NEOREALISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
BALANCE OF POWER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

A thesis presented to
the faculty of
the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts

David A. Norris
March 2002
This thesis entitled

NEOREALISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
BALANCE OF POWER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

BY

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This thesis has two aims: first, to use neorealist theory to help illuminate the future role of European Union foreign policy; second, to use the case of the EU to help highlight some benefits and limitations of neorealism. Particular emphasis is given to how neorealism’s balance of power theory pertains to relations between the European Union and the United States, that is, to consider the possibility of the EU challenging the USA for global leadership. The thesis uses two case studies to focus on the development and trajectory of European foreign policy in its near-abroad, first in the Balkans and second in the Middle East. In both regions, the EU’s actions are considered in the context of transatlantic relations. Conclusions drawn from these studies are later supplemented with evidence from other issue areas. In a dedicated chapter, special attention is given to the ramifications of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the USA.
For Mum and Dad
Acknowledgements

I would like to gratefully acknowledge the guidance of Prof Harold Molineu in the preparation of this thesis. Thanks also to Prof Symeon Giannakos for his special assistance.
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Introduction

The dual-goal of this thesis is, firstly, to assess the future of the European Union in relation to neorealist theory and, secondly, to gauge the utility of neorealism as a tool in helping to understand international relations. The thesis aims to identify the character of the EU in light of neorealism, as well as to use the EU itself as a case study to reveal important benefits and limitations of neorealism. The thesis will follow neorealist theory to establish certain expectations of the EU in international relations, and then look for evidence that either supports or detracts from these expectations. In this way, the thesis is a study not only of the EU but also of neorealism itself.

The thesis attempts to apply neorealism's balance of power model to the European Union, assessing the EU's capacity to create a new equilibrium of power between two or more polar actors. Since the balance of power model includes the notion of a challenge by an aspirant actor to a dominant one, the thesis shall explore relations between the EU, as the challenger, and the United States, as the dominant power.

The thesis is not intended to conclude with a 'yes/no' response to the question of whether the European Union will challenge the United States and establish bipolarity. Instead, the thesis seeks, first, to analyse the current state of transatlantic relations; second, to identify the conditions necessary to bring about a challenge; third, to evaluate the extent to which the EU is willing and able to meet them; and fourth, to the extent that these conditions are being met, to ask what does this tell us about neorealism itself?
The aim of **Chapter One** is to set out the reasons for choosing neorealism and the European Union as, respectively, the tool and the subject of analysis, and also to outline what the thesis hopes to achieve. **Part 1** offers a brief outline of the significance of neorealism in relation to the broader theory of political realism. **Part 2** discusses neorealist theory and explores its continuities and changes. **Part 3** offers a brief overview of the international system structure during the Cold War era, in order to help grasp the changes that have since taken place. **Part 4** gives particular emphasis to developments that have occurred in the post-Cold War era. Parts 2 and 4 introduce the notion of hegemon and challenger, and identify these as the United States and the European Union. **Part 5** begins the task of applying neorealism to the European Union and the transatlantic relationship, and attempts to identify contrasting neorealist approaches to Europe as a global actor. Lastly, **Part 6** presents more precisely the goal of the thesis, breaking it down into a series of concise questions.

The next two chapters use neorealism to examine the European Union by way of two case studies, that is the EU’s activity in the former Yugoslavia and in the Middle East respectively. These two case studies are chosen since they are the largest and perhaps the most important incidents so far of European Union power-projection. If the EU is going to have the kind of capability required to become a challenger, it is unavoidable that these two regions will feel its presence, and they will most likely do so before any other regions.
Chapter Two looks at the events and impact of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Part 1 introduces the theme of the chapter, namely the impact the wars had in drawing attention to the need for a European security apparatus that is more independent from the United States. Part 2 outlines initial transatlantic reactions to the outbreak of war in the region, including an American acquiescence to European ambitions. Part 3 offers a brief analysis of the wars, looking mainly at the causes of conflict after the end of the Cold War. Part 4 follows the various European attempts to intervene in the conflict and American responses to these efforts. Part 5 analyses the pressures transatlantic disagreements put on the Atlantic Alliance (herein the ‘alliance’) and on the EU to reformulate European security. Part 5.1 recounts the development of the concept of a transatlantic Common Joint Task Force (CJTF). Part 5.2 traces the new impetus in Europe to develop an autonomous military force at the EU level. Part 5.3 discusses the potential for a stronger EU to diminish the cohesion and strength of NATO.

Chapter Three focuses on European policy towards Middle East. Part 1 maps out the history of the region during the Cold War, in terms of early attempts to develop a distinctly European foreign policy. Part 2 moves on to the post-Cold War era, noting reinforced patterns in the European drive to forge a foreign policy. Part 3 discusses the attempt by the EU to launch a comprehensive regional initiative (the Barcelona process) that appear to be a response to a similar American programme (the Madrid Tracks). Part 4 turns attention to European efforts to increase its role in the Middle East Peace Process, in distinction to its Barcelona policy. Part 5 identifies reasons why increased European investments in the Middle East do not appear to translate
into political leverage over other regional actors. **Part 6** argues that the evidence in this chapter points towards a new EU determination to work in coordination with the US rather than compete with it, a conclusion that seems to contrast with the one laid out in Chapter Two.

**Chapter Four** seeks to assimilate the evidence from the previous chapters to draw firmer conclusions and then support these with evidence from other areas pertaining to the transatlantic relationship. In effect, this chapter is an attempt to answer the questions raised in Chapter One, using the evidence gathered in the case studies. **Part 1** summarises the thesis so far and highlights three factors – capabilities, motivations and transmission of motivations – as key variables in addressing the goals of the thesis. The chapter looks at each of these variables in turn, first analysing their current standing and second suggesting what conditions may be met in changing them in future.

Chapter Four, **Part 2** looks at the first of these, capabilities, and assesses the nature and significance of changes in the distribution of power between Europe and the United States. The following section highlights European external power projection (2.1a) and internal institutional cohesion (2.1b) as the most important conditions in making a challenge more likely.

Chapter Four, **Part 3** examines the second variable, motivations, and draws on evidence from issue areas outside of Chapters One and Two (3.1), in order to augment the mixed evidence apparent in the earlier case studies. This section
seeks to identify the character of a possible European challenge by assessing first the *extent* of the European motivation (3.2a) and then the *object* of the challenge (3.2b). **Part 3.3** posits the conditions that would be necessary to make European motivations more of a challenge to the United States, and focuses on American commitments (3.3a) and capabilities (3.3b) rather than European factors.

Chapter Four, **Part 4** examines the third key variable, transmission of motivations. **Part 4.1** points to ambiguities over both the European role in international relations and over American security commitments as obstacles to clear communications. **Part 4.2** identifies the conditions necessary to either overcome or enhance these obstacles as, first, attention to the EU-NATO relationship (4.2a) and, second, democratic reform of EU institutions (4.2b).

Chapter Four, **Part 5** looks at the implication of the discussion of the above three variables upon neorealism as a political theory. It begins with acknowledgment of insights gained by applying neorealism to the subject of the European Union (5.1). This section then turns to the theory’s limitations, focusing on the role of the hegemon rather than the challenger in triggering a challenge (5.2a) and finally on the difficulties with neorealism in coming up with a definition of ‘challenge’ or ‘balance’ (5.2b).

Shortly after commencing this thesis, the United States suffered the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001. Due to these unprecedented events and their remarkable repercussions on international relations, the thesis is supplemented with a fifth
chapter that focuses specifically on the aftermath of these events. **Chapter Five** seeks to assess whether a European challenge is any more or less likely after September 11th. In keeping with the conclusions of Chapter Four, this chapter highlights the role of the United States in affecting the motivations of the European Union. **Part 1** introduces the significance of the attacks and their potential to renew or damage transatlantic relations. **Part 2** notes evidence that suggests a reinvigorated alliance and thus a weaker possibility of a challenge due to a new American commitment to multilateralism. **Part 3** explores counter evidence that indicates separating trends within the alliance due to American unilateralism. **Part 4** outlines a distinct European approach to September 11th that diverges from that of the United States. **Part 5** briefly looks at implications of the attacks on European capabilities and motivations, specifically at centripetal pressures (**5.1a**) and centrifugal pressures (**5.1b**) for and against a stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). **Part 5.2** draws some conclusions on the impact of September 11th, and attempts to relate recent events to the patterns in transatlantic relations evident in the previous chapter.
Chapter One

Neorealism and the European Union

1. Realism and Neorealism
Why utilise realism to help interpret and delineate the future of the European Union in world politics? In choosing realism, why specify neorealism as the tool to help shed light on the issues? The brief answer is that, because of its profound impact on international relations theory, using realism is unavoidable. Given its persistent use as a helpful – if incomplete – approach, one would rather have to justify not using it:

Realism as an intellectual construct has dominated the study of international relations from the beginning [for the reason that] Realism has consistently provided the most reliable guidance for statecraft, and it has consistently offered the most compelling explanations of state behaviour.¹

Moreover, the role of realism has been so pervasive that other paradigms and specific theories are partly defined in terms of the position they take in opposition to it. David Baldwin notes that the main challenges to realism in recent years, interdependency (defined by Baldwin as commercial liberalism), democratic peace theory (republican liberalism), constructivism (sociological liberalism) and neoliberal institutionalism all take as their starting point a critique of realism.² Robert Keohane writes that these critiques go to validate the significance of realism in international relations:

Periodic attacks on Realism have taken place; yet the very focus of these critiques seems only to reconfirm the centrality of Realistic thinking in the international political thought of the West.\(^3\)

In choosing specifically neorealism as a guide, one recognises that it has been realism’s “most rigorous variant”\(^4\) over at least the last two decades. Since Kenneth Waltz published his *Theory of International Politics* (1979) neorealism has been for theorists either the approach of choice or the focus of criticism. The debate between neorealism and neoliberalism, wrote Robert Powell in 1994, “has dominated much of international relations theory for the last decade”.\(^5\) Emerging from this debate, as we shall see in Part 3, neorealism has emerged with significant alterations and shifts of emphases – yet for all that, I will argue, is still faithful to Waltz’s original elucidation.

Neorealism continues to exert a strong influence on the field of international relations theory, but now in somewhat new guises. The changes within neorealism have been deep and marked by controversy, yet in my judgement they represent a necessary effort to develop neorealism and synthesise it with lessons learned elsewhere.

### 2. Neorealism and the Balance of Power

In *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz presented a form of structural realism that defined a system structure according to

1. Its ordering principle, in our case being anarchy as opposed to hierarchy
2. The specification of functions of its units
3. The distribution of its capabilities\(^6\)

---

Waltz’s focus was on the nature or interaction of states, specifically on explanations for the recurrent pattern of warfare. He argues that states operate in an anarchic realm, in which they cannot rely on others to respect their interests, or even on the continued benign intentions of friendly states. Without a world government, there can be nothing to prevent one state from taking a hostile stance towards another. The main effect of anarchy is to produce the imperative of self-help, since ultimately a state can depend on only itself for its survival. This leads Waltz to make the simple conclusion that “wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them”.7

Avoiding dependence upon other states is necessary to minimise a state’s exposure to the dangers of anarchy. Waltz claims that this leads to all states becoming functionally alike, rather than differentiated. Whereas in a hierarchical system states would do well to specialise in a particular function, thereby enjoying economies, specialisation in an anarchical system will bring at best short-term benefits at the certain cost of vulnerability over the long-term. In an early essay, Waltz likened the international system to a mechanism in which each unit can survive and function even in the absence of all others, in contrast to an organism, in which the whole is dependent upon the specialised function of each organ:

A mechanical society rests on the similarity of the units that compose it; an organic society is based on their differences.8

If all states, are alike their arrangement, according to Waltz, is determined by their capabilities. Since all states must do what they themselves can to safeguard their existence and interests, those who are most capable will prevail, whilst those who are least able are most vulnerable. Although all states have the same functions, they are able to perform them to unequal standards. All will attempt to maximise their security in order to mitigate the effects of anarchy, but will not fare equally since they have different resources to channel into the effort. Thus, Waltz’s theory is reminiscent of Thucydides’ description of a grim reality:

“...the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept”.9

This manner of arrangement of the units leads Waltz to a crucial point about the relations between states. If a more capable state achieves supremacy over others, there is nothing to prevent one of those states or a coalition of them from trying to enhance their capabilities in order to unseat the hegemon from its position. Indeed, since there is nothing to block a hegemon from exploiting its position, that is, maximising its interests, the disadvantaged states would actually have a powerful systemic incentive to attempt to rearrange their relative positions. As Max Weber, one of Waltz’s main influences, puts it:

...peace is nothing more than a change in the character of the conflict...as every big political community is a potential aspirant to prestige, it is also a potential threat to all its neighbours. Finally, by virtue of an unavoidable ‘dynamic of power,’ wherever claims to

Because of their insecure environment and their fear of the hegemon, then, smaller powers will rise up in a rebalancing of the system structure. Since states are assumed to be rational, and it is in their interests to balance, they are expected to initiate their challenge as soon as possible after their adversary has attained hegemony. If the challenging state(s) subsequently attain(s) the hegemonic position, then another challenge from elsewhere is to be expected, simply because it is always in the interest of disadvantaged states to issue a challenge and because there is nothing to stop them.

This balance of power theory is, according to Waltz, the single most important contribution of neorealism (indeed, of realism *per se*) to international political theory.

If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power is it.\(^{11}\)

Although Waltz by no means originated the balance of power idea, he elaborated it through realist principles into a coherent theory, locating the prime causal variable at the system level. For Waltz, it is primarily the insecurity of the system – the anarchic ordering principle – that generates the constant rearrangement of its units, rather than variables at the unit level or below. Moreover, unless this ordering principle is transformed, the ‘balance of power’ is held to be both an automatic and eternally applicable process, as another influential neorealist explains:

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Disequilibrium replaces equilibrium, and the world moves toward a new round of hegemonic conflict. It has always been thus and always will be, until men either destroy themselves or learn to develop an effective mechanism of peaceful change.\textsuperscript{12}

3. The Cold War Era

Having ravaged Western Europe with its economic and human costs, World War II depleted the resources of the great European powers and all but ended their imperial ambitions. As colonies wrestled their independence, Western European states started to become accustomed to their massive power losses relative to the Soviet Union and the United States. For the first time since the beginning of the state system of international relations in the seventeenth century, the political centre of gravity moved outside of Europe. Traditionally multipolar, the structure of world politics began to be ordered according to a bipolar system, dominated by the nuclear, conventional and economic capabilities of the USSR and the USA.

Although the two superpowers had been allies, their competition and mutual fears polarised them within just a few years of the war. In his famous \textit{Long Telegram} in February 1946, George Kennan predicted a “battle” between “two centers of world significance”\textsuperscript{13} headed by the respective superpowers. Kennan warned his government in Washington that the Soviet Union intended to “reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers”.\textsuperscript{14} In response, he

\textsuperscript{12} Gilpin, Robert in Viotti & Kauppi (1999): 166.
\textsuperscript{13} Kennan, George Frost. \textit{The Long Telegram}. 1946: Part 1(a) \textless http://www.uiowa.edu/~c030162/Common/Handouts/Other/KENNAN.html\textgreater ,
\textsuperscript{14} Kennan (1946): Part 1 Deductions (a).
argued, the United States should build alliances with friendly (Western) states in opposition to the aggressive policies of the USSR.\textsuperscript{15}

Although Kennan would later be a strong critic of American foreign policy during the Cold War, his \textit{Long Telegram} heavily influenced the containment policy that underpinned the Truman Doctrine, set out by the American president a year later. Truman announced that the United States would support “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”.\textsuperscript{16} This effectively disavowed the traditional American avoidance of alliances, and committed the US to “open-ended support” of any state challenged by internal or external communist forces.\textsuperscript{17} Following the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June 1948, which Washington saw as just such a challenge, the US stepped up its efforts to maintain European security, culminating in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949), which institutionalized American security commitments to Europe. In 1955, when West Germany was admitted into NATO, the USSR set up the parallel, opposing Warsaw Pact, thus formalizing the Cold War in Europe between two security organizations.

With varying degrees of intensity this bipolar structure persisted throughout the Cold War. The former great powers in Western Europe gradually set themselves on a path of economic integration via what would become the European Economic

\textsuperscript{15}Kennan (1946): Part 5 (2).


\textsuperscript{17}Griffiths, Martin. \textit{Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations}. Routledge, New York, 1999: 23.
Communities but, facing the potentially hostile Soviet superpower, they remained dependent upon the United States to maintain their security. Unable any longer to provide sufficient security as sovereign states, the Western European powers maintained their alliance with the US. Economically unable to match superpower status individually, the Europeans were also disinclined to regain their former relative power status collectively for fear of provoking the USSR and alienating the US. The Europeans, then, could not return the system structure to multipolarity so long as the Cold War continued.

Likewise, the United States, fearing the implications of a Soviet-dominated Europe, deepened its commitment to Western Europe, investing vast economic and military resources in its Marshall Plan (beginning in 1947) and NATO. As long as the US and Western European states considered that the Soviet Union represented a major threat, they would be bound to one another, and the system structure would remain bipolar. Bipolarity would persist at least until one superpower no longer considered the other as hostile, either through a change in policy or through a defeat/withdrawal.

Beginning in 1985, the policies of Soviet president Gorbachev, particularly his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and his relatively lenient attitude to growing protest movements in Eastern Europe, went some way to convince the West of a change in Soviet motives. These policies allowed the freedom for the eventual independence of many Soviet republics, including Russia, which in turn led to the ultimate collapse of the USSR in 1991. The sudden departure of the USSR now transformed the system structure into unipolarity. Perhaps most significantly for a system that
previously experienced only multipolarity or bipolarity, it was unclear how durable the new structure would be. The events up to 1991 loosened or even eradicated the ties that bound Western Europe to the United States. Many of the forces that limited the ability of European states to reassert their influence internationally were now gone.

4. Neorealism and the Post-Cold War Era

If the balancing process is unavoidable and timeless, then the end of the Cold War would have profound implications for neorealism. As the new era began, the traditional realist claim that “…the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience” became the backdrop for new debates and expectations in international political theory. Without another superpower to hold it in check, the United States stood out clearly as just the kind of threatening hegemon that neorealism had highlighted. As Waltz puts it

Never since the Roman Empire has power been so concentrated in one state.  

For this situation to endure would be an apparent falsification of neorealism, or at least anomalous to it. The balance of power theory would lead one to expect some kind of confrontation between the state enjoying primacy and one or more of the states that judge their position vis-à-vis the hegemon leaves them exposed to its selfish policies. In 1993 Waltz proclaimed that the process was already underway:

Hegemony leads to balance…. That is now happening, but haltingly so because the United States still has benefits to offer and many other countries have become accustomed to their easy lives with the United States bearing many of their burdens.\(^{20}\)

Seven years on, Waltz maintained his argument that the rebalancing of the system was underway, but that its definition might become clear only in retrospect. If “the balance is emerging slowly”, he argued, “in historical perspectives, it will come in the blinking of an eye”\(^{21}\). Yet, with each passing year, other neorealists have felt it necessary to look again at Waltz’s formulation of structural realism. In the post-Cold War era so far neorealism has fractured into offensive and defensive offshoots.

Offensive realism is the more traditionally realist of the two. It maintains that states are compelled by structural imperatives to maximise power for the sake of their security. Because of the anarchic environment states find it very difficult to cooperate in areas that may see potential adversaries gain an increase in relative power. Two states may increase their power through cooperation, but what is most significant is that one may increase it more than the other. For offensive realists, cooperation merely highlights the “fundamental problem of international relations in the contemporary world,” which is “the problem of peaceful adjustment to the consequences of the uneven growth of power among states, just as it always was in the past.”\(^{22}\)


\(^{22}\)Gilpin, Robert in Viotti & Kauppi (1999): 166.
States remain vulnerable to the actions of each other. Offensive realists argue that motivations are not a significant factor in international relations, since anarchy prevents states gaining knowledge over the motivations of other states. It is therefore beholden on each state to act as if every other actor is in a permanent state of hostility or potential hostility. The profound impact of anarchy “…provides strong incentives for expansion. All states strive to maximize their power relative to other states because only the most powerful states can guarantee their survival.”

In contrast to offensive realists, defensive realists have developed a more progressive approach, arguing that trying to interpret the arrangement and, then, the dynamics of states purely by their capabilities is inadequate. A hegemon may well have the capacity to inflict damage on inferior states, whilst disadvantaged states may have enough resources to initiate a challenge – but their capabilities alone are a poor measure of their behaviour. Instead, defensive realists reach back into post-World War II realism and focus on states’ intentions. Instead of emphasising the incentives of the system to practise self-help, that is to distrust and compete with other states, defensive realists point also to the incentives for cooperation and the costs of competition.

For defensive realists, a rational actor in an anarchic environment does not have a pre-disposition for any pattern of behaviour. Instead, the actor will calculate whether cooperation or competition is in its best interest. Randall Schweller argues that

anarchy does not fashion an automatic propensity for states to conflict, at least not if we assume that their motivation is merely their own security:

...if all states seek the minimum of power needed for security, threats sufficient to provoke balancing behavior will not arise in the first place...anarchy among units wishing to survive does not mean that war is always possible, and states that do not pursue security will not be punished by the system.\(^{24}\)

For Schweller, if all states are security seeking, then there should be no necessary cause for war. Many wars occur not because of systemic insecurity but rather because some states actually are aggressive. Just as a domestic government cannot prevent criminal activity when individuals wish to commit crimes, a world government could not avert inter-state conflict \textit{if at least one state is so motivated.}\(^{24}\)

Just because a world government does not exist, one should not assume that the cause of conflict is anarchy rather than the aggressive posture of a state. Schweller's argument therefore spotlights states' motivations and not just structural factors in accounting for war. As with revisionist states, security-seeking states may also be categorised by their motivations. In contrast to the more pessimistic balance-of-power theory, conflict is not seen as inevitable since states, being rational, will recognise that it is in their mutual interests “to build and deploy forces and develop doctrines that emphasize their benign intentions and that create no incentives to strike first”.\(^{25}\)


\(^{25}\) Schweller (1996): 118.
Charles Glaser shares with Schweller the judgement that intentions and not only capabilities should be considered when evaluating state behaviour. Starting from the assumption that states are assumed to be rational, he claims that security-seeking states should concentrate more on building means of cooperation rather than attempting to maximise their power.

Structural realism properly understood predicts that, under a wide range of conditions, adversaries can best achieve their security goals through cooperative policies, not competitive ones, and should, therefore, cooperate when these conditions prevail.  

Glaser posits that through rational, self-centred goals – and not through liberal means such as institutions – states can and are motivated to achieve high levels of cooperation. States are able to demonstrate their benign intentions through ‘costly signals’. They are able to do this most clearly with their military policy, adopting strategies that a non-security-seeking state would find too costly to make, such as by reducing armed forces to a level that could ensure defence yet would be insufficient for an offensive campaign. In this way, a security seeking state “can communicate information about which type of state it is, that is, about its motives.” Glaser concludes that Waltz’s neorealism misjudges the propensity of states to succumb to systemic pressures towards conflictual patterns of behaviour. His reformulation of structural realism, which he calls ‘contingent realism’, sees alternative possibilities:

Considerations of power do influence the answers to these questions but they only begin to tell the story… In short, states motivated

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primarily by security should not as a general rule try to maximise their relative power.\textsuperscript{28} Andrew Kydd agrees with Glaser and Schweller that motivations as well as capabilities matter in terms of state behaviour, arguing that “…anarchy is not so bad in and of itself, it only leads to problems if there are states with aggressive motivations, a desire for more land or power for instance.”\textsuperscript{29} If security-seeking states are indeed rational, they will search to understand the motivations of other states. If it can be confident that another state is also security seeking there is scope for cooperation; otherwise, it should resort to self-help and look to increase its relative power to safeguard its own security. The issue, then, revolves around the question of whether motivations of one unit in an anarchic setting are knowable at all.

For Kydd there is no doubt that, for much of the time motivations can be deduced, in two ways. First, as Glaser suggests, states can send costly signals to others. Kydd notes that, whilst these signals may be prohibitively expensive for aggressive states, they may bear no cost for security-seekers; an aggressor, for example, may have to generate domestic support for its policy with invective about another state, whereas a security-seeker can downplay such rhetoric. Secondly, going one step beyond Glaser and into the field of neoliberalism, Kydd claims that the policy processes of democratic states usually make the motivations of a state very clear. The transparency of these states makes information regarding their general intentions almost impossible to hide so that, “If a democracy is really a security seeker, the

\textsuperscript{28} Glaser (1996): 134 and 145.
openness of its policy processes will reveal this to the world”.\textsuperscript{30} In marrying these unit-level variables to neorealism’s emphasis on the effects of anarchy, Kydd rejects what he considers is the traditional structural argument that wars occur regardless of the good intentions of any particular state. Structural realists, he argues,

\[\ldots\text{strongly overestimate the difficulty in assessing state motivations. Information on the motivations of security seeking states is so easy to come by that mistaken fears about motivations cannot plausibly explain any significant war, arms race or crisis this [twentieth] century.}\textsuperscript{31}\]

Stephen Walt also agrees that the type of state rather than systemic anarchy alone is to account for state behaviour. Walt argues that the traditional conception of the balance of power theory is misleading, since the capabilities of a state do not necessarily generate a balancing behaviour by that state or by other states that fear. A very powerful actor, like the United States, may be able to inflict harm on others, but may not wish to. Conversely, less powerful states, such as Iraq may be motivated by revisionist goals and thus threaten the stability of the system. It is the revisionist state rather than the most powerful state that others will balance against. Consequently, Walt depicts a “balance-of-threat” dynamic in place of a balance of power:

\begin{quote}
Balance-of-power theory predicts that states will ally against the strongest state in the system, but balance-of-threat theory predicts they will tend to ally against the most threatening.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{30}{Kydd (1997): 119.}
\footnotetext{31}{Kydd (1997): 128.}
\end{footnotes}
Where offensive realists remain true to the pessimistic judgement of classical realism, that “Of the gods we know and of men we believe, that it is a necessary law of their nature that they rule wherever they can”, defensive realists have attempted to create synthetic theories, drawing from non-systemic levels of analysis and even from non-realist approaches. Indeed, Legro and Moravcsik have argued that modern realist research is increasingly invoking factors both outside of and contradictory to realism, and even accuse these new scholars of undermining their own paradigm whilst boosting the credibility of alternatives. They see defensive realists as corrupting neorealism by rejecting its main strength:

Realism’s central analytical leverage, parsimony, and distinctiveness derive from its ability to explain social life simply through variation in the distribution of objective material power capabilities, rather than preferences, perceptions, or norms.

Michael Spirtas makes a similar, albeit more colourful, point regarding defensive realists. He draws a broad distinction between “Evil” and “Tragedy” schools of realism. In the Evil school, conflict is explained through the deliberate actions of humans or states; the actor is considered to be intrinsically evil (as Niebhur and Morgenthau argued). Because the unit is evil it is irredeemable: even if inter-state conflict can be mitigated (such as through skilful diplomacy) it cannot be fundamentally solved or avoided. Alternatively, the Tragedy school declines to assign responsibility for evil events to the nature of humans or states, but rather posits it with their environment. Good states perform evil acts because of the

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35 Legro and Moravcsik (1999): 34.
insecurity of their surroundings (as Waltz argues) not because of their intentions, which may be perfectly good.

