PARTIES, PROCESS, AND NURANI HATI: HOW THE INDONESIAN PRESS
CONSTRUCTED THE 2004 ELECTIONS

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In 2004 Indonesia celebrated its sixth year as a democracy with the first direct
election of the president. This thesis is a study of Kompas newspaper its framing of the
presidential elections. The framing analysis is guided by Kerbel et al.’s (2000) candidate,
issue, process and audience frames. The research methods are content and textual
analyses of the election coverage articles during each campaign period. This thesis
surfaces four frames: political associations, predators and prey, organizational process,
and constituent perspectives. Kompas framed candidate and issue discussion through
political parties, coalitions and personal associations. Personality contests were framed
in a predator-prey characterization that admires the prey candidate as a victim. The
elections were not just framed as the contest, but also as the organizational process of
KPU. Finally, Kompas parted from these elite frames to reflect the perspectives of
constituents and the qualifications they set for voting nurani hati (with a pure heart).

Approved:

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Preface

On September 20, 2004, I stood in a polling station by the side of a highway in Makassar, Indonesia, and watched as an elderly gentleman signed in, received his ballot, took a moment behind a booth, and then placed his punched ballot in a steel ballot box. That vote became one of millions that would select the next Indonesian president. Although it has been co-opted by authoritarian governments, used for propaganda justifying conflict, and captured within the fuzzy lingo of development policies, democracy remains the truest form of governance: one person with one vote choosing their government on the basis of the future they envision and the debate among the ideas that will get them there. There are rare moments in our lives when we witness an event that embraces and exposes the ideals for which we struggle. In that autumn of 2004, as motorcycles zipped by and an elderly man chose his president, I witnessed democracy in its simplest, most intimate and most honest moment.

For six weeks that summer and fall, I worked with The Carter Center as a long-term election monitor for the second round of the presidential elections in Indonesia. The Carter Center, created by former President Jimmy Carter as a foundation to promote democracy, win peace and fight poverty around the world, has monitored more than 55 elections since 1990. President Jimmy Carter has led several election observation delegations and has personally witnessed election fraud. The Carter Center observed the first democratic election in Indonesia in 1999 and had been invited by the government to return for the first direct democratic presidential election in 2004.
International election observation researchers are rethinking the process of election observation in a more comprehensive manner that also captures the political and social setting that elections take place in. Traditionally, international observers step off the plane a few days before the election and then leave a few days after the election. This has several advantages, including objectivity and a standard structure. The European Union observes that elections are not one-day events. Rather, they are processes that must be observed over the course of each stage (Bjornlund, 2004). Recently, international election monitoring groups such as the National Democratic Institute, the Carter Center and the European Union have stressed the practice long-term election monitoring. Long-term election observers stay and travel in a region over an extended period of time, and thus gain better understanding and knowledge of the political environment and election process (Bjornlund, 2004). It was as a long-term election observer that I experienced the presidential elections. What happened in my experience was more than gaining comprehensive knowledge of the process, but journeying with people through the process of making the elections: organizing logistics, settling disputes, campaigning, reporting the candidates. It is the difference between reading a report and reading the novel. A report details events and processes. In a novel, you journey with the characters, understand each of their stories and how those stories interact. In the story of an election, democracy is the protagonist and in the case of Indonesia, democracy is a hero.

My summer in Indonesia began with ten weeks of language study at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, the cultural capital of Indonesia and the hometown of Amien
Rais, one of the presidential candidates. The program was immersive and so I lived with an Indonesian family where both spouses were mathematics professors at local universities. Every morning my host father would joke with me about reading *Kompas*, an Indonesian language newspaper, until I finally did. I was particularly impressed by the amount and quality of coverage about the candidates, but also about the election process and preparations. These morning musings in a language I barely understood sparked a growth in my election vocabulary and my interest in the election coverage topic as a subject for this thesis.

I suspected that part of the success of the election was related the commitment of newspapers like *Kompas* to democracy: to promoting free elections, sparking debate, checking the candidates, and educating the public. The extent *Kompas* demonstrates this commitment reflects on where Indonesia is in its democratic transition.
Introduction

This thesis strives to take a snapshot of Indonesia and describe where the Indonesian press is now as it transitions towards democracy. The first direct democratic election provides an ideal opportunity to take this picture. Elections are one of the few times where political communication and public participation can be concretely observed. Furthermore, the elections provide a means for measuring where the political system is in the democratic transition.

The wave of democratization during the 1980s and 1990s gave birth to between 76 and 117 democracies in the world, depending on how democracy is defined (Diamond, 1999). The eruption of new democracies was followed by the aftershock of defining democracy. Collier and Levitsky (1997) reviewed 150 studies on democracy and identified more than 550 subtypes of democracy. These definitions are led by electoral democracy and liberal democracy.

In an electoral democracy the executive and legislative seats are filled as a consequence of multiparty elections with universal suffrage occurring at regular intervals (Przeworski et al., 1996; Diamond et al., 1990). Electoral democracy assumes minimum levels of civil liberties (speech, press, organization and assembly) required for multiparty contestation (Diamond, 1999). Liberal democracy consists of the notion of freedom in the negative sense, freedom from government interference (Forst, 2001). Liberal democracy requires institutional support for that freedom: horizontal constraints on executive power, a military subordinate to the elected executive, freedom of expression, uncertain electoral outcomes, freedom to form parties, freedom of the press and
alternative press sources, multiple channels for citizen representation, political equality of citizens under the law, an indiscriminate judiciary system, and other modes of protection and opportunities for civil freedom (Diamond, 1999).

The question of democracy is tricky when nations do not meet all the standards set by the liberal model. Democracy may vary significantly within a country, for example the states of Karnataka, Kerala, Gujarat and West Bengal are far more democratic than most other states in India (Diamond, 1999). A nation classified as democratic, such as Russia, represses Chechnyan minority populations through violent means and violates civilian liberties as an assertion of sovereignty. Pseudo democracies have formal democratic institutions and tolerate opposition parties, disguising authoritarian domination (Diamond, 1999). Similarly, semi democracies (Diamond, 1999) or one-party democracies (Emmerson, 1995) have democratic institutions and a multiparty system, but are dominated by one party, such as in Singapore, Malaysia, and Mexico before the 1990s.

Delegative democracies lack horizontal accountability between the executive and other branches (O’Donnell, 1994). The institutional vacuum provides greater opportunities for personally charismatic presidents like Alberto Fujimori of Peru to maintain their power. Illiberal democracies (Diamond, 1999), like Argentina under president Memem, are constitutional democracies and similar to delegative democracies, but with supporting institutions so weak that the state can impose systematic violence and political assassinations to maintain power.
This thesis will follow the definition of liberal democracy: regularly held multi-party contestation in which all adults have the right to vote or run for office. The integrity of elections is ensured through the protection and promotion of civil and political liberties such as: freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the freedom to form and join organizations (Diamond et al., 1990). Liberal democracy considers the importance of diverse media as channels for citizens to participate and as sources of various views and information (Diamond, 1999). Democratization is the process by which Indonesia reforms and strengthens its institutions and protects civil liberties in order to realize liberal democracy. The democratization of the Third World precipitates the discussion of the character of media in the process of democratization.

This thesis examines the Indonesia’s democratization through a case study analysis of the Indonesian print press. The review of literature will examine critiques of the application of “Western” theories of the press to Third World press systems and the inadequacy of these models to describe the press in transition. These critiques voice the need for in-depth analysis and description of systems from which new theories can be derived. I will than review existing literature about how media in some countries are making transitions and the nascent theory arising from these observations. I will tentatively place Indonesia within that journey by describing the history of media in Indonesia up until the end of the New Order, Soeharto’s 30-year authoritarian regime in Indonesia.

In order to understand the political and social setting in which the Indonesian press operate, I will provide a brief history of Indonesia and describe the political
landscape of Indonesia at the time of the elections. I will introduce the political candidates, new regulations, and the new entities, such as the KPU (General Election Commission), that were created for the elections.

The camera capturing the Indonesian press in the moment of elections is the daily newspaper *Kompas*. *Kompas* is the largest circulating daily newspaper, surviving the New Order, the transition, and the period known as *reformasi* (reformation). This research will analyze the content of *Kompas* articles covering the elections during the course of the campaign period before the first election and the three weeks before the second round of elections. This thesis asks questions about how candidates, issues, the democratic process, and constitute were discussed in *Kompas* in order to explore the larger question: where is the Indonesian press now?
Asian Values and Pancasila Democracy: the Historical Dependence of Media Theory on Ideology

When I raise the topic of media in Indonesia over coffee with an Indonesian journalist, the discussion tends to boil down to one of two topics: the freedom of the press in Indonesia, and the pressure for development journalism during the New Order (and the traces of the ideology that continues). Likewise, most of the literature about the Indonesian press, written by Indonesians and non-Indonesians alike, is dominated by discussing normative and ideological press theory and, in the practical expression of enforcing that ideology, the freedom of the press. There is a gap in the research examining products of the Indonesian press, particularly political content, from a perspective absent of the development journalism and the Asian values discourse.

In this thesis, I intend to break away from the ideology underlying the press and normative theories of the role of the press. I also aim to make another break from previous literature on the press in Indonesia, a break from the New Order. While my introductory chapters will describe the history of the press and Kompas during the New Order regime and how the New Order maintained control of press content, my analysis will not reference the press in the New Order nor compare the content style to reporting style during the New Order. My question is not to explore how far Kompas has come since its New Order days, but to look at Kompas now, on the eve of the first direct elections in Indonesia.

In this first chapter I will begin with a discussion of non-Western theories of the press that move away from ideological mandates and introduce a complex of economic
and political pressures that influence press systems in transitioning political, social and
economic settings. I then review the normative theories and ideological discussions that
have dominated past research on media in Indonesia, specifically the Asian development
press theory, which have guided the analysis of the Indonesian press during Soeharto’s
New Order Regime. I argue that these normative theories limit how we can understand
the press today and the need for an approach unfettered by normative theories. I also
recognize that the New Order ideology imposed upon Indonesian media contributed to
the framing of media content. Recognizing the influence of the New Order ideology and
the impact of current political, economic, and social realities, I will outline the
approaches to analyzing news frames that will guide my examination of Kompas.

Press Models In Transitioning Democracies

With the fall of communism and authoritarian rule around the world more
countries than ever are transitioning towards democracy. Countries are not following a
set pattern but mapping their own courses. Thus far, there is no theoretical perspective to
explain how liberal, democratic institutions, come into being (Hallin, 2000). Media in
democratic transitions have never fit under a theoretical umbrella; a gap that media
theorists are now trying to fill. Rozumilowicz (2002) proposes an outline of the political
stages for media as a state democratizes: pre-transition, primary transition, secondary
stage, and the mature stage.

The pre-transition stage recognizes that the fall of communism and authoritarian
regimes did not just ‘happen’ but were collapses after years of undermining total state
authority (McNair, 2000; Sen, 2002, Rozumilowicz, 2000). Media in many countries
began opening up before the marked transition (Sparks, 2000; Sen 2002). The liberal perspective places the press in one of two roles: as the promoter of state propaganda and development plans, such as the Pancasila press (Romano, 1998) or as an underground opposition media (Menyang et al. 2002; Rozumilowicz, 2002).

The primary transition has structural influence on the press. This is the period in which policy structure is revised with new press laws and regulations (Rozumilowicz, 2000). During this time the government opens up the press to the private sector and offers incentives for the development of commercial enterprises. After the primary transition, the state is vulnerable. It may slip into authoritarian backlash where the government tries to regain control by tightening its grip on institutions and media again. However, after the formulation of new structures, the state may continue to fine tune its new policies and strengthen institutions in a second stage. The reformed government, having formulated new legislation, will try to implement the reforms and address the glitches as they become apparent (Rozumilowicz, 2000).

The mature stage of the political transition can still be threatened by an authoritarian backlash, even if weaknesses are addressed. Fine-tuning may continue for an extended period of time. Hopefully, the new system will emerge as a complete and coherent new media system. At this stage, the media system has only to continue consolidation as well as drawing a greater representation from all sectors of society (Rozumilowicz, 2000).

Although Rozumilowicz (2000) charts these two distinct paths, backlash and further reform, we cannot rule out the mess arising by combining the two. Some new
laws may be implemented, but we may also see ownership of commercial media by the political elite. We see in Russia the rise of elite media barons, whose ownership of media allows them to influence politics: “Media ownership translates economic power into political and cultural power” (McNair, 2000, p. 88). Similarly, in some countries there is no clear separation between the politically powerful and the economically powerful, for example in Mexico and Italy. Newspapers are owned by wealthy individuals who use the papers to increase their power by colluding with politicians (Hallin, 2000).

Rozumilowicz framework is a general outline for the political changes that take place during the transition from authoritarianism, however the framework is limited and does not elucidate the role of economic and social changes. The collapse of the New Order’s regime was inevitable. Indonesia’s middle class was expanding, growing richer and smarter, their children studying overseas and returning with new hopes. The collapse was accelerated for economic reasons, sparked by the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis (Sen, 2000). Indonesian media were not isolated from these changes. Furthermore, the Indonesian experience does not mirror the political stages and their effect on media that Rozumilowicz proposes. The government allowed foreign investment in media during the pre-transition stage (Sen & Hill, 2000), whereas in Rozumilowicz’s (2002) model foreign investment is not encouraged until the second stage of transition. Although fitting the description of the primary transition phase, Indonesia already provided trainings, awards and seminars for journalists, elements in the secondary and mature stages (Sen & Hill, 2000). However, the state still has a criminal
libel law that is not facing reform in the near future\textsuperscript{1}. Although Rozumilowicz’s outline of transition stages provides benchmarks, the approach is prescriptive. Other approaches offer a more fluid description of transitioning media systems.

\textit{Liberal and Critical Economy Perspectives}

Traditional media theory grounds media in the expression of political values. Likewise ideological in nature, media theory based upon political realities did not reflect reality, particularly outside the West. However, the polarity between a state-controlled press and a democratic deregulated press surfaces an important truth about media: “that there really is a difference between the ways in which the market shapes the media and the ways in which the state shapes the media” (Sparks, 2000, p. 37). Because of this distinction, Western media theory was a debate between the liberal, state controlled perspective, and the critical economic perspective that press institutions are controlled by the market and other economic considerations (McNair, 2000).

Sparks (2000) finds this duality troublesome because it defines the political and economic powers that shape the press as distinct and separate. The liberal and critical economic perspectives do not take into account societies where the political powers are interrelated with the economic power holders (Sparks, 2000). This is demonstrated in the history of the Indonesian press when through economic growth and expansion forced the transfer of political power over the press to economic power players, first in the state and later in the market. Second, the liberal and critical economy perspectives, like normative

\textsuperscript{1} The criminal libel law was reinforced in its use to convict prominent news magazine editor, Bambang Harymuti, suggesting that political elites to not intend to do away with it. At the time of writing this, no draft legislation eliminating the law has been submitted to the Indonesian parliament.
press theories, do not take into account social realities and media interaction as a social institution (Sparks, 2000).

Media theory needs analysis of the way that the press actually functions in real settings. Rather than assuming that the economic and political are exclusive, it is more relevant to examine where the economic and political intermingle and how that interrelationship evolves (Sparks, 2000; Hallin, 2000). Economic liberalization and political democratization together allowed for the opening of the media system in Mexico (Hallin, 2000). Similarly, in Indonesia political openness and the economic liberalization created opportunities for the media system to open up and diversify (Sen, 2002).

_Ideological Theories of the Press_

Ideology and discussion of what the press ought to do has dominated the discussion of the Indonesian press among academics, bureaucrats and journalists through the promotion of the _Pancasila_ press model, discussed in detail later (Romano, 1998). Ideological press theories assert that the press reflects the core values of a society, taking on “the form and coloration of the political structures within which it operates” (Siebert et al. 1956, 1). Despite the severe criticism of Schramm’s _Four Theories of the Press_, outlining democratic, authoritarian, social responsibility and totalitarian press systems, the theories continue to be adapted, rejected, reworked and complimented with non-Western political and social structures (Sparks, 2000). The Asian development press model is one of these additions to the community of normative press theories (Romano, 1998).
Asian Development Journalism

Asian development journalism (or Asian-value journalism) re-imagined the social responsibility theory to integrate Asian values (Wong, 2004; Shah & Gayatri, 1994). Romano (1998) parallels the evolution of development journalism with development communication “similar although not identical” (p. 63) having evolved from a positivist perspective to a liberation approach. The conception of Asian development journalism began in the Philippines amid journalists and media theorists excited to apply journalistic skills to development issues, so that through clear and simple language, the poor and uneducated could understand complex development processes (Romano, 1998). Asian development journalism rejects the individualistic bias and negative character of Western style journalism. Development journalism encourages the advancement of “positive stories” that fuel the development process rather than undermine through hyper-negative and sensationalistic stories (Idid & Pawanteh, 1989). Negative reporting is also encouraged, but measured and constructed towards development needs (Romano, 1998; Pudjomartono, 1998).

Partnership between media and government for the economic development of the country became the predominant expression of Asian development journalism in Southeast Asia (Wong, 2004). Proponents maintained that the partnership does not threaten press freedom or democracy, so long as political elections are held regularly and democratically, determining who runs the government. Regular, fair elections legitimize Asian development journalism (Wong, 2004). Western-style journalism is viewed as adversarial and exercising too much freedom, challenging the state and potentially
compromising public safety and internal security by arousing ethnic hostilities (Romano, 1998). During Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, this government-media partnership along with Asian and Islamic values was expressed through the Pancasila press model.

**The Pancasila Press Model**

The *Pancasila* press model grounds the principles of the press in the *Pancasila*, the five-point national ideology that unites Indonesians: belief in one God, nationalism as the expression of the unity of Indonesia, just and civilized humanitarianism, popular sovereignty through consultative democracy, and social justice for all Indonesian people. Furthermore, it draws on Asian values such as respect for leaders, maintaining social harmony, and the Islamic values of speaking of all people in “mild manner and kindly way” (Hasnain, 1988, p. 185). The *Pancasila* press was consciously developed as a normative model for Indonesian journalists, rejecting communist and libertarian models (because they do not adopt the first tenet of the supremacy of God) (Wonohito, 1977). The Indonesian Press Council’s 1974 *Guidelines for the Creation of an Ideal Press* prescribes the “all-embracing we-*kita*”\(^2\) perspective in reporting, cooperating with community and government (Romano, 1998; Dewan Pers 1974).

The press was to be inspired by the “family-state” principle, namely that the state was “at one with its entire people, transcending all groups in all walks of life” (Besar, 2003, 43). This unity of the state and its people rejects the idea of individual dissent or

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\(^2\) In Indonesian there are two pronouns for “we”: *kami*, meaning ‘myself and others’, but not the person being addressed, and *kita*, including both the speaker and the person being addressed as one group. Wonohito (1977) explains in his guidelines for *Pancasila* journalists that Western style press models focus on *aku* (I), while the Soviet-communist style focuses on the *kami* term for we, in which the state is not included.
representation and even the voice of the majority. Rather, leaders, like fathers, represent the will of the entire nation as a united whole (Besar, 2003; Wonohito, 1977). The President is not just the leader of the nation, but is “the Father of all citizens” (Wonohito, 1977, p. 85). Thus, to maintain this unity, the *Pancasila* press is a partner of the government, particularly of the President as father of the nation, to gain national consensus for the development of the nation and maintain unity.

As Asian Development Journalism theory developed, it also began to split. A liberation interpretation adopted a more emancipatory approach that rejected the state as supreme and development journalism as an instrument of advocacy and tool for participation in a democracy (Romano, 1998; Hedebro 1982). Organizations like the Inter-Press Service, a cooperative of foreign press correspondents committed the mission “to cover news from the "Third World", give a voice to the voiceless, promote information on development issues, and help create a better balance and flow of international news” (Inter-Press Service, 2006), realize this emancipatory form of development journalism. While the Indonesian government continued to sing the praises of development journalism, it was only the government-press partnership of the *Pancasila* press that they championed. Development journalists adopting an emancipatory approach found themselves unwelcome. The Inter-Press Service Indonesia office was shut down and banned because it was viewed as communist (Romano, 1998).

Advocates for the *Pancasila* press, such as Jakob Oetama, the owner-editor of *Kompas* newspaper (the newspaper under study in this thesis), also promoted a watchdog role for the *Pancasila* press. The press was to be “free and responsible” in promoting
programs, but not free from government control. In a state where the government exerts control over all political institutions, even the press must acquiesce (Romano, 1998).

Pancasila press freedom did not mean freedom from the government, but the freedom to assist in the development and unity of the nation. This control became evident in the framing of news stories in the Indonesian press. Kompas mastered the Pancasila style of reporting and became the model for the press.

The “free and responsible press” in the Pancasila press model was limited to reporting the guidelines dictated by the Ministry of Information, which are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. In a democracy press freedom means not only the absence of government restraints and restrictions on the media, but also establishing the conditions for the dissemination of a diversity of ideas and opinions (Weaver, 1977). From this pluralistic perspective, freedom of the press entails not only more freedom, but also more press, such as community radio and local newspaper publications. In Africa, this sort of pluralistic press freedom has not only encouraged the exchange of ideas among opposition position groups, but also has allowed identifiable groups to hold each other accountable, strengthening the structure and practice of democratic governance (Karikari, 2004).

In addition to binding the press to the government and limiting the expression of opposing ideas (i.e. ideas that are not inline with the government development program), the Pancasila press model suffers the shortcomings of all normative press theories. First of all, normative theories argue that media systems are grounded in traceable core values, such as Asian values, but that these values may not be the same ones expressed in society
Romano’s study (1998) of *Pancasila* journalists demonstrated an inconsistency between what they consider the most important journalistic values and those promoted by the *Pancasila* press ideologues.

Second, the assumption that media institutions are based on core social values precludes the possibility of any evolution of media institutions (Sparks, 2000). In this spirit, the *Pancasila* press, the partner of the government, does not account for the role that media, especially broadcast media, played in the downfall of the New Order and the political transition from the authoritarian New Order regime to the nascent democracy we see today. Third, normative press theories “abstract” media from real social relations. This is to say, that media remain uninfluenced by the society and the relations in the society in which they operate (Sparks, 2000). Romano’s study (1998) supports this shortcoming as well as journalists envisioned themselves not as partners of the government, but as partners of the people. As the New Order regime faced collapse, the Indonesian media demonstrated this interactive role with society through exposing the government (Romano, 1998; Sen, 2000).

