Resurrecting the Red Dragon:
A Case Study of Welsh Identity

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Dianne E. Selden

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This thesis titled
Resurrecting the Red Dragon:
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by
DIANNE E. SELDEN

has been approved for
the Department of Political Science
and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Myra Waterbury
Assistant Professor of Political Science

Benjamin M. Ogles
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
ABSTRACT

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Despite increases in globalization and multiculturalism, national identities acutely influence politics on both domestic and international levels. Through a qualitative analysis of Welsh identity, I examine how contemporary phenomena such as supra-state institutions influence national identities. Instrumental, political identity has increased in the Welsh case in part as a result of involvement in the European Union and of devolution. The Welsh case shows trends in modern nationalism, with many national identities becoming increasingly instrumental and decreasingly cultural.

Approved: ________________________________________________

Myra Waterbury
Assistant Professor of Political Science
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND IDENTITY

Despite increased globalization, growing supranationalism, and expanding acceptance of multiculturalism, regional and national identities have not disappeared. In fact, these regional and sub-state identities may have grown stronger despite these seeming adversities. The nation of Wales within the United Kingdom (U.K.) is an example of a region where national identity is consolidating. More than ten years after the U.K. devolved specific governmental powers to Wales, identity markers such as language use, politics, and culture intimate that Welsh identity has strengthened. If it has changed, why? While it may seem surprising, I expect to find that globalized international institutions such as the European Union (EU) and state action toward sub-state regions are two factors that bolster instrumental national identity.

Where states are faced with globalization, immigration, and multiculturalism, national identity seems to gain ground. When states acknowledge nationalist concerns and provide nations with the tools for stronger self determination, national identity also seems to strengthen, without necessarily entailing anti-state sentiment or calls for secession from the state. Understanding sub-state nationalism is important in the study of modern-day politics and democracy because states, especially EU member states, increasingly are devolving power to these nations. Political philosopher Kymlicka asserts that lately “all Western democracies that contain sizeable sub-state nationalist movements have moved in this direction (toward territorial autonomy). … All groups over 250,000 that have demonstrated a desire for (territorial autonomy) now have it in the West, as well as many smaller groups (such as the German minority in Belgium)” (Kymlicka 47). Sub-
state nationalism also increasingly reshapes state policy agendas (Beland and Lecours 677). In the U.K., the state policy of devolution allowed regions to take on governing powers that once were reserved for the state. Because devolution is a continuing process, state policy agendas might further be altered.

   Early in February 2010, Assembly Members (AMs) at the National Assembly for Wales (NAW) voted positively on a “trigger” vote to decide whether Wales should have a referendum requesting more devolved powers. If the U.K. Parliament were to devolve more powers to Wales, the state policy regarding nations would be changed. Nations that receive greater credibility from states might see an increase in nationalism. In the context of the Scottish parliament’s increased independence discussions, the Welsh conception of devolution could lead to its Assembly becoming a law-making Parliament. For the first time in its history, the nation of Wales could create laws separated from the English laws for Welsh citizens. From the U.K. state perspective, too, nationalism is having an increased impact. In March, the Scottish National Party and the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid Cymru, announced they have formed a coalition preceding the 2010 Westminster elections. As of yet, we do not know how the combined resources of both parties will affect U.K. policy. Despite increased public discourse concerning devolution and even secession, I assert that Welsh nationalists will not broach the topic of secession from the U.K. in the near future because involvement with and protection from the state are still in the nation’s best interests. My thesis will take these events into account and analyze their possible repercussions.
Welsh politics show that Welsh identity and nationalism are proliferating very quickly. Within thirty-one years, Wales has shifted from a nation that refused to accept increased political powers to a nation that is undertaking more and more steps toward obtaining law-making powers. In the devolution referendum of 1979, only 20 percent of Welsh voters supported devolution. In 1997, that number rose to just over 50 percent. As Welsh Member of Parliament (MP) Adam Price said, “Wales nearly voted itself out of existence… twice” (Price, speech to the Institute of Welsh Politics). Examining the constructivist vision of present politics might explain why Wales is considering further powers and even why Wales is not considering drastically enhanced powers. It might also explain why Welsh nationalism has not manifested in violence. Could the increasingly Cardiff-centered Welsh politics signify an increasingly Welsh-centered identity within the U.K.?

Identity is a useful and pivotal basis from which to examine U.K. politics. It has both objective and subjective qualities, along with perceptible effects. According to theorists Smith and Wistrich, identity “is not fixed but is indeed a process… People are objectively located in relation to certain collectivities at any given point in time and in their lives and subjectively react to them” (Smith and Wistrich Collective Identities 10). This process of action/reaction means that, by nature, identity involves constant transformation. This transformation is not a passive evolution, but a social construction, as theorists such as Anderson and Gillis note.

Authors Keith and Pile note that the creation of social identities requires power and the created identities themselves develop power (Keith and Pile “Introduction Part 2”)
29). Soja, a theorist specializing in geopolitics, furthers this concept. He asserts that “space can be made to hide consequences from us, how relations of power and discipline are inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality of social life, how human geographies become filled with politics and ideology” (Soja 6). How space became regions and states, and what that process of becoming entails, is an extraordinary concept. The concept of the state was historically constructed by dominant groups. The current Western system of nation-states developed as the result of feudal states, principalities, and kingdoms adapting to global conditions, through political actions such as war and strategic marriages (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 259-260). For the nation-state to develop as we know it, the state historically had to foster loyalty and create a “national” identity. This so-named national identity was supposed to swallow regional, or sub-state national, identities, but regional identities often survived and cultivated. This theory implies that identity is susceptible to evolution based on many social factors and ideologies, that identity is somewhat fluid, or at least that they undergo significant transformations.

Political scientist Gillis asserts that the revolutions, both political and economical, of the late 1700s brought the most acute changes to the nature of social identity; the change, he asserts, is that while identity once divided people (and belonged to the upper class exclusively), it evolved to unite people (and spread among lower class). He asserts that this unification led to the “demand for commemoration… gradually expanding until, today, everyone is obsessed with recording, preserving, and remembering” (Gillis Commmemorations 7). The memories of national identities in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries “often evoked a myth of ancient independence and precocious statehood, crushed by external repression,” Keating asserts, adding that, “Many contemporary nationality movements, by contrast, have chosen to present themselves as the most European of the Europeans and have rediscovered pre-state traditions of shared sovereignty and pactism [sic], which lend themselves to the new European dispensation” (Keating 1996 25). These recreated histories were bolstered by new research into regional histories in an effort to downplay the role of states in favor of Europeanization, Keating asserts.

Through this new focus on the histories of non-state entities, contemporary discourse has opened to include identity politics. Authors Caplan and Feffer note that in the early twentieth century, “territorial integrity and self-determination came to define interstate relations in the post imperial order. Self-determination wedded the liberal notion of self-rule with nationalism’s principle that every ethnically defined nation should have a state” (Smith and Wistrich 15-16). Despite the rising public consciousness about nations and their evolving relationship with states, discourse concerning nations’ rights did not develop until later in the twentieth century. Kymlicka claims that “…there was no Western discourse of ‘the rights of national minorities’ prior to 1990, either within particular countries or across Europe as a whole” (Kymlicka “The evolving basis of European norms of minority rights.”39). Now, talk of nationalist rights – alongside questions about secession, devolution, and autonomy – abounds throughout the West.

I expect these transformations of popular concepts of identity to be paramount in the Welsh case. Before delving into the topic of identity, however, several further
distinctions must be made. Part of the evolution of identity is the decrease of the cultural form of identity, in which those who identify with a specific group do so on the basis of shared cultural markers, such as ethnicity, language, and religion. While this type of identity seems to continue decreasing, there is a marked increase in a different form of identity: the instrumental kind. This instrumental identity is built on shared processes of decision making and policy beliefs and is more political than cultural in nature. For the purposes of this paper, the identity I address is this instrumental identity in a sub-state, or national, form. It is a dynamic entity that can be boiled down to a regional political consciousness that holds itself separate from and unique compared to other collective political consciousnesses. This identity can be measured through literature and public discussion about politics, sovereignty, policies, and devolution, in addition to gauging how this instrumental identity manifests itself in relation to cultural identity. Often, instrumental identities call on sentiments or collective memories of cultural identity.

In the French language, concepts of nation and state cannot be distinguished; political scientist Hobsbawm would claim this connection is natural since the idea of nationalism was created in the eighteenth century and solidified by the French revolution. (Keating 2001: 20). Yet if we look at the traits of what we now call nationalism, such as public discourse supporting self-determination, we can see nationalism existed prior to our conception of it. In 1320, the Scottish Treaty of Arbroath was a marker of nationalism, albeit in a context of feudalism as opposed to the context of the modern state. (Keating 2001: 20).
There are many definitions for sub-state nationalism: groups united by language, culture, religion, ethnicity, symbols, and myths; “concrete processes of territorial mobilization” seeking “to gain or maintain for a group– the nation– a measure of self-government most often in the form of autonomy or independence;” and groups that “can trace the history (real, reinvented, or imagined) of a cultural or linguistic group in such a way as to emphasize its continuity, resilience, and dynamism” (Beland and Lecours 678). In this work, “national identity” or “nationalism” generally refers to a shared sub-state ideology including culture, ethnicity, language, political preferences, and perception of history in a specific geographic region within an internationally recognized state. For the purposes of this paper, nationalism will not refer to state-level loyalty unless expressly indicated.

I also recognize that nationalism is expressed in a plethora of ways, even within each nation. Individuals’ loyalties and identities can reflect sub-state nation, state, and European sympathies in many levels and combinations. This concept of “nested identities” is important to consider when examining nationalism, not only because every nationalist group expresses identity malleably, but also because each nationalist group’s identity is tied to its specific relationship with other aspects of identity, such as with the state or the world. Theorist Baubock asserts that for many nations, national identity trumps other nested identities. He asserts that “Politically mobilized national minorities, however, consider themselves a polity apart and often rank their minority identity above their association with the larger state” (Baubock 95). Not all nationalists believe loyalty to nation and loyalty to state are contradictory (Connor 123). Nor do all national
identities blossom in the context of their nested identities. Some such as Hobsbawm argue that “As states give up their powers to supra-state institutions and transnational corporations, we end up in a condition of post-modernity in which national identities become less relevant and dysfunctional and where they are superseded by other kinds of association and identity” (McGarry 2001 296). Hobsbawm’s critics, however, note that nationalism appears to be thriving in the globalized European context despite the growth of supra-state institutions.

Certainly, globalization creates a unique context from which to study nationalism. By globalization, I refer to a cross between Moore’s definition of globalization as “increased global economic trade, the liberalization of economic markets, the advance of the multinational corporation to many corners of the globe, and capital mobility” (Moore “Globalization, cosmopolitanism, and minority nationalism” 44) and McGarry’s definition of globalization as represented by increased global communications, a mobile world economy, regional integrated economies, supra-state political institutions, pushes for democratic and human rights, and a global regime (McGarry “Globalization, European Integration, and the Northern Ireland Conflict” 295). Kymlicka points out that globalization did not “extinguish minority national identities” as some predicted, but rather that nationalism retained its strength and spread to become a global phenomenon (Kymlicka “Immigrant integration and minority nationalism” 61). Did this phenomenon serve to streamline nationalism, making national identities more homogenous and less significant? It would seem not; in fact, strengthened national identities could represent a backlash of globalization. McGarry, Keating, and Moore assert that “the cultural
dimension of globalization, with the development of new communications technology, increased travel, the spread of English as the *lingua franca* and increased migration flows, has posed a threat to some minority cultures, and facilitated a nationalist response” (McGarry, Keating, and Moore Introduction *European integration and the nationalities question* 5-6). Moore urges us not to assume that “increasingly common standardized cultural forms will necessarily or automatically translate into the assimilation of minority nations” (Moore “Globalization, cosmopolitanism, and minority nationalism” 45).

Because of globalization, Moore posits that “local and regional forms of social solidarity (are formed and used) to cope with these changes” (Moore “Globalization, cosmopolitanism, and minority nationalism” 49). Globalization, then, creates a distinctive background from which nationalism rises to global prominence.

