COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
A HISTORY OF REFORMS AND RESISTANCE

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Abstract

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COMMUNICATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN: A HISTORY OF REFORMS AND RESISTANCE (138 pp.)

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This thesis presents a recent history of development and communication in Afghanistan. The reforms introduced by the state under different rulers and governments since the 1870s, and public reaction to these initiatives, are examined. Whether influenced by global events or socioeconomic and political developments domestically, those attempts at reform were often resisted by the local communities in Afghanistan. This study explores both external and internal factors contributing to the reforms and resistance to those reforms. This thesis seeks to uncover the possible causes of that resistance.

Strategies related to media and communication in the country are explored in terms of the role they have played in attempts to develop the country. Discussed is the use of media, use of traditional communication channels and the use of interpersonal channels for introducing socioeconomic changes in the country.

In modern history, all three of the main approaches to development and communication, modernization, dependency and liberation perspectives, have been used as strategies to bring about developmental change in Afghanistan. The paper describes the principal development events and tries to find out the causes of success or failure of these approaches.
The paper concludes that the involvement and participation of Afghan citizens in the development process is a key determinant in achieving the desired results. It also explains how the social system and values of the population, if taken into account, can support development activities they understand and have helped to bring about.

Approved:

Don M. Flournoy
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To Afghan Children, who Look for a Peaceful and Better Future
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I would like to thank my academic advisor and committee chair, Dr. Don Flournoy for his extensive support and guidance throughout my academic program and thesis work. I would also extend my thanks to Dr. Duncan Brown and Dr. Robert Stewart for their valuable input, critical review and constructive suggestions that helped me in writing this thesis.
Preface

It took me nearly six hours to reach Kalat from Kandahar. Located on the 488 km long road connecting Kandahar to the capital city of Kabul, the town of Kalat is only 135 km away from where I started in Kandahar. Though the whole trip would normally take less than six hours, the poor condition of the road meant that travelers were taking 13 to 14 hours to reach Kabul. When entering the town, the taxi in which I was traveling made a stop in front of a small restaurant and the driver, pointing towards a mud structure, told me and the other travelers in the taxi that we had only half an hour to have our lunch and offer our afternoon prayers. He insisted that everyone had to be ready on time in order to reach Ghazni City, another stop on the way, before complete darkness fell. We were expecting to spend the night in Ghazni and then go on to Kabul the next morning.

I reluctantly entered the restaurant and after finding out what they had for lunch, I ordered my Palau (a small dish of rice and vegetables) with a tea. I was tired and totally exhausted. I leaned back to the wall and looked around. Though it was the year 2002, one year after the fall of the Taliban, I could see nothing different about the people or the place from the time of the Taliban. Only by the music in the restaurant could I know that the town was no longer under Taliban control. The songs being played seemed to be local music. I was interested to note that the music was not just for entertainment; these songs had political messages.

At that time I did not pay much attention to it, but what surprised me in the findings of this thesis which I am writing some years later was the extent to which small media have been effective as channels of communication throughout the history of reforms in Afghanistan. In particular, small media served as powerful weapons in the
hands of resistance forces against centralized reforms. As Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) observed in their research, small media tend to be participatory in nature and not easily controlled by agencies of state or by big corporations.

After working for about three years with different international organizations in Afghanistan, especially in working with the National Solidarity Program (NSP) as a media officer, I became more interested in studying the role of communication in the development process. This interest has led to the writing of this thesis in the School of Telecommunications at Ohio University.
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Chapter 1: Background

The modernization process in Afghanistan started in the 1870s with the establishment of industries and introduction of administrative, social and political structures. Since then, Afghanistan has witnessed implementation of a series of reforms and intermittent public resistance. In its contemporary history, there are a number of instances where the central government implemented socioeconomic changes that failed to achieve the desired result. Sometimes the reforms produced strong resistance by the local population that turned to armed revolt. One of the factors contributing to the failure of modernization efforts in Afghanistan, as this thesis argues, was the absence of participatory communication in the development process.

This thesis discusses the history of development initiatives in Afghanistan and examines the role of, or lack of, communication in the development process. It will address some of the arguments concerning failure of development programs that were applying different theoretical approaches to development communication, and what the literature says about those approaches. This study also investigates the ways mass communication was used to introduce and implement socioeconomic and political changes during those periods and how traditional and interpersonal methods of communication were often used to counter these changes.

This study examines a period from the 1870s, the beginning of early modernization in Afghanistan, until the fall of the Taliban. It also discusses briefly the post-Taliban era focusing on the new National Solidarity Program’s approach to
development and communication in the country (see Appendix C). The study considers both external and internal factors that influenced strategies of reform and strategies of resistance. It discusses the ideological basis of the implemented development models, the circumstances under which the reforms were carried out, and why these programs faced resistance within the local population.

Historically, Afghanistan has served as a playing field for the ‘Great Game’ between the world powers (Klass, 1991). During the 19th century, the country served as a battleground for the expansionists’ armies but also a testing field for ideological and psychological warfare. Throughout its recent history, Afghanistan has experienced the rule of several opposing ideologies. These ideologies influenced the development agendas of Afghanistan’s government and also choice of communication channels.

The early reforms, to include the establishment of industries, a modern army and the printed press in the 1870s, were brought to an end by the Second Afghan-Anglo war. Later, regional and global political and socioeconomic developments gave birth to a reformist movement that took power in the country in the 1920s and implemented a new wave of reforms that were halted by a popular resistance that toppled the government. Though the modernization process continued, resistance to the imposed, centralized changes continued for decades. The second big wave of reforms was introduced when the communists took over in a coup in 1979. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet army and the intervention of regional and global powers once again led to public opposition, and an armed resistance that resulted in decades of war as well as near complete devastation of the country (see Appendix B).
Although reforms were undertaken by different governments in line with the state’s ideological leaning at the time, these initiatives had some common attributes. Based on the review of the literature, most of the reforms up to the time of the fall of the Taliban were centralized, non-participatory and not need-based. In many instances, the development initiatives were counter to the social system and threatened the traditional values of the local communities.

Community is the core element of the Afghan society. These communities are well-organized, and in some of the social institutions such as the Jirga (local council) there is a type of self-governance that functions both in the presence and in absence of the government. In most cases, these social institutions perform the judicial, executive, and legislative powers of the local governments (Noorzai, 2001a). The geopolitical location, extraordinary climate and difficult to reach terrain, together with history and a unique social structure has resulted in a local system of living characterized by a decentralized form of governance without external control. Traditionally, the indigenous bodies have resisted any kind of imposed control over their local tribal governance and their social affairs (Klass, 1991; Gregorian, 1967). American anthropologist Louis Dupree has described Afghan society as an inward-looking society in which the population consists predominantly of illiterate, self-sufficient villagers who tend to reject social reforms and progress of any kind (Saikal, 2004). However, the researcher concludes that the problem is not that these local communities reject social reforms. Rather, it is that they reject changes imposed from outside, especially those in which the local people are not involved.
The National Solidarity Program, a recent initiative related to community empowerment through which participation of the local population in the development projects is ensured, has been regarded as one of the most successful development programs in the country\(^1\), although there were some shortcomings in terms of planning and implementation of the program. It suggests that when programs are locally designed and implemented the results can be more positive. As Melkote and Steeves (2001) write, development activities should have cultural and traditional support and must use the existing local organizations for best results. Following a presentation of the historical record of development communication in Afghanistan, this study concludes with a discussion of some development programs and strategies that are taking into consider Afghanistan’s setup and unique history.

Since the beginning of modernization in Afghanistan, mass media, as an integral component of the reformist agenda, has been used to promote specific socioeconomic changes. The researcher will argue in this study that, although successive central governments used media to disseminate their policies, a communication and understanding gap always seemed to exist between development stakeholders in the country. In addition to providing a historical record of developments in the field of mass media, this study will explore the role, importance and usages of different national, regional, traditional, and interpersonal channels in the process of development in Afghanistan.

\(^1\) The National Priority Program (NPP) Strategy Document (2004) for National Solidarity Program (NSP) says that NSP is one of the successful community driven development programs in the world (cited in Kakar, 2005).
Since the fall of the Taliban and the beginning of reconstruction a number of
development programs have been designed and implemented. This study will examine
whether or not the lessons learned from the past are taken into account in the post-
Taliban era. Additionally, the study investigates what communication channels and what
theoretical models were used to support the development activities in Afghanistan.
The specific goals and objectives of the study are:

- To present a literature review of development communication and different
  theories and approaches used as a way to answer questions about the
  achievements and failures of development programs in Afghanistan.

- To present a historical record of the development activities in Afghanistan since
  the 1870s. The socioeconomic and political circumstances under which the
  development programs were undertaken are discussed.

- To explore the achievements and failures of development programs in
  Afghanistan.

- To investigate how communication works in the unique social structure of the
  Afghan society and to trace the historical development of mass media in
  Afghanistan.

- To critically examine the role and usage of communication channels in the
  implementation of development programs and seek to identify any relationships
  between the development activities, achievements and failures, as well as the type
  of communication used.
1.2 Methodology

The methodology selected for this thesis is a systematic analysis of the development history of Afghanistan using government and NGO documents and scholarly articles written on communication and development. A qualitative systematic review summarizes the results of primary studies and reports.

1.3 Organization of the Study

This thesis is organized in the following four chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction: This chapter presents the scope and importance of the study, the objectives, methodology and a theoretical framework for the study.

Chapter 2: Communication and the social structure in Afghanistan: This chapter will include general information about Afghanistan, the social structure and its traditional communication channels and networks.

Chapter 3: Reforms in Afghanistan: This chapter presents a historical record of the major development activities in the country, their achievements and failures, the ideological and sociopolitical motives behind these programs, external and internal factors shaping development policies and strategies and the causes of resistance to many of these programs. Chapter III is divided into the following sections (see Appendix C):

a. From the 1870s to 1910s: This section includes the early reforms of Amir Shir Ali Khan and covers an interval up to the third Afghan-Anglo war.
b. From the 1920s to 1980s: This section covers a period from independence to the civil war in 1929.

c. From 1930s to 1979: The section presents development and communication activities in the Gradual Reform period that ends by the communist coup in 1979.

d. From 1979 to 1992: This part of the chapter covers a period from the coup in 1979 to the fall of Najibullah’s government.

e. From 1992 to 1996: This section briefly discusses the period of civil war and Mujahideen’s government.

f. From 1996 to 2001: This section covers a period of the Taliban’s rule.

g. From 2001 to now: This section presents the development issues in post-Taliban Afghanistan and explains briefly the general development process in the country. This section discusses in detail the National Solidarity Program (NSP), a somewhat successful community empowerment project, and explores some of the communication initiatives supporting the development process in the country.

Chapter 4: Conclusion: In this chapter, an evaluation of development projects that have applied one or more communication and development approaches is done. Causes of failure and achievements and the role of communication are discussed. Additionally, the chapter will examine the approaches and concludes which approach works in Afghanistan, taking into account the social and cultural setup of the country.
1.4 Theoretical Framework

Development communication has emerged as a field of study and practice during the last half of the 20th century leading to a considerable body of writings and research (Melkote & Steeves, 2001). Sharma (1987) says that examining the application of communication solutions to human problems can be traced to the work of Burt (1951) and Hick (1951, 1952). However, the systematic study of the role of information and communication technologies in developing nations began in the 1950s with Daniel Lerner’s book, The Passing of Traditional Society, published in 1958 (Hedebro, 1982). Later on, scholars such as Wilbur Schramm (1964), Everett Rogers (1962, 1969), Fredrick Frey, Lucien Pye, and Lakshmana Rao helped to expand this field of study (Melkote & Steeves, 2001).

Generally, the three main approaches to the study and practice of development and communication have been identified as modernization, dependency and liberation approaches (Melkote & Steeves, 2001).

This research examines the history of development and communication in Afghanistan in the context of examining development events and programs to include developments in mass media. It also examines the role of mass media in the development process of the country.

1.4.1 The Modernization Approach

Modernization, sometimes called the dominant approach, is “based on the neo-classical model of economic theory and supporting capitalist economic development. The
perspective assumes that the Western model of economic growth is applicable elsewhere, and that the introduction of modern technologies is important in development” (Melkote & Steeves, 2001, p. 34). In the dominant approach, the projects are often macro, implemented from the top and centrally administered. Five year master plans appeared in most of the Third World countries as a path to modernization. Similarly in communication, the dominant paradigm defined communication as a linear process where messages are sent directly to the receiver (Melkote & Steeves, 2001). Melkote and Steeves write: “At both the macro and micro levels, communication is viewed as a product and reinforce of economic growth and development” (2001, p. 103). The approach viewed media as change agents for bringing about reforms in the developing world (Hedebro, 1982). In the modernization approach, mass media function as a means of transmitting ideas and models to the developing countries from the West and from urban to rural areas (Melkote and Steeves, 2001).

The three main academic areas making contributions to understanding the role of the media in development are: the communication effects approach, the diffusion of innovations and mass media and modernization approach and social marketing.

“Thus, the earliest theoretical models on media effects conceptualized the impact of mass media on individuals as direct, powerful, and uniform” (Melkote and Steeves, 2001. p. 106). The *Bullet or hypodermic needle* theory, which in popular discourse explains media effects as direct and powerful, was used to depict the power of mass media. The models developed by Lasswell, Shannon and Weaver, Schramm and others conceived communication to be a vertical or top down process. Their research centered on the important role mass media played in the process of development (Melkote and
Steeves, 2001). Melkote and Steeves further say that “media were considered to be *magic multipliers* in terms of development benefits among Third Word Nations” (2001, p. 118).

The theory of direct effects of mass media was challenged by Klapper in 1960. Based on his empirical findings, he argued that in most cases media have limited or no direct effects. Hedebro (1982) writes: “Rather they tend to reinforce attitudes and behaviors that people already possess. Their potential for change is small” (p. 15). The argument that media has little effect was supported by a paradigm shift that occurred in the field of communication and media during the 1960s. In this period more attention was paid to the role and importance of interpersonal channels in the process of communication. What emerged was the two-step model that undermined the direct effects theory by emphasizing the role and importance of interpersonal communication in the process of mass communication (Williams, 2003). This model emphasized the importance of primary groups and informal communication channels, the importance of opinion leaders and provided an alternative to the theory of mass society (Defleur, 1970; Williams, 2003). This so called two-step flow theory emerged from a study of the decision making process in an election campaign conducted by Lazarsfeld, Benard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet (Katz, 1957). Later on, a number of other studies concluded that media audience is not passive. Such studies caused a growing interest in personal networks as channels for disseminating information and influence (Melkote and Steeves, 2001).

The dominant paradigm was challenged not only on the grounds of ignoring the role of opinion leaders and interpersonal communication channels, but also it was argued
that this approach overlooks the traditional channels of communication and assumes that the traditional channels only reinforce the traditional norms and practices. Both traditional channels and opinion leaders were thought to be hindering the development process (Rogers, 1995). On the other hand, the dominant paradigm was also thought to be widening the gap between the have and have-nots and having a negative impact on the living conditions of the people (Melkote and Steeves, 2001).

In 1962, Everett Rogers published a book based on his empirical research on the introduction and spread of new ideas. His research on diffusion of innovation became influential both in the developed and developing world. Rogers’ theory says that cultural norms and values should be considered and emphasizes the role of interpersonal communication in the process of diffusion (Hedebro, 1982). The practice of diffusion of innovation and its research model are criticized on the grounds that it has a pro technological bias, a pro source bias and a bias toward message (Melkote and Steeves, 2001).

Social marketing helps in conceptualizing the field of development communication. This model assumes that communication plays a major role in the spread of information and in behavior change. However, social marketing campaigns have tended to be top-down with receivers targeted for social change. Additionally, the solutions to the problems are coming from the authorities rather than from the people themselves (Melkote and Steeves, 2001). Entertainment education is another area that, according to Singhal and Rogers (1999), incorporates educational messages into entertainment programs. Entertainment education is about social change that addresses social issues.
In general, efforts to produce modernization have been criticized as they ignore the social context in the sender-receiver model. Considering information transmission as an isolated and top-down activity, it was believed that the effects of media can be studied separately (Agunga, 1997). Socioeconomic constraints in the Third World challenged the powerful role of media in development in the 1970s and encouraged rethinking the role of communication in the development process. Modernization, transformation of a traditional society, was challenged by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Usage of the traditional communication channels was considered for social change in the rural areas. Participatory, local, and horizontal communication became main principles for the new concept of communication and development (Malkote and Steeves, 2001).

This study looks back at modernization efforts in Afghanistan when modernization was one of the main agendas of the rulers of the country. In addition to the external and internal forces that influenced development planning and implementation, the study examines the causes of success or failure of those development initiatives in different intervals. The role and uses of media as well as communication in the development processes are also explored.

1.4.2 Dependency

Modernization theory was eventually challenged by what is commonly called dependency or critical theory (Hornik, 1988). Melkote and Steeves (2001) explain:

For those with a critical perspective, therefore, development communication is a process of consensus building and resistance. It is not a linear process, but must be historically grounded, culturally sensitive, and multifaceted with attention to
all the political, economic and ideological structures and processes that comprise society (p. 38).

Critical or dependency theory rejects the marketing models of communication intended and used to spread and advocate Western technologies and economic and political values (Melkote & Steeves, 2001). Modernization or the dominant model, according to Frank (1969), Grunig (1971) and Felstehausen (1973), creates reliance on developed countries that paves the way for exploitation of the developing nations (cited in Hedebro, 1982).

According to the dependency theory, expansion of capitalism is the main cause of underdevelopment of the developing nations. It was not insufficient information and support from the social system and cultural values that caused underdevelopment of the Third World (Rogers, 1995); however, the reason for underdevelopment should be studied in the global economic context (Agunga, 1997). Though the expansionist and imperialistic nature of the modernization was challenged (McAnany, 1980), and it provided a framework for international relations studies in the 1960s and 1970s (Agunga, 1997), dependency theory failed to provide a concrete alternative to the dominant paradigm (McAnany, 1980). Additionally, as Kazan (1993) mentions, development of dependency theory needs more empirical research. Criticism of the theory includes focus on the macro level media, ignorance of interpersonal and group communication and the individual interaction with the media and how those interactions are interpreted (Kazan, 1993).

This research also examines the application of dependency theory to development activities in Afghanistan. One of the unique features of development initiatives in
Afghanistan is the external factors that influenced the development process.

