other to constitute my subjective self as native researcher. In the multiplicity of Malay identities, mine was individual, as my IDA of Badawi’s discourse of Islam Hadhari was uniquely Malay.

The chapter concludes with a reevaluation of the assumptions (described in Chapter 1), a discussion of the implications of the findings, and a summary.

*Analytical category 1: The relationship between UMNO and the Malays*

The first research study question sought to uncover how Badawi represented UMNO. Having qualified himself as UMNO president at the 2004 UMNO General Assembly—“... the torch of leadership now passes to me”—Badawi reestablished the social identity of the party, testifying that “the Malays, UMNO and Islam in this country cannot be separated. Together, the elements form a distinct culture and identity.” Chee (1989, as quoted in Abdullah, 2003) opined that UMNO is not merely a political party but “the major socio-political organization of the Malay community, the self-avowed defender of all the values, privileges and symbols that define Malay identity.” Abdullah (2003) attributed the “general cultural knowledge” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 39), or “common cultural ground” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 36), of *Ketuanan Melayu* (Malay supremacy),
encompassing the *hak* (rights), *kedaulatan* (sovereignty), and *keistimewaan* (privileges) of the Malays as owners of the country, to UMNO’s nationalism.

UMNO was founded by Malay elites, who reproduced the traditional hierarchy of Malay society (Omar, 1993). Abdullah (2003) proposed that UMNO was founded to maintain the ethnic identity of “Malayness i.e. the Sultans” (p. 116). The royal institution was used to demarcate and exclude the Other, “as a shield or an umbrella against the intrusion of the Chinese and the Indians” (Abdullah, 2003, p. 116). Malays believed that it was “only the Sultans who could protect their interests” (Abdullah, 2003, p. 116). Thus “when UMNO was established, its first task was to seek support from the royal circle” (Abdullah, 2003, p. 116). UMNO’s policies have reflected the interests of its leaders, who were selected from the Malay upper- and middle-classes. It has been patronized by the royal circle, the ruling elites not only supporting UMNO but also have been complicit in its activities (Abdullah, 2003):

The active role of those closely related in the royal court in modern Malay politics was a legacy of traditional socio-political pattern of the Malay society. . . In the case of UMNO, its first two leaders came from the circle. Its first president, Dato’ Onn bin Jaafar, might not have royal blood but professed long relationship with the sultan. . . Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, the second UMNO president, was the uncle of Sultan Abdul Halim Badlishah, the Sultan of Kedah who reigned since 1968. (Abdullah, 2003, pp. 117)
The late leftist Malay party Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM, 1945-1948) had rebuked UMNO for its defending the cause of a “degenerate Malay aristocracy” (Omar, 1993, p. 111) against “Malay progress and sacrificed Malay interests for the sole purpose of enriching and exalting themselves” (Omar, 1993, p. 111). Third PAS president Burhanuddin (1956) commented that

The present leadership of UMNO have proven themselves to be trustworthy guardians of imperialist capitalist interests because it has consistently shown its willingness to compromise and even to capitulate to the imperialists on questions of fundamental interest to the people. (as quoted in English from Malay in Noor, 2004, pp. 143)

As “racial unity is a determining factor in ensuring political stability, peace and harmony” (Badawi, 2004, para. 68), Badawi implied an ethnic trajectory in the founding of UMNO. Badawi (2004) upholding the “objectives behind the formation of UMNO” (para. 58) revealed that “UMNO was formed to fight for the rights of the Malays (para. 58). The UMNO president was determined that

Malays have to be reminded to return to the noble values that are a part of their culture; a culture that has produced our strength and built our civilization.

(Badawi, 2004, para. 63)

UMNO, “the country’s largest political party” (Badawi, 2004, para. 68), was “the collective strength of the Malay race” (Badawi, 2004, para. 71) that led “the Malay struggle” (Badawi, 2004, para. 69). Badawi (2004) unveiled a paradox that as UMNO and
its leadership had to be “insightful and perceptive to sensitive issues that touch on religion, race, culture and language” (para. 68), “the Malay agenda is the thrust of our struggle” (para. 82):

It is an agenda that needs to be continued. Independence has to be meaningful to the Malays. A balanced and equitable achievement among the Malays and other races is a deciding factor in ensuring a peaceful and stable Malaysia.

(Badawi, 2004, para. 82)

The “Malay agenda” is a “social representation,” a collective experience, conflict or action that draws “affective feelings of belonging to the group” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 141). For individual group members, it follows then that part of their personal identity (self) is now associated with a social identity, namely, the self-representation of being a member of a social group (van Dijk, 1998). Individual and collective actions of group members may be monitored by evolving social representations, “thus, group members act as group members when these actions are (also though not exclusively,) based on shared knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, norms, or values” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 142).

Tham (1977) proposed that the “total” (p. 280), or common cultural knowledge, associated with the Malays was the durability of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions:

The key elements associated with this cognitive and value framework include the institution of the sultanate at the state level and the institution of the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong at federal level, the identity of Islam with Malay values and life,
the traditional indigenous symbols in domestic life including values and
etiquettes associated with it, and the Malay language. These also constitute that
whole concept of ‘Malayness’ held about the community and on which also
much of the rationale connected with Malay political legitimacy rests. (Tham,
1977, pp. 280)

The total concept of ideology of the Malays had implications for modernization: that
modernization

and change must not deviate from the centrality of concerns as perceived by the
Malays, that is the Malay political system with the sultan at the apex and the
ideals and ethics associated with Islam. (Tham, 1977, pp. 282)

The “ideational system” (Tham, 1977, p. 282) structured as inviolable would lead
to “a cognitive closure” (Tham, 1977, p. 282), the tendency to “reject other values and
ideals because they are not generated by the ideational system of the Malays or have
their motivational bases there” (Tham, 1977, p. 282). The outcome was therefore the
tendency to frame situational factors for causes of Malay backwardness and
impoverishment, the frame “ideological to a degree because of a discrepancy between
what it believed and what can be established as scientifically correct” (Tham, 1977, p.
287). The selective framing, or “modeling” (van Dijk, 1998) of events, to the suppression
of other causes “clearly is a manifestation of the drive to preserve the identity of the
community” (Tham, 1977, p. 287).
Tham (1977) proposed that the ruling ideology “may be regarded as the most dominant set of propositions or beliefs emanating from and proposed by a community and its elites” (p. 289) to model social reality. The ideological propositions formulated by the Malay political-bureaucratic elites to promote modernization and achievement are “conditioned in one vital aspect by political objectives, and their materialization is effected by the machinery of government” (Tham, 1977, p. 290).

Badawi (2005) understood that Malays are worried that other communities will leave them behind in terms of social status and economic achievement. During the 1960s, the income gap between Malays and Non-Malays was vast, with Malays earning less than half compared to Non-Malays. This gap created a feeling of unease among Malays. After the May 13 incident, the government realized that it was imperative to implement a program that could create socio-economic parity amongst the country’s different races. The Malays had to be given opportunities to enable them to elevate themselves so that they could equitably enjoy the fruits of economic progress. The New Economic Policy was therefore introduced as a formula to reduce the disparity in economic achievement amongst the various races in the country. (para. 39)

I perceived a “false consciousness” about the social reality of the Malays sustains and legitimates UMNO’s bid for political hegemony and describes the relationship between UMNO and the Malays. The ruling ideology conditions the function of the
political institutions: “the ideology held creates and utilizes for its realization institutions and techniques commensurate to its premises” (Tham, 1977, p. 290). Proclaimed Badawi (2005):

The success of the Malays lies at the heart of UMNO’s struggle. . . . Our objective is to see Malays play a significant and meaningful role. . . . The developed nation that we envision must be accompanied with progress for the Malays. There is no sense in being a developed nation when Malays are marginalized. It is not enough to ensure that Malays will not disappear from the Earth, when we lag so far behind. (para. 64)

Malay pride was attached to the attainment of economic wealth:

When we succeed, it will not matter wherever we are, in whatever company we find ourselves—our presence will be felt and we will be respected. We will be Towering Malays. (para. 65)

Articulating UMNO’s “distinct culture and identity,” Badawi (2007) regularly conflated Malayness as Islam-ness in the Malay-Muslim dialectic. UMNO interpreted the Muslim imperative that

It is not possible for Muslim societies to embrace secularism because Islam is practised not only as a religion but also a whole way of life for all Muslims. . . . It is sometimes said that society might indeed benefit by being less religious.

However, such an idea cannot take root in Muslim communities because the
Islamic religion and the Muslim way of life are indistinguishable and inseparable.

(para. 11)

The party was avowedly Islamic, as it “has never practiced secularism that rejects the hereafter and focuses solely on worldly matters” (Badawi, 2004, para. 29), understanding that “Islam must be lived as a system that considers both the sacred and the ordinary” (Badawi, 2006, para. 34). UMNO was implicitly in structural opposition to PAS, the UMNO president assuring that the party did not endorse a narrow interpretation of Islam and would not “downsize” (Badawi, 2007, para. 13) the religion “to fit the needs of a political organization” (Badawi, 2007, para. 13), as “Islam cannot be the exclusive domain of any single group” (Badawi, 2007, para. 13). He disclaimed the political party managing of Islam, the religion Articled in the Constitution under the jurisdiction of the Heads of State:

It is not UMNO’s culture to trivialize religion. UMNO has never allowed religion to be used as a political tool. UMNO staunchly opposes the use of Islam as an instrument to manipulate people’s beliefs. UMNO has always ensured that Islam and Muslims are protected from such abuse of religion. (para. 18)

Notwithstanding the disclaimers, the adat (culture, Milner, 1994) of Malay politics cannot preclude a political economy of Malayness. In The Challenge, Mahathir (1986) conceded that “today Malay values are changing without systematic study and without guidance” (p. 103) He advised that it was time
the Malays realized this and thought out the right steps to ensure that such a vital and potential tool as a system of values was properly used for the good of the Malay community. (Mahathir, 1986, pp. 103)

Ostensibly, Islam Hadhari was introduced to catalyze Islamist Malayness beyond rituals and narrow interpretations. Badawi (2007) qualified that “There is nothing wrong with Islam” (para. 15), nonetheless

UMNO believes that Islam will not grow, nor will it be respected if it is confined to rituals. . . . Indeed, the application of Islam through the prism of shallow minds and narrow interpretations can cause discomfort not only among non-Muslims, but among Muslims themselves. (2007, para. 14)

While Kessler (2008) lamented UMNO’s “PAS’s often reluctant, even unwitting, instrument, subject to PAS’s bidding and outbidding” (p. 68), “becoming a de facto Islamizing, Shari’a-promoting, Islamist and hence ‘non-secular’ party” (p. 68), I found it a false premise to presuppose the Malay party as an ideological construct of Ketuanan Melayu to be bereft of Islam-ness. As had been the adat of Malay politics, there was always the constant dialectic between Malayness and Islam-ness in the problem of political survival.

Hall (1996) proposed that precisely because identities are constructed within discourse, they need to be understood as produced “in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices by specific enunciative strategies” (p. 4). Identities emerge within the play of specific modalities of
power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity. Identities are constructed through difference, entailing the recognition that

It is only through the relation of the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term—and thus its ‘identity’—can be constructed. (Hall 1996, pp. 4-5)

Identities throughout their careers function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, “to leave out, to render ‘outside’, abjected” (Hall, 1996):

Every identity has at its ‘margin’, an excess, something more. The unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as foundational is not a natural, but a constructed form of closure, every identity naming as its necessary, even if silenced and unspoken other, that which it ‘lacks’. (Hall, 1996, pp. 5)

In rendering UMNO, its ideologies, and its relationship to the Malays, Badawi was obliged to name the group Other in the ideological discourse of Islam Hadhari. In this study, the Other was indexed in the analytical categories of The ideological adversary of UMNO and The social adversary of UMNO.
Analytical category 2: The ideological adversary of UMNO

In *The Challenge* (1986), Khoo (1995) concluded that Mahathir deemed a nefarious intent in the democracy imposed on former colonies in return for their being granted independence, suggesting “a basically anti-Western message to the Malay community” (Khoo, 1995, p. 47):

By far, ‘the most effective pressure inflicted by the West on the East’ (p. 52) came in the form of ‘democratic governments’ which the West foisted on their former colonies ‘as a condition of independence’ (p. 53). But for many a newly independent nation, ‘not very skilled in or knowledgeable about democratic administration’ (p. 53), the ‘obstacles and problems’ (p. 53) and ‘complexity of a democratic Government’ (p. 53) tended to lead to failure in the practice of democracy and to its replacement by ‘autocracy’ (p. 54)—at which point ‘the entire Western machinery will be used to condemn the nation concerned’ (p. 54). (Khoo, 1995, pp. 46)

Finding Mahathir “is no theorist” (Khoo, 1995, p. 46), Khoo (1995) argued that Mahathir failed to offer a “coherent or sophisticated critique of Western imperialism in the 1970s” (p. 46). He concluded Mahathir “unable or uninterested in comprehending the complexities of the ‘West’” (Khoo, 1995, p. 47), “viewing the ‘West’ from an ‘Eastern’ perspective, he could only offer a vaguely drawn anti-Westernism, or what might be called ‘Occidentalism’” (Khoo, 1995, p. 47).
Means (2009) proposed that Badawi had inherited “a system of power built by his predecessor” (p. 341) Mahathir and was constrained by past policies and practices that included the definition and propagation of Islam. Publicly, the UMNO president acquitted himself as the OIC chairman, the prime minister of a Muslim country, and part of the Malays, “the Malays being seen as standard bearers of Islam, in this country and internationally” (Badawi, 2005, para. 17), entitling him to speak on the state of political Islam. Answering the third research question, how did Badawi explain the Islamic approach of Islam Hadhari, the UMNO president articulated its broad ideological antithesis, categorically (a) Occidentalism and (b) the common Western conceptualization of Oriental Islamism.

