JOURNEYING TOWARDS AMERICA:
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO WHAT WE THINK IS REAL

Jonathan Freiman
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Senior Honors Thesis
For my parents, my bounders and my creators, who have kept the delicate balance

The fundamental coerciveness of society lies not in its machineries of social control, but in its power to constitute and to impose itself as reality.

Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy
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As Peter Berger said, the definition of reality represents a society's most powerful form of control, its cognitive straitjacket on creativity. As a member of American culture who has more often than not found himself thrown up against the walls of reality by the cultural police, I have long found what we call reality fascinating. I remember when, after withdrawing from college after my freshman year, I began to hear dire warnings about the 'real world'. A moment away from the safety net of academia, it seemed, and I was about to be plunged into the dark abyss of harshness, the teeth-flashing pit of a dog-eat-dog world.

It wasn't that way, of course. I found things I liked doing, and none of them were located in that dark pit. But it seemed to me that whatever lifestyle I chose, I never entered that mythical 'real world'. I moved to Israel and lived on a kibbutz, which was acceptable as a digression, but not a way of life. Somehow it just didn't count to the people around me as 'real life'. I took up acting, working as part of a company in which people spent their lives, but it too failed to measure up to 'real life'. I worked with my parents in their small pharmacy, but still, I was miles away from the 'real world'.

When I returned to academia, the warnings changed. I'd better plan for that time not too far away, that childhood's end, that entrance into the real world. But I started to express a desire to become an academic, to make my life in the world of
universities. And once again, in my neck of the woods, eyebrows raised in the face of my obstinate refusal to finally become a part of the real world.

Personally, I think everything I've done is real, and my confidence in that belief provided the first push towards this thesis. Why, I wondered, do we limit what we call 'real'? What do we mean by 'real' in the first place?

I still don't know, but I think I've made a start, and the start has been as valuable for me emotionally as it has intellectually. I was faced with the cultural cops, our notion of reality, and they came down hard. But as Milton Yinger has observed, Victor Turner has inferred and Neil Postman has demanded, good education is itself a subversive activity, the analysis and deconstruction of our own social codes and beliefs. That insurrection has given me an emotional base from which to withstand the repressive forces. This is my first attack.
INTRODUCTION: CHARTING THE JOURNEY

You have in your hands a thing: a discrete, bounded entity. You see paper, which you identify as a thing, and you see some concept, 'thesis', less directly than paper, but still as a thing.

But as much as you have a thing, you engage in a process, the interaction of my mind and yours, a time-delayed conversation. A thesis (or article or book) performs the role of an intellectual launching pad, a catalyst for thought. Both 'realities', the slices of a dead tree and the process-engagement, confront you through experience.

And yet, as Americans we are more likely to think of even the process elements of a thesis as a thing: a bounded, complete set of thoughts ready for dissection. Unless reminded, we allow the process to slip into the background. We forget the engagement and concentrate on the analysis. I call this paper "Journeying Towards America" to emphasize what we sometimes forget: that any written work is both a journey shared and a place reached, a process of exploring the intricacies of the foreign terrain, and a recounting of the things found there.

In this case, the foreign terrain is not so foreign. I take the anthropological collander to our own soup, and sift through our own vegetables. The advantage in all this intimacy, of course, is that it's your soup too. You know what I'm not even sifting, what I didn't see at the bottom of the pot and what I did.

My primary vegetable, the big cheese passing through my autoanthropological grater, is epistemology, or the way of seeing and making sense out of the world. I submit that our tendency to
see this thesis as more of a thing than a process ties into a distinctly American (or Western) way of seeing the world. Our blind spot for process, this half-amnesia of the intellect, clusters around our notion of reality. Much of the world, I aim to prove, we see through the filter of thinghood, through the lens of boundaries and borders, physicality and separateness.

That thinking, a way of looking at the world I have tagged 'thing-epistemology', has been associated through the long march of history as 'Aristotelian' thinking. Set up against it by our duality-loving minds has generally been something called 'Galilean' thought, a means of understanding that I call 'process-epistemology'.

