Academic Ambassadors in the Middle East: The University Contract Program in Turkey
and Iran, 1950-1970

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Richard P. Garlitz

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This dissertation titled
Academic Ambassadors in the Middle East: The University Contract Program in Turkey and Iran, 1950-1970

by

RICHARD P. GARLITZ

has been approved for

the Department of History

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

____________________________________

Chester J. Pach, Jr.
Associate Professor of History

____________________________________

Benjamin M. Ogles
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
ABSTRACT

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Academic Ambassadors in the Middle East: The University Contract Program in Turkey and Iran, 1950-1970 (276 pp.)

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This dissertation examines the performance of American university advisors in the administration of technical assistance to Turkey and Iran during the first two decades of the Cold War. University advisors sought to improve and expand both formal and informal educational opportunities by demonstrating to Turks and Iranians pedagogical and administrative practices that had worked well in the United States. In so doing, most American university personnel acted in good faith and showed a genuine concern for improving quality of life for the Turks and Iranians with whom they worked. But these academic ambassadors had to negotiate cultural traditions that they did not fully understand, and they lacked a mechanism for altering the basic values in Turkish and Iranian society. As a result, the university contract program was only partially successful in encouraging educational improvements in these two countries.

American advisors achieved their most significant successes when they allowed host country officials a high degree of control over technical assistance projects even if that meant the net result would be a different kind of educational reform or institution than they had originally intended to create. The reality that some techniques that worked well in the United States would not do so abroad and the modest size of the technical
assistance project also combined to limit American influence on education reform and expansion in these two countries.

Approved: _____________________________________________________________

Chester J. Pach, Jr.

Associate Professor of History
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ABBREVIATIONS

Used in text:
AID United States Agency for International Development (since 1961)
BYU Brigham Young University
CIC Committee on Institutional Cooperation
CIPA Committee on Institutional Projects Abroad (1954-1960)
ECA Economic Cooperation Administration (1948-1951)
FOA Foreign Operations Administration (1953-1956)
IIAA Institute for Inter-American Affairs (1942-1948)
ICA International Cooperation Agency (1955-1961)
LDS Latter Day Saints
MBA Masters of Business Administration
MSA Mutual Security Agency (1950-1953)
MSU Michigan State University
NALGCU National Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities (became NASULGC in 1969)
NEF Near East Foundation
PAKD Planlama, Arastirma, ve Koordinasyon Dairesi, Turkish Ministry of Education Planning, Research, and Coordination Office
TCA Technical Cooperation Administration (1950-1952)
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
USU Utah State University

Used in footnotes:
AID Records of the United States Agency for International Development (RG 286, National Archives II, College Park, MD)
BYU L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT
CICPP Center for International and Comparative Programs Papers (KSU)
DSB Department of State Bulletin
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
KSU Department of Special Collections and Archives, Main Library, Kent State University.
NAII National Archives and Records Administration, Archives II, College Park, MD
Nebraska Archives and Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
NSR<sup>1</sup> Semiannual Report of University of Nebraska International Cooperation Administration Omnibus Contract Turkish University Program (Nebraska)
OPR Office of the President Records, 1955-1970 (UPA 4, Penn)

<sup>1</sup> The title of this report changed to simply Nebraska in Turkey: Semiannual Report of the Turkish University Program after the formation of AID.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>Penn</td>
<td>University Archives and Records Center, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA</td>
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<td>PFPF</td>
<td>Point Four Program Files (MSS SC 2993, BYU)</td>
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<td>PUPR</td>
<td>Pahlavi University Project Records, 1958-1966 (UPB 107, Penn)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRAAT/NU</td>
<td>Report on the Review of Project No. 277-AI-11-AF Advanced Agricultural Training, Nebraska University (Nebraska)</td>
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<td>TPCR</td>
<td>Turkish Program, Coordinator, Records (RG 44/5/1, Nebraska)</td>
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<td>TPR</td>
<td>Turkish Program Records, 1955-1968 (RG 44/5/2, Nebraska)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDN</td>
<td><em>Turkish Daily News</em> (Microfilm)</td>
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<td>UPI</td>
<td>University Participation in Iran (23.5, USU)</td>
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<td>USFAA</td>
<td>Records of the United States Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961 (RG 469, National Archives II, College Park, MD)</td>
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<td>USIA</td>
<td>Records of the United States Information Agency (RG 306, National Archives II, College Park, MD)</td>
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<td>USU</td>
<td>Special Collections and Archives, Merrill Library, Utah State University, Logan, UT.</td>
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<td>UUIOHP</td>
<td>Utah Universities in Iran Oral History Project, Charles Redd Center for Western Studies, L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT</td>
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INTRODUCTION

“If the United States could do only one thing to promote Third World development, education would be a rational choice.”
- Samuel Butterfield, former AID agricultural officer, 2004

On 20 January 1949, President Harry Truman used the occasion of his inaugural address to discuss American foreign policy goals in the context of increasing Cold War tensions. The president argued that the United States should follow four main courses of action, the first three of which reinforced existing objectives: the nation should continue to support the United Nations, maintain its program for the economic recovery of Europe, and offer military assistance where it was needed to “strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression.” With his fourth point, however, Truman offered an idea that was almost entirely new to the nation’s diplomatic portfolio. The president declared, “I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life.”

The idea of providing technical assistance to the developing world became a modest but consistent part of American relations with the countries of the developing world for the next two decades. Originally called Point Four in reference to the president’s address, technical assistance was designed to be a positive and proactive component of the nation’s foreign policy. American advisors shared their knowledge of scientific agriculture, health and sanitation, nutrition, and education in an attempt to improve quality of life and to foster development in the Third World, but Americans

were also keen to win hearts and minds and thereby to limit Soviet influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

American universities soon emerged as attractive potential partners for the new technical assistance program; indeed, as educational institutions, they seemed to be ideally suited for that kind of development work. Universities employed top scientists and possessed some of the nation’s best research facilities. They also attracted people who had an interest in the wider world. This was particularly true during the 1950s and 1960s when American universities became increasingly internationalized. More faculty members acquired international experience, and an influx of foreign scholars and students allowed others to work with people from different cultures. Walter Adams and John Garraty, Michigan State University researchers who studied university performance in overseas technical assistance, expressed a common view when they wrote that members of the academic community would “make both competent and selfless ambassadors – better, on the average, than protocol minded diplomats and bureaucratic civil servants.”

The nation’s land-grant universities became particularly important players in overseas technical assistance. Land-grant institutions emphasized teaching and research in agriculture, engineering, and home economics. They also stressed public service; a key component of their mission was disseminating knowledge about better agriculture and public health practices to farmers and rural communities through extension services. Land-grant universities played an important role in America’s own impressive industrial development between roughly 1870 and 1945. Officials within both the government and

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the academic community believed that experience gave them a unique capacity to contribute to development work in Third World countries, most of which were still largely rural and agrarian in the middle of the twentieth century.\(^4\)

In order to facilitate cooperation between the government and the universities for overseas technical assistance, the Point Four agency developed a university contract program during the 1950s. In all, more than fifty American universities held some kind of technical assistance contract in Africa, Asia, or Latin America between 1950 and 1970. In the beginning, most participating American universities provided technical assistance to agencies of the host countries’ governments, especially ministries of education, agriculture, and public health. By the mid-1950s, however, the universities had turned most of their attention to working with institutions of higher learning in the host countries. Both the government and university leaders agreed that the optimal role for universities in foreign assistance was the development of educational institutions and education-based programs.\(^5\)

This dissertation examines how American university advisors performed technical assistance in Turkey and Iran during the 1950s and 1960s, the most important two decades of the university contract program. Both countries became important political allies of the United States during the 1950s, and both hosted a variety of technical assistance projects conducted by teams from American universities. Technical


assistance, however, was never just technical. University personnel who participated had to act as academic ambassadors for the United States in addition to being technical advisors. They had to negotiate Turkish and Iranian cultural traditions in order to win the confidence of their hosts and affect positive change. One AID official who spent most of the 1960s working on education projects in Korea, Nigeria, and Thailand noted that successful advisors were ones “whose power of diplomacy, general understanding, sincerity, patience, tolerance, and forceful imaginative leadership are substantially above average.”

All technical assistance advisors, including those from the universities, faced the basic reality that they lacked the capacity to bring fundamental change to Turkish and Iranian education, agriculture, or public administration. Point Four and AID projects represented a relatively small component of the nation’s foreign aid program, and the projects rarely lasted longer than four or five years. More important than time and resource constraints, however, the American advisors simply had no mechanism for altering entrenched and frequently conservative social values. At best, university advisors could provide a primer, or a model upon which Turks and Iranians could continue the process of modernization. Turks and Iranians themselves would ultimately determine which American ideas would permeate their societies and to what extent.

Point Four technical assistance embraced an approach that scholars call low modernization, or “modernization via citizen participation.” Unlike the “high modernization” approach of national five and seven year plans that emphasized large-

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scale and coordinated industrial, agricultural, and communications development, Point Four was “a program of [local] teaching and demonstration.” Its first director, Henry Bennett, called it “a grass roots method of working which brings modern methods to the villagers in a form readily understood by them and easily adapted to their problems.”

Low modernization was about showing people that making simple changes could lead to larger benefits. The Brigham Young University (BYU) project to improve Iranian elementary and secondary education (Chapter Three) and the Utah State and University of Nebraska efforts to organize agricultural extension education in Turkey and Iran (Chapter Four) illustrate the low-modernization approach to technical assistance. BYU professors operated a series of demonstration schools in which they taught brief courses in American pedagogical techniques to modestly-educated Iranian teachers. Extension advisors worked with both host country agents and peasant farmers to demonstrate how best to apply scientific techniques to agriculture and home economics.7

The low-modernization approach to technical assistance worked because it reached out to ordinary teachers and farmers in ways that they could see and understand. Low modernization generally required no fundamental reordering of society, and nations did not have to satisfy any industrial pre-conditions in order for it to be effective on the local level. Rather, it required dedicated and patient advisors who were willing to work with people of limited education and means. It is true that Turkish and Iranian teachers

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and farmers showed a considerable amount of fatalism and often hesitated to embrace American techniques; this proved especially true when teachers thought the new approaches to education would not work in their own context or when peasants believed that distant elites would enjoy most of the benefit. But the low-modernization approach yielded positive results once teachers and farmers observed a tangible benefit to applying the concepts that the American advisors brought.

The downside of low modernization was that its results would necessarily be limited. The BYU education advisors, for example, could demonstrate effective ways to teach children to read, but they could do nothing to attack the basic problem that most Iranian elementary school teachers could barely read themselves. Moreover, because Point Four stressed the multiplier effect in its technical assistance, American advisors had but scant contact with many of the people they were sent to help. Rather, the Americans would generally train a group of Turkish or Iranian teachers or extension agents who would then diffuse the American techniques throughout the population. Confusion and an imperfect understanding of new ideas or their applications to the local context diluted the effectiveness of the approach; the brief duration of many Point Four projects did not allow enough time for sufficient demonstration and reinforcement. Projects, therefore, often showed promising results as long as the advisors remained active but lapsed once the project ended and the advisors went home.

A second common problem that lurked within the university technical assistance program resulted from American advisors trying to bring about modernization based on what had worked in the United States without properly considering the cultural context of
the host country. This approach tended to produce a rather hollow or cosmetic modernization. Projects showing cosmetic modernization adopted the outward appearance of what the American advisors were trying to demonstrate but inwardly remained a chaotic and often volatile mixture of traditional practices and imperfectly understood applications of American ideas.

Cosmetic modernization stemmed in part from the American assumption that Third World development should follow the American model. In his *Liberal America and the Third World*, one of the first critical assessments of American thinking on international development, Robert Packenham argued that mid-century American liberals harbored a very self-serving and not entirely accurate view of their own exceptional transformation from an agrarian nation to an industrial superpower between about 1870 and 1945. Americans showed unique ingenuity in building a democratic, wealthy, and technologically advanced society without violent revolution. This view convinced many Americans that they were uniquely qualified to bring beneficial development to the Third World while simultaneously sparing its peoples from totalitarian ideologies. Economist John Kenneth Galbraith, an advisor to President John F. Kennedy, also noticed that Americans showed a “highly persistent tendency to advocate what exists in the United States, with no very critical view of its appropriateness” to recipient nations. Recent scholarship underscores the point. Nils Gilman writes in his *Mandarins of the Future* that American modernization theorists had “confidence that the United States should be a
universal model for the world and a sense that the United States had a duty to promote this model.\textsuperscript{8}

While the emphasis on promoting development along the American model resonated with the westernized political leadership in Turkey and Iran, it often provoked resentment from other important segments of the population. Intellectuals and religious leaders, for example, tended to view Americanization as a threat to indigenous culture. At the very least, the presence of American advisors suggested that there was something inadequate about the way that Turks, Iranians, and other peoples of the non-western world were going about their lives. More immediately germane to the technical assistance advisors, however, were the officials who worked closely with the Americans but who were themselves more comfortable with familiar practices. Time and again, American university advisors experienced the frustrating paradox that while host country government officials or university leaders expressed a desire to bring American education concepts into their countries, these same individuals often clung firmly to established practices. The bureaucracies of both Turkey and Iran were based on a system of political patronage that rewarded seniority and the ability to maneuver within the system much more than the ability to effect progressive change. Those who had achieved success within the existing system showed an almost distinctive conservatism and a

corresponding reluctance to accept new ideas that they either did not understand or that seemed to threaten the traditional prestige of their offices.\textsuperscript{9}

In this environment, projects could easily become muddled and rife with tension, especially if the American advisors lacked flexibility in negotiating the cultural divide between what they were trying to teach and what the host country officials were prepared to accept. Donald Pittman, a Utah State soil scientist who helped the Iranian government develop an agricultural college at Karaj outside of Tehran between 1940 and 1942, wrote home that Iranians seemed “torn between a desire to introduce the most modern ideas from outside and a fear that if they do they will be admitting that something in Iran had not been ‘the best in the world’ before.” Similarly, Marvin Zonis, a scholar of modern Iran, has described the country during the 1960s as a “symbiosis of divergent traditions” in which westernization was “at best halting.” Such was the essence of cosmetic modernization.\textsuperscript{10}

The University of Pennsylvania project to develop Pahlavi University in Shiraz between 1962 and 1967 (Chapter Six) provides a clear illustration of cosmetic modernization. The Penn team had instructions from both AID and the shah to build an American-style university. While the Penn advisors tried to implement the plan, they met resistance at every turn from Iranian academics and administrators who felt threatened by outside ideas and preferred to build a university based on the pattern of traditional higher


\textsuperscript{10} Pittman quoted in Bob Parson, “International Students and Programs, unpublished manuscript, folder 16, box 4, University History Collection, USU; Marvin Zonis, “Educational Ambivalence in Iran,” \textit{Iranian Studies} 1 (Autumn 1968), 134.
education in that country. The result was a university that showed some outward appearances of American higher education but inwardly was deeply conflicted. The university functioned much like Iran’s other institutions of higher learning, which decreased its ability to attract top Iranian scientists who had settled in the West. The Penn advisors were less successful academic ambassadors than some of their colleagues, and the situation at Pahlavi University produced frustration for both the Iranians and the Americans involved.

When American advisors did balance their own goals with cultural realities of the host country effective technical assistance was possible, even if the results of the project differed from what the advisors originally intended. Between 1955 and 1967 the University of Nebraska, for example, embarked on a project to help develop a university in Eastern Turkey that would operate like an American land-grant university (Chapter Five). The Nebraskans gradually came to realize that Turks had little understanding of how much the land-grant approach to education differed from Turkish higher education. The Nebraska advisors accepted that they would not be able to transplant the land-grant concept to Turkey in the same form that it existed in the United States, so they turned their attention to making Atatürk University the best institution it could be in the Turkish context.

Though American technical assistance advisors had only a limited capacity to influence modernization in Turkey and Iran, the university contract program did develop an innovation that allowed some American influence to continue after the advisors had left. The participant program (Chapter Seven) allowed host country nationals to travel to
the United States to take advanced training that was not available in their own countries. The primary purpose of the participant program was to produce a generation of scientists and administrators who could make important contributions to their own nations’ development. Participants occupied an important position in many technical assistance projects. They became development brokers who could exert a lasting influence in Turkey and Iran but who also helped disseminate the concepts they learned in the United States.

By telling the story of American education advisors in Turkey and Iran, this dissertation adds richness to both the literature on technical assistance and on American relations with the nations of the Middle East since the Cold War. A substantial literature exists on the technical assistance program and on the university role, but much of it focuses on the domestic politics and effectiveness of aid. Scholars have paid much less attention to the cultural interactions between advisors and hosts that had an important impact on success and failure. Samuel Butterfield, a thirty-year veteran of development work, has recently written a comprehensive study of American technical assistance from the Truman Administration through the dawn of the twenty-first century that gives some emphasis to technical assistance in Afghanistan, Chile, India, Nigeria, Taiwan, and other places. In addition, Vernon Ruttan has recently produced an exceptional study of the domestic politics of foreign aid. He devotes some chapters to exploring the application of technical assistance to developing countries, but he is mostly concerned with showing how the program developed over time. Both Butterfield and Ruttan provide valuable insight into the working of the foreign assistance program, but neither emphasizes how
university advisors acted as academic ambassadors for American development concepts.11

Likewise, the literature on the university contract program provides important information on the relationship that developed between the United States government and universities that participated in overseas technical assistance. Two contemporary assessments remain very useful forty years after their publications. Adams and Garraty’s thoughtful 1960 study, *Is the World Our Campus?*, examines the challenges that universities faced in conducting foreign assistance during the 1950s. It is a sobering study that adds perspective to what had been generally high hopes for university involvement. Adams and Garraty discuss some cultural encounters, but they emphasize administrative deficiencies and the divergence of university and government priorities in the early years of the university contract program. John M. Richardson provided a remarkable analysis of the challenges, miscommunications, and differences of opinions that universities and the government faced during the tumultuous first sixteen years of the university contract program in his 1969 study *Partners in Development*. Finally, Brian Jordahal and Vernon Ruttan’s more recent and concise study of the government-university relationship is particularly useful in considering developments during the 1970s and 1980s. All of these studies remain useful in understanding the relationship between American universities and overseas technical assistance, but their point of view

is essentially policy-based. None emphasize the process of cultural negotiation in university overseas technical assistance.\textsuperscript{12}

A large literature also exists on United States relations with both Turkey and Iran during the early Cold War. Studies of U.S.-Turkish relations generally emphasize the security dimension, particularly Turkey’s relationship with NATO and American defense planning. One important study that considers how cultural factors complicated the relationship is George S. Harris’s \textit{Troubled Alliance}, published in 1972. Harris, who served as a State Department official in Ankara from 1957 through 1962, offers an especially insightful analysis of the rise of anti-American sentiment among Turkish university students during the second half of the 1960s. Studies of the United States and Iran almost inevitably gravitate toward the theme of how and why the United States supported the authoritarian dictatorship of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The American technical assistance program in Iran during the 1950s and 1960s is almost always overshadowed by the coup of 1953, the CIA’s involvement in training the Iranian security forces, the modest American attempts at encouraging the shah to liberalize his regime, and the much larger story of military assistance. One good study that does attempt to analyze the impact of American technical assistance in Iran is Mark Gasiorowski’s \textit{U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah}, published in 1991.\textsuperscript{13}


Studies of American relations with the nations of the Middle East, however, have not yet embraced the kind of cultural analysis that has characterized scholarship on the postwar relationship between the United States and Europe or Japan. Henry J. Kellerman, for example, has shown how the United States government used education exchanges to build democratic values in postwar Germany. Jessica Gienow-Hecht has explored how an American-sponsored newspaper transmitted American culture and values to readers in occupied Germany. Toshio Nishi has similarly analyzed the attempts of American occupation officials to spread democracy in Japan by reforming its education system. Other studies, of course, have shown how American consumer culture helped shape the postwar western European landscape and even parted the iron curtain to bring glimpses of Americana to Muscovites. This study operates in the same spirit. It attempts to show how American university advisors influenced the development of Turkish and Iranian education during the 1950s and 1960s.\footnote{Henry J. Kellermann, \textit{Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program Between the United States and Germany, 1945-1954} (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978); Jessica Gienow-Hecht, \textit{Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Cold War Germany, 1945-1955} (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1999); Toshio Nishi, \textit{Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952} (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford Univ. Press, 1982); on how aspects of American culture influenced postwar Europe, see Walter Hixson, \textit{Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961} (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998); Richard Pells, \textit{Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II} (New York: Basic, 1997); and Uta Poiger, \textit{Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany} (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2000).}
CHAPTER 1: FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSITY PARTICIPATION

“Increasingly, our programs of foreign aid to Asia, Africa and Latin America have come to recognize that at the root of the many problems of an underdeveloped – or any modern – country lies the need for an educated leadership and more highly trained and competent manpower.”

- The University and World Affairs, “Morrill Committee Report,” 1960

President Truman called for a bold new initiative when he articulated his fourth foreign policy goal in his 1949 inaugural address. Prior to the Second World War, the United States government had shown little interest in undertaking technical assistance abroad. In 1939, Congress authorized an Interdepartmental Committee to oversee small-scale technical assistance in the Latin American republics, but this was the extent of government involvement. In contrast, American missionary and philanthropic groups had been active since the early years of the twentieth century in technical projects in East Asia and the Middle East as well as in Latin America. The situation changed dramatically during the decade following 1945 as the United States government embarked on a wide-scale program of technical assistance in the developing world. The war’s vast destruction, the decline in money and resources among the European democracies, and the onset of diplomatic and economic rivalry with the Soviet Union all forced the United States to allocate a substantial amount of its public resources to foreign assistance, including technical aid.15

The technical assistance program endured a bumpy existence in its first decade. It faced constant opposition from conservative critics both inside and outside the

government, and it underwent a number of important philosophical changes, often as the product of changes in organization and leadership. Given the emphasis on science, technology, and education, it is not surprising that the decade between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s also marked a proliferation of American college and university participation in overseas technical assistance projects. Yet the relationship between the government and the universities was not always an easy one. Each brought their own priorities to technical assistance, and at times each felt the other was being less than fully cooperative. The relationship between the government and universities engaged in overseas technical assistance reached a low point during the middle years of the 1950s but revived again upon the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 and the emergence of the Agency for International Development (AID) the following year. University participation in the technical assistance program reached its peak during the middle years of the 1960s only to taper off late in that decade as the deepening American participation in the war in Vietnam cast the nation’s foreign assistance program in a less favorable light. Moreover, growing food shortages in the developing world during the latter 1960s and into the 1970s forced a change in priorities. Whereas education development had been the emphasis in the 1950s and 1960s, the most basic and immediate needs of the poorest people in the least developed countries became the focus in the 1970s.16

The Point Four program was the brainchild of a mid-level State Department public affairs officer named Benjamin Hardy. When Truman aide Clark Clifford

solicited State for recommendations on how to make the president’s inaugural speech “a democratic manifesto addressed to the peoples of the world,” Hardy responded with a proposal for a wide-ranging technical assistance program. Hardy hoped his idea would “capture the imagination of the peoples of other countries and harness their enthusiasm for social and economic improvement to the democratic campaign to repulse Communism.” He had formerly been a reporter for *The Atlanta Journal* and a representative of the modest American technical assistance program in Brazil during the Second World War. These positions had given him a first-hand perspective on how the spread of new technologies could improve backward economies. According to Clifford, top State Department officials such as Dean Acheson – soon to become Secretary of State – Robert Lovett, and Paul Nitze showed little enthusiasm for the technical assistance proposal. But Truman embraced the concept, and it became the most enduring point of his speech.17

Technically assistance faced an uphill battle from the beginning. According to Acheson, “The State Department was slow in realizing the importance of Point Four and getting a program in motion.” Members of Congress also showed uncertainty with how to proceed. They spent nearly sixteen months debating Democratic and Republican proposals for a technical assistance bill before passing the Act for International Assistance in June 1950 and creating the Technical Cooperation Agency (TCA) to administer the Point Four program. By this time, the United States had already undertaken several larger and more expensive foreign economic and military assistance

programs. In 1947, for example, Truman convinced Congress to authorize $400 million in economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, two countries that at the time seemed particularly vulnerable to Soviet expansionism. The following spring, the president signed into law the European Recovery Program, or Marshall Plan. Finally, Truman approved of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act in the fall of 1949, which authorized the United States to provide over $1 billion worth of military equipment to thirteen countries and the president to sell weapons to other countries that aligned with the United States.18

The TCA therefore had to compete with military and economic aid for resources. While Congressional conservatives begrudgingly accepted the strategic necessity of the latter two in at least some form, many lawmakers saw less potential in the new Point Four idea. For them, the reconstruction of Western Europe was much more important than a still vaguely defined concept of technical assistance to developing nations that were less strategically significant. Consider, for example, that while Congress funded the TCA at just under $35 million in 1950, it spent nearly $15 billion on the Marshall Plan during the Truman administration. In fact, the Point Four program never enjoyed widespread support in Congress in the early 1950s. Technical assistance received only about 2.15 percent of the $6.5 billion that Congress authorized for foreign aid in 1951. Two years

later, Congress appropriated about four cents to Point Four programs for every dollar it spent on military and economic aid.\textsuperscript{19}

The most powerful Congressional critic was Representative Otto Passman (D-LA) who, as chair of the Executive Steering Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, exercised considerable influence on foreign aid appropriations. Passman opposed almost all foreign aid except emergency food relief. His attitude reflected the majority opinion of his Louisiana constituents who tended to take a “fortress America” posture of strong defense at home and isolationism abroad. But Passman was more than simply an isolationist; he was also a businessman who wanted to streamline government spending. Moreover, Passman doubted that Point Four would win the United States many long term allies in the developing world. Rather, he argued that recipient nations would eventually come to resent being dependent upon the United States for resources and know-how. Criticism of the new technical assistance program was not limited to Congress. One particularly acerbic commentator called Point Four an “open waste drain” and judged it to be “a do-gooder, share-the-wealth program – a program of all give for the United States and no get.” Other opponents described it as a “great giveaway” and a “world-wide WPA” in reference to the New Deal’s Works Progress Administration.\textsuperscript{20}

Members of the Truman administration countered that technical assistance was as integral to national security as was the Marshall Plan and military assistance. Secretary of State Acheson argued that technical assistance would help to open new markets and thereby expand the volume of world trade. He also saw Point Four as a vehicle for public diplomacy. American technicians working toward humanitarian goals in the developing world would showcase the basic goodness of the American people; the resulting goodwill would make its people more receptive to American business. Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., director of TCA’s Program Planning and Advisor Staff, emphasized the psychological boost that American technical assistance gave to those in the developing world who were resisting Soviet influence. Finally, Capus M. Waynick, who acted as head of the Point Four program before Congress authorized the TCA, added that technical transfers would cost a fraction of what the United States spent on European reconstruction and military aid.\(^{21}\)

In addition to its struggles with conservatives and isolationists, the Point Four program endured three major reorganizations of its administration and a succession of leaders, some of whom differed considerably in their outlook toward the program. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 triggered a militarization of American foreign assistance policy. Foreign economic aid also became more closely associated with the specific national security goal of containing communism in Third World countries that appeared to be vulnerable to Soviet influence. Truman, for example, folded TCA together with the Marshall Plan and military assistance to form the Mutual Security

Administration (MSA) in late 1951. The Republican sweep of both houses of Congress and of the presidency the next year continued the trend. Dwight Eisenhower recognized the value of technical assistance, but he also wanted to streamline and reduce the Point Four program; his administration even encouraged TCA officials to refrain from using the popular name “Point Four” in an effort to distance the foreign aid program from its Truman administration roots. In terms of promoting Third World development in the broader sense, Eisenhower championed the encouragement of free international trade during his first term. Harold Stassen, Eisenhower’s first director of technical assistance, announced Presidential Reorganization Plan Seven of 1 June 1953 which folded all foreign assistance into a single new agency, the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA). This reorganization stipulated that only those nations aligned with the West could receive technical aid.22

Proponents of Point Four expressed concern at the new trend in foreign assistance. They argued that combining technical and military assistance would blur the lines between the two in the minds of both recipient governments and American taxpayers. They also feared that by tying technical assistance to Cold War allegiances, the program would lose its altruistic reputation. That reputation was always something of a veneer, of course, since technical assistance served as a vehicle to entice developing nations away from Soviet influence. But it was a laudable veneer. And, as Paul Kennedy

of the *New York Times* pointed out, allowing neutral nations to benefit from Point Four aid made the program less vulnerable to Soviet propaganda. Indeed, many both inside and outside the Eisenhower administration argued that Point Four had to remain separate from military and economic assistance if it was to generate good will abroad. Finally, proponents of technical assistance feared that joining all forms of foreign assistance into one umbrella organization would further choke off the relatively modest financial support going to Point Four programs. Proponents of technical assistance complained that under the FOA, Point Four would be reduced to “Point Two and a Half.”

Technical assistance did not, however, diminish during the Eisenhower Administration. On the contrary, the first head of the FOA oversaw a proliferation of the program by convincing more American universities to become involved. Harold Stassen was a progressive Republican and significant figure within his party during the 1950s. He gained fame by being elected governor of Minnesota at the age of thirty-one, and he was a leading candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1948. Though he was never a serious contender thereafter, Stassen continued to seek the Republican nomination in every presidential race except one until 1992. He was not an expert on technical assistance, but Stassen did bring two important qualities to the job. First, he was a consummate promoter who always thought big. Despite Congressional pressure to reduce foreign assistance, he told former TCA direct Stanley Andrews, “I didn’t come in

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here … to liquidate the foreign aid program. We’re going to make it bigger.” In addition, Stassen gained experience working in higher education when he served as the President of the University of Pennsylvania between 1948 and 1953.24

Stassen turned toward the universities for a variety of reasons. Most significant was Congressional pressure to reduce the permanent foreign assistance staff, both in Washington and abroad. It put the director in the difficult position of having to do more with less. Second, Stassen saw great potential in forging technical assistance linkages between American universities and foreign institutions. Such relationships could produce mutual cultural benefits, and if properly nurtured, partnerships between foreign and American universities could thrive long after the end of U.S. government assistance.25

Finally, Stassen found willing partners in academia, especially among the land-grant universities, which had been engaged in domestic technical assistance throughout their existence. Many land grants were beginning to come into their own as prominent research universities in the middle of the twentieth century, and their leaderships often saw foreign technical assistance as a way to enhance institutional prestige. John Hannah, president of president of Michigan State College (Michigan State University, MSU, since 1964) and of the National Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities (NALGCU, now NASULGC) wrote to Truman in February 1949 offering the services of the NALGCU institutions to the Point Four effort. Land-grant college officials

reaffirmed their “definite responsibility and desire” to participate in a national program of agricultural services to foreign areas when they met with TCA and Department of Agriculture officials in the spring of 1952. The first director of the TCA, Henry Bennett, had been president of a land-grant university, Oklahoma A&M College (Oklahoma State University after 1957), and had envisioned a strong relationship between Point Four and the American universities. A “loveable man with a genius for inspiring people,” Bennett had helped forge a partnership between Oklahoma A&M to build an agricultural college at Jimma, Ethiopia, one of the first Point Four ventures in education assistance. He died tragically in a plane crash while on Point Four business in Tehran in December, 1951.26

Cognizant that a conservative Congress controlled the purse strings, but confident in the university partnership, Stassen oversaw the initiation of twenty new university-based technical assistance projects during his eighteen months at the FOA. In October 1953 he told reporters, “It has been our observation that many of the best developments overseas have occurred in those instances in which colleges and universities of our country have been brought into a direct relationship.” The next year, he told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that his agency was trying to transfer to the developing world “the process that took place in our own national development through the land grant-colleges and extension services.” To Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), another

champion of international educational cooperation, Stassen stressed the cultural reciprocity of technical assistance projects and noted that the “depth of the people-to-people warmth” in the university contracts “gets greater results than the direct hiring of governmental technicians.”

Critics remained skeptical of this new twist on foreign technical assistance; after all, many areas of the United States needed better schools, rural health, and agricultural technology during the 1950s. The university linkages abroad enjoyed Eisenhower’s support, however, and they attracted just enough Congressional funding to stay afloat. Clarence Randall, a steel executive whom Eisenhower had asked in 1954 to head a commission for the study of foreign aid, concluded that if technical assistance would be “sharply limited” to education and technical training, then “the moderate sums of money involved would seem to be altogether proper as part of our total national effort.”

Stassen’s personal leadership style, however, and the rapid growth of the university contract program during the mid-1950s created considerable problems within the FOA and in FOA-university relations. Officials remembered his tendency to issue policies without prior consultations; they referred to such directives as “SSS” or “Stassen Says So.” His successor, James Hollister, thought Stassen was “not a team player,” and noted that he spent so much time promoting the university contract program that he appeared to have little technical knowledge of how foreign assistance actually worked.

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Skeptics also wondered if Stassen was using the contract system to create a network of support for his next run for the presidency.\(^{29}\)

Stassen’s strategy resulted in a tremendous expansion of the university contract program, but it was one that featured very little coordination and oversight. As a result, the middle years of the 1950s produced a great deal of tension between participating universities and the government. According to Philip Glick, a long time TCA employee in Latin America, universities signed contracts for which they were unprepared to render adequate services “with surprising frequency.” Some institutions seem to have been unaware of the full extent of contractual obligations and rather viewed technical assistance as another source of grant income that could be tailored to suit the individual college or university’s research agenda. One FOA official later admitted that the university contract program “was not well developed” and produced “a mat of contracts spread out over the world.” A lack of joint government-university planning, both in terms of overarching philosophy and at the level of individual projects proved a constant source of frustration throughout the decade. Michigan State University researchers Walter Adams and John Garraty concluded that in the field of foreign technical assistance, “Planning and continuity are conspicuous chiefly by their absence.”\(^{30}\)

Eisenhower appointed a fiscal conservative and former Ohio Congressman, James Hollister, to succeed Stassen in 1955 and bring order to the university contract program.


Hollister brought a very different outlook to the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), as the third incarnation of Point Four was known between 1955 and 1961, than had his predecessor. Like many of his conservative colleagues, the new ICA director looked on foreign assistance with a certain amount of suspicion and saw its usefulness in promoting national security rather than international development. He preferred to limit foreign economic aid to capital transfers (usually loans) for “fewer but more meaningful projects” in strategically significant countries that faced a direct communist threat. While Hollister was not the uncompromising opponent of technical assistance that some within the academic community made him out to be, he did engineer a substantial consolidation and reduction of the program’s operations. He did not share Stassen’s enthusiasm for the university contract program citing a “tendency to develop new projects without completing the old” and believing that university technical assistance produced uncertain results. Hollister also closed most of the technical assistance missions in Western Europe arguing that they were no longer needed. Because he was determined to make technical assistance more accountable for showing results, Hollister imposed a more systematic and rigorous scrutiny on proposals for future projects.31

In short, friction characterized the government-university relationship for overseas education assistance projects for much of the university contract program’s first decade. The uncoordinated growth of the contract program under Stassen, the failure of some universities to understand and carry out the full responsibilities of their contracts,

and the sharp reduction of projects under Hollister all contributed to a climate of pessimism within both the academic and the foreign assistance communities. Brigham Young University (BYU), an institution that had worked on rural education and teacher training in Iran since 1951, was one such institution that found its project terminated by Hollister’s reforms – much to the dismay of the university’s president and its advisors in Iran.\(^{32}\)

The university-government relationship reached its nadir in 1956. Academic representatives such as John Hannah of MSU thought Hollister’s attitude went beyond opposition to one of neglect. “I don’t know Mr. Hollister,” Hannah told an assembly of university administrators, “but I haven’t seen anything he has said or written that indicates he has any awareness at all of this university program.” In April, the American Council on Education’s Committee on Institutional Projects Abroad (CIPA) organized a State Department briefing so that Hollister and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles could explain their plans for the university role in technical assistance. According to one observer, “The participants considered it an insult and disaster.” Dulles, in particular, “was so poorly briefed that he gave the impression of hardly knowing what university contracts were all about.” When Eisenhower used the occasion of his May commencement address at Baylor University to discuss the importance of technical

\(^{32}\) Viktor H. Skiles to BYU president Ernest L. Wilkinson, 31 August 1955, box 10, entry 576 Deputy Director of Operations, Office of Near East and South Asia, Administrative Office, Near East Central Files, Iran Project Files, 1951-1957, USFAA, NAI.
assistance, a number of reporters pointed out that the president made no references to the university contract program and gave no indication that he knew of its existence.\textsuperscript{33}

The technical assistance program’s reliance on annual Congressional appropriations further complicated the university-government relationship and made long-range planning difficult. Many university projects involved building or improving foreign schools and universities; the process of institution building takes a long time, often decades or more. In addition to building the physical plant, which in itself could take years, American advisors had to negotiate the deep-seated pedagogical and administrative traditions of host countries and contribute to the training of core faculty. The annual wrangling over Congressional funding and the government’s hesitation to continue most projects for more than five years eroded university confidence that they would be able to see through to completion the projects they undertook.\textsuperscript{34}

But universities also sometimes failed to inspire the government’s confidence. Early contracts required very little of participating institutions other than to provide the advisors who would perform the technical assistance; as a result, participating institutions too often put little effort into their projects. John Gardner of the Carnegie Corporation who also served as president of CIPA noted in his influential study, \textit{The University and


\textsuperscript{34} See especially the comments of Ira Baldwin in \textit{Proceedings of Campus Coordinators’ Conference of AID-University Contracts}, Fort Collins, CO, 28-30 August 1963 (Fort Collins: Colorado State University, 1963), 18.
World Affairs, “The university as a whole has not really been involved in many of the overseas contracts.” Rather, in many cases, advisors worked as “independent operator[s]” with home institutions “committed … only superficially.”

Some institutions encountered difficulty in convincing their top faculty members to put aside comfortable jobs and ongoing research to participate. One plant pathologist from Pennsylvania State University wrote in frustration to Milton Eisenhower, who was then president of both Penn State and NALGCU, that owing to their “preoccupation with other matters,” faculty members showed “no general interest” in overseas development work. Some universities proved reluctant to allow their top scientists to participate, while others staffed field teams with individuals from outside the university and with little concern for quality control. Speaking at CIPA’s 1955 Conference on University Contracts Abroad, Hannah acknowledged that, “One of our faults is that sometimes we haven’t sent people particularly well fitted to do the job.” Fayette Parvin, a TCA agricultural extension specialist in Jakarta, agreed explaining in a letter to Milton Eisenhower that while the TCA had recruited many competent technicians, “some are misfits and drifting adventurers.”

