SOLVING ALLIANCE COHESION:
NATO COHESION AFTER THE COLD WAR

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Abstract

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Why does NATO remain a cohesive alliance in the post-Cold War era? This question, which has bewildered international relations scholars for years, can tell us a lot about institutional dynamics of alliances. Since traditional alliance theory indicates alliances form to counter threat or power, it is challenging to understand how and why NATO continues to exist after its founding threat and power – communism and the USSR – no longer exist. The fluctuation of cohesion in NATO since the end of the Cold War will be examined to determine how cohesion is forged and maintained. To achieve this, alliance theories will be fused into a clear and understandable model to measure cohesion.

Approved: _____________________________

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Introduction

What causes the high level of cohesion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? Fifty-seven years have passed since NATO’s founding, making it the longest serving military alliance of its size in history. Sixteen years have also passed since the end of the Cold War, which makes NATO’s overall purpose not nearly as clear as it had been for decades. Since 1991, the alliance’s membership has expanded significantly, as well as its armed role in military conflicts, with the use of NATO forces in Afghanistan being the most recent example. Yet the current war and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan has made intra-alliance tension reach new heights. Therefore, the question of what causes cohesion in an alliance is becoming ever more important.

In recent decades, numerous international relations scholars falsely predicted NATO’s downfall, while the father of neorealism Kenneth Waltz maintains that NATO’s years are numbered.\(^1\) So then, how long can we expect NATO to continue to serve its allies at contemporary levels and to persist as an important and active alliance? In order to understand the alliance’s present level of cohesion, it is essential to understand the dynamics of alliance cohesion. This essay will focus on the question of how to determine the level of alliance cohesion in order to comprehend the behavior of NATO and alliances in general.

To comprehend accurately and comprehensively what the mechanisms are that hold alliances together, it is imperative to first understand alliance behavior, including alliance formation and disintegration. In Chapter 1, these concepts will be reviewed and

will be followed with analysis of alliance cohesion and corresponding literature. Chapter 2 explains how a different perspective of alliance cohesion will be offered, which closely incorporates Patricia Weitsman’s cohesion theory in Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. A methodology and research design will be offered that explain how the case study in Chapter 3 will carried out. The case study in Chapter 3 will include an assessment of NATO cohesion from 1991 – 2005 which will be offered in three five-year increments. The case study will review NATO policies and initiatives by focusing on how threat affects alliance cohesion. Importantly, internal as well as external dyads will be reviewed to present a full review of alliance activity and perspectives. Chapter 4 follows with a review of how other theoretical perspectives on NATO cohesion contribute to understanding the alliance’s behavior. Chapter 5 looks at the state of cohesion in NATO and how cohesion will likely change in the near future. Lastly, Chapter 6 will explain the importance of alliance cohesion study.
Chapter 1: Alliance Theory

Part 1: Alliances in the Context of International Relations Theory

Part 1.1: Alliances in International Relations and International Relations in Alliances

A military alliance is a form of international organization that groups various state-level agreements, institutions, and organizations together. There are different types of alliances, which all have many distinguishing features. One thing they all have in common is that they have been and are still a fundamental component of world politics. Alliances have helped states go to war, provide for their own security, and even open the doors to peace. Therefore, to have a clear understanding of international politics and the international system, it is vital to know how alliances work. Although each one is unique, there are distinguishable patterns that emerge. It is from this basis that alliance theory has developed into a growing and advanced sub-field of international relations.

Within the international system, alliance theory shows that alliances play important roles in international relations and vice-versa. Alliances can help manage and foster transparent relations among members and non-members, while making the international system more predictable and stable. On the other hand, alliances can also be dangerous to members and non-members. With World War I as a classic example, alliances can foster unpredictability, paranoia, and ultimately war. Even the forefathers of the United States – George Washington and Thomas Jefferson – warned of “permanent” and “entangling” alliances that could jeopardize national security. Other features of alliances include the ability to serve as power concentrations in the
international system, legitimize sovereignty of members, band states with common goals together, and even to define world poles of power, as NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) did during the Cold War. Alliances can also be viewed as stimulants for achieving international insecurity – or just the opposite. One argument purports that alliances breed counter-alliances, which can extinguish security benefits,\(^2\) while another maintains that the more alliances appear threatening to each other, the greater the chance that opposing alliances will form.\(^3\)

An international relations scholar, George Liska, maintains that alliances are an integral part of international relations, and in fact, “It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name”\(^4\). Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan concur with this idea by stating, “alliances are apparently a universal component of relations between political units”\(^5\). Since alliances are woven into the fabric of world politics, it is important to understand how they work and what holds them together or pulls them apart.

While alliances certainly shape international relations, international relations produce effects on alliances as well. Some argue that the structure of the international system plays an important part in producing alliance agreements, including defining the type of alliance and the predominate roles. Additionally, different combinations of power concentrations and types of polarity may influence the formation and disintegration of


alliances. The multipolar world leading up to World War I is often cited as an example of how states can use alliances to forge low to high-level commitment agreements with other states with the intention of maximizing power or security. Moreover, the Cold War era demonstrates how a clear division of polarity in the world (a bipolar system) can coincide with the emergence of large and strong alliances to counter each other.

However, it is important to consider that alliances are never necessarily the lone cause or determinant of the structure of world power or the frequency, type, or duration of war or peace. In fact, alliances may not prevent or promote war or peace at all; instead, they merely serve as tools for states to manage relations.⁶

**Part 1.2: Alliances and Neorealism**

A vast amount of alliance literature was written during the Cold War, an era in which the realist school of thought dominated the field. As a result, most literature during this period was written using a realist framework, in which power between states in the world system is focused on. Although realism is still prevalent, there are now many other schools, including institutionalism and constructivism, that are also very important.

One of the first major studies of contemporary alliance theory among realists is Kenneth Waltz’s classic book *Theory of International Politics*. In the book, he builds off Hans Morgenthau’s theory of realism to explain that alliances form by states to balance against power. Waltz’s overall approach to international relations holds that the international system consists of two structural parts. First, there is an overarching

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structure, and second, there are interacting units within the structure. This systemic approach reduces international politics down to the sum of its parts.

Within a systemic approach to understanding international relations, neorealism argues that states are the principle units within the system and tend to act rationally. The theory also assumes the international system is anarchic and decentralized.\(^7\) Because the system lacks a hierarchical order, neorealists seek to understand the relationship between state actors and the abstract international system. Waltz considers the system to always maintain a blank frame that units in the world operate within. He also considers the domestic unit to be defined based on the principle of which it is ordered, by the specifications of intrastate functions, and by the distribution of capabilities within the operating units of a state.\(^8\) This means that among and within every state there is a power structure arrangement where power is distributed among institutions and organizations in which capabilities are located.\(^9\)

As a result of the arrangement, Waltz states that between units and the system, states resort to self-help behavior due to anarchic constraints.\(^10\) Moreover, states will always remain as similar\(^11\) and related units unless the entire system becomes anarchic and unordered.\(^12\) However, Waltz does not claim that states are the only units within the system. Instead, he says they are simply the most major, principal, and important. While

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\(^8\) Ibid. P. 82.
\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^10\) Ibid. P. 91.
\(^11\) By “similar”, Waltz means that states “are alike in the tasks that they face, though not in their abilities to perform them. The differences are of capability, not of function” (1979, P. 96).
there are other important units in the world, such as alliances, none of these or any other
will replace states in the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{13}

Importantly, Waltz claims that the nature of the anarchic international system is
always a state of war. While he also believes the hierarchic state system is also a state of
war, what separate the two realms are the respective systemic structures. In the typical
national system, the state exercises legitimacy on the public use of force over private use
of force. As a result, few nationals feel the need to rely on individual protection. This
type of system is not a self-help system because the state always offers a public-help
system: police and military forces. However, the international system is a self-help
system because there are no legitimate world police or military forces that ensure national
security.

Concerning the behavior of states in the self-help international system, Waltz
believes that a security dilemma exists, in that states view gains relative to that of
others.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, Waltz views the international system as a zero-sum game. Consequently,
this is how Waltz sees international cooperation impeded.

Specifically regarding alliances, Waltz views them as tools states use to maximize
power relative to that of others, even others in the same alliance. His theory of
neorealism assumes that alliances are not autonomous political actors because it is states
that created them, it is states that largely provide the staff that run them, and it is states’
national interests that dictate the direction of the alliance. In fact, the realist Glenn
Snyder writes that “alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which

\textsuperscript{13} Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesely Publishing Company: Reading.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. P. 106.
they are a response”\textsuperscript{15}. Kenneth Waltz adds that while an alliance’s own bureaucracy can strengthen its longevity, it is state members of the alliance that ultimately determines its fate.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, alliances are sometimes “created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests”\textsuperscript{17}. Waltz’s understanding of alliances indicates that they are primarily a network of interests, in which states, and sometimes primarily the most powerful state, have primary control over the alliance’s formation, longevity, and disintegration. This is not to say that institutional features of alliances cannot exist, instead, even when they do exist their independent effect is minimal.

In 1985, Stephen Walt built off this theory by explaining why states actually balance against threats, not simply powers. He claims that the Waltzian balance of power approach is flawed because “it ignores the other factors that statesmen will consider when identifying potential threats and prospective allies. Although power is an important factor in their calculations, it is not the only one”\textsuperscript{18}. Walt goes on to explain that “it is more accurate to say that states will ally with or against the most threatening power”\textsuperscript{19}. This means that Waltz’s conception of power balancing is not entirely invalid, it just misses an important dimension. For example, during the Cold War, did the U.S. view France or Great Britain as threats? Both of the countries have a colonial history, both possess vast nuclear weapons programs, and both have substantial standing armies. Despite their great power capability, the U.S. did not balance against these powers;

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. P. 9.
instead, it largely balanced with them against others. Therefore, if states balance against powers alone, does that not mean that they will do so irrespective of perception of threat? Walt claims that this is a key reason why much of realist thought on power balancing is incomplete.

In the next decade, Randall Schweller twisted the logic around again to claim that states balance against *interests* through alliances. His argument adds a new dimension to the prevalent balancing-bandwagoning debate. Schweller explains that “all sides in the debate have mistakenly assumed that bandwagoning and balancing are opposite behaviors motivated by the same goal: to achieve greater security. As a result, the concept of bandwagoning has been defined so narrowly—as giving in to threats—as if it were simply the opposite of balancing”\(^\text{20}\). This means that the causal understandings scholars have had of state behavior pertaining to balancing and bandwagoning may be incomplete. Furthermore, Schweller adds that “In practice, however, states have very different reasons to choose balancing or bandwagoning. The aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted. Simply put, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain. The presence of a significant external threat, while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to bandwagon.”\(^\text{21}\)

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\(^{21}\) Ibid. P. 75.
**Part 1.3: Alliances and Institutionalism**

During the final phase of the Cold War, a new approach to international relations – institutionalism – became a prevalent method to conceive of international relations. Institutionalism is largely founded by Robert Keohane, whose multiple works on the approach have inspired new areas of interest in the field. John Duffield, Stephen Krasner, Robert McCalla, and Celeste Wallander also provide important contributions to the institutionalist framework for international relations and alliance theory. Where institutionalism diverges with realism over alliances is on the role of institutions (examples of institutions are alliances, international organizations, or even norms like non-proliferation). Keohane emphasizes that institutions have a significant effect in world politics. He states that institutions provide a favorable environment for international cooperation and that institutions explain the high level of contemporary globalization.

Both institutionalism and realism view the international system as anarchic. They also view states as the primary actors in the international system. Both theories consider states as rational actors and claim that they resort to self-help actions in response to the systemic restraints on their security. Neoliberal institutionalism therefore is also a systemic theory in that it considers the international system to be the main determinant of state behavior.
Keohane defines institution as persistent and connected sets of rules, often affiliated with organizations, that operate across international boundaries.\textsuperscript{22} It is among these institutions that international cooperation takes place, whether it is by means of military alliances, economic unions, cultural practices, norms, or even ideologies.\textsuperscript{23} Keohane defines cooperation as a requirement of “the actions of separate individuals or organizations – which are not in pre-existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination”\textsuperscript{24}. He claims that when cooperation takes place, each unit involved changes its behavior “contingent on changes in the other’s behavior”\textsuperscript{25}. In regard to the rationality of states in the international system, Keohane states that realists focus too much on “gloomy deterministic conclusions about the inevitability of warfare” and that it can instead be used to explore roots of international cooperation.\textsuperscript{26}

The concept of relative versus absolute gains is also viewed different among institutionalists. Keohane states that two issues are more significant over the two types of gains: “1) the conditions under which relative gains are important; and 2) the role of institutions when distributional issues are significant—that is, when relative gains are at stake”\textsuperscript{27}. This means that one must look deeper into the conditions under which relative gains are important and whether or not prospects for achieving absolute gains (which

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{23} Ibid. P. 380-1.
\bibitem{26} Ibid. P 381.
\end{thebibliography}
institutionalists believe are attainable) are real. Keohane examines how the roles of institutions are significant when units in the system consider the importance of relative gains in certain situations. He writes that states “often worry about the potential for others to cheat, as in the Prisoners’ Dilemma” as well as the potential for unequal cooperative gains. Because of this, institutions are often employed to ensure equal or fair distribution and to prevent conflicts of interest in the process.

Keohane also claims that institutionalism accounts for both the “creation of institutions and their effects” and that institutions are created by states because of their anticipated effects on patterns of behavior. Along with the “shadow of the future” effect, institutions also enhance cooperation by establishing a mutuality of interests and revealing the number of parties involved. This means that when states create institutions they do so because they have a good idea of what effects the institution will have on the issue at hand, to develop common interests, and to make the environment more transparent. Axelrod and Keohane write that “the greater the conflict of interest between the players, the greater the likelihood the players would in fact choose to defect.” Therefore, by achieving a mutuality of interests through institutions, defection (as illustrated in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game theory) would be limited while cooperation would be maximized. Additionally, in regard to “revealing the number of parties involved”, it is important that actors clearly see who is an ally, who is an

29 Ibid. P. 45.
30 Ibid. P. 46.
32 Ibid. P. 87.
adversary, and who is neutral in order to enhance cooperation. This reduces fear and mistrust, and therefore yields confidence and trust.

Regarding security institutions, the sustained existence of the institutions depends on “whether its assets – its norms, rules, and procedures – are specific of general, and whether its mix of assets matches the kinds of security problems faced by its members”\(^{33}\). Therefore security-oriented institutions persist not only when the same reason they were created for continues to persist, but also when the internal nature of the institution is able to structurally and effectively adapt to the constantly changing environment.

In sum, institutionalism pays attention to the roles of institutions on state behavior. Institutions are the components that help foster cooperation in the self-help system which otherwise lacks a vehicle for doing so. Neoliberal institutionalism does not disregard important neorealist theoretic assumptions; instead, the theory claims to have improved an overall theory of international politics which takes into account tenets of both realism and liberalism. As a result, institutionalists tend to view the international system as an environment that is capable of attaining high levels of cooperation.

According to the theory, alliances are seen as security management institutions.\(^{34}\) A prime reason for this is based on the high amount of cooperation that institutions can provide states. Cooperation concerning international security is considered to be evident often, such as during peacemaking, ceasefires, economic agreements, or non-proliferation agreements. The theory affirms that a capability exists for absolute gains in the international system, even in the security realm, and considers the role of institutions in

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\(^{34}\) Ibid. P. 705.
absolute and relative gains fundamental. Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander elaborate by stating, “security issues often generate common interests in coping with threats such as preventing military attack, or in controlling risks such as those involved in nuclear proliferation or regional conflict and instability”\(^{35}\). Haftendorn et al also emphasize the ability of institutions to foster certainty to states.\(^{36}\) This is achieved by developing “norms and rules that regularize the behavior of states belonging to them, making it more predictable”\(^{37}\). Based on this understanding, institutions have the capability to ensure fair and equal comprises which can prevent conflict or war, all the while increasing certainty and stability.

**Part 1.4: Traditional and Modern Conceptions of Alliances**

One roadblock to studying alliance theory is that contemporary alliances are often far different than alliances of the early twentieth century and definitely different than those of several centuries ago. Is it really fair to compare the U.S. – French alliance of the 1700s to the U.S. – French alliance in NATO of the 2000s? This is especially difficult because alliances of a century ago “consisted of a small number of states of comparable capability. Their contributions to one another’s security were of crucial importance because they were of similar size. Because major allies were closely interdependent militarily, the defection of one would have made its partners vulnerable to a competing alliance.”\(^{38}\) Classic examples of the different types of alliances are pre-


\(^{36}\) Ibid. P. 4.

\(^{37}\) Ibid.

World War I alliances as opposed to the Cold War bipolar NATO and WTO alliances. Moreover, the contemporary notion of the U.S. providing security to virtually all liberal democratic countries in the ‘free-world’ is quite new, and cannot even be accurately compared to past policies of colonial or imperial powers.

What the differences in time over alliances reduce down to is state-level partnerships and recognition. Today the U.S. and Saudi Arabia may not be part of any official alliance, but they still have a special diplomatic and economic relationship that promotes bilateral cooperation and recognition. Whether or not an interstate relationship formally takes place under an alliance, bilateral and multilateral partnerships have defined international relations for centuries. Therefore, there are ways to connect the writings of Thucydides and Sun Tzu to the work of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt. The same can be said regarding the history of world power. How can we know if bipolarity brought forth NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization if a bipolar distribution of world power has never existed before? One way is to reduce polarity to concentrations of power. Therefore, by reducing modern concepts to their fundamental definition, we can compare more historical facts and data to allow us to understand how the international system works.

The definitions of alliance and alliance cohesion used are ones applicable with past research on the subject. For alliances, the definition used will be from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project, which serves as a central database for data on alliances. The definition they use is: *a formal agreement among independent states to
cooperate militarily in the face of potential or realized military conflict.\textsuperscript{39} The definition therefore excludes other forms of informal or unofficial alliances, such as coalitions and aligned nations. Ultimately, it is important to broaden the understanding of alliance cohesion to unofficial alliances, but for the purposes of this thesis, only formal alliances will be examined.

For alliance cohesion, a central definition is not very clear. One alliance scholar, Fred Chernoff, argues that alliance cohesion is based upon the distance between individual member interests and the collective alliance interest,\textsuperscript{40} whereas Stephen Walt describes it as alliance duration. Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan describe alliance cohesion as the ability of member states to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends.\textsuperscript{41} Patricia Weitsman also uses this definition in her recent book on alliance cohesion, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Weitsman mentions that the degree to which an alliance is cohesive “will be manifest in the degree to which member states agree over how to proceed, particularly during moments of crisis”.\textsuperscript{42} Therefore, alliance cohesion can most accurately be measured when the alliance faces significant conflicts. During time periods when an alliance does not face conflicts, however, it is very difficult to determine cohesion. She specifies that during wartime conflicts, alliance cohesion is

determined “in regard to the states’ coordination of military strategy, their agreement on war aims, and their prevention of a separate peace”\(^{43}\).

While Weitsman presents a clear definition of cohesion, she does not present clear definitions of low cohesion, moderate cohesion, or high cohesion. It is up to the individual measuring cohesion to qualitatively assess the degree to which an alliance’s behavior and activity satisfy the definition of cohesion.

**Part 1.5: Alliance Formation**

One of the first areas of alliance theory that scholars focused on in recent times is alliance formation. Ever since alliances plunged the world into World War I in the early twentieth century, it has been increasingly important to discover the causal mechanisms behind the formation of alliances.

In *Nations in Alliances: the Limits of Interdependence*, George Liska considers alliances and alignment (informal and unofficial alliances) as the same thing. He mentions that unity and a sense of community (common identities) can help alliances stay cohesive, but rarely play a role in alliance formation. Liska also points out that many theories on alliance formation ignore the fundamental basis why alliances are formed in the first place. He maintains that states enter into alliances to form a partnership or to simply supplement each other’s power capability. This is the classic realist understanding of alliance formation. However, Liska also states that alliances also can serve as means of reducing threatening political pressure. These two points represent balancing and bandwagoning. Liska describes a powerful-less powerful component of

alliance relationships, in which alliances are used to manage relationships between states of distinct power statuses.

Lastly, Liska considers balance of power shifts in the international system that results in the formation of alliances as an origin of conflicts. This means that an important aspect of alliance formation is the necessity of a security conflict somewhere in the system or even within the state to spur state actors to form alliances in an attempt to resolve the conflict. The ultimate goal of members of alliances, therefore, is to “achieve the best possible results within the limits of economy.”

In Stephen Walt’s article “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” he outlines various theories on alliance formation to explain a bigger picture. The first theory, balancing, is defined as allying in opposition to the principal source of danger. To balance, states “join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat.” Walt identifies two reasons why states choose to balance. First, states join together with other less or non-threatening allies to curb the potential of a greater enemy. The second reason states balance is because it provides a better place for the state to control the alliance or coalition, whereas bandwagoning to a greater power does not give the state as much say in the direction of the alliance.

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45 The content of “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power” is also present in Walt’s book published three years later, The Origins of Alliances (1987).
The second theory, bandwagoning, is defined as *allying with the state that poses the major threat*.\(^{48}\) Walt mentions two reasons why states choose to engage bandwagoning. First, it is a form of appeasement. States sometimes are put into positions in which bandwagoning to the source of a threat will provide them more security than to risk balancing with others against the threatening power. The second reason is because, during war time, states can foresee which side will be victorious. Therefore, states will bandwagon to the threatening power because it will be the winning power. As such, the state will then be able to “share the spoils of victory.”\(^{49}\)

Walt’s emphasis regarding the balance-bandwagon debate is that states do not solely view alliance policy in terms of power. Instead, by focusing on power, states actually focus on threats. He also mentions that “Because balancing and bandwagoning are more accurately viewed as a response to threats, it is important to consider all the factors that will affect the level of threat that states may pose.”\(^{50}\) He lists four factors that come into play when a state determines the level of threat emanating from another state: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions.

Based on Walt’s analysis of balancing and bandwagoning, he states that balancing occurs far more frequently than bandwagoning. Therefore the main cause of alliance formation is states aiming to counter the threat of a powerful state(s) by banding together with others that share the same intention. This is not to say that alliances never form out of bandwagoning behaviors, they just do so less frequently.

\(^{49}\) Ibid. P. 8.
\(^{50}\) Ibid. P. 9.
Contrasted to the balance-of-power alliance behavior, Walt mentions that some believe a cause behind alignment is shared ideologies. This concept is based on the idea that political or cultural traits can bring states together. He cites remarks by foreign leaders that mention destiny, nature, democracy, and even Christian brotherhood as bases for alignment.\textsuperscript{51} However, some occurrences of this idea may be attributable to secondary factors.\textsuperscript{52}

Another dimension to this is the importance of cross-national ideological solidarity in alliance formation. There have been many international movements, such as communism, pan-Arabism, and Rastafarianism. These ideological networks can provide incentives and motivation to ally with states in an ideological group. Walt considers the significance of this concept and draws important conclusions. To begin, states are \textit{more likely to follow their ideological preferences when they are already fairly secure}. This means that when a secure state is in a position to support a similar state, it will more likely do so if that state is already secure. In other words, states are ‘pickier’ when they are secure than when they are not. Therefore, “security considerations take precedent over ideological preferences, and ideologically based alliances are unlikely to survive when more pragmatic interests intrude”\textsuperscript{53}.

Walt also identifies political tools states use to gain allies. It is important to understand this because tools can play a role in initiating and crafting alliance

\textsuperscript{52} For example, perhaps close geographic proximity makes it easy for states to ally, but pointing out this type of factor tells us nothing about \textit{why} alliances form. While it may be true that states tend to ally with states geographically close by, that still does not tell us why, of all the states nearby, a state chooses to ally with one over the other.
agreements. The tools he focuses on are bribery and penetration. For bribery, he refers to foreign economic and military assistance. He cites examples of states providing arms or economic aid to others in hope of establishing “significant leverage over the recipient”. Therefore, there are historic examples of formal and informal alliances forming in the context of foreign aid exchange. Walt, however, calls the idea that ‘aid creates allies’ as erroneous and simplistic. Instead, he mentions that “a large aid relationship is more often the result of alignment than a cause of it” and therefore it is “more appropriate to consider the conditions under which the use of military or economic assistance will have powerful independent effects on the recipients conduct”.

The second tool Walt mentions is penetration. For this, he refers to political penetration, which means the covert or indirect manipulation of one state’s political system by another. This takes many forms, including diplomats attempting to bring their own country close with another, cross-national lobbying organizations seeking to alter national policies, or even foreign propaganda used to sway another state’s public opinion. Political penetration may be able to influence or sway a state into forming an alliance. Just as with bribery, Walt cites historic examples of how states have pressured other states into forming alliances. However, he claims that penetration has a very limited effect of alliance formation. When it does have a significant effect, societies are often open, and foundations for prospective relationship are often already conducive.

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55 Ibid. P. 28.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid. P. 31.
Therefore, penetration does not really provide a *cause* for alliance formation; instead, it mostly serves as an outlet for states in forming alliances.

While Walt’s balance-of-threat theory provides an important contribution to the understanding of alliance formation, others have sought to refine his theory. Randall Schweller argues that the bandwagoning-balancing debate is inaccurately understood as consisting of two opposite alliance behaviors. Instead, he argues that alliance behavior can be better understood as a balance-of-interests, in that both balancing and bandwagoning behaviors are “motivated by the same goal: to achieve greater security”\(^58\).

Moreover, the concept of bandwagoning has also been too defined, and as a result, we are left to assume that bandwagoning behavior means strictly giving in to threats. Alternatively, Schweller writes that “The aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted”\(^59\).

**Part 1.6: Alliance Disintegration**

Since the end of the Cold War, the continued persistence of NATO has caused many to wonder what the causal mechanism is that drives alliances. Alliance disintegration is therefore a much newer area of study than alliance formation. Moreover, much of the contemporary literature is geared around NATO’s longevity and not the abstract notion of alliance disintegration.

In *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies*, Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan discuss the various theories of alliance

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\(^{59}\) Ibid.
disintegration. The authors mention that balance of power theorists maintain that “Alliances that endure without change over significant periods of time merely introduce rigidities into the international system, with the result that they are a source of instability in the long run”\(^{60}\). This means that, to some, persisting alliances are seen as institutional roadblocks that lead to instability. Therefore, the advantages of alliances persisting in peacetime do not outweigh the destabilizing disadvantages. This would then account for the trend of alliances dissolving after their primary utility ends.

Holsti et al also consider the role of nuclear weapons in alliance disintegration. Do nuclear weapons remove the need to maintain alliances? Can states have a self-sufficient nuclear-based national security policy? These were important questions at the beginning of the Cold War, but are not any more because history shows us that nuclear weapons cannot absolutely guarantee security, even for states under a so-called ‘nuclear umbrella’. Threats can emanate from outside adversarial states. Even among such states, such as the Taliban Afghanistan, a prospective war with a nuclear power – the U.S. – did not worry the Taliban because they knew nuclear weapons would not be used. From the opposite scenario, a war between a larger power and smaller nuclear power that does not involve nuclear warfare is also a realistic scenario. There are likely contingency plans for war between the U.S. and North Korea where no nuclear warfare occurs.

Another noteworthy hypothesis that Holsti et al mention is whether or not the threat of nuclear war depletes rationale for alignment. Is it in any country’s interest to put its life on the line for another country? From the outset, it appears that states do see it

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in their interest to align with others in the midst of a nuclear threat. However, there has never been an occurrence of nuclear war during or after the Cold War, so perhaps there is such a faith in deterrence that no state ever honestly feels like it is putting its life on the line for others. U.S. – Taiwan relations are a perfect example. U.S. policy on Taiwan has included that it will protect Taiwan in case of an invasion from the mainland. But how genuine is that promise? How can we really know how strong alliance commitments are over a nuclear threat if no nuclear weapon has even been used since World War II?