America, of course, and Americans in particular, do not locate themselves entirely within an Aristotelian world. Elements of process-thinking occasionally seep in, and some groups within American society base their philosophic systems on process, not thing. 'America' (whatever that means) represents a mixed system, a melting pot that separates, a constellation of opposites tugging at each other across a self-created divide. More often than not, Aristotle wins that tug-of-war, and reality appears to us as a thing.

A thing is, by definition, something bounded, something discrete. The world presents itself as an undifferentiated stream; it is we who cut and carve, who name, bound and define. "This is a man," we say, including saliva in the mouth but excluding that just spit our, drawing our man-line around the scab but between the foot and the sock, counting a transplanted kidney but not a hairpiece. "This is a foot," we say, meaning it is not an arm, a leg or a chin, although the four may form one
integrated body. "It ends here," we say, "and isn't the same as this," 'this' being a second thing.

Anything that bounds must exclude. As Kenneth Burke once said, a way of seeing is a way of not seeing. If I say "this is a man" the way I did above, then I leave out spit, sock and hairpiece. If I say it in a different way, I could leave out skin, soul and history. Spit, sock and hairpiece seem reasonable exclusions to make because they lie outside our culture's\(^1\) definition of a man; to leave out skin or soul, which our culture doesn't, seems absurd.

But not absurd to all. A culture may leave spit in its definition of a man, or it may leave soul out. The point is not to ask whether spit or soul should be included in the definition of a man, just to note that different cultures count different things. And by counting different things, they leave others out. The whole process of defining, of cutting and carving, necessarily excludes some concepts and includes some others. That is the essence of thingness.

To most of my (American) readers, this must seem pure sophistry. Of course reality is a thing, as much as anything is a thing. But that doesn't mean we think it's a small thing, a little picture window on a world obscured by the white walls of

\(^{1}\)I have drawn my notion of culture, here and following, from the works of Geertz and Witherspoon, particularly "Thick Description" and Language and Art in the Navajo Universe.
our cultural living room. It's a thing, but it's our concept for the whole thing, the big thing, the real thing.

And that seems plausible. Such is the danger with autoanthropology. As one astute observer once remarked, the more anthropologists say about America, the less we trust what they say about Samoa. Maybe we distrust what we/they say because its revelations directly confront our common sense, that variegated last-ditch cultural system on which we so often base our actions.

If the second is true, then the distrust, growing out of discomfort, must be seen as a positive indicator of progress, a signpost reading "DANGER! CULTURAL ASSUMPTIONS CHALLENGED." Since challenging cultural assumptions (or at least pointing them out) is the primary business of autoanthropology, we're on the right road.

But doubting anthropology in your own backyard may come from boredom as much as it comes from distrust. Discussing American conceptions of reality in terms of thinghood just doesn't seem like anything special, certainly nothing to spend a hundred pages on. But what seems most evident may seem so because most rooted, and what is most rooted may be so because most basic. Bateson echoes the teachings of Zen Buddhism in saying

[T]hat which we know best is that of which we are least conscious, i.e., that the process of habit formation is a sinking of knowledge down to less conscious and more archaic levels. The unconscious contains not only the painful matters which consciousness prefers to not inspect, but also many matters which are so familiar that we do not need to inspect them. (1972:141, my emphasis)

Inspecting familiar matters from an unfamiliar perspective is just what I'm after: the analysis of epistemology--our way of
seeing and understanding the world—that most basic cultural grid.

What is most basic, then, may be one of those Witherspoonian cultural keys, central clues to the understanding of a culture. Such is the case, I think, with 'reality is a thing'. It seems obvious because it is: obvious, but crucial.

* * *

That different cultures define reality in different terms leads not only to the question of how America defines it, but also to the question of where cultures get their ideas of reality. The terrain here, the connection between reality and a culture's conceptions of it, can be tricky. Should I frame the question as "Which cultural conception, or which synthesis of varying conceptions, comes closest to depicting the world as it is?"

