SANE and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Shape U.S. Foreign Policy

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This thesis titled
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ABSTRACT

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SANE and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Shape U.S. Foreign Policy (115 pp.)

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This thesis examines the role of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) in building support for the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Focusing on SANE’s highly publicized newspaper advertisements shows how the organization succeeded in using the growing public fear of the potentially lethal effects of radioactive fallout from atmospheric testing to raise awareness of the nuclear test ban. SANE ads successfully sparked national interest, which contributed to a renewal of U.S. efforts to negotiate a treaty. It also strengthened SANE’s credibility and expanded the role of the organization’s co-chair and Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins in working with the Kennedy Administration. Ultimately, disagreement within SANE, the primary role of the Citizens Committee in garnering support for the treaty, and the administration’s decision to minimize SANE’s identification with the treaty out of the fear that the liberal association could inhibit efforts to broaden the treaty’s appeal resulted in SANE playing a peripheral role in gaining Senate approval. Incorporating extensive archival research including State Department documents and SANE archives, this thesis argues that SANE laid critical groundwork for the treaty’s approval, but ultimately lost its effectiveness prior to the Senate ratification of the treaty.
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INTRODUCTION

On 5 August 1963, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Nearly two months later, the United States Senate ratified the treaty. This treaty became the first significant arms control agreement during the Cold War that reduced the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Scholars have produced a significant body of research on President John F. Kennedy’s efforts to establish a nuclear test ban treaty and the effectiveness of the treaty, but little attention has been paid to the role of one of the most influential peace groups of the time, the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy (SANE), in the treaty’s success. This thesis will examine the role of SANE in raising public awareness of the Test Ban Treaty, especially through the organization’s highly publicized newspaper advertisements which ran throughout the United States.

SANE’s advertisements in 1962, particularly one in April featuring the well-known pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock, focused widespread national attention on the test ban issue. It also strengthened SANE’s credibility and expanded the role of the organization’s co-chair and Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins in working with the Kennedy administration. This thesis argues that although SANE as a whole, performed a valuable function in raising public awareness about the test ban treaty, its chair, Norman Cousins, had a more influential role in ensuring the treaty’s success.

SANE’s creation reflected the growing force of scientific, environmental, and social activism that had experienced a rebirth since the onset of the Cold War. The advancement of nuclear weapons and the technological revolution that followed World
War II led many members of the scientific community to recognize the need for greater caution and responsibility regarding the use of these innovations.\(^1\) The 1954 development of the hydrogen bomb and nuclear testing in the Pacific incited growing concern about safety. In July 1955, notable scientists Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell issued a statement declaring that the power of nuclear weapons demanded governments consider the risk of disaster when evaluating the potential use of force. The Einstein-Russell appeal marked a serious outcry by the scientific community and raised international awareness of the issue.\(^2\) The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) had long been a forum for scientists to consider the effect of their work on society and to express their concerns to the public. By 1956, AAAS members, under the direction of Warren Weaver of the Rockefeller Foundation and Barry Commoner, a botany professor at Washington University in St. Louis, looked to provide stronger leadership in defining the responsibility of scientists to the general public.\(^3\)

In a moving 1957 address at Washington University in St. Louis, prominent chemist at the California Institute of Technology Linus Pauling called for the end of nuclear weapons tests. In June, Pauling publicized the “Appeal by American Scientists” with the signatures of 11,038 scientists, including thirty-seven Nobel laureates, from forty-nine nations. That April, Albert Schweitzer, renowned Nobel Peace Prize


humanitarian and theologian, issued a similar public declaration.\textsuperscript{4} Still working with the AAAS and chairing its Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, Barry Commoner co-founded the Committee for Nuclear Information (CNI) as a scientific organization focused more towards grassroots-activism in April 1958. Serving as an impartial source for scientific information in order to assist the public in making decisions on controversial social issues became the group’s primary goal. The group’s expertise on nuclear testing enabled it to pose a serious challenge to the pro-nuclear information distributed by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).\textsuperscript{5}

In addition to SANE, other anti-nuclear groups emerged with the growth of non-violent resistance within the broader peace movement.\textsuperscript{6} Non-Violent Action Against Nuclear Weapons emerged as a small ad hoc committee of pacifists under the leadership of A.J. Muste and, in 1958, became known as the Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA). Although the group remained small, it organized public displays of protest at nuclear weapons sites. A highly publicized effort involved attempting to sail a vessel known as the \textit{Golden Rule} into the Pacific nuclear test zone. In 1960, a group of women in the Washington D.C. area founded Women Strike for Peace (WSP) to organize women’s antinuclear protests. The group’s largest protest occurred on 1 November 1961 and included roughly fifty thousand participants in sixty cities throughout the country.

\textsuperscript{5} Egan, \textit{Barry Commoner and the Science of Survival}, 60-64.
The group coordinated messages and visits to members of Congress and the White House, but it failed to become a cohesive national organization.\(^7\)

The post-war technology boom resulted in the further questioning the relationship between science, humanity, and the environment. During this period, environmentalism expanded from appreciating the aesthetic beauty of nature to considering the human relationship to the environment and preserving it from toxins. In 1962, zoologist Rachel Carson brought this issue to widespread public attention with the publication of her bestselling book, *Silent Spring*. In this work, Carson combined her love of nature and a condemning account of new technologies, particularly within the pesticide industry. Carson’s message helped ignite the modern environmental movement by raising public awareness and impelling people to action.\(^8\) These examples illustrate the growing realization of the inextricable connection between humans, the environment, and health. SANE’s opposition to nuclear testing was interjected into this atmosphere of protest and change.

The first chapter of the thesis discusses the early work to create a nuclear test ban treaty and growing concern about lethal health hazards posed by radioactive fallout resulting from nuclear tests in the late 1950s. Using primarily secondary sources, especially Robert Divine’s *Blowing on the Wind*, this section explains how developments in nuclear testing increased the American public’s fear of radioactive fallout and stirred

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\(^{7}\) Ibid., 246-250, 261-263, Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb*, 64-65, 92-93.

public debate on the impact of nuclear tests. The chapter outlines President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s efforts to establish a test ban, as well as John F. Kennedy’s views on the issue during his Senate career and the 1960 presidential campaign. Using Milton Katz’s *Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1957-1985*, the chapter discusses the origin of SANE and its early advocacy of a nuclear test ban.

The second chapter describes the diplomatic difficulties President Kennedy faced while negotiating the test ban treaty and SANE’s powerful newspaper advertisements. The shared desire for a test ban treaty led both SANE and Kennedy to focus on fear of fallout as a way to mobilize public support. The discussion includes SANE’s meetings addressing the organization’s advertising objectives and strategies, as well as Kennedy’s various references to the health benefits resulting from a nuclear test ban in his press conferences and speeches.

By the spring of 1962, negotiations in Geneva had come to a standstill as the United States and the Soviet Union could not agree on an inspection program to ensure the preservation of the treaty. The United States contended that verifying nuclear detonations required international inspections. Yet the Soviet Union felt strongly that verification required only national inspections. With negotiations going so poorly, the president reluctantly conceded to significant pressure from members of the defense

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community to resume atmospheric testing. In response to atmospheric testing by the
Soviet Union, Kennedy finally scheduled the resumption of atmospheric nuclear tests in
late April of 1962. SANE viewed this as an opportune time to reevaluate its strategy and
publish stronger ads on the negative effects of nuclear fallout. Ultimately SANE hoped to
courage the public to express more vocal support for the test ban treaty and to motivate
Kennedy to intensify his efforts. This chapter addresses the organization’s strategy to
broaden its appeal by emphasizing the threat fallout posed to children. Appearing in over
eighty newspapers throughout the country, the ad featuring renowned pediatrician Dr.
Spock receives the greatest amount of analysis due to its tremendous positive reception
and widespread attention.12

The chapter also describes how the success of the ads encouraged President
Kennedy to utilize SANE co-chair Norman Cousins as a liaison between the United
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union in late 1962 through early 1963. Cousins’ visit to
Moscow enabled Kennedy and Khrushchev to overcome a miscommunication that had
paralyzed negotiations and move forward to secure a test ban treaty. As a result of
Cousins’ work, Kennedy made Cousins co-chair of the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear
Test Ban upon its creation in 1963, with the express purpose of gaining public support
and ensuring the Senate’s ratification of the treaty.13

11 Glenn T. Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban* (Berkley: University of California Press,
1981), 142-149.

12 National Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, *Letter from Nell Lee Litvak to Dr. Spock*, 1 May 1962
and various documents from the Public Information Committee. This autobiography will also be useful:
The final chapter examines how SANE’s public outreach efforts diminished as a result of growing internal division within the organization, President Kennedy’s creation of the Citizens Committee in 1963, and the administration and Citizens Committee’s decision to minimize SANE’s identification with the treaty out of the fear that the liberal association could inhibit efforts to broaden the treaty’s appeal. The publication of ads, which some members and key supporters of SANE viewed as too confrontational, in addition to debate over the organization’s future fueled disagreement within the organization.\(^{14}\) The Citizens Committee proved to be another factor in SANE’s loss of influence on the test ban. The president hoped that building vocal public support would help to soften the stance of some senators. With Kennedy selecting Norman Cousins as a committee leader, SANE’s role shifted to serving as support for Cousins. While SANE supported Cousins by providing assistance and aiding with mailings in key congressional districts, the organization’s efforts in securing the treaty’s ratification were peripheral.\(^{15}\) SANE’s newspaper advertisements succeeded in attracting much needed public attention to the test ban issue, but the organization played a minimal role in attaining the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

Because little has been written on this topic, understanding relevant work by previous scholars involves examining concerns about nuclear fallout, President Kennedy’s role in the creation of the test ban treaty, and the actions of peace groups such

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14 SANE, assorted memos and letters from “1961-1962 Advertisements” file, correspondence and minutes from the Public Information Committee, and “Minutes of the Meeting of the Ad Committee,” 1 May 1963.

15 SANE, assorted documents from Correspondence files and various “Minutes of the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee.”
as SANE. A brief overview of the historiography of these areas provides a better understanding of how this thesis is situated in the study of history, and the significance of this study’s approach in its unique synthesis of secondary works and its focus on SANE’s ads. In order to address the issue of nuclear fallout, sources discussing both changes in American culture and the government’s nuclear policy, as well as the relationship between the two have proven to be the most valuable. In 1985, Paul Boyer produced the first significant work exploring the atomic bomb’s influence on American culture, _By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age_. Boyer examines how the use of the atomic bomb affected the thinking of Americans in the first five years following World War II. The author’s focus on the cultural and intellectual responses to the fear and hope that accompanied nuclear technology made it valuable to understanding public concerns about nuclear issues. Boyer’s argument that the American public has gone through cyclical patterns of activism followed by apathy laid the groundwork for many later scholars. His assertion that the reactions to the bomb’s initial use parallels the later responses in American society based on recurring concerns helped situate the concern about nuclear fallout that occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the larger context of the Cold War and nuclear history.

The 1993 work, _Life Under A Cloud: American Anxiety About the Atom_ by Allan Winkler, investigates the interconnected nature of the work of scientists, cultural elites, and government officials. In discussing the development of the public’s fear of nuclear fallout in the 1950s, Winkler describes how each of these groups shaped the American response. Ultimately, the concern about the negative effects of nuclear testing led the
1956 Democratic presidential candidate, Adlai Stevenson, to call for an end to nuclear testing.\textsuperscript{16} Building on Boyer’s argument of periods of activism and apathy, Winkler believes that the public’s deeply held fear of nuclear destruction influenced policymakers, and that the government calmed public fears by creating additional protective programs, or by making arms negotiations and agreements.\textsuperscript{17} While this thesis discusses the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as more than a government instrument to ease public concern, Winkler’s research into the development of public fears of nuclear fallout proved to be valuable in explaining how the issue of nuclear fallout played a role in the approval of the treaty.

Robert Divine’s 1978 work, \textit{Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960}, provides the most relevant study in discussing public concern about nuclear fallout and government policy. This book’s narrative account of the negative impact of nuclear testing in the 1950s and the inner workings of the Eisenhower administration helped in covering the early movement toward a nuclear test ban. Divine gives Eisenhower considerable credit for initiating the negotiations for a test ban treaty, but he concludes that the president’s efforts failed due to the persistence of conflicting views among his diplomatic, military, national security, and scientific advisors. Eisenhower’s lack of leadership and inability to ease this division led to the stalling of the Geneva negotiations. This work concludes in 1960 with a description of the lessening fears of fallout. Divine addresses Kennedy’s efforts only very briefly in the epilogue and does not


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 188.
explain how the fear of nuclear fallout reemerged with the resumption of nuclear testing in 1961.

In one of the most comprehensive sources on the disarmament movement, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970*, Lawrence Wittner begins like Divine by discussing the movement’s emergence following the development of the hydrogen bomb and the resulting fear of fallout. Wittner contends that the worldwide disarmament movement influenced government policies by placing constraints on the nuclear arms race, yet fell short of its ultimate goal of complete disarmament. Wittner maintains that nuclear disarmament groups, including SANE, gained widespread appeal by emphasizing the dangers of nuclear weapons and shifting public opinion in favor of arms limitations like the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. His argument provided the basis for this thesis and the discussion of role of SANE’s newspaper advertisements in the approval of the Test Ban Treaty.

Although Wittner refers to SANE primarily in the broader context of the global disarmament movement, he also emphasizes the relationship between the U.S. government and SANE. The book mentions the significance of Cousins’ work as an unofficial diplomat between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the efforts of the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban. Despite the brief nature of these discussions, this work serves as an excellent secondary source to support this thesis when placed in context with Melvin Katz’s book and the SANE documents.

John F. Kennedy’s efforts proved to be crucial in negotiating the test ban treaty. *John F. Kennedy and Europe*, an edited collection of papers from a 1992 conference,
examines various aspects of U.S.-European relations during the Kennedy administration. The most relevant chapters include Bernard J. Firestone’s, “Kennedy and the Test Ban: Presidential Leadership and Arms Control,” and Carl Kaysen’s, “The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.” In the first selection, Firestone discusses the significance of the treaty and concludes that, despite its weaknesses, the treaty encouraged average Americans to pressure U.S. leaders to pursue a more positive relationship with the Soviet Union. Firestone agrees with Divine’s conclusions about Eisenhower’s lack of success. The author proceeds to explain President Kennedy’s leadership throughout the negotiation process, contending that Kennedy’s efforts did not represent a “decisive departure in either political or strategic dynamics of the Cold War. It did, however, serve as a precedent for presidential leadership,” in defining American-Soviet relations. This source assisted in covering President Kennedy’s role in treaty approval.

The chapter by Kaysen addresses the attainability of a comprehensive test ban under Kennedy. Kaysen argues that, at that time, pushing for a comprehensive test ban would have prevented the signing of any treaty. Despite the treaty’s shortcomings, Kaysen contends that the treaty did make progress by reducing the pollution caused by atmospheric tests and by placing weapons development and deployment at the forefront of U.S.-Soviet relations. Like Firestone, Kaysen begins with the Eisenhower efforts for a nuclear test ban and then focuses on Kennedy. Kaysen concentrates primarily on diplomatic relations and long-term outcomes, while Firestone addresses President Kennedy’s leadership.

In exploring the diplomacy of the Kennedy administration and the President’s role in establishing the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Glenn T. Seaborg’s *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban* proved to be an essential source. In this firsthand account, Seaborg, chair of the Atomic Energy Commission, discusses the specifics of nuclear issues, including testing and fallout, and distrust in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The author illustrates how Kennedy provided leadership that became a key to alleviating internal disagreement and working towards a treaty. Seaborg includes accounts of meetings and personal conversations with the president.

Norman Cousins’ 1972 book, *The Improbable Triumvirate: John F. Kennedy, Pope John, Nikita Khrushchev*, offers a firsthand account of his experience in serving as an unofficial diplomat between the United States and the Soviet Union beginning in late 1962 through the Limited Test Ban Treaty’s ratification by the Senate. Cousins notes similarities between Kennedy and Khrushchev in the pressure exerted upon them by their respective military leaders. Cousins supplies insight into the private thoughts of each leader and first person descriptions of meetings regarding the treaty. Cousins presents the most thorough account of his efforts to end the impasse in negotiations.