This unhappy state of affairs led to frustration and disappointment on the part of host institution personnel. Turhan Feyzioğlu, a member of Turkey’s Grand National Assembly (parliament) and a former dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University, for example, describes his disappointment with a team from New York

University who arrived in 1954 to help organize a graduate program in public administration at the university as follows: “We soon realized that these were not the first rate scholars that New York University had promised us. With possibly one exception, they were mediocrities.” The leadership of the University of Istanbul had a similar regrettable experience with advisors that Harvard University sent in August 1954 to help develop the business school. One Turkish professor lamented that, “It is evident that Harvard uses this program as its dumping ground. It sends us people who would never be permitted to teach on the Cambridge campus.” The lack of institutional support from their home universities discouraged many ambitious participants from staying on the job any longer than their initial obligation, which usually lasted two years. As a result, near constant staff turnover also hindered progress on many projects.37

The election of John F. Kennedy, a strong advocate of international development, to the presidency in 1960 brought another major reorganization to the technical assistance program as well as a noticeable improvement to university-government relations. Kennedy restored and expanded the original goal of using technical assistance to “prime the pump” of economic development throughout the Third World. He also added an emphasis on reforming conservative governments aligned with the United States so that American aid would benefit people rather than regimes. Kennedy’s philosophy of development aid linked to political liberalization clashed with traditionalists in the State Department who “continued to support Cold War policies that would strengthen military alliances,” but the new president found supporters within his administration.38

37 Adams and Garraty, Is the World Our Campus?, 66, 104.
Among them were the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Kenneth Hansen, and the Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith. Hansen, who had formerly headed the Harvard Advisory Group in Iran, argued that the American aid program had become “uninspired, a tired leftover from the 1950s.” He stressed political reform as an important precursor for effective development aid, especially in Iran, an authoritarian monarchy about which Hansen had substantial first-hand knowledge. During the second half of the 1950s, Eisenhower became drawn to the idea of using “soft currency” loans to promote Third World development. Galbraith argued that such loans, while useful, did not, on their own, constitute an effective economic development strategy. Rather, effective foreign assistance had to stress the development of an educated, competent workforce and a reliable civil administration. “There will be no durable, self-sustaining advance,” wrote Galbraith in 1961, “under conditions of widespread illiteracy and ignorance and without an educated elite of substantial size.” The renewed emphasis on educational projects fueled another major proliferation of the university contract program in the mid-1960s.\(^{39}\)

In order to accommodate a broad-ranging agenda for foreign development assistance, Kennedy created the Agency for International Development (AID) in 1961. While the difficulties of the 1950s did not disappear completely, a tone of AID-university cooperation replaced the air of mistrust that had previously characterized the relationship. Writing from the perspective of 1963, Howard E. Wilson, dean of the UCLA School of Education and a frequent consultant on education activities abroad, observed that while

“inevitable irritations” remained, the university contract program began to “work with increasing ease and efficiency.” Much of this was the result of the interested leadership of David Bell, AID administrator from December 1962 through December 1966.40

Two landmark studies provided a philosophical blueprint for this improved relationship. *The University and World Affairs*, published in 1960, also known as the Morrill Report after the chair of the committee of university leaders that produced it, outlined a number of modifications that would make the university contracts program work better. The Morrill Report encouraged the government to provide maximum autonomy to participating universities, and it advised the universities to pledge the full weight of their resources to the important work of education assistance abroad. The report outlined ways that, by integrating foreign assistance projects more fully into individual institutions’ areas of expertise, the whole program could enhance rather than diminish the strengths of participating universities. Three years later, Bell asked Gardner to direct an inquiry into how well universities and the government were cooperating in technical assistance. Gardner’s presidency of CIPA gave him access to university leaders, while his friendship with Bell provided him with influence among AID’s top officials. His 1964 *AID and the Universities* quickly became the single most important study of the university contracts program; it commanded a wide readership both within the government and the academic community. Gardner’s study reinforced most of the Morrill Report findings. He emphasized university autonomy in conducting individual

projects and urged participating institutions to make overseas development work an integral part of their educational and research agendas.\textsuperscript{41}

The number of AID-university contracts for overseas technical assistance peaked during the middle years of the 1960s. At least half of these were programs to build or improve agricultural or veterinarian colleges, while others provided assistance to host government ministries of agriculture in founding instructive rural extension services. This reality reflects the thinking of pioneers such as Henry Bennett and John Hannah that the American land-grant universities had a special role to play in education assistance. These years, therefore, marked the heyday of institution building. A 1968 study produced jointly by AID and the Consortium for Institutional Cooperation (CIC), an association of major Midwestern research universities, noted that when measured against the backdrop of Point Four’s meager beginnings, “U.S. citizens have every reason to be proud of the accomplishments of AID and their land grant universities” in the conduct of overseas technical assistance. While the record of nearly two decades revealed frustrations and some failures, the university contract approach had also produced “enough solidly successful operations to indicate that the objectives of transplanting the land grant idea as a stimulus for agricultural development is both worthwhile and feasible.”\textsuperscript{42}

The evolution of “direct contracts” represented another device that helped improve university overseas technical assistance during the decade. Direct contracts


were agreements that American universities made directly with foreign institutions to continue technical assistance beyond the termination of an AID-funded contract. AID contracts often provided funds for getting an institution started – building a campus, developing a library, sending promising young scientists abroad for advanced training, and funding American faculty members who taught some courses when host country experts were not available. Direct contracts, on the other hand, allowed American and foreign institutions to continue exchanges of faculty and graduate students so as to continue developing an indigenous pool of trained researchers, extension workers, and, of course, teachers. These arrangements also enhanced American institutions by helping to internationalize their faculties and graduate programs, and they allowed the American universities to maintain relationships they forged through AID-funded contracts.43

Some problems, however, remained apparent throughout the decade. Congressional funding was probably the single most important. NASULGC reiterated that building educational institutions was “a long-term proposition” and one of “fundamental importance” to technical assistance in its 1969 Statement on International Development Assistance. The organization argued that such projects required “funding of an appropriate duration – not limited by annual authorization.” This appeal met no more success than previous attempts. In fact, the nature of university involvement in overseas technical assistance had already entered the beginning stages of a change away from institution building by the end of the 1960s. Reductions in funding and phasing out

projects rather than longer term appropriations characterized AID’s new position toward university contracts abroad beginning in 1969. Budget allocations and reductions created significant difficulties for the University of Nebraska field team near the end of its lengthy project to help Turks develop an agricultural university in Eastern Turkey between 1955 and 1968.  

Of the major university technical assistance projects in Turkey and Iran, perhaps the University of Pennsylvania collaboration with Pahlavi University in Shiraz from 1962 though 1967 best illustrates the continuing difficulties in the AID-university relationship. Max Copeland, the project director during the last two years of the AID contract, lamented the “constant bickering” between Pennsylvania and AID throughout most of the program over matters of security clearance of personnel, overhead rates, contract disallowances, and selection of personnel. The Penn team had difficulty getting people out of the field when circumstances forced them to leave their posts early. Its members were dismayed to discover that because they could not use AID funds to pay Iranian nationals, they would have to work without sufficient interpreters for a time when Pahlavi University was unable to pay the salaries. Paul Schrode, the project director until 1965, was flabbergasted at how miscommunications and misplaced paperwork delayed important members joining his team. Nor was Schrode impressed when AID attempted to improve the contract. He complained that while AID made some minor adjustments, “it just didn’t make any progress whatever in the direction of the fundamental difficulty  

the universities have with AID.” Schrode voiced particular concern about what he considered to be AID’s “harassment” of contracts through a complex web of forms, clearances, and other documents.45

Before concluding this discussion of how technical assistance came to be part of the American foreign aid program and how American universities became involved in carrying out the work, it is important to take a moment to examine why universities became involved. What did they stand to gain by devoting scarce resources to helping poorer countries develop educational institutions in far corners of the world? What motivated American scientists and professors, many of whom enjoyed rewarding careers with comfortable salaries, to embark on risky technical assistance abroad?

William Warne, the first Point Four direct or in Iran, noted that, “The universities are interested in widening their horizons internationally, increasing their service to mankind, raising the intellectual and living standards abroad, and lessening world tensions caused by poverty and ignorance.” As Warne suggests, universities became involved for a number of reasons. Certainly, participation fed off a desire for universities to become more cosmopolitan at a time when the United States was assuming a greater role in international affairs. The 1968 CIC-AID report Building Institutions to Serve

Agriculture, for example, noted that ninety percent of returned professors considered it important for universities to “develop a faculty with broad experience in international development.” Similarly, a 1955 FOA policy paper cited the opportunities for faculty members to work abroad, to experience foreign educational institutions, and to undertake research abroad all represented important vehicles for faculty development. The knowledge and experience that faculty members gain when they accept overseas assignments, the report continued, “enrich their own domestic programs and bring additional competence to their student bodies.” The Morrill Report emphasized that just as technical assistance included the transfer of skills from American advisors to host countries, the citizens of the host countries assist in “developing our knowledge about them.” Marvel Baker, who led the University of Nebraska project to build an agricultural university in Eastern Turkey, agreed that participation in overseas technical assistance made the University of Nebraska a more cosmopolitan place. “I don’t think we had a person over there,” reflected Baker years later, “that didn’t profit by it.” The benefit extended beyond the university community in Lincoln as several members of the field team lectured on their experience around the state. “It gave the people of Nebraska a much broader perspective than they ever had before,” concluded Baker.46

The scholarly community also promoted Third World development during the 1950s and 1960s. Social scientists, particularly those who contributed to MIT’s Center

46 William Warne, “Report of Contributions Made by Brigham Young University in the Development of the Point Four Program in Iran,” folder 1, PFPF, BYU; CIC-AID, Building Institutions to Serve Agriculture, 77; “Basic FOA Policy on University Contracts,” 13 June 1955, folder 7, box 2, Dean A. Peterson Collection, BYU; Committee on the University and World Affairs, The University and World Affairs, 40; and George Round interview with Marvel L. Baker, 1 October 1973, box 10, George Round Oral History Collection, Nebraska.
for International Studies raised the thinking about international development to a science. CENIS founders Max Milikan and Walt Rostow, both economists who studied economic growth in developing nations, provided some of the important bedrock ideas that shaped the discussion of foreign assistance for nearly two decades. Rostow’s theory of the stages of economic growth suggested that properly applied economic and technical assistance would promote orderly development in the emerging nations of the former colonial world. Given proper guidance, these societies could experience in a generation or two the economic, political, and social development that that had required roughly two centuries to accomplish in Western Europe and North America.47

In addition, CENIS scholars linked development assistance to American foreign policy objectives, especially the containment of Soviet influence. The Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent the People’s Republic of China, wielded great weapons in the battle for hearts and minds. Their economic and political doctrines appealed to the downtrodden and those who had grown to resent Western European imperialism. Their state-controlled economies could invest large amounts of money and human resources in foreign aid. Soviet propaganda glorified Russian development and harangued against American “dollar imperialism.” In such a confrontation, Rostow argued, the United States needed a vigorous and coordinated program that would display the best characteristics of American culture and technology. American universities, among the

most advanced institutions of learning in the world, could demonstrate both benevolence and competence to developing nations while they aided the nation’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{48}

The development of area studies as an integral part of university curricula also provided a great inducement. The Cold War’s battle for global influence fueled the need for more advanced knowledge of the economies, politics, and cultures of the Third World. Large philanthropic organizations such as the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller Foundation provided leading universities with millions of dollars to establish forums for international and area studies during the early decades of the Cold War. The U.S. government also became heavily involved. The military, the intelligence community, and propaganda organizations funded research germane to their fields.\textsuperscript{49}

Scholars have rightly pointed out that the government did not fund area studies out of a benevolent concern for advancing knowledge. Much of the support was clandestine, and money often went to research that ordinary Americans found distasteful – even immoral – such as the CIA’s funding of Columbia University’s Bureau of Social


Science Research work on the psychological effects of torture on prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. Still, area studies could and did provide American universities with enlightened intellectual benefits. The University of Kansas, for example, used development work in Costa Rica to attract scholars to its growing program of Latin American studies program and to enhance the university community’s understanding of Latin American politics and culture. Similarly, Cornell University sought an institution-building project at Los Banos in the Philippines in part because the faculty and administration wanted to enhance its competency in Asian Studies. Cornell’s deep, abiding commitment to the Los Banos project made it one of the most successful agricultural education projects in East Asia. Area studies helped promote the whole university concept by using development work abroad to strengthen academic competencies at home.⁵₀

Few American universities profited as much from using overseas technical assistance to build strong international programs as did Michigan State. That institution engaged technical assistance projects in Brazil, Colombia, India, Iran, Nigeria, Okinawa, Pakistan, South Vietnam, Taiwan, and Turkey, during the 1950s and 1960s. The South Vietnam project, which assisted the government of Ngo Dinh Diem in training public administration officials and police officers between 1954 and 1962, eventually came back to haunt the university. Student anti-war demonstrators condemned MSU’s role in supporting a corrupt regime; the fallout forced Hannah to resign the presidency of the

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university in 1969. Michigan State’s other technical assistance programs, however, proved less controversial. The university established an International Programs Office in 1956 to help facilitate educational, administrative, and social programs in the developing world. The office helped expand the university’s research agenda, particularly in the sciences, and added comparative and international programs to both the undergraduate and graduate curricula. The teaching of foreign languages multiplied roughly nine times during the first half of the 1960s, and languages taught grew from five to twenty. Participant training, a feature of technical assistance that allowed foreign nationals to study in the United States, helped triple the foreign graduate student population on the East Lansing campus between 1956 and 1970. By 1965, more than sixty percent of the MSU teaching faculty had some overseas experience, much of which came as a result of the university’s technical assistance projects. Nearly four decades after the apex of university participation in overseas technical assistance, MSU still maintains the largest undergraduate study abroad program among public universities in the United States.  

Individual advisors often participated out of a desire to use their technical skill to help improve the quality of life for less fortunate people. “The objective of the mission as I see it,” wrote Utah State agricultural advisor Farrell Olson, who served in Kermanshah, Iran, “is to assist the people to improve their way of life.” A. Reed Morrill of Brigham Young University linked overseas technical assistance to work that Latter

Day Saints were already carrying out in other areas of the world; he even suggested that BYU might become “a leader in this type of humanitarian work.” Others volunteered out of a sense of adventure or in order to broaden their own horizons and those of their families. J. Richard Brown, a BYU professor who worked at Ahwaz in Iran from 1953 through 1955 wanted to “learn a little more about the world” while he and his family did “something to help.” Deon Hubbard, a Utah State agricultural economist and his wife Louise saw a similar opportunity. “For us it was a learning adventure, a growing experience.” Finally, many advisors felt a patriotic duty to do their small part to prevent the Soviet menace from dominating the world. Marvel Baker of the University of Nebraska acknowledged that recent Soviet threats to Turkish sovereignty provided a sense of immediacy for his institution’s work in Erzurum, near the Soviet border.52

Despite the popularity of technical assistance with American universities, AID began reevaluating its technical assistance program in light of foreign policy developments near the end of the 1960s. The prolonged war in Vietnam seemed to make all American foreign assistance suspicious in the eyes of many in recipient countries. Members of Congress were growing impatient with the slow pace of institution building; some also argued that technical assistance should reach the poorest people in the least developed countries, but building colleges and universities benefited mainly elites. Finally, by 1970 the tremendous population growth in the developing countries was outstripping the “Green Revolution” increase in agricultural production of the previous

decade. All of this meant that beginning in the late 1960s and especially during the Nixon years, American technical assistance abroad underwent another series of shifts in emphasis, first back to capital transfers and then to intensive research in higher yield grains, livestock improvement, and better medicine after 1975. By the early 1970s, the grand era of technical assistance abroad had come to an end, and AID greatly reduced all of its education programs.53

The 1950s and 1960s, then, represented something of a golden age in American technical assistance abroad, and those decades also brought a wide ranging involvement of the nation’s colleges and universities, especially the land grants, in that work. The technical assistance program traveled a rocky path during those two decades, to be sure. Critics inside of Congress and off the Hill questioned the program’s worth and sought to curtail its funding. The universities and the government often maintained an uneasy relationship as the two sides of this partnership always brought their own goals into the projects. Still, from Point Four through the first decade of AID, American universities sent hundreds of advisors into the developing world to try to help improve the quality of life for the people with whom they worked. Each of these advisors became, in effect, a cultural ambassador for the United States – an individual who introduced the American way to the people of the developing world.

CHAPTER 2: FROM MISSIONARIES TO POINT FOUR: AMERICAN EDUCATORS IN TURKEY AND IRAN, 1870-1953

“A whole generation of educated Iranians … felt that ‘Amerika’ was the only western country that was sincere and selfless.”
- Sattareh Farman Farmaian, Daughter of Persia, 1992

“Around America I had woven a lacework of romance. She was the land of faultless people and government; she was the land of liberty; at every corner opportunity waited to be seized.”
- Selma Ekrem, Unveiled: The Autobiography of a Turkish Girl, 1930

When Point Four technicians entered Turkey and Iran during the early 1950s, they began working in two countries where Americans already enjoyed a long standing educational presence. Protestant missionaries became the first Americans to live and work among the people of the Middle East when they began setting up ministries in the Ottoman Empire and Iran during the 1830s. In addition to proselytizing, their work included technical assistance activities such as organizing rudimentary schools and hospitals as well as teaching sanitation and homemaking practices to peasant families. By the end of the nineteenth century, missionary groups had founded a number of colleges that were beginning to show some impact on Turkish and Iranian modernization. Utah State Agricultural College, an institution that became heavily involved in Point Four technical assistance to Iran, strengthened the relationship between American higher education and the Middle East by inviting a number of Iranian officials and students to its campus in Logan beginning in 1915. While the Utah State relationship with Iran was limited during the interwar years, the college seems to have had some impact on the course of early agricultural education in that country. The first Iranian graduate of Utah State, Mohamed Amin Sepehri, helped found Karaj Agricultural College upon his return
American missionary and philanthropic activity in Turkey and Iran, especially during the first half of the twentieth century, prepared the ground for Point Four technical assistance. Missionaries established colleges that introduced the Turkish and Iranian elite to American education. These schools educated some of the government officials that presided over modernization in both countries during the interwar years. As missionary schools became more responsive to the development needs of Turkey and Iran during the years surrounding World War I, they began to develop technical assistance programs designed to train students in scientific agriculture and engineering. The most sustained American technical assistance effort anywhere in the world prior to the advent of Point Four developed out of philanthropic relief for refugees from the First World War. The Near East Foundation (NEF) engaged in the same kind of low-modernization agricultural assistance projects in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iran during the 1930s that would characterize the Point Four program of the 1950s. Indeed, the NEF helped bridge the private philanthropic tradition of American education assistance with government-sponsored programs under Point Four and AID. NEF provided a model for early Point Four technical assistance in Iran and became a formal partner in 1953. Finally, the missionaries challenged the prevailing social order by advocating for the education of girls and women. This important emphasis not only anticipated a central Point Four goal,

but it also helped introduce Turkish and Iranian leaders to western approaches to education and development. In all of these activities, American missionary and philanthropic organizations earned a generally positive reputation for introducing modern and effective educational practices into the Middle East.55

The early experiences of Point Four advisors in Iran, however, reveal that despite all the groundwork that the missionary and philanthropic forerunners laid, American advisors would still face substantial difficulties in part because they had little grasp of Iranian culture and politics. Many of the missionaries had dedicated lengthy segments of their lives to working among the different national communities in Turkey and Iran, a reality that gave the more open-minded of them a deep understanding of Turkish and Iranian culture. Not so for the Point Four advisors and their families who arrived in Iran amid a confusing political crisis from 1951 through 1953 and with little knowledge of the country. While few of the Point Four advisors understood much about Iran or the crisis, they tended to side with the reactionary, westernizing shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, against the populist prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh. The Anglo-American sponsored coup that removed the government of Mossadegh from power in August 1953 began a twenty-five year process that eroded the generally positive image of the United States that many Iranians once held.56

56 Though some missionaries developed a deep understanding of Turkish or Iranian culture, it is important to remember that many others clung dogedly to ethnocentric views of their own Christian and Western superiority over the people of the Middle East. See Michael P. Zirinsky, “Harbingers of Change: Presbyterian Women in Iran, 1883-1949,” *American Presbyterians* 70 (Fall 1992): 174.
American missionary colleges, including Robert College founded just north of Istanbul in 1863, Syrian Protestant College – later the American University of Beirut – founded in 1866, and the Presbyterian Boys’ School in Tehran – later Alborz College – founded in 1871, provided an intellectual window through which Western ideas and techniques could be spread through Turkey and Iran. Universities as institutions that embraced a wide spectrum of learning and held the advancement of knowledge as a core goal were a novel concept in the Middle East during the first half of the twentieth century. Neither the Turkish nor Iranian government sponsored a modern university before the 1930s. Rather, almost all learning outside of military training took place in Qur’anic schools that emphasized the study of religious texts over the pursuit of broader knowledge. Robert Daniel, a historian of the Protestant mission schools, observed that the American colleges “provided an indispensable institution for modern society.” Enrollment of Turkish and Persian students expanded beginning around 1900 as a desire for scientific education with an international outlook slowly began to replace the traditional distrust of these “Frankish” enterprises among wealthy and influential Turks and Iranians. Muslims represented half of the students at the Presbyterian school in Tehran, for example, by 1897.57

The westernization programs of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran made American-style education even more popular during the interwar years. The Turkish government, for example, recognized only two institutions as being “of university grade” in Turkey during the 1920s. The Darülfünün, the forerunner of Istanbul University, was one; Robert College was the other. Dr. Samuel Jordan, who along with his wife, Mary, taught at the Presbyterian school in Tehran for forty years between 1898 and 1940 and who was probably the most respected American in the city for most of that time, could boast by the middle of the 1930s, “Probably no other school in the world has ever enrolled so many of the children of the leading men of any country as for the past thirty-five years have been enrolled in this College.” Missionary colleges, then, helped introduce educated Turks and Iranians to American education during the first half of the twentieth century. Some of the Turkish and Iranian graduates of the missionary colleges entered government service and came back into contact with American educators through the Point Four program.58

In responding to the needs of modernizing societies, the colleges also initiated some programs that anticipated Point Four technical assistance a generation later. Robert College developed an agricultural curriculum that revolved around a 135-acre demonstration and experiment farm. While the Turkish agricultural faculties of the day generally prepared students for office work in the Ministry of Agriculture, Robert

College taught scientific methods of farming and research. Similarly, the European Turkey Mission organized the Thessalonika Agricultural and Industrial Institute in 1903. The college instituted a curriculum centered on the agricultural and mechanical arts that resembled those of the American land-grant institutions that were then developing in the United States.59

From the beginning, American missionaries had gently but firmly challenged the belief, widely held by both Muslims and non-Muslims in the Middle East, that formal education was inappropriate for girls. Evidence of American missionaries founding girls’ schools dates from the middle of the 1830s in the Ottoman Empire and from the early 1840s in northwest Iran. Monica Ringer, an historian of nineteenth century Iran, writes that missionary girls’ schools were “significant for the impetus they provided to women’s education in the pre-constitutional [before 1905] period.” She notes that Americans “in particular viewed women’s education as a means of improving general living standards” by providing instruction in sanitation and homemaking skills. The most advanced American school for young women to open in the Middle East during the nineteenth century was the Constantinople Women’s School, founded in 1871. The school received a collegiate charter from the state of Massachusetts in 1889 thereby becoming the first college for women in the Middle East. Halide Edib, a prominent Turkish novelist, feminist, professor, member of parliament, and probably the most famous graduate of the school, recalled that the college had “a liberating effect” on her opening up “new vistas

into wider paths.” The emphasis on female education marks another important way in which missionaries prepared the ground for Point Four technical assistance in Turkey and Iran.60

The first coordinated technical assistance program by an American philanthropic organization in the Middle East began as a response to the tremendous humanitarian crisis that the First World War brought to Eastern Anatolia, Western Iran, and Syria. American missionaries continued to operate in Ottoman Turkey because the United States never went to war with that country. Appalled by the brutality of Turkish operations against Armenians in Eastern Anatolia – the Armenian Genocide – missionaries organized relief efforts for deported and starving civilians throughout the war. Wartime circumstances forced the organization, Near East Relief, to create a self-help approach out of which grew a technical assistance program during the 1920s. By 1923, Near East Relief had largely terminated its emergency relief activities and “concentrated its efforts on the care and education of children.” Schools emphasized vocational training in skills practical for the Middle East. Near East Relief embraced “mass education of a simple, direct sort, carried to the people in their fields and workshops.” It must be “education vital to their lives.” In other words, the organization embraced low modernization. Near East Relief so completely reoriented itself during the 1920s that by the end of the decade the organization changed its name to the Near East

Foundation. It operated the most extensive American technical assistance program in the world during the interwar years.\(^{61}\)

The Foundation’s first rural development and education projects took place in Greece and Albania; they consisted of agricultural education, basic literacy, and public health. NEF expanded its program into Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan with the development of a rural school program during the 1930s. The Foundation cooperated with the American University of Beirut (formerly Syrian Protestant College) to create an Institute of Rural Life. The Institute’s varied activities included water purification and sanitation improvements, malaria control, and home welfare demonstrations. The project provided rural agricultural extension training and work for seventy-five farm boys and published a number of bulletins in simple Arabic to promote literacy among peasant farmers. It also employed women to organize schools and teacher training for developing rural cooperatives.\(^{62}\)

The NEF launched a comprehensive program for rural improvement on the Varamin Plain region just south of Tehran in 1946; it was the Foundation’s most extensive technical assistance effort in Iran prior to Point Four. The plain extended about sixty-five miles south of the Alborz Mountains and contained 354 villages, less than one

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in thirty of which had a school in 1943. Like its Near East Relief predecessors, the project emphasized the low-modernization approach. The agricultural demonstration and extension program, for example, stressed “practical instruction carried directly to the people on their primitive farms and in their simple houses and isolated communities.”

Gholam Hossein Kazemian, a scholar who studied the effect of American technical assistance on Iran’s rural development, noted that the Varamin agricultural extension program “has been quite effective, and for the most part, successful.” The project’s other major focus was developing a system of elementary education and adult literacy classes. In order to facilitate literacy courses, the NEF pioneered a system of training ambitious village school boys who could read and write to become local teachers. Each Thursday, the Foundation provided these young teachers with “intensive instruction both in methods of teaching and in the subject matter itself of which they possessed but limited knowledge.” The technique required a great deal of practice to become efficient, but it did mark an important innovation in training local teachers that would later serve as a model for Point Four education development projects.63

As with its missionary predecessors, NEF took special care to promote the education and professional opportunities of young women. Girls attended the orphanage schools from their opening in 1919; they studied basic reading, writing and arithmetic alongside the boys and participated in the same games and chores. Insofar as education

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for practical skills was concerned, however, most of the girls studied homemaking, sanitation, and hygiene while a smaller number studied nursing or education. The expansion of NEF technical assistance into Iran during the 1940s brought new opportunities for female education. The Foundation built enough schools between 1946 and 1951 for all children in the 350 villages to attend, and it encouraged peasant families to send their children. As a result, female enrollment grew from 311 in 1946 to 4,387 in 1962. The NEF also helped found a series of normal schools for girls during the Point Four era. The Ghaleh Nou Girls Teacher Training School opened in 1954 offering up to a sixth grade education. Within a decade, the school’s capacity had increased from twenty-five to 125; it had added a high school, and it had trained over 150 rural female teachers, all of whom found employment within the Ministry of Education upon graduation.64

NEF emphasis on female education also allowed some Iranian women to enter into high levels of government service. Shamsomoluk Mosaheb, who worked in literacy materials development for the Foundation, became one of the first female senators in the Iranian parliament. Two former principals of the Ghaleh Nou Girls Teacher Training School went on to become director and assistant director of the Ministry of Agriculture’s extension program for women while another became director of the Home Economics Department at Karaj Agricultural College. Such accomplishments would have been

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impressive in a western context during the middle of the twentieth century; they were almost unimaginable for rural women in a nation as socially conservative as Iran.\textsuperscript{65}

The Near East Foundation provided valuable support for early Point Four programs, particularly in Iran, as the two organizations collaborated to build a nationwide rural development program. NEF maintained its principal operating responsibility over the Varamin Project, even after becoming part of the Point Four program in 1953. It served as a model for Point Four advisors who worked on agricultural extension and demonstration centers. The Foundation also continued its work in building educational institutions and training teachers. It provided valuable information to a team of advisors from Brigham Young University who worked on rural school development and teacher training. When NEF launched its rural literacy program in Iran it found a dearth of qualified teachers. The advisors found that they could not employ candidates from urban areas because many of these young people could not tolerate village life. Those that did try rural teaching usually abandoned the task at the first opportunity to pursue a position in the cities. NEF personnel helped the BYU team recruit and train teachers from the underdeveloped rural population. Finally, the Foundation signed an agreement with the Iranian government to assume responsibility for supervising the development of Ahwaz Agricultural College in southwestern Iran in 1959.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{65} Fuller, “From Village School to Agricultural College in Iran,” in Badeau and Stevens, eds., \textit{Bread From Stones}, 47.

On 19 October 1950, Iran became the first nation in the world to accept technical cooperation under the new Point Four program when it signed a rural improvement agreement with the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). It is significant that Point Four technical assistance planted early roots in Iran. For one thing, the missionary and philanthropic groups had already prepared the ground. In offering his support for technical assistance in 1961, Representative Barratt O’Hara (D-IL) connected the government effort to this earlier missionary antecedent. “What the government is doing now,” he told his colleagues, “is merely following the pattern that the churches have set for us.”

More important, however, Iran had become much more important to American foreign policy during and immediately following the Second World War. The country represented an important strategic link in the wartime alliance, and the United States had sent troops to Iran as part of the Allied occupation. Moreover, in January 1943 the State Department endorsed a memorandum written by its Iran desk officer urging that the United States provide “American specialists and application of American methods in various fields.” The author, John Jernegan, reasoned that because the continuation of an Anglo-Soviet rivalry in Iran threatened American interests it was within the American national interest to help Iran develop and so assert its full independence. The substance of the memorandum reached President Roosevelt who gave it an informal endorsement. The United States also made general promises to provide economic aid to Iran after the...

Point Four technicians could do little in Iran during 1951 other than experiment with two village demonstration centers because Iran experienced a series of political crises that disrupted the country’s international agreements. Mohammad Mossadegh, a former Qajar nobleman, the leading figure in Iran’s populist National Front coalition, and the parliamentary leader of the fight to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, came to power in April shortly after the Majlis (parliament) accepted his bill to nationalize the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Mossadegh wanted American aid, but he was disappointed at the offer of $23,450,000 for technical assistance that he had received when he visited Washington, D.C. in November 1952. The Iranian government had been asking for loans as large as $250 million. William Warne, Point Four’s first country director in Iran, recalled that during the negotiations Mossadegh voiced his displeasure with the size of the American program by comparing it to an Iranian tarantula, “It jumps up and down and scares everybody, but it has never been known to bite.” In his memoir, Warne added, “It seemed to me to be grossly unfair, since our slowness in starting was at least half his
responsibility.” At any rate, Mossadegh balked on the Point Four agreement for almost two more months before he finally signed it in late January 1952. 

While negotiations with Mossadegh’s government stalled, Point Four officials in Washington D.C. concentrated on assembling a field team. They concentrated their efforts on three major universities in the state of Utah because a number of scientists at these schools had previous technical assistance experience in Iran. One of these individuals was Franklin S. Harris, a soil scientist who had served as president of Brigham Young University from 1921 through 1945 and then held the same office at Utah State Agricultural College from 1945 through 1950. In 1939 the State Department had asked Harris to serve as an agricultural advisor to the Iranian government. One of his Iranian assistants on that project, Jafar Madani, was himself a 1920 graduate of Utah State. When Harris left Iran in 1940 he urged the Iranian government to hire two Utah State professors, Luther M. Winsor, an irrigation specialist, and Don W. Pittman, and agronomist, to continue the work he had begun. Pittman left Iran in 1943, but Winsor remained in the country throughout the Second World War.

Harris had extensive international experience. He had helped organize a branch of the Latter Day Saints (LDS) Church in Japan in 1926, and he spent several months of

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70 Bob Parson, “International Students and Programs,” 2-7, folder 16, box 4, University History Materials, USU.
1929 in the Soviet Union working on the resettlement of Jews displaced in the Russian Civil War. In addition, he worked on various irrigation projects in Syria and Beirut during 1946, an assignment that also afforded him the chance to visit Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Iraq, and Greece. By the time Harris became the first technical director of Point Four in Iran in 1950, he had established a reputation for providing high-quality technical assistance in agriculture and for working effectively with governments throughout the Middle East. Moreover, his connections to both BYU and Utah State gave him access to a sizable pool of potential advisors. Harris’s enthusiasm for overseas technical assistance and his frequent extolling of his adventures to colleagues at both universities provided a major impetus for Utah universities taking the lead in performing Point Four technical assistance in Iran during the 1950s.71

In addition to Harris, Point Four recruited Hoyt J.B. Turner, a State Department official who had previously taught at the University of Georgia, as supervisor of field activities. Turner had extensive experience in technical assistance in China and South America. Locating a country director proved more difficult since Harris, the ideal candidate, took the position of technical director. After some coaxing, TCA convinced William Warne, a journalist and former Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Water and Power, to accept the job in November 1951. Warne had technical assistance experience working on water problems in both California and Korea. With Warne, Turner, and Harris, the Point Four program in Iran had a solid nucleus of technical assistance experts

who had substantial international experience. The three of them served a combined twelve years in the country.72

That spring, E. Reeseman Fryer of the TCA contacted Utah State Agricultural College to inquire about sending agricultural technicians to Iran. Utah State had cultivated a number of contacts with prominent Iranians as early as 1915 when the school invited Iranian diplomat Mirza Ali Gholi Khan to give the baccalaureate speech at the college. It also helped that TCA administrator Henry Bennett held a favorable opinion of the Utah State scientists. “I like these Utah fellows,” he said, “They usually get things done.” Finally, the soil and climate in Utah resembled that in the semi-arid regions of Iran. Utah State officials were interested in the Iranian Point Four program but wanted more information. In the meantime, Fryer contacted BYU president Ernest Wilkinson to inquire about sending advisors to Iran. Wilkinson promptly indicated that Brigham Young was interested in all fields of technical assistance, but he agreed to cooperate with the other major research universities in the state. In the end, the contract authorized BYU to send advisors in the field of education, the University of Utah to send medical personnel, and Utah State to send agricultural advisors. Wilkinson found it irritating that Utah State received the largest share of advisors and the biggest operating budget, but despite this early spat of institutional rivalry, the three Utah universities cooperated well in Iran. Most Utah advisors shared the common bond of being Mormons; they socialized

freely and worshiped together, something that gave the Utah teams a common identity and sense of purpose.73

The Utah advisors and their families brought a wide range of expectations and experiences with them to Iran. Some had served in overseas LDS missions and were familiar with negotiating foreign cultures. At least one Utah State professor, Richard Griffin, had prior technical assistance experience working with farmers in Brazil, China and the Soviet Union. Others, such as Bruce and Lula Anderson, had difficulty finding Iran on a map. Gordon Van Epps of Utah State felt drawn by “a deep interest in the Middle East going back to [his] elementary school” studies of the great ancient Persian kings, Cyrus and Darius, and their magnificent capital at Persepolis. Others, though, took a more typically American view of the Middle East driven by images from popular culture. Jay Hall of Utah State, for example, looked forward to passing through Baghdad on the way from Beirut to Tehran because he had read the stories of the Arabian nights and hoped to catch of glimpse of its mythical oriental splendor.74

Compounding the problem of the advisors’ general lack of familiarity with Iran, they received but a scant two week long project orientation in Washington D.C. prior to their departure. This deficiency reflected one of the central early problems of the

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university contract program. That is, the program’s rate of growth outpaced the Point Four agency’s ability to perform proper planning and coordination. The orientation program did include a cursory introduction to the Persian language, but the course was so short that it did the advisors very little good. The wives and children received no real orientation at all, though they apparently received some vague promise of an orientation in Iran. Not surprisingly, the technicians generally found this training lacking. Vern Kupfer, a psychologist from the College of Southern Utah recalled that he was “not thrilled with it very frankly.” Most of the facilitators had never been to Iran or had made brief visits to Tehran, Isfahan or Shiraz. Their descriptions of the people and cultures of Iran proved almost useless for those Americans who would be stationed in rural communities and tribal areas far removed – both geographically and culturally – from the large cities. 75

Traveling from Utah to Tehran proved an arduous proposition in the early 1950s. The trip required several lengthy flights with Beirut and Baghdad being the most common air destinations for access to Iran. But that still left lengthy overland drives that most families made by automobile caravan over rough dirt roads. Lodging accommodations often seemed primitive, dirty, and sometimes unsafe to middle class Americans. Almost all experienced some level of cultural shock. Upon reaching Iran, one of the BYU professors, A. Reed Morrill, wrote to President Wilkinson, “This is indeed a strange land into which we had flown. Strange in custom, strange in human action, and degenerate in appearance.” For Louise and Deon Hubbard, it was “a shock to

see the beggars, the camels, and the donkeys on the street.” Prior to leaving Utah, Iran had been a “fairy tale fantasy,” but the reality of seeing “the poverty and the peculiarities of the Middle East was a shock.”³⁷⁶

For some, such as Gordon Van Epps, however, plunging head first into a completely new and foreign environment heightened the sense of adventure. “I think our first impressions were ones of curiosity in the way the people lived and the way they dressed, especially when we went to the city to visit the shopping areas.” Once they settled, it was not difficult for the Utah families to link their new surroundings with imagery familiar to them from the Bible. Helen Milligan, the wife of Utah State agricultural engineer Cleve Milligan, described why her LDS group chose to study the Old Testament, “We could look out our windows and see them [Iranian peasants] harvesting the grain with a sickle and tying it up.” The sight brought to mind images of the barley harvest in ancient Judea. “It was just like being transported back to Biblical times to see the way they did things.”³⁷⁷

Because of their common bonds and because many of the Utah families knew each other prior to their arrival in Iran, they tended to live close together whenever possible, sometimes sharing enclosed compounds and in some cases even sharing homes. “We were all LDS and pretty much all from the Logan area [where Utah State is located] and BYU,” remembered Mildred Bunnell, “We’d known each other before we even went over. If somebody got sick, two or three people went.” Of course, this was easier for those posted in and around Tehran than it was for those posted in regional cities or in the

³⁷⁶ Berryessa to Wilkinson, 9 October 1953, folder 4, box 4, A. Reed Morrill Papers, BYU; Hubbard Oral History, 2, UUIOHP, BYU.
³⁷⁷ Van Epps Oral History, 2, UUIOHP, BYU; Milligan Oral History, 4, UUIOHP, BYU.
provinces where Point Four advisors sometimes worked with only one or two other Americans and in some cases with only Iranians. The Utahans took to calling their enclaves “Utahvilles” and, at least in Tehran, enjoyed access to an American commissary where “it was just like shopping in one of our shopping malls here. Anything we wanted was there.”

Contemporary commentators and historians have sometimes criticized Point Four and AID officials for their habit of cloistering themselves in affluent neighborhoods abroad or “golden ghettos” as they became known. Critics cite Americans for living extravagant lifestyles, abusing diplomatic privileges, breaking local laws, and behaving boorishly toward the people they were there to assist. These criticisms, however, do not seem applicable to the Utah technicians and their families, despite the presence of Utahville in the town of Shimron, a suburb of Tehran located in the foothills of the Alborz Mountains. For one thing, the Utah families experienced frequent burglaries and occasionally became the target of political demonstrations in Tehran between 1951 and 1953. The need for safety kept the families close together. Moreover, the Mormons carried on a much different lifestyle than those who frequented the “cocktail circuit,” as Lula Anderson called the carousing that characterized the social scene among State Department officials. LDS members sometimes attended these parties without drinking alcohol, but in the main, the social lives of the Utahans revolved around church and family. The advisors and their families established regular church branches, selected leadership, held Sunday school (often held on Friday, the Islamic day of rest) and

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78 Mildred Bunnell Oral History, interviewed by Jessie Embry, 17 June 1999, 10, UUIOHP, BYU; Anderson Oral History, 2, UUIOHP, BYU.
worship services. Sometimes, the religious discussions became very eclectic as Catholic and Protestant Americans and even a few Iranian Muslims participated. The Mormon influence created a wholesome living environment. It might have bored the American “cocktail circuit,” but it helped Utah families thrive in a new and strange environment. It certainly seems to have won the respect of the Iranians, many of whom were practicing Muslims and taken aback by the extravagance and drinking of other Americans.79

From late 1951 through the summer of 1953, Utah families also found themselves caught up in a series of political crises in Iran that culminated in an American sponsored coup that removed Prime Minister Mossadegh from power. While they did not take an active role in either the oil controversy or the factional strife that characterized Iranian politics during the ordeal, they could not escape the wrath of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, which viewed all western influence in Iran as imperialist. Tudeh supporters, for example, protested loudly against the participation of American engineering and consulting firms in the crafting of Iran’s Seven Year Development Plan in 1949. They saw within the plan a new and sinister “American ascendency” poised to replace that of the war-weakened British. On more than one occasion, Tudeh-inspired public demonstrations against the American presence in the country wrecked Point Four property and threatened the lives of the advisors and their families. BYU elementary education professor Max Berryessa recalled that, “This ‘Yankee go home’ was a constant threat.” Rowdies sometimes spat

79 On the concept of Point Four and AID “golden ghettos,” see Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1998), 60; William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958); Jalal al-e Ahmad in his novel, The School Principal, translated by John K. Newton (Minneapolis and Chicago: Biliotheca Islamica, 1974); Nevzat Üstün, Türkiye ’deki Amerika (İstanbul: Yaylacik, 1967), 7-11; on the cocktail circuit, see Anderson Oral History, 10, UUIOHP, BYU; on the central importance of the LDS Church to Utah technicians and their families and on the theological discussions, see Nola and Vern Kupfer Oral History, 10, UUIOHP, BYU.
upon and otherwise intimidated the Americans, some of whom spoke of not being able to go into certain areas of the bazaar for fear of attack.\textsuperscript{80}

The situation worsened in early 1953. In February, a coup attempt fizzled out but triggered a series of violent clashes between royalist army officers and much larger pro-Mossadegh crowds in the district of Tehran where many Utah families lived. On April 18, “communist mobs” raided, plundered, and destroyed the Point Four office in Shiraz. Education specialist Glen Gagon, a graduate student at BYU, lost all the data he had been collecting on the nomadic Qashqai tribes. In July, near the apex of the crisis, mobs stormed the Point Four offices in both Tehran and in Shiraz. In Tehran, soldiers at the nearby prime minister’s residence held back the demonstration long enough for Mossadegh to escape in a Point Four jeep via residences used by American advisors. The entire Point Four office was ransacked and several vehicles vandalized.\textsuperscript{81}

Rioting lasted for three days in Shiraz, and the police could not prevent mobs from destroying the Point Four offices there. The Utah advisors and their families fled after having been tipped off by the Iranian husband of an American secretary and an Iranian the American children had befriended. Mohammad Bahmanbegi, a Qashqai intellectual who was working with Point Four on an education program for his people, helped the Americans and their families take refuge at the tribal headquarters at Bagh-e Eram, the “Garden of Heaven.” Without telephone service, the American embassy in

\textsuperscript{80} Max Berryessa Oral History, interviewed by Jessie L. Embry, November 3, 1998, UUIOHP, 12; Bunnell Oral History, 13, UUIOHP, BYU.