If I do, I must join the philosophers. As I'll show later, the phrasing of that question makes it likely that only philosophers from certain cultures would ask it at all. Phrasing the question like that has also allows philosophically-minded politicians a possible justification for imperialism, trumpeting as they so often do the virtues of bringing the true god to the heathens, or the only real form of freedom to the self-oppressed.

Since I claim no privileged access to truth, I will avoid that phrasing entirely. As close as ethnosophistry and the sociology of knowledge may sometimes come to philosophy, my own best interests lie in drawing the line firmly. Philosophy aims, like some Cortez of knowledge, to find the fountain of truth; anthropology contents itself with charting the paths of those varied cultures that seek it, and then documenting in fine detail
the millions of places where it has been found. The temptation
to pick the biggest fountain or the brightest or the most
beautiful and call it the only one is a temptation that
philosophical anthropologists must always fight.

How, then, should I frame the question of the connection
between reality and cultural conceptions of it? As I said at the
beginning, cultures differ in their understandings of the
undifferentiated stream that is the world. That led into a
discussion of bounding, of cutting and carving. But cutting and
carving can be seen as creating as easily as they can be seen as
bounding. A wood sculptor could be said to be constructing
boundaries, but it could just as easily be said (and more often
is) that she creates. So too with a culture's view of reality;
reality is on one hand a bounding of the world that is, on the
other a new creation. Neither tag, bounder or creator, needs to
exclude the other, and something can be learned by looking at the
sculptor in both lights. What we are dealing with in the second
light is the cultural creation of reality, or as Berger and
Luckmann once put it, "the social construction of reality."

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2 Many trends in modern science, including especially quantum
physics, indicate that there is no absolute truth except where we
locate it. Buddhism, Hinduism, information theory, cognitive
science and neurophysiology all agree to at least some extent.

3 Picking the most beautiful fountain seems to depend in no small
way on which fountain you grew up under; which cascade of water
has shed its drops on you for years. And the choice also seems
not uninfluenced by your compelling motive in looking at the
other fountain at all: is it to consider purchase or capture, to
admire or self-affirm by depreciation of a rival, or to create a
glorious 'other' from which to set yourself and your fountain
apart.
The very notion of a culturally-created reality brings bile to the mouths of most American philosophers. G.E. Moore, proving the reality of the external world by holding up one hand and saying here is a physical object and then holding up the other and saying here is another is, as Clifford Geertz has noted, "the epitomizing image of a very large part of recent philosophy" (1983:77). More broadly, culturally-created reality as a concept rubs most Americans, philosophers or not, the wrong way. "Look, reality just is," you're likely to hear when you ask an American if culture creates reality. Reality is undeliberated on. It is assumed, or even more directly, un-assumed, for the very act of assumption half-implies a fleeting recognition of the assuming.

In its taken-for-grantedness, the acceptance of reality parallels common sense. As Geertz remarks,

it is an inherent characteristic of common-sense thought precisely to deny [that it is a relatively organized body of considered thought] and to affirm that its tenets are immediate deliverances of experience, not deliberated reflections upon it...common sense rests its [case] on the assertion that it is not a case at all, just life in a nurshell. The world is its authority. (1983:75)

Whether common sense models its unassumednes on the unassumedness of reality or the unassumedness of reality grows from common sense's 'no questions' approach, the two styles converge. Just as common sense is an organized cultural system masquerading as direct experience, our dominant definition of reality claims to be reality itself.

4 Who are, of course, part of the culture under study, the one that dictates (too strong a word?) objective truth.
Of course not all of our culture denies the cultural createdness of reality. Quantum physicists, for instance, often find themselves defending the human createdness of reality against less-than-accepting philosophers and theologians, although they do so without recourse to the word 'culture'. Theater, for its part, often questions the taken-for-grantedness of reality, as do poetry, science fiction, and a wide cross-section of the arts. Much of academia also embraces the idea of a culturally- (or humanly-) created reality, from deconstructing literary theorists to symbol-wielding neurophysiologists. As Chapter 4 will show, this belief in the cultural creation of reality may represent the core of the process-epistemology, the organizing principle and common bond around which many of America's counterepistemologies collect.