Another critical aspect of studying the historiography related to this thesis requires understanding the existing research on SANE. Wittner’s information about the SANE organization comes directly from *Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1957-1985* (1986) by Milton Katz. While Katz includes a brief discussion of Cousins’ work as a diplomat with the Kennedy administration, he does not refer to Cousins’ work on the Citizens Committee. Katz
discusses SANE’s newspaper ads and their emphasis on public concerns about nuclear fallout, including the success of SANE’s ad featuring Dr. Spock. He does not explain the role of the ads in context of diplomatic efforts for a test ban treaty or how the more controversial ads that followed resulted in disagreement within the organization.

The benefits of this study become more apparent after considering the existing literature relating to this topic. Building on the work of Wittner and Katz, this thesis explores SANE’s efforts in the disarmament movement in greater detail by focusing on the organization’s efforts for a test ban treaty. This work expands on previous discussions about SANE’s newspaper advertisements by looking at the strategy behind them as reflected in committee minutes. The use of minutes from SANE meetings, in conjunction with documents from the Kennedy administration, to address the issues of public opinion and the Limited Test Ban Treaty allow for a new perspective. While SANE’s goals included attaining nuclear disarmament, the organization’s greatest success came from positioning Norman Cousins to work with key political leaders, specifically President Kennedy. Discussing Cousins’ work with President Kennedy provides evidence of a tangible way in which SANE contributed to the development of the treaty. This thesis illustrates how special interest groups and government leaders attempt to influence public opinion as a tool for shaping foreign policy.

This examination of the evolution of SANE’s involvement in the creation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, beginning with its influential advertising campaign, shows how SANE’s ads proved beneficial in attracting public interest and in gaining recognition for the organization. However, SANE lost its effectiveness prior to the
treaty’s ratification. Ultimately, the Kennedy administration, with the help of Norman Cousins, successfully mobilized support for the treaty’s approval. This research offers greater understanding of the numerous factors that shape nuclear policy and the role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy. Ideally this narrative encourages and challenges readers to think about how similar widespread mobilization could impact current policy.
CHAPTER 1: HEIGHTENED AWARENESS: FALLOUT FEARS AND THE GROUNDWORK FOR A TEST BAN TREATY

This chapter examines the growing concern about the potential hazards posed by nuclear testing and the early work towards a nuclear test ban from the 1950s through 1960 and the election of President Kennedy. The discussion explores the parallel development of the American public’s heightening fear of radioactive fallout, President Eisenhower’s efforts to establish a test ban treaty, and SANE’s early advocacy for a nuclear test ban. Ultimately, SANE emerged to express and mobilize popular anxiety as a means to curtail the arms race. While SANE experienced some success in doing so, the organization faced questions about the national loyalty, or patriotism, of its members which threatened its integrity.

Soon after nuclear testing began in Nevada in 1952, public anxiety increased due to the advancement of nuclear weapons and greater awareness of radioactive fallout.19 The international recognition of the need to limit fallout from nuclear testing arose in the mid 1950s. During this same time, peace groups, including the CNVA and SANE expressed similar goals of increased arms control. While the CNVA focused its efforts on non-violent protests, SANE emphasized increasing public awareness and influencing politicians. The public’s concern about nuclear fallout continued to grow amid the early efforts to establish a test ban. While the issue of radioactive fallout would be used as a

means of gaining support for the treaty, addressing national security questions would ultimately be the greater concern.

When Eisenhower entered office in 1953, he recognized the significance of nuclear power in national defense, but remained concerned about its potential misuse. He also hoped to develop a healthy nuclear power industry within the United States. Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Program reflected this desire, encouraging nations to share nuclear materials and technology for peaceful use. This idea led Eisenhower to call for the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to oversee this sharing of information. The United Nations established the IAEA in 1957.20

During this time, several incidents fuelled public fears about the dangers of nuclear fallout. In November of 1952, the United States exploded the first hydrogen bomb and the Soviet Union followed shortly afterward in August 1953. One thousand times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, the hydrogen bomb had the capacity for more severe and expansive destruction.21 In March of 1953, former director of the AEC’s Brookhaven National Laboratory, Dr. Lyle Borst, publicly expressed his concern saying, “I would no more let my children be exposed to small amounts of radiation unnecessarily, than I would let them take small doses of arsenic.”22


The most serious threat from the Nevada tests occurred during Operation Upshot-Knothole, when a detonation known as Shot Harry exploded slightly outside of its intended target site in May 1953 and covered the town of St. George, Utah with radioactive clouds. Citizens complaining of health problems and ranchers upset by the mysterious death of forty-two thousand sheep filed a lawsuit against the government. Due to a lack of scientific evidence, the government won the case in 1956. Although the AEC worked to minimize news coverage of the incident and legal proceedings, in 1957 *U.S. News & World Report* labeled St. George as “Fallout City.” Some resolution came in 1984 when a federal judge granted a new trial because the government had withheld key findings and victims received minimal compensation.23

The U.S. BRAVO test in the Bikini atoll on 1 March 1954 gained considerably more publicity and deepened public concern. When the explosion proved to be more powerful than expected, the Navy evacuated twenty-eight Americans from a weather station on the nearby island of Rongerik. By 5 March, 236 natives had been evacuated from four nearby Marshall Islands to Kwajalein hospitals. Widespread alarm began when the Japanese fishing boat *Lucky Dragon* docked at Yaizu on 14 March. The strength of the blast covered the boat in radioactive ash and subjected the crew to radiation poisoning. Several crew members had to be hospitalized and the radio operator died of complications from the radiation. Since the ship’s tuna catch had to be destroyed, people boycotted fish markets throughout Japan, and the government resorted to using Geiger counters to inspect all fish. Eventually, on 4 January 1955, the United States agreed to

reimburse Japan for healthcare costs and losses to its fishing industry with two million dollars for what the American ambassador called a “regrettable incident.” The event’s front page newspaper coverage and a story on the Lucky Dragon in Life magazine resulted in widespread concern throughout the United States.²⁴

American popular culture reflected and fed public fears of nuclear fallout during this time. In 1954, the television drama Twilight Zone featured an episode of the world devolving into chaos and violence as people fought over shelter space during a nuclear attack. Images in the press of people fighting off intruders by gunpoint served only to escalate public anxiety. The movie industry also capitalized on fallout fears following the 1954 scare from Pacific nuclear tests by depicting extreme cases of genetic mutation due to radiation exposure. Films including Godzilla, in which a four hundred-foot reptile flattens Tokyo, and Them!, in which enormous killer ants emerge from the deserts of the American West, captivated audiences. The plots of these films and others of a similar vein such as The Blob and The Attack of the Crab Monsters proved plausible enough to thrill moviegoers, while becoming low-budget profit makers. Comic-book creator Stan Lee’s stories also reflected the possibility of mutation due to radiation in his series. In “The Hulk,” scientist Bruce Banner gains the power to transform himself into “The Hulk” after being exposed to gamma rays in a nuclear test. Additionally, in “Spider-man,” high school student Peter Parker receives his super powers as a result of being bitten by a radioactive spider.²⁵

²⁴ Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 3-9, Winkler, Life Under A Cloud, 93-95.

Sharing in the growing public concern about nuclear fallout, world leaders began to call for limitations on nuclear weapons by the mid-1950s. In 1955 at the Bandung Conference, leaders of rising nations in Asia and Africa issued a resolution calling for an end to the production of and experimentation with nuclear weapons. India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru reiterated this sentiment in a pledge made later that year in a communiqué he signed with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin. Amid this increasing outspokenness of world leaders, President Eisenhower preferred a comprehensive disarmament proposal rather than a gradual process of disarmament beginning with nuclear testing.\footnote{Divine, \textit{Blowing on the Wind}, 58-66.} In May 1955, the first discussions on an agreement to end nuclear tests began in the U.N. Disarmament Commission with the Subcommittee of Five (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union).\footnote{U.S . Department of State, “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,” <www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4797.htm> (29 September 2008).} Throughout 1955, popular journals and magazines began to consider the ramifications of nuclear testing. \textit{Science, Science Digest,} and the \textit{Bulletin of Atomic Scientists} called for more information and the \textit{Bulletin of Atomic Scientists} and \textit{Science Newsletter} printed debates over whether nuclear testing should be stopped. Later in the year, more mainstream sources including the \textit{Christian Century, New Republic, Nation, Reporter, Saturday Review,} and \textit{New Yorker} also demanded more information and research on the safety of testing.\footnote{Divine, \textit{Blowing on the Wind}, 184-187, 266, Norman Isaac Silber, \textit{Test and Protest: The Influence of Consumers Union} (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), 103-105.}
The 1956 presidential election brought the nuclear test ban debate to American attention and forced Eisenhower to place greater focus on the issue. Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate for president, made the matter a central issue in the campaign when he spoke out in favor of a nuclear test ban. Stevenson believed that the United States needed to “take the lead in promoting curtailment by all nations of hydrogen-bomb tests.” According to Stevenson, a nuclear test ban would be beneficial to international security and disarmament and would end the dangers posed by nuclear fallout. Stevenson described the test ban as a matter of life and death because it involved “the actual survival of the human race.” Stevenson struggled to make his policy proposal clear. He oscillated between ending all nuclear tests and stopping just the testing of hydrogen weapons. Eisenhower characterized Stevenson as naïve on foreign policy issues. Ultimately, Stevenson lost the election by a considerable margin, but his platform had placed the test ban at the center of American politics.

During the campaign, the administration began to privately consider the political benefits of revising its position on nuclear testing. Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy explained these considerations to the president’s special assistant on disarmament Harold Stassen. Noting the growing public concern about the health effects of radiation, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles recommended a unilateral announcement of a one-year moratorium on testing large-yield nuclear weapons. The temporary cessation would also put the Soviet Union on the defensive. Due to the


30 Ibid., 84-112.
opposition of Strauss at the AEC and Pentagon leaders, however, Eisenhower postponed
suspending nuclear tests.\(^{31}\)

Eisenhower’s eventual movement on the issue came in large part from a concern
for America’s international image, as well as Secretary of State Dulles’s decision to
support a test ban. Eisenhower favored a test ban, but thought that it needed to be
accompanied by an end to the production of nuclear weapons. While the Soviet Union
also desired a test ban, the Soviets believed the proposal of ending all production to be
too far reaching. In 1957 Eisenhower established the president’s Science Advisory
Committee to advise him on military issues, especially those regarding arms control.
Because “national goals in the area of arms limitations are not clearly understood,” as
explained by Jerome Wiesner, then director of MIT’s Research Laboratory of
Electronics, exploring the viability of a test ban became a central focus of the
committee.\(^{32}\)

As the Eisenhower administration reconsidered its position on nuclear testing in
the spring of 1957, a group of human rights advocates formed the SANE committee. In
April, the secretary of the American Friends Service Committee in Chicago, Lawrence
Scott, took the initiative to create a committee with the goal of ending the testing of
hydrogen bombs. Lawrence asked two previous secretaries of the American Friends
Service Committee, Norman Cousins and Clarence Pickett, to organize a meeting of

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\(^{31}\) Ibid., 177-178, 198-200, Robert Murphy to Harold Stassen, 31 August 1956, Lot 58 D 133 Box 29
Record Group (RG) 59, “General Records of the Department of State,” National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland.

from page 62.
leading liberals and religious leaders in New York to discuss the role of such a group. The 21 June meeting attracted twenty-seven national leaders who realized the problems with nuclear testing. The group agreed on the importance of encouraging American action on the issue, as well as the need to help the country “recognize the immorality of poisoning the air of others by our continued nuclear tests.”

The group established a steering committee led by Cousins and Pickett, with Unitarian minister Homer Jack as secretary. Each week, the committee would distribute a newsletter to prospective members, while considering how SANE would gain funding and best influence U.S. policy.

From its beginning, SANE struggled to raise the money required to run the organization. The Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker founded lobbying group, initially supplied the funds for the newsletter. Norman Cousins also contributed some of his own money in addition to borrowing against the stock of the *Saturday Review*, of which he was editor. When wealthy New York writer and peace activist Lenore Marshall learned about the organization, she soon became the group’s supporting sponsor. SANE also faced the challenge of deciding how it could best influence national policy. When discussing the peace movement at the University of Michigan, SANE’s first full-time executive director, Donald Keyes, explained one of the greatest obstacles faced by a peace organization:

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“It must balance its advocacy of ideas against their acceptability in the society. It runs the dual risks of advocating a bold and needed policy and thereby effectively alienating itself from society, or of becoming so respectable and conservative in order to reach society that its policy becomes meaningless in its dilution.”

From SANE’s perspective, the struggle that Keyes described drove existing peace groups to be too isolated from society or ineffective at stimulating political action. The organization’s decision to focus on a nuclear test ban treaty came as a compromise between tackling the broad issue of disarmament and simply lobbying politicians. Catherine Cory, a West Coast organizer for the Friends Committee on National Legislation, explained the benefits of this focus to Cousins and Pickett, saying that the average person “becomes paralyzed at the complexities of ‘general disarmament,’” but with ending nuclear tests, “at last we have an issue that the average Joe understands.” SANE decided that its purpose should include distributing important information to the public, conducting conferences, talking with policymakers, creating debate, and calling people to action.

SANE’s first major effort to stimulate public support was a 15 November 1957 advertisement in the *New York Times*. The bold headline warned “We Are Facing A Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever Existed,” and the text explained the threat posed by the arms race. Believing that man has the natural right to “live and to grow, to breathe unpoisoned air, to work on uncontaminated soil,” SANE called for an end to

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38 See appendix A to view the advertisement.
nuclear testing as one step to reducing this threat. The ad’s sponsors primarily consisted of liberal leaders including clergy members Harry Emerson Fosdick and Paul Tillich, scholars like Lewis Mumford, novelists like John Hersey, in addition to Eleanor Roosevelt and Norman Thomas. Other sponsors declined to have their names published in the ad, including scientist Eugene Rabinowich who objected to the use of emotional phases like “poisoned air” and “uncontaminated soil.”

The public had a similar mixed reaction to the ad. Critics attacked the liberal tone of the ad. The New York Daily News remarked in an editorial, “Far be it from us (to charge SANE’s leaders) with consciously trying to do a job for the Kremlin. We merely think that as regards nuclear weapons tests they are as nutty as so many fruitcakes.” Even more extreme, a Colorado organization led by Robert and Virginia Heinlein responded with an ad in local papers entitled “Who Are The Heirs of Patrick Henry? Stand Up and Be Counted.” The ad quoted Henry’s “give me liberty, or give me death” speech and declared the organization’s message to be “the rankest sort of Communist propaganda,” even if SANE leaders may not all be Communists. On the other hand, supporters responded excitedly and contributed to SANE’s rapid growth. Donations covered the $4,700 cost of the ad in days. Within three weeks, the New York office received almost $10,000. SANE leaders had given little attention to building mass membership, but the widespread response reshaped the organization. With a broader national membership, SANE decided to organize local chapters under a national office. By the summer of 1958,

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40 Katz, Ban the Bomb, 28.
the organization grew to 130 chapters, including about twenty-five thousand people, around the country.  

SANE’s second newspaper advertisement used highly charged emotional language to explain how American nuclear testing poisoned the entire world. Published in the New York Herald Tribune on 24 March 1958, the ad utilized the text of an editorial that Norman Cousins had written for the Saturday Review. The ad declared “We do not have the right – nor does any nation – to take risks, large or small, for other peoples without their consent.” Despite the critique of some within SANE that the ad played too much on emotions, it compelled enthusiastic supporters, including Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., to sign their names to the ad. 