According to Spirtas, these schools coexisted in realism until the advent of neorealism, beginning, as he dates it, with the publication of Waltz’s *Theory of International Relations* in 1975. The defensive realists, then, represent in part a reversion to pre-Waltzian realism in order to make up for the deficiencies they and others see in neorealism, deficiencies that have become clearer following the end of the Cold War. Schweller agrees, rejecting Legro and Moravcsik’s taunt that defensive realists have abandoned the fundamentals of realism, countering that the series of realist theories after the ending of the Cold War

...has been faithful to the paradigm’s core principles precisely because it has not advanced unicausal explanations of complex phenomena. In so doing, it has restored the theoretical richness of realism that was abandoned by structural realism.

Again, Spirtas depicts the same processes in sharper terms:

Now the major challenge to Waltz comes from those who seek to include unit-level factors in a theory of state behavior. Realists are increasingly turning to evil to explain international politics.

Moreover, despite Spirtas’ point that the new realist researchers are mining the resources of classical and post-World War II realism, it is far from clear that defensive realists are actually straying very far even from neorealism, at least as it

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has been defined and developed by Waltz. In fact, the recent addition of unit-level variables is consistent with a point Waltz has made repeatedly about the indeterminate nature of neorealism and the need for it to be augmented with non-systemic factors.

In 1954 Waltz first outlined his theory of the significance of the system structure – or the “third image” – with the qualification that on its own it is insufficient:

The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy.\(^{39}\)

In 1979, Waltz gave added emphasis to the third image relative to the other two, but again acknowledged that a system level of analysis offered us only a very limited amount of information regarding a state’s behaviour, since anarchy merely implied that

Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone.\(^{40}\)

In Robert Keohane’s *Neorealism and its Critics* (1986), Waltz was more explicit about the need to include sub-system levels in any analysis of how states respond to the pressures of the system:

Far from thinking of unit-level processes as ‘all product…and…not at all productive’ I, like Durkheim, think of unit-level processes as a source of both changes in systems and of possible changes of


systems, hard though it is to imagine the latter. Neither structure nor units
determine outcomes. Each affects the other…. Changes in, and
transformations of, systems originate not in the structure of a system
but in its parts.\textsuperscript{41}

In his first major article following the end of the Cold War, Waltz’s position remained
consistent with his earlier pieces, refining them into what has been called “duality of
causation” model\textsuperscript{42}:

Structural change begins in a system’s unit, and then unit-level and
structural causes interact.\textsuperscript{43}

Finally, and most recently, Waltz reiterated his theory, confirming that without
knowledge derived from the system’s units, any theory of international politics would
be incomplete:

Structures shape and shove; they do not determine the actions of
states…One example is enough to show this…[In Yugoslavia] American
policy was generated not by external security interests, but by internal
political pressure and national ambition.\textsuperscript{44}

Given Waltz’s argument for the inclusion of unit-variables alongside (although
apparently not integrated with)\textsuperscript{45} his structural theory, the elaboration of theories by
defensive realists can be seen to be in direct lineage with neorealism. Rather than
be castigated for bringing in non-systemic variables, Waltz himself has persistently
made it clear that this is not only consistent with but also necessary for neorealism to

\textsuperscript{41}Waltz, Kenneth N. in Keohane (1986): 328 and 343.
\textsuperscript{43}Waltz (1993): 49.
\textsuperscript{44}Waltz (2000): 24 and 29.
\textsuperscript{45}Waltz’s demand for parsimony leads him to advocate not a mixture of unit and systemic variables in
one theory but the creation of separate but complementary theories: “Any theory of international politics
requires also a theory of domestic politics, since states affect the system’s structure even as it affects
them”. Waltz (1986): 331.
be practicable. This casts serious doubts on a common interpretation of neorealism that is used both to condemn and, in Spirtas’ case, to laud the theory:

The advantages Waltz’s neorealism enjoys is that it discourages the proliferation of variables by making the distribution of capabilities among states the only independent variable.  

The basic addition defensive realists have made to Waltz’s theory is the consideration of (a) motivations as well as capabilities and (b) strategies in order to make motivations transparent. Allowing for these two points means that the balancing dynamic is seen not as automatic but rather dependent upon other factors. John Vasquez writes that the post-Cold War research programs of realism collectively suggest

that the balancing of power was never the law Waltz thought it was. In effect, he offered an explanation of a behavioural regularity that never existed, except within the logic of the theory.  

As Taliaferro notes, the work of the defensive realists amounts to the notion that anarchy does not directly constrain or encourage certain behavioural patterns of states, but rather is sifted through “structural modifiers”. The objective for modern realists is to identify and explain these modifiers. Schweller points out that the key question

…is not whether states balance or bandwagon – history clearly shows that they do both – but rather under what conditions states choose one strategy or the other.\textsuperscript{49}

For scholars, the question is not what strategy the system structure imposes or even what strategy a state is determined to take, but what conditions are required to make any particular strategy more or less likely. Neorealism today is less content to formulate theoretical abstractions. The apparent stability of the post-Cold War era has made theorists more aware of the complexities of international relations beyond the automatic balance of power theory. To the extent that defensive realism follows on directly from neorealism as well as importing new variables into their research programs, Robert Powell argues that the gulf between neorealism and its main alternative paradigm, neoliberalism, has narrowed considerably. In both approaches, researchers are moving their focus from the structure alone to its conditional relationship to the system units.

…both neorealism and neoliberalism see the effects of anarchy and the degree of concern about relative gains to be conditional. The task ahead is to specify these conditions more precisely.\textsuperscript{50}

5. Neorealism and the European Union
The flawed interpretation of neorealism that it is purely a structural rather than a dual-causality theory is mirrored in realism’s analyses of the European Union. There have been two broad avenues of approach. First, European integration has been


considered to be a nation state-centred response to bi-polarity: that is, an American-led ballast against Soviet aggression, and an attempt on the part of former great powers to recapture their fortunes as sovereign nations on the world stage. The basic aim of integration was not to forge a common power, but to empower individual states through common means. Integration of European states was little to do with Europe and everything to do with states. For this reason, Joseph Grieco argues, “Modern realists have been sceptical of the EC”.\textsuperscript{51} As Gilpin explains it, the European Community (as it then was) is an interstate alliance whose primary purpose is to strengthen the position of individual states in an interdependent and highly competitive global economy.\textsuperscript{52}

This analysis led to the expectation that, upon the end of the Cold War, Western European states would break from earlier integrationist patterns and utilise their greater freedom vis-à-vis the superpowers to escape the constraints of integration and assert their particular national interests. Drawing on both neorealist theory and political history, John Mearsheimer expected a return to multipolarity in Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Noting that “The European state system has been plagued with war since its inception”,\textsuperscript{53} he predicted that Europe would go “Back to the Future” in a cycle of balance, since “the keys to war and peace lie more

in the structure of the international system than in the nature of the individual states”.\textsuperscript{54} This analysis is consistent with Griffiths’ reading of neorealism:

States are condemned to reproduce the logic of anarchy and any cooperation that takes place between them is subordinated to the distribution of power.\textsuperscript{55}

The second interpretation largely agrees with the state-centred causes of European integration, as described above, but sees the effect as a coalesced (potential) new European superpower rather than a set of strongly empowered nation states. In this instance, European powers would not be balancing against other European powers: they would combine their weight in order to balance against the remaining superpower(s). Richard Rosecrance perceived that the post-Cold War era was quickly set up to be dominated by a multipolarity of superpowers, including one in Europe:

Five great bases of power again control the organization of the world order: the United States, Russia, the European Community, Japan and China.\textsuperscript{56}

As the 1990s progressed, the prospects for a ‘Back to the Future’ scenario declined as the forces of deeper integration advanced. European states, cautiously supported by the United States, appeared to intensify their efforts to lift themselves out of the anarchic environment to which realists had thought they were condemned. This, to some surprising, development was partly the cause of the need for researchers to reformulate neorealism to take added consideration of unit-level variables. As

\textsuperscript{54} Measheimer, (1990): 12.
\textsuperscript{55} Griffiths (1999): 49.
European states failed to conform to common neorealist expectations, and cooperated both internally with each other and externally with the hegemon, researchers from other paradigms weighed in with their judgement that structural theory is misleading. David Lake, for example, judged boldly that, “Whether or not realists got the Cold War right, they have most certainly got the warm peace wrong”, whilst Schweller and Wohlforth noted that a common conclusion among scholars was that “the end of the Cold War undermines realism”.  

Contrary to the eternal balancing expectation of neorealism, European states had seemingly found a way to institutionalise their motivations to cooperate, despite structural pressures towards self-help strategies. The EU, as Patricia Weitsman argues, looks like it was not simply an alliance formed against an adversary, but one that was formed between adversaries, thus improving “the chances of enduring peace among Union members”. Robert Jervis invokes Stephen Jay Gould’s distinction between “time’s cycle” and “time’s arrow” to differentiate those who, like Mearsheimer, believe structural constraints after the Cold War will see states revert to former patterns of conflict and balance, and those who, like Schweller, believe progress can be made and that international politics can be elevated on to a higher level of cooperation. 

If neorealism appears to have been blindsided by its over-weighting of structural factors, one ought not to conclude that it fits easily into the ‘time’s cycle’ category. Although it is fair to say that, like realism in general, structural theory is “particularly weak in accounting for changes”\textsuperscript{61} it is not entirely static. Whilst \textit{offensive} realism fits quite neatly into the time’s cycle depiction of world history, with its emphasis on a break-down in European integration and a reversion to past national strategies, \textit{defensive} realism is better able to be integrated into time’s arrow approach, since its consideration of unit factors allows it to account for changes as well as continuities.

As the post-Cold War era evolves, it might appear increasingly difficult to sustain neorealism in view of the accelerated and deepened European integration. In fact, given what we know of Waltz’s dual-causality method, such a judgement is flawed. Because Waltz insists on consideration of unit variables, his theory – and, then, the neo-structural theories that follow – is operative in both time’s cycle and time’s arrow approaches. Mearsheimer, in disavowing unit-analysis, lacks Waltz’s subtlety in allowing for changes at the unit level. For Waltz, European states were not destined to revert to multipolarity and intra-European conflict, although that would certainly be one possibility consistent with the balance of power theory. The fact that integration has continued and apparently contradicted this scenario is not evidence that neorealism “has got it wrong”, since one other possibility remains.

It is in its time’s arrow format – the format adopted by defensive realists – that Waltz’s theory remains powerful and plausible. This is because, although the

structure is fixed, changes at the unit-level and their interaction with the structure have profound implications for international politics. Specifically, European integration since the end of the Cold War has meant that European politics have changed at the unit level but must continue to operate in a systemically anarchic environment. Whilst Europeans may be taking themselves out of anarchy in Europe by coalescing their capabilities, their strategies remain constrained by structural pressures. Whilst the European Union has weakened the case of offensive realism, the case of the defensive realists – and of Waltz himself – remains valid and strong. If European states do not balance among themselves, acting together they may balance against others. In short, the collection of European powers may well be coalescing into one single system unit – a development allowed for in the time’s arrow conception of neorealism – and that unit must face up to the incentives and constraints of a unipolar world.

Therefore, the claim of neorealism that the balance of power is still operative in Europe a decade after the end of the Cold War appears to rest on the prospects of a European superpower rising up to challenge the current hegemon, or that hegemon pre-emptively striking at potential challengers. When one looks at the list of such challengers, the European Union, and not any of its member states, must be considered the likeliest candidate from that region. As the first variant of neorealism – a return to time’s cycle European multipolarity – seems ever more remote, it now falls back on its alternative, time’s arrow, expectation, that a rebalance of the global system will occur through the EU as a global actor.
The ideas of unit-change and, in particular, the establishment of a European actor to replace the various European states are long-standing points in realism. Robert Gilpin has stated that one of the core assumptions of all realists is that the prime actor in world politics is not the nation-state, but merely the “conflict group”.  

Conflict groups can be any kind of organisation of politically united actors who are bound by a common interest, though realists are interested mostly in the “primary” groups, which since the seventeenth century has meant nation-states. Gilpin notes elsewhere that the precise organisation of the conflict group is not fixed over time, so that, for example, a supra-national state is fully compatible with realism:

...just as the modern nation-state is a product of particular historical forces, changes in those forces could bring about the demise of the nation-state.

If this does occur, Gilpin specifies, “...the result would not be the end of political affairs as understood by realists; it would still be a jungle out there”. Kenneth Waltz concurs, stating that, “International structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era, be they city-states, empires, or nations”.

Gilpin and Waltz’s attention to the possibility of unit transformation was preceded by Hans Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations (1948). Morgenthau posited three alternative predictions regarding European integration, two of which correspond to

\[\text{footnotes}\]

\begin{itemize}
  \item \text{Gilpin (1996): 7.}
  \item \text{Gilpin (1996): 26.}
  \item \text{Waltz, Kenneth N. in Vasquez (1996): 309.}
\end{itemize}
the offensive and defensive variants of neorealism and a third which, as Morgenthau himself wrote, was a ‘neutral’ between them:

1. “Political creativity”: deep integration of political, military and economic systems, i.e. pooled sovereignty.
2. “Political impotence”: Europe declares itself neutral and shies away from foreign affairs.
3. “Political desperation”: a movement away from integration and towards national agendas.  

Option three was the expectation held by offensive realists, at least following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the systemic imperative of self-help gripped European nation-states once more. The European Community responded to the end of the Cold War, though, with the opposite pattern of behaviour. Since 1991, the EC has developed a series of agreements that has seen a greater cohesion between the nations and a larger role for supra-national institutions, in an impressive drive to fulfil the original goal of “ever closer union”. These agreements have incorporated waves of integration of the three sectors identified by Morgenthau.

Whilst this prediction of Morgenthau by no means puts an end to the question of whether the EU is itself an actor (as opposed to the traditional realist view that supra-national institutions are merely a reflection of the interests of their major members) it does help identify the trajectory of European integration, which is towards the EU’s evolution into a primary conflict group. In contrast, Mearsheimer’s prediction of a slide-back to anarchy in Europe is already beginning to look archaic. Waltz is in

agreement with the concept of an evolutionary transformation of supra-national institutions into global actors, claiming that

Supranational agents able to act effectively, however, either themselves acquire some of the attributes and capabilities of states…or they soon reveal their inability to act in important ways…

During the 1990s, the European Community/Union has increasingly taken on the look of a state. Today, after coming a long way in transforming itself into a cohesive unit, the EU may be read by defensive realism as not only a primary actor, but as one of the main candidates – perhaps the main candidate – for triggering a renewed balancing of world politics. Over the past ten years, the EC/EU has been engaged in an intensified effort to expand its territory, its political influence and its economic strength. Particularly noteworthy, as we shall explore later, has been the gradual creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which first appeared in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. These efforts continue yet. According to Gilpin’s theory of international political growth, one can therefore identify the European Union as a state that is attempting to change the international system. Joseph Nye Jr quotes an observer of European integration who is representative of the realist view that the EU’s actions are consistent with the balance of power theory:

A political bloc is emerging in the form of the European Union that likes to see itself as a challenge to America.

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Commentators have begun to take the prospect of a European rebalance of world politics ever-more seriously. Waltz listed the EC/EU as one of four contenders for the role of balancer in his 1993 article (the others being Germany, Japan and China), adding Russia to the list in 2000, while William Wohlforth declared, "If the EU were a state, the world would be bipolar". Similarly, academic books have been commonly questioning whether the Atlantic Alliance can sustain a more assertive EC/EU, with titles such as *Allies or Adversaries*, *Europe: The Strange Superpower*, and *American and Europe: Is the Break Inevitable?* In terms of neorealism, then, the notion of an EU challenge to American primacy is both necessary (since the alternative, time’s cycle/offensive realism has lost much credibility) and plausible.

### 6. Goal of the Thesis

Whilst the theoretical case for an EU challenge is strong, the task remains to demonstrate this in fact. The goal ahead is to analyse the evidence that may support, weaken or amend the defensive realist position as outlined above. After reviewing the evidence, the thesis asks where this leaves us in terms of the future of the EU in world politics and neorealist theory. If the EU does indeed appear ready to embark on a challenge against the United States, what kind of challenge will it be, and what roles and relationship will those two actors have in the future? Alternatively, if the EU does not represent a challenge, what implications does this have for neorealism? In the following pages, the objectives are:

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To judge whether the EU is, in fact as well as in theory, a potential catalyst for rebalancing:

- Does the EU currently have, or will it have in the future, the capabilities to initiate a challenge?
- In particular, is the EU growing at a faster rate than the United States on a range of measures that would indicate its rise to a potential superpower status in a bi-polar world?

To assess the likelihood of this balancing mechanism actually occurring:

- Does the EU have the motivations to initiate a balance, i.e. is the EU a non-security seeker?
- Conversely, if the EU is a security-seeker, is it able to clearly signal its motivations to the United States?

In 1993 Waltz claimed that the challenge expected by neorealism was likely "In the fairly near future, say ten to twenty years." If he is correct, the imperative of attempting to prepare for the balance hardly needs to be stressed. In trying to address the above questions, I shall examine the EU’s capabilities and intentions in its two most important areas of foreign policy, the Balkans and the Middle East, with particular focus on the EU’s relationship with the United States. At the end of this review, it should be possible to assess the ability of neorealism’s balance of power theory to explain the EU’s role in world politics.

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Chapter Two

Splintering Over Yugoslavia

We were thus dealing not only with the problems of Bosnia itself, but with the essence of the transatlantic partnership. There was a clear risk that the Atlantic alliance was on the verge of perhaps its worst crisis ever.

Carl Bildt

One of the most difficult challenges facing the EU today, especially since the beginning of the war in Kosovo, is that of redefining itself in relation to the United States.

Dominique Moïsi

1. European War, Transatlantic Tension

The Balkan wars of the 1990s marked the first conflict in Europe, and the first challenge to security on the continent, since the end of the Cold War. As European security had been set firmly within the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – and in particular upon Western Europe’s alliance with American capabilities – the dissolution of Yugoslavia in a sense served as a test of endurance for this existing structure in the emerging geo-political environment. The wars, in particular those in Bosnia and Kosovo, would have profound repercussions on the Atlantic alliance, causing severe strains between the United States and its European allies. In particular, as the gulf in military capabilities across the Atlantic became apparent, questions arose on both sides as to the reliability and future intentions of their traditional partner. By the end of the decade there were growing indications not only of diverging versions of global politics but of competing interests.

Fears grew in Washington of a new power that would no longer be willing to accept American leadership, as the European Union (formerly the European Community) coalesced economic, monetary and political power. Likewise, Europe grew increasingly concerned that Washington appeared to be more focused than hitherto on American national interests, relative to transatlantic security. As neorealists expected, in a more uncertain world, the imperative of self-help seemed to reassert itself, on the one hand by way of a deeper resolve to building a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and on the other by way of a politicisation of American foreign policy. As we shall see, no factor has been more important in this regard than the allies’ experiences in the former Yugoslavia.

2. Initial Transatlantic Reactions
The EC became involved in the Balkans already equipped with a fledgling CFSP and with a weight of expectations for it to be an effective international actor. Although the CFSP as yet lacked any military component, or what would become known as the ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’ (CSDP), European leaders hoped that a combined diplomatic and economic policy would suffice to deal with the worsening problems in the Balkans. The EC member states were negotiating an expansion of European integration into the foreign policy and security realms as the initial conflicts broke out in Slovenia and Croatia, in the summer of 1991. These new European capabilities were later signed as Pillar II of the EU’s Maastricht Treaty (February 1992). They had emerged out of the sensibilities affected by German reunification as well as widespread disappointment at Europe’s collective inability to prevent and,

failing that, to substantially participate in the Gulf War.\textsuperscript{76} Both events took place in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, which has seen by many as signalling "a coming of age of the European Union [which was asked] to perform the role of a superpower in the making".\textsuperscript{77}

In the midst of the unfolding, dramatic events in Europe, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic spoke of new expectations of Europe as an international actor. Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission demanded, “We must demonstrate that the Community... is an actor and not simply a subject of contemporary history”.\textsuperscript{78} Likewise, President George H Bush welcomed “the emergence of Europe as a partner in world leadership”.\textsuperscript{79} Consequently, as the Yugoslav state collapsed and demands rose for international action, the United States for the first time since the Second World War declined a leadership role on a substantial issue of European security, conceding leadership to Europe. As Secretary of States James Baker put it, "It was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show they could act as a unified power".\textsuperscript{80}

The United States’ decision not to engage in the problems of Yugoslavia was paralleled by an equally forceful desire on the part of many in Europe to wrestle the mantle of leadership from the Americans, in what was seen to be "a European, not a


\textsuperscript{79} Nuttal (2000): 37.

transatlantic question". With the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, many Europeans viewed the EC as the major power in Europe, particularly given the new moves towards political union being agreed in Maastricht. In this political climate, Yugoslavia would be seen in many quarters as the means to express the long-held desire to emerge out of the shadow of American dominance. Intervening in the Yugoslav mêlée was not merely a necessity for European leaders, but an express wish. By successfully dealing with the incipient wars the EC could send an unmistakable signal that it was a heavyweight international actor with new political and security dimensions. Far from being merely a challenge to European security, therefore, the Yugoslav crises were embraced “both as a challenge and an opportunity”. Whilst Europe's CFSP was as yet in labour, the EC commenced an intervention in Yugoslavia which "was widely touted as the EC’s debut on the international stage".

3. Sources of War
The conflict in Yugoslavia stemmed from its fragile political patchwork and, in particular, from the way in which that structure was destabilised by an aggrandised Serb nationalism. Yugoslavia after World War II was made of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro) as well as two Serb provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo), all fitted together in a decentralised federation. Although (what we now recognise as) the different ethnic and religious

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81 Gow (1997): 0.
groups had generally lived in harmony under successive Ottoman and Hungarian empires, by the late nineteenth century European nationalism had reached the region and had begun to transform group identities. Individuals’ loyalty to their original state would from this point compete with a growing sense of nationalism. The problem was that, since the inhabitants of Yugoslavia (known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 1919-29) lived within political boundaries that did not fit their modern national identities, nationalism in the Balkans threatened to undermine the state.

Under the leadership of Joseph Broz Tito, Yugoslavia’s premier (1945-80), the federal government assiduously constructed and maintained the political system in such a way as to repress sub-state nationalist politics. Tito sought to promulgate a Yugoslav nationalism which would suppress other national loyalties. In general, he was able to limit national grievances and secessionist aspirations, most notably in Kosovo, where he pursued a strategy of appeasement. In contrast to Tito’s appeasement strategy, Serb leaders in the 1980s would seek to revoke the autonomous powers of its regions in an attempt to bolster Serbia’s leverage in the federal system. This not only exacerbated strong anti-Serb resentment in Kosovo, but inflamed long-held suspicions in other republics about Serbian desire for hegemony.

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Growing nationalism in the region was fuelled by publication of a Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences Memorandum in September 1986. The document highlighted the "discrimination" felt by Serbs and drew particular attention to the suffering of Serbs in Kosovo who, it claimed, were victims of "genocide" at the hands of Kosovo Albanians. It concluded that the answer to the Serbs' plight was "the Serbian people's complete national and cultural integrity, regardless of which republic or province they might be living in". Seven months later, the political tinder created by this document would be alighted by Milosevic’s *cri du cœur* to Serbs in Kosovo that "No one should dare beat be you!", effectively establishing him as the standard-bearer of Serb nationalism.

After extending Serb sovereignty over the provinces in 1989, Milosevic went on to consolidate power over Montenegro. Fearing creeping Serb hegemony, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia declared independence by June 1991, with Bosnia-Herzegovina following in October. The federal government – by now a Serb property – declared the declarations illegal and moved tanks into the republics to assert Yugoslav/Serb territorial control, starting with Slovenia on 26th June 1991.

4. European Intervention, American Reserve
These events happened to occur just at the time when the European Community was negotiating the Treaty on European Union, or the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty included the new provision of the CFSP, which substantially upgraded the rather
informal European political cooperation (EPC) that had existed since 1970.

Maastricht called for the new European Union

…to assert its identity on the international scene, in part through the implementation of the common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.\(^88\)

Such a lofty ambition was the backdrop for EC/EU intervention in Yugoslavia, with Jacques Poos, then President of the European council, declaring, "It is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans".\(^89\) Yet Europe – and the fledgling CFSP – proved unable to live up to its expectations. During the brief conflict in Slovenia and then the longer one in Croatia, the EC was powerless to prevent or resolve the wars. The "sense of euphoria"\(^90\) generated by the apparent EC diplomatic coup in Brioni, July 1991, for example, turned out later to be just a pause in the fighting in which Serbia was able to regroup and turn its focus away from Slovenia (where there were few Serbs) and towards Croatia (where there was a substantial Serb community). By mid-September concerns grew that the conflict would spread into Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and other areas, yet the EC remained divided over taking strong action. Unable to agree a common policy, let alone resolve the escalating conflict, the EC’s international debut quickly degenerated into a "debacle".\(^91\) The outbreak of war in 1991, then, had the result of arresting unrealistic European ambitions regarding CFSP and concentrating minds on the difficulties in achieving a genuine common policy:

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\(^88\) Treaty on European Union, Article B  
By the end of 1991 the EC had gone from brave optimism to dealing with the unpleasant and inevitable – and had already found the limitations of CFSP along the way.  

After fourteen failed EC ceasefires and 10,000 deaths, the war in Croatia finally ended in late November 1991 under a United Nations proposal, and a protection force (UNPROFOR) was deployed to maintain the truce. Just as the EC had failed to anticipate and mediate the conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia, the same pattern would emerge in Bosnia-Herzegovina, only on a more tragic scale. War broke out in Bosnia on the first of March 1992, following a Serb-boycotted referendum on Bosnian independence. Serb forces quickly overran Bosnia and by June over 2 million Bosnian refugees would be flooding neighbouring areas, including the EC itself. The political pressure on the EC to respond decisively to this refugee crisis was compounded in the summer of 1992 by the Serb slaughter of civilians in Sarajevo and later by television pictures of Serb internment camps. The pattern of EC responses, though, amounted merely to "a series of empty threats… allied to the wide use of humanitarian aid as a substitute for actual policy".

Despite the Bush administration’s quite open invitation for Europe “to take a leading role in this conflict because this is, after all, a conflict on European soil…” the European Community found that its lack of coercive power undermined its best

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93 Rogel: 25-26
diplomatic efforts. The EC, riven by disunity, effectively admitted its inability to resolve the situation in Bosnia when it internationalised the management of the crisis in the form of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which replaced the previously EC-exclusive Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY). Although the EC concluded that force was needed, it turned to the United Nations rather than the United States, still seeking to take advantage of the preference in the US for a European-led settlement. As the ICFY came closer to an agreement with the warring factions, however, it became increasingly clear that the ability to threaten force rested ultimately on decision-makers in Washington and not in New York, home of the UN. Consequently, in contrast to the Bush administration, the new Clinton team would become ever-more activist in the search for a new Bosnia policy, first in apparent support of the ICFY and then rather openly in opposition to it. Since American force was needed, it would become apparent that, regardless of European efforts, the US had an effective veto on any proposed plan.