Tehran was next to powerless to help. Thirty-three Americans received food and accommodations at the Qashqai headquarters, and one of the chiefs, Kosro Khan, promised ten thousand horsemen to protect the Americans. The danger to the Utah technicians and their families became acute enough for several of the wives and children to leave Iran. Lula Anderson and her children accompanied four other families to Switzerland. Others went directly back to the United States. The State Department would not allow the families to return until 1954; some never did.  

The reactions of the Utah families to the political disturbances surrounding the coup of August 1953 shed some interesting light on how these harbingers of the university contract program understood Iranian politics. As foreigners who had limited experience in that country and little outside knowledge of it, they were understandably confused by the often chaotic nature of the mass demonstrations that characterized Iranian politics during 1952 and the first half of 1953. Mildred Bunnell, for instance described how “one group would shout, ‘Long live the Shah.’ Around the corner was another group coming that was saying ‘Death to the Shah’.” Many seemed ambivalent about Mossadegh’s leadership but were quite concerned about the presence of anti-American agitation. Undoubtedly, much of the concern came from the Tudeh Party’s ability to whip crowds into a frenzy and to perpetrate violence. A few linked Mossadegh to communism, a common American misreading of the prime minister. Max Berryessa, one of the most reflective and articulate members of the BYU team, thought that the prime minister was a “guy who played with the communists.” Louise Hubbard

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82 Anderson Oral History, 3-6, UUIOHP, BYU.
concluded that the United States “preferred the Shah to Mossadegh’s communist and Russian ties.”

Most advisors and their families, however, thought highly of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. This also coincided with a common American view. They saw the king as a benevolent dictator, as a modernizer and a westernizer. He was an individual who wanted to elevate the material well being of the Iranian people, and he was willing to break the considerable power of the landlords, who held much political power in rural Iran, and the Shia ulama, who often rejected modernization and reinforced traditional social values. Again, the view of Max Berryessa is representative. “I had great sympathy for the Shah. He was western oriented. He really wanted his country to be brought up to the standards of the western countries. He tried everything in his power. A lot of [Iranian] people didn’t like the Shah, but I had great respect for him because he really wanted to help people.”

It should not be surprising that the Utahans held these views. First, the most had little first-hand experience with the shah’s repressive regime; they worked in Iran during the early 1950s, while the king was still consolidating his authority. Second, the Utahans were engineers, agricultural scientists, irrigation specialists, biologists, and teachers; they were not political analysts. It is not surprising that the shah’s enthusiasm for land reform, his program of building schools, and his desire to create modern universities, all swayed their opinions much more than his willingness to crush political opposition. They learned of the arrests, the torture, and the killings later, of course, but the reports lacked the

83 Bunnell Oral History, 13, UUIOHP, BYU; Berryessa Oral History, 7, UUIOHP, BYU; and Hubbard Oral History, 5, UUIOHP, BYU.
84 Berryessa Oral History, 6, UUIOHP, BYU.
immediacy of the generally positive view of the shah’s modernization agenda that these individuals gained while in Iran. The recollections of Gordon Van Epps capture this reality. “Yes, there were some people that were killed under his regime. But I saw the good that he was doing for that country in changing the people and in getting the women out of their homes and being educated. … I saw what he did for land reform.” Land reform in particular impressed the Utah advisors as many of them worked in rural areas where impoverished peasants suffered under the often oppressive power of a couple hundred very wealthy landowners.85

The American-sponsored coup that removed Prime Minister Mossadegh from power in August 1953 ended Iran’s fragile quasi-democracy and marked the beginning of the shah’s authoritarian monarchy. It also marked the beginning of profound changes in American-Iranian relations. For twenty-five years between the second half of 1953 and the end of 1978 Iran became a client state of the United States. The American government showered Iran with foreign aid, and within a few years, the Central Intelligence Agency began training Iran’s new internal security apparatus, SAVAK, the organization that was responsible for carrying out much of the Shah’s repression over the next two and a half decades. As a result, many Iranians began to associate the American presence in their country with the shah’s increasingly dictatorial regime.86

American education and technical assistance in Turkey and Iran traveled a broad arc from its rather humble beginnings in the nineteenth century to the government-sponsored Point Four program of the 1950s. There can be no doubt that the success of

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85 Van Epps Oral History, 12, UUIOHP, BYU.
missionary and NEF activity in these two countries laid a solid foundation for their Point Four predecessor. The missionaries founded colleges that introduced Turks and Iranians to American education and that initiated the concept of technical assistance. They also helped prepare the way for female education, an important priority for Point Four projects. The NEF proved particularly valuable as its low-modernization technical assistance to the Varamin Plain provided a successful model for Point Four agricultural projects. Missionary schools and the NEF contributed to the generally favorable view of the United States and of American technical prowess that many Turks and Iranians held at the middle of the twentieth century. Moreover, the long association with Iran and Iranians that the Utah universities, particularly Utah State, had forged during the early decades of the twentieth century provided a ready pool of university advisors. All of these factors seemed to make Iran a promising place to begin the Point Four program.

Yet for all the groundbreaking work that the missionaries and NEF accomplished, an analysis of how the early Point Four advisors and their families understood the political crisis in Iran during the early 1950s illustrates how little many American technical assistance advisors really knew about the culture in which they worked. This was a common problem that challenged, and in fact limited, the effectiveness of American education and other technical assistance projects in the developing world, including in Turkey and Iran, during the 1950s and 1960s.
CHAPTER 3: BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY EDUCATION ADVISORS IN IRAN, 1951-1955

“Could I make them see that I had no desire to tell them what they must do or to transplant an American curriculum onto Iran? … I had never had such a moment of humility in my life.”
- Alva John Clarke, BYU education advisor in Iran, 1953-5, 1962-4

The families of five Brigham Young University professors that arrived in Iran near the end of 1951 faced a momentous challenge. They had come to begin work on advising the Ministry of Education on the expansion of its national primary education program. That alone presented a towering task in this country where modern education was perhaps a generation old and eighty percent of children still did not go to school. But the advisors and their families also had to learn to negotiate a culture about which they knew very little. None among them could speak Persian well enough to communicate directly with an Iranian educator or public official. They did not yet understand how strongly social inertia gripped school administrators or how much a sense of divine fatalism shaped the peasants’ lives. Nor could they fully appreciate how the country’s lack of modern transportation and communications systems would complicate every aspect of their work. That would all come later. In the beginning, it was a small team of highly devoted academics that set out to contribute something to the betterment of their fellow man and to strike a blow against Soviet influence in the Middle East at the same time.87

The BYU project to improve and expand Iranian primary and secondary education during the first half of the 1950s demonstrates the limits to which American

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advisors could provide assistance to Turkish and Iranian education under the Point Four and AID university contract program. The magnitude of educational challenges facing Iran, the modest size of the program, and the less than perfect Iranian understanding of American education techniques all meant that the Brigham Young advisors could do little more than provide a primer for educational reform. The BYU professors put their hearts into the job; they used low-modernization techniques that generally forged good working relationships with their Iranian partners, and they developed some seminal programs in teacher training and curriculum reform. Yet, they could not, on their own, bring about widespread change in the Iranian education system. The BYU advisors provided only the most basic training to Iran’s teachers. They introduced new techniques but were not in the country long enough to implant them deeply into Iranian educational culture. Finally, the Americans could do little to improve the most fundamental deficiency of that system, the very low educational level of most Iranian elementary school teachers.

The most successful BYU project in Iran was a collaboration with the Qashqai nomadic tribe of Fars province to build a system of movable tent schools for the tribespeople. This low-modernization project functioned well because the American advisors contributed what they did best—collecting important demographic information, providing logistical support, and organizing supplies, while and Iranian oversaw the project from the beginning and Iranian teachers conducted the classes. In other words, the tent school program worked because it was Iranian by design with the Americans playing an important but secondary support role.
In order to place BYU’s work in Iran into its historical context, it is important to examine the state of public education in that country around 1950 as well as the steps that Iranians were taking to improve the system. Prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, the Iranian government invested no effort in mass public education. Basic education in Iran traditionally took place in the *maktabs*, Islamic schools that emphasized the study of the Quran and placed little emphasis on education as a means of improving one’s intellect or material prospects. The government enacted a compulsory education law in 1911 but lacked the capacity to implement it. During World War II, four out of five Iranian seven year olds still did not have access to schools, a reality that prompted the passage of a second compulsory education law in 1943.\(^8\)

The early 1960s brought the most rapid expansion of public education in Iran’s history; these were the formative years of Mohammad Reza Shah’s “White Revolution” of national development, or the “Revolution of Shah and People,” as the king liked to call it. It was only during this period that school attendance among children aged six to ten approached fifty percent. Even then, educational opportunities varied greatly between urban and rural areas and among boys and girls. At the beginning of the White Revolution in 1962/3, about three quarters of urban children attended school compared to only about a quarter of rural children. Urban children accounted for about fifty-seven percent of the total school enrollment though they made up only about a quarter of the school age population. That year, only about fifteen percent of the country’s fifty thousand rural villages had even a crude elementary school. The disparity between urban

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and rural schools was even greater at higher levels. Nine out of every ten first cycle (middle school) students lived in urban areas, as did ninety-eight percent of second cycle (high school) students.89

The gender gap was at least as wide owing to the reluctance of many conservative rural parents to send their daughters to school. Moreover, strict gender segregation in education after the first four grades combined with a lack of female teachers made school attendance beyond the primary grades impossible for many Iranian girls of the 1950s. The education gender gap did, however, narrow over the next thirty years. In her analysis of how rural women contributed to Iran’s development during the 1960s, Susan Horning Ashraf observed that the number of girls attending secondary schools in 1972 was eighteen times greater than in 1952 while enrollment for boys increased only ten times during the same period. In 1952, girls accounted for barely one-fifth of high school students, but the figure increased to almost two-fifths by 1977. Not surprisingly, the education gender gap remained wider in rural than in urban areas. Nearly seven out of ten rural girls were still not attending school as recently as the mid-1970s.90

In addition to the gender gap, a high rate of attrition prevented many children from finishing more than four years of schooling. David Menashri found that as recently as 1975 only about one-third of first graders could expect to complete the fifth grade. Attrition rates became even steeper after elementary school. A 1953 BYU survey of middle and high school enrollment revealed an eighty-four percent attrition rate between the seventh and the twelfth grade. Reasons varied beyond the availability of schools. Many rural parents still saw their children as productive laborers at an early age, which resulted in a high rate of absenteeism at important times in the agricultural cycle. Some parents also placed a low value on education’s ability to train children for work. Working in the fields for boys or learning to sew and cook for girls were more important than academic training after children had achieved a basic literacy. Finally, conservative parents often found it inappropriate for girls to attend more than a few years of school.91

Students who could attend school often had to do so in deplorable conditions. Issa Sadiq, one of the first Iranian philosophers of modern education to be trained in the United States, reported in 1931 that Iran had few school buildings constructed for that purpose. Many lacked “all sanitary arrangements.” Max Berryessa, who was the first director of elementary demonstration schools for Point Four in Tehran, recalled school conditions when he arrived in 1951. The single classroom was about the size of an average living room and contained “forty boys, no girls, squatting on a dirt floor.” The only light in the room came through a hole in the wooden door. There were no textbooks. Blackboards had been improvised from painted plywood, and teachers made

the chalk. There was neither paper nor pencils with which children could write. It was clearly a “hard thing for the teachers and a poor educational environment for the students.”  

Beyond the basic problems of enrollment and facilities, a number of administrative, curricular, and social factors limited the effectiveness of Iranian education. The government created a highly centralized system of education as part of Reza Shah’s modernization agenda. He saw the school system as a way of blunting the loyalties of non-Persian Iranians (roughly forty percent of the population) to their ethnic/linguistic group or tribe and as a way of lessening the influence of Iran’s Shia clergy. The centralization scheme therefore created a single highly-nationalized curriculum based on the Persian language to be used throughout Iran. The Ministry of Education in Tehran also held a near-complete monopoly on policy. Local officials could do little except implement policies handed down from above. The ministry allowed no variations for regional diversity; it even dictated that heating stoves be turned on and off on the same day each fall and spring in all parts of the country though climate varied greatly. The entire system, in the words of Issa Sadiq, “destroys all initiative and quenches all fire of leadership.”

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Ministry dominance did not, however, promote stability within the system. Iran experienced sixty-one changes of prime minister between 1907 and 1952 and eighty-seven changes of education minister. The average Iranian government, therefore, lasted fewer than nine months with the average tenure of a minister of education being even shorter. Political cronyism brought many unqualified people into high ranking positions and amplified discontinuity. New ministers tended to discard the policies of their predecessors, who had frequently been appointed by political rivals. The generally low level of education available to even the children of white collar families meant that the ministry often had to fill its ranks with people poorly equipped for education administration.94

The philosophy and method of Iranian education was built on an almost “blind imitation” of the French model resulting from heavy French influence in Iranian legal reforms during the constitutional revolution (1905-1911) and the large number of Iranian officials who had studied in France. The system required students to memorize their teachers’ lectures and in many cases to reproduce them on examinations that took place at the end of the school year. It was a very rigid system that did not encourage the development of analytical or problem solving skills, and it dominated every stage of Iranian education from the primary schools through the universities. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, a scholar of education and social change in the Middle East, observed that, view of how the processes differed, see Joseph S. Szyliowicz, *Education and Modernization in the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1973), 230-234.

“Scholasticism was carried to ridiculous extremes.” Botany, for example, required students to memorize the names of all vegetables but did not expect them to differentiate between poisonous and edible mushrooms. The system produced graduates who were ill-equipped to meet the intellectual and practical problems of Iranian development.

Sociologist Norman Jacobs described the representative educated Iranian as an individual who “is quick to copy and serve those in authority, who tends to talk rather than to act, who hates to make decisions, who is not utilitarian, who is not objective, who can not operate effectively in a critical environment, who does not necessarily understand what he accepts, who cannot analyze his responsibilities, … who basically is insecure and consequently, unproductive.”

Despite the deficiencies within the Iranian education apparatus, the government had taken a number of steps to improve the system when BYU advisors arrived in late 1951. Already, in the late 1920s, Sadiq was calling for major philosophical changes in Iranian education. He wanted to reduce the reliance on memorization and replace it with approaches that cultivated the students’ intellect. He expounded on the need to provide practicing elementary school teachers with better overall education and more training in modern pedagogical techniques. Both of these recommendations became staples of the BYU program. In 1936/7 the government initiated a campaign against illiteracy and organized a series of adult reading classes, an idea that that BYU technicians recast as

95 The blind imitation reference is from Ali Mohammad Kardan, L’Organisation Scolaire en Iran (Geneva: Imprimerie Reggiem et Jacond, 1957), 99-100 quoted in Szylowicz, Education and Modernization in the Middle East, 236; on the teaching method in higher education, see Completion of Tour Report, Dr. R.H. Walker, Supervisor of the Utah State University Contract and Advisor to the Dean of the College of Agriculture at Karadj, box 116, entry 617, AID, NAII; Norman Jacobs, The Sociology of Development: Iran as an Asian Case Study (New York: Praeger, 1966), 159. Sadiq notes that of the eighteen most recent Iranian Ministers of Education in 1931, fifteen spoke only French in addition to Persian, while four spoke French, English, and Persian; see Sadiq, Modern Persia and Her Educational System, 39.
“fundamental education” a decade and a half later. The next year, the government made physical education compulsory, again anticipating a major theme of the Brigham Young program. The American emphasis on educating girls also echoed an aim, if not in all cases a reality, of education reform under the Pahlavi monarchy.96

Reza Shah’s governments also took the first steps toward professionalizing teacher training by opening new and better teacher training institutions. Requirements for elementary school teaching were very low in 1918; an individual had to have a sixth grade education, be at least twenty years old, and be a person of good character. At first, the teacher training schools were little more than middle schools that offered some instruction in pedagogy. But the government created a more formal Tehran Teacher’s College by the end of the decade. The new institution required a high school diploma for admissions, and the curriculum became one of real higher education. The 1934 Teacher Training Act also established normal schools in the provinces with higher standards than those of 1918. Candidates now had to possess a middle school diploma, and the curriculum brought graduates up through the eighth grade. Finally, during the White Revolution, the shah created a “Literacy Corps” as an alternative to compulsory military service for young men who had achieved a twelfth grade education. These men received only a basic military training and then underwent a cursory training as teachers before being dispersed into the provinces to teach in the emerging elementary schools. The Ministry of Education requested that BYU advisors help organize more formal teacher

education for Literacy Corps veterans who wanted to continue teaching after their enlistments ended.  

There were limits to these reforms, however. Most rural teachers still had less than eight years of formal education in 1950, and many had no teacher training. While the government did begin to pay more attention to education during the 1930s, schools never received more than four percent of the annual budget in an era when military spending always exceeded fifty percent. Also, while Reza Shah’s governments expanded education at all levels, they did not modernize the curriculum. Rather, the nationalization and centralization of education helped universalize traditional practices. Finding little education innovation during the second half of the 1940s, Ahmad Fattahipour-Fard calls these years “politically colorful but educationally dismal.”

It was into this educational environment that the BYU advisors began work in late 1951. The initial contract involved six advisors working to improve elementary education practices in Tehran and the various provinces between 1951 and 1955. They began by experimenting with two demonstration schools while TCA officials worked out the final Point Four agreement with the Mossadegh government. The BYU team sought to instill child-centered principles of teaching and learning that would reduce the reliance on rote memorization and the authoritarianism of the teacher-student relationship. In their place, the Point Four advisors tried to show teachers how to encourage children to develop a love of learning and problem solving skills. The BYU advisors emphasized the

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importance of a positive and mutually comfortable teacher-student relationship and the importance of both teachers and students becoming life-long learners. The idea was to help Iranians move away from seeing public education as an avenue for producing a limited class of obedient civil servants and toward seeing it as a universal tool to produce citizens who were engaged in the task of making Iran a great nation.\footnote{BYU, \textit{Technical Aid}, 83-4.}

Isfahanik, a small village outside of the city of Isfahan in central Iran, became the site of the first demonstration center. The village had never had a formal school, and many children suffered from malaria arising from an abundance of standing water in moats around a discarded fort. One of the Iranian members of the team, who studied building construction in the United States, undertook the project of clearing away the water and building a school with sanitary facilities. Another Iranian team member, a horticulturalist also trained in the United States, created a school garden for use in botany and homemaking classes. The garden project in particular aroused the interest of the local population. According to Franklin Harris, many village families “thought of school as something remote from their interest.” Once they saw that its activities “related to their lives,” however, the children “were willing to be pupils.” The Point Four team encountered the same suspicion of school at Kamalabad, about thirty miles west of Tehran, the site of the second demonstration school. This time, in addition to a garden, the team developed a playground, an orchard, and a poultry project under the supervision of another Iranian technician. Again, the local population showed an interest in education because they came to understand how it might improve their lives. The Point
Four advisors learned a valuable lesson that would serve them well, especially when it came to promoting extension education.\(^{100}\)

Once the Point Four mission in Tehran arranged the necessary agreements with the Iranian government in early 1952, the Brigham Young education technicians expanded this initial demonstration project by setting up a variety of similar schools in Tehran. The government granted these schools latitude to experiment with new approaches to education. These schools achieved some success, and by the beginning of the 1953/4 school year, the BYU team had opened up thirteen additional demonstration schools outside of Tehran. The schools served two purposes. On the one hand, they provided a location for in-service training for Iran’s marginally educated rural teachers. But they also acted as regular schools that enrolled students and reached out to local communities.\(^{101}\)

The public reaction to such schools was often encouraging even in areas where the population showed skepticism. In Rasht, for example, the superintendent assigned “all the slowest children” to the new school, but the BYU advisors and their Iranian counterparts earned high praise when these children posted the highest marks in the city and the lowest rate of failure on the annual examinations. Education specialist Lula Anderson began receiving requests for more schools, and several compiled long waiting lists to admit students by the summer of 1953. The mayor of Rasht was among those who wished to have his children enrolled. The BYU team began experimenting with

\(^{100}\) Harris, “The Beginnings of Point Four Work in Iran,” *Middle East Journal* 7 (1953), 224-226.

\(^{101}\) The demonstration school program was Project Agreement 12, signed on 23 June 1952. Max Berryessa, “Our Life Together”; William Warne, “Report of Contributions Made by Brigham Young University in the Development of the Point Four Program in Iran,” 3, folder 1, PFPF, BYU.
demonstration secondary schools in 1953, and at least one such school was up and running in almost all provinces by the fall of 1954. Advisors in Tehran purchased Persian typewriters from Sweden in order to conduct typing classes. The classes won the support of the Ministry of Education, which cooperated in creating a series of similar courses so that ministry personnel could learn the skill. The courses even attracted the attention of the shah who paid them a personal visit.102

While the demonstration schools marked a good start to BYU’s educational efforts in Iran, the project ultimately revolved around improving the training and performance of the country’s rural teachers. When he took a moment to reflect upon his first two years of service in Iran, A. Reed Morrill noted, “One cannot contemplate the educational ills in Iran without concluding that many of the present mal-practices and unsound concepts are present because of poor and improper training of the teachers.” The single largest contribution that the BYU advisors made to Iranian education during the 1950s was a series of summer demonstration courses for teachers that they helped design and implement. The majority of Iranian elementary school teachers had no more than six years of education themselves, so conducting teacher training along the lines of higher education in the United States would be impractical. Under the circumstances, demonstrating basic techniques and allowing the teachers to observe the resultant changes in student performance promised to be the most efficient way to effect changes.

Finally, a small but vocal group of communists within the teaching profession concerned both the American and Iranian governments by speaking out against Point Four activities. The BYU advisors responded with a determination to show the teachers that American technical assistance could be beneficial to Iran.\(^{103}\)

The in-service training program began in the summer of 1952. The Iranian Ministry of Education decided to concentrate on seven provinces during the first summer, and selected forty-five of the best-educated rural elementary school teachers from those provinces to receive advanced training in the techniques directly from Point Four technicians in Tehran. The program pooled educators from the Ministry of Education, the BYU team, the International Information Administration – the forerunner of the United States Information Agency (USIA) – branch in Tehran, as well as American Fulbright Fellows working in Iran. The initial Tehran course lasted seven weeks; thereafter the teachers returned to their locales and taught the curriculum to approximately 1,200 teachers in just over 600 villages. Unlike in Tehran, where American technicians did most of the classroom teaching in the early years, the program relied largely on Iranian educators in the countryside from the very beginning. In the sparsely populated rural provinces, where illiteracy was the highest and formal education

among teachers the lowest, there was usually but a single American technician working on the in-service training.104

The course emphasized three major points. First, by showing teachers ways to have the students actively participate in the lessons, it tacitly discouraged the rote memorization of lectures and textbooks, especially in basic reading and arithmetic lessons. Second, the course demonstrated easy and cost effective ways to make durable teaching tools, visual aids, and classroom displays. This would help make a more pleasant learning environment for the children. Finally, the program taught teachers how to make simple repairs to school equipment and furniture. In so doing, American advisors confronted one of the universal values of the Iranian class system – educated officials refused to do even routine manual labor. Sadiq observed, “Since the introduction of the State examinations in 1911, each graduate of a secondary and even of an elementary school has been ambitious to have a desk in some office of the Government.” Educated Iranians considered “industrial and commercial pursuits unworthy of a scholar who has succeeded in obtaining a state certificate.” Yet, the overwhelming majority of rural schools languished in a dilapidated state. Since there was generally no one to make the repairs, the students could not use much of the furniture. At the same time, however, most of this equipment was simple – consisting of benches, desks, and blackboards – and rather easy for teachers to repair. After the Iranian educators saw American professors and their colleagues wielding hammers and saws, the

104 Hoyt Turner and Stewart Hamblen, “In-Service Education for Iranian Rural Teachers,” 8 October 1958, box 13, entry 576, USFAA, NAI; Bowles, “The Role of Education in Point IV,” 11, USFAA, NAI. The locations of the seven provincial courses in 1952 were: Babolsar, Tabriz, Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Kermanshah, and Ahwaz.
teachers’ objections to working with their hands largely disappeared, replaced by a desire to improve the functionality of their schools.\textsuperscript{105}

Though limited, the first summer program was a success from the standpoint of building a warm working relationship between the American technicians and the Iranian educators who orchestrated the program in the provinces. The cooperation allowed the program to grow rapidly. Female teachers attended both in Tehran and in the provinces for the first time in 1953. That same year, the program also extended to the large nomadic Qashgai tribe of Fars province, with over 100 teachers receiving basic training in the American methods. The program offered summer in-service training to secondary school teachers for the first time in 1954. At the conclusion of the fourth summer in-service program in 1955, over 6,000 Iranian teachers had received some basic exposure to innovative teaching methods. The dispersion technique seemed to be making significant progress.\textsuperscript{106}

According to Point Four documents, the majority of the Iranian educators who completed the summer training courses judged the experience to be positive. After the first summer, a number of Iranian teachers reported that the short course taught them more about pedagogy than they had learned in the entirety their previous education and teaching experience. The most encouraging indicator was the number of teachers who reported that their new outlook on teaching and learning had enhanced their view of the profession. The directors of education in each of the seven provinces that participated

\textsuperscript{105} Bowles, “The Role of Education in Point IV,” 11, USFAA, NAI; Turner and Hamblen, “In-Service Education for Rural Teachers,” 4, USFAA, NAI; Sadiq, \textit{Modern Persia and Her Educational System}, 88.

\textsuperscript{106} Glen S. Gagon, “Report of the Educational Activities in the Fars Ostan for the Period November 19, 1951 through September 6, 1953,” 15 September 1953, box 13, entry 576, USFAA, NAI.
asked for the program to be continued and expanded in their districts. One even asked if Point Four could arrange for all three thousand teachers under his supervision to take part in the course. Rizza Clarke, who helped organize the training courses in 1954 and 1955, remained popular with her Iranian colleagues when she returned with her husband for a second assignment in 1962. “Wherever she appeared,” wrote Alva John Clarke in his memoir, “the word spread of her presence.” Former students called on her or sent their greetings. Several had since risen to become principals or sharesten (roughly county) chiefs. They were “anxious and proud to have her see what they had done with the ideas they had received in summer sessions.”

For ten years, the summer in-service training course remained the most extensive and effective Point Four program to promote education in Iran. At the end of 1959, the program had held 755 courses, most taught by Iranian educators, and had reached almost all of the practicing elementary school teachers in Iran. This was no average feat in a country that still faced a paucity of paved roads and in which the horse and mule were still the primary means of long-distance travel for most rural people. The accomplishment underscores the dedication and tenacity of the Point Four team and even more that of the Iranian teachers who did much of the work in the provinces. By the mid-1950s, the Point Four team had also designed courses from principals and sharesten chiefs as well as for the teachers of the newest educational level in Iran, the kindergarten.

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107 Turner and Hamblen, “In Service Education for Iranian Rural Teachers,” USFAA, NAI; Alva John Clarke, “Personal Histories, 1977,” folder 1, Alva John Clarke Collection, BYU; and Bingham, Shirt Sleeve Diplomacy, 112.
108 Hendershot, Politics, Polemics, and Pedagogs, 84-85.
As with all low-modernization projects, Iranian educators and assistants played an essential role in the success of the demonstration schools and teacher in-service programs. Communicating across the language barrier was a constant challenge for both the American and Iranian technicians as well as the mostly Iranian assistants. Morrill noted that because the English-speaking abilities of the Iranian assistants varied, the field team had to concentrate on communicating ideas and concepts as much as words. In this vital link of the teaching process, establishing a synergy between American and Iranian technicians was absolutely necessary. Competent Iranians acted as translators and as liaisons between the BYU team and the Ministry of Education; they also explained Iranian educational policy. American advisors did occasionally find working with Iranian assistants and counterparts difficult. Sometimes, language skills or personality conflicts caused problems, but in other cases conflicting attitudes toward tradition and innovation caused friction. For the most part, however, the American advisors worked well with Iranian educators. Most seemed to understand that they could not simply dictate to the Iranians or expect ideas that had worked well in the United States to translate seamlessly to Iran. They had to work in an equal partnership, moving slowly and explaining concepts that were quite foreign to Iranian educators. When questions or objections arose, as they frequently did, American advisors had to learn to be respectful of accepted traditions.\footnote{Morrill, “A Brief Report of Secondary Education in Iran,” 50; A. Reed Morrill Collection, BYU; and Clarke, “Personal Histories, 1977,” 41, Alva John Clarke Collection, BYU.}

In short, successful education assistance required the technicians to become skilled academic ambassadors. “If we fail in the development of good personnel
relations,” observed A. Reed Morrill, “the key to all accomplishment will be lost.” The Americans often had to win over Iranian educators gradually such as the administrator who, in 1953 believed that he could run a school as well as the Americans if he only had the money. By the conclusion of the program he was encouraging his colleagues, “Gentlemen, we are not educators we are clerks, we spend all our time behind desks, writing letters, I have watched our American friends work together to help us solve our educational problems, cooperatively, I am a new man.”

Despite the numbers served and the generally positive response within the Iranian education community, the summer training courses showed two major limitations. First, the courses only lasted a few weeks. They exposed teachers to new approaches to teaching and learning, but their brevity offered limited opportunities for practice. Many teachers consequently had difficulty digesting them; some did not really understand or accept them to begin with. In addition, the courses had no mechanism for addressing one of the most persistent problems of elementary education in Iran, the deplorably low level of overall education for most teachers. The program could never be anything more than a primer for a more thorough Iranian program of education reform.

The state into which in-service training lapsed after the BYU advisors withdrew in 1955 suggests that the techniques that the BYU team’s efforts went only surface deep in Iran. Clarence Hendershot, who was education director in Iran when the in-service program terminated in 1961, observes that, “Under full Iranian control, the in-service program languished, due primarily to changes in the Ministry which brought into power

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men who had other interests which absorbed their attention and Ministry funds.” Iranian
officials continued to favor the concept of in-service training to enhance teachers’ skills,
“but implementation was no longer on a regular basis.” Nor were the classes as widely
available under Iranian leadership as they had been under the Point Four program.111

The demonstration schools, too, show evidence of having achieved largely
ephemeral results. Upon returning to Iran for a second assignment in 1959, this time at
the National Teacher’s College, A. Reed Morrill lamented that “the Point Four
demonstration schools had become ‘now typically Iranian in organization, methods of
teaching, and results obtained’.” Morrill understood that this was not exclusively, or
even mostly, the fault of Iranian educators who took over control of the program in 1955.
The new concepts “required constant care and careful supervision to maintain them,” yet
the BYU team operated for only four years in Iran against a background of twenty or
more years of traditional practice. Moreover, Morrill also noted that Point Four officials
in Iran failed to follow up on the progress of the demonstration schools after the BYU
program ended. The BYU advisors probably diminished the multiplier effect by
attempting to reach tens of thousands of teachers in very short summer courses rather
than concentrating on thoroughly educating a representative core of teachers, but the
program was designed more to spread ideas rather than to provide individual teachers
with a thorough education.112

The demonstration schools and the summer teacher training courses illustrate two
fundamental realities of American education assistance in the developing world. First,

111 Hendershot, Politics, Polemics, and Pedagoges, 84.
112 A. Reed Morrill, “Appendix A” to Completion of Tour Report, undated, folder 1, PFPF, BYU.
results would necessarily be limited given the strategy and timetable that Point Four employed. Time and again, American advisors came to the realization that it was neither possible nor desirable to transform the education systems of developing nations quickly. Second, achieving favorable results required the advisors to negotiate a deeply rooted Iranian culture of education that stressed very different values from those that the Americans were trying to spread. The BYU professors had to realize that they could not simply remake the process of teaching and learning in the American image. University teams first had to develop an appreciation of which aspects of education host country educators and government officials were willing to modify. They then had to blend aspects of their own educational philosophy into existing pedagogical frameworks in such a way that educators and Ministry officials in the host countries could understand and embrace. Finally, the Americans had to accept that if the projects were to exercise any long-term influence on education in developing countries, host country nationals had to take ownership of the projects. This meant that once the Americans withdrew, the projects would not function exactly as the advisors had envisioned them.

The last major component of BYU assistance to primary education in Iran during the 1950s was a program to assist in the development of a series of portable schools to benefit the semi-nomadic tribes of southwestern Iran. Of these, the most sustained and successful effort concerned that of the Qashqai tribe of Fars province.

The Qashqai are a large confederation of mostly Turkic speaking tribes whose population numbered about 200,000 in the middle of the twentieth century. Most split their time between summer pastures in the highlands of the Zagros Mountains and winter
pastures some three hundred miles to the southeast at the base of the range. Leading Turkoman khans rose to power around Shiraz by forming the Qashqai confederacy near the end of the eighteenth century. Over the next hundred years, the relatively weak shahs of the Qajar dynasty respected the autonomy of the khans who controlled an area roughly the size of Belgium. But Reza Shah saw the tribes as a backward affront to the modern Iranian state and employed ruthless means to break their power during the 1920s and 1930s. He imprisoned several tribal leaders and deployed the army to block Qashqai migratory routes; he even subjected their migrations to aerial bombardments. As a result, many tribes people found themselves trapped in highland summer pastures causing a great loss of life to both humans and livestock during the winters.113

The war years and the fall of Reza Shah allowed the Qashqai leadership to reestablish its power base in Southwestern Iran. Between 1941 and 1953, the young Mohammad Reza Shah lacked the power to bring the tribes under state control. It was near the end of this period, in 1952, that a Qashqai intellectual whose family headed a small clan, Mohammad Bahmanbegi, began experimenting with a system of tent schools that could move with the tribes on their regular migrations. Few Qashqai were literate before the 1950s. A handful of men could read and write well enough to keep clan records, and they generally passed the skill onto their sons. Beyond this, though, tribal life offered few rewards for literacy. Conversely, school age children could assist in useful activities such as sheep herding, hunting, and carpet weaving. The experience of

the modern Iranian state during the 1930s, however, convinced the Qashqai leadership of the importance of being able to function in an increasingly sophisticated society. Consequently, the idea of educating their children gained popularity among the Qashqai by the 1950s. Bahmanbegi was abundantly qualified to lead the experiment in education. His father had served on the staff of the Qashqai’s leading khan, and Bahmanbegi himself took a law degree from the University of Tehran. In addition to his native Turkish dialect, Bahmanbegi spoke Persian and French fluently, could write English well, and knew some German. He published a major study of the tribes of Fars in 1945.  

Bahmanbegi began by teaching his neighbors to read and write; by 1952 he had organized an ad-hoc school for older children that ran during the roughly eight months in which the people were relatively settled in either winter or summer pasture. He lacked formal teacher training, but that probably helped him develop innovative schools because he was not steeped in Iranian pedagogical traditions. Bahmanbegi did visit the United States twice and was favorably impressed with the schools he saw, especially those for American Indians. By the early 1950s he had become convinced that pastoral nomadism held no future for the tribes of Fars. Years later he admitted in an interview, “Except for the teachers, I tell our students, ‘Don’t go back to your people. … The real power to help them lies not in black tents [the nomads’ homes] but where the money and decisions are made – in government, industry, and the professions.’”

Glen Gagon, a Point Four advisor and graduate student of Max Berryessa at BYU, assisted in the tent school program almost from its inception. The Point Four staff assigned Gagon to work in Fars, but anti-American mobs destroyed the Shiraz Point Four office in April 1953 and ruined much of his preliminary data collection. To help facilitate a partnership, Point Four put Bahmanbegi on its payroll; he and Gagon began designing a tent school program for all the Qashqai as well as for the neighboring Basseri tribes. The Point Four role was mostly logistical – it helped with supplies and the training of teachers; Bahmanbegi supervised the schools and conducted the student examinations.\(^{116}\)

Gagon’s contributions nearly ended before they really began. Making the schools work required cooperation and coordination from the Ministry of Education and local army officials in Fars. When delays from the ministry threatened the training program for the schools’ teachers in May 1953, Gagon appealed directly to one of leading Qashqai khans who was then serving in Parliament. The education minister reacted fiercely to an initiative that failed to consult his office and requested that William Warne eject Gagon from Iran. Only the intercession of the Iranian undersecretary of education, who had previously worked with Point Four Director of Education, Hoyt Turner, allowed Gagon to remain in Iran. That incident, however, was far from the end of Gagon’s political difficulties. August 1953 brought the coup that removed Mossadegh from power, and the

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Qashqai leadership supported the prime minister. Reasons included both their profound distrust of the Pahlavi monarchy and their positive experience with Mossadegh during his governorship of Fars thirty years earlier. The Qashqai also supported the prime minister’s parliamentary fight to nationalize the Iranian oil industry. Rumors that Mossadegh supporters had fled into Qashqai territory following the coup brought an acute threat of armed conflict to the area late in the summer of 1953.117

In the midst of the disturbance, Gagon’s first tour in Iran came to an end on 1 September 1953, and he was forced to return to the United States. It had been a frustrating two years. Along with Bahmanbegi, he had laid the groundwork for moveable tent schools and had trained the first teachers, but political disturbances and his own indiscretion prevented him from going any further. Gagon returned to Iran in January 1954, this time without his family as the State Department would not allow them back into Iran for fear of their safety. Through Bahmanbegi, he learned that the Qashqai had avoided armed conflict with the army when three of its most important khans had accepted exile abroad. The tent school program could finally begin.118

The schools that Bahmanbegi and Gagon devised had to be light and durable. They consisted of a circular white tent, textbooks, notebooks, chalk, pencils, soccer and volleyballs for recreation, and a tent to serve as a sanitary latrine. The advisors tried to design wooden desks, but they proved cumbersome and uncomfortable for children accustomed to sitting or squatting on carpets or on the ground. Students usually

118 Ibid.
discarded the desks altogether in favor of assuming their usual posture, though they sometimes wrote with the aid of simple lapboards. Dr. Clarence Hendershot, a frequent visitor to the schools as the American Education Director in Iran from 1961 through 1965, describes the proceedings on a typical day in a typical school:

An air of orderly informality marks these schools. The boys and girls squat together on colorful rugs, usually facing a small blackboard resting on crude posts like an easel, often with a bag of chalk lying on the ground underneath. The upper classes may be sitting in small groups nearby in the open, or in the shade, if any is to be found. All are intent on their books, or the blackboard. The monitor system is common, the older children teaching the younger, or one child works a problem on the blackboard while the others watch, being quick to raise a hand if an error is noted. The concentration of mind, the alertness to every development, the complete absorption of their minds in the learning situation make for a speed of accomplishment not found in many schools.119

The schools faced serious problems finding and paying teachers. Gagon notes that slightly over one quarter of the teachers that Point Four helped train in 1953 refused to work for the tent schools. Some wanted to avoid the political instability in Fars during 1953, but many others found nomadic life too arduous. Teachers from a tribal background proved better suited for the job, but they almost always lacked the credentials that the Ministry of Education required. This presented a convenient excuse for the Ministry to refuse to pay the teachers’ salaries since the ministry took no interest in supporting the program during its first two years. The Iranian government was only prepared to educate the children of settled tribespeople and to do it in permanent schools in Shiraz. Bahmanbegi procured the necessary funds from wealthy Qashqai families for

119 Hendershot, White Tents in the Mountains, 17.
1953/4, but no one other than Gagon found this situation suitable. The ministry finally agreed to pay teacher salaries after Bahmanbegi arranged a very successful demonstration of tent school competence for ministry officials in 1955, but the ministry insisted that teachers acquire the proper credentials. To remedy the situation, the ministry opened a tribal normal school in Shiraz and initially waived the requirement of six years of formal education for admission. Rather, admission was based on “literacy and general ability,” though within a decade the ministry imposed the regular admissions criteria. The tribal normal school at Shiraz produced nearly 500 teachers in its first decade, enough to teach about 15,000 children.¹²⁰

The tent schools seemed to have a positive effect on the children, especially since the ministry relaxed the standard calendar to allow for migrations. Paul Barker, an American Peace Corps volunteer who taught in the tent schools from 1973 though 1975, noted that tribal children seemed to be healthier than those who dwelt in villages. Frequent migrations, a vigorous life outdoors, and Bahmanbegi’s strict standard of teacher hygiene all contributed to a healthful environment. Bahmanbegi himself was largely responsible for the schools’ much higher than the national average rate of academic success. Point Four data indicates that the failure rate was less than three percent for the first two grades; the same data indicates that with regular attendance,

¹²⁰ Gagon, “A Study,” 92-3; Barker, “Tent Schools of the Qashqai,” 151-2; and Tribal Education in Iran (Tehran: Kayhan Press, 1965), 7, NAIL, RG 286, Entry 617, Box 124. Bahmanbegi gave a similar accounting of the difficulty of finding teachers in the early years to Pierre Oberling in a 1957 interview. Oberling included much of the transcript of this interview in The Qashqa’i Nomads of Fars, 207-8. The ministry also opened five other normal schools in four provinces, but they proved less successful. A discrepancy exists over the exact number of teachers trained. According to Tribal Education in Iran, the schools trained 477 in seven years. According to Hendershot, they trained 465 teachers in twelve years. Hendershot, White Tents in the Mountains, 14.
some students advanced more than one grade of the normal curriculum during a single school year. As Director General of tribal education, he meticulously inspected the schools and their teachers. He forbade the use of corporal punishment and encouraged parents to send their daughters to the schools. The per-student cost of operating the tent schools actually turned out to be much smaller than those of the village schools.121

In many ways, the tent schools program proved the most successful primary education project that Point Four engaged in Iran; it functioned exactly as a low-modernization technical assistance project should. Gagon provided crucial help with gathering important demographic data, procuring supplies and training teachers during the first two years of the program before the Ministry of Education offered its support. The Americans also shaped the teaching methods to some degree, though many of Bahmanbegi’s ideas resulted at least as much from his own trips to the United States. The program itself, however, was almost exclusively Iranian in execution. Iranians taught and maintained the schools with Bahmanbegi firmly in charge. American influence declined rapidly after the Iranian Ministry of Education assumed financial responsibility for the program in 1955, and Bahmanbegi left the Point Four payroll.122

Almost 1,200 tribal children were attending seventy-eight tent schools by the end of the first school year (May 1954) despite the migration routes causing intermittent attendance problems. The tent school program increased educational opportunities for tribal girls, a goal of both the BYU advisors and the Iranian Ministry of Education.

