The Spanish University:
An Analysis of the Relationship
Between Institutional and Political Change

Julia A. Brezon
To Juan Ramón Tovar
I wish to thank, first of all, my two advisors William Norris and J. Milton Yinger. Their probing questions and concrete suggestions proved to be invaluable. I would also like to acknowledge the support of Enrique Aguilar and Soledad Miranda García, Professors of the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras of the Universidad de Córdoba, for their willingness to share their expertise in Spanish history with a naive foreigner. Equally, Professor Emeritus Leonardo Santamarina, Resident Director of PRESHCO, offered to relay the breadth of his experience as a Spanish political exile. For information on the current crisis in the Spanish University, I owe a debt to Spanish friends, principally Antonio Latorre-Rus, Manuel Montes-Pareda, and Ignacio Jové. Research in a foreign language is bound to cause certain difficulty, and I have Harriet Turner to thank for help in translating idiomatic passages. Lastly, this acknowledgement would not be complete without mentioning two friends, Anne-Marie Borkowski and Paget Wilson, who continually supported a weary or exuberant student.
Contents:

Introduction

I. Theoretical Perspectives: The University as an Institution Reflecting Political Ideology

II. Overview of the Political Transition: 1923-1976

III. Structural Changes in the Spanish University: The Student Movement as a Reaction to Institutional Inconsistencies

IV. The Present University Structure: Reflection of Uneven Democratization

Conclusion
Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to reveal the nature of institutional adaptation of the University within the context of the political upheavals in twentieth-century Spain. I will focus on the changing structure of the University under the Republican era, the Franco years, and the present democracy. Elements within this changing educational structure suggest an ideal typology, a hypothetical university which manages to rise above its role as a mere function of the social milieu. By contrast, the reality of the University as an institution controlled by political regimes is evident throughout the paper. The contention herein is that among the three forms, the University under Franco was the furthest from the ideal typology.

At the root of Spain’s educational problems was the changing political structure itself, which drastically altered the University. At the turn of the century, this traditional institution proved archaic and obsolete. Early liberalism had failed to bring about structural reform, and Miguel Primo de Rivera’s short-lived dictatorship devoted scarce attention to education. The Second Republic, from 1929 to 1934, instilled changes in the University with varying degrees of acceptance. During this time period, or "enlightenment", there were partially successful efforts to construct a liberal, flexible, and public educational system. However, the University changed under Franco’s system of government. Modelled after the regime’s structure, university revision sought to undo all the changes
proposed and executed under the Second Republic. One cannot but be struck by the apparent impasse that arose in the University during the Franco period; political and intellectual autonomy were nonexistent. Paradoxically enough, democracy has not brought about the ideal of free thought, but instead, one still perceives a staleness within the University, wherein most students continue their discontented and passive routine.

The marked effect of an authoritarian regime with elements of fascism and bureaucratic rationalism upon all social institutions will be discussed at length. Franco’s evolving political system greatly affected all social institutions. The regime left little room for divergent political and social philosophies; the nature of its claim to power was repressive. Thus can be identified one of the many problems of this regime: repression of social development leads to unrest. This unrest aimed at structural problems accompanying the artificial halt to the natural process of institutional change, and manifested itself primarily among university students. The late 1950’s and early 1960’s witnessed the first overt political protests in Spain, with the obvious intent to modernize an archaic institution, and with a more subtle and complex protest against the Franco regime itself. The first aspect is more easily defined and detailed, and the reasons for protest are clear. The Spanish University, while seemingly adapting to conservative military and religious control, entered a period of crisis still apparent today. Students protested against the hierarchical, bureaucratic organization of the University, and specifically, against the inconsistent nature of selection and evaluation. On
the broader level, students objected to the lack of dynamism and creativity in the University, prevented by both the regime's desire to indoctrinate a potentially volatile youth and the need to repress and depoliticize the student body. This protest in essence reflects the broader societal dilemma of a population subjected to a bureaucratic, fascist political form.

In discussing these structural changes in the University, I will focus on the student movement in the 1950's and 1960's, with the interpretation that student revolt was a manifestation of an institution under stress, resisting and later adapting to revisions resulting from church/state interference. It is useful to detail this resistance in an effort to understand changes during the Franco years, which in the author's opinion greatly weakened the infrastructure of the University. The present stalemate existing in the Spanish University also deserves attention, and implies both the successful adaptation of an institution to existing conditions, and the relative failure of resistance, or the lack of importance granted to the attitudes of the students themselves.

This paper, therefore, attempts to arrive at conclusions concerning the effect of the Spanish political systems of republican democracy, authoritarianism, and socialist democracy upon the University. Ideologies of each system greatly determined the proposed institutional changes. By explaining the nature of the systems, as well as the transitions between each one, I hope to make explicit the institutional reflection therein. The employment of an ideal typology aids in clarifying
a means of comparison between what the University should be, and what actually exists under each system. Lastly, the focus on student attitudes is an integral element to the discussion, revealing the inadequacies and strengths of the University through political transitions.
I. Theoretical Perspectives: The University as an Institution Reflecting Political Ideology

Twentieth century political upheavals in Spain reveal inherent societal contradictions. These contradictions, resulting from the imposed ideologies of all political regimes in Spain, exist in the institutional sphere. The University adapted to the inconsistencies inherent in a constitutional republic, an authoritarian fascist form, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and finally, a socialist democracy. This chapter presents a theoretical framework, indicating by contrast to the realities imposed by each political form the major requisites for an ideal university.

Political ideology predicates institutional structures in Spain, a factor which serves to relate the inconsistencies and inadequacies of the University to those of each governmental form. Karl Mannheim identifies the problematic nature of ideology: ruling groups become bound by particular interests.¹ The formation of an ideology occurs when these ruling groups can no longer see the totality of society. The second stage of this ideological formation involves the controlling ideologue's creation of a "collective unconscious": by masking issues and societal conditions, an ideological platform is widely-accepted by the masses and thus stabilizes the inconsistencies already present in society.² Consolidated, vaguely-defined interests tend to distort social realities, but because the ideology is part of the "Volksgeist", it is maintained by the public and affixed to concrete subjects such as the state. In this schema, one class
usually becomes the bearer of an historically evolving consciousness, a factor which tends to pronounce class distinctions. Herein lies the implication of a "false consciousness", in that the ideology is often only an integral element of the social situation of the creating or supporting group.

In the context of political ideologies, the educational institution is particularly malleable. Mannheim states that "Modern education is from its inception a living struggle, a replica, on a small scale of conflicting purposes and tendencies which rage in society at large." The University reflected the dynamics of this changing political structure, but did so in such a way as to emphasize the inadequacies of each political phase. The Republican University reflected the ideals of a liberal society wherein rewards were based upon achievement rather than ascription. The University was to be a democratic meritocracy, but the Republic imposed liberal tenets upon a highly stratified, traditional, and anachronistic society. Accordingly, resistance to these proposals of University reform occurred among reactionary political forces. The University structure under Franco attempted to integrate the students in a corporatist structure reflecting the regime's make-up. This idea of a hierarchical, rigid University in which students were to ascribe to fixed dogma, enforced by both the Church and state, ultimately resulted in a period of revolt as an expression of widespread discontent among students and professors. The present University bases its structure upon the ideals of a socialist, participatory democracy. The problems of the present university structure
result from the inconsistencies of a transition from Franco’s political system to that of a democracy. Certain theoretical problems include the following: 1) bureaucratic authoritarian regimes desire only a limited return to prior mediation structures; 2) the issues of human rights, economic nationalism, and general amnesty, previously repressed, come to the fore; and 3) the role of the masses must be redefined.6

In order to discuss political and institutional development in Spain, it is necessary to address the problem of uneven modernization. Gino Germani develops the notion that when traditional patterns of social stratification change to modern patterns, mobility becomes institutionalized. In order to achieve a total and stable transition, a society must develop economically, socially, and politically into a rational state organization, which directs structural change while at the same time maintains social integration.7 Spain’s modernization was asynchronist in various aspects: political development began as early as 1812, when traditional absolutist concepts of monarchy gave way to constitutional liberalism. This liberalism strengthened throughout the nineteenth century, but without economic and social modernization it could not arrive at a stability.

More relevant to this analysis is the failure of the Second Republic, from 1931-1936. The Republic attempted to integrate Spanish society moreso than before, but the persistence of extreme social stratification patterns, precluding the presence of a middle class, as well as the existence of an agrarian-based
economy, prohibited the success of integration. The Franco regime encouraged economic growth, but at the expense of any political integration and social advancement. It remains to be seen what course of development the present socialist democracy will take, but one can safely generalize that economic problems, a fragmented and disorganized political parties, and the continued conflict between a controlling upper class, a small middle class, and a large and impoverished lower class, prevents Germani's "total transition."

In the context of this uneven modernization, one must recognize, as does J. W. Freburg, that modernization of the University is inextricably linked with modernization of society. An educational system of any society reflects the needs, aspirations and ideologies of the larger political, economic and cultural sphere. It is useful to construct a model of a Weberian ideal type to explain a University system which stems from, yet optimally rises above given political forms. With this ideal type as a means of comparison, one can clearly see the inadequacies of each structure.

The first and most basic element of a modern, democratic university structure is secularization. Referring to Germani's theoretical construct, secularization in all spheres is one of the minimum universal criteria for a modernized industrial society. Secularization, as defined by Germani, involves rational organization based on norms which carry no religious, moral, aesthetic, nor prestigious connotations. This secularization normally proceeds, depending on the "minimal conditions for the functioning of social organization compatible
with basic requirements of economic development. The Second Republic recognized the need for secularization and instituted statutes guaranteeing the separation of Church and state. University education was to be public and autonomous; nonetheless, the control of the Catholic Church in a backward economic and social system prevented a widespread acceptance of such innovations. Later, with economic advancement in the technocratic era, the process of secularization advanced somewhat. Social and cultural secularization occurred unevenly, however. Within Franco’s structure, the Opus Dei controlled much of the administration of key social institutions and the Catholic Church established moral and cultural norms.

Additionally, the period from 1955 to the present has witnessed a degree of change in stratification patterns. Stratification, although diminishing somewhat, still existed, a factor which was not commensurate with the expected patterns of a fully-modernized society. Stratification based on achievement rather than ascription was indeed the ideal, and lower class aspirations rose in proportion to the level of contradiction between ideals and realities. Protest movements inspiring change can be explained in part by the factor of relative deprivation.

In the field of education, secularization serves to lessen the inequalities in a highly stratified society. However, during the Franco era, the University was not a secularized institution; in fact, Franco encouraged the influence of the Catholic Church as a conservative, dogmatic force. The democratic university has attempted to achieve total secularization, mainly through
statutory autonomy provisions. To a large degree, the control of the Church has diminished in all spheres of the present society, and thus the University has also changed commensurate with overall secularization.

The second and related element in this ideal-typical view of the Spanish University is that of autonomy. In order to rise above the inconsistencies of the societal-political system, the University should be free from any particular ideology, and should espouse a doctrine of pluralism integral with what it aspires to accomplish: the goal of independent, critical, creative impartation of knowledge. If it is to be effective, autonomy must be legally enforced through fixed legislation, formulated by a committee of professors and students. Autonomy also encompasses the selection of a professorate based on qualifications rather than ideology.

Total autonomy neither existed in the Republican University nor in the structure under Franco. The Republic, although approaching theoretical autonomy, in practice was infused with liberal ideology to the point where it rejected any other possible beliefs. In theory, the Republican University ascribed to a tradition of autonomy; the state could not interfere with any facet of education in a negative manner. However, it was the state’s position to decide the limits of positive interference. A policy of purge ensued in an effort to rid the University of all vestiges of Church control. The Republic encouraged the use of the University to aid its political propagation. But although the Republican university structure fell short of realizing total autonomy, at least it recognized the implicit need for such
provisions. By contrast, the University under Franco ignored any pretense of autonomy. Franco created a university in the image of all other structures of the regime. In order to understand the meaning of this negation of autonomy, it is necessary to discuss the complex nature of the Franco regime through its various phases. The University under Franco no longer met basic educational and societal requisites, as it was so narrowly bound by Church and state ideology.

In the initial transitional phase from the Second Republic to the Franco regime, prior to the Civil War, fascist ideology became the political, economic, and moral solution to a crisis in which the class system failed to adapt to the processes of modernization. Hence, fascism arose amidst a period of economic and political instability, espousing the commitment to deed rather than to historical evolution.11 Mannheim developed a typology of the nature of fascism, involving the desire on the part of a dictator to "deaden the will to action of those very masses by whose newly mobilized energies they have risen to their present position."12 Dictators rise to power effectively because they encounter no moral resistance on the part of a poorly-selected and maintained elite, which no longer has the power to integrate the rest of society.13 The duration of a dictatorship depends on the degree to which a modern mass society lacks direction and integration, and the degree to which possible resistance groups have "cancelled each other out".14 Fascism opposes religion and traditionalism, and favors the petite bourgeoisie in its campaign against big business. Circumstances
heighten the appeal of fascism to a normally liberal middle class: "Extremist movements ... appeal to the disgruntled and the psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and authoritarian persons at every level of the society."15 The early Spanish fascist movement followed this pattern indirectly and to a lesser degree both in its tolerance for tradition, which ultimately was to strengthen support, and in that the middle class was virtually nonexistent. Instead, the Falange appealed at first to youth, and later to a sector of the landless and alienated workers.

Fascism is opportunistic in the sense that it makes the most of any possible emotional and irrational element of mass political energy in a type of "reverse democratization".16 Under Mannheim’s construct, dictatorships are rational in organization but irrational in ideology. Occurring in this political system is the extraordinary appeal to the leader, a greater distance between the elites and the masses, and a crisis in which the individual feels helpless and perceives his only alternative as that of incorporation into the fascist structure.

The Franco regime, then, adopted a corporatist facade in the early phase as an effort to integrate society under state control. Franco’s corporatism involved the defined pattern of denying "spontaneous interest articulation" and instituting "authoritatively recognized groups that interact with the government in defined and regularized ways."17 Through its simultaneous incorporation of masses and exclusion through depoliticization, the Franco regime effectively minimized all
opposition. Hence, students in the early phase joined fascist youth groups, and later, after the regime's consolidation, became incorporated into the controlled and indoctrinated student syndicate, or Sindicato Escolar Universitario (SEU).

