OPERASI LILIN DAN KETUPAT:
CONFLICT PREVENTION IN NORTH SULAWESI, INDONESIA

A thesis presented to

the faculty of

the Center for International Studies of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Karen P. Kray

June 2006
This thesis entitled

*OPERASI LILIN DAN KETUPAT:*

CONFLICT PREVENTION IN NORTH SULAWESI, INDONESIA

by

KAREN P. KRAY

has been approved for

the Center for International Studies by

Elizabeth Fuller Collins

Professor of Classics and World Religions

Drew McDaniel

Interim Director, Center for International Studies
In the heightened religious and ethnic tensions of Post-Suharto Indonesia, the city of Manado in North Sulawesi emerged as an example of peace and harmony. Despite this, it also has active local militias and latent tensions between ethnic groups and social classes, and has faced attacks and threats from terrorist groups and many of the political and social pressures affecting regions in conflict.

This research examines North Sulawesi from the peace-building framework of John Paul Lederach in *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (1997), and the theory of peaceful cities by Ashutosh Varshney in *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life* (2002). Extended interviews and ethnographic field research were conducted in the cities of Manado and Tomohon, from June to August 2005.

What makes Manado and North Sulawesi unique are the active peace-building initiatives, the circumstances of local politics, and the historical commitment to tolerance and diversity.

Approved:

Elizabeth Fuller Collins

Professor of Classics and World Religions
### Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Representation and Conflict</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories on Indonesian Violence</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Forging Minahasan Identity</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Minahasa</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Indonesia</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Order</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Suharto Era</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Players in North Sulawesi Conflict Management</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-Level Leadership</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Range Leadership</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Leadership</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engagement</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lederach and Varshney in the Context of North Sulawesi</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Toleransi</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A: Extended Interviews Conducted in Manado and Tomohon</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B: Lumimuut and Toar</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1: Map of North Sulawesi</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2: Map of Minahasa, marked with current cities and towns</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1
Representation and Conflict

On Christmas Eve 1999 over a dozen coordinated bombings targeted Christians across Indonesia. No bombs were planted in North Sulawesi, and despite the elevated ethnic tensions in the region and the outbreaks of communal violence across Indonesia, North Sulawesi remained restful and non-violent. Moreover, these attacks led local religious leaders in North Sulawesi to arrange teams of young people to guard houses of worship on holy days – Christians guarding mosques and Muslims guarding churches. Later dubbed *Operasi Lilin dan Ketupat*, this new tradition has become the foremost symbol of tolerance and inter-religious harmony in North Sulawesi.

Residents of North Sulawesi, particularly the Christian Minahasans who dominate the social and political landscape, maintain that tolerance is a natural characteristic of their community. Minahasans I spoke with mentioned that they hold a more liberal attitude towards inter-religious marriages and religious conversion; and that there is a tendency towards living in diverse neighborhoods, and the widespread use of a local creolized language, a historically egalitarian society and a shared history has led to higher levels of tolerance for non-Christians; (Dr. Wilheim Roeroe, personal communication, 1 July 2005). Further, they believe that high personal achievement, seen locally in high levels of literacy and the percentage of students graduating from high school and enrolling in college, can also explain the lack of local communal violence. According to Manadonese historian Fendy E.W. Parengkuan, the local Catholic school draws the top
performing students *regardless of religion or ethnicity* (personal communication, 2 August 2005).

There is also anecdotal evidence supporting Minahasans’ assertion of tolerance; I observed several examples where Minahasans adapted habits and cultural traits from Islam. For example, at Protestant church services, the Pastor and congregation used the Arabic word *Allah* to refer to God rather than the more common term in Indonesian Christianity, *Tuhan*. The use of loudspeakers in neighborhoods of Manado and the retail areas of smaller villages broadcast religious services, music and special announcements to all residents of a neighborhood is likely borrowed from the muezzin's call to prayer. At most public meetings with an opening prayer, both a Christian and Muslim are invited to speak. At weddings, *halal* food is offered as well as local Manadonese delicacies.

In addition, there are traditional mechanisms for communal conflict prevention and resolution. The most notable of these are community cooperative work parties, called *mapalus* or *mutual help*, to prepare for wedding feasts or funeral ceremonies, or community meetings to discuss and overcome conflict. These activities, however, are rooted in community and family linkages, and do not specifically address religious or ethnic pluralism. Moreover, these traditions are weakening in the face of modernization and urban growth. The danger of relying on these traditions to keep the peace is a lesson learned from Ambon, where the ancient *pela gandung* alliances between Muslim and Christian villages were all but ignored in the violence that overwhelmed the province.
Theories on Indonesian Violence

Since the fall of Suharto, ethnic and religious identities have been at the center of communal conflict and violence across the country. While in all cases the specific trigger of violence was not religion or ethnicity, people involved often mobilized along these divides. In other cases religious or ethnic identity fueled the conflict. The most notable cases were anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta, Medan, Solo, and other cities (May 1998), Muslim-Christian conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi (1998-2002), Dayak-Madurese conflict in Sambas, West Kalimantan (1999), and in Sampit, Central Kalimantan (2001) and Christian-Muslim violence in Maluku (1999-2001).

Initial news reports of the violence focused on the brutality of the attacks: rapes of ethnically Chinese Indonesians as young as nine years old, hundreds of accounts of headhunting in Kalimantan, mob-based lynching in Java, and reports of mass graves discovered in Central Sulawesi (Richburg, 1998; Lakshmanan, 1999; Anon, 1998a; Schmetzer, 2000). Reports also speculated on the causes of and conditions exacerbating the violence: simmering religious tensions, unemployment caused by economic collapse, provocateurs from the New Order government, and weak law enforcement forces (Anon, 1998a; Anon, 1998b; McBeth & Cohen, 1999). The fear among many Indonesian observers was the potential for these conflicts to lead to the Balkanization of Indonesia (Thatcher, 1998).

Important sources of information and commentary on the violence were non-traditional media outlets, many of which published on the Internet to international readers. The conflict in Ambon and the Malukus has been most exhaustively covered by a variety of religious organizations, international non-governmental organizations, local justice committees and unaffiliated individuals. These included the Catholic Crisis Centre
Diocese of Amboina; Ambon is Bleeding Online (*Ambon Berdarah On-line*), and newsgroups such as Masariku Network (Protestant) and the Sunni Communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah*) (Muslim) (Bräeuchler, 2003). International organizations, such as the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch, released reports throughout the conflicts reporting from the field and offering policy recommendations.

As time passed and news was analyzed, international observers discussed the various causes of violence, and whether these episodes had commonalities. One major theme discussed internationally and within Indonesia was the impact of “outside agitators” often referred to as *provocateurs* in Indonesian. Hefner discussed this theory in his *Civil Islam* (2000), arguing that the actions of New Order elites struggling to retain power caused the ethno-communal violence at the height of the *reformasi* protests and pro-democracy movement. These elites, led by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Prabowo Subianto, commander of Special Forces, sought to reframe the explanation of the monetary crisis (*krismon*) of 1997 and the energy of the pro-democracy movement as an international campaign to destabilize Indonesia and destroy the Suharto regime. At the center of the alleged international conspiracy were Mossad, the CIA, the Vatican, and overseas Chinese. The reports were distributed to ultra-conservative Islamists who opposed the pro-democracy movement. Prabowo is also alleged to have directed the killings of four students at a protest at Trisakti University, the attacks on Chinese neighborhoods and businesses, and rapes of Chinese girls and women. In a later column, published in 2001, Hefner further argued that the violence in Ambon was pursued as a method of destabilizing the country and returning New Order elites to power. The violence in
Maluku was “the most tragic illustration... [of violence] abetted by hard-line factions within the political elite... seeking to destabilize the country so as to block political reform.” “Islamic extremism or primordial passion” was not the cause of violence (Hefner, 2001).

Schwartz, in the second edition of *A Nation in Waiting* (2000), argued that the violence was a result of the tensions between the legacy of the New Order’s authoritarian state and people’s desire for justice. He identified the factors underlying the violence as provincial unrest, economic uncertainty, political instability, and a distrust of democracy. He wrote, “with some oversimplifying, all of these obstacles can be boiled down to one: a disturbing shortage of social trust. Societies use the political process to articulate demands and to negotiate compromises between conflicting views. Suharto’s elite-centered authoritarian rule brought this sort of politics to a standstill. In what is arguably Suharto’s most damaging legacy to the Indonesian people, he allowed resentments and sectarian antagonisms to fester out of sight while at the same time disemboweling the political institutions needed to mediate them” (p 427).

At an Asia Society discussion in New York, Jones (2000) said the ethnic and religious violence occurring in Indonesia is neither a new phenomenon nor “an outgrowth of the fall of Suharto.” She highlighted four factors influencing the violence around Indonesia. First, the colonial legacy attributing higher status to Christians and ethnic Chinese was increasingly eroding. In this shifting power structure, minority groups felt they were under siege and responded violently to actions they saw as challenges to their power. Secondly, groups have recently begun seeking proper compensation for development policies that had overlooked indigenous rights. This factor is also a result of
the diminished role for traditional authority and customary rights. Third, Jones argued that the communication revolution – specifically the prevalence of cell phones and email – turned local conflicts into national conflicts, whereby co-religionists and members of ethnic groups mobilized support and directed attention to the conflict from outside the area. Finally, provocation worked to incite violence when other factors were also present in the communities.