Dependency theory, according to Miraki (2000), can be used to explain the Second Wave of Reforms in Afghanistan when Soviet aid and involvement was one of the prominent factors and influenced the social and economic environment in the country.

1.4.3. The Alternative or Participatory Approach:

The third approach is sometimes called the liberation perspective, or the alternative or participatory approach. Rejecting the macro, top-down and economic driven approaches, it proposes micro projects that are need-based, participatory and culturally acceptable. This model focused on indigenous knowledge, folk media and interpersonal channels.

In this alternative approach, communication in development is defined and operationalized in a different way. The main idea is liberation from oppression through empowerment so the focus of attention is at personal and community levels. The main goal is to include all stakeholders participating in the process so communities may determine their own future (Melkote & Steeves, 2001).

In the alternative approach “societal transformation” is mainly focused upon rather than purely economic development. It also emphasizes rural development (Ray, 1995) and draws in marginalized groups in the society (Karim, 1994). Communication is regarded as the main element (Ray, 1995), and empowerment is the main focus of the new approach. Melkote and Steeves mention:

The focus on empowerment has a direct consequence on the objective of development communication. In the future, just the delivery of new information
and technological innovations will be inadequate. Empowerment requires more than just information delivery and diffusion of innovations. An important focus of development communicators will be to help in the process of empowerment of marginalized individuals, groups and organizations (2001, p. 38).

In the alternative paradigm, the main focus is on community empowerment and participation. Community empowerment suggests that the individuals in the community should have a role in setting the agenda, design and process of development. Participation is a key factor in achieving development objectives.

Karim (1994) says that the main obstacle in achieving a greater level of participation, especially among the rural population, is the existing sociopolitical structure and power relations in the society that had already caused failure of a number of local level initiatives. He further suggests that changes in the political and economic power relations, such as ensuring women participation and that of other marginalized groups, is a necessary factor for the approach to work.

This study explores the role of participatory approaches in the context of Afghanistan and presents a detailed evaluation of that approach used in the National Solidarity Program (NSP). Also presented are some of the causes of failure in past development activities in the country and the need for public involvement in the process of development.
Chapter 2:
Social Structure and Communication in Afghanistan

2.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter presents briefly the social structure and lifestyle in Afghanistan. It also examines the key determinants contributing to communication that involves masses of its people. These factors include commerce, government, religion and the unique social setup in the country. Traditional forms of public communication, mass media and other channels of communication in Afghanistan are noted.

2.2 Social Structure

Expansion of the Russian and British empires in the north and south of Afghanistan in the late 19th century established the boundaries of Afghanistan. Today’s Afghanistan is a landlocked country surrounded by Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in the north, Iran to the west and Pakistan to the south and southeast. In the east the country shares a border with China (see Figure 1).

The map of Afghanistan can be divided on the basis of topography and ethnolinguistic settlement patterns. The North of the country can be divided into two main regions: the North East (Badakhshan-Vakhan) region and the Northern region (Balkh Maymaneh). The South of Hindukush can be subdivided into five sub regions – those of Central (Kabul), South West (Qandahar), West (Herat), South East (Paktia) and Central Highland (Hazarajat) (Afghanpedia, 2006). Though agriculture is the main source
of livelihood in Afghanistan only 12 to 15% of the land is arable and only half of that is used for that purpose (Rondinellie, 2004).

As for the population of Afghanistan, as Misdaq (2006) mentions no proper census of the population has been conducted. Largely, because of all the migrations and
displacement over nearly three decades of war, the total population of the country is not known. The estimates vary from about 25 to 30 million.

Figure 2 Population
(Courtesy of the General Libraries, University of Texas at Austin)

Also, sources do not agree on the ethnic composition of the Afghan society. Figures provided by the government, UN and other agencies are based on partial surveys and often contradict each other. A survey from 1956 and a number of other sources conclude that Pashtons form the majority of the population (Saikal, 2004). Miraki (2004) says that Pashtons form 60 to 65% of the population. Wheelock (2005) says that although Pashtons can be found across the country they mostly live in the south and east of the country and on the other side of the border with Pakistan. A scientific census based on a six year survey (May 1991-December 1996) conducted by an NGO, the WAK
Foundation for Afghanistan (WAKFA) provides some ethnic and linguistic figures for the majority groups in the country (Misdaq, 2006). According to the report the figures are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pashto</td>
<td>62.73</td>
<td>55.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>12.38</td>
<td>33.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hazard</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>5.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aimaq</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are at least 34 different ethnic groups living in Afghanistan (Saikal, 2004), although Mirsa claims that the entire population can be divided into eight groups: Pashtons, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Baluchis, Turkmens, Aimaqs and Kirgizs (cited in Ewan, 2002) (see Figure 3). There could also be sub-ethnic or sub-tribal groups (Wheelock, 2005).

Though composed of different ethnic groups, the population has nearly the same life-style and occupational patterns. Their livelihood mainly depends upon land and livestock just like their ancestors (Wheelock, 2005), however, trade has been part of the life of Afghanistan for thousands of years (Rondinellie, 2004).

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2 Misdaq (2006) mentions: “9% of Hazara, who speak their Hazaragi dialect of Farsi (Dari), are also part of the 33% Dari [Tajik] speakers listed under language; other small groups are not included in the table.”
The urban population has grown around the ring road that connects Kabul to Qandahar, then to Herat and in the north of Kabul to Mazar-e-Sharif. The urban and semi-urban units operate as administrative and commercial centers to their surrounding villages. Around 80% of the population lives in the rural areas of the country. Farming and animal husbandry are the main sources of income in these areas. Rural life is characterized by living in small villages mostly located near the irrigated land in the valleys of major rivers. Each village contains several mud houses inhabited by closely connected families who form a defensive community (Emadi, 2005).
There is also a nomadic group of around 2.5 million people dispersed all over Afghanistan called Kochis (Weijer, 2005). The livelihood of the Kochis depends on livestock and trade. The recent wars have forced Afghans to live as refugees in camps or to move to cities in neighboring countries. There are also some displaced communities who were forced to leave their homes in war torn areas and to stay in remote areas. They are unable now to reestablish their former homes and ways of life (Emadi, 2005).

In Afghanistan, family is the core unit of the social system (Wardak, 2003). The concept of family is shared by all the ethnic groups in the country, where individual honor, social status and behavior are all determined by the family (Emadi, 2005). The family structure in the area is extended, so that two or more blood-related generations live together in a mud and stone house or a series of adjacent houses. All matters related to the family are considered private and are solved within the family (Wardak, 2003). Social and cultural values prohibit direct interference by the state in family affairs. Islamic law and social customs govern family related business, such as marriage and inheritance (Emadi, 2005).

The extended family also serves as an economic unit where individuals work together on the family farm, retail business or estates and support each other. Individuals rely on the family’s support system and perform their obligations to its members (Emadi, 2005). The power structure in the family is hierarchical, where the oldest man of the family – grandfather or father exercises the authority. The family’s shared resources are also controlled by the grandfather or father strengthening his status (Wardak, 2003).

Families are organized around villages where blood relatives typically live together. A village or a number of villages form a community which, in its own turn,
makes the most important unit of the society (Wardak, 2003). The average size of a village is from 50 to 200 individuals who share some socioeconomic or public facilities such as mosques, water springs, mills and water canals. This may not mean that all the members of the same branch live in the same village; it also depends on numbers. If the population is excessive, they may live in a number of villages.

In the rural areas of the country the central government has less presence and the sociopolitical issues related to the village or community are dealt with by the local Jirga, the Local Council (Wardak, 2003). These communities are well-organized and have their own institutions. The Jirga is one of the organized institutions of the community that functions as a self-governing body both in the presence and in absence of the government. In most cases, these institutions perform the judicial, executive and legislative powers of the local governments (Noorzai, 2001a). The Jirga also serves as a communication channel by which information is shared, disseminated and how decisions are made. The local Jirga also functions as a local government. Issues related to the community, between families and among the communities, are discussed and decided there. It is also important to mention that every individual can participate and usually a member of each family attends the sessions (Rawan, 2002). The Jirga system is common among the Pashtons, though other ethnic groups also have similar local institutions that govern their local activities (Wardak, 2003).

These local Jirgas are networked to the tribal or provincial Jirgas that deal with issues concerning the tribe. The tribal networks are linked through a national network of Jirgas called Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly). This is what makes the Loya Jirga a representative decision-making body (Noorzai, 2001a).
The Jirga is itself part of the broader social and cultural norms of Pashtons called Pashtonwali. These norms have a great impact on the social life of both the individuals and their communities. As Newell (1972) reports, the main source of social norms that regulates the Pashtons way of living is Pashtonwali. These norms describe standards of honor, self-reliance, hospitality, respect, courage and revenge. Cooperation and consensus are the fundamental features of tribal polity (Newell, 1972). Though other ethnic groups do not have exactly the same social values, in most instances they own similar traditions (Saikal, 2004). These values are part of the cultural system (Edwards, 1986).

This research examines how the social structure and the cultural values have influenced development activities in Afghanistan. It also explores the importance and the role of Afghan local and regional institutions to be taken into account in future development of the country.

2.3 Communication in Afghanistan

2.3.1 Traces of Early Mass Communication

Some form of mass communication exists in every society. Because of its distinctive socioeconomic context, Afghanistan has its own unique forms of communication that are both vertical and horizontal. Trade, religion and governmental are the three main elements that blend with the social structure to shape the way mass communication functions in Afghanistan.

Having a common history and sharing of many social and cultural values with its neighbors, Afghanistan fits in to the surrounding regions of Central Asia, the Indian Sub-
continent and the Middle East. Sometimes, Afghanistan is purposefully placed in one region or another on the map. The former Soviet Union and now Russia locates Afghanistan as part of Central Asia. On the other hand, British sources include Afghanistan in the Indian sub-continent and others perceive Afghanistan to be part of the Middle East. Afghanistan has similarities with all the three mentioned regions and the country has served as a crossroads between these regions.

The trade routes, such as the famous Silk Road, linking Europe, the Far East and the Indian sub-continent crossed through Afghanistan and Central Asia. This fact has brought both a wealth of culture and material to Afghanistan. The crossroads also brought diversity in ethnic and cultural composition of the country (Magnus & Naby, 2002). Its location also made Afghanistan vulnerable to invasions by regional and world powers (Gregorian, 1969). Trade along these routes and their safety made it essential for the rulers, security establishments, traders, travelers and the communities living along and near to the routes to be actively involved in communication among themselves.

The discovery of maritime routes between Europe and the East and expansion of imperialist powers greatly undermined the monopolistic position of Central Asia and Afghanistan as transit trade centers (Gregorian, 1969). In addition, the expansion of imperialist powers made Afghanistan more economically and culturally isolated. The importance of the silk routes was soon reduced to a secondary position in the world’s trade.

Being a crossroads country not only brought trade but attracted religious missionaries to use these routes to spread their religious beliefs within the country and surrounding regions. Some of the world’s leading religions (Hinduism, Buddhism and
Islam) expanded through Afghanistan (Saikal, 2004). The ancient Silk Route in Afghanistan was used to expand Buddhism to China and Japan. Zoroastrianism, one of the first monotheistic religions, was given birth in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2000), between the 18th and 6th centuries BC (Wikipedia, 2006). Some of the empires used the idea of expanding religion as a basis for territorial expansion. Communication played a pivotal role in all these developments. Networking, campaigning and both interpersonal and mass communication were used for this purpose. There is strong historical evidence in the region that shows religions used multiple means of communication for spreading and creating awareness and mobilizing the masses.

The state is another factor in shaping communication in Afghanistan that involves masses. Because of its location as the gateway to India, Afghanistan has always attracted the world’s famous conquerors. Many of them tried to occupy the Afghan land in order to use the routes to reach surrounding regions and to expand territories. Afghanistan had also been itself the center for a number of empires or had been part of neighboring empires. Both the invaders and Afghan/regional empires needed to communicate with the people living within the geography of today’s Afghanistan to ensure their control and dominance over the area.

The state had little to do with the internal affairs of the local population. Even in the contemporary history of Afghanistan, as Rubin (2002) mentions, state intervention in villages was limited because the state had little to offer and taxes were not collected from these villages. However, a parallel system of governance has always existed that ruled the community life. The social system is an important factor that forms and influences communication. A good example is the Jirga institution that serves both as a governing
body and as a communication channel. The word Jirga means gathering and consultation in the Pashto and Dari languages. The gathering may involve a few or a large number of people (Wardak, 2003). Jirga is a decision-making body in which every adult male can participate. The Jirga decision is based on consensus (Rubin, 2002).

Airgas are convened at different levels: local Airgas are community-based where every adult male member of a community may participate. Local Airgas are networked to the tribal or provincial Airgas that deal with tribal/provincial issues. The tribal Airgas are linked through a national network called Loya Jirga which means grand assembly that mainly discusses national and international issues (Noorzai, 2002a). Another very important characteristic of Jirga is that they are both bottom up and top down communication institutions.

Jirga gives equal opportunity to every participant to express himself. Frembgen (1990) says that this reveals the Pashto attribute of equality (cited in Rawan, 2002). It also serves as a channel for discussing and disseminating ideas and information on new developments inside and outside the tribe (Rawan, 2002). Jirga, both at local, tribal and provincial levels serve as an important channel of communication. Through its members, the institution communicates with the public. Communication is the most important component of the Jirga system (Wardak, 2003). The institution is not only used as a decision making body but also as a channel for spreading information and persuading the population.

Historically, women were part of the meetings, especially elderly women, but today there is little feminine presence in these meetings (Rawan, 2002). Though in recent years women have participated in the Loya Jirga at the national level with no objection
from tribal groups, women are generally excluded from participation in Jirga. As Wardak (2003) mentions, it reflects the patriarchal social structure of Afghan society.

The Mosque is another important channel of communication that operates in Afghanistan. The mosque has a central position in the Islamic society. It is not only the place for religious activities but also for exchanging information, negotiation and discussion (Rawan, 2002). The mosque functions as a community center where the public are educated, as well as a communication medium (Asghar, 1981). The religious scholar, or Mullah, who leads the five-time daily sermon has special status and social responsibilities in the village (Rawan, 2002). The Friday’s prayer is a very important gathering. The Mullah not only leads the congregation but also provides villagers with news and comments on issues relevant to the social and religious life (Ahang, 1970). The Friday prayer has long been used by governments in Islamic states. In Afghanistan, the most important political announcements are made in the Friday Khutba (speech) by the mullah (Rawan, 2002).

The religious leaders exercise considerable power even though there is no organized system that determines the political influence of religious scholars, they are the primary source of education and moral attitudes among the common Afghans (Gregorian, 1967). The religious leaders have enjoyed a full monopoly over public education when no schools are present. Mosque learning is normally based on tutoring and mostly with the Mullah serving as the teacher (Olesen, 1995). Religious education has a long history in Afghanistan. The Zoroastrians and the Buddhists used temples and monasteries as centers for learning. With the expansion of Islam in the region, the Islamic schools (Madrasas) and Mosques became the principal centers of learning.
The Mosque has also been used a site for interpersonal communication and a place for socialization. Religious leaders participate in intra and inter tribal gatherings, especially when there is a conflict among the tribes (Saikal, 2004). Such religious networks, without exception, exist in all ethnic groups in both rural and urban settings. The religious and tribal leaders are opinion leaders and can strongly influence the view of the local population. Both the Jirga and the Mosque are highly organized communication networks that influence collective and individual decision-making in Afghan villages.

Other important channels of communication are the open air bazaars and weekly markets that mostly occur once on Fridays. Bazaar conversation is a recreation, and public gatherings usually involve sharing of stories, singing, and dancing (Smith, 1980). Storytelling, folk music, public poetry, family and friends gatherings, and honoring of shrines are other means of communication. These channels are the traditional communication channels that operate throughout Afghanistan. The influential community leaders and opinion leaders tend to be the Mullah, the religious scholar, the Khan, the landlord or tribal leader and teachers (Rawan, 2002).

In some parts of Afghanistan there is also a pattern of local Sufi brotherhoods under the leadership of religious scholars. Like the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan is characterized by a close connection between Sufism and orthodoxy quite different from the other Islamic societies where they are seen as opposing groups. Sufism has a long history in Afghanistan (Wheelock, 2005). Sufi networks are the religious authorities that are based on spiritual association in the form of initiation into a tariqat3. The oldest tariqat of Ahamdiya originated in the Balkh province of Afghanistan in the second

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3 The spiritual paths of Sufism
century. Chishtiya and Mawlaviya are other tariqats founded in the country (Olesen, 1995). The Naqshandi tariqat has a strong presence among Pashtons (Wheelock, 2005). Within the religious network, Sufis play a great role in influencing the public opinion and behavior (Olesen, 1995).

Nomads and merchants have provided information to villagers in the past. Even today, they are introducing cultural innovations and providing the villagers with news. In exchange, the dwellers sell their agricultural goods to the nomads and exchange information with them. This two way communication has created a distinctive feature of Afghan way of living. Though they are exchanging commercial and cultural goods, they do not adopt each others way of living. (Newell, 1972)

Though decades of war has disrupted and nearly destroyed the social and communication system, the traditional structure of communication still exists (Rawan, 2002). However, there has always been a problem of communication between communities because of the hard to reach and mountainous terrain (Misdaq, 2006).

2.3.2 Media in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has not only experienced the presence of Super powers in the country but also different ideologies. Among these were Abdul Rahman Khan’s ideas of absolute monarchy, the “constitutionalism” of Amanullah Khan, the decade of democracy during King Zahir Shah, the socialism/communism of the Khalqis and Parchamis (the two main branches of PDPA), the Islamism of the Mujahideen and the fundamentalism of the Taliban (Saikal, 2004), and the current democracy in the post Taliban era.
The use of media and attitudes towards media varies according to the ruling ideologies. Until recently, radio and TV were state owned and used exclusively by the ruling party. Although the press enjoyed some freedom, most of the time it was oppressed. On the other hand, the press was also used as a vehicle for disseminating personal and ideological messages rather than providing content of public interest. As in other parts of the region, foreign media was broadcast to the masses from outside. During the cold war, a number of international radio channels, such as the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Moscow, etc. started broadcasting over Afghan airwaves.

