Hegemonic Ideas and Indian Foreign Policy to the United States: Changes in Indian Expectations and Worldviews

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ABSTRACT

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I describe a change in Indian public images of the United States. Using Indian newspaper editorials as my medium, I perform a qualitative analysis of Indian popular discourse on the United States. I hypothesize that changes in Indian foreign policy towards the United States occurred due more to changes in hegemonic ideas in Indian society than any changes in the international distribution of capabilities or regional balance of power concerns. I problematize the existing arguments within their own logic and then describe a constructivist account of this Realist international system.

Approved: ________________________________

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

I perform a study, asking the following question; what has caused the recently notable change in Indian foreign policy to the United States?

When United States President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a joint statement agreeing to closer nuclear energy ties in 2005, the official relationship between the United States and Indian governments quickly went from historically difficult, to publicly cooperative. The deal marked a *de facto* recognition of India’s nuclear weapons program by breaking with past US policy of not selling nuclear fuel to states that had not signed the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The deal also marked a significant break from past Indian foreign policy, as both states agreed to work towards a strategic partnership for the first time since Indian independence in 1947.

Since India gained independence in 1947, Indian foreign policymakers have acted with vigilance in the international arena. Indians across the country had declared their unwillingness to ever again be colonial subjects. As a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, India established its unwillingness to cooperate in the Cold War superpower struggle. In the post-Cold War era, India has continued to resist American influence, fearing a return to the role of subject under a larger power, resembling its pre-Independence status.

Despite this continued vigilance, India and the United States have begun to form a more cooperative relationship. We can see emerging in the past twenty years (as in the
example of the recent Indo-US nuclear deal) a distinct political move towards a working relationship between the two states.

Many scholars have implicitly assumed Indo-US relations should be friendly and productive. One can see this by merely looking at many book and journal article titles. Scholars have written about The Cold Peace and The Hope and the Reality of relations between the two states.\(^1\) They have described the two states as The Unfriendly Friends, Estranged Democracies, and Comrades at Odds.\(^2\) They have asked, what of this Natural Alliance?\(^3\) These scholars are tacitly applying the assumptions of the Democratic Peace Theory to the case of the world’s two largest democracies. According to the logic of this theory, the shared belief in diverse, democratic societies and secular government should be enough to carry Indo-US relations forward.\(^4\) A quote from Deepak Lal perfectly sums up “the hope and the reality” of Indo-US relations:

> “An observing Martian would expect some natural affinities between Indians and Americans. India and the United States are both ex-colonies of the British, having wrested their freedom by some form of nationalist struggle. Subsequently they both set up states based on written constitutions which embody very similar ideals. They are both large pluralistic democracies welding together a vast mosaic of different ethnic and linguistic groups. Yet mutual perceptions and attitudes of the two peoples towards each other can only be described as unflattering if not openly hostile.”\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Brands 1990; Gould and Ganguly 1992  
\(^2\) Kuhni Krishnan 1974; Kux 1994; Rotter 2000  
\(^3\) Hathaway 2003  
\(^5\) Lal in Glazer et. al., pg. 271
While we may not be witnessing the emergence of an idealist alliance between “the world’s two largest democracies,” the fact that India has begun to consider engaging the United States as a part of their national interest is in itself significant.\(^6\) The fact that cooperative relations with the U.S. are even thinkable marks a significant break with past Indian foreign policy.

*Brief History of U.S.-Indian Relations*

Both Indian and American declaratory policy clearly shows an interest in improving the once-unstable relationship between the two states. Beginning with Rajiv Gandhi’s government in the 1980s, Indian policy has opened more and more to the West, hoping to establish both economic and security ties with the world superpower.

Despite recent claims to a “natural” alliance between India and the United States, relations have never truly been so amiable or apolitical to assume friendship.\(^7\) While “the world’s two largest democracies” share many interests and ideologies, fusing the two countries in such a liberal alliance has not been possible.\(^8\) Relations between the two states were usually defined by ambivalence, if not distaste, in the formative years of Cold War politics.

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\(^6\) We should note Keohane’s discussion on the difference between cooperation and harmony of interests. I do not argue that the new era in Indo-US relations is marked by harmony, which is an apolitical phenomenon in which an actor’s policies automatically facilitate the attainment of others’ goals. Instead, I argue we are witnessing an increase in cooperation, which is merely the “mitigation of conflict.” See Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Pg. 51.

\(^7\) Hathaway, pg. 26

\(^8\) Hathaway, pg. 25
During the formative years of the Cold War in the 1950s, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress Party had originally led the Non-Aligned Movement against the two world superpowers: the United States and the U.S.S.R. Nehru saw the emerging Cold War as a mere power struggle between two parties, not an overarching ideological war with any relevance to India. America scoffed at this, feeling India was not so serious about democracy and liberalism if it could not stand up to support the side of democracy in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{9} American policy-makers were baffled by their Indian counterparts’ unwillingness to stand with them in the Cold War, but felt they would eventually bend due to sentiments of cultural connectedness and shared Western values.\textsuperscript{10}

Eventually, U.S. foreign policy-makers stopped trying to engage India. They felt betrayed by India’s indifference. This was a race for alliances, however, so the U.S. moved quickly to find a friend in South Asia. Pakistan was more than happy to receive U.S. military and political assistance in the form of a defense treaty signed between the two states in 1954. This enraged Indian leaders, who saw the aid as a direct challenge to Indian perceived dominance in the region. Indian leadership in the region up to this point had been very passive, making it relatively easy for the United States to move in and support the military build-up of a South Asian state.

When India did begin taking decisive action in the region, during the 1971 war with Pakistan, Indians were appalled by the deployment of the \textit{U.S.S Enterprise} aircraft carrier by U.S. President Richard Nixon. This was seen as a direct attack on Indian

\textsuperscript{9} McMahon, pg. 40
\textsuperscript{10} McMahon, pg. 45
dominance in the region.\textsuperscript{11} Not only was the United States challenging India in the region, but it was also legitimizing India’s archenemy, Pakistan. This gave Pakistan the impression of parity with India and the ability to actively challenge India for regional dominance.\textsuperscript{12} The deployment also came as a great surprise to an Indian population that had traditionally held higher expectations for the United States. Cohen says this action has stuck with Indian policy-makers more than any other when debating a potential relationship with the United States. This pushed Indira Gandhi to be more aggressive in the region, possibly more than any other act.\textsuperscript{13}

After India’s victory in the 1971 war, the U.S., U.S.S.R, and China changed policy to South Asia, recognizing India’s preeminence by default.\textsuperscript{14} However, Washington’s luke-warm response to South Asia generally, matched with its continued support for Pakistan’s military throughout the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s deepened Indian resentment of U.S. hegemony.\textsuperscript{15} Even in the early 1990s, elements of the Indian public remained highly skeptical and unwilling to entangle themselves in Western affairs.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite India’s persistent desire to challenge the global hegemonic order and emerge as an independent, disentangled power, it has recently been moving closer and closer to that order, gaining regional power all along.\textsuperscript{17} India’s economy has been

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Cohen, pg. 137
\item \textsuperscript{12} Cohen, pg. 155
\item \textsuperscript{13} Cohen, pg. 137
\item \textsuperscript{14} Kapur, pg. 95
\item \textsuperscript{15} Cohen, pg. 283
\item \textsuperscript{16} The Hindu, April 5, 2006
\item \textsuperscript{17} Nayar, pg. 215
\end{itemize}
restructured on a Western model, bringing in more foreign direct investment and business contacts.\textsuperscript{18} It has changed its economy to a Western system, is governed by democracy and the rule of law, and supports the United Nations international framework. Additionally, the U.S. and India have a common goal in defeating Islamist terrorism in the region, bringing the two militaries and governments closer and closer.\textsuperscript{19} India has chosen to remain independent on the nuclear proliferation issue, probably more than any other. However recent developments in the U.S.-India relationship on this issue have done much to bring India to the superpower table and further deepen the relationship.

Cooperation in economics surely will have an impact on issues of war and peace. However, we may want to consider the current relationship between the United States and China before we give these arguments full explanatory status. China is currently the United States’ largest trading partner and sends many of its citizens to American universities and businesses. However, as we will see below, this does not yield automatic cooperation on issues of security. Many Americans still view China with skepticism in this area. Increased economic contacts have not yielded an increase in security dialogue between the two states. For my purposes, it is much more interesting to concentrate on the increase of security dialogue between India and the United States, as in the example of the recent nuclear energy agreement. Issues of war and peace, antagonism and alliance, can best be studied in this area.

This emerging relationship becomes even more interesting if we consider Indo-US relations and nuclear weapons within the context of the Nuclear Revolution. The

\textsuperscript{18} Cohen, pg. 285
\textsuperscript{19} Cohen, pg. 307
Nuclear Revolution, as labeled by Robert Jervis, represents a new era in international security relations in which nuclear weapons change the dynamics of war and peace.\textsuperscript{20}

Before the advent of nuclear weapons, conventional military victory was possible through brute force and the seizure of the adversary’s territory. Much could be gained in terms of material and geographical resources and much could be kept from the enemy, in terms of mobilization and retaliation on one’s homeland. However, in the presence of nuclear weapons, the options for the “winners” and the “losers” change. The “losers”, if possessing strategic nuclear weapons, can still harm the “winners” by attacking vital interests.\textsuperscript{21} As Thomas Schelling puts it, “Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy.”\textsuperscript{22}

Important here is the idea of “mutual kill”. The threat of mutual annihilation from the shared possession of strategic nuclear weapons far outweighs the benefits of fighting and winning a conventional war. This drastically alters the payoffs of choosing war as an option for the resolution of international security conflicts, hence the title the Nuclear Revolution. Important here is not so much the role of nuclear weapons as tactical weapons, but more as strategic weapons. McGeorge Bundy says mutual annihilation is more about “existential deterrence” in that “the very existence of nuclear stockpiles has created and enforces a considerable caution in the relations among nuclear weapons

\textsuperscript{21} Jervis, Robert. “The Nuclear Revolution and the Common Defense”, Pg. 690
\textsuperscript{22} Schelling, pg. 157
states.”

Established second-strike capability on both sides leads to deterrence and caution in relations.

On May 11, 1998 India tested a nuclear weapon and declared its ascendance into the club of nuclear-weapons states. However, India still today does not possess a second-strike capability vis a vis the United States. India’s Agni III missile system, its main nuclear weapons delivery system, has only a range of 3500 kilometers, not able to threaten any vital US interests. Because of this, the India-US security relationship does not fit the model of the Nuclear Revolution. A major change in foreign policy towards one another does not logically follow based on this theory. India today still lives with the threat of an unanswerable nuclear attack at the hands of the Americans.

Furthermore, based on the logic of Jervis’s theory, India should feel more threatened in its current situation. Jervis says that the times of transition into a situation of mutual annihilation are more dangerous than if neither state possessed nuclear weapons. Jervis says the likelihood for crises is highest when the status quo of mutual annihilation is not entirely clear. The deterrent effect of mutual kill is unclear, leading each state to question each other’s potential options and leaving more likelihood for direct conflict. However, shortly after the Indian nuclear weapons tests we see the United States and India make some of the largest moves towards rapprochement. US President Bill Clinton honored his commitment to visit India in March 2000 despite the nuclear weapons tests, with his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Vajpayee, making a response visit to Washington in 2003. High-level discussions on both economics and security

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23 Bundy, pg. 85
24 Jervis 1986, pg. 695
followed. Both of these visits came at a time when India’s Agni II missile system had only a range of 2500 kilometers.

In 2005, the two states agreed on the initial language of a civilian nuclear energy deal where India would obtain access to U.S. nuclear energy technologies. This was the clearest recognition of India’s nuclear weapons and energy programs since the 1998 tests. Under the arrangement, later agreed upon and signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in March 2006, India would be able to purchase nuclear fuel from the U.S. for their civilian facilities. In exchange India agreed to put 14 of their 22 nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. International inspectors would now be able to inspect Indian facilities for the first time. The independent Indian spirit came out most vigilant on this issue as the negotiators resisted coming under the international fold most vehemently. Many non-proliferation advocates felt Bush’s timing was terrible in light of the on-going negotiations with Iran to end that state’s uranium enrichment on the grounds of controlling nuclear substances.25 However, this is the first time India, a non-signatory to the NPT, would be under any international safeguards and inspections. This, it would seem, is a step forward for a state that has longed wished to claim their perceived rightful place at the nuclear table. This is a virtual institutionalization of U.S.-Indian relations where none truly existed prior.26

Most importantly, the 123 Agreement on the exchange of nuclear fuels explicitly recognizes the desires of both India and the United States to continue building a strategic partnership on issues of security. Both India and the United States signed this agreement

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26 Cohen, pg. 297
with the inclusion of a clause calling for the “strengthening (of) the strategic partnership between them.” This comes only 9 years after India crashed the gates of the group of five nuclear weapons states, and while India continues to develop longer range missiles. Instead of India preparing for potential threats from the United States (most importantly at the time of India’s 1998 nuclear weapons test), India had moved forward with discussions of strategic partnerships.