In Wessel’s and Wimhöfer’s *Violence in Indonesia* (2001), Colombijn pointed out that violence in Indonesia is not culturally unique. He noted that the factors of violence in Indonesia – “the role of youth, a fierce military, ethnic tensions, a strong social identity and the dehumanizing of the Other” (p 40) – also exist in other countries of the world. What is unique about violence in Indonesia is the presence and combination of these features. He wrote this is evident in violent intercommunal conflicts, but also in street brawls that erupt following a defeat, “at a referendum, a football match, and so on” (p 39). In a new essay, Colombijn (2005) explained the current episodes of violence as socially learned behaviors with deep historical roots. It is therefore necessary, he wrote, to teach non-violent behavior (p 266).

van Klinken (2001) applied Ted Gurr’s theory of “communal contenders,” where local leaders manipulate identity to grab power, to the case of Maluku violence. He argued that religious identity was mobilized at certain times and in certain circumstances as a tool for intra-elite competition. This battle was not only fought through physical violence, but through aggressive verbal attacks and the use of propaganda to influence policy-makers and the public. He dismissed the argument that Jakarta elites were behind the largely localized violence and argued that *provocateurs*, though typically envisioned
as outsiders, were actually followers of local elites. Rather than being directly implicit in the violence, Jakarta was simply uncoordinated and incapable of alleviating the tensions.

For Bertrand (2004), the violence was caused not only by elites vying for power, but a nation fighting “to renegotiate the elements of the national model: the role of Islam in political institutions, the relative importance of the central and regional governments, the access and representation of ethnic groups in the state’s institutions, as well as the definition and meaning of the Indonesian ‘nation’” (p 3). Furthermore, he argued there were three sets of tensions in the late 1990s: the threat of further marginalization or the opportunity for redress by formerly excluded groups, increased tensions between religious groups, and the emergence of new opportunities to renegotiate a position with the government.

Bertrand also supported Hefner’s thesis in *Civil Islam*. While there were local grievances and local dimensions affecting and directing the violence, he argued that, “the large number of conflicts, and their intensity after 1996, were not coincidental,” and that Indonesian military units had planned the attacks on Chinese Indonesians prior to the public protests and violence (p 68).

In addition to general theories and discussions of the violence, two quantitative studies have been released concerning occurrences of local conflict in Indonesia. The first, released by Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin (2004) for the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, looked at the incidents of violence according to newspapers and local sources for the period of 1990-2003. The findings show that episodes of violence did not increase in number following the fall of Suharto in 1998, but the frame of the violence moved from state-perpetrated violence used to maintain control...
of society, to collective violence between social groups. Moreover, although Indonesia was being portrayed as overwhelmed in violence, only 15 (of 440) districts throughout the country accounted for 85% of the deaths (p 34). This research suggests that deadly violence is highly localized and pinpoints youth clashes as the single most important trigger. Although acts of terrorism generally attract more international attention and public pressure, the more significant danger is violence between groups of youths rather than terrorists (possible youths) against adult social structure. According to the research, while ethnocommunal violence doesn’t account for a large proportion of the incidents, it does account for 90% of the recorded deaths (p 25).

The second report by the World Bank team of Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan (2004) looked at the local results of a national survey conducted by the Indonesian Statistical Agency in 2003 and presented quite different conclusions. For instance, the authors argued that conflict is not concentrated, but significant across Indonesia; it is often underreported; and only 3.3% could be categorized as ethnic conflict. Many of the findings contained in this report require further consideration. For instance, the World Bank team found that inequality is associated with lower levels of conflict, and that the density of places of worship can be associated with lower levels of conflict, but the number of active religious groups is associated with higher levels of conflict.

Urdal (2004) of the World Bank found that, “youth bulges increase the risk that a country will experience domestic armed conflict” (p 16). He argued that the sheer number of youth increases the possibility that they will take a collective identity to address unanswered personal and collective grievances. Further, as other scholars have also noted, youth are idealistic and have more opportunity to participate in protests and
revolution given their freedom from career and family responsibilities. Perhaps most critically for Indonesia, youth traditionally recognize themselves in terms of a collective, often exclusivist identity. It is a definition that could be in terms of religious organizations such as Christian Pemuda GMIM, or Muslim Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah; student groups such as KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Students Action Union) or GMKI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Student Movement); regional organizations such as Pemuda Aceh or Komite Nasional Pemuda Papua Barat (West Papuan National Youth Committee); or a variety of other social or professional clubs and organizations.

These explanations of violence in Indonesia rely upon factors also present in North Sulawesi – including high numbers of un- or under-employed males, high numbers of active religious organizations, active opposition to Indonesia as an Islamic State, and ethnically diverse communities; yet, the region has remained free of major communal violence. This paper specifically examines the reasons why the diverse city of Manado has remained stable throughout the period of highest communal violence.

The following chapter looks at the creation of the Minahasan identity, its role and changing presence in history, and how this identity has been used in political and social movements to affect, both positively and negatively, the threat of ethnocommunal conflict. Chapter Three explores the most recent programs for peace-building in North Sulawesi. This chapter draws from the work of John Paul Lederach who has mapped a hierarchical framework for intervention to identify peace-building and conflict management activities at top-level, mid-range, and grassroots levels of leadership. It also
looks to Ashutosh Varshney’s work on peaceful cities in India for evidence that collective civil society organizations made positive impacts in North Sulawesi.

The interviews and fieldwork contained in this study were conducted over a six week-period in mid-2005, with additional preliminary informational interviews conducted in July 2004. A total of eighteen extended interviews were conducted in the cities of Manado and Tomohon (see Appendix A). Most of the interviews in Manado were conducted at the offices of youth organizations or at local coffee shops or eateries. In Tomohon, interviews were conducted with students or faculty of the Universitas Kristen Indonesia-Tomohon (UKIT) in university offices. Most interviews were conducted in Indonesian, recorded and later translated as needed. Additional information was gathered in ethnographic field research, news coverage, and other academic scholarship, both published and unpublished.
Chapter 2
Forging Minahasan Identity

Siapa orang Minahasa? Dia berdarah Toar Lumimuut, dia kawin dengan orang Minahasa, dia tinggal di tanah Minahasa atau dia diangkat sebagai anak angkat, diterima oleh adat dengan gelar adat.

Who is a Minahasan? It is someone who has the blood of Toar and Lumimuut, who has been married to a Minahasan, who lives in Minahasa or was raised as an adopted child, or someone who was been given a traditional honorary title.\(^1\)

North Sulawesi is located at the northern tip of the Indonesian island of Sulawesi. It is bounded on the west by the province of Gorontalo and extends northeast to include the island chains of Sangihe and Talaud. The current population of the province is 2.15 million; 27% of the population resides in urban areas of Manado and Bitung, while 73% of the population resides in rural areas of the province (Badan Pusat Statistik [BPS], 2004). The capital city is Manado, with a population of over 400,000. There are currently nine autonomous regions in the province, including the districts, or kabupaten, of Minahasa, South Minahasa, North Minahasa, Bola’ang-Mongondow, Sangihe and Talaud, and the cities of Manado, Tomohon and Bitung. Sixty percent of the residents are Protestant, 28% Muslim, 6% Catholic, 1% Hindu and .5% Buddhist. Economically, the largest amount of revenue comes from copra, cloves, and mining. The first two are dominated by land-holding Minahasans, and the latter by foreign firms. High prices for cloves in the 1970s and early-1980s contributed to an increase in prosperity in North Sulawesi and the region saw significant improvements in its level of development and measures of wealth (Sondakh & Jones, 2003, p 17).

\(^1\) Remarks of Professor Sinolungan at the Conference of the Study of Minahasan Culture (Pelatih Budaya Minahasa) (Massie, 2005).
Colonial Minahasa

The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC or Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie) first arrived in the vicinity of present-day Manado in 1608. The region was recognized as a potential source of rice for the Dutch military stationed in Maluku. Control of the region was secured first through military intervention – by defeating various tribal

---

groups, the king of neighboring Bolaang in 1644, and Spain in 1660. In 1679 the VOC governor in Ternate signed a treaty with various tribal leaders (representing the regions which would in the future constitute the region of Minahasa) guaranteeing that the VOC would “never abandon them or allow the King of Bolaang to regain dominion over these regions and people” (Henley, 1996, p 31).

![Map of Minahasa](http://www.minahasa.net/en/about-map.html)

**Figure 2: Map of Minahasa, marked with current cities and towns**

---

The Minahans of the 17th and 18th centuries remained warring tribal units with traditional constructs of power, ritual, values and customs. Schouten (1998) wrote, “By [1790], Minahasa had experienced two and a half centuries of contact with Europeans, and a century of formal relations with the VOC. The society had changed in this era, but none of these transformations were imposed from the outside” (p. 50). During the 19th century, however, the Dutch began making significant changes to colonial policy and used new methods for establishing cooperation. These methods were successful in North Sulawesi because of three specific policies: the promotion of local chiefs to positions of leadership and as liaisons to the Dutch Residents; the positioning of Christianity as a marker of modernity and as a refuge in rapid social change; and education and literacy as a tool for the powerless.