Finally, the Asian development press models, including the *Pancasila* press, failed to include the role of economic players within and outside of the government in understanding how the press operates. The perspective from which the *Pancasila* press is understood is political and isolated from economic factors (understandably, since the state envisioned itself as the motor of economic development). In order to understand the evolution of the press since *reformasi*, we must understand the *Pancasila* press model
that held normative dominance during the New Order. As Indonesia reforms politically and recovers strategically from the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the political and economic playing fields have shifted, separating and intermingling, inevitably impacting media. As mentioned earlier, the liberal and critical economy perspectives assist understanding media, but do not suffice in capturing new roles and forces emerging as the country democratizes.

Therefore, as Indonesian strengthens its democratic transition, new frames for understanding Indonesian media are needed. Liberal and critical economic perspectives have proven to reveal truths about the influence of politics and the market on media, but have also limited understanding the social influences on media and the influence that media have in advancing systematic change. Rozumilowicz (2002) uses comparative studies of media systems to demonstrate the need for a press theory for transitional democracies. A press theory for transitional democracies still has the taste of normativity. However, the comparative political communication approach offers the flexibility to understand the Indonesian media without unnecessary normative constraints.

*Comparative Political Communication*

Curran and Park (2000) propose a comparative approach that examines non-Western media through individual case studies guided by political and economic categories: authoritarianism and democracy, and regulated and neo liberal, respectively. There is little disagreement that political and economic forces shape media systems in complex and singular ways. However, the way in which political and economic forces intermingle, dominate or exclude each other is specific to each country (Sparks, 2000).
Esser and Pfetsch (2004) posit a comparative political communication approach that analyzes cross-nationally, arguing that the findings from one country can be generalized to another. The generalization of findings cross-nationally assumes underlying commonalities about general aspects of the media systems that are being compared. Ferree et al. (2002) demonstrate differences in the nature of the public sphere between Germany and the United States: “In Germany, political parties and stable actors dominate the stage; in the United States, the political parties are mostly backstage, and advocacy organizations are major players” (p.8). These differences affect the public discourse of abortion, the policy issue of their investigation.

Mickiewicz (2005) also takes a comparative approach in studying Russian television, but abstains from comparing the Russian media with other, particularly Western, media systems because “the toolbox Russians use to make sense of their news is adapted to particular conditions” (p.356). The approach avoids generalizations and surfaces meaningful nuances in the Russian media system. This thesis follows the logic of comparative political communication used by Mickiewicz, that the people and political environment of Indonesia are significantly different from that of the West, thus meriting concentrated attention on the Indonesian media during democratization. Not only is Indonesia different politically and culturally from Western nations, Indonesia has more cultures, religions, and languages than any other Southeast Asian country. The diversity of this nation is spread over more than 14,000 islands that spans an area almost the width of the United States. Indonesia’s media during the fall of the New Order demonstrated that they do not strictly adhere to any normative theory: neither the Pancasila press
model, Asian development journalism, nor Rozumilowicz’s transition model explains the role of the media toward the end of the New Order and reformasi period.

**Framing Analysis**

Framing is a formidable power in the democratic process; a power that is dominated by political elites (Zaller, 1992). The public sphere is often imagined as an open square or a playing field on which players assume the ubiquitous influence of mass media. Ferree et al. (2002) contend that “the field in which framing contests occur is full of hill and valleys, sinkholes, promontories, and impenetrable jungles” (p.12) giving the players on it advantages and disadvantages. Politicians will compete with each other and journalists over control of the framing of an issue or event (Entman, 1989; Riker 1986). Through framing we can see the traces of that power. Frames can be examined at different levels, revealing balance at one level and power at another (Entman, 1993). Framing analysis captures the different players and their level of influence over how people think about the elections, the candidates and the issues. This thesis will identify the media frames as independent variables, surfacing the frames that were used in Kompas to make sense of the election for its audiences.

Framing theory is argued to be the daughter of agenda-setting theory. McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) study on Chapel Hill voters and the agenda of issues presented to them laid the groundwork for agenda setting theory. There are two levels of agenda setting: the object level, typically a public issue, is the presentation of what to think about; the attribute level is the presentation of the characteristics or attributes of that object, how to think about it. Attributes can be presented such that the particular
presentation of an attribute can dominate the way the public thinks about an object (McCombs, 2005). This is where agenda setting and framing converge. Ghanem (1996) integrates agenda setting and framing by asserting that certain object attributes alone are compelling arguments for their salience. These compelling arguments are frames, dominating and organizing the structure of the picture.

Entman (1993) reviews the “fractured” conceptualization of framing theory and calls for the development of a more consistent conceptualization. Scheufele (1999) responds to Entman with a typology that categorizes framing research into individual and media frames, framing as independent and dependent variables. Audiences use media discourse, personal experience and popular wisdom as resources used by viewers to process media frames (Gamson et al., 1992). Media frames are schemes for both presenting and comprehending the news (Scheufele, 1999). Media frames provide meaning through the selection and salience of specific object attributes (Entman, 1993):

To frame is select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (p. 52, original emphasis).

Kiousis (2004) presents attention, prominence and valence as three dimensions that give an issue salience.
Scheufele breaks down framing studies into the analysis of frames as independent and dependent variables (1999). The study of media frames as dependent variables examines factors such as individual or ideological variables (Tuchman, 1978), organizational variables (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), and methods of news sourcing (Gans, 1979), as influential in constructing frames (Scheufele, 1999). The study of media frames as independent variables look at the effects of frames, predominantly on how frames influence audience perceptions towards a particular event (Scheufele, 1999).

Entman (1993) surfaces five attributes of a story line about the downing of an Iranian and a Korean airplane that create a certain frame: judgments of importance, agency, identification with the victims, labeling of incidents, and generalizations about the incidents to the national context. Iyengar (1991) uses a content analysis of TV newscasts by major networks to demonstrate the framing of newscasts in episodic or thematic terms. Benson (2004) argues for the study of media as an independent variable, examining differences between news organizations, but without searching for explanations to explain why media organizations frame stories the way they do.

This thesis examines media frames employed by Kompas to make sense of the elections for Indonesian voters. During the New Order regime a development and Pancasila frame dominated the Indonesian news in much the same way that the “Cold War frame” dominated the U.S. news during the 1980s (Shah & Gayatri, 1994). Thus far, no research has examined news framing and media products after the New Order. Furthermore, there is no research examining the framing outside of the Pancasila democracy frame. This thesis treats the media frames both as an independent variable.
As an independent variable, the analysis will surface the characteristics of the campaign and election process that were used to make sense of the Presidential elections for voters. The analysis of frames during a political transition cannot ignore Ferree et al.’s (2002) description of the mass media as a stadium with hills and valleys, where political elites and interest groups are competing for the influence of the media. Thus, this thesis also considers the social construction of media frames as a dependent variable in the framing analysis.

Because this thesis will focus on the framing of the first direct Presidential Elections, I will lay the groundwork for future analysis of political frames by understanding the framing in two areas common to analysis of election news: horse race and issues; and two areas covered less frequently in framing analysis: the democratic process and the perspectives of constituents (including experts and civil society groups). Thus, I hope to provide a baseline for framing for future studies on the Indonesian press and push understanding further into areas of framing analysis that are more current. The approach and method for the framing analysis will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Four.

Summary

I argue that normative theories do not adequately describe any media system, even the Indonesian press, despite its ideological past. In order to place the Indonesian press, specifically the print press, we will step back for a moment and see where Indonesia has been politically and socially as a nation since independence, during the New Order, and as it brings about reform. I propose that analysis of media frames offers
salient to understanding the democratic process and the place of the Indonesian press within that process. The next section will give a brief historic overview of the press in Indonesia and set the stage for the 2004 elections.
Politics, Parties, Players and the 2004 Elections

History

Indonesia won independence on 17 August 1945, freeing itself from Dutch efforts to restore sovereignty in its former colony after the Japanese occupation during WWII. Indonesia is not the oldest democracy in the region, however its electoral history holds a kernel of the electoral culture that Indonesians are striving for. Indonesia held its first election in 1955. More than 90 percent of the voters selected Sukarno as their president. Benedict Anderson (1996) considered the election “the most open and participatory election held anywhere in Southeast Asia since World War II” (p.29).

In 1965 General Soeharto installed himself as President after thwarting a suspiciously staged military coup. He established the New Order, intended at exterminating all traces of the communist party and the nationalism under Sukarno. Soeharto sought to unify Indonesia under the principles of the Pancasila and through the arm of the military. With a dwifungsi (two-function) mandate the military occupied both political posts. Ali Moertopo, Soeharto’s closest political advisor and later the head of the Ministry of Information, reorganized the political party system, down-sizing it from nine parties to Golkar and two parties: PDI (Indonesian Democracy Party) and PPP (United Development Party). During his 30 years of authoritarian rule Soeharto continued to hold elections. He simply ensured that the People’s Consultative Assembly would elect him each time.

After 32 years as Indonesia’s second president, on May 21, 1998 President Soeharto resigned from office seventy-two days after the People’s Consultative Assembly
(MPR) unanimously voted him into office again. The undercurrent for change within Indonesia had finally surfaced as the country faced rioting unlike any it had ever seen before (Forrester & May, 1999). The Asian economic crisis was the catalyst for the collapse of the Indonesian economy, which had begun to expand into world markets, straining the seams of the political control the state held over the economy. However, long before the riots, the student demonstrations and the crumbling of the region’s economy, Indonesians were demanding more “participation, political transparency and accountability” (Anwar, 1999, p.33). The fall of Soeharto opened the doors for reform across all sectors.

In the period of reformasi, two major reforms transformed the structure of government in Indonesia: decentralization and election reform. Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 devolved political and fiscal power from the central government to the district governments. The decentralization laws gave new powers to local officials and prompted the need for new election laws. The election reform law was in the process of development at the time of the 1999 elections and thus not passed an implemented until 2003. For an overview of the structure of the Indonesia government see Appendix A.

On June 7 1999, Indonesia held its first general election in which voters chose a political party, whose central board selected candidates. The voter turnout was more than 90 percent with 112 million people voting. It was hoped that a democratic election would be the first solid step towards stabilizing the country and rising from the rubble of the economic crisis (Weatherbee, 2002). In the years that followed the central government initiated a sweeping plan for decentralizing administrative powers to the regions.
Included in these reforms was a new electoral law in which the citizens of Indonesia would directly elect their President and Vice President.

The 2004 Presidential Elections

On September 20, 2004, the Indonesian people directly elected their president in an election that was free, fair and democratic for the first time in history. All three rounds of elections held in 2004 were peaceful and with minimal incidents. Elections in other countries in Southeast Asia are regularly spattered by violence in connection with the elections. For example, earlier in 2004 the Philippines re-elected the incumbent President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who arose to the Presidency after the ousting of President Estrada for corruption. The Philippines is the oldest democracy in Southeast Asia and has a large and active civil society sector that is considered a model for other countries. Nonetheless, more than 160 deaths and election-related violence rattled the national and regional elections in the Philippines.

Indonesia’s elections were comparatively calm. There were two bombings during the course of the campaign and election period. The first bomb exploded in a toilet in the central KPU offices following the first round of presidential elections. The small bomb was widely perceived as the response of a disgruntled candidate or supporter for their loss in the first round. The police and Indonesian public expressed general dissatisfaction and that the bomb was a step back towards New Order mentality. The second bomb was much larger and detonated outside the Australian embassy a few weeks before the second election. This bomb was not viewed as an attack related directly to the elections, but rather an attack against the international community. Australia’s role in supporting the
East Timorese movement for independence from Indonesia was not welcomed by Indonesian nationalists. The press and the public decried the bombing with the same mournfulness that they did the Bali bombing. The national sentiment against terrorism was renewed – never again another Bali bombing. There was a consistent media campaign throughout Indonesia, mostly in the form of banners calling for a peaceful and fair election.³

Three national elections were held in 2004: direct election of the legislative bodies at the national and regional level in April and two rounds of presidential elections in July and September. This study focuses on the two rounds of presidential elections.

Five president-vice president candidate pairs ran against one another in the 2004 election. The electoral candidates must be nominated as a pair by a party or party coalition. It is not required that both candidates belong to the same party, so long as the nominating party supports both candidates. In order to gain a place on the ballot, the candidate pair’s party must occupy at least 15% of the seats in the People’s Representative Council (equivalent of the House of Representatives) or 20% of the national vote for members in the People’s Representative Council (R.I. Law 23/2003). The five candidate pairs are ordered according to the strength of their representation in the People’s Representative Council. The candidate pairs were as follows⁴:

1. Golkar Party - General Wiranto and Sulahuddin Wahid

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³ This paragraph is based upon my experience, observations, and conversations in Jakarta and Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan during the periods following the bombings.

⁴ From this point forward I will use the names by which the candidates are popularly known as in the media: Megawati, Wiranto, Rais, SBY and Haz.
2. Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) – President Megawati Sukarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi

3. National Religious Party (PAN) – Amein Rais and Siswono Yudohusodo

4. Democrat Party – General Susilo Bambang SBY (popularly known as SBY) and Jusuf Kalla

5. United Development Party (PPP) - Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar

Public officials, whether elected or civil service, were prohibited from campaigning for candidates. Regulations stipulate equal opportunity for all the candidates for media campaigns such that television networks and print publications were not allowed to accept the advertisements of one candidate and refuse that of another. Candidates used the traditional means of campaigning such as posters, banners, mailings and rallies, as well as capitalizing on the new television networks to target their audiences. All of the candidates had at least one television advertisement, the front-runners, Megawati, Wiranto, and SBY each had more than one television advertisement.

Four days before the election, two nights of debates were televised on all stations. In the first debate Megawati faced of Rais. In the second debate SBY, Wiranto and Haz challenged each other.

The first round of elections was held on July 5, 2004. In the event that no candidate pair wins more than fifty percent of the vote, the two frontrunners face each other off in a second round held in September. SBY’s popular appeal won him 34% of the vote, Megawati squeezed into second place with 26% to push Wiranto, 22%, out of the running. Wiranto contested the results before the Supreme Court, but was unable to
produce any evidence of fraud and the case was dismissed. In the week that followed, a bomb exploded in the headquarters of the KPU in Jakarta.

The run-off election was held on September 20, 2004. There is no legal campaign period preceding the second round of elections. Instead, three days are given for the candidates to present their vision, mission and program to the electoral commission and to the public. During these three days SBY challenged Megawati to another debate, which she declined.

General Election Commission (KPU)

The General Election Commission (KPU – Komisi Pemilihan Umum) is responsible for establishing the rules for campaigning, logistics and counting. They set the date for Election Day, designating it as a national holiday to encourage everyone to vote. They investigate the eligibility of each candidate and monitor the campaign fund contributions. KPU must convey all information about their election activities to the public. They also are responsible for counting the votes and announcing the winner (R.I Law 23/2003).

KPU’s responsibilities are delineated at the national, provincial and district level. At the national level, the KPU is responsible for the duties listed above. It is responsible to the national government for completing the elections “on time” and submitting a report to the new President 30 days after the inauguration (R.I. Law 23/2003). The provincial level is responsible for coordinating the districts, but has no say in the organizational dynamics or the operating of the districts. This is in coordination with the
decentralization laws that delegate most governing powers to the lower district levels so that provinces do not harness so much political power that they might secede.

Most of the Election Day organization happens at the KPU district level. It is responsible for employing election officials, establishing polling stations and recapitulation centers, and coordinating security at the village, sub-district and district stations. KPU implements all the election procedures and conduct the counting at the sub-district and district level before passing the ballots to the province (R.I. Law 23/2003).

*Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates*

There were five presidential and vice presidential candidates. What follows is a short political background of all five presidential candidates and the vice presidential candidates of Megawati and SBY, who continued to the second round of elections:

*Megawati Sukarnoputri – Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)*

Megawati Sukarnoputri is the daughter of Indonesia’s first president and national hero, Sukarno. Sukarno was overthrown in 1965 and placed under house arrest by General Soeharto, who then established himself as president. She entered politics in 1987 when she joined the National Democratic Party (PDI). She was popular among Sukarno supporters as well as among young people who saw her as a viable political opposition to the Soeharto regime. In 1987, Megawati and her politically hefty husband, Taufik Kiemas, were awarded seats in the House of Representatives (Profile: Megawati, 2004).
The Soeharto government banned the use of Sukarno’s image in the PDI’s election campaign in 1992. Megawati remained a popular icon of opposition, nonetheless, and thus boosted popular support for the PDI party. In 1996 the Soeharto government attempted a takeover of the party by supporting a faction within PDI. Megawati gained further support in 1997 when the Soeharto government prohibited her participation in the general election (Profile: Megawati, 2004).

In 1999, Megawati consolidated her power and renamed her party the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Although she won 34% of the vote, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected President by the People’s Consultative Assembly. Megawati was reluctant to accept the nomination for Vice President, which she won, beating out Hamzah Haz. Haz arose to the vice presidency when President Wahid was ousted for his gross incompetence and Megawati was named President (Profile: Megawati, 2004).

Overall, Megawati continues to hold the privilege of being the main opposition to the New Order despite her new allies with Golkar members during her presidency. Furthermore, Megawati continues to reign as the pluralist candidate. As a pluralist she represents the middle class and intellectuals, who, during the New Order, strived for a more democratic system, transparency and at the same time feared the ascendancy of a single ethnic or religious group. With her Vice Presidential candidate, Hasyim Muzadi, Megawati marries two political streams, pluralism and Islam. The Islamic political stream is more complex and somewhat problematic stream without distinct political thought, but representing a shared set of values and symbols distinguishing them from non-Islamic groups (Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003). During the New Order, Islamic intellectuals and
politicians were actively excluded from politics (Aspinall, 2005). Allying with Hasyim Muzadi represented an alliance with a broad base that had previously been excluded from politics.

Megawati’s incumbent Vice President, Hamzah Haz, pursued his own campaign for the Presidency in 2004. Because of the history with the PDI and the nomination of Wahid before her as the party’s presidential candidate in 1997, Megawati had a reputation for poor coalition building to recover from. Coalition building is crucial in traditional Indonesian politics. The PDI-P party wooed and won Hasyim Muzadi, the Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization. The hope was that Muzadi would be able to bring the 47 million NU members to the polls.

Muzadi was wooed by several parties. He was a Member of Parliament through much of the New Order. He is a moderate Muslim leader and prominent member of the National Awakening Party (PKB) party. Muzadi is appealing for many Indonesians because of his moderate Islamic stance on issues.

General Wiranto – Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)

General Wiranto was the Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya) Presidential candidate. He also wooed but failed to win Muzadi. This was a political loss that could have been easily overcome if it was not coupled with internal party division. General Wiranto was nominated by the party over the Golkar party president, Akbar Tanjung.

It would be hard to believe that with the largest political machine (or at least a good chunk of it) in Indonesia supporting your candidacy for the presidency that there
would be many real obstacles to winning. Yet, General Wiranto faced another
debilitating barrier to winning the hearts and minds of the Indonesian public. His image.

General Wiranto is an internationally accused war criminal for crimes committed
in East Timor. It was this image that the campaign ads of him as a fatherly leader could
not overcome. Furthermore, it was in one of his television ads that he made an image
blunder by showing him standing before a crowd at a military function with his
subordinates standing behind him. The subordinate general that could be most clearly
seen was General Susilo Bambang SBY, another Presidential candidate.

*Amien Rais - National Mandate Party*

Amien Rais was the candidate for the National Mandate Party (PAN). Rais’s
predominant image is that as the champion of Muslim rights during the New Order. He
was once the head of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organization in
Indonesia, composed mostly of small businessmen and urban Muslims. He helped
establish the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, which was led by
Soeharto’s successor BJ Habibie. Although the organization was approved by Soeharto
and led by Habibie, Rais left the organization and helped lead protests against the regime.
As the Speaker of the House in 2001, he led the movement to oust Wahid from the
presidency on charges of incompetence (Profile: Rais, 2001).

Rais formed the National Mandate Party with other academics and intellectuals
who had become disaffected with the Indonesian Socialist Party. As an academic turned
politician, his core support continued to be derived from Muhammadiyah and those
looking for a Muslim leadership (Profile: Rais, 1999; Aspinall, 2005).
Susilo Bambang SBY – Democrat Party

Susilo Bambang SBY, popularly known as SBY, is a retired general known for his thoughtful quiet approach. He resigned (some say removed) from his position as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs on Megawati’s cabinet following a dispute with Megawati and Taufik Kiemas, her husband. Following his resignation, he announced his candidacy for the presidency (Harvey, 2004).

In 2002, he became prominent for his vocal fight against terrorism following the Bali bombing. He delivered a speech on the anniversary of the bombing that is considered one of the strongest speeches ever delivered in Indonesia and remains politically sensitive (Harvey, 2004).

His military career and marriage to the daughter of Sarwo Edhie Wibowo have allowed him legitimacy with the military and brought him into a close circle of Soeharto ties. His military career has included a conflict with General Wiranto over the appointment as chief of the Armed Military Forces (TNI). Despite his military career, SBY was viewed as an intellectual and above the politics and abuse of the military. He is a secular nationalist who advocated for military reform and a Muslim by faith (Harvey, 2004).

His running mate, Jusuf Kalla, is high in the leadership of Golkar and was thus a strategic choice. Although on the Democrat Party ticket, Kalla continued to hold his position and membership in the Golkar party. Shortly before the second election round,

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5 Sarwo Edhie Wibowo was a general in the military during the Soeharto era. He was close to Soeharto and well known for his diligence in eradicating communists after 1965. Wibowo is considered part of the 1945 generation, the generation that fought for Indonesia’s independence (Sijabat, 2004).
Kalla was kicked out of Golkar for refusing to support the National Coalition’s support for Megawati.

Kalla’s family owns a conglomerate of businesses. However, because Kalla is from South Sulawesi and ethnically Bugis, he is considered to be separate from the elite Jakarta crowd. He was appointed Minister of Industry and Trade under President Wahid only to be dismissed six months later for alleged corruption. The ousting of President Wahid for corruption in 2001, restored the public image of Kalla and he was then believed to have refused to participate in corrupt activities as Minister of Industry and Trade.