So, if India’s status as a state lacking second strike capability vis a vis the United States has remained constant, and India’s new status as a state in the process of developing long-range missiles could reasonably be expected to complicate the nuclear status quo and thus relations between the two states, why have security relations between the two states become more cooperative, as opposed to more antagonistic? The realities of nuclear weapons based on the logic of the Nuclear Revolution makes my research question even more interesting.

These developments in the security arena mark a major change in Indo-U.S. relations. The question arises, though, why has there been such a change? Why has Indian foreign policy shifted to be more accepting of engagement with the United States?

Existing Explanations for Change in Indian Foreign Policy

What can explain these changes? The existing literature generally focuses on the disintegration of the USSR and end of the Cold War as the time of the most change in Indo-US relations. The strategic realities of the bipolar world no longer exist, allowing

for a major restructuring of interests and alliances. This has affected Indo-US relations in two ways. First, both parties have been freer to explore new alliances and relationships that Cold War strategic concerns did not allow. Second, a recent concentration on China as a rising challenger to the American-led order and potential Asian hegemon serves as a “concrete mutual shared interest” for the two states.\textsuperscript{28} The latter is mainly derived from the former, but both are equally important to current India-U.S. relations.

\textit{The End of the Cold War}

At the conclusion of the Cold War, both the US and India relaxed relations with antagonistic states that stood between the two large democracies.\textsuperscript{29} India was suddenly free from the pressure of relations with the U.S.S.R., and the U.S. relaxed relations and military aid to its staunch Cold War ally Pakistan.

India no longer had the support and military backing of a major world power, leaving it searching for support in a new world. Some authors went as far as to claim that India had been a substantial loser in the Cold War and was a “lonely” and “friendless” power.\textsuperscript{30} It had effectively compromised its non-alignment by getting close to the U.S.S.R. while snubbing fellow democracies in the West. At the end of the Cold War, India did not have the resources needed to emerge as a major world power.

\textsuperscript{28} Malik and Kapur, pg. 29
\textsuperscript{29} Thakur cites six major factors contributing to the warming of relations between the two estranged democracies. The first, and most important, factor is the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. See Thakur, pg. 575. Also see Mohan, C. Raja. Crossing the Rubicon, pg. 87. Mohan claims the new realities of American unipolarity necessitated an Indian reevaluation of policy to the United States.
\textsuperscript{30} Nayar and Paul, pg. 205
The dissolution of the Soviet states also led to the need for less U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. The strategic importance of Central Asia all but disappeared after the end of the Afghanistan War and the fall of the Soviets.\textsuperscript{31} The U.S. now had little reason to continue funding the Pakistani military, its former conduit to Afghani fighters. By retracting support for India’s main enemy, the U.S. made relations between the two states much more appealing and imaginable to Indian leaders. The zero-sum game of South Asian politics implicitly piqued India as American support swung away from Pakistan. Or as Garver concludes, “In the zero-sum logic of the India-Pakistan dyad, the United States was no longer the friend of India’s enemy.”\textsuperscript{32}

Anderson says that the fall of the Soviet state also allowed for improved Sino-Indian relations as the new Russian state sought to mend ties with its one-time communist rival.\textsuperscript{33} India was no longer the friend of a blatant enemy in the eyes of many Chinese leaders. While many sticking points in Sino-Indian relations still exist (as we will see below), the end of a major alliance with a declared enemy of China did much to help Indian relations with its neighbors.

The authors present the removal of a major player in the strategic calculations of the US and India as a primary reason for a warming in relations. The absence of the Soviet Union necessarily led to negotiations between the two states and a search for common ground. However, a look at the historical record shows a move towards better security relations with the United States in the 1980s under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

\textsuperscript{31} Thakur, pg. 575
\textsuperscript{32} Garver, pg. 10
\textsuperscript{33} Anderson, pg. 767
India did not seem so shocked at the end of the Cold War that it groped in the dark for any major power friend it could find. Moves had been made prior to 1989 to improve relations with the United States.

Before discussing the impact of Rajiv Gandhi’s policies on Indo-US relations, we can look back to his mother’s encounters with the United States during her second term as Prime Minister from 1979 to 1984. Indira Gandhi and Ronald Reagan formed a close personal relationship after the latter’s election as president of the United States. However, personal relations can only push policy so far. On a diplomatic level, we can see a decrease in inflammatory rhetoric against the United States and an increased willingness to work with the new American administration.34 This comes at an interesting time, as Reagan is actually increasing military aid to Pakistan in support of the anti-Soviet insurgency in the Soviet-Afghan War. Gandhi did not react as strongly against the United States despite “the India-Pakistan dyad”.35 One would expect a much harsher reaction to this funding.

More interestingly, Indira Gandhi began to more openly criticize the Soviets on a number of issues. She expressed her displeasure with Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and declined to hold celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, a treaty which she had negotiated and signed in 1971.36 However, we should keep these moves in perspective. These were positive signs, but were not followed with any high-level discussions on security or economic cooperation.

34 Kux, pg. 391
35 Garver, pg. 10
36 Limaye, pg. 28
Gandhi did not shift the overall focus of Indian foreign policy or her relationship with the U.S.S.R. in any substantial fashion. Indira Gandhi’s son would be instrumental in pushing for policy change, more than merely a change in tone.

Rajiv Gandhi has been described as the first modern Indian Prime Minister, reflecting the values of a young urban elite. He “leaned toward the private sector and had a healthy skepticism about the socialist economic dogma adopted by the Congress Party.” He is seen as a more tech-savvy, Western-oriented politician than his Congress predecessors, who carried with them much anti-Americanism. While not challenging the foundation of his mother’s or grandfather’s socialist economy, “Rajiv seemed to be interested in new departures. Unlike his predecessors, he seemed to believe that rapid economic development was a matter not merely of devising good socialist programs but of improving the management of the programs and creating a more hospitable atmosphere for private industry.” He was more predisposed to a Western-style economy that privileged free enterprise, privatization, and the power of the market. Rajiv Gandhi, then, has a much different starting point from which to build relations with the United States.

After his mother’s assassination, Gandhi had a shaky start in governance. He had far less experience in politics than his brother Sanjay Gandhi, initially choosing to be a commercial airline pilot instead of carrying on the family legacy of political leadership. However, once in office, he learned quickly. Furthermore, his attitude was such that

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37 Kux, pg. 400
38 Kux, pg. 404
39 Mehta, pg. 63
American diplomats believed India had finally selected a Prime Minister that would be willing to work with the West. He was seen as “young, modern, well-informed, pragmatic” leader that Americans could deal with. In line with his mother, Rajiv Gandhi also spoke out against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, satiating many American policy-makers. This new atmosphere of cooperation was in itself a distinct break with past Indian antagonism towards the U.S. superpower.

In the area of security policy, Rajiv Gandhi broke with Nehruvian strategy by opening up a strategic dialogue with the United States. Whereas security relations with the United States were almost unthinkable for much of the previous four decades, Gandhi began engaging the U.S. on issues of military cooperation. For example, India and the U.S. opened negotiations on the sale of a Cray supercomputer in the mid-1980s. This computer, the Cray XMP-24, was billed as a tool for improved weather tracking to aid in agricultural development. But the capabilities of the computer went far beyond weather predictions. It would have been equally useful in the development of weapons technologies, including nuclear weapons.

In 1988, India and the U.S. also started working closely on a plan to share technologies for the development of a Light Combat Aircraft fleet. This was a major step forward in terms of Indian willingness to become involved with the United States on

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40 Kux, pg. 404  
41 Limaye, pg. 40  
42 Limaye, pg. 195  
43 Kux, pg. 410  
44 Kux, pg. 416
issues of security. These talks deepened through 1989, moving slowly, but surely, out of
the political arena and towards policy implementation.\footnote{Kux, pg. 430}

The 1990 approval, in principle, of the sale of a Combined Acceleration Vibration
Climatic Test System (CAVTS) marked another major security development. India had
been pushing the U.S. to approve this sale for over two years, hoping to acquire a system
that American opponents of the sale said would give India an advantage in nuclear
missile systems.\footnote{Kux, pg. 430} This adds another layer to the security dimension of the changing
Indo-U.S. relations.

In the end, however, we must be cautious in our evaluation of these events. They
do not mark the official establishment of a friendship or security alliance. Both states’
major security strategies remained largely unchanged. India continued to work most
closely with the U.S.S.R. on weapons sales and security guarantees. Also, India still
worked within a socialist economic model, not yet changing policy to fit a Western
Liberal model.

Specifically, India criticized the U.S. proposed sale of a Boeing 707 Advanced
Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Pakistan to aid that state’s air force
 technologies.\footnote{Kux, pg. 409} Furthermore, the move from Indo-U.S. dialogue on defense technologies
to the implementation of policy was slow, and sometimes stalled.\footnote{Kux, pg. 411} The Cray
supercomputer discussions ended in the sale of a compromised, weaker Cray XMP-14.

In the economic arena, A Bush Administration Super 301 trade policy initiative, in which
the President was required to take retaliatory action against states that imposed restrictions on US commerce, enraged many Indians and led to the return of the nationalist rhetoric of the past. India was not going to be “intimidated or policed by anybody on the issue of sovereignty or economic independence”. There was the resurgent mention of the “sheer arrogance of power” of the US.49

Many sticking points remained in Indo-U.S. relations. But the Rajiv Gandhi years were marked by a major effort to open up a dialogue with the U.S. where one did not exist prior. The fact that India was even discussing matters of defense with the United States marks a distinct break from the past. This clashed with the long-standing Indian policy of not becoming entangled with the two major world powers on issues of security. Furthermore, these discussions came at a time when the US was funneling millions of dollars of military aid to India’s archenemy, Pakistan, in the Soviet-Afghanistan proxy war. This should be viewed as an important part of any discussion on Indo-US security relations in the post-Cold War world. This also problematizes the “post-Cold War” hypothesis on improved Indo-US relations.

Indo-U.S. Check on China

Many security scholars argue that India and the United States have now moved closer together following a shift in the world balance of power that left China as the second most powerful state in the world. A shared wariness of a rising China, it is argued, has

49 Kux, pg. 436
made closer ties between India and the U.S. more appealing.\textsuperscript{50} Nayar and Paul argue that China’s new role as the second largest state in the international system has made an anti-China alliance appealing to both the United States and India.\textsuperscript{51} India’s regional balance-of-power concerns and the United States’ similar considerations at the global level make this alliance an easy fit. These scholars have argued, along balance of power lines, that India and the U.S. now have a shared interest in forming a “strategic alliance” to check China’s rising influence throughout Asia.

These authors generally follow the logic of Robert Gilpin’s seminal work \textit{War and Change in World Politics}. Gilpin argues that the structure of the international system will typically reflect the interests of the most powerful actors in that system.\textsuperscript{52} When the international balance of power changes to empower those that do not reap the same benefits from the system, a conflictual era of potential change will emerge.\textsuperscript{53} A rising power that sees the current system as more costly than beneficial will seek change. This particular rising power is termed a revisionist state by many scholars that have used Gilpin’s theory.\textsuperscript{54} Many scholars inherently view China as a revisionist state that the U.S. will attempt to check with the help of India.

These scholars argue that this is an alliance of convenience, emerging merely as a counterweight to China. This seems very likely and strategically sound from an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Malik and Kapur, pg. 29; Anderson, pg. 767; Kissinger
\item \textsuperscript{51} Nayar and Paul, pg. 114
\item \textsuperscript{52} Gilpin’s actors are exclusively states, pg. 15
\item \textsuperscript{53} Gilpin, pg. 9
\item \textsuperscript{54} Most notably for my purposes, Alastair Ian Johnston in “Beijing’s Security Behavior in the Asia-Pacific: Is China a Dissatisfied Power?” and Nayar and Paul in \textit{India and the World Order.}
\end{itemize}
American perspective. The international system is being defended from a rising China by its American creators. However, India has long avoided becoming entangled in great power struggles and may not be overly anxious to be a pawn in an American-led crusade against communist China. India’s position as a revisionist state has not changed drastically. Furthermore, India has continuously worked for closer relations with Asian powers, including China, Russia, and Japan.

In addition, China’s revisionist state credentials may not be as strong as these scholars believe. Alastair Ian Johnston critiques this theory of rising power politics in a study of China and Sino-U.S. relations. He initially challenges the classification of China as a revisionist state and later critiques the assumptions of those that put the rising-power-as-challenger theory into practice. He argues that viewing a state as revisionist may actually lead to the construction of a security dilemma between two states where one did not previously exist.

Johnston initially challenges the notion that China is in fact a dissatisfied, revisionist state. He first highlights the criteria for the classification of a revisionist state. The state will either not participate in the international organizations that govern the international community, or participate while rejecting the institutional norms. Further, if given the chance, the state will attempt to undermine the institutions.

