Conditions for Moderation: Unpacking the Inclusion Experience of Islamist Parties in Three Different Political Systems in Indonesia

A thesis presented to
the faculty of
the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts

Sri Murniati
August 2008
This thesis is titled

Conditions for Moderation: Unpacking the Inclusion Experience of Islamist Parties in
Three Different Political Systems in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

MURNIATI, SRI, M.A., August 2008, Political Science

Conditions for Moderation: Unpacking Inclusion Experience of Islamist Parties in Three Different Political Systems in Indonesia (63 pp.)

Director of Thesis: Julie A. White

Inclusion of Islamist parties in the political process has been assumed to generate moderation of their ideological outlook because it provides opportunities to undergo political learning and recalculate their strategies. However, inclusion of Islamist parties in three different political systems in Indonesia shows that inclusion does not necessarily result in moderation, under certain condition it even appears to result in radicalization. This thesis hypothesizes that the different impact of inclusion on the moderation of Islamist parties results from the manner in which they are included in the political process. To prove the hypothesis, the thesis explores the process of inclusion of Islamist parties in the legislative and executive politics of three different political systems in Indonesia (Representative Democracy of 1956-1959, Authoritarian Regime of 1971-1998, and New Democracy of 1998-2004). The study shows that inclusion of Islamist parties may lead to radicalization when the inclusion results in what Irish Marrion Young calls as “internal exclusion,” in which Islamist parties are formally included but their presence is largely ignored and unappreciated.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My deep gratitude, first of all, would be for Dr. Elizabeth Collins who has been assisting me writing this thesis with her intellectual insights and motherly patience. Without her continuous support and assistance, this thesis would never be completed. I would like also to thank Dr. Julie White for her time and advice and Dr. Loren Lybarger for his insightful discussions of Political Islam.

My intellectual journey in the Political Science Department was enriched by classes that I took from other faculty members and the helpful support I received from the staff. My special thanks to Dr. Takaaki Suzuki, Dr. James Mosher and Dr. Myra Waterbury who introduced me to the exciting field of Comparative Politics and to Dr. Clarlyle Thayer who nurtured my interest in Southeast Asian Politics.

I would like to thank the International Foundation for Election Studies (IFES) that provided generous support for the initial part of this research. My final thanks would be to Fulbright for the opportunity to take further steps in my intellectual journey in the United States.
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CHAPTER I: ISLAMIST PARTIES, INCLUSION AND MODERATION

Muslim countries were generally left out of the early period of the third wave of democratization, which started in Portugal in 1974 and spread to Eastern European and Latin American countries and to some Asian countries that did not have a majority Muslim population. However, starting in the 1980s many regimes in Muslim countries managed to open up limited political spaces and allow the participation of previously excluded opposition groups in an electoral process. Other countries have undergone a transition from an authoritarian rule to democracy. As of 2005, Freedom House listed 24 out of 47 Muslim countries as electoral democracies and three were rated free. These countries are now facing challenges to sustain and consolidate the democratization and political liberalization process they have been undergoing.

One interesting aspect of this democratization and political liberalization in Muslim countries is the participation of groups known for their commitment to shari’a as a social, political and legal blueprint to be applied to the existing state. Scholars use different terms to refer to these groups. Some, like Huntington (1996), call them Islamic fundamentalist groups, while others, such as Olivier Roy (1994) and Graham Fuller (2003) call them Islamists. In several Middle Eastern countries, Muslim Brotherhood-

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1 Olivier Roy defines Islamism as “the brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that claims to recreate a true Islamic society, not simply by imposing shari’a, but by establishing first an Islamic state through political action. Islamists perceive Islam not only as a religion, but also a political ideology that should reshape all aspects of society (politics, law, economy, social justice, foreign policy, and so on)” (Roy 2004, 58).

2 “Islamists are ones who believe that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and who seek to implement this idea in some fashion” (Fuller 2003, xi). Some Islamists are Islamic fundamentalists who “follow a literal and narrow reading of the Qur’an and the tradition of the
affiliated organizations like the Islamic Action Front Party (*Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami*, the IAF) in Jordan, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform Party (commonly called the *Islah*) or the *Wasat* Party in Egypt, formed political parties and/or proposed candidates for political seats in response to the initiatives of political liberalization taken by ruling regimes. In Turkey the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) and in Algeria the Islamic Salvation Front Party (*Front Islamique du Salut*, FIS) won the election. In Indonesia, where a transition to democracy began in 1998, 14 political parties aspiring to implement *shari’a* in the country registered for the election held in 1999 (Tim Litbang Kompas 1999)³.

The inclusion of groups inspired by political Islam in democratic elections is an interesting phenomenon because critics of Islam have argued that Islam is inherently undemocratic. Such inclusion has been seen as a threat to democracy (Pipes 2000, Dhume 2007, Huntington 1996, Tibi 1998). For that reason, the acts of compliance or moderation that these political parties show during their participation in democratic elections and legislative politics have been viewed as merely a temporary political tactic to hide their true political agenda of establishing an Islamic state. However, it is important to note that the cooperative attitude of some Islamist parties is accompanied by a shift in their political outlook. Some show a willingness to abandon the idea of an Islamic state and are open to an alternative view of the place of *shari’a* in the

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³ Articles on the 1999 Elections have different accounts of the number of Islamic parties participating in election. Arsekal Salim, for example, as quoted by Azyumardi Azra, says that there were 20 Islamic parties. See Azyumardi Azra, “Islam pada Masa Pasca Soeharto,” introduction for A.M Fatwa, *Satu Islam Multi Partai: Membangun Integritas di Tengah Pluralitas*, (Bandung: Mizan, 2000).
constitution. For that reason, it has been argued that the participation of Islamist parties in the political process leads to ideological moderation. In other words, inclusion leads to moderation.

That inclusion leads to moderation is an hypothesis well established in the study of other ideological parties, like the Christian Democrats (Kalyvas 2003) and Communist Parties in Europe (Przeworski 1991). Inspired by these studies, experts on Muslim politics argue that inclusion of Islamist parties in the political process also generates moderation because it provides opportunities for these parties to undergo political learning and calculate different benefits and risks of political contestation (Wickham 2004). Inclusion provides a venue for political learning because it exposes leaders of Islamist parties to different political actors and ideas, which may lead them to rethink their ideological convictions and adopt new political ideas and practices. Meanwhile, inclusion leads Islamist parties to calculate different benefits and risks of political contestation because it opens up new opportunities and challenges for Islamist parties which can lead them to revise their strategy.

In spite of the supporting evidence, this hypothesis needs to be revisited, particularly as it relates to Islamist parties, because it does not explain the following conditions. First, not all Islamist parties included in political process, including those included for quite substantial periods, exhibit moderation. The Malaysian Islamic Party (Partai Islam se-Malaysia, PAS), for example, has participated in the Malaysian political process since the 1960s, yet its ideological outlook has become more radical (Noor 2003). In Indonesia, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP)
reasserted its close-minded Islamist agenda of inserting the obligation to observe shari’a in the constitution after the Suharto regime collapsed. Second, some Islamist parties, in fact, undergo moderation when they are excluded from the political process. Nahdalah in Tunisia, for example, developed to be a more moderate Islamist party after it was ousted from political contestation in Tunisia in the 1990s (Dalacoura 2006, 520). Likewise, Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia, which joined other Islamist parties in the 1950s in supporting Islam as the state ideology, moderated as it withdrew from the formal political process.

For these anomalies, there is a need to explore the phenomenon of inclusion because in some cases inclusion leads to moderation but in others inclusion leads to radicalization. Most studies have focused on either providing reasons why inclusion leads to moderation (Wickham 2004) or elaborating the extent of moderation (Schwedler 2006, Clark 2006). However, scholars have been largely inattentive to the manner of inclusion as an explanandum for different level of moderation. In explaining the different results of inclusion, existing studies examine the internal dynamic of the Islamist part—the structuring of power in the party and the organization of debate—that leads the party to reinterpret their ideology (Schwedler 2006). While internal party dynamics are important, to use the capacity of a party to reinterpret its fundamental ideology as the explanation for the different results of inclusion is circular because this capacity is a measure of moderation.

Without ignoring the importance of internal party dynamic, this thesis explains the results of inclusion by examining the political system in which these parties are
included. However, this thesis does not rely merely on the institutional design (i.e., presidentialism or parliamentarism, or democracy vs authoritarianism) of the state, but also examines the manner in which the Islamist party is included in the political institutions of the state. In other words, this thesis argues that the manner of inclusion and the nature of the political institutions in which inclusion takes place explains the different degrees of moderation that take place. To elucidate the argument, this thesis poses the following questions: what kind of inclusion can trigger moderation of Islamist parties? How does the institutional design of the state influence the degree of moderation?