Holsti et al also discuss whether attributes of alliances provide insight into alliance disintegration trends. Some propositions relating to alliance attributes involve the variables: size, structure, purposes, and ideology.\(^{61}\) Regarding the size attribute, some consider alliance size to reflect the minimum commitment to win.\(^{62}\) In other words, an alliance will only be as large (number of members and degree of cooperation) as needed to win. If an alliance exceeds a ‘minimum winning coalition’, then the utility of the alliance will not be beneficial enough to extend the alliance’s duration. Concerning the structure attribute of alliances, Holsti et al mention that some believe the more (in number or significance) an alliance forms intra-alignment coalitions, the more likely that it will disintegrate.\(^{63}\)

Regarding the purposes of alliances, the authors point out that there is evidence to support the notion that offensive alliances are prone to disintegration more than defensive

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ones. However, at the same time, others have explained how defensive alliances endure not as long than offensive alliances. These findings are somewhat contradictory and signify how many contradictions and lack of clarity there is about the reasons why alliances disintegrate. Lastly, Holsti et al mention that some point to the political structure to understand alliance disintegration. For example, Jacob and Teune claim that alliance structures that are managed by authoritarian actors will disintegrate due to frustration over less-powerful members’ inability to exercise power over the alliance. Therefore, democratically managed alliances have a greater likelihood of enduring.

**Part 2: Alliance Cohesion Theory**

Building off previous work on alliance theory and contemporary international relations theory, a new area of study is emerging that broadly focuses on alliance *cohesion*. Although determining the causes of alliance formation and disintegration is important, more generally determining what causal mechanisms drive alliance cohesion is important as well. Cohesion is an often ignored and overlooked aspect of alliances. Determining what causes unity or disunity in alliances from both internal and external points of view is essential to truly understand alliance behavior. Furthermore, understanding cohesion can tell us a lot about the international system and the future of world stability.

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A contemporary and thorough look into alliance cohesion is *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* by Patricia Weitsman. This book primarily examines the internal view of alliances to see how cohesion is determined within the alliance. This perspective opens the door to the idea that alliances are not all merely tools of capability aggregation, as traditional balance of power theory suggests. Instead, alliances can have important internal management functions that allow states to manage their own threats from other alliance members. Through her theory, Weitsman describes not just what holds alliances together, but what causes their formation as well. Moreover, her theory strives to distinguish when alliances serve as tools for capability aggregation or for management purposes.

**Part 2.1: Weitsman’s Alliance Formation Theory**

Weitsman emphasizes the importance of examining alliances in a multidimensional manner. This is an important point because it is unlikely that all alliances – that vary in type, environment, and membership – form from the same underlying causes. Weitsman explains that, “In thinking about the fundamental issues of alliances – their capability aggregation purpose, balancing and bandwagoning behaviors, and management functions – it becomes clear that these different behaviors emerge under different conditions. Threat does generate each of these responses, and, more precisely, different levels of threat will result in different alliance behaviors.”

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Weitsman argues that there is a curvilinear relationship between threat level and alliance formation. When states face low levels of threat, they hedge. Hedging is a low-level commitment taken toward another state under minimal levels of threat that does not involve the obvious consequences of entering into a formal alliance. Hedging enables states to play politics with other states in maximizing their interest, without officially choosing sides. As this threat rises to a moderate level, states will shift from hedging behavior to tethering, which involves allying with an adversary. Tethering enables a state to manage relations with alliance members.

Weitsman notes that the distinctive characteristic of tethering is motivated by antipathy. Therefore, instead of acting on hostile relations by balancing or going to war, states tether by drawing closer with their enemy. This does not remove the threat, but prevents it from escalating. If, however, the threat rises substantially, states no longer rely on tethering and instead balance against their enemy by allying with others. Lastly, if the threat between the states reaches the highest level, in which a state’s sovereignty is directly threatened, then the state will cave in and bandwagon to the source of the threat. This, and the previous possible combinations, explains how threat is central in the development of commitments and alliance agreements.

**Part 2.2: Weitsman’s Alliance Cohesion Theory**

Reasons why states seek to form or join alliances provide clues for why alliances, once formed, endure in a cohesive manner or not. Weitsman emphasizes that the origin of alliances is centered on the level and source of threat. Weitsman uses similar

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framework to determine how internal alliance cohesion is determined. For the external dimension, Weitsman writes that, “If cohesion were a constant function of external threat alone, we would never expect alliances to be cohesive in the absence of an external threat”\textsuperscript{69}. This means that if threats emanating from other states or actors are the sole cause of alliance cohesion, then how is peacetime alliance cohesion explainable, where no external threats are present?

Further, Weitsman mentions that some believe not only is external threat to an alliance \textit{not} the sole cause of cohesion, but the internal dynamics of an alliance can be so institutionalized that it “transcend[s] a mere military alliance”\textsuperscript{70}. This means that an alliance can evolve into a “community of values [that] leads to mutual responsiveness”\textsuperscript{71} and exists independent of external threat – and may even serve as its only significant external threat.

Risse-Kappen posits that NATO did not form and maintain cohesion simply by countering the external Soviet threat. Instead, an institutionalized community of values among the North Atlantic nations existed before 1949, especially among NATO’s early top contributors: France, Great Britain, and the U.S. Therefore, the pre-existing “collective identity led to the threat perception, not the other way around”\textsuperscript{72}.

Weitsman responds to this idea by stating, “What the security communities argument implies is that in alliances where member states have mutual values and a sense

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. P. 32.
of loyalty, the level of internal threat is low”73. She incorporates this liberalist framework and the realist external threat argument into a theoretical model to explain alliance cohesion.

| TABLE 1.1 |
| Possible Dyadic Alliance Motivations Under Conditions of Threat |
| State A’s Motives | State B’s Motives | Characteristics of Alliance |
| Hedge | Hedge | Low commitment level; modest cohesion; low internal threat |
| Hedge | Balance | Low to moderate commitment level; limited cohesion; low internal threat |
| Hedge | Bandwagon | Low to moderate commitment level; limited cohesion; threat within alliance to State B |
| Tether | Hedge | Low commitment level’ moderate to intermediate internal threat; low cohesion |
| Tether | Tether | Variable commitment level’ low or no cohesion’ high internal threat |
| Tether | Balance | Variable commitment level, moderate internal threat, low to moderate cohesion |
| Balance | Balance | High commitment level; high cohesion; high external threat |
| Balance | Bandwagon | Variable commitment level, though probably high moderate cohesion; internal threat to B is high, external threat to A is high |

Note: For simplicity, duplicate outcomes have been dropped (e.g. Balance/Hedge and Hedge/Balance do not both appear). The Tether/Bandwagon combination drops out, since tethering is reciprocal—both sides need to be of the same approximate power level. Bandwagon/Bandwagon drops out, two states will not bandwagon with each other – bandwagoning requires capitulation of one to another. The latter state will therefore have other motives, i.e., hedging or balancing.


Ultimately, Weitsman recognizes that much of the previous work on alliance cohesion fails to understand a larger picture. She mentions that all of the alliances that have existed in the world have formed, endured, and disintegrated in varying conditions. In some, the level of external threat is high, while in others it is low. In other cases, the level of internal threat is high, and yet in other cases it is low. Past theories of alliance

cohesion cannot account for all types of alliances, nor the motivations allies have upon entering one. Instead, they create either a generalized theory or one based on conditions. To resolve past differences and to advance the study of alliance cohesion, Weitsman creates a model to account for all military alliances. She easily explains it through a two-by-two matrix (see Table 1.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.2</th>
<th>Threats and Cohesion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low internal threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low External Threat</td>
<td>Moderate or low cohesion; depends on which (internal or external) threat is higher; usually hedging alliances. In these cases, insights generated from liberalist theory will hold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High External Threat</td>
<td>Moderate to high cohesion; balancing alliances. In these cases, insights from realist theory will hold.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 1.2 shows us the hypothesized cohesion status of alliance dyads facing varying levels of internal and external threat. This means that the table describes the likely cohesion status of an alliance when such threats exist.

At low levels of external and internal threat, the dyad will face moderate to low cohesion. The cohesion level will vary based on the differences in external versus internal threat. Weitsman identifies the motivations of an alliance that fits this threat arrangement as hedging. Again, hedging is a low-level commitment taken by a state to inch closer to another state devoid of the formal agreements a traditional alliance entails.
At low levels of external and high levels of internal threat, Weitsman identifies the motivations of an alliance in this context as tethering, in which a state allies with an adversary to manage relations and prevent escalation of conflict. At high levels of external threat and low levels of internal threat, Weitsman identifies the dyadic relationship in this context as a balancing alliance. This type of alliance counters threats or power concentrations emanating from other states or alliances. Lastly, at high levels of external and internal threats, the dyadic relationship will be difficult to manage and sustain, and may resemble varying types of alliance, including tethering, balancing, or bandwagoning. Ultimately, the differences in level of external versus internal threat will be important in identifying what type of alliance it is.

The theoretical model that Weitsman offers has genuinely advanced the field of alliance theory, and more specifically, alliance cohesion theory. Her research, which is based on various alliance theories from the past, uses modern data and secondary sources. As such, it is applicable with past research and conducive for additional research. This thesis will use the theoretical model Weitsman offers to determine what insights can be generated from the NATO case study (1991 – 2006). Before doing so, a more detailed theoretical model of alliance cohesion will be offered to advance the field of alliance theory and international relations more generally.

Before Weitsman’s theoretical framework is applied to the NATO case, it is important to gather views on alliance cohesion from other scholars. This will put Weitsman’s theoretical model in perspective, while also providing new insights to incorporate into the forthcoming research design.
The next work on alliance cohesion that will be examined is George Liska’s *Nations in Alliances: the Limits of Interdependence*. Liska’s theory of alliance cohesion is not behavioral-based like Weitsman’s theory. Instead, it is based on social characteristics and stresses the ability of an alliance to endure in time and to satisfy the alliance ‘fight-the-war’ function.

In his book, he states that the main cause of alliance cohesion can be found by examining the reasons for formation and disintegration. He maintains that ideology is a central factor in determining how effective an alliance will be. On this basis, alliances are social institutions, which network states of similar ideology into an alliance of political goals. Therefore, if an alliance is loosely formed on an ideological basis, then it will likely not have a high level of cohesion.

Liska distinguishes the differences between offensive and defensive alliances as centering on ideology as well. In a defensive alliance of democracies, it is likely that it is “rich in ideological lore” and that there is heterogeneity of interest derived from the “need to transform alliances of democratic states under stress into communities of friendship among peoples”\(^\text{74}\). It is not clear what ideological lore to which Liska refers. Is it the propaganda that governments provide their people, or is it a real sense of ideology among heads of states and diplomats – i.e. the actual people involved in alliance politics? Liska also discusses the characteristics of an offensive alliance. He claims that offensive alliances of autocratic states will have cohesion defined by the lust for material

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gain. Regarding ideology, he states that the ideology of the alliance’s leading member will be evident in all member states.

Further concerning ideology, Liska maintains that alliance formation, implementation, and persistence has “ideological requirements”\(^\text{75}\) that will determine the cohesion of the alliance. For alliance formation, ideology will emphasize the mutual interests and benefits the alliance will provide in order to rally prospective and current members. In other words, ideology (such as democracy, freedom, or self-determination) will be used to ‘sell’ alliance member to prospective and current ‘clients’. Regarding alliance implementation in times of war (i.e. carrying out an alliance treaty stipulation, such as collective defense) the underlying ideology of the alliance will be what drives members to unite against the threatening enemy. Allies must perceive a rational reason and method of using the alliance to combat the enemy. However, when the alliance is implemented in times of peace, the alliance will continue to emphasize the threat emanating from the enemy. In sum, Liska asserts that ideology has a dual dynamic for alliance cohesion: external to provide legitimating reasons for staying in the alliance and internal to maintain member loyalty and perseverance.

Lastly, regarding the persistence of alliances, Liska claims that ideology too plays a role in sustaining the alliance. After an alliance has faced a common threat, the way to retain cohesion is to glorify the past with the intention to create “a moral obligation and an irrefutable political argument for perpetuating the alliance”\(^\text{76}\). This explanation reinforces the dominant theme Liska includes in the role of ideology in alliance cohesion:

\(^\text{76}\) Ibid. P. 63.
perception. The way to keep an alliance together involves 1) convincing members that entering the alliance is beneficial and necessary, 2) convincing members to remain in the alliance because external threats are still significant and for internal solidarity purposes, and 3) incorporating moral and historical obligation to the alliance. All of these points are based on the role of perception of government leaders. Therefore, the framework that Liska sees ideology tying into alliance cohesion is based on rationality and the individual level of analysis. Government leaders must see it in their rational interest to be active members of an alliance. Succeeding in this endeavor will foster the ideological basis of alliance cohesion.

Another concept that Liska identifies as playing an integral part to the cohesion of an alliance is consultation. Consultation by an alliance – or specifically by the core-member of an alliance – toward external actors and threats and toward internal member-states and threats is key to providing cohesion. If an alliance lacks a managing tool to quell disunity, then the whole internal aspect of cohesion is jeopardized. Regardless of the size of an alliance, every member wants to maximize its political influence and power over decision-making. Having multiple member states competing for the same thing can blur the purpose of the alliance to members and to the world. It can also block the idea of community and shared identity, concepts that sometimes are key to defining cohesion in alliances. Additionally, without a method to manage the internal dimension of an alliance, consensus-building and shared decision-making opportunities will be put at risk. Consultation is also important for external actors and threats to an alliance. If conflicts often arise to an alliance, then lacking a tool to manage those threats and perhaps
preventing the potential activation of alliance stipulations is very important. While some alliances do serve as power maximizing tools, others serve as management, deterrence, or bandwagoning alliances. In these cases, it is even more crucial to be able to effectively manage the common foreign policies of the alliance.

Liska also makes two other important points about alliance cohesion. First, when an alliance lacks a “single unifying conflict”\(^{77}\), the internal threat level to the alliance will escalate. This implies that when an alliance faces a common threat, internal alliance conflict is minimal, even if threats would ordinarily be high. During peacetime, an alliance faces a balance of power dilemma among members, Liska argues. When a crucial and powerful ally’s power status sharply declines during peacetime, Liska argues that this sudden intra-alliance instability will fuel dissolution. Therefore, the best strategy for an alliance in peacetime to foster cohesion is to implement a strategy that “promises to realize the security objective of the alliance”\(^{78}\). Liska adds, “Strains are less likely to deepen into disintegration when there [is] an ideological conflict with the enemy, which limit the loosening effect of both excessive success and extreme failure”\(^{79}\). This is an important point that obviously references NATO’s high cohesion during the ideology-driven Cold War.

The second point Liska argues is that the nuclear age has put alliance cohesion in a new perspective. Deterrence and second-strike capabilities, which are unique to the 1940s-on, are integral necessities of an alliance that includes nuclear-armed member


\(^{78}\) Ibid. P. 90.

\(^{79}\) Ibid.
Liska claims that when a core nuclear-armed power of an alliance is not willing to consider use of its nuclear arsenal in defense of an attacked ally, then the alliance’s cohesion and effectiveness will suffer. In other words, if an alliance’s power capability is not reliable, then neither is the commitment of member states. Liska explains this by stating, “Cohesion normally grows with the capability of the core-power to defend the lesser-allies, which capability in turn rises with the leader’s immunity to direct attack.” Therefore, the power capability and confidence in the core-power is a significant internal and external component of alliance cohesion, especially when the core-power, such as the U.S. during the Cold War, is virtually immune to direct attack.

Liska’s work, while being one of the first scholarly works focused on alliance cohesion, provides an interesting outlook on alliances. However, much of Liska’s descriptions of alliances, conflict, and cooperation reveal his traditional, offense-defense conception of alliances. Liska wrote Nations in Alliances: the Limits of Interdependence in 1962, during the early stages of the Cold War and less than two decades after World War II. As is evident in most international relations articles and books of his time, Liska maintains a realist and traditional outlook that predates both contemporary study on alliance theory and contemporary examples of international cooperation. This is not to say that Liska’s theory of alliance cohesion is outdated or inherently flawed; instead, it merely shows the perspective the work was written in.

Another early work on alliance cohesion, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies, by Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and

John Sullivan presents a realist outlook on alliance cohesion. This outlook argues that cohesion depends on *external danger* and declines as the threat to the alliance wanes. Obviously, this theory does not emphasize the internal dimension of an alliance and instead focuses on external threat perception.

Holsti et al make an important distinction between cohesion and efficacy. The definition of cohesion they use (which is the one used in this thesis) is “the ability of alliance partners to agree upon goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activities directed toward those ends”\(^81\). Their definition of efficacy, on the other hand, is “the ability of the alliance to achieve its goals”\(^82\). If alliance goals are what is include in the treaty that formed the alliance, then alliance cohesion and alliance efficacy can be far different conditions. Stipulated goals of an alliance are not always the most strategic for the alliance to follow. For example, if a rebel unit of Mexican soldiers attacked U.S. border personnel, it would likely not be strategic for NATO members to literally consider that “an armed attack against one or more [members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and


\(^{82}\) Ibid.
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. In fact, if certain members of NATO attacked Mexico in retaliation, cohesion to the alliance may weaken.

Although this example is an extreme case, there does appear to be possible scenarios in which fulfilling alliance stipulations may actually weaken the cohesion of the alliance. Holsti et al point out that “Although there are some doubts that alliance cohesion increases efficacy, most theorists agree that effective and successful alliances enjoy greater unity.” This means that while efficacy does not necessarily bring cohesion, most cohesive alliances are effective in achieving alliance goals.

Holsti et al’s approach to explaining alliance cohesion is in line with the idea that “cohesion depends upon external danger and declines as the threat is reduced.” This concept, which is similar to Walt’s theory of the balance of threats, was a popular theory during the Cold War. Holsti et al include that the following is seen in line with the theory, “alliances are formed primarily against something, and only secondarily for something; and, that they tend to reflect shared interests in a specific situation rather than a sense of community arising from common values, culture, and the like.” This description makes clear that alliances are primarily formed to counter something, and that in practice, alliances tend to stand for something as well. Holsti et al also express that alliances reflect the interests of its members in certain situations and not a vague concept like ideology, identity, or values. This means that alliance politics are centered on countering specific threats and therefore fluctuate based on mutual threat perception.

85 Ibid. P. 17.
86 Ibid.
Holsti et al also claim that “as the threat which gave rise to alliance recedes, so will cohesion within the alliance”\(^{87}\). This hypothesis echoes the popular idea that the threat that causes the alliance to form will determine the cohesion of the alliance as well. Obvious examples, such as NATO enduring after the Cold War, demonstrate that this hypothesis is not always clear or correct. Holsti et al expand on this by stating, “Typical propositions of this type link increasing external threat to greater cohesion, a greater propensity to rally around the alliance leader, and a willingness to subordinate conflicting purposes to a single goal. Conversely, inter-alliance negotiations, peace, and generally declining international tensions are associated with eroding cohesion.”\(^{88}\)

Another aspect of alliance cohesion discussed deals with dyadic relationships and threats. If every alliance is a network of states which has many bilateral dyadic relationships, then perhaps this internal feature of alliances can provide insight toward alliance cohesion. Holsti et al discuss the significance of a threat perceived to an alliance being perceived\(\text{differently}\) by each alliance member. They state that, “If only part of the alliance membership is threatened, or if the threat strikes at the basis of group consensus, severe divisions may arise. Similarly, unless the external danger creates an equitable division of labor among alliance members, cohesion is likely to suffer.”\(^{89}\) This is a very important dimension of alliance cohesion to consider. Too often are alliances considered as singular and cohesive units that act, perceive, and ultimately behave as one. Alternatively, alliances can be viewed as loose or cohesive networks of members. In


\(^{88}\) Ibid.

\(^{89}\) Ibid.
such a perspective, internal and external cohesion to the alliance can be measured by assessing all the dyadic relationships individually.

Holsti et al also discuss significant attributes that relate to alliance cohesion: decision-making structure, duration, and size. Regarding the decision-making structure, it is important to consider the divergent structures among alliances. Some structures are centralized, while others are de-centralized. Some are largely dependent on the major actor(s) in the alliance, while others lack a clear dominant power. It is also important to consider how diverse alliance treaties can be that legally brought forth the alliance. All of these factors undoubtedly influence the type of decision-making structure present, along with many more factors. Holsti et al include many hypotheses relating to the decision-making structure of alliances.

One hypothesis posits that a coalition will be more stable to the extent that decision-making is centralized.\(^90\) It is important to note that stability and cohesion are not always the same thing. Just like a marriage, an alliance can be a stable partnership, thus lacking crucial conflicts, but cohesion among allies may still be low. Another hypothesis puts forward that cohesion is high when decision-making is centralized.\(^91\) (A centralized decision-making structure is one that is hierarchically organized.) This idea seems quite simplistic and probably has much historical evidence to refute it.

Another set of hypotheses takes a more pluralist and decentralized stance toward alliance cohesion. One maintains that an alliance with a loose system of states, as

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\(^91\) Ibid.
opposed to one with a tight system, will be cohesive.\textsuperscript{92} Another posits that the more centralized an alliance gets, the chance of conflict among members increases.\textsuperscript{93} Interestingly, another hypothesis suggests that cohesion is based on the “oppressive rule of a single power” or principle. This idea is not the same as claiming alliances are cohesive if they have a hegemonic member. Instead, an alliance will be cohesive if its members are oppressed.

Regarding the duration of alliances, Holsti et al mention important hypotheses that also provide conflicting arguments. Some believe that alliances that endure for a long length of time will eventually disintegrate due to mounting strain, while others believe that the longer an alliance exists, the more cohesive it becomes.\textsuperscript{94} There seems to be a tendency among alliance theorists of the Cold War to see alliance cohesion in black and white terms. The preceding cohesion hypotheses demonstrate just that. Since alliances formation, alliance type, and the circumstances surrounding the alliance and its members all vary, it is not always easy to generalize a claim to apply to all alliances. With this recognized, it is still useful to reflect on hypotheses that may only relate to certain alliances.

Lastly, Holsti et al discuss the size attributes of alliances. The authors mention that large alliances are typically considered to be less cohesive than small alliances.\textsuperscript{95} They include that there is an argument in the cohesion theory community that posits, “the larger the alliance, the less important the contributions of any single member (especially
minor partners), and the easier it is for any partner to rationalize the argument that failure to meet all alliance obligations will not really make any difference. This argument, which Holsti et al admit lacks empirical supporting evidence, may apply to sociological theories between people, but when applied to alliance among states, doing so becomes quite difficult. Even if one considers alliances to be a network of groups of diplomats (instead of a network of governments), small alliances will still involve hundreds of people. Therefore this hypothesis seems well off the mark.

Another important alliance attribute that Holsti et al mention is national attributes. They mention that if members of an alliance have significantly different attributes, the alliance will not be very cohesive. A similar angle argues that unequal changes in power capability among members will weaken cohesion. Another significant hypothesis is that differences in state bureaucratic structure may serve as barriers to the coordination of alliance strategies. Thus, if an alliance has severe difficulty coordinating policies for the alliance, cohesion may suffer.

Another important work on alliance cohesion is When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics by Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond. In the book, Kegley and Raymond hypothesize that in a bipolar world order where alliance systems are polarized, alliance treaty stipulations will be followed more rigidly by alliance members. The case study that the authors use to test this hypothesis is France after World War II. After suffering a painful defeat by Nazi Germany, France sought to

97 Ibid. P. 23.
98 Ibid.
rebuild and work to prevent future invasions. From 1945 to the early 1960s, France collaborated with allies in NATO and in failed negotiations for a European Defense Community. Kegley and Raymond emphasize that this period resembles a polarized world, in which two hegemonic alliance systems countered each other: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. However, by 1964 the French infrastructure was greatly improving along with other former hegemonic powers: Great Britain and Germany. As a result, the international balance of power was tipping away from the U.S. and more toward Europe and other regions.

During this time, France no longer perceived a genuine commitment from NATO and instead demoted its membership status to pursue greater independent security initiatives. In other words, the polarization of the international system and of the countering alliance systems of the post-war period was unraveling, at least moderately. As a result of these systemic changes, commitment from one of NATO’s most powerful allies – France – reduced substantially. Therefore, Kegley and Raymond have contributed to the study of alliance cohesion by showing how polarization of the world and of the world’s alliance systems can affect the cohesion of an alliance – or at least the level of commitment from members.

A different angle of alliance cohesion is explored in Thomas Risse-Kappen’s *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*. In the book, Risse-Kappen takes a liberalist approach to examine how America’s allies constrain its foreign policy. He also explores mechanisms and processes of cooperation within alliances, an area of study still quite underdeveloped. Significantly, Risse-Kappen
highlights Karl Deutsch’s security community concept, which posits that integrated and institutionalized communities of states, such as the U.S. and West Europe, can develop a sphere of lasting peace. This means that alliances, such as NATO, can evolve into a highly integrated security community. Risse-Kappen notes that “One could even argue that the North Atlantic Alliance represents an institutionalization of the security community among democracies” . . . and that “The North Atlantic Treaty contains various allusions to a community of values” .

If NATO does currently represent Deutsch’s concept of a security community, then the potential of cooperation among alliance members is very great. Since NATO has demonstrated commitment to cooperation during the Cold War and afterward, then perhaps a clue to causes of intra-alliance cohesion has less to do with threats, and more to do with the degree of community present among allies.

Another important examination of intra-alliance cohesion and behavior in NATO appears in “NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior” by Charles Kupchan. In the article, Kupchan uses a case study – NATO efforts to address Persian Gulf conflicts – to study cooperation and conflict among NATO member states.

Kupchan conceives alliance cohesion as being the same thing as alliance cooperation. This understanding is not far off Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan’s definition of cohesion, which is the ability of alliance members to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends. Kupchan states that

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cooperation within NATO can be measured along three dimensions: the ability of allies to engage in joint operations or offer explicit military assistance to each other, the ability of allies to compromise on policy issues, and the level of financial contributions for collective defense. Thus, Kupchan also states that intra-alliance cooperation can be understood through three theories: balance-of-power theory, collective action theory, and pluralist theory.

Regarding balance-of-power, Kupchan claims that the theory supports the idea that “allies check rising threats by seeking to cooperate more closely with each other. Alliance cohesion therefore rises and falls with member states’ shared perceptions of threats to their security.” This idea, which seems to fit Walt’s balance-of-threat theory more than balance-of-power theory, posits that when NATO member states perceive threats, they counter them by cooperating with allies. The claim that alliance cohesion is dependent upon external danger to alliance members is comparable to Weitsman’s theory (when external threat to an alliance is high and internal threat is low, cohesion will be high).

For the collective action theory, Kupchan includes that “intra-alliance behavior is fundamentally a public goods problem. It focuses upon the distribution of military and economic capability among member states and the dynamics of group action as the key to independent variables determining alliance cohesion.” This means that alliance behavior among member states is best understood through collective action. The

102 Ibid. P. 324.
103 Ibid.
dynamics of members providing varying economic and military assistance to the alliance is key, according to Kupchan, to understand cohesion. He also claims that “the alliance leader’s willingness and ability to assume a large share of the costs of the collective good produced by the alliance leads to cohesion”\textsuperscript{104}. This idea implies that for alliances with clear leaders, providing a large share of military and economic assistance will promote commitment among members to the alliance. This idea fails to distinguish political leaders of alliances from hegemonic leaders of alliances. One could argue that the Soviet Union provided great economic and military assistance to the Warsaw Treaty Organization (hegemonic leadership) but failed to provide political leadership, which ultimately doomed the alliance.

Kupchan explains the pluralist theory as being based on state-level political and economic factors. The political leaders of states cooperate with the alliance’s goals (thus fueling cohesion) when there is popular support among their electorate or top political advisors. Therefore when the opposite conditions are in place in a state(s) – opposition from constituents and/or political advisors – cohesion will weaken.

From testing these hypotheses on two case studies, Kupchan concludes that alliance cooperation varies depending on what factors are present in each case. Despite the inconclusive results, Kupchan provides important hypotheses that may help explain cohesion in alliances.