Rehearsing popular knowledge, Badawi (2004) deemed that the Muslim world was undone due to the advancement of Westernism and imperial colonialism, having “confronted with many challenges during its fifteen centuries of existence” (para. 5). Muslims nations fell “under the European colonial yoke,” “lost their sovereignty, and their people lost their freedom. Their resources were exploited and plundered” (Badawi, 2004, para. 7). Badawi (2004) asserted that Muslim and Muslim majority countries were subject to imperial standards of postcoloniality. Muslim countries were “synonymous with poverty, illiteracy and malnutrition,” some standing out “because of oppression, tyranny and injustice,” and “are devoid of a common voice that is taken seriously” (para. 9). The UMNO president concluded that the postcolonial Muslim world was subaltern in a global order:
It is reality, and compounding this harsh reality is a global order that exacerbates our suffering. . . . Yes, we have ourselves to blame, but that does not absolve policies that continue to oppress, obliterate and vilify millions of Muslims around the world. (Badawi, 2004, para. 13)

Imperialism pervaded the globe: “Globalization today has also brought about a challenge to the roles of sovereign nation states which traditionally claim exclusive authority within their own national borders” (Badawi, 2006, para. 11).

As Mahathir (2000), speaking at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies in 1996, had opined that the misunderstanding of Islam by the West “today is at its peak” (Mohamad, 1996, para. 37), and that the West had regarded “aberrations in the practice of the Muslim faith by a minority of Muslims as true manifestations of Islam” (Mohamad, 1996, para. 37), Badawi in 2005 interpreted the Western reproduction of the Oriental conceptualization of Islam as exclusively radical and conservative, reified by terrorist attacks as on September 11 and 7 July. As Prime Minister of Malaysia, he assumed to “showcasing to the world that Malaysia is a modern Islamic country” (Badawi, 2005, para. 16) competitively engaged in the global economy: “a trade partner that is dynamic, responsible and trustworthy, a safe haven for investment and a safe destination for tourists” (Badawi, 2005, para. 16).

Badawi presented UMNO as the custodian of Malay Islamism. He problematized the social representation (van Dijk, 1998) of “the culture of extremism and violence”: “We have a responsibility to protect Malays and Muslims from becoming tools to those
who want to promote their narrow agenda” (Badawi, 2005, para. 18). Badawi reported on contemporary events to persuade the more “civilized” Islam to be assimilated by the Malay constituency in the form of Islam Hadhari.

The “social representation” (van Dijk, 1998) of “the culture of extremism and violence” (Badawi, 2005, para. 18) regarded the Muslim world as the next existential enemy after communism, the West’s Other (Badawi, 2008). Words as “terrorism” and “extremism” lexically described a monolithic Islamism, and the Muslim world was ideologically constructed as the antithesis of the West: “it has become commonplace to characterize anything Islamic as being antithesis to everything Western, and therefore prejudicial to western interests” (Badawi, 2007, para. 19).

Badawi channeled Edward Said, who defined Orientalism as the Western discourse of knowledge understanding the Other, including Islam. Badawi (2004) exposed the “strange revival of canonical, though previously discredited, Orientalist ideas about Islam,” and that “malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in the West,” advancing that “what the late scholar and political activist, Edward Said, once wrote near ten years ago still holds true to this day” (para. 9).

Orientalism theorizes that colonialism operates “not only as a form of military rule but simultaneously as a discourse of domination” (Young, 2001, p. 383). Said derived from Michel Foucault the idea of discourse as “the imposition of linguistic order
knowledge has to conform to its paradigms in order to be recognized as legitimate” (Young, 2001, p. 386):

Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient. . . . My contention here is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. (Said, 1985, pp. 3, as quoted in Young, 2001, pp. 386)

Badawi (2004) indicted the West for reducing the multiple cultures of lived Islams that comprised the Muslim world to an ahistorical, static, monolith:

. . . this great monotheistic religion is treated as a monolith, with few exceptions, despite clear differences among Muslims throughout the globe. The nuances of the debate within the Muslim world are totally ignored. The breadth of different opinions among Muslims is unheard of. (para. 10)

Said (2000) had identified the Arabists and Islamologists who still functioned “unrevised”: 
For them there are still such things as an Islamic society, an Arab mind, an Oriental psyche. Even those whose specialty is the modern Islamic world anachronistically use texts like the Koran to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian society. Islam—or even a seventh-century ideal of it—is assumed to possess the unity that eludes the more recent and important influences of colonialism, imperialism, and even ordinary politics. Cliches about how Muslims (or Mohammedans as they are still insultingly called by some Orientalists) behave are bandied about with an abandon no one would risk in talking about black or Jews. At best, the Muslim is a ‘native informant’ for the Orientalist. Secretly, however, he remains a despised heretic who for his sins must additionally endure the entirely thankless position of being known negatively, that is, as an anti-Zionist. (pp. 105)

Badawi accused the Western media of popularizing an Oriental Islam. He maintained that “popular sentiment is driven by a sensationalist western media that focuses almost exclusively on extremist discourse” (2004, para. 10), that “they have allowed disproportionately large amounts of publicity to extremist views and actions, probably unintentionally” (2007, para. 14) and that “the current perception of Islam continues to be fed by hidden assumptions and distortions of fact that premise even the most ‘neutral’ coverage of Muslims and events” (2004, para. 9) about them.

Ironically, in the concern to explain the Islamic approach of Islam Hadhari—the third research study question—Badawi was forced to express an Oriental postcoloniality
in a derivate Western discourse. Accordant to the idea that colonialism “is first of all a matter of consciousness” (Nandy, 1983, p. 63, as quoted in Young, 2001, p.340), “a culture in which the ruled are constantly tempted to fight their rulers within the psychological limits set by the latter” (Nandy, 1983, p. xi, as quoted in Young, 2001, p. 342), Badawi had evaluated the Muslim world from the imperial perspective. He asserted that the Arab Muslim “scaled the heights of civilization, culture and learning” having “learnt much from the Greco-Roman civilization” (2004, para. 6) to pass on to Europe. He reported that only five countries in the Muslim world feature “high human development by the UNDP. . . Only five countries in the Muslim world enjoy a per capita GDP above 10,000 US dollars. 30 countries have a per capita GDP of less than 1,000 US dollars” (2004, para. 10). He described the “harsh reality” of “a global order that exacerbates our suffering,” in an appeal to “human dignity, natural justice, human rights and international law” (2004, para. 13). Badawi presenting the economic, material and cultural conditions of the postcolonial Muslim world drew on the standards, registers, and vocabulary determined instrumentally by the West.

Analytical category 3: The social adversary of UMNO

van Dijk (1998) proposed that ideologies represent the self-serving principles that explain the world in general, as in religious ideologies, and that ideological structures are cognitive reconstruction(s) of the main social conditions for the existence and reproduction of various social groups. Besides an ideological adversary, the social
group in structural opposition to UMNO was PAS. In October 2000, speaking in London, Mahathir commented that

> The most aggressive opposition party is the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party or PAS. We thought no one would be taken in by their claim that voting for their party ensures heaven in the afterlife; that they and Islam are one and the same thing, that we the other Muslims, the majority in the country are all infidels (*kafir*). But they persisted. They carried out a hate campaign beginning in the kindergarten right through to the universities and managed to instill so much hate against the coalition that they made a lot of headway in the last election. Two of the states fell to them and already signs of regression are being seen. (para. 16)

The second research study question sought to uncover how Badawi described the opposition party PAS. In the ideological discourse of Islam *Hadhari*, Badawi associated with PAS the Oriental Islam the West regularly conflated Islamisms in total: radical and conservative. I found that, as Mahathir had before him, Badawi dichotomized the Islam of the Malays to negotiate the discourse of Malay Islamism. In the attempt to control “local meanings” (van Dijk, 1998) of his discourse, he stressed the absurdity of PAS’s claims, accusing the party of politicizing religion, and of canvassing for votes “by telling villagers that they would be assured of heaven if they vote for their party. . . . They have been known to decree members and supporters of my party as infidels” (Badawi, 2004, para. 44).
Beliefs in “event models” (van Dijk, 1998) are selectively constructed to form the semantic representation of text and talk. Not all that is known about the event is disclosed in the meaning of discourse, so that the select bias of the speaker may influence the models of the recipient in the preferred direction (van Dijk, 1998). Badawi (2004) framed PAS as antithetical to UMNO, reduced in lexical terms of “truth” and “falsity:”

The election results indicate that a progressive and moderate approach will defeat a conservative ideology and extremist ways. The election results gives us confidence that, in facing PAS, there is no need for us to alter our philosophy, we do not need to change our methods, we do not need to be alarmed. We must not fall into the trap of using religion for political gain. The light of truth cannot be obscured forever by the fog of falsity. (para. 11; italics added)

Negative information about Us was suppressed, and the oppositional subject only alluded to:

Our success in bringing Islam in a progressive and dynamic manner has caused anxiety among some political groups who have, up to now, monopolized Islam for their purposes. Therefore, they have tried to sabotage Islam Hadhari, which has been purposely painted as something which is confusing. (Badawi, 2005, para. 20)

A negative presentation of the Other/Them, PAS, was emphasized:
We give assurance that UMNO will not endorse a narrow interpretation of Islam. UMNO opposes the culture of violence, we oppose a political culture that can disrupt the daily lives and commercial affairs of the *ummah*. Islam must not be downsized to fit the needs of a political organisation. Islam cannot become the exclusive domain of any single group. (Badawi, 2007, para. 13)

PAS was discredited lexically to manage local meanings or understandings: The “opposition” “Islamist” party practiced a “political Islam” presupposed at variance with the “legitimate” political system of “participatory democracy.” It was disingenuous of PAS to resist the UMNO ideology, an approach “not difficult to understand, if it is interpreted with sincerity” (Badawi, 2005, para. 21). Badawi (2007) opined that the approach to Islam promoted by UMNO was “fair” (para. 9).

UMNO, the Malay party inscribed on a British “Orientalist-colonialism” (Shamsul, 2004), was the Western postcolonial object constrained to resolve an Oriental Islam in the discourse of Islam that was instrumentally organized, managed, and controlled by PAS. In the attempt to defeat its social adversary, UMNO became its Islamist Other with Islam *Hadhari*. Md. Khalid (2008) advanced that What was clear with the introduction and active propagation of Islam Hadhari was that while UMNO had long criticised PAS for abusing Islam to secure electoral support from among Muslims, the UMNO was now overtly resorting to the same strategy. (pp. 146)
Analytical category 4: The ideological conflict

Ideologies revolve around real sociopolitical conflict. The ideological struggle comes from the unequal group relations of power and control, and the competition for scarce resources of material and symbolic social capital (van Dijk, 1998). In this study, UMNO was found engaged in an “Islamist policy auction” (Kessler, 2008, p. 71) with PAS for an Islamist Malayness that better resonated with the Malay constituency. This was not always the case.

The British colonial administrator R. J. Wilkinson (1908) wrote that “there can be no doubt that Moslem law would have ended by becoming the law of Malaya had not British law stepped in to check it” (p. 49, as quoted in Roff, 2009, p. 97). Commenting on Wilkinson, Roff (2009) proposed that

a process—or processes—of ‘Islamization’ were or had been in train at the time of the onset of British paramountcy; and secondly that . . . it was precisely that signal feature of British law, the statutory enactment, that was to become the vehicle for much ‘Islamization’ of Malay society. . . right up to the present day. (pp. 98)

UMNO, endorsed by the British colonial office, had not endeared itself to PAS, who judged its leadership to be “trustworthy guardians of imperialist capitalist interests” (Burhanuddin, 1956, as quoted in English in Noor, 2004, p. 143). Funston (1980) suggested that UMNO was founded on a secular Malay nationalism or Malayism (Funston, 1980). Presupposing a party on a secular trajectory, Kessler (2008) dismissed
UMNO’s Islamization during the Mahathir administration as a “retreat” and “capitulation” (p. 59) to PAS. To quote Burhanuddin (1956), UMNO had shown “its willingness to compromise and even to capitulate” (quoted in English in Noor, 2004, p. 143), in this case, to the Islamists; UMNO became the intellectual and strategic captive of an avowed Islamist party. It became PAS’s often reluctant, even unwitting, instrument, subject to PAS’s bidding and outbidding on matters of relations between Islam and the state. It became a de facto Islamizing, Shari’a-promoting, Islamist and hence “non-secular” party. (Kessler, 2008, pp. 68)

The UMNO discourse of Islam Hadhari was an engagement in the discourse of the Malay Islamic state begun by PAS, the party whose principal ideological agenda was the establishment of an Islamic state of government. As both UMNO and PAS had in various turns appropriated the Islamic state concept to define and organize their respective political projects, the debate narrowed to “just what kind of Islamic state Malaysia is or should be, and who has the right to define this” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 81). The discourse gained momentum when Mahathir pronounced on September 29, 2001 that Malaysia was already an Islamic state:

While detractors were quick to dismiss Mahathir’s statement as little more than a gambit, it was in effect the culmination of a number of low-key but significant government-initiated discussions on the Islamic state in the present Malaysian context, resulting in the conclusion, reached by a number of state-linked ulama,
that Malaysia already possessed the qualities of an Islamic state. (Chinyong, 2009, pp. 82)

Mahathir’s announcement was fundamentally removed from the stance of first prime minister and second UMNO president Tunku Abdul Rahman, who in the 1950s had rebuffed the idea of the Islamic state, the realization of which would cost “the drowning of every non-Muslim in Malaya.” While Mahathir had previously advanced that Malaysia as an “Islamic country,” his pronouncement that the country was already an Islamic state “marked a fundamental shift in Malaysia’s discursive politics of Islamism” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 82-83). PAS was thus obliged to articulate its own conceptions of a functional Islamic state. Its own study on the Islamic state resulted in four drafts that were introduced in the years 2002-2003. The last was released on November 12, 2003 as the Islamic State Document (Chinyong, 2009).