Hamzah Haz - United Development Party

Hamzah Haz campaigned as the incumbent Vice President and the leader of the United Development Party (PPP), the third largest political party in Indonesia. His campaign was plagued by a statement he made before he became Vice President under Megawati and that he repeated during the 2004 election campaign period: Women are not fit to become the President of the world’s largest Muslim nation. He has lost twice to Megawati. First, he lost the vote for the position of Vice President under Wahid. When Wahid was impeached, he lost to Megawati again when the House voted her in as President.

Political Ideology Streams

It is important to bear in mind that presidential and vice-presidential pairs were not built necessarily on shared ideology, but on political maneuvering by each partner. The candidates represent different ideological streams, each too weak or with a history
too tainted to win the hearts of the Indonesian people. Hadiz and Bourchier (2003) describe the political thinking of Indonesia during and just after the New Order as four streams: organicism, pluralism, Islamism and radicalism. Imagine these not as categories, but streams where interests may be shared or flow into one another at times. They are also not exhaustive. Organicism refers to the official ideology of the New Order, in which the society operates organically as a ‘family’. There is hierarchy and order, which is maintained by the dual role (dwifungsi) of the military, integral to maintaining harmony in the family. Pluralism is rooted in the social democratic tradition and is an expression of the social and cultural diversity of Indonesia. This thinking supports a rule of law, but with political openness and transparency. Islam is the most indistinct stream of thought since there are several schools of political thought among Islamic thinkers. I will use Hadiz and Bourchier’s description (2003): that there is a stream of political thinking promoting Islamic values in politics and society. Fourth is Radicalism, supported by activists and the non-governmental organizations that advocated for political reformation and “a radical redistribution of economic and political power” (p. 10). As a political force, radicalism led to the major political change ending the New Order, but has not consolidated into a unified stream of thought.

Among the candidates, only radicalism is not represented. The presidential and vice-presidential elections were a dance in which the candidates had to demonstrate their cooperation with other schools of thought. As a pluralist, Megawati courted Hasyim, who represented Islam. Wiranto, from the organist camp, has a military background and needed balance also from the Islamic stream. Amien Rais represented Islam to the
public, as did his running mate. Strictly speaking though, much of his thought would fall into the pluralist camp as well.

In order to gain influence in the political machinery, political parties from different streams form coalitions with one another in order to build their voter base. In the past, candidates relied on the political machines built by these coalitions and deals made in the corridors of coalition meetings to ensure their election. For the 2004 election, the political machine did not fully anticipate the force of an old player with a louder voice: the Indonesian press.
History of the Press in Indonesia

In this chapter I will describe in greater depth the history of the print press in Indonesia, issues of freedom of the press, and sketch a picture of *Kompas* as the model newspaper during the New Order Regime. Finally, I will briefly set the scene for the press during the elections.

*Professional and Political Nurturing*

Indonesia’s press during Dutch colonialism struggled for air under oppressive Dutch press laws and regulations such as the 1931 Press Act. Dutch law restricted the printing of anything that might disturb “public order” or spread “hatred” (Hill, 1991, p.1). After the Dutch fled the Japanese in 1942, the Japanese Occupation created a new atmosphere for the press. The Japanese Occupation also censored publications, but also nurtured journalistic skills through professional training and encouraged the use of Indonesian both in the press and in the bureaucracy (Hill, 1991). After the war, the Dutch attempted to reclaim the East Indies. The revolutionaries against the Dutch colonial government gave birth to a politically motivated print press. The print press earned prestige as a tool of the revolution and after independence adopted the mission to spread nationalism throughout the islands. Press publications sprouted up and by 1949, four years after independence from the Dutch, there were 75 press publications with a combined circulation of 413,000 per issue (Hill, 1991).

Having witnessed the power of the press to unite the elite and the public, President Sukarno, Indonesia’s first President, encouraged the press’s political personality by requiring that all newspapers receive sponsorship from a political party.
Media outlets were required to register with the government and gain permits to operate (Sen, 2002). On October 1, 1965 following the installation of Soeharto, the New Order government directed the media to abandon the revolutionary self-image and embrace a new direction to develop the nation by promoting the government’s development plan and nationalism.

*Media during the New Order Regime*

The New Order required nationwide literacy in Bahasa Indonesia, the national language, giving the printed press the capability and advantage of setting the political agenda. This agenda setting power continues today as the print press employs more journalists actively engaged in investigating, newsgathering, reporting and disseminating than any other medium (Sen, 2002).

During the New Order media were costumed as guardians of the *Pancasila*, the five principles laid out in the 1945 Indonesian Constitution upon which the state’s ideology rests: nationalism as expressed as the unity of the nation, belief in one Supreme God, just and civilized humanitarianism, popular sovereignty arrived at through deliberation and representation or consultative democracy, and social justice for all Indonesian people. As guardians of the *Pancasila*, the press was to be free, but responsible, promoting the best interests of the state, building its identity, and glossing over disruptions that would threaten the unity of the nation (Sen & Hill, 2000). The government intensified the nationalist aims since the Sukarno days, emphasizing unifying the diverse Indonesian audience under the *Pancasila* over communicating messages. Towards this aim journalists were forbidden to cover SARA issues: ethnicity (Suku),
religion (Agama), race (Ras), and social class (Antargolongan). The Ministry also censored stories covering topics not included in SARA, such as the business interests of the Soeharto family, human rights abuses by the military, protests or any public unrest (Chen Low, 2003; Manzella, 2000; Sen & Hill, 2000).

Soeharto continued the permits and other media controls that existed under Sukarno. Until the collapse of the New Order regime, all publications were required to obtain a press permit, *Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers (SIUPP)*. The state owned Indonesia’s two television and radio networks, TVRI-1, TVRI-2 and RRI, respectively. Unlike broadcast media, which broadcast programs promoting the government agenda, print media was privately owned and dominated by the elite intelligentsia. The two political parties permitted during the New Order, Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) and the United Development Party (PPP) were unofficially allowed to support certain papers, whereas the state party Golkar maintained clear ownership of *Suara Karya*. The press was pressured to move away from political messages and broaden its audience base, uniting differences across the political spectrum (Sen & Hill, 2000).

**Ministry of Information and Press Freedom**

The Ministry of Information was the icon of ideological control under the New Order Regime. Soeharto empowered Ali Moertopo as the Minister of Information with the authority to close any newspapers that were seen as a threat to security and order, ordaining him the nation’s top press censor. 163 newspapers were banned in 1965 when the New Order came to power. In 1974 another 12 publications were banned and journalists arrested following the coverage of riots. In 1978 seven dailies and student
newspapers were banned for reporting riots in Jakarta. After a period of “openness” in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Ministry of Information clamped down on press freedom again with the closing of three major daily papers in 1994: *Detik*, *Tempo* and *Editor* (Menyang, 2002; Sen, 2002).

Aside from the constant threats of bans, other restraints were placed on Indonesian media. The 1966 Basic Press Law restricted ownership and capital of the press to Indonesians, banning any foreign services or ownership of the press. A 1969 ministerial decree required journalists to join the *Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia*, Indonesian Journalist Organization. The leadership, composed of former and serving military officials and Golkar functionaries, maintained tight relationships with the government and thus rarely advocated on behalf of journalists to the Ministry (Sen & Hill, 2000).

Similarly, the Ministry of Information authorized the establishment of the state newspaper association, *Serikat Penerbit Suratkabara*, which all newspaper publishers were required to join (Sen & Hill, 2000). During the era of press bans in the mid-1990s, press permits were only given to those who were tight with the Soeharto family (Sen & Hill, 2000). The Ministry of Information not only exercised political control over the press, but economic control as well. The Ministry regulated newsprint supply until 1980, when its power of economic control of the press waned in preference of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Sen, 2002).

The press resisted the control of the Ministry of Information in creative ways. Despite the mandated membership for PWI, only 60% of journalists were actually
registered members (Kitley, 2001). The ministerial closure of the three dailies, *Detik*, *Tempo* and *Editor*, sparked the establishment of the unofficial *Aliansi Jurnalis Independen* (AJI), the Alliance of Independent Journalists (Sen & Hill, 2000). *Tempo* harnessed a loophole in Indonesia’s press law that did not address new technologies and established *Tempo Interaktif*, an online daily newspaper (Kitley, 2001).

**Underground Press**

The Ministry of Information feverishly struggled to control the press as the Ministry’s economic influence waned in the finally years of Soeharto. Underground media began to flourish, increasingly bold in their criticism of the government and fueling public opposition. According to Menyang et al. (2002) this underground press was “a sort of social movement themselves” (p. 141). Underground press predominantly reported news of the opposition movement’s activities and run-ins with the authorities. Underground press operated without the required publishing permits and employed unlicensed journalists. Most underground press were localized print publications that were also available through the Internet. Local press had to exercise continuous self-censorship because they faced a greater likelihood of silently being closed down by local authorities than the Jakarta-based media, which receive more attention.

In the months leading up to the downfall of the Soeharto regime, underground and mainstream media experienced greater freedom. As President Soeharto and his Ministers focused on maintaining control of the country and their wealth, a power vacuum emerged as no one was trying to control the press (Menayang, 2002).
The economy developed and the New Order was not capable of maintaining the same regulations while fostering growth. While the Ministry of Information held press regulation as its primary concern, the Ministry of Trade and Industry considered media a domestic industry that should be deregulated. Thus, the economic control of media fell increasingly under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade and Industry while the Ministry of Information regulated ideology (Sen, 2002).

Political, ethnic and religious loyalties declined, influencing the commercialization of media and openness to the market (Hill, 1994). It was on the basis of market demands that the Ministry of Trade and Industry won a revocation of the 1966 Basic Press Law and foreign investors were allowed to enter. At first, foreign investment was allowed to permeate entertainment publications such as Kosmopolitan, the Indonesian translation of the women’s fashion magazine, Cosmopolitan. Regional papers began publishing English inserts. With the door then cracked, more foreign investors were able to enter (Sen, 2002).

Indonesian media were allowed to grow, in part through the economic planning of the New Order, but with the subsequent introduction of new voices through new technologies in people’s homes, the government and the Ministry of Information could only hold the reins on Indonesian media for so long. The friends and family of Soeharto owned these new technologies and resisted the restrictions imposed by the new Minister of Information (Sen, 2002). Despite the commercialization of media and the subsequent increase in entertainment programming, the public still demanded critical political news
(Menyang et al., 2002). New technology and new media inevitably brought new voices into people’s homes (Sen, 2002). It was not long before these unrestricted voices started to produce their own news. The press had to negotiate and promote this new freedom while appeasing the government in a way that was uniquely Indonesian, buttering up the government before criticizing it. In the weeks before the fall of Soeharto, Kompas became more liberal by directly quoting the opposition to the government and publishing articles about the riots (Manzella, 2000).

Political Collapse

In June 1997, Soeharto appointed a new Minister of Information, a military leader, in order to rein in the media. His position made him responsible to the head of the Indonesian military at the time, General Wiranto. In 1998, General Wiranto instructed the Minister of Information to shut down all private television stations that do not “bring into line” their coverage of the riots (Sen, 2002). During the weeks preceding Soeharto’s downfall, print media, and to a greater extent, broadcast media discovered that they had greater freedom than ever as the regime focused on more immediate threats to its power (Sen, 2002). Media continued to enjoy greater independence from the Ministry of Information after the collapse up until 1999 when elected President Wahid closed the Ministry of Information (Manzella, 2002).

To many outside observers the collapse of the New Order occurred suddenly, the result of economic calamity brought by the Asian Economic crisis and coupled with waves of mass protests. For the press and other players on the fence between government and society understood the mounting pressure placed on the New Order to hold together.
The collapse of the New Order resulted not only from the Asian economic crisis, but also from the internal contradictions of freeing the market and controlling the public sphere.

*Media Coverage of the 1999 Elections*

The 1999 elections were the first free and fair elections in more than 30 years. Media continued the path they had begun to pave in toppling Soeharto and ending authoritarian rule by taking up the role of socializing the public about the electoral and voting process. Media initiatives were instrumental in educating the public about the democratic process and the reforms taking place (Chen Low, 2003). Radio and television reached more Indonesians than the national newspapers and thus had a more significant impact on the educative process. Print media, on the other hand, maintained its influence among the educated and the elite, influencing both the political agenda and the agenda for other media (Chen Low, 2003).

At the same time, major media outlets were criticized for their coverage of the 1999 elections, demonstrating bias towards the incumbent President Habibie. Critics accused the press of focusing predominantly on personality and the horse race instead of the issues that Indonesia faced. Print media owned by the families of candidates also showed bias towards their respective candidate. Megawati’s father owned the newspaper *Rakyat Merdeka*, which did not hide their clear preference, covering the front page with large pictures of her (Chen Low, 2003). Megawati won the popular vote in the 1999 elections, but Abdurraham Wahid won the overall vote. Megawati won the vice presidency and was installed as President when Wahid was ousted for incompetence.
Post-Soeharto Mediascape

The mediascape opened up in the reformasi period after the fall of Soeharto. The Ministry of Information removed the requirement for press publications while issuing more than 1,200 new licenses (Kitley, 2002). In 1999 the Parliament passed a new Press Law ensuring the freedom of the press and President Abdurrahman Wahid dissolved the oppressive Ministry of Information. Journalists were free to form new professional associations and released from their obligation to belong to the state-approved journalist association Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (PWI). Nonetheless, they were obliged to belong to a professional journalist association and could face the suspension of their licenses (Sen & Hill, 2000).

Ownership also opened up after the collapse of the New Order, largely due to the economic pressure placed on the press during the Asian Economic Crisis. Habibie passed a decree that allowed for twenty-five percent foreign ownership of newspapers in Indonesia (Sen & Hill, 2000). The injection of foreign capital from the United States and European countries revived the struggling press.

Self-Censorship

The decades of development partnership with the state underlying journalistic values have provided an unsettling legacy of basis for self-censorship (Hardjono, 1998; Menayang et al., 2002; Chen Low, 2003). The Indonesian press continues to treat issues of ethnicity, religion, race, and social class, which were forbidden to discuss in the press during the Soeharto era, with great sensitivity (Chen Low, 2003). One Kompas editor

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6 Journalists were required to follow the SARA rule: ethnicity (Suku), religion (Agama), race (Ras), and social class (Antargolongan) were all taboo topics in the press.
describes the New Order rules of self-censorship simply: “Write whatever you like, but don’t criticize the president’s family or the military” (Manzella, 2000, p. 310). Menaying et al. (2002) describe self-censorship as journalists “had to uphold the principle of neutrality, they had to convey information from as many conflicting or involved parties as possible, and they had to criticize in a subtle manner, hoping the audience would understand what they are implying. It also meant that there was no need to be outspoken or explicit” (p. 130). This description of self-censorship echoes of the values promoted by Asian value journalism. Remnants of self-censorship from the Soeharto era are further reinforced by a growing number of incidents of violence and threats against the press by the police and prominent businessmen (Chen Low, 2003).

**Values in the Indonesia Press**

Manzella (2002) conducted in-depth interviews with mainstream media figures, including *Kompas* editors and journalists, and identifies four values shared by the Indonesian press and the press in western cultures. The first of these values is in the watchdog role of the press, monitoring the government and accessing the government for information. Second is the shared belief that through the power of the written word, the press can bring about positive social change. Third is the belief in striving for balance a story as opposed to maintaining pure objectivity. Finally, the recognition of the press as “an equalizing social force” (p.313) that serves the poor and middle class in an elite-controlled society.

Romano (1998) also tested journalists’ agreement with these values in interviews with 65 Indonesian journalists, complemented with participant observation at three
Jakarta newspapers, including *Kompas*. Only three of these journalists professed a role as members of the *Pancasila* or development press. One third of journalists expressed support for the *Pancasila* or development press model and almost two-thirds criticized the models as “ideological tools to control journalists” (Romano, 1998, p.73). Rather, half of the journalists interviewed perceived their role as ‘watchdogs’ monitoring the elite and exposing misconduct. They did not perceive this role as necessarily antagonistic to government programs, but as crucial in aiding that process (Romano, 1998).

The watchdog function was followed by the perception that their role of the journalist is to empower and educate the public as individuals. Almost the same number of journalists voiced their role in nation building, emphasizing their role in the development of the country (Romano, 1998). These two roles capture the two different kinds of development journalism discussed earlier, the first as a liberating role to educate the mind of the individual so as to empower them, and the second as a facilitator for the nation as a whole to contribute to the development process.

Ideological and normative press theories treat the press as a passive instrument of either political or economic elites. Examining the values of the press do not sufficiently paint a picture of what actually occurs in the press and the influence that the press has in forming the political and economic environment in which it exists.

*The Print Mediascape*

Print media thrive in Indonesia today, in part because of their significant influence that in setting the political agenda (Chen Low, 2003). Print media are dominated by three conglomerates: *Kompas-Gramedia Group, Jawa Pos Group*, and *Media Indonesia/Surya*
Persindo Group. *Kompas* is the largest newspaper with a circulation of 600,000 people and a readership of 2.4 million people. This is followed by *Jawa Pos* (450,000), *Republika* (350,000), and *Suara Pembaruan* (325,000) (Chen Low, 2003). Thus, every newspaper is read by approximately four people.

The largest publishing conglomerate, Kompas-Gramedia Group, owns *Kompas*, the *Jakarta Post* (the nation’s only English language daily) and five regional newspapers: *Banjarmasin Post, Pos Kupang, Sriwijaya, Serambi*, and *Surya*. The Kompas Group also owns four magazines: *Angkasa*, news magazine; *Bola*, a sports magazine; *Info Komputer*, a computer magazine, and *Kontan*, a tabloid. Finally, the Kompas Group owns five FM radio stations and a book-publishing house.

National dailies circulate predominantly in Jakarta and the largest cities in Java, although *Kompas* and *Jawa Pos* are also read in the regions. Regional newspapers draw most of their stories from *Antara*, the semi-government news agency, but also write their own local stories (Chen Low, 2003).

Most newspapers continue to have ties to a political party through ownership (Kingsbury, 2002). *Republika*, is owned by the Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), and has close ties to the Golkar party. Most political parties publish news magazines as well. Other national newspapers, such as *Kompas* and *Jawa Pos*, have been able to maintain neutrality through diversified ownership.

*Influence of Broadcast Media*

Indonesia’s print press was relatively free in comparison to broadcast media during the Soeharto years. The state owned national radio and television stations, RRI
and TVRI respectively, were the only source of news for many Indonesians, particularly in the regions until the end of the 1980s. In 1989, Soeharto’s son Bambang Triatmojo was given permission to start the first private television networks, RCTI (Gazali, 2002). In the next five years, the demand for private television allowed for the start of four more television networks: SCTV, TPI, ANTV, and Indosiar (Haryanto, 2004). At the same time, private radio stations cropped up in provincial capitals (Gazali, 2002), initiating competition with the government’s RRI national network of 49 broadcasting and more than three hundred transmitting stations (Gunaratne, 1999). Similarly, TVRI has a network of 23 stations and 395 transmitters across the archipelago (Chen Low, 2004). Despite the alternative radio and television networks, the 1997 Broadcast Law required the broadcast of all official news reports and only reports from licensed “consensual” journalists.

The printed press is historically known for its agenda-setting role. At the same time it is also the most intellectual and elite-oriented media (Siregar, 2002) with limited readership and low circulation (Chen Low, 2003). By the mid-1990s, broadcast media were proving to be the media of the masses. Whereas circulation of newspapers averaged 2.4 per 100 people there was an average of 14.9 radio and 6.6 television receivers per 100 people in 1995 (UNESCO, 2005). Thus, newspapers, like Kompas, representing the interests of the elite and intelligentsia, remained reserved until the week before Soeharto stepped down (Manzella, 2000). It was the broadcast media that posited alternatives and the change desired by the Indonesian people (Sen, 2002).
After the collapse of the regime, a new press law was introduced in 1999. This was followed in 2002 by the Broadcast Media Law with the establishment of the Indonesian Broadcast Commission (KPI) established in mid-2004 to create a code of ethics and settle disputes and claims (Haryanto, 2004). By 2004, the private national television networks that emerged at the end of the Soeharto era had taken hold of the majority of the market: Indosiar (23.8%), RCTI (17.7%), SCTV (16.6%), TransTV (12.5%), and TPI (10.9%) (Haryanto, 2004). Similarly, in 2004 the five most watched stations were: Indosiar (45%), RCTI (19%), SCTV (12%), TransTV (5%), and TVRI (4%). Although the least watched of the five networks, TVRI hosted 40% of all the election-related programs.

According to Nielsen Media Research Indonesia (2004a) 66% of voters watch TV everyday and another 20% watched TV more than once a week. Three-quarters of voters (74%) reported that television was their source for national events; this is compared with 65% during the 1999 elections. Similarly, 80% of Indonesians watched television for information on voting and the general elections (Nielsen Media Research, 2004a). The political parties and the KPU responded to this with increased advertising, falling just below hair product advertisements. Among advertisements for specific brands, the KPU placed the third greatest number of advertisements on television, using the medium for voter education (Nielsen Media Research, 2004b). KPU also invested 14 million Rupiahs in newspaper advertisements, falling third behind advertising space bought by political parties PDI-P (Rp 21.2 million) and Golkar (Rp 14.5 million).
Kompas

*Kompas* newspaper was founded in 1965 by Jacob Oetama along with P.K. Ojong as an initiative of the Catholic Party. In the restructuring of the political parties in the 1970s, the Catholic Party was dissolved. Nonetheless, *Kompas* is considered a Catholic publication and thus independent from the Muslim majority and politically influential Muslim organizations. Thus, *Kompas* is viewed as politically neutral with respect to parties, however Anderson (1994) characterizes its style as “determined boringness” and “the New Order newspaper par excellance” (p.140). This reputation is due in large part to the editor-owner Jakob Oetama who argued that press freedom does not mean freedom from government control, but the functional freedom to contribute to the economic development of the nation by promoting development programs (Romano, 1998). The journalistic style was to ensure compliance with government that controlled the press and how development was defined (Romano, 1998). Jacob Oetama continues to be the editor-in-chief of *Kompas*.