Another scholar, Christian Tuschhoff, explains in \textit{Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space} that alliance cohesion can be best understood using the

institutionalist model. He claims that NATO has been able to increase its cohesion after the Cold War because “its features as a security institution allowed the members to manage the changing intra-alliance balance of power caused by Germany’s re-emergence in the post-war period”\textsuperscript{105}. Tuschhoff also explains an important dynamic of internal cohesion. He writes that “NATO’s system of information exchange reduced mutual uncertainty and increased the predictability of behavior in case of attack”\textsuperscript{106}. In other words, contemporary cohesion in NATO is fostered by institutional management features within the alliance. Intra-alliance management and the spread of information among allies explain present cohesion levels, not an explanation involving external causes.

What does Tuschhoff’s theory say about alliance cohesion in general? Not much. Instead, it reflects the institutionalist theory largely founded by Robert Keohane. In summary, institutions are able to provide certainty and trust to members by creating a forum to make alliance policies. Tuschhoff falls short of explaining why other alliances of democratic states have not been able to use institutional features to manage, prolong, and unify relations among members to the extent NATO has.

Lastly, Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf state that alliance cohesion depends on the “cost/benefit calculations of its members, so it is almost exclusively determined by the threat posed by an adversary”\textsuperscript{107}. Additionally, levels of cohesion are believed to correlate directly with threat levels.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid. P. 151.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
This analysis of past literature on alliance theory and cohesion provides a starting point to delve further into alliance cohesion theory. Table 1.3 summarizes the theories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Hypotheses and Insights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weitsman</td>
<td>Internal dimension is emphasized, cohesion is based on level and source of threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liska</td>
<td>Ideology and common values are significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holsti et al</td>
<td>External danger and threat drive cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kegley et al</td>
<td>Polarization of world power polarizes alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risse-Kappen</td>
<td>Institutionalization and ideology fuel alliance cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupchan</td>
<td>Material support and military cooperation within the alliance fuel cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuschhoff</td>
<td>Institutional features allow alliances to adapt to allies’ interests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter 2: A New Look at Alliance Cohesion Theory**

The previous literature review of alliance cohesion shows that alliances are can be viewed as partnerships between two or more countries with an underlying intent to manage each member’s national interest. This line of thought is based on classical realism, in which states are the primary actors in the world system. It is also based on the idea that states are persistently determined to pursue their national interests. To others, alliances are viewed from a structural realism approach, in which the systemic level of analysis is used. More recently, scholars such as Robert Keohane use institutionalism to view alliances.

Weitsman, on the other hand, does not view alliances using a single approach. Instead, she fuses realist and institutionalist theory together. Weitsman’s theory consists of her *Threats and Cohesion* matrix (see Table 1.2) which shows predicted cohesion status of a dyad based on levels of internal and external threat. However, the method in which she conceives of threat in *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of*
War is quite different than how it is done so in this thesis. The time period of the
countries and alliances she examines in her case study is the nineteenth century and early
twentieth century. That period of international relations for the countries and alliances
involved in is very different than NATO and its members during 1991 – 2005. This is
where the divergence of threat conception originates from. The fundamental type of
international system is still present, though the units within the system have significantly
changed.\textsuperscript{109} This is why a revised conception of threat will be used.

Unlike the alliances in Weitsman’s case study, NATO members never expected
that an ally would invade its territory during 1991 – 2005.\textsuperscript{110} Nor did they ever face a
significant threat of a state outside of NATO invading and diminishing national
sovereignty (as they had during the World War II and Cold War eras). Even scenarios
involving massive attacks from North Korea or Al Qaeda do not threaten an ally at the
extreme it could have in the past. Traditional attacks against the major powers of NATO
are improbable, especially from a state within the alliance. To the smaller powers, minor
attacks are now unlikely to occur due to their membership to NATO as a collective
defense pact. Serbia knows if it were to invade Slovenia, the invasion would be met with
a quick NATO response. Even in West Europe, where World War I and II ended not too
long ago, the possibility of Germany invading France or any other dyadic combination is
miniscule.

\textsuperscript{109} In “Structural Realism After the Cold War” (2000) Kenneth Waltz explains that there often changes in
the international system, but rarely fundamental changes of the international system. This thesis argues that
important changes have transpired within the system, which therefore requires a slight revision in concepts.
\textsuperscript{110} While NATO members did not expect an ally to attack them, they still maintained a level of caution.
After World War II, the concept of great-power war has slightly changed among the great powers of the world. Since 1945, no great power has fought another great power in a traditional war. One reason behind this is that the destructive capability from weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear weapons, has increased the risk of great power inter-state war. Because of the changed environment, the threat level among allies has fundamentally changed. The possibility of invasion or the common use of war as a tool of foreign policy among allies is doubtful. In fact, some claim that threat is no longer a main security problem for NATO at all.

This makes Weitsman’s theoretical model, which was tested on three old alliances, not fully applicable to some modern alliances, such as NATO. However, her theory is applicable in many other ways.

Part 1: A New Approach

Part 1.1: Methodology

In Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, Weitsman measures alliance cohesion by focusing on the internal dimension of the alliance, which reveals many important hypotheses about cohesion. She explains the role threat plays internal to an alliance and reveals the type of alliance behaviors that occur under different levels of threat. In the other alliance cohesion theories reviewed in the previous section, a tool to measure the cohesion of alliances is missing. Such a tool is important to fully develop.

111 Since 1945 there have been border skirmishes and war-like acts, such as the 1962 blockade on the Soviet Union, but there has never been a major war between the U.S., Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, China, Japan, Australia, Canada, Italy, South Korea, or India.

This thesis seeks to build off Weitsman’s theory of alliance cohesion by adding thorough analysis of ally-to-external actor dyad relations. Inclusion of this important dimension adds a perspective often overlooked in alliance literature. This perspective provides insight into the intentions and motivations of allies, which allows for a more comprehensive assessment of threat in dyadic relationships. For example, by documenting the United States’ relationship with Russia, we can better assess NATO cohesion. This is so because NATO – Russia relations are still important in the post-Cold War era, therefore by thoroughly assessing the U.S. and Russia’s relationship with alliance leaders, we can accurately understand NATO’s activities in Eurasia.

Therefore, dyadic relations internal to the alliance will be analyzed just as they were in Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. External dyadic relations, which were not analyzed in the book in this manner, will be also be explored not to draw cohesion conclusions among the ally-to-external actor dyads, but to shed insight on allies’ intentions and motivations. Therefore, the independent variable in this thesis is threat and the dependent variable is cohesion.

In the forthcoming research design, every dyadic relationship is qualitatively analyzed via three case studies of five year periods between 1991 and 2005. The qualitative case study, which also includes quantitative evidence, is the best method to explore alliance cohesion because it provides for a systematic process to examine and analyze historical evidence, perspectives, and opinions. The qualitative analysis is based on the independent variable of alliance cohesion: threat. Threat is used because it is fundamental to the cohesion of alliances. While there are other identifiable themes, this
is the two most significant one identified in modern alliance theory literature and it is the dominant theme for which many other issues tie in to, such as competition for power.

**THREAT**

The method in which Weitsman conceives of threat in alliance theory is applicable to this thesis. Weitsman writes, “Threat is an inherently perceptual concept. While capabilities play an important role in determining what is deemed threatening, the other essential ingredient is intentions . . . Gauging threat thus has to do with identifying those states that have the capacity to undermine one’s interests and the perceived desire to do so as well.”¹¹³ This means that while capabilities are an important part of measuring threat, understanding intent is equally as important. Therefore, the ability to perceive an actor as threatening involves its capabilities.

In the case study, threat is broken down into three categories: low, moderate, and high. Low threat indicates that there may be few significant internal or external issues affecting alliance cohesion, but these low threats will not hinder the overall intended operation of the alliance nor will they significantly alter cohesion. Moderate threat means there are several significant threats to the alliance that hinder the alliance’s ability to achieve cohesion. There may be a competition for power inside the alliance. Lastly, high threat indicates that many significant threats face the alliance. These threats put the very existence of the alliance and possibly the security or sovereignty of alliance members in jeopardy. Therefore, high threat has the potential to tear an alliance apart.

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An important part of gauging threat also involves determining if a competition for power exists. This type of struggle is an important factor in bilateral relationships. George Liska maintains that when alliance members compete for the same thing, the behavior can blur the purpose of the alliance to members and to the world. This type of behavior can also prevent shared identity among members.¹¹⁴

Competing behavior is resembled by at least two actors trying to increase relative gains. For example, in the U.S. – France alliance, the countries have moderate to low threat, which is largely explained by the moderate to low power struggle (over influence in the Middle East and European security, for instance). Therefore the power component of threat is viewed in a neorealist perspective as a balance-of-power competition.

The direct way in which the independent variable threat is used in the case study is by analyzing the severity of threat in each dyadic relationship, which includes the internal competition for power. This means the threat perceptions of both actors toward each other will be analyzed to determine if the nature of the threat and level of it are severe or not. Intentions and motivations are important in achieving this.

This method is different than the one used by Weitsman. Weitsman’s method is a good fit for the time period and alliances used in her case study because factors like proximity of the homeland and proximity of colonial holdings were crucial to inter-state relations during the periods reviewed. Today, while these factors still are important, they are not as important as they were centuries ago. Air forces, inter-continental ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and uncharacteristic actors such as international

terrorist groups have altered the nature of the battlefield. Therefore, if Weitsman’s method of measuring threat is used in this thesis, it will miss some very important perceptual factors in dyadic relationships.

Weitsman states in Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War that “threat is an inherently perceptual concept. While capabilities play an important role in what is deemed threatening, the other essential ingredient is intentions.”

This thesis takes those two factors, capabilities and intentions, and views them qualitatively instead of quantitatively.

**DYADS**

Since an alliance serves purposes related to power and threat, one must examine significant characteristics of dyadic relationships to determine the ability of the alliance to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics and to coordinate activity directed toward those ends. To determine the cohesion of an alliance, it is imperative to examine each dyadic partnership within the alliance, while also considering insights generated from assessing dyads external to the alliance.

For example, each bilateral relationship is a dyad. This means that a three-member alliance has six total dyads. Therefore, for every alliance, one must multiply the number of allies by the number of allies less one to determine the total number of dyads.

\[ n(n-1) \]

Consider an alliance with three members. If ally \(a\) bombs a nuclear weapons facility in ally \(b\)’s territory, then the action of ally \(a\) was likely precipitated by a power

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competition, bilaterally, within the alliance, regionally, or internationally. It will also involve threat because the bombing likely is a response to an increased perception of threat from ally $b$ to ally $a$. There is a distinction here between power competition and conflict. Conflicts between states are often a result of a power competition, but not all states that engage in competing behavior area necessarily coming into conflict. The U.S. and Great Britain, for example, compete for power within the international system, but rarely find themselves in conflict over specific issues. Therefore, conflicts are end-results of some power competitions, but definitely not all.

For NATO, there are several dyadic relationships both internal and external. The internal dyads include only NATO members (France – Germany, for example). The external dyads include a NATO member and a non-alliance actor, which include non-member states and non-state actors such as other alliances or groups. An example of an external dyad is Canada – Al Qaeda.

Only significant dyadic relationships will be examined due to the limits of this thesis, although it is ideal that every identifiable dyadic relationship is examined because it is impossible to precisely establish which actors should be included as significant dyads. Therefore, dyadic relationships inside the alliance (allies among allies) will be examined. Insights on cohesion are generated and external dyads will be assessed (allies among non-ally actors). Alliance behaviors (hedging, tethering, balancing, bandwagoning) will be evaluated based on the dominant trend internally and the dominant trend externally.
It is important to note that Weitsman generated hypotheses on behavior for dyads under conditions of threat. For example, she writes that when two states hedge with each other, the characteristics of the dyadic relationship are low commitment level, moderate cohesion, and low internal threat. This thesis applies her understanding of dyads to groups. This means that while each dyadic relationship is still considered, they are generalized in a group. For example, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, most dyads in NATO maintained high cohesion by hedging with each other. The internal threat level in the alliance was low while the external threat level was high. We can generalize the individual dyads because their characteristics are all very similar. From this, we can say that the alliance resembles hedging behavior due to the abundance of hedging among dyads. Therefore, this thesis views NATO as a group of dyads and generalizes common dyadic characteristics for the whole alliance.

For the external dyads in NATO, the reason they will be assessed is because the information gathered adds important insights to each ally’s status in the alliance. For example, it is important to examine U.S. – China relations to fully comprehend the position of the U.S. in NATO. However, the reverse approach to this dyadic relationship (China – U.S. relations) is unnecessary because only the ally’s perspective of a non-ally is able to affect NATO cohesion.

Dyadic relations can also exist with an ally and a non-state actor. Examples of this include other alliances or organizations, movements, or groups of people. When analyzing the external perspective of an ally, it only makes sense to consider all

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significant actors to be eligible for a dyadic analysis. For example, when analyzing the cohesion of NATO, it would be a mistake not to examine U.S. – European Union relations or U.S. – Al Qaeda relations.

After a dyadic map is created, the variables power and threat will be analyzed just as they are internally. Furthermore, the cohesion of the alliance based on the categorization of threat for each dyad will be measured. The following tables can be used to plug in the information to determine alliance cohesion. The tables will incorporate an example alliance, Alliance X, with three member-states: Canada, France, and Japan.

| TABLE 2.1 |
| Example Dyadic Model: Internal; Three Member Alliance |

| Alliance X |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Alliance Member** | Canada | France | Japan |
| **Possible Dyadic Combinations Within Alliance** | Canada-France | France-Canada | Japan-Canada |
|  | Canada-Japan | France-Japan | Japan-France |
| **Total Alliance Internal Dyads** | 6 |

Table 2.1 organizes and lists all of the possible dyads in the alliance that are to be tested. The reason a dyad appears twice, for example Canada – France and France – Canada is because both dyads are unique. The Canada – France dyad translates to Canada’s relations with France – from Canada’s perspective, while the France – Canada dyad translates to France’s relations with Canada from France’s perspective. Analysis of both dyads will reveal different information. For example, if a Canadian scholar or diplomat wrote a book on Canada – France relations, the information present in this book would be far different than if it was written by a French scholar or diplomat.
Table 2.2 organizes the dyads outside of the alliance, which include significant non-member states and non-state actors such as other alliances or groups. External dyads do not include ally to ally dyads because those dyads are internal, not external. External dyads involve an ally and a non-alliance actor. The shaded area in Table 2.2 shows all of the eighteen possible external dyadic relationships. Added to the total internal dyadic relationships, there are a total of twenty-four dyads in this alliance.
Table 2.3 is used to qualitatively measure threat in the dyadic relationship. The table appears at the conclusion of each five-year case study in Chapter 3. This table is used to account for all twenty-four total dyads in the example case. In the example table, the threat and cohesion scores for each dyad are generated from a qualitative assessment based on the conception of threat and cohesion, as presented in this thesis. The alliance behavior was determined by looking at the actions of actors in the dyadic relationships. For example, the Japan – U.S. external dyad was assessed to have low threat (1.0/5.0), high cohesion (5.0/5.0), and tethering behavior evident. Once the threat, cohesion, and alliance behavior assessments are completed for each dyad, the next step is determining cohesion of the alliance from the evidence collected thus far.

The method to determine cohesion among dyads is to qualitatively assess each dyad’s data based on the threat scores. After the network of dyadic relationships is analyzed, the cohesion level of each dyad will be assigned a value in order to understand how cohesion varies in one alliance dyad to dyad. (It is important to generate a cohesion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2.3: continued</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada-U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>France-Al Qaeda</td>
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<tr>
<td>France-China</td>
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<tr>
<td>France-EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>France-Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>France-OPEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>France-U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan-Al Qaeda</td>
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<td>Japan-China</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan-OPEC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>External Dyads Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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value for ally-to-non alliance actor because it provides invaluable information about allies’ perspective inside the alliance.) After a cohesion score is listed, insight will be generated concerning cohesion.

**COHESION**

The methodology used in the case study involves qualitative methods in an attempt to draw important hypotheses about alliance cohesion in NATO. As much as possible, the methodology tries to match Weitsman’s for compatibility purposes, although the methods used are ultimately quite a bit different because the objectives of both sets of research are different. Weitsman research explores the internal dimension of alliance cohesion and draws many important conclusions. This thesis, on the other hand, seeks to provide a model to measure the cohesion of an alliance. By focusing on the external dyads and determining alliance behavior in the external realm, a thorough analysis of alliance cohesion will be explored. The following research design will incorporate this model into the case study.

**Part 1.2: Research Design**

To evaluate the many aforementioned theories on alliance cohesion a clear and structured research design will be used. First, a case study research method will be included that contains background analysis of fifteen years of NATO history in five-year increments to 1) measure the level of threat perceived, and 2) determine the level of cohesion. In determining the level of cohesion of the alliance, Weitsman’s theory that maintains different levels of threat produce different alliance behaviors will be focused on. Further, background analysis will use diplomatic, historical, and policy-based
sources, a thorough analysis of NATO will be provided. Second, the internal and external threat dynamics among NATO allies and external dyads will be explored. This will provide important insight into the validity of Weitsman’s theory concerning internal-external threat and alliance cohesion. Third, the state of NATO’s cohesion during each time-period will be calculated using the method described in the previous section. The internal dyads of NATO will be measured, while the external dyads will be taken into consideration to provide a better picture of each ally’s foreign relations. Lastly, the alliance’s ability to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends will be emphasized during the analysis.

For applicability purposes, and to build off insightful alliance cohesion research by Patricia Weitsman, much of her methodology and research design used in Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War will be incorporated. However, the case studies in her book involve old and terminated alliances, such as The Two Leagues of the Three Emperors and the Dual and Triple Alliances. The background of each alliance is provided, including diplomatic and military history. For each alliance, Weitsman examines alliance formation and alliance cohesion dynamics and changes in external and internal threat levels. These important steps are incorporated into this research design. However, alliance formation, while very important, will not be focused on due to the limits of this thesis.

Before this three-part research design will commence, it is very important to first explicitly mention what NATO’s own treaty – the North Atlantic Treaty – states about NATO’s founding goals, strategies, and tactics.


Part 1.3: The North Atlantic Treaty

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 during the onset of the Cold War. The overt purpose of the treaty was to band the World War II victors together in a formal alliance for collective security purposes (the 1940s was still a somewhat unstable world) and of course to counter the perceived threat of the Soviet Union from North America and West Europe. Although others may argue that NATO had other significant purposes and founding goals, it is important to examine the written, official goals of the actual North Atlantic Treaty.

The treaty contains three explicit goals. First, member states agree to “seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area . . . [and] to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security”\(^\text{117}\). This implies that a function of NATO is to improve relations and security among member states and within the North Atlantic region. This function was executed successfully during the Cold War. No member of NATO was ever attacked in the North Atlantic region and no intra-alliance war or major conflict ever occurred. While East Germany (which was a communist ally of the Soviet Union) was part of the North Atlantic geographic region, the Cold War saw no war or insecurity within the state.

The second goal of the treaty is that members “will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”\(^\text{118}\). This means that members are obliged to provide national defense capabilities and strategies for national and

\(^\text{118}\) Ibid. Article III.
alliance purposes. During the Cold War, all NATO members carried out this goal.\textsuperscript{119} In fact, after NATO’s founding, two alliance members, Great Britain and France, developed nuclear weapons to complement the arsenal of the United States. Lastly, the third and perhaps most significant goal in the treaty is the collective defense mechanism, in which “an armed attack against one or more [members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”\textsuperscript{120}.

The goals of NATO, included in the North Atlantic Treaty, reflect the international security environment of the early stages of the Cold War. The collective defense mechanism of the alliance (Article V) was created primarily to respond to a potential Soviet/WTO invasion of Europe. Now that the Cold War is over, the founding goals of NATO are still the same (as the treaty has not been amended), but the alliance has taken on new goals and strategies and tactics to achieve them.

The reason it is important to understand the contents of the North Atlantic Treaty is because alliance members are not only expected to fulfill certain duties of the alliance, but also their contractual agreements in the treaty. This concept provides context to what cohesion means to members in its most basic sense. Again, the definition of alliance cohesion used is the ability of member states to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends. While goals, strategy, and tactics of the alliance have been created, dismissed, and amended every year, it is important to consider the founding goals, strategies, and tactics mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty when trying to holistically understand alliance cohesion.

\textsuperscript{119} This does not include Iceland, which is the only NATO member that does not have a national military; instead, it is largely relies on its geostrategic location in which a NATO military base is located.  
Now that background on NATO’s founding treaty is provided, the activities of NATO during the last decade and a half will be analyzed to test the validity of alliance cohesion theories.

Chapter 3: NATO Cohesion, 1991 – 2005


The 1990s proved to be perhaps the most important decade for NATO. In December of 1991, the Soviet Union officially began to dissolve when eleven Soviet republics signed the charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Though the Soviet government was on its way out, the core strength of the Russian armed forces – and the nuclear forces scattered throughout the former Soviet Republics – loomed large.

A result of the Cold War ending is a new international structure. For almost fifty years, two colossal powers constantly tried to gain an edge on the other, which made the threat of nuclear inter-state war very real. The period after the Cold War showed signs of optimism and hope as the U.S. emerged as the single world hegemon. Importantly, this shift also places NATO as the unrivaled strongest and largest military alliance in the world.

Part 1.1: Background

With the fundamental change in the structure of world power came a change to NATO’s role and function as an alliance. As an alliance, the internal rules and structure of NATO were designed for engagement during the Cold War. Now that the war was over, the new balance of world power permitted NATO to modernize its internal command structure to meet new needs. Originating from its 1990 Alliance Strategic
Concept, NATO announced many changes to the alliance. These include a significant reduction of troops stationed in central Europe, which were originally positioned to deter and/or prepare for a continental invasion from the Soviets. This was on top of a larger conventional force withdraw between both NATO and the WTO and massive reductions in nuclear weapon stockpiles and delivery capability.

A consequence of the shift of U.S. troops out of Europe is an Europeanization effect. With the Cold War over, and thousands of American troops on their way out of the continent, European powers, including Great Britain, France, and Germany, considerer the defense of Europe to be primarily, but not wholly, in Europe’s hands. This is reflected by their involvement in the Eurocorps, Western European Union (WEU), and Europeanization efforts within NATO. While this realization seemed sudden, it occurred with a sharp decrease of threat to Europe.

During the early 1990s, the Eurocorps and WEU became heavily involved in European affairs. But neither the Eurocorps nor the WEU were the organizations destined to replace the security gap. Instead, NATO and the newly created European Union have begun to jointly provide new defense and security programs for Europe. The European Security and Defense Policy has become the central tenet under the EU to

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coordinate European security and defense,\footnote{Originally, in 1996 the European Security and Defense Identity was planned to be structured within NATO but coordinated by the WEU. By 1998, the European Union took control of this responsibility, though still in close coordination with NATO.} while NATO members still chiefly rely on the alliance for security.

An obvious needed change for NATO was re-organization of its Cold War-era command structure. The structure that replaced it during this time was actually two strategic commands, the Supreme Alliance Command Europe and the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic.\footnote{The command structure has since been reorganized again. As of 2007, it consists of the Allied Command Transformation, which is responsible for training and transforming NATO, and the Allied Command Operations, which is responsible for coordinating all NATO military operations.} Also, during the early 1990s, NATO created a Combined Joint Task Force program to improve the interoperability of allied military forces in NATO with respect to armed missions. This program, and the issue of interoperability in general, have proved to be crucially important for NATO operations.

Perhaps the most significant change for NATO after the Cold War is determining a sound membership policy. Before 1991, NATO had sixteen members, mostly North American and West European nations. However, after the Cold War ended, relations between NATO members and former Soviet bloc countries, including Russia, significantly improved. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) formed in 1991 to bring Central and Eastern European countries closer to NATO and ultimately to prepare some for potential membership (the NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997). The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was established in 1994 to improve relations, trust, and cooperation between NATO members and former Soviet bloc countries. Although a dynamic framework was put into place in the early
1990s to improve relations, NATO did not begin to add new members until 1999. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council before it) also aims to improve relations between the alliance and countries in Europe and Near Asia.

A historic undertaking for the alliance is its intervention in Bosnia in 1995. Since the ethnic conflict in Bosnia got out of hand, and thousands of civilians died, European powers and NATO felt responsible to resolve the conflict. After failed diplomatic efforts from NATO, the alliance launched air strikes and mandated a no-fly zone over Bosnia to end the violence. This military action was the alliance’s first and actually occurred outside the framework of Article V. Some thought that collective action in Bosnia would improve NATO’s long-term utility. In fact, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher even claimed that, previously “many in Europe, as well as the United States, questioned whether NATO had a continuing role to play after the Cold War. Now, NATO’s role is universally acknowledged. It has found a vocation.”

Considering all of the background issues during 1991 – 1995, there are many internal and external dyads of the alliance that must be examined. The following are tables of the significant dyads that have been assessed and are designated as the most significant to examine.

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Part 1.2: Internal Dyads

BRITISH INTERNAL DYADS

During the early 1990s, Great Britain had a cooperative relationship with France and Germany, but there were still significant issues that provoked conflicts. A conflict occurred during the creation of a NATO multinational intervention force. NATO’s Defense Planning Committee planned for the NATO Allied Command Europe to lead these efforts by creating a rapid reaction force which was to be led by a British general.\(^{128}\) This political move inside NATO left Germany and France without influence in the project as they wanted. As a result, the countries founded the Eurocorps in 1991 (taking effect in 1995) to serve as a continental force (affiliated with the WEU and linked to NATO) to partly mimic the British-led rapid reaction force, but to have the authority to operate outside of NATO’s defined security zone.\(^{129}\)

Although the Eurocorps has operated throughout the world, most notably in Bosnia and Afghanistan, it did not replace the influence of NATO or its rapid reaction force at all. Instead, it symbolically proved to enforce the idea that Europe – led by Germany and France – is committed to take more of an active and leading role in providing for its own security and defense. Since the controversy over the Eurocorps formation, the ESDI and ESDP have formed, and Europe ultimately has taken a step away from American reliance toward self-reliance.


From Great Britain’s perspective, it has maintained a leadership role in Europe and the European Union. While minor conflicts have surfaced over the provision of European security and defense, Great Britain remains the continental military power. Throughout 1991 – 1995, Great Britain maintained a steady defense budget of $41 – $43 billion USD\textsuperscript{130}, which was the third highest in NATO behind the U.S. and France. During this time, Great Britain was part of the 1991 Gulf War which pitted an UN-authorized coalition (which included German financial and political support and French military support) against Iraq. This war unified the foreign relations of Europe during the early 1990s.

Overall, Great Britain’s relations with Germany were steady during 1991 – 1995, especially due to their mutual membership in the EU. Great Britain’s relations with France, as well, were steady during this time period. Nuclear issues, on the other hand, brought Great Britain and France together. Their efforts culminated in the Joint Nuclear Weapons Commission of 1992.\textsuperscript{131}

British – American relations, as well, were remarkably positive during the 1990s. The dyadic relationship was cooperative both military and politically. NATO proved to be a conducive environment for cooperation to occur for the two countries. This was seen in Great Britain’s partnership with the U.S. to invade Iraq in 1991 and its commitment to Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia. In the Gulf War, Great Britain maintained its close partnership with the U.S. as its top ally. Its participation in the


coalition proved to be strategic domestically, as Prime Minister John Major attained the highest opinion poll marks ever in Britain.\textsuperscript{132} Importantly, the successful Gulf War coalition revealed how important military interoperability is. Within the coalition, a major reason the U.S. and Great Britain (and France) were able to cooperate so quickly and efficiently is due to their status as NATO allies.\textsuperscript{133}

**FRENCH INTERNAL DYADS**

France hoped that in the post-Cold War era, it would be able to exert political power on European security and defense affairs better than it could previously. With the Soviet threat gone, the American security blanket over Europe via NATO became less important. During this time, Europe started to consider its defense and security more of its own responsibility, despite defense spending dropping for virtually all NATO allies. In the early 1990s, the European Union was formed and the Western European Union was reinvigorated by adopting the Petersburg Tasks. This was good news for France, who sought an alternative route to exert its influence outside of the American-led NATO.