The Islamic state draft entitled ‘Memorandum Negara Islam: Pemerintahan Islam Dalam Abad ke-21’ (Memorandum on Islamic State: Islamic rule in the 21st century) was introduced by party president Fadzil Noor at the 2002 Muktamar, or assembly. Not disclosing the details, Noor outlined the key themes of the Islamic state (Liew, 2008):

1. A civil society (Masyarakat Madani) and a civil state (Negara Hadhari);
2. The principle of equality (al-Musaawah);
3. Sovereignty of law based on Syariah and Islamic jurisprudence;
4. A government based on, and aimed at, achieving justice (al-‘Adalah);
5. Appreciation of true meritocracy (as-Solahiyah);
6. A true welfare state; and,

7. An innovative and dynamic government. (pp. 114)

The Memorandum was redrafted in June 2003 and entitled ‘Memorandum PAS kepada Rakyat Malaysia: Penghayatan Pemerintahan Islam Dalam Demokrasi Abad ke-15/21M’ (PAS Memorandum to the Malaysian People: The Understanding of Islamic Rule in the Context of 15th Hijrah/21st Century Democracy). The 20-page redraft rejected the UMNO assertion that Malaysia was already an Islamic state, warning that such proclamations should not be an outcome of desperation on the part of the ruling party to attract support from Muslims (Chinyong, 2009).

On November 12, 2003, the more orthodox PAS Islamic State Document (Dokumen Negara Islam) was made public. The Dokumen consisted of seven “very different principles” (Liew, 2008, p.116):

1. A state that is based on the supremacy of law (Negara undang-undang);

2. Caliphate (Khilafah);

3. Righteousness and God-fearing (Taqwa);

4. Consultation (Syura);

5. Justice and equality (al-‘Adaalah wal Musaawah)

6. Freedom (al-Hurriyah); and

7. Absolute sovereignty (As-Siyaadah wal-Haakimiyah) (Liew, 2008, pp. 116)
The *Dokumen* elicited “heated responses in many quarters” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 91).

UMNO dismissed what it concluded to be nothing more than a political gimmick.

UMNO’s response was to

ratchet up the Islamization race further with its own list of principles for Islamic governance. These principles took the form of *Islam Hadhari* (Islamic Civilization), the latest addition to the litany of Islamic terms in Malaysian politics. (Chinyong, 2009, pp. 91-92)

The years following Badawi’s accession to power appeared to Kessler (2008) as the progressive shift of the “desecularization of Malaysia” (p. 62) from the time of its independence, or *merdeka*, in August, 1957. Kessler (2008) assumed that the Constitution framers had thought that

though not yet a fully secular society, Malaya would evolve in that direction:

partly because of its own irrepressible cultural and religious pluralism and partly because that seemed the trajectory of modern nationalism and modernity itself. What other basis, it then seemed, might there be for mutual accommodation and nation-building? The 1957 constitution was a compromise that acknowledged the public, emblematic significance of Islam as the state’s official religion yet tried to provide potential space, even support in future times, for freedom of, from and in religion. (pp. 62)

The Badawi administration made Islam *Hadhari* a major component of its campaign platform for the 2004 General Elections, the first Election in Badawi’s tenure
as prime minister. Purportedly an adaptation of the thought of Ibn Khaldun, the 14th century Muslim historian and sociologist (Chinyong, 2009), Islam Hadhari was authored by a committee consisting of Nakhaie Ahmad (a former ulama stalwart of PAS who defected to UMNO), Mustapha Mohamed, and Abdul Hamid Othman. UMNO “belonging to the Malays,” and had “successfully advanced Islamic teachings” (Badawi, 2005, para. 66) deployed the party ideology of Islam Hadhari to confront PAS Islamism:

1. The election results indicate that a progressive and moderate approach will defeat a conservative ideology and extremist ways. . . . We must not fall into the trap of using religion for political gain. The light of truth cannot be obscured forever by the fog of falsity. (Badawi, 2004, para. 11)

2. UMNO’s success is the success of moderation. . . UMNO has now proven to the world the success of a progressive approach to Islam. UMNO must therefore enhance its understanding of the concept of development that we propagate through Islam Hadhari. (Badawi, 2004, para. 12)

In the ideological conflict of the Malays, UMNO resolved to make “the Islamic religion serve as a unifying instead of a dividing factor” (Badawi, 2007, para 17). “We have decided to urge the Muslims in Malaysia to adopt Islam Hadhari or Civilizational Islam as the correct way of adhering to the faith” (Badawi, 2007, para. 17; italics added).

The third research study question sought to understand how Badawi explained the Islamic approach of Islam Hadhari. At the 2004 UMNO General Assembly, Badawi qualified Islam Hadhari as a Malay Islamism, and not a revision of Islam. Islam Hadhari
is not a new religion. It is not a new teaching nor is it a new *mazhab* 
(denomination). Islam Hadhari is an effort to bring the *ummah* back to basics, 
back to the fundamentals. (para. 18)

Islam *Hadhari* “complete and comprehensive, with an emphasis on the development of 
the economy and civilization” (Badawi, 2004, para. 22), was calibrated to building 
“Malay competitiveness” (Badawi, 2004, para. 22), and was ambivalent of non-Muslims: 
Underlying the whole message of Islam Hadhari is a call for tolerance towards 
people of other faiths, in accordance with God’s injunctions: For you, your 
religion, for me, my religion. (Badawi, 2005, para. 25)

Badawi would “leverage yet again a fundamental, longstanding issue in Malaysian 
concluded that 

by enunciating “Faith and piety in Allah” as its opening tenet, *Islam Hadhari* 
paradoxically constricts the very space for civil and plural discourse that it 
purports to open, thereby launching Islamist politics in Malaysia to new levels of 
intensity and exclusivism. The reference made to “Allah” is a considerable shift 
from the *Rukunegara*, which had as its first principle “Belief in God.” By this 
token, *Islam Hadhari* effectively narrows the national discourse to an Islamic 
one. (pp. 95)

UMNO possessed an ideology complex that was both secular and religious, 
dialectically *Ketuanan Melayu* (Malay Supremacy) and Islamist. The dichotomy of
secular and religious, all equally requiring assimilation: The Federal Constitution, the Rukun Negara, Islam Hadhari, and the National Mission. In the ideological conflict of Islamist Malayness, or a Malay Islamism, Islam Hadhari was promoted as the means of nation-building:

The Malaysian experiment in nation-building... is, in many ways, faith-based. The government has used the progressive teachings of Islam as the basis for good governance to deliver benefits to all sectors of our multi-racial society without discrimination. The national philosophy is firmly rooted in the values and injunctions of Islam but compatible with modernity. We call this approach Islam Hadhari. (Badawi, 2008, para. 26)

UMNO engaged PAS in the discourse of Islam for a Malay Islamism the effectiveness of which was beyond the scope this study. The IDA, done to explore how the discourse of Islam Hadhari as spoken by Badawi in the years 2004-2008 demonstrated the hegemony of UMNO in Malay politics and society, did not assess the persuasiveness of the ideology to the Malays. Not knowing enough why Islam Hadhari did not register with the Malays, beyond that Malays are ideologically inclined to the incorruptibility of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions, including Islam (Tham, 1977), I did find anecdotal evidence that the ideological conflict to change the Malay tasawwur, or worldview, was unsuccessful.
Islam Hadhari was not regarded as relevant to the Malay society. Months into its introduction, the government periodical *Dewan Masyarakat* that dedicated its March 2005 issue to the problem of Islam Hadhari reported that Muslims failed to see Islam Hadhari’s application in *akidah* (faith), *syariah* (Islamic legal code), and *akhlak* (personal bearing), confusing Islamism with new Islam. In 2006, keynoting at the 57th UMNO General Assembly, Badawi submitted that “unfortunately, some quarters have misinterpreted Islam Hadhari as an excuse to become more conservative and more radical” (para. 74). Submitting a Malay agenda, he implied that the Islamist ideology should not preclude the ideological expression of Malayness:

1. Those who would wish to inflame communal sentiments have sensationalised the words of a few UMNO speakers. The act of unsheathing and kissing a keris is part of our cultural heritage, but its meaning has been twisted to spread fear among non-Malays, and the image of UMNO and Malaysia has been smeared overseas. (para. 57)

2. By the same token, other communities must appreciate the sensitivities of the Malays. Basic matters relating to the sanctity of religion, beliefs and practices, Malay interests and the social contract between the communities are sacred to us and should not be raised. (para. 58)

The speaker whose motif was “Work with me” (Badawi, 2004, para. 10) intended for Islam Hadhari to resolve the ideological conflict of Islamism dividing the *bangsa Melayu*. Rather than uniting the two social groups, the UMNO ideology exacerbated the

Saya berpendapat bahawa yang ada sekarang ni... bukan lagi parti UMNO. . .
yang sebenar. Yang ada sekarang ni adalah sebuah parti. . . parti ini hanya menjadi satu badan untuk mengiktiraf Abdullah Ahmad Badawi sebagai presiden dan mengutamakan kepentingannya. . . sehingga segala kepentingan negara dikebelakangkan.

[In my opinion what presently exists... is no longer the UMNO party. What exists presently is a party... the party now is a body to recognize Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as president and to advance his personal interests... at the expense of the interests of the nation.] (“Mahathir quits UMNO,” 2008)

The following month, on June 16, PAS spiritual leader Nik Aziz pontificated that [“Islam Hadhari is falsehood. What guarantee (is there that) Islam Hadhari would be accepted by God on the Day of Judgement?”] (“Tok guru berkenaan peralihan,” 2008).

Analytical category 5: Reconstructions or representations of ideologies

Badawi (2006) believed in the influence of religious ideology, opining that
In more and more nations today, religion is an important and powerful force in shaping public perception. . . The capacity to deploy religious arguments is therefore an essential tool in combating religious extremism, and in furthering development on all fronts in the Muslim world. (para. 8)

Advocating the moderate and progressive Islamism of Islam Hadhari at a zeitgeist of Islamophobia, the UMNO president sought to separate the myth from fact of Islam and the Muslims, to reconstruct and represent ideologies that comprised the discursive regime of knowledge of Islam appealing (and be politically correct in the process) to the West and the Muslim world. Speaking to an international audience, Badawi suggested that (a) Islam is a universal religion practiced by both Arabs and non-Arabs; (b) the “clash of civilizations” is not the clash of religious or secular ideologies, rather of “fundamental interests” (Badawi, 2007, para. 11); (c) globalization is not inherently anti-Islam or anti-Islamic; (d) an Islamic theocracy is not the proper response to encroaching globalization, such theocracy an “extreme” (Badawi, 2006, para. 13) state “propagated by the enemies of Islam” (Badawi, 2006, para. 13); (e) modernization and democracy are not conditions inimical to Islam; (f) the legal process of *ijtihad* (interpretation of Islamic law) be revived, and last, that the (g) Islamic lexicon, of the word *jihad*, be properly defined as “struggle,” not “holy war” (Badawi, 2006, para. 9).

Badawi denied the Orientalism of Islam as an Arab religion to distinguish the religion from the race, simultaneously subsuming Islam as a Malayness. In his defense of the universality of Islam, however, Badawi (2006) fallaciously described statistics rather
than submitting the precept that Islam precludes the notion of race, insisting that “in fact, there are more Muslims in other countries than in Arab countries” (para. 3):

The truth is that there are more than 1.2 billion Muslims spread between the Atlantic and the Pacific with an important presence in Europe and America. As a whole, Muslims make up some 19 percent of the world’s people. . . . In Southeast Asia alone, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, there are more than 300 million Muslims. (para. 3)

The OIC chairman advised that the “belief in the inevitability of conflict can be one of its main causes,” and regretted that “it seems to be in vogue today to talk about an inevitable clash of civilizations between the Islamic world and the West” (2005, para. 1). In London in January, 2007, Badawi thought the conflict of Islam and the West unnatural and oxymoronic as “there is so much common ground in the religion, values and cultures of the west and the Muslim world” (para. 15). He allowed that while “the conflicting parties may have a distinct national, cultural or religious character,” or “they may mobilize themselves along ideological or religious lines,” that the clash of “fundamental interests” of power, territory and resources (para. 13), was in fact material rather than religious.