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55 Kissinger. Furthermore, Nayar and Paul are inconsistent in their power transition formulation. They originally argue that India has not been able to emerge as a major world power because of their revisionist status in the world. However, in 1989, it would seem that India is no longer perceived to be a revisionist state and is newly interested in an anti-China alliance. See Nayar and Paul, Pgs. 66 and 114.
56 Johnston 2004, pg. 34
57 Johnston 2004, pg. 35
58 Johnston 2004, pg. 39
Consequently, the state will display a clear preference for a “radical redistribution” of material power in the international system and will act towards this goal.

Johnston claims China is actually ‘over-involved’ in international institutions and has largely benefited from their existence. Furthermore, China complies and frequently advocates many international norms, such as sovereignty, free trade, and non-proliferation. Of course allegations of widespread human rights abuses in China tamper this view of a compliant China. But more often than not, China has performed as a functioning member of the “International Community.” As far as a restructured global distribution of power, Johnston argues that evidence is not so strong. China has in fact lobbied hard for a change in the status of Taiwan. However, they have hardly shown interest in establishing global, or even regional, hegemony and limiting American influence.

It would seem that scholars are overstating the case for an anti-China arrangement. Based on the logic of this theory, India could be similarly defined as a status-inconsistency power that is rising fast in the international system. India’s defiance on nuclear weapons in international law cannot be disregarded. In fact, as India has gained military power in nuclear weapons and economic power in Gross Domestic Product growth, India and the United States have moved closer together. This inverts Gilpin’s theory, as India has remained consistent in its call for change in the international system. The question arises, then, why India has chosen to improve relations with the

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59 Johnston 2004, pg. 40
60 Johnston 2004, pg. 41
61 Johnston 2004, pg. 51
United States *at all*, let alone why India has not moved to align with two other “status-inconsistency” powers, Russia and China. The status-quo/revisionist forms of Gilpin’s power transition theory cannot explain these phenomena.

Current scholarship on Indo-US security relations does not capture the importance of identities in forming and changing foreign policy decisions. I argue that India’s national identity as a great civilization and its role identity as a major power in international affairs have not changed over time. Since Independence, Indian foreign policymakers have loudly declared their goal of emerging as a leader in the international system. What *has* changed is India’s perception of the international system itself—one established and dominated by the United States—and its expectations from major powers in that international system. India’s expectations for the United States have changed as India has learned how to interact in a world where the meaning of “major power” is defined in a particular way. The change is seen in the Indian definition of what constitutes a “major power”.

*Hegemony and Indian Foreign Policy*

The existing arguments in this case are problematic. They cannot completely capture the reality of Indian foreign policy towards the United States or a more general Indian “strategic culture” by themselves. I concentrate on hegemonic ideas in Indian society, arguing that changes in shared knowledge of what constitutes the international system and a major power’s role in that system explain this change in policy.
In chapter 2, I defend the concentration on language in international relations scholarship on identity. I describe a test in which I look for these hegemonic ideas in Indian public discourse on issues of security. I will be coding editorial and opinion pieces from India’s largest English-language daily newspaper, The Times of India. I also outline the limitations of a test based on an analysis of English-language press in India.

In chapter 3, I outline a constructivist theory to explain the change in Indian foreign policy to the United States. I hypothesize that a change in hegemonic ideas in Indian society can explain this shift in policy. The way Indians perceive themselves, the United States, and the international system in which they both operate have all changed, leading to a change in policy. I use a constructivist approach to the research question, which will allow me to privilege Indian national identities and interests. My systemic theory is primarily based on Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics.

In chapters 4 and 5, I present my case studies, describing the involvement of the United States in two different Indian actions. I will be looking at two historical events that could be viewed as the closest confrontations between India and the United States since India’s independence in 1947: the 1971 Bangladesh War and the 1998 Indian nuclear weapons tests. I also describe the hegemonic foreign policy ideas held at the government level in each time period. I define the two hegemonic ideas as Nehruvianism and “strategic culture”.

During the 1971 Bangladesh war of independence, the Nixon Administration sent the USS Enterprise aircraft carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal, reportedly to aid in the evacuation of American citizens in Dacca. Indians viewed this move with great
suspicion and branded the Nixon Administration as imperialist and power hungry. There was much dismay that a fellow democracy could be so biased towards undemocratic Pakistan and antagonistic to democratic India. Nehruvian thought in foreign policy led many Indians to maintain high expectations for the democratic United States.

On May 11, 1998 India entered the club of nuclear weapons states with three nuclear explosions just weeks after the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won control of the government. Pakistan followed with similar nuclear tests shortly after. The U.S. responded to these tests with anger and dismay. Congress and the President quickly passed economic and military sanctions against both India and Pakistan, marking another low point in cooperation between India and the United States. However, the Indian reaction was markedly different in this instance of American “punishment”. Indian government officials were more prepared for the American response to the weapons tests and more willing to work closely with the U.S. to improve relations. A new definition of “strategic culture” was emerging in Indian society, leading to revised expectations for the United States.

In chapter 6, I describe the results of my hand coding. I show a change in expectations towards the United States and a change in hegemonic ideas on India’s role in the international system. Moralist Nehruvianism has been challenged by the newer idea of “strategic culture”, which reflects a change in these identities. Each of these identities carries with it certain restrictions on action as the beliefs held by a society can restrict potential future options in foreign policy. I conclude that these changes in hegemonic ideas can explain India’s change in foreign policy towards the United States.
I also describe areas in which my study can be expanded to include an explanation of the changes in hegemonic ideas between my two times periods.
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND TEST DESCRIPTION

I outline a theory of hegemonic ideas’ role in Indian foreign policy choices. I argue that this requires the researcher to look at levels beyond that of a single government decision-maker. Instead, I concentrate on a change in hegemonic ideologies in a society, more generally. I view this as an indicator of a state’s understanding of its role in the international system. I will show introductory evidence for my theory by looking at editorials and opinion pieces from *The Times of India* English-language daily newspaper.

I defend the use of discourse and content analyses in constructivist scholarship. Finally, I outline the limitations of my test, clearly noting what my test explains and where more work will be required in the future.

*Language and Discourse Analysis*

It is initially necessary to defend the concentration on language in my study. Why is it important to privilege language when studying societies? Many scholars would argue that it is crucial, almost necessary to privilege language when trying to understand the behaviors and characteristics of a society.62 Citing Wendt, individuals are fully capable of having independent ideas about the world in which they live.63 However, cultures are formed when these individuals begin to interact and establish a store of shared knowledge. Of course individuals can have interactions, or encounters, where no spoken

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63 Wendt 1999, Pg. 180
or written language is used. For example, in a First Encounter situation, Actor A could merely ignore Actor B, or Actor A could act aggressively towards Actor B without ever making an utterance, merely feeling threatened due to a pre-social understanding of others as challengers. But the majority of realistic encounters and creations of shared knowledge take place through verbal communication. Onuf goes as far as to claim that we cannot understand the world outside of our personal experiences without discourse.64 While we may claim that there is a phenomenal world independent of our experiences, we cannot know about that world without language. Shared understanding is based on communication.

Furthermore, a simple counterfactual can give additional support to a concentration on language; if we are trying to understand culture and the identities of actors, what is a better means of measurement? Language is itself based on shared understanding, or culture. In studying language, we are studying a body of shared ideas about sounds, grammar, syntax, word definition, symbolic representation, and more. Hopf concludes that language is “a social institution par excellence.”65 Language should be seen as the standard to which a replacement methodology would have to be presented and defended.

**Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: a Multimethod Approach**

Even if we accept language as an accurate indicator of culture and identity, the method by which language is studied or interpreted is still debated in the literature. A major debate

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64 Onuf, pg. 37
65 Hopf 2002, pg. 21
has emerged on the relative value of a more interpretivist discourse analysis and the more scientifically “realist” content analysis. Both methods have been given credit in the field as promising measures of identity. 66 In the end, I use a combination of the two, as recommended by Abedal, et al and implemented by Jacques Hymans.

Discourse analysis is defined by Abdelal et al as “the qualitative contextualization of texts and practices in order to describe social meanings.”67 The scholar is attempting to discern the intersubjective context of actors’ speech. This method involves a researcher relying on interpretive skills to gauge major themes in text.

Content analysis is one of the most accepted methods of studying identity in any field.68 Content analysis involves coding speech and written text for particular words, phrases, or ideas to measure frequencies of certain identities and perceptions. Different ideas and themes are given different categories and then compiled for statistical analysis. For my purposes, content analysis is beneficial for quantifying major themes and demonstrating shifts in hegemonic ideas based on their relative absence or presence.

Discourse analysis and content analysis differ on the issue of prescribing meaning in text. Content analysis involves a fixed meaning of the desired words and phrases. The coding manual is constructed before the study is performed and implies a fixed meaning of the discovered words and phrases. Discourse analysis allows for more nuance and more exhaustive description of the text. However, discourse analysis is not easily

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67 Abdelal et al, pg. 702
68 Abdelal et. al. 2006; Hopf 2002
reproduced, as the reading is strictly that of the researcher. Content analysis, on the other hand, should be more easily replicated by any number of coders following the same rules.

I follow Jacques Hymans’ method in his study *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*. He recommends a combination of discourse and content analysis in three steps. First, he recommends a review of existing interpretive analyses to gather a set of guidelines and categories of ideas that can be said to be important to the subject society. This would be similar to a literature review or a research probe. Second, the researcher will perform the quantitative content analysis, using a coding manual and compiling statistics on her selected categories. Third, the researcher will use interpretive methods to form a combination of the quantitative data and the existing studies. In this stage, the researcher is able to flesh out the quantitative data with major themes and nuances.

This method allows the researcher to better fit his coding scheme with the cultural realities of the test group. We can still establish a repeatable coding scheme while not sacrificing cultural specificities.

*Sources*

I will be analyzing and coding opinion and editorial articles from one Indian English-language daily newspaper: *The Times of India*. *The Times of India* has the largest circulation of any English-language daily in India. The National Readership Studies

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69 Hymans, pg. 50
Council 2006 reports an estimated circulation of 7.4 million.\textsuperscript{70} These numbers pale in comparison to India’s two most popular daily newspapers, \textit{Dainik Jagran} (with 21.2 million readers) and \textit{Dainik Bhaskar} (with 21 million readers). Unfortunately, a language barrier keeps me from using these papers as resources at this time. Future research should include these papers. Furthermore, with India having a population over 1 billion people, we should keep in mind the relative low circulation of these two English language dailies. Comparatively the United States’ two most circulated dailies—\textit{USA Today} and \textit{The Wall Street Journal}—each have over two million readers.\textsuperscript{71} I am citing a source that has only two to three times more circulation in a market four times the size of the United States.

However, we have reason to believe the selection of The Times of India is acceptable as a representation of an Indian national security discourse. Kinsella and Chima have selected English language sources for their study of the language of prestige in Indian national security discourses.\textsuperscript{72} The authors used the weekly magazine \textit{India Today} due to its large, nation-wide readership. Those that fall into the category of the Indian middle class comprise a large portion of \textit{India Today}’s readership, presumably representing a national perspective with much influence. Furthermore, the magazine is mainstream in its overall politics, acting as a forum for many different perspectives in Indian society. Similarly, Rampal defends the concentration on English language press

\textsuperscript{70} http://www.hindu.com/nic/nrs.htm
\textsuperscript{71} http://www.burrellesluce.com/top100/2007_Top_100List.pdf
\textsuperscript{72} Kinsella and Chima 2001, Pg. 363
because these sources are the most widely read by policy-makers and opinion leaders, and comprise the most influential source of Indian news.\footnote{Rampal 1999, Pg. 39}

These characteristics similarly apply to \textit{The Times of India}.\footnote{In fact, Kinsella and Chima use \textit{The Times of India} as supporting (albeit less exhaustive) sources in their data set.} Additionally, the most widely-read Indian dailies (the aforementioned \textit{Dainik Jagran} and \textit{Dainik Bhaskar}) are more regional newspapers, printing in Hindi language. \textit{The Times of India} is the largest circulating newspaper in a language shared by Indians in all parts of the country.

The relationship of language and class in Indian society may have a further impact on the universality of my data. I must be careful to bracket my test by highlighting the exceptional position my subjects hold in Indian society. While English education is in fact mandatory in Indian public schools and is the medium of education in many private schools, English is the primary language of communication for only a small percentage of Indian society. We may agree, as Kinsella, Chima, and Rampal, that analysis of English-language sources provides us with a picture of the national debates. However, if I claim to be studying discourse as an indicator of national identities, I must be careful not to project my findings onto the entire nation. I cannot assume that English-language discourse represents all discourses in India. If language is an indicator of shared knowledge, I am necessarily limited to a view of the English-language culture in India. We must bracket this by saying these sources represent a national debate among only the elites in Indian society.
We can still take value from this dataset if we recognize the separation of the public discourse in the media and the statements of politicians. But we must recognize that I am taking only a small step towards an analysis of a more general public’s representations of both the United States and the role of India in the international system. Further research may need to be performed regionally, due to the issue of multiple national languages in India. This would of course limit the universality of my findings. So, we see emerge a trade-off between universality and a valid test measuring anything we might call hegemonic ideas, a la Gramsci.