As local administrators, the new corps of Minahasan educated elites became a “regional bureaucratic aristocracy” (Lundström-Burghoorn, 1981, p 64). This aristocracy pursued closer personal relationships with Dutch residents, sent their children to the same schools, intermarried with the children of Dutch residents, adopted Dutch fashion, and learned the Dutch language. A Dutch visitor to Minahasa in the mid-1800s was struck, not just by Minahasan adoption of Dutch lifestyle, but of the Eurasian adoption of the Minahasan identity,

It was remarkable how extraordinarily well these chiefs expressed themselves in their speeches to His Excellency. Most of them did so in High Malay, one, however… spoke very fluent Dutch and gave an excellent address. I had already met this mayor during my previous visit to the area, and it was certainly a strange experience to hear this Alfur speak perfect Dutch while his wife, a daughter of the missionary Riedel and therefore of European blood, speaks not a single word of Dutch and understands very little. (cited in Henley, 1996, p 67)
In 1824, there was one native official for every 5,900 inhabitants in North Sulawesi. In contrast, there was only one per 13,600 in West Sumatra and one per 22,108 in Java (Lundström-Burghoorn, 1981, p 56). By 1930 there were only approximately a dozen Dutch officials in Minahasa in a population of 300,000, none of whom were assigned outside of Manado. This reliance upon local native administrators is something not typical of Dutch colonial government structures elsewhere in Indonesia.

During this period, the church and schools promoted the concept of “Minahasa,” meaning “becoming one united,” to establish the unity of the peoples in the region, and the territory under one government. This campaign was undertaken through the promotion and study of local history, the transcription and publication of oral folktales, and the use of Minahasan-centric maps and newspapers. One product of this campaign was the promotion of the creation story (for alternative texts, see Appendix B). Nicolaas Graafland, who spent decades with the Dutch Missionary Society (NZG or *Nederlands Zendelinggenootschap*) in North Sulawesi, also published a story eliminating the slight differences between each local version.

Parallel to the creation story, it was taught that Christianity would be the tool for reuniting the region. Graafland wrote, “All differences in religion are in any case disappearing as people convert to Christianity and will ultimately vanish all together. The Christian religion will eliminate all divisions, and all Minahasans shall truly become brothers” (cited in Henley, 1996, p 54). In the process, *Minahasa* became synonymous with Christianity. Currently, Minahasa refers to Christians (Protestant or Catholic) who belong to one of the eight indigenous linguistic groups.
Under the leadership of NZG and Graafland, access to education in North Sulawesi expanded greatly. By 1860, there were 150 schools in the Minahasan region, 12 of which were state schools, 30 were schools funded with local government funds and 108 were schools sponsored by the NZG (Schouten, 1998, p 113). By 1935, 21% of all native children and 14% of girls in Manado were enrolled in native schools, the highest rate throughout the Dutch East Indies (Cribb, 1999, p 144). Schouten (1998) writes that literacy was a weapon for Minahasans in the colonial era, a tool they could use to secure rights and privileges. Ironically, however, “colonial administrators had encouraged the introduction of schools precisely because they regarded them as helpful in creating compliance.” (p 274).

The Dutch missionaries in Minahasa were committed to creating a new Christian community with hopes that their presence in North Sulawesi would eventually be unnecessary (Henley, 1996, p 63). The Dutch government was less interested in this emancipation. However, by 1880 local elites were sufficiently capable of leading the region and had begun to resent Dutch control. Minahasans began petitioning for equality and justice to both the local colonial administration and the government in the Netherlands. By the early 1900s Minahasan leaders petitioned for inclusion within the same legal category as European residents, the end of the Cultivation System, the right to female suffrage, and the continued elevation in rank of Minahasan soldiers in the Dutch army over Muslim soldiers. Minahasans wanted “to be treated seperti orang Belanda – like Dutchmen” (Henley, 1996, p 88)
Minahasans also believed that they were meant to bring development and modernization to other regions of Sulawesi and the Dutch East Indies. This often took a “self-congratulatory” tone. As one newspaper writer of the period wrote:

Yes, Minahasans are simply good for everything. Which land in the Indies is without its Minahasan community now? Wherever people still live in darkness, Minahasans are at work as teachers, administrative assistants, Salvation Army officers and much else. We Minahasans, and unquestionably also the government, are full of appreciation for the achievements of these countrymen of ours, for the way they have labored alongside Europeans to bring progress to some of the more backward people of this archipelago. (cited in Henley, 1996, p 82)

Likewise, Minahasans believed the Dutch missionary no longer had a role in the province and that Minahasans could serve on their own as teachers and preachers:

We Minahasans are already Protestant Christians. Do not try to force the Christian religion upon us any longer, because from now on we can learn all we need to know at the government schools. Besides there are government teachers who can match any missionary or assistant missionary in knowledge of the bible. Take your mission schools to Puruk Cahu, Halmahera and Merauke, and if you should need extra staff there, then we will lend you a helping hand. (cited in Henley, 1996, p 101)

**Independent Indonesia**

While asserting the qualifications of their local elites, Minahasans also repeatedly asserted their loyalty to the Dutch King. Minahasa was famously called the “Twelfth Province” of the Netherlands. Minahasans used the slogan to proclaim their allegiance to the Dutch, and the Dutch used it to express perceived rights of access to resources of the region (Schouten, 1998, p 140). This slogan was popular again during the 1940s when Minahasans were debating options for independence: were they better off submitting to a
Dutch, Javanese, or local leaders? There was dissatisfaction with the local Minahasaraad (est. 1919), a local elected council with limited legislative powers. Some Minahasan legislators had become corrupt and an anonymous post to the local Fikiran newspaper asked if any government would be different:

What can Minahasa hope to gain from independence? Nothing. Minahasans understand fully that no bangsa is free. Everybody must obey a government, and the question is merely whether or not the governors belong to the same bangsa as the governed. (Henley, 1996, p 106)

A number of Minahasans, most notably Samuel Ratulangi (1890-1949), became active in the independence campaign alongside Sukarno, Mohamad Hatta, and Indonesia’s other “Founding Fathers.” Of critical importance to Ratulangi – as well as to groups from Eastern Indonesia, Christians, secularists, and non-Javanese – was the importance of addressing and accommodating ethnic and religious diversity in the new nation of Indonesia. Minahasans represented two minority groups; as Christians they were a minority that constituted less than 10% of the population, and as Minahasans less than 1% of the total population. Ratulangi wrote about “natural nationalities” that would join in the new political entity that was Indonesia:

The nation of the Indies will thus be formed synthetically out of these ethnic nationalities, as a pure political nation. For this no unity of culture, language, and tradition between the different ethnic nationalities is required. Sufficient is the unity of political will of these nationalities. That is why we have repeatedly argued that, from the viewpoint of the psychology of nations, the federative system of state is the only acceptable one for the Indies. The federation of ethnic nationalities is the political nation of the Indies. (van Klinken, 2003, p 99)

Muslim nationalists campaigned for the “Jakarta Charter” which stipulated that Indonesia would be an Islamic State and Islamic law, syariat, would be required for all Muslims.
Ratulangi’s coalition of minority groups and secularists successfully opposed the inclusion of this charter in the constitution. Instead the constitution is centered around the Pancasila, which, among other things, established the primacy of the belief in One God. They were unsuccessful, however, in securing a system of federalism to allow local autonomy.

Though Minahasans had a presence in the new national government with three to five Minahasans served in Sukarno’s cabinet, Minahasans generally felt underserved by the national government. Minahasans felt that North Sulawesi had not received its fair share of the Japanese war restitutions despite suffering from heavy Allied bombing and that revenue from copra, and other local businesses were subsidizing unnecessary Javanese projects not the development of North Sulawesi. Minahasans also feared the increasing influence of Communism.

In 1955, local military units took control of the local copra market, establishing a black market with South Sulawesi and North Sumatra to bypass the state monopoly (Ricklefs, 1993, p 252; Cribb, 1999, p 165). Jakarta ordered the military units to close the primary North Sulawesi port, but local leaders demanded the order be rescinded. Increasingly frustrated with Javanese interests at the expense of the Outer Islands, a coalition of Eastern Indonesian civilian, political and military leaders declared martial law and proclaimed Permesta (Perjuanan Semesta Alam or The Total Struggle) on March 1, 1956. Leaders from North Sulawesi included Lieutenant Colonel Ventje Sumual, Alex Kawilarang, and Joop Warouw.

Permesta called for political, military and economic reforms, including the establishment of a federal system and autonomy for the four provinces of East Indonesia:
South and Southeast Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, Maluku, and Nusa Tenggara. Militarily, the coalition sought the establishment of a single military unit for the entire East Indonesia area. Economically, it demanded the payment of war reparations in proportion to geographic area rather than population and the requirement that locally generated revenue remain in the region. This specifically addressed the concerns of North Sulawesi farmers who led the region in the production of copra. The proclamation further specified that a region enjoying economic surplus would retain 70% of the revenue with 30% being sent to the national government. In a region of economic shortfall, 100% of the revenue would stay in the region, augmented for 25 years with government subsidy for the purpose of development (Harvey, 1977).