To clarify the issues raised by these questions, this thesis takes Indonesia as a case study. Indonesia is chosen because it has experienced both a democratic and an authoritarian political system, in which Islamist parties were included in the political process. Three different political periods in Indonesia—representative democracy (1956-1959), the authoritarian regime of Suharto (1966-1998), and the recent transition to democratic rule (1999-2004)—are used to clarify the effects of political inclusion on Islamic parties in democratic elections and under authoritarian rule.

In these three periods, Islamist parties that participated in the political system showed different attitudes. Islamist parties that participated in the representative democracy of the 1950s, particularly Masyumi, failed to moderate. The United Development Party (PPP), as mentioned above, adopted moderate positions in dealing with Islamist issues under Suharto’s authoritarian New Order. Yet, PPP failed to maintain a moderate stance after the fall of Suharto and returned to the pursuit of an old
ideological agenda when the transition to democracy took place in 1998. Different from the 1950s democratic experience, Islamist parties participated in Indonesian new democracy, particularly the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), managed to moderate their ideological outlook. In short, the inclusion of Islamist political parties in the Indonesian political system shows varying effects.

**Institution and Moderation**

That inclusion leads to different levels of moderation has been carefully noted by Jillian Schwedler (2006). Her observation of the participation of *Islah* party and IAF in the process of political liberalization in Yemen and Jordan respectively shows that the level of moderation of Islamist parties in these countries was different. In spite of similar level of political liberalization, the IAF in Jordan experienced a greater degree of moderation than did the Islah party in Yemen. It adopted democratic practices to organize and regulate internal party affairs and managed dynamic debate among party members. But more importantly, the IAF successfully redefined the boundaries of their ideology to justify their political practices, in particular their coalition with leftist groups (Schwedler 2006, 196-197). The Islah party, on the other hand, was not successful in adopting internal democratic practices or managing internal debate.

In addition to use internal dynamic of the party as an explanation, she adds another factor that contributes to determining the level of moderation of Islamist parties. That factor is the way the ruling party relates to a limited political liberalization process.
Using Karl and Schmitter’s classification of democratic transitions, Jordan underwent an imposed transition in 1989, while Yemen underwent a pact model of transition. In these different processes of political liberalization, the way the ruling regime relates with opposition parties and the public is different. In an imposed transition, the ruling regime stands above all other political actors and exerts strong control over them. In the pact model, while the ruling regime has a certain degree of control over opposition parties, including Islamists, they have to maintain relatively equal status with other parties to ensure the success of political liberalization. Schwelder argues that the greater degree of moderation in the IAF was made possible by the indirect participation of the Hashemite Kingdom in the political process. To use Schwedler’s expression, the kingdom stayed “beyond” politics. In contrast, the Islah regime had to compete with other political actors, including Islamists, to win votes from the masses. While they had a certain degree of control over other political parties, the control was not as strong and massive as that of the ruling regime in Jordan.

Daniel Brumberg, Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University, is of the same opinion as Schwedler about the importance of institutions in giving incentives for Islamist parties to moderate, which he defines as the ability to “accommodate the logic of power sharing”. He specifically argues that “dissonant states”, which are able “to institutionalize competing visions of community into different political organizations,

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4 Karl and Schmitter found four modes of transition in Latin America: (1) Pact: elites agree upon a multilateral compromise among themselves eg. Spain, Venezuela 1958, (2) Imposition elites use force unilaterally and effectively to bring about a regime change against the resistance of incumbents eg Turkey, (3) Reform: masses mobilize from below and impose a compromised outcome without resorting to violence eg. Paraguay, Bulgaria (4) Revolution: masses rise in arms and defeat the previous authoritarian rulers militarily eg. Mexico 1910, Cuba 1959, Nicaragua 1979, Russia 1917 and Bolivia 1952 (p. 275). Karl and Schmitter, Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe.
associations and political parties,” as well as “to distance themselves from the cultural, religious and ideological project of any groups,” are likely to prevent Islamism from radicalization, particularly from imposing its short-sighted Islamist agenda. By providing “a multipolar arena that abets competition and negotiation, dissonant states open opportunities for Islamist parties to accommodate the logic of power sharing. Brumberg points specifically to Soeharto regime as the best example of a successful dissonant state. In his view, the New Order successfully institutionalized Islamism and constructed strong political cleavages that prevented each group, Islamists and nationalists, from strictly imposing their political ideology (Brumberg 2002).

Looking closely into these two studies, it is clear that the authors have focused on the ideological moderation of Islamist parties in the context of limited political liberalization in the Middle East, in particular in Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon. In this context, the attitude of secular ruling elites was very important in determining the direction of moderation. For the Indonesian case, these studies help to explain the moderation of Islamist parties during Soeharto’s regime. However, they cannot explain the dynamic of Islamist parties in two other more democratic political systems.

An institutional approach has been used extensively in studies of other ideological parties’ participation in different political systems. Discussion of the participation of ethnic-based parties, for example, has centered on a debate whether a presidential or parliamentarian system is better to promote a peaceful political process in which diverse political actors participate. Some argue for parliamentarism (Linz 2000) and others for presidentialism. Another stream of debate has focused on whether a consociational model
or an integrative model is more effective in encouraging moderation of ethnic-based parties participating in the political process. The most recent literature seems to argue that the integrative model is more effective in encouraging ethnic-based political parties to moderate because it provides incentives for moderation rather than constraints (Sisk 1996). The institutional approach has also been used to explain the moderation of Christian democrat parties in Europe. Kalyvas (1998), who has studied the Belgium Christian Party, argues that the presence of competitive institutions in a democratic system and the centralized structure of Catholic Church contributed to the moderation of the Belgium Catholic Party in the early period of Belgian republic.

While based on studies of different kinds of parties, the literature concerning the role of institutions on the moderation of ethnic-based parties and Christian democrat parties is important in evaluating the influence of institutional design on the moderation of Islamist parties because these parties all share some similarities. These parties are assumed to base their identity on a set of values that are not easily compromised. Modification and compromise of these values is seen as a violation of divine authority in case of religious parties or the legacy of the ancestors in the case of ethnic parties. Such a violation is generally assumed to threaten the basis of party identity. Yet, interestingly, like ethnic-based parties and Christian democrat parties, Islamist parties undergo moderation.
Manner of Inclusion and Moderation

In addition to the institutional design, this thesis also focuses on the manner in which actors are included in the system. The existing literature describes different forms of inclusion of Islamist parties in the political process, ranging from participation in an electoral process and legislative politics to appointment in executive posts. However, these studies do not pay attention to the implications of these different forms of inclusion on moderation. This thesis shows that different forms of inclusion result in different levels of moderation.

This thesis was inspired by Irish Marion Young’s efforts to clarify the phenomenon of inclusion in democratic political systems. In her book, *Inclusion and Democracy*, Young argues that the meaning of inclusion in democratic political institutions has been taken for granted. The participation of voters in an election has been regarded as genuine inclusion in democracy. In fact, Young argues that in such forms of inclusion, exclusion can be taking place. Young identifies two kind of exclusion. The first is external exclusion, which refers to the exclusion of “some individuals or groups out of fora of debate or processes of decision making” or to a government in which some individuals or groups have “dominative control over what happens to them.” Another form of exclusion, which is less visible, is internal exclusion. This kind of exclusion “occurs when individuals and groups are nominally included in the discussion and decision making,” but their views are not considered or ignored (Young 2000, 52-53).

Irish Marion Young exclusively uses the idea of internal exclusion to criticize democratic systems. This thesis assumes that it is internal exclusion, in the form that will
be elucidated later, that explains the failure of certain Islamist parties to moderate their ideological outlook when included in the political system. In other words, this thesis uses Young’s term internal exclusion to unpack the nature of inclusion of Islamist parties in both democratic and non-democratic political systems. In doing so, this thesis argues that inclusion in an authoritarian system is not a genuine inclusion; it is automatically a form of internal exclusion following Young’s term. Young’s idea of internal exclusion is very useful to indicate the ineffective inclusion practices in different political systems in Indonesia that will be elucidated later. This thesis maintains the basic idea of genuine inclusion as meaningful participation in the decision-making process that Young uses in her book.

To identify the occurrence of internal exclusion, this thesis specifically looks at the participation of Islamists parties in the legislative and executive bodies in three different periods. In the executive, internal exclusion can be indicated by the absence of the appointment of leaders of Islamist parties to important ministerial posts or other important positions. The appointment to influential positions in the executive is assumed to represent more genuine inclusion because by in an executive post a group or an individual participates more actively in the implementation of public policies. In countries where executive posts provide greater access to political, social and economic resources, as in Indonesia, the appointment to executive posts means that the appointed persons or groups have important bargaining positions in relation to the ruling group.