Nationalism can be viewed through many different lenses within the field of political science. Author Kennedy argues that liberalism is not one of those lenses, because “Liberalism considers individuals as of equal moral worth, free to choose their own ends, while nationalism ‘holds that the nation should be collectively and freely expressed’” (Kennedy 41). Furthering this assertion, Kennedy notes John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian argument about nationalism: nationalists’ “sentiment of nationality’ cannot outweigh the ‘love of liberty’” (Kennedy 41). An important retort would ask whose liberty is in question. Often, those who live in areas that are part of the governing regions of the original state, not the assimilated nations, have more direct power over governance. If the state uses repressive measures on a nation or even ignores a nation’s plea for greater autonomy or representation, does not the nation’s liberty suffer? To this end,
many types of liberals have responses. Kymlicka claims that from a liberal multicultural lens, nationalists “have a valid claim, not only to tolerance and non-discrimination, but also to explicit accommodation, recognition, and representation within the institutions of the larger society” (Kymlicka 2001 65). This can be expressed by education that includes the minority’s history and culture and checking the media’s stereotypes or complete ignorance of minorities. Also, consider the quasi-communitarian argument that nationalism helps liberal democracies work (Kennedy 42). If the state’s goal truly is liberty, the state should not dismiss nationalists. Dismissing a group of people who feel their freedom has been usurped or hindered by assimilation into a state could cause the nation to secede or use violence against the state. If the state offers the nation better political representation and the means to shape its own institutions, the democratic process will have increased the overall liberty of the state. McGarry, Keating, and Moore assert that “the spread of global norms on human rights has arguably made minorities more resistant to a subordinate status than they once were. We now live in a world where discrimination and/or alien rule is more difficult to justify. The spread of norms of self-determination, brought about first by decolonization, and then by the emergence of multiple new states in Eastern Europe, may also have reinforced pro-independence arguments from minority nationalist leaders” (McGarry, Keating, and Moore Introduction European integration and the nationalities question 5-6). Is this the case when it comes to British devolution? To ascertain the Welsh political climate and to understand the nation of Wales within the U.K. state, tools from the constructivist school of thought, such as an in-depth, historical, and contextual analysis, will be useful.
What, if anything, is Wales entitled to as a British nation? Article 27 of the UN’s 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights says that religious or linguistic minorities within states are entitled “to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language” (Kymlicka “The evolving basis of European norms of minority rights.”40). However, this article does not offer as much clarity on the question as one might assume; because of its vague wording, the article can be applied to any person, such as a tourist in a foreign country, and thus is often not used for anyone at all (Kymlicka “The evolving basis of European norms of minority rights.”41). States and suprastate institutions, then, are left to deal with nations on their own.

I chose to study Wales because the Welsh case is a natural experiment from which I can examine whether national identity is increasing in the context of globalization and, if so, why it is increasing and what the increase entails. The purpose of this study is to evaluate and interpret the state of Welsh identity. Wales is a small nation with a population of only three million people, or about five percent of the population of the U.K., but matters of Welsh identity have broader implications. I intend to examine the twentieth and twenty-first century evolution of Welsh nationalism and research potential causes of any changes in the strength of Welsh identity. I also suspect the Welsh case represents general trends among other nations within states (Belgium, Scotland, the Catalans and Basques). Because there are many other nations within states, including potential EU member states, examining how nations behave within states and how states respond to nations is a crucial to the realm of political science.
Examinations of literature about Wales, nationalism, and globalization have led me to suspect that two factors influence changes in Welsh nationalism and identity above all others: first, involvement in the EU; second, devolution in the U.K. Most literature on U.K. devolution and European integration focuses on Scotland and Northern Ireland. Many political scientists have examined how Scottish identity impacted devolution and Scottish involvement with the EU. Consider Hepburn’s assertion in “Scottish Autonomy and European Integration” in *European Integration and the Nationalities Question* that Scotland used its preexisting constitutional goals for autonomy and expanded them to include European representation. Welsh nationalists, too, have turned to European representation as a form of increasing self-determination.

Most literature, however, parcels Wales with Scotland when it comes to European goals. Demczyk’s dissertation for Miami University entitled “Political Expression of Regional Identity in Scotland and Wales” asserts that the EU has increased “the political expression of regional identity” in Scotland and Wales. Examining Wales in line with Scotland is problematic because of several basic differences between the two nations, including different devolution settlements. One basic difference is that there was little to no collective Welsh identity prior to the late twentieth century. Because of this, Wales provides a useful case to study the modern phenomenon of nationalism. Many theorists have questioned how the development of supra-state institutions such as the EU and how globalization affect states and nations. Some theorists, as McGarry, Keating, and Moore point out, are inclined to believe that either these changes would crush nationalism or
create an anarchic environment in which nationalism would prove to be disadvantageous.

They assert:

Some ‘post-nationalists’ have focused more narrowly on European integration, arguing that it portends the erosion of nationalism, and the creation of new overlapping and multiple forms of identity linked to an overarching Europeanness. … Others have resurrected the nineteenth-century distinction between the nationality of large, established states (good) and that of stateless nations and minorities (bad). … This is part of a long tradition in which minority nations were presented as dysfunctional, atavistic, romantic carry-overs of a different and bygone world order. They were regarded as uncivilized, as vessels for ethnocentrism and illiberalism, and obstacles to social justice and solidarity. Nationalism was not only unattractive and unattainable, it was also dangerous: because there are an infinite number of potential nations; and unnecessary, because nations are not real, but the creation of states are state-aspiring nationalist intellectuals who mobilize the masses behind their projects (McGarry, Keating, and Moore Introduction European integration and the nationalities question 4-5).

Nationalism, however, has not been absorbed into Europeanness nor has it become dysfunctional or anachronistic. Despite globalization, supranationalism, and multiculturalism, nationalism is a growing phenomenon, a political tool to deal with internal fractures in states. Why is minority nationalism rising? Some say nations form “the basic building-blocks of the new global economy” while others believe that “the powerful state and the international order of the cold war suppressed ancient ethnic sentiments and hatreds that erupted as soon as the lid was taken off” while others still say “ethnic and national identities are said to be fabricated by political elites in order to take advantage of the changing international conditions” (Keating and McGarry 2001 5). But all of these theories are problematic because they overlook some portion of “the interplay between historical, economic, cultural, and political factors” (Keating and McGarry 2001 5). Therefore, I will examine Welsh history, economy, culture, and politics to grasp
Welsh identity and I will use the EU and U.K. devolution to study how that identity might be impacted by globalization.

How does involvement in the EU affect national identity? Does it provide the tools nations need to increase their identities, or does it limit national identity? I predict that it provides the tools nations need to solidify nationalism. Discourse with other nations within states lead to self confidence and optimism about increased self determination. As McGarry and Keating assert, one way to measure this prediction is by looking at the economic impact of the EU on Wales. They assert that the EU bolsters nationalism mostly through economic empowerment, but studying the EU’s politics and influences on culture are equally important.

Does the E.U.’s possible impact on national identity render states as we know them obsolete? Most likely not. Keating argues that nations still need states contrary to some assertions that European integration dissolves nation-states in his chapter “Europe, the state and the nation” in European Integration and the Nationalities Question. Sasse points out that the EU must concede to states in order to survive, so it only supports nationalism when it is in the state’s interest (2006). Is Welsh nationalism in the U.K. state’s interest? If nationalism leads to decentralization, which it has in the Welsh case, and decentralization helps states survive in an age of globalization, one might assume it is. The U.K. has many interests and activities; allowing Wales to govern its own affairs frees up the U.K. parliament to focus on broader concerns, such as security and international affairs.
How does devolution affect identity? Does it create more equality within the political climate or does it continue to reflect existing power dynamics? Keith and Pile raise a scathing review of how politics before devolution might have been oppressive and how post-devolution politics still retain traces of oppression in their introduction to *Place and the Politics of Identity*. One of their main assertions is that by keeping nationalities away from political power, states benefit financially and politically. Pre-devolution U.K. politics were not intended to be inevitably oppressive to the Welsh, although the state’s quest for control often highlighted the weak and divided Welsh identity. Prior to Europeanization and devolution, there seemed to be little need for exclusively Welsh politics.

The Europeanized political atmosphere created space for nations within its context, allowing the devolution discussion to occur in the U.K. as part of a larger devolution discourse in the European framework. Once devolution was in place, it had several independent effects on Welsh identity. These include increased self awareness, representation, and self-determination. Devolution also allows Welsh citizens to give greater credibility to their language and culture. These effects intermingle to amplify a Welsh sense of self, sans reliance on England, allowing Wales to forge a separate idea of what it is from the idea of Welshness that England created and Wales once embraced. This theory calls for an examination of how national identity affects states. Does an increased national identity decrease state unity, or can strong regional identities exist without being detrimental to states? In other words, does a strengthening national identity lead to the demise of states as we know them, leaving in place a multitude of independent
nations? McGarry and Keating warn against viewing nation-oriented political evolutions as necessarily leading to independence (2006). Instead, these evolutions must simply be viewed as transformations within their own unique contexts. One such context is that devolution is becoming a trend for democracies, or so Kymlicka asserts in *European Integration and the Nationalities Question*. Devolution provides the framework for nations to reflect on and solidify their concepts of national identity. In Britain, Welsh nationalism has increased since devolution, according to Guibernau. This intensification of nationalism after devolution has occurred in other states, such as Canada and Spain, as well, according to Guibernau, Beland and Lecours, and Maddens and Vanden Berghe.

Devolution is a growing trend in European countries, and researching these questions through the case of Welsh identity can provide insights into how other devolved areas might respond to devolution. My research will provide groundwork to begin studying the impact of national identity, and will help map nationalist trends. One theory, as articulated by McGarry, Keating, and Moore, is that the EU fosters national dependency that supersedes a nation’s dependence on its state (McGarry, Keating, and Moore 6). If Welsh nationalists depend more on the EU than on the UK, might they seek further separation from the U.K? Narrower implications of my research include helping to untangle the web of confusion that surrounds identity politics, beginning to define the current Welsh identity in context to its historical identity and the London-centered perception of Welsh identity, and predicting how Wales will act within the U.K. and how the U.K. will act in response to Wales.
Because this case study focuses on identity, quantitative research currently cannot lend to a complete understanding of my topic. Using a qualitative case study allows me to test my hypothesis that the EU and devolution have changed or created a Welsh identity within the context of their histories and the current, evolving political climate. It is easier to succumb to bias in qualitative research, especially when interpreting results, but I hope to avoid bias by examining a wide spectrum of theories and statistics. By reviewing secondary literature along with mainstream and alternative media, I will have a rough picture of how different groups (i.e. EU politicians, U.K. politicians, Welsh politicians, U.K. citizens, and Welsh citizens) view Wales and themselves in relation to Wales. By examining secondary literature and media in addition to public opinion polls, I hope to show that Welsh identity is in fact shifting. Next, I believe I will find evidence that identity and politics impact each other, that the changing Welsh identity is tied to the changing political processes in Europe. Again, secondary literature in addition to discourse analysis will be my best medium for analyzing identity’s relationship to politics.

With Welsh identity as my dependent variable, I focus on involvement in the E.U. and devolution as my independent variables. Obviously, other factors, such as new media and the resurrection of a historic language, play an important role in Welsh identity. However, because both the EU and the U.K. have prioritized record keeping and have been popular discussion topics among political scientists, I have enough information to effectively measure the variables of the EU and devolution on Welsh identity. My hypothesis is that independently the EU and devolution have impacted Welsh identity,
and that an increased Welsh identity and nationalism have created a climate in which Wales is better able to handle political self-rule. I will test my hypothesis through literature reviews, discourse analysis, and public opinion surveys.

My thesis will concisely show my analysis of the aforementioned components of my study. In order to best relay the results, I will not write my thesis in a chronological manner. It would be more difficult to explore the specific effects of my variables on Welsh identity through a chronological examination. Therefore, my thesis will be arranged by topic, starting with Welsh history and identity and leading into the EU and devolution.

First, I will provide an overview of Welsh history and illuminate the historical context of Wales in the U.K., leading to an analysis of the current state of Welsh identity. Then I will gauge how, if at all, it differs from historic Welsh identity. I examine this through markers such as language, economics, culture, literature, politics, the NAW, Plaid Cymru (the Welsh nationalist party) and public discourse. It is my hypothesis that Welsh identity has become more synchronized and more expressive, and that the Welsh case represents a trend for other nations and their identities.

Then I will explore how the EU and devolution influence Welsh identity. I will examine literature about how the EU impacts identity and will specifically research how it impacts Welsh identity. I predict the EU opens channels of communication that allow philosophies of nationalism to blossom in states. This legitimizes the nationalist context within states, serving to bolster nationalism. I will also explore how devolution impacts identity and will illuminate its effect on Welsh identity. I predict that devolution has a
strong influence on making national identity more expressive and accepted. I will also address cases similar to the Welsh case, such as with other U.K. nations, Belgium, the Catalans and the Basque, which have each dealt with the concepts of national identity within states. Examining these cases will allow me to see if the EU’s and devolution’s effects on Wales are actually broader trends in nationalism.