French relations with Germany on these efforts were very close, and in fact, France and Germany became significantly close allies in the 1990s. Regarding the formation on the Eurocorps, France saw the idea as a basis for a European army, while Germany viewed it as an opportunity to strengthen its commitment to NATO and European security.\textsuperscript{134} During the Gulf War, Germany did not cooperate with France,


Great Britain, or the U.S. in military operations due to constitutional questions over its use of force outside of NATO’s article V. Although this was perceived as a let down, Germany did contribute approximately ten percent of the war’s budget.\textsuperscript{135}

Franco – British relations, on the other hand, were not as cooperative as France’s relationship with Germany. The rivalry between Great Britain and France was evident in the CAP policy and the establishment of the British-led rapid reaction force inside NATO. Despite these setbacks, France maintained an overall positive relationship with Great Britain. For example, Franco – Anglo cooperation occurred when the countries tried to carefully slow down Germany unification (against the wishes of the United States) to improve European integration.\textsuperscript{136} Cooperation also occurred on the issue of non-proliferation. Particularly, “At the end of the Cold War they found themselves united in opposition to revisions in NATO strategy which declared nuclear weapons as ‘weapons of last resort’\textsuperscript{137}. Subsequently, France and Great Britain formed the Joint Nuclear Weapons Commission in 1993 to coordinate arms control and disarmament positions.\textsuperscript{138}

The same can be said for Franco – American relations. During this period, there were some obstacles to cooperation. After the Cold War ended, France hoped that the new environment would enable it to exert more political power on European security and defense affairs.\textsuperscript{139} France also saw the post-Cold War era as “creating a welcome

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid. P. 40 - 41.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid. P. 337.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
opportunity to confine U.S.-dominated NATO and leave security space that a more powerful, coherent, and confident Europe could occupy.”\textsuperscript{140} The first few attempts to achieve this proved to be setbacks for France because their European allies and the U.S. saw the moves as shifting too much power to Russia and less to the U.S. and NATO. For example, France promoted the bold ‘European Confederation’ idea in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a successor organization to the European Community. This never materialized, and instead, the European Union was founded 1992. France also backed the re-emergence of the WEU and its adoption of the Petersburg Tasks. The WEU is now a dormant alliance. Lastly, France opposed the enlargement of NATO and a new policy of affiliation with the OSCE, both of which failed.

Although France intended to extend its power by blocking U.S.-backed efforts, it ultimately came out of the struggle in a satisfactory strategic position. Perhaps the turning point is when France sent troops to assist in NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force in Yugoslavia in 1995, for which France was not able to assist in the operations command due to its withdrawal from the NATO military committee. After this point, France became less antagonizing over U.S. policies on Europe.

\section*{GERMAN INTERNAL DYADS}

Germany found itself in a comfortable place after the Cold War ended. By 1991, the country had emerged united with a growing economy and national defense system. The Berlin Wall was torn down just two years prior to 1991 and communism was finally fading out of the continent. During this time, Germany developed better relations with

France than it did with Great Britain. As was previously mentioned, Germany and France united to counter the NATO rapid reaction force by founding the Eurocorps, which some thought could replace NATO in time.141

This action reflected the competitiveness Germany felt toward Great Britain and the U.S. After all, European security and defense was largely guaranteed by the United States during the Cold War. Now that the Cold War is over, Germany saw an opportunity to reassert itself in transatlantic affairs. The strategy it followed, drawing closer with France, produced an odd alliance taking into account the fact that both countries fought each other three times in the past seventy years before the end of World War II.142

German – Anglo cooperation during this period is largely defined by their work on non-proliferation issues. Britain even supported France’s ambition to test nuclear weapons during this period; an idea today which would be certainly opposed.143 However, there is an issue that impeded German – Anglo cooperation: ‘Euroskepticism’. Germany envisioned a further integrated Europe as significantly benefiting its own country perhaps more than Great Britain or France. However, opposing the slowing down of European integration also brought Germany closer to France, who also sought a more active role in European politics.

Germany’s relations with the U.S. differ greatly from their relations with European allies. An important reason for this is that the current German government

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originates from the defeat of Nazi Germany by a U.S.-led coalition during the 1940s. When the new government was created, the U.S. maintained close relations with West Germany, partly to oppose the Soviet-supported East German government. Part of the relationship involves a stationing of approximately 150,000 U.S. troops in the country. After the Berlin Wall fell, the U.S. wanted to build off of this relationship and expected Germany to become a close ally. There were many in the U.S. that considered the timing of this prospective relationship crucial, as this was a significant tipping point in European integration.\textsuperscript{144} However, when Germany failed to supply substantial military support for the Gulf War, the U.S. – German relationship slightly weakened.\textsuperscript{145} In fact, German defense spending declined during 1991 – 1995 from $44 billion USD – $39 billion USD.

\textbf{AMERICAN INTERNAL DYADS}

As the Cold War ended, the United States declared a ‘New World Order’ of great power cooperation. The new order was also a unipolar one in that the United States emerged as the world hegemon. Absent a Soviet threat, the U.S. relationship with West European powers was significantly changed. No longer was the U.S. security blanket over West Europe a vital service. With the Soviet Union gone, there were no major countries that posed a direct threat to West European security.

The event that defined this period for the United States is the invasion of Iraq in 1991 and the success of the multi-country coalition, which included many NATO members. This incursion symbolizes the idea of the ‘New World Order’ led by the U.S. with the absence of the Soviet threat. The U.S. – Great Britain alliance certainly

benefited from these developments. Great Britain was America’s closest ally and most competent military partner\textsuperscript{146} during the 1990s and during the Gulf War, in which Great Britain supplied the most troops – 43,000 – and military aid of any other European country.\textsuperscript{147} Within NATO, the U.S. and Great Britain also had a strong partnership. During the creation and adoption of the New Strategic Concept and internal reforms within the alliance, the United States and Great Britain worked closely to achieve mutual goals. This is especially true regarding prospects for NATO expansion – an issue in which the U.S. and Great Britain cooperated closely on.\textsuperscript{148} Additionally, the U.S. and Great Britain led NATO efforts in Yugoslavia during the early 1990s.

While the U.S. and Great Britain prolonged their strong transatlantic partnership, U.S. – France relations worsened. After the Cold War, the U.S. thought France would make a closer move toward NATO, while France thought the U.S. would propose systemic reform in NATO.\textsuperscript{149} While the predicted actions of both countries was not exact, France’s subsequent policies over reforming European security structures by having the continent take a more proactive approach evoked suspicion.\textsuperscript{150} The U.S. suspected that France was trying to undermine NATO efforts and ultimately weaken American influence in the region. This turn of events isolated France and forced it to

\textsuperscript{147} However, Turkey did supply 50,000 non-combat troops.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
comprise with its initiatives (the ‘European Confederacy’ idea died and the Eurocorps became linked to NATO, for example) and jump on board with Atlanticist policies.\textsuperscript{151}

While U.S. – French relations got off to a bad start, U.S. – German relations were strong. An initial obstacle to this partnership was convincing the Soviet Union to permit the unified Germany to join NATO. Ultimately, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (the Two Plus Four Agreement) was signed in 1990. This was a turning point in that the U.S. and NATO allies now had greater trust in Germany and its relationship with the Soviet Union, which concluded its withdrawal of troops from Germany in 1994. The treaty also ushered in a new “international responsibility”\textsuperscript{152} to Germany (via the UN, NATO, and EC/EU).

Building off this pressure, Germany proved to be an important ally for the United State and NATO. German’s military and defense spending did not grow to a level desirable to the U.S., but Germany did eventually take part in many NATO and U.S.-led missions, including peace-keeping missions in Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Somalia, Djibouti, Georgia and Sudan. The post-Cold War relationship that developed between Germany and the U.S. occurred amidst new strategic conditions; Germany is no longer divided, the Soviet Union dissolved, and Germany’s reliance on the U.S. for security lessened.\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{Part 1.3: Internal Threat}

Internal threats to NATO during this period involve collective identity as well as


material power. The first threat NATO faced in the 1990s was the possibility that the alliance would dissolve, just as its counterpart the Warsaw Treaty Organization did. Since the alliance’s foremost adversaries, the Soviet Union and the WTO, no longer existed, the purpose and function of NATO was unclear. NATO leaders faced three general options: 1) end NATO, and possibly revamp the EU, WEU, or OSCE, 2) revamp NATO through membership expansion and use of alliance forces in conflicts, or 3) make no significant change for the future of NATO. Although the alliance persisted through the end of the Cold War, and ultimately followed the second option, the uncertainty that existed for several years about NATO’s fate was perceived as a threat.

Although NATO enlargement in the 1990s was an important means to prolong the alliance’s existence and utility, many viewed it more cautiously. These skeptics included leaders at the Pentagon, State Department, and in Congress. Concerns centered on freeing up U.S. forces in Europe, paralyzing the decision-making structure of the alliance, and even extending and enhancing the distinction between alliance members and non-members in Europe. Some even imagined an enlarged NATO as another tool to contain Russia, which could ultimately provoke hostile relations with the country. In other words, extending the alliance past West Europe was a risky endeavor.

On the other hand, some contend that extending the alliance to the rest of Europe extends a zone of peace and stability – both for the alliance and for the continent.  

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Expansion was also seen as a method of extending democracy to former Soviet republics. Moreover, if democracies do not wage war against other democracies, this would enhance the peace and stability of Europe. Also, extending the alliance throughout Europe was seen as expanding and strengthening the U.S. – Europe alliance and America’s role as world hegemon. NATO enlargement was also seen as a way for the Bush and Clinton administrations to show that the U.S. was not becoming isolationist after the Cold War.

The last significant internal threat NATO faced in the early 1990s is the renewed determination of European countries to manage and coordinate their own defense and security policy, i.e. Europeanization. Although most European members of NATO viewed Europeanization of continental security and defense policy as crucial, American policy makers had a different view. During the Cold War, the U.S. bared the brunt of the cost for the defense of Europe. When the Cold War ended, America called on Europe to begin paying its fair share of defending its own continent. However, during this time, allied defense expenditures dropped across the board. Instead of European members of NATO maintaining U.S. levels of spending on the defense of Europe, they created structures outside and within NATO to coordinate security and defense policy. European powers have made progress since the early 1990s to coordinate continental security and defense; first within the WEU, then NATO, and beginning in 2003, the European Union.

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157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 This does not include Norway because it modernized its outdated military during this period.
The only noteworthy dyadic feud among alliances members during this period was a Greece – Turkey territorial dispute. These two countries, which have been off-and-on adversaries for many decades, had virtually all of their major disputes resolved during the first half of the 1990s. Unfortunately, issues arose over territorial boundaries in the Aegean Sea in 1994, which escalated diplomatic tension between the states. This tension did not increase again until 1996.

Moreover, during this period, the internal competition for power affected the threat levels between dyads. This is especially true for France, who yearned for power within NATO. France’s material resources did not compare to the superior political position that Great Britain and Germany had over continental defense and security. Great Britain, on the other hand, exhibited more of a hedging behavior toward the U.S. to attain more power and leadership in the alliance. Great Britain wanted to rise as Europe’s leader in NATO, but at the same time it wanted to prevent rivalries in the foreign policy sphere. To achieve this, it hedged to the U.S. and became the top European contributor during the Gulf War.

Lastly, the U.S. hedged and tethered the members of the alliance by leading it politically and militarily. U.S. leadership in peace-keeping in the Balkans and Operation Deny Flight, which was the alliance’s first real military action, was an important endeavor. Additionally, the U.S. was a leading ally in the alliance’s policy initiatives, which include the development of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept and the Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue programs.
Taking into account all of these threats, NATO faced a low-level of internal threats.

**Part 1.4: External Dyads**

**BRITISH EXTERNAL DYADS**

During the early 1990s, Great Britain’s relationship with China is important to consider to fully understand Great Britain’s role in NATO. China emerged out of the Cold War with one of the most impressive militaries and economies in the world. Absent the Cold War security environment, China, as a very large and communist country, found itself in a different position. China was the unrivaled largest and most powerful communist country remaining, but actually started on a path to become more democratic and to liberalize its economy. China was not perceived as a direct threat (like Iraq, for instance) to Great Britain, France, Germany, or the U.S. Instead, it was perceived as a future threat.\(^{160}\)

The Great Britain – China relationship was primarily focused the issue of Hong Kong. The two countries had a unique arrangement up until 1997 in that the Hong Kong territory was administered by Great Britain. Eventually, the administration of the region was handed over to the authority of the Chinese government – though Hong Kong is still largely autonomous. While the handing over process escalated during the 1991 – 1995 period, mistrust between Great Britain and China also increased.\(^{161}\)

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\(^{160}\) For a more in depth analysis of threats Western states perceived from China, see Cable, Vincent; Ferdinand, Peter. “China as an Economic Giant: Threat or Opportunity?” *International Affairs*. Vol. 70, No. 2. 1994. P. 243 – 261.

The Great Britain – Russia relationship was less focused on mending relations and supporting the emerging Russian government. The new Russian government, formed in 1991, was no longer built on communist tenants nor did it advocate world communism. Instead, the government initiated market reforms and introduced important democratic reforms. During 1991 – 1995, Great Britain and other NATO members were cautious of Russia’s stability and future. The new government still controlled thousands of nuclear weapons, an enormous army, and communist sympathizers were still spread throughout the Russian military and government. In fact, a constitutional crisis emerged in 1993 when President Boris Yeltsin dissolved the national legislature.

Although the unstable political environment in Russia made for uneasy relations between the two countries, the instability in Yugoslavia provoked Great Britain to take armed action. Great Britain was a leading member of Operation Deliberate Force, which was NATO’s first real armed operation. The ethnic turmoil that caused NATO to respond was actually in Europe (which is considered the North Atlantic area, for purposes of the NATO Treaty, although considerable skepticism does surround this action). For European members of NATO, this instability was brewing in their backyard, therefore use of force through the UN or NATO was desired. During this conflict, Great Britain and its allies in NATO agreed to take action in Bosnia and to add 1,500 Russian peace-keeping troops to the 60,000-strong force of NATO members.

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163 Explicit authorization for the war under a UN Security Council Resolution was desired, but expected vetoes from Russia and/or China prevented a vote.

Great Britain also developed important relations with the European Community (EC) and its successor (beginning in 1992) the European Union (EU), as well as the Western European Union (WEU). During the transformation of the EC to the EU, Great Britain played an active role. However, Great Britain has always been skeptical of its participation in the EU for economic, political, and security reasons.\textsuperscript{165} Therefore, since many NATO members were also EU and WEU members during 1991 – 1995, it is very important to consider how the overlapping institutions affected NATO’s cohesion.

In Great Britain’s case, it joined the EU with the other European leaders as the successor to the EC; not as an entirely different organization. Although Great Britain never adopted the Euro as its currency, it has been very involved in the EU for other economic, cultural, political, and security reasons. Domestic concerns in Great Britain – known as Euroskepticism – include that the EU will erode the value of the British Pound, it will foster a European super-state, and that it will erode the national sovereignty of Great Britain. This mood, which was been prevalent in the Labour and Conservative Parties over the years, has intensified competition with Great Britain’s rivals: France and Germany. In a way, it also worsened Great Britain’s position in European integration. British Prime Minister John Major sought for the UK to be at the ‘heart of Europe’, but by opting out of the Euro and the EU’s social policy, he alienated his government’s ability to directly influence these important policies.\textsuperscript{166}

Although the EU did not significantly involve itself in the security affairs of Europe during the early 1990s, the WEU certainly did. In 1992, the Petersburg Tasks,


which include conflict prevention, crisis management, and peace-keeping activities, were incorporated into the WEU (only to later be incorporated into the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy, therefore eroding the value of the WEU). This action is symbolic in that it is Europe’s first step (outside of the Eurocorps of which Great Britain is not a member) to take a greater responsibility of continental security. While the WEU may appear as a competitor to NATO, as the duties of both organizations are somewhat similar, fourteen of the eighteen WEU members were NATO members, while fourteen of sixteen NATO members were also WEU members. The variable in this significant overlap is the United States, a member of NATO but not the WEU, who cautiously followed European integration policies, especially concerning security and defense.

Great Britain maintained a cautious policy during the early 1990s on adding security and defense responsibilities to the young EU. It did not want to see NATO (and its own) influences in the region erode. This is why Great Britain supported the WEU’s Petersburg Tasks. British Foreign Secretary Malcom Rifkind explained it by stating, “without cutting across NATO, [the WEU] would give the Europeans the means to mount combined military operations to manage the crises that are more likely to face us”\(^{167}\). In other words, the WEU could be a separate institute to implement the Maastricht Treaty’s goals on European security and defense.

While the EU and the WEU were important non-state actors that affected Great Britain’s participation in NATO during this period, another important actor is the network of international communism. The Soviet Union’s demise in 1991 symbolizes

the fall of communism worldwide, but communist states, communist sects in non-communist states, and the general ideology were still a threat to Great Britain and all NATO members. Countries such as China, North Korea, Cuba, Yugoslavia, and even some in Eastern Europe, still posed a threat to Great Britain. Since communism was still apparent in the world, the struggle to rid the world of it was not completely over. With fears of communist uprisings in Russia and other East European states, Great Britain followed a cautious foreign policy during the early 1990s that took this perspective into consideration.

**FRENCH EXTERNAL DYADS**

Just as with Great Britain, France’s relationship with China did not involve a direct threat. What it did involve is a political crisis relating to the One China Policy, in which Taiwan is considered part of China. France viewed Taiwan as a sister democracy that struggles to achieve nationhood from a powerful communist and largely dictatorial state. France maintained a diplomatic and military relationship with Taiwan in that it sold the government arms. This crisis ended when France ended exports of arms to Taiwan in 1994. Despite this hiccup in French – Chinese relations, the relationship has been strong and primarily based on trade.

The Soviet Disintegration, on the other hand, enabled France and Russia to develop positive relations. One event that brought France and Russia together is the Bosnia intervention by NATO. Russia wanted to send a peace-keeping force to operate

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separate from NATO command. France supported this idea and worked with its NATO allies to secure it.\textsuperscript{170} France and Russia also cooperated in the Partnership for Peace program starting in 1994.

Although France dropped out of the NATO military committee in 1966, it contributed forces to the NATO-led war in Yugoslavia. It also took part in all discussions on involvement in Yugoslavia within NATO since 1992.\textsuperscript{171} These policies are significant because France actively participated in the war and policies surrounding it without being represented on the command committee that coordinated the war. Further, this event is significant in that France felt responsible and in a way obligated to ensure security on the European continent. France had been a part of Europeanization efforts of security and defense affairs for years, therefore if France could not assist in achieving a ceasefire, it would not be seen as a credible military and diplomatic force. Perhaps part of this renewed commitment comes from France’s inaction in the Rwandan Genocide (along with the U.S., Great Britain, and Germany).

France’s relations with the organizations that have their roots in Europeanization efforts are also an important topic to explore. France is a leader of the EC/EU, particularly the idea behind the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar in the Maastricht Treaty (even though its populace just narrowly approved the treaty in 1992).

Along with the EU, France is a founding member of the WEU. France played a leadership role in the WEU throughout the 1990s, particularly in the establishment of the Eurofor, the WEU’s rapid reaction force. Although France was active in the EU’s

security and defense policy in the early 1990s and the WEU’s administration, the aims of those organizations was not to combat communism. France’s Cold War threat was no longer significantly apparent in the post-Cold War period, therefore the WEU and EU primarily prepared for engagement in rogue or failed states or in under-developed areas of the world.

**GERMAN EXTERNAL DYADS**

German – Chinese relations during this period focused on trade and German investments in China. Unlike France, Germany did not refute China’s One China Policy. Germany also broke with the status quo by being the first country to visit a Chinese military base during a visit on trade.\(^{172}\) Germany is one of the top European exporters of goods to China. In fact, “Both Britain and France have strained relations with Beijing. China, by contrast, terms its ties with Bonn ‘excellent,’ and that, some commentators say, puts Germany in a position to exert influence where the United States cannot”\(^{173}\).

German – Russian relations during this period were fundamentally different. The former Soviet Union was the sponsor of the former East Germany communist government; therefore West German – Soviet relations leading up to 1991 – 1995 were not very strong. Once Germany reunified, it sought normal relations with the new Russian government for both political and economic purposes. It is Germany’s goal, along with many pro-integration European countries, to incorporate Russia’s markets into the rest of Europe. This is beneficial for economic purposes but also political, as linked

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economies often foster positive diplomatic relations. Part of this German strategy includes being Russia’s largest creditor and rescheduling billions of dollars of Russian debt.\textsuperscript{174}

German – Yugoslav relations were not very active leading up to NATO’s involvement in Bosnia. However, Germany was a quick to recognize the independence of former Yugoslav republics. This policy was significant within Europe and helped initiate the EU and ultimately NATO to effectively respond to the regional instability. Germany was a leader within the EU in providing foreign aid to the Balkan countries affected by the crisis and it took in the largest number of refugees.\textsuperscript{175} It also joined its allies in the EU and NATO by assisting in the alliance’s efforts in Operation Deliberate Force against Yugoslav forces.\textsuperscript{176}

Working with the EU was a priority for Germany’s strategic aims. A country that was split in half for decades following its defeat in World War II and its postwar administration, Germany valued peace. Therefore peace was an important component of German foreign policy.\textsuperscript{177} Because of this, Germany’s European integration policy (which is thought as a crucial method to prevent inter-continental war) was really valued. Part of this policy was its support of EU expansion, which, during this period, included Austria, Finland, and Sweden.

\textsuperscript{176}For details on Germany’s contribution to Operation Deliberate Force, see “Regional Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe: Operation Deliberate Force.” \textit{North Atlantic Treaty Organization}. December 16, 2002. \url{http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm}.
Germany’s participation in the WEU also reflects this. However, while Germany sought a stable and secure Europe, especially during the Cold War, one of the major reasons European integration and security and defense integration occurred is due to Germany’s militaristic foreign policy of the 1930s and 1940s. This perspective puts Germany in a unique position as a leader against militarism, dictatorship, and war. This is also similar to the perspective Germany has of communism during this period, in that the former East German communist government had been recently reunited with West Germany.

AMERICAN EXTERNAL DYADS

The 1989 Tiananmen Square suppression haunted Chinese foreign policy into the 1990s and 2000s. However, the U.S. relationship with China did not fully erode. The U.S. economic, political, military, and technological sanctions that followed the Tiananmen Square conflict prevented a strong post-Cold War relationship from forming. Many components of the sanctions lasted for over a decade, which forced China increase its economic partnership with Russia and Europe. Some saw this U.S. policy as a strategy to contain China’s military and economic aspirations in the post-Cold War era.178

The One-China policy also was an important concern for American officials. In 1994, the Clinton Administration announced that it reaffirmed the One-China policy in regard to Taiwan’s independence. This was a huge step in improving U.S. – China

relations, which had been especially unsteady since the Tiananmen Square conflict sanctions began.\textsuperscript{179}

The U.S. – Russia relationship during this period developed at a considerable rate after the Soviet Union’s demise. A primary focus of the relationship is on economic and political issues, as the U.S. desired the new Russian government to have open markets and democratic institutions. The U.S. was also concerned about the level of corruption in Russian industries, media, and elections. One major step the U.S. took, along with other NATO members, to integrate the new Russian government into Europe and NATO is the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, established in 1994. The PfP has provided the U.S. and Russia with an opportunity to establish cooperative relations after the Cold War. It has also enabled France, Germany, and Great Britain to develop economic and political partnerships with Russia that were largely absent during the previous decades. Most importantly, the PfP has preventing NATO from being a threat to Russia or East Europe and has prevented “the United States and NATO prematurely drawing another line in Europe to divide it in a different way”\textsuperscript{180}. Since Russia already felt alienated amidst talk of serious reform in NATO, it was important to develop cooperative councils between NATO members and Russia and NATO members of the rest of East Europe. The PfP succeeded in doing this as well as the succeeding councils that prepared the remaining European non-members for potential members – including Russia, though the prospects


for Russian membership in the near future are small.\textsuperscript{181} By drawing close with Russia, conflictive issues such as enlargement were able to be made under integrative and multilateral auspices.

Regarding the U.S. – Yugoslavia relationship, the U.S. was the leader in the NATO military campaign to halt ethnic violence in Bosnia. By cooperating with European powers under NATO, U.S. leadership in this endeavor – Operation Deliberate Force – is symbolic. It demonstrates the American interest in using NATO as a legitimizing tool and as an effective an interoperable alliance to achieve its national interest.\textsuperscript{182}

As NATO emerged as an increasingly important world actor during this period, the relationship of the U.S. to the EU and WEU proved to be crucial. The EU and the WEU took on responsibilities that were very similar to NATO’s responsibilities. Should this be a threat or an asset to NATO? Thus, the U.S. found itself in the following position: “On the one hand, the WEU states wanted a capacity to take military action if and when NATO were not inclined to act—by implication that meant abstention by the United States. On the other hand, the United States and some other allies were concerned that few if any European states would provide the resources needed for a full-fledged WEU, in addition to NATO—there were simply not enough resources to create two sets

of military forces. There were also concerns that promoting a truly independent WEU would prevent the latter’s capacity to act.\textsuperscript{183}

Throughout Bush and Clinton administrations, the answer to this predicament became clear: the U.S. supports the Europeanization efforts, but still maintains a cautious outlook on those developments. After all, European participation and reliance on NATO as their primary alliance is crucial to American interests in the region.

When the Cold War ended in 1991, the U.S. maintained a cautious policy on the remaining communist-oriented states: China, Cuba, North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. Of this group, China and Yugoslavia posed a threat to the United States during the early 1990s. China was feared as a nuclear-armed Asian power; Yugoslavia was an unstable communist power that threatened European stability.

It is important to realize that while the Soviet Union and state-sponsored communism in Russia ended for good by 1991, this development was not absolutely certain in the early 1990s. The Tiananmen Square massacre in China – which the U.S. responded to with embargoes – reminded the world that the transition into the post-Cold War is not a sudden event, but a process that has become more complete every year. Moreover, a failed coup took place in Russia in 1993 against Boris Yeltsin, which meant the likelihood of another coup in the latter part of the 1990s was not an unconceivable idea.

Part 1.5: External Threat

While the post-Cold War era is void of a substantial communist threat, the NATO alliance still faces serious external threats. The most powerful among them was China, who, by the early 1990s, had around 2,000,000 active duty soldiers.\(^{184}\) Although China was, and still is, a communist state at heart, the 1990s witnessed substantial capitalist and democratic transformations in China. Therefore, while China and the former Soviet Union had somewhat comparable military capabilities, their intentions were far different. Although China never provoked war with America or NATO countries, the possibility of nuclear war was still real. Scenarios involving Taiwanese independence or conflicts emanating from North Korean provocation led some to believe that China may intervene militarily.\(^{185}\)

Russia also posed a threat to NATO; though quite different than from the threat it posed years earlier. The new Russian government was far from stable (at least on European standards) and its large nuclear stockpile, which had been spread across territory that had seceded, was quite worrisome. Relations between Russia and the U.S. and NATO also faced difficult times, especially regarding plans for NATO expansion and alliance involvement in Bosnia.

While discussion was being had about the future of NATO and its responsibility to the European continent, instability broke out in East Europe. In 1992, Bosnia seceded from the communist Yugoslavian government. Soon political and ethnic tension in the


region escalated into ethnic cleansing and warfare. NATO took the lead in the conflict and engaged in its first ever armed mission. Alliance forces enforced a no-fly zone and launched air strikes on Bosnian Serb targets. NATO’s involvement spurred the war to a close.