Minahasan *Permesta* leaders announced the new North Sulawesi Province on June 20, 1956. By 1957, the *Permesta* alliance with South Sulawesi folded and a new alliance was established with PRRI rebels in West Sumatra. On February 21, 1958, the Indonesian Army bombed the cities of Manado and Padang. In North Sulawesi, military battles continued throughout 1958, driving as many as 15,000 *Permesta* soldiers into the highlands. Gorontalo fell in mid-May and Manado in late-June 1958, but guerilla fighting continued until Kotamobagu finally fell in September 1959. An end to the hostilities was reached in April 1961. Individuals involved in *Permesta* were given amnesty and some were allowed to remain in military or civil service after a period of “political quarantine and reindoctrination” (Harvey, 1977, p 145). Though guerilla fighters remained legendary figures for their role in *Permesta* (Schouten, 1998, p 263), the era was also known as the period of disturbance, *masa pergolakan*, (p 214).
During this period, regional identities were strong. Minahasans developed relationships that traversed religions, and carved a role for themselves within East Indonesia and the Outer Islands. This is apparent in constitutional debates and regional rebellion, and in the formation of inter-religious community organizations. The first such organization was established by religious leaders from the islands of Sangihe and Talaud who sought to promote peace and calm in the midst of *Permesta* by bringing together representatives from several Christian and Muslim congregations. After *Permesta* this concept was brought over to the North Sulawesi mainland where it was broadened to include representatives of the bureaucracy, military, and police. Historian F. Parengkuan believes this is when the concept of tolerance was first introduced in governmental initiatives (personal communication, August 2005). In 1969, this organization became *Badan Kerja Sama Antar Umat Beragama* (BKSAUA, Committee for Inter-religious Cooperation).

The 1965-66 outbreak of communal violence that engulfed many regions of Indonesia causing the massacre of unknown hundreds of thousands of Communists and suspected Communists also took place in North Sulawesi. Although a reliable estimate of the number of deaths is unavailable, it is recorded that Christian vigilantes were behind the attacks (Cribb, 1999, p 170). Similar to what occurred in Java and Sumatra, significant increases in the membership of one Pentecostal church suggests that formal membership in a world religion also served as a cover to Communist affiliations in North Sulawesi (Schouten 1998, p 219).

In the aftermath of the massacre of Communists, representatives of various religious groups issued *Ikrar Bersama* or collective vow. The *ikrar* was an inter-religious
commitment to promote “unity and community among religious [Christian and Muslim] congregations”, and “to delve more deeply into religious teachings individually in a way that is genuine and consistent… to advance the New Order” (Parengkuan, 2005, p 5). It contained six points encouraging residents of North Sulawesi to commit themselves to religious teachings, to embrace tolerance and solidarity between religious groups, to avoid controversial religious debates, to look to government servants as proper role models, to disavow lasting relics of the Sukarno era and the Communist Party, and to warn others of the dangers of anti-government politics.

The New Order

Some scholars suggest that, as a result of the Permesta rebellion, North Sulawesi remained a political and economical backwater for the next forty years. While Minahasan elites had been active in National politics during the Colonial period and post-Independence era, only one Minahasan was appointed to the New Order Cabinet for a short time (1996-97) (Sondakh & Jones, 2003, p 276). The region did produce great wealth in production from mining, copra and cloves, but Suharto’s family controlled much of the wealth.

The unity of Indonesia was centrally important to Suharto’s presidency. Therefore, the discussion of identity relating to ethnicity, religion, race, and group/class (commonly referred to as SARA: suku, agama, ras, antar golongan) was strictly controlled and discouraged. That is not to say, however, that the era was free from inter-SARA tension and conflict. Localized violence occurred across Indonesia, sometimes against government forces, sometimes intercommunal in nature. One episode of violence
lingers in the memory of current residents in North Sulawesi. In 1970, a conflict arose between Muslim laborers and Chinese businessmen over a situation of perceived injustice. Riots broke out in downtown Manado, culminating in fires, and the ransacking and destruction of Chinese homes, businesses, and the largest Confucian temple in downtown Manado. Windows of a Protestant church in downtown Manado were also vandalized. The next day Minahasans and Chinese attacked and destroyed Muslim neighborhoods. BKSAUA, whose members were elite religious figures from each of the five national religions, was called upon to advise government officials and serve as a communication link between the Muslims and Chinese in order to reach a peaceful resolution (Parengkuan 2005, p 6). Even today this organization retains a central role in conflict management strategies in North Sulawesi. Its programs and leadership will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

Outside of this single outbreak of violence, provincial politics in North Sulawesi were relatively stable throughout the New Order. While each of the governors during this period was a Christian, the vice-governor and/or leader of the provincial legislature was often a Muslim or other non-Minahasan. Despite this power-sharing strategy, and even though Christians and Muslims were nearly equal in population, Christian Minahasans dominated the region socially and politically. Central to this political control was the advancement of the Christian Evangelical Church of Minahasa (Gereja Masehi Injili di Minahasa – GMIM) as a political powerhouse. The church was established in 1934 and now has over 600 parishes and 750,000 members (source: EMS Worldwide). During its early years, each congregation enjoyed autonomy as a statement of independence from the Dutch missionary system (Schouten, 1998, p 195). But in the 1970s, GMIM
centralized its church leadership and integrated the region’s churches into a tight network. Since that time, GMIM has become a powerful political and social force within North Sulawesi. As a result of their collective strength and representation, national government funding often favored Minahasan projects.

**Post-Suharto Era**

While violence did not overcome North Sulawesi as it did other regions of Indonesia, the struggle for political representation became defined according to religious and ethnic divisions. This political maneuvering was given additional space with the 2001 decentralization laws and *pemekaran* (literally ‘blossoming’) or the creation of new provinces, cities and districts. Muslims in Gorontalo felt their region of the province lagged significantly behind Christian Minahasans who enjoy some of the highest rates of achievement in education, level of health care, and other measures of wealth and development. In January of 2001, the district of Gorontalo was split off from North Sulawesi and became a new province. As a result, the demographics of the province shifted. Gorontalo became a Muslim majority province and the new North Sulawesi province contained 69.5% Christians and 28.6% Muslims (2003 estimate).

In 2004, activists and politicians from the east coast of North Sulawesi proposed the formation of Southeast Minahasa, to come from the existing South Minahasa province. Residents of the region, who were majority Muslim and worked as fishermen or in fish preparation, argued that Amurang, the seat of the existing district, was much too far and difficult to reach from the East Coast. According to Rolly Porong, member of the provincial parliament, the desire for local control of government development funds and
government salaries were also behind the petitions. The petition was denied, however, citing an insufficient natural resources and level of development (personal communication, 21 July 2004).

When Laskar Jihad entered Maluku, elites in North Sulawesi saw it as a potential trigger of ethnic and religious violence in their region. A number of militias were formed, including Legium Christum (Catholic), Militia Christi (Evangelical Protestant), Bani Jousua (Pentecostal), and Brigade Manguni (several denominations). Legium Christum was formed in 2000 as a rapid mobile response force. It is estimated to have over 5,000 members, and youths are recruited for membership after being released from jail. While there isn’t formal cooperation between this militia and the Catholic Church, there are priests who serve as spiritual advisors (McCall, 2002; Jacobsen, 2002b, p 22-26). Former President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) even acknowledged his appointment as honorary member in January 2002 (Madjowa, 2002).

Brigade Manguni draws upon the legacy of Permesta, using the name of a band of local soldiers participating in the rebellion. It received the support of Governor Sondakh and the GMIM church in its work to protect the region; however, members were also known for roughing up visitors at the sea port, looking for illegal immigrants or suspected criminals; carrying out attacks on street peddlers (pedagang kaki lima) in Bitung; and supporting the American mining company Newmont Minahasa Raya as the trial began on charges Newmont dumped mercury and arsenic into Buyat Bay (Perlez, 2005).

According to Michael Jacobsen (2002), thousands of men, supplied at various degrees of readiness with guns, explosives, and intelligence, were willing to deploy
across the province and into Central Sulawesi or Maluku. Arianto Sangaji (2005) also found evidence that members of Brigade Manguni have been involved in illegal arms sales and shipments to Central Sulawesi. While it is not clear who is the source of weapons for members of these militias, Sangaji reported that retired military officials, police and local security forces have been accused of trafficking small arms in and out of Central Sulawesi (p 17).

In some respects, members of these militias are preman, most commonly translated as gang member or thug. In general, preman are youth, and often former criminals who run private security businesses, control markets, parking and bus terminals, pubs and discos, prostitution, and other underworld enterprises. It is rare however, for elites or other individuals who utilize preman to acknowledge the relationship. It is unclear if North Sulawesi elites have chosen to embrace the role of preman because they fear security forces are incapable of protecting the region, or they have taken control as a means to preventing violence as caused by preman or youth elsewhere in Indonesia. Journalist Jake Lynch (2003) who was in Manado in 2002 during the Bali nightclub bombing and the Philippine Embassy bombing in Manado reported that trucks carrying Brigade Manguni members were patrolling the streets and shouting wildly. According to Lynch, the members said they were going to hand any “outsiders” over to the police should they be found on the streets.