The strict rule of governments over the press in Afghanistan made the opposing political parties and politicians print their publications outside the country, mainly in Pakistan. Though banned, these publications were distributed to the public privately. Even during the Taliban era, opposition groups were publishing periodicals outside Afghanistan targeting Afghans both inside and outside. The state owned media were used as a tool to convey the government’s policy to persuade the masses, and Skuse (2002) noted that as the broadcasting under successive Afghan regimes were abused, people turned from them and relied on the international or outside sources. However, media in today’s Afghanistan have grown both in the number of outlets and in the quality of programs. There are also some initiatives towards deregulation, privatization and convergence of the media in the country.

Radio is the most effective channel of communication in Afghanistan. Radio has been broadcasting since the 1940s (Smith, 1980). By 1990, the state owned Radio Afghanistan, the only radio station with national coverage, was broadcasting 50 programming hours per week. Radio Afghanistan, in the 1990s, had a listening audience
of 10 to 12 million. Radio has always been used as a propaganda tool (Rawan, 2002). There are more than 45 FM radio stations local radio stations are operating in Afghanistan (Reports without Borders, 2005). Radio ownership is 85% among the male population in Afghanistan (Internews Afghanistan…, 2004), however the ratio of women listeners is lower (Kamal, 2004). Radio channels are mostly local channels and there are one or more radio stations in every province (Sapi, 2006).

International stations such as BBC, VOA, Radio Free Europe and Deutsche Welle are broadcasting for Afghanistan (Altai Consulting, 2005). BBC, VOA and Radio Free Afghanistan each have 12 hours on the air and the main objective behind many of their programs is to support the ongoing reconstruction and development process in the country. BBC’s Afghan programming includes a series of educational program packages providing the audience entertainment and educational content (Skuse, 1997).

In 2004, Equal Access, an American based international non-profit started providing radio content via the World-Space satellite network operating over Asia. By providing content to both end users and local radio stations, Equal Access has started broadcasting teacher training programs and other programs related to the development activities (Equal Access, n.d.).

There are four independent TV stations in addition to the state-owned TV with its 11 provincial TV stations (Altai Consulting, 2005). The number has increased to eight stations by June 2006 (Sapi, 2006). Their problems relate to the type of programs and their specific content. For instance, the appearance of women had been one of the controversial issues in the beginning of the post Taliban era which caused a debate in the country. In Jalalabad a ban on women appearing on TV was imposed. In Herat, under
Ismail Khan, the presence of women on TV was interpreted as being against Islam while it was different in other parts of the country. The vagueness was also caused by the new constitution. Article 22 of the constitution prohibits publishing and broadcasting anything against Islam, however, there is no clarification of what is against Islam. Thus, the presence of women on TV was interpreted to be against the Islamic values by some hardliners. Even in Kabul, it took years before images of women appeared on TV. Similar conflicts over TV programs and foreign music are fought out between the radicals and liberals in the country.

Though the conservative circles in government are against any kind of footage of the women appearing in the public media, satellite dishes, called digital, in Afghanistan are widespread and around 40 to 50 % of the houses in cities such as Kabul and Herat have access to it. Cable has also found an audience in the main cities of Afghanistan. The number of cable TV networks has increased to 200 in the country (Sapi, 2006).

In terms of the printed media, Afghanistan today has more than 500 periodicals. Most of these are weeklies and are published in nearly all the provinces. However, the circulation of newspapers and magazines is limited and most are funded by NGOs. There is also an increase in the number of web pages. Around 40 private websites are registered with the Ministry of Communication. With the deployment of high capacity fiber optic telecommunications lines the number of web pages is also expected to increase (Sapi, 2006).

Although the first Afghan movie, Eishq wa Dusti (Love and Friendship) was produced in 1947. There are only a few cinema compounds in the country and few movies have been produced to date. One of the important developments in recent years is
the introduction of mobile cinema that takes tours in the villages and shows movies. Mobile theater is another means used for educating masses. Other initiatives included mobile radio used as a new approach to support communication campaigns. A pair of loudspeakers with an amplifier installed on a car goes village by village and broadcasts messages. These messages could be live interviews with opinion leaders or are recorded material on CD or tape cassettes. Tape cassettes are effective means of communication that are used both for music and for communicating educational messages. Other ICT technologies are also now in use in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, small media have a great potential for use in sociopolitical development. Posters, leaflets and mobile cinema, theater and radio are among these media. Small media have been exploited by different groups in the course of the Afghan history. Because radio and TV is controlled by the government, the opposition groups and the public at large had few opportunities for participation; these citizens have resorted to small media.

As in other countries in the region, mediated communication has played a great role. Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) explained that it was the fax machine that supported the popular struggle in the People’s Republic of China, in Poland community radio was used, in Romania TV was used and in the Iranian revolution cassettes were used effectively. In Afghanistan, as mediated communication has played a substantial role depending on the type of events.

From the very beginning, public literature has served as a medium of information and communication. The usage of literature and literary pieces by religious missionaries is a good example of early communication through literary pieces. The Veda, interpreted
to sacred knowledge, is among the earliest religious literature produced by Aryans living around the Oxus River in 1200 BC. The Veda was transferred to India and became the sacred religious literature of the Hindu Community. Buddhism has also used literature and the arts to communicate religious ideas. Buddhist monasteries and shrines were used for this purpose in ancient Afghanistan. Islamic literature has also been used to disseminate Islamic values in the country (Emadi, 2005).

Another item for consideration is folk poetry which has been used throughout Afghan history to communicate social messages and spread information. These poems often depict the day to day life of the people. Pashto Landy, a unique form of poetry, is a good example within the public literature. During the wars against the British, folk poetry played a great role in disseminating information to the general population both to inform them and to motivate them toward resistance. During the Soviet occupation both pro government and pro resistance scholars were using poetry. Such literary features comprise a substantial part of the content in the Afghan media (Edwards, 1986).
Chapter 3:  
Development and Communication in Afghanistan

3.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter analyzes the history of modernization and resistance to the changes in Afghanistan, as well as media development in the country. A historical record of the development process in the country including achievements, failures and ideological and sociopolitical motives behind these programs are presented. Examining the relationship between communication and development, the study considers specific reforms undertaken in the country and seeks to understand why most of the reforms were resisted by the local population. It also explains the usage of communication and media in the country and whether communication and media played a role in the development process.

This chapter is organized into several sections. The Early Reforms section covers a period from the 1870s to 1910s. It starts with the reign of Amir Shir Ali Khan and ends with Afghan Independence in 1999. The second section, called the First Wave of Reforms, discusses the changes introduced by Amir Amanullah and it covers a 10-year period from 1919 to 1929. Development events in the era from the 1930s to 1979 are covered in the third section. During the period of Gradual Reforms a number of five year development plans were implemented. The fourth section, called the Second Wave of

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4 Amir (Emir). Commander, also nobleman, prince, ruler, chief. First used by Caliph Omar who assumed the title of Amir Al Mu'minin (Commander of the Believers), in Afghanistan the rulers assumed the title since 1826 until Amanullah Khan adopted the title of “king” in 1926. Taliban’s leader Mullah Muhammad Omar also adopted the title “Amir” and changed the name of the country to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Adamec, 2003). The title had been used for political reasons since Amir is the person who declares Jihad (holy war).
Reforms, discusses the reforms introduced by the pro-Soviet regime, covering events from 1978 to 1992. It is followed by the rule of Mujahideen and Taliban, 1992 to 2002, and the last section discusses the new era or post Taliban developments (see Appendixes A & B).

This chapter also discusses the development issues based on some of the UN Millennium Development Goals in the country in the post Taliban era. It presents briefly the development process in the country and some of the sociopolitical factors that influence the development activities. In this section, a detailed explanation of the approach taken for the implementation of the National Solidarity Program (NSP) is presented. NSP is a community based development approach undertaken by three development partners: the Afghan government, NGOs and individual communities. In the last section of this chapter, some new initiatives in communication and development are also presented.

**3.2 Early Reforms: 1870s to 1910**

**3.2.1 Shir Ali: 1863 to 1879**

The first wave of reforms in Afghanistan started in the 1870s under the rule of Amir Shir Ali Khan with the foundation of a modern army. The reforms were proposed by Sayyed Jamal-ul-Din Afghani, the leading philosopher and thinker in the Eastern and Islamic world. Though the sovereignty of Afghanistan at the time was threatened by the British and Russian empires, Amir Shir Ali Khan was a strong supporter of modernization.
This agenda included opening of a number of factories, creating a system for collecting land revenue in cash and the establishment of government and public institutions. As part of his political reforms, Amir Shir Ali Khan established a council of elders who advised him on state affairs. Modern education was also introduced for the first time. Military and civil schools were built to train the new army and civil service personnel. In education, Turkish and British models were copied (Emadi, 2005).

These reforms included the establishment of printing houses and introduction of a newspaper. The periodical Shams-ul-Nehar (Morning Sun) was published in Kabul. Although, the circulation was limited to Kabul and adjacent cities, it was regarded as a milestone in the history of journalism and communication in Afghanistan. Its content promoted Afghan nationalism (Shirzad, 1989). However, the main focus of Amir Shir Ali Khan’s reforms was the building of a strong central government and the exercise of military power. These reforms did not involve the public and were not fully implemented.

These early reforms were disrupted by the British invasion and the second Afghan-Anglo War in 1878 (Magnus & Naby, 2002). The war not only affected the reforms but to a great extent destroyed the country’s economy and infrastructure.

3.2.2 Abdul Rahman Khan: 1880-1901

Similar to the popular uprising of the Afghans during the First Afghan Anglo War in 1841, the British were forced out of Afghanistan by a popular uprising in 1881-82 (Edwards, 1986). However, the British army was able to install Amir Abdul Rahman Khan to rule Kabul.
One of the main characteristics of the Afghan society, especially Pashtun society, is its decentralized governance and distributed power sharing. This distinguishes Afghanistan from other countries in the region. China, India and Iran each had strong centers controlling their countries. To keep the Afghan state functioning, rulers have throughout history used tribal representative bodies to get support for their programs and policies (Misdaq, 2006). Even the Afghan dynasties in India followed the same pattern for effective governance (Noorzai, 2001a). This approach was adopted by all Afghan rulers until Amir Abdul Rahman Khan started modernization and centralization of the state by creating a modern army, civil service and a judiciary system (Roy, 1986 cited in Misdaq, 2006). Amir Abdul Rahman Khan with the help of weapons and cash provided by the British (Rubin, 2002), reshaped the state of Afghanistan. The history of modern Afghanistan started from there (Edwards, 1986).

Though Afghanistan lost some of its land in treaties imposed during his reign, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan succeeded in unifying the country and introducing centralized reforms. Changes were introduced in the political, legal, economic and social system in the country. Although the reforms were mainly in accordance with Amir’s perceived political needs and the resources available, they laid the basis for Afghanistan’s administrative and Islamic legal system. The reforms introduced such public services as health and education. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan also assisted in establishing small industrial projects, medical and educational institutions and a printing press. Tax collection was another important feature of these reforms (Edwards, 1986).

Amir imposed his reform agenda by force and blood. There were at least seventeen major military operations. Two involved dynastic disputes and six were against
rebellions. The remaining nine, however, were against his fellow Pashtons who were a threat to his rule. Among the revolts was the Shinwari rebellion (1882-1892) in the east, which had to do with controlling the levying of tolls on caravans passing through Khaibar Pass. The Safi tribe revolt of 1888 occurred during the construction of a road in the valley of Chaukai (Edwards, 1986).

Amir used suppression for centralizing and establishing a modern state, but also brought about administrative reforms. Departments focusing on different areas of government were established. Provincial and district level administration were also established (Edwards, 1986).

For his reforms, Amir used written pamphlets and distributed them among the population, informing them about their responsibilities to the King and to their country (Misdaq, 2006). He also used written religious tracts advocating religious war against Kafirs although the text of these was carefully worded to avoid anti-British intent (Edwards, 1986).

The modernization efforts by Amir Abdul Rahman helped in establishing a centralized state. Resistance to these reforms started from the very beginning but Amir was able to deal with any revolts using military power. Force was the main tool used to carry out his agenda of centralization and modernization. The modernization efforts of Amir were not necessarily to benefit the population, rather to strengthen and expand his power within the country. In the absence of mass media, traditional communication channels such as religious and tribal networks were used to disseminate information. It can be concluded that Amir’s efforts to modernize Afghanistan was to build a strong
centralized state, focused on establishing a modern government structure and expanding central control to the rest of the country.

3.2.3 Amir Habibullah Khan: 1901-1919

With the death of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, his son Amir Habibullah Khan succeeded the throne. Amir Habibullah Khan took power when the region was undergoing a fundamental change. The political activities of Sayyed Jamaluddin al Afghani (1939-1897) had awakened the masses. Demands for internal reforms and resistance to outside intervention from Persia, Ottoman Turkey and Egypt were voiced. This resistance resulted in a number of national changes in succeeding years, paving the way for more nationalistic thinking in the country. Amir Habibullah insisted that a strong government could shield Islamic institutions and that further military and economic innovations were necessary in Afghanistan. Under Amir Habibullah, an Afghan modernist and nationalistic elite came onto the scene (Newell, 1972).

The emergence of the reformist movement in Afghanistan was mainly inspired by regional developments. A modern education system was a milestone for the reformist movement. Habibiyya High School established in 1903 was the birthplace of the Afghan reformist movement. Both the faculty and the administration were anti-colonialism and pro modernization, which influenced the young Afghan students. The education system in Habibiyya High School was a copy of the British model of a twelve-year secondary school introduced in India (Magnus & Naby, 2002).

The factor that accelerated the reformist movement in Afghanistan during Amir Habibullah Khan’s rule was allowing some of the individuals and families to return to
Afghanistan who were exiled by his father, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan. One of the leading figures in the reformist movement returning from exile with his family was Muhmod Tarzi. Tarzi, who had close family ties with the royal family, had great influence. Tarzi was responsible for tutoring Amir Habibullah’s two sons, Inyatullah and Amanullah Khan and the two princes married daughters of Tarzi. Tarzi is today perceived to be architect of modernization and liberalization in Afghanistan. His ideas and the policies he proposed served as the main strategy for Afghan rulers during the first three decades of the 20th century (Ewans, 2002).

Tarzi had spent his life in British India and in Turkey and was inspired by the changes that had occurred in those regions. He started the newspaper, Siraj al Akhbar, which took a stronger pan Islamist and anti imperialist stance. Tarzi is regarded as the father of modern journalism in Afghanistan (Ahang, 1972). He was critical of economic and social backwardness and religious traditionalism. His paper supported the idea that Afghanistan and other Islamic States needed to adopt new ideas and modernize their economies. However, he also believed that nations can preserve their indigenous social and religious structure while adopting new ideas, using the example of Japan (Schinasi, 1979).

Tarzi’s way of thinking was greatly influenced by the Pan Islamism of al-Afghani and the Young Turk Movement of Turkey. He thought that Turkey can serve as an ideal model for modernization in Afghanistan (Magnus & Naby, 2002). Tarzi, like al-Afghani, believed that the survival of the Muslim nations and of Islam was in returning to the true spirit of Islam: free from the corrupted and tyrant rulers and ignorant Ulema (Religious scholars) who were responsible for the widening gap between Islamic standards and
secular values which caused the backwardness of Muslim nations. In fields of culture and education, he was also influenced by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), the founder of the modern Islamic movement in India. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan believed that Muslims should remove their prejudice against western civilizations and adopt new approaches. According to the concept of Islamic Modernization, the underdevelopment of Islamic society is the result of moving away from true Islam and that Islam is compatible with science, technical programs and human freedom (Rubin, 2002).

As a leading figure of the reformist movement, Tarzi suggested that it was not military power that Afghanistan or any other nation should rely on to compete against European nations. To compete, Afghanistan should adopt new technologies and sciences as well as local industry, and reorganize the society. For this purpose, Tarzi published a number of articles on scientific discoveries and inventions and wrote about the benefits of science and technology, communication technology and other areas of human achievements. The main purpose of these writings was to show that Islam is not contrary to the modern sciences. Tarzi and his Young Afghan movement were also strong advocates of women’s education. He saw modernization as the only means whereby Muslims would be able to resist the British (Magnus & Naby, 2002). Though Tarzi strongly advocated copying the European way of development, he did not want an uncritical imitation. He brought the example of Japan, where some European values were copied but also kept its own customs, morality and way of living (Schinasi, 1979).

The periodical, Siraj-al-Akhbar Afghaniyah was published in 1901. The editor of this publication was a teacher of Habibiyya High School, Abdul Rauf Khan Kandahari. The publication was closed after its first edition but 10 years later, in 1911, Siraj-u-
Akhbar, was opened by Tarzi (Noorzai, 2001b). The paper demanded and supported independence, modern education, nationalism and, more importantly, modernization (Gregorian in Shirzad, 1989; Newell, 1972). The content of Saraj-al-Akhbar was not limited to domestic problems but also addressed international affairs. Though the circulation was limited, copies of the newspaper were read publicly in bazaars of Afghan towns and the Pashto belt under British India. The paper was read and quoted in India, Persia and the Ottoman Empire. The British government in India tried to convince the Afghan government to stop the publication of Siraj-al-Akhbar because of its anti-British tone and its circulation in British India (Newell, 1972; Noorzai, 2001b).

Saraj-ul Akhbar was not only attacking imperialism but was also critical of Amir Habibullah’s polices and the royal family. The paper encouraged Amir to consider reforms and give opportunity to the reformists. During that time every topic of reforms was approached (Grassmuch and Adamec, 1986 in Shirzad, 1989). Because of their leaning towards constitutional monarchy, the reformists were also called constitutionalists. The paper promoted education and modernization mainly among the ruling class. Even the first issue included an editorial on the value of modern science (Shirzad, 1989).

Other initiatives included the publication of Seraj-al Atfal (Lamp for the Children) which started printing in 1918 and became a source of education for children. The main task of the paper, as mentioned by its editor, was to provide information on science, innovation and religious issues in easy to follow language (Ahang, 1970).

In this period, the impact of education on young Afghans and the role of modern schooling and printed media in shaping the opinions of the elite and educated Afghans
could be observed. Global and regional changes also had an impact. Afghan returnees and strong individuals within the country can be seen as influencing modernization in the country.

### 3.3 First Wave of Reforms: 1919-1929

In the wake of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and a number of new states emerged that influenced the whole political scenario in the region of Afghanistan. In Turkey, Kemal Ataturk was struggling to change Turkish traditional society into a modern society. In the north, the Soviet Union replaced the Russian Empire, denouncing colonialism and promising independence to the Central Asian states. To the south, Gandhi was challenging the permanence of the British Indian Empire. These movements influenced to a great extent the social and political situation in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2000).