If the lesson for EC member states up to late 1992 was to intensify their efforts to stay united behind a common policy, there would be substantial evidence in the next phase of the conflict that they had taken heed of that lesson. In the framework of the ICFY, led by mediators David Owen (for the EC) and Cyrus Vance (for the UN), the member states evinced a greater resolve to stick together in robust political support of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP). The Europeans managed to maintain their unity in the face of opposition not only from the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia but eventually also from the Clinton administration. Following the failures of 1991-92 the EC states largely "kept together, through the successes and failures of Balkan
diplomacy”. As we shall see, the issue for the EC’s CFSP ambitions in Bosnia shifted from European unity on the one hand, to anxiety over the traditional American guarantee of European security on the other. Whilst the Europeans had made progress in their Balkans policy by beginning to show the ability to work towards a common goal, by 1993 they would begin to feel that this achievement was being compromised by the unreliability of American commitments to European security.

The VOPP was unveiled in January 1993, with the EC issuing an ultimatum to Serbia and Montenegro to accept it unconditionally or face complete isolation. The plan called for a confederal structure in Bosnia that would maintain a unitary, multi-ethnic state, albeit one fragmented into ten mostly mono-ethnic units. While the EC vigorously supported the VOPP, American support was equivocal at best. Implementation of the plan required a 60,000 soldier-strong force, of which 20,000 were earmarked from the United States. The VOPP had earned the support not only of the EC, but also Russia and most of the warring parties, and it seemed likely to end the war, given strong US support. Rather than welcome the VOPP as an opportunity, though, Washington would resist it, focusing instead on the domestic political implications of the plan’s call for American troop deployments.

Having campaigned in the presidential elections for a more forceful American policy over Bosnia, the Clinton administration signalled immediately upon taking office that the United States was no longer prepared to rest on the sidelines. In testimony to

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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State-designate Warren Christopher announced that the US in future would be more willing to use force in Bosnia. 97 Two weeks later, Christopher received a sweeping State Department review of all options, including the large-scale use of military power, 98 a policy unequivocally ruled out by the previous administration. 99 In the coming months, however, the Clinton-Christopher Bosnia policy morphed in several directions, all whilst the VOPP was nearing a settlement.

Partly in reaction to a media offensive in the US by Lord Owen, 100 the administration signalled in February that it had apparently now ruled out using military force and instead would “actively engage in the Vance-Owen negotiations”. 101 By May, the US policy changed once more. Just as the VOPP looked to be finally agreed in Athens, Warren Christopher travelled to Europe to promote a new American option of ‘lift and strike’, that is the lifting of the UN arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims combined with NATO airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. The VOPP required the US to make good on its promises to help enforce any agreement made between the parties, including the deployment of ground troops. In the light of US domestic politics, the timing of the American turnaround perhaps should not be a surprise. As Lord Owen

99 Ralph Johnson specified that the Bush administration “should focus our current efforts on political, economic and diplomatic measures. As the President has stated, we will act with prudence and caution when it comes to US involvement in this crisis”, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs. 11th June 1992.
100 In the winter of 1993, Lord Owen, using American newspapers and television to put pressure on the Clinton administration, claimed that “they [the Clinton officials] were out to ditch this plan and we stopped them doing that”. From Bosnia: Peace Without Honor. Panorama, BBC Worldwide Television, 1995.
ruefully notes, the same day that Christopher left for Europe to advocate his new plan – and thus effectively dismiss the VOPP – the *Sunday Telegraph* had asked pertinently: “Bosnia: Will it be Clinton’s Vietnam?”

With US troop deployments at stake, Washington felt it could not revert to the Bush position of leaving the issue to the Europeans. Following strong European resistance to ‘lift and strike’, Christopher persisted in trying to find an American policy that was politically acceptable on both sides of the Atlantic, even if its goals would be more modest than those of the VOPP. By July he had refined the preferred American option to threaten NATO airstrikes without lifting sanctions, which was eventually authorised by NATO in August. Wishing to reassert American leadership over the issue of Bosnia, Washington finally arrived at a position with which the Europeans could agree, albeit reluctantly. The *Washington Post* reported that the evolution of this option appeared to be “driven by emotion and a sense of crisis rather than by some broader principle”, while the *New York Times* spoke of “growing disarray in NATO, confusing shifts in American policy”. Limited NATO airstrikes would finally happen in the spring of 1994; in the meantime, the VOPP was in effect discredited by Washington’s disinclination to enforce it, a stance cited by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic as the reason the plan was rejected by his

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103 President Clinton acknowledged that, in trying to demonstrate American leadership over Bosnia, the US had not taken sufficient account of European views. On the failed policy of lift and strike, he said, “I think we overestimated our ability [to persuade Europe]. We thought if we had reason to stick our necks out on a change of policy that they could come along with us”. Devroy, Ann and Jeffrey Smith. “Excessive Rhetoric Had Haunting Echo”. New York Times. 17th October 1993.
Although the administration never rejected the plan outright, its policy switches served to undermine it, apparently not an unwelcome development in Washington:

[The VOPP's] most serious weakness was Washington's equivocal position. Even while mouthing support for VOPP, the Clinton administration did not fully back the plan. In the end, Washington was content to let it fail.  

Worse than the American government's failure to support the VOPP in the eyes of many Europeans was an approach that appeared to mask its "all important domestic agenda" with "the impulse of moral indignation" over European policy. A widely held view in American policy circles was that the VOPP rewarded ethnic cleansing and merely ratified Serb territorial gains, an argument that influenced the administration. By refusing to endorse the VOPP on moral grounds, President Clinton could "take credit for a muscular policy on behalf of the Bosnians as well blaming the Europeans for preventing its enactment". For David Owen, Washington's posturing was simply "outrageous conduct" which merely killed the path to peace for the sake of American – not transatlantic – motives.

When the United States did eventually join Europe in support of a peace plan it would be, according to the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, "three years and more

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106 Explaining the Bosnian Serb rejection of th VOPP, Karadzic claimed that the Americans "are standing behind, just distant from this plan. Unfortunately, the Americans didn't want to end the war, even in 1993. That's why we presumed that this plan as not going to fly". From Bosnia: Peace Without Honor. Panorama, BBC Worldwide Television, 1995.

109 See, for example, William Pfaff, "Invitation to War". Foreign Affairs. 72.3 (1993): 99.
than a hundred thousand deaths after America's first real opportunity to help end the war." Moreover, this new plan, negotiated virtually exclusively as an American programme, compromised more than the VOPP on two key American principles, that is on the refusal to reward ethnic cleansing and a refusal to allow ethnically defined territories. Having previously rejected the VOPP in part for rewarding Serb aggression and for accepting ethnic partition, the US plan appeared to fall somewhat short of its own self-proclaimed objectives:

Having refused to attempt implementation of Vance-Owen on these grounds in 1993, the US was prepared to oversee and contribute significantly to a deal which was worse, regarding the principles at stake.  

From an American perspective, Europe had shown itself unable to deal with a security issue in its own area, despite being handed an opportunity by Washington to demonstrate leadership. US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke complained that, while the Americans were busily trying to solve the crisis in Bosnia, “the Europeans were literally sleeping through the night. You have to wonder why Europe does not seem capable of taking decisive action in its own theater.” For Europeans, however, the failure of the EC to resolve the crisis was not attributable to any lack of effort, but rather to Washington’s decision to withhold military support from the European peace negotiations or, to put it another way, Europe’s unreliable dependence on US coercive power.

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For many in Europe, this dependence thus became a source of resentment. Not only had EC states lost the chance to implement their own peace plan; not only had they to come to terms with the fact that it was their key ally, the United States, that had caused the chance to be lost; but they later felt compelled to implement an American plan which appeared to be considerably inferior. Unlike in the earlier conflicts, the lesson to be drawn from the war in Bosnia was not one of European unity, but rather that Europe in the post-Cold War era could not rely upon the assistance of the United States to maintain European security in the way Europe had come to expect in previous decades:

The old Cold War days of European deference and automatic solidarity with US decisions overriding even genuine differences were over.\(^{114}\)

In becoming the main source of troops, reconstruction aid and diplomatic leadership during the long-term implementation of the Dayton accords, the European Union, in the words of peace negotiator Carl Bildt, has become "little more than the paymaster of policies directed from the other side of the Atlantic".\(^{115}\) Having learned to follow a common approach after their misendeavours in Slovenia and Croatia, European Union states now faced the reality that its security had become "politically vulnerable"\(^{116}\) to domestic agendas in Washington. In this sense, Bosnia represented the "end of America’s Eurocentricism"\(^{117}\) and a time to reflect on the meaning of the alliance:


The United States could at any moment choose to detached itself from European security, if not in renouncing the [North Atlantic] Treaty, at least in interpreting its obligations in a minimalist manner, whilst the European countries clearly do not have that advantage.\textsuperscript{118}

From a European perspective, that the war in Bosnia was ended unnecessarily late and on American terms sent a powerful message about the fragility of the alliance. More disturbing yet was the realisation that even this American support to European security was as much incidental as deliberate, and that even this might not be assured in future. Washington had consistently ruled out deploying American troops in the war in Bosnia since it calculated that such a policy "could never be sold to the American people".\textsuperscript{119}

Following another lethal attack on Sarajevo market in February 1995, Serb attacks on UN safe areas in April and July as well as Serb kidnapping of UN peacekeepers, European soldiers in UNPROFOR were shown to be not only ineffective but vulnerable. In anticipation of such a scenario, European nations in NATO had called for an evacuation plan (Op-40104) the previous year, to which the United States had pledged 25,000 troops. Now, in the summer of 1995, European states urged the US to either forcefully intervene or, for the sake of the endangered European troops, implement the NATO plan. Either way, the US was committed to military engagement or risk the credibility of NATO and severely damage the transatlantic alliance. Although the US government was still against enforcing a peace plan,


European pressure for it to honour its earlier commitment in Op-40104 had in
effect imposed the military option even against its will:

What one Clinton advisor called 'the single most difficult position of
[Clinton's] presidency - to send troops to Bosnia' had been made
without anyone realising it.\textsuperscript{120}

The United States at this stage was left with just two choices. First, it must choose
between a "war to withdraw or war to withstand",\textsuperscript{121} that is between a positive use of
force to enforce a settlement on the one hand, and the evacuation plan on the other.
Second, whichever option it took, the US had to choose between NATO and the UN,
which up until then had been the main international organisation involved. For the
credibility of US foreign policy commitments generally, and for the benefit of
American values, it clearly made more political sense for the administration to opt for
enforcement of a peace plan rather than to suffer the humiliation of evacuating UN
peacekeepers, including its European allies. Likewise, it made political as well as
strategic sense for the US to choose NATO over the UN. First, the US would be
assured a dominant voice in operational planning, and would not have to defer to
either Russia, which already had soldiers on the ground, or China, which occupies a
seat in the UN security Council. Second, a NATO mission in Bosnia would for the
first time bring the organisation out-of-area, thus consolidating American leadership
over the allies in a revived NATO. Just like the diplomatic activity, the military
component of the international effort would be run from Washington, with the
potential to revitalise American influence over European security.

\textsuperscript{120} Bass (1998): 100.
\textsuperscript{121} Gow (1997): 146
Thus, not only did the United States move later than Europe had wished in addressing the first crisis of European security in the new era, but it did not do so fully of its own volition. Despite persistent US declarations of renewed commitment to the alliance, Bosnia was a testament to its priorities in the field of political and military hard choices. Following Bosnia, American claims to be still absolutely committed to European security would be more convincing if the Bosnian experience had not provided all-too-visible evidence of America's hesitance to involve itself in potentially lethal situations in Europe... The verdict comes in the form of a question: If not Bosnia, where?\textsuperscript{122}

5. Damaged Alliance and the CFSP

The shadow cast by Bosnia over the future of the alliance in European security extended over Europe's CFSP. Bosnia demonstrated to the Europeans that it was not enough to have merely a common foreign and security \textit{policy}; in order to be effective, the EU would require a reliable foreign and security \textit{capability}. Now that Europeans saw the role of NATO as tied to American domestic politics in an unprecedented way, EU states would have to reformulate their preparations for military interventions in the event that the United States would again decline its traditional leadership role.

\textsuperscript{122} Clarke (1993-94): 30.
5.1. The CJTF, Albania and Kosovo

Following the collapse of the VOPP (and later its derivative, the ‘EU Action Plan’)\textsuperscript{123} in 1994, the need for Europe to have access to military resources and for the United States to maintain the alliance without over-committing itself was born out in NATO’s new concept of the combined joint task force (CJTF). Established at the NATO summit in Brussels in December 1994, this idea was fleshed out in Berlin in June 1996. With the CJTF, the United States agreed to support a European security and defence identity (ESDI) on the basis that it would be "separable but not separate".\textsuperscript{124} ESDI would be acceptable to the US provided it was set within the framework of NATO. NATO assets could then be turned over to European command within a CJTF, leaving flexibility for American involvement. In this way, even whilst European states could gain access to assets, the US could maintain its leadership over European security issues:

By providing a simple, albeit US-dependent, solution to the operationalization of ESDI, CJTF can be seen both as a US move to block European autonomy and as a European recognition of the weakness of their military assets.\textsuperscript{125}

Subsequent events in Europe, however, would soon overtake the CJTF concept. In early 1997 Albania was facing economic and political collapse. Given its relations with Kosovo Albanians and other Balkan neighbours, an unstable Albania portended

\textsuperscript{123} The EU Action Plan differed from the VOPP mainly in that it was constructed more directly through cooperation between EU member states rather than via mediators, although David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg (who had replaced Cyrus Vance) continued their roles as EU/UN negotiators. See Owen (1995): Chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{125} “A Risky Reduction Strategy for NATO”. BASIC <www.basicint.org/natorr6.htm>
wider trouble in the region. Although the European Union supported Albania’s request for NATO intervention, "one word from the US delegation was enough to change the trajectory of EU activity in Albania".\textsuperscript{126} Rather than encouraging the EU to act within the framework of a CJTF, the United States appeared to prefer the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to step in instead.\textsuperscript{127} Ultimately, a Greco-Italian-led force with some support from other European countries and Turkey launched an independent coalition-of-the-willing under a UN mandate (Resolution 1101). The following year, when the EU accelerated its drive to build an autonomous military capability, the lesson of Bosnia was reinforced by this latest failure of the NATO/CJTF commitment to European security, as recounted in a conversation between Wesley Clark, NATO’s supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR) and Javier Solana, the EU’s newly-appointed High Representative for its CFSP:

\begin{tabular}{ll}
Wesley Clark - & Dr Solana, when do you – you say you will always come to NATO first – if that’s the case, why would you ever then need a European security force, if the United States is always going to be there? \\
Javier Solana - & In 1997 you weren’t there. Italy went into Albania alone. NATO wouldn’t participate – wouldn’t lead it.\textsuperscript{128}
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The "European security force" that Clark was referring to is the latest and boldest attempt by European states to create an autonomous military apparatus. This arose

\textsuperscript{127} Brassey’s (2000): 111.
\textsuperscript{128} Clark, Wesley. "State of the NATO Alliance". Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, European Sub-Committee. \textit{Congressional Information Service}. 27\textsuperscript{th} February 2001.
in March 1998, as conflict escalated between Serbia and Kosovo. After having withdrawn Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, pressured by conservatives in the Serbian Assembly, proceeded to clamp down further on the region, such as by removing official status for the Albanian language and extending Serbian control over the Albanian education system. In 1987, after Kosovo politicians had failed to win concessions from Milosevic, armed separatists set up the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to fight for independence, following the pattern of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. As in the previous conflicts, the Serb military moved in to establish control by force, raising tensions in the region further through massacres of civilians and through other human rights abuses.

Compared to the previous wars, the American response was forceful and swift. An alleged Serb massacre of 45 Albanians in Racak, Kosovo, in January 1999, after a ceasefire brokered by US envoy Richard Holbrooke, served as the political opportunity for the United States to lead a military operation against Serbia’s forces. The following month a final attempt to end hostilities in Rambouillet, France, left the Serbs politically isolated and tainted as the ones not only contravening human rights but also defying the international community. Shortly after, NATO conducted its first military campaign against a sovereign state.

If NATO-American action was impressive, it did not quite balance out the momentum building behind an autonomous European military. Indeed, in three ways the Kosovo crisis deepened and accelerated the European commitment to its CFSP. First, unlike in the three earlier wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, the Serb-Albanian
war directly threatened NATO – and American – interests. Instability in Kosovo was a key American concern ever since Milosevic had come to power, with President Bush issuing Serbia a written warning that it would face an American response if it moved on Kosovo, a warning repeated by President Clinton.\(^{129}\) The American worry was that any conflict in Kosovo would provoke intervention by Albania and Macedonia, which in turn might draw in neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria, and possibly even Turkey. With Greece and Turkey being NATO members, the US could in such a scenario be drawn into a general Balkan war. Thus it was directly in American interests to prevent and repel Serb aggression in Kosovo, unlike in Slovenia, Croatia or Bosnia. In this light, a strong American response was not surprising and in no way was an indicator that Washington would not repeat the actions that so frustrated the Europeans earlier.

Second, the NATO response in Kosovo was dominated by an aerial strategy that was dictated by domestic American political fears of risking ground troops.\(^{130}\) The United States was able to impose this strategy on top of strong European – particularly British – preferences for the option of ground forces to be at least kept open. The clear signal by the United States that it did not wish to risk its soldiers was felt by some European leaders to weaken NATO's ability to issue ultimata; it would also give Milosevic the freedom in the first weeks of the war to initiate an accelerated policy of ethnic cleansing, which would put tremendous political pressure on the NATO leaders. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the NATO campaign,


\(^{130}\) Parmentier (2000): 16.
European dependence upon a military strategy devised for a security issue in Europe but based firmly within the constraints of Washington politics was likely to cause European leaders to
draw their lesson even more emphatically that they must have the capacity to act effectively on their own and reduce their dependence on the United States. Few European leaders in the future will want to take such domestic heat again for relying on the United States and then coming up short.131

Third, and most importantly, the cost of the campaign by NATO confirmed even more starkly than in Bosnia Europe’s capability-dependence upon the United States. Unlike in Bosnia, Europe played "a basically insignificant role in the Kosovo campaign, largely removed from active engagement after the first few days of bombing".132 The near-total dominance of the American military in an operation on European soil reflected badly on European states and "highlighted in vivid and embarrassing detail Europe’s dependence on the US military".133 European leaders were shocked that, with more than 2 million troops, they were unable to muster an effective force in the European security operation.134 "The sad truth is", noted Germany’s foreign minister Joschka Fischer, “that Kosovo showed Europe is still not able to solve its own problems".135 The depths and sincerity of the European shock was recalled by Senator Joseph Biden of the US Foreign Relations Committee:

One of the things I did not anticipate as a consequence of our significant show of capability in Kosovo was the extent of the embarrassment and resentment it caused in European capitals. I was stunned by how profound it was…. It is not merely a matter of the political tricks which we’ve on observed on and off over the last 30 years.\textsuperscript{136}

5.2. The Road to St Malo

Crucially, the campaign in Kosovo has generated a movement toward realising a common foreign and security capability worthy of the name, directly producing "a sea change in European attitudes on things military".\textsuperscript{137} Europe’s leaders had to come to terms not only with the gap in military capabilities across the Atlantic, but with the inferior position that this left them in, with respect to diplomacy and military strategy, even in Europe itself. The result has been galvanised support for an effective CFSP:

More than any other issue, Kosovo has given new impetus to European action. Shock at the evident disparity between US and European military capabilities and over the way in which decisions were taken in NATO during the air campaign has strengthened the European resolve to provide an alternative voice and set of capabilities to cope with the crisis in Europe.\textsuperscript{138}

Coming to terms with what \textit{The Economist} labelled Europe’s "blush-makingly dim performance"\textsuperscript{139} in Kosovo has meant a stark reappraisal of pan-European security requirements. British Prime Minister Tony Blair took the lead, explaining, "We need to identify the gaps in our capability and plug them. We need to do more to plan our defence together at the European rather than a national level".\textsuperscript{140} Representing a country traditionally wary of initiatives on European defence, Blair’s message


\textsuperscript{137} Daalder and O’Hanlon, (1999): 137.

\textsuperscript{138} Brassey’s (2000): 68.

\textsuperscript{139} “Europe and America: Weathering the Storm”. \textit{Economist}. 9\textsuperscript{th} November 2000.

\textsuperscript{140} Tony Blair in Medley (1999): 21.
indicated the degree to which Kosovo had transformed the European political scene. In fact, Blair had anticipated the collective poor European showing in Kosovo and prepared his own proposals to strengthen the CFSP long before the NATO campaign began.

In the spring of 1998 Blair had commissioned an intelligence report on what European states could offer militarily should a NATO operation be required in Kosovo. He was reportedly "appalled" at what he heard.\(^{141}\) As a result, he initiated a Franco-British dialogue that was presented later that year as the St Malo Declaration. The two leaders laid out a firm set of goals for the creation of a European military capability and a timetable in which to achieve them. For the first time, leaders of major European states have attached their credibility to fulfilling an ambitious agenda to invest a genuine coercive power in the CFSP.

The St Malo Declaration was endorsed first at NATO's Washington summit in April 1999, and then two months later at the European Council summit in Cologne, where it became official EU policy. Cologne called upon a European "capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision-making bodies".\(^{142}\) Six months later, in Helsinki, the European Council confirmed the specific goals set out in St Malo. The CFSP was to have the capability within three years to undertake EU-led operations inside a 60-day notice period and

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be able to sustain the operation for at least one year. The target in terms of troops
was set at up to 60,000 – the same number Europe would have required to
implement the VOPP.

Cologne’s specification that the new capability was to be "autonomous", and
Helsinki’s call for "EU-led" operations are significant not only for heralding a
European capability separate from the United States, but also for breaking from the
traditional expectation that any new European military strength would be placed in
the Western European Union (WEU). Whereas the EU confidently reaffirmed the
central role of the WEU as the EU’s defence arm as recently as 1997,143 at Marseille
in November 2000 the EU terminated its effective purposes.144 The EU announced it
would absorb the WEU’s operational objectives known as the Petersberg Tasks,
named after the German city where they were fashioned in 1992. These tasks range
from humanitarian and peacekeeping fully to peacemaking, including a potential
Bosnia- or Kosovo-type situation. Given that the WEU’s relations with NATO had
grown fairly strong through their joint exercises in the Gulf War and in their missions
in the Balkans (mainly to monitor and enforce sanctions), the usurpation of the
WEU’s roles by the EU145 may be seen as a strong indication that European leaders
were planning a capability truly independent from NATO and United States.

145 The EU’s adoption of the WEU’s main responsibilities and the WEU’s effective dissolution was confirmed at the WEU’s meeting in Marseilles on 13 November 2000 <www.weu.int/eng/future>. 
5.3. Stronger CFSP, Weaker NATO?
The radical goals and timetable set out in Cologne and Helsinki are augmented by a new CFSP apparatus. Set up within the European Council, the EU would establish a hierarchy to manage its new security responsibilities. For the first time, defence ministers of the member states would be included in EU-level policy meetings within the General Affairs Council. Supporting the defence ministers would be a military committee (MC), to be made up of national military chiefs who would offer planning advice. The MC would pass on recommendations to a political and security committee (PSC), which would be a permanent institution based in Brussels. Members of the PSC would in effect be national ambassadors for the full range of CFSP issues, including the CSDP, and would deal with the political control and strategic direction of crisis operations. The MC and PSC would be given military expertise by a military staff (MS), which would be responsible for early warning of crises, strategic planning and identification of national troop contributions. The MS includes the new Situation Centre (or Sitcen), also based in Brussels, whose initial responsibility was to establish an operational capacity for the Petersberg Tasks by the end of 2001.146 In 1999, as the structures were created, the CFSP was also buttressed by its first High Representative (or ‘Mr CFSP’). In choosing the former NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, the EU signalled that its intention to build an effective CFSP was finally to be taken seriously.

Following its experiences in the Balkans in the 1990’s, the EU has rapidly accelerated the development of its CFSP in terms of goals, structure and deadlines.

Altogether this would, in the words of then-British Defence Secretary George Robertson, "give the European Union a place in international affairs worthy of its size, experience and economic strength". As Robertson acknowledged, the European Union was now moving beyond the concepts of CJTF and ESDI that were endorsed by the United States, and was moving much more towards creating an autonomous power:

> Our ultimate aim...is not so much a European Security and Defence Identity but something altogether more ambitious – namely, a European Security and Defence Capability.  

Although European leaders have since 1950 announced lofty sounding goals, the new collection of initiatives at the end of the century, being so specific and elaborate, seems "more serious than its many predecessors", and was described by External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten as "a real change of gear". The crises in the Balkans showed European security to be dangerously dependent on a partner whose commitment was questionable (in Bosnia and Albania) and, when it did demonstrate its commitment, did so in a way that only highlighted that dependence and Europe's incapacity to govern war strategy even on its own soil (Bosnia and Kosovo). As Western Europe and the United States were no longer bound by a common enemy, the imperative of self-help did appear to bear a stronger impact on the outlook of each side, with the United States more concerned than before about

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149 Gordon (2000).

its domestic politics, and Europe alarmed at the apparent lack of depth and reliability to its dependence on the US.

Although the greatest developments in the CFSP are too recent for one to know their ultimate destination with certainty, their potential to represent a challenge to the Atlantic alliance is clear. At least formally, the European Union is still committed to NATO, which, it declares, "remains the foundation of the collective defence of its Member States". Yet even this commitment is vague, since the nature of NATO as a collective defence organisation is not assured, particularly as it launches its second wave of expansion in 2002. If the EU remains committed to NATO as a collective defence institution, but grows more independent and assertive itself as a European security institution, the future of the alliance remains assured only so long as it stays in the business of collective defence. Since NATO has no obvious adversary, however, and since it is expanding into former hostile territories, it is beginning to look more like a collective security organisation. As both NATO and the EU evolve, then, there is the increasing likelihood that their responsibilities and their capabilities cover the same areas and issues. If this happens, European and American policies could become at odds and even competitive with one another.