Conflict management strategies of the New Order government remain as well, strengthened because of the threat of “provocateurs”. This strategy asks residents to remain vigilant and report the suspicious activity of neighbors and visitors in the region. Residents are instructed to keep track of new people in the area and report them to the
authorities, who are then required to register the visitors and verify identification cards. In this way, the awareness of the security risks becomes an everyday concern. In Sangihe, residents turned over to the police a suspected terrorist who allegedly had come to the island to recruit *jihadis*. Merry, a student at UKIT, said, “We all are anticipating [what problems might happen in the future]. Because of that, with each disturbance, for example each inter-village conflict, [we are concerned that] it doesn’t head towards unrest or allow some third party who could use the situation to make it more violent. Therefore, a neighborhood official checks at every house – is there a new person, is there a foreigner? That name is recorded in Manado. He visits every house, every rooming house… This is to prepare so that nothing happens” (personal communication, 27 June 2005).

The Post-Suharto period also featured a renewed initiative for the transition of Indonesia to an Islamic State. Minahasans responded to this campaign with threats to secede from Indonesia. Young local activists hosted the *Kongress Minahasa Raya* for several thousand residents of North Sulawesi, primarily Christian Minahasans, held in 2000 and 2001 in Tomohon. The purpose of the meeting was to formally oppose the campaign to institute Islamic Law (Parengkuan, personal communication, 5 August 2005). After the defeat of the initiative, this mobilization of energy led activists to pursue cultural programs to redefine and popularize the Minahan identity based on a more local construct invigorated with some pre-Christian traditions. Minahan art exhibitions, dance and singing contests, conferences and publications have become very popular both within North Sulawesi and elsewhere in Indonesia.
Conclusion

The strength of the Minahasan identity has wavered depending on the political issues of the period. The Dutch created a single ethnic group as a means to control the diverse tribes of the region. The new Minahasans adopted Christianity and aspects of the European lifestyle to gain favor with the Dutch. Minahasan Nationalists highlighted affinities with their indigenous neighbors during the independence movement, and alongside Eastern Indonesian neighbors when pursuing a federal system of government. This pragmatic approach to identity continues through the present as Minahasans continue to discuss identity as a means of mitigating threats of violence and redefining local culture.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Colombijn warned that a strong social identity has triggered outbreaks of violence in Indonesia and around the world. In the Indonesian cases, for instance, a strong social identity has both focused intense resentment, as seen in the violence against ethnic Chinese, and fostered marginalization, as seen in the experience of Dayaks in Central Kalimantan. Colombijn also argues that it is the combination of a strong social identity and the tendency to dehumanize groups or individuals outside the social class that caused the outbreak of violence in Indonesia. In this, the North Sulawesi community is unlike those plagued by violence. The government programs and community actions to be discussed in the next chapter constructed successful bridges between ethnic and religious groups in North Sulawesi.
Chapter 3

Players in North Sulawesi Conflict Management

Torang samua basaudara, baku-baku bae,
baku-baku kasi inga deng baku-baku sayang.
All mankind belongs to one family,
we have to nurture one another and share our love.

During my first trip to North Sulawesi in 2004, people told me that Manado had escaped the violence that overcame other regions of Indonesia. “Manado aman,” they said, “Manado is peaceful.” This, however, didn’t agree with the research I had done prior to my visit. A variety of sources – State Department warnings, newspaper stories, and situational reports on the area – had warned that the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf posed a security risk to Americans and international businesses in the area, especially in terms of kidnapping for ransom. Manado and the ports of North Sulawesi were also reportedly transit points for Jihadi fighters in and out of training camps in the Southern Philippines. This risk increased when Laskar Jihad began fighting in the Malukus and took residence in Poso, Central Sulawesi in 2001.

The great influx of thirty-five thousand Christian residents who had fled Maluku and Central Sulawesi into North Sulawesi following various episodes of violence in those regions also posed a threat to local stability and calm. The initial goodwill shown by the residents of North Sulawesi turned into disrespect by both groups. Minahasans were seen as having low morals, and local government officials were seen as corrupt. IDPs (internally displaced persons) were characterized as lazy because they accepted government assistance and international aid while some were still able to purchase
television or hire other residents to wash their clothes. It was also rumored that some IDPs were criminals using the camps as bomb and ammunition factories, and that some were provocateurs who would bring terrorism to North Sulawesi (Duncan, 2004, p 5). A North Sulawesi official said, “Everyone in Indonesia has a homeland and they must return there, they cannot live on someone else’s land or eventually there will be conflict… If you (the IDPs) do not go back to North Maluku, in ten years my children will kill your children, since this is our homeland not yours” (p 15).

Beyond the warnings and potential for violence and conflict, specific incidents occurred reminding residents that violence was a real threat. Periodic street violence has been reported between employees and mining officials in the region of Kotamobagu, in the southern region of North Sulawesi. The Philippine Embassy in Manado was bombed on the same evening as the Bali nightclub bombing in October 2002, though there were no injuries. In the weeks to follow nearly two-dozen bomb threats were reported in Manado and live bombs were found and diffused at the Pasar 45 central market, a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant and the home of a Protestant pastor (Anon, 2002, p 2). In the shadow of this show of force, there was no major communal conflict or street violence. There were episodes of localized physical violence between neighborhood gangs in regions of Manado, and between villages surrounding Tondano and among youth in the South Minahasa district.

I suspected that residents were choosing to underestimate or overlook the threats to their security. But, as my summer in Manado progressed, various people made mention of these threats. What became clear, then, was that residents recognized that Manado and the surrounding area had its share of conflict, but it still experienced less violence than
other regions of Indonesia. Furthermore, there was a sense that violence was less likely to engulf wider swaths of the communities or become a proxy for a greater cause.

The reputation of Manado and North Sulawesi attracted some new attention from scholars and journalists. Michael Jacobsen, of the Hong Kong-based Southeast Asia Research Centre, wrote on such topics as the Chinese community of Manado, the positioning of Minahasans in local politics, the process of decentralization and the secessionist debate. Chris Duncan discussed the sometimes-tense relations with IDPs. Jake Lynch wrote about the techniques of peace journalism and the inter-religious dynamic he witnessed when in Manado on the night of the Bali nightclub and Philippine Consulate bombings in October 2002. In addition, the province has attracted interest from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international aid agencies seeking to offer additional training to support existing conflict management systems and traditions. Missing from this literature is a collection and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the local conflict management strategies.

This paper is a modest attempt to fill the gap by using two works from the field of peace studies; the first creates a framework with which to consider the focus of conflict management strategies and the second is a theory concerning the importance of vigorous inter-religious and inter-ethnic civic engagement. Neither theory addresses the situation in North Sulawesi, but using them creates a useful frame for recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of conflict prevention in the province.

It is not so unusual to look at social systems in terms of grassroots, mid-level and elites, as does John Paul Lederach in his framework for peace-building. However, I found this particularly interesting because, in my first visit to Manado in 2004, it became clear
that the two most noted projects in the region operated at very different levels in the community. The first, BKSAUA, was often referenced in the local newspapers and former members gained special recognition. The second, the tradition of youths guarding religious ceremonies, seemed more notable outside North Sulawesi. According to Lederach, at each level, individuals (or groups) are pursuing specific courses of action according to their capacity for policy initiatives or public influence.

In a post-conflict situation, Lederach explained, top-level leaders would be pursuing ceasefire agreements or other high-level negotiations. Middle level leaders are in positions to influence individuals at both higher and local levels, and are often involved in training programs for conflict resolution or they are leading peace commissions and reconciliation sessions. At the grassroots level, leaders are hosting prejudice reduction workshops, instructing vocational training, and providing other relief services. The role of leaders in North Sulawesi differs from these specific examples, but top-level leaders are addressing policy requirements and opportunities for the interethnic and inter-religious community, mid-level leaders are seeking ways to influence policy-makers and the general population, and grassroots leaders are working in local circumstances, often in a more informal manner.

Lederach also discusses the importance of deconstructing the assumptions and stereotypes held by the participants of “the other”. He brings an example of the meetings between representatives involved in the Middle East (Israel and Palestine) Peace Process prior to the Oslo Accords signed in 1993. He explained that, over the course of the initial meetings, the participants moved beyond their understandings of their counterparts as contained in propaganda materials rather than real “face time” (p 33-34). This idea that
intimate interactions can foster reconciliation or move peace-building forward is also central to the theme of Ashutosh Varshney in *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life* (2002). Varshney argued that intercommunal networks of civic life, both associational and quotidian, promote peace; and the absence or weakness of these networks gives room for communal conflict.

Associational forms of civic engagement, he explained, include business associations, professional organizations, reading clubs, film clubs, festival organizations, trade unions and cadre-based political parties. Everyday forms of engagement are casual inter-cultural and inter-religious relationships, including traditions of eating together, visiting homes, jointly participating in festivals and allowing children to play together (p 3).