Lastly, I will examine how Wales could respond to evolving devolution settlements. I will explore the possibilities and explain what each possibility could entail for national identity. While it is not likely that Wales should call for secession from the U.K., it may seek further devolution. Devolution could strengthen identity, if the nation feels it is better capable of handling its own affairs, have no effect on identity, weaken identity, or it could lead to stronger state-centrism. I will then summarize my findings and conclude my thesis, having successfully exposed the case of Welsh identity in the dawn of the twenty-first century.
CHAPTER 2: WELSH HISTORY AND WELSH IDENTITY

Some argue that devolution is little more than a fluke, since Wales has been assimilated into the U.K. for centuries. Morgan notes “To adopt the terms of that notorious entry in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*—in which were encapsulated all the humiliation and the patronizing indifference which helped to launch the modern nationalist movement in the principality—‘for Wales, see England’. Wales, it seemed, existed on a lower stratum from England, Scotland, or even Ireland. It belonged to prehistory” (Morgan 3). Some argue that even if the borders of Wales can be separated from England, Welsh identity is little more than a daydream founded on illusions. According to this thread, the nation of Wales is blossoming not because of its past, but in spite of its past and because of its collective cultural rewriting of its past. Morgan asserts that: “It is in Wales the product, broadly, of a number of factors during the last two centuries; a cultural revival beginning in the eighteenth century, a religious revival beginning in the eighteenth century but rising to a zenith in the nineteenth, and an institutional revival, often political, beginning in the nineteenth century, and spreading during the twentieth. People of varying persuasions have been concerned to ‘understand Wales’, to ‘save Wales’ and to ‘serve Wales’. But they must have inherited some inchoate and passive people, culture, or society, which they find worth understanding or saving or serving. The logical basis for all their efforts, to make Wales a cultural unit, a religious unit, a political unit inside Britain, or a political unit outside Britain, is the survival of a Welsh people from a very ancient time” (Morgan “Welsh National Consciousness— the historical background” 14). According to this light, every state must
base its state-centered nationalism on “some inchoate and passive people, culture, or society”- to call upon the past and expect a people to feel something is to expect the present to find resonance in the past. Often, whether through ethnicity, shared experience, or redesigned historical consciousness, this resonance exists and becomes a main drive for people of certain areas or cultures to celebrate their area or culture and to prevent their past, real or fictionalized, from becoming obsolete. I believe Morgan’s theory ignores the importance of collective impulses and passions and of cultural consciousness in general. Wherever ideas of collective consciousness begin, they become real and have genuine effects on their people’s present and future. Wales’ perceptions of a collective history are an important part of how Wales perceives itself today.

**Welsh history**

In order to analyze the current state of Welsh identity and whether it has changed, we must first understand the historic context of Welsh identity. To best provide a basis for historic Welsh identity, I will first provide a brief history of the nation of Wales. Wales, also known as Cymru, first was understood as a geographic region with a specific people in the fifth and sixth centuries; in literature, the Welsh originally were “semi-Romanized Britons” in the western highlands who stood up to English attackers (Morgan “Welsh National Consciousness- the historical background”15). In some ways, Wales was Romanized; it accepted Roman imperial civilization and converted to Christianity. However, according to Morgan, when the Romans left “a version of the native ‘Celtic’ civilization which had been theirs before the Romans arrived, and which historians call
‘Brythonic’, reappeared, in language, literature and other arts. The Welsh for many centuries continued to claim that they were true heirs of the crown of Britain, they the true and only Britons, and indeed up to the eighteenth century, British was an adjective applied to the Welsh not to England or Great Britain” (Morgan “Welsh National Consciousness- the historical background” 15-16). However united they were or how truly they claimed to be Britons, their historical reality never culminated in a politically centralized body. The people of Wales were dispersed throughout the landscape. Sometimes, kingdoms consolidated under specific leaders, such as Hywel Dda in the mid-900s. This isolation and lack of cohesion left them susceptible to invasion.

From 1090 to 1282, Wales was invaded by the Normans and much intermingling of these ethnic groups occurred (Morgan “Welsh National Consciousness- the historical background” 16). A few Welsh kingdoms held steady against foreign invaders. Gwynedd was one of these kingdoms, under the leadership of Llywelyn I and II, in the 1200s. However, these kingdoms survived only by paying homage to and catering to the political whims of English kings (Morgan, P. 1973 16). Some Welsh wanted to shake off the English, unify Wales, and become independent. Owain Glyndwr opposed Henry IV from 1400 to 1410, but was unsuccessful (Morgan, P. 1973 16). By the 1500s, the English kings were not content with the homage settlement and sought official regency over the nation. The 1536 Act of Union, unlike those for Scotland and Ireland, “completely assimilated Wales into the English political, administrative and ecclesiastical system and penalized the Welsh language” (Loughlin 39). Some Welshmen supported the act because they saw in it the chance for centralization and peace, and many Englishmen
assumed “that Welshmen could easily get over the harsh post-Glyndwr anti-Welsh laws, that Welsh life flourished happily in the confusion of little lordships of the Principality and the Marches, and… turned the upper classes away from local Welsh life and oriented them culturally and politically toward London” (Morgan, P. 1973: 17). Indeed, the 1500s were the beginning of the political, religious, and social assimilation of the Welsh into England. England, all the while, considered the Welsh far inferior. This frame of mind became evident when, in 1689, the English abolished the Council of Wales, whose job it had been to represent the Welsh people (Morgan, P. 1973 18).

Yet these assimilations were not complete. The Welsh maintained a sense of being separate from the English, perhaps because the English treated them differently. When Britain embraced historical revivals in the 1700s, the Welsh manifested their Welshness through creating and embracing great mythic histories. Morgan asserts that “the discovery of a remote past, the Druids and the Celts and others, had an astonishing effect upon the Welsh” (Smith and Wistrich 22). This revival pushed into the nineteenth century, when economic forces united Wales as nothing previously had.

Industrialization invigorated the Welsh. By 1856, a Welsh national anthem had been created, albeit not recognized by the English (Morgan 1981: 92). The Welsh landscape, which was comprised of mountains and wetlands and very little arable land, was further divided by the English railway system. Morgan asserts that the English “transport and the communications network served to divide the Welsh people from each other still further,”” but he also notes that “the Welsh people retained their identity and their elements of unity” (Morgan 1981: 8). With industrialization, a new middle class,
English by birth, began replacing the small landed elites as controllers of “municipal life” through local government, justice, and society (Morgan 1981:10).

The Welsh economy was the epitome of dichotomy in rural and industrial society; rural areas were the poorest of the poor and industrial areas faced “uncontrolled expansion” (Morgan 1981:59). The Welsh were noticeably worse off than their English counterparts, and the gulf in Wales between the English elite and the Welsh workers began to cause unrest. The Welsh responded by creating institutions that came to be markers of Welsh identity, such as higher education systems and literary and cultural celebrations. Three Welsh colleges were founded, one each in Cardiff, Bangor, and Aberystwyth in the late 1800s. In 1880, the national eisteddfod, a celebration of Welsh literature and culture, was reorganized (Morgan 1981:97). Especially with the eisteddfod, concern arose about the Welsh cultural dependence on created history. Morgan notes that “There was criticism, too, of the bogus, folksy pageantry that surrounded its ceremonial, and of ‘Hwfa Mon’ for retaining his faith in the authenticity of the bardic past in the face of all scholarly evidence to the contrary” (Morgan 1981:97). Still, such celebrations gave the people of Wales something to call their own and helped form a national identity. Morgan asserts that Welsh culture built up also through the spread of nonconformist chapels and “friendly societies, working men’s institutions, choral festivals and cymanfaoedd canu, ‘penny readings’, local theatrical and operatic societies…. All these by-products of popular folk culture flourished more richly than ever before or since” (Morgan 1981:72). These markers resulted in national feelings of unity, growth, and optimism, in a thick, cultural identity.
In 1884, the British Reform Act expanded voting to farmers and industrial workers, allowing the majority of the population of Wales to engage in British politics for the first time (Morgan 1981: 27). In 1886, the Welsh Parliamentary Party formed to deal with economic and social problems. By 1911, 25 million tons of coal and anthracite, which were highly in demand because of their “fine burning qualities,” were exported from Wales (Morgan 1981: 62). By 1913, Welsh coal comprised about thirty-three percent of the world’s coal exports and about forty percent of British coal exports (Morgan 1981: 125). The Welsh contribution to the U.K. –and world- economy was significant.

The first, and only, Welsh-born British Prime Minister was Lloyd George, who served as PM from 1916 until 1922. He came to office during a time when the Welsh were infused with “the spirit of social equality and of civil libertarianism, modified always by the ethic of middle-class chapel respectability,” yet they were flippantly dismissed by the Conservatives and imbued with feelings of unrest and tension (Morgan 1981: 53, 57). Lloyd George acknowledged the Welsh and the poor state their nation was in; according to Morgan, he “did more than any other man to make Wales a political reality and a political fact” (Morgan 1981: 36).

World War I united the British, even those national factions seeking autonomy, under the U.K. state. Many Welsh soldiers served in the war, partially because the war was seen as a fight “for Welsh national libertarian values” and for small, helpless nations in general (Morgan 1981: 160-161). The post-war mood was less sympathetic to cooperation with the U.K. state. The Welsh gave in to “disillusion, cynicism, and…
despair,” partly because they felt the British would continue abandoning them despite
their involvement in the war (Morgan 1981: 180). Nationalist sentiments rose. In 1925,
Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru (what is now called Plaid Cymru) formed, in what is
considered a consequence of WWI, merging two nationalist groups, Byddin Ymreolwyr
Cymru (Welsh Home Rule Army) and Y Mudiad Cymreig (the Welsh movement), that
had mostly been comprised of peace activists during war (Morgan 1981: 206). When
Plaid became more conventional, a party split “was avoided by the creation, in 1962, of a
separate Welsh Language Society. This effectively served as a division of labor, enabling
Plaid to distance itself from the image of being a radical Welsh language pressure group
and brand itself as a more inclusive nationalist political party with a broad socioeconomic
program for Wales” (Elias 196).

For some, the lack of data about Wales and the Welsh contribution to the British
economy offered another reason to reexamine the Welsh relationship with the English.
Professor Edward Nevin from the university in Aberystwyth estimated that between 1948
and 1962, “the amount which Wales paid in taxes to the central government exceeded
current government expenditure in Wales by some £50 million” (Thomas 73). Critics of
this theory argue other expenditures were made on Wales’ behalf and that it didn’t
include the government’s capital expenditures of Wales (Thomas 74). However, no
official U.K. economic data was conducted on Wales alone, so the state of the Welsh
economy’s relationship to the British economy remains unclear. By the 1970s, Wales was
more prosperous than the Republic of Ireland, possibly making it a better candidate for
decentralization. Thomas asserts that Wales “would be in a very much stronger position
economically than almost all of the Commonwealth countries that have been granted political independence in the post-war period” (Thomas 73). Still, most believed Wales depended on England much more than England depended on Wales for economic benefit (Thomas 85). Without evidence, however, the economic climate of the mid-1900s served to further propel Wales towards reform. The English could not ignore the Welsh once they had organized under a common cause: to gain greater representation for and acknowledgment of Welsh life, including more data pertaining to Welsh economy and culture.

Another point marking greater representation for the Welsh was the creation of the Welsh Office in 1964; within ten years it was headed by a Secretary of State who held Cabinet rank (Talfan Davies 93-94). This office allowed a specific set of personnel to deal with Welsh issues, instead of having each issue wrung through a convoluted system of various committees. The office also gave Welsh politicians and citizens more access to the committees and policy makers that affected their lives (Talfan Davies 97-98). For all its benefits, though, the Welsh Office had some drawbacks. Since it was located in London, the office showcased how far politics were removed from the people of Wales. As Rhys Davies of the Welsh journal The Planet said, “Whereas previously consideration of Welsh needs would normally be included in drawing up national strategy in a particular field, this duty is now sometimes considered to have been discharged if a draft of proposals which will affect the whole of the United Kingdom, but which have been arrived at after examination of the Welsh situation, is passed to the Welsh Office for comment at a stage when only revisions are possible” (Talfan Davies “The Welsh Office
and the Council” 99). Those who had placed their hope for better representation in the Welsh Office were bitterly disappointed. By the late 1960s, this disappointment had manifested itself in language activism as well as in the U.K. by-elections, with regional parties gaining major ground, and the devolution dialogue began (Wigley 1992:73-83).

These regional parties pushed the U.K. government to explore how the current political system affected the nations and regions. Radical Welsh nationalists committed guerilla activities attempting to elevate the status of the Welsh language. Gareth Miles rode his bike around town with a person on the front, which was illegal, until he was arrested; he then refused to take part in the legal process unless it was conducted in Welsh (Hannan 2004: 63). Emyr Llewellyn chose a more dangerous activist route: he planned to plant a bomb in a reservoir; when he was caught, he was sentenced to a year in jail (Hannan 2004:63). This was a seemingly light sentence considering Llewellyn’s actions could count as attempted terrorism. Perhaps the state did not want to draw attention to violent nationalism, perhaps it did not want to give nationalists a reason to rally, or perhaps it was beginning to acknowledge the new prominence of nationalism. This nationalism was different from the earlier thick, cultural nationalism. It was a time when people felt isolated from each other, when chapel attendance was dwindling as was the Welsh language. This new nationalism was a fiery response to the seeming death of a culture; it was an instrumental effort to get the Welsh to see themselves in and demand a separate political sphere from general British politics. Nationalists felt Britain did not meet Welsh needs, and campaigns for Welsh political autonomy increased. In 1967, the U.K. passed the Welsh Language Act, which allowed Welsh to be spoken in public courts and
administrations. A Commission of Inquiry was formed to study the relationship between Westminster and the nations and regions of the UK” (Elias “198). This Commission noted that the Welsh not only needed more outlets for political discussion, but that they also lacked adequate representation.