Dictatorships "coordinate through organizations the impulses which the revolutionary period unchained to direct them toward prescribed wish objects."18 These symbols, in the Franco regime, were religious and nationalist: "Dios" and the "patria" formed a spiritual and almost ritualistic unity of popular propaganda. But according to Mannheim, dictatorships are only a transitional form: they stem from the "negative working of the forces of mass democracy ... nothing more than a violent attempt to stabilize a stage in the development of liberal society, which was by nature transitory, to reinforce and to extend that stage with all its defects, in favor of the one-sided interest of a certain group."19 This factor explains how the Franco regime established itself after the initial phase of the Civil War. But Mannheim's theories fail to explain why the Franco regime lasted for thirty-seven years, rather than merely serving as a short-term transitional form.

This government clearly was much more than a simple fascist dictatorship. The long duration of the Franco regime can be attributed to its ability to adapt from a fascist base, through phases of bureaucratic authoritarianism and patrimonial rationalism. The Franco regime essentially rose above the insecurities upon which it was founded, aided by a strong network of traditional and accepted religious and nationalist symbols.
The term "bureaucratic authoritarianism" refers to political systems often evolving in Latin American countries, but it can be applied, in modified form, to the Franco regime in Spain. The vast body of literature defines this type of political organization as non-democratic, excluding of the popular sector, and dominated by a coalition of military and civilian technocrats operating in collusion with foreign corporations. 20 The emphasis on economic development rather than on ideological cohesion and integration occurred in the later years of the Franco regime, after stability and installation of the dictatorship had long been guaranteed. However, the economic contradictions within a bureaucratic authoritarian structure are multiple. As Guillermo O'Donnell hypothesizes, the premise to its very structure is reactionary in the sense that it seeks to overcome the gap which occurs in the course of economic development, wherein the domestic market becomes glutted with simple home-manufactured items. 21 Further industrialization, or the "capital goods" stage, is encouraged in order to avoid the associated problems of inflation of imported goods and devaluation of consumer goods, which lead to deficits in the balance of payments and the foreign debt. However, the capital goods stage cannot occur without adequate resources. The resulting economic gap between the need to develop industry and the lack of resources occurred in Spain in the late 1950's and early 60's, before the steel and automobile industries were established and aided by foreign capital. 22 Vertical, corporate labor structures were instituted as a means of rationalizing production, overcoming the gap of scarce resources, and containing competing social forces.
Besides these economic contradictions, in which industrialization without the proper resources is attempted, are contradictions in the very legitimacy of a bureaucratic authoritarian system. As O'Donnell states:

The reification of the state in its institutional objectifications obscures its underlying role as guarantor of domination within society; yet—inasmuch as it implies that state and society appear to be separate—it tends to generate various mediations between them through which consensus tends to be created. The state ultimately is based on coercion, but it usually is also based on consensus, which both encompasses and conceals coercion. 23

The consensus, in the case of the Franco regime, resulted from the victory of Franco's "Movimiento Nacional Español" in the Civil War, a fact that was never allowed to be forgotten. Most of the citizens desired order in any form after the catastrophic nature of the war. O'Donnell describes the consensus as "tacit": people are lulled into their private routines and are not expected to participate in any meaningful way in the body politic. 24 Citizens also are made to feel secure by the unintelligible language of the technocrats. 25

The University, in the context of the Franco regime, was essentially an instrument, designed to reinforce patterns of state domination. The general public accepted this domination from its inception. Later, however, student revolt revealed the lack of legitimacy of an institution that was theoretically designed for the revelation of truth, but prohibited from any autonomy.

The Franco regime, by its nature, exerted an extreme amount of control over the institutional form of the University.
Autonomy in this system, although vitally necessary, could never exist. In light of the problematic nature of state control over university education, the democratic university of the present has taken great pains to revise the juridical statutes in order to guarantee autonomy from Church and state. In this aspect of the ideal typology, the democratic university best accommodates the needs of an educational system which attempts to impart truths not based on ideology and dogma.

The third element of the ideal type is that of a meritocracy, or rather, a system of selection or admission based on the student's achievements. This of course should be balanced with every possible aid and encouragement to those who are at a disadvantage. The state should subsidize preparatory courses designed to ensure that the student is properly qualified to enter the University. Additionally, the meritocracy idea should be mitigated by offering various alternatives to those not capable of succeeding in the advanced course work of highly specialized fields. By formulating some sort of just selection process, the University would avoid the problems of mass entry into a system incapable of providing for an excess of students. The meritocracy idea also implies the need for the faculty appointment system, or "oposicion", to be revised. Decisions should be based on the complex needs of each department.

The republican and democratic university structures best comply with the meritocratic idea, but both forms contradict a pure process of university selection based upon equal access according to abilities. The University of the Second Republic,
although attempting reform within this parameter, could not dismantle the rigid class structures of Spain in the 1930’s. Higher education, although more accessible, was still reserved for the upper class and the almost nonexistent middle-class. During that time period, access was limited to those who ascribed to the elitist normative pattern of educating their children. The Franco university never overtly denied access to higher education, but economic patterns perpetuated traditional class boundaries and discouraged open access. Once access became more widespread, during the period of university expansion in the 50’s and 60’s, the problems of professional placement became acute. These problems continue to plague the University today. The democratic university attempts to be a meritocracy; access is open to anyone completing secondary school requirements. However, this factor causes uncontrolled expansion in a university system lacking the capacity to accommodate for the influx of students. Because there is no uniform selection process, many are unqualified for the demands of a university education. The result of the democratic university’s efforts are unfortunate: a high percentage of students either fail or drop out.

The fourth element of this ideal type is that of democratization as the process most fit to integrate the students into their education. In theory, this process allows for social mobility through the access to any profession, and guarantees the student the fundamental right to decide policies affecting him/her. Students should work in conjunction with administration and professors to arrive at just policies concerning curriculum,
evaluation, and corporate life. In this way, the University should become a vital arena of participation instead of passivity.

It follows that the Republic ascribed to the ideals of a democratized university system, but the barriers of a chaotic political arena, economic problems, cultural anachronisms, a rigid class system, and obviously, a Civil War, served to curtail any consolidation of reform efforts. The structure under Franco opposed any ideological autonomy; the state depoliticized the University and succeeded in imposing a closed system of integration according to "correct" Church and state dogma. The present democracy, through its legislation, attempts to create a university which reflects the larger structure. Nonetheless, uneven democratization prevents the support and acceptance of new forms among older professors and right-wing students. A sense of passivity pervades the present University. This passivity can be explained in part by the inconsistent transition to democracy. Referring to Germani's construct, transition to democracy involves three stages: no democracy, limited democracy, and progressive democracy. Although mass suffrage exists in Spain, many are apathetic with regard to their right to vote. A wide political spectrum exists, yet splinter groups gain no significant power nor support, and retain only an insecure minority status. It may be hypothesized that only a limited democracy exists in Spain: rational organization, acceptance of its legitimacy, and traditional consumption patterns describe more accurately the political arena than would the
characteristics of a progressive democracy. 28

Lastly, an ideal educational system requires state subsidiation. Related to the meritocratic idea, the state should subsidize preparatory courses designed to ensure that the student is properly qualified to enter the University. If managed properly, adequate funding also would guarantee the advancement of investigation, both in the natural and social sciences. Without this funding the University cannot establish a contributory role to society, because students are inadequately prepared in their fields. The University should have at its disposal the proper resources to guarantee the fostering of creative research and contribution to knowledge. In order not to conflict with university autonomy, subsidies should be granted with the only condition being that they provide an implicit societal return on the investment.

Regarding the monetary needs of the University, no political regime has been able to invest substantial amounts of revenue into higher education. The Republic was proportionally most willing to invest, and instituted several innovations in the fields of scientific research and pedagogy. Spain has always remained one of the poorest Western European countries, however, and especially after the Civil War, could little afford the "luxury" of a well-endowed educational system. The present democracy has suffered economic depressions, intensified by labor strikes, high inflation, and a substantial foreign debt. The University requires funding, but probably will not approach a realization of this requisite.

The ideal type, while not absolute, hypothetically yields to
a university with a qualified and reasonably limited student body, participating and actively responsible for its education. Students would be trained in a more profound manner than simple rote memorization; autonomy and secularization would lead to freedom of thought and doctrine. This structure would by its nature propagate a well-qualified and interested professorate, concerned for the well-being of the students and not merely with the desire to succeed in their fields. By contrasting the ideal type to each system's realities, one approaches a more complete understanding of inadequacies. This understanding facilitates suggestions for improvement within structural limitations, which are predicated by the narrow boundaries of political regimes.
Footnotes:

2 Ibid., p. 36

3 Ibid., pp. 58-59

4 Ibid., p. 50, 66

5 Ibid., p. 138


9 Germani, op. cit., p. 126

10 Ibid., p. 124

11 Karl Mannheim, op. cit., p. 119


13 Ibid., p. 87


15 Ibid., p. 91

16 Mannheim, op. cit., p. 63


18 Ibid., p. 98

19 Ibid., p. 107

20 David Collier, "Overview of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model," from The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, op. cit.,


23 Guillermo O'Donnell, op.cit., p. 288

24 Ibid., p. 296

25 O'Donnell, op.cit., p. 54


27 Germani, op.cit., p. 126

28 Ibid., p. 124
II. Overview of the Political Transition: 1923-1976

Institutional Changes in the Spanish University are difficult to interpret without highlighting pertinent elements of the political milieu during the transition from the establishment of the Second Republic through the Franco years, and finally to the installment of democracy. Politics in twentieth century Spain were and are at times chaotic and always complex, and within this complexity one gains an appreciation of major problems inherent in the University system.

Spain’s liberal-democratic tradition changed under the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, from 1923-1931. Prior to Primo de Rivera’s coup and subsequent dictatorship, moderate liberal leaders had attempted limited modernization, but instead of solving Spain’s many socioeconomic problems, this limited change exacerbated inequities. Drastic economic conditions easily gave rise to class consciousness, and a “despondent extremism” arose among the alienated industrial workers of the north and landless peasants of the south. Major problems, then, included unequal industrialization, political fragmentation, and a disorganized military sector confronted with conflict in Morocco. Within this context early socialism and syndicalism thrived. So, too, existed a “liberal xenophobia” among influential thinkers of the Generation of ‘98 such as Miguel de Unamuno, Pío Barroja, Antonio Machado, and José Ortega y Gasset. The left in Spain was highly contradictory, at times ascribing to the tenets of classical European liberalism, and more often
posing the idea of the Spanish "raza", unique and noble. The right in Spain, on the other hand, always seemed to offer panaceas to the Spanish people in the form of safe traditionalism and state aggrandizement.

Miguel Primo de Rivera's talents as a politician were minimal, however, and during his "dicta blanda" the only official ideology was patriotism. Coalitions within the powerful Church oligarchy supported the military regime. But patriotism could not contain a growing political polarization encouraged by economic exigencies. Early national syndicalist activity fomented in the context of economic and political disequilibria. Primo de Rivera's dictatorship clearly delineated political cleavages, thus in the process strengthening all opposition. Not surprisingly, this short-lived dictatorship was easily overridden by the still-strong liberal wing, with national elections giving rise to the Second Republic, from 1931 to 1936.

During the Second Republic, the New Right, with its platform of action and decisive deed as the ultimate expedient, gathered support. This constituency desired a total break from the past, offering a seemingly fresh and effective alternative for Spain. The ideology of the New Right, however, was highly irrational, appealing to politically confused, weary or naive individuals. Various utopic ideas were especially aimed at the nation's youth:

The New State will be constructive, creative. It will supplant individuals and groups, and the ultimate sovereignty will reside in it and only it ... We defend, therefore, Panstatism...
(We advocate) exaltation of the universities, ... the supreme creative organ of scientific and cultural values ...
(We advocate) articulation of the varied districts of Spain. The basic reality of Spain is not Madrid,
but the provinces. Our most radical impulse must consist, then, in connecting and encouraging the vital focus of the provinces...

Syndication of economic forces will be obligatory and in each instance bound to the highest ends of the state. The state will discipline and guarantee production at all times...\(^\text{3}\)

This ideology, deceptively invigorating and idealistic, followed closely the fascist pattern. Characteristics include ideological oppression, or the enforced acceptance of a single ideology and intolerance of divergence; a movement orientation of mass mobilization with a middle-class base; a continuous realization at the political level of what is to be achieved; and oblivion to the ruling class.\(^\text{4}\) Slogans such as "arriba" and "España, una, grande y libre" gave life to the newly formed Junta de Ofensiva Nacional Syndicalista (JONS).\(^\text{5}\)

By 1933 the Republic's "Bienio Rojo" had changed to the "Bienio Negro", with the center, or the Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Groups (CEDA), in control. This party enlisted the aid of the Catholic Church, in support of a conservative, corporate state ideology. The Church was, as always, considered the religious, moral, and political fiber of society. Even under the brief Second Republic, many Spaniards were unwilling to support more liberal ideologies, and the political spectrum became increasingly center-rightest. Major problems during this time period included: a) rising anticlericalism; b) rising civil power of the army; c) the problem of regional autonomy; d) a backward, uneven economy in which wealth distribution followed class cleavages, excluding the large lower sector, thus disallowing integration for all but Church personnel and the nobility.
Mobilization occurred in the 1930’s, however, as Spanish syndicalism continued to grow under the dynamic leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, who sought to vindicate the memory of his father’s dictatorship. José Antonio, as he was popularly referred to, became the leader of the Falange Española (FE). The FE was to become the most important right-wing party from 1935 to 1960. José Antonio encouraged the peculiar nature of Spanish fascism in that he was a rather atypical fascist leader. In an intellectual and idealistic manner, José Antonio desired a “New Spain”, infused with energy and grandeur, rather than strife and contradiction. In his words,

Fascism was born to inspire a faith not of the Right (which at bottom aspires to conserve everything, even the unjust), nor of the Left (which at bottom aspires to destroy everything, even the good), but a collective, integral, national faith...

