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DeGaulle, the European: 1961-1966

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Introduction

One man against Europe — it is a sufficient paradox that such a thing is still possible in the democratic age in the West. But at the same time there is hope in this fact. For what will be the stronger in the long run: the stubborn will of one man whose Fifth Republic will not outlive him or the historic forces and necessities of our century?


But time passes, history is slowly being made. And I don't doubt that one day it will see in DeGaulle a man who, in the end, by his refusals and the delays he imposes, will have served Europe better than those persons whose loud motions and declarations we read about these days — and which will sink into oblivion.


As the above two quotes show, opinions on the European policy of France during the presidency of Charles DeGaulle have tended to polarize between portraying DeGaulle as either a narrow nationalist or as the one European with a realistic plan for unity. Simply put, this polarization comes from what amounts to two fundamentally different views on how Europe should unite; whether around a supranational authority which would make the institution of the nation-state obsolete or around a confederation of independent states, each of which would preserve its own identity and sovereignty.

Among experts, the former scheme has generally had the most proponents. The supranational approach has been seen as the only way for Europe to overcome the centuries of division and bloodshed that has resulted from its organization around the nation-states. Authorities who take this view generally see DeGaulle as a living relic from a outmoded past, who by defending the nation-state merely prolonged its life by artificial means. When DeGaulle and his followers left the scene, they would argue, Europe would be able to resume
its "proper" path, that leading to complete integration through the supranational approach.

Yet DeGaulle has now been dead for nearly ten years, and it is difficult to argue that Europe is any more supranationally united than when he left office in 1969. Naturally this must raise questions as to the inevitability of the supranational approach. Given the fact that this approach has not proceeded in the fashion that many of its proponents thought was certain to occur, perhaps it is time to take a look at the other vision of Europe, re-evaluating it in the light of what has happened, or what has failed to happen, in the years since DeGaulle's departure.

This is the purpose of this thesis: to study the ways in which DeGaulle can be thought of as a European, rather than merely a French nationalist, and to examine his vision of Europe. The period selected for investigation extends from the European summit conference of February 1961, to the resolution of the agricultural crisis in May of 1966. Chapter I examines the ideological foundations behind this vision of Europe, discussing DeGaulle's political attitude, and his views of the State, the failings of supranationalism, and Europe's relationship to the superpowers. Chapter II will show what happened when DeGaulle tried to enact his vision of Europe with the Fouchet Plan. Chapter III examines DeGaulle's attempt to enact the Fouchet Plan avec deux with West Germany, with the Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963. In Chapter IV we will see how DeGaulle's opposition to the British application to the EEC is consistent with his vision of Europe and why he considered it impossible for Britain to join Europe at that time. The final Chapter shows what happened when the Gaullist and supranationalist visions of Europe finally collided in the Agricultural Crisis of 1965, and what the implications of this collision were for Europe's future.
Charles DeGaulle's dramatic return to power in May, 1958 signaled the return to the European stage of the most colorful, yet in a curious way most enigmatic French leader of the twentieth century. Embracing an outlook rather loosely defined as 'Gaullism', DeGaulle promised to renew French grandeur, both internally and externally, and restore France's commitment to, in his words, "an exalted and exceptional destiny." Beyond these ambitious though somewhat nebulous goals, the content of the Gaullist political outlook has generally defied precise description. In fact, authorities of no less stature than Stanley and Inge Hoffmann have concluded that Gaullism is ideologically empty:

Gaullism is a stance, not a doctrine, an attitude, not a coherent set of dogmas; a style without substance—beyond the service of France and French grandeur, itself never defined in content, only in context.

One undoubtedly cannot construct as comprehensive a political theory as one could for say, Hobbes or Marx. Still, as a guide to interpreting DeGaulle's European policy, the essence of Gaullism can be described from a few sets of key concepts. One such set is the particular Gaullist attitude, its values and its style, which the Hoffmanns believe define the term of Gaullism. Others include: the Gaullist view of the state, in particular why the state can never be violated and why the state is the only effective organization in achieving European unity, the contrasting conceptual and practical failings of supranationalism, and the need for an independent 'European' Europe, free from the grand designs of either super power.

I. The Gaullist Attitude

Naturally, the Gaullist attitude is inextricably linked to the personality of General DeGaulle. Much has been written on DeGaulle's personality (perhaps too much, at the expense of obscuring the issues at hand), and this personality certainly seemed to pervade every major decision of the French government during his presidency. Several of DeGaulle's ideals and values, as well as the particular style that resulted from them, merit particular attention here as a way of explaining the reasons behind
his unique and often misunderstood vision of Europe.³

Throughout his career DeGaulle went to great lengths to promote the mystique of the leader. DeGaulle's conception of the leader, like many of his ideals, had both a theoretical and a practical basis. This conception owes a great debt to the philosopher Henri Bergson, whom DeGaulle knew personally and quoted a number of times in his writings.⁴ Bergson believed in an organically changing world, resulting in a perpetual state of flux in which all must struggle to survive through adaptation. As a device of adaptation, the intellect by definition can be only partly successful. For Bergson, the intellect understands by artificially removing and conceptualizing parts of the organic whole, like a camera photographing a moving object. He writes: "Of the discontinuous alone does the intellect form a clear idea."⁵ Since these mental snapshots are insufficient in dealing with Bergsonian reality, they must be supplemented by the use of instinct. Rather than a mechanical and artificial device like the intellect, instinct "is molded on the very form of life... [and] proceeds, so to speak, organically."⁶

The use of instinct allows a particular type of vision which supplements the often narrow conclusions of the intellect. The possession of this vision and the ability to use it effectively is sine qua non to the leader. He (or she) must be a special kind of dreamer, able to form grand views of history and of the future, aware that he (or she) must often be able to see further than contemporaries, and be willing to accept the consequences. In DeGaulle's thinking, this type of vision could immediately recognize the moral bankruptcy of the Vichy regime, and thus justify what was legally treason. Likewise, only a visionary leader could ensure the survival of his (or her) followers, recognizing, in the case of France "that only vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of disintegration inherent in her people; that our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, as they are, must aim high and hold itself straight, on pain of mortal danger."⁷ Ultimately only this type of vision could unify Europe, overcoming both the destructive elements of nationalism and the grand illusions of supranationalism.⁸

This necessity of standing apart from one's contemporaries, of standing by one's vision alone if necessary in hopes of eventual vindication, is essential to the Gaullist concept of leadership. Certainly it pervaded
DeGaulle's own career. André Malraux observed that: "On several occasions, he had played France against the majority of Frenchmen. He derived a bitter and secret pride from this. Did he hope posterity would understand?" Correspondingly, to his own mind, he would at various times play Europe against the majority of Europeans, again hoping that history would prove him right. DeGaulle would play a role in his historical vindication with regard to both France and to Europe by writing the epic Mémoires de guerre and the unfinished Les Mémoires d'espoir. Mainly though, time itself would render the final verdict, exonerating the leader and his (or her) vision.

A corollary to this Gaullist-Bergsonian vision is a certain aloofness, an introverted detachment which his critics found especially infuriating. Jean Lacouture has written that DeGaulle "often gives the impression of conducting a guerilla warfare for a cause whose true significance only he understands." The leader must cultivate rather than oppose this sense of aloofness. In 1932, DeGaulle wrote in Le Fil de l'épée:

In the designs, the demeanor, and the mental operations of a leader there must always be a "something" which others cannot altogether fathom, which puzzles them, stirs them, and rivets their attention.

Through detaching himself from the narrower interests of those around him, the leader can ensure the correctness of his (or her) vision through introspection and contemplation.

If one can define the nature of DeGaulle's vision for France and to an extent for Europe in a single word, that word would be grandeur. With what was probably a calculated degree of overstatement, grandeur expressed one of the dominant themes of DeGaulle's career after 1940: the need for the French to regain a positive belief in themselves and in France. Particularly for those of us who have grown up in the postwar era, it is important not to underestimate how acutely the defeat of 1940 haunted France for years after the war. The collapse of a supposedly unbeatable army, the extent of collaboration, and the shame of independence with the Vichy regime left France demoralized and ashamed, despite the more honorable role of the resistance. DeGaulle sought to restore France's self-esteem, further eroded by postwar economic problems and the ordeal of decolonization, through expressing grandeur, that essential core of French greatness and
genius that remained constant despite all the catastrophes that France had faced.

Grandeur enabled DeGaulle to claim in 1940 that France had lost only a battle, not a war. He could echo a past which would in turn inspire the future. Malraux writes: "He did not attach much weight to the fact that Napoleon left a mutilated France; in his view, the Emperor had proved to Frenchmen that France existed." Grandeur, despite the archaic and perhaps pompous implications of the term, enabled the French to acknowledge their own strengths. This apparent pretension of DeGaulle's had a firm basis in what he considered the reality of France's situation. While grandeur was in part a masquerade, it held meaning for most Frenchmen; it provided a kind of ideological anchor, a basis for belief, as the French faced the postwar world. DeGaulle had a high appreciation for the importance of belief in any nation. Malraux writes:

The General knew (it is not enough to say he felt passionately) that the agony of France came not from the lack of reason for believing in her..., but from her inability to believe in anything. He had said to me once: Even if Communism lets the Russians believe in Russia for nonsensical reasons, that belief is irreplacable.

Though grandeur was primarily a French phenomenon, the same basic premises applied to the Gaullist idea of Europe as well. Like France, Europe had to reawaken an awareness of its own strengths, of the greatness of European civilization. The only obstacles to Europe's being more than, in Willy Brandt's often-quoted words, 'an economic giant, but a political dwarf', were the fears and inhibitions of the Europeans themselves. Europe, by relying on its own genius, could regain the historical prominence it deserved. Unfortunately, this European vision was often too closely connected to French grandeur, and DeGaulle rarely did as much as he might have to dispel such connections.

A final aspect of the Gaullist attitude that bears description here involves the actual practice of grandeur, or DeGaulle's political tactics. Probably no single factor contributed so much to the controversy surrounding DeGaulle during his lifetime, or is so well remembered when we consider his presidency today, DeGaulle's interesting pragmatic basis, will provide useful insights into interpreting DeGaulle's handling of specific issues later on.
What will be called DeGaulle's 'grand manner' involved many different types of theatrics: his characteristically blunt way of stating his position on very delicate issues, his slow, deliberate, seemingly condescending way of speaking, and his habit of sitting at a raised desk during press conferences, accentuating his already considerable height. DeGaulle's sense of theatrics, which in its own way rivaled that of any leader in this century, served useful political purposes far beyond those of personal arrogance. A national policy of grandeur had to be expressed in a grand manner. Theatrics could reinforce the confidence building aspects of grandeur. Richard Mayne observes that DeGaulle's "greatest gift was to use the grand manner to conceal his lack of resources." Theatrics had certainly helped compensate for DeGaulle's weaknesses during the war, through his numerous BBC speeches and his dramatic quarrels with Churchill and Roosevelt. During his presidency of the Fifth Republic, DeGaulle was a no less effective performer, both at home and abroad, through key speeches, elaborate state visits, and what Lois Pattison de Ménil has called the waging of "war by press conference." Through such performances, DeGaulle could personify a confident and determined France, sure of her own destiny, as well as that of the continent. Generally speaking however, DeGaulle knew the limits of the grand manner, and was not taken in by the megalomania with which he is so often attributed. DeGaulle once whimsically remarked to Malraux:

Actually, you know, my only international rival is Tin-Tin. [the French comic book character] We are the little ones who refuse to get taken in by the big ones. No one sees this, because of my height.17

Lending credibility to the grand manner was DeGaulle's willingness to take risks in the face of considerable odds. One might even say that the whole history of DeGaulle's career can be written around the taking of various risks, from his decision to set up the Free French as a fairly obscure general with no legal authority, to risking the referendum which ended in his resignation in April, 1969. Taking risks was always sanctioned as a corollary to the Gaullist picture of the leader, whose vision would always be vindicated in the long run. Eventually, the risks would be seen as having been worth it. Given the guarantee of history, DeGaulle could make risk the cornerstone of his political strategy. He said to Malraux:
The integration of many efforts into one, the determination to double the stakes, the passion for risk — all that is the essence of strategy. 18

DeGaulle's vision of Europe naturally involved taking many risks, most of which resulted from his own intransigence. This intransigence would lead him to alienate practically every major European leader by the end of our period. DeGaulle the European carried most of the character traits of DeGaulle the Frenchman. He would sacrifice or narrow opportunities of the present in hopes of getting his own way in the end. Each of the next four chapters contains examples of this: the revisions of the Fouchet plan, the decision to proceed with the Franco-German Treaty at the expense of the other four members of the European Community, the failure of Britain's application to enter the Common Market, and the Agricultural crisis of 1965. In each example DeGaulle believed he was serving the best interests of Europe, not just the best interests of France, by not yielding to his partners. According to his own reasoning, he kept Europe from pursuing an unrealistic dream which would have collapsed on its own anyway, and which would have decreased European influence in the world. By taking such a stubborn and inflexible stand in the present, DeGaulle hoped to lay the foundation for a realistically united Europe in the future.

II. DeGaulle and the State

The institutional expression of DeGaulle's political outlook is the nation-state. Simply put, DeGaulle considered the nation-state, despite all the cataclysms it was believed to have caused, the only effective means of organizing the people of the modern world. His ideas of the state are perhaps less notorious for their uniqueness than for the fact that he defended them so vociferously. The attributes of a state can be summarized easily in DeGaulle's own words. In a press conference in 1953, he stated that to be viable and effective, any state must have a:

... political, economic, financial, administrative, and above all, moral entity sufficiently living, established and recognized to obtain the consequential loyalty of its subjects, to have a political policy of its own, and, if it should happen, that millions of men should be willing to die for it. 19
De Gaulle expressed the need for each of these attributes consistently throughout his career. Only a strong and assertive state could have forged a policy capable of dealing with postwar economic problems, like the policy of 'vérité et sévérité' that DeGaulle implemented soon after taking office, which enabled France to participate in the EEC tariff cuts of 1959. DeGaulle believed that such a state had to derive its authority from the people at large through referendums and direct elections, rather than from political parties, whose narrow interests it must supersede. The State must take final responsibility for defending the nation's interests both at home and abroad through independent policies. By protecting the nation's interests, the State can command the people's loyalty, which in turn insures its own legitimacy. Only with this symbiotic relationship between the government and the governed can the nation-state face the extraordinary challenges of the modern world.

The Third Republic, the Vichy regime, and the Fourth Republic amply demonstrated for France the consequences of lacking an effective state. The first two chapters of the Mémoires de guerre, significantly titled "The Slope" and "The Fall", describe the horror DeGaulle felt at the disintegration of the Third Republic, and the extent to which that disintegration haunted him for the rest of his career. DeGaulle describes the government's failure to make a firm decision to continue resistance abroad:

At the time when they were faced by the problem on which, for France, all the present and all the future depended, Parliament did not sit, the Government showed itself incapable of adopting as a body a decisive solution, and the President of the Republic abstained from raising his voice, even within the Cabinet, to express the supreme interest of the country. In reality this annihilation of the State was at the bottom of the national tragedy. By the light of the thunderbolt the regime was revealed, its ghastly infirmity, as having no proportion and no relation to the defense, honor and independence of the Republic.

The Third Republic, plagued with perpetual fragile coalitions, was unable to act in the nation's interests, even to save itself. Vichy constituted a cruel parody of the French state, abjectly cowering to the will of the foreign invader and acting as an umbrella for the collaborationist traitors. Probably the cruelest parody of all was the ruin of Marshal Pétain, whose
last years as the administrator of France's subjugation obscured the services he had rendered earlier. DeGaulle writes: "Old age is a shipwreck. That we might be spared nothing, the old age of Marshal Pétain was to identify itself with the shipwreck of France." The Fourth Republic, created when DeGaulle's ideas for a new constitution were rejected, merely recapitulated the infirmities of the Third. DeGaulle never forgot what he considered this resurrection of particularism, with the politicians asserting their vanity at the expense of the State. He told Malraux:

When I saw the politicians gathered together again for the first time, I felt at once, no mistaking it, their hostility to everyone. They did not believe in the slightest that I was a dictator, but they understood I represented the State. That was just as bad: The State is the devil, and if it exists, then they do not.

When DeGaulle finally got the opportunity to write his own constitution with the Fifth Republic, he took full advantage of the lessons of the past. His reforms aimed at giving the State, organized around the President, a power independent of the parties. The President, after 1962 elected by universal suffrage rather than by a College of Notables, could dissolve Parliament under certain circumstances, yet could appoint a new government if Parliament returned a vote of censure rather than necessarily hold new elections. Article 16 allowed the President to suspend the Constitution in a national emergency. DeGaulle sought a further popular base of support through his frequent use of the national referendum. A central premise of the Fifth Republic constitution was the protection of the State. Only a state capable of the derisive interests that undermined the Third and Fourth Republics could hope to keep France a nation. France's experience between 1918 and 1958 proved just how deep and destructive her divisions could be. Events during his own presidency seemed to prove his point no less clearly, particularly during the trauma of extracting France from Algeria, which culminated in the generals' plot of 1961, and the riots of 1968, in which France seemed in mortal danger from both the Right and from the Left.

For France then, the continued existence of the nation-state was absolutely essential. In the present study we will see that few European
statesmen disagreed, despite much polemic to contrary. DeGaulle simply stated the necessity of the nation-state directly, often even bluntly, while other statesmen either obscured or avoided the issue. For DeGaulle, nationalism could be disarmed and removed from its most extreme ramifications; it could not be eliminated. Trying to do so in the existing world merely distorted reality.

Of course, DeGaulle could hardly ignore the interdependence of states which characterized the postwar world. Beneath the pomposity and the pretensions, DeGaulle understood the diminished role of France and Europe on the world stage, and that France acting alone could probably never again play as big a role in world affairs as she had before the Second World War. Still, if France and Europe could no longer rule the world they could rule themselves and have final say in their own destinies. In a world dominated by huge geopolitical blocs, Europe could regain the influence it deserved through unification. The logical conjunction of the need for the nation-state and the need for European unity was DeGaulle's notion of Europe des États, a united Europe of the States. No theme runs more clearly throughout DeGaulle's career after World War II than the need for a united Europe, but one united on what he would call realistic terms. In February, 1953, six months after the European Coal and Steel Community raised the spectre of supranationalism over Europe, DeGaulle said in a speech:

Instead of an intolerable and unworkable fusion, let us practice association. We have already lost several years following chimeras. Let us begin by making an alliance of the free states of Europe.24

Understanding DeGaulle's stubborn and uncompromising attachment to what he believed was simply political reality is important to understanding his defense of the nation-state. The reasons behind the formation of the Fifth Republic are of course unique to France, but a tale leading to the same conclusion could be told for each of the other countries of Europe as well. Each people's political loyalty is invested in their respective State, and only these States have the authority to act in their behalf. DeGaulle stated in a press conference in September, 1960:
The States are, in truth very different from one another, each of which has its own history, its own language, its misfortunes, glories and ambitions; but these States are the only entities that have the right to order and the authority to act. 28

Since only the States had the authority to unite Europe, Europe would either be united around the States or not at all. With his characteristic willingness to take risks, DeGaulle risked the building of no Europe at all rather than one built on what he considered were groundless dreams. A more precise picture of what DeGaulle actually meant by a *Europe des États* will be provided in the next chapter, which concerns the Fouchet Plan. Next we turn to examining more closely why Europe could only be built around States with discussing the Gaullist view of supranationalism.

III. Supranationalism: Its Conceptual and Practical Failings

To most observers, particularly Americans, the concept of European unification means one thing: the gradual dissolution of the various nation-states, and their replacement by some sort of federal authority acting in the interest of all. This is the essence of supranationalism. Around the European experience grew a veritable garden of integration models, some of whose scope and complexity must have sorely taxed even the imaginations of political scientists. Though the means often varied widely, the ends were always the same: the creation of a new super-state, the United States of Europe, through the surrender of authority by the individual nations. The United States of America was often taken as a model, where a federal authority had wholly integrated the various smaller entities, resulting in the creation of a political, economic, and military superpower.

Supranational theories carried enormous prestige in the years following the war for several reasons. Perhaps the most compelling was the desire to bury that institution which had apparently torn Europe apart for centuries; the nation-state. World War II had shown more graphically than previously imaginable what nationalism carried to its extremes could do. It was widely held that repetitions which would ultimately destroy European civilization were inevitable without an external system of control. Apparently if the nation-states were left to themselves, they would never
be able to avoid annihilating each other. Almost everyone, including such diehard nationalists as DeGaulle and Churchill, advocated some form of European unity, as a way to reassert European influence in the bipolar world. In addition, unification was seen as the best way to deal with the alleged threat from the Soviet Union, with Stalin thus playing the rather curious role of European federator.

Apart from producing an endless array of models, suggestions, and devices for arousing a 'European consciousness', the supranationalist or federalist movement proceeded mainly through the creation of 'European' institutions. Following the advice of their ideological leader and mentor Jean Monnet, federalists took a so-called 'functional' approach to European integration, in which the various sectors of 'Europe' would gradually be placed under supranational authority. The hoped for result would be a 'spill-over' effect, in which the un-integrated sectors would fall into line like dominoes, the result being a supranationally integrated Europe. Edward Koldziej observes:

For the federalists, Europe was already a reality and only the modalities and timing of its implementation were at issue—essentially technical questions. ...For them the development of Community institutions was tantamount to European union. 26

Up to DeGaulle's reappearance in 1958, the functional approach had been attempted in four main areas. In July, 1952, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed an agreement that would place their coal and steel industries under the authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). As well as constituting a first step toward supranational European unity, the ECSC served, at least in the minds of its foremost proponents, to make impossible any future war between France and Germany by putting these basic war industries under the control of a supranational organization. Also in 1952, a plan was proposed to create a European Defense Community (EDC), which would contain integrated units under a single authority tied to NATO. After two years of parliamentary battles the French Assembly voted down the EDC Treaty, with the Gaullists and the Communists for once ending up on the same side in opposition. In March, 1957, treaties were signed creating the European
Economic Community (EEC or Common Market) and Euratom. The Common Market has been the primary achievement of the supranationalist movement in Europe to date. While its first concerns involved the removal of trade barriers among its members, its ultimate goal was European economic unity, which would in turn act as a springboard for further assaults on the nation-state. As a concomitant to the EEC agreements or, as it was generally called, the Rome Treaty, the Euratom Treaty provided for cooperation in peaceful atomic development, as well as a sharing of technology and resources. It hardly need be added that the technical difficulties of each venture were immense, so much so that when DeGaulle returned to power in 1958, the Common Market remained a largely untried organization; nearly all of the most controversial decisions remained to be made.

DeGaulle was determined from the outset to see that these decisions were made in accordance with French interests. He wrote in Les Mémoires d'espoir:

...our negotiators in 1957, caught up in the dream of a supranational Europe and anxious at any price to settle for something approaching it, had not felt it their duty to insist that a French interest, no matter how crucial, should receive satisfaction at the outset. It would, therefore, be necessary either to obtain it en route, or to liquidate the Common Market.²⁷

The differences between DeGaulle and the supranationalists can be stated fairly simply and concern fundamentally different assumptions. Most fundamentally, DeGaulle argued that no nation can or should be expected to surrender its vital interests to an authority rising above the states. The popular will of each nation is invested in its state and can be invested nowhere else without direct popular approval. One of DeGaulle's most persistent complaints with the supranational approach as it had been undertaken to date was the lack of a popular mandate, beyond promises in the Rome Treaty of a popularly elected European Parliament. DeGaulle regularly proposed a European referendum as a necessary prerequisite for meaningful steps toward unity. Without authority, which can come only through direct popular expression or an indirect expression through the States, supranational organizations are merely technical devices, of little value.
in confronting the most serious problems that Europe faced. In 1960, DeGaulle said of the existing communities:

> These organs have their technical value, but they do not have, they cannot have authority and consequently, political effectiveness. As long as nothing serious happens, they function without much difficulty, but as soon as a tragic situation appears, a major problem to be solved, it can then be seen that on another "High Authority" or another has no authority over the various national categories and that only the States have it.\(^28\)

For DeGaulle, 'Europe' had to be much greater than the arithmetic sum of the various 'European' institutions. A Europe built without a popular mandate by technocrats who could hardly possess the special vision of the leader could only mean a Europe without real political authority or influence in the world. On the contrary, European unity based on an imaginary type of authority would serve to continue Europe's subordinate role on the world stage — Europe would have to remain a political dwarf. As a consequence, American hegemony over the continent would continue.

Equally dangerous to the aesthetically minded DeGaulle was the possible debasement of European culture. Like DeGaulle's view of the necessity of the State, this was a projection of his view of the nature of France. To DeGaulle, France was an almost mystical entity, unique and irreplaceable. He wrote in the first sentences of the *Mémoires de guerre*:

> All my life I have thought of France in a certain way. This is inspired by sentiment as much as by reason. The emotional side of me tends to imagine France, like the princess in the fairy stories or the Madonna in the frescoes, as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny.\(^4\)

The culture of France belonged at once to France and to Europe, as part of a larger European tradition. The unique identity of each other country was no less precious, both to that country and to the fabric of European culture. DeGaulle believed that if supranational theories were carried to their logical conclusion, all distinctions between nationalities would eventually disappear, with the resulting creation of supposedly a 'European'
nationality. DeGaulle professed confusion as to just what the supranationalists wanted, whether an objective harmonization of interests, or to:

...achieve the total fusion of their respective economies and policies in a single entity with its own government, parliament and laws, ruling in every respect its French, German, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and Luxembourg subjects, who would become fellow citizens of an artificial motherland, the brainchild of the technocrats?30

DeGaulle, as Calleo observes, made an illuminating distinction between l'Etat, the State, and la patrie, the nation.31 Whereas the State involves the exercise of, in Calleo's words, "responsible power and authority"32 The nation involves the spirit of the Marseillaise, an emotional loyalty to a national culture. States could be joined through a synchronization of interests and objectives. To attempt to integrate nations, however, would not only deny the unique cultural contribution of each country, but would paradoxically deny the European tradition as well. DeGaulle stated in a press conference in May, 1962:

Dante, Goethe, Chateaubriand belong to all Europe to the very extent that they were respectively and eminently Italian, German and French. They would not have served Europe very well if they had been stateless, or if they had thought and written in some kind of integrated Esperanto or Volapük.33

As irritating for DeGaulle as anything was his impression that the existing supranational institutions had been built at a proportionally greater cost to France than to any of her partners. In DeGaulle's words, the ECSC, while effectively ending French claims to reparations from the Saar: "had been inaugurated under an agreement which, without offering us the means of restoring our devastated mines, exempted the Germans from having to provide us with fuel deliveries and gave the Italians the wherewithal to equip themselves with a large-scale iron and steel industry."34 He also alleged that while France had maintained an Atomic Energy Commissariat for fifteen years, Euratom countries without nuclear programs were now in a position to buy American rather than European equipment with common funds.35 Most important, the Rome Treaty had practically ignored provisions
for an agricultural common market, concentrating on relatively simpler issues involving industry and trade regulation. As DeGaulle put it: "The industrial provisions were as precise and as explicit as those concerning agriculture were vague."36 DeGaulle believed that in creating each of the existing communities French negotiators had subjugated their country's vital interests to supranational dream.37 As we noted earlier, DeGaulle intended either to restore the balance of interests expressed in the European communities or to have France leave them entirely.