* * *

But why should we assume the opinion of the second group, the actors and artists, physicists and poets, when it comes to the question of the cultural creation of reality? Why not accept what I paint to be the dominant American picture, the opposition to the notion of a culturally-created reality?

The answer lies in our own bodies. As Emerson once said, overstating, "The whole of nature is a metaphor of the human mind." A large body of literature has grown up around humanity's seeming need for external creations. As Peter Berger puts it, "Human being is externalizing in its essence and from the beginning" (1967:4). The need for externalization, noted by Spencer, Hegel and Marx, has recently been attributed to human physiology (Gehlen, Plessner, Buytendijk, Portmann, Lapassade,
cited in Berger). Berger summarizes the field by saying

essential steps in the process of 'finishing' man's development, which have already taken place in the foetal period for the higher mammals, occur in the first year after birth in the case of man. That is, the biological process of 'becoming man' occurs at a time when the human infant is in interaction with an extra-organismic environment...thus a biological foundation to the process of 'becoming man' occurs at a time when the human infant is in interaction with an extra-organismic environment...thus a biological foundation to the process of 'becoming man' in the sense of developing personality and appropriating culture. The latter developments are not somehow superimposed as alien mutations upon the biological development of man, but they are grounded in it. (1967:4-5)

Culture does not wait for biology to develop, as the Enlightenment view held. The process of externalization is basic. Learning or creating a symbolic code for the external world, that first and ongoing step of culture, binds itself inextricably to physical development. To call one the real person and the other costume, one cake and the other icing, is to fly in the face of the fact that they are everywhere, always bound together. There is no cultureless human, just as there is no bodiless human. The true noble savage, free from culture and alone in the world with its instincts, could exist no more readily than the discorporate mind, patterning symbols in a world of which it is, but is not, a part. The one is Beast, the second God, but only bound are they Human.

Why they are bound relates directly to the unfinished nature of the human instinctual structure. Geertz, in an essay titled "The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man", puts the matter this way:

The behavior patterns of lower animals are, at least to a much greater extent, given to them with their physical structure; genetic sources of information order their
actions within much narrower ranges of variation, the
narrower and more thoroughgoing the lower the animal. For
man, what are innately given are the extremely general
response capacities...[which] leave it much less precisely
regulated. (1973:46)

Or, as Berger puts it somewhat more succinctly,

man's instinctual structure at birth is both
underspecialized and undirected towards a species-specific
environment...[the human] world must be fashioned by man's
own activity...Man must make a world for himself. (1967:5)

Human physiology, then, at least partially explains the human
necessity of externalized symbolization. The human instinctual
structure and the link between body and mind point the way
towards a necessary creation of reality.

What happens in our bodies also happened in our history: the
story of human development is a story of body and symbol standing
together. Culture, represented archaeologically by tools, began
at least a million years before Homo sapiens developed. Culture,
that means, didn't just happen after we stopped evolving. It
happened while we were developing, and helped determine that
development. Culture and nature grew up together, each affecting
the other.

Understood cybernetically, the ramifications of so simple a
fact are enormous. Geertz again:

As culture, step by infinitesimal step, accumulated and
developed, a selective advantage was given to those
individuals in the population most able to take advantage of
it...until what had been a small-brained, protohuman
Australopithecus became the large-brained fully human Homo
sapiens. Between the cultural pattern, the body, and the
brain, a positive feedback system was created in which each
shaped the progress of the other. (1973:48)

As Bateson says, "it is the context which evolves" (1967:154), not
one element (here culture) within a seemingly fixed context.

Bateson's classic ecological example serves as an apt
analogy: Eohippus didn't just react to the grassy plains to become a horse; the plains also developed turf as a response to the changing ungulates. The context, the full ecology, evolves, horse and turf together. So with the human being: the context--the whole--changes as a result of dynamic feedback changes, not one variable (culture) reacting to a finished physiological context.