At the legislative level, internal exclusion can be indicated by the absence of accommodation of the position of an Islamists party in state policies or regulations. Such
accommodation can be indicated either by acknowledging the obligation to implement shari’a in the state constitution or the incorporation of certain tenets of shari’a in state regulations or policies. In Indonesia, the accommodation of Islamist parties has centered on the reinsertion into the Constitution of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter, which would formally recognize the obligation for the state to enforce shari’a and to formulate state regulations based on Islamic teachings. If such accommodation takes place in Indonesia, Islamist parties are genuinely included in political process. It should be noted however, While arguing that genuine inclusion of Islamist parties is represented by the accommodation of Islamist ideas, this thesis does not argue that a country that wants to have a moderate Islamist party should accommodate completely the ideology of the Islamist party, but rather that accommodations in one sphere, preferably through executive appointment, may compensate loss in another.

It is important to mention here the work of John Sidel in “Riots, Pogroms and Jihad” (Sidel 2005) that examines the transformation of non-religious communal conflicts in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto into religiously-based violence, which points to the importance of including Islamist parties in power sharing. Sidel argues that the transformation of communal conflicts into religious violence resulted in part from the disappointment of certain Islamist leaders, particularly those who belonged to modernist groups, at the declining role of Islamist groups in the state. While the exploration of that period in this thesis will result in a different conclusion, this thesis takes Sidel’s account of the negative impact of exclusion of Islamist groups into consideration.
**Islamist Party**

The term Islamist party in this thesis is used to denote political parties that explicitly acknowledge Islam as a party principle, promote Islam as a fundamental principle of the state and the formalization of *sharia* in the constitution, and following the definition of the International Crisis Group (ICG), “assert and promote any beliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies, that are held to be Islamic in character” (ICG 2005, 1).

In the period of Representative Democracy, the term Islamist parties refers to the five Islamic parties that participated in the 1955 elections: Masyumi, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, Arabic, the Awakening of Religious Scholars), PSII, Perti and PTTI. This thesis focuses on Masyumi, the most popular and significant of these parties. In the authoritarian period of Suharto’s New Order the term Islamist party refers to PPP, while in the contemporary democracy, this term refers to PPP, PK and PBB.

This definition, therefore, excludes Islamist movements that are not registered as political party and do not intend to participate in elections. Examples of such groups in Indonesia are the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) in the contemporary Indonesia, or like the Darul Islam Movement (DI/TII) in representative of democracy period. The definition also excludes political parties that are rooted in and garner support from Muslim organizations but do not use Islam as party principle, like the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN).
**Indicating Moderation**

The phenomenon of moderation does not exclusively belong to Islamist parties. Other ideology or identity-based political parties show similar phenomenon. In fact, the literature on the moderation of Islamist parties benefits from the literature on the moderation of communist and Christian democrat parties. Experts on Christian Democrat parties generally describe the moderation of these parties in terms of their willingness to build coalitions with ideologically opposed groups (Kalyvas 1998) and to comply with democratic rules. In short, these experts have largely used “political behavior” (Schwedler 2006) as the main indicator for moderation.

Scholars working on Islamist parties have used a similar approach to indicate moderation. Mishal and Shela (2004), for example, who work on Hamas, the Islamist party in Palestine, argue that this party has undergone moderation, pointing to this party’s compliance with the political rules and its willingness to control the use of violence and to build coalitions with different political groups as indicators of moderation.

For those scholars, such changes in political behavior serve as adequate indicators for moderation, but other scholars view such changes as a temporary transformation to cover their genuine ideological agenda and compliance is said to be a political strategy to gain more votes in the election and to secure political power (Nasr 2005, 13-14). The argument that Islamist parties are inherently undemocratic because of their ideology is usually presented by this last group of scholars.

It should be acknowledged that acts of compliance, refraining from violence and cooperating with groups with a different ideology are not sufficient indicators of
moderation. An Islamist party might cooperate with other political parties, including those with a different ideology, in non-*shari’a* issues. But they might not be willing to cooperate in *shari’a*-related issues or to change their outlook on *shari’a* related issues as a result of this cooperation. In that way moderation cannot be assumed to take place.

To assess true ideological moderation, therefore, one should go beyond analyzing political behavior. Jillian Schwedler (2006), professor at the University of Maryland, and Carrie Wickham (2004), professor at Emory University, argue that one must look at changes in the way Islamist parties discuss and debate issues related to *shari’a* before and after participation in politics to determine ideological moderation. By showing ideological transformation in Islamist parties’ agenda, one can argue against those who perceive Islamists’ acts of cooperation as temporary tactics to hide their real political agenda.

These political scientists identify particular issues used to determine that there has been ideological moderation in an Islamist party. Wickham locates the moderation of Wasat Party in Egypt by observing transformation in the ideas of leaders on *shari’a*, popular sovereignty, pluralism and the citizenship status of women and non-Muslims before and after participation in politics (Wickham 2004, 208-210). Schwedler identifies moderation in the IAF in Jordan and the Islah party in Yemen by pointing to changes in the discussion of Islam, democracy and national unity within the parties before and after participation in the political process (2006, 117-148).

In Egypt, Wickham notes that leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood who established or joined the *Wasat* party had different opinions compared with Muslim Brotherhood
leaders who did not participate in the party. While a new generation of Muslim Brotherhood leaders still sought to “establish a political system based on Islamic law,” they realized the importance of “critical reassessment of the historical shari’a, affirm[ed] the principle of popular sovereignty as the basis of legitimate state power, endorse[d] pluralism in all sphere of social and political life, and support[ed] equal rights for all citizens, including women and non-muslim minorities.” They no longer followed the old Muslim Brotherhhood’s understanding of shari’a as a ”fixed and unchanging set of rules,” or insisted on God’s sovereignty as the basis of legitimate power and were more open to the idea of women and non-muslim’s equal status (Wickham 2004, 207-211). The leaders of the Wasat party had become more moderate because they had “abandoned, postponed and revised” more radical understanding of their ideology.

This thesis combines definitions of ideological moderation introduced by Jillian Schwedler (2006) and Carrie Wickham (2004) in identifying moderation in Islamist parties in Indonesia. Moderation in this thesis, therefore, refers to “the abandonment, postponement, or revision of radical” understandings of Islam, as well as forsaking a closed and rigid view of the relationship between the state and shari’a/Islam, such that party leaders are open to and tolerate alternative perspectives. More specifically in the Indonesian context, moderation is indicated by the abandonment of the idea of an Islamic state, the acceptance of Pancasila as the state ideology, and giving up the demand that the obligation for Muslims to observe shari’a be inserted in the constitution.
Organization of the Thesis

To explore the different forms and results of inclusion, this thesis benefits from the extensive literature on Indonesian Islam and documents produced by Indonesian Islamist parties.

There are five chapters in this thesis. This chapter outlines research questions, describes methodology and reviews the literature on moderation in Islamist parties. The second chapter describes the participation of Islamist parties in the Representative Democracy (1956-1959). The focus is Masyumi, the largest political party in that period and the champion of the idea of an Islamic state, and why it failed to undergo moderation. Chapter Three describes the United Development Party (PPP), the one and only Islamist party included in the New Order political system, and its temporary moderation. Chapter Four explores the Islamist parties of the present period of democratic politics. This thesis focuses on the participation of two major Islamist parties, the Justice Party (PK) and the Crescent and Star Party (PBB), in the early period of democratic transition (1999-2004), and their different levels of moderation. The concluding chapter is devoted to a statement of findings of this study.
The period of 1956 to 1959, shortly after Indonesia declared independence in 1945, has been noted as a period of representative democracy (Teik 1972). This was the first time that Indonesia had an elected House of Representatives and government. From the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 until the announcement of election results in 1956, both the executive administration and legislature were appointed by the president and vice president. The national election was held in 1955, ten years after the Declaration of Independence, although the plan for free and fair elections was laid out in the first year of independence. In this election, 257 members of the House of Representatives and 514 members of the Constitutional Assembly (given special mandate to draft the constitution) were elected; 172 political parties participated. Only 10 political parties won a substantial number of votes and were recognized as major and medium size political parties. Among them were four Islamist parties: Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama, Perti and PSII (Feith 1955, 61).

Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama emerged as the second and the third vote winners in the election. With representatives of Perti, PSII and other small Islamist parties, Islamist groups had about 95 representatives in the parliament and 203 in the Constitutional Assembly. With this substantial support, when the Constitutional Assembly convened in November 1956, Islamist parties confidently proposed that Islam be adopted as the state ideology and the seven words of Jakarta Charter requiring Muslim

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5 The return of the Dutch colonial power and the uncertainties surrounding the transfer of sovereignty prevented some elements in the temporary government from organizing an election and forming a popularly elected government.
to observe shari’ah be put back into the Constitution. Nationalist, communist and socialist parties in the Assembly rejected this idea and proposed Pancasila as the state ideology. Pancasila is the name for five principles on which the Indonesian state is founded: belief in god, a just and civilized humanitarianism, the unity of Indonesia, consultative democracy and social justice. The debate over state ideology went on for almost three years. The Islamist parties refused to compromise their ideological stance that Islam should be adopted, for reasons that will be elucidated later. Without resolution of the problem of state ideology, the new Indonesian constitution could not be installed.