We see then, that DeGaulle and the supranationalists had fundamentally opposed visions of a unified Europe. While DeGaulle advocated a Europe based on cooperation between sovereign states, the supranationalist favored the gradual abolition of the individual states, and their replacement by a European federal government. Each considered the other's basic assumptions both unrealistic and counterproductive. Yet as fellow players on the European stage both working toward unity, the Gaullists and the supranationalists had to interact throughout our period. The question became whether any kind of modus vivendi could be reached between the two visions of Europe, and what form such a compromise might take.

IV. Europe and the Superpowers

Along with the preservation of the nation-state, the other sine qua non of DeGaulle's vision of European unity was the necessity of a Europe independent of either superpower, particularly the United States. For DeGaulle, Europe had to regain its independence to maintain its identity in the bipolar world. Europe could be herself by taking responsibility for her own destiny, and with this independence could regain the prominence in world affairs she deserved. Again, this is an extension of DeGaulle's idea of the best course for France, the notion that Europe, like France, could renew herself through a well planned assertion of her own resources and genius.

The heart of the problem, of course, was the Europe created by the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the Europe agreed to by the two superpowers left standing at the end of World War II. As relations between the two superpowers soured, Europe divided along Churchill's Iron Curtain, each
half clinging to the superpower that had liberated it from the Germans. These countries became essentially client states of either the United States of the Soviet Union, dependent on one of the superpowers both militarily and economically.

DeGaulle fought American hegemony in the West even as it was developing at the end of the war, deeply resenting France's exclusion from both the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. He suspected, probably with some justification, that the Americans did not intend Europe to play a large role in postwar world affairs, and expected Europe to accept without complaints a world based on American peace goals. DeGaulle's quarrels with Roosevelt were legendary and started with Roosevelt's attempt to install the politically pliable General Giraud rather than DeGaulle as leader of the French provisional government. DeGaulle describes Roosevelt's vision of the peace and his discomfort at French obstinacy:

"...from the moment America entered the war, Roosevelt meant the peace to be an American peace, convinced that he must be the one to dictate its structure, that the states which had been overrun should be subject to his judgement, and that France in particular should recognize him as its savior and arbiter. Therefore the fact that France was reviving in the heat of battle, not in terms of a fragmentary and hence convenient resistance but as a sovereign and independent nation, thwarted his intentions."

DeGaulle saw NATO as an institutionalization of American hegemony, an agent of subjugation which helped perpetuate the dangers it was created to eliminate. While maintaining the guise of a supranational organization, which in itself could hardly have pleased Gaullists, NATO subjugated European forces under American control. Americans also exercised exclusive control over the devices likely to determine Europe's fate in the event of a war, nuclear weapons. As a result, European security was essentially the captive of American foreign policy. The Berlin crisis of 1961, in which the United States and Britain appeared ready to negotiate Berlin's status, and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, in which the United States went to the brink of nuclear war without serious consultation with its European allies, seemed to bear out DeGaulle's thesis. Though he never rejected the principle of the Atlantic Alliance, DeGaulle insisted that
France would never be subject to what he considered America's military hegemony. Taking advantage of the fact that the original NATO treaty expired in 1969, DeGaulle phased out French participation throughout the 1960's. Having been unable to assure French equality within the NATO structure, DeGaulle chose to develop a separate defense policy.39

Scarceley more acceptable to DeGaulle were the proliferation of schemes in the United States advocating a 'Grand Design', creating an 'Atlantic Community.' Simply put, such grand designs intended to extend the role of NATO-like institutions to economic and political areas.40 Probably the most popular articulation of these ideas during our period was Joseph Kraft's The Grand Design: from Common Market to Atlantic Partnership, which as Lois Pattison de Ménill writes "graced every Washington coffee-table by mid-1962."41 Kraft's book epitomizes what DeGaulle considered the curious combination of grandiose views and narrow interests that characterized American attitudes toward Europe during the 1960's. While only vaguely defined, the Grand Design was rather immodestly described as a magic elixir for the ills of the 'free' world. Kraft writes:

It is a new principle of association in a period of disassociation, a force for positive unity, a powerful base for the assertion of mastery over drift.42

The Grand Design, as Kraft describes it, may be summarised as follows: a supranationally united Europe closely linked to the United States would form an invincible barrier to the encroachments of the Communists, and due to its innate goodness would head off any more German wanderings from the western liberal fold. After dissolving any differences between American and European interests, possibly through sheer goodwill, this Atlantic Community could proceed to modernize the Third World. The consequences of failing to adopt the Grand Design amount to nothing short of a catastrophe:

The European powers will almost certainly drift off into a nuclear defense of their own,...offering for exploitation by the Communist bloc a split of gigantic proportions, and virtually foreclosing any chance of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. ...Sooner or later the toll will be taken in
domestic upheaval or foreign catastrophe — perhaps both. The United States will have to default on power; resign from history.43

As Pattison de Ménil observes, American goals in fostering the Grand Design were twofold.44 Neither were consistent with an independent Europe. Since the end of the Second World War, America had supported a United Europe as a bulwark against 'Communist aggression.' American leaders assumed that the security umbrella they provided guaranteed that on key issues European and American interests could always coincide. Events in the early 1960's had undermined this assumption in two ways. The development of the Common Market had always had protectionist undertones, with the liberation of trade barriers between members and the common external tariff. The creation of an Atlantic Community could stifle Europe's tendency to look inward, closing off lucrative markets to American penetration. An Atlantic Community which included a supranationally united Europe could also head off what was seen as an alarming rebirth of Old World nationalism. DeGaulle's ideas of a Europe des États had many supporters, particularly in West Germany. To such thinkers, DeGaulle was a "tiresome old King Lear"45 who served only to reawaken dangerous impulses in Germany, and to fan the flames of traditional French recalcitrance. An Atlantic Community could thus strengthen the Pax Americana by containing the countries whose nationalism had best epitomized the flaws of the Old World.

For DeGaulle, the Pax Americana created by Yalta and Potsdam, as well as NATO and the Grand Design which were its institutionalizations, represented a thinly disguised desire for hegemony over the west. DeGaulle wrote in the Mémoires de guerre:

The United States, delighting in her resources, feeling that she no longer had within herself sufficient scope for her energies, wishing to help those who were in misery or bondage the world over, yielded in her turn to that taste for intervention in which the instinct for domination cloaked itself.46

DeGaulle believed that a Europe whose very existence depended on a military organization controlled by the Americans, whose monetary system was dominated by the American currency, and whose foreign policy was expected in all respects to emulate America's could never be an equal in an Atlantic
partnership. In effect, Europe would only be able to wave approving hands over American leadership. DeGaulle's foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, writes:

In the heart of an ensemble of two theoretically equal poles, the United States would necessarily be the driving force, their associates following them, more or less docilely according to their nature. In a European construction of this genre, we could, as the most optimistic proponents of this construction say willingly, "influence America." A pleasing perspective in their eyes, but one that shows well that there would be no question of Europe having a policy of its own, no more than its own defense or even its own economy.47

As well as being an end in itself, indeed a necessary goal of emancipation, DeGaulle's vision of an independent Europe also sought to create a genuine basis for détente between the superpowers. Europe's division was caused by the Cold War, which in turn insured the division of Europe. The Soviets considered the American presence in Western Europe no less threatening than the Americans considered the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, which made the perpetuation of their presence in Eastern Europe essential. A Europe tied to an Atlantic Community meant a Europe permanently divided. Couve de Murville writes:

A Western Europe tied to Atlanticism meant the indefinite division of the old continent, and consequently, of the entire world.48

DeGaulle sought to break the vicious circle that had entrapped the superpowers since the Second World War. The Soviets would never consent to an undivided Europe tied to the United States. DeGaulle believed they might consent to an undivided independent Europe.49 With the immediate cause, and to DeGaulle, the raison d'être of the Cold War solved, a real détente between the superpowers could take place. Europe could regain the place it held before the mutilation of two world wars, that of a vital, independent civilization in full control of its own destiny, and exerting influence in every corner of the globe.

Thus, in terms of plans for Europe's future, DeGaulle was certainly
one of the more radical thinkers of his day. He realized before any other major world figure that the bipolar world created by Yalta and Potsdam was artificial and bound to be impermanent. A resurrected Europe, which the United States had helped to create, was bound to challenge its leadership. DeGaulle was the first major European to argue that this challenge was not only feasible, but desirable. In the process, Europe could find herself and help diffuse the conflict her near self-destruction had brought about.
End Notes to Chapter I


3An interesting question to keep in mind throughout the present study is, given the extent to which DeGaulle's personality pervaded French foreign policy, how the Gaullist notions on Europe might have been received had someone else been President of France at the time. Also, to what extent have DeGaulle's ideas become more acceptable since his departure; to what extent is today's Europe DeGaulle's Europe minus DeGaulle?


6Ibid., p. 165.


8DeGaulle would never have argued that the supranationalists lacked a great vision. Rather, their vision was based on incorrect assumptions and on misinterpretation of what constituted authority and allegiance. Thus, their vision was unrealistic and unfeasible.


12Sections of DeGaulle's career certainly lent themselves to extended periods of withdrawn introspection. Examples: his time as a prisoner of war during World War I, his exile in London during World War II, and the twelve years between his two presidencies, 1946-1958.


14Ibid., p. 28-29.


18 Ibid., p. 61.


21 Ibid., p. 79.

22 Malraux, *Felled Oaks*, p. 82-83.

23 The *force de frappe* fits interestingly into this concept of the protection of the State. As a primarily defensive rather than offensive weapon, the *force de frappe* would most likely be used at a moment of extreme peril, like the invasion of 1940. The *force de frappe* guaranteed that the State would never again be as helpless as it had been then. It assured that if France ever fell again, it would fall with a bang rather than with a whimper.


34 DeGaulle, Memoirs of Hope, p. 10.


36 Ibid.

37 At best DeGaulle somewhat oversimplified his analysis of this issue. French recalcitrance neither began nor ended with DeGaulle. For a discussion of France's position during the Rome Treaty negotiations, see Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, Chapter IX.


39 It is doubtful that DeGaulle imagined all Western Europe freeing itself from NATO domination in a similar fashion. France's force de frappe was hardly sufficient to defend Western Europe by itself. A fully remilitarized West Germany, complete with nuclear weapons, was of course unthinkable. It is more likely that he imagined an Atlantic Alliance based on the equality of its partners, like the joint American-British-French command of NATO that DeGaulle proposed to Eisenhower in 1959.

40 My discussion of the Grand Design is indebted to that appearing in Patterson de Menil, Who Speaks For Europe?, p. 100-117.

41 Ibid. p. 100.


43 Ibid. p. 119-120.

44 See Patterson de Menil, Who Speaks For Europe?, p. 101-103.

45 Ibid., p. 103.
46 DeGaulle, Unity, p. 88.


48 Ibid., p. 350.

49 DeGaulle's vision of a Europe united from Gibraltar to the Urals is more difficult to fathom, since it assumed two rather unlikely events: a change of regime in Russia, and the dissolution of the Soviet empire east of the Urals.
Chapter 2: The Fouchet Plan

By 1961, with France stabilizing at home economically and abroad through a gradual, if still potentially explosive, resolution of the Algerian situation, DeGaulle felt secure enough to take the initiative in attempting to implement his ideas for Europe des États with the Fouchet Plan. The failure of this initiative illustrates the collection of conflicting goals and priorities, as well as the intransigence on certain issues that all parties displayed during our period. The patterns that emerged during the Fouchet negotiation help explain DeGaulle's positions on the issues that will be discussed in the succeeding chapters. The Fouchet Plan represented more or less DeGaulle's picture of the ideal road to European unity; its failure and the reasons behind that failure hardened his resolve to oppose any road but his own. To a great extent then, this chapter sets the pattern for the rest of the paper, clarifying the basic issues that were to be debated later on.

Before approaching the Fouchet Plan, however, we should set the scene by examining briefly DeGaulle's dealings with his European partners up to the time our period opens in 1961. To a great extent, DeGaulle accepted the work of the supranational organizations, and in fact lent them a rather unexpected amount of support. Yet in considering DeGaulle's policy during this period, we see various indications of the problems to come, and certainly a conviction that before any larger steps were taken toward supranationalism, that Europe should be steered on the 'right' path, that leading to a union of sovereign states.

DeGaulle's return to power in 1958 brought about reactions in Europe quite similar to those in France. Many welcomed what seemed to be the promise of a stable regime, but many Europeans, like many Frenchmen, were less pleased with what they saw as his conservative nationalism. However, nearly all Europeans feared a worse situation if the rightist Generals planning Operation Resurrection had brought a regime of their own to power. Few echoed the sentiments of the West German socialist newspaper Vorwärts, which stated that DeGaulle did not take power legally. In general, Europe, like France, preferred DeGaulle to le déluge.

However, many doubts were expressed as to whether France would be
willing or even able to comply with the first round of tariff cuts on industrial goods called for by the Rome Treaty, a 10% cut beginning January 1, 1959. French economic problems had nearly reached a crisis stage. The French balance of payments deficit had grown from $1,345 million in 1956 to $1,760 million in 1957. In addition, the Algerian war was costing France 200 billion francs per year. The merry-go-round of governments in the closing days of the Fourth Republic had an increasingly difficult time securing loans to keep the economy afloat, which in any case only postponed dealing with France's basic economic problems. Accepting the tariff cuts called for by the Rome Treaty without taking draconian measures to solve the French balance of trade and budgetary deficits would only have deepened the crisis, and could easily have resulted in the collapse of the French economy. Any government, however 'European' oriented, would have faced grave difficulties in fulfilling the agreements that France had signed.

To the surprise of many Europeans, DeGaulle quickly made clear his intention to participate in the tariff cuts through economic reforms based on his policy of vérité et sévérité. The budget deficit was halved through an increase in indirect taxes and miscellaneous budget cuts, including some painful reductions in social security payments. Most important in terms of the trade deficit, the franc was devalued by 17.5%, making it again a viable currency on the world market. To simplify the mathematics as well as, in DeGaulle's words, "to restore to the venerable French franc, whose losses were a reflection of our national ordeals, something of its former substance, the new franc, worth an hundred of the old" was established as the new currency. The combined effect of these moves enabled France to participate in the 1959 tariff reductions as scheduled. The success of the Common Market in the first year following the 1959 cuts led the six states to speed up the tariff reduction schedule of the Rome Treaty, concluding an agreement with DeGaulle's blessing in May, 1960. By mid-1961 import quotas on industrial goods had been reduced to near insignificance, and tariff barriers between the Six had been nearly halved. Trade between member countries of the EEÜ had increased 70% between 1959 and 1961, while trade with non-member countries had only increased 35% during the same period. DeGaulle's flirtation with the supranationalists seemed to be paying off handsomely.
Still, even during this period of maximum friendliness between the two schools of European unity, various quarrels which would dominate the scene later began to take shape. Since the spring of 1957, a negotiating team connected to the Office of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), headed by Roger Maudling of Great Britain had been negotiating with the newly established EEC to establish a free trade area including all the OEEC countries. By the fall of 1958, it became clear to the French that EEC goals of economic integration and the Maudling proposals for a free trade area were irreconcilable. Jacques Soustelle, DeGaulle's Minister of Information, made a fairly blunt statement to that effect on November 14. Maudling became offended by this typical display of Gaullist directness, and suspended the negotiations. This foreshadowed the exchanges that would take place later between the British and the French on the proper role of trade between EEC members and other countries. Also during the 1958-1961 period, French agricultural surpluses accumulated to such an extent that creating an agricultural common market became a virtual necessity for France. The lag in increases in farm income, as well as dissatisfaction with continued surpluses led to mass demonstrations by French farmers in May, 1961. The problems that would culminate in the crisis of 1965 began to form here. 8

On the whole, however, DeGaulle and the supranationalists were on better terms during the period 1958-1961 than at any time thereafter. The reasons can be explained fairly simply. First and probably foremost, was the French preoccupation with Algeria, which proved a constant threat to DeGaulle and the Fifth Republic until 1962. DeGaulle did not even make a major statement on Europe until his press conference of September 5, 1960. With this threat to the South, DeGaulle hardly needed to make enemies in Europe. The economic triumphs of the Common Market during these years seemed to open a new area for the expression of French grandeur, and provided a welcome diversion for French minds from the problems in Algeria. France's economic situation in 1958 was so severe that strong measures would have to have been taken whether the 1959 tariff cuts had been negotiated or not. To an extent, DeGaulle could make a virtue out of a necessity, capitalizing on the popularity of the European idea and stimulating the French economy in the process. By 1961, the EEC had proven its value to French trade. Between 1958 and 1962, French and German trade with EEC partners had doubled, while Franco-German trade nearly tripled. 9
-- On n'est pas encore prêts à se rencontrer.

Source: Le xx° Siècle fédéraliste, May 20, 1960
It is also important to keep in mind that in 1961, the EEC was still quite a new organization, less than five years old. Removing trade barriers was hardly the highest goal of the supranationalists; their greatest assaults on the nation-state were yet to come. Also, DeGaulle always conceded a certain administrative value to the supranational organizations, as long as their prerogative was subordinated to the control of the States. Edward Kolodziej observes a useful distinction in the Gaullist mind between "low politics", the technical aspects of economic and social policy, which under sufficient guarantees can be administered by supranational organizations, and "high politics" (i.e., foreign and defense policy) which must always remain under the control of the States. Thus, as long as the supranational organizations were confined to their proper place, France could reap the economic benefits they helped facilitate with a minimal loss of sovereignty. However, it was crucial to DeGaulle that these organizations remain the servants of the States rather than attempt to become their masters. This meant steering the whole unification movement away from supranational ideals toward those needed to create an Europe des Etats. This was the purpose of the Fouchet Plan.

The French initiative which would result in the Fouchet Plan began with DeGaulle's visit to Italy in June, 1959. The result was a Franco-Italian proposal to regularize meetings between foreign ministers of the Six. The following November, Couve de Murville suggested at a November meeting of the EEC Council of Ministers that such meetings be arranged, tactfully adding that these ought not prejudice or attempt to replace meetings of NATO and of the Western European Union (WEU). The basic outlines of the Fouchet Plan began to take shape with the meeting with Adenauer at Rambouillet in July, 1960, when DeGaulle sought West German support for his initiative. During his first major public statement on Europe during his press conference of September 5, DeGaulle sketched his proposals:

The launching of Europe ... requires organized, regular consultation between responsible Governments, and the work of specialized organs in each of the common domains which are subordinate to the Governments. This requires periodic deliberations by an assembly formed of delegates from the national parliaments, and, in my opinion, this will have to require, as soon as possible, a formal European referendum so as to give this launching of Europe the character of popular support and initiative that is indispensable.
Le nouvel aménagement de l'Europe

Source: Frankfurter Rundschau, October 7, 1960.
Even as the basic provisions of what would become the Fouchet Plan took shape however, the suspicions and misconceptions which would ultimately capsize the French initiative began to form as well. To this point, DeGaulle had looked primarily to West Germany and Italy for support, raising fears in the smaller members of the Six of a Paris-Bonn-Rome axis which planned to dominate Western Europe. Also, the problem for the West Germans of reconciling attraction to DeGaulle's proposals with commitments to the United States came to be raised here, with regard to West Germany's position in NATO. As a result of the blooming friendship between DeGaulle and Adenauer lower officials were often excluded from major discussions. This would lead to occasional misconceptions on both sides as to what had actually been agreed upon. Such misconceptions had already arisen over NATO and the protection of existing community institutions, which had to be resolved during a visit to Bonn by Premier Michel Debré and Couve de Murville. After smoothing out these problems with the West Germans, DeGaulle moved to present his proposals before the other European partners.

A European summit conference was arranged which met in Paris in February 10, 1961. Around this time, the battle lines came to be more clearly drawn. To Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, DeGaulle's press conference seemed to undermine the existing communities, and forewarn a Franco-German attempt to impose a Gaullist Europe on the Six. Dutch objections on the issue of British participation, as well as on NATO and the future of the existing communities were already becoming known. Luns insisted that the final communique of the Paris meeting only establish a study commission to make further proposals, without allowing a schedule of subsequent meetings to be set. He managed to delay the next summit from May until July, by which time the British had publicly announced their intention to enter the EEC. As a result of the Paris summit the Fouchet Commission was formed, headed by the French ambassador to Denmark, Christian Fouchet. Ostensibly its job was to locate some type of consensus, but perhaps it was, as Pattison de Menil observes "at the outset, a coverup for basic disagreement." Though possibly some grounds for a consensus could have been found at this point, the pattern of the negotiations quickly established itself. France with strong German support faced the Netherlands. The remaining three of the Six were presented a choice between attempting to mediate or simply choosing a side.
Sur glace et dans la C.E.E. les Pays-Bas ont leur mot à dire.

Source: Algemeen Handelsblad, February 20, 1961.
The second European summit, held in Bonn on July 18, 1961, managed to paper over the differences between the two parties. The final communique, later known as the Bonn Declaration, called on the Fouchet Commission to submit proposals as soon as possible to the Six "on the means by which a statutory form can be given...to the union of their peoples." The Bonn Declaration represents one of the more clever attempts during our period to reconcile the two visions of Europe. Made possible by key French concessions on references to the Atlantic Alliance and the existing communities, the Bonn Declaration cited enough of the favorite notions of all concerned to be acceptable. For the supranationalists, the Declaration stated that the Rome Treaty represented the inspiration for political unity, stating the desire of the Six to "give shape to the will for political union already implicit in the Treaties establishing the European Communities...." It also encouraged the study of ways to expand the role of the European Parliament, as well as more closely connect it to public opinion. The Atlantic Alliance was praised, stating the conviction of the Six "that only a united Europe, allied to the United States of America and to other free peoples, is in a position to face the dangers that menace the existence of Europe and of the whole free world...." For DeGaulle, the central idea of his plans of European unity, the synchronization of policies through cooperation between states, was officially sanctioned by the Six. They agreed in principle:

To hold, at regular intervals, meetings whose aim will be to compare their views, to concert their policies and to reach common positions in order to further the political unity of Europe....

At first glance then, the Bonn Declaration seemed to point to a middle way between the supranationalists and the French positions. In specific terms, however, it remained to be seen how the supranational implications of the Rome Treaty could be reconciled with an *Europe des États*. What would become the most important issue to the Dutch, the question of British participation, was avoided entirely. Despite its pleasing tone, the Bonn Declaration left most of the major issues unsolved.

Two external events merit attention at this point in the negotiations. Particularly since late 1960, though actually since 1958, tensions had been
building between the Eastern and Western blocs over the status of Berlin. The Soviets insisted that West Berlin be demilitarized and neutralized, while the Western powers wanted it to remain tied to the Bonn regime. As Soviet pressure continued to build through the spring and summer of 1961, the United States and Britain appeared ready to negotiate Berlin's status. On August 13, just over a month after the Bonn Declaration, the East Germans closed off West Berlin, and began building the Berlin Wall. Thus, the Fouchet Commission began its work during a period of considerable international tension, and at a time when many Europeans feared a softening of the Atlantic Alliance. The 1950's had shown that the impulse toward European unity was strongest when the Cold War was coldest. Paul-Henri Spaak, who in 1962 would become Belgian Foreign Minister, wrote: "Europeans, let us be modest. It is the fear of Stalin and the daring views of General George Marshall which led us into the right path..."21 Thus, differing views of European unity could be temporarily submerged in the common danger.

By the fall of 1961, when the Fouchet Plan was actually being debated and revised, the Berlin Crisis seemed to have at least stopped getting worse, neither side wanting to escalate the conflict any further. West Germany and France, the two countries that most feared a Western retreat in Berlin, remained distrustful of the American and British position, while the other four of the Six considered the direst threat to have subsided. Perhaps for both sides European solidarity became a less critical item, one to be pursued more with more consideration for particular interests.

Complicating the situation still further was the British application to the EEC, announced by Harold Macmillan in a speech to the House of Commons on July 31. The most important question this raised was whether or not the British should participate in the Fouchet discussions. The Dutch, who for reasons that will be discussed later, considered Britain's presence in any major European decision absolutely essential, could now feel free to press the case for British participation even more strongly. Such a complication could hardly have pleased DeGaulle, whose reservations about the British application were already well known. In any case, DeGaulle did not believe that the British could participate in any political union until they had accepted the economic union as it existed up to that point by joining the EEC. At the moment however, all sides were reluctant to force
the issue, perhaps waiting to see how the Fouchet discussions developed. 22

Governments of the Six submitted position papers to the Fouchet Commission on the ideas expressed in the Bonn Declaration throughout the fall of 1961. On November 2, the French government submitted an actual draft treaty, the Traite d'union d'Etats, or as it became known, the Fouchet Plan. This plan constitutes the clearest documentation during our period of DeGaulle's Europe des Etats, describing the institutions and aims of a Gaullist Europe. It represented DeGaulle's attempt to make sovereign States, rather than what he saw as the artificial supranational structures, the building blocks of a union. The supranational organizations would be retained, but as servants of the States rather than usurpers of the States' prerogative.