Human retention of radiation remained a concern despite a May 1957 report from the AEC to other government agencies that recorded levels of public accumulation of radiation well within normal - 1/200 of the permissible amount found in children and 1/1000 recorded in adults. In January 1958, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists devoted the entire issue to the topic by having various contributors discuss the possible dangers of strontium, especially in milk, which could be mistaken by the body for calcium and incorporated into bones. Laurence Kulp and his associates at Columbia University had been studying the presence of strontium-90 in bones, and in their third study found that the amount of strontium in children up to four years of age had doubled within the past year. These findings and the pressure required to get the AEC to release its results, 

41 Ibid., 26-30, Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 166-168, Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, 52-53. 
42 Katz, Ban the Bomb, 31-32. For the original ad see the New York Herald American, 24 March 1958, 9.
increased concerns. The mounting anxiety led President Eisenhower to conduct AEC hearings and increase government oversight of the milk supply.43

Eisenhower’s hesitancy to impose a test moratorium granted the Soviet Union a victory in the sphere of global opinion when the Soviets announced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear testing on 1 March 1958. Following this setback, the United States continued to make progress towards a test ban. In April, Eisenhower convinced the Soviets to jointly convene a Conference of Experts in order to determine the technological capability to monitor a test ban.44 By July, the Public Health Service had established ten inspection stations throughout the country, increasing government scrutiny of radiation levels in the milk supply.45 Following the encouraging report from the Conference of Experts in October, the administration began to plan trilateral test ban negotiations including the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in Geneva for the summer of 1959. As negotiations progressed, the three nations informally agreed to an atmospheric testing moratorium as long as talks continued.46

In March 1959, SANE held a month-long campaign to remind world leaders of the public’s desire for the success of negotiations in Geneva. For two weeks, the organization set up a storefront information center in New York City’s Times Square as a


way to raise awareness about the hazards of nuclear testing to the public. The window display showed a Geiger counter and graphic photographs of the bomb’s effect on Hiroshima. The center also contained displays of pamphlets and books including *On the Beach*. This 1957 novel by Nevil Shute, made into a popular 1959 movie of the same title, depicts the lives of Australians in the year 1963 after a Third World War has wiped out the entire Northern Hemisphere. As fallout spreads south, the characters face inevitable demise as the world’s population slowly dies. SANE distributed literature, including articles on the effects of the presence of the radioactive element Strontium-90 in milk and statements by Albert Schweitzer and Nobel Prize-winning chemist Linus Pauling on the threat posed by nuclear fallout. The display also included a loudspeaker warning passersby about leukemia, cancer, and bone disease resulting from the Strontium-90 left by fallout. Lunch hour lectures by speakers such as Dr. Algernon Black of the Ethical Culture Society, Stanley Issacs of the New York City Council, the Reverend Donald Harrington of the Community Church, and Dr. Hugh C. Wolfe, of Cooper Union’s Physics Department, provided another way for SANE to educate the public. Approximately forty thousand individuals visited the display and contributed $2,200 to the organization. SANE distributed nearly eighty thousand pieces of literature and received six thousand signatures on its “Time is Now” petition to end testing. The event received some press coverage in newspapers and on the “Today” show; however, the scope of the effort remained limited to people visiting Times Square. Even with this restricted scope, the display carried a very explicit message about the horrors caused by fallout.47

The growing protest against fallout forced Eisenhower to make an effort to calm public concern. On 24 March, AEC chair John McCone testified before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that his agency had never withheld information about fallout from the public. McCone maintained that the AEC spent $18 million annually to study safeguards against radiation hazards. Eisenhower affirmed this position in a news conference the following day, contending that the government had been taking every effort to fully release the facts to the public.48

That same month the article, “The Milk We Drink,” in Consumer Reports broadened public concern about strontium laden milk. The article warned of the rising levels of strontium-90 and called for greater action on the part of the government. As feared, the Milk Industry Foundation noticed a two to three percent decrease in milk sales that March when compared to the same month the year before. The dairy industry responded with a public campaign promoting milk’s wholesomeness. In addition, the government continued to confirm the safe levels of strontium-90 in milk.49

Amid this period of growing concern, the United States conducted a series of underground tests, known as HARDTACK II. In reviewing these tests, researchers learned that the technology to detect and differentiate between nuclear explosions and earthquakes had not progressed as far as the Conference of Experts had initially thought. This discovery made the need for on-site inspections of testing facilities a focal point of negotiations. Without inspections, the difficulty of identifying possible Soviet

48 Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 269-270.
underground tests could ultimately compromise U.S. national security. The new findings led Eisenhower to propose an atmospheric test ban, in order to avoid a disagreement on inspections, while still achieving some form of test ban. Khrushchev quickly rejected this proposal in support of a comprehensive treaty. Progress continued with the talks and, by the spring of 1960, Khrushchev agreed to have some on-site inspections. Believing an agreement to be close at hand, the three nations planned a summit in Paris that May.

Unfortunately, a few weeks before the summit, the Soviets shot down an American U-2 spy plane. Eisenhower eventually accepted responsibility for the incident, but refused to make a public apology. Angry and embarrassed, Khrushchev withdrew from negotiations for the remainder of Eisenhower’s term.50

In addition to this unfortunate turn of events, Eisenhower’s lack of leadership within his own administration contributed to the failure of negotiations. The strongest opponents of a test ban treaty within the administration included the AEC, first led by Lewis Strauss and then John McCone, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Those on the other side of the issue included the president’s science advisor James Killian, replaced by George B. Kistiakowsky in July 1959, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), disarmament advisor Harold Stassen, and Secretary of State Dulles. This division proved to be a significant hindrance in preparing for negotiations. For instance, in early 1958, Stassen proposed that the United States begin disarmament negotiations by offering a test ban without requiring an end to the production of nuclear weapons. Stassen’s plan gained support from UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. and Treasury Secretary Robert

Anderson, but Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy and General Nathan Twining, chair of the JCS, voiced strong opposition. In the midst of the conflict, an indecisive Dulles did not express his opinion. When the plan eventually failed, Eisenhower asked Stassen to resign and Deputy UN ambassador James Wadsworth replaced Stassen as the American representative in negotiations. The division also led to severe dissatisfaction among the AEC and military leaders when the president opted to extend the test moratorium through the end of 1959.\textsuperscript{51} As historian Robert Divine explains, “for two years, he had permitted a difference of opinion between his diplomatic and scientific advisers and his military and national security experts to paralyze the negotiations at Geneva.”\textsuperscript{52}

As the presidential election approached, Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy supported President Eisenhower’s efforts for a nuclear test ban. In a November 1959 speech, Senator Kennedy opposed New York Governor and Republican primary candidate Nelson Rockefeller’s argument for resuming testing. Kennedy contended that resuming tests would be “damaging to the American image” and could risk “the very existence of human life.” The senator proposed a four point program including a continued moratorium on U.S. testing during negotiations, additional work on a comprehensive test ban, resumption of U.S. underground tests only if preceded by Soviet tests, and further studies on fallout and its control.\textsuperscript{53} In the Senate, Kennedy also sponsored legislation to create an arms control research organization that would also


\textsuperscript{52} Divine, \textit{Blowing on the Wind}, 314.

examine economic, social, and political issues. Both houses of Congress approved the legislation on 26 September 1961, which established the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).  

In 1960, Kennedy articulated these same objectives as the Democratic presidential candidate when AEC director Thomas Murray asked the presidential candidates to consider resuming underground and outer-space nuclear testing. Kennedy also made clear that the United States should “exhaust all reasonable opportunities” in reaching a test ban before resuming tests. On the campaign trail, Kennedy reminded citizens about the threat of the arms race, warning,  

“A single nuclear weapon today can release more destructive energy than all the explosives used in all the wars throughout history - the radioactive fallout from that single bomb can destroy all higher forms of life in an area of ten-thousand square miles.”

This statement reflected how, as a candidate, Kennedy’s advocacy of a test ban and greater attention to disarmament issues became more evident.

Throughout the campaign, Vice President and Republican presidential nominee Richard Nixon charged Kennedy with having a weak stance on defense. For instance, Nixon frequently pointed to Senator Kennedy’s vote against a resolution allowing for use of force to defend Taiwan as proof. Kennedy managed simultaneously to support a

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54 Ibid., 94-95.


nuclear test ban and maintain a firm anti-communist stance. Reassuringly, Kennedy declared,

“Of course, I do not want to minimize the Russian threat…. They still want to ‘bury us’ economically, politically, culturally and in every other sphere of interest. Nor do I believe that we can rely for disarmament on merely trusting the word of Soviet leaders - we must have an inspection system as reliable and as thorough as modern science can devise. But I do believe that under what appears to be a more fluid and rational atmosphere since the death of Stalin, the Soviet leaders may realize that the path of Russian self-interest permits - and perhaps compels - them to agree to some steps toward comprehensive arms control.”

In his third debate with Nixon, Kennedy discussed the importance of a test ban, explaining,

“If we cannot succeed, then we must strengthen ourselves. But I would make the effort because I think the fate not only of our own civilization, but I think the fate of world and the future of the human race, is involved in preventing a nuclear war.”

Kennedy showed a desire to strengthen national security, while maintaining a deep commitment to reaching a test ban agreement.

During the campaign, SANE’s work towards a test ban continued with several additional newspaper ads, petition campaigns, and public meetings. One of the largest public meetings was a rally at Madison Square Garden in May 1960 that attracted roughly twenty thousand people. This progress came to an abrupt halt when temporary chair of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Thomas J. Dodd (Dem.-CT) made charges that SANE suffered from “serious Communist infiltration at the chapter level.”

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Dodd conceded that SANE was “headed by a group of nationally prominent citizens about whose integrity and good faith there is not question,” but he demanded that they “purge their ranks ruthlessly.” Cousins had cautioned other SANE leaders about this issue and even asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the summer of 1958 for a list of subversives to guard against, but the FBI refused.

Hearings before the Dodd Senate subcommittee began on 13 May 1960 with the committee investigating West Side New York chapter co-chair Henry Abrams. Well known within New York, Abrams had played a key role in organizing the Madison Square Garden Rally, and some believed he had previously had some connection to the Communist Party. Suspicion arose when Abrams pleaded the Fifth Amendment regarding questions about his Communist ties. With the hope of preventing any further investigation, Cousins dismissed Abrams from the organization. Cousins and Dodd had worked together in the United World Federalists (UWF) and lived near each other in Connecticut. As a neighbor and friend, Cousins met with Dodd in Washington in order to get Dodd to end his attack. Following the meeting, Dodd announced that Cousins had agreed to help him clean up SANE, which led some to criticize Cousins for his compliance. A New York Times article charged Cousins with requesting Senator Dodd’s investigation and led some SANE members to question Cousins’ credibility and leadership.

59 Katz, Ban the Bomb, 46.
The SANE leadership attempted to show compliance, declaring that SANE welcomed the membership of anyone “whose support is not qualified by adherence to Communist or other totalitarian doctrine.”\textsuperscript{61} Despite Cousins’ signs of abiding by the committee’s wishes, Senator Dodd continued his investigation. In August, he attacked Nobel Prize-winning chemist Dr. Linus Pauling, who had helped SANE organize a 1957 petition for a nuclear test ban. When Pauling refused to provide the committee with the names of the people who had helped him distribute the petition, the committee threatened to hold him in contempt. Rather than attract additional negative attention, the Dodd committee opted to discredit Pauling and the petition by attempting to connect him with Communism. Through the remainder of the summer, the Dodd committee subpoenaed twenty-seven more SANE members. While Dodd stated that the Communists had attempted to infiltrate SANE, the committee never produced a final report of the hearings.\textsuperscript{62}

The Dodd hearings inflicted considerable damage on SANE even without conclusive findings. Disagreement within SANE’s leadership over Cousins’ response to Senator Dodd’s charges, particularly the dismissal of Abrams, had led to uncertainty about the organization’s future. A considerable decrease in SANE’s membership followed the Dodd hearings. Upset with Cousins’ compliance with the Dodd committee, more liberal members, especially students and pacifists, left the organization. SANE became more centralized around the national office, with a consolidated staff. The

\textsuperscript{61} Katz, \textit{Ban the Bomb}, 50.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 52-55, Wittner, \textit{Resisting the Bomb}, 363-364.
organization revised its strategy to focus on education, lobbying, and electoral work, with the Washington office’s political-action director, Sanford Gottlieb, playing a larger role.\textsuperscript{63} This revision enabled SANE to refine its efforts for a test ban and ultimately allowed the organization to work more closely with the incoming administration.

The greater awareness of the risk posed by nuclear testing that occurred in the 1950s not only sparked a fear of radioactive fallout within the American public, but also fostered international interest in a nuclear test ban. While President Eisenhower failed to achieve a test ban treaty, in part due to a lack of leadership within his administration, John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency with a similar objective. Amid this period of heightened concern, SANE emerged to articulate and mobilize popular anxiety in an effort to restrain the arms race by working specifically towards a nuclear test ban. SANE had some success in doing so, particularly through its newspaper advertisements, yet questions about the loyalty of the organization’s members threatened its reputation. At a time when popular sentiment regarding nuclear testing remained malleable, SANE’s reorganization and its plan to rally public support for a test ban would allow the group to work alongside the Kennedy administration, which had similar aspirations.

CHAPTER 2: NEGOTIATING A TREATY: SANE’S PUBLIC CALL TO ACTION AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

This chapter examines the ongoing work towards attaining a nuclear test ban treaty from the beginning of the presidency of John F. Kennedy through the treaty’s signing in July of 1963. As in the previous chapter, this discussion looks at the parallel efforts of SANE and the Kennedy administration to achieve a test ban treaty. Both SANE and President Kennedy attempted to shape popular sentiment. While SANE focused primarily on the hazards of fallout, Kennedy had to balance concerns about fallout with national security issues, sometimes putting the two at odds. As treaty negotiations progressed, Norman Cousins’ involvement in the treaty’s progress increased through his work with President Kennedy, while SANE’s influence diminished.

Negotiating a nuclear test ban treaty became one of the Kennedy administration’s goals. Kennedy also had a strong desire to foster global political and economic freedom, which made him concerned with the Soviet Union’s desire to spread communist ideology, particularly in the Third World. While sometimes dichotomous, these interests in reducing tensions and promoting freedom required Kennedy to strike a delicate diplomatic balance in order to meet his objectives and slowed the progress of nuclear arms control. Kennedy’s leadership, particularly in his ability to learn from the mistakes of President Eisenhower and to shape public debate on the issue, proved essential to the eventual agreement. Kennedy realized how continuous discord within the Eisenhower administration had contributed to the inability of the United States to negotiate a test ban.

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treaty. Kennedy made special efforts to create an atmosphere of relative harmony that enabled officials to focus more energy on their jobs. Special assistant and speechwriter Theodore Sorensen recalled,

“He (Kennedy) was quite careful to keep the White House staff very small and relatively low profile and made sure the staff members confined their role to being advisers and assistants. This restricted substantially their ability to say on the phone that the president insists that you do this or that. That has been a major source of discord in other administrations.”

Kennedy also remained very accessible which made presidential advisors feel included. Agreeing with Sorensen, AEC chairman Glenn Seaborg believed that Kennedy’s openness and down to earth nature allowed officials to pay “relatively more attention to getting the job done and relatively less attention on who got credit or blame.”

This leadership style enabled Kennedy to prevent division within the administration, as occurred with Eisenhower, from derailing a nuclear test ban agreement. In the Eisenhower administration, the greatest opposition came from the AEC and the JCS. As Kennedy assumed the presidency, little had changed. The 1960 annual report by the AEC responded harshly to the nuclear test moratorium warning that it posed a “resultant threat to the free world.” Because of AEC chairman John McConn’s opposition to a test ban, Kennedy made him the president’s disarmament advisor as a way to strengthen the AEC, while still utilizing McConne’s familiarity with Geneva negotiations. To replace McConne, Kennedy selected Nobel Prize winning chemist and

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65 Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban*, 182.
66 Ibid., 182-183.
67 Ibid., 33.
chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley, Glenn T. Seaborg to head the AEC. While Seaborg supported a nuclear test ban, the AEC remained divided on the issue, as Kennedy did not replace the organization’s three commissioners.68

Early in Kennedy’s presidency, much of the public remained either apathetic about a nuclear test ban treaty, or convinced that national security required nuclear testing. In a June 1961 Gallup poll that asked if the United States should resume nuclear testing during negotiations for a treaty despite the voluntary agreement with the Soviet Union to stop tests, 55 percent of those asked responded affirmatively, while only 26 percent thought that testing should not be resumed.69 Both Kennedy and SANE realized that in addition to reaching a diplomatic agreement with the Soviet Union, obtaining public support would be beneficial to the attainment of a test ban.