*Coding Rules*

I have collected *Times of India* opinion and editorial articles that deal primarily with issues of security. I have selected opinion and editorials as a representation of dominant public discourse on Indian foreign policy. Editorials and opinion pieces make political discourses explicit, providing the reader with justifications for policy recommendations and background information. Furthermore, India’s culture of free press and *The Times of India’s* role as one of India’s largest circulated papers gives the researcher confidence that the editors provide a relatively even distribution of opinion and political debate.

I am looking only at articles that deal with issues of international security. This includes articles referring to US actions in Vietnam, India’s strategic realities, and more general articles on the status of Indo-US political relations. I will not be looking at articles on international relief aid, the fall of the dollar in 1971, or the status of US society. These articles are tangential to my research at this stage.
I code only articles written for an Indian audience. In 1971, The Times of India carried pieces from the New York Times. This is interesting if we consider images and expectations of America as a whole. This shows a certain level of acceptance of American opinion and worldview. Interestingly though, based on a brief analysis, most of the New York Times-authored pieces were highly critical of the American Administration. In the end, I have decided not to code these articles, as they were not authored with an Indian domestic audience in mind.

Categorization

I will be categorizing statements for four key ideas in the text. I will be looking for positive and negative statements about the US, expectations for the US, statements reflecting Nehruvianism, and statements reflecting strategic culture. The first and second categories represent the perceptions and role identities Indians hold for the United States. The third and fourth represent Indians’ hegemonic ideas, carrying with them self-perceptions and role identities. This meets Wendt’s criteria for gauging a state’s understandings of self and other under a particular logic and degree of anarchy.

United States, Actions and Expectations

I will be looking for statements made about the United States on issues of security and defense. I have two coding categories; general positive or negative statements made about US actions, such as weapons sales to Pakistan or the decision to work towards détente with China, and high and low expectations for the United States.
I am looking at statements made about expectations for the US. Normative statements on how the United States should be acting in the world are coded in terms of high or low expectations. I then perform a qualitative analysis of the forces informing these expectations. Why would the United States act differently towards democratic India and authoritarian Pakistan?

I am also looking at general reactions to US actions, which have implicit or explicit expectations attached. A hard count of positive and negative statements on US actions can tell us much about what the authors have deemed important, even relevant to their lives.

*Nehruvianism and Strategic Culture*

Because my theory relies similarly on the self-identity of India in the world order, I will also be looking for statements about India’s role in that world. I will be looking for statements regarding India’s role in major power politics, the status of the international system, and the role of non-alignment. These statements are placed in two categories: Nehruvianism and Strategic Culture. Indians’ perceptions of their role in the international system can be interpreted based on their agreement or disagreement with these two hegemonic ideas in Indian politics. The categories themselves are not mutually exclusive, as a person may advocate the value of Non-Alignment based on calculations of power politics.

*Limitations of the Test*
I have defended the value of discourse analysis in constructivist scholarship. However, I must clearly establish the boundaries of my study. I am only hand coding documents from two six month time periods, leaving a twenty-five year gap in my data set. This data, then, will not show a process of socialization. We can only see the changes between two time periods and cannot assume that this process is filling in this gap. The data may show a transition in Indian images of the United States, but will not show these attitudes in transition. This will need to be the focus of future studies.

The data can only hope to show a shift in Indian images of the United States between these two time periods. However, for my theory to work, we cannot deny the importance of this initial finding. We can establish a very simple null-hypothesis for my test. Regardless of the shifts in attitude, which rest in twenty-five years of as-yet unanalyzed data, if we see no difference between these two cases looking for a process of socialization will be unnecessary. We cannot argue that Indian society has been socialized to anything based on these findings. A demonstrated change is what it is—the first step to a larger study with an expanded data set.

My historical narratives will serve as preliminary evidence for that time outside of my two case studies. I will show some evidence of a shift in images, but will not be able to hold this data to the same standard as my discourse analysis. I cannot hope to show a shift in public attitudes by looking only at historical outlines of policy choices and accounts given by policy-makers. Therefore, it can be said that my study could give preliminary evidence for process of socialization, permitting further pursuit.
CHAPTER 3: HEGEMONIC IDEAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

I argue that India’s shift in policy to the United States is not caused by an inherent power politics or changes in the international distribution of material capabilities. Instead, I argue that a change in hegemonic ideologies better explains this shift in policy. Indian hegemonic ideas on the role of states in the international system inform Indian foreign policy. Expectations for particular states, such as democratic India or powerful United States, inform foreign policy. I describe a constructivist approach to the research question, which privileges Indian national identities and interests. My theory is primarily based on Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics.

The International System

Systemic, or Third Degree, theorizing in International Relations theory has long been dominated by the “Neorealist” school of thought, led mainly by Kenneth Waltz. Its hegemony in the field has been so strong that systemic theorizing and Neorealist logic have become inseparable, causing systemic theory, by association, to become the victim in many critiques of Waltz’s theory. Wendt, in his Social Theory of International Politics, had a difficult task in not only challenging the hegemony of Neorealist theory, but also presenting systemic theory as a viable approach to International Relations scholarship. Wendt’s book is incredibly exhaustive and I do not attempt to repeat many of his important debates. I will take many of his points as “given”, not wishing to rehash the theoretical and philosophical debates appearing in his book. I instead will present a

75 See Waltz, Kenneth Theory of International Politics 1979, and Man, the State, and War 1959
simple introduction to how his theory differs from Neorealism, then move on to a
description of his international system. For my purposes, I will be using his theoretical
international system as a foundation. I will then add to his theory, describing hegemonic
ideas in a society.

Material Structures and Social Kinds

Wendt, in his Social Theory of International Politics, continually stresses that he does not
critique Neorealism for its focus on structure. His main goal is to show the possibility of
actors taking on identities that have no meaning outside of structure, how groups of
people create a reality that goes beyond the possibilities of an individual. This is a
structural theory. Instead he criticizes the school’s focus on materialism, the privileging
of material forces in forming state behavior.76 For Neorealist scholars, these material
forces would be constituted by military power measured in defense spending and types of
weapons acquired and economic power measured in capital. This distribution of
capabilities impacts state behavior because of the self-help nature of the international
system. Since the international system is defined by anarchy, states must necessarily
build up their own defenses to ensure security. As states gain and lose material might,
threats, alliances, and the prospects for world peace change. Within Neorealism, this is
all assumed to be a product of human nature. States have an inherent desire for material
capabilities, yielding security.

76 Wendt, pg. 184
Wendt argues against this logic in his introductory chapters. He argues that the interest in these material forces is a product of a particular belief system. Desire and belief lead to action. But the two are not so separate, as desire is founded upon a belief—a belief that something is desirable.\footnote{Wendt, pg. 117} Material interests, then, are predicated upon a belief in their efficacy. They do not carry meaning apart from that which individuals or societies assign. Furthermore, material and biological drives are largely “directionless”, requiring social context to establish desirable routes of acquisition.\footnote{Wendt, pg. 123} I may say, “I am hungry,” but will tend to not step into my neighbor’s kitchen unannounced to meet this need. In international relations, the desire for security does not carry an inherent set of behavioral choices.

This is all to say that Wendt’s international system is not one based upon a broad, fixed understanding of “human nature” or “self-interest”. Wendt does not deny the reality of anarchy in the international system, defined by the absence of central authority to make and enforce laws.\footnote{Wendt, pg. 246} Defined as such, this is an empirical fact. He instead argues that the impact of anarchy is defined by the actors within the system. The effect of anarchy is based upon the ideas shared by the actors, or culture, within the international system.\footnote{Wendt, Pg. 141} Actors in one particular system may not define material capabilities as an interest at all.

\textit{Shared Ideas as a Structure}

\footnote{Wendt, pg. 117}
\footnote{Wendt, pg. 123}
\footnote{Wendt, pg. 246}
\footnote{Wendt, Pg. 141}
It will become important later to describe Wendt’s three “logics of anarchy”, how they affect state behavior, and how they are recognized empirically. First, however, we must understand what constitutes Wendt’s international system: shared ideas, or culture. Unlike Neorealists who say that anarchy causes states to act in a self-help manner, Wendt argues instead that this logic of anarchy must be problematized. If shared knowledge, through interaction, can change state behavior and identities, we can see a weakness in strictly materialist theorizing. As mentioned above, Wendt argues against the independent importance of most material capabilities short of cultural context.

Wendt provides a lengthy debate about agency and the impact of the international system, arguing both are mutually constitutive and inseparable. This necessitates a discussion of structure based on agents’ actions. He argues that agents do bring their self-understandings to a “First Encounter” situation, in which no shared knowledge exists. However, as actors begin to interact, particular actions begin to be reaffirmed as acceptable or punished and eliminated. I do not discuss this process, but for now we must move forward and assume the actors now have a certain degree of shared knowledge, or what Wendt calls a culture. This culture is based on interactions not reducible to individuals actors, thus is called collective knowledge.⁸¹ Collective knowledge becomes important for our discussion when we consider more closely this social aspect. He says we must “treat interaction as a distinct level of analysis between the unit and structural levels, and locate it firmly within the purview of systemic

⁸¹ Wendt, Pg. 164
theorizing. Moreover, this interaction level has, and should therefore be recognized as having, ‘structure.’”

This becomes important when we look back to anarchy. Wendt argues that there is no inherent logic of anarchy. Instead, he highlights three logics of anarchy where state actions, and state identities as a part of a particular international system, differ based on shared knowledge. Wendt describes Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian logics of anarchy.

In the Hobbesian culture, states truly are in a self-help system. No others can be trusted to provide the state with security. War is acceptable and expected. This is the traditional Realist understanding of anarchy in the international system. However Wendt rejects this as an empirical falsity. Instead, states do cooperate at some level and do operate with certain norms that restrict their actions, decrease the likelihood of this war of all against all.

In the Lockean culture, anarchy is defined less by assumed aggression and more by competition between states. The idea that best explains this anarchy is the system of state sovereignty. In the current international system, the idea that each state has a right to exist and govern the internal matter of its people is a norm. There is still no international authority to govern state interactions, but international political borders limit the range of options for each state.

In the Kantian culture states begin to identify with each other as equals not separate from themselves. In this logic, states begin to form a shared identity, or what

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82 Wendt, Pg. 146
83 Wendt, Pg. 250
Adler calls a “security community.” In this system, states recognize their stock of shared values and expectations in the international system. States have moved from national security to collective security.

Changing between these three logics of anarchy are state identities as a part of the international system. The meaning of “state” has changed, from a world of all against all, to one of sovereign states, holding inherent rights to self-rule and freedom from invasion. Not only is plunder less likely in a Lockean world due to international legal punishment, but states are less tempted to consider plunder a viable option due to a different understanding of themselves and the system. This is something that states just do not do.

This understanding of foreign policy decision-making moves beyond Realism as it privileges state interests and identities, asks us to look at what constitutes a state, a major state, in the international system. In explaining a Realist world, we must be careful to highlight major differences, such as different assumptions about the behavior of states. Realists assume fixed interests. However, within a Realist world, we may often view a construction of state’s interests that better lines up with Constructivist logic. In justifying India’s nuclear weapons program, Subrahmanyam offers a Realist argument with a twist: “The continued possession of nuclear weapons by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council has legitimized the role of nuclear weapons in the new international order.” Realists would reject this statement by arguing that nuclear weapons are always ‘legitimate’ forms of self-help, national security. When we get into
discussions about the legitimization of particular weapons systems, we necessarily leave the realm of Realist logic. We must begin to ask what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ state action.

Wendt argues that the current world system is defined by a Lockean logic of anarchy. He says the Third Degree Lockean culture is the foundation of our “common sense” about international politics. States are self-interested actors that have no higher legal authority. “But,” Wendt says, “states also recognize each other’s sovereignty and so are rivals rather than enemies, that they have status quo interests which induce them to constrain their own behavior and cooperate when threatened from outside, and that the system is therefore in part an other-help system qualitatively different in its fundamental logic than the Hobbesian world of sauve qui peut.”

Hegemonic Ideas in a Society

I have, so far, described the key characteristics of Wendt’s international system. However, we must define the relevant communities that assign meaning to these systemic forces. The agents must assign meaning to structural forces for a systemic theory of international politics to be relevant. Gramsci’s hegemony fits well in a discussion of agency at the society level.

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87 Wendt, pg. 296
88 Wendt, pg. 185; This is the main theme of the “Agent-Structure Problem”, see Wendt, Alexander. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” International Organization Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer, 1987), 335-370.
Antonio Gramsci, Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri have contributed much work on the construction of hegemony, defined as a dominant set of ideas in a society. They ask important questions about the way in which an ideology becomes dominant. Hardt and Negri go on to discuss social aspects of the maintenance of hegemony.

Gramsci defines hegemony as “intellectual and moral leadership whose principal constituting elements are consent and persuasion.”\(^{89}\) This is similar to Hansen’s formulation of public culture. Hansen defines public culture as “the public space in which a society and its constituent individuals and communities imagine, represent, and recognize themselves through political discourse, commercial and cultural expressions, and representations of state and civic organizations.”\(^{90}\) Here we are talking about the dominant ideas that are forming a “culture”, based on shared understanding.