When the Labour party narrowly returned to power in 1974, beating the Conservatives, they needed the support of the Scottish Nationalist Party and Plaid Cymru. According to Elias, “The bargaining leverage accorded the nationalists led to significant concessions from the government on the issue of constitutional reform, and paved the way for the 1979 referendum on devolution for Scotland and Wales” (Elias  198). In Wales, Labour had traditionally been the party for the Welsh miners and workers. It was a sort of nationalist party in the sense that many people who, either culturally or politically, saw themselves as uniquely Welsh identified with the Labour party. The general Welsh population was not on par with Plaid-Cymru-esque Welsh nationalists about devolution. Labour seemed to support the general Welsh population’s decisions; it was through Labour that the Welsh first were able to vote on devolution, and Labour that legitimized their response to the state. In 1979, the Welsh rejected devolution by 79.7 percent, when less than 60 percent of eligible voters had gone to the polls. Elias’ theory for this rejection is that “By being too closely identified in the eyes of the electorate with devolution and the incumbent administration, a vote for Plaid Cymru was also a vote of sanction for the deeply unpopular Wilson government” (Elias “From ‘full national status’ to ‘independence’ in Europe” 199). Labour indeed had lost the U.K. The Conservatives came into power, and devolution was put on the backburner (Elias “From ‘full national
status’ to ‘independence’ in Europe” 199). Thatcher was about as anti-devolution as they came, working hard to keep the U.K. state united. The Tories valued the whole of the U.K., not its individual parts. In fact, such individualism was extremely contrary to the popular social ideas in Wales. The extent to which the Tories ignored Wales was not lost on the Welsh. According to Assembly documents, between 1945 and 1999, the U.K. passed only eleven acts that pertained to Wales alone.

By the 1990s, Welsh nationalists seemed like a pleasing alternative to outright disregard. When Blair’s Labour party took power in 1997, it made the regions the Tories snubbed a high priority. Blair likely felt Thatcher and her successor John Major’s individualist policies exacerbated the violent conflict in Northern Ireland. To deal with the conflict, Blair had to deal with the nations of the U.K. This time around, the Welsh had formed a political identity cohesive enough to vote for devolution. The Labour party acknowledged these national identities and legitimized their requests for devolution.

Contemporary Welsh identity

Where did this sense of identity begin? Most likely, before written records could depict it existed. This early national identity, as mentioned earlier, was thickly involved with culture. Religion, language, dress, and ethnicity set the Welsh apart from other Brits. Morgan asserts that “The sense of nationality is as old as the Welsh themselves. There were echoes of it even in the writings of Gildas before the time of Bede. The differences between themselves and the English who had conquered them were a constant theme in Welsh poetry and prose throughout the Middle Ages” (Morgan 1981: 90). Yet this
identity did not become cohesive or vital until the early to mid-1800s, when Welsh national identity re-emerged, “vague and unfocused,” according to Morgan. *Nationalism* was not present, Morgan asserted, but *national identity* was. He asserts, “They had undeniably their own language, spoken by a clear majority of the population at a time when Gaelic in Scotland and Erse in Ireland were manifestly in retreat and spoken only by remote... communities… The Welsh retained their own legends, their own folk memories and songs, a sense of shared experience and suffering over the centuries, with myths in abundance from Arthurian days down to the cultural renaissance of the eighteenth century” (Morgan 1981: 90-92). Alan Butt Philip asserted that modern, instrumental Welsh identity is comprised of three parts: an ideology centered on self-government; a societal movement for nationalist demands; and a nationalist consciousness imbedded in the population (Butt Philip 316). Yet this instrumental identity still calls upon its cultural roots. Politicians use cultural memories and markers to appeal to the Welsh, even to those who never considered themselves attached to the thickly cultural identities. AM Jenny Randerson called the Welsh culture “the texture of our living... the aggregate of our actions and aspirations, interests and passions, values and beliefs. ...To the extent that Wales has an image beyond its borders, it is largely based on cultural factors- landscape, language, music, poetry and sport” (“Creative Future: Cymru Greadigol; a cultural strategy for Wales” 2002. 13).

Historic Welsh identity pivoted around a collective perceived notion of being invaded by England and having its resources exploited by England. This notion led to Wales having “a psychological dependency” on London “which engenders feelings of
inadequacy but also resentment” (Loughlin 41). This feeling of inadequacy could help explain why the Welsh chose to remain on the fringes of British politics in 1979, along with the fact that the traditional cultural markers of Welsh identity seemed to be fading. Despite the fading of the cohesive cultural identity, however, a strong civil, instrumental identity developed. This identity utilized the remnants of Welsh cultural identity to encompass the cultural nationalists, but it also expressed its nationalism in political terms. The Welsh present themselves to the world in a creative, independent light, emphasizing their popular traits. Loughlin asserts the new nationalism utilized “traditional image of male voice choirs and ‘how green was my valley’… the success of Welsh rock groups; the new economy; Cardiff Bay; even the new devolved institutions themselves” (Loughlin “The Welsh Case” 60). They also highlight the importance of their film industry, with Welsh landscapes as the backdrop for many films and television shows, such as “Dr. Who” and “Torchwood.”

Such traits not only gain world recognition but also bolster the Welsh economy. McGarry, Keating, and Moore site globalization’s economic impact on the state “has weakened the state’s capacity for managing its economy through tariffs, taxes, and subsidies, and has shifted power from the state to the marketplace” allowing nations to use their economies as another form of national expression and unity (McGarry, Keating, and Moore 5-6). In 1998, Welsh manufacturing brought in seven percent higher GDP than the U.K. manufacturing in general, with the Welsh GDP at 27.8 percent and the U.K. GDP at 20.8 percent (Loughlin 42-44). The next year, the percent of Welsh exports going to the EU, 72.1 percent, exceeded the overall percent of U.K. exports going to the
EU, 60.8 percent (Loughlin 44). The Welsh pride themselves on their industrial history and lament the death of those industries, feelings which remain at the heart of Welsh nationalism.

Language has long been an important aspect of nationalism, and it is a particular interesting phenomenon to examine in Wales. In industrial sections of Wales, Welsh has been absent from most communication for hundreds of years. Welsh generally is spoken more frequently in northern Wales (Lindsay 1), and traditionally has been spoken mostly in northern Wales, western Wales, or in the valleys. Few who live in southern Wales speak Welsh fluently, perhaps because most industrial sections of Wales (and most immigration from England) are in the southern section. Overall, the number of Welsh speakers has oscillated in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with statistics being hard to gauge because of each survey’s different parameters. For instance, some surveys included children aged three and over while others had narrower age limitations; some surveys considered bilingualism the ability to speak one word of Welsh, while others set stricter standards. Still, based on these surveys, one sees that Welsh was a dying language; this could partly be because, for generations, Welsh speakers were penalized in the education system (Price). Perhaps Welsh would be a dead language had Welsh politicians not legislated official bilingualism for the nation. In 1901, 49.9 percent of the Welsh population spoke Welsh (Morgan 1981: 121). By 1911, the percent had dropped to 43.5 (with 35 percent of that 43.5 percent being bilingual) (Morgan 1981:121). Morgan asserts that those who spoke Welsh, however, “were using their language for a wider range of contemporary purposes political and administrative as well as literary and
academic” (Morgan 1981: 121). In 1931, 36.8 percent of the population above the age of three spoke Welsh (Loughlin 45). By 1991, that number was 18.7 percent. According to the Welsh Assembly Government, 21 percent of the Welsh population could speak Welsh in 2001; this means there are about 580,000 Welsh speakers in Wales (“Welsh Language Statistics”). The next U.K. census will measure the number of Welsh speakers in 2011. In 2010, the Assembly passed its first Legislative Competence Order concerning the Welsh language, meaning that it can now pass laws about the Welsh language. One measure the Assembly is tentatively pursuing is creating a position for a Welsh Language Commissioner.

Another tool extending the reach of the Welsh language is literature. Welsh-language periodicals have been popular since the 1890s (Morgan 1981:103). Using the Welsh language permits speakers to share something with each other that non-Welsh speakers cannot share, providing a natural marker for Welsh identity. Many Welsh speakers engage in Welsh literature as a social and political instrument. Welsh poet and the 2002 Welsh National Children’s Laureate Menna Elfyn writes exclusively in Welsh, because, she says, “…my worldview and vocabulary aren’t any smaller than anybody else’s. It could be they are enlarged because I am aware of all the different tiny villages, tiny communities all over the world. … If I’m writing in English, it will not be me because the whole way I see life is through my Welsh language” (Moore Fuller 23). The Assembly supports Welsh literary organizations, such as the Welsh Books Council; in fact, the Welsh Books Council receives £200,000 per year at least until 2012 to promote Welsh-language press. In 2009, the council distributed more than 719,000 items, which
grossed £5 million; they spent more than £750,000 on English-language materials and more than £1.5 million on Welsh-language materials (“Facts” 2010). The fact that more literature about Wales is available for consumption and is being utilized seems to illustrate that the concept of a Welsh-exclusive, or at least Welsh-centered, identity is growing.

In addition to its unique language and literary climate, Wales prides itself on its ability to compete in British cultural markers, such as boxing and rugby. In the early 1900s, Wales produced many boxing champions, but most of the Welsh disliked the fame their countryman brought by violence (Morgan 1981: 133). From 1900 to 1912, the Welsh won the Triple Crown (a rugby competition) six times (Morgan 1981: 133). Journalist Patrick Hannan notes that sports such as rugby were an outlet for the Welsh to rebel against the English. He asserts that “People have failed to understand the significance of rugby in Welsh folklore. Big stadiums and professional players in sponsored cars have no place in it. The important point once was that rugby represented a small nation’s defiance, its cheek, in the face of opponents who had superior natural supplies of everything but spirit” (Hannan 2004 10). The Welsh identity was tied into that opposition and it still retains the elements of Otherness and of being the underdog. When the Welsh had little political representation, the insolence of athletics seemed necessary.

It is complicated to determine whether increased representation could undermine the confrontational nature of Welsh identity because Welsh politics are relatively new. These politics have unified Welsh identity. Hannan asserts that they allow Wales to shape and implement a specific agenda, to give the Welsh common aspirations (Hannan 2004
12). He alleges, “It’s difficult to overstate the way in which a Welsh assembly is likely to change our ideas about our lives and how they are run. Partly it is because the assembly will provide a Welsh focus that has never existed before, Welsh affairs run by people solely answerable to Welsh voters. …The creation of the assembly is the most significant change in a process during which Wales seems, looking back, to have altered at breakneck speed and to have done so, not simply in the creation of new institutions, but in the way in which people have increasingly come to confront the Welsh dimension of public life” (Hannan 2004: 12). Instrumental Welsh identity replaced cultural Welsh identity in bonding the people of Wales. For these reasons, I will further examine the NAW and the Welsh national party, Plaid Cymru, to see how these institutions and organizations affect that Welsh dimension.

**National Assembly for Wales**

In 1997, 50 percent of eligible Welsh citizens voted in the devolution referendum, with devolution narrowly passing. In 1999, the Assembly was established. It was not until 2008, however, that the Assembly passed its first law, which, according to Assembly records, was “the first Welsh law passed since the 10th century” (NAW Annual report and statement of accounts 2008-2009). Soon after, the Assembly conducted a survey that revealed 70 percent of the Welsh people approved of devolution, either partial or full (NAW Annual report and statement of accounts 2008-2009).

While having its own Assembly allows Welsh people to have more direct influence on their politics, it also convolutes the process. Forty of the sixty AMs are
elected by constituency using the first-past-the-post system, and the other twenty AMs are chosen by a second vote on a regional basis. These AMs must present a legislative competence order (LCO) concerning specific fields or matters—i.e., education or agriculture—to Westminster. If the LCO is approved, the Assembly can pass laws—known as assembly measures—on that specific segment of powers. These measures are equivalent to parliamentary acts within the Welsh judicial system. However, Parliament retains many areas of power, such as taxation and security. Also, questions of sovereignty regarding Wales and the EU enable Westminster to enact more control over Wales. Many of the EU’s sovereign areas coincide with the rights of devolved institutions. Whenever these areas coincide (devolved powers and EU powers), “Westminster is able to exercise close supervision over the activities of the devolved governments” (Cole 2006, 73).

According to some researchers, such as Alan Trench, this process “undermines accountability and clarity for electors… it is unclear which government is responsible for what” (“Welsh law process ‘unaccountable’”). A diagram of this process shows the intricacies of the process:
The Assembly currently controls: agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and rural development; ancient monuments and historic buildings; culture; economic development; education and training; environment; fire and rescue services and promotion of fire safety; food; health and health services; highways and transport; housing; local
government; NAW; public administration; social welfare; sport and recreation; tourism; town and country planning; water and flood defense; and the Welsh language (“A guide to the legislative process in the NAW” 2009). These areas might soon expand to include even more devolved duties.