Negotiations for a test ban treaty had been hampered by the debate over two key issues, the status of Berlin and on-site inspections. Khrushchev advocated a German peace treaty that would demilitarize Berlin. From the Soviet perspective, a demilitarized Berlin would enable the Soviet Union to strengthen the East German’s communist regime and limit West Germany’s contributions to NATO. The economic prosperity of West Germany attracted emigrants from East Germany, which the Soviet Union feared would weaken communist East Germany. On the other hand, the United States felt strongly about building a sound democracy in West Germany and rejected a Soviet proposed


demilitarization treaty in July 1961. The next month Khrushchev approved the East German government’s closing of the border between East and West Berlin and beginning construction of the Berlin Wall. Closing the border stopped the large number East Germans fleeing to the West and helped stabilize the communist regime, but the incident caused a sharp rise in tensions between the two powers. The United States believed that maintaining open access to West Berlin and freedom for its citizens to choose their own way of life required the continued presence of American troops.

On 1 September 1961, the Soviet Union resumed atmospheric nuclear tests, breaking the moratorium established during the Eisenhower administration. Khrushchev disclosed plans to detonate a fifty megaton bomb at the end of the month. Despite suggestions from military advisors to immediately resume testing, Kennedy preferred the more strategic approach suggested by the U.S. Information Agency. USIA director Edward R. Murrow argued that by resuming testing, “we destroy the advantages of the greatest propaganda gift we have had for a long time.” The worldwide reaction to Soviet testing had been extremely harsh in all areas, except China. Il Tempo in Rome compared Khrushchev to Hitler saying, “it is the same tactic of speaking about peace, while at the same time launching the thunder of war.” Rangoon’s Nation warned, “Those

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of us who had hoped our children could grow up in a world free of possible atomic annihilation can now resume building our atomic shelters.” Brazil’s Radio Jornal do Comercio made the dire prediction that “Scientists foresee a day of radioactivity saturation. Then human beings will begin to die because a Russian dictator did not permit any human consideration to check his effort to dominate the world.”73 As described in a message from the Department of State to all American diplomatic posts, the United States hoped that “in exploiting world fear of fallout to (the) disadvantage of (the) Soviet Union, (the) United States should retain flexibility with respect to our own future testing program.” The U.S. government also believed that this intimidation by the Soviet Union could be used to “solidify world opinion in advance against the testing of very high yield weapons.”74

In an effort to capitalize on world reaction, SANE’s co-chairs Norman Cousins and Clarence Pickett responded with an 16 October letter to the editor in the New York Times that reiterated the effects of fallout. The letter warned readers,

“adequate means of decontaminating food and water of radioactive strontium produced by the nuclear tests do not exist. Poisonous strontium finds its way into human bones. Children are especially vulnerable, since the body takes up strontium in the same manner it does calcium during the period of intensive growth.”75


In the ad entitled, “Open Letter To the Russian People,” SANE urged Soviet citizens, as well as people of other nations, to pressure their respective governments to end atmospheric testing.

The United States reacted more harshly than it had to past Soviet aggression. Kennedy resumed underground testing in mid-September, yet rejected demands from military leaders to conduct atmospheric testing. Seaborg advised Kennedy that the government remained unsure of the level of fallout from the Soviet detonation. Despite this uncertainty, Kennedy mentioned the danger of fallout in a White House statement by declaring,

“We believe the peoples throughout the world will join us in asking the Soviet Union not to proceed with a test which can serve no legitimate purpose and which adds a mass of radioactive fallout to that which had been unleashed in recent weeks.”

This message helped shift world opinion in favor of the United States and temper reaction to American underground testing. The U.S. government aimed at “putting the monkey on the Russian back for our resumption of testing,” as explained by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harland Cleveland. For instance, in a 8 November news conference, President Kennedy clarified the difference between the impact of atmospheric testing and underground testing saying, “What is significant in this area, of course, is the amount of megatons put in the air and the condition under which the bombs may be exploded as it might affect fallout. And I don't think that there is any

76 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 112.

doubt the Soviet Union is first in that very dubious category.” As promised, the Soviet Union conducted its massive test on 30 October, which yielded roughly fifty-seven megatons and led the United States to actively plan atmospheric testing. Despite this setback in the negotiation process, President Kennedy capitalized on the situation. He maintained diplomatic strength with the resumption of underground testing while he simultaneously retained favorable world opinion by not moving ahead with atmospheric testing.

With the resumption of underground testing and possible expansion of U.S. nuclear testing, the SANE National Committee sought to reevaluate its effectiveness in promoting a test ban treaty with the hope of appealing to a broader audience. Apart from articles written by the organization’s leaders and attempts to work with politicians, SANE’s efforts had focused primarily on educating the public and gaining public support for a treaty. Previous SANE newspaper ads relied on large amounts of dense text, rather than images, to urge readers to make donations to the organization. “Our ads are too complicated and call for intellectual participation,” Sheldon Sosna contended in a meeting of the Public Information Committee to reconsider SANE’s advertising. Sosna, a vice president at the New York advertising agency of Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield and developer of the Bristol-Myers and Peace Corps accounts, pointed out that “unless we have specific material Sane simply reflects the intellectuality of the people

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79 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 114-115.
who produce it.”\textsuperscript{80} In addition, previous ads had multiple objectives such as educating readers, urging political action, and making financial contributions; therefore, they lacked focus. “We are running ads to influence public opinions – not as money makers,” Sonsa reminded the committee.\textsuperscript{81}

Bearing in mind these weaknesses, the committee moved forward in planning the organization’s next efforts in reaching out to the public. To strengthen the credibility of SANE’s message, the leaders hoped to highlight the initiation of 800 lawyers and physicians into the organization in the fall of 1961. The goals of the committee also included building a celebrity roster to encourage those who supported SANE to volunteer their time or services to the organization. The committee agreed that doing a series of “simple and dramatic” ads would allow SANE to define a primary focus for each ad and get expanded exposure.\textsuperscript{82}

As SANE reevaluated its message, the U.N. broadened test ban discussions. By 1962, the U.N. had expanded negotiations from the initial five nations, creating the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) to conduct discussions in Geneva. That spring, Kennedy advised Secretary of State Dean Rusk to offer a modus vivendi to the Soviet Union on the Berlin issue as a way to “lower the temperature of their


\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 19 January 1962, DG 58, Series A, Box 8, 1.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 11-12.
‘inflammatory propaganda’ on Berlin and East Germany,” with the “possibility of widening the future negotiations on non-aggression.” Kennedy also hoped that setting the issue aside temporarily would allow the two powers to make progress on other key issues, such as a test ban treaty. Rusk urged Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and later Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to agree to this offer.

As Kennedy addressed the Berlin issue, SANE revised its advertisement strategy to broaden its audience and deepen public reaction. In a 16 February meeting, the Public Information Committee decided to take a powerful emotional approach in contrast to its past advertising described by one member as “rational and devoid of emotional appeal.” Part of this strategy included utilizing magazines such as *McCall’s* and *Redbook* that had a wide female readership. “SANE’s primary objective was to make the threat of nuclear war real to a public which had become hardened to the idea of mass destruction; our ‘stock in trade’ is to sell the threat and to mention the cure-all, not sell the cure,” director of development Harold Applebaum stressed at a 9 March meeting. While reevaluating its audience, the committee considered running the advertisements in the *Washington*

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85 “Minutes of the Meeting of the Public Information Committee,” 16 February 1962, DG 58, Series A, Box 8, 2.

86 “Minutes of the Meeting of the Public Information Committee,” 9 March 1962, DG 58, Series A, Box 8, 3.
Post with the intent of reaching Washington leaders, they ultimately decided to place the
ads in the New York Times hoping to reach a broader demographic.  

Before the planned SANE ads were published, the issue of inspections had
brought treaty negotiations to a standstill. In the latest round of discussions, the Soviet
Union objected to onsite inspections. The Kennedy administration saw onsite inspections
as essential to identifying detonations and differentiating them from earthquakes. Since
the United States still lacked conclusive results from its seismic research program
(VELA), the administration remained uncertain of what concessions would be reasonable
to resolve the issue. Kennedy continued to receive pressure from military and scientific
advisors to resume atmospheric testing in order to complete existing test series. The
support of military leaders and the JCS would be essential to the future ratification of a
treaty. Kennedy felt compelled to acquiesce on atmospheric testing for political reasons
in order to ensure their support in the long run. Lacking any foreseeable resolution to the
freeze in treaty negotiations, on 2 March, Kennedy announced that the United States
would recommence atmospheric nuclear testing in late April.88 Kennedy declared on 29
March,

“We cannot at this time enter into a treaty without the ability and right of
international verification. Hence we seem to be at a real impasse. Nevertheless, I
want to repeat with emphasis our desire for an effective treaty and our readiness
to conclude such a treaty at the earliest possible time.”89

87 “Minutes of the Meeting of the Public Information Committee,” 19 January 1962, 5-6.
88 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 142-149.
89 Ibid., 147.
Despite this professed eagerness, a treaty appeared to be unrealistic to Kennedy at this point.

Prior to the U.S. resumption of atmospheric testing in April 1962, SANE hoped to capitalize on the fear of fallout. Based on the ideas discussed at earlier meetings, SANE published a series of three ads in the *New York Times* with strong messages about the threat of fallout. An 10 April full page ad featured a picture of a nuclear explosion and asked “What are the Risks of Tests?”90 In this ad, SANE contended that resuming nuclear tests would create a testing race with the Soviet Union, resulting in increased radioactive fallout. The ad explained how continued testing posed a greater risk to humans than not testing. To help illustrate that more weapons would not ensure additional security, SANE cited Kennedy’s own words before the U.N. where he declared, “In a spiraling arms race, a nation’s security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase.” The ad quoted Nobel Prize-winning geneticist Hermann J. Muller’s statement that as many as three hundred thousand people could die from the existing level of fallout and stated that further testing would endanger more lives, especially those of the next generation. The ad also pointed out that the American resumption of tests played to the Soviet Union’s favor by allowing for shared blame of potential fallout. The second ad pictured renowned pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock standing thoughtfully over an infant girl and warned readers that “Dr. Spock is worried.”91 This 16 April ad also contained a letter from Dr. Spock expressing his concerns about nuclear testing. The third ad from 18 April, entitled “President

90 See appendix B to view the advertisement.

91 See appendix C to view the advertisement.
Kennedy: You Stopped the Steel Hike. You Can Still Stop Nuclear Tests,” informed the public about a proposed compromise being discussed in Geneva, which called for the Soviet Union to accept on-site inspections and the United States to agree to a national detection system. The ad also called on President Kennedy to consider this proposal and not pursue further atmospheric testing.92

The ad featuring Dr. Spock in particular, succeeded in attracting public attention to the test ban treaty by focusing on the lethal effects of nuclear fallout. In order to strengthen SANE’s disarmament message, Homer Jack recognized the significant influence of an endorsement from leading pediatrician Dr. Spock and encouraged the physician to join the organization. Dr. Benjamin Spock had revolutionized parenting following World War II with the 1946 publication *The Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care*. The book focused on the psychological needs of children and advised parents to be flexible and treat each child as an individual. Dr. Spock reassured parents that they were the experts on their own children. The first section of the book entitled “Trust Yourself” encouraged parents, “You know more than you think you do.”93 Millions of parents quickly embraced this rejection of traditional strict parenting principles and learned how to enjoy raising their children.94 Dr. Spock initially worried that his joining SANE would send a message of fear to parents. Ultimately, “I saw that it was a pediatric


issue,” Dr. Spock recalled. “I realized that if we didn’t have a test ban treaty, more and more children, not only in America but around the world, would die of cancer and leukemia or be born with mental and physical defects from fallout radiation.”

In March 1962, the pediatrician joined the national board. William Bernbach, SANE board member and founding partner of the advertising agency Doyle, Dane, and Bernbach, approached Dr. Spock to write the copy for the ad. With plans to develop a full-page ad for the New York Times, an excited and fearful Dr. Spock composed a statement of his philosophy on disarmament. After being asked to limit his statement to two hundred words, Dr. Spock lamented, “I was being asked to discard ninety percent of my creation. It felt like being asked to commit hara kiri.” The advertising agency also took special care to avoid any statements that seemed confrontational to the Kennedy Administration, or that the public would see as crass, in order to ensure the ad’s wide acceptance. Public information director Nell Lee Litvak briefly updated President Kennedy on SANE’s efforts in an 13 April letter and referred to the ad saying, we (SANE) “hope this ad appearing in the New York Times on Monday will have a ‘visceral reaction’ that will lead to the postponement of atmospheric testing.”

The ad’s immense success stemmed primarily from Dr. Spock’s influence and his poignant message that accompanied the photograph. Dr. Spock avoided an offensive tone in expressing his opposition to further nuclear testing. He made an effort to avoid

95 Benjamin Spock, M.D. and Mary Morgan, Spock on Spock (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 167.
96 Ibid., 168.
97 Ibid., 167-168.
condemning past government decisions saying, “I am worried. Not so much about the effect of past tests but at the prospect of endless future ones. As the tests multiply, so will damage to children – here and around the world.”99 Dr. Spock also addressed the ethical aspect of testing saying,

“And if I am to be destroyed through some miscalculation I would prefer to be destroyed while we are showing leadership in the search for a cooperative world than while sitting in an illusory fortress blaming our opponents for the lack of a solution.”100

He urged citizens to recall that the government does not always make the correct decisions and stated, “in a moral issue, I believe that every citizen has not only the right but the responsibility to make his own feelings known and felt.”101 Dr. Spock, working with the advertising agency, took great care to make his message appealing to a large portion of the public.

By 25 April, over eighty newspapers throughout the nation had requested permission to publish the ad. America’s leading news magazines Time, with a weekly circulation of nearly three million and Newsweek, with a circulation of about 1.5 million, both published articles on the ad.102 Interest also came from abroad, with the ad appearing in the Ottawa Citizen, the London Observer, and Sydney’s Women’s Day. Some


100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

newspapers such as *The Gazette and Daily* of York, Pennsylvania and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* simply chose to run the ad as a public service. In many cases, the cost of running the ad had to be raised by local SANE chapters or by private citizens. For instance, the Cleveland SANE chapter raised $1,152 in a matter of hours to publish the ad locally. In West Lafayette, Indiana, a group of professors in Purdue University’s Department of Forestry collected the funds to publish the ad in the local *Journal and Courier*.\(^{103}\)

“The flood of letters coming in express a resurgence of hope and real desire to do something,” reported Public Information Director Nell Lee Litvak. She summarized public response in correspondence with Dr. Spock and in SANE newsletters. Respondents expressed “heartfelt thanks” and being “glad you’re showing us how to channel our anxieties.” One Connecticut supporter collected $250 in donations in the span of a day.\(^{104}\) A woman from Brooklyn wrote, “that Dr. Spock ad in the *Times* of 16 April, was the best you’ve ever run. By showing it around I was able to get women in the playground to sign petitions against testing and some to agree to write the President.” “Although I have always favored your cause, your ad has made me realize that I should act now. Your *Times* ad was one of the most effective and inspiring that I have ever seen and goes right to the core of the matter,” a letter from Rego Park, New York praised. A letter from Connecticut commended SANE on the ad saying, “It represents a sure-fire


\(^{104}\) Litvak, letter to Dr. Spock, 1 May 1962.
way of reaching people who would otherwise not be touched by even the most logical approach.”105 By the beginning of May, SANE had received more than twenty-five thousand requests for full-sized reprints of the ad and twenty thousand pre-addressed copies to be sent to President Kennedy. Copies of the ad began to appear in store windows and physicians’ offices. A national pediatricians’ convention also issued copies to its attendees.106 Following this widespread response, Nell Lee Litvak concluded,

“I think the most valuable insight that we as a peace organization have to gain from this experience is that there are millions of people in the world who are ready to respond and act in a warm and wonderful way if we approach them in that way.”107

Amid this increase in public awareness, atmospheric testing resumed as planned.