A fascist state is not created by the triumph of either the strongest or the most numerous party—which is not the right one for being the most numerous, though a stupid suffrage may say otherwise—but by the triumph of a principle or order common to all, the constant national sentiment, of which the state is the organ.

If anything truly deserves to be called a workers’ state it is the fascist state—and the workers will come to realize this, no matter what—the workers’ syndicates are directly elevated to the dignity of organs of the state...

One achieves true human dignity only when one serves. Only he is great who subjects himself to taking part in the achievement of a great task.6

José Antonio gave the newly-formed Falange cohesion and a powerful ideology. Members were to embody the concept of a united patria, instilled with noble ideals. The Falange grew in force during this time period when people were losing faith in the still young and somewhat ineffectual Republic. However, José
Antonio had no definite plan of action, and ideology alone did not have the desired effects. Support for the Falange continued to intensify, but most members of this politically immature party had no concept of the true ideals of José Antonio's national syndicalism. Subsequently, during and after the Civil War the ideology of the Falange diminished to a crude facsimile of its original form. Yet in its inception the Falange inspired its members with the revolutionary zeal inherent in any hitherto unheard-of ideology. Many students, discontent with the Republican FUE (Federación Universitario Española), desired to participate in the fledgling student branch of the Falange, the SEU. By 1934 the conflict between these two organizations was apparent, with tension increasing in the University of Madrid. Violence between the factions became widespread during 1934: in the span of one month, two student Falange sympathizers were shot. The death of Matías Montero, student organizer for the SEU, received great public attention, which ultimately was to aid the cause of the FE.

The Spanish Civil War, from 1936-39, involved a wide range of political factions, ranging in emotional appeal. The strife during these years reached hitherto unknown proportions, becoming highly personal in its violence. The Falange emerged as the national party, surviving in an entirely different form from that which José Antonio had envisioned. Francisco Franco Bahamonde, a career general, became the leader of the Movimiento Español and the subsequent dictator of Spain. Franco seized upon the Falange as the key political facade upon which to build national
support. After the long political and social struggle, Spaniards had no choice but to accept whatever they were given in the political sphere. With the left destroyed and repressed, national syndicalism was the inevitable transitional political form. Franco’s final victory in 1939 promised an end to the massive war-time destruction, and many citizens were more than willing to accept the new "Caudillo".

Franco’s coalition government was an uneasy blend of the military and the Church. The "New Spain" was to be a "confessional" state, with the Generalissimo as leader "por la gracia de Dios". It was a state predictably destined to be supported and legitimated to a large degree by the Catholic Church; one cannot overemphasize the enormous power of this institution over society. Ultimate control rested in the figure of the Caudillo, yet Franco delegated to Church functionaries key positions in social institutions. Franco also headed the military apparatus and the leader of the only state party, the Falange Española Tradicional (F.E.T.). Franco was to be a unique authoritarian figure, serving the "needs" of all citizens through promises of economic strength, development, national unity, and religious morality. As Shlomo Ben-Amí describes the Caudillo,

Franco nunca fue un líder carismático y su gobierno no se apoyaba en la manipulación populista de la multitud. El dictador español se distinguía de otros tiranos --incluso de los gobernantes democráticos-- por su abstención de todo lo que tuviera que ver con la "imagen" y con las encuestas prefabricadas para sondear la opinión pública. Tomaba su fuerza de una fe ciega en su propio cometido histórico, de su convicción de que las manifestaciones para expresarle apoyo constituían no un plebiscito diario, sino una legitimación permanente de su gobierno,
de su asombrosa capacidad de superar las crisis, de su estilo autoritario que volvía superflua toda discusión con él ... así como de sus tácticas y estrategias políticas.  

Basically, Franco denuded any organization of its ideology. Again, as in Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, the only safe ideology was patriotism. The Falange soon lost its impetus and became "hollow rhetoric." The F.E.T., a fusion of the FE, the JONS, and the Carlists, was an instrument of state unity, effectively checking potential opposition. This party soon became valuable to Franco also for the purpose of checking a potentially volatile sector of society: the students. The SEU originated in 1937; by 1939 it had a monopoly on student representation, and by 1944, membership was compulsory. The SEU became the University’s chief instrument of indoctrination. Other youth organizations, although fascist in nature, were soon quelled for being too subversive.

The regime disguised its repressive nature by adopting a supposedly corporatist form of social integration. Labor and management were subordinate to the state, in that Franco established obligatory syndicates. These syndicates presented the appearance of legitimacy, but since they were arbitrarily directed from above, the organizations did not represent social interests, but rather, only furthered state ends. Vertical organization gave the regime an impermeable character: Franco appointed each political faction the control of a particular institution. Leaders, of course, were to answer to the Caudillo as the ultimate authority. In general, the Church was given social control and the military occupied a position of political
primacy. The Cortes Españoles were also reinstated in 1942 under Franco, but these courts were only part of the facade. The object of their reinstatement was to give the government a more legitimate appearance, but in reality the "diputados" controlled nothing. Members were selected and appointed vertically, either directly by Franco or through the syndicates. In sum, the Cortes had only consultative power and any legislation originating therein was subject to revision or nullification by Franco.

Further consolidation of the regime included the titulary control of jurisprudence by the monarchists, education and international policy by the Christian Democrats, and labor and economy by the technocrats. A packet of legislation aimed to appease Spaniards of every political persuasion and to give legitimacy to the regime. First among the laws promulgated was the Fuero de Trabajo in 1938, primarily involving worker regulations such as guaranteed social security (unmodified until 1971), and obligatory participation in vertical syndicates, designed to represent the workers and affix reciprocal obligations between the corporate state and the workers. This vertical idea, in the form of the "Organización Sindical" (OS), hardly represented any constituency, again since leaders were selected from above. The Fuero was based upon corporate ideals, but in practice, promises were never realized. Supposedly the Fuero guaranteed agrarian workers a small parcel of land; it was to promulgate fair conditions and salaries for industrial workers; and claimed to revise business practices. None of these changes were enacted, however.

The second important piece of legislation, the 1945 "Fuero
de los Españoles", was a bill of rights designed to give the regime a democratic make-up. Supposedly, this "democratic" concept gave Spanish citizens a constitution based on "inherent rights". The first part sets forth the nation's principles as a social, right-wing, Catholic state. The second part details the citizens' obligations as taxpayers, with enforced military service, loyalty to the Caudillo, and "rights and privileges." However, the Fuero was hardly more than another aspect of the facade as it guaranteed nothing specific. Also, this legislation was nullified by the "Ley de Contrafuero", which proclaimed that the Caudillo could revise any constitutional laws at will. Additional legislation such as the "Ley de Referendum" supposedly gave citizens the opportunity to "voice opinions" and to "approve issues"; however, only "si" votes were counted. Other legislation appeared to be a technique to liquidate the opposition: the Amnesty law of 1946, the Law of Civil Responsibility, the Law of Repression of Masonry and Communism, the Social Security Law of 1941, and the Penal System Reform, successfully strengthened and unified Franco's authoritarian bureaucracy. Finally, the "Ley de Sucesión", arranged by secret negotiation in 1947 with Don Juan de Borbón, guaranteed the hand-picked succession of Don Juan's son Juan Carlos as eventual king of Spain. This law was of extreme importance to Franco, as it gave him indefinite power, appeased the monarchists, the Church, and the military, and guaranteed a "proper" fascist education for the prince.

The various organizations and legislation originating in the
The regime’s early years seem infinite. They reveal, however, the nature of the Spanish state under Franco. Franco soon became a mastermind in appeasing the four basic constituencies of the regime: the Church, the Falange, the military, and the Monarchists. Most important in the analysis of institutional change and adaptation are the Church and the Falange. Both of these institutions became the major force of indoctrination against which students protested. It was not until the establishment of a democracy that their influence diminished, but the still-apparent presence of Church and military conservatism in Spanish society contributes to the problems inherent in the University today.

With this background in mind, it must be emphasized that democracy in Spain is clearly inconsistent and idiosyncratic, as a result of the pervasive character of the Franco regime. The subsequent political transition to democracy first involved Franco’s attempts to stabilize the impending political succession prior to his death. In 1969 Franco nominated Juan Carlos as his successor. Rather than prompting stability, however, this move inspired a great deal of agitation, resulting in a state of emergency, proclaimed on January 24, 1969. A high degree of tension continued until March 26 of that year, when the state of emergency lifted. This episode reveals the patrimonial nature of this projected transition, wherein Franco and his supporters desired to control and to decide the course of Spanish politics and society. The Caudillo’s speech to the Courts on November 1969 underlines the regime’s stance on the transition:

In thirty years ... the face of Spanish society
has changed considerably. The task before us is a heavy one: for long years our country will need to be governed with infinite prudence, and also with understanding and love. Above all, it will be necessary to avoid the luxury of light-hearted and impulsive improvisation, of freedom to turn against oneself and break up into mutually hostile factions. Your health, so newly restored, would not resist such an ordeal. 9

The transition was to be gradual, and in the main governed by Franco. Nonetheless, certain extraneous events prevented an orderly change. Franco's political right-wing support divided into two opposing factions: the aperturistas, or those under the age of fifty who desired a liberal monarchy, and the anti-aperturistas, the "bunker" over the age of fifty who supported repressive institutions and favored a traditional monarchy. In addition to this main division among supporters of the Franco regime, other left-wing political groups were gaining force. The PSOE, led by Felipe González, returned from exile in Toulouse and established itself in Madrid. Spain also had to contend with high inflation as a response to the world-wide oil crisis, which in turn served as a provocation to strikes and unfavorable public opinion. Military problems occurred at this time, involving the claims of Morocco and Mauritania to the Spanish Sahara. Further complicating political and social cohesion was the high degree of regionalism in Spain. Basque terrorists of the ETA continued their strife, inspiring other groups in Catalunya, Galicia, the Canary Islands, Valencia, and Andalucia. Franco, moribund in 1974, was clearly unable to direct any orderly transition, and all illusions of patrimony were violently broken upon his death in 1974.

Juan Carlos de Borbón, crowned king on November 22, 1975,
inherited a rigid political system amidst social and political chaos. It is a miracle that Spain’s transition was as smooth as it was; one would question any unrealistic hopes for a true democracy under those circumstances. Basically, Juan Carlos’ tactic was to gauge the situation and to subsequently instill certain political leaders in various branches of government, thus achieving a balance among the factions. Suárez, the new prime minister, was a Christian-Democrat of Falange origins. He established a respectable cabinet of young ex-Francoists and technocrats. Juan Carlos and Suárez succeeded in bringing about a noticeable aperture with the following laws: a broad pardon for all offenders to the regime, with the exception of ETA terrorists; allowance of strikes, revision of the fundamental laws (bases); the establishment of a bicameral parliamentary system with deputies and senators elected by universal suffrage (Oct. 1976); the legalization of political parties (March 1977); and free elections (June 1977). At this juncture tension was evident, and opposition from the right continued. But the June 15 elections revealed a much higher degree of political stability than previously. The results of these elections were not surprising: Suárez and the UCD attained a majority, followed by the PSOE, the PC, the AP (Popular Alliance), the dissident socialists, the Basques, and the Catalonians.

This transformation succeeded in the political arena, but in terms of the economy and the social structure, a high degree of disequilibrium existed. Problems caused by a continuation of "feudalism, exploitative capitalism of dubious efficiency, and
right-wing opposition" lingered. The economy in Spain, accustomed to the rigid control of an authoritarian regime supported by the conservative elite, could not cope with the fluctuations of an unrestricted capitalism. Financial deficits to foreign countries increased, leading Spain into a weak international status. Labor continued with its uncompromising position; inequities increased as the economy became weaker. The general attitude, nevertheless, was one of overconfidence in the authority of the King and of Suárez. A passive and confused public, the fragmented left, and problems of scarcity and unemployment served to paralyze any orderly solutions.

Amidst the overall political transformation, it is logical to assume that the Spanish University also witnessed revision. This indeed was the case to some degree, but reflecting the larger society, democratization occurred unevenly and it is questionable to what degree it actually affected the students themselves. Returning to Germani’s theories of modernization, and in this case applying those ideas to democratization of the University, it should be stated that resistance can result from the continuity of traditions, group conflict, ideologies, stratification patterns, and social values. In the Spanish University, a degree of political fragmentation exists because of the persistence of right-wing energies throughout the transition to democracy. Equally, the religious and moral dogma of the Catholic Church remains, although not to the degree of rigidity as previously. Traditional patterns of social stratification, diminishing somewhat, still exist as a result of current economic problems.
The nature of the political transition in Spain directly relates to institutional problems, because each controlling group determines ideologically the structures in the social sphere. One can clearly perceive this effect in the case of the Spanish University. Education is particularly vulnerable to manipulation; in this case, the University suffered due to the volatile and inconsistent nature of the political transition, from a republic, to an authoritarian structure, and finally, to a socialist democracy.
Footnotes:


2Ibid., p. 4

3Ibid., p. 13


5Payne, op.cit., p. 18

6Ibid., p. 31-32

7Shlomo Ben Ami, La Revolución Desde Arriba: España 1936-1979, (Barcelona: Talleres Gráficos Hostench, S.A., 1980), p. 193: "Franco was never a charismatic leader, and his government did not support itself by the manipulation of the populace. The Spanish dictator was distinguished from other tyrants--including democratic governors--by his abstention from anything to do with his "image" and with prefabricated public opinion surveys. His strength came from a blind faith in his own historic mission, and from a conviction that supportive manifestations not only constituted the popular vote, but also permanent legitimation of his government, his astounding capacity to overcome crises, his authoritarian style which always made superfluous any arguments--effectively, his political strategies."