The aims of the Union, were spelled out in Article 2. While avoiding any mention of the Atlantic Alliance, the union would seek "to bring about the adoption of a common foreign policy in matters that are of common interest to the Member States...." 23 Even more alarming for Atlanticists, the draft stated a desire "to strengthen, in cooperation with the other free nations, the security of Member States against aggression by adopting a common defense policy." 24 The draft failed to mention either NATO or the Atlantic Alliance directly. To Atlanticists, this seemed to call for a defense policy much more loosely connected to the United States and the NATO alliance, presumably under French leadership. In less controversial areas, the Union sought:

.....to ensure, through close cooperation between Member States in the scientific and cultural field, the continued development of their common heritage and the protection of the values on which their civilization rests.... 25

The institutions of the proposed union show the influence of the Fifth Republic constitution in the degree to which the States were to be protected and preserved. The real 'power' of the Union rested in the Council, which "would meet every four months at the Head of State or Government level, and at least once in the intervening period at the Foreign Minister level." 26 The Council would take up matters submitted to its agenda by the Member States (rather than by some supranational body), and perhaps most disconcerting for ardent supranationalists would "adopt decisions necessary for
achieving the aims of the Union unanimously." No Member State could have decision imposed on it by the Union against its wishes, ensuring the safeguarding of each State's vital interests. Of course, the EEC Council of Ministers also operated with the unanimity rule, but the Rome Treaty called for the institution of weighted majority voting in that body beginning January 1, 1966. The supranationalists could assume that no such evolution was likely to ever take place with the Fouchet union. The European Parliament embodied DeGaulle's fondest dreams concerning the role of parliaments, having the prerogative to advise the States without having any authority to impede their operations. The Parliament had the right to submit recommendations and ask questions of the Council, but it had no direct power over Council decisions. The European Political Commission, as the administrative arm of the Union, represented DeGaulle's concessions to what he saw as the technical advantages of the supranational approach. Rather than a supranational body that would theoretically serve as the nucleus of a European government, it was purely an administrative device, with no responsibility to even advise the Council. Article 10 reads:

The European Political Commission shall assist the Council. It shall prepare its deliberations and carry out its decisions. It shall perform the duties that the Council decides to entrust it.

Article 16 outlined plans for the future of the Union. It called for a general review of the treaty three years after it came into effect, "with a view to considering suitable measures for strengthening the Union in the light of the progress already made." The review was intended to complete provisions for a unified foreign policy, and lay the groundwork for "the gradual establishment of an organization centralizing, within the Union, the European Communities." To many supranationalists, this seemed to say that the Gaullist political union, rather than the existing group of economic communities, would become the center of efforts for European unity. In effect, they feared, the supranational steps taken so far would be swallowed up in the Éurope des États. Once the existing communities had been coordinated into the Gaullist union, future change would occur according to the ideas that inspired the Fouchet Plan, (i.e. a union organized...
around sovereign states), rather than according to supranationalist ideas designed to make the States obsolete. The goal would become a *Europe of United States* rather than a *United States of Europe*. Though the broader implications of the Rome Treaty seemed under attack in future plans for the Union, its economic provisions remained the standard for the acceptance of new members. Prospective new members had to "have previously acceded to the European Communities," and be accepted by a unanimous vote in the Council of Ministers. Perhaps DeGaulle was already serving warning to the British, who had recently submitted an extensive list of special considerations to their would-be partners in their negotiations to enter the EEC, that the economic provisions of the Rome Treaty had to be accepted for them to enter any political union.

Undoubtedly, the Fouchet Plan was a Gaullist document; yet certain of its objectives offered hope to the supranationalists as well. For the first time, a plan was submitted to institutionalize political cooperation among the governments of the Six. The path to a unified foreign policy was virtually mapped out. The economic institutions of the EEC would have been preserved, though subordinated to the political union. Thus, further economic integration could occur directed by a legitimate political authority, an organized union of European States. This union would assume leadership of the whole unification movement, bringing the European peoples together under the auspices of an organization based on what DeGaulle considered were basic realities rather than on supranational illusions. Perhaps the boldest aspiration of the Fouchet Plan was to coordinate the supranationalist movement itself, accepting the technical value of its institutions, though substituting legitimate political authority for the imaginary authority that had previously served as their guide. Extending the prerogative of this union was made a goal for the indefinite future, but was not abandoned entirely. DeGaulle wrote in *Les Mémoires d'espoir*:

My policy therefore aimed at the setting up of a concert of European states which in developing all sorts of ties between them would increase their interdependence and solidarity. From this starting point, there was every reason to believe that the process might lead to their confederation, especially if they were one day to be threatened from the same source.
Until the basic realities of Europe's situation changed, (i.e. until the 'interdependence and solidarity' of the Europeans increased to the point where legitimate supranational authority was a realistic possibility), all major decisions of the union had to be made unanimously. In any final analysis, each member of the Six, no matter how committed to supranationalism officially, would do what was necessary to see that its vital interests were protected. Ironically, the Dutch would prove this point in leading the fight against the Fouchet Plan. A completely unified Europe could emerge only after a long evolutionary process during which the Europeans had to learn to live and work together, trying to dictate when this evolutionary process would be completed would inevitably prove unsuccessful, as would the provision in the Rome Treaty calling for majority voting in the Council of Ministers as of January 1, 1966. While Europe's evolution was taking place, the Europeans had to accept the battles and frustrations that the unanimity rule implied.

The reactions of key supranationalists bear out the fact that, at least at first, the Fouchet Plan was viewed as a serious step toward European unity. After all, few who supported any form of European union could object to an organized coordination of interests among governments of the Six. The supranationalists hoped to incorporate the Gaullist initiative into their own plans in the same way as the Gaullists hoped to coordinate the supranationalists. As early as November, 1960, Jean Monnet had written to Adenauer:

Are General DeGaulle's proposals merely for 'cooperation' and not 'supranational'? It is only by advancing that we shall find the answers to these questions, primarily on the political plane. I believe that some of the suggestions which you have discussed with General DeGaulle may usefully serve the development of Europe, and that we must act to give them practical shape. ...I have often told you that your presence as leader of Germany at the same time as DeGaulle is leader of France offers us a possibility of action today which may not occur again."

Monnet was as much a pragmatist as he was a supranationalist, seeing possibilities for his own ideas in the French initiative. He advocated the same tactic with the Fouchet Plan as he would advocate with the British application to

*Jean Monnet to Konrad Adenauer, November 16, 1960, quoted in Jean Monnet, Memoirs, trans. Richard Mayne (New York: Horizon & Sons, 1958), p. 216. (This was omitted originally in the endnotes.*)
the Common Market: simply put, to sign agreements now and work out disagreements later within the apparatus already agreed upon. Monnet was willing to accept the French initiative to increase cooperation between governments as a prerequisite to greater attempts at unity. Monnet's support for the immediate, if not the ultimate aims of the Fouchet Plan later translated into endorsement by Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Not even Paul-Henri Spaak, probably the second most prominent supranationalist after Monnet, opposed the Fouchet Plan at this point, though his eventual siding with the Dutch would prove decisive in the failure of the negotiations. More supranationally oriented than the Dutch, Spaak hoped to use his blessing to obtain concessions from DeGaulle on community institutions and British participation. Still Spaak, like Monnet, considered the Fouchet Plan a viable starting point for negotiation on political unity, at least at first. 34

Only the Dutch stood opposed to the French initiative from the outset, ostensibly on supranational grounds. Even before the Bonn meeting of July 18, the Dutch submitted a report to the various governments which stated: "The Dutch delegation ... fears that the system of European institutions might be compromised by the creation of a political structure of an inter-governmental character." 35 Examining the Dutch position, one often overlooked or misinterpreted in studies of the obstacles to European integration, is useful in understanding the failure of the Fouchet Plan, as well as certain issues later on. Dutch attitudes on European union generally show a curious combination of supranationalist talk and nationalist action. Alterio Spinelli, whose book The Euroscepts studies the interactions of the various national delegations to the European communities, writes of the Dutch:

In the abstract they are generally favorable to solutions which imply real transfers of authority to united European organizations, but in the concrete they always demand long and minute preliminary intergovernmental negotiations, which invariably help to strengthen that very Europe of the nations which, as a matter of principle, they say they abhor. 36

As inhabitants of a small nation with stable institutions but without real prospects for defense, the Dutch people's long history of independence rested upon attempts to remain neutral and preserve European equilibrium. With
centuries of commercial connections abroad, the Netherlands resisted any of the protectionist tendencies of European integration. The Dutch were among the strongest supporters of the EEC negotiations in the late 1950's. 

Realizing that their prosperity and independence in the postwar world rested of some freedom of movement within the Atlantic Alliance, the Dutch based their foreign policy on close Atlantic ties and a desire to equilibrate the European Community through the addition of new members, particularly Great Britain. More than any other country, the Netherlands feared a Paris-Bonn-Rome axis which seemed to be emerging in early 1961. As the Fouchet discussions grew more extensive, these fears increased, leading the Dutch to press more strongly for inclusion of the Atlantic-oriented Britain to regain a balance. Allessandro Silj suggests that the Dutch would have resisted any European initiative that would tie them too closely to the Continent, whether Gaullist plans for a politically independent Europe, or plans to increase European economic insularity through the EEC. They would show this opposition to economic insularity during the agricultural negotiations taking place throughout our period.

By late 1961, the positions, or as they were soon to become, battle lines, were basically known. France and the Netherlands stood on opposite sides. West Germany, was firmly in the French camp. The Belgians had clear sympathies with the Dutch position, but had not as yet actually allied themselves with them. After Spaak became Foreign Minister in January, 1962, the attachment to the Dutch solidified. Luxembourg, the smallest and most forgotten member of the Six, generally sided with the Franco-German position. Italy seemed to hold the most promise for obtaining a compromise at this point. Until the very end of the negotiations, Italy acted as a mediator between the French and the Dutch, a role to which she was suited in several ways. As the only 'middle' European power of the Six, too large to be considered a 'small' power like the Benelux countries, yet lacking the economic or political strength of France or West Germany, Italy's position seemed to lend itself to finding a middle way between large and small power interests. Also, the merry-go-round of internal Italian politics, which would eventually play a role in the failure of negotiations, kept two Italian leaders with pro-French sympathies; Premier Antonio Segni and
Le seul qui puisse regarder de Gaulle dans les yeux

"De enige die De Gaulle in de ogen kan kijken"
(Th. Times)

Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani, from aligning themselves too closely with De Gaulle's camp.

The European Parliament also attempted to find some sort of middle way, mainly through suggestions for modifying certain of the Plan's provisions. In September, 1961, the Parliament's political commission asked a committee headed by René Pleven, (who had designed the unsuccessful proposals for the European Defense Community during the 1950's), to review the Fouchet Plan. The Pleven Committee findings criticized certain elements of the Plan and suggested changes, many of which would be incorporated into the discussions later on.

Recommendations in the Pleven report ranged in scope from simple wording changes to major revisions in the proposed union's institutions. It stated that the original title of the Fouchet Plan, Traité d'union d'États, or Treaty of the Union of States, contradicted the intent of the Bonn Declaration, suggesting instead the title, The Union of the European Peoples. The report recommended that the vagueness with regard to existing communities be resolved by including specific guarantees of the Treaty of Rome. The ambiguity of the plan with regard to NATO could be cleared up by a statement that the harmonized foreign and defense policies must aim at strengthening the Atlantic Alliance.

The committee's report differed most from the Fouchet Plan on the issue of the Union's institutions. According to the abridged version of the report appearing in H.S. Chopra's De Gaulle and European Unity, the committee "objected to the institutionalization of a body comprising national functionaries of 'the Six' as a Political Commission distinct from the Council." In short, this meant an objection to the Commission as the dependent technical arm of the Council. The report advocated instead the "nomination of a Secretary-General, who like his counterpart in the European Economic Community, would be independent of the Governments of the Member States of the Union." This represented a fundamental change in status for the Commission from an administrative device to a center of supranational authority. The report also objected to strict devotion to the unanimity rule, suggesting that the Council refer problems on which a unanimous decision was unattainable in a specified period of time to the European Parliament for an opinion. Other recommendations for increasing the influence of the European Parliament included: giving the Parliament
approval over the Union's budget, including the budget for defense projects, the right of the Parliament to ratify international treaties concluded by the Union, and quick adoption of proposals for electing the Parliament by universal suffrage. Though the Plevin report certainly proposed major revisions in the Fouchet Plan with the intent of coordinating it into the supranational cause, the Plan was accepted as an useful starting point for discussions on political unity. The Report praised, for example, the principle of regularized meetings between leaders of the Six, as well as the plans for extending the union alluded to in Article 16. Plevin himself said of the Fouchet Plan:

All progress toward political union that does not question the results acquired and does not prejudice the forms and future developments of the European structure must be welcomed as a positive contribution. 43

In January, 1962, several events occurred that would in combination seal the fate of the Fouchet Plan, even before the Fouchet Committee could submit its recommendations. Spaak became Foreign Minister of Belgium, and proceeded to align that government's position more closely to that of the Dutch. On January 16, the Six reached an important agreement on including agriculture in the Common Market, perhaps lessening DeGaulle's need to further appease his European partners. 44 At the foreign ministers' meeting on January 18, the French took the offensive by submitting a new draft of the Fouchet Plan containing what they referred to as "quelques améliorations de style" 45, but which in fact represented a noticeably toughened version of the Fouchet Plan, one which, in Chopra's words, honored the Assembly's recommendations "only by ignoring them completely." 46

Though the broad outline of the second Fouchet draft was the same as that of the first, the wording of many of the provisions was shortened considerably, while certain vague assurances given to France's partners in the first draft were eliminated entirely. In Article 2, which stated the aims of the union, the cloudy reference to the Atlantic Alliance was omitted, the second version omitting only a short statement expressing the desire of the Six to "unify the policy of Member States in spheres of common interest: foreign policy, economics, cultural affairs and defense." 47 Article 16,
regarding review of the Union's achievements after three years, was shortened considerably. In the new version, any mention of the existing communities was removed, simply stating that the review would attempt to strengthen the Union by "simplifying, rationalizing and co-ordinating the ways in which Member States cooperate." These and other sins of omission in the second draft seemed a deliberate flouting of what the five saw as their legitimate concerns, mainly the need to guarantee both the Atlantic Alliance and the existing European Communities. By shortening and simplifying the language of the second draft, DeGaulle appeared to present his vision of Europe as a package deal, to be accepted or rejected in its entirety.

Although DeGaulle, according to Silj, personally approved the first draft of the Fouchet Plan, he "corrected" the second draft in a meeting with Debré, Couve de Murville, and Fouchet. The appearance of the new draft surprised even the French diplomats involved in the negotiations. The reasons behind this new tactic are not entirely clear, since by deliberately provoking a confrontation with his partners DeGaulle seemed to virtually eliminate the French initiative's chances of success. To an extent, the new draft simply expressed frustration with Dutch intransigence; the French position could throw the differences between the Six into bolder relief, and make serious work on the issues possible. Later on, in the spring of 1962, DeGaulle proved willing to restore and even extend the assurances given in the first draft. At the very least, the second draft would encourage the Dutch to take a clear stand on the goals of the union, explaining how they intended to reconcile what DeGaulle saw as their contradictory attachment to both supranationalism and British participation. In justifying the new draft, Couve de Murville wrote:

At the very least we would serve notice that we were not the dupes of exasperating delaying tactics and that after all, if — as our October draft showed — we were prepared for reasonable compromise, since others remained immobile, we were also entitled to mark our preferences.

Whatever the reasons behind the new draft, it provoked a predictable response from France's partners. L'Anee Politique reported that: "This text had already incited great apprehension in several European capitals. Since then, the Low Countries who had previously found themselves
isolated in their opposition to the French views, were joined on January 18 by their partners.52 The January 20 issue of the Amsterdam newspaper Algemeen Handelsblad lauded the second draft a giant step backward, a complete reversion to narrow nationalism, that offered no hope to the supranationalists.53 These partners felt free to drop any appearance of objectivity, and joined the Dutch camp.

The final draft adopted by the Fouchet Committee pointed to the reduced state of the whole French initiative. Its 'text' if one may use such a term, provided little more than a listing of differences between France and her partners.54 In the right hand column was printed the text proposed by the French; on the left column was the text approved by France's partners. Occasionally throughout the document there appeared articles printed in the middle of the page, which were the passages upon which both groups had managed to agree. The discrepancies were predictable and sometimes mutually exclusive. Article 2 in the French version merely stated the aim to unify various national policies, while the other version stressed the importance of the Atlantic Alliance and the existing communities.55 The French version required unanimous decisions in all cases, while the other included a rather peculiar provision allowing the Council to waive the unanimity rule in certain cases if it chose to do so unanimously.56 Most significantly, the version endorsed by the five proposed the creation of a Secretariat which would function independently of the Member States, as well as a supranational Court of Justice responsible for interpreting the Treaty.57 This attempt to make the union a least in part a supranational organization is at the heart of the differences between the two versions of the treaty, and shows that the two versions called for two fundamentally different types of union. With regard to new members, while both agreed that such states must first have acceded to the existing European Communities, on a unanimous vote of approval by the Council, while the others proposed automatic accession to the political union once access to the existing communities was complete.

From January to April, 1962, various attempts were made to reconcile the opposing views. The Fouchet Committee met in January, February, and March, the result being the somewhat schizophrenic draft just described. However, five days after the final Fouchet Committee draft was submitted,
the Six agreed at the meeting of foreign ministers to dispense with the formation of the independent Secretariat. DeGaulle himself attempted to mend fences that spring. In visits to Adenauer in February and to Fanfani in April, DeGaulle accepted the inclusion of references to NATO and the existing communities. Thus, DeGaulle appeared too willing to retreat from the hard line implied by the second Fouchet draft. Compromise appeared possible on most of the major issues: the Atlantic Alliance, the existing communities, and limiting the supranational character of the new union. Only the British question remained, whether the French would allow the British to participate in the political discussions without having yet joined the EEC, and whether the Dutch and the Belgians would join a political union that did not include Britain. Neither side would compromise on this issue, which proved the immediate cause of the failure of the French initiative.

The demise of the Fouchet negotiations occurred in the late spring of 1962. While DeGaulle's visits to Italy and West Germany had helped narrow differences, they helped revive fears in the small states of a Paris–Bonn–Rome axis. So, with the following combination factors as a backdrop, the foreign ministers of the Six met on April 17, 1962: France willing to make some concessions on several key issues, rising suspicion in the Benelux countries of their larger partners, and neither the Dutch nor the French willing to compromise on the British question. Italian Foreign Minister Segni, continuing Italian attempts to mediate, suggested a compromise along the lines of the DeGaulle–Fanfani meeting of April 4. Luns and Spaak, however, suddenly insisted on a general revision of the Union after three years specifically to give it a more supranational character. Spaak then dropped a bombshell which left no doubt as to Belgium joining the Dutch comp, by refusing to sign any treaty of political union until Britain became a full member of the EEC. Given the state of the EEC negotiations with Britain at this point, this was hardly a condition that was likely to be met in the near future. Couve de Murville, who presided, adjourned the meeting sine die.

DeGaulle's press conference of May 15 seemed to slam the already closing door. Realizing that the French initiative was a lost cause by virtue of the differences on the British question, he took the opportunity to take a
few rhetorical shots at some of France's partners among the Six in his most ironic and condescending manner. With a clear reference to Spaak and Luns he said that two "quite contradictory" objections to the French proposals, the supranationalism issue and the question of British participation, were made by the same objectors. With characteristic bluntness, he remarked: "Yet everyone knows that Great Britain, in its capacity as a great State and a nation loyal to itself, would never agree to lose its identity in some kind of utopian structure." It was on this occasion that DeGaulle made his notorious bon mot about losing the various European cultures "in some kind of integrated Esperanto or Volapük." DeGaulle reserved his most biting remarks for what he saw as the inevitable result of the supranational approach: the permanent preservation of American hegemony. He said of a supranational union:

But such an entity cannot be found without there being in Europe today a federator or with sufficient power, authority, and skill. That is why one falls back on a type of hybrid, in which the six States would undertake to comply with what will be decided upon by a certain majority. ... but there is no way, at the present time for a foreign majority to be able to constrain recalcitrant nations. It is true that, in this 'integrated' Europe, as they say, there would perhaps be no policy at all. This would simplify things a great deal. ... But then, perhaps, their world would follow the lead of some outsider who did have a policy. There would perhaps be a federator, but that federator would not be European.

As if this were not enough, DeGaulle felt obliged to commit supranationalist ideas to the realm of The Thousand and One Nights: "You see, when one's mind dwells on matters of great import, it is pleasant to dream of the marvelous lamp that Aladin had only to rub in order to soar above the real."

Predictably, this press conference sounded the death knell for the Fouchet discussions, despite increasingly feeble attempts to revive them, mainly by the Italians, which continued the fall. As Pattison de Menil observes, the press conference was curiously devoid of references to the British question, either to reaffirm France's previous position or to offer some compromise, which conceivably could have re-opened the negotiations.
As she suggests, perhaps DeGaulle was awaiting further clarification on the British position vis-à-vis the common agricultural policy and commitments to the Americans, which would come through the EEC negotiations. If these issues were resolved favorably, the logjam on political union could be broken, and agreement acceptable to all reached at some later date. As it turned out however, the British negotiations would drag on for months, with diminishing hopes for success. That July DeGaulle made an attempt to form some type of Fouchet-like union with West Germany and Italy, the two countries which had initially been most receptive to the Fouchet Plan. With the celebrated 'opening to the Left' going on in Italy at the time, few Italian politicians wanted to be so closely related to Gaullist views of Europe. So, in the last half of 1962, DeGaulle pursued his views of European unity with his only remaining ally, Adenauer's West Germany. In the meantime, the door remained open to the other partners, provided that they accept the provisions that had been refused when the Fouchet negotiations ended. DeGaulle said in a speech on June 15, 1962:

> It is up to the States, as they are to organize themselves. Later on we will see, either we or our descendants, what the Europeans will do, when the people will have become accustomed to living together. It is still necessary that they begin. France has invited them to do so in the past, and she continues to invite them today.

The failure of the Fouchet negotiations, which DeGaulle had helped cause through his revised version of the draft treaty, brought about considerable resentment on his part which undoubtedly poisoned his attitude later on. The Fouchet initiative represented the high point in DeGaulle's interest in European political unification. The rejection of the Fouchet Plan raised certain issues which make the whole episode a turning point in the history of European integration. Edward Kolodziej observes that: "So long as no state proposed a formal union, there was no need to face the embarrassing question of what kind of union to establish." The Fouchet negotiations had raised two such embarrassing questions: how supranational a character ought further European unification have, and under what conditions ought Britain to be allowed to participate? Answering these two questions
constituted the basis of DeGaulle's European policy throughout the rest of our period. If DeGaulle took the Fouchet episode as an example, the answers to these questions did not bode well for his vision of Europe.

Some bitterness appeared concerning particular nations as well. DeGaulle especially resented the lack of embarrassment Luns and Spaak showed at endorsing a supranationally united Europe with British participation, which he considered mutually exclusive. The French failed to see how the small countries' interests could have been better protected by a supranationalist structure than under the French proposals. Couve de Murville writes:

If ever by chance - or mischance! - the large countries should work together in a supranational structure, how much influence would the voices of the small countries carry in Community votes, or how could their representatives make themselves heard in an assembly where they would be submerged by numbers? In truth, the only reasonable guarantee for the small countries is that offered to them by France, equality of the states and the principle of making unanimous decisions. 69

Pattison de Ménil observes that if majority voting, which the supranationalists claimed to support so strongly, had been in place during the Fouchet negotiations, the Dutch would probably have been defeated in 1961 and the Fouchet Plan would have been enacted. 70 As it was, DeGaulle suspected, that Belgium and Dutch supranationalism and the insistence on the participation of Britain was merely a cover for a desire to keep Europe in the tow of the United States, both economically and politically. DeGaulle also resented the fact that the Italians failed to either mediate successfully or to convincingly join the Gaullist camp. He tartly remarked in Les Mémoires d'espoir that although Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani had sufficient sympathy for DeGaulle's vision of Europe: "so simple and categorical a resolve would have been out of keeping with the political complexities characteristic of our transalpine cousins." 71

With the failure of DeGaulle's 'positive' initiative toward European unity, he became more willing to take 'negative' steps to see that no vision of Europe replaced his own. If his Europe des États was not to be
sanctioned officially by France's partners, he would see to it that on major issues only the States would be allowed to make decisions. DeGaulle thus set about realizing his vision of Europe through sheer obstinance. His first step was trying to incorporate that European state whose views seemed most in line with his own, West Germany, with the Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963.
Endnotes to Chapter II

2 Ibid., p. 274.
3 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 See Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe*, p. 280.
8 For a more full discussion of these problems, see Chapter V.
12 Ibid., p. 292.
16 See Appendix 1. All succeeding quotes from the Bonn Declaration are taken from this Appendix as well.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.

22Macmillan praised the Bonn Declaration in his speech to Commons on July 31, (see Silj, *Europe's Political Puzzle*, p. 67), while DeGaulle declared his support for the principle of British entry into the EEC, (see *Major Addresses*, vol. I, p.147).

23See Appendix 2, Article 2. All subsequent quotes on the first Fouchet plan are taken from this Appendix.

24Ibid.

25Ibid.

26Ibid., Article 5.

27Ibid., Article 6.

28Ibid., Article 7.

29Ibid., Article 10.

30Ibid., Article 16.

31Ibid.

32Ibid., Article 17.

33DeGaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, p. 171. Note that DeGaulle could have seen this threat as coming from either the United States or from the Soviet Union, both of whom endangered Europe's independence and sovereignty.


35Quoted in Silj, *Europe's Political Puzzle*, p. 41.


38See Chapter V.

39Even passing references to Luxembourg are hard to come by in the literature on the Fouchet Plan, but see Kolodziej, *French International Policy*, p. 296.
These suggestions are excellently summarized in H. S. Chopra, *DeGaulle and European Unity* (New Delhi, India: Abhinav Publications, 1974), p. 99-104. My discussion of the Pleven revisions is based on this summary.

**41** Ibid., p. 100.

**42** Ibid., p. 100-101.


**44** See Chapter V for a more complete discussion of the 1962 agricultural agreement.


**46** Chopra, *DeGaulle and European Unity*, p. 105. For selections from the second Fouchet draft, see the left-hand column of Appendix 3.

**47** See left hand corner of Appendix 3, Article 2.

**48** Ibid., Article 16.

**49** Silj, *Europe's Political Puzzle*, p. 149.

**50** Ibid.

**51** Couve de Murville, *Une Politique étrangère*, p. 371.


**53** Ibid., p. 388.

**54** See Appendix 3.

**55** Ibid., Article 2, (both sides of the page).

**56** Ibid., Article 7, (right hand column).

**57** Ibid., Article 11, 14, (right hand column).


**60** See Chopra, *DeGaulle and European Unity*, p. 122-123.


**62** Ibid.

**63** Ibid.
64Ibid., p. 176-177.
65Ibid., p. 177.
66Pattison de Menil, Who Speaks For Europe?, p. 77.
67Speech in Dale, January 15, 1962, printed in Jouve, Le Theme "Européen" p. 84.
68Kolodziej, French International Policy, p. 301.
69Couve de Murville, Une Politique Etrangère, p. 381.
70Pattison de Menil, Who Speaks For Europe?, p. 181.
71DeGaulle, Memoirs of Hope, p. 177. Fanfani and Segni exchanged jobs with some regularity throughout our period, which accounts for previous references to Fanfani as premier and Segni as Foreign Minister.
Chapter III: The Fouchet Plan à deux: The Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963

When by mid-1962 it became apparent that the Fouchet Plan would die stillborn, the Gaullist initiative shifted to the one country where DeGaulle's vision of Europe seemed to have a realistic chance of acceptance: Adenauer's West Germany. By bringing about a formal and quite ceremonious reconciliation between the two nations really at the center of Europe's two civil wars, DeGaulle believed he could demonstrate on a smaller scale the type of union envisioned in the Fouchet Plan, and thus lay a foundation for unifying Europe as a whole. Tying together the two largest and most powerful members of the EEC could create a compelling example to the others if that union were successful. Yet the Franco-German Friendship Treaty would suffer the same fate as the Fouchet Plan, though its demise would take much longer.