The independence of Afghanistan was proclaimed in 1919, after the assassination of Amir Habibullah Khan and succession of King Amanullah Khan. King Amanullah Khan started a new wave of reforms. Tarzi served as principal adviser to the King in the post of Foreign Ministry. He saw his visions transformed into practical reform policies during the 1920s. The general philosophical background and justification for reforms could be read in issues of Siraj al Akhbar from 1911 to 1918 (Saikal, 2004).

King Amanullah, leading the reformist movement in the country, formed a government that was mainly composed of youth educated in the Western system. These youth were impatient with the changes and demanded more. They were principally demanding implementation of a constitutional monarchy and a government held
accountable to the public (Magnus & Naby, 2002). Throughout the process of implementing reforms there was tension between conservatives and modernists within the power structure (Gregorian, 1969). Amanullah Khan devoted his energy to comprehensive political and administrative reforms with emphasis on the formulation of a legal, judicial and administrative framework for the state (Rashid, 2000). Amanullah also began a series of essential economic and social reforms.

3.3.1 Amanullah Khan’s Reforms

The reforms in the period from 1919-1923, included a number of special laws related to the organization of the central government, provincial and local administration and the law for the courts were issued (Olesen, 1995). In 1923, the first constitution (Nizamnama) of the country was written promising revolutionary changes and a shift from the autocratic and tribally based monarchy established by Abdul Rahman Khan to a modern twentieth century political state. These social reforms focused on domestic life including choice of marriage, female education and informally discouraging female veiling and polygamy (Edwards, 1986).

The Nizamnama was presented to a Jirga of 800 delegates from the Eastern provinces on Independence Day in 1923. From the very beginning, the reforms introduced by King Amanullah were criticized as being harmful to the progress of Islamic teaching and promoted secular values (Olesen, 1995). Edwards wrote that these new codes were opposed both by the religious circles and local tribes. One of the
threatening aspects was nationalizing some of the remaining *Waqf*[^5] that were not taken over by the reforms introduced by Abdul Rahman Khan. The institution of Muhtasib was abolished, a social practice that enforced religious morality and religious observation, was another reason that the religious circles were furious and opposed the changes (Edwards, 1986). In effect, the reforms that Amanullah Khan tried to introduce in Afghanistan upset the prevailing social structure and norms in the country (Hammond, 1984).

Education was one of the areas to which the government was paying attention. Students were sent to France, Germany and Italy for higher education. Women’s education was also promoted which was accompanied by proclaiming equal rights for women (Olesen, 1995).

Further reforms included the adoption of Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) approach intended to import small industries to supply consumer goods for the domestic market (Miraki, 2001). In commerce, the treaty of 1921 with the Soviet Union allowed Afghan goods to enter the USSR duty free and duty on Soviet goods was cut to 5%. This increased bilateral trade between the countries. Afghan exports to the USSR rose from 1.3 million rubles in 1923/24 to 11.7 million in 1928/29. Import jumped as well from 690,000 rubles to 7 million rubles. Textile mills and cement plants were opened. Hydroelectric capacity was enhanced and health services and agricultural innovations were also introduced (Newell, 1972). During the reign of Amanullah Khan, the first bank was established to replace the bazaar money changers; transit services increased with

[^5]: endowment of land or property by Muslim for religious, educational or charitable purposes.
neighbors, especially with Soviet Central Asia, and agricultural exports were developed (Magnus & Naby, 2002).

3.3.2 Rebellion against the Reforms

In 1924, a rebellion started in the South Eastern province of Khost opposing the reforms introduced by the King Amanullah Khan (Hammond, 1984). This revolt led by two Mullahs, Abdullah and Abdul Rashid (Misdalq, 2006). The demands were that the educational reforms should be curbed. Modern education should be provided only to a limited number of boys who will deal with foreigners. Girls’ education should be an Islamic education. Girls should only go to school before reaching marriageable age and should be taught only the Quaran. The minimum age for male teachers, teaching girls, should be set at eighty years (Olesen, 1995).

The rebellion forced Amanullah to moderate his reforms. In a Loya Jirga, Amanullah withdrew and gave up some of the reforms. Both the Ulamma, thinking that they have revived their former authority, and the tribes, believing that they regained their autonomy and independence, were satisfied (Edwards, 1986). However, soon after taking a tour of Europe, Amanullah Khan was impressed by the progress that the Europeans had made and once again thought of social and technological reforms for Afghanistan (Hammond, 1984). He was especially impressed with the reforms introduced by Ataturk in Turkey (Edwards, 1986). Though, as Dupree (1980) pointed out, Ataturk warned Amanullah Khan about the difficulty in making large scale sociopolitical reforms without a strong army. Ataturk promised to send some of his best officers to train the Afghan army. His associates, including Tarzi, advised him against taking hasty steps, but
Amanullah Khan rushed to implement his reforms platform without adequate planning (Dupree, 1980).

### 3.3.3 Reforms after Amanullah Khan’s Tour of Europe

Convening a second Loya Jirga after his return, Amanullah Khan reintroduced the reforms previously rejected by the 1924 Loya Jirga and introduced some new measures. Laws defining the minimum age of marriage, prohibiting child engagement, banning blood money, promoting co-education for students from six to eleven years of age, eliminating financial privileges to Mullahs and requiring them to be certified, introducing foreign language in religious schools and changing the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday were among the new measures to be launched by the state (Edwards, 1986).

Other reforms included a new monetary system and extension of the military draft to the whole country where the tribal men did not serve in the national army. This was an attempt to reduce the autonomy of the tribes and the influence of the religious leaders. The wearing of western clothes by delegates to the Loya Jirga was required (Hammond, 1984). Edwards (1986) mentioned that everyone who entered Paghman had to have a European hat and clothes.

Changing conditions for women was one of the main objectives of the reform program. Laws related to marriage and engagement defining the minimum age for marriage and other related issues were enacted. To protect women’s rights, Anjuman-e-Hemayat Niswan (The Association for Protection of Women) was established. Building

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6 Paghman is a district in Kabul at the time of Amanullah Khan. It used to be the summer capital and the Loya Jirga of 1924 and 1928 were both held in Paghman.
schools for women and printing publications for women were other initiatives introduced by the state. These reforms quickly formed opposition within the population.

3.3.4 Rebellion and the Civil War

The process of implementing this agenda of modernization, together with the distribution of printed materials, caused revolts in the tribal communities. Pictures of King Amanullah and Queen Soraya in western clothes during their grand tour of Europe shown in the tribal areas heightened public anger (Hammond, 1984). Rumors spread that the European trip had cost one million pounds, and that the Amir’s conduct had been impious: he had danced, drunk alcoholic beverages and even eaten pork. Pictures of the Queen traveling unveiled in foreign lands appeared in such newspapers as Settare-ye Iran (Star of Iran), Koushesh (Efforts) and Iran. Ghobar (2000) was of the opinion that the British purposefully distributed the pictures to make the people rise against Amanullah Khan. In any case, his tax measures had alienated the urban population as well as the peasantry and religious establishment.

The first confrontation started in the Eastern province of Ningarhar where the Shinwari tribe began an armed revolt against the government. This uprising was not explicitly related to the reforms, yet a connection cannot be denied. On the other hand, the revolt encouraged other sections of the population to take arms against the government (Edwards, 1986).

The 1929 reforms were mainly opposed by the religious groups of the time (Smith, 1980), but there was also interference from the outside (Hammond, 1984). Amanullah Khan was disliked by the British rulers of India because of the country’s
ideological leanings toward the Soviets (Smith, 1980). Though Amanullah Khan later tried to compromise by involving influential leaders, it was too late. All important religious leaders were alienated. Disaster was prepared to occur (Saikal, 1979).

A series of revolts in the tribal areas of the south paved the way for a brigand, Habibullah Kalakani, (known as Bacha-Saaqao, which means the son of water carrier) to capture Kabul from the north. The country was practically in a civil war when Habibullah Kalakani remained in power for nine months. Habibullah stopped all the reforms that were introduced by Amanullah Khan (Gregorian, 1969; Shirzad, 1989).

### 3.3.5 Communication and the Reforms

The growth of media during Amanullah’s reign (1919-1929) was fast and noteworthy (Shirzad, 1989). In addition to the printing of newspapers in Kabul, separate publications were initiated in provinces. The content of these papers mainly supported the government sponsored reforms and were designed to gain public acceptance (Newell, 1972). Amanullah started for the first time open theater in the country (Gregorian, 1969). By 1967, there were theaters in Heart, Kandahar and Kabul (Smith, 1980).

Aman-Afghan replaced the Seraj-ul-Akhbar as the government’s official paper in 1919. This paper was progressive and strongly supportive of rapid modernization in Afghanistan (Shirzad, 1989). The paper not only encouraged modernization but also women’s right. The purpose of the paper, as stated in the first issue, was to inform the public of what was happening in the country and around the world. From 1919 to 1929, there were improvements in the quality and quantity of newspapers. A total of twenty three daily and weekly periodicals and journals were noted. Newspapers were published
in Herat, Jalalabad, Baghlan, Kandahar and Mazar Sharif. Mainly these papers supported modernization and education (Shirzad, 1989). Publication of periodicals also started. In addition, some ministries also published their own journals. These papers were often run by young Afghan liberals (Gregorian, 1980). Irshad-ul Niswan was a weekly paper appearing in Kabul in 1921. The editor of this paper was Tarzi’s wife, Ms. Asmar. The main purpose behind publishing Irshad-ul Niswan was to educate Afghan women about their rights (Shirzad, 1989).

Radio was another important development in this period. In 1925, the first Afghan radio station began operating in Kabul. By 1927, two 100-watt transmitters similar to the one already in use were supposed to be installed; however, the project was abandoned after the 1928 outbreak (Gregorian, 1969). Limited broadcasting power and live programming makes it difficult to determine the content and the impact of radio at that time. The audience for radio broadcasting was just a small portion of the population in Kabul. However, radio made a cultural contribution by helping the development of music (Shirzad, 1989). Gregorian (1969) estimated the number of radio sets to be about 1,000 in Afghanistan in 1928. He also mentioned that Russia planned to establish a powerful radio station in Kabul. This was a part of a technical assistance package to improve Afghanistan’s communications, connect Afghanistan with Central Asia through roads and telegraph lines, and to help Afghanistan with military training.

There is a little doubt Amanullah Khan laid the foundation for communications in the country. He received the telegraph equipment and other material from the Soviet Union to build a link between Kabul, Heart and the outside world. A telegraphic link was
established between Peshawar and Kabul. In addition to the postal services, telephone services also started.

A number of factors contributed to the failure of these reforms in Afghanistan. As result, scholars have explained those factors include foreigners interfering, ignoring the social and cultural structure of the society, adopting changes from other countries and challenging the authority of religious and tribal leaders. However, one of the main factors was the centralized authoritarian approach associated with modernization of the time. The strategy taken was not participatory or need based.

Another important factor that contributed to the lack of success in reforms efforts was government dependence on the mass media. Although the Loya Jirga was used to introduce the reforms through opinion leaders, that institution was only informed about the changes. The Jirga is a consultation and decision-making organ that seeks to reach consensus, whereas Amanullah Khan used it as a means to inform the masses rather than consult them or let them decide what should be done. On the other hand, the opposition forces were effective in using interpersonal, traditional and small media. Word of mouth communication, especially the use of rumors, played a great role in inspiring people to stand against the reforms. Rumors were circulating when Amanullah Khan was in his trip to Europe (Edwards, 1986). In the Khust rebellion, Mullah Abdullah had the Nizam Nama (constitution) in one hand and the Quran in the other hand, asking the people which one they will obey (Misdaq, 2006). The religious network was effectively used against the King’s reforms. Small media, such as the photos of Queen Soraiya wearing a sleeveless dress, also played a great role in provoking the tribal men (Edwards, 1986).
3.4 Gradual Reforms

Habibullah was ousted by Nadir Khan in January 1929. Nadir Khan was an army general and the head of the Paktia front during the Independence War. He came to Afghanistan from France through British India. He managed to unify the tribes and organize a tribal army against Habibullah which captured Kabul. Nadir Khan was assassinated in 1933 and Zahir Shah, his 18-year old son, succeeded to the throne. However, his uncles were the actual rulers of the country from 1933 to the end of Second World War (Edwards, 1986).

Nadir Shah believed in gradual modernization and that progress and cultural reforms could be introduced with a slower pace. He believed that the national was not ready for Amanullah Khan’s reforms and argued that there is no disagreement between the religion and progress. Amanullah tried to change the minds of people by changing their hats, he said (Gregorian, 1969). Learning from the experience of Amanullah Khan, Nadir Khan did not attempt to introduce rapid social and economic changes. He adopted a gradual modernization approach in which the reforms would be implemented slowly and conservatively. This was the approach followed throughout the rule of Zahir Shah (Shirzad, 1989). However, a desire for new administration was indicated in the new constitution ratified by a Loya Jirga in September, 1930. To gain support from the religious establishments, the sanctity of Hanafi law was reaffirmed (Edwards, 1986).

Schools stopped during the civil war of 1929 were reopened in 1932. In trying to improve education, government efforts were concentrated on establishing primary schools at the village level and secondary and higher education in provincial capitals and
in Kabul. A strategy to expand the government’s presence, while neutralizing the groups that might be involved in anti-state activities, was to include religious leaders in the management of tribal affairs, thus avoiding direct involvement of the state in tribal affairs (Edwards, 1986).

In the era of Saradar Mohammad Hashim Khan, no significant reforms were undertaken. Shah Mahmud Khan, an uncle of Zahir Shah, became the prime minister under the constitution of 1946. Supported by educated and modernized Afghans, he initiated political reforms. The main goal of the government from 1933 to 1953 was to break down local autonomy and to make the tribes more dependent on the state. Primary attention was paid to the structure of the government and in particular to the Afghan army (Edwards, 1986).

During the time of both Hashim Khan and Shah Mahmud Khan, internal problems were given the priority and a policy of neutrality in foreign affairs was preserved. However, the issue of Pashtoonistan⁷, which became a key determinant of the internal and external policies of Afghan government during Daud Khan’s period in the 1950s, became a key factor in the internal and external policies of the government (Edwards, 1986; Ewans, 2002)

The change in the international system in 1947 gave the state means to follow the development goals by acting independently from the tribal and religious establishment.

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⁷ The Afghan land separated from Afghanistan by the Durand line signed by Sir Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of the government of India and Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893. The line separates the Pashto tribes located on both sides of the Durand line. However, since its demarcation, the line has not been accepted by the Afghan rulers and has become a sensitive political issue. With the creation of Pakistan, the issue of Pashtoonistan, an independent state of Pashtons on the other side of Durand, has become a top priority in foreign policy of Afghanistan.
This became possible and was limited to the foreign financial aid to which later the sale of the natural gas was added. Additionally, the state building strategy of the government made the government to be more independent from the tribes, peasants and Ulema (Rubin, 2002).

3.4.2. “Guided Economy” Modernization

In 1953, Daud Khan, Zahir Shah’s cousin became the prime minister. He also had reformist ideas, and over his 10 years reign he introduced military, social and economic centralized changes (Magnus and Naby, 2002). In Daud Khan’s government, the main emphasis was on infrastructure projects (Newell, 1972). Relying on the Afghan national army and police, Daud started to confront the tribal and religious establishment. For instance, “lifting veil” was used to show that government can implement a reform strategy even if the tribes and local communities are against these reforms. During the Independence Day, Daud and his senior army officers appeared with their families and the women were unveiled. This caused a protest by the religious circles; however, the government was able to deal with the issue with support from religious authorities and from its police and military power to suppress the protest firmly without any violence (Rubin, 2002).

A Ministry of Planning was established in 1955 and 1956 to organize development activities and receive foreign aid (Newell, 1972). The Ministry drafted its first Five Year Plan in 1957. 40 % of the funds were spent in agriculture and related areas. Second in priority was communication and transportation. An important task was paving of the roads. Health and education was given 8 % of the available funding. Daud
Khan’s Five Years Plan included expansion of education from elementary to higher education. The main emphasis was to make the facilities available in provinces. Improvements in the coal mining projects and surveys concerning minerals and energy were also part of the plan. External assistance came from both blocs, the Western and the Soviets, as they competed with each other in the region. Afghanistan received more than $1 billion in Soviet aid that included some military assistance (Newell, 1972). The First Five Year Plan was a step to industrialize the country where 12 % of the total funding was given to industry (Kamrany, 1962). The main projects were construction of roads linking Afghanistan with its neighbors. Establishment of Ariana Airline, and large irrigation and power projects were also included in the plan (Mehrabi, 1978).

The first plan was to guide both the government and private sectors in an economic strategy for improving the living standards of the population. It also laid the conceptual base for further planning and economic developments in a “guided economy” approach (Kamrany, 1962).

Daud’s government policy was to attract and expand foreign development assistance for Afghanistan (Edwards, 1986). Some 80 % of the funding for the development projects was coming from the foreign grants. It was even difficult for the Afghan government to pay for 20 % of the plan and pay the operating cost after the projects were in place (Rubin, 2002).

The Second Development Plan prepared by the Ministry of Planning covered the years 1963 to 1967. According to (Mehrabi, 1978), some of the shortcomings of the First Five Year plan, such as sector planning and feasibility studies, were in the second plan.
However, cost to benefit ratios and other impacts of investment were ignored. Lack of data and trained personnel were areas ignored in both the programs (Mehrabi, 1978).

The Third Development plan covered the years from 1968 to 1972. For this plan policies and strategies were clearer than the preceding ones. There was also a shift in emphasis. The infrastructure dominant investment program was transferring to a more product based program with more immediate yields, though according to (Mehrabi, 1978), the implementation and the estimated revenue to be produced was exaggerated.

The Forth Development Plan implemented in the years 1973 to 1977, contained the same defects as previous plans. In all these programs, it was the government playing the major role. The government set up the goals for all development initiatives (Mehrabi, 1978).
Mehrabi (1978) acknowledges improvements in infrastructure, however, these programs failed to increase growth in production, income and foreign exchange receipts. Additionally, the foreign debt service mounted rapidly from $28 million in the second of the five year plans to $108 million in the third plan and $200 million in the fourth plan. Administrative constraints were also felt during the implementation of the program. There was too heavy a reliance on foreign aid and inadequate mobilization of the local resources. In the assessment of Mehrabi (1978) the overall result of these programs was poor. For instance, agriculture continued to contribute around 50% to the total Gross Domestic Product and employed 80% of the total workforce in the country. Agriculture production and income increased at a very low rate. Agricultural sectors remained at subsistence levels economically and there were strong barriers between the agriculture system and the money economy.