The concept of ESDI implied that the European Union might conduct operations independent of the United States but depend on NATO assets, and work under the command and control of NATO structures. On this basis Washington gave its assent

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to Europe's CFSP. Following the Cologne and Helsinki summits, however, the EU has left no doubt that it intends to have the capability to launch missions ‘with or without’ recourse to NATO.\textsuperscript{152} Beyond structures and command, the troops pledged to the CFSP are those very same troops who are currently committed to NATO,\textsuperscript{153} so that, as reported by the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, the European initiatives are "mired in contradictions with existing commitments to NATO by most EU states".\textsuperscript{154} According to some analysts, therefore, the EU plans would "inevitably and mathematically dilute and weaken NATO".\textsuperscript{155} This fear has led US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to comment that he would be "watching carefully to see how things evolve", while simultaneously cautioning the United States to be "vigilant" against the CFSP generating instability within NATO.\textsuperscript{156} Current developments highlight ironic tensions within the alliance since, in answering American demands for a strengthened European pillar within NATO, the United States now fears the consequence of that very thing happening:

For years, the United States pressed its European allies to shoulder more of the burden of their own defense. Now Europe is forging ahead with a plan to do just that, and Washington suddenly is worried it could split the NATO alliance.\textsuperscript{157}

Until a new, specifically European security threat arises, or until the EU signals its willingness to engage its new capabilities beyond its borders, the tense, vague

\textsuperscript{152} Paraphrased from European Council President's Report on CFSP, Cologne, Annex III, No. 4, 'Implementation'.
\textsuperscript{157} Ulbrich (1999).
relationship between the CFSP and NATO is unlikely to be resolved. The European experiences in the Balkans, however, have clearly marked a shift in Europe’s ambitions and determination to lessen its dependence on Washington. Though it is still far too early to claim that the EU is becoming independent, the way it has responded to the lessons drawn from the dissolution of Yugoslavia demonstrate that "it is certainly capable of moving in that direction…".\textsuperscript{158}

Chapter Three
Between de Gaulle and the Atlantic

1. Europe and the Middle East in the Cold War
The history of the European Community/European Union in the Middle East\textsuperscript{159} is intertwined with the drive towards European political integration.\textsuperscript{160} The 1967 Arab-Israeli war, for which the EC member states failed to come up with a joint response, was a spur to the birth of European Political Cooperation (EPC) the following year. EPC was a relatively informal predecessor to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and marked an early attempt to create a coherent policy towards pan-European issues. Europe's geographical proximity to the Middle East and greater dependency on Arab oil were the ostensible factors that led it to take a divergent path from the United States; this was compounded by the fact that, unlike in the US, Israeli security was not considered a vital interest for the EC. Altogether, this made European responses from the outset more sympathetic than American policy to Arab and Palestinian causes. This trend began with the Schuman Paper (1971), the EC’s first attempt to address the Arab-Israeli conflict, but which failed to even mention Israeli security.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{159} The term 'Middle East' in this chapter refers to the countries stretching from North Africa eastwards to the Levant and the Persian Gulf. Parts of the chapter will compare European and American policies towards the entire region; other parts, where identified, will focus on their respective policies towards the actors involved in the Arab-Israeli, and especially the Israeli-Palestinian, conflict.

\textsuperscript{160} Robert Olson claims, for example, that "Europe chose the Middle East as one of two issues...around which to build a European foreign policy as an exercise in political unity. There has never been any secret about it". Olson, "Europe and the Peace process: An Arab-American Dilemma", American-Arab Affairs, 32 (1990): 63.

EPC continued to be driven by events in the Middle East. In 1972 the EC unveiled its Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), an innovative attempt to gain influence around the Mediterranean region through economic means. The ineffectiveness of this policy, in terms of having an actual impact in the region, was exposed by the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the resulting oil crisis, which provoked the EC's Brussels Declaration, the "first joint declaration on an active foreign policy issue and the first concrete result of the 'political cooperation' process". The Declaration was heavily tilted towards the demands of the Palestinians, noting the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force; calling on Israel to end its occupation of Arab lands; calling for the recognition of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians"; and merely noting the right of "every state" (not mentioning Israel by name) to exist "within secure and recognised boundaries", a right which challenged as much as reassured Israel.

The war and oil crisis broke European hopes for its GMP, since they "had the effect of separating the Middle East conflict (and currently the peace process) from attempts to create an overarching EC-Mediterranean Partnership". From this point on, European policy would address the region as a whole separately from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The events of 1973 had a second crucial effect in changing, or at least accelerating, the course of EPC. During the conflict the United States had intervened robustly – and, it turned out, decisively – in Israel's favour, including a vital airlift of military

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supplies. The war consolidated Israel’s hold on former Arab territory and undermined Arab hopes that the lands could be won back militarily. With Arab leaders now more likely to compromise their traditional hostility to Israel, the clear Israeli victory thus paved the way for the start of intensive American attempts to broker a settlement based on a 'land for peace' basis. In taking a relatively pro-Palestinian/Arab stance, however, Europe not only lost the confidence of Israel, the war’s victor, but also raised suspicions in Washington of a newly active and autonomous European foreign policy. Since the release of the Brussels Declaration, the Middle East has become a key source of transatlantic discord as well as a symbol of European independence from the United States, particularly as championed by neo-Gaullist French administrations.

Since 1973 the EC’s pro-Palestinian tendencies had the effect of distinguishing it from the United States as well as alienating Israel. Consequently, this limited European leverage over the key actor in the region and its superpower sponsor. This meant that European pronouncements had the liberty of lacking significant responsibility but also, predictably, that they had only a very modest effect. Indeed, Europe has had great difficulty in coming up with a unified policy at all, so that "Although European approaches to the Middle East have often been different from those of their US counterparts, there is a plurality of European national approaches, different from each other, or even contradictory to each other".\textsuperscript{165} Most major EC policy statements, therefore, were motivated by the same reason as the 1973

declaration, which is "in order to gain Arab support and with little hope of actually influencing events".166

The Brussels Declaration was followed up by a Euro-Arab Dialogue (1973), through which the European Community hoped to secure its energy needs in return for Arab demands for political, not just economic discussions. Through the Dialogue, the EC veered far from American policy, fiercely criticising Israeli settlements and welcoming the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as part of Arab delegations, this at a time when the PLO was classed as a terrorist organisation in the US. The divergence in the policies of the Atlantic partners grew starker over the next few years. Whilst the United States operated a piecemeal diplomatic effort, with Israeli security paramount, the EC preferred a comprehensive settlement, with the Palestinian issue at the centre of all other issues, and the EC held firm to this policy even after the apparent success of US efforts leading to the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accord in 1979.

In 1980 the EC issued its seminal Venice Declaration which, in focusing upon Palestinian rights and upon Israeli settlements as an obstacle to peace, seemed to highlight Europe's pro-Arab bias and, as far as Israel was concerned, its irrelevance:

The Venice Declaration marked a low point in Israel's relations with the EC from which it has never fully recovered.... By mirroring the stance taken by the Arabs, it [the EC] effectively removed itself as a potential mediator between the two sides. Whilst the same charge, in reverse, could be levelled against the United States, the Europeans had little

leverage with Israel and their collective voice was studiously ignored in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{167}

The Venice Declaration was just as poorly received in Washington. Apart from the obvious differences in tone and policy, the high profile given by the EC to its new Middle East initiative as well as its post-Camp David timing clearly set Europe apart from the United States on a key international issue. After failing in its attempt to prevent the EC from issuing its statement, Washington viewed it "as an act of open hostility towards America".\textsuperscript{168} Instead of rallying behind an American approach that appeared to be reaping dividends, the EC seemed to be going out of its way to deprive Washington of international support and to be needlessly striking an independent path. Crucially, though, with the United States acting as the sole guarantor of Israeli security and as the sole broker in the emerging peace process, European statements had little or no way of being backed up by action and therefore had the luxury of being cost-free so far as Europe itself was concerned.

The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in 1983 further highlighted the differences in approach by Europe and the United States. In the 1980's there were several outbursts of warfare instigated by the Israelis in Lebanon, with the United States on each occasion being either compliant or for the most part quiescent.\textsuperscript{169} Whereas the European community denounced the invasion of

\textsuperscript{168} Greilsammer and Weiler (1987): 45.
\textsuperscript{169} For an account of the United States role in the invasion of Lebanon, see Rubenberg, C. \textit{Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination}. 1986: 269-70.
Lebanon as a "fragrant violation of international law,""\textsuperscript{170}" the United States was virtually the only nation in the world that did not issue a statement criticising the invasion,""\textsuperscript{171}" and Congress went on to increase aid to Israel from the previous years."\textsuperscript{172} Similarly, the United States was singularly defiant in support of Israel following the Israeli attack on PLO headquarters in Tunis."\textsuperscript{173}

During the 1980s, with the start of democratisation of the European Community and the accession of Greece (1981), and then Spain and Portugal (1986), the exigencies of the Mediterranean region as they related to European security moved up the agenda in European capitals. As Belgian foreign minister Leo Tindemans would later put it, "Europe had to take an active part in the peace keeping process because the Mediterranean is a lake...if there are fires around the Mediterranean, we will see the flames at our doorstep"."\textsuperscript{174} This development was reinforced by the introduction of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 and the push towards dissolution of intra-EC borders later agreed in Schengen (1992). These agreements brought about greater EC attention to fears of southern Mediterranean states that their traditional exports to Europe would be compromised by the single market, which led several of them to apply for EC membership;\textsuperscript{175} raised concerns in Europe about potential security threats and immigration patterns that could stem from growing disparities in socio-economic levels across the Mediterranean; and made the EC's external

\textsuperscript{170} Khouri, F. \textit{The Arab-Israeli Dilemma}. 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 1985: 433.
\textsuperscript{172} Khouri, F \textit{The Arab-Israeli Dilemma}. 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. 1985: 430.
\textsuperscript{175} Applicants around this time were Morroco, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta.
borders more significant, given that security threats and immigration would have complete freedom of movement once imported into the EC.\footnote{Roberson, BA. “Islam and Europe: An Enigma or a Myth?” Middle East Journal. 1994. 48.2: 302.}

These were all factors influencing European policy towards the Middle East that had little or no relevance to American policy-makers. Internal European integration was beginning to transform the way in which the EC looked at its southern neighbours. Whereas from at least 1973 the main issue was energy supplies, in the 1980s other, 'soft' security considerations grew in importance, particularly immigration, extremist Islamic movements and terrorism, all of which were deemed rooted in socio-economic factors. This contrasted with the typical American approach, which emphasised more 'hard' security issues and responses. The 1986 American attack on Libya in response to the allegations of Libyan involvement in the bombing of a Berlin discotheque, for example, was deplored by most EC member states. Most European governments deemed the military response as inappropriate and possibly counter-productive in draining power from leaders like Colonel Ghaddafi.\footnote{See Joseph Coffey and Giovanni Bonvicini. The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989: 289-90. The exception of the UK from this reaction to American policy is important and shall be explored later.} Instead, they believed that more fundamental issues had to be dealt with, such as popular economic and political empowerment and the Israeli-Palestine conflict. As the democratic and economic liberalisation in Europe continued on to a new level, Europe became more attractive for those enduring relative paucity, and those experiencing popular, often religiously-fuelled unrest to the south. As European integration deepened, then, the Middle East increasingly represented a potential
security threat of various guises. This change of emphasis has been neatly summarised by Ghassan Salamé:

> Europeans tend to view the Middle East basically as a security issue for which the catchword has changed over the years from 'oil deliveries' to 'terrorism' and now to 'Islamism'.

2. Post-Cold War trends

The end of the Cold War amplified the above trends towards a more assertive European common policy that has focused on soft security issues and has been forged in part for the sake of signalling autonomy from the United States. The peaceful democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe further spotlighted the authoritarian regimes to Europe’s south as the staging ground for future threats. As the EC was forced into constructing a CFSP in response to the events to its east, southern member states, led by France and the Delors Commission, "pressed for a degree of parallelism in policy towards the EC's two peripheries". Between 1990 and 1992 Europe launched new proposals to this end. A 'five plus five' group was set up with five countries each from the north and south Mediterranean to address security and immigration – not just economic – issues. This was superseded by a more ambitious plan for a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), based on the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, proposed by Spain and Italy; this proposal had intended for the United States to participate, just as in the CSCE. Both of these ideas were trumped, however, by a European Commission suggestion in 1993 for economic and political reform in the Mediterranean and the Middle East for the sake of reducing extremism,

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178 Salamé in Roberson (1998); 39.
violence and migration pressures:

The Mediterranean basin constitutes an important strategic zone for the European Community. The consolidation of peace and stability in the region is one of the highest priorities for Europe. This final proposal led to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, commonly known as the 'Barcelona process', officially signed by participating states in 1995. Barcelona is most significant because it marks a genuine effort by the EU to launch a credible, independent and comprehensive policy towards the southern Mediterranean, including most of the Middle East and North Africa. The process is composed of three dimensions or 'baskets':

(a) Political and Security, including a Charter for Peace and Stability

(b) Economic and Financial, with the goal of a free trade area by 2010, with southern economies buttressed by EU aid

(c) Social and Cultural, with the aim to increase inter- and intra-regional understanding and tolerance.

Since the EU is not economically dependent on southern Mediterranean states, the Barcelona initiative is explicable mainly on security grounds. In effect, the aim of Barcelona is to export the functionalist philosophy of European economic integration in order to build confidence in the intentions of former adversaries:

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^181 Stavridis et al (1999); 35.
The objective is to apply in North Africa and the Middle East the model developed successfully in Europe...to create a zone of economic development, democracy and peace for a process of integration. ¹⁸²

Apart from its security aspect, Barcelona was also motivated by Europe’s sense of inadequacy stemming from the Gulf War and the subsequent relaunched peace process, in which Europe was sidelined by clear American military and diplomatic superiority. From a European perspective, near-total American primacy and European powerlessness is striking in the context of European – especially French and British – history. The political imbalance in the early 1990s, first during the Persian Gulf crisis and later the Middle East Peace Process, was particularly humbling for France, the traditional vanguard of a common European Middle East policy, and this period "only reinforced French envy of America". ¹⁸³ From a French and, to a lesser extent European, standpoint, the end of the Cold War opened up new opportunities to address a somewhat anomalous situation in terms of (the lack of) European power in the Middle East:

...there exists a widespread feeling of frustration with the present phase in which Europe so clearly lacks the influence that it had for centuries and, in all likelihood, will have again in some not so distant future. ¹⁸⁴

Barcelona links the now 15 EU states to 12 Mediterranean partners\(^{185}\) with the immediate aim of creating the world's largest free trade area. It is comprised of both bilateral and, crucially, multilateral arenas in which members are obliged to cooperate over particular regional tasks, such as water supplies and employment programmes. In attempting to forge functional south-south ties as well as north-south ties, the process seeks to create conflict-preventing interdependencies and is thus "acutely concerned with security".\(^{186}\) Since the economic clout of the European Union is so great,\(^{187}\) the EU has been able to supply the incentives for members to participate in its working groups even where the United States has been unable to bring them together. Until November 2000, when Syria and Lebanon began to boycott Barcelona meetings,\(^{188}\) it was the boast of the EU that, unlike the US-sponsored Madrid multilaterals, Barcelona was "the only forum where Ministerial meetings involving all parties have taken place even during difficult periods in the Middle East peace process".\(^{189}\)

Through these bilateral and multilateral agreements, therefore, Barcelona is intended to establish the framework around efforts to achieve peace and stability, most obviously in the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Barcelona is meant to complement the policies of the EU and others in the search for a settlement on these

\(^{185}\)Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and the Palestinian Authority


\(^{187}\)As well as providing a huge market for southern Mediterranean exports, the EU has committed over 9 billion euros to investment in the southern countries through the Barcelona process. "From 'MEDA I' to 'MEDA II': What's New?", EuroMed Special Feature, 21, 3rd May 2001.


issues, rather than work as a policy independent of the peace process. As Robert Olson writes, “Although not designed specifically to advance the peace process, Barcelona was intended to work in its favor”.  

Barcelona is supplemented by a parallel partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), starting in 1981 but really gaining momentum in 1999 when the parties agreed to create a separate customs union by 2005. Although the tool is once again economic, security remains the paramount concern. According to the EU’s own account, "Behind the creation was a general perception by these states of their vulnerability arising from their oil wealth in contrast to their small and dispersed populations (28 million), their vast surface area (2.6 million km$^2$) and their limited military capabilities in a generally instable region". The EU has established separate yet similar bilateral agreements with non-members of Barcelona or the GCC, including Iran, Yemen and Libya. This means that the EU has embarked on a mission to extend and deepen its influence throughout the entire Middle East region, submerging its activities in the Middle East peace process in a broader network of economic, political and security ties. In a sense, then, this marks a return to the objectives of the 1972 Global Mediterranean Policy.

3. Barcelona: Balancing Madrid
Apart from its breadth and ambition, the Barcelona process is perhaps most distinguished by the fact that, contrary to the CSCM plan, no place was provided for

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190 Olson (1997): 82.
the United States, despite the expressed wish from Washington to participate.\textsuperscript{192} Indeed, in a sense the Barcelona process can be seen as an autonomous European effort to attain leadership in the region and circumvent the much more limited role that the United States had accorded it in the Madrid Conference of the Middle East peace process (1991). In Madrid, when the US felt it needed an international dimension to bolster its efforts, particularly to win the trust of Arab nations,\textsuperscript{193} it invited an ailing USSR as co-sponsor rather than the ambitious European Community, which it "firmly excluded".\textsuperscript{194} This was in line with the American policy since 1973 to discourage "independent European initiatives in the Middle East",\textsuperscript{195} and in this case reportedly left the EC "simmering with anger" at its exclusion.\textsuperscript{196}

In lieu of co-sponsorship, the EC was given responsibility over the Regional Economic and Development Working Group (REDWG), the most important of Madrid’s multilateral tracks, a role "dismissed by many...as a poor consolation prize to the Europeans".\textsuperscript{197} Foreshadowing Barcelona, the American intention of the multilaterals was "to create a web of functional interests vaulting political faultlines".\textsuperscript{198} Europe’s dissatisfaction at its restricted role and its continued aspiration to occupy a leadership position is evident in that, even whilst chairing REDWG, it was drawing its various plans that culminated in Barcelona. Rather than

be limited to the role assigned to it by the United States, the EC has preferred to embark on a policy that is remarkably similar to REDWG, the main difference being that in Barcelona there is no question of the United States being in charge.

This streak of competitiveness was evident in October 1994, when the United States sponsored the creation of Middle East and North Africa Economic Summits (MENAS), just as the EC was formalising its Barcelona policy to include its own Middle East financial arm, called MEDA. Through the MENAS, the United States proposed a Middle East Development Bank, which the EC rejected in favour of its own European Investment Bank, so that it maintained independent control of its own financial-based policies.\(^{199}\) MENAS was part of the American-backed REDWG/Madrid process, which was paralleled by Barcelona. The European Union could have chosen to satisfy its wish to contribute to the peace process and to regional stability through the American channels but instead launched its own institutional framework for much the same ends, thereby circumventing American leadership. Barcelona, then, may be seen as a European initiative to divert and gain independent political authority of the multilateral process that had begun in Madrid under American auspices.

4. Balancing the Peace Process

Apart from the Barcelona process, the European Union has invested directly in the Middle East peace process, and in the post-Cold War period has become by far the largest financial contributor to international efforts. The EU’s involvement in the

MEPP is, as we have seen, substantially older than the Barcelona process, dating back to the birth of European Political Cooperation in 1970. In terms of real significance, however, they share a common time frame and genesis. Within the MEPP, Europe has greatly enhanced its relevance both to the regional parties and to the United States by performing the role of main financier of the process.

![Pie chart showing contributions of different countries to the Palestinian economy](image)

**Fig. 1** Percentages of total international aid to Palestinian economy by most significant contributors. Total: US$ 2.8 Billion, 1993-97

As the above chart shows, since 1993 the EU has supplied over half of all international aid to the Palestinian Authority (around five times that of the United States). Moreover, the EU has provided over 800m euros per year to Israel's four neighbouring countries, investing through the MEDA programme almost 3.5bn euros.

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between 1995-1999, out of a budgeted 4.4bn euros. The European Investment Bank delivered an additional 4.8bn euros in loans in the same period, with over 6bn more in loans scheduled for 2000-2007.\textsuperscript{201} Although this investment points to Europe having merely a financial role in the peace process and in the quest for regional stability, the funds have not been offered without a significant expectation that it should give Europe the kind of political leverage that its Middle East policy has traditionally lacked. Contributing massively with finance but having little say in the shape of major policy allowed Europe to claim "a classic case of taxation without representation".\textsuperscript{202} The refrain of EU leaders in this regard has been that "The EU does not want to play an economic role only, but also to play a political role, like the United States".\textsuperscript{203} By becoming the largest financier of peace initiatives throughout the region, European politicians have called for a greater voice alongside the United States in terms of mediation and political leadership. As one commentator put it in 1995, the European Union was

\begin{quote}
tired of being asked to pay the bills but gaining little influence in Middle East peacemaking in return...\textsuperscript{204}
\end{quote}

Although European leaders have often demanded a larger role in the Middle East, in the post-Cold War era Europe's financial investments have demonstrated a greater resolve than in the past. This development is seen with greater clarity when put

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{201} Figures taken from the European Union's “Creating an area of dialogue, cooperation and exchange” <www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/intro/index.htm>.
\item \textsuperscript{202} Hadar, Leon (1996): 42
\item \textsuperscript{203} Belgium Prime Minister Louis Michel on the eve of Belgium's assumption of the European Council's presidency. "Mubarak Seeks Greater European Role in Peace Process". Xing Guoxin News Agency, 24\textsuperscript{th} April 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{204} Parks, Michael. "Europeans Foot Bills But Get No Respect". \textit{L.A. Times}. 10th February 1995.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
alongside intensified diplomatic activity, which was motivated mainly by two factors, one internal and one external. Internally, the election of Jacques Chirac to the French presidency brought a neo-Gaullist outlook to French foreign policy, that is, a deeper determination to get French and European voices heard on the international stage. Externally, European efforts were energised by difficulties arising in the peace process, specifically by Israel's Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon in the spring of 1996 and the subsequent policies of the newly elected Likud government under Binyamin Netanyahu in May 1996.

Judging the Grapes of Wrath to be a major threat to the peace process – including Europe's investment in it – France led a wave of European intervention. Pre-empting American action, France successfully made a major contribution to securing a ceasefire and, along with the United States and others, participated in a monitoring force to implement the agreement. Later that same year, Jacques Chirac made a high-profile visit to the Middle East to protest the new Likud's government's stance towards the peace process, in particular its controversial decision to open the Hasomean Tunnel in East Jerusalem. A year after the signing of the EU-Israeli Association Agreement (a part of the Barcelona process), European diplomatic activity was stepping up with the aim of developing new political strength. As Joel Peters writes, the visit of Chirac and other European leaders to the region reflected the long-standing frustration within many European capitals at their marginalisation from the central political developments within the peace process and a growing dissatisfaction with the American and Israeli self-imposed division of labour; namely that the United States would act as the sole external
mediator between the protagonists, whilst Europe would be responsible for providing the bulk of the financial resources required for underwriting any agreements reached by the parties.  

Following directly from Chirac’s visit, European efforts to gain a greater diplomatic capability were formalised in the appointment of a European Special Envoy to the Middle East, Miguel Angel Moratinos, in December 1996. Long a preserve of the United States, the role of Special Envoy was to improve European coordination and heighten its profile with regional actors and with the United States. Moratinos has declared that, given Europe’s clear commitment to the peace process, its role could “not be secondary or marginal” and the EU deserved “a seat on the board”. Moratinos’ appointment was later augmented by the appointments of Chris Patten as the European Commissioner for External Relations (September 1999) and of Javier Solana as the EU’s first High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (December 1999). By the end of the decade, then, Europe had forged a considerable financial and institutional structure to back up its 30 year-old policy ambitions in the Middle East.

5. Investing Capital, Lacking Leverage

Given the changes we have seen in the European Union’s Middle East and Mediterranean policies, the question remains as to whether these have generated sufficient political capital to achieve its ambitions – and, then, whether the EU has demonstrated the intention to press such an advantage. There have been some

206 “US Monopoly on Middle East Negotiations is Over”. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11th February 1997.
indications that the EU was indeed able and willing to use its new strengths to gain influence in the peace process. This has been most obvious through the EU's economic leverage over Israel, which has traditionally been the actor Europe has most wanted to influence. Given the lack of trade with its neighbours, Israel has always been deeply dependent upon trade with Europe, and this dependency was reinforced by Israel's active participation in the Barcelona process, starting in 1995. Israel has for many years had a trade deficit with the European Union, which in 2000 reached nearly $7bn. The EU accounts for nearly a third of Israeli exports, and almost a half of its imports, thus creating the potential for EU economic policies to have serious repercussions in Israel. It was not surprising, then that, following the deterioration in the peace process the subsequent year, the idea of the EU exploiting its economic relations with Israel should be raised:

Imagine that the 15 nations of the European Union were belatedly to adopt the Eisenhower Principle and to issue a joint declaration to the effect that, if Israel has not complied with international law...the European Union would have to consider the imposition of economic sanctions against Israel.

For some time such a radical policy has appeared a distinct possibility. In May 1998, exploring ways to resuscitate the peace process, the European Commission recommended that the EU exclude Israeli goods that originated in Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. This proposal was revived by France within the

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European Council in March 2001, in reaction to Ariel Sharon's blockade against Palestinian cities, and implicitly threatened two months later in an EU-Israeli diplomatic meeting. Moreover, beyond pressuring Israel directly, Europe's even greater economic leverage over the Palestinian Authority has reportedly encouraged it to exert pressure on Israel via its main sponsor, the United States.

Up to the current time, however, the European Union has generally refrained from exploiting these channels, and what political capital it has amassed has been checked by internal division and external pressures. Although the EU has come far beyond any point it has previously reached in becoming a real player in the Middle East, its political impact has remained extremely limited. Within the EU itself, policy-making is still performed on an intergovernmental basis, ensuring that, in an arena that can change by the hour, Europe is often hopelessly slow in reacting to events. Javier Solana, the new 'Mr CFSP', merely represents EU foreign policy, rather than presides over it; policy itself is still made in the European Council, to which he is responsible. Policy remains subject to national rivalries and different national agendas, which in the Middle East often means that one activist member state goes far beyond the others in advancing its particular vision of European policy in the Middle East. Usually, this has happened to be France, which has been accused of a selfish pursuit of great-power status rather than of having a genuine desire to contribute to regional stability.

In this light, the flurry of European diplomatic

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activity that we traced earlier is testament to its internal shortcomings as much as its collective ambition. The neo-Gaullist policy of Jacques Chirac in the spring of 1996, for example, caused unease within Europe as well as in Israel and the United States, since France was seen to be overshadowing collective EU efforts. Rather than demonstrate support for the Italian foreign minister, who was touring the region in Italy's capacity of European Council President, Chirac preferred to advance his own national initiative. Thus, the subsequent appointment of Special Envoy Moratinos should be seen as much as a response to internal EU indiscipline as a drive to pressuring outside parties.

An often-overlooked fact in many commentaries is that a 'European' initiative (whether originating in France, Germany or elsewhere) does not necessarily mean an "EU" initiative. Although France tends to be the vanguard of European activism in the Middle East, its vision and preferences, particularly pertaining to the United States, are often not shared by other member states, such as in its 1997 proposal to strengthen the security dimension of the Barcelona process, which was opposed by the UK. Indeed, sometimes views can be more in tune across the Atlantic than within the EU itself, and French activism can even compound such splits:

The French know all too well that their secret dream - to build a Europe that will challenge the United States - is the nightmare of their continental partners. By openly expressing its differences with America, over the Middle East for example, Paris more often than

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not isolates itself from London and Bonn.\textsuperscript{219}

External pressures also bear some responsibility in limiting the EU’s willingness and ability to transform its potential economic capital in its relationship to Israel into political leverage. Given Europe’s historical ties to the Jewish state, there are clearly awkward political implications in, say, issuing economic sanctions, with Germany in particular tending to be sympathetic to Israel. It would also be reasonable to expect France to find it especially difficult to support tough measures against Israel, given its criticisms of the effects of sanctions on civilians in Iraq.\textsuperscript{220} More importantly, any coercive European economic policy would inevitably have to deal with a strong American response. Unlike other states which have experienced European sanctions, Israel enjoys the status of key American ally. Just as the United States airlifted in military supplies in 1973, one would expect any serious European punitive measure to trigger a counter move from Washington, such as an increase in aid. In a short time, then, European efforts to achieve political leverage over Israel may have little impact on Israel, but have the undesirable effect of causing a damaging rift in transatlantic relations.

