THE FOREIGN POLICY OF WILLIAM GLADSTONE IN THE 1860s
The limits of liberalism in Victorian England

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of Honors in History at Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, on April 29, 1989.
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INTRODUCTION

William E. Gladstone was the rising star of the Liberal Party between 1859 and 1874. His domestic and foreign policy played a role in the two most important developments of this period in British History: the surge of liberalism and the loss of British influence in European affairs. Because he was the leading British statesman of the period, Gladstone's statesmanship is widely blamed by contemporaries and historians for Britain's decline in European affairs at the time of Otto von Bismarck's ascendancy. This study seeks to answer the question of whether Gladstone's statesmanship is to blame for Great Britain's dramatic slip in European influence.

The prevailing view is that Gladstone's statesmanship in this period failed to contend with the shrewd Realpolitik of Bismarck. As a result, critics of Gladstone contend, Britain fell from the leading role to secondary status in European diplomatic circles in less than ten years. Historians like Paul Kennedy and Raymond Sontag condemn Gladstone's statesmanship, while others, such as Paul Knaplund and H.C.G. Matthew, applaud Gladstone's pursuit of morality in his policy, but see his statesmanship as second-rate. Similarly, contemporaries like Bismarck and Napoleon III had little respect for Gladstone's diplomacy. While each of these interpretations raises valid points, none takes into account the crucial interplay of foreign and domestic events that limited the options available for British diplomacy to respond to the challenges of a new Bismarckian order in Europe.

This study considers the tumultous political environment
facing Gladstone both at home and abroad as an accelerator of British isolation from European affairs. The interpretation that follows demonstrates the critical interplay between internal and external affairs by targeting two factors that hamstrung Gladstone's statesmanship between 1859 and 1874. First, Gladstone inherited a bankrupt and impotent foreign policy from Lord Palmerston's last five years at the helm. By 1864, the new Bismarckian order had been established and British isolation had been ensured. Secondly, the rise of liberalism in Britain preoccupied Gladstone's policy throughout the period, with most of his time and energy spent uniting the Liberal Party with his legislative agenda. Indeed, the constraints on her policy were so great that it would not be an overstatement to say that Britain would have found herself just as isolated by 1874 even if Bismarck and Gladstone had exchanged positions and Britain found herself under the guiding hands of the Iron Chancellor. The rise of liberalism in Britain and the limited options of British diplomacy painted Gladstone's statesmanship into a corner.

In what follows, the constraints on British policy that led to Britain's retreat into diplomatic isolation will be discussed so that Gladstone's statesmanship can be evaluated. In this pursuit, The Gladstone Diaries, edited in this period by H.C.G. Matthew, several articles written by Gladstone, and Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, were invaluable tools for understanding the motivations, inner thoughts, and preoccupations of the leader of the Liberal Party. These primary sources allowed a glimpse at Gladstone's sophisticated measuring of the national pulse on domestic and external issues,
which enabled him to adjust his policy to political exigencies for the benefit of the Liberal Party and his country. Gladstone's tailoring of his policy to the prevailing winds of his nation is a useful index of the rise of liberalism in Britain in this period.

Because the unity of the British Liberal Party is central to understanding the presence of internal and external constraints on Gladstone's statesmanship, two approaches to the rise of liberalism were used in this study. First, Gladstone's legislative agenda and ideology will be analyzed to demonstrate the degree of interplay between events in foreign and domestic policy. The impact of such events as the Italian Question, the American Civil War, the Reform Bill of 1867, and the Irish legislation on Gladstone's political outlook and the state of the liberal coalition will be measured by considering the opinions of contemporaries and historians, and election and by-election data.

Secondly, the three distinct stages of development for Gladstone and the Liberal Party are reflected by the division of this study into three phases. Phase I, 1859 to 1865, represents Gladstone's apprenticeship as a statesman, as Gladstone tackled the challenges of pluralism and unified the Liberal Party through his financial policy, while British diplomacy was made impotent by the presence of the new Bismarckian order in Europe after the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis in 1864. In Phase II, 1865 to 1868, Gladstone emerged as the leading British statesman and the leader of the Liberal Party through his Reform Bill victory in 1867. Phase III, 1869 to 1874, was the test of Gladstonian Liberalism. As Prime
Minister, Gladstone's legislative agenda led to the fall of his first Ministry, while his foreign policy was successful despite the limited options available to British diplomacy. It will be shown that, by 1874, despite Gladstone's effective leadership, the domestic challenges of the rise of liberalism and the development of the Bismarckian order in Europe combined to leave Britain diplomatically isolated.

The legacy of Gladstone's statesmanship between 1859 and 1874 has been misunderstood by most observers. Faced with unprecedented challenges from all sides and at each turn, Gladstone fostered the acceptance of the liberal state in Britain and lost little ground in the European political arena. In so doing, Gladstone cleared the obstacles posed by the complex interaction of domestic and foreign challenges and left his mark on British History by obtaining a leading role for morality and justice in British politics.
PHASE I: 1859 to 1865

The British Liberal Party in Phase I of this study was under the guidance of Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, but its rise was due primarily to the financial wizardry of Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Events at home and abroad combined to leave Britain diplomatically isolated by Palmerston's death in 1865. A Britain with more diplomatic options and unchallenged by the rise of pluralism might have posed a worthy opponent to Otto von Bismarck in European politics, but, with a fragmented majority party and isolated by the new Bismarckian order, her statesmen lacked the maneuverability to reverse her decline in Europe.

In Phase I, Gladstone's second term as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he rose to national prominence and served his apprenticeship as a statesman. In this period, he was preoccupied by financial questions and domestic events and rarely strayed from the positions taken by Palmerston and Russell on foreign affairs. His interventions were on disagreements of degree rather than of substance. Still maturing as a statesman, he gained public acclaim for his considerable talents in finance. His successes in the financial realm unified the Liberal Party as a leading radical, Richard Cobden, notes: "I consider that you alone have kept the party together so long by your great budgets." Gladstone's skills in finance assured his acceptance into the party leadership.

Gladstone's was an eclectic political philosophy, with a pragmatic instinct for the "ripeness" of an issue or policy in harmony with his distinct ethical code of public service. His
approach refused to compromise his high principles in the political arena. Gladstone's energy as a public servant was unbounded and study of his diaries attests to his ascetic pursuit of the national interest and his uncanny sense of political timing. His evolution from Tory "Boy Wonder" to progressive national leader reflects his sensitivity to the prevailing mood of his country.\textsuperscript{2} In Phase I, Gladstone poured his personal and political resources into solving the complex financial problems of the day so that he could unify the Liberal Party.

While there was certainly no love lost between Palmerston and Gladstone over the course of policy, both were capable of setting aside their mutual disaffection and tolerating the other in their professional interaction.\textsuperscript{3} Each respected the political skills, will, and intellect of the other and their differences lay not over objectives of policy, but over principles. Palmerston was concerned only with maintaining and increasing British influence in Europe and his Ministry's influence at home. The pagan "enfant terrible" could neither adapt himself, nor explain himself, to the pious chancellor.\textsuperscript{4} Their antagonism was most divisive over the the defense estimates. While Palmerston sought huge increases in British fortifications to counter the French buildup across the Channel, Gladstone sought to limit defense spending. Gladstone's skills in finance, and the widespread popularity such ability entailed, bridged the gulf between their diverging ideologies.

The battles between British statesmen in Phase I stemmed from
conflicting approaches to foreign policy. The foreign policies of Lord Russell, Lord Palmerston and Gladstone reflect the ideology and respective constituencies of each within the Liberal Party. As Foreign Secretary, Russell voiced his diplomatic principles:

...the Powers of Europe, if they wish to maintain that peace, must respect each other's rights, must respect each other's limits, and, above all, restore and not disturb that commercial confidence which is the result of peace, which tends to peace, and which ultimately forms the happiness of nations.

Russell's foreign policy was that of a mainstream whig, prudently seeking to assert British influence while avoiding risky ventures.

To Palmerston, maximizing British interests was the sole guideline of foreign policy. With a role in British diplomacy since 1829, his policies had propelled Britain to a leading role in Europe. During the Italian Question in 1860, Palmerston expressed his foreign policy doctrine:

England is one of the greatest powers of the world... and her right to have and express opinions on matters... bearing on her interests is unquestionable; and she is equally entitled to give upon such matters any advice which she might think useful, or to suggest any arrangements which she may deem conducive to the general good.

His bluffs and bullying brought the ire of many in his Cabinet, the Court, and within parliament, but Palmerston had asserted British influence whenever possible, regardless of the risks involved.

Gladstone took a more internationalist stance and held up his policy to a moral litmus test. Indeed, one can trace the origins of the League of Nations in Paul Knaplund's interpretation of the Gladstone Doctrine of foreign policy:
He advocated applying the principles of the Sermon on the Mount in dealing with foreign nations -- law, justice, and the equal rights of all nations should prevail and be recognized; British statesmen should strive to promote peace, should further the cause of nationality and political liberty, should seek to maintain the concert of Europe; they must avoid landgrabbing and beware of the delusion that peace is promoted by large armaments.

The concept of morality in foreign relations fits into Gladstone's ideology. Despite his insulation from the Foreign Office, Gladstone reserved the right to comment on moral questions in European affairs. During Phase I he voiced his views on the Italian Question, the Papal States, the American Civil War, the Cobden Treaty, and the treatment of Denmark in the Schleswig-Holstein Affair.

Domestically, the British Liberal Party in 1859 was incohesive. Nominally, it included a part of every class of British society under the patronage of Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone. In real terms, the party had yet to evolve from a mere parliamentary entity to a national party. It remained a precarious coalition of whigs, liberal businessmen, and radical nonconformists. Five factors stemming from the party's fragmented nature accelerated its rise to national prominence. These factors include the loose leadership of the official party, the growth of the provincial press, the agitation of the working class and nonconformists, and the loyalty of the whigs to the Liberal Party even after the death of Lord Palmerston. Because of these factors, the party was well poised for battle with the Tories by 1865.

First, the loose leadership of the party allowed Gladstone the flexibility in his financial policy to gain untapped power
brokers. His budgets were as calculating politically as they were brilliant fiscally and they helped to unify the Liberal Party. Through targetted concessions in the budget, including tax breaks and the removal of tariffs, Gladstone improved the livelihoods of groups he coveted. Each segment of the budget could be acclaimed by a class of British society and Gladstone and the Liberal Party, in turn, gained their allegiance.

Secondly, Gladstone founded the penny press by repealing the Paper Duties in 1861. The new penny press diffused ideas and propaganda to the poorer classes and across the countryside through a growing network of provincial newspapers. The press adopted the responsibility of enlightening, civilizing, and morally transforming the world; and great orators, like Gladstone and John Bright, gained national followings. As a result, Gladstone became identified with the novelty of this new movement and reaped the benefits of strong relationships with many influential members of the press, including Thornton Leigh Hunt of the Daily Telegraph. Through his use of press releases, leaks to the press, and by publishing his speeches, Gladstone established the Liberal Party as a national entity.

Thirdly, he turned to the growing working class movement. The working classes provided a national base of support and a pre-existing network of union organization in many industries. Gladstone had no reverence for working class society, but was pleased to make the Liberal Party the only option for its electors, thereby undergirding his national support. By repealing the Paper Duties
and removing tariffs on such working class food staples as beer, tea, coffee, and sugar in his budgets, Gladstone captured the working class for his party. But, he was hardly ecstatic about including the working class in his coalition: "God knows I have not courted them, I hope I do not rely on them."11

Fourthly, Gladstone gained the support of nonconformists within the Commons and in British boroughs. These men were committed to Gladstone's agenda of social welfare and could command tremendous resources because of their abundance of time, energy, popular connections and money. They pursued a better society with the same motivation that brought them their fortunes and political influence. To gain their support, Gladstone turned to his 1860 Budget by granting tax exemptions for life-insurance policies and deferred annuities. Thus, he could shield the non-landed from the burden of an increase in income tax while at the same time stimulating the economy.

Finally, Gladstone's concessions to the landed whigs ensured the emergence of the Liberal Party. The whigs were a conservative force within the liberal coalition and sought to maintain their privileged social and economic position. His refusal to attach himself too closely to the radicals in his policy initiatives by steering clear of reform, abolition of the Church Rates, and financial attacks on the whig lifestyle assured their support. Also, his piecemeal liberalism was attractive to the whigs because of their disrespect for Disraeli and their identification with Palmerston and Russell.
Gladstone's tailoring of financial policy to the unlikely coalition of whigs, liberals, radicals, nonconformists, and the working class in Phase I made him the leader of the Liberal Party. His financial policy combined his ethical code of politics, including free trade, social welfare and retrenchment, with a pragmatic adjustment to a changing British political landscape. Meanwhile, the challenges to British foreign policy in these years also contributed to the growth of pluralism in British politics. Both the Italian Question and the American Civil War turned into domestic issues that strengthened the liberal coalition.