This sets up Gramsci’s argument in terms similar to those of Ikenberry. For Ikenberry, hegemony takes on the form of co-option.\(^{91}\) Gramsci says this is a means to an end: consent, persuasive power, and deference. Gramsci says a dominant group “manifests itself in two ways, as domination and as intellectual and moral leadership.”\(^{92}\) He goes on to say that material force should not be relied upon. Material force alone will not lead to hegemony. In fact a reliance on force is antithetical to hegemony, as hegemony is much more about the internalization of norms, acceptance of those norms.

\(^{89}\) Fontana, pg. 140  
\(^{90}\) Hansen, pg. 4  
\(^{91}\) Ikenberry 2001  
\(^{92}\) Gramsci, pg. 57
Wendt and Friedheim, in their work on what they term informal empire, state that in fact overt coercion is an obvious sign of a lack of authority. 93

An emerging hegemonic ideology must supersede the existing mode of thinking, the existing cultural world. Because of this, it must initially challenge the “common sense” of the masses. 94 If this happens, true hegemony has been attained. This is the act of co-opting, and not purely dominating, the masses. This was Joseph Nye’s main argument; to truly gain soft power, one must make one’s interests the interests of those one seeks to control. 95 In fact, for Gramsci hegemony is the common sense of a society.

Hardt and Negri, in Empire, elaborate on Gramsci’s theme, incorporating notions of normalization. This ability to portray force as “in the service of right and peace” is an aspect of what the authors term biopolitical power. 96 Biopolitical power is an internalized power that resembles the idea of a narrowing of potential choices.

The authors present two societies that arise during the formation of a hegemonic order, an order they term “Empire”. 97 First, there exists the Disciplinary Society. This is a system of external restraint embodied in recent history by international institutions and regimes, such as the World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These organizations exert outside political

93 Wendt and Friedheim, pg. 702
94 Gramsci, pg. 330
95 Nye, Joseph, Soft Power
96 Hardt and Negri, pg. 15
97 “Empire” here differs from our normal perception of colonial wealth extraction. Hardt and Negri’s “Empire” is an ideological empire, not an overt adventure in exploitation.
force on individual states based on a body of written rules. The authors state that in all reality, the existence of this society relies upon the resistance of such by the individual.98

This externalized resistance is turned inward in the second society, the Society of Control. This is a society of internalized constraint based upon norms of interaction. This is the stage where the set of potential choices has been internally narrowed through interaction and recognition of international laws and norms.99 An ideology cannot truly be hegemonic until it has permeated the masses to the point of biopolitical power in this way.100

This is not to say that organizations like the IAEA should disband, all states recognizing the futility of developing nuclear facilities. These institutions matter now because of the fact that they are called upon. They represent an order that has been normalized and utilized.101 This is in line with constructivist sentiments of mutual constitution. For Hopf, an actor is not able to act on its identity until the relevant community of meaning acknowledges the legitimacy of that action, by that actor, in that social context.102 This is the same for the regulatory bodies and the hegemonic power itself.

This is a crucial aspect of biopolitical power. Hegemony, to the authors, is not created at the hand of the dominant actors. This is why Machiavelli rejects the

98 Hardt and Negri, pg. 24
99 Hardt and Negri, pg. 23
100 Hardt and Negri, pg. 24
101 Hardt and Negri, pg. 31
102 Hopf 1998, pg. 178
“dominate” option in leadership styles. Instead, the hegemonic power has been accepted as such when it is called upon by smaller powers. It becomes truly hegemonic when the relevant community (the Indian public) acknowledges the power and calls upon it to act as such. For example, it can now be argued that the United States has been called upon by the world to act as the “peace police”. While the elephant in the room here is the international resistance to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, we must remember that America has been called upon in countless other crises such as Somalia, Sudan, Haiti, Bosnia, and Persian Gulf 1. The United States has been called upon to defend the international order that it itself created. Furthermore, the system itself has been established in such a way that calling upon American might is quite easy. There is a “surplus of normativity and efficacy” through American-established institutions. This is all consistent with Nye’s argument for co-opting states for the sake of transforming their self-interest in terms favorable to the dominant force.

For our purposes here, we are looking at the way in which Indians represent their self-identity and the identities of the United States and the international system in which they both operate. We are looking for the ways in which Indians, separate from the government, perceive themselves as part of a state that is an actor in the international system. We are looking for their statements of common sense. Hegemonic ideas shape state’s expectations in international relations and define the state’s interests and identities.

103 Fontana, pg. 144
104 Hardt and Negri, pg. 181
105 Hardt and Negri, pg. 180
**Hypotheses**

In the following chapters, I describe two cases in which India and the United States have been most intensely at odds since India’s independence in 1947. I am looking for the way in which Indians perceive India in the world to see how India fits into Wendt’s theory of international politics.

If Realist scholars who argue for the end of the Cold War as the major phenomena bringing India and the U.S. closer together are correct, I would expect to see a major change in perceptions of the United States in 1989, but no sooner. 1989 would have to be a catalyst for a drastically reformed approach to the world’s single superpower. Due to the timeframes of my data set, I will not be able to account for this in my data. I will be concentrating on a six-month window surrounding my two cases. This of course, does not include the year 1989, and presents a problem for the value of my tests. However, the historical record I have presented above will serve as my initial challenge for this theory. I will have to expand my dataset and return to the research question in order to more fully support my argument.

Neorealism is fundamentally unconcerned with public perceptions as an independent variable. A state’s interests and policy choices are dependent upon the state’s position in the international distribution of material capabilities. This is all predicated on a fixed understanding of state’s interests that does not emerge from public discourse on the direction of the state or the state’s role in the world.106 These are all subsumed. Therefore, Indian public images of the United States or China as “enemy” or

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106 See Kinsella, David and Jugdep S. Chima 2001, Pg. 362
“ally” do not matter. Also, Indian expectations for US actions in the world would presumably remain the same. However, the Neorealist theory would be emboldened if I find no evidence of my theory in the data.

If my theory is true, I expect to make two key findings. First, I expect to find evidence that the 1971 U.S.S Enterprise incident outraged most Indians and clashed with a national security policy that was not accepting of heavy-handed tactics, especially at the hands of a large democracy. Second, in the 1998 data set, I expect to see a decline in the number of references to the United States as an abusive hegemon and imperial power. I expect to find more acceptance of the realpolitik actions of major powers. If this is true, it will give weight to my hypothesis that images of the international system—the American-led international system—had changed dramatically in India, ushering in an era where working relations with the United States, based more on power politics, are even thinkable.
CHAPTER 4: THE 1971 BANGLADESH CRISIS AND NEHRUVIANISM IN INDIA

The US actions in the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 constitute one of the lowest points in Indo-US relations since India’s independence. US and Indian policy were at odds and caused open rhetorical conflict between both governments and opinion leaders. India’s expectations for the United States as a democracy and supporter of freedom throughout the world were still very high at this point. At this time Nehruvian ideals were still very strong in India, heavily influencing Indian official and public perceptions of India’s role in the world and the constitution of that world more generally. At the time of this conflict, there is absolutely no evidence for a natural alliance between the world’s two largest democracies.

The Roots of the Conflict

The Bangladesh crisis of 1971 was rooted in a number of political, cultural, and economic issues between East and West Pakistan. While geographical separation between East and West Pakistan surely complicated governance and the state-building process after Partition, geography itself cannot explain why East Bengal might split and form an independent Bangladesh. Since Partition, more than just political borders separated the two halves of the new Islamic state.

Politically, West Pakistan dominated the government and the national discourse. West Pakistanis dominated the Army and the bureaucracy, leaving Bengalis out of two major areas of state power. Furthermore, cultural and linguistic differences complicated
the East/West situation early in the history of Pakistan. West Pakistan is comprised of
Urdu speaking Punjabis, Pashtuns, and Baluchis, while East Pakistan was comprised
mainly of Bengalis in culture and language. Unlike India, West Pakistan was slow to
accept multilingual governance. In 1948, Pakistan’s founding father Mohammed Ali
Jinnah dictated that Urdu would be the sole language of state. This left Bengalis at a
disadvantage in state-building and policy-making as they would be forced to spend more
on education, studying foreign language before entering government posts. Bengali was
later included as an official state language in 1952, after heated debate.\textsuperscript{107}

This unequal arrangement existed in the sphere of economics as well. There
existed large economic disparities between East and West, with most capital being
concentrated in the West. Capital tended to move from East to West, but people did not.
Bengalis were not able to easily move to higher paying jobs in the capital-holding
West.\textsuperscript{108} Furthermore, government spending on development was mainly concentrated in
the West, despite the East’s majority population.

These issues form the background of the conflict. However, many scholars have
highlighted 1970 as the year that marks the beginning of a process of active movement
and political action aimed at Bangladeshi Independence. The Assembly elections of
December 7, 1970 mark a clear referendum on Bangladeshi popular opinion and an event
that set off much of the harsh West Pakistani reaction.

General Yayha Khan took power on March 25, 1969 and called for general
elections, more in an attempt to divide East Pakistani opinion and power in the Centre

\textsuperscript{107} Ayoob and Subramanyam, pg. 51
\textsuperscript{108} Ayoob and Subrahmanyan, Pg. 2
government. He predicted divisions between the Islamic Awami League, the major party in East Pakistan pushing for increased autonomy in the East, and the various Communist parties vying for seats in the Assembly. These divisions, in theory, would cause pandemonium in the streets and justification for his military dictatorship. Yayha’s problems with East Pakistan really began after a massive cyclone hit the East on November 12, 1970. Between 200,000 and 500,000 people were killed and the landscape was devastated. However, the Centre government, dominated by West Pakistani politics, was slow to provide aid and reconstruction monies. This further consolidated an emerging anti-West attitude in the East, increasing the Awami League’s nationalist vote bank.

Adding to Khan’s problems, leaders of the largest Communist parties in East Pakistan pulled out of the election campaign, citing the disastrous conditions after the cyclone. This increased support for the Awami League and spelled disaster for General Khan’s divide and rule strategy. When the polls closed, the Awami League gained 167 of the 169 seats available to East Pakistan, leaving the party with a clear majority of 313 Assembly seats.\textsuperscript{109} This was completely unacceptable to General Khan and the Pakistan People’s Party, led by Zia Bhutto, who wanted power to be split between the East and West. The Awami League was poised to write the constitution of its choice, as they had gained additional support from a number of smaller political parties in the West.

Finding the situation intolerable, General Khan postponed the inaugural meeting of the Assembly, immediately causing Bengalis to take to the streets in protest. The

\textsuperscript{109} Sharma, Pg. 23
General’s heavy-handed response, a police crackdown that led to the killing of dozens of protesters, further alienated Bengalis and put pressure on Awami League leader Sheik Mujibar Rahman to declare Independence. This was clearly “the beginning of the end” for Yayha Khan’s Pakistan.\textsuperscript{110}

On March 25, discussions in Dacca between General Khan, Bhutto, and Mujibar Rahman broke down, leading to no compromise government and a military dictator on the wrong side of a popular mandate. General Khan left Dacca and immediately ordered troops into East Pakistan to crack down on the Awami League. Sheik Mujibar Rahman officially signed a declaration of independence the same day, citing the violence as the last straw in the Bengali fight for autonomy. The attack was swift and harsh to a degree not expected or prepared for, leaving scores of Bengalis dead in the initial days of the conflict. The word “genocide” began to be thrown around diplomatic circles as West Pakistan forces clashed with and cracked down hard on Mukti Bahini militants fighting for an independent Bangladesh.

\textit{India and the Division of Pakistan}

From the beginning of the killings in East Pakistan, India had publicly declared its unwillingness to get involved in the internal affairs of sovereign Pakistan. The conflict was officially labeled a civil war and deemed outside of India’s authority. By the end of April 1971, India had made its position clear that it would not enter the conflict.\textsuperscript{111} However, East Pakistani refugees proved to be the first problem for India in the

\textsuperscript{110} Sharma, Pg. 27
\textsuperscript{111} Ayoob and Subrahmanyam, Pg. 190
conflict. As the fighting continued, more and more refugees poured into Northeast India, straining Indian aid organizations and relief budgets. Indian diplomats began to call loudly for international action on the refugee situation and the genocide in Bangladesh. This was no longer an internal conflict in many Indian decision-makers’ minds. The economic and security burden had now been partially put upon India’s shoulders.

By August, both India and Pakistan were amassing troops on their shared borders in preparation for a potential conflict. On August 14th, the conflict took on some superpower concerns when India and the USSR signed the Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. This merely added to US President Nixon’s previous reluctance to support India. He had, after all, recommended to Henry Kissinger that the US should “tilt” in favor of Pakistan.

India and Pakistan had exchanged small border skirmishes as the conflict in Bangladesh occasionally spilled over into Indian territory. But it was not until December 3 that any concerted attacks began. Pakistan launched air attacks on a number of Indian air bases, causing minimal damage but making their position clear. Indira Gandhi ordered Indian troops into East Bengal, commencing a twelve-day war with Pakistan.