On April 22, 1959 Soekarno, the ruling president, advised the Assembly to return to the 1945 Constitution, ending the debate about state ideology. Islamist parties were reluctant to agree, not only because the 1945 Constitution had a fuzzy conception of the place of Islam in the nation state, but also because they realized that Soekarno intended to rule the country by dictatorship. The vote over Soekarno’s proposal did not settle the issue. The number of Constitutional Assembly members voting to adopt the 1945 constitution (263 for, 203 against) fell short of the two-thirds needed to pass. Islamist parties again refused to compromise. With this failure to reach a settlement of the issue,

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6 The debate over the role of Islam in Indonesia emerged in series of meetings held by BPUPKI, a preparatory committee for Indonesian Independence established by the Japanese in 1945 to facilitate independence. The committee was assigned to prepare everything necessary for the establishment of new state, including drafting a constitution. The Muslim faction in the committee proposed to use Islam as the state ideology, while the nationalist faction proposed Pancasila as the state ideology. As the members of the committee could not reach a final agreement, a sub-committee consisting of nine members (known as Panitia Sembilan) was formed to resolve the deadlock. The Muslim members finally agreed to accept Pancasila with the condition that a statement requiring Muslims to observe shari’ah be attached to the first principle of Pancasila.

7 The idea of Pancasila firstly came up in a meeting of the preparatory committee for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) in June 1945. It was Soekarno, later inaugurated as the first Indonesian president, who came up with Pancasila as the name for the five principles for state philosophy that he proposed. The order of the five principles that I give above differs from the order that Soekarno proposed.
Soekarno issued a presidential decree on July 5, 1959 dissolving the Constitutional Assembly and initiating “Guided Democracy,” Soekarno’s term for his dictatorship. It has been said that the failure of Islamist parties to compromise their ideological stance was one of contributing factors to the failure of democracy in the early period of an independent Indonesian state (Maarif 1984).

The Indonesian experience of representative democracy shows that inclusion in and of itself does not encourage Islamist parties to moderate their ideological outlook. It seems, even, that Islamist parties fulfilled the predictions of political scientists who consider Islamist parties to be a threat to democracy. This chapter explores the reasons why one Islamist party, Masyumi, held fast to its struggle to give Islam a special place in the Indonesian political system. The failure of Masyumi to moderate its ideological position is explained by looking at the way in which Masyumi was included in political process under the system of Representative Democracy.

**Masyumi: Modernist Muslims’ Failure to Be Moderate**

Masyumi was established on November 8, 1945 as a response of different Islamic organizations to the call for multiparty election issued by temporary government that declared Indonesian Independence on August 17, 1945. Almost all major Muslim organizations as represented by the founders, except Perti\(^8\), participated in this party.\(^9\)

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\(^8\)Perti was established in Minangkabau, West Sumatra on May 20\(^{th}\), 1930. The Perti was an association of religious schools in Minangkabau that is established to improve the quality of religious schools in the region. The Perti was also established as a response of established religious groups in Minangkabau (*Kaum Tua*, literally means old generation) against the aggressive Islamic reform movements brought by the new generation of Muslim scholars (*Kaum Tua*).
The name of the party was similar to the association of Muslim organizations before Independence and was established by the facilitation from the Japanese colonial administration. The Japanese-facilitated Masyumi however was dissolved when the Japanese occupation in Indonesia ended in 1945.

While established by the traditionalist and modernist Muslim organization, Masyumi was mostly known to be a modernist Islamist party. The domination of modernist Muslim organizations in the party, indeed, helped establishing this image. Furthermore, Nahdlatul Ulama that represent the largest bloc of traditionalist Muslim organization in the party withdrew its support in July 1952 and established its own political party.

Prior to the 1955 Election, Masyumi played a very important role both in the executive and legislative bodies founded in the early period of the Indonesian Republic. At the legislative level, Masyumi secured the largest number of seats (49 out of 263 in 1951, or 44 out of 263 after NU withdrew from the party in 1952) of any party in the Provisional Parliament. Of the seven governments that ruled Indonesia between the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 to Soekarno’s issuance of martial law in 1957, three


\[\text{Mahendra notes that the establishment of Masyumi came from these individuals: Haji Agus Salim (Syarikat Islam/Penyadar), Abdul Kahar Muzakar, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Muhammadiyah), Abdul Wahid Hasyim (NU), Mohammad Natsir (Persis) Moehammad Roem and Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Jong Islamieten Bond), Yusril Ihza Mahendra, p. 62-63. Some of these people participated in the preparatory committee for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) set up the Japanese, in which Indonesians discussed matters related to the new state’s constitution.}

\[\text{The Provisional Parliament, which was established after the transfer of power from Dutch in 1949, consisted of 21 parties (Budiardjo 1956, 20).} \]
governments were formed by Masyumi leaders. Muhammad Natsir, the most prominent Masyumi intellectual, was the second prime minister of the Indonesian Republic from September 1950 to March 1951. After Natsir resigned, another Masyumi leader, Sukiman Wirdjosandjojo, led the Indonesian government from April 1951 to February 1952. After two PNI cabinets that lasted for three years, Masyumi reclaimed the prime minister’s seat in August 1955. This time Masyumi was represented by Burhanuddin Harahap. His government succeeded in conducting the first Indonesian election in 1955. With the installation of the new popularly elected government in 1956, Burhanuddin Harahap resigned (Feith 1962).

Masyumi, however, could not maintain its central position in the government. The results of the 1955 election that were announced almost six months later pronounced PNI as winner. Masyumi had to be satisfied with the second position. It won only 20.92% of the votes for the Parliament and 20.59% of the votes for the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). With this share of the votes, Masyumi only secured 57 seats in the parliament and 112 seats in the Constitutional Assembly. Masyumi, indeed, held an equal number of seats in the Parliament with PNI; but in the Constitutional Assembly, PNI had seven more seats than Masyumi. As a consequence, Masyumi lost its authority to form government, and its position as the largest political party in the parliament.

After the 1955 election, Masyumi’s role in the political process continued to deteriorate. Sukarno’s official ban of the party in 1960 was a huge blow from which

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11 These seven governments are (named by Prime Minister): (1) Muhammad Hatta’s Cabinet, (2) Muhammad Natsir’s Cabinet, (3) Sukiman Wirdjosandjojo’s Cabinet, (4) Wilopo’s Cabinet (5) Ali Sastroamidjojo’s Cabinet (6) Burhanuddin Harahap’s Cabinet and (7) Ali Sastroamidjojo’s Cabinet.
Masyumi did not recover. The ban was issued based on the allegation that Masyumi had been involved in the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, PRRI), rebellion in Sumatra from 1958 to 1959.

**The Superiority of Islam and the Neutrality of Pancasila**

Masyumi leaders proposed that Islam be adopted as the state ideology because they believed that Islam was superior to other ideologies and belief systems. The superiority of Islam, according to Kasman Singodimejo, one of Masyumi’s representative in the parliament, derived from its teachings that based on ultimate truth and possessing a holistic character as they are revealed from God (Maarif 1985, 157-167). Additionally, other Masyumi leaders argued that Islam should be adopted as the state ideology because it was rooted in the life of Indonesian Muslims, who were the majority in Indonesia, and Islam had played an important role in the struggle for independence.

In addition to arguing for the superiority of Islam, representatives of Islamist parties attacked Pancasila for being neutral, ambiguous and secular (Maarif 1985, 145). They maintained that because Pancasila was neutral, it could be infused by other ideologies, including communism, and because it was ambiguous, it could be interpreted differently by different factions and groups. As quoted by Endang Saifuddin Anshary, Muhammad Natsir, president of the party, argued:

Nobody would deny that Pancasila has so many fine ideas. However, the explanations that we have heard from supporters of Pancasila show that they could not define what the core idea of Pancasila is, what the structure is, where it
originates from, what the nucleus is and what the relation between its principles is (Anshary 1981, 75).

This argument was explicitly applied to the first principle of Pancasila, belief in God:

Pancasila is an empty formulation, it still needs contents. The content of Pancasila depends on the idea of the person who interprets it. In the case of the first principle, if the person who interprets it is the one who considers stone as god, the belief in the one god principle would mean belief in stone as god (Anshary 1981, 74).

The Islamist parties admitted that Pancasila did not contradict the Qur’an and Islamic values. As Natsir argued, “Pancasila is not identical to Islam nor does it accommodate the whole body of Islamic teachings. Pancasila has Islamic sense, but it is not Islam itself” (Anshary 1981, 65). But Pancasila could be interpreted in ways that contradicted Islamic teachings. The neutral character of Pancasila caused Islamists to fear that it could be used by atheists, agnostics, animists, secularists or other non-Muslims to justify their religions or understanding of religion. They argued that Pancasila must have Islamic values as the basis of interpretation. Muhammad Isa Anshary, representative of Masyumi, stated: “Pancasila needs to be under the protection (asuhan dan rawatan) of Islam, because otherwise it is likely to be taken over (ditelan) by imperialism and communism (Anshary 1981, 76).