Three new developments imposed constraints on British foreign policy. First, the rise of newspapers such as the *Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Bee Hive*, and the provincial press meant that statesmen had to devote more time and energy to relations with the press. Secondly, Queen Victoria's demands for an increased role in foreign affairs, especially after the death of Prince Albert in 1861, slowed the response of British diplomacy. Finally, special interests used the press and the absence of party stability as an opportunity to assert their role in foreign policy. For example, unions and business groups were active on the American Civil War, while radical and agriculture lobbies were active on the Cobden Treaty.

Gladstone stepped into the foreign policy arena when questions of morality arose. His interventions took the form of public speeches, articles, and Cabinet memoranda. The infrequency of his comments on foreign policy is due to his preoccupation with the time-consuming
duties of his office. But, his sense of national interest would not allow him silence during these years of decreasing British influence. Each crisis in international affairs in Phase I influenced Britain both domestically and in her position among the other powers of Europe. The impact of each event on the unity of the Liberal Party, the new Bismarckian order, fundamental British interests, and Gladstone's ideology will be discussed. Because they had the greatest impact domestically in Britain, the Italian Question and the American Civil War will be considered first.

The Italian Question erupted in early 1858 and remained a leading issue in European affairs for the next three years. Cavour's brilliant manipulation of Napoleon III's territorial aspirations combined with the failure of Austrian and Russian diplomacy to allow Italian unification in 1861. Italian statesmen understood that Italy could be unified only by exploiting the differences between the Great Powers. Cavour embarked on his path with the benefit of Napoleon's sponsorship, assured by the Franco-Sardinian Treaty of January 2, 1859, Austrian isolation, assured by the Franco-Russian Treaty of March 3, 1859, and Britain's tacit compliance. His diplomatic skill transformed a war that lacked justification on any basis of international law into one that has been unanimously approved by posterity.

In Britain, Cavour's Italy was applauded for confronting the decaying forces of reaction and conservatism in Austria. The cause of Italian unification became a rallying point for the blossoming liberal coalition. The consensus in Britain was for
neutrality with an assurance that Napoleon would make no territorial demands and Austria would lose little of its influence in Europe, especially in the Near East. Britain's support for the Sardinian cause made Palmerston assert that Austria could appeal to the judgement but not the sympathies of Europe. 14 Academics who embraced Italian nationalism and praised Cavour as a prudent liberal formed an unlikely coalition with the working class over the Italian Question because of shared enthusiasm for Italian liberalism and shared enmity for Austrian conservatism. 15 Identification with the Italian movement transcended parochial class distinctions, allowing radicals and whigs alike to support Cavour and his attractive nationalism.

The unification of Italy was the first hint of a new Bismarckian European order that would overthrow the system established at Vienna in 1815. Three factors brought on the upheaval. First, the Italian uprising upset the balance of power in Europe by diminishing Austrian influence. The Franco-Russian Entente and Bismarck's competition within Germany combined to destroy Austrian hopes for a Holy Alliance and left Austria diplomatically isolated during the critical battles of the days ahead. Secondly, French adventurism increased British distrust of Napoleon. The British viewed him as expansionist and saw no reason to bridge the gap between their policies which would hamper the future responses of both to the challenges of the new Bismarckian order. Finally, the Czar had asserted his unwillingness to play a role in western Europe. He would only pledge his assistance to Napoleon in return for the promise of future gains in the Near East.
At the outset of the Italian conflict, Gladstone was preoccupied with domestic problems and seemed indifferent. In his diary he shows his removal from the question: "War is begun. May God direct it." But, he soon stated his views on the conflict in an article in the Quarterly Review and in a memorandum on the Papal States. Both show exceptionally well-informed opinions on a foreign policy question for a Chancellor of the Exchequer.

In the article, Gladstone spells out his argument for Britain to tread lightly in Italy. First, he condemns the policies of both the French and Austrians. He attacked the Austrian treatment of the Italians, and he saw the infamous Buol Dispatch of February 25, 1859, to illustrate that, "a blind Conservatism may come to be the most dangerous Radicalism, and that the closets and cabinets of despotic sovereigns are too often the main factories of Revolution." He saw Austrian policy necessitating that, "in no other way than by the sword shall any Italian be free." His respect for international law and morality in foreign policy made him appeal to the Austrians to rule within the limits of legal rights. But, Gladstone could use nothing more than words, for he maintained that an Austrian military presence was vital to the European balance of power. Gladstone was fearful of the territorial designs of Napoleon, but understood his position: "she is strong enough to paralyse that commanding union of force and authority, by which alone, placed on the side of right, the Italian question can be peacefully adjusted." Gladstone's policy was for support of Cavour through neutrality.

Gladstone was hopeful for Sardinian liberalism. He praised
Italian unification from within and applauded Cavour for planting a tree of liberty that had been watered neither by blood nor tears. His view was similar to that of Palmerston and Russell, but it was within his own moral framework. He held that the British role in the conflict should be to urge the principles of reason and justice while standing clear of selfish interest. So long as the conflict destroyed little of Austria's power in the Near East and did not spur the adventurism of Napoleon, Gladstone supported the Italian cause.

Gladstone then discussed the Papal states. With a mixture of sympathy for the national self-determination of the Papal subjects and long-standing anti-Papism, he condemned the Papacy as the worst and most ridiculous of European governments. He maintained that the only remedy for the existing evils was the permanent separation of the temporal from the spiritual power. The stagnation, imbecility, and anarchy of Papal rule confronted Gladstone's notion of religious self-determination, which held that the state should be detached from the church. His attack on the temporal power of the Papacy appealed to the progressive sector of the Liberal Party.

Just as in the Italian Question, the American Civil War penetrated British politics at many levels and posed a challenge to British statesmen. While the early days of the Civil War sharpened existing divisions in British society, the Emancipation Proclamation of September, 1862, strengthened the liberal coalition. The identification of the sectors of the British polity with the Union and the Confederacy respectively was a veil for the social and
political antagonisms prevailing in Britain and taught Gladstone valuable lessons about the interplay of domestic and foreign policy in British politics. The Union's victory accelerated the growth of liberalism in Britain and challenged the privileges of the landed classes.

The pro-Confederacy sentiment in Britain was a combination of businessmen, workers hurt by the Northern blockade and class-conscious aristocracy. It was a sector concerned primarily with social and economic factors. The disaffected workers hit hardest by the blockade were spurred by the powerful Bee Hive, while the landed feared that a victory by the industrialized North would set a dangerous precedent for their lifestyles and businessmen feared the costs to British commerce. Additionally, moderates in the Liberal Party were uneasy about Lincoln's friendship with British Radicals and with John Bright, whose ideals, friends, and works were anathema to them. Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone were all card-carrying supporters of the Confederacy.

On the other hand, Unionist sentiment in Britain mirrored the liberal coalition itself, lacking only the support of its leading statesmen and the whigs. It included the working class, radicals and academics, who unlike the pro-Confederacy coalition, did not have their livelihoods at stake in the American conflict. They were therefore willing to overlook economic considerations for the cause of the Union's liberalism. Radicals were strongly pro-Union and Bright himself respected the opportunities offered by the North's tenet that "every man may hope and does hope to rise to wealth."
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was a turning point for the Liberal Party by delivering the bulk of the working class to the Unionist position. Gladstone followed Lincoln's message with his own powerful speech at Newcastle on October 8, 1862. His oversight of British finance would not allow him to overlook the economic costs of the Northern blockade. First, he appealed to pocketbooks by outlining the decline of the British economy as a result of the Northern blockade. He speculated that the value of British trade with the United States had diminished by as much as nine and a half million pounds, and the quadrupled price of cotton meant that only "one-half of the owners of mills and factories are keeping open their works." 

Finally, he expressed his contempt for the Northern government, which he felt was growing too fast and had too often threatened Canada. On the other hand, Gladstone had nothing but respect for the Confederate leaders, perhaps seeing a reflection of the British model in their institutions: "There is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making a navy; and they have made what is more than either -- they have made a nation." A large segment of the whigs shared this view and Gladstone could overlook none of the economic hardships caused by the Northern blockade, nor could he afford to compromise whig opinion.

Gladstone's brilliance as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Phase I responded to the rise of pluralism and united the liberal coalition. But, on the issue of parliamentary reform, he was more
a man of his time. The editor of his diaries, H.C.G. Matthew, observes that the curious dislocation of early Victorian politics meant that "fiscal liberalism had been achieved while political liberalism had barely begun." It was no accident that Gladstone's liberalism failed to spill over into the reform question, for he believed that support for reform might be enough to push the whigs into the waiting arms of the Tories. Also, his keen sense of timing and feel for the "ripeness" of issues, his personal reservations about the reform issue, and the opposition of Palmerston, the Court, and the Cabinet to reform initiatives made him rely on financial questions to popularize his party. Thus, he took the safest course to form a consensus for his party while keeping whig support intact.

In Gladstone's pursuit of a greater Britain, he combined a Burkean, incremental course that would avoid great upheavals in policy with a Peelite concern for government thrift. He waited for the prevailing temper of the nation to demand change and planned his course accordingly. With long range political objectives in mind, he would allow economic progress to silence cries for parliamentary reform until action was made necessary. Indeed, his increase of the income tax in the 1860 Budget was particularly sensitive to the social repercussions of the tax. Moreover, his bitter clashes with Somerset at the Admiralty and his long-time friend Herbert at the War Office show his deep concerns about the implications of government spending priorities.

Gladstone's concept of morality in the practice of politics
was the backbone of his ideology and the chief motivator of his
policy. Even up to 1865 he saw little prospect of peaceful,
major change in Britain, so he zealously pursued smaller alterations
like reducing waste and spending. He stated that, "Religion and
Christian virtue, like the faculty of taste and perception of
beauty, have their place, ay and that the first place", in the
conduct of politics. He applied his distinct ethical code to
his political life like no other British statesman before or since.

The Cobden Treaty of 1861 was perhaps Gladstone's most active
involvement in the realm of foreign affairs as Chancellor of the
Exchequer. Apart from the leading role free trade played in his
ideology, he saw economic and diplomatic benefits in the Cobden
Treaty. After concluding the treaty, he outlined his achievement:
"Whatever may have been our most sanguine expectations as to the
operation of that treaty, whether in a social or commercial sense,
up to this moment, they have been more than fulfilled." The
significance of the treaty lies in its impact domestically. It
allowed the Liberal Party to corner the popular issue of free trade.

But the treaty failed to defuse growing tensions on both sides
of the Channel sparked by the French annexation of Nice and Savoy
in 1860 and the race in armaments. The Anglo-French antagonism
would plague the conduct of British foreign and domestic policy
throughout this period. When Napoleon expressed his intention to
reassert French influence in world affairs, even at the cost of
friendly relations with the British Government, by augmenting
French sea power, he touched on raw British nerves. British
statesmen disagreed about the readiness of the nation's defenses in the face of the French threat and a controversy soon developed with Palmerston and the Court taking up the cause of fortification. Gladstone, true to his minimalist view of finance, sought to constrain defense spending and the Cobden Treaty could alleviate much of the Treasury's burden while fitting easily into his objective of creating a model of international free trade.38

Gladstone hoped to construct a bridge of friendship, supported by pillars of economic interdependence between the two nations.39 In so doing, he ran into the opposition of Palmerston, who saw the treaty as creating a greater need for fortification.40 The latter had the support of both the Cabinet and the Court, while Gladstone depended on an alliance of Cobdenite radicals, free trade whigs, business interests, and liberal intellectuals. Gladstone joined Cobden in negotiations with the French and reached an agreement without consulting either Palmerston or the Foreign Office. The treaty itself was narrow in its economic scope, but rich in its symbolic benefits domestically for the Liberal Party.

The Italian Question, the American Civil War, and the Cobden Treaty constituted Gladstone's active participation in foreign affairs during Phase I of this study. In each question, domestic considerations and Gladstone's personal ideology were the chief motivations behind his policy. Although his diaries show some additional interest in the course of continental events, he was too immersed in domestic affairs to contend with challenges on the continent that had little impact on the unity of the Liberal Party.
Events had hemmed Britain into a predictable course in its foreign policy and Bismarck took full advantage of her inflexibility in the Polish Question and the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis. Palmerston's diplomatic glory was behind him and his aggressiveness and adventuring spirit were gradually deserting him.\(^{41}\) Facing the new and unique challenges of the rise of pluralism and with few diplomatic options, Britain fell prey to the new Bismarckian order in Europe. Thus, by Palmerston's death in October of 1865 Britain stood isolated and with a greatly diminished role in Europe.