This external conflict was a threat to NATO because it questioned the alliance’s will to fulfill the North Atlantic Treaty. The preamble of the treaty states NATO members agree to “seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.” 186 Although this provision is nowhere near as explicit as Article V, it still carries with it an implicit obligation to prevent major war in Europe. Therefore, when violence erupted in East Europe, it was interpreted by NATO as a threat to not just continental security, but to the legitimacy of NATO. NATO announced in a North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting in 1992 that “We are profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating situation in the former Yugoslavia, which constitutes a serious threat to international peace, security, and stability.” 187 Further, “An explosion of violence in Kosovo could, by spreading the conflict, constitute a serious threat to international peace and security and would require an appropriate response by the international community.” 188

Another important external threat to NATO during the early 1990s was rogue states. Some, including Somalia, North Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, were

188 Ibid.
considered to pose a threat to international security. There were substantiated concerns that a rogue state would try to attain nuclear weapons and potentially sell them on the black market, use them as a deterrent, or even possibly strike a NATO member or its allies with them.\textsuperscript{189}

Another dimension to non-proliferation efforts came from former Soviet-controlled nuclear weapon facilities. After the Soviet government abruptly dissolved, independent republics had temporary control of some of the weapons, and thus worries of a nuclear weapon getting in the hands of a terrorist group or rogue state were then a new realization.

Terrorism, while always being a part of American history, reached new heights during the Clinton administration. In 1993, the World Trade Center was bombed by an Islamist terrorist group. Two years later, a federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed by an anti-government militia group. This brought a renewed realization to NATO members that Islamic terrorism and terrorism from domestic origin poses a serious threat to the security of states; even those without significant ethnic tensions. These threats indicated that NATO also faced low levels of external threats.

\textbf{Part 1.6: Dyadic Cohesion}

The cohesion status of NATO during 1991 – 1995 appears on the surface to be fairly high. After all, during this time, NATO did pull together to forge through the end of the Cold War. But by ignoring hindsight, NATO’s cohesion status may have actually have been far less cohesive. To determine NATO’s cohesion during this period, the

\textsuperscript{189} North Korea has attained a nuclear arsenal; Iraq and Libya attempted to develop nuclear weapons in the past, but failed.
definition of cohesion will be applied, as well as Weitsman’s theory and the theories of other scholars.

The definition of cohesion is the ability of member states to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends. During 1991 – 1995, NATO balanced many goals, including its three founding goals.

NATO’s first goal – promoting stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area and to unify efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security – was certainly achieved. After the Cold War, former Soviet republics and communist states were faced with difficult transitions. NATO led the way with its programs and councils to foster relationships with new independent countries. Although ethnic tension broke out in the former Yugoslavia, NATO was the only alliance force that led the way to end the violence.

The second founding goal that NATO was faced with was: maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. Although defense expenditures dropped across the board among NATO members during 1991 – 1995, each member maintained their individual capacity to attack. The alliance also maintained its organizational capacity, as demonstrated in the NATO strikes on Bosnia.

The third founding goal of NATO is to provide collective defense in the event of an armed attacked against one or more of NATO members in Europe or North America. Although no NATO member was ever attacked until 2001, this collective defense mechanism of the alliance is what partly justified its war in Yugoslavia. Having the largest ethnic cleansing atrocities occurring in its own backyard was seen as a threat to
the neighboring NATO members. War in Europe during the past century has never proved to be good news for continental stability, so the perception of threat that emanated from this conflict is understandable.

Beside their founding goals, NATO had two significant goals to achieve during the early 1990s. First, NATO had to deal with reforming the alliance’s strategy. For the alliance to persist far into the post-Cold War period, it was clear that NATO needed a new comprehensive strategy. That is what the New Strategic Concept set out to achieve. This strategy, which was agreed upon by NATO members in 1991, has guided NATO through the post-Cold War era successfully. The strategy calls an end to ‘flexible response’, it supports initial Europeanization efforts, and also aims to increase cooperation between NATO and non-members, particularly Russia and former Soviet states. Crisis and conflict management, as well as the ability to quickly respond by force to conflicts was also a central component. Importantly, the strategy set the tone for NATO’s force posture in an environment where the likelihood of encountering a colossal single-state threat was significantly reduced.

A goal originating in part from the New Strategic Concept that was a priority in the 1990s was reaching out to non-members in Europe and near-Asia. This was accomplished by the Partnership for Peace program, the North American Cooperation Council and later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and later the Mediterranean Dialogue. These programs have proven effective in bringing Russia closer to the alliance, eventually bringing former Soviet states into NATO membership, and increasing cooperation with other countries.
NATO has achieved all of its founding goals and significant goals set in the first half of the 1990s. However, during that period NATO members were probably somewhat skeptical. Although NATO’s services were seen as useful in bringing the former communist bloc close in relations with the alliance, the long term utility and life of the alliance was uncertain. NATO was formed after World War II primarily to counter the Soviet Union. In other words, the power and threat that emanated from the USSR was countered by the NATO alliance. Now that the threat was largely removed and the military power status was less concerning, NATO’s mission seemed to be over. Therefore, before NATO specified in its New Strategic Concept and before alliance members really realized NATO’s new mission, it was reasonable to except skepticism of NATO’s ability to fulfill all of its goals during this period. Despite this, members did agree on the new goals of NATO, therefore this part of the definition of cohesion was implemented during this period.

The next part of the definition of cohesion is strategy. Whether or not NATO members agreed on the alliance’s strategy during 1991 – 1995 has a lot to say about its cohesion. The most significant strategic planning NATO achieved in the 1990s was the New Strategic Concept. As previously mentioned, the New Strategic Concept is a post-Cold War strategic plan that involves reaching out to former adversaries, including Russia, to increase cooperation and ease hostility. The plan also aims to modernize NATO’s force posture and overall military strategy.

In many ways, the drafting of the New Strategic Concept was the first step NATO took to endure past the Cold War. Considering it was agreed upon without significant
disagreement, this strategic plan reflects the ability of the alliance’s members to cooperatively agree on the alliance’s future.

On the other hand, membership expansion plans did not reflect a very internally cohesive alliance. One reason NATO members supported the alliance is because, “Faced with the prospect of NATO disappearing and the U.S. disengaging, the instinct of nearly every government in Europe was to opt to maintain the Alliance in some new form, if only as an insurance policy.” Another perspective on the causes of enlargement is that NATO was actually not in favor of it directly after the Cold War – the U.S. State Department even opposed it because it thought enlargement would naturally weaken alliance cohesion. NATO leaders did not want to impede on their delicate relationship with the Soviet Union/Russia. Instead, it was East and Central European leaders that started the discussion for enlargement. After the discussion was brought to the table, (reunified) Germany and U.S. Senator Richard Lugar became top advocates for enlargement. These points show that enlargement was not a unified policy by all NATO members for the start. Instead, the discussion to enlarge the alliance brought friction to the alliance, which ultimately paid off.

While most of the tactics NATO used during the early 1990s were not very controversial, the campaign of air strikes in Bosnia certainly was. There were several NATO operations, including Operation Deliberate Force, which symbolize NATO’s new role as an alliance. Before the Cold War ended and tension in the Balkans escalated,

191 Ibid. P. 28.
192 Ibid. P. 7.
193 Ibid. P. 30.
NATO had never fought any country or any foreign force, let alone a country that did not attack one of its members. In fact, NATO involvement in Yugoslavia bypassed NATO’s collective defense clause to instead be authorized by various other parts of the NATO Treaty. In other words, while the actions of NATO in Yugoslavia were bold and ambitious, the authority to conduct war is seen by some as illegal or questionable at best.

Part 1.7: Cohesion Theory Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Dyads</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Alliance Behavior</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>GB-GR</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>FR-GB</td>
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<td>Tether</td>
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<td>GR-GB</td>
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<table>
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<th>Threat</th>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Alliance Behavior</th>
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<tr>
<td>GB-Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB-Communism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Balance</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB-China</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tether</td>
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<td>GB-EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB-Russia</td>
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<td>FR-WEU</td>
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<td>GR-Communism</td>
<td>2</td>
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The cohesion characteristics of NATO during this period reflect Weitsman’s predictions. Table 3.1 shows the internal threat level was very low at 1.5/5.0, while cohesion was high at 4.0/5.0. External threat was moderate at 2.5/5.0, while the cohesion of external dyads was also moderate. According to Weitsman, an alliance that has low-internal threat and low-moderate external threat should have low-moderate cohesion, depending on which threat is higher. NATO had moderate internal cohesion during this period, while the external dyads had moderate cohesion as well. This conclusion is similar to Weitsman’s predictions, though not exactly.

On a more detailed level, NATO’s internal threat level among all states was very low at 1.5/5.0, while internal cohesion was very high at 4.0/5.0. The members of NATO reviewed – the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France – were all liberal democracies with very cooperative dyadic relationships. Considering the stable and peaceful relations among all alliance members and the dyads reviewed, the internal environment in NATO resembles a hedging alliance in that most dyads experienced cooperative behavior. This is reflected in the average cohesion of the internal dyads at 4.0/5.0 and the average cohesion for all dyads at 3.1/5.0.
Weitsman reaffirms that these types of alliances are usually hedging alliances, which involve low-level commitments taken toward each alliance member. The cohesion status of NATO during this period does reflect Weitsman’s theoretical forecast.

Externally, NATO exhibited tethering behavior. This is primarily reflected in dyads coming together to manage their relations rather than let threat levels go through the roof. Threat was moderate at 2.5/5.0 while the cohesion level is also at a moderate 2.6/5.0. However, on several occasions, threat increased while cohesion dropped, which is resembled by balancing behavior by allies against communism and the government of Yugoslavia.

During the time period reviewed, NATO generally had moderate cohesion level in the alliance at 3.1/5.0 among both sets of dyads. It also had a low-moderate cumulative threat level and moderate cohesion. Hedging and tethering were the primary alliance behaviors.

Weitsman responds to the fact that NATO had both high internal cohesion and moderate external cohesion by stating, “an alliance such as NATO could endure beyond the end of the Cold War because the low level of internal threat provided the necessary conditions for cooperation to continue.”

She further states, “Alliances that confront low levels of internal threat and low levels of external threat provide the necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for cohesion to burgeon. . . In the absence of conflicts of interest, common values, institutions, and goals may flourish.”

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195 Ibid. P. 27.
1991 – 1995 COHESION CONCLUSION

The 1991 – 1995 period was an uneasy one for NATO members in that the future was uncertain. However, the alliance ultimately proved to be very cohesive. The alliance boldly chose to persist indefinitely into the post-Cold War period. It established relations with its former adversary Russia and former Soviet republics. The alliance saw its first military action in the Balkans. And importantly, the alliance reformed internally, and paved the way for membership expansion. Throughout these five years, NATO faced low-moderate levels of internal threat and low-moderate levels of external threat. The alliance engaged in hedging behavior internally and tethering behavior externally.


During 1996 – 2000, NATO faced a tough challenge. Membership expansion continued to be a significant issue, as many claimed expansion could make or break the alliance. Others, however, contend that this was insignificant because NATO was soon to expire anyway. Skeptics predicted an increase in NATO – Russia tensions or even division among the succeeding Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) if membership went forward. Though the battle of expanding membership was tumultuous for many actors, it proved to be surprisingly successful.

NATO faced a renewed security threat to Europe during this period. The ethnic tension and war in Yugoslavia demonstrated to the world the length NATO would go to ensure continental stability. It also demonstrated how severe a conflict needed to become for engagement to occur. More importantly, these crises revealed how effective and important NATO was for its European members and for the continent. Consequently,
non-NATO security organizations in Europe, including the OSCE, WEU, and EU have not posed a challenge to NATO, but instead have dissolved or complemented the alliance through partnership.

Through its battles, internal reforms, and political dialogue among members and regional countries, NATO found its place in the second half of the 1990s. An expanded alliance and one militarily engaged in continental crises became the alliance’s new role.

**Part 2.1: Background**

Building off political discussions and agreements of the previous years, NATO was now ready to consider membership opportunities to the former Soviet bloc. Expansion of NATO was not just about increasing the number of members; it was about expanding the scope of NATO’s collective security sphere. It also about revising the whole purpose of the alliance. If the remaining non-NATO European states were eventually admitted to NATO, would it be possible for such a large military alliance to function? Would decision-making by consensus work with so many members? In essence, to open NATO’s door to the former Soviet bloc, which was never even envisioned for membership by NATO’s founders, means fundamentally revising the logic of alliance membership.

Though membership requirements are absent from the NATO treaty, the alliance has since adopted Membership Action Plan (MAP) guidelines. The MAP is a guiding plan that prospective members use to prepare themselves for approval by all NATO members. The first group of countries that entered the MAP is the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Also during the 1990s, Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Macedonia entered the program. So far, all of the countries except Albania and Macedonia have been admitted as full members to the alliance.

Some expected that since many interested European countries were not included in the first MAP group, hostilities would emerge and perhaps the continent would become divided. Fortunately, NATO managed this situation well by ensuring dialogue and cooperation was in effect with all regional non-members, including Russia. Partnership with Russia was achieved via the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as Individual Partnership Action Plans, Intensified Dialogues, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the eventually the NATO-Russia Council beginning in 1997.

Another important development in European security strategy during this period is the formation of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). This identity, which was more of a caucus, formed within NATO structures to carry the Petersburg Tasks (peace-keeping and humanitarian missions) through WEU forces. The reason it was in NATO is both to keep the alliance active and to satisfy North American members, while at the same time ensuring cooperation between the alliance and new European initiatives. In 1998, NATO leaders decided that the tasks could be best carried out completely through EU structures. This transformation was made official in 1999 at the NATO Washington Summit. In 1999, NATO also agreed to create a new rapid reaction force (building off the Eurocorps force).
Stabilizing the conflicts in the Balkan region was, and continues to be, an important goal for NATO. After the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in 1995 to halt the Yugoslav campaign in Bosnia, NATO led a multinational peace-keeping force called IFOR to implement the accord’s provisions. In 1996, IFOR was replaced with a smaller SFOR, which would last until 2004 when the European Union took over. NATO’s former communist foe Russia was an important contributor to the mission, as were many former Soviet bloc states. The Bosnia peace-keeping missions proved to be a historic endeavor that shaped NATO’s post-Cold War strategy.

Unfortunately, the stability that NATO’s peace-keeping force brought the region was short-lived. Beginning in 1996, just one year after Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic signed the Dayton Peace Accord, ethnic tension intensified in Kosovo, a province of southern Serbia. This catalyzed into a civil war that destabilized the whole region. NATO no longer viewed the crisis as strictly a domestic issue.

NATO military action was launched when diplomatic efforts for ceasefire failed. A bombing campaign lasted from March to June of 1999 as Operation Allied Force, which was NATO’s largest military operation (as of 1999).

The 50th Anniversary Summit of NATO occurred at a momentous time in the alliance’s history. Central issues include the ongoing military intervention in Kosovo and the addition of three new member states to the alliance. Also discussed was the updated New Strategic Concept, the formation of the ESDI within the alliance, the launching the Defense Capabilities Initiative, and new efforts to combat WMD proliferation.
The summit is significant because it symbolizes a new chapter in NATO’s history. The period 1991 – 2000 was one of re-defining the priorities of the alliance. By 1999, NATO’s new role and identity was quite visible to the world. Three new members were added, all of which were formerly under the Soviet sphere of influence. NATO was waging a difficult war in Kosovo, which was a real test for the alliance militarily. And by 1999 NATO allies modernized their militaries, prepared for emerging threats, and furthered interoperability framework.

Considering all of the background issues during 1996 – 2000, there are many internal and external dyads of the alliance that must be examined. The following are tables of the significant dyads that have been assessed and are designated as the most significant to examine.

**Part 2.2: Internal Dyads**

**BRITISH INTERNAL DYADS**

During the second half of the 1990s, the Great Britain – France relationship improved. The countries and Europe in general were more unified on the concept of European security and there was no war that divided European leaders. In fact, the Kosovo War in 1999 between NATO and Serb forces actually brought France and Great Britain closer together because they were fighting side by side in an alliance-led war. Moreover, one objective of the war was to increase the security of Europe, which is a
common goal of both countries. Internal NATO issues such as Membership Action Plans and membership enlargement also saw Great Britain and France on the same page.\footnote{\textit{\textquotedblleft NATO Press Release: Membership Action Plan (MAP).\textquotedblright} \textit{North Atlantic Treaty Organization}. April 24, 1999. \texttt{Http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm}.}

Great Britain – German relations also showed positive signs during this period. The countries served together in the Kosovo War and worked together in NATO on important strategic issues. British Prime Minister Tony Blair also developed a close relationship with the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. This partnership contrasts with Britain’s former postwar attitude toward Germany. In fact, in 1992, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher described Germany’s position in Europe by stating, "Germany is . . . by its very nature a destabilizing rather than stabilizing force in Europe. Only the military and political engagement of the United States in Europe and close relations between the other two strongest sovereign states in Europe – Britain and France – are sufficient to balance German power: and nothing of the sort would be possible within a European super-state."\footnote{Thatcher, Margaret. \textit{The Downing Street Years}. HarperCollins: London. 1993. P. 791.} This comment reveals that by the early 1990s, there were still some British leaders that held serious reservations about Germany’s position in NATO, the EU, and Europe in general.

The Great Britain – U.S. relationship during this time was also very cohesive. Prime Minister Blair and President Clinton formed a close relationship which built off their shared left-of-center political ideology. Both countries cooperated in the Kosovo War and in internal NATO policy issues. Both also led NATO efforts to reaffirm the alliance’s relationship with non-ally partners, particular Russia, but also East Europe and non-European states. Great Britain and the U.S. supported NATO expansion to East
Europe – but not to Russia – and both worked to prevent Russia from dominating Central and Eastern Europe again.\textsuperscript{198}

**FRENCH INTERNAL DYADS**

France found its Europeanization efforts really paying off by the late 1990s. The WEU first attained a boost of responsibilities, although the EU gradually took on the new continental efforts. During this time, France suffered from the transatlantic paradox in that it actively supported Europeanization efforts through the WEU and the EU, but at the same time it realized that Europe must not stray too far from reliance on the United States and NATO.\textsuperscript{199} American support and leadership in Europe has been crucial for Europeanization to emerge and to succeed. In addition, although the Cold War ended just a few years prior by 1996, France and other European leaders still had many legitimate worries and concerns, including terrorism and instability in East Europe that required a close partnership with the U.S.

Between France and Great Britain, the bilateral relationship was very productive. This period of time saw France and Great Britain becoming leaders of Europe – both through the EU and NATO. French goals coincided with the vision Prime Minister Tony Blair had for his country. Both countries actively pursued security and defense issues for Europe. This was seen in their joint participation in the Balkans conflicts and their partnership in NATO to enlarge the alliance. It was also seen in their partnership in the EU when both countries came together to advocate for the EU to take on the Petersburg

Tasks from the WEU. The transfer of military duties occurred in 1998 and added for the first time a substantial military apparatus inside the EU.

The French – German relationship was also sound during this time. By 1996, “the marriage of interest between the two countries remain[ed] so solidly embedded that the current phase of turbulence will again lead the two countries to realize once and for all that neither Bonn nor Paris has any credible political alternative but to deepen their relationship.” In other words, Franco – German relations will always be solid because their common interests are so close that their partnership will always endure. Moreover, France’s bilateral cooperation with Germany has proved to be integral to its national interest, with the Eurocorps being a direct product of this. The Franco – German partnership is also considered a prerequisite for European stability. The bilateral relationship is “tied by very strong common interests and the fear that, if old demons were again unleashed on the two sides of the Rhine, serious harm would be inflicted on each other and on Europe. This potential danger compels each partner always to seek compromise.”

France – U.S. relations focused on reforming NATO and using NATO forces in Kosovo. During the 1996 NATO Summit in Berlin, France and the U.S. compromised on many strategic Europeanization issues for NATO. Cooperation at the summit “opened the door for reform of NATO structures, the long-held objective of the French bureaucracy and a principal source of controversy with the American for what this

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202 Ibid. P. 249.
implied in terms of an Alliance division of labor". France and the U.S. also cooperated in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. The rapidly-escalating conflict caused France to immediately support efforts in NATO to intervene, but not without prior UN Security Council authorization (since it was outside the scope of Article V).

**GERMAN INTERNAL DYADS**

By 1996, Germany was a very stable country and an economic leader of Europe. It was very active within the EU and was one of the first countries (including France) to adopt the Euro. In partnership with the U.S., Great Britain, and France, Germany fully supported enlargement of NATO. Germany also was a proud contributor to Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, which was its first participation in a war since World War II. Its involvement in the war showed its commitment to the alliance, which reinforced its unity with the U.S. and other allies, without appearing too provocative.

Germany’s relationship with France was seen in a much different perspective than from France. Germany seeks to be a promoter of peace and free trade on the European continent. In fact, Germany is an economic powerhouse in Europe. In 2000, its GDP was $2.4 trillion USD, which was by far the highest in Europe. France, on the other hand, while still maintaining an impressive GDP of $1.8 trillion USD in 2000, had a foreign policy focused on security, defense, and transatlantic issues more than international trade. German – Franco relations were also impacted by their two new heads of state: Gerhard Schröder (1998) and Jacques Chirac (1995). These two leaders

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205 Ibid. P. 86 – 87.
took office with the expectation to maintain the close friendship that the prior two heads of states had: Helmut Kohl (1982) and François Mitterrand (1981). When Schröder and Chirac did not immediately exhibit such friendship, some interpreted the dyadic relations as weak, even though Germany and France’s common interest remained the same.

Germany – Great Britain relations, while not being as close or cooperative as Germany’s relationship with France, still maintained a high level of cohesion. Historical and cultural barriers prevented a Germany and Great Britain from becoming as close as Germany is with France. The first and second World Wars and the Berlin Wall had a tremendous effect on the British psyche. For this reason, it was difficult on many levels for the two countries to unite. Despite this setback, German surprised many by contributing to the operation in Kosovo – its first armed mission since World War II.

Germany – U.S. relations during this period were again strong. The countries intensified their economic partnership, and, by 2000, half of German direct investment went to the U.S. Concerning security and defense initiatives, Germany did not improve its overall military capability (which had been an issue during the Gulf War in the early 1990s). Its defense spending decreased from $48 billion USD in 1992 to $36 billion USD in 2000. Although spending decreased, Germany showed signs of being a more ‘responsible’ European power by contributing to the NATO operation in Kosovo.

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207 Ibid. P. 60 - 61.
The need for Germany to be an active military power in Europe is part of an overall normalization policy, which means Germany must “become a responsible power which must help shape a structure for peace and security and order in Europe, including the use of force when necessary to maintain stability”\textsuperscript{211}.

**AMERICAN INTERNAL DYADS**

U.S. foreign policy from 1996 – 2000 contrasts with the previous and latter period. Under President Clinton, the U.S. was engaged in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the Balkans. However, during this time defense spending was around $320 billion USD, which, while being the highest in the world, was $10 billion USD less than in 1990.\textsuperscript{212} In other words, the post-Cold War era was a period of strategic readjustment for the U.S. armed forces, both in total size and focus.

One major event of this period was Operation Desert Fox in which the U.S. and Great Britain bombed Iraq. The collaboration between the U.S. and Great Britain is symbolic in that is shows the persevering special relationship between the two countries. A major policy that brought the countries together is NATO expansion. The 1998 decision by NATO to admit three East European countries involved close American and British cooperation and policy formulation.\textsuperscript{213}

U.S. – France relations, on the other hand, were not very eventful in the late 1990s. While the U.S. was engaged in Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan and Kosovo, France was


\textsuperscript{212} “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.”  *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.*  \url{Http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html}.

only an active supporter of the Kosovo War through its membership in NATO. However, the U.S – France relationship was very close throughout the war, despite French frustration over military policy. One important difference in U.S – French partnership in the second major NATO involvement in Yugoslavia is that the second time around France was more engaged in policymaking. The efforts of both countries revealed “Communication at the working level—ministry to ministry—staff to staff—was free from the tension that so frequently in the past had distracted and interrupted”\textsuperscript{214}.

However, amidst cooperative activities, France was perceived as “the ally most likely to challenge U.S. positions and oppose American leadership, and most determined to obstruct and dilute American power”\textsuperscript{215}. NATO enlargement, for example, involved France challenging America’s plan for expansion, which only involved three countries, whereas France supported the admission of five. French President Chirac was so upset that the U.S. was shutting French plans out of the discussion that he reportedly told his aides, “We’re wasting our time here. We’re nothing but extras in Clinton’s marketing plan. The Americans have already decided to do everything without us. They see us as crap.”\textsuperscript{216}

U.S. – German relationship was strong during this period, but did not significantly focus on security and defense issues. Instead, economic interests were focused on. There are many German companies in the U.S. and American companies in Germany. This economic feature brought President Clinton and Chancellors Helmut Kohl and Gerhard

Schröder very close. In fact, by 2000, 3.75% of U.S. exports went to Germany and 4.8% of U.S. imports came from Germany, while 10.3% of German exports went to the U.S. and 8.5% of German imports came from the U.S.\textsuperscript{217} This makes the U.S. the second largest market in the world for German exports. Moreover, the U.S. is also the third largest importer of goods into Germany.

**Part 2.3: Internal Threat**

A top internal threat to NATO during this period was defeat or a prolonged involvement in Yugoslavia. Although the ethnic tension was decades, and in fact, centuries in the making, the alliance hoped for a swift resolution. The aftermath of the first involvement in Bosnia, and the subsequent failed Dayton Peace Accord, did not make the alliance optimistic. During the Kosovo War, NATO attempted to carefully plan and design an enduring peace plan that would suffice all the actors involved. Although the eventual peace agreements in Kosovo have not achieved full desired outcomes, further violence in the region has been avoided. In fact, Bosnia, Serbia, Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and other regional states have expressed serious interest in joining NATO.

Another internal threat was French opposition to enlargement. France, which has always had a prickly relationship with the NATO leadership, wanted to ensure that significant changes made to NATO were decided one step at a time. France did not want NATO to make leaping changes to the alliance’s makeup or function because France could lose influence in the organization. France’s plans for post-Cold War Europe involved itself playing a leadership role. It has been a staunch supporter of the Western

European Union, ESDI in the WEU and NATO, and later the ESDP in the European Union, where it undoubtedly plays a leading role.

During this period, there was a moderate level of competition for power in NATO. An event that triggered this is discussion on NATO enlargement. Ever since the Cold War was in its final years, enlargement was top concern for NATO. France took an early position against enlargement because it could deplete its influence in the alliance and could complicate alliance decision-making. France was also concerned with how much power the alliance gave the U.S. in Kosovo.

Taking into account all of these threats, NATO exhibited low internal threat.

Part 2.4: External Dyads

BRITISH EXTERNAL DYADS

Five years after the end of the Cold War, Great Britain was one of several European countries that considered it beneficial to further relations with Russia and to incorporate it into NATO and European institutions. Though Great Britain hoped for a democratic Russia to emerge, it still maintained a cautious foreign policy toward the country, as Anglo–Russo relations have historically been tense. Russia, as well, forged cautious relations with Great Britain, the former world hegemon and leader of the British Commonwealth. In particular, the new Russian Premier Vladimir Putin wanted to hedge toward Great Britain as part of his new grand strategy for Russia, but the ethnic conflict
in Chechnya worsened relations. Putin considered it to be a domestic concern, while others considered being a human rights concern.

Although Anglo – Russo cooperation was more intense in the late 1990s than during the Cold War, the two countries (as well as most NATO countries) lacked a unifying issue that would foster cooperation. However, the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 did create an opportunity for institutional cooperation between Russia and NATO members.

Although Anglo – Russo relations were steady, Great Britain’s relations with Yugoslavia remained conflict-prone. Great Britain was a leading member of NATO’s Operation Allied Force, which entailed two and a half months of bombing Serb targets in Kosovo. Following this campaign, Great Britain led the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) peace-keeping operation in Kosovo, despite dealing with an overstretched army. In the Kosovo conflict, Great Britain took a commanding role because the stability of Europe and the seven bordering countries was at stake. The legitimacy toward NATO enlargement was also at stake. Why would NATO enlarge its zone of peace if it cannot even secure its own continent?