6. Atlanticism Resurgent

Europe’s internal incoherence, as intended, has been considerably reduced by the team of Moratinos, Solana and Patten and by the added emphasis in the late 1990s given to greater cohesion in EU foreign policy. Yet this has been achieved in a rather surprising manner. Although the apparent build-up of political capital and the

\textsuperscript{219} Moïsi (1998): 95.

\textsuperscript{220} “France condemns Iraq sanctions”. BBC Online. 2\textsuperscript{nd} August 2000<brhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_862000/862619.stm>.
addition of experienced leadership in the 1990s have indeed brought some leverage over regional actors, they have also had the unanticipated effect of sobering the kind of neo-Gaullist activism so evident in 1996 and in earlier periods of European Middle East policy. Instead, these recent developments have fuelled a new form of Atlanticism, a greater desire to fulfil long-held ambitions but in a way that is more coordinated than competitive with the United States. Far from lending it political strength alone, the maturation of EU policy in the Middle East has also brought it a new sense of responsibility that was never apparent in the days when its role was characterised by "mainly a sheaf of European declarations and reactions to them by the Israelis (negative), by the Arabs (grudging satisfaction), and the Americans (indifference)".  

Again, internal and external factors are involved. Internally, progression towards a more coherent and higher-profile policy has reduced the need for member states to make eye-catching statements or regional tours, and has raised the costs of doing so. Externally, the decline in the peace process since 1996, and particularly since the onset of the second Intifada, has focused efforts on constructive measures to revive the process rather than on those to advance the autonomy of European foreign policy. Having made a large financial and political commitment to the peace process, the EU has taken on a more pragmatic and modest approach to the region, including its relationship with the United States. Over recent years, it has become less worthwhile for EU leaders to release comments merely for political rather than practical effect, as it has tended to do in the past for either domestic or Arab

\[^{221}\text{Olson (1990): 61-62.}\]
consumption. Now with a major stake in the process, European politicians, as we shall explore, have adopted a more conciliatory tone to transatlantic cooperation over the Middle East.

Although Europe’s financial investments and past pro-Arab sympathies do create significant potential leverage over the Palestinian Authority, these factors simultaneously restrict any leverage it might otherwise have over Israel. Since Israel is the regional player that holds most of the cards, the perception of many Israeli leaders that Europe is biased towards the Palestinians has "effectively removed [Europe] as a potential mediator between the two sides". By using the Middle East as a means of achieving a foreign policy identity independent of the United States, Europe has further reduced its potential role, since "only the United States has the ability to influence Israel significantly".

By deliberately and unmistakeably choosing an alternative path to that of the US, such as in the post-oil crisis Euro-Arab Dialogue (1973) and in the post-Camp David Venice Declaration (1980), the EU alienated the US as a partner, so that "Since 1973 it has been evident that the United States does not desire independent European initiatives in the Middle East".

Europe has "steadfastly maintained" this neo-Gaullist element in its approach to the Middle East, lauding European policy as much for its non/anti-American quality as for its inherent worth, "despite gaining little in tangible terms and seeming to have lost much."

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In the 1990s, though, the costs of this neo-Gaullist strain have become increasingly apparent, as the EU invested heavily in the region. As noted in 1997 by Gerard Collins, former foreign minister of Ireland, unless Europe was willing to alter this approach it would merely exchange its own long-term goals for short-term parochial political gain:

Europe condemns itself to compensate for the losses caused by the ongoing occupation of Arab land instead of promoting the development of the Palestinian economy and lasting stability in a neighbouring region.226

Beginning with the appointment of Moratinos, the European Union has made a subtle yet significant shift in its approach to the region, a move towards a policy that is more constructive and coordinated with outside actors, and less concerned with a strategy shaped by endogenous EU goals. This new approach was signalled by the EU’s new Special Envoy immediately upon his appointment. Rather than use his new post to coalesce European energies and press a collective agenda on the United States, in October 1996 Moratinos outlined a vision of partnership in direct contrast to the neo-Gau list European moves earlier in the year:

We have to unite with the Americans, speak to them directly, reveal each sides' resources and share their roles, and share their tasks in a coordinated and complementary way.227

227 Cited in "Palestinians and Israelis Hail Moratinos Appointment". European Report, 1st November.
Commencing his work in late 1996, Moratinos kept to his Atlanticist vision and, unlike previous European representatives, was "careful not to tread on the toes of the Americans [and remained] firmly in the background".\footnote{Peters, Joel in Stavridis (1999): 312.} For its first initiative in the region under Moratinos’ stewardship, the EU drafted a 'code of conduct' that it hoped would be signed by Arab and Israeli parties in order to inject some confidence in the faltering peace process. Significantly, rather than present the plan directly, the EU chose to offer it to the United States in order to first gain American approval. The code of conduct paper was, remarked Moratinos, "a first step towards strengthening the idea of a European-United States complementarity to find a way out of the crisis".\footnote{"Urgent EU Proposes Mideast Peace Initiative to US". \textit{Agence France-Presse}. 7th April 1997.} Some observers interpreted this remarkable deference to the US as meaning that Europe had given up its quest for independent leadership and "has effectively accepted its complementary role".\footnote{"How Europe Could Put Pressure on Israel". \textit{Le Monde Diplomatique}. July 1998}

As the peace process stalled in the summer of 1997 Arab nations, and even Israeli leaders, encouraged the EU to play a bigger unilateral role, complaining that the United States had abrogated its leadership responsibilities. Yossi Beilin, a key Israeli negotiator at Oslo, urged a stronger European effort, claiming "The Americans have left the region - and have just left us some phone numbers where we can reach them".\footnote{Hiro, Dilip. "Can Europeans Fill the Peace Process Vacuum?" \textit{Inter Press Agency}. 14th July 1997.} The EU, however, resisted any temptation to intervene unilaterally and
persisted in its backing of American leadership. As well as developing its relationship with the United States, the EU stepped up diplomacy over the Middle East with Russia, which was still a co-sponsor of the American-backed peace process. In May 1997, the Russian foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, announced, "An historic turning point has been turned because we have drawn the conclusion that Russia's and the European Union's interests [in the Middle East] converge completely".232

In January 1998 the EU continued its diplomatic efforts, with Moratinos giving the clearest indication yet that the European Union was determined to support rather than compete with the United States, declaring that the EU's "objectives do not imply that the EU pretends to compete with the United States in this area. We support American efforts to revive the peace process because the United States is best placed to broker a deal".233 Shortly after, there was a sign that Washington was warming to the new European approach. In March Moratinos met American officials for the "first broad consultations between the EU delegation and their US counterparts",234 as the US sought to capitalise on the EU's new approach and enlist its support its attempt to relaunch the peace process.

This meeting in the Summer of 1998 was preceded by the EU's London Conference in which, significantly, the United States and Israel participated. Although it is true

that the choice of venue "indicated a new significance for a European role in the Middle East", the key point of note was the heightened transatlantic coordination and the modesty of European ambitions rather than any additional European strength. At the Conference, the EU again deferred to the United States, this time agreeing to an American request to postpone the launch of a European initiative in order to allow the US to promote its own plan. This direction continued into the Luxembourg European Council in June 1998, in which the EU declared its "full backing" to the new American peace plans. Significantly, the host government of the Conference made it clear that the days of anti-Israeli invective had given way to a more balanced approach to the conflict, announcing that Europe believed "as passionately in security for Israelis as we do in justice for Palestinians".

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer would later expounded on this point, arguing that the EU should no longer be seen as being biased to one party in the conflict:

I have always maintained in the Council of Ministers that we Europeans must prove capable of speaking with, and being listed to by both sides. And that there is no point in drafting declarations of solidarity with one side, because that means losing the ability to talk things over with the other side.

During 1999, with the peace process fracturing still further, Euro-American coordination remained strong. In that year, the peace process was threatened by a

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235 “Palestinians "positive" about London summit: Blair”. Deutsche Presse Agentur. 20th April 1998.
particular problem in that Yasser Arafat had vowed to unilaterally declare an independent State of Palestine, in line with the timetable set out at Oslo. As a form of compensation for holding back on this promise, the European Union declared its strongest support yet for the right of Palestinians to self-determination, "including the option of a state". Although this may seem to be a reversion to its neo-Gaullist disposition, the crucial point here is that this move was "apparently developed in coordination with [the] US government". Unlike the Euro-Arab Dialogue and other European statements, this pacification of the Palestinians was not offered for obviously European interests but instead for the sake of avoiding a potential flashpoint that could have seriously disturbed regional and American efforts to maintain the peace process. The appearance that Washington had informally endorsed the European statement was taken by one scholar to be the start of "a division of labor between the Clinton administration and the EU that will grow".

The EU persisted with its supportive and coordinated strategy in the hopes that the final status negotiations under the Oslo framework could achieve a permanent settlement. Although not entitled to a participatory role, the EU backed American efforts in Sharm El-Sheik and later in Camp David. In April 2000, in one of his first major statements on EU Middle East policy, Chris Patten gave an unequivocal signal of transatlantic solidarity, cutting EU policy loose from its neo-Gaullist ties:

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The EU has assisted in the negotiations and we are ready to continue where we are asked to do so. But we need to work in close cooperation with the United States.... Europe cannot and should not seek to compete with that work, or cut across it. Rather, we are partners in the effort.  

Perhaps most revealing of the new approach is that, as negotiations broke down, the EU did not see it as an opportunity to advance its own agenda but instead stayed loyal to American attempts at reconciliation. As *Intifada II* escalated, Javier Solana joined the US-led Mitchell committee in October 2000 to investigate the causes of the outbreak and to suggest means of ending it. This unusual high-level, joint effort of the US and the EU, along with Russia and Norway, pointed to both an EU desire to support the United States as well as an American willingness to invite the EU into diplomatic initiatives – providing the EU sticks to its supporting role. Late in the year France, in its capacity as President of the European Council, requested Javier Solana to visit the Middle East on behalf of the EU to help reduce tensions. Unlike in 1996, the role of High Representative for CFSP absolved France of the pressure to take a high profile initiative of its own; indeed, the new institutional structure for CFSP, including the personalities of Moratinos, Patten and Solana, have made neo-Gaullist and/or nationalist initiatives more politically costly for EU member states, for there is now greater pressure on them to ensure their approaches are harmonised with fellow members.

By early 2001, as the new Bush administration took office, American efforts appeared to have run aground, with Washington now seemingly prepared to vacate 

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243 Patten (5th April 2000).
244 “Solana to Travel to Middle East”, Deutsche Presse Agentur. 9th October 2000.
the role of external peace broker. "The Oslo peace process is dead", as *The Economist* put it in February, "[and] Mr Bush may be willing to wait for several years before engaging in the peace process again". By the summer, the peace process seemed so shorn of credibility it appeared conceivable that *Intifada II* signalled not just an end to Oslo but to the entire era of negotiations under American auspices. Since American primacy has rested on its ability to help secure a final settlement, or at least sustain hope of one – in particular by ‘delivering’ Israel – it has been a logical assumption that "Europe will be more active if the peace process founders or if the United States is seen as acting irresponsibly". Without credible hopes for a settlement and in lieu of American leadership, an opportunity for an independent European initiative seemed to present itself:

> Political nature abhors a vacuum, and one is being created by President Bush’s dislike of intimate involvement in the conflict.

Yet Europe’s chance, if it existed, has not been taken. Rather than exploit the United States’ misfortunes and the resulting political vacuum, the EU has adhered to its coordinated, supportive policy. In November 2000, as the peace process began to collapse, the EU endured Arab taunts that its policy of "neutrality" was "immoral" and "cowardly". For the first time, Syria and Lebanon boycotted meetings of the Barcelona process in protest at the EU’s inaction. Europe’s stance, so reserved compared to past key moments such as Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and the first

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249 Cited in "EU Backs the Creation of Palestinian State". *Inter Press Service*. 17th November 2000.
Intifada, was indicative of the more responsible and modest tack it now took on the Middle East – even at a cost to its primary initiative in the region. Instead of diverging from American policy, the EU maintained its solidarity. Investigating the origins of Intifada II, Javier Solana served on the American-led Mitchell Committee, in what he described as a “model of European-American effort”.\textsuperscript{250} Although the United States adopted a lower profile in the region, its continued efforts were supported by the European Union. In February 2001, for example, secretary of state Colin Powell welcomed Javier Solana to the White House to coordinate European and American plans,\textsuperscript{251} and in July the EU and US, together with Russia, made a joint effort to restrain warring factions in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{252}

Solana continued his support of the United States throughout the year, despite a series of broken American initiatives to resuscitate the peace process. Making a virtue out of the modesty of the EU's ambitions and pro-American line, Solana stated his "hope for a new dynamic before the end of the year, but not a new plan, because all the plans are already on the table".\textsuperscript{253} This view was clarified days later by a statement from the President of the European Commission and the presidency of the European council:

\begin{quote}
We underline the fact that the European Union and the United States are adopting a common approach to the Middle East Peace
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{251} "Europe and US Trying to Coordinate Mideast, Balkans Peace Efforts". \textit{Associated Press}. 6\textsuperscript{th} February 2001.
\textsuperscript{252} "US, EU, Russian Envoys Converge to Lebanon to Warn Against Violence". \textit{Agence France Presse}. 6th July 2001.
\textsuperscript{253} "EU Leaders Begin Whirlwind Mideast Tour to Kickstart Peace Process". \textit{Agence France Presse}. 17\textsuperscript{th} November 2001.
Contrary to some expectations, coordination with and support of the United States has risen to an historically high level, and European aspirations in the region have been expressed more modestly, with greater consideration for the agendas of outside actors. Rather than use its new financial and institutional structures to flesh out an independent vision to compete with the United States in the Middle East, the European Union’s approach has become more cooperative. After more than twenty years of predominately neo-Gaullist yet rather ineffectual policies, in the 1990s the EC/EU has increasingly evinced a more Atlanticist tendency. That is not to say that Atlanticism has utterly replaced neo-Gaullism, since in fact both have co-existed, such as in Europe’s support of the American-led Madrid Conference and the ongoing drive to develop autonomous European leadership through Barcelona.

This growth of European policy should not be all that surprising. Firstly, changes in policy have not been a prerogative of the Europeans alone. The United States has altered its policy more to resemble past European stances than the other way around. Above all, the US has changed its position on the centrality of the Palestinian question to the peace process and the recognition of the PLO as a legitimate party to talks, beginning with President Reagan’s reaction to the original Intifada. In fact, the fundamentals of the European stance since at least the 1980 Venice Declaration persist today, albeit with far more emphasis given to Israeli

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security. Rather than seeing change in European policy only, it would be more accurate to say that European and American policies have converged. This is true over regional issues beyond the peace process. As we have seen, through Madrid and the MENAS initiative, the United States has given increasing emphasis to the underlying socio-economic causes of instability that Europeans have traditionally highlighted. Also like the European Union, the US has identified non-state threats, particularly terrorism and its link to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as a primary threat to its national security. Both in the peace process and in the wider region, the United States agrees with the European Union that it has a basic need to work towards peace and stability beyond the imperative of Israeli security.

This touches on the much broader point that in the Middle East "...nowhere are American and European strategic interests in fundamental conflict". Both have a vital interest in secure energy supplies at reasonable prices, and Europe's greater dependency here amounts to very little here considering the worldwide economic impact on either side of the Atlantic of any alterations in supply or price. From Mossadegh to the Gulf War the West, led by the United States, has demonstrated its determination to intervene forcefully to protect its energy supplies and, by extension, to attempt to promote stability in the Middle East. In the Gulf War, even Europe's leading critic of the United States, France, showed its willingness to support a united military front. There is no question that in the Middle East, the Euro-American

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relationship is bound by some fundamental common interests that are likely to resist any competitive pressures from either side of the Atlantic and that for this reason, "commonalities of view between the United States and Europe outweigh differences".  

When common interests are directly threatened, whether in the form of energy supplies, stability or terrorism, there is little evidence so far to suggest the EU and the USA will compete. In a few isolated cases, views do clash, such as over American economic sanctions of Iran and Libya; but this has been over a unilateral American move that not only excluded European interests, but lacked any diplomatic consensus over goals in the first place. Where consensus has been built, over sanctions on Iraq, for example, Europe has maintained the policy, albeit with increasing diplomatic pressure for change.

This is clearly borne out in the Middle East peace process. Looked at from one perspective, Europe has increased its neo-Gaullist stance, investing heavily to increase its political leverage over regional actors. The Barcelona process is evidence of a Europe that seeks to circumvent American leadership and establish its own independent power in the Middle East. Yet this competitiveness is limited by increasing European coordination and support of American initiatives, commensurate with moderation of European public statements. In recent years, as the peace

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259 The Bush administration has acknowledged and responded to European criticism over western policy towards Iraq. For example, see "Powell Proposes Easing Sanctions on Iraqi Civilians". *New York Times*. 27th February 2001.
process has broken down and Europe may have been expected to raise its profile vis-à-vis the United States, it has done the opposite, clearly signalling its support of US leadership.

Instead of trying to highlight an alternative path to the one laid out by the United States in the peace process, the EU has not only displayed its loyalty to American leadership but has effectively cut itself loose from its former ambitions and has turned its attention to the post-settlement era. At the Feira European Council summit in June 2000, the EU stated that its Common Strategy, designed to fulfil the aims of Barcelona, would be implemented "once a comprehensive peace settlement has been achieved" and that Barcelona is considered "a determining factor in providing a foundation on which to build once peace has been achieved" (my emphasis).260

As the EU has increased its commitments through Barcelona, it has heightened its coordination with the US over the peace process. Although Barcelona does certainly indicate a drive towards an independent European identity in the Middle East, it does not seem to be at the cost of the transatlantic relationship. Indeed, the goals of Barcelona are shared by the USA, and the fact that Europe is shaping this process is a natural reflection of the fact that it was already by far the largest financier of the parallel Madrid multilaterals, rather than an indication of discord over goals or means. Moreover, since the fortunes of Barcelona and the peace process are interlinked, it has proven more valuable for the EU and its member states to recognise American

primacy in the peace process rather than to fruitlessly compete with it through public pronouncements. In short, increased investment has not only increased Europe’s leverage in the region, but has also brought added responsibilities, and has focused European minds more sharply on the interests held in common across the Atlantic.

261 In February 1998, for example, Jacques Santer, then president of the European Commission, noted that the decline in the peace process had “contaminated” the Barcelona process. “Santer Seeks New EU Role in Mideast”, Financial Times, 6th February 1998. The interlinkage of the two processes has also been acknowledged by Chris Patten in his speech to the European Parliament, 31st January 2001 <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_01_49.htm>. 
Chapter Four
Balancing the Alliance

The Atlantic Alliance is without question in the midst of the most severe crisis it has faced for many years…. It is a fact that the history of NATO is filled with a succession of crises – each successfully overcome. Is this but the latest which also will be overcome? Or, is this crisis so qualitatively different from previous challenges to the cohesion of NATO that it signals a watershed and calls for (or threatens) revolutionary changes?

US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1982

The end of the Cold War buried America and Europe’s existential interdependence…. But this much is true: in the sharing of ideals and the search for partners in a more complex world, the Europeans and Americans still look to each other before they look to anyone else.

Anthony Blinken

1. Conditions for Challenge

As we saw in Chapter One, the validity of neorealism’s balance of power theory appears to depend on the prospect of the European Union challenging American unipolarity, or, in anticipation of this, the United States pre-emptively striking at the EU (p40). Chapters Two and Three looked at case studies in the EU’s near-abroad, where its foreign policies are most developed and, one would reasonably expect, are most indicative of the EU's future direction. If neorealism is correct, one would expect to find evidence of a challenge by the EU against American leadership, probably in the very near future. In tracing the development of neorealist theory, we highlighted the significance of not only changes in the distribution of power, or capabilities, but also motivations and the clear transmission of motivations in precipitating the rebalancing mechanism. If neorealism can be supported, we would

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look for increases in the EU’s relative capabilities, a shift in its traditionally pro-American motivations, and/or a failure to successfully communicate benign intentions. Drawing on the evidence relating to these three factors - capabilities, motivations and clear transmission of motivations - to what extent should we expect a challenge; more specifically, under what conditions is a challenge most likely? Does the evidence give credence to neorealism, that is, is neorealism a helpful tool of analysis in highlighting trends in the emerging post-Cold War system? Lastly, how does the evidence reflect on the state of neorealism; how could neorealism be altered to improve its analytical strength?

2. Military and Institutional Capabilities

In both the Balkans and the Middle East, the European Union has indeed used the greater freedom of the post-Cold War era to develop its economic, diplomatic and even military capabilities. No longer bound to the United States by the common threat of the Soviet Union, the EU has taken unprecedented steps to advance its own power structures in its near-abroad. As we have seen, experiences in the Balkans stirred doubts in Europe about the dependability of traditional American commitments to European security. Over quite a short length of time, the EU has begun creating its own rapid reaction force (RRF), made officially operational in a low-key declaration at the December 2001 EU summit in Laeken, Belgium. With this force, the EU stands ready to undertake missions independent of American or NATO leadership or control. In the Middle East, the EU has launched its Barcelona process, an economic-security initiative that it hopes will build its stature and leverage in a region that has for much of the last 50 years been used to the United
States as the outside actor of influence. Moreover, the deployment of a Special Envoy to the Middle East, as well as the new leadership of Javier Solana and Chris Patten, has added a new weight to the EU’s political and diplomatic strength.

To some extent, then, there have been significant changes in the distribution of power between the EU and the United States, with the former making some relative gains. However, whatever kind of ‘rebalance’ this may signal, it marks at best only the most limited form of challenge. The EU's RRF is clearly not designed to be a regular army, with a single chain of command and the power to project an offensive power beyond its borders. Instead, if it achieves its most ambitious targets, it would be capable of the Petersberg Tasks, including Bosnia-style peace making operations within Europe. For missions that require more military intelligence for identifying targets, as did Kosovo, the EU will remain dependent upon the United States, even within Europe itself.²⁶⁴ So far, the establishment of the RRF has been geared more toward structures rather than investment in new technologies or weaponry, with capabilities originally earmarked for NATO simply being redesignated for the EU. Crucially, national governments remain in control of military budgets and of missions-approval, so that the EU has little or no say in the funding, coordination or sanctioning of military operations.

What may initially appear to be a challenge to the United States, in terms of the RRF and other added strengths to European capabilities, turns out to be far less

threatening. In terms of capability, the military force may be merely the minimum one might expect of the EU given the disquiet over its experiences in the Balkans before the United States demonstrated its own resolve in 1995. Indeed, given the fact that the US until then allowed and even encouraged the European Community to deal with Balkans issues without relying on American assistance, the EU is now merely evincing the kind of responsibility for its own security that the US hoped it could demonstrate as far back as 1991. Although any build-up in EU capabilities may raise suspicions in some quarters, the very limited new powers of the EU should not in themselves be seen as a direct threat to American interests. Rather, the US and NATO may be more threatened by the failure of the EU to build a limited military capability, for without this NATO and the US would be required indefinitely to answer the quite minor European security threats that are more likely in the post-Cold War era, and NATO’s European members would be unable to be effective partners. The Balkans consistently showed that, for domestic political reasons, the US finds it difficult to justify troop deployment, particularly in a generally peaceful and stable Europe. For the sake of the alliance, it is probably necessary that the EU acquires a limited capacity to deal with the type of security threats that have little appeal for the United States.

Beyond demonstrating a certain independence from the United States, then, the European Union's new military capabilities may also be read as the EU taking its alliance partnership more seriously. After four decades of American support for a stronger European pillar within the transatlantic partnership, Europe is at last showing some real progress. The difficulty of course is that the EU has chosen to
develop its capability as a force autonomous of NATO, not within it as the US had intended. Although this does pose some difficulties for the alliance, it would be unreasonable to see it as a mere self-interested challenge to the United States. From the point of view of the Europeans, not only NATO but the CJTF concept had failed them in the Balkans; if Europe could not depend on American assistance for limited operations, it was imperative to build some autonomous capability.

Complete autonomy from NATO would require building a capability comparable to it, which in turn means large increases in European defence budgets. Far from increasing military budgets, however, European Union states continue their trend of transferring resources from defence to other priorities, according to domestic political considerations, and are falling further behind the US in this area. In 2000, the combined budget of European NATO partners made up less than a quarter of world defence spending in contrast to the US, which alone spent over a third. Of all major partners - Greece and Turkey excluded - only the US allocates three per cent or more of its gross domestic product; Germany, one of the three main EU military powers, spends just over 1.5 per cent. Because of pressures for economic and monetary integration, member state budgets are restricted to a maximum budget deficit of three per cent of GDP, thus limiting their freedom to increase spending. Despite their commitment to increase expenditures in NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (spring 1999), European states have actually continued cutting funds and

look set to fail to meet their expressed commitments.\textsuperscript{266} Whereas the US has continued to increase its military expenditures,\textsuperscript{267} funds continue to dry up in Europe. As the gulf in capabilities widens across the Atlantic, Europe continues to be dependent on the US rather than prepared to challenge it. Indeed, even the full goals of the RRF look certain not to be realised in time due to financial constraints.\textsuperscript{268} The US Ambassador to the EU, Alexander Vershbow, said in May 2001 that, two years after NATO adopted its DCI, “rhetoric has far outpaced action when it comes to enhancing capabilities”, and that NATO “as a whole gets a failing grade”.\textsuperscript{269} Crucially, not only are European budgets falling, but they also continue to lack co-ordination, with significant duplication and missed economies of scale. "Today", says Lord Robertson, “the European allies spend about 60% of what the United States spends on defence but nobody would suggest that the European allies have 60 per cent of the capability”.\textsuperscript{270} In short, European military ambitions are modest; not supported by a credible commitment to invest; do not look set to be fulfilled at least in the short term; and, over the long term, Europe continues its dependence on the US.

The EU's new military capabilities, therefore, should not be taken as a genuine attempt to push the United States out of European security issues, either externally

\textsuperscript{267} For example, President Clinton proposed an 11 per cent increase in the US military budget for 2001, a request that congress actually increased. See Miriam Pemberton, "Sharing And Reducing The Military Burden". \textit{Foreign Policy In Focus}. 5.27 (2000).
\textsuperscript{268} “The Military Balance”. Remarks by Dr John Chipman, Director of International Institute for strategic Studies. 18\textsuperscript{th} October 2001 \texttt{<http://www.iiss.org/pub/tx/tx00010.asp>}
\textsuperscript{269} Vershbow Remarks on Euro-Atlantic Security and Defense”. 15\textsuperscript{th} May 2001. The United States’ Mission to the EU \texttt{<www.useu.be/Categories/Defense/PolSecVershbowEuroAtiSec15May01.html>}
\textsuperscript{270} “Shifting Alliances Over Europe”. \textit{Vancouver Sun}. 24\textsuperscript{th} May 2001.
or within Europe itself. Although the RRF does indicate a new resolve, its
genesis and limited nature would indicate that Europe is assuming those
responsibilities that the US is either unable or an enthusiastic to take on. Indeed, so
far as it may be seen as a challenge, the force is more a challenge for the US to
renew its commitment to European security as opposed to a hostile move against
American interests. While Europe wished to demonstrate leadership in the Balkans,
it did not show any inclination to build an independent capability until it grew wary of
US commitments. Had American action been more supportive of European designs,
the road to St Malo may never have been taken. European efforts to create an
independent capability, in other words, are in large part a reaction to American
behaviour, rather than a reflection of inherent European ambition. The modesty of
these efforts signals that Europe is not ready to jettison the transatlantic partnership,
but is merely willing to lead operations that the US considers unsuitable.