8Payne, op.cit., p. 200


12Gino Germani, op.cit., p. 169
III. Structural Changes in the Spanish University: the Student Movement as a Reaction to Institutional Inconsistencies

"La historia de la Universidad, prácticamente desde 1940 hasta nuestros días, ha sido la historia de una degradación constante y ello por el abandono en que los poderes públicos han tenido sometido a la Universidad." (Jose Luis Abellán, 1975)

"La insufficiencia y el anquilosamiento de nuestro sistema de enseñanza constituye hoy el motivo de pesimismo probablemente más justificado de cuantos pueda concebir el estudioso de nuestro desarrollo. Al propio tiempo, la inversión en la ampliación y mejora de nuestra enseñanza, en sus múltiples aspectos y modalidades, es el tipo de inversión para el desarrollo de más alto prioridades (...) El estrangulamiento más importante de nuestra economía (...) es la ausencia de proyectos de inversión bien estudiada (...) Un sistema de enseñanza tan poco satisfactorio desde el punto de vista social, como el nuestro, implica un enorme despilfarro a la movilidad social." (Amando de Miguel, 1976)

The University under Franco entered a long period of crisis, and a full recovery from the structural revisions resulting from the dictatorship has not yet occurred in the present democracy. With the purpose of explaining the problematic nature of the Spanish University, this chapter discusses the structure of the Republican University and changes implemented under Franco, with the aforementioned ideal type as a means of comparison. Additionally, the reactions of the students themselves to the Franco University are integral to the discussion of structural problems. Student revolt, occurring as early as the 1950’s and continuing through the 60’s, reveals the nature of a political and institutional system incapable of meeting societal needs.

The general structure of the University was of little inducement to independent thought and study. The Spanish University of the early twentieth century was a rigid, authoritative institution founded upon elitist notions of a
classical and religious education. Early reform under the Second Republic seemed to offer hope of modernizing this archaic institution: the University underwent a short period of rebirth during this time period. Even prior to the Second Republic, promising signs of enlightenment and modernization evidenced themselves in the form of the Junta de Ampliacion de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas (Commission for the Advancement of Studies & Scientific Research), the first organization devoted to objective scientific investigation. The Junta was governed by the Minister of Education and composed of twenty-one permanent members, in this way guaranteeing its autonomy from political control. Among its works, the Junta granted scholarships abroad, positions in research centers, and innovations such as the Instituto Escuela, a preparatory school which attempted certain revolutionary teaching methods. Additionally, the Junta provided Residence Halls at the Universidad de Madrid in an attempt to provide some sort of corporate student life and to act as "agencies of reform" for students. 

3 Adolfo Gil y Monte, Catedrático of the Universidad de Valencia, officially announced the separation of the state from education. 

4 In 1928 and 1930, a committee attempted to analyze the problems inherent in the University, but because of the chaotic nature of the political transformation from Primo de Rivera's dictatorship to Republican rule, no issues were resolved.

With the inception of the Second Republic, however, reform soon followed. Marcelino Domingo Sanjuan, the new Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts, created Pedagogic Missions in
their chosen field. Fourthly, the academic course of study was divided into two basic periods; the first three years assuming a general plan and the latter two years involving specialization. And finally, increased variety within each specialization occurred. Still, the general curriculum was not up to par in terms of connection between theory and practice. Isolation, reliance on dogma, rigid obedience and external discipline combined to ensure sub-level higher education, even under the Republic. 6

The Republican university encouraged a wide spectrum of political organizations for students, although no organization exercised primacy. The Federación Universitaria Escolar (FUE) and the Unión Federal de Estudiantes Hispánicos (UFEH), both republican/democratic organizations, coexisted albeit grudgingly with right-wing groups such as the Asociación Escolar Tradicionalistas (AET), the Juventudes de Acción Popular (JAP), and the Sindicato Escolar Universitario (SEU).

The new attitude of all left-wing groups toward education was that of an open society, disposed to a nonelitest system of cultural transmission. In the Republican form, the University was much more than an agent of social stratification. It was still a democracy of the most able, but at least the university system opened to less fortunate individuals, giving them a chance for more than poverty and ignorance. The University, in this sense, was not a mere instrument of the dominant social class, but rather, it attempted to unify the diverse sectors of society and reinforced the Republic. 7 Ideals such as autonomy,
democratization, a meritocratic system of selection and placement, and state funding of research and other programs could be partially realized under the Republic. Thus, the University took on a more integral role within society. In the words of Ortega y Gasset, renowned Spanish philosopher:

De este modo no será la Universidad una institución sólo para estudiantes, un recinto "ad usum delphinus", sino que medida en medio de la vida, de sus urgencias, de sus pasiones, ha de imponer como un "poder espiritual" ... representando la serenidad frente al frenesí, la seria agudeza frente a la frivolidad y la franca estupidez. 8

University policy began to change in 1934 with the advent of the Bienio Cedista, or the right-wing branch of the Republic. The Bienio Cedista, of Catholic origins, attacked the various Republican innovations such as the Institucion Libre de Ensenanza:

Se han ido asentando en el Ministerio de Instrucción Pública toda una colección de masones y marxistas, que ni aun ahora abandona su mejor trinchera y que en alianza más o menos encubierta con una conocida organización, culpable de toda la desnacionalización de nuestra cultura, prosiguen con la inconsecuencia o la complicidad de autoridades tímidas o indecisas, o ligados por compromisos a esa misma Institución, la tarea negativa y autenticamente revolucionaria. 9

In short, the Bienio prohibited the Marxist syndication, revised university inspections to be more stringent, and reformed legislation. Church control again encroached upon the University, reinforced by Gil Robles, influential leader and spokesman for the Cedistas, or Christian Centrists. Gradually, as the Second Republic weakened, a new nationalist emphasis reflecting
the overall political forum grew within the University. The new ideology regarded education as a modifier of natural impulses. Students were to be socialized for the purpose of state aggrandizement. Early signs of change thus appeared: autonomy diminished to the point where the University was more a political instrument than an independent institution for learning.

Tension grew in the University commensurate with the weakening of the Second Republic, reflecting pre-war society as a whole. All political factions used youth groups as a rallying forces in preparation for the inevitable conflict. As Castillejo states, "Scanty information applied to a brash, disabused intelligence unbridled by experience, faith in oneself, and reckless audacity, generosity and illusion, are revolutionary weapons treasured by youth."10 This factor created a high degree of polarization among the students. The Asociación Escolar Tradicionalista (AET) began attracting more students with a traditional, Catholic background. Fascist youth groups envisioned a "first line", formed by the Juventudes de Acción Popular (JAP) and of course, the SEU. These right-wing organizations constantly conflicted with older student organizations, and the highly politicized nature of this conflict acted to the detriment of the University. Pablo Lizcano, commenting on this era, noted that:

La vida académica estaba exhausta. La agitación universitaria estaba en manos falangistas, que lanzaban a los estudiantes contra el gobierno, con parecida capacidad de convocatoria y el mismo recurso a la huelga que tanto tuvo la FUE. Ya a principios de año, el SEU, junto con la AET y la FEC, había mobilizado todas las universidades de España en una huelga contra el separatismo. La oposición de
izquierdas era completamente insuficiente, incluso después del balón de oxígeno que recibí tras el triunfo del Frente Popular. Falangistas, Católicos, y Tradicionalistas trataron de fundirse en un Frente Universitario Nacional.  

This political agitation in the University was a precursor to the Spanish Civil War, during which time the University was thrown into a hopeless chaos of student war volunteers, fighting for either side, and escaping liberal catedráticos and rectors. After the main violence had diminished, leaving Franco as self-proclaimed dictator, it became clear that all innovation and liberal ideology associated with the University was to be dismantled. In 1943 the Ley de Ordenación Universitaria established the fascist SEU as the only legal student organization. This law also demanded membership from everyone in the University, including professors and administrators. According to this law, the University was to be the "teleological army to combat heresy; the creation of the missionary Falange which seeks to affirm the truth of Catholicism." Additionally, this law granted the University a confessional nature: the University ascribed to the dogma and morality of Catholicism, with obligatory religious instruction, activities, etc.

The SEU imitated the regime’s vertical organization, as described earlier, and could be characterized in its earlier stage as the most militantly fascist of all Franco’s organizations. The SEU played a role in restructuring the Franquist University along the lines of ideologic indoctrination, rapidly gaining control of university propaganda, radio and press. The ends of the SEU, in the context of the students
themselves, were threefold: that of political, professional and military formation. This insidious process was designed to be in accord with the students' own desires, so that indoctrination would necessarily lead to success within the regime.13

The control of the SEU worked in conjunction with Church control in the University. The two main Catholic organizations exercising power were the Asociación Nacional de Propagandistas (ACNP) and its creator body, the Opus Dei. The task of the ACNP was to "reconquer and defend" lost Catholic territory; in this case, the University.14 Originally, the ACNP desired to form "men of action with a simple ideology", and of course, this end dovetailed with those of the Franco regime. During the early years of university reorganization, Franco allowed the Opus Dei to play an increasingly large role in university control.

The works of the Opus and the ACNP were of great influence in the Spanish University. The first major change was the establishment of the High Commission of Scientific Investigation (CSIC), designed to replace the Republican Junta de Ampliacion Cientifica. This research organization worked separately from the University, and was the only body of its kind endowed with the funding and talent for scientific research. Unfortunately, Church dogma restricted and circumscribed all forms of investigation.

In its desire to infiltrate the University, the Opus Dei manipulated policy. The Colegios Mayores, or residence halls, were of key importance to this idea of encroachment from within. By providing luxurious student housing, the Opus could attempt to watchguard the students, observing who would be suitable for
recruitment to the ranks of membership. This elitist formation would hypothetically attract "deserving" youth to the secretive world of the Opus Dei. The Opus legitimated its control of the Colegios, stating that only by living therein could youths gain "correct" values and modes of behavior: "Un Colegio Mayor es uno de los medios fundamentales en los que se pueden crear hábitos y dar esa verdadera educación política y social que consiste en tener conciencia de que vivimos con los demás." 15

Besides controlling the Colegios Mayores, the Opus managed to obtain key administrative posts. The Opus controlled the professorial body as it did the students through policies instituted by "line men" in the Ministry of Education. The first Minister of Education under Franco, José Ibañez Martín, instituted a policy of "purification" of the academic chairs: in other words, those liberal professors who had not already fled during the war were discharged and substituted with Opus men. Moreover, the tribunals which judged the oposiciones to attain the catedra were also dominated by the Opus Dei. The rationale behind the Opus' desires to control the University can be summarized in the words of Antonio Fontan, catedrático in 1949: "Lo que nos importa es el hecho de que en la España contemporánea, la Universidad y la política no son dos realidades ajenas entre sí, sino estrechamente fronterizas. Como lo son la Universidad y España, la religión y la política, y aun la Universidad y el problema religioso." 16 The megalomaniacal tendency of the Opus to merge politics and religion, to the point where the Church could again dominate Spanish society, became
evident. The University was thus a pawn in a subtle power play. The Opus Dei also managed to establish its own autonomous and private university, despite the theoretical illegality of private educational institutions. The present Universidad de Navarra began as the "Estudio General de Navarra", a type of Catholic preparatory school. With the lack of any state university in the northern region of Navarra, the Estudio General expanded and became a legitimate university in its own right, despite legal obstacles. This university carried with it all the advantages of a private institution run by the organization which controlled scientific research. Navarra soon became the seat of Opus recruitment, an elitist and indoctrinated institution.

Obviously, the control of the Opus and the SEU was problematic to the University. Denuded of its autonomy, the University gave up all pretense of being a place for free and creative thinking. Moreover, the University also lost its intellectual base, since the most important scholars fled with the last vestiges of the Republic. The Church and the military could not compare in terms of scholarship with the autonomous thinkers of the pre-war era. As prisoners of doctrine and new ideology, these two organizations turned the University into an "ir y venir del nacionalismo místico al catolicismo más patriótico, un frenésí esteril."17 In the powerful words of Pablo Lizcano:

Fue la época más falso, más altanea y más triste de todos. Todo eran gritos, falsa euforia, y una vida de extasis fantasmal que escondía el más horroroso de los vacíos. Con la Universidad dormida en la paz de los sepulcros, instrumentalizada, atemorizada y bisbeante, el único
aliciente era salir por España y hacer cruzada. El estamento docente, gravemente mermado por el exilio y las depuraciones, quedó a merced del más oportunista.18

With these elements in mind, it is possible to analyze the first signs of student revolt, in 1956. Student revolt in its inception was mainly a political revolt rather than rebellion against the university structure itself. Students were more aware of their individual depoliticized state than of the crisis in the University as a whole. It was not until later years, when the Franco regime ended its period of autarky and opened to the rest of Europe, that students became sensitized to other educational systems and demanded modernization of their own university.

A slight amount of aperture occurred in the University under the ministry of Joaquín Ruíz-Giménez, from 1951 to 1956. Ruíz-Giménez believed in the political evolution of the Franco regime towards a more tolerant state structure. He appointed two important rectors, Pedro Laín Entralgo and Antonio Tovar, to the Universities of Madrid and Salamanca respectively. These two men were relatively liberal and later became important in student revolt. Ruíz-Giménez also allowed certain key intellectuals to reenter the country and reestablish themselves in universities. Philosophers such as Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, and Pío Baroja soon became influential again. In this way, the falangist influence of the SEU diminished slightly. But despite his attitudes, Ruíz-Giménez was still closely tied to the Franco regime and could not institute any significant changes in university structure. In general, the atmosphere in the Univer-
sity was of intellectual poverty, inefficiency, censureship, and cultural isolation. Students resigned themselves to a systematic work process, with the ultimate intent to gain a title of one sort or another. The majority of the students complied with their obligations as set forth in the Ley de Ordenación Universitaria, but beyond those constrictions, they expressed no voluntary interest in the activities of the SEU. There existed a growing awareness that the SEU was a falsely representative body: most students rejected the SEU, did not participate in the rigged elections, and in fact, regarded its active members as objects of ridicule.

Faced with many obstacles in the new university structure, politicization occurred slowly. As one student comments:

Había tres o cuatro estudiantes que eran socialistas y sólo uno afiliado al Partido Comunista. Pero mira, hasta tal punto era difícil entonces, era imposible entonces, hacer nada, que se comportaban como demócratas liberales. No había forma alguna de hacer política de izquierdad de ningún tipo. La cosa más atrevida que se podía hacer era comentar un artículo ocasional --por Tierno Galván, por Ridruejo-- que podía tener un tono liberal. Aun en 1956 la política estudiantil era producto de no más de veinte personas. Aquel mundo era un mundo arqueológico y dudo mucho que lo puedas describir si no es literariamente.