By the end of our period, the Treaty was more or less ignored by both parties in the making of important policy decisions, though it remained on the books. More clearly than with the Fouchet Plan, the question of Atlanticism and the degree of dependence on the United States would prove the main cause of the failure. This failure more or less completes the rejection of DeGaulle's vision of Europe by his partners. Afterwards, DeGaulle would feel compelled to wait for history to vindicate his vision of Europe, while obstructing further attempts to lead Europe down the false road to unity through supranationalism.

At the start, however, the Franco-German entente proceeded down a path strewn with the roses that would be often used as a metaphor during the entire episode. The rapprochement of our period actually shows continuity with French foreign policy during the Fourth Republic. Under Georges Bidault and Robert Schumann, the only two Foreign Ministers during that otherwise unsteady Republic, Franco-German reconciliation had been pursued as a necessary evil, and as a response to American Cold War pressure. The Schumann Plan, which created the European Coal and Steel Community, marked the high point in Franco-German relations during the Fourth Republic, though the French viewed it as being as much an opportunity to perpetuate at least partial control over German war industries as a step toward unifying Europe.
For DeGaulle personally, the entente he initiated concluded a gradual shift in attitude since the war. Like many Europeans, DeGaulle originally favored the dissolution of Germany into a loosely joined confederation of small states, somewhat similar to the German Confederation created by Napoleon. As late as 1949, DeGaulle continued to advocate such a confederation, particularly noting the need for an independent Ruhr.

From the day when Germany will have received an organization, such that she will be composed of States tied together, doubtless with federative ties, but each maintaining its sovereignty, from the day when the Ruhr will have a European status, we will see Europe appear in all her power.

At the same time however, DeGaulle came to realize that any unification of Europe had to rely on Franco-German reconciliation. Even a truncated Germany was likely to recover economically and politically, and Europe had to incorporate this recovery, through bringing about an understanding between its two oldest and most bitter foes:

But reason requires that, to reach that goal, there be one day a way of establishing a direct and practical entente between the German and French peoples, responding to the fact that they are in so many ways complementary to each other, and surmounting vicissitudes of History. Deep down, that is the heart of the problem. There will or there will not be a Europe depending on whether an agreement without any interlopers can or cannot be possible between the Germans and the Gauls.

DeGaulle was also highly aware of the emotional appeal of such a reconciliation. This emotional side, which would play a major role in the approach, began to develop even before the end of the war. DeGaulle wrote in the Memoires de guerre:

Thus, amid the ruins, mourning and humiliation which had submerged Germany in her turn, I felt my sense of distrust and severity fade within me. I even glimpsed possibilities of understanding which the past had never offered; moreover, it seemed to me that the same sentiment was dawning among our
soldiers. The thirst for vengeance which had spurred them on at first had abated as they advanced across this ravaged earth. Today I saw them merciful before the misery of the vanquished. 4

The Cold War had effectively solved the problem of potential German domination of the continent. Now divided and occupied by the two hostile superpowers, Germany could no longer threaten European peace. Thus, DeGaulle could encourage West Germany's revival as a partner rather than as an enemy of France. Despite a great deal of talk to the contrary, most European statesmen recognized that the division of Germany would have to continue for the foreseeable future; reunification would have to be put off to, in Pattison de Menil's words, "the tomorrow of history." 5 DeGaulle himself put off reunification until an independent united Europe was able to negotiate a detente leading to the end of the Cold War. By creating detente to solve the German question rather than demanding a solution to the German question as a prerequisite to detente, DeGaulle hoped to make reunification a real possibility, though admittedly far in the future. In the meantime he asked of the West Germans: "acceptance of existing frontiers, an attitude of goodwill in relations with the East, complete renunciation of atomic armaments, and unremitting patience as regards reunification." 6 Given acceptance of these conditions, West Germany could be an ideal partner in the building of DeGaulle's Europe.

The close relationship between DeGaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer seemed to hold still more promise for the partnership. DeGaulle's admiration for Adenauer began well before the former's return to power in 1958. As early as 1950, he had referred to Adenauer as a potentially valuable partner in the unification of Europe.

Chancellor Adenauer is partisan of an entente and perhaps some day a union between the two peoples. It seemed to me on several occasions that I could perceive in what this good German said, a sort of echo of the call of a Europe, ruined, disfigured, weeping, and calling on her children to unite. 7

DeGaulle showed his respect for the Chancellor by the honor of arranging their first meeting at his country home at Colombey-les-deux Eglises rather
than in Paris, which took place on September 14, 1960. The close personal relationship between the two leaders began to develop here. Adenauer himself wrote of the meeting:

Premier DeGaulle—and I say this very frankly—no way matches the image which one might have of him from reading the newspapers in recent months. He is a quite different person from what he has been represented by the foreign press as well as our own. He is open-minded; he is not a nationalist; and he is well acquainted with foreign affairs. He is especially well aware of the significance of Franco-German relations for these two countries, for Europe as a whole and for the shaping of international relations in general.

It is worth noting that although the meeting focused mainly on broad issues and goals, it did produce two concrete results. DeGaulle promised to continue his tough line on the status of Berlin. In turn Adenauer agreed to support the termination of the Kauling negotiations on a free trade area attached to the EEC, negotiations strongly supported by the man who would become Adenauer's successor, Economic Minister, Ludwig Erhard. Thus, we see that a precedent was set for a Franco-German bloc within the Six three years before the Fouchet Plan was even submitted. We can also note that there were already other West German leaders on the scene who would be less willing to cooperate with French designs once Adenauer left office.

Much has been written about the DeGaulle-Adenauer friendship, and it is possible to cite a few similarities in style and outlook which help explain its basis. First and perhaps foremost was their age and the perspective they brought to their roles as leaders. When our period opens, DeGaulle was 71 years old and Adenauer was 85. Both reached adulthood well before the First World War and could remember the Age of Europe at its height. Both had witnessed the entire spectrum of twentieth century history, and carried a keen sense of this history to their work. Both were devout Catholics, which at times lent an aura of religiosity to the Franco-German rapprochement, while at the same time raising fears in Britain and other Protestant sections of Europe of an Europe des catholiques. The two shared a similar style, a preoccupation with grand ideas over technical details, and a certain detachment from subordinates while at the
same time exercising tight control over them. DeGaulle’s royal manner of governing is of course well known, while Adenauer’s government was only half jokingly called a Kanzlerdemokratie. Interestingly, both had also had troubled dealings with the British during the war years, DeGaulle during his exile in London, and Adenauer with his removal from his post of Bürgermeister of Cologne in 1945 for alleged incompetence.

Though the DeGaulle-Adenauer entente undoubtedly facilitated the Franco-German entente, it created certain problems, especially when viewed from the outside. The close relationship between the two men, like the emotional aura that surrounded the rapprochement, could sometimes cloud the real issues, particularly the question of just how independent the West Germans could become of their American patrons. Equally important, an entente based to a large extent on the relationship of two leaders was bound to be fragile, particularly since one of the leaders was obviously nearing retirement. Throughout the Franco-German courtship, the position of Adenauer’s government slowly but steadily declined. The Berlin crisis of 1961 cost Adenauer’s Christian Democrats an absolute majority in the Bundestag, which made Adenauer replace his pre-French Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano with the Atlanticist Gerhard Schröder to obtain support from the Free Democrats for a coalition government. Even more damaging was the Der Spiegel affair, in which the editor Rudolf Augstein and associates were arrested on what were at best dubious legal grounds for allegedly publishing military secrets. As a result, Adenauer had to fire a pro-French cabinet member implicated in the episode, Defense Minister Josef Strauss, as well as agree himself to retire the next autumn. When this retirement took place and more Atlantic oriented leaders took Adenauer’s place, the Franco-German entente would suffer accordingly.

Until he retired in October, 1963, however, Adenauer remained the final authority on West German foreign policy, and thus the entente between he and DeGaulle could begin what was at first a promising course. In contrast to the Fouchet negotiations, which had begun under circumstances of suspicion and basic disagreement, the Franco-German discussions began in a whirlwind of ceremony and popular acclaim. The courtship began with Adenauer’s state visit to France in July 1962. DeGaulle recounts the
historic and religious significance of the occasion in the Les Mémoires d'espoir:

Standing side by side in a command car, they [DeGaulle and Adenauer] inspected a French and a German armored division which outvied one another in smartness and bearing. Then, with their ministers and many dignitaries around them, they watched these heavy units parade before them, while aerial formations from both countries flew overhead. The journey ended at Rheims, the symbol of our age-old traditions, but also the scene of many an encounter between the hereditary enemies, from the ancient Germanic invasions to the battles of the Marne. In the cathedral, whose wounds were still not fully healed, the first Frenchman and the first German came together to pray that on either side of the Rhine that deeds of friendship might forever supplant the miseries of war.9

DeGaulle's reciprocal visit to West Germany that September was an even greater spectacle, and in terms of popular support and high expectations of success, represents the high point of Franco-German relations during our period. Since the public referendum DeGaulle believed to be a prerequisite to any European political union was forbidden by the West German constitution, he sought approval through sheer popular acclaim. The West German public did not disappoint him, and Le Monde would observe that "General DeGaulle has won a veritable plebiscite...."10 In fifteen speeches given in six days, all given in precisely rehearsed German, DeGaulle extolled the emotional appeal of Franco-German reconciliation, summarized in his often repeated statement: "Sie sind ein grosses Volk!"11

Obviously wanting to conclude an agreement while riding this wave of popular acclaim, as well as perhaps belatedly taking Jean Monnet's advise on the Fouchet Plan to sign now and work out the details later, the French government submitted a memorandum to Bonn on September 19 outlining Franco-German agreement. Significantly, the West Germans did not reply until November 8, and once they did they suggested revisions making meetings between leaders less a regularly defined institution and requiring that any military coordination include NATO. Still, Adenauer was also anxious to conclude an agreement, and a consensus was ironed out fairly easily. Since Adenauer was committed to retiring by the fall of 1963, he was determined
to make some form of the Franco-German entente a matter of law before he left office as his foreign policy testament to his successors. Since the Bundestag could only ratify a formal treaty, the consensus between the French and German positions was rather quickly transformed into a document signed by Adenauer and DeGaulle in Paris on January 22, 1963.

The Treaty itself consisted of four parts: a Common Declaration and three sections dealing with organization, program and assorted final provisions. The Common Declaration listed basic premises and goals of the treaty:

Convinced that the reconciliation of the German people and the French people, bringing an end to the age-old rivalries, constitutes a historic event which profoundly transforms the relations of the two peoples,

Conscious of the solidarity which unites the two peoples both with respect to their security and with respect to their economic and cultural development,

Observing particularly that young people have become aware of the solidarity and find themselves called upon to play the determinant role in the consolidations of Franco-German friendship,

Recognizing that a strengthening of the cooperation between the two countries constitutes a vital stage along the road to a united Europe, which is the goal of the two peoples,

Have agreed to the organization and to the principles of the cooperation between the two States as they are stated in the Treaty signed this day.12

The organizations of the treaty imitated those of the Fouchet Plan, though contained several significant revisions. The Heads of State would determine how to implement the program of the Treaty, agreeing to meet at least twice each year for that purpose.13 The Foreign Ministers would carry out the policy directives given by the Heads of State, agreeing to meet at least every three months. Similar meetings were arranged between cultural, defense, and economic ministers. The treaty paid lip service to what would have been the Political Commission under the Fouchet Plan, with the creation of an interministerial commission. At best rather loosely defined, this commission would be presided over by some high Foreign Ministry official, presumably on a rotating basis, and would fill both the
administrative role of the Fouchet Political Commission, and the advisory role of the European Parliament. The text reads:

In each of the countries, an interministerial commission will be charged with following problems of cooperation. It will be presided over by a high Foreign Ministry official and it will include representatives of all the administrations concerned. Its role will be to coordinate the action of the Ministries concerned and to report periodically to its Government on the state of Franco-German cooperation. It will also have the task of presenting all useful suggestions with a view to implementing the program of cooperation and to its ultimate extension to new domains.\(^1^4\)

Significantly, this is the only specific mention of revising and extending the treaty made in the entire document. Unlike the Fouchet Plan, no specific review was called for, and any real progress in the union was left dependent on the goodwill and basic commitment of the two heads of state. As we will see, having this type of commitment appeared to be a questionable prospect even before the treaty was signed.

The Program of the treaty stated basic goals in foreign policy, defense, and education. In foreign policy, the main objective was clearly stated: "The two Governments will consult each other, prior to any decision, on all important questions of foreign policy, and in the first place on questions of common interest, with a view to arriving, insofar as possible, at a similar position."\(^1^5\) Although this point was perhaps the most important goal of the treaty, it proved difficult to achieve from the very first. As we will see, both parties violated the spirit of this objective even before the treaty was signed. The text went on to list specific areas of cooperation, including the work of the European Communities, the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, and significantly, NATO. The two countries also agreed to develop a common position with regard to aiding the underdeveloped countries. Economic cooperation between France and West Germany was to be increased within the framework of the EEC. Cooperation in agriculture, already a substantial issue between the French and the Germans was the first sector cited, along with energy, transportation, and industry.\(^1^6\) For obvious reasons on both sides, cooperation in defense was confined to specific technical areas. Franco-German centers for Operations
Research were to be set up, and exchanges between military staffs were to be increased. Both governments agreed to cooperate in conventional weapons research, with specific proposals to be submitted later.¹⁷

The program for Education and Youth turned out to be the most enduring product of the treaty. Each country agreed to increase the teaching of the other's language, on the theory that such knowledge would become more and more important as the union between the two peoples progressed.¹⁸

Both agreed to consider ways in which academic degrees could be granted equal status in both countries. Joint scientific research was to be increased, through specific proposals were put off to the future. Finally, exchanges between the young people of France and West Germany were to be increased. This goal became institutionalized with the Franco-German Youth Office, which with a generous budget of 50 million francs per year supported fellowships, group exchanges and other youth programs. The number of young people participating in projects funded by this office would reach 400,000 by 1964.¹⁹

A section of Final Provisions cited various concluding points. With no provision for formally extending or revising the treaty, the Foreign Ministers were simply instructed to keep an eye on its progress.²⁰ Governments of EEC members were to be kept informed of the progress of the treaty. A rather vague statement was included giving the two governments the authority to make any revisions they might consider in order toward the application of the treaty. As a significant point for the West Germans, the provisions of the treaty, except in defense, were to apply to the city of West Berlin unless the Bonn government specifically requested otherwise. This was another gesture of French support for the West German position.

For DeGaulle and the French, the broader goals of the treaty were twofold: the attempt to create an Europe des États starting with two key States and the attempt to coax West Germany part of the way out of the American orbit. Couve de Murville sums up the first objective:

The objective of this understanding was both to establish a direct coordination of policies and to conduct a real cooperation in the practical and human orders, to correctly confer its reason to the henceforth fraternal entente between these two peoples.²¹
By creating a union in political and economic spheres between Europe's two oldest and most bitter rivals, DeGaulle hoped to set a compelling example for the rest of the continent. Like the supranationalists, he hoped for a 'spillover effect,' but on which would result in the Gaullist Europe des Etats.

In many ways, DeGaulle attempted to correct many of the unhappy circumstances that brought about the demise of the Fouchet Plan. By surrounding the discussions between the two governments in ceremony and historical significance, DeGaulle could negotiate in an atmosphere of popular acclaim on both sides of the Rhine, rather than in the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion that clouded the Fouchet discussions. Both sides wanted to conclude an agreement quickly rather than risk the lengthy and derisive debate that had helped capsize the Fouchet Plan and would help defeat the British application to the EEC. As another way of making a Fouchet-type union more acceptable, DeGaulle consented to a noticeably weaker document than the first version of the Fouchet Plan. The Fouchet Plan specified the goal of achieving common foreign and defense policies, with the particular path toward a common foreign policy being clearly marked. Institutions, though limited in scope, were clearly defined. The Franco-German Treaty, on the other hand, was more a statement of good intentions. It listed areas of cooperation rather than areas where a common policy would be formed. Ironically, in hopes of making his ideas of Europe more acceptable, DeGaulle weakened their chances of being applied successfully. Alfred Grosser concludes:

It was a treaty based on wishful thinking. In general, a treaty establishes procedures or agreements; here, we find established the desire to arrive at an agreement, which supposes that an agreement did not exist at the time of the signature.22

The second French goal was to loosen, though not remove, West Germany from the American orbit. Contrary to what some of DeGaulle's most vociferous critics believed, he never expected the West Germans to give up their defense ties to the United States. As early as 1958, DeGaulle informed Adenauer that he "considered it perfectly natural that Federal Germany should adhere
unreservedly to the Atlantic Pact."\(^{23}\) The Franco-German Treaty called for cooperation in specific technical areas of defense; it did not call for a common defense policy per se.\(^{24}\) DeGaulle never planned to give West Germany a role in French nuclear policy.\(^{25}\) Rather than an attempt to completely remove the Americans from West Germany, the treaty was a test of whether the Bonn regime would strive toward political independence from the United States, and by implication whether the United States would accept such a policy. Couve de Murville wrote of the treaty:

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\text{It was not a question of Germany having to choose between France and America for the defense of Europe, which would be according to an expression of General DeGaulle, a "poor joke" - The question was to know if Europe, starting with our two countries, would be capable of organizing herself to practice an independent policy, that is to say, one no longer to be subordinate to America, while maintaining the indispensable alliance.}^{26}\]

In Bonn, it seemed to become more and more apparent that some kind of choice between Paris and Washington would be necessary in spite of the Adenauer government's attempts to choose both. Adenauer's diplomatic tightrope would be shaken by internal West German politics and eventually by American pressure. As a direct product of the Cold War, West Germany was more dependent on American support than any other western European country for its very existence. Much more than France, West Germany governed her foreign policy according to Cold War assumptions of the incorrigibility of the Soviet bloc and the imperativeness of American guarantees of protection. Out of very real, though at times somewhat exaggerated fears for their security, the West Germans had generally sought these guarantees at the expense of other foreign policy goals, including the unification of Europe. Fear of the Soviet bloc remained the number one factor in the minds of West German leaders. Adenauer wrote in his memoirs: "I was forever preaching to my people that it was of primary importance that every foreign policy move be viewed with an eye to whether or not it strengthened Russia."\(^{27}\) For the West German leaders leaders, the most effective way to avoid strengthening Russia was to remain as closely tied as possible to the Atlantic Alliance.
The alliance was coming under serious suspicion in Bonn when the Franco-German courtship began in the summer of 1962. With the Berlin crisis still fresh in their minds, many West Germans suspected American promises of protection, remembering the irresolute behaviour the Americans had displayed one year earlier. Adenauer was known to have held Kennedy personally responsible for the building of the 'wall of shame' in Berlin. Adenauer recalls a conversation he had with DeGaulle on the eve of the signing of the Franco-German Treaty:

I am very disturbed by the United States. I do not know what course of defense they plan to follow, when everything changes so rapidly there. The uncertainty began with McNamara's public statements concerning conventional weapons. Next came the Bahama Agreements which are full of loopholes... Ball's explanations before NATO did not satisfy me... Who knows what plans America will have tomorrow? To be sure America does not want to disappoint anyone, but then no one knows for sure what the Americans will be thinking tomorrow... Relations with France, on the other hand, seemed to hold much promise. More than any of West Germany's other allies, the French had remained absolutely intransigent on the status of Berlin. Moreover, Adenauer held some sympathy for the Gaullist vision of Europe, wherein his country would likely be able to wield more influence than it could as a subservient client of America. At a certain level, then, closer ties with the French were certainly worth pursuing.

In the final analysis however, the United States would always hold the key political cards. Unlike France, West Germany could never possess its own force de frappe, and hence the degree of independence from the American nuclear umbrella that DeGaulle enjoyed. Ultimately, Bonn's security would always depend on American goodwill, and neither France nor any Europe des Etats could fill in the gap if the Americans left. To a great extent then, West Germany would always be a hostage of American foreign policy. As we will see later on, the United States would use the diplomatic leverage this position afforded it to lure West Germany away from DeGaulle's plans for Europe.
Complicating the situation still further was the change of leadership about to take place in Bonn. Adenauer's position was steadily on the decline. The Berlin crisis and the Spiegel affair cost Adenauer his majority in the Bundestag and two of his most pro-French ministers, both of whom were replaced by firm Atlanticists. Thus, a situation resulted wherein Franco-German reconciliation, one of the major goals of Adenauer's career, occurred at a time when that career was clearly nearing an end. The heirs apparent, LudwigErhard and Gerhard Schroder, were likely to find this reconciliation less essential that did their predecessor. Thus, the central question of Franco-German relations became to what extent the new West German leaders would pursue Adenauer's attempt to embrace both the Atlantic Alliance and the Gaullist view of Europe, particularly in the face of American pressure against the French.

Even before the treaty could be implemented, several events strongly affected its prospects for success, already far from certain. One event often cited as a primary cause of the failure of the treaty was DeGaulle's infamous press conference of January 14. Contrary to what most accounts report, the press conference did not constitute a 'veto' of the British application, yet DeGaulle did state in explicit and not entirely tactful terms why the negotiations were about to fail. In any case, the press conference seemed at the very least to defy the spirit of the treaty, since Adenauer had received no advance warning. Its timing was indeed unhelpful, just eight days before the treaty was to be signed in Paris. This rather blunt statement of DeGaulle's position and the termination of the negotiations two weeks later seemed to put Adenauer in the position he dreaded most: having to choose between a Gaullist or Atlantic oriented European policy. The exclusion of Britain from the EEC made it especially difficult to advertise the Franco-German Treaty as a step toward European unity, particularly with the Americans, who held Adenauer partly responsible for not taking a stronger stand with DeGaulle. Except for the problems it caused with the Americans and the British, Adenauer himself shed few tears over the failure of the British application, perhaps sensing the battles looming over agriculture in the EEC, and not wanting to increase his problems by having to consider the British position. Though it is
practically never mentioned in the literature on the Franco-German Treaty. Adenauer also violated the spirit of the treaty before it was signed by agreeing to participate in negotiations with the Americans on the Multilateral Force (MLF) without any prior consultation with DeGaulle. The problems of commitment on either side which were to plague the treaty once it was enacted began to show itself here.

When the West German legislature came to ratify the Franco-German Treaty the following May, the future direction of West German European policy began to make itself known. On March 1, the Bundestag approved the treaty on its first reading, though at the same time passing a resolution asking the government to apply the treaty with a view toward certain key foreign policy goals, such as reunification, strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, and the unification of a Europe that would include Great Britain. The Bundestag followed this lead by requiring a Preamble to the treaty listing certain objectives of West German foreign policy — reunification, the inclusion of Britain in the Common Market, and strengthening the Atlantic Alliance — upon which the treaty could not infringe. Significantly, the treaty's first reading in the Bundestag came two days after the Atlanticist Ludwig Erhard was officially chosen as Adenauer's successor. Now that he was a lame duck dependent on a coalition government, Adenauer was in no position to resist the pressure in favor of a Preamble, though he was personally angered by its inclusion. With Adenauer's grudging consent, the Franco-German Treaty including its Preamble passed the Bundestag with no further difficulties.

The Preamble naturally displeased DeGaulle, who recognized the implications it held for West German foreign policy after Adenauer's departure. Still, he kept fairly quiet for the moment, not wanting to risk further problems with the treaty's ratification. Of course, he forbade any Preamble to the French version, and pointed out that the German addition in no way bound France. Couve de Murville summed up the French position:

After the treaty, the context into which the discussions between Bonn and Paris were placed had not changed. The central issues remained: the Soviet Union, Europe, and the United States. The divergences on these issues were well known. The Preamble added by the Bundestag did nothing but underscore them, with
the intention of reassuring those people in the
Federal Republic and elsewhere who worried about
the Franco-German understanding.39

By that summer however, DeGaulle had clearly begun to lose faith in the
treaty's prospects, as evidenced in a dialogue in the press between himself
and Adenauer. At a dinner with French officials at the Elysee on July 2, 1963,
he made his famous remark: "Les traités, voyez-vous, sont comme les jeunes
filles et les roses: ça dure ce que ça dure. Si le traité franco-allemand
n'était pas appliqué, ce ne serait pas la première fois dans l'histoire."
Then, quoting Victor Hugo's Orientales, he quipped: "Hélas! que j'en ai vu
mourir des jeunes filles." Adenauer, an avid rose gardener, and perhaps
more optimistic about the treaty, replied "Les jeunes filles passent
peut-être vite, dit-il DeGaulle, mais non les roses, et je m'y connais."
DeGaulle returned, perhaps with a degree of irony: "Le traité n'est pas eine rose, ni même un rosier, mai une roseraie....une roseraie dure très
longtemps quand on le veut."33

The treaty's prospects dimmed still more during the second half of
1963. The first meeting of the two Heads of State under the new treaty
was held in Bonn on July 4-5. Two weeks earlier, DeGaulle announced the
withdrawal of the remainder of the French fleet from NATO, in his usual
blunt way with no consultation with Bonn. The West Germans expressed their
disapproval, though DeGaulle's move hardly constituted a major shift in
French foreign policy. DeGaulle's intention to remove France from NATO
had been clear for at least five years.39 Despite this unpleasant backdrop,
the two leaders concluded that the meeting had been reasonably successful,
though this seemed in part an attempt to shore up sagging expectations.
Both countries agreed to begin joint development of a vertical take-off
cargo plane, the Transall. The Franco-German Youth Office, discussed
earlier, was created as a result of this meeting, and would prove the
most enduring product of the whole episode. DeGaulle, perhaps wanting
not to aggravate the West Germans with the change in leadership coming
in October, declared himself satisfied with the meeting, and even made a
favorable reference to his talks with Adenauer's heir apparent, Ludwig
Erhard.40
Erhard, who Adenauer had once declared unfit to be Chancellor, did in fact assume that post on October 11. As a supporter of the British proposals for a free trade area attached to the Common Market back in the late 1950's, Erhard remained an outspoken proponent of including Britain in the EEC. He said in a speech in London in January, 1964: "Without Britain, Europe would only be a torso, ... the expression Continental Europe may be a geographical reminiscence, but it is not a political reality." Erhard embraced the Atlantic Alliance even more closely than Adenauer, and could be even more easily seduced by the vague American offers to participate in the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MNF). As for NATO, Herbert Tint observes that: "Erhard appeared to feel the need for NATO in direct proportion to DeGaulle's coolness toward it." Still as leader of a Christian Democrat and Socialist coalition government, he could not afford to offend too seriously the pro-French wings of either party. However, Erhard's Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schröder, felt no such qualms, and repeatedly stated his opposition to DeGaulle. On October 31, only twenty days after Adenauer's departure, L'Express quoted him as saying:

"Gaullist policy, ... has destroyed completely the idea of European unification on a supranational basis, and more and more one is left to believe that the General is seeking French hegemony within a grouping of European states. In studying the recent speeches of the General, the question arises whether we could not re-examine again the problem of Franco-German relations."