*The USS Enterprise Enters the Bay of Bengal*

Throughout the conflict in East Pakistan, the United States and India had taken much different official positions on how to act. India had lobbied hard for the world’s major

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112 Sharma, Pg. 45
113 Gupta, pg. 60
powers to take note of the genocide in East Bengal and put pressure on Pakistan to end the killings. Furthermore, India supported the Bengali rebels and advocated for their right to seek political freedoms and democracy. The Nixon Administration officially said very little about the conflict, claiming it was an internal dispute that should be resolved internally.

However, the strategic value of Pakistan to the Nixon Administration cannot be ignored. The US and Pakistan had signed a defense treaty in 1954, establishing Pakistan as a junior member of the strategic struggle against communism. The US continued to sell weapons to Pakistan, even after an official arms embargo to both India and Pakistan after their 1965 war.\textsuperscript{114} The US was friendless in South Asia without Pakistan, thus the continued support for a return to a status quo, united East and West Pakistan.

But on December 9, the Nixon Administration moved beyond official silence on the conflict. India was now soundly defeating Pakistan in East Bengal, causing new worry in the US about the future of West Pakistan as well. The Nixon Administration ordered the dispatch of the Navy’s Seventh Fleet from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Bay of Bengal. The Seventh Fleet consisted of ten major fighting vessels, including most importantly the nuclear-powered \textit{USS Enterprise} aircraft carrier. The Seventh Fleet arrived in the Bay of Bengal on December 12, just four days before the war would come to an end and Pakistan would sign a peace treaty and accept defeat.

The order to move the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal was officially justified by the need to evacuate American citizens from the war zone in Dacca.

\textsuperscript{114} Gupta, pg. 90
However, Americans in Dacca had largely been evacuated on December 12 by British ships.\textsuperscript{115} According to available documents, it appears that the Nixon Administration had no intention of using force in the East Pakistan crisis, nor was it prepared to enter the conflict on the side of Pakistan. The dispatch of the Seventh Fleet can instead be seen as a symbolic gesture to a staunch Cold War ally and to a China that was increasingly ready to discuss \textit{détente} with the United States.\textsuperscript{116}

However, this caused outrage in New Delhi as the US continually failed to present the Prime Minister with an acceptable excuse for sending the fleet.\textsuperscript{117} The presence of the fleet was perceived as an open threat to India’s national interest, bordering on an act of war against her. The US had consistently ignored India’s concerns in East Bengal and was now trying to dictate actions in the region with its gunboat diplomacy.

\textit{Nehruvian Ideals in India’s post-Independence Foreign Policy}

During the time of the Bangladesh crisis, Nehruvian ideals were still very dominant in Indian politics, both foreign and domestic. Indian foreign policy in this era, which I term Nehruvian foreign policy, was defined by Non-Alignment, non-violence, and the utilization of international institutions such as the United Nations. India also had high expectations for fellow democracies, most notably the United States.

Any analysis of post-Independence Indian foreign policy necessarily centers on Jawaharlal Nehru, the father of the Indian nation and its first Prime Minister. As the

\textsuperscript{115} Sharma, pg. 244
\textsuperscript{116} Walter, pg. 302
\textsuperscript{117} Sharma, pg. 250
Indian state was finding its way in the world after Independence, Nehru was largely unchallenged on foreign policy, holding the portfolios of Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs. He led Indian foreign affairs with no resistance from Congress and only issue-specific resistance from opposition parties and the press. The opposition parties generally did not challenge his over-all goals and outlook.\textsuperscript{118} As if consolidating and nurturing a huge new nation were not enough, Nehru was the unchallenged public face of Indian foreign policy. Jaswant Singh has said that Nehru “so towered others around him, he, not through any act of will, more as a cultural consequence, prevented an alternative thought from emerging.”\textsuperscript{119} While this may distort Nehru’s position in society (as popular icon as opposed to democratically-supported policy-maker), it does acknowledge his position of leadership in Indian foreign policy. For this reason, I refer to the post-Independence era of Indian foreign policy as the Nehruvian era. Nehru was the philosophical guide of Indian foreign policy and met few challenges to his position, warranting the overall foreign policy bearing his name.

If we are confident that we can call this the Nehruvian era, we must define the specifics of this foreign policy. Nehru’s experiences with colonialism and his work with Mahatma Gandhi on Indian independence played a major part in shaping this foreign policy. Nehruvian policy can generally be defined by the importance placed on secularism, non-alignment, anti-colonialism, racial equality, peaceful solution of conflicts, and economic independence.\textsuperscript{120} For our purposes here, the importance placed

\textsuperscript{118} Mansingh, pg. 152
\textsuperscript{119} Singh, pg. 43
\textsuperscript{120} Mansingh, pg. 152; Nanda, pg. 3
on non-alignment and peaceful conflict resolution are the most relevant to my discussion on foreign policy. This platform rested on the foundation of a widely held belief in India’s greatness as an ancient civilization and contemporary state that had much to teach the world.\textsuperscript{121} I will begin with Nehru’s nationalist understanding of India’s role in the world.

During one of his multiple visits to pre-Independence British-administered prisons, Nehru wrote his ode to his homeland, \textit{The Discovery of India}. \textit{The Discovery of India} was both one of his most important works and a textbook example for all nationalist leaders, as Nehru describes the greatness of the early Indian civilizations and argues for the return of a free Indian state to this high position in world history. \textit{The Discovery of India}, first and foremost, acts as a unifying text, creating an “India” where one may not have existed prior. Winston Churchill is famous for saying that what we today call India “is not a country or a nation… It is merely a geographical expression. It is no more a single country than the equator.” If we consider this quote, we may ask how Nehru came to “discover” the India that he did.\textsuperscript{122} Before the Raj-- before any English governance--nothing connected the people of today’s Punjab with those of Tamil Nadu.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{121} Jacques Hymans has written extensively on national identity and foreign policy, focusing specifically on Indian national identity. He highlights the consistency of this strong Indian national identity in his book \textit{The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation}.

\textsuperscript{122} Tharoor, pg. 9

\textsuperscript{123} Churchill’s comment does of course express a contemporary rhetorical strategy that sought to divide the Indians in order to continue ruling. The idea was to make Indians believe they were only “Indians” because of British presence. Dennis Austin gives off a similar air of paternalism when he posits, “perhaps India was never fully India except under British rule (34).” In the end, one may make the argument that Nehru’s India is a perfect example of what Benedict Anderson calls an “imagined community”.

This debate would be an interesting study by itself, but for my purposes it is important that Nehru (rather successfully) introduces a history of a great, unified, ancient India. He argues that India’s subjugation to foreign powers had long stalled India’s development and civilizational progress: “It is not surprising that in this condition of mental stupor and physical weariness India should have deteriorated and remained rigid and immobile while other parts of the world marched ahead.”¹²⁴ A free India would again expand and show the world its greatness.

*Anti-Colonialism and Anti-Racism*

This civilizational greatness and history of subjugation informed Nehru’s stance on colonialism and racism throughout the post-World War Two world. Nehru himself perceived the Nehru-Gandhi push for Independence as an issue that went beyond India’s borders, a small part of a larger fight against colonialism and racism. He was fighting for more than just Indian sovereignty, focusing more on the perceived hypocrisy of Western dominance and notions of sovereignty.¹²⁵ This came out in his discussions with fellow world leaders and speeches at U.N. summit meetings, in which Nehru “was accused of sermonizing and reading homilies to other nations.”¹²⁶ Nehru had much to teach the world about human rights, sovereignty and global governance. These lessons, it seemed to other world diplomats, were given by a state leader with far less power than his tone would admit.

*Non-violence*

¹²⁴ Nehru, pg. 23
¹²⁵ Mansingh, pg. 159
¹²⁶ Nanda, pg. 20
Nehru also privileged non-violence in international affairs. He preferred to use the United Nations as a platform to resolve international conflicts and gave many inspiring speeches to the General Assembly about the futility of force. Nehru’s views on non-violence were rooted in a high degree of political idealism, articulated most clearly by intellectuals in the 19th century Indian renaissance, most notably scholars from Bengal. A quote from Rabindranath Tagore can sum up this position well:

“Men of feeble faith will say that India requires to be strong and rich before she can raise her voice for the sake of the whole world. But I refuse to believe it. That the measure of man’s greatness is in his material resources is a gigantic illusion casting its shadow over the present-day world—it is an insult to man. It lies in the power of the materially weak to save the world from this illusion, and India, in spite of her penury and humiliation, can afford to come to the rescue of humanity.”

Indian nationalist experiences in the fight for independence also served as a guide for other states in this manner: “The fact that a predominantly non-violent movement had made it possible to liquidate imperialism in India seemed to prove that physical force was not necessarily the arbiter of the destiny of nations.” Despite a lack of material power, India acted as a leader in the U.N., a champion for causes outside of its direct “national interest”. Nehru instead relied on a stock of soft power, or ideological power, to lead the world in a different direction.

Non-Alignment

India’s role as a great world power and champion of the subjugated peoples of the world similarly informed Nehru’s stance on non-alignment. Nehru did not want India to

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127 Bandyopadhyaya, pg. 176
128 Nanda, pg. 2
129 Limaye, pg. 16
ever again act as a subject to power and this was evident in his dealings with the bipolar, post-World War Two world. The legacy of colonialism influenced India’s desire to remain independent and outside the realm of power politics.\textsuperscript{130} But Nehru equally rejected the options offered by the two superpowers, Western capitalism and authoritarian policies in the U.S.S.R. Western capitalism “was rejected because it was believed inevitably to breed exploitation, economic inequality, imperialism and racialism. But the Soviet model of development was also rejected because it was believed to be based on violence and dictatorship, which were alien to the ideals of the Indian national movement.”\textsuperscript{131} He chose instead a more democratic, socialist worldview.

\textit{Nehru and the United States}

Nehru’s non-aligned stance certainly had an impact on his policy towards the United States in this era. He respected the United States’ constitution and foundations of democracy and drew heavily from the American founding fathers. However, India’s early experiences with American power in practice left a poor impression on Nehru. This theme of the “hope and reality” of Indo-U.S. relations begins even before Indian Independence. Franklin Roosevelt initially supported Indian independence and the Congress Party’s push for democracy. However, as World War Two intensified and America’s relationship with Great Britain gained priority, Roosevelt shifted positions on Indian independence in support of his major war ally. Nehru was deeply upset by this lack of support from a fellow former British colonial subject.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} Limaye, pg. 17  
\textsuperscript{131} Bandyopadhyaya, pg. 177  
\textsuperscript{132} Mansingh, pg. 152
This merely intensified India’s desire to remain independent in the world and distrust of America’s ability to use power. Furthermore, Indian elites were disappointed with their day-to-day dealings with American diplomats, which they viewed as crass, vulgar, and materialistic. These interactions served to reinforce India’s unwillingness to deal with the heavy-handed superpower. As the early 20th century progressed, India’s foreign policy moved more towards open antagonism towards the United States as expectations continually outpaced results. U.S. support for Pakistan and détente with China left India feeling helpless in dealing with the superpower. Vigilant independence in foreign policy quickly transformed into a lack of desire to work with the United States as a cooperative partner, especially during Indira Gandhi’s first term as Prime Minister. India signed a friendship pact with the Soviets in 1971 and constantly resisted economic dealings with the U.S. in a further show of defiance.

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133 Lal, pg. 272
CHAPTER 5: INDIA IN 1998, A NEW STRATEGIC CULTURE?

In 1998, India elicited a fast and harsh reaction from the United States after performing the Pokhram II nuclear weapons tests. India openly defied the international norm of nuclear non-proliferation and the policy goals of the American Clinton Administration. At this time, we see a much more subdued Indian official response to this instance of American punishment. Also emerging at this time is a new hegemonic ideology in Indian foreign policy, one defined by power politics and active engagement with the other major powers in the international system. “Strategic culture”, as defined by Jaswant Singh, began to emerge as a dominant theme in official circles.

India’s Nuclear Weapons Program

The history of India’s nuclear technological development begins directly after independence with Jawharlal Nehru. Nehru pressed hard for the development of civilian nuclear facilities in the name of scientific progress and domestic energy production. This was mainly driven by his desire to develop a modern, industrialized Indian economy. He established the Atomic Energy Commission in 1947 to develop these civilian technologies.

By the 1960s, India had fuel-reprocessing facilities that resulted in weapons-ready plutonium. But all official consideration of nuclear energy research was still focused on civilian technologies. Any talk of nuclear weapons technology did not begin until Indira Gandhi’s premiership in the 1970s. The research and debates leading to India’s Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion (PNE) did not begin until 1972, shortly after India’s third war with Pakistan. Even then, public discourse on nuclear weapons was minimal.\textsuperscript{134}

After the 1971 conflict between India and Pakistan, Indira Gandhi was facing no pressure from the Lok Sabha, the media, or the public to begin developing nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{135} However in 1972 she ordered the commencement of research on weapons technology, pushing India’s nuclear energy program outside of civilian technologies for the first time. The PNE was billed as merely a demonstration of India’s explosion capabilities, not a missile test and full weaponization.