British involvement in the European Union in the late 1990s was markedly different than the rest of Europe. It has consistently maintained a somewhat distant relationship with the organization and has never adopted to the Euro. While Great

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Britain still takes part in all EU institutions, it maintained a careful policy toward the organization’s security and defense initiatives.

For example, when the EU incorporated the Petersburg Tasks into the EU (from NATO) in 1999, Great Britain was at first an opponent, but later a supporter of this plan.\textsuperscript{222} This was directly because of the 1998 St. Malo agreement between Great Britain and France, which explicitly states that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”\textsuperscript{223} The agreement also includes that the EU should not “make decisions and approve military action” where NATO is already engaged.\textsuperscript{224} This is very important because it prevents the EU from replacing or competing with NATO; instead, the EU must work with NATO or be engaged in areas where the alliance is not. This agreement has also improved relations between Great Britain and France.

Terrorism also proved to be a top issue for Great Britain during this period. While Great Britain still viewed the Irish Republican Army and similar groups as threats during this period, Islamist terrorist groups did as well. This emerging threat was reinforced after the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, which resulted in nineteen American soldier deaths and over 300 additional casualties. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the attack, which also draws in the importance of the Palestine – Israel conflict. The 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya that killed over 200

\textsuperscript{223} United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Republic of France. \textit{St. Malo Joint Declaration.} December 3-4, 1998. \\
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid.
people and wounded more than 4,000 had the most significant effect. This attack was done by Al Qaeda, a new terrorist group that was led by Saudi billionaire Osama Bin Laden. Great Britain assisted U.S. efforts against this group as early as 1998, when it arrested seven Al Qaeda suspects in Great Britain.225

Great Britain, France, and Germany, however, did not take significant responsive actions to combat terrorism after these events. The countries already considered terrorism a threat and incorporated counterterrorism measures along with its defense planning and national security planning. For Great Britain, terrorism was nothing new. It had dealt with Irish nationalists for decades. Islamist terrorism, on the other hand, was new to Great Britain. The scope of terrorist aims was not really fully understood until 2001, so all NATO countries did not prioritize their efforts because the threat level of Islamist terrorism was still not very high.

FRENCH EXTERNAL DYADS

France’s significant external dyadic relations included strategic relations with Russia. In the post-Cold War era, France valued the UN Security Council more than the U.S. and others because it allowed countries like France to have great influence on world politics (a multilateralist outlook). This is especially important for Russia, a country that will probably never attain full membership in NATO. The French President Jacques Chirac said in 1998 that “France will never accept that a regional organization [NATO]

set itself up as a holy alliance to do everything everywhere”\textsuperscript{226}. This statement reflects the French view that NATO must not take on too many duties so that other alliances, organizations (such as the UN Security Council, of which Russia is a veto-power member), and individual countries can also influence European and world politics. France worked with Russia during this period to increase Europe (and Russia’s) influence on the United States.\textsuperscript{227}

While France cooperated with Russia to promote non-NATO institutional structures, France also to a great extent cooperated with NATO in the Kosovo War. Although France prefers a UN-mandate for all non-Article V actions taken by NATO, the rapid escalation of violence in Kosovo forced France to quickly side with NATO allies to promptly intervene. By this time, France gave up efforts for a diplomatic solution as the situation on the ground was unexpected and developed very rapidly.

The France – EU relationship in the late 1990s was also a cooperative one. Two developments in the EU during this time are especially important. These include the transfer of Petersburg Tasks via the Amsterdam Treaty from the WEU (previously from NATO) to the EU, along with the St. Malo agreement, which affirmed that the EU will only operated in areas outside of NATO engagement. Transferring the Petersburg Tasks was huge news for the EU and equally important for France. By 1998, the EU had become the most successful, institutionalized, and powerful European-based organization in history. Its political and economic successes far outweigh the success of the WEU and


Eurocorps and definitely the failed ideas of the European Defense Community and the European Confederacy.

Therefore, by adding the Petersburg Tasks (and subsequently the foundation for the EU rapid reaction force) without rivaling NATO, the EU had potential to become enormously important for the coordination of European security and defense policy or even European defense forces. These developments were excellent news for France, a country that always strives for Europe take a more proactive approach to foreign affairs. It comes as no surprise that France was integral in this policy shift. This policy was part of a grander idea France had for the EU, which entailed a major constitutional convention that began in 2004.²²⁸

While French efforts in Europe dealt primarily with economic and security issues during the late 1990s, it maintained a strong focus on counter-terrorism measures. Ever since French – Algerian tensions escalated in the 1950s, it has developed an impressive counter-terrorism program. A September 11, 2001 type attack was prevented in France in 1994 when French law enforcement killed four terrorists who hijacked an Airbus, intending to crash it into downtown Paris. Although much of French terrorist threats in the last several decades came from Islamic groups, they were primarily Algerian independence groups – not Islamist groups. In fact, in 1998, France convicted thirty-six Algerian militants who carried out a 1995 attack on a Paris subway station.²²⁹ This is an

example of how France has made its country so “inhospitable” to terrorist networks that many relocated to Germany or elsewhere.\textsuperscript{230}

**GERMAN EXTERNAL DYADAS**

German – Russian relations were good during this period, but the projected future of the bilateral relationship did not show any signs of improved relations.\textsuperscript{231} German – American relations significantly affected Germany’s foreign policy toward Russia, which is why Germany never developed a clear nor very cooperative policy on Russia.\textsuperscript{232} NATO enlargement, an issue that Germany supported and Russia opposed (but still accepted), also affected their relations. “Through high-level summits and active economic, military, and cultural ties, [Germany] hope[d] to insulate German – Russian bilateral relations from Russia's interaction with NATO and the United States, and thereby minimize the friction that stems from NATO enlargement.” This means that Germany’s policy on Russia was more or less a no-policy, in that they wanted to maintain positive relations, but to avoid fostering a relationship that would negatively impact Germany’s relations with Europe or the United State.

Germany’s relations with the government of Yugoslavia were very poor during this period. When NATO’s involvement in the Kosovo War began, Germany crafted a very significant policy on this topic. The country decided to go to war with its NATO allies, despite never once engaging in a military conflict since the end of World War II. Germany’s actions in the Kosovo War brought it closer to its European allies in many

\begin{flushleft}
\texttt{Http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,176139,00.html}.
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
ways. It also removed the taboo that it was dangerous or risky to have Germany militarily engaged anywhere. Some describe the situation as “Europe has changed and Germany has changed with it.”\textsuperscript{233} After the conflict, Germany is viewed as the leading economic power of Europe \textit{and} an emerging military power. By 2000, Germany spent $36 billion USD on its military, which is significantly lower than Cold War levels but still the highest level of spending in the EU behind France and Great Britain.\textsuperscript{234}

One goal of German military spending is countering terrorist groups. In 2000, the same year as the Al Qaeda embassy attacks, Al Qaeda planned to blow up a market in Strasbourg. German police actually foiled the terrorist plot in Frankfurt and helped prevent what would be Al Qaeda’s first attack on European soil. Germany also took a tough stance on Iran in regards to terrorism and other countries that sponsor terror.\textsuperscript{235}

\textbf{AMERICAN EXTERNAL DYADS}

U.S. – Russia relations during the late 1990s largely reflect their relationship during the previous five years. One obstacle to cooperation which also affected Russia’s relationships with Great Britain and France is the Kosovo War. There are many cultural and ethnic linkages between Russia and Serbia. Partly because of this, Russia strived to prevent another NATO military engagement in the region. Though Russia ruled out a military intervention to protect Serb forces, it was still important for the U.S. to maintain dialogue with Russia on this crisis. From Russia’s perspective, it thought the U.S. and

NATO’s quick decision to use force against Yugoslavia was and not to take the issue to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council early on is a “cynical ploy to claim rights of intervention for the West at the expense of the rest”\textsuperscript{236}.

U.S. – EU relations during this period focused on economic and nation-building efforts in the Balkans. The economic relationship built off the 1995 agreement between the EU and U.S.: the New Transatlantic Agenda. This agreement has reduced barriers to trade, particularly via the 1998 EU – U.S. summit in London, but at the same time, disputes over beef and fruit trade caused a rift in U.S. – EU relations.\textsuperscript{237} In addition, by focusing on the Balkans conflict, the EU reinforced its desire to develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar of the organization. This is especially significant because the Kosovo War took place on the European continent; therefore, EU involvement in humanitarian and peace-keeping operations was a strategic stepping-stone. In fact, the Kosovo War “proved to be the impetus for the development of an actual military force” in the EU.\textsuperscript{238} Regarding the rebuilding and peace-keeping of Kosovo after the war, the EU was the largest donor to the rebuilding of Kosovo by 1999.\textsuperscript{239}

Lastly, the U.S. ambitiously targeted terrorist groups during this period. After suffering casualties from the Khobar Towers bombing, the embassy attacks, and the USS Cole attack, the U.S. led new efforts against Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups,

which not only included bold actions abroad, but domestic reforms as well. These efforts involve executive orders and directives issued from President Clinton, and laws created by Congress. Military action was also used in 1998 as an attempt to destroy Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan following the embassy attacks.

**Part 2.5: External Threat**

The external threats NATO faced during the latter half of the 1990s include instability and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, a provoked Russia, and terrorism. The threats coming from China and rogue states are also important during this period. Instability in Eastern Europe was a top concern for NATO. As the largest (and second ever) military conflict NATO waged, its success was important not just for the alliance internally, but for the security of its European members. If mismanaged, the conflict in Bosnia and later Kosovo could have become more of a NATO – Russia conflict. Throughout the war, Russia was opposed to intervention, largely due to the ethnic linkages of the Slavic populations in Serbia and Russia.

Russia also posed a threat to NATO members over the alliance’s membership expansion policy. Although this threat has proved to be mostly unfounded, some states during the late 1990s perceived NATO’s actions as threatening toward Russia. Fortunately, by 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin no longer opposed enlargement as

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241 Particularly Executive Order 12947, “Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process” and the Presidential Decision Directive 62, which created the Office of the National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism.

242 Of most significance is the Anti-Terrorism Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
long as it enlarged “in a way that was sensitive to Russian concerns”\textsuperscript{243} and that was able to allow partnership with Russia.

New terrorist developments also threatened NATO in the late 1990s. In 1996, the Khobar Towers were bombed in Saudi Arabia by a Saudi Islamist terrorist, killing nineteen Americans. In 1998, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed by Al Qaeda, killing twelve Americans. And in 1999, American officials uncovered the Al Qaeda Millennium terrorism plot. While these attacks and plots in themselves threatened the alliance, the idea that Islamist terrorists will target NATO member states in well-coordinated attacks was very threatening.

After taking all of these points into consideration, the external threat level of NATO during this period is moderate-high.

\textbf{Part 2.6: Dyadic Cohesion}

NATO achieved high cohesion during the 1995 – 1996 period. Internally, NATO proved to members how valuable alliance membership is. One way it achieved this was by being deeply involved in many different projects, missions, and non-member states. Externally, the conflicts that NATO faced brought the alliance together more than pulled it apart. The significant events of this period that affected cohesion will again be analyzed, beginning with the definition of cohesion.

The definition of cohesion – the ability of member states to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends – will now be examined.

The first founding goal of NATO is to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area and to unify efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security. The alliance did not achieve this entire goal as well or as completely as it could. The aftermath of the Bosnia conflict and the events leading up to the Kosovo conflict, though decades and centuries in the making, could have been a higher priority for NATO during the developing stages. For instance, the alliance could have been more closely engaged in the region at least as late as 1990, when relations between NATO and the Soviet Union/Russia had improved. Instead, the alliance acted too late during both the Bosnia and Kosovo crisis. Fortunately, the cumulative military, peace-keeping, and diplomatic effort that NATO put in has paid off. Bosnia is now a sovereign country and Kosovo has a semi-autonomous government as part of Serbia.

NATO has, however, successfully unified efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security during this period. When violence and instability in Kosovo threatened regional NATO members, the alliance took collective defense measures – though outside the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty – to preserve the peace and stability of the North Atlantic area. Apart from this conflict, the alliance improved the interoperability of allies’ militaries and developed plans to modernize the alliance’s collective defense capability.

NATO’s second founding goal is to maintain its ability to resist an armed attack. The alliance’s third founding goal is to provide collective defense for every member in the alliance.
The regular goals that NATO set for itself during this period are 1) to maintain cohesion in the alliance while expanding outward, 2) stabilize the Balkans conflict and succeed in peace-keeping and military intervention, and 3) develop a new force posture and overall military strategy. For the first goal, NATO was able to superiorly foster alliance cohesion while expanding the alliance east. The road to enlargement was not conflict-free by any means, but the actual enlargement process proved to be successful as no serious internal conflict arose. The Bosnia peace-keeping mission was also successful. NATO’s SFOR commanded the peace-keeping force, which was a multilateral force comprised of alliance and non-NATO countries, including Russia. This force helped foster cohesion among members in the long term by proving NATO’s effective capability and relevance in the post-Cold War era.

The Kosovo intervention was even more ambitious. With opposition mounting from China and Russia, the alliance fought a serious war protect the native Kosovo Albanians from ethnic cleansing and to secure Kosovo at least partial autonomy. Despite a potentially dangerous standoff between NATO and Russian forces at the Belgrade airport and despite the ‘accidental’ bombing of the Chinese embassy, the war went relatively smoothly. Only twenty NATO soldiers were killed in action, which is extremely low for a modern war.

The mission to establish a new force posture and military strategy was another goal of the alliance. The new goals were in response to both necessary post-Cold War era reforms and specifically to the crises in the Balkans. NATO needed to be ready for traditional deterrence, but also engagement in non-Article V conflicts. The policies have
enabled NATO to be better prepared for future conflicts that involve air strikes, ground combat, or peace-keeping.

The strategy part of the definition of cohesion will now be examined. One thing NATO can really be proud of is the successful manner it formed and followed its strategies. First, NATO decided to go forth with expanding the alliance to East Europe. Second, NATO executed its peace-keeping mission in Bosnia successfully. Third, NATO launched its largest military offensive ever against Serb forces in Kosovo. And of course, NATO’s strategic plan – the revised New Strategic Concept – was agreed to in 1999, which prepared NATO for the twenty-first century.

The tactics NATO used to achieve its goals in the latter half of the 1990s were for the most part free of controversy. There were a few occasions that the alliance could have used better tactics to achieve the same goal including the Russian airport standoff, the bombing of the Chinese embassy, and appeasing Russia during the Kosovo War. However, the tactics used by the alliance did not hurt cohesion in any major way. And within the alliance, the decisions regarding NATO’s peace-keeping in Bosnia and going to war in Kosovo were made without internal battles.

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**TABLE 3.2**

**TABLE 3.2: continued**

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<td>GR-EU</td>
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<td>Hedge</td>
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<td>GR-Terrorism</td>
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<td>US-Russia</td>
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<td>Tether</td>
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<td>US-Yugoslavia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Balance</td>
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<td>US-EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>US-Terrorism</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td><strong>External Dyads Total</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Balance</td>
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**Part 2.7: Cohesion Theory Results**

Table 3.2 shows that NATO faced very low internal threats at 1.1/5.0 and high internal cohesion at 4.5/5.0. The predominant behavior from virtually all internal dyads reviewed is hedging. Externally, the threat level is moderate at 2.5/5.0 and cohesion level is low-moderate at 2.3. The cumulative threat level for NATO is low at 2.0/5.0. The cumulative cohesion is moderate at 3.3/5.0. Lastly the most predominant dyadic behavior is hedging.

Focusing in on the internal dimension of NATO, the 1.1/5.0 threat level is incredibly low – even lower than the previous period. Threats that affected cohesion among the allies reviewed include instability and ethnic violence in East Europe and
uncertainty over Europeanization efforts of continental security and defense. Internal cohesion was able to reach very high levels at 4.5/5.0. Cohesion was maintained absent a very high external threat or balancing/bandwagoning behavior.

The external threat level was 2.5/5.0 which is moderate. This is very significant for NATO considering how many external issues the alliance faced. Moreover, the cohesion of external dyads was 2.3/5.0, which, while low-moderate, is impressive considering the external challenges NATO faced, including the Kosovo War.

The cumulative threat level was 2.0/5.0. This low-moderate level of threat reflects how well NATO managed its internal issues. The cumulative cohesion level is 3.3/5.0, which also reflects the ability of NATO to effectively manage its internal dyads.

Weitsman’s theory of alliance cohesion describes the cohesion status of NATO during 1995 – 2000 to the same extent it did in the previous period. Her Threats and Cohesion matrix (see Table 1.2) claims that NATO’s low internal threat (1.1/5.0) and moderate external threat (2.5/5.0) will produce moderate to high cohesion internal to the alliance. Cohesion was in fact moderately high at (4.5/5.0). She also states that this type of alliance is usually characterized by balancing; however, NATO exhibited hedging behavior.

1996 – 2000 COHESION CONCLUSION

While the internal environment was quite stable, externally NATO was fighting the toughest conflict in its fifty-year history. For NATO’s allies that are geographically closer to Serbia (Hungary, Czech Republic, Italy, Greece), the Kosovo conflict posed a severe external threat due to the possibility of refugees and spreading of violence across
borders, which was a worry new to alliance. The external threat that the Kosovo conflict and other forces had on NATO was reflected by a balancing behavior. Moreover, NATO was able to maintain moderate-high cohesion during the entire decade. The internal threat level in NATO was low due to the lack of significant adversarial dyadic relationships. The external threats level was moderate-high due to Serbia’s action in Kosovo and the general instability in the Balkans, coupled with resistance from Russia and growth of terrorist groups worldwide.

From the perspective of NATO members, the post-Cold War era lacked nuclear threats or threats of invasion. But other threats formed, notably the instability in the Balkans and from terrorist groups. Influenced by the multilateralist foreign policy of President Bill Clinton, NATO members continued to hedge to the United States, which enabled the alliance to sustain its high level of internal cohesion. At the same time, NATO enforced its collective security capacity by going to war in Eastern Europe. This aggressive policy reflects balancing behavior. Therefore NATO was a hedge-balance alliance during the latter half of the 1990s.


While the previous decade was extremely important in NATO’s history, the next five years brought forth unexpected challenges that tested the fabric of the alliance. The event that triggered a series of challenging events is the attacks on the United States by Al Qaeda. The attacks reaffirmed the importance of counter-terrorism and national security measures and ushered in a renewed realization that NATO members face a substantial threat after the Cold War.
However, what has been most telling to the alliance is its collective response to the attacks. For the first time in history, NATO invoked Article V to militarily respond to the aggressor. While initial engagement against the Taliban was successful, the succeeding peace-keeping and nation-building efforts have been very difficult. A strain on American and British resources occurred when the countries invaded Iraq just two years later. The alliance’s performance in Afghanistan and the political in-fighting concerning Iraq among allies is what the cohesion of NATO centers on in the 2000s.

**Part 3.1: Background**

Before 2001, counter-terrorism efforts among NATO members was an important part of their national security strategies. But among the alliance’s top two contributors, the U.S. and Great Britain, terrorism posed less a threat than nuclear proliferation or rogue states. In the U.S., the Clinton administration actively pursued Al Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden during 1993 – 2001, but never at a level of absolute urgency. Americans had recently experienced the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, the Oklahoma City federal building bombing in 1995, the 1998 embassy bombings, and the Yemen attack on a U.S. Navy ship in 2002. But none of these attacks involved the mass-killing of Americans, let alone persons on U.S. soil. In Great Britain, the Irish Republican Army and other separatist groups had virtually halted terrorist attacks by 1996, while the ETA’s use of violence in Spain also declined. Therefore, when almost 3,000 civilians died in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 from a terrorist attack, terrorism was given a new priority by all alliance members.
Three years following the 2001 attacks, Spain suffered a significant loss when commuter trains were bombed, killing 191 people. Although Al Qaeda was not directly involved, most suspect a small Islamist group as the culprit. Great Britain was also attacked in 2005 by an Islamist group affiliated with Al Qaeda, but based in Great Britain. Fifty-six people died and several hundreds were injured in the attack.

NATO responded to the new tide of terrorism through Operation Eagle Assist to patrol U.S. skies, the International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) for peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) Balkans, and Operation Active Endeavor to fight terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO has also taken steps to improve its members’ abilities to prepare, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks. Preparing alliance forces to respond via Article V to another attack similar to the one on September 11, 2001 is also a priority. NATO has reached out to other countries, councils, and organizations to fight the War on Terrorism. These include the NATO-Russia Council, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the EU, Russia, and several Middle Eastern countries.

Following the 2001 attack, NATO invoked Article V for the first time to collectively authorize the invasion of Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan harbored Al Qaeda and allegedly Bin Laden, and since it was a rouge state anyway, NATO allies swiftly approved the invasion. Although the invasion was legitimized by the alliance, the U.S. was the primary country involved in the early stages. Since 2001, more NATO allies and non-NATO countries have been involved. A reluctant U.S. eventually became supportive.

of the ISAF, which is authorized by the UN and led by NATO. The ISAF is charged with assisting the new Afghan government to exercise its authority over the country, reconstructing the country’s infrastructure, and helping the new government build its defense and military. There have been over 574 Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF troops killed since 2001.

Although the Afghanistan war was legitimized under Article V of the NATO Treaty, a subsequent war in Iraq was not. In 2003, the U.S., Great Britain, and others invaded Iraq as a coalition. The invasion was spurred upon by the War on Terrorism, despite any serious terrorist cell located in Iraq before the invasion. However, spreading democracy, removing potential WMD stockpiles, and regime change were important goals of the war.

Over three years after the invasion, no evidence of pre-9/11 Iraq-al Qaeda links surfaced, nor have any WMDs. Consequences of the pre-war intelligence failures hurt the U.S. administration at home and abroad. To make matters worse, U.S. forces misjudged the subsequent insurgency and influx of terrorists. By 2007, the military and political failings in Iraq, which have left thousands of U.S. troops dead, have hurt NATO in a way unimaginable.

While the failures in Iraq have brought instability to the region, it has also brought instability to NATO. The United States originally hoped for NATO to legitimize the Iraq War as it had the Afghanistan War. Although invoking Article V was not an option, U.S.

authorities hoped for the same level of cooperation that NATO pledged to the Balkans crisis. What made the Iraq War different is that there was not a crisis or armed conflicts inside the country prior to the invasion, instead many perceive a growing threat from Iraq President Saddam Hussein. Since NATO allies view justification for war in Iraq and fundamentally different than the war in Afghanistan, the alliance was not heavily involved.

In fact, France, Germany, and Belgium initially opposed NATO involvement with Turkey during the lead-up to war. They thought that NATO cooperation with Turkey before the war may usher support for a UN Security Council resolution to authorize the invasion and it may mean further encourage the U.S. to invade. The countries eventually gave in to the support for Turkey, but the U.S. attempt to get a resolution passed at the UN was withdrawn.

While NATO members were facing tough challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq, internal alliance developments advanced. In 2004, seven new countries were admitted to NATO: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This significant expansion was the largest ever. The enlargement ended the ideological debate about how much of Europe will be able to attain NATO membership. By 2004, NATO membership had spread all throughout West Europe, the Mediterranean, East Europe, and even several former Soviet countries. During this period Croatia became a member of the Membership Action Plan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia become part of the Individual Partnership Action Plan, and Tajikistan, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbia entered the Partnership for Peace.
During this time period, NATO became a much more active actor in world politics. The alliance has enormous responsibility in Afghanistan, in which it engages in peace-keeping and nation-building efforts. Concerning the Iraq War, NATO nations were divided about the decision to invade and the strategy to rebuild the country. President Bush failed to receive authorization both in the United Nations and NATO. Eventually, however, NATO provided Turkey with precautionary defensive measure, in preparation for an attack or influx of refugees from neighboring Iraq. NATO also supported Poland, a member of the Iraq War coalition, with force generation, communications, logistics and movements.\(^\text{247}\) Finally, NATO trained Iraqi forces to assist in the post-invasion occupation and rebuilding of Iraq.\(^\text{248}\)

Another mission for NATO during this period was Operation Essential Harvest, which involved the deployment of NATO troops to Macedonia in 2001 to aid in the disarmament of ethnic Albanian militant groups. While NATO’s involvement in the Balkans was winding down, the alliance also improved its relations with the European Union. With the 2002 NATO – EU Declaration on the European Security and Defense Policy, the two organizations developed framework that enables them to cooperate in crisis management and conflict prevention.

The NATO – Russia Council also creates cooperative framework between the alliance and an important regional country. The Council is a forum for “consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint-decision and joint action on a wide range of

security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region between NATO and Russia.”249 This partnership has proven to bring the alliance and its former adversary close together in the post-Cold War era.

While NATO faced its most ambitious mission to date, the alliance encountered important internal reforms and projects. First, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought changes to the alliance. Second, the alliance formed a very close relationship with the EU, whose security and defense aims overlap those of NATO. Third, the command structure was streamlined so that it can be “leaner, more flexible, more efficient, and better able to conduct the full range of Alliance missions”250 around the world. Lastly, enlargement of the alliance was a significant project. Several countries became official members during this period, while almost a dozen become part of one of NATO’s cooperative partnership councils.

**Part 3.2: Internal Dyads**

**BRITISH INTERNAL DYADS**

Great Britain’s relationship with France during 2001 – 2005 diverged largely on the issue of Iraq. Since France bitterly opposed the war, this made its relations with Great Britain worsen over other foreign policy issues. In fact, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw commented on the bilateral relationship by stating, “Both sides are committed to good relations but there is also this sense that some French politicians want to set France up as a separate pole to create a bipolar world . . . That could cause greater

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instability in the world . . . It is very important that we both recognize the consequences of our actions.”

However, two years prior, when NATO invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., relations between Great Britain and France were close. During this time, NATO authorized the U.S. and its coalition to invade Afghanistan to eliminate terrorist training camps and cells, and to install a democratic government. While Great Britain was the main U.S. ally in this ongoing effort, many other NATO allies contributed significantly, particularly France.

Within EU institutions, Anglo – Franco differences were seen in “the lengthy debate about the extent of links between the EU and NATO and about how much redundancy the EU should have in its military planning staff”. The role of the ESDI and later the ESDP in providing continental security and defense has been an especially troubling issue for Great Britain and the U.S. because both countries very much want to see NATO maintain its strength and influence.

After the 2001 attack, the U.S. received NATO and UN authorization to invade Afghanistan to remove the Taliban government and go after Al Qaeda terrorists. Great Britain was able to become America’s top ally in the war and eventually took lead of a large amount of coalition soldiers in Afghanistan. Before the war began, Great Britain was an adamant supporter of U.S. policies and goals in the region. It supplied the second

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largest number of forces and total support to the war. British policies on the Iraq War, however, caused severe opposition from its European and NATO allies. Germany, in particular, adamantly opposed the U.S. and British-led war in Iraq. This opposition largely mounted from claims that the U.S. was behaving unilaterally in an imperialist manner and did not appreciate ‘Old Europe’ (French and German) support. Officials from Germany worried that the new U.S. policies in the Middle East would lead to further discord in the region. Along with their political opposition, Germany did not supply and troops to the war, while both it and France did send troops to the first Gulf War in Iraq and in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Although France and Germany mounted opposition to Great Britain over the Iraq War, Great Britain and the U.S. maintained very close relations. Since Great Britain supplied the most troops to Afghanistan\textsuperscript{255} and Iraq\textsuperscript{256} (after the U.S.) it became clear that Great Britain was America’s top ally and Prime Minister Blair was President Bush’s top head of state supporter.

However, when Great Britain suffered a significant terrorist attack in July of 1995, it realized that the Islamist terrorist threat that it faces is quite different than the threat the U.S. faces.\textsuperscript{257} After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Great Britain prepared for a similar attack: one in which several thousands of people would die from an external terrorist group attack. However, the 1995 attack revealed that Great Britain’s threat may be more homegrown Islamic extremists than an external group like Al Qaeda. Although

the threats the countries face may be different, Great Britain and the U.S. are incredibly close allies.