122 Hendershot, White Tents in the Mountains, 27-8; Caseel Burke, Completion of Tour Report, folder 1, PFPF, BYU.
Almost thirty percent of the nearly 112,000 children who attended the schools between 1953 and 1978 were girls. The tribal normal school first admitted girls in 1962; eleven years later 270 had graduated and were teaching, a significant accomplishment given the hesitancy with which some Qashqai greeted the idea of sending their girls to school just a decade earlier.123

Both internal and external observers noted a positive parental response. Barker writes that during the two and a half decades between the fall of Mossadegh and the 1978/9 Revolution, the tribal education program spread literacy throughout the tribal populations of southwestern Iran. “Many would argue,” he continued, “that it has been the most excitingly successful educational experiment in modern Iranian history.” UNESCO observer James Dunhill similarly reports, “The achievement managed by these tribal children is probably the most astonishing single feat of education I have ever seen.” Ministry officials thought that a number of factors that led to the success; these included the dedication of the teachers, the interest they showed in student development and the singularity of purpose with which most tribes embraced the program. Indeed, the people held the teachers in high regard, especially those who were members of the tribe that they taught. School teachers often received deference second only to that of the highest khans.124

After having successfully extended its first contract for education assistance in Iran through the fall of 1955, the BYU administration expressed its interest in continuing

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124 Barker, “Tent Schools of the Qashqai,” 139-140. Dunhill quoted in Sabahi, “The White Tent Programme,” 247; Government of Iran, see Tribal Education in Iran, 11; Hendershot, White Tents in the Mountains, 8-12; and Barker, “Tent Schools of the Qashqai,” 154-157.
the project, but the Point Four agency, then the ICA, declined. That decision brought to a close the first phase of BYU’s participation in technical assistance in Iran; the university would not embark on another Iranian contract until the end of the decade. In the second phase of its education program in Iran, the BYU team focused on strengthening Iran’s National Teacher’s College, the Daneshsaraye Ali.

Some of the circumstances surrounding the ICA’s decision to terminate the BYU contract irritated the university’s president, Ernest Wilkinson. He believed that the director of Point Four in Iran at the time, Clark Gregory, disliked Mormons and this attitude helped shape the decision to bring the BYU team home. The most compelling evidence to support this assertion appears to have been an October 1955 letter in which Gregory expressed concerns about the problems he saw as “inherent” in having “too many of any one faith working as a unit in a country predominantly Muslim.” In a January 1956 letter to the ICA, Wilkinson offered to supply evidence that Gregory had, during his previous assignment in Jordan, promised to “reduce the number of Mormons” in Iran if he ever landed another assignment there.125

That Wilkinson was upset with the apparent anti-Mormon sentiment of a prominent Point Four official is easy enough to understand. But whatever ill-will Gregory harbored against Mormons does not appear to have been the deciding factor in terminating the contract. Rather, the work that the BYU team had been doing with the Ministry of Education was not really in line with the emerging strategy of shifting university technical assistance contracts to higher education projects. Wilkinson himself

125 Embry, “Utah Universities in Iran,” 174; Wilkinson to Joseph M. Stokes, January 3, 1956, folder 8, box 2, Dean Peterson Collection, BYU.
acknowledged the shift in February 1955. More important, however, the new ICA
director, James Hollister, wished to curtail the university contract program; he started
very few new projects and terminated many existing ones. The ICA Chief of the Greece,
Turkey, and Iran Division had, in August, advised Wilkinson that these changes in the
nature of the university contract program would make it impossible to renew the BYU
contract.  

Scholars who have examined Point Four technical assistance in Iran have often
dismissed it as inadequate, misguided, or worse. Nikki Keddie, for example, emphasized
that Iran’s persistent rural poverty compromised many of the Point Four efforts. Paul
Barker described Point Four as “fumbling” in his analysis of the Qashqai tent school
program. One of the most acerbic critics of American technical assistance in Iran, Reza
Arasteh, wrote, “the majority of American advisors were not qualified to do their jobs
and personal problems often distracted them.” He goes on to charge that “genuine
public-minded Persians did not want to participate in the program,” and that “second-rate
Americans worked with Persians of a similar character and the result was failure.”
Arasteh offers scant evidence to support this broadside attack. He is correct in pointing
out that a 1956 Congressional inquiry found evidence of misappropriation and wasted
funds in the Point Four program in Iran, but he provides nothing to demonstrate the

126 Wilkinson to Warne, 14 February 1955, folder 7, box 3, Dean Peterson Collection, BYU; Wilkinson to
Stokes, 3 January 1956, folder 8, box 2, Dean Peterson Collection, BYU; Victor H. Skiles to Wilkinson, 31
August 1955, box 10, entry 576, USFAA, NAI. Jessie Embry, a BYU scholar who has studied the Utah
contracts in Iran at great length, finds some merit in Wilkinson’s concern over anti-Mormonism in the ICA
but also concludes that Wilkinson probably overreacted. Embry interviewed by Richard Garlitz, December
2006, Provo, UT.
incompetence or malevolence of either American education advisors or their Iranian counterparts.\textsuperscript{127}

Indeed, both Point Four and BYU documents suggest a very different picture of the quality of Americans and Iranians working on education reform and of the relationship between the two groups. William Warne, for example, credits the BYU advisors with making “a great contribution in up-grading the education of the entire country.” Warne concludes that in “their acceptance of the assignment as a ‘mission’ to help improve the way of life among the underprivileged people of Iran,” the BYU advisors had performed “a worthy service.” Warne obviously had reason to paint the BYU contribution in the best possible light, but his commentary on the sincerity and the commitment of the technicians nevertheless casts doubt on Arasteh’s caustic judgment of the BYU advisors having been second rate.\textsuperscript{128}

Certainly, there are grounds for criticism. U.S. Operations Mission (USOM – the Point Four Mission in Iran) evaluations suggest that the Iranian education system often had difficulty utilizing those individuals that it had sent to the United States for advanced training. A 1960 report commissioned by the ICA still found problematic many areas of emphasis in the education program. The author, Dr. John Allen Fitz of the University of Southern California, noted a “definite improvement” in the planning and quality of the in-service education of teachers, but he also ranked the quality of teacher education in general among the persistent “key problems.” He found that curriculum reform had

\textsuperscript{127} Nikki Keddie, \textit{Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution} (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2003), 117; Barker, “Tent Schools of the Qashqa'i,” 144; Arasteh, \textit{Education and Social Awakening in Iran}, 171.

\textsuperscript{128} Warne, “Report of Contributions Made by the Brigham Young University in the Development of the Point Four Program in Iran,” 4, 6, folder 1, PFPF, BYU.
failed to translate into many classrooms and that too many school grounds were still “dirty and unclean.” While the Fitz report identified some instances of local officials failing to implement innovations that the Ministry of Education had endorsed, he found that the major problem was a lack of “clearly stated, stable program.” In other words, while many ideas had been introduced during the past decade, nobody, neither the Ministry nor the American advisors, had yet to mold them into a coherent program. As a result, the rate of improvement was very uneven over the country.\textsuperscript{129}

In reality, the BYU personnel did the best they could to contribute to the expansion and reform of Iranian elementary and secondary education. It is difficult to ignore the critical support that Point Four in general, and Glen Gagon in particular, gave to the tent school program during its most nascent phase when the Ministry of Education would do nothing to assist it. The American advisors also helped increase opportunities for girls. Point Four advisors working in all provinces stressed the importance of girls attending schools. Finally, working for Point Four became a “fashionable outlet” for educated Iranian women. William Warne recalled that Iranian parents “liked the wholesome, matter-of-fact American attitude toward working women,” and therefore some allowed their daughters to work as typists, secretaries, and teachers, all positions that allowed a small group of women to acquire skills that carried a high value in a developing society such as Iran. In one instance, Warne even took the daring step to assign a woman, Lucy W. Adams, as provincial Point Four director at Isfahan; a position

\textsuperscript{129} USOM/Iran, \textit{Follow-Up Evaluation Study of Iranian Participants Who Received Training in the U.S. Under ICA Sponsorship}, (Tehran, 1956); Dr. John Allen Fitz, “Observations on Education in Ostan 2,” 27 July 1960, box 124, entry 617, AID, NAI.
in which she did “more than anyone else in recent years to break the shackles off Iranian
women.”130

In the final analysis, the BYU educational programs in Iran tell us much about the
capacity of American technical assistance to shape modernization in the developing
world. The BYU advisors were genuine in their desire to promote educational
development in Iran, but they could never have been more than a primer for more
thorough education reform that the Iranians would have to carry out themselves. On their
own, the BYU advisors lacked the capacity to change the social and pedagogical
traditions upon which Iranian education rested. Their ideas of pragmatism, child-
centered education and developing the intellect were at odds with core values in Iran’s
rigid and hierarchical education system such as rote memorization and the tendency to
see education as a vehicle for training a limited class of obedient officials. Much more
than four years and many more skilled and dedicated Iranians were required to tackle
these larger problems.

130 Warne, Mission for Peace, 172-3.
CHAPTER 4: TAKING LEARNING TO THE PEOPLE: EXTENSION EDUCATION

“In Agriculture, we can help the people adopt new and better practices and help instill in them a healthy philosophy of faith in their country.”
- Farrell G. Olson, Utah State Agricultural College Advisor, Kermanshah, Iran

“An Extension Service ... may hold the key to the social and economic development of Eastern Turkey.”
- Ted Doane, University of Nebraska Extension Advisor in Turkey

Melvin Peterson, a Utah State Agricultural College advisor assigned to assist the people of Fars province develop modern agricultural extension, stood alongside Khan Ziad of the Dareshuri clan of the Qashqai as the two surveyed a plain of hip deep grass stretched out across the khan’s summer pasture. As the two men spoke, Dareshuri reflected on a recent pleasant change in his people’s fortune. “Two years ago,” the chief recalled, “an American Point Four man told me that I could grow twice as much grass by rotating grazing.” Then he added that the plain had not been grazed since. “Look at it,” marveled Dareshuri, “there is twice as much grazing as on my other ranges.” A simple piece of advice and a simple observation, but both Peterson and Dareshuri understood how much it meant to the Qashqai and to the reputation of American agricultural advisors in Iran.131

Extension work, the field of technical assistance designed to take specialized knowledge about scientific agriculture and healthy living to people in remote communities, represented a low-modernization approach to improving the quality of life for rural people in the developing world. American advisors and the extension agents they helped train worked directly with farmers and their families to solve problems that had kept village people poor and undernourished for hundreds of years. According to

131 Melvin Peterson, Completion of Tour Report, 1 August 1957, folder 1, box 7A, UPI, USU.
Harold Allen, a veteran Near East Foundation rural development advisor in Iran, extension education had to be “simple, easy to apply and adapted to local conditions” since most Turkish and Iranian peasants were illiterate. Low-modernization qualities helped make extension work popular with villagers, particularly in Iran. Though many peasants did not immediately embrace agricultural improvements if they thought landlords would receive most of the benefits, they did respond once they saw how scientific agriculture and cleaner living could improve their lives. Rural adult literacy programs and youth clubs that taught adolescents about gardening, clothes making and record keeping were also popular in many isolated communities.132

At the same time, however, American attempts to bring the agricultural extension concept to Turkey and Iran showed some of the same limitations that the BYU programs in elementary and secondary education had. The size of the American effort and the necessity for Turks and Iranians to translate these ideas into sustainable practices in their own countries meant that the American advisors were able to provide only a foundation for extension services. Indeed, American work on agricultural extension in Turkey and Iran demonstrates one of the liberal fallacies that Robert Packenham saw guiding American foreign assistance. That is, the tremendous growth of extension services in the United States before 1945 and the prominent role that extension played in expanding agricultural production gave Americans an exaggerated confidence in how effectively they could transfer this kind of education to the developing world. The novelty of the extension concept, the inability of both governments to create smooth-functioning extension services, and the reluctance of universities to accept related disciplines such as

home economics all limited the American ability to influence the growth of extension services in Turkey and Iran. As with other aspects of technical assistance, the American advisors could provide a valuable primer that helped launch extension programs, but Turks and Iranians would have to be the ones to adapt these services to make them work well in their own countries. When they could not, as was largely the case in Turkey, host country extension services showed less-promising results.133

Developing effective extension services brought the American advisors and their Turkish and Iranian counterparts face to face with some formidable obstacles. Like most developing nations in the middle of the twentieth century, Turkey and Iran were largely rural and agrarian. Even in the mid-1950s, agricultural production accounted for a larger percentage of Iran’s gross domestic product than did oil. Yet, for the most part, Turkish and Iranian farmers lived difficult lives and enjoyed few modern conveniences. Communications and road networks remained primitive and imposed a provincial isolation on many communities. Most small farmers used technology that was centuries and even millennia old. Marvel Baker of the University of Nebraska thought that Turkish agriculture in the mid-twentieth century worked about like it had in the United States around 1790. The similarities between the simple wooden ox-drawn plows of the Iranian peasants and artifacts from twenty five centuries earlier amazed Utah State advisors. In addition to technological deficiencies, peasants battled diseases, both to humans and to livestock, and many types of crop-destroying parasites. Peasants and villagers lacked even the most rudimentary knowledge of sanitation. One of the most shocking sights to

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westerners upon arriving in Iran during the 1950s was the common practice of women washing clothes and dishes in *jubes*, lined gutters that ran alongside streets and washed away waste, debris, and sewage. “The villagers are in the grips of destitution,” declared Iran’s Minister of Agriculture, Mustafa Zahedi. “Although they support the people of our country, they are totally lacking in health and education, and they live for the most part a very hard life.”134

In addition, soil and climate conditions varied considerably throughout each country. This meant that agents stationed in different parts of each country would require different training and scientific knowledge. Extension work was new to both Turkey and Iran during the 1950s; existing services were inadequate, and technicians rarely understood their role as being an educational one. The idea of fundamental education (adult literacy) had existed in both countries since the 1930s but neither had the resources – human or material – to create widespread programs. Finally, the modest number of American advisors assigned to extension work meant that they would not be able to reach every area in need.135

As a result, extension and fundamental education programs produced uneven results during the university contracts era. In Iran, the programs produced significant successes in many of the communities that they reached; in Turkey, however, extension work suffered from organizational problems that neither the Turkish government nor the

134 Marvel Baker, Interview by George Round, 1 October 1973, box 10, George Round Oral History Collection, Nebraska; Utah State University, *Iran and Utah State University: Half a Century of Friendship and a Decade of Contracts* (Logan: Utah State Univ., 1963), 24; Mustafa Zahedi, Minister of Agriculture of Iran, “Problems and Difficulties Facing Extension Work in Iran,” folder 19, box 6, UPI, USU.

135 On the inadequacies in training agents, see, for example, Homer V. Judge, Completion of Tour Report, undated (tour ended 4 September 1956), folder Isfahan Agriculture Reports, box 14, entry 486 Iran Provincial Subject, 1956-1964, AID, NAIL.
American advisors ever adequately sorted out. Consequently, American engagement in that country’s extension effort remained smaller while AID focused its attention on a more promising integrated agricultural project in a single southwestern province. Utah State University (Iran) and the University of Nebraska (Turkey) provided most of the university involvement in technical assistance to the extension services. Rural girls and women had an important role to play in agricultural extension and fundamental education projects, too. Home economics represented one of the few fields in which Turkish and Iranian village women could receive a scientific education past the fifth or sixth grades. The extension services also brought rare professional employment opportunities in fields such as sanitation, nutrition, child care, and home maintenance.

Extension work differed from other university-based assistance projects in some important ways. First, American advisors and their counterparts in Turkey and Iran had to persuade would-be technicians that extension work should be educational. The existing agricultural services in both countries were largely regulatory, and agents worked more as law enforcement personnel than as educators. Second, extension work is, by nature, informal education. While the training of agents sometimes took place in vocational and agricultural schools, almost all of the work with small farmers took place outside of classrooms and in rural communities. Furthermore, the relationship between the farmer and the extension agent had to allow for a two-way flow of information. Agents could not simply lecture farmers in a way similar to the teaching that took place in formal Turkish and Iranian schools. Rather, agents had to learn about local conditions and needs from the farmers they served. Finally, in conducting extension work abroad,
university contract teams worked with American advisors from outside of the academic community, usually with representatives from the Department of Agriculture (USDA). The success of agricultural extension in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century helped convince American experts that they might improve living standards by introducing similar concepts into the developing world. The extension movement joined with the growing capacity of the land-grant universities to disseminate information about better farming techniques. Early efforts produced many of the same problems that later manifested themselves in extension projects overseas: programs were small and could not reach many of the poorest farmers; some university scientists harbored a prejudice against working with farmers in the fields; planners debated the relative merits of focusing on extension services as opposed to emphasizing vocational education. Yet, extension service grew at a remarkable rate in the decade following World War I, and at the same time home economics and home extension came into their own as widely practiced professions for rural women. New Deal programs such as the Soil and Conservation Service, the Rural Electrification Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Authority continued to spread extension concepts during the 1930s.

The coming together of government, land-grant colleges, and rural communities to create an inter-locking series of federal, state, and local extension programs within the space of little more than a single generation gave Americans a great deal of confidence.

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that they could duplicate this success in the developing world. Indeed, just over a week after Truman called for a Point Four program in his 1949 inaugural address, the Executive Committee of the NALGCU authorized the organization to take whatever action seemed desirable to include “education in agriculture and homemaking in the formulation and development of our foreign policy.”

American involvement in agricultural extension work in Iran dates from the mid-1940s when the Near East Foundation (NEF) launched its rural improvement program for the Varamin Plain region near Tehran. Utah State Agricultural College signed a Point Four agreement with the Iranian Ministry of Agriculture in the summer of 1951 to provide technical assistance in the development of agriculture in the nation’s provinces and to advise the administration of Karaj Agricultural College on its modernization and expansion. The first Utah advisors arrived that fall and began work in Isfahan. A few months later in January 1952, Utah State personnel began work in Tabriz and Mazandaran on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea. In order to get the extension training program up and running, Point Four recruited eight USDA technicians to begin training two hundred Iranian agricultural extension agents late in 1952; the USDA also participated in training the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture in the principles of agricultural extension. Finally, the NEF entered into an agreement with the Technical Cooperation Administration in 1953 making its rural development projects part of the Point Four program in Iran.

American assistance to Turkish agriculture began in 1950 as part of the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction. The Turkish Technical Agricultural Organization, which administered Turkey’s extension service, originated several years earlier in 1943. It had established extension services in twenty provinces by 1952; most were in the more developed areas of western Anatolia, though the extension service had also entered the Black Sea region in the northeast. Much of the American aid to Turkish agriculture came in the form of tractors and other mechanized equipment. Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) advisors reported that Turks often failed to maintain this equipment properly, but the infusion of tractors did help Turkish farmers expand the total acreage of wheat production by 400 percent in 1950. ECA assistance also included advising a program of village teachers to assist with agricultural projects and the recruitment of an American home economist to assist the Ministry of Agriculture in improving home economics education. The most significant ECA contribution to the development of agricultural extension in Turkey, however, was the assistance that its technicians gave in drafting an organization plan for a nationwide Turkish extension service.140

140 “Technical Agricultural Organization in Turkey,” 1952, box 4, entry 1399, USFAA, NAI; on the increase in wheat acreage, see “Monthly Food and Agriculture Report, ECA Special Mission to Turkey,” May 1950, box 4, entry 1399, USFAA, NAI; and Fuad Köprülü, Turkish Foreign Minister, to Russell H. Dorr, Chief of ECA Special Mission to Turkey, 16 June 1951, folder Agricultural Project, box 22, entry 1399, USFAA, NAI; on home economics education see Hugh K. Richwine, Food and Agriculture Officer, ECA, to Luther Brannon, Agricultural Extension Specialist, ECA, 23 February 1951, box 4 entry 1399, USFAA, NAI; on the Organization Plan, see Hugh Richwine to Ismail Şener, Agricultural Advisor, 18 September 1950, box 4, entry 1399, USFAA, NAI.
Extension education had to engage villagers on terms that they could understand and in ways that would allow them to see how investing in improved techniques would improve their livelihood. Many showed a reluctance to embrace mechanization if they perceived that the benefit would go not to them but to the landlord. The advisors therefore helped organize a variety of community fairs and field days at which agents demonstrated new techniques and local farmers showed their improved produce and livestock. Some of these became quite extravagant productions, with hundreds and even thousands of farmers participating. Extension advisors made wide use of educational films and other forms of visual media to supplement demonstrations. Most Turkish and Iranian peasant farmers were illiterate, and extension research in the United States had shown that distributing literature would have only a marginal effect on local participation anyway. Films, however, attracted more attention both because this novel medium interested the peasants and because films could show agricultural improvements over time.141

As much as they designed fairs to attract the peasants, the advisors also had to impress village landlords and the Shia clerics who still wielded enormous legal and moral influence in rural life. Iranian villages, for example, remained feudal at least until the middle of the 1960s when the shah’s land reform scheme began transferring ownership of many agrarian villages to the peasants. Scholars have long debated how much (and how many) peasants benefited from the shah’s land reform program. Writing in 1969, Anne

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Lambton observed that while “living conditions in the villages had improved and oppression lessoned,” the economic benefit had been “at best, marginal.” C. David Anderson, a rural development officer from 1962 through 1964, reported that large landlords still controlled how much access many peasants had to American technical assistance. “If a development activity was to be carried out, the villager could only participate to the extent that his landlord approved of the project.” Mullahs, the Iranian Shia clergy, held less direct influence, but their approval was often an important prerequisite for enthusiastic peasant participation.142

Point Four assistance to agricultural extension took divergent paths in Turkey and Iran during the 1950s. The Iranian extension service made enough progress that Point Four’s Tehran Mission decided to integrate fully American projects with the new Iranian extension service by the middle of the decade. Integration seemed like a natural step to R. H. Walker, the supervisor of the Utah State contract and an advisor to Karaj College. “The program must be an Iranian program,” he wrote in a 1956 report, “not an American program.” James B. Davis, a food and agricultural advisor and chief of the Agricultural Division of AID in Iran, added that while Point Four extension education had helped Iranian farmers, the program had also “been dominated by Americans” in its early years. Some Utah technicians believed integration made their work more productive. Farrell Olson, Utah State’s extension advisor in Kermanshah, observed that the changes created

“more time for teaching the technicians, for holding demonstrations, and doing all those things needed for the lasting improvement of agriculture in Iran.”

Not all of the American advisors, however, felt that integration had been so successful. Allen C. Hankins, an extension advisor in Kurdistan, thought that integration actually resulted in the loss of some concepts when Iranian agents assumed responsibilities for which they were not ready. The Ministry of Agriculture also seemed incapable of careful planning, creating instead a series of ineffectual “crash programs.” Undoubtedly, the political battles and frequent turnover within the ministry had “a debilitating effect” on real long-term planning. Others complained that Iranian agents continued to rely on American advisors to make administrative decisions after integration and that the Iranians sometimes lacked the technical competency to make efficient use of scarce resources. Odeal Kirk, one of Utah State’s longest serving advisors in Iran, observed in 1958 that he did not believe that Iranian Ministry of Agriculture personnel “had sufficient experience” to keep the Baggah Demonstration farm “moving ahead.” Kirk also argued that keeping an American presence of the farm for a few more years would “provide tangible evidence” of the American desire to help Iranian agriculture. Clearly, then, from an administrative standpoint, extension work was not going to be an easy aspect of technical assistance to accomplish. The Iranian lack of familiarity with extension principles meant that the transition from American to Iranian control would not

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be seamless. The American advisors would have to continue to provide some support even after integration.  

Despite these difficulties, Point Four and AID advisors helped improve both Iranian agriculture and the extension service. Utah State advisors, for example, taught farmers how to control the sen bug that had ravaged the wheat crop around Isfahan and how to use sulfur spray to control mildew on grapes. USU technicians also demonstrated how row planting and irrigation of sugar beets (as opposed to hand sowing and sheet or “kart” irrigation) and planting earlier in the spring could yield increases of up to five times what the peasants could grow per acre using the same technology. The Near East Foundation also made good progress in its extension program at the Varamin Plain area. With the cooperation of the Ford Foundation and Point Four, the NEF helped establish an agricultural teacher training school during the early fifties for village boys and girls. NEF agents demonstrated the use of an improved draft moldboard plow that could be easily used with smaller oxen and was affordable for most peasant households. Finally, NEF agents demonstrated improved tillage, helped with vaccinations against livestock disease, worked with farmers to improve draining and irrigation, and organized a cooperative to help peasant farmers market their cotton crop. As a result, the average household income in the Varamin area grew from 11,832 rials (about $165) in 1952 to 19,736 rials ($245) at the end of 1953.  

144 Allen C. Hanks, End of Tour Report, 9 February 1965, folder 1, box 116, entry 617, AID, NAI; Leonard Williams, Completion of Tour Report, undated, (tour ended 6 August 1961), box 118, entry 617, AID, NAI; Embry, “Utah Universities in Iran,” 173; and Odeal Kirk to Harry A. Brenn and Ray G. Johnson, 8 April 1958, folder 8, box 3, UPI, USU.  
Watching the Iranian agents grow into their jobs and take leadership roles proved a rewarding experience for several American advisors. Farrell Olson congratulated Malek Almedi, Chief of Veterinary and Livestock, for his “dogged determination” to build a livestock cooperative in Kermanshah. Mahmoud Bahadory, an enterprising twenty-five year old, almost single handedly brought agricultural extension to the impoverished and remote desert province of Baluchestan in southeastern Iran. The Ministry of Agriculture congratulated the tireless Neyshabur extension agent Amir Riazi for his outstanding work in the field of fruit orchard management. In 1959, Riazi was doing extensive work in six villages as well as scattered work in 150 others, and he helped establish three cooperative farms. In one year he carried out eighty-three fertilizer demonstrations, forty-eight in wheat seed and smut control, forty poultry demonstrations, and helped castrate chickens in forty villages. Such a record would have made any Iowa extension agent proud, but this was Iran, a nation with few paved roads and little material support for extension agents. Even ordinary laborers benefited from employment on the extension farms. Odeal Kirk spent much of the last of his three tours supervising the Karaj Demonstration Farm, which he called “an excellent training place for people regardless of status or education.” Ordinary laborers who had worked on the farm for even a short while “found themselves quite in demand” and were able to find “more profitable employment” because of their experience.146

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146 Farrell Olson, End of Tour Report, folder 3, box 7A, UPI, USU; Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Extension in Iran, 6-7; Odeal C. Kirk, Completion of Tour Report, folder 5, box 2, UPI, USU.
Point Four assistance to Turkish agriculture produced more modest results. The Turkish government and the ECA had both initiated a number of projects, but these lacked coordination during the early 1950s. The Foreign Operations Administration’s (FOA) Food and Agriculture group worked with the Turkish government from 1951 through 1954 trying to determine how the extension service should be organized without reaching a consensus. The Turks never achieved a workable organization. As a result, AID initiated a substantial reduction in its technical assistance to agricultural extension beginning in 1961.147

AID officials again discussed the possibilities for contributing to agricultural extension in Turkey during the middle of the 1960s, but again they found a lack of coordination and commitment on the part of the Turkish government. W. S. Smith, one of AID’s agricultural advisors in the country, argued that a buildup of American technical assistance in the field “would appear at this time to be completely unwarranted.” Smith suggested AID reduce the American extension advisors to one each in agriculture and home extension for a period of three more years. Another advisor thought that while the Turkish extension specialists wanted to work more closely with the American advisors, “they do not as yet have the confidence to deal with the farmer out on the land.” Prospects became even more ominous the following year. The technical assistance plan for fiscal year 1966 found little ingenuity on the part of the Turkish agricultural extension service. It did note that the program had made some progress over the past decade, but AID also saw “little evidence of leadership or enthusiasm” for the program “at the

147 Irwin Hedges, Chief of FOA Food and Agriculture Division, Turkey, to E.N. Holmgreen, Director FOA Food and Agriculture Division, Washington, D.C., 4 August 1954, box 62, entry 1399, USFAA, NAI.
national level.” Rather, the plan urged AID to support the more promising extension efforts then being developed at Atatürk University and the Integrated Agricultural Services project in Denizli province of Southwestern Anatolia.\(^{148}\)

The Denizli project represented a more focused cooperative effort between the United States and the Government of Turkey in developing agricultural extension services. The idea of the project was to assist the Turks in developing a wide-ranging approach to boosting agricultural production and standards of living for farm families in a limited area. The project would integrate a number of services: agricultural and homemaking extension, rural credit cooperatives, soil and water management (toprak-su), and 4-H style rural youth clubs. AID officials had noticed a high level of territoriality in Turkish government agencies and a reluctance to cooperate and share resources with one another. While most Turkish bureaucrats felt comfortable working within such an arrangement, AID lamented the redundancies and lack of cross-fertilization between organizations that though closely related usually operated in near complete isolation of one another.\(^{149}\)

Though more limited than the national program of extension services, the Denizli project produced more satisfactory results. Denizli served as a model for cooperation in Turkish agricultural programs during the second half of the 1960s, and it allowed the Government of Turkey to concentrate scarce resources and trained personnel in one

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\(^{148}\) Smith to Ralph N. Gleason, Food and Agriculture Officer, Turkey, 23 March 1964, folder Agriculture 1964, box 30, entry 581 Turkey Subject Project File, FY 1962-1965, AID, NAI; Ralph Gleason to Monroe McCown, Chief Agricultural Branch, Near East and South Asia, AID, 18 May 1964, box 30, entry 581, AID; and “FY 1966 TC Program,” 13 February 1965, box 61, entry 242 Turkey Subject File FY 1963-1969, AID, NAI.

\(^{149}\) “Integrated Agricultural Services,” 1 March 1966, folder Integrated Agricultural Services FY 1966, box 5, entry 235, Turkey Subject FY 1964-1974, AID, NAI.
location. This concentration in turn allowed American extension advisors to reach a large number of Turkish agents in one place rather than the more expensive way of traveling from village to village.150

The second kind of extension assistance that Point Four and AID attempted in the developing world, home extension education, proved one of the most culturally ambitious. While most rural people in Turkey and Iran enjoyed little access to education and upward mobility, the prospects of village girls proved particularly limited in these largely conservative societies. Few professional alternatives to early marriage existed for most. Evelyn Morrow Lebedeff, an American home economist who spent six years in Turkey as part of the University of Nebraska team at Ankara University, estimated that less than one quarter of Turkish girls finished primary school as late as the mid-1960s. Of these, perhaps two percent went on to secondary schools. A basic lack of knowledge about cleanliness and nutrition also contributed to pervasive and debilitating poverty for most peasants. Home extension programs addressed these realities. They offered educational opportunities for village girls and respectable professional careers for women teaching the rural households healthier living habits. Malno Reichert, a Brigham Young University home economics advisor to Iran and a strong advocate for female education in that nation’s conservative rural society, summed up the importance of the home extension program from an educational point of view when she wrote: “Until a large percentage of the women are educated, the nation will not be able to make much progress.”151

150 “Integrated Agricultural Services Project,” 14 January 1969, folder Integrated Agricultural Services Concept and Implementation, box 5, entry 235, AID, NAII.
151 Evelyn Morrow Lebedeff, End of Tour Report, NSR, 31 December 1965, 27; Malno Reichert, End of Tour Report, undated [1961?], folder 1, PFPF, BYU.
The first Point Four assistance to Iranian home extension training began in the fall of 1952 when the Ministry of Education requested help in designing a home economics program for one girls’ school in Tehran. Nothing of the kind existed in Iran, and Point Four understood that “its need is keenly felt by Iranian women.” The task of advising fell to an American home economics teacher and dietitian, Bernice King. She enjoyed strong support from the Point Four office in Tehran but sensed that the Iranian government did not quite understand the idea of homemaking extension and was uncertain about how to get it started. So, King visited several villages and interviewed hundreds of Iranians from all walks of life – from the very wealthy to street beggars. She made notes on furnishings, clothing types, care of the sick and family health. She also negotiated the conversion of Honarestan Banouvan girls’ school in Tehran into a teacher training institute for home economists and home extension agents.152

King assembled a remarkable Iranian staff that of eight women and two men; all held at least one college degree – five from American institutions, two from European universities, and the balance from Iran. The staff included a specialist in child care and family health, one in family relationships, one in home furnishings, two in general home economics and one in rural education. King also hired two translators, one of whom spoke English, Russian, Persian, French, Turkish and German. Procuring supplies and utensils from Tehran’s bazaars allowed the team to stretch its budget and ensured that they would teach using the same equipment that Iranian families used. Parvin Torfeh Naimi, a rural education specialist with a master’s degree from the University of

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Minnesota and a professional background in the Iranian schools, went to work writing a curriculum that the ministry approved in February 1953. By the end of June – only eight months after King accepted her assignment – the pilot school was ready to accept sixty-three teachers for its initial summer session. It was a remarkable beginning in the annals of Point Four work in Iran.153

Point Four assistance to Turkish home extension also began in 1952 with the sending of two young women, Suat Kundak and Inayet Berkman, to study home economics at American universities. The effort intensified slightly the following year when an American home economist, Katherine Holtzclaw, presented the first short course for Turkish home extension agents. Ruby Simpson arrived as the first Point Four supervisor of home economics development in 1954. She advised the Ministry of Agriculture in establishing a training center for home extension agents at Bornova near Izmir on the Aegean coast. Kundak, who had successfully completed her training in the United States, became the center’s first director. Mary Rokahr, the third American home economist in Turkey, helped design the department of home economics at Ankara University between 1956 and 1958. This department, along with a similar one at Atatürk University, was to be responsible for producing home economics research applicable to Turkish households and for training extension agents.154

Like their colleagues who worked in Iran, these early Point Four home economics advisors had to develop a national program from the ground up. A 1965 AID assessment found that the nation lacked effective homemaking education. Some girls’

153 Ibid.
schools offered instruction in marketable skills such as handicrafts and embroidery, but these “luxury” programs did nothing to improve the health and quality of life for Turkish families. The few courses that did exist in real home economics were “not related to homemaking practices of Turkish women.” Moreover, the home extension concept was not yet widely accepted. Evelyn Morrow Lebedeff observed that “well meaning professors” who lacked experience in extension field work provided meaningless services by imposing “purely theoretical schemes on rural families.” Like Bernice King, Lebedeff took a team of Turkish home economists on a “meet the people tour” of rural Turkey at the beginning of her service in the early 1960s. They gathered information on living conditions, caloric intake, exposure to modern technology, and other information that would be useful to research and in training field agents.155

The development of modern home economics education made slow progress in Turkey during the 1950s and into the 1960s. Organization remained a persistent problem. Like agricultural extension, home economics and home making extension drew on the resources and jurisdiction of three government ministries – agriculture, education, and rural affairs. This resulted in protracted and often fruitless discussions concerning the administration of courses and the duplication of efforts. One AID report concluded that, “The current state of affairs is one of confusion.” Reluctance on the part of government and higher education leaders to accept home economics and home extension as worthy of inclusion in the university curriculum presented another thorny problem.

The Ministry of Education invited a UNESCO team to visit Turkish facilities in 1954 and to suggest recommendations for improving home extension and other vocational education, but many senior ministry officials protested “vigorously against the changes suggested.” When University of Nebraska advisors submitted their proposed curriculum for training home extension agents at Ankara University four years later, the Faculty of Agriculture rejected it as “too Americanized and not adapted to Turkish education policies.” Reflecting on the University of Nebraska’s work at Ankara and Atatürk Universities, Marvel Baker lamented that, “We put quite a bit of effort into home economics, and in many ways we didn’t fare too well.” Finally, extension programs often had to make do with very small budgets, another indication of its relative importance in government priorities.156

Despite limitations in Point Four and AID home extension enterprises, several advisors expressed satisfaction with the progress that the new national home extension services did make. Dale W. Anderson, and advisor in Iran, noted that while home extension was quite new to Iran in the late 1950s, it “rapidly developed into a very important part of the overall extension program.” Village people welcomed the agents, “and in almost every case remarkable progress is evident.” Thelma Huber, an AID advisor in Iran between 1962 and 1964, reported “a dramatic change” in the attitudes of the village people toward the home extension program. Early on, she had to sell the idea to mayors, landlords, mullahs, and parents before she could recruit agents from or place

them in villages. By the time she left Iran, however, Huber proudly noted that she was having trouble finding enough trained agents to fill the requests that were pouring in from the villages. Eleanor Southerland, who replaced Huber and worked in Iran until early 1966 added that in several cases, “home agents have done such a good job” that village elders “requested they serve on village council or even as mayor.” Southerland also noticed that a higher percentage of lower class girls were finding their way into the home extension program by the middle of the decade. Finally, Allen Hankins reported that in 1965 the home extension program was “the soundest extension activity” in Kurdistan. Hankins attributed the success to “a well trained supervisor, excellent training workshops, good national support for the program, and consistent AID advisory services.”