In September 2008, in Malaysia at the 3rd International Conference on the Muslim World and the West in September 2008, the Malaysian prime minister publically disclosed his gambit: reinterpret (or “model,” van Dijk, 1998) the events:
there is a need to reframe the discourse on the divide. We need to establish recognition that it is not one between total strangers but between parties which do share a historical, existential and philosophical worldview. If we can accomplish this, we would have taken one important step in closing the gap. (para. 16)

Badawi’s “reframing the discourse on the divide” (para. 16) also entailed rationalizing the globalization of the Muslim world in state religious discourse, to harness the “Muslim imperative to act” (Badawi, 2004, para. 48). Badawi (2004) explained that “In Malaysia, we believe that this compulsion to act because of religion can be directed towards good, towards progress, and towards development” (para. 21). The UMNO president found globalization—and modernization—“are processes which cannot be stopped” (Badawi, 2006, para. 11), and are not inherently anti-Islamic: “The truth is that Muslims can easily partake in the processes of globalization yet remain faithful to the teachings and traditions of Islam” (Badawi, 2006, para. 12).

On July 24, 2006, keynoting at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta on his conferment of the honorary doctorate in Islamic thought, Badawi ironically invoked the very discourse of Oriental Islam he had denounced for “the fallacy of mistaking the extreme for the norm” (para. 2) in recognizing an “alternative system guided by Islam as a political ideology” (para. 13) integrated into all aspects of society “including politics, law, economy, foreign policy and so on” (para. 13) are “extreme
views propagated by the enemies of Islam” (para. 13), and assuming that an Islamic
government would preclude the peaceful co-existence between peoples and nations.

Badawi invested in a “progressive” and “moderate” approach to Islam in Islam
Hadhari was obliged to the modernization of the Muslim world. Badawi understood that
as Islam was associated with “extremism” and “conservatism” in the West, the
postcolonial Muslim world would conflate “modernization” with “secularization” and
“westernization.” He appealed that Islam was “thoroughly applicable to modern needs,”
“not an archaic and irrelevant vestige of a distant past” (Badawi, 2004, para. 22).
Modernization and democracy were not inimical conditions in Islam:

1. Another deep-seated fallacy which must be corrected is the notion that Islam
   is anti-democratic and inherently anti-modern. . . The problem exists because
   of the tendency to equate modernization with westernization, that the
   modern Muslim includes only those who shared western values. (Badawi,
   2006, para. 4)

2. We must believe and accept that it is entirely conceivable to be modern
   without being western. . . . Science and technology, creativity, innovation
   and renewal—the fundamental ingredients for modernization—are not the
   monopoly of any particular race or civilization. (Badawi, 2006, para. 7)

In Jakarta on July 24, 2006, Badawi spoke presupposing a monolithic Islamic
world ably resourced to modernize “not for purposes of appeasing or accommodating
the West,” but “so in order to establish the Islamic world’s equality with the West”
Badawi articulated a militant rhetoric, engaging the underprivileged subaltern, speaking in terms of Us and Them:

> We must do so in order to secure reciprocity from the West. This is the best way of gaining the respect of the West for Islam. Equality, reciprocity and mutual respect is the only basis upon which real understanding and harmony can be established between the Islamic world and the West. . . (para. 6)

In the defensive in the stratified new world order, it fell to Muslims to alter their approach toward their religion accordingly, to open up the “discursive space in the Muslim world” (Badawi, 2004, para. 30) and “directly challenge the extremist doctrines that Islam has become synonymous with over the last few years” (Badawi, 2004, para. 30) and assimilate a modernist Islam, “or progressive Islam, or even liberal Islam” (Badawi, 2004, para. 30). “Desecularized” (Kessler, 2008) Malaysia was modeled as the modern Islamic state by the standards of logical positivism, “a showcase of what it is to be a successful, modern Muslim country” (Badawi, 2005, para. 10). Badawi (2005) invoked the Western discourse of knowledge: “our conclusion is derived from inductive empirical evidence and deductive logic” (para. 14).


> Sometimes the pronouncements of the religious authorities at a given time and in a given situation are mere opinions or ijtihad, based no doubt on their wide knowledge of Islam and their understanding of the problem or situation. But,
again, these are the opinions of very human individuals and they, too, can be wrong. (para. 14)

A fellow modernist Islamist, Badawi echoed the same sentiments. Badawi (2004) pressed to reconstruct and represent ideologies for the modern civilization of Muslim society, “to usher a change of mindset among the ummah” (para. 23). He called for “actions that are encompassing, comprehensive and systematic, regardless of sector or partisan loyalty. It requires society to change their tasawwur (worldview)” (para. 23).

In January 2004, at Magdalen College, University of Oxford, Badawi speaking in his capacities as “first and foremost as a Muslim” (para. 2), “the prime minister of a multi-religious nation where the majority are Muslim” (para. 3), and “the chairperson of the Organisation of Islamic Conference or OIC” (para. 4) that “Islam must not be ossified and fossilised by blind imitation of traditional thought and opinion” (para 31). Badawi revealed that he had repeatedly called for the relevance of contemporary *ijtihad* which is the effort a Muslim jurist or scholar makes in order to deduce a law or opinion, which is not self-evident, from the sources of the *sharia*. (para. 32)

In April 2006, keynoting at the Institute Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM), he voiced concern about the proper application of *jihad*:

A change in attitude and culture requires *ijtihad* and *jihad* (struggle). The concept of *jihad* must be given a broader interpretation, covering all aspects of
life, including the pursuit of knowledge, the mastery of science and technology and economic activity. (para. 30)

He reiterated the need in July 2006 in Jakarta: “The often misunderstood and overused term “jihad” literally means “struggle,” not “holy war.” In fact, “holy war” is a term not found anywhere in the Qur’an” (para. 9).

The third research study question sought to explore how Badawi explained the Islamic approach of Islamic Hadhari. Unraveling the reconstructions or representations of ideologies, I found that in the discourse of Islam Hadhari, Badawi rendered the Malays quiescent to abide change in their tasawwur (worldview) that was required of them by UMNO.

Badawi reconstructing ideologies in a derivative colonizer discourse demanded that the Malays revise their ideology complex. Consonant with the Malay ideology of the “inviolability of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions” (Tham, 1977, p. 280), including “the Identity of Islam with Malay values and life” (Tham, 1977, p. 280), Mahathir (1970) in The Malay Dilemma had warned against manipulating a “force” of the Malays:

Religion is another established force with the Malays. No change, no plan and no ideology which runs counter to the religion of the Malays can succeed. Islam must therefore be left alone in the quest for progress. In fact, Islam must be upheld and even further propagated if success is to be assured. (pp. 104-105, Italics added)
Archer (2007) proposed that our social identities come from the manner in which we personify such roles in line with our concerns. Islam Hadhari was the discursive attempt by UMNO to reconstruct a Malay Islamism in its own particular worldview. The “moderate,” “progressive” ideology was found wanting by the Malay constituency, and dismissed as a political maneuver.

**Analytical category 6: Models**

Mental “event models” (van Dijk, 1998) are the personal representations of events. The mental model is the device that connects personal memory with social memory or shared representations and initiates discourse production.

Thus, what people know personally about such an event, as well as their perspective on an opinion about the event, is represented in their subjective, individual models of the event. For discourse this means that the model is being constructed for the event the discourse is about. (van Dijk, 1998, pp. 79)

Models may be structured by a schema so that the structures that organize the way events are understood will also influence the ways such events are talked about (van Dijk, 1998).

The fourth research study question sought to explore how Badawi associated himself with former UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir. In discoursing on Islam Hadhari, Badawi implied his disapproval of Mahathir’s politics in office in modeling (a) the 1999 and 2004 General Elections, and (b) the UMNO ideology of Islam Hadhari, in organizing and managing the interpretations of those events.
1999 and 2004 General Elections

In communicating the events of the 1999 and 2004 Elections at the UMNO General Assembly in September 2004, Badawi distanced himself from former UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir and appropriated the Islamization project begun by his predecessor.

The UMNO president disclosed that the 1999 General Elections which resulted in significant UMNO losses had led “some in my party” to conclude that they had to become “more Islamist than the opposition, even though my party openly stands for an inclusive and progressive Islam” (Badawi, 2004, para. 18). Badawi (2004) had thought otherwise, convinced that while Malaysian political choices are to some extent influenced by the issue of religiosity, what is actually more important to the voters are the issues of good governance and broad-based economic growth. (para. 18)

On September 23, 2004, keynoting at the 55th UMNO General Assembly, his first as prime minister, Badawi affirmed his role in reversing UMNO’s fortunes and correcting the deficiencies of the former administration:

When I became prime minister last year, I embarked on some modest reforms in order to address the grievances which led to our erosion of support in 1999. I took a hard line on corruption. I ordered an extensive reform program for the police force. I stressed on the need to have credible and independent institutions of government, like the judiciary. I embarked on balancing the budget and
redirecting government spending on needy socioeconomic programs. I pushed for a more effective education system. I launched an initiative to develop biotechnology and to modernize agricultural sector so that the rural areas—which are predominantly Muslim—would not be left behind. (para. 19)

Due to his efforts, “the electorate responded” (Badawi, 2004, para. 47), returning the party “with its biggest majority since independence” (Badawi, 2004, para. 47). Badawi exhorted that

We have demonstrated that we can roll back the Islamists, not by engaging in a ‘holier-than-thou’ contest, but by addressing the root causes of anger and frustration. . . . If you confront and deal with these issues, you can prevail over Islamists in a democratic contest. (para. 20)

In fact, the 2004 Elections were a major reversal of 1999. In 1999, UMNO candidates were rejected in the major Malay states of Peninsula Malaysia, particularly in the north and north-east states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, losing a significant number of parliamentary and state seats to PAS. In 2004, the UMNO-led ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN or National Front) returned a decisive victory, securing 199 of the 219 parliamentary constituencies. PAS meanwhile, which had made considerable gains in 1999 by winning 27 seats in parliament and forming two state governments in Kelantan and Terengganu, endured severe losses in 2004 of 21 seats, relinquishing the Terengganu state government and barely holding on to power in Kelantan (Md. Khalid, 2008, p. 142-143).
Following the exceptional electoral performance of the BN in 2004, many local and international analysts surmised the defeat of PAS to be the victory of the moderate and progressive brand of Islam advocated by Badawi, the successor to Mahathir, appointed on November 1, 2003. International media and analysts lauded “the roll-back of Islamism and the resurgence of moderation and secularism in the crucial arena of Malay-Muslim politics in Malaysia” (Chinyong, 2009, p. 96). This “mandate for moderation,” as the election result was called by CNN, was celebrated as “a good precedent for the Muslim world.” ChannelNewsAsia, a major regional news network, further opined that the results were “an overwhelming mandate for its [UMNO’s] secular rule in one of the world’s most developed states.” Elsewhere, it was reported that “Abdullah Badawi handed the fundamentalist Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, or PAS, one of its worst-ever defeats in last week’s elections by touting a modern, progressive Islam. His ruling coalition now controls eleven of the country’s twelve states, and seems to have quashed the idea that radical Islam was infiltrating the politics of Southeast Asia.” (Chinyong, 2009, pp. 96-97)

Chinyong (2009) found two findings apparent of the 2004 Elections: “first, many observers viewed Islam as a determining factor in the elections; second, the election results were a triumph for UMNO’s brand of “progressive” Islam over the “fundamentalist” opposition” (p. 97).
Md. Khalid (2008), however, argued that the significance of Islam in the 2004 Elections was “probably exaggerated and almost certainly misunderstood” (p. 146). Md. Khalid (2008) stressed that “the issue of Islam” (p. 146) in the 2004 Election should be understood in terms of its link with the personality and image of the new prime minister that the BN actively sought to promote. Abdullah [Badawi] was packaged by the ruling coalition as a compassionate, more accommodating Muslim leader who would serve to heal the wounds that had erupted among the Malays under Mahathir. (Md. Khalid, 2008, pp. 147)

Badawi (2004), concluding that voter issues of “good governance and broad-based economic growth” (para. 18) were “actually more important” (para. 18) than the “issue of religiosity” (para. 18), nonetheless modeled the Elections as political expressions of Islamism. Speaking in Sydney in April 2005, the Malaysian prime minister defined the “the root causes of anger and frustration” in the discourse of the Islamist state:

My party was returned with its biggest majority since independence and we were able to win back the states we lost in 1999. We have demonstrated that we can roll back the Islamists, not by engaging in a ‘holier-than-thou’ contest, but by addressing the root causes of anger and frustration. I postulate that the issues that we addressed are similar to those in many other Muslim countries, and by
tackling these issues, Islamists can be overcome in a democratic contest. (para. 5)

Md. Khalid (2008) advanced that “Abdullah was eager to introduce new initiatives that would help discard the idea that his premiership would be conditioned by the many legacies of his predecessor” (p. 145):

*Islam Hadhari*, or civilisational Islam, can be interpreted as an attempt by prime minister Abdullah [Badawi] to disassociate himself from the type of Islam promoted by Mahathir, a practice of faith that was apparently far too biased towards the idea of material development with inadequate attention to matters spiritual. For Abdullah [Badawi], ‘Islam Hadhari is an approach that emphasizes development, (but) consistent with the tenets of Islam and focuses on enhancing the quality of life’. (Md. Khalid, 2008, pp. 145)

*Islam Hadhari*

Mahathir’s response to the resurgence of Islam in Malay society throughout his administration was both intellectual and political (Milne and Mauzy, 1999). Speaking at the UMNO General Assembly in the years 1982-1987, Mahathir often referred to the need for UMNO, the Malays, and Muslims to assimilate “worthy Islamic values” (Khoo, 1995, p. 180). Khoo (1995) advanced that he came closest to introducing a list of Islamic values that merited internalization at the 1984 Assembly when he called for ‘putting in practice Islamic values like trust, discipline, loyalty, industriousness and persistence, close bonds between Muslims, boldness arising
from honesty, tolerance and consideration, justice, repentance and gratefulness and other honoured values’. Mahathir frequently said that for the Muslims these values were necessary to assist them in ‘seeking wealth in a moral and legal way’ or, ultimately, to ‘obtain prosperity in this world and in the hereafter’. (Khoo, 1995, pp. 180)

UMNO in the contest for the Malay constituency was obliged to “matching PAS, or at least to not being outbid (or seen to be) in Islamic terms by PAS” (Kessler, 2008, p. 68).