Most students were too young to remember clearly the Civil War, however, and although they were cautioned by their parents not to become involved in politics, many could see no legitimate reason to tolerate indoctrination and circumscription of freedom. Activity first fomented in Barcelona, where regionalist sentiment was strong and from which city proceeded many Republican leaders. This city, traditionally a trouble-spot for the Franco regime,
supported clandestine political organizations. It was in Barcelona where students united with workers striking for better wages and work conditions. Students united also with groups fighting for regional autonomy and the right to use their native language, Catalan. In 1956 a few scattered incidents occurred in Barcelona, principally aimed against the SEU.

In Madrid, students began demonstrating in response to various events outside of the University, but relating nonetheless to a growing politicization. In 1954, in answer to the nation’s general displeasure concerning the Queen of England’s visit to Gibraltar, students of the Movimiento Nacional demonstrated under the auspices of the SEU. However, chaos and confusion ensued as the police broke up the manifestation, leaving the students feeling betrayed by their so-called representative organization. In 1955, as a response to the death of Ortega y Gasset, students demonstrated marked discontentment. Groups such as the Unión de Estudiantes Demócratas (UED), the leftist Frente de Liberación Popular (FLP), the Moviment Socialista de Catalunya (MSC), and the Partido Comunista (PC) became more visible although still clandestine. After the events of 1956, the Communist Party demanded certain concessions from the government:

Desde la corazón de la Universidad ... para que el Régimen reconociese la caligrafía, es decir, comprendiese que la juventud que en 1956 le pedía un Congreso Nacional de Estudiantes y una Universidad democrática ... era la misma, o venía de la misma que en 1947, nueve años antes, le había pedido libertad de cátedra, honradez administrativo, lealtad al pueblo, y justicia social.21
The Communists requested a representative body allowing for collective participation to solve the problems of the University, and amnesty to prisoners of conscience and political exiles.

These manifestations and events in Madrid and Barcelona were important, but the main occurrence, on the 8th of February, deserves additional comment. Students directly attacked the Falange by occupying the University of San Bernardo. This occupation took the form of a battle, in which the SEU was ousted from the walls of the University. The results of the confrontation were marked: key supporting professors such as Tamames and Dionisio Ridruejo were jailed, although soon released; classes were suspended, and tight vigilance ensued. The police became daily presence in the University. Of course, the Communist Party received most of the blame for this occurrence, and the Opus Dei gained a stronger footing among those students and administrators dissuaded from volatile politics. Overall, an atmosphere of tension prevailed throughout the Spanish university system.

With the growing political awareness of the students came an awareness of the problems inherent in the University. University revolt continued to foment through the 1960’s, giving rise to a prolonged period of point/counterpoint on the part of the students and the Franco regime. Repression immediately followed the events of 1956: Franco regarded the causes of revolt as rather simplistically related to the "libertarian" nature of society, and censorship roles became tighter. Problems, according to this viewpoint, resulted from an increasing sense of materialism and "loose morality". Subsequently, Minister of
Education Ruíz-Giménez was replaced by Jesús Rubio García Mina, of a more traditional ideology. Despite the repressive actions on the part of Franco, students were irreversibly politicized and no longer tolerated the SEU. This organization progressively became weaker, and eventually was nothing more than a "bureaucratic apparatus", a hollow structure.²³ Splinter groups, originating within the SEU and disguised by its legality, withdrew from clandestinity. Essentially, the SEU was weakened from within as well as from the outside. Most agreed that the SEU was not capable of adapting to the current problems demanding redress, and that without its old fascist rhetoric, no longer appropriate to the times, it was denuded of all ideology and cohesion.²⁴

Among the many student political organizations forming at this time, the Agrupación Socialista Universitaria (ASU) exerted the most pressure against the SEU, and the Frente de Liberación Popular (FLP) mitigated the control of the Catholic church. The ASU organized from within the SEU, in an attempt to awaken the "sleeping consciences" of classmates.²⁵ The final consolidation of the ASU, in 1957, occurred under the premise that this group would form a "new generation of opposition against a blind, clumsy, tenacious and ineffectual" educational system.²⁶ The successes of this organization in dealing with the SEU can be attributed to its bourgeois composition, which strived to create a certain ideological neutrality. The ASU turned to the exterior of Spain for role models, and thus gained a more realistic yet imaginative profile. The major concession granted by the SEU was the instigation of Camaras de Facultades, or Faculty Senates,
permitting students to participate in electing members.

The FLP originated in 1957, formed by intellectuals of Catholic background. This group, led by Julio Ceron, soon formed the Comite de Coordinacion Universitario, principally concerned with the "vacío, el abandono, el aburgusamiento y la proliferación de vicios que había invadido el catolicismo oficial..." Later, the Marxist elements of the FLP became apparent, and a decidedly revolutionary flavor predominated. The ultimate end was to mobilize against the government, but in order to succeed in this venture it was necessary to establish a link between students and workers. This objective was never realized in anything more than a spontaneous and symbolic fashion, as the workers continued to regard students as an elite with separate interests. The only visible linkage between the students and workers was the short-lived Servicio Universitario de Trabajo (SUT), which placed students in various summer jobs, ranging from mining in the north to olive-picking in the south. Franco soon disbanded the SUT because he regarded it as far too risky: students could easily instigate political consciousness among the workers. The FLP did succeed in provoking more antagonistic attitudes among the students toward the regime and the official dogma of the Catholic Church, however.

In the 1960's the student movement underwent a transition. The activity in the 1950's demonstrated to the students that politicization was achievable if only through the force of will, but that the problems of the University were not as easily solved. In fact, 1959-1961 witnessed a certain calm within the University. As Lizcano states:
La mas átona y mediocre de las existencias se había enseñoreado de los claustros. Era una vida lúgubre y vacía, donde desde luego no cundían las pasiones irrefrenables. La miseria cultural y vital corría pareja a las enormes pretensiones de triunfo que albergaban aquellos muchachos. La aplicación en el estudio, la memorización voraz de textos, la consecución de buenas notas era norma general, casi sin excepción. Los mejores alumnos, los más ávidos de lecturas, solían ser al mismo tiempo los estudiantes con alguna inquietud.28

But in 1961 this stalemate broke with the formation of the Federación Universitaria Democrática Española (FUDE), an agrupation of the FLP, PCE, and PSOE. This federation requested a free, democratic syndicate to replace the archaic SEU. The main objective consisted of liberty of association and reunion, liberty of political structure for any organization, university autonomy, and the right to defend interests.29 The FUDE became the transmitter of student goals, and succeeded in giving the student movement an air of legality. In fact, from 1961-65 the movement gained a certain degree of efficacy partly due to more political unity among the students. At this point in the Franco era, the autarkic economy moved to a position of strength and self-confidence and became more europeized. Other factors feeding into the strength of the movement were the higher degree of intellectual liberty, and the impetus provided by successes in the worker movement.30

During this time period students could additionally turn their attention to less obvious problems such as their future role within Spanish society as servants of technocracy. This aspect never reached the proportions within the May Movement in
France or the Berkeley revolt in California, because Spanish students were fighting for basic classical liberal tenets denied them in the Franco era. \(^{31}\) But it became obvious, as students finally earned long sought-after titles, that the scarce employment opportunities were governed by a system of patronage, in part controlled by Opus Dei recruitment, and also by the political-economic structure of the Franco regime. Administrative posts were accessible to those who had good connections; professorships were granted on the basis of the inequitable oposición. Professional placement, to a large degree, depended on ideology and "good behavior". More overtly, the problem of scarceness of professional openings within a backward economy to this day plagues the University. In the 1960's students became aware of the inadequacies of the Spanish University to place them, according to economic exigencies, into growing professions. Students left the University unprepared to confront the real problems of unemployment. Significantly, the rapid and uncontrolled influx of students during the late 1950's and early 1960's brought to the forefront the problems of future "salida" into the job market.

The activity of the student movement peaked in 1965, when radicalization, intensity, and plurality combined at the Fourth Free Student Assembly at the University of Madrid. This assembly set forth a revised statement of student rights and obligations to include the following: optimal educational conditions commensurate with the necessities of Spain in terms of pedagogical and scientific development; the search for truth and liberty as an essential condition of intellectual growth; free
expression and association; and finally, political amnesty. What followed this Free Assembly was predictable: police repression and academic sanctions ensued. But compromise did not prevent a 13/14 vote of all Spanish Universities to reject the SEU as the representative syndicate. The Government's response to this referendum was to replace the SEU with the Professional Students' Association (APE). Thus, in 1965 agitation resulted in a partial victory for the students: what occurred was the rejection of favoritism, incompetence and authoritarianism, and a general support for a more democratic university structure.32

From 1965-67, agitation intensified yet more. Students opposed the new APE, which in reality was hardly more democratic than the SEU. Life returned to the University after the stalemate of 1959-61. As one student describes it:

Era un período de asambleas permanentes y de "sentadas" contra la represión. Las reivindicaciones eran un sindicato democrático de estudiantes y libertades generales de asociación, reunión, y expresión. Esas libertades se establecen dentro de las Facultades, que se convierte en "territorios liberados", y había que defenderlas día a día. Y el apoyo de los estudiantes aumenta muy rápidamente a través la lucha. Había una vida fantástica dentro de las Universidades, con obras de teatro, películas, librerías de los estudiantes, conferencias, charlas, seminarios, carteles, revistas que ahora atacaban y directamente al régimen, denunciando la represión y la dictadura.33

The factors explaining this apparent radicalization of the movement are multiple: 1) alternatives to deviate from the norm of a one-party political system were now open to students, whereas in the early Franco years only the most clandestine and dangerous of political alternatives existed; 2) many student
leaders proceeded from families of center-left persuasion, and recognized the need to keep alive, even under the worst of repression, these tendencies; 3) some of these students were socialized in families with permissive, anti-authoritarian parents of upper-middle class status; and 4) students now could travel more freely to foreign countries where they might encounter radical books censured in Spain. At this point in the movement recruitment occurred openly, proselitism was short and efficient, and participation was widespread. In effect, a political subculture arose in which students rapidly became revolutionary.

But the question of whether this sense of fervor actually accomplished much in the way of university change is debatable. In 1968 a new wave of repression in response to the May Movement in Paris occurred, proving that the government still regarded the student movement as a matter of public order rather than an indicator of the political climate among one sector of society. Government sanctions included the request that university administrators become more rigorously disciplinarian, and the suppression of the student bill of rights, within which existed the provision that police could not venture into university territory without the permission of the rector.

The Opus attempted to answer the questions raised by the student revolt with a policy of modernization without democracy. As Lopez Rodo, key Opus administrator, stated, "The government's number one objective is to reach a per capita income of $1,000; the rest, be it social or political, will in consequence be solved by itself as a matter of course." The Opus was still
successful during this time, partly because of its thorough infiltration of administrative posts, and partly because it reinforced the regime's stance on economic development and political suffocation.

Problems inherent in the University structure persisted despite the success of the student movement in politicizing the University. As a resistance to the regime, the movement was influential, but as a response to an institution in crisis, the movement achieved only a modicum of success. University inefficacy can be attributed to less obvious factors. In theory, the University would like to claim a balanced relationship between economic and educational development, but in Spain, only the former occurred. The First Development Plan of 1964 discussed the following objectives: the breaking of traditional stereotypes, the adaptation to new professional possibilities, and the inversion of "human resources" in education. However, the Second Development Plan of 1967 silenced all sincere objections within the former plan of the elitist nature of higher education. This set off a series of debates, with the definitive statement given by the Libro Blanco of 1969:

La demanda de educación está tan condicionada por la igualdad como lo está la oferta de servicios educativos por la eficacia del sistema. Para que un sistema educativo pueda cumplir su función social hace falta que ofrezca igualdad de oportunidades a toda la población. Por ello, la planificación de la enseñanza en una organización administrativa debe estudiar la desigualdad social, la distribución territorial de la población y la movilidad de ésta, entre otros problemas ... Otra necesidad de suma importancia es la de conseguir la mayor adecuación posible entre el número y el tipo de profesionales y
This statement indicates certain attention to the problem of social stratification, but classism cannot be changed easily in a traditional society such as Spain. It is true that the Spanish University opened its doors to more students in the 1950's and 1960's, but within the University a class hierarchy nonetheless persisted, and those who eventually achieved titles had the support of their parents and connections, or a middle-upper class background, to aid them in establishing themselves.

The University needed to contend with the following problems: the lack of proper preparation in the high schools; the lack of an equitable policy of selection to restrict the large influx of students; the lack of professional opportunities; and the lack of true intellectualism. The University under Franco diverged from the ideal structural model in every respect: secularization in education was nonexistent; status and professional placement was based on ascription more so than on achievement; channels of participation and democratization were cut off by the regime's ideological and political control; and monetary funding was controlled by the Church and state. Of course, under these conditions autonomy could never exist. The student movement addressed its attention mainly to the political needs of the University, but structural problems persisted.

The Spanish University changed, as did all institutions,
with the political transformation from the Second Republic to the Franco Regime. The student movement revealed problems in the University, setting the stage for more comprehensive revisions under the future democracy. But subsequent democratization was only partial in the University and could not solve the many structural problems inherent in this institution. To a large degree elitism, class polarization, bureaucratism, and a technocratic emphasis still pervaded the University. Although less traditional and rigid as before, the Spanish University was not disposed to fundamental changes which would directly aid the students. It would appear, thus, that the student movement under Franco was more an ideological response to political repression among a volatile youth population than a demand for direct redress of University problems. Especially seen in light of present-day passivity among the student body, faced with many of the same complaints as before, the efficacy of the student movement is dubious.

Student revolt in Spain was a demand for University politicization and for classical liberal tenets such as freedom of speech, student participation in University government, freedom of academic appointments, freedom to pursue research, freedom of association, and political amnesty. The students were only vaguely conscious of inherent structural problems in the University, and from lack of contact with other educational systems, could exercise little imagination in envisioning possible changes. Only a general dissatisfaction with the education they received came to the fore upon graduation, when
students realized what little importance a title carried in the closed, competitive job market of many fields. Students also made an unconscious statement against the technocratic control exercised by the Opus Dei, which effectively succeeded in infiltrating university structure and professional placement. By opposing the Opus’ stronghold, students opposed a future pre-planned technical placement based upon hierarchy and connections. Students were aware of this religious, political and economic domination more upon leaving the University than while actually enrolled, thereby reducing the efficacy of protest against technocracy.