The insurrection in Poland on January 24, 1863, further shook the European order. A new instability developed in European diplomacy which would allow the Iron Chancellor to gain for Prussia the leading role in the German Confederation and in European affairs. Bismarck's success was due to British diplomatic impotency, the gulf between British and French diplomacy, the isolation of Austria, and the Iron Chancellor's manipulation of the Czar. After the Polish Question, Bismarck's control of European diplomacy was firmly established.

Popular sentiment in Britain was supportive of the Polish rebels, but Palmerston and Russell had no diplomatic options. First, Queen Victoria's Prussophile leanings made her veto both unilateral and joint intervention in the crisis. In hindsight, the handicaps under which the Foreign Office worked makes her view seem reasonable.\(^{42}\) Secondly, growing British distrust of Napoleon ruled out cooperation at a time when England, coming to grips with Bismarck, needed French support as never before.\(^{43}\) Napoleon risked the Franco-Russian Entente by bowing to French public opinion and expressing his support
for the insurrection. Finally, Austria, hardly a friend to Britain against her brother emperors, could do nothing but follow the Prussian lead in Poland because of her precariousness in the German Confederation. Although there was little chance of a renewal of the Holy Alliance, due to competition between Austria and Prussia in Germany and Austria and Russia in the Near East, Britain could turn to none of the three eastern powers. In European diplomacy, Britain's hands were tied.

Limited to rhetoric, Palmerston thus turned to sharp and persistent protests to St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{44} The absence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's opinions on the question is perhaps an indication of its limited impact on domestic affairs. There is no more than casual mention of the affair in his diaries and there is little indication that he would have taken a separate course from that of Palmerston. Moreover, Gladstone defended the Government's policy in the Commons, arguing that Britain should not lose its bargaining position on behalf of the Polish people at St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{45}

The Schleswig-Holstein Crisis of 1864 confirmed Bismarck's diplomatic mastery of Europe and culminated in Britain and Palmerston "drinking a cup of humiliation more bitter" than any before.\textsuperscript{46} The Danish defeat on July 20, 1864, left Britain an isolated and weary nation. In Schleswig-Holstein, as in the Polish Question, events beyond the control of British statesmen limited their possible responses to the aggression of Prussia and Austria against Denmark. European diplomacy had taken an uncertain turn and the checks on aggressive policy were removed: the eastern powers could no longer restrain France, France could no longer restrain Russia, and France
and Russia could no longer restrain Austria and Prussia. The growing British contempt for the fickleness of Napoleon, the Francophobe outlook of the Queen, and Austria and Russia's position in the Prussian orbit combined to rule out joint action on Denmark's behalf.

With an absence of a domestic consensus and a new European order, Britain had no options. Palmerston sought to guarantee Copenhagen, but his inability to bring the Cabinet to his view made him balk at the guarantee. Because of British inaction, the Danes overestimated their support from Britain, and ended any chance of their adopting a conciliatory attitude towards the Germans. Queen Victoria and the Cabinet responded by ruling out British military intervention, which not only allowed the annexation of the duchies by the German powers, but was also the final demonstration of British isolation from the events of the continent.

Again, the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not provide an alternative to Palmerston's policy. He outlines his mainstream position against British intervention in the crisis in his diary:

We don't meddle with the war but think independence of D(enmark) a matter of importance to us & all, so we say thus far no further -- we will not see Denmark utterly crushed. Get engagement from Aust. & Pruss. that wd. confine their operations to the Continent & adjacent islands & not attack Copenhagen.

Gladstone also adopted a non-interventionist stance in the Cabinet on June 25, 1864, by voting against Palmerston and Russell on technical language that would ensure the protection of Copenhagen. Gladstone showed no overriding concern with the Danish Question, merely making a plea against British overcommitment.
In his preparation for a leading role in British politics in Phase I, Gladstone adjusted his policy to a changing Britain. His financial policy assured him a larger role in the cabinet and British politics and increased the strength of the Liberal Party. Gladstone's rise to influence through his financial policy mirrored the rise of the Liberal Party to the forefront of British politics. While the Liberal Party was by no means dominant by 1865, it had emerged as a national force in British politics.

Gladstone's interest in foreign policy in Phase I of this study was dominated by his political morality and the value of issues to the unity of the Liberal Party. His comments and actions on the Italian Question, the American Civil War, and the Cobden Treaty demonstrated his position as the leading moral conscience in British politics. Nonetheless, the lack of British diplomatic options doomed the efforts of British statesmen to reverse the loss of Britain's influence in the new Bismarckian order. The outcome of Phase I of this study reveals a Britain occupying a severely diminished role in Europe and Gladstone as the rising star of British politics.
ENDNOTES FOR PHASE I


Gladstone entered the Commons as a Tory (largely because of his conservative religious views) and soon distinguished himself as a future leader in the party. By the late 1840s, he had moved to the moderate Peelite position (as a follower of Sir Robert Peel), because of Peel's support for government efficiency and free trade. By the late 1850s, Gladstone began the third stage of his evolution as a leader of the Liberal Party and a progressive on financial issues.

2Gladstone viewed Palmerston as an immoral opportunist. His foreign policy had been expensive and too adventurous and his domestic policy sought only to gain excessive funds for defense. To Gladstone, Palmerston was a restrictive, conservative force, lacking the personal code of ethics necessary for leading Britain and the Liberal Party. To Gladstone, his death marked the end of whig active leadership in British politics.


Prince Albert was often critical of Russell's work at the Foreign Office for being overshadowed by Palmerston. He referred to Russell as Palmerston's pawn on foreign matters.


8Gladstone's principled approach to politics made him appear to be above appealing to the press, but he made brilliant use of his relationship with the media to popularize himself and the Liberal Party. Because Hunt and his paper may have benefitted most from the Paper Duty repeal (outdistancing the *Times* in circulation by 1871), he had nothing but kind words for Gladstone: "His words and deeds alike have confuted the fools who hold that statesmanship is intrigue and diplomacy chicanery." Matthew, *Gladstone*, p. 136.


13 Ibid., p. 112.


18 Ibid., p. 541.

19 Ibid., p. 550.

20 Ibid., p. 561.

21 Ibid., p. 557.

22 In Gladstone's concept of religious self-determination, he took the view that the state could not dictate the religious affiliation of its subjects. To Gladstone, the state and church were unattached and the individual was free to adopt the denomination of his choice. His concept will develop throughout the period. He acted on its behalf in attacking the Papacy in 1859 and 1869, in the Irish Church Bill of 1869, in the Education Bill of 1870, and in the Irish University Bill of 1873.


25 Fear of alienating radicals and his own foreign policy doctrine made Gladstone shy away from support for the Roebuck Resolution in June of 1863, which would recognize the Confederacy as a sovereign state. He thought supporting the resolution constituted undue interference in American affairs. Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 171, c. 1812.

26 Pelling, America and the British Left, p. 8.

27 Henry Pelling argues that the Emancipation Proclamation was the turning point of British thought on the American Civil War in terms of the British public, because it caused a hardening of "Liberal, Radical and working class opinion in favour of the union." Pelling, Before the Socialists, p. 8. Also, Royden Harrison comments on the tremendous reception for Gladstone's Newcastle Speech, noting that it was "cheered by a crowd of Jarrow ship workers", who
had undoubtedly been hurt by the Northern blockade. Harrison, *Before the Socialists*, p. 62.

28 *The Times*, (London), October 9, 1862, p. 7.


30 *The Times*, (London), October 9, 1862, p. 7.


32 In a personal memorandum, Gladstone placed himself along with Lord Russell, Somerset, Newcastle, and Gibson as the most progressive members of the Cabinet on the reform issue. Matthew, ed., *The Gladstone Diaries*, 5: 493.


34 Gladstone's ideology centered on his Peelite notion of government efficiency and low government spending so that domestic political upheaval could be averted. This was due to his following of Edmund Burke's concessionary conservatism. He hoped to maintain domestic political tranquility and the status quo until political exigencies made change necessary to avoid domestic agitation. When change was called for, it would be fostered in the most piecemeal fashion, granting only those alterations that would lessen the chances of domestic strife.

35 Matthew, *Gladstone*, p. 76.

36 *The Times*, (London), October 9, 1862, p. 7.


40 Gladstone held that the treaty avoided conflict in the arms race, by appeasing the aggressive tendencies of Napoleon. Palmerston countered that free trade strengthened any power and the Cobden Treaty thus strengthened the French and was more reason to increase fortification efforts. Bell, *Lord Palmerston*, 2: 257.


42 Ibid., 2: 345.

43 Ibid., 2: 352.

44 Ibid., 2: 384.

45 Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 172, c. 1106.
Gladstone's emergence within the Liberal Party was made possible by his financial talents, his growing popularity and some degree of good luck. The luck lies in the deaths of several contenders to party leadership that might have posed competition to Gladstone had they lived. The deaths of Aberdeen, Cornwall Lewis, Graham, Herbert, Newcastle, and ultimately Palmerston in 1865 helped pave the way for Gladstone's rise to leadership of the Liberal Party.
PHASE II: 1865 to 1868

In Phase II of this study, British statesmen faced domestic turmoil in the form of party strife and the development of such controversial issues as parliamentary reform and Irish Church disestablishment. These issues combined with new diplomatic challenges to continue the retreat of British foreign policy into isolation from continental affairs. It will be argued below that Gladstone and other British leaders in this period faced domestic upheaval and had few diplomatic options in responding to events on the continent. With Britain in isolation an obstacle was removed for Otto von Bismarck to consolidate his hold on Europe.

This political turmoil provided Gladstone with perhaps his greatest tests as a statesman. He used his parliamentary skill, moral integrity and political resiliency to adjust to a volatile electorate and an increasingly unpredictable House of Commons. In Phase II he emerged as the leader of the Liberal Party by withstanding a major embarrassment in the Reform Bill debacle of 1866, and uniting his party by reshaping the 1867 Reform Bill; by introducing legislation to disestablish the Irish Church in 1868; and by gaining a commanding majority in the 1868 elections. Although few statesmen have dealt more successfully with subjects of such difficulty, Gladstone maintained his principles and made the transition from efficient administrator to national political leader.¹

Domestically, Gladstone's ethical code provided him a framework for adjusting his ideology to the challenges of pluralism.
His ideology combined a sophisticated measure of public opinion with his high principles and religious fervor. To Gladstone, Britain was a moral society distinct from religion, but destined to combine and coalesce with it, so that she could become the liberal example for the world.  

By 1865 the Bismarckian order had been firmly established in Europe. European affairs became a more complex game of diplomacy where national interest alone was paramount. This new order dealt Britain a hand that greatly increased her diplomatic isolation. The uncertainty in the European political arena limited Britain's options so that she could regain little of her previous influence in European affairs.

Any study of the Liberal Party in this period should consider the question of Gladstone's opportunism. His political skills and instinct for the "ripeness" of issues led many observers to contend that his approach to politics smelled of opportunism. Some argue that Gladstone's religious convictions were merely a cover for his political ambition, and that his moral righteousness blinded him to the fact that his original motivation was usually political. Others doubt that Gladstone's political career had been sustained by anything more than personal ambition. Additionally, one could argue that Gladstone played a leading role in "ripening" issues like parliamentary reform and the Irish Question merely for his own and his party's political benefit.

Gladstone's principles and objectives and the political environment in Britain in this period reveal two flaws in the theory.
First, Gladstone's diaries show the painstaking decision-making process he underwent to arrive at his positions on issues like Ireland and parliamentary reform. For example, Gladstone saw his early support for disestablishment of the Irish Church as an "embryo opinion in my mind as there was no cause to precipitate it into life, and (I) waited to fortify or alter or invalidate it by the teachings of experience." He went to similar lengths to adopt a position of support for parliamentary reform, condemning those who thought that it was a "subject to be played with or traded on." In both instances, Gladstone had taken years to develop his positions. Secondly, the political climate in Victorian Britain was far too complex for a statesman of even Gladstone's stature to steer events to his own political end. Such an interpretation places too great an emphasis on the role of the individual in modern society.

Gladstone's skill in adjusting his outlook to political exigencies cannot alone mark him an opportunist. His biographer, John Morley, disagrees with attempts to label Gladstone as such, adding that, "if an opportunist be defined as a statesman who declines to attempt to do a thing until he believes that it can really be done, what is this but to call him a man of common sense?" Gladstone never compromised his principles, he merely made adjustments in the timing, accent, and method of achieving his political objectives. It was Disraeli, his opponent on the Conservative front bench, who is more deserving of the opportunist label.