During the season of press bannings in the 1970s, *Kompas* ingratiated itself with the Soeharto regime and secured a large government loan that provided 75 percent of the capital to establish a new print house (Sen & Hill, 2000). The Kompas Gramedia group was able to maintain its lead after its jump forward in the 1970s. By the 1990s, digital technology allowed for *Kompas* national editions to reach the outlying islands quicker. Already, Kompas Gramedia has established itself as an empire of almost forty subsidiaries in print and publication. The conglomerate dominates the print and publication sphere in Indonesia with several large city newspapers and other commercial
enterprises. By the force of its size and pervasiveness, the Kompas Gramedia group was able to weather the political collapse of the New Order and lead during reformasi (Sen & Hill, 2000).

*Kompas*, in its mission statement, encourages its journalists to cover both sides of the story and to cover all possibilities. Also in its mission statement, *Kompas* defines its role to “console the poor and remind the established”, echoing early American press values to comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable. During the New Order and the crisis leading up to the fall of the regime, *Kompas* urged its journalists to maintain balance, not objectivity. On the one hand, the editor would compliment or wish a new Minister success, but then qualify that praise by saying that the new official would have to prove himself to the people (Manzella, 2000). It is in this manner that *Kompas* has been able to find the balance between criticizing the government through indirect implications and staying within the legal and self-censorship boundaries.

*The Landscape during the 2004 Elections*

The election campaign and Election Day were overshadowed in the press by the trial of Bambang Harymurti, the editor-in-chief of *Tempo* magazine, Indonesia’s leading investigative journalism magazine. Harymurti was convicted to one year of incarceration on criminal charges of libel against Tommy Winata, a prominent businessman. The two journalists who wrote the article were acquitted (Indonesian editor jailed, 2004).

The day that Bambang Harymurti was found guilty, he also held a previously arranged conference with the election observers for the Carter Center at Hotel Borobudur (owned by Tommy Winata). In the lion’s den, Harymurti alongside other independent
editors and journalists expressed their concern for the effect this will have on the already self-censoring media. While members of the press do not argue the irresponsibility of the journalists or that what was printed constitutes libel, there is great concern over the criminal libel law used on the press.

Indonesia is one of the few countries in which libel is considered a criminal offense, punishable by incarceration, and not an offense for the civil courts. In a civil suit the case is settled in terms of monetary compensation that can often be crippling for the media outlet. The criminal libel law with which Harymurti was convicted has its roots in the colonial Dutch press laws. The libel law is not an independent law but imbedded in the national criminal law. The case brought forth against Tempo used the national criminal code instead of the R.I. 40/1999 Press Law, which establishes a Press Council to mediate conflicts with the press, develops a code of ethics and applies that code. The Ministry of Communications and Information asserted in pressing the charges that because of the influence of the media they should be held accountable to the criminal code unless the Press Council can impose tougher penalties (Unidjaja, 2004).

At the time of the elections, there are no moves from the government to change the criminal libel law or loosen the reins on the press to allow for even more press freedom. Megawati’s government was considering the replacement of the Press Council that raised the issue to the level of the Supreme Court (Unidjaja, 2004). Each of the presidential candidates professed that if elected, he or she would revive the icon of the
New Order, the Ministry of Information\textsuperscript{7}. Shifting the organizing the development of the telecommunication sector, which is currently under the Department of Home Affairs, to a Ministry of Information is the rationale for the resurrection of the Ministry of Information (KPI ingatkan ada, 2004). The return of the Ministry of Information threatens the return of broadcasting and journalistic licenses that choked the press during the New Order regime.

In February 2006 the Supreme Court overruled the decisions of the lower courts and endorsed the 1999 Press Law in the Winato-\textit{Tempo} libel case. The decision is considered a major victory for press freedom, but not a sure victory. The Supreme Court did not rule out the use of the criminal law for other libel cases, nor was decision clear in establishing a precedent for the lower courts to follow (Widiastuti, 2006).

\textsuperscript{7} The \textit{Kompas} article was based on an interview with Bimo Nugrono, a representative from the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI), who said that the Commission had evidence that this was the intention of the all the candidates.
Methods

Frame analysis is the theoretical launching point for the methodology of this study. In this thesis I propose to capture Kompas’ s framing of the 2004 presidential elections, a critical step in the political transition towards democracy. I will examine the selection of stories and style of writing used to frame the discussion of the candidates, define the issues important in the election, evaluate the democratic process, and represent the perspectives of constituents to the elections and the candidates. The definition of frame analysis is based on Entman (1993) and Ott and Aoki (2002) defining framing by the selection of events chosen for coverage during the campaign period, the partiality of the story, whether it has a negative or positive bias, and the structure of the articles, i.e. how the story is written. This thesis does not aim to compare with the Pancasila style of reporting and the growth away from it. The exploratory nature of this thesis is evident in my research questions.

Research Questions

Proposed Research Questions

During the proposal stage of my thesis I posed the four research questions below. These questions guided the development of the content analysis tool and oriented my approach towards the textual framing analysis.

RQ 1. How did Kompas report the candidates? Was the reporting of candidates during the first round of elections balanced among the five candidates or were only two or three promoted as viable? Did any candidate receive greater positive or negative
coverage? Were candidates the dominant focus of the articles and in what way? Did *Kompas* focus on their issue stance or more on their personality and family background?

**RQ 2. How did *Kompas* report the issues?** How did *Kompas* pair issues with the candidates? Were issues discussed on their own and as a dominant focus, or did they come secondary to the candidates? How did *Kompas* report the democratic process?

To what extent did *Kompas* report the electoral and voting process? Did the newspaper report only the activities of KPU? What external organizations, such as Transparency International and the European Union, did it choose to represent? Was the reporting of the democratic process portrayed as positive or negative?

**RQ 3. How did *Kompas* represent the perspectives of constituents and non-politically associated experts and organizations?** How were the perspectives of the public represented in *Kompas* outside the opinion page and public polls? What sort of experts did *Kompas* approach for input and information? How did *Kompas* evaluate the opinions of non-politically associated constituents?

*Modified Research Questions*

On further review of the literature on the Indonesian press, I modified the four research questions to direct my study better and also to have a firmer footing in existing literature, modeling my questions after Kerbel et al’s (2000) frame analysis of the PBS coverage of the presidential election. The scope of the research questions remains broad in nature.

**RQ1: What frames did *Kompas* use to describe the candidates and to explain the political workings of their campaigns?** The 2004 elections were the first direct elections
of the president and vice-president of Indonesia. Historically, presidential elections have been dubious affairs conducted in closed rooms and controlled by the political parties. Voting for the person and not for the party is new in Indonesia and surely demands a new way of thinking about the election, and thus the framing of the politics of each candidate. The framing of the campaign by the journalist reflects their reality of how the elections and how politics work (Kerbel et al., 2000). It is because of this shift from party to person that the framing of the candidate’s is worthwhile for study.

Kerbel et al. (2000) offer two frames in which the candidate personalities can be understood: personal character and non-events. In personal character frames, the journalist questions the integrity and qualifications of the candidate for office through description. Non-event frames dwell on scandals or improper behavior of candidates that have no political import (Kerbel et al., 2000).

In surveying general trends through the content analysis tool, I will focus on the two personality frames above (personal character and non-events) and political strategy (political party versus personality). I will surface important trends through questions of positive and negative coverage in the content analysis and delve deeper in the textual analysis of the frames.

RQ2: Which issues did Kompas select to highlight in this election year? How were those issues highlighted? According to Kerbel et al. (2000) examining the framing of issues is of greatest importance. The coverage of issues and how they are frame sparks the discussion of policy matters (Kerbel et al., 2000). Covering issues prompt the candidates to engage in substantive debate, giving the voters the policy meat they need to
make informed, voting decisions. For more than 30 years, the government influenced the selection of issues worth reporting, i.e. the development policies of the government and limited the framing of stories to abstain from the sensitive SARA issues of race, ethnicity, religious and class (Sen & Hill, 2000; Romano 1998). Several papers were shut down for their coverage of conflict and contentious issues with the government (Menyang, 2002). Even during the campaign period and elections, Aceh continued to remain closed international journalists and most national journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Given past restrictions of issues and events permitted, what does Kompas highlight as important?

In looking to question the framing of issues, I chose issues that were important to Indonesian voters. The Asia Foundation conducted a study of voters, identifying five issues that were of importance to them: Economy, Violence, Crime, Corruption, and the War in Aceh (Meisburger, 2003). None of these issues would have been considered New Order friendly. Were these issues picked up by Kompas or did Kompas define other problems as important for the country in this election?

Kerbel et al. (2000) also use an ideology frame to understand issues. An ideological frame is about ideas and beliefs, instead of specific policies. Ideological frames are thus more difficult to capture because they may not be explicit and occur in context (Kerbel et al., 2000).

For the purpose of this study, policy issue frames will be surfaced in the content analysis and examined further in the textual analysis, while the ideological frames will
not be addressed in the content analysis because of their subtlety, but will be examined in the textual analysis.

*RQ3:* How did Kompas frame the political process of the first direct presidential elections? During the 1999 elections, media took the lion’s share in educating the public about electoral reforms, how the new democratic processes work, and the role of the public in those processes (Chen Low, 2003). The *Pancasila* model preached to journalists the importance of their role in development, educating the public (Romano, 1998). This question does not ask whether the press still fulfills the role as a partner of the government, but asks how *Kompas* framed this process.

The framing of the political process impacts how the elections and politics are perceived by the public, although in a less suspicious way than other aspects of election coverage (Kerbel et al., 2000). The political process frame explains the mechanics of the election and election regulations (Ross, 1992). Although considerably less controversial, the political process frame in this election is important because of the nature of the election: the first election following major reform in election regulations and procedures.

*RQ4:* How were the perspectives of constituents and non-politically aligned citizens represented in the articles? Political communication research criticizes the current state of Western models of the political media complex for their failure to adequately cover the public (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; Swanson, 1992). Kerbel et al. (2000) included public opinion frames from the opinion pages and focus groups in the political framing of their study.
Framing analysis of political communication predominantly focuses on political and elite actors. The role of political advocates and social movements is increasingly the subject of study for their role in influencing how the press frames public debates (McCune, 2003). While media are agents for framing the issues, they also act as a “venue in which groups with conflicting worldviews attempt to establish their perspective. In other words, [political advocates] regard the news media both as an influential group and as a group that is subject to influence” (McCune, 2003, p. 7). This is not to say that the press is not without influence; in the months leading up to the fall of Soeharto media were important in defining the debates and pushing the regime to collapse (Sen, 2002). Instead, in a study that looks at where news frames originate, McCune (2003) argues that political advocates and social movements have become savvy in using symbols and social values to promote their worldviews to the media. Thus, this question asks the role constituents and non-political representatives of constituents in Kompas’s reporting. Furthermore, this question departs from Kerbel et al. in that it does not ask how public opinion was framed in the selection of opinion pieces and public polls, but rather asks how public opinion was sought out or offered to the journalists for news stories.

**Research Methods**

This study aims to systematically and objectively analyze the construction and the framing of the Presidential elections in the print media. A mixed methods approach of content analysis, framing analysis and participant observation allows this examination to be approached both quantitatively and qualitatively. The content analysis provides a
quantitative basis and hard foundation for discussion of the framing analysis (McCune, 2003). Participation observation will flesh out the findings in order to make sense of this research.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is a systematic, quantitative method for analyzing the construction of media messages. On its own, content analysis does not provide much depth to analyzing the framing of a story (Entman, 1993). Thus, the content analysis will be used to provide a quantitative basis from which to direct the text analysis of the framing of the Indonesian elections. This study analyzed the content of Indonesia’s largest circulating daily newspaper, Koran Kompas. The content analysis focused on four themes: candidates (horse-racing), issue coverage, electoral and democratic processes, and constituent opinion and concerns, including those of civil society groups and experts unidentified with a political party.

Sampling

The content and framing analysis will cover two periods: first, the campaign period one month before the first round of presidential elections until the day of the election (June 5 – July 5), and the second period covering the two weeks of coverage preceding the second round of presidential elections until the day of the election (September 7 – September 20). The campaign period for the first round of presidential elections ran from 1 June until 2 July with elections held on 5 July. The second round of the presidential elections had no official campaign period, but candidates were permitted three days, from 14-16 September, during which they were obliged to make their vision,
mission and program public to the electoral commission (KPU) and the public. Although
the campaign period for the second round was technically only three days, coverage of
the candidates and the election began earlier. I decided to start the analysis of the
campaign again when at least three articles relating to the election appeared in Kompas,
on September 7. The second round of elections was held on 20 September.

During the two campaign periods 290 articles were identified as relating directly
to the election or the candidates. For the purpose of meeting time constraints, 199
articles were randomly selected according to day of the week in which the articles
appeared. 112 articles covered the first round of elections and the remaining 82 covered
the second round of elections. From the complete set of articles, 22 were randomly
selected for the purpose of establishing intercoder reliability. All 290 articles were read
for the framing analysis.

The analysis covered all stories related to the elections including those on the
front page, the politics and law section (Politik & Hukum) and any special sections
devoted specifically to the elections. Articles covering the legislative elections were
excluded unless they explicitly built a relationship to the Presidential elections. Because
this study focuses on the role of the press, the sample will not include opinion essays or
letters to the editor.

Coding

Coding was conducted with the assistance of three Indonesian research assistants,
who are better able to grasp the full cultural context of the content of the articles than I
am. Although I have read all the articles for the purpose of surfacing frames not captured
in the content analysis, I am nonetheless an American with an interest in Indonesia and unfamiliar with some of the cultural references made in the articles.

I attempted to establish inter-coder reliability twice, both times by asking three Indonesian students to participate in the research and conduct the coding. The first attempt was unsuccessful due to the time limitations of two of the students, both journalists, one in newspaper and the other in radio. The third student, a political science graduate student, gave birth two weeks before her due date and was naturally not able to continue. They were able to finish the quota to establish intercoder reliability. The two journalists offered several suggestions for improving the coding analysis tool, which were then adopted.

The second group of article coders was also Indonesian students, who volunteered by responding to a notice on the Permias (Association of Indonesian Students of America) online message board. None of them had a background in journalism or political science. One interesting and unexpected aspect of the group is that they are all ethnic Chinese Indonesians. The ethnic Chinese community tends not engage in overt political activities in Indonesia. Wealthy Chinese business conglomerates develop patron-client relationships with government officials. Mostly though, ethnic Chinese refrain from participating in politics and act more as interested observers.\(^8\) I do not anticipate that the ethnicity of the coders will impact the outcome of the analysis.

Intercoder reliability was established using 22 randomly selected articles (using Excel’s random number generator). 98 categories with a total Initial intercoder reliability

\(^8\) Personal interview with Alasdaire Bowie, political scientist at George Washington University.
was 0.84. Coders disagreed significantly over 15 categories with reliability in those categories ranging from 0.27 to 0.68. One set of categories had reliability from 0 to 0.14, so low that the category discussing source credibility was removed altogether. I reviewed these categories with the coding team and established intercoder reliability within those categories by coding an additional 12 articles. Intercoder reliability was then established at 0.89 with a range of 0.73 to 1.0 among all ninety-eight categories. The coding instrument was finalized and used to analyze the remaining selected articles.

**Categories**

Four major themes were addressed in the content analysis: candidate representation and discussion, issue coverage, the electoral and democratic process, and constituent perspectives and concerns. The content analysis sought to identify which of these themes dominated the article. If a candidate or more than one candidate was identified as dominating an article, I also asked whether the discussion of them took place in connection with the issue, democratic process or constituent perspective themes.

The candidate theme was further broken down into categories of how the candidate was discussed: their personality, discussion of issues, professional background, party affiliation, political experience, family and other group affiliations. I also look at whether Kompas explicitly presented each candidate as a frontrunner, contender or likely to lose. In instances of negative coverage of the candidate, the instrument asks how the journalist creates a negative spin: through humor or ridicule, negative association with a group, guilt by association with an individual, and name-calling.
Coverage of issues was classified into four categories: present, present with a link to a candidate, presence with a link to a candidate and the candidate’s position on that issue, and discussion of that issue by a constituent not associated with a political party or institution. Twelve issues were selected for analysis. Five issues, economy, violence, corruption, the war in Aceh, and crime were the biggest issues Indonesia faced according to a research conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2003 (Meisburger, 2003). An additional six issues, poverty, education, environment, security or military not related to Aceh, and ethics and moral decline were added as categories taken from Miller (1996) content analysis of the 1990 and 1994 California and Texas gubernatorial elections. To complement the previous categories, I added the twelfth category, democratic process, on the basis of trends that I saw in the first two weeks of coverage while I was in Indonesia.

I chose to use Miller’s model based on studies of American elections because of what Sussman and Galizio (2003) term the “global reproduction of American politics” (p.309), the transnationalizing of professional political communication. The politics of elections, as well as reporting them, are products of political culture to Indonesia. However, Indonesia’s culture and politics are not isolated from global media trends. Both journalism and political communication have been globally “professionalized”, predominantly by means of communication and media consultants from the United States (Sussman & Galizio, 2003). Although Indonesia’s elections are foremost Indonesian in character, as the field of political communication becomes more professionalized by
Western consultants, it cannot be assumed that the campaigning and reporting are free from traits of the American media. 9

The theme of the democratic and electoral process in election coverage appeared to be distinct from coverage of the election campaign and issues facing Indonesia. Thus, I established electoral process as a separate category for content analysis. Articles were examined for coverage of KPU activities, election monitoring, the election and voting process, election reforms and regulations, and the discussion of democracy in general. Classification of the articles includes not only absence or presence, but also whether the article was informative, critical or questioning, or informative with an instruction to readers, such as how to vote and urging people to vote in the election.

The fourth theme is constituent perspectives, opinions and statements from the public or persons not associated with a political party or any government institutions. Kerbel et al. (2000) used a public opinion category frame to “capture mass response” to the debate between candidates. Unlike Kerbel et al.’s content analysis, this study did not focus on public opinion polls, surveys or letters to the editor. Rather, the study focuses on journalists’ efforts to incorporate the opinion of individuals who represent a larger segment of society, from pedicab drivers to academic experts. The analysis tool focused on the presence of public opinion on issues, preference for a specific candidate, perspectives regarding the election process, expectations and desires of the new president and what issues are captured as important problems that need to be addressed.

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9 As an election monitor, I was frequently told that SBY had American consultants and even received support for his campaign by various American interest groups. This was not true. However, I did meet both SBY and Wiranto’s campaign managers who had received training in journalism and public relations, respectively, in the United States.
Full version of content analysis tool see Appendix B.

Textual Analysis

In addition to the content analysis, I conducted a separate textual analysis of the frames covering the complete set of articles. The categories for the content analysis have largely been pulled from Western research and analysis. The aim of the textual analysis was to surface additional frames and flesh out a better understanding of the results of the content analysis. All 250 articles were read in order over a period of several months. Almost 50 articles were read twice because of an improvement in my Indonesian fluency. Notes were taken on each article and general notes taken on emerging themes.

Participant Observation

I was present in Indonesia from 4 June, the third day of the election campaign and the first day of news article collection for this study. I attended language school at Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta for ten weeks. The elections arose from time to time as a subject in class. I lived with an Indonesian family where both adults were mathematics professors at local universities. Both husband and wife read Kompas every morning before work; I was also encouraged to read it. In the evenings the family watched the news. In addition to observing their news consumption, we would discuss the elections, candidates, and democracy in general. This household was interesting in that the husband and wife supported different candidates. On Election Day for the first round, we went to the polling station together. They brought with them their ID, but also the list of candidates and the voting instructions cut carefully from Kompas the day
before. At the polling station, I casually talked with neighbors about voting, what the important issues were for them, and what they looked for in a President.

Participant observation was more in-depth during the second round of elections, during which I was a long-term election observer with The Carter Center. As a long-term election observer, I traveled to Samarinda, Balikpapan, Tenggarong and Bonang in East Kalimantan, an area rich in natural resources, but with relatively poor infrastructure (except Tenggarong, which is the richest district in Indonesia). I then traveled to Palangkaraya in Central Kalimantan, a much poorer province that has suffered from ethnic conflict in the last five years. I spent Election Day and the three days previous in the city of Makassar and a poorer, rural district just south of Makassar, District Goa, both in South Sulawesi. Makassar is the hometown of SBY’s vice presidential candidate, Jusuf Kalla.

As a long-term election observer, I was teamed with a Filipino from Namfrel\(^\text{10}\). Together we conducted interviews with KPU officials at the provincial and district level, members of Panwaslu, independent domestic election monitoring groups such as KIPP and Forum Rektor, local political party leaders and campaign volunteers, journalists from local papers, and various civil society groups that could give us a good overview of the political situation and information about which government officials may not be forthcoming. We stayed in each area for a period of up to two weeks visiting polling sites and the places designated for counting. Notes were taken for all of the interviews and most interviews were conducted with the aid of an interpreter.

\(^{10}\) Namfrel is an independent election monitoring group in the Philippines.
Content Analysis

In order to answer my research questions I first conducted a content analysis to gain a general overview of how the elections were covered in Indonesia. This provides me with a quantitative basis from which to investigate further when reading the articles for the framing analysis. I divide this chapter into four sections, following the research questions:

RQ1: What frames did Kompas use to describe the candidates and explain to them the political workings of the campaign?

Even if a journalist follows the rules of objectivity and is committed to objectivity in her reporting, she may still convey a particular political view (Entman, 1993). In developing the content analysis tool, the group of coders composed of journalists advised me that Indonesian journalists are not taught objectivity, but rather aim for balance in their stories, presenting all sides involved. Beginning with the assumption that stories are framed and not objective, and that balance is highly valued in journalistic skills among Indonesians, I first set out to look at the balancing of the stories simply by the weight given to covering each candidate. The coders counted the number of paragraphs in each article in which the candidate’s name appears. The sum of the paragraphs of all the articles coded totaled 1,531. The content analysis revealed that Megawati dominated the number paragraphs covering candidates with 13 percent while

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Objectivity has been defined and debated extensively. For the purposes of this thesis I use Ryan’s (2001) defense of previous works on objectivity, defining it as “the collection and dissemination of information that describes reality as accurately as possible” (p. 3). Objective journalists would refuse to support any political or social standpoint, even admirable ones, and always present all relevant sides and information.
Hamzah Haz was almost absent with the least number of paragraphs in articles, 4 percent. The remaining three candidates: Wiranto and SBY, and Rais received mentions in 8 and 9 percent respectively.