Mahathir nonetheless attempted to break that neo-traditional clericalist Islamist stranglehold by seeking to promote a modernist approach that saw the Islamic faith as belonging to all the faithful, not just the conventionally trained experts. (Kessler, 2008, pp. 68)

Yet Mahathir difficultly projected himself as a proper spokesman for the kind of modernist Islam that he sought to promote because he was always a selective, not a thoroughgoing or consistent, modernist. His Vision 2020 embraced technological and economic modernization but was decidedly ambivalent and unenthusiastic about, even unsympathetic towards, some of the key sociocultural dimensions of modernity such as human rights, individual freedom, and “lifestyle” pluralism; while he never had the religious standing or credentials to make him a convincing proponent of the kind of modern, essentially democratically anticlericalist, Islam that he sought to encourage. (Kessler, 2008, pp. 73)
As a means to counter PAS, Mahathir felt that his successor as prime minister had to “possess adequate, if not impressive, Islamic credentials” (Md. Khalid, 2008, p. 145) that would help the party win back the support of the Malays:

Mahathir himself would admit that Abdullah was chosen as his deputy because of the latter’s impeccable Islamic credentials which could be used to help win over the hearts and minds of rural voters. (Md. Khalid, 2008, pp. 145)

Following the UMNO defeat to PAS at the 1999 General Elections, Mahathir and Badawi sought a platform to counter the rising popularity of PAS among the Malays. UMNO began advocating “a more tolerant and compassionate brand of Islam—Islam Hadhari” (Md. Khalid, 2008, p. 151). First introduced by the government in 2002 (Abd Samad, 2008), the Badawi administration made Islam Hadhari part of the UMNO/BN manifesto for the 2004 General Elections.

I found that Badawi had ambitions bespeaking a UMNO leader. Badawi, “a leader with requisite and undeniable credentials to develop Islam in line with Article 3 of the Federal Constitution” (Abd. Samad, 2008, p. 297), who spoke “first and foremost as a Muslim” (Badawi, 2004, para. 2) was, in the end, a Malay politician with a master plan (Abd. Samad, 2008). As the new prime minister, “Datuk Seri Abdullah [Badawi] obviously tried hard to distance himself from the excesses of the previous administration” (Abd. Samad, 2008, p. 77). In April 2005, speaking in Sydney at a conference organized by the Asia Society of Australia, he asserted his role in correcting the deficiencies of the
Mahathir administration that resulted in his party to return with its “biggest majority since Independence” (Badawi, 2005, para. 5):

When I took over as Prime minister of Malaysia in October 2003, I embarked on some modest reforms in order to address the grievances that led to our erosion of support in 1999. I took a hard-line stance on corruption. I ordered an extensive reform programme for the police force. I stressed on the need to have credible and independent institutions of government like the judiciary. (para. 4)

Badawi’s listing of impressive achievements was selective. Milne and Mauzy (1999) observed that in two important areas, “Mahathir’s policies have been non-existent or non-successful” (p. 170)—respect for the judiciary and the rule of law, and corruption. Mahathir had “limited regard for the judiciary” (Milne & Mauzy, 1999, p. 171) and motioned “without much notice or press comment” (Milne & Mauzy, p. 47) Parliament to pass the Federal Constitution (Amendment) Act 1988, thus amending Articles 121(1) and 145:

Henceforth, the powers of the judiciary would no longer be embedded in the Constitution; rather, they would be conferred by Parliament through statutes. Also, by this Act, the High Courts were stripped of the power of judicial review previously granted in the Constitution. Further, the attorney-general assumed control of instructing the courts on what cases to hear and which courts to use, and assumed responsibility for judicial assignments and transfers. (Milne & Mauzy, 1999, pp. 47)
The modified separation of powers was terminated and the judiciary was stripped of much of its independence and power “virtually overnight” (Milne and Mauzy, 1999, p. 47).

Milne and Mauzy (1999) advanced that Mahathir’s “greatest” (p. 171) weakness in policy was his failure to arrest corruption, particularly in the form of “money politics” (p. 171) rampant in UMNO. While not a new phenomenon, it has never been as widespread as in the late 1990s. Mahathir denounced it at both the 1994 and 1995 UMNO General Assemblies, and at the latter meeting his speech culminated in tears. . . . The practice continued at the 1996 UMNO General Assembly elections, although there were modifications in the methods used. (Milne & Mauzy, 1999, pp. 171)

Disassociating himself from Mahathir, Badawi modeled Islam Hadhari as the novel construct of his administration. The UMNO president and prime minister emphasized his involvement in the establishment of Islam Hadhari on July 24, 2006, at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta, Indonesia, on his conferment of the Honorary Doctorate in Islamic Thought:

In Malaysia, the status of Islam as the official religion is enshrined in the constitution. Islam has always been predominant in the political, economic and social life of the country. Soon after I assumed leadership of the Government at the end of 2003, we wanted to make a formal pronouncement that the true and correct teachings of Islam shall serve as the basis and inspiration for good
governance and development in Malaysia. We decided to call the approach and articulate it as Islam Hadhari. (para. 18)

In summary, this IDA of 19 speeches given by UMNO president and Prime Minister Badawi in the years 2004-2008 found that UMNO sought to persuade and influence the divided Malay constituency by engaging PAS in the discourse of the Malay Islamist state through the party ideology of Islam Hadhari. In his discoursing Islam Hadhari in 2004, Badawi sought to relate UMNO with the Malays, presuming “Malays, UMNO, and Islam in this country cannot be separated,” the three “elements” forming “a distinct culture and identity” (para. 27). UMNO was formed “to fight for the rights of the Malays” and to uphold “the nationalist agenda of the Malays” (para. 58). The party, which “has never practiced secularism” (para. 29) and “staunchly opposes the use of Islam as an instrument to manipulate people’s beliefs” (para. 18), nonetheless sought to change the Malay tasawwur or worldview, “to bring the Ummah back to basics, back to the fundamentals, as prescribed in the Quran and the Hadith that form the foundation of Islamic civilization” through “the concept of development that we propagate through Islam Hadhari” (para. 18). In 2005, Badawi disclosed that the success of the Malays “lies at the heart of UMNO’s struggle” (para. 64) in the Vision 2020 that finds the affluent “Towerling Malays” (para. 65), a “false consciousness” found about the social reality of the Malays which described the relationship between UMNO and the Malays: In advocating modernization through a progressive Malay Islamism of Islam Hadhari, the
materialization of the ideological ambitions of the Malays functioned on the institutions of the UMNO-led administration.

In the discourse of Islam Hadhari, Badawi also disclosed the ideological and social adversary of UMNO and the ideological conflict differentiating it from PAS; reconstructed or represented ideologies; and last, modeled the events of the General Elections of 1999 and 2004 and the approach of Islam Hadhari.

Badawi described an ideological adversary in Westernism and its popular Orientalization of Islam informed by the colonial discourse of knowledge of Orientalism. As Westernism and Orientalism defined for the colonizer and the post-colonized a monolithic, radical and exotic Other in Islam and the Muslim world, so Badawi deemed the West the Occidental Other to the Malays and the ummah.

Interiorized of British colonial-Orientalism as Mahathir had been before him, Badawi dichotomized the Islamism of the Malays. PAS, which practiced a “conservative ideology” (Badawi, 2004, para. 11) and “extremist ways” (Badawi, 2004, para. 11), was the social group in structural opposition and adversarial to UMNO that “does not endorse a narrow interpretation of Islam” (Badawi, 2007, para. 13) “that can disrupt the daily lives and commercial affairs of the ummah” (Badawi, 2007, para. 13). UMNO advocated the proper Malay Islamism as “progressive and moderate” (Badawi, 2004, para. 11).

Advocating a modernist Islamism in Islam Hadhari, Badawi sought to change the worldview (tasawwur) of the Malays and the Muslim community (ummah). He
proposed that (a) Islam is a universal religion practiced by both Arabs and non-Arabs; (b) the “clash of civilizations” was actually a conflict of “fundamental interests” (Badawi, 2007, para. 11); (c) globalization is not inherently anti-Islamic; (d) an Islamic theocracy is an “extreme” (Badawi, 2006, para. 13) state “propagated by the enemies of Islam” (Badawi, 2006, para. 13); (e) modernization and democracy are not states inimical to Islam, and coterminous to modernity; (f) the legal process of *ijtihad* (interpretation of Islamic law) be revived, and last, that the (g) Islamic lexicon, of the word *jihad*, be properly defined as “struggle” (Badawi, 2006, para. 9), not “holy war” (Badawi, 2006, para. 9).

In his discourse of Islam *Hadhari*, Badawi modeled (a) the 1999 and 2004 General Elections, and (b) Islam *Hadhari*, to structure and organize the way the events and contexts should be understood and talked about. Badawi modeling the 1999 and 2004 General Elections attempted to distance himself from former UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir. Modeling Islam *Hadhari*, he sought to disassociate himself from the Islamism promoted by Mahathir while also appropriating for himself the Islamization project which produced the ideology of Islam *Hadhari*.

*Reevaluating assumptions from Chapter 1*

The four general theories or assumptions of Malay society (explained in Chapter 1) that grounded this IDA study were reevaluated having reconstructed the ideological discourse of Islam *Hadhari* as spoken by Badawi.
The first assumption was that the modern Malaysian state had inherited an unresolved contest between *kerajaan*, *ummah*, and *bangsa* and a discourse of political conflict (Milner, 1994). This assumption held true in the finding in *Analytic category 1*. Badawi (2004) emphasized that “the Malays, UMNO, and Islam in this country cannot be separated” (para. 27), the composite forming “a distinct culture and identity” (para. 27). UMNO thus possessed an ideology complex composed of not only a Malay traditionalism (Omar, 1993) and nationalism (Funston, 1980), but the ideology complex of the Malays consisting of Malay as *kerajaan*, Malay as *ummah*, and Malay as *bangsa Melayu* (Milner, 1994).

The second assumption was that the elements of Islam and ethnic nationalism (or Malayism, Omar, 1993) variously correspond and compete with one another in a binary called the Islam-Malay ethnicity dialectic (Mutalib, 1990), in this study called the Malay-Muslim dialectic. This assumption held true based on the findings in *Analytic categories 1-6*. The Malay-Muslim dialectic was regularly featured in the discourse of Islam *Hadhari* by Badawi.

The third assumption was that the Malays were ideologically attuned to the incorruptibility of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions, including Islam (Tham, 1977). This assumption held true in social practice. Islam *Hadhari* was an attempt to change the Malay mindset that was encompassing, drastic and systematic, regardless of sector or partisan loyalty: It required the Malays to change their *tasawwur* (worldview) (Badawi, 2004). In March 2005, *Dewan Masyrakat* reported that “members
of society” a year later still failed to understand Islam Hadhari’s application in social realities and had confused the ideology as a revision of Islam, which should preclude its assimilation. Islam Hadhari was “misinterpreted” as “an excuse to become more conservative and more radical” (Badawi, 2006, para. 74). Former UMNO president Mahathir mused pithily that

To my knowledge, the prophet only brought one Islam. He never mentioned anything about Islam Hadhari (Malaysiakini, 2008, February 2).

The fourth assumption was that the concepts of modern Malayness are drawn on a British Orientalism (Shamsul, 2004). This assumption held true in the finding in Analytic category 1.

Implications of findings

UMNO president Badawi (2006) understood that Islam “must be lived as a system that considers both the sacred and the ordinary” (para. 34). In the discourse of Islam Hadhari Badawi (2007) asserted that Islam and “the Muslim way of life are indistinguishable and inseparable” (para. 11), as religion was for Foucault “always a part of set of force relations and discursive practices which order human life” (Carrette, 1999, p.32).

Jeremy Carrette (1999) found that Foucault’s work offered a reading of religion “outside of theological traditions and belief—a reading that does not position religion in some separate realm but inside a political struggle of knowledge-power” (p. 32).
Foucault brought religion back into the “immanent struggle of identity and subjectivity” (Carrette, 1999, p. 32):

Foucault’s work can therefore be seen to move within a discursive space of ‘religion and culture’ – where one mutually informs the other. . . [A] culture cannot understand itself without first understanding its implicit connection and development within the constructs of religious belief and practice.