The RRF ensures the European Union a greater voice in at least European security,
whilst allowing it to remain firmly attached to the transatlantic security alliance,
particularly regarding external threats. By creating a limited independent option,
Europe ensures that the US treats its peace plans or similar initiatives seriously.
Since an independent European operation could risk dragging NATO into war
involuntarily, the US has no option but to coordinate with the Europeans and
consider their views more than in the past. In maintaining its dependence on the
United States, though, Europe guarantees the US its continued management role,
particularly for major operations. Thus, in terms of capabilities, evidence from the
Balkans does point to some form of shift in the way of European-American strength
and influence with each other - yet this ‘rebalance’ also preserves the transatlantic alliance. The evidence suggests that Europe's new capability represents a challenge for the US to show greater consideration for European security issues within a framework of continued American leadership.

This conclusion is paralleled by the European Union’s policies in the Middle East. On the one hand, the EU is making a substantial political and economic investment in the region, via the Barcelona process. As with the Balkans, the end of the Cold War has meant that, while Europe previously refrained from launching significant independent initiatives, in the 1990’s it began to develop its own genuine programme of leadership in the region. Just as in the Balkans, however, Europe's new capabilities here are modest and its independence from the US is limited. Barcelona is a web of bilateral and multilateral linkages that complement rather than compete with American efforts in the region. Barcelona is directly related to the European role in the Madrid tracks, in which the US effectively limited Europe’s political influence but called on it to contribute with funding and expertise. Although Barcelona has taken the European role outside the framework of Madrid, the EU has maintained its supporting role in American efforts. Moreover, as European investments have become more substantial, we have seen that the EC has tended to be more responsible, publicly acknowledging the vital role of the US and recognising the interdependency of Barcelona and the American-led peace process. Despite seeking an independent role, these initiatives should be seen more as a greater and more serious contribution to the transatlantic partnership than a challenge to American influence.
In both the Balkans and the Middle East, the EU’s capability is defined partly by what it is not as by what it is. The EU has not thus far translated its economic leverage with Israel into enforcing concessions in the peace process, i.e. despite frequent criticism of Israel, the EU has not imposed sanctions on settlement produce or revoked Israel’s Association Agreement, even though the EU has made similar decisions on other occasions (e.g. Serbia, Iraq, Argentina, Zimbabwe); it has not launched a separate peace process but, increasingly since 1996 it has deferred to American leadership and sought to work in direct support of American proposals; during 2000-2001, the EU did not attempt to exploit an apparent leadership vacuum as the new Bush administration stepped back from mediation efforts - indeed, the EU has withstood damage to its Barcelona process from Arab states disgruntled with its collaboration with the US.

The EU clearly does wish to gain a new level of leadership, yet most importantly wishes to do this without threatening the transatlantic partnership. Although Barcelona is, formally-speaking, an independent initiative, this is a reasonable reflection of the Europeans’ major role in the multilateral tracks of Madrid and in its financial sponsorship of the Oslo Accords, in which its low profile never matched its status as the largest contributor. Indeed, one might wonder if Barcelona might not have happened if the European Community was given a ‘co-sponsor’ status by the United States. Whether through Madrid or Barcelona, formally independent or not, the EU capability in the Middle East is coordinated and interdependent with that of
the US by design. Its greater role certainly indicates a relative balancing of the EU-US relationship, but marks more a genuine partnership than a unilateral challenge.

2.1. Capabilities and Conditions
Although the post-Cold War period has witnessed changes in the relative distribution of power, these changes, according to the evidence we have seen, have been insufficient to mark anything other than a modest rebalance in transatlantic relations. This is particularly so since the American military strength has still outpaced its European counterpart, despite the EU’s efforts to build a credible CDSP. The rebalance long expected by neorealists has not occurred and is not likely to occur in the near future, least of all through a direct European challenge to American interests. In terms of capabilities, such a challenge would be conditional on improvements in two areas: external power projection and internal EU cohesion.

2.1a. External Power Projection
As we have seen, the European Union does not have an offensive external power capability, and is only beginning to build a modest capability to deal with the Petersberg Tasks. Moreover, there is no prospect of the EU building an offensive force, leaving the US as the incomparable global military power. Not only does this mean that a traditional, military challenge against the hegemon is out of the question purely on capability grounds, it also means that Europe remains dependent upon American security guarantees. If a new, major threat should arise against European interests, the EU will look to benefit from American supremacy, not challenge it.
Moreover, because European defence spending is declining as that of the US increases, and because European budgets are hampered by inefficiencies, the gap in capabilities - and therefore the depth of the European dependency - looks set to increase. A switch from unipolarity to European-American bi-polarity is not possible without massive injections of military investment that is coordinated at the European level.

Although the European economy is of comparable strength to the American economy, increased defence spending at this level is, to say the least, highly unlikely – unless Europe’s hand was forced, for example by the collapse of NATO. If traditional American commitments to European security were abandoned, the European states would no doubt seek to improve their security self-sufficiency at the supra-national level. Given the cost of this to Europe, and the obvious danger it could pose to American leadership, both the EU and US are seeking to avoid damage to NATO. Securing NATO's future will clearly be contingent on the EU and US reaching agreement on rules of engagement and asset inter-operability. NATO cannot afford Europe’s RRF dragging it into a European conflict that it wishes to avoid, unless the US agrees to such a risk prior to its commencement. The US could not tolerate complete European independence for its RRF, since NATO's Article Five would, de facto, automatically commit the US to support any and all European missions, in effect conceding the leadership of NATO to the smaller EU capability. This would institutionalise the American experience in Bosnia where, despite its misgivings, it found itself bound to intervene – if not for the sake of the original European mission, then for the sake of saving embattled European forces. Such a
situation would undoubtedly produce a crisis of confidence across the Atlantic and could ultimately lead to the degradation of NATO. In December 2001 at Laeken the EU vowed to finalise its relations with NATO: it is a concern that this is merely a restatement of earlier declarations outstanding since 1999.

2.1b. Internal Institutional Cohesion
Apart from investing in an offensive force, any challenge by the European Union would be conditional on greater internal cohesion. As we have seen, the EU has made significant efforts to improve the coordination and presentation of its policies in the pursuit of a more credible CFSP. However, even if the EU had a more substantial military capability, the CFSP as yet could not support a challenge to the United States. Currently, responsibility for external relations is divided mainly between the European Council (which has the chief responsibility for CSDP) and the Commission (which is in charge of trade, foreign aid and is ‘fully associated’ with the Council’s CSFP). Within the Commission, four Commissioners must coordinate their external policies with their President, who coordinates with the Council’s High Representative, who in turn coordinates with the fifteen member states. This convoluted process will become even more complex when more nations accede into the union. There is no European equivalent to the American President or Secretary of State. Visiting American officials are greeted by a cumbersome ‘troika’ of Commission President, President of the European Council, plus its High Representative, none of whom have overall responsibility. Although the European Council President might be thought to be the most important of the three, his or her influence is limited not only by the fact that s/he must seek authority from fourteen
colleagues in the Council, but also by his or her short (six month) tenure in office. As Romano Prodi acknowledges, despite some improvements in the EU’s structure, “we are still far from having the single telephone number Mr Kissinger once asked for.” Commissioner Poul Nielson has similarly complained that the EU’s best efforts have managed to produce only a diluted foreign policy:

We cannot have a high representative on the basis of a low common denominator. The ‘C’ in CFSP stands for ‘Common’ not ‘Convenient’. A main obstacle to a credible European contribution to conflict prevention are the barely coordinated views expressed by member states. I would not be honest with you if I did not point to this obvious lack of sufficient political will in member states to accommodate the unity of messages which is absolutely crucial to the credibility of Europe’s common foreign policy.

Clearly, no real balancing of global leadership can occur without the EU overhauling its foreign policy apparatus. The present system tends to impede leadership and swift decision-making. Agreement in most policy areas is very difficult to reach, let alone enforce, so in many key areas, such as Iraq and on American plans for a missile shield, there is in fact no European policy. As happened in the Balkans and the Middle East, policy tends to be pushed up to the EU level from one or more member states (usually France, Germany or the United Kingdom) in reaction to a crisis that the EU has been powerless to prevent. In December 2000 Javier Solana complained that, with seven centres of policy-making, the CFSP was too bureaucratic and was unable to match the hopes that the EU’s ambitions had generated. Without reform, he wrote

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We will widen even further the gap between poor effectiveness, on the one hand, and on the other hand the high expectations they (the common strategies) raise.\textsuperscript{273}

Currently, European foreign policies are spread across all three of the EU’s pillars. CFSP stands artificially separate from economic and monetary issues and from home affairs, a structure that fails to match the transnational nature of modern economic and criminal forces. To tackle international drug trafficking, for example, the Commission has recently issued new objectives that spread responsibility across each of the three pillars (e.g. via external aid, law enforcement, plus EU economic and health programmes to reduce demand within Europe) but placed overall responsibility in none.\textsuperscript{274} In May 2001 Commission President Prodi proposed collapsing the system into a single external policy structure, headed by a more powerful High Representative and located in the Commission.\textsuperscript{275} Such a radical change would require complementary reforms. Qualified majority voting and constructive abstentions could be extended into defence and security policy areas to prevent national states vetoing common action by others. This would clearly have major implications for Greece (and applicant country Turkey), as was seen in the difficulty the EU had in declaring its RRF operational.\textsuperscript{276} Another key related reform would be for the Commission to have an exclusive right, or at least the main

\textsuperscript{276} “EU fights to save defence deal”. \textit{BBC Online}. 10\textsuperscript{th} December, 2001. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1701000/1701785.stm].
responsibility, to initiate CFSP policies or joint actions. As the Commission was a
catalyst for economic and monetary union, so it could be on foreign policy.

All such reforms, however, are probably as distant as they are necessary to create a
European Union capable of balancing the power of the United States. Deeper
integration would have to overcome the strong statist inclinations of France, which very often has been as European as it takes to advance French interests; of the UK, which has traditionally been suspicious of European integration for its own sake and for the sake of its self-declared ‘special relationship’ with the United States; and of Germany, which has traditionally favoured a stronger, federal European structure in which these plans might fit - yet, like the UK, is unlikely to risk relations with the US for the sake of its European vision. Such tensions within the EU would have to be resolved before more serious tensions arose with the US. As we have seen in the Middle East, proposals from Paris to increase the role of the EU vis-à-vis the US are often not paralleled in Berlin or London, and the eventual European policy tends to be far more conciliatory with American interests. Beyond these three nations, other member states, such as Denmark and neutral members Austria, Ireland and Sweden are not strong supporters of a much greater European military capability. As William Pfaff has written, "The flaw in Europe's ambitions is that not all the Europeans are ambitious".277

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Beyond overcoming the opposition of nation states (and, by association, the United States), radical reform of the CFSP structure would very probably face strong public resistance, at least in lieu of a major crisis that demonstrated an obvious and immediate need for such reform. The difficulties that the EU faced over monetary union in Sweden, Denmark, the UK and even France could reasonably be expected to be amplified across Europe on the more vital issue of losing sovereignty over aspects of national defence and security. In June 2001, the usually Europhile Ireland shocked Europe by rejecting the Nice Treaty in a referendum, an outcome which was in a significant way attributed to the ‘No’ campaign’s concentration on European plans for the new RRF.\textsuperscript{278} Generating public support for a genuine supra-national defence and security capability is therefore not a simple task, particularly for a European Union that has acknowledged itself to be “isolated and insensitive” in the eyes of ordinary Europeans.\textsuperscript{279}

3. **Motivations**

In the Balkans we have seen that, to the extent that the EU is developing its capabilities, it is doing so more as a challenge to the United States to renew its commitment to European security, rather than as a precursor to breaking free from the alliance. In the Middle East, similarly, as the EU has become a more significant independent player in the region it has increased its determination to coordinate with and support American efforts. As the EU generates greater independent strength, the tendency seems to be a Europe seeking more balanced partnership, not conflict.

If the EU were able to meet the conditions that created a sufficiently strong capability to challenge the US, the same pattern of balance without challenge would appear to persist. As defensive neorealists acknowledge, strengthened capability alone is not a faithful indicator of an actor’s behaviour; one must also consider intentions, or more specifically the motivations behind policy. It is also important to bear in mind that the push for increases in European military capabilities comes not only from within Europe but also from the United States. Far from fearing a stronger CSDP, the US is encouraging it, providing it is “done right”, in which case it “could help to rationalize and redirect resources, result in more balanced burden-sharing, and lead to a genuine strategic partnership between two premier organizations”.

Motivations behind the burgeoning EU capabilities discussed above are mixed, as we saw in the previous chapters. Undoubtedly there are some within the EU, led by France, that wish to build a stronger, supra-national institution as a balance against a dominant United States. This was clear in the neo-Gaullist approach that France has often adopted regarding European policies in the Middle East. French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine has stated bluntly that “The entire foreign policy of France, among other objectives, is aimed at making the world of tomorrow composed of several poles, not just a single one”. Recognising this, however, is not to ignore a parallel motive espoused, for example, by the UK’s Tony Blair, which sees foreign policy as perhaps the last stage in a European integration within the transatlantic


framework. Foreign policy, according to this school, is not intended to challenge so much as enable Europe to make a fuller contribution to the alliance. This was seen in the Franco-British “mutual surrender” in which “The French have accepted that there is no good alternative to NATO. The British have realized that they have no choice but to embrace Europe”. If this latter motive predominates, the US should not fear but in fact welcome European efforts to build more credible capabilities, since it could then share the burdens of leadership whilst achieving the same alliance ends:

What if the United States could find a partner it could count on as it faces the demands and opportunities of the new era in world affairs – a rich and powerful one that shared the American belief in political and economic freedom?

Distinguishing between these motivations can be difficult, since anti-Americanism may be the political tool that generates support within the EU for a higher degree of integration. In the Middle East, for example, Jacques Chirac’s activism did little to reassure the United States of European support in the area, but it did lead to European support for the creation of the EU’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, following member states’ concerns about French unilateralism. In the Balkans, European disenchantment with Washington’s reaction to the Vance-Owen peace plan and to Operation Alba were directly related to the establishment of the RRF:

Little doubt exists that there are voices within the European Union that expect (indeed, long for) a growing foreign policy in rivalry with the

United States. Romano Prodi, head of the European Commission, has let it slip that he regards it [the RRF] as a European army in embryo. 284

3.1. Rivalry in Other Issue Areas

The anti-American spirit so apparent in the CFSP may be seen more clearly in other policy areas. The establishment of the euro, for example, has created "a new and fundamental factor of US-EU rivalry of competition [that] will tend to diminish American economic influence and related political weight in the world". 285 Those states adopting the euro, according to The Economist, "made no secret of their hope that it will quickly rival the dollar". 286 The implications of the euro may yet be profound, since the new currency may deprive the United States of its ability to fund public deficits, including the kind of borrowings it has made to sustain its military investments. 287 This rivalry with the United States is evident elsewhere. In 2001, after President Bush announced the American decision to reject the Kyoto protocol, the EU stepped in with an unusually active and urgent show of leadership to secure the deal in a modified form. Politically, the agreement seemed to be as much about standing up to the United States as demonstrating concern for the environment. Commissioner Margot Wallstrom, for example, declared the new European-led deal "a victory of multilateralism over unilateralism. The international community has sent a very strong message to the United States". 288 Elsewhere, in early March 2001 the Bush administration announced that it was freezing talks indefinitely with North

288 “Bonn Deal on Kyoto is Approved after Last-Minute Drama”. Agence-France Presse. 26th July 2001.
Korea in a new hardline posture that threatened the Sunshine (peace) policy of South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung. Two weeks later the European Union announced that it was sending its first high profile delegation to visit Pyongyang (the troika of Belgium prime minister Goran Persson, Chris Patten and Javier Solana) in support of the peace talks.\footnote{Europa <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm>}

If the EU had wished to send a signal of support for American policy, the timing of this unprecedented mission might have been chosen with greater care.

Still further, the EU has reacted frostily to American sanctions against Iran and Libya. In July in 2001, when the sanctions were renewed for another five years, the EU adopted a Blocking Statute in response, making it illegal for any EU business to comply with the American law.\footnote{Chris Patten statement, “EU Regrets Extension of US Sanctions Law Against Iran and Libya”. European Union <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iran/news/lp011162.htm>}

In what could be considered another riposte, in May 2001 European Union states gained added representation on two United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESC) committees at the expense of the United States. It was the first time since the UNESC’s Human Rights panel was formed in 1947 that the US had lost such a vote, in this case to three successful EU countries, Austria, Sweden and France.\footnote{“US-UN Relations Seen Worsening Over Due US Payments and New Talk of Freeze Draw Ire of Diplomats”. Elizabeth Neuffer. Boston Globe. 10th May 2001.} As news emerged later of the US loss of the second vote, this time on the International Narcotics Control Board, there was "speculation that the US lost their votes because of joint action between European
countries". This time Austria, France and the Netherlands were the EU beneficiaries, each winning a place on the committee.

The backdrop to such European Union-United States rivalry, of course, is conflict over trade. High profile disagreements, particularly over genetically-modified beef and bananas, have hindered transatlantic relations for a number of years, as each side complains of quality standards or barriers to free trade. In December 2001 the Bush administration appeared prepared to commence another round of conflict, this time over American plans to raise steel tariffs. The following month, the EU successfully won a World Trade Organisation case against American tax policies and demanded that the US comply with the ruling or face new tariffs "as high as 100% on a broad list of American goods". Perhaps the most celebrated case of transatlantic trade rivalry was the concerted and successful European effort to build a common aeroplane manufacturer, Airbus Industrie. This was designed as an intergovernmental project specifically to rival the dominant American private companies in the sector.

Europe's already strong economy, recently augmented with the single currency and due to expand still further upon the next wave of enlargement, undoubtedly

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competes with that of the United States. The magnitude of the single market has been generated, and is now exploited, by a deeper level of integration at the European level, so that the EU will in the near future "equal or exceed the United States on every key measure of economic strength and will speak increasingly with a single voice on a wide array of economic issues". Back in 1997 Leon Brittan, then Vice-President of the Commission, used the EU's economic weight to justify his claim that the EU and the US were engaged in a "partnership of equals", adding that this equality extended into the political dimension, with the EU and US "sharing world leadership more and more".

In several geographical and issue areas - from Iran to Korea, from the environment to trade - the EU indeed appears motivated by a sense of rivalry with and a desire to balance the influence of the United States. These and other examples led the International Institute for Strategic Studies to note in their 2000-2201 review, that "There seems to be a mood in Europe in favour of challenging the United States on a broad front of issues". Observers from across the political spectrum in the United States have grown concerned about this rivalry. Jesse Helms and Gordon Smith, Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have complained that the real motive behind the European RRF seems to be a desire "to check

dle=124093&cq_cur_document=3&cq_pdq_document_view=1&cqsubmit=view&cqreturn=&cqpage=1>
American power and influence within NATO”.  Senator Joseph Biden, Democratic Chairman of the same Committee, has warned Europeans against "playing with fire" by expressing an anti-American spirit that could jeopardise transatlantic relations. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has expressed similar sentiments, complaining that a rising Europe was generating a level of competition that endangered the alliance:

I wish there were not this sense that we have to compete.... I find it a little bit of a surprise personally how competitive the United States and Europe are.... what we're seeing is the rise of other power centres and Europe is obviously one of them.

3.2a. Extent of European Motivations

How can all this evidence of rivalry be squared with our two case studies in the Balkans and the Middle East, where it appeared that Europe was seeking a degree of independence, but not a challenge; how can one truly discern European motivations? Two main points seem pertinent here. First, to the extent that the EU is motivated to challenge the United States, it chooses its issue and timing with care. No general challenge across all issues, or even the most important issues, and no sustained challenge is apparent. Shortly after the EU's foray into Korean peninsula politics, for example, the United States announced it would resume its dialogue with North Korea, following which the EU has maintained its financial assistance as a dutiful supporter of the American-led Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Organisation\textsuperscript{303} – but has refrained from making any further interventions in the peace process. On the issue of missile defence, despite some early criticism, the EU (and its member states) has proven to be quite receptive to American wishes. After meeting the new administration officials, Javier Solana downplayed the apparent dispute, saying that the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty was “not the Bible” and that transatlantic differences on the issue were “not very dramatic”.\textsuperscript{304}

Regarding trade issues, perhaps the most notable fact about recurring “crises” is that they tend to be peacefully resolved without any resort to the trade war that is much anticipated by some observers. The EU and the US have shown themselves willing to accept international mediation and then transcend any differences. Consecutive major disagreements have been resolved without any serious move to widen the issue into a more general conflict. In May 1998, for example, President Clinton waived the provisions of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in return for greater EU efforts against state-sponsored terrorism.\textsuperscript{305} A similar compromise was reached over the American Helms-Burton Act, which President George W Bush suspended in response to an EU public support for democratic change in Cuba.\textsuperscript{306} Even the high-profile, nine-year dispute over bananas was resolved through WTO procedures, in April 2001, with the EU relenting on its tariffs and the US suspending its retaliatory

\textsuperscript{303} See Europa <www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm>
\textsuperscript{304} “Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ‘not the Bible’". Agence-France Presse. 5\textsuperscript{th} February 2001.
Lastly, in the long dispute over Airbus, the longest and bitter of all disputes, resolution was achieved by deepening transatlantic cooperation:

After a decade of difficult diplomacy, the US and the EC not only avoided an overall trade war in aircraft but succeeded in crafting an international managed trade regime for this sector.  

In these examples, the EU may be said to challenge or check the power of the United States on a specific issue and for a limited time, yet in each case the apparent crisis has not spread to other issue areas or risen to the ranks of international leaders. Instead, each has been resolved by containing the crisis to its issue area and, when necessary, by diplomatic-level dialogue. Moreover, the EU has made efforts to signal that its CFSP, whilst independent, is also bound to the Atlantic partnership. The appointments of Solana and Patten to head the EU’s foreign policy team at once indicate the gravity of the EU’s ambitions and the desire to maintain strong links with the USA. Solana assumed his position following his work as Secretary-General of NATO, where his chief responsibility was coordinating European political authorities with the organisation’s American leadership; in choosing Patten, a political heavyweight of the British Conservative party and a Governor of Hong Kong that was famously tough on China, the EU could hardly have picked a politician of equal repute with a more pro-American background. Also, the EU took care with the appointment of its Special Envoy. Immediately prior to his EU post, Miguel Angel Moratinos was Spanish ambassador to, of all countries, Israel,

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thus bringing a particular familiarity with and sensitivity to Israeli concerns. If the EU wished to demonstrate the Atlanticist strain of its character at the expense of its neo-Gaullist strain, better ‘costly signals’ would have been hard to come by.

**3.2b. A Challenge to What?**

A second key point to help us understand the nature of these challenges is to consider the object of the European challenge. In all these examples, the EU is not seeking to maximise its power, but rather to defend its own interests and agenda against what it sees as too much or, indeed, *too little* American influence. The difference between this strategy and one of challenge to unipolarity is two-fold. The first point is that these actions have been aimed more at encouraging the United States rather than at usurping its leadership. Over North Korea, Kyoto and missile defence, for example, the EU was most concerned about avoiding an isolationist or neoisolationist American policy. Recognising the United States’ role at the hub of interlocking international issues, the EU has sought to prevent an ‘America-first’ strategy in Washington that does not take into account allied interests. On these issues, the EU has shown little or no activism until Washington appeared to signal a new, self-centred approach; once the Americans re-engaged themselves, at least in the Korean peninsula and over missile defence (which quietly lost the ‘National’ from its title) the EU has acquiesced in American intentions.

A similar pattern was apparent in our case studies. In the Balkans and in the Middle East, although the EU felt a degree of independence was necessary, the primary motivation was to maintain American commitments to European security and to the
peace process. Despite rhetorical flourish from some quarters, neither the EU nor its member states have ever shown the resolve to make the necessary investments to assume total or even the main responsibility for European security, let alone the security of other regions. As Robert Kagen comments, talk of a European challenge to American unipolarity misses the point that the EU and its member states tend not to back up their most vociferous ambitions with action:

If Europeans genuinely sought multipolarity, they would increase their defense budgets considerably, instead of slashing them. What France, Russia and some others really want is not genuine multipolarity but a false multipolarity, an honorary multipolarity. They want the pretense of equal partnership in a multipolar world without the price or responsibility that equal partnership requires.  

A second, related point to make in distinguishing between European strategy and a polarity-changing challenge is that, while the EU is clearly willing to stand up to the United States in support of its own interests, it is not seeking to maximise those interests through an amoral pursuit of power. Even over trade, the EU’s strongest issue, conflict is maintained within legitimate fora, which help not only to resolve disagreements peacefully, but also to prevent future disagreements along the same lines. Whilst the EU does compete aggressively with the US over trade, there is no question of moving beyond agreed regimes simply because the EU has the power to do so. The EU has legitimate interests it wishes to uphold, but not over the need to maintain a healthy transatlantic relationship. In the Airbus case, for instance, the EU

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310 The term ‘amoral’ and the distinction between the terms ‘self-interest’ and ‘self-interested’ are borrowed from Hurd, Ian, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics”. International Organisation. 53.2 (1999): 386-387.
fought to sustain a vital European industry against near total (80 per cent) control of the market by American companies and, to this end, subsidised its industry despite American objections of unfair practise. Once Airbus had achieved its goal of 30 per cent market share, however, the EU – far from pressing ahead still further – relaxed its stance and agreed to compromise with the US.\textsuperscript{311} Although the Europeans were willing to endure conflict with the Americans, this was contained within single issue areas and limited over time, with the transatlantic relationship on both sides defined ultimately more by cooperation than coercion. The EU, one might concede, has \textit{self-interests} but, when it comes to the overall EU-US relationship, is not \textit{self-interested}.

To a very large extent the source of the conflict we have seen is at least as much found in Washington as in Brussels or even Paris. While the EU has shown itself to be concerned about a United States that appears to be shrinking from its global responsibilities (such as in European security, the global environment, the Korean peninsula and the Middle East) or exploiting its prominence to the detriment of vital European interests (such as in missile defence and extraterritorial trade laws) it has attempted to replace American with European leadership. These European efforts, however, are not sustained and in many cases are mainly political manoeuvres to pressure the US to reassert its leadership.

The EU neither has, nor is likely to have, the kind of capabilities necessary to sustain a challenge to the key American global role. It cannot, for example, replace the

\textsuperscript{311} McGuire (1997): 171.
strategic American importance in the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Middle East or even in Europe itself. Consequently, bi-polarity is a long way off, and expectations (or fears) of a European challenge are misplaced. The EU is likely to rebalance the US-EU relationship somewhat more in its favour, but is not about to break free of the American-led transatlantic partnership. As the (20-year old) quotation at the start of this chapter indicates, current pressures on the Alliance are not new phenomena, and the transatlantic partners have a habit of transcending successive crises.

3.3. Motivations and Conditions
If the evidence points to a renewed alliance rather than a European challenge, what conditions could arise that might make European intentions more hostile; what conditions may cause the EU's largely security seeking behaviour to transform into a power seeking challenge? From what we have witnessed in the Balkans, the Middle East and elsewhere, two key conditions present themselves. First, the EU is likely to become more self-assertive if the credibility of American commitments and leadership declines. Second, the EU may seek to develop bi-polarity if, despite its intentions, the ability of the United States fails to meet its own global responsibilities.