The insistence of some representatives of Islamist parties that Islam be the basis of interpretation of Pancasila contradicted the idea of “no-monopoly” on interpretation of Pancasila. Muhammad Natsir, one of the supporters of this idea, argued, “No formulator of Pancasila is allowed to have a monopoly over Pancasila’s interpretation. Every
Indonesian has a right to interpret it” (p. 66). Yet Natsir outlined limitations of the kind of interpretation of Pancasila that was to be allowed:

We hope that Pancasila will not be filled with ideas that contradict the teachings of the Qur’an, the words of God that have been part of our life as Indonesians for centuries. We hope that Pancasila will not be used to prevent the implementation of principles and teachings outlined in the Qur’an (Anshary 1981, 66).

The Legislative Defeat and Executive Isolation

For almost three years, the Constitutional Assembly was a venue of endless debate between nationalist and Islamist groups on state ideology. Both factions presented their best arguments to convince others of their proposal. Unfortunately, each of them failed to demonstrate that their idea would work better for the future of the country. While Nationalist groups’ resistance to Islam is an important puzzle that needs to be explored, this thesis explores the inability of Islamist parties to compromise and moderate their ideological outlook. This chapter argues that the failure of Masyumi, as the largest Islamist party and the boldest supporter of an Islamic state, to moderate can be understood better if we look at its participation in both parliamentary and executive institutions.

Looking at the political development between 1956 and 1959, it is clear that in the last two years of its participation in the Constitutional Assembly, Masyumi’s position in the executive and in the parliament was greatly undermined. While the debate in the Assembly continued until 1959, the government that resulted from the popular election in 1955 was no longer in place. In April 1957, almost one year since after an elected government was installed, the ruling Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, returned the
mandate to govern to President Soekarno. One month after the transfer of power, Soekarno issued a declaration of martial law and formed his own cabinet, appointing Djuanda to be Prime Minister. No Masyumi leaders or representatives were appointed to the new cabinet. Soekarno ignored the fact that Masyumi was the second largest vote getter in the 1955 election and therefore represented a substantial portion of the Indonesian population, particularly those who lived outside of Java (Teik 1971).

In addition to being excluded from Djuanda’s cabinet, Masyumi was alienated from its close political allies: NU and the Armed Forces. In spite of NU’s alliance with Masyumi in the Assembly, NU participated in and endorsed the new Djuanda cabinet. Likewise, armed forces leaders, particularly Abdul Haris Nasution, who was close to Masyumi leaders before the election, diverted his loyalties to Soekarno and PNI.

Long before martial law was declared, Masyumi’s participation in executives was undermined. As the second largest party, Masyumi was asked by the largest vote getter, the nationalist PNI, to form a coalition government. Ali Sastroamidjojo, the PNI-man who obtained the mandate from the government, included Masyumi in his cabinet formation. Masyumi secured five positions in the government: first deputy Prime Minister (Muhammad Roem), Minister of Justice (Muljatno), Minister of Finance (Jusuf Wibisono), Minister of Communication (Suchjar Tedjakusuma) and Miniser of Public Works and Power (Pangeran Noor) (Feith 1962, 469-470).

In spite of this accommodation, PNI succeeded in isolating Masyumi. PNI ignored the ideas of Masyumi leaders who proposed a bicameral parliamentary system, a territorial system of elections and a devaluation of the rupiah, Indonesian currency, to
ease the economic crisis. The PNI also refused to appoint Masyumi leaders from the Burhanuddin Cabinet era as ministers in Sastroamidjojo’s cabinet (Teik 1972, 234-235). As Teik argues, there was no power sharing between PNI and Masyumi as the two largest political groups in Indonesia (Teik 1972, 237).

In addition to being unable to push the establishment of Islam as the state ideology, Masyumi also lost the chairmanship of both the parliament and the Constitutional Assembly to PNI. Masyumi’s candidate for parliament spokesperson, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, was defeated by PNI’s candidate, Sartono. Masyumi’s candidate for chairmanship of the Constitutional Assembly, K.H. M Dahlan from NU, also lost his bid to the PNI candidate (Teik 1972, 234).

Looking at the pattern of Masyumi’s participation in the period of Representative Democracy, I argue that Masyumi was effectively excluded from the system, although it was formally part of it. The defeat of Masyumi in both legislative and executive institutions can explain the party’s insistence on maintaining its ideological commitment. Had Masyumi’s defeat in the Constitutional Assembly been compensated by genuine engagement at the executive level, Masyumi’s fate would probably would have been different.
CHAPTER 3: CORPORATIST INCLUSION AND UNSUSTAINABLE MODERATION

The collapse of the Old Order (Orde Lama) regime of Soekarno did not give Islamist parties an opportunity to further their political aspirations. From the very beginning, the New Order regime signaled its intention to limit any ideologically based political expression because they were perceived to be obstacles to economic development. The New Order regime forced the three major Islamist parties to fuse into one political party, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), and excluded Masyumi. Soeharto let the PPP participate in elections to contest seats in the parliament until the end of his rule in 1998. PPP, to some extent, moderated its ideology. It accepted Pancasila as the state ideology and abandoned the idea of an explicit statement of shari’a in the Constitution. However, this moderate attitude was not deeply embedded in PPP. When the New Order collapsed in 1998, PPP revised its agenda and again asserted that the obligation for Muslims to observe shari’a be included in the Constitution. It should be noted, however, that while PPP proposed constitutional acknowledgement of the obligation to observe shari’a, it did not propose that Islam be adopted as the state ideology.

PPP’s example might show that inclusion of Islamist parties by an authoritarian regime creates possibilities for moderation. Yet, certain features of inclusion in the New Order system made the moderation PPP’s agenda less enduring. Such features were the failure to include the aspirations of an Islamist party in government positions and the
requirement that political actors adopt relatively homogenous positions in support of the government.

The PPP and Unsustainable Moderation

The fusion of Islamist parties that gave birth to PPP took place in 1973. In the first election of the New Order regime, Soeharto allowed major Islamist parties to participate as distinct political entities, but only three major Islamist parties from the Soekarno era were allowed to participate in the election: NU, PSII and Perti. Masyumi, which had been banned by Soekarno was not allowed to participate unless transformed into a new political party. Responding to this demand, Masyumi leaders established the Indonesian Muslims Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Parmusi). However, Soeharto did not allow Masyumi leaders to hold important positions in the new party. Masyumi leaders finally withdrew their support from Parmusi, and Parmusi fell completely under the control of Soeharto. In the 1971 election, Parmusi coalesced with the government-sponsored party, Golkar, but in 1973 it joined in the formation of PPP.

Golkar won the 1971 election with 62.82% of the votes. Meanwhile, the Islamist parties won only 27.06% of the vote, a percentage far lowest than their achievement in the 1955 election (about 45% of total votes). This defeat, undoubtedly, contributed to the decision of party leaders to join in one Islamist political party. However, the biggest trigger for this fusion was pressure from the government. As mentioned, Soeharto’s regime intended to simplify political life as this would be more beneficial for economic development. Soeharto did this by simplifying the party system. After 1970, Soeharto
often invited important figures from major Islamist parties to his house and expressed his intention to see closer cooperation of Islamic parties. Responding to Soeharto’s appeal, Idham Khalid, head of Nahdlatul Ulama, with leaders of other Islamist parties agreed to form “Kelompok Persatuan Islam” (the Union of Islamic Groups) on March 13, 1970. The name of this coalition was later changed to “Kelompok Persatuan Pembangunan” (the Union of pro-Development Groups) after consultation with Soeharto (DPP PPP 2003, 5-6). On January 5, 1973 the four Islamist parties that had participated in the 1971 election were formally joined in one political party, PPP.

It is important to note that the government’s intervention in these four political parties, particularly those categorized as modernist parties, PSII and Parmusi, made the establishment of a single Islamist party proceed more smoothly. Soeharto ignored Muhammad Roem, the Parmusi leader elected at the first national convention of the party, and instead approved HM S Mintaredja, a more moderate and cooperative Parmusi leader from Muhammadiyah. Soeharto also intervened on behalf of his preferred candidate for PSII, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, as opposed to the elected leaders of PSII, CH Ibrahim and Osman Y. Helmi (Haris 1991, 8-9).

To further suppress Islamist ideology, in 1975 the New Order required PPP to adopt Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as a fundamental party principle in addition to Islam. Fearing the consequences of being labeled anti-Pancasila and against the 1945 Constitution, PPP accepted this requirement. PPP later dropped Islam as a party principle in 1985 when the government issued two laws, UU No.3/1985 and UU No.8/1985, requiring all political parties and mass organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole
principle (*asas tunggal*). At this time, PPP also changed its symbol from the *ka'ba* (Arabic, the pilgrimage site in Mecca) to a star that was considered more neutral. Syamsudin Haris points out that PPP removed Islamic expressions in their bylaws and programs, replacing them with more "neutral" expressions at the second PPP Congress (*muktamar*) in 1984. PPP dropped *basmallah* (Arabic, in the name of Allah) in the preamble of its bylaws and changed the expression “*Allah Subhananu wata'ala*” (Arabic, God is the Highest and praise be upon Him) to *Tuhan Yang Maha Kuasa* (God who is the most powerful) and *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Arabic, Islamic solidarity) to *persaudaraan* (brotherhood) (Haris 1991). PPP’s acceptance of Pancasila as the sole principle of the party formally ended the debate in Parliament over the state ideology.