Daud Khan attempted to make progress in women’s right in addition to education and the military. Though his reforms were carefully designed, they were not without opposition. The issue of “lifting veil” inspired protests among the Ulema in the Southern City of Kandahar (Edwards, 1986). Kamrany (1962) says that the announcement of freedom for women in 1959 made women take more responsibility on their own behalf and some entered the workforce. However, it was only limited to the urban areas of the country, and there was no change in the living conditions of women in the rural areas of the country.

US aid projects were also initiated to exploit such mineral resources as coal and gas. Karakul skins, dairy, fruit, and crop harvests projects began to benefit the national economy. Tourism and Afghan worker income earned in the oil rich Middle Eastern
states also entered the equation. On the negative side, poppy cultivation, corruption (multiplied by poppy cultivation) and an increase in the military budget took place in this period. One of the very critical factors that later caused a problem was the increased division between urban and rural areas. Nearly all the higher educational institutions were located in Kabul, as were the banks and hospitals (Magnus & Naby, 2002).

By the late sixties, there were about 540,000 students in Afghan schools and 1,400 high school students were graduated annually. The number of students at Kabul University increased ten fold reaching approximately 7,000, and at the same time, the number of teachers also increased (Edwards, 1986). From year 1963 to 1973, the number of primary schools doubled. Secondary school students increased six fold. Though the university enrollment was less rapid, it was 3.5 times as large at the end of the decades as the beginning. There were 11,000 students at university level by 1974 and some 1,500 students had been sent abroad for education. However, the problem created by the new approach to education was that the schooling separated village youth form their villages. Literacy remained at 10%. The schooling system created tension between the modern and traditional values. In the rural areas, especially, the elite recognized education as a threat to their control (Rubin, 2002). Later, they recognized educating their sons as a way to preserve their control because the power was shifted away from the provinces to Kabul (Edwards, 1986).

In terms of foreign policy, Afghanistan remained neutral during World War I and II. When the British left the Indian Subcontinent, there was a change in the regional political structure in 1947 that brought about the issue of Pashtunistan. During the Cold War, Afghanistan preserved its neutrality policy with both the Western and Soviet bloc.
Afghanistan had also maintained its neutrality policy having friendly and diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, including the Soviet Union and Iran (Kamrany, 1962). However, the issue of Pashtoistan influenced both the Afghan internal and external policies (Rubin, 2002; Ewans, 2002).

The issue of Pashtoistan increased tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additionally, the growing engagement of the US with Pakistan and the refusal of the US to give military aid to Afghanistan in 1954, made the government of Afghanistan turn to the Soviet block. The Pashtoistan issue increased the dependency of the Afghan government on the Soviet Union (Edwards, 1986). In terms of military assistance, the Afghan government equipped its army with Soviet weaponry and sent Afghan officers to the Soviet Union for training (Ewans, 2002). The rivalry between the US and Soviet Union in terms of economic aid had existed since World War II (Karmrany, 1962), however, the US economic aid was not adequate (Rubin, 2002).

The global and regional political situation, together with the newly established democracy and the schooling system, influenced the political environment in Afghanistan. Both left and right politics can be traced to the beginning of modernization in the country. The left politics started with the Afghan Youth Movement in the 1920s when the aim was to create a more pan-Islamic perspective. In the 1940s, the major leftist party was Wish Zalmyan, favoring modernization and progress. The left politics took a more radical approach in the 1960s and 1970s.

These movements were following different paths to modernize Afghanistan. The pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was influenced by the Soviet model for transforming the society. Other movements included the pro China’s
party Shola (Flame). However, these groups were after securing the power and were
divided over ethnic, linguistic and religious boundaries (Misdaq, 2006). The Islamist
movement also started in the 1920s. The Afghan Islamists were influenced by such
outside scholars as Hassan al Bana in Egypt, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood; Sayd
Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose books were translated; Muhammad ibn Abdal
Wahab of Arabia, Mawdudi of Pakistan, and Shariati of Iran (Misdaq, 2006).

In 1963, when Daud Khan resigned, King Zahir Shah declared his intention to
found a constitutional monarchy and prohibit the royal family from holding top positions
in the government. Zahir Khan’s modernization program included a liberal constitution
and the creation of a stronger electoral system (Edwards, 1986). This attempt at
democracy lasted for a decade (1963-1973). Though most of the delegates to the
parliament coming from the rural areas were elected without any ideological background,
in the late sixties two opposing political camps were formed, and struggled against each
other. The Marxists on one hand and the Islamists on the other were looking to win
ground from more moderate movements. The Marxists were the more vocal of the groups
(Edwards).

In 1973, Daud Khan ousted his cousin King Zahir Shah in a military coup and
became President of Afghanistan. His reforms were centrally designed and infrastructure
focused, and the media gave support to his centralized projects. In 1976, the government
started a more participatory village development program via a village elected councils
and government assistance. Folk media were also used to gain public support for
government policies (Smith, 1980).
Adopting the gradual reform policy of Nadir Khan, his brothers and son had avoided a direct confrontation with the public, communities and tribes. However, some people resisted the imposed changes. The incident at Kandahar, where religious circles provoked an uprising against the government’s policy related to women, is an example. Another significant incident was the outbreak of anti-government fighting in Paktia over roads which the tribes thought a violation of the understanding made between Nadir Shah and the Paktia tribes that the government would not interfere in their tribal affairs. The outbreak of the violence was basically an intertribal conflict in which an Afghan military officer was shot. This caused thousands of tribesmen to flee the country to Pakistan in order to escape the government’s retaliation (Edwards, 1986).

### 3.4.3 Media and Development

There was strict censorship of the press under the rule of Muhammad Hashem Khan. During the time of Shah Mahmud Khan, the parliament was established and laws guaranteed a free press. A number of newspapers and journals were also published. The content of these publications were mainly supporting constitutional monarchy and demands for further reforms (Magnus & Naby, 2002). In early 1951, the new press law permitted the publication of independent newspapers and five new journals came on the horizon (Magnus & Naby, 2002). The press became more powerful and responsible in the decade of democracy from 1963 to 1973. The press was strongest during Mosa Shafaq’s premiership who also considered establishing private TV and radio (Shirzad, 1989). After Daud took the power in 1973, he declared the constitution invalid and all the private publications were banned (Shirzad, 1989). However, in 1976, there were still about 17
dailies with a total circulation of around 100,000. Copies were consumed by those who could read and for illiterate people their contents were read aloud (Smith, 1980).

Radio broadcasting was halted during the civil war and did not start again until the late 1930s. In 1937, after an agreement with Marconi Company, radio stations were established in Kabul, Maimana, Khost, Khanabad and Dujazu. In the same year, Telefunken Company of Germany was given a contract for installation of a 20 KW transmitter. Despite the lack of radio sets, groups listened to radio through strategically placed receiving sets equipped with loudspeakers. By 1948, the Afghans owned some 8,000 radios, eight times as many as in 1936 (Gregorian, in Shirzad, 1989). By 1958 and 1959, two short-wave transmitters, one of ten and the other of 50 kilowatts, started operating at a new installation at Yakatut north of Kabul. Educational programming was the main content. Developing Afghan folklore and producing thousands of records was another initiative. There were some specialized programs as well, such as programs for farmers about agricultural innovations. Radio was regarded as one of the main channels of entertainment and education. In addition to national languages, Kabul Radio broadcast in English, French, Russian, Arabic and Urdu (Shirzad, 1989). In 1976, the radio program scheduled had grown to 8 hours a day. Music formed about 50% of the programs (Smith, 1980).

The media was mainly used to disseminate news, propaganda and to gain public support (Newell, 2005). Bakhtar News Agency, the state owned agency, provided news to Afghan and international media outlets. The government also used word of mouth especially the religious networks to ensure the loyalty of the tribes. The government tried to use media for educational purposes and for development. Prime Minister Hashim...
Maiwandwal in 1966 said that media should be used to convey to the people useful information about the affairs of the country and the world. It should also raise the level of education, promote national unity and acknowledge progress (Smith, 1980). In 1978, experimental television broadcasting started in Kabul (Shirzad, 1989). For personal communication there were the postal services, telephone and telegraph. The number of telephone lines was 19,900 in 1972, 19,939 in 1973 and reached 20,700 in 1974 (Mehrabi, 1978).

3.4.4 Foreign Aid and Dependency

In the period of gradual modernization, changes were concentrated on restructuring governmental institutions and making the local communities more dependent on these institutions. Beginning in 1957, for a period of 20 years, the government planned its development agenda in five-year increments. These initiatives were used mainly to improve the infrastructure in the country. However, a shift to more product-based programs was observed in the last plan. The five-year development programs brought little change in the living conditions of ordinary Afghans (Mehrabi, 1978). In fact they increased the gap between the rural and urban areas (Magnus & Naby, 2002). All the public facilities were located in the cities.

The achievements and the scope of these programs were mainly dependent on foreign aid and foreign expertise. These programs increased the country’s financial debt and made Afghanistan dependent on external assistance. For instance, the financial contributions of the Soviet Union in the development projects, the use of natural gas and the purchase of military equipment that accompanied sending Afghans for training in the
Soviet Union not only led Afghanistan to depend on the Soviet bloc but also to be influenced by it ideologically. Later on, these factors influenced the process of development and the political environment in the country, leading to two military coups and the subsequent Stalinist attempts to transform the Afghan society.

During this time the private and independent press flourished, though there were some interruptions. Radio programming had become more localized. Experimental TV programming was started. Overall, there were great improvements in the media. However, the media were mainly used for centralized education and propaganda, following a modernization and dependency approach.

3.5 Second Wave of Reforms and the Soviet Invasion:

With the communist coup in 1978, the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took power and the state policy of neutrality, balance and slow transformation and unification ended (Saikal, 2004). In the beginning, the regime had a non-ideological tone, but after three months radical reforms were announced. A clear policy of transforming the society along Marxist lines was implemented (Edwards, 1986). As Gupta (1986) described it, the pro-Soviet regime reform program consisted of 30 points called “Basic Line of Revolutionary Duties of the Government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” (cited in Miraki, 2000).

3.5.1 Radical Reforms

After the communist coup, a number of decrees were proclaimed; among them were the abolition of usury, changes in marriage customs and in land use. These were
poorly communicated to the villagers and enforced by imprisonment, torture and death. Thousands of members of the traditional elite, the religious establishment, and the intelligentsia were killed.

One of the decrees was regarding women’s rights. Decree Number 7 promised equal rights for women. According to the ideology of the PDPA, the decree was necessary to do away with “the unjust patriarchal feudalistic relations between husband and wife,” since the injustice was rooted in economic inequality between men and women. The government prohibited polygamy, and made compulsory the enrollment of girls in schools. It banned the practice of bride price in which the family of the bride gets money from the groom when giving their daughter in marriage. Such a dowry was limited to Afg. 300, equivalent to 10 Dirhams, according to right of Shari’s Law. The decree prohibited forced marriages and gave women the right of choice in marriage. It also prohibited child marriage and set a minimum age for marriage both for men and women (Edwards, 1986). A very simple solution was imposed by the authorities to the custom of the “bride price” had been part of the traditional marriage contracts. It ensured that the bride was given security (Ewans, 2002), and it was also an indication of their social status.

Another set of reforms was to free peasants from indebtedness. The ruling party enacted a law that banned the practice of usury by lenders and reduced or canceled all rural debts prior to 1974. However, the traditional practices of buying seed grain, tools and other items needed to plant and raise a crop were ignored. The money lenders were no longer interested in making loans without interest. In addition, the regime failed to
keep its word that they would establish a credit system for peasants. As a result, farmers were unable to plant their crops, and agricultural production fell (Hammond, 1984).

Land reform was another area addressed. This decree was carried out by confiscating and redistributing the land by force (Gupta, 1986 in Miraki, 2000). However, it was not only a question of land, as tenant farmers often relied on landowners for seed, fertilizer, credit and animals and water rights (Ewans, 2002).

The government focused on a mass literacy program for both sexes and adopted a curriculum that paralleled the Soviet way of education. The literacy and education reforms, which included women, imposition on the elderly, ideological content and having teachers from outside the community increased the anger of the local communities (Ewans, 2002).

Though the regime presented statistics by the spring of 1979 showing its reforms were of great success, the reality was that they caused anger in the population and disturbed the social and economic structure of the country (Ewans, 2002). The failure of these reforms were caused by a number of problems, such as the disorganized State credit which could not replace the pre-existing private sources, cooperative initiatives failed to pay off, and uncertainty about land ownership. The committees that were sent around the provinces to settle apportionments often did so in a totally random manner. Additionally, mortgage documentation was in most of the cases unavailable. It should also be noted that the purpose and meaning of the decrees were ill communicated. Based on the Marxist ideology, the reforms were supposed to do away with feudalism and capitalist practices. Nevertheless, the reforms proposed were seen as radical, threatening the
prevailing values and structure of the society at nearly all levels family, clan, tribe, nation and religion (Newall, 1972).

Industrialization of the country was a top priority in regime’s reformist agenda. The government announced a new five-year plan when it seized power in 1978. It also announced projections for proposed development in manufacturing (Klass, 1991). The economic plan designed for 1980 to 1985 emphasized the rapid development of the heavy industry so that by 1985, the expectation was to produce 36 % of the Afghan GDP as compared to 23 % in 1980. Besides, two-thirds of the funding was coming from the Soviet Union (Bossin, 2004). However, by 1986 a disjointed list of unrelated projects was underway (Klass, 1991). These development projects were centered in Kabul and a few other cities. Because the regime did not have control over the rest of the country, they could not implement reconstruction and development projects in most parts of the country, especially the rural areas.

The sources of foreign aid and trade changed. Foreign policy shifted from balanced nonalignment to strict alignment with the Soviet Union. The Soviet share of foreign aid, which had been 50 % from 1955 to the end of the Decade of Democracy (1963-1973), was increased to 80 %. The remainder was donated by the Warsaw Pact. In education, the proportion of the students going to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries approached 90 % by the mid-1980s, one fifth of the previous number (Rubin, 2002).

The regime used both repression and structured reforms to do away with any sort of competition in all aspects of Afghan society. Repression was directed at the tribal aristocracy, rival intelligentsia and local and leaders. The government, led by PDPA,
believed that through a mass literacy program the liberated masses, would be educated and would defend the revolution (Rubin, 2002). The goal was to restructure the Afghan society in such a way that the traditional structure, existed for a long time, would be replaced (Edwards, 1986).

### 3.5.2 Armed Resistance

The resistance soon started against the regime and its reform agenda. The uprising was based on a basic distrust of the government among the population and took place village by village. At the beginning, the resistance was initiated at the local level with no plan in mind but to ride out the government without any obvious connection to national politics (Edwards, 1986; Rubin, 2002). The regime accused foreign interference and no cooperation for the failure of the reforms; however, it had to acknowledge resistance within the local communities was very strong. As a result, the reforms caused great disruption and hardship since as much as a third of the land, the main source of income in the country, went out of cultivation (Ewans, 2002).

The local communities in the east of the country were the first to start resistance to the reforms. In his dissertation, Edwards (1986) examined the origins of the popular uprising that took place against the Afghan government in 1978 and 1979 in Eastern provinces in Afghanistan. He tried to relate the uprising to a larger historical context, namely the Afghan culture and state development in the Twentieth Century. As Edwards (1986) mentions, the first revolt started in the East and quickly expanded throughout the country. Soon the government found itself in a war with a broadly based opposition. He further says that the government indulged in an internal conflict between the rival
fractions, Khalq and Parcham, two main branches of the ruling party. The religious networks actively encouraged people to resist and take action against the enacted decrees of the government. Opposition to these unpopular acts soon escalated and fighting broke out (Edwards, 1986).

The reforms and resistance together with some external factors brought political changes in the ruling party. In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, the former Prime Minister and Defense Minister, seized power from Noor Mohammad Taraki (Newell, 1972). A new government under Babrak Karmal, exiled leader of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, was installed in Kabul by the Soviet troops (Newell, 1972). With the Soviet invasion the resistance entered a new stage. The internal problems of Afghanistan gained international attention (Rubin, 2002). The Great Game of the previous century was replicated once again in the region. USSR and the communist bloc on one side and the Western bloc, China and Islamic countries were on the other side. Resistance to the PDPA government and its Soviet sponsors was developed from unplanned social uprisings, political elites and international actors together (Rubin, 2002).

The Soviet invasion made the political situation in Afghanistan worse. The Peshawar based guerrilla organizations became active in nearly every part of the country. They were financially and militarily supported by the US and other countries (Gibbs, 2002). However, modern warfare, aid from foreign powers that wished to reshape Afghan politics and the participation of Islamist sectors all transformed the movement. Military aid to the resistance started in the tens of millions of dollars per year (Rubin, 2002).

The strategic goal of the Soviet military in rural Afghanistan was to re-conquer selected strategic areas of the countryside. In 1985, the Soviets also tried without success
to seal the Pakistani and Iranian borders (Rubin, 2002). The government sought to change policies which did not work. For instance, land reforms were announced incorrect and not carried properly; therefore, were declared invalid (Shirzad, 1989). Attempts were made to convince religious leaders and public figures to curb the resistance. Mullahs were invited to Kabul for conferences and send to Soviet Central Asia to convince them that Islam was thriving in the USSR (Hammond, 1984). As part of the new strategy, the media stopped calling Afghanistan a socialist state. However, these efforts did not pay off and the resistance continued until Kabul was seized by the Mujahideen.

The government lost control over major part of the country. Around 120,000 Soviet troops in Kabul and the provinces were used to keep the regime in power, to cut the supply lines of resistance along the border with Pakistan and to keep open the country’s principal lines of communication. An overwhelming majority of Afghans opposed the communist regime, either actively or passively. Afghan freedom fighters called Mujahideen made it almost impossible for the regime to maintain a system of local government outside major urban centers. The resistance made possible the withdrawal of Soviet Union’s in 1989. In 1986, in order to control the situation, Karmal’s resignation brought Dr. Najibullah to power. His attempts at national reconciliation (Shirzad, 1989), also failed and that regime fell in 1992.