Other European student movements at the time, such as the May Movement, compared to the Spanish movement on a broader theoretical base. The May Movement in France, according to Alain Touraine, was an expression of disequal economic, political and social change under De Gaulle’s republic. In this movement, class polarization, between the managers of a technical bureaucracy and the professional sector which participated in the bureaucracy, was highly evident. Moreover, the controlling technocrats no longer considered the University as a seat of cultural formation, but rather an economic investment. This is not solely a negative force because in a sense it did enforce ideological neutrality and the removal of certain values which perpetuated the control of dominant social classes. In any event, this technocratic element alienated the students from directing their own futures:

La Universidad tecnócrata que, al efecto, se ha montado, termina provocando, a lo largo, una nausea en el estudiante que la incita a la liber-
The students, in this context, were the future actors who must either oppose or adapt to the desires of those who directed and exploited their expertise. They petitioned for better professional placement, the teaching of a critical capacity, and a "demasking" of the contradictions evident in technocracy.

Inherent in the student movement, then, is the desire to reveal contradictions, both in technical domination and in an archaic bourgeois society. The May Movement revealed the opposition between workers and technicians; between technical and cultural exigencies of present-day France and an inherited, obsolete organizational and institutionalized form of education. Touraine stresses the transformation of the French University within De Gaulle's political economy to the point where it ceased to be a "conservatory of social and cultural values, but rather, a massive institution training people to carry out functions of integration and manipulation."

Other elements of this influential movement included a populism wherein the emotional appeal was strong and the organizational elements weak; a utopian communist class struggle as a reaction to those institutional obstacles opposing radical change; and finally, an intellectual movement of an anti-society, intent upon questioning traditional authority and the irrational nature of accepted
In some respects, the Spanish student movement paralleled the May Movement in France, but it was not until the late 1960’s that ideological issues clarified themselves in light of an international movement. Cultural and political isolation gave Spanish students a limited vision of the larger issues at stake. Like the French University, the Spanish University’s traditional, rigid, controlled, routinized, and divided nature impelled the students to question its legitimacy. Some of the methods of the May Movement also evidenced themselves in Spain: strikes, sit-ins, appeals to liberal professors, possession of faculties, and in some cases, even barricades, although this extreme measure appeared only to a slight degree in Spain. The students in Spain united with workers in opposing the Franco regime, perhaps to a greater degree than in France, where grievances were not as blatant and where economic conditions were not as severe. France, however, had the advantage of political freedom and solidarity, whereas in Spain political parties essentially did not exist in the regime’s eyes.

As a movement of an anti-society, Spanish students had the support of what little intelligentsia still existed. Certainly the Franco years were laden with contradictions: a regime with a strong need to repress ideas cannot be secure of its truths if it is threatened by any divergence. However, the anti-societal nature of student revolt in Spain was difficult to develop, given the political and cultural constraints. As mentioned earlier, key thinkers and intellectual supporters of the movement such as Tierno Galván and Dionisio Ridruejo were thrown into jail upon
mere demonstration of support for the students. The questioning of authority succeeded in bringing about a slight aperture in Spanish society, though, since Franco realized that appeasement was imperative.

Alejandro Nieto postulates other factors explaining the revolutionary nature of the international student movement. He describes a "marxist fervor", also animated by anarchists and intellectuals. Students revolted against both conservative and liberal, paternalistic authority. Nieto also develops the idea that a modern mass society requires not an archaic, bourgeois, nineteenth century university, but rather, a university that is commensurate with modern needs. At the other extreme, the "multiversity" proposed by Clark Kerr, president of the University of California, is not the proper solution either, because that type of institution seems to promote an even greater degree of alienation of students from their work and their vocation.

Concerning actual social change within the University, the movement brought about slight revision, especially in terms of the immediate formation of a participatory collective. But this sense of student solidarity vanished in the face of broader political changes in the present-day university, as will be shown. Certain curricular revisions did occur: a broadening of faculties to include more experimental professions and the expansion of planned courses are two examples. Equally, legislature and participatory government expanded within the context of the change to democracy in Spain. But it is
questionable whether these were merely symbolic acts, far from influencing the students’ daily life. It is perhaps more important to recognize, as does Touraine, that the movement’s importance rests in the fact that "It stood against the identification of a particular social domination with society; it denounced the material and ideological private interests that hid behind a mask of objectivity, neutrality, scientific agencies, and economic necessity."Thus, the Spanish students recognized and protested the fact that they were dominated, controlled and manipulated by a University which claimed to be a place for formation but in reality was an instrument reinforcing the existing political and social system. The student movement, in this sense, expressed an inquietude resulting from a stifling of social and cultural change under Franco’s authoritarian regime.

The Spanish University under Franco evolved into a repressive institution opposed to the educational ideals of secularization, autonomy, meritocracy, and democratization. The Catholic Church, in the guise of the technocratic Opus Dei, controlled administrative appointments, scientific research, access to the private Universidad de Navarra, and professional placement. The regime’s single party, the F.E.T., controlled the SEU, which in turn attempted to restrict ideology and student corporate life. The student revolt underlined the inconsistencies in this type of structure, which acted to the detriment of an institution designed to prepare people to think creatively, critically, and above all, professionally. As a reaction, the movement also pointed to the political contradictions of the Franco regime, which by their nature
affected economic and social spheres.
Footnotes:

1Amando de Miguel, Reformar la Universidad, (Barcelona: Editorial Euros, 1976), p. 8. Jose Luis Abellon: "The history of the University, practically from 1940 until now, has been the history of a constant degradation, caused by the abandonment which the public authorities have perpetrated against the University."

2Ibid., p. 12. "The insufficiency and the stagnation of our educational system constitutes today the justifiable reason for the pessimism of those who study our development. But at the same time, investment in the extension and improvement of our educational system, at all its levels, is the type of investment necessary to the development of our highest priorities (...) The stagnation of our economy results from the absence of well-planned investments ( ...) Such an unsatisfactory educational system, from a social standpoint, implies an enormous waste of talents and an enormous block to social mobility."

3Jose Castillejo, Wars of Ideas in Spain (London: John Murray, 1937), p. 30

4Antonio Molero-Pintado, La Reforma Educativa de la Segunda Republica Española, p. 120

5Perez-Galan, Mariano. La Enseñanza en la Segunda República Española, (Madrid, Editorial Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1975), p. 147

6Castillejo, op.cit., p. 162

7Molero-Pintado, op.cit., p. 154

8Ibid., p. 85. (From Ortega y Gasset, "Misión de la Universidad, Revista del Occidente, Madrid 1967, p. 78). Ortega's idea is as follows: The University will no longer be merely an ivory tower for a privileged group of students, but rather, a powerful institution recognizing life's urgent necessities, passions, and spirituality... representing serenity amidst frenzy, sobriety amidst frivolity and stupidity.

9Peréz-Galán, op.cit., p. 236. Peréz-Galán's ideas can be paraphrased thusly: For some time now masonic and marxist groups have gained influence in the Department of Education; even today they are firmly entrenched, often working in collusion with other groups not overtly associated with their ideologies. These Masons and Marxists are guilty of denationalizing our culture, and continue their activities in such a way as to take advantage of confused or frightened administration, nominally in authority, which chooses not to call them to account.

10Castillejo, op.cit., p. 148

11Pablo Lizcano, La Generación del '56: La Universidad
Contra Franco, (Barcelona: Ediciones Gryalbo, 1981), p. 32: "Academic life was exhausted. University agitation was in the hands of the Falangists, who immersed the students into anti-governmental activity, with the similar convocatory capacity and resources to eliminate separatism. The leftist opposition was demoralized, even after the boost it had received with the triumph of the Popular Front. Falangists, Catholics, and Traditionalists desired the construction of a United National University."


13Ibid., p. 308


15Montoro-Romero, op.cit., p. 122. "A Colegio Mayor is one of the fundamental means through which certain habits can be created and the true political and social education which consists of a consciousness that we live with others will thus flourish."

16Ibid., p. 61. Fontán, paraphrased: "It is important to recognize the fact that in contemporary Spain, the University and the political arena are not two separate realities, but rather, are closely linked as are the University and the nation; religion and politics; and even the University and the broader religious issue of Spain."

17Lizcano, op.cit., p. 50. "...coming and going of mystical nationalism to patriotic Catholicism. A sterile frenzy."

18Ibid., p. 50. "It was the falsest and saddest time of all. Everything was shouts, false euphoria, and a life of fantastical extasy that hid the most horrible of emptiness. With the University asleep in a death stupor, instrumentalized, frightened, and muttering its rosaries, the only recourse was to leave Spain, making the sign of the cross. The teaching establishment, gravely reduced by exile and purges, was at the mercy of opportunists."

19Ibid., p. 80

20José María Maravall, Dictadura y Disentimiento Político, (Madrid: Ediciones Alfaguara S.A., 1981), p. 161. "There were three or four students who were socialist and only one Communist Party affiliate. But at that point it was difficult, almost impossible to act in a democratic manner. There was no form of leftist politics. The most daring act within this atmosphere was to comment on some article--by Tierno Galvan or Ridruejo--that might have some liberal element. Even in 1956 student politics were a product of not more than twenty people. That world was archaic, and I doubt very much that you
could overemphasize its repressive nature."

21. Lizcano, op. cit., p. 129. "From the heart of the University ... so that the Regime may recognize the writing on the wall, or rather, understand that the youth who in 1956 requested a National Congress of Students and a democratic University ... it made the same petition that in 1947, nine years earlier, requested liberty of catedra, administrative honor, respect of the public in general, and social justice."

22. Ibid., p. 134

23. Ibid., p. 165


27. Ibid., p. 203. "emptiness, abandon, bourgeois character, and the proliferation of vices which had invaded official Catholicism."

28. Ibid., p. 218. Lizcano's words can be paraphrased thusly: The University had become a repository for the most mediocre and apathetic of existences. Therein, one could experience a languid and empty life, which discouraged any display of passion and energy. Cultural stalemate accompanied the enormous pretension of victory among those students of the SEU. The general norm was to apply oneself in study, by vocaciously memorizing textbooks and attaining good grades. The best students, those who were avid readers, were at the same time the only students who displayed any discontentment.

29. Montoro-Romero, op. cit., p. 111

30. Maravall, op. cit., p. 170


32. Ibid., p. 113

33. Maravall, op. cit., p. 175. "It was a period of permanent assemblies and of "sit-ins" against repression. The reivindications consisted of a democratic student syndicate and a general liberty of association, reunion and expression. These liberties were entrenched in the Faculties, converted into "free territories", and defended day by day. Student support rapidly augmented through this fight. There was a fantastic life within the Universities, with theatrical works, movies, student
bookstores, conferences, discussions, seminars, posters, and leaflets which now directly attacked the Regime, denouncing repression and dictatorship."

34Ibid., p. 207

35Salvador Giner, op.cit., p. 118

36De Miguel, op.cit., p. 22. "The demand for education results from the system's inequality just as the ability to offer educational services depends on the system's efficacy. So that an educational system can complete its social function it must offer equality of opportunity to all the population. For this reason, the educational planning of an administrative organization must study social inequality, distribution of population by region, and social mobility, among other problems the greatest adaptation and adjustment possible among the number and type of professionals public works, and the necessities of employment. This coordination will come to mean, simply, the educational system's adaptation to the society which it serves. Thus, it is essential that administrative organizations attend to the prospective study of social evolution and the realization of adaptations and corresponding changes in the educational system."

37Ibid., p. 77

38Alejandro Nieto, Ideología de los Estudiantes Europeos (Barcelona: Ediciones Griel, 1971), p. 81

39Ibid., p. 129. "The technocratic university, effectively installed, provokes in the student a nausea which incites a desire for liberty. Moreover, the technician who specializes in mastering production eventually feels a certain necessity to participate equally in the economic and administrative domain. The individual who has only concentrated finite disciplines ultimately protests the mutilation of his/her remaining intellectual and social facilities."


41Ibid., p. 29

42Nieto, op.cit., p. 38
IV. The Present University Structure: Reflection of Uneven Democratization

In the 1970's the University witnessed reform efforts, at first on the part of institutional planning agencies and social commentators, and later stemming from the overarching political transformation to a democratic, socialist government. Proposals to reform the University are multileveled, encompassing both structural and ideological revisions. Ideological reform involves overall democratization, which premises an educational system capable of meeting the needs of a mobile, meritocratic and modernized society. Structural reform builds upon this ideological transformation, involving the implementation of secularized education, political and economic autonomy, expansion of the University, and economic support of this expanding and modernizing institution.

As a preface to understanding institutional problems, it is necessary to discuss the present general structure of the university. The Spanish University, like most continental universities, is a highly traditional institution, rigid and hierarchical in form. Academic chairs are granted to those professors who have completed doctoral training and have passed a series of "oposiciones", or exams created by those higher in the occupational ladder. Each university has a designated number of these "catedraticos", or professors who have gained access to academic chairs, or the "cátedra". But the bulk of the teaching rests in the hands of the "no numerarios", those professors who have not passed the oposicion, and whose jobs are in a constant
state of insecurity. University administration also follows a hierarchical pattern. Each university is designated from above a rector who essentially determines all significant policy. Below the Rector, each branch of the University has a dean, or Decano, who administers the Faculty and its staff. The Claustro Constituyente is the only form of representation, aiding in policy-making on a lower level. The Decano, the Secretary, certain Catedraticos and professors, and a small proportion of students form this committee. Under the Franco regime the claustro was appointed from above, without free election and student representation; now, however, in addition to the Claustro are several smaller representative bodies.

The Spanish University is divided into faculties usually spread throughout the city in a hapless pattern. There is no "campus" in this system, aside from the "ciudad universitaria" later introduced in Madrid. Only the loosest of unity exists between faculties. At present the Spanish University system contains the following faculties: Marine Biology, Political Science & Sociology, Law, Physical Education, Nursing, Statistics, Business, Pharmacy, Philosophy & Letters, Pedagogy, Physics, Physical Therapy, Geology, Engineering, Mathematics, Medicine, Chemistry, and Veterinary Medicine. The spectrum of studies has increased significantly since the Franco era.