The death of Lord Palmerston left the Liberal Party a precarious
coalition of liberals, radicals, whigs and nonconformists both within and outside the House of Commons. By 1868, Gladstone had used two issues -- restructuring the 1866 Reform Bill and initiating Irish Church disestablishment -- to unify the coalition. He created the whig-working class entente to act as a double weapon for the Liberal Party on the reform question. On one hand, addressing the reform question would yield the balance of the British working class and radicals for the Liberal Party, while, on the other, the whig sector would guard against frivolous legislation that might lead to domestic upheaval.

By maintaining his link to Palmerston and Russell's moderate and non-revolutionary liberalism, Gladstone enjoyed the support of the whigs. Although his vague agenda made a certain degree of disunity unavoidable, it also enabled the party to include a variety of opinions which acted at the same time as a powerful influence against disintegration. Indeed, the absence of party dogma and the lack of a clearcut leadership hierarchy, as under Lord Palmerston, combined with continued widespread dislike of Disraeli to provide Gladstone with a strong majority in the Commons. Gladstone further improved his popularity by extra-parliamentary addresses and by maintaining a strong relationship with the press.

Gladstone's whig-working class entente shows his sophisticated tailoring of the Liberal Party's message. He could embody the whig social ideal by keeping radical pressures and extra-parliamentary agitation in check and guiding those energies into constructive, but safe channels, while attending to working class hopes.
of social mobility. Gladstone's remarks on May 11, 1864, often referred to as his "Pale of the Constitution" Speech, show his willingness to make only limited adjustments to the franchise. In the speech, he qualified his famous appeal to bring more electors under the pale of the constitution by vowing not to, "recede from the protest I have previously made against sudden, or violent, or excessive, or intoxicating change."\textsuperscript{11} Gladstone could thereby merge progressive appeals on behalf of the working class with the moderation of the whigs.

The death of Lord Palmerston and the declining influence of Lord Russell were the first openings for Gladstone's emergence as leader of the Liberal Party. While the entire nation grieved the loss of a statesman whose, "heart always beat for the honour of England,"\textsuperscript{12} Palmerston's death marked the end of a clearcut course in domestic and foreign policy. The direction of Britain's foreign policy was unclear, but her diminished role and lack of allies in European affairs were evident, with Russia hostile, Prussia unfriendly, France estranged, and the United States angry.\textsuperscript{13} The passiveness and inactivity of British foreign policy since the Crimean War and specifically in the wake of the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis had left Britain only a secondary player with few options in the new Bismarckian order.

The diplomatic baton was passed to Gladstone and Disraeli, two leaders with uncertain capacity in the nuances of foreign policy. Each had his own distinct approach to foreign policy, but neither could reverse the loss in terms of British influence. Gladstone
viewed politics as the arena in which to discover God's intentions for the world, and foreign policy was the means of spreading God's intentions throughout Europe and the globe.\textsuperscript{14} His foreign policy stressed the principle of collective, peaceful intervention, by way of advice and recommendation.\textsuperscript{15} But such intervention had to be in accordance with the opinions of a nation's inhabitants.\textsuperscript{16} Unfortunately, Gladstone's utterances were inapplicable to the new rules governing diplomacy in Europe and Bismarck was convinced that so long as the liberalism of 'Professor' Gladstone was dominant, England's army would be weak and her diplomacy impotent.\textsuperscript{17}

On the other hand, Benjamin Disraeli's foreign policy commanded respect from Bismarck. In tune with the pursuit of national interest, Disraeli saw a dynamic foreign policy as a means to personal power and national glory. Because they mirrored his own approach, Bismarck respected Disraeli's opportunism and his conservative strain. Disraeli offered Britain a choice between "a comfortable England.... meeting in due course an inevitable fate and a great country -- an Imperial country....a land of liberty, of prosperity, of power, and of glory."\textsuperscript{18} Again, however, domestic turmoil and limited diplomatic options blunted the effect of Disraeli's eloquence.

That Gladstone and the statesmen of Britain failed to adjust their foreign policy to an altered Europe indicates the degree of Britain's isolation, their preoccupation with domestic events and their miscalculation of the motives and capacity of Bismarck. The Liberal Party became the domain of reform, free trade, and limited defense spending, but lost its claim to the foreign policy expertise
it had had in Palmerston's years of glory. The Prussian victory over Austria in June of 1866 strengthened the foundations of the Bismarckian order and further isolated Britain.

Gladstone's leadership of the Liberal Party was strengthened by his numerous extra-parliamentary speeches, and his memorable exchanges with Disraeli in the House of Commons. Gladstone carried the mantle of liberalism into the charged debates against the conservative leader and the battles brought out the best in his oratory and debating skills. There is also little doubt that facing his brilliant conservative opponent accelerated his evolution to support for parliamentary reform and Irish Church disestablishment.

Gladstonian ideology had embraced reform since the late 1850s, but only to the point of compromise. He sponsored the limited Russell Reform Bill of 1866, which sought only to delay a problem that was ripe for social agitation. Gladstone explained that he supported reform because, "in freedom, in the free discharge of political duties, there is an immense power both of discipline and of education for the people." But the 1866 bill was conservative in nature. First, only limited suffrage extension was granted so as not to undermine the mid-century order of State, Party, and politics. Secondly, Gladstone explained that the measure was adopted because it left the working class in a marked minority. Unfortunately, Russell and Gladstone had miscalculated and the half-hearted bill garnered support from neither side of the house. Thirdly, because it would be opposed by those M.P.'s who would be dropped from the Commons if it included
provisions for redistribution, the bill included only provisions for franchise reform. Gladstone explained that redistribution would be addressed later, but was "a matter of only secondary importance."²² Because of their aversion to redistribution, this was music to the whig ears. Ironically, it was the conservatives, not the liberals, who would soon reopen the redistribution issue.

Gladstone had miscalculated. General Grosvenor's amendment on April 19 called for full disclosure of the Ministry's intentions for the bill. He charged that the Government had introduced the bill, "like a thief in the night; it was masked; half its features were disguised, and yet they were surprised that the House did not fall in love with the object."²³ Robert Lowe, who later served in Gladstone's first Ministry, added that, "history may tell of other acts as signally disastrous, but none more wanton, none more disgraceful."²⁴ Even one of Gladstone's greatest speeches reduced little of the opposition in the Commons. He outlined the Government's commitment to parliamentary reform:²⁵

> You cannot fight against the future. Time is on our side. The great social forces which move onwards in their might and majesty, and which the tumult of our debates does not for a moment impede or disturb -- those great social forces are against you; they are marshalled on our side.

The Ministry could defeat the amendment by only five votes, an obvious defeat, and the Russell Government resigned on June 19.

Its successor, the Derby Ministry, was immediately met by two extra-parliamentary factors that combined to ripen the issue of reform: the financial crisis and the Reform League's Hyde Park agitation in the summer of 1867.²⁶ Gladstone feared that the
strife might worsen by involving forces that had not yet been drawn into the heat of political controversy. The minority status of the Conservative Party combined with the prospect of working class agitation to convince Disraeli that his party would benefit from a major reform initiative. He merely joined members on both sides of the house who viewed it safe to concede working class enfranchisement and dangerous to withhold it.\textsuperscript{27} Still, steadfast conservatives were fearful and Lord Derby observed that, "we are making a great experiment, and taking a leap in the dark."\textsuperscript{28} By initiating the 1867 Reform Bill, Disraeli sacrificed his pledges to place and his principles to power.\textsuperscript{29}

Gladstone stepped in to restructure the bill. It was apparent to him that Disraeli had intended to extend the franchise by one part of his plan, while neutralizing its extension by the other.\textsuperscript{30} Disraeli's accent was on "fancy franchises", rating, dual votes, and compound householders, all of which would only widen the privileges of the upper classes.\textsuperscript{31} Newfound pro-reform sentiment arose from the "Tea Room Revolt" of April 5, 1867,\textsuperscript{32} giving Gladstone more support to "make a good bill out of a bad bill."\textsuperscript{33} He condemned Disraeli's intentions by stirring up the Commons and the press with his progressive appeals and he forced Disraeli to admit that, "the government will never introduce household suffrage pure and simple."\textsuperscript{34} The summer's social strife had brought Gladstone around to the view that if reform should come, it should be broad and bold.\textsuperscript{35} He had learned from his failure of 1866.

Gladstone succeeded in restructuring the Derby Ministry's
major legislative initiative from the opposition front bench. With the aid of the Hodgkinson Amendment on May 17 he forced Disraeli to incorporate his eight progressive improvements into the bill.\textsuperscript{36} The bill's passage on July 15 strengthened the whig-working class entente. The whigs were loyal to Gladstone's calculated success and continued to be leery of Disraeli, while the working class owed its right to vote, its daily newspapers, and the low prices of its daily food staples to the leader of the Liberal Party. Gladstone had brought both groups into his party.

Meanwhile, during the heat of the reform crisis in 1866, tensions in Europe were growing. Britain's miscalculation of the Iron Chancellor further limited her foreign policy options and doomed her to isolation. Because his motives were seen as inconsistent and unorthodox, Bismarck posed an enigmatic figure. But British statesmen were not alone in failing to understand "whether Herr von Bismarck thought more than he said, or said more than he thought."\textsuperscript{37} Because he alone understood the new European order, the Iron Chancellor was the only statesman in Europe who could play the new game of diplomacy.

Austrian diplomacy was perhaps the easiest prey for Bismarckian policy in Phase II, and the Iron Chancellor needed none of the sophisticated tools for the Austrians which he required against the French. Bismarck first painted Austria into a diplomatic corner through bluffs and then swiftly capitalized on her weakness through force. His diplomacy led to the victory over Austria which demonstrated the capacity of Prussia's Minister, the strength of
Two events eased Bismarck's task. First, he tested the European powers at Gastein in August of 1865, by dictating one-sided terms for the division of Schleswig and Holstein. The relative silence of European diplomacy to the terms fortified Prussian demands and proved to Bismarck that "the statesman who fears has no chance against the statesman who dares." Secondly, the Iron Chancellor feigned acceptance of Napoleon's call for a conference on the German Question in May of 1865, knowing that Austrian pride would reject the offer and lead directly to conflict. Again, Bismarck understood that Austria's overconfidence would make her reject the opening which might have saved her from disaster. Because of her isolation, Britain could only watch. The Austrian rejection of the conference removed the only diplomatic obstacle for Prussia, and Bismarck sought only a cause for war.

To obtain just provocation, the Iron Chancellor relied on his familiar combination of bluff and intimidation. First, he argued that Austria, who had already mobilized and suspended her diplomatic ties to Prussia, was the aggressor by summoning the Estates of Holstein without Prussian consent. Sparked by Bismarck's condemnation over the technicality, Austria declared war on June 18. Within weeks, the victory at Sadowa demonstrated the prominence of Prussian iron, and Europe had seen no more crushing victory since Waterloo. Bismarck's defeat of Austria made Prussian hegemony in Germany a virtual fait accompli by June of 1866.

The resounding force of the Prussian victory clouds both
Bismarck's diplomatic achievements and the failure of European diplomacy. The vacuum in European politics had allowed Bismarck to threaten the status quo with provocative statements:  

"The great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and majority votes -- that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849 -- but through blood and iron."

He further boasted that Europe would soon have reason to know "how superior our guns are to the Austrian artillery." By combining duplicity with force, Bismarck secured his dominance of Europe.

In Bismarck's scheme, France had to be isolated next to remove the only remaining obstacle to Prussian policy. Three factors left France without an ally: the Polish Question led to the collapse of the Franco-Russian Entente, animosity continued in Anglo-French relations, and Franco-Austrian tension grew over Italy. Of these factors, the key was the Anglo-French antagonism, which had developed steadily since the French annexation of Nice and Savoy in 1859. The enmity was expressed in the arms race and in British fears of Napoleon's expansionism, and led to a failure of their foreign policies to cooperate even when objectives overlapped, as in the Polish Question and the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis. The Anglo-French rift limited the foreign policy of both countries and played into Bismarck's hands.

Three factors contributed to Bismarck's rise in Europe. First, as A.J.P. Taylor notes, by 1865, both Russia and Great Britain had virtually eliminated themselves from the European balance. The former had no interests in the west and clashed with Austria in
the Near East. Bismarck could thereby appeal to the Russian axiom: "Better a strong Prussia than a strong Austria." Britain's preoccupation with domestic affairs and diplomatic isolation weakened her statesmanship and her influence on the continent. Secondly, Austria was plagued by ethnic centrifugal forces and continued to lose influence within the German Confederation and in Europe. The chief interest of Austrian foreign policy was to maintain its hold on Venetia and its role in Germany and the Near East. Finally, Italy was newly-unified and growing, and had set its sights on Venetia to further its unification process.