The Labour-Plaid coalition, formed in 2007, prioritized deepening devolution. Prior to its coalition with Plaid, Labour had a coalition with the Liberal Democrats (from 1999 to 2003). The Labour-Lib Dem coalition was not popular with voters, and Labour could not retain enough votes to be the sole leading party. Plaid had been their largest opponent, so it was a rather unexpected move for the two to form a coalition. Plaid had been urging for increased devolution while Labour focused more on social issues. The coalition meant that Labour would have to ask for increased devolution, but it also meant that Plaid had to expand its issues to match Labour’s. Still, the voters of Wales likely found this a better alternative than the proposed Rainbow Coalition, which would have pitted Labour against the joint forces of Plaid, the Tories, and the Lib Dems. The very idea that Plaid and the Tories would form a coalition seems incredible; their politics were extremely disconnected. While the Welsh Tories stopped insisting that devolution was a horrible idea, the British Tories still despised it. Plaid revolved around obtaining devolution and furthering it.

The All Wales Convention, which was established by the Assembly to examine issues of devolution in Wales, suggested that “the transfer of full powers was preferable to the current system” (“More power for Wales says report”). Full-power devolution would not require more than the 60 current AMs and would not be strenuous on the
Assembly’s budget, according to the convention’s report. Plaid AM Helen Mary Jones asserted that, “As a nation, there is recognition that this is not about power for power’s sake but about giving our Welsh government the proper tools it needs to do the job at hand” (“More power for Wales says report”). Yet there is tension from the remnants of the old system, those Welsh politicians who were centered in London. Welsh Secretary of State Peter Hain, whose Welsh Office lost some hegemony with the creation of the Assembly, has voiced his reluctance and animosity towards the Assembly seeking more powers (“More power for Wales says report”). AMs, for their part, express their distaste for the Welsh Office, which they view as a self-serving, not citizen-serving, institution (Howell 226). In February 2010, fifty-three AMs voted in favor of holding a referendum to devolve further powers to Wales. After the vote, Hain had to approve the referendum and draft an order to be voted on by Parliament. With the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in office, PM David Cameron delayed the process, much like Thatcher did throughout the late 1970s until 1990, refusing to consider a referendum until 2011. Future researchers should gauge whether the new government’s snubs concerning Welsh affairs will impact Welsh voter turnout in forthcoming elections.

McAllister and Cole report the number of constituents voting in elections has fluctuated since devolution (McAllister and Cole “Pioneering new politics or rearranging deckchairs?” 542). In the 1997 Westminster general election, 74 percent of Welsh voters attended. The same year, only 50 percent of Welsh constituents voted in the devolution referendum. The following table provides Plaid’s performance in the U.K. general elections.
Table 1

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% vote</th>
<th>Westminster seats</th>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>14.3</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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In 1999, only 46 percent of constituents voted in the Assembly election. Sixty-two percent of Welsh voters turned out to the 2001 Westminster general election, while only 38 percent voted in the 2003 Assembly elections. Sixty-three percent voted in the 2005 Westminster general election, and 44 percent voted in the 2007 Assembly election. Such figures seem to point that Welsh voters feel more obligated to vote in British elections than in Welsh elections. The repeated low turnout for Assembly elections suggests voters are not yet confident with the Assembly, are confused by the political process, do not care about the Assembly, or are displeased with devolution. Future research should analyze the 2011 Welsh elections.

Plaid Cymru

A closer examination of the Welsh nationalist party might better yield insights into the stable or changing nature of Welsh identity. Plaid was established 1925 in response to the immense changes brought by the First World War; certain people in Wales feared their language and culture would fade out of existence in the new world context (Elias 194). To protect its cultural identity, Wales formed an instrumental identity. In the European Free Alliance, Plaid received observer status in 1981 and full
member status in 1984. In 1975, Plaid started the Bureau of Unrepresented Nations which got Plaid in touch with the Breton, Alsace, and Basque nationalist movements. This bureau had an office in Brussels, but it faded out of existence by 1980 (Elias 210). Perhaps because Plaid had better communication with other nationalist movements, it began to form a more distinct ideology at this point. By 1981, Plaid had included word “socialism” with its party goals, in reference to removing economic control from the state by seeking to cooperate with this state while pursuing devolution (Elias 194). The nationalists had begun to define their values, which are an integral building block of identity, as “local democracy, social justice and ‘community socialism’” (Elias 202-203).

Plaid developed three strategic goals: to become “the international voice for Wales,” to incorporate non-Welsh speakers in their nationalist vision, and to form coalitions with non-state institutions sympathetic to ideas of autonomy (Elias 203). By the 1990s, Plaid linked self-determination to European integration (Elias 193). It went so far as to highlight a “two-phase process” towards autonomy: “devolution of a range of powers to a law-making Welsh Parliament” and “the transfer of all remaining Westminster competencies (apart from those already transferred to Brussels) to a fully self-governing Wales” (Elias 204).

From 1979 until 1999, Plaid received increasing support in European elections, but did not receive a Member of the European Parliament until 1999. In 1999, the first-past-the-post system changed to one of proportional representation (Elias 208). In fact, in Wales, Plaid Cymru has often been the main Welsh opposition party, as opposed to the Conservative or Labour Party in the U.K. Oppositional political pressure within Wales
led Plaid to state in 1999 that independence has never been its goal (Elias 211-212). This assertion seemed to boost support for the party, implying that the general population of Wales was not prepared for statehood. The first Plaid MEPs received almost 30 percent of the Welsh vote, closely behind the Labour Party. However, when the fifth Welsh constituency was abolished in 2004, Plaid lost an MEP (Elias 208). Based on Plaid’s acceptance into the European Free Alliance, Plaid’s MEPs sit in the EFA group in the European Parliament, because it is a “ready-made structure” in which Plaid can work effectively (Elias 211).

However, to the people of Wales, the Labour party was practically “ready-made” for them, tied to Welsh identity and consciousness since the industrial revolution. Because the U.K.-wide parties are older and better known and receive more media attention, Plaid faces rigorous competition. The fact that Plaid has maintained its position as the main oppositional party in Wales is testament to the concept that the people of Wales recognize themselves as a people alienated from general U.K. politics, but not completely estranged.

During Welsh elections, support for Plaid has oscillated. It will be interesting to see how the people of Wales vote regarding Plaid since its coalition with Labour. Prior to the coalition, support for Plaid had increased; its place as the major opposition party likely brought it favorable attention. All in all, Plaid has done exceedingly well in a nation that has lost the thick cultural connection to nationalism only to gain a less cohesive political identity. The following table provides the results of Plaid in Assembly elections.
Table 2

Plaid Cymru Assembly election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% constituency votes</th>
<th>NAW seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 3: EUROPEAN UNION, DEVOLUTION, and EXAMINING SIMILAR CASES

Now that we have ascertained that Welsh identity has indeed grown stronger and more cohesive since 1990, we will examine more closely the institutions I predict have had the most impact on this change from civil to political nationalism: the EU and devolution. First, I will provide an overview of the EU and devolution. Then, I will analyze how the EU and devolution affect Welsh identity. Finally, I will compare the EU’s and devolution’s impact on Welsh identity compared to their impact on nations in similar circumstances to Wales. This will allow me to locate any trends in how the EU and devolution affect identity.

The EU

In its present form, the EU is a recent phenomenon whose affects on states and nations has yet to be wholly comprehended. Baubock astutely describes the EU as “a supranational polity that is neither adequately described as a confederation nor as a federal state” (Baubock. 94). In 1993, under the Maastricht Treaty, the European Economic Community (started in 1957), the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community merged into a single entity whose goals included integrating European economies and politics. Citizens of member states gained new identities because they simultaneously became citizens of this supra-state institution (Smith and Wistrich. 7). In 1994, this entity changed its name from the European Community to the EU. A common currency, the euro, was adopted by most member states (although not by the U.K.) in 1999. Despite its development, support for the EU
remains dubious. In 2005, support for EU membership hung at around 50 percent; by 2006, support had risen to 55 percent, but only 50 percent were happy with how the EU expressed democracy (Smith and Wistrich, 1).

Perhaps this tentative support of the EU is related to the questions that still remain about how it will affect its member states. The EU slants the relationship between a state and its nations in a capricious light: the state is no longer the highest entity to which the nation must submit. As McGarry, Keating, and Moore argue that “many policy areas that were once matters of sovereign-state jurisdiction have now been transferred upwards, and are matters to be discussed at the European level, or transferred downwards, to more local levels, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity [sic.]” (McGarry, Keating and Moore 9). These changes render nation-state borders less significant because of the free flow of “capital, goods, and labor” among EU countries, they assert (McGarry, Keating and Moore9).

Despite these purported effects, the EU remains vague on its policies of acknowledging nations, perhaps to avoid tiffs with member states. According to Guibernau, the EU only recognizes “administrative, economic and geographic” regions and regions with a “historical basis and a well-defined cultural identity” (Guibernau, “Nations without states in the EU” 217). If a region meets these demands, how does the EU handle nations? According to Mitchell and Cavanagh, there are two general schools of thought on how the EU deals with nationalism: the intergovernmentalist approach asserts that the EU is state centric to the point of overlooking nationalism, whereas the multi-level governance perspective asserts that non-state actors such as nations
significantly affect the EU and its decision (Mitchell and Cavanagh 247-248). Because the EU depends on its member states and neighbors for survival, Sasse asserts it develops a hierarchy of issues related to sub-state entities that is intended to maintain beneficial relationships with its states; this hierarchy often favors “non-territorialized, internally diverse and marginalized minorities” (Sasse. 69). However, specific policies concerning nations and regions provide a better basis for us to examine the EU’s response to nations.

The Single European Act (SEA) is perhaps the most important EU decision impacting nationalism. It formed a single economic market from its constituent states and regions. Thatcher surprisingly accepted this act; she had not been willing to give political power to regions within her state, but she was willing to give political power to a suprastate institution. Wealthier states feared that, in order to create the single market, their money would be spent on poorer states. To ensure this would not happen, the EU opened up regional funds, with qualifications that regions in most states could meet for funding. Wales, with a little bit of maneuvering, became one of those regions.

The Maastricht Treaty, which formally changed the European Community into the EU, also has sections that support cultural diversity, which the European Parliament has used to support funding for such developments as the Bureau of Less Widely Spoken Languages located in Dublin (Keating. 2006: 27). The Council of Europe, part of the permanent structure of the EU, has a Committee of Regional and Local Authorities, which makes room for both regions and municipalities. From this committee, a European Charter of Local Self Government was created and a European Charter of Regional Self Government was drafted (Keating 2006: 31). Both the Council of Europe’s 1992
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the 1995 Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) support such nationalist functions as “the right to write to public authorities in one’s own language” (McGarry, Keating and Moore, M. 10-11).

These decisions help define minorities and direct states on how to deal with them. Keating asserts, “Membership of a minority is determined by a mixture of self-designation and objective criteria, but signatory states were allowed to designate their own minorities before ratification. Matters covered include the use of language, education, the media, public administration, commercial signs and cross-border contacts” (Keating, Europe, the state and the nation. 27). Baubock asserts these policies have been ineffective because they tip-toe around nations for apprehension of states. Baubock notes that, to date, the EU has ignored claims for political autonomy from “territorially concentrated stateless nations and national minorities” whose states have not formally acknowledged them (Baubock. 100). Other theorists assert that these policies, taken together, advocate “effective participation” for nations. Kymlicka asserts that effective participation has different meanings when used to describe different minorities. If a minority seizes autonomy, using violence, “effective participation is interpreted as supporting federal and/or consociational power-sharing within a multilingual, multination state,” but for peaceful minorities, “effective participation is interpreted as requiring only non-discriminatory participation and equitable representation within a unitary, monolingual state” (Kymlicka 1996: 59.). It was this philosophy, Kymlicka asserts, that led to the EU’s fore-runner recommending territorial autonomy for many regions in the
1990 Copenhagen Declaration (Kymlicka 1996: 55). He asserts this approach is politically correct and relatively effective at preventing violence because it acknowledges the politics of minority ambitions, “while avoiding the ‘dangerous’ and ‘radical’ ideas of national self-determination” (Kymlicka 1996: 55).

After examining the EU’s policies about nationalism, what can we deduce about the EU’s impact on nationalism? The EU might prevent nations from seceding. Keating claims the EU might actually make nations’ statuses more indeterminate because of their lack of impact; in fact, the EU could prevent nations from seceding from states so that nations retain what meager support or representation they get from the EU (Keating. “Nations without states: the accommodation of nationalism in the new state order” 38). Connor furthers this assertion by claiming that “there are many separatist factions who hold out the prospect of full membership in the EU for their nation in order to encourage greater support for independence. Thus, membership in the EU becomes associated with greater, not less, political self-reliance for the group” (Connor 126). Some nationalist groups even seek independence in Europe; at one point in time, Plaid’s slogan for the European elections was “Wales in Europe.” The concept that the EU might allow nations to achieve autonomy is a popular one. Keating furthers this concept by asserting that as the EU grows more expansive in its capabilities, nations feel more confident about seeking independence or autonomy because the risk of separating from the state diminishes (Keating 2006: 32). However, such hopes likely are unfounded. Keating notes that some nations have been less than pleased with how the EU has allowed non-state actors to affect policy. According to Keating, “Frustrated at having to share a place
with municipal governments, the strong regions, stateless nations and federated units launched an initiative for the ‘Regions with Legislative Powers’, or ‘Constitutional Regions’, to gain recognition in the European constitution’ (Keating 2006: 31).