Externalization, then, is biologically rooted in both the species and the individual, and the symbolic universe we create is as vital to humanity in general and humans in particular as the physical world we inhabit.\(^5\) Or, to be more accurate, the symbolic and the physical make up one world, the real world, and it is that world which is vital.

* * *

Accepting the cultural createdness of reality doesn't necessarily lead to accepting the presence of multiple views of reality. You can accept culture, that is, without accepting cultures. Following this logic, you would accept the brain/body connection and the idea of a cybernetic, contextually inseparable development. But then you'd take your shot: just as the child, **universally**, emerges into this world unfinished, and just as Homo sapiens, **uniformly**, developed simultaneously in brain and body, we should expect a **universal** and **uniform** culture, an essentially

\(^5\)Our very perception of the physical world is itself symbolic; i.e., our brains do not directly experience anything; our sensory nerves send signals (symbols) to our brains which our brains interpret as real.
singular way of looking at reality. Minor changes may occur, a different language here, a different costume there. But in the end, like unfinished babies who may vary from child to child but share their essential humanity, all cultures understand reality in the same terms. As we developed as a species, as our culture patterned our physiological development, as we selected ourselves, so to speak, one view of reality developed to match the single species.

The simplest answer to this view is that the so-called 'minor changes' are not minor at all; that language and costume (to use the two named above) are themselves part of a symbolic universe that defines the culture, not evanescent epiphenomena that change like leaves in autumn, yet leave the tree unmoved. The way to prove this is detailed comparative ethnography, cross-cultural thick description aimed at debunking the myth of

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6Suppose my assumptions are wrong and this argument proves correct? Suppose contemporary philosophers like Bloom (1987) are right, that my base assumption of differing cultural views of reality shows false? What I am I left with then--just another hundred pages wasted on a bad paradigm? Something else, I think. For if I explain some of the essentials of the American view of reality and it is ultimately proven that there is no distinctively American view of reality, that everyone views it the same way, then I will have explained some of the qualities of the universal understanding of reality, or perhaps of reality itself.

It's here that Bloom and his ilk should be most careful. If philosophy (or anthropology itself) should ultimately deny the existence or significance of basic cultural differences, then the anthropologist's role increases, not decreases, in significance. A specific understanding of American notions of reality becomes a general understanding of human notions of reality, and ethnophilosophy becomes philosophy.

7This view isn't just a derivative of the mainstream's thing-epistemology. Timothy Leary, for instance, believes that culture can be reduced to our biological commonalities--that culture is a patterning developed from our DNA.
universalism, the maxim that we are, after all, just human beings. Chapter 3 will provide the cross-cultural evidence, drawn mainly from contemporary Hopi and Navaho cultures and older accounts of Dravidian and Chasidic cultures. Chapter 4 will, similarly, provide the inside evidence, examples of American groups whose epistemologies counter our own.

* * *

Once we've passed through some of the terrain, begun our journeying towards America, where do we go? Chapter 2 will have brought us to the fortified castle of this realm, Chapter 3 will have put that castle in a comparative context, other castles in other valleys, and Chapter 4 will have shown the revolutionaries and malcontents: the quiet monks and palace radicals, cloistered women and political peasants.

As every good tourist knows, once you've seen the sights get out of the carriage and meet the people. See how they actually live their local lives, whether the king picks potatoes among the peasants, whether the monks visit the castle. Chapter 5 brings us to that stage of the journey, what anthropology has come to call the 'practice' approach, locals living their lives.

As every good tourist will also tell you, you can't trust a

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8 My cross-cultural evidence is thin, not thick. Since none of my cross-cultural evidence is firsthand, I must depend mainly on ethnographies written from other than an ethnophilosophical perspective (with the exception of Witherspoon). I am forced to interpret interpretations, to translate translations, to comment on commentaries. My whole process remains meta, a step removed. My evidence of counterepistemologies in America, to the contrary, is based mainly on firsthand experience and knowledge.
tourist. What they say about dinner on the Seine with Beckett or the Tuilleries in Spring comes not only from their adventures, but also from their preconceptions. If I hate absurdism I probably didn't enjoy dinner, and if Miro on