Bismarck's manipulation of Napoleon allowed him to establish a leading role in European affairs for Prussia. He catered to Napoleon's expansionism, exploited his overextension in Italy, and capitalized on the growing Anglo-French antagonism. In each of these areas, few options were available for British statesmanship to reduce the costs in terms of British isolation and the cementing of the Bismarckian order in Europe.

Because he knew that Napoleon was susceptible to territorial bribes, Bismarck could act on the Duke of Wellington's adage that, "it is not possible to do anything great in the world without France." Had Britain and France been less antagonistic, Bismarck's offers of territory might have been less seductive to the Emperor. But in light of the cross-channel tensions, he could continue his scheme. First, Bismarck catered to Napoleon's territorial aspirations in the Rhineland and Luxemburg. Prussian policy was couched in terms that would appeal to Napoleon, on the
one hand holding out bait to French ambition; on the other, offering a compliment to French pride. Bismarck also made the tradeoff clear to Napoleon: France could compensate herself with annexations if she gave Prussia a free hand in Germany. Napoleon knew that his territorial extension depended upon cooperating with Prussia. He pledged that the true interest of France was not to obtain an increase of territory, but rather to help Germany in the most favorable way for her interests and those of Europe. By delivering French neutrality in the Austro-Prussian conflict, Napoleon played into Bismarck's hands.

The Luxemburg Crisis of the spring of 1867 seemed to realize British fears of their southern rival. But even the French threat to Luxemburg's sovereignty could not bring British statesmen out of their insular shell. The absence of allies forced Lord Stanley, the British Foreign Secretary, to pay only lip service to checking French ambition in Luxemburg:  

The guarantee now given is collective only. That is an important distinction. It means this, that in the event of a violation of neutrality all the Powers who have signed the treaty may be called upon for their collective action. No one of these Powers is liable to be called upon to act singly or separately. It is a case, so to speak, of 'limited liability'. We are bound by honour -- you cannot place a legal construction upon it -- to see in concert with others that these arrangements are maintained.

There is no indication that Gladstone or others in the Liberal Party expressed any more concern than did the Derby Ministry over Luxemburg. There is perhaps no better reflection of the degree of British detachment from the affairs of the European continent in this period than the Luxemburg Question.
Bismarck duped Napoleon into a pledge of neutrality in the
Austro-Prussian War without sacrificing a thing in return. He
urged the French to assert themselves by annexing Luxemburg:
"commit yourselves. Present Europe and the King of Prussia with a
fait accompli." Then, without skipping a beat, he cited the
German responsibility to protect the small state and withdrew his
support for French annexation, offering instead a promise of
territory in the Near East. His bluff had hurt French pride, and
Maustier complained in the autumn of 1867: "You offer us spinach
without salt, Luxembourg is the salt." With Napoleon bitter
and subject to Europe-wide condemnation, jealousy and suspicion
became the rule on the frontier of the Rhine.

The insurrection in Crete in the summer of 1866 was the next
piece in Bismarck's diplomatic puzzle. Until Crete, he had taken
the Near East for granted, but French support for the sanctity
of the Turkish Empire conflicted with both British and Russian
policy. Thus, Bismarck could further estrange the French from the
courts of Europe. The British were sympathetic to the people of
Crete and Gladstone warned the Turks that mistreatment of them
would disgrace the Turks in the eyes of Europe. The Czar
also supported the insurrection as a precedent for Pan-slavism in
the region. British and Russian condemnation of French policy in
the Turkish Empire allowed Bismarck to close the door on French
diplomacy.

Bismarck's scheme was then furthered by annexing three German
states following the Austro-Prussian War. The swift Prussian victory
forced Napoleon to accept Bismarck's terms which incorporated the 4.5 million people of Hanover, Hesse and Frankfort, into the German Confederation under Prussia, which removed another obstacle to German unification. Openly displaying his diplomatic isolation, Napoleon had to concede these states to Prussia.

Bismarck had earlier turned to Italy to manipulate the Italians, the French, and the Austrians. The Iron Chancellor later reflected on the importance of Italy to his scheme: "Si Italie n'existait pas, il faudrait l'inventer."\(^5\) By dangling Venetia as the spoils of Italian cooperation in the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck secured the secret Prusso-Italian Treaty of April 8, 1866. The promise of Venetia was enough to gain the Italian army against Austria, leaving Austria facing a dreaded two-front war.

Venetia was also a blind spot for French diplomacy. Her annexation was seen as another step towards crowning an Italian nation, which Napoleon had long advocated as a counterweight to Austrian strength in the region. Bismarck knew the risks Napoleon was prepared to take to obtain Venetia for Italy and encouraged his overextension there. French and Italian armies intent on Venetia would thus surround Austrian forces. Bismarck understood the motivation of each power, and allowed Austria and France to promote the war which led to the destruction of their traditional grandeur in Europe; and for both Venetia was the deciding factor.\(^5\) Bismarckian policy feasted on French over-extension, Italian aspirations, and Austria's vulnerability to a two-front war.

The Venetian Question was the lone opportunity in Phase II for
British diplomacy to step in to avert the coming conflict. After Austria had rejected Napoleon's call for a Congress over the growing Austro-Prussian tensions, she offered Venetia to Italy in return for Italian neutrality in Germany, and in order to avoid a two-front war. Strong, unambivalent British sponsorship of the offer, ideally with French blessings, might have convinced the Italians to accept. Without asking anything but a promise of Italian neutrality, the Austrians would surrender the territory that would bring the Italians into war. But the Russell Ministry was preoccupied with the issues of parliamentary reform and Fenian violence in Ireland and played no role in the negotiations.

Domestically, Gladstone had built a foundation for the Liberal Party. His sponsorship of Irish Church disestablishment unified the Liberal Party nationally and within the House of Commons. Until the outbreak of Fenian violence, however, he saw the problems of church, land and education in Ireland as related but out of all bearing on the practical politics of the day. As his concept of religious self-determination evolved by the late 1860s, he began to express sympathy for the Irish plight. He was committed to "wipe away the stains which the civilized world has for ages seen" in Britain's Irish policy. The Fenian violence helped ripen the Irish Church issue.

The violence moved the Commons to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus by an overwhelming majority in February of 1866. Despite John Stuart Mill's plea that the bill "was a cause for shame and humiliation to the country," most in Britain shared Gladstone's
view that the Fenians were "subversive to all that a civilized community ought to cherish and maintain." Many were sympathetic to the causes of the uprising, but fearful of its violence. The attempted prison break at Clerkenwell Prison in London on December 11, 1867, injuring 120 civilians, pushed Gladstone to act for his party, stating that for Ireland, "justice delayed is justice denied."62

Gladstone condemned the Anglican Church in Ireland, which included only one-eighth of the Irish population in its ranks. He saw Ireland as a disgrace and it was the Liberal Party's responsibility to bring her, "into the condition of being a great part of the glory of this Empire, instead of being, as hitherto, in respects neither few or small, our danger and our reproach."63 To Gladstone, the Irish Church had never demonstrated that it could fulfill any of the objects for which a religious Establishment is constituted.64 After carrying a majority of sixty on his resolution to disestablish on April 3, 1868, he was attacked by Disraeli, who saw disestablishment as depriving Her Majesty's subjects of their "precious privileges".65 Just before gaining a majority of sixty-five for his resolution on April 30, Gladstone replied that the Irish Church kept alive the principles of religious inequality and religious ascendancy.66 Despite the bill's rejection by the House of Lords on June 20, Gladstone's victory secured the resignation of the Disraeli Ministry and passage for the bill in the next session. Gladstone had stolen the show for his party.67

Gladstone's national popularity and the unity of the Liberal
Party were peaking by the end of 1868. He had won two major battles against Disraeli from the opposition front bench by mobilizing his support within the Liberal Party. His major legislative successes, the Irish Church Bill and the Reform Bill of 1867, could be added to his national popularity in the canvassing for the November elections. These victories and the relative stability within the Liberal Party led to a majority of 112 in the 1868 elections and, accordingly, Queen Victoria's request for Gladstone to form his first ministry on December 1 of that year.

Gladstone's rise to the leading role in British politics in Phase II does not absolve him of some blame for the loss of British influence in European affairs. That he and his colleagues could not adjust to a changing Europe is clear, but their failure to do so is due to their few diplomatic options. British diplomacy had simply been painted into a corner. By 1868 the new Bismarckian order dictated that Britain could play no active role in Europe.
ENDNOTES FOR PHASE II


5Ibid., p. 20.


7Ibid., 2: 238.

8Ibid., 2: 241.

9Jenkins, Gladstone, Whiggery and the Liberal Party, p. 18.

10Ibid., p. 7.


12Bell, Lord Palmerston, 2: 416.

13Walpole, The History of Twenty Five Years, 2: 206.


15Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 184, c. 131.


19Hansard, 3rd s., Vol. 182, c. 58.


21Walpole, The History of Twenty Five Years, 2: 149.
The failure of Overend, Gurney & Co., on Black Friday (May 11, 1866) launched a financial crisis that Gladstone saw as, "without parallel in the recollection of the oldest men of business in the City of London." Walpole, The History of Twenty Five Years, 2: 166.) The Reform League's agitation for parliamentary reform culminated in a huge demonstration that pillaged much of Hyde Park on July 2, 1866.

Disraeli sought lateral and not vertical extension of the franchise. His "fancy franchises" would allot votes for characteristics such as wealth, education and taxpaying; he supported giving the vote to only compound householders (owners of houses), while Gladstone would give it to occupiers as well; dual votes allowed electors to vote in two different constituencies; and rating meant that income tax rates determined who would vote. Each of these would further extend the interests of the upper classes.

Gladstone took the middle ground in the early spring of 1867 by agreeing for the rating of householders according to their income taxes, but the "Tea Room Revolt" saw 50 Liberal M.P.'s voice their willingness to take the more progressive step of supporting household suffrage. This sentiment was expressed in the Hodgkinson Amendment of May 17, 1867, which abolished compound householders and introduced household suffrage.

Gladstone's eight improvements to Disraeli's Bill were to: 1) introduce a franchise for lodgers; 2) remove the distinction between compound householders and other householders; 3) remove direct taxation franchise; 4) remove dual votes; 5) enlarge the distribution proposal; 6) reduce the county franchise; 7) end the optional use of voting papers; and 8) remove "fancy franchises".


42 Sontag, *Germany and England: Background in Conflict*, p. 76.


44 Palmerston had been obsessed with the French buildup in armaments, especially in ironclad ships. He argued incessantly against Gladstone for increasing the fortification of the southern coast.


46 Walpole, *The History of Twenty Five Years*, 2: 175.


54 Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 185, c. 444.


58 Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 190, c. 1770.


60 Walpole, *The History of Twenty Five Years*, 2: 143.

61 Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 181, c. 266.
63 Ibid., 3rd S., Vol. 191, c. 1667.
64 Ibid., 3rd S., Vol. 191, c. 1650.
65 Ibid., 3rd S., Vol. 191, c. 924.

67 The Irish Church Question was the focal point of Gladstone's ideological evolution. The question combined his notion of religious self-determination (for the people of Ireland) with his concept that the tools of government and progressive legislation rather than force could best solve problems. Also, by addressing the ripening Irish Question, Gladstone could corner a popular issue for the Liberal Party.
PHASE III: 1869 to 1874

William Gladstone's first Ministry faced a variety of crises in both the foreign and domestic spheres of policy. Swept into office at the outset of Phase III by the Liberal Party's overwhelming victory in the 1868 Elections, the Prime Minister was armed with a huge majority in the Commons, widespread popularity in the press and his own arsenal of oratorical skills, parliamentary talents and political stamina. Although each crisis in European affairs found the Ministry limited in diplomatic options, its foreign policy fared well against the challenges of the new Bismarckian European order. Domestically, however, the Ministry's flawed legislative programme and Gladstone's leadership problems loosened the hold of liberalism on British politics by 1874.

Gladstone faced one of the most tumultous periods in British politics in Phase III of this study in terms of party loyalty and stability. The Liberal Party's fragmented nature in this period can be gauged in two ways. In one measure of party loyalty, the voting patterns of seventeen liberal M.P.'s, referred to as the Adullamites, were analyzed in relation to Gladstone's votes for the fifteen years of this study. Of the twenty-five key votes studied, not one of the Adullamites matched Gladstone's positions on each vote, and as much as thirty percent of the group's votes strayed from his for the entire period. The voting patterns of the Adullamites show the limited loyalty that Gladstone could summon within the Commons even on key issues. A second measure of party fragmentation is performance in the four parliamentary
elections between 1859 and 1874. In these fifteen years, only thirty-one percent of British parliamentary seats were found to be stable in terms of party loyalty. The high turnover of parliamentary seats suggest domestic upheaval, party disorganization and the absence of consensus on even key issues.