Varshney likened the degree of inter-religious engagement to the severity of an earthquake. He argued if civic life is both inter-religious and associational the community can withstand an intense ethnic “earthquake”. If the community has everyday inter-religious engagement, an “earthquake” of a lesser ferocity will have some impact on the stability and calm of the region. If engagement between religions doesn’t exist, he wrote, “small tremors (unconfirmed rumors, victories and defeats in sports) can unleash torrents of violence” (p 12).

The United Nations Support Facility for the Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) has asked Varshney and Rizal Panggabean to undertake a study based on the methods and arguments as contained in *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*. As in India, this study is comparing pairs of violence-prone and conflict-free cities in Indonesia, and Manado is included. I was not able to conduct as extensive an interview and research schedule as
Varshney, but this paper looks for many of the same examples of associational and quotidian civic engagement.

*Top-level Leadership*

Peace-building at the top-levels of leadership should be envisioned as a process of broadening and formalizing the political, bureaucratic and social services for fair and responsive representation of the community’s needs. At the top level this would include religious, military, political or other well-known elites, who Lederach explained, are highly visible, are locked into their positions and goals, and have, or are perceived to have, significant levels of power and influence (p 38-40). In North Sulawesi, these leaders have been politicians and religious figures.

As discussed in the previous chapter, politics in North Sulawesi has generally reflected the diverse composition of its residents and acknowledged the need to cut across ethnic or religious membership in order to pursue political or economic goals. For instance, *Permesta* linked Christian Minahasans with Muslims from South Sulawesi to gain control of the local copra market. During the 1980s and 1990s, Christian Minahasans served as governor, and often a non-Christian, or non-Minahasan served as Vice-Governor, or Chair of the Regional Parliament. During the District, Mayoral and Provincial elections of 2005, political party members were also attentive to the calls for conflict prevention and inclusiveness. There was public support for candidates who valued pluralism, and several of the party tickets were of mixed religions or ethnicities. Additionally, at the mid-range level of leadership, a trio of religious groups, *Legium Christum, Brigade Manguni* and *GP Ansor*, hosted a public rally calling for a peaceful
and calm campaign, and in attendance were gubernatorial candidates, local military officials, and representatives from numerous community organizations (Anon. 2005).

The use of slogans has been a popular technique to mobilize the community and promote the vision of political leaders. In 1995 the Governor E.E. Mangindaan (1995-2000) introduced the slogan Torang Samua Basaudara meaning, “We are all family.” According to local historian Fendy Parengkuan, this message was the most crucial statement of the government’s commitment to diversity because it preceded the fall of Suharto and the ensuing instability. On the other hand, Jacobsen (2002b) suggested the 2001 decentralization law and the ensuing political maneuvering to gain power at the district level centered on issues of identity and belonging, thereby undercutting real commitment to the slogan.

Torang Samua Basaudara remains visible throughout the city on billboards, as well as on the masthead of a local newspaper and is often recalled in public speeches or comments. Public support and acceptance of this slogan seems high. Muis, Chair of the Indonesian Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI), welcomed it as a representation of the formal commitment to diversity within the region (personal communications, 5 July 2005). Interestingly, this also represents a contrast to other regions of Indonesia where more difficult local languages create a distinct line between insiders and outsiders. In Central Sulawesi, for example, a Bugis candidate for local election campaigned speaking the regional Bahasa Bugis dialect, angered members of his own Golkar Party and the general public (Sangadji, R., 2005). In North Sulawesi, however, the various tribal languages – once the dominant daily languages – have lost prominence in favor of the Manado creole Bahasa Melayu Manado. While the structure
of the language is strict and its vocabulary distinct, it has become the *lingua franca* of the region.

Governor A.J. Sondakh (2000-2005) sought to continue the public pronouncements of Governor Mangindaan. Sondakh issued a series of annual proclamations declaring the *Tahun Kasih* (Year of Love) in 2002; *Tahun Kasih Tanpa Kekerasan* (Year of Love without Conflict) in 2003; *Tahun Kasih dan Pengharapan* (Year of Love and Hope) in 2004; and *Tahun Kasih dan Rahmat* (Year of Love and Mercy) in 2005. The public seems especially aware of *Tahun Kasih*, evidenced by the stickers on the front doors of homes and windows of *bemos* (public transportation buses) across the province. These campaigns were undertaken to symbolize and encourage the social cohesion of the region. It is quite possible that the campaigns were promoted as a ways of legitimizing the value of Minahasan political and social institutions at a time when Islamic groups were calling for the establishment of Islamic Law at the national level. These campaigns, first of Governor Mangindaan and then Governor Sondakh, call to mind the way in which the New Order conducted campaigns to shape public opinion. The slogan of *Tahun Kasihs* recall the myth of Toar and Lumimuut and the promise Graafland made that Christianity would unite the region and uses these traditions to legitimate the present provincial government.

BKSAUA (*Badan Kerja Sama Antar Umat Beragama* or the Committee for Inter-religious Cooperation), first discussed in Chapter Two, should also be considered a top-level leader. While it is not acting as policy-maker, its members are the top representatives of the five religions in the province. During the violence of the late-1990s and early 2000s, BKSAUA strengthened its information networks throughout the
province, using religious congregations to spread intelligence and directives relating to violence and threats to people in the region. BKSAUA will deliver a statement condemning the actions and reminding the greater North Sulawesi community that it needs to be cautious. Donal, a member of the Christian Student Movement in Indonesia (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia GMKI) believes in the ability of the committee to calm tensions: he said “during the events in Ambon or Poso, it was BKSAUA who spoke to the people of Manado and told them not to be provoked by the actions in Ambon or Poso. They also warned us not to generalize that this was a Christian or Muslim conflict.” He explained that religious leaders take this message to congregations throughout the province (personal interview, 29 June 2005).

A good deal of criticism is aimed at BKSAUA. Ishmael, of the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia PMII), asks if its members have enough courage to voice objections to government policies or criticize their inaction. Furthermore, he said, “There is almost no religious leader – whether Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist or from any religion – who has made an explicit statement about the development process [as a trigger to violence] that is happening now. They practically close their eyes to statements like that” (personal communication, 27 July 2005). According to Muis of HMI, BKSAUA is a bureaucratic body that doesn’t administer real projects, but whose members love to accept a government salary (personal interview, 5 July 2005). Donal of GMKI supports most of the work of BKSAUA, but adds, it is “just a formal committee” and it cannot “reach those at the bottom” affecting true grassroots change (personal interview, 29 June 2005).
Elites in North Sulawesi did not use militia or preman for personal interests or political gain as did elites in other regions of Indonesia. As a result, no elites were forced to account for their relationships with criminals, thereby allowing political leadership to remain stable and social trust strong. Furthermore, the recent election campaigns have been free of violence and reports of political intimidation or bullying are rare. While it is not clear why elites had not used preman or militia in this manner, one possible reason is that the opposition in North Sulawesi posed only a low level threat to Minahasan political control. Non-Minahasans in the regions did not constitute a single opposition party and as such lacked the political strength to contest the Minahasan dominance. Moreover, the region enjoyed social and economic stability thereby limiting opportunity or cause for political upset.

**Middle-Range Leadership**

Middle-range leaders are individuals or groups independent of formal government agencies and opposition groups according to Lederach’s system. They have the ability to influence individuals and communities at both the grassroots and top-level, and are not using their position to undercut current political or military leaders for personal promotion. Lederach explains there can be four categories of middle-range leaders. These can be highly respected individuals active in less-prominent fields, such as healthcare, business, education, or agriculture; organizations and their leaders that link various groups, such as religious groups, academic institutions or humanitarian organizations; ethnic, neighborhood or regional leaders; and individuals whose fame or celebrity is outside of the conflict, such as a writer, actor or sports figure (p 41).
At this level, the most important factor is the dominant GMIM church and Minahasan Protestants who have, from the early days of the church, accepted Graafland’s conviction that Christianity will unite the region. While missionary work has been stifled by the fear Indonesian Muslims have of *Kristenisasi* (Christianization), and religious conversion (especially Christianity to Islam) is widely accepted to allow young people to marry, Christianity is publicly displayed and participation in religious events is always popular, although most in the region seem to adhere to a more liberal manner of Christian behavior. Moreover, Christians dominate the region politically, and the 2005 elections suggest they might constitute a single political block. With this power and status, Minahasans and the GMIM church are sensitive to the damage massive communal violence could bring, and to mitigate this potential loss of power and prestige, the GMIM network has been a leader in promoting inter-religious dialogue and cooperation.

One of the most notable organizations at this level is the Network for the Work of Love (*Jaringan Kerja Kasih*, Jajak). It is, in effect, the youth arm of BKSAUA whose leadership also represents the five national religions. This group was created on February 14, 2001, by then-Governor A.J. Sondakh. Jajak has also been active in hosting conferences and dialogues between young activists, government officials, and other elites. In 2003, Jajak and *Ansor* (student association of *Nahdatul Ulama*) hosted a local conference on religion and conflict, along with invited guests such as the Governor of North Sulawesi, an official from the Embassy of the United Kingdom, and representatives of the Ministry of Natural Resources, local religious officials, academics and members of the provincial government. In 2004, Jajak and the GMIM Church sponsored a conference for young activists from academia, religion, politics, civil society
and journalism on violence, gender issues and conflict resolution. Participants brainstormed recommendations for action, such as improvements to legal and education systems, the promotion of education programs encouraging the just valuation of diversity, inter-community communication, and inter-religious dialogue (T. Pasiak, personal communication 8 August, 2005). A book was later published containing some of these papers and recommendations.