Complicating the situation still further was a personality conflict between Schroder and his French counterpart, Couve de Merville. According to Pattison de Ménil: "Relations between the two men were not merely reserved; they were politely, but openly, hostile." Obviously, this antagonism boded ill for the execution of the treaty, which depended so much on the goodwill and good intentions of the leaders involved.

Another factor weakening the Franco-German Treaty throughout 1963 was the overt American pressure against the Gaullist view of Europe. As we noted in Chapter I, schemes multiplied throughout the early 1960's for
a 'Grand Design', an Atlantic Community that would keep Western Europe firmly within the goals of American foreign policy and sagely out of the Gaullist snares. One of the most popular offsprings of the Grand Design was the Multilateral Force (MLF) which, theoretically, would have coordinated nuclear forces under some kind of multi-national command tied to NATO. Never particularly well defined by the Americans, the MLF was nonetheless preached as the only feasible alternative to the various independent deterrents which seemed the logical conclusion of Gaullism. Kennedy's advisor Arthur Schlesinger wrote:

Kennedy agreed with this pragmatic reaction: MLF was the best available tool to reconcile interdependence — the indivisibility of the deterrent — with partnership — the building of a united Western Europe; moreover, it would fill a vacuum into which, otherwise, Gaullism might seep.  

Despite its ambitious goals, the MLF, which DeGaulle labeled privately the 'multilateral force', suffered from contradictions and simple illusions. The Nancou agreements, from which Britain received the Polaris missile and special technological assistance, seemed to imply that all partners would not be treated equally. Also, there was never any question but that the Americans would be the final authority in any version of the MLF. The Americans intended to give the Europeans the appearance of having partial control over the nuclear weapons placed in Europe while keeping the weapons ultimately under American jurisdiction. The French, predictably, were not taken in by the aura that surrounded the MLF and considered it an attempt to split up the Franco-German entente. Couve de Murville wrote:

Washington [with the multilateral force] saw a way to give to the Federal Republic apparent satisfaction, But we also perceived the intention to isolate France in order to lead her to renounce her national armament.  

The Americans made a major effort to get their European allies to accept the MLF in the spring of 1963. Under the leadership of Livingston Merchant, a sales crew of forty American diplomats was organized which made a grand tour of European capitals in its own private jet to win support
for the scheme. For the most part, this support was not overwhelming. Italian enthusiasm was muted due to the instability of internal politics. The British, who hoped to keep a deterrent of their own, were not enthusiastic either. For obvious reasons French support was not expected. Only the West Germans received the project as favorably as Washington had hoped. For Adenauer and his government, the ULF represented the tangible reaffirmation of the American security umbrella that they had been waiting for since the Berlin question began to heat up again in 1958. So great was the West Germans' enthusiasm that they eventually offered to pay 40 per cent of the cost, in an attempt to encourage other allies to join. Such enthusiasm hardly lent itself to what DeGaulle saw as the broader goals of the Franco-German Treaty.

If there was any doubt about Bonn's enthusiasm for such American grand designs, Kennedy's visit to West Germany in June dispelled it completely. Now that Bonn's acceptance of the initiative on the ULF had proven them loyal to American foreign policy, and that the Berlin Crisis was more or less over, Kennedy felt free to become a vociferous defender of West German rights and aspirations. This represented a noticeable shift from his position during the actual crisis. The pinnacle of the whole trip was his celebrated speech in West Berlin on June 26, 1963 when he said: "All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words 'Ich bin ein Berliner'." Whatever these words actually meant in practice after Kennedy left the podium is not entirely clear, but their effect on his audience was absolutely electric. Kennedy himself remarked privately that if at that moment he had asked his audience to march over to the Wall and tear it down, they would have done it. Under less hysterical circumstances, many West Germans favorably compared Kennedy's visit to DeGaulle's visit of a year earlier. While DeGaulle stood behind Berlin much more firmly than did Kennedy back in 1961, he spoke of reunification as the fond but unrealistic dream that it was as long as West Germany remained tied to the Cold War. Kennedy however, knowing that America was prepared to do nothing to revise the status quo in Berlin, was nonetheless willing to perpetuate Cold War rhetoric. The effect was not lost on the West Germans. Die Welt editorialized:
General DeGaulle appealed to the German people last July, and the German people responded wholeheartedly when DeGaulle placed Germany once again within European history and freed her from the past. But the General did not go to Berlin, and he spoke only reservedly of German unity. President Kennedy... must have understood quickly that he could only win the heart of the German people by speaking of what concerns them—the unity of the German people and the freedom of their capital. 52

Though the Franco-German Treaty remained on the books throughout our period, the combined effects of the Preamble, the change in West German leadership and the American intervention weakened it too much for DeGaulle's goals for a Franco-German entente to ever be realized. With DeGaulle unable to outbid the Americans for West German allegiance, relations between Paris and Bonn continued to worsen through the end of 1963 and into 1964. The West Germans remained eager to participate in the NLF, even on a bilateral basis. The new American president, Lyndon Johnson, realizing that the program had no support elsewhere, and being unwilling to risk the political consequences of including Bonn in American nuclear policy on a bilateral basis, quietly laid the NLF to rest in 1964. DeGaulle continued to lose faith in the treaty, as he demonstrated by the diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China in January, 1964, without consulting Bonn. During his press conference on July 23, he lamented the inability of the two countries to make progress in coordinating their positions regarding eastern policy, particularly on Eastern Europe, on Southeast Asia, on the developing countries, or on agriculture. He remained gloomy as to the treaty's future:

...one could not say that Germany and France have yet agreed to make together a policy and one could not dispute that this results from the fact that Bonn has not believed, up to now, that this policy should be European and independent. If this state of affairs were to last, there would be the risk, in the long run, of doubts among the French people, of misgivings among the German people and among their four partners of the Rome Treaty, an increased tendency to leave things as they are, while waiting perhaps to split up. 53
At the end of 1964, Franco-German relations showed a marked, if short-lived upswing. In December the West Germans agreed to a common cereal price considerably lower than their own, and one highly favorable to the French. DeGaulle responded by inviting Erhard as a special guest to the inner sanctum of Gaullism, the château at Rambouillet. By the following February, he referred to their relationship as one of "friendly trust." In March, however, the Italians proposed a summit conference of leaders of the Six to discuss political union. All accepted but the French, who among other conditions required a final agreement on agriculture as a prerequisite. Erhard took the French refusal as a personal affront, having stated publicly that he had DeGaulle's support for a conference of that kind. As the year went on, relations between the two countries became more strained, as the crisis of that summer neared. In the wake of the crisis, the complete demise of the Franco-German Treaty became undeniable. DeGaulle would lament in a press conference on October 29, 1966:

It is quite possible that... our neighbors across the Rhine have lost several opportunities in regard to what could have been the common action of the two nations, because, while they were applying, not our bilateral treaty, but the unilateral preamble that changed all its meaning and that they themselves had added to it, events were progressing elsewhere, particularly in the East and perhaps even in Washington, confusing the facts of the matter as they were at the outset.

The slow death of the Franco-German Friendship Treaty marked the complete rejection of Gaullist ideas by France's partners. For them, Europe had to remain tied to the Atlantic Alliance on American terms to ensure American protection. West Germany, once thought to be the only European country besides France where DeGaulle's vision of Europe had a chance of acceptance, would in time reject it no less decisively than did the other four partners. DeGaulle believed that the Franco-German Treaty failed not because his ideas and goals were incorrect, but because they had not really been tried. Neglecting the role his own particular style of diplomacy played in the failure of the treaty, DeGaulle blamed the whole
episode on a failure of nerve on the part of the West Germans. This failure of nerve involved the rest of France's partners as well. For DeGaulle, the failure of the Franco-German Treaty confirmed his suspicion that Europe had no resolve to be truly independent of the United States. For his own part, if he could not bring about the independence of Europe, he could at least ensure the independence of France. The result of this was his series of diplomatic initiatives to the Communist powers that characterized his foreign policy during the second half of the 1960's. At the same time, he would continue to take such measures as were necessary to protect and complete the economic foundations of a unified Europe, with regard to British participation in the EEC and the agricultural common market.
End Notes to Chapter III

1. For an elaboration on this point, see Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, Chapters 4 and 5, p. 80-125.


12. See Appendix 4, Common Declaration. All subsequent quotes from the treaty come from here as well.

13. Ibid., Organization, subsection 1.


15. Ibid., Program for Foreign Affairs, subsection 1.

16. Ibid., subsection 4.

17. Ibid., Program for Defense.

18. Ibid., Program for Education and Youth.


24See Appendix 4, Program for Defense.

25DeGaulle had in fact rejected in 1958 a scheme wherein West Germany would help pay for the development costs of the force de frappe. He confirmed this during his first meeting with Adenauer. See Pattison de Ménil, Who Speaks for Europe?, p. 93.

26Couve de Murville, Une Politique Etrangère, p. 264.


30See DeGaulle, Memoirs of Hope, p. 177-181.

31See Chapter 4.

32See the interview with Kennedy appearing in L'Express, January 31, 1963

33See Chapters 4 and 5 for a discussion of British agriculture, and how including Britain in the EEC would have complicated West Germany's position in the agricultural negotiations.

34To the author's best knowledge, only one book mentions this point. See Pattison de Ménil, Who Speaks for Europe?, p. 97.

35See Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, p. 315.

36Ibid., p. 316.

37Couve de Murville, Une Politique Etrangère, p. 260.

38L'Année Politique, 1963, p. 280. Translation: DeGaulle: Treaties, you see, are like young girls and roses. They last as long as they last. If the Franco-German Treaty is not applied, it will not be the first time in history. Alas, I have seen the death of young girls. Adenauer: He [DeGaulle] says that young girl pass quickly, but not roses, and I know them well. DeGaulle: The treaty is not a rose, nor a rose bush, but a rose garden... A rose garden lasts a long time, when one wants it to.


41 Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, p. 314.

42 Quoted in Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, p. 328.


45 Pattison de Menil, Who Speaks for Europe?, p. 129.


48 Couve de Murville, Une Politique Etrangère, p. 265.

49 Pattison de Menil, Who Speaks for Europe?, p. 112.

50 Quoted in Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 805.

51 Ibid.


54 See Chapter V.

55 Quoted in Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, p. 335.

56 See Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, p. 335. Note also that the EEC Commission proposals for administering the common agricultural funds were revealed at about this time. See Chapter V.

Chapter IV: The British Question

Of all the issues discussed in the present study, none brought DeGaulle more vilification from his critics than the termination of negotiations on the British entry into the Common Market in January, 1963, for which DeGaulle has been held primarily responsible. Nearly all books dealing with this topic, both general histories and more specific works, advance the same basic argument: DeGaulle 'vetoed' the British application to the EEC, in part to avenge certain indignities suffered by the General during the war, but mainly because the British entry would have threatened French designs for hegemony over the continent.¹ His opposition to British participation during our period is often taken as another example of the way in which DeGaulle stood in the way of those who wanted to build "Europe". The purpose of this chapter is to show that this situation was not as simple as it has often been portrayed. Of course, few would argue that in the long run the exclusion of Britain from Europe was in Europe's best interest, and it is equally difficult to argue that DeGaulle's behavior during the whole episode was beyond reproach. For our purposes, however, it is most important to avoid overly simplistic explanations. DeGaulle's opposition to the British entry involved much more than revenge and megalomania. His notorious press conference of January 14, 1963, was the product of many long-range and immediate causes, both of which will be discussed here. We will see that the French position, while certainly difficult and perhaps even counterproductive in the long run, had a firm basis in the facts of the case. Perhaps the whole episode can be better explained by these facts than by the personality of the French president.

In discussing the long range causes of the failure of Britain's first attempt to enter the European Economic Community, we should have some understanding of Britain's historic relationship to the continent, and how this relationship made Britain's permanent attachment to Europe a particularly difficult task. Generally speaking, we can note that until her conversion to the "European idea" in the early 1960's, Britain intervened in continental affairs only to prevent the hegemony of any one European country. Once some kind of balance was restored, as for example after the Napoleonic wars
and to an extent after the two World Wars, Britain tended to leave the
continent more or less alone, and pursued a worldwide role through the
Empire. In an interview with the *Saturday Evening Post* in 1930, Winston
Churchill summed Britain's perception of her role in Europe:

> We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not compromised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed.

For a time, Britain's experience during the Second World War seemed
to reaffirm her separateness from the continent. Great Britain was the
only West European country whose institutions and traditions were actually
reaffirmed by the war. Unlike the defeated and demoralized nations of the
continent, Britain had withstood the German onslaught in her finest hour,
and had preserved a foothold in the West which made the eventual defeat
of the Nazis possible. It was tempting for the British to believe that
their uniqueness rather than German strategic mistakes or simply geography
had spared them the fate of the continent. The victory seemed to mean
that this uniqueness would be preserved. Assured a place among the victors
with her Empire intact, Britain hoped to preserve some sort of world role,
despite the economic and material damage she had suffered, and the emergence
of the American superpower. Preserving this world role meant that Britain's
separateness *vis-à-vis* the defeated continent would continue.

As Britain's situation both at home and abroad began to deteriorate
soon after the end of the war, the British accepted the *Pax Americana*
as a natural successor to the *Pax Britannica* of the nineteenth century.
This meant continuing to accept the secondary position they held in the
American alliance during the war. Unlike DeGaulle, who opposed what he
saw as American domination from the very beginning, the British preferred
to work closely with the Americans within the Atlantic Alliance. In
finding their niche within the Western bloc, the British hoped to assume
the role of an elder statesman, guiding the superpower to whom they had
helped give birth.³ DeGaulle recalls Churchill's explanation of this pos-
ition in the *Memoires de guerre*:
...in politics as in strategy, it is better to persuade the stronger than to put yourself against him. This is what I am trying to do. The Americans have immense resources. They do not always use them to the best advantage. I am trying to enlighten them, without forgetting, of course, to benefit my country. I have formed a close personal tie with Roosevelt. With him, I proceed by suggestion in order to influence matters in the right direction.

Though often overrated as a harbinger of Franco-British relations during DeGaulle's presidency, his dealings with the British during the war nonetheless offer useful insights into attitudes on both sides of the Channel in the postwar years. DeGaulle certainly never forgot what he considered were the indignities he had suffered at the hands of the British during his time in London as head of the Free French. As a fairly obscure general heading a government-in-exile by virtue of his own initiative, DeGaulle remained at British mercy throughout the war, and was never treated as the guardian of French sovereignty that he believed himself to be. When confronted with British designs for the French territories in Syria, as well as his exclusion from the planning for D-Day and the Teheran and Yalta conferences, DeGaulle could do little more than protest vociferously.

Most humiliating for DeGaulle was an incident he recalled in which Churchill clearly revealed his preference for the American alliance over the possibilities of Europe. He 'quotes' Churchill:

We are going to liberate Europe, but it is because the Americans are in agreement with us to do so. This is something you ought to know: each time we must choose between Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose the open sea. Each time I must choose between you and Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt.

We must, of course, accept DeGaulle's 'quote' with some reservations, considering that he was not always the most objective historian. Still, given the numerous confrontations between the two men, and the choice Churchill might be expected to make between DeGaulle and Roosevelt, we can imagine that he could easily have said something close to DeGaulle's
DeGaulle certainly remembered the incident years later, and recalled it in speeches, at cocktail parties, and even during a meeting with Harold Macmillan at Rambouillet near the end of the EEC negotiations. Beyond the heated circumstances which no doubt provoked the incident with Churchill, the two men clearly recognized the differences between Britain and the continent. DeGaulle summarized the distinction in another and much more calm conversation with Churchill:

"Mr. Churchill and I agreed modestly in drawing this commonplace but final conclusion: when all is said and done, Great Britain is an island; France the cape of a continent; America another world."

Though both DeGaulle and Churchill left office shortly after the war, the distinctness they recognized between Britain and the continent remained a part of British foreign policy for fifteen years after the war. Britain's record during the 1950's hardly supported the claims made during the 1960's of Britain's sincere commitment to Europe. In 1950 the British were invited by French foreign minister Robert Schuman to participate in the negotiations which were to lead to the setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The French government had submitted in draft proposal, the Schuman Plan, which the countries of what would later become the Six accepted as a basis for negotiations. The Schuman Plan called for the official pooling of resources in coal and steel production under a single supranational authority. Consenting to negotiate using the Schuman Plan as a basis meant accepting the principle of supranational authority in advance. The British response could easily have been written by DeGaulle:

"It remains the view of His Majesty's Government that to subscribe to the terms of the draft communiqué... would involve entering into an advance commitment to pool coal and steel resources and to set up an authority, with certain supreme powers, before there had been full opportunity of considering how these important and far-reaching proposals would work in practice. His Majesty's Government are most anxious that these proposals should be discussed and pursued, but they feel unable to associate..."
themselves with a communique which appears to take decisions prior to, rather than as a result of, inter-governmental negotiations.8

By asking for a special status in the negotiations, that of not necessarily accepting the basic supranational principles of the Schuman Plan, the British put a barrier between themselves and the nations of the continent which guaranteed their exclusion from this important first step in economic unification. DeGaulle would probably have taken a stand quite similar to the British, and had he been in power at the time the ECSC might well never have come into existence at all. As it was, however, DeGaulle would accept the ECSC and the other existing communities as a fait accompli when he returned to power, and would in time vigorously defend the economic unification they had helped facilitate. We can note, then, an ironic aspect of the whole episode of Britain's first application. Though DeGaulle and the British shared similar political views on supranationalism, DeGaulle would insist that the British adhere strictly to the economic provisions set up by supranational organizations if Britain was to become a member of the Common Market.

Britain's rejection of participation in the ECSC set a pattern that recurred throughout the 1950's when other European communities were proposed. The British attempt to preserve some sort of worldwide military role, in addition to their usual stand on supranationalism led to their rejection of participation in the supranational European Defense Community in 1952. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden remarked in a speech at Columbia University on January 11, 1952 that joining such a European organization "is something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do."9 At the same time many other European leaders felt in their bones that they could not participate in such an organization without the British, particularly since the proposal included the partial rearming of the West Germans. The British rejection of the EEC contributed to French distrust of the proposal, and in turn made it easier for the French Parliament to reject the Plan, which torpedoed the entire project. Since American Cold War pressure required that West Germany be incorporated in European defense in some way, the Western European Union (WEU) was hastily contrived in which the West Germans would be admitted to NATO under the auspices of a non-supranational military alliance of
Western European states. The British, who accepted participation in this more traditional alliance system, maintained the right to withdraw their four divisions and tactical aircraft if an overseas crisis warranted it.

The British rejected participation in the European Economic Community for the same set of reasons they would require special considerations when they decided to join five years later. In June, 1955, the British were invited to join the Spaak Committee, which was charged by the resolution of the Messina Conference to form specific proposals for a European economic community. Britain did in fact send a representative, the economist R. F. Bretherton, who from the first, in Richard Wayne's words: "pointed out that he was 'neither a delegate nor an observer, but a representative' — presumably to stress Britain's midway position of being neither 'in' nor 'out'". By that November the differing positions between Britain and the nations on the continent became clear, and Bretherton informed the Spaak committee that Britain's Commonwealth ties would probably make it impossible for her to join a common market. Shortly thereafter, Bretherton left the committee, putting to rest any question of Britain participating in the EEC at its birth.

Still, the British hoped to deal with the new community on terms that they deemed more suitable to their economic role in the world, and at the same time resist the protectionist tendencies that community implied. The British government sent a team of negotiators headed by Roger Maudling to organize a free trade area open to all members of the office of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), in which the emerging EEC would act as a single entity. Negotiations began in the summer of 1956. Initially the British effort found support in the low countries and in West Germany, where the enthusiasm of Economic Minister Ludwig Erhard seemed to hold out the possibility of a split in the EEC between the French and the West Germans. Yet as the negotiations dragged on for eighteen months, through November, 1957, and the British continued to insist on many of the guarantees they would ask for when they finally decided to join the EEC vis-à-vis the Commonwealth and British agriculture, many critics began to fear that if the British proposals were realized, the Common Market could dissolve "like a lump of sugar in a British cup of tea." DeGaulle's return to power in May of 1958 sealed the fate of the British initiative. Having obtained West German support during the first meeting between DeGaulle and Adenauer in November, the French proceed to hastily
end the negotiations. The Maudling negotiations foreshadowed later battles over Britain's relationship to the EEC. Here, as later, Britain would press to open up the EEC to its world wide interests, while France would insist that increasing trade between members be the primary goal.

Seeing their initiative defeated, the British proceeded to set up an organization espousing their own economic ideals to rival the EEC. That November, an agreement was signed creating the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) joining Britain, Portugal, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, an economic confederation that became known as the Seven. The EFTA, which Couva de Murville referred to as "les combats d'arrière-garde", offered some of the economic advantages of the EEC without its political implications. As a strictly economic organization dedicated to reducing trade barriers, the EFTA could attract traditionally neutral countries like Sweden and Switzerland. Also, the Seven hoped to organize some sort of collective defense against the challenge of the EEC, whose protectionist tendencies such as the common external tariff threatened to close off lucrative markets. The British had a few reasons of their own for organizing the EFTA. Britain hoped to apply economic pressure to those EEC countries that most depended on trade outside the Six, mainly the Benelux countries and West Germany. With over one fourth of West German exports going to EFTA members, the section of the West German business community that had endorsed the free trade area negotiations initially led by Ludwig Erhard, could exert pressure to make the EEC more amenable to the British designs.

By loosening the West German attachment to the EEC, the British could head off the type of Franco-German cooperation that had helped torpedo the Maudling negotiations. Though the EFTA was indeed viewed as a challenge by the EEC, it helped produce an effect the opposite of that desired by the British when the EEC decided to accelerate the tariff reductions called for by the Rome Treaty. By removing more trade barriers between the Six, Benelux and West Germany would be less tempted to move outward toward the Seven. For its own members, the EFTA never produced results equal to those of the EEC in terms of growth and the expansion of trade between members. The British themselves showed their dissatisfaction with the whole scheme by applying for membership in the EEC only a year and a half after the EFTA came into existence. Nonetheless, the EFTA experience meant that the
"If you can't beat them, join them."

"Si vous ne pouvez vous débarrasser d'eux, joignez-vous à eux."

British would ask another area of special consideration, the economic ties to their EFTA partners, when they began negotiations to enter the EEC.

We see then, that the British record with regard to European integration raised serious doubts as to the plausibility of their alleged conversion during our period. Opposition to the supranational approach led the British to decline participation in the ECSC. The failure of the EDC encouraged the British to believe that Europe could not unite without their consent. When the Six failed to grant sufficient concessions to British interests like the Commonwealth and British agriculture, Britain rejected participation in the EEC, instead setting up a direct challenge with the EFTA. The EFTA experience meant that the British would ask for still more concessions when they did decide to join the Six. Though DeGaulle shared certain ideological similarities on European unity with the British, the fact that France had participated in the European communities from their birth meant that French interests were considered all along as the communities developed. Whereas DeGaulle could help shape the communities' policy from the inside, the British had to ask for special consideration as outsiders. Thus, as the negotiations began, the main issues involved determining to what degree, if any, the attitudes that had caused Britain to reject European unification in the 1950's had changed in the 1960's and how, if at all, these attitudes could be reconciled to the interests of the Six.

The climate of opinion within Britain and in the Commonwealth tended to indicate that the factors that had precluded British participation earlier were still quite strong. Both parties remained politically divided on the issue of joining Europe, and several influential groups opposed any British participation in Europe whatsoever. During the early 1950's, the Labour Party had been traditionally opposed to joining the integration movement on the continent, preferring to concentrate instead on the great socialist experiment taking place at home. Also, as nominal socialists they maintained a certain ideological opposition to what H.S. Chopra calls the "conservative, capitalist, Catholic Europe" which seemed to be emerging. Though these attitudes softened as the years went on, Macmillan's Conservative government never convincingly obtained Labour support for his initiative, and the influence of the anti-EEC forces within the party
"All right, I'll drop out if they let me be 'Miss Europe'."

"D'accord, je me retire s'ils me font Miss Europe."

increased as the negotiations dragged on. Before the negotiations ended, support from Labour had disappeared. Though Macmillan, led the Conservative Party, he confronted a great deal of opposition from that quarter as well. Many Conservatives favored traditional British ideals on free trade which would be undermined by participating in a protectionist Common Market. Conservatives were also more attached than Labourites to the Commonwealth. Through a great deal of maneuvering Macmillan was able to more or less preserve party unity on the question, though at the price of making pledges with regard to EFTA and the Commonwealth which he knew would be difficult to keep if the negotiations were to succeed. The British public at large remained fairly ignorant of the entire Common Market question. In a survey taken in September 1961, one month before the negotiations began, 69 percent of those asked either did not know or answered incorrectly when asked if Britain belonged to the EFTA and/or the EEC. Several trade union leaders expressed opposition, fearing industrial competition from the cartels on the continent which could put certain relatively inefficient British industries at a disadvantage, and undermine British wage standards. Farmers were almost universally opposed, fearing the loss of generous government subsidies called deficiency payments if British agriculture were incorporated into a common market.

Opposition in the Commonwealth was nearly unanimous. The decline in importance to the British economy of the Commonwealth in the decade preceding our period encouraged the Commonwealth countries to cling all the more tightly to those ties that remained. While British exports to the Commonwealth as a percentage of total exports had decreased from 50% to 39% from 1951-1961, the percentage of exports to Europe had increased during the same period from 25% to 32%. In contrast to the anti-western movements sweeping other parts of the world, many Commonwealth countries welcomed an alliance less directly linked to either the United States or the Soviet Union. India under Nehru opposed British entry on the assumption that it would make India, as a member of the Commonwealth, more closely attached to Europe and the Western bloc than their non-aligned policy seemed to allow. India also feared that as Europe became more inward looking, the poorer nations would be forgotten. The nations of the "white"Commonwealth, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, opposed British entry even more strongly, fearing that their huge market for agricultural exports would be closed off. Of the entire Commonwealth,
'Already, mon general, we've discarded our two-party system and got lots of extra new parties... like France!'