Table 1

*Frequency of Paragraph Mention per Candidate - Election Round One*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Number of paragraphs</th>
<th>% of total (n=1531)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Megawati</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiranto</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rais</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBY</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haz</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During my time as an election monitor, most Indonesian journalists I spoke to claimed that *Kompas* did not have a bias towards any candidate (with the exception of those few who said “Not Haz”). However, many of the international consultants in Indonesia at the time of the election responded to my description of my thesis topic by saying – that’s easy, *Kompas* is pro-Megawati. Although the weight of the coverage tilted towards Megawati, it was not consistent over the entire campaign period for the first round. Charting the number of mentions over the course of the campaign for the first round and then mapping a polynomial regression line, we can see how the coverage of candidates developed overtime.

The dominance of Megawati was not consistent from day to day, spiking and plummeting from one day to the next, while steadily declining in the last few weeks.
Haz also had peaks and days without any coverage, but after the first week, his coverage increased and then plateaued (Figure 2). Coverage of Rais increased steadily after the first week and a half and continued to increase, with only a slight drop of coverage after peaking on June 26th, when candidate coverage was extensive for all the candidates (Figure 3). Wiranto and SBY also demonstrate similar patterns of coverage, starting off steady, declining and then increasing dramatically until June 26th (Figure 4, Figure 5). They continued to receive frequent paragraph mentions until dropping off more dramatically just before the election.

For the second round of elections, Kompas did provide balanced reporting of the two candidates in terms of paragraph representation. The articles analyzed totaled 897 paragraphs. From this Megawati was represented 20% of the time and SBY 19% of the time, thus maintaining balance in terms of paragraph representation. The two candidates were equally balanced in representation over time (Figure 6).

Neither the actual count nor regression demonstrates the predominance of one candidate over another further away or closer to the elections. There is no trend of declining or increasing representation with time.

In constructing the campaign, how did Kompas choose to focus the discussion? Were candidates dominant or were the issues? Or did Kompas choose a role as educator, framing the elections as a process? Using each article as a unit of analysis, the coders were asked to identify the dominant focus of each article at two levels. First, if a
Figure 1

*Paragraph Representation of Megawati in the First Round*

![Graph showing the paragraph representation of Megawati in the first round.]

Figure 2

*Paragraph Representation of Haz in the First Round*

![Graph showing the paragraph representation of Haz in the first round.]

Figure 3

Paragraph Representation of Amien Rais in the First Round

Figure 4

Paragraph Representation of Wiranto in the First Round
Figure 5
Paragraph Representation of SBY

Figure 6
Paragraph Representation of Megawati and SBY in the Second Round
candidate(s) were the dominant focus and if so, which candidate(s). If candidates did not dominate the article, they were to indicate so. Second, the coders were also asked to identify the dominant discussion: general political news, campaign activities, issues and policies, election process and regulations, and constituent perspectives. I also created an “other” option for articles about the election with a focus that did not fit into the category. Thus, an article could have either a dominant focus on discussing candidates, or be dominated by the discussion of issues, election process, or opinions by citizens, or both.

Exactly half of the 112 articles covering the first election round included candidates as a dominant focus. Of these 56 articles covering the candidates, 33 articles (59 percent) focused on the activities of all five candidates.

Table 2

*Articles with Dominant Candidate Focus - Election Round One*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># of articles</th>
<th>% candidate articles</th>
<th>% of all articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n=56)</td>
<td>(n=112)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All candidates</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megawati</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiranto</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rais</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBY</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haz</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All candidates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>except Haz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11% of the candidate articles discussed all the candidates except for Hamzah. Of all the articles in which a candidate dominated the article, Megawati was the dominant focus of more than a fifth of those articles. The interesting statistic is with Haz, who was ignored twice as much as he was dominant. Only 3 articles were dominated by discussion, whereas 6 articles discussed all the candidates, but ignored Haz completely. The strongest category is clearly the reporting of all the candidates with 29%, almost a third of the election coverage on articles that highlight each candidate. (see Table 2)

Candidate Coverage – Second Round

The coverage for the second round was more balanced between the two candidates, Megawati and SBY. From the 86 articles coded for the second round, 42 articles had candidate coverage as the dominant focus. Megawati dominated in 26% of the articles with candidate coverage while SBY edged ahead with 31% of the articles with candidate coverage as the dominant focus. The remaining 43% of the 42 articles with a dominant candidate focus covered both candidates.

Table 3

*Articles with Dominant Candidate Focus - Election Round Two*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of articles</th>
<th>% candidate articles (n=42)</th>
<th>% of all articles (n=87)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Megawati</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBY</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both candidates</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similar to the first round, although not as strong, journalists covered both candidates equally in a single article.

Discussion of the Candidates

Kerbel et al.’s (2000) personal character frame asks how the journalist created a perception of the integrity and quality of character of candidates. I added to this a political affiliation frame, that the candidate is qualified not just by the integrity of their own character, but also by their group and party affiliations. Thus, the content analysis broke down the discussion of the candidates into seven categories: the candidate’s professional background and qualifications, personality, position on issues, party affiliation, political experience, family, and group affiliations. With each article as a unit of analysis, the category was coded as absent, positive or negative for each candidate. Looking just at the presence of the discussion of the category, candidates were most frequently discussed in terms of their party affiliation (see Table 4).

The content analysis for both rounds reveals that the discussion of a candidate’s party affiliation is the most significant and frequent frame for discussing the candidate, although less pronounced in the second round. The emphasis on political parties makes sense. Before the 2004 Presidential Election, voters would vote for a party, not a candidate, which upon winning would then select a president. These elections were the first in which the public chose the president directly, without going through the party.

Following political parties, position on issues accounted for the next largest portion of the discussion of candidates. In the second round, position on issues was discussed almost as frequently as the candidate’s political party. Likewise, in the second
Table 4

*Candidate Discussion in Round One and Round Two*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Round One</th>
<th>Round Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>background</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position on issues</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party affiliation</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polit. experience</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group affiliations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

round it appears that personality was used more frequently to frame the candidates.

Journalists remained quiet about the families of the candidates, mentioning them only a few times in each campaign period.

Breaking down the coverage further into positive and negative framing of the candidates within each category, I will only focus on political party, position on issue, personality and family, since the results of these frames is most interesting. While the candidates were predominantly framed according to their party affiliation, this affiliation was never covered as a negativism. While *Kompas* is still framing the election in terms of political parties, it is not clear how this is being done (see Table 5).
Table 5

Positive and Negative Coverage of Candidates in Selected Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Round One</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Round Two</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Megawati</td>
<td>Wiranto</td>
<td>Rais</td>
<td>SBY</td>
<td>Haz</td>
<td>Megawati</td>
<td>SBY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position on issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first round, candidates were only criticized only once or twice negatively with regards his or her position on an issue. In the second round, Megawati’s and SBY’s positions on issues were not criticized or questioned. The interesting category is Personality, in which we see the tremblings of personality as relevant to the framing of candidates. While the campaign period during the first round only mentions personality a few times, during the second round, personality was used to describe the candidates in
more incidents than the total combined personality mentions of all the candidates in the first round. Furthermore, Megawati’s personality is only captured once in the first round and negatively at that. SBY, on the other hand, is discussed in terms of personality four times, thrice positively and once critically. In the second round, Kompas positively portrays SBY’s personality six times. Megawati does not receive the same balance of treatment; the newspaper highlighted her personality only three times, twice negatively. These findings are clearly not statistically significant, but future research on election coverage might consider the personality frame.

**Overall Treatment of Candidates**

Because the categories for discussing the candidates were based on categories developed by Western theorists and expanded to my own observations, the coding analysis may not have captured the discussion and tone of the candidates. Coders were asked to evaluate the overall treatment of the candidate in the article. Treatment of candidate was classified as Not Present, Positive, Negative, and Balanced. As I mentioned above, I chose ‘Balanced’ instead of ‘Neutral’ because while establishing intercoder reliability with the first group, the Indonesian coders, two of whom were journalists, were confused by the term ‘Neutral’. After a brief discussion, we agreed that ‘Balance’ would more adequately describe Kompas’s treatment of candidates by presenting both positive and negative aspects in an article or presenting all candidates at once in a balanced manner.

Similar to describing the character and highlighting qualifications and affiliations, the overall treatment of the candidate by Kompas was balanced for most candidates. The
only exceptions to this were in the first round with the treatment of Megawati and SBY. While the other candidates averaged fine articles with positive treatment, SBY was covered positively almost than twice as frequently as the other candidates. Megawati, on the other hand, was treated negatively in a total of 10 articles compared to the other candidates who averaged 5 articles with negative coverage.

Table 6

*Overall Treatment of Candidates - First Round*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Balanced</th>
<th>Not Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Megawati</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiranto</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rais</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBY</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haz</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of articles were either balanced in structure or in treatment. As discussed earlier, many of the articles were balanced structurally, covering all five of the candidates in one article. Balanced treatment meant that the candidate was treated either neutrally, that is, neither positively nor negatively, or in a balanced manner, both positively and negatively, but emphasizing neither side.

For the second round, Megawati and SBY were portrayed with greater equality; Megawati was covered positively in nine articles and SBY in 14. Negative treatment was confined to 3 articles for each candidate. Otherwise, the candidates predominantly were treated in a balanced manner (see Table 7).
Table 7

*Overall Treatment of Candidates - Second Round*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Balanced</th>
<th>Not Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Megawati</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBY</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not only was negative or critical coverage in *Kompas* rare, it was difficult to identify how candidates were criticized. Of the articles that were coded as negative towards a candidate, most did not receive a score in any of the category descriptions of the candidates: humor/ridicule, negative association, name-calling and guilt by association. Furthermore, *Kompas* did not use name-calling at all and only used humor and negative association once during the first campaign periods. During the lead up to the second election, none of these categories were used to negatively characterize the candidates. In discussing this later with my coders, I asked them how they interpreted negative treatment of a candidate by *Kompas*. They explained that negative coverage by *Kompas* was no coverage at all. Hamzah Haz was covered negatively by his absence from articles in which all the other candidates appeared. The content analysis team also observed that an article may start out negative, but then redeem itself by the second paragraph, balancing the article with more generous comments about the candidate.

The content analysis of the character frame of the candidates permits a few conclusions. *Kompas* gave greater weight to covering Megawati. While most of the treatment of the candidates was balanced, *Kompas* was more negative towards Megawati than any other candidate. SBY, on the other hand, received less, but in addition to
balanced coverage, was also portrayed positively. *Kompas* excluded Haz both in terms of space in the election articles and in coverage on positions or qualifications. In framing the debates about the candidates in the elections, *Kompas* emphasized the political discussion around the parties more than any other aspect, including the issues and background and political experience. *Kompas* placed issues second in importance after political parties. How did *Kompas* frame the issue debate for this election?

*RQ2: Which issues did Kompas select to highlight in this election year? How were those issues highlighted?*

*Kompas* did not prioritize raising issues and sparking debate on the topics that voters considered important for this election. In looking at the dominant focus of the all the articles, issues were significantly ignored or at least not seen as the focus of debate on the elections. Only 9% of all the 112 articles in first round and 2% of the 87 articles in the second were dominated by discussing political issues. Thus, while issues may have been connected to candidates, they were not often the focus of the candidate coverage, nor were issues raised for debate by *Kompas*.

I chose the issues represented in the content analysis instrument on the basis of a study by the Asia Foundation that surveyed voters and what they considered the most important issues the country faces during this election. These issues were: Economy, Violence, Crime, Corruption¹² and the War in Aceh. I included six additional issues used in Miller’s content analysis tool: Poverty, Violence, Education, Environment, Ethics and

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¹² Corruption appeared in the coding tool as “KKN”, the commonly used acronym in Indonesia for *Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme* or Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism.
Moral Decline, and Security Issues. Finally, because Indonesia is in transition I include debate about Democracy as an issue category.

I considered four categories by which issues could be framed: present, present and linked to a candidate, present and linked to a candidate and a policy position, and present with a link to the public. The present classification means that the article spoke about the issue, but did not relate it to any candidate. Present and linked to a candidate means that either a candidate or a spokesperson said something about the issue, or that the issue was identified with the candidate in some way. Present with link to candidate and policy asks whether the issue was discussed by a candidate proposing a specific policy towards that issue. Articles that challenged candidates to take policy action on an issue were also included. Finally, the present with link to public classification is for the discussion of an issue by a non-political group or person, such as a specialist or expert.

The issues framed as important by Kompas were corruption, poverty and the economy (the last two being closely related) during the first election. Although violence, crime and Aceh were voiced by voters in the Asia Foundation study as crucial issues, violence was only mentioned 6 times, Aceh mentioned 4 times and crime was not mentioned at all. None of these topics was ever the dominant focus of an article. Kompas highlighted the same issues in the second round as well (see Table 8).

Kompas linked most of its reporting of the issues with either the candidate or a candidate’s spokes person or from an outside public source. The only issue that Kompas gave attention to without linking to an outside source is corruption. Although not as significant, Kompas also raised issues of democracy and ethics without linking them to
Table 8

**Discussion of Selected Issues for the First Round of Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Link to Candidate</th>
<th>Link to Candidate &amp; Policy</th>
<th>Link to Public</th>
<th>Number of Articles Discussing Issue</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Articles (n=112)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

outside sources. The emphasis on the economy and poverty with a link to the candidate suggests that the candidates’ campaign teams saw these two issues as the core of the issue debate. With *Kompas’s* individual stress on corruption, it appears that the newspaper conflicted with politicians on the issue agenda for the elections.

The most important finding in the discussion of issues is how much the issues were de-emphasized during the campaign period. The content analysis tool broke down the analysis of the dominant focus of the article into two stages: candidate focus and a
topic focus. The topic dominance could be shared with a candidate or stand alone. The issues and policies topic ranked fourth as the dominant topic in the first round and fifth in the second round. Clearly, Kompas’s priority was not to foster debate around substantive issues and policies. So what was the newspapers priority?

Table 9

Discussion of Selected Issues for Second Round of Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Link to Candidate</th>
<th>Link to Candidate and Policy</th>
<th>Link to Public</th>
<th>Number of Articles Discussing Issue</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Articles (n=87)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RQ3: How did Kompas frame the political process of the first direct presidential elections?

I defined the discussion of the political process as articles related to election reforms, regulations, campaign rules, election preparations, the voting process, and election monitoring. Kompas highlighted the democratic process of the elections second after the candidates. The discussion of the democratic process dominated 37% of the articles in the first round and 40% of the articles in the second round.

Table 10

Dominant Topic Focus Rounds One and Two of Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Round One</th>
<th>Round Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of articles</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Process</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituent Perspectives</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Political News</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues/Policies</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No dominant issue</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike in the coverage of the candidates, while covering the democratic process Kompas adopted a more critical and questioning voice. I divided the classification of the
discussion of each category into four possible approaches taken by the journalist: Not Applicable, Critical or Questioning, Informative, Informative Linked to an Action. The critical/question classification was used in response to the literature on Indonesian media that journalists rarely openly criticize government agencies. Furthermore, the questioning category accommodates raising issues for debate about the democratic process. I used the informative classification because I was more interested in whether Kompas framed the democratic process as an educational process rather than positively or negatively. Finally, the Informative Linked to Action category was added as an experiment to see whether Kompas used its position as an agenda-setter to call the public to action, for example to vote or become involved in election monitoring.

Table 11

Democratic Process - Round One of the Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Critical/Questioning</th>
<th>Informative</th>
<th>Informative and active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPU Activities</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Process</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Reforms</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Democratic Process</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In covering the democratic process, Kompas favored covering the activities of KPU, frequently questioning them, but more often providing information to the public. The KPU was featured almost daily with updates on their preparation activities. The
voting process was barely covered in the first round, featured just before Election Day and ignored in the second round.

Table 12

*Democratic Process - Round Two of the Elections*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Critical/Questioning</th>
<th>Informative</th>
<th>Informative and action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPU Activities</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Process</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Reforms</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Democratic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers of the democratic process raise some interesting questions about the relationship between *Kompas* and the KPU. One third of all the articles were dominated by a discussion of the democratic process. The majority of these articles were dominated by coverage of KPU activities. *Kompas* clearly monitored KPU closely or had a good working relationship with the commission. There is another approach to consider: McCune argues that organizations are more sophisticated in working with the press and may exploit the press to promote their own agenda. This consideration cannot be ignored in analyzing how the frames of the election were constructed.
**RQ4: How were the perspectives of constituents and non-politically aligned citizens selected and represented in the articles?**

*Kompas* did not run any independent polls over the course of the campaign period. However, they did report polling results from other sources. I did not include sidebars on polling nor letters or editorials from the Opinion page in the content and framing analysis. I wanted to focus only on what *Kompas* journalists actually reported. I was interested not only in how *Kompas* represented the candidates, issues and the democratic process, but also how *Kompas* represented voters in their reporting. The inclusion of this category proved insightful. During the first campaign round, *Kompas* had a bi-weekly feature about a province, covering all the provinces over the campaign period, and what citizens of each province were looking for in a leader and how they showed their support for different candidates in that region.

When coding for constituent perspectives, we included the perspective of any person without a connection to the government, politician, candidate, political party or any other political institution. I allowed representatives from civil society groups, universities and religious institutions to be included as constituents because of their roles as opinion leaders among the public.

The classification of the public perspectives changed after the intercoder reliability was established. At first, three classifications of the article existed: No Interest (not present), Active Interest, and Passive Interest. The Active Interest category meant that the constituent either gave a direct quote or was involved in analyzing the elections in some way. Passive Interest meant that the constituent discussed was either an
attendant at a rally, questioned on the street, or a group of people referred to and not directly quoted. The Active and Passive categories caused confusion among the coders and it was agreed that the classification would be collapsed into the Active Interest classification.

As seen in Table 5.9, constituent perspectives were the dominant topic focus of almost a fifth of the articles in the first and second round (18% and 20% respectively). The categories developed for the constituent perspectives failed to surface much about the characteristics of how Kompas selected and represented constituents.

Table 13

Discussion of Constituent Perspectives - Rounds One and Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Round One</th>
<th>Round Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>% of all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>articles</td>
<td>(n=112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion on Issues</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Preference</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election process</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations of new</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>president</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While issues were not the dominant topic focus of articles, constituents voiced their opinion on issues in more than a third of the article for each round. Despite the
discussion of issues by candidates and by constituents, that is, experts, civil society leaders, and common citizens, Kompas downplayed their importance (see Table 5.9).

All of the constituent perspective categories were met in at least 10% of the articles. Whether this was mostly consulting experts or testing the pulse of the audience is unclear. Kompas did sacrifice some objectivity by choosing to represent constituents’ candidate preference in both the first and second round. I failed to foresee that the return on this category might merit further inquiry into which candidate, thus it is not clear whether the revealing of candidate preference among constituents was biased in Kompas or not.

As an exploratory question, I asked what Kompas covered when constituents voiced their qualifications for the president. The qualifications listed were personality, experience, family background, stance on issues, moral standing and party affiliation. Coders were asked to code all the qualifications listed in each article. In constituent qualifications for the new president, stance on issues received most importance. Constituents claimed that party affiliation played almost no role in how they evaluated the qualifications for a new president (see Table 14). This differs significantly from how Kompas covered the candidates, emphasizing the discussion of political party affiliation and de-emphasizing discussion of issues. Kompas was correct in reading that family background did not play a strong role in how constituents evaluated presidential candidates.
Table 14

Constituent Qualifications for President in Rounds One and Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Round One</th>
<th></th>
<th>Round Two</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>% of all articles</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>% of all articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=112)</td>
<td>(n=87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stance on Issues</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Standing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

The content analysis surfaced a few trends in how Kompas constructed the 2004 presidential elections. First, Kompas highlighted political party affiliation in the discussion of the candidates, suggesting that the newspaper considered the political debate in the domain of political parties and not the individual candidates. Second, Kompas de-emphasized policies and issues as the substance of political discussion. Although Kompas raised the issue of corruption and covered candidates’ stands on the economy and poverty, the newspaper failed to raise other issues and thus the point of departure for debate. Issues were the most frequently discussed topic and important qualification from the perspective of constituents. Third, Kompas extensively covered the democratic process in terms of the activities of KPU, both critically and from an
informative perspective. Finally, *Kompas* was not shy to approach or be approached by experts, not openly identified with a party, or constituents to gain their perspective on the elections. Who the constituents and experts are merits further inquiry.
Textual Analysis

The content analysis provided a basic overview of the election coverage in terms of balance and general trends. However, the tool was to be exploratory so as to tease out characteristics and the subtleties of Kompas reporting. The textual analysis allows deeper investigation into the content and style of Kompas’s coverage of the elections. Similar to the content analysis, the textual analysis will follow the order of the research questions.

**RQ1: What frames did Kompas use to describe the candidates and explain the political workings of their campaigns?**

*Balanced Reporting*

The content analysis revealed that more weight was given to Megawati, simply in terms of mentions by paragraph. In the textual analysis Kompas appeared to have a bias towards covering Megawati, however not always in a favorable manner. Most of the articles on the candidates did discuss all of the candidates, leading with the discussion of Megawati. This may have been bias or deference towards the incumbent President. However, it also became clear that Kompas followed the official candidate ordering by KPU according to strength in the DPR (People’s Representative Council), that is: (1) Megawati – PDI-P; (2) Wiranto – Golkar; (3) Rais – PAN; (4) SBY – Partai Demokrat; (5) Haz - PPP. Typically ;the articles would lead with Megawati, followed by Wiranto, then Rais, SBY and Haz (if the journalists included him).

*Kompas* did not strictly follow this order, particularly if one of the stories of the other candidates on the campaign trail was more salient. For example, while at a campaign activity in Cirebon, Wiranto condemned a video about his role in the May 1998
riots in which police and military used excessive force against students (DHF et al., 2004). Most of the article covers his condemnation of the video, but follows up with a report of his campaign activities in Cirebon. The report of his campaign activities is then followed by reports of the campaign activities of each candidate, several paragraphs long and resuming the political party order with Megawati, Rais, SBY and even Hamzah Haz.