The attention from the ad also led to greater participation from other well-known figures of the time. Celebrities including Shelley Winters, William Holt, Ossie Davis, Ruby Dee, and Viveca Lindfors made appearances at the Times Square Silent Vigil. The New York SANE chapter organized the nightly vigil from 25 April to 5 May to protest the resumption of atmospheric testing. Julie Harris, accomplished actress of film, television, and Broadway, as well as friend of the Kennedy family, not only attended the vigil, but also promised Nell Litvak to express her concern to President Kennedy when Harris attended his birthday party. While this increased activism on the part of celebrities helped bring attention to the issue of nuclear testing, Dr. Spock’s efforts proved to be “perhaps most significant for the future of the movement,” according to historian Charles

105 SANE Action, 25 April 1962, DG 58, Series A, Box 16.

106 Litvak, letter to Dr. Spock, 1 May 1962.

107 Ibid.
DeBenedetti. Ultimately, the immense trust that the public placed in Dr. Spock proved to be the key factor in this increased attention in America on a nuclear test ban treaty.\textsuperscript{108}

Following the end of the moratorium on atmospheric testing, communication continued between the United States and the Soviet Union, but neither side made any concessions on its positions. The Soviet Union had not responded to the U.S. offer of a modus vivendi on the issue of Berlin and negotiations remained at an impasse. The stalemate continued in the three sessions of the ENDC in Geneva on 14 March to 15 June, 16 July to 8 September, and 26 November to 20 December.\textsuperscript{109}

SANE continued to exploit public fears of nuclear fallout following the response to Dr. Spock’s ad, but the later ads received considerably less attention and greater criticism as in the case of a 5 July 1962 ad showing a milk bottle with a poison label.\textsuperscript{110} As SANE’s first major advertisement since its April campaign, the heading declared, “Is this what it’s coming to?” The ad warned the public of the threat posed by the presence of radioactive elements in milk resulting from fallout. Iodine 131 could potentially concentrate in the thyroid gland and strontium-90 could be mistaken by the body for calcium and be incorporated into bones. Dubbing milk “the most sacred of all foods,” SANE called for parents to speak out against nuclear testing, “Raise hell; it’s about time


\textsuperscript{110} See appendix D to view the advertisement.
you did.” The ad recommended that in areas subject to higher rates of fallout, people consider using powdered or evaporated milk.111

SANE’s publication of this controversial milk ad happened within months of President Kennedy’s public relations campaign to calm anxiety. That past November, concern for milk safety rose again after the Public Health Service reported the highest ever level of iodine-131 in milk following the resumption of nuclear tests. To reassure the public and avoid a decrease in milk sales, the administration reiterated that the findings remained well under the threshold of being unsafe and explained the limited risk iodine-131 posed by stressing its short eight day half-life.112 Speaking before the National Conference on Milk and Nutrition, President Kennedy offered additional reassurance, reminding the public that “detailed guidelines to protect the health of people against radiation have been developed by the Federal Radiation Council…. The milk supply offers no hazards.” The President declared that he had ordered milk to be served at all White House meals and concluded the speech with a toast using milk. In a press conference the next day, Kennedy restated the message that “milk is safe, and can be drunk with strong conviction that it's assisting health and not working against good health.” Kennedy reasoned that a decrease in milk consumption harmed the American diet, economy, and farm program. This campaign of reassurance, proved successful in

111 “Is This What It’s Coming To?” July 1962, DG 58, Series A, Box 16.
assuaging the majority of public concern over milk, in large part due to its acknowledgement of the high priority of continued monitoring.\textsuperscript{113}

The proximity of these events made SANE appear confrontational towards Kennedy and contributed to the negative reception of the ad. The Milk Industry Foundation expressed harsh opposition. In writing letters to both Clarence Pickett and Norman Cousins, the organization’s director of public relations Norman Myrick called the ad a “masterpiece of propaganda that makes effective use of fear, innuendoes, half truths and sly suggestions.” Myrick chastised the SANE leaders saying, “but as a citizen of the Republic to whom your name has always stood for truth and decency and the dignity of the human spirit I am appalled at the terrible prospect this advertisement affords.”\textsuperscript{114} The week after the ad’s publication, \textit{Time} magazine carried an article reassuring the public of milk’s safety and critiquing SANE’s ad. The story acknowledged the legitimate concern posed by strontium-90 and iodine-131, but explained logically how the risk could be addressed. The article discussed two new innovations to remove strontium-90 from milk. Ion exchange resins and plastic membranes, to filter positive electric charges, had 98 and 90 percent success rates respectfully. The reiteration of the eight day half life of iodine-131 provided additional reassurance. \textit{Time} concluded that “its threat does not justify the scare advertisement (showing a bottle of milk with a death’s- 


\textsuperscript{114} Norman Myrick to Clarence E. Pickett and Norman Cousins, 10 July 1962, DG 58 Series A Box 16: 1961-1962 Advertisements, Katz, \textit{Ban the Bomb}, 76-77.
head label) that the National Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy ran last week in the
New York Times.”115

SANE stood by its ad despite the dairy industry’s accusation of the ad’s
misstatement of facts. SANE defended its position by referring to government inaction
and the Federal Radiation Council’s more lenient radiation standards than those
recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection.

“Essentially,” the response concluded,

“the milk companies, which have been going along on government reassurances,
have been brought to account by SANE’s action, and are in a position of having to
continue to ‘cover up’ or to ‘face up.’ We are hopeful that they will come to
recognize their responsibility.”116

This strongly worded statement, along with the message of the ad, had a tone reminiscent
of the organization’s more confrontational approach prior to the Spock ad. The ad’s
release just as public concern about the milk supply dissipated further fueled the
disappointing response to the ad. Had the ad’s publication come at the height of the
debate, it may have gained a more positive response.

As SANE faced these challenges, several developments during the summer and
fall moved the United States and the Soviet Union towards compromise. The 7 July
publication of Project VELA’s findings highlighted the potential shortcoming of the U.S.
requirement of international inspections. The study concluded that detection of
underground tests could be significantly improved by surface instruments with special


filtering techniques and that detection of underwater tests seemed promising with the use of seismometers. The study also found that far fewer earthquakes in the Soviet Union could be mistaken for nuclear tests than originally thought. Uncoordinated responses to the study further weakened the U.S. position. In a 12 July news conference, Secretary Rusk mentioned the promising signs the study found for detection instrumentation, but said that there remained no substitute for onsite inspection. In contrast, when U.S. chief negotiator Ambassador Arthur Dean returned to Geneva on 14 July, he mentioned how the study might make it possible to avoid any international inspection within the Soviet Union. This misstep resulted in criticism and confusion at the Geneva negotiations and forced the Kennedy Administration to reconsider its stance on the issue. Administration officials held four meetings on 26, 27, 30 July and 1 August at which they reevaluated the U.S. position on the need for onsite inspections and how to proceed with treaty negotiations. Ultimately, the administration decided to push forward, but reduce the previous demand for twelve to twenty onsite inspections to a lower negotiable number. Fearing that the issue of inspections may have jeopardized the feasibility of a comprehensive test ban, the United States proposed a limited test ban in August that still allowed underground testing. The Soviets rejected the limited treaty in favor of a comprehensive agreement, but the issue of onsite inspections had been reopened for negotiation.117

As the issue of inspections dominated treaty negotiations, the Soviet Union’s support of Cuba’s communist regime increased, raising U.S. concern. Hoping to curb

117 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban 162-171.
rising tensions, while maintaining a presence in Cuba, the Soviets became more willing to make concessions on other aspects of disarmament. In early September, the Soviet Union finally agreed to a modus vivendi, to separate the Berlin issue from the test ban negotiations. A Special National Intelligence Estimate dated 13 September explained Soviet self-interest stating, “the increase in tensions over Cuba, has led the Soviets to conclude once again that a separate treaty which poses a direct challenge to the Western presence in and access to Berlin is too hazardous a course.” Khrushchev made further concessions later that month in agreeing to the possibility of a limited test ban, while continuing to work on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba reached the point of crisis on 15 October when American U-2 planes conducting reconnaissance flights over the island identified intermediate-range missile sites. Two days later, photographs verified launchers and missiles that, within two weeks, would be capable of being fired. President Kennedy responded firmly by ordering a blockade of the island and the inspection of all passing ships. By 28 October, the Soviet Union had agreed to remove the missiles, but this period of nearly two weeks brought the superpowers to the brink of nuclear war, which sobered both Kennedy and Khrushchev.

In the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, SANE published a policy statement as an ad in the 24 October New York Times that urged both the United States and the Soviet Union to accept responsibility for the incident. The severity of the situation allowed

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119 Ibid., 224, 230, 235, and 239.
120 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, 172-176.
SANE to provide policy suggestions such as the Soviets ending arms shipments to Cuba and the United States removing its blockade. After the negative response to the July ad, SANE looked to moderate the message of its advertisements, but this ad fell short of that goal, as many Americans feared for the nation’s safety.

One positive outcome of the crisis had been the development of a closer, more respectful relationship between Kennedy and Khrushchev. The two leaders had been exchanging private correspondence since September 1961, but during and after the crisis the communication occurred with greater frequency. The letters also expressed a more urgent commitment on the part of both to addressing disarmament concerns. For instance, following Khrushchev’s 28 October letter discussing efforts to decrease tensions, Kennedy responded,

“Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field [disarmament]. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date.”

The Cuban Missile Crisis also resulted in greater hostility between the Soviet Union and China. Because the Soviet Union had backed down, China denounced Khrushchev for “capitulationism.” Khrushchev retorted that China would have preferred an all out war.

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121 Katz, *Ban the Bomb*, 80-82.


This hostility between China and the Soviet Union proved to be another encouraging factor in increased cooperation with the United States on the part of the Soviets.124

While both leaders articulated a stronger commitment to negotiating a test ban treaty, the issue of international inspections remained an unresolved point. In an October letter, Khrushchev expressed his unchanged position saying,

“We have now conditions ripe for finalizing the agreement on signing a treaty on cessation of tests of thermonuclear weapons. We fully agree with regard to three types of test or, so to say, tests in three environments. This is banning of tests in atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In this respect we are of the same opinion and ready to sign an agreement.

But there are still some differences with regard to underground explosions. Therefore it would be good if you gave instructions to find a compromise in the decision on the underground test ban, but without inspection. We shall not accept inspection, this I say to you unequivocally and frankly.”125

In the process of developing an acceptable system of inspections, a misunderstanding occurred between the Americans and the Soviets that threatened termination of treaty negotiations. While discussing the issue in October, the Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. V. Kuznetsov, mistakenly received the impression from Ambassador Arthur Dean that the United States could agree to two to three international inspections annually.126 Khrushchev softened his position on inspections by mid-December saying, “Well, if this is the only difficulty on the way to an agreement, then for the noble and humane goal of ceasing nuclear weapon tests we are ready to meet you halfway on this


125 Fensch, Kennedy-Khrushchev Letters, Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 30 October 1962, 349.

126 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, 178-180.
question.” Through correspondence with Kennedy, Khrushchev learned that the United States remained steadfast in its original requirement of eight to ten inspections per year. An angry Khrushchev abruptly ended substantive discussion of the test ban until the United States would make concessions. At this point, the United States knew nothing of the Soviet Union’s misunderstanding of the number of inspections the United States required and Kennedy wanted to move forward with treaty negotiations as soon as possible. Despite Dean’s later insistence that he mentioned only eight to ten inspections, a miscommunication had occurred. 128

As these events unfolded, Norman Cousins planned a trip to Moscow near mid-December on behalf of the Vatican to discuss religious freedoms in the Soviet Union with Khrushchev and to arrange the release of imprisoned Archbishop Josyf Slipyi. The leader of Ukrainian Catholics, Slipyi protested Soviet efforts to force Ukrainians into the Russian Orthodox Church with the conclusion of the Second World War, which led to his arrest. 129 Prior to his departure, Cousins received White House approval for the trip and met with President Kennedy to discuss his meeting with the Soviet premier. Kennedy requested only that Cousins convey the strong desire on the part of the United States to ease tensions in the relationship. Cousins’ conversation with Khrushchev focused primarily on religious issues, but it gave Cousins a unique opportunity to get to know the Soviet leader and understand some of the challenges Khrushchev faced. Khrushchev’s

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129 Cousins, *The Improbable Triumvirate*, 30, 48-50
chief domestic concerns entailed moving the Soviet people beyond Stalin’s leadership, particularly in the government and economy. Cousins noted,

“He (Khrushchev) realized, therefore, that there would have to be something approaching a psychological upheaval before people would be ready to face up to the need to change the way they were doing things. This meant de-Stalinization. The bureaucracy had grown up under Stalin. Only by changing attitudes toward Stalin could they change everything else that had to be changed, he said.”130

Khrushchev also struggled with not appearing weak following the removal of missiles from Cuba. Yuri Zhukov, associate editor of the Soviet Union’s leading newspaper Pravda, explained to Cousins that Chinese propaganda insisted that Khrushchev “had not only sold out to the West but was actually leading the Russian people away from socialism with his bourgeois revisionism.”131 Cousins heard Khrushchev confirm this challenge posed by propaganda in his speech before the Supreme Soviet. The Soviet leader also addressed the issue briefly in their conversation saying that the Chinese confused diplomacy with rejecting communist ideology.132 Cousins relayed Kennedy’s message, but aside from Khrushchev’s brief mention of his desire to continue work on the test ban treaty, the two men did not discuss U.S.-Soviet relations in depth.133

After his return, Cousins visited Washington in early January 1963 and met with presidential aide Ralph Dungan to discuss the trip and convey his willingness to visit Khrushchev again at the service of the government. Within a few days, Secretary Rusk scheduled a lunch with Cousins to discuss the misunderstanding over the issue of

130 Ibid, 43.
131 Ibid., 33.
132 Ibid., 36-37, and 45-47.
133 Ibid., 16-57.
inspections that had led to a stalemate in treaty negotiations. The administration feared that the impasse in negotiations might make a test ban unattainable, if not addressed quickly. Rusk asked Cousins to return to Moscow, in order to “bear witness to the good faith of the United States.” After speaking with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Khrushchev scheduled the visit for mid-April.134

Before Cousins made his second trip to Moscow, key members of peace organizations, including SANE and several other groups such as the United World Federalists (UWF), established an ad hoc committee in order to concentrate efforts to raise public support for the test ban in early March 1963. The job of the committee, as articulated by Cousins, “should be to help develop strong counter-pressures to the present test-ban opposition.” The committee adopted a three-step strategy that included working with individual members of Congress to inform and persuade them, building a campaign to encourage decreases in the defense budget, and reporting progress on these aspects to the president, urging him to take further action. The group also agreed on taking specific actions such as creating a subcommittee of inter-faith religious leaders, working with leading magazine editors, personally contacting key representatives and senators, gaining the participation of university administrators, appealing to women, and gaining the support of scientists.135

Norman Cousins discussed the strategic issues of the test ban during his 12 March meeting with the president. Kennedy “felt that the most effective time for the political

134 Ibid., 78-79.

135 Summary of Discussion, 6 March 1963, DG 58 Series A Box 8 SANE Ad Hoc Committee on the Test Ban 1963.
campaign would be when he had a specific treaty to bring before the Senate – or at least reasonable prospects of one.” Cousins took this opportunity to inform the president about the ad hoc committee and its desire to “put emphasis on education now and political action when the time was right,” with which Kennedy agreed. The meeting also allowed Cousins to convey the committee’s belief in the need for strong presidential leadership.136

Committee member Robert Stein, editor of *Redbook*, began to organize editors from *McCall’s*, *Ladies Home Journal*, *Good Housekeeping*, *Parents’*, *Woman’s Day*, and *Family Circle* in a joint effort to reach the public. The committee recruited twenty-one prominent business leaders representing companies including General Mills, Merck, Kodak, Whirlpool, Coca Cola, and several steel and railroad companies to sign an ad published in the *Wall Street Journal*, entitled, “Why Business Leaders Want a Nuclear Test Ban.” The group succeeded in organizing a Universities Committee for Disarmament that published an ad in the *New York Times* with the endorsement of eighty-five universities. The committee also met with various religious leaders to discuss a plan to organize social action leaders in key states.137

During this time, dentists for SANE, published the ad, “Your children’s teeth contain Strontium-90,” on 7 April 1963 in the *New York Times* that used the same moderate tone as the Cuban Missile Crisis ad.138 Depicting three laughing children, the ad


138 See appendix E to view the April 7 advertisement.
restated accepted data that strontium could accumulate in bones and teeth, and contained the signatures of more than two hundred concerned dentists. The dentists went on to express their support of a nuclear test ban and called on all governments to bring an end to testing. These more recent ads had a considerably more subdued and polished tone than the July milk bottle ad. Neither ad created the mass appeal of the ad featuring Dr. Spock, but they did not generate vocal opposition like the milk bottle ad.\textsuperscript{139} Despite the more restrained quality of these ads, the moderate approach they represented compared with the more activist approach of the July ad created a point of contention within SANE that would impair the effectiveness of the organization.