"Et déjà, mon général, nous avons abandonné notre système bipartisan et nous avons maintenant des tas de nouveaux partis superflus... comme en France!"

GRANDE-BRÉTAGNE ET MARCHE COMMUN

"Jeun powres Heeth, vos amis du Commonwealth ne reviennent à nous dans les crêtes d'écrit !

(D'après "Punch")

only Cyprus and Trinidad supported the British application. 24

We see then, that Britain's application would have faced major difficulties no matter who had been sitting in the Palais de l'Elysée. To join in the unification of Europe Britain had to dissociate herself from centuries of tradition which separated her from the continent. She had to coordinate her special needs with a unification movement that had proceeded for eleven years without British participation, and at times in spite of it. Even now, the British application faced considerable opposition at home and in the Commonwealth. These problems were not lost on the man who would become the _bête noire_ of the whole episode, General DeGaulle. For DeGaulle, the central issue was whether or not Britain was ready to make the fundamental transitions needed to become a full member of the European communities. DeGaulle's first public mention of the British application was a mixture of caution and optimism. When asked if he approved of the British application, he briefly replied:

> We [the Six] know very well how complex the problem is, but it appears that everything now points to tackling it, and as far as I am concerned, I can only express my gratification, not only from my own country's point of view, but also from the point of view of Europe, and consequently of the world.25

Before considering the immediate causes of Britain's failure to enter the EEC, the negotiations of 1961-1963, we should summarize the reasons behind Britain's decision to join Europe and the advantages Britain hoped to obtain through joining the EEC. Throughout our period, Britain was in the midst of a long and painful transition period which saw the final setting of the sun on the British Empire. With decolonization effectively ending Britain's role as a world power, the British eagerly sought a new role by permanently attaching themselves to the continent. Although nearly all of Britain's former colonies had been granted independence, emotional and economic ties remained strong; the sun had not yet set on Britain's world wide range of commitments. Indeed, _British_ commitments had even been extended through the EFTA venture. Britain hoped to supplement rather than
replace these ties through participation in the EEC. The EEC could provide stimulus to the perpetually sluggish British industry that the Commonwealth and the EFTA could not. The question for the British was how to participate in the economic miracle taking place on the continent without abandoning commitments elsewhere that continued to play an essential role. For the Six, the question was whether or not the British goals could be reconciled with their own.

For the present discussion the negotiations between Britain and the Six will be divided into two periods: the start of the negotiations in 1961 through the summer recess of August, 1962, and from that September through the end of the negotiations in January, 1963. The August recess constitutes a rough dividing line separating the rise and fall of hopes for the negotiations' success. Macmillan announced Britain's intention to seek membership in the Common Market in a speech to the House of Commons on July 31, 1961. In his cautiously worded statement, Macmillan cited various interests which had to be satisfied, noting that no British government:

...could join the European Economic Community without prior negotiation with a view to meeting the needs of the Commonwealth countries, of our European Free Trade Association partners, and of British agriculture consistently with the broad principles and purposes which have inspired the concept of European unity and which are embodied in the Rome Treaty. 26

From the start then, the British made their participation contingent upon the successful coordination of their commitments and the principles of the Rome Treaty, assuming that changes could be made in the existing institutions if their needs required it. After the negotiations had failed, Couve de Murville would assert that Britain considered the provisions of the Rome Treaty secondary, and that "Great Britain requested not, as it is generally believed, to adhere to the Treaty of Rome in terms of its Article 237, but to study with us the conditions in which it could envisage its participation in the Common Market..." 27 The basic issue raised then, was whether or not the Rome Treaty and the institutions it had created could be revised to accommodate the needs of new members. This issue would become more clearly defined as the discussions actually got under way.
During the first seven months of the negotiations, a distinguished British delegation led by Edward Heath provided an extensive survey of the problems Britain faces in entering the EEC. According to Robert Krieiman, the British delegation during this period "seemed largely concerned with educating the Six in the details of Commonwealth production, from Indian cricket bats to Australian kangaroo meat to Bechuanaland customs procedures ...". These elaborate discussions were intended to make the Six more amenable to the concessions that Britain would soon be requesting with regard to the Commonwealth. At the same time, the British delegation went to great lengths to claim their allegiance to the final goals of the EEC, even expressing their consent to the principle of the planned agricultural common market and the common external tariff. Despite the conciliatory, even flattering, pose of the British at the start of the negotiations translating agreements in principle to agreements on paper would prove an exhausting and lengthy task.

Jean Monnet warned that a lengthy process of negotiation could prove fatal to Britain's application. Monnet reasoned that the longer the British stayed out of the Common Market, the smaller the role they would play in shaping its development, particularly with regard to agriculture. If Britain was signed into the EEC quickly on the basis of a commitment to basic principles, it could become too politically embarrassing for her to leave rather than conclude agreements on the technical issues. Also, the French, who had already expressed great reservations about the British entry, would be encouraged to veto the application entirely, a right guaranteed by the Rome Treaty, if the negotiations went on too long. As we will see, after fourteen months of negotiations, after which many of the most difficult issues remained unsolved, this would in fact happen. Realizing that time would work against British entry, Monnet advocated a hasty conclusion of the negotiations after an agreement on fundamentals. In a statement to Agence France Presse on August 1, 1961, before the negotiations had even begun, Monnet said:

The negotiations must move rapidly to avoid creating confusion. It is a mistake to think that wide-ranging negotiations are necessary. We must not let ourselves be impressed by the problems of substance: they are not all that difficult to solve.
A quick conclusion to the talks quickly proved unlikely, considering that neither the British nor the French would consent to Britain entering the EEC without agreement on the huge technical issues that separated Britain and the Six. Of course, a detailed chronological examination of the negotiations is beyond the scope of our purposes here, but a more brief survey can serve to illustrate the problems to be confronted and what the prospects were of solving them. For the first two months the parties debated procedures, finally deciding to concentrate on three major issues: the common external tariff with regard to the Commonwealth, British Agriculture, and the EFTA. In January, the Six moved closer to creating a common agricultural policy, with the agreement of January 14. This immediately complicated the British position, since two of the three main issues concerned agriculture. With the Six moving toward an an agricultural common market on their own, Heath remarked that Britain's position "was like negotiating on a moving staircase." The British also had to contend with what would become a rising tide of apprehension in the Commonwealth, particularly in Canada. In January, Heath began a major attempt to assuage Commonwealth fears by visiting Ottawa, assuring the Diefenbaker government that Britain had no intention of entering the EEC without obtaining sufficient guarantees for the Commonwealth. Probably in reaction to the EEC agricultural agreement, the British moved to speed up the discussions through proposing that serious bargaining on agriculture begin before the end of February. Of course, given the technical complexities of the problems and the unwillingness of the Six to conclude an agreement without solving these problems, the laborious discussions had to continue.

In April, serious discussions rather than exploratory studies seemed to be getting underway. The British delegation submitted a plan for solving the problem of agricultural imports from the Commonwealth, in which the various products would be negotiated individually, and a transition period determined to allow the Commonwealth countries to adjust. According to Couve de Murville, the British originally requested that this period be twelve to fifteen years, obviously a much longer period than those who wanted an agricultural common market completed quickly could accept. The Six at that time were discussing transition a period of seven and a half years. In May, the British submitted proposals to steer the negotiations toward a
'Come on, now—there's plenty of good stuff in our own camp.'

"Allez viens, maintenant — chez nous aussi il y a des tas de bonnes choses."

settlement on imports from the Commonwealth. On manufactured goods, Britain agreed to end Commonwealth preference, provided that the Six negotiate in the upcoming Kennedy Round of tariff reductions with a view toward reducing their own barriers to the outside.37 Agricultural imports could be handled in the same way. On other raw material imports, the British requested "temporary" exemptions or nil duties, from the common external tariff on some twenty-seven items, including aluminium, tin, lead, and journal paper, for which final agreements could be worked out at some undisclosed point in the future.38 That the British stance at this point was not viewed as entirely conducive to Britain's actual entry into the EEC was noted by Adenauer in an interview with the New York Times on May 7, in which he strongly suggested that Britain might not be able to go beyond associate status in the Common Market at this time.39

As the negotiations went into the summer, little progress was made on the issues of nil duties or on Commonwealth agriculture. Perhaps to cover for this lack of progress after nine months of talks, a meeting between Macmillan and DeGaulle was arranged at the château of Champs for June 2-3, 1962. Shrouded in secrecy, the meetings concluded with a rather vague joint communiqué stating continued good intentions of all.

After having confronted their views on the problems of the situation, and confirmed these views and the community of interests that unites France and Great Britain, they expressed their intention to make this spirit prevalent in the examination of the major international problems that they must face. It is in this same spirit that they engaged and in which they have been as following in the negotiations in progress at Brussels.40

Finally, in August, agreement was reached on one major issue, manufactured goods from the 'white' Commonwealth. In this agreement, the common external tariff was to be applied in stages, to be completely in effect by January, 1970. Still, agreement remained as elusive as ever on Commonwealth and British agriculture. Britain continued to defend Commonwealth needs, and scheduled a conference of Commonwealth nations for September 10 to provide assurances. The negotiations were suspended for a summer recess, to resume after the Commonwealth Conference had taken place.
De Gaulle : « Nee hoor ! Die dikke er niet bij ! »

De Gaulle : « Non vraiment ! Pas ce gros-là ! »

As this first section of the negotiations ended, the basic set of
circumstances that would continue until the termination of the negotiations
the next January become clear. After eleven months of talks, agreement
had been reached on only one major issue, the common external tariff for
manufactured goods from the Commonwealth. The agricultural question, either
in the Commonwealth or within Britain, was nowhere near resolution. The
entire issue of Britain's EFTA ties had barely been touched. Still, the
Champs agreement meeting showed that both sides continued to show good faith
and wanted to reach an agreement. The question then became how long this
good will could continue without a significant amount of progress on basic
issues.

The last five months of the negotiations wrestled with these issues,
though with diminishing expectations of success. The Commonwealth Conference
of September 10-19 involved basically an airing of grievances without any
major agreements. Macmillan asked a benevolent neutrality of the Common­
wealth, promising again not to let Britain enter the EEC without safeguarding
their interests. In October, Labour Leader Hugh Gaitskell publicly expressed
his opposition to Britain entering the EEC under the conditions he envisioned
emerging from the Brussels negotiations, thus initiating a new wave of
controversy within Britain. At around this time British deficiency
payments seemed to become an intractable issue in the negotiations, with the
Six considering the EEC subsidy system adequate to meet the expected dif­
ficulties, and the British wanting to either continue the payments indefinitely
or phase them out over a long transition period. Another blow to the nego­ti­
atations came in November, when the four African members of the Commonwealth,
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanganyika, and Uganda rejected association with the EEC under
conditions similar to those enjoyed by the former colonies of the Six. By
December, with no agreement in sight on deficiency payments and other problems
with British agriculture, the EEC Commission special committee on agriculture
headed by Commission vice president Sicco Mansholt was invited to act as
mediator. The Mansholt report was submitted on January 15, 1963, the day
after DeGaulle's infamous press conference, when the demise of the nego­ti­
tiations was all but certain.

One further complication resulted from the Nassau agreements of December
1962, in which Britain was given the opportunity to purchase the Polaris
missile from the United States. The British had been working on their own
missile, the Blue Streak, through the 1950's, but eventually abandoned the project as too expensive. At that time they were promised the chance to purchase an American equivalent, the Skybolt, then in the development stage. By late 1961 and through 1962, as development costs for Skybolt soared, American defense officials began to hint that the project might be dropped altogether. Faced with enormous political embarrassment at home which could have brought down his government, Macmillan sought a substitute from the Americans during a meeting with Kennedy at Nassau on December 18-21, 1962. During these three hectic days, an agreement was worked out wherein Britain could purchase the submarine based Polaris missile and receive special technical assistance in return for coordinating the British force with NATO and agreeing to withdraw it in only in case of a dire national emergency. Though the whole episode is perhaps overrated in terms of the effect it had on the Brussels negotiations, it did produce the kind of Anglo-Saxon collaboration which made the French especially suspicious of the sincerity of Britain's commitment to the continent. The French were in fact invited to purchase Polaris, but without the submarines or warheads which would have made it a viable weapon. Predictably DeGaulle tartly refused the offer in his January 14 press conference, and assailed what he saw as the conspiracy of the Anglo-Saxons of which it was a product.

So, the situation at the time of DeGaulle's January 14 press conference may be summarized as follows: after fourteen months of talks, few tangible results could be shown. Aside from the agreement of the common external tariff on Commonwealth manufactured goods, substantial progress on nearly all of the major issues remained to be made. The British desire to protect Commonwealth and domestic interests in agriculture remained as strong as ever. One might even wonder how much longer the British themselves would have allowed the negotiations to go on under such circumstances. To add to the difficulties, the British had just concluded an agreement with the Americans on nuclear weapons concerning which her would-be European partners were neither consulted nor invited to participate in any viable way. In a sense then, despite the good natured and hopeful rhetoric that surrounded them, the Brussels negotiations constituted a house of cards which would collapse once attacked by a participant unwilling to see them continue under the present circumstances.
If that house of cards needed only a breeze to tumble down, De Gaulle supplied a tornado. In his January 14 press conference, which took place during an actual negotiating session in Brussels, De Gaulle gave one of the more memorable performances of a very theatrical career. As though revealing eternal truth to mortals for the first time, De Gaulle explained how Britain differed from the continent.

England is, in effect, insular, maritime, linked through its trade, markets and food supply to very diverse and often very distant countries. Its activities are essentially industrial and commercial, and only slightly agricultural. It has, throughout its work, very marked and original customs and traditions. In short, the nature, structure and economic context of England differ profoundly from those of the States of the Continent.

De Gaulle went on to assert that Britain could only enter the European Community in a monogamous marriage, which seemed unlikely to take place at the present time:

...it is possible that Britain would one day come round to transforming itself enough to belong to the European Community without restriction and without reservation, and placing it ahead of anything else, and in that case the Six would open the door to it and France would place no obstacle in its path.... It is also possible that England is not yet prepared to do this, and that indeed appears to be the outcome of the long, long Brussels talks.

After consolingly praising once more the key role played by Britain during the Second World War, De Gaulle remarked that: "This very day no one can dispute the fitness and valor of the British." This hollow tribute being paid, De Gaulle rather condescendingly remarked that if Britain one day makes herself acceptable to the Six, "it will be in any case a great honor for the British Prime Minister, for my friend Harold Macmillan, and for his Government to have perceived this so early, to have had enough political courage to proclaim it and to have had their country take the first steps along that path that, one day perhaps, will bring it to make fast to the Continent."

The press conference had a predictable effect on the talks in Brussels. Since according to the Rome Treaty decisions regarding new members had to
C'est vraiment très aimable de la part de M. Macmillan! Comme cela je ne serai pas obligé de payer pour ces photos exclusives de Lord Snowdon! (Copyright Opera House.)

Ce dessin a été publié initialement dans le Daily Express.

"... and what we must do is to be creative and constructive, not vindictive." — Macmillan, 30 January.

"... et ce qu'il faut, c'est être actifs, constructifs, non pas vindicatifs." — M. Macmillan, le 30 janvier.

be made unanimously, the French had a legal right to actually veto the British application if it ever came to a vote. Still, by such a display of theatrics, without consulting any other government, DeGaulle shocked and offended his partners. Jean Ronnet urged Adenauer not to sign the Franco-German Friendship Treaty until the negotiations were reopened. Among journalists and scholars, the press conference unleashed a stream of polemic the basic content of which has not changed to this day. On January 17, Couve de Murville asked the head of each delegation if he believed there was any point to continuing the negotiations. On January 29, with the outcome of any further talks already clear, they were adjourned sine die. The delegation leaders each made brave speeches, including Beath, who reaffirmed Britain's commitment to Europe: "Have no fear. We will not turn our back on Europe. We are a part of Europe through its geography, history, culture, commerce, and civilization. We will continue to work with all our friends to increase the power and the unity of this continent." Still, the British would make their own small gesture of retaliation, by cancelling Princess Margaret's visit to France scheduled for that February.

For their own part, the French believed they simply made a decision that was inevitable, but that none of the others were bold or realistic enough to make. Britain's worldwide commitments had formed a vital part of her national purpose for centuries; completely attaching herself to Europe would require a fundamental and painful transition. The Brussels negotiations gave strong indications that Britain was not yet willing to accept all the implications of this transition. In short, it appeared to the French that negotiations proved that the reasons behind Britain's traditional separation from the continent still applied. Thus, the French saw themselves presented with the option of excluding the British from the European Communities for the time being or of making those communities less 'European' by changing them to suit Britain's particular needs. The French saw their move as preserving 'Europe' as it had been built up to that time. Couve de Murville wrote:

Once again the Head of State [DeGaulle] assumed the responsibility. He stated the evidence and drew the logical conclusion. He got right to the heart of the matter, preferring to assume the rupture rather than to prolong the ambiguities and go on toward ruin, with a final result that
would have been no different; that is to say that in any case it would be incumbent upon France to take charge of the crisis or to take responsibility for the ruin.

Of course, France's partners hardly viewed the situation in the same light. In their eyes, DeGaulle had taken it upon himself to exclude a potential rival who endangered French hegemony over the continent. The failure of the British application constituted a major step in the isolation of France among the Six. This isolation would be completed during an episode that would shake the very foundations of the European Economic Community: the agricultural crisis of 1968-1969.
Endnotes to Chapter IV

1. The most pro-DeGaulle book on French European policy during the 1960's used in the present study, Lois Pattison de Ménil, Who Speaks for Europe?, discusses the British application only as it relates to other issues, never directly.


11. Ibid.


18. Ibid., p. 189-201.


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., p. 193.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.


30 Quoted in Monnet, *Mémoires*, p. 486.


33 Quoted in Mayne, *The Recovery of Europe*, p. 270.


35 Couve de Murville, *Une Politique Étrangère*, p. 400.

36 See Chapter V.

37 The Kennedy Round was a series of negotiations initiated by the United States with the intent of reducing tariff barriers between the countries of the Western Bloc.


39 Ibid.


42. Ibid. p. 576.


45. According to Richard Mayne, various officials listened to DeGaulle's press conference with pocket radios out in the hall by the conference room while the negotiating session was taking place. See Mayne, The Recovery of Europe, p. 274.


47. Ibid., p. 215.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., p. 217.

50. Mayne, The Recovery of Europe, p. 239.


52. Couve de Murville, Une Politique Étrangère, p. 412.
Chapter V: The Showdown: The Agricultural Question and the Crisis of 1965

The evolution of events discussed in the preceding four chapters seemed to point to a showdown between the two visions of Europe. The truce that emerged between De Gaulle and the supranationalists after De Gaulle resumed power in 1958 came apart gradually throughout our period as De Gaulle attempted to realize his vision of Europe des Etats, as it turned out without a great deal of success. With the Gaullist attempt to create a Europe des Etats having failed, the time seemed appropriate for a supranationalist counterattack. The long delayed solving of the agricultural question seemed to provide an unusually good opportunity for this counterattack. De Gaulle had long considered the setting up of an agricultural common market the number one goal of the EEC in the economic sphere, and had often threatened to leave the EEC if this failed to materialize. The EEC Commission, headed by Walter Hallstein, supported the inclusion of agriculture in the Common Market, but in return wanted concessions from De Gaulle which would allow the strengthening of the supranational institutions. Yet at no time during our period did De Gaulle indicate that he considered such concessions possible, or even that he intended to comply with a political provision already written into the Rome Treaty: the institution of majority voting in the EEC Council of Ministers. We see then, that the situation pointed to either a landmark compromise or an unprecedented battle between Gaullist France and her European partners.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine what happened when the Gaullist and EEC positions collided, resulting in the crisis of 1965. First the basic economic problems of the agricultural question will be discussed, explaining what an acceptable solution to the French actually constituted. Secondly the political positions of the protagonists will be explained, those of the French, the West Germans, and the EEC Commission. The gradual resolution of the economic situation will then be discussed, showing how most of the French requirements were satisfied. Next, we will see how the attempt of the Commission to collect political concessions in return for the economic solution actually precipitated the crisis by putting the French and the EEC Commission in clear opposition. Finally, we will show that although De Gaulle won a short run victory, the failure of the supranational initiative deepened the rift between France and the five, creating an uneasy stalemate between the two
visions of Europe that would remain until DeGaulle left office. If DeGaulle's policy of the 'empty chair' could stop the supranationalists, it could not create an Europe des États.

The basic economic problems may be summarized as follows. On the surface the situations of France and her partners seemed complementary. West Germany, cut off from the traditional agricultural regions in the East, and beset with overly decentralized and inefficient farms, had to import $2.5 billion worth of food the year the Common Market opened in 1958.\(^1\) The Direction Générale l'Agroulture of the EEC estimated in that year that West Germany’s need to import food would increase by 1970.\(^2\) Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands had to import food during this period as well. France, on the other hand, had to deal with markets increasingly glutted with domestic surpluses. The government-assisted modernization plan of 1959-1961 had resulted in massive overproduction and the depression of farm incomes due to low prices. French farmers showed their frustration in a protest in May, 1961, in which they blocked highways with unsold surpluses. The only hope for increasing French farm income was to find new markets. Their markets of EEC members seemed to be the logical solution. However, the world market was dominated by such agricultural superpowers as the United States and the "white" Commonwealth, making world prices lower than French farmers could attain except through massive subsidies.

The crux of the whole agricultural problem during our period is that although French prices were lower than those of her partners, they were still noticeably higher than world market prices. France’s partners naturally preferred to buy from the world market. Although France was exporting more food to Community members than previously, the French saw much room for improvement. In 1958, French agricultural exports to the five constituted 19% of total French agricultural exports, while in 1961 this figure was 32%.\(^3\) Still, imports from France as a percentage of each country’s total agricultural imports remained small.\(^4\)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EEC member</th>
<th>French imports as a % of total agricultural imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The French hoped to increase these percentages through the establishment of Community preference. Establishing Community preference involved getting the five to pay the differences between French prices and world prices, and in effect to subsidize what on a world scale was the relative inefficiency of French farmers. Though the principle of an agricultural common market held much support from proponents of European integration, subsidizing French farmers represented an unattractive prospect for France's partners. We might take note that had Britain entered the Common Market at this point, the problem would have been even worse, given huge British imports at low prices from the Commonwealth.

Throughout the negotiations, the French would demand swift progress on creating an agricultural common market as an essential step toward completing the Rome Treaty. For De Gaulle, the vague set of promises in the Rome Treaty clearly showed how the ineffectual negotiators working under the previous Republic had failed to safeguard the vital interests of France. De Gaulle wrote in Les Mémoires d'Empain:

It must be said that in this respect the spirit and terms of the Treaty of Rome did not meet our country's requirements. The industrial provisions were as precise and explicit as those concerning agriculture were vague. This was evidently due to the fact that our negotiators in 1957, caught up in the dream of a supranational Europe and anxious at any price to settle for something approaching it, had not felt it their duty to insist that a French interest, no matter how crucial, so should receive satisfaction from the outset.⁵

As a result, agricultural provisions in the Rome Treaty were, in Coute de Merville's words, "limited to a number of pious voms."⁶ In turn, progress toward creating an agricultural common market lagged years behind the progress made in industry.

Considering the prominence of agriculture in the French economy, the
French negotiators continually stressed the special consideration agriculture needed in the Common Market. In industry, the normal capitalist mechanisms were able to produce a fairly stable equilibrium with a relatively low level of governmental intervention. Agriculture, on the other hand, much more dependent than industry on the whims of nature, needed more regulation to ensure equilibrium. Though the resulting technical problems involved in creating an agricultural common market in Europe were much greater, the French believed that a Common Market not including agriculture was not complete and hence one in which France could not participate. All the agricultural negotiations during the early 1960's occurred under a running French threat to withdraw from the European Communities entirely. The alternative to such a departure was Community preference in agricultural goods, with all the economic readjustments that this implied for France's partners. A French came to connect a commitment to Community preference to a commitment to Europe. The British, who imported such a large percentage of their agricultural products from the Commonwealth, were judged unfit to join Europe on this principle. The five partners of France had to be judged on the same principle, the verdict determining whether or not France would continue to participate in the EEC.

DeGaulle knew that the five, particularly West Germany, would go to great lengths to make sure that this participation continued. European integration could and indeed had proceeded without Britain, but it would collapse without France. DeGaulle gambled, correctly as it turned out, that the five would prefer French participation without political concessions to no French participation at all. In West Germany, with both the Christian Democrats and the Socialists publicly committed to the principle of economic integration, DeGaulle held a certain amount of rhetorical leverage over Erhard's shaky coalition. Appeals to completing the Rome Treaty with regard to agriculture carried influence in other EEC member capitals as well, particularly considering the support DeGaulle received at the outset from the EEC Commission. Finally, DeGaulle saw the establishment of an agricultural common market as a way to restore the balance of advantages obtained by the European Communities. As one of the world's major industrial powers, West Germany, even in its truncated form, had been better able to take advantage of the industrial provisions of the EEC than the more agriculturally oriented France. Since
West Germany would be the EEC member forced to pay the most for Community preference as the greatest importer of food among the Six, concessions from Bonn were seen as particularly crucial to obtaining an agreement in agriculture. DeGaulle said in a speech in 1961:

The Common Market is entre le pist et le mest. [at the point of decision] We have done a great deal for Germany: the ECSC, Euratom, the EEC. It's really time for her to do something for us.7

The West German position centered around trying to obtain the greatest political gains at the smallest economic costs. As the EEC member forced to pay the most to establish Community preference, the West Germans were anxious to have the economic provisions of the agricultural common market as weak as possible. Making West German agriculture competitive, as it would become in the 1970's, would require major dislocations highly unpopular with West German farmers. The farmers, traditionally a Christian Democratic stronghold, were crucial to the preservation of Ludwig Erhard's fragile coalition government. So, for both political and economic reasons, the West Germans wanted the agricultural common market set up over as long a period of time as possible.

Still, the West Germans would lead the fight for political concessions when the crisis actually got underway in 1965. Strengthening the supranational institutions was important to the West German for several reasons. First was no doubt the genuine commitment of Erhard and Schröder to the ideals of supranationalism as the best way to unify Europe. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the West Germans hoped to increase the power of the supranational organizations as a way to check what DeGaulle's most vociferous critics called the spread of French hegemony over the continent. With Adenauer's departure came the end of the period of West German ideological sympathy and cooperation with DeGaulle's vision of Europe. The new leaders, Erhard and Schröder, sought closer ties to the United States as a way to ensure West Germany's protection at the expense of the Franco-German entente. Essentially this meant abrogating the Franco-German Friendship Treaty after Adenauer finally left the scene.8

The new Bonn government hoped to increase the role of the Brussels institutions as a way to tame French influence in Europe. In a supranational
"ich esse meine Suppe nicht -- nein, meine Suppe ess' ich nicht!"