The emphasis of university education in Spain is decidedly vocational, both in curriculum and instruction. Students begin at age eighteen, already having chosen their field. It is difficult to transfer once the student has made the initial decision of faculty, because there is no general curriculum
applying to all fields. In essence, the "Plan de Curso" is fixed, with only a slight margin for elective courses. The academic calendar begins in October and ends in June, when students take exams determining whether or not they have passed the courses. During the year, the student is enrolled in large, auditorium classes where he/she remains stationary for three to five hours while professors enter and leave the classroom. While in the classroom, many students frantically copy what the professor chooses to pontificate on, realizing that possibly this could aid him/her in passing the final exam, which is at times based on material given in class. Because the mid-year exams are of minor significance, the student is expected to know the entire subject for the final exam, upon which rests the weight of the grade. There are no clear parameters for these exams; for this reason students are accustomed to saying, upon passing, that they were "lucky"; or upon failing, that they were "unlucky". Under this system it is virtually impossible for many students to motivate themselves to study independently, if at all.

Living conditions tend to reinforce the lack of motivation and independence within the University. Most students live at home or nearby, prolonging their adolescence and allowing for a large degree of parental control. Additionally, students have the option to live in dormitory-like dwellings called "colegios mayores", described earlier, which are still owned by the Opus Dei. These colegios mayores, since they tend to be rather luxurious and expensive; consequently, are reserved for the middle to upper class students. An unspoken agreement between
the colegio administration and the parents exists, wherein students’ lifestyles are closely monitored. Some students do, however, live in apartments or fondas. These individuals are generally the older, more independent, and better disciplined students.

Regarding reform of this structure, analysts considered the solutions to problems as purely economic in nature. The technocrats of the 1960’s and 70’s perceived the problems as resulting from institutional stagnation, and were not willing to recognize ideological inconsistencies reflecting the unequal social transformation in Spain. In their vision, the University needed to evolve economically, but it was not imperative to develop a sense of ideological consistency and coherence. The technocratic influence herein was not wholly negative, for it stated in clear terms under what guiding principles actual reform was to occur: "El gasto educativo, la inversion en hombres, ha de ser la primera y mas importante en un programa de desarrollo economico."1 With this economic motive to reform, the technocrats were able to provide a well-defined platform to which the highly-bureaucratized governmental structure of the late Franco regime was inclined to respond. Earlier reform efforts thus involved the desire to arrive at an "increase in production" through the use of the "most efficient means", that of education.2

With the advent of the political change from the Franco regime to a democratic form came a desire to dismantle old institutions, both structurally and ideologically. But this desire was inconsistent, and in its actuation reflected the mixed

74
political climate of the early post-Franco years, when many citizens and administrators remained conservative and clashed with political forces recently freed from clandestinity. There was agreement regarding the economic imperatives of the University, but conflict centered around questions of democratization. The degree to which the hierarchy of professors and administrators changed from the Franco years to the present is minimal. Student participation is also marginal, although a structural revision permitting this involvement has occurred. In general, structural change exists in the spheres of University autonomy, increasing economic support, and democratization of certain governing bodies. Ideally, the University should also reflect a mobile, meritocratic society which allows for those without opportunities, but also rewards individuals with a given level of talent and skill. In this sense, though, University reform has been problematic and ambivalent. Other areas of ambivalence result from the fact that these reforms, although structurally sound, are not wholeheartedly supported. Reflecting the larger transition, University reform is inconsistent in that former ideological and social attitudes persist. In analyzing University reform, one must account for the difficulty of changing from an authoritarian to a democratic structure in a traditional society, inconsistent in its modernization.

The basic structural changes, then, involve a transition to a juridically autonomous institution, an attempt to transform the University into an open social entity based on achievement rather than ascription, the implementation of monetary supports for
research and expansion, and lastly, the democratization of governing bodies. This chapter explores the relative efficacy of these proposals, with the contention that reform was uneven and inconsistent, and that successful transformation to an ideal University, if it is to be approached, depends on the willingness on the part of those most affected to actively support and further the transition.

The present University structure proposes total autonomy from Church and state. Number 10, Article 27 of the Spanish Constitution supposedly guarantees academic, curricular, financial, and administrative autonomy in an effort to grant to the University "...professional and investigational quality: something which, nevertheless, can only be offered if there is a guarantee of liberty and autonomy." The Ley de Reforma Universitario (University Reform Law), supplementary to this Article of the Constitution, asserts that the University is not "...patrimony of the actual members of the University committee, but rather, constitutes an authentic public service related to the general interests of the entire nation." The only stipulation in the legislation is that this autonomy be accompanied by "...the control of the end product and usage, and the responsibility ... which is implied in access to the University and in the acquisition of a title." Article 3 of the Título Preliminar (Preliminary Title) specifies these conditions in clearer terminology, including the liberty of catedra, research and study. Furthermore, students, researchers and professors are to comply with reasonable obligations within the University’s juridical body. According to the basic statutes,
autonomy encompasses the election of governmental and administrative personnel, the selection of a capable professorial body, the creation of specific entities which support research efforts, and finally, the establishment of coordination among the Spanish University system and other foreign institutions. The Ley de Reforma Universitaria is vague, however, and the legislation only postulates in the ideological sense a justification and implementation of autonomy.

A closer examination of autonomy provisions in the University emphasizes the desirability of this ideal yet contrasts with the reality. Autonomy, in theory, is necessary to a university which attempts to comply with its "mission", that of imparting objective truth. The Spanish University of the 1970's was a juridical creation, with statutes set forth in the Ley de Reforma Universitaria, the Ley General de Education (General Education Law), and the Ley deOrdenacion Universitaria (Law of University Ordenation). State universities follow the jurisdiction of public law:

Los organismos autónomos son entidades de derecho público, creadas por la ley, con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propios independientes de los del Estado, a quienes se encomienda expresamente, en régimen de decentralización, la organización y administración de algún servicio público y de los fondos adscritos al mismo, el cumplimiento de actividades económicas al servicio de fines diversos, y la administración de determinados bienes del Estado, ya sean patrimoniales o de dominio público.

The Spanish state clearly and officially recognizes and provides a rationale for University autonomy in this citation from the Ley de Régimen Jurídico (Law of Juridical Regime). But according to
Tania Díaz-González, the University is increasingly similar to a private association with a corporate structure. Although Universities are public entities, certain groups still dictate in various spheres through the imposition of their individual interests. An elaborate system of patronage enables those professors with good contacts to obtain the best positions. The Opus Dei remains in partial control of research, infiltrating the CSIC, the Universidad de Navarra, and the Colegios Mayores. It would appear that autonomy, although approachable, is yet unrealized in the present University.

The second element of reform involves the expansion and transformation of the University from a selective, ascriptive form to that of an open, meritocratic system designed to accommodate a modern society, in which social stratification is lessened, allowing for class mobility. Reform of this nature is closely related to overall societal reform. With political democratization, the various inconsistencies of the Franco regime diminished, and a more parallel pattern of economic and social development ensued. University education had expanded somewhat under Franco in proportion to economic modernization; more parents could afford to give their children higher education. But it was not until the late 1960’s and early 1970’s that any large-scale "massification" occurred in the University. Overall, the faculties of Natural Science, Political and Economic Sciences, Philosophy and Letters, and Medicine witnessed marked increases, whereas more established or stagnating disciplines, such as law, pharmacy, and veterinary medicine, either remained
stable or decreased in matriculation. Another important indicator of expansion and modernization is the fact that female matriculation increased five-fold, whereas male enrollment doubled from 1939 to 1970. This reveals general trends of social and economic modernization, in that women are increasingly free to pursue professional goals, even if the chances of gaining employment in their field are less than the opportunities for men.

Many of the problems associated with University expansion stem from poor planning. Dramatic increases in enrollment required certain accommodations such as the hiring of additional professors and administrators, the construction of university and housing facilities, and placement programs to aid graduating students. This last aspect is perhaps most important, for it is the contribution which students can eventually make to society and to their professions that ultimately defines the quality of a given educational system. MEDIT 63, a statistical planning agency in Spain, anticipated a high "productivity rate" for graduates in 1971. Supposedly 21,400 licenced graduates were to become active participants in their fields; however, only 50% of students included in this expected figure actually attained professional placement. Obvious factors in this discrepancy involve the uncontrolled increase in enrollment, the declining importance of the title of "licenciado", the increasing difficulty of doctoral training, the glutting of "fashionable careers" such as journalism, psychology, sociology, and communication studies, and the aristocratic aspect of the more traditional professions such as pharmacy and law. A general
lowering of the quality of education occurs in conjunction with uncontrolled expansion, thus creating a vicious circle. Poorly-paid professors are not inspired to teach large numbers of students; these students, without any individual attention, have low motivation and skill levels; and knowledge that professional placement is negligible serves to depress the system yet more.

Referring to these problems which accompany expansion, one could reasonably hypothesize that some justified method of selection is desirable. Any student in Spain passing the basic COU preparatory course offered in his/her last year of high school can enter the University. Often these students are inadequately prepared for the demands inherent in intellectual work on the University level. This poor preparation and subsequent open access results in the following:

(Al estudiante universitario) se le garantiza, de facto, el status de incompetencia subvencionada permanente (...) La institución (universitaria) ofrece otra vía aun más apetecible, que consiste en la licenciatura semiautomática de incompetentes (...) El alumno puede obtener casi cualquier título de cinco años en un máximo de diez, sin estudiar prácticamente nada (...) Este fenómeno, reforzado por el nepotismo prevalente, explica el bajo nivel relativo del profesional medio reciente y permite anticipar los costes sociales de la profesionalización masiva de incompetentes, que se puede estimar en cerca del 50% de los universitarios actuales. 

This author suggests that selection would aid in eliminating the large percentage of incompetent graduates, thus clearing various professions for those truly dedicated and talented few. This viewpoint is extremist, however. It should be recalled that ideally, democratization naturally sifts through the incompetent
and allows for those superior in their field to succeed. Artificial restrictions could possibly obstruct this process and impede those who for some reason were at a disadvantage in high school. A middle ground is necessary, in which flexible selection methods could be employed, and which grants to those who are unsuccessful other alternatives.

University ideals project an institution able to comply with the ultimate goal of the discovery and revelation of objective truth. Indeed, as an entity created by society, a University ought to reflect that society’s search for enlightenment. In terms of the individual, then, optimally s/he should have access to this essential formation. Methods of selection contradict this ideal, however necessary they may be to regulate the student personnel of the University. The Spanish University, by following autonomy statutes, has no clearly defined policy of selection. This absence of policy leads toward inevitable over-expansion of the universities, and also results in a student body less than capable of and inspired by the academic material.

The logical solution to the ideological problem of selection and the practical problem of uncontrolled expansion rests in the establishment of policies based on the meritocratic model, which holds that access to education should not be restricted by lack of economic resources, but rather, by ability. Students should have equal access, through a flexible system of examination, to University preparation. If the student is unsuccessful in these measurements of ability, s/he should have other alternatives to choose from. These alternatives might exist in the form of various levels of University education, ranging from highly
professional and competitive fields, to options requiring less preparation. In the Spanish University of the present, these options indeed appear: depending on the particular field, student can opt for five-year, highly technical career preparation; four-year plans; or three-year, general preparation.

Despite the limitations of University reform efforts, their very existence is a positive step. The legislation recognizes the inherent obstacles as being attitudinal rather than structural, with the claim that comprehensive reform can only occur in accordance with a changing normative structure in the larger university population:

El profesorado y los alumnos tienen, pues, la clave de la nueva Universidad que se quiera conseguir, y de nada servira ninguna Ley si ellos no asumen el proyecto de vida académica que se propone, encaminada a conseguir unos centros universitarios donde arraigan el pensamiento libre y crítico y la investigación. Sólo así la institución podrá ser un instrumento eficaz de transformación social, al servicio de la libertad, igualdad y el progreso social para hacer posible una realización más plena de la dignidad humana.13

A combined effort on the part of all concerned is essential; no amount of legislation can change attitudes stemming from a past era in which repression and rigid tradition were the norms. The Ley de Reforma Universitaria requires that those involved in the Spanish University system follow the guidelines set forth, in an effort to arrive at the creation of a reformed institution. The issues herein are complex, however. Reforming the Spanish University is as much a question of lingering structures as attitudinal assumptions. Clearly, reform must originate from
within, and it is not entirely false to justify existing problems with the disclaimer that attitudes preclude total reform. But in that sense, it is necessary to develop a sense of critical analysis of the efficacy of existing structures, with the assumption that perhaps there can be improvements upon revised statutes and provisions. Follow-up must ensure that efforts thus far are not merely symbolic.

In the 1950’s and 60’s, students revolted for basic University reforms. During that time period both students and liberal professors achieved a critical approach to the existing form of the University. Reforms occurred along with the political transformation after Franco’s death, but mere legislation did not change fundamental problems. The needs of the students and professors still remain to a large degree unanswered, yet without a large-scale impetus to express any discontentment and to propose reform, there is little hope that the University can revitalize itself and meet its ideals on an individual level.

Structural problems of the University apply to the professorial body as well as to the student population. The University cannot produce qualified and dynamic professors to match the increase in students, paradoxically enough. One would assume that more students would be encouraged by this deficit to enter the teaching profession. Both the First and the Second Development Plans, of 1964 and 1967 respectively, have addressed this problem. Major difficulties result more from the archaic system of oposiciones required to attain even the lowest of positions, than from a lack of interest in the teaching
Las oposiciones representan exactamente el sistema de "exámenes públicos" de tipo memorístico que caracterizaban el mundo burocrático de la China clásica (...) Lo que no podemos saber, sin un estudio monográfico, es si los requisitos de objetivación--memorismo, publicidad, baremos prefijados, etcétera--son mecanismos conscientemente dispuestos para lograr una amenoración de las normas adscriptivas y particularistas, o bien son sólo funciones latentes de una institución con otros propósitos (...) Podemos entender las oposiciones como la contrapartida de un ambiente tradicional de favoritismo.14

Additionally, a high degree of job insecurity occurs in the lower strata of "profesores docentes". As mentioned earlier, although supposedly there are no ideological restrictions imposed upon professors, the University is not yet free from dogma. Professors who seem radical or different often do not achieve their long-due promotions, and life can be uncomfortable unless they regain a moderate ideology within the University. Francisco Lillo, a "profesor docente" of the Facultad de Derecho in the Universidad de Córdoba, is presently experiencing extreme job insecurity because of his attitudes regarding the University. Quoted as stating "No enseño, sólo doy clases", Lillo could be termed only in the remotest sense a "radical", but because he is critical of University education, his position is tenuous.15 Clearly, ideological and structural autonomy would enable the University to achieve a more balanced treatment of its professors. Fundamental revision of the oposiciones would also eliminate any lingering elements of a patronage system, and at the same time would encourage more students to enter the teaching profession.