The committee began to see the need for a stronger authority on the test ban issue. At the 23 May meeting, only $7,000 had been contributed beyond the basic public relations budget. This lack of incoming funds, combined with the June estimate of a minimum of $500,000 needed to spread their message, made it increasingly difficult for the committee to accomplish its goals. The committee discussed that “certain members of the ad hoc group could be asked to constitute a steering committee for a bi-partisan or non-partisan citizens’ committee to be formed for visibility purposes.” This group could include members not as closely associated with liberal or peace activities as a way to broaden its appeal. The ad hoc committee would continue its efforts to move the public toward vocalizing support through letter writing campaigns, while Cousins would quietly

solicit support for a citizens’ committee and encourage the Kennedy administration to strengthen its stand for a test ban.140

Amid these plans to establish a citizens’ committee, Cousins made a second trip to Moscow in May, which proved to be much more productive diplomatically than the first. Complying with Khrushchev’s previous request, Cousins brought two of his daughters along on his visit to Khrushchev’s Black Sea retreat. This trip allowed Cousins the opportunity to see a more relaxed Khrushchev, who entertained the girls with his large bear coat and challenged Cousins to a game of badminton. The pair also spent considerably more time addressing the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Khrushchev explained that the Soviets had discussed the acceptability of three inspections on multiple occasions. Not only had scientists discussed the issue during a meeting at Cambridge University, but Soviet scientist Yevgeni Federov and the president’s special assistant on science and technology, Jerome Wiesner, also made this point about inspections. Khrushchev had reassured the Council of Ministers of the American position. He also persuaded the council to accept on-site inspections, arguing that without this, the treaty would not receive ratification by the U.S. Senate.

“People in the United States seem to think I am a dictator who can put into practice any policy I wish. Not so. I’ve got to persuade before I can govern. Anyway, the Council of Ministers agreed to my urgent recommendation. Then I notified the United States I would accept three inspections. Back came the American rejection. They now wanted neither three inspections nor even six. They wanted eight. And so once again I was made to look foolish. But I can tell you this: it won’t happen again,” Khrushchev explained angrily to Cousins.141


141 Cousins, The Improbable Triumvirate, 97.
The Soviet leader went on to contend that he had been under extreme pressure from his atomic scientists and generals to carry out more nuclear tests as a matter of national security, given that the United States had carried out seventy percent more tests than the Soviet Union. As the meeting concluded, noticeable tension still existed regarding the misunderstanding on inspections, but Khrushchev had agreed to move past the issue as long as the United States made the first move.142

Back in Washington, Cousins met with President Kennedy to give him a full report of the trip. Cousins explained the domestic challenges that Khrushchev faced and described the humiliation the Soviet leader suffered after reneging on his pledge to the Council. The credibility of Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence hinged in large part on the success of the test ban treaty. Khrushchev believed that this policy would result in an increase in consumer goods and services, as well as a rise in the Russian standard of living. If the policy failed, anti-Western, hard-line views within the Communist world would be strengthened and weapons production would increase considerably. Kennedy observed,

“One of the ironic things about this entire situation is that Mr. Khrushchev and I occupy approximately the same political positions inside our governments. He would like to prevent a nuclear war but is under severe pressure from his hard-line crowd, which interprets every move in that direction as appeasement. I’ve got similar problems. Meanwhile, the lack of progress in reaching agreements between our two countries gives strength to the hard-line boys in both, with the result that the hard-liners in the Soviet Union and the United States feed on one another, each using the action of the other to justify its own position.”143

142 Ibid., 80-101.
143 Ibid., 113-114.
This empathy for Khrushchev made it easier for Kennedy to understand the severity of the challenges Khrushchev faced, while encouraging Kennedy to take the next step in treaty negotiations.144

The idea for this next step came from Cousins’ memorandum to the president about his trip, in which Cousins suggested a dramatic offer of peace to the Soviet Union.145 Kennedy felt compelled to take this step towards a possible treaty because he believed that the United States had the strategic upper hand at the time. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, a close U.S. ally, strongly favored a test ban treaty. Macmillan implored Kennedy to move forward with negotiations in a thirteen page letter he sent the president in March. Khrushchev’s concern about proving that cooperating with capitalist nations could be beneficial had been growing, which Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev confirmed to Glenn Seaborg in late May. The stagnant expansion of Soviet influence in the third world further encouraged Kennedy to take this calculated risk. In addition, the president had some hope that an agreement between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain could constrain China’s development of nuclear weapons. Despite strong Republican criticism of the president’s policies, Kennedy believed that public opinion remained malleable, which would allow him to gain the necessary domestic support for the treaty. Ultimately, these factors prompted Kennedy to move forward in support of a test ban.146 At President Kennedy’s request,

144 Ibid., 113-116.
145 Ibid., 122-123.
146 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 184-186.
Cousins returned to Washington to work with Theodore Sorensen on composing a speech they hoped would mark a turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations.\textsuperscript{147}

The commencement speech at American University on 10 June 1963 signified Kennedy’s attempt to take the initiative in moving negotiations forward. In the speech, Kennedy articulated a fresh, more expansive approach to disarmament issues. He focused broadly on the topic of world peace, which he defined as

“No a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children – not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women – not merely peace in our time but peace for all time.”\textsuperscript{148}

Kennedy went on to discuss the wastefulness of weapons stockpiles and the need to reexamine attitudes towards other nations. He explained that world peace “does not require that each man love his neighbor – it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement.” As Seaborg notes, the target audience of the speech included Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership as a means of reaffirming Kennedy’s commitment to disarmament issues. Kennedy strengthened his appeal to the Soviet Union by calling for a new attitude towards the Soviet people.

“No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people

\textsuperscript{147} Cousins, \textit{The Improbable Triumvirate}, 122-123.

for their many achievements – in science and space, in economic and industrial
growth, in culture and in acts of courage.”149

Not only did Kennedy acknowledge the valuable contributions of the Soviets, but he also
commended them for their considerable sacrifices in fighting with the United States in
the Second World War. He noted the loss of twenty million Soviet lives and compared
the widespread destruction of Soviet territory as equal to America’s land east of
Chicago.150

Kennedy also made an effort not to appear soft on communism in the hope of
quelling domestic opposition to the speech. For instance, in praising Soviet achievements,
he tempered his commendation by noting why communism disgusts Americans. Kennedy
reiterated America’s unwillingness to compromise on the issue of Berlin saying,

“Our commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for example,
stands undiminished because of the identity of our vital interests. The United
States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and
other peoples, not merely because they are our partners, but also because their
interests and ours converge.”151

Kennedy highlighted the recent success of the two nations, particularly on working
towards a nuclear test ban. Advocating a fresh start in negotiations, Kennedy explained
his hopes that a test ban treaty “would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most
dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively
with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid., and Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, 211-218.

151 John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at American University.
arms. It would increase our security – it would decrease the prospects of war.” Kennedy concluded by announcing the agreement between himself, Khrushchev, and British Prime Minister Macmillan to hold high-level discussions the following month in Moscow.152

The address received a mixed reception around the world. Within the United States and Britain, the speech gained little attention from the media and the public. Seaborg recalled that in Britain the lack of coverage resulted from the fact that a sex scandal in the British cabinet, the Profumo Affair, received more attention. In the United States, civil rights issues garnered more media and public attention. The apparent lack of concern from within America did create some uncertainty for President Kennedy. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. explained Kennedy’s frustration, recalling that ten days after the address, the mail report counted that the speech had prompted 896 letters, 861 favorable, and 25 unfavorable, while the Congressional bill on freight rates provoked 28,232 letters. Kennedy remained confident that the majority of people supported a test ban treaty, but he feared that there may not be enough time for them to express their support.154

More importantly, Kennedy’s address made a favorable impression on the Soviet Union. Upon hearing it, Khrushchev dubbed it “the best speech of any American president since Roosevelt.”155 Kennedy’s speech had inadvertently coincided with the arrival of the Chinese delegation in Moscow for policy discussions. The Chinese brought

152 Ibid., and Cousins, The Improbable Triumvirate, 125-126.

153 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, 217-218.

154 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 909-910.

with them an open letter to the Russian people in which they dismissed recent U.S. treaty proposals as unacceptable and touted the failure of treaty negotiations. The letter also predicted the failure of Khrushchev’s policy of coexistence and the need to develop policy more in line with that of Peking. In a period of twelve hours following Kennedy’s speech, the Soviet media released no news of either the Chinese open letter or the president’s address. When the press finally released the full text of Kennedy’s speech, it became clear that Khrushchev had not yet given up on the policy of coexistence. The release of the president’s speech showed that Kennedy had convinced not only Khrushchev, but also members of the Council of Ministers, of his commitment to disarmament issues.  

In planning for the Moscow conference set for mid-July, the administration named Averell Harriman as the chief American negotiator. Harriman, “the most experienced and distinguished of American diplomats,” according to Arthur Schlesinger, spent most of his career working with the Soviets. Harriman’s previous work included negotiating mining concessions with Trotsky, attending all of the leadership conferences during the Second World War, serving as ambassador to Moscow and London, and overseeing the Marshall Plan in Europe, which made him well qualified for this new task. A Soviet Embassy official remarked to Schlesinger, “as soon as I heard that Harriman was going, I knew you were serious.” The initiative the president took in his


158 Ibid., 903.
speech and the forethought given to the Moscow talks further evidenced Kennedy’s commitment by circumventing the traditional bureaucratic channels of the Department of State. Kennedy’s display of good faith also resulted in the end of Soviet jamming of Western broadcasts and the agreement of the Soviet Union to IAEA safeguards on nuclear weapons on 20 June.\footnote{Firestone, \textit{The Quest for Nuclear Stability}, 107-114, and Seaborg, \textit{Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban}, 218.}

Ultimately, the Moscow conference resulted in the signing of a limited test ban treaty officially titled a “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water.” American, Soviet, and British delegates initialed the agreement on 25 July.\footnote{Seaborg, \textit{Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban}, 254-255.} Prior to the Moscow conference, most of the contentious issues aside from the number of inspections had been addressed. The resolution of the diplomatic impasse between the United States and the Soviet Union, in addition to Kennedy’s American University speech, allowed the parties to reach an agreement that all three leaders believed could be in their political interests. The test ban treaty negotiations had been fraught with complications and roadblocks. Both SANE and President Kennedy attempted to shape popular sentiment, SANE through its advertisements, and Kennedy through his speeches and public appearances. However, different concerns put the two in conflict at times. As treaty negotiations moved forward, Norman Cousins’ collaboration with President Kennedy intensified, while SANE’s efforts diminished. After the signing of the treaty, Cousins’ work with the Kennedy
Administration would only increase as the focus shifted towards gaining Senate ratification for the treaty.
CHAPTER 3: THE DRIVE TOWARD RATIFICATION: PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE AND SANE’S ANCILLARY ROLE

SANE’s advertisement featuring Dr. Spock attracted widespread attention to the nuclear test ban, but the organization’s success proved to be short-lived. Unlike the tremendous positive response this ad received, later ads proved controversial. By the time of the test ban treaty’s signing at the end of July 1963, the ads had become a point of contention within the organization. As this disagreement emerged, Norman Cousins’ involvement with the Kennedy Administration expanded as he became the co-chair of the president’s Citizens Committee on the Test Ban Treaty. The Committee’s primary responsibility entailed mobilizing public and Senate support for the treaty. The Kennedy administration, as well as Cousins, feared that SANE’s association with the test ban treaty would make it appear to be a liberal cause, thereby interfering with the administration’s efforts to broaden support for the treaty and to prevent conservatives or moderates from blocking the treaty’s ratification. Ultimately, the disagreement within SANE, in addition to the Citizens Committee assuming the primary role in promoting the treaty, resulted in SANE’s minimal involvement in gaining public support for the test ban treaty prior to its ratification by the Senate on 24 September 1963.

The division within SANE continued to grow with the proposed publication of an August ad in the New York Times. The organization hoped the ad, “Now it’s up to the Senate…and You!” would counter the public letters of opposition received by congressional offices that advocated continued nuclear testing as an essential aspect of
national security.\textsuperscript{161} The ad emphasized the importance of the treaty to world peace because it limited the arms race and ended nuclear fallout. The ad reminded readers that, with a limited test ban treaty, “present and future generations will be spared additional reproductive danger and bone cancer.” It congratulated the negotiators of the treaty and urged all senators to vote to approve the treaty as soon as possible. From SANE’s perspective, “by ratifying the treaty, the Senate can make clear the will of the American people to seek a just and lasting peace under honorable and safeguarded agreements.” In conclusion, it called on the public to write letters to each of their senators and to President Kennedy conveying their support.\textsuperscript{162}

Some within SANE believed the organization needed to shift its approach following the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. For them, this meant SANE should moderate its message and cooperate with the government through the treaty’s ratification. When Donald Keys wrote to Clarence Pickett requesting his feedback on the Senate ad, Pickett gave an unenthusiastic response. Pickett found the text to be “satisfactory,” but expressed misgivings about the ad in general. “I confess to considerable skepticism as to whether the use of large-scale newspaper advertising for our purposes is not already worn thin and somewhat over-done.” Despite his doubts, Pickett still gave Keys permission to attach his name to the ad.\textsuperscript{163} Norman Cousins shared Pickett’s view; in 1964 he would

\textsuperscript{161} See appendix F to view the advertisement.


\textsuperscript{163} Clarence Pickett to Donald Keys, 24 July 1963, DG 58 Series A Box 16.
even argue that SANE should dissolve its national organization since its original objective of a test ban treaty had been attained.  

David Riesman, renowned sociologist and active SANE member since the organization’s beginning, expressed even stronger objection to the ad. In 1950, Riesman had published *The Lonely Crowd*, the most widely read book on American culture in the twentieth century. Riesman’s insight into American cultural trends made his opinion highly desired by political leaders and journalists in the 1950s and 1960s. Keys regularly requested Riesman’s advice on SANE ads and sought Riesman’s approval for attaching his name to each ad. From Riesman’s perspective, the ad needed to stress the considerable concession made by the Soviet Union to accept continued underground testing and to more directly refute potential objections to ratifying the treaty. “As it is,” Riesman explained, “the ad flies in the face of just such objectors by laying out an array of what seem for the time being at least to be far-fetched hopes of a stronger United Nations and the furling of the war flags.” Riesman also opposed the ad’s portrayal of the test ban as a step towards complete disarmament. He warned, “The Committee is one for a Sane Nuclear Policy, not a committee to get rid of all war and all violence.” Ultimately this would weaken the movement because it “would seem to “prove” that the proponents of the test ban want to use it to strengthen the United Nations and reduce our armed forces generally.” Riesman believed that the benefits of the test ban treaty would be more


indirect, such as a settlement on Berlin, rather than total disarmament. By connecting the two, SANE’s followers would be disappointed by the lack of immediate results. Riesman also disagreed with the timing of the ad’s publication. He explained,

> “Feeling as I do that the ad is a waste of scarce resources I would rather hold your fire until some of the opposition begins to manifest itself and then answer its arguments…. I see no urgency to entering the fray now with a statement that if it says anything only supports the fears of the opponents of the test ban.”