Contemporary culture is born out of religious traditions and the conditions of our knowledge are therefore embedded in religious discourse. (Carrette, 1999, pp. 33)

It was through the deployment of the concept of “governmentality” as “the techniques and procedures for directing human behavior” (Carrette, 1999, p. 42) that Foucault fused the political and the individual which led to “a collapsing of the boundaries between politics, religion and the ethics of the self” (Carrette, 1999, p. 42). An analytics of government would “view practices of government in their complex and variable relations to the different ways in which ‘truth’ is produced in social, cultural, and political practices” (Dean, 2010, p. 27). Badawi (2008) offered Islam Hadhari as the definitive approach in the ideological conflict of Islamist Malayness:

The Malaysian experiment in nation building. . . is, in many ways, faith-based.

The government has used the progressive teachings of Islam as the basis for good governance. . . The national philosophy is firmly rooted in the values and
injunctions of Islam but compatible with modernity. We call this approach Islam Hadhari. (para. 26)

Badawi (2004) spoke about Islam Hadhari as neither a new religion nor a new denomination, but “an effort to bring the ummah back to basics, back to the fundamentals” (para. 18). The progressive approach to Islam, Islam Hadhari was “the correct way of adhering to the faith” (Badawi, 2007, para. 17). For Foucault, religion was “always part of a political technology governing the self” (Carrette, 1999, p. 42). It is the intertwining of the “government of self and the government of state that forms the basis of a ‘political spirituality’” (Carrette, 1999, p. 42):

How can one analyze the connection between ways of distinguishing true and false and ways of governing oneself and others? The search for a new foundation for each of these practices, in itself and relative to the other. . . this is what I would call ‘political spiritualité’. (Foucault, 1978, p. 82, as quoted in Carrette, 1999, pp. 42)

Foucault intended political spirituality as “the dimension of freedom practices opposing truth regimes, and involving the whole of peoples’ ways of life” (Vintges, 2011, p. 107):

By spirituality I mean. . . the subject’s attainment of a certain mode of being and the transformations that the subject must carry out on itself to attain the mode of being. (Foucault, 1997e, pp. 294, as quoted in Vintges, 2011, pp. 103)

Spirituality was invoked as “an exit from the impoverished self-techniques of modern man, which are over-determined by surveilling and scrutinizing disciplines and
governing practices,” an “autonomous dimension of life” (Vintges, 2011, p. 103) for the creation of a personal ethos, “visible in one’s acts and ways of life” (Vintges, 2011, p. 104). Islam Hadhari therefore was unique in its conflation of religious practice and government Truth regime for the subjection of Malays.

Badawi (2006) stressed “religion to be a powerful force in shaping public opinion” (para. 8) and “believed that this compulsion to act because of religion can be directed towards good, towards progress, and towards development” (Badawi, 2004, para. 21). Badawi, in Foucault’s terms, was affecting “disciplinary power” and the Malay assujettissement, “variously translated as “subjectivation”, “subjection” or even “subjugation”’’ that describes “a double process of the actions of power in relation to selves that is both negative and positive” (Heyes, 2011, p. 160).

Foucault argued that power is not only repressive, and nor does it act only upon the already formed subject, but rather power enables the identities we claim while it constraints, “and these two actions ultimately cannot be separated” (Heyes, 2011, p. 160). Foucault (1980) viewed power as “not an institution, and not a structure. . . it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a particular society” (p. 93, as quoted in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 187), and that power relations are “intentional and non-subjective. . . They are imbued, through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives” (Foucault, 1980, p. 95, as quoted in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 187). Disciplinary
power is the form of power which “acts upon bodies to make certain kinds of persons” (Heyes, 2011, p. 162).

Disciplines create a subject “who is self-monitoring, developmental, the object at the intersection of numerous vectors of management and coercion and, most of all, useful, productive” (Heyes, 2011, p. 162). The subject is created using four key mechanisms (Foucault, 1979, p. 149-169, in Heyes, 2011):

In brief, first, the relation of the individual to space is redefined, through novel forms of architecture (most famously, the Panoptic prison) and mechanisms of population management; second, the individual’s activity is exhaustively controlled and monitored and his body incorporated into that process. . . third, time is organized and monitored much more closely, and comes to be understood as both progressive. . . and minutely (even infinitely) divisible; finally, the composition of forces is restructured to maximize the productive effects of people working together, organizing bodies according to their relative position and mutual effects, and redirecting attention to efficient “tactics”. (Heyes, 2011, pp. 162)

Foucault (1979) distilled three techniques that operate across these four mechanisms to consolidate modern subjectivity (p. 170-194, in Heyes, 2011):

Hierarchical observation functions by making subjects constantly visible and knowable, through a single gaze that sees everything constantly. . . Second, normalizing judgement is enacted through the micromanagement of behaviour
in areas of social life from which penalty had previously been absent. . . The third technique of disciplinary power is the examination (an instrument that combines hierarchical observation and normalizing judgement). (Heyes, 2011, pp. 163)

In the ideological discourse of Islam Hadhari I found the functioning of Panoptic technology. Badawi invoked and deployed the ideology of Islam to the advancement of Malayness. The common Malay practice of Islam was presupposed “misguided. . . by those who fail to interpret Islam and those who fail to practice it with open minds and rational thought” (Badawi, 2007, para. 15), which demanded the discipline of a “progressive approach to Islam. . . that we propagate through Islam Hadhari” (Badawi, 2004, para. 12). Normalization was defined in the UMNO ideology, “not a new religion. It is not a new teaching nor is it a new mazhab (denomination). Islam Hadhari is an effort to bring the ummah back to basics, back to the fundamentals” (Badawi, 2004, para. 18); the underlying exclusivity of Islam Hadhari paradoxically “a call for tolerance towards people of other faiths, in accordance with God’s injunctions: For you, your religion, for me, my religion” (Badawi, 2005, para. 25). The micromanagement of behavior was “complete and comprehensive, with an emphasis on the development of the economy and civilization, capable of building Malay competitiveness” (Badawi, 2004, para. 22).

For Foucault, power “is exercised, not simply held” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 192):
The tendency for power to be depersonalized, diffused, relational and anonymous, while at the same time totalizing more and more dimensions of social life, is captured, made possible, and summed up in the Panoptic technology. (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, pp. 192)

Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) stressed that Foucault found the Panopticon to be the archetypical technology for disciplinary power:

- Its chief characteristics are its ability to make the spread of power efficient; to make possible the exercise of power with limited manpower at the least cost; to discipline individuals with the least exertion of overt force by operating on their souls; to increase to a maximum the visibility of those subjected; to involve in its functioning all those who come in contact with the apparatus. In sum, Panopticism is a perfect example of a meticulous ritual of power which, by its mode of operation, establishes a site where a political technology of the body can operate; here rights and obligations are established and imposed. (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, pp. 192)

Discipline creates a novel subject position: the individual (Heyes, 2011). The individual is “a conformist, docile, self-monitoring person, who is expected... to develop in particular ways and is subject to much closer yet more seemingly benign forms of management” (Heyes, 2011, p. 163).

Foucault proposed that power is not restricted to political institutions (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983), like UMNO. Power “plays a “directly productive role;” “it comes from
“it is multidirectional, operating from the top down and also from the bottom up” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 185). Being the individual, Badawi was also subjected to relations of power, by his own admission. In the discourse of Islam Hadhari, he qualified himself in social hierarchy of nation, political party, lobby, and ummah:

1. The party, founded under the leadership of Dato’ Onn Jaafar, has been subsequently led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, Tun Hussein Onn, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and the torch of leadership now passes to me. (Badawi, 2004, para. 4)

2. The advances of the nation and the ummah have resulted in the Malays being seen as standard bearers of Islam, in this country and internationally. (Badawi, 2005, para. 17)

3. I speak before you in many capacities. I speak first and foremost as a Muslim. (Badawi, 2005, para. 2)

4. I speak too as the prime minister of a multi-religious nation where the majority of the people are Muslim. (Badawi, 2005, para, 3)

5. I speak also as the chairperson of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, or O.I.C., a grouping of 57 countries with a population of 1.4 billion people. (Badawi, 2005, para. 4)

Invoking the early Malay dictum of “life is contained in custom” (Milner, 1994, p. 22), Badawi referred to the reputation of his subject (Milner, 1994, described in Chapter 2) or nama.
Chapter Summary

This chapter focused on the unraveling of the discourse of Islam Hadhari as spoken by UMNO president and Prime Minister Badawi in the years 2004-2008. In summary, this chapter organized along six analytic categories, discussed the ideological discourse structures in Badawi’s speeches on Islam Hadhari to find that UMNO under Badawi sought to persuade and influence the divided Malay constituency by engaging PAS in the discourse of the Malay Islamist state through the ideology of Islam Hadhari.

Viewed in Foucauldian terms of power/knowledge, the UMNO ideology of Islam Hadhari is panoptic in expression of disciplinary power. Islam Hadhari enforced a standard of Islamist Malayness in a binary of “progressive and moderate” and “conservative and extremist” (Badawi, 2004, para. 11) that, typical of operation of the Panopticon, simultaneously “compared individuals against one another, measuring their differences and then asserting the truth of the standard it discovers as the rule” (Foucault, 1979, 182-183, as quoted in Feder, 2011, p.63). Discipline creates the position of the individual, a docile, self-monitoring body, and finds Badawi subjected to the relations of power.
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overview

The conclusions of this study derive from the six major findings and the four research study questions that concern the areas of (a) how Badawi represented UMNO to the Malays; (b) how Badawi described the opposition party PAS; (c) how Badawi explained the Islamic approach of Islam Hadhari; and, (e) how Badawi associated himself with former UMNO president and Prime Minister Mahathir. This study advances two conclusions:

The first conclusion of this study is that Malayness is dialectically ethnic and Muslim, as expressed in the discourse of Islam Hadhari, spoken by UMNO president and Prime Minister Badawi in the years 2004-2008 in 19 speeches. In this study, UMNO, “the collective strength of the Malay race” (Badawi, 2004, para. 71) “leading the Malay struggle” (Badawi, 2004, para. 69) was assumed to reflect the social identity of the Malays, as claimed by Badawi: “Malays, UMNO, and Islam in this country cannot be separated. Together, the elements form a distinct culture and identity” (Badawi, 2004, para. 27).

The second conclusion is that present theories of Malayness should evolve to describe Malay identity, in this study in parallel to the theory of a civilization in the Malay bangsa, as proposed by Milner (2011). The Malay ideology complex is an aggregate of ideologies, and the findings of this study should affect the theoretical framework that grounded the study.
This chapter is the conclusion of this study.

This study explored the role of discourse in demonstrating a Malay hegemony and domination. The six findings suggest that UMNO, under Badawi, sought to persuade and influence the Malay constituency by engaging opposition party PAS in the discourse of the Malay Islamist state through the ideology of Islam Hadhari. Not the architect of Islam Hadhari, he was nonetheless responsible for its ideological discourse and his administration was complicit with the form of its implementation in government.

This study sought to understand “how a multiracial, multicultural, and multi-religious society can live in peace and harmony in a country that is run by a multi-party and multi-racial coalition government” (Ghazali, 2004, p. 145). In the time of the Badawi administration, hate speech was common and the suspension of disbelief of a multiracial, multicultural, and multi-religious society country living in peace and harmony was sustained by authoritarian acts of media blackouts and arrests. In 2006, a coalition of NGOs called Article 11 held forums about the encroachment of the shar’ia (Islamic law) courts on civil courts to loud protests and demonstrations by Muslims. Badawi accused the coalition of playing up religious issues and undermining Malaysia’s fragile social balance by highlighting “sensitive issues” which should not be publically discussed (Mohd. Sani, 2010, p. 66). He did not rule out using the ISA, which allows for indefinite detention without trial the Article 11 members (Mohd. Sani, 2010). The media were issued a stern warning to “stop reporting on issues related to religious matters” (Mohd. Sani, 2010, p. 66).
On November 25, 2007, HINDRAF, a coalition of 30 Hindu NGOs entrusted with the preservation of Hindu community rights and heritage, organized a rally to submit a petition to the British High Commission, accusing the UMNO-led government of marginalizing ethnic Indians and instituting a policy of ethnic cleansing. The coalition also feared the intervention of *shar’ia* law. The rally turned into a riot of 10,000 people. Over 130 people were arrested. In December that year, select organizers and Indian activists who participated in the rally were detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for inciting hatred (Mohd. Sani, 2010).

The year before, on November 15, 2006, Badawi, keynoting at the 57th UMNO General Assembly, had acknowledged the disconnect between the discourse of Islamic moderation and progressivism and religious expression. Badawi regretted the increased “polemics on issues related to race and religion” (para. 66) and offered that the more open environment had allowed debate to evolve “to a level where the line on religion and race issues has been crossed. The openness we see today is a new phenomenon for Malaysia” (para. 66). He admitted that “unfortunately, some quarters have misinterpreted Islam *Hadhari* as an excuse to become more conservative and more radical” (para. 74).