**FRENCH INTERNAL DYADS**

France’s relationship with Great Britain during this period resembles its historic foreign policy of individuality and, to an extent, stubbornness. Since World War II, France has taken a more active role in providing for its national security, while at the same time realizing the importance of working in a multilateral alliance. The U.S. and Great Britain’s invasion of Iraq without French, German, UN, or NATO backing was viewed as imperialist and disrespectful to the French. Some even describe it as France sees “a new aggressive strain of messianic universalism in U.S. policy, a willingness to impose democracy by use of the U.S. military”\(^{258}\).

Moreover, if the Saddam Hussein government was to be overthrown, France would have preferred a multilateral invasion similar to the Gulf War coalition that included all major European powers. Since the U.S. and Great Britain bypassed ‘Old Europe’ in its ad-hoc coalition, France and Germany stubbornly oppose the war. This conflict has worsened relations between France and Great Britain.

Another significant issue that weakened cohesion among the allies is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Some think the multinational policy overly favors France over the rest of Europe, which generates animosity.\(^{259}\) From France’s perspective, Great Britain and the rest of the EU agreed in 2002 on a set policy for CAP funding to each member until 2013. France does not want to revise this agreement at all, which is


what has caused significant discourse in the EU, particularly because CAP funding accounts for most of the EU’s more than €100 billion EUR. From Great Britain’s perspective, it contributes more to the CAP than it receives; therefore reform is needed to ensure equality for all EU members.

During this time period French relations with Germany improved. Part of the reason for this is due to both countries’ efforts in leading other countries to oppose the Iraq War. At the fortieth anniversary of the Elysee Treaty, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder both said that war in Iraq is not inevitable, and if it is to occur, it must be authorized by the UN. While France and Germany prevented the UN from authorizing the war, they also prevented NATO from having a role in the war.

The Iraq conflict and disunity in NATO caused relations between France and the U.S. to suffer. While relations have been historically tense (but often cooperative), the NATO crisis over Iraq made relations the weakest in decades. French leaders had a fundamental different view on Iraq. French President Chirac thought a war in Iraq would outrage Arab and Islamic public opinion and “create a large number of little bin Ladens.” In other words, war in Iraq – even for noble and necessary purpose – would have many negative consequences.

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Anti-French sentiment in American society and even in government was also at a very high level. Perhaps the peak of the conflict between France and the U.S. was Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s comments: “Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem . . . But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They’re not with France and Germany on this, they’re with the United States . . . Germany and France represent ‘old Europe’ and NATO's expansion in recent years means the center of gravity is shifting to the east.” These comments are very significant because they symbolize the perception of American unilateralism. This perception hindered relations not only with France and the U.S., but the U.S. and Germany, Russia, China and several other countries.

GERMAN INTERNAL DYADS

Germany’s relationship during the 2000s with Great Britain encountered several conflicts. First and foremost, Germany adamantly opposed the war in Iraq. Since Great Britain and the U.S. were leading the war without UN or NATO authorization – institutions that Germany and France use to increase their relative power in Europe and the world – Germany felt forced to oppose the war. By opposing Great Britain’s actions, Germany also ‘emancipated’ itself as an independent country not dependent on Great Britain or the United States for military, political, or economic needs. While Germany values American leadership as the world hegemon and its commitment in

NATO, it also realizes the importance of its own capacity for leadership. The 2000s really have revealed Germany without its World War II or Cold War constraints. In fact, German military involvement in the Balkans and Afghanistan was met with little controversy internationally. Within the EU, relations between Germany and Great Britain are also tense. The rumors and backdoor agreements over agricultural issues between Germany and France (without Great Britain) have caused suspicion and distrust.\(^{268}\)

While German – Anglo relations weakened, Germany’s relationship with France strengthened. The alliance between the two countries – largely founded in the Elysee Treaty of 1963 – has increased in importance since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Germany and France are close allies within the UN, EU, and NATO. They are also engaged in Afghanistan under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. Regarding economic relations, France and Germany have developed a ‘special relationship’ within the EU. The 2002 Brussels Summit is a good example of this relationship, when Germany and France developed a mutually favorable agricultural policy, which excluded other EU members. Some described this event as, “Chirac had defended French agriculture against drastic changes; Schröder had averted any increase in the CAP budget”\(^{269}\); thus, their mutual self-interests were attained.

The German – U.S. partnership took a drastic turn during the 2000s. After World War II, Germany developed close relations – a ‘special relationship’ – with the United


States.\textsuperscript{270} After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ‘partnership in leadership’, as it was also called, unified Germany even more.\textsuperscript{271} But the German opposition to the Iraq War has proved to be symbolic because it shows that Germany no longer has a blanket policy toward the U.S. and therefore it will not automatically support U.S. foreign endeavors.

While German – U.S. relations remain tense over the Iraq issue, both countries also cooperate in various other ways. The U.S. still has around 150,000\textsuperscript{272} troops on German soil and both countries cooperate in NATO, the UN, and in their economic partnership. Germany also contributes to the War on Terror, including Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the ISAF.\textsuperscript{273} Germany’s commitment on this is especially important due to its sizable Muslim population, which is almost four percent of its total population, some of which have extremist views, whom terrorists might seek to recruit.\textsuperscript{274} Germany also felt an urgent responsibility to respond to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks because it was center in the planning of the attack. Lastly, Germany also has about 7,800 troops abroad, of which approximately forty percent are engaged in counterterrorism operations.\textsuperscript{275}

\textsuperscript{273} For more information on Germany’s counter-terrorism cooperation, see Crumpton, Henry. “U.S. – German Counter-terrorism Efforts.” \textit{U.S. Department of State}. September 6, 2006. \url{Http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2006/73812.htm}.
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid.
**AMERICAN INTERNAL DYADS**

The United States and Great Britain continued their historically strong relationship into the 2000s. While the Iraq conflict isolated many European powers from the U.S., it brought Great Britain and the U.S. together in a strategic way. Since Great Britain is the largest European contributor to both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, it is undoubtedly America’s number one ally. In other words, relations between both countries are extremely positive, despite domestic opposition in both countries.

U.S. – French and U.S. – German relations were just the opposite during this time period. The French and German resistance to America’s efforts in Iraq has not only worsened diplomatic relations with the U.S., but it has contributed to the deterioration of NATO’s cohesion. The enduring Afghanistan battle has also put the alliance is a precarious position. If the new Afghanistan government is unable to succeed and another Islamist government takes over, then NATO’s utility and capacity will be viewed in a different manner. This means NATO is being tested by its success in Afghanistan. However, if France and Germany did not block the United States’ goal of legitimizing the Iraq War through NATO, then perhaps NATO’s ability to conduct coalition warfare would have already been crippled. Even though France and Germany maintain an open relationship with the United States and cooperate in Afghanistan, the UN, and in the War on Terrorism, the Iraq opposition will impede positive relations between the countries for years to come. In fact, in 2002, Deputy Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz reiterated Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s policy that “the mission must determine the

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coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission." This has been interpreted as under-valuing military alliances like NATO and allies like France and Germany, who both opposes the U.S. case for war in Iraq.

**Part 3.3: Internal Threat**

The Iraq stalemate is making victory in Afghanistan difficult. Since 2006, NATO has taken charge of a large region of Afghanistan, making it the alliance’s largest military operation to date. Over 500 alliance troops have died so far in the operation, which is an unprecedented loss for the alliance. The tension from Iraq started during the lead-up to war when several NATO allies, including France, fiercely opposed the decision to invade. When the U.S. decided to go on without full support from NATO, a rift emerged in NATO that has yet to go away. This contributed to the moderate to high internal threat present in the alliance.

During the latter half of the 1990s, NATO experienced very low internal cohesion. This was largely due to the high level of competition for power within the alliance. The U.S. and Great Britain sought NATO to authorize and participate in the Iraq War, while France and Germany wanted NATO to not be involved in the war in Iraq. From their perspective, the U.S. and Great Britain pursued war in Iraq arrogantly and without consent or participation of Europe’s other two top military powers. While France

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and Germany both would have like to seen a new regime take power in Iraq, a unilateral war without their participation or the participation of the UN or NATO was not worth it.

It is important to examine the method in which the policy on war in Iraq was formulated in 2003 compared with the war in 1990 – 1991. The first Iraq war was led by the U.S., but with a broad coalition of European, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries, among many others. It had authorization from the UN Security Council and both Germany and France took part in it. The second war saw the U.S. lead a divided coalition to war without clear objectives or post-war plans. Therefore, even though NATO did not authorize the first war (as it was clearly outside of the scope of Article V), its members were active supporters of the policy and participants in the war. Since the opposite is true of the second Iraq War, it is evident that German and French support from early stages could have helped improve NATO political involvement in the war and NATO cohesion overall.

Therefore, the internal threat level was moderate-high during this period.

**Part 3.4: External Dyads**

**BRITISH EXTERNAL DYADS**

Great Britain was part of the U.S. invasion of the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan from the start of the ‘Shock and Awe’ campaign. The British Foreign Office had poor relations with the young Taliban government, of which it did not recognize as legitimate leading up to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. During 2000, an international incident occurred when a jetliner was allegedly hijacked from Afghanistan and eventually landed in a London airport. Cooperation between British and Taliban authorities resulted in the
Taliban declaring that it would not negotiate with terrorists and that they “trust the British
government to take any action they deem fit.” However, while this incident did not
really affect the bilateral relationship, by 2001 the Taliban’s shelter of Al Qaeda
operatives and its poppy industry did. After the Taliban was ousted by the U.S. and
British-led coalition, the new democratic leader of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, maintains
positive relations with Great Britain and the NATO alliance as a whole. Karzai’s
government is dependent on Great Britain’s contribution to NATO forces that engage in
nation-building, peace-keeping, and security efforts.

Great Britain’s relationship to the Saddam Hussein-ruled Iraq was poor. British
forces were part of the Clinton administration’s bombing campaign in the 1990s and
leading up to President Bush’s second month in office in February of 2001. During 2003,
Great Britain’s relations with Iraq soured after a diplomatic solution to a weapons
inspection plan failed in the UN. While European powers fractured – some calling for
further diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and prevent war – others, including Great
Britain saw an opportunity to partner with the U.S. and use its exemplary combat and
support forces.

British relations with North Korea, which have also been very tense and
antagonistic, did not lead to war. Diplomatic relations expanded between North Korea
and Britain (and Germany) in 2000 and focus on methods to prevent war and escalation

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281 For more on the fracture of public opinion over the Iraq War in Europe, see Graff, James; Kirwin, Joe;
Kucharski, Tadeusz L.; McAllister, J.F.O.; Radu, Mihai; Simeonova, Violeta; Stojaspal, Jan; Turgut, Pelin.
of tension. Unlike the U.S., Great Britain was not part of the Six Party Talks, which began in 2003.

While various diplomatic initiatives failed in the 2000s, diplomatic dialogue has prevented war with Iran. However, the fact that relations worsened to the extent that war was a possibility may signify that Great Britain and others’ diplomatic initiatives with Iran failed to the largest extent. Great Britain, along with the U.S., is concerned with Iran’s nuclear energy program which could be used as a nuclear weapons program. Great Britain is also concerned with Iran’s foreign policy, namely its relationship with terrorist and insurgent forces in Iraq and with terrorist networks worldwide. Some believe that if Iran wanted to, it could take a more proactive role in the insurgency and even claim part of the Iraq territory from British forces deployed there. Great Britain was part of the EU Three (along with France and Germany) that negotiated non-proliferation issues with Iran, but so far has failed. In 2005, Iran announced to Great Britain and all other countries that have been involved, that it will end its suspension of uranium enrichment.

Another threatening aspect of the Great Britain – Iran relationship is Iran’s military. The army of Iran alone includes a 350,000 soldier force, while the full active

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duty military includes 540,000 troops\textsuperscript{287}. The latter number ranks Iran’s military the eighth largest in the world, in terms of number of active duty soldiers, which is much greater than Great Britain (206,000), France (259,000), and Germany (284,000), but not larger than the 1.6 million soldier force of the U.S.\textsuperscript{288}

Although Iran’s military and political ambitions in the region are worrisome to Great Britain, the bilateral economic relationship has actually grown over the years. British exports to Iran increased from $580 million in 2000 to $875 million in 2004\textsuperscript{289}. However, economic cooperation is far outweighed by tense political relations between the two countries, which could in fact still lead to war.

British counter-terrorism efforts during the 2000s have been focused on home-grown threats\textsuperscript{290} as well as foreign. Because of these threats, Great Britain’s counter-terrorism laws are among the most stringent in the world.\textsuperscript{291} The London Bombings of 2005 reinforced how important domestic counter-terrorism efforts are. From an international perspective, Great Britain is very involved in the apprehension of terrorist suspects and the destruction of terrorist cells.

Great Britain’s relationship with the EU was cooperative in the 2000s, despite some setbacks. The EU Constitution, which was ratified by many EU members, was not voted upon by the British Parliament. Instead, Prime Minister Blair opted for a national

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{287}“Military.” \textit{Global Security}. January 25, 2006. \texttt{Http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/active-force.htm}.
\item \textsuperscript{288}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{290}For more information on Great Britain’s home-grown Islamist terrorist threats, see Chance, Matthew. “Britain’s Home-Grown Terrorists.” \textit{Cable News Network}. July 14, 2005. \texttt{Http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/14/homegrown.terror}.
\end{itemize}
referendum, which has not yet occurred. Moreover, when the Euro went into circulation in virtually all EU countries in 2002, Great Britain held on to the British Pound. The Common Agricultural Policy portion of the EU budget was also a hot issue, particularly when Britain held the Presidency in the European Council in the latter half of 2005.\textsuperscript{292} Another important issue for Great Britain relating to the EU is enlargement. In 2004, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia all became EU members in the largest EU expansion initiative ever. Great Britain fully supported enlargement.

\textbf{FRENCH EXTERNAL DYADS}

While the U.S. and Great Britain took the lead in the invasion of Afghanistan, French troops also contribute to the ongoing operation. France supported the policy to invade Afghanistan and remove the Taliban after diplomatic solutions failed. It was also one of the first countries to send troops.\textsuperscript{293} There are currently around 2,000 French troops in Afghanistan serving under the International Security Assistance Force of NATO.\textsuperscript{294}

Along with Germany, France was the leader in Europe and the world against the U.S. move to invade Iraq. While French reservations for the U.S. policy largely centers on reluctance to support wars not authorized by the UN and/or NATO and to prevent a hasty and unilateral U.S. foreign policy. In fact, “For some time now, the United States and France have pursued different approaches to Iraq. Ever since the Gulf war, the

French have been highly critical of the U.S. over-reliance on military means to coerce the Iraqi leadership to cease and desist on issues ranging from their use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in the north of the country to enforcement of the no-fly zones by U.S. and UK aircraft. The French, in contrast, have been willing to enter into negotiations with the regime on issues of mutual concern.” Therefore, the French opposition to the U.S. policy on Iraq following the 2001 attacks on the U.S. should come as no surprise, especially in the absence of evidence that suggest Iraq poses a new and significant threat to the U.S. or others.

France also had economic interests at stake in Iraq. Iraq was one of the world’s top exporters of oil and France had a strategic economic relationship with its oil industry. In fact, “the French and the Hussein government in the early 1990s entered into a memorandum of understanding calling for French companies to develop oil fields and produce 1 million bbl. a day” Furthermore, between 1996 and 2003, France exported $3.5 billion USD in goods to Iraq and in 2001 alone, French exports to Iraq reached $650 million USD, which was more than any other country.

France – North Korea relations were weak during this period, just as French relations with Afghanistan and Iran were weak. Since France does not have normalized diplomatic relations with North Korea, its policies on North Korean nuclear issues do not involve actual diplomatic cooperation with North Korea. France supports the Six Party

Talks as an alternative to direct diplomatic relations, which is consistent with the U.S., Great Britain, and Germany’s policy. France has been a leader in Europe, along with Great Britain, on efforts to lure North Korea to comply with international commitments surrounding nuclear weapons. Former French President Jacques Chirac has said that he has “confidence – and the word is a weak one – in the ability of the current regime [of North Korea] either to guarantee human rights or to guarantee non-accession to nuclear power status.”

France – Iran relations have also been very rocky since the start of the Iraq War. Consistent with its policy in the late 1980s, France opposes Iran’s post-Shah government; however, France also permitted revolutionary Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to reside in France while he plotted and prepared the Iranian Revolution. This fact gives France a unique perspective on Iran’s government and, in a way, a responsibility to prevent a similar situation from happening again on its soil. In fact, in 2003 France took action against the People's Mujahedin of Iran – an Iranian group who some label a terrorist group – under suspicions it was relocating its headquarters on French soil. While France opposes Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it also opposes the President of Iran’s statement against Jews and Israel. Although political relations between France and Iran eroded after the Iraq War, France maintained diplomatic and economic ties to Iran.

301 Clarke, David. “Europe Condemns Iran’s Call to Wipe out Israel.” Reuters. October 27, 2005.
French counter-terrorism efforts during this period centered countering threats from Islamist and domestic extremist groups. Since France has experienced terrorist activity from Islamic groups on its own soil for decades and since it has the largest Muslim population in Europe, it has taken bold steps against terrorist groups. In fact, France is considered by many to have one of the strictest anti-terrorism programs in the country. The main tenants of France’s counter-terrorism strategy are the “privileged relationship between intelligence services and dedicated magistrates, as well as the qualification of acts of terrorism as autonomous offences punishable by increased penalties.” Another important component of it is the Vigipirate, which is France’s color-coded national security alert system.

Lastly, France – EU relations during this period were very positive. Regarding economic policy, France was seen to have an unfair advantage regarding EU subsidy to French farmers via the Common Agricultural Policy. This policy is an example of how some view France as wanting “a strong EU that conducts politics towards other centers, but at the same time it wants a strong French national presence in Europe where France conducts a politics of alliances that threatens to fragment the structures of the EU.” Another important EU issue affected France’s relations with the EU is the

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303 Ibid.
305 Ibid.
French electorate’s ‘no’ vote (55% against) on the European Constitution, which went against the support President Chirac had for the treaty.\footnote{French electorate’s ‘no’ vote (55% against) on the European Constitution, which went against the support President Chirac had for the treaty.}

\textbf{GERMAN EXTERNAL DYADS}

During 2001 – 2005, Germany contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom and the ISAF in Afghanistan. German relations with the former government were very poor leading up to the 2001 offensive. Along with the rest of Europe, Germany supported the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban-run Afghanistan. Germany’s perspective in this war is completely different from all other allies in that it is the first authorized military action Germany has taken since World War II. In 2001, following the Al Qaeda attacks on the U.S., Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had to receive support from the German parliament to officially permit Germany to engage in foreign wars.

Although Germany supported U.S. action in Afghanistan after the 2001 terrorist attacks, it joined with France in opposing the Iraq War. German foreign policy since World War II focuses on diplomacy over war, and this attitude is definitely reflected in its policy on Iraq. It is also important to point out that Germany already had troops deployed around the world by 2003: 3,000 in the Balkans and 4,000 in Afghanistan.\footnote{“International Security Assistance Force.” \textit{North Atlantic Treaty Organization}. March 14, 2007. \url{Http://www.nato.int/isaf/media/pdf/placemat_isaf.pdf}.} Therefore, if Germany was to provide a significant amount of forces to Iraq, comparable to British force levels, its military could be overstretched. Lastly, it is important to note that German opposition to U.S. war aims in Iraq is the first time bilateral relations have been so conflictive in decades on a foreign policy.

During this period, Germany’s relationship with the North Korean government also deteriorated. Since Germany is committed to non-proliferation, it opposed North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the communist North Korea split from the South is also symbolic of Germany’s previous split with the communist East German government. Therefore, North Korea’s communist outlook coupled with its determined militaristic foreign policy makes diplomatic cooperation very difficult.

However, one area where Germany did cooperate with a rogue state directly is with Iran on the issue of its nuclear program. In 2000, Germany pressured Iran diplomatically, with its European allies, to end its quest for a nuclear program, which Germany thought would prevent war and escalation of tension. Again in 2005, Germany, France, and Great Britain met with Iranian officials in another attempt to convince Iran to end its nuclear ambition. Germany’s persistence with Iran in using diplomatic might—as opposed to military threats—reflects a consistent policy beginning as early as 1995. During 1995, Germany broke with the Clinton administration on how to deal with Iran and its nuclear ambition. The U.S. tried to “isolate Iran diplomatically and strangle its economy. German—and Europe—favor engagement . . . built around a multibillion-dollar trade and investment relationship.” Clearly, Germany fundamentally views the method to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear program differently than the U.S.

In fact, while Germany and Iran also had little diplomatic communication during the 2000s, its economic relationship was strong. Germany was and still is Iran’s top importer of goods.\textsuperscript{313} Germany and Iran’s strong economic relationship actually goes back decades, but potential for normalized diplomatic cooperation is minimal due to Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its President’s recent comments toward Jews, Hitler, and Israel. Furthermore, Germany’s membership in the EU and NATO also makes cooperation difficult because many of Germany’s allies have tense relations which may actually turn to war in the next few years.

While Germany’s defense forces are approximately equivalent to its European neighbors, it is quite active in the War on Terrorism. Its counter-terrorism policy has been reinvigorated after the terrorist attacks on America. German efforts have resulted in the apprehension of Al Qaeda suspects, while German forces were deployed abroad to fight terrorism in Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, the Horn of Africa, and on the coast outside the Lebanon – Israel border.\textsuperscript{314}

An important aspect of Germany’s fight against terrorist groups is that since 2001, Germany perceives terrorist groups as a real and urgent threat to its homeland. In fact, “Like the United States, Germany now sees radical Islamic terrorism as its primary national security threat and itself as a potential target of attack. Today, Germany also recognizes that threat to its domestic security lie far beyond its own boarder, in places

\textsuperscript{313} Afrasiabi, Kaveh. “Carrots, Sticks and the Isolations of Iran.” \textit{Asia Times}. May 27, 2006. \texttt{Http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HE27Ak01.html}.
such as Afghanistan.”

This reveals that the threat present in the U.S. from terrorists – and its effect on government – is also present in Germany now.

Moreover, as Europe’s top economic power, Germany has a real stake in the EU. During this period, Germany maintained its powerful position in the organization, politically, economically, and militarily. In 2003, Germany was a leader in the ESDP reform and has taken part in the security and defense arm’s operations across the world; Bosnia, Macedonia, the Congo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Importantly, Germany is also the largest EU member to successfully ratify the European Constitution treaty in 2005.

AMERICAN EXTERNAL DYADS

In the years leading up to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. was “Sensitive to criticism that it had forsaken Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal,” but it also had “consistently, although with varying intensity, supported UN efforts to bring about a peaceful transition of power.” After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. discovered that the perpetrators were Al Qaeda terrorists, and since Afghanistan harbored Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda cells, the U.S. offered an ultimatum to hand over the terrorists. While Afghanistan continued to harbor Bin Laden, the U.S. pressured for his extradition. The Taliban government offered to try Bin Laden...
Laden in an Islamic Court, which the U.S. outright rejected. Since the Taliban did not cooperate fully with U.S. demands, and since it was an Islamist dictatorship anyway, the U.S. invaded. NATO allies supported the invocation of Article V to authorize the war and subsequent occupation. By 2005, the U.S. had overthrown the Taliban’s authority over Afghanistan, but there is still instability in the country, with insurgent, warlords, and former Taliban sects seeking control.

Immediately after the 2001 attacks on the U.S., President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and other administration officials began discussion to invade Iraq (after or simultaneous to Afghanistan) to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and to establish a democratic government. While Iraq had no collaborative role with Al Qaeda, and in fact viewed the terrorist group as a threat, U.S. officials, including President Bush, publicly claimed that there were links that serve as justification for war. When the U.S. finally gave up a diplomatic solution to the crisis in the United Nations Security Council, it launched Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003.

Although Iraq was not involved in the attacks, the need to remove threats to the U.S. was urgent. Iraq became a target because it previously had WMDs and a nuclear weapons program. There was not clear evidence of this before the invasion, but there was concern that if Iraq actually had WMDs – or acquired them in the future – it would

323 Ibid.
give or sell them to terrorist groups or other rogue states to use against U.S. interests.\footnote{See Powel, Colin. “U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council.” \textit{The White House}. February 5, 2003. \url{http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html}.}

For these reasons, and the fact that the previous Bush administration waged war in Iraq short of regime change, the U.S. invaded Iraq. By 2005, the Saddam Hussein regime was overthrown and a new Islamic democratic government was in place. However, insurgents, terrorists, and those still loyal to Saddam and his Baath Party engaged in a violent campaign against occupying and national troops and civilians. The violence has made the new Iraq government very unstable.

When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq to remove regimes and terrorist cells it perceived as threatening, it also pressured North Korea and Iran to halt nuclear programs. By September of 2004, under the Bush administration, North Korea announced it developed its first nuclear weapons.\footnote{“Timeline N Korea Nuclear Standoff.” \textit{British Broadcasting Corporation}. April 17, 2007. \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2604437.stm}.} As a rogue regime that pits the U.S. as an ‘evil empire’, the North Korea threat is real – particularly to U.S. allies and interests in Asia. Relations between the two countries did not get in better when, in 2002, President Bush declared North Korea (and Iran) as an ‘axis of evil’.\footnote{Bush, George. “President Delivers State of the Union Address.” \textit{The White House}. January 29, 2002. \url{http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html}.} The Bush administration did not engage in formal diplomatic communication with North Korea, but has relied on the Six Party Talks to draw North Korea’s regional neighbors into conversation. This led to an announcement in 2005 that the U.S. and North Korea are
committed to “take steps to normalize relations and discuss outstanding issues of concern”\(^{328}\).

While North Korea still poses a threat to the U.S., Iran does too. By 2005, Iran had progressed on their efforts to develop nuclear energy facilities – which could also eventually be used for nuclear weapon development.\(^{329}\) Although the U.S., France, and several others possess both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons programs, the U.S. maintains a cautious policy to non-nuclear states who want to develop a new program, even if the stated purpose is for strictly energy purpose. The U.S. is also suspicious of Iran’s relationship with Iraq insurgent and political groups. As Iraq’s neighboring country, Iran sees it in its interest for fellow Sunnis and pro-Islamists to take power either through present government structures or through a new government.\(^{330}\)

American efforts against terrorist groups and states that support or sponsor terror reached unprecedented levels during this period. The source of the threat was the same as the previous period, but the tactics of terrorist groups were misunderstood. U.S. intelligence agencies knew terrorists in the past or present have considered creative methods to kill mass amounts of civilians, but the idea of using commercial jets as missiles was not an idea that was focused on.\(^{331}\) When the U.S. fully understood the resolve of Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, it quickly developed a new grand strategy to counter these threats, most of which is present in President Bush’s 2002 National

[Http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm).


Security Strategy. It is important to note that President Bush’s administration considered NATO cohesion to be at an all-time high after the 2001 attacks, though many also consider the fall-out from the Iraq War to have worsened NATO cohesion to the weakest in history.

In its efforts to combat terrorism, the U.S. cooperates with the EU on counter-terrorism measures. During 2001 – 2005, cooperation directly with the EU was not substantial on counter-terrorism, but cooperation with EU members was. In fact, in May of 2007, the U.S. and EU held their first summit on counter-terrorism cooperation.

While counter-terrorism cooperation is just recently getting off the ground, U.S. – EU economic relations are very cooperative. In fact, European Commission President describes U.S. – EU relations as “the world’s strongest, most comprehensive and strategically most important partnership”. The EU has also engaged in peace-keeping and security operations in recent years, including taking over NATO’s SFOR force in Bosnia (now called EUFOR Althea), of which the U.S. was a top contributor. The EU also cooperated with the U.S. under NATO structures in the current operation EUFOR Concordia in Macedonia. Lastly, the EU is assisting U.S. efforts in Iraq by training judicial, police, and penitentiary officers as part of EUJUST Lex.

