When the Locomotive Puffs: Corporate Public Relations of the First Transcontinental Railroad Builders, 1863-69

A dissertation presented to

the faculty of

the Scripps College of Communication of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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August 2009

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This dissertation titled
When the Locomotive Puffs: Corporate Public Relations of the First Transcontinental Railroad Builders, 1863-69

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Abstract

WOOD, LELAND K., Ph.D., August 2009, Journalism

When the Locomotive Puffs: Corporate Public Relations of the First Transcontinental Railroad Builders, 1863-69 (246 pp.)

Director of Dissertation: Patrick S. Washburn

The dissertation documents public-relations practices of officers and managers in two companies: the Central Pacific Railroad with offices in Sacramento, California, and the Union Pacific Railroad with offices in New York City. It asserts that sophisticated and systematic corporate public relations were practiced during the construction of the first transcontinental railroad, fifty years before historians generally place the beginning of such practice. Documentation of the transcontinental railroad practices was gathered utilizing existing historical presentations and a review of four archives containing correspondence and documents from the period. Those leading the two enterprises were compelled to practice public relations in order to raise $125 million needed to construct the 1,776-mile-long railroad by obtaining and keeping federal loan guarantees and by establishing and maintaining an image attractive to potential bond buyers. Also, relationships had to be established and maintained with members of Congress, the California state legislature, and federal regulators; with workers and potential workers; and with journalists. In addition, the companies’ images among the general public also had to be established and maintained. The railroad leaders sometimes faced public-relations dilemmas in which the material produced to build relationships with one audience might damage relationships with another audience. The dissertation concludes
that, despite the enormous challenges faced in the construction of the railroad, the companies’ leaders persisted in their attention to public relations and developed practices that continue to be used.

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Acknowledgments

This work would never have reached this point without the able and longstanding guidance of Dr. Patrick S. Washburn. Also, Ohio University as a whole provided me with a substantial fellowship to begin my Ph.D. studies and its faculty members have been guiding and helpful lights on my pathway. Others were of material assistance at archives: Kathryn Hodson at the University of Iowa Library; Diane Cooter at Syracuse University; Greg Galer at Stonehill College; and Susan Jellinger at the State Historical Society of Iowa Library in Des Moines. Laura Bowers at Owen Library at the University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown was an important first reader and cheerleader. Sewell Harper Claycomb of Westmoreland, New York, provided important financial support by offering a place to stay for six weeks.
This work is dedicated to my mother, Lila Marie (Claycomb) Wood, whose guidance and love have made all things possible. I am one of Lila’s boys.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Getting Up Steam</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: A Steam Whistle Signal: The Train Is Ready to Board</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: All Aboard</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: The Conductors</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: Locomotive Breath</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: Unscheduled Stops</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8: Pulling into the Station: Letting Off Steam</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary of Names</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A: Pacific Railroad Act of 1862</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B: Pacific Railroad Act of 1864</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C: Pacific Railroad Act of 1866</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

Page

Figure 1: Map of the Transcontinental Railroad ............................................................. ix

Figure 2: Periodical Circulation, 1869 ............................................................................54

Figure 3: Cover Page of July 1868 Editorial Excursion Scrapbook ...............................62

Figure 4: Brick Pomeroy, “Wilkes Booth the Second” .................................................77

Figure 5: “Every Public Question with an Eye only to the Public Good” ......................85
THE TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD

Figure 1: Map of the Transcontinental Railroad
Chapter 1: Introduction

Leland Stanford, Central Pacific Railroad Company president, missed when he tried to deliver the first blow on an elusive 18-ounce golden last spike of the first transcontinental railroad at Promontory Point, Utah, on May 10, 1869. He struck the rail instead, and the resounding clang drew snickers from the crowd of mostly railroad workers. He passed the silver-headed ceremonial maul to Thomas Durant, Union Pacific Railroad Company vice president. He hit the rail, too, instead of the spike, with the second attempted blow to what was said to be a spike of gold. He may have missed in sympathy with Stanford.

The first blows delivered around 12:30 p.m. were greeted with cheers from the 500 to 1,000 spectators, whistles from locomotives and music from a military band. They were assembled in the middle of nowhere between the Wasatch Mountain Range and the Great Salt Lake, 1,086 miles west of Omaha, Nebraska, where the Union Pacific directors had begun, and 690 miles east of Sacramento, where the Central Pacific organizers had launched their enterprise. The ceremony was to celebrate the unification of the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific rails into one continuous line. The connection of the merged railways to existing railroads east of the Missouri River meant the United States had a railroad that crossed the North American continent and the world’s first transcontinental railroad.

1 “Eyewitness Tells of ‘Last Spike’ Driving” in Southern Pacific Bulletin, May 1926. Although billed as the Golden Spike Ceremony, one railroad worker said the last spike driven at Promontory was a standard-issue iron spike, not the precious gold one which, he said, had been set aside after its presentation, along with other special spikes of gold and silver. The 18 ounces of gold in 1869 would have been the equivalent of about six months’ wages for railroad laborers. A ceremonial polished laurel tie with silver plate also was not placed and souvenir-seekers whittled away several standard ties put in last.

2 There were two bands at the ceremony – a military band from the 21st Regiment of Infantry from Fort Douglas in Salt Lake City and a community band from Ogden’s 10th Ward with new instruments that cost $1,200. See Charles Edgar Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific: A Reappraisal of the Builders of the Railroad (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Meredith Corporation, 1969), 338-339; Maury Klein, Union Pacific: Birth of a Railroad, 1862-1893 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1987), 224; and Grenville Mellen Dodge, “Autobiography” (unpublished, on microfilm) at the State Historical Society of Iowa Library in Des Moines, Iowa), 952.
The Civil War, some contemporary commentators said, had resulted in a binding of the Union, north and south. Now, according to the Rev. John Todd, who delivered the ceremony’s invocation, the transcontinental railroad would tie the Union east to west with ribbons of iron, “giving all the institutions of the east power to kiss the young sister at the West, and breathe our love upon her.”

Two historians said of Stanford’s miss that he was nervous and bothered by wires dangling from the head of the ceremonial maul. Those wires, and wires wrapped around the last spike, were to serve as an oversized telegraph key to capture the last hammer blows, transmitting Morse code dots over telegraph wires nationwide. The nationwide telegraph network had been cleared of traffic so the Promontory ceremony proceedings could be heard at telegraph offices throughout the country. The telegraph operator at Promontory, frustrated with the missed silver hammer blows, simulated them with his regular telegraph key and transmitted the word, “Done.” That was the signal to begin, or renew, celebrations nationwide that included cannon fire, ringing church bells and parades everyone could join in.

There had been a two-day delay in the ceremony, originally scheduled for Saturday, May 8. Historian James McCague said the delay was caused by spring washouts on the Union Pacific line leading to Promontory Point, and Union Pacific leaders did not want to attend without arriving in their finest special passenger cars, the so-called president’s car and the directors’ car. The delay led to confusion in

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3 Rev. John Todd. The Sunset Land; or the Great Pacific Slope (Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1870), 247.
5 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 324-25. The directors’ car was too big to travel on the Pennsylvania Railroad, according to a letter on August 13, 1866, from Springer Harbaugh, a Union Pacific government director, to Durant as the car was being built with Durant’s specifications. “I consider her magnificent in every respect save one,” Harbaugh wrote of the directors’ car. “I think you have planned her too large both in width and in height. I have been inquiring in regard to the capacity of tunnels on Penna RR. A car 10 feet wide and 11 feet 6 inches high will clear the Tunnels on that road but nothing larger will pass. Your car is 14 feet 1 inch high and 10 feet 8 inches wide.” The Harbaugh-Durant letter is in Series II, Box 17, file “Harbaugh, Springer,” in the Levi O. Leonard Collection, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa, hereafter referred to as the Leonard Collection. The president’s car was designed to transport Abraham Lincoln, serving him only once to deliver his body for burial after his assassination. The Union Pacific directors had bought the car at a government auction
Sacramento and San Francisco, where celebration began May 8 as originally scheduled and after the Central Pacific had advertised free train rides to Sacramento for all who wanted to participate, according to McCague. Historian Robert West Howard said the Central Pacific had concentrated all its publicity skills on the May 8 celebration. The *Sacramento Union*, McCague said, ran a story May 10 about the nonexistent May 8 celebration that pretended the ceremony had taken place as scheduled -- “Everything was conducted in a pleasant and orderly way,” the newspaper said of the ceremony that had not happened, “and nothing of a public character disgraced the event.”

In addition to transportation to the site, the approximately thirty reporters at the Promontory ceremony had been given official texts of the comments that were to be made so they got it right even if they couldn’t hear what was said. The Union Pacific issued its news release of the day, providing details of the locomotive and cars it sent to the ceremony. Three railroad photographers, two of them employed by the Union Pacific, were present to record the event with wet-plate equipment.

Spectator George A. Crofut remembered the ceremony thirty-one years later in a newspaper account:

The most exciting scene I ever witnessed was the completion of the Pacific Railroad. I have seen many stirring events, have been present at floods and fighting and executions where men’s blood was up and every nerve strained to its utmost, but the driving of the last spike in the railway spanning the continent was the grandest and most exciting event my eyes

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10 McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 324-25. The news release, according to McCague, said the Union Pacific’s No. 119 locomotive was a coal-burning engine, and the cars carried the largest number of passengers ever to travel over the line.

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ever beheld. Perhaps we were over-strained in our estimates at the time, but we felt that the work there being concluded meant more to this nation and to the advancement of civilization than anything else that could be imagined. Great mass meetings were held in the principal cities, but at Promontory Point, when the men standing on the cow-catchers of the two engines reached forward and shook hands, the crowd sang and danced and shouted with a delirium of joy never to be known but once in a lifetime.11

After the ceremony, a joint Union Pacific/Central Pacific telegram was sent to United States President Ulysses S. Grant: “The last rail is laid. The last spike is driven.” A copy of the telegram went to the Associated Press.

The public-relations sophistication of the Golden Spike ceremony and its clear attention to public participation and perception came at the conclusion of an unmatched national effort. The work to build the first transcontinental railroad consumed more than six years, $125 million, and the working lives of many thousands of people. The work killed some men and blinded others in snow-reflected sunlight. It forced the leaders to become practiced at public relations, particularly because of the money they needed to raise to pay for 1,776 miles of track into mostly wild lands.

This dissertation will examine the public relations program that helped assure the building of the first transcontinental railroad from January 1863 to May 1869. The examination will include an overview of the builders’ attempts to create and maintain corporate images that permitted the project’s completion with a sometimes sophisticated corporate public-relations practice or “knowledge management” aimed at external and internal “publics,” including employees; and “issues management” that included relationship-maintenance with legislators and regulators through lobbying in addition to attempts to influence general public opinion.12

The transcontinental builders’ public-relations practice included sophisticated tactics: preventative public relations that anticipated public-relations issues before they occurred, audience-tailored information aiming specific information at specific audiences, and goal-oriented media campaigns in which goals were discussed before practice.

The transcontinental railroad builders engaged in recurring efforts to create and maintain their companies’ public images throughout the construction period, and their corporate public relations practices were carried out fifty years before public-relations historians note the systematic development of such practices.

The two companies that built the first transcontinental were new companies. Each needed to establish a commanding public presence in what was becoming a booming postwar period that tested the country’s capacity to produce iron rails, locomotives, and railroad workers. The Central Pacific’s leaders, who built the road’s western portion out of Sacramento and through the Sierra Nevada Mountains, organized their company in 1861 under California corporate law. The Union Pacific’s managers, builders of the eastern portion starting in Omaha, Nebraska, organized in 1863 under Congressional guidelines. The two companies were among early corporations in America and, as later public-relations professionals would learn, had to create and maintain an image that enticed lenders, investors, and laborers. The companies also had to attract passengers and settlers to provide the business to help make the lines profitable.

The public relations practices during the first transcontinental construction included:

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and government. Cutlip, on 430, also mentioned Avco Manufacturing Corporation leaders’ discussion of improving that company’s image among the “investing public.” See also Scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center, Effective Public Relations. 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978), 4; Craig E. Aronoff and Otis W. Baskin, Public Relations: The Profession and Practice (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1983), 9; and Fraser P. Seitel, The Practice of Public Relations. 5th ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), 10, 12-13, in which Seitel describes the target of public relations both internal and external: internally to include supervisors, clerks, managers, stockholders and the board of directors along with labor unions and employee families, and externally to include the press, government, educators, customers, suppliers and the community along with regulatory authorities, banks and competitors, and not only existing customers and investors, but potential customers and investors.
- A constant monitoring of the news media of the day – newspapers, magazines and, sometimes, pamphlets – for items that pertained to corporate interests.
- The organizing, and assuring publicity, of staged events aimed at promoting positive corporate images. The Golden Spike ceremony is but one example of a sometimes-inventive recurring campaign to create information for public consumption aimed at creating and maintaining positive perceptions.
- Establishing and maintaining relationships with reporters/correspondents and editors. The corporate leaders made it part of their business to know the journalists and attempt to influence them. They invited journalists on frequent excursions arranged for powerful guests and, in one instance on the Union Pacific, arranged an exclusive summer excursion with a special train and employees assigned to assure their comfort. Sometimes, the influence attempts took the form of outright payments for positive reports, with these being kept secret from the public.
- Preparing and placing advertising, including posters, pamphlets and newspaper advertisements, aimed at selling lands, passenger tickets, and the companies’ bonds. The companies arranged for production, or produced themselves, advertisements and texts for use in pamphlets and editorial columns. The Union Pacific advertising for the 1868 construction season reportedly cost $200,000.
- Answering complaints and preventing publication of damaging information. Each company used the excursions and the generation of positive reports as tools to respond to criticism. Positive reports placed in newspapers sometimes were as simple as daily items reporting track-laying progress or publication of company reports of increased earnings from operations. The railroad leaders tried to prevent publication of reports with potentially negative results about Indian attacks, snow blockades or, in the case of the Central Pacific in California, an increasing monopolistic control of all West Coast railroad traffic. Central Pacific leaders, flush with money in the construction’s later stages, discussed buying a newspaper to quash negative reports and opinions.
The builders of the two railroads, as their lines approached each other at Promontory Point, increasingly encouraged damaging reports about the other company to slow its progress. Both sides saw prizes worth having if they got to some points first: potential control of rail traffic from Salt Lake City and the Pacific Northwest and ownership of coal deposits in the Wasatch Mountains.

The corporate public relations practiced during the first transcontinental railroad construction is the primary subject of no existing history. According to historian Alan Rauch, in 1968, the subject cannot be examined thoroughly.

With lands to sell and legislation to influence, railroads, early in their history, had begun efforts to win friends by hiring lobbyists and secret press agents. Offering passes for free transportation to reporters and editors, railroads successfully influenced newspaper opinion during the nineteenth century. While most of the efforts by railroads to influence the press were secret and therefore cannot be examined thoroughly, some spokesmen urged more open methods. Thus, as early as 1880, the trade journal *Railway Age* printed a circular which announced the establishment of a “Bureau of Information” for the purpose of educating the press, legislators, and the people, as to the true relations of the railway interest to the public welfare.13

Rauch’s assertion that railroad public-relations practices in relation to the first transcontinental road cannot be examined thoroughly because they were secret can be disputed on two grounds.

First, although much of the discussion and planning leading to public relations practices was secret, the practices themselves were not. In fact, the primary purpose of many of the practices was the widespread public dissemination of information. Company officials organized numerous staged events throughout the first transcontinental road’s construction, including excursions, track-laying demonstrations and ceremonies.14

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14 Excursions were conducted upon the achievement of any notable accomplishment with the biggest excursion, The Grand Excursion or The Great Pacific Railroad Excursion to the 100th Meridian, held by the Union Pacific in October 1866. About 170 mostly Eastern “elites” were invited on that excursion. For accounts of the Grand Excursion see Silas Seymour, *Incidents of a Trip through the Great Platte Valley to the Rocky Mountains*, etc (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1867), 74-75, 83-87; Klein, *Union Pacific*, 75;
companies’ managers also openly advertised, sometimes lavishly, to sell bonds and lands and to attract settlers and passengers. They provided information and illustrations regularly to writers and their publications in attempts to encourage reports that built and maintained their public image.

Second, although much of the public-relations planning was not public, a wealth of sources exists to examine the managers’ discussion of attempts to manipulate perceptions of their enterprises. Correspondence between Vice President Collis P. Huntington in New York City and his Central Pacific associates in Sacramento, California, available at Syracuse University since the 1970s, is rich with discussion and detail of ongoing public-relations efforts during the transcontinental construction. Original records also offer documentation of Union Pacific officials’ attempts to manipulate public perceptions. Those records can be found in the extensive Levi O. Leonard (Union Pacific company historian) Collection at the University of Iowa in Iowa City available since 1958; in the papers of Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, Union Pacific chief engineer, in the Iowa State Historical Society Library at Des Moines, available to

*Gerald M. Best, Iron Horses to Promontory* (San Marino, California, Golden West Books, 1969), 100; Ames, *Pioneering the Union Pacific*, 154; and McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 134-36. An unopened bottle of champagne for the excursion with a Union Pacific label was on display on April 10, 2008 and March 14, 2009, at the Union Pacific Railroad Museum at Council Bluffs, Iowa. A letter from Durant to H. M. Hoxie October 12, 1866, (Series II, Box 12, file “Durant, Thomas C., Letterpress Book, 1864-1867,” Leonard Collection) said Durant was shipping wine for the excursion and that the president’s car and the directors’ car had left Pittsburgh that day. Klein, *Union Pacific*, 75, said two trains left Omaha. Seymour, *Incidents of a Trip through the Great Platte Valley to the Rocky Mountains, etc.*, 83-84, said it was one train with two locomotives for power.

Track-laying demonstrations became a competition between the two railroads to determine which could lay the most rail in one working day. The Union Pacific took the lead in a October 27, 1868 demonstration that put down seven and one-half miles, beating a Central Pacific mark of six and one-half miles. Charles Crocker, the Central Pacific construction overseer, responded that he would beat the seven and one-half miles with ten miles, according to Sabin, *Building the Pacific Railway*, 176-77. Durant bet $10,000 that Crocker could not do that before witnesses, but Crocker did, with 200 feet to spare, extending Central Pacific track then fourteen miles short of Promontory Point on April 28, 1869. The eight rail carriers for the ten-mile Central Pacific demonstration carried and placed 1,970,000 pounds of iron that day, according to Best, *Iron Horses to Promontory*, 46-47.

The ceremonies included ground-breaking ceremonies on both sides in 1863. The Union Pacific ground-breaking on December 2, 1863 might have wiped out the company’s $200,000 treasury, according to Sabin, *Building the Pacific Railway*, 87. Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 164, estimated that it consumed one-fourth of the Union Pacific’s funds. The ceremony included cannon fire, fireworks, and a banquet, according to Charles Edgar Ames in *Pioneering the Union Pacific*, 25-26.
research since 1923; and in the correspondence and diary of Oliver Ames Jr., Union Pacific president during much of the construction, at Stonehill College in Brockton, Massachusetts, available for research for at least 20 years.

Also, there are more than twenty well-documented histories of the first transcontinental railroad that, although their focus is not public relations, contain documentation and analysis of specific public-relations situations confronted by the transcontinental builders. Still further, the United States House of Representatives in 1873 conducted two nearly simultaneous investigations, one looking into the affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad during the construction period and the other examining alleged bribes placed with members of Congress in stock of the Credit Mobilier Corporation, an organization that allowed Union Pacific managers to take substantial profits from the railroad’s construction contracts.

This dissertation will present results from an examination of all of these sources of information, both secondary and primary, to glean a history of the corporate public-relations practiced by the business leaders in the building of the first transcontinental railroad.

Several public-relations historians have placed the genesis of corporate public relations generally in the late nineteenth century at the earliest. However, a review of colonial history found in Scott M. Cutlip’s *Public Relations History* revealed a handful of earlier public-relations efforts. Developers of the state of Georgia in 1732, Cutlip said, took measures to prevent publication of anything that would hurt their plans and used a staged event to promote development by taking an Indian chief and some warriors back to England to meet with King George II and the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1734. King’s College (Columbia University) held a staged event to promote itself in 1758: a college commencement complete with news releases to announce it, which is claimed to be the first event of its kind. And Cutlip asserted the Boston Tea Party in 1773 was a staged event for public-relations purposes.\(^\text{15}\) Also, there is an early history of business

public relations practiced by the Bank of the United States in a bank war, 1830-33, involving the bank and President Andrew Jackson, according to Cutlip.\textsuperscript{16}

However, the beginning of corporate public relations as a business practice generally has been placed in the late 1800s.

“The growing awareness of the need to court public opinion rather than contemptuously ignore it, emerged in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century,” Cutlip said.\textsuperscript{17} Alfred McClung Lee placed business leaders’ recognition of the need for public-relations experts in the same period:

From the 1880s on, many other commercial organizations found increasingly pressing uses for publicity experts. Industrialists thought that the rising popular clamor for reform – culminating in the “era of muckrakers” of 1901-12 – could be stilled more efficiently with “satisfactory explanations” and by “making the correct facts available to the Sovereign People” than by adapting their own practices to changing conditions. Favors and bribes still worked with the smaller sheets, but the powerful “yellow” dailies of Hearst, Pulitzer and others and later the cheap reform magazines required more subtle expedients.\textsuperscript{18}

Marvin N. Olasky, referring specifically to railroad public relations, got closest to the 1863-69 transcontinental construction period but still placed development of corporate public relations afterward:

Three conclusions emerge from a study of railroad public relations during the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century. First, railroad executives gained public relations sophistication very fast during the 1870s and 1880s. After an early emphasis on simple press agentry, they began developing the


In the Bank War, The Bank of the United States, Cutlip said, promoted Davey Crockett as a frontier hero to counter Andrew Jackson’s popularity as a frontiersman. Robinson tied the banks’ public-relations efforts directly to later railroad promoters, who may have learned techniques of public-perception manipulation from the Bank War: “Banks were among the business interests which early made use of the newspapers. Since these financial institutions operated under charters given them by the state, they were interested in maintaining a favorable public opinion toward their activities.”


forerunners of today’s elaborate governmental relations, educational relations, and corporate contributions programs.19

Speaking again of the 1880s, Cutlip found that Theodore Vail of the American Bell Telephone Company was a revolutionary thinker: “Vail saw that for the company to flourish and for it to be accepted as a ‘natural monopoly’ that it would have to earn the goodwill of the public – a most revolutionary idea in the business world of the 1880s. These were rare concerns indeed in those years.”

The concern for public goodwill was not rare among the business leaders who built the first transcontinental railroad fifteen years earlier. Not only did the Central Pacific and the Union Pacific officials need enough public goodwill for investors to part with their money, but they also needed public support for a continuing substantial federal payback guarantee on money they borrowed through government bonds. They needed the support without a close scrutiny of their work or the arrangements they made to funnel funds into their own pockets.

This examination will provide evidence that systematic corporate public relations, at least in the building of the first transcontinental railroad, was being conducted at least a decade before historians place its beginning and at least thirty years before its generally recognized rise as a business practice.

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Chapter 2: Getting Up Steam

The building of the transcontinental railroad was a culmination of more than forty years of railroad-building in the United States in an era when the railroad was seen as a guarantor of prosperity in settled areas and as a vehicle that transported civilization itself to untamed regions. Why it was built when it was built with groundbreaking ceremonies on both sides in 1863 in the midst of the Civil War has been debated by historians. Some, however, envisioned a transcontinental railroad much earlier and the philosophers among them said it would be the realization of what Christopher Columbus set out to accomplish when he discovered America: find a trade route to Asia. Still, there was much to accomplish on the way to that end.

The first recorded railroad trip with a steam locomotive and passengers took place in England on a fifteen-mile section of the Manchester & Liverpool Railroad on August 26, 1830. The trip was an experimental run by George Stephenson on the locomotive Northumbrian in preparation for a public excursion and demonstration twenty days later on September 15. The public excursion, according to historian Charles Francis Adams Jr., included the prime minister and drew 500,000 spectators.20

Although there is no account of what was done to arrange for the prime minister’s participation and the enormous crowd, there must have been extensive arrangements and publicity. Little is recorded of the efforts to generate publicity or practice public relations in the history of the earliest railroading except for reports of results of what had to be campaigns to raise funds and eventually attract passengers and freight, along with reports of inaugural excursions for dignitaries and the public. Such excursions were held in conjunction with the June 1835 opening of the Boston and Providence Railroad and the July 1835 opening of the Boston & Worchester Railroad.21 One report provided some details of an 1838 door-to-door campaign to raise money for the Western Railroad from

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Boston to Albany, New York,\textsuperscript{22} which marked its 1841 opening with a parade.\textsuperscript{23} But nothing apparently was recorded about the publicity and arrangements for an 1851 446-mile excursion that included President Millard Filmore to publicize the opening of the New York & Erie Railroad. A crowd of 50,000 was reported in Piedmont, New York, to send off the excursionists, and celebrations that included speeches by Secretary of State Daniel Webster were held in each of the major communities along the New York & Erie route during the excursion.\textsuperscript{24} Meanwhile, in Illinois, there is a report of lobbying, publicity and legislative efforts in an attempt to get land grants for the Illinois Central Railroad in the early 1850s,\textsuperscript{25} but lobbying, publicity and public relations would not fully flower with an extensive recorded history until the first transcontinental railroad.

Passengers on the experimental run on August 26, 1830, included actor John Kemble and his daughter, Mrs. Francis Kemble Butler, who thought the experience of flying on a “tame dragon panting along his own pathway” at thirty-five miles an hour important enough to write down. Mrs. Butler said she traveled “swifter than a bird flies” and, at one point, closed her eyes and had the sensation of flying. She reported that she had “stood up and drank the air before me. The wind weighed my eyelids down.”\textsuperscript{26} A passenger on the September 15 excursion, who was described as a “well-traveled man,” said of speeding along at thirty-five to forty miles an hour that, “Although it was a dead calm, the wind appeared to be blowing a hurricane.”\textsuperscript{27}

There was no vehicle as fast as a locomotive, said historian Robert West Howard of the speed averaging ten miles an hour by 1836. [Robert] Fulton’s steamboat averaged only 4.75 miles an hour on its upstream runs between New York City and Albany. An ox team averaged two miles an hour; a canal boat, three miles an hour; and a stagecoach, six

\textsuperscript{23} Adams, \textit{Railroads}, 79.
\textsuperscript{26} Adams, \textit{Railroads}, 12-13.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 34.
to eight miles an hour.28 Historian James McCague said that locomotive developments led to a speed of sixty miles an hour in 1848 by the English-built Antelope during a run on the Boston & Maine Railroad, and the Lightning, in 1849, covered sixteen miles in thirteen minutes on a run on the Utica and Schenectady.29

The earliest trains were fastest after they gained momentum or they were going downhill, but the locomotives that pulled or pushed them were not as powerful as needed at times. Some passengers on the September 15 excursion had to get off the train and walk up an incline because the Northumbrian could not pull them all up.30 Early in railroad development, stationary steam engines were sometimes used to pull carriages up inclines.31 The use of the great innovation of the age – steam power – was considered an important leap for inland development. The development of steam power in a moving steam engine, or locomotive, was an object of early efforts to broaden utilization of steam, according to historian Frederic L. Paxson.

The broadening use of steam was the promise that inspired the new movement and brought the frontier almost for the first time into contact with the industrial revolution. This revolution – the change from hard work to the use of power machinery – began after the invention of the stationary engine in the eighteenth century and made Western Europe a new world. It cut it off sharply from all preceding history, altering the habits of workers, the distribution of population, and the application of capital. It increased the amount of manufactured goods, at a cheapening cost and thereby added to the physical comfort of every life. It not only cut Europe off from its past by the sharp change in conditions, but it cut it off from contemporary America. The open frontier and the abundance of land made it hard to drive Americans into factories; and the scarcity of American capital made the rise of manufactures doubly slow. By 1850, America was at least fifty years behind Europe with reference to

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28 Robert West Howard, The Great Iron Trail: The Story of the First Transcontinental Railroad (New York: Putnam, 1962), 19. Riding a train was scary for some because of the speed. William Francis Deverell, Building an Octopus: Railroads and Society in the late 19th Century Far West (Dissertation: Princeton DAI-A 50/08, p. 2619 Feb. 1990), 49, said, “From our late twentieth-century vantage point, it is perhaps difficult to appreciate the psychic price exacted by a short ride at twelve or fifteen miles an hour. But as one early rail traveler breathlessly described the experience: ‘It is really flying, and it is impossible to divest yourself of the notion of instant death to all upon the least accident happening.’”


30 Adams, Railroads, 34.

the industrial revolution, and many of the differences between American and European civilization, noticeable to all, were consequences of this.

But when the industrial revolution passed from power machinery to locomotion, when the stationary engine was adapted into the traveling engine, America took hold more rapidly; for there were more premiums to be gained by quick transport in America than by manufacture.32

A modern conception of railroads emphasizes the rolling stock of locomotives and cars, but railroads first were conceived, like turnpikes, plank roads, and canals, with an emphasis on the smooth pathway upon which a user would provide his own vehicle to move people and material inland without the jolts and bumps of bad road surfaces. The earliest railways used wooden rails with carts to move coal in English mines as early as the 1600s and, earlier in Germany. The wooden rails eventually were topped with an iron strap to improve their durability.33 In the 1820s, when railroads first appeared in the United States, the emphasis continued to be on the roadway element and not the mode of power or the vehicles using the road as described by historian Thomas Parke Hughes, “The railway was mere road, made of materials by which the resistance of friction is considerably reduced, whereby a propelling power is capable of more useful effect.”34

Earliest American Railroads

Historian Robert Edgar Riegel said the first American railroads were modeled after earlier forms of transportation. “The theory of private toll roads was taken over for their operation. Each user furnished his own carriage and horse, and paid a fee for the use of the road. This conception of the nature of the railroad disappeared very early, but can be traced as far west as Arkansas.”35

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The first railroad of note in England, a thirty-eight mile line called the Stockton and Darlington, went into operation in 1825 to transport coal. The first American railway was constructed in 1826 in Quincy, Massachusetts, to move granite from a quarry three miles to a river. The Quincy railway had wooden rails topped with iron that provided a pathway for horse-drawn carts loaded with stone that was used to build a monument to the Revolutionary War’s Battle of Bunker Hill.

Riegel said the first important public railroad in the United States was the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad begun in 1827 with plans to eventually connect Baltimore, Maryland, with the Ohio River at Wheeling, West Virginia, 300 miles away. “The locomotive had not yet come into use, so various kinds of motive power were tried,” he said of the Baltimore & Ohio. “Horse traction was used, and experiments were made of putting the horse inside the car on a treadmill. At one time sails were put on the cars, which were then operated like boats. None of these methods having proved successful, experiments were continued further with steam engines.” Historian David Mountfield said the Baltimore & Ohio, open for operation in May 1830, like the railway in Quincy, Massachusetts, had iron-topped wooden rails, and it also had converted stage coaches as cars pulled by horses. John Debo Galloway said that, by general consent, the Baltimore & Ohio was acknowledged as the first American railroad for general traffic to organize and build a line [thirteen miles from Baltimore to Ellicott Mills].

However, there was a railroad in operation for general traffic four months earlier than the Baltimore & Ohio in the United States, according to Galloway. That road, the Charleston & Hamburg in South Carolina, had six miles of rail and became operational in January 1830. Although the Baltimore & Ohio experimented with a steam locomotive called the Tom Thumb in 1830, it was the Charleston & Hamburg that was the first in the United States to use a steam-powered locomotive to transport passengers. That first

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37 Adams, Railroads, 37.
38 Riegel, The Story of Western Railroads, 3.
39 Mountfield, The Railway Barons, 114.
40 Galloway, The First Transcontinental Railroad, 11.
41 Adams, Railroads, 44-45.
trip, on January 15, 1831, used the *Best Friend of Charleston* to pull a train of passengers at sixteen to twenty-one miles an hour. The *Best Friend* exploded two months later, without reported injury, after a safety valve to let off excess steam was blocked shut.42

**Railroad Mania**

By the end of 1831, discussion of building railroads was pervasive, at least in New York State. According to the *Independent Republican* of Goshen, New York, “It is almost impossible to open a paper without finding an account of some railroad meeting. An epidemic on this subject seems nearly as prevalent throughout the country as the influence.”43 In the following spring, passengers were putting out fires on each other’s clothing, and umbrellas were burning up from smokestack sparks on an excursion from Albany to Schenectady pulled by the *DeWitt Clinton* locomotive.44

The people of Massachusetts got an operating railroad on May 16, 1834, with passengers from Boston to Newton and an excursion with the opening in June 1835 of the Boston and Providence Railroad. The excursion led one newspaper observer to remark that the road’s impressive excavations and embankments “testify in strong language to man’s dominion over nature.” Excursions on the Boston & Worcester, opened on July 6, 1835, included military salutes, military bands on the tops of cars and, according to one account, the novelty of differing scenes presented relatively quickly in succession.45

The Western Railroad, connecting Boston to Albany, New York, was opened in December 1841 with a parade of military and fire companies in Boston.46 It had been funded in part by Massachusetts, which bought stock and bonds in the enterprise.47

However, railroad development in the 1840s in the United States had come to a near halt because of an economic depression triggered by the Panic of 1837. Ambitious

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42 See Ibid., 39, 42-43; McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 3; and Mott, *Between the Ocean and the Lakes*, 7.
46 Ibid., 79.
state plans for internal improvements, including railroads and canals, fell into default with the economic downturn and led to some state constitutional changes prohibiting the extension of state credit to transportation enterprises.\(^{48}\) After the states’ repudiation of debts, according to historian David Mountfield, and the federal government’s inability to fund internal improvements because of legal questions of whether the U.S. Constitution allowed for such federal funding, it was up to corporations “which now began the unparalleled progress to vast economic and political power.”\(^{49}\)

Historians Arthur M. Johnson and Barry E. Supple said the economic depression triggered by the Panic of 1837 was deep and severe and lasted until a mid-1850s boom, when a new optimism included easy terms for eastern money and renewed investment in railroad projects.\(^{50}\) Beginning about 1850, some railroad leaders were demanding a federal subsidy to help them build lines, particularly promoters of the Illinois Central Railroad.\(^{51}\) The first congressional land grant to states to allow them to aid railroad development was made in 1850 to Illinois. A major portion of the grant, 2.6 million acres, was passed along to the Illinois Central through a state charter for the road. The Illinois Central promoters had done some public-relations work ahead of the land grant, Johnson and Supple reported. “Even before the land-grant bill was confirmed [in 1851-1852], [George W.] Billings and the [Illinois Central] promoters, with some advice from [U.S.] Senator Stephen A. Douglas, were mapping out a campaign of direct action and newspaper publicity to obtain from the Illinois Legislature a charter that would control disposition of the land.”\(^{52}\)

The first long-distance railroad, 446 miles, the New York & Erie Railroad from Piedmont, New York, 60 miles north of New York City, to Dunkirk, near Buffalo, New York, was opened officially on May 13 or 14, 1851, with the first long-distance excursion. The guest list included President Millard Filmore and Secretary of State Daniel Webster. Filmore, upon being welcomed by 50,000 spectators, called the new

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\(^{48}\) Ibid, 78.
\(^{49}\) Mountfield, The Railway Barons, 114.
\(^{50}\) Johnson and Supple, Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads, 77, 79.
\(^{52}\) Johnson and Supple, Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads, 130-31
railroad the most costly and greatest work of its kind on the continent, and in the world, too, with the exception of a Russian line from Moscow to St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{53} By the end of the 1850s, the Illinois Central had the longest railroad in the world with 700 miles completed.\textsuperscript{54} Congress granted funds to forty railroads from 1852 to 1857, according to historian Marvin N. Olasky.\textsuperscript{55}

Although railroad mileage in the 1850s more than tripled to 30,000 from 9,000,\textsuperscript{56} only four lines were building westward from the Mississippi River. The Chicago & Rock Island Railroad built the first bridge crossing the Mississippi in 1853 from Rock Island to Davenport, Iowa. That railroad, however, went only a few miles past Davenport when legal wrangling erupted over its Mississippi River bridge. Two steamboats had crashed into the bridge’s piers and the steamboat owners sued, alleging the bridge was a public nuisance that impeded commerce. As a lawyer, Abraham Lincoln represented the railroad’s interests early in the case.\textsuperscript{57} Meanwhile, three lines were crossing Missouri. One, the Hannibal & St. Joseph, had crossed the state by the 1850s from the Mississippi River to the Missouri River. Two other lines, both calling themselves Pacific railroads and both originating in St. Louis, also were making slow and sporadic progress across Missouri.\textsuperscript{58}

According to Johnson and Supple, rivers in the 1850s in the United States generally were used for north-south transport, and the Great Lakes provided for east-west connections. The cost of transporting freight in 1853 was $15 per ton per mile on turnpikes; $2.30 to $3.50 per ton per mile on railroads; $1.10 on the Erie Canal; eighty cents on the Ohio River; seventy cents on the Hudson River; and five cents to $1.10 on the Great Lakes.\textsuperscript{59} Railroads had one significant advantage over waterways, however, at least in the North. They could continue to operate after the waters had frozen in winter.

\textsuperscript{53} Mott, \textit{Between the Ocean and the Lakes}, 96.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, 127.
\textsuperscript{55} Olasky, \textit{Corporate Public Relations}, 16.
\textsuperscript{56} Johnson and Supple, \textit{Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads}, 128.
\textsuperscript{57} McCague, \textit{Magul and Iron Men}, 3-4. Lincoln, in one argument for the railroad’s right to cross the Mississippi, said that people had just as much right to travel east and west as they did to travel north and south.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{59} Johnson and Supple, \textit{Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads}, 71.
By 1859, the Chicago & Rock Island and the three Missouri roads were the only railroads west of the Mississippi, except for a twenty-one mile line in California completed in 1855 from Sacramento to Folsom.60

Going West
Out in California, the 1860 population was 380,000, nearly half of them, 154,000, from other states, and a fourfold increase from an 1850 count of 92,000. Even with the growth, however, there was a sense of isolation as travel to that state was both arduous and time-consuming. Historian David Lavender said the isolation was leading to one big problem: too few people were emigrating there.

If one went by sea, the threat of fire and shipwreck was ever present. Physically, the overland journey was an even greater ordeal. One had to use his own equipment, spend three to five months on the trail, and run the risk of Indian attack. In 1855, uprisings on the plains, the nationwide depression, and the free soil-slavery turmoils in Kansas, held the number of overland emigrants which once had reached 50,000 a year, to a few hundred. The state’s overriding need, Senator [John B] Weller cried to Congress, “is an increase of population.” And that would come only with better transportation.61

For those traveling by sea to and from California and using the isthmus at Panama, the journey was made less arduous in 1855 with completion of a forty-six mile railroad that took passengers to the isthmus’ Pacific side from Aspinwall on the Caribbean Sea. The overall Isthmus trip took five to six weeks; alternatively, a clipper ship around South America and Cape Horn, took seventy-six to eighty-nine days.62 A stagecoach ride between California and the East took at least three weeks when the

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60 Ibid. The California line, the Sacramento Valley Railroad, employed Theodore Judah as its engineer. He was the person who found a way over the Sierra Nevada Mountains and convinced the so-called Big Four (Leland Stanford, Collis Huntington, Mark Hopkins and Charles Crocker) to form the Central Pacific as the western half of the first transcontinental railroad. In February 1856, Sacramento Valley officials held an excursion to Folsom for people who each paid $10 for the ride and an all-you-can-eat barbeque and an all-night dance at a new hotel in Folsom, according to David Lavender, The Great Persuader (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970), 69-70. Lavender said two trains took 1,000 excursionists on the trip, one with six passenger cars and the other with flat cars equipped with benches. Those on the flatcars, Lavender said a San Francisco reporter related, had their trip rendered unpleasant by the rushing wind and the great number of tobacco chewers on board.


62 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 6-7.
service became available in 1858. George T. Clark, in his biography of Leland Stanford, described the early California stage service.

An overland mail stage line was established in 1858 connecting San Francisco and St. Louis by the so-called Butterfield Route through Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Arkansas. The time required was about the same as by steamer [using the Panama isthmus], but the stage service was twice a week, while the steamers arrived but twice a month. By 1859, a Salt Lake stage route developed.63

The stage journey, however, was hampered by limited luggage, bad food, and deserts and snow.64 It was inaugurated after the federal government awarded a contract in 1857 for mail delivery that required the transport of mail from Tipton, Missouri, to San Francisco. John Butterfield was given a year to implement the mail service over a route of 2,795 miles with delivery required in twenty-five days. But retrenchments in the Postal Service in 1859, which reduced costs to $1.276 million from $2.185 million, led Postmaster General Joseph Holt to a conclusion that the $600,000 per year cost of the California service was too much. “Until a railroad shall have been constructed across the continent, the conveyance of the Pacific mails overland must be regarded as wholly impracticable,” he said.65

The overland mail service that averaged less than twenty-two days whetted Californians appetite for improved communication with the East, according to historian Robert R. Russel.66 United States military officers also knew of the cost and the difficulty in reaching an isolated West. The march of a mounted rifle regiment from Fort Leavenworth in Kansas to Oregon in 1849 took five months. An 1857 movement of the Army of Utah took three months from Leavenworth to Fort Bridger in the Rocky Mountains.67 Nelson Trottman, in his book on the Union Pacific’s history, said the Army of Utah movement made the need for improvement obvious. “The difficulties and

63 George T. Clark, Leland Stanford: War Governor of California, Railroad Builder, and Founder of Stanford University (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1931), 162.
64 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 6-7.
66 Ibid., 286.
dangers of western transportation were great, and these difficulties and dangers were experienced in full measure by the national government when, in 1857, it attempted to enforce the federal laws against Mormonism in Utah.  

Improved transportation with railroads was sought throughout the country, not only in the West, and new railroad construction was regarded favorably at least by the press, and, presumably, by the public generally, according to Frederick A. Cleveland and Fred Wilbur Powell.

Local newspapers were almost invariably friendly to new railroads, and their liberal donation of news space was one of the most effective aids to those in charge [of railroad enterprises]. Editorial controversies over minor features of the plans – choice of route, gauge, form and amount of public aid – kept popular interest alive. Many of the representative journals of the country conducted the same sort of campaign of education. The *American Railroad Journal* was for many years little more than a collective prospectus. *Niles’ Register, DeBow’s Commercial Review* and *Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine* gave their influence freely in support of railroad enterprise, and it must be said, with little examination of the merits of individual projects.

By 1860, about two-thirds of internal trade was carried by railroads in the United States. Most of the railroad transport was in the North, where 85 percent of railroad investment had been made. In 1860, of $960 million invested in railroads in the United States, $818 million had been invested in the North.

**California Connections**

The 1860 presidential election included among its issues the construction of what was then called a Pacific railroad connecting the eastern states to California and Oregon. Both Democrat and Republican Party platforms called for federal aid for a Pacific railroad. The Republican position boiled down to supporting whatever it would take to get the railroad built; the Democrats said everything that could be done, should be done,

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within the limits of the Constitution. Russel provided an analysis of the 1860 presidential election.

It would seem that primarily economic issues turned enough votes to the Republicans in some of the doubtful states to insure Lincoln’s election. The promise of a protective tariff was most effective in Pennsylvania. The proffer of free homesteads to actual settlers appealed strongly in the Northwest. The unequivocal plank [in the Republican platform] on the [Pacific] railroad and daily overland mail probably gave [it] the margin of victory in California.

The idea of a transcontinental railroad was not new in 1860. A Pacific railroad plank was part of the Republican Party platform in the 1856 election, too, and a railroad to connect the navigable headwaters of the Missouri and Columbia rivers was proposed as early as 1820, according to historians Frederick A. Cleveland and Fred Wilbur Powell. Also, there were several suggestions for a Pacific railroad in the 1830s. Congress was first presented with a plan to build a transcontinental railroad by Asa Whitney in 1845, based partly on opening a potential trade route with the Orient. A philosophical group of Pacific railroad promoters said its completion would be the realization of Columbus’ original intention to find a way to the Orient. In 1849, U.S. Senator Thomas H. Benton of Missouri suggested that the construction of a Pacific railroad should include a colossal Columbus statue hewn from the granite of a Rocky Mountain peak, pointing to the western horizon. According to Grenville Dodge’s autobiography, Benton said the statue of Columbus should be placed along the route overlooking the road, “the mountain itself the pedestal, and the statue a part of the mountain, pointing with outstretched arm to the western horizon, and saying to the flying passenger, ‘There is East! There is India!’”

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72 Sabin, Building the Pacific Railway, 28-29.
73 Russel, Improvement of Communication with the Pacific Coast, 287.
74 Cleveland and Powell, Railroad Promotion and Capitalization in the United States, 204-5.
76 Sabin, Building the Pacific Railway, 14-17.
Historian Frederic L. Paxson said it was clear, because of economics, why railroads, including a transcontinental one, would be a political object in the country’s developing western regions that included Missouri.

In the fundamental analysis of border life, after the procuring of the land itself, and the capital with which to develop it, the marketing of the crop contained the key to prosperity. The bulky agricultural staples of the West constituted nearly the sole produce that could be converted into money with which to pay debts or buy land. They could not be sold or consumed at home. Their bulk and weight made them costly to move to distant markets. Whatever device promised to lessen freight rates, whether by roads, or vehicles, or by legal control of the carriers, was certain of a western hearing, and almost certain to inspire a western movement in politics.78

Despite pressure from western representatives in Congress, a deal could not be reached for federal backing of a transcontinental line. Congressional representatives from both the North and the South could block one another’s attempts to get enough votes for federal aid for a route favoring their regions. Southern partisans, however, succeeded in assuring what was thought to be the best route for a southern transcontinental line with the 1853 Gadsden Purchase from Mexico.79 The departure of southern representatives from Congress with secession of their states at the outbreak of the Civil War, however, removed them as obstacles to federal legislation. “Before the Civil War there was a reasonable choice among the three best routes, but after secession, the two southern lines were out of the question for the same reason that shifted the overland mail to the Platte trail in 1861,” said Paxson. “There could be no national railroad in Confederate country, and even Missouri was ruled out as somewhat dangerous.”80

On July 1, 1862, during the Seven Days’ Battle that ended the Peninsular Campaign in Virginia, President Lincoln signed a law authorizing federal aid for a Pacific, or transcontinental, railroad. The law also set rules for formation of a company,

78 Paxson, History of the American Frontier, 402-3.
79 Trottman, History of the Union Pacific, 7. Lavender, The Great Persuader, 72, reported that Congress in 1857 authorized $250,000 and $300,000 to start work on two national wagon roads.
80 Paxson, History of the American Frontier, 469.
the Union Pacific, to construct the eastern portion of the road with government oversight. The law was titled, “An Act to Aid in the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean and to Secure to the Government the Use of the Same for Postal, Military and Other Purposes.”

The preceding fall, in October 1861, a Pacific telegraph line was opened from Omaha, Nebraska, (with connections to the East Coast) to San Francisco. California governor-elect Leland Stanford assured his state’s loyalty to the Union in a first message to President Lincoln transmitted over the new line. “Today California is but a second’s distance from the national capital. Her patriotism with electric current throbs responsive to that of her sister states and holds civil liberty and union above all price.”

**Threats to California**

Holding California and Oregon in the Union may have been a convincing argument for beginning construction of the Pacific railroad in the beginning stages of the Civil War – like other expenditures being approved, it could be considered a military necessity. Jefferson Davis, in an annual report in his role as Secretary of War in 1855, had pointed out the difficulty of defending the Pacific states, according to historian Robert R. Russel. “In case of war with a strong naval power,” Davis said, “communication with California by sea could not be relied upon. At existing [1855] rates, it would cost $20 million and require from four to six months to transport overland a year’s supplies for an army huge enough to defend the Pacific Coast. A railroad would reduce the cost to $3 million and the time to seven days.”

Historian Stephen Ambrose likened California and the West Coast to colonies of America and, like all colonies, “America couldn’t hold onto them for long.” There

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82 Russel, Improvement of Communication with the Pacific Coast as an Issue in American Politics, 1783-1864, 278. The telegraph line was built with congressional aid and $60,000 from California.

83 Clark, Leland Stanford, 112. Clark said the message was sent when the line was completed on October 23, 1861. Russel said the line was completed on October 26, 1861.

84 Russel, Improvement of Communication with the Pacific Coast, 198-99.

were two perceived threats to California’s continuance as a part of the Union from both within and without. From within, there were fears that California might join the secessionist states or declare neutrality. A later Republican representative of the state in both houses of Congress, Cornelius Cole, described the California political scene at the Civil War’s outbreak.

As soon as news reached California of the steps taken in certain states towards secession, and of the slave propaganda to resist the authority of Mr. Lincoln, no little uneasiness arose as to what attitude the Southern element here in California would assume. That element was yet dominant in political circles, and at first there was ground for apprehension that an attempt would be made to line up California with the insurgents. I say at first, for in a few months a very decided element arose in favor of preserving the Union. Before this determination became overwhelming different schemes were proposed to stand by the South. When it became evident from the tone of the press and the speech of people that this State, though still under ultra Democratic sway, could not by any possibility be carried over to join the seceded states, a strong movement was set on foot to have her assume an attitude of neutrality between the North and the South. Of course this meant resistance to Lincoln’s administration and virtual secession. All of our representatives in the two houses of Congress favored this plan for an independent Pacific Republic, and several widely circulated newspapers in San Francisco took the same ground.86

From without, there was a fear of a British naval attack on San Francisco, particularly after relations with England deteriorated with the Trent affair, also called the Mason and Slidell incident, in October 1861. A Union warship captain had removed from a British ship and jailed two Confederate diplomats en route to England. The affair was resolved with an American apology, but an inability to defend California became public, said historian Nelson Trotman.

The fear of a possible attack upon California remained notwithstanding the settlement of the Mason and Slidell affair. The Pacific slope, including California with its great mineral wealth, lay practically defenseless against foreign aggression. Without quick and safe transportation facilities it would be difficult to hold this territory against a foreign enemy in the event of war. The pages of the Congressional Globe are convincing evidence that, in the popular mind, the military feature of the proposed Pacific Railroad was the paramount consideration in 1861 and 1862. The

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86 Clark, Leland Stanford, 118-19, reproduction of a portion of Cornelius Cole’s memoirs.
commercial and economic importance of the road was at that time a secondary consideration.\(^{87}\)

Another argument for a Pacific railroad was that it would save the government money, including what was being spent to protect western regions, said Charles Edgar Ames in his Union Pacific history. The maintenance of a chain for forts and posts to provide protection to overland travelers cost $2 million annually between 1857 and 1861, although one estimate that included postal service placed the cost to the federal government at $7 million a year. Rail service eventually reduced costs by nearly $5 million annually.\(^{88}\)

Historian Henry K. White said the money-saving arguments had an effect on members of Congress, but they were not decisive. “Although these arguments touching the purse were potent enough to make it certain that a road would eventually be built, reasons of quite another sort induced the taking up of the task at the particular time when it was taken up [late 1861 and the first part of 1862] – a time which none more unfavorable could have been chosen.”\(^{89}\)

The decisive arguments in 1862 congressional action, White said, were political: keep the Pacific Coast states in the Union. He said an 1850 fight to determine whether California would be a slave state or a free state had not been forgotten and there was a fear that political elements favoring both slavery and the South might exert a controlling influence in the state, an eventuality that could be prevented by a rail connection with the free states in the east.\(^{90}\)

Still more important than this menace from within was one from without. There was good evidence that if the Trent Affair had ended in open rupture between the United States and England, the British fleet on the Pacific would immediately have struck at San Francisco, and, in the then isolated position on the coast, nothing could have prevented the success of such an assault.

\(^{87}\) Trottman, *History of the Union Pacific*, 9.
\(^{90}\) Ibid.
These, then, were the reasons for the enactment of the Act of 1862. It was a war measure, put through when the nation was in imminent danger of disruption.91

Russel reached a different conclusion on what swayed a majority of Congress to vote for the 1862 Pacific Railroad Act. He said that the Pacific Coast was too populous to be vulnerable to a successful foreign attack; that the real reason for congressional support for the 1862 law was that the transcontinental line was a commercial and social necessity.92

Historian Allan Nevin described a “social” necessity.

Eastern wealth wanted the opportunities for investment. Eastern labor wanted those for employment. National leaders were apprehensive lest a new generation should arise on the Pacific Coast without any warm attachment to the Union; while some social observers believed that the West was suffering from the excessively rapid growth of communities far removed from the conventional and religious restraints found in the rest of America and that the influence of these communities upon American manners, letters, and politics was vulgarizing.93

Lavender summed up the arguments for the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862:

The government would save upwards of $7 million a year in transporting troops, munitions, and mail; the western Indians would be quelled; emigration to the Coast would be speeded; the intervening territories would be developed; trade with the Orient would jump; California’s loyalty to the Union would be assured; foreign aggressions would be confounded; the nation’s prestige would soar.94

The Pacific Railroad Act of 1862

Whatever the decisive argument, the Pacific Railroad Act passed the U.S. House seventy-nine to forty-nine on May 6, 1862, and the U.S. Senate passed it on June 20 by a thirty-five to five vote.95 Lincoln signed it on July 1. The law was considered liberal because of what the federal government would give the companies that constructed the

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91 Ibid.
92 Russel, *Improvement of Communication with the Pacific Coast as an Issue in American Politics, 1783-1864*, 295.
95 White, *History of the Union Pacific Railway*, 12.
Pacific road. The land-rich United States government gave half of the land away to the railroad companies for ten miles on either side of a 400-foot-wide right-of-way that also was granted. The government also agreed to provide cash in the form of government-guaranteed bonds: $16,000 to $48,000 per mile, depending on the anticipated difficulty of construction. In return, the government would hold a first mortgage on the property and the right to seize it if the road were not completed by July 1, 1876. Also, the government would enjoy the transportation of troops and freight with charges for such service to be applied to what the companies owed in interest and principal on the bonds they got.96

Russel said that huge appropriations being approved to fight the Civil War may have played a role in the liberal funding provided the Pacific road through government-backed bonds. “By accustoming congressmen to appropriations of vast proportions, the war probably enabled the railroad to receive more liberal aid that it could have received if peace had prevailed. It was a matter of pride with many to demonstrate that the Union was strong enough to crush rebellion and take measures to insure its future prosperity at the same time.”97

The land grant gave the railroads building the transcontinental line alternate sections (each section one square mile or 640 acres) for ten miles on either side of the track – 6,400 acres for each mile of track they built. The land, however, was considered of little or no value, and, except for a comparatively minor role, cash from land sales did not pay construction costs. Giving away the land was considered a wash for the government because the half of the land that the government retained doubled in value with a railroad in place. “The Pacific Railroad Act was partly founded on the notion that it was good business to give away half the region affected by a railroad in order to double the value of the other half,” said Paxson.98

96 See Cleveland and Powell, Railroad Promotion and Capitalization in the United States, 256; Russel, Improvement of Communication with the Pacific Coast as an Issue in American Politics, 1783-1864, 308; and Maury Klein, Union Pacific: Birth of a Railroad, 1862-1893 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1987), 14.