84
Scientific investigation is another major area of deficiency in the Spanish University. Public spending only reached two-thirds of the minimum required budget for effective research in 1967, totaling only two million pesetas.\textsuperscript{16} This figure is absurdly small for a country with an expanding economy. The Third Development Plan estimated costs of twenty-two million pesetas in 1975, but this figure was never realized.\textsuperscript{17} Spain has the potential to produce effective and original scientific research. It is questionable, however, whether resources are nonexistant or simply poorly-managed. Antonio Tovar declares that it is more a question of resource management. He attacks the CSIC, of Opus origin and control, as the responsible party:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Merece críticas severas la existencia de un llamado "Consejo Superior" que se mueve con plena libertad mientras las Universidades están sujetas a toda clase de trabas, y en primer lugar la de su falta de recursos ...}\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Scientific research should be the domain of the University and not a subsidiary and non-autonomous organization such as the CSIC. If university reform occurs along economic criteria it is not unreasonable to demand the modernization of investigation in proportion to the exigencies of an industrial society. Scientific research is one of the fundamental rights of students interested in and capable of developing its possibilities.

University reform has been most successful in the political arena, and as expected, legislation postulates a democratic organization reflecting the larger society. University statutes as they appear in the Ley de Reforma Universitaria embody the creation of the following governmental bodies: 1) among the
students and professors: the Consejo Social (Social Counsel), Claustro Universitario (University Commission), the Junta de Gobierno (Government Board), Juntas de Facultades, de Escuelas Técnicas Superiores y de Escuelas Universitarias de Departamentos y de Institutos Universitarios (Commissions of Faculties, Superior Technical Schools, University Schools and Institutes); and 2) among the administration: Rector (Director), Vicerrectores (Subdirectors), Secretario General (General Secretary), Gerente (Manager), Decanos de Facultades (Faculty Deans), and Directores de todas ramas Universitarias (Directors of all University branches). The most significant of these myriad subdivisions are the Consejo Social, which maximizes student participation; the Junta de Gobierno, which supervises economic activities; and the Claustro Universitario, which represents a synthesis of the most important components of the University. The rest follow in declining significance and power. Finally, the Consejo de Universidades, at the state level, represents each region equally and attempts uniform national policy-making.

In discussing University deficiencies and proposed reforms, it is necessary to examine the perceptions of the students themselves. Various surveys gathered by Amando de Miguel reveal harsh criticism and dissatisfaction on the part of the professional elite of Barcelona regarding their training. Those interviewed claimed that their background did not prepare them professionally nor did it enable them to "confront reality". Discrepancies were surprisingly small between the older and younger generations, revealing that the same problems continue to the present. This severe lack of preparation seems to intensify
in professions such as medicine, law, engineering, psychiatry, and pharmacy.

While students are actually enrolled in the University, however, most choose either to ignore these fundamental problems or to remain unaware of any possible constructive criticism. Students of the Spanish University are relatively passive when compared to attitudes of the 1950's and 60's. A general dissatisfaction no longer vents itself in the form of organized protest as in the Franco era, but rather, exists as merely amorphous complaints. Speaking of his native Facultad de Derecho in Barcelona, Ignacio Jové, age 20, claims that the general student attitude towards participation is negative. Students have the opportunity to elect members of the Claustro Constituyente, but only a marginal number actually are sufficiently interested to vote. In terms of academic participation, Jové states that "La gente va al bar todo la mañana y son muy activos bebiendo cerveza y hablando, pero en clase no lo son tanto." An estimated 25% of the students usually pass the final examinations, and the rest must repeat the classes they failed. Jové further states that around 95% of the students in the law school support democracy, but that a small percentage of the extreme right-wing at times impose their viewpoints rather violently. One revealing anecdote supports this apparent violence: "Una vez se pusieron en una Facultad con bates de béisbol e hicieron cantar el himno falangista a los que entraban, y si no les golpeaban hasta que llegó la policía, claro." An interesting polarity exists among the student body,
between the majority who remain passive and a minority whose actions are extreme.

Recent events reveal a minor effort on the part of the students to address the problems they perceive as resolvable; however, these efforts are not widespread and their efficacy is questionable. During the 1984 elections for Claustro Constituyente at the Universidad de Córdoba, a student platform entitled "La Candidatura Unitaria de Alumnos" attempted the following: to increase its established 28% representation to a more equal balance between students and professors; to achieve student participation in the commissions of the Junta de Gobierno; to aid in deciding faculty appointments; and to aid in department policy. Additionally, the CUA envisioned the creation of a Vicerrectorado composed solely of students; the reestablishment of an Information Office for students; the creation of new scholarships; the elaboration of a student guidebook of Córdoba; and finally, the reinstatement of a cultural center. These intentions were highly idealistic, however: facing a passive and even cynical majority, the CUA stood little chance of realizing its goals, but at least it served as an impetus. The Anarchists, a popular political contingent in Córdoba, effectively advertised in such a way as to discourage students from voting, thus contributing to the general attitude of noncommitment.

Efforts to change the status quo are few and far between, but certain examples provide hope for transforming the University. In September of 1984, Antonio Latorre-Rus, a student of the Facultad de Derecho in Córdoba, acted assertively upon the
unjust administration of a surprise oral exam instead of the expected written comprehensive final. Latorre-Rus, convinced that most students were in agreements concerning the illegitimacy of the exam, administered a petition in protest. Only two other students signed the petition, however. Effectively, the petition demanded redress for the "irregularidades que se han producido en la asignatura de Derecho Penal, parte especial, dependiente del Catedrático Dr. Miguel Navarrete ..." The Catedrático in question stated in response to the petition: "Yo soy el Catedrático y hago el exámen como quiera." Certain ambivalence regarding reform of the inherent University hierarchy can be seen in this episode. Ironically, at the same time that he was disgraced, Latorre-Rus gained the respect of his classmates and professors, a factor which illustrates the inherent recognition of a need for reform.

The present academic year at the Universidad de Cordoba has witnessed other minor examples of protest. As recently as February of 1985 there was a sit-down strike outside of the Facultad de Derecho protesting the lack of heat in the classrooms. Speaking from experience, it is difficult to concentrate for three hours in succession with room temperatures below forty-five degrees. More importantly, however, is the student protest against pending increases in tuition directed towards those who repeat courses, appearing in Decreto numero 1.498/84. Students claim that this new statute violates Article 14 of the Constitution. These protests are in part organized by the newly-formed "Junta de Representantes de
Alumnado de la Facultad de Derecho", which seeks to ensure fundamental natural rights of the students.

Student attitudes of passivity illustrate a definite paradox, being that democracy should in theory prompt a greater participation, whereas repressive fascism should discourage such activity. The student movement in the 1950’s and 60’s and subsequent apathy in the 1970’s and 80’s gives rise to some questions about the nature of fascism and democracy. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate fully this paradox: more research on the quantitative level is necessary to hypothesize with greater depth. Suffice to say that from the information herein, one can surmise that uneven cultural and social democratization has occurred in Spain, and the effects of this phenomenon are perhaps most clearly seen in the case of the University.
Footnotes:

1 De Miguel, op.cit., p. 7. (Cited from the Organizacion Sindical Española, Declaracion del Primer Congreso Sindical, 1961.) "Educational costs, as an investment in men/women, should be the first and foremost priority in a program of educational development."

2 Ibid., p. 7 (De Miguel cites Santiago Valenti Camp, 1910).

3 Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, p. 4. "... professional and investigational quality: something which, nevertheless, can only be offered if there is a guarantee of liberty and autonomy."

4 Ibid., p. 4. "patrimonio de los actuales miembros de la Comunidad universitaria, sino que constituye un auténtico servicio público referido a los intereses generales de toda la comunidad nacional..."

5 Ibid., p. 4. "el control del rendimiento y la responsabilidad ... que implica el acceso a la Universidad y la adquisición de un título."


7 Ibid., p. 57. "Autonomous organisms are entities of public law, created by the law, with independent juridical personality and patrimony. These organisms are expressly entrusted with decentralization, organization and administration of public services, the completion of economic activities serving diverse interests, and the management of state goods under the public domain."

8 Ibid., p. 60

9 Montoro-Romero, op.cit., pp. 142-43

10 De Miguel, op.cit., p. 43

11 Ibid., p. 76

12 Ibid., p. 84. "The University student obtains a de facto guarantee of his/her status of a permanent incompetent. (...) The University institution offers another more attractive alternative which consists of the semi-automatic licencing of incompetents (...) The student can obtain almost any five-year title in a maximum of ten years with very little effort (....) This phenomenon, reinforced by widespread nepotism, explains the relatively low level of the new "mid-professional", anticipating the social costs of professionalization of incompetents, which can be estimated at around 50% of actual University graduates."
The professors and students have in their hands the keystone of the new University they wish to attain, and no law will aid this process if they do not instill a sense of academic life in the University centers, dedicating their efforts to the creation of free, critical and investigative thought. Only in this way can the institution become an efficient means of social change, at the service of liberty, equality and progress, thus realizing the ideal of human dignity.

The oposiciones faithfully represent the rote system of "public exams" characterized in the bureaucratic world of ancient China. (....) What we cannot know, without monographic studies, is if objective requisites--memorization, publicity, pre-set--are conscious mechanisms to arrive at a diminution of ascriptive and particular norms, or if they are only latent functions of an institution whose purposes are otherwise (....). We can thus understand the oposiciones as the mainstay of a traditional and favoritist system.

Lillo states: "I don't teach, I only give classes." This is significant in the context of this conversation (March 1984, Cordoba), in which Lillo affirmed that were he to truly teach, no one would be interested. The Spanish student, according to him, is extremely passive and only desires the minimum required information to be relayed.

This figure, in U.S. dollars, is equal to approximately $3,000 if the exchange is set at 70 pesetas per dollar. In the current exchange, this figure would only be about $1,100 dollars, a ridiculous amount if estimating yearly research expenditures for an entire country.

The existence of a so-called 'Superior Counsel' deserves harsh criticism. This Counsel acts with liberty whereas the Universities are subject to all types of impediments, most of which are due to a lack of resources.

Ignacio Jóve is the assistant of Spanish House, Oberlin College. He attended the Facultad de Derecho for two years, and dissatisfied, accepted this job offer in the United States. He states: "People spend the mornings in nearby bars and are very active drinking beer and talking, but in class they are silent."

Jóve describes the 1982 incident vividly: "Once they entrenched themselves in a Faculty with baseball bats and forced
those who entered to sing the Falangist hymn, and if one were to refuse, they would hit him/her, until the police arrived, of course."

23 Effectively, Latorre-Rus cites the following irregularities: a) the exam occurred without witnesses; b) it entailed a series of written work, which was neither read nor graded; and c) the September exam was only partial, whereas the June exam involved the entire course as expected.

24 "...irregularities which manifest themselves in the special exam for the academic course 'Penal Law', designed by the Catedratico Doctor Miguel Navarrete...."

25 Navarrete’s words are as follows: "I am the Catedratico and I will design the exam as I please."

26 Juzgado de Guardia, Revista del Aula de Cultura, No. 12, Ano 111. "Especial Estatutos," p. 7
Conclusion

The present Spanish University approaches the ideal model of an institution most capable of meeting the needs of a modernizing society. A socialist democracy yields to a university which strives to be participatory, autonomous, meritocratic and well-endowed. Within this structure there is room for students to organize and to voice complaints, ideological control diminishes, and professional placement is facilitated by monetary support. But reflecting the overall uneven transition to a democratic form, in which elements of right-wing political ideology, a weak economy, and traditional class barriers still exist, the University remains inconsistent with its ideals. Rapid expansion causes tension in a system financially incapable of handling such an influx, yet unwilling to form a just and meritocratic selection policy. The traditional administrative hierarchy persists in the University, causing dissatisfaction among the professorate. Most importantly, and reflecting the larger society, an aura of passivity prevents students and professors from voicing complaints and spurring reform policies commensurate with constantly changing needs.

But the University has witnessed substantial and positive reform since the Franco era, a period of ideological and political domination which ultimately denuded the institution of much of its intellectual merit. The University was an empty vessel, laden with inconsistency and dogma which reflected the nature of the regime. This structure obviously did not meet the needs and ideals of the student body, and through its repressive
nature promoted profound and widespread unrest. Student revolt, although only partially successful, revealed the need for institutional revision.

Ironically, much of the structural change which ensued as a result of student revolt and elements of the overall political transition had occurred earlier, under the brief Second Republic. The Republic attempted to create a university with provisions for autonomy, meritocratic selection, state subsidation, and democratization. But although the foundations for such an institution existed in the Republic, the subsequent political fragmentation, economic disorganization, and existence of traditional class parameters precluded the successful implementation of reform. Thus, the Republican University became a mere shell of its ideals, attempting to indoctrinate youth with the tenets of liberalism, but only revealing the inadequacies of such ideology in a society laden with tensions.

The Spanish University provides a fascinating case study of an institution which is easily manipulated by political forms. Various theoretical factors explaining this malleability are the processes of modernization, the inter-related nature of ideology and its manifestations, and the nature of a repressive regime upon societal freedom. It can be stated that the Spanish University is most successful in approaching classic educational ideals in the form of an autonomous entity. Although never fully realized, autonomy is most obvious within the present structure. It is the work of future generations to promote a spirit of educational autonomy, and one can only hope that this effect will be forthcoming.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:


"Education in Spain". Review of Reviews, October 1932.