"Je ne mange pas ma soupe -- non, ma soupe je ne la mange pas."

organization whose authority was theoretically independent of the states, West Germany's economic strength could improve her standing among her partners, particularly if the agricultural provisions were not too costly. 9 By asserting themselves within the EEC, the West German hoped to facilitate the entry of Britain, thus adding another check to the French. Finally, Erhard needed some kind of diplomatic success to shore up his position domestically. Never as stable as its predecessor, the Erhard coalition was coming under increasingly heavy criticism near the end of our period from the pro-French wing of the Christian Democratic Party, led by Franz-Josef Strauss. If a victory over the French on Community institutions could be achieved without destroying Erhard's support among West German farmers, these heretics could be quieted and Erhard's position strengthened.

The perspective of the EEC Commission can be summarized quite easily. If the French wanted an agricultural common market without political concessions, the West Germans wanted with political concessions, and a weak agricultural common market; the Commission wanted both political concessions and a strong agricultural Common Market. As a supranational body dedicated to realizing the fullest implications of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission supported the agricultural common market for obvious reasons. The Commission would play a key mediating role during the agricultural negotiations from 1961-1964, often supporting the French position and working for compromises from the West Germans. But in return, the Commission expected progress in strengthening the political power of the Community, and Commission proposals to this effect would actually set off the crisis of 1965. The Commission was anxious to expand its role as an arbiter among the states, and hoped to have a chance to do this when majority rule voting would come into effect in the Council of Ministers in 1966.

The Six did not seriously set about creating an agricultural common market out of the 'pious set of vows' contained in the Rome Treaty until 1961. Throughout that year, the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and a special agricultural committee worked on various proposals for regulating the markets of particular products. The French remained fairly quiet until June, perhaps not wanting to cause problems for the upcoming Fouchet negotiations. In June, however, the French informed the Community that France would not participate in the next set of tariff cuts already agreed upon by the Six unless substantial
progress were made on an agricultural agreement by December 31, 1961. Premier Michel Debre expressed the French government's dissatisfaction with the lack of progress before the National Assembly that June:

No real progress... has been registered, but we have taken note of the accumulation of the Byzantine contentions on interpreting the clauses of the treaty.... All our effort will lead towards getting the first agreement accepted, and towards the creation of new commercial currents, thanks to longlasting contracts. We should be conciliatory, but we should not be dupes.10

Despite this warning, no substantial progress was made until December. Seeing good prospects for an agreement toward the end of the year, the Six agreed to 'stop the clock' and continue negotiating past December 31.

Finally, after an intense series of meetings lasting from January 4-14, the Six finally reached an agreement at 5:23AM on January 14, which when finally realized would cover 55% of Community agricultural production.11

On cereals, the products that would cause the greatest problems throughout the agricultural negotiations, a mechanism was devised which would guarantee cereal prices throughout the Community. A target price would be set which would represent the market price at the desired equilibrium ($P^*$). If the market price fell to a certain degree below the target price, to the point designated as the intervention price ($P'$), the Community would agree to purchase surpluses until the target price was restored. The target price would be set annually for each country during the 7½-year transition period, at the end of which annual prices would be set for the Community as a whole. Levies on imports were to be unified through the establishment of a threshold price, which would equal the target price minus certain transportation costs. The amount of the levies would equal the threshold
price minus the lowest world price. Farmers could export cereals at the world price, receiving a subsidy covering the difference between the domestic price and the world price. During the transition period the Community would pay the farmers part of the difference in prices between EEC members, but only a part to ensure movement toward Community preference. Other markets were to be coordinated through less elaborate means. For pork, eggs, and other poultry products, the Community would establish a minimum price related to cereal prices, and control imports through levies. This simplified version of the cereal solution would be applied to the fruit and vegetable markets as well. Import quotas on wine between the Six were to be raised considerably.

The West Germans made several key concessions and had received some special favors in return. Their most important concession was consenting to the cereal price support mechanism discussed earlier. All the traditional devices for protecting the West German farmers, import quotas, government purchase of surpluses, and tariffs, had to be discarded over the course of the transition period. Their only protection was the target price, which in their interest should be set as high as possible. In what was the greatest concession for the French and for the Commission, it was agreed to set the target price at some date in the future, which as it turned out would not be until the end of 1964. Essentially, this meant that although the mechanism for the Common Market in cereals had been agreed upon, it could not actually come into effect until the target price was set. As another concession to Bonn, a seven and a half year transition period was agreed upon, longer than either the Commission or the French had wanted in the beginning. (Though it was a much shorter period than the British, who by now were negotiating to enter the EEC, had in mind.)

Although the 1962 agreement had great significance as the first real attempt to incorporate agriculture in the Common Market, it left many problems unsolved. Besides the setting of the common target price, which would not take place until nearly three years later, the entire issue of financing the large subsidies that would be paid out by the Community was barely approached. An organization for distributing the common subsidy fund, the Fonds Européen d'Orientatlon et de Garantie Agricole (FEDGA), was set up to subsidize exports until further agreement was reached and was financed by national contributions rather than by revenues from levies on imports. This was another concession to the West Germans, to whom a system of funding based
on levies on imports would have been especially costly. How the fund would function once the agricultural market came fully into existence remained to be decided. Proposals to manage this fund submitted in the summer of 1965, heavy in their political implications, would touch off the crisis. For the time being, however, so many difficult issues remained to be solved that the 1962 agreement, which in and case only covered just over half of Community agricultural products, must be considered to a large extent only an agreement to agree. In January, 1963, the Six promised to extend the proposed agricultural union by December 31, 1964.

This extension resulted after another marathon negotiating session from December 18-23, 1963, which followed two years of less successful talks. This "miracle of Brussels" as it came to be called, seemed to confirm what turned out to be an erroneous impression that the Six could solve any issue if their representatives were locked in a room for a long enough period of time. The pressure to conclude an agreement came from DeGaulle, who again brandished a threat to have France leave the Common Market if an agreement proved impossible before the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations opened in the spring of 1964. DeGaulle stated this threat in his press conference of July 29, 1963, again using his partners desire to conclude an agreement on agriculture as a test of their commitment to building Europe.

... an agreement must be concluded for the reason that the tariff negotiations between the United States and Europe are due to open the next spring and that in the face of the storms which will not fail to come up on that occasion, it will be necessary then that the Common Market be standing on its feet, complete and assured, or that it disappear.

Thus the year 1963 is decisive for the future of a united Europe. If, at the heart of the world, a real community is established between the Six in the economic domain, it may indeed be thought that they will be led more than they are to organize themselves in order of conduct together a policy which is European.

The 1963 agreement, which included arrangements for 85% of Community agriculture were substantive enough for DeGaulle to claim that sufficient progress had been made to suspend his threat to leave the EEC, while still failing to solve the most difficult issues. As in 1962, an agreement had
— Y a-t-il encore des morceaux, monsieur? Je ne mange pas d'ordinaire tout seul.
been reached through concessions from the French and the West Germans. The West Germans agreed to bring their beef and dairy prices into line with a price established by the Community by the end of a transition period beginning on January 1, 1970. Most importantly, they agreed to completely turn the subsidizing of agricultural exports over to the Community by 1970. Funds for these subsidies would come from a combination of the revenues from levied on imports and from national contributions. This was the commitment to indirectly subsidizing French exports that Bonn had been reluctant to make in 1962. The main French concession was agreeing to postpone settlement of the two biggest unsolved issues: setting the common cereal prices and the operation of the common agricultural fund. The Six agreed to postpone consideration of the Marshall Committee's proposals for common cereal prices until the spring of 1964. Discussion of managing the common fund was avoided more or less entirely. Lois Pattison de Ménil has observed that the 'miracle of Brussels' was in fact "an epithet more revealing of the dreaded apprehensions of deadlock than a commentary on the actual agreement. The West Germans finally yielded, in principle, but the principle was to postpone the clash."

During 1964 the economic provisions of the agricultural common market were mainly settled, making way for the political battles that were about to begin. Most of the year was spent negotiating the common cereal price. Predictably, these negotiations proceeded under a running French threat to withdraw from the EEC if a solution satisfactory to them could not be reached. Premier Georges Pompidou stated on November 5:

The agricultural common market must be completed, failing which the industrial common market will perish. The problem is not to know whether or not we will leave the European Economic Community. If France, at one time or another, considers the Common Market mortally wounded in its soul and in its deep potentialities, well, it will die a natural death, regardless of the texts and terms which have been provided for application and which, at that time could not be applied."

In West Germany the whole agricultural question remained a highly political issue, both internally and externally. Facing elections in the fall of 1965 in the Bundestag, the Erhard government was particularly anxious not to alienate
its strong support among the farmers. Agricultural Minister Werner Schwartz told the Bundestag on February 4, 1964 that the West German government would not consent to lowering on cereal prices during the next year. When Freye-Josef Strauss's pro-French wing of the Christian Democrat Party made an organized attempt to attack Erhard's European policy within the CDU that summer, they were rebuffed by the Party as a whole. Erhard's policy of delaying a final agreement on agriculture seemed to be paying off at home. Two problems with the 1962 agreements foreshadowed Bonn's position toward the end of 1964. In December 1963, Bonn informed the EEC that the price agreement on apples which were to take effect of January 1, 1964 could not be applied with unduly damaging West German producers. The Commission ruled to give the West Germans until January 12 to comply with the agreement, and this decision was upheld by the Council of Ministers. The West Germans conceded, but attempted a similar move with regard to eggs in February. The Commission concluded that the West Germans' egg troubles were due to domestic rather than external factors, and ordered them to comply with the previous agreement immediately. Again the Council of Ministers agreed with the Commission and the West Germans conceded. Thus, twice in one month period, the West Germans had tried to circumvent the existing agreements, raising doubts as to their commitment to any agricultural common market at all.

Bonn's position on the agricultural common market was more clearly revealed in the proposals submitted by Agricultural Minister Werner Schwarz for setting a common cereal price. These proposals included the setting of the Community wheat price at 440 DM/ton, meaning a reduction of 35 DM/ton, to be set into place on July 1, 1967. The proposals suggested 700 million marks of Community funds in compensation for West German farmers, to be supplemented by funds from Bonn. Also, the West Germans suggested that all decisions regarding agriculture not be determined by majority voting in the Council of Ministers, which was supposed to take over on January 1, 1966. This hardly coincided with the supranational ideals the West Germany claimed to espouse. French objections to majority voting are often used as proof positive of their lack of 'European spirit', but we might note that the French position on majority voting had a precedent with one of her partners whose 'European' credentials were supposedly pristine.

The Six agreed on a common wheat price in the same hectic, pressured manner
in which they had reached the previous agreements. The Mansholt Committee suggested its own set of guidelines.A Community wheat price of 425 DM/ton to begin on July 1, 1966, with 560 million marks in compensation.23 These proposals were 15 DM/ton lower in compensation than the West German proposals. The two plans were reconciled in an all-night bargaining session taking on December 14-15. The Six agreed to a price of 425 DM/ton but accepted the West German date of July 1, 1967 for implementation.24 A provision was included allowing the common price to rise with the cost of living. A fairly small sum in compensation was agreed upon, roughly half the amount included in the Mansholt proposal, but the Community members were allowed to supplement these subsidies at their own expense.25 This meant that the Erhard government, facing elections in the fall of 1965, could maintain its base of support among the large number of Christian Democrat farmers, if it chose to bear the additional expense. With the wheat price settled, the other cereal prices were agreed upon fairly quickly. The only major issue that remained was establishing provisions for regulating the common fund. Apparently taking a lesson from the preceding agreements, in which a series of marathon sessions had produced a settlement, the Six promised to agree by July 31, 1965, to reach an agreement on the regulation issue.

To sum up the agriculture talks so far, we can note that by the end of 1964, the French had gotten most of what they wanted in creating the agricultural common market. Community preference was to be established through the setting of common prices highly favorable to French farmers. Levies from the substantial food imports to West Germany would subsidize French farmers, since the French would receive far more than they would contribute from the common fund. The French, by forcing her partners to import foodstuffs at a price higher than the world price, could claim satisfaction for what they considered they proportionally greater benefits their partners had received from the Communities already in place. Even DeGaulle would declare himself pleased with the results, noting the possible political implications of the agreements. Couve de Murville said in a speech to the French ministers on the day after the agreement was reached:

General DeGaulle expressed in conclusion the wish that the same state of mind, which had allowed the six States to make this key step in that which concerns economic Europe, to go much further on a political plan.26
LE DESEIN DU JOUR, par Jacques FAIZANT

ET QUAND IL COMMENCERA À MARCHER, ON L'AURA 
TOUT LE TEMPS DANS LES JAMBES!

The Commission, of course, had its own ideas about the political implications of the agricultural agreement, specifically with regard to the common fund. Now that the economic side of the issue had been decided on terms highly favorable to the French, it was up to the French to provide corresponding concessions on increasing the authority of the supranational communities. The Commission planned certain proposals to that effect which, combined with the application of majority voting in the Council of Ministers, would have constituted the greatest advance in the supranationalist cause since the EEC came into existence in 1957. In revealing their plans, the Commission hoped to beat DeGaulle at his own game. Commission president Walter Hallstein opted to set these proposals before the deadline at a session of the European Parliament of March 23, rather than through traditional diplomatic channels or even through the Council of Ministers meeting scheduled for April 8. To DeGaulle, this confirmed his suspicions that Hallstein imagined himself at the head of some imaginary super-state, submitting his program to the legislative branch of his government for approval.

The Commission's proposals included three major areas. Part I involved financing agricultural subsidies during the two year transitional period. The FEOGA would pay for two thirds of the subsidies during the first year, five sixths during the second year, and the entire cost by July 1, 1967. Part II, dealing with EEC finances from 1967 on, contained the most daring proposals. In 1967 it was expected that levies on agricultural imports would not produce enough revenue to completely pay the costs of agricultural subsidies; the Commission proposed that industrial duties be paid directly to the EEC, which would be responsible for making up the deficit. In future years, when it was expected that industrial and agricultural levies would far exceed the costs of the subsidies, the EEC could either use those revenues toward other projects or return them to the States. Part III gave the European Parliament the power to approve the EEC budget. Also included was a proposal which said that only agricultural exports included in Community trade agreements would be eligible for Community subsidies. This was a clear attack at French plans to sell wheat to the Soviet Union and to the People's Republic of China. The effect of these proposals, particularly when
combined with the institution of majority voting in the Council of Ministers is quite clear. The EEC would become the powerful supranational body its founders had envisioned in the 1950's. It would possess an income totaling billions of dollars, and would exercise exclusive control over agricultural and industrial tariffs. Majority voting would place further restraints on the recalcitrant French. The nation-state would at last be dealt a severe blow.

Somewhat surprisingly, the French did not withdraw immediately, and in fact tied for three months to work out a compromise. The French in fact favored paying revenues from levies directly into the FEOGA, but opposed allowing the EEC control over that fund. On June 14, Couve de Murville submitted counterproposals illustrating the French position. At the same time, the French sought support from the West Germans, who themselves had great reservations about the Commission proposals, since if industrial levies were included they would be paying for 39% of the EEC's revenue. Couve de Murville's proposals delayed the paying of levies directly to the EEC until 1970; in the meantime the FEOGA would continue to be funded by direct national contributions. This would effectively deflate the Commission proposal for expanding the prerogative of the European Parliament, since the Community's revenue would continue to be controlled by the States. The main issue then was getting the five to accept the continuance of national funding until 1970. Of course, this also meant delaying the broader supranational implications of the Hallstein proposals for at least five years.

During the Council of Ministers meeting of June 30 attempts to come to an agreement broke down completely and the crisis came to a head. The Italian and the Dutch delegations resolutely refused to accept longer than a two year period until the Community was financed through agricultural and industrial levies. Carl Friedrich claims to have learned from "unimpeachable sources" that the actual break came when the Erhard government suddenly reversed its position on an agreement previously worked out with the French on industrial tariffs. DeGaulle, feeling double crossed, ordered the negotiations terminated. For whatever reason, such agreement as had previously existed between Paris and Bonn broke down, and as Pattison de Ménil writes: "in the context of a general atmosphere of pandemonium", the session ended. The French began their policy of the "chaise vide" (empty chair), withdrawing
their permanent representatives in Brussels shortly thereafter, and ceasing most of their participation in work groups.

The larger issue at stake was no less than the long awaited showdown between the two visions of Europe. The split between France and her partners that had been evolving even since the rejection of the Fouchet Plan now evolved into a state of open warfare. The Commission, having granted France a very generous settlement in agriculture, now expected real concessions with regard to the authority of the supranational organizations. With a spirit more reminiscent of the 1950's than of our period, the Commission presented the Six with an extremely ambitious set of proposals in a manner which seemed to deliberately provoke that hostile enemy of supranationalism, General DeGaulle. The crisis, actually precipitated by the Commission proposals, was a test of whether DeGaulle could successfully defy all five of his partners on the future of the Community, and if he were unsuccessful, whether DeGaulle would actually assume the internal and external risks of permanently leaving the Community.

For their own part, the French considered the settlement on agriculture a right merited by the unequal advantage given to industry rather than a privilege granted by the Commission and the five, and that concessions on supranational authority were neither appropriate nor possible. The French placed the blame for the crisis squarely on the Commission, whose unexpected assault on the nation-state jeopardized France's vital interests. DeGaulle said in his press conference of September 9, 1965:

...the intervention of this body, the Commission which is essentially consultative and whose members have never, in any country, been elected for that purpose, would only aggravate the usurpatory character of what was demanded. Be this as it may, the combination—premeditated or not—of the supranational demands of the Brussels Commission, of the support that several delegations declared themselves ready to give them, and finally, of the fact that some of our partners at the last moment went back on what they had previously accepted, forced us to bring the negotiations to a close.

To DeGaulle, the crisis represented the inevitable clash between the supranationalists and the realists. France's partners had shown themselves unwilling to include agriculture, a vital interest of France, in the Common
Market without accompanying provisions which would have made French protection of this vital interest impossible. As DeGaulle put it:

"France would be prepared to see her hand forced in any economic matter—therefore social and often even political—and, in particular what would have seemed gained in the agricultural area could be, despite her placed at stake at any moment."

To DeGaulle, the majority voting clauses placed in the Rome Treaty, was an unworkable way of solving Community problems when one member's vital interests were at stake. The Dutch had demonstrated this fact in a less dramatic way by their rejection of the Fouchet Plan. DeGaulle confirmed it by the present crisis. On major issues, the unanimity rule was a fact of life. Couve de Murville writes:

"It is clear that nothing can be accomplished without the agreement of all the participants: the success of the Common Market is a daily illustration of this; the failure up to the present time to create a political union is, negatively, further proof."

The proposals of the Commission to extend the authority of the supranational apparatus and the application of majority voting in the Council of Ministers represented the antithesis of DeGaulle's ideas for an Europe des États. Without any devise for obtaining popular approval, the States were expected to cede authority to the supranational organizations. For her part, France, determined to have final say in the defense of her vital interests, could not participate in the work of the Communities under these circumstances. DeGaulle said in his September 9 press conference:

"This claim of supranational authority was held by a technocracy, for the most part foreign, destined to infringe upon France's democracy in settling problems that dictate the very existence of our country, obviously, could not suit our purposes once we were determined to take our destiny into our own hands."

Whether or not DeGaulle could have actually made good on his threat to leave the Community permanently is not clear. On the one hand, France's
withdrawal from NATO seemed to demonstrate that DeGaulle would remove France from any organization that threatened her sovereignty, no matter how crucial that organization was to other French interests. At the time, DeGaulle seemed more than willing to remove France from the supranational Europe, betting that his vision of Europe des États would triumph in the end. To him, it seemed another example of the leader's vision exceeding that of those around him, and of the leader making an unpopular decision at the time in hopes of eventual vindication. In practical terms however, DeGaulle still held one valuable card: the EEC without France would inevitably become only a shell, despite loose talk at the time about inviting Britain to fill in the empty chair. The EEC seemed to need France more than France needed the EEC, and seemed likely to compromise if France remained obstinate.

On the other hand, DeGaulle found himself paying a heavy political price for his policy of the chaise-vide, both at home and abroad. For the five, impressions of DeGaulle as an obstinate old fool who would single-handedly stop the building of Europe seemed to be confirmed. More easily than ever before, DeGaulle could be portrayed as opposing Europe in favor of old-fashioned nationalism. Vilification of DeGaulle in the European press reached new heights. However, the most severe political costs to DeGaulle were incurred at home. As the crisis continued into the fall, it became more of a factor in the presidential election slated for December. DeGaulle's empty chair policy was extremely unpopular even within France. No doubt believing that DeGaulle would indeed carry through his threat to leave the community permanently, and fearing the loss of enormous economic benefits at what seemed a fairly small political cost, public opposition to DeGaulle mounted. Even the farmers would turn against DeGaulle, in a stinging statement issued in October by the Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles:

What is at stake in the present crisis is not only the future of economic Europe, but of political Europe as well. The realization of the Common Market calls for the ultimate realization of a politically united Europe, which remains the hope of the European peoples. France has fixed her signature to the Treaty of Rome; she cannot remove it. Certainly, she has the right to discuss the modalities of a European construction that must be realized in a community spirit, but for this discussion, France must bring no assumptions contrary to the Treaty of Rome. The farmers demand this with insistence.
Public dissatisfaction with the empty chair policy reached its climax in the presidential election that December. Perhaps deliberately delaying a solution to the crisis so as not to appear weakened in the storm of internal and external criticism, DeGaulle refused to allow the French to negotiate until after the election. The candidate of the leftist coalition, François Mitterand, in Pattison de Menil's words, "had sung the whole litany of supranationalism" during the campaign, and reaped the benefits of French support for the Communities. Mitterand forced DeGaulle into a run-off, which the latter won with a mere 55% of the vote. Across the Rhine, Ludwigh Erhard benefited by the general dissatisfaction with DeGaulle, and substantially improved his party's standing in the Bundestag elections that fall. DeGaulle's opponents seemed to be on the rise everywhere, confining the French president to a ferociously defended, but ultimately untenable isolation among major Europeans.

Still, with the election behind him, DeGaulle decided that the time was ripe for a solution of the crisis, if one could be worked out with terms favorable to the French. Couve de Murville agreed to attend a foreign ministers meeting if the Six agreed to hold the meeting in Luxembourg rather than in that den of supranational iniquity, Brussels. Over the next few weeks an agreement was reached on the issue of majority voting. The agreement achieved a type of circumspect logic rivaling only that of the Bonn Declaration on political unity back in 1961. The three major provisions of the agreement bear quoting in full:

> When issues very important to one or more member countries are at stake, the members of the Council will try, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all the members of the Council, while respecting their mutual interests, and those of the Community, in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty.

> The French delegation considers that, when very important interests are at stake, the discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached.

> The six delegations note that there is a divergence of views on what could be done in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement.

Thus, the Six consented to what was essentially an agreement to disagree for the sake of mutual face saving. The Council of Ministers promised as much as possible to attempt to arrive at a unanimous decision, without stating
even vaguely what should be done if this proved impossible. The Rome Treaty provisions for majority voting were changed de facto though not officially. Most importantly, the French agreed to resume participation in the European Communities, thus opening the way for a solution on administration of the Common Fund and the role of the Commission.

This agreement was reached by May 11, 1966. The FEOGA was to take over agricultural subsidies starting July 1, 1967. Half of the funds would come from direct national contributions and half would come from levies on agricultural imports outside the Six. The European Parliament was given no specific power over the FEOGA budget. Moreover, the Commission was defined more clearly as subordinate to the Council of Ministers. Though the Commission retained the right to initiate various proposals for improving the Communities, the Council of Ministers asserted its right to oversee the Commission's work. Thus, the authority of the supranational bodies was officially declared secondary to that of the Council of Ministers.

Ostensibly, DeGaulle could claim victory. The supranational assault on France had been effectively repelled. The states would retain control over half of the FEOGA funds, and funds from industrial levies would not be turned over to the EEC. The Commission's authority was not extended, the European Parliament remained consultative body with no real authority. DeGaulle had gotten an agricultural common market without significant political concessions. When threatened with the prospect of French departure, the five conceded to French demands with regard to the supranational organizations. In his press conference of February 21, DeGaulle proclaimed his victory, adding that only the principles behind the Fouchet Plan stood a chance of success in achieving political union:

Obviously, the issue for the Six is not to brandish again absolute theories as to what should ideally be the future European office; not to impose a figid framework conceived ap priori for realities as complex and changing as those of the life of our continent and of its relations with the outside; not to assume the problem of the construction of Europe solved before even having begun to live together, politically speaking; in short not become lost again in the myths and abstractions that have always prevented the Six from undertaking in common anything other than painful adjustment of their economic production and trade. No! What is imperative, on the contrary, is that they work for the purpose of cooperation.
Still, DeGaulle had won a pyrrhic victory. While he had maintained the political status quo plus gaining the inclusion of agriculture in the Common Market, DeGaulle ensured the isolation of France among the Six. The situation would remain more or less frozen until DeGaulle left office in 1969. The Franco-German Treaty was reduced to total insignificance. Within France, DeGaulle's stand during the crisis caused him to be seen more as an old man who had overstayed his welcome, forshadowing his handling of the riots of 1968. France's partners concluded that any more steps toward the kind of Europe they envisioned would have to wait until DeGaulle left office. The French opposition to the second British application to enter the EEC in 1968 seemed to verify this conclusion. In short, some form of Europe des Etats had been created by default in that no major Community decision could be made without the approval of the States; yet such an atmosphere of animosity and distrust had been created that the current European construction was hardly the type of confederation that DeGaulle had envisioned in 1961.
Endnotes to Chapter V

1 Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, p. 288.

2 Ibid.


4 Ibid.

5 DeGaulle, Memoirs of Hope, p. 132.


9 DeGaulle believed that EEC President Walter Hallstein wanted to use the EEC to line up Western Europe behind the goals of West German foreign policy, and hoped to weaken France's position to that end. See Memoirs of Hope, p. 184. DeGaulle held Hallstein largely responsible for the crisis of 1965, and saw to it that Hallstein lost his job when the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC were joined into a single community in 1967.

10 Quoted in L'Année Politique, 1961, p. 475.

11 Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, p. 290. Three representatives had heart attacks during the final set of negotiations.

12 Pattison de Menil, Who Speaks for Europe?, p. 137.


14 Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, p. 335.