97 Russel, Improvement of Communication with the Pacific Coast as an Issue in American Politics, 1783-1864, 296.

98 Paxson, History of the American Frontier, 1763-1893, 471.
But the land grant was considered too little an incentive to get private investors to build the transcontinental road, so the cash infusion from government-guaranteed bonds was added. The government bonds were six thirties, paying a bond buyer 6 percent interest annually with the payback of principal in thirty years. The companies building the road eventually would have to pay for the government bonds with interest. Trottman said the government cash infusion was essential to get the road built.

A land grant would not offer sufficient inducement to capital to bring about the building of a Pacific railroad, as public opinion of that period believed that the entire region west of the Missouri River was a barren desert. It was, moreover, well understood that whatever route might be adopted, a Pacific railroad would pass through a mountainous region, and popular belief greatly exaggerated the expense and the engineering difficulties involved in building a road over the Rocky Mountains. A liberal subsidy would have to be provided in addition to the land grant in order to induce private capital to undertake the work.

The 1862 act also required that all iron rails used for the transcontinental route had to be of American manufacture even though quality English rails were available. The requirement assured business for Pennsylvania ironworks and rolling mills at Johnstown, Danville, Scranton and Allentown.

The law named the Central Pacific Railroad Company as the designated builder of the Pacific road east from Sacramento, California. Four enterprises were eligible for designation as the eastern portion of the transcontinental road – railroads originating on the Missouri River at Leavenworth, near Kansas City; at Atchison, across the Missouri River from St. Joseph, Missouri, in Kansas; at Omaha; and at Sioux City, Iowa. The designated federal Pacific railroad running west and eligible for the benefits of the Pacific Railroad Act would be whichever one first reached the 100\(^{th}\) meridian of longitude, 247 miles west of Omaha, near Fort Kearny. “The Pacific Railroad Act assured Central Pacific of a monopoly on Federal loans and land grants east to the Nevada border, provided it could meet the time requirements,” said historian Robert West Howard. “But political pressures forced Union Pacific into bitter competition by defining the 100\(^{th}\)

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meridian as ‘the official beginning point’ of the Pacific Railroad. The first branch line to reach there would win the right to build on toward the California border.”

Even with Southern obstructionist legislators gone from Congress, the remaining Union lawmakers could not decide among rival cities on which would be a single eastern terminus for the Pacific Railroad. “Besides this main line [from Omaha], the act [of 1862] provided for other branch lines. Each of the various cities on the Missouri River wanted the valuable privilege of being the eastern terminus of the system, and to quiet these demands a system of branches was devised,” said historian Henry K. White.

The 1862 law was amended two years later to sweeten the deal for the railroad companies. It doubled the land grant by providing alternate sections to the railroad companies for twenty miles on either side of the track, instead of ten miles, so that the companies received 12,800 acres of land for each mile of track they laid, a total of 33 million acres by the time that the road was completed. The companies also got the mineral rights to the land they received. Most importantly, however, the government agreed that the money it loaned the companies through the government-guaranteed bonds would be placed in a second-mortgage position behind new first-mortgage company bonds in amounts equal to the government bonds. The first mortgage bondholders would be first in line to receive proceeds from company assets should problems develop. The first-mortgage bonds allowed the companies essentially to double their cash flow, if their bonds got a price close to the price investors paid to get government-backed bonds.

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101 Howard, The Great Iron Trail, 163,
102 White, History of the Union Pacific Railway, 13-4. Interests in bigger cities were behind the branch lines. The Leavenworth railroad, the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western, later changed its name to the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, and was backed by St. Louis and Philadelphia interests. Chicago interests backed the Omaha line.
103 See Appendix B for a text of the 1864 amending act.
Lincoln signed the 1864 amendment on July 2, 1864. At the time, the Union Pacific had done no work from Omaha west, and the first grading of that road would not take place until the fall. 106 The Central Pacific had completed track for thirty-one miles from Sacramento to Newcastle a month earlier, on June 3, 1864, but construction stopped there for nearly a year. 107

Soon after, however, construction began in earnest on both sides of the transcontinental railroad and the organizers took steps to assure that everyone knew of their progress in a sophisticated campaign to garner publicity and build and enhance their companies’ image.

107 Clark, Leland Stanford, 206-7.
Chapter 3: A Steam Whistle Signal: The Train Is Ready to Board

Staged media events were common throughout the construction of the first transcontinental railroad. The events, which included groundbreakings, track-laying demonstrations, and excursions, were designed to generate publicity, which was an essential ingredient in the railroad leaders’ attempts to get money to pay for the construction and ensure a profit for themselves and other large investors. Railroad-provided excursions for invited participants were held often to allow journalists, potential investors, and selected members of the public a firsthand look at the work. Although the ultimate purpose of the events usually marking some specific construction achievement was to get money, they also were organized to promote positive images of the companies. The Golden Spike ceremony is but one example of a sometimes-inventive recurring campaign to create information for public consumption aimed at creating and maintaining positive perceptions. These positive perceptions could lead not only to individual investment but to public support that would help pressure federal legislators to aid the enterprises or, at least, not hinder them with inspections or investigations.

Despite scarce funds, officials of the two railroad companies who built the first transcontinental railroad paid for groundbreaking ceremonies to get public attention for the opening of their enterprises. The Central Pacific in Sacramento, California, was ahead of the Union Pacific by eleven months in breaking ground on January 8, 1863. Central Pacific officials advertised their ceremony to draw a crowd, procured the Sacramento Union Band to play, and invited members of the California Legislature and the Sacramento Pioneer Association, a civic group dedicated to preserving the community’s history. They also had straw brought in to spread on ground too muddy for ladies’ ceremonial dresses and had two wagons decorated for the occasion. Just as he led the golden spike ceremony that would conclude the building, Leland Stanford, the
Central Pacific president, did the honors at the company groundbreaking, described by historian Gary Hogg.\(^{108}\)

A cart loaded with rubble and drawn by a gaily bedecked cart-horse was maneuvered within his [Stanford’s] reach. Sticking out of the rubble was a spade. Governor Stanford leaned over the rail of the platform and grasped the handle. Then, a little clumsily since he was not used to manual work, he dug into the heap of rubble and tossed some of it into a hollow in the ground beside the platform.\(^ {109}\)

The Sacramento Union called it “a ceremony of vast significance.”\(^ {110}\)

Union Pacific officials held a more elaborate groundbreaking on December 2, 1863, that made a big dent in the company’s treasury and may have wiped it out.\(^ {111}\) Historian Robert West Howard said the arrangement committee for the “Grand Opening Ceremony “sent sheaves of telegrams to state governors, federal officials, bankers and newspaper editors urging each to attend the ‘gala ceremony and banquet.’”\(^ {112}\) The Union Pacific groundbreaking included more than one band, blaring whistles, cannon fire, and flags. There were fireworks at dusk followed by a banquet and a ball.\(^ {113}\) Congratulatory messages from President Abraham Lincoln and Mormon leader Brigham Young also were read.\(^ {114}\)

The Central Pacific groundbreaking, though a more modest affair, at least was accompanied by work underway: the driving of pilings nearby to support a bridge across


\(^{110}\) Kraus, *High Road to Promontory Point*, 58.


\(^{112}\) Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 164.


the American River. The Union Pacific leaders were not ready to begin construction at their groundbreaking. The first grading for the Union Pacific line would not start for nearly eight more months, but the ceremony had to go forward, Howard said, because Union Pacific chief operator Thomas C. Durant was feeling heat from a competitor.

Construction by the competition confronted Durant when his dummy stockholders enabled the October 29th [1863] birth of Union Pacific. A week or two before, Samuel Hallett & Company had broken ground for the Union Central Pacific Railroad [apparently, the Leavenworth, Pawnee & Western Railroad that later would be called the Union Pacific, Eastern Division, and still later, the Kansas Pacific] at Leavenworth, Kansas. Its stockholders included Philadelphia and St. Louis bigwigs; the Union Central Pacific, then, was the realization of the Philadelphia-St. Louis “team up” predicted during the Federal commissioners’ convention in Chicago [on September 2, 1862]. Hallett pledged to have rails into Lawrence, Kansas, before January 1, then build on up the Kansas River Valley, during 1865, and reach the 100th meridian “before 1866.”115

The publicity targets most likely included potential investors as leaders of both companies had been engaged in unsuccessful efforts to sell company stock leading up to the groundbreakings. Land speculators and investors also may have been targets; historian Charles Edgar Ames mentioned that real estate promoters were among the...

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115 Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 163. In October, Durant had assembled a group of initial Union Pacific investors -- some who he guaranteed against loss and others who lent their name only to stock subscriptions that he paid for out of his own pocket -- to meet Pacific Railroad Act requirements that limited what any individual could hold in stock and to get the Union Pacific Railroad Company operating before time ran out as set forth in the law. All together, the subscribers put in $214,000 in cash, or 10 percent down, for stock with a face value of $2.14 million. Durant also spent $435,754 in early 1864 in lobbying and arrangements, particularly with Leavenworth-Pawnee investors, to get the 1864 amendment to the 1862 law, according to Charles Edgar Ames, *Pioneering the Union Pacific: A Reappraisal of the Builders of the Railroad* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Meredith Corporation, 1969), 27-28. Leavenworth branch progress would be stopped with Hallett’s death on July 27, 1864. Hallett was shot in a brawl involving railroad employees, according to Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 166. Although Howard said Hallett died during the winter of 1863-64, a lawsuit filed by Henry C. Crane, Durant’s attorney and secretary, set the date of his death as July 27, 1864. Documents of the lawsuit were dated December 15 and 16, 1864, and the civil complaint was to the Supreme Court of the City and County of New York. The civil complaint is in Series II, Box 9, file “Crane vs Fremont, Hallett, et al.” in the Levi O. Leonard Collection, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa, hereafter referred to as the Leonard Collection. The lawsuit asks the court to order Hallett’s wife to refrain from disposing of 114,000 shares of Union Pacific, Eastern Division, stock worth $200,000 until a judgment is satisfied against Hallett for $14,653.
Historian Maury Klein suggested that it may have been members of Congress who were a target of the Union Pacific publicity because the 1864 amendment to the Pacific Railroad Act would become law seven months later. “Besides confirming the road’s presence in Omaha, the event would garner some publicity and perhaps impress Congress, which was about to convene,” Klein said.\textsuperscript{117}

The Union Pacific needed all the help it could get at the outset, said Sabin, because the prospects for revenue-generation from railroad operations were slim.

The task before the Union Pacific far dwarfed that before the Central, who had to build only fifty miles, difficult though they were, into waiting traffic, while the Union was to build 1,500 miles, long stretches of what tapped no settlements whatever.

There were the Colorado gold field, the city of Denver, and the produce of the Salt Lake Valley, with, of course, the Pacific coast at the far end as trade sources; but the whole Territory of Nebraska contained scarcely 35,000 people. From central Nebraska to the Salt Lake Valley the country was deemed a barren waste.\textsuperscript{118}

Historian James McCague also described the daunting ordeal faced by the Union Pacific’s leaders at the groundbreaking.

In sheer mileage alone the task was gargantuan. Previous railroad construction in the United States had been of the short-line variety, reaching out from city to city by easy stages in the densely populated East, the established South and the new Northwest. But from the Missouri River to the Pacific was roughly 2,000 miles (no one knew the actual figure till the route could be surveyed fully), and at least a third of them were unexplored miles. Kansas was the sole Union state extending west of the Missouri, California and Oregon the only ones on the Pacific Coast. In between lay the vast Territories of Dakotah [sic], Washington, Nebraska, Colorado, Utah, Nevada and New Mexico.\textsuperscript{119}

The Central Pacific followed its groundbreaking with a plan to hold another ceremony on October 26, 1863, when the first rail was laid and the first spike driven, but Central Pacific Vice President Collis P. Huntington did not want another ceremony

\textsuperscript{117} Klein, \textit{Union Pacific}, 25.
\textsuperscript{118} Sabin, \textit{Building the Pacific Railway}, 82.
\textsuperscript{119} McCague, \textit{Moguls and Iron Men}, 34-35.
then. Still, company officials held a celebration 15 days later when the first locomotive, the Governor Stanford, arrived and newspaper editors were among the dignitaries given a ride on what historian Stephen Ambrose called “the biggest man-made thing in the state: Weighing 46 tons, it was more than 10 feet tall and 50 feet long with four driving wheels, each 4 1/2 feet in diameter.” Hogg described the locomotive’s arrival:

On the date when this splendid locomotive was delivered in sections for assembly, only two miles of track had actually been laid. Nevertheless the company officials were determined to lose no time in seeing it in action. Invitations were sent out to local dignitaries, bankers, sponsors and others to attend its inaugural run.

Media Events

Central Pacific Railroad leaders staged another event on August 21, 1864, to show that their combination of railroad, stagecoach and steamer service between San Francisco and Virginia City in the Nevada silver-mining country was faster than the Freemont Railroad’s service. San Francisco newspapers acted as contest judges and the Central Pacific won handily.

In a July 4 parade sponsored by Central Pacific leaders in 1866 in Sacramento, Edwin B. Crocker, the railroad’s attorney, waved the groundbreaking spade from his carriage. Railroad workers took part in the parade, too, with different types of workers marching in separate groups and a banner for all – “Ho for Salt Lake, 1870.” Those associated with the Central Pacific had at least one reason to celebrate; the July 3, 1866, second amending of the Pacific Railroad Act that lifted a restriction that they stop

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120 Kraus, High Road to Promontory Point, 72.
122 Hogg, Union Pacific, 32.
123 Two historians agree that the victory clearly went to the Central Pacific. See David Lavender, The Great Persuader (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 160; and Gerald M. Best, Iron Horses to Promontory (San Marino, California: Golden West Books, 1969), 20-21. Lavender said the Virginia City-San Francisco run took twenty-one hours for the Central Pacific combination versus nearly thirty-five hours for the competitor. Best said it was thirteen hours versus twenty-two-and-a-half hours. He reported railroad speeds of forty-two to forty-four miles an hour for the race’s railroad portions.
building 150 miles east beyond the California border.\textsuperscript{125} But in addition to that, the Central Pacific track had reached beyond Dutch Flat, where detractors had said they would stop because they had no intention of building the railroad beyond a connection there with their wagon road to Virginia City.\textsuperscript{126} The July 4 parade generated many pages of good publicity, said historian David Haward Bain.\textsuperscript{127}

Union Pacific officials had their turn with a media event in April 1868, when their westward-moving line crossed Sherman Summit in Wyoming, the highest point at that time of any railroad in the world, 8,242 feet above sea level. Historian Charles Edgar Ames said Union Pacific Vice President Durant arrived just in time on April 5, 1868, to ceremoniously spike down the last rails over the summit at milepost 549.\textsuperscript{128} Ambrose said Durant; Grenville M. Dodge, Union Pacific chief engineer; and a party of dignitaries arrived at Sherman’s Summit on April 18 to watch the first train go over the high point.\textsuperscript{129} Durant had exchanged telegrams with Stanford during the two previous days in an apparent attempt to let the rival railroad’s leaders know that the Union Pacific had surmounted a Rocky Mountain barrier. “We send you greeting from the highest summit our line crosses between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,” Durant wired Stanford on April 16 from the Laramie Mountains via Cheyenne, Wyoming. “Eight thousand two hundred, 8200, feet above the tide water. Have commenced laying the iron on the downgrade westward. T. C. Durant”

His telegram was received at 11:30 a.m. on April 17 in Sacramento, and Stanford wired back the same day to the Laramie Mountains via Cheyenne: “We return your greeting with pleasure. Though you may approach the union of the two roads faster than ourselves, you cannot exceed us in earnestness of desire for that great event. We cheerfully yield you the palm of superior elevation. (7042) Seven thousand and forty two

\textsuperscript{125} See Appendix C for the full text of the 1866 amending act.
\textsuperscript{126} Lavender, The Great Persuader, 175. Detractors called what they said were the true plans to stop at Dutch Flat “The Dutch Flat Swindle.”
\textsuperscript{128} Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 272.
\textsuperscript{129} Ambrose, Nothing Like It in the World, 261.
feet has been quite sufficient to satisfy our highest ambition. May your descent be easy and rapid. Leland Stanford\textsuperscript{130}

Union Pacific workers carried out a track-laying demonstration on October 27, 1868, before Durant and his friends to show that Union Pacific track-layers could beat a Central Pacific track-laying record of seven miles in one working day. The track-layers did seven-and-a-half miles that day, setting a new record, but it cost the company at least $20,000 as other workers were idled for the demonstration.\textsuperscript{131}

Clearly, the demonstration had a goal of generating publicity, according to a telegram to Durant from Cornelius S. Bushnell in New York City on October 28, 1868. “Your dispatch to Mr. Ames [apparently Oliver Ames, Union Pacific president] yesterday is at hand and Shatuck [apparently L. F. Shattuck, company advertising and special agent] will have it verbatim in all the Papers in the Country tomorrow morning.”\textsuperscript{132}

According to historian Edward L. Sabin, the track-laying demonstrations became a running contest between Union Pacific and Central Pacific officials in 1868 and 1869. Brigadier General John Stephen “Jack” Casement of Painesville, Ohio, who was in charge of Union Pacific track-layers, put down six miles in one day in 1868 and Charles Crocker, Casement’s counterpart on the Central Pacific, responded with seven miles. The October 28 demonstration was a response to Crocker’s new record, and when Crocker heard that he had been beaten, he reportedly said his workers would do ten miles in one day. Durant, learning of the ten-mile boast, wired Crocker that he would give him $10,000 if he could do that before witnesses. Crocker responded that he would let Durant know when he would do it.\textsuperscript{133}

Crocker eventually did as he had boasted, and he did it with a timing that assured the Union Pacific would not be able to respond when the Union Pacific railhead was only

\textsuperscript{130} The telegrams are in Series I, Box 2, in the Collis Potter Huntington Papers in the Special Collections Research Center at Syracuse University Library, hereafter referred to as the Huntington Papers. The collection’s files are organized chronologically. The telegram exchange apparently was published as it is contained in an unmarked newspaper clipping in Series II, Box 32, file “Union Pacific Railroad History (Construction)” in the Leonard Collection.

\textsuperscript{131} Best, \textit{Iron Horses to Promontory}, 113.

\textsuperscript{132} Telegram, Bushnell to Durant, October 28, 1868, Series II, Box 6, file “Bushnell, Cornelius Scranton, 1863-1875,” Leonard Collection. Bushnell was a Union Pacific director.

\textsuperscript{133} Sabin, \textit{Building the Pacific Railway}, 176-77.
nine miles short of Promontory Point on April 28, 1869.\textsuperscript{134} The record for one working day had been eight miles and 3,000 feet, which was set by the Union Pacific earlier in 1869.\textsuperscript{135} The ten-mile demonstration had to be delayed a day when a locomotive ran off the Central Pacific track leading to the demonstration site, a particularly embarrassing accident because of all of the newspaper correspondents assembled.\textsuperscript{136}

Howard said Central Pacific workers laid ten miles, 200 feet in a twelve-hour, forty-five minute working day on April 28, 1869. The workers placed 25,800 ties and 3,520 rail lengths. They also used 55,000 spikes and 7,040 fishplates [iron slats bolted to the inside of tracks at rail joints] and the eight ironmen, or rail carriers, lifted nearly 2 million pounds of iron that day.\textsuperscript{137}

**Central Pacific Excursions**

Another popular event staged by officials of both railroads throughout the construction was the excursion, a free ride aboard a company train to the end of the track or to some significant point that had been achieved on the line. Officials at both companies arranged frequent excursions -- usually inviting government officials, business leaders, and, of course, newspaper or magazine correspondents -- with the apparent aim of generating publicity and, subsequently, investment in their enterprises. Historian

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\textsuperscript{134} Best, *Iron Horses to Promontory*, 127.
\textsuperscript{137} Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 328. Howard’s report on the ten-mile demonstration includes rail lengths and numbers that do not make sense -- 3,520 rail lengths of 120 feet each, as he reported, would account for forty miles of track. Best, *Iron Horses to Promontory*, 46-47, says that ten miles and fifty-six feet were laid that day and the eight ironmen carried 1,970,000 pounds. Sabin, *Building the Pacific Railway*, 201-203, repeats the 1,970,000-pound figure for the ironmen. McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 304, said it was 985,600 pounds that the ironmen, all Irish, lifted, and McCague said they did the demonstration in an eleven-hour work day. Each rail length, according to Ambrose in *Nothing Like It in the World*, 349, weighed 560 pounds and was carried by four ironmen. If the rail lengths were thirty feet, instead of the 120 feet Howard reported, 3,520 rail lengths would equal ten miles of track. Using Ambrose’s weight of 560 pounds per rail length, the weight of the iron needed to lay ten miles of track would be 1,971,200 pounds. Ames in *Pioneering the Union Pacific*, 334-35, said the Central Pacific workers laid track on an uphill grade and did the demonstration in eleven hours.
David Haward Bain said there were important connections between the excursions and company bond sales.\textsuperscript{138}

Railroad company excursions were not new when the transcontinental line was being constructed. Public relations historian Scott M. Cutlip said they had been offered in the United States since at least 1846. He offered as evidence an excerpt from a July 25, 1846, issue of the \textit{American Railroad Journal} that said the railroad excursion was a novelty then.\textsuperscript{139}

The first full-fledged excursion on the transcontinental railroad took place on March 20, 1864, on twenty-two miles of Central Pacific track laid at that point to Roseville, where there was a granite quarry. Historian Gary Hogg described it:

The day came when some twenty miles of track had been graded and successfully laid. This seemed a milestone for celebration, The more celebrating that was done in the early stages the more enthusiastic people might be expected to become, and so the greater the amount of money that would be subscribed by sponsors anxious to take a practical share in the ambitious enterprise.

So, the company decided that a full-scale excursion should be organized from Sacramento to the new rail-head, some twenty miles distant. It would not be a very spectacular trip, for those twenty miles of track still had not reached the true slopes of the Sierra, the gradient rising not much more than 120 feet from start to finish.

But the rail-head was the pleasantly named settlement of Roseville, a junction, in fact, with a small local line [apparently the Central California Railroad] that had been laid some time before to link a farming district with a mining district some twenty miles away. The advent of this new railway brought the promise of development in both regions, and the excitement in Roseville as the rail-head became established there was tremendous. Beyond Roseville, within the next dozen or so miles, the track would have to be lifted something like a thousand feet. This would be the first real challenge to be faced by the Company’s construction engineers, and it seemed fitting that they should pause momentarily at Roseville to regain their breath and prepare for the next great step.

\textsuperscript{138} Bain, \textit{Empire Express}, 333.
\textsuperscript{139} Scott M. Cutlip, \textit{Public Relations History: From the 17\textsuperscript{th} to the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. The Antecedents} (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995), 144. The excerpt Cutlip used from the railroad journal said, “They [excursions] are perfectly in accordance with the genius of our people.”
This time not only local dignitaries but members of the State Legislature were invited, for the Company was anxious that Government officials also should be impressed with what was being done in this far-flung corner of America. In all, some hundreds of guests were expected, and accommodation was arranged for them in a number of passenger coaches each capable of carrying no fewer than sixty persons.140

Hogg said that the ornate passenger coaches were reserved for the dignitaries and legislators; less important passengers rode on seven flat cars with fitted benches. A band of ten musicians rode on a flatcar behind the locomotive tender. When the party got to the quarry, Central Pacific officials provided a picnic of wine, cheese, and bread and Hogg suggested that a public-relations consciousness may have dictated the picnic menu. “Possibly the provision of so humble a type of fare was deliberate: to show that the Company was economically minded.”141

That the excursions achieved their purpose was shown in letters written to Collis P. Huntington, the Central Pacific vice president operating in New York City as a salesman of company bonds and as a purchasing agent for rails, locomotives, and equipment necessary to build the road. After a June 1867 Union Party convention in Sacramento, E. B. Crocker told Huntington in a letter that Central Pacific officials invited convention participants on a free ride to Cisco at milepost ninety-two.

The next day after the convention adjourned, we gave the delegates, their wives and friends, the candidates, and the crowd generally a free ride to Cisco and back – with suitable refreshments. The delegates include some of the best men from all parts of the state, and it was a real treat to them to have a chance to see our railroad, and they appreciated it. It was a good thing for us. It made us friends. Such things have a good effect. Charles [Crocker], Stanford, Hopkins and Miller went with them. It was a jolly crowd.142

When the Central Pacific’s Summit Tunnel was finally ready in December 1867, another excursion was organized. The Summit Tunnel, after years of work removing its hard granite, was holed through in August 1867. The achievement was important for two reasons: the Central Pacific had surmounted the Sierra Nevada Mountains and could now

140 Hogg, Union Pacific, 36-37.
141 Ibid., 38-39.
142 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, June 17, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
concentrate its resources on the down slope to the Truckee River meadows and Reno
beyond; and the tunnel’s completion put to rest criticism that the company had poor
engineers who had picked the wrong way through the mountains and would never get
over them. Howard reported extraordinary measures that Central Pacific directors took to
get the tunnel done as quickly as possible, including driving a shaft from above,
perpendicularly into the tunnel’s center and working both ways out while working both
ways in. Nitroglycerin also was used.143 Mark Hopkins, the Central Pacific treasurer and
a longtime business partner of Huntington, told his associate about the excursion plans.

Saturday [the next day, December 7, 1867] we run an excursion train to
tunnel no. 12 at the head of Donner Lake and take the Legislature and
their friends to see the railroad sights. We have never failed on such
occasions to make a favorable impression upon the members of the
Legislature regarding the merit of the company and the progress. And this
Democratic Legislature I think will not be more difficult than past
Legislatures have been.144

Bain said the excursion stopped only for fuel and water on its way to the Summit
Tunnel. The trip was huge with nearly 800 passengers, including members of the press.
He continued: “The Central Pacific arranged a Saturday ‘junket’ to dwarf all previous
excursions, losing no opportunity to throw a rolling party for the public relations value of
the opened tunnel.”145

E. B. Crocker, the Central Pacific attorney, provided a report after the excursion
in a letter to Huntington. “Dec. 7 took the legislature and leading men of the state over
the road and they all expressed their astonishment at the amount of the work done.
Democrats and all expressed their good will towards the Co. It made a strong
impression. It rained when we got to Cisco, and it turned to snow when we reached the
Summit, and that was a novelty to a great many.”146

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143 See E. B. Crocker to Huntington, August 3 and 29, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers, for
reports on holing through at the tunnel and Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 231-33, for discussion of the
extraordinary measures to get the tunnel done as quickly as possible.
144 Mark Hopkins to Collis P. Huntington, December 6, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
146 Crocker to Huntington, December 11, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
The Summit Tunnel excursion, however, was marred by incidents along the way. Twice platforms were yanked from cars when trains attempted to get underway; there was a snowball fight at the Summit; and a train stalled for fifteen minutes inside the tunnel, where smoke from the locomotive got dense enough to be potentially dangerous. Pickpockets were operating in the crowd, and one railroad worker, a fireman, fell off a train. 147 Some bad publicity resulting from the incidents apparently alarmed Huntington because E. B. Crocker wrote to assure him that the excursion was a success. “As to accidents on that excursion,” he said in a January 22, 1868, letter, “they amounted to nothing. The reporters found little to write and so magnified molehills into mountains.” 148

Union Pacific Excursions

Over on the eastern side of the transcontinental railroad, Union Pacific excursions began modestly with a trip of about fifteen miles from Omaha west to Sailing’s Grove at the Elkhorn River on November 10, 1865. The Union Pacific had gotten that far in four months of track-laying. “For a number of reasons the work dragged,” said historian W. F. Bailey. “It took one year to complete the first forty miles.” 149

About twenty guests were accommodated with nail kegs as seats on flatcars. The guest of honor was a Civil War hero, Union General William Tecumseh Sherman, named commander of the United States Army’s Department of the West five months earlier. 150 Durant arrived from New York City to host the excursion and invited leading citizens of Omaha, Council Bluffs and Nebraska Territory. The excursion train was pulled by a locomotive named General Sherman. “By November the railroad, still some way short of instituting regular revenue service, felt itself ready for the lesser though still epic step of running its first excursion,” historian James McCague said. 151

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148 Crocker to Huntington, January 22, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
149 Bailey, The Story of the First Trans-Continental Railroad, 51.
150 For accounts of the nail-keg excursion, see Best, Iron Horses to Promontory, 92; W. F. Bailey, The Story of the First Trans-Continental Railroad: Its Projectors, Construction and History (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Printing Co., 1906), 51; Howard, The Great Iron Trail, 185-86; Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 119; McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 98; and Bain, Empire Express, 240.
151 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 98.
Historian Robert West Howard said Sherman had accepted the excursion invitation because he and Ulysses S. Grant, Army commander, were beginning to be convinced that the Pacific railroad was a military necessity to provide protection from hostile Indians on the plains. Durant wanted Sherman there so he could press his argument that the army should release General Grenville M. Dodge from military service to be Union Pacific chief engineer.152

Durant got what he wanted, and Dodge took over as chief engineer the following May. Jack Casement instituted procedures for that summer’s construction that included a work train containing all of the supplies needed and a barracks and a kitchen car so workers could awaken and eat at the end of the track. The Union Pacific track made astonishing progress that summer, and in August Sherman was treated to a much longer ride of 190 miles from Omaha to just five miles short of Fort Kearny.153

By October 5, 1866, the Union Pacific line reached the 100th meridian at milepost 247, and that called for an excursion to outdo anything that had preceded it.154 Durant apparently began planning this grand excursion when the Union Pacific opened the first 100 miles on June 2, 1866.

“Durant was elated,” said historian Charles Edgar Ames said of the Union Pacific beating a deadline by twenty-five days to get 100 miles constructed. “He thought that his accomplishments would attract public capital, if only they could be properly advertised. So he began planning a second excursion, this one to be the most lavish publicity event ever concocted by a railroad to that date. He issued invitations to several hundred

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154 Howard in *The Great Iron Trail*, 208, said that a horse called “Blind Tom” pulled the first railcar across the meridian and that the Union Pacific by reaching the point ahead of any other railroad, assured its designation as the federally backed railroad that would build the eastern portion of the transcontinental. The Union Pacific, Eastern Division (formerly the Leavenworth, Pawnee & Western), the competitor building in the Kansas River Valley, reorganized as the Kansas Pacific and veered away to follow a route to Denver. Howard said the Union Pacific, by reaching the 100th meridian first, assured that Chicago would dominate St. Louis as a wholesale, manufacturing, and shipping center for the upper Midwest.
persons in the public eye to a ‘Great Pacific Railway Excursion to the One Hundredth Meridian.’”155 Howard described the excursion’s purpose: to raise money.

Durant, from June [1866] on, worked on plans for a “Grand Excursion” that would boost Union Pacific stock sales and enable a first dividend for the investors in Credit Mobilier.156 Construction costs to the 100th meridian were totaling more than $12,000,000. The Federal loans on the 247 miles of track would net only $3,000,000. Now was the time for a master promotion stroke that would put Union Pacific on every newspaper front page in Europe and the United States and break through the passive cynicism of millionaires and bankers. During August, clerks at the New York office labored over hundreds of letters to a select list of the New York, Boston and Philadelphia “elite” and to each member of Congress. They requested the honor of the recipient’s company on a two weeks’, no-expense journey to the 100th meridian via special train. Departure from New York City was scheduled for the afternoon of October 15.157

Those invited included the president and all of the cabinet members, all members of Congress, business leaders, diplomats and those who had invested substantially in the railroad. Also invited were journalists, and those who accepted included the Boston Post; the Cleveland Herald; the Chicago Times; the Cincinnati Commercial; the Waltham (Massachusetts) Sentinel; the Pittsburgh Daily Gazette; the Washington, D.C., National

155 Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 153.
156 More likely it was bond sales Durant wanted to boost. Union Pacific stock, at least when it was first issued by the company, did not sell on markets because federal law required that it be sold for $100 a share and it rarely was worth that much. See Cornelius Bushnell in congressional testimony (House Select Committee No. 2, House Report 78, Affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, 42nd Cong., 3rd sess, February 20, 1873, 542. The committee chairman was Jeremiah Wilson and it will be referred to hereafter as the Wilson Committee), said that the highest price paid for the stock on Wall Street was seventy to seventy-five cents for each dollar of face value. Arthur M. Johnson and Barry E. Supple in Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads: A Study in the Nineteenth Century Railroad Investment Process (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), 202, said Union Pacific stock was sold for $4.50 a share to Credit Mobilier stockholders in one transaction. J. B. Crawford in The Credit Mobilier of America: Its Origin and History. Its Work of Constructing the Union Pacific Railroad and the Relation of Members of Congress Therewith (Boston: C. W. Calkins & Co, Publishers, 1880), 35, said the market price of Union Pacific stock was $30 a share. The company distributed its stock by using it primarily to pay inflated construction contract prices set by its sister corporation, Credit Mobilier, which technically built the railroad. The officers and large stockholders in both corporations were the same people. The inflated contract prices assured a profit for the builders and allowed the Union Pacific Company to comply with federal rules to sell its stock at par, at least so the books showed. For descriptions of the arrangements see Johnson and Supple, Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads, 202; and Robert Edgar Riegel, The Story of Western Railroads (New York: Macmillan Company, 1926), 74-76.
Intelligencer; the Philadelphia Evening Telegraph; the Chicago Tribune; and even the Phrenological Journal and Life Illustrated. Horace Greeley from the New York Tribune and J. P. Beach, the editor of the New York Sun, were among three journalists who declined the invitation. Historian Maury Klein said 140 accepted their invitations. “The guest list was heavy with senators, congressmen, capitalists and others who could be useful to the company,” he said.

Durant had soaring expectations for the Great Pacific Railroad Excursion, McCague said:

[Reaching the 100th meridian] meant the kind of progress that might bolster the lagging confidence of important Eastern capitalists with money to invest. Money still was needed; it was always needed. And there were personal considerations. Durant so far had enjoyed scant opportunity to display his bent for doing things in the grand manner. The ground-breaking in ’63 had gone almost unnoticed by the nation at large. The crude little excursion in ’65 had suffered by comparison with the Central Pacific’s impressive Sierra trip for the Schuyler Colfax party. This time, Durant wanted his railroad’s achievement celebrated by an excursion that would stand unmatched for splendor in all the annals of American railroading.

The Grand Excursion train started on October 15 in New York City and picked up passengers in Pittsburgh and Chicago, where it left on October 18 on its way to St. Joseph, Missouri, the only railhead on the Missouri River. There, the excursionists boarded two steamboats for a 130-mile cruise to Omaha, the same trip taken by most of the construction supplies for the Union Pacific road. On board the steamboats, the excursionists were given a dinner that included thirty entrees [including bear], eighteen pastries, and six desserts accompanied by decorations that included a cornucopia of spun sugar and a sponge candy pyramid. The two steamboats each had a band: the Great

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158 Notes accepting or declining invitations, usually handwritten on the invitation, are in Series II, Box 15, file “Excursion Invitations,” Leonard Collection. Greeley said in an October 3 response, “I cannot accept, being too busy in the canvass.”

159 Klein, Union Pacific, 75.

160 The Central Pacific’s Colfax Excursion was a trip conducted on August 17, 1865, over fifty-five miles of track to Illinoistown which, upon arrival, was renamed Colfax in his honor. Later vice president in the Grant administration, he was then U.S. House speaker. For other accounts of the Colfax trip, see Griswold, A Work of Giants, 122-24; and Bain, Empire Express, 234.

161 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 131
Western Light Guard of Chicago aboard one and Rosenblatt’s Band of St. Joseph on the other.

The excursionists arrived on October 22 for a welcoming ball at the Herndon House, Omaha’s finest hotel. They were joined by thirty people from the Omaha area, including newspaper editors, who Dodge had been instructed to invite. They all left Omaha on October 23 for Columbus, Nebraska, a pair of antlers mounted on the front of a bunting-decorated locomotive pulling a train of nine cars: a baggage and a supply car, a mail/express car converted for use as a saloon, a mess or cooking car, four passenger cars, Durant’s private car (apparently the Lincoln car, also called the president’s car), and the directors’ car for members of Congress and distinguished guests. The band from St. Joseph continued with the excursion party along with barbers and wine that Durant had shipped. The wine or champagne may have been labeled especially as Union Pacific wine for the excursion. 162

A tent encampment awaited the excursionists in Columbus. It had been prepared for them by Dodge with help from Superintendent Webster Snyder. Dodge had used his military connections to procure the tents and Indian entertainment. “I immediately sent to the quartermaster, General Myers, who had served under me, and obtained tents enough to camp the whole party,” Dodge said of his part in the preparations. “I set up the first camp at Columbus on the Loup Fork River. I put it in an immense circle and had a large amount of wood hauled to put a bonfire in the centre. I sent for Major North [a Pawnee Indian] who had had command of the Pawnees during the Indian campaigns

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162 For accounts of the grand excursion see Silas Seymour, Incidents of a Trip through the Great Platte Valley to the Rocky Mountains (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1867), 74-75, 83-87; Klein, Union Pacific, 75; Best, Iron Horses to Promontory, 100; Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 154; and McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 134-36. An unopened bottle of wine for the excursion, apparently champagne, with a Union Pacific label was on display on April 10, 2008, and March 14, 2009, in the Union Pacific Railroad Museum at Council Bluffs, Iowa. A letter from Durant to H. M. Hoxie on October 12, 1866, (Series II, Box 12, file “Durant, Thomas C., Outgoing letters and telegrams (Letterpress Book), 1864-1867,”212, Leonard Collection) said Durant was shipping wine for the excursion and the president’s car and the directors’ car had left Pittsburgh that day. Hoxie was a straw man in the first contract for Union Pacific construction and was later identified as an assistant operations superintendent. Klein in Union Pacific, 75, said two trains left Omaha. Seymour in Incidents of a Trip through the Great Platte Valley to the Rocky Mountains, 83-84, said it was one train with two locomotives pulling.
under me [in summer 1865] and requested him to select about fifty or sixty of the best Indians.”

Just before sunrise on October 24, Dodge used the Indians that North had assembled.

I then gave Major North instructions to go into the camp with a war-whoop. They filed up and formed in the opening of the circle. Everyone in camp was asleep. The Indians went in with their war-whoop and immediately heads could be seen peeping out from every tent; they were all greatly excited, but I calmed them by telling them it was a friendly visit. The Indians gave them two or three of their dances around the great camp fire, and entertained them until breakfast time. I think everyone in the party gave the Indians presents, generally money so that they were all happy. After breakfast the Indians circulated around through the camps. A good many of the Pawnees could speak English, therefore had a good time and I think begged everything in sight.

Silas Seymour, the Union Pacific consulting engineer, said the second day of the excursion included a stop at a point overlooking the Pawnee encampment to watch a sham fight with other Indians pretending to be their arch enemies, the Sioux. “Perhaps no better illustration could have been given of the extremes of civilized and savage life,” Seymour said. “On one side was the track of the Union Pacific Railroad, upon which stood that great civilizer, the locomotive and train, while on the other hand, were grouped these uncouth savages.”

The excursion’s second night was spent at a camp thirty miles west of the 100th meridian at the end of the track, where a telegraph and printing office was established to communicate with the outside world. It was there apparently that the excursionists paused to adopt a resolution to congratulate mankind: “Resolved: That it is the deliberate opinion of this excursion party that our nation and the world have abundant cause to rejoice that the Union Pacific Railroad was projected and is in successful progress to

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164 Ibid.
165 Seymour, Incidents on a Trip through the Great Platte Valley to the Rocky Mountains, etc, 88.
166 Ibid, 92.
completion, and we now congratulate mankind at the success of this magnificent enterprise.”

Also at this point, some of the excursionists apparently went hunting. Dodge said Durant had asked him to arrange to have fifteen to twenty ponies available with Indian guides to go for buffalo if they could be found nearby. Seymour said they found buffalo and real Indians, too, who used the area as part of their hunting grounds. “A group that went off to hunt antelope and buffalo was confronted by Indians, who took their buffalo and let them go after they promised to stay out of Indian hunting grounds.”

On the last night of the excursion, October 26, the excursionists on their return to Omaha viewed a fifteen- to twenty-mile-long prairie grass fire set along the track for their amazement. An engineer’s report had said the prairie grass was seven to ten feet high in the bottomlands, and, when it caught fire, it was a grand and appalling sight.

Dodge said the Grand Excursion was a success. “The visit of the Indians pleased Mr. Durant very much and helped to make the excursion a great success,” he said. “There was a good many men of capital in the party, people who had been promoting the road, bankers who had been selling the bonds and some people from abroad whom Mr. Durant was trying to get interested in the enterprise.”

Historian Wesley S. Griswold suggested the excursion probably had a lasting effect on those who participated. “No one who took the trip ever forgot it, and the Union Pacific garnered an immense amount of publicity as a result.”

Historian David Haward Bain said the publicity came at the right time, just before the Union Pacific managers would need a fresh infusion of cash from company bond

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169 Seymour, Incidents on a Trip through the Great Platte Valley to the Rocky Mountains, etc., 100.
170 See Ibid., 107; Bain, Empire Express, 293; and Klein, Union Pacific, 76.
171 Ambrose, Nothing Like It in the World, 141.
sales for the push west when the construction season got underway in the following spring. Howard said Durant’s satisfaction with the excursion lasted for months. “In New York that week [the week after Christmas 1866] Durant purred over the hillocks of press clippings and correspondence that the Grand Excursion had generated. Sidney Dillon and Oakes Ames [Union Pacific principals] were due in that afternoon for a conference. The time was ripe to launch a public offering of Union Pacific’s first-mortgage bonds.”

Union Pacific officials conducted excursions regularly after they saw the Grand Excursion results. An excursion for 200 newspaper editors and correspondents was held in October 1867 with favorable results, according to historian James McCague.

So the second remarkable excursion on the great Pacific Railroad passed into history. As with the first one, the Union Pacific had left nothing undone to make it a memorable experience for its guests. Newspapers from as far away as London and Belgium had been represented in the party, but the great majority of the editors were from small-town journals all over Illinois and Indiana, giving the affair a kind of homey, grass-roots touch which the more pretentious junket of ’66 had lacked. As a result of it the farmer, the mechanic and laboring man, the small businessman and storekeeper of mid-America would get a fresh and intimate look at the West and the transcontinental railroad building across it such as they never had had before. The effects would be incalculable, but over the long haul quite considerable.

Dodge conducted a June 1867 excursion for Army General John A. Rawlins, Grant’s chief of staff, after he had been diagnosed with tuberculosis and ordered to spend time in the mountains. He traveled with two companies of cavalry that allowed Dodge to survey a hostile Indian area in force, influence the site selection for an Army post, and name a Wyoming railroad station site for Rawlins.

The Editorial Excursion

The most effective excursion for its publicity versus its cost probably was the five-day trip in July 1868 that transported twenty-nine prominent eastern reporters on a

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174 Bain, Empire Express, 293.
176 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 194-95.
plush tour of the Union Pacific works to milepost 710 in Wyoming. A special four-car train was used for the excursion with company managers assigned to look after the needs of the so-called knights of the quill. The group, led by Charles Dana of the New York Sun, formed themselves into the Rocky Mountain Press Club and assembled a ninety-two page scrapbook of club documents and clippings which were written as a result of the excursion.178

On July 21, 1868, the day that the excursion left for the West, the Omaha Herald categorized these journalists as coming from a class different from what Omaha residents had been used to seeing.

They are not of that class known as itinerants, who often appear here as members of the Press, denominated Bohemians, begging the privilege of publishing cheap letters in respectable journals to secure cheap transportation from localities in the East in which they cannot gain honorable subsistence, to fields of reckless adventure in the West. We are happy to welcome them on the contrary as responsible and intelligent representatives of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, and other journals.179

The Herald’s editor, Dr. George R. Miller, at a welcoming dinner July 20, acknowledged their importance, according to a Herald article. “He asked of the gentlemen present as representatives of organs that controlled and moulded public opinion, the favor to give to the world impartial opinions founded upon their practical observation of what they may learn of this young and growing State.”180 Historian David Haward Bain said the Omaha Herald was Thomas Durant’s main cheerleader.181

Periodical circulations of the time only occasionally reached 100,000 or more, with nine New York City publications listed at that level in what is touted as the first newspaper directory in the United States.182 The circulations at or above 100,000 were for weekly newspapers and five magazines. The largest circulation listed, for Pomeroy’s

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178 "Rocky Mountain Press Club Scrapbook,” unpublished, in Series II, Box 27, file “Rocky Mountain Press Club,” Leonard Collection, The scrapbook has unique lettering on its cover composed of tiny, mostly bearded men forming the letters. Hereafter, it will be referred to as the Leonard Scrapbook.
179 Ibid., 7.
180 Ibid.
181 Bain, Empire Express, 270.
Democrat, was 275,000. The largest magazine circulation was registered by Peterson’s Ladies’ Magazine published in Philadelphia. In all, with newspapers estimated to number 5,000 in the United States, 81 registered circulations of 20,000 or higher. Advertising agents, who numbered 20 in New York City in the Civil War era and 10 outside New York, compiled lists of publications that historian Frank Presbrey described as the agents’ “stock in trade, something to be guarded as carefully as the manufacturer’s secret formula.”\footnote{Frank Presbrey, The History and Development of Advertising (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1929), 263-64.}

Historian Hazel Dicken-Garcia reported a published assertion in 1868 that the press shaped public opinion with the information and debate it provided, and an assertion in 1869 that the press formed public opinion completely.\footnote{Hazel Dicken-Garcia, Journalistic Standards in Nineteenth-Century America (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 161-62}

The editor of a high-circulation newspaper held one of the most influential positions “know to modern society [1869]” for he had the public’s ear; taking ten or fifty thousand people “quietly aside in their brightest most impressionable mood refreshed by rest and before they have committed themselves” to the day’s business [most people read their daily newspaper at breakfast], he could “in a quarter hour give their minds a bias from which they may never recover.”\footnote{Ibid., 180.}

One of the journalists on the July 1868 excursion, Francis Wells, said the trip was arranged to stop lies circulating about the Union Pacific Railroad: the road never would be built; if built, it would be badly built; and, if built and built well, it would not generate sufficient revenue for profits. “It was Peaslee & Co. [L. F. Shattuck], Special Agents for the U.P.R.R. who wisely concluded that the men to stop this lying were the newspaper men,” Wells said in an August 31, 1868, article in the New York \textit{Evening Mail}.\footnote{Leonard Scrapbook, 22.}

Thomas B. Fox, writing in the August 3, 1868, issue of the \textit{Weekly Boston Transcript}, credited I. G. Hubs with the idea for the excursion. The Rocky Mountain Press Club scrapbook lists Hubs as being from the Philadelphia \textit{Inquirer} and as club president. “He was the first, I believe, to suggest the advisability of taking measures to have the press
see for itself and judge from its own observation precisely what the Union Pacific Road is,” Fox said. “His plan has been carried out; and whilst his colleague ([S. D.] Page, both representing Peaslee & Co.’s Advertising Agency) has been the executive officer on the journey, he has efficiently cooperated with him in the management of the trip.”  

V.

A LIST OF NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS CLAIMING MORE THAN 50,000 CIRCULATION EACH ISSUE, WITH ACTUAL AMOUNT OF CIRCULATION GIVEN IN EACH CASE, ACCORDING TO THE BEST ACCESSIBLE AUTHORITY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALABAMA.</th>
<th>NEW YORK.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile, Register, weekly.</td>
<td>New York, Christian Advocate, 30,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington, National Intelligencer, weekly.</td>
<td>New York, Chimney Corner, 35,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILLINOIS.</td>
<td>New York, Day Book, 35,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago, Times, daily.</td>
<td>New York, Dispatch, 36,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago, Tribune, daily.</td>
<td>New York, Examiner and Chronicle, 36,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago, Daily Herald, 36,000</td>
<td>New York, Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, 70,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago, North-west Christian Advocate, 36,000</td>
<td>New York, Frank Leslie's Illustrated Zettung, 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, Prairie Farmer, 35,000</td>
<td>New York, Harper's Banner, 70,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago, Western Rural, 34,000</td>
<td>New York, Harper's Weekly, 100,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago, Little Corporal, 30,000</td>
<td>New York, Hoam's and House, 45,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>XENTUCKY.</td>
<td>New York, Independent, 65,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louisville, Courier-Journal, weekly.</td>
<td>New York, Irish American, 34,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASSACHUSETTS.</td>
<td>New York, Literary Almanac, 9,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Journal, daily.</td>
<td>New York, Moore's Rural New Yorker, 80,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Herald, daily.</td>
<td>New York, Observer, 35,000</td>
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<td>Boston, Congregationalist.</td>
<td>New York, Scientific American, 35,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Cultivator, 37,000</td>
<td>New York, Soldiers' Friend, monthly, 41,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Every Saturday.</td>
<td>New York, Sunday Mercury, 60,000</td>
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<td>Boston, Pilot, 30,000</td>
<td>New York, Weekly, 200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Watchman and Reflector, 30,000</td>
<td>New York, American Agriculturist, 150,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Waverly Magazine, 30,000</td>
<td>New York, American Phrenological Journal, 30,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Youth's Companion, 40,000</td>
<td>New York, Demorest's Illustrated Monthly, 50,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Atlantic Monthly, 50,000</td>
<td>New York, Frank Leslie's Budget of Fun, 25,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Ballou's Monthly Magazine, 50,000</td>
<td>New York, Frank Leslie's Ladies Magazine, 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston, Missionary Herald, 75,000</td>
<td>New York, Harper's Monthly Magazine, 125,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Our Young Folks, 75,000</td>
<td>New York, Pleasant House, 24,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONTANA.</td>
<td>New York, Teachers and American Educational Monthly, 98,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detroit, Advertiser and Tribune, weekly.</td>
<td>OHIO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Brunswick, Rural American, 20,000</td>
<td>Cincinnati, Enquirer, weekly, 70,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEW JERSEY.</td>
<td>Cincinnati, Gazette, weekly, 60,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York, Christian Advocate, 30,000</td>
<td>Cincinnati, Times, weekly, 70,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York, Western Christian Advocate, 40,000</td>
<td>Cincinnati, Ladies' Repository, 35,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York, Herald, daily, 85,000</td>
<td>Toledo, Blade, weekly, 75,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York, News, daily, 49,000</td>
<td>PENNSYLVANIA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, Statesman, daily, 41,500</td>
<td>Philadelphia, Public Ledger, 62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, States-Telegram, weekly, 39,000</td>
<td>Philadelphia, Saturday Evening Post, 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, States-Telegram, Sunday, 40,000</td>
<td>Philadelphia, Saturday Night, 111,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, Sun, daily, 47,000</td>
<td>Philadelphia, Sunday Mirror, 24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, Times, daily, 38,000</td>
<td>Philadelphia, Artisans Home Magazine, 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, Tribune, daily, 48,000</td>
<td>Philadelphia, Godfrey's Lady's Book, 105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, World, daily, 150,000</td>
<td>Philadelphia, Journal of the Farm, 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, World, weekly, 35,000</td>
<td>Philadelphia, Our School Day Visitor, 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, Weekly, 75,000</td>
<td>Philadelphia, People's Journal, 55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, Belief in C. Journal, 35,000</td>
<td>Philadelphia, Peterson's Ladies' Mag, 140,000</td>
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</table>

Figure 2: Periodical Circulation, 1869.

W. W. Nevin, writing in the August 8, 1868, issue of the Philadelphia Press, described the excursionists. “The party, which is limited to thirty-five, will consist of prominent journalists from the representative journals of the Northeast, together with a member or so from the leading banking houses interested in the disposition of bonds of the Union Pacific Railroad Company – Messrs. De Haven and Painter, I believe, representing Philadelphia.”  

The special train, traveling an average of thirty-four miles an hour for the trip and going fifty-five miles an hour for one portion, included two Pullman palace cars, at least one of them with a parlor organ. “The journey is under the immediate superintendence of Mr. S. D. Page, who has left nothing undone to promote the comfort and enjoyment of the guests of the Union Pacific Railroad corporation,” said Fox in a July 21, 1868, article in the Boston Transcript. “Omaha – we began there that survey of the great work which is to unite ocean to ocean, and the east to the west, with iron bands, and annihilate so much space and time. In the way of speed, ease, courtesy and fair living, we have found nothing to complain of.”

E. C. Spruhan of the New York Times also said the journalists’ needs were being met, apparently lavishly. “[Union Pacific employees] have done their best for the party, sparing no expense to make the trip a pleasant and agreeable one.”

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188 Ibid, 57. Painter is most likely Uriah Painter, or U. H. Painter, whose name is sprinkled throughout Union Pacific history. He was a reporter in Washington, D. C., for the Philadelphia Inquirer, according to congressional testimony of Oakes Ames (Select Committee to Investigate the Alleged Credit Mobilier Bribery, Credit Mobilier Investigation, House Report 77, 42nd Cong., 3rd sess., February 18, 1873, 31). He was among the people, including 11 members of Congress, who received no-cost Credit Mobilier stock in late 1867 and early 1868, according to Crawford in The Credit Mobilier of America, 164. The late 1867-early 1868 alleged bribery of members of Congress was the reason for the congressional investigation, headed by U. S. Representative Luke Poland of Vermont, into what was dubbed the Credit Mobilier Scandal. Painter was one of a Washington press corps that numbered 60 in 1860 and 120 in 1870, according to Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Press Gang: Newspapers and Politics, 1865-1878 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 80-81. Summers, on 110 and 112, said that Painter, also writing for the New York Sun, conducted the equivalent of an extortion racket as a reporter, who would launch investigations and report revelations and then collect money for silence.