In 2009, in all of his final months in the office of the chief executive of the government, Badawi himself was mute on Islam *Hadhari*. On March 26, 2009, keynoting his last UMNO General Assembly speech as UMNO president and prime minister, Badawi allocated a part of one sentence to the party ideology: “... Islam was developed
progressively through the approach of Islam Hadhari” (para. 30). I can only assume that, Badawi, snubbed by public opinion and ridiculed by the opposition, realized that the ideology of a moderate, progressive Malay Islamism had outlived its usefulness in the tenure of its principal advocate.

This study concludes that UMNO, which “belongs to the Malays” (Badawi, 2005, para. 66), reflected the social identity of the Malay constituency. In 2004, UMNO was “the largest political party, with 3.2 million members” (Badawi, 2004, para. 4), and its influence over the Malay constituency is undeniable. It had been a major Malay political party since its founding in 1946, and from independence in 1957, has since been continuously in dominance, its president also the prime minister of the government of Malaysia. This study found that UMNO, under Badawi in the years 2004-2008, demonstrated hegemony in Malay politics and society by its regular manipulation of the Malay ideology complex, appealing to, and influencing popular Malay sentiment. In the ideological conflict of an Islamist Malayness with PAS, the Badawi administration embodied Malayness in its performance of the adat, or custom, of Malay politics in the Malay-Muslim dialectic: The dialectic here meaning the Malay identity constantly vacillating between Malay ethnic community (bangsa Melayu) and Malay ummah (Muslim community), the Malay party founded on an ethnic nationalism of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay sovereignty) ideologically shifted to an ethnic Malay Islamism in Islam Hadhari in the interests of the party.
In the discourse of the Malay Islamist state, Islam *Hadhari*, that attempted to reconfigure the Malay *tasawwur* (worldview), was UMNO’s hubris. As had been held, that the Malays were ideologically attuned to the incorruptibility of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions, including Islam (Tham, 1977), the ideology was resisted (“Islam Hadhari: antara konseptual dengan perlaksanaan,” 2005), misrepresented (Badawi, 2006), and dismissed (“Mahathir—condemn Islam Hadhari,” 2008). Consequently, UMNO suffered political defeat at the March 2008 General Election, losing five of 13 state governments at the expense of PAS, which made significant gains.

From the findings of this study, I deduced the need for a general theory that would subsume the four general theoretical assumptions of Malay identity and society that premised this study to describe the Malay ideology complex, or Malayness. The study found that the Malays, or *bangsa Melayu*, are an elusive, contested multiplicity defined in terms of UMNO and PAS ideologies, eliciting the questions: Who are the Malays, and what constitutes Malay society?

The second conclusion of this study is that present theory should extend to describe Malayness. In qualitative research, the findings of a study may be a function of its theoretical framework, influencing its form and perspective. This study was informed by four theoretical assumptions about the Malay identity, and the assumptions held true in findings. Reflexively, I sought a theory to explain the Malays, not in a polemical binary of the Malay-Muslim dialectic of “moderate,” “modernist”/“progressive,” and “extremist”/“radical” and “conservative” configurations.
Milner (2011) proposed that it was more effective to focus Malayness rather than on the Malays, to examine the development of an idea (or more accurately several ideas, and the contest around them) than to speak of the evolution of a people. Milner (2011) found the bangsa Melayu to be a “concept in motion—a notion of community that is by no means fixed but, rather, open to redefinition or refashioning” (p. 235) Milner (2011) suggested localizing the bangsa “in a specifically Melaka-Johor flavor” (p. 236). The Melaka-Johor state concepts of Malay allowed people not related by descent to become “Malay:”

. . . the manner in which ‘Malay’ in Melaka-Johor had developed into much more than a river-based identity does not evoke specifically ‘racial’ thinking. The phrase ‘Malay ways’ (current in the early sixteenth century), and the mention in kerajaan writings of ‘Malay customs’, ‘Malay dress’, ‘Malay music’ and so forth, do suggest that ‘Malay’ had begun to be understood more as a culture, or perhaps more accurately, as a civilization. (Milner, 2011, pp. 236-237) The civilization of bangsa is “a dynamism that the terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ do not so readily convey” (Milner, 2011, p. 242). For Milner (2007), civilization referred to states of mind, and to representations:

It carries as well a notion of ‘structure’—and structures are expected to be undergoing change, or at least to be susceptible to rebuilding. They are also based on principles—‘logics’—that have the potential to be transferred to, or learned by, others. (Milner, 2011, pp.242)
Understanding Malayness as civilization, I returned to a 1983 study of Malay ethnic identity by Mohd Aris Othman.

Othman (1983) sought to “determine the various forms and situations in which Malay ethnic identity is articulated” (p. 7). Localizing his participant observation research to 220 informants residing in the small Malay community of Kampung Baharu in the capital, Kuala Lumpur, Othman (1983) intended to examine how “the meaning of Malay as an identity varies according to situational contexts and at various levels of ethnic interrelationship in Malaysia” (p. 7). His study was done in response to Judith Nagata, who had concluded from her study that there was an “oscillation from one identity to another, such as from Malay to Arab or vice versa” (Othman, 1983, p. 10) and in the process individuals involved “would manipulate cultural criteria and behaviors appropriate in a particular kind of situation” (Nagata, 1974, p. 333 as quoted in Othman, 1983, p. 10). The identity “switching” functioned to “avoiding tensions due to inconsistencies of role expectations in any given set of circumstances” (Nagata, 1974, p. 343, as quoted in Othman, 1983, p. 10).

In exploring the dynamics of Malayness, Othman (1983) was unconcerned with “the ‘switching’, ‘oscillating’ or ‘transformation’ of identity as such” (p. 11), focusing on exploring the various meanings of the ethnic category Malay in social realities. Othman (1983) argued that it was precisely the very question of “what is a Malay” (p. 10) that was the subject of Nagata’s study, “and this question she has failed to answer” (p. 11). Summarily, he proposed that
while the narrowest meaning of Malay is perceived at the local level in the form of a regional identity, the broadest meaning of Malay emerges when the Malaysian Malays, foreign Malays, Arabs and D.K.K. classify themselves as Malay as opposed to the Chinese, Indian and Others. (Othman, 1983, pp. 51)

Othman (1983) concluded that the issue before Nagata was in fact “the dynamics of Malay identity rather than the process of identity change or oscillation of identity in Malay society” (p. 56). The “dynamics” of Malay identity that Othman referred to in 1983 was perhaps what Milner (2007) meant in the Malay “representation,” or “states of mind.”

In the end, Islam Hadhari, “literally, civilisational Islam, or an approach towards a progressive Islamic civilization” (Badawi, 2004, para. 49), was dislodged for another, refashioned, Malayness. In 2008, Deputy Prime Minister Najib revealed that “I am a great believer of Islam Hadhari,” and had “told the Prime Minister that after March . . . he does not have to worry because this is something we will continue to propagate” (“Najib pledges to continue Islam Hadhari,” 2008, para. 3). In 2010, Najib as UMNO president jettisoned the ethnic exclusiveness of Islam Hadhari for the inclusiveness of bangsa Melayu in 1Malaysia.

In his book, Najib’s Answers: Solving Yesterday’s Problems, Today’s Conflicts and Tomorrow’s Challenges (2010), the prime minister explained that 1Malaysia, grounded on the National Constitution and National Principles (Rukun Negara), was “a core philosophy that transcends policy and implementation” (p. 70). 1Malaysia “is what all
Malaysians have always dreamed of and aspired to” (p. 71). Najib (2010) intended that the 1Malaysia concept “will become a national formula to foster the coming into being a Malaysian race, thus uniting Malaysians of various races and religions” (p. 77).

On September 21, 2010, the UMNO president keynoting the UMNO General Assembly (“Najib’s 61st UMNO General Assembly,” 2010) spoke of the national visions (wawasan negara), which included national unity:

1. It was in the early ‘50s that the president of UMNO then, the late Dato’ Onn Jaafar, promoted the idea for the party’s membership to be opened to non-Malays. (Najib, 2010, para. 6)

2. However, the Dato’ Onn’s proposal at the time was deemed as too progressive for UMNO members who felt the position of the Malays was still not that strong. As a result, it was opposed by the majority of UMNO members and leaders. (Najib, 2010, para. 7)

Najib (2010) conceded that national unity was a political expedient to gain independence from the British:

. . . although the idea by Dato’ Onn at the time was not acceptable by UMNO, his successor, the late Tunku Abdul Rahman, was aware of the importance of multi-ethnic political cooperation to achieve independence. Tunku then took on a strategy that was more realistic and acceptable by the majority of the Malays and others by pioneering an alliance among the various races. (Najib, 2010, para 8)
Submitting that Mahathir had intended to reinforce “national unity to forge Bangsa Malaysia” (Najib, 2010, para. 16), Najib (2010) nonetheless stressed that the ethnic inclusiveness of 1Malaysia, “in line with Islamic values” (para. 23), was defined and constrained in the socio-political interests of the Malays:

*Jawa itu Melayu, Bugis itu Melayu*

*Banjar juga disebut Melayu*

*Minangkabau memang Melayu*

*Keturunan Acheh adalah Melayu*

. . . *Jakun dan Sakai asli Melayu*

*Arab dan Pakistani, semua Melayu*

*Mamak dan Malbari serap ke Melayu*

*Malah muallaf bertakrif Melayu* (para. 31)

[Javanese are Malays, Bugis are Malays

Banjar are also called Malays

Minangkabau are really Malays

Achehnese descendents are Malays

. . . Jakun and Sakai natives are Malays

Arab and Pakistani, all Malays

Mamak and Malbari are subsumed as Malays

While converts are regarded as Malays] (translated from Malay by the author)
Considering Milner’s Malayness concept of civilization in *bangsa*, the UMNO president rationalizing that the Malays should assume leadership of the country appeared less racist than sensible:

1. Let us not forget, this party [was] tasked to change Malays who were not politically conscious before World War II to a nation that was able to gain independence through negotiations with one of the world’s major powers, Britain. (Najib, 2010, para. 29)

2. In addition, the neatly-arranged records in the country will also show that UMNO had raised the consciousness of nationalism, patriotism and political democracy. (Najib, 2010, para. 30)

3. . . . in the psychology, behaviour or the character of the Malay, the fundamentals are reflected in the seeds of moral leadership. If explored further, the Malays accord a high placing on the refined attitude of leaders and their leadership in the community. (Najib, 2010, para. 32)

4. Evidently, the Malays have stood the test of time. Their character has also enabled Malays to be accepted as leaders in a multiracial society. Their moral leadership has also provided for that they take on the leadership of the nation. (Najib, 2010, para. 33)

Qualitative research is conducted to explore a topic to develop theory to explain behavior of participants under study (Creswell, 1998). In correspondence to that objective of qualitative research, extending theory to include the Malay *bangsa* as a
civilization constructive in understanding Othman’s “dynamics of Malay identity” and Najib’s ideological discourse of 1Malaysia at the September 2010 UMNO General Assembly.

As the Middle East imploded in popular revolt against the hegemony commonly labeled the Arab spring, I found it reasonable that the discourse of the Malay civilization of Malaysia by Prime Minister Najib on September 15, 2011, given on the eve of the anniversary of the founding of the country, focused on the practices of a “functional and inclusive democracy, where peace and public order are safeguarded in line with the. . . the Constitution, the rule of law and respect for basic human. . . and individual rights (Najib, 2011, para. 33).

The local media reporting on Najib’s speech marking the founding of Malaysia were keenly aware on what was newsworthy. The Star Online stressed that “PM announces repeal of ISA, three Emergency proclamations” in its account of the UMNO president’s speech published on September 15, 2011. The lede of the story offered that “several draconian laws including the ISA and the three Emergency proclamations are to be repealed under major civil liberty reforms” (“PM announces,” 2011). The “historic changes” (“PM announces,” 2011) were rationalized by Najib (2011) as “[t]he checks and balances that must exist in a modern democracy are between national security and personal freedom” (para. 21).

Najib (2011) affirmed the political ideal of the country, that “the power to determine which political party would form the government. . . lies absolutely and
without exception in the hands of the people” (para. 13). Resolving that the government was committed “towards upholding the system of parliamentary democracy, constitutional monarchy, rule of law, the federation philosophy and principles of checks and balances between the three branches of government” (para. 16), Najib allowed that we find the experience, maturity and wisdom of the people in the country in choosing a government that could ensure that the future they aspired for could not be denied by anyone else. (para. 13)

Expressing the Foucauldian immanent relations of power, that it is “not an institution [or] a structure, nor an individual capacity but rather a complex arrangement of forces in society” (Foucault, 1990a, p. 93, as quoted in Lynch, 2011, p. 21), and that “power comes from below” (Foucault, 1990a, p. 94, as quoted in Lynch, 2011, p. 22), Najib (2011) understood that “the era where the government knew everything and owned a monopoly on wisdom has long gone” (para. 14). Perhaps a preemptive tactic against local popular revolt against the government in a scale not unlike the Arab countries as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, based on the findings of this study and in accordance with the ideal of CDA, I nonetheless applaud Najib’s dismantling the techniques of surveillance and intervention for the freedom that “no individual will be arrested merely on the point of political ideology” (Najib, 2011, para, 26).