At this point, it is clear that India was a nuclear weapons-capable state. However, India’s undeclared status left its diplomats in a very difficult position in international negotiations on nuclear test bans and proliferation. India long resisted unequal international treaties that allowed nuclear weapons-possessing states to maintain their status quo while all other states were restricted from developing similar technologies. Many Indian politicians and decision-makers referred to this as “nuclear apartheid.”

This became a major problem for Indo-US relations, as the United States was the main advocate of indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which restricts all signatory non-nuclear weapons states from developing those technologies. After the 1974 PNE, India was vigilantly opposed to the NPT and all nuclear weapons treaties that did not work towards denuclearization in the five weapons-possessing states: the United States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain. The NPT was put to a vote

\textsuperscript{134} Hymans, pg. 182
\textsuperscript{135} Hymans, pg. 182
and passed for permanent status in 1994, sponsored mainly by the Clinton Administration.

Finally in 1998, India shed its ambiguous status with two nuclear weapons tests on May 11th and 13th. Weapons had been considered, and nearly tested, by a number of prior Indian Prime Ministers, including Rajiv Gandhi and P.V. Narasimha Rao (Hymans, 193). However, it was not until the rightist Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) took control of Parliament in 1998 that weapons were finally openly tested. The BJP leaders, including new Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, had campaigned on the bomb, saying explicitly that they would test.

India’s test was quickly followed by similar tests by Pakistan and a number of military and economic sanctions from the United States. The Clinton Administration lobbied hard for other states to impose sanctions against both India and Pakistan. Clinton’s representatives also introduced UN Security Council Resolution 1172 to lay out a list of demands for the two states. The harsh reaction startled many Indian decision makers and politicians and marked the beginning of an uneasy era of Indo-US relations.136

However, both governments moved quickly to mend relations. Despite initial harsh reaction by the Clinton Administration and the US Congress, the sanctions were removed after only a matter of months, in 2000.137 The Administration called on both India and Pakistan to establish a clear set of guidelines and command and control

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136 Mohan, pg. 90
137 Cohen, Pg. 178
Clinton continued to court India, visiting the state in 2000, thus giving a degree of legitimacy to the state of affairs in South Asia. Prime Minister Vajpayee made similar appeals, calling for improved relations between the “world’s two largest democracies.”

A New Dominant “Public Culture”?

If we are looking at hegemonic social ideas, or what Hansen calls “public culture”, in India we see a major shift away from Nehruvianism in the 1980s at the official level. Instead we see a new hegemonic idea in Indian foreign policy, led by the Hindu nationalist BJP.

Hindu nationalism was one force rising in India that sought to fill the void in the public space left by failed Congress-led Nehruvianism. In fact Hansen claims the “Hindu nationalist agendas, discourses, and institutions have gradually penetrated everyday life.” This stream of public culture has risen under the banner of Hindutva, or “Hinduness”, defined generally as a Hindu culture shared by all peoples who can call India their religious homeland. If we look briefly at the history of Hinduism, we will see how unlikely it may have been that Hindu nationalism could one day be viewed as a hegemonic idea in Indian society.

The reality of the practice of Hinduism makes the idea of one hegemonic Hindu “public culture” difficult. Even the word “Hinduism” itself can be misleading in this regard. According to King, when one takes the “ism” portion of the word “Hinduism”
for granted, one subsumes many Western biases on the theory and practice of religion.\textsuperscript{140}

One may want to be careful when even referencing an adherent to “Hinduism” as a “Hindu,” as this is also a loaded word. We must understand its \textit{meaning} before even addressing its application in society. From there we may determine how a statewide body like the BJP could potentially use it politically.

The term “Hindu” was coined by Persians, originally to describe the peoples that lived beyond the Indus River. It was used to describe a geographic region, not a religion.\textsuperscript{141} The “ism” was added later by Western “Indologists” who were trying to understand the religious practices of the people of the subcontinent. King claims that Hinduism as a singular concept was developed by Orientalist Westerners who were trying to apply Western norms of religion on these exotic practices. According to his argument, the word Hinduism is a false singularity attempting to describe the practice of a particular geographical region.\textsuperscript{142}

If “Hinduism” was never unified, never a community, until presented with an Other, one might find it difficult to argue for the impact of dominant ideas within a community if no community is clearly defined. However, King, while arguing that the


\textsuperscript{141} King, pg. 162

\textsuperscript{142} Lorenzen argues that the use of “Hindu” as a religious marker predated the arrival of the British. He says there is little evidence that “Indian” Muslim converts were referred to as “Hindus” by Persian and Mughal invaders (636). If “Hindu” was strictly a geographical outgroup, Muslim converts should have remained within that category. Their new religious identity presumably had an impact on their status as “Hindu” or non-Hindu. However, even if the term did carry religious meaning at this time, as Lorenzen claims, the word is still constructed based on othering. \textit{It is still given no meaning apart from what it is not}—Islam. Defining an in-group based in this logic alone would prove murky at best.
word “Hinduism” does not carry the meaning that Indologists ascribed to it, says the word has acquired meaning by both scholars and Hindus alike.

King highlights the indigenous role in the creation of “Hinduism” by looking at the Brahmins in the 19th century. The Brahmins had an interest in seeing the Brahminical version of “Hinduism” painted as the standard by which other forms of “Hinduism” would be judged. So contemporary Brahmins did play a role in this construction according to King:

If one asks who would most have benefitted from the modern construction of a unified Hindu community focusing upon the Sanskritic and Brahmanical forms of Indian religion, the answer would, of course, be those highly educated members of the higher brahmana castes, for whom modern 'Hinduism' represents the triumph of universalized, Brahmanical forms of religion over the 'tribal' and the 'local'.

He goes on to say that the Orientalist definition of Hinduism was actually used by and useful to Indians later in the 19th and 20th centuries. Regardless of what “Hinduism” was before this time, the word began to pick up more indigenous meaning. Or at least, indigenous elites began to ascribe it meaning in their own political context. Hansen says these Hindu elites could now create a unified “Hinduism” to be used politically, to create a “core and periphery” of Hindu practices. In the end, invoking a unified “Hinduism”, where none existed prior, was an effective political tool.

However, Hinduism could hardly ever energize a national movement while the caste system remained. The articulation of Hindutva, or “Hinduness”, offered the

143 King, pg. 170
144 King, pg. 171
145 Hansen, pg. 66
foundation for a broad-based movement. Das says the proliferation of Hindu nationalism was so effective that “the BJP (,) in establishing the discourse of Hindutva as the nationalist identity of India (,) forces one to use the terms Hindutva, Hinduism, and the Indian national identity synonymously.”

Furthermore, the faltering Nehruvian doctrine, led by the increasingly corrupt Congress Party, could no longer effectively guide Indian politics. Arguing for the hegemonic status of the process of the BJP party and Hindu nationalism’s rise, I will now shift into a discussion of how BJP foreign policies and ideology differed from the previous Nehruvian era.

*India in the Post-Cold War World: Priority of “Strategic Culture”*

Based on the available statements and writings from Hindu nationalist policy-makers, we can confidently claim that this new social force looked beyond the Nehruvian legacy of non-violence and universal conflict resolution and towards a “strategic culture” that privileged Indian national security, self-help, and military strength. BJP leaders have emphasized, over and over, the importance of national defense based on weapons and the failure of Nehru in this area. Sisir Gupta, an Indian diplomat, argued India had no choice but to develop an Indian nuclear weapon, as “military capability remains the most important source of a country’s status, prestige, and power.”

The Ministry of Defense similarly recognizes the absolute necessity of material capabilities:

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146 Das, pg. 80
147 Hansen, pg. 134
148 This is, of course, a large step, but I feel Hansen has covered the issue extensively and persuasively. See Hansen, The Saffron Wave.
149 Kinsella, pg. 357
“Modernization of arms and equipment and a maximum degree of self-reliance and self-sufficiency in the shortest possible time have been the major objectives in our defence production effort. ... No free nation ... can afford to ignore the imperative need to maintain constant preparedness to defend [against] any threat to its borders.”

For Hindu nationalist leaders, this was the major failure of Nehru’s foreign policy. No one has written such a broad critique and counterargument to Nehruvianism as former Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Jaswant Singh. Singh outlines a new era of “strategic culture”, which he loosely defines as a culture of national defense and contingency planning based on military preparedness. This definition of strategic culture may differ with that of other scholars, as his is limited to one based on military strength and defense planning. For this reason, I will continue to refer to this new hegemonic ideology as strategic culture, but the reader is asked to remember that this definition based on Singh’s formation.

Singh labeled Nehruvian foreign policy as immature and neglectful, saying Nehru did not develop a strategic culture. Under Nehru’s leadership, Indian strategic culture consisted of “an absence of iconoclastic questioning; a still continuing lack of institutional framework for policy formulation; lack of a sense of history and geography;
an absence of sufficient commitment to territorial impregnability; and a tendency to remain static in yesterday’s doctrines, even form.”\textsuperscript{153}

Singh gives Nehru credit for his knack for diplomacy, but criticizes his lack of defense planning: “Foreign policy as the forte of Pandit Nehru had a certain cachet, a glamour. Not so defense, astounding as that assertion may sound. There are many factors that contributed to this neglect, \textit{but the result was inevitable} (emphasis added).”\textsuperscript{154}

Despite an historical explanation, Nehru is still blamed for this oversight:

“The foundations of this neglect (of defense policy) had, of course, been laid well before Independence: they lay in the cultural and civilizational roots outlined earlier; the British monopolization of this responsibility; the neglect by successive generations of Indian thinkers of this vital area of national endeavor; and a deliberate relegation of the importance of defense by post-Independence political leadership. Once again responsibility devolves upon Nehru. He had a sense of history but few of his colleagues or his successors shared that sense. The consequences of such a lack have been damaging. \textit{For obviously, a people devoid of a sense of history, and an awareness of the lessons of it, will be at a disadvantage when dealing with nations that do} (emphasis added).”\textsuperscript{155}

Nehru’s main failure was his over-reliance on morality in international affairs. The ‘reality’ of national security necessarily limits the articulation of morality in international politics:

“This ‘moral aspect’ was in essence a confusion… It is a search for the ‘moral’ in the realm of international affairs, a reconciliation then of that ‘moral’ with the demonstrated reality of the conduct of nations in pursuit of their respective national goals and interests. It is a confusion that arises from not differentiating between individual human morality and ethics, and the reality of national interests. \textit{It is also a consequence of not}

\textsuperscript{153} Singh, pg. 58
\textsuperscript{154} Singh, pg. 39
\textsuperscript{155} Singh, pg. 40
recognizing that between high idealism and the hard stone of a pursuit of national goals what will splinter is always this ‘moral aspect’.”

Here we also see a major theme in Singh’s critique of Nehru: the ‘reality’ and primacy of a strategic culture whose first goal is national defense. This is a perfectly Realist argument for a self-help state of affairs. Apparently Nehru did not realize his own state’s interest and subsequently failed India. Furthermore, whatever strategic culture was articulated by Nehruvians was weak and immature, as made evident by the case of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion. India had long pushed for international disarmament while moving forward on nuclear weapons tests. Singh criticizes this inconsistency as further evidence of an absence of a well-developed strategic culture.

Consistent here is a logic of the inevitability of Realist self-help security policy. The ‘hard stone of a pursuit of national goals’ was overlooked. History inevitably vanquished an idealist India due to Nehru’s neglect. The only way to assure these real, hard national interests is through military strength, namely nuclear weapons and an enhanced strategic culture.

India as a Major Power

The ‘failure’ of Nehru was the failure to raise India to its long-desired goal of major power status in the world. For Hindu nationalists, this goal could be realized through social order and a strong state building a strong military. Hansen recognizes this goal throughout the history of India but emphasizes that, “Hindu nationalist discourse and

156 Singh, pg. 42
practices are centrally concerned with notions of national honor and how a vibrant sense of national community can stabilize social identities, governance, and the larger social order, and ultimately extract a much-desired global recognition of India’s place among the leading nations in the world.157 Here we can see an explanation for Singh’s strong language and appeal for military might. For India to be a world leader, it must stand along with the other great powers and flex its military muscles. This is what ‘major world powers’ do.