When war broke out in 1979, the country was already one of the world’s poorest nations. The conflict covering three decades devastated the country and Afghan society. Even the most cursory glance at the list of development indicators for Afghanistan confirms the scale of the challenges to be addressed. The result of the Afghan Soviet war
during 1979-1989 and the civil war that followed it has increased poverty and Islamization of the country.

A large scale displacement of the population took place after the Soviet invasion of 1979; people migrated to neighboring countries in large numbers (Dupree, 1983). Before the war around 85% of the population lived in rural areas. It is believed that a significant change in the location of the population has occurred since then (Rashid, 2000). Though cross border assistance started by providing civilians living in areas controlled by Mujahideen with food, support for health care and agricultural programs, the aid and assistance decreased with the withdrawal of Soviet Union (Rubin, 2002). On the other hand, during the Soviet occupation, the commodity aid by the Soviet Bloc was provided only to the population in Kabul and the provinces and rural areas were ignored (Bossin, 2004).

### 3.5.3 Media and the War

During the war, both sides tried to use media to influence public opinion and to gain public support. Mass media was controlled by government and was used as the government’s propaganda machine; to counter this, the opposition started using the traditional interpersonal communication channels and small media. All the forms of media were used to achieve their separate purposes (Shirzad, 1989). Additionally, a number of countries started broadcasting for Afghanistan in local languages. This means that the war was not only fought with weaponry but also fought psychologically at local, national and international levels.
The pro-Soviet regime used the mass media to gain the support of the people for their policies and reform programs (Shirzad, 1989). Radio had national coverage and provincial radios were also operating in many provinces. Kabul Television started broadcasting in 1979. At the end of the 1980s, the daily schedule for broadcasting had increased to six hours. About two million people in the capital and the surrounding areas were able to receive its signals. In 1982, a satellite station Shamshad with the help of former Soviet Union was established. The Soviet satellite network Intersputnik was used for exchanging programs with other countries and providing content to the eleven local TV stations. The number of household TV owners had increased to 800,000 by 1987 (Rawan, 2002).

Media propaganda failed to be convincing in establishing a positive image of the ruling party among Afghans (Shirzad, 1989). The Soviet films, documentaries, sports, dance, cartoons and music made up the major content of the mass media in Afghanistan. The regime also sought to modify the content of books, especially school textbooks (Shirzad, 1989).

The national media were presenting a very different picture of what was going on in the ground. For instance, camera crews were sent to the provinces to cover the ceremony of land distribution. Farmers were shown happily dancing and carrying signs with slogans such as “The land belongs to the peasants who work on it.” Media propaganda failed to be convincing in establishing a positive image of the ruling party among Afghans (Shirzad, 1989). However, the use of the state-owned media by the regime as propaganda tools undermined the credibility of the national media. Instead,
people started depending on the international broadcasting channels and interpersonal
communication for the accurate news and information.

Interpersonal communication was one of the main fronts the resistance used
against the Afghan regime and the Soviet troops. To counter the state-owned media
propaganda, the resistance also used some small media. In the areas under control of the
regime, night letters were used to convey opposition messages to the public. For instance,
shortly after the Soviet Invasion, *shabnamahs* (nightletters) were secretly distributed in
Kabul by the resistance calling for Afghans to rise against the Soviets and President
Babrak Karmal (Misdaq, 2006).

Cassettes were also effective. Edwards (1986) reported that poetry was used as a
format for conveying information to the public. Poetry was sung and recorded on a
cassette which was then sold in the Peshawar Bazaar. Edwards noted that inexpensive
batteries for tape players became common item in the home in Pashton life. Tape players
were heard in shops, guest houses and tea stands. The resistance forces, having a wide
support from the local population, were also able to use the traditional and religious
networks very effectively.

### 3.5.4 Failure of the Reforms

There are a number of factors, both internal and external, that contributed to the
failure of the succession of reforms attempted in Afghanistan. One of the main and very
obvious factors that were not taken into account was the complexity of the Afghan social
system. Though many of the PDPA members, especially the Khalq faction, were brought
up in the rural society and also knew about King Amanullah’s reforms, they failed to
consider the social structure and the cultural values of the Afghan society in planning and implementing their reform agenda (Ewans, 2002). Rubin (2002) states these reforms were badly formulated and poorly implemented. Rubin (2002) attributes these failures to reasons such as the government’s ideological radicalism, in particular their attacks on Islam and the regime’s close relations and loyalties to the Soviet Union which caused local resistance.

The reforms were administered centrally, by passing the established social and cultural structure and were insensitive to the values of the Afghan society. The reforms were introduced rapidly and imposed by force on the population. The public was not involved. The models imposed on Afghanistan were those implemented in Central Asia by the Soviet Union and other models in socialist states were copied and implemented. As Miraki (2000) mentioned the Stalinist approach to development, a centralized and top down model, once again did not work in the country.

In this period, the mass media were used to propagate the government’s policies and justify its activities. Though the number of radio and TV stations increased as did the number of programming hours, it appears the mass media had limited effect. The international media broadcasting in local languages were thought to be influential, although it can be argued that these media only reinforced and supported the activities of the popular resistance. The small media and the interpersonal communication channels were thought to be more effective because of their decentralized nature. The exploitation of the traditional and religious networks and the support of the international broadcasting channels from the resistance have helped the Mujahideen to have an upper hand on the pro-Soviet regime.
3.6 Mujahideen and the Continuation of the Civil War

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the global and regional political scenario and affected Afghan politics. The Geneva Accord (1988) and the later withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 weakened the Kabul regime. On the other hand, the US and Western powers that militarily and financially supported the resistance to the Soviet occupation were no longer interested in being involved in Afghanistan. Regional powers, especially neighboring countries interference and interests and the differences among the Mujahideen’s groups led to a civil war between the rivalry groups.

The collapse of Soviet Union, the only military and financial source for regime in Kabul weakened the position of the regime at home and outside and paved the way for its collapse. With the fall of Najibullah’s government in 1992, Mujahideen groups based in Peshawar took power. It was mid-April 1992, when the Mujahideen established an Interim Islamic Jihad Council to assume control of the country. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi chaired the Council for two months, and later Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani became the head of the government. The council consisted of 10 members. Though Rabbani was supposed to leave after a period of six months, he remained in power until Kabul was captured by the Taliban in 1996. Kabul was divided by factions within the Mujahideen groups. Almost immediately, groups started fighting against each other which destroyed the capital city. By the time the Taliban took over, the county was split into many rival groups.
The few existing development programs under the communist regime were totally halted during the factional fighting. Some UN and aid organizations were working in the country but their activities were hampered by the lack of security and the ongoing fighting. The media organizations were badly affected. Nearly all the governmental media organizations were destroyed. The professional staff escaped and took refuge in neighboring countries. Broadcasting radio and television hours were reduced and content was completely dedicated to the coverage of war.

3.7 Taliban

The emergence of the Taliban is still a mystery. The appearance of the Taliban (1994) in the political scene could not be something sudden; at least it did not happen overnight. How the Taliban movement emerged is still unknown. However, at least, in the beginning, they had extensive support among the rural population. Though it is widely believed that ending the factional fighting was the main reason behind its popular support, there were a number of other factors that contributed to its success. War, migration, poverty and the unbalanced development polices and strategies of several central governments ignoring the rural population in past were among the contributing factors shaped the Taliban Movement. Most of the Taliban movement members were from poor families in rural areas or refugee camps.

The Taliban very effectively exploited the religious and traditional networks to gain the support of the desperate rural population who wanted to see an end to the anarchy and warlordism. However, what the population gained was a different kind of
oppression that grew from the Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islam in the country (Rashid, 2000).

The Taliban’s rigid governance structure and strict rule, based largely on fear, successfully extended their influence and control over the country. Such control was unforeseen based on the entire history of Afghanistan. The Taliban adopted existing ideological and organizational patterns for the purpose of governance, tax collection and army recruitment. This strategy proved to be very efficient and effective (Rubin, 1998).

The Taliban regime started harboring fellow hardliners from other countries and Afghanistan became a shelter for terrorist groups. Though the role of these groups in funding and operating within the Taliban structure is not yet well understood, it is known that these groups were trained and armed in Afghanistan and participated in terrorist activities in the country and elsewhere. These outsiders, especially those led by Osama Bin Laden were involved in spreading Wahabism. The Taliban’s support of foreign terrorists and their human rights record quickly isolated Afghanistan in the global politics. Although strict security and pacification of the country under the Taliban did increase private investment in some sectors, the economy and development activities were greatly damaged.

In terms of media and communication, the Taliban had a very unique approach in that they banned a number of social activities. Dancing and singing were banned, even in weddings. Practices that had been part of the Afghan culture for centuries were prohibited (Rashid, 2000). For the men having a turban, keeping a beard and going to the mosque were made compulsory. Many popular games were prohibited. Even playing football was...

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8 Wahabism refers to the movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahab. It presents a more fundamentalist view of Islam. The movement is the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia.
banned; later, the Taliban lifted the ban, but only if the game would be interrupted when it coincided with prayer time. Both players and spectators must offer their prayers in congregation. Clapping was not allowed, instead participants had to chant Allah-o-Akbar [God is Great]. The Taliban used the football ground for executions, for it was where most people could gather and watch the scene.

The Taliban strongly opposed education of girls and imposed very strict rules over women’s appearance in public. When the Taliban took power in Kabul, women could no longer go to their duty stations, schools and the university. Such restrictions damaged the public sector and especially the education system as they were operated mainly by women.

Restriction of women’s appearance in public places did not start with the Taliban. Mujahideen groups fighting against the Soviet Union had banned female doctors in the areas under their control. In addition to opposing women’s presence in public, footage of women on TV and pictures of women in newspapers and magazines were banned by Prime Minister Hekmatyar. When Hekmatyar entered Kabul as the prime minister for Mujahideen regime, he banned movies, Television and pictures. The Taliban presented an even stricter form of these controls. As soon as the Taliban brought an area under their control, they ordered the destruction of all pictures representing human beings and animals.

The only medium of mass communication allowed under the Taliban was radio. Radio Kabul was renamed Radio Shariat. Though there was a 40 % reduction in employment at the radio station, the Taliban relied on radio as a means for disseminating its policies. Radio was a state propaganda tool 24 hours a day. A few periodicals, mainly
magazines, were published by the Taliban. In the last years of their regime they launched their own website. On July 1998, the Taliban regime announced that within 15 days all the television sets, videos and satellite dishes must be thrown away (World Press Review, 1998). Music, television programs, video cassettes, satellite dishes were banned. It should be noted these electronic media were rarely available in the country anyway (Rashid, 2000).

Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi An al Munkar (Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention Observations) was an organization used by the Taliban for assuring prescribed social behavior. Its goals were to make sure that the rules that they introduced was understood and followed by the people. Radio Shariat was also used to disseminate these messages.

The Taliban did not issue any press releases, make policy statements or hold regular press conferences. Indeed, Taliban’s leaders made very few appearances in the media. Their leader, Mullah Mohammad Omer, rarely granted interviews. The ban on photograph and television made their leaders faces unknown to the people and the rest of the world (Rashid, 2000).

The Taliban preferred radio for its propaganda. Afghans were getting their information from the international radio channels. Listening to the foreign media became popular beginning in 1978 when the communists took over. The population later started listening programs by BBC, Deutsche Welle, and Voice of America in their local languages (Afghanistan, 1998). BBC Trust with its series of educational programs, tried to fill the gap that was caused by the absence of schooling and public entertainment during the time of the Mujahideen and the Taliban (Bunting, 2001). For a time, the
BBC’s educational programs were the only source of education and entertainment in the country.

Except for some scattered efforts by the NGOs and the UN in Afghanistan during the period of civil war and the Taliban’s regime, there were no major development programs. The foreign aid was limited to occasional emergency and relief operations. All activities considered non-Islamic or that related to women were prohibited. Afghanistan received only a small amount of development assistance from the international community. From 1980 to 1986, the official development assistance was around $200 million annually. In the years 1992 to 1996 the aid was $160 million. During the reign of the Taliban the figure fell to $130 million a year (Rondinelli, 2004).

In 1995, Afghanistan was ranked 170th out of 175 countries by the UNDP’s Human Development Index, making it one of the least developed countries in the world. Fighting, exploding mines, drought, refugees and displaced persons and education were among the problems that Afghans continues to face.

Continuation of the civil war and later the strict rule of the Taliban prevented any sort of reconstruction and development activities. However, in this era NGOs, whose work was limited to the refugee camps before started working inside Afghanistan. Though most of their work was related to relief and recovery activities, they also initiated some development work.

During the civil war, media was used as propaganda tools by different groups. However, the existing infrastructure was heavily damaged during the fighting. Though the state owned media had lost totally the ground to the international media, some initiatives had been undertaken by the international radio channels such as the New
Home, New Life soap opera to support the reconstruction and development process in the country.

3.8 New Democracy and Development

The change in the global politics in the post 9/11 era had been a milestone in sociopolitical developments in Afghanistan. Usama bin Ladin and his Al Qaida network, harbored by the Taliban in Afghanistan, had been identified responsible for the attacks. Afghanistan became the central focus in the War against Terror. Soon, the UN imposed diplomatic sanctions and an arms embargo on the Taliban and a coalition was formed to fight the terrorism. On 7th of October the military operation against Al Qaida and the Taliban started.

Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts also began to find a political solution for post Taliban Afghanistan. The UN sponsored a conference in December 2001 to bring the representatives of some political and military groups to discuss the future of Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era. After nine days of talk, the representatives the Rome, Peshawar, Cyprus movements, and Northern Alliance groups reached an agreement in Bonn called “Agreement on Provisional Arrangement in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions.” The Bonn agreement provided a timeframe for a transitional period.

The framework said that the Interim authority, would rule for a period of 6 months, until 22 June 2002. In the Bonn conference, it was decided that an Emergency Loya Jirga would be held to appoint a Transitional Authority for a period of two years. In this period, a constitution should be drafted, approved by a Constitution Loya Jirga, and
national elections should be held to form a representative government. Meanwhile, A Military Technical Agreement was also signed by the Afghan Interim Administration on January 4th, 2002 on the deployment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was expanded to the provinces in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to provide security for the establishment of the governmental institutions and to the development activities. The Bonn agreement was completed in September 2005 after the elections of National Assembly.

In 2002, the development/reconstruction programs also were started with the support of the international community. At the Tokyo conference, in January 2002, donors agreed to provide $4.6 billion over 2.5 years for the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. The conference was followed by another conference in Berlin in April 2004. This time the financial commitment by the International donors reached 8.2 billion for a period of over three years.

Elections for the National Assembly marked the completion of the Bonn Agreement. In the London Conference, 2006, a framework called Interim Afghan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) of cooperation for five years was presented by the Afghan Government in consultation with the UN and the International community. The framework is basically an effort to get the Afghanistan Millennium goals set in 2005 for vision 2020 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006). The three pillars of the five years adoption of the Afghan Compact include: 1) Security; 2) Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and 3) Economic and Social Development (The London Conference…, 2006).
Other areas called cross cutting areas include eliminating the narcotics industry, which has a strong relation with the insecurity and instability in the country (The London Conference…, 2006).

Table 2 I-ANDS Programmatic Framework

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Gender Equity (cross cutting theme 1)

Counter Narcotics (cross cutting theme 2)

Regional cooperation (cross cutting theme 3)

Anti-Corruption (cross cutting theme 4)

Environment (cross cutting theme 5)

3.8.1 Development Issues

“Even before the conflicts with Russia and the Taliban, Afghanistan was one of the poorest places on earth” (CIA, 2002 in Rondinellie, 2004, p. 14). The Soviet occupation and the subsequent political upheavals further devastated the socioeconomic and physical infrastructure in the country. This resulted in Afghanistan’s rank as one of

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the least developed countries in the world. The country is ranked 173rd among 178 nations on the list compiled by the United Nations (UNDP, 2004) (for development issues see Appendix D).

A decade of Soviet occupation and efforts by the communist regime to bring the country under its control cost Afghanistan over a million lives. UN figures set life expectancy at 44.5 years; 20 years lower than neighboring Central Asian countries (Agence France Presse, 2005). Nearly half of the population of Afghanistan was estimated to be below 14 years or over 65 years of age (Afghanistan and the United Nations, 2002 cited in Rondinellie, 2004). The infant and maternal mortality rates are even more shocking: Among every five children one dies before the age of five and within every thirty minutes one woman dies from pregnancy-related issues (Agence France Presse, 2005).

The war displaced millions of people (Shirzay, 1992). The UNDP estimated that more than one million Afghans were internally displaced by 2002. Some moved to Kabul, others went to refugee centers in Pakistan and Iran. An estimated 3.8 million Afghans were refugees (UNHCR 2002a in Brynan, 2005). Since the fall of the Taliban, some 1.8 million people from Pakistan and 600,000 from Iran returned to their countries. Afghanistan is also one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) calculated that 7,097 Afghans were killed or wounded by landmines between 1998 and 2003; leaving a large disabled population (Agence France Presse, 2005).

The UNDP’s National Human Development Index report for Afghanistan (2004) says that half of the population lives under the poverty line. Poverty is associated with a
number of other problems such as absence of social institutions, poor health, poor nutrition, human rights violation, displacement, bad security and gender inequality. Additionally, the country has been subject to frequent droughts, floods and earthquakes. A recent widespread drought (1999-2002), together with continuing war has had a bad impact on the country. The drought halved agricultural production (UNHCR 2002a in Brynan, 2005)

Education level is low and basic services are non-existent in most of the country. Less than 30 % of boys are enrolled in elementary school. Under the Taliban, girls were forbidden to be educated and women were not allowed to be trained, obtain access to health services or work outside (Rondinellie, 2004). Illiteracy was above 64 % and nearly two thirds of the Afghan adults were illiterate. Infrastructure was destroyed, and health conditions were poor. An estimated 70 % of children were malnourished in 2000 (Afghanistan…, 2002 cited in Rondinellie, 2004).

Only 35 % of people living in urban areas and 19 % of those living in rural areas had access to safe drinking water (Immediate and …, 2002 cited in Rondinellie, 2004). Other problems, including sanitation, deforestation, desertification, natural disasters and destroyed system of irrigation, also contribute to the miseries of the Afghan people. The socioeconomic and physical infrastructure is in ruins. The war not only destroyed much of the physical and social infrastructure and disrupted the social services but also disabled small scale businesses and trade (Rondinellie, 2004).