If home extension education provided one of the very few professional opportunities for young rural Iranian women, it also made limited but clearly discernable headway for women in higher education and in high levels of the government. Iranian women staffed fledgling home economics departments at both the National Teacher’s College and at Karaj College during the early 1960s. Many of these women also had the opportunity to study at American universities as part of the participant program. Malno Reichert of the BYU field team judged these pioneers to be “some of the brightest people I have ever met, and some of the most progressive.” Frances Patten noted with satisfaction that home economics was the only department in the Ministry of Education

that had a professional staff comprised entirely of women in the early 1960s. Home extension training made similar inroads in Turkey during the era of Point Four and AID assistance. Ministry of Education officials began supporting home extension programs once they saw that the work could be “important in the economic and social development of Turkey.” Women also held all of the junior faculty positions at the home economics department at Ankara University.¹⁵⁸

American advisors also helped bring the 4-H concept of rural youth clubs to Turkey and Iran. Called 4-D in Iran (after the Persian words for heart, health, head and knowledge) and 4-K in Turkey after the same words in Turkish, the youth clubs proved to be a remarkably effective low-modernization tool for fostering a “farm family” approach to rural education. They also allowed rural youth to develop modest money making ventures as children and adults learned how to produce marketable goods. The Iranian youth club program got its start when a young extension agent named Younatan Isaac became interested in 4-H clubs while he was studying in the United States during 1953/4. Upon returning to Iran, Isaac began experimenting with a few clubs in Babolsar on the Caspian shore. The clubs proved successful, and within a few years the Iranian government asked him to direct a national program of youth extension clubs. Point Four contributed two rural youth advisors.¹⁵⁹

4-D clubs in Iran turned out to be an effective way of introducing agricultural extension concepts into provinces that had low literacy and school attendance. Once

¹⁵⁸ Reichert, End of Tour Report, undated [1961?], folder 1, PFPF, BYU; Frances Patten, End of Tour Report, undated (tour ended April 1962), box 118, entry 617, AID, NAII; Technical Assistance Project History and Analysis Report, AID, NAII.
¹⁵⁹ Leonard Williams, Completion of Tour Report, undated, (tour ended 6 August 1961), box 118, entry 617, AID, NAII.
demonstrated by Iranian technicians, the basic projects were simple enough for
uneducated or marginally educated adults to supervise. Village and private gardens, for
example, provided ample opportunities to demonstrate planting techniques and the care
of crops on a small scale that also they yielded nutritious vegetables to supplement
peasant diets. AID’s communication and media division assisted the Iranian extension
service in creating manuals and record keeping books that required no reading ability.
These publications enhanced the education of club members by teaching them simple
bookkeeping procedures.160

Home extension advisors also made extensive use of the growing popularity of 4-
D clubs. Upon her village extension visits, Thelma Huber was impressed to see the
number of 4-D children showing off the cheap and durable clothing that they made as
part of club projects. Clothing making soon became a small money making venture for
both 4-D girls and their mothers. Village women made and sold over five thousand
garments in 1958, making enough money to purchase fifty sewing machines. 4-D also
had a noticeable effect on the health and appearance of rural children. Huber observed
that club participants were “much cleaner and neater” than other village children.
Baluchestan, a hot, poor, and remote province of southern Iran that offered few incentives
to extension agents, and Kurdistan in the north proved especially fertile grounds for the
development of 4-D vegetable gardens and the clothing program. By the early 1960s, the

160 Williams, End of Tour Report, undated, AID; NAII.
Iranian 4-D program consisted of almost five hundred clubs with nearly ten thousand members.\textsuperscript{161}

The final component to rural education under Point Four and AID assistance was fundamental education, or “practical education for illiterate or low literate men, women, and youth aimed at helping them improve their daily living mainly through their own efforts.” The Turkish and Iranian governments had been experimenting with this low-modernization approach to rural adult education since the interwar years, but they lacked the capacity to build nation-wide programs. The development of agricultural extension during the 1950s, however, suggested that rural literacy programs could succeed. In addition, both Turkey and Iran developed an army-based literacy corps that allowed educated conscripts to teach in rural communities as part of their military service. Finally, Point Four and AID assistance provided much needed financial resources and some advisors to help with organization and the training of teachers. Almost all of the actual teachers, however, were Turks and Iranians\textsuperscript{162}

Fundamental education proved particularly popular in rural Iran, especially among girls and adult women. Even when villagers showed skepticism toward homemaking agents, they usually recognized the value in literacy and attended courses with enthusiasm. The program, however, did not prosper. The program reached only about three percent of the nation’s villages in 1963. That year, the Iranian Ministry of


\textsuperscript{162} Luanna J. Bowles, \textit{The Story of Fundamental Education in Iran}, box 124, entry 617, AID, NAII; Hoyt B. Turner, Completion of Tour Report, 19-26, 16 January 1957, box 124, entry 617, AID, NAII.
Education folded fundamental education into its larger and urban-centered Adult Education Department. Thomas J. Edwards, an AID advisor who worked on fundamental education for four years, thought the move a terrible mistake and believed it to have been the personal decision of a new minister who lacked previous experience in the program. Edwards complained to his superiors that the ministry had not consulted him about the consolidation “despite US AID’s investment of funds and manpower in fundamental education.”

The reliance on conscripted officers for teaching initially gave the program a great deal of credibility in Turkey since the army was by far the most respected public institution in that country. Yet, the soldier-teachers encountered the same problems in Turkey that they had in Iran. Educated soldiers tended to come from urban areas and frequently had difficulty winning the trust of the rural population with whom they worked. Some put little effort into the endeavor. For its part, AID never displayed a great faith in Turkish fundamental education. In 1963, W. Drake of AID reported that he was “convinced that the GOT [Government of Turkey] wants to move aggressively into this field, but are not yet geared to do it by themselves. [sic]” Five years later, AID forwarded a memorandum to the Turkish government outlining a myriad of problems within the adult education program including a “lack of training of responsible personnel,” a “lack of coordination and cooperation,” and “the people’s indifference toward the services.” The first two deficiencies were common to almost all educational assistance problems in Turkey and certainly limited agricultural and home making.

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extension as well as fundamental education. The third, however, is somewhat surprising given the general popularity of the other extension services and the popularity of the adult literacy program in neighboring Iran. AID advisors believed that the program’s creators failed to pay sufficient attention to the needs of particular communities.164

By the middle of the 1960s, AID technical assistance to extension services began to wind down in both Turkey and Iran. Most Turkish programs seemed to have reached the point of diminishing returns, especially since the government never clearly delineated the exact lines of responsibility among the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, and Rural Affairs. American advisors and AID continued to complain about duplication of effort and a lack of cooperation and coordination among the various Turkish government agencies involved. In early 1966, AID decided to continue technical assistance in Turkey until approximately 1975 but to continue to reduce its work on the extension services. James Davis, who supervised the Agricultural Division of AID in Iran in 1965/6, noted that Iranians “grew weary” of U.S. advisors, especially the “lecturers, hecklers, and memorandum and report writers” among them. While the Iranian government still desired the assistance of some American advisors, its interest was mainly confined to a handful of specific projects such as the development of oil crops and sugar beat production. With all American technical assistance in Iran scheduled to terminate by the middle of 1968, however, AID proved increasingly reluctant to provide new advisors to

replace those whose tours were ending. As a result, a number of projects in which American advisors had been engaged ended such as pest control, citrus production and marketing, and land preparation for irrigation.\footnote{James P. Grant to Robert C. Hamer, 29 July 1966, box 61, entry 242, AID, NAI; Davis, End of Tour Report, 30 April 1966, AID, NAI.}

As a component of American technical assistance, extension education produced an interesting record in Turkey and Iran. On the one hand, those aspects that showed the most consistent low-modernization qualities – agricultural and home extension, the rural youth programs, and fundamental education – all seemed to enjoy popularity, especially in Iran. Indeed, Mark Gasiorowski, a leading scholar of recent U.S.-Iranian relations has observed that, “Probably the most effective aspect of U.S. agricultural assistance was its focus on education.” Unlike American assistance to primary and higher education, extension work required no fundamental reordering of educational institutions and presented less of a threat to educational elites. Farmers and their families generally embraced what they saw could improve their yields and their quality of life. The American advisors did a particularly effective job of negotiating the cultural dimension of providing education and opportunities for village girls and women as home extension agents, though they met less success in introducing home economics to the universities. The extension work that American advisors undertook in Turkey and Iran demonstrated the best characteristics of the Point Four philosophy. Armed with know-how and skills that could promote healthier living and better agriculture, American advisors worked
closely with Turkish and Iranian extension agents and farmers to spread this knowledge throughout the two countries.\footnote{Mark Gasiorowski, \textit{U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991), 107.}

On the other hand, however, the story of extension work also bears out Robert Packenham’s observation that American advisors often overestimated how effectively they could bring about positive change in the developing world through technical assistance. The administrative difficulties that the integration of American and Iranian extension efforts created, the indecisiveness that the Turkish government showed in creating agricultural extension and fundamental education, and the difficulties that home economists faced in bringing their discipline into the universities all illustrate the limits to how effectively Americans could transfer practices that worked well in the United States into Turkey and Iran. In addition, old habits died as hard in extension work as they did in other fields of education. A. N. Renshah, a veteran agricultural advisor who worked for seven years in Iran and two more in Indonesia, reported as late as 1966 that most extension education in Iran still took place by rote memorization. Getting agents to think in terms of hands-on, practical education and in terms of continuing their education through lifelong learning remained difficult.\footnote{Packenham, \textit{Liberal America and the Third World}, 112-115; A.N. Renshah, End of Tour Report, undated (tour ended January 1966), folder 5, box 118, entry 617, AID, NAI.}

As with all technical assistance, the extension effort operated on a small scale and could offer but a “drop of aid in an ocean of need.” Even with their focus on training domestic agents, the programs could do little more than offer a primer or a foundation upon which Turks and Iranians could observe how to build effective extension services.
The American effort to bring extension services to Turkey and Iran does, however, also show that technical assistance could be effective in limited, focused projects if they enjoyed a high level of cooperation with host country technicians and the support of the local population. Americans could provide scientific knowledge and some organizational expertise, but Turks and Iranians would have to be the ones to shape the programs and make them work in their own countries.
CHAPTER 5: BRINGING THE LAND GRANT CONCEPT TO EASTERN TURKEY

From the early years of Point Four, American technical assistance in the developing world emphasized agricultural education. The nation’s land-grant universities played an important role in this endeavor. These institutions offered a pragmatic combination of teaching, research, and community outreach. While they did not ignore the traditional liberal arts subjects, land-grant universities focused on advancing knowledge about agriculture and home economics and then transferring this know-how to farmers through extension services. The teaching and research of American land-grant universities provided a significant boost to the agricultural and industrial development of the United States from about the 1870s. Foreign technical assistance leaders of the 1950s such as Henry Bennett of Oklahoma A&M, the first director of Point Four; John Hannah of Michigan State; and Harold Stassen, director of the technical assistance program from 1953 through 1955, believed the land grants were uniquely qualified to undertake similar development work overseas. In fact, all eight of the American universities that held overseas technical assistance contracts with the United States government at the end of 1952 were land-grant institutions. Helping to develop institutions of agricultural education and extension represented an integral part of all eight contracts.168

This chapter explores a significant American attempt to transfer the concepts of land-grant education to the Middle East. The story revolves around the University of

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Nebraska collaboration with the Turkish government to develop Atatürk University to serve the development needs of Eastern Anatolia between 1955 and 1968. The Point Four agency, at the time the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), selected the University of Nebraska to do the work in part because that institution had achieved a distinguished record in agricultural research and extension and in part because soil and climatic conditions in Nebraska resembled those in much of Eastern Turkey.169

In many respects, the University of Nebraska effort in Turkey represents a successful Point Four and AID project to build a university designed to enhance Turkey’s agricultural productivity and eastern development. Whereas no Turkish institutions of higher learning of any kind existed east of Ankara before the 1950s, the Nebraska advisors helped develop a thriving university that enrolled 1800 students by 1968. They also sent nearly 200 Turks to the United States to receive advanced training in land-grant practices and agricultural research. Atatürk University graduates served in important positions at the university, in the Ministry of Agriculture, as rural agricultural extension agents, and in private business and industry. Both the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and outside observers commended the University of Nebraska for its determination to render the best possible service to the Turks. The ICA, for example, noted Nebraska’s enthusiasm and “wholehearted interest” in “carrying out all of the responsibilities which it assumed under the contract.” Walter Adams and John A. Garraty, Michigan State researchers who studied the university overseas contract  

program, observed that the Turkey projects enjoyed “top priority in the Nebraska scheme of values.” Despite beginning during one of the most difficult periods in the relationship between the American government and the universities, Nebraska encountered very few problems in dealing with any of the agencies that administered the Point Four Program or with AID. With only a few exceptions, the nearly fifty Americans, most of whom were Nebraskans, who served on the field team at one time or another did an admirable job of adapting to a region that was remote enough to qualify as an ICA hardship post during the mid-1950s.170

Still, the Nebraskans achieved only limited success in transplanting the principles of a land-grant institution to a country with a higher education tradition steeped in classical European learning. While Atatürk University grew quantitatively as well as qualitatively during its first decade, the institution’s legal structure, the pedagogical methods with which many of its senior professors were familiar, and the rapid turnover of senior administrators all acted as brakes on the Nebraskans’ ability to mold it into a true land-grant style institution. Many of the Turkish professors and administrators lacked a complete understanding of the land-grant university concept and seemed uncertain about how to adapt these concepts to Turkey; others took very little interest in the university and contributed little to it. Those that did want to improve agricultural education in Eastern Turkey often balked at practices that seemed to carry the potential to undermine their standing in the accepted Turkish system. The Ministry of Education also

170 On the success of Atatürk University graduates, see Leo Fenske, Eight Years in Turkey (Bemidji, MN: Richards, 1983), 50-52; ICA/Ankara Education Division Contract Representative observations, 1 June 1960, box 1, TPCR, Nebraska; and Walter Adams and John A. Garraty, Is the World Our Campus? (East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. Press, 1960), 102.
complicated the university’s development by providing weak leadership at several important points and often showed its own ambivalence toward the university’s orientation. Indeed, while ministry officials understood how land-grant universities had contributed to American development and wanted to bring that benefit to Turkey, they showed no clear understanding of how the concepts might be applied to Turkey. Finally, thorny questions concerning the amount of influence that American advisors should have in shaping the university arose during the last four years of the contract. All of these challenges taught the Nebraska advisors that regardless of how much they wanted to transfer the concepts of an American land-grant institution to eastern Turkey, Atatürk University would necessarily be a Turkish institution. The best the Nebraskans could do was work to make it responsive to the needs of the surrounding community; the Turks would have to define the extent to which the university adopted American ideas.

The six million people of Turkey’s rural, remote, and poor eastern provinces, scattered across nearly ten thousand villages and towns, enjoyed very little access to formal education in the middle of the twentieth century. The founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, recognized as one of the most basic prerequisites for national development the need to create educational opportunities and raise the standards of living for these people. In 1937, he challenged the Grand National Assembly to create a new kind of university for Eastern Anatolia. But Turkish development was mostly confined to the major cities in Western Turkey and European Turkey during the interwar years, and the Second World War rendered the plans impossible during the first half of the 1940s. Eastern development once again became a major item on the Turkish agenda.
after the war. During his 1954 visit to the United States, President Celal Bayar expressed an interest in obtaining American assistance to build a university that would use the American land-grant model, a “Purdue of the Middle East” as he called it.171

This institution should not be like Turkey’s existing universities in Istanbul and Ankara. Those institutions were steeped in the classical European traditions of higher learning that emphasized students memorizing lectures from their professors. The system featured minimal class discussion, few opportunities for students to interact with professors, no written work outside of annual examinations, and almost no practical application of knowledge – even in fields such as agriculture and medicine. Fields that had been central to American development such as agricultural extension and home economics did not exist in this classical Turkish university curriculum. Atatürk University, on the other hand, was to emphasize the practical and mechanical arts. Students would learn both in the classroom and by working on experiment farms. They would develop technical, administrative and research skills that were important to raising the agricultural production of the entire country and the standards of living of the rural population of the East.172

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The Turkish government originally considered building four university campuses in different cities. Van, surrounded by a rich archaeological heritage near the confluence of historic Armenian, Iranian, Greek, and Turkish civilizations, would house the humanities faculty, but natural sciences would be located some 230 miles to the west in Elazig. Diyarbakir, the technical center of the southeast, seemed the natural choice for an engineering faculty. Erzurum in the northeast would be home to the fine arts and veterinary medicine faculties as well as an athletics institute. This arrangement offered the advantage of providing multiple centers of higher education in a region of the country where overland transportation was still difficult.\textsuperscript{173}

The Nebraska advisors, however, lobbied against it; they wanted to build a fully integrated institution that offered all students access to the resources of the entire university. Integrated universities were an American concept that had no precedent in Turkey. The nation’s oldest university, Istanbul, grew out of a series of Ottoman imperial schools such as war, medicine, and engineering that were scattered throughout the city. Ankara University likewise lacked a single campus. But the Turkish government proved receptive to the integration concept, at least insofar as building a single campus with a central research library was concerned. A number of factors influenced the government’s ultimate decision to build the new university at Erzurum. These included the availability of land for demonstration farms and the reliability of adequate rainfall. In addition, Erzurum had long been an administrative center of Eastern Turkey. Finally, as a military garrison town, the city held symbolic importance as a

\textsuperscript{173} Elvin Frolik and George Round, “Report on Proposed Contract Between the Ministry of Education of Turkey, Ankara University, Foreign Operations Administration, and the University of Nebraska,” July 1954, 7-12.
bastion against Russian invasion. The government chose Erzurum in part to emphasize the strength of its conviction to move Turkey toward the West.\footnote{W. V. Lambert, Albin T. Anderson, Knute O. Broady, Elvin F. Frolik, Roy M. Green, and Carl Olson, Jr., “Report of the University of Nebraska Delegation to Turkey on the Establishment of Atatürk University,” 1 November 1954, 3-4; on the historic importance of Erzurum, see Lord Kinross, \textit{Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey} (New York: Morrow, 1964), 202.}

The Nebraska advisors faced a myriad of challenges to building a land-grant-style university during its first decade. Most stemmed from the legal structure of the university and its relationship to the Ministry of Education. The Turkish Grand National Assembly did not charter Atatürk University under University Law 4936, a piece of legislation that ensured the country’s other established universities a significant degree of autonomy from the central government. Rather, the Assembly passed University Law 6990 in June 1957 placing Atatürk University under the direct control of the Ministry of Education. The reason for this was that the ministry wanted to be able to exercise a significant amount of supervision over the university’s development along land-grant lines. The ministry controlled the appointments of all university personnel and allocated the funds from the university’s budget. A committee of senior Turkish university professors from outside of Atatürk University oversaw faculty promotion.\footnote{An English translation of University Law 6990 appears in \textit{NSR}, 30 September 1957, 61-3. A summary is located in Appendix I to Okyar, “Universities in Turkey,” 237-38.}

Far from freeing the new university to experiment with a new kind of higher education, the arrangement gave significant control to representatives of Turkey’s traditional higher education elite. Atatürk University’s legal standing prevented the Nebraska team from cultivating the principles of American land-grant education and instead ensured that it would retain strong elements of the classical higher education that
permeated the nation’s other universities. The external professors who controlled promotion were generally conservative and tended to privilege seniority and ability to work within the system over innovation. In awarding tenure, they favored the production of esoteric theses whereas the Nebraska advisors argued that research should address the practical needs of Turkish agriculture and home economics. Turkish law also required a lengthy process of acquiring three graduate degrees before an individual could assume a professorship. The Nebraska team argued that the process was cumbersome and did not make the best use of human resources. This was especially true for young Turkish scientists who had acquired American doctoral degrees but still had to complete redundant degrees in Turkey before assuming full-time faculty positions. Again, the senior Turkish professors, both inside and outside the university, were unmoved. Equating an American doctorate to the highest Turkish graduate degree (the professor degree) would lessen the prestige of the Turkish higher education elite. Finally, the Nebraska advisors resented ministry control over the budget. Obtaining the necessary approvals for even routine purchases, let alone the extraordinary ones of building an entire campus, proved frustrating, especially during periods in which the ministry provided ineffective leadership.\footnote{\textit{Atatürk University Development Committee Meeting,
15 October 1957, box 17, TPCR, Nebraska; Baker, Report, \textit{NSR} 30 September 1961, 55; RRAAT/NU, 19 July 1965, 7-8, box 1, TPCR, Nebraska; Don Hanway, End of Tour Report, \textit{NSR}, 30 June 1967, 50-52; and “Summary,” an untitled and undated document probably produced in 1967 or 1968, box 1, TPCR, Nebraska.}

In order to free Atatürk University from the grip of the Ministry of Education and Turkey’s conservative higher education elite, the Nebraska team constantly tried to convince Atatürk administrators and Turkish political leaders to restructure the
The Ministry of Education appointed senior administrators such as the rectors and deans represents another persistent problem of government control that the university faced throughout the period of the Nebraska contract. The system all but ensured instability. According to University Law 6990, the normal assignment for a rector at Atatürk University was supposed to be five years; yet eleven different individuals held the job during the first decade. None served a full assignment, and only two stayed on for as much as two full academic years. Tenures for faculty deans proved

equally brief during that time; nine headed the Faculty of Agriculture and eight led Arts and Sciences. The list includes former government ministers and prominent professors from Turkey’s most distinguished universities. Unfortunately, only a couple achieved much distinction in Erzurum, and none was able to shape the university along the lines of an American land-grant institution.178

The ministry chose rectors from senior faculty at Turkey’s top universities. Naturally, some resented being taken away from successful careers at established institutions in more attractive cities. A few lacked any interest in the project in the East and spent as much time away from Erzurum as possible. Moreover, the government often granted rectors only two years leave from their home institutions; this practice made it very difficult for any rector to complete a full appointment. Two years in office would be a short term for a chief administrative officer at an established institution of higher learning; it proved entirely unworkable at one that faced unique challenges and changed dramatically over the first ten years of its life.179

Difficulties with the office of rector began even before the university opened in the fall of 1958 and started a pattern that continued for a decade. Throughout 1957, the Nebraska advisors had requested that the Ministry of Education appoint a rector; they argued that the final preparations for opening the university required the full administration to be in place. The Turkish Government, however, declined to make an appointment until after the national election scheduled for late October, 1957. Viewed in the context of Turkish politics, this decision makes sense. Atatürk University was an

178 University of Nebraska, Nebraska in Turkey, 1-6; Fenske, Eight Years in Turkey, 51.
179 RRAAT/NU, 2 May 1963, box 1, TPCR, Nebraska; RRAAT/NU, 19 July 1965, 5-6, TPCR, Nebraska.
important symbol of Turkey’s national development; had the governing Democrat Party
lost control of the Grand National Assembly, the new cabinet would certainly have seized
the opportunity to appoint its own rector. On the other hand, however, the delay retarded
the university’s development. The first rector, Ahmet Özel, did not receive his
assignment until early 1958, roughly eight months before the university was to open and
well after the Nebraskans thought prudent.\footnote{A. C. Breckenridge, Report, NSR, 30 September 1957, 6; Otto Hoiberg, Report, NSR, 30 September 1957, 9.}

Even then, some of key members of the Nebraska group did not believe Özel to
be a wise choice. The new rector was an electrical engineer and had distinguished
himself as rector of Istanbul Technical University, at the time Turkey’s most advanced
engineering university. He had been elected to the Grand National Assembly in 1954 and
had served as Minister of Education at the same time that the Nebraska team was
working out the initial plans for Atatürk University. He failed, however, to impress the
Nebraska advisors in his capacity as a government minister. Marvel Baker, the head of
the Nebraska team in Turkey and a man who worked with Özel on university planning,
reported to his colleagues that Özel “just didn’t get things done with the government.”
Baker also noted that the rector lacked grounding in the land-grant university concept.
The Nebraska team tried to arrange for him to learn more by visiting Lincoln, but the
ICA declined to support the trip. In the end, the appointment mattered little, at least in
1958. Özel served for only six months, six weeks of which he spent in Europe, before
vacating the position just months before the university opened in the fall.\footnote{On Özel’s professional background, see Summary, NSR, 31 March 1958, 2, 11; and Baker, Report, NSR 31 March 1961, 16; on Özel’s performance as Minister of Education, see the transcript of “Meeting of}
Political instability within Turkey between the spring of 1960 and the end of 1961 further compromised administrative stability. In May, Turkish military forces took control of the government in order to “prevent fratricide” and to extricate the government from the “irreconcilable situation into which they had fallen.” This “irreconcilable situation” was the rapidly deteriorating government of the Democratic Party, which had controlled Turkish politics for a decade. The administrative situation at Atatürk University that spring was not favorable, though the rector, Sabahattin Özbek, enjoyed the confidence of the Nebraska team. As dean of agriculture at Ankara University during the 1950s, Özbek had worked effectively with the Nebraska staff in starting the agricultural extension program there. He had also received one year of advanced horticulture training in Lincoln as part of the participant training program. Unfortunately, as rector of Atatürk University in early 1960 he found himself simultaneously holding all three of the major administrative offices – rector, dean of agriculture, and dean of arts and letters – due to faculty resignations. The situation certainly limited his effectiveness. The Ministry of Education showed little interest in Atatürk University during the political crisis leaving it to languish under the uncertain leadership of two interim rectors for a year and a half.182

The general unfamiliarity with land-grant concepts of education and the basic incompatibility of those ideas to traditional Turkish higher education represents a third major obstacle to the university’s development throughout the period of the Nebraska contract. While many Turks on the faculty liked the idea of a university that could bring prosperity to Eastern Turkey, they seemed uncertain about how to square the American ideas with the practices of traditional Turkish universities. Early on, the University of Nebraska arranged a series of short seminars to acquaint Turkish professors with the American land-grant system, but the university administration concluded that the “results of such seminars were questionable.” The idea that a university could be grounded in the mechanical and agricultural arts, that professors and students could teach and learn by getting their hands dirty in the soil, and that public service could be central to a university’s mission, were all completely foreign to most Turkish academics. The social prestige of a university professor led many to balk at the idea of doing applied research on actual farms. The external tenure system also encouraged traditionalist teaching and research.183

As a result, while Atatürk University developed into Turkey’s foremost agricultural institution during the 1960s, it did not really take on the spirit of an American land-grant institution. Six years into the project, the Nebraska field team reported: “An understanding of the characteristics, functions, organization and operation of land-grant universities in the United States proved to be of slow growth.” Eight years after American advisors arrived in Turkey, the AID office still lamented that Atatürk

183 “Meeting of the University of Nebraska Turkish Committee,” 9 September 1957, box 17, TPCR, Nebraska.
University had “continued to operate more along the lines of the classical type university.” Upon the completion of the contract, AID and University of Nebraska officials reflected their work in Erzurum. In discussing the land-grant orientation of the university, they concluded that it was “questionable” how much Atatürk leaders “understood the changes in education and service to the community” that would have been necessary to create such an institution. That was the real heart of the matter. While Turkish leaders saw how land-grant institutions had contributed to American development and wanted to bring that positive change to Turkey, the social and educational system in which they operated was too rigid and bound by tradition to allow this type of education to flourish. And, the generally conservative senior faculty and external professors carried more influence than did the Nebraska advisors.184

The language barrier between Turkish staff and American advisors represents a fourth major obstacle to forming effective administration during the early years. The first rector spoke no English, and none of the American advisors knew Turkish well enough to communicate the subtle points of what they were trying to accomplish. The Nebraskans used interpreters, of course, but the language barrier made it impossible for the Turks and Americans to engage in the kind of informal give-and-take discussions that help to establish close working relationships. Moreover, the lack of available Turkish professors meant that the Nebraskans had to do a good deal of the teaching. Leo Fenske, a Nebraska agricultural economist who served for nearly eight years on the field team in Turkey,

estimated that he could teach only about half a course each semester using an interpreter. Even Turks who had a high level of proficiency in English often struggled to convey those technical concepts for which Turkish lacked precise terminology. Fenske himself knew no Turkish at the beginning of his assignment, so he could not help to his interpreters, nor could he ascertain the accuracy of the translation. Students naturally found the whole process tedious and cumbersome.\textsuperscript{185}

Thus, Atatürk University made few institutional gains between its opening in the autumn of 1958 and the end of 1961. “Progress was difficult to impossible with no administrative head regularly present at the university to give it guidance,” noted one AID field report. In addition, the university’s legal standing gave significant power to outside traditionalists, and the Turkish faculty had an incomplete grasp of land-grant education concepts and of how they might adapt these ideas to the Turkish context. Both factors limited the Nebraskans’ ability to influence the new university. Finally, the building program lagged behind schedule. Classes were held in a converted secondary school inside the city during the 1958/9 school year. As late as the spring of 1963, nearly five years after the university first opened, classroom and office space as well as student housing remained inadequate. Laboratory space was almost non-existent.\textsuperscript{186}

Professor Eyub Hizalan, a soil scientist from Ankara University, brought a degree of stability to Atatürk when he assumed the rectorship at the beginning of 1962. The eighth rector in the five year history of the institution, Hizalan became the first to take up full-time residence in Erzurum and to devote “a major part of his time and efforts to the

\textsuperscript{185} Fenske, \textit{Eight Years in Turkey}, 12.
\textsuperscript{186} RRAAT/NU, 2 May 1963, TPCR, Nebraska.
university.” He also became the first to serve at least two full years as rector and was the first to indicate a willingness to complete a full five year appointment. The new rector “stated very explicitly” his desire to “establish an American system of education” and even emphasized that the failure to do so “would not only reflect on the stated intentions of the Turks but also would reflect adversely on American prestige.” The arrival of the young faculty educated in the United States under the participant training program helped. While few could teach right away under existing Turkish regulations, they provided valuable assistance to the professors. Moreover, their presence created a cadre of Turkish scientists who understood the land-grant concept. “Perhaps the most encouraging feature of Atatürk University presently,” noted a team of Nebraska representatives in the summer of 1962, “is the splendid group of young assistants and doçents on the staff.” They did their work “with sincerity and enthusiasm” and “are imbued with the land-grant college philosophy.”

The rector also agreed with the American advisors on the necessity of drafting a new university law that would remove the university from the authority of the Ministry of Education and allow it to function as along the lines of a land-grant institution. While building the permanent campus still lagged behind schedule, the university did open a new faculty apartment building in the summer of 1962. For the first time, Atatürk could offer comfortable housing to prospective professors and their families. The American advisors welcomed all of these improvements; noting that since Hizalan became rector

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187 First quotation: RRAAT/NU, 31 October 1963, TPCR, Nebraska; second quotation: RRAT/NU, 2 May 1963, TPCR, Nebraska; third quotation: Jason Webster, Franklin Eldridge, and Elvin F. Frolik, “Inspection Report on University of Nebraska Program in Turkey,” June 20-July 13, 1962, in NSR, 30 September 1962, 12; on the improved faculty housing situation, see Fenske, Eight Years in Turkey, 42.
“cooperation and relationships had appeared to be good and the Mission [AID/Ankara] felt that progress was being made.”

The optimism, however, ground to a halt during the summer of 1964. An extended illness that confined the rector to his home between late April and June proved most inopportune. The university lost over a month of planning immediately prior to a visit by the minister of education who found the state of the university most unsatisfactory. The minister expressed particular concern with the administration, apparently claiming that the university was in dire need of three good men – one rector and both deans. According to the Nebraska advisors, Hizalan immediately blamed the Americans for the problems at Atatürk and convened a series of meetings designed to expose their inadequacies to the Turkish staff and the city of Erzurum. The Nebraskans thought these meetings brought out little of substance. “Matters of policy and major operations were carefully avoided; discussions centered around matters of minor operational importance.” The acerbic tone of these meetings left the Nebraska technicians dumbfounded, though they attempted to mitigate the damage by avoiding direct confrontation with the administration.

That summer brought to the fore a number of fundamental differences of opinion between traditionalist Turkish administrators and the Nebraskans. Even before the minister of education’s visit to Erzurum, the rector felt offended by a letter that Harold Allen, then an advisors in agricultural extension, had written in May concerning an AID audit of equipment purchases. AID noted that some of the equipment purchased under

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188 RRAAT/NU, 30 October 1964, 3, box 1, TPCR, Nebraska.
189 RRAAT/NU, 30 October 1964, 3, TPCR, Nebraska; see also RRAAT/NU, 19 July 1965, 3-6, TPCR, Nebraska.
the Nebraska contract was not currently in use at Atatürk University. Allen suggested that “the United States Government is not interested in penalizing the Government of Turkey or any institution with which it cooperates,” but that AID does need to know that “the assistance given is warranted, wanted, and properly utilized.” Allen’s use of the term “penalizing” struck a nerve with Hizalan who shot back that the American government lacked the power to penalize any agency of the Government of Turkey. Allen withdrew the letter and deleted the offending paragraph. The episode nevertheless represents an early manifestation of one of the central problems that the Nebraska team encountered during the second half of its collaboration in Turkey, that is, a protracted debate concerning how much control the Americans would have in shaping Atatürk University.190

A second area of disagreement emerged concerning the basic orientation of the university. For reasons that the Nebraska team did not fully grasp, Hizalan apparently began reevaluating his earlier commitment to the land-grant concept and instead began to favor the more familiar classical European style. The rector might have taken his cue from the Ministry of Education, which itself showed some ambivalence toward the orientation of the university at about the same time. In addition, the dean of agriculture, Hakki Kıskürek, an influential administrator in his own right, also favored a more classical orientation. Another factor was undoubtedly the rector’s belief that the Americans were failing to make the land-grant concept grow in Erzurum. Rather, he believed the Nebraskans were themselves becoming “Turkized” [sic] into accepting

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190 RRAAT/NU, 30 October 1964, 5, TPCR, Nebraska. This is not the same Harold Allen who worked on technical assistance through the Near East Foundation’s program for the Varamin Plain region of Iran.
traditional Turkish higher education practices. Regardless of what led Hizalan to this change of heart, he made a significant miscalculation. While the Americans were learning that they would have to adapt their land-grant ideas in order to make them grow in Turkey, they remained resolute in bringing as many of these principles to Erzurum as they could. Hizalan’s reappraisal contributed to the growing rift within the Turkish faculty between traditionalists, largely senior professors, and proponents of the American-style reforms, who were mostly junior faculty who had received at least some of their education in the United States. This fracture continued to grow throughout the summer and indeed was still a central feature of the university staff at the end of the Nebraska contract in the summer of 1968.\(^{191}\)

A third major area of disagreement concerned the nature of American contributions to the university. Hizalan wanted the Nebraskans to assume a greater role in teaching and department-level supervision, but he also gave the impression that he wanted them to stay out of upper-level administration. Those wishes, however, ran contrary to what the Americans were really supposed to be doing. The Nebraskans were willing to teach courses and provide some departmental oversight, especially in areas of the university that lacked enough properly-credentialed Turkish docents or professors. “We will continue to be errand boys of sorts as long as we are in Turkey,” noted Harold Allen. Neither the Nebraskans nor AID, however, saw this “fill in” work as the primary reason for American professors to be in Erzurum. Rather, they were there to provide advice on how a land-grant university should work; in their minds that meant working on matters of administration, especially curriculum and faculty development. The

\(^{191}\) RRAAT/NU, 31 October 1963, TPCR, Nebraska; RRAAT/NU, 30 October 1964, 5, TPCR, Nebraska.
Americans complained that: “The Rector and the Deans are supersensitive to everything which appears to challenge them in any matter. They want the prestige of their offices.” Complicating the matter, Hizalan provided no effective leadership during the crisis. He absented himself from the university much of the summer before resigning in late July, and he declined to meet with Chancellor Clifford Hardin of the University of Nebraska when the latter visited Turkey to assess the situation. Kı sakürek, acting rector in Hizalan’s absence, continued to foment what the Nebraskans considered to be an anti-American campaign throughout the summer. Thus, neither the Nebraska team nor any of the Turkish administrators were able to accomplish much in the way of institutional development.  

The crisis of the university came at a very trying time in Turkish-American relations. While the United States and Americans had enjoyed a generally lofty stature in Turkish public opinion during the 1950s, that began to change during the first half of the next decade. The American posture towards Cyprus, more than any other issue, drove this popular reappraisal. The Turkish government contemplated sending a military force to the newly independent island that summer in order to ensure the rights of the Turkish minority. But President Lyndon Johnson, wanting to avoid an open rift between two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey) over Cyprus, sent Turkish President İsmet İnönü a frankly worded letter in June warning him not to use American equipment in any campaign on the island. Turkish public opinion reacted negatively to the letter; many saw it as high handed and unbecoming an ally. The Nebraska advisors did not know

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192 First quotation: Harold Allen to Jason Webster, 2 February 1963, folder 13, box 49, TPCR, Nebraska; second quotation: RRAAT/NU, 23 October 1964, box 1, TPCR, Nebraska.
exactly how the Cyprus crisis affected the Atatürk University project, but they did notice a “sharp downturn” in Turkish-American cooperation in Erzurum that summer. They also thought it possible that the Turks drew negative parallels between Johnson’s attempt to use American military aid as leverage to influence Turkish foreign policy and Allen’s letter concerning the use of American equipment at Atatürk.193

The events of the summer of 1964 caused AID/Ankara and the University of Nebraska to consider seriously the possibility of terminating the project at Atatürk University. Following Hizalan’s resignation, however, the situation stabilized under the leadership of interim rector Muharram Köksal, who guided the university through the opening of its seventh academic year that autumn. AID and the Nebraska advisors thought him a capable administrator; they praised him for bringing together a “badly divided Turkish staff” and restoring harmony to the relationship between the Turkish professors and the American advisors. The interim rector used his address at the opening of the 1964/5 academic year to stress the importance of Turks and Americans working together to build a better university. By late October, the Americans could breathe easier as “the most serious crisis in the recent history” of the university “appears to have completely passed.”194


194 Muharrem Köksal, “Opening Speech for the Academic Year, 1964-1965,” box 1, TPCR, Nebraska; RRAAT/NU, 30 October 1964, 9, TPCR, Nebraska.
Atatürk University entered into a second period of constructive growth in 1965 and 1966 under the leadership of Osman Okyar, a renowned economist and one of Turkey’s most astute critics of its higher education system. Okyar had previously held professorships at Istanbul and Ankara universities as well as at the new Hacettepe Science center, which in the mid-1960s was developing into Turkey’s most advanced medical school. He impressed the Nebraskans from the beginning. “Rector Okyar does not possess any of the basic characteristics and traditional attitudes of most previous Atatürk administrators,” noted one field report. “He is a progressive, open-minded person.” During the summer of 1965, the rector collaborated with senior Turkish faculty members and Don Hanway, the head of the Nebraska field team, to produce a five-year University Development Plan. This document provided the first comprehensive plan for the university’s growth since its opening seven years earlier. Many of these buildings were completed by the end of 1967, including the library which Duane Lowenstein, the last head of the Nebraska team in Erzurum, called “the most beautiful building” on the campus. From the perspective of the Nebraskans, however, the new rector’s most important contribution was his drafting of a new university law to submit to the Grand National Assembly on behalf of the university. In Osman Okyar, it seemed, the American advisors had finally found a rector who was both able and fully committed to building a land-grant style university in Turkey.195

195 First quotation: RRAAT/NU, 19 July 1965, TPCR, Nebraska; second quotation: Duane Lowenstein report prepared for Wayne Collings, 24 August 1967, NSR, 31 December 1967, 15; see also Don Hanway, Report, NSR, 31 December 1965, 4; on the progress of building the campus, see Fenske, Eight Years in Turkey, 43.
Okyar’s lofty stature and his ambitious start did not, however, allow him to heal the divisions within the Turkish faculty. Indeed, his decisive leadership ultimately intensified them. These divisions created a second major crisis within the Nebraska-Atatürk collaboration beginning in the autumn of 1966, one from which the project never fully recovered before terminating two summers later. At the same time, changes in AID policy toward the university contract program placed greater financial limits on the Nebraska field team. In retrospect, these changes reflected the initial stages of the decline of AID’s enthusiasm for institution building, but that was not apparent to the Nebraskans at the time. Rather, the AID budget crunch represented another problem making the tense faculty situation more difficult.196

The most immediate problem from Okyar’s perspective was that too few of the Turkish professors wanted him to pursue changes in the university’s legal structure that would allow it to operate more like an American land-grant institution. In October 1966, Hanway wrote to A. C. Breckenridge, the University of Nebraska Vice Chancellor for International Programs, that the rector and one dean were “still pretty much alone” among the Turkish faculty in pushing for a new law. A group of Turkish professors apparently met with a member of the Grand National Assembly that month to voice their opposition. The resistance to a new university law allowed traditionalist professors to unite in opposition to the rector’s leadership. “We observed Okyar’s functional authority

196 “Technical Assistance Project History and Analysis Report: Advanced Agricultural Training,” 18 October 1968, box 21, entry 183, AID, NAII.
decline,” wrote Hanway, “as the Faculty factions found ways to organize and thwart his
efforts.”

Developments within the Turkish faculty put the Nebraska advisors in a
precarious position. On the one hand, they still had confidence that Atatürk University
might ultimately emerge as a strong institution capable of bringing modern agricultural
and homemaking practices to Eastern Turkey, and they knew that at least some of the
Turks wanted the project to continue. On the other hand, however, a cloud of uncertainty
surrounded the project as the Nebraska contract was scheduled to end the following
summer. While the University of Nebraska, AID, and Okyar all agreed that a one year
extension would allow for a more orderly termination the following summer, the
Americans were united in their opinion that such an extension would only be desirable if
Turks and Americans could recapture a spirit of cooperation. The Ministry of Education
recalled Okyar at the end of 1966 and replaced him with an acting rector who enjoyed
support from neither the Turkish faculty nor the ministry, “challenged from beneath and
apparently lacking solid support from above,” as Hanway put it. The situation led to
“staff anarchy” that inspired neither Nebraska advisors nor AID to continue the
project.