Riesman concluded by declining to sign his name to the ad saying, “I don’t think any ad should ever be written that doesn’t strike an original or a quasi-original tone or bring news to your reader rather than pious platitudes.”

In spite of this disapproval, SANE’s national leaders published the ad on 2 August. The sudden absence of Riesman’s support was significant due to his expertise in American culture and longstanding involvement in the organization.

President Kennedy’s creation of the Citizens Committee also resulted in SANE’s minimal participation in the treaty’s ratification. Even with national surveys showing the majority of Americans supporting ratification, White House and Congressional mail had been as much as fifteen to one against the treaty. This negative response, in addition to the expected negative Senate testimonies from military figures and physicist Edward Teller, created concern about the treaty’s ratification within the administration. Teller’s work as a member of the Manhattan Project and co-founder of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, in addition to his current position as associate director of the laboratory, led those in the administration to fear the impact of his testimony. “The President’s chief concern was that enough southern Democrats might combine with

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166 David Riesman to Donald Keys, 25 July 1963, DG 58 Series A Box 16.
Republicans to prevent the necessary two-thirds vote,” Sorensen recalled.\textsuperscript{167} When White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger met with Norman Cousins to discuss potential ratification problems at the end of July, Salinger suggested that Cousins’ Ad Hoc Committee be reconstituted into the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban. The Citizens Committee would bring together key members of the Ad Hoc Committee and prominent, pro-ratification business leaders who would work closely with the White House to devise an effective strategy.\textsuperscript{168}

Following the official creation of the Citizens Committee after the meeting between Salinger and Cousins, the relationship between the Kennedy Administration and the new group quickly solidified. The president sent Carl Kaysen, deputy special assistant for national security affairs, to meet with the leaders of the UWF on 2 August to make plans for inundating senators with letters and requests for meetings to discuss the test ban. Kennedy also arranged for Senate Democratic Whip Hubert Humphrey to meet with Cousins to discuss strategies for ratification such as running newspaper ads and distributing tapes to radio stations. On 7 August, the committee leaders met with President Kennedy at the White House. The five leaders in attendance included James Wadsworth, who had served as U.S. Ambassador to the UN and chief representative in test ban negotiations; Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers of America; William Clayton, former under secretary of state of economic affairs under Truman; Marion Folsom, former secretary of the department of health, education, and


welfare under Eisenhower; and Cousins. Attendees from the government included
McGeorge Bundy, Lawrence O’Brien, Frederick Dutton of the State Department, and
Adrian Fisher of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This meeting
would provide the basis for the Citizens Committee’s strategy and actions.

Kennedy began the meeting by explaining the challenges that the committee
faced. O’Brien, the White House liaison aide to Congress, reported that mail showed
roughly a fifteen to one ratio against the test ban. Kennedy warned that the Senate lacked
the two-thirds majority needed for ratification.

“My guess is that the mail to the White House and to the Congress against the
nuclear test ban will increase. The opponents to any ban are going to try to snow
us. I’m not going to underestimate the size of the opposition…. They know that
all they need to knock out the treaty is a handful of votes,” Kennedy cautioned.

Cousins then gave the president a review of the background of the Ad Hoc Committee,
including a list of its members. Cousins went on to describe how the Citizens Committee
had developed as an extension of the Ad Hoc Committee and the active role that SANE
had played in the test ban campaign. The new committee would retain the staff
established by SANE and the Ad Hoc Committee, including David Finn and the public
relations company of Ruder and Finn, which had worked closely with SANE throughout
much of its history.

During the meeting, Kennedy discussed some initial steps the committee could
take to strengthen its message. The president believed that recruiting of additional

170 Cousins, *The Improbable Triumvirate*, 129.
171 Ibid., 128-133.
business leaders would be beneficial. Cousins recalled Kennedy’s excitement upon seeing the ad hoc committee’s June ad in the *Wall Street Journal* highlighting the support of business leaders and the president’s remark, “Now you’re talking.”¹⁷² Kennedy also pledged to telephone Edwin Neilan personally, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Frederick Kappel, chairman of the board of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, who had been reluctant to make a commitment to Wadsworth and Cousins. Another important measure included gaining added support of leading scientists, including Eisenhower’s science advisors James Killian and George Kistiakowsky, as a means of combating Dr. Edward Teller’s strong opposition. Acquiring the support of religious figures, farmers, educators, and labor leaders became another important aspect of the group’s strategy. The group also discussed the possibility of targeting specific states in order to gain key Senate votes. While these plans resembled many of SANE’s efforts, gaining broader support required distancing the movement from its activist roots.

“SANE performed a valuable function by sticking pins in us and forcing us to consider the problem,” Bundy commented, “but we’re beyond that point now…. The kind of persuasion we need now has to come from people who are not readily identified with causes.”¹⁷³

In closing, Kennedy thanked organizations such as SANE and UWF for their work, but, like the Ad Hoc Committee, reiterated the need to minimize their involvement so the test ban did not appear to be an exclusively liberal cause.¹⁷⁴


¹⁷³ Ibid., 427.

Cousins and Wadsworth, both leaders of the Ad Hoc Committee, spearheaded the president’s Citizens Committee. As part of minimizing the role of activist organizations, Wadsworth became the chairman of the committee and Cousins would be identified only as the editor of the Saturday Review. From its creation, the committee met once every ten to fourteen days. The group quickly began its work to create a widespread support for the test ban treaty. They agreed that their basic actions should focus on increasing the number of letters sent to Washington, making personal visits to senators either in Washington or in their home states, and issuing joint newspaper statements with strategic groups. Through letter writing and additional recruiting, the committee hoped to show not only the volume of support for the treaty, but also the depth of support. It could also target individual senators. For instance, if a senator responded well to those in business but not religious leaders, his office should be inundated with the support of both state and national business leaders.175

Cousins had received considerable support from the McCall Corporation, the new owners of the Saturday Review. With the help of Redbook editor Robert Stein, the committee arranged a meeting between President Kennedy and the editors of Redbook and McCall’s, the nation’s two leading women’s magazines. The meeting allowed the president to discuss the importance of the treaty and the editors to question Kennedy on the subject. Both magazines published transcripts of the discussion, marking the first such joint venture by women’s magazines.176

176 Cousins, The Improbable Triumvirate, 136-137.
The committee promptly took action on the president’s suggestions. In gaining the support of business leaders, the committee received forty-five positive responses to its request for their participation in a statement of support for the treaty. After an 14 August press release, the statement appeared in a double-page advertisement in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. Local leaders further developed the movement. The *Chicago Tribune* published the same ad, but added notable local names. Business leaders in Chicago, St. Louis, Indianapolis, and Des Moines began local campaigns to issue public statements and speak directly to senators. These steps represented the considerable progress made with additional resources of the Citizens Committee compared to the twenty-one supporters, and one, one-page ad organized by the Ad Hoc Committee.177

In soliciting the support of scientists, the committee recruited James Killian as chairman of the Scientists Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban, in addition to others including Dr. Kistiakowsky. By the end of the month, the group of scientists published advertisements in the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *Washington Star*. In papers not carrying the full ad, Ruder and Finn coordinated news releases with “localized” cover sheets noting regional notables supporting the issue. The committee also expanded the idea of reaching out to a wider array of religious leaders. Dr. Kenneth Maxwell of the National Council of Churches distributed bulletins urging the creation of letter-writing campaigns. Other leaders, including Father Cronin of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and Cardinal Ritter and Archbishop Wright of Pittsburgh, created letter-writing campaigns within the Catholic Community. Rabbi Maurice Eisendrath, president

177 Ibid., 138-139.
of the Union for American Hebrew Congregations, and Rabbi Uri Miller of the Synagogue Council of America did the same within the Jewish community.\textsuperscript{178}

Much like the committee of scientists, the Citizens Committee also created the University Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban. President Robert Goheen of Princeton volunteered to be the group’s chair and sixty-three other members had been recruited by the end of August. The committee produced a basic advertisement and issued a broadly circulated press release on 11 September. The statement highlighted the variety of supporting collegiate heads from the Universities of Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, Texas, along with New York and Purdue Universities. The list also included prestigious private schools such as Harvard, Columbia, Vassar, M.I.T., Yale, Cornell, Notre Dame, Pittsburgh, and Swarthmore. “As educators, dedicated to the training of youth and the preservation of our nation’s heritage,” they urged Senate ratification of the treaty and called on citizens to express their support by mail or wire to leaders in Washington.\textsuperscript{179}

The Citizens Committee also focused its efforts on farming and labor organizations. The committee worked with the Department of Agriculture which issued messages in weekly farm publications calling for the end of radioactive fallout. The Farmers Union distributed notices to all of its members, urging them to send letters of support to Washington. The union’s president, James Patton, used his influence in


\textsuperscript{179} Cousins, \textit{The Improbable Triumvirate}, 141, “Presidents of Ten State Universities and 24 Other Academic Heads Urge Ratification of Test Ban Treaty,” 11 September 1963, DG 58 Series B-6 Box 66, 1963-64: Correspondence and Related Papers.
Colorado to personally encourage the state’s senators to support the treaty. The committee distributed separate news and information kits for farm newspapers, weeklies, and television and radio programs. The kits included information about the test ban along with tapes featuring statements by President Kennedy, Averell Harriman, William Foster, and supporting senators.\(^{180}\)

As the process of Senate ratification began, the treaty had already garnered much support. Despite this support, senators remained concerned about the impact of the treaty on national security and defense policy, which would be two critical factors in determining votes. In an 20 August news conference President Kennedy addressed these security concerns saying, “Every test in the atmosphere produces fallout and we would be, it seems to me, remiss in not attempting to keep the number of tests to the minimum, consistent with our national security.” The president also cited an example of how testing had adversely affected national security. Kennedy recalled, “You remember one test went out and built an artificial Van Allen Belt, which was far different from what had been imagined, which could have endangered our whole space program, and indeed, that of any other country.”\(^{181}\) Scientists feared that atmospheric testing could upset the balance of highly charged particles in this outer space belt, thereby compromising radio transmissions and space travel. In July 1962, when the United States conducted the DOMINIC atmospheric testing series, the fluctuation of electrons destroyed three satellites, a U.S. naval navigation satellite, a Defense Department satellite, and a British


By highlighting this incident, Kennedy illustrated that, regardless of the level of precautions taken, nuclear testing could have disastrous effects. President Kennedy also made an effort to maintain public engagement on the test ban. In a 12 September press conference, the president made sure to call public attention to the beginning of Senate hearings on the treaty. Kennedy spoke of the value of intensive debate on the treaty, but he also sent a clear message to the Senate and the American public. Discussing the treaty’s benefits, Kennedy reminded listeners that “this treaty will enable all of us who inhabit the earth, our children and our children’s children, to breathe easier, free from the fear of nuclear test fallout.”

Kennedy also had to address the resistance of the JCS to a test ban agreement. In order to minimize the JCS’s doubt about the concept of arms control in general, Kennedy stressed that the group take political factors into account when making their recommendations. Kennedy needed the support of the JCS members in order to ensure the ratification of a treaty by the Senate. Therefore, Kennedy needed to take their concerns into consideration, making them feel included in the decision making. For instance, as agreement neared, the JCS participated in eight meetings of the Committee of Principals, a group of interagency leaders organized by the president, from July 1962 to July 1963. Ultimately, Kennedy promised the JCS to safeguard the funding of underground tests and weapons laboratories in return for their support.

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The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings on the treaty in the summer of 1963. Technical issues such as the effectiveness of detection devices continued to be critical, yet Glenn Seaborg received the most questions on the issue of radioactive fallout. Seaborg testified about the existence of a degree of ambiguity concerning the full effects of fallout, but he understood how public sentiment shaped the line of questioning. He recalled that an early September Gallup Poll “showed nearly four-to-one support for the treaty among those with opinions; in the Harris Survey the margin was ten to one. Congressional mail and other public expressions made it clear that the fallout question was probably the most important factor leading to this popular support.” As Seaborg intimated, the concern about nuclear fallout had grown considerably over the period of treaty negotiations, especially in the period following the treaty’s signing, leading up to the Senate’s ratification. An American Institute of Public Opinion polling showed that in 1955, only 17 percent of Americans could correctly define fallout; but, by 1961, the figure had jumped to 57 percent. A July 1963 Harris Survey found that 12 percent of test ban supporters favored the treaty because it would cut fallout. In a September poll of the supporters, that number grew to 21 percent, with an additional 18 percent supporting the ban because it would end testing and 15 percent because they believed it would prevent war.


Amid this final drive to gain support for the treaty’s ratification, SANE assumed a lesser role. SANE, along with other organizations including the UWF, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), American Association for the United Nations, Friends Committee on National Legislation, and labor union representatives formed a working group in Washington. A Citizens Committee report to the president explained that group “fully accepts the need to work behind the scenes, activating their memberships, and cooperating in a combined program to produce support for the treaty.” SANE’s tasks consisted of composing letters for the Citizens Committee, organizing letter-writing campaigns, meeting with senators, and monitoring the number of letters received by the president, senators, and representatives.\(^{187}\) In addition, SANE made its own kits including a copy of its August *New York Times* ad, facts compiled about fallout, and a bumper sticker. Unlike the kits strategically distributed by the Citizens Committee, SANE made its kits available for purchase only to its members, in effort to maintain a low profile.\(^{188}\)

Following nearly a month of hearings and three weeks of floor debate, the Senate ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty on 24 September 1963 by a vote of 80-19. As the Administration had predicted, those senators who voted against the treaty included ten Southern Democrats, in addition to Senator Frank Lausche of Ohio, and eight Republicans. President Kennedy signed the final document on 7 October and urged, “With our courage and understanding enlarged by this achievement, let us press onward


\(^{188}\) “Materials for the Ratification Campaign for the Test-Ban Treat,” no date, DG 58 Series B-6 Box 66, 1963-64: Correspondence and Related Papers.
in quest of man’s essential desire for peace.” Three days later, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom certified the ratification of the treaty and the
agreement went into effect.189 As McGeorge Bundy had expressed, SANE had performed
a valuable role in raising awareness of the test ban treaty. The organization also
encouraged public support of the test ban by implementing tactics that would later serve
as a basis for the work of the Citizens Committee. Perhaps the most important piece of
SANE’s legacy evident in the push for ratification was Norman Cousins’ and James
Wadsworth’s leadership of the Citizens Committee. In spite of SANE’s vital efforts in
gaining early support for the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the organization’s contributions to
securing the treaty’s ratification became peripheral due to a combination of internal
conflict, the Kennedy administration’s fear that SANE’s association with the treaty would
interfere with efforts to broaden its appeal, and the Citizens Committee’s assumption of
the primary role of garnering support for the treaty.