Road conditions are poor (UNHCR 2002a in Brynan, 2005). Only 13 % of roads were paved in 1991, and most of those were not repaired during the years of civil war. The country’s natural resources, including natural gas petroleum, coal, copper and
minerals are not used because they have not been exploited for commercial purposes (Rondinellie, 2004).

One of the main problems in the country is that of poppy cultivation. Prior to and after Taliban rule, many farmers turned to poppy cultivation which made Afghanistan one of the largest suppliers of illicit opium (Rondinellie, 2004). Opium cultivation and trafficking together with kalashinkovization\(^{10}\), terrorism and warlords remain among the great threats to the security and development in the country (Yousaf and Atkin, 1992; Brynan, 2005).

Since the fall of the Taliban Afghanistan has made progress in nearly all the fronts. According to the World Bank main four foci in post conflict development are: 1) security, 2) governance and participation, 3) social and economic well being and 4) justice and reconciliation. These pillars constitute efforts for rebuilding in Afghanistan (Orr, 2004). However, there is still a long way to go for Afghanistan to achieve its development goals and to sustain them.

Achieving the post-reconstruction and development goals, stabilizing the region and uprooting the terrorism need a long term commitment by the International community and neighboring countries, though most of the countries initially supporting the War against Terror and the operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan started to pursue their own vested interest in the region in the post-Taliban era (Peimani, 2003).

As Leader and Atmar (2004) mention: “Providing security, justice and promoting the rule of law, living longer, healthier and richer, economic growth with an end to terrorism and drug trafficking and adoption of democratic principles,” are the broader

\(^{10}\) The term Kalashinkovization appeared in the mid 1980s to describe the deterioration of law and order as a result of the dissemination of AK-47 rifles called Kalashinkovs (c)
development goals in the post-Taliban era. However, attaining these goals is the most complex challenge that the country is facing. They further mention that the destroyed economy made the development process in Afghanistan totally dependent on the foreign aid and assistance.

This study focuses on some of the development programs in the country including the National Solidarity Program (NSP) and some communication for development initiatives such as establishment of community radios and New Home New Life (NHNL) soap opera.

### 3.8.2 National Solidarity Program (NSP)

A noteworthy development initiative during the civil war in Afghanistan was a community development program started by UN-Habitat in five provinces. The program was later on in the post-Taliban expanded into a nation wide program called National Solidarity Program (NSP). This is a community based development approach that gives ownership of the development projects to the local communities. Communities are asked to identify, plan, manage and monitor the development activities. Such a strategy is thought to ensure local participation in rural reconstruction and poverty alleviation.

The core elements of the program are: 1) community mobilization; 2) facilitating elections to establish Community Development Councils (CDCs) and helping CDCs to identify, plan and implement approved development subprojects; 3) building capacity of CDC and community members through participation, consensus building, accounting, procurement and contract management operations and maintenance and monitoring; 4) providing direct block grants to fund subprojects; and 5) linking CDCs to government
agencies, NGOs, and donors to improve access to services and resources (National Solidarity…, 2006).

The program seeks to 1) establish community development networks that encourage development decisions at the village level 2) strengthen community capacity through participation, training and promotion of accountability by using both private and public resources (National Solidarity…, 2006). Donors to this program include the World Bank, the European Union, and individual governments. Though the program is a project executed by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MMRD), the oversight consultancy is given to Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and facilitation is done through 24 partner NGOs. The NGOs facilitate the election of Community Development Councils (CDCs) in fair and open elections, educating communities about the purposes of the NSP, providing assistance in planning, writing proposals, training CDC members in skills in such skills as accounting, procurement and contract management and promoting transparency and inclusiveness in reporting and evaluation. The NSP’s goal is to work with some 20,000 communities. In effect, the program will reach the estimated 37,000 villages that exist in Afghanistan (http://www.nspafghanistan.org, 2006).

The program reached 6,000 communities in its first year. In the second year roughly 4,500 additional communities were targeted. However as of July 2005, only 10,500 communities, about half of Afghanistan, were participating (Kakar, 2005). Security was a big factor in slowing the expansion of the program.
Table 3 Main Output Indicators and Achievements as of April 2006
(NSP Results. http://www.nspafghanistan.org)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result Indicator</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Provinces</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Districts</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Facilitating Partners’ Personnel Deployed</td>
<td>5,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Communities Contracted for NSP to FPs</td>
<td>17,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Communities Mobilized</td>
<td>12,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Community Development Councils Elected</td>
<td>10,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Community Development Plans Prepared</td>
<td>10,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Subproject Proposals Submitted</td>
<td>18,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Approved Sub-projects</td>
<td>18,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Subprojects completed</td>
<td>5,079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 Main Output Indicators and Achievements by Sector as of April 2006
(NSP Results. http://www.nspafghanistan.org)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total No. of Subprojects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Building</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>3,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood</td>
<td>1,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>2,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>3,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>4,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,193</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The key element of the program is community participation. Participation means not only owning and running the development projects, but also doing the planning and providing labor. Guidelines for implementing these programs included inclusiveness,
gender equity, transparency and accountability in the use of program funds and sustainability through stipulating that communities contribute to the operation and maintenance of each project (National Solidarity…, 2006).

The amount of each grant is based on the number of families. For the purpose of the NSP, a community is defined as having 25 families to be eligible to receive funds. A family is defined as a husband, a wife (or wives) and unmarried children or a single head of the household. Communities with more than 300 families are divided into smaller groups. The number of the families is decided on the basis of available government records. However, to deal with the lack of data, the facilitating NGO partners consult local authorities about local settlement patterns. When such data is contested or is not available, is to have an assessment based on a community meeting, consultation with the local Mullah(s), community contributors to asher\textsuperscript{11} and/or collection of signatures of heads of households (National Solidarity…, 2006).

After mobilization, the first step is to have fair and open elections for the Community Development Council (CDC). Once the CDC is established, an agreement is worked out between MRRD, facilitating NGO partners and the local CDC. The CDC is responsible for overseeing the preparation of the community development plan and subprojects design and implementation. CDC officers include a Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Treasurer and Secretary. To draw on money, goods and services on behalf of the community, a management committee is elected in an assembly of the community to manage individual subprojects or to oversee specific tasks (National Solidarity…, 2006).

\textsuperscript{11} Community collective and voluntary work
Elected community members serve as the decision making body for local NSP activities. Though the CDC is supposed to supervise NSP projects, the intention is that these councils serve as a permanent local governance body for taking on additional responsibilities as they mature. Councils should also include women, and other marginalized members of the community. As mentioned in the NSP’s Operational Manual, participating in the NSP and other development programs will strengthen the skills and attitudes necessary to define, manage, and govern their own development (National Solidarity…, 2006).

There are some shortcomings in the way the NSP is designed and implemented. Kakar (2005) speaks of the power structures that the local CDCs must to compete with for legitimacy and authority. She mentions that these multiple power structures are the product of a century of sociopolitical changes.

The CDCs are often criticized because they don’t necessarily include the existing power holders in the community. These power structures include such opinion leaders as Maliks\textsuperscript{12}, Khans\textsuperscript{13}, Mirab\textsuperscript{14} and Ulema\textsuperscript{15}, and the local institutions such as Jirga and the Mosque. Kakar (2005) argues that these power holders should be involved in the process

\textsuperscript{12} Malik: A “power broker and representative between community and central power/government, communal dispute resolution and maintenance of communal property” (p. 14). Malik/Arbab represents the community to the government. Internally, the “Malik/Arbab is a community point person for solving community problems. These problems may range from fixing communal property, such as bridges, canals and roads, to handling conflicts. In some instances, the Malik/Arbab may call upon the help of the village elders’ Shura to resolve a problem. Malik or Arbab represents the needs of the community to government officials and lobbies for projects needed by the community,” (Kakar, 2005, p. 15).

\textsuperscript{13} Khan: “Large landowner who controls many resources in the community along with providing jobs to laborers and land to sharecroppers; may also arbitrate conflicts” (Kakar, 2005).

\textsuperscript{14} Mirab: “Controller of community water canals” (p. 14). He is either appointed or consensually elected annually. “He wields power through the control and management of precious water resources that community needs for its agriculture based livelihoods,” (Kakar, 2005, p. 21).

\textsuperscript{15} Ulema: “Religious leaders who lead prayers, give sermons and oral judgments in the community, also involve in solving conflicts from the view of Shari’ah,” (Kakar, 2005, p. 14).
even if they only provide advice to CDCs. Another recommendation is that the Afghan government should consider incorporating its own activities into the CDC structure, especially with its ministries of Interior, Health, Education and Agriculture and Husbandry; also, it should work to improve the participation of women in the program (Kakar, 2005).

Though the program has a very flexible approach to gender issues in the communities, female participation lacks legitimacy compared to that of men. Kakar suggests that an increase in female staff and gender awareness can help address gender biases in training and in legitimizing women’s participation. She also emphasizes the role of religious leaders supporting the participation of women in line with women’s rights in Islam and in accepting women’s leadership in their communities. She mentions that the cultural norms prevent women from voting, being elected and attending meetings. However, the recent experience of the general elections in Afghanistan showed that by following the social structure and norms and using proper communication channels, women’s participation can be ensured (Noorzai, 2005). The NSP program adopted a flexible approach so that each community decided whether to have a mixed (men and women together) or separate CDCs.

According to Karim (1994), one of the obstacles in achieving a greater level of participation especially among the rural population is the socioeconomic structure. Kakar (2005) also confirmed that the changes in the social structure caused by decades of war have made the task of facilitating partners more difficult. The Maliks, elders, Ulema/Mullahs and local commanders have each felt threatened or have sought ways to abuse the system.
Kakar (2005) reports that the research done on the process of implementation of the NSP showed there was no great desire for a new council. The Facilitating Partners (FPs) interviewed mentioned that there is a lack of understanding about NSP program in local communities and that they were threatened by the formation of a new structure. Additionally, resistance was also present to female participation.

Melkote and Steeves (2001) mentioned that using the existing institutions is one of the key elements in the successful implementation of development programs. Though it is claimed that NSP is based on the Afghan tradition of Asher (community members working together on a volunteer basis to improve community infrastructure), follows practices of the Jirga (councils comprised of respected members of the community), and adopts Islamic values of unity, equity and justice, the new setup of CDCs and committees and then the procedure were imposed on the communities (National Solidarity…, 2006). Kakar (2005) thought that the integration of the traditional power structures into the NSP could have been one of the options. She based her recommendations on the experience of post-conflict Indonesia, East Timor and Malawi. She mentioned that in Indonesia and East Timor. In these instances, where local governance did not incorporate the traditional and culturally acceptable institutions, they lacked both legitimacy and sufficient authority to rule. Institutions imposed by central government were resisted by the local communities.

The experience of Malawi, on the other hand, where local governance was incorporated into the traditional local structures, adoption was a success. In Malawi, the government incorporated traditional chiefs/leaders into local government legitimizing programming and implementation. The traditional leaders also linked government with
their communities. However, taking into account the social and political structure in rural Afghanistan, incorporating the NSP institutions into already existing and accepted local institutions such as the Jirga and the Mosque and involving the community leaders could perhaps have made the program more successful and ultimately more sustainable.

Kakar (2005) reported a lack of understanding about the programs, objectives and an experience of indifference by the people to the NSP and Facilitating Partner. She thought these matters could be addressed with proper communication. A key element in any community-based development is communication. Though it is mentioned that reports of the subprojects, proposed budget and actual expenditures were to be posted on the public notice board, there is a need to communicate all the aspects of the program to the communities. To address the women’s issue, the strategy should be to adopt a traditionally acceptable way to increase women’s involvement.

3.8.3 Communication for Development

The international community and the Afghan government have each paid attention to the media in the post-Taliban era. To promote political stability and a pluralistic and democratic society, the international organizations have provided funding for a number of projects. These projects include supporting state owned radio and TV (and improving their programming), supporting newspapers and periodicals, and building an institutional infrastructure for media (Kumar, 2006).

Radio is the most popular medium of communication in the country. In the past radio was used as a propaganda tool (Rawan, 2002). Today’s media have grown both in number (of outlets) and in quality (of programs). The current government has taken
initiatives that resulted in deregulation, privatization and convergence of the media.

There are some 35 independent and 15 state-owned local radios operating in Afghanistan. More than 89% of the population has access to radio (Equal Access, n.d.). Radio channels are mostly local channels, and there are one or more radio stations in every province (Sapi, 2006). However, there are also international radio stations that broadcast into Afghanistan. These have gradually changed their focus and coverage of development activities has been highlighted greatly. Radio content is also provided via the World-Space satellite network operating over Asia. Teacher training programs and other development related programs have been begun providing content to both end users and local radio stations. Equal Access also intends to provide satellite radio sets to the CDCs of the NSP. The idea is to reach the areas that are beyond coverage of the radio stations or have a limited coverage (Equal Access, n.d.).

Though the number of television channels has increased, the impact of TV is limited. The few cable TV channels via satellite are limited to entertainment programming. Printed media, because of the low literacy rate and limited circulation, has a modest impact on development, although it can influence the policy making process.

Other means of mass communication such as movies and theaters, CDs and tape recorders, music, cassettes, posters, leaflets, literature and folk music have also been used for communicating development messages. Though the Internet is recognized as a promising channel for communication, computer literacy, non-availability of computer technology and lack of Internet service providers are problems in using the Internet for development purposes in Afghanistan. The marriage of new ICTs (Internet,
telecommunications and computers) with the old ICTs (telephone, radio and TV) can prove very effective as a future means of information and communication in Afghanistan.

### 3.8.3.1 Community Radio

In their 2002 assessment study, Communica and Spek said that community radio is not only a viable option but also a low-cost and effective way of contributing to reconstruction and development, democracy and nation building. However, they noted some challenges in establishing community radio stations. Afghan law did permit establishment of independent radio stations but licenses were required (Communica and Spek, 2002).

Communica and Spek (2002) defined community radio as community owned, independent and participatory. However, as Kumar (2006) mentioned the ownership of community radio differs from one case to another. He noted that the Afghan radio stations fall into two categories. Some were locally owned stations supported by the community where community members provided land, buildings and voluntary time. Other stations were started by NGOs. IMPACS, a Canadian NGO, established four stations targeting women including Radio Rabia-e-Balkhi in Mazar-e-Sharif, Radio Quyaash in Maimana, Radio Zohrah in Kundoz and Radio Sahar in Herat. In addition, some stations originally started by NGOs were later incorporated into the Internews network (Kumar, 2006).

By signing a cooperative agreement with USAID, Internews started 14 radio stations in February 2003. Internews selected locations and owners for the stations, loaned the necessary equipment and trained radio staff and journalists. By March 2005,
twenty more stations were established. Internews also established a network of these stations. Though these local stations preserved their autonomy by local participation and ownership, the stations were networked together. Coverage of local issues and local news is an important feature of these community radios. The operational expenses of these local stations are much less compared to an integrated FM station (Soloway and Saddique 2005 in Kumar, 2006).

The criteria for selecting the location for these NGO-supported community radio stations included the following: 1) the stations should be dispersed throughout the country, 2) the community should be large enough to support the station financially and 3) entrepreneurs should have at least $1,000 available for investment in the station. Training, salaries and operational costs are included in the package provided to the community radio owners (Kumar, 2006).

Programming was also provided through a distribution network called Tanin (Echo). In addition to broadcasting music, the stations aired news, interviews with community leaders and religious programs. Stations run by some NGOs focused on health, sanitation and other development issues. Sensitive issues were dealt with carefully. Though there was no censorship, a sort of self censorship was imposed so as not to clash with socially and culturally sensitive issues.

Kumar (2006) summarized the experience of establishing community radio in Afghanistan into three lessons. First, many media experts preferred national radio stations to local ones. Their argument was that the community stations may not be sustainable, training and technical assistance was difficult because of the poor transportation, and there were doubts that these communities could produce their own programming.
However, he noted most of these radio stations were operating and running reasonably well. Also, the experience showed that the community radio operation could earn some revenue from community and local announcements, though it might not be sufficient to meet all operating costs. Long term financial support may be needed for these stations.

One of the innovations considered by Internews was to provide Internet access to the communities through VSAT, a two-way satellite data services. In this case the community radio station would be able to earn money by providing Internet access to the public (Kumar, 2006).

3.8.3.2 New Home New Life (NHNL)

The BBC was thought to be the most trustworthy news channel in Afghanistan (Clark, 2004). BBC’s Afghan programming included a series of educational program packages providing the audience entertainment education content (Skuse, 1997). The NHNL soap opera broadcast by BBC was an initiative to address some of Afghanistan development’s issues. This soap opera is broadcast in Pashto and in Dari, the two languages in Afghanistan, and was one of the most popular radio programs in the country. It turned out to be a main source for entertainment and education in the rural areas. Today, NHNL is one of the most important and accepted channels of communication for development issues in the country.

The BBC drama addresses a wide range of development-related issues, including some of socially taboo items that were never discussed in public such as family planning products, HIV-AIDS prevention measures, human rights violations, and women and
family issues. All these were broadcasting through entertainment education programming.

In Afghanistan, there are a number of issues that are regarded private and cannot be discussed in public. For instance, all matters related to the family are considered private and must be solved within the family (Wardak, 2003). Publicly discussing in public issues related to sex, family and marital affairs are socially prohibited, and cannot normally be included in media/communication campaigns and strategies.

The BBC started broadcasting in Pashto in 1981. Since then, the BBC has developed a series of educational programs. In the beginning, they were targeting Afghan refugees in the neighboring countries. Once its reputation had been established as the most credible channel for news and information in the war-torn country, it used the opportunity to promote social changes (Adam, 2005). Realizing the need, the BBC started educational programming. Later on, these programs were run through a separate agency, called BBC Afghan Education Projects. The BBC-AEP projects included a series of education packages providing the audience education entertainment content (Skuse, 1997). New Home New Life (NHNL) was launched in 1994 amid the civil war and the emergence of the Taliban (Perraton, 2003). This soap opera soon became the only source of entertainment and education in the country because of the Taliban’s ban on most entertainment activities, media and formal education. Even today, NHNL is the most important, accepted and accessible channel of communication in rural Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, most people either own a radio or listen to the radio with their neighbors. Family listening is common, though the number of women listening to the NHNL is thought to be fewer than men. Research shows that soap operas do generate
dialogues among families and listening groups (Unesco, n.d.). The characters and storylines of the NHNL are popular and are discussed among the people (Perraton, 2003).