Another serious dispute near the end of 1967 reinforced the notion that the
Nebraska collaboration with Atatürk University was approaching the end of its useful
life. A faction within the faculty and some of the students launched another campaign
aimed at ridding the university of American influence. Duane Lowenstein, who replaced

197 Hanway to Breckenridge, 20 May 1967, folder 5, box 50, TPCR, Nebraska.
198 Elvin Frolik and Jason Webster, “Report of Inspection Trip, October – November 1966,” box 14, TPCR,
Nebraska; Hanway to Breckenridge, 20 May 1967, TPCR, Nebraska.
Hanway as chief advisor midway through 1967, reported that its support seemed to have been limited to a small cadre of faculty and students, but they were vocal in their opposition to the continuation of an American presence in Turkey. Lowenstein was convinced that these factions harbored pro-Soviet sympathies and called them the “Russian element.” According to Lowenstein, the students who agitated against American involvement at Atatürk University posed the more serious problem. Many proved more interested in engaging shadowy campus politics than earning a degree. These “professional students” worked “to promote their politics which aren’t in keeping for the betterment of Turkey.”

Lowenstein might have been correct. In a masterful study of the radicalization of Turkish politics between 1967 and 1971, Jacob Landau shows that some of the most violent political movements of the era on both the Left and the Right emerged on Turkish campuses and that “professional non-student organizers” played an important role promoting publicity and agitation. Specifically, the radicals in Erzurum, who were mostly Leftists, cited a dispute between the university and the Nebraskans over control of the institution’s trust fund, to which both the Turkish government and AID had contributed. AID and the Nebraskans wanted to ensure that this money be spent on contract activities, but the anti-American students interpreted the dispute as further evidence of Turkey’s subservience to American foreign assistance.

Disaffected students posed a significant threat to the harmonious functioning of the university during the winter of 1967/8. On 27 December the Nebraska advisors

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199 Lowenstein to Jason Webster, 24 June 1967 and 25 July 1967, folder 2, box 52, TPCR, Nebraska; Lowenstein to Clyde [no last name], 25 June 1967, folder 2, box 52, TPCR, Nebraska
200 Jacob Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey (Lieden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1974), 33.
learned that a group of students was disseminating anti-American literature and planning campus disturbances on a scale large enough that the authorities would not be able to single out individual students as culprits. Concerned that rioting might ensue, Lowenstein discussed the matter with Professor Ali Ertugrul, dean of the university’s new medical school. Local authorities responded by sending a large number of policemen to patrol the campus. The university remained quiet, but student dissatisfaction with the American presence at the university continued.201

The growth of anti-American sentiment at Atatürk University mirrored developments across Turkish campuses during the second half of 1960s, though political movements tended to originate in Ankara or Istanbul and arrive in Erzurum only later owing to the city’s relative isolation from the rest of the country. Students and professors from across the political spectrum, and not necessarily radicals, all came to resent the level of American involvement in Turkish domestic and foreign affairs from 1964 onward; this included the increasingly ubiquitous foreign assistance workers. One observer noted that by the middle of the decade, “the American presence had become too obvious in Turkey.” Mounting rhetorical attacks on Americans in Turkey became a specialty of the communist Turkish Labor Party, especially after its president, Mehmet Ali Aybar, proclaimed in the summer of 1966 a campaign against “Anglo-American imperialism,” to cut Turkish relations with the United States, and to “struggle until no American is left in Turkey.”202

201 Duane Lowenstein to Marvin Cernik, AID/Ankara, 29 December 1967, folder 1, box 52, TPCR, Nebraska.
202 First quotation: Giritli, “Turkey since the 1965 Election,” 356; Aybar quoted in Harris, Troubled Alliance, 136.
The inability to firmly establish the principles of land-grant education, the growing rift among the Turkish faculty and between traditionalist Turks and the Nebraska advisors, and student anti-Americanism all combined to create a spirit of frustration within the Nebraska team during late 1967 and early 1968. Don Hanway, who headed the Nebraska contract between the summers of 1965 and 1967, felt that his two years in Turkey “were unsuccessful and unproductive.” Hanway believed that the difficulties came “mostly from the Turkish side,” but Duane Lowenstein, who replaced him, was not so convinced. “His [Hanway’s] way of working with the Turks was not acceptable – a traditional US way of telling and not listening enough.” Lowenstein, however, understood his predecessor’s frustration. As foreigners, the Americans often felt that “a person is not seen for his good points,” especially when serious disagreements arose. Even veterans of the project considered leaving. Leo Fenske, an agricultural economist who worked for nearly eight years on the project, wanted out, but A.C. Breckenridge persuaded him to help Nebraska find a way “to leave Turkey with good mutual feelings.”

Changes that AID imposed on the university contract program at about the same time also contributed to the Nebraska team’s collective frustrations. Prior to 1967, the Nebraskans enjoyed a generally strong working relationship with the AID office in Ankara. Throughout 1967, however, the Nebraska advisors complained of AID’s budget cuts and a tightening money situation. They held the AID office in Ankara partially responsible for worsening relations between Turks and Americans at Atatürk University.

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203 Lowenstein to Webster, 24 June 1967, TPCR, Nebraska; Breckenridge to Fenske, 8 February 1968, folder 8, box 49, TPCR, Nebraska.
because that office slashed Hanway’s list of new participants without explaining the cuts to either Hanway or the Turkish administration. Making the whole situation worse, AID’s deputy director in Ankara planned a pleasure trip to Erzurum that summer in which he apparently demanded the use of the Nebraska team’s lone vehicle and required a full cocktail party complete with Turkish professors and Nebraska advisors. According to Lowenstein, “fur flew for awhile,” because the Nebraskans were themselves low on supplies, and two advisors had already scheduled the use of the automobile.204

Raising the academic standards of the university and improving student performance ranked high in the priorities of the Nebraska advisors, particularly over the last eight years of their contract in Turkey. In so doing, they came face to face with the reality, deeply entrenched in Turkish higher education, that the social prestige of a university degree and the professional doors that students believed the degree would open far outweighed concern for the subject matter in the minds of many students. Not many students in the first few classes really understood agriculture. Indeed though Atatürk University was to be an institution that helped improve the lives of rural Turks, most of the students came from the larger cities where the secondary schools were concentrated. Some had never seen a farm before enrolling in the university. Few gave any indication that they wanted to make improving farming practices the focus of their careers or even that they were willing to accept positions in rural areas that would require them to work closely with farmers. As educated professionals, these individuals did not expect to have

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204 Duane Lowenstein to Jason Webster, 10 April 1968, folder 1, box 52, TPCR, Nebraska; A.C. Breckenridge to Leo Fenske, 8 February 1968, folder 8, box 49, TPCR, Nebraska; on the relationship between the University of Nebraska and AID, see “Meeting of University of Nebraska Turkish Committee,” 12 December 1957, TPCR, Nebraska.
to dirty their hands by working on the university’s instructional and demonstration farms or in working with peasants. Rather, most students sought to enter the professions or perhaps take a position in the Ministry of Agriculture. Atatürk University just happened to be the institution of higher learning into which they gained acceptance.\textsuperscript{205}

Given the novelty of Atatürk University and that Erzurum lagged far behind the more cosmopolitan cities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir in popularity among Turkish university students, it is not surprising that the quality of the first students to enroll was less than what the Americans had wanted. The AID office in Ankara noted with some disdain that the first classes “were literally picked off the streets.” University of Nebraska personnel who toured the university in the summer of 1962 were appalled by the “lack of respect and general lack of mature conduct” on the part of some students. Marvel Baker likewise complained that: “There is a compelling need for a greatly improved sense of student responsibility and … student discipline.”\textsuperscript{206}

The problems with student discipline stemmed, in part, from reactions to new regulations concerning academic standards and the evaluation of student progress that the Nebraska advisors had pushed through the administration. Most Turkish universities held exams only once per year (in the spring) and required no written work outside of this extended examination period. The Nebraskans rejected this arrangement on the grounds that annual examinations did not require students to demonstrate any applied knowledge

\textsuperscript{205} On the first class of students at Atatürk University, see Fenske, \textit{Eight Years in Turkey}, 49. Hanway estimated that roughly 40\% of Atatürk University students came from west of Ankara during the first decade; see Hanway, End of Tour Report, \textit{NSR}, 30 June 1967, 57.

in laboratories, through written reports, or on the instructional farms. Moreover, students who failed an exam were allowed to attempt the exam the following spring but could not proceed with coursework during the interval. The Nebraska advisors pointed out that this procedure created a class of largely idle students who, facing an uncertain future, became easily disaffected. The Nebraskans lobbied hard to have regular examinations, written work, and lab reports added to the curriculum. A group of students retaliated by instigating a three-week strike at the beginning of the 1961/2 academic year to protest these new regulations; individual Nebraska professors who tried to initiate regular examinations faced similar boycotts, walkouts, and other forms of abusive behavior from the students.207

As with their relations with the Turkish professors, the Nebraska advisors never won all of the students over to the concept of an American land-grant institution. Recall the disaffected students who launched a campaign against what they saw as excessive American influence at the university in 1967. But the Nebraskans did help the university improve its overall quality. They held their ground on integrating more research and exams into the curriculum, and the quality of student commitment improved. “Most of our students were sincere and hardworking,” concluded Leo Fenske after eight years on the job. Standards also rose as the university became better established during the 1960s. If the first students really were “picked up off the streets,” that clearly was no longer the case four years later when one thousand students applied for two hundred openings in the 1962 incoming class. Applications doubled the following year, though the university still accepted fewer than three hundred incoming students. The Nebraska advisors helped

revise the entrance examinations to target more effectively the students whose preparation suggested they could succeed at the university. Perhaps as important as the rising standards, the university attracted more students from Turkey’s eastern provinces where education opportunities had historically been limited. Over three hundred from Erzurum province alone graduated in the first decade. Graduates entered responsible positions in the state extension service, the Farm Credit Bank, the Ministry of Agriculture’s irrigation service, sugar refineries, and other agencies. Others entered the Atatürk faculty as assistants. A few even became farmers. “It gives me great satisfaction,” concluded Fenske, “to note the progress of my former students.”

Had the Nebraska advisors been a cynical bunch, it would have been easy for them to have emphasized their shortcomings when the last members of the field team left Turkey for good in the summer of 1968. After all, they had been only marginally able to transplant land-grant style concepts into Eastern Turkey. The university never achieved the requisite legal standing to break away from traditional Turkish higher education practices. Perhaps more important, however, many Turkish professors and students displayed ambivalence and even hostility to the new American practices. Indeed, the professors broke down along pro and anti-American lines at critical points in the university’s first decade of existence, and Erzurum did not prove to be immune to the growing anti-American sentiment among Turkish university students during the second half of the 1960s. When one factors in an administration that never achieved stability and

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208 Fenske, *Eight Years in Turkey*, 49-51; RRAAT/NU, 31 October 1963, TPCR, Nebraska.
the Turkish government’s lack of a clear view of what the university should be, it would have been easy for Nebraskans to see their project as a failure.209

By and large, however, the members of the Nebraska team were not cynical. And while they acknowledged that they could not transplant such a distinctly American educational idea onto a foreign culture whose own sense of the university was steeped in very different values, they did understand that they had helped make a valuable contribution to Turkey’s development. Leo Fenske concluded that: “Even though this situation existed [with respect to the land-grant ideas], the University of Nebraska people left a legacy of solid achievement at Atatürk University.” By the end of 1967, Jason Webster, the project’s long-time coordinator in Lincoln, could see that the university was “attacking some of the economic problems of eastern Turkey,” and noted with approval that a number of Turks trained in the United States as part of the program were then contributing to the building of Turkey’s newest medical school in Ankara. A number of Nebraska professors who enjoyed extensive connections to the project also recognized how it enriched the University of Nebraska. “I don’t think we had a person over there,” recalled Marvel Baker some years later, “who didn’t profit by it. … It gave the people of Nebraska a much broader perspective than they ever had before.”210

It is interesting to note that Atatürk University’s development after the Nebraska advisors left has mirrored much more closely recent developments in the American land-grant institutions than was ever the case during the 1950s or 1960s. Like its counterparts in the United States, Atatürk University is today a thriving comprehensive research

209 University of Nebraska, Nebraska in Turkey, 2-4, 15-6; “Summary,” 18-30, TPCR, Nebraska.
210 Fenske, Eight Years in Turkey, 51; Webster, Coordinator’s Comments, NSR, 31 December 1967, xv; and Baker, Interview, George Round Oral History Collection, Nebraska.
university of over 40,000 students, seventeen faculties, in excess of 113,000 alumni, with research institutes and graduate programs in many fields of study. From its humble origins of just over a hundred students attending classes in a rented secondary school, today the university fulfills Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s vision to provide a “shining torch” to the people of Eastern Turkey. The university continues to express gratitude to the people of the University of Nebraska and Chancellor Hardin for their thirteen years of assistance in bringing agricultural education to Eastern Turkey.²¹¹

“To stimulate our entire educational system, I would like us to establish here a university modeled strictly on American lines and with a primarily American staff.”

“An American-style university would help meet the needs of the thousands of our young people who at present go to study abroad.”
- Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, *Mission for My Country*

As in Turkey, the Iranian government put considerable effort into building a modern system of higher education that would contribute to the nation’s modernization during the middle decades of the twentieth century. Iran’s westernizing monarch, Reza Shah, created the University of Tehran, the nation’s first modern university, in 1934, one year after the Turkish government organized the modern Istanbul University. His son and successor, Mohammad Reza Shah, shared much of his father’s outlook on modernization and the role of education in creating a stronger and more prosperous Iran. He appreciated Iran’s need to create more and better universities in order to educate the professionals required to lead an advanced and powerful nation. Like his father, Mohammad Reza Shah looked abroad for assistance in modernizing Iran, but he increasingly came to favor American methods of higher education. The shah visited several universities during his 1959 trip to the United States and spoke highly about what he saw. He seemed particularly impressed with the emphasis that American universities placed on pragmatism and cultivating problem solving skills. He envisioned creating a university in Iran that would equal the greatest institutions of higher learning in the West and inspire similar reform in other Iranian institutions of higher learning. In his 1961 manifesto, *Mission for My Country*, the king wrote, “To stimulate our entire educational
Beginning in 1962 and for nearly a decade, a team of advisors from the University of Pennsylvania (Penn) worked with Iranian higher education elites to make the shah’s vision a reality. With the financial backing of AID and the full support of the shah, a team of Penn advisors set out to convert a new, small, and struggling provincial university in Shiraz into Pahlavi University. The shah hoped this institution would become a shining beacon of higher education excellence in the Middle East.

The Penn-Pahlavi collaboration, however, turned out to be one of the less successful American education assistance projects in Iran. It produced perhaps the clearest example of cosmetic modernization among all the university contract projects in Turkey and Iran during the 1950s and 1960s. Pahlavi University took on the outward appearance of an American university but continued to function much like other Iranian institutions of higher learning. Like their colleagues from the University of Nebraska, the Penn advisors were unable to persuade powerful elements within the Pahlavi University administration to adopt their proposed practices. Rather, entrenched Iranian educational traditions proved too strong for the Penn team to modify in such a way as to create a true American-style university. For its part, the Penn team proved unwilling to modify its plans for Pahlavi University enough to allow the institution to work in its Iranian context.

In this regard, the Penn advisors proved less successful academic ambassadors than their Nebraska colleagues who, upon seeing that Turks lacked a deep understanding of the land-grant university concept, modified their plans to help establish the best university they could for Turkish conditions. As a result, American advisors and Iranian administrators often found themselves at odds with each other. Pahlavi University largely failed in its mission to inspire wide-spread reform along American lines throughout the Iranian universities.²¹³

Penn’s cool relationship with AID represents another important factor that limited the project’s effectiveness. Neither Penn nor AID ever fully trusted the other’s commitment to the project with the result that Penn advisors spent much valuable time arguing with AID officials. This also represents a significant difference from the University of Nebraska relationship with AID which was, until the final year, mutually agreeable. For all of these reasons, the University of Pennsylvania’s relationship with Pahlavi University steadily waned after the end of AID support in 1967.

The shah hoped that Pahlavi University would enhance Iran’s international prestige and attract prominent Iranian scientists and academics who had taken up residence in the West. Iranians enjoyed very little access to higher education within their own country in the middle of the twentieth century. The University of Tehran was the only state supported university prior to 1947, and it remained a very modest enterprise during the 1940s. After the war, Iranian officials including the shah and the U.S.-backed Plan Organization recognized the need to expand higher education in order to meet the

nation’s development needs. The Majlis (Parliament) passed a provincial universities act in 1949, and the government created small institutions in Mashad in the northeast, Shiraz in the southwest, Tabriz in the northwest, and Isfahan in central Iran. The new institutions remained universities in name only. They were small, understaffed and poorly equipped. According to one scholar, “They were set up with little planning and scant regard for the availability of teaching and research staff.” Academic standards were low and attendance lax. Like their counterparts in Turkey, Iranian students came more in search of social prestige and a ticket to a comfortable position in the government bureaucracy than they came in search of usable knowledge.214

Yet, at the same time, the expansion of secondary education was creating a larger pool of high school graduates with rising social and economic expectations. The country’s inability to accommodate them meant that more Iranian students sought college educations abroad during the 1950s than did college students of any other Middle Eastern country. Some acclimated themselves to life in the West and did not return. The talents of these individuals, including engineers, scientists, doctors, and others who spoke western languages, were obviously lost to Iran’s modernization project. Thus, the shah hoped that by creating a domestic university whose teaching faculty and research

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214 The University of Tabriz actually began under the short lived Azerbaijan Autonomous Government of 1945/6. The Iranian government, however, did not recognize this institution and started its own in 1947. On the creation of provincial universities, see Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, 213; on Iranian students studying abroad, see George B. Baldwin, “The Foreign-Educated Iranian: A Profile,” *Middle East Journal* 17 (Summer 1963): 264-5; for a statistical comparison of the number of Iranian university students studying abroad with those of other Middle Eastern and developing countries, see James Alban Bill, *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization* (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), 59; for an American Fulbright professor’s description of the primitive conditions at the University of Tabriz during the late 1950s, see Curtis Harnack, *Persian Lions, Persian Lambs: An American Odyssey in Iran* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 14-27.
facilities equaled those available in the west, Pahlavi University would help stem the Iranian brain drain.\textsuperscript{215}

In addition, the shah wanted a university where the approach to teaching and learning resembled practices common in the United States. Iranian universities shared much of the reliance on classical European scholasticism that characterized Turkish institutions of higher learning. As a result, Iranian universities showed many of the same deficiencies. Course work did not emphasize critical thinking; rather annual examinations required students to memorize lectures that professors often mimeographed and distributed to students. The curriculum rarely included professional applications or research activities designed to advance knowledge. In short, the universities were not well suited to produce competent and innovative professionals. The shah hoped that Pahlavi University’s western orientation would produce a new generation of college graduates equipped with stronger analytical and problem solving skills who could better meet the country’s development needs. One of the key components of the Penn contract, the development of a general liberal arts curriculum in critical thinking for all Pahlavi students, was specifically American concept designed to answer this concern. The shah also hoped that the university would serve as a model for reforming all Iranian higher education curricula along American lines.\textsuperscript{216}


The king also favored an American style university administration in order to break the authoritarianism and conservatism of Iran’s higher education elite. Individuals who occupied the highest teaching and administrative positions held a near-complete monopoly on policy making within Iranian higher education. Discussion and negotiation, so familiar to problem solving in the West, played a very small role, if any, in this highly personalized style of leadership. In *Mission for My Country*, the shah castigated professors who “regard themselves as little gods whose opinions must not be disputed and whose time must not be wasted on students.” But professors rarely dedicated their professional energies to the pursuit of new knowledge (another problem also common in Turkey as well). Most held positions outside the academy and spent relatively little time on teaching or research. As a result, courses tended to become stale copies of those that professors had studied in Europe decades earlier. Moreover, few academics acquired their positions through intellectual or administrative merit alone. Rather, many high-ranking administrators were political appointees, and seniority often took precedence over performance in the promotion of faculty members. Park Teter, an historian who worked in Iran as part of the Penn team for two years, thought that the authoritarianism within Iranian higher education stemmed from a lack of qualified personnel: “The Iranians have adjusted to the shortage of leaders by building institutions around individual personalities rather than the reverse system to which we are accustomed and which we hope to teach.”

Much like the situation in Turkey, Iranian university leadership tended to be conservative and highly personalized; senior professors and administrators resisted any innovations that might threaten their positions or the prerogatives of their lofty status. James Bill, one of the foremost American experts on Iranian politics of the second half of the twentieth century, called these leaders “maneuverers” because they were highly adept at exploiting the existing socio-political system without adding anything productive to it. The shah understood that Iranian higher education did not promote the kind of forward thinking that modernization required. He saw in American-style higher education a way to introduce a more cooperative, efficient, and merit-driven administration and faculty that would cultivate innovation rather than exist to protect its own status.218

In response to the shah’s inquiries, the ICA requested that Penn provide a small team of professors and administrators to visit Iran during the summer of 1960 and to report on the prospects of helping the shah realize his vision. Gaylord Harnwell, president of the university, headed the delegation. Penn emerged as an attractive choice for a number of reasons. The university had a long standing connection to archaeological excavations in Iran from the late nineteenth century, and it drew the support of some of the leading figures in the university contract program such as Richard Humphrey, who was then director of CIPA. In addition, Harnwell had served as the president of the American Council of Education in 1959/60, during which time the Council emphasized studying the relationship between the universities and the ICA.219

The most important factor, however, was the strength of Penn’s medical school. There existed in Shiraz a first-rate medical facility built during the late 1940s and early 1950s through the largess of Mohammad Nemazee, an Iranian philanthropist who was concerned about how the hardships of the Second World War had weakened Iranian society. The center consisted of a technologically advanced hospital, a nursing school, and a medical school under the direction of an American-trained physician, Dr. Torab Mehra; the American government began providing financial support in 1953. In addition, the Iran Foundation, a private philanthropy made up of concerned Iranians and Americans, helped recruit American doctors and nurses to teach there. The ICA and Penn had hoped to use these existing medical facilities, which largely operated on American lines, to act as a kind of power plant that would generate the intellectual energy to build a new university.  

Shiraz suited the king as well. He had grown weary of the heavy concentration of Iran’s university students in Tehran ever since clashes between students and the police during the trial of Mohammad Mossadegh in December 1953 left three students dead and hundreds more injured or under arrest. Besides, the real work of national development would take place in the poor rural provinces, not in Tehran. The shah feared that once students got accustomed to life in the nation’s most cosmopolitan city, they would not want to relocate to areas that most urgently needed development. Finally, if Reza Shah’s University of Tehran dominated the capital, then his son’s Pahlavi University would bask

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in the grandeur of Iran’s glorious past. Shiraz was in the heart of old Parsa, the homeland of the classical Persian Empire. Nearby lay the ruins of Persepolis, the large palace structure from where Darius and Xerxes presided over an empire that stretched from Greece to India and Central Asia. Shiraz also counted among its posterity Iran’s great medieval poets, Sa’di and Hafiz; the new College of Arts and Sciences was built adjacent to the latter’s tomb.221

Upon returning to Philadelphia, the Penn team wrote its recommendations into a report, *A Pattern for a New University*, which popularly became known as the “Blue Book,” and for which Harnwell was the lead author. In order to break the power of the “little gods” in the administration and on the faculty, Harnwell’s report recommended that Pahlavi University be made autonomous from the Ministry of Education and that it be guided by an external board of trustees, whom the shah would appoint from among accomplished Iranian professionals in a variety of fields. As with American universities, the chief administrative officer, the chancellor, would be accountable to the board. He was to oversee the university’s administration, but he was not to do so in the normal manner of personalized, authoritarian leadership. Rather, he was to ensure the smooth functioning of the university by delegating responsibilities to the appropriate administrators and department heads. The chancellor would also devote his full attention to the university, a break with tradition that the Americans hoped would promote more

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221 On Iranian students and the Mossadegh trial, see Afshin Matin-asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2002), 24-36; on the shah’s desire to channel students out of Tehran, see Bill, *The Politics of Iran*, 78.
stable administration, foster productive growth for the entire institution, and serve as a model for the rest of the faculty to follow.\textsuperscript{222}

Because few Iranians knew much about the workings of American universities, Harnwell recommended establishing an Educational Consultative Council (ECC) made up of American advisors and Iranian professors who had experience working in American higher education. The ECC would advise the Pahlavi administration but would have no decision making power in its own right. The minister of court, often a close associate of the shah, would chair the ECC and act as liaison between the university, the Penn advisors, and the crown. The Blue Book also addressed the shah’s concern with faculty commitment to teaching by recommending that professors be required to devote themselves full time to the university and produce original research that would be useful to the nation’s development. Finally, Harnwell’s report outlined an integrated arts and sciences curriculum that all students would have to complete.\textsuperscript{223}

While the Iranian Ministry of Education and the Penn advisors agreed that Harnwell’s Blue Book should serve as the model for Pahlavi University, the Penn team showed little flexibility in adapting its American ideas to an Iranian context. As a result, Penn advisors often had difficulty working with Iranian administrators who understood and were much more comfortable maneuvering within the existing system than altering it in ways that might threaten their positions. But the Iranians had more leverage within the system than the Penn advisors, a reality that often frustrated the Penn team’s ambitions.

\textsuperscript{222} Gaylord Harnwell, John C. Hetherston, Philip E. Jacob, and Jonathan E. Rhoads, \textit{A Pattern for a New University: Proposals and Recommendations of the University of Pennsylvania Survey Team} (Philadelphia, September 1960), 11-14. See also “Pahlavi University Prospectus,” July 1963, folder Pahlavi University, box 9, PUPR, Penn.  
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
The Americans, in other words, could not compel Iranian educators to accept their vision for the university. Iranian professors and administrators often paid lip service to the American aims as the university developed some of the trappings of an American institution of higher learning such as a circulating library and a faculty of arts and sciences. But many Iranians continued to operate as though Pahlavi University was like other Iranian institutions of higher learning.

AID, the government of Iran, and the University of Pennsylvania concluded a technical assistance agreement for the development of the medical school at Pahlavi University in early 1962, and the first members of the Penn field team arrived in Shiraz that September. It soon became apparent to all concerned that support for the medical school alone would be insufficient to build the university that the shah desired. The University of Pennsylvania therefore renegotiated its agreement, and the American advisors increasingly concerned themselves with developing the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, which was to become the foundation of the university’s novel general education curriculum.224

The Penn advisors devoted much of their attention in the first three years of the contract trying to mold the administration along an American model. They met little success in this endeavor. They were unable to convince the two powerful chancellors who oversaw the university between 1962 and 1965 to give up the traditional authoritarian prerogatives of high level Iranian administrators. Neither chancellor, for example, made himself accountable to the Board of Trustees, a reality that damaged...

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224 Overseas Liaison Committee, An Analysis, 73; George Pollack, (Rural Development Officer, AID), End of Tour Report, July 1965, folder 5, box 118, entry 617 Iran End of Tour Reports, AID, NAI.
relations between Pahlavi University and the Penn team. In addition, both of the chancellors spent much of their time away from Shiraz engaged in other pursuits. Again, while consistent with traditional Iranian approaches to higher education, they failed to provide stable leadership under which Pahlavi University could grow. In short, the Penn team failed to change the traditional culture of higher education leadership at Pahlavi University. Nor could the Penn advisors rely on the Iranian government, which did not provide firm leadership toward the university or on behalf of the American advisors.

The most important Pahlavi University official with whom the Penn advisors worked early in their contract was Loftali Suratgar, chancellor of the university from April 1962 through early 1964. Prior to assuming the chancellorship, Suratgar had been a successful professor of Persian literature at the University of Tehran; his appointment at Shiraz underscored the shah’s desire to create a comprehensive university not simply an advanced medical school. The board of trustees did not, however, appoint Suratgar Rather, he was a political appointee of Prime Minister Ali Amini and showed little interest in making himself responsible to the board. That is not to say that Suratgar was incapable. Indeed, Richard Weekes of the Iran Foundation judged him to be an independent thinker, “one of the few in Iran,” and a very hard worker dedicated to building the whole university. Weekes believed Suratgar to be “one of the best choices possible for Chancellor of Pahlavi University.”

Throughout 1962 and 1963, the chancellor exercised a personal control over the university that was much more in keeping with the traditional authoritarian model of

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Iranian higher education than it was with the designs of the Penn team. E. W. Berlin of AID noted that Suratgar would not accept any changes that “incorporated any different system other than that to which he has been so long accustomed at Tehran University.” Representatives of the Iran Foundation indicated that the chancellor “took exception to most of the suggestions made by Board members” and “acted as though the Board was a committee acting on his behalf.” Ken Livingston of AID reported that Suratgar “thumbs his nose at the Board and only reports when convenient.” In order to give himself a freer hand, the chancellor removed Dr. Mehra, the only member of the board of trustees who resided in Shiraz. He convened the board only sporadically and made critical decisions without consulting it. Finally, the chancellor took steps to marginalize the growing cadre of younger, American-trained Iranian faculty that Penn and the Iran Foundation had recruited, individuals who came to Shiraz expecting to find a university that worked like those to which they had grown accustomed in the United States. These developments set the stage for a major confrontation between the Penn team and the American representatives of the Iran Foundation on the one hand and the chancellor on the other.226

The board itself proved to be part of the problem. The whole concept was foreign to Iranians who did not really grasp its function in guiding a university. Members did not represent a cross section of Iranian professionals as the Penn advisors had hoped. Instead, the board consisted mostly of “representatives of the Iranian government or else laymen who are under the sway of the chancellor.” The trustees did not take an active

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226 E. W. Berlin to Gaylord Harnwell, 10 November 1962, folder Suratgar visit, box 10, PUPR, Penn; Bettina Warburg, “Report on a Visit to Iran, April 7th – April 29th,” folder Iran 1964-5 (3rd of 6), box 11, PUPR, Penn; “Penn Team – Points of View,” 12 April 1963, folder Iran 1964-1965 (3rd of 6), box 11, PUPR, Penn. For further analysis from the Iran Foundation of the relationship between the Chancellor and the Board, see “Summary of a Visit to Iran, August 19-26, 1963,” folder Closing out, box 9, PUPR, Penn.
role in the leadership of the university. Paul Schrobe, a physician who headed the Penn
team in Shiraz, visited a meeting of the board of trustees during the fall of 1963 and came
away with the impression that its members were a “somnolent group who were there
because they had been called.” Suratgar tended to dominate the meetings; “nothing came
up that he didn’t initiate.” The chancellor was the only administrative officer of the
university who maintained regular contact with the board of trustees. Consequently, he
could disclose or omit developments as he saw fit. The Iran Foundation complained that
he had failed to report important matters such as the resignations of two deans the
previous autumn and the reasons for their departure. A flabbergasted Schrobe wrote to
Harnwell that had he been a member of the Board rather than an American adviser who
worked at the university every day, he too would have thought “that the State of the
Union must be excellent.”

But not everything was right with the university. The chancellor’s personal
leadership destabilized the institution during its first two academic years. For one thing,
Suratgar did not seem to commit himself fully to the project in Shiraz. He was, in
Schrode’s estimation, “neither competent nor enthusiastic;” rather, “He is in Tehran more
than he is here.” That the university failed to produce a budget that could account for the
cost of hiring new faculty members and still allow the medical school to procure enough
x-ray film seemed not to bother the chancellor. He simply blocked the hiring of more
professors and told the medical school to make do with what it had.

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227 First quotation: Warburg, “Report on a Visit to Iran, April 7th – April 29th,” PUPR; see also an unsigned
letter to Richard Parsons, 28 May 28, 1963, PUPR; second and third quotations: Paul Schrobe to Gaylord
Harnwell, 26 November 1963, folder Iran 1960-65, XVI, box 136, OPR, Penn.
228 Schrobe to Harnwell, 26 November 1963, OPR, Penn.
Suratgar also incited friction between himself and the academic deans as well as the American advisors by going outside of the agreed upon admissions policy in both the summers of 1962 and 1963. Eleven days before Pahlavi University was to open for its first academic year (1962), the chancellor admitted an additional two hundred students. (AID, Penn, and Suratgar had all agreed upon 120 students for the first class.) Overnight, the university faced the prospect of absorbing nearly three times as many students as it could reasonably accommodate. The admissions crisis led to the resignation of Dr. Yusif Hatfi, the acting dean of arts and sciences. Hatefi was a world-renowned biochemist and an individual committed to moving Pahlavi University away from the old pattern of personalized control. The Penn team had hoped to use his reputation to attract similarly talented minds to Shiraz. The chancellor then accepted seven medical students who had failed to gain admission to any other school over the vigorous objection of the dean, who pointed out that nearly three hundred qualified students were already requesting transfer to Shiraz. When the dean refused to admit the seven, the chancellor cut all funding to the school including the payment of salaries. In so doing, Suratgar demonstrated one of the most time-honored prerogatives of the Iranian university chancellors – a strong power of the purse. Unfortunately, the chancellor’s steadfastness also led to the resignation of a second dean during the university’s first month of operation.229

In the absence of an effective board of trustees, the Educational Consultative Council (ECC) provided the Penn advisors with the only avenue through which they might influence the chancellor. Formed in June 1963, the Council consisted of Harnwell, 

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229 Livingston, “Pahlavi University,” PUPR, Penn; on Hatifi’s relationship with Pahlavi University, see Bill, The Politics of Iran, 83-4.
representatives of AID and the Iran Foundation, and one American faculty member from each of Robert College in Istanbul and the American University of Beirut. The Council initially assumed an optimistic position, gently urging the chancellor to “appreciate that many traditionally acceptable prerogatives of administration are not compatible with the principals of administration at Pahlavi University.” Most of the American advisors soon came to realize, however, that Suratgar could brush aside the Council even more easily than he could the board of trustees.230

The ECC did enjoy the sympathy of Hossein Ala, and elder Iranian statesman and former prime minister (1951, 1955-1957) who chaired the Council by virtue of his being the minister of court. Ala held a number of government responsibilities simultaneous to chairing the ECC, and he lacked a familiarity with the details of Pahlavi University’s development. But he was an energetic man, even at the age of eighty, and impressed both Schrode and Iran Foundation personnel with his interest in the university. He was also someone the shah trusted. The Americans believed that they had finally found an effective way to leverage the formidable chancellor. At one point in December, several Americans from Penn, the Iran Foundation, and AID met with at least two Iranian professors to discuss the possibility of asking the minister of court to arrange a private meeting with the shah so that they could lay bare a situation that Schrode believed the king would find intolerable.231

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231 Schrode to Harnwell, 26 November 1963, OPR, Penn; Scrode to Harnwell and 26 December 1963, folder Iran 1964-65 XVI, box 136, OPR, Penn; Warburg, “Report on a Visit to Iran, April 7th – April 29th,” PUPR, Penn.
The tense situation between Penn advisors and the Pahlavi University administration changed suddenly, though temporarily, the following spring when the shah replaced Suratgar with a close personal associate, Asadollah Alam. Despite being only forty-five years old at the time of his appointment, the new chancellor had been a central figure in Iranian politics for more than a decade, including a term as prime minister (1962-1964). Alam was a close and longtime friend of the king, and he had acquired a reputation for acting decisively on behalf of the monarch. He gave, for instance, the order for security forces to fire on students supporters of the Ayatollah Khomeini on 5 June 1963. The shah sent Asadollah Alam to Shiraz in order to ensure the survival of an enterprise that was of great personal interest to the king but one that nevertheless seemed to be mired in uncertain leadership and going nowhere in early 1964.232

Alam’s appearance initially created a better working relationship between the Pahlavi University administration and the various groups of American advisors. The new chancellor stressed his desire to follow Harnwell’s Blue book, going so far as to say: “We must become another [University of] Pennsylvania in Iran.” He also meticulously observed student admission policy, which increased the quality of the incoming class for 1964 and helped ease the overcrowding situation that had developed under his predecessor’s rather uncoordinated selection process. The ECC cited improvement in faculty recruiting. Hatifi returned as provost in time for the 1964/5 academic year; engineering added three new professors, and the university attracted Hussein Nasr, a

world-renowned Iranian scholar of Shiism, to head the Philosophy Department. Finally, the library and Faculty of Engineering received major outside grants. The Iranian Oil Operating Companies chipped in for collection development and research grants; AID, the UN, and the Oil Consortium agreed to make Pahlavi University the repository for all economic, social, and engineering studies that they made. G. H. Muller, a visiting professor of American literature at Pahlavi University at the time, wrote that the Oil Consortium had so well funded the university’s “splendid library” that the staff could not buy books fast enough to exhaust the annual appropriations. Muller estimated that he ordered more than two thousand books during his two years at the university. Bruce Jessup, a public health advisor who worked at Pahlavi University from the spring of 1963 through May 1964, commented that Alam’s arrival “abruptly changed” the course of the institution, even going so far as to claim that a “new Pahlavi University has been launched, confidence in this potentially great undertaking has been restored.” That December, the Council concluded that, “There is a contagious feeling of excitement growing throughout the entire university.”

Alam also exercised decisive leadership in solving a major crisis that had developed between the Shiraz Medical Center and Pahlavi University in recent years. The technologically-advanced and well-funded Shiraz Medical Center, the powerhouse that would drive the development of the new university, did not always blend well with

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the struggling new university. The doctors at Shiraz Medical Center enjoyed much more prestige and higher salaries than those who worked in the newer facility at Pahlavi University. Consequently, the Americans had difficulty recruiting faculty for the university’s medical school. Communication between the two facilities became ineffective as Dr. Mehra closely guarded the institutional autonomy of Shiraz Medical Center. The center’s position, however, became less tenable after AID and the Iran Foundation moved their financial support to the university in 1962. Still, Mehra refused to accept a formal merger of the two institutions. Ken Livingston described the relationship between the two as “a state of anarchy” that threatened to damage both institutions. The new chancellor, however, persuaded Nemazee to allow the merger to go forward during the summer of 1964 and reorganized the medical school’s faculty that fall. Both the Penn and Iran Foundation advisors agreed that these changes eased what had been the single greatest threat the university and that “forward movement of the Medical College and University will unquestionably improve.”

But the improvement came at a considerable price. For one thing, the merger led to the resignation of Dr. Mehra, a talented doctor who had accompanied Harnwell and his associates on their first trip to Iran during the summer of 1960. Mehra had been an important ally in promoting Iranian-American cooperation in Shiraz; all the American advisors were disappointed to see him go. Beyond that, Alam conducted the reorganization in such a way that created resentment among senior Iranian faculty and

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234 On the salary disparity, see Suratgar, “1963-64: The Year of Trial,” 8, folder Board of Trustees, box 9, PUPR, Penn; on Dr. Mehra’s rejection of the merger of Shiraz Medical Center and Pahlavi University, see Mehra to Janeway, 1 July 1964, folder Iran General 1963-64, box 10, PUPR, Penn; and Kenneth Livingston, “The Educational Consultative Council,” 11 October 1964, folder Educational Consultative Council, box 3, PUPR, Penn.
raised the eyebrows of several American advisors. The chancellor did not consult the board of trustees before shuffling the staff in October; he did not even inform the key people involved until the morning that the changes were to take effect. While the result made the medical school function better, the method showed no improvement on the heavy-handed tactics of Alam’s much-maligned predecessor.235

For all the good will that his appointment as chancellor had created in 1964, Asadollah Alam did not succeed in creating at Shiraz the university that the shah and Penn had envisioned. While his administration did bring a level of growth and stability that had been lacking under Suratgar, it did not conform to the style of administration that Penn and the Ministry of Education had originally agreed upon. Like his predecessor, Alam was a political appointee; he was not chosen by and was not always accountable to the independent board of trustees. Though the conditions of his appointment required him to dedicate all his energies to overseeing the university, Alam spent much of his time attending to political and diplomatic affairs in Tehran before the shah recalled him permanently to become minister of court in late 1966. One Penn advisor lamented that “the prospects for Pahlavi University appear to have deteriorated” during the winter and spring of 1965. The chancellor “had not taken the major forward steps which President Harnwell understood were in the offing.”236

Lacking firm leadership, the university entered a period of drift in 1965 that saw non-academic administrators take control of the university. Yusif Hatifi left for good after the 1964/5 academic year depriving Pahlavi University of a first-class scientist and an energetic organizer who was committed to the Penn team’s vision. Penn advisors noted that “The faculty does not command the respect which is due it.” Park Tutor complained that the administrator who effectively controlled the university in the chancellor’s absence “is not educated,” and “demonstrated that he does not know what a university is about.”