15 Pattison de Menil, Who Speaks for Europe?, p.137.

16 Ibid.


19 De Gaulle's position during this inter-parts quarrel was hardly neutral. He displayed his preference for Adenauer over his successor during a visit to Adenauer's home in July, 1964. Appearing at a meeting with Erhard twenty minutes late because of this visit, De Gaulle lamely apologized, saying: "J'ai été séduit, et donc prisonnier." (I was seduced, and thus a prisoner.) See Le Monde, July 7, 1964.

20 For a more complete discussion of these two West German requests, see Pattison de Menil, Who Speaks for Europe?, p. 143.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.


25 Ibid.

26 Quoted in L'Année Politique, 1964, p. 323.

27 My summary of these proposals closely follows that appearing in Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, p. 342-343.

28 Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, p. 243.


30 Pattison de Menil, Who Speaks for Europe?, p. 150.

31 Still, the French did not burn all their bridges, continuing to participate in lower level committees discussing agriculture and the association of Greece and Turkey. See Kolodziej, French International Policy, p. 331.


33 Ibid.

34 Couve de Murville, Une Politique Etrangère, p. 335.


36 For a fine brief summary of the attitudes of the French public, see Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation?, p. 106-113.
37 Le Marché Commun et l'Agriculture (Livre Blanc des Organizations Professioneis et Agricoles), (October, 1961), Quoted in Friedrich, p. 110-111.


39 Ibid.


41 See L'Année Politique, 1066, p. 129-130.

42 See Kolodziej, French International Policy, p. 334.

43 Press conference, July 21, 1966, printed in Major Addresses, vol II, p. 120.
By the end of our period, the two visions of Europe had arrived at a stalemate. DeGaulle's attempt to create an Europe des Etats with the Fouchet Plan failed because France's partners were unwilling to unite around an alliance, of states which France would predominate, and which under French leadership would work toward greater independence from America. The failure of the Franco-German treaty demonstrated even more clearly that France's partners preferred to cling to the American alliance rather than risk participating in DeGaulle's bold attempt to break out of the settlement imposed upon Europe by the superpowers at the end of World War II. Still, if DeGaulle could not impose his vision of Europe on his partners, they could not impose theirs on him. By successfully rebuffing two of Britain's attempts to enter the EEC, and by torpedoing the Commission proposals on the common agricultural fund in 1965, DeGaulle made sure that no more assaults on the nation-state would take place while he was in office. But DeGaulle had paid a heavy price in resisting his opponents. His obstinate and often impolite way of conducting diplomacy had played a heavy role in defeating the Fouchet and Franco-German initiatives, and by the end of our period would result in the isolation of France among the Six. To an extent, the European Union built by the end of our period was a form of, in F. Roy Willis's words "organized disagreement." DeGaulle would seek to break out of the Europe unilaterally, through his series of overtures to the Eastern bloc powers in the second half of the 1960's. France's partners became content to preserve the status quo with regard to European unification, and simply wait for DeGaulle to leave office or die before starting any new initiatives.

DeGaulle took the initiative in the East hoping that Western Europe would eventually take his example in choosing détente over American pipe dreams for ending the Cold War through a show of strength to the Soviet bloc. However, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact in 1968 demonstrated that the Soviets were no more willing to let go of the Cold War than the Americans. With his attempt to realize his vision of Europe frustrated in both the East and the West, DeGaulle left office in 1969 embittered and pessimistic about

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1Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, p. 278.
Europe's prospects. He told Malraux in 1969:

We are certainly witnessing the end of Europe. ...You know as well as I do that Europe will be a compact among the States or nothing. Therefore nothing. We are the last Europeans in Europe, which was Christianity. A tattered Europe, but it did exist. The Europe whose nations hated one another had more reality than the Europe of today. It is no longer a matter of wondering whether France will make Europe, it is a matter of understanding that she is threatened with death through the death of Europe.

Yet today, ten years after DeGaulle's death, the influence of his ideas remains strong. The agricultural common market he pressed for so strongly remains in place, though overabundant supplies, depleted subsidy funds, and Mrs. Thatcher's Government may soon change this. In terms of international politics, Europe is more independent of the United States today than at any time since the Second World War. DeGaulle would no doubt take a degree of satisfaction in Washington's decreasing ability to dictate the foreign policy of Western Europe. He would probably also be pleased at the recent stand taken by the EEC Council of Ministers on the crisis in Iran, in which a consensus was ironed out through consultations between representatives of the States. Considering these factors, it may be that the vindication of DeGaulle's vision of an Europe des États is beginning to take place. As DeGaulle would say, however, we await for history to render the final verdict.

\[\text{\footnotesize Malraux, Felled Oaks, p. 123-124.}\]
Appendix 1: Excerpts from the
Bonn Declaration, issued July 18, 1961.

The Heads of State of Government of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, desirous of affirming the spiritual values and political traditions which form their common heritage; united in an awareness of the great tasks that Europe is called upon to fulfil within the Community of free peoples in order to safeguard freedom and peace in the world; anxious to strengthen the political, economic, social, and cultural ties that exist between their peoples, especially in the framework of the European Communities, and to advance towards the union of Europe;

convinced that only a united Europe, allied to the United States of America and to other free peoples, is in a position to face the dangers that menace the existence of Europe and of the whole free world, and that it is important to pool the energies, capabilities, and resources of all for whom liberty is an inalienable possession; resolved to develop their political co-operation with a view to the union of Europe and to continue at the same time the work already undertaken in the European Communities;

desiring the adhesion to the European Communities of other European states ready to assume in all spheres the same responsibilities and the same obligations, have decided:

1) To give shape to the will for political union already implicit in the Treaties establishing the European Communities, and for this purpose to organize their co-operation, to provide for its development and to secure for it the regularity which will progressively create the conditions for a common policy and will ultimately make it possible to embody in institutions the work undertaken;

2) To hold, at regular intervals, meetings whose aim will be to compare their views, to concert their policies and to reach common positions in order to further the political union of Europe, thereby strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. The necessary practical measures will be taken to prepare these meetings. In addition, the continuation of active co-operation among the Foreign Ministers will contribute to the continuity of the action undertaken in common. The co-operation of the Six must go beyond the political field as such, and will in particular be extended to the sphere of education, of culture, and of research, where it will be ensured by periodical meetings of the Ministers concerned;

3) To instruct their Committee to submit to them proposals on the means by which a statutory form can be given as soon as possible to the union of their peoples.

*Source: Silj, Europe's Political Puzzle, p. 133-134.
The Heads of State or Government are convinced that by thus organizing their co-operation, they will further the application of the Treaties of Paris and Rome. They also believe that their co-operation will facilitate any reforms that might appear opportune in the interests of the Communities' greater efficiency.
Appendix 2: Excerpts from the first draft of the Fouchet Plan, submitted November 2, 1961.

Title I - Union of the European peoples

Article 1

By the present Treaty, a union of States, hereafter called "the Union," is established.

The Union is based on respect for the individuality of the peoples and of the Member States and for equality of rights and obligations. It is indissoluble.

Article 2

It shall be the aim of the Union:

— to bring about the adoption of a common foreign policy in matters that are of common interest to Member States;

— to ensure, through close co-operation between Member States in the scientific and cultural field, the continued development of their common heritage and the protection of the values on which their civilization rests;

— to contribute thus in the Member States to the defence of human rights, the fundamental freedoms and democracy;

— to strengthen, in co-operation with the other free nations, the security of Member States against any aggression by adopting a common defence policy.

Article 3

The Union shall have legal personality.

The Union shall enjoy in each of the member States the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under their domestic law. It may, in particular, acquire or dispose of movable or immovable property and may go to law.

Title II - Institutions of the Union

Article 4

The Institutions of the Union shall be as follows:

*Source: Silj, Europe's Political Puzzle, p. 141-147.
— the Council;
— the European Parliament;
— the European Political Commission.

Article 5

The Council shall meet every four months at Head of State or Government level, and at least once in the intervening period at Foreign Minister level. It may, moreover, at any time hold extraordinary sessions at either level at the request of one or more Member States.

At each of these meetings at Head of State or Government level, the Council shall appoint a President who shall take up his duties two months before the subsequent meeting and continue to exercise them for two months after the meeting.

Meetings of the Council held at Foreign Minister level shall be presided over by the Foreign Minister of the State whose representative presides over meetings at Head of State or Government level.

The President in office shall preside over extraordinary meetings that may be held during his term of office.

The Council shall choose the place for its meetings.

Article 6

The Council shall deliberate on all questions whose inclusion on its agenda is requested by one or more Member States. It shall adopt decisions necessary for achieving the aims of the Union unanimously. The absence or abstention of one or of two members shall not prevent a decision from being taken.

The decisions of the Council shall be binding on Member States that have participated in their adoption. Member States on which a decision is not binding, by reason of their absence or abstention, may endorse it at any time. From the moment they endorse it, the decision will be binding on them.

Article 7

The European Parliament provided for under Article 1 of the Convention relating to certain institutions common to the European Communities signed in Rome on 25 March 1957, shall deliberate on matters concerning the aims of the Union.

It may address oral or written questions to the Council.

It may submit recommendations to the Council.
Article 8

The Council, on receipt of a recommendation addressed to it by the European Parliament, shall give its reply to the Parliament within a period of four months.

The Council, on receipt of a recommendation addressed to it by the European Parliament, shall inform the Parliament of the action it has taken thereon within a period of six months.

The Council shall each year submit to the European Parliament a report on its activities.

Article 9

The European Political Commission shall consist of senior officials of the Foreign-Affairs departments of each Member State. Its seat shall be in Paris. It shall be presided over by the representative of the Member State that presides over the Council, and for the same period.

The European Political Commission shall set up such working bodies as it considers necessary.

The European Political Commission shall have at its disposal the staff and departments it requires to carry out its duties.

Article 10

The European Political Commission shall assist the Council. It shall prepare its deliberations and carry out its decisions. It shall perform the duties that the Council decides to entrust to it.

Title V - General provisions

Article 15

The present Treaty may be reviewed. Draft amendments shall be submitted to the Council by Member States. The Council shall pronounce on such drafts and decide whether or not they should be passed on for an opinion to the European Parliament.

Draft amendments adopted unanimously by the Council shall be submitted for ratification by the Member States, after the European Parliament, where appropriate, has expressed its opinion. They shall come into force once all the Member States have ratified them.
Article 16

Three years after this Treaty comes into force, it shall be subjected to a general review with a view to considering suitable measures for strengthening the Union in the light of the progress already made.

The main objects of such a review shall be the introduction of a unified foreign policy and the gradual establishment of an organization centralizing, within the Union, the European Communities referred to in the Preamble to the Present Treaty.

The amendments arising from this review shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure outlined in Article 15 above.

Article 17

The Union shall be open for membership to Member States of the Council of Europe that accept the aims set out in Article 2 above and that have previously acceded to the European Communities referred to in the Preamble to this Treaty.

The admission of a new Member State shall be decided unanimously by the Council after an additional Act has been drawn up to this Treaty. This Act shall contain the necessary adjustments to the Treaty. It shall come into force once the State concerned has submitted its instrument of ratification.
Appendix 3: Excerpts from the draft adopted by the Fouchet Committee on March 15, 1962.

The left-hand column represents the text proposed by the French delegation; the right-hand column represents the text proposed by the other delegations. The articles for which only one text is given were agreed upon by all delegations.

TITLE 1

Union the European peoples

Article 1

By the present Treaty, a union of States and of European peoples, hereafter called "the European Union," is established

Article 2

It shall be the aim of the Union to reconcile, co-ordinate and unify the policy of Member States in spheres of common interest: foreign policy, economics, cultural affairs and defence.

Article 2

1. It shall be the task of the European Union to promote the unity of Europe by reconciling, co-ordinating and unifying the policy of Member States.

2. For the purpose of accomplishing this task, the objectives of the Union shall be:

--- the adoption of a common foreign policy

--- the adoption of a common defence policy within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as a contribution towards strengthening the Atlantic Alliance;

--- close co-operation in the educational, scientific and cultural fields;

--- the harmonization and unification of the laws of Member States;

--- the settlement, in a spirit of mutual understanding and constructive co-operation, of any differences that may arise in relations between Member States.

*Source: Silj, Europe's Political Puzzle, p. 147-156.
3. Objectives other than those laid down in the preceding paragraph may be defined by the Council after consultation with the European Parliament.

4. This Treaty shall not derogate from the competence of the European Communities.

Draft Treaty for the establishment of a union of States and of European peoples

PREAMBLE

The High Contracting Parties, resolved to pursue the task of reconciling their essential interests already initiated, in their respective fields, by the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community;

desirous of welcoming ready to welcome to their ranks other countries of Europe that are prepared to accept in every sphere the same responsibilities and the same obligations and conscious of thus forming the nucleus of a union, membership of which will be open to other peoples of Europe that are as yet unable to take such a decision;

resolved, to this end, to give statutory form to the union of their peoples, in accordance with the declaration of 18 July 1961 by the Heads of State or Government;

who, having exchanged their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

TITLE II

Institutions of the Union

Article 5

The Institutions of the Union shall be as follows:
---the Council;
---the Committees of Ministers;
---the Political Commission;
---the European Parliament.

Article 6

The Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of Member States. It shall meet in principle every four months and not less than three times a year.

Article 7

The Council shall deliberate on questions whose inclusion on its agenda is requested by one or more Member States. The agenda shall be drawn up by the President. The Council shall adopt decisions necessary for achieving the aims of the

---the Council and the Committees of Ministers;
---the European Parliament;
---the Court of Justice.

2. The Council and the Committees of Ministers shall be assisted by a Political Commission and a Secretary-General.

Article 6

1. The Council shall consist of the representatives of the Member States. Member States shall be represented on the Council, in accordance with the constitutional requirements and the usage prevailing in each country, by the Heads of State or Government and, where appropriate, by the Foreign Ministers.

2. The Council shall meet in ordinary session three times a year and in principle every four months. Extraordinary sessions of the Council may be convened at any time by its President on his own initiative or at the request of one or more Member States of the European Union.

3. The office of the President shall be exercised in rotation by each member of the Council for a term of six months one year.

4. The Council shall lay down its own rules or procedure.

Article 7

1. The Council shall deliberate on all questions whose inclusion on the agenda is requested by one or more Member States or by the Secretary-General under the terms of Article 2. The agenda shall be drawn up by the President.
Union unanimously. The Council's decisions shall be binding on Member States. The abstention of one or of two members shall not prevent a decision from being taken.

The decisions of the Council shall be implemented by Member States that have participated in their adoption. Member States that are not bound by a decision, by reason of their absence or abstention, may endorse it, at any time. From the moment they endorse it, the decision shall be binding on them.

The meetings of the Council shall be prepared by the Committee of Foreign Ministers. Decisions necessary for achieving the aims of the European Union shall be passed by the Council unanimously.

2. The decisions of the Council shall be carried out in accordance with the constitutional requirements in force in each Member State. The Council may, by a unanimous decision, waive the principle of unanimity in specific cases. The abstention of one or of two members shall not prevent decisions requiring unanimity from being taken.

3. If a decision that requires unanimity cannot be adopted because it is opposed by one Member State, the Council shall adjourn the deliberation to a later date to be specified by it. Before this second deliberation takes place, the Council may decide to obtain the opinion of the European Parliament.

Article 8

1. The Council may conclude agreements on behalf of the European Union with Member States, third countries of international organizations. It shall lay down the methods to be followed in its rules of procedure.

2. The agreements shall be submitted to the Parliament for an opinion. They shall not come into force until they have been approved in all Member States by the bodies that, under the respective constitutional requirements, must where appropriate, approve such agreements concluded by these States.
Article 9

The Political Commission shall consist of representatives appointed by each Member State. It shall prepare the deliberations of the Council and ensure that its decisions are carried out. It shall perform such other duties as the Council decides to entrust to it. It shall have at its disposal the necessary staff and departments.

Article 10

The Political Commission shall consist of senior officials appointed by each State. This Commission shall prepare the deliberations of the Council and of the Committees of Ministers and perform the duties which the Council decides to entrust to it.

Article 11

1. The Council shall appoint for a period of .... a Secretary-General who shall be independent of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union. His term of office shall be renewable.

2. He shall be assisted in the performance of his duties by a staff appointed by him in accordance with a procedure to be laid down, on his proposal, by the Council.

3. The functions of the Secretary-General and of members of the Secretariat shall be deemed to be incompatible with the exercise of any other office.

4. In the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the members of the Secretariat shall neither solicit nor accept instructions from any government. They shall abstain from any act that is incompatible with the nature of their functions.

3. Agreements concluded in accordance with the preceding provisions shall be binding on the institutions of the European Union and on Member States.
5. The Member States undertake to respect the independence of the Secretary-General and of his staff and to refrain from influencing them in the accomplishment of their task.

Article 14

1. The Court of Justice of the European Communities shall be competent to decide on any dispute between Member States connected with the interpretation or application of this Treaty.

Member States undertake not to subject such disputes to any other form of settlement.

2. The Court of Justice of the European Communities shall be competent:

a) to decide on any dispute between Member States where the said dispute is submitted to the Court under a special agreement between them;

b) to give a decision pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a contract, whether governed by public law or private law, concluded by or on behalf of the European Union.

TITLE IV

Finances of the European Union

Article 15

3. The draft budget, drawn up by the Secretary-General with the assistance of the Political Commission, shall be adopted by the Council, after obtaining the Parliament's opinion.
Article 14
The budget shall be implemented by the Political Commission.

Article 15
This Treaty may be reviewed. Draft amendments shall be submitted to the Council by the Governments of the Member States.

Draft amendments adopted unanimously by the Council shall be submitted for ratification to the Member States, after the European Parliament, where appropriate, has expressed its opinion. They shall come into force once all the Member States have ratified them.

Article 16
Three years after this Treaty comes into force, it shall be subjected to a review in order to consider suitable measures either for strengthening the Union in general in the light of progress already made or, in particular, for simplifying, rationalizing and co-ordinating the ways in which Member States co-operate.

Article 17
The budget shall be implemented by the Secretary-General.

Title V
General provisions

Article 19
1. This Treaty may be reviewed, without prejudice to the general review referred to in Article 20.

2. Draft amendments shall be submitted to the Council either by the Member States or by the Parliament. If the Council, after having consulted the Parliament where a draft is proposed by one of the Member States, unanimously adopts such a draft amendment, this shall be submitted to Member States for ratification. Such draft amendment shall come into force when all the Member States have ratified it in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

Article 20
1. At the time fixed for the transition from the second to the third stage laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the present Treaty shall be subjected to a general review. This shall aim at determining suitable measures for strengthening the European Union and the powers of its institutions in the light of the progress already made.

With this end in view, a draft constitution of the European Union shall be drawn up by the Council
before expiry of the time-limit specified above, and submitted to the European Parliament to its opinion.

2. The general review shall in particular have the following objectives:

a) To associate the European Parliament more closely with the work of defining the common policy and carrying out the provisions of Article 138 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community relating to the election of the Parliament by direct universal suffrage;

b) To gradually introduce the majority principle in decisions of the Council of the Union.

3. At the time of the general review, the conditions shall be fixed under which, at the end of the transition period of the Common Market, the European Union and the European Communities will be incorporated in an organic institutional framework, without prejudice to the machinery provided for in the Treaties of Paris and Rome. To facilitate this process, reforms shall be undertaken, in accordance with the procedures laid down in the Treaties of Paris and Rome and before the general review is carried out, with a view to simplifying and rationalizing the machinery provided for in those Treaties.

4. The competence of the Court of Justice shall be extended in the light of reforms introduced by the general review.

Article 17

The Union shall be open for membership to States that have acceded to the European Communities referred to in the Preamble to this Treaty.

Article 21
The admission of a new State shall be decided unanimously by the Council after an additional Act to this Treaty has been drawn up.

Accession shall come into effect once the State concerned has submitted the instrument ratifying this Act.
Appendix 4

The Common Declaration and the Treaty between the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, dated 22 January, 1963 *

Common Declaration

General Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, and Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

At the close of the conference which was held in Paris on January 21 and 22, 1963 and which was attended, on the French side, by the Premier, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Armed Forces, and the Minister of National Education and, on the German side, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Family and Youth Affairs.

Convinced that the reconciliation of the German people and the French people, bringing an end to the age-old rivalries, constitutes a historic event which profoundly transforms the relations of the two peoples,

Conscious of the solidarity which unites the two peoples both with respect to their security and with respect to their economic and cultural development,

Observing particularly that young people have become aware of this solidarity and find themselves called upon to play the determinant role in the consolidation of Franco-German friendship,

Recognizing that a strengthening of cooperation between the two countries constitutes a vital stage along the road to a united Europe, which is the goal of the two peoples,

Have agreed to the organization and to the principles of the cooperation between the two States as they are stated in the Treaty signed this day.

The Treaty

Following the Common Declaration of the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, dated January 22, 1963, on the organization and the principles of the cooperation between the two States, the following provisions have been agreed upon:

I. Organization

1. The Heads of State and of Government will give whenever required the necessary directives and will follow regularly the implementation of the program set hereinunder. They will meet for this purpose whenever this is necessary and, in principle, at least twice a year.

2. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs will see to the implementation of the program as a whole. They will meet at least once every three months. Without prejudice to the contacts normally established through the channels of the embassies, high officials of the two Ministries of Foreign Affairs, responsible respectively for political, economic and cultural affairs, will meet each month in Paris and Bonn alternately to survey current problems and to prepare the Ministers' meeting. In addition, the diplomatic missions and the consulates of the two countries, and also the permanent missions to the international organizations, will make all the necessary contact on problems of common interest.

3. Regular meetings will take place between the responsible authorities of the two countries in the fields of defense, education and youth. These meetings will not in any way affect the functioning of the already existing bodies - Franco-German Cultural Commission, Permanent General Staff Group - whose activities will on the contrary be extended. Both the Ministers of Foreign Affairs will be represented at these meetings in order to ensure the overall coordination of the cooperation.

(a) The Ministers of the Armed Forces or of Defense will meet at least once every three months. Similarly, the French Minister of National Education will meet, at the same intervals, with the person who will be designated by Germany to follow up the program of cooperation on the cultural level.

(b) The Chiefs of Staff of the two countries will meet at least once every two months; in the event of their being unable to meet, they will be replaced by their responsible representatives.

(c) The French High Commissioner for Youth and Sports will meet, at least once every two months, with the Federal Minister for Family and Youth Affairs of his representative.

4. In each of the countries, an interministerial commission will be charged with following problems of cooperation. It will be presided over by a high Foreign Ministry official and it will include representatives of all the administrations concerned. Its role will be to coordinate the action of the Ministries concerned and to report periodically to its Government on the state of Franco-German cooperation. It will also have the task of presenting all useful suggestions with a view to implementing the program of cooperation and to its ultimate extension to new domains.

II Program

A - Foreign Affairs

1. The two Governments will consult each other, prior to any decision, on all important questions of foreign policy, and in the first place on questions of common interest, with a view to arriving, insofar as possible, at a similar position.

This consultation will cover, among other subjects, the following:

- Problems relative to the European Communities and to European political cooperation;
- East-West relation, both on the political and economic levels;
- Subjects dealt with in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the various international organizations in which the two Governments are interested, notably the Council of Europe, Western European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

2. The cooperation already established in the area of information will be continued and developed between the services concerned in Paris and Bonn and between the diplomatic missions in other countries.

3. With regard to aid to the emergent countries, both Governments will systematically compare their programs with a view to maintaining close cooperation. They will study the possibility of engaging in joint undertakings. Since several Ministerial departments are responsible for these matters in both France and Germany, it will be the duty of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs to determine together the practical bases for this cooperation.
4. The two Governments will study together the means for strengthening their cooperation in other important sectors of economic policy, such as agricultural and forest policy; energy policy; communications and transportation problems and industrial development, within the framework of the Common Market; as well as export credits policy.

B - Defense

1. The following objectives will be pursued in this domain:

(a) On the level of strategy and tactics, the competent authorities of both countries will endeavor to harmonize their doctrines with a view to arriving at mutual concepts. Franco-German Institutes for operational research will be created.

(b) Exchanges of personnel between the armed forces will be increased. These particularly concern professors and students from the general staff schools. They may include temporary detachments of entire units. In order to facilitate these exchanges, an effort will be made on both sides to give the trainees practical language instruction.

(c) With regard to armaments, both Governments will endeavor to organize a joint program from the time of drafting appropriate armaments projects and formulating financing plans. To this end, joint committees will study the research being conducted on these projects in both countries and will carry out a comparative study. They will submit proposals to the Ministers, who will examine them during their quarterly meetings and will give the necessary directives for implementation.

2. The Governments will make a study of the conditions in which Franco-German cooperation could be established in the area of civil defense.

C - Education and Youth

With regard to education and youth, the proposals contained in the French and German memoranda of September 19 and November 8, 1962 will be studied, in accordance with the procedures indicated hereinabove.

1. In the field of education, the effort will chiefly concern the following points:

(a) Language instruction:

The two Governments recognize the essential importance that the knowledge in each of the two countries of the other's language holds for Franco-German cooperation. They will endeavor, to this end, to take concrete measures with a view to increasing the number of German students learning the French language and that of French students learning the German language. The Federal Government will examine, with the governments of the Länder competent in this matter, how it is possible to introduce regulations making it possible to achieve this objective.

In all the establishments for higher education, practical courses in French will be organized in Germany and practical courses in German will be organized in France, which will be open to all students.

(b) The problem of equivalences:

The competent authorities of both countries will be asked to accelerate the adoption of provisions concerning the equivalence of academic periods, examinations and university degrees and diplomas.

(c) Cooperation in scientific research:

Research bodies and scientific institutes will increase their contacts,
beginning with more extensive reciprocal information. Concerted research programs will be established in the areas in which it will appear possible.

2. All opportunities will be offered to the young people of both countries in order to draw closer the ties that unite them and to strengthen their mutual cooperation. Collective exchanges, particularly, will be increased.

A body whose purpose will be to develop these possibilities and to promote exchanges will be created by the two countries with an autonomous administrative council at its head. This body will have at its disposal a joint Franco-German fund for the exchange between the two countries of pupils, students, young artists, and workers.

III - Final Provisions

1. The necessary directives will be given in each country for immediate enactment of the above. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs will examine the progress made at each of their meetings.

2. The two Governments will keep the Governments of the member States of the European Communities informed on the development of Franco-German cooperation.

3. With the exception of the provisions concerning defense, the present Treaty will also be applied to the Land of Berlin, barring a contrary declaration made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Government of the French Republic in the three months following the entry into force of the present Treaty.

4. The two Governments may make any improvements which might appear desirable for the implementation of the present Treaty.

5. The present Treaty will enter into force as soon as each of the two Governments will have made known to the other that, on the domestic level, the necessary conditions for its implementation have been fulfilled.
Bibliography