Another impact the EU seems to have on nationalism is supporting, at least in regional context, minority languages. Guibernau asserts that the EU has increased cultural and linguistic diversity, pointing to the fact that the original eleven official languages of the EU (Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish) increased to twenty after the EU enlarged (with Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak and Slovene being added) (Guibernau “Nations without states in the EU” 219). While these are official state languages, the fact that the EU embraces them signals intent to maintain the cultural and linguistic diversity of its member states. Laitin notes that while English trumps even most states’ official languages as the mode of European communication and states maintain their official languages in public education systems, regional languages are encouraged by being incorporated into “regional education systems and bureaucracies” (Laitin 95).

Will these effects be the extent to which the EU will affect nationalism, or will the EU have a more radical effect on nations in the future? Keating asserts that the EU will never become a body of peoples as opposed to of states, but “there is a new form of politics in which nationalities questions can be managed and normalized” (Keating 2006: 23-24). Instead, he asserts, there are four different ways the EU and states can deal with nations: de-ethnicizing nationalist movements and creating doctrines addressing complex issues of sovereignty; removing concepts of democracy and human rights from the state
framework; other types of social regulation and “collective action” will work with the state to create new types of autonomy; or making room for non-state actors to impact policy (Keating 2006: 23-24).

Devolution

Devolution is when the centralized functions of states are decentralized to specific regions or nations. It is a distinct trend of the late-twentieth century and the early twenty-first century. Seventy-five regions within the EU have received devolved legislative powers; this is approximately 56.3 percent of the EU’s population (Guibernau “Nations without states in the EU” 221). This is one way states respond to inner diversity by creating “channels of access for the minorities concerned into the central state” (Keating 2001:26). The U.K. government devolved powers to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales in 1999.

These devolved powers receive their budgets from the U.K. Treasury (Powys). In 2010, the U.K. announced a £6.2 billion budget cut; the Welsh budget would effectively decrease by £163 million, or one percent of its £15.7 billion budget (“Impact of U.K. spending reductions on Wales” 2010). In devolved areas, the Welsh government must address the budget cuts and decide where to reduce spending. With the election of a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition in the U.K., the people of Wales fear further reductions will be directed at them in other areas. PM David Cameron staunchly put down calls for a 2010 referendum for increased devolved powers until 2011 (“Cameron says no Assembly referendum until next year.”). Welsh Secretary Hain asserts that in
addition to this snub, the U.K. is attempting to reduce the number of Welsh constituencies from forty to twenty. Hain believes this cut would inhibit Welsh politicians from being able to carry out their duties adequately. In essence, devolution has given the U.K. state a reason to distance itself from the people of Wales, which, in turn, has increased upheaval among the people of Wales and could lead to increased nationalism as well as calls for further powers to be devolved.

To summarize the EU’s and devolution’s effects on Wales, as Keating so eloquently put it, “European integration does not do away with the nation-state but transforms it. Nation and nationality take on new meanings in this context, as state transformations both stimulate new minority nationalisms or the revival of old ones, and provide new means for their accommodation (Keating and McGarry 2001a). Some states and some nationality movements have adapted to these new opportunities better than others” (Keating 2006: 23-24). Nations are developing different contexts within both states and the world. National identities must adjust to these new contexts. Therefore, I predict that both the EU and devolution have transformed national identities. In the case of Wales, these two factors increased the popularity of nationalism and allowed the Welsh to recreate national identity, allowing the nation to fit into the world’s new, global framework.

*Taken together: the EU, devolution, and Wales*

After three attempts to join the EU, the U.K. joined in 1973 (Elias 197). Some theorists assert that during these attempts, the U.K. was exposed to trends of nationalism.
While the EU might have increased the U.K. state’s recognition of nations, it also might have swayed nations from seeking independence, for reasons mentioned above. Keating and McGarry claim that because the EU blurred the meaning of sovereignty, Welsh nationalists “have explicitly renounced statehood as a goal in favor of nation-building in a new form” (Keating and McGarry 2001:9). Perhaps Welsh nationalists predicted this effect, because Plaid Cymru originally asserted itself as anti-EU. Elias claims this is because “membership of the EEC represented yet another layer of remote, bureaucratic and undemocratic government which would not only add nothing to the prospects of Welsh self-determination, but would effectively move in the opposite direction (Turner 1998: 75)” or because “the EEC was a ‘capitalist club’ whose common market would leave Wales economically isolated on the periphery of Europe…. the EEC was therefore incompatible with the socialist underpinnings of Plaid’s basic ideology which emphasized local democracy, social justice and communitarianism. Furthermore, Wales would only enter the free market when it could negotiate its own terms - in other words when it had achieved self-government (Mathews 1971)” (Elias 197). In 1973, some nationalists criticized nationalists’ decisions to ignore the EU. Morgan asserts, “An opportunity now exists for all the nations of Europe to be regarded as the basic elements in the mosaic of the new European society that is being created. This presents the Welsh people with a choice. If they wish to remain a nation, they should stop hedging their bets and endeavor to place Wales, as Wales, in to this European context that is clearly emerging. The alternative is to continue the descent into a rather shabby English provincialism” (Morgan, W.J.1973:13). During the 1979 referendum, the Welsh people
made their choice: to remain a nation within the U.K., represented only in the central government. Perhaps this decision led Plaid to reconsider its policy on the EU.

Anti-EU sentiments quickly departed Plaid. Elias notes that “the redistribution of certain policy competencies from the state domain to the European institutions has overlapped with Plaid Cymru’s own policy priorities, for example environmental protection and peace and security” (Elias 205). By the 1989 European Parliamentary elections, Plaid’s slogans included “A Voice for Wales in Europe” and “Plaid Cymru-Wales in Europe.” Plaid seemed to find hope for an autonomous Wales that would be fully represented in Europe. Elias claims this culminated in “giving Wales 15 MEPs and direct representation in the Council of Ministers” (Elias 201).

EU financial support completely altered the relationship between Wales and the U.K. Prior to involvement in the EU, the U.K. exclusively was responsible for funding Wales. Because the traditional regional break in Wales was North and South, and neither of these regions’ average per capita GDP was under 75 percent of the EU’s average, Wales would not qualify for Objective 1 Strategic funding. To ensure it did get funding that was much needed in certain areas, Wales changed its regions, adding West Wales and the Valleys, which got Objective 1 funding from 2000-2006 (Boland). According to the Welsh European Funding Office, the EU directly gives £1.9 billion to Wales from the European Structural Funds programs (“Programmes”). The EU has directed an additional £1.9 billion to Wales, mostly of U.K. money. From 2007 to 2013, Wales qualifies for funding for three types of issues: West Wales and the valleys, which are poorer than most of the U.K.; employment in East Wales; and “territorial cooperation” or border issues,
such as with creating a Wales-to-Ireland ferry route (“Programmes”). This funding is mostly match funding, or co-financing with national sources or private sectors. Wales has been allocated approximately €4.5 billion, of which €2.22 billion comes from European funding. The remaining money must come from other areas, such as the state or the private sector, but the money the EU provides “leverages” Welsh funding (“EU match funding 2007-2013”).

Indeed, the EU has helped bolster and even recreate Welsh identity. Elias notes that “By providing an alternative political arena when the domestic one is firmly closed off, Europe allows Plaid Cymru to ‘rebuild the nation internally by projecting it externally as part of a European family’ (Keating 2004b: 3)” (Elias 200). Wales has had to define how it wants to project itself, leading to a bourgeoning of Welsh cultural markers, from literary to economic to political. The political projection can best be explained through examining how devolution impacted Welsh identity.

Keating asserts devolution of a form has existed in Wales since 1965, because that is when Wales gained a secretary of state in the U.K. government. This secretary not only influenced governance on Wales, but also represented the territorial and state-centered interests of the U.K. on Wales (Keating 2001:26). This can hardly be described as devolution, since Welsh citizens had little say in the matter. Wales did not have its own government body, related to but separated from the central government, until after the 1997 devolution referendums showed that the nations wanted their own governing bodies.
Once Wales received a National Assembly in 1999, Welsh nationalists seemed to dampen their calls for independence. Perhaps this is the effect of actively participating in politics. As Proudhon realized, legislative tasks can completely absorb politicians and lead them to lose sight of current affairs (Guerin 69). Another explanation of this dampening is that nationalists, once involved in the political system, better understood the context of globalization and felt that independence could put them at a disadvantage. Loughlin asserts that Welsh politicians feel they are participating in “‘multi-level governance’ (our words) that involves Cardiff, London, Brussels and opens out to the wider world, they are becoming increasingly aware that they are primarily part of the Welsh nation” (Loughlin 57). Perhaps they are even aware that it is their task to define the Welsh nation, to articulate Welsh identity to the rest of the world, which could lead them to reconsider notions of independence that would slant them in a negative light to the rest of the EU community.

Devolution also impacted the Welsh economy. Peter Hain told the Welsh Grand Committee that “having declined steadily relative to the UK average between 1995 and 1999, Welsh GDP per head has for the last three years remained stable at about 79 per cent. Since the National Assembly was established, the relative decline in Welsh GDP per head has been arrested. Excluding the south-east and east of England, Wales has done better than most other regions. Indeed, according to figures released in August, Welsh GDP has increased by 15.6 per cent between 1997 and 2001” (House of Commons publications). This increase provides a marker of how devolution impacts the people of Wales.
All in all, the EU seems to have bolstered Welsh nationalism and tempered nationalist calls for secession. It has done so by acknowledging the Welsh as a region unique in Europe and supporting its rights to control matters such as its language, but it has also refused to support secession by legitimizing the state and the state’s sovereignty over Wales. Devolution, too, has served to legitimize and connect Welsh nationalists. Through the creation of a uniquely Welsh governing body, devolution enabled the citizens of Wales to more directly impact Welsh policies. Through its policies, the National Assembly helps define and create what it means to be Welsh in the modern age. Both the EU and devolution have given the Welsh distinct reasons to form an instrumental identity; being a politically unique nation has its perks, as seen in the increased Welsh economy. Are these effects isolated to the nation of Wales, or do they represent national trends?

**Similar cases: case studies of Flanders, Catalonia, the Basques, and Scotland**

I examined the nations of Flanders in Belgium, the Catalans and Basques in Spain, and Scotland in the United Kingdom, analyzing how national identity responded to the European Union and devolution regarding cultural and instrumental aspects. These cases are beneficial to examine together because the regions shared memories of autonomy, real or imagined. Baubock asserts this will impact how they respond to devolution settlements, which “may be the key to long-term stability of multinational democracy in Belgium, Spain and the UK” (Baubock 92).
Belgium

Belgium was transformed from a unitary state into a federation of three language communities and three regions in 1992. The three economic regions are Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels; three cultural communities are Flemish speakers, French speakers, German speakers (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 603). These regions were legitimized by the state in a 1993 constitutional amendment which stated that “Belgium is a federal state composed of regions and communities” (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 603). One difference between the Belgian devolution and that of the U.K. is that the Belgian federalism is one that centers on separating the regions as much as possible rather than encouraging a strong federal government. The instrumental aspects of Belgian nationalism were created to uphold the cultural aspects of nationalism.

Because Flanders is better off economically than the other regions (starkly in contrast to Wales in the U.K.) and because Belgian national identities come from thick cultural markers of language and religion (Catholicism), the division between cultures is more visible. Flanders’ nationalist party, Vlaams Blok, is a right wing party, perhaps the only right-wing nationalist party in this study. The party was organized by “Catholic Flemish petty bourgeoisie” who were interested in protecting their capital interests, an instrument used to keep thick identity markers separated from other groups (Beland and Lecours 693). This confined their national identity to a small group of people, excluding many. Today, the party tends to be anti-immigration and anti-European (Beland and Lecours 680, 195). The party supports further decentralization, and often tries to ignore state-wide or non-Flemish issues. The Francophones often view the politics in Flanders
as trying to destroy the state of Belgium, on which the Francophones rely because the Wallonian nation is economically dependent on the state (Beland and Lecours 696). These tensions were exacerbated in 2001, when the Flemish government created a new social policy that the Francophones couldn’t implement because of lack of funds (Beland and Lecours 694).

The political exclusion fostered by Flemish politics does not seem to represent the actual perceived identities of its nation, though. Studies have shown that only four percent of the population feels they are only Flemish, while eleven percent feels they are only Belgian (Miley 4). This leaves eighty-five percent of Flemish individuals connecting to a dual identity (with seventeen percent feeling more Belgian than Flemish, forty-five percent feeling equally Belgian and Flemish, and twenty-three percent feeling more Flemish than Belgian) (Miley 4). This identity is likely some combination of honoring thick cultural markers such as language, religion, and economy and of relishing the instrumental markers such as increased representation and autonomy.