During the final three years of its AID contract with Pahlavi University, the Penn team focused on developing the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and creating an integrated core curriculum that would provide all students with a basic liberal arts education. Again, the Penn team met limited success. Penn personnel had noted as early as the summer of 1963 that the Faculty of Arts and Sciences was among the weakest at the university (along with engineering) and that it would require particular attention in order to become the centerpiece of the university. The college held a special significance to some of the American advisors who noted it represented the only native-run curriculum of its type in Asia. The Penn team, however, faced significant handicaps. First, a full team of arts and sciences advisors was not available until 1966, four years into the Penn-Pahlavi cooperation and only one year prior to the end of AID support. (Recall that the emphasis in the early years had been on the medical school.) Faculty recruiting proved difficult as teaching loads were high and the lack of graduate programs meant there were

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few assistants. Peace Corps volunteers did help with the teaching of English, though some of the volunteers worked on agricultural extension projects associated with the university.\textsuperscript{238}

The larger problem in the long term, however, was that the regular faculty at Pahlavi University did not really understand a liberal arts curriculum. In this respect, the Penn advisors faced many of the same challenges that the Nebraska team encountered in trying to establish land-grant education ideas at Atatürk University. While most Pahlavi University faculty had received at least some graduate training in the United States, few had done undergraduate work in an American university. As professors groped to understand their roles in the new curriculum, students showed indifference. Many simply wanted the prestige of a degree and a corresponding professional position. They did not grasp the importance of critical thinking or developing problem solving skills and saw little point to a liberal arts education. Writing after the Penn’s AID contract had ended, Arthur Doerr, a geographer from the University of Oklahoma who joined the Penn team in 1965/6, concluded that: “The liberal arts curriculum is poorly understood.” The failure of the Penn team to initiate an integrated arts and sciences curriculum was not at all unique to Pahlavi University. The University of Nebraska largely failed in its attempt to create a similar curriculum at Atatürk University. In 1962, for example, Marvel Baker

\textsuperscript{238} “Report to the Pahlavi University Board of Trustees,” 3 July 1963, folder Iran 1960-65 XIII, box 136, OPR, Penn; “The College of Arts and Sciences,” 1963, folder 14, box 4, Harnwell Papers, Penn; “Report of the Educational Consultative Council to Pahlavi University,” 3 December 1964, folder Educational Consultative Council, box 3, PUPR, Penn; “Points raised at the discussion held on 14 February 1971,” folder 15, box 5, Harnwell Papers, Penn; on the development of the arts and sciences field team, see Max Copeland to Paul Schrode, 8 July 1965, folder Robert Burgess, box 2, PUPR, Penn; on the prospects of Peace Corps volunteers at Pahlavi University, see Minutes of the Meeting of the Penn Group at Pahlavi University,” 25 May 1965, 1 June 1965, 13 June 1965, all in folder Iran 1964-65 (1 of 6), box 11, PUPR, Penn.
observed that: “The development in ‘Letters’ up to the present time bears little relation to
the needs of the university in this area.” Like Doerr, Baker concluded that the Turkish
professors at Atatürk University did not understand the proposed curriculum’s
“possibilities or responsibilities in the cultural, social and economic development of the
country.”

That is not to say that the arts and sciences advisors made no significant
contributions to Pahlavi University. Penn archaeologist Nicol Murray undertook a
significant excavation during the spring and summer of 1966 to preserve three
Achaemenid-era monuments. The expedition allowed Pahlavi University to preserve
Iran’s national treasures as it brought the rudiments of an archaeological collection to the
institution. Penn also arranged for some of its doctoral candidates in archaeology to
begin teaching basic courses in ancient Near East history and culture at Shiraz. In
addition, Arthur Upham Pope, a distinguished historian of Persian art and culture donated
his extensive personal library to Pahlavi University “to serve as the basis of an academic
and research program in Iranian art and culture.” Finally, Penn advisors helped create an
Asia Institute at Pahlavi University to house the Iranian studies program that Pope
directed until 1969 when distinguished Iranologist Richard Nelson Frye succeeded
him.

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September 1962, 14.
240 Nicol to Asadollah Alam, 10 March 1966, folder Dr. Nicol’s Expedition, box 4, PUPR, Penn; Nicol to
Alam, 10 October 1966 and Nicol to Max Copeland, 30 October 1966, folder Establishment of a
Department of Archaeology, box 4, PUPR, Penn; John Heatherston to Alam, 13 October 1965 and Arthur
Upham Pope to Alam, 1 November 1965, folder Pope, 1965-66, box 11, PUPR, Penn; Muller, “Shah vs.
Bureaucrats,” 241; on the growth of the Pahlavi University Asia Institute during the 1970s, see Jafar
Moayyed (Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas at Austin) to Robert Clawson
A divergence of opinion concerning how much the Americans should press the chancellor to conform to Harnwell’s Blue Book characterized relations between AID and Penn advisors throughout the autumn of 1963 and into 1964. Penn personnel usually advocated a strict application. The Penn advisors came to Shiraz with marching orders from both the shah and their own administration to develop an American-style university. They were not, in general, experts on Iranian higher education or on the concept of cultural exchange. They were often inflexible; they understood one model for Pahlavi University, and they tended to see Iranian failures to implement Blue Book recommendations as foot dragging or sabotage. Schrode, in particular, believed that the chancellor’s seizure of all authority in running the university was the root cause of Pahlavi’s problems. AID’s Ken Livingston also took this position in his correspondence with Isaac Starr, Penn’s coordinator in Philadelphia. Suratgar, Livingston was convinced, took “an extremely critical attitude” toward anything that the Americans did “that would enable Pahlavi to become a great university.”

Other AID officials, however, took a more flexible position on the American role in Shiraz. The advisors were there to help an extant institution; that institution was an Iranian one; the Iranians should therefore shape and administer it, and the Americans were not to forcibly pursue their recommendations. AID had to concern itself with how the project fit into U.S.-Iranian relations, and that meant maintaining good relations

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between American advisors and Iranian officials. The AID office in Tehran was also more accustomed to working with Iranians on development projects and no doubt better understood when to take a stand on procedural matters and when to allow the Iranians to do things in a way that was more familiar and comfortable to them.\footnote{Penn Team Points of View,” PUPR, Penn.}

If a combination of Penn’s inflexibility in applying Harnwell’s Blue Book principles to Pahlavi University and the success of Chancellors Surratgar and Alam at evading them caused significant problems in the Penn-Pahlavi relationship, then the Penn team’s relationship with AID offered little relief. For the most part, the Penn advisors maintained a very cool attitude toward AID. Paul Schrode frequently wrote to Philadelphia that he felt harassed by “innumerable provisions within the contract” and argued that the paper work that AID required took valuable time away from more important projects. Penn and AID frequently argued over proposed changes to the Penn-Pahlavi contract. Schrode vented his frustration to Sydney F. Thomas of AID after numerous bouts of engaging in protracted discussions with AID officials concerning some critical point and then reaching an agreement only to have someone else from AID later overrule the decision.” Schrodé’s “personal reaction,” he told Thomas, was to “tell them ‘to go to hell’.”\footnote{Schrode to Harnwell, 26 March 1965, folder AID (1 of 8), box 1, PUPR, Penn; Schrode to Harnwell, 26 November 1963, and 26 December 1963, OPR, Penn; Memorandum to the Files, “Iran Contract Difficulties,” 27 July 1964, folder Iran 1960-65, XVII, box 136, OPR, Penn; Schrode to Thomas, 26 August 1964, OPR, Penn.}

Penn team members also doubted AID’s commitment to Pahlavi University. AID officials sometimes summoned Penn advisors to Tehran only to keep them waiting or to cut meetings short. Harnwell harangued the State Department in Iran, which oversaw
AID, for “the ineptitude” with which it approached the Pahlavi University project and rather acerbically claimed, “Much is being accomplished in spite of AID rather than because of it.” The Overseas Liaison Committee of the American Council on Education agreed with Penn’s criticisms of AID in its 1976 study of U.S.-Iranian cooperation in higher education noting that Pahlavi University “received rather little attention, and never the full support of the Point Four Mission [AID/Tehran].”

The problem was not entirely AID’s, however. On more than one occasion, Penn officials either misunderstood or misinterpreted AID policy, especially with respect to hiring field team members. Such miscommunications easily led to frustration on the part of Penn advisors who often felt they lacked enough personnel to cover all of Pahlavi University’s needs in the early years. In addition, questions of Penn’s own long-term commitment to the project began to surface in mid-1964 and continued through the last three years of the AID contract. Unlike the Nebraska team in Turkey, Penn did not draw primarily on its own faculty to staff the Shiraz field team. This does not, of course, mean that Penn filled Pahlavi University with inferior professors; Arthur Doerr and G.H. Muller both joined the Penn team from outside the University of Pennsylvania and both performed well. But it does seem that Penn engaged in some of the “academic hustling” that critics of the university contract program had alleged since the mid-1950s and that the Overseas Liaison Committee found still to be a feature of American education assistance in Iran as late as the mid-1970s. Academic hustling refers to the practice of an American university accepting an overseas technical assistance assignment because its

244 Peter Binzen, “State Department Inept in Iran, Harnwell Says,” The Evening Bulletin [Philadelphia], 16 December 1964, folder AID (1 of 6), box 1, PUPR, Penn; Overseas Liaison Committee, An Analysis, 71.
administration believes the contract will enhance its institutional prestige. Supporting that contract is secondary, so the university fills its field team with outside professors or scientists, often individuals who have had difficulty finding permanent employment elsewhere. Robert Burgess, a botany professor from North Dakota State University wrote frequent letters to Philadelphia during the summer of 1966 complaining about Penn’s lack of institutional support for its project in Shiraz. “Many of us in Shiraz believed the project was in trouble,” he wrote to Max Copeland that September, “yet there was little evidence that this was understood in Philadelphia.”

Penn’s AID contract terminated in the summer of 1967, but its relationship with Pahlavi University continued for several more years under a number of direct university-to-university agreements. Initially, Penn personnel greeted the change with considerable satisfaction since the relationship between Penn and AID had never been an easy one. Yet, Penn’s partnership with Pahlavi University languished under the direct contract. Penn continued a faculty exchange, but it reached an impasse with the Pahlavi administration over who should be involved. Penn favored sending arts and sciences professors in a continuing effort to meet its long-term goals for the university, but Pahlavi requested engineers. The latter could reasonably point out that producing competent engineers was obviously important to national development and that the engineering faculty was, in any event, in almost as rudimentary a shape as was arts and sciences. Moreover, cooperation between the two institutions became more complicated once Penn

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245 Phillip Talbot to Schrode, 6 July 1964, folder AID (6 of 8), box 1, PUPR, Penn; Burgess to Copeland, 15 September 1966, folder Robert Burgess, box 2, PUPR, Penn; on academic hustling in Iran, see Overseas Liaison Committee, *An Analysis*, 6, and Burgess to Copeland 8 July 1966 and 5 August 1966, folder Robert Burgess, box 2, PUPR, Penn; on the composition of the Penn field team in Shiraz, see Bill, *The Politics of Iran*, 84.
removed the project head from Shiraz. Philip George, the associate director in 1970, complained to Copeland that: “The Pahlavi-Pennsylvania contract has been one in name alone. … Pahlavi deserves a much better deal.”

The situation did not improve any over the next few years as Penn’s relationship with Pahlavi University steadily faded. In early 1971, Penn decided to limit its assistance to specific areas of the university that required specialized assistance such as developing graduate programs in engineering. Perhaps the most telling sign that the Penn-Pahlavi relationship was fading was the decision, apparently taken jointly by both universities, to phase out Penn’s efforts to recruit Iranian academics living in the United States. Faculty recruitment had been one of the most fundamental goals of the Penn-Pahlavi relationship from the beginning and represented perhaps the shah’s highest priority for the university. Within a few years, even faculty exchanges between the two universities had dwindled to almost nothing. Penn sent none of its professors to Shiraz during the 1972/3 academic year and notified Pahlavi officials that interest among the Penn faculty to go to Shiraz on a direct hire basis was “infinitesimal.”

By the early years of the 1970s, Kent State University (KSU) in Ohio had replaced Penn as the American institution of higher learning holding the most significant relationship with Pahlavi University. AID no longer administered higher education institution building contracts, and the KSU administration, having observed the

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246 Max Copeland to Robert Burgess, 8 July 1965, folder Robert Burgess, box 2, PUPR, Penn; Philip George to Max Copeland, 6 October 1970, folder 14, box 5, Harnwell Papers, Penn.
difficulties that many American universities encountered working through AID, was not interested in that kind of relationship anyway. KSU sent few advisors to Shiraz; most of those that did go worked on developing Iran’s first modern school of library science, which opened at Pahlavi University in 1973/4. The KSU-Pahlavi relationship focused on student – and to a lesser extent faculty – exchanges; many of these remained vibrant well into the 1970s. In August 1974, former Point Four official and Iranian ambassador to the United States Ardeshir Zahedi gave a commencement speech at KSU in which he announced that the Iranian government would finance a series of scholarships for KSU students to study at Pahlavi University in honor of the American bicentennial. With only a few intermittent breaks, the KSU-Pahlavi exchange continued until late 1978.248

Both Penn and Kent State’s operations in Shiraz became more difficult during the 1970s as the storm clouds of student disaffection with the shah’s regime gathered strength. Since its inception in 1962, Pahlavi University usually remained on the periphery of political demonstrations, but it was not immune to violent clashes between students and the authorities. In May 1970, for example, a group of thirty KSU exchange students witnessed the university karate club, acting on behalf of the administration, attack a group of students who were striking against alleged corruption in the operation of

248 On the development of the KSU-Pahlavi relationship, see Overseas Liaison Committee, An Analysis, 92; on KSU advisors and the Pahlavi University library school, see Guy A. Marco (dean of KSU library school) to John F. Harvey (Dean of Library Services, University of New Mexico), 7 December 1973, folder 37, box 39, School of Library Science Office Files, KSU, “Pahlavi University Library Science Department M.L.S. Program Beginning from 1973-1974,” undated, folder 21, box 13, CICPP, KSU, and A reply to the queries of Dean Marco regarding the Department of Library Science at Pahlavi University, undated, folder 21, box 13, CICPP, KSU; on student exchanges and the bicentennial scholarship program, see George Urban (Executive Assistant to the President, KSU) to G. H. Kazemian (Minister Counselor for Cultural Affairs, Iran) to 10 January 1975, folder 12, box 14, CICPP, KSU, Kazemian to Urban, 17 January 1975, folder 12, box 14, CICPP, KSU, and Bob Clawson, Memo, the Kent State-Iranian Bicentennial Scholarship Program, 20 January 1976, folder 9, box 14, CICPP, KSU.
the cafeteria. The altercation caused the entire university to go on strike; the administration called in army troops who proceeded to “beat students indiscriminately” and arrested seventy-five. The disturbance came at a most unfortunate time for these students who had earlier that spring learned of the tragic National Guard shooting on their own KSU campus. In June 1974, an American geography professor watched in horror as police and soldiers descended on students “with truncheons swinging,” attacking “like men possessed.” The students had started a “rampage” near the library after rumors spread that seventy percent of them had failed their English exam (the rumor later proved false). Soldiers rather quickly dispersed the crowd but proceeded to spend the rest of the day hunting down and beating students who tried to flee the dormitory complex. Another protracted student strike delayed the opening of the university for two weeks in November 1978. By early December the last KSU officials in Shriaz decided that they could do nothing further given the level of discontent at the university, in the city, and throughout Iran.249

In assessing the successes and failures of the American effort to help develop Pahlavi University, we must begin with the effort to encourage the return of expatriate Iranian academics and research scientists since this was one of the shah’s highest priorities. On this count, the Penn program achieved mixed success. George Baldwin, an American analyst who advised the Iranian Plan Organization, concluded that Pahlavi University represented, “the most dramatic example of a successful recapture mechanism

in Iran after World War II.” Between 1966 and 1968, the Penn recruiting office canvassed all major graduate schools in the United States enquiring about Iranian students and their fields of study. In just over two years, Penn gathered information on over 250 Iranian graduate students who had expressed an interest in moving to Shiraz. Pahlavi officials offered a position to about one hundred of these, and seven out of ten accepted. From the perspective of enticing young academics and scientists back to Iran, then, the Penn collaboration proved very successful indeed.250

Yet, American advisors were much less successful in convincing senior faculty who had built careers in the United States to return to Iran. Penn’s unsuccessful attempt to recruit Rouhollah Ramazani, a prominent professor of international relations and Iranian political history, illustrates why. In 1965, Ramazani offered to accept a two-year position at Pahlavi, but he was unwilling to commit to a permanent one. The university had been unable to establish a department of international relations at that point, and Ramazani did not want to leave his much more attractive position at the University of Virginia and the Woodrow Wilson Center in the United States. In addition, Ramazani’s correspondence with the Penn team indicates a certain distrust of the Iranian regime. He wrote Max Copeland that he would consider leaving the United States only if both the authorities of Pahlavi University and the Iranian government guaranteed in writing that both he and his family “would be allowed to enter and leave Iran without any impediment whatsoever.”251

250 Baldwin, “The Iranian ‘Brain Drain’,” 281. For data on the Penn effort to steer Iranian graduate students studying in the U.S. toward Pahlavi University, see pages 276-7.
251 Rouhollah Ramazani to Max Copeland, 31 August 1965, folder Dr. Ramazani, box 4, PUPR, Penn.
Faculty shortages remained a problem at Pahlavi University throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Abbas Amirie, head of the KSU group at Pahlavi, noted in the spring of 1970 that the university was “desperately in need of qualified faculty in all fields.” Four years later, Abazar Sepehri, a member of the university’s library staff, wrote to an American colleague, “Pahlavi University seems to have considerable difficulty in recruiting and keeping faculty.” The case of Yusif Hatifi, the renowned biochemist who quit Pahlavi University in frustration in 1965, underscores this last point, especially for those reform-minded professors that the university attracted.252

In terms of the overall quality of the university that American advisors helped to build, the picture is equally mixed. On the one hand, the Overseas Liaison Committee of the American Council on Education concluded in its 1976 study of U.S.-Iranian cooperation in higher education that despite its troubles, Penn-Pahlavi relationship “clearly has had something to do with the success of Pahlavi in becoming one of the leading universities in Iran today.” On the other hand, few of the Americans involved seem to have had a very high assessment of the university’s academic standards. In the summer of 1965, for example, Ken Livingston argued, “To date the efforts of Penn and AID to establish firm academic footing at Pahlavi have not been successful.” Perhaps it is not fair to make an assessment based on the view from 1965, just three years into the Penn-Pahlavi relationship, but later documentation suggests that the overall quality of the university did not improve much in subsequent years. G. H. Muller, the former professor of literature at Pahlavi, thought that the university’s high academic standards for

252 “Office of International Studies and Programs, Kent State University,” 12 March 1970, folder 80, box 1, Charles F. Kegley Papers, KSU; Sepehri to John Harvey, 7 February 1974, folder 38, box 39, School of Library Science Office Files, KSU.
admission were largely wasted on a curriculum that provided little pressure on students to excel. 253

A group of KSU students who spent the 1971/2 academic year at Pahlavi University likewise expressed disappointment with academic standards. Over sixty percent of them judged Pahlavi to be average or below average in comparison to Kent State, and the students were “generally appalled by the amount of cheating that occurred in class.” Three-quarters found the library inadequate (again, in comparison to KSU), and nearly four out of five described the professors as average to below average. Two out of three thought that an “autocratic approach, lecture from the book for memorization” still dominated teaching at Pahlavi University. Difficulties that the KSU students encountered in adjusting to a foreign learning environment undoubtedly influenced the preponderance of negative responses, but the large percentage of negative responses points to the persistence of real academic deficiencies as well. 254

Perhaps most important in the final analysis, however, the university largely failed to embrace the American administrative and pedagogical methods that Penn, the Iran Foundation and AID had tried to cultivate. The persistence of administrators and professors that either did not understand or rejected the Penn model and who were more comfortable maneuvering in the traditional Iranian higher education system certainly limited the Americans’ ability to shape the university. Iranian higher education elites

253 Overseas Liaison Committee, An Analysis, 78; Livingston quoted in “Minutes of the Meeting of the Penn Group at Pahlavi University,” 1 June 1965, PUPR; Muller, “Shah vs. Bureaucrats,” 241.
254 Gretchen Bierbaum, “Questionnaire Data Obtained from the Kent-Pahlavi Student Program, 1971-1972,” March 1973, folder 1, box 13, CICPP, KSU.
knew how to butter their bread within Iran’s system of political patronage, and the buttering had little to do with working to make the system more responsive to the needs of national development. Indeed, operating outside the accepted system, even in an attempt to improve it, was much more likely to cause damage to a career than to achieve the desired reform. Or, in the cases of Yusif Hatifi and Rouhollah Ramazani, it was likely to lead talented and westernized faculty members to seek better opportunities abroad.

Similarly, the goals of Iranian students did not really change because of their exposure to American teaching methods. Concern for social prestige and a position in the government bureaucracy had long been the brass ring that students attempted to grasp. Developing problem solving skills did not necessarily improve their prospects, so this element of American education won few adherents. Literature professor G.H. Muller summarized Penn’s insurmountable problem well. “In an atmosphere that does not encourage independence of thinking or brilliance in the execution of necessary education reforms,” he concluded, “the impetus for instituting modern administrative practices is totally absent.”255

Working within such an intellectual climate, the Penn advisors were able to accomplish little more than cosmetic reform – the creation of a university that showed some outward signs of American influence but remained solidly within the traditional Iranian higher education establishment. Writing in the summer of 1968 Arthur Doerr underscored this point, “The form of an ‘American-type’ university has been captured, but the substance seems to be missing.” Robert Burgess was more blunt. In 1966 he

lamented to Max Copeland, “Pahlavi Univ., plain and simple, wishes we would take our concepts, innovations, motives and so forth and get the hell out – But leave the money, the equipment, the books, etc.” Indeed, the American advisors lacked the capacity to do anything more. The failure of the Penn team to create an American model of higher education in Iran, then, provides another clear illustration of one of the central limitations of technical assistance. Regardless of how much time and human talent American advisors invested in building institutions of higher education overseas, these institutions would inevitably take on characteristics of the educational culture of the host country. The Penn advisors proved less successful than their Nebraska colleagues because they showed less willingness to accommodate this reality. In addition, Penn documents leave the impression that the Pahlavi University project did not rank as high on the institutional priority list of the University of Pennsylvania as did the University of Nebraska venture in Erzurum, especially after the termination of the AID contract five years into the Penn-Pahlavi relationship.256

Ayşe Erkut was a very unusual young woman in 1950s Turkey. A graduate of Ankara University who obtained a master’s degree from the University of Tennessee in 1955, she was one of the nation’s few female scientists. Prior to going to Tennessee, she had worked for a time as an assistant in the Ankara University Faculty of Agriculture; upon finishing her master’s degree, she went back to Turkey and became a home extension agent in Bursa near the Marmara Sea in northwest Anatolia. She taught rural families about nutrition, the care of infants, sanitation, and hygiene and helped establish the home economics training center at Bornova. It is not surprising, therefore, that the University of Nebraska field team identified her in 1957 as an ideal candidate to take part in the participant training component of its cooperative engagement in Turkey.257

Participant training was a common component in most Point Four and AID technical assistance projects in the developing world. Foreign nationals, ranging from top administrators and senior professors to promising young minds who had just graduated college, received the opportunity to take advanced training abroad. Most of this training took place in the United States, though occasionally programs in Turkey and Iran utilized American-operated institutions in the Middle East such as Robert College in Istanbul or the American University of Beirut. The program allowed hundreds of Turks and Iranians to experience life and culture in the United States while it provided them with technical education and research experience that was not available in their home countries. Courses of study ranged from observation tours of agricultural facilities that

lasted a couple of weeks to the pursuit of advanced degrees that committed the participant to an American university for two or three years. The participant program allowed a measure of American influence to continue, especially in the universities, after the American advisors had left. Through participant training, American universities made an important impression on a generation of Turkish and Iranian scientists who then went on to influence the course of development in their own home countries.\footnote{George D. Derr (Acting Advisor and Consultant to the Dean of Karaj Agricultural College), “Advancement in Teaching and Research at Karaj Agricultural College,” September 1954, folder 4, box 2, UPI, USU; “Report on Status of Project Agreement No. 9, Karaj Agricultural College Project, and Justification for FY-1953 Funds Required,” 10 June 1953, folder 4, box 2, UPI, USU.}

The participant program presented significant difficulties for American universities. Many foreign participants came with insufficient English language skills and academic preparation to compete in American higher education. With the few exceptions of those who had previous experience in the United States, participants faced significant cultural challenges as well. They had to adjust to a foreign system of higher education as well as social customs that were often very different from their own. The American universities also often struggled to find the best ways to select and educate the participants. More than a few participants became disillusioned, and not all succeeded in their studies. In this respect, participant training illustrates another way in which cultural barriers limited the ability of American university advisors to transfer technical knowledge to the developing world.

Many others, however, did quite well. Dozens achieved advanced degrees and returned to their home countries to take up important roles in higher education or government service. For these participants and for their American hosts, the program
offered valuable opportunities for cultural exchange. Participants learned about American educational practices that they could then help transfer to their home countries while American campuses benefited from the increase in international presence. Upon completion of their training, many participants took up positions in the government, higher education, or industry of their home countries that allowed them to apply their skills to problems of national development.

American universities that held large technical assistance contracts often hosted dozens or more participants. Such was the case with the University of Nebraska and Utah State, where Turkish and Iranian academics studied American agricultural education, engaged in research, and gained exposure to modern mechanized farming. Ayşe Erkut was one of these participants. She studied food and nutrition, chemistry, and bacteriology at Kansas State University for three years as a Turkish participant in the Nebraska collaboration with Ankara University, obtaining her doctorate in 1960. Upon returning to Ankara University she became the third member of its fledgling home economics department. Utah State’s long association with Iranian higher education made it one of the most popular American universities for Iranians seeking higher education in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. More than 250 Iranians enrolled at Utah State between 1953 and 1963; another 132 visited the university as part of educational tours or as participants in short courses. When the head of Iran’s extension services, Jafar Rassi, came to the United States to pursue a doctorate degree in 1965, he enrolled at
Utah State citing the large number of Iranian students there and the university’s commitment to public service in Iran.\textsuperscript{259}

Two Michigan State University (MSU) programs brought several dozen Turkish faculty members to East Lansing late in the university contracts era. In the first project, MSU assisted the Turkish Ministry of Education in transforming a system of academies of economic and commercial sciences, which in the mid-1960s operated somewhat like American junior colleges, into modern business schools between 1964 and 1970. At that time, modern business education was still in its infancy in Turkey, so the collaboration included sending Turkish participants to MSU in order to earn master’s degrees in business administration. These participants provided the academies with young faculty members who possessed knowledge of contemporary marketing, management and managerial accounting. They also represented a core group of teachers who were familiar with American approaches to business education and could help build these concepts into the academies. A second MSU venture in Turkey assisted the Ministry of Education in creating a central planning, research, and coordination office (\textit{Planlama, Arastirma, ve Koordinasyon Dairesi}, PAKD) between 1968 and 1974. Participants in this program worked on degrees in international and comparative education and learned about electronic data collection and processing as well as budget systems and analysis. Participant training for both projects benefited from the experience of the many participants who came before them during the 1950s and 1960s. Hindsight allowed MSU

\textsuperscript{259} Utah State University, \textit{Iran and Utah State University: Half a Century of Friendship and a Decade of Contracts} (Logan: Utah State, 1963), 113; Lila Garr, “Distinguished Iranian Studies at Utah State,” \textit{The Herald Journal}, 26 January 1965, folder 10, box 109, Papers of Daryl Chase, USU.
to design very specific programs for its Turkish participants and to select those best suited for advanced work in an American university.  

A lack of quality graduate programs in Turkey and Iran made the need for participant training especially acute. A Point Four consultant concluded in 1950, for example, that graduate programs at Turkey’s two main universities, Ankara and Istanbul were “badly in need of being improved.” As late as 1966, Nebraska’s chief advisor in Turkey, Don Hanway, complained that “Turkey today has no graduate training worthy of the name.” Doctoral programs, he continued, “approach the farcical” in terms of preparing young minds for careers in scholarship and teaching. The bewildered Nebraska advisors in Turkey reported an instance in which a survey of the various kinds of tractors used in Turkey passed as a doctoral dissertation in engineering.

Graduate work tended to be equally weak in Iran. In Mission for My Country, for example, the shah pointed out that few Iranian professors engaged in original research and argued that this made research-centered graduate work impossible. “If a university professor knows nothing of scientific method,” asked the king, “how can he teach it to his students?” A 1969 UNESCO report corroborated the shah’s views. It found a “non-inquiring” attitude in Iranian graduate programs, “the very antithesis of the approach to research and to the application of new knowledge.” Like the shah, UNESCO noted that professors themselves lacked the necessary research experience to teach graduate

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261 Don Hanway to Virginia Totter, 25 March 1966, box 17, TPCR, Nebraska; “Meeting of University of Nebraska Turkish Committee,” 7 September 1957, box 17, TPCR, Nebraska.
students how to advance useful knowledge effectively. A third critic charged that some of the dissertations written in Iran “were not worth the paper they are printed on.”

Turkish academics corroborated these deficiencies. Osman Okyar, an internationally respected Turkish economist and former rector of Atatürk University, believed graduate training to be “the most neglected and haphazard aspect” of university teaching in Turkey. Degree programs often lacked formal coursework, so students did not always acquire a theoretical or practical grounding in their fields prior to undertaking research. According to Okyar, ineffective graduate programs tended “to perpetuate enfeebling, archaic practices” in Turkish higher education. Talat Güllap, an Atatürk University participant in economics, noted that graduate training suffered especially acute neglect at Turkey’s new universities: “Here we have a very poor library; we don’t have graduate courses; and we only have one professor who is busy organizing the department and providing notes for lectures.”

The University of Nebraska field team encountered a number of difficulties in organizing its participant program with Ankara University in 1956 and 1957. The Turkish Ministry of Education employed university professors and the Agricultural Ministry employed extension agents, so the ICA and the University of Nebraska had to acquire their permission before bringing these participants to the United States. The ministries showed an understandable reluctance to release their best people for overseas


training. The compulsive military service to which all Turkish males were subject also complicated the availability of promising candidates. Very few qualified candidates applied in some of the most important fields, especially in home economics. Most of these applicants during the first three years lacked training and had no work experience in the field; many gave no indication that they really understood home economics or what home extension agents actually did.264

In addition, the original University of Nebraska-ICA contract limited overseas training to a maximum of twelve months per participant. Nebraska personnel, both in Turkey and in Lincoln, very soon realized that twelve months would only be sufficient for the small handful of participants who came to the United States on relatively short tours of agricultural institutions and facilities. Twelve months proved altogether unworkable for the majority who completed coursework and conducted field research. Adjusting to a very different culture and completing intensive English language work, which most participants required, often consumed an entire year. The University of Nebraska negotiated with the ICA to allow participants to remain in the United States for more than twelve months during the summer of 1958.265

Finally, Nebraska advisors struggled to develop a formula for identifying the best candidates for rigorous overseas study. They soon discovered that senior scientists often brought a considerable amount of baggage to participant assignments. Family arrangements often presented an insurmountable stumbling block. The ICA could not

pay for family members to accompany participants, and the Turkish government often declined to do so. Many established Turkish scientists proved to be set in their ways and therefore benefited little from exposure to new ideas and methods. This reality led the ICA and American universities to focus their participant recruitment on younger faculty and graduate students. English language proficiency and inadequacies in undergraduate education proved pervasive problems for Turkish and Iranian participants as they did for foreign participants from other countries throughout the developing world. Marvel Baker of the University of Nebraska recognized all of these difficulties and counseled his colleagues in Lincoln to “use a little tolerance and understanding” in evaluating participants’ progress, especially early in an assignment.266

For a variety of reasons, then, Nebraska’s Turkish participant program got off to a rocky start. Robert Fox, a soil scientist who served on the Nebraska team at Ankara University from 1957 through 1959, “looked in vain for evidence” that Turkish professors who had been participants had benefited from their time in the United States. He concluded that it was “very doubtful” that the participants were making much of a difference at the University of Ankara. Fox did, however, see more promise among the younger Turkish assistants who usually received longer, more rigorous, and better focused graduate training in Lincoln than did the senior professors. Like many Nebraska

266 Don Hanway, End of Tour Report, NSR, 30 June 1967, 55; University of Nebraska, Nebraska in Turkey, 15-16; and Baker, “Meeting of University of Nebraska Turkish Committee,” 7 September 1957, TPCR, Nebraska. An insufficient command of English and deficiencies in academic preparation proved a common stumbling block throughout most Point Four/AID-funded participant programs. See Forrest Clements, “World Wide Evaluation of Participant Training: Summary of Principal Findings and Primary Recommendations for Action,” March 1966, folder AID (3 of 8), box 1, PUPR, Penn. John Ernst emphasized the problem of participants’ English language ability in his analysis of Michigan State’s technical assistance program in South Vietnam; see John Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance: Michigan State University and the Vietnam War (East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. Press, 1998), 91-108.
advisors, Fox thought it possible that in time the younger cadre of participants might collectively effect some positive change in the teaching and research at Ankara and Atatürk universities.\footnote{Robert Fox, “Supplemental to Final Report,” April 1959, box 49, TPCR, Nebraska.}

The Nebraska group also sometimes found it difficult to get participants to return to Turkey once their training was complete. This proved especially true for those assigned to Erzurum, a remote and generally unattractive location. Some dawdled in the United States for months before leaving; others designed their travel plans so that they would be unavailable to teach during their first semester at Atatürk University. Again, Baker urged his colleagues to appreciate the mental and emotional toll that pursuing extensive graduate work in the United States exerted on many participants. It seemed only fair to give them some time to relax and visit their families before taking on faculty positions. But delays became serious enough that both Jason Webster, the long-time project coordinator in Lincoln, and Harold Allen, chief advisor in Erzurum, sent letters to several participants lecturing them about their responsibilities to Atatürk University and to Turkey. At least four simply refused to accept a position at the university (a condition of their appointments as participants). Another declared that he would not report to Erzurum until Atatürk University established a chemical engineering department, an undertaking that was not then within the university’s capacity.\footnote{Jason Webster to Harold Allen, 22 July 1960, Nebraska, box 24, TPCR, Nebraska; Marvel Baker, Report, NSR, 31 March 1961, 17; Baker to L. K. Crowe, 27 September 1960, TPCR, Nebraska; for a list of participants who refused to report to Atatürk University, see “Participant Report from beginning of contract to December 31, 1960,” NSR, 31 March 1961, 37-40 and Ihsan Çataltaş to Sabahattin Ozbek, 3 February 1959, box 26, TPCR, Nebraska; on the importance of recognizing the needs of Atatürk University, see Jason Webster to Orhan Alpan, 11 May 1967, box 21, TPCR, Nebraska; Harold Allen to Jason Webster, 3 March 1960, folder 5, box 28, TPCR, Nebraska.}
The Nebraska team did, however, become more effective at identifying the strongest candidates and improving their educational experience in the United States. “I am learning a few things – very slowly,” wrote Marvel Baker to Otto Hoiberg, the man who replaced Baker in 1957 as Nebraska’s chief advisor in Turkey. The Nebraskans learned that they had to pay close attention to degree objectives before assigning participants. The Turkish university system did not recognize the American master’s degree, so the Nebraska group came to favor sending participants whose ultimate goal was to earn a doctorate. A few of these individuals, such as Ayşe Erkut, actually earned American Ph.D.s. More often, however, Turkish participants came to the United States to complete course work that was not available in their home countries and to conduct the research for theses that they could write upon their return to Turkey. The process eliminated the possibility of participants earning an American degree that would be redundant in Turkey. For a time, Michigan State advisors to the Turkish academies of economic and consumer sciences worked out a similar agreement that allowed an American MBA to stand in lieu of Turkish doctoral course work. Finally, the Nebraska advisors became more selective, choosing individuals who showed characteristics such as the capacity and the willingness to dedicate themselves to the arduous task of building a new university in Turkey. “I would rather have one man who can really take up leadership in an area,” wrote Baker to the ICA in 1960, “than to have half a dozen half-baked people.” A proven ability to work well with Americans and a temperament that suggested the candidate could withstand the emotional toll of advanced study in a foreign culture also became important prerequisites.269

269 Marvel Baker to Otto Hoiberg, 9 February 1959, box 22, TPCR, Nebraska; Eli P. Cox, “Graduate
Working with participants gave American advisors the opportunity to demonstrate that manual labor in the pursuit of scientific knowledge was not beneath the dignity of university personnel. For this reason, the Nebraska team insisted that participants do more than simply observe. Even full professors had to roll up their sleeves and work on demonstration farms and at experiment stations, and they had to accompany Nebraska extension agents on farm visits around the Midwest. “We need to get them out of the ivory tower and into the country,” suggested M. D. Weldon, a professor of soil science at Atatürk University. M. A. Alexander, one of the project coordinators in Lincoln, agreed. “Atatürk University has too many indoor workers now,” he wrote to Harold Allen, an extension advisor who also headed the field team in Turkey. “The University is not developing enough talented people to do work that is immediately useful to the rural people.” Getting the participants’ “feet wet and their hands muddy” took some doing as many participants clung to the Turkish social tradition of educated people frowning on manual labor.  

Those who adapted, however, often found their attitudes toward agricultural education and research change. These individuals began to understand the utility of American agricultural education; upon their return to Turkey, they often became strong advocates for bringing the concepts they learned in the United States to Ankara and Atatürk universities. Soil scientist Abdüsselam Ergone acknowledged in his final report that “experiment stations are one of the most important parts of the agricultural colleges,”

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270 M.D. Weldon to Harold Rhoades, 26 December 1960, box 19, TPCR, Nebraska; M.A. Alexander to Harold Allen, 21 November 1963, box 19, TPCR, Nebraska.
and suggested that University of Nebraska officials require all participants to spend at least part of their time in the United States working on them. Kerim Omer Caglar, a full professor who spent roughly six months of 1956 touring agricultural stations and schools in the western United States, expressed amazement the first time he saw his American companions pick up a shovel or a hoe and go to work on some experimental plot. “We have workmen to do this sort of job for us [in Turkey], but scientists in the United States do all the work involved in their experiments themselves.” Before long, Caglar began noticing how efficiently American researchers worked. A team of two or three scientists could oversee an entire extension station that would have required a small army of laborers in Turkey. Ali Balaban, an agricultural extension engineer who came to Nebraska in 1960/1, made “an extremely fine impression” upon his American colleagues with his “enthusiasm, his desire to know the ‘why’ as well as the ‘how’ of field applications, and his capacity for hard work.” His Nebraska advisor, John C. Steele, wrote that, “Ali has been an example, not only to his fellow countrymen but to others as well, of what perseverance, dedication, and hard work can do.”

Participant training also gave many Turkish academics a deeper understanding of how American higher education worked, especially at a land-grant university. This knowledge would help them mold Atatürk University into an effective institution for improving quality of life in Eastern Turkey. Mehmet Aydin, a physicist who studied in Lincoln from 1957 through 1959, came to admire the rigor of his course of study and the

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271 Abdüsselam Ergone, Final Report, folder 3, box 28, TPCR, Nebraska; Omer Caglar, “A Study on Soil Science in the United States,” 10 January 1957, box 25, TPCR, Nebraska; and John C. Steele, Nebraska extension agricultural engineer, to University of Nebraska Turkish staff, 1 March 1961, box 23, TCPR, Nebraska.
way that his classmates dedicated themselves to their course work and research. Aydin noted that regular examinations, a practice that did not exist in Turkey, forced students to keep up with their studies while research requirements allowed them to apply what they learned. Though he struggled with very limited English language ability in his first year, Aydin persevered, and the physics department ranked him in the top half of all its graduate students by the end of his second year.272

Working with Professor Leo Fenske, Talat Güllap came to respect the way that American professors interacted with students. He had never seen a class discussion before, nor had he ever heard a Turkish professor answer a student question with “I don’t know.” But Güllap noticed that those “I don’t know” questions were often the ones that led to the most fruitful research possibilities. Finally, Ayşe Erkut came to appreciate the importance of enjoying a collegial relationship with her instructors, something she had not experienced in Turkey. Courses involved more than memorization of lectures from a single authority; rather, assignments familiarized students with a body of scientific thought in each subject. Once they returned to Turkey with a strong understanding of pragmatic agricultural and home economics education, participants such as Ergone, Caglar, Balaban, Aydin, Güllap, and Erkut were in a better position to effect lasting changes in Turkish higher education than the American advisors had been. Their

272 Aydin to L. K. Crowe, 29 April 1960, box 22, TPCR, Nebraska; Aydin to Harry Gould, 26 June 1959, box 22, TPCR, Nebraska; and E. J. Zimmerman (chair of Physics at Nebraska) to Gould, 13 February 1959, box 22, TPCR, Nebraska.
presence at Ankara and Atatürk universities allowed the American ideas to remain once the Point Four and AID contracts had terminated.  