3.3a. American Commitments
The EU has been motivated to assert itself against American wishes when it has feared either an American withdrawal on the one hand, or an irresponsible American dominance on the other. In the 1990's, the US has been labelled the "bully of the
world”312 and “the rogue superpower” that is "On issue after issue… increasingly alone, with one or a few partners, opposing most of the rest of the world states and peoples".313 In 1995 Brent Scowcroft spoke of “A new unilateralism…which holds that we will deal with the world when we must, but only in our own ways, in our own time, and on our own terms".314 The following year commentator Martin Walker wrote of an alarm that "…has been sounded among the European allies that not since the 1930’s has the United States sounded so emotionally ready to turn inward".315 President Clinton acknowledged this fear when he warned in 2000, “America must not listen to those who say we must go it alone… America has a permanent interest in a permanent alliance with Europe”.316 In May 2001 Chris Patten, reacting to President Bush’s rejection of Kyoto, spoke of his "dashed" hopes that there would not be a "closing of the American mind to unilateralism".317 In February 2001 German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder identified "a danger of unilateralism, not just by anybody but by the United States".318 The following month The Economist recorded the shock in Europe at the new Bush administration's approach to foreign policy, which appeared to consist of "all smack and little leadership".319

316 “Clinton Says Russia Belongs in NATO and the EU – Hails Transatlantic Ties”. Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2nd June 2000.
As we have seen in many examples, nothing is more certain to produce a concerted European effort to advance its claims to global leadership than an isolationist or neoisolationist American outlook. Nothing is more likely to maintain support for the European role within the alliance than an engaged United States acting in the best interests of its allies and not itself alone. As director of the US State Department Policy Planning Staff, Richard Haass has written, "In the end, the creation and maintenance of an American world system will depend as much or more on what Americans and their leaders do as on outside influences". This was recognised in the first US attempt to define its global role in the post-Cold War era. The United States, it suggested, would ward off potential challengers by demonstrating responsible leadership and thereby effectively removing the incentives from other actors to make a challenge:

[America’s mission will be] convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. [The United States] must efficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.

### 3.3b. American Capabilities

Apart from a revocation of such inclusive American motivations, a European-American bi-polarity could emerge if the United States finds itself unable to shoulder the burdens of global leadership alone. Ultimately, this depends on the United States being able to maintain the current global system of free trade, which in turn

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depends on its economic and military strength. Should that strength fail to keep up with the demands on (or indeed the demand of) American foreign policy the American capacity could become over-stretched. In June 2001, American Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld appeared to signal an end to the Pentagon’s ‘two war’ strategy, partly because it had “been undermined by a lack of investment…”

Future crises could mean that the EU is willing, at the least, to take on more responsibility for its own security if American assets need to be diverted elsewhere. If this unlikely scenario should occur, it would mean not a European challenge against American interests, but rather a European response to American demands. This correlates with the evidence in Chapter Two, which suggests that improvements in European military capabilities are likely to be inversely related to American security commitments to Europe. As Gompert and Larrabee have noted, Europe has a "dependency culture" regarding its own security, something it is unlikely to change “unless challenged to do so by the United States “.

In the first of these two scenarios – the United States adopting a unilateral approach – the European Union reaction may be expected to issue some form of challenge. In the second scenario, however, bi-polarity (or something approaching it) could still be established, but in response to the American need for a more powerful partner. Should this latter scenario occur, it would still be possible to maintain the alliance, albeit with two more equal partners, and conflict between the two would likely be

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conditional on the degree to which the United States would be prepared to cede authority in recognition of the EU’s new capabilities. Still, given that this possible future would come about through crises, it is most unlikely that the EU would focus more on its issue-specific rivalry with the United States rather than join the US against their new common threat. In times of need, the EU and the US are likely to find that "... neither partner is capable of solving their problems alone; neither partner is likely to find effective assistance elsewhere."\footnote{Weidenfeld (1996): 97.} Even if crises lead to improved European capabilities, then, they would also serve to consolidate the Atlantic partnership. As we have seen elsewhere, if a rebalance takes place it is more likely to merely reformulate the alliance rather than break it.

4. Transmission of Motivations
Assuming that neither relative abilities nor motivations radically change, the EU will defend its self-interests and even provoke American leadership, but it is not likely to challenge it in the sense of pursuing bi-polarity. The transatlantic partnership is likely to grow more equitable, particularly on economic and financial issues, yet continue to be defined by clear American leadership. Of course, this still requires the need for motivations on both sides to be communicated clearly. Regardless of the EU’s capabilities and motivations, suspicions will linger in the United States of a growing European challenge if European leaders continue to release the type of neo-Gaullist statements that arise from time to time or, crucially, if the European Union does not clarify the role it seeks as an actor in international relations. This in turn will depend
upon the United States clearly answering critics’ charges of unilateralism and coming to an agreement with the EU over their respective future roles in the alliance.

4.1. Ambiguities
The European Union and the United States for now remain ambiguous over their respective roles, as the kinds of certainties evident during the Cold War era continue to evade policymakers over a decade after it ended. Both sides of the Atlantic have still not resolved what Werner Weidennfeld has described as "an identity crisis" in the 1990s. The US hesitation over what to do in the Balkans, and again over Europe's desire to create a RRF expressed well the confusion over how to deal with the transatlantic partnership in the new era. In the Balkans and particularly in the Middle East, the EU in the second half of the 1990's appeared to want to carve out a larger, but loyal, role for itself within the alliance. Yet the EU remains fundamentally unsure of itself. Commission President Prodi, for example, has called for Europe to be a "pole of influence, a persuasive partner of other actors on the world stage". On a separate occasion, Prodi called for a “New Europe” that would be “a more equal partner of the United States … not just as a regional partner, but also in global leadership". The EU has also stated in true realist language a wish to improve its military capabilities in order "to use force where its vital interests are stake…close to

326 Weidenfeld (1996); 97.
its own spheres of influence". For all this vision, however, Europe's future role remains best expressed as a question rather than a plan:

It is time to ask ourselves the fundamental question of what sort of Union we want. What is the ultimate goal of our European project? We have never before faced up to this question…. But we have reached a point where the step by step approach towards an undefined goal will work no longer. It is time for us all to face the ultimate question of what the Union is aiming for?

4.2. Communications and Conditions.
With such ambiguities hanging over the motivations of both the European Union and the United States, what conditions will affect the likelihood of a break in the alliance via a European challenge to the US? Two factors will be crucial in this regard, namely EU-NATO relations and the democratic status of the EU.

4.2a. EU and NATO
If the European Union and the United States are to assure each other of their benign intentions, then it is imperative that they coordinate their respective roles. Nowhere is this more urgent than in EU-NATO relations since, as we saw earlier, confusion in roles has the potential for the EU to usurp American leadership and, then, to severely damage the alliance. Although the EU has received American backing for its RRF, this has tended to be on the implicit understanding that NATO would have a right of first refusal for military missions: "with the Americans if possible, on our own

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if necessary” as Dutch foreign minister Jozeas von Aartsen has expressed it. Still, this understanding is yet to be codified, and difficulties could arise if the EU, for instance, deemed another Operation Alba necessary. Indeed, in stressing the autonomy of its own military force, as we saw in Chapter Two, the EU has not appeared to be in harmony with the American perspective on this issue. In June 2000 the Union claimed that EU-NATO cooperation “must take place in full respect of the autonomy of EU decision-making [and] reflect the fact that each organisation will be dealing with the other on an equal footing”.

Needless to say, it is unlikely that the United States sees the EU and NATO as equals when it comes to security matters. According to Madeleine Albright, the European force will be active only “in those cases where the alliance as a whole is not militarily engaged”. Although this gives more weight to NATO, it merely begs the question: under what circumstances can the Europeans commence a mission without NATO? Such ambiguity is a hallmark of EU-US relations as both sides seek to adjust their partnership. All other things being equal, this needs to be swiftly resolved if motivations are to be clearly transmitted. Clear EU-NATO arrangements will require as much American reassurance of support for European security as any EU acceptance of its own inferior security role. As the evidence in the Balkans showed, if the EU senses an American unwillingness to back up its commitment with action, there may be greater moves toward a more autonomous European military

pillar. The more confident the EU is about US support, the more likely it is to defer to NATO. The key, interrelated questions, as Wesley Clark has expressed them, are

…will the European Union truly make NATO its institution of first choice for meeting European security needs? Will the US pledge, and follow through, always to participate when there is a security challenge to allied interests?334

4.2b. EU and Democracy
The communication of the EU’s motivations will become more difficult if its capabilities continue to increase within its undemocratic structure. As we saw in Chapter One, defensive neorealism expects motivations to be better revealed by the open policy processes of democratic governments (see pp. 28-29). Similarly, one might add that EU intentions could be better communicated by a democratic structure since democracy will encourage it to live up to its international commitments.335 If more power within the EU is transferred to the Commission, as Romano Prodi has proposed regarding external relations, it will be taken out of the hands of an elected intergovernmental institution (the European Council) and into those of an unelected supranational institution. Over the long term, then, the clear communication of the EU’s motivations will be contingent, in part, on the level of its democratic reform in proportion to the level of its greater internal cohesion.

The ability of the European Union and the United States to signal and understand their mutual motivations, then, will be conditional on a reformulation of their respective roles, especially regarding EU-NATO relations, as well as some degree of democratisation within the EU should power be transferred to the Commission. Whilst the Union’s motivations are generally supportive of the United States rather than challenging to it, in the future this will be conditional on the extent to which the US maintains a responsible, engaged style of leadership and on its ability to meet its global responsibilities. Lastly, as we have seen, were European motivations to be geared towards a challenge, this would be conditional on it greatly increasing its ability to project power beyond its borders as well as on a far more supranational, cohesive internal structure.

5. Comments on Neorealism
Our case studies, along with evidence in this chapter, offer moderate support for neorealism in its defensive format. To a limited extent, the EU has taken advantage of the switch to unipolarity to develop the capabilities that would upgrade its position in the world system relative to other actors. Robert Gilpin’s judgment in 1996 – that the EU could not be considered a state since its member states had “retained the three essential components of states sovereignty: coinage, taxation, and defense” – already seems badly out of date. The EU has also shown some willingness to challenge the policies and intentions of the United States. It is far more credible to talk of the EU as a global actor today than it was just ten years ago, and it would be reasonable to predict that the EU’s role in world politics will continue to increase

substantially in the coming decades. Although its capabilities are as yet only beginning to develop, the history of the Union suggests that integration has its own momentum in moving power to the supra-national level. As Henry Kissinger has said of the euro, one might consider for the more ambitious plans for CFSP:

> It is difficult to see how the European monetary union can succeed. It is even more difficult to imagine that it will be permitted to fail.\textsuperscript{337}

However, we have seen that the challenge the European Union represents to the United States has a particular nature that confounds some neorealist expectations of the inevitable and rapid emergence of bi-polarity and validates the concern of defensive neorealists about unit-level factors. The EU does look set to precipitate a more balanced transatlantic partnership in which it is able to offer leadership where the US will not; it is able to approach the US on some issues as an equal, or near-equal; and it will assume new responsibilities in vital areas, including security. Yet the EU is neither capable nor apparently motivated to launch the kind of challenge that produces bi-polarity, at least not in the foreseeable future and certainly not in the time period expected by Waltz (see p. 45).

### 5.1. Neorealist Insights

Defensive realists are correct to argue that the rebalancing mechanism is not automatic but is instead dependent on unit-level variables that make up capabilities, motivations and the communication of motivations. Waltz is right to point to the nature of the state in assessing its potential to challenge: regardless of its \textit{capability}, is it a

threat? The EU’s potential to be a threat is considerable, from security in the Balkans and stability in the Middle East, to the establishment of missile defence and leadership in the UN. Yet, the EU lacks the capability to issue a genuine and sustained challenge to American leadership for, despite mild periodic defections, it is still committed to and, crucially, dependent upon the transatlantic relationship. To focus on the EU’s ability to inflict harm on American interests is to rob the Atlantic partnership of the rich layers of linkages that undergird an American-led partnership.

To the limited extent that a rebalance does occur, it appears likely to happen within - rather than at the cost of - the alliance. Schweller’s distinction between security seeking and power seeking states is helpful here. The EU has not rushed to exploit its new freedoms under unipolarity, but has built up its capabilities through a most awkward and drawn-out collaboration with the US. Despite an element of anti-Americanism, the primary goal of the more active EU has been security rather than power for its own sake. Achieving that security has generated some limited challenges towards the US, but only where the EU has feared American exploitation or, more commonly, where it has feared a withdrawal of American leadership – in other words, where the EU has grown concerned about American motivations. Crucially, for the most part, the US has reassured Europe over its commitments and the afeared ‘challenge’ has tended to be submerged in a deeper level of cooperation and American engagement. As Glaser anticipates, costly signals have allowed the EU to build up more independent capabilities whilst keeping the alliance intact.
5.2. Neorealist Limitations

Notwithstanding the above insights, one under-developed area of defensive neorealism is its focus on the potential challenger to the established hegemon, rather than on the hegemon itself. From the evidence we have seen, the capabilities, motivations and communication of intentions of the United States have been at least as important as those of the European Union. In fact, since the actions of the EU in building its capabilities and in making brief challenges themselves tend to be responses to the policies of the US, the role of the hegemon would appear to be key to anticipating any move towards a change in the system structure. The most important of all conditions regarding whether the EU balances the United States is located at the unit level, but within the US rather than in the European Union.

5.2a. Role of the Hegemon

Defensive realism is geared towards identifying a potential challenger to the status quo, asking what type of actor would issue a challenge, whereas it largely avoids the pertinent question of why an actor would want to challenge in the first place. One must look not only at the motivations of an actor, but its rationale: why is it motivated to be a security-seeking actor or a power-seeking actor; what goals is it pursuing and why? We have seen that, whilst the EU is security-seeking, its capabilities and motivations regarding a balance are strongly related to the behaviour of the United States. The EU may remain security seeking and yet still generate a structural change if it feels that its needs are not being met under the current order. The EU may have no interest in challenging the US, yet feel compelled to challenge nonetheless – not because such a challenge is an inevitable consequence of
systemic anarchy, but because the EU has a sense of insecurity that stems from
the United States. The source of the rebalancing mechanism can be the hegemon
as much as the system structure or the ambitions of the challenger.

Waltz is vague on whether a hegemon will be able to resist the temptation to exploit
its position. On the one hand he argues that, even if a hegemon acts in the interests
of others, the mere fact of its potential exploitative power will trigger a rebalance; on
the other he implies that, even if the hegemon tries to act altruistically, it cannot be
anything other than self-interested:

...even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and
forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future
behavior...Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger
to others. The powerful states may, and the United States does, think
of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice, and well-being in the
world. These terms, however, are defined to the liking of the
powerful, which may conflict with the preferences of others. In
international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to
try to balance against it. With benign intent, the United States has
behaved and, until its power is brought into balance, will continue to
behave in ways that sometimes frighten others. 338 (My italics)

To the limited extent that the European Union has moved to check American power,
Waltz is correct that "overwhelming power" triggers a rebalancing mechanism. Yet
he is not clear whether it is the power itself that causes this or whether it is the
exploitative use of this power. In our case studies it is apparent that the European
Union has sought to check the United States only after the US has given it reason to
doubt American commitments. The EU did not, for example, seek to build its RRF,
or increase its presence in the Balkans and in the Korean peninsula until the US signalled a possible withdrawal. Moreover, the EU has tended to balance the US not by challenging its roles so much as by urging it to renew its prior commitments. The EU has not questioned American leadership as much as it has questioned the absence of American leadership. This has not been an automatic European response to unipolarity but rather a reaction against specific American policies and decisions.

Defensive neorealists, in focusing on motivations and not just capabilities, are better equipped than Waltz to account for this conditional balance, yet their focus is on the challenger as opposed to the hegemon. Kydd writes, for example, “For conflict to arise, at least one state must want to redistribute the benefits of the international system in its favor, for reasons unrelated to security”. 339 Schweller similarly attributes balancing to “the power-maximising goals of revisionist states”, 340 just as Glaser distinguishes between states that are “maximising relative power” versus “states motivated primarily by security”. 341 Since the hegemon is unlikely to be the revisionist, all these theorists take the hegemon to be either a satisfied, status-quo power, which stands to be challenged by a power-hungry inferior state, or a hegemon that intends to increase its relative strength even further.

None of these authors takes into account the possibility of conflict arising from a satisfied hegemon faced with a security seeking potential challenger. Since the

hegemon may be in a position to provide essential public goods, weaker actors may have a self-interest in maintaining an active hegemon, perhaps by provoking it, rather than challenging it and generating an insecure new (dis)order. In our case studies, the evidence seems to suggest that the greatest danger lies not in an aggressive European Union that threatens the United States, but in an isolationist (or neoisolationist) US that threatens Europe, thus generating a greater, albeit modest, European balance. Walt comes closest to this by stating that conflict derives not from the “strongest state” but from the “most threatening”, though he does not specify that the threat can be in the form of withdrawn hegemonic leadership as opposed to an active inferior state.

5.2b. Defining the Challenge
Apart from its failure in identifying the hegemon as one of the chief threats to international order, defensive neorealism is also weak on defining just what a rebalance will look like. Neorealists tend to use such words as ‘balance’, ‘challenge’ and ‘bi-polarity’ without specifying their respective natures or their inter-relationships. Without common definitions analysts may be just as blind to the onset of a structural change towards bi-polarity as they were to its earlier collapse. Alternatively, observers may witness a new balance and mistake it for a challenge, or vice-versa.

Should a major war occur between an aspirant power on the one hand and a satisfied power on the other, a clear rebalance by way of a challenge will be apparent. As Gilpin notes, changes in the distribution of power may destabilise and

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ultimately destroy the system structure, such as the Congress of Vienna equilibrium. Short of an actual war between the Atlantic partners, though, how does one recognise a new disequilibrium; does a disequilibrium, say of military capabilities, automatically represent a new balance or does it require the lesser actor to press home its relative gains via a challenge? If so, what is the form of the challenge other than a military strike; if not, can a rebalance be produced by a peaceful, agreed transition of authority, or could it even be encouraged by a hegemon that seeks assistance from a friendly actor?

The European Union has not issued a sustained, general challenge against the United States, though it has used limited and issue-specific checks against it. This correlates with Gilpin’s claim that there is not one system structure but rather “…several structures, differing by issue-area…” Schweller distinguishes between security as a potentially positive-sum value and zero-sum “positional goods, such as prestige, status, political influence, leadership, political leverage, a positive trade balance, or market share”. According to all of Schweller’s zero-sum indicators, one could say confidently that the EU-US relationship is far more balanced today than during the Cold War; yet, one still has some difficulty claiming that the EU has balanced the US, and one could not say that the EU has challenged American unipolarity despite its more active international profile as an independent actor. Moreover, even if in time the EU does rise to equal the US in overall capabilities, this ‘balance’ may not be accompanied by a challenge, and may not lead to radical

alterations in the way that the two actors deal with each other. As Richard Haass has put it,

Like unipolarity, multipolarity is simply a description. It tells us about the distribution of power in the world, not about the character or quality of international relations.\(^{346}\)

The nature of any balance or challenge, then, is at least as important as the likelihood of them occurring. In our studies, the evidence pointed to a European Union that desires a greater, more independent role for itself but also one anxious to maintain an American foreign policy that is engaged in international affairs. The system structure has provided the EU with incentives to balance; yet a willing and able American leadership can negate these or even turn them into disincentives. Although the transatlantic partnership may come under certain stresses, it appears to be sustained by shared interests, values and goals in most policy areas, which could be disrupted by an unnecessary European challenge. Equally, in view of these commonalities, a more balanced transatlantic relationship could be welcomed by the United States, as we have seen in the debate over the RRF, particularly if it strengthens both sides against new common threats. This leads one to look at the nature of a changing bilateral relationship by viewing it in a multilateral context, with other actors; the United States may resist a greater European capability in its own right, but may encourage it if American capabilities need to be redeployed to meet a threat outside Europe.\(^{347}\) Without examining the particular nature of the balance or


\(^{347}\) Schweller makes a similar point here in arguing that actors may be prepared to accept absolute rather than relative gains in relation to another actor, if it means that they enjoy relative gains in relation to outside actors. See Schweller (1996): 110.
challenge, then, an expectation that these may occur is likely to generate unjustified fears or hopes of an altered world order.

5.3. Inadequacy of Neorealism

Neorealism tends to focus on the role of the challenger rising up against the hegemon or, alternatively, the hegemon pre-emptively striking at the revisionist inferior state. Defensive realism advocates investigation of unit-level factors to reveal the motivations of the respective states. The evidence from this thesis, however, would suggest that neorealism here has a simplistic outlook. Neither the European Union nor the United States have operated according to a static or purely endogenous strategy during the post-Cold War era. Instead, both actors have modified their positions over time in response to policy developments in the other. The creation of a European military force and the increased European profile in the Middle East are reflections not just of EU ambitions but of the reciprocal nature of the transatlantic relationship. As we have seen, increases in European capabilities have most often occurred following European frustration with American policy. In many ways, the credibility of the EU’s CFSP improved only after several years had passed since the end of the Cold War; may not have been taken. Had Washington, for example, supported the VOPP and given the EC/EU a more substantive role at the Madrid Conference, it is possible that the roads to Europe’s RRF and Barcelona process may never have been taken.

Such a maturation of European foreign policy suggests that the CFSP is a product not only of unit-level variables but also of the interaction of unit-level variables
between actors. The growth of the European Union as an international actor appears to be strongly related to policy made by the United States and other actors. This not highlights the importance of scholars understanding, say, EU perceptions of American motivations, but also taking account of the fluid nature of these factors. As we have seen, the EU is not motivated in one firmly-set way, but has rather changed in reaction to the way it perceived American policy. The RRF, for instance, was not solely an indication of an intrinsic European drive for autonomy, but also a reflection of growing European concerns about American commitments to European security.

The behaviour of one actor, then, can alter the behaviour of another. Motivations are not purely endogenous but also exogenous over time: they are processional, not fixed. At least in the case of the EU, neorealism has proven to be inadequate in accounting for this aspect of international relations. Deeper understanding of European and transatlantic politics may thus require the application of theory from elsewhere. The reciprocal nature of motivations and transmission of motivations suggests that constructivism would merit some investigation to this end.
Chapter Five

September 11th

In retrospect, the millennium marked only a moment in time. It was the events of September 11th that marked a turning point in history…. What is the answer to this crisis? Not isolationism, but the world coming together with America as a community.\(^{348}\)

Tony Blair

…the Union stands at a crossroads, a defining moment in its existence. The unification of Europe is near…. What is Europe’s role in this changed world? Doesn’t Europe, now that [it] is finally unified, have a leading role to play in the new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?\(^{349}\)

European Union

1. The Attacks

The United States suffered terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 that, many argued, had within days produced a tectonic shift in international relations. As time has worn on, though, this view has been partly eclipsed by opposing perspectives over what the coming era will look like. Across the Atlantic, the United States and the European Union reaffirmed their mutual solidarity in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Yet with time, that solidarity may be seen to be marked more by immediate interests than long-term approach, with a growing gap between American and European views of the coming order. On the one hand, the emergence of terrorism on an unprecedented scale has renewed the alliance by providing it with a common enemy; on the other, the two sides have significantly different views on how to deal with the new threat and on what it means for the future. Whilst the United

\(^{348}\) Tony Blair’s speech to Labour Party Conference, 2nd October 2001

States has seemed to view September 11th as an attack on the US, through a Cold War-like prism in which it holds leadership over a cohesive bloc of states, the EU has tended to view it more in terms of transnational security that requires deepened integration between states.

2. Reinvigorated Alliance?
Expressing a widely held opinion, Lord Robertson declared a month after the terrorist attacks that they had "changed the world…. it was not just America that suffered. On September 11, the entire civilised world was transformed."350 In the United States, Secretary of State Colin Powell concurred, declaring "Not only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War is also over".351 Just how the new world would be ordered, what the coming era should be called or what it meant for transatlantic relations, however, were less clear. In the furore following the attacks the United States' demand for cooperation, along with impassioned statements of solidarity from Europe, appeared to herald a deepened commitment to the transatlantic partnership. The attacks "served as a sharp reminder of the values and interests Americans and European still have in common".352 The American ambassador to the EU spoke of a "renewed solidarity" and a "reinvigorated sense of partnership"353 a sentiment shared by European Commission President Romano Prodi, who declared it was "time for real solidarity".354

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Generating the requisite support for its military mission in Afghanistan, the United States successfully forged new alliances with a series of states with which it had poor or strained relations. Developing new, friendlier ties with Russia, Pakistan and China, for example, the US transformed the terrorist attacks into a rationale for heightened international cooperation. "All at once", claimed President Bush," a new threat to civilization is erasing the old lines of rivalry and resentment between nations". In October Richard Haass, elaborated on the President's hopes for the future:

… we recognize that despite our immense power, we will not be able to achieve our objectives.... without the help of others. The terrorist threat is global. It demands a global response.... We will strive to integrate the world in such a way as to protect our interests and ensure that the values we believe in are embraced as standards, not the exceptions.  

The unprecedented attacks on US soil had, it seems, stripped the country of its sense of invulnerability. "We are all Americans now", wrote Le Monde, expressing European equality in terms of both security as well as sympathy. With geography no longer protecting it, the US would enter the rank of ordinary nations, no longer able to separate itself from outside affairs. As with the United Kingdom in the early 20th century, isolation would no longer be an option for American foreign policy: "America is no longer protected by vast oceans", as President Bush

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acknowledged in his State of the Union address. Following September 11th
the US would have less choice than ever before about entering ‘entangling alliances’:

> In our diplomacy and alliances, we assumed that the world needed us more than we needed them. No more…For America, this is the end of unilateralism.

### 3. American Strength, Alliance Weakness

In responding swiftly to the attacks, the United States clearly signalled a new activism in its foreign policy. Questions remained, however, over the nature of this activism, with conflicting indications coming from Washington. Although the US reached out to other nations, even adversaries, the primary focus was centred more on short-term military goals, rather than long-term political objectives. In the Middle East, for example, American foreign policy underwent "a remarkable turnaround. Since the assault on America last month, the Bush administration has viewed the ongoing violence as a grave impediment to its efforts to build an international coalition against terrorism". Where the United States stepped up its diplomatic efforts, it did so for the benefit of a specific, limited self-interest that may or may not outlast the needs of other states.

With these conflicting signals, it was not immediately clear whether the United States saw itself in the light of a newly interdependent world, and predictions that September 11th had transformed American foreign policy and international relations were premature. The question was not so much what the US was doing but why and

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for how long. A month after the attacks, for instance, Lord Robertson praised the US-led activity as "a masterpiece of multilateralism... coalition-building at its very best". 362 In tune with Robertson, Steven Miller noted that "many have claimed that September 11th and its aftermath must spell an end of US unilateralism, which had reached its apogee in the first months of the Bush administration.... [The coalition] may temper Washington’s unilateralist impulses and compel greater acknowledgement of the interests and perceptions of others". 363 Despite such expectations, however, it is far from clear that September 11th marks a higher level of American multilateralism as opposed to American self-interest by the nearest alternative route.