As the PPP gave up its use of Islam as a party principle and formally accepted Pancasila as a party principle and the state ideology, the New Order government’s control over the party continued to increase. PPP was required to submit a list of individuals to be party candidates for the House of Representative before every election to be approved by the government and PPP allowed the government to decide on the head of the party in 1984. PPP largely functioned as a “government partner” rather than the “people’s representative” (Haris 1991). Most surprisingly, the PPP, together with other political parties in the Parliament, issued a statement condemning demonstration by Muslims in Tanjung Priuk, Jakarta on September 12, 1984 (Raillon 1993, 200). The relatively moderate attitude of PPP was sustained until Soeharto resigned in 1998.

As new political spaces opened, PPP reclaimed Islam as its principle. This time, however, PPP leaders did not see any contradiction between adopting Islam as a party
principle and their conviction that Pancasila is the final ideology for the Indonesian state. The use of Islam as a party principle only affects party membership. As PPP accepts Islam as a party principle, it limits membership to Muslims.

While accepting Pancasila as the state ideology, PPP leaders still argued that the Constitution should acknowledge the obligation of Muslims to observe shari’a. For PPP leaders implementation of shari’a is necessary to solve a multidimensional crisis, including a moral crisis, in Indonesia today. In the 2000’s annual session of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), PPP joined with PBB and other smaller Islamist parties to propose the reinstatement of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter in an amendment of Chapter 29 of the 1945 Constitution. PPP even proposed another article for that chapter that would outlaw the dissemination of ideologies that contradict Islamic teachings, like communism. The belief that Indonesia should not be a secular country, the argument that implementation of shari’a would solve all human problems, and the claim that reinstatement of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter would be an expression of appreciation for the work of the nine delegates who worked on the draft of Indonesia’s Constitution (and who are considered by PPP to be the founding fathers of the nation) seem to be the background of this proposal (Basalim 2002).

The New Order’s “corporatist policies” (Porter 2002) of intervening in all political parties, as illustrated above, provides one explanation for the willingness of PPP to moderate its ideology during the new Order. However, it should be recognized that PPP’s moderation of its ideological agenda did not come from within the party itself. The government forced PPP to erase its Islamic identity and leave its political Islam legacy
behind. Yet, these policies did lead to moderation, because if not, in 2000, PPP would have proposed Islam as the state ideology, rather than only proposing formalization of shari’a.

The next part of this chapter explores the success of PPP in influencing legislation related to Muslim affairs that can be said to have contributed to the willingness of PPP to adopt a more moderate position.

**Legislative Success with the Absence of Governmental Inclusion**

The New Order regime intended to completely contain the force of 1950s political Islam. To achieve this objective, it issued a number of laws, including in 1984 the requirement that Pancasila be the only principle (*asas tunggal*) for mass organizations and the “floating mass” policy that cut the connection of political parties with their local constituencies. However, the New Order regime realized that Muslims were the largest population in the country and Islam was a powerful power tool to contain communism. Therefore, instead of completely banning any expression of Islam, Soeharto chose to suppress only Islamic political expression as represented by Islamist parties, in particular Masyumi, during the 1950s. The regime even promoted efforts to improve the ritual piety of Muslims by sponsoring activities related to Islamic rituals, like building mosques and sponsoring Qur’anic Recitation Contests (*Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur’an*). This two-pronged policy contributed to the emergence of vibrant Muslim associations in Indonesia (Hefner 2000, 59). The moderation of Muslim groups not included in the formal political
process, like NU, Muhammadiyah and a new generation of modernist Muslims, can be explained in this way.

In addition to providing room for the development of non-political Muslim organizations, Soeharto was careful about legislation that directly affected Muslims. PPP’s role in this process cannot be underestimated. While the Parliament under Soeharto functioned more as a rubberstamp for legislation issued by Soeharto, on several occasions PPP was able to influence the policies related to Muslim. These policies, it is worth noting, were issued during the worst period of relations between Islam and the New Order government (1960s to 1980s).

In 1973 a law to regulate marriage practices was proposed by the New Order. The law was intended to give a legal basis to the different marriage practices that have been adopted by different religious and ethnic groups in Indonesia. Unfortunately, the marriage law drafted by Soeharto’s government included several provisions that were in conflict with Islamic teachings, like the legal status of inter-religious marriages and the prohibition on a man/ or women marrying an adopted sister or brother (Azra 2000). Muslims went into the streets to protest this bill. As the protests mounted, Soeharto, represented by army officials, negotiated with PPP and NU to revise provisions in the bill considered to be in violation of Islamic teachings (Hefner 2000, 81). The Marriage Law was finally issued in 1974 with revisions regarding the status of inter-religious marriages, marriages between adopted siblings, and polygamy.

Five years later, in 1978, another controversy emerged. The Draft of the Broad Outline of State Policy (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) that was to be
approved by the Parliament elected in 1977 included a proposal to include *kepercayaan* (mystical beliefs) as one of the officially recognized religions (*agama*). This proposal was seen by Muslim groups as an effort to elevate the status of *kepercayaan*, which they considered to be a heterodox Islamic belief (Liddle 1978). PPP supported by other Muslim groups voiced objections to this proposal. The reference to *kepercayaan* was finally dropped from the GBHN. Until now, the status of *kepercayaan* in Indonesia remains ambiguous. The Department of Religious Affairs has never been given authority over issues related to *kepercayaan* communities.

Most observers of Indonesia agree that Soeharto’s policies toward the Muslim community changed considerably at the end of the 1980s (Liddle 1996, Hefner 2000). During the first fifteen years of his rule, Soeharto adopted policies that Porter has called “exclusionary corporatist” policies, which were designed to keep Muslim outside the political system (Porter 2002). Yet, as the relationship between Soeharto and the Indonesian military changed (Liddle 1996) and the size of Muslim middle class increased (Effendy 2003), Soeharto began to change his attitudes toward Islam. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, a number of regulations based on Islamic teachings were issued, like the Religious Judicature Act (Cammack 1989) and Islamic Bank Act (Hefner 2003).

In short, PPP was quite successful in the Parliament in safeguarding the interests of Muslims through revising government policies considered to violate Islamic teachings and by approving policies in line with shari’a. PPP leaders might see the New Order as accommodating some Muslim interests.
This success, in my view, led PPP leaders to assume that moderation was an acceptable strategy in relating to a state that required it to submit and give up an explicitly Islamic identity. The more moderate PPP was, the more possibility opened for the New Order to accommodate Muslim interests.

The PPP’s success at the legislative level, unfortunately, was not accompanied by participation in the executive branch of government. In the seven cabinets (with five year terms) formed during the New Order regime, Soeharto only allowed Islamist parties to hold ministerial seats in the cabinet of 1968-1973 and PPP to participate in the cabinet of 1973-1978. From 1968 to 1973, Soeharto appointed four individuals from Islamist parties to ministerial posts. They were Idham Khalid (NU) who was appointed as the Coordinator Minister of Public Welfare, Muhammad Dahlan (Parmusi/Muhammadiyah) who was appointed as Minister of Religious Affairs, HMS Mintaredja (Parmusi/Muhammadiyah) who was in charge of relation between the executive and legislative bodies, and Harsono Tjokroaminoto (PSII) who was appointed as Minister of State Apparatuses (1972). In the 1973-1978 cabinet, PPP was given one ministerial seat. For last five cabinets of the New Order regime, Soeharto did not reserve any ministerial seats for political parties, including PPP. Almost all of his ministers were recruited from the military. From 1978, the number of military officials sitting as ministers continued to grow from thirteen in the period of 1978-1983 to fourteen in the period of 1983-1988 (MIS 1998).