By the middle of the 1960s, American universities that were engaged in overseas education assistance were producing more efficient participant training programs. The Michigan State collaboration with the Turkish Ministry of Education’s central planning organization (PAKD) serves as a good example. This cooperative venture began in 1968, near the end of the AID-university contract program, and it benefited from the trials and errors of the many participant projects that preceded it. MSU and the Turkish government designed the PAKD participant program to be small and very well defined. Only twenty-one participants went to the United States over the six-year course of the project. All were degree candidates; nine sought a Ph.D., while twelve pursued a master’s. MSU and the Ministry of Education selected only candidates for whom the ministry had created a specific position and for which the proposed overseas training would improve the candidate’s qualifications in some tangible way. The MSU staff in Ankara accepted the responsibility for preparing participants – academically, socially, and linguistically – for graduate work in the United States, and MSU granted those candidates who studied in East Lansing a high degree of flexibility in choosing courses. In addition, the Michigan State faculty designed special seminars on education and development and educational planning for the participants. Finally, MSU and the Ministry of Education agreed that all doctoral dissertations had to address relevant problems in Turkey’s educational system. This last requirement ensured the participants

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would only have to spend two years in the United States; they would collect data and write the dissertation in Turkey.\textsuperscript{274}

The collective profile of the doctoral students suggested promise as well. All were experienced Turkish educators and as a group they were more mature than most beginning doctoral students. (Ages ranged from thirty-five to forty-seven.) Perhaps more important than maturity, all had previous postgraduate experience in the United States. On the whole, they had an easier time clearing language and cultural hurdles than many of the younger participants who had never been to the United States. Familiarity with the system also made them less resistant to American practices than some of the senior professors had been. All but one studied at Michigan State, and many took the same courses. This arrangement gave the participants a built-in social network and allowed them to tutor each other through academic difficulties. The practice taught them a great deal about professional collaboration, something the MSU advisors found lacking in Turkish government administration. Finally, all but one doctoral candidate brought his family to the United States, a condition that further mitigated loneliness and homesickness.\textsuperscript{275}

The PAKD doctoral participant program proved very successful in their studies at MSU. The field team’s final report called the doctoral candidates “an impressive group of men.” All nine finished their degrees in a timely fashion and found themselves “thrust into leadership roles in the MOE’s [Ministry of Education] reform efforts.” A joint AID-MSU review of participant progress in the spring of 1971 found that the first to complete

\textsuperscript{274} Bohnhorst, et. al., \textit{Final Report}, 48-49, 55-59.
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid.; “Supplement to the Eight Semi-Annual Report,” December 1971, box 2, entry 235, AID, NAI.
their degrees “took on even broader responsibilities” than either they or MSU had originally planned. Nurettin Fidan, who finished his MSU doctorate in 1972, assumed the directorship of PAKD the following year. Galip Karagozoğlu, who completed his at the same time, became an undersecretary in the Ministry of Education. A third MSU participant went on to become a deputy undersecretary of education upon completion of his doctorate, while two others became assistant directors of PAKD.276

The master’s degree participants also encountered substantial success despite facing more linguistic and cultural obstacles than the doctoral candidates had. None of the master’s candidates had any prior experience in the United States, and none passed the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) exam prior to arriving at MSU. They were, however, capable students, and the selection process had been rigorous. The Ministry of Education selected only twelve from one hundred applicants, all of whom had at least two years of experience at the ministry. Like the doctoral participants, the ministry chose master’s candidates to fill specific positions. Most of these were in systems analysis, so half of the master’s participants came from a strong mathematics background; five had been mathematics teachers. The ministry also selected one electrical engineer to be trained in computer science, and three candidates, one each from the social sciences, literature, and business administration, to be trained in budget and

finance. Ten of the twelve master’s candidates finished degrees; all but one accepted a position within PAKD.277

American advisors had to monitor how well foreign participants interacted with their American peers, with professors, and in the community. In some cases, participant training provided fruitful opportunities for cultural exchange. Sociologists at both the University of Nebraska and Utah State, for example, offered courses to help familiarize participants with local culture and with the American way of life broadly defined. Akgun Aydeniz, a plant nutritionist who came to Nebraska in 1962 brought with him Turkish fine arts magazines, books illustrating Turkish ceramics, and postcards and photographs to help describe his home country to the Americans that he met. A group of Iranian participants who studied at Utah State introduced their American friends to Iranian food at dinners that they organized on the first day of spring, the Iranian New Year. And, two Iranian professors who came to Utah State in the early 1960s as participants offered courses on Iranian and Middle East history and culture.278

For many participants, however, the cultural exchange component of the overseas experience took a back seat to more pervasive feelings of social alienation that came from living in a strange culture. Ayşe Erkut experienced difficulties of this kind; her experience in Kansas was not an easy one. She had a sound but not native grasp of English and struggled to complete advanced research papers on top of exams and laboratory research. She had very few Turkish friends in Manhattan, Kansas, which

278 Akgun Aydeniz, “Report about Work Completed During Fall Semester, 1962-1963,” 19 February 1963, Box 22, TPCR, Nebraska; Utah State University, Iran and Utah State University, 116-117.
made it all the more easy for her work to consume her life. Erkut explained her difficulties to Jason Webster, lamenting that she had acquired something of an anti-social reputation within her department because she often had to decline dinner invitations on account of spending long hours in laboratories or the library. Eli Cox, the chief of the MSU field team that assisted the Turkish academies of economic and consumer sciences, found through his conversations with participants’ wives that their biggest complaint about life in East Lansing was that they rarely saw their husbands, who often inhabited the library or computer lab from open until close. Sympathetic advisors such as Cox and Marvel Baker at Nebraska urged their colleagues to show patience with participants, reminding them that it was much more difficult for a foreigner, struggling with the language, culture, and marginal preparation, to earn a graduate degree than it was for most Americans. Yet, there was only so much they could do. Even with the best support, participants felt isolation, loneliness, and even despair.  

The social alienation of foreign participants became apparent at Utah State University, a fairly small campus that is located in a remote community of northern Utah. Utah State’s extensive involvement with technical assistance in Iran coupled with the university’s historic ties to that country made it an attractive destination for Iranian students during the 1950s and 1960s. Iranians accounted for just over twenty percent of the total foreign student population in 1957, and the percentage continued to climb into the next decade. The Iranian community undoubtedly helped ease participants’ culture shock, but President Daryl Chase thought that the university still showed “an alarming

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279 Erkut to Webster, 24 February 1960, folder 5, box 28, TPCR, Nebraska; Eli P. Cox, “Graduate Degree Program for Turkish Assistants in the United States,” 18 May 1967, box 3, entry 235, AID, NAI.
deficiency” in accommodating foreign participants as late as 1962, over a decade after Utah State-Iran contracts began. A lack of familiarity with university procedure, curriculum, academic standards, and local social habits all contributed to participants’ sense of isolation from the broader community. The university tried to ease the sense of social alienation by forming a Cosmopolitan Club in 1952 so that foreign students could mingle with their American counterparts, and it organized an International Club two years later. Plans for an international house on campus where Iranian and other foreign students could relax and socialize, however, fell through.280

The close-knit nature of the Latter Day Saints (LDS) community that predominated in Logan and on the Utah State campus added to the sense of many Iranian students that they were outsiders. When university officials queried foreign students about their quality of life in Utah, a number suggested that LDS students acted aloof toward foreigners. One respondent claimed that while it was fairly easy to socialize with the non-LDS students, “the Mormons, forget about it.” Whereas a strong sense of shared faith and values allowed Utah families to thrive in Iran, these same qualities made it more difficult for foreign students to assimilate themselves socially in Logan. Some Iranian students also reported experiencing housing discrimination as local land lords where sometimes reluctant to rent to foreigners.281

In a few extreme cases, loneliness and cultural differences contributed to Turkish participants getting themselves into considerable legal trouble while in Nebraska. On one

280 Bob Parson, International Students and Programs,” undated and unpublished paper, folder 16, box 4, University History Collection, USU.
281 Survey of International Students at Utah State University, Fall quarter, 1968-1969, box 12, Papers of Glenn Taggart, USU.
occasion, University of Nebraska officials had to intervene on behalf of a Turkish veterinarian student when a local farmer “wanted him removed from the country [due] to the alleged loss of his wife’s affection.” On another occasion, a Turkish agricultural economist got himself banned from a Lincoln neighborhood when a local mother complained to the authorities about the nature of a friendship that he had struck with her young daughter. Both participants claimed that a desire to make friends had led to their unfortunate circumstances.282

Most participant training programs in Turkey and Iran wound down in the late 1960s or early 1970s as AID scaled back its university contract program for technical assistance. Some American universities judged the participant program to have produced less than they expected, but several others rated participant training among the most successful aspects of their overseas development work.

The Nebraska advisors in Turkey were among those who expressed disappointment with the results of participant training. The program at Atatürk University suffered a number of unfortunate setbacks during the last five years of the Nebraska contract, and these contributed to the straining of relations between the Turkish university administration and the American advisors. No new participants went to the United States for over a year in 1963/4 during one of the most trying periods of Nebraska’s work in Turkey. AID’s budget reductions caused another controversy in the spring of 1967 when its Ankara office capped the number of new participants at less than half of what the Nebraska group had worked out with Atatürk officials. The situation presented a serious problem for the Turks since the 1967 group would be the last

282 Webster to Hanway, 11 May 1967, box 21, TPCR, Nebraska; Sefkati Gulten, box 30, TPCR, Nebraska.
participants to go to the United States under the Nebraska program. Don Hanway, Nebraska’s second-to-last chief advisor in Erzurum, provided “verbal assurances that the Mission [AID/Ankara] would support others who qualified,” but the dean of agriculture proved “unwilling to discuss means of meeting the problem.” The tension rippled all the way back to Lincoln. “I know they [the Turks] are angry about the handling of the Participant Training program,” wrote A.C. Breckenridge to Leo Fenske. “We have been trying to rectify it, but the primary concern is dollars.”

Participant training at Nebraska ended amid a cloud of uncertainty, and the American advisors painted a rather gloomy picture of the program in their final reports. Don Hanway believed that the limited number of advanced degrees earned by Turkish participants (eighteen between 1957 and 1967 with four still working on doctorates) was evidence of “the low general academic level” achieved by most participants. The University of Nebraska final report also pointed out that English language proficiency “was never fully satisfactory” and that a “weak academic background prevented many from satisfactory academic performance” before conceding that, “A few were the exception that did very well.” Hanway was certainly correct. The language barrier presented a formidable obstacle for participants from most developing countries who studied in the United States. It was also difficult to deny that the undergraduate preparation of many Turkish (and Iranian) participants paled in comparison to their

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283 University of Nebraska, *Nebraska in Turkey: Turkish University Program Final Report, 1955-1968* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska, 1968), 15; Hanway to Breckenridge, 20 May 1967, TPCR; Breckenridge to Leo Fenske, 8 February 1968, TPCR; and Duane Lowenstein to Clyde [no last name], 25 June 1967, TPCR.
American classmates. Both restricted the benefit that many participants took from their educations in the United States.284

Yet participant training did help bolster the faculty at Atatürk University far beyond what the Turks would have been able to do using their own universities. Of the seventy-three Atatürk participants, forty-one were working at Erzurum in 1968 with another twenty-one still overseas. Most filled out the junior ranks, but a few had already been promoted to doçent or professor. Only eleven had resigned or refused to work in Erzurum, despite the university’s remote location. Former participants included the rector, both deans, all department chairs in the Faculty of Agriculture, as well as the directors of the Extension Institution and Agricultural Research Institute. The program also introduced a generation of American-trained junior faculty members who helped reinforce American concepts of agricultural education and research. The University of Nebraska, it seems, left a considerable mark on the first generation of Atatürk University’s faculty. Former rector Osman Okyar called the participant program “very satisfactory” and noted that a “close cooperation” between the two universities had made it possible.285

Like the Nebraska field team, Michigan State advisors to the Turkish academies of economic and commercial sciences encountered difficulty in framing participant training so that it would meet Turkish requirements. The root of the problem was that the Turkish higher education establishment did not accept the American Master’s of Business Administration (MBA) degree as part of the lengthy Turkish process toward a

284 Don Hanway, End of Tour Report, NSR, 30 June 1967, 48; Nebraska, Nebraska in Turkey, 16.  
professorship. This reality put the MSU advisors in a bind. Students could only receive advanced business training in an MBA program at MSU or at some other foreign university, but those who went to East Lansing risked falling behind their colleagues who stayed in Turkey and received a more traditional graduate education. The MSU team thought it had worked out an acceptable compromise in the spring of 1964, when it reached an agreement with the academies to allow the American MBA to stand in lieu of all coursework save a Turkish doctoral dissertation, which the participant could complete upon finishing his or her training. But conservative professors at Turkey’s major universities complained about the practice; they feared that giving a foreign master’s degree even partial equivalency to a Turkish doctorate would lower the prestige of their own degrees. The MSU advisors, especially Eli Cox, the chief advisor, went to great pains to explain the difficulty of the MBA program at Michigan State and to assure the professors that Turks who acquired one would be in a good position to teach modern business administration at the academies. But the professors held a great deal of clout, and their conservatism negated the MSU-academies compromise after only a year. As a result, MSU reduced participant training over the last two years of its academies contract.286

Nevertheless, the Michigan State advisors and AID agreed that the training was largely successful for those that did go to the United States. Turks who studied business administration and economics at Michigan State University generally maintained grade-point averages that were competitive with their American colleagues. That was no small

accomplishment given the Turkish students generally lacked formal business training as undergraduates, were products of an education system that valued the memorization of facts over the application of principles, and had to wrestle with language and cultural barriers. AID and the Michigan State field team agreed that returned participants represented “a major factor contributing to progressive changes” within the academies. One AID report from the spring of 1970 noted that they, “have been instrumental in curriculum changes” and in “orienting the Academies away from a traditional legalistic approach and toward modern, relevant instruction in business administration.” In many cases, returned participants were the only staff capable of teaching some of the new courses that the MSU field team had helped to create. Because participant training had become “clearly the most important element of the project,” AID agreed to continue funding participants through fiscal year 1972, even though the MSU field team was scheduled to leave Turkey during the summer of 1970. Ilhan Cemalcilar, the president of the Eskişehir Academy, called participant training “the most advantageous part of the project.”

J. Clark Ballard of Utah State also judged the Iranian participants in agricultural extension and research to have been “most successful.” Karaj Agricultural College reported very little attrition among participants it sent to Logan between 1951 and 1964. The diverse group included a former Iranian minister of agriculture and dean of the college as well as several promising young graduate students. All completed their

training by the summer of 1964 and went on to play “important roles in the development of the institution.” Karaj professors benefited from participant training as well. William Carroll, Utah State’s primary advisor to the college from October 1954 through the spring of 1957, observed that those who received training in the United States were “quick to apply the observations they made to their work at the college.” One completely reworked his laboratory courses by replacing his old practice of lecturing through a demonstration with more student participation, “much to the interest of the students.” The agricultural extension participant program yielded similar fruitful results. On an inspection trip to Kerman province in southern Iran during February 1963, Ballard was “amazed to see the number of U.S.U. graduates who occupy very responsible positions even in remote areas.” The mayor of Kerman, the head of community development, and the European market representative for a large nut growers association were all Utah State alumni.288

Finally, the participant program provided a vital lifeline to early home economics education and home extension work in Iran. At a time when its universities rejected the home sciences, Iran had very few people trained in this science that was so important to development. American-trained participants were therefore the only Iranians working in this field, which was so important to rural development, during the 1950s. The first four faculty members in home economics at the Daneshsaraye Ali, Iran’s National Teacher’s College, were all former participants. Assisted by advisors from Brigham Young

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288 Iranian University Progress Reports, “Participant Training,” 91-4, box 1, UPI, USU; J. Clark Ballard, End of Tour Report, 30 June 1964, box 116, entry 617 Iran End of Tour Reports, AID, NAI; William Carroll, Completion of Tour Report, 6 April 1957, box 116, entry 617, AID, NAI; “Summary of USAID Agricultural Activity in Iran, 1951-1967,” folder 1, box 116, entry 617, AID, NAI; and Ballard to Daryl Chase, 13 February 1963, folder 1, box 72, Papers of Daryl Chase, USU.
University, these four women designed a curriculum suitable to Iran’s needs and translated a number of basic field texts into Persian. One even taught English classes.\(^{289}\)

Participant training created difficulties for both the contracting universities and for the Turkish and Iranian participants. American universities had to work with host country institutions to design effective training programs that took into account the individual needs of different projects, and they had to devise a system of selecting candidates who could benefit the most from advanced education in the United States. They also had to negotiate with higher education systems practices that often did not share their priorities. The participants themselves often embarked on a brave new journey into the unknown. They left familiar academic or professional settings to undertake work in a foreign and frequently confusing society. Many struggled to use English well enough to learn in American classrooms; others felt an intense loneliness and sense of isolation from their American peers. Participant training, then, reinforces that technical assistance was never purely technical. The abilities foreign participants could negotiate cultural challenges and the extent to which American advisors were prepared to accommodate the participants’ special needs also shaped the transfer of educational and scientific knowledge to the developing world.

On the whole, however, the participant program seems to have yielded an abundance of success stories in Turkey and Iran. Working side by side with American professors and extension agents created opportunities for cultural exchange. Moreover,

\(^{289}\) BYU Contract Team, *Evaluation and Recommendations for Daneshsaraye Ali* (Tehran: 1972), 149-150; Edith Bauer, End of Tour Report, 2 July 1959, folder 1, PFPF, BYU; Malno Reichert, End of Tour Report, undated [1961?], folder 1, PFPF, BYU; Frances S. Patten, End of Tour Report, April 1962, folder 5-1, box 118, entry 617, AID, NAII; and J. Clark Ballard to David Burgoyne, 11 September 1962, box 72, folder 4, Papers of President Daryl Chase, USU.
many of the participants enjoyed exposure to research techniques and expertise that were not available in their home countries. Probably the most important measure of success, however, was the number of Turkish and Iranian participants who assumed important leadership positions within either their government or in higher education upon completion of their training.

Participant training certainly helped enhance the image of American higher education in Turkey and Iran, two countries whose own academic traditions had previously been steeped in classical European learning. Advisors who were trying to bring American education concepts to these countries often found allies in returned participants who grasped the utility of American ideas more completely than did the senior faculty who were usually trained in Europe or in their own countries. In this respect, the participant program helped American influence in Turkish and Iranian higher education to continue after the technical assistance projects had terminated.
EPILOGUE

“These have been the years when all those people who said they wanted to do something meaningful for the downtrodden have had the opportunity to do so.”
- Allen C. Hankins, Rural Development Advisor in Iran, 1963-1965

The university contract program wound down in the late 1960s, and by the middle of the 1970s the university role in overseas technical assistance had changed dramatically from what it had been during the previous two decades. The American government began to phase out its technical assistance program in Iran during the middle years of the 1960s and ended in 1967. By that time, Americans had an increased confidence in the stability of the shah’s regime, and the tremendous growth in Iran’s oil industry convinced policy makers that the nation now had the ability to pay for its own development. In addition, both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations encouraged an increase of American private investment in the country. In Turkey, where the American technical assistance program had been smaller and less well organized, the program had reached what appeared to be the end of its usefulness at about the same time. The AID mission in that country continued technical assistance into the 1970s but at a significantly diminished level.290

New conflicts and new priorities characterized foreign assistance during the Nixon years. Technical assistance had never enjoyed full Congressional support, and the political fallout of the Vietnam War tempered enthusiasm even more. AID had invested heavily in South Vietnam’s development during the 1960s, stationing some of its best officials there. In addition, Congress became increasingly concerned that sending teams

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of university advisors to develop educational institutions benefited elites in the developing world but left the poorest people largely untouched. Finally, the onset of a world food crisis created more immediate technical assistance priorities. During the 1970s, university participation in overseas technical assistance shifted toward applied research, particularly in high-yield grains. Dubbed “new directions” by the Nixon White House, AID deemphasized grand institution-building projects and began targeting smaller, more focused efforts designed to meet the basic human needs of the poorest people in the least developed countries. The president asked John Hannah, former president of Michigan State University and the NASULGC and a longtime proponent of university cooperation in foreign assistance, to direct AID during this period of transition.291

The development of a widespread student movement against American involvement in Turkish universities between late 1967 and the spring of 1971 added a tumultuous final chapter to the university contract program in that country. Turkey, unlike Iran, was a fairly open society during the 1960s, and students enjoyed wide latitude to express their political opinions in public demonstrations. While Turkish university students expressed a high level of confidence in the United States during the 1950s, their attitudes began to change during the second half of the 1960s.292


292 “Preliminary Evaluation of Ankara Student Questionnaire,” 22 September 1958, and “Advance Highlights – Turkish Student Survey,” 29 September 1958, box 100, entry 1015, Country Project Files,
Some of the cooling resulted from Turkey’s growing sense of confidence on the world stage. The Soviet Union no longer posed the immediate threat to Turkish security that it had twenty years earlier, and Turks across the political spectrum expressed a desire for their country to chart a more independent foreign policy. Leftists in particular came to see the NATO alliance and Turkey’s reliance on American military aid as a none-too-subtle form of imperialism. The Cyprus crisis of the summer of 1964 added legitimacy to the view that Turkey would never be truly independent as long as it maintained a close but unequal association with the United States. In addition, many Turkish students were appalled by the level of CIA involvement in the politics and elections of developing nations and in the training of internal security forces. As with other student movements around the world, American involvement in Vietnam made the United States a popular target during the frequent Turkish student protests beginning in late 1967 and continuing until the military intervention of the spring of 1971 suppressed the student movements.293

Throughout 1969 and 1970, the Turkish academies of economic and commercial sciences became embroiled in frequent student demonstrations and disturbances to the point that they seriously hindered the functioning of MSU advisors there. According to Ralph Smuckler, dean of International Studies at MSU, the academies had “become anti-foreign and anti-American” and the MSU advisors tended “to bear the brunt of the attack.” Smuckler noted that while anti-American sentiment existed on most Turkish campuses, activist leaders often found easy targets on those that had a large number of

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Americans, especially on the faculty. Leonard Pompa, AID’s education director in Turkey, noted that the “students’ riots and disorders had serious detrimental effects” on Michigan State’s work at the academies and led the agency “to terminate the full-time contract team sooner than had been previously planned.” The pattern fits Joseph Szyliowicz’s description of the connection between student activism and anti-Americanism across Turkey. Szyliowicz, an American social scientist who made extensive studies of Turkish political activism during the 1960s and 1970s, concluded that while many student demonstrations had “roots that were non-ideological” and grew out of demands for better educational opportunities, “the universities had become so politicized that placards demanding an end to American imperialism began to appear.”²⁹⁴

AID reduced the number of American advisors in its later technical assistance projects to Turkish universities and instead began to rely on specialized grants and loans; the era of institution-building projects was coming to an end. The American relationship with Middle East Technical University (METU) and Hacettepe University in Ankara represent interesting examples of this new approach. The Turkish government wanted METU, founded in 1956, to grow into a regional leader in engineering and architectural education that would draw students from across the Middle East. Like Atatürk University, METU was to break the pattern of scholasticism in Turkish universities. Hacettepe University was likewise to become a leading scientific center in Turkey. Founded in 1958 as a medical training facility, Hacettepe became a university in 1968.

Its renowned president, İhsan Doğramacı, was one of the foremost Turkish proponents of bringing American higher education concepts to Turkey. AID began giving financial aid and assistance with faculty recruitment to METU and Hacettepe University in 1968 but did not send large teams of advisors to either institution.\textsuperscript{295}

METU in particular became a center of anti-American activism from 1968 through 1971. Militant leftists formed the Turkish People’s Liberation Army, a splinter group from the Federation of Revolutionary Youth in Turkey – \textit{Dev Genç} – with the expressed purpose of cleansing it of American influence. When U.S. Ambassador Robert Komer visited in January 1969, radical students burned his car while he lunched with the university president. Komer, who had formerly been an analyst for the CIA and headed the rural pacification program in South Vietnam, became a favorite target of leftist students who frequently demanded his recall. Even American Peace Corps volunteers found their physical safety in jeopardy at the two campuses. During a visit of American consultants to the METU architecture school in February 1969 administration officials expressed relief that classes were not in session, so they would not have to explain “an American visit during such hostile times.” When officials of the Hacettepe Science Center negotiated its loan with AID in 1967, they stressed the importance of doing everything to avoid being labeled “an American institution.” The administration feared that a close association with Americans would “affect adversely” the “future and widespread support it now enjoys in Turkey.” METU eventually asked for a limited number of American consultants, but not until after the military intervention of the spring

\textsuperscript{295} “Meeting with President Şefik Erensu,” 23 June 1971, box 1, entry 235, AID, NAI; Memorandum of Conversation, “Summary of Meeting with Education and World Affairs,” 7 May 1970, box 21, entry 183, AID, NAI.
of 1971 suppressed the student movements. While Hacettepe did not take American
advisors, it adopted American higher education concepts because nearly sixty percent of
its doctors had been trained in the United States.296

It was not just unruly students who questioned the wisdom of American
involvement in Turkish and Iranian education. Prominent intellectuals led the charge
against what they saw as unhealthy Westernization and Americanization. The most
influential of these in Iran was the teacher and writer, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, “Iran’s most
eminent anti-establishment intellectual and social critic of the 1950s and 1960s,” and “the
most dauntless and effective rabble rouser of his time.” Born in 1923 at the beginning of
Reza Shah’s westernizing reign, Al-e Ahmad witnessed and resented the “deep national
humiliations” of the Allied occupation during the Second World War and of the Anglo-
American coup that toppled the Mossadegh government in the summer of 1953. But it
was not just Western political influence that troubled Al-e Ahmad. Iran’s forced
westernization under the Pahlavi monarchs threatened the integrity of its national fabric.
Most disconcerting, however, was the enthusiasm with which two generations of
educated Iranians were accepting, all too uncritically in his view, Western ideas and
customs.297

296 On the Turkish People’s Liberation Army, see Landau, *Radical Politics*, 41; on the Komer visit and the
Peace Corps, see George Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective,
139-140, 191, and Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of
a Distinctive Alliance*, (New York: Nova Science, 2003), 33-34; “Consultant’s Visit to Faculty of
Architecture, METU,” 10 February 1969, box 2, entry 235, AID, NAI; on concerns at Hacettepe
University, see “Proposal and Recommendations for the Review of the Development Loan Committee:
Turkey – Hacettepe Science Center,” 20 June, 1967, box 2, entry 235, AID, NAI.

297 Mehrzad Boroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism* (Syracuse,
Al-e Ahmad’s concept of *gharbzadegi*, usually translated as *Weststruckness*, *Westoxication*, or *Plagued by the West*, became his most important contribution to Iranian intellectual discourse. His single most important work, called simply *Gharbzadegi*, appeared in 1962 and grew out of a report that he had written for the Ministry of Education the previous year. He argued that a sense of fatalism and “slumber” had prevented Iranians from developing a healthy indigenous modernization that would allow them to maintain their independence and cultural integrity in the face of western industrialization and growing military supremacy. Al-e Ahmad found particularly appalling the extent to which educated Iranians gravitated toward cosmetic but largely ineffectual modernization. Lacking an indigenous model of modernity, Iranians followed the lead of the Pahlavi kings in grasping at every idea that flowed from the West without stopping to think how these ideas might work or not work in the Iranian context. “The entire local and cultural identity of existence,” he wrote, “will be swept away.” As a teacher and intellectual, Al-e Ahmad was particularly concerned with western influence in Iranian education.298

Only occasionally did Jalal Al-e Ahmad single out Americans for criticism, but his writing leaves no doubt that he believed American technical assistance had done little to improve Iran. He resented the “western advisors who are in control of things,” and he sees little difference between foreign assistance workers and the British and Russian military men who used to fight for control of Iran. “If, when western man originally came to the East or Asia, he was master, … today he is an advisor.” In an early novel

based on his brief career as a public school principal, Ale-Ahmad wrote about a brash American Point Four technician who runs over one of the school’s teachers and then avoids prosecution by hastily paying the family of the badly injured teacher. The nameless Point Four man shows neither concern for the teacher nor a connection of any kind to the Iranian community. (He drives a car, which automatically distinguishes him from the impoverished Iranians, and he speeds away from the accident without even stopping to see if the victim is still alive.) Indeed, the principal gives no indication that this Point Four man was doing anything productive in Iran. In Gharbzadegi, Al-e Ahmad takes on American influence in higher education. He laments the English language Faculty of Letters that Penn was helping to build at Pahlavi University “right on the doorsteps of Hafez and Sadi tombs.” He argues that sending Iranians abroad to receive advanced training in technical fields, a hallmark of the university contract program, creates a cultural “nowhere man” who does not function well in Iran.299

Early in his career, Jalal Al-e Ahmad participated in the radical leftist politics popular in northwestern Iran during the second half of the 1940s and even for a time admired the Soviet Union as “the most progressive society in the world.” Though he gave up formal politics after the 1953 coup, his leftist roots certainly influenced his subsequent criticisms of the West. The leading Turkish intellectual critic of American influence, Doğan Avcıoğlu, also came from a similar political background, though Avcıoğlu remained a life-long Marxist.

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In his Türkiye’nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın. (Turkey’s Situation: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow), Avcıoğlu argued that the War of Liberation that created the Turkish Republic after the First World War had not ended. Rather, the nation was still fighting for its independence during the 1950s and 1960s only American cultural and economic penetration had replaced British and Greek occupation forces and Russian threats. To Avcıoğlu, the price of foreign assistance was American control over Turkish agriculture, industry, and the military. Like Al-e Ahmad, Avcıoğlu found particularly disconcerting Americans technical assistance to Turkish education. He abhorred Point Four and AID projects that provided “an American education to thousands of Turks,” and believed that such graduates could do little more than “ape” the West. Turks, not Americans, argued Avcıoğlu, could be the only ones to devise effective reform and expansion of Turkish schools and universities.300

In his study of the origins of the American-Iranian alliance, Mark Lytle argued that Americans “have always overestimated the effectiveness of foreign advisors as instruments of policy.” Hamilton based his analysis on the trials that American missions to train the Iranian army, police and gendarmerie (rural security forces) endured during the Second World War. But the observation also seems germane to the university contract program. It started out as a noble idea for combining humanitarian assistance with Cold War national security strategy, but in the long run, neither the university

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300 Landau, Radical Politic, 80-2; Doğan Avcıoğlu, Türkiye’nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın (Turkey’s Situation: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow), vol. 2 (İstanbul: Tekin, 1998), 556-62.
advisors nor any other component of technical assistance had a lasting impact on American relations with either Turkey or Iran.\textsuperscript{301}

Basic time and resource limitations all but ensured that even under the best of conditions, the university advisors could provide only a primer for development; Turks and Iranians would have to do most of the heavy lifting themselves. The entire technical assistance program never represented more than a few drops in an ocean of need. Consider the case of Iran. Between 1950 and 1965, the United States government provided $709.7 million in economic aid to that nation. Most of it went as capital assistance (grants and loans) for large building projects such as dams, hospitals, and roads. The technical assistance program had to make do with less than $120 million or seventeen percent of the total. The pattern of annual Congressional appropriations made long-range planning difficult as the Penn-Pahlavi cooperation and the latter years of the University of Nebraska project at Atatürk University make clear.\textsuperscript{302}

It is uncertain, however, that more time and abundant resources would have produced more satisfying results. For one thing, the American advisors lacked the capacity to make the fundamental changes in Turkish and Iranian society that western development would require. Moreover, the technical assistance program never exerted more than a minimal effect on American relations with Turkey and Iran. University advisors who embodied the best attributes of the academic ambassador abroad undoubtedly made favorable impressions on a limited number of Turks or Iranians. But

\textsuperscript{301} Mark Hamilton Lytle, \textit{The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance, 1941-1953} (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), 44.

larger trends within American foreign policy – the militarization of American foreign aid, American participation in the removal of Mossadegh from office in 1953, and the Vietnam War – all negatively influenced Turkish and Iranian public opinion more than did any positive feelings that the modest successes of technical assistance achieved.

Indeed, the extent to which university technical assistance projects led to any sustained Turkish and Iranian goodwill toward the United States is unclear. A 1958 American survey of Ankara University students revealed, for instance, that while sixty-three percent reported a “very good” or “good” opinion of the United States, forty-three percent placed more faith in Soviet rather than American science and technology. Another survey conducted in late 1963 and early 1964 revealed that only two percent of students favored Turkey receiving American assistance for either education or technical development. When Sattareh Farman Farmain wrote that “a whole generation of educated Iranians … felt that ‘Amerika’ was the only western country that was sincere and selfless,” she was referring to her classmates at Sage College, a missionary school, during the 1930s, not to Iranians who worked with Point Four or AID advisors.303

The story of the university contract program also raises thorny questions about the relationship between modernization and westernization and about the wisdom of attempting to transplant western ideas into the nations of the developing world. Certainly, American modernization theorists of the 1950s viewed modernization through a decidedly western lens. Walt Rostow, for example, based his theory of economic

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303 “Preliminary Tabulations of Ankara Student Study Questionnaire,” 22 September 1958, box 100, entry 1015 Country Project Files 1951-1964, Turkey, USIA, NAI; “Complete Tabular Presentation of Turkish Students Survey Marginals and Open Ends Only, 10 January 1966, box 100, entry 1015, USIA, NAI; and Sattareh Farman Farmain, *Daughter of Persia: A Woman’s Journey from Her Father’s Harem through the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Crown, 1992), 135.
development primarily on his understanding of European economic history. In order to advance through the stages of growth, developing societies would have to adopt western economic, political, and even social ideas. Daniel Lerner, a colleague of Rostow’s at the Center for International Studies and an expert on sociology in the Middle East, used terms such as westernization, Europeanization, and modernization almost interchangeably in his 1958 study, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, which became a landmark work in development studies. Lerner argued that “Middle East modernizers would do well to study the historical sequence of western growth.”

To be sure, that kind of thinking won plenty of adherents among Turkey’s and Iran’s westernizing political elite. “We in our country are working to follow the example of American development,” said Turkish President Calal Bayar in 1957 adding that he hoped that in thirty years Turkey would “be a little America.” The World Bank, the American Embassy in Tehran, two American consulting firms, and Max Weston Thornburg, an influential American oil executive and consultant to the State Department, all played important roles on Iran’s Plan Organization, a central planning body that wrote the country’s first two comprehensive development plans (1949-1954; 1955-1962). The plans they developed largely reflected western development. And then, of course, Mohammad Reza Shah drew many of the principles of his “White Revolution” for national development from western ideas of economic growth and social equality.

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But the promotion of western development often produced resentment, frustration, and cosmetic modernization. In his study of the role of education in Iran’s modernization, A. Reza Arasteh argued that Iranians tended “to accept those practices which were in harmony with their own values and to appose the disharmonious ones.” Moreover, while Iranians have sometimes openly resisted outsider influence, more often they “nominally accepted a practice only to circumvent it, devising their own modifications.” Marvin Zonis described the attitudes of Iran’s political elite toward education and technology as a “symbiosis of divergent traditions” in which westernization was “at best halting.” Education elites, in such a society, presented “a fascinating and seemingly contradictory amalgam of the traditional and the modern.” That would certainly be a fitting description for the demonstration schools that the BYU team helped build, the teachers they helped train, and Pahlavi University. American technical assistance often gave Iranian schools a veneer of modernity – a few more schools, a smattering of professional education for rural teachers – much like Penn gave Pahlavi University the form of an American university without capturing its essence.\(^\text{306}\)

The cultural westernization of the Pahlavi monarchs fomented anti-shah and anti-American sentiment during the 1960s and into the 1970s. Resentment grew especially strong among disaffected classes who benefited little from the White Revolution, especially small urban merchants (the bazaaris), conservative university students, and, of course, the Shia clerics. Members of all three groups played central roles in bringing

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about the revolution of 1978/9. One of the most important figures to oppose the White Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, rose from his position in Qom as a little-known cleric in 1963 to the central religious leader of the revolution in part by lambasting westernization and the amount of American influence in Iran. Khomeini attacked the privileges that American military and technical advisors enjoyed in Iran, arguing that they “have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog.”

Turkey did not explode into a national revolution, but resentment against American influence in Turkish life and diplomacy manifested itself in violent anti-American outbursts during the second half of the 1960s, particularly at METU. They contributed to the “state of chaos” that reigned in Turkey by early 1971 and helped bring about the military intervention that suppressed student politics. American influence in Turkish education, which had been both strong and popular from the early decades of the twentieth century through the middle of the 1960s, dwindled to almost nothing by the mid-1970s. A 1977 study for the House Committee on International Relations concluded that the decline stemmed from, among other factors, growing nationalism and a continuing popular reappraisal among Turks of the wisdom of their country’s close relationship with the United States.

Popular resentment against western modernization was not confined to the Middle East. American officials enjoyed a much freer hand in reforming Japan’s education

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system during the military occupation of 1945 through 1952, for example, than they had in either Turkey or Iran. Toshio Nishi writes that “the uncompromising Americans proceeded to jam their reforms down Japanese throats, but he also notes that to the surprise of Japanese and Americans alike, many Japanese found “downright appetizing” Americans ideas such as civil liberties and free expression that were designed to foster democracy. Nishi argues that in one respect the American reforms were remarkably successful; by the early 1950s they “had already formed the basis of a new political culture.” Yet, on the other hand, American reforms produced cultural contradictions that lingered just beneath the surface of Japanese society for the next four decades. Like the traditionalist Turks and Iranians who resisted American university reforms in Erzurum and Shiraz, many Japanese officials were more comfortable in a formal hierarchical society. In their reaction against the education reforms’ “excessive imitation of Western civilization,” many older Japanese developed “a deep emotional malaise” that accompanied the search for a new cultural authenticity.309

So, was foreign assistance the “open waste drain” that conservatives of the 1950s claimed it was? No, that is not entirely accurate, either. Certainly the “low-modernization” Point Four projects of the early 1950s bore some tangible fruit. In fact, American university advisors achieved remarkable local successes when they concentrated on meeting the basic needs of the rural poor without trying to change deeply-held educational customs. The rural improvement program in Iran helped increase crop yields, decrease livestock deaths from disease, and build schools for

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thousands of Iranian children. The development of home economics gave some rural girls access to better education, and the home extension service provided them with professional opportunities. The Nebraska advisors even helped create a university that started the process of bringing scientific farming to a poor and remote region of Turkey.

The university advisors of the 1950s also provided a model for the much more publicized and flashy Peace Corps initiative of the 1960s. The idea of harnessing American idealism, generosity and technical skill had roots in the Point Four program as did the belief that advisors working to improve the quality of life in the developing world could provide a valuable American people-to-people presence in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.\textsuperscript{310}

And, of course, there was the benefit that American universities and university personnel received from participating in the university contract program. Almost ninety percent of faculty who had participated in agricultural education projects through 1968 thought it important for universities to develop a faculty with “broad experience in international development.” At the same time, overseas technical assistance projects allowed universities to develop strengths in the newly emerging fields of area studies. Individual advisors often agreed to serve for largely altruistic reasons, but others saw overseas technical assistance as a way to broaden their horizons and those of their families. It is interesting to note that despite all the frustrations and limitations associated with the university contract program, very few of the advisors who went to Turkey and Iran considered their assignment wasted effort. With the partial exception of the

University of Pennsylvania, whose field team members expressed a great deal of disappointment toward the end of their relationship with Pahlavi University, none of their universities’ leaderships did, either.311

“These have been the years when all those people who said they wanted to do something meaningful for the downtrodden have had the opportunity to do so,” reflected Allen Hankins on his years in Iran. The American university personnel who served as technical and education advisors in Turkey and Iran during the 1950s and 1960s generally performed their duties in good faith and to the best of their abilities. The university contract program in which they operated was far from a perfect vehicle for transferring technical skills from the United States to the developing world, but the advisors managed to achieve some limited successes when they acted as skilled academic ambassadors. If on their own they could not accomplish widespread development in either country, they could at least make some modest contributions to that process.312

311 CIC-AID, Building Institutions to Serve Agriculture (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue Univ., 1968), 77.
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