189 See Francis Wells, New York Evening Mail, August 31, 1868, Leonard Scrapbook, 22; and J. E. Clark, New York Evening Post, August 14, 1868, Leonard Scrapbook, 16.

190 Leonard Scrapbook, 22


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Union Pacific executives got the results they wanted from the excursion, according to the press club scrapbook of newspaper clippings. “Has the road been poorly built as a speculation, and to obtain the grants of land and money, as has been often insinuated or roundly asserted by its enemies and those ignorant of the truth?” asked Fox in a August 4, 1868, article in the Transcript. “No, most emphatically no.”192

C. R. Bliss, in an article published August 20, 1868, in the Boston Congregationalist & Recorder, concluded a series of articles he wrote about the excursion with a declaration: “It would be a violence to the truth to deny that the road is what its friends declare it to be – a thoroughly built, substantial, superior road.”193

Another journalist, E. Fulton, suggested nefarious motives for those who criticized the Union Pacific.

It is proper to say just here that the rumors which have been put afloat at the East that the company is a party of speculators, putting down a rude and poorly constructed road that will be useless, or nearly so, when completed, is a falsehood that could only have been deliberately concocted and put in circulation for purposes that would scarcely bear examination. The road is a good one, well and solidly laid, with heavy rail and twenty-six hundred cross-ties to the mile, over which the cars travel with remarkable smoothness and the equipments, stations and work shops of which all show that it is being built for use and not for speculation.194

The excursion train’s speed on the return trip to Omaha, according to Pittsburgh reporter J. C. Purdy, provided convincing evidence that the Union Pacific road was well-built.

The Union Pacific Railroad is an enterprise of such audacity and greatness, involving in its success such inconceivable and far reaching results, and in its failure such disaster and discouragement that of course every step of its progress has been noted, watched and criticized. Its daring has produced skepticism, and the swift triumphs which have overcome the great obstacles have led to the settled conviction in many minds that work done at this rate could not be well done, and that the road which could leap forward at a speed of three miles a day must be a road that would need making over again in a year or two, and over which, even at its best estate, trains could pass only with the utmost caution, and at the

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192 Ibid., 35.
193 Ibid., 48-49.
194 Ibid., 75, Baltimore American, July 29, 1868.
slowest speed. Our trip from Benton [Wyoming] to Omaha disproved this later croak, and the observation of every intelligent man who has passed over the road must have settled in his mind the fact that the road is a first class one, and one sure of ultimate and permanent success.195

It wasn’t just the track and buildings that were worthy of praise. The railroad employees, too, were exceptional. “In no particular is there more uniformity than in the good character and fine appearance of the workmen employed, from Omaha out to the end of the track,” said A. Fleming in an August 25, 1868, article in the Pittsburgh Commercial. “They are sober, active and intelligent looking men, and seem to be far above the average in the different departments, compared with the same on almost any railroad.”196

Nevin, of the Philadelphia Press, made note of the employees’ quality, too. “Neither pains nor money have been spared to secure in every position the services of the best men.”197

According to the Rocky Mountain Press Club Scrapbook’s newspaper clippings, the men running the Union Pacific were daring, courageous, and brilliant. There were faithful and persistent, too, and they deserved anything they got in profits as payment for their extraordinary efforts, said James Redpath, writing in the Boston Daily Advertiser.

I concede that the Union Pacific Railroad is the greatest wonder of America. There has been nothing more marvelous or more admirable, but in boldness of conception and brilliancy of execution, since the Great Eastern steamed away from Ireland with the cable in her hold and landed it in safety at Heart’s Content [an apparent reference to the trans-Atlantic cable connected in 1866]. People talk of it as a selfish speculation and of course it is, and ought to be; for men who have dared to carry through so magnificent an enterprise should receive a magnificent reward.198

196 Ibid., 79.
198 Leonard Scrapbook, 39, James Redpath, Boston Daily Advertiser, August 8, 1868.
Fulton at the Baltimore *American* agreed that the Union Pacific directors were entitled to reward, even if they got through the Rocky Mountains much easier than anyone thought possible.\(^{199}\)

The men, therefore, who had the courage and the faith to take hold of this grand enterprise, and the pluck and persistence to push it to such an early accomplishment, are deserving not only of praise, but of the more substantial rewards of a great success. If the difficulties that lay in the way have disappeared before their vigorous attack more easily and more quickly than was supposed at all possible, none ought to begrudge them the advantages they have gained. They took the risk when more timid men halted and debated and the American people will be the last to sympathize with those who attempt to belittle their work or magnify their profits.\(^{200}\)

Fleming, in an August 25, 1868, article, said not only that the Union Pacific directors were entitled to get richer, but they were the kind of men who would know how to handle more wealth.

This is not the place to discuss the propriety of the action of this Government in establishing a precedent in lavishing those extraordinary subsidies on the Union Pacific Railroad Company, by which its corporation has been so enormously enriched. These donations must be regarded as a prize offered to any body of men who had the capability to carry such a stupendous undertaking to successful termination.

It is sufficient to know that without some most liberal offer on the part of the Government, the road would not have been built for at least a century to come, and the persons who had the courage to undertake to win this prize are fully entitled to reap its reward.

\(^{199}\) Dodge in “Autobiography,” 409-10 said he discovered a relatively easy pathway, the Lone Tree Pass, through the Laramie Mountains or Black Hills, the first range of the Rocky Mountains, while being pursued by Crow Indians on September 22, 1865. McCague, in *Moguls and Iron Men*, 94, said Dodge was leading his men through the area after an indecisive campaign against the Sioux. Durant knew that the pass, later named Evans Pass for one of Dodge’s field engineers, was feasible by October 1, 1866, according to Dodge’s “Autobiography,” 580. The Union Pacific Board of Directors adopted the Lone Tree line, with Sherman’s Summit at its pinnacle, in resolutions dated November, 15, 1866, but several of them — Cornelius Bushnell, Oakes Ames, and John B. Alley — testified before the Wilson Committee, 28, 30, 550, and 556-67, that Union Pacific board members were unaware of the easy path through the Rockies when they awarded a bloated contract in August 1867 to one of the company’s associates, Oakes Ames, to build through the section.

The directors of this great company cannot be parsimonious and grasping with the vast wealth committed to their trust – they will not know how. They will be magnanimous towards the people through whose representatives they have obtained the generous gifts, and will make ample return for the favor.\footnote{Ibid., 81, A. Fleming, Pittsburgh Commercial, August 25, 1868.}

The Union Pacific’s leaders had the business acumen, too, to know how to raise funds to finish their enterprise, according to Nevin of the Philadelphia \textit{Press}.

No enterprise, excepting perhaps the United States securities under the management of Jay Cooke, has been so vigorously, so intelligently, so thoroughly advertised. An able, experienced, and active advertising company was employed to undertake this work, and it in turn secured the best facilities of the pen and press to push its enterprise. The bonds were put upon the country systematically and by a concerted movement, nearly every newspaper in the land displaying its column advertisement, and the consequence is they now sell above par, and are sought after by many in preference to Government securities.\footnote{Ibid., 59, W. W. Nevin, Philadelphia \textit{Press}, August 4, 1868.}

The clippings in the press club scrapbook were uniformly laudatory of the railroad company and its directors and employees. That is not surprising, perhaps, because the scrapbook, according to its introduction, was assembled for presentation to the excursion superintendent, S. D. Page, and Durant. Whether clippings derogatory to the railroad and its officials were deleted from the nearly ninety pages of clippings cannot be determined from the scrapbook.

Two less-than-laudatory clips were included, but neither found fault with the railroad. Both were written by E. C. Spruhan of the New York \textit{Times}. On August 2, 1868, he complained that Omaha did not have a first-class hotel, but he said the Union Pacific Railroad was not to blame.\footnote{Ibid., 18.} In the other clipping, he described the new town of Laramie, Wyoming. He joined three other excursionists on the lead locomotive’s
cowcatcher for a better view of the country on the fifty-six-mile ride from Cheyenne to Laramie.204

Fifteen minutes brought us to Laramie, a city of canvas, with a population of perhaps two or three thousand, composed for the most part of thieves, gamblers and vagabonds, of every description and of both sexes. We spent an hour seeing the place, under charge of one of the influential citizens. Gambling, dancing, drinking and debauchery of the most outrageous kind stare you in the face on every side. We entered one of those temples to which the votaries of pleasure are accustomed to worship, and the sight was one to shock, if not disgust, the most abandoned. The hall is constructed both roof and sides, of canvas, with a roughly boarded floor, and is perhaps one hundred and fifty feet in length by fifty wide, with an inner temple devoted to what vile purposes I dare not even allow myself to imagine. On the right as we enter is the bar, presided over by a fellow with the most fiendish countenance I ever looked upon. All around the sides are placed tables, at which anxious men, and in some cases no less anxious beings of the other sex, are risking various sums of money on the turn of a wheel or the face of a card, while on the open space in the centre are big burly men, some with hats on, some without, some coatless – aye, some even shirtless – whirling round and round in some wild dance, with painted wrecks of what once were women, clinging to them with some shallow semblance of affection that carries a leprosy in its every manifestation. Here at Laramie every man goes armed to the teeth, with Bowie knives and revolvers, not only at night, but in the broad daylight also; and not the men only, but those wretched women have adopted the custom of the country in this respect as in others. One gorgeously gotten-up nymph I noted in the afternoon promenading the principal street of the place, with a trail of several yards of rich blue silk, raising a terrible dust and creating, I have no doubt quite a sensation – in her belt was conspicuously displayed a finely mounted Smith and Wesson, which I presume was intended no less for use than ornament. This is Laramie as I found it, but in time it will slough off this vile scum and become a fit habitation for Christian men and women.205

The excursionists witnessed a track-laying demonstration on July 23, at milepost 710, and returned to Omaha on July 25.206

204 Ibid., 19, E. C. Spruhan, New York Times, August 10, 1868. Spruhan said the others on the cowcatcher were Charles Dana of the New York Sun, James Redpath of the Boston Advertiser, and Frank Wells of the Philadelphia Bulletin.
205 Ibid. 20, E. C. Spruhan, New York Times, August 10, 1868
206 Ibid., 2.
Reporters traveling to the end of the line were common in the Union Pacific construction. Samuel Reed, a Union Pacific division superintendent, saw reporters on the line in November 1867 and was not impressed, according to historian Maury Klein, who quoted Reed. “‘Such a set of ninnies,’ he wrote contemptuously, ‘I never saw on the plains.’”207

In the summer of 1868, excursionists, including reporters, were a bother to the men laying the track, reported historian Wesley S. Griswold, but the excursions were allowed in the interests of publicity.208 Historian David Haward Bain also reported the nuisance of excursionists in that summer of 1868.

“In that empty unfriendly terrain, their only problems seemed to be gawkers. There was an endless parade of excursion trains filled with curious newspapermen, politicians, Army brass, ministers, educators – their engines chuffing up slowly behind the laborers’ backs as if to chide them on, well-dressed Easterners stepping out of the cars to watch the sweat-glistened Irishmen work at a pace a little quicker than comfortable in order to impress the dignitaries.”209

There was a tremendous surge of building in 1868. The Central Pacific’s workers put down 363 miles of track that season and the Union Pacific crews built 425 miles. The railroads’ leaders got as far as they did and could feel some satisfaction with their progress because of the help of many others, including the laborers who performed the tough job of laying track.

207 Klein, Union Pacific, 136.
209 Bain, Empire Express, 528.
Figure 3: The cover of the July 1868 Editorial Excursion Scrapbook.

Source: Papers of Levi O. Leonard, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa.
Chapter 4: All Aboard

The men who organized the building of the first transcontinental railroad needed the help of many others to succeed. They needed men to do the grading, cutting and filling that prepared a foundation for the tracks. They needed workers, too, to bore tunnels and lay the track, and men to build cars and operate and maintain the trains. The organizers also needed people other than those who did the manual labor; politicians and investors to provide the money, particularly a steady and reliable flow of funds from federal bonds as they completed portions of the track.

To get the help they needed, the organizers realized, apparently from the beginning, that good public relations was essential, and that meant they needed correspondents, reporters, and writers who could create the words necessary to build and maintain positive company images. They needed journalists to keep quiet the information that might damage company images and emphasize the information that would confirm or enhance those images. Positive images helped lead men to apply to work for the companies; allowed politicians to support their enterprises with public funds and land; and convinced investors that putting money into company-backed bonds was a prudent decision.

For the manual workers who built the western portion of the transcontinental, many of the public-relations issues were associated with a California labor shortage and a decision in early 1865 to meet that shortage by using Chinese workers, who eventually did most of the constructing. Historian James McCague described a cool relationship

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210 George Thomas Clark, *Leland Stanford: War Governor of California: Railroad Builder and Founder of Stanford University* (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1931), 213-16. Clark said the Central Pacific first used Chinese workers about January 1865 and, within six months, had 2,000 to 3,000 Chinese on company payrolls. He said the California labor shortage was so pressing that E. B. Crocker, in an April 12, 1865, letter to U.S. Sen. Cornelius Cole, mentioned that he [Crocker] at one time thought it would be a good idea to transport 5,000 Confederate prisoners to California and have them work on building the Central Pacific road, “but I suppose they will all be let loose now.” James McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men: The Story of the First Transcontinental Railroad* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 110, said that the Central Pacific in December 1865 employed 7,000 Chinese workers and 2,500 white men, mostly Irish. Wesley S. Griswold, *A Work of Giants: Building the First Transcontinental Railroad* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), 196, said nearly 14,000 Chinese were working for the Central Pacific in June 1867, but George Kraus, *High Road to Promontory Point: Building the Central Pacific Across the High Sierra* (Palo Alto, California: American West Publishing, 1969), 160, said that, in the spring of 1867, only 13,500
between the Central Pacific leaders and the California laborers available when the railroad began building in 1863.

California labor, to be sure, never had evinced much more than a monumental indifference toward the work on the Pacific Railroad. All the same, spurred by sudden misgivings for the future and incited by an indignant San Francisco press, leaders began to raise a passionate hullabaloo over this unfair competition by “yellow labor.” Working-class people who had been able to shrug off the allegations of “Dutch Flat humbug” [the allegation that the Central Pacific organizers intended to build only to Dutch Flat] now were presented with an issue that seemed bound up directly with their own bread and butter, and all the railroad’s old opponents were delighted.

Leland Stanford’s public statements and reports to stockholders during this period show that the company was stung. For months they were loaded with arguments and apologies aimed at justifying the Central Pacific’s Chinese. Without them, Stanford declared over and over again, the company’s construction deadline could not be met. It was probably true, but it meant nothing to the agitators. The thing grew quickly into a cause célèbre and lasted a long, long time.

For years to come, the “yellow peril” would stalk California like a chain-clanking, doom-croaking ghost in a haunted house. The Central Pacific’s public image would be blackened even more than it was already; its successor, the Southern Pacific, would suffer touchy relations with organized labor far into the twentieth century for its parent’s old, alleged sin of having beaten good California citizens to their knees with cheap imported Chinese.211

Working on the Central Pacific line paid a Chinese laborer $30 a month when, elsewhere in California, they were getting $4 to $8 a month, according to historian Robert

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men were working for the Central Pacific. Robert West Howard, *The Great Iron Trail: The Story of the First Transcontinental Railroad* (New York: Putnam, 1962), 227, said that in the spring of 1865 for every 1,000 white workers signed up to work building the Central Pacific line, only 100 were still working a week later as news spread of Nevada silver strikes. McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 280, said it took 2,000 free railroad rides for white workers to the end of the Central Pacific track to get 100 to stay and work on the line because of the lure of striking it rich with silver prospecting. No evidence was found that Central Pacific leaders attempted to downplay the silver strikes or emphasize those who did not get rich in silver prospecting. The imported Chinese workers, apparently arranged for with Chinese contractors, proved more than capable of building the road and solved the labor shortage problem, at least for the time being.211 McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 106. The 1860 United States Census listed five Asiatic males of unknown age, all in California. The 1870 census listed 48,825 males born in China in California; 3,327 in Oregon; 3,146 in Nevada; and 98 in Alabama.
West Howard. The monthly pay had been raised to $35 by June 1867, when there was a strike on the line by Chinese laborers, who demanded $45 a month and a reduction in daily work hours from eleven to ten. Mark Hopkins, the Central Pacific treasurer, said the strike, which lasted only a week, had been instigated by Chinese gamblers and opium traders who were prohibited from Central Pacific work sites. The gamblers and opium dealers apparently were prohibited by Construction Superintendent James Harvey Strobridge, who also hated liquor among the men.

By the fall of 1867 and in January 1868, Central Pacific leaders reached the conclusion that a labor glut was the solution to continuing manpower problems, and their subsequent discussion included suggestions that they get 100,000 to 500,000 more Chinese immigrants into California. Collis P. Huntington, the Central Pacific vice president based in New York City, had another suggestion as he fretted over what he said was a labor surplus in the East in January 1868. He detailed plans to tap the eastern surplus, going so far as to plant a Central Pacific agent among the Union Pacific’s workers to steal labor from the rival company.

Now this surplus of Labor on this side will give the Union Co. an immense advantage over us, as they have an arrangement with the “Chicago and Northwest Road” to take out labor, and material at a mere nominal price from Chicago to Omaha. Now to overcome this in part would it not be well to have some well written short articles published in

213 Hopkins to Collis P. Huntington, June, 28, 1867, Series I, Box 1, in the Collis Potter Huntington Papers in the Special Collections Research Center at Syracuse University Library, hereafter referred to as the Huntington Papers. Files in the collection are arranged chronologically by months. Hopkins said in the letter that Central Pacific leaders were looking into the possibility of getting 5,000 freedmen because they wanted a labor glut to quell unrest. In a March 16, 1868, Hopkins letter to Huntington, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers., Hopkins said the Central Pacific paid machinists and carpenters $4 a day; locomotive engineers were paid $100 to $125 a month; firemen got $75 to $80 a month; wood choppers, who cut down trees for ties, got $40 a month and board; and foremen on the work got $60 to $100 a month, depending on their merit.
214 Hopkins to Huntington, July 1, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
216 E. B. Crock to Huntington, September 12, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers. Crock said the Central Pacific leaders in California wanted 100,000 more Chinese imported to bring down the price of labor. Huntington liked the idea of more Chinese and told Hopkins it should be 500,000 in an October 3, 1867, letter, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers. “It would be all the better for us and the state if there should be a half million come over in 1868.”
the Sac.[ramento] Union, Bulletin and Alta as Editorial that living was very very cheap, and wages high in Cal & c &c &c then send them to me and I would have them copied in the papers on this side. If this is done, it wants to be done soon. I think it would send many laborers to Cal., as fare is very cheap. Some have gone as low as $25 in stowage and then if we could find just the man (which would be very difficult) to go over on the line of the Union Road, and work amongst their men and send them over to our road. The right man could do that and never be found out. By all I can learn they have a man that can lay more track in a day than any other man in the United States.  

Huntington, apparently impatient with his associates carrying out his suggestion to have articles published in California for reprint in New York City papers, went ahead on his own and told associate Charles Crocker about it in late January 1868.

“I am having some articles written for the papers here showing the great demand for common and skilled labor in California and as labor is very plenty here and the fare to California is so very cheap I am disposed to think that there will be a very large emigration to California this coming spring and summer.”

Around that time, Hopkins at the Sacramento, California, company headquarters reported that they were getting more out of the workers they already had, at least for a while in December 1867. The Sierra Nevada Summit Tunnel was finished on the first of the month.

At last we have reached the summit, are on the down grade and we rejoice. All work freer and with more spirit. Even the Chinamen partake of our joy. I believe they do five or ten percent more work per day now that we are through the granite rock work and can trot along toward Salt Lake instead of remaining in each camp so long that they become sick and tired of it.

That spring, though, the Chinese laborers were complaining that, among other issues, they had to move camps so often, and it took so much time to tear down and set

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217 Huntington to E. B. Crocker, January 13, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
218 Huntington to Charles Crocker, January 26, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers. Charles Crocker, E. B. Crocker’s brother, was in charge of constructing the Central Pacific.
219 Hopkins to Huntington, December 1, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
up camps that they were not making enough money. E.B. Crocker, the Central Pacific attorney, told Huntington of problems with the Chinese in a June 9, 1868, letter.

I also inclose a paper we have got up and which is signed and given to the Chinamen. We found a few weeks ago that they were rapidly quitting the work and found that they complained that they could not make anything as it took them so much of their time to move camps and the other points covered by the paper and to satisfy them these papers were got up with the two big golden seals and it has apparently settled the difficulty. Worthless white men have been stuffing them with stories that E. of Truckee [in Nevada] the whole country was filled with Indians 10 ft. high who eat Chinamen and with big snakes 100 ft. long who swallow men whole. To counteract this we got up teams and had them pick out 15 or 20 men and we sent good men along with them to show them 100 or 200 miles of the country where the road was to be built. They have not returned yet, but we have heard from them and that the Chinamen were well satisfied. The fact is there are no Indians on the line until we reach Winnemucca, and there they are harmless like the Piutes on the Truckee and the Chinese despise them. We have a ticklish people to deal with but manage them right and they are the best laborers in the world. The white men we get on our work here are the most worthless men I ever saw.

Smallpox broke out among Central Pacific track-layers in January 1869 as the force worked at milepost 476, three miles east of the North Fork of the Humboldt River in Nevada, approaching Utah.

“Our track laying force were seized with a small pox [sic] panic the other day and became demoralized to a great extent,” Crocker reported to Huntington in a January 18, 1869, letter. “No real cause for apprehension, but you can’t reason with such men. No new cases have broken out lately, so we hope it will soon pass over.”

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220 Gerald M. Best, Iron Horses to Promontory (San Marino, California: Golden West Books, 1969), 26, said Central Pacific tracks reached Reno May 1 and Wadsworth, thirty-five miles east of Reno, on July 9. A seven-mile gap in the line between the Summit Tunnel and Strongs Canyon at the head of Cold Stream was closed in early June, according to Howard, The Great Iron Trail, 291; and Crocker told Huntington the gap was closed in a letter on, June 23, 1868, in Series I, Box 2, of the Huntington Papers. Closing the gap, which the Central Pacific leaders tried to keep a secret, speeded up delivery of materials to the end of the track in Nevada.

221 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, June 9, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.

222 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, January 18, 1869, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
Two days later, the smallpox intelligence was on its way to Union Pacific Chief Engineer Grenville Dodge, developer/overseer of a Union spy network in the Civil War and, apparently, of a Union Pacific network to gather information on the Central Pacific.

“[Central Pacific] Track laying force about seventy-five or eighty men,” said a letter to Dodge from L. F. Bent in Salt Lake City, quoting from a report of a special messenger at the end of the Central Pacific track. “They are short of men on account of small pox [sic] at end of track. Their usual track laying force about 120 men as near as I could ascertain, but small pox [sic] being very bad, I do not think they can add to their present force for some time.”

By the end of the month, however, the smallpox problem was lessening, according to Hopkins. “The Small Pox [sic] is abating at the end of the track – only one new case there last week,” he said in a January 31, 1869, letter to Huntington. “Nearly all died who went into the pest cars and those who did not die increased the panic among the men more than those who died and ‘told no tales’.”

**Working on the Union Pacific Railroad**

On the Union Pacific side, the number of workers constructing the line never reached the Central Pacific’s, but, by 1868, the size of its workforce was approaching it with 10,000 graders and track-layers using 10,000 draft animals. Union Pacific workers were paid about $3 a day and those on the track-laying crews were charged $20 a month for board. Union Pacific managers had problems, like those on the Central Pacific, with workers leaving the line to seek their fortunes through prospecting, but it was a double-edged sword, according to Operations Superintendent Webster Snyder.

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223 L. F. Bent to Grenville Dodge, January 20, 1869, Box 66, Vol. 156, File 2 (Jan. 11-20, 1869) Grenville Mellen Dodge Papers at the State Historical Society of Iowa Library in Des Moines, hereafter referred to as the Dodge Papers. The letter said the end of the Central Pacific track was three miles east of the north fork of the Humboldt River, 476 miles east of Sacramento and thirty-three miles west of Humboldt Wells.

224 Hopkins to Huntington, January 31, 1869, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.

225 MCCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 244.

226 Charles Edgar Ames, *Pioneering the Union Pacific: A Reappraisal of the Builders of the Railroad* (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft Meredith Corporation, 1969), 124. Ames said laborers on the Union Pacific track-laying crews got $2.50 a day, spikers got $3 a day, and ironmen got $3.50 to $4 a day. Foremen were paid $125 a month.
“The Sweet Water mines near Fort Bridger are lately attracting too much attention [and] will I fear effect [sic] the labor question seriously in construction and perhaps in operating,” he said in a January 30, 1868, letter to Dodge. “It will however help as much in passenger earnings.”

Other than an April or May 1869 kidnapping of Union Pacific vice president Thomas Durant by unpaid Wyoming woodcutters and some upheaval near the completion of the transcontinental line over unpaid wages generally, Union Pacific workers apparently did not cause much trouble in the construction. A telegram from Union Pacific construction engineer Samuel Reed to Durant on June 6, 1868, however, mentions a workers’ strike near Green River in western Wyoming. Reed appears ready to handle the situation.

“Men on strike at Green River. Have asked Gen Augur [Major General Christopher Colon Augur, then commanding the Army’s Department of the Platte] to send troops and ordered Carmichael [a contractor] to discharge the mutineers. Can send men from here [the telegram was sent from Salt Lake City] to do the work.”

The November 3, 1868, presidential election between Republican U.S. Grant and Democrat Horatio Seymour, and the ability of Union Pacific workers, who were largely Irish, to vote in that election, was the subject of the only relatively long letter written by Durant in the records examined. The letter to Superintendent Snyder was unusual for Durant, whose correspondence with subordinates usually was through telegrams and took

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228 For evidence of an overall upheaval near the end of construction, see Snyder to Durant, March 31, 1869, Series II, Box 29, file “Snyder, Webster, 1868-1869,” in the Levi O. Leonard Collection, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa, hereafter referred to as the Leonard Collection, in which Snyder told Durant that a half million dollars was needed for payrolls “to float;” telegram, Samuel Reed to Durant, April 9, 1869, Series II, Box 26, file “Reed, Samuel Benedict – 1869,” Leonard Collection, in which Reed said, “Work at every point on line will be stopped unless we have funds to pay men. Cannot control them until we can send off turbulent men [apparently by paying the turbulent men what they were owed in full];” and two telegrams, Reed to Durant, April 12, 1869, Series II, Box 26, file “Reed, Samuel Benedict – 1869,” Leonard Collection. Reed in the April 12 telegrams said he wanted $1 million and that men at tunnel number three were on strike and half the men at the head of Echo Canyon quit, apparently for lack of pay. “Promontory force will work until fifteenth,” Reed said. “On that day I expect a general strike on all grading unless funds are on hand.”

229 Telegram, Reed to Durant, June 6, 1868, Series II, Box 26, file “Reed, Samuel Benedict – June – December 1868,” Leonard Collection.
the form of clipped language and directives. In this letter, Durant eventually reached his clipped directive style, but he prefaced that with his reasoning for action at the end of the line in a preventative public-relations move.

I am informed that some of our employees are dissatisfied because there are to be no precincts for holding elections in Nebraska west of North Platte although heretofore with less population there have been several and that for a distance of some two hundred and fifty miles they are to have no opportunity to vote unless they go to North Platte the nearest precinct.

As this section of our work is in the Indian district where it is difficult to keep our employees many of whom are ready to take advantage of the slightest excuse to bring about a feeling of dissatisfaction I think it is a matter of policy on the part of the company and advisable to meet the case by furnishing all of our men who desire free transportation to North Platte in order that they may register their names and also on the day of election that those who wish may exercise their full privilege. Probably when the opportunity is given them many will not avail themselves of it otherwise would be dissatisfied. In other cases, it will have the tendency to keep them on the line for a time. Take care however that no partiality is shown any party and by all means keep the co. out of politics. You will act in accordance with the above suggestions.²³⁰

Political Relations: Lobbying and Bribery

Both the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific engaged in extensive political lobbying and bribery on a national level to get what they felt they had to have to be successful. They also named locomotives after the people who could help them, and they liberally gave free passes to Congress members and federal officials. They probably had to do it, said historian Maury Klein.

The birth of the Union Pacific as a mixed enterprise [a private company subsidized by the government] ensured that for decades to come it would remain a creature of politics. All railroads had to deal in politics at the state and local level, but only the Union Pacific and, to a lesser extent, the Central Pacific, was at the mercy of Congress. This dependence subjected the road to all the whims and passions, the vagaries and shifts in mood of public opinion, the pressures and venality that gave

²³⁰ Durant [at Fort Sanders] to Webster Snyder, September 29, 1868, Series II, Box 29, file “Snyder, Webster, August 1868-1869,” Leonard Collection.
national politics so distinctive a flavor. It forced the company into the lobbying business not simply to get what it wanted but to protect itself from those who used congress to attack the road for their own purposes.\textsuperscript{231}

Railroad lobbyists preceded the transcontinental project by more than a decade. George W. Billings, a former agent of the Cairo City and Canal Co., a town-promotion company in Illinois, was employed in the lobbying business in the early 1850s by the Illinois Central Railroad.\textsuperscript{232} In 1861, Henry Bennett worked as chief lobbyist for the Leavenworth, Pawnee & Western Railroad, according to historian David Haward Bain, who described Bennett as a veteran lobbyist.\textsuperscript{233}

William Chandler and Joseph B. Stewart were identified as Washington lobbyists for the Union Pacific Railroad,\textsuperscript{234} and former Brigadier General Richard H. Franchot and former General Thomas Ewing were identified as Washington lobbyists for the Central Pacific Railroad.\textsuperscript{235} Evidence that the lobbyists were important to the companies included an agreement by Central Pacific officials to pay Franchot $20,000 a year to work for the company in Washington, twice what the Central Pacific associates paid

\textsuperscript{234} Chandler was named at various points in the materials reviewed but was named specifically as a Washington lobbyist for the Union Pacific by Klein, \textit{Union Pacific}, 217. Stewart was an attorney to whom Durant gave $380,000 for arrangements that led to passage of the 1864 amendment to the Pacific Railroad Act. See Klein, \textit{Union Pacific}, 28; and Ames, \textit{Pioneering the Union Pacific}, 27-28. Also, Stewart to Durant, July 7, 1867, Series II, Box 29, file “Stewart, Joseph B.,” Leonard Collection, and House Select Committee No. 2, \textit{House Report 78, Affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad Company}, 42\textsuperscript{nd} Cong., 3\textsuperscript{rd} sess, February 20, 1873, 173. The committee chairman was Jeremiah M. Wilson of Indiana, and the committee’s report will be referred to hereafter as the Wilson Committee Report. In his July 7, 1867, letter to Durant, Stewart said he got $380,000 from Durant in 1864. The letter may have been provided as documentation for Durant seeking Union Pacific company reimbursement for $435,754 he said he had spent in arranging for the 1864 Pacific Railroad Act amendment.
\textsuperscript{235} Stephen E. Ambrose, \textit{Nothing Like It in the World: The Men Who Built the Transcontinental Railroad, 1863-1869} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 193, identified Franchot as an ex-congressman and said he was probably the first paid railroad lobbyist when he was hired in 1866. Ewing is identified in letters Huntington wrote to his associates (see Huntington to E. B. Crocker, May 13, 1868, and Huntington to Hopkins, June 8, 1868, both in Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers) about attempts to get the federal Interior Department to approve a Central Pacific proposed line in Utah.
themselves, according to historian Wesley S. Griswold. Huntington told Hopkins he offered Franchot considerably more to obtain an Interior Department approval in May 1868 for the proposed line in Utah. “I told Ewing that if he would get the location within three weeks that I would give him $10,000 Cash and $20,000 Stock which I think will bring the location this week.” Ewing, according to a Huntington letter, was a former law partner of Interior Secretary Orville Hickman Browning.

Union Pacific attempts to provide money to Congress members included the apparent transfer of $60,000 to Pennsylvania congressman Thaddeus Stevens in 1864, and a provision of $10,000 to help a U.S. senator get elected in 1866 in Iowa. Also, bribes were transferred to Congress members by “selling” them Credit Mobilier stock that, if they “bought” it, would pay dividends that covered the purchase price and provided cash back.

Stewart told Durant of the Stevens arrangement in a letter on June 19, 1864; money was to be given Stevens for an ironworks property east of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, but the property’s title was not to be transferred. “In the matter of iron work in Pennsylvania I believe your suggestion of $60,000 – or $70,000 and not take the property will be agreeable,” Stewart said. “Since you mentioned I have carefully tried it on . . . and though I believe the whole purchase [unintelligible] preferable, I am sure your proposition will be acceded to.”

Durant apparently was late in providing money required under an agreement with Stevens, according to a letter a month later from Alexander Hay to Stewart in which Hay referred to Stevens as the “old man”: “I saw the old man Tuesday,” said Hay, who was a Union Pacific bondholder but also apparently an agent for Stewart and Durant and

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236 Griswold, A Work of Giants, 283. Ambrose, Nothing Like It in the World, 193, said the $20,000 per year for Franchot matched what the Central Pacific associates took as pay for their work. Griswold said that Franchot was the Central Pacific’s chief Washington lobbyist and a “confidential agent” for the railroad.
237 Huntington to E. B. Crocker, May 13, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
238 Huntington to Mark Hopkins, June 8, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
240 Stewart to Durant, June 19, 1864, Series II, Box 29, file “Stewart, Joseph B.,” Leonard Collection.
perhaps a staff member for Stevens. “He appears dissatisfied. He went to [ironworks] on Thursday and will go to Bedford Monday or Tuesday. We suffer by not paying the $60,000 which ought to be done without a days [sic] delay.”241 The next day, Stewart wrote to Durant from Washington:

    Much to my regret I have been delayed here – the many things pressing upon me. Keeps me at work day and night.

    In the last three days I have been called on by several of the parties who keep me constantly embarrassed at them by their increasing anxiety at not being settled with according to agreement. I put them off with the best explanation I can make assuring them it shall be done soon and this I hope will be the case. There are also several of the parties in New York who are waiting my return there and whom I were to have seen there during the past week. I this morning received a letter from one of them (a senator) who is evidently much annoyed.

    Enclosed I send you a letter from Mr. Hay. You will see what he says.

    It is a great mistake to let matters of such grave importance drift into confusion in this way. It annoys me from morning till night for I am at a loss what to say. I have seen enough in the last eighteen years here to know that it is the source that trouble ever springs from in all matters of this sort. I shall do my best to avoid it and beg that you will be prepared when I see you to close up the whole concern in such a way that I can place all parties in some definite position.242

The records examined do not show for certain that the $60,000 was paid, and the executor of Stevens’ estate testified that he could find no indication that it had been paid

241 Stewart to Durant, July 23, 1864, Series II, Box 29, file “Stewart, Joseph B.,” Leonard Collection. Hay’s role is unclear. At some point, he owned Union Pacific bonds, but he was an agent for bond transfers on behalf of Stewart and Durant, according to his testimony before the Wilson Committee, 457-67. He resided in Philadelphia and York, Pennsylvania, and it was his signature that appeared on an October 11, 1866, note to Durant declining an invitation for Stevens to participate in the Union Pacific’s Grand Excursion to the 100th Meridian in Series II, Box 15, file “Excursion Invitations D-L,” Leonard Collection. “The near approach of the meeting of Congress; and delicate state of health prevents Mr. Stevens from accepting your kind invitation to accompany you West,” the note said. “He expresses great desire to view your road and hopes that after the adjournment of Congress he may be able to do so. I will also wait your next trip.”

242 Stewart to Durant, July 24, 1864, Series II, Box 29, file “Stewart, Joseph B.,” Leonard Collection.
from reviewing Stevens’ bank account records. Durant, however, was reimbursed for more than $172,000 spent by the Union Pacific, mostly for expenses in Washington, D.C., in August and September 1864.

Durant also gave $10,000 to help in the 1866 election of James Harlan to the U.S. Senate from Iowa. In testimony before a U.S. House committee in 1873, two Union Pacific principals tied Durant to the cash payment, which was allegedly used to keep afloat two Iowa newspapers supporting Harlan, a federal Secretary of the Interior for fifteen months ending in August 1866 at the beginning of the Andrew Johnson administration (the Interior Department was designated to carry out the provisions of the Pacific Railroad Act and oversee inspections of the work and disbursement of federally backed bonds). Durant admitted making the $10,000 payment to assist in Harlan’s election in 1866 “for the purpose of securing the influence of some newspapers.”

On the Central Pacific side, Huntington proposed to pay for the re-election of U.S. Senator William M. Stewart of Nevada in 1867 in a letter to Hopkins.

The last time I was in Washington, Stewart asked if we would pay the expense of his reelection. He said he hoped it would not cost over $20,000 but it possibly would $50,000. I said that if my associates would that I would not object.

Now Stewart is a very good man for us, and although the amount is large, I think we had better pay it to elect him rather than have a fellow like [Charles E.] DeLong in his place.

After looking the ground all over if I thought the sum named would elect him I would pay it.

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243 Testimony of Oliver J. Dickey, Wilson Committee Report, 676-78. See Wilson Committee Report, 301-303 and 312 for testimony from Oliver Ames and John B. Alley regarding the Stevens’ bribe. Both testified that Durant had told them of the bribe, but they suspected that no such payment had been made and Durant pocketed the $60,000 or $80,000. Alley repeated the testimony before the Select Committee to Investigate the Alleged Credit Mobilier Bribery, Credit Mobilier Investigation, House Report 77, Serial Set Vol. No. 1577, Vol. No. 2, 42nd Congress, 3rd sess., 88. Luke Poland of Vermont was committee chairman and the report will be referred to hereafter as the Poland Committee Report. Durant denied any financial transaction with Stevens before the Wilson Committee, Wilson Committee Report, 521-22.

244 Wilson Committee Report, 313-14.

245 Testimony of T. C. Durant, Poland Committee Report, 178.

246 Huntington to Hopkins, December 17, 1867, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
Huntington also reported to his associates that he had agreed to pay U.S. Rep. Samuel Beach Axtell, who was then in the middle of his first term in Congress. “Axtell is the best man, I think, that we have ever had from California,” he wrote to Crocker on February 21, 1868. “I have employed him as our Atty. (confidential).” Huntington told Mark Hopkins in a March 31, 1868, letter, that he would give Axtell $5,000 “to attend to our business.” There were more details when Huntington reported a $5,000 payment to a Minnesota congressman in a letter on April 6, 1868, to Crocker.

Donnally [U.S. Rep. Ignatius Donnelly] of Minn. called at our office last week and said that he wanted $10,000 to control some paper in his state &c &c, and as he is on the Rail Road, and also the Land Committee of the House, I finally gave him $5,000. He is a man of considerable ability, and he has been very true to us, but I did not like the way he called for it and I was sorry I gave it to him, but I am not certain it was for our interest but he told me he had talked with Franchot [Central Pacific lobbyist] about it &c so I made the check to the order of Franchot.

Newspapers of the day, according to two historians, were in a transition period from being extensions of political parties and relying on financial support from political friends to a reliance on advertising from commercial interests to keep their publications going. “In the early nineteenth century, editors defined news as a political instrument intended to promote party interests,” Gerald J. Baldasty said. “By the century’s end, editors defined news within a business context to ensure or increase revenues. News had become commercialized.” Mark Wahlgren Summers agreed a transition was underway, but said that the 1868 presidential election “fit squarely in the Golden Age of partisan journalism.” That changed with time, Summers said, “As newspapers broke ties with political parties and reporters were free to write what they saw, they got a new master in business interests.”

247 Huntington to E. B. Crocker, February 21, 1868, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
248 Huntington to Hopkins, March 31, 1868, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
249 Huntington to E. B. Crocker, April 6, 1868, Series 1, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
Summers said that Mark M. (Marcus Mills) “Brick” Pomeroy’s *Daily Democrat*, begun in 1868 in New York City as a Democratic Party organ provided evidence of the decline of the partisan press. “When he arrived in New York in 1868, it was as a celebrity [from his newspaper work at the LaCrosse, Wisconsin, *Democrat*], his newest newspaper project offering an appeal to laboring-class Democrats with a rough, masculine style unlike the *World’s* [an established Democratic Party organ]. ‘Damn it! Damn it! Damn it if you will,’ his circular for the organ read, ‘but read it first.’ “

Pomeroy’s daily paper, however, went into decline almost immediately, Summers said, as it became clear that no great journal could be a party organ.

This became more the case, and with it, the organs felt the pressure at the very least to relegate politics to the sidelines and expand the alternative entertainments open to their readers. Let editors look to Brick Pomeroy if they ever imagined otherwise. He began his New York career with plenty of advantages, including the advance publicity as an editor of a paper “famous for its entire disregard both of grammar and propriety.” Ten thousand dollars were spent just to prepare for the first issue. A splendid Bullock press was bought for $15,000 to do the printing. Special local sketches were provided by correspondents at high cost, and the price of two cents rivaled the low cost of the “Star.” Over 20,000 copies sold on the first day of publication. But the novelty of unmodulated vituperation wore off quickly. By the following day, sales were in decline. Before the presidential campaign had reached its midpoint, Pomeroy was selling 5,000 or less. In a year, he had lost over $100,000. In two years, Pomeroy had sold the daily and restricted himself to a Saturday edition called *Pomeroy’s Democrat*.252

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Figure 4: Brick Pomeroy, “Wilkes Booth the Second.”

Marcus Mills “Brick” Pomeroy, editor/publisher of Pomeroy’s Democrat with sword drawn and being assisted by Democratic vice presidential candidate Frank Blair Jr. in an imagined assassination attempt on Republican presidential candidate Ulysses S. Grant.


The Credit Mobilier Scandal
The bribing of members of Congress became known nationally in the Credit Mobilier Scandal that led to nearly simultaneous U.S. House investigations in 1873. Klein said the investigations “probably did more to blacken the public image of railroads than any other event of the nineteenth century.”

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253 The Wilson and Poland committee investigations.
254 Klein, Union Pacific, 97.
Ames, a Massachusetts representative in Congress, a heavy investor in the Union Pacific, and a brother of Oliver Ames, the Union Pacific president during most of the transcontinental construction. Oakes Ames distributed 160 shares of Credit Mobilier stock to eleven members of Congress, nine House members and two senators, in late 1867 and early 1868.\footnote{See Klein, Union Pacific, 145, and Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 202.} Oakes Ames, throughout his testimony before the congressional committees, denied that he was bribing anyone by providing cost-free stock in the Credit Mobilier Corporation. He said that, in order for his actions to be considered bribery, there must be something required in return and, since he asked for nothing and the company needed nothing further from Congress, it was not a bribe. Instead, he testified, he was only seeking to involve more good men in the Union Pacific enterprise.\footnote{See Poland Committee Report, 32 and 39, for Oakes Ames’ defense of the Credit Mobilier stock gifts that he bestowed on members of Congress.} A letter on December 8, 1867, from Oakes to brother Oliver indicates otherwise, however.

[U.S. Representative Cadwalader C.] Washburn of Wisconsin is going to offer a resolution in relation to prices charged on the Pacific R. Roads for freight &c and get them reduced. I think we will be able to get it referred to our committee and if we can we can kill it or get a report that will not hurt us. I think we should give out our 65mC.M. [$65,000 of Credit Mobilier] stock to those M.C. [members of Congress] who will pay for it and not over 3,000 to any one of them, some of them, 1,000, some 2, and some 3,000 [10, 20 and 30 shares at $100 a share]. They will then be interested to prevent any legislation that will injure us.\footnote{Oakes to Oliver, December 8, 1867, Oliver Ames, Jr., Incoming Correspondence Letterbooks, Stonehill College Archives and Special Collections, Arnold B. Tofias Industrial Archives, Brockton, Massachusetts, hereafter referred to as the Oliver Ames Papers, which are on microfilm in chronological order.}

On the next day, Washburn introduced a bill in the House to regulate the rates over the Pacific Railroad.\footnote{Poland Committee Report, iv.} One of the congressional investigating committees concluded that although Oakes Ames said the Union Pacific wanted nothing more from Congress when he was giving away the Credit Mobilier stock to its members in December 1867 and early 1868, he had a motive that constituted bribery. “Mr. Ames entertained a fear that, when the true relations between the Credit Mobilier Company and
the Union Pacific became generally known, and the means by which the great profits expected to be made were fully understood, there was danger that Congressional investigation and action would be invoked.”

In February 1868, according to the congressional testimony of Henry S. McComb, a Union Pacific director, E. B. Washburne of Illinois attempted another move in Congress to regulate rates or investigate the Union Pacific’s affairs. “E. B. Washburne, of Illinois, in his place in the House, had moved some kind of an investigation into the affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad; I do not recollect the precise point,” McComb testified. “Mr. [Schuyler] Colfax was in the chair as Speaker of the House, and by some parliamentary maneuver, they blocked the game and defeated it. Mr. [Oakes] Ames called my attention to it, and asked me if I did not think that, in Mr. Colfax’s case, the investment [bribe] had paid.”

A letter on February 17, 1868, from Dodge to McComb, reported that a rate-regulation resolution had been defeated in the House that day by a vote of 73-61. Dodge, then a member of the House representing an Iowa district, called it a “close vote.”

As a result of its 1873 hearings, the committee specifically investigating the Credit Mobilier and the alleged bribery of Congress members recommended the expulsion from the House of Oakes Ames and Representative James Brooks of New York. The House, instead, publicly sanctioned the two. Senator James W. Patterson also was recommended for expulsion from the Senate, but his term ended five days after the committee report was filed.

**Naming Power**

Transcontinental railroad executives exercised less questionable attempts at influence by using their power to name locomotives. The *General Sherman* locomotive already has been mentioned as the driving force for the Union Pacific’s nail-keg

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259 Ibid.
260 Ibid., 275-76.
261 Testimony of Henry S. McComb, Poland Committee Report, 429.
excursion in November 1865, but the Union Pacific did not follow through with this method of gaining favor.263 The Central Pacific, however, continued to name its locomotives, according to McCague.

Each [Central Pacific] engine [was] not only numbered but named, after the traditional fashion of railroading in America. In this the Central differed from the Union Pacific, where names were abandoned quite early in favor of the more prosaic and businesslike system of numbers alone.

The names followed no discernable pattern. Of the first six locomotives in service on the Central Pacific, four bore titles honoring individuals. In addition to the Governor Stanford and the C. P. Huntington, there was a T.D. Judah [the first Central Pacific chief engineer], one of the two smallest engines on the roster (the other, ironically, being the Huntington). California Senator John Conness was also honored. Later, two other engines were named for Civil War heroes: the Phil Sheridan and the U.S. Grant. Others bore the names of towns along the line, notably the Gold Run. Appropriately for a railroad with transcontinental intentions, there was an Atlantic and a Pacific. Others names were classical in derivation, or merely resounding: Hercules, Growler, Mars, Hurricane, Diana, Sultana, Leviathan, Tempest, Hector, Terrible, Vulcan, Tamaroo.264

Historian David Lavender said Huntington, in the naming of the Conness, was engaged in a political balancing act.

Huntington did what he could to cultivate the new senator [John Conness, elected in 1863 and serving as a U.S. senator until 1869], a delicate bit of balancing since he had to keep from offending [U.S. Sen. Cornelius] Cole and other outraged Republicans back in California. Among other gestures, he gave the name Conness to a new locomotive that he had ordered from the Mason Works in Taunton, Massachusetts, the largest locomotive yet sent to the West. To counterbalance this

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263 Griswold, A Work of Giants, 170-71. “Four of the Union Pacific’s first five locomotives were named for Civil War heroes: Generals Sherman, McPherson, and Sheridan, and Admiral Farragut,” Griswold said. “After these came a brief flurry of geographical names – Idaho, Omaha, Osceola, Manchester, Colorado, and Denver. Then the transportation department appeared to run out of inspiration. It merely gave numbers to all engines that followed.”

264 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 151-52. Griswold in A Work of Giants, 113, note 10, said the Central Pacific’s names at first drew on mythological sources or Biblical sources with Hercules, Ajax, Samson, Goliath, Achilles and Jupiter. “Then came a phase in which names of birds and beasts were favored. Finally, a more poetic mood served the engine-namers, and they christened locomotives Storm, Growler, Whirlwind, Terrible, Hurricane and Tempest.”
sycophancy, he named another locomotive for [U.S. Representative from California Aaron Augustus] Sargent.265

Huntington stopped naming the locomotives in September 1867 and gave them only numbers, instead. “I have only the number put on our locomotives now,” he said in a letter on September 11, 1867, to Crocker. “You can name them there if you want it done.”266 Crocker replied that Central Pacific officials in Sacramento would “attend to naming and numbering the locomotives here” in a letter on November 7, 1867, to Huntington,267 but, by February, problems were developing because parts were arriving for locomotives assigned numbers that differed from the numbers in California. Crocker wrote Huntington about the problems, said the numbering system should be abandoned for a naming system and provided a Sacramento-created list of possible names for new engines.268

Free Passes
Union Pacific managers may not have used the practice of naming locomotives much, but they liberally distributed free passes to make friends for the railroad. The passes, mostly for a calendar year, went to an assistant postmaster general; military officers; the St. Louis mayor and five or six of his friends; and all senators and representatives in Congress. Chief Engineer Grenville Dodge seemed to be a clearinghouse for many free-pass requests,269 but Dodge was not the only Union Pacific

265 David Lavender, The Great Persuader (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970), 150. Lavender said Conness was a resident of El Dorado County, “a region bitterly hostile toward the Central Pacific.” Griswold, A Work of Giants, 15, said Sargent was “the most persistent advocate of the Pacific Railroad in the House.”
266 Huntington to E. B. Crocker, September 11, 1867, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
267 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, November 7, 1867, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
268 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, February 11, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers. “It seems that your numbers on the Engines do not correspond with our numbers here,” Crocker said. “Mr. Miller suggests that it will be best to leave off the numbers and put names on them there. If they are named there then each box containing a part of any Engine will be marked with its name and avoid a great deal of trouble here in putting them up. I enclose you a list of names to select from.”
official coordinating free-pass distribution. Klein said that Oakes Ames also “distributed passes liberally in Congress to all who wanted them.”

Free railroad passes also were given to another constituency with whom the railroad leaders wanted to have friendly relations: the press. At least some of those passes were solicited or given for promises of positive articles. One example of such a solicitation was a letter from Robert P. Noah, who identified himself as a correspondent for the New York Democrat, to H. G. Crane, Durant’s attorney, secretary and “confidential” man. “In the absence of Dr. Durant, I beg to solicit from you the favor of a similar pass over the Union Pacific Railroad to those issued to my fellow correspondents here. The Democrat has more than once taken up the cudgel in the Company’s interest and I have personally been of service to it here, which I trust will entitle me to your favorable consideration.”

A letter-writer to Durant, who identified himself as president of Wabash College and a correspondent, asked for a free pass for a trip to California. “For twenty years or more I have been the stated and regular correspondent of two religious weeklies in the Evangelist of New York and Herald of Cincinnati, the two having a large circulation amounting to many thousands – and for some time also the correspondent of the Cincinnati Gazette, the editor occasionally using my railroad articles as editorials,” wrote Joseph F. Tutell from Crawfordsville, Indiana. “During the present season I desire to go over your road to California. Can you furnish me a pass. If you can I shall use my pen in such a way as I trust will be of service to your road.”

On the Central Pacific side, Huntington told Charles Crocker that he had provided a pass to a correspondent in a letter on June 8, 1868. “I have just given a pass and also a letter that will be sent to C. C. Coffin, and it would be well to show him some attention.

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270 Klein, Union Pacific, 144.  
He is an old newspaper correspondent and is acquainted with many of my friends here in the same business.”273

Those with business in government had good reasons to cultivate relationships with journalists, as described by Mark Wahlgren Summers:

For the lobbyist, the reasons why journalists were so useful was still plainer. First, no one was better versed in what government officials intended to do, nor with reader access to insiders who might need convincing or persuasion; and experienced journalists knew not just who held which offices, but where the real power in any department or committee actually resided – at least that is what he prided himself on. Like [Uriah] Painter, he might even know what other lobbies were up to and keep them from interfering with each other.

Second, with the power that newspapers wielded over public opinion, they needed squaring if any lobby wanted to make it cases effectively . . . Hungry for information, journalists often would welcome leads and transmit stories dutifully. Not just individual reporters, but the Associated Press wire services opened their cables to corporate explanations passed as Washington dispatches.274

Professional journalistic standards of conduct had not be established, Summers said, with a new professional status for reporters, and journalistic tradition did not provide strong defense against the temptation to take compensation outside their publication’s wages, which, were relatively low at $50 a week for Washington, D.C., reporters when compared with relatively high costs in that city.

For editors accustomed to a system where newspaper establishments were bought or sold to take a political position, being bought or sold to support a commercial one may not have seemed indefensible. For reporters to whom independent attitudes meant passing judgment, overt advocacy may not have seemed unethical at all. If, for example, they thought that a land grant was a steal, it made sense to say so. And if that put them in alliance with or even on the payrolls of, the lobby working against that bill, the public interest was none the worse off for it.275

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273 Huntington to C. Crocker, June 8, 1868, Series 1, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
275 Ibid., 113.
Summers said journalists gathering information distinguished between reporters, news gatherers who wired the freshest information daily, and correspondents, who provided supplementary longer reflections that might offer an evaluation of the significance of the news. Both types needed more than their newspaper compensation to live comfortably.

The same force driving Washington correspondents to sell their wares to several editors at once encouraged them to moonlight as lobbyists. There was only one legal limit: before the Speaker gave out press gallery privileges, a journalist had to sign a pledge not to involve himself in private claims. With so many alternative ways of cashing in, that restriction was like a locked door without a house around it. Newsmen speculated in gold and whiskey on their inside knowledge during the Civil War and afterward. They were not ashamed of doing so. One reporter even admitted the widespread speculation to vindicate his colleagues of getting rich by corrupt means.\textsuperscript{276}

\textsuperscript{276} Ibid., 113-14.
Figure 5: “Every Public Question with an Eye Only to the Public Good”
“Let him that has not betrayed the trust of the People, and is without stain, cast the first stone.”