These dual identities likely are representative of the divided loyalties many other nations within the EU feel. As a founding member of the EU, Belgian feels its loosely central government with strong peripheral nations should be a model for the EU to become a federation. One area Belgium easily could be a useful model to the EU is by examining the potential dangers of divided identities, including cultural and instrumental. According to Maddens and Vanden Berghe, “The multicultural nation risks being perceived as an artificial, state-concocted construction lacking authenticity and emotional power, and thus failing to engender national loyalty” (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 602).
Thus, the potential threats to the Belgian state—separatism, nationalism, and racism—could also threaten the EU (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 611). However, it seems that by acknowledging the thick, cultural basis for instrumental nationalism, the state ensures that nationalists in many different contexts are not inspired to seek violent means for legitimization.

Spain

Spain is a newer nation-state, not becoming a “sociopolitical concept”—a combination of cultural and instrumental identity markers—until the Cadiz Constitution in 1812 (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 260). The Constitution made “Love of the Fatherland” a “fundamental obligation” (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 267). Spain made history, from the state’s perspective, compulsory, which “transformed the former subjects of a dynasty into citizens of one nation and patriots with the same interests” (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 263). In 1857, the General Law of Public Instruction (called the Moyano Law) created archives, libraries, and museums, followed by an 1867 Royal Decree that founded the Madrid National Archaeological Museum, which the state used to create a culturally patriotic citizenry (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 263). In fact, the discourse in this decree supports a primordialist- or thickly ethnically cultural- view of Spain: “Our peninsula, the privileged theater of various invasions and colonizations, guards in its breast some precious remains from its indigenous peoples, from the ancestors of the noble Iberian race… our duty is to gather together these vestiges, which help so much to elucidate the annals of those times, which
providentially prepared the way for modern civilization” (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 264). The state used an instrumental combination of subjective facts and symbols to create a Spanish national identity rooted in Castile language and culture (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 267).

Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon assert that since the general populace of Spain was not attempting to preserve regional history or express regional identities, this push appeared to be a top-down and very instrumental approach at creating a unified nation that celebrated its historic regions (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 265). The top-down approach is similar to how instrumental, thin Welsh nationalism became prominent over the cultural, thick Welsh nationalism- through the policies and creations approved by the state. These created regional loyalties “survived and were transformed by the economic revolution brought about by capitalism” (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 266). In fact, these nationalist tendencies began to challenge and fracture the state, a perfect example of how state-led “nationalism” sparks sub-state nationalism.

When Franco’s dictatorship ended in the 1970s, “the reconfiguration of post-Franco Spanish identity as democratic, pro-European, secular, modern, industrialized and in favor of decentralization has promoted a dual identity among large sections of the population” (Guibernau, “National identity”66 ). In 1978, Spain became a decentralized state where the Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalities were fairly autonomous (McGarry, Keating, Moore. 1996. 8). While these communities are considered equally autonomous, the central region is granted more instrumental support than the other regions. Castilian Spanish is still favored by the state government above Basque, Catalan,
and Galician languages (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 272). This led to these nations perceiving the Spanish state as oppressive; Basques especially felt that the Spanish state occupied their nation. This is similar to how some U.K. regions perceived the central region of England. Such concerns were given greater consideration immediately before and following Spain’s joining the EU in 1986. Spain needed to cater to its nations in order to have a cohesive enough state to join the EU; however, Spain also needed to promote and enforce an overarching Spanish “nationalism.” Keating and McGarry bluntly point to how the EU impacted democracy and nationalism in Spain: “incentive of membership in the EU helped stabilize democracy in Spain, and an important element in this was accommodation of the minority nations” (Keating and McGarry 2001:9).

Unlike in Belgium, Spanish national discourse is unitary and congruent because of “lack of elitist consensus about the compound nature of the state and the dominant position of Hispanic culture” (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 601). This means that Spanish nationalists retain more loyalty for the state than Belgian nationalists do. The cultural nationalism is more state nationalism than sub-state nationalism, and instrumental nationalism reflects this. In this view, Spain would exist without its nations. Many would say the U.K. has a similar relationship with its nations. According to Maddens and Vanden Berghe, “The various cultures are not viewed as constituent elements or building blocks of the Spanish nation” (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 608); whereas in Belgium, the state is viewed “vis-à-vis the sub-nations” (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 609). It is precisely this strongly centralized view of the state that led to
further nationalist unrest; since nationalist concerns were not met through instrumental means, there was a tendency for nationalism to rely on thick, cultural markers to imbue emotion into the political sphere. In the early 21st Century, state politics alienated Spanish nations. According to Guibernau, “the neo-conservative, neo-centralist policies and attitudes of the Aznar government, once it attained a majority in the Spanish Parliament (2000-04), have undoubtedly contributed to radicalizing regional nationalism in Spain and indirectly fed separatism” (Guibernau, “National identity” 64). In some respects, such centralist politics have aroused old national wounds. Guibernau asserts that “instead of directly responding to the nationalist demands of Catalonia and the Basque Country as nations which had enjoyed their own institutions and laws until the eighteenth century and which still maintained their own separate identities, specific cultures and languages, they decided to divide the territory of Spain into seventeen autonomous communities” (Guibernau, “National identity” 62).

These include Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, Andalusia, the Navarra, the Canary Islands, Valencia, Murcia, Aragon, Madrid, and seven others (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 603; Guibernau, “National identity” 65). Murcia, Aragon, and Madrid are least supportive of devolution (Guibernau, “National identity” 65). Future studies should examine whether this lack of support is related to economic dependency on the state. Regardless of the unpopularity of devolution in some nations, post-devolutionary politics in Spain have seen more popularity than those in the U.K. The nationalist governments in Spanish nations have maintained majorities in several of the nations, unlike in most U.K. nations. What makes this cultural nationalism so successful in Spain? To determine this, I
will study Catalonia and the Basque, two nations that express stronger cultural nationalist leanings, even in their instrumental nationalism.

Representing the earlier mentioned state-led approach to “nationalism,” Catalan national movement is “an elite-led, ‘top down’ project” which can be determined because “political and bureaucratic elites in Catalonia register ‘more Catalanized’ identities than does the general public” (Miley 3, 9). This intimates that instrumental Catalan identities reflect perceived cultural Catalan identities, while cultural Catalan identities do not necessarily rely on political instruments. The cultural Catalan perception of self does not inherently involve an instrumental perception of self, contrary to the Belgian case. Guibernau notes that “The main political parties of Catalan origin (CiU-Convergence and Union; PSC or the Socialist Party of Catalonia federated with the PSOE or Spanish Socialist Workers Party- PSC-PSOE; ICV Initiative for Catalonia-Greens; and ERC- Catalan Republic Left) define Catalonia as a nation. However, Catalonia is not recognized as such within Spain where it has the status of autonomous community” (Guibernau 216). To politicians, and to the cultural Catalan nationalists, this downgrade from nation to autonomous community is just another one of the injustices committed to the nation by the state or the instrumentalists, like the outlawing of its language in schools during the Franco regime. Yet less than forty percent of Catalonians prefer the term “nation” to the term “region” (Miley 14). About 35 percent of Catalonians feel their Catalan identity is greater than their Spanish identity, and only 16 percent feel exclusively Catalan (Miley 5; Guibernau, “National identity” 66). These numbers are large enough that the Catalan nationalists are seeking to change the constitution for
more instrumental autonomy (Guibernau, “National identity” 62). Of the autonomous communities, Catalonia alone has more people who want greater autonomy as opposed to further centralization of the government, keeping the current model, or seeking complete independence (Guibernau, “National identity” 63).

The Basque nation also calls for greater autonomy. In fact, Plan Ibarretxe, which declares the Basque country should be a ‘free state’ with its own parliament in Spain, has been endorsed by Basque Parliament but rejected by Spanish Parliament (Guibernau, “National identity” 62). Twenty-five percent of those living in the Basque nation identify only with being Basque (Guibernau, “National identity” 66). This shows that in Basque territory, possibly unique to my case studies, there is a much weaker sense of dual identities. This strong sense of national cultural identity is based on a long history of perceived collectivity, and feels it must be acknowledged by institutional and instrumental means. Where Catalonia historically was a land through which people traveled, “Euskadi (the Basque Country) has demonstrated a historical isolationist tendency as exemplified in the fueros by the concept of universal nobility and purity of blood” (Jauregui 239). This means that the Basques feel a stronger affinity for ethnic-based nationalism than the Catalonians.

In addition to ethnicity, the Basque language and ideology further isolate Basque culture from general Spanish-ness. Political scientist Jauregui notes that “While Catalan is a romance language, easily learned, Euskera represents a barrier to people from other parts of Spain. From its origins, Catalan nationalism was linked to the industrial revolution, and provided an alternative path to modernization against a backward Spanish
state. By contrast, Basque nationalism, at least initially, represented the old pre-capitalist society threatened by the rise of industrial society” (Jauregui 239). This sense of threat is pervasive in nationalist discourse, much more so in Basque than in any other nation I examined. This sense of threat is manifested by a sense that the Spanish state is an enemy, an occupier. Therefore, Jauregui asserts, “It followed from this analysis that the only valid strategy was the expulsion of the ‘occupier’, the rejection of everything Spanish, the maintenance of Basque purity, and the rejection of participation in Spanish political life” (Jauregui 239-240). That sense led to “…the Kehendakari (President) of the Basque government, Juan Jose Ibarretxe, present(ing) a proposal in the Basque Parliament in September 2002. This provided for a ‘new political pact with the state’ to reconcile ‘our self-government framework to the desires of the majority of present-day Basque society’” (Jauregui 243). As I mentioned earlier, this plan was shot down by the Spanish parliament.

Why is nationalism in these two nations so strong and centered in cultural as opposed to instrumental channels? One theory about these strong cultural national identities is that “The state did not have the exclusive cultural control that could have created a single historical memory, a single cultural, linguistic and artistic tradition and a single patriotism for all the people of the country” (Manzano Moreno and Perez Garzon 277). Such exclusive cultural control seems lacking in all my cases, yet instrumentalism seems to be stronger in cases where cultural memories are used to rouse emotions of Otherness and separation.
United Kingdom

The U.K. also has multiple cultures and identities that have not been assimilated into the dominant English culture. Political scientist Loughlin asserts “…there is a problem of identity in Britain. Until now they have tended to assume, in a non-reflective way, that ‘Britain’, ‘England’ and ‘the United Kingdom’ were synonymous. No Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish person would ever have made such an assumption” (Loughlin 35). Indeed, many of these nations are content with devolution as opposed to secession because of their historic amalgamation with the English as well as their current economic dependency on the U.K., which they tend to view as the outcome of centuries of the English taking advantage of and using these nations’ resources. However, this sense of abuse is not as sharp as with the Basques, and nationalist parties in the U.K. are less popular than in Belgium and Spain. This hints that instrumental nationalism is stronger in Belgium and Spain than in the U.K. No nationalist party has, by itself, won a majority in regional elections in the U.K.; British-wide parties have held the majorities (Guibernau, “National identity” 65). Perhaps, then, it was the U.K.’s joining the EU in 1973 that inspired the devolution talks; the first referendum on devolution occurred six years later, in 1979. It wasn’t until the late 1990s that the U.K. actually devolved power to its nations.

Only Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland received devolution settlements, meaning the eighty-five percent of the U.K. population who live in England are represented only by the federal government (Guibernau, “National identity” 64); yet fifty-seven percent are content with the current model and only twenty-two percent want a
devolution settlement; (Guibernau, “National identity” 64). This likely represents the state ideology that England is unified and that devolution harms this unity; because the English associate more with the dominant state, the conqueror, they are less likely to understand the sub-state nationalists’ sense of exclusion and dejection, of being conquered unfairly. Because England does not have a devolution settlement from which I can gauge subsequent identity changes and Northern Ireland is geographically isolated from Great Britain, I will only examine Scotland.