Ishmael of PMII, a critic of BKSAUA, voiced a similar criticism of *Jajak*, saying it is an elite organization whose members don’t have much influence. He said that *Jajak* and similar organizations spend too much time in meetings, “Meetings are resolved as merely meetings. What I mean, people just attend, get together, have a discussion and then release a statement about what they did. But work that is ‘real’ with the people directly at the grassroots level remains very much divided and exclusive. This would be the measurement of whether pluralism is truly rooted in Manado or North Sulawesi” (personal communication, 27 July 2005).

However, it is important to note that some of the recent “graduates” of *Jajak* have taken other influential positions in the community. Marhany Pua (b. 1963) served as Chairman of the Indonesian Christian Youth Movement (GAMKI) from 1985-2005, and Chairman of *Jajak* from 2002-2004. He is currently one representative of North Sulawesi to the *Dewan Perwakilan Daerah* (DPD or Regional Representative Council) and was running mate to former police brigadier general Wenny Warouw in the 2005 Gubernatorial elections. Former member Taufik Pasiak is the current Chair of Muhamadiyah in Manado and is working as a local physician.
Pemuda organizations, such as GAMKI, PMII and other religious and community organizations, whose membership generally consists of university graduated, single men and women aged 20-35, have been very active in the Post-Suharto period. Many of these organizations host regular discussions of violence and conflict prevention training sessions. Multiple day retreats are very popular in the province and are often organized by the Pemuda organizations for the youth group with the same church affiliation. These are officially religious education programs but have also become opportunities to discuss pressing social issues, including HIV/AIDS, violence and conflict, etc.

Mid-level leaders also include the local offices or local partners of international non-profit organizations. There have been a number of important trainings in Manado since the outbreak of violence. In 2000, the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, with grant money from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), hosted a training session on engaging civil society in peace-building. In 2001, CARDI (The Consortium for Assisting the Refugees and Displaced in Indonesia) hosted workshops for local youths and IDPs as an opportunity to confront the tensions and stereotypes of the two groups. Also in 2001, Internews, and Pelita Kasih Abadi (Peka Foundation), with USAID funds, hosted a six-day training for non-media professionals on the topic of peace journalism. In 2003 Jakarta-based LP3ES and Manado-based Publika NGO invited activists and government bureaucrats from Sulawesi, Maluku, and Papua to attend training on communal conflict management. Also in 2003, the Center for Research on Inter-Group Relations and Conflict Resolution (CERIC) of the University of Indonesia sponsored a training sessions
at the University of Sam Ratulangi in Manado on the “Role of the University in Conflict Management.”

Grassroots Leadership

Lederach characterized grassroots leaders as individuals who use existing networks to incorporate new programs and projects to encourage peace and conflict resolution. In contrast to middle-range leaders, those at the grassroots level concentrate on implementing programs, fostering reconciliation and offering training programs, rather than conducting public campaigns to influence public opinion or policy makers. By definition, grassroots leaders are involved in the daily activities of those people most affected by the conflict (p. 42-43).

In North Sulawesi, particularly in rural areas, but also in urban Manado, traditional methods of conflict management and conflict resolution continue to be utilized at the neighborhood level. This includes families solving disagreements through private meetings, or if at a wider level, *musyawarah*, or consensus through negotiation and discussion. There are also community-building methods of conflict prevention, such as *mapalus* (mutual help). Similar to the Indonesian *gotong royong* where the community works together to finish a project, *mapalus* is often used in the context of preparing for a wedding party, community festival or in the construction of a new home. However, these traditions are becoming more fragile as communities become more diverse.

As mentioned earlier, young people, in their roles as guards outside of religious services, have become representative of a diverse and tolerant North Sulawesi. The tradition of guarding mosques and churches came from Governor AJ Sondakh in 2000,
after the church bombings of 1999. However, most youths I spoke with were in agreement that they and their peers were not contributing all that they could to a peaceful North Sulawesi community. Ishmael of PMII said, “While youth groups have an understanding of pluralism or a peaceful life, it is a simple comprehension of the ideal. They live a peaceful life because [it is] something that happens… [But] the young people are not focused on [whether conflict exists]. We must admit that the role of youth is actually limited” (personal communication, 27 July 2005). He explained that although orang pemuda have very public roles in conflict prevention and represent inter-religious cooperation, this interaction does not carry over into everyday life: “[although there appears] to be a pattern of working together…it very much depends on the moment or event. When there is an important holiday, we appear to be in harmony across faiths. But when it is over, there is almost no work done between the youth, almost none” (ibid).

Civic Engagement

Ishmael is not alone in his judgment that inter-religious cooperation is lacking among youth in the region. Not one of the leaders of youth organizations I interviewed was able to identify an event or program their organization had hosted in coordination with another youth group of a different religion or ethnicity. While many times their messages overlapped, such as protesting increased violence, their demonstrations responded to specific incidents affecting co-religionists: Christian groups at the university demonstrated against the murder of a priest in Central Sulawesi, and Muslims demonstrated against increased violence in Maluku. Even outside of issues specifically relating to religion or race, these groups do not successfully forge partnerships. For
example, both Christian and Muslim student organizations have been advocating separately on behalf of poor landowners and farmers (Ishmael, PMII personal communication, 27 July 2005).

Although there have been open meetings and dinners between Muslim and Christians at UNSRAT following outbreaks of violence, the success of inclusive social activities and informal meetings likewise remains low. Donal of GMKI argues that if he were to suggest a social event, he believes invited members of Muslim student groups would not attend. “If we hold [a dinner or meeting] we are only throwing away money” (Donal, personal communication, 29 June 2005). Moreover, many of the local special interest clubs or sports teams, (rumored to exist, but difficult to find) which would likely have more inclusive membership, have fluid membership rosters. While several young people claimed to belong to the university-based nature club, for instance, they hadn’t attended an event in months.

Outside of the university, social events seem to regularly include all community members. Christian weddings offer halal food and the popular Easter parades held in a number of cities include Muslim families and Islamic organizations marching down the street. The Islamic halal bi halal ceremony following Idul Fitri welcomes Christians, and public meetings often begin with both a Christian and Muslim prayer. In the worst-case scenario, the experience of university-aged residents of North Sulawesi represents a turning tide of the new generation. But more likely it reflects the tolerance an adult will already have developed – as a parent of a child in a diverse classroom, the cousin or friend of someone in an inter-ethnic or inter-religious marriage, or a homeowner in a diverse neighborhood. This differentiation highlights the need for projects and
opportunities directed at youth to enable inter-religious and inter-ethnic engagement and undercut the potential dangers of the “youth bulge” as explained by Urdal (see Chapter 1).

*Lederach and Varshney in the Context of North Sulawesi*

The theories of Varshney and Lederach provide valuable insight into the stabilizing forces acting upon inter-religious and inter-ethnic exchanges in North Sulawesi. Even so, these theories do not sufficiently explain the lack of violence because the systems and programs do not measure up to the standards the authors set. For instance, both associational and quotidian civic engagement exist, but much of the associational engagement – within business associations, professional organizations, reading clubs, film clubs, festival organization, trade unions, cadre-based political parties, etc. – exists mainly at high and mid-levels of leadership. Members of BKAUA, Jajak, and leaders of local political parties successfully cross religious and ethnic divides. On the other hand, similar organizations do not exist at the grassroots level, where religious groups are the most popular social organizations.

Quotidian civic engagement – or everyday forms of engagement, casual inter-cultural and inter-religious friendships, traditions of eating together, visiting homes, jointly participating in festivals and allowing children to play together – exists more often among adults (especially those with children), rather than among young adults with whom the potential for conflict and therefore the need for civic engagement is greater.

While Ishmael, Donal and other student leaders may argue that empty rhetoric and too many public appearances limit the success of elites at the grassroots level, their
own inability (or inattention) to create alliances between student organizations illustrates that additional training and incentives for such empowerment are also necessary. Furthermore, more media coverage or networking opportunities might be valuable to leaders at the grassroots level to share information about current and planned projects.

The lack of major communal violence in North Sulawesi should be seen, in part, as a result of the programs and institutions mentioned above. However, in processing the fieldwork and analysis of the theories of Indonesian violence several other factors have emerged as influential directing the social and political forces of the region and affecting the likelihood of communal violence. These factors cannot fit neatly into the Lederach’s framework or Varshney’s theory. These additional factors are discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 4

Toleransi

One of the purposes of peace and conflict studies is to consider how the “good practices” of one community can be implemented elsewhere. The purpose of this research project was to discover the successful community and government programs that seem shadowed by the more popular understanding that North Sulawesi is peaceful because Minahasan culture is characteristically tolerant. However, emerging from this fieldwork is a difference between tolerance and the Indonesian term toleransi. The first suggests an acceptance of differences and the promotion of an environment in which diversity can exist. Minahasans maintain they are tolerant with examples of non-Christians enrolled in Christian schools or as patients at Christian hospitals and clinics. Toleransi however, refers more closely to “tolerate.” Muslims and non-Minahasans living in the Minahasa-majority districts are tolerated because they do not seek to assert political, social or economic power. In rural areas where Javanese immigrants in Minahasan districts have gone from working as pedang kaki lima to owners of stores with nice homes, they come to be seen as a threat to Minahasan entrepreneurship.