“Justice” points to politicians standing in front of the Capitol (from left) Vice President Henry Wilson, a Massachusetts Republican and Senators James Harlan, R-Iowa; former vice president Schuyler Colfax, R-Indiana; and James Patterson, R-New Hampshire; U.S. Reps. James Brooks, D-New York; Oakes Ames, R-Massachusetts, with a file marked “Bait;” James Garfield, R-Ohio; John Bingham, R-Ohio; and Glenni Scofield, R-Pennsylvania; and William Kelley, R-Pennsylvania. With whiskers in front, U. S. Sen. Henry Dawes, R-Massachusetts. The group she is pointing for are journalists (from left) Henry Watterson, Louisville Courier-Journal, behind the portico and ready to throw a rock; Samuel Bowles, Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican, bending over; Horace White, Chicago Tribune; James Gordon Bennett Jr., New York Herald; Whitelaw Reid, New York Tribune; Benjamin Wood, New York Daily News, smoking; Charles Dana, New York Sun; Marcus Pomeroy, New York Democrat; Theodore Tilton, Independent, behind Pomeroy; Manton Marble, New York World; and Joseph Howard Jr., New York Star.

Source: Harpweek.com, Harpweek, LLC
Politicians also were afraid of journalists, whose accounts could make or break a political career so that journalists were particularly effective lobbyists in getting a hearing for a client’s arguments, according to Summers. Still, Summers asserted that most of the journalists had integrity, an assertion that might be bolstered by evidence that the transcontinental railroad builders had to hire writers to get what they wanted.

The politicians’ dismissal of even the reforming journalists as hirelings was mistaken. As has already been made clear, reporters were genuinely excited by scandalous news stories and many of them unfeignedly indignant at what they found. Most took no retainer but the newspaper’s, and others who lobbied or provided information did not compromise their integrity in what they put into their columns. They kept the two occupations separate. Yet whatever the realities, their reputation was not an enviable one.277

A Case Study in Media Relations: The Sacramento Union

Attempts by the transcontinental railroad organizers to maintain good relationships with journalists might best be illustrated by the relationship between Central Pacific organizers and their hometown newspaper, the Sacramento Union. The Union, in the early stages of the construction, was closely tied to the Central Pacific and among the company’s strongest supporters. By February 1868, however, it “became one of the bitterest foes of the railroad company.”278

Historian George Thomas Clark said of the Union that for a generation beginning in the 1850s, it was the most widely circulated and influential paper in Northern California.279 The newspaper’s early support for the Central Pacific was unflagging, according to historian Wesley S. Griswold.

[Lauren] Upson’s [the Union editor] unflagging enthusiasm for the Central Pacific was at least partially sustained by an annual handout from the railroad’s board of directors. In 1863 he had been issued $2,000 worth of C.P. stock “for services.” In September 1864 he would be given an additional $1,600 worth. Another member of the Union’s staff, Noah

277 Summers, The Press Gang, 120.
278 Kraus, High Road to Promontory Point, 191.
279 Clark, Leland Stanford, War Governor of California, 76. Ambrose, however, in Nothing Like It in the World, 104, said that the most prestigious newspaper in California at the time of the transcontinental construction was the Daily Alta California, published in San Francisco.
Brooks, its Washington correspondent, was also to win a tangible [sum] from the Central Pacific’s directors that summer. In June 1864 Huntington would give him 10 shares of stock in the course of distributing 310 in Washington and elsewhere. These gifts were all charged to the C.P.’s construction account.280

The Central Pacific relationship with the Union went sour after Upson gave up the paper’s editorship in 1864, and James Anthony, one of the paper’s owners, took over.281 Central Pacific officials continued to support Upson, despite him no longer being the Union’s editor, as a letter on February 20, 1866, from treasurer Mark Hopkins told Huntington that the Central Pacific was helping to pay for a trip by Upson to Washington, D.C. “When Upson – He goes on this steamer – It is arranged that we contribute toward his expenses,” Hopkins said. “Upson is a good friend of ours and also of Conness – We thought his presence there would be of value to him and to you, too.”282

Anthony was another story, according to Griswold. “Anthony at first seemed to be as friendly to the Central Pacific as his predecessor; but in 1868 he abruptly turned hostile. From then on the Union rarely had a good word for the C.P. or any of its principals. The newspaper’s voice was then listened to widely in the East, and especially in Washington.”283

McCague also mentioned the Union’s influence in Washington, where, he said, the Interior secretary ordered an investigation based on the newspaper’s reports that Central Pacific track constructed in Nevada was shoddy and dangerous.

That sturdy old friend and indomitable ally, the Sacramento Union had unaccountably turned heckler following a change in editors in ’64. And this fall (’68), the new man, James Anthony, had started printing charges that the Central Pacific track across Nevada had been laid so hurriedly and haphazardly that the road’s government commissioners [federal inspectors whose approval was necessary for work quality to allow the issuance of government bonds] were guilty of inexcusable carelessness, if not worse, in approving it. One twenty-five mile stretch in particular, claimed Anthony, was so bad that passengers took their lives in their hands when they rode over it. The Union was a paper of great

280 Griswold, A Work of Giants, 78-79.
281 Ibid., 251.
282 Hopkins to Huntington, February 20, 1866, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
283 Griswold, A Work of Giants, 251.
prestige in faraway Washington, D.C., where it maintained an active correspondent, and presently the accusations came to the attention of Secretary of the Interior Orville Hickman Browning, who appointed a special commission to go west for an on-the-spot investigation.284

Central Pacific leaders were unhappy with Anthony before a February breakup reported by historians Kraus, Clark and Lavender.285 Three letters written by Central Pacific attorney Crocker to Huntington in July and August 1867 described a deteriorating relationship with Anthony and the Union. In the earliest of the three letters, Crocker reported on a June 1867 Sacramento nominating convention for the Union Republican Party in which George C. Gorham was chosen as the party’s candidate for governor.

Gorham is the man for us. [John] Bidwell would have been controlled by the hue and cry of newspapers against corporations. Gorham knows his friends and will be true to them. The Union, the supporter of Bidwell, raised the hue and cry against the “4 great corporations” and that helped to defeat B. and to nominate Gorham. That matter is all right. The Union has taken a notion to buck against us and got knocked into line the first pop. They published an article about the Chinese strike, full of errors, and Charles [Crocker, E. B.’s brother in charge of construction] explained to Weeks [apparently the article’s writer] and asked him to correct the errors, which he promised to do. He now says he wrote it but Anthony would not let it go in. Anthony is at the bottom of it all. It is all narrow-minded jealousy. He can’t bear to see us prosper, especially as we don’t drink and play cards with his crowd. Gorham’s nomination is decidedly favorable to business. Brooks is editing the Alta, and will help Conness.286

A month later, E. B. Crocker expressed his despair with Anthony. “There is no use to try and control Anthony,” Crocker told Huntington, “at least we all think so. He is a man of strong bitter prejudices and being rich, he can afford to indulge his feelings, and spit it out in his paper. My plan is to buy him out as soon as the money can be spared.”287 Five days later, Crocker was still fuming about Anthony and the Union. “As to the Sac. Union, it is nothing but small envy and jealousy on the part of Anthony, but some times I

284 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 261-62.
285 See, Kraus, High Road to Promontory Point, 191; Clark, Leland Stanford, War Governor of California, 284; and Lavender, The Great Persuader, 211-12.
286 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, July 10, 1867, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
287 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, August 10, 1867, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
think he wants us to grease him. I have been trying to get Upson to buy out Anthony and thus control it, but he has not done any thing yet. With Upson in Anthony’s place the paper would be all right and it is a paying institution.”288

Historian George Thomas Clark, however, pinpointed the breach at January or February 1868.

The breach occurred in 1868, some time between January 7 and February 17. On the former date, the Union published an editorial opposing any legislative action that would have the effect of reducing freights and fares and urging the most liberal support of the Central Pacific to aid in the early completion of its line. That seems to be the Union’s last utterance that could be construed as favorable to the associates. Several weeks later, on February 17, it devoted one whole editorial column to a denunciation of the Central Pacific and the indorsement [sic] of a bill then before the legislature to reduce railway charges.289

Lavender offered three explanations for the breach between the railroad leaders and the newspaper’s editor.

Charles Crocker said that the proprietors of the Union had turned hostile because one of them was ejected from a Central Pacific passenger coach while trying to board it, contrary to regulations, with a hunting dog and gun. Huntington suggested that his partners foolishly took the railroad’s printing away from the Union’s job presses and awarded it to a firm headed by H. S. Crocker, a brother of Charles and Ed. Hopkins saw more sinister motives. He was convinced that emissaries of the Union Pacific not only paid the editors of the Sacramento Union for the attacks but were also behind the unfriendly resolutions in the legislature. The reader may take his choice.290

Whatever the reason for the break, the Central Pacific leaders did not like it. Crocker said they had a way to retaliate by taking away the Union’s advantage of having the Sacramento news in San Francisco three or four hours ahead of its competitors. He said that could be done with train scheduling so that the first morning train in a San Francisco-Sacramento service would begin in San Francisco rather than Sacramento.291 Hopkins told Huntington in March 1868 that he did not know what to do about the Union

288 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, August 15, 1867, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
289 Clark, Leland Stanford, War Governor of California, 284.
290 Lavender, The Great Persuader, 211-12.
291 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, February 18, 1868, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
other than to hope that it had lost its influence. “You will, I know, regret to see the Sacramento Daily Union so hostile and malignant towards the C.P.R.R. Co. I regret it exceedingly, but I don’t know any especial reason why it does so, or how we can prevent it. James Anthony’s envy and constitutional prejudice to such as we are, is unchangeable. The Union certainly could do us good, but they have been so bitter and untruthful, that they have now but comparatively little power to injure us.”

Crocker told Huntington in a letter on March 20, 1868, that he had tried to get their associates in Sacramento to buy out Anthony in the fall of 1867, but, “I could not make them see it and now we are taking it.” Crocker said he thought, like Hopkins, that Anthony was so aggressive in his opposition to the Central Pacific that his credibility was eroding. “We keep stirring him up in several papers here,” he said. Then, he suggested that they consider buying out one of the paper’s owners in New York state, “and then we would have a hook in his nose by threatening to have the joint property sold and divided if he did not do right.”

A month later, Crocker told Huntington that he should not assume that the press generally was against their railroad just because the Union was. “You are mistaken,” Crocker said. “The great majority are our friends. You only take the Union and as they now take pains to publish everything said against us in other papers and nothing the other way – you cannot arrive at a correct conclusion.” Huntington was not mollified when he wrote back in May. “I do wish there was some way to control the Sac. Union; Eastern Papers copy from it and it hurts us.”

Other Media Relations

It was not just the Sacramento Union that the Central Pacific associates sought to control in California. A letter on January 17, 1867, from Hopkins to Huntington indicated that the latter had advised his California partners to seek control of the

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292 Hopkins to Huntington, March 15, 1868, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
293 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, March 20, 1868, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
294 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, April, no date, 1868, Series 1, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
295 Huntington to E. B. Crocker, May 13, 1868, Series 1, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
Marysville *Appeal,* too, and to buy for $4,000 the Auburn *Stars and Stripes.* An Associated Press correspondent in San Francisco, Benjamin Parke Avery, was on a Central Pacific retainer when he took a railroad ride to the Sierra Nevada summit in 1867, according to historian David Haward Bain. The *Alta California,* described by historian George Kraus as an early enemy of the Central Pacific, became a cheerleader by the summer of 1868 because of the success in breaking through the Sierra Nevada. Quoting an unidentified *Alta* reporter aboard the first train from Sacramento to Reno on June 17, 1868, he said that words could not describe “the greatest highway yet created for the march of commerce and civilization around the globe.”

Discussing the Central Pacific relationship with newspapers in general, Huntington offered Crocker a report on the situation in New York City.

There is a disposition with many on this side to strike at the Pacific Roads.

Many like the N.Y. *Herald,* for the sake of Black Mail, and others like the *Tribune,* because they think these roads will be grasping monopoly and they want to protect the people.

I have but little trouble to get favorable things said of us by any of the papers by giving the local Editors a box of Cigars, but we have grown so that old Bennett of the *Herald* and others like him think we are fat enough for them to gather tribute of and so they forbid any about these papers saying any good natured thing of us.

Crocker responded with a report from the California scene a month later. “We have the same kind of newspaper troubles here that you have East. The truth is we have grown so fast, we are beginning to be feared.”

Central Pacific leaders in California drafted Thomas Magee, a newspaper correspondent, as part of their attempts at image-management for the company. Crocker told Huntington of Magee in a letter on January 7, 1867: “We have made arrangements

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296 Hopkins to Huntington, January 17, 1867, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
297 Bain, *Empire Express,* 412.
298 Kraus, *High Road to Promontory Point,* 98, 198.
299 Ibid., 198.
300 Huntington to E. B. Crocker, March 28, 1868, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
301 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, April 21, 1868, Series 1, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
with a man by the name of Magee, who is a correspondent of the N. Y. Herald and World here, to weave into his correspondence matters relating to our R.R. He is a vigorous writer, and shows his letters to us so that we can correct any errors which may creep in – I shall furnish him grants from time to time. He has just sent some letters East, so look out for them and send us copies.”

Three months later, Crocker wanted Huntington to use his influence to help Magee get designated as a correspondent at the New York Tribune.

He has been writing a good many articles for papers here and in N.Y. I presume you have noticed those in the N. Y. papers. We pay him for what he writes about our road and see that he gets it correct. He would like to correspond for the Tribune, and would notice our road from time to time in his letters. If you could manage it any way to get him appointed or authorized to act as correspondent, it would be a good point for us. He writes well, brief and pointedly and entertainingly. Perhaps if you applied personally they might think you had a R.R. object, but I presume you can find someone to do it. I think I will get him to write a letter for the Tribune from which they can judge his ability.

Magee apparently wrote the letter for the Tribune and sent it to Mark Hopkins, according to a letter on April 25, 1867.

Enclosed is letter for the New York Tribune, which if you will take the trouble to forward to Mr. Huntington and ask him to get presented to the editor of the Tribune by some acquaintance of the latter either by letter or in person, I think will be accepted. I hope it will please you.

In a few days I will write the letter for the London Times and send it up for your perusal before sending it off.

I sent the communication we talked of to the Sac. Bee on Monday.

I will write a letter about the road for the Times or Alta of this city [San Francisco] in a few days.

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302 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, January 7, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
303 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, April 15, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
304 Thomas Magee to Hopkins, April 25, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
On May 3, Crocker told Huntington that Magee’s letters had appeared in the *Union, Bulletin* and *Alta* in California, including an article about the use of nitroglycerine at the Summit Tunnel that appeared in the *Union.*

Eleven months later, on April 6, 1868, Hopkins wrote a letter of introduction to Huntington for Magee, who was to make a trip to the East.

This will introduce to you our friend Mr. Thomas Magee, who as [a] Newspaper correspondent residing at San Francisco has written in our interest for many months past, we paying him $100 monthly which arrangement is continued for a three month trip to the Atlantic states – going by water and returning over land. Any points you give him will be judiciously used and perhaps you can put him on favorable relations with Union Co. which will facilitate travel and information on his overland trip westward.

Hopkins then wrote a letter directly to Huntington about Magee:

During his trip we continue to pay him the $100 per month, which pays him for any incidental service, but of course would not enable him to make the trip unless he has some other paying business.

We think him entirely reliable in our interest and if you have any special service for which he is adapted and for which he could earn additional pay he will be at your service.

I told him you was talking of sending a man on secret service along the Union RR line towards Salt Lake, but whether you had engaged a man, or whether you would conclude to do so, I could not say. I write you to let you know our interest in him. I gave him a letter to you, if you have any use for him, he will be glad to serve you.

Magee made a good impression on Huntington, who wrote to Hopkins on May 16 that Magee was leaving that night to return to California. “He is an honest hardworking man and is earnestly trying to do us good,” Huntington said. “He had no money. I gave him $300 ($100 gold, $200 currency) which I have charged to expense a/c and is outside of what you do for him.” Magee was back in California by June 9 and Crocker

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305 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, May 3, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
306 Hopkins to Huntington, April 6, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
307 Hopkins to Huntington, April 11, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
308 Huntington to Hopkins, May 16, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
reported back to Huntington: “Mr. Magee has just got in from Overland trip. He talks plain about the miserable character of the U.P.R.R. I suppose you will see his letters in the Herald and World. They are sharp and severe. I think I would have softened them down a little.”

Although no similar record involving a specific correspondent exists in the materials examined for the Union Pacific side of the transcontinental, the railroad’s leaders clearly had friends in publications. Among the most loyal and aggressive was George R. Miller, editor of the Omaha Herald, according to Union Pacific Chief Engineer Grenville M. Dodge in his unpublished autobiography. “Dr. Miller’s paper the Herald had been sustaining us during all the time we were building the road,” he said. “Dr. Miller was very active and aggressive in developing the country and was a very able leading citizen of Nebraska, devoting his time to its interests and I had gotten an order from the company to turn over to him what printing was done at Omaha, which he was very grateful for. His paper was the leading paper west of the Missouri [River].”

In his autobiography, Dodge included a letter on October 26, 1865, from Miller to him in which Miller professed his loyalty not only to the Union Pacific, but also to Thomas Durant. “I am working for the company with all my might and giving every paper and every man the devil who says a word against him [Durant] or the company,” Miller said. “The Republican came out the other day with a local fling at the Ox Bow [a proposed route for the Union Pacific tracks out of the Omaha area]. I went after it with hot shot, as I intend doing in every case and am sustained in it. I intend he [Durant] shall not be ignorant that the editor of the Herald is and has been as you well know, faithful when others have faltered.”

John B. Alley, a Union Pacific director, said he had been told that Charles Dana of the New York Sun agreed to publish positive Union Pacific news. According to Alley’s testimony before an 1873 congressional investigating committee, Jackson Shultz, “one of the most prominent citizens of New York” and involved in the leather trade,

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309 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, June 9, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
reported a conversation with Dana. “He [Shultz] told me he had been talking with Mr. Dana, editor of the Sun, and he had requested him to say, in his paper, a good word for the Union Pacific Railroad, as he had some good friends in the direction he would like to do a favor to. As he had assisted Mr. Dana to get up the Sun, Mr. Dana replied that he would be glad to.”

Some journalists’ requests for information from Union Pacific leaders included commitments to promote the railroad. James Edwards of the Daily Press in St. Paul, Minnesota, said he needed up-to-date information to make arguments in favor of the Union Pacific. He complained of old information in a letter on May 25, 1868, to Dodge.

The first report you sent conveyed no new information. Having been “in harness” some fifteen years, and having written many articles in that time on every proposed route, the generalizations of your Oregon and Montana report I could have written myself. What I am in search of is the newest material for use in advocating the various roads. I found much that was rather new (or rather in fuller detail) in your report of surveys for 1866. If you will be so kind as to send me your report for 1867 (if not yet in print, when published) you will confer a favor.

Will you also please inform me to whom I ought to apply for the fullest and latest reports of the company? Arguments based upon the financial success of the road are worthless unless supported by the exact figures, and those I have are more than a year old.

Henry M. Flint of Camden, New Jersey, who identified himself as a book author in a letter on November 7, 1868, to Durant, said he wanted Union Pacific employees to provide an outline for his writing about the railroad. “I am now engaged in preparing the material for the Second Edition of my History of Railroads,” he said. “I hope to devote fully 30 pages to the Union Pacific road; and as I wish to do this to the best advantage of the Company, I would suggest that you get some gentleman in your office, conversant with the subject, to prepare me a skeleton sketch of the article, embracing the points of most vital interest.” The skeleton, Flint says, “may be as brief or extended as you choose, leaving me as much or as little to fill in, as you think best.”

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312 Testimony of John B. Alley, Poland Committee Report, 93.
Before he asked that Union Pacific engineers prepare a map of specific dimensions to fit into his book, he said, “My only object is to make the chapter present the road to the public in the most advantageous light possible.”

But the railroad leaders took a more active role than that of merely making friends in their attempts to assure an image that would keep their coffers full. They monitored the coverage they received, coordinated it when they could, and tried to assure that some information stayed hidden.

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314 Flint to Durant, November 7, 1868, Box 15, file “Flint, Henry M. 1868.” Leonard Collection.
Chapter 5: The Conductors

The men at or near the top of the two companies building the first transcontinental railroad engaged in extensive monitoring of public reports on their enterprises, thereby keeping track of their evolving image, gathering intelligence on their rival company and sometimes even learning what was happening in their company. They notified others in the company of newspaper reports that might damage their company’s public image or enhance it. They also attempted to coordinate and direct public presentations to benefit their companies and they attempted to keep some information hidden.

Corporate public-relations historian Scott M. Cutlip said sophisticated corporate public-relations practice included the monitoring of public sentiment toward clients in what he called a “two-way concept” that encompassed not only projecting a corporate image to the public but projecting the public and its sentiments to clients.315 The transcontinental organizers, in a rudimentary way, attempted to learn public sentiment and anticipate potential damage by reading published accounts about their work and discussing those accounts. What they found was a public sentiment in published reports that was both positive and negative. It was the negative reports that seemed to have gotten their attention the most, although positive reports could be useful in persuading potential investors to part with their money.

Correspondence in 1864 and 1865 from Washington, D. C., and St. Louis, Missouri, to Union Pacific Vice President Thomas C. Durant and eventual chief engineer Grenville M. Dodge reported potentially damaging newspaper articles.316 One article in

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316 See R. W. Latham to Durant, November 3, 1864, Series II, Box 22, File “Latham, R.W,” in the papers of Levi O. Leonard, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City (hereafter referred to as the Leonard Collection); Latham to Durant December 20, 1864, Series II, Box 22, File “Latham, R.W.,” Leonard Collection; and Herbert M. Hoxie to Durant, May 13, 1865, Series II, Box 20, File “Hoxie, Herbert Melville,” Leonard Collection. The letter on November 3, 1864, from Latham, an agent for Durant in Washington, said that Secretary of the Interior John Palmer Usher was upset about a New York Tribune article that had attacked him. “I told him I did not know who wrote it,” Latham said,
particular, published in the St. Louis *Evening Dispatch*, resulted in more than the mention it got in a letter on May 24, 1865.\(^{317}\) The letter was written to Durant from Herbert M. Hoxie, the Union Pacific shipping agent in St. Louis, who also wrote Dodge eleven days later about the *Dispatch* clipping. “The *Dispatch* of last week had a villainous article on Durant about the cotton [apparently about Durant’s so-called Cotton Expedition that was an attempt by him and others to retrieve baled cotton from the Confederacy in the midst of the Civil War as a profit-making venture. An elaborate document granting Durant passage through Union lines is in the Leonard Collection]. I sent it to Durant and he telegraphed back for names of editor and publisher, which I shall send him Monday. I think I see a law-suit for libel.”\(^{318}\)

Hoxie wrote to Durant with what he could find out about the *Dispatch*’s owners on the next day.

“I cannot certainly inform you, as requested, who are the responsible owners of the St. Louis *Dispatch*, published by the St. Louis Dispatch Printing Co.

It is not, however, a corporation. The property has been owned more or less anonymously by various persons. Those who now own it as nearly as I can ascertain are Boston Able, John Howe and O.D. or Giles F. Filley. Less credibly, R. J. Howard and Samuel T. Glover are named as owner in part.

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\(^{317}\) Hoxie to Durant, May 24, 1865, Series II, Box 20, File “Hoxie, Herbert Melville,” Leonard Collection. Hoxie was a straw man in the awarding of the first major construction contract for the Union Pacific out of Omaha. His interests in the contract were assigned to the Credit Mobilier Corporation. See Select Committee to Investigate the Alleged Credit Mobilier Bribery, *Credit Mobilier Investigation, House Report 77*, Serial Set Vol. No. 1577, Vol. No. 2, 42\(^{nd}\) Congress, 3\(^{rd}\) sess., 391. Luke Poland of Vermont was committee chairman and the report will be referred to hereafter as the Poland Committee Report. Also see J. B. Crawford, *The Credit Mobilier of America: Its Origin and History. Its Work of Constructing the Union Pacific Railroad and the Relation of Members of Congress Therewith* (Boston: C. W. Calkins & Co., Publishers, 1890), 26. Attached to testimony of T. C. Durant in the Poland Committee Report are documents including the contract signed with Hoxie on August 8, 1864, and his assignment of the contract to Durant or his assignees on September 30, 1864. The attached documents showed that the contract that had begun with Hoxie was assigned to the Credit Mobilier on March 15, 1865.

\(^{318}\) Grenville M. Dodge, *“Autobiography,”* microfilm at the State Historical Society of Iowa Library in Des Moines, Iowa, 359. Dodge was then commanding the Army’s Department of Missouri.
Great care is taken to conceal the responsible ownership from the public, and perhaps also to avoid any responsible ownership. Tracy and Grissom, the manager and editor are wholly irresponsible parties. The men named as responsible owners, Able, Howe and Filley, are men of large wealth and together worth perhaps $1,000,000 certainly more than $500,000.\textsuperscript{319}

Hoxie then discussed Missouri libel and slander laws in the letter, apparently having gleaned information from the judge advocate on Dodge’s staff, who, Hoxie maintained, had advised that legal action would reveal the paper’s ownership arrangements. Hoxie wrote more bad news on the same day on letterhead that read “Head Quarters, Department of the Missouri,” apparently from Dodge’s headquarters. “The newspapers of western Iowa are pitching into you on a rumor that emanates from Omaha that you are going to commence the road at Bellevue [rather than Omaha]. The Council Bluffs paper copied the first article I mailed to you. General Dodge who is at Leavenworth writes me that he is afraid you will have a fight.”\textsuperscript{320}

Publicity about a potential fire hazard posed by snow sheds, which eventually covered thirty-seven miles of Central Pacific track in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, caused some concern in fall 1867 correspondence between E. B. Crocker, the railroad’s attorney in Sacramento, and Collis P. Huntington, its vice president in New York City. Huntington had included a clipping about “pine boards that you are covering up the C. P. road with” in a letter on September 30, 1867, to Crocker.\textsuperscript{321} Crocker responded on October 22, “As to that ‘pine board covering,’ you or somebody appear to be laboring under a mistake. The covering boards and the timbers are all sloshed over with a heavy coat of coal tar mixed with a peculiar rock ground fine and which makes it fire proof.”\textsuperscript{322}

\textsuperscript{319} Hoxie to Durant, June 5, 1865, Series II, Box 20, File “Hoxie, Herbert Melville,” Leonard Collection.  
\textsuperscript{320} Hoxie to Durant, June 5, 1865, Series II, Box 20, File “Hoxie, Herbert Melville,” Leonard Collection.  
\textsuperscript{321} Huntington to Crocker, September 30, 1867, Series I, Box 1, of the Collis Potter Huntington Papers in the Special Collections Research Center at the Syracuse University Library. The papers are organized chronologically and hereafter will be referred to as the Huntington Papers.  
\textsuperscript{322} Crocker to Huntington, October 22, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
Crocker seemed exasperated with Huntington complaining about the snow shed fire hazard in a letter sixteen days later. “You still sneer about ‘pine lumber’ being ‘stacked up on the line.’ If you knew how much it cost us last winter to shovel snow out of those cuts, you would not say another word. Snow sheds will pay their cost in a single winter. In a late letter I explained how they were made and the security against fire.”

The correspondence examined for this dissertation is replete with references to newspaper articles, much of it mentions specific enclosed but missing newspaper clippings, often called “slips.” Some of it contains a mere mention that clippings are enclosed. Others discuss articles or enclosed clippings. “You have seen by the papers that our road has been the subject of attack from some of our enemies,” Oakes Ames

323 Crocker to Huntington, November 7, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
324 See for the Central Pacific leaders, Crocker to Huntington, January 10, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Crocker to Huntington, March 20, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Crocker to Huntington, May 22, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Crocker to Huntington, June 8, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Huntington to Crocker, November 15, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Huntington to Crocker, November 26, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Crocker to Huntington, February 7, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Huntington to Crocker, February 25, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Crocker to Huntington, March 9, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Huntington to Crocker, March 12, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; and Huntington to Crocker, April 6, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers. See for the Union Pacific leaders, Oakes Ames to Durant, March 30, 1868, Series II, Box 3, File “Ames, Oakes,” Leonard Collection; Oakes Ames to Oliver Ames, May 28, 1868., Oliver Ames, Jr., incoming Correspondence Letterbooks, Stonehill College Archives and Special Collections, Arnold B. Tofias Industrial Archives, Brockton, Massachusetts, hereafter referred to as the Oliver Ames Jr. Papers, which are arranged in chronological order; Poland Committee Report, testimony of Henry Wilson, U. S. Senator from Massachusetts, 189; and J. Blickensderfer, a Union Pacific location engineer, to Dodge, December 4, 1868, Box 66, Vol. 155, File 6, “December 1-15, 1868,” Grenville Mellen Dodge Papers at the State Historical Society of Iowa Library in Des Moines, hereafter referred to as the Dodge Papers.
325 For the Central Pacific see Crocker to Huntington, May 13, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Huntington to Crocker, memorandum, March 26, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers; Huntington to Crocker, April 17, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers; and Huntington to Leland Stanford, June 8, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers. For the Union Pacific, see Hoxie to Durant, January 31, 1866, Series II, Box 20, File “Hoxie, Herbert Melville,” Leonard Collection; Springer Harbaugh, Union Pacific government director from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to John Adams Dix, Union Pacific president, and Durant, March 28, 1866., Series II, Box 17, File “Harbaugh, Springer,” Leonard Collection; telegram, R. W. Latham to H.C. Crane, February 8, 1869, Series II, Box 22, File “Latham, R. W.,” Leonard Collection; and telegram, Snyder to Dodge, April 16, 1869, Box 67, Vol. 157, File 6, “April 3-17, 1869,” Dodge Papers.

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wrote to Durant on March 30, 1868, in a letter written on U.S. House stationary.326 R. W. Latham, writing from Washington, D.C., to H. G. Crane, Durant’s secretary in New York City, sounded worried in a letter on November 25, 1868, about newspaper articles that had appeared. “I enclose you an editorial from the Chronicle here [Washington, D.C.], which is simply a copy of what I sent you from the Baltimore Sun yesterday,” Latham said. “The article doubtless was dictated by the president’s direction. I hope Doct. Durant will get back soon, and have organized here a power to defend your road, and secure its rights.”327 A Union Pacific government director (the Pacific Railroad Act required that presidentially appointed directors be included on the Union Pacific’s board of directors), Jesse Lynch Williams, complained in another letter on April 1, 1869, that the New York Times was treating the railroad unfairly. “A very unjust Editorial is in the New York Times of this morning,” Williams said to Dodge. “Get the paper and read it. I thought that Journal was on the other side.”328

Among the Central Pacific leaders, Huntington kept his associates in California informed of his monitoring of eastern papers: “I send clip from Herald, such things do us no good here,” he said in a letter on March 7, 1868, to Mark Hopkins, Central Pacific treasurer.329 Ten days later, Huntington enclosed more clips, this time to Crocker, “I send with this clips from Washington Paper. It will not hurt us much as it shows very plainly that it was written for the purpose of getting Black Mail.”330 Crocker was sending clips back to Huntington: “I also inclose slip cut from to day’s Record. It hits the Union hard, but was not written by any of us.”331 In a letter on August 26, 1868, from Union Pacific

327 R. W. Latham to H. C. Crane, November 25, 1868, Series II, Box 22, File “Latham, R. W.,” Leonard Collection. President Andrew Johnson appears to have had little direct involvement in the transcontinental railroad, although his appointees: the Secretary of the Interior, government representatives on the Union Pacific board of directors, and commissioners to inspect construction had direct involvement.
328 J. L. Williams to Dodge, April 1, 1869, Box 67, Vol. 157, File 4, ”March 30-April 2, 1869,” Dodge Papers.
329 Huntington to Hopkins, March 7, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers,
330 Huntington to Crocker, March 17, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
331 Crocker to Huntington, June 5, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
Superintendent Webster Snyder to Chief Engineer Dodge in Salt Lake City, he complained that he did not know what was going on “outside” because he was so busy that he did not get time to read newspapers.332

The transcontinental leaders also noted and passed around clippings positive to their enterprises. The clippings are not part of the archives, but the correspondence remains. Oakes Ames seemed happy with the Union Pacific company’s efforts to distribute good news in a letter on May 21, 1868, to his brother, Oliver. “I enclose you three slips from Cheyenne paper. If we have so many new things in one paper we are scattering well. Are they true where is Durant and who is doing these things and by what authority.”333 Herbert Hoxie was so pleased with a Chicago Tribune article that he told Dodge about it in a letter on December 6, 1868. “The Chicago Tribune of Wednesday contains special from Washington that is rather good. [Silas] Seymour [a Union Pacific consulting engineer] evidently wrote the article.”334

Crocker sent Huntington a copy of the San Francisco Alta with a letter on May 3, 1867. “I send you copy of the Alta California, the financial and commercial article being a very flattering statement of our affairs. The Alta always wants to be on the strong side.”335 Huntington wanted more copies of an article that Crocker apparently sent him later that year, perhaps to use in convincing potential investors. “That was a very good article in the weekly Mercury, Vol. 1, No. 1 [perhaps the San Jose, California, Weekly Mercury then in publication]. If you could send me a few copies I would like it.”336

Huntington offered a pessimistic assessment of the likelihood of a positive Thomas Magee article appearing in the New York World in a letter on June 8, 1868, to Hopkins. “The Herald had a good article on Saturday written by T. McGee [sic]. I sent the Paper to Ewing. It will do us good with the Secretary [apparently Interior Secretary Orville Hickman Browning]. I also inclose the letter with this T. Mc wrote [on?] our Co.

335 Crocker to Huntington, May 3, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
336 Huntington to Crocker, November 2, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
[for?] *The World* (sent me a copy). It is more sally than the one in the *Herald*, but it has not come out yet and may not as the paper is receiving large amounts from the Union Co. for advertising & c.”

**Intelligence Gathering**

The transcontinental leaders clearly used newspaper accounts to gather intelligence. The Central Pacific leaders, in particular, left a record of the information they found in newspapers on competitors or potential competitors. Crocker, for instance, told Huntington in a letter on January 10, 1867, about reported progress on a short-line railroad originating in Vallejo, California, a potential competitor to Central Pacific arrangements because it was projected to run to Sacramento. “Haskins [apparently D. C. Haskin, builder of the California Pacific Railroad from Vallejo to Sacramento] is still making a great blow through the papers. An article appears in the *Alta*, stating in the most positive terms that the road will be built from Vallejo to this city [Sacramento] by Nov. next.” Crocker followed up in a letter on March 20, 1867: “As to the Vallejo Co. they have only scratched the ground a little around Vallejo. The papers there keep saying that the storms keep them back, but they are going to do great things when the weather settles.” That summer, Crocker updated Huntington on the Vallejo road in a letter on August 15. “From the newspaper accounts it seems that the Vallejo Co. are still at work, but I judge they are not doing much.”

The *Alta* was working to build the prospects for another railroad, Crocker told Huntington in a letter on May 22, 1867. That road, the Southern Pacific, eventually would be acquired by the Central Pacific associates and used to form a southern transcontinental connection. “That San Diego correspondent of the *Alta* wrote a big lie about the Southern Pacific breaking ground. All they have done is survey the line from San Jose to Gilroy, and it is in the hands of Phelps Hutchinson & Co., who will never

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337 Huntington to Hopkins, June 8, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
338 Crocker to Huntington, January 10, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
339 Crocker to Huntington, March 20, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
340 Crocker to Huntington, August 15, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
build a mile of road, but are waiting to sell out. I think they have given the *Alta* some stock, perhaps something else, to blow for them."\(^{341}\)

The Central Pacific associates were interested in acquiring another California short line that was supposed to reach Marysville from Roseville and a connection with the California Northern Railroad there. C. L. Wilson had fallen seven miles short of reaching Marysville from Folsom with the California Central and the Central Pacific leaders were looking to buy him out. Crocker was keeping Huntington posted and sent him a Marysville *Appeal* article that, he said, indicated that the feeling in Marysville was that they wanted Wilson out of the way.\(^{342}\)

Huntington reciprocated with reports from New York on the Central Pacific’s biggest rival, the Union Pacific: “The Union Co. after quarreling for the last three days and having men running to keep the quarrel out of the papers, have at last agreed upon a [board of directors]. I see by this morning papers a list of the names published as the Board of Directors, and as I divide them, Ames has 11 and Durant 9."\(^{343}\)

The Union Pacific’s directors had formed into two factions, one supporting Durant and his contention that the earliest investors’ interests, including his own, should control the company, and the other around the Ames brothers, Oliver and Oakes, made up mostly of later Boston-area investors, who were attempting to assert their control over the company.\(^{344}\) Durant’s hostility toward the Ameses became open when Oliver Ames, named a Union Pacific director on October 3, 1866, was elected the company’s president pro tem on November 24, 1866, with the departure of figurehead company president John Adams Dix.\(^{345}\) The feuding included Durant getting court injunctions to stop the company from awarding a contract for construction in March 1867.\(^{346}\) Durant was removed as president of Credit Mobilier and as a member of its board of directors on

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\(^{341}\) Crocker to Huntington, May 22, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\(^{342}\) Crocker to Huntington, May 22, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\(^{343}\) Huntington to Crocker, October 5, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\(^{344}\) For a discussion of the feuding between the two factions, see Ames, *Pioneering the Union Pacific*, 188-92.
\(^{345}\) Ames, *Pioneering the Union Pacific*, 155.
May 18, 1867, after the Ameses and Sidney Dillon had quietly purchased enough Credit Mobilier shares to control that company. By May 30, 1867, Oliver Ames, acting Union Pacific president, sent Dodge a letter telling Dodge that Durant should be considered “hostile to the road.” On June 21, 1867, Durant met with Oliver Ames to try to get back into the Union Pacific management, according to Ames’ diary. According to the diary’s entries in September, Durant and his friends tried to gain control of the Union Pacific Company prior to the October board of directors meeting by subscribing to additional stock, but the Ames faction matched and far exceeded Durant’s resources by pledging $50 million for additional Union Pacific stock. However, when the company tried to award a 667-mile construction contract to Oakes Ames, which was negotiated in August 1867, Durant blocked it with a court injunction and forced the formation of a group of trustees, including himself, to oversee the Oakes Ames contract and divide its profits. Durant was back in charge as vice president in March 1868. He was put out of the management for good in March 1869. Dodge, in his “Autobiography,” said that Durant was forced out for good on March 10, 1869. “The Union Pacific was under new direction and management and the Durant interest eliminated, excepting so far as the great interest he had in the contracts and as a stockholder in the contracting company. We expected him to make as much trouble here as possible.” Durant’s resignation letter on May 24, 1869, claimed that he was the largest stockholder in the company, that he was resigning as vice president, and that he would not accept election to the board of directors.

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349 Oliver Ames Jr., diary, Stonehill College Archives and Special Collections, Arnold B. Tofias Industrial Archives, Brockton, Massachusetts.
353 Durant to President and Board of Directors, UPRR, May 24, 1869, Series II, Box 31, File “Union Pacific Railroad Company,” Leonard Collection.
Crocker passed along to Huntington what he heard of the Union Pacific on his end. As they considered building into Utah, Mormon leader Brigham Young became a subject for monitoring and particularly Young’s relationship with the Union Pacific Company. Both companies could use Mormon help when they constructed their lines in Utah, and Crocker reported what he knew about a visit by Dodge to Salt Lake City in a letter on September 12, 1867. “I doubt whether Gen. Dodge saw Young at all, and if he did it is doubtful whether anything occurred between them. I think from what I learn through the papers that Young was absent on one of his annual tours about the time Dodge was there.”  

In a letter to Huntington on July 31, 1868, Crocker reported that the Union Pacific might be having problems with alkali water in the Wyoming desert. “I suspect the U. P. must have met with difficulties about water, I see by a letter from a newspaper correspondent that they are troubled with alkali water, and from our experience of it, the difficulty is a great one.”

The leaders also used newspaper accounts to monitor politics and legislation. Silas Seymour, the Union Pacific’s consulting engineer then in New York City, wrote to Durant in Omaha on June 27, 1866, that the amended Pacific Railroad Act had passed the U.S. House of Representatives. He said he had seen a newspaper article reporting the passage. Durant in St. Joseph, Missouri, telegraphed his secretary, H. G. Crane, in New York City on June 23, 1864, that he had seen that a bill was moving through Congress, according to the Associated Press, but he had been advised that bill’s version would not pass the House. A telegram exchange on December 3, 1868, between Durant, in Washington, D. C., and Crane, in New York City, apparently monitored coverage of Washington events in the New York City papers. “Was [sic] there any

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354 Crocker to Huntington, September 12, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
355 Crocker to Huntington, July 31, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers. According to Gerald M. Best, *Iron Horses to Promontory* (San Marino, California: Golden West Books, 1969), 108, the Union Pacific construction on July 31, 1868, would have been in the vicinity of Laramie (reached on June 18) Benton (reached in July), and Point of Rock (reached on September 11, 1868). The alkali water, which the Central Pacific encountered in Nevada dry areas, damaged the boilers and pipes on the steam locomotives, which required regular water refreshment.
356 Seymour to Durant, June 27, 1866, Series II, Box 28, File “Seymour, Silas,” Leonard Collection.
357 Telegram, Durant to H. C. Crane, June 23, 1864, Series II, Box 8, File “Crane, Henry C.,” Leonard Collection.
extracts from Post published in morning papers except concluding remarks,” Durant said.\textsuperscript{358} Crane responded: “Concluding remarks only, Washington correspondent makes favorable comments, World says nothing.”\textsuperscript{359} Crocker, in a letter to Huntington on April 21, 1868, reported that based on a newspaper account, Central Pacific friend U.S. Rep. Samuel Beach Axtell would win the Democratic nomination in his district.\textsuperscript{360}

Transcontinental railroad principals even learned information about their own companies through newspaper reports. In two letters in 1868 to Crocker, Huntington asked about what he had seen in public reports on the Central Pacific. “I notice by dispatch to the Associated Press that you had bought the San Jose Road; how is it?” Huntington wrote in a letter on February 25, 1868.\textsuperscript{361} In April, Huntington said he had learned that his associates were laying track on the Western Railroad, something he advised against because it would take resources from the transcontinental effort. “I notice by the Cal. Papers that you are laying track on the Western Road, but I think it is a mistake.”\textsuperscript{362} On the Union Pacific side, Oakes Ames wrote his brother, Oliver, on April 18, 1868, that he had learned from a newspaper that the track had crossed the Black Hills or Laramie Mountains at Sherman’s Summit. “I see by the Chronicle this morning that the road is laid to the Summit on the 16\textsuperscript{th} by Telegram to the Secy of the Interior,” Oakes said.\textsuperscript{363} In his diary, Oliver Ames, Union Pacific president, noted that he had learned from newspapers that the two transcontinental companies had agreed to a joining at Promontory Point, Utah. “Learned from papers that point of Junction is fixed (at Promontory) and am not satisfied at all with it.”\textsuperscript{364} Union Pacific officials had hoped to lay their track well west of Promontory, perhaps as far as Humboldt Wells in Nevada, to control the Salt Lake City market and the easiest routes northwest to Oregon.

\textsuperscript{358} Telegram, Durant to Crane, December 3, 1868, Series II, Box 8, File “Crane, Henry C.,” Leonard Collection.  
\textsuperscript{359} Telegram, Crane to Durant, December 3, 1868, Series II, Box 8, File “Crane, Henry C.,” Leonard Collection.  
\textsuperscript{360} Crocker to Huntington, April 21, 1868, Series II, Box 2, Huntington Papers.  
\textsuperscript{361} Huntington to Crocker, February 25, 1868, Series II, Box 1, Huntington Papers.  
\textsuperscript{362} Huntington to Crocker, April 28, 1868, Series II, Box 2, Huntington Papers.  
\textsuperscript{363} Oakes Ames to Oliver Ames, April 18, 1868, Oliver Ames Jr. Papers.  
\textsuperscript{364} Oliver Ames Jr. Diary, April 10, 1869.
The monitoring of publications also revealed technology and techniques that might be useful. Springer Harbaugh pasted a clipping from the *United States Rail Road and Morning Register* of Philadelphia of June 16, 1866, about an experiment to burn peat to fuel locomotives in a letter to Durant on June 19, 1866. The experiment, on June 2, 1866, was carried out by the New Haven, Hartford and Springfield Railroad, according to the clipping. “One great consideration, which will be hailed with joy by the traveling public,” the clipping said, “is the entire absence of smoke or cinders, the whole substance burning to ashes.”365 Crocker, in a letter on March 20, 1867, to Huntington, reported that a certain freight locomotive looked like it would work well on the Central Pacific. Crocker told Huntington that he was enclosing “a slip cut out of a paper about just the kind of freight engine for your road – I have seen it favorably noticed in several railroad papers. I have talked with Hopkins and we think it would be well to get one made and sent out so that we can give it a trial.”366

**Journalists as Central Pacific Targets**

The transcontinental leaders attempted to manipulate the publicity their railroads received in what historian Stephen E. Ambrose said was the next big national story after the Civil War: “Reporters trained in the war had little of national significance to write about [after the war] and, therefore, gravitated to the railroad story.”367 The transcontinental railroad dominated the news of 1867, he said, and developed into a “mania” in the spring of 1868 with the railroad at “the top of the news in every newspaper, nearly every day on the front pages.”368 Historian Edward L. Sabin said a rare early public glimpse of transcontinental work was provided with the August 1865 Schuyler Colfax excursion on Central Pacific tracks.

In mid-August the Speaker [of the U.S. House] Colfax party from the East inspected the line from Sacramento to the end o’ track at Colfax, and along the grade almost to the summit. Through Editor [Samuel]
Bowles and his Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican, and journalist A. D. Richardson, New York Tribune man and ex-prisoner of war, the American people were given their first authoritative unbiased tip upon the mighty achievement ever waxing amidst these wild fastnesses.

Heretofore the project, so slowly developing, of the Pacific Railway had been but briefly treated in the National press. California was safe and remote, and war news held the columns of daily and weekly in stern grip. Truth to say, through several years of actual construction work the Pacific Railway lacked advertising other than that put out by its companies in prospectuses and reports and the financial departments of the public prints.369

Historian Thomas C. Cochran wrote that railroad leaders in the time period were engaged in attempts to influence editors and have favorable articles published.370 William Francis Deverell said the Central Pacific leaders, in particular, became adept at influencing the news. “Crucial to the maintenance of a popular pro-railroad disposition involved corporate influence upon the press. The directors of the Central Pacific, at first inexperienced, would eventually master this sort of lobbying. The Big Four did not single out California newspapers; Stanford and Huntington, in particular, took pains to create favorable eastern opinion about the American West, the Central Pacific, and rail travel in general.”371

In 1867, the Central Pacific associates were trying to get the Associated Press correspondent in San Francisco to disseminate what they wanted over the wires. Apparently, they assigned the task of relations with the correspondent to company president Leland Stanford, but he did not get results. “I have got matters in tow to control [?] the agent of the Associated Press,” Crocker revealed to Huntington in a letter on January 31, 1867. “I had left the matter to Stanford, who spends nearly all his time in S.F. [San Francisco] but he did not attend to it, and now I have got A. G. Richardson at it

and I have just got a letter from him that he will see to it and can do it.”

In May, Huntington apparently was pushing his California associates to get more positive publicity with telegraphed reports on construction progress similar to publicity the Union Pacific was receiving. “You refer to telegraphic dispatches,” Crocker said in a letter to Huntington on May 27. “I have noticed the daily item from Omaha that the U.P. are laying track at a rate of 2 to 2 ½ miles per day. Some of them come this way. There is no one of us to attend to this but myself, and I do not come in contact with the agent of the Ass [sic] Press, who is in S.F. I am so overrun with a mass of detail that I find it impossible to get at everything. I will however bear it in mind and send facts to Richardson and get him to have them sent.”

On June 4, Crocker had more to report to Huntington on the Associated Press agent in San Francisco:

As to telegraph matters I find the agent of the Ass. Press in S. F. is required to send commercial reports, the arrival and departure of vessels, market reports and the like, that is limited to a certain amount of matter, and this commercial news takes nearly all of it. He appears willing to send items for us, when he has any room. It seems that Simonton in N.Y. controls this whole matter, and if he should send directions to allow more matter sent, it could give us a better chance. I have left with the agent several brief items, and will furnish him more from time to time, and if you can get Simonton all right I think we will be able to get that matter working all right.

In August, Crocker seemed perplexed that the items he was giving the San Francisco Associated Press correspondent were not appearing. “We have sent numerous items to agent of Ass. Press in San Francisco, but I have not noticed any of them in the Post, which is the only N.Y. paper I take. How is it, do they appear there. [sic, correspondents of the period rarely use question marks] The agent here declares he sends them. It may be that Simonton suppresses them.”

Huntington responded in a letter on September 7, “I think I have seen three telegrams from Cal. in relation to work & etc. on the C. P. road, and likely there has [sic] been others. If you can get good notices in the

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372 Crocker to Huntington, January 31, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
373 Crocker to Huntington, May 27, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
374 Crocker to Huntington, June 4, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
375 Crocker to Huntington, August 16, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
Cal. Papers and send the Papers to me, I will get them republished on this side. I think all telegrams that come over, that relate to our road, are treated fairly, as Simonson and myself are on good terms.”

By October, Crocker reported that he was using the Associated Press dispatches to create the proper impressions to allow Huntington to buy up bonds for railroads that the associates were acquiring: “The papers here got to saying that we had bought the Yuba and Cal. Central roads and we feared that it would go East in that form and so affect your purchasing the bonds. So we had the dispatch put through that it was the rolling stock and not the roads we bought, thus they [bondholders] would see their roads were left without rolling stock [and, therefore, worth less].”

Crocker sounded confident in a letter on December 12 that he could further direct Associated Press dispatches from San Francisco: “When we connect [a gap in the line] I will see that the Ass [sic] Press agent sends the news. Avery, a good friend of ours is the agent, and he is here this winter, reporting for the Bulletin.”

Crocker told Huntington in a letter on July 10 that he had prepared facts to go into an article for publication as he anticipated completing the Summit Tunnel, “By this time there cannot be more than 250 feet left in that tunnel, which will be out in say 6 weeks or the 20th of August. I shall of course telegraph you promptly and get the ass. [sic] Press agent to do the same. You can afford to blow over it in the N.Y. papers. I have hastily put together a few facts about this work, from which Mr. Coleman [a writer in Huntington’s employ in New York City] can make up an article. I will get a copy and send it in my next letter.”

Even though they had gained some control over Associated Press dispatches originating in San Francisco, harmful telegraphic dispatches were getting out and being published in at least one New York City newspaper, according to Crocker in a letter to Huntington on March 28, 1868.

The telegrams to the Herald were taken from articles in the papers here that have all been taken back after the parties interested had denied

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376 Huntington to Crocker, September 7, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
377 Crocker to Huntington, October 22, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
378 Crocker to Huntington, December 12, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
379 Crocker to Huntington, July 10, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
them. Some fellow humbugged the Bulletin with them. Of course such things hurt us there but how can we stop them. The Herald has a special agent here and don’t rely on the associated press dispatches. We do not know who he is and the legislature has kept us tied down here for 2 mos. so none of us could get away. The legislature adjourns Monday and these sensational things I think will adjourn with them. They were got up to influence them.\textsuperscript{380}

By the end of 1868, however, they apparently experienced trouble again getting what they wanted out from the San Francisco Associated Press agent. Crocker told Huntington in a letter on December 5 that he would look into the matter.\textsuperscript{381} In a letter on December 10, Central Pacific treasurer Mark Hopkins told Huntington that promises had been made by the Associated Press agent. “We have recently sent several items to the Agt. Of Associated Press and obtained promises that they would be sent to the Eastern Press. I hope they went. The enclosed dispatch from Stanford is supposed to have been sent East to Associated Press.”\textsuperscript{382}

Hopkins gave Huntington an assessment of overall California newspaper coverage of the Central Pacific in a letter on December 21, 1868: “Besides keeping our scrapbook record up, we have some duplicate newspaper clippings which I enclose with this, chiefly to show your our newspapers are discussing RR matters Editorially with more animation that ever before and with stronger sympathy in our behalf – Except the Sac Union, nearly all seem to see the importance to the commercial interests of the state and Pacific coast that our road should go East to Weber Canon [Canyon, east of Ogden, Utah].”\textsuperscript{383}

Huntington had given an assessment of the New York City newspaper scene in a May 5, 1868, letter to Crocker: “The Tribune has been very strongly opposed to aid any Rail Roads until we have reduced our National debt & c but I have had several talks with them lately and I think they are going to be pleasant. I send one article from yesterday’s

\textsuperscript{380} Crocker to Huntington, March 28, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\textsuperscript{381} Crocker to Huntington, December 5, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
\textsuperscript{382} Hopkins to Huntington, December 10, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
\textsuperscript{383} Hopkins to Huntington, December 21, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
paper. I think we can get all the N.Y. dailys [sic] to say good natured things for these great National through lines.”

Huntington clearly understood the power of publicized information in New York City financial markets. After a Presidential Cabinet decision on October 20, 1868, approving a Central Pacific proposed line into canyons east of Ogden, Huntington wanted Central Pacific workers to begin grading on the line to establish possession of it ahead of Union Pacific workers. When Central Pacific graders occupied the line, Huntington said, his California associates should let him know so that he could see that it was published in New York City newspapers. If he did that, he might be able cause a bankruptcy of the Union Pacific, then scrambling to get cash to keep its construction going.

The Central Pacific track approaching Utah in late 1868 led to a discussion by company president Leland Stanford about Utah newspapers and whether the Central Pacific wanted to exert control over them. Apparently, Huntington in New York had seen some Utah papers and judged them to be biased toward the Union Pacific and its manager, Durant. Huntington passed his fall 1868 assessment to Stanford, then in Utah looking out for Central Pacific interests and he responded: “You speak of the papers being in Durant’s interest. We could have had them in our interest, but I did not think after surveying the ground that they were worth getting. The fact is there is but one power [Mormon leader Young] here to be cared for, and we have the good will of that.”

Later, Stanford elaborated in a letter on November 21, 1868, to Huntington.

Brigham wants we should beat the U.P. to Ogden. I presume you understand the location of Ogden. It is between the Weber and Ogden [rivers] near the mouth of Weber [Canyon] where Brigham Young wishes to connect a Railroad to be built by himself to run South to Salt Lake City. I don’t think you will see anything more in either of the Mormon Papers unfriendly to us. Brigham’s organ the Deseret News has not so far as I am aware said anything intended to our prejudice since my first visit.