Prominence of Political Parties

The content analysis highlighted the importance that political parties played in the election. It makes sense for Kompas to discuss the candidates in terms of their political party. Since 1973 Soeharto only allowed for the existence of three political parties. Golkar, founded by Soeharto, dominated the parliament and faced no significant opposition because of consistent intimidation and vote buying by the party and government. After the fall of Soeharto, political parties mushroomed with almost 150 new parties registering within seven months of the New Order collapse (Fealy, 2001).

Under the Presidential Election Law only parties with 15% of the seats in the People’s Representative Council (DPR) or 20% of the national vote for members in the DPR (R.I. Law 23/2003) can nominate a presidential candidate. In order to gain political leverage, political parties will build coalitions to support the candidate of another party with the expectation that supporting the presidential candidate of another party will pay off should that candidate win. The Indonesian Presidential Election Law encourages coalition building between parties as it does not require that the presidential and vice-presidential candidate pair belong to the same party. This was the case with four of the five candidate pairs in the first election.
Kompas discussed the political parties in two ways. First, Kompas included the party affiliation in discussion of the candidate, but without any specific mention of the role of the party. Second, Kompas covered the coalition building of political parties to support specific candidates and the tensions that arose from coalition building.

In Kompas’s coverage during the first round, the first set of party-related articles covered the discord between Golkar and the Crescent Moon and Star Party (PKB). This discord began when Wiranto (Golkar) chose Wahid (PKB) as his running mate and officially formed a coalition.\(^{13}\) Kompas framed the conflict in the coalition between Golkar and PKB indirectly; never mentioning that there was a conflict outright, but hinting at internal turmoil. On 4 July 2004 Kompas reported that Muslim pesantren\(^{14}\) scholars were ‘confused’ about the coalition between Golkar and PKB (DWA., 2004c). Kompas focuses on the “confusion” between PKB and Golkar and whether the coalition would continue to exist if Wiranto won the election. Kompas uses this subtle approach of questioning and confusion to frame the debate regarding the coalition. Furthermore, the article questions Golkar’s integrity by quoting the PKB members as confused and concerned about the coalition (DWA, 2004). The reporter then utilized quotes from Golkar members defending their intentions to balance the article.

The party tension was raised again on June 9 with an article reporting that Golkar and PKB “refute charges” that they are not getting along well (SIE, 2004). The article

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\(^{13}\) This coalition was considered strategic because it allied the politically organist Golkar with the largest Islamic party. Not only did it unite two political streams, but also the coalition indirectly implied the support of PKB’s former head and Indonesian President Abdurrahim Wahid, who claimed he would not support any party.

\(^{14}\) Muslim boarding schools.
was taken from a press conference with heads from Golkar and PKB. Kompas’s approach, again, is subtle. The journalist never cites the sources who say that the coalition is not running smoothly.

A similar series of articles appeared on June 11, 2004 about the division within the PKS party over whether to support Amien Rais or Hamzah Haz (Ely et al., 2004). Kompas raised the issue of which party PKS would support eleven days later, explaining vaguely why PKS had not yet decided on which the party to endorse (SMN & MAM, 2004). The PKS endorsement was announced at a press conference on June 30th and in the next morning’s edition of Kompas (MAM et al. 2004). The remainder of that same article covered support for other groups, political parties and persons to the other candidates. In the second round, PKS support for SBY was announced the day before elections in a speech at the Islamic Center in Jatimakmur and highlighted in the Election Day edition of Kompas (SAM & DWA, 2004).

In the textual analysis the discussion of political parties and their coalition building was prominent as the content analysis indicated. The content analysis of constituent perspectives also indicated that political parties were not key considerations for winning their vote. This is supported by political analysts, who after the first election and again after the second election, stated that political parties had grown distant from the electorate because they operate behind closed doors and assumed the public would follow (Wanandi, 2004; Taufiqurrahman, 2004). If it was clear after the first round that political parties had lost their influence because of their deal making, then why did Kompas choose to continue framing the political workings of the elections in terms of the political
parties? *Kompas* used the same frame to make sense of the elections for its readers in 2004, after major electoral reform, that it would have used in 1999 before direct elections. In the same spirit, *Kompas* chose to frame the elections in the manner preferred by the old-school party bosses and not the electorate.

*Candidate Affiliations*

The content analysis tool attempted to uncover the association of candidates in two ways: first by looking for discussion of their group affiliations, and second by asking whether negative coverage included negative association or guilt by association. The findings of the content analysis do not demonstrate that *Kompas* used group affiliations to discuss the candidate. Through the textual analysis, it became clear that association, particularly individual association, was used as a positive tool for candidates. In covering the campaign trails, reporters would list religious, political and civil society leaders who each candidate met with in that particular neighborhood or town. The article mentioned above about Wiranto’s condemnation of a video and the campaign activities of the other candidates is an example of this. While in Cirebon, Wiranto met with the *kiai* of a Muslim boarding school: KH Abdullah Abbas and KH Fuad Hasyim. In the same article, Rais was joined by his vice presidential candidate, Eros Djarot, Zainuddin MZ, AM Fatwa, Muktar Pakpahan, Dimi Haryanto and Aida Muhiyiara, all of them the leaders of other political parties (DHF et al., 2004). Aside from highlighting support and alliances with other political parties, *Kompas* surfaced the importance of religious *kiai*
and local NU and Muhammedyiah\textsuperscript{15} leaders in political decision-making by highlighting them and the candidates with them on the campaign trail.

A June 10, 2004 article is the most blatant use of personal association employed by Kompas, detailing the intellectuals backing candidates and with whom the candidates associate, a sort of Who’s Who List of who the candidates know (VIN & INU, 2004). The article is somewhat critical of Megawati and Wiranto for taking advantage of these persons, as though knowing the candidates is a negative association for intellectuals, not the candidates themselves.

The Absent Families

The absence of coverage about the candidate’s family continues the standards set by the Pancasila press and the unofficial rules of self-censorship: you don’t write about the family (Manzella, 2000). Kompas only discussed the families of the candidates from the nostalgic perspective, what the candidate is like around his wife or the character of the candidate as a child. Does the absence of character attacks or coverage of a candidate’s family imply that Kompas censors itself? There are few considerations: the first is that Kompas is a successful daily that knows its audience. The constituent perspectives did not link a president’s qualifications to family background. If the readers of Kompas will deride it as a gossiping tabloid or even as a disrespectful publication, then it does not make financial sense for Kompas. On the other hand, if journalists at Kompas consider their role as watchdogs over the government, they would be more vocal in

\textsuperscript{15} Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammedyiah are Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations. NU was a political organization stripped of that mandate during the Soeharto years.
talking about Jakarta’s best known secret: that Megawati’s politically powerful and corrupt husband has been powerful in her administration.

Candidate Image – Predator and Prey

The content analysis indicated that a candidate’s personality was not frequently covered. In the textual analysis, a different frame for developing a candidate’s image was surfaced one in which one candidate is portrayed as the victim of another predator candidate. The candidates seemed to battle tirelessly over victimization in the press. The most prominent example of Kompas using victimization to frame candidate image was a series of articles about investigation into the July 27 affair that attempted to oust all of Megawati’s support from the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in. 16

Megawati, projecting her image as the daughter of the victim first President Sukarno and as the heroine of the people, led the political opposition towards the end of the New Order regime. The attack on the PDI office and her leadership on July 27, 1996 resulted in rioting and dozens of deaths and strengthening Megawati’s position politically and among the people (Aspinall, 2005). The July 27 case was brought up again, reminding the public of Megawati’s history defending the people, but also casting a black shadow on SBY. Although the military is quiet about it and SBY himself denies any involvement, SBY was the head of the Indonesian military in Jakarta at the time. It

16 On July 27, 1996 the PDI headquarters was cordoned off by the military and police early in the morning. Trucks arrived carrying almost two hundred hired laborers and street thugs dressed in red t-shirts (red is the color of the PDI party). They attacked the PDI headquarters as the police and military looked on. Rioting ensued until the police and military led an attack on the building to bring calm. Almost 200 arrests were made, 56 buildings destroyed. While official figures state only four died, it is accepted that the death toll was much higher (Aspinall, 2005).
would be difficult for him to explain his role as less than organizing the attack ordered on the PDI headquarters. The July 27 investigation into who organized and implemented the attack remains “unsolved”.

*Kompas* then covered the issue in three articles that followed. The first article appears on June 5, 2004, “Sutiyoso: SBY Not Involved in July 27 Case” defends SBY by placing him in a different place and position at the time of the attack (ANT & J05, 2004). This article positions SBY as prey on the defensive, the victim of “false” accusations. The second article is suspiciously titled “Extending July 27 Investigation Not Connected to Presidential Election” and reports from the Police General the decision to extend the investigation of the July 27 case, focusing on the statements by the chief of police and the director of the Indonesian Forum for the Defense of Democracy. In the short six paragraph article, three paragraphs reiterate that the investigation is not related to the elections (SON & ANT, 2004).

The third article follows the next day, June 10, “Bringing up the July 27 Case Again Raises Many Questions” exemplifies the questioning reporting style of *Kompas* and introduces SBY as the victim (SIE et al., 2004). The article questions why discussion of the case emerges at the time of the election. The reporter quotes a criminology professor from the University of Indonesia: “Why bring it up again now? When our country is facing a presidential election. This case that will likely drag down SBY is full of political nuance” (SIE et al., 2004). *Kompas* criticizes the decision to revive the July 27 case by questioning the motives behind the decision. The article concludes with a statement that both allows Megawati to be the victim, but at the same time casts her as
one who now exploits her people, “Consider Megawati, who degrades the attack on the
PDI headquarters 8 years ago further by the transforming the victims, who shed blood in
the July 27 affair, into political commodities” (SIE et al., 2004).

In this set of stories, *Kompas* maneuvers through use of direct statements and
quotes from each side, SBY, the police (viewed as Megawati’s instrument), and finally
the neutral perspective from academics. Megawati’s side is never covered through direct
interviews. The repeated statement that the continuation of the case is unrelated to the
election may be true. Whether SBY was involved in the attack on the PDI headquarters
eight years before is a question that should be raised when he may possibly be (and
eventually was) chosen as leader of the country. Nonetheless, *Kompas* framed SBY as
the victim of Megawati as a manipulative politician who would use a national tragedy for
her own political gain.

*Blaming the Unnamed*

Balance was not the rule for all stories. Journalists claimed to be watchdogs and
at times responsibly criticize the government. Occasionally the reporters would be
critical of the candidates, usually directing the criticism at all of the candidates as in the
article “Presidential candidates have yet to identify the basic problems” (DWA, 2004a).
Despite the title, the accusation comes not from *Kompas*, but from speakers at a
conference of the Friends for the Reformation of the Indonesian Government.
Sometimes though, they did narrow in on one candidate, but only treading lightly.

*Kompas* reporters expertly dance around the issue and drop indirect accusations at
the end of articles that are critical. The article “Witness preparation for the presidential
elections misused” discusses how witnesses are prepped by some campaign teams to protest the counting and show support for their candidate, rather than as witnesses, citing the trend to only show up at the end of the counting (DOT, 2004). No accusations are made, but a hint is dropped in the final sentence “According to (Gunawan Hidayat), as far as the election monitors in the region have found, all of the cases stem from the bureaucratic machine that is trying to gain a win for a certain candidate” (DOT, 2004). Megawati, as the head of the executive branch, is the candidate associated with the bureaucratic machinery.

The Case of “Indonesia Success”

I first heard about Success Indonesia while consulting as an election observer with a former KPU official in Jakarta a few weeks before the second round of elections. This ex-official, who had left because he felt his work with NGOs conflicted with his role as a KPU official, suggested that the Carter Center look into the Indonesia Success contest to see who was really behind it. The question “who is really behind it” translates into “see if so-and-so is funding this contest illegally”.

Indonesia Success was a nationwide education scholarship contest for 14.1 billion Rupiahs (about $1.5 million). The winner was to be announced on September 18 on national television. Indonesia Success was sponsored by the Foundation for Investigation, Mediation and Monitoring, a foundation with suspected links to Megawati.

My colleague only needed to be asked whom he thought was behind it, but Kompas and other media outlets avoided connecting Megawati to the Indonesia Success contest. In an article on September 17, 2004, three days before the election, Kompas
reported that Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan Umum (Panwaslu) was investigating the contest, but skirted around the rationale (DIK & TRI, 2004):

According to Rozy (Panwaslu official), the problem with the contest is that among others there is a debate as to whether the contest happens to be linked with one of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates because the contest runs alongside the election. The contest also has the potential to degrade one of or both candidates.

The two journalists who wrote the story ensure that they use a source to describe the problem with the *Indonesia Success* contest. In paraphrasing the interview with the Panwaslu official M. Rozy Munir, they use ambivalent language: *antara lain adanya perdebatan*, “among others there is a debate”, removing the suspicion from both the reporters and the Panwaslu officials to make them appear as indifferent bystanders. The accidental form of “connected to”, *terkait*, is used, implying that if the candidate is connected to the contest then it is only by chance, not intentionally. Finally, the comment that the contest could affect both candidates also implies that the candidate behind the contest does not intentionally want to harm the opponent.

The *Indonesia Success* contest was covered in six articles, yet for most of the coverage of the contest, Megawati’s name was absent. In the first article, “KPU and Panwas take issue with the Indonesia Success advertisement”, the discussion is again questioning: does the Megawati administration’s support of this contest constitute campaigning or not? (IDR & DIK, 2004). The journalists are careful not to refer to Megawati’s candidacy or her campaign team, but rather talk about “Megawati’s government” (IDR & DIK, 2004). The next article on September 9, treads lightly around
the topic and balances the accusation of “veiled campaigning” between both Megawati and SBY (J10 et al., 2004). On September 14, 2004 a third article appeared with the defense from Megawati’s campaign team, in which they claim that they have no connection with the IMM, the sponsor of the contest. IMM also clarifies that Kompas made an error in its coverage that the advertisement is sponsored by “Megawati’s government” when the advertisement literally says, “the government at this time” (IDR, 2004b). In the remaining articles covering Indonesia Success neither Megawati’s name nor the name of any of her campaign team are mentioned. Rather, Kompas refers to the contest as having questionable support from “one of the candidates” (TRI & DIK, 2004; DIK, 2004d; DIK & TRI, 2004).

Furthermore, the assignment of the story fell on more than one journalist. Over the six articles, no one journalist contributed to all of them. DIK contributed to five of the six stories, but not always with the first byline. The ambiguous reporting of the Indonesia Success contest certainly protects the journalists and editors from accusations of libel. It is difficult to say whether the subtle reporting of the story reflects the Indonesian value of avoiding speaking unkindly about another, or whether the reporting reflects self-censorship by Kompas. Kompas chose the story, but not to investigate it. The story was framed to remove Megawati from the center of the story, even though Megawati is the center of the story.
RQ2: Which issues did Kompas select to highlight in this election year? How were those issues highlighted?

The content analysis suggested that discussion of issues did not dominate the political debate framed by Kompas. The textual analysis reinforced the results of the content analysis. Kompas blamed the lack of debate on the candidates in an article covering campaign activities on June 28, 2004 (OIN et al., 2004). The compiling journalist argues that none of the presidential candidates have discussed anything of substance, but have only presented issues in general terms. The article is one of many campaign activities articles and does not raise issues that need to be discussed, but rather dutifully reports the candidate’s campaign activities, including that Megawati was late to her appointment (OIN et al., 2004).

Kompas occasionally presented headlines about a candidate’s stance on an issue teasing readers with substance and then revealing an empty hat full of campaign promises. For example the article “Hasyim promises to counter corruption, Amien guarantees reconciliation” (ANT et al., 2004) suggests that these issues might be discussed raising debate between the stances of the different candidates. However, these articles, and many like them, are only highlighting statements taken from a campaign activity. The later parts of the article are followed by summaries of statements from the campaign activities of other candidates. Thus, articles leading with a position on an issue the article do not juxtapose the different positions of a candidate on an issue, rather summarizes what happened on the campaign trail the previous day.

There were several authors of the article, and one of them compiles their contributions into one whole article.
Corruption was identified as the most discussed issue by Kompas. Although corruption was discussed, it was often discussed in general terms and often in terms of campaign promises. Wiranto vowed at a rally not to fill his cabinet with corrupt officials (BUR et al., 2004). Vice presidential candidate Hasyim Muzadi promised a government clean of corruption if elected (ANT et al. 2004).

Other articles on corruption were mostly related to the candidates not releasing their financial statements to KPU or discrepancies within those statements. An article on politik uang (money politics) was the only article of the three hundred focusing specifically on an issue and the candidates’ stance towards the issues (SUT et al., 2004). The article failed in that it mirrored the coverage of campaign activities, reciting quotes from the candidates and lacking any investigative substance.

The content analysis revealed that economy and poverty were the main issues discussed by the candidates and by the public. This proved true in the textual analysis as well. However, again the economy and poverty were spoken of in general terms, usually in quoting a candidate’s statement at a rally or campaign activity. There were no articles that discussed each candidate’s plan or stance on improving the economy. In the article “Candidates have Yet to Identify Basic Problems” on June 15, 2004 several important economic issues were raised, for example the trial of conglomerates, who were friends of Soeharto, over assets that went missing during the New Order (DWA 2004a). As mentioned earlier, this article was based on workshop by the executive directory of Friends for the Reformation of the Indonesian Government.
Kompas covered some issues that were not identified among the categories. Two major themes emerged: the role of religion and the religious in politics, and legal reform.

The Role of Religion in Politics

The role of religion in politics first surfaced at the beginning of the campaign season with a statement from Salahuddin Wahid, the vice presidential candidate for Wiranto, that according to Islamic law, women are not fit to be President. The statement was picked up by Kompas and framed as a debate between Salahuddin Wahid and Hasyim Muzadi, Megawati’s vice presidential candidate. Both Wahid and Muzadi are prominent figures in the NU, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization.

Kompas first reported the debate on June 5, 2004 in the article “Not wise to use religious norms in presidential competition” (NMP et al., 2004) The issue of women in politics is linked directly to the two candidates and the debate over which position the NU supports. Muzadi’s perspective is reported first, stating that the declaration that it is “against religious doctrine to choose a woman, is a sin against Megawati”18 and thus positioning Megawati as the victim. Kompas covers Muzadi’s outcry for five paragraphs before putting Salahuddin Wahid on the defensive.

Although the issue is directly linked to the two candidates, the discussion in the article is to remove religion from politics. Kompas avoids taking sides by taking a stronger stance against the inclusion of religion in political matters. Half of the first article and the second article on June 7, 2004, “Politicization of Religion quickly Escalates physically among the public” (NWO et al, 2004) follow up on the theme of the

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18 My translation.
dangers that incur when allowing religion and politics to blend. The story was taken from a roundtable discussion with NU leaders, Islamic academics, the head of the Human Rights Commission, the executive director for the Center for Electoral Reform, and other civil society leaders (NWO et al., 2004). Thus, Kompas quells the discussion of the role of women in politics with regards to religion.

Legal Reform

In the roundtable discussion following the content analysis, I asked the coders if they felt there was a category missing in the “Issues” section of the analysis tool. All of them agreed immediately that legal reform was raised frequently by candidates and constituent experts, such as university leaders and civil society group leaders. In the article “Democracy needs to be supported by progressive law” (J10, 2004), the journalist covers a talk given by a university law professor on how law creates an autonomous institution among the people that is necessary for democracy. Another article on KPU (IDR, 2004a) and campaign violations begins with criticism of the KPU, but uses the problem as a springboard to discuss the need for legal reform to empower Panwaslu and KPU to better and more expediently investigate violations. Similar to previous issues, Kompas did not raise the issue of legal reform independently, but instead relied on statements by the Indonesian Corruption Watch and Transparency International.

Kompas’s coverage of issues was weak. None of the articles read for textual analysis brought together different nuanced views towards an issue. Kompas presented the different sides of the women in politics issue, but did not dig into independent sources
about the debate. Kompas’s coverage of issues was as general and unexamined as the sweeping promises made by the candidates.

*RQ3: How did Kompas frame the political process of the first direct presidential elections?*

On Election Day, voting takes place in the morning and ends around one o’clock in the afternoon. After a short lunch break for the poll workers, the counting at the polling station begins. The turn around is able to happen quickly because Election Day is a national holiday, and because the voter list is limited to around 300 persons for each station. The fast turn around is intended to yield quick results and limit opportunities for election fraud.

The vote counting process during the first round almost immediately revealed a nation-wide contest for ballot validity as it became clear that almost half the ballots were double punched, rendering them invalid votes. Ballots were designed with a fold to maintain the confidentiality of the vote as it was placed in the ballot box. However, voters did not unfold the ballots completely, resulting in almost one out of two ballots double punched.\(^{19}\)

In the aftermath of the double-punching incident, both mass media and the KPU were blamed for poor voter education on the specifics of the voting process. If the role of the press is to educate the public, how specific should that education be? As the content analysis indicated, Kompas was almost excessive in its informational role and at times

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\(^{19}\) The ballots double-punched as described, with one hole through the candidates and the other hole through blank space, were deemed by KPU to be valid since the error showed no preference to any candidate.
called readers to action. *Kompas* called on constituents to take part in the election and encouraged voters to choose according to their conscience and refuse bribes or other favors from the campaign teams. A one-half page spread in the Politics and Law section on June 30, a week before the election, titled “Protect Your Conscious Vote” (DIK, 2004e) laid out in detail the new Election Law, the difference between the new direct elections and past elections, the process of voting and vote counting on election day, and inauguration of a new president. *Kompas* used a different format of bullet points and numbered lists to help readers digest the mass of information and made the article suitable for clipping out of the newspaper to follow the process. The article speaks directly to the reader “Do not fear the ‘dawn attacks’ (the wave of vote buying on the election morning) in its various forms that will try to unsettle your decision. Now is the time to make your decision firm so that its genuineness is protected!” (DIK, 2004c). The article thus not only informs and calls citizens to vote, it also implies that protecting each vote is protecting democracy.

*Kompas* was devoted in covering information released by the KPU, from articles declaring 5 July and 20 July national holidays to reporting the special voting instruments for the blind to providing updates on the status of the distribution of ballots and ballot boxes. *Kompas* covered KPU’s activities almost daily from preparation to citing campaign violations against candidates.