It was in this volatile political environment that Gladstone accepted the Queen's request to form a government on December 11, 1868, with a characteristic sense of duty. His rise to the office of Prime Minister capped his life-long application of justice, peace, honour, duty, and piety to public service. Much of Britain shared his commitment to large-scale reform, with the liberal landslide of 1868 providing not only a majority of 112, but also a mandate for religious equality, educational opportunity, and the release of public services from aristocratic control. Fresh from the elections, and with a capable Cabinet intent on reform measures, Gladstone could realize Lord Palmerston's prophecy that, "whenever he gets my place we shall have strange doings."

Gladstone's foreign policy had remained a constant throughout his public life. His emphasis on morality in international relations was a break from traditional British foreign policy. But, because his notion of an ecumenical council of civilised opinion appealed neither to the whigs, who preferred the discreet bargains of the closet, nor to the Radicals, who saw in it the sinister implications of continental involvement, Gladstone lacked widespread support for his foreign policy. With Britain hopelessly mired in diplomatic isolation by 1870, Clarendon could state that "Europe now cares no
more about England than she does about Holland."8

Several external events tested the Ministry. Gladstone had to respond to the challenges of the Papal Infallibility Doctrine, the threat to Belgium and the Franco-Prussian War, all in 1870; the terms of the Prussian victory; the renewed Russian challenge in the Black Sea; and the Alabama Claims negotiations from 1870 to 1872. In each, Gladstone secured British interests within the context of his doctrine of international law, which can be seen as follows:9

The greatest triumph of our time, a triumph in a region loftier than that of electricity and steam, will be the enthronement of the idea of Public Right, as the governing idea of European policy; as the common and precious inheritance of all lands, but superior to the passing opinion of any.

In the foreign policy of his first Ministry, Gladstone was willing to use force on behalf of British interests when the need arose and options were present.

Gladstone's first Ministry is clearly divided into two distinct periods. Between 1869 and 1870 the Ministry successfully passed legislation like the Irish Church Bill of 1869 and the Irish Land Bill and the Education Bill of 1870. The Ministry's early popularity is reflected in its competitive stance in the 1869 and 1870 by-elections. Continuing its gains of the 1868 elections, the Liberal Party netted three seats in the by-elections of 1869 and lost only two seats in those of 1870.10 Even Gladstone, never one to be immodest, found his first year as Prime Minister to have passed with "circumstances of favour far beyond what I had dared to anticipate."11
Between 1871 and 1874, however, legislative embarrassments and intra-Cabinet quarrels overshadowed the previous triumphs of the Ministry. By March of 1873, Gladstone understood the depths to which his party had fallen, stating that "there is now no cause. No great public object on which the Liberal Party are agreed & combined." The falling popularity of the Liberal Party after 1870 is reflected in its disastrous performance in by-elections between 1871 and 1874. In these four years, the Conservative Party averaged a net gain of five seats per year, including a peak of eight seats in 1873. The conservative resurgence and the whig and Irish desertion of the Liberal Party led to the fall of the Ministry.

Because Gladstone miscalculated the political impact of his legislative agenda, his first Ministry fell from grace in five short years. Hence, we reach the paradox of Gladstone's first Ministry. On one hand, his legislation, avoiding the appearance of social upheaval and violence, was conservative in tone and alienated radicals and nonconformists by seeming half-hearted. On the other hand, by undertaking difficult reform legislation and failing to heed fears that he leaned towards the further radical steps of English disestablishment, home-rule and secular education, he alienated whig-liberals. By attempting an ambitious legislative agenda, Gladstone abandoned the formula he used in Phase I and Phase II to create the whig-working class entente for the Liberal Party: vagueness and lack of party dogma. The precariousness of the Liberal coalition caught up with Gladstone.

Gladstone's first words upon his promotion to the office of
Prime Minister, that his "mission is to pacify Ireland," provided the Ministry's focus for the next five years. He then began his legislative assault on the Irish problem. Gladstone's approaches to the Irish Upas Tree -- Church, Land, and Education -- were novel, but his solutions were thoroughly conservative. His object was to stabilize Ireland, not to restructure it for the future. For Gladstone, the Irish Question was one problem to be solved for Britain to regain its leading role in Europe.

The Prime Minister had personal reasons as well as political considerations for advocating Irish Church Disestablishment in 1869. Personally, he opposed concurrent endowment because denominational funding conflicted with his notion of religious self-determination. His Irish Church Bill ended funding for the Church, but was by no means an assault on Anglicanism, whose creeds, orders, and mission would continue entirely unimpaired. His political motivation for Irish Church Disestablishment was its use as a unifying measure for the Liberal Party. He campaigned on the issue in the fall of 1868, and later boasted correctly that the elections had turned mainly on the subject of the Irish Church. With a mandate for the bill bestowed by the 1868 elections, Gladstone could steer the bill through the Commons free from disabling amendments.

While Gladstone sought only to punish harsh landlords, and not to develop a new structure for tenant rights, whig-liberals and many in Ireland opposed the principle of the Irish Land Bill. The whigs saw the bill as a dangerous precedent for British landlord-
tenant relations, while radicals felt that Gladstone's bill should have gone farther. The bill reverted to the conservative custom of Ulster tenant right in granting compensation for disturbances and ignored the issues of security of tenure and protection against raised rent for tenants. Gladstone outlined the objectives of the bill:

Every line of the measure has been studied with the keenest desire that it shall import as little as possible of the shock or violent alteration into any single arrangement now existing between landlord and tenant in Ireland.... Its operations, we believe, will be quiet and gradual.

Despite the bill's conservative nature, Gladstone failed to alleviate whig fears that their livelihoods were under siege.

In a letter to his whig Foreign Secretary Clarendon, Gladstone expressed his commitment to the land bill: "to this all the early part of the next Session is dedicated or doomed." The novelty of the approach and the commitment of the Government created an impression among whig-liberals that Gladstone rested the fate of his Ministry on overhauling the social order. That the bill passed by the overwhelming majority of 442 to 11 is perhaps more due to the party's popularity in 1870 than to widespread support for the bill's provisions.

Meanwhile, the Liberal Party faced a growing Home Rule movement in Ireland after the summer of 1870 which would mean disaster for its legislation and its following there. The staggering growth of the Home Rule Party hurt the Liberal Party far more than the Conservative Party. For example, of the sixty-four Irish parliamentary seats that began the 1869 session in Liberal Party hands, sixty-seven percent moved to the Home Rule Party in elections by 1874. Conversely, only fifteen percent of Irish seats switched from the
Conservative Party to the Home Rulers in the same period.\textsuperscript{24} The growth of the Home Rule Party dealt a huge blow to the Liberal Party's following in Ireland.

The Education Bill of 1870 further compromised the Ministry's support within the Liberal Party. The bill sought to offer adequate elementary education throughout Britain, and Gladstone emphasized that a school had been placed within the reach of every child.\textsuperscript{25} Yet, because of Gladstone's personal commitment to denominationalism and local funding, the bill became, in Forster's view, "the most conservative proposal which might satisfy liberal opinion."\textsuperscript{26} Gladstone's version failed to provide the progressive solutions of a country-wide school board, a national education system, and compulsory attendance. Again, Gladstone miscalculated the impact of his legislation. By injecting his religious fervor into the bill, Gladstone compromised both whig and nonconformist support. Both groups were more advanced in their view of the role of religion in education. The whigs attacked with the Cowper-Temple Amendment, which banned the use of formularies in public schools and radicals were driven towards the alternative of secular education.

The first foreign challenge of the period came in the events leading up to the Franco-Prussian War, which disrupted both the Ministry's support and the peace of Europe. Gladstone had little respect for either side in the conflict, finding Napoleon and Bismarck "nearly on a par,"\textsuperscript{27} but he and his Cabinet saw France as a "demon of ambition and aggression."\textsuperscript{28} His suspicions seemed confirmed by Bismarck's publication of the 1867 Benedetti Treaty in
the Times on July 25, 1870, which outlined Napoleon's eastward designs. Anglo-French enmity continued to play a key role in Bismarck's diplomatic scheme.

Gladstone had few diplomatic options. Alienated from France, distrusting Bismarck, removed from the Prussian-minded Czar, and with Austria again beset by inter-cultural conflict, he saw no prospect for joint intervention. At home, the consensus for neutrality meant that the Prime Minister must maintain "intact the character and fame of England while this unhappy war shall continue." Because of his antipathy to both sides and his lack of diplomatic options, Gladstone made Britain's only role in the conflict that of a spectator.

An opportunity for active British foreign policy to prevent or at least delay the conflict presented itself early in the summer of 1870. Napoleon had been secretly negotiating with Austria and Italy to form an alliance against Prussia. In fact, Sir Spencer Walpole maintains that if the battles of Wissembourg and Reichshofen had been postponed for eight days, the alliance would have been secured. British support for the alliance might have lessened anti-Prussian feeling in France and avoided war. But, British distrust of Napoleon, the uncertainty that Italy and Austria would subject their armies to a war bearing no fruit for their interests, the secrecy of the negotiations, and the rapid course of events doomed the alliance and led to war.

The next external challenge to the Ministry came in 1870 not from Prussia or France, but from the Vatican. The Doctrine of
Papal Infallibility threatened the Government both at home and abroad. Domestically, it drew Gladstone's ire because it "cast in doubt the civic allegiance of all Roman Catholic populations," thereby severing a link that Gladstone had spent years building. He also feared that the Papal decree would lead to an outbreak of Fenian violence in Ireland. Most importantly, the decree conflicted with his religious outlook, which saw the political influence of the Church as a threat to individual liberty.

Having always harbored resentment to the Pope's political rule in Rome, Gladstone condemned the decree. He observed that only threats would be noted by a Pope whose "whole policy is based on the rejection of reason." Because the carrot would no longer work with the Vatican, the Prime Minister hoped to use Napoleon's forces as the stick. With the Emperor overextended in Italy, Gladstone had an opportunity to threaten Pius IX with Italian invasion by urging the withdrawal of French troops from Rome. To Gladstone, withdrawal of the troops was the only policy "which the Pope & his myrmidons care about." But, the Anglo-French antagonism limited Gladstone's options in responding to the Papal Decree.

Although his diplomacy was respectable, Gladstone's policy towards the Papacy alienated whigs both within and outside the Cabinet. His ministers, led by Clarendon, overruled Gladstone's hopes of expressing Britain's strong opposition to the decree. Then, Argyll and other whigs, in light of the threat posed by the Paris Commune, sought coercive legislation to put down the Fenian
violence and challenged Gladstone's release of the remaining Fenian prisoners. Gladstone's response to the Papal decree failed both at home and abroad. 36

The threat to Belgian sovereignty was the next external threat to the Ministry. Gladstone held to the terms of the Treaty of 1839, stating that a French or German threat to Belgian neutrality would bring Britain to the "very edge of war." 37 In one of his greatest foreign policy initiatives, Gladstone concluded a treaty guaranteeing Belgian safety. The treaty stipulated that if one side violated Belgian neutrality, then Britain would join the other for her defense, but without entering the large-scale conflict. 38

Gladstone's swift and resolute action on behalf of Belgium was popular in Britain. He had authored a major treaty while risking little chance of engaging Britain in armed conflict. If the treaty failed to guarantee Belgian neutrality, Gladstone showed signs of his willingness to intervene militarily. On July 16, 1870, he asked Cardwell to submit a report on the possibility of sending 20,000 men to Antwerp to further protect Belgium. 39 Gladstone thereby proved his willingness to involve his country in continental affairs when the sanctity of a treaty was compromised or a fundamental British interest was at stake.

The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War posed the greatest threat to the Ministry's foreign policy. But Gladstone and the Cabinet acted in a restrained manner due to British diplomatic isolation and the demands of an ambitious legislative agenda. That the Gladstone Ministry managed to protect Britain's interests and
avoid entangling her in the conflict is a testament to its sound diplomacy. Bismarck's foreign policy was never better than in the days leading up to the Franco-Prussian War. In just a few weeks, the Iron Chancellor reduced France from the first place among European nations to fifth or even sixth place. By manipulating French fears one moment and French pride the next, Bismarck forced the ill-prepared Napoleon into the tragic undertaking. It was a conflict that even Marshall Niel, the French Minister of War, claimed no part in, declaring that he would rather be cut in pieces than advise the Emperor to enter a European war without allies.

Napoleon's mishandling of the Spanish Throne Crisis in the spring of 1870 allowed Bismarck to set his trap. The fatal mistake on the French part was the Duc de Gramont's ex post facto demand for a Prussian guarantee that no Hohenzollern would ever sit on the Spanish Throne. The mistake altered European opinion, which until then had rested with France, but, as a result of the unnecessary demand, was transferred to Prussia. The Spanish Question gave Bismarck the edge he needed against the French.