189 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, 278-282.
CONCLUSION

The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 marked a pioneering breakthrough for international agreements on nuclear arms control. Following its initial signing by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, other nations joined the accord. As of today, the majority of nations have signed the agreement, with the notable exceptions of France, China, and North Korea, demonstrating its broad international acceptance.¹⁹⁰

Both SANE and President Kennedy utilized public concern about the health hazards posed by radioactive fallout from atmospheric testing, but Kennedy had to focus primarily on addressing security concerns. SANE’s strategy centered on newspaper advertising designed to raise awareness and mobilize public support while calling for government action. The campaign’s pinnacle came in response to President Kennedy’s planned resumption of atmospheric testing with the well-received Dr. Spock ad, but became less effective with the publication of more confrontational ads fueling discord in the organization. President Kennedy’s commitment to a test ban led him to collaborate with SANE by utilizing SANE co-chairman Norman Cousins as a liaison with Khrushchev, and by appointing Cousins to the Citizens Committee. Ultimately, the efforts of all involved resulted in securing the treaty.¹⁹¹ To conclude this discussion, an examination of the treaty’s degree of success and its legacy will provide insight into the


impact of public opinion on foreign policy issues and suggest future steps toward arms control.

The treaty’s effectiveness in fulfilling its intended purpose has been varied. As Seaborg recalled, the original hopes for the treaty included:

“1. It would significantly reduce the hazard to human health from radioactive fallout.
2. It would act as a brake on the arms race between the superpowers.
3. It would be followed by further arms control agreements leading ultimately toward the beginning of genuine nuclear disarmament.
4. It would slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”192

The treaty did succeed in dramatically curbing nuclear fallout from atmospheric testing. Prior to this agreement, the United States had conducted 217 atmospheric tests, the Soviet Union 215, the United Kingdom 21, and France 4, for a total of 457. While France and China have not signed the treaty, they conducted 37 and 23 atmospheric tests respectively from August 1963 through 1990. Despite some continued atmospheric nuclear testing, this reduction represents a notable decrease.193

The collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union fostered a more favorable climate for negotiations on subsequent arms control agreements. The 1963 agreement resulted in a greater emphasis on arms control in both diplomatic and defense policy as reflected by the ensuing accomplishments of American presidents following Kennedy. President Lyndon Johnson concluded the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, preventing nuclear weapons from orbiting earth, in addition to precluding the installation or testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear

192 Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, 286.

Weapons in Latin America in 1968. President Richard Nixon completed Johnson’s work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 and agreed to the Seabed Treaty in 1972, which prevented the installation of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor, and the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975. In 1972, Nixon and Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT I accords, the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and an Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons. Both presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter negotiated the SALT II Treaty concluded in 1979.\textsuperscript{194} President Ronald Reagan continued negotiations, renaming the SALT discussions the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with the hope of reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of both countries and conducting substantive arms talks with Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev at the October 1986 Reykjavik summit.\textsuperscript{195} In 1987, the two leaders signed the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), in which both nations agreed to destroy ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles of short to medium range, along with their supporting equipment.\textsuperscript{196} With the guidance of President Bill Clinton, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996 and referred to the U.S. Senate for ratification in September 1997. In October 1999, the Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of forty-


eight in favor and fifty-one opposed. The accord fell significantly short of the two-thirds approval required for ratification in large part due to the concern over the limits the treaty would place on the development of new weapons. The CTBT currently rests on the calendar of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.\textsuperscript{197} While the effectiveness of each of these agreements could be debated, the repeated efforts for arms control reflect a continued commitment to the issue since the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.

In other areas, the treaty neglected to fulfill original expectations. The Limited Test Ban Treaty lessened the danger of nuclear fallout resulting from atmospheric testing, but it failed to slow the arms race. Continued development of nuclear weapons using underground testing accelerated and gained greater acceptability. From August 1963 to 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union combined averaged approximately forty tests annually, in contrast with the roughly twenty-eight per year from 1945 to 1963.\textsuperscript{198} President Kennedy’s acceptance of the Joint Chiefs’ four safeguards in order to ensure ratification also adversely affected the impact of the treaty. The security safeguards included: “(1) continued underground tests; (2) high-level maintenance of U.S. weapons laboratories; (3) continued readiness to resume atmospheric testing; and (4) improvement of our national means of detecting any Soviet treaty violations.”\textsuperscript{199} The safeguards committed the U.S. government to sustaining military preparedness, while shifting the focus away from pursuing more aggressive arms control agreements. For instance, even


\textsuperscript{199} Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban, 287.
before the treaty took effect, Republican Congressman Craig Hosmer of Missouri sent a 24 September letter to President Kennedy urging the president to allocate $1 billion in initial expenses and $250 million annually to uphold the safeguards. With Kennedy requesting only $17.5 million for the AEC, debate developed within the government regarding the level of commitment to military preparedness.\textsuperscript{200}

Since 1963, the power of the president to encourage arms control has diminished as the influence of the president has drastically changed. The Vietnam War and Watergate fuelled distrust that led to a severe weakening of the institutional presidency and a resurgence of Congressional authority. The 1970s also saw the diminishing of the middle ground that Kennedy held, which called for a strong military response to communism combined with arms control. Following the Vietnam War, the debate over defense policy became more polarized between anti-war and anti-Communist elements.\textsuperscript{201} Presidential power has been altered considerably since the Kennedy administration, yet the legacy of the efforts behind the Limited Test Ban Treaty remains relevant today. Much like the steps taken prior to August 1963, enacting the CTBT will require similar dedication in order to advance arms control and strengthen the NPT.

The chief objective of the 1970 NPT involved preventing additional nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. The absence of limitations on the growth of the arsenals of the existing nuclear powers instilled a sense of hypocrisy in the agreement. Key nations including Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,


\textsuperscript{201} Firestone, \textit{The Quest for Nuclear Stability}, 148-153.
and South Africa have not signed the treaty. In contrast to the NPT, the more equitable nature of the CTBT has made it amenable to more nations. The CTBT’s implementation would be an initial step in confirming the nuclear powers’ commitment to arms reduction, giving greater weight to the concept of nuclear non-proliferation, and potentially strengthening the NPT.202

The Senate’s rejection of the CTBT represented a growing lack of faith on the part of the United States in measures of deterrence. The development of nuclear programs in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, raised doubts about the validity of arms control measures to provide security.203 Sharing these misgivings, President George W. Bush declined support for the CTBT and renewal of the verification program for START I, in addition to withdrawing the United States from the ABM Treaty in 2002. President Bush and Russia’s Vladimir Putin did negotiate the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), or the Moscow Treaty, in 2001 but it promised only limited reductions in the deployment of nuclear warheads by 2012 without disposing of the actual warheads.204 Considering the U.S. nuclear policy’s lack of focus, the Hoover Institute at Stanford University held conferences in October 2006 and 2007 to discuss the future of arms control. Participants included George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state from 1982 to 1989; Henry Kissinger, U.S. secretary of state from 1973 to 1977; and Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Senate


204 Bunn and Rhinelander, “Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” 4-6.
Armed Services Committee. Acknowledging the new challenge posed by terrorist groups, the participants agreed, “Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.”205 With threats coming from a wider variety of sources, achieving the security offered by “mutually assured destruction” as with the former Soviet Union becomes far less likely. In order to reduce the nuclear arsenals of all nations and move toward a nuclear free world, the group concluded that necessary steps include enacting the CTBT and relying on new technology to secure and detect unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.206

Given that the ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate would constitute a progressive step in arms control, lessons from the efforts on behalf the Limited Test Ban Treaty remain relevant. The 1963 ratification offers a case study of the potential impact of public opinion on shaping foreign policy. Initially the public concern about nuclear fallout triggered interest in the test ban treaty. SANE capitalized on this fear through its popular newspaper advertisements which broadened awareness of the test ban. Both SANE and the Kennedy Administration fostered public action through simple explanations geared toward civic education. Kennedy’s leadership skill directed members of the administration and key military leaders to articulate the value of the treaty with a unified voice. Tools for mobilizing public opinion have grown enormously since SANE’s


206 Ibid, also see the Bunn Rhinelander brief, which outlines the plan devised at the Hoover Institute.
newspaper ads of the 1960s. With today’s expansive media and instantaneous internet communication, public groups and government leaders now have numerous ways to mobilize citizens. SANE’s efforts in raising public awareness contributed to President Kennedy’s willingness to utilize Norman Cousins as an envoy to the Soviet Union. The Citizens Committee, created by Kennedy and based in part on the efforts of SANE, assumed the leading role in gaining support for the treaty’s ratification by the Senate. Today, cooperation between the executive branch, Congress, as well as private groups is perhaps even more critical than in 1963 given the changes in presidential influence and advancements in communication.

Based on these lessons, when harnessed, public opinion has the potential to influence national foreign policy. The work of groups such as SANE can prove valuable in advancing public awareness and concern, but ultimately strong presidential leadership will be required to move forward with present arms control agreements. Arms control today requires the same guidance and commitment exemplified by Kennedy in order to attain the genuine peace - “the product of many nations, the sum of many acts…, dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation”--- that Kennedy called for in 1963.\(^\text{207}\)

\(^{207}\) John F. Kennedy, “Commencement Address at American University.”
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APPENDIX A: NOVEMBER 15, 1957 ADVERTISEMENT

"We Are Facing A Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever Existed..."

First of a Series of Statements For Americans in A Nuclear Age

A top scientific truth must become a common sense. As we look out into the world, we can see that the age of the atomic bomb is upon us. New weapons are being developed, and their destructive power is being increased. These weapons can be used to destroy cities, nations, and possibly the whole world. The danger is real, and it is growing.

With this in mind, we present a series of statements for Americans in a Nuclear Age. Each statement will focus on a different aspect of the nuclear threat, and will provide information and guidance on how to take action to protect ourselves and our loved ones.

What You Can Do

1. Stay informed. Keep up with the news and developments related to nuclear weapons. Stay informed by reading the news, watching the latest reports, and discussing the issue with friends and family.

2. Speak out. Let your voice be heard. Write letters to your elected representatives, contact your local newspapers, and participate in demonstrations or other forms of activism.

3. Support non-proliferation efforts. Work to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. Support organizations that are working to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.

4. Educate others. Share information about the dangers of nuclear weapons with others. Help to raise awareness about the issue and encourage others to take action.

5. Consider your options. Think about the options available to you in the event of a nuclear attack. Consider the steps you can take to protect yourself and your loved ones.

Let us work together to ensure a safer future. Together, we can make a difference.

208 Katz, 27.
What are the risks of tests?

There is more risk in mankind in resuming nuclear tests to the atmosphere than in not testing:

- If we and the Russian continue testing, or for that matter continue to encourage each other in doing so, the results will be catastrophic. 
- More tests are needed to assess the potential damage caused by such weapons.
- The United Nations, in condemning the Russian actions, has expressed concern over the potential damage to the environment.

President Kennedy's statement on resuming atmospheric testing was groundbreaking. He urged the United Nations to take action and to ensure that nuclear tests do not lead to a dangerous escalation of arms races.

There is still time to make a commitment to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis.
Dr. Spock is worried.

If you've been raising a family, or Dr. Spock's book, you know that he doesn't get around much.

Even the University of Ohio where he works, or which was the address where the campaign of nuclear arms in the atmosphere

Every parent, every concerned citizen, is interested in the prospects of nuclear arms in the atmosphere.

The parents of the young children who are those who believe in the strength of a parent's love, in the strength of a parent's love. If Dr. Spock

Todays parents must face the fact that the possession of nuclear arms is a serious threat to the future of their children.

If you would like to do so still more, send a small amount to the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy:

Dr. Spock has become a sponsor of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1000 Third Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.
APPENDIX D: JULY 5, 1962 ADVERTISEMENT

Is this what it's coming to?

As if we weren't having problems enough witharium 90 in our milk, something new has been added.

Isotopes. From the atomic bomb.

Concern over Isotopes was expressed several weeks ago by Dr. Russell Morgan, Chairman of the Public Health Service's National Advisory Committee on Radiation.

Isotope 131 is a radioactive substance that comes from the fall-out of nuclear explosions. It is taken up by milk and appears in milk. It works on tumours in the thyroid gland. In other terms, it is a poison that affects the thyroid, and the most affected of these is the childhood thyroid gland after the age of about three years.

According to The New York Times of June 19th, "The continued high level of radiation in the Midwest, is causing particular concern because it comes in an area that had already received high doses of it from the Hiroshima bomb.

As a result of these doses, the radiation exposure to the thyroid of children is estimated to have approached 100% of the normal level in children born 10 years ago and 50% of the normal level in children born 5 years ago.

President Kennedy, in his last press conference, and the same day, before a tribunal of health officials, offered a $10,000 reward to anyone who could develop a technique to get rid of the isotope 131 from the milk.

Meanwhile, what should one do with milk for our children? In a letter to the editor, the author of the Isotopes article in the July 2, 1962, issue of the New York Times, wrote:

"As a result of these doses, the radiation exposure to the thyroid of children is estimated to have approached 100% of the normal level in children born 10 years ago and 50% of the normal level in children born 5 years ago."

Ibid., 78.
Your children's teeth contain Strontium-90

All children's teeth now contain radioactive Strontium-90 from nuclear weapons tests.

Radioactive Strontium is a potential cause of leukemia, as pointed out in the United Nations report on radiation. Early signs of leukemia appear in the mouth, and dentists are familiar with them.

Scientists can tell how much radioactive Strontium-90 is in children's bones by measuring the radioactive material in their teeth. A recent analysis of baby teeth shows a 10-fold increase in Strontium-90 over the past five years. Unlike baby teeth, however, the permanent teeth and bones retain Strontium-90 throughout their existence.

As dentists, we deplore the buildup of radioactive Strontium-90 in children's teeth and bones. It is a measure of the sickness of our times. Even if nuclear weapons tests cease today, the accumulation of Strontium-90 will continue for years.

We oppose nuclear weapons testing by all nations not only because of the contamination of bones and teeth of our children and patients, but because it is a direct stimulus to the arms race. The testing race only multiplies mistrust and tension, and increases the chances of nuclear war.

Therefore, as dentists, our responsibility to promote life and health compels us to make this public appeal to all governments to cease nuclear weapons tests and to develop those international agreements which would eliminate the nuclear arms race.

*Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy*
APPENDIX F: AUGUST 2, 1963 ADVERTISEMENT

Now it's up to the Senate...and You!

A treaty ending nuclear weapons tests is now before the United States Senate for ratification. In their meetings in Moscow, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain have agreed that a treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space is in their interest and is the interest of world peace.

According to the law of the land, a treaty does not become effective until ratified by a two-thirds majority of the U.S. Senate. There is every reason why the Senate should ratify this agreement unamissibly and soon.

A test ban treaty will put an end to widespread radioactive fallout from nuclear testing. Proliferation and future generations will be spared additional reproductive damage and base cancer. Little can be done about what has already occurred.

The spread of nuclear weapons and their development by new nations will be prevented, reducing the chances of nuclear war.

But most important — the world will have taken the first step to end the nuclear arms race.

The text ban treaty is also an historic turning point. There is evidence that the test ban agreement represents a breakthrough of modest yet progressive scope both within the United States and the Soviet Union. This development provides an opportunity to begin the real work of building peace. The treaty opens the door to next steps — more important and far-reaching steps for lessening world tension and for achieving universal and controlled disarmament.

Only world security under a stronger United Nations can take the place of national minorities, the arms race, and the rule of fear. The world will not be safe until "the war flags are farred in the Parliament of Man."

Five years ago, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy was formed to seek these ends. A nuclear test ban treaty was then, and is now, first order. But the treaty was then, and is now, first order.

We congratulate the men who have secured this vital agreement. We are proud of the U.S. in its achievement. We look forward to repeated efforts by our nation to achieve safeguarded, worldwide disarmament.

The moral leadership of the world belongs to the nation which shows the way, by practical steps, to build the edifice of peace. The first step is now up to the United States Senate. By ratifying the treaty, the Senate can make clear the will of the American people to seek a just and lasting peace under humanitarian and safeguarded agreements. The Senate will act with due caution and after careful review. It is necessary to the Senate's decision that the lawmakers know where the country stands and what its citizens will approve.

This is where you come in. Write these letters and send them now. Use each to your Senator, and one to President Kennedy, indicating in your own words, your support for the test ban agreement.

SANE
Nuclear Policy
10 East 40th St., New York, N.Y. 10016

[Signature]

SANE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A SANE NUCLEAR POLICY

[Addressee names and addresses]

[Signature]

213 Ibid., 85.