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20 Exact translation does not capture cultural meaning. The voter education programs all carried a similar theme *pilih dengan hati nurani*, meaning vote with your conscience. This phrase became important in teaching citizens that democracy had arrived and one was not obligated to vote by party or influenced by bribes. The title of the article carries this with it, not just to protect individual heartfelt votes, but also to protect democracy.
The detailed reporting of KPU’s daily activities also raises some unsettling questions about the investigative courage of *Kompas*. Two reporters, DIK and IDR covered all but eight of the articles devoted to KPU. They religiously reported KPU’s budgetary shortfalls, quoting the head of KPU that the election may not take place in some districts if the DPR did not approve more funds*(DIK, 2004b; DWA, 2004b).* The government bent to pressure and released additional funds just before the second round of elections took place.

Although *Kompas* reported each step of the logistical preparations for the elections as well as KPU’s expenditures and voter education costs, reporters failed to investigate the story. Rather, *Kompas* loyally reported on each statement by KPU that they lacked funds. As an election observer, I received these statements from KPU as well and logged them in my reports that in certain areas KPU worried that there would be no election because they had no funds. At the same time, I began to hear rumors of corruption in KPU at the national level. I heard these not only as an election observer, but from journalist friends who were skeptical about the elections if the KPU, an independent commission composed of academics vocal for democratization, were as corrupt as the rumors claimed. Six months after the year elections, an audit report by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) revealed corrupt activities in the KPU involving more the Rp 90 million ($9.47 million) of the Rp 800 billion ($85.6 million) procured for election activities *(Ritonga, 2005).* The chairman of KPU and former leading political scientist, Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, personally received Rp 5.3 billion ($521 million) in kickbacks.

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21 The KPU originally received Rp 4 trillion ($421 million) for operational costs and the elections from the People’s Representative Assembly *(Ritonga, 2005).*
from an insurance company that won a Rp 14.9 billion ($1.57 billion) contract with the
KPU (Sijabat, 2005). It is puzzling that Indonesia’s most respected newspaper would fail
to tune into the well-known rumors and recognize the repeated statements pressuring
Parliament to release funds as something a little smellier than rotten fish. At the same
time, Gans (1979) and Shoemaker & Reese (1996) explain this behavior by examining
the routines of journalists and accessing official sources, particularly government
officials to follow storylines.

There may be another explanation: everyone wanted the elections to be a success.
KPU advertised heavily on television and in the newspapers, urging people to vote. In
the five cities I visited during that time, banners were strung up in cities centers calling
for peaceful and fair elections. Furthermore, during these definitive elections Indonesia
was in the international eye. Not only was the Carter Center monitoring the 2004
elections, but also the EU sent a monitoring delegation of almost 200 persons. Perhaps
the 2004 elections were imagined as a hurdle to testify to the international community,
and more importantly to the Indonesian nation, that the country is firmly on the path to
stability and the consolidation of democratic reformations. If the elections were
perceived this way, then it could motivate novice journalists to ignore where the elections
fail.

Clearly, *Kompas’s* access to KPU served KPU’s interests, but the arrangement
with the government officials also provided fodder for stories about the campaign.*Kompas*
used the KPU and Panwas in order to publicly check the candidates for
corruption in campaign financing. The June 11 article about the discrepancies in
donations and expenditures reported by candidates and actual amounts highlights this
technique by focusing on an press release and conference by Transparency International
(SON, 2004). No investigative journalism follows up the reports of illegal donations or
other violations.

*Kompas* journalists protect themselves from appearing overly critical by
countering bold statements later in the article. A similar article appears a week later,
breaking down campaign financing violations per candidate (IDR, 2004a). Titled “KPU
is not proactive in capturing candidential money politics”, the article begins with
criticism of the KPU, but quickly shifts gears to describe the faults of the legal system in
empowering Panwaslu to investigate election finances. By the end of the article, the
writers conclude that KPU’s hands are tied in investigating and revealing violations, and
taking action.

*Kompas* also reported instances of campaign violations made available through
KPU and Panwas. On 10 June, only a week and a half into campaigning, *Kompas*
published the article “All the Presidential candidates have committed violations” that
deals with the candidates both collectively, and breaking down the number of campaign
violation incidents per candidate pair (DWA & SIE, 2004). The article deals with the
violations gently, explaining the causes for so many violations as human error in the
provinces.
RQ4: *How were the perspectives of constituents and non-politically aligned constituents selected and represent in the articles?*

The results of the content analysis revealed that *Kompas* sought perspectives from constituents and surfaced some topics of those perspectives: opinions on issues, what they are looking for in a president, and even their candidate preference. The content analysis lacked a category for who the constituents were and the context in which they were engaged.

Two types of constituent perspective articles emerged in the textual analysis: those focusing on statements by experts and those focusing on the political perspectives of a region. There were also other constituent contributions interlaced in articles with a different focus, usually a representative from an organization providing a political reading, for example, on resurrecting the July 27 case, or the comment from a street vendor present at a Megawati campaign rally (BUR, 2004).

*Kompas* ran a series of articles covering what constituents sought in a president and whom they tended to favor. Different provinces of Indonesia were featured each week, highlighting the problems and atmosphere of that region. They interviewed constituents, taxi drivers, street vendors, and students to frame what the election was about for that region, by seeking out from constituents what they considered the most pressing issues and what qualities people were looking for in a president. For example, students in Yogyakarta prefer a president who is not a charismatic leader of people, but who can govern well (K07 & BSW, 2004). A fruit seller in the same city says “I want a president who will protect the little people. I have five children and right now they are all
unemployed. A president who can give the people work is the president I will choose” (K07 & BSW, 2004). In the island group, Nusa Tenggara Barat, the citizens expect a president who will bring peace and security to the region (chaerul Anwar, 2004). The constituency in West Kalimantan wants a president brave enough to bring real economic and political change (M. Syaifullah, 2004). The constituent perspectives also got the opinion of the people about the elections and democracy in general. In Bandung, the fourth largest city in Indonesia, those interviewed criticized KPU for not enough voter education (K02, 2004).

Academics and civil society leaders not representative of parties and who represented larger populations were often selected for interviews. The director of the Bandung Institute of Governance Studies was interviewed about his research of the political perceptions of the citizens of Bandung (K02, 2004). A professor of economics at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta was quoted from a speech to students about needed economic structuring (K07 & BSW, 2004). The constituent perspective series also assessed the viability of each candidate in that region. Early in the race, they reported SBY’s increasing popularity in Nusa Tenggara Barat and East Kalimantan (chaerul Anwar, 2004; Prasetyo, 2004). Many of these same articles broke down how many votes each candidate was aiming and expecting to win in that region. In East Kalimantan, Wiranto’s team targeted 35% of the vote and Rais sought 30% (Prasetyo, 2004).

*Kompas* also selected constituents that would raise issues or allude to accusations against a candidate. A more specific content analysis would likely reveal an overlap in
the discussion of issues and the constituent perspective articles sourced from experts and organizations. Indonesian Corruption Watch provided all the material pointing to corruption in Megawati’s Attorney General’s office (SIE et al., 2004). The same organization along with Transparency International provided the key quotes for an article about KPU’s laxity of addressing corruption within the campaign financing (IDR., 2004a). The assertions and conclusions were all quotes from experts in these organizations.

Academics, commission heads and religious leaders were also in the pool of constituents approached or approaching Kompas. An article title “Democracy needs progressive laws” was entirely taken from a talk the journalist attended by legal expert Satjipto Rahardjo from Dipenegoro University in Semerang (J10, 2004). The head of the independent government Commission of Indonesian Broadcasters issued statements about the freedom of the press and warning against the revitalization of the Ministry of Information that were picked up by Kompas. Finally, the opinions of religious leaders were covered, such as in the case of the role of women in politics.

How Kompas selected these constituents, experts, academics, civil society and religious leaders is difficult to determine. Some of the articles are from press conferences or workshops. Kompas interviewed people on the street, but also took advantage of being present at campaign rallies and talks by experts to access other opinions. The political mapping was largely based on information from the campaign teams and not from independent groups or academics in that region. The textual analysis suggests that Kompas reporters sought information predominantly from the campaign teams and then
attended the non-politically aligned workshops, speeches and press conferences to which they had been invited. This means of information seeking for news stories may point to the sort of journalistic routines and newsroom factors that the composing of a storyline (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Tuchman, 1978).

**Summary**

The textual analysis confirmed many of the findings of the content analysis. Political parties and coalition building were the focus of most of the discussion about candidates and the campaign. In addition to the political parties, the category of personal affiliations, who the candidates met with and won the support of as they visited various regions, emerged. Megawati did receive the most weight, although it was not necessarily positive. A new candidate image frame was also surfaced, the positive frame of a candidate as the underdog or victim of another. The textual analysis also raised two new issues discussed in the election coverage: the role of religion in politics and legal reform. Corruption was frequently discussed, but often in general terms and referencing KPU and Panwas investigations into campaign finances.

The textual analysis strengthened the finding that *Kompas* rarely raised issues independently, but through the use of experts and attending workshops sponsored by concerned organizations. Issues were not debated within articles among key players nor investigated further when experts raised the importance of progressive law, for example. The de-emphasis on issues is reinforced by the importance given to political parties and the KPU. The KPU did receive almost daily coverage in *Kompas* suggesting a close
working relationship. The questioning or criticism of KPU was removed from KPU and blamed on the poor legal system.

Finally, the constituent perspective frame included voices from the region that would often be ignored. The frame reinforced that it was issues that were important to constituents and experts alike. However, as the discussion of issues indicated, Kompas chose not to investigate further into the concerns raised by constituents.
Discussion and Conclusion

A year and a half after the presidential elections in one of Southeast Asia’s newest democracies, Indonesian government is trying and convicting the members of the KPU for massive corruption during the 2004 elections. In the Philippines, the region’s oldest democracy, the government is shutting down newspapers and threatening broadcast stations in response to a failed coup attempt and massive protests for the president to step down after evidence of corruption and fraud during their 2004 elections. Although young, it appears that Indonesia is moving towards greater democratization and not towards a backlash of authoritarianism.

Discussion of Findings

The content analysis and textual analysis surfaced four independent media frames to make sense of the elections for its readers: political association, predator and prey, organizational process, and constituent perspectives. The political association frame characterizes the candidates according to the associations with which the candidates engage. This includes the coalition building by political parties. The candidate whose party receives the support of Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), for example, wins the association with members of PKS and of the specific Muslim organizations that support the party. Political association is also indicated through a candidate’s meeting with other prominent political, religious, and civil society leaders. The political associations are chosen by the candidate, but through demonstrating the associations, Kompas is able to characterize the candidate without using descriptive labels, such as, fundamentalist, liberal, authoritarian, moral right, nationalist, etc.
The predator and prey frame portrays one candidate as the victim of predacious behavior by another. The victim is not portrayed as huddling in the corner, rather trying to defend himself or herself from the attacker. Thus, the prey is not just a victim, but also a survivor, a characterization commonly cast in Indonesian television dramas. The predator and prey frame merits further study as a dependent variable. The frame is one that is played out in real time as candidates vie for the role of the victim to gain public sympathy and emerge the survivor.

The organizational process frame describes the elections as an organizational process that is logistically detailed and complex, and broad in jurisdiction from citing campaign violations, monitoring campaign funding, educating the public, declaring the election days, and determining the validity of the vote. *Kompas*’s coverage of the electoral commission is a primer in the details of organizing an election on an island nation for more than 100 million voters.

This case study of *Kompas*’s framing of the elections reveals the import that journalists continue to give to official sources, party politics, and political elites in determining the presidential elections. That *Kompas* did not spark debate on issues, even when mentioned as important by constituents, only highlights that elections are best understood through coalition building and political association. The election of SBY from a small and new party demonstrated that traditional party politics sparring for power through closed anti-democratic coalition building does not work anymore. Rather, the elections are more entangled in the rough terrain of the public sphere. As political elites sought advantages, *Kompas* introduced another player onto the field: the voter.
The constituent perspectives frame captured the expectations of voters and civil society groups for the elections. The nature of this frame is the most vague because the articles were not set into storylines, but rather stood on their own. These frames capture constituents, not as party followers, but individuals with concerns about issues, such as the economy and corruption, that they want to hear the candidates address. As a result, this frame is conflicts with the underlying assumptions of the previous frames. The previous frames assume that political parties and political elites determine the outcome of the election. The underlying assumption of the constituent perspective frame is that voters will *nurani hati*, from their pure conscience, on the basis their qualifications and standards.

*Consistency between Methods*

This study analyzed the framing of the elections using content analysis to lay a quantitative basis for understanding the frames and a textual analysis to flesh out the findings and surface elements not captured in the content analysis. The content analysis is not thorough in capturing the subtleties and hues of a frame. Entman (1993) argues that not all statements are either positive or negative and that deeper meaning is salient in the context in which it sits. Furthermore, the positive-negative dichotomy may ignore other influential understandings of the frame (Entman, 1993). The content analysis tool demonstrated the insufficiency of evaluating the reporting positively or negative by its inconsistency with the findings of the textual analysis. The content analysis demonstrated that *Kompas* reporters did not criticize nor report candidates negatively, whereas the textual analysis revealed subtle strategies of creating victims and placing
subjects on the defense. The content analysis tool also did not capture the importance that religion played in framing the elections. The textual analysis also demonstrated the importance of a candidate’s personal affiliation with other political, religious and community leaders that not seen in the content analysis.

Overall, the textual analysis supported and gave depth to the findings of the content analysis. The content analysis found that parties were the most frequent frame for discussing the candidates. The textual analysis deepened this by showing how *Kompas* detailed the coalition building strategies of the parties during the elections to gain voter support. The content analysis also showed a lack of discussion of the issues. The issue vacuum deepened as the discussion of issues was shallow, a line in a rally or coverage of a workshop by an outside organization. Both methods also revealed unsettling positive coverage of KPU activities. Two reporters covered the electoral commission beat with very little criticism or investigation.

**Shortcomings of the Study**

The joy of doing this research is that now, at the end, I know exactly how I would do this project. There are two shortcomings that concern me in this thesis and that I would take into consideration should I do this project again. The first of these is in relating current reporting to the reporting style during the New Order. The second of these shortcomings follows from the theoretical approach in creating the content analysis tool.
What is to be done with the Pancasila Press?

In researching and writing this thesis, I wrestled the most with whether to compare *Kompas*’s reporting style with what it was in the New Order era. In other words, to ask the question, how far has *Kompas* come in fulfilling the mandate of the press as watchdog since the end of the New Order? Almost all the current literature in media studies examines the press in Soeharto’s New Order or how traces of it still can be seen today. The New Order and its impact on journalism in Indonesia should not be ignored. Investigative journalism skills are lacking in Indonesia and reporters are hesitant to challenge the government or raise sensitive issues. There are stories today that deserve investigation: corruption in the courts and in the utilities system. *Kompas* gives a shallow report, but does not challenge (*tempo*). Were I to have formed a different analysis tool and focused on comparing current journalism with that supported during the New Order, I would be able to describe how far *Kompas* has or has not come.

I chose not to take a New Order comparative approach in my thesis despite the literature. The decision came when watching an interview with an American academic on a talk show on an Indonesian version of Larry King Live. He discussed with the moderator the issue that Indonesia has not lost the ‘New Order mentality’. The question arose in my mind whether it is the Indonesian people who still have a ‘New Order mentality’ or academics from outside who cannot break away from the New Order. The New Order era, like the Cold War, provides an anchor for scholars and researchers to reference. Without the New Order comparative tool, we can feel adrift in our studies. At the same time, the New Order as a reference point focuses attention on specific actions,
ideology and phenomena, and as a result, turns our attention away from other possible points of departure in understanding the system.

It was for this reason that I decided to review the Pancasila Press paradigm as a part of the history of the Indonesian press, but not to bring that paradigm into the analysis. While I now believe that this was the right decision for my study, it is a shortcoming of the thesis. There is data in this research study that is better interpreted through the Pancasila Press lens, particularly in style, but also in content and the selection of sources.

*What to Look for in the Content Analysis?*

This leads me to the second major shortcoming of the thesis – the content analysis tool. The content analysis tool was designed to extract the general content of the articles and did not tease out elements that could be considered more ‘Indonesian’ or ‘New Order’. Examples of this are negative reporting, choosing sources, and positioning personalities within the article.

*Negative and Positive Reporting*

Negative reporting in Kompas is subtle, but not difficult to pinpoint if the right questions are asked. Rather than looking for approaches such as name-calling or humor, I would include categories such as ‘indirect association to a negative incident’, ‘campaign violation accusations’, and ‘confused about candidate’s position/actions’. I would keep the negative association category, even though the results were minimal because of the role that positive association played in some of the articles.
I would further expand the content analysis tool to look at how candidates are covered positively. One of these ways is by painting one of the candidates as a victim or underdog. *Kompas* journalists also portrayed candidates positively to the audience by listing important religious and political leaders, figureheads, civil society and other opinion leaders. Not only would I highlight positive association, but in doing the content analysis again, I would also categorize the type of leaders used for positive association.

**Information Sources**

In the textual analysis it became clear that *Kompas* relies more on its sources for direct quotes and composing the story than I had anticipated. The content analysis tool could be much improved by inquiring for information sources and the context in which that information was received, for example, campaign activities, rallies, press conference, or workshops. Furthermore, in understanding constituent opinion the content analysis tool fails to identify whom the experts and citizens are that *Kompas* contacts for input. In this category, I would also ask whether opinions about issues raised in the article are voiced by the journalist or by the information source. One of the major shortcomings of *Kompas* is the failure to raise issues. While the content analysis did demonstrate it, a stronger tool would have painted a clearer picture.

**Positioning of Persons in Articles**

I suspect that the positioning of persons in an article became important in how the story was framed, particularly in stories that cast a candidate or person as a victim. This is conjecture without a quantitative basis through which to understand the story. Furthermore, the placement of a candidate’s or person within the article may also indicate
Kompas’s support or dislike for a candidate. This approach would have changed the character of the content analysis tool, but I believe give us a better understanding as to how Kompas frames a personality positively or negatively.

Overall, the content analysis tool bore a Western bias towards investigating the coverage of the elections in Kompas. It failed to tease out some of the trends identified in the textual analysis about negative and positive coverage, personal affiliations, and the sources of information. While it did reveal major schemes in framing, the content analysis tool with these additions would surface more subtle aspects of framing in Kompas.

One of the weaknesses of the methods used was the limited ability to do a chi-square analysis for the significance of the data from the content analysis. The content analysis tool unearthed interesting findings that were supported by the textual analysis. However, the difficulty of calculating a chi-square suggests that a better tool could have produced better data. The content analysis tool could be considered a shortcoming of this study, but my rationale for using an exploratory tool rests in breaking away from the dominant normative theory paradigm and percolating new trends.

*Indonesia’s Press Today*

Since reformasi the Indonesian press is no longer a partner of the government. Kompas, the New Order newspaper “par excellence”, also is clearly no longer the sole partner of the government. Indonesia’s press is sophisticated in negotiating the new realities of a changing government. Although the incumbent received the most press coverage, the coverage was not loyal coverage, demonstrating that the press are no longer
the government’s partners. However, this is contradicted by Kompas’s treatment of the independent electoral commission. Kompas is using its new freedoms to branch out to include the voices of constituents, religious leaders, civil society groups and watchdogs. The result is that Indonesia’s democratic press appears to continue to value elite and government sources in their information seeking and sourcing for stories as suggested by Shoemaker and Reese (1996). The textual analysis highlighted this, noting the lack of diversity of sources and investigation into stories, and reconfirming McCune’s (2003) study of how political elites and social movements work with the press so as to influence frames according to their worldview.

The greater freedom of the Indonesian press in this transition does not only free it from its government, it also opens the press up to savvy political interest groups and organizations with a desire to mold a different political perspective. The newspaper’s silence in sparking debate or raising the issues important to readers reinforces that the press is “a venue in which groups with conflicting worldviews attempt to establish their perspective as dominant” (McCune, 2003, p.7), giving various interest groups an opportunity to bring the issue to Kompas. However, Kompas failed to investigate or juxtapose opposing views, usually opting to present one criticism or observation from a source at a time. The press is no more free or democratic if it acts as the mouthpiece for an independent watchdog group than it is when speaking for the government.

Attempts at developing new theories for the press in transitioning societies should also be understood in terms of the influence of social and new political forces on the stage. Several studies look at this from the macro-perspective, examining the
institutional changes of individual countries (Curran & Parks, 2000; Hallin, 2000; Sparks, 2000). Press theory in Indonesia is dominated by the paradigms of the New Order (Sen, 2002), prompting the need for study that breaks away from the regime that fell eight years ago. This thesis looks at changes in the press through a case study of how Indonesia’s largest circulating daily framed the 2004 elections. Indonesia’s press is allowing new voices to enter and dominate a discussion, but as it does so it lays open new vulnerabilities. Not only for the free press, but for the audience that selects its leaders based on the worldview of the organizations savvy in attracting the spotlight.

Epilogue

My grandmother was the daughter of Irish immigrants who settled in Chicago. After turning 21, on the morning of her first election as a constituent, she sat at the kitchen table reading the newspaper’s description of each of the candidates. My great-grandfather Doyle entered and asked her what she was doing. Choosing whom she was going to vote for, she explained to him. So long as the Doyle family lives in Chicago, my great-grandfather flared, we vote Democrat. The Democrats take care of us and the Democrats ensure that there is food on the table and peace in the city. So long as you live in this family, you vote Democrat.

While walking with my host family to the polls for the first round of presidential elections, I thought of this story told to me by my great-uncle Joe. Although each of my host parents knew who they were going to vote for that day, they brought along a clipping from Kompas that outlined each candidate, their party and platform as given to
the newspaper. Before going up to vote, they each reviewed it again. Both voted for new parties and not for the party to which they belonged.

*Kompas* impressed me on that day because of these two spreads. I have voted in three presidential elections in the United States. In neither Indiana nor Ohio have my local papers detailed the process of voting. None of my local papers in Indiana detailed the candidates according to party and platform. In Ohio, the local paper did run a series on the candidates for local elections. When I entered the voting booth in Ohio for the 2004 US Presidential Elections the setting and way in which to vote were unfamiliar. When Indonesians entered the polling area, they knew exactly what to expect. It was because of this that *Kompas* first impressed me, sparking the first thoughts for this thesis.