Many scholars have highlighted a long-standing desire in Indian foreign policy to be recognized as a major world power.158 Nehru’s foreign policy attempted to realize this goal through soft power, diplomacy, and moral leadership. As this policy failed, we can see the emergence of a national security policy based on material capabilities and self-interest. The search for prestige in the international system pushed India to acquire nuclear weapons because of India’s definition of what it means to be a state and what it means to be a major power. According to Sagan, “military organizations and their weapons can therefore be envisioned as serving functions similar to those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams: they are part of what modern states believe they have to possess to be legitimate, modern states.”159 Hansen sums up the scenario well:

“The Hindu nationalist claim of a universal mission of Hindu culture is not new to Indian nationalism... But in the Hindu nationalist appellation, this alternative universalism is no longer a critique of the West, but rather part of a strategy to invigorate and stabilize a modernizing national project through a disciplined and corporatist cultural nationalism that can earn India recognition and equality (with the West and Other nations) through

157 Hansen, pg. 10
159 Quoted in Kinsella and Chima, pg. 360
assertion of difference. The more the Hindus assert their deep and constitutive difference vis-à-vis the West, and the more Hindu civilization asserts the purity of its alternative universalism and its civilization, the more it will be respected and admired, the reasoning goes. However, in order to gain respect from the West and from its neighbors, India must be strong and powerful. The Hindu nationalists are not the only forces in India that wish to see India a well-armed major world power. Some of the largest and most decisive arms purchases and strategies of technological upgrading took place in India during the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi as prime minister. However, it is no coincidence that the most decisive steps toward going nuclear, and toward extracting the recognition from the West that the western world was unwilling to extend on its own, were taken by the Hindu nationalists.\textsuperscript{160}

Jaswant Singh and many other Hindu nationalist leaders pushed for a new foreign policy in India, defined by power politics and military might. The era of soft power Nehruvian policies was over. It was time to begin a new era of engagement with other major powers, namely the United States.

\textsuperscript{160} Hansen, pg. 231
CHAPTER 6: CODING RESULTS

1971

My reading shows two strong trends in the discourse on US foreign policy and India’s role in the international system. First, negative statements made about the United States often contained high expectations for the US based on Indians’ particular definition of what it meant to be a democratic state and a major world power. Second, while Jaswant Singh had described a lack of defense planning in India’s defense sector even at this time, there is evidence of awareness of balance of power politics and strategic thinking even in the era of Nehruvian foreign policy. There is evidence of a strategic culture, but not strategic culture as defined by Jaswant Singh and operationalized for my test.

Expectations and Images of the United States

In 1971, we see very high expectations for the United States. The United States’ role as a free, democratic world leader led to Indian expectations for fairness and American support for East Bengalis’ right to fight for democracy and justice. As the United States continually failed to meet up to these expectations, the authors increasingly make negative statements about the US. Out of 39 statements containing expectations for the United States, 29 represent high expectations or a call for Indians to quickly lower expectations for the United States. Indians’ definition of the role of democratic states in the international system limited the range of potential options Indians could expect of these states.
Table 1

**Coding Results 1971-United States**

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<tr>
<td>796</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
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</table>

It is predictable that Indians would have a negative view of US support for Pakistan in 1971. The US turned a blind eye to Pakistani atrocities in East Bengal and tacitly supported its war against India, a new ally of the USSR. The analysis becomes interesting when we look at the way the US was criticized. Nixon’s choice of Pakistan is questioned not simply because Pakistan is antagonistic to India, but also because the US is standing behind an authoritarian Pakistan and against democratic India.

One typical response appeared in the December 12, 1971 issue. The reader writes to the editor, “What surprises the world today is that Americans who fought and won their war of independence should conspire with a dictatorship in crushing the liberty of millions of people and attacking a democracy like India.”

The US’ experience with colonialism and its support of democracy around the world should preclude these foreign policy decisions.

We also see many statements calling for a reevaluation of thought on the United States after the *USS Enterprise* incident. The Bangladesh crisis can be seen as a turning point for many of the authors in this way. A December 27 Times of India editorial suggests that now the United States’ “bona fides are now suspect” in India and will

161 *Times of India*, December 12, 1971
necessitate confidence building measures if the US wishes to again improve relations.\textsuperscript{162}

After deploring US support for military dictators, one author makes a clear policy recommendation for the Indian government:

\begin{quote}
“The US may go to any length in support of its blind policies. Its policies are based purely on considerations of power, regardless of the human consequences. As such the Government of India should revise its approach to the US accordingly.”
\end{quote}

One author, even prior to the \textit{USS Enterprise} incident, claims the US support for military dictators should have been predicted. Indians will soon need to assume the US will act in a consistently appalling fashion:

\begin{quote}
“With a little reflection, if not imagination, we could have foreseen at the beginning of the Bangla Desh crisis that the United States and China would gang up behind Pakistan and that we would be forced to depend upon the Soviet Union for political and military help. It is difficult for me to say whether the government had foreseen these developments but very few outside the government appear to have done so.”\textsuperscript{163}
\end{quote}

Indians failed to foresee the strict power politics calculations of the United States. The shared values of democracy should outweigh any strategic actions. This reflects well these authors’ views on the role of democratic states in the world, what it means to be a democracy in the international system. Furthermore, the United States’ role as a world superpower endowed it with a special responsibility. Strong states need to respect the sovereignty and political desires of those in weaker states.

Another author sums up my conclusions from this dataset well. He writes,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{162} \textit{Times of India}, December 27, 1971
\footnote{163} \textit{Times of India}, September 10, 1971
\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
“The friendship and mutual respect between the peoples of India and the U.S.A. are in jeopardy today. During the days when we were struggling for freedom, the U.S.A., which was once itself a colony, sympathized with our struggle. Indians had always identified America with freedom and democracy. But, alas, that image has changed.”

American actions are causing a reevaluation of Indo-US relations and damaging its image of a supporter of freedom in the world, thus shaping future relations with the United States.

**Strategic Culture**

While Nehruvian moralism found a place in many of my authors’ writings, we still see evidence of a strategic culture. Many authors make reference to the distribution of power in Asia, and India’s position in this list. Realpolitik is recognized as a reality in the world system in this author’s statement: "India, too, will have to learn to live with deliberate misrepresentation of its policies as it takes its legitimate place in the region and the world."  

Table 2

**Coding Results 1971-Hegemonic Ideas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Paragraphs</th>
<th>Strategic Culture</th>
<th>Nehruvianism Pos.</th>
<th>Nehruvianism Neg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>796</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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164 *Times of India*, December 15, 1971

165 *Times of India*, 12/29/1971
However, typically statements on strategic culture were tinged with cynicism, as the statement above. The overall attitude is one of disgust with the emerging realities of the world system. While strategic realities are recognized, these statements were far less prescriptive. Furthermore, these statements do not as strongly represent “strategic culture”, as defined by Singh and operationalized for this test.

1998

The data for my second case shows a drastic decrease in statements of high expectations for the United States and a marked qualitative difference in statements about strategic culture. Discourse on the role of democratic states in the international system is negligible while statements on strategic culture, as operationalized in my test, reflect a new definition of the role of major powers in the international system.

*Expectations and Images of the United States*

In this case, we still see a large number of negative statements about the United States, but the statements are qualitatively different as they are devoid of any major positive expectations for the US. The lack of statements expressing high expectations for the United States is very telling. Out of 24 statements containing expectations for the United States, only 3 are positive.
Table 3

Coding Results 1998-United States

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>862</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in the 1971 case, it may seem fairly predictable that the authors in my second case made many negative statements about the United States. The US had imposed sanctions against India after many heated discussions on the unfair nature of ‘nuclear apartheid’. Interestingly though, in this case many authors recognized the likelihood of sanctions being placed on India and Pakistan, while Pakistan would eventually be relieved because of the sorry state of its economy. These statements were typically presented matter-of-factly, reflecting a lack of high expectations for fair US actions. One editorial on May 18, 1998 recognizes the likelihood of sanctions being lifted off of Pakistan in an attempt to keep its government from falling. This, of course, would necessitate a change in American domestic law, but is likely to happen nonetheless. The statement is matter-of-fact in its recognition of double standards for Pakistan and India.\footnote{Times of India, 5/18/1998}

Even more interesting is the general lack of statements of expectations for the United States. If expectations were referenced, they were typically negative. This is interesting if we consider Weldes. To Weldes, the “dogs that do not bark” become interesting because they tell us about what is outside of the subject’s range of
thinkability. The role of the United States as a democracy is not discussed by these authors. The authors simply do not hold high expectations for the US in this time period.

Prior to India’s nuclear weapons tests, there was much debate about the predicted international reaction to Indian nuclear weapons tests. While some argued for nuclear weapons tests and some against, the authors agreed that the system was not set up with fairness in mind. Praful Bidwai makes an interesting comment about the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by democracies, claiming no one should hold high expectations for these states. He says, “those who exaggerate the danger of WMDs falling into “terrorists” hands end up legitimizing their possession by “democracies”.

However, the only state that has ever used nuclear weapons is “democratic” America—an act of massive terrorism.”

This is also a good example of how a negative statement about the United States in this time period could be very aggressive yet not carry with it any expectation for change. The system is set up to favor the five major nuclear powers. Shared democracy means nothing for the authors.

After India performed the nuclear weapons test at Pokhran and the United States signed sanctions into law, many negative statements were predictably made about the US. But again, the authors carried no major expectations for the US. One editorial made this perfectly clear in the first sentence just days after the tests. The author writes, “Given the hypocrisy which governs US policy on nuclear matters, the imposition of limited

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167 *Times of India*, 2/24/1998
sanctions against India was only to be expected.” Another author makes an even more telling statement:

“While the US reaction to India’s tests has been along predictable lines, it is galling for India to be hectored by countries like Japan and Australia, which helped to legitimize the cult of nuclear weapons by extending the NPT indefinitely and availing of the comfort provided by the security blanket of the US.”

Comparing the 1971 case to the 1998 case, we see a drastic decrease in the expectations held for the United States. Democracy was not a unifying factor for these authors as it was for authors in my 1971 case.

**Strategic Culture**

We see an overall increase in the number of statements reflecting strategic culture. But again, we see a qualitative difference in these phrases. Unlike the 1971 case, they were backed less by an attitude of unfairness in the world system and more by matter-of-fact calculations about the realities of power in the international system. Rasgotra, for example, simply claims that “the single most important lesson of India’s history is: defense preparedness is the key to independence, peace, and security.” This is prescriptive in the article.

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168 *Times of India*, 5/14/1998
Table 4

Coding Results 1998-Hegemonic Ideas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Paragraphs</th>
<th>Strategic Culture</th>
<th>Nehruvianism Pos.</th>
<th>Nehruvianism Neg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>862</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can see a change in the definition of the role of power in the international system for many more of the authors in this case. The currency of power is defined differently by these authors. Authors made multiple references to material might as a path to power in the international system. K. Subrahmanyam, a major proponent of strategic culture as Singh defines it, makes a blunt statement about the need of a missile test to boost India’s confidence. He says, “India needs an Agni test to build up the bruised confidence of its people. A nation lacking in confidence cannot engage in confidence building with others.”\(^{171}\) He implies that a proud Indian people need material forces to realize their role in the international order. Material forces will build confidence. This is a far cry from the former pride in non-alignment and non-violence. Similarly, an April 29 editorial claims that, “By arming itself with nuclear weapons and missiles, (China) has become an effective participant in international decision-making on strategic matters.”\(^{172}\) This statement was made as a path for India to follow.

Looking at the numbers on Nehruvianism, we can see that this hegemonic idea maintains a large presence. Most of these statements were critical of the government’s decision to test a nuclear weapon, reflecting Nehruvian nuclear weapons policy.

\(^{171}\) *Times of India*, 4/9/1998

\(^{172}\) *Times of India*, 4/29/1998
However, the statements were largely critical of the nuclear weapons test because of the lack of security they provide. Yes India should not have nuclear weapons for moral reasons. But more so, India does not need nuclear weapons because of the strategic realities they place on states.

Strategic culture, as defined by Singh, does increase between time one and time two. However, we cannot declare that this represents a hegemonic discourse in India at this time. While the idea may have taken hold at the government level, it did not pick up as much support at the popular level. However, we can see many strategic calculations even in Nehruvian statements. Moralism is present, but takes on a different form.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

I have shown how Indian public perceptions of the United States have changed, carrying fewer expectations for the United States as a fellow democracy and a new understanding of the world system as one defined by power politics. The moralism of the Nehruvian era has largely been challenged by an increased call for engagement in the world in the form of realpolitik and military preparedness. While it cannot be said that strategic culture has completely replaced Nehruvianism as the hegemonic ideology informing Indian foreign policy, we can see how it has had an impact on public debate. Furthermore, we can see a qualitative difference in Nehruvian statements, reflecting a higher understanding of power politics.

In the end, the real force behind strategic culture may have been concentrated in the BJP-led government. But we cannot deny the importance of the fact that the BJP actually maintained government control long after the nuclear weapons tests and two potential conflicts with Pakistan. The Indian public was not so interested in reeling in the strategic culture elements of the party. A new understanding of the role of major powers and India’s role as a major power has emerged.

I have described a change in Indian public perceptions of both the United States and India’s role in the world. I have theorized that this change explains a change in Indian foreign policy to the United States. However, more work will need to be done to explain the process of change. Wendt dedicates many pages to a theory on the process of change in the international system. He outlines a theory of socialization in which states learn how to act within a particular logic of anarchy. I cannot capture these changes in
identities and interests with my current data set. I will need to expand this data set to capture hegemonic ideas in transition.

My initial findings are crucial for the progression of this research project. If we would not have seen a change in hegemonic ideas, we would not be able to give weight to a constructivist account. Looking at socialization would be useless. Showing a change is the first step towards a research project to explain change in the international system.
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