This study suggests that Malayness is a dichotomy of ethnicity and religion engaged in conflict for dominance. Beyond the dialectic, this study also suggests that Malayness is also the individual search for a social identity in nama, expressed in
ideological terms in the practices of UMNO or PAS. The Malay individuality implies a certain freedom, as Foucault (1994) offered:

One must observe that there cannot be relations of power unless the subjects are free. If one or the other were completely at the disposition of the other and became his thing, an object on which he can exercise an infinite and unlimited violence, there would be no relations of power. In order to exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least a certain form of liberty. (pp. 12, as quoted in May, 2011, pp. 78)

Recommendations for further research

As researcher of this study, I recommend further Ideological discourse analysis (IDA) studies be conducted to understand issues of identity generally, and the Malay condition in particular. The IDA approach in considering “ideologically relevant context structures” (van Dijk, 1998) in the broader CDA preoccupation on “authentic everyday communication in institutional, media, political or other locations” (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Leibhart, 1999, p. 8), operates on the ideal of “allying itself with those who suffer political and social injustice. . . to intervene discursively in given social and political practices” (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Leibhart, 1999, p. 8). Coupled with a tempered reflexivity, IDA studies would be insightful as a “socially critical approach” (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Leibhart, 1999, p. 8) to researcher objectives intended to emancipate.

In view of this recommendation, the following points should be considered:
1. An IDA research design should be appropriately configured for the particular research problem, as “the quality and utility of the research is not based on its reproducibility” (Stake, 1995, as quoted in Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008). For the purposes of this study, three ideological discourse structures of context, topic, and local meaning were considered relevant. Each IDA research study, as is qualitative, unique, and so should be its design—such as the analytical guideline.

2. The limited scope of this study comes from the perspective and reflexivity of the native researcher. Following from (1), a more comprehensive research on the ideological discourse of Islam Hadhari as spoken by Badawi should be conducted to uncover other findings to add to the literature. Other studies may also include IDA studies on the ideologies of Najib’s 1Malaysia. Still others may explore other areas of the Malaysian political discourse to understand what it means to be members of social identities.

   **Researcher reflections**

   “Takkan Melayu hilang di dunia” [“The Malays shall not vanish from this world”]

   --Hang Tuah

   Archer (2007) maintained that the goal of defining and ordering our concerns through a life-long internal conversation is to arrive “at a satisfying and sustainable modus vivendi” (p. 87). In dedicating oneself to a cluster of concerns, one takes responsibility for them and makes them one’s own (Archer, 2007):
The subject constitutes her identity as the being-with-this-constellation-of-concerns. Thus, through her internal conversation, the subject reflexively attains a strict personal identity by virtue of her unique pattern of commitments. (Archer, 2007, pp. 88)

Meta-reflexively, the internal conversations that had led me to undertake this study of Malay identity was the need to explore what it means to be Malay in connection with the Malay constituency and the major Malay political party UMNO in the discourse of Islam Hadhari. In concluding this study, I found “Malay” to be a constantly contested and reconstituted algorithm of modus vivendi. In the discourse of Islam Hadhari, both UMNO and PAS reified the construct of “Malay” as essentially recursively Islamist and racist, signified by Milner (1994) as the adat (custom) of Malay politics.

Radhakrishnan (1987) interpreting Foucault proposed that being represented is a violation: Foucault found representation as “disciplinary, panoptic, and coercively theoretical” (p. 204), and that “the best the intellectual can do is to thematize her own marginality and not presume to speak for the other” (Radhakrishnan, 1987, p. 204). This study exploring Malayness held four theoretical assumptions about Malayness. First, in the British colonial era, an “invention” of Malay politics as a new adat or custom in the dialogue of three distinct ideological orientations of community in Malay society—the sultanate or kerajaan, the Islamic community or ummah, and the Malay race or bangsa (Milner, 1994); second, postcolonial Malay politics is defined by the conflict and correspondence of Islam and race or ethnic nationalism (or Malayism,) in the Islam-
Malay ethnicity dialectic (Mutalib, 1990), in this study called the Malay-Muslim dialectic; third, the Malays are ideologically tended to the incorruptibility of their socio-political and socio-cultural institutions, including Islam (Tham, 1977); and last, concepts of modern Malayness are drawn on a British Orientalist-colonial knowledge (Shamsul, 2004). I propose the four theories explaining Malay ethnicity are the type of theory Radhakrishnan (1987) found “to accord theory the task of reading ethnicity as a socio-political-cultural construct caught up in the connectedness of its own history to prehistories and other histories,” discrediting “the very notion of ethnicity as unmediated, as an experiential given” (p. 203). So located, the theorists belie themselves to “the prevailing paradigms and research programmes of the white bourgeois academy” (West, 1985, p. 113, quoted in Radhakrishnan, 1987, p. 201), simultaneously disqualifying and qualifying them “to speak for the other” (Radhakrishnan, 1987). Appropriating the English language and the Western discourse of knowledge in the van Dijk (1998) theorizing of ideology, ideological discourse structures, and ideological discourse analysis (and embedding in it a native researcher reflexivity) to explore and understand the Malay identity, I was also subject to the same deficiencies as the four theorists cited in this study, as was my study similarly refrained.

Presuming my constitutive self a subjective “active agent,” for which I develop and define my ultimate concerns to make for my concrete singularity as a person (Archer, 2007), I for Other being Malay and Muslim was myopic to understanding discourse as colonial discourse, empathizing with Homi Bhaba’s deciphering of Fanon’s
Black Skin, White Masks, whose concern was with the psychology of the oppressed colonialized. Bhaba’s Fanon “indicates that colonial identities are always oscillating, never perfectly achieved” (Loomba, 1998); the divide between black skin and white mask was not a neat division but rather a doubling, dissembling image of being in at least two places at once. . . It is not the Colonialist self or the Colonised Other, but the disturbing distance in between that constitutes the figure of colonial otherness—the White man’s artifice inscribed on the Black man’s body. It is in relation to this impossible object that emerges the liminal problem of colonial identity and its vicissitudes. (Bhaba, 1994, pp. 117)

Colonial discourse, as problematized in this form of IDA study, is not a new term for colonialism; it “indicates a new way of thinking in which cultural, intellectual, economic or political processes are seen to work together in the formation, perpetuation and dismantling of colonialism” (Loomba, 1998, p. 54). Colonial discourse “seeks to widen the scope of studies of colonialism by examining the intersection of ideas and institutions, knowledge and power. Consequently, colonial violence is understood as including an ‘epistemic’ aspect, i.e. an attack on the culture, ideas and value systems of the colonized peoples” (Loomba, 1998, p. 54).

This study was constructed on previous interrogations and studies of colonial discourse. In the review of the literature (explained in Chapter 2), the four theoretical assumptions that grounded this study found Malayness as pre-postcolonial
constructions. In the analysis, interpretation, and synthesis of findings (described in Chapter 5), Badawi was found constrained to operate on an inherited system of power built by Mahathir (Means, 2009) to constitute an essential Malay Islamism defensive to diffused Occidentalism and totalized Oriental Islamism. A study of colonial discourse, the IDA in this study unraveled UMNO’s performance of the Malay-Muslim dialectic in the discourse of Malay politics. This study concluded acknowledging the utility of defining “Malay” as “civilization” in understanding the UMNO discourse of the Malay Islamist state.

This study done to broaden the knowledge about the Malays and their society applied the Western discourse of knowledge of the IDA. The deployment of the IDA methodology in this study to exploring Malayness—and consequently, Malay identities—this study does not, in my mind, invalidate its findings. In this study the appropriation of the theory of ideology by van Dijk (1998) was used to articulate and demonstrate, rather than fabricate and imagine, aspects of the Malay ideology complex which were (re)configured by UMNO in the years 2004-2008 through the Malay Islamism of Islam Hadhari.

Being Malay I find the “Malay” algorithm as civilization to be an enablement past the postcolonial Malay interstitiality of the Malay-Muslim dialectic constant and “cognitive closure” (Tham, 1997) stagnating contemporary Malay politics and society. A Malay civilization would be complicit with decoupling the Malay-Muslim dialectic and rendering superfluous the essential Malay Islamist dichotomies of
“moderate/progressive” and “radical/extremist.” Islam had become the last defining signifier of Malayness due to the 1971 national cultural policy, which effaced the exclusivity of the Malay ethnic boundary and affecting a political Islam in Malaysia (Irwan, 2005). As the discourse of the Islamic state had evolved that the two approaches of Malay Islamism endorsed by UMNO and PAS became indistinguishable (Nair, 1997), I found the subsumption of Islam to Malayness—“Malays, UMNO and Islam. . . cannot be separated” (Badawi, 2004, para. 27) ineluctably untenable, as lexically defining “a progressive and moderate approach” (Badawi, 2004, para. 11) in UMNO and “a conservative ideology and extremist ways” in PAS was political rhetoric of the structural binary of Us against Them. Islam is ideologically biasedly non-ethnic, a feature familiar to the UMNO president himself: “In Southeast Asia alone, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, there are more than 300 million Muslims” (Badawi, 2006, para. 3). Notwithstanding the fact, “Malay” as used by Badawi in the years 2004-2008 in the UMNO discourse of Islam Hadhari was unequivocally ethnic:

1. UMNO belongs to the Malays. (Badawi, 2005, para. 66)
2. UMNO’s strength is the collective strength of the Malay race. (Badawi, 2004, para. 71)
3. UMNO was formed to fight for the rights of the Malays. I strongly uphold the nationalist agenda of the Malays. (Badawi, 2004, para. 58)
4. Islam Hadhari is complete and comprehensive, with an emphasis on the development of the economy and civilisation, capable of building Malay competitiveness. (Badawi, 2004, para. 22)

In the ideological conflict of the Malays, UMNO resolved to make Islam “serve as a unifying instead of a dividing factor” (Badawi, 2007, para. 17). Added Badawi (2007): “We have decided to urge the Muslims in Malaysia to adopt Islam Hadhari or Civilisational Islam as the correct way of adhering to the faith” (para. 17). In this IDA, Islam Hadhari as discoursed by Badawi was identified as a UMNO Malay Islamism. I propose that Badawi framed Islam Hadhari on an ethnic trajectory because he, like Mahathir before him, found meaning in terms of the Malay-Muslim dialectic in the discourse of the Malay Islamist state. Being postcolonial Malay and UMNO president, he functioned in the UMNO ideology complex whose narrow discourse of knowledge was tautological: Premised on “the nationalist agenda of Malays” (Badawi, 2004, para. 58), the social identity of UMNO was an ethnic Malayness conceiving only a localized, Malay, Islamist state. Being Malay not coerced by political office into interiorizing a UMNO-ness, I am free to understand “Malay” as a civilizational sensibility, and interpret Islam Hadhari as an ethnic—rather than authentic—Islamism ideologically, so removed from the refrain of interstitiality of the Malay-Muslim dialectic.

This IDA study was an ethnography. There have been other qualitative studies done about the bangsa Melayu, of course (described in Chapter 2), but I thought I would substantially contribute to the literature generally, and to ideological discourse analysis.
studies particularly, through this original research study of Badawi’s ideological discourse of Islam Hadhari at a scale and design that had not been attempted in the academy (at least at the time of its writing), and this study done by a native researcher reflexive on the subject matter under study. It is hoped that this study would achieve its intended purpose.
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APPENDIX A. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (CF)

1. The relationship between UMNO and the Malays
2. The ideological adversary of UMNO
3. The social adversary of UMNO
4. The ideological conflict
5. Ideologies reconstructed or represented
6. Models
APPENDIX B. ANALYTICAL GUIDELINE FOR PROCESSING SPEECH TEXT MATERIAL (VAN DIJK, 1998, AND JAGER, 2001)

1. Processing the text material for structure analysis

1.1 Context: Type of communicative event

1.2 Context: Types of participant and participant roles

The relationship between UMNO and the Malays (Index 1)

1.3 Topic

2. Processing the text material for fine analysis of ideological discourse fragments in speech texts

2.1 Local meaning

2.1.1 Presence/absence of information in semantic representation derived from event models

2.1.2 Expression/suppression of information in the interests of speaker/writer

2.1.2.1 Express/emphasize information positive about Us.

2.1.2.2 Express/emphasize information negative about Them.

2.1.2.3 Suppress/de-emphasize information positive about Them.

2.1.2.4 Suppress/de-emphasize information negative about Us.

2.1.3 Implications for social group or social issue

2.1.4 Rhetorical means

2.1.4.1 Detail and level of description
2.1.4.2 Implicitness/explicitness, presupposition

2.1.4.3 Local coherence

2.1.4.4 Lexicalization (vocabulary style), as mitigation, euphemism, nominalization

The ideological adversary of UMNO (Index 2)

The social adversary of UMNO (Index 3)

The ideological conflict (Index 4)

Ideologies reconstructed/represented (Index 5)

Models (Index 6)
APPENDIX C. SPEECHES ON ISLAM HADHARI, 2004-2008


4. “The Challenges confronting Muslim nations,” delivered at the International Islamic University of Islamabad, Islamabad, Pakistan, February 17, 2005, on occasion of the conferment of the honorary doctorate degree of laws.


13. “Islam, modernization and globalization,” delivered at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 24, 2006, on occasion of the conferment of the honorary doctorate in Islamic thought.


16. “Presenting the true face of Islam to the world,” delivered at the State Institute of International Relations, Moscow, Russia, June 20, 2007.