Scotland was an autonomous state with its own monarch and institutions, meaning the Scottish identity—which was based more on autonomous instrumental institutions than on culture and language—was harder to assimilate into British identity than a nation such as Wales, which never had autonomous institutions and had its language repressed by the dominant culture. McGarry and Keating note that “While there has been a powerful Scottish identity for some time, it has existed alongside a strong British identity. Only since the 1970s has the former made inroads at the expense of the latter, with a significant nationalist movement emerging in Scotland. Many of the re-emerging nationalisms are ‘civic’ rather than ethnically particularist” (Keating and McGarry2001: 6). What inspired the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) to become leftist and more outspoken was a unique combination of the fall of the colonial empire, reactions to nuclear weapons, British interventionalist politics from the 1950s and 1960s, and the Thatcher’s government’s neoliberal discourse and policies (Beland and Lecours 690). These issues blatantly showed the people of Scotland that their political goals were different from those of the U.K., leading to a stronger push for devolution.
The Scottish supported devolution more strongly than any other nation in the U.K. It is because of the Scottish push for home rule that the question of devolution was first posed to U.K. nations in 1979. Support for devolution from the other nations was weak, but Scotland’s was strong. During the referendums on devolution in the 1990s, more than seventy-four percent of the Scottish wanted a Scottish parliament and more than sixty-three percent thought the parliament should have tax-raising powers (Hepburn 233). With the passing of the 1998 Scotland Act that Scotland received its own parliament and executive (Beland and Lecours 691). This Act allowed Scotland to have control over more areas than the other devolved nations. “Foreign affairs, defense and social security were powers retained by Westminster, whilst Edinburgh’s 129 Members of the Scottish Parliament were given the power to legislate in an extensive range of domestic policies including education, economic development, health, housing, law, home affairs and local government; and the ability to vary taxation” (Hepburn 233). Scottish politicians have thrived in this environment. Hepburn asserts that the proportional representation system allows small parties to have a larger say on issues of nationalism (Hepburn 234). In fact, all of Scotland’s major parties claim to be “the” nationalist party. He adds that “The Scottish Labour Party, Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, Scottish Liberal Democrats, and smaller parties such as the Socialists have proclaimed themselves to be the true representatives of the Scottish people, offering a range of constitutional proposals including sovereign statehood, regional autonomy, decentralization and federalism” (Hepburn 225-226). So far, further decentralization seems to be favored by the Scottish people, whose nationalism is based on a robust instrumental identity.
Devolution served to further the Scottish instrumental national identity. In fact, in 2007, thirty-seven percent of the Scottish population feels only Scottish (Miley 4). This strong Scottish identity now also hopes for legitimization through the EU. In this light, Hepburn asserts “…the Scottish case mirrors the experience of other nations such as Brittany, Catalonia and the Basque Country, in which parties compete in their representation of national identity and interests, many of them expanding their constitutional goals to include Europe” (Hepburn 225). In fact, the SNP’s motto of “‘independence-in-Europe’ has met calls from all political parties claiming to be the true ‘voice’ of Scotland in Europe” (Hepburn 226); this is particularly ironic considering the Scots were initially wary of the EU, in part for distrust of the capitalist system and for “fear that Scotland would be further removed from the new economic and political centers and that Scotland’s fisheries, agriculture and traditional industries would be threatened by the common market” (Hepburn 226-227). But after the failed 1979 referendum, Scotland increasingly turned to Europe for help obtaining autonomy. Thatcher’s policies left the Scottish feeling desperate, especially because of her poll tax in Scotland that she pushed for “inciting various forms of civil and political disobedience” (Hepburn 229). Europe could offer the solution. Therefore, in 1988, the SNP began calling for “independence-in-Europe,” because “the European context would provide economic and security safeguards and dispel voters’ fears of ‘going it alone’” (Hepburn 232). Soon, any party that wanted to obtain power in Scotland had to look to Europe. Hepburn notes that “Once the SNP and Labour both switched sides to a comfortably pro-European stance in the late 1980s, joining the solidly Europhile Liberal
Democrats, Scottish parties had a field day parodying the ‘little Englander’ mentality of the Tories’ Europhobia, and playing on the commonly-held perception that Scotland is a more pro-European nation” (Hepburn 231). In fact, this perception is furthered by the SNP’s description of its mission: “to create a just, caring and enterprising society by releasing Scotland’s full potential as an independent nation in the mainstream of modern Europe” (Beland and Lecours 692).

Interpretation of case studies

I will now explore what these case studies have revealed. I explored how nationalism responded to factors such as the European Union and devolution in sub-state nations in Belgium, Spain, and the U.K. Along the way, I realized additional factors have recently impacted nationalism. These factors include social policies; multilingualism; historic perceived oppressions; perceived collective histories; whether states want to assimilate nations or encourage them to retain their own cultures; and how a nation-state transitions toward democracy. On this last factor, I noticed an interesting link among my cases. Each of my nation-states was once ruled by a monarch and still retains a monarch as a state- or figure- head. This cultural-instrumental symbol attempts to place symbolic power with the state. According to Maddens and Vanden Berghe, “The monarchy as an institution is inherently connected to nationhood and nationalism and thus almost by definition an important factor of national identity politics” (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 604). People still see the monarch as the symbol of their united nationhood (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 605). Especially where states acknowledge nations- legitimizing their
unique identities through devolution- and nations rely on states economically, monarchs serve as a reminder to nations that while they may be sub-state regions, they are tied together within the state. Perhaps this link- between current states with figurehead monarchs and sub-state nationalism- deserves to be studied more, in another paper. The rest of this paper will investigate the roles of the EU and devolution on identity.

The EU seems to have bolstered nations’ ideas about increased autonomy, providing them with legitimization. The specific type of identity it seems to bolster is instrumental, providing nations with political tools for autonomy as opposed to cultural reasons to separate from states. In most of my cases, states instituted devolution only after joining the EU: Belgium was one of the founders of the EU in 1945, and it formally devolved powers to its nations first in 1970 and further in 1993; the U.K. joined the EU in 1973, and it devolved powers to its nations in the late 1990s. The exception to this trend of EU-before-devolution is Spain. Spain devolved powers to its autonomous communities in 1978, and it joined the E.U. in 1986. Why is Spain different? For one, its devolution settlement does not actually grant its nations formal recognition and political autonomy, meaning the type of identity that is being catered to is a thick, cultural identity. That is why unrest is still prevalent within Spanish nationalism and helps explain why some Spanish nationalists are considering seeking independence. Another factor related to the fact that Spanish nations are defined as “regions” and receive no direct representation on the EU level is the fact that Spanish identities tend to be divided between Europe, state, and nation more than other countries. In Catalonia, the sense of dual identity is larger than those in the U.K. (Guibernau, “National identity” 67).
Guibernau notes that “(Catalonia) is not a European electoral constituency and lacks direct access to EU decision-making institutions. At EU level, delegates of the Spanish government represent the Catalans” (Guibernau 217). Yet the Catalans feel a disconnection between how they want to be represented and how they are being represented. Perhaps national recognition by the EU leads to stronger national identities within divided identities. Sub-state nations within the EU are less likely to feel obligated to the state and more interested in how the EU can provide greater autonomy for them (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 604). Nationalism becomes more prominent in both nationalist and state discourse after a state joins the EU, even in the case of Spanish nationalism. Further research could determine whether it is involvement in the EU that sparks devolution, or whether this seemingly causal connection is merely spurious.

Devolution also has strengthened regional instrumental identity in all my cases, even creating a sense of instrumental national identity in the Welsh case. Most nations begin to support devolution more after it occurs. When Spain allowed languages other than Castilian Spanish to be taught in regional schools in 1990, nationalists responded by urging for further control over cultural and political happenings. In all the cases I studied, so far, devolution has seemingly been one factor to appease nations enough that the states are able to avoid nations’ secession. Obviously, in the case of Spain, further decentralization might be necessary to avoid Catalan and Basque secession or violence. Also, because Belgian devolution caters more heavily to regional and economic differences, its nations very well might become autonomous states. In other cases, however, devolution seems to be an unspoken compromise between the nation and the
state, with assurances that if the nation remains in the state, it will receive greater representation or self-determination. Such as with the U.K., perhaps devolution provides a starting point for meaningful dialogue with nations to build better relationships. If a state is more engaged with its nations’ interests, nations will likely be more content within the state. We have seen also how economic imbalances can impact devolution; either driving nations further from centralization if they are wealthier or keeping them connected to the state if they are poorer. Devolution often offers these economically dependent states more incentive to stay. Devolution seemingly could allow nation-states to continue existing for quite some time. Without devolution, we likely would have seen more violent pushes for independence from nations. When nations feel their needs are being ignored or even countered by the state, such as with the Basques, violence becomes a more appealing response. Therefore, devolution could hold the key to some states ending violent nationalist uprisings.

All in all, these cases allowed me to examine trends in nationalism in the past century, which seem to be mostly centered around the evolutions in the nature of nation-states toward devolution and on participation in the EU. Sub-state nationalism is resurging into domestic and international politics, especially in a new instrumental form, and understanding what impacts such nationalism and how nationalism responds to different political phenomena can help political science analysts as well as national and state actors to maneuver through the next century.
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The case of Welsh identity insinuates that national identity is increasing in the context of globalization, but that such an increase will not necessarily lead to a drastic changing of the world order. As nations adapt to new suprastate institutions, their identities alter to reflect two important factors: the fear that their national identity will be swallowed in multiculturalism and globalization, and the blurring of the hierarchical relationship between the nation and its state, which allows the nation to seek self-reliance and individualism through representation in non-state entities. This second factor is illustrative of the current nationalist trend within the EU.

There have been various waves of nationalism, each wave adjusting to new world institutions and philosophies. Globalization expanded socio-economic possibilities for nations, as well as altering the hierarchy between state and nation. In the twentieth century alone, we saw nationalists seeking independence to create their own states, nationalists turning to representation within the EU, and nationalists embracing autonomy within devolution. In the context of the EU and devolution, Wales has not expressed considerable intention to separate from the U.K. state, but it has sought greater representation outside the U.K. state. This is emblematic of its growing self-determination and its revitalized cultural identity.

Welsh identity obviously has undergone many changes since it voted down devolution in 1979. The fact that the Welsh voted for devolution in 1997 intimates that Welsh self-determination is growing. The slowly increasing numbers of Welsh speakers shows that when the nation is placed in charge of language issues, political priorities are
given to cultural fortifications that are embraced as part of the national identity. Education, communication, and funding are poured into cultural measures such as language, literature, craftsmanship, and the economy. The strengthening of the Welsh identity very well could be a top-down approach, with politicians and elites setting standards of nationalism and defining identity. None the less, Welsh identity has resurfaced, better articulated than in its previous incarnations.

The advancement of this identity was aided by the EU and devolution, which seemed to have very real effects on Welsh identity. Because the EU and the U.K. have many open records and are popular in public discourse, it is easier to gauge their impact on identity than by using more obscure variables that likely have an effect, such as new media and the resurrection of a historic language. EU has bolstered the Welsh identity while pushing it to express that identity within the confines of the traditional nation-state relationship. The EU encouraged nations such as Wales to seek devolved control of matters involving language and culture. Devolution allowed Welsh identity to be recreated and expressed through Welsh-made policies concerning language and culture. Both of these variables gave Wales the tools and opportunities to define and create what it means to be Welsh. The effects these variables had on Welsh identity can also be seen in other nations that received devolution settlements in the EU.

Since the EU is an ever-evolving entity, and since devolution settlements are still being ironed out and tweaked, what changes can we predict these factors will bring to Welsh identity in the future? If representation in the EU increasingly justifies a sense of Welsh Otherness, which devolved institutions in Wales support as the Welsh identity,
nationalism might turn toward increased separation from the U.K. According to Keating and McGarry, “The possibility that Britain will break up no longer seems unthinkable” (Keating and McGarry 2001: 5). However, separatism seems unlikely in the near future. As McGarry, Keating, and Moore assert, if independence is sought, “Inevitably, there will be minorities in the new state who would rather remain in the old (rump) state, minorities in the old rump state who would rather be in the new state, and minorities in both areas who would rather have their own state than either of the existing ones” (McGarry 1998)” (McGarry, Keating, and Moore 7). Welsh identity is still significantly reliant on and nested in the British identity. Even if the Welsh identity slowly began to trump the Welsh people’s conceptions of Britishness, the likelihood that this new Welsh identity would desire complete separation from the state that helps fund it and risk disdain and rejection from the EU in the process seems almost impossible. Plaid’s official stance on nationalism, that it rejects “claims that independence equates to the creation of a Welsh state and outright separation from the UK,” support this assertion (Elias 213). Besides, many assert that the Welsh identity is not strong enough to seek independence; Price asserts that “formal independence is meaningless unless we have first decolonized our minds” (Price).

If Welsh identity increases, then, how can it fully express itself situated within the state? Kymlicka asserts the only thing to do with nations that did not ask for assimilation is to acknowledge them fully. He asserts that “territorially concentrated groups that were involuntarily incorporated into the state should not be forced to adopt the majority’s national identity, but should have the rights and powers needed to sustain themselves as
distinct national societies within the larger state…. Their distinctiveness should be recognized in public life and public symbols, through such things as official-language status, self-government rights, and recognition of their distinct legal traditions” (Kymlicka 2006:64-65). Wales has received some self-governing abilities and its language has been given official status, but perhaps increased governing rights and further removal from accountability to the central government will be necessary.

How would the U.K. respond if Wales chose to seek independence? The current Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition seems to be staunchly against further devolution, and it likely would respond with animosity toward attempts at secession. McGarry, Keating, and Moore mention that the U.K. could decide it would be better off to allow independence. They assert that “…downsizing mindsets can be acquired through learning behavior: if it becomes clear that expansionism, or retaining a particular territory, carries considerable costs, in violence and destruction, or economic loss, states may be induced to contract” (McGarry, Keating, and Moore : 15).

The case of Wales permits us to predict that in the context of involvement with suprastate institutions and devolution, small, historically assimilated regions could experience cultural renaissances bringing declining identities into the forefront of regional consciousness. It is no longer feasible to assume regional and national identities will disappear. In fact, the very institutions representing globalism, supranationalism, and multiculturalism might be preserving, revitalizing, and/or resurrecting national identity, as evidenced by Flanders, the Catalans, the Basques, Scotland, and Wales. Such bolstered identities could push for regional autonomy. If states respond to such regions without
further repressing them and by gratifying their requests for increased representation and legitimization, these nations likely will not cause the breakup of the traditional nation-state. If the trend for increased regional identities spreads, we are likely to see more diversity, not less, represented in international politics.
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