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384 Huntington to E. B. Crocker, May 5, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
386 Stanford to Huntington, November 10, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington papers.
There is another little paper here the Gentile Paper that wants help but its friendship in this locality is hurtful. I have not sought its friendship.387

In 1867, Crocker and Huntington discussed the creation of illustrations to accompany articles, perhaps in big New York City-based magazines. In a letter on March 8, Crocker suggested that they might be able to use an artist to create views to accompany an article. “That will be a good thing to get that illustrated article in Harper’s Magazine. How would it do to get Ross [Russ?] Browne to go over the line as soon as the snow is off and write the articles and get our stereoscope artist to take some views expressly for it.”388 In a letter to Huntington on June 4, Crocker said the proposed Harper’s article “ought to be illustrated, but I presume that can be done with the views you have.”389 In a letter on August 2, Crocker was back to suggesting that illustrations be created in California to accompany magazine articles:

The proprietors of the Sunday Mercury, a literary paper in S.F., propose to illustrate it with Cal. views and want to put in views of the R.R. and they say they can, or have, arranged it to send on the engraved blocks to Harper or Leslie where they will be republished. We to pay the cost of engraving $40 each. We think of trying 10 or 12 views. Of course there will be a proper descriptive article with each. They may not be able to get them republished in N.Y. Do you think you could, you furnishing the engraving and the descriptive articles.390

Huntington rejected Crocker’s proposal, however, in a letter on August 23: “As to the proposition of the S.F. Mercury to print views & etc., I think it would not pay as we are not selling any securities in Cal. and the paper is not taken on this side, and I do not think that the Harper’s would republish it, and Leslie is only taken by women and children.”391

The Central Pacific leaders also were engaged in pamphlet publication. In a letter on November 7, 1867, Crocker suggested a pamphlet in German to get winemakers to

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387 Stanford in Salt Lake City to Huntington, November 21, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
388 Crocker to Huntington, March 8, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
389 Crocker to Huntington, June 4, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
390 Crocker to Huntington, August 2, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
391 Huntington to Crocker, August 23, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
settle on Sierra Nevada slopes to generate freight and passengers for trains. “I have long thought that a well written pamphlet printed in German showing the value of our lands for grape raising would help us and I will have Redding write it up. He is good on land and viniculture. I think letters from German wine cultivators will be good to print with it. There is no doubt that the grapes raised on the foothills make the best wine in the state.”

Union Pacific Manipulation

On the Union Pacific side, attempts to coordinate or manipulate news coverage were documented as being carried out by R. W. Latham, a Durant agent in Washington, and Dodge. Latham, in letters to Durant in December 1868, was working to put out publicity fires ignited after Treasury Secretary Hugh McCulloch had halted bond releases for the transcontinental railroad companies until there could be assurances of quality construction. It was a time when the Union Pacific sorely needed money. In a letter on December 7, Latham told Durant of more problems in Washington, D. C.:

I also ascertained that Hoover former Marshall of this District, who owns the *Evening Express* of this city, and who is one of the leaders in the Democratic party, has gotten up some awful charges against your road, and he charges that he was cheated by the Rock Island party [apparently the leaders of the Rock Island Railroad], who got him into Mississippi and Missouri Road [a railroad Durant was associated with prior to his involvement with the Union Pacific], and he put you down as the one who done it. I told him that whoever may have cheated him, you certainly had not. He promised that he would say nothing more until he saw Mr. [L. F] Shatlock [Shattuck, Union Pacific advertising and special agent], from whom I delivered him a message. He also promised me to see the *Intelligencer* party and get them to say nothing more, until he saw Mr. [Shattuck]. I therefore telegraphed you to have Mr. S. here tomorrow.

All the newspaper men except one or two are satisfied, and enthusiastic, and when Mr. S. gets here he can put it all right.

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392 Crocker to Huntington, November 7, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
In a letter two days later, Latham advised Durant that a Colonel Johnson “has made a legal argument in regard to the delivery of your bonds, which he has read to McCalloch [sic]. I have advised him to send you a copy of it, which he says he will do. You may deem it worthy of publication.”394 Also on December 9, Latham reported to Durant that Shattuck had arrived: “Mr. Shattock [sic] arrived here this morning and I am sure he will fix up all the unfinished business with the press, in a manner satisfactory. If Mr. Shattock fixes his business here today, and I have no doubt but that he will, I see no obstacles in the way of your perfect triumph [sic].”395

In April 1869, a little over a month before the Promontory Point joining of the two railroads, Dodge launched an attempt to gain favorable publicity in Chicago as the Union Pacific leaders fought with their Central Pacific counterparts over federally designated control of the transcontinental line in eastern Utah. Dodge told the story in his autobiography:

I was very anxious to have the friends of the company understand fully our position in this contest with the Central Pacific as they had been advertising their claims against us with considerable effect and on April 1, 1869, I wired Messrs. Hall, Ayres and Co., who were a railroad supply concern as follows:

Washington, April 1st, 1869

Great efforts are being made by legislation and otherwise to stop our road at Ogden when our track has now passed Ogden twenty-five miles, and the Central road is 150 miles West of that point. Get the Tribune and other papers to denounce this and demand that the two roads shall continue till they meet, and have the substance of their articles telegraphed to the eastern papers.

On April 2, 1869, I received a letter from Hale, Ayer [sic] & Co. from Chicago, as follows:

Your telegram was received today. The writer immediately called on Mr. White, the Senior Editor of the Chicago Tribune, and he promised the writer that he would write a good, strong article expressing himself 394 Latham to Durant, December 9, 1868, Series II, Box 22, File “Latham, R.W.,” Leonard Collection
395 Latham to Durant, December 9, 1868, Series II, Box 22, File “Latham, R.W.,” Leonard Collection
strongly that the U.P.R.R. had right on their side unless there was something in the law as to the point of meeting fixing it at a given point.

We came to the conclusion it was not advisable to have an article on that subject published at the same time, as it might look as if it was gotten up for this particular occasion by concert of action among the Journals of the city. Tomorrow will endeavor to have an article in some other paper. If there is anything we can do for you further command us and we will obey.

On April 5, 1869, I wrote the following letter to Horace White, the Editor of the Chicago Tribune:

Washington, 1869

I did not like to telegraph you or write but Hall, Ayer & Co. were very large creditors of ours; we purchase immense amount of stores, but I had no idea they would take the course they did. I thought they understood the question fully and could explain, but I see now that I ought to have written you directly.

The country demands a road – a good one, and to make us pull up our track and wait two or three months for the C. P. Co. to reach us is a base fraud that the country or no one else would stand.396

Dodge also knew the power that publicity could exert. He displayed that understanding in a story from the fall of 1868 in Utah that he recounted in his autobiography.

On Oct. 11th I started East to the end of the track by the line and with me were Messrs. Durant, Reed, Seymour, Root and a French countess and Miss Young. I was taking Miss Young along for the purpose of visiting one of the bishops, her people asking me to do so. When we reached the Bishops [sic], I supposed Miss Young would stop there. I was away from my train all day and when I returned at night I found her still with the train working her way east evidently trying to get out of Salt Lake. I knew it would not do for me to aid her in escaping and told her that she would have to return to the Bishops house. She protested very strongly and I greatly sympathized with her. I learned that they were trying to induce her to be sealed to one of the bishops as a plural wife, but I told her frankly that I could not help her escape from the territory but that I would write to Brigham Young about the matter, which I did. I

wrote him a very strong letter giving him all the facts in the matter. He stopped the marriage, I think, more from the fact that I did not propose to make any publicity of the matter unless the girl was forced to accept this bishop; but if she did, the story had become so well known among my whole party that it would be impossible to keep it a secret.397

Secrecy and Deception

The transcontinental builders were accustomed to secrecy and officials of both companies developed codes to encrypt their telegrams.398 Ambrose suggested that the transcontinental companies were the first businesses to use secret codes.399 Historian Wesley A. Griswold said that one Hopkins telegram to Huntington on March 12, 1869, was “Roving Pella Fish Dance” or, unencrypted, “We are laying track at the rate of four miles a day.”400 A three-page telegram on October 11, 1868, among the Huntington Papers at Syracuse University from George E. Gray, the Central Pacific consulting engineer, to Huntington is entirely in code in an apparent attempt to keep the information from Union Pacific agents.401

The Central Pacific associates were not above deception in their dealings with the government. Mark Hopkins, in a letter to Huntington on November 20, 1868, suggested that Huntington deface the postmark on an envelope containing a government report so as to avoid questions.

We have tonight sent you by mail the Commissioners Report of 20 mile section from 410 to 430th mile.

In order to hasten the report one day we obtained the commissioner’s [sic] signature without waiting for the notice to be received by them from the Surveyor General, which will come to them tomorrow. Therefore the Report is dated (tomorrow) the 21st.

I mention this to you, so that in case the post mark is the 20th you can so deface the figures of the post mark on the Envelope as not to show

399 Ambrose, Nothing Like It in the World, 292.
401 Telegram, George E. Gray in Salt Lake City to Huntington, October 11, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
the awkward discrepancy in dates, in the event that you should show the Envelopes at the Department [of the Interior]. 402

Charles Crocker, in charge of Central Pacific construction, had a ruse planned for a government inspection of Central Pacific tracks on November 24, 1868, that he told Huntington about in a letter on November 21, three days earlier. The inspection, according to historian David Haward Bain, had been ordered after the Sacramento Union said that Central Pacific tracks east of Wadsworth, Nevada, were poorly constructed. 403 Charles Crocker said he was worried about the inspection:

I am to go 24th inst. with the new Commissioners and am afraid of trouble with them. [Lloyd] Tevis [sometime partner of the Central Pacific associates] says they talk of going to the front and then returning over the line horseback at the rate of 15 miles per day and examining every inch of the road.

I am considerably anxious as to the result of some portions of the road beyond Wadsworth across those Alkili [sic] flats won’t bear the closest scrutiny as to ballast culverts & c &c but between Sac. and Wadsworth I will put it up against any road in the United States. I will have them out examining culverts, ballast and bridges between here and Wadsworth so that they won’t want to hear of culverts or anything of the kind beyond there.404

Bain said Charles Crocker got the inspectors to approve the Nevada portions after tiring them out and then placing a glass of water on the floor of their rail car and suggesting they approve the track because little water had spilled from the glass as the train moved over the track.405

On the Union Pacific side, company president Oliver Ames Jr. was willing to be deceptive with the government also, utilizing what public relations historian Scott M. Cutlip called a “third party technique” or “front technique.”406 In a letter on January 8, 402

402 Hopkins to Huntington, November 20, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
404 Charles Crocker to Huntington, November 21, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
405 Bain, Empire Express, 576.

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1868, to Dodge, Ames said he liked the idea of an Oregon branch line from the main transcontinental line, but there would have to be government aid to construct the line:

The Union Pacific Railroad Company will use their best efforts to secure the construction of this road whenever the people on its line shall awake to its importance. It cannot be built without Gov’t aid, but our Co. should not appear as applicants for this Charter, but it should come through the exertions of Representatives of Oregon. Any aid we might give without appearing as too prominent actors will be most heartily rendered. I trust you will be able to enlist active workers enough in this most desirable undertaking without clogging it with too many other interests.407

E. B. Crocker, apparently responding to questions from Huntington on reports published in the Sacramento Union, told Huntington in a letter on August 15, 1867, that the newspaper did not know what it was talking about, “We cannot stop the Union charging us with being active for [George C.] Gorham [candidate for California governor in 1867] and [U.S. Senator John] Conness, but what we do is very quietly done, and the Union is talking on mere surmises and not from any knowledge.”408

After both companies’ engineers determined that a line to Salt Lake City was not viable, they tried to keep Young from finding out. Union Pacific leaders particularly wanted to keep it secret until they had locked him into contracts to provide labor and materials for their work, according to Griswold. Speaking of a trip to Salt Lake City in May 1868 by Union Pacific construction superintendent Samuel Reed, Griswold said Reed’s orders included keeping the line’s location north of Salt Lake a secret.

Reed’s main goal was to persuade Brigham Young to take grading and tunnel-building contracts for the Union Pacific in the Wasatch Mountains and begin them as soon as possible. He also wanted to arrange for Mormon graders to go to work for the U.P. as far west as Humboldt Wells, Nevada. At the same time, the railroad’s directors did not want him to reveal to Brigham Young that the track was almost certainly not going to go through Salt Lake City. If Young found out, he might very

408 Crocker to Huntington, August 15, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
well refuse to help the Union Pacific at all. Worse, he might shift his vital supply of labor, materials, food and fodder to the Central Pacific.  

Dodge eventually told Young the truth in August 1868, Griswold wrote, and he reacted by sermonizing against him at a tabernacle service, going to the Union Pacific directors, then to the Central Pacific and finally back to the Union Pacific. Historian Maury Klein reported that Young promised Union Pacific directors that he would not contract for work with the Central Pacific, but he sent Central Pacific agents seeking Mormon contracts to Mormon bishops.

On their side, Central Pacific directors tried to lull the rival Union Pacific leaders into a sense that not much progress was being made after they broke through the Sierra Nevada Mountains into Nevada early in 1868. Huntington chided Charles Crocker for his reported ambitious plans for 1868 progress in a letter on February 22: “Now I notice that the Cal. and Nevada Papers write and Print that you are a going to do wonderful things, and I know it is difficult to prevent that kind of Newspaper Blowing, but I would suggest that you [unintelligible] your talk. Do what you can to get the idea out that you will only have 20 miles of iron and that you hope to lay it, but that you shall pay more attention to the quality than the quantity of road.” This letter came after a discussion among the Central Pacific directors of building fast at a quality just good enough to pass government inspections. In a letter on March 20, 1868, E. B. Crocker told Huntington of the difficulty in keeping their ambitious plans secret: “We have kept very close about what we intend to do this summer, but we have to give orders to our headmen to prepare for the work, and it leaks out that way. Besides the fact that you are chartering so many ships and intend to ship out 40,000 tons of iron has been telegraphed here, and gives rise

409 Griswold, A Work of Giants, 266.
410 Ibid., 274.
412 Huntington to Charles Crocker, February 22, 1868, Series 1, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
413 The discussion culminates with a letter on January 16, 1868, in which E. B. Crocker told Huntington of his idea of reversing the order of graders and track-layers to get track down faster “right on the natural surface and fill in behind to raise it up 2 or 3 feet for drainage.” See E. B. Crocker to Huntington, January 16, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
to a good deal of talk.”

The quantity of iron being shipped from eastern shops to California over the summer was a giveaway on the progress being made, despite efforts to downplay how far and how fast the Central Pacific track-layers were going, according to a letter from E. B. Crocker to Huntington on August 6, 1868: “You inclosed us a slip copied from Bulletin about C.P.R.R. shipping iron across the Isthmus. Now the fact is that every body here knows that the iron by the Isthmus goes right up on the C.P. It can’t be kept secret here, and of course the reporters get hold of it.”

Apparently, there was at least one other way that information was getting out. Central Pacific consulting engineer George E. Gray in Salt Lake City told Central Pacific president Leland Stanford that Union Pacific agents were intercepting telegraphed reports of daily Central Pacific progress, perhaps in Reno, Nevada, or in San Francisco, in a letter on October 9, 1868:

I telegraphed asking that reports of track laid be sent me twice a week. I have had one thus far from the Judge [E. B. Crocker]. The reports from end of track to you [unintelligible word] daily are caught out from some point on the line and sent to this city and Union P. also other reports advising them of all your operations on the line. It seems to me if I were you I would know who sends them. It may be from the Reno office, but probably from your city [San Francisco]. Of course I never see the reports but I know the fact from reliable sources.

The biggest secret on the Union Pacific side, other than the guaranteed-profit arrangements between the company and its sister contracting corporation, Credit Mobilier, was the discovery in 1865 of a relatively easy line through the first range of the Rocky Mountains, the Black Hills of Wyoming or the Laramie Mountains. Dodge recounted that he discovered the pass near Lodge Pole and Crow creeks, which he called the Lone Tree Pass and later was named Evans Pass after a Union Pacific engineer, on September 22, 1865. Dodge said he was near the summit of the Black Hills with a small party of soldiers looking at the country and detached from a column when they were discovered and pursued by Crow Indians. Dodge said the party moved down the hills

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414 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, March 20, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
415 Crocker to Huntington, August 6, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
416 George E. Gray to Stanford, October 9, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
toward the column on a relatively easy grade that he marked by a tree.\textsuperscript{417} Historian James McCague said Dodge was leading men through the area after an indecisive campaign against Sioux Indians.\textsuperscript{418} Union Pacific engineers returned to the site nearly a year later, according to Dodge in his autobiography: “On August 23\textsuperscript{rd} [1866], I had received from Mr. James A. Evans, the preliminary line over the Black Hills, using the Lone Tree Divide, Crow Creek Line discovered in 1865 by me. I wrote to Mr. Durant giving him the comparison between the new Lone Tree Divide line and all others showing that the new line was far superior to any of the others.”\textsuperscript{419} Klein said Durant on September 4 moved to keep the line secret, threatening dismissal for any employee revealing it to outsiders.\textsuperscript{420} Dodge said he went to look at the line later that month:

We spent the 24\textsuperscript{th} in following up the line on Lone Tree divide to the Summit going almost over the ground which I travelled when I came down from the summit trying to avoid the Indians in 1865. The closer I examined the line and the country, the more satisfied I was that this was the line that we should build. The preliminary surveys over it were much more favorable than I had expected and indicated that we could get a good 90 foot grade not only on the line on the East slope of the Black Hills, but also on the Western slope going down into the Laramie plains and the line was very direct.\textsuperscript{421}

Dodge said that in November he traveled to New York City to present the location engineers’ work for the summer, including the line over the Black Hills, to the Union Pacific board of directors.\textsuperscript{422} The board adopted a resolution accepting the Lone Tree line on Dodge’s recommendation on November 15, 1866, according to Dodge’s autobiography, which includes the board resolutions.\textsuperscript{423}

Although Durant testified that he knew of the relatively easy way through the Black Hills in 1863, two Union Pacific board members said they did not know of it when

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\item \textsuperscript{417} Dodge, “Autobiography,” 409-10.
\item \textsuperscript{419} Dodge, “Autobiography,” 574.
\item \textsuperscript{420} Klein, Union Pacific, 81-82.
\item \textsuperscript{421} Dodge, “Autobiography,” 579.
\item \textsuperscript{422} Ibid., 588.
\item \textsuperscript{423} Ibid., 595.
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they were discussing a $47 million bloated contract for Oakes Ames to construct the Union Pacific line through the area in the summer of 1867. The Union Pacific directors may have wanted to keep the easy way a secret for three reasons. Klein suggested that they may have wanted to keep a high federal bond subsidy on that section, which was judged to be difficult mountain construction. The directors’ testimony suggested that it was to assure a big profit in the Ames contract, and the Union Pacific directors also apparently enjoyed a public image of being intrepid despite looming obstacles.

Much of the documented secrecy involving the Central Pacific associates involved their acquisition and, in one case, creation of railroads other than the transcontinental line as they attempted to assure control of all Pacific Coast rail traffic. From the start, they maneuvered behind the scenes, according to historian David Lavender:

During the maneuvers in Congress prior to the passage of the act of 1862, Huntington and [Theodore] Judah [Central Pacific chief engineer] had sought to secure the co-operation of Donahue, Dame, McLaughlin, and Houston, the San Franciscans who were building the railroad south to San Jose, by assigning to them, as individuals, whatever rights the Central Pacific won between Sacramento and San Francisco. Thus San Francisco really was the terminus of the Pacific railroad. The associates had not quite dared to say so as yet, however. The assignment would not be binding until confirmed by Congress in the form of an amendment to the act of 1862. Fearful that public talk of the transfer in advance of confirmation might strike congress as presumptuous, the men concerned had stayed silent.

Now [when the Central Pacific organizers were trying to sell stock in their company to investors in San Francisco], however, it seemed necessary to speak out. After anxious discussion, the Central Pacific’s directors openly announced on December 4, 1862, that they were turning over their land grant and bond rights between Sacramento and San Francisco to the men who were building the San Francisco & San Jose. On December 13, the assignees incorporated the Western Pacific Railroad

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424 See testimony of T.C. Durant, House Select Committee No. 2, House Report 78, Affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, 42nd Cong., 3rd sess, February 20, 1873, (The committee chairman was Jeremiah M. Wilson of Indiana and the committee’s report will be referred to hereafter as the Wilson Committee Report), 92; testimony of Cornelius Bushnell, Wilson Committee Report, 42, 550; and testimony of John B. Alley, Wilson Committee Report, 566-67.

425 Klein, Union Pacific, 81-82.
for building a connecting link from San Jose around the south side of the Bay to Stockton and thence to Sacramento.\textsuperscript{426}

In 1868, the Central Pacific associates formed another railroad company, the San Joaquin Railroad, as an alternative to the Southern Pacific Railroad projected south along the coast to Los Angeles. They wanted the Southern Pacific for an eventual connection at the Arizona border to a southern transcontinental line, but the price was too high. Perhaps an alternative line south would lower the price.\textsuperscript{427} E. B. Crocker was in on the maneuvers and sent Huntington a map showing the two lines in a letter on February 3, 1868: “I inclose herein draft of a bill [for congressional action] to grant lands to the San Joaquin R.R. Co., a Co. secretly organized by us to build a R.R. from the W.P.R.R through the San Joaquin and Tulare Valley to Kern River. You will notice that I have marked on one of the maps, by a green line, the line of the Southern Pacific, showing that a high range of mountains separates the 2 roads, and therefore they do not interfere with each other.”\textsuperscript{428} Huntington responded in a letter on April 25, 1868: “If you could get control of Southern Pacific I think it would be best to put that in the Bill instead of S.J.V. [San Joaquin Valley Railroad] (and not have it known that we control it).”\textsuperscript{429}

Stanford told Huntington that his California associates had purchased the Southern Pacific in a letter on July 15, 1868: “On Saturday last the 11\textsuperscript{th} I concluded a trade for the Southern Pacific at $350,000 – giving us a majority of the stock and the board of directors. Ralston is the nominal purchaser so far as is known to those who sell except [Lloyd] Tevis and [Horace] Carpentier. All are to keep still and we will change the board gradually so as to avoid attracting attention. We will put in the board our confidential friends.”\textsuperscript{430} Crocker followed up with reminders to keep the Southern Pacific purchase secret in letters to Huntington on August 31, “Our interest in the S. P.

\textsuperscript{426} Lavender, \textit{The Great Persuader}, 122.
\textsuperscript{427} Bain, \textit{Empire Express}, 490.
\textsuperscript{428} Crocker to Huntington, February 3, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\textsuperscript{429} Huntington to Crocker, April 25, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
\textsuperscript{430} Stanford to Huntington, July 15, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
has been carefully kept secret here and I hope you have there,” and on October 12, “You must be very careful not to let it slip out that we have any interest in it.”

In an attempt to control rail traffic northward to Oregon, the Central Pacific associates also were trying to buy out bondholders of the Yuba Railroad and the stockholders of the Central California Railroad. Crocker told Huntington in a letter on February 14, 1868, that he and the other associates in California were not letting outsiders know of their acquisition plans, but they could not control others, “We do not do our business on the house tops, but you must bear in mind that the other parties are noted for not keeping a closed mouth.” In a letter on February 25, Huntington told Crocker that he had bought the Central California for $40,000. Then on March 6, there was enough speculation that the Central Pacific leaders had bought the Southern Pacific and the San Francisco & San Jose that the associates had to issue a denial, according to Lavender.

Enemies of the railroad jumped to the conclusion that the Central Pacific had bought control of the [Southern Pacific] and [San Francisco & San Jose]. Cries of monopoly arose. On March 6, 1868, Stanford issued a statement vigorously denying the accusations. Neither the Western Pacific nor the Central Pacific nor any of the men connected with those roads were associated – he said – with either the Southern Pacific or the San Francisco & San Jose.

Technically Stanford was telling the truth, but only because negotiations had not yet crystallized.

In a letter on May 4, 1868, Huntington congratulated E. B. Crocker for getting Yuba Railroad bonds in their effort to gain control of that line: “You done well I think to buy those 35 Yuba Bonds. I hope you bought them through a Broker so that no one will know you have them, but I have no doubt you did as I wrote and gave you my reasons for keeping it secret if you should buy any.”

431 See Crocker to Huntington, August 31, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers, and Crocker to Huntington, October 12, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
432 Crocker to Huntington, February 14, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
433 Huntington to Crocker, February 25, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
434 Lavender, The Great Persuader, 212.
435 Huntington to Crocker, May 4, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
Yet another railroad was acquired in 1868 and reported to Huntington, according to a letter from Crocker on August 6. “We have purchased the majority of the stock of the S.F. & Carlsbad R.R. Co. at 75 cents on the dollar. The purchase is not made public, as we are not prepared to take poss. yet. Mr. Cohen from whom we purchased is to go right on with the business the same as though he still owned it, but we are to receive the profits. We bought 3285 shares the purchase price of which amounted to $261,375.”

Hopkins opposed the acquisitions. He appeared in a November 13, 1867, letter to Huntington to be conscious of an image of the longtime partners as hardware store owners in Sacramento, not railroad monopolists. Stanford had been in the hardware business, too. And, when Hopkins arranged for the sale of the Huntington and Hopkins store, he wanted to hang onto the image with a one-fifth interest in the store. “Anxious as I have been to get our Hardware business into other hands,” Hopkins said, “I still thought it was good policy to continue to be regarded as Merchants of Sacramento for a time at least. This arrangement answers the purpose.” In a letter on March 21, 1868, Hopkins argued against getting more railroad control:

We already come as near owning a monopoly of R.R. in this state as we or any one set of men, in close corporation, can control without being denounced and becoming unpopular to a degree that will destroy the value of our R.R. property. We own enough now. We are committed to the building of enough. No matter how desirous the public along any and all routes may be to have Rail Roads built, when once they get the road built, all must go “deadhead” [without charge] for passage and freight else they join in the cry of demogogerous [sic] fools and known to reduce the rates of the “Monopoly” and denounce it as a “soulless and bloated Corporation” &c &c.

You and I may think Jim Robinson and Com. Vanderbilt were unwise that they did not conciliate the public and that we could do better and have it and keep it lovely all around. But I have come to the conclusion we are mistaken. We can’t do it. This everlasting row with the political and selfish public is inevitable and inseparable from Rail Roads under Republican institutions. No better and no worse in California than in New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Illinois. Here or there any one company owning all the roads in the state will be forced to the wall.

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436 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, August 6, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
437 Hopkins to Huntington, November 13, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
Though as one of several or many strong companies scattered over the state they would stand some chance of success in the contest with the public, where the public make the laws and demagogues [sic] seize any and every popular hobby to keep themselves in place. It is morally certain that no Rail Road management that can pay stock holders will ever be popular. We have got enough at present and till other folks have some when more will make these we now have more valuable I am willing, but not till then.438

Crocker chimed in a week later in a letter to Huntington on March 28:

You say we [ought] to be in condition to control the West end of the southern road. I think we can do it without much trouble, but is this business of expanding, extending, and buying up railroads never to end. Hopkins talks very decidedly against it and I must say I don’t much like the idea of slaving myself to this railroad business for the rest of my days. Stanford I believe would buy up every road in the state and you don’t seem disposed to stop. This buying up of road and starting new ones is working against us. You see how the Union abuses us for it. It frightens the people and scares the legislature. They actually fear that we are becoming too powerful.439

All the image-building and maintenance seemed to have a single focus for the leaders of both sides of the transcontinental railroad enterprise: to keep money flowing both from the government and from investors. On May 13, 1865, when Huntington picked up the first federally backed bonds in Washington for the Central Pacific totaling $1,258,000, “million” was not part of his vocabulary. “I received yesterday twelve hundred and fifty eight thousand dollars United States bonds for account of Central Pacific Railroad of California,” he telegraphed Stanford.440 By the time both companies concluded, however, they spent $125 million.

438 Hopkins to Huntington, March 21, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
439 Crocker to Huntington, March 28, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
Chapter 6: Locomotive Breath

Money was the fuel most needed to construct the first transcontinental railroad. The eastern portion of the road, 1,086 miles constructed by the Union Pacific Railroad Company, cost the company $74.4 million: $11 million raised through stock sales, primarily to its sister corporation, the Credit Mobilier Corporation of America; $27.1 million provided by government bonds; $30 million through loans, including $23.7 million through company first-mortgage bonds sold to investors; and $6.3 million through company income bonds, also sold to investors.\textsuperscript{441} Estimates, however, ranged up to $115.2 million.\textsuperscript{442} The Central Pacific, which built the 690-mile western portion of the transcontinental railroad, burned through at least $51 million, according to historians Edward L. Sabin and Wesley S. Griswold: $27.86 million in government bonds and $23.3 million or $53 million in company first-mortgage bonds sold to investors.\textsuperscript{443} Therefore, the first transcontinental railroad companies spent $125.56 million to complete


\textsuperscript{442} W. F. Bailey, The Story of the First Trans-Continental Railroad: Its Projectors, Construction and History (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Printing Co., 1906), 101, said the Union Pacific portion of the road cost $115.2 million. House Select Committee No. 2, House Report 78, Affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, 42\textsuperscript{nd} Cong., 3\textsuperscript{rd} sess, February 20, 1873, ii, said that the Union Pacific had received government bonds totaling $27.2 million and issued its own first-mortgage bonds totaling $27.2, sold land-grant bonds totaling $10.4 million and income-anticipation bonds of $9.4 million for a total of $74.2 million. In addition, the committee report said the Union Pacific had issued stock with a face value of $36.8 million for a total of $111 million in funding. E. H. Rollins, the Union Pacific Company’s secretary and treasurer, testified, according to the committee report, 188, that the company’s books showed the road’s cost as $88.6 million. The committee chairman was Jeremiah M. Wilson of Indiana and the committee’s report will be referred to hereafter as the Wilson Committee Report.

\textsuperscript{443} Wesley S. Griswold, A Work of Giants: Building the First Transcontinental Railroad (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), 198, said the brokers for Central Pacific bonds, Fisk & Hatch of New York City, sold $27.86 million in government bonds for the company and $53 million of the company’s first-mortgage bonds. Those numbers do not make sense for the transcontinental railroad alone because the companies were limited to first-mortgage bonds equal to the amount of government bonds. Edward L. Sabin, Building the Pacific Railway (Philadelphia and London: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1919), 306, said the Central Pacific used $23.3 in first-mortgage bond proceeds, making the total with Wesley’s $27.86 in government bonds $51.16 million.
the transcontinental railroad, nearly all of it (except $13.6 million) from spring 1866 to spring 1869.\textsuperscript{444}

Sidney Dillon, the Credit Mobilier president, in testimony before a congressional investigating committee, said Union Pacific directors were aware that they needed to build quickly to get revenue flowing from railroad operation in order to pay the interest on all the money they had borrowed, “Time [haste in construction] was a very important element in the thing; on account of the interest accruing on the bonds as the road progressed.”\textsuperscript{445} Historian Glenn C. Quiett said the Union Pacific leaders, sometimes borrowing money at annual interest rates of 18 or 19 percent, had to build quickly not in a competition with the Central Pacific directors to see which company could build the most track for the transcontinental but because of the accumulating interest. “If the work had not been completed until the time-limit fixed, July 1, 1874, the weight of interest on borrowed money, with no income from traffic to offset it, would have crushed the Union Pacific.”\textsuperscript{446}

These tens of millions of dollars in the latter part of the 1860s were enormous sums, which could be concluded from the letterhead stationary of banks at which officers accepted or declined invitations to take part in the Union Pacific’s Grand Excursion in October 1866. A sampling showed that bank letterhead stationary at the time claimed

\textsuperscript{444}By early June 1866, the Union Pacific reached the 100 milepost. See telegram, Samuel Reed and Webster Snyder in Omaha to Thomas C. Durant in New York City, June 4, 1866: “One hundred miles track laid this morn. We send you greetings.” in Series II, Box 29, File “Snyder, Webster - 1866” in the papers of Levi O. Leonard, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, hereafter referred to as the Leonard Collection; telegram, Grenville M. Dodge, Union Pacific chief engineer, in Council Bluffs, Iowa, to John A. Dix, Union Pacific president, June 6, 1866, “Our hundred miles of road built.” in Series II, Box 11, File “Dix, John Adams,” Leonard Collection; and Gerald M. Best, Iron Horses to Promontory (San Marino, California: Golden West Books, 1969), 97, who said the Union Pacific reached the 100 milepost on June 14, 1866, nine miles west of Columbus, Nebraska. Arthur M. Johnson and Barry E. Supple, Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads: A Study in the Nineteenth Century Railroad Investment Process (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), 200-01, said a contract to build the first 100 miles of the Union Pacific railroad required the company to pay $50,000 a mile to the contractor for a total of $5 million. George Kraus, High Road to Promontory Point: Building the Central Pacific across the High Sierra (Palo Alto, California: American West Publishing, 1969), 140, said the Central Pacific reached Alta, California, at milepost 70, on July 21, 1866, at a cost of $8.6 million, or $123,000 per mile.

\textsuperscript{445}Wilson Committee Report, 510.

\textsuperscript{446}Glenn C. Quiett, They Built the West: An Epic of Rails and Cities (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934), 71.
total bank assets of $2 million for the National Park Bank; $1,235,000 for the Merchants’ Exchange Bank of New York City; and $3 million for the Central National Bank of the City of New York.447

The transcontinental railroad leaders raised much of the money they needed by using provisions of an 1864 amendment to the original 1862 Pacific Railroad Act. The amendment allowed not only proceeds from federal bonds to be used by the companies but also money raised through the sale of company bonds. Both types of bonds, or promises to pay back at a set interest rate over a prescribed time, were sold on markets to investors who believed in the likelihood of payback of the bond’s face value and the interest promised until the payback date. Of course, federally guaranteed promises commanded a relatively high price, something near the bond’s face value, because investors perceived the likelihood high of payback and interest payment. For the government bonds, the Department of the Interior, upon certification of satisfactory completion of twenty-mile sections of the construction, would provide company agents with government-backed bonds in amounts of $16,000 to $96,000 per mile, depending on how difficult the construction was judged with mountain work commanding the highest amount. Company agents then would sell the government bonds in markets and use the money investors paid to help pay for the construction. The federal bonds were, in essence, loans from the United States treasury to help assure that a transcontinental railroad would be built to benefit the country as a whole. The transcontinental railroad companies were required to pay back the bonds’ face value to the federal treasury after thirty years.448

In addition to allowing for the issuance of company bonds, the 1864 amendment also changed the position of the federal government in a potential line of creditors if the enterprise failed. The original law had the government holding a first mortgage on railroad property to secure its loan, therefore, making it first in the line of creditors. The 1864 amendment moved the government to a second-mortgage position and put the new company bonds in a first-mortgage position; this was a move, it was hoped, that would make company bonds more attractive to potential investors with better security for their investment. Even with that enhancement, however, the bonds did not sell initially and, at least on the Union Pacific side, they were used as collateral for high-interest bank loans to keep the construction going.\(^{449}\)

The price paid for the companies’ first-mortgage bonds, or even whether investors would buy them, was the driving force behind the leaders’ concern that the public perceive the companies as solid, reputable, and likely to succeed; this was a different sort of public-relations job than many knew at the time, such as conducting comparatively short political campaigns to get voter approval for a candidate or an issue and buttonholing legislators, sometimes threatening them or bribing them. This raising of money through public bond sales required not a short-term campaign aimed at some specific election result or the manipulation of individual legislators, but an ongoing, multifaceted effort to get many people to do much more than vote a certain way. This sort of fundraising required image creation and maintenance over three or more years to lead many people to part with their money.

Jay Cooke, a Philadelphia financier who was sometimes called the financier of the Civil War, had shown that it could be done. He raised more than $1 billion to equip, transport and feed Union armies by selling government bonds to the public. It had not been done before. Traditionally, the federal government’s debt had been sold to banking houses, which would bid on how much less they would pay than a bond’s face value to take ownership of the debt. In the first two of many government bond issues after the Civil War began, banking house bids of 90, 94 and 96 cents for a dollar bond were

\(^{449}\) Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 126-27.
accepted. Cooke had a different idea on how to fund the federal government’s debt. It could be sold, he said, to less-sophisticated members of the public and at face value with no discount. “He visualized the great possibilities of the emotional appeal, the appeal to the patriotism of the people,” said historian Henrietta M. Larson. “This led directly to the idea of a wide participation by the general public in government loans.”

A large part of Cooke’s success in selling Civil War debt for the Union was attributed to his use of agents along with advertising and favorable newspaper news and commentary. Historian Elwyn Burns Robinson described Cooke’s methods to use the press that, he said, “dwarfed” previous attempts.

Made sole subscription agent for the [federal Civil War] loans, he sold in a period of a little over two years about a billion dollars worth of securities. This gigantic financial operation was only made possible by the skill with which Cooke used the public press. Distributing advertising with a lavish hand, he engaged a corps of able newspaper writers to turn out editorial and other matter on loan for insertion in the journals which were ready to accommodate the gargantuan advertiser. Every effort was made to invigorate the work of the papers in pushing the loan; their editors and correspondents were visited by Cooke’s agents, showered with hospitality, and loaded with presents of wine, ducks, and fish sent in wholesale quantities from Cooke’s old home in Toledo [Ohio].

Failure at First

The transcontinental railroad managers had to have been watching Cooke’s methods and eventually surmising that they, too, could raise big money in a similar way for their enterprise. But it was no easy task. Failure had been the result of their initial attempts to sell stock in the companies. In Sacramento, the Central Pacific builders determined in 1862 that they would need about $3 million to get construction started and they launched a campaign to sell company stock at $100 a share. Historian David Lavender described the stock-sales campaign.

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451 Ibid., 105.
The campaign began with an announcement in the [Sacramento] Union of October 16, 1862, that the company would open its books for subscriptions in Sacramento on October 22 and in San Francisco on October 28.

For publicity the company relied on the enthusiastic editorial in the Union and on a special report, issued by [Theodore] Judah [the Central Pacific chief engineer] in October, and filled with his usual glowing predictions. On the first day of the drive, so reported the Union, eager investors pledged themselves to take 3,642 shares [at 10 percent down, $36,420]. On the twenty-fourth the directors actually walked the streets in person, knocking on the doors of prosperous citizens. 453

Lavender said the Union predicted that at least $1 million in stock would be subscribed in Sacramento, and San Francisco still had to be heard from.

And then the bad news began to drift in. No one in the Bay area was buying Central Pacific stock.

The company’s agent there was Marcus D. Boruck, editor of a weekly newspaper, Spirit of the Times. Boruck wrote fervid stories in support of the grand project. On November 7 the Sacramento Union tried to support him with a long, pained editorial about the short-sightedness of the neighboring community. A correspondent signing himself “Railroader” (probably Judah) wrote an exhortatory letter to the San Francisco Bulletin. None of it availed. In twenty-two days Boruck sold a total of fourteen shares of stock, 10 percent down, to three different customers -- $140 income. 454

The Union Pacific organizers had a similar, nearly simultaneous, experience in an attempt to sell their company’s stock. At an initial organizing convention on September 2, 1862, those elected temporary officers authorized the opening of stock-subscription books on the first Wednesday of November in thirty-five cities. The company needed to sell 2,000 shares of stock with a face value of $1,000, a total of $2 million in subscriptions with 10 percent down, in order to organize on a permanent basis under federal law. Notices of sale were printed in newspapers in twenty-four cities. “Newspapers of late October and November, described the bonds’ [stock certificates’]

454 Ibid.
gracious engravings and carried editorials urging their purchase as ‘patriotism and faith in the Union’s future,’” said historian Robert West Howard.455 Historian Maury Klein said the campaign resulted in subscription to only twenty shares, or $2,000 in cash.456 Not until nearly a year later, on September 25, 1863, were deposits suddenly placed on 2,000 shares, the minimum required for lawful formation of the company.457

One of the problems in raising funds through stock sales was that the Central Pacific and the Union Pacific were relatively new forms of business organizations: corporations, a legal entity that could act like a person. Like a human being, a corporation could hold title to property, borrow money, and make contracts. They were in their relative infancy at the time of the transcontinental railroad building and, as corporate public-relations specialists noted during the 1900s, corporations needed to control the human-like attributes that would be associated with them. Although the leaders of the infant Union Pacific and Central Pacific never quite articulated their need for an image in public-relations terms, they clearly had a sense of an immediate need to acquire attributes such as reliability and strength and, as one of them said, to be viewed as parties of progress.458

455 Howard, _The Great Iron Trail_, 153.
456 Klein, _Union Pacific_, 16.
457 Ames, _Pioneering the Union Pacific_, 18. The shares were subscribed to by Thomas C. Durant and a group of investors he organized, promising at least some of them that he would provide the money for the subscription or guarantee against loss. The 1862 federal law limited any one person from owning more than 200 shares and Durant’s arrangement gave him effective control of the Union Pacific. Two thousand shares would have a face value of $2 million at $1,000 a share and a 10 percent deposit, $200,000, would have been paid to gain ownership of the shares. In testimony before a congressional committee (Wilson Committee Report, 38), Cornelius S. Bushnell claimed that he, not Durant, raised the first $2 million in subscriptions to organize the Union Pacific in 1863. Lavender, _The Great Persuader_, 142, also said it was Durant, not Bushnell.
458 Corporate public-relations history has examples of business discussion and implementation of such attribute acquisition. Scott M. Cutlip, _The Unseen Power: Public Relations_. A History (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994), 654, mentioned advice from Earl Newsom to Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey in 1945 that the company needed to expand its perceived character: “The public must learn that the Jersey company has a heart as well as a brain.” Roland Marchand in _Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in American Big Business_ (Berkley, California: University of California Press, 1998), 68, described a public-relations image crossroads faced by innovator American Telephone and Telegraph Co. in the early 1900s: what gender should the company be? Competing AT & T advertising campaigns, one featuring a female telephone operator and the other a male lineman, offered a choice. The female was chosen. Marchand does not clearly delineate when the gender was selected, but indicates that it was between 1915 and 1930. Mark Hopkins, _Central Pacific
The corporation was necessary for an enterprise as great as the transcontinental railroad. “Large-scale production makes the corporation necessary,” said historian William Allen White in 1958. “Individual capital and partnership are not big enough for vast industries, great railroads, great ship companies and the like. The corporation appeared: a device whereby many individual capitalists pool their resources and limit their risks at the same time that a great majority of them surrender their active control of the use of their capital into the hands of the management of the enterprise.”  

Not only were the two transcontinental, or Pacific, railroads one of the new forms of business, but the two companies had no record upon which to judge the likelihood of their providing an investment return for stock purchases, or paying back loans with interest through company bonds. Historian Charles Edgar Ames offered an explanation for the initial failures to sell stock.

Earnings and dividends were conjectural at best. Anyway, most investors were not educated to buying common stocks of any kind in that era. The equity shares of most companies were held closely by a few people in the management or by the founding family. However, individual and institutional investors did understand and believe in bonds, where the rate of interest was fixed, where there was a definite maturity time, and where there was a priority claim on the assets and cumulative interest in case of trouble. Bonds, particularly national and state issues with active markets on the New York Stock Exchange, were more popular investments than stocks. The Exchange had been organized as early as 1817, yet by 1869 there were only 73 companies whose [stock] shares were regularly quoted on the Exchange, and well over half of these were railroads.

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So, the Central Pacific and Union Pacific leaders theoretically could find buyers for company bonds, but those buyers were scarce in the early stages. For the Central Pacific, entrenched opposition in San Francisco succeeded in providing an unrelenting gale of negative publicity that gave reasons not to invest in the enterprise. The opposition included stage, express, steamboat, and telegraph companies, along with an ice company fearful that the railroad line into the Sierra Nevada Mountains would provide easy access to mountain ice that would put the existing company out of business, according to historian James McCague. “This was opposition with an important vested interest to protect, and no scruples about how it was done,” he said of an early period in mid-1863. “Among them, the firms involved controlled the San Francisco press almost absolutely, and soon every newspaper in the city save one was printing derogatory editorials on the Central Pacific.”

Union Pacific managers had perhaps more problems in convincing investors, according to McCague.

There were other factors which made the [Union Pacific] an even poorer risk. The California road at least offered the prospect of traffic originating in its own Sacramento Valley and could promise a potential plum in the rich business of the Nevada Comstock. But in heading westward from the banks of the Missouri, the Union Pacific would be striking out into an empty and desolate wilderness in which the land was regarded as utterly worthless. Here the land grant features of the Act of ’62 held little appeal.

As far as the American businessman was concerned the only possible commercial value of a transcontinental railroad lay in its promise of a short route to the teeming trade ports of the Orient. The Union Pacific, which seemed destined to start nowhere in particular and end at some indeterminate point in the desert, did not appear likely to fulfill such a promise.

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462 McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 64-65. Judgments of a land’s value were based primarily on an analysis of its cover. Hardwood trees generally were considered the best cover because their presence indicated a fertile soil with adequate water and, of course, they could provide timber for building, according to Arthur M. Johnson and Barry E. Supple, *Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads: A Study in the Nineteenth Century Railroad Investment Process* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), 65. The Great Plains, because they offered no hardwood tree cover and only soft wood cottonwoods for the most part along waterways, was considered by some to be “The Great American Desert.” Because the federal legislation authorizing the transcontinental railroad required that a telegraph line be installed, in addition to the railroad, and because of the lack of trees on the plains, buffalo noticeably used the
Thomas C. Durant, the Union Pacific vice president, tried again to sell stock in the company in the spring of 1865 with the sweeter 1864 deal from Congress that doubled the land grant and allowed one Union Pacific Railroad share to sell for $100, instead of the $1,000 price set in the 1862 law.463 “Expensive advertisements announced the re-opening of the books in the principal cities of the Union,” said historian Charles Edgar Ames. “The results were more disheartening than ever. Said a Government Director [Charles Sherman]: ‘I believe that not a dollar was subscribed.’”464

Even the federally backed bonds were difficult to sell, at least early on, according to Collis P. Huntington, the Central Pacific vice president. “We commenced selling the Governments at 90. They were a new thing, and we had some difficulty in disposing of them.”465

The Union Pacific directors in early 1866, according to historian Maury Klein, found the company’s bonds had no market value and could be used only as collateral for bank loans at heavy discounts. Union Pacific stock was sold to shareholders in the Credit Mobilier company for $4.50 a share (on a $100 face value) with the loss made up in inflated construction contracts between the two companies in a sort of stock-laundering arrangement that assured the letter of the federal law was met; that is, the books on the transactions showed that Credit Mobilier accepted the stock at face value, $100 a share, as payment for work on construction contracts it performed that were, in turn, set at prices far above the actual cost of construction to cover the stock-transaction losses and

telegraph’s supporting poles as scratching posts, knocking poles down or rubbing them askew, according to McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 123-24. Some early photographs of the railroad show telegraph poles out of line although they were installed properly.

463 The Union Pacific, unlike the Central Pacific, was a creation of Congress. The terms and conditions of its organization, including how much each share of stock would cost, were established in the 1862 Pacific Railroad Act. The Union Pacific had five of its fifteen board of directors’ members appointed by the United States president. The Central Pacific, on the other hand, was a private enterprise organized under California corporate law and designated by Congress to construct the western portion of the transcontinental railroad.


more.\textsuperscript{466} Once the stock was out of the Union Pacific Railroad Company and into other hands at the legal price, it could be sold at whatever price would be paid on the markets. John M. S. Williams of Cambridge, Massachusetts, an original stockholder and one-time treasurer of the Union Pacific and a director of Credit Mobilier, attempted to describe to members of a congressional committee the arrangement between the two companies with nearly identical shareholders regarding stock sales and construction-contract prices. “If your right hand pocket had more money than your left and you took some from the right and put it in the left, you would be neither richer nor poorer. It was your own property, and you took it out of one pocket and put it in another.”\textsuperscript{467}

By the end of 1866, two months after the Grand Excursion to the 100\textsuperscript{th} meridian, the capital of the investors in the Credit Mobilier was exhausted and the Union Pacific Railroad Company was $3 million to $4 million in debt. No company first-mortgage bond had been sold for cash, according to historian Charles Edgar Ames.\textsuperscript{468}

There were concerns on the Central Pacific side, too, according to congressional testimony from Collis P. Huntington in 1873. “I have lain awake, I presume, a thousand nights, since 1861,” Huntington said, “to find out where the money was coming from to pay our bills.”\textsuperscript{469}

**Fundraising Success**

For both transcontinental railroad companies’ directors, the funding drought caused by investor reluctance ended beginning in the spring and summer of 1867. By then, the Union Pacific had completed more than 300 miles of track through Nebraska grasslands and it appeared in California that the Central Pacific might, in fact, surmount the Sierra Nevada Mountains. Klein said Union Pacific agents for the first time in June 1867 were able to sell company bonds on open markets.\textsuperscript{470} Historian Henry K. White

\textsuperscript{466} Klein, *Union Pacific*, 79. For the best description of the stock-laundering arrangement, see Robert Edgar Riegel, The Story of Western Railroads (New York: Macmillan Company, 1926), 74-76. For other descriptions, see Crawford, *Credit Mobilier of America*, 35; and Johnson and Supple, *Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads*, 202.

\textsuperscript{467} Testimony of John M. S. Williams, Wilson Committee Report, 170.

\textsuperscript{468} Ames, *Union Pacific*, 154, 162.

\textsuperscript{469} Testimony of Collis P. Huntington, Wilson Committee Report, 721.

\textsuperscript{470} Klein, *Union Pacific*, 111.
reported the turnaround in fundraising efforts: “The Union Pacific then allowed [Cornelius] Bushnell to undertake the sale of a large block of first-mortgage bonds which it had on hand and on which it was borrowing money at extravagant rates of interest, up to 14 ½ percent.”

Bushnell, in congressional testimony, provided details of his spring 1867 campaign to sell bonds that echoed Cooke’s Civil War methods:

I went to work, employed an advertising agent, and started advertisements in every leading paper in the Northwest and New England, and I sent traveling agents to every leading city. My most sanguine expectations were realized, and in less than six months I sold ten millions of bonds, and put the price up from 90, at which we had started, to 95. That furnished us with money, so that we were out of the woods so far as financial difficulties were concerned.

Central Pacific directors experienced a surge in investment as they holed through the granite at their summit tunnel in August 1867. Huntington told E. B. Crocker in a letter on October 30, 1867, that he had been selling Central Pacific bonds briskly for three months, “Sold 384 bonds [with a $1,000 face value] in three months which is quite satisfactory when we consider that most of the time the money market has been very tight.” Nearly two months earlier, in a letter on September 7, 1867, Huntington reported to Crocker that he had sold Central Pacific bonds in Germany. Further, Huntington confirmed in a letter to Central Pacific president Leland Stanford that the bonds were being purchased by small investors. “There is [sic] very few bonds taken by bankers but have to be placed in small lots amongst the people.”

In a letter to Hopkins on November 14, 1867, Huntington said that Union Pacific leaders were having problems when investors compared the two companies’ bonds. “The Union Co. are spending large amounts of money in their efforts to show that their bonds are as good as ours but they can’t do it. But to take their word for it from day to day, they have sold at least

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472 Testimony of Cornelius S. Bushnell, Wilson Committee Report, 42. Bushnell, of New Haven, Connecticut, was a Union Pacific director from the start. He also was an investor in design and construction of the Monitor, the Union ironclad warship in the Civil War.
473 Huntington to Crocker, October 30, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
474 Huntington to Crocker, September 7, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
475 Huntington to Stanford, September 28, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
$100,000,000 but they are borrowing all the money that they can on them at 60."476 In a letter a day later, Huntington told Crocker that he thought $500,000 in Central Pacific bonds would sell that month.477 He reported bond sales of $590,000 for the month in a November 29, 1867, letter to Crocker.478 The latter wrote back on December 5, 1867: “Sale of $500,000 bonds in Nov. is first rate. If you keep up that rate long we will soon be out of debt and plenty of funds to go on with and then we can put them up to par in currency.”479 December sales were even higher, $705,000, according to a letter from Huntington to Crocker on January 1, 1868.480

On the Union Pacific side, the 1867 financial windfall led the directors on to take substantial returns on their investments. On October 1, 1867, a complex agreement was reached on a $47 million, 667-mile contract with Oakes Ames.481 Historian Robert West Howard detailed what the contract agreement meant to Union Pacific/Credit Mobilier directors:

That day [that the arrangement was agreed to] the Casements’ work train was 228 miles west of the 100th meridian [where the assigned Oakes Ames contract started]. Statistics were available to prove that construction costs west from Omaha had averaged $27,500 a mile, including erection of stations, water tanks, side tracks, wood yards and round houses. Still, the Ames contract specified payments by Union Pacific of $43,500 a mile for the trackage between the 100th meridian and Cheyenne [Wyoming, including the Evans Pass route through the first Rockies range]. Obviously, it assured [the directors] a clear profit of $16,000 a mile for the 228 miles already constructed – a total of $3,658,000.482

On December 12, 1867, that money, or at least portions of it, was distributed in a dividend to Credit Mobilier shareholders. Historians have disagreed on how big the dividend was because it was distributed in Union Pacific bonds and stock that had been paid Credit Mobilier on contracts. Ambrose said it was a 76 percent dividend and Klein said it was 99.2 percent.\textsuperscript{483} Another dividend was declared for Credit Mobilier shareholders on January 4, 1868, of 80 percent.\textsuperscript{484} Klein said news of the dividends in January boosted the price on Union Pacific first-mortgage bonds to par and on Credit Mobilier stock to 350.\textsuperscript{485} Huntington, of course, was watching. He told Crocker about it in a letter on January 24, 1868: “The Union Pacific folks have made lots of money in building their Road up the Platte [River]. They divided 3,000,000 of their first mortgage Bonds a few days ago amongst the stock holders of the Credit Mobilier and they feel strong.”\textsuperscript{486}

**Back to Tight Money**

But even as they were enjoying the fruits of their risk-taking to that point, trouble was brewing in finances for the Union Pacific leaders. In a letter to Durant on January 1, 1868, Oliver Ames, acting as Union Pacific president, directed cuts in expenses. “Money is tight,” he said. “Discharge all unnecessary men once you get more ties and timber than is absolutely necessary. It would be an eternal disgrace to us and you in particular as the manager of the construction to be forced to suspend for want of funds to continue the work.”\textsuperscript{487} In Omaha, Herbert M. Hoxie, complained to Dodge about a lack of funds in railroad operations in a letter on January 3, 1868. He said the operations department needed $750,000.\textsuperscript{488} Huntington noticed a tightening in investment on the Central Pacific side, too. He said in a letter to Stanford on January 9, 1868, that he had sold few first-
mortgage bonds that month. On April 7, 1868, Huntington gave Crocker a report on Union Pacific financial troubles.