PPP’s experience under the New Order shows that inclusion of Islamist parties, even in an authoritarian regime, can create opportunities for Islamist parties to moderate.
The moderation might not be very deep because the pressure to moderate came from the regime, but inclusion pushed Islamist parties to redefine the boundaries of their ideology in order to able to survive in the system and to represent, although minimally, the interest of Muslim populations. Such redefinition, no matter how minor it is, changes the outlook of the party.
CHAPTER 4: DIFFERENT INCENTIVES IN A NEW DEMOCRACY

On May 20, 1998, Suharto, who had ruled Indonesia for more than three decades, resigned after a series of mass demonstrations in the midst of an economic crisis that had begun in 1997. Suharto’s resignation marked the beginning of a transition to democracy in Indonesia. Habibie, Suharto’s vice president, who was charged to continue ruling the country after Suharto resigned, launched a series of political reforms that opened previously closed political spaces, including removal of the limitation on the number of political parties involved in the political process. The response to this reform was very rapid. During the next two months, some 150 new political parties were established, among them parties that proclaimed Islam to be their ideology and the implementation of shari’a as their main agenda. In the election held in 1999, 14 out of 48 parties approved for participation were Islamist parties.\(^{12}\)

Eight Islamist parties gained adequate votes to secure seats in the parliament. However, most of them gained only one or two seats. Only three Islamist parties, the United Development Party (PPP), the Justice Party (PK) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB), managed to win a substantial number of seats in the parliament. PPP secured 56 seats, PBB secured 13 seats, and PK secured seven seats. Overall, Islamist parties won 14% of the total votes in 1999 election and secured 87 out of 462 contested seats in the parliament.

\(^{12}\) Articles on the 1999 Elections have different accounts of the number of Islamic parties participating in election. Arsekal Salim, for example, as quoted by Azyumardi Azra, argues that there are 20 Islamic parties. See Azyumardi Azra, “Islam pada Masa Pasca Soeharto,” introduction for A.M Fatwa, *Satu Islam Multi Partai: Membangun Integritas di Tengah Pluralitas*, (Bandung: Mizan, 2000). This number based on the implicit use of Islam as state principle.
In the 2000 annual session (Sidang Tahunan) of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), two Islamist parties, PPP and PBB, supported by other smaller Islamist parties, except PK, proposed to reinsert the seven words of Jakarta Charter to Chapter 29 of the Indonesian Constitution. However, unlike the Islamist parties of the 1950s, the Islamist parties were able to compromise their political ideology and did not insist on pushing this agenda in the session. While the small number of representatives supporting this proposal shaped the relatively moderate attitude of these Islamist parties, there are other factors that I think matter. This chapter argues that the more fruitful and substantial participation of Islamist parties in the government was an important factor leading to their successful moderation.

Another factor that characterizes Islamist parties in Indonesia today is the relatively more diverse understanding of shari’a. Compared to the Islamist parties of the 1950s that united to pursue an Islamist agenda in the Constitutional Assembly, contemporary Islamist parties, particularly PK, went in different directions. PK seems to be more moderate than two other major Islamist parties. This chapter will explore the different attitudes of Islamist parties toward the formalization of shari’a by looking more closely at the political statements of the two parties, PK and PBB, which represent two different poles on shari’a.

*Fruitful Legislative Participation and Meaningful Executive Participation*

In the first three years after the collapse of Suharto regime, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) held four sessions to discuss the amendment of the 1945
Constitution. Among the most highly contentious parts of the Constitution is Chapter 29 on religion. The Chapter consists of two articles stipulating that (1) the Indonesian state is based on the belief in one god and (2) the state guarantees the freedom of each of its citizens to uphold their religion and observe the teachings and obligations of their religion. Chapter 29 highlights the important position of religion in the Indonesian state, although it is not regarded as state ideology. It also highlights the obligation of the state to guarantee the freedom of citizens to observe and practice religions that they adhere to.13

The most contentious part of Chapter 29 is the first article, which was composed following the first principle of Pancasila and in its original version included the seven words of the Jakarta charter requiring Muslims to observe their religion. As mentioned before, these seven words were regarded as a compromise reached by nationalists and Islamists on the state ideology during the struggle for independence period. These seven words, however, were finally dropped from Pancasila on the second day after the Indonesian Declaration of Independence after protests by people in the eastern part of Indonesia, who were mainly Christian. Islamist groups, as explained in Chapter 2, struggled to reinsert these words in the Constitution, but they failed. In 2000, PPP, PBB and other Islamist parties brought up this issue again. They proposed to reinsert these seven words into the Constitution, remove the word “kepercayaan,” which refers to local

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13 It should be noted however that this formulation only recognizes the freedom of religion of those who profess five officially recognized religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Local religions that are referred as “kepercayaan” in the Constitution, were not treated as religion but as culture.
animistic religions, from the chapter and mention explicitly the ban of anti-Islamic ideologies, like communism.

The debate first emerged in the MPR’s annual session in 2000. The Islamist parties made every effort to set a special time on the agenda for discussing the Jakarta Charter. Yet, as other political parties argued that other chapters of the Constitution deserved more attention at that time and the period of annual session was near its end, the demand of the Islamist parties was not met. The Islamist parties appear to have been satisfied that they were able to express their views through speeches delivered in the session and did not insist that the MPR discuss the Jakarta Charter. By showing such moderation, contemporary Islamist parties demonstrated that they are more moderate than their predecessors in the 1950s. What made them willing to compromise? What about the democratic system in Indonesia today provides more effective incentives for moderation in the ideology of Islamist parties? This thesis argues that the moderation of Islamist parties is due to their meaningful participation in the executive body. This success served as compensation for their failure to win enough power in the parliamentary elections to impose an Islamic ideology.

Despite of the small number of their representatives in the parliament, Islamist parties have been able to influence the most important political decisions in the early years of Indonesia’s new democracy. They had a central role in influencing the presidential and vice presidential elections in 1999 and 2001. In 1999, the Islamist

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14 The first presidential election after the collapse of Suharto's regime was conducted in an indirect fashion. The President and Vice President were elected by members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), which consisted of popularly elected representatives from political parties, senators, and representatives of special groups as well as the military. The 1999
parties joined with their old allies in the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) and the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB)\textsuperscript{15} and succeeded in installing Abdurrahman Wahid (more popularly known as Gus Dur), their preferred candidate to Megawati Sukarno Putri, as President of a newly democratized Indonesia (Liddle 1999).

Megawati’s party, the Indonesia Democratic Party for Struggle (PDI-P), won the election by securing 35% of the votes. With such victory in hand, Megawati’s supporters believed that their candidate would win the presidential seat. However, Islamist groups who were worried about the domination of Christian and secular groups in PDI-P proposed their own-candidate. Habibie, the incumbent president, was the first choice. However, his final presidential accountability report (\textit{Pidato Pertanggungjawaban}) was not accepted by the parliament, so Habibie could not push his candidacy forward. Islamist parties had to look for another candidate. Since they did not have enough votes to win the election, they decided on a candidate who would be supported by other parties. The choice went to Abdurrahman Wahid. With his record as opposing the formalization of shari’a in the Constitution, Wahid was not the most preferred candidate. However, the Islamist parties preferred him over Megawati. Gus Dur won the Presidency by gaining

\textsuperscript{15} PAN and PKB are the political parties of the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. In 1950s, these two organizations were part of Masyumi. Muhammadiyah remained with Masyumi when NU withdrew from Masyumi in 1952. However, NU joined with Masyumi to propose Islam as the state ideology in the Constitutional Assembly in 1956. These two organizations developed a more open and less Islamist perspective during Suaharto’s New Order. As a result, their leaders established open-political parties, rather than Islamist parties.
support from all Islamist parties, PKB, PAN and some representatives from Golkar (Liddle 1999).

In 2001, Abdurrahman Wahid was ousted from the Presidency because of his alleged involvement in illegally diverting state funds for the Logistical Affairs Board (Badan Urusan Logistik, Indonesian Agricultural Procurement Agency) for other causes. Megawati, as his vice president, automatically became President. An election was held to select a new Vice President to replace Megawati. Four candidates contested for the seat, Hamzah Haz, head of PPP, the largest Islamist party, Akbar Tanjung, head of Golkar, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono and Siswono Yudohusodo. Hamzah Haz won the election. His victory was another sign of the influence of Islamist parties in Indonesian politics.

In addition to winning the Presidency for the period of 1999-2001 and the Vice Presidency for the period of 2001-2004, leaders of Islamist parties were involved in the two cabinets. During Gusdur’s presidency, Islamist parties were given four ministerial positions: Department of Forestry (Nurmahmudi Ismail, PK), Department of Law and Human Rights (Yusril Ihza Mahendra, PBB), Coordinating Ministry of People’s Affairs and Welfare (Hamzah Haz, PPP) and the Department of Small and Medium Enterprises (Zarkasih Nur, PPP). Under Megawati, Islamist parties secured three of the ministries that they held under Gusdur, losing control of the Department of Forestry.

The substantial involvement of Islamist parties in the new democratic government was a victory for Islamist parties that reflected their effective engagement in Indonesian politics. Since the fall of Burhanuddin Harahap’s cabinet in 1956, Islamist parties not occupied any central political positions in the Indonesian government. In addition, the
success of the Islamist parties in making Hamzah Haz Vice President under Megawati Sukarnoputri marked a new era of possible cooperation between Islamists and nationalist parties, their bitter enemy in the past. More importantly, the meaningful participation of Islamist parties at the executive level appeared as compensation for their relative failure at the legislative level. It makes sense that Islamist parties in the past has failed to moderate their ideological commitments because their defeat in legislative politics was not compensated by involvement in the executive. Instead, the Islamist parties of the 1950s were defeated and isolated in both the executive and the legislature.