Unlike during the 1991-92 Gulf War, the military effort in Afghanistan was an almost wholly American affair, rather than a genuine coalition. Apart from a minor British contingent, whose most active role came on the first day, this campaign was an American, not an international or even Western one. Although the US received immediate support from NATO, which invoked its Article Five clause for the first time, the US largely declined to draw on this resource. After several weeks several European nations did offer the US some military assistance, but these were received in terms of political rather than military support and Washington did not take the offers up. 364 Also, although the American strikes were sanctioned by the United Nations, it was France, which sponsored the resolution condemning the terrorist

362 Lord Robertson. 10th October 2001.
attacks, that seemed more interested than the US in gaining UN legitimacy.\textsuperscript{365}

The military campaign in Afghanistan was an American one performed in the name of American self-defence rather than a multinational one in the name of international security:

The Americans have preferred to lead a national war under the cover of an international coalition, and in choosing à la carte from among the allies those who could bring them a useful contribution, rather than leaning on the collective apparatus of NATO.\textsuperscript{366}

Apart from the military component of the war in Afghanistan, the United States' political handling of it evinces a certain preference for unilateralism, regardless of the cost this brings to other actors. The US took the unilateral decision early on to define its mission not just as a direct response to the attacks themselves but rather as a generic "war on terrorism", with President Bush declaring to other actors " either you are with us or you are with terrorists".\textsuperscript{367} Such a sweeping rationale for warfare has had a dramatic effect on conflict elsewhere in the world, particularly in the Indian subcontinent and between Palestinians and Israelis. The American policy has inadvertently allowed these and other conflicts to be redefined in terms of terrorism, in which the state can more legitimately fight back against opposition. Therefore, there may yet be an international price to be paid in part because of US policy:

\textsuperscript{365} Gordon and Suzan (2001).
\textsuperscript{366} Beltran and Parmentier (2001).
…we have converted what were regional and inconclusive events that had little impact on the larger world to the global level, with serious implications for world stability.\textsuperscript{368}

American unilateralism and its international repercussions come into sharper focus when one considers the apparent desire in Washington to move beyond international support and embark on military operations into states other than Afghanistan. As the success of the initial American military strikes became clear, a hawkish faction in Washington appeared by December to become more influential in pushing for a campaign to bring down the regime of Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{369} The particular style of the war, with local anti-regime warriors on the ground in combination with American satellite and aerial power, strengthened the hand of Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who in 1998 had argued in favour of just such a strategy in Iraq.\textsuperscript{370} In December leading members of congress, including Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman, urged the President in writing to identify Iraq as the next target in the war.\textsuperscript{371} The following month, in his State of the Union address, President Bush "dramatically expanded the mission"\textsuperscript{372} by naming Iraq, Iran and North Korea partners in an "axis of evil", warning "I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer". In his speech, Bush not once used the word “coalition” and, whilst three times mentioning American ‘allies’, he

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Blankley, Tony. "Wielding Solomonic Sword". \textit{Washington Times}. \textit{2\textsuperscript{nd} January 2002.}}
\footnote{"Unfinished Business". \textit{Economist}. \textit{8\textsuperscript{th} December 2001.}}
\footnote{"US Experts on Iraq Warn of New Vietnam". \textit{United Press International}. \textit{8\textsuperscript{th} December 2001.}}
\end{footnotes}
spoke only of US responsibility to protect them rather than they themselves having any role in future operations. Bush expressed a form of neo-Truman Doctrine for a new kind of Cold War, i.e. the US is prepared to take the fight to the enemy anywhere around the world, only this time the threat was expected from terrorists and/or rogue states rather than communist armies, and the US would be prepared to intervene alone rather than with allies:

My hope is that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own…. But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will.

In Europe, such sabre-rattling was far from welcomed, and EU states have publicly declined to offer support for an extension of the campaign outside Afghanistan. In late November Germany’s foreign minister Joschka Fischer claimed that "All the European nations would view a (broadening of the conflict) to include Iraq highly sceptically – and that is putting it diplomatically". France’s Hubert Vedrine has dismissed President Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ notion as “simplistic", whilst even the normally dependable United Kingdom has refrained from offering support for the American stance. For the EU, Chris Patten has warned that the very success of the American operation in Afghanistan has fed “some dangerous instincts" in Washington: “that the projection of military power is the only basis of true security;

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that the US can rely only on itself; and that allies may be useful as an optional extra…”

In contrast to the issues we examined earlier, the United States has continued to pursue its own agenda, rather than absorb European objections move back closer to a consensus position. Leading American politicians have noted that, whilst allies would be welcome, they were not necessary. Richard Perle, Chairman of the United States’ Defense Policy Board, has stated that “if it comes to a choice between action to protect the American peoples without allies or [with] allies but no action, we’ll go without allies”, echoing Colin Powell’s remark that “we have to preserve the option to act alone”. Beyond the Republican administration, the hawkish tone has also enjoyed the support of leading Democrats:

…the unique threat to American security by Saddam Hussein’s regime is so real, grave and imminent that, even if no other nation were to stand with us, we must be prepared to act alone.

The American conduct of the war, then, suggests that its new activism may mark not so much a new level of multilateralism so much as a preparedness to intervene internationally in pursuit of an American agenda. Despite its sudden, new alliances, it would seem that the United States’ "commitment to multilateral action was tactical

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rather than strategic”. Although analysts were correct in perceiving heightened American activism and a new sense that American interests are linked to the interests of other countries, many were wrong in interpreting this as a radical shift towards multilateralism. Instead, we have witnessed an expedient, perhaps temporary, self-interested internationalism, or neoisolationism. The war has been defined by the US and according to American terms, with very little influence from outside actors save where the US required specific assistance to meet its objectives, such as in obtaining military bases in Uzbekistan and intelligence from Pakistan.

This neoisolationist approach has been more clearly evident in other areas that, in existing both before and after the attacks, would reflect a more multilateralist outlook if such existed. In November, Senator Carl Levin was among those who hoped that the recent events had generated a new attitude to foreign policy:

> Also changed – and hopefully not just for the moment – is the administration's basic approach to foreign affairs. Gone virtually overnight is the unilateralist, do-it-alone approach so prevalent before the attacks.

Levin reached this judgement in the belief that the Bush administration would reconsider its policy to withdraw unilaterally from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty. Steven Schlesinger articulated the same thought, suggesting that American policy was now based more on exogenous strategies:

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are we going to listen to our partners who are concerned about
global warming, about the ABM treaty? Are we going to take a fresh
look at the proliferation of nuclear weapons? In the Bush
administration, there is a new sensitivity to listen to others. 381

In a short space of time, however, such hopes have proved to be groundless.
Following the September 11th attacks, the United States has acted self-interestedly in
a series of international fora. In October, after promising to bring new ideas to the
table over global climate change, the motive of the US delegation at a new round of
talks "appeared to be to make sure nothing happened at the conference that might
harm US interests". 382 A month later, at a United Nations conference in New York to
strengthen the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the US declined even to attend, 383
despite the fact that the fight against nuclear proliferation was shortly to be central to
the Bush Doctrine. The US followed this by announcing that, although it would not
be resuming nuclear testing, it would upgrade its testing infrastructure in case world
events made testing necessary in the future. 384 Then, in December, Washington
rejected an initiative to strengthen the biological weapons convention, a decision
"which stunned many of its European allies" 385 given that it came on the heels of an
anthrax scare in United States. Finally, later the same month, the US unilaterally
pulled out of the ABM treaty, despite Russian President Putin's assurance that the

382 Daalder and Lindsay (2001).
383 “CTBT Entry Into Force Conference”. British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
<http://www.basicint.org/nuk_CTBT_01EIFConference.htm>
<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/02012400.htm>
US could continue more tests for its missile shield within the bounds of the
treaty. These examples suggest that, if US foreign policy was composed in part by an element of unilateralism and even neoisolationism, September 11th has only reinforced rather than modified this pattern. The American withdrawal from the ABM treaty, for example, was judged by William Pfaff to have “now reaffirmed its determination to go back to the road of sovereign and solitary action”. Although the United States demonstrated its preparedness to forge an international coalition, policy would be shaped by American, not international, requirements:

The great discussion after 9/11[sic] was whether we were now going to abandon unilateralism. I do not think that we have…. For ad hoc purposes the administration is happy to have allies, but in the midst of all this they withdrew from the ABM treaty and that shows the unilateralist purpose remains as strong as ever and is only modified in cases of emergencies. The administration believes strongly, and many Americans believe strongly, in our freedom of action and that we should not be bound by commitments.

4. The European Way
In contrast to the American approach, European leaders have used September 11th to try to steer international relations, and especially transatlantic relations, into a more multilateral framework. Adopting a sharply different tone from American politicians, European leaders have espoused a revived idealism that has focused less on immediate military goals and more on the long-term ramifications of the terrorist attacks. The European Union and its member states have sought to

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emphasise not just terrorism but its causal factors and the interdependence of actors in global politics. Nine days on from the attacks, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder were reported to want to use September 11th as leverage in pressing Washington into a more multilateral stance, believing “the crisis represents a golden opportunity to reverse a dangerous trend towards American isolationism”.389 The following day an extraordinary session of the European Council released its maiden statement on the recent events, declaring that the “fight” (not “war”) against terrorism would be largely won on ‘soft’ security issues, within a new system of world politics:

The integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development is the condition for a strong and sustainable community for combating terrorism.390

In October Tony Blair made his first keynote speech since September 11th, arguing that actors in world politics should be seen not as isolated, sovereign entities in an anarchic setting, but rather as interdependent units in a global “community”. Acknowledging that this was as yet merely a vision, Blair called on the major powers to turn it into a reality:

This is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us reorder this world around us.391

Blair’s vision was endorsed by Belgium’s Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, in his capacity as President of the European Council in a speech at Carleton University in Canada, in December. Verhofstadt spoke of his “political dream” for a more powerful European Union on the world stage, but one that would be “always ready to put that power at the service of the world community… A rich Europe, but fully aware that its richness remains fragile as long as the poverty of a large part of the world has not been addressed”. Verhofstadt specifically drew a contrast between this vision of Europe and the current American approach:

When Osama bin Laden and his terrorists struck New York on September the 11th, the Americans said: this is evil, we are right, God will help us, we will catch this guy. And then they just did what they said. Regardless of the fact that we still do not have the means to do so, I am not sure we would react as vigorously in Europe, even if Paris or London were hit. We are still not capable to believe [sic] so clear-cut in good and bad again, still less to begin another armed conflict. The mental hangover of two devastating wars is not gone yet. That is the fundamental reason why a Europe is still no superpower.

There does seem, then, a clear difference between the American and European reactions to the events of September 11th. One is fuelled by a form of realism in which the state reasserts its sovereign right of self-defence, according to a self-help imperative: the other by a brand of idealism in which states, recognising their interdependency, raise the level of international cooperation to a higher level, beyond anarchy. The difference between these two approaches has some correlation with

393 Verhofstadt (18th December 2001).
the ‘time’s cycle’, ‘time’s arrow’ images of international relations that we saw earlier (pp. 38-40). Whereas for the United States, as the *New York Times* put it, “At times, it seems as if the Cold War is back, but only with a new and very different enemy”, there appears in Europe a desire to develop a more progressive approach in which major actors have a self-interest in engaging rather than isolating potential adversaries. For Europe, it is as important to reduce the threat of other actors by increasing their security as by seeking a superior military capability; for the US the character of the threat is not as important as the capability of an actor to inflict damage. Just weeks after the attacks, the US officially announced a major shift in policy along these lines, noting that the central objective of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was “to shift the basis of defence planning from a ‘threat based’ model that has dominated thinking in the past to a ‘capabilities-based’ model for the future”.

The distinction between these two approaches, of course, is not to say that the United States and Europe are working from totally different agendas. The US, for example, is the largest contributor to the effort to re-establish order in Afghanistan and has renewed its peace-making missions in the Middle East and on the Indian sub-continent. However, these attempts are directly tied to the current American anti-terror campaign, rather than reflections of a change in the long-term US approach, and in fact tensions in these latter two areas have increased partly as a

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result of American policy following September 11th. On the European side, the EU and its member states have supported the American military in Afghanistan, although they have expressed extreme reticence about extending this campaign into other countries. There is, then, some overlap in the views of the Atlantic partners. In the short-term, both sides wish to see the destruction of Al Qaeda, including a military response to September 11th. Yet, in the long-term, the American outlook seems more influenced by a realist conception of self-interest, and this has been expressed early on in issue areas unrelated to the anti-terror campaign. The European approach on the other hand appears more progressive, wishing to temper military power with the importance of soft security instruments. Whereas the United States appears to view terrorism as a new common threat with which to mobilise a bloc of nations around American leadership, the Europeans seems to perceive it as a catalyst for a deliberate integration of states and a refashioning global politics, such as they have achieved at the European level.

5. September 11th and the CFSP
Besides these differences in visions, one should also note the intensified debate over the development of the CFSP caused by the terrorist attacks. The showing, once again, of the capabilities gap across the Atlantic has been evident not just in assets but also in policy. At its emergency meeting on the 29th September, the European Council stated that its member states would offer European military missions “each according to its means.” In effect, this meant that there would be no common security and defence policy over Afghanistan. Where the EU did produce rapid and

impressive results was in areas where it was already strong, such as in clamping down on terrorist finances, although significant progress was also made in creating common policies over police and judicial matters. On matters of Security and Defence Policy, however, the lack of action gave the lie to the pretence of a Union policy. A day before the emergency session, the three biggest EU states (Germany, France and the UK) met privately in a trilateral format to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, alongside but formally exterior to the EU framework.\(^{397}\) The following month a similar mini-summit between these three states in London was the cause of a diplomatic row within the EU, with eight smaller member states objecting to their omission; Romano Prodi, who himself was not invited to London, sympathised with the excluded states, toothlessly declaring that all members should be considered equal.\(^{398}\) According to one observer of the summit – which at the last minute expanded to include representatives from Italy, Spain and the Netherlands – “its chief effect was again to demonstrate the European Union’s inability to draw from an array of indubitable good intentions anything resembling a common action plan”.\(^{399}\)

If September 11\(^{th}\) again highlighted the European Union’s weakness regarding its own CFSP, it also encouraged those pressing for a greater EU in external affairs. A month after the attacks in the Untied States, Romano Prodi argued that the CFSP needs “to develop fast if we are to be a real force for good in the world now emerging

\(^{397}\) “German, French, British Leaders Meet to Discuss Afghanistan”. BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 20\(^{th}\) October 2001.
\(^{398}\) “EU’s Small States Demand to be Heard”. BBC Online. 8\(^{th}\) November 2001 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1644000/1644806.stm>.
\(^{399}\) “Bush Warning to Allies Grate on European Nerves”. International Herald Tribune. 12\(^{th}\) November 2001.
from the tragedy of September 11th.\textsuperscript{400} Jacque Beltran and Guillaume Parmentier agree that a stronger CFSP is needed as a result of recent events, since there is a “strong possibility” that September 11\textsuperscript{th} will “accelerate the devolution to the Europeans of the responsibility to ensure security in the Balkans”.\textsuperscript{401} Further, the EU has emboldened its rhetoric regarding its ambitions for the CFSP, identifying one of three basic challenges for the future of the Union to be “how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new, multipolar world”.\textsuperscript{402} Lord Robertson has claimed that, with some NATO assets, including AWACS aircraft, being transferred from Europe to the United States, September 11\textsuperscript{th} marks the first occasion of “the old world coming to the aid of the new”\textsuperscript{403} and that, with added pressures on the US, September 11\textsuperscript{th} must generate “a rebalancing of responsibilities between Europe and North America”.\textsuperscript{404}

5.1a. Centrifugal Pressures
Clearly, as we saw earlier, the gap between Europe’s ambitions and its capabilities must be significantly reduced before the European Union’ aspirations in world politics can be considered credible. Still, September 11\textsuperscript{th} has given a new impetus and rationale for the CFSP, with both centrifugal and centripetal pressures building a need to enhance it. The nature of the terrorist threat has reinforced the European trend towards pooled sovereignty, albeit in a limited way, and has again made clear

\textsuperscript{400} Prodi, Romano (24\textsuperscript{th} October 2001).
\textsuperscript{401} Beltran and Parmentier (2001).
\textsuperscript{402} European Council Summit at Laeken. Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1.II, “Challenges & Reforms in a Renewed Union”.
\textsuperscript{403} Lord Robertson (10\textsuperscript{th} October 2001).
the incapacity of individual European states to have significant influence in major international security events. The rapid consensus to create a common arrest warrant, as well as common definitions and sentences for terrorism in the wake of September 11th touched on policy areas that were previously considered strictly the preserve of the nation-state. Also, unlike in the Balkans and in the Middle East, the smaller states have demanded to be included in policy-making meetings, no longer leaving the CFSP effectively in the hands of the three largest states. If there is to be a meaningful CFSP at all, this is likely to increase the pressure to create a more powerful framework for policy-making at the supranational level, perhaps guided by the Commission. Finally, September 11th has seen the United States increase its own pressure for a more credible CFSP. First the US made the unprecedented call on NATO assets and required European assets to take up some slack in the Balkans. Second, Washington has signalled its frustration at the incohesion of European action and has demonstrated its own need for faster and more united EU-level capabilities. This was apparent when the US issued, as part of its anti-terror platform, a list of 47 demands to the EU rather than to its member states. In the future, European efforts to improve its CFSP may meet swifter approval from a Washington that is more in need of a stronger Europe than fearful of it.

In what form the CFSP and CSDP will end up is uncertain, and the European (in)action in reply to September 11th in contrast to the awesome display of American power in Afghanistan should put to rest any lingering suspicions of a European ‘challenge’ to American primacy. Yet, if the recent pressures toward a more credible CFSP continue, a heightened number of defections within the alliance and/or a more balanced alliance are more likely as a result of September 11th than before. The US may be less willing to risk its troops in European security operations if the EU itself has sufficient capabilities to act alone; a stronger EU may be less willing to accept American political and military leadership, particularly if it wishes to dissociate from American foreign policy. Indeed, in their timing, the terrorist attacks are likely to encourage such a future. At its Laeken summit in December 2001, the European Council called for a constitutional convention to address many fundamental questions regarding the future of the EU in the run up to the next inter-governmental conference in 2004. As Lord Robertson and others have argued, the new terrorist threat may require a stronger EU, both as a partner of the US and for the sake of European security. September 11th is likely to be a powerful motivating factor for those who will campaign within the convention for a more powerful CFSP, and an uncommonly difficult argument for others to resist.

As we have seen elsewhere, though, there is no consensus within the European Union on the development of CFSP, and the challenge facing the upcoming convention to define Europe's future world role is daunting. By 2004, the EU will not yet have fully overcome its two other great ambitions – the single currency and enlargement of the EU to its final boundaries. It will be useful for the EU to be clear
about its external role before it admits other states, since consensus will be even more difficult to achieve after. Yet it is far from evident that the current members will be prepared for a leap towards more centralised foreign and security policies just two short years after their September 11th incoherence. This is especially noteworthy given that the most useful reforms, such as transferring responsibility for the CFSP to the Commission, are likely to produce calls for a more democratic EU, thus transferring even more power away from the nation state. The United Kingdom, in particular, is likely to lead opposition against aspects of Romano Prodi’s vision of a stronger EU. As its behaviour after September 11th has shown, the UK desires to stand alongside, not against, the US, particularly since it tends to gain prestige by joining the US in operations where France is less willing and where Germany is less able.

5.1b. Centripetal Pressures
Washington’s instinct for unilateralism, backed with its new activism, may well cause the European Union to increase its capabilities. As we saw earlier, this is likely to occur not as a result of US policy itself, but rather if the EU fears its interests will be harmed by US policy. In supporting largely unilateral American action in its anti-terror campaign, the EU and its member states are protecting their own interests as much as showing solidarity with the US. Europe is likely to react against American neoisolationism only if this situation changes. The apparent reprise of the American policy that designated Yasser Arafat a terrorist is one potential area for a
transatlantic rift. Similarly, in his State of the Union address, President Bush signalled that the US may be reverting to a hardline posture over North Korea, and so one might expect concern in the EU, as was evident in the Spring of 2001. A unilateral American war against Iraq or other states is another possible cause of EU-US discord – if, at least the war does not result in a clear and swift US victory. In his speech, Bush not only opened the path to future military operations against Iraq, but the next day authorised the recommencement of full financing of the opposition Iraqi National Congress. In these cases, American activism could destabilise the wider region, and, in the case of Iraq and Iran, generate unrest among European Muslims. The current standoff between India and Pakistan, which arose from India adopting an anti-terror posture in the guise of American policy, is a third possible catalyst for a stronger Europe. This not only risks war between two nuclear powers but also threatens neighbouring China with its fallout.

However, as with the potential for pressures within the European Union, pressures coming from American policy are likely to be limited. Full-scale wars between India and Pakistan or between Israel and its neighbours are worst-case scenarios, to which a European military response is probably years away at the earliest. Until European states can reach basic consensus on their CFSP and the role of the EU, only a most irresponsible American policy would be sufficient on its own to coalesce otherwise unwilling European states to integrate their foreign-policies. September

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11th has highlighted not only the potential of a powerful US neoisolationism but also the lengths the EU will have to go to achieve a more meaningful CFSP.

5.2. Defection and Alliance
Evidence from our earlier chapters indicated that, while United States’ policies may oscillate between reassuring and worrying Europe, they are unlikely to threaten rather than benefit European interests over the long-term. Events since September 11th have not negated this conclusion, but have cast a shadow over it. The full ramifications of the Bush Doctrine could, at worst, encourage European states to substantially coalesce their powers and at last translate EU economic weight into global political influence. Whereas the Truman Doctrine met some consensus in a Europe that also felt the need to contain communism, the Bush Doctrine does not appear to share that advantage. Without a countervailing power, the United States may exploit its unipolar position, and intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other states. Given the recent QDR’s apparent reassertion of the Pentagon’s two-war strategy,409 and President Bush’s $48 billion (15%) increase in military spending,410 the US certainly has the internal capabilities for such behaviour.

If the US went to war alone against Iraq there would certainly be more pressure both within Europe and throughout the world for a stronger CFSP, and the Commission and Mr CFSP could be expected to capitalise on such an opportunity, particularly at a time when the EU is considering its constitutional future. In the case of Iran and

409 See the remarks by Henry H Shelton, Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the QDR (2001): 67.
North Korea, states to which the EU has long been more sympathetic than the US, one would expect an even stronger reaction. In contrast to the American policy on Iran, for example, the EU is considering launching a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Teheran, which would especially contrast with the US policy of sanctions against that country.\footnote{Dempsey, Judy. “Europeans reject Bush 'axis of evil' line on Iran”. Financial Times. 4th February 2002 <http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3VW6BNAXC>.
411} Moreover, the European public, which appears already to believe that the US fought in Afghanistan largely for its own, not for international, interests,\footnote{Asked whether they agreed with the statement “The US was taking in account the interests of its partners or acting on its own”, 70% of American respondents agreed versus 28% who disagreed. Answers from non-Americans reversed the figures, 62% to 33%. From Dr James Zogby, “Americans Find that Unilateralism Has its Consequences”. Global News Network. 6th January 2002.
412} might be expected to increase its support for more pooled sovereignty if US policies evince a need for alternative world leadership.

Yet, such a future has to overcome several hurdles. First, it assumes that the US would engage in unilateral action over the top of objections from its European allies. As the near-unilateral action in Afghanistan showed, though, the US still needs the support of Europe for political, logistical and even military reasons. The EU has played a vital role in the non-military aspects of the American “war on terrorism”, for example, while individual EU member states have had important supporting roles, such as the UK’s reopening of communications with Iran.\footnote{“UK Foreign Secretary to Visit Iran”. BBC Online. 21st September 2001 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/h/eng/uk_politics/newsid_1555000/1555733.stm>.
413} The US is also unlikely to risk losing the strong support of the EU in the Middle East, at least in terms of appeasing the cause of the Palestinians at a time when the US itself appears to Arabs as ever more pro-Israel.\footnote{Sciolino, Elaine. “Saudi Affirms U.S. Ties but Says Bush Ignores Palestinians’ Cause”. New York Times. 29th January 2002.
414} Over the long-term, the US has a self-interest in
consulting and coordinating its policies with the EU and its member states, rather than acting unilaterally. The American policy to maintain the strategic importance of NATO also suggests against US unilateralism in its war on terrorism, since Lord Robertson has said publicly that the US should not expect NATO support unless its operations were motivated by evidence linking its new targets to the September 11th attacks.\textsuperscript{415}

Second, a plethora of financial, institutional and political barriers within the EU lie in the way of constructing a genuine CFSP that could hope to challenge US primacy. Financially, the price tag attached to building anything approaching American capabilities is likely to be beyond the wealth and inclination of a Europe that will be for quite some time concerned with great internal issues. European defence budgets are constrained by both domestic politics and EU policies.\textsuperscript{416} Institutionally, the EU lacks the cohesion and leadership to confront American policy, and significant reform is required before the EU can attain alternative global influence, especially when a premium is put on rapid decision-making.\textsuperscript{417} Politically, EU policies are currently limited by discord among its members, which are responsible for the CFSP; if foreign policy were handed to a supranational EU institution, then its political weight would probably be unsustainable without democratic reform.


\textsuperscript{416} In January 2002 the European Commission for the first time demanded a reprimand against Germany and Portugal for those countries’ expected breach of EU rules on maximum budget deficits. “EU raps Berlin and Lisbon on budgets”. \textit{BBC Online}. 30\textsuperscript{th} January 2002

\textsuperscript{417} It is worth noting that it took ten days following the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks for the European Council to hold its first meeting on the crisis.
The EU may be expected at most to increase its capabilities in a limited way, and possibly with American encouragement, that partly balances the transatlantic alliance but does not threaten it. The future is likely to produce escalated – but contained – disagreement over policy, at least in the short-term. Differing perspectives on world politics is likely to produce a greater level of defection on both sides as American neoisolationism and European ambition assert themselves. However, neither of these forces is likely to be powerful enough to counter, first, the pressures that prevent agreement within the EU against the US, and, second, those pressures outside the transatlantic partnership that help to maintain its solidarity. The alliance will be more balanced in the future, but focused on an agenda that is agreed across the Atlantic rather than exclusively within Europe.

Although September 11th has made the alliance more resilient to defection, it has also made such defection more likely, thus consolidating the trend we traced earlier of a more balanced alliance. Europe and the United States share basic interests and goals that ensure a fundamental unity, especially in times of crises. Leadership in the alliance over the long-term lies unquestionably with the United States, which alone possesses the military and diplomatic capability to respond – and do so rapidly – to threats to international security. Although European leaders have tended to downplay the use of military force after September 11th, this stance would gain more credibility in the US if the EU actually possessed its own substantive capabilities before it rejected the use of others’. Europe is part of an alliance to which it is committed and on which it remains dependent. It is highly likely that disagreements
will continue and probably increase within the alliance, but also that the alliance will prove resilient enough to withstand them. September 11th has highlighted both transatlantic ties and tensions. The extent to which either of these prevail depends in the short-term on US actions and, if these harm European interests, over the long-term on the motivation and ability of EU member states to pool sovereignty and reform the EU. September 11th has increased the chances that EU-US relations may take on a neorealistic guise, but has made it no less automatic, nor less conditional upon the foreign policy of the United States and upon a variety of factors within the EU.
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