Their [Union Pacific directors’] Bonds are not selling and they are borrowing money in large amounts. They have just passed resolutions to pay the principle of the Bonds in gold, and [W. B.] Shatock [sic], the man that attends to their advertising he is the man that done Jay Cook [sic] & Co.’s advertising of government Bonds in the war) he told a friend of mine that they expected to spend about $200,000 in advertising this season, but I do not believe they can sell their bonds at par. They have been sold on the street in the last few days in small lots from 95 to 96, and I think they will be compelled to reduce the price, and if they do it it will hurt them badly.

They are advertising their bonds now, as payable in gold and not naming any price, which looks suspicious as they have all the time until within a few days named the price at which they were selling.

Poor sales of Union Pacific bonds were noted in Oliver Ames’ diary. In the entry for April 16, 1868, he said that he had seen in a newspaper that morning that no company bonds had sold the previous day. Then, apparently in August, Interior Department officials received a report from Union Pacific government director Jesse Williams, who had inspected the line over the summer, that there were problems with the workmanship. Some problems involved culverts constructed of wood instead of stone. Oliver Ames attempted to explain the wooden culverts in a letter to his brother, Oakes, in Washington.

To get the road along as rapidly as the public require it is impossible to put in stone culverts until after the road is built and Stone must be transported over the Road. Stone for our culverts otherwise would have to be carted hundreds of miles and delay indefinitely the Road. We have thus far this season spent $77,000 per mile and have a very heavy force along the whole line of Road to Salt Lake. To withhold from us now our bonds would seriously embarrass if it should not force us

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489 Huntington to Stanford, January 9, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
490 Huntington to Crocker, April 7, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
491 Oliver Ames Jr. diary in the Stonehill College Archives and Special Collections, Arnold B. Tofias Industrial Archives, Brockton, Massachusetts, hereafter referred to as the Oliver Ames Jr. Diary.
492 Bain, Empire Express, 535-36.
to stop our grading and delay for one or two years the completion of the road.\textsuperscript{493}

Oliver Ames noted in his diary entry for September 30, 1868, that the Union Pacific directors had set aside $3 million in first-mortgage bonds as a pool to pay for making temporary structures permanent, as directed by the Interior Department. Ames said in his diary for October 2, 1868, that money was “still very close.”\textsuperscript{494} Then, on October 6, the president’s cabinet in Washington agreed that bonds to the Union Pacific should be held up until a board of three engineers inspected the line.\textsuperscript{495} Government bonds releases were not resumed until December 22.\textsuperscript{496} In a letter on October 24, 1868, Oliver Ames told Dodge that the money squeeze was getting awful. “We are really now needing our bonds and as we have now 80 miles of road done on which we have received no bonds nor can we issue our 1\textsuperscript{st} Mortgage bonds until we receive the government’s, it virtually keeps $5,000,000 out of us which we have to raise in the market to keep the road moving along.”\textsuperscript{497}

The financial problems for the Union Pacific continued until the May 10, 1869, Golden Spike ceremony joining the two transcontinental roads. The day after bonds were resumed to the company, Oliver Ames wrote to Durant, who was out on the line at the end of the track, from Washington on U. S. House stationary. “The demands for money are perfectly frightfull [sic] and I hope you will be able to check the leaks there.” Ames said he had heard “awful stories” about corruption in contracting and stealing on the line where construction was underway. “I believed up to within two months that at the end of our work we should have had a handsome surplus. It now looks as though we should have a large floating debt.”\textsuperscript{498}

\textsuperscript{493} Oliver to Oakes Ames, August 31, 1868, Oliver Ames Jr. Papers.
\textsuperscript{494} Oliver Ames Jr. Diary.
\textsuperscript{495} Bain, \textit{Empire Express}, 551.
\textsuperscript{496} Bain, \textit{Empire Express}, 583.
\textsuperscript{497} Oliver Ames to Dodge, October 24, 1868, Box 66, Vol. 155, File 4, “October 1868,” Grenville Mellen Dodge Papers at the State Historical Society of Iowa Library in Des Moines, hereafter referred to as the Dodge Papers.
\textsuperscript{498} Oliver Ames to Durant, December 23, 1868, Series II, Box 3, file “Ames, Oliver,” Leonard Collection.
A Good Image Means Money

The transcontinental builders clearly perceived connections between public reports and perceptions, and their ability to raise cash through bond sales. On the Union Pacific side, Cornelius S. Bushnell wrote to Durant at the beginning of the 1867 drive that sold $10 million in company bonds that published reports on the railroad’s earnings, more than anything, would help sell the bonds. “Weekly reports telegraphed here [to New York City, from Omaha] every Monday morning of the earnings will help as much as any one thing in the sale of our bonds. I have no doubt you have all that provided for.” Edward Henry Rollins, a U.S. House member from 1861 to 1867 and, in 1869, the secretary of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, suggested in a letter he wrote to Oliver Ames on December 11, 1867, that the publicizing of high expenses would bolster Union Pacific arguments in Washington. Revealing the high expenses, he said, might help fend off moves to control rates, unless such information would hurt bond sales. “The bill to which you allude is before the Pacific RR Committee, but probably will not receive any attention until Jan. I think in the mean time the facts in relation to the large expenses incurred in running the road owing to the high price of fuel & c should be made public unless the sale of bonds might be impaired thereby. On more reflection I may conclude that it will be best to reach the members in a more quiet way.” Oliver Ames referred to a specific report’s effect on bond sales in a letter to Durant on December 3, 1868: “Your telegraph to Associated Press and quotation from the close of the Commissioners’ Report [the report from the engineers appointed to inspect the Union Pacific line] is having a good effect and will make our finances easier to manage. We have got along very well today.”

John Duff, in a letter to Dodge on February 11, 1869, spoke about the kind of government directors that the Union Pacific needed as Ulysses S. Grant’s administration was on the verge of taking office. Duff had his eye on public perceptions of the company and the connection between positive perceptions and stock prices.

499 Bushnell to Durant, May 2, 1867, Series II, Box 6, file “Bushnell, Cornelius Scranton,” Leonard Collection.
500 Rollins to Ames, December 11, 1867, Oliver Ames Jr. Papers.
I trust you are looking after the subject of our Directors, I mean the Government directors. What I think we want for the great interest of the Road is some first class men of standing and who will give confidence in its management. What we want is that the public should have confidence in the Directors as that will have a good effect on our stock which is a very important matter to us large stockholders and all others that are interested in its securities.502

On the Central Pacific side, Huntington was given a lesson in the winter of 1866-67 by Durant, who, according to historian McCague, “was passing word in the East that the Central Pacific was hopelessly trapped in the Sierras. “ McCague said Durant was using reports from his California informants and “announcing publicly” that the Union Pacific track would reach California’s eastern border before the Central Pacific’s tracks got there. “The situation was serious,” McCague said. “Huntington’s moneyed contacts were getting nervous, potential investors were shying off. Some tangible refutation of Durant’s claims was urgently in order.”503

When Huntington learned that Central Pacific workers had holed through the summit tunnel in August 1867, he moved to publicize it, according to Lavender.

After nearly two years of effort, drillers finally holed through the summit tunnel in the Sierra Nevada. The work was by no means done. The bore would not be widened enough for trains until November. And below it, near Donner Lake, yawned a rough seven-mile gap where no iron had yet been laid. In spite of those remaining obstacles, Huntington’s spirits leaped. Now to push bond sales! He hired a publicity expert, Richard Colburn, to send glowing stories about the conquering of the mountains to newspapers throughout the nation. He had garish posters plastered to the walls of depots everywhere. As fast as he received E. H. Miller’s audits about each month’s profits on the operating part of the line, he had them printed in eastern newspapers, paying for the insertions when editors balked.

Bond sales perked up. Fisk & Hatch agreed to handle paper issued against the unbuilt line in Nevada. Inquiries began coming in from Europe, particularly Germany. To speed the interest, Huntington had

503 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 162.
circulars prepared extolling California’s wine-making potentials and sent them throughout the grape-growing areas of Germany and France. 504

Huntington bragged about arrangements he had with financial editors at New York City newspapers in letters to Hopkins in May 1868 and suggested that the arrangements would lead to more bond sales. In a letter on May 23, he told Hopkins, “We have got the financial editors here so that they put some notice of our bonds into the financial column of the papers which is the very best place in the paper to get a notice and I think we can sell as many bonds this season as the law will allow so I think we need have no fear about our having money.” On May 26, Huntington said the notices were better than advertisements, “Our Bonds are selling well. The Financial Editors of nearly all the N.Y. Dailies give us good notices which are worth more than long advertisements.” 505

Both Huntington and Durant displayed a relatively sophisticated understanding of public relations that did not show immediate tangible results but prepared potential investors for possible bond sales in a future campaign. In a letter on November 7, 1867, Huntington told Hopkins that an agent in Germany was returning without having sold any bonds. Still, he said he thought that the trip would prove fruitful. “I think he has done us some good as he has been talking up our securities in Germany and explained many things connected with our Road, which I have no doubt will do us good hereafter.” 506 Durant, testifying before a congressional committee in 1873 and under questioning by James Brooks, a congressman accused of accepting bribes in Credit Mobilier stock, said Brooks had done work to justify payment from the Union Pacific. “You did not succeed in placing the stock, but you created a favorable impression among gentlemen who would not otherwise have taken the subject into consideration.” 507

Working to build the Union Pacific’s image in 1866 as the line approached the 100th meridian, Springer Harbaugh of Pittsburgh, a Union Pacific government director

504 Lavender, The Great Persuader, 193-94.
505 Huntington to Hopkins, May 23 and 26, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
506 Huntington to Hopkins, November 7, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
507 Testimony of Thomas C. Durant, Poland Committee Report, 178.
who also worked for the company by contracting for iron for rails, provided the Pittsburgh Gazette with a telegram sent him from Durant, “Two and a half miles of track laid yesterday. We shall be at Fort Kearney September 1\textsuperscript{st}, and cross the 100\textsuperscript{th} meridian within ninety days.” The Gazette printed the telegram signed by Durant on August 6, 1866, and wrote, “The following telegraphic dispatch shows that unprecedented progress is being made in the construction of this important line. Mr. Durant and his associates are live managers, and whatever they attempt is certain to be prosecuted with the utmost ability and energy.” He included the Gazette item in an undated letter to Durant with a note accompanying the clipping, “I am determined the country shall know we are building the great back bone road and let honors be given to whom honors are due. That little branch or E. D. [Union Pacific, Eastern Division, building through Kansas] are constantly ventilating what they are doing and we must let the people know that we are fighting through the great route with a rapidity which is beginning to astonish all R. R. men.”\textsuperscript{508}

Klein said that progress in construction in the summer of 1866 went a long way toward building a positive image for the Union Pacific. “As the perceptive Dodge had long argued, nothing gave the company more credibility than the presence of track with trains running on it.”\textsuperscript{509} Historian Robert William Fogel agreed that the speedy construction in 1866 led to a turnaround in perception of the Union Pacific.

Prior to 1867, what few articles that appeared in the regular press were often unfavorable. The burst of speed shown in construction during 1866 found almost immediate reaction in the press. Between mid-March and mid-September, 180 miles of track were laid.

What was responsible for the sharp reversal in the attitude of the investing public toward the Union Pacific Railroad that apparently took place between the spring and winter of 1867? The main factor in this change seems to have been the deep impression made on the press and the public by the spectacular and entirely unexpected speed with which construction was pushed.

\textsuperscript{508} Harbaugh to Durant, undated, Series II, Box 17, file ”Harbaugh, Springer, July 1866—1874,” Leonard Collection.

\textsuperscript{509} Klein, Union Pacific, 75.
The continuation of this rate of construction in 1867 had a snowballing effect on public opinion.\textsuperscript{510}

\textbf{Keeping Up Appearances}

For the Central Pacific, a reputation that the company had money was viewed as a good attribute by Huntington and Crocker. “We have got the reputation among capitalists and the people of being a rich corporation,” Crocker told Huntington of the company’s standing in California. “[The reputation is] one result of our efforts to build up a credit.” Even a June 1, 1867, article in the Sacramento \textit{Union} intended to damage the Central Pacific was positive, Crocker said in a letter on June 17, 1867, to Huntington.

I wish to draw your attention to an article in the Sac. \textit{Union} of June 1\textsuperscript{st} headed “Camden and Amboy” – and articles of a similar character in that paper before and since. They are inspired by venom towards us – but they show up our company as wealthy, independent with valuable privileges in fact a monopoly – comparing us to the Camden and Amboy Co. It strikes me that such articles, though dictated by malice, or articles founded on them, might help our credit, as showing our power and wealth. Capitalists would prefer lending to “Camden and Amboy” rather than a Co. that has no power or special privileges.\textsuperscript{511}

Hopkins told Huntington in a letter on October 26, 1867, as the Central Pacific was building track to the summit and on the verge of widening the summit tunnel enough to put track through it, that it probably would not be smart to open the line that winter, even if it were completed through the tunnel in order to keep the company’s reputation for reliability.

Rest assured we do not under-estimate its importance and if we can do it, it will be done this fall. But, if done, we shall only run regular trains to Cisco, after the first heavy snow fall. We will be prepared to overcome all obstacles to that point and be content with what of credit and profit that will give us. Our last winters [\textit{sic}] experience in fighting deep snows and new banks and unprotected open line of road, without covered depots, station yards, turntables, wood sheds, water tanks & c. convinces us that it would be bad policy ever to try it again. And there is no need of our doing it. A year from this winter we will be prepared to

\textsuperscript{510} Fogel, \textit{The Union Pacific Railroad}, 79-80
\textsuperscript{511} Crocker to Huntington, June 17, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
operate the whole line successfully – with regularity and profit. We can’t do it this winter.\textsuperscript{512}

Huntington agreed with Hopkins’ in a letter on November 14, 1867.

I am inclined to think you are quite right in not operating the Road this winter above Cisco unless it should be an unusually mild winter. Of course our enemies would make it tell against us to the extent of their ability so to do. But I consider it very important that we complete the Road to the Truckee [River and Meadows on the eastern side of the Sierra Nevada range] this fall, and then publish it in the papers that on account of the many high embankments that have been built in the dry season, that you have concluded not to operate the road until it has a winter’s rain on it & c.\textsuperscript{513}

In a letter on January 21, 1868, Hopkins chided Huntington again about the snow sheds covering some Central Pacific track and he said they were essential to the railroad’s winter reliability.

I am anxious to have your friend Smith [?] of Schenectady get back to New York. He can tell you about our “pine cover to the road” which you talk to the Judge [E. B. Crocker] about. I am aware that with purchases of Bonds at that distance, the least said of “pine cover to the road” the better. But it is difficult to prevent telegraph and newspaper writers from making frequent mention of it. Its very novelty is sure to attract attention and call out remarks. Smith saw it, and can tell you how it impressed him, for snow protection and durability.

It ranks well and demonstrates the practicality of operating the road in winter. Without it I know we could not operate it and must build four times as much more next season in order to ensure its operation during the winter of 1869, which we all deem essential to the reputation of the road, to the daily earnings during winter, and to the progress of construction during 1868 and 1869.\textsuperscript{514}

The Central Pacific’s increased earnings reports caused a public-relations challenge. On one hand, the directors wanted high earnings published to convince potential investors of the company’s financial strength, but the reports also led to

\textsuperscript{512} Hopkins to Huntington, October 26, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\textsuperscript{513} Huntington to Hopkins, November 14, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\textsuperscript{514} Hopkins to Huntington, January 21, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
legislative moves to regulate the rates charged passengers and shippers. Hopkins described the dilemma in a letter to Huntington on November 19, 1867.

For the purpose of giving our Railroad bonds credit and standing in the Eastern and European market of course you give the greatest possible publicity to our reports of large monthly earnings and our small operating expenses. This is sound policy and right. But when our California Newspapers republish those statements, copied from Eastern Journals, they are too often accompanied by remarks tending to claim that these large earnings prove that the company charge too high freight and passenger rates, and that the Legislature should reduce the rates by an amendment to the California Railroad law & c & c.\textsuperscript{515}

Huntington, in a letter on November 15, 1867, to Crocker, suggested that they could make the earnings appear as they wished them to appear. “If the time should come when we thought small earnings would suit us better, I think we could make it so appear.”\textsuperscript{516}

The Central Pacific associates attempted to position their company image in comparison to the Union Pacific as the company of quality, with quality construction, and not one of speed and questionable quality. Still, behind the scenes, they were planning to go as fast and as cheaply as they could. Within two days of each other, Crocker and Huntington wrote letters regarding the Union Pacific’s speed of construction. Crocker’s letter to Huntington was on December 30, 1867:

I see by the papers that the [Union Pacific officials] talk of building over the Black Hills [of Wyoming, sometimes referred to as the Laramie Mountains] in January. If they do that, or were to lay track to the top in midwinter, I shall begin to think they will lay the 350 miles in 1868. They have been pretty smart in building [their] R.R. but they have never yet come up to their bragging. They boasted they would lay the track to Cheyenne by the 1\textsuperscript{st} of September, but did not do it until Nov. 16. But it will not do for us to trust to their laziness. Better act as though they would perform what they say.\textsuperscript{517}

Huntington wrote to Crocker in a letter on January 1, 1868, about what the Central Pacific associates should do in the coming construction season.

\textsuperscript{515} Hopkins to Huntington, November 17, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\textsuperscript{516} Huntington to Crocker, November 15, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\textsuperscript{517} Crocker to Huntington, December 30, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
I would commence with laying 400 miles of iron in 1868, and I would not say anything to the newspapers what I was doing, and I would have it understood by the superintendent and foreman that there should be no unnecessary talk, but that the work was to be pushed.

It would do the Bonds no good for the Public to know that we were to lay 2 or 3 miles of track per day. It would be better to have it understood that we were working quietly and building a good road, but I would build the cheapest road that I could and have it accepted by the commissioners [Interior Department inspectors] so it moves on fast.\footnote{Huntington to Crocker, January 1, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.}

Earlier, in a letter on December 7, 1867, Huntington laid out his reasoning for hurrying the line to Salt Lake ahead of the Union Pacific.

Now this matter of which shall reach Salt Lake first, I consider of vast importance. It is not altogether the profits in operating the Road, nor of the greater influence that the long roads will have in fixing rates of freight on through business between New York and San Francisco, but to us it seems to me to be very important that the Central Pacific should be built to Salt Lake for this reason that if we build to there, most of the business of that city or that meridian will go to S. F., and if they build there and say 100 miles west, they would, to a certain extent control the business both ways, and of course would always discriminate against us.\footnote{Huntington to Crocker, December 7, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington papers.}

\section*{There They Go}
Both railroads built fast in 1868 with the Central Pacific laying 363 miles of track and the Union Pacific putting down 425 miles, reaching milepost 966.\footnote{McCague, \textit{Moguls and Iron Men}, 263. The record is confusing regarding Central Pacific progress. A letter from Hopkins to Huntington on December 8, 1868, in Series I, Box 2, of the Huntington papers reported that they had reached milepost 650, ninety miles short of Ogden in eastern Utah. But another letter in Series I, Box 2, of the Huntington Papers from Hopkins to Huntington on March 20, 1869, more than three months later said they had completed a thirty-mile section to the 600 milepost. Explanations may include that the December letter was reporting on grading ahead of the track-laying, or it may have reported track laying without the necessary side tracks and other accompaniments such as water towers and stations necessary for government approval. A six-foot snowfall on the Sierra Nevada summit stopped further construction there in 1867, according to a Hopkins letter to Huntington on December 19, 1867, in Series I, Box 1, of the Huntington Papers. Still, track was being laid in the less wintry areas approaching Reno, which was reached on May 1, 1868, according to Best, \textit{Iron Horses to Promontory}, 26. A seven-mile gap in the line beginning east of the summit at Strongs Canyon and ending at the head of Coldstream remained until it was closed on June 15, 1868. See Hopkins to Huntington, }
1868 drew nationwide attention as newspapers marked the progress of the two roads approaching each other. Dodge noted the attention in his autobiography. “As each 100 miles of road was completed there came a general acclaim from all parts of the country to our great encouragement.”

Crocker noted it, too, in a letter to Huntington on July 31, 1868: “There is a great deal of feeling growing up on this coast over this railroad race. We are continually asked if we are not going to beat the U.P. to Salt Lake. We reply that we intend to build road as fast as we can.”

Historian Charles Edgar Ames said Dodge noted in a report on August 14, 1868, “The great conflict had begun between the two companies.” Historian W. F. Bailey described a running report on progress published daily in newspapers. “The progress made was daily wired East and published in the principal newspapers. Thus in the *Chicago Tribune* items such as “One and nine-tenths miles of track laid yesterday on the Union Pacific Railroad” appeared in every issue.

Historian Edward L. Sabin described a sort of mania, too. “The press and people in the East were wakening to the miracle of railroad building being enacted in the West. The front pages of the metropolitan papers – the Tribune of Chicago and the exultant Greeley’s great Tribune of New York – the papers of Boston and Cincinnati and Washington – displayed the bulletin in each issue: “One and nine-tenths miles of track laid yesterday on the Union Pacific Railroad”, “two miles of track laid yesterday on the Union Pacific Railroad . . .”

Sabin said the traveling public flocked to the end of the line to see the work underway.

It was worth the dust, the heat, the cinders, the hurrying ride day and night, the fatigue and the exposure, to see with one’s own eyes this second grand “March to the Sea.” Sherman with his victorious legions sweeping from Atlanta to Savannah was a spectacle less glorious than this army of men marching on foot from Omaha to Sacramento, subduing unknown mountains, surmounting untried obstacles, and binding across

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522 Crocker to Huntington, July 31, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
525 Sabin, *Building the Pacific Railway*, 175.
the broad breast of America the iron emblem of modern progress and civilization.526

Indians and snow, however, provided sometimes serious impediments to the transcontinental railroad progress and those obstacles provided their own public relations problems and opportunities as directors of the two companies tried to establish reputations for reliability, safety, and progressiveness. A disgruntled contractor and his workers also created at delay for two Union Pacific directors when they held them hostage until their back pay was delivered. Still, the railroads’ leaders continued to puff along on trains loaded with construction materials, freight and passengers.

526 Sabin, Building the Pacific Railway, 175.
Chapter 7: Unscheduled Stops

The organizers of construction of the first transcontinental railroad, particularly on the Union Pacific’s eastern portion of the 1,776-mile rail line, encountered uncontrollable circumstances that created public relations dilemmas. Indians, sometimes hostile and occupying territory in western Nebraska and eastern Wyoming, created problems for nearly two years for the Union Pacific builders, who sought to get what they considered sufficient numbers of Army troops to protect laborers. At the same time, the builders had to convince laborers that working in Indian lands was safe. Both the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific encountered debilitating snowstorms that in Wyoming closed the Union Pacific line for six weeks and in California blinded workers ordered to open snow-blocked cuts. Also, Union Pacific Vice President Thomas C. Durant allegedly was kidnapped by unpaid workers and held hostage less than a month before construction was completed although Chief Engineer Grenville Dodge, a former Civil War general, suspected that he arranged the kidnapping to get money out of the cash-strapped company in the form of ransom for his release.527

The Indian “troubles,” as they were called, plagued the Union Pacific construction from 1866 to 1868 as the company’s workers built the line across western Nebraska and into Wyoming. They presented a two-fold dilemma for the Union Pacific’s managers. While the managers wanted to emphasize the problems they were having with Indians to federal officials, particularly military officials, in order to get more troops, they also wanted to downplay the problems so that they could get enough laborers at what they considered a reasonable wage rate.528 Also, the results of Indian raids were often exaggerated, perhaps to increase the sense of adventure involved in the railroad’s construction and certainly to add to a list of difficulties overcome not only to enhance the personal images of the builders but to help justify the profits they made.

The hostile tribes, primarily Sioux and Cheyenne, impeded railroad progress mostly in the plains east of Cheyenne, Wyoming. Three writers of the period regarded the Indians of the West with disdain. Silas S. Seymour, a Union Pacific consulting engineer, called them “worse than useless.” A. K. McClure, in a collection of letters he wrote for the New York Tribune and the Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, Franklin Repository about a trip he took by stagecoach to Denver and on to Salt Lake City during the transcontinental construction, called Indian women “dusky daughters of the forest.” McClure also described Indian atrocities, including the skinning of a cat at a stage station, and argued that the military fought them in “too civilized a way.” He wanted the federal government to allow settlers to settle scores with the Indians. Historian John Debo Galloway, in the introduction to his 1950 book on the first transcontinental railroad, wrote, “Where once roamed wild animals and wilder Indians there has developed a rich empire providing homes and livelihood for millions of people.” He included an excerpt from an 1838 Knickerbocker Magazine regarding a railroad line to the West: “The very realms of chaos and old night will be invaded; while in the place of the roar of wild beasts, or howl of wilder Indians, will be heard the lowing of herds, the bleating of flocks.”

Historian Robert West Howard said a fight with the Indians seemed inevitable.

The West seemed destined as a theatre of war for decades and perhaps generations. Ever since the Army’s high-plains pioneering by Generals [Stephen W.] Kearney, [Winfield] Scott and [William S.] Harney, Army commanders had pursued the stupid course of chasing Indian horsemen with wagonloads of infantry drawn by ox or mule at 2 to 4 miles an hour. Congress had never appropriated funds to police the

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530 Silas S. Seymour, Incidents of a Trip through the Great Platte Valley to the Rocky Mountains and Laramie Plains in the Fall of 1866, with a Synoptical Statement of the Various Pacific Railroads and an Account of the Great Union Pacific Railroad Excursion to the One Hundredth Meridian of Longitude (New York: Van Nostrand, 1867), 90.
533 Ibid., 32.
West with a cavalry; it had come closest when it permitted Jeff Davis to experiment with the Camel Corps [in 1856 in Texas].

A transcontinental railroad was the solution. Enough troops could be assigned to protect track gangs during the push into Utah. Once trains were running over the Rockies, troops could be transported 500-600 miles overnight. The Pacific Railroad would become the Army’s deadliest weapon with which to quell Indian uprisings and protect the massive flow of migrants and goods between the Missouri and the Pacific.  

The Indians, too, saw the railroad as a weapon, one that must be taken away from those who were invading their lands, according to Howard.

The simplest object for assault then, in the reasoning of the braves and subchiefs among the Cheyenne and Sioux, was the locomotive itself. After all, this was the monster that frightened the bison, elk and antelope away from hunting grounds, made a noise like forty-seven devils and vomited the columns of smoke and flaming cinders that started prairie fires. The half-breed traders and reservation agents all referred to the monster as the “iron horse.”

Serious Indian trouble began in the summer of 1866 as the Union Pacific Railroad built west from Omaha, and the trouble lasted twenty months in what historian Jacob Randolph Perkins called “bitter warfare.” Howard said in June 1866 (when the Union Pacific reached 100 miles west of Omaha) “parties of young braves circled east behind the work train, each intent on capturing an iron horse.” The braves tried lassos to loop the locomotive smokestacks. “These succeeded in tilting one or two stacks, but at the price of broken ribs and scarred buttocks,” Howard said. The Indians also tried a rawhide trip rope, Howard said. Historian James McCague described an escalating problem with Indians in the summer of 1866:

West of Kearney [Fort Kearney, also spelled Kearny, near Grand Island, a 60-mile-long island in the Platte River], however, Indian troubles began in grim earnest. They were no new or sudden thing. Since ’64

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535 Ibid., 207.
537 Howard, The Great Iron Trail, 207.
survey parties had been subjected to harassment and often driven off their jobs. And once the first few miles out of Omaha had been covered, graders and track gangs had never been able to be sure that some wandering party of wild young braves would not swoop down out of nowhere, stampede cattle and work stock and even take a white scalp or two if the chances looked good. Heretofore it had been more nuisance than serious hazard. But now the railroad (the fire road) was thrusting deep into the range of the vast Republican buffalo herd (named for the Republican River which winds through southern Nebraska and northern Kansas) which constituted the main commissary of tribes of the Central Great Plains.

The controversy arising from the white man’s killing and wilding the buffalo, making the red man’s hunt more difficult, had always been at the bottom of the Indian trouble.538

In May 1866, when Chief Engineer Grenville M. Dodge joined the Union Pacific after leaving as a general in the Army, L. L. Hills, an engineer assistant locating lines in the Wyoming Black Hills, was killed by a Sioux war party.539 On December 21, 1866, at Fort Phil Kearny in north central Wyoming along the Bozeman Trail to Oregon and well north of the Union Pacific line, eighty-one cavalroymen led by Lieutenant Colonel William J. Fetterman were ambushed and killed by Sioux, Cheyenne and Arapahos, and according to historian Charles Edgar Ames “massacred to the last man, and their bodies horribly mutilated.”540

Not all Indians were hostile, however. The Pawnees, described as enemies of the Sioux, served as Army scouts and helped entertain guests on the October 1866 Union Pacific’s Grand Excursion. Also, according to historians Levi O. Leonard and Jack T. Johnson, Union Pacific managers provided free transportation to Indians to keep them out of mischief. “Having more leisure than work, many an Indian brave spent days of pleasure riding up and down the newly laid track,” they wrote. “Hanging on the outside of cars, these real Americans, with their blankets flying before the wind, presented a colorful picture. In all this joy-riding, there was but one requirement: the red man must

539 Ibid., 169.
Historian Edward L. Sabin said the Central Pacific managers also offered free passage on freight cars to Paiutes and Shoshones and one chief even got a passenger pass. Correspondent A. Fleming described the free rides for Indians in an August 25, 1868, Pittsburgh Commercial article produced as part of a Union Pacific-sponsored excursion for reporters, correspondents and editors in July 1868 to the end of the track in Wyoming.

There is constant inquiry, why the Indians do not tear up the track, attack trains in transit and pull down the [telegraph] wires? For the telegraph, or “long tongue” as they call it, they have fortunately a superstitious awe, perhaps acquired from handling the warm iron, and for the cars they have the respect which arises from personal convenience. The rule of the road allows the Indians to ride free for any distance, on the trucks and on the platforms of the cars, but not in the cars. This obviously proper restriction does not trouble them, and they may be daily seen exercising their privilege, well understanding the advantage derived.

But Webster Snyder, the Union Pacific operations superintendent, said in a letter to Dodge in March 1868 that the possibility of Indian violence meant the company had to pay more for its workers. Durant connected Army protection from Indians to keeping men on the construction work in a telegram on July 11, 1866, to Union Pacific president John Adams Dix. “See Gen. Sherman [Army General William Tecumseh Sherman, then commanding the Department of the West] about placing troops on the north side of Platte to protect workmen on third and fourth hundred miles. Unless it is done we cannot hold our men on work.” Perkins said that Dodge, in outlining plans to build 288 miles of railroad in 1867 to Sherman, had told him that more soldiers for protection would mean more workers could be employed as the soldiers’ presence gave the men confidence.

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541 Levi O. Leonard and Jack T. Johnson, A Railroad to the Sea (Iowa City, Iowa: Midland House, 1939), 163-64.
543 A Fleming, Pittsburgh Commercial, August 25, 1868, in Rocky Mountain Press Club, “Scrapbook” unpublished, 78-79, Series II, Box 27, file “Rocky Mountain Press Club,” in the Papers of Levi O. Leonard, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, hereafter referred to as the Leonard Collection. Hereafter, the scrapbook will be referred to as the Leonard Scrapbook.
544 Snyder to Dodge, March, no date given, 1868, in Dodge, “Autobiography,” 745.
545 Telegram, Durant to Dix, July 11, 1866, Series II, Box 11, File “Dix, John Adams,” Leonard Collection.
Dodge suggested that 5,000 soldiers were needed east of the Rockies and north of the Platte River.546

Dodge wrote Sherman on January 14, 1867, requesting “ample protection” in the North Platte, Nebraska, area 300 miles west of Omaha. “We are going to be scarce of laborers and any lack of protection, so that workmen lose confidence in their security, would be almost fatal to us.”547 In a letter to Dodge on January 16, 1867, Sherman called the Union Pacific construction of its part of the transcontinental railroad “your great national enterprise,” but, he said, he was having problems finding enough troops to protect it from Indians. “I regard this road of yours as the solution of the Indian affairs and the Mormon question, and, therefore, give you all the aid I possibly can, but the demand for soldiers everywhere and the slowness of enlistment, especially among the blacks, limit our ability to respond.”548 Howard said that members of Congress were weary of war and worried about the national debt. Furthermore, they were receiving assurances from the interior secretary that the problems with the Indians could be settled through negotiation and treaties. “Consequently,” he concluded, “The War Department didn’t have enough budget to recruit 500 cavalrymen, let alone 5,000 for the Platte.”549

The forts in the area of the Union Pacific construction work, Kearney, McPherson, and Sedgwick, had a total of 200 mounted men and 600 soldiers.550 Jesse L. Williams, a government director on the Union Pacific board of directors, wrote Dodge on February 9, 1867, from Fort Wayne, Indiana, “Without some very decided assurance of perfect safety, which only the Government can give, I fear you will not get laborers along that much dreaded Lodge Pole, heretofore so often annoyed by Indians thieving and scalping.”551 Sherman told Dodge in a letter on February 20, 1867, that even though workers did not see troops, they would be there and that Dodge should explain tactics to the workers.

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546 Perkins, Trails, Rails and War, 206.
550 Ibid.
551 Williams to Dodge, February 9, 1867, Dodge “Autobiography,” 599.
General [Christopher Colon] Augur and I will do all to cover the working parties that is possible, only we may consider it better done by combining all against the hostile Sioux offensively instead of keeping the soldiers close in, in sight of your men. I think with a little explanation from you, the working parties will understand that they are more safe along the Lodge Pole with our soldiers two or three hundred miles north, than if those same soldiers were close at hand.552

Howard said the Cheyenne and Sioux broke their winter camps near Fort Larned in Kansas in April 1867, raided stage stations and ranches along the Smoky Hill and Santa Fe trails, and then rode north toward the Platte. Dodge, in a letter from his home in Council Bluffs, Iowa, to Durant in New York City on May 20, 1867, said he would go to the end of the track if his health permitted. “If I can get out on the work I think I can hold most of our men, they stick to me yet [an apparent reference to his Civil War command].”553 Dodge also wrote to Sherman on May 20, 1867, “We are now at Alkali, 40 miles west of North Platte [the town], and I tremble every day for fear of a stampede [of workers]. Have smothered all of the recent attacks and kept them out of the press. Auger [sic] and myself only know it, but should our men get at the real truth, they will stampede.”554

The Indian troubles attracted reporters and correspondents, including some from Europe, according to Howard. A feud between the War Department and the Interior Department over the proper strategy to follow in handling the troubles, a surprising rush of construction by the Union Pacific, and the Indian raids promised exciting headlines. “From June on,” Howard wrote, “North Platte and Casements’ railhead were host to ‘special writers’ and correspondents stabbing questions, scribbling notes in a dozen languages, and driving the telegraph operators frantic with night dispatches and ‘urgent’ bulletins.”555 Historian Stephen E. Ambrose said that Dodge was not successful in

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552 Sherman to Dodge, February 20, 1867, Dodge “Autobiography,” 617.
555 Howard, The Great Iron Trail, 244-46. Howard said attacks on Wells Fargo stages on June 1-5, 1867, led to “the week’s best escape story” when an Episcopal missionary, the Reverend W. A. Fuller,
keeping Indian attack reports out of the press, they were detailed in big city newspapers, including those in New York City and Chicago, which included some details that reporters apparently made up.  

Exaggerations of the Indian danger were common in the Union Pacific’s transcontinental-construction history. John Duff, a Union Pacific director, testified before a congressional committee in 1873 that there were “hundreds” of Union Pacific workers killed by Indians during the construction, but the record shows that no more than fifty-six Union Pacific employees or contractors’ employees (including possible duplicate reports and the highest estimates) were killed. Historians also exaggerated the danger.

jumped from a stagecoach roof into the Platte River and swam underwater to a bush in the river, where he hid.  


557 Testimony of John Duff, House Select Committee No. 2, *House Report 78, Affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad Company*, 42nd Cong., 3rd sess, February 20, 1873, 494. The committee chairman was Jeremiah M. Wilson of Indiana, and the committee’s report will be referred to hereafter as the Wilson Committee Report. Historical accounts detail that L. L. Hills, a Union Pacific engineer assistant, was killed in early April or May 1866 six miles east of Crow Creek or Cheyenne when 100 Cheyenne Indians attacked. See McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 169; Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 242; and Sabin, *Building the Pacific Railway*, 235. Assistant Engineer Percy I. Browne was killed by Sioux on July 23, 1867, as he moved out of Fort Saunders, apparently in Kansas, with a survey party, according to McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 171. Earlier, in May 1867, a Browne party member, a young man named Clark, a nephew of Thurlow Weed of New York City, was killed by Sioux, according to McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 171. Ames, *Pioneering the Union Pacific*, 216-17, said two were killed in the Browne party. See also Sabin, *Building the Pacific Railway*, 235; and Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 244. In a telegram on May 21, 1867, Samuel Reed, a Union Pacific construction engineer, told Durant that four men, apparently Union Pacific employees, had been killed and men were leaving their work. See telegram, Reed to Durant, May 21, 1867. Series II, Box 26, file “Reed, Samuel Benedict, 1867” Leonard Collection. In a telegram on May 23, 1867, Reed told Durant that a man was killed in a crew working to cut ties from timber in the Black Hills. See telegram, Reed to Durant, May 23, 1867, Series II, Box 26, file “Reed, Samuel Benedict, 1867” Leonard Collection. Ames, *Pioneering the Union Pacific*, 217, said that on May 25, 1867, five of six men on a Union Pacific section gang near Overton, Nebraska, were killed; that three were killed near Brule, Nebraska, on the same day and that a man was killed in a contractor’s camp at the same time. Ames, *Pioneering the Union Pacific*, 218-19, reported that two men were killed on June 10, 1867, by Cheyenne at Julesburg, Colorado. Ames, *Pioneering the Union Pacific*, 219-20, said that “two or three” men were killed on July 5, 1867, near Cheyenne, Wyoming. Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 259-60, said of the same incident that five Union Pacific graders were killed. According to the Oliver Ames Jr. diary in the Stonehill College Archives and Special Collections, Arnold B. Tofias Industrial Archives, Brockton, Massachusetts, hereafter referred to as the Oliver Ames Jr. Diary, entry for August 8, 1867, seven men were killed when a train was derailed, apparently an incident in which Cheyenne Chief Turkey Leg or Turkey Foot succeeded in derailing a freight train on August 6, 1867. See Gary Hogg, *Union Pacific: Building of the First Transcontinental Railroad* (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), Chapter 1; and Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 252. McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 181-86, said two were killed in the Plum Creek Massacre, which he described as the
Historian Nelson Trotman, citing Dodge, and Duff’s congressional testimony, wrote, “Notwithstanding all precautions, it is said that hundreds of workmen were killed and much of the livestock lost [to Indians].”558 Bailey asserted there were thousands of Indian incidents that “illustrate the trials and dangers encountered by the hardy pioneers.”559 Sabin quotes Oakes Ames that the country through which the line was built was “swarming” with hostile Indians who killed locating engineers and conductors of construction trains. Sabin provided a dramatic description of the Indian troubles:

The red warriors on the buffalo range vastly increased the difficulties. For the three years of building across the plains from Omaha to the Rockies they bitterly fought the road, impeding it at almost every mile. Surveyors worked under military escort. They were attacked and they died beside their transits and their stakes; graders dug and delved after they had stacked their guns within instant reach and they too died upon their picks and shovels. Construction trains and way freights were derailed and stormed by bullet and arrow.560

There were calmer assessments of the Indian danger, however. Charles T. Sherman, a Union Pacific government director, testified before a congressional committee, “I think there was no danger of Indian hostilities after 1865.”561 Sabin quoted a letter from General Sherman to his brother, a congressman: “No particular danger need

Turkey Leg or Turkey Foot incident. McCague said it took place near Lexington, Nebraska, and two were killed and one scalped. Gerald M. Best, Iron Horses to Promontory (San Marino, California: Golden West Books, 1969), 102-03 said the Plum Creek Massacre took place on August 12, 1867, and four men were killed, although details in Best’s account match the Turkey Leg or Turkey Foot incident in which a train was stopped. In April 1868, W. F. Bailey, The Story of the First Trans-Continental Railroad, 74, said a Union Pacific section gang of five was killed near Elm Creek station. Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 263-64, recounted the same incident without a specific day in April. On April 23, 1868, Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 263-64, said that two men were killed three miles east of Dale Creek bridge. Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 263-64, also reported that Dodge had been notified in early June 1868, of the deaths of eleven men in three incidents on contractors’ work sites. See also J. E. House to Dodge, May 6, 1868, Box 65, Vol. 154, File 6, “May 1-10, 1868,” Grenville Mellen Dodge Papers at the State Historical Society of Iowa Library in Des Moines, hereafter referred to as the Dodge Papers. The House-to-Dodge letter added four section men killed near Plum Creek station and one man killed at Sidney. Finally, in September 1868, Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 263-64, said that a fireman was roasted when he was pinned against the firebox of a train derailed near Ogallala, Nebraska.

559 Bailey, The Story of the First Trans-Continental Railroad, 77.
560 Sabin, Building the Pacific Railway, 144.
be apprehended from the Indians. So large a number of workmen distributed along the line will introduce enough whisky to kill off all the Indians within 300 miles of the road.”

But Durant took the threat seriously as late as May 8, 1868, when he issued “General Order No. 3” from Fort Saunders to Union Pacific workers. The general order suggested that it was worker and contractor negligence that had led to employee deaths and injuries by the Indians.

The military authorities have done and are now doing everything in their power to protect the road and its employees from depredations by the few roving bands of Indians which occasionally make their appearance upon the plains—and it only remains for those connected with the road to use due diligence, in order to avoid any further annoyance from that source.

It is therefore ordered:

The Engineer in charge of Construction will direct each contractor or Foreman in charge of work to see that their men are well-armed when they go upon the work and that their arms are in good condition, properly stacked and within easy reach in case of an alarm. Also that proper precautions are taken to guard against surprise.

Inasmuch as the only casualties that have happened along the line from this source has been occasioned by the most gross and almost criminal neglect on the part of those in charge of the work, it is further ordered that at the direction of the Engineer in Charge, in case the contractors fail to obey instructions in this matter and neglect to make the proper use of the means placed at their disposal by the military authorities and the company for the protection of their men, these means will be taken from them.

Signed: Thos. C. Durant, Vice President.

The Indian troubles led government director Jesse L. Williams to question whether he would become an “Indian hater.” In a letter to Dodge on August 3, 1867, he

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562 Sabin, Building the Pacific Railway, 232.
said, “What will you do for experienced locating engineers in place of those valuable men killed by the Indians? I fear I shall become an Indian hater. Has not the race fulfilled its mission on the earth?”

Union Pacific president Oliver Ames Jr. suggested that extermination of Indians might be their fate in a letter to Dodge on April 24, 1868. “I have feared this trouble with the Indians and see no way to avoid it unless the Government will feed them or give them such severe punishment that they will not feel that they can rob with impunity. I see nothing but extermination to the Indians as a result of their thieving disposition, and we probably have to come to this before we can run the road safely.”

Snow Delays

For both companies, snowstorms also stopped operations. As with all occurrences in the construction of the road, the managers were attentive to the public relations involved and how the storms might affect public perception of them, their companies, and their work. Central Pacific Vice President Collis P. Huntington did not like the mention of snow in a commissioners’ report to the Secretary of the Interior in the fall of 1867 about the progress and character of the railroad’s work to that point. “It is very good in the main,” Huntington said of the report, “but there is too much said about snow and particularly when it says that you could not get to work before July on account of the snow. As there was no necessity of saying it, and all such is an argument in favor of another road.”

Huntington wanted to broadcast the overcoming of snowstorm obstacles when the Central Pacific successfully got through its first big storm threatening the road’s operation in December 1867, according to company attorney E. B. Crocker, who wrote from Sacramento to Huntington in New York City on December 23.

We have had most terrific storms in the mountains and valleys for several days past but the Central Pacific has come out of them with flying

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564 Williams to Dodge, August 3, 1867, Dodge “Autobiography,” 677.
565 Ames to Dodge, April 24, 1868, Dodge “Autobiography,” 748.
566 Huntington to E. B. Crocker, November 2, 1867, Series I, Box 1, in the Collis Potter Huntington Papers in the Special Collections Research Center at the Syracuse University Library. The papers are organized chronologically and hereafter will be referred to as the Huntington Papers.
colors. Not a day has passed that the trains have not made the trip over the road. The snow plows, with the assistance of the snow sheds, have had no difficulty in keeping the track clear of snow up to Cisco and next winter when the track is fully settled, and we will be fully prepared, we feel there will be no difficulty in operating the road clear through.\(^{567}\)

Crocker said, however, that the railroad’s bridge over the American River at Sacramento had been damaged by storm runoff, and passengers were walking across the bridge to board trains on the other side. The Central Pacific managers constructed thirty-seven miles of show sheds by 1869 at a cost of $2 million.\(^{568}\) Huntington was quick to see a public-relations opportunity in withstanding the December 1867 storms in a letter to Central Pacific Treasurer Mark Hopkins on December 29, 1867. “After some of these terrible storms it would be well to send or have sent over to the Associated Press here how the storm came and beat upon the Central Pacific Road, but it harmed it not as it was founded on a Rock.”\(^{569}\)

The Central Pacific associates were not as ready to be boastful fifteen months later in March 1868 when a snowstorm blocked the railroad through the Sierra Nevada Mountains. In a letter to Huntington, Hopkins said the storm was unparalleled in the five winters that they had been operating the railroad, with five feet of snow at Cisco in an initial fall followed in three days with eleven feet more and then winds that drifted the snow and “alternate snow storms for a week longer.” Hopkins reported, “The road has been blocked several days from Blue Canyon to Cisco.”\(^{570}\) Charles Crocker, who was in charge of Central Pacific construction, had a gloomy report on the storm in his letter to Huntington on March 29, 1868:

There is no place between Cisco and Coldstream less than fifteen feet of snow lying on the track and line of uncompleted work and in some places between 50 and 100 feet drifted and slid in. We have just got the road opened to Cisco having been blocked up with snow for five days [because] a snowslide from Black Bute Mountain took out a bent of trestling from bridge at Bute Canon and a dozen snow slides between

\(^{567}\) Crocker to Huntington, December 23, 1867, in Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\(^{568}\) George T. Clark, Leland Stanford: War Governor, Railroad Builder, and Founder of Stanford University (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1931), 224.
\(^{569}\) Huntington to Hopkins, December 29, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
\(^{570}\) Hopkins to Huntington, March 16, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
Cisco and Em. [Emigrant] Gap raised h—I generally. I was up through the whole of it. The storm commenced on the 29th Feby and lasted with 3 or 4 days intermission until Tuesday 17th inst. during which time 13 feet of snow fell at Cisco.571

In late April, Central Pacific workers were shoveling the snow off the line at Coldstream with 1,000 men and encountering problems with the sun reflecting off the landscape. “The snow has blinded a good many [workers],” E. B. Crocker wrote Huntington on April 23, 1868, “and we have had to buy up all the cheap goggles in the market. Only think of that. What an item in railroad building.”572 Hopkins also mentioned the blinding of workers in a letter to Huntington on the same day:

The grade is nearly done to the Big Bend [of the Truckee River, on the eastern foothills of the Sierra Nevada Range. A seven-mile gap remained, however, between the Summit Tunnel and Coldstream or Strong’s Canyon. As the work is completed the men are brought back onto the snow line to complete the connection and open the road from Cisco to Coburn – about 1200 to 1500 are already there and daily increasing, but ‘tis impossible to count on more than 75 percent to work, so many are made blind then to quit.

Neither man or animals can stand the reflected sun’s rays on the snow. But we will work it through in some way and connect by the 15th June, I believe.573

On the Union Pacific side, historian Maury Klein wrote that March 1867 blizzards on the plains “inspired Senator [John] Conness of California to fresh mischief by promoting rumors that the Union Pacific had stopped work entirely.”574 The Union Pacific’s real problems with snowstorms and bad public relations, however, took place in February and March 1868 when blizzards closed hundreds of miles of track at a time.575

Union Pacific attorney A. J. Poppleton testified before Congress that government commissioners were to blame for the Union Pacific snow blockade problems on the

571 Charles Crocker to Huntington, March 29, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
572 E. B. Crocker to Huntington, April 23, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
573 Hopkins to Huntington, April 23, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
575 Sabin, Building the Pacific Railway, 190.
Laramie Plains east of Laramie, Wyoming. He said the commissioners insisted that the road be constructed on the level and not following the undulations of the plains, requiring cuts that put the track below the surface and provided perfect snowdrift collection points. Historian Robert West Howard, who said the workers for both railroads fought a “white hell” with the snow, asserted that Union Pacific engineers had erred by failing to build snow sheds in the Black Hills [Laramie Mountains] and the Wyoming Basin.

When the Union Pacific had its prolonged bout with the snow in Wyoming in the first three months of 1869, he said, “publicity releases out of Sacramento smugly announced that ‘no Central Pacific train is running more than two hours late.’ But from February on, eastern papers had successive features about Union Pacific trains stalled in Evans Pass . . . at Rawlins . . . on the Red Desert.”

Historian Charles Edgar Ames said the worst of the storms on the Wyoming plains was a “mighty blizzard” that struck in late February 1869 and blocked the track west of Cheyenne, Wyoming, for ten days. “All passenger trains,” he said, “were being sent out fully provisioned, with cooking arrangements aboard.”

Historian James McCague said the Wyoming blizzard hit on February 20 and stranded 200 eastbound passengers at Rawlins and several hundred westbound passengers at Laramie 100 miles away. Then, he wrote, some of the passengers at Rawlins walked to Laramie:

Presently, though, part of the 200 left behind at Rawlins came tramping in [to Laramie] having elected to walk. They were weary and somewhat frostbitten, but otherwise little the worse for the experience. This was a group of prominent California Republicans on their way to Washington for Ulysses S. Grant’s inaugural. But they never made it. March 4 had come and gone by the time they got as far as St. Louis, in a mood to unburden themselves [to reporters] of some pretty sour comment on the Union Pacific Railroad and the vaunted transcontinental route.

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578 Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 329.
579 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 276-77. Wesley S. Griswold, A Work of Giants: Building the First Transcontinental Railroad (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), 303, said 600 passengers were stranded at Laramie for three weeks, the same period that the non-walking Rawlins passengers were stranded. Griswold said the passengers who reached St. Louis unburdened themselves to reporters of the St. Louis Dispatch, the newspaper Durant was gathering information to sue for libel in 1865.
A telegram was sent from Rawlins to Huntington in Washington on February 22, 1869, apparently from California eastbound passengers, that told him of the closed Union Pacific line, “Two hundred passengers believe themselves unnecessarily delayed here ten days also eleven U.S. Mails. The conduct of the officers of Laramie Division and officers over them is disgraceful to Railroad and the government.” That message apparently was read by Union Pacific Operations Superintendent Webster Snyder before it was sent, and he discussed the telegram’s contents in a letter to Dodge on February 21. Snyder said there may have been company employees who aided in wording the dispatch.

I enclose copy of dispatch going through tonight. It is rather rich. There are not one hundred fifty (150) passengers at Rawlins. None of them have been there 10 days and most of them three.

Storm has been awful. Whole force of men on the Division and all outsiders we could employ have been at work all week. High winds and cuts fill with snow faster than we can shovel out. Adrian [?] a little more favorable tonight. Got through Laramie to Cheyenne today and think that part can be kept open.

Don’t know origin of the dispatch to C. P. H. [Huntington] but will find out who they are and what figuring for. The wording of dispatch induces me to think some men connected with the road have had a hand in it.

Telegrams to Snyder on February 23 and 24, 1869, told him that a passenger train had been left on the tracks with four days’ provisions aboard and little likelihood it would get out for at least two days; the line had been blocked for ten days west of Cheyenne; eastbound trains had been stopped going to Rawlins; provisions at Wasatch were enough for thirty days, except for beef; Bitter Creek had a lot of provisions and passengers there were quiet and comfortable; cuts between Cheyenne west to Laramie had been shoveled out but were full again with snow; and even with pleasant weather, it would take a week to resupply section houses. “Do not think it advisable to send any more [passenger

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trains] West,” said a February 24 telegram to Snyder from J. N. C. “Am giving passes to passengers back to Omaha.”

Durant, in the Union Pacific offices in New York City, got involved after newspapers published reports of the snow blockade, threatening the Union Pacific’s image. Durant sent an undated note to Snyder, probably because of conflicting newspaper reports regarding the blockade’s duration asking how long passengers had been detained. Snyder responded in a telegram to Durant on February 26 that it had been 15 days. Durant then ordered Snyder to assign up to 500 more men to clear the snow.

Snyder provided details of the publicity damage’s origin in letters to Dodge on February 27, 1869. “Employees of Central Pacific happen to be delayed at Cheyenne and Rawlins and are telegraphing awful lies through the country. I think they are assisted by some—[Union Pacific employees?] and propose to find out who they are.” In another letter to Dodge on the same day, Snyder provided names.

The dispatch sent to the Associated Press from Cheyenne 25th inst. stating that we had but four (4) inches of snow and that no efforts were being made to open road was signed by: Chas. James, San Francisco; W. J. Hall, New York; W. B. Hunt, Sacramento; A. J. Rhodes, Sacramento; L. P. Edmonds, New York; S. H. Newton, New York. At least four (4) of these men are employees of the Central Pacific R. R. Their statement is false except as to fact of blockade. I think they have had some assistance in forwarding their dispatch from parties connected indirectly with this road, in regard to which I propose to ascertain facts.

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583 Durant to Snyder, undated notes, and telegram, Snyder to Durant, February 26, 1869, Series II, Box 29, file “Snyder, Webster, August 1868-1869,” Leonard Collection.