Preoccupied with the Irish Land and Education Bills, the Ministry failed to note the sharpened Franco-Prussian tensions. Gladstone outlined the Government's insulation from the crisis:

\[\text{\ldots the Government have exercised, and will exercise, all the legitimate and friendly influence they may be supposed to possess\ldots for the purpose of preventing an event so calamitous and so deplorable as that a great European conflagration and bloodshed should arise.}\]

Had his Cabinet been less strained domestically, Gladstone might have made a stronger offer to use the British good offices to
mediate. But, because of the rapid course of events and the deep-seated hostility on both sides, there is no indication that such an overture would have been accepted in either Berlin or Paris.

Bismarck struck while French forces were unprepared. His alteration of the Ems Telegram moved the overconfident Napoleon to declare war. The French, disorganized militarily, were soon awestruck by the Prussian war machine, which had longed for a chance to measure itself against France. Once mobilized, the strength of the Prussian military forces overmatched the French. Gladstone conveyed his miscalculation of the consequences of German unification, when he stated that it was "not a matter on which other countries are entitled to take any hostile cognisance." His diplomacy was hamstrung by his limited options, but it risked no British interests or British forces on his uncertain understanding of the new Bismarckian order.

While a consensus existed in Britain regarding neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War, the debate over the British role in the postwar negotiations was more divisive. The peace talks represent the crowning of Bismarck's Europe and the final defeat of Gladstone's notion of international cooperation. By the autumn of 1870, force had replaced negotiation in European diplomacy and all of Europe breathed a harsher air. At home, disagreement within the Cabinet over Britain's role in the peace talks limited Gladstone to only watch as Germany dictated severe peace terms.

Because he knew that they would have wide implications for Europe, Gladstone hoped for Britain to play an active role in the
talks. He was unopposed to flexibility of boundaries, but required legitimization of their change.47 He had three concerns about Prussia's demands. First, he argued that because the legitimate defense of Germany did not necessitate its domination of Alsace-Lorraine, the region should be neutralized. Secondly, in a letter to John Bright he condemned the German argument that victory entitled her to territory:48

My opinion certainly is that the transfer of territory and inhabitants by mere force calls for the reprobation of Europe, & that Europe is entitled to utter it, & can utter it with good effect.

Finally, Gladstone objected to German designs on Alsace-Lorraine without considering the rights of its people. He held that the inhabitants of the region should not be handed over to Germany against their will.49

Two factors limited Gladstone's policy. First, although it agreed with the general terms of Gladstone's argument, the Cabinet was hesitant to involve Britain in the negotiations. A more confident Prime Minister might have brought the Cabinet to his side, but Gladstone was preoccupied with domestic affairs, understood the limited diplomatic options available, was never an expert on foreign matters, and was a shaky leader of his Ministry. He therefore failed to win his Cabinet's favor for an activist policy. Led by the whigs Granville and Hatherley, the Cabinet took the view that it would intervene only if British interests were at stake. Granville wrote of his battle with Gladstone over the peace talks:50

Quite exhausted....after the longest fight I ever had against Gladstone. The losses were great; the killed and wounded innumerable; but I remained in possession of the field and the Cabinet. He wanted to declare our
views on the conditions of peace; I was against doing so.

Gladstone experienced the greatest foreign policy defeat of his first Ministry at the hands of his own Cabinet. Secondly, British condemnation of the peace terms was muzzled by her isolation from European affairs. Gladstone's high-principled assault was ignored in Berlin without the combined force of the European powers. His words had no power to moderate the policy of blood and iron. 51

During the heat of the Alsace-Lorraine Question, another challenge to European peace and British diplomacy appeared in the form of the Gortchakoff Circular. Gladstone's support for a conference to settle the dispute over the Russian renouncement of the 1856 Treaty of Paris was unpopular domestically and highlighted Britain's diplomatic isolation. At home, the Ministry had to weather Disraeli's attacks on the risks of the London Conference. Disraeli assailed the Ministry's support for the London Conference as contradictory and inconsistent. 52

In diplomatic terms, however, the Cabinet's policy toward the Russian Black Sea demands of 1870 should be applauded on three levels. First, Granville's treaty revision in 1870 endangered no British interests because the agreement afforded Turkey as much leeway as it did Russia. 53 Secondly, because of the relative disinterest among the other powers of Europe for the Russian action, the Ministry had little chance of maintaining the Treaty of Paris as it stood. 54 For example, the French sent a representative only for the official signing of the new treaty. Finally, and most importantly, Gladstone turned the tables on the initial Russian challenge by bringing the
dispute under the collective consideration of the European powers, thereby setting a precedent for the future. The precedent was in Granville's conclusion that an essential principle of the law of nations was "that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty." By 1871, the Gladstone Ministry had lost the support of the whigs. The Irish Land and Education Bills of 1870, the growth of Fenian violence, the Russian Black Sea challenge, and intra-Cabinet tensions over the Papal decree and the fate of Alsace-Lorraine combined to weaken the Ministry. Whigs from both within and outside the Cabinet deserted Gladstone over these issues. The whig George Grey challenged the Prime Minister to make a firm stand against the extreme sections of the party or "some of our institutions will be in great danger." Another whig, Earl Fortescue, reacted against the pull of nonconformity and the creation of the Home-Rule Association in Ireland in the spring of 1870 by vowing that "constitutional whigs are not going to be dragged into the abyss of wild democracy merely to keep out the Tories." By the time of Disraeli's Crystal Palace Speech in June of 1872, which sought to win disaffected whigs to the conservative side, it was clear that Britain was experiencing a conservative resurgence. The conservative backlash was accelerated by the Ministry's further legislation, its financial bumbling, the Alabama negotiations and the failure of the Irish University Bill in 1873.

The Army Regulations Bill of 1871 and the Civil Service Act of 1870 reflect the reasons for the fall of Gladstone's first
Ministry. The Prime Minister hoped to replace the corruption of Army promotion purchases and Civil Service patronage with merit-based systems. But both bills were taken by the Court and the landed classes as an assault on their way of life and helped to accelerate their steady drift away from the Liberal Party. Gladstone saw his attackers as representing the failure of the landed class to justify its existence in the modern world. The bills drove the whig Knatchbull-Hugessen to express his growing distrust of Gladstone's "leaning to the extreme party."60

The issues of local taxation and the role of trade unions further estranged both the whigs and the radicals from the Liberal Party. The debate over local taxation was in full swing during the 1872 session, with the Lopes measure defeating the Ministry by a hundred votes. The Trade Union and Criminal Law Amendment Acts of 1871 caused further alarm among whigs because they seemed to lead to domestic upheaval. In practice, however, radicals were put off by the conservative interpretations of the laws, which led to violence and condemnation of the Government. Gladstone was largely unsympathetic to the union causes, but saw the political gains in granting moderate concessions. Again, Gladstone's policy angered all and pleased none. To whigs and industrialists, the Ministry appeared to be taking the side of strikes and social disturbance, while, to the radicals, it appeared to be sanctioning repression.

The Alabama Claims Question occupied three years and severely tested the Prime Minister's energy and political tact. Gladstone's
patience resulted in perhaps his greatest foreign policy achievement: establishing the use of arbitration as a means of settling international disputes. At home, however, the length of the negotiations and costs of the settlement created the impression that the Ministry was weak.

Gladstone publicly denounced American intentions in the Alabama dispute. He maintained the position from the outset that he would make no admission "that reparation is due from us to America in the matter of the Alabama." He made light of the American claims, arguing that Britain could make similar remonstrances against the United States for its role in causing the Lancashire Famine and in North American Fenianism. He would under no circumstances allow the Cabinet to stray from its, "sacred and paramount duty" to its country in the negotiations. He would not budge from his view that the matter should go before arbitration and that American indirect claims should be dropped. His patience allowed both to be achieved in the final settlement in June of 1872.

The significance of the Alabama Question lies in Gladstone's commitment to arbitration as an effective tribunal for international disputes. The Prime Minister saw the impact of the Alabama Question in the scope of its bearing on the subject of arbitration and "upon the future interests of the world." He risked British prestige on an experiment in the application of justice and morality to international disputes and emerged with a victory for his diplomacy.

Domestically, Disraeli's harsh attacks marred Gladstone's victory. Following the arbitrator's decision that Britain owed
$15.5 million to the United States, the conservative leader could emphasize the Government's feebleness in the negotiations: It does appear to me that if we get into a Serbonian bog of diplomacy upon this matter the consequences may be enormous and fatal. It is one of those questions which ought not be allowed to drag its own slow length along.

The time eaten by the negotiations and the cost of the settlement blemished the diplomatic precedent set by Gladstone's policy.

A great leader possesses the political agility to adjust both his agenda and personal approach to the political exigencies of the day. Because Gladstone would not adjust his legislative agenda, he lost the support of the whigs on one hand by appearing to drift towards the radical sector, and the radicals on the other by offering seemingly half-hearted solutions to societal problems. Instead of anticipating a conservative resurgence by 1870 as a reaction to the reforms of 1867, Gladstone clung to his agenda and never publicly emphasized the concessions that his legislative offered each group in the Liberal Party.

Gladstone's shaky leadership of the Ministry also contributed to divisions within the party and accelerated the fall of the Government. His overbearing and moralizing manner was more suited to a cabinet position than for the office of Prime Minister. He lacked interest in gossip and in the small change of politics and "intimidated colleagues and subordinates from keeping him in touch with those small details which signal danger to the acute political eye." Gladstone was an enigmatic figure to his Cabinet and was an inconsistent and under-confident leader.
His uncertain leadership in the questions of the budgets and the Estimates crippled the Ministry. First, finding Lowe at the Exchequer an ineffective ally against the spending departments, he lost his party's monopoly on the issue of government thrift.\textsuperscript{72} Lowe's 1871 Budget had to be withdrawn by Gladstone and became a major embarrassment to the Ministry. Similarly, the Cabinet lost popularity by battling over the Estimates. The French loss to Prussia in 1870 removed the only threat to British coastal defenses and, to Gladstone, all legitimate demands for increased defense spending. Nonetheless, projections for the Army Estimates rose by over eighteen percent between the budgets of 1870-71 and 1872-73.\textsuperscript{73} That Gladstone could not maintain his trademark "retrenchment" is a testament to his weak leadership of the Cabinet.

Facing a conservative resurgence and with a divisive legislative agenda, the defeat of the Irish University Bill in 1873 sealed the fate of the Government. Although solving the University Question in Ireland was a progressive aim, the bill drafted by Gladstone and Thring, the legislative counsel, was conservative. From the start, Gladstone had private reservations about the bill because of the fragmentation of the Liberal Party. He saw "no more doubtful point in the composition & tendencies of the Liberal Party than its disposition to extremes in the matter of unsectarianism."\textsuperscript{74} Nonetheless, Gladstone saw the issue as a unifier for his party and announced that the bill was vital to the existence of the Government.\textsuperscript{75}

The provisions of the University Bill were "characteristically neat and Burkean",\textsuperscript{76} but still failed to gain support within the
Liberal Party. It was defeated for three reasons: the desertion of Irish M.P.'s, largely due to the rise of the Home Rule Party, the conservative resurgence -- Glyn (Chief Whip) had reported on July 6, 1872, that the Liberal majority had dwindled from 112 to 86 --77 and the whig assumption that the bill set a dangerous precedent for British higher education.

The whigs fled from the University Bill for two reasons. First, the Gladstone Ministry seemed to be threatening a fundamental axiom of British society: the bond between education and the Church of England. Secondly, with the Government obviously in peril due to its diminishing majority, the conservative resurgence was apparent to the whigs. The handwriting was on the wall following the Ministry's defeat on the Irish University Bill in the spring of 1873. Disraeli understood the depths to which the Liberal Party had fallen and brilliantly rejected office so that it could expose its own vulnerabilities. By the autumn of 1873, Gladstone had little hope for his party and found himself the leader of a demoralized government with little hope of remaining in power.

Gladstone's first Ministry poses several paradoxes. While Phase III of this period marks the beginning of a new era of domestic reform, it also saw the precariousness of the Liberal Party and the growth of pluralism defeat a capable and reform-minded Ministry. Stronger and more flexible leadership and a less rigid legislative agenda from a Prime Minister already enjoying tremendous popularity, an overwhelming majority in the Commons, and an electoral mandate for reform might have secured the hold of
liberalism on Great Britain. Yet, while Gladstone and his Ministry failed the test of the 1874 Elections, the reforms of his first Ministry and the benefits of the liberal experiment have passed the test of time.