Unlike soap operas that only communicate a single issue, the BBC series covers all aspects of social life. Its messages are repeated and supported by feature programs and a cartoon magazine (Skuse, 2002; Adam, 2005). The NHNL soap opera is thought to have had a great impact on reduction of mine injuries (Andersson et al, 2003).

One of the very important factors in making NHNL popular and effective was the soap opera format. The soap opera provided an opportunity for the repetition of messages that could be put in different contexts and repeated as many times as needed without making it boring to the audience (Perraton, 2003). Episodes of particular relevance could be repeated according to the perceived needs. Furthermore, the soap opera was on-going. There need be no end to it because it presented real life situations that sounded real to the audience. Dialogue on how to overcome dilemmas and resolving human conflict were part of the soap opera genre. That is also the reason the soap opera is a better format to carry educational messages, based on the people’s own experience (Unesco, n.d.).

The NHNL dramas were completely Afghan in context and content (Unesco, n.d.). The scenes in the program involved families in two villages (Perraton, 2003). Villages are core social institutions in Afghanistan. The series was also based on Afghanistan’s rich history of community-based living, and promoted such cultural and traditional values of Afghan society as “Jirga,” community council, “Ashar,” and even the oral literature (Unesco, n.d.). On the other hand, the drama did not challenge Afghan social structure and patriarchal authority; rather it followed the normative culture, and tried to bring gradual change from the inside-out. The series is not regarded as imposing
Western values since it is presented within the broader cultural parameters of Islam and Afghan values (Adams, 2005).

This drama also addressed some critical issues that arose during different regimes in different time periods -- for instance, providing girls with education under the Taliban regime when education was completely banned for women. Forced marriage and sterility among males (blamed on women and used as an excuse for taking a second wife) were topics raised through the medium of the soap opera. Another socially taboo had to do with the vaccination of women. In some parts of the country, women’s vaccination was not allowed. A health worker reported that after listening to the BBC program on vaccination, in which the topic was put in an entertainment education format and the characters in the drama discussed vaccination and its benefits, villagers agreed to allow women to go for vaccination. Three hundred women came for vaccination (Adams, 2005).

The NHNL drama gained popularity and acceptance among the population for a number of reasons. These factors included the type of programming which was need-oriented, the format of the programming which represented the rural life, sensitivity to cultural and social values and a strong production team and coordination of its programming with other activities in the field. The formative research, the letters, feedback through journalists and the consultative meetings all helped to identify the right and appropriate issues to address and created opportunities for the communities to participate in sitting the program’s agenda.
Chapter 4:  
Conclusions & Suggestions

4.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter presents the findings of this study and provides a brief summary of the approaches undertaken and the factors influencing the development agenda of different Afghan governments. Additionally, the role of, or lack of, communication in the development process in the country is explained, and the different types of media/communication channels used by development proponents and resistance forces are illustrated.

In conclusion, a more appropriate approach to development is suggested based on a review of the communication and development literature and past practices in Afghanistan.

4.2 Past Approaches to Development

Modernization was in the main agenda of Afghan monarchs in the 19th and 20th centuries (Misdaq, 2006). The historical record of development and communication in Afghanistan shows that development strategies, from the beginning, were all centralized and imposed. The record shows a pattern of resistance to social changes that are incompatible with Afghan cultural values and social system. Numerous instances in Afghan history illustrate that values and practices imposed from outside are opposed by the inhabitants. Lack/gap of communication, no participation of the local population and
not taking into account the needs of local population are some of the characteristics of these reforms.

Scholars have observed that attempts at social and economic development tended to be equated with modernization. Modernization was seen as a process by which western values and western social structure were to be imposed (Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1994). These modernization programs were basically copies of the industrial, educational and economic models of western countries; thus they clashed with the Afghan social and cultural values. As Misdaq (2006) pointed out, modernization caused social upheavals. The reform agendas undertaken by King Amanullah Khan and by the pro-Soviet regime provoked the local population to the extent that there were armed revolts. In each of these cases, the country was thrown into civil war.

Though little changed in the ordinary living conditions of the rural population observed, the imposition of modernization, in particular commercialization and introduction of new agricultural technologies disturbed the social relations in the villages (Rubin, 2002). The modern education system alienated the youth from their villages and brought a parallel system to the already existing traditional system of education provoking conflicts between these systems. These reforms created a gap between the urban and rural areas and the have and have-nots in the country, which inspired clashes between the rural and urban population.

In general, reforms up to the time of the fall of the Taliban were centralized, non-participatory and not need-based. In many instances, the development initiatives were counter to the social system and threatened the traditional values of the local communities. Lack of proper communication and dependence on the mass media to
persuade the population and gain their support for the development projects are also features of these reforms.

Resistance to the imposed reforms continued throughout the modernization period. The reforms and resistance brought some consequences. In the case of Amanullah’s reforms, the clashes between the central government and the local tribes paved the way for a bandit, Habibullah Kalakani, to take power and put a stop to all reforms. The pro-Soviet era reforms were ended by international interference and a civil war that devastated the whole social and economic infrastructure of the country. The war gave birth to an even more radical movement led by the Taliban, who believed in religious fundamentalism and retraditionalization of the society. In the period of gradual reforms, the local population had doubted the changes recommended by the central government and resisted but did not engage in armed revolt. However, the clashes between the pro-modern and traditionalist groups could be noticed in this period. The approach taken led to conflict that was increasingly violent. What is more, the reforms increased the Afghan foreign debt and forced reliance on foreign countries.

Afghanistan’s domestic political affairs have tended to be defined by global and regional politics (Rubin, 2002). For instance, the cold war rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US was a principal reason for development activities taking place within the country. Rather than improving the living conditions of ordinary people, development made the country more dependent, particularly on the Soviet Union. Both the US and the Soviet Union provided loans for projects and tried to shape the way these projects were implemented. Afghanistan was expected to follow their different philosophies for
economic assistance and development (Bosson, 2004). Later, both put a lot of money into the war, and with their support the Afghan economy was ruined.

4.2.2 Factors Contributing to Reforms and Resistance

A number of factors can be identified that influenced the development process. Among the most important were the personalities of such leaders as Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, Mahmod Tarzi, Amanullah Khan, Nadir Khan and Daud Khan. Their attitudes toward change and modernity affected the ideology of development. The personality factor, later on, changed to the ideological factor. The pro-Soviet regime, the Islamic parties and the Taliban each had their own agenda for development in line with their ideological leanings.

The sociopolitical environment in the country was another determining factor in the development process in the country. The two opposing political camps, pro modernists and pro traditionalists, contributed to the reforms and resistance. For instance, as explained in Chapter 3, the political activities in the 1960s and 1970s, when pro-communist parties and Islamic groups were involved in politics, inspired reforms and resistance in the country. Administrative and education reforms also played an important role. Modern schools and education gave birth to modernization. The reformist movements opposed traditional and religious schooling systems.

Another important factor was the global and/or regional socioeconomic circumstances that influenced development planning and strategies of implementation of different governments. The early reforms or the first efforts to modernize Afghanistan emphasizing the establishment of a modern army were undertaken to enable the state to
defend itself from the two superpowers neighboring the country at that particular time. A good example is the post Second World War development initiatives where the regional situation affected Afghan. The dispute of Pashtoonistan and the close ties between the US and Pakistan made Afghanistan more dependent on the Soviet Union for both military and development support. Because the development projects funded by the Soviet Union were implemented in line with the Soviet philosophy of development, project staff and military personnel increased pro-socialism/communism feelings in the youth. These civil servants and military personnel were trained in the Soviet system which increased the pro-socialist/communist feelings in the young Afghans. These civil servants and military personnel had contributed to both the 1973 and 1978 coups and initiated the second wave of reforms that caused social upheaval in the country.

### 4.3 Alternative or Participatory Approach

There is no universal model for development as it is an integral, multidimensional and dialectic process that differs from society to society. However, there are alternatives to modernization and dependency (Agungu, 1996). Rather than relying on the centralized, hierarchical economic driven initiatives, an alternate approach to development would be need-based micro projects that are compatible within the social and cultural context. Empowerment and participation would be the key determinants (Melkote & Steeves, 2001). Although it is repeated by scholars that the local communities in Afghanistan always reject social reforms, the National Solidarity Program illustrates that under certain circumstances local population do not oppose change. They reject changes imposed from outside, especially those in which the local people are not involved. The lesson of NSP is
that models from other countries cannot be implemented without taking into account the prevailing social and economic conditions of Afghanistan (Rondinellie, 2004).

Miraki (2000) suggests that any adoption of socioeconomic change in the country must be compatible with the prevailing value system. When the proposal reforms are incompatible, people tend to reject them. The Afghan social system is based on community life and communities are core elements of the alternative approach to the development. These communities have their own institutions of governance and communication. Although the war has affected the social setup in the country, these institutions still exist. Other important factors such as the social system and religion were also believed to be against the modernization or social changes. However, as Melkote and Steeves (2001, p. 201) explain: “Denying the role of religion and culture would deny the continuity that it has provided during all periods of change and thus deny history and meaning to the people or nations involved.”

The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is such a community empowerment. It is in an initiative that ensures local participation by giving ownership of development projects to the local communities. Although there are some shortcomings, such as in the way community and villages are defined and in imposing new institutions on the communities, the project has had some success. More empirical research is needed to find out the compatibility of the project with local culture and local values, and participatory strategies that will work in bringing the changes that are needed.

Local ownership, ensuring community involvement, citizen empowerment, identification of needs, compatibility with local social structures and a modest role for the religion and culture should be essential components of social and economic development
These elements are not only key to the success of community-based projects but also in solving other problems Afghanistan faces such as security, corruption, warlordism, and poppy cultivation. Working closely with the communities not only bypasses corruption and the bureaucracy that is the byproduct of decades of war, but can seed to emergence of workable governance at the local level (Kakar, 2005). An alternative paradigm that aims for individual and community empowerment is an approach that is compatible with the social setup of the country. As Saikal (2004) mentions, Afghan society is democratic in nature both by decentralized governance and equality among the members. Regardless of the differences in status and wealth, every citizen has the right to speak his mind simply and directly to anyone. This suggests that using the existing social institutions and existing cultural values are compatible with a more democratic, participatory approach.

4.4 Communication and Development

In the context of cultural imperialism arguments, both the model of modernity and dependency anticipate big effects from big media. The ‘traditional’ culture and social structures had to be changed. Mass media had been thought to be powerful and capable of inspiring and even bringing about social and economic changes. The role of traditional and interpersonal media was largely ignored. In third world countries, there was always a part of the political structure in the third world countries (Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1994). As Melkote and Steeves (2001) explain, the communication is used to reinforce development both at macro and micro levels and that the mass media were social change agents. In the context of Afghanistan, mass media were used to support the
development agenda of the government. The importance and use of traditional media/communication and the way communication works in Afghanistan was ignored throughout the development process.

Effective communication is two way. Communication is not only dissemination of information and prescribing what to and what not to do. As Melkote and Steeves say that the communication is a meaning creation process that occurs in cultural and sociopolitical context and is part of the context (2001, p. 43). Information and communication can be used as a tool of empowerment. Participatory communication and interpersonal relations and interactive media can be used to facilitate problem solving and support and encourage projects of mutual interest. Information and communication technologies can facilitate communication between the stakeholders including individuals, community members or community groups, regional authorities, NGOs, government services, institutions working at community level and policy makers. This kind of communication means moving from a focus on information and persuading and changing behaviors and attitudes to facilitating communication among stakeholders to address common problems.

Participatory communication can help to identify what is needed in terms of knowledge, partnerships and resources to arrive at joint solutions and create an efficient level of trust for work to be carried out and sustained. For this purpose, traditional and small scale media would seem to be more effective in Afghanistan. As Melkote and Steeves note: “Revised concepts of development communication, such as self-help, grassroots participation, and two way communication, led to a re-examination of the
advantages of traditional media as vehicles for information, persuasion, and 
entertainment of rural people” (2001, p. 268).
References


March 15, 2006, from

http://www.nspafghanistan.org/content/e79/e256/box_file257/NSPOperationalMan-
nualVersion3-15Jan2006_eng.pdf


Appendix A: Chronology (1869 to Present)*

1869: Amir Shir Ali Khan came to power for the second time.

1878: Second Anglo-Afghan War

1880: Britain recognized Abdul Rahman Khan as Amir of Afghanistan

1881: End of Second Anglo-Afghan War and British defeat in Kandahar

1893: Durand Line imposed on Afghanistan

1901: Amir Abdul Rahman Khan died and Habibullah became Amir.

1911: Mahmud Tarzi began publishing the newspaper Seraj al-Akhbar

1919: Amir Habibullah Khan was assassinated in Laghman; Amanullah Khan became Amir; Afghanistan got its independence.

1924: Khost uprising

1928: King Amanullah returned from Europe to Afghanistan and introduced reforms; In December Shinwari uprising

1929: Amanullah went into exile; Habibullah Kalakani became Amir. Nadir Khan captured Kabul and proclaimed king.

1933: Nadir Shah assassinated, and his son Zahir Shah came to power and Muhammad Hashim, Nadir Shah’s brother, became the prime minister

1946: Muhammad Hashem Khan resigned and Shah Mahmud Khan (another brother of Nadir Shah), minister of defense became the new prime minister

1953: Shah Mahmud resigned; Zahir Shah’s cousin, Muhammad Daud, present defense and interior minister, became the prime minister

1963: Prime Minister Daud resigned; Prime Minister Yusuf formed a new government

1964: New Constitution approved

1965: People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) founded; Prime Minister Yusuf resigned. King Zahir Shah asked Muhammad Hashem Maiwandwal to form cabinet

* Sources for this chronology are diverse. However, I mainly consulted Adamec (2003).
1967: Prime Minister Maiwandwal resigned; Nur Ahmad Etemadi became prime minister

1971: Nur Ahmad Etemadi resigned; Abdul Zahir, the former ambassador to Italy, became prime minister

1972: Musa Shafiq is asked to form government.

1973: In a coup, Muhammad Daud, former prime minister and a cousin of King Zahir Shah, deposed the King, and announced a republic. President Daud dissolved the Parliament.

1978: Communist Coup; PDPA took power. Nur Muhammad Taraki is named President and premier of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

1979: Prime Minister Hafezullah Amin took power and became the President; Soviet Invasion, overthrowing of Hafizullah Amin; former Deputy President Babrak Karmal was installed in power.

1986: Babrak Karmal resigned; Najibullah resumed the power.

1988: Geneva Accord. (Afghanistan, the USSR, the US and Pakistan sign peace agreement and the Soviet Union began withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan)

1989: Soviet Union Troops completed withdrawal from Afghanistan

1992: Najibullah took refuge at UN compound; Mujahideen forces entered Kabul; Fractional fighting started.

1994: Taliban movement took control of Kandahar

1996: Hekmatyar came to Kabul as prime minister; the Taliban took Kabul; Mujahideen forces withdrew to Panjshir valley.

2001: A terrorist attack destroys the World Trade Center in New York and part of the Pentagon in Washington. On 7th October, Attacks by American and British started on the Taliban and al Qaeda military bases in Afghanistan; Taliban left Kabul; An Afghan delegation consisting representative of Rome, Peshawar, and Cyprus met under UN auspices in Bonn 27 November-5 December to agree on an interim government. Hamid Karzai was nominated as interim leader.

2002: An international conference in Tokyo agreed to provide $4.5 billion for the reconstruction of Afghanistan; Loya Jirga convened and Hamid Karzai was elected head of the Transitional Government.
2004: Loya Jirga passed the new constitution adopting presidential system; Berlin Conference on Afghanistan. Presidential election took place in October.

2005: London Conference on Afghanistan. In September of the same year Parliamentary elections were held.
Appendix B: Rulers’ Timeline

1869
Shir Ali Khan
1880
Abdul Rahman Khan
1901
Habibullah
1919
Amanullah Khan
1929
Habibullah Kalakani, Nadir Khan
1933
Zahir Shah
1953

1901
Daud Khan
1929
Nur Mohammad Taraki
1933
Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal
1953
Najibullah
2001
Sebghatullah Mujadai,
Civil War &
Burhanuddin Rabani
Retraditionalization
Taliban Took Power
Hamid Karzai

1978
Habibulah Zahir Shah
1979
Hamid Karzai
1986
Nadir Khan

1992
Abdul Rahman Khan

1953
Habibullah Kalakani, Nadir Khan

1978
Daud Khan

1979
Nur Mohammad Taraki

1986
Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal

1992
Najibullah

2001
Sebghatullah Mujadai,
Civil War &
Burhanuddin Rabani
Retraditionalization
Taliban Took Power
Hamid Karzai

1996
Abdul Rahman Khan

1996
Nadir Khan

Early reforms
Gradual Reforms
2nd Wave of Reforms
New democracy

1st Wave of Reforms
(Amanullah’s Reforms)
(Radical Reforms)
### Appendix C: Reforms and Resistance Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>Early reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>1st Wave of Reforms (Amanullah's Reforms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Gradual Reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2nd Wave of Reforms (Radical Reforms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Civil War &amp; Retraditionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>New democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Civil War &amp; Retraditionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Civil War &amp; Retraditionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Civil War &amp; Retraditionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Civil War &amp; Retraditionalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**
- Tribal revolts
- Rebellion against the Reforms
- Some resistance to the reforms
- Resistance to the reforms
- Civil War
- Modernization
- Dependency
- Some alternative Approaches (NSP)
## Appendix D: Development Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Poverty and Hunger</strong></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>No data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population below US$1 a day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty gap ratio</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of poorest quintile in consumption</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underweight children under 5 years of age</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population below minimum level of dietary energy</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>20.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Primary Education</strong></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>54%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment ratio in primary education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach Grade 5</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate of (15 to 24 years olds)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Gender Differentials</strong></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>0.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of girls to boys in primary education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of girls to boys in secondary education</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of literate females to males (15 to 24 year olds)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.34</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Child Mortality</strong></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>230</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 5 mortality rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of 1 year olds immunized against measles</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Maternal Health</strong></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>1600</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility rate</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of women receiving professional ante-natal care</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB and other diseases</strong></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>National- 10% Rural 6% and Urban 21%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIV prevalence amongst blood donors</td>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of blood samples screened for HIV/AIDS</td>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contraceptive prevalence rate</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population aged 15/49 years with comprehensive and correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS</td>
<td></td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.67% (reported cases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>333 per 100,000 active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>24% of population detected and cured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Water and Sanitation</strong></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>23%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of population with sustainable access to improved water source, urban and rural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved sanitation, urban and rural</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>