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Part 3.5: External Threat

Terrorism became a much more severe threat to NATO during 2000 – 2005 than any previous time period. After 9/11, alliance members re-evaluated the threat that terrorism poses to their own countries and to the world. In response to the new threat, NATO launched an ambitious war in Afghanistan and collaborated with other countries and organizations around the world to fight terrorism. The collaborative work has prepared the alliance’s security, defense, and communication structures for further attacks in the War on Terrorism.

During NATO’s war in Afghanistan, the alliance responded quickly and effectively to the invocation of Article V. While the threat emanating from Taliban and insurgent fighters in Afghanistan was considerable, what has become more threatening is the task of keeping the country stable after major hostilities have ended. Relations among allies worsened during the war when the U.S. launched another war in Iraq, this time absent any Al Qaeda connections. The Iraq War, which was launched without authorization from NATO or the UN, has placed many members of NATO, notably the U.S. and Great Britain, in a horrible situation. While U.S. and Great Britain troop levels are overstretched between Afghanistan and Iraq, both countries and all others involved are facing mounting pressure to withdrawal troops from Iraq due to a stalemate. These threats to NATO reached high levels.

Part 3.6: Dyadic Cohesion

The cohesion of NATO during 2001 – 2005 was the poorest since the early 1990s, and according to some, the poorest to date. NATO faced tough battles externally. Its
mission in Afghanistan – ISAF – is its most ambitious operation to date. Over five years after the invasion began, Afghanistan is still far from stable, although stabilizing a country that was previously ruled by an unstable and young government is extremely difficult. Internally, the alliance has suffered political differences for the war in Iraq. Not only did NATO or the UN not authorize the war, but many leading allies vocally opposed American and British efforts in the country. Since the war has become a stalemate and no WMDs have been discovered, the future for Iraq is gloomy.

Meanwhile, NATO has embarked on yet more significant internal projects. Membership to NATO has expanded again without hurting the cohesion of the alliance. More countries are also involved in the MAP, PfP, and EAPC (abbreviate this earlier) programs, making NATO’s involvement and influence in the world expansive at many levels.

Based on the definition of alliance cohesion, NATO’s cohesion status will be analyzed for the 2001 – 2005 period.

For the first time in NATO’s history, the alliance was able to act upon its most central founding goal, Article V. Although NATO officially responded to 9/11 attack, America was the primary country involved with the Afghanistan invasion. Other founding goals include the alliance’s mission to maintain its ability to resist an armed attack. The alliance’s swift response to the 9/11 attacks reveals the institutional infrastructure in NATO works well. Defense spending slightly dropped during this period, roughly equal to the same rate during the previous five years.
The alliance’s third founding goal is to provide collective defense for every member of the alliance. For the first time, the alliance was able to officially respond to this clause of the NATO Treaty. What the response initially consisted of was less military assistance and more diplomatic and logistical assistance, although later on NATO became very much engaged in the operation.

The regular goals of NATO during this time period include success in ISAF and in the Iraq War, adding new members to the alliance while maintaining cohesion, and forging new relationships with countries IGOs and keeping existing ones with members. To succeed in these areas, NATO set another goal of reforming its military command.

During this period, NATO agreed on many aspects of the Afghanistan War, enlargement, and internal reform. However, some areas, such as whether the U.S. or a multinational force will lead peace-keeping and nation-building in Afghanistan became a hot issue inside the alliance. Overall, the alliance attained enlargement and internal reform, but long-term success in Afghanistan is still uncertain.

Strategies that NATO developed during this period center on enlargement, military command reform, and winning in Afghanistan. The enlargement strategy originated years prior, but found its culmination during 2001 – 2005 when seven new members were added. The strategy to reform the alliance’s military command to better prepare it for coalition warfare and to combat terrorism, among other things, was successful. Lastly, NATO’s strategy to effectively assist the new Afghan government in securing and rebuilding the country has come along way, but is far from finished. Therefore NATO has not met its ISAF strategy entirely.
The tactics the alliance used to achieve its goals and to execute its strategies were not as conflict-free this period as the previous one. First, the steps taken to admit the additional seven members lacked controversial tactics. Second, the maneuvers taken to reform NATO’s military command were also swift and successful. Third, the alliance’s methods to invade Afghanistan, combat terrorism, and rebuild the country brought forth much debate in the alliance. Although the war was authorized by NATO, the U.S. was the primary allied force involved. Moreover, the network of alliances, organizations, and countries that are involved in re-building Afghanistan are having trouble determining what groups in the government, society, and warlord factions are rational to aid.

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<tr>
<th>TABLE 3.3</th>
<th>Dyadic Cohesion Model: NATO, 2001 – 2005</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low = 1</td>
<td>Moderate = 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>High = 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dyads</td>
<td>Threat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal Dyads</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB-FR</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB-GR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB-US</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR-GB</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>FR-GR</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>FR-US</td>
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<td>GR-GB</td>
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<td>GR-FR</td>
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<td>GR-US</td>
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<td>US-GB</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>US-FR</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>US-GR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal Dyad Totals</td>
<td>Threat Average</td>
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<td>External Dyads</td>
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<td>GB-Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB-North Korea</td>
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<td>GB-Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB-Terrorism</td>
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<td>GB-EU</td>
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<td>FR- Afghanistan</td>
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<td>FR- Iraq</td>
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TABLE 3.3: continued

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<th>Threat</th>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Predominant Behavior</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Tether</td>
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<td>FR- Terrorism</td>
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<th>External Dyads Total</th>
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<th>Cohesion Average</th>
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<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Balance</td>
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**Part 3.7: Cohesion Theory Results**

The results from Table 3.3 show that NATO faced low internal threat at 1.8/5.0, though much higher than the previous period. NATO also faced much higher external threat, which made internal cohesion very difficult to attain at 3.5/5.0, which compared to the previous two periods, is extremely low for NATO. According to Weitsman, this type of alliance is will have low to moderate cohesion and a moderate threat level, which is basically true via hedging behavior internally and balancing behavior externally. This is reflected by alliance members hedging toward each other during a time of international instability. However, it is important to note that many allies actually perceived greater threat and tethered.

During this period, allies sought to maximize policies over the handling of post-war Afghanistan. Although all members supported the decision to wage the Afghanistan War, several others supported the Iraq War. Many countries continue to supply forces to
the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, tethering behavior also took place, most notably from France toward the U.S. and Great Britain over the Iraq War. France did not want to see a unilateral or overly aggressive U.S. destabilize the Middle East more than the region already is. The deadlock over whether to invade and what to do after the invasion produced enormous political and decision-making strain on the alliance.

Externally, NATO balanced against its adversaries, notably terrorist groups and the Taliban-run Afghanistan. Although some members of the alliance disagreed with the tactics or strategy of the war and post-war reconstruction, the alliance overall was firm in its decision to wage war for the first time outside of Europe and by means of Article V. These actions reflect a balancing behavior.

Cumulatively, NATO faced moderate threats at 2.7/5.0, though from far greater external sources than internal. The cumulative cohesion level is 2.6/5.0, which is a lot lower than the previous period. The reason cohesion dropped is due to NATO’s moderate internal threat level, which is high for the alliance, and the moderate external level.

The overall internal cohesion status of NATO during this period fits Weitsman’s prediction, which is low-moderate. The internal threat level was moderate, though substantially higher than it had been in previous years. The external threat level was moderate, especially due to the rise of Al Qaeda as a powerful terrorist network. Lastly, the cohesion of NATO was moderate throughout the early to mid-2000s. The cohesion
of NATO during this time period reflects its hedge-balance behavior.

2001 – 2005 COHESION CONCLUSION

Although there was discussion in academia and possibly among NATO members of the alliance’s potential demise, the 2001 – 2005 figures show that NATO lingered on without facing very low levels of cohesion. The ISAF is the toughest challenge of NATO since the end of the Cold War. Fighting a war in the Middle East came as a surprise to many around the world, as most considered Article V to deal with states attacking states, not terrorist groups attacking states. Although NATO powers command a much more powerful military force than any insurgent, terrorist, or Taliban force, the quest of holding such a fractious country together while simultaneously building a democracy in a region foreign to the idea may prove to make or break the alliance. Ultimate success in Afghanistan can put confidence and faith back into NATO’s utility in the twenty-first century. Failure, however, will have significant long-term implications for NATO. In fact, failure could weaken cohesion so much that the alliance will finally wither way.

Part 3.8: 1991 – 2005 Case Study Conclusion

The cohesion of NATO has fluctuated between all three periods measured. What has remained constant is that the internal threat of the alliance was never extremely low. In fact, the moderate cohesion that the alliance experienced during the past few years comes as a surprise to many.

The internal threat of NATO throughout all three periods reviewed was low, low, and moderate. This shows that perhaps low internal threats can help sustain alliances. Moreover, the external threat to the alliance was low, moderate, and moderate. Therefore, perhaps low-moderate threats in general can help sustain an alliance. As a result of the low internal threats among the reviewed dyads, the consistent alliance behavior is hedging. States continued to see benefit in drawing close with their allies by cooperating. This is seen in the cooperative agreements among allies that did not always entail a high level of commitment. At the same time, allies did not want to be viewed as too provocative or combative. France and Germany, for instance, opposed U.S. policies in Iraq, but still found other ways to cooperate with the U.S. inside and outside of NATO. Year after year, NATO allies did not let internal competition for power or other forms of threat affect the fundamental fabric of the alliance. This seems to bring to light Walt and Liska’s idea that ideology and shared identity are crucial in alliance cohesion.\textsuperscript{338} \textsuperscript{339}

NATO’s external alliance behavior, tethering, balancing, and balancing, reinforces Weitsman’s alliance behavior characteristics in that allies, under considerable amounts of threat, tether or balance. During the period reviewed, NATO aggressively sought plans to expand membership into the former Soviet Union, despite reservations from both Russia and France. The alliance also took bold action in the Balkans – outside Article V – which brought into question the utility and scope of the collective defense and collective security policies of the alliance. Lastly, the alliance’s ability to wage war

in Afghanistan and effectively hold off a Taliban-resurgence (so far) is very impressive. Allies have shared information and conducted operations in the War on Terrorism and have prepared their national security structures for attacks.

Overall, results from the case study support Weitsman’s theory on alliance cohesion (see Table 3.4).

| TABLE 3.4 |
| Weitsman’s Theoretic Model on NATO Cohesion, 1991 - 2005 |
| Internal Threat Level | Low | Low | Moderate |
| External Threat Level | Low | Moderate | Moderate |
| Internal Behavior | Hedge | Hedge | Hedge |
| External Behavior | Tether | Balance | Balance |
| Predicted Cohesion | Moderate-Low | Moderate-High | Low-Moderate |
| Actual Cohesion | Moderate | High | Moderate |

Chapter 4: Alternative Theoretical Perspectives on NATO Cohesion

Part 1: Introduction

So far, I have examined general alliance theory and alliance cohesion theory to provide background on the behavioral aspect of alliances. Additionally, I analyzed the background issues and apparent threats that faced alliance members for the three five-year time periods to determine the cohesion levels of the alliance. This analysis is based on Weitsman’s research design in Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Importantly, dyadic relations among members within NATO and significant states and actors external to the alliance are considered. Next, insights drawn from theoretical perspectives on alliance cohesion mentioned in Chapter 1 will be coupled with
Weitsman’s theory. The goal of this section is to fuse modern literature on alliance cohesion together to understand, on many different levels, how alliance cohesion works in NATO.

**Part 2: Alliance Theories**

I will now re-evaluate the theories discussed in Chapter 1 beside theories and approaches evident in the NATO case study. First, I will consider if there is an alternate method to incorporate background issues for the time periods reviewed. Second, I will examine the concept of threat in this thesis to determine if other scholars perceive it fundamentally different. Third, I will evaluate goals, strategy, and tactics (the three parts of the definition of alliance cohesion) for the same purpose. Lastly, I will re-visit the concept of alliance cohesion and alternate ideas on the subject will be mentioned.

**BACKGROUND ISSUES**

It is impossible to generate a complete and fully comprehensive picture of the past. To view the background issues facing NATO from 1991 – 2005, there are only so many sources one can access. It is impractical to interview or survey all men and women that were involved in all issues affecting NATO cohesion during this period. Therefore, it is necessary to resort to primary sources, such as NATO communiqués, press statements, and secondary sources, such as books, articles, and essays. What are missing are more in-depth qualitative sources, such as memoirs or interviews with or surveys taken by defense ministers, heads of state, NATO staff, or members of a diplomatic corps, for example. Since most of this information is usually very difficult to obtain
(though memoirs tend to be somewhat more common, but often unrevealing) it is unfortunately left out of research on this subject.

Accurately understanding background issues is important to consider when determining the causes of alliance behavior. For example, George Liska claims that the main cause of alliance cohesion (and NATO cohesion) can be found by examining the reasons the alliance formed or dissolved. These reasons are often rooted in background issues, such as alliance membership, territorial disputes, or ethnic tension. One type of background issue which is extremely important to alliance cohesion is threat.

**THREAT**

According to some scholars, including Stephen Walt, threat is what drives the formation of alliances. If this is true, then upon entering into an alliance, prospective member states will each decide how membership will affect its management of threats. Tethering may be an answer for how to reduce their threats, or hedging, bandwagoning, or balancing. What these possible behaviors demonstrate is that states seek to achieve their interests through alliances by figuring out where their threats come from and what can be done to manage them.

The same could be said for behavior within an already-existing alliance. Actions taken by allies are often results of premeditated thought on how to reduce threat. If threat is high inside an alliance, then allies will often take big steps outside the interests of the members of the alliance to reduce the threat, which in the long run will weaken or lead to the dissolution of the alliance. But if internal threats are low, allies will make decisions mostly in line with one another which will not threaten the cohesion of the alliance. This
fits with Weitsman’s theory that cohesion of alliances can be determined by examining internal and external threat dyads, and that to achieve high cohesion, alliances must typically have low internal threats.

Additionally, when I look at very significant decisions made by NATO from 1991 – 2005, it is apparent that all major decisions, actions, and reform efforts are agreed to during periods of high internal cohesion. First, during the 1991 – 1995 period, NATO initiated major post-Cold War reforms amidst low internal threat. Second, during 1996 – 2000, NATO progressed on many reforms, including membership expansion, and fought for the first time as an alliance. Again, the alliance faced low internal threats during this period. But during 2001 – 2005, the internal threat level increased significantly to a moderate level. Importantly, internal threat began to increase substantially after the alliance decided to invoke Article V to support the United States’ war in Afghanistan. Although NATO took part in many projects around the world involving counter-terrorism, military operations, and membership expansion, the alliance did not agree to further significant actions or reforms after 2001, at least at the level it had during the previous decade.

George Liska’s views on threat add to the understanding of cohesion in NATO. Liska maintains that ideology is what holds allies together in times of war.\(^{340}\) Since this idea does not seem to hold true for the Iraq War, where the coalition’s cohesion has significantly dropped, perhaps Liska’s idea only holds true when the national sovereignty of members is threatened. For peacetime situations, Liska also claims that an alliance

will emphasize a threat coming from an enemy for purposes of cohesion, despite the lack of a threat to the national sovereignty of members. Applied to NATO, this idea seems to hold true. When NATO lacks a clear enemy, as it did from 1991 to 2001, it emphasized threats coming from various actors, including rogue states and terrorist groups.

Liska mentions another valuable point about cohesion that can help us understand NATO. He claims that ideology continues to play a part in an alliance after it faces a common threat. 341 To maintain cohesion, the alliance will glorify the past to provide a continued reason of the alliance’s importance. This is definitely relevant for NATO. The alliance often glorifies their fifty-year history and triumph in the Cold War. During the 1990s when the future of the alliance was unclear, glorification of the past undoubtedly played a part in providing purpose and ultimately increasing cohesion.

The last point Liska makes concerns the alliance’s ability to manage threats. Liska calls this role alliance consultation. Alliance cohesion can be preserved when the core members of an alliance consult with threatening external actors and internal threats. Without this type of management function, an alliance would lack some control over its cohesion. In NATO, there are many ways to manage threats. Externally, NATO reaches out to many former threatening states, including Russia, through programs like the Partnership for Peace or other forms of communication. Internally, the institutional structure of NATO fosters management. The NATO military committee, for instance, has a decision-making procedure based on consensus. The alliance also has periodic summits to discuss important alliance matters.

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Ole Holsti et al focus on dyadic relationships and threats. Whereas Weitsman uses a dyadic model to explain alliance cohesion as being based on cohesive relationships among dyads, Holsti et al explain it as being the perception of threat among dyads. In other words, to explain how NATO perceives threats, it is best to focus on ally-by-ally relations than the alliance as a whole. This is definitely true and reflects the work of Weitsman and work offered in this thesis. However, it is necessary to recognize that not all allies’ perceptions are important. For example, if Iceland feels threatened by Turkey’s membership in NATO, and if Iceland’s perception is not be shared by other members, then its perception of threat may not be even remotely significant. Therefore, we must be careful not to exaggerate the value of every alliance member’s perception of threats.

Unlike Holsti et al, Charles Kupchan makes a different case. He states that allies counter external threat by increasing internal alliance cooperation, which means cohesion fluctuates based on individual allies’ perceptions of others outside the alliance. For NATO, this means that cohesion is based on its members’ perceptions of external threats. For example, if most members of NATO perceive Iran as a high threat, cohesion will increase as a result of the subsequent need to cooperate internally to oppose the threat. This may help explain why NATO was cohesive during the Cold War, but it does not explain why NATO cohesion is not high amidst the War on Terror.

While these scholars present interesting perspectives on elements of alliance cohesion, Patricia Weitsman’s work on cohesion is central to understanding how threats affect NATO’s cohesion. Weitsman states that alliance cohesion is determined by

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examining the level and origin of threat from all alliance dyads. Applied to NATO during this period, this means examining the perception of threat for each dyad in the alliance. With a network of threats, one must determine which are significant and which are not in order to determine if internal threat is really affecting the cohesion of the alliance. Lastly, Weitsman’s *Threats and Cohesion* table (see table 1.2) is a very useful guide for determining how internal and external threat combinations will yield cohesion.

**GOALS, STRATEGY, AND TACTICS**

Alliance literature tells us how threat can affect an alliance’s ability to agree goals, strategies, and tactics. Weitsman explains that high internal threat can block an alliance’s ability to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics. Threat can also hamper the significance level of goals. If the internal threat to an alliance is high, then the alliance’s cohesion will be low, which will make the ability to agree on goals and strategy very difficult. Liska’s work also reflects this. He maintains that without a method to manage the internal dimension of an alliance, the consensus-building and shared decision-making efforts will be put at risk.

In NATO, this idea could not be closer to the truth. In recent years, the internal threat that emerged in the alliance has weakened NATO’s ability to formulate goals, strategies, and the tactics and to carry them out. Moreover, strategic planning in NATO would be virtually impossible if threats within the alliance were very high.

Another way of looking at aspects of cohesion as the dependent variable is to consider cohesion as the independent variable. What if negotiations within the alliance
that generate cohesion culminate in alliance rigidity? This is a very interesting way in which to conceive of cohesion and could tell us a lot about cooperative and negotiating forces in alliances. This thesis presents cohesion as, more or less, the level of cooperation in an alliance.

However, what if cohesion is not important at all? What if alliances are merely tools for states to reach their interests? In fact, some conceive of the international system was being a web of personal relationships and relationships of groups of people. Therefore official groups that people enter into to achieve their interests may be an irrelevant aspect of the world system. Alexander Wendt, for example, argues that there is a struggle for recognition by individuals and states in the anarchic world system. He cites evidence for this as nationalism and patriotism, in which there has historically been a struggle through war and politics for recognition. Therefore, through time, people and states will eventually develop a need for inclusiveness, in which increasing amounts of people and states are recognized and provided legitimate rights.

Wendt outlines five stages, of which the last stage, the world state, is the ‘end-state’ which serves as the highest developed organization of governing authority in the world. It is important to note that Wendt has made clear that there is no linear trend toward development of a world state, despite such a process being teleological. In fact, there is reason to believe that progression may move backward at times, but eventually

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the international struggle for recognition will serve as a magnetizing force, always
pulling world state development toward its path.346

If the international system is really on a teleological path toward a world state,
what significant would NATO have anymore? Would alliances still exist or would the
world be one total alliance? This argument, and many others before it, is important to
consider to understand alliances and the idea of alliance cohesion. Non-neorealist or
institutionalist approaches may provide perspectives that are otherwise not fathomable.

Chapter 5: Future of NATO Cohesion

Part 1: The State of the Alliance

The state of NATO is uncertain. The unexpected drop in cohesion caused over
the Iraq War is worrisome. Moreover, the unexpected shift in American foreign policy –
from multilateralism and ‘engagement’ in the Clinton administration to unilateralism and
the Bush Doctrine in the Bush Administration – makes some wonder how important
legitimization and coalition warfare is for U.S policy makers. In fact, in Patricia
Weitsman’s “(W)hither Unilateralism? Intra-alliance Politics and the Dynamics of
Coalition Warfare” she argues that coalitions are often formed for legitimizing purposes,
not military purposes. Moreover, “states are vulnerable to threats of abandonment, even

346 This analysis is from Mecum, Mark. “Alexander Wendt and the World State: Historical Foundations,
Contemporary Theory, and Prospects for the Future.” International Relations Independent Study: Dr.
when the resources of coalition members are not necessary to the prosecution of the war itself.\footnote{Weitsman, Patricia; Balkin, Eli Asher. “(W)hither Unilateralism? Intra-alliance Politics and the Dynamics of Coalition Warfare.” \textit{Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association}. August 31, 2006. P. 19.}

This realization could lead great power-led alliances, such as NATO, to no longer utilize military support from many members during the conduct of operations. Weitsman emphasizes to what financial extent the U.S. pursues for legitimization purposes in Operation Enduring Freedom and the Iraq War by stating, “Albania, with its 120 or so troops in Iraq and 35 or so in Afghanistan, received $6 million, as did the Czech Republic, which has roughly 100 troops in Iraq and 60 in Afghanistan.”\footnote{Weitsman, Patricia. “The High Price of Friendship.” \textit{New York Times}. August 31, 2006. \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/31/opinion/31weitsman.html?ex=1314676800&en=5e01e51a05bfd842&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss}. For Albania’s thirty-five soldiers in Afghanistan, for example, the U.S. paid $38,709 USD per soldier. In a way, this inefficient policy resembles a mercenary relationship, except in this case the forces are being reimbursed for non-crucial military services.

Assuming NATO’s use of coalition warfare in operations will continue at current levels, this will probably help sustain alliance cohesion. If NATO conducts small to moderate-sized operations, such as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, and avoids major political disagreement over policies to go to war or how to conduct it, these endeavors will likely strengthen cohesion. In other words, conducting additional operations like Operation Allied Force every decade may prove to members that the alliance is useful and is in their interest to be a part of. On the other hand, if, in the long-run, NATO either lacks future military operations or if future operations are led by few major alliance
powers, then the small and medium-sized members may not perceive substantive interest in the alliance. Moreover, if Operation Enduring Freedom does not end soon or if instability in Afghanistan increases, then the short-term fate of the alliance could be in serious jeopardy.

**Part 2: Threats**

While potential failure of Operation Enduring Freedom to keep Afghanistan stable is a threat to NATO, there are several other concerns that can threaten the alliance. First, ethnic conflict in East Europe could draw more NATO troops to the region. There is a real possibility that a conflict could emerge in the former Yugoslavia that would invoke Article V, especially now that many NATO members are East Europe countries. Second, terrorism poses a direct threat to members of NATO. Great Britain, Spain, and the U.S. have experienced Islamist terrorist attacks in recent years. France and Germany have also nearly experienced attacks that either were prevented or failed by Islamist groups. Third, rogue states continue to threaten the alliance, most notably Iran, who may be developing nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which already has several nuclear weapons. There is a real possibility that the U.S., Great Britain, and/or Israel may strike Iranian nuclear sites in the near future. While these events will probably not involve NATO authorization, they will involve NATO members. Therefore strikes against Iran could weaken NATO cohesion just as the Iraq War has weakened cohesion.

Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons also brings up the need to prevent the spread and development of new WMDs as well. Efforts are still underway to monitor and find former Soviet nuclear weapons, while the U.S. and other NATO allies
are actively preventing the spread of nuclear weapon technology. NATO has taken the lead as an alliance against terrorism. It is involved in counter-terrorism operations, protecting member populations from attacks, improving member capabilities to combat terrorism, and cooperating with non-members on counter-terrorism issues.\textsuperscript{349}

While there are certain threats that NATO faces now and will face in the future, one threat that is uncertain is regional alliance competition. Will the EU’s ESDP compete with NATO in providing an effective means of defending Europe? Will the ESDP’s rapid reaction force – consisting of mostly overlapping NATO members – be sufficient for out of area combat operations? These questions are a top concern for NATO’s future utility. While the EU expands in scope and size, the ESDP is becoming more impressive every year. When the EU Treaty is fully ratified, and a new EU Minister of Foreign Affairs and European External Action Service is created, the EU will have an even stronger voice on foreign policy.

Lastly, the composition of NATO membership could be a threat in the future. Currently, there are twenty-five non-members that are cooperating with NATO via Membership Action Plans. Eight of these countries have declared it as an explicit goal to become full members of NATO in the future. Therefore, NATO could very well expand from twenty-six members to thirty-four, which may weaken alliance decision-making. Moreover, if NATO adds another eight members, this could materialize as a policy to eventually add all European countries to the alliance. Such a move would fundamentally change the nature and function of NATO.

Chapter 6: Alliance Cohesion Theory Revisited

This thesis brings to the fore the relevance and utility that the study of alliance cohesion brings to international relations. Understanding how threat affects cohesion and how cohesion is determined by examination of alliance dyads is essential to comprehend alliance behavior, which continues to be important to the world system. Alliances can legitimize and assist states in war, they are vehicles for states to further their national interest, and they keep order in the international system by managing state interests, among other functions.

The analysis and test of alliance cohesion theory on NATO’s activities from 1991 – 2005 achieves two things. First, the research reinforces the accuracy of Patricia Weitsman’s theory on alliance cohesion. The level and source of threat between states is directly linked with cohesion. As Weitsman proclaims, “In thinking about the fundamental issues of alliances – their capability aggregation purpose, balancing and bandwagoning behaviors, and management functions – it becomes clear that these different behaviors emerge under different conditions. Threat does generate each of these responses, and, more precisely, different levels of threat will result in different alliance behaviors.”

This thesis shows that low levels of internal threat result in high cohesion, while moderate to high levels of internal threat result in low to moderate cohesion. Moreover, this research shows that international instability causes political tension in alliances, which can override the importance of identity and ideology. In other words, low levels of

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external threat allow internal cohesion to be unproblematic to attain, absent internal disputes. But when external threat rises among allies and non-alliance actors, then the internal environment is more conducive to conflicts and struggles. Insight is also provided on the role of alliance behaviors and their relationship with the treat and cohesion outcomes.

However, it is important to realize that hypotheses such as ‘low levels of internal threat result in high cohesion’ should not be as far as we go. Instead, deeper analysis that takes into account how behavior of alliances is linked to threat should take place. Furthermore, the concept of dyadic relations in alliances needs much more research. This thesis only opens the door to the idea of different levels and dimensions of dyads.

Ultimately, it is important that alliance cohesion is examined by scholars more than it already is. This is important because the better we understand alliances, the better we understand the world system. If scholars and policy makers can make more educated decisions and predictions about the world, perhaps war and military incursions can be avoided. During the lead-up to World War I, states did not realize that the alliances they were engaged in could cause such friction to ignite world war. This type of uncertainty can certainly be avoided with further study into alliance cohesion. Solving alliance cohesion therefore is about solving the nature of international relations. The more we know, the easier it may be to get along.
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