584 Snyder to Dodge, February 27, 1869, Box 66, Vol. 156, File 6, “Feb. 21-28, 1869,” Dodge Papers.

On March 1, Snyder told Durant that prospects were better for opening the line with 800 men shoveling and said the line was open the morning of March 2 “except Lookout to Perry work. Trains at each end blockade and two intermediate trains all with snow plows and large force men. Weather fair and expect to clear track by midnight.”

Snyder knew what to do when the line was cleared of snow: he would notify the Associated Press. “I hope to have road open tomorrow. Will telegraph Associated Press soon as it is sure.”

In a letter to Dodge on March 5, Snyder said he was worn out from supervising the clearing of the snow blockade for three weeks. On the same day, another storm hit and blocked the line westward from Cheyenne and into the Black Hills, or Laramie Mountains. Snyder was back on the telegraph to Durant explaining what was closed and when it would be open. On March 9, Snyder telegraphed Durant that the Laramie Division was open and clear, and on March 12 he wired Dodge that the entire line was open.

Central Pacific Treasurer Mark Hopkins seemed almost gleeful as he related to Huntington the return of some acquaintances to Sacramento after being stranded on the Union Pacific by the Wyoming storms.

Genl Hutchinson, Col. James, Bill Hunt and Frank Rhodes and others who were blockaded on the Union Road 3 weeks have just got through here. They talk loud and continuous on denunciation of the Union Road route and Co.

They told them there on the spot that if they had one tenth the pluck and force of the Central Co. they would not have been blocked at all with so little snow &c &c &c.

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586 Telegram, Snyder to Durant, March 1, 1869, Series II, Box 29, file “Snyder, Webster, August 1868-1869,” Leonard Collection.
587 Telegram, Snyder to Durant, March 2, 1869, Series II, Box 29, file “Snyder, Webster, August 1868-1869,” Leonard Collection.
589 Snyder to Dodge, March 5, 1869, Dodge “Autobiography,” 899.
589 See telegrams, Snyder to Durant, March 5 and 6, 1869, Series II, Box 29, file “Snyder, Webster, August 1868-1869,” Leonard Collection.
Came near having a fight several times on this and would but they found out that fighting was just what Hunt, Rhodes and few other Californians that were there, would like best and could win at all the time so this band of Central Pacific Californians brow beat them for three weeks and carried the crowd with them.592

One of the effects of the Wyoming snow blockades was showing up at the end of the Union Pacific track, where construction was underway, according to a letter from Central Pacific president Leland Stanford, who was in Utah looking after company interests, to Huntington on March 20, 1869. “The U. P. track is about (8) eight miles west of Ogden where it remains for want of material,” he wrote. “To day it reported the road is open but I am inclined to doubt it.”593 Union Pacific Construction Superintendent Samuel Reed wired Durant on March 23, 1869, that progress had been slowed in part because workers had no gunpowder to blast for eight days during the snow blockade.594

**Durant Kidnapping**

Another public-relations crisis followed the snow blockades by less than six weeks when Durant, the most visible of the Union Pacific leaders, and director John Duff were kidnapped at Piedmont in the southwestern corner of Wyoming, near Utah’s eastern border. When the kidnapping took place is disputed as some historians say it was while they were on their way to Charles Crocker’s ten-miles-in-one-day track-laying demonstration scheduled for April 28, 1869, and held on April 29.595 Other historians say it was while the two Union Pacific officials were on their way to the Golden Spike ceremony joining the Union Pacific and Central Pacific tracks at Promontory Point, Utah,

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592 Hopkins to Huntington, March 17, 1869, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
593 Stanford to Huntington, March 20, 1869, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
594 Telegram, Reed to Durant, March 23, 1869, Series II, Box 26, file “Reed, Samuel Benedict, 1869,” Leonard Collection.
595 See James McCague, *Moguls and Iron Men*, 309, who argued that the kidnapping took place April 28 and that other historians were wrong in asserting that it delayed the Golden Spike ceremony or took place after the ceremony; and Howard, *The Great Iron Trail*, 324-25 and 330-31, who wrote that the kidnapping took place on mid-morning April 27 or 28 at Bear River Divide, also while Durant was on his way to the track-laying demonstration. Durant had wagered $10,000 that Crocker could not lay ten miles. Accounts of the demonstration do not mention Durant’s presence.
which was originally scheduled for May 8.\textsuperscript{596} One historian also asserted that the kidnapping took place after the Golden Spike ceremony as officials were returning east.\textsuperscript{597} Union Pacific Chief Engineer Grenville Dodge wrote that it was not a kidnapping at all but an event staged by Durant to force the Union Pacific company to release money to contractors with whom Durant was associated.\textsuperscript{598}

Whatever the truth, company officials were concerned that news of the kidnapping could spread and lead to other actions by unpaid employees and contractors, and they tried to keep the story quiet. McCague revealed the company secrecy policy regarding the incident. “Much of this press uncertainty [regarding dates and incident details] undoubtedly was due to the Union Pacific’s official silence about the incident. It was altogether too explosive a situation while it was going on and probably too embarrassing afterward.”\textsuperscript{599} Historian Charles Edgar Ames agreed that the Union Pacific leaders “did their best to hush it up” as it could have had a serious effect on a situation of unpaid workers and contractors all along the line. Historian Jacob Randolph Perkins noted the company’s efforts to keep the story quiet did not work. “The action of the contractors [the kidnapping] spread all along the line of the Union Pacific from Ogden to Omaha, and a great strike seemed imminent. Dodge telegraphed Oliver Ames for a million dollars to pay off hundreds of employees, including trainmen, who had received no money for months, and the president of the Union Pacific, alive to the situation, wired the full amount, the men were paid and the wheels began to move.”\textsuperscript{600}

\textsuperscript{596} See Griswold, \textit{A Work of Giants}, 319, who said the kidnapping took place May 6; Dodge, “Autobiography,” 944, who agreed on the May 6 date; Ames, \textit{Pioneering the Union Pacific}, 322-23, who cited Dodge’s autobiography and said that the kidnapping took place at Piedmont, near Aspen Summit; and Perkins, \textit{Rails, Trails and War}, 237. Clark, \textit{Leland Stanford}, 269, and Best, \textit{Iron Horses to Promontory}, 130, wrote that Durant was held from the evening of May 6 to the morning of May 8. A May 8 entry in the Oliver Ames Jr. Diary said that he had received a telegraph that “Duff and Durant are hostage at Piedmont in hands of laborers demanding pay.”

\textsuperscript{597} Sabin, \textit{Building the Pacific Railway}, 230, said that Durant was held hostage on May 11 to 14 after the Golden Spike Ceremony.

\textsuperscript{598} Dodge, “Autobiography,” 944. “There is no doubt,” Dodge wrote, “this was an arrangement made by Durant for the purpose of forcing the company to pay. It was a dispute between Davis and Co. [a contractor] and [Samuel] Reed, the superintendent of construction upon the amount due and he [Reed] had refused to accept a great deal of the timber and ties they [Davis & Co.] had brought in.”

\textsuperscript{599} McCague, \textit{Maguls and Iron Men}, 310.

\textsuperscript{600} Perkins, \textit{Rails, Trails and War}, 237.
Some documents lend credence to those who said the kidnapping took place while Durant was on the way to the scheduled April 28 ten-mile track-laying demonstration, and he was released with a ransom payment. There were warnings of worker dissatisfaction in late March and early April 1869.\(^{601}\) A telegram on April 22 from Durant in Chicago to Duff in Council Bluffs, Iowa, said he would leave that evening for Omaha after having been detained in New York City signing papers.\(^{602}\) A telegram from Union Pacific director Sidney Dillon, president of Credit Mobilier, in Echo City, Utah, to Henry Crane, Durant’s attorney and assistant, on April 24 instructed Crane to deposit $100,000 in the First National Bank in Omaha.\(^{603}\) The April 26, 1869, entry in the Oliver Ames Jr. diary reported that he had received a telegram from Duff, Dodge, and Dillon asking for money, and the entry for April 28 said $125,000 had been sent to New York on April 27 and Dillon had been authorized to draw “on us” for $200,000.

Despite the disagreement on the date for the kidnapping, the details of the event seem consistent. The rail car transporting Durant and Duff was waylaid by 300 armed graders and tie-cutters who, according to historian Wesley S. Griswold, had not been paid since January and threatened to take Durant into the mountains and feed him salted horse meat and sage brush.\(^{604}\) Sabin said the kidnappers were discharged workers who were owed their pay, and historian Charles Edgar Ames said the overdue pay was $200,000 or more. In his autobiography, Dodge said it was not workers who kidnapped Durant but the “Davis outfit,” who were contractors to provide ties and timber. Dodge said when he learned of the abduction, he wired the commander at Fort Bridger to put a company of

\(^{601}\) See Snyder to Durant, March 31, 1869, Series II, Box 29, file “Snyder Webster, August 1868-1869,” Leonard Collection, in which Snyder reported that a contractor named Kennedy owed his men $1 million, “Must have one half million for payrolls at once to float;” telegram, Reed to Durant, April 9, 1869, Series II, Box 26, file “Reed, Samuel Benedict, 1869,” Leonard Collection, in which Reed warns, “work at every point on the line will be stopped unless we have funds to pay men;” and telegram, Reed to Durant, April 12, 1869, Series II, Box 26, file “Reed, Samuel Benedict, 1869,” Leonard Collection: “Men at tunnel no. three (3) on strike yet [.] Half the men at head of Echo [Canyon] quit work. Cannot control them with[out] money to pay them off. Promontory force will work until fifteenth. On that day I expect a general strike on all grading unless funds are on hand.”


\(^{603}\) Telegram, Dillon to Crane, April 24, 1869, Series II, Box 11, file “Dillon, Sidney,” Leonard Collection.

\(^{604}\) Griswold, A Work of Giants, 319.
soldiers on a train that he had arranged to transport them from Green River to Piedmont
“and take possession of the car and the crowd that was there.” Dodge said his telegram to
the Fort Bridger commander was taken off the wire, however, by the telegraph operator at
Piedmont, who was in league with Davis. The kidnappers then appealed to Dillon, who,
Dodge said, ordered that if a train of troops were dispatched to Piedmont, it should go
through without stopping. Dodge said this order assured that the troops would not
intervene. “I did not hear of it [the Dillon directive] until it was too late to stop it. There
was nothing left to do now but to furnish money to pay off these contractors to release
Duff. I knew Durant would be released any time he wanted to.”

Thomas C. Durant: A PR Problem

Durant, the apparent target of the kidnapping, was a public-relations problem with
a volatile personality, a flamboyant style that assured notice, and an inability to get along
with his associates. Historian Ames described his prominence in the Union Pacific
enterprise:

Of all the persons connected with the UP during its construction, Durant was ever, for better or worse, the most conspicuous. With unceasing determination and unbridled ambition, he conceived the project, pressed congress for the charter, took most of the first subscriptions, and made himself Vice-President, General Manager, and chairman of both the Executive and Finance Committees of the UP and President of the Credit Mobilier of America. He took no salary.

Historian Robert G. Athearn called Durant the promoter of the century. Ames provided a description of Durant, who was called “doctor” because he had received a medical degree in 1848 from Albany Medical College.

Dr. Durant was rather tall and lean, somewhat stooped, with flashing penetrating eyes and sharp features. His long brown hair, drooping dark mustache and somewhat straggly goatee were worn in the

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606 Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 22.

style of the day. He dressed expensively and ornately, preferring to wear his slouch hat, finely fitted velvet sackcoat and vest, corduroy breeches, and top boots. Restless and quick in action, his speech was rapid, quiet and terse. In controversy, his manner was caustic and impatient; in salesmanship, suave and persuasive. When the time came for a decision, no one could be more adamant. 608

As an executive, Durant certainly was “not over-scrupulous,” yet he was smart enough to be seldom caught by the law, even though many accusations were brought against him of misappropriation of company funds and other serious irregularities. Essentially secretive, he wrote few letters.

In spite of such versatile talents, Durant had one fatal weakness: he did not know how to get along with people. One after the other, he first befriended and then fought his associates.

He was out on the line most of the time as construction neared the end. In fact, he took dictatorial charge of about everything, with little worry about details such as dual capacities and conflicts of interest. His own words portray his character: “I had rather have a man about me that did all his enemies claimed … [who] had pluck and energy and resources within himself to accomplish his work than to have a dolt, though he might be as honest as the sun. 609

Of all of the characteristics attributed to Durant, his energy is most often mentioned. Charles T. Sherman, a Union Pacific government director, testified before Congress that Durant had “unexampled energy and goaheadativeness . . . He could drive work better than any man I ever saw.” 610 Huntington warned Hopkins about Durant’s energy in a letter on May 30, 1868: “You have no ordinary man working against you on this end of the Road. Durant is a man of wonderful energy, in fact reckless in his energy and it looks to me now as though he would get to Salt Lake before we can.” 611 The energy was sometimes wasted, however. Peter Dey, the first Union Pacific chief

608 Ames, Pioneering the Union Pacific, 22.
609 Ibid., 23.
610 Testimony of Charles T. Sherman, Wilson Committee Report, 654
611 Huntington to Hopkins, May 30, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
engineer, told Dodge in a letter on January 21, 1864, that, when he tried to explain some proposed lines to Durant, “he flies off in a fit of excitement.”

Durant was ambitious and petty. He also was pugnacious and bellicose, “as furious in his demonstrations as anyone well could be generally,” Oliver Ames told Dodge in a letter. He also frequently raised objections to decisions that the company reached. “He was frequently making protests on one thing or another,” Oliver Ames testified before a congressional committee. Union Pacific superintendent Webster Snyder questioned Durant’s loyalty to the company in a letter to Dodge on March 29, 1869, in which he said, after reviewing documents in a Union Pacific lawsuit, that Durant may have been providing evidence to the other side. John B. Alley, a Union Pacific director, testified before a congressional committee that Durant was frequently threatening Union Pacific leaders with disclosure of their alleged dishonest deals to federal officials.

The Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Credit Mobilier Company had been black-mailed in every conceivable way, by insiders and outsiders, until the two companies were robbed of immense sums for which they never received any value. They endeavored always to accomplish their purpose when any large scheme was involved, and it was resisted, by threats of exposure to the Government. The fright occasioned by these threats too often succeeded, because these men had embarked their millions, and a row with congress, whether they were right or wrong, was sure to bankrupt the road, and most of the individuals engaged in it. I knew Durant to carry his threats so far once to write a letter and put it in the post-office, directed to Elihu B. Washburne [an Illinois congressman], accusing the companies of the greatest rascalities. [The letter was retrieved from the mail].

613 See Oliver Ames to Dodge, August 23, 1868, in Dodge, “Autobiography,” 805; Benjamin F. Ham, Union Pacific auditor, to Oliver Ames, February 4, 1867, in Oliver Ames, Jr, Incoming Correspondence Letterbooks, Stonehill College Archives and Special Collections, Arnold B. Tofias Industrial Archives, Brockton, Massachusetts, hereafter referred to as the Oliver Ames Jr. Papers, which are arranged in chronological order; and Ham to Oliver Ames, February 5, 1867, Oliver Ames Jr. Papers.
614 Ames to Dodge, July 26, 1868, Box 66, Vol. 155, File 1, “July 1868,” Dodge Papers
615 Testimony of Oliver Ames, Wilson Committee Report, 285
616 Snyder to Dodge, March 29, 1869, Dodge “Autobiography,” 907.
Sidney Dillon, the Credit Mobilier president, called Durant a “fast man” in testimony before a congressional committee. “He was a man who when he undertook to help build a railroad didn’t stop at trifles to accomplish his end,” he said. He had a reputation as a stock-jobbing Wall Street speculator. He also was clever.618 Hopkins called him “an infernal blower and infamous liar” in a letter to Huntington on November 7, 1868.619

Durant regarded his partners with disdain and said the arrangements between the Union Pacific company and the Credit Mobilier needed to be explained to Oliver Ames, the Union Pacific president, so that Union Pacific meetings were not allowed to stray into Credit Mobilier matters in front of the government directors.620 Durant revealed his disdain for his associates in testimony before a congressional committee.

As I have stated, Mr. Ames, Mr. Alley, and their friends were not original stockholders in the company. They came into it by virtue of their character as contractors and their interest in the Credit Mobilier, and did not come into the direction until after several hundred miles of the road had been completed at the time of the execution and assignment of the Oakes Ames contract. Their claim of patriotism and of a far-seeing, intelligent, and honest policy put forward on their behalf is ridiculous. In fact, so uninformed were they of the mode of conducting the entire business, that they did not distinguish and at times seemed incapable of distinguishing between the railroad company and the Credit Mobilier. And I may here state that it does not seem to me strange that gentlemen, members of Congress, to whom Mr. [Oakes] Ames sold interests [the alleged bribing of congressional members with Credit Mobilier stock] mistook the company in which they held stock for. I do not think Mr. Ames himself could hardly have given them a clear idea on the subject.621

Durant’s extravagance was documented with accounts that said he had the finest carriage horses in New York City’s Central Park, a black walnut-paneled office with a marble fireplace, Oriental rugs, palms, paintings, statues, gilt mirrors, and cages of

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618 See testimony of Sidney Dillon, Wilson Committee Report, 510-11; Griswold, A Work of Giants, 185; Huntington to Crocker, November 1, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
619 Hopkins to Huntington, November 7, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
620 John Glidden of Glidden & Williams, California Packet Office, Boston, to Ames, December 5, 1866, including a copy of a letter from S. Hooper to Glidden, December 2, 1866, Oliver Ames Jr. Papers.
621 Poland Committee Report, 387.
singing canaries. Sabin said the office probably was the finest in New York City. Durant joined the New York Yacht Club in 1865 while residing in Brooklyn and bought an eighty-five-foot schooner called *Idler*, which historian Charles Edgar Ames said he used for business. “On pleasant weekends he would entertain prospective investors, influential politicians and judges with luxurious cruises up and down the placid Hudson.” John M. S. Williams, the Union Pacific treasurer and executive committee member, said Durant was “the most extravagant man I ever knew in my life.”

When Durant was courteous and confiding, pliable and anxious to please, Oliver Ames noted it in letters to Dodge. He also was a publicity hound, likely to make a “splurge” and take credit for the action of others. Union Pacific president Oliver Ames seemed exasperated with him. In a letter to Dodge on May 14, 1868, Ames said a general order Durant had issued “is one of those peculiar exhibitions of character which Durant everywhere exhibits and which shows the impolicy of giving him power which he is sure to abuse always.” His damage to the Union Pacific’s image and trustworthiness is best documented in January 1869 letters from Jacob Blickensderfer, a Dodge assistant, to Dodge after Blickensderfer left the company. He had been appointed to serve on an Interior Department commission assigned to examine the construction of both the Union Pacific and Central Pacific to assure that the roads were well-built. He said in a January 2, 1869, letter that he was surprised that the department had approved a Central Pacific line that reached eastward to the head of Echo Canyon in Utah, a coup for Huntington in his attempts to get control of the Salt Lake City traffic as the construction neared its end.

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624 Testimony of John M. S. Williams, Wilson Committee Report, 163.
626 Oakes Ames to Oliver Ames, March 31, 1868, Oliver Ames Jr. Papers.
628 For other documentation of Durant damage, see Oakes Ames to Oliver Ames, February 19, 1867, Oliver Ames Jr. Papers; and Oliver Ames Jr. diary, December 10, 1868.
I fear Dr. Durant has in some way got the government officials prejudiced against him, and this would naturally send their sympathies to the other side. May there not be lack of confidence in the doctor’s statements or want of trust in his word, which has injured your road? The long grasp to Humboldt Wells [Durant ordered graders into Nevada in an attempt to get the Union Pacific line extended well west of Utah.] and its subsequent abandonment, the first no doubt made with many assurances and assertions which could not be made good, I fear has had much to do with all this, and would naturally tend to destroy confidence in all things from the same source even if they were true.629

In another letter labeled “Private” from Blickensderfer to Dodge on January 18, 1869, he reached a conclusion that Durant was damaging the Union Pacific.

I am afraid your company will regret that they placed so much in the hands of Durant for I am very much inclined to think the U.P.R.R. Co would occupy a much better position at Washington if that same Dr. Durant were a less prominent feature in the concern. Besides I am strongly inclined to think he not only adds nothing to the credit of the company, but really detracts from its credit in spite of his reputation for energy and administrative ability.630

The transcontinental builders’ handling of the incidents they could not anticipate again shows that they were conscious of their public images and took steps to burnish those images. Just as in the events and information over which they exerted measures of control, they demonstrated a constant vigilance over how they might be perceived by the government and by the public generally and strove to make that perception as positive as possible. They were attentive to the public-relations work in spite of the full demands for their attention to build and operate their railroads. They clearly perceived public relations as essential to their success.

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Chapter 8: Pulling into the Station: Letting Off Steam

Public relations historian Scott M. Cutlip described the work of creating and placing written and graphic materials for public consumption as publicity-agent or advertising-agent work that preceded the development of modern corporate public relations. Modern public relations, he said, was a higher form of practice that, while it includes the creation and placement of articles and advertisements, utilizes those abilities in a strategic campaign with predetermined objectives. A corporate public-relations professional, he said, helps business leaders determine the objectives of creation and placement of materials along with advising them on how to design multifaceted campaigns aimed at achieving public-relations objectives. Further, according to him, a still higher form of corporate public relations has the public-relations professional participating in corporate-level decision-making to steer the decisions into areas where the corporation’s interests and the public’s interests coincide.\(^{631}\)

Although the leaders of the transcontinental railroad construction in the 1860s had no public-relations professionals to advise them during the construction of their road, they persistently performed public-relations functions. Their activity meets Cutlip’s definition of the most advanced form of public relations in which corporate decisions include consideration of their public-relations effects. The transcontinental leaders performed the acts associated with advanced public relations, and they also were the ones who made the highest corporate-level decisions. They developed objectives and oversaw the creation and placement of materials for public consumption and for the consumption of other “publics,” internal and external with objectives in a six-year campaign. In at least in several instances, they determined policies and actions with an eye on how their

\(^{631}\) Scott M. Cutlip, *The Unseen Power: Public Relations. A History* (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, Associates, 1994). The statements here are an attempt at a synopsis of Cutlip’s sometimes fuzzy and disjointed distinctions to separate what he calls publicity from public-relations. Through biographical descriptions of the profession’s founders throughout his book, Cutlip described a development of the public-relations profession in the early and mid 1900s. He also wrote in passing of developments early in the professionalization, particularly a two-way function in which business leaders are informed of public sentiment toward their companies.
decisions would affect their companies’ image and relationships with those who could affect their success. The Central Pacific managers’ decision to not open their road beyond Cisco to the summit of the Sierra Nevadas in the winter of 1867-68 is but one example of the attention paid to public perceptions; in that case, it was the Central Pacific’s reputation for reliability of service. Attempts to maintain positive internal relationships with workers were apparent when Union Pacific managers’ tried to keep information hidden on Indian attacks as was the Central Pacific managers’ arrangement of a trip into Nevada to assure Chinese workers of a lack of dangerous Indians and wildlife. Collis Huntington’s concern about the number of mentions of snow in a Central Pacific government report and even the bribing of members of Congress by Union Pacific operative Oakes Ames display attempts to maintain a positive external relationship with those in the federal government.

However, it is with a traditional definition of public relations -- the relationship between a corporation and the general public and, for the transcontinental railroad builders, particularly the potential investors among the general public -- that the transcontinental railroad builders may have been most active. Historian Stephen E. Ambrose said the Central Pacific associates had adopted a policy that would be later copied by twentieth century corporations: to do everything possible to attract favorable attention from the media.632 David Haward Bain said that the Central Pacific leaders were “highly attentive” to press relations.633

Cutlip wrote, however, that it wasn’t until a late nineteenth century discovery of the power of publicity that the nation’s first publicity firms began along with the first public-relations professionals in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The transcontinental railroad builders, however, had discovered the power of publicity much earlier and knew well its effects, both positive and negative.634

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634 Cutlip, The Unseen Power, 76.
Thomas Durant, the Union Pacific vice president, knew how to use publicity power to provide substantial profit on his investments, according to historian Robert West Howard, before Union Pacific construction began. Durant apparently planted a story, Howard said, that reported an Iowa railroad in which he had an interest had been designated to be the road to connect with the transcontinental one at Council Bluffs, opposite Omaha, on the Missouri River. The news resulted in a substantial rise in the value of the Iowa line’s securities and perhaps $250,000 in Durant’s pockets.635

The Central Pacific managers also were aware early on of the importance of publicity. They hired a photographer to record the road’s construction beginning in 1864 when the company was short on money.636

Although there were no publicity firms per se associated with the first transcontinental builders, both the Union Pacific and Central Pacific managers employed professionals to help them with public relations. Union Pacific directors employed what was called an advertising agency and “special agent” -- Peaslee & Co. of New York City -- but the agency, with L. F. Shattuck in charge, went beyond only placing advertisements.637 The company’s employees also prepared pamphlets and coordinated

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635 Robert West Howard, The Great Iron Trail: The Story of the First Transcontinental Railroad (New York: Bonanza Books, 1957), 154-55. “Durant’s next move appeared as a news story in the October 7th [1863] issue of the Chicago Tribune, under the headline of ‘The Pacific Railroad.’ ‘Dateline – Omaha, Nebraska, Oct. 6 – The $2,800,000 of stock required by the charter of the Union Pacific Railroad company, previous to an organization, has been subscribed and paid to the treasurer, and a meeting of the stockholders has been called to convene in the city of New York on the 29th inst. What is still more important to Omaha, the Mississippi & Missouri Railroad [in Iowa] has been selected as the commencement of the Pacific route.’” [end of article] [Abraham] Lincoln’s decision fixing Council Bluffs as the eastern terminus was dated Nov. 17, 1863. The October 7th announcement in the Tribune must have been a Durant handout. The Mississippi & Missouri’s rail head was still more than 150 miles out of Council Bluffs on October 7. The newspaper report about its selection as ‘the commencement of the Pacific route’ [spread] through brokerage offices. The stock began to rise. When it reached 149, Thomas C. Durant sold out. [Union Pacific Chief Engineer Grenville] Dodge and others later inferred that Durant’s profits in the move were more than $250,000.”

636 See Ambrose, Nothing Like It in the World, 122; and George Kraus, High Road to Promontory Point: Building the Central Pacific across the High Sierra (Palo Alto, California: American West Publishing, 1969), 9. Ambrose said the photographer’s name was Alfred A. Hunt while Kraus said it was Alfred A. Hart.

637 W. B. Shattuck to Grenville Dodge, February 24, 1869, Box 66, Vol. 156, File 6, “February 21-28, 1869,” Grenville Mellen Dodge Papers at the State Historical Society of Iowa Library in Des Moines, hereafter referred to as the Dodge Papers. The letter is on Peaslee & Co. letterhead, which says the company, at No. 5 Beckman Street, New York City, is a general advertising agent and “Special Agents for
an excursion for reporters. Shattuck also appeared in Washington on December 9, 1868, to take care of any problems with reporters there. Central Pacific officials employed at least two professional writers and a stereoscope artist to generate and illustrate articles, and Central Pacific Vice President Collis P. Huntington employed a

the Union Pacific Railroad.” The letterhead said that the company received and filed 3,000 newspapers and undertook all business that might be promoted through the press. The February 24 letter asked that Dodge confirm a correct mileage from Omaha to Sacramento, 1,721 or 1,767 miles, so that it could be correct in a new pamphlet that Peaslee was preparing for the Union Pacific. The 1,721 miles had been used in previous pamphlets, Shattuck said. His position at Peaslee is not clear. He may have been a relative of L. F. Shattuck. Collis P. Huntington, the Central Pacific vice president, said a Mr. Shattuck, apparently L. F. Shattuck, was the agent who placed advertisements for Jay Cooke in his campaign to sell government bonds to finance the Civil War. See Note 490.

Frank Presbrey, The History and Development of Advertising (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1929), 264, identified Peaslee & Co. as “a name under which L. F. Shattuck operated.” Presbrey said that Shattuck got the $1 billion Civil War government bond business advertising contract from Jay Cooke after Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase intervened on Shattuck’s behalf. “The [Civil War government] bond-issue advertising was placed in every newspaper that Shattuck or the U.S. Treasury Department found,” Presbrey said. “Newspapers not covered in the first mailing quickly identified themselves by writing to government officials, and the copy must have appeared in some four or five thousand papers, at card rates. This advertising constituted the first truly national advertising effort, and in the number of publications used made a record that stood for many years.” The list of newspapers Shattuck obtained from the Cooke business with editors identifying themselves must have been a treasure in its time.

George Presbury Rowell, Forty Years an Advertising Agent, 1865-1905 (New York: Printers’ Ink Publishing Co., 1906), 135, 139-40, identified Peaslee & Co. as “a concern consisting, as it appeared, solely of one man, L. F. Shattuck.” Rowell, who published the first newspaper directory in 1869, said he met Shattuck in April 1867, apparently after Shattuck had a lunch with an egg stain on his watch chain. “He was a large, fine-looking man, handsomely, even elegantly dressed,” Rowell said. Rowell also said that Shattuck was “the most successful of all the advertising agents that had had an existence in America.”

“Rocky Mountain Press Club Scrapbook,” Series II, Box 27, file “Rocky Mountain Press Club,” in the Papers of Levi O. Leonard, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, hereafter referred to as the Leonard Collection. Hereafter, the scrapbook will be referred to as the Leonard Scrapbook. The scrapbook contains clippings of articles written by twenty-nine press club members as a result of their all-expenses-paid excursion on July 21-25, 1868, on the Union Pacific Railroad. The scrapbook says the reporters left New York City on July 14, 1868, at the invitation of Peaslee & Co., the advertising agents for the railroad company. One of the newspaper clippings in the scrapbook said the excursion was held under the auspices of Messrs. Peaslee & Co., widely known advertising agents.

R. W. Latham to Thomas C. Durant, December 9, 1868, Series II, Box 22, File “Latham, R.W,” Leonard Collection. Latham wrote of Shattuck’s arrival in Washington, D.C.: “Mr. Shattuck arrived here this morning, and I am sure he will fix up all the unfinished business with the press in a manner satisfactory.”

Edwin B. Crocker to Huntington, March 8, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Collis Potter Huntington Papers, Special Collections Research Center, Syracuse University Library. The papers are organized chronologically and hereafter will be referred to as the Huntington Papers. “That will be a good thing to get that illustrated article in Harper’s Magazine. How would it do to get Ross [Russ?] Browne to go over

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Mr. Coleman as a writer in New York City.\textsuperscript{641} The Central Pacific associates in Sacramento had Thomas Magee under their employ as a writer.\textsuperscript{642} Mr. Redding apparently was in charge of pamphlet-preparation for the railroad in California.\textsuperscript{643} These professionals did not call themselves public-relations experts or firms, but they did some of the core work associated with such firms by creating articles, illustrations and advertising that was placed in newspapers and magazines and in pamphlets or on posters.

On the Union Pacific side, two letters both dated March 31, 1868 urging freight-rate and passenger-fare reductions reached Union Pacific President Oliver Ames. They provided an example of Union Pacific officials’ attention to public perception. The letters were written by Oakes Ames, Oliver’s brother and a heavy investor in the railroad, and Dodge, both of whom were members of the House of Representatives. Oakes reported to Oliver that many congressmen were receiving complaints about the rates and fares that the Union Pacific was charging.

I think you must reduce the rates of fare and freight. The members from Nebraska in both houses are having constant calls to introduce bills to reduce our charges. The Ill., Michigan and members from all the states that furnish the immigrants and miners are having complaints come to them.

If I were President of the road I would reduce the fares and freights at once as soon as I would get out a table or bill printed that should reduce the price from 20 to 25 per cent from what it now is even if I did not earn

\textsuperscript{641} Crocker to Huntington, July 10, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers. Crocker discussed the pending breakthrough at the Summit Tunnel. “By this time there cannot be more than 250 feet left in that tunnel, which will be out in say 6 weeks or the 20\textsuperscript{th} of August. I shall of course telegraph you promptly and get the ass. Press agent to do the same. You can afford to blow over it in the N.Y. papers. I have hastily put together a few facts about this work, from which Mr. Coleman can make up an article.”

\textsuperscript{642} See Crocker to Huntington, January 7, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers, “We have made arrangements with a man by the name of Magee, who is a correspondent of the \textit{N.Y. Herald} and \textit{World} here, to weave into his correspondence matters relating to our R.R. He is a vigorous writer, and shows his letters to us so that we can correct any errors which may creep in – I shall furnish him grants from time to time.” Also see Crocker to Huntington, April 15, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers, “There is a Mr. Thos. Magee in San Francisco who is quite a good writer and he has been writing a good many articles for papers here and in N.Y. I presume you have noticed those in the N.Y. papers. We pay him for what he writes about our road and see that he gets it correct.”

\textsuperscript{643} See Crocker to Huntington, January 16, 1868; Hopkins to Huntington, January 21, 1868; and Crocker to Huntington, March 6, 1868, all in Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers. Also see Note 392.
enough to pay dividends on the stock. It will stop the clamor of reasonable men and the unreasonable ones you cannot satisfy.644

Dodge said the rates and fares should be reduced quickly so that it did not appear the company was compelled to the reductions.

Now I want you to send an order to [Webster] Snyder [the operations superintendent] to reduce Freights and Fares one quarter. Have it done and have it known all over the country. It will be the best stroke of policy you ever made . . . The public opinion is against us and we better move ourselves and not be forced to it. Snyder says we can do it and ought to do it and if we do you have no idea how it will help us.645

Durant in testimony in 1873 before a congressional committee said public opinion was more important than Congress or any need to bribe its members. He was being questioned regarding the expenditure of $435,754 in Washington prior to the passage of the 1864 amendment to the Pacific Railroad Act with suggestions that at least some of the money was used to bribe congressmen. “There was no use in talking to Congress,” he said of the bribe’s potential, “for Congress had its master in the constituents of the members; in public opinion.”646

644 Oakes Ames to Oliver Ames, March 31, 1868, in Oliver Ames, Jr, Incoming Correspondence Letterbooks, Stonehill College Archives and Special Collections, Arnold B. Tofias Industrial Archives, Brockton, Massachusetts. The papers are on microfilm arranged in chronological order and hereafter will be referred to as the Oliver Ames Jr. Papers. Oakes Ames had a different version of events when he testified before a congressional committee in 1873 regarding his concern about a proposal to regulate rates and fares in December 1867 in Congress. He testified in 1873 that regulation of rates and fares did not much matter to him or the Union Pacific Company in an apparent attempt to discredit a suggestion that he had bribed members of Congress in return for their opposition to the rate and fare regulation. “I did not care much about it,” Ames testified on the move to regulate. “The road was being constructed then very rapidly. We were employing all our means for the transportation of iron, ties, supplies, and every kind of material, and it was very dangerous to take freight or passengers over the road, and we did not want them.” Testimony of Oakes Ames, Credit Mobilier Investigation, House Report 77, Serial Set Vol. No. 1577, Vol. No. 2, 42nd Congress, 3rd sess., 302. Luke Poland of Vermont was committee chairman and the report will be referred to hereafter as the Poland Committee Report.

645 Dodge to Ames, March 31, 1868, Oliver Ames Jr. Papers. Freight charges were reduced at least temporarily according to a rate schedule dated May 11, 1868, in Box 32, file “Union Pacific Railroad, Time Tables and Tariffs,” Leonard Collection. The schedule shows a 10 percent reduction in charges from Omaha to Papillion and a 19 percent reduction from Omaha to North Platte. However, the rates were back to their previous levels by July 1868, according to another rate schedule.

646 Testimony of Thomas C. Durant, House Select Committee No. 2, House Report 78, Affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, 42nd Cong., 3rd sess, February 20, 1873, 516. The committee chairman was Jeremiah M. Wilson of Indiana and the committee’s report will be referred to hereafter as the Wilson Committee Report
Durant’s sentiment was echoed in Cutlip’s public-relations history, which noted the philosophy of political consultants Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter in a speech by Baxter in 1951: “Our conception of practical politics is that if you have a sound enough case to convince the folks back home, you don’t have to buttonhole the senator. He will hear from home, and he is prone to respect very highly the opinions he gets from that quarter.”\footnote{Cutlip, The Unseen Power, 609. Whitaker and Baxter operated in California in the 1930s through the 1950s, according to Cutlip.}

The men who oversaw the building of the first transcontinental railroad were well aware of a need to obtain and maintain general public support for their enterprises. Throughout the records of their efforts, there is clear attention to public sentiment and likely public perception of at least some of their actions as part of their deliberation and decision-making. In an attempt to explain why he gave Credit Mobilier shares to members of Congress -- not to get them to do any specific thing as one might do with a bribe but only to increase support for the Union Pacific -- Oakes Ames talked of the need for general public support in a written statement to a congressional committee investigating the Union Pacific in 1873. “We wanted capital and influence,” he said in the statement. “Influence not on legislation alone, but on credit, good, wide, and a general favorable feeling. If the community had confidence in our ultimate success, that success was insured. But if there was distrust or ill-will, the reverse was as certain.”\footnote{Oakes Ames’ written statement, Poland Committee Report, 16.}

E. B. Crocker, the Central Pacific attorney in Sacramento, mentioned public approval twice in letters he wrote to Collis P. Huntington in May 1868 after the latter had urged that Central Pacific graders be put to work in the Echo Canyon vicinity in eastern Utah. Crocker reminded Huntington that federal law said they could not work more than 300 miles beyond the continuous line already constructed.

This means we must send out laborers to grade road more than 400 miles beyond our completed road and a long distance beyond our accepted location. This letting of contract by the Union Co. [a contract for grading 300 miles west of Salt Lake City, also well beyond the 300-mile limit from completed track] if the work is commenced immediately under it is a violation of the act of Congress and is a piece of sharp practice on the part
of Durant which seems to me will not be sustained by Congress or the Sec. of Interior. It places them in the wrong. Will we not be equally in the wrong if we follow suit, and set men to work more than 300 miles ahead of [the] completed road. Bear in mind that ours is a national work [and] that the public are watching us all. Our strength lies in building railroad fast[,] keeping within the law and acting fairly and honorably, free from all sharp practice.649

In a letter two days later, Crocker suggested that Central Pacific graders might start work in the Echo Canyon area, but only after notifying the secretary of the interior and the Union Pacific leaders; agreeing to take no federally guaranteed loans for the work until track was laid; and offering the grading to the Union Pacific at cost should the rival company’s track-layers get to the area first. “There is a fairness about this which will keep us fair and right before the public and before Congress,” Crocker told Huntington. “What do you think of this plan. Bear in mind – the public eye is upon us and we must be prepared to justify ourselves before Congress and the public.”650

Central Pacific Treasurer Mark Hopkins said that he thought the company should build its machinery in Sacramento, even if it would cost more than to build or buy elsewhere. He said that investing and providing jobs there would solidify public support in California. “It would be regarded with popular favor in all fronts of the State and Pacific Coast,” he said in a letter to Huntington on January 7, 1867, “and we are not yet independent of the opinion of the California public – and their representatives.”651

A Central Pacific decision to begin building a railroad from Sacramento to Stockton would bring more public support to the railroad, Crocker told Huntington in a letter on February 11, 1868. “The filing of our articles of incorporation of the San Joaquin Valley R.R. and the arrival of ties and the letting of [a] contract to grade the Western Pacific between here and Stockton has created an agreeable excitement in our favor. It brings that line of Southern counties to our support. They want railroad bad

649 Crocker to Huntington, May 23, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
650 Crocker to Huntington, May 25, 1868, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
651 Hopkins to Huntington, January 7, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
[sic] and now they feel sure of getting it. It is pretty well understood here that whatever we put our hands to goes through.”

Early on in American railroad history, positive public sentiment had to be earned through hard work. Historians Frederick A. Cleveland and Fred Wilbur Powell noting efforts in 1838 to get money to build a railroad from Boston to Albany, New York, said: “like a United Way campaign, fundraisers for the Western (Massachusetts) Railroad canvassed all homes on the route for funds through stock subscriptions. Activists met and appointed solicitation committees for each part of Boston. Committee members were pledged to call upon every man in their precincts and personally urge upon each one as a matter of public duty to share in the responsibilities of the work.” Clergy were enlisted, too, to sermonize on the good moral effects of railroads by Western Railroad promoters, according to Cleveland and Powell, who cited reports from Charles Francis Adams Jr.

By the time that the transcontinental builders broke ground in 1863, however, public support for railroad construction was nearly automatic, according to historian David Lavender. “To an extent difficult to realize today, railroads had captured the popular imagination as beacons of progress, and guarantors of prosperity,” he said, speaking of a forty-mile rail line completed to Sacramento in 1855. Still, the Central Pacific associates went door-to-door in Sacramento in their first campaign to sell stock in 1863, and they had to win public support while fighting entrenched opponents.

A turning point in public support for the Central Pacific, according to historian James McCague, took place in 1867, after the railroad had been built beyond Dutch Flat to Cisco and tunnels were being bored higher up in the Sierra Nevada Mountains.

652 Crocker to Huntington, February 11, 1868, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
656 George T. Clark, Leland Stanford: War Governor of California, Railroad Builder, and Founder of Stanford University (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1931), 202-03. Clark said that significant opposition to the Central Pacific early on also came from prosperous San Francisco merchants who had cornered markets in certain goods and did not want Chicago competition that would come from a transcontinental railroad.
For the gentlemen of the board of directors there was perhaps a wistful sort of content to be taken in the fact that no one in California questioned the legitimacy of the Dutch Flat and Donner Lake route any longer. For almost the first time in its short life, the Central Pacific was winning friends and popular support in its home state. The few who would lose by the railroad’s completion – the town of Placerville, the stage and wagon freight operators – still were opposed, but the violence was going out of their efforts. Resentment stirred up over the importation of Chinese labor lingered among special-interest groups, and those who doubted on general principles remained loudly vocal. But plain Californians in general were heartily in favor of the Pacific Railroad – as they always had been, really under all the noisy furor of hostility – and now began to grow openly optimistic and even enthusiastic as the road went forward despite all the predictions of its imminent doom.657

Near the end of construction in 1869, the Central Pacific leaders apparently were willing to tolerate petty theft of their lanterns in Nevada rather than risk upsetting the public support that they had there, according to a letter from Hopkins to Huntington on March 22:

In regard to Lanterns – The orders sent you probably appear very large. I confess the consumption is so enormous that I am not sufficiently a “rail road man” to face it without surprise. It is perhaps some consolation to know the line of our road and the state of Nevada is not very populous, and when they are each supplied with a Lantern, the demand on us may be less.

But send on the Lanterns as speedily as possible and we will endeavor in some way to have them give as much light as we can.658

The public-relations function to determine whether specific information to be disseminated for public consumption would meet objectives seems to be at the heart of a telegram exchange on December 4, 1863, between Durant and his associate, George Francis Train, an early Union Pacific promoter. The latter had been given the job of coordinating the Union Pacific groundbreaking ceremony on December 2, 1863, in Omaha, and he wired a message to Durant in New York City two days after the ceremony. “Shall remain here till Saturday to see extra [apparently a handout newspaper]

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658 Hopkins to Huntington, March 22, 1869, Series I, Box 2, Huntington Papers.
Durant telegraphed back the same day: “Send your papers here by express. We do not want them ‘distributed far and wide’ until we have seen them.”659

On the Central Pacific side, the public-relations work got to be too much at one point for E. B. Crocker, the railroad’s attorney in Sacramento. In a letter on May 22, 1867, to Huntington in New York City, he complained about the workload and an apparent need to prepare public opinion, most particularly in Salt Lake City, for the eventuality that the transcontinental line would not pass through the only city of note in its path.

Your plan of reaching Sec. [of the Interior Orville Hickman] Browning about locating the line N. of Salt Lake is first rate. The truth is the line S. of the Lake is nearly impracticable. I would suggest that it would be well to get the N.Y. city papers to publish short items about our road from the [Sacramento] Union or other papers from here. You take the Union and can furnish it to them for that purpose. We occasionally get them to publish short items about our work and I would make it a point to get proper items in it, such as would do to republish there. I have just written one for it about the location N of the Lake, and if they refuse to publish it, I will get it in the Bee or some other paper and send you a copy. The fact is it needs a man to spend a good deal of his time attending to this newspaper business, and I am the only one that does anything at it, and I have so much to do that I can’t attend to it properly.660

Crocker complained again about the public-relations work five days later in another letter to Huntington. He talked about the need to show the public regularly that the Central Pacific construction was progressing, just as the Union Pacific was showing with daily telegraphed updates on construction progress then being published in newspapers.

You refer to telegraphic dispatches. I have noticed the daily item from Omaha that the U.P. [Union Pacific] are laying track at a rate of 2 to

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659 Telegrams, Train to Durant and Durant to Train, December 4, 1863, Series II, Box 31, file “Train, George Francis,” Leonard Collection. Train had described the proceedings in brief in a telegram to Durant on December 2, 1863. (Series II, Box 31, file “Train, George Francis,” Leonard Collection.) “Five o’clock the child is born. Great success. Stores all closed. Population all out. Broke ground amid war cannon and waving of flags. Tonight mayor gives banquet and ball and citizens illuminate city. Your name read with cheers.”

660 Crocker to Huntington, May 22, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
2 ½ miles per day. Some of them come this way. There is no one of us to attend to this but myself, and I do not come in contact with the agent of the Ass. [Associated] Press, who is in S.F. [San Francisco]. I am so overrun with a mass of detail that I find it impossible to get at everything. I will however bear it in mind and send facts to Richardson [apparently a Central Pacific employee in San Francisco] and get him to have them sent. We often give the Union short items to publish and Magee writes letters to the Union and other papers which we send you. Now cannot you get these items in the N. Y. papers through the aid of some “Bohemian.”

Crocker said the work was difficult in a letter to Huntington on May 17, 1867:

This getting anything into the papers here laudatory of our Co. is no easy thing. They all seem afraid that such articles will render them liable to the suspicion of being bought up. But we have a good writer [apparently referring to Thomas Magee] writing up matters for various papers here and at the East. His articles generally appear in the shape of correspondence. They have appeared in the Union, Bee, Bulletin, Times and Alta [all California newspapers]. He mixes us up with other matters so that it shall not appear that he is writing us up. We have thought this the best way. He is still at work. I furnish him points and facts.

Many of those working in the Union Pacific management were involved in the company’s public-relations efforts even when they were busy with other tasks. Nearly all were monitoring publications for company-related items. In one 1868 letter, Union Pacific Operations Superintendent Webster Snyder told Chief Engineer Grenville Dodge that he was sending newspapers daily to Salt Lake City for Dodge, apparently so that he could keep up his monitoring away from his Omaha base.

Snyder reported in a letter to Dodge on March 31, 1869, that he was coordinating a campaign against the Central Pacific in the Union Pacific’s fight to get government recognition of Union Pacific rights to build west of Ogden, Utah. At the time, Snyder still was in charge of the overwhelming job of trying to clear the line of Wyoming snow blockades. “I have been firing at [the Central Pacific] for past ten days through press of

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661 Crocker to Huntington, May 27, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers.
662 Crocker to Huntington, May 17, 1867, Series I, Box 1, Huntington Papers. Hiding Magee’s employment by the Central Pacific is a so-called third-party public-relations technique.
663 Snyder to Dodge, August 26, 1868, Box 66, Vol. 155, File 2, “August 1868,” Dodge Papers. Dodge spent time in Salt Lake City to oversee line locations and to negotiate with Brigham Young for Mormon labor to grade the selected line.
Chicago, Cincinnati, Albany & etc. N.Y. papers have refused to take dispatches and letters favorable to the road. I am trying them again today.”

Nearer the beginning of the Union Pacific enterprise, when there was a pressing need to complete surveys for location of the line, Dodge had a press handout prepared by his engineering office for the seventeen reporters on the October 1866 Grand Excursion. “The representatives of the press took full notes of the road,” Dodge said in his autobiography. “I had had prepared in my office, ready to turn over to them, such information as I knew would be attractive and of benefit to the road and they used it, adding a great deal of romance to it so that the Eastern papers were full of the excursion and books were written on it.” Only one book appears to have been written -- by Union Pacific Consulting Engineer Silas Seymour.

The transcontinental railroad builders had more than enough on their hands to construct the 1,776 miles of track that could have justified a lack of attention to public relations. Still, their public-relations efforts persisted. The Union Pacific managers oversaw construction of a line more than 1,000 miles long through territory without permanent settlements and sometimes without timber and water. The territory was populated by Native Americans, who included warriors hostile to the construction. They had to go over the Rocky Mountains, building a railroad that crossed Sherman Summit in Wyoming at 8,236 feet, the highest elevation reached by a railroad in the world at the time. The Central Pacific builders had to climb 7,000 feet in elevation in their first 105 miles eastward from Sacramento to surmount the Sierra Nevadas, a north-south range separating California and Nevada that, for much of its 400-mile length, consists of two ranges separated by a pitched valley as much as forty miles wide. Then, the Central

664 Grenville Mellen Dodge, “Autobiography” (microfilm at the State Historical Society of Iowa Library in Des Moines, Iowa), 920.
665 Dodge, “Autobiography,” 587. Dodge does not detail how he expected the information would benefit the Union Pacific.
666 Silas Seymour, Incidents of a Trip through the Great Platte Valley to the Rocky Mountains and Laramie Plains, in the Fall of 1866, with a Synoptical Statement of the Various Pacific Railroads and an Account of the Great Union Pacific Railroad Excursion to the One Hundredth Meridian of Longitude (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1867).
Pacific builders descended into the Nevada desert for construction that parched men and animals on the way to Utah. They also had to coordinate and ship nearly everything from the East, except timber; rails, spikes and locomotives all came from Eastern suppliers mostly shipped around the tip of South America. This route was greater than the circumference of the Earth but cheaper than a shorter route over the Panama Isthmus.

Still, the public-relations efforts persisted. It is obvious that the managers gave it priority given the extensive discussion, organization, and coordination that they pursued. Although they did not employ public-relations professionals since the profession did not exist in their time, they acted in the most advanced ways of such professionals, golden spike included.

Why did those with the overseeing responsibility of the enterprises give significant time and attention to their public relations? It may have been their egos or a need for public support to help assure favorable legislation in Congress or, for the Central Pacific, support both in Congress and the California legislature. But it appears to have been mostly because of their nearly insatiable need for success and the money that came with it. “Nothing succeeds like success,” historian James McCague said of the “changing breezes of public opinion” in California in favor of the Central Pacific leaders.668 Historians Arthur M. Johnson and Barry E. Supple said an investing public’s feeling of confidence in the Union Pacific enterprise “depended in large measure on the success of construction.”669

Cutlip, the public-relations historian, said that Ivy Lee -- considered by some the founder of modern corporate public relations – offered “groundbreaking” advice to Colorado coal-mine operators regarding their public relations in 1914. He said that Lee told the operators that, if they had a story to tell, they should tell it themselves, frankly and fully.670 In testimony before the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations in 1915,

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668 McCague, Moguls and Iron Men, 225
670 Cutlip, Unseen Power, 60.
Lee, in describing what he did as a corporate public-relations professional, said of the job, “My idea is that the principal himself should be his own publicity agent.”

The managers of the first transcontinental railroad had acted as Lee advised fifty years earlier and without the benefit of his advice.

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671 Ibid.
Glossary of Names

Alley, John B. – Union Pacific stockholder and director.

Ames, Oakes (Massachusetts) – U. S. Representative, Union Pacific investor.

Ames, Oliver Jr. – President, Union Pacific Railroad.

Anthony, James – Editor, Sacramento *Union*.

Augur, General Christopher Colon -- U. S. Army commander, Department of the Platte.

Axtell, Samuel Beach (California) – U. S. Representative

Blickensderfer, Jacob – Engineer, assistant to Dodge


Browning, Orville Hickman – U. S. Secretary of the Interior. 1866-69.

Bushnell, Cornelius – Union Pacific director and investor.


Cisco, John J. – Union Pacific investor and treasurer.

Cole, Cornelius (California) – U. S. Senator.

Colfax, Schuyler (Indiana) – U. S. Representative; Speaker of the House; Vice President in Grant administration; alleged recipient of Credit Mobilier stock gift.

Cooke, Jay – Financier, marketer of $1 billion in government bonds during the Civil War.

Crane, Henry C. – Thomas C. Durant’s attorney and “confidential man;” and assistant treasurer, Credit Mobilier.
Crocker, Charles – Central Pacific track-laying superintendent.

Crocker, Edwin B. – Central Pacific attorney.

Cutlip, Scott M. – Public relations historian.

Dana, Charles – Editor, New York Sun.

Davis, Jefferson – U. S. Secretary of War, 1853-57.

Dey, Peter – first Union Pacific chief engineer.

Dillon, Sidney -- President, Credit Mobilier, 1867-68.

Dix, John A. – First Union Pacific president.

Dodge, Grenville M. – Union Pacific chief engineer.

Duff, John – Union Pacific director.

Durant, Thomas C. – Union Pacific vice president.

Ewing, General Thomas – Central Pacific lobbyist in Washington

Filmore, Millard – U. S. President, 1850-53.


Grant, Ulysses S. – U. S. President, 1869-77.

Gray, George E. – Central Pacific consulting engineer.

Harbaugh, Springer – Union Pacific government-appointed director, contractor for iron rails.

Harlan, James (Iowa) – U. S. Secretary of the Interior, 1865-66; U. S. Senator.

Hay, Alexander – assistant to attorney Joseph B. Stewart and U. S. Representative Thaddeus Stevens.

Hopkins, Mark – Central Pacific treasurer.
Hoxie, Herbert M. – Union Pacific assistant superintendent.

Huntington, Collis Potter – Central Pacific vice president.

Judah, Theodore – First Central Pacific chief engineer.


Magee, Thomas – Central Pacific writer.

McComb, Henry S. – Union Pacific investor and director.

McCulloch, Hugh – U.S. Secretary of the Treasury who, in 1868, stopped transfer of government bonds to the Union Pacific and Central Pacific until the lines could be inspected to assure their quality construction and, for the Union Pacific, money set aside to assure any needed upgrades.

Miller, Dr. George R. or L. – Editor, Omaha Herald.


Painter, Uriah H. – Washington correspondent, Philadelphia Inquirer; Union Pacific lobbyist; and recipient of Credit Mobilier stock gift.

Patterson, James W. (New Hampshire) – U.S. Senator

Peaslee & Company – Union Pacific advertising and “special” agent.


Poppleton, A. J. – Union Pacific attorney.