The commitment to toleransi, and to the pledge Torang Samua Basaudara, has increasingly met strict limits. Although the presence of IDPs in North Sulawesi was taken as evidence of charity towards co-religionists and tolerance towards non-Christians, their exit from North Sulawesi was encouraged soon after the initial outbreaks of violence had subsided. After Gorontalo split from North Sulawesi, some ethnic Gorontalese living in North Sulawesi faced backlash and calls they return to Gorontalo. In the aftermath of the
terrorist bombings in Jakarta, and Bali, the government quickly cracked down on non-residents arriving by plane or already present in the area, checking identification papers and travel plans. These incidents have been portrayed as security threats, but some residents have also translated these into causes to police their own neighborhoods.

The distinction between insider (or indigenous) and outsider is also becoming more pronounced and guarded. A village just outside Manado only allows Christian residents. Members of the Legium Christum militia stood outside some Manado mosques during the 2002 Idul Fitri celebrations. According to Jacobsen (2002), this was meant to intimidate the region’s Muslims, as well as those watching from outside North Sulawesi. Minahasans also make clear their support of Israel and the United States with the flags of these two counties often hung in public buses. Given that there are very few foreign visitors to the region, this statement seems meant for Indonesian Muslims, not American or Israeli allies.

While the absence of major communal violence would seem to present Manado and North Sulawesi as examples of successful peaceful cities, the ambiguous commitment to tolerance, not merely toleransi (as toleration), as well as the critical lapses in peacebuilding initiatives, suggests the real cause of stability and calm in the post-Suharto era was the lack of tensions in the region at levels critical enough to cause communal violence. Someone once remarked that if Minahasans can host parties, they would remain content and satisfied. Should the future stability of the province rely upon this standard of living, the potential for local conflict and violence will depend upon their continued social, economic and political dominance of the province. If this is to erode, the capacity to avoid communal violence will depend upon real respect for the
commitments of tolerance and innovative programs and policies forging inter-ethnic and inter-religious alliances at all community levels.
Bibliography


Jacobsen, M. (2002). “To be or what to be – that is the question’ On factionalism and secessionism in North Sulawesi province Indonesia.” Working Paper Series No 29. Southeast Asia Research Center. City University of Hong Kong.


Appendix A

Extended Interviews Conducted in Manado and Tomohon

**Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia (GMKI)**
The Student Christian Movement in Indonesia

Donal Moninja: early 20s. Born in and currently resides in Manado. He is a senior in the political science department at the Universitas Sam Ratulangi. Interview conducted on 29 June 2005.

Nelly Matoneng: mid-late 20s. Nelly is a student at UKIT from Sangir Talaud. She has lived in Tomohon for five years. Interview conducted on 1 July 2005.

Debby Souma: early 20s. Debby is a student at UKIT from Manado. She has now lived in Tomohon for 6 years. Interview conducted on 1 July 2005.

**Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (GMNI)**
The Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement

Ferol Warouw: late 20s. Ferol is Protestant, and currently unemployed activist. He is a resident of Manado and graduate of UNSRAT. Interview conducted on 4 July 2005.

Donny Rumagit: late 20s. Donny is also Protestant, a journalist, member of Pemuda GMIM, and the outgoing chair of the Executive Student Union UNSRAT (*ketua Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa Unsrat*). Interview conducted on 4 July 2005.

**Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI)**
Islamic Student Association

Muis Djamin Tharanoate: mid-20s. Muis has lived in Manado for six years. He is the chair of HMI and graduate of UNSRAT. Interview conducted on 5 July 2005.

**Pemuda GMIM**
The Minahasan Christian Evangelical Church Youth Group

Youla Anita Lanten: early 20s. Born in and currently resides in Tomohon. Student at UKIT. Interview conducted on 28 June, 2005

Vero Mawikere: mid 30s. Born in and currently resides in Tomohon. Vero is the leader of a youth group at her church. Currently she is a student in the master’s degree program at UKIT. Interview conducted on 27 June 2005.
Ferdinand Wowiling: early-mid 20s. Born in Tomohon and currently resides in Manado. He is currently employed at a local radio station, and is very involved in a local Christian community youth choir. Interview conducted on 5 July 2005.

*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII)*

*Indonesian Islamic Student Movement*

Ishmael: mid to late 20s. Ishmael has resided in Manado for six years and is a graduate of UNSRAT. Interview conducted on 27 July 2005.

**Nongovernmental Organizations**

Yus: mid 30s. Yus is an activist with Publika. He is Catholic and from Madura, and has been in North Sulawesi for 10 years, after first entering the Seminary at Pineleng. Interview conducted on 30 June 2005.

Ishmael: low 30s. Ishmael is an activist with Publika. He is a Bugis Muslim who was born in South Sulawesi. Interview conducted on 30 June 2005.

Vanda Lengkong: early 30s. Vanda is a project manager at Church World Service. She is a graduate of UKIT and former member of *Pemuda GMIM*. Interview conducted on 29 June 2005.

**Others**

Merry Pamikiran: mid 40s, a resident of Manado. Merry works as a pastor for the GMIM church. Currently she is a student in the master’s degree program at UKIT. Interview conducted on 27 June 2005.

Fendy Parengkuan: 50-60 yrs. Pak Fendy is a professor of history at UNSRAT. He was also chair of Persatuan Minahasa. Interview conducted on 2 August 2005.

Dr. Wilhem Roeroe: 50-60 yrs. Dr. Roeroe is the Graduate dean of UKIT. Interview conducted on 30 June 2005.

Rolly Porong: 40-50 yrs. Pak Rolly is a member of the provincial legislature from the district of South Minahasa. Interview conducted on 21 July 2004.

Taufik Pasiak: 35-40 yrs. Pak Taufik is a scholar and doctor who had been very involved in Jajak in the late 1990s and early 2000. He prepared the conference proceedings of the 2004 Jajak/GMIM conference. Interview conducted on 8 August 2005.
Appendix B

Lumimuut and Toar

Here are two versions of the creation story. While Graafland did try to standardize these, local versions remain.


The mother was very handsome. Her name was Lumimuut and she was descended from the gods. Her beauty was fascinating and eternal youth her portion. And her son, named Toar, who had become a young man, left her to explore the world. At their farewell she presented him with a staff of equal length to hers. And she entreated him not to marry any of his relatives and therefore never to propose to a woman who was in possession of a staff of the same length. After many years and long journeys the son returned. He met a beautiful woman, whom he desired to marry. In her he did not recognize his mother who had indeed remained eternally young, while she did not assume that this full-grown man was her son. Before entering into marriage, mindful of the wish of his mother when he had left her, the son laid his staff alongside that of his bride for comparison. Because of intensive use during his travels, however, his staff had been greatly worn down and was no longer of the same length. So there was nothing to prevent the marriage of the ancestors of the Minahasa people.


At any early age, Lumimuut left her parents and her place of birth. She went with a canoe and took with her a handful of earth, which she threw on the sea. Immediately a great land rose out of the sea. She went ashore and struck a great rock which split in two, and out of this split came Kareima, the priestess. After some days Kareima said to Lumimuut, “Turn your face to the south”. Kareima prayed to the deity of the southern wind to fertilize Lumimuut, but she received nothing. On the command of the priestess she then turned to the east, to the north, and then the west. Finally he deity of the west wind, the wind which brings rain and fertilizes the earth, gave Lumimuut procreative powers and she gave birth to a son named Toar. When Toar reached adolescence, Kareima cut two sticks of the same length, one from the tuis plant and one from the assa plant. The tuis stick she gave to Lumimuut and the assa stick to Toar. Then she ordered Lumimuut to go to the right and Toar to the left, and whenever they met anyone, they should measure the sticks. If they were of the same length, they would know that they were mother and son, but if they were different lengths they should immediately come to Kareims at the centre of the earth.
Both went their way and after a time they met without knowing that they were mother and son. When they measured their sticks, they found that Lumimuut’s stick was longer than Toar’s because the tuis stick has sprouted out and grown. Then they went to Kareima who measured the sticks and found that they were not mother and son, and therefore they should become man and wife. So Lumimuut and Toar became man and wife and they were fruitful, they had many children, twice nine, three times seven and once three. Lumumuut’s descendants increased rapidly and spread over the earth. When those descendants increased rapidly and spread over the earth.

When these children had multiplied several times, she called them together for a meeting at Batu Pinawetengan. Lumumuut divided Minahasa in 4 pieces, she gave one fourth to the northwest to the Tombuluh, one fourth in the northeast to the Tonsea, one fourth in the southeast to Totuma-atas and one fourth in the southwest to Tontemboan.