Similarly, although Gladstone was preoccupied with domestic struggles and, because of Britain's isolation, had few options in the international arena, the foreign policy record of his first Ministry is respectable. Gladstone's foreign policy in Phase III regained little of Britain's past glory and position in Europe, but it sacrificed nothing in the face of new external challenges. The legacy of Gladstone's foreign policy is his reliance on justice, treaty obligations and international cooperation as the guiding principles in diplomacy. Indeed, Gladstone's solutions to the Black Sea Question and the Alabama dispute set precedents for future interaction between nations, just as the Prime Minister's principles and commitment to his beloved nation set precedents for future statesmen.
ENDNOTES FOR PHASE III

1 These liberal M.P.'s were said by John Bright to have been in the "cave of Adullam", because they voted against some form of the 1866 Reform Bill. The Adullamites were chosen as a measure of the cohesiveness of the Liberal Party because they were active members of the Commons and, with 5 whigs, 5 country landowners, 3 liberals, and 4 nonconformists, they represent an excellent cross-section of the Liberal Party.

2 No trend was found that links the timing of the loss in Liberal Party popularity with an increase in voting divergence among the Adullamites. They voted in their self-interest and had little loyalty to their party on most issues. Also, the 30% of votes that differed from Gladstone's is actually higher when one considers the high number of abstentions.

3 To qualify as a stable parliamentary seat, a seat had to both be unchanged in each of the four elections between 1859 and 1874 and remain under the auspices of one party throughout.


5 Ibid., 8: 348.


12 Ibid., 7: 88, Intro.

13 Before 1870, neither party netted more than five seats in any one year's by-elections and neither party gained anything close to momentum. After 1870, however, the Conservative Party dominated by-elections: it gained 2 seats in 1870, 5 seats in 1871, 9 seats in 1872, and 7 seats in 1873.

15 Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 351.

16 Ibid., p. 57.

17 At St. Helens on August 5, 1868, Gladstone spoke of his embarrassment over the Irish Question; stating that, "the conduct of England towards Ireland is disapproved by the civilized world at large." *The Times*, (London), August 6, 1868.


28 Ibid., 7: 28.

29 *The Times*, (London), July 25, 1870.

30 Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 203, c. 1313.


33 On April 16, 1870, Gladstone wrote to Archbishop Manning of his fears of: "the ulterior consequences likely to follow from the interference of the Pope and Council in the affairs of the civil sphere." Matthew, ed., *The Gladstone Diaries*, 7: 277.


35 Ibid.
Ironically, despite Gladstone's longtime antipathy to the Papacy and his recent outcry against the Papal decree, many whigs continued to see Gladstone as pro-Catholic because of his release of the convicted Fenians.


Ibid., 2: 459.

Ibid., 2: 490.

Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 203, c. 33.


Ibid., 7: 374.

Ibid., 7: 357.


Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 204, c. 839.

The Treaty of London ended in a compromise agreement, with Turkey regaining control of the Black Sea straits and Russia gaining freedom from limits on the number of her ships that were allowed in the Black Sea.


Parry, *Democracy and Religion*, p. 323.

Ibid., p. 324.
The notion of local taxation superceding central taxation stirred up support among the middle class, but conflicted with Gladstone's sense of efficiency and government thrift. To Gladstone, it would place too much power in the hands of local authority and dangerously reduce government coffers.

Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 210, c. 1331.


Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 209, c. 73.

Parry, Democracy and Religion, p. 352.

Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 209, c. 73.


Ibid., 7: 73, Intro.

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CONCLUSION

This study has sought to determine whether Gladstone's statesmanship is to blame for Britain's loss of influence in European affairs. The interpretation suggested here through the discussion of the events between 1859 and 1874, is that Britain was already diplomatically isolated by the end of Phase I and had few diplomatic options in Phase II and Phase III. Thus, with his hands tied diplomatically by the new Bismarckian order, Gladstone had no chance of regaining Britain's lost influence when he assumed the office of Prime Minister from 1869 to 1874.

In Phase I, 1859 to 1874, Gladstone's financial policy met the challenges of pluralism and unified the Liberal Party under his leadership. But, the tone was set for Britain's isolation from the continent for the next fifteen years. Bismarck's new European order was assured by the sharpening of the Anglo-French tensions after Napoleon's annexation of Nice and Savoy in 1860. The Polish Question of 1862 was proof of the cross-channel enmity, allowing Bismarck's aggression in Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 to doom Britain's foreign policy to a secondary role in European affairs.

In Phase II, 1865 to 1868, Britain was severely tested by the movement for parliamentary reform. Again, Gladstone showed that his domestic policy was up to the challenge by authoring the 1867 Reform Bill which unified the Liberal Party. The preoccupations of reform gave both the Russell and Derby Ministries no time for diplomatic challenges that mattered little to the European order because events had already painted Britain into a diplomatic corner.
by Palmerston's death in 1865. Because of Britain's isolation, her statesmen had little room to maneuver and few diplomatic options. Gladstone and his colleagues could only watch as Bismarck further consolidated his rule of Europe by trouncing Austria in the summer of 1866. By the 1868 Elections, which bestowed a tremendous majority of 112 on the Liberal Party, Britain was without diplomatic options.

Phase III, 1869 to 1874, provided Gladstone and liberalism with their first test at the helm of British policy. Gladstone and his first Ministry overlooked the precarious coalition that was the British Liberal Party and attempted a divisive legislative agenda. By antagonizing each segment of the liberal coalition by a part of the agenda, and thereby dividing the whig-working class entente, Gladstone allowed domestic embarrassments to overshadow his relatively successful foreign policy. In so doing, he lost widespread support for his party despite his diplomatic prowess in protecting Belgian sovereignty, organizing the Black Sea Conference, and establishing the precedent for arbitration in the Alabama Claims Question. Although his domestic policy faltered during his first Ministry, his diplomacy was respectable in light of his options.

Gladstone's legacy for this period is his patronage of the liberal movement in Britain and his infusion of morality into the art of politics. For the benefit of the Liberal Party, Gladstone merged his Burkean liberalism with the movement and transformed British domestic policy from the disinterest of Palmerston's era to his reform-minded legislation that was ahead of its time. His legislative achievements are numerous, including the 1860 Budget,
the Cobden Treaty, the Paper Duties Repeal, the 1867 Reform Bill, the Irish Church Bill, the Irish Land Bill, the Education Bill, and the Army Reform Bill. Up to 1870, his legislative record was outstanding and his efforts unified the Liberal Party by offering something to each component group in the coalition. Without Gladstone's patronage, the liberal movement in Britain would have faltered.

No British statesman, before or since, had such high standards for himself or his nation. Gladstone's eclectic religious outlook and uncompromising moral principles were injected into his foreign policy and his legislation. But, his ethical approach to foreign policy was reduced by the new Bismarckian order which, by isolating Britain, gave her few options in responding to continental events.

Gladstone's leadership was far from perfect, but one cannot point to his statesmanship as the cause of the loss of British influence in continental affairs in the new Bismarckian order. He inherited a Britain beset by two confounding problems and could solve only the most important challenge, the domestic. On one hand, the rise of liberalism threatened to overturn domestic order and confronted his moderate ideology. He responded by adjusting his ideology and hedging his progressive evolution to sponsor the Liberal Party through financial policy and legislative initiatives while avoiding domestic upheaval. On the other hand, the Bismarckian order established by the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis of 1864 left Britain without an ally and without a role in Europe.

By the time Gladstone assumed the responsibility of foreign policy in 1869, British options were further reduced and Bismarck
was well on his way to European hegemony. In light of British diplomatic options, the foreign policy of Gladstone's first Ministry was respectable and did not further isolate Britain. The damage to British influence had been done under Palmerston, and Gladstone simply could not make up the difference. As a result, in the age of nationalism, Britain would maintain its isolation for the next fifteen years at the hands of the Iron Chancellor and the Liberal Party was demoted to minority status.

Between 1859 and 1874, Gladstone faced one of the most tumultuous periods in British History. Despite unprecedented challenges in both foreign and domestic affairs, Gladstone's statesmanship set a new level of achievement for British leaders and established liberalism as a force in European affairs. His statesmanship in this period proves that morality can be successfully pursued in the art of politics.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography has been divided into four sub-topics:

I. PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES
II. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
III. WORKS OF REFERENCE
IV. SECONDARY LITERATURE

I. PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES

Gladstone outlines his views on the peace talks after the Franco-Prussian War, criticizing the Prussians for demanding that France cede Alsace-Lorraine.

(Gladstone, William E.), "War in Italy", Quarterly Review. Vol. 105, No. 211, March 3, 1859.
As the anonymous author, Gladstone argues that British foreign policy should tread lightly in Italy. He condemns the Austrians for their ruthlessness there, the French for their expansionism, and the Pope for his despotic rule of the Papal states.


II. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

The Times, (London), July 25, 1870, April 6, 1867, October 9, 1862.

III. WORKS OF REFERENCE


Bateman offers valuable background information on many of the most powerful men in Britain. The information was used in this study in the examination of the Adullamites and their voting patterns.

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III. WORKS OF REFERENCE (cont.)

The work furnished valuable reference information for the study of the Adullamites

The work served as a valuable reference for the studies of party strength in elections and by-elections, the rise of the Home-Rule Party, and party loyalty.

IV. SECONDARY LITERATURE

Bell discusses the second half of Lord Palmerston's political career. His criticizes Palmerston for his diplomatic failures at the hands of Bismarck.

Bernstein argues that Gladstone's emergence as leader of the British Liberal Party was the crucial development for the party, allowing it to overcome domestic constraints.

Fitzmaurice discusses Granville's political career, with his examination of the relations between Granville and Gladstone from 1869 to 1874 allowing insight into Cabinet-level discussions on the formation of foreign policy.

Harrison discusses the domestic impact in Britain caused by the Civil War. He sees the partisanship of British society with either side in the U.S. as a veil for social and political antagonisms in Britain.

Harvie views the interplay between foreign affairs and domestic forces promoting cohesion in Britain on domestic reform. He sees the Italian Question and the American Civil War providing external impetus for domestic liberal consensus.
Jenkins examines Gladstone's oversight of the Liberal Party in the 1860s. He finds Gladstone an opportunist and deems him a poor leader who merely rode the currents of public opinion.

Kennedy analyzes the growth of the antagonism and points to the erosion of liberalism and the rise of nationalism as exacerbators of Anglo-German tensions. He is critical of Gladstone's statesmanship.

Knaplund applauds Gladstone's pursuit of morality in his first Ministry's foreign policy, emphasizing his successes in the Alabama Claims negotiations and the Black Sea Conference. He does, however, concede that Gladstone lacked an understanding of the nuances of diplomacy.

Magnus examines the political career of Gladstone.

Matthew's interpretation of Gladstone's political career, which sees him as a statesman intent on pursuing justice in all walks of life, was a foundation for this study. Although keenly aware of Gladstone's limits as a statesman (his ideology, his religious thought, and the moral tests of his policy), Matthew sees Gladstone as a great figure in British History.

McGill discusses the composition of both the Liberal Party and the Tory Party in Victorian England. His examination of the liberal coalition was particularly useful to this study.

A friend of Gladstone, Morley discusses Gladstone's political career with the benefit of his close relationship. His interpretation is an excellent complement to Gladstone's diaries.
IV. SECONDARY LITERATURE (cont.)

Parry discusses Gladstone's leadership of the Liberal Party paying particular attention to its precarious composition. He sees Gladstone's eclectic religious beliefs as the chief reason for the whig desertion from his legislative agenda after 1870.

Pelling discusses the views of British liberals towards the United States. He views the Union's victory as an accelerator of British liberalism.

Seton-Watson discusses the impact of the Near East Question between 1874 and 1880 on British domestic politics. His work provides a useful context for the aftermath of this study.

Sontag sees the growth of Anglo-German tensions as due largely to the failure of Gladstone's statesmanship, which allowed Disraeli's calls for British nationalism and xenophobia to become forces after 1874.

Southgate examines Palmerston's political career and finds him an opportunist who maximized British interests. He sees Palmerston as a sponsor of liberalism only when it served British interests.

Taylor examines the rise of Bismarck to dominance in European diplomacy. He is particularly critical of Napoleon III, whose diplomatic failures he sees as a leading reason for Bismarck's ascent in Europe.

Trevelyan discusses the tumultuous 1860s in terms of British
IV. SECONDARY LITERATURE (cont.)

Vincent examines the growth of the Liberal Party from a disorganized coalition to a bona fide national party. He emphasizes Gladstone's role as the connector of the party.

A contemporary of Gladstone's, Walpole gives an insider's interpretation of British foreign and domestic policy in the period.