Reed, Samuel Benedict – Union Pacific construction engineer-in-charge.

Sargent, Aaron Augustus (California) – U. S. Representative.


Seymour, Silas – Union Pacific consulting engineer.

Shattuck, L. F. – Principal, Peaslee & Company.
Sherman, Charles T. – Union Pacific government-appointed director.

Sherman, General William Tecumseh – Commander, U. S. Army Department of the West.

Snyder, Webster – Union Pacific general superintendent.

Stanford, Leland – Central Pacific president.

Stevens, Thaddeus (Pennsylvania) – U.S. representative.

Stewart, Joseph B. – Attorney with offices in New York City and Washington; Durant fixer in Washington; Union Pacific lobbyist.


Upson, Lauren – Editor, Sacramento Union.

Washburn, Cadwallader C. (Wisconsin) – U. S. Representative.


Williams, John M. S. – Union Pacific investor, director, and treasurer; Credit Mobilier director.

Wilson, Jeremiah M. (Indiana) – U. S. Representative and chair, U. S. House committee to investigate the affairs of the Union Pacific Railroad, 1873.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Appendix A: Pacific Railroad Act of 1862

ACT OF JULY 1, 1862. [12 Statutes at Large, 489.]

AN ACT to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri river to the Pacific ocean, and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal, military, and other purposes.

Amos C. Babcock, W. Seldon Gale, Nehemiah Bushnell, and Lorenzo Bull, of Illinois; William. H. Swift, Samuel T. Dana, John Bertram, Franklin S. Stevens, Edward R. Tinker, of Massachusetts; Franklin Gorin, Laban J. Bradford, and John T. Levis, of Kentucky; James Dunning, John M. Wood, Edwin Noyes, Joseph Eaton, of Maine; Henry H. Baxter, George W. Collamer, Henry Keyes, Thomas H. Canfield, of Vermont; William S. Ladd, A. M. Berry, Benjamin F. Harding, of Oregon; William Bunn, junior, John Catlin, Levi Sterling, John Thompson, Elihu L. Phillips, Walter D. McIndoe, T. B. Stoddard, E. H. Broadhead, A. H. Virgin, of Wisconsin; Charles Paine, Thomas A. Morris, David E. Brandlham, Samuel Hanna, Jonas Votaw, Jesse L. Williams, Isaac C. Elston, of Indiana; Thomas Swan, Chauncey Brooks, Edward Wilkins, of Maryland; Francis R. E. Cornell, David Blakely, A. D. Seward, Henry A. Swift, Dwight Woodbury, John McKusick, John R. Jones, of Minnesota; Joseph A. Gilmore, Charles W. Woodman, of New Hampshire; W. H. Grimes, J. C. Stone, Chester Thomas, John Kerr, Werter R. Davis, Luther C. Challis, Josiah Miller, of Kansas; Gilbert C. Monell, and Augustus Kountz, T. M. Marquette, William H. Taylor, Alvin Saunders, of Nebraska; and John Evans, or Colorado; together with five commissioners to be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, and all persons who shall or may be associated with them, and their successors, are hereby created and erected into a corporate and politic in deed and in law, by the name, style, and title of "The Union Pacific Railroad Company;" and by that name shall have perpetual succession, and shall be able to sue and to be sued, plead and be imploade, defend and be defended, in all courts of law and equity within the United States, and may make and have a common seal; and the said corporation is hereby authorized and empowered to lay out, locate, construct, furnish, maintain, and enjoy a continuous railroad and telegraph, with the appurtenances, from a point on the one-hundredth meridian of longitude west from Greenwich, between the south margin of the valley of the Republican river and the north margin of the valley of the Platte river, in the Territory of Nebraska, to the western boundary of Nevada Territory, upon the route and terms hereinafter provided, and is hereby vested with all the powers, privileges, and immunities necessary to capital stock of said company shall consist of one hundred thousand shares of one thousand dollars each, which shall be subscribed for and held in
not more than two hundred shares by any one person, and shall be transferable in such
manner as the by-laws of said corporation shall provide. The persons hereinbefore
named, together with those to be appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, are hereby
constituted and appointed commissioners, and such body shall be called the Board of
Commissioners of the Union Pacific Railroad and Telegraph Company, and twenty-five
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. The first meeting of said board
shall be held at Chicago, at such time as the commissioners from Illinois herein named
shall appoint, not more than three nor less than one month after the passage of this act,
notice of which shall be given by them to the other commissioners by depositing a call
thereof in the post-office at Chicago, post-paid, to their address, at least forty days before
said meeting, and also by publishing said notice in one daily newspaper in each of the
cities of Chicago and St. Louis. Said board shall organize by the choice from its number
of a president, secretary, and treasurer, and they shall require from said treasurer such
bonds as may be deemed proper, and may from time to time increase the amount thereof
as they may deem proper. It shall be the duty of said Board of Commissioners to open
books, or cause books to be opened, at such times and in such principal cities in the
United States as they or a quorum of them shall determine, to receive subscriptions to the
capital stock of said corporation, and a cash payment of ten per centum on all
subscriptions, and to receipt therefor. So soon as two thousand shares shall be in good
faith subscribed for, and ten dollars per share actually paid into the treasury of the
company, the said president and secretary of said Board of Commissioners shall appoint a
time and place for the first meeting of the subscribers to the stock of said company, and
shall give notice thereof in at least one newspaper in each state in which subscription-
books have been opened, at least thirty days previous to the day of meeting, and such
subscribers as shall attend the meeting so called, either in person or by proxy, shall then
and there elect by ballot not less than thirteen directors for said corporation; and in such
election each share of said capital shall entitle the owner thereof to one vote. The
president and secretary of the Board of Commissioners shall act as inspectors of said
election, and shall certify under their hands the names of the directors elected at said
meeting, and the said commissioners, treasurer, and secretary shall then deliver over to
said directors all the properties, subscription-books, and other books in their possession, and thereupon the duties of said commissioners and the officers previously appointed by them shall cease and determine forever, and thereafter the stockholders shall constitute said body politic and corporate. At the time of the first and each triennial election of directors by the stockholders, two additional directors shall be appointed by the President of the United States, who shall act with the body of directors, and to be denominated directors on the part of the government; any vacancy happening in the government directors at anytime may be filled by the President of the United States. The directors to be appointed by the President shall not be stockholders in the Union Pacific Railroad Company. The directors so chosen shall, as soon as may be after their election, elect from their own number a president and vice-president, and shall also elect a treasurer and secretary. No person shall be a director in said company unless he shall be a bona fide owner of at least five shares of stock in the said company, except the two directors to be appointed by the President as aforesaid. Said company, at any regular meeting of the stockholders called for that purpose, shall have power to make by-laws, rules, and regulations as they shall deem needful and proper, touching the disposition of the stock, property, estate, and effects of the company, not inconsistent herewith, the transfer of shares, the term of office, duties and conduct of their officers and servants, and all matters whatsoever which may appertain to the concerns of said company; and the said board of directors shall have power to appoint such engineers, agents, and subordinates as may from time to time be necessary to carry into effect the object of this act, and to do all acts and things touching the location and construction of said road and telegraph. Said directors may require payment of subscriptions to the capital stock after due notice, at such times and in such proportions as they shall deem necessary to complete the railroad-and telegraph within the time in this act prescribed. Said president, vice-president, and directors shall bold their office for three years, and until their successors are duly elected and qualified, or for such less time as the by-laws of the corporation may prescribe ; and a majority of said directors shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. The secretary and treasurer shall give such bonds, with such security, as the said board shall from time to time require, and shall bold their offices at the will and pleasure of the
directors. Annual meetings of the stockholders of the said corporation, for the choice of
officers (when they are to be chosen) and for the transaction of annual business, shall be
holden at such time and place and upon such notice as may be prescribed in the by-laws.
SEC. 2 And be it further enacted, That the right of way through the public lands be, and
the same is hereby, granted to said company for the construction of said railroad and
telegraph line; and the right, power, and authority is hereby given to said company to take
from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road, earth, stone, timber, and other
materials for the construction thereof; said right of way is granted to said railroad to the
extent of two hundred feet in width on each side of said railroad, where it may pass over
the public lands, including all necessary grounds for stations, buildings, workshops and
depots, machine shops, switches, side tracks, turn-tables, and water stations. The United
States shall extinguish as rapidly as may be, the Indian titles to all lands falling under the
operation of this act, and required for the said right of way and grants hereinafter made.
SEC. 3 And be it further enacted, That there be, and is hereby, granted to the said
company, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of said railroad and telegraph line,
and to secure the safe and speedy, transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of war,
and public stores thereon, every alternate section of public land, designated by odd
numbers, to the amount of five alternate sections per mile on each side of said railroad,
on the line thereof, and within the limits of ten miles on each side of said road, not sold,
reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States, and to which a preemption or
homestead claim may not have attached, at the time the line of said road is definitely
fixed: Provided, That all mineral lands shall be excepted from the operation of this act;
but where the same shall contain timber, the timber thereon is hereby granted to said
company. And all such lands so granted by this section which shall not be sold or
disposed of by said company within three years after the entire road shall have been
completed, shall be subject to settlement and pre-emption like other lands, at a price not
exceeding one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, to be paid to said company.
SEC. 4 And be it further enacted, That whenever said company shall have completed
forty consecutive miles of any portion of said railroad or telegraph line ready for the
service contemplated by this act, and supplied with all necessary drains, culverts,
viaducts, crossings, sidings, bridges, turnouts, watering places, depots, equipments, furniture, and all other appurtenances of a first-class railroad—the rails and all the other iron used in the construction and equipment of said road to be American manufacture of the best quality, the President of the United States shall appoint three commissioners to examine the same and report to him in relation thereto; and if it shall appear to him that forty consecutive miles of said railroad and telegraph line have been completed and equipped in all respects as required by this act, then, upon certificate of said commissioners to that effect, patents shall issue conveying the right and title to said lands to said company, on each side of the road, as far as the same is completed, to the amount aforesaid; and patents shall in like manner issue as each forty miles of said railroad and telegraph line are completed, upon certificate of said commissioners. Any vacancies occurring in said board of commissioners by death, resignation, or otherwise, shall be filled by the President of the United States: Provided, however, That no such commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the United States unless there shall be presented to him a statement, verified on oath by the president of said company, that such forty miles have been completed in the manner required by this act, and setting forth with certainty the points where such forty miles begin and where the same end; which oath shall be taken before a judge of a court of record.

SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That for the purposes herein mentioned, the Secretary of the Treasury shall, upon the certificate in writing of said commissioners of the completion and equipment of forty consecutive miles of said railroad and telegraph, in accordance with the provisions of this act, issue to said company bonds of the United States of one thousand dollars each, payable in thirty years after date, bearing six per centum per annum interest (said interest payable semi-annually), which interest may be paid in United States treasury notes or any other money or currency which the United States have or shall declare lawful money and a legal-tender, to the amount of sixteen of said bonds per mile for such section of forty miles; and to secure the repayment to the United States, as hereinafter provided, of the amount of said bonds so issued and delivered to said company, together with all interest thereon which shall have been paid by the United States, the issue of said bonds and delivery to the company shall ipso facto
constitute a first mortgage on the whole line of the railroad and telegraph, together with
the rolling-stock, fixtures, and property of every kind and description, and in
consideration of which said bonds may be issued; and on refusal or failure of said
company to redeem said bonds or any part of them, when required to do so by the
Secretary of the Treasury, in accordance with the provisions of this act, the said road,
with all the rights, functions, immunities, and appurtenances thereunto belonging, and
also all lands granted to the said company by the United States, which, at the time of said
default, shall remain in the ownership of the said company, may be taken possession of
by the Secretary of the Treasury for the use and benefit of the United States: Provided,
This section shall not apply to that part of any road now constructed.

SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That the grants aforesaid are made upon condition that
said company shall pay said bonds at maturity, and shall keep said railroad and telegraph
line in repair and use, and shall at all times transmit dispatches over said telegraph line,
and transport mails, troops, and munitions of war, supplies, and public stores upon said
railroad for the government whenever required to do so by any department thereof, and
that the government shall at all times have the preference in the use of the same for all the
purposes aforesaid, (at fair and reasonable rates of compensation, not to exceed the
amounts paid by private parties for the same kind of service); and all compensation for
services rendered for the government shall be applied to the payment of said bonds and
interest until the whole amount is fully paid. Said company may also pay the United
States, wholly or in part, in the same or other bonds, treasury notes, or other evidences of
debt against the United States, to be allowed at par; and after said road is completed, until
said bonds and interest are paid, at least five per centum of the net earnings of said road
shall also be annually applied to the payment thereof.

SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That said company shall file their assent to this act,
under the seal of said company, in the Department of the Interior, within one year after
the passage of this act, and shall complete said railroad and telegraph from the point of
beginning as herein provided, to the western boundary of Nevada Territory, before the
first day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four: Provided, That within two
years after the passage of this act said company shall designate the general route of said
road, as near as may be, and shall file a map of the same in the Department of the Interior, whereupon the Secretary of the Interior shall cause the lands within fifteen miles of said designated route or routes to be withdrawn from pre-emption, private entry, and sale; and when any portion of said route shall be finally located, the Secretary of the Interior shall cause the said lands hereinbefore granted, to be surveyed and set off as fast as may be necessary for the purposes herein named: Provided, That in fixing the point of connection of the main trunk with the eastern connections it shall be fixed at the most practicable point for the construction of the Iowa and Missouri branches, as hereinafter provided.

SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That the line of said railroad and telegraph shall commence at a point on the one hundredth meridian of longitude west from Greenwich, between the south margin of the valley of the Republican river and the north margin of the valley of the Platte river, in the Territory of Nebraska, at a point to be fixed by the President of the United States, after actual surveys; thence running westerly upon the most direct, central, and practicable route, through the territories of the United States, to the western boundary of the Territory of Nevada, there to meet and connect with the line of the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California.

SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company of Kansas are hereby authorized to construct a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri river, at the mouth of the Kansas river, on the south side thereof, so as to connect with the Pacific Railroad of Missouri, to the aforesaid point on the one-hundredth meridian of longitude west from Greenwich, as herein provided, upon the same terms and conditions in all respects as are provided in this act for the construction of the railroad and telegraph line first mentioned, and to meet and connect with the same at the meridian of longitude aforesaid; and in case the general route or line of road from the Missouri river to the Rocky Mountains should be so located as to require a departure northwardly from the proposed line of said Kansas railroad before it reaches the meridian of longitude aforesaid, the location of said Kansas road shall be made so as to conform thereto; and said railroad through Kansas shall be so located between the mouth of the Kansas river, as aforesaid, and the aforesaid point on the one-hundredth meridian of
longitude, that the several railroads from Missouri and Iowa, herein authorized to connect
with the same, can make connection within the limits prescribed in this act, provided the
same can be done without deviating from the general direction of the whole line to the
Pacific coast. The route in Kansas west of the meridian of Fort Riley, to the aforesaid
point on the one-hundredth meridian of longitude, to be subject to the approval of the
President of the United States, and to be determined by him on actual survey. And said
Kansas company may proceed to build said railroad to the aforesaid point on the one-
hundredth meridian of longitude west from Greenwich, in the Territory of Nebraska. The
Central Pacific Railroad Company of California, a corporation existing under the laws of
the State of California, are hereby authorized to construct a railroad and telegraph line
from the Pacific coast, at or near San Francisco, or the navigable waters of the
Sacramento river, to the eastern boundary of California, upon the same terms and
conditions, in all respects, as are contained in this act for the construction of said railroad
and telegraph line first-mentioned, and to meet and connect with the first-mentioned
railroad and telegraph line on the eastern boundary of California. Each of said companies
shall file their acceptance of the conditions of this act in the Department of the Interior
within six months after the passage of this act.

SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That the said company chartered by the State of
Kansas shall complete one hundred miles of their said road, commencing at the mouth of
the Kansas river, as aforesaid, within two years after filing their assent to the conditions
of this act, as herein provided, and one hundred miles per year thereafter until the whole
is completed; and the said Central Pacific Railroad Company of California shall complete
fifty miles of their said road within two years after filing their assent to the provisions of
this act, as herein provided, and fifty miles per year thereafter until the whole is
completed; and after completing their roads, respectively, said companies, or either of
them, may unite upon equal terms with the first-named company in constructing so much
of said railroad and telegraph line and branch railroads and telegraph lines in this act
hereinafter mentioned, through the territories, from the State of California to the Missouri
river, as shall then remain to be constructed, on the same terms and conditions as
provided in this act in relation to the said Union Pacific Railroad Company. And the
Hannibal and Saint Joseph railroad, the Pacific Railroad Company of Missouri, and the first-named company, or either of them, on filing their assent to this act as aforesaid, may unite upon equal terms, under this act, with the said Kansas company, in constructing said railroad and telegraph to said meridian of longitude, with the consent of the said State of Kansas; and in case said first-named company shall complete their line to the eastern boundary of California before it is completed across said state by the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California, said first-named company is hereby authorized to continue in constructing the same through California, with the consent of said state, upon the terms mentioned in this act, until said roads shall meet and connect, and the whole line of said railroad and telegraph is completed; and the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California, after completing its road across said state, is authorized to continue the construction of said railroad and telegraph through the territories of the United States to the Missouri river, including the branch roads specified in this act, upon the routes hereinbefore and hereinafter indicated, on the terms and conditions provided in this act in relation to the said Union Pacific Railroad Company, until said roads shall meet and connect, and the whole line of said railroad and branches and telegraph is completed.

SEC. 11. And be it further enacted, That for three hundred miles of said road, most mountainous and difficult of construction, to wit, one hundred and fifty miles westwardly from the eastern base of the Rocky mountains, and one hundred and fifty miles eastwardly from the western base of the Sierra Nevada mountains, said points to be fixed by the President of the United States, the bonds to be issued to aid in the construction thereof shall be treble the number per mile hereinbefore provided, and the same shall be issued, and the lands herein granted be set apart, upon the construction of every twenty miles thereof, upon the certificate of the commissioners as aforesaid that twenty consecutive miles of the same are completed; and between the sections last named of one hundred and fifty miles each, the bonds to be issued to aid in the construction thereof shall be double the number per mile first mentioned, and the same shall be issued, and the lands herein granted beset apart, upon the construction of every twenty miles thereof, upon the certificate of the commissioners as aforesaid that twenty consecutive miles of
the same are completed: Provided, That no more than fifty thousand of said bonds shall
be issued under this act to aid in constructing the main line of said railroad and telegraph.
SEC. 12. And be it further enacted, That whenever the route of said railroad shall cross
the boundary of any state or territory or said meridian of longitude, the two companies
meeting or uniting there shall agree upon its location at that point, with reference to the
most direct and practicable through route, and in case of difference between them as to
said location the President of the United States shall determine the said location; the
companies named in each state and territory to locate the road across the same between
the points so agreed upon, except as herein provided. The track, upon the entire line of
railroad and branches shall be of uniform width, to be determined by the President of the
United States, so that, when completed, cars can be run from the Missouri river to the
Pacific coast; the grades and curves shall not exceed the maximum grades and curves of
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; the whole line of said railroad and branches and
telegraph shall be operated and used for all purposes of communication, travel, and
transportation, so far as the public and government are concerned, as one connected
continuous line; and the companies herein named in Missouri, Kansas, and California,
fil ing their assent to the provisions of this act, shall receive and transport all iron rails,
chairs, spikes, ties, timber, and all materials required for constructing and furnishing said
first-mentioned line between the aforesaid point on the one-hundredth meridian of
longitude and western boundary of Nevada Territory, whenever the same is required by
said first-named company, at cost, over that portion of the roads of said companies
constructed under the provisions of this act.
SEC. 13. And be it further enacted, That the Hannibal and Saint Joseph Railroad
Company of Missouri may extend its road from Saint Joseph, via Atchison, to connect
and unite with the road through Kansas, upon filing its assent to the provisions of this act,
upon the same terms and conditions in all respects, for one hundred miles in length next
to the Missouri river, as are provided in this act for the construction of the railroad and
telegraph line first mentioned, and may for this purpose use any railroad charter which
has been or may be granted by the legislature of Kansas: Provided, That if actual survey
shall render it desirable, the said company may construct their road, with the consent of
the Kansas legislature, on the most direct and practicable route west from St. Joseph, Missouri, so as to connect and unite with the road leading from the western boundary of Iowa at any point east of the one-hundredth meridian of west longitude, or with the main trunk road at said point; but in no event shall lands or bonds be given to said company, as herein directed, to aid in the construction of their said road for a greater distance than one hundred miles. And the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company of Kansas may construct their road from Leavenworth to unite with the road through Kansas,

SEC. 14. And be it further enacted, That the said Union Pacific Railroad Company is hereby authorized and required to construct a single line of railroad and telegraph from a point on the western boundary of the State of Iowa, to be fixed by the President of the United States, upon the most direct and practicable route, to be subject to his approval, so as to form a connection with the line of said company at some point on the one-hundredth meridian of longitude aforesaid, from the point of commencement on the western boundary of the State of Iowa, upon the same terms and conditions, in all respects, as are contained in this act for the construction of the said railroad and telegraph first mentioned; and the said Union Pacific Railroad Company shall complete one hundred miles of the road and telegraph in this section provided for in two years after filing their assent to the conditions of this act, as by the terms of this act required, and at the rate of one hundred miles per year thereafter until the whole is completed: Provided, That a failure upon the part of said company to make said connection in the time aforesaid, and to perform the obligations imposed on said company by this section, and to operate said road in the same manner as the main line shall be operated, shall forfeit to the government of the United States all the rights, privileges, and franchises granted to and conferred upon said company by this act. And whenever there shall be a line of railroad completed through Minnesota or Iowa to Sioux City, then the said Pacific Railroad Company is hereby authorized and required to construct a railroad and telegraph from said Sioux City upon the most direct and practicable route to a point on, and so as to connect with, the branch railroad and telegraph in this section hereinbefore mentioned, or with the said Union Pacific railroad, said point of junction to be fixed by the President of the United States, not further west than the one-hundredth meridian of longitude.
aforesaid, and on the same terms and conditions as provided in this act for the
construction of the Union Pacific railroad as aforesaid, and to complete the same at the
rate of one hundred miles per year; and should said company fail to comply with the
requirements of this act in relation to the said Sioux City railroad and telegraph, the said
company shall suffer the same forfeitures prescribed in relation to the Iowa branch
railroad and telegraph hereinbefore mentioned.
SEC. 15. And be it further enacted, That any other railroad company now incorporated,
or hereafter to be incorporated, shall have the right to connect their road with the road
and branches provided for by this act, at such places and upon such just and equitable
terms as the President of the United States may prescribe. Wherever the word company is
used in this act, it shall be construed to embrace the words their associates, successors,
and assigns, the same as if the words had been properly added thereto.
SEC. 16. And be it further enacted, That at any time after the passage of this act all of the
railroad companies named herein, and assenting hereto, or any two or more of them, are
authorized to form themselves into one consolidated company; notice of such
consolidation, in writing, shall be filed in the Department of the Interior, and such
consolidated company shall thereafter proceed to construct said railroad and branches and
telegraph line upon the terms and conditions provided in this act.
SEC. 17. And be it further enacted, That in case said company or companies shall fail to
comply with the terms and conditions of this act, by not completing said road and
telegraph and branches within a reasonable time, or by not keeping the same in repair and
use, but shall permit the same for an unreasonable time to remain unfinished or out of
repair and unfit for use, Congress may pass any act to insure the speedy completion of
said road and branches, or to put the same in repair and use, and may direct the income of
said railroad and telegraph line to be thereafter devoted to the use of the United States to
repay all such expenditures caused by the default or neglect of such company or
companies: Provided, That if said roads are not completed, so as to form a continuous
line of railroad, ready for use, from the Missouri river to the navigable waters of the
Sacramento river in California, by the first day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-six,
the whole of all of said railroads before mentioned, and to be constructed under the provisions of this act, together with all their furniture, fixtures, rolling-stock, machine shops, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and property of every kind and character, shall be forfeited to and taken possession of by the United States: Provided, That of the bonds of the United States in this act provided to be delivered for any and all parts of the roads to be constructed east of the one-hundredth meridian of west longitude from Greenwich, and for any part of the road west of the west foot of the Sierra Nevada mountains, there shall be reserved of each part and installment twenty-five per centum, to be and remain in the United States treasury, undelivered, until said road and all parts thereof provided for in this act are entirely completed; and of all the bonds provided to be delivered for the said road, between the two points aforesaid, there shall be reserved out of each installment fifteen per centum, to be and remain in the treasury until the whole of the road provided for in this act is fully completed; and if the said road or any part thereof shall fail of completion at the time limited therefor in this act, then and in that case the said part of said bonds so reserved shall be forfeited to the United States.

SEC. 18. And be it further enacted, That whenever it appears that the net earnings or the entire road and telegraph, including the amount allowed for services rendered for the United States, after deducting all expenditures—INCLUDING repairs and the furnishing, running, and managing of said road—shall exceed ten per centum upon its cost, (exclusive of the five per centum to be paid to the United States,) Congress may reduce the rates of fare thereon, if unreasonable in amount, and may fix and establish the same by law. And the better to accomplish the object of this act, namely, to promote the public interest and welfare by the construction of said railroad and telegraph line, and keeping the same in working order, and to secure to the government at all times (but particularly in time, of war) the use and benefits of the same for postal, military, and other purposes, Congress may at any time—having due regard for the rights of said companies named herein—add to, alter, amend, or repeal this act.

SEC. 19. And be it further enacted, That the several railroad companies herein named are authorized to enter into an arrangement with the Pacific Telegraph Company, the Overland Telegraph Company, and the California State Telegraph Company, so that the
present line of telegraph between the Missouri river and San Francisco may be moved upon or along the line of said railroad and branches as fast as said roads and branches are built; and if said arrangement be entered into, and the transfer of said telegraph line be made in accordance therewith to the line of said railroad and branches, such transfer shall, for all purposes of this act, be held and considered a fulfillment, on the part of said railroad companies, of the provisions of this act in regard to the construction of said line of telegraph. And in case of disagreement, said telegraph companies are authorized to remove their line of telegraph along and upon the line of railroad herein contemplated without prejudice to the rights of said railroad companies named herein.

SEC. 20. And be it further enacted, That the corporation hereby created and the roads connected therewith, under the provisions of this act, shall make to the Secretary of the Treasury an annual report, wherein shall be set forth:

First. The names of the stockholders and their places of residence, so far as the same can be ascertained.

Second. The names and residences of the directors and all other officers of the company.

Third. The amount of stock subscribed, and the amount thereof actually paid in.

Fourth. A description of the lines of road surveyed, of the lines thereof fixed upon for the construction of the road, and the cost of such surveys.

Fifth. The amount received from passengers on the road.

Sixth. The amount received for freight thereon.

Seventh. A statement of the expense of said road and its fixtures.

Eighth. A statement of the indebtedness of said company, setting forth the various kinds thereof; which report shall be sworn to by the president of the said company, and shall be presented to the Secretary of the Treasury on or before the first day of July in each year.

Approved July 1, 1862.
Appendix B: Pacific Railroad Act of 1864

ACT OF JULY 2, 1864.

[13 Statutes at Large, 356.]

AN ACT to amend an act entitled "An act to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri river to the Pacific ocean, and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal, military, and other purposes," approved July first, eighteen hundred and sixty-two.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the capital stock of the company entitled the Union Pacific Railroad Company, authorized by the act of which this act is amendatory, shall be in shares of one hundred dollars, instead of one thousand dollars, each; that the number of shares shall be one million, instead of one hundred thousand; and that the number of shares which any person shall hold to entitle him to serve as a director in said company (except the five directors to be appointed by government) shall be fifty shares, instead of five shares; and that every subscriber to said capital stock for each share of one thousand dollars, heretofore subscribed, shall be entitled to a certificate for ten shares of one hundred dollars each; and that the following words in section first of said act, "which shall be subscribed for and held in not more than two hundred shares by any one person," be and the same are hereby repealed.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Union Pacific Railroad Company shall cause books to be kept open to receive subscriptions to the capital stock of said company, (until the entire capital of one hundred millions of dollars shall be subscribed,) at the general office of said company in the city of New York, and in each of the cities of Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, Cincinnati, and St. Louis, at such. places as may be designated by the President of the United States, and in such other localities as may be directed by him. No subscription for said stock shall be deemed valid unless the subscriber therefor shall, at the time of subscribing, or remit to the treasurer of the company an amount per share subscribed by him equal to the amount per share
previously paid by the then-existing stockholders. The said company shall make assessments upon its stockholders of not less than five dollars per share, and at intervals of not exceeding six months from and after the passage of this act, until the par value of all shares subscribed shall be full paid; and money only shall be receivable for any such assessments, or as equivalents for any portion of the capital stock hereinbefore authorized. The capital stock of said company shall not be increased beyond the actual cost of said road. And the stock of the company shall be deemed personal property, and shall be transferable on the books of the company, at the general office of said company in the city of New York, or at such other transfer office as the company may establish.

SEC. 3 And be it further enacted, That the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and all other companies provided for in this act and the act to which this is an amendment, be, and hereby are, empowered to enter upon, purchase, take, and hold any lands or premises that may be necessary and proper for the construction and working of said road, not exceeding in width one hundred feet on each side of its centre line, unless a greater width be required for the purpose of excavation or embankment; and also my lands or premises that may be necessary and proper for turnouts standing places for cars, depots, station house[s], or any other structures required in the construction and operating of said road. And each of said companies shall have the right to cut and remove trees and other materials that might by falling encumber its road-bed, though standing or being more than one hundred feet therefrom. And in case the owner or claimant of such lands or premises and such company cannot agree as to the damages, the amount shall be determined by the appraisal of three disinterested commissioners, who may be appointed upon application by any party to any judge of a court of record in any of the territories in which the lands or premises to be taken lie; and said commissioners, in their assessments of damages, shall appraise such premises at what would have been the value thereof if the road had not been built; and upon return into court of such appraisement, and upon the payment to the clerk thereof of the amount so awarded by the commissioners for the use and benefit of the owner thereof, said premises shall be deemed to be taken by said company, which shall thereby acquire full title to the same for the purposes aforesaid. And either party feeling aggrieved by said assessment may, within thirty days, file an
appeal there from, and demand a jury of twelve men to estimate the damage sustained; but such appeal shall not interfere with the rights of said company to enter upon the premises taken, or to do any act necessary in the construction of its road. And said party appealing shall give bonds, with sufficient surety or sureties, for the payment of any cost that may arise upon such appeal. And in case the party appealing does not obtain a more favor able verdict, such party shall pay the whole cost incurred by the appellee as well as its own. And the payment into court for the use of the owner or claimant of a sum equal to that finally awarded shall be held to vest in said company the title of said land, and the right to use and occupy the same for the construction, maintaining and operating of the road of said company. And in case any of the lands to be taken as aforesaid shall be held by any person residing without the territory or subject to any legal disability, the court may appoint a proper person, who shall give bonds, with sufficient surety or sureties, for the faithful execution of his trust, and who may represent in court the person disqualified or absent as aforesaid, when the same proceeding shall be bad in reference to the appraisement of the promises to be taken and with the same effect as have been already described. And the title of the company to the land taken by virtue of this act shall not be affected nor impaired by reason of any failure by any guardian to discharge faithfully his trust, And in case it shall be necessary for either of the said companies to enter upon lands which are unoccupied, and of which there is no apparent owner or claimant, it may proceed to take and use the same for the purpose of its said railroad, and may institute proceedings in manner described for the purpose of ascertaining the value of and acquiring a title to the same; and the court may determine the kind of notice to be served on such owner or owners, and may in its discretion appoint an agent or guardian to represent such owner or owners in case of his or their incapacity or non-appearance. But in case no claimant shall appear within six years from the time of the opening of said road across any land, all claim to damages against said company shall be barred. It shall be competent for the legal guardian of any infant or any other person under guardianship to agree with the proper company as to damages sustained by reason of the taking of any lands of any such person under disability, as aforesaid, for the use as aforesaid; and upon such agreement being made, and approved by the court having supervision of the official
acts of said guardian, the said guardian shall have full power to make and execute a conveyance thereof to the said company, which shall vest the title thereto in the said company.

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That section three of said act be hereby amended by striking out the word "five," where the same occurs in said section and by inserting in lieu thereof the word "ten;" and by striking out the word "ten," where the same occurs in said section, and inserting in lieu thereof the word "twenty."

And section seven of said act is hereby amended by striking out the word "fifteen," where the same occurs in said section, and inserting in lieu thereof the word "twenty-five." And the term "mineral lands," where ever the same occurs in this act, and the act to which this is an amendment, shall not be construed to include coal and iron land. And any lands granted by this act, or the act to which this is an amendment, shall not defeat or impair any pre-emption, homestead, swamp-land, or other lawful claim, nor include any government reservation or mineral lands, or the improvements of any bona fide settler on in any lands returned and denominated as mineral lands, and the timber necessary to support his said improvements is a miner or agriculturalist, to be ascertained under such rules as have been or may be established by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, in conformity with the provisions of the pre-emption laws: Provided, That the quantity thus exempted by the operation of this act, and the act to which this is an amendment, shall not exceed one hundred and sixty acres for each settler who claims as an agriculturalist; and such quantity for each settler who claims as a miner, as the said commissioner may establish by general regulations: Provided, also, That the phrase "but where the same shall contain timber, the timber thereon is hereby granted to said company," in the proviso to said section three, shall not apply to the timber growing or being on any land farther than ten miles from the centre of the line of any one of said roads or branches mentioned in said act or in this act. And all lands shall be excluded from the operation of this act, and of the act to which this is an amendment, which were located or selected to be located under the provisions of an act entitled "An act donating lands to the several states and territories which may provide colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the
mechanic arts," approved July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and notice thereof given at the proper land office.

SEC. 5 And be it further enacted, That the time for designating the general route of said railroad, and of filing the map of the same, and the time for the completion of that part of the railroads required by the terms of said act of each company, be and the same is hereby extended one year from the time in said act designated; and that the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California shall be required to complete twenty-five miles of their said road in each year thereafter, and the whole to the state line within four years, and that only one-half of the compensation for services rendered for the government by said companies shall be required to be applied to the payment of the bonds issued by the government in aid of the construction of said road.

SEC. 6 And be it further enacted, That the proviso to section four of said act is hereby modified as follows, viz: And the President of the United States is hereby authorized, at any time after the passage of this act, to appoint for each and every of said roads three commissioners, as provided for in the act to which this act is amendatory; and the verified statement of the president of the California company, required by said section four, shall be filed in the office of the United States surveyor general for the State of California, instead of being presented to the President of the United States; and the said surveyor-general shall thereupon notify the said commissioners of the filing of such statement, and the said commissioners shall thereupon proceed to examine the portion of said railroad and telegraph line so completed, and make their report thereon to the President of the United States, as provided by the act of which this is amendatory. And such statement may be filed and such railroad and telegraph line be examined and reported on by the said commissioners, and the requisite amount of bonds may be issued, and the lands appertaining set apart, located, entered, and patented, as provided in this act and the act to which this is amendatory, upon the construction by said railroad company of California of any portion of not less than twenty consecutive miles of their said railroad and telegraph line, upon the certificate, of said commissioners that such portion is completed as required by the act to which this is amendatory. And section ten of the act of which
this is amendatory is hereby amended by inserting after the words United States in the last clause, the words "and states intervening."

SEC. 7 And be it further enacted, That so much of section seventeen of said act as provides for a reservation by the government of a portion of the bonds to be issued to aid in the construction of the said railroads is hereby repealed. And the failure of any one company to comply fully with the conditions and requirements of this act, or the act to which this is amendatory, shall not work a forfeiture of the rights, privileges, or franchise of any other company or companies that shall have complied with the same.

SEC. 8 And be it further enacted, That for the purpose of facilitating the work on said railroad, and of enabling the said company as early as practicable to commence the grading of said railroad in the region of the mountains, between the eastern base of the Rocky mountains and the western base of the Sierra Nevada mountains, so that the same may be finally completed within the time required by law, it is hereby provided that whenever the chief engineer of the said company and said commissioners shall certify that a certain proportion of the work required to prepare the road for the superstructure on any such section of twenty miles is done, (which said certificate shall be duly verified,) the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and required, upon the delivery of such certificate, to issue to said company a proportion of said bonds, not exceeding two-thirds of the amount of bonds authorized to be issued under the provisions of the act, to aid in the construction of such section of twenty miles, nor in any case exceeding two-thirds of the value of the work done, the remaining one-third to remain until the said section is fully completed and certified by the commissioners appointed by the President, according to the terms and provisions of the said act; and no such bonds shall issue to the Union Pacific Railroad Company for work done west of Salt Lake City under this section, more than three hundred miles in advance of the completed continuous line of said railroad from the point beginning on the one-hundredth meridian of longitude.

SEC. 9. And, be it further enacted, That to enable any one of said corporations to make convenient and necessary connections with other roads, it is hereby authorized to establish and maintain all necessary ferries upon and across the Missouri river, and other rivers which its road may pass in its course; and authority is hereby given said
corporation to construct bridges over said Missouri river and all other rivers for the convenience of said road: *Provided,* That any bridge or bridges it may construct over the Missouri river, or any other navigable river on the line of said road, shall be constructed with suitable and proper draws for the passage of steamboats, and shall be built, kept, and maintained at the expense of said company, in such manner as not to impair the usefulness of said rivers for navigation to any greater extent than such structures of the most approved character necessarily do: *And provided, further,* That any company authorized by this act to construct its road and telegraph line from the Missouri river to the initial point aforesaid, may construct its road and telegraph line so as to connect with the Union Pacific railroad at any point westwardly of such initial point, in case such company shall deem such westward connection more practicable or desirable; and in aid of the construction of so much of its road and telegraph line as shall be a departure from the route hereinbefore provided for its road, such company shall be entitled to all the benefits and be subject to all the conditions and restrictions of this act: *Provided, further,* however, That the bonds of the United States shall not be issued to such company for a greater amount than is hereinbefore provided, if the same had united with the Union Pacific railroad on the one-hundredth degree of longitude; nor shall such company be entitled to receive any greater amount of alternate sections of public lands than are also herein provided.

SEC. 10. *And be it further enacted,* That section five of said act be so modified and amended that the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the Central Pacific Railroad Company, and any other company authorized to participate in the construction of said road, may, on the completing of each section of said road, as provided in this act, and the act to which this act is an amendment, issue their first mortgage bonds on their respective railroad and telegraph lines to an amount not exceeding the amount of the bonds of the United States, and of even tenor and date, time of maturity, rate and character of interest, with the bonds authorized to be issued to said railroad companies respectively. And the lieu of the United States bonds shall be subordinate to that of the bonds of any or either of said companies hereby authorized to be issued on their respective roads, property, and equipments, except as to the provisions of the sixth section of the act to which this act is
an amendment, relating to the transmission of dispatches and the transportation of mails, troops, munitions of war, supplies, and public stores for the government of the United States. And said section is further amended by striking out the word "forty," and inserting in lieu thereof the words "on each and every section of not less than twenty."

SEC. 11. And be it further enacted, That if any of the railroad companies entitled to bonds of the United States, or to issue their first mortgage bonds herein provided for, has, at the time of the approval of this act, issued or shall thereafter issue any of its own bonds or securities in such form and manner as in law or equity to entitle the same to priority or preference of payment to the said guaranteed bonds, or said first mortgage bonds, the amount of such corporate bonds outstanding and unsatisfied or uncancelled shall be deducted from the amount of such government and first mortgage bonds which the company may be entitled to receive and issue; and such an amount only of such government bonds and such first mortgage bonds shall be granted or permitted as, added to such outstanding, unsatisfied, or uncancelled bonds of the company, shall make up the whole amount per mile to which the company would otherwise have been entitled: And provided further, That before any bonds shall be so given by the United States, the company claiming them shall present to the Secretary of the Treasury an affidavit of the president and secretary of the company, to be sworn to before the judge of a court of record, setting forth whether said company has issued any such bonds or securities, and, if so, particularly describing the same, and such other evidence as the Secretary may require, so as to enable him to make the deduction herein required; and such affidavit shall then be filed and deposited in the office of the Secretary of the Interior. And my person swearing falsely to any such affidavit shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and on conviction thereof shall be punished as aforesaid: Provided, also, That no land granted by this act shall be conveyed to any party or parties, and no bonds shall be issued to any company or companies, party or parties, on account of any road or part thereof made prior to the passage of the act to which this act is an amendment, or made subsequent thereto under the provisions of any act or acts other than this act and the act amended by this act.

228
SEC. 12. And be it further enacted, That the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company, now known as the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Eastern Division, shall build the railroad from the mouth of Kansas river, by the way of Leavenworth, or, if that be not deemed the best route, then the said company shall, within two years, build a railroad from the city of Leavenworth to unite with the main stem at or near the city of Lawrence; but to aid in the construction of said branch the said company shall not be entitled to any bonds. And if the Union Pacific Railroad Company shall not be proceeding in good faith to build the said railroad through the territories when the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company, now known as the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Eastern Division shall have completed their road to the hundredth degree of longitude, then the last-named company may proceed to make said road westward until it meets and Connects with the Central Pacific Railroad Company on the same line. And the said railroad from the mouth of the Kansas river to the one-hundredth meridian of longitude shall be made by the way of Lawrence and Topeka, or on the bank of the Kansas river opposite said towns: Provided, That no bonds shall be issued or land certified by the United States to any person or company, for the construction of any part of the main trunk line of said railroad west of the one-hundredth meridian of longitude and east of the Rocky mountains, until said road shall be completed from or near Omaha, on the Missouri river, to the said one-hundredth meridian of longitude.

SEC. 13. And be it further enacted, That at and after the next election of directors, the number of directors to be elected by the stockholders shall be fifteen; and the number of directors to be appointed by the President shall be five; and the President shall appoint three additional directors to serve until the next regular election, and thereafter five directors. At least one of said government directors shall be placed on each of the standing committees of said company, and at least one on every special committee that may be appointed. The government directors, shall, from time to time, report to the Secretary of the Interior, in answer to any inquiries be may make of them, touching the condition, management, and progress of the work, and shall communicate to the Secretary of the Interior, at any time, such information, as should be in the possession of the Department. They shall, as often as may be necessary to a full knowledge of the
condition and management of the line, visit all portions of the line of road, whether built
or surveyed; and while absent from home, attending to their duties as directors, shall be
paid their actual travelling expenses, and be allowed and paid such reasonable
compensation for their time actually employed as the board of directors may decide.

SEC. 14. And be it further enacted. That the next election for directors of said railroad
shall be held on the first Wednesday of October’ next, at the office of said company in
the city of New York, between the hours of ten o’clock a. m. and four o’clock p. m. of
said day; and all subsequent regular elections shall be held annually thereafter at the
same place; and the directors shall hold their offices for one year, and until their
successors are qualified.

SEC. 15. And be it further enacted, That the several companies authorized to construct
the aforesaid roads are hereby required to operate and use said roads and telegraph for all
purposes of communication, travel, and transportation, so far as the public and the
government are concerned, as one continuous line; and in such operation and use, to
afford and secure to each equal advantages and facilities as to rates, time, and
transportation, without any discrimination of any kind in favor of the road or business of
any or either of said companies, or adverse to the road or business of any or either of the
others; and it shall not be lawful for the proprietors of any line of telegraph authorized by
this act, or the act amended by this act, to refuse or fail to convey for all persons requiring
the transmission of news and messages of like character, on pain of forfeiting to the
person injured, for each offence, the sum of one hundred dollars, and such other damages
as he may have suffered on account of said refusal or failure, to be sued for and recovered
in any court of the United States, or of any state or territory of competent jurisdiction.

SEC. 16. And be it further enacted, That any two or more of the companies authorized to
participate in the benefits- of this act are hereby authorized at any time to unite and
consolidate their organizations, as the same may or shall be, upon such terms and
conditions, and in such manner as they may agree upon, and as shall not be incompatible
with this act, or the laws of the state or states in which the roads of such companies may
be, and to assume and adopt such corporate name and style as they may agree upon, with
a capital stock not to exceed the actual cost of the roads so to be consolidated, and shall
file a copy of such consolidation in the Department of the Interior, and thereupon such organization so formed and consolidated shall succeed to, possess and be entitled to receive from the government of the United States all and singular the grants, benefits and immunities, guarantees, acts, and things to be done and performed, and be subject to the same terms, conditions, restrictions, and requirements which said companies respectively at the time of such consolidation are or may be entitled or subject to under this act in place and substitution of said companies so consolidated respectively. And all other provisions of this act, so far as applicable, relating or in any manner appertaining to the companies so consolidated, or either thereof, shall apply and be of force as to such consolidated organization. And in case, upon the completion by such consolidated organization of the roads or either of them of the companies so consolidated, any other of the road or roads of either of the other companies authorized as aforesaid (and forming, or intended, or necessary to form a portion of a continuous line from each of the several points on the Missouri river hereinbefore designated to the Pacific coast) shall not have constructed the number of miles of its said road within the time herein required, such consolidated organization is hereby authorized to continue the construction of its road and telegraph in the general direction and route upon which such incomplete or unconstructed road is hereinbefore authorized to be built, until such continuation of the road of such consolidated organization shall reach the constructed road and telegraph of said other company, and at such point unite and connect therewith; and for and in aid thereof the said consolidated organization may do and perform, in reference to such portion of road and telegraph as shall so be in continuation of its constructed road and telegraph, and to the construction and equipment thereof, all and singular the several acts and things hereinbefore provided, authorized, or granted to be done by the company hereinbefore authorized to construct and equip the same, and shall be entitled to similar and like grants, benefits, immunities, guarantees, acts, and things to be done and performed by the government of the United States, by the President of the United States, by the Secretaries of the Treasury and Interior, and by commissioners, in reference to such company, and to such portion of the road hereinbefore authorized to be constructed by it, and upon the like and similar terms and conditions, so far as the same are applicable
thereto. And said consolidated company shall pay to said defaulting company the value, to be estimated by competent engineers, of all the work done and material furnished by said defaulting company, which may be adopted and used by said consolidated company in the progress of the work under the provisions of this section: Provided, nevertheless, That said defaulting company may at any time, before receiving pay for its said work and material, as hereinbefore provided on its own election, pay said consolidated company the value of the work done and material furnished by said consolidated company, to be estimated by competent engineers, necessary for and used in the construction of the road of said defaulting company, and resume the control of its said road; and all the rights, benefits, and privileges which shall be acquired, possessed, or exercised, pursuant to this section, shall be to that extent an abatement of the rights, benefits, and privileges hereinbefore granted to such other company. And in case any company authorized thereto shall not enter into such consolidated organization, such company, upon the completion of its road, as hereinbefore provided, shall be entitled to and is hereby authorized to continue and extend the same, under the circumstances, and in accordance with the provisions of this section, and to have all the benefits thereof, as fully and completely as are herein provided touching such consolidated organization. And in case more than one such consolidated organization shall be made pursuant to this act, the terms and conditions of this act, hereinbefore recited as to one, shall apply in like manner, force, and effect to the other: Provided however, That rights and interests at any time acquired by one such consolidated organization shall not be impaired by another thereof. It is further provided, that, should the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California complete their line to the eastern line of the State of California before the line of the Union Pacific Railroad Company shall have been extended westward so as to meet the line of said first named company, said first-named company may extend their line of road eastward one hundred and fifty miles on the established route, so as to meet and connect with the line of the Union Pacific Railroad, complying in all respects with the provisions and restrictions of this act as to said Union Pacific road, and upon doing so shall enjoy all the rights, privileges, and benefits conferred by this act on said Union Pacific Railroad Company.
SEC. 17. And be it further enacted, That so much of section fourteen of said act as relates to a branch from Sioux City be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows: That whenever a line of railroad shall be completed through the States of Iowa or Minnesota to Sioux City, such company now organized or as may hereafter be organized under the laws of Iowa, Minnesota, Dacota, or Nebraska, as the President of the United States, by its request, may designate or approve for that purpose, shall construct and operate a line of railroad and telegraph from Sioux City, upon the most direct and practicable route to such a point on, and so as to connect with, the Iowa branch of the Union Pacific railroad from Omaha, or the Union Pacific railroad, as such company may select, and on the same terms and conditions as are provided in this act and the act to which this is all amendment, for the construction of the said Union and Pacific railroad and telegraph line and branches; and said company shall complete the same at the rate of fifty miles per year: Provided, That said Union Pacific Railroad Company shall be, and is hereby, released from the construction of said branch. And said company constructing said branch shall not be entitled to receive in bonds an amount larger than the said Union Pacific Railroad Company would be entitled to receive if it had constructed the branch under this act and the act to which this is an amendment; but said company shall be entitled to receive alternate sections of land for ten miles in width on each side of the same along the whole length of said branch: And provided further, That if a railroad be not completed to Sioux City, across Iowa or Minnesota, within eighteen months from the date of this act, then said company, designated by the President as aforesaid, may commence, continue, and complete the construction of said branch, as contemplated by the provisions of this act: Provided, however, That if the said company so designated by the President as aforesaid, shall not complete the said branch from Sioux City to the Pacific railroad within five years from the passage of this act, then, and in that case, all of the railroad which shall have been constructed by said company shall be forfeited to and become the property of the United States,

SEC. 18. And be it further enacted, That the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company, a corporation organized under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Iowa, be and hereby is authorized to extend its road through the Territory of Nebraska from
the point where it strike the Missouri river, south of the mouth of the Platte river, to sonic point not further west than the one-hundredth meridian of west longitude, so as to connect, by the most practicable route, with the main trunk of the Union Pacific railroad, or that part of it which run, from Omaha to the said one-hundredth meridian of west longitude. And, for the purpose of enabling said Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company to construct that portion of their road herein authorized, the right-of-way through the public lands is granted to said company for the construction of said road. And the right, power, and authority is hereby given to said company to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road, earth, stone, timber, and other materials for the construction thereof. Said right-of-way is granted to said company to the extent of two hundred feet where it may pass over the public lands, including all necessary grounds for stations, buildings, workshops, depots, machine-shops, switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water-stations. And the United States shall extinguish, as rapidly as may be consistent with public policy and the welfare of the said Indians, the Indian titles to all lands falling under the operation of this section and required for the said right-of-way and grant of land herein made.

SEC. 19. And be it further enacted, That for the purpose of aiding in the construction of said road, there be and hereby is granted to the said Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company, every alternate section of public land (excepting mineral lands as provided in this act) designated by odd numbers, to the amount of ten alternate sections per mile on each side of said road, on the line thereof and not sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States, and to which a preemption or homestead claim may not have attached at the time the line of said road is definitely fixed: Provided, [That] said company shall accept this grant within one year from the passage of this act, by filing such acceptance with the Secretary of the Interior; and shall also establish the line of said road, and file a map thereof with the Secretary of the Interior within one year of the date of said acceptance, when the said Secretary shall withdraw the lands embraced in this grant from market.

SEC. 20. And be it further enacted, That whenever said Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company shall have completed twenty consecutive miles of the road mentioned
in the foregoing section, in the manner provided for other roads mentioned in this act, and the act to which this is an amendment, the President of the United States shall appoint three commissioners to examine and report to him in relation thereto; and if it shall appear to him that twenty miles of said road have been completed as required by this act, then, upon certificate of said commissioner[s] to that effect, patents shall issue conveying the right and title to said lands to said company on each side of said road, as far as the same is completed, to the amount aforesaid; and such examination, report, and conveyance, by patents, shall continue from time to time, in like manner, until said road shall have been completed. And the President shall appoint said commissioners, [and] fill vacancies in said commission, as provided in relation to other roads mentioned in the act to which this is an amendment. And the said company shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities granted to the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company by the said last-mentioned act, so far as the same may be applicable: Provided, That no government bonds shall be issued to the said Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company to aid in the construction of said extension of its road: And provided further, That said extension shall be completed within the period of ten years from the passage of this act.

SEC. 21. And be it further enacted, That before any land granted by this act shall be conveyed to any company or party entitled thereto under this act, there shall first be paid into the treasury of the United States the cost of surveying, selecting and conveying the same by the said company or party in interest as the titles shall be required by said company, which amount shall, without any further appropriation, stand to the credit of the proper account, to be used by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, for the prosecution of the survey of the public lands along the line of said roads, and so from year to year, until the whole shall be completed, as provided under the provisions of this act.

SEC. 22. And be it further enacted, That Congress may at any time alter, amend, or repeal this act.

Approved July 2, 1864.
Appendix C: Pacific Railroad Act of 1866

ACT OF JULY 3, 1866.
[14 Statutes at Large, 79.]
AN ACT to amend an act entitled "An act to amend ‘An act entitled an act to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the Missouri river to the Pacific ocean, and to secure to the government the use of the same for postal, military, and other purposes,’ approved July 1, 1862," approved July 2, 1864.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That that the Union Pacific Railway Company, Eastern Division, is hereby authorized to designate the general, route of their railroad, and to file a map thereof, as now required by law, at any time before the first day of December, eighteen hundred and sixty-six; and upon the filing of the said map, showing the general route of said road, The lands along the entire line thereof, so far as the same may be designated, shall be reserved from sale by order of the Secretary of the Interior: Provided, That said company shall be entitled to only the same amount of the bonds of the United States to aid in the construction of their line of railroad and telegraph as they would have been entitled to if they had connected their said line with the Union Pacific railroad on the one-hundreth degree of longitude as now required by law: And provided further, That said company shall connect their line of railroad and telegraph with the Union Pacific railroad, but not at a point more than fifty miles westwardly from the meridian of Denver, in Colorado.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Union Pacific Railroad Company, with the consent and approval of the Secretary of the Interior, are hereby authorized to locate, construct, and continue their road from Omaha, in Nebraska Territory, westward, according to the best and most practicable route, and without reference to the initial point on the one-hundredth meridian of west longitude, as now provided by law, in a continuous completed line, until they shall meet and connect with the Central Pacific Railroad Company of California; and the Central Pacific Railroad Company of
California, with the consent and approval of the Secretary of the Interior, are hereby authorized to locate, construct, and continue their road eastward, in a continuous completed line, until they shall meet and connect with the Union Pacific railroad:

Provided, That each of the above-named companies shall have the right, when the nature of the work to be done, by reason of deep cuts and tunnels, shall for the expeditious construction of the Pacific railroad require it, to work for an extent of not to exceed three hundred miles in advance of their continuous completed lines.

Approved July 3, 1866.