My initial views of *Kompas* were rather romantic, as the paper seemed to stress educating the public and remaining unbiased. They were enchanting as a model development journalism newspaper. However, when the numbers began to emerge from the content analysis, *Kompas* no longer appeared to be a model newspaper for educating the public and supporting the democratic process. The textual analysis reinforced the findings that *Kompas* failed to spark debate and raise the issues that were important for constituents in the 2004 elections.

*Kompas* is negotiating the new realities of democracy with the old paradigm of the *Pancasila* press. Just as *Kompas* must learn that the old perspective cannot be applied today, Indonesian press theorists must also begin to turn their attention to the influence of new social players on the press. The Democrats in Chicago relied on Irish families like
my grandmother’s to keep them in power, not paying attention that a new generation
might raise their children to discern on their own and vote Republican.
References


Gazali, E. (2002). The Suharto regime and its fall through the eyes of the media.

*Gazette: the International Journal for Communication Studies* 64 (2), 121-140.


APPENDIX A - Government Structure

The People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)

The People’s Consultative Assembly is the core central government entity established in Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution. The MPR is required to meet as a whole once every 5 years. Votes are determined within the organ by a majority rule. The MPR is composed of five branches:

1. The House of Representatives (DPR)
2. The Presidency
3. The Supreme Advisory Council (DPA)
4. The Supreme Court (MA)
5. The State Audit Board

The tasks of the MPR are to determine the Constitution (and any Amendments) and set guidelines of state policy. Before the Presidential Elections in 1999, the People’s Consultative Assembly also elected the President and Vice-President.

The Presidency

The President of Indonesia serves as the head of state and the chief executive. The term of office is five years with the possibility for re-election. The President is the Mandatory [define] of the MPR and responsible for the conduct of the entire government. The President is the Supreme Commander of the Indonesian Army, Navy and Air Force. The President has the power to declare war, make peace and sign treaties with other nations (Chapter 3, Indonesian Constitution 1945).

The House of Representatives (DPR)
The government submits bills to the House of Representatives, who then deliberates and passes them. The House of Representatives may also draft their own laws. Bills are passed by a simple majority (Article 21, Indonesian Constitution 1945). A bill becomes a law when signed by the President. Starting in April 2004, members of the House of Representatives are elected in a national election by their party according to the percentage of votes the party receives nationally.

The Supreme Advisory Council (DPA)

The Supreme Advisory Council is responsible for answering any questions the President may have about the government. The Council can also make recommendations to the President in relation to state affairs. The members are nominated by the House for a period of five years (Article 16, Indonesian Constitution 1945).

The Supreme Court (MA)

The Supreme Court is independent of the executive and legislative branches (Article 24, Indonesian Constitution 1945). The Supreme Court and the Judicial Branch is currently undergoing extensive reforms that are raising a lot of controversy.

The State Audit Board

The State Audit Board examines all the state finances. They submit their findings to the House for the composition of a new budget. The budget is set by the House of Representatives. If they do not pass a budget, they are constitutionally required to use the budget from the preceding year (Article 23, Indonesian Constitution 1945).
APPENDIX B - *KOMPAS* Newspaper Article Code Sheet

**Article Information**

1. Coder ID # (1-4) 
   _____

2. Artifact ID # (001-320) 
   _____

3. Date (month/day) 
   _____

4. Name or initials of journalist (code 0, if not present) 
   __________

5. Number of paragraphs (001-200): 
   _____

6. Candidate representation in paragraphs (01-99): 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Megawati</th>
<th>Wiranto</th>
<th>Rais</th>
<th>SBY</th>
<th>Haz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Focus of the Article**

7. Dominant focus of the article (a – g): 
   _____
   a. Candidate (if a candidate, which one (0-4)) 
      (0) Megawati 
      (1) Wiranto 
      (2) Rais 
      (3) SBY 
      (4) Haz 
   b. All the candidates 
   c. General political news 
   d. Issues/policies 
   e. Campaign activities 
   f. Election process or regulations 
   g. Constituent perspectives 
   h. Other (if other, what? _____________________________)
I. Candidates

Discussion of candidate:
(0) if not present
(1) present and positive
(2) present and negative

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Megawati</th>
<th>Wiranto</th>
<th>Rais</th>
<th>SBY</th>
<th>Haz</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Candidate’s professional background and qualifications:</td>
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<td>9. Candidate’s personality:</td>
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<td>10. Candidate’s position on issues</td>
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<td>11. Candidate’s party affiliation:</td>
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<td>12. Candidate’s political experience:</td>
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<td>13. Candidate’s family:</td>
<td></td>
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<td>14. Candidate’s group affiliations:</td>
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</table>

Overall treatment of candidate:
(0) Candidate not present
(1) Positive
(2) Negative
(3) Balanced

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Megawati</th>
<th>Wiranto</th>
<th>Rais</th>
<th>SBY</th>
<th>Haz</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. Overall treatment of candidate in the article:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Overall treatment of candidate in the article heading:</td>
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</table>

Overall participation of candidate:
(0) Candidate not present
(1) Active
(2) Passive

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Megawati</th>
<th>Wiranto</th>
<th>Rais</th>
<th>SBY</th>
<th>Haz</th>
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<tr>
<td>17. Overall participation of candidate in the article:</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Overall participation of candidate in the article heading:</td>
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19. If the article or heading is negative, identify the strategy used by the journalist:
(1) Humor/ridicule
(2) Negative association
(3) Name calling
(4) Guilt by Association
(5) Not applicable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of negativity</th>
<th>Megawati</th>
<th>Wiranto</th>
<th>Rais</th>
<th>SBY</th>
<th>Haz</th>
</tr>
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</table>

20. Candidate viability:
(0) Not applicable
(1) Frontrunner/likely to win
(2) Contender/competitive
(3) Loser/unlikely to win

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate viability</th>
<th>Megawati</th>
<th>Wiranto</th>
<th>Rais</th>
<th>SBY</th>
<th>Haz</th>
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II. Issues

Issue representation:
(0) Not Present
(1) Present
(2) Present with link to candidate
(3) Present with link to the candidate with policy position
(4) Present with link to audience/public

21. Economy

22. Violence

23. Corruption (KKN)

24. Crime

25. War in Aceh

26. Education

27. Poverty

28. Environment

29. Ethics/moral decline

30. Security/military (not related to Aceh)

31. Democracy

32. Dominant issue (code 21 – 31, or 00)
33. Source of credibility about issue
   (1) Direct quote or paraphrase of statement by candidate or spokesperson
   (2) No direct quote or statement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of credibility</th>
<th>Mega</th>
<th>Wiranto</th>
<th>Rais</th>
<th>SBY</th>
<th>Haz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

III. Democracy and Election Process

Democratic Process
   (0) Not applicable
   (1) Critical/Questioning
   (2) Informative
   (3) Informative linked with action

34. Discussion of KPU preparation activities

35. Discussion of voting process

36. Discussion of election reforms and regulations

37. Discussion of election monitoring

38. Discussion of democracy in general

IV. Constituent perspectives

Expression of constituent perceptions
   (0) Not interested
   (1) Active

39. Constituent opinion on issues

40. Constituent preference for candidate

41. Constituent perspective regarding the election process

42. Constituent desires or expectations for new president
43. Constituent qualifications for president (code all that apply)
   a. Personality
   b. Experience
   c. Family Background
   d. Stance on issues
   e. Moral standing
   f. Party Affiliation
   g. Not applicable

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent Qualifications</th>
<th>Megawati</th>
<th>Wiranto</th>
<th>Rais</th>
<th>SBY</th>
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APPENDIX C - KOMPAS Newspaper Article Codebook

Article Information

2. Coder ID # identifies the number assigned to each coder (1-3) during the training session. Use the number assigned to you during the training session.

3. Article ID # indicates the published article or composition under analysis. Use the three digit identification number written in red on the front of each individual article (001-300).

4. Publication date indicates the day and the month in which the article under analysis was printed. Use the publication date written in red at the top of each article under analysis.

5. Identify the journalist(s) credited with the byline to the article: (code 1 if present, 0 if not present)

6. Number of paragraphs (001-100) Count the number of paragraphs printed in the article under analysis. A paragraph may be one line or several lines in length. Paragraphs are to be identified by the indentation of left side column alignment. Use three digits to indicate the number of paragraphs (i.e., 001 to indicate one paragraph).

7. Candidate representation (01-99) Count the number of paragraphs in which the presidential candidates' first and/or last names are printed. Record the number of paragraphs using two digits (i.e., 01 to indicate the number 1). Since the presidential candidates will vary according to the article under analysis, the specific candidates' names will appear on the individual code sheets. The names will appear as Megawati, Wiranto, Rais, SBY or SBY, and Haz.

Dominant focus of the article each article may contain two foci or a focus on the candidate or candidates and a subject focus--what the candidate is doing or talking about or to what the journalist(s) is/are linking. Using the items listed below each of the following two areas, identify the candidate focus and the subject focus. Note: the article may not have a dominant candidate focus (i.e., the article may discuss campaign activities of all the candidates running and mention the candidates in question in only one of the paragraphs. In this instance, the dominant candidate focus would be neither and the dominant subject focus would be campaign activities.).
8. Dominant focus of article: each article may include a hodgepodge of information. Select the dominant focus using the following categories if one or more of the candidates in question or issue is discussed through the article.
   a. Candidate: one more more candidates are the focus of the article. Code the number (0-4) to indicate which candidates are under discussion. Article will mention their first, full, or last name.
   b. All of the candidates: all of the candidates are being discussed in the article.
   c. General political news: although a presidential candidate's name may appear in the article under analysis, the writing may identify and describe another political candidate or general political news and analysis. Code this category if the dominant focus of the article is of any other political candidate, campaign, or political news.
   d. Issues/policies: Code this category if the dominant focus of the article under analysis is of one or several policy or government oriented issues (e.g., taxes, crime, immigration, welfare, healthcare, etc)
   e. Campaign activities: Code this category if the dominant focus of the article under analysis is of the daily campaign activities of the presidential candidates.
   f. Election process or regulations: Code this category if the dominant focus of the article under analysis is electoral process, rules of the election or campaigning (e.g. KPU, preparations, voter information, voting process information, new regulations relating to the elections, etc.).
   g. Constituent perspectives: Code this category if the dominant focus of the article under analysis is the perspectives, views, opinions, or expectations of the voting constituents (public, academics, persons not associated with a political party or a specific candidate or political group).
   h. Other (specify): Code this category if the dominant focus of the article does not meet the definitions of the above categories

I. Candidates

Discussion of candidate: the following categories analyze the written content of the article under analysis. Code for both the male and female candidates using the spaces provided on the right side of the code sheet. The names of the candidates will change from one code sheet to the next.

Code

(0) if not present
(1) if present

8. Candidate's background and qualifications: mentions or discusses the candidate's credibility as a candidate. Specific references may include: the candidate's education, previous business, previous profession, success or failures, etc. (excluding previous experience in politics).
9. Candidate's personality: mentions or discusses various aspects of the candidate's character and disposition. Specific references may include candidate’s honesty, leadership, integrity, toughness, intelligence, etc.

10. Candidate's position on issues mentions or discusses the candidate’s stance on an issue.

11. Candidate's party affiliation: mentions or discusses the candidate's political party or a party coalition to which a candidate belongs.

12. Candidate's political experience: mentions or discusses the candidate's previous experience in political office and how the candidate will help the state.

13. Candidate's family mentions or discusses the candidate's family. Specific references may include: the role of the family in the campaign, in politics, problems faced by the family, etc.

14. Candidate's group affiliations: mentions or discusses the candidate's affiliations with groups other than a political party (e.g. N.U. Muhammadiyah, Koalisi Kabangsaan, etc.)

**Overall treatment of the candidate**

15. Overall treatment of the candidate in the article: Code for all the candidates using the spaces provided. This judgment should be based on the characteristic that best describes your perception of the overall treatment of the candidate in the article under study. Indicate your perception by marking the following:

   (0) Candidate name is not included in the article: Code if the candidate's name or any abstract reference to a candidate did not appear in the article.

   (1) Positive: Code 1 if the candidate's name or abstract reference to the candidate did appear in the article. The perception you have of the candidate as described in the article must be positive, complimentary, and beneficial. The journalist as used a support slant to describe the candidates.

   (2) Negative: Code 2 if the candidate's name or abstract reference to the candidate did appear in the article. The perception you have of the candidate as described in the article must be negative, adverse, and destructive. The journalist has used a less than complimentary tactic to describe the candidate. Some strategies may include: humor/ridicule, negative association, name-calling, guilt by association.

   (3) Balanced: Code 3 if the candidate's name or abstract reference to the candidate did appear in the article. The perception you have of the
candidate as described in the article must be impersonal, plain, and without a dominant positive or negative slant by the journalist.

16. Overall treatment of candidate in the article heading: code for each candidate using the spaces provided. This judgment should be based on the characteristic that best describes your perception of the overall treatment of the candidate in the article under study. Indicate your perception by marking the following:
- (0) Candidate name is not included in the article: Code 0 if the candidate's name or any abstract reference to the candidate did not appear in the article.
- (1) Positive: Code 1 if the candidate's name or abstract reference to the candidate did appear in the article. The perception you have of the candidate as described in the article must be positive, complimentary, and beneficial. The journalist has used a support slant to describe the candidates.
- (2) Negative: Code 2 if the candidate’s name or abstract reference to the candidate did appear in the article. The perception you have of the candidate as described in the article must be negative, adverse, and destructive. The journalist has used a less than complimentary tactic to describe the candidate. Some strategies may include: humor/ridicule, negative association, name-calling, guilt by association.
- (3) Balanced: Code 3 if the candidate's name or abstract reference to the candidate did appear in the article. The perception you have of the candidate as described in the article must be impersonal, plain, and without a dominant positive or negative slant by the journalist.

Overall Participation of the candidate

17. Overall participation of candidate in the article: Code for each candidate using the spaces provided. This judgment should be based on the characteristics in the article that best support your perception of the overall treatment of the candidate in the article under study. Indicate your perception by marking the following:
- (0) Candidate name is not included in the article: Code if the candidate's name or any abstract reference to the candidate did not appear in the article.
- (1) Active: The journalist describes the candidate as energetic, agile, and alive. The journalist may document the daily activities of the candidate, focus on the number of hours spent traveling, campaigning, or working in the office.
- (2) Passive: The journalist does not mention or discuss any activities of the candidate that would show the day-to-day energy and power of the candidate. Some references to passiveness may include the need or use of help, etc.
(3) Neutral: The journalist does not mention or discuss the activity of the
candidate, but simply describes the campaign and/or issues with specific
references to the candidate's participation.

18. Overall participation of the candidate in the article heading: Code for each
candidate using the spaces provided on the code sheet. This judgment should be
based on the characteristics in the article that best support your perception of the
overall treatment of the candidate in the article under study. Indicate your
perception by marking the following:
   (0) Candidate name is not included in the article: Code 0 if the candidate's
       name or any abstract reference to the candidate did not appear in the
       article.
   (1) Active: The journalist describes the candidate as energetic, agile, and
       alive. The journalist may document the daily activities of the candidate,
       focus on the number of hours spent traveling, campaigning, or working
       office.
   (2) Passive: the journalist does not mention or discuss any activities of the
       candidate that would show the day-to-day energy and power of the
       candidate. Some references to passiveness may include the need or use of
       help, etc.
   (3) Neutral: The journalist does not mention or discuss the activity of the
       candidate, but simply describes the campaign and/or issues with specific
       references to the candidate’s participation.

19. **If the article or heading is negative**, identify the strategy used by the journalist.
   Code this category using the following items to identify the strategy, marking 1 if
   present, and 0 if not present:
   (1) Humor/ridicule: The journalist made fun of the candidate by ridiculing
       things the candidate said or did what the candidate stands for.
   (2) Negative association: the journalist links the opponent with undesirable
       issues or images.
   (3) Name-calling: The journalist uses unflattering labels for the candidate.
   (4) Guilt by association: The journalist links the candidate with undesirable
       groups or individuals. Implying that the candidate associates with
       undesirable groups or people. In some election years, this could include
       association a candidate with another unpopular current or past politician.
   (5) Not applicable: The article or heading is not negative.

20. **Candidate viability**: Candidate viability will assess the journalist's (article's
    perception of each candidate's viability according to the following classifications
    or similar descriptive:
    (0) Not applicable (candidate not mentioned, the candidate’s name is either
        nor mentioned in the article or "candidate viability" is not discussed.
(1) Frontrunner/likely to win. The article places the candidate in the lead as a political contender for the presidential race.

(2) Contender/competitive. The article discusses the candidate in fairly neutral terms, but does mention the status of his race (i.e., the race is "too close to call" or "some polls indicated that she will and some polls indicated that he will win").

(3) Loser/unlikely to win: The article discusses the candidate in terms as being behind or lagging in the polls.

II. Issues

Issue representation: Identify the issues, if any, which are mentioned or discussed in this article. Use the spaces provided on the right side of the code sheet. Since political issues may be represented differently within a given article or from article to article, use the following scale to determine the dominant form of representation of each issue included in the article under analysis:

(0) Not present: use this number to indicate that this issue is not mentioned or discussed in the article under analysis.

(1) Present: use this number to indicate that the issue is mentioned or discussed in the article under analysis.

(2) Present with link to candidate: Use this number to indicate that the candidate has (or has been reported as having) discussed, mentioned, or participated in some campaign activity related to the issue mentioned or discussed in the article under analysis. This candidate/issue link may come in the form of a quotation from the candidate, the opponent, a representative of the presidential candidate, or a constituent. It may also include a journalist's assumption based on fact or hearsay.

(3) Present with link to candidate with a policy position: use this number to indicate that the candidate has (or has been reported as having) taken a position on an issue mentioned or discussed in the article under analysis. This candidate/issue position link may come in the form of a quotation from the candidate, the opponent, a representative of any presidential candidate, a constituent, or the journalist.

(4) Present with link to public opinion: The issue is linked to an opinion by identifiable citizen or group of citizens without any official political affiliation. This may be a direct quote or based on journalist’s direct interaction with citizens.

21. Economy: mentions or discusses the national economy in either general terms or in specific issues other than employment.

22. Violence: mentions or discusses violence in general terms other than the war in Aceh.
23. Corruption (KKN): mentions or discusses corruption, collusion, nepotism, or anti-corruption measures.
24. Crime: mentions or discusses crime, the crime rate, criminals, prisons, victim's rights, measures to curb crime.
25. War in Aceh: mentions the war in Aceh, GAM arrests or killings, martial law in Aceh, war victims, Aceh peace talks, Special Autonomy for Aceh.
26. Education: Mentions or discusses the public schools and programs, colleges and universities, illiteracy, rural education, state of school facilities, teachers, etc.
27. Poverty: mentions or discusses the rate of poverty, urban and rural poor, social programs to fight poverty.
28. Environment: mentions or discusses the environment, natural resources, logging, mining, or cleaning up pollution.
29. Ethics/moral decline: mentions or discusses a decline in ethical and moral values of the country and/or the citizens and/or the need for stronger “values”
30. Religion mentions or discusses role of religion in government, religious diversity, Shariah law, religious values, etc.
31. Democracy: mentions or discusses, democracy, decentralization, democratic or electoral reforms, etc. as an issue.
32. Dominant issue: Code the issued identified as the most dominant by marking the first number printed to the left of each issue category (21-31). If these is an obvious combination, code the issue mention or discussed first in the article. In the event that no issue is mentioned or discussed, code 00.

Sources of credibility: the journalists(s) may reference several sources to add credibility to the article. Code the presence or absence of a particular quotation by marking 1 if present and 0 if not present. The following references are to be identified:

33. A statement by the candidate (name of candidate) is quoted or paraphrased by the journalist(s): Code 1 if a specific quotation or paraphrase is credited to the candidate (i.e., with quotation marks, "he said"). The reference may cite the candidate by name or title (e.g., President, General, Vice President, etc). Code 0 if not present.

III. Democracy and Election Process

Democratic process: Identify any mention or discussion of the democratic process or reforms. Use the spaces provided on the right hand side of the sheet. Use the following scale to determine the form of representation of each aspect of the democratic process:
(0) Not applicable – not discussed in any way
(1) Critical – criticizes reforms, process, or democratic activity
(2) Informative – provides voter information about reforms and process
(3) Informative linked with action – Both informs and calls readers to act in a particular manner, for example by encouraging citizens to vote.

34. KPU’s preparation activities: article mentions or discusses the KPU’s preparations, passing new rules, logistical problems, or any other activity conducted by the electoral commission.

35. Voting process: The article provides information on how the voting process works, the set-up of the polling stations, the inking of fingers, identification needed, how results are tabulated, etc.

36. Electoral reforms and regulations: The article mentions or discusses the electoral reforms and regulations, including campaign rules and regulations.

37. Campaign rules and regulations: The article mentions or discusses monitoring by Panwaslu, domestic monitoring groups, and international election observers.

38. Democracy in general: The article mentions or discusses in general the democratic process, representation, democratic governance, etc.

IV. Constituent Perspectives

Constituent Perspectives: Constituent participation is the active reporting of opinions of citizens who are not connected formally to a campaign or a political organization. Citizens may be individual or a group, such as market vendors with whom the journalist interacts. The interaction must be direct with the journalist or a direct observation by the journalist between the citizens and a political figure, party or group. Code the following scale to describe the kind of audience participation.

(2) Not interested – the citizen or public expressed neither positive nor negative interest in issues, candidate or process.

(3) Active – the citizen or public discusses the issue, candidate or democratic process enthusiastically. They voice their own opinion or view.

39. Constituent opinion on issues: The focus or discusses issues, how the public views issues, what they see as important issues, the issues they feel are lacking in discussion, etc.

40. Constituent Preference for candidate: The article mentions or discusses a preference by a person for a specific candidate.

41. Constituent opinion regarding electoral process: The article mentions or discusses views by citizens regarding their opinion of the process thus far, what direction further reforms should take, whether it is good to participate, etc.

42. Constituent desires or expectations for new President: The article mentions or discusses the desires or expectations they have for the position of the president.

43. Constituent qualifications for the President (code all that apply): The constituents in the article express specific qualifications that they feel the president should have in order to be elected.