The Justice Party (PK) and Crescent Star Party (PBB)

While contemporary Islamist parties are more moderate than the Islamist parties of the 1950s, the level of moderation that they undergo during their participation in politics varies. Among the three major Islamist parties, PK appears to have undergone the greatest degree of moderation when compared to PPP and PBB. This chapter examines these differences by exploring the positions of PBB and PK on the amendment of Chapter 29 and the implementation of shari’a in Indonesia.

The two Islamist parties that are the focus of this chapter are new to the Indonesian political landscape. Each was established as the New Order collapsed and democratic elections were announced. PBB was established on July 17, 1998 (Pramuko, 67-70), while PK was established on August 20, 1998 (Damanik 2002). However, the origin of these parties can be traced to the activities of Masyumi, the largest Islamist party in the 1950s, at the beginning of the New Order. As explained Chapter Two, after
Masyumi leaders were banned from involvement in the new political party Parmusi, they decided to establish a non-party political organization, called the Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII). DDII carried out its political activities by conducting Islamic training for lecturers and students in universities and campaigning against a perceived Christianization in Indonesia. DDII’s Islamic training programs on university campuses had a significant impact on a campus-based Islamic movement that emerged in the 1980s and gave birth to the Justice Party in 1998 (Furkon 2004). PK, however, is not officially associated with Masyumi or DDII. Instead, PK identifies itself as the Indonesian extension of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (Balda 2000, 7).

In addition to establishing DDII, Masyumi leaders also established a fraternity organization called “the Family of Crescent and Star” (Keluarga Bulan Bintang). This organization played an important role in the establishment of the Crescent and Star Party (PBB) (Pramuko 2000). For that reason, PBB sees itself as the torchbearer of Maysumi’s legacy.

PBB proposed amending Chapter 29 of the Constitution by reinserting the seven words of the Jakarta Charter in the first article and removing the word “kepercayaan” from the second article. Looking at comments and writings of PBB’s leaders, four reasons for promoting this amendment can be identified. First, the reinstatement of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution would serve as constitutional justification for the non-secular character of the Indonesian state. PBB leaders argued that the Indonesian constitution is ambiguous about the nature of the nation-state because it
only states that Indonesian is a state based on law (Negara hukum); it is neither a religious state, nor a secular state (Basalim 2002, 84).

Second, the seven words provide constitutional acknowledgement for existing regulations and laws issued to fulfill the interests of the Muslim community that are based on Islamic principles, like the Marriage Law (UU Pernikahan), the Alms-giving Law (UU Zakat), and the Religious Courts Law (UU Peradilan Agama). The seven words would also legitimize the formal application of shari’a in several provinces in Indonesia, most notably in Aceh (Zoelva 2002, 47).

Third, the seven words would give the state a larger role in encouraging its citizens, particularly Muslims, to fulfill their religious obligations. The existing statement in the 1945 Constitution only bestowed upon the state the passive role of respecting freedom of religion. Hamdan Zoelva, a PBB representative, argued that the state should play a more active role in promoting Islam (Basalim 2002, 97). According to Zoelva, the state should only issue regulations that conform to Islamic teachings and should also have the authority to review regulations that contradict the teachings of Islam (Zoelva 2003, 45-47).

Fourth, the seven words would legalize the implementation of Islamic law in Islamic Courts. In 1991, Indonesian Muslims were given authority to establish their own religious courts and to use Islamic law to regulate family issues. In 1992, the government allowed the establishment of Islamic banks. The only part of Islamic law that has not been adopted by the state is the Islamic penal code. The Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions, two main sources of legislation for Muslims, provide textual outlines for
punishing various crimes. According to Zoelva, there are ten behaviors that are considered to be crimes in the Qur’an and should be punished in particular ways. The crimes are apostasy (irtad), rebellion against legitimate government, out-of-wedlock sexual intercourse, falsely charging another person with out-of-wedlock sexual intercourse, theft, highway robbery, alcoholic intoxication, homicide and murder.

Unlike PBB, PK did not support the amendment of the first article of Chapter 29, but PK proposed adding an article to Chapter 29 stipulating the obligation to observe religious teachings for all religious followers. PK argued that adding the seven words of the Jakarta charter to the Constitution would only accommodate Muslims and ignore non-Muslims who have a similar obligation to observe the teachings of their religion. PK also argued that the implementation of shari’a does not depend on its formalization in the Constitution and the use of the state’s coercive power. “Each Muslim can observe religious obligations without waiting for the amendment of 1945 Constitution. We can start to observe Islamic teachings on brotherhood, unity, honesty, solidarity, and social justice from now on,” said Untung Wahono, a PK leader (Wahono 2004, 13-22).

At first glance, PK’s proposed amendment is not so much different from that of PBB; the only difference seems to be the PK’s rejection of the Jakarta Charter. Indeed, the two parties agreed on several points, like the necessity of a non-secular state, conviction that religion and politics cannot be separated, and the view that local religions are not genuine religion.

However, there are three points that show PK is more moderate than PBB. First, by proposing the obligation to observe religious teachings on people of all religions, not
only Muslims, PK recognizes the equal status of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. PBB, in contrast, maintained that the implementation of shari’a would guarantee the rights of non-Muslims, but did not acknowledge that the requirement for Muslims to observe shari’a marginalized non-Muslims and potentially relegated them to the status of second-class citizens. Second, while agreeing on the importance of a constitutional guarantee for the implementation of shari’a, PBB and PK took different positions on the role of the state. PBB viewed the constitutional guarantee of shari’a as critical for the implementation of shari’a, while PK viewed it as complementary to cultural socialization of shari’a as the primary strategy to be adopted by society. Third, by proposing the seven words of the Jakarta Charter be reinserted to the 1945 Constitution, PBB shows its inability to break away from the old Islamist parties’ legacy and to reinterpret their ideology in accordance with changes in social and political circumstances. PK, however, has been able cut the connection with the past and adapt in light of the current political situation.
CHAPTER 5: FOR AN INCLUSION TO BE A POSITIVE IMPULSE FOR MODERATION

Inclusion has been assumed to generate moderation of Islamist parties because it provides a venue for new strategic calculations and political learning. However, as previous exploration of the inclusion of Islamist parties in three Indonesian political systems shows, inclusion may result in radicalization and does not necessarily result in deep, sustainable and a similar degree of moderation.

This thesis shows that inclusion, alone, does not necessarily lead to moderation or a similar degree of moderation but rather that the benefits that inclusion provides to an Islamist party matter. Political parties are assumed to have benefit from inclusion in a political system, but this is only true if they are included in decision making processes, their ideas are appreciated or approved at the legislative level and they participate in the executive level of government. In that way to use Young’s idea, Islamist parties are not internally excluded from the system, in which they participate. While participation in both the executive and legislative institution is very rare, moderation may still occur when loss in one sphere of political contestation is compensated by gains in another.

The exploration of Indonesian cases also shows a more specific pattern of inclusion. First, comparison of the inclusion of Islamist parties in two democracies shows that inclusion in executive institutions is likely to give incentives for Islamists to moderate. In the two period of democratic government in Indonesia, Islamists parties did not gain substantial benefits from participation in legislative bodies. However, in the
democratic government established at the end of the New Order in 1990, the Islamist parties PK, PBB, and even PPP, have been accommodated and even given important positions in the executive branch of government. The failure to include PPP in the executive branch of government under Suharto’s New Order can also be said to account for the lesser degree of moderation evidenced by PPP during the New Order.

Second, the diversity of perspectives of participants in the political process is another factor in determining the degree of moderation that is likely to occur in an Islamist party. Under the New Order PPP showed a degree of moderation in its political ideology. However, lack of exposure to different political ideas limited PPP’s political learning’s experience.

Third, as has been confirmed by some research on moderation of Islamist parties, limited inclusion or even inclusion in an authoritarian political system can generate certain degree of moderation, particularly if the regime accommodates some policy proposals from Islamist parties or allows leaders of Islamist parties to be part of the ruling government.

There are two practical implications of this research for Indonesia as the country approaches the 2009 elections, faced with the challenge of institutionalizing a multi-party system. First, Indonesia needs to maintain multiparty elections that accommodate a wide range of political players with different ideologies and programs. Such a wide range of players will provide Islamist parties with a conducive environment for political learning. The electoral threshold that is used to limit the number of parties participating in the election, therefore, should be set relatively low.
Second, a coalition government model that accommodates different political parties at the executive level is likely to be maintained. It is been argued that such a model leads to the absence of effective opposition in Indonesia. Indonesians call it “politik dagang sapi” (politics of butchers), because instead of choosing ministers on the basis of professional expertise and experience, a coalition government tends to choose ministers based on their political party affiliation. Understanding that radicalization of Islamist parties is likely to lead to the emergence of authoritarian government and the argument of this thesis suggest that while having ministers with professional background is good, having a stable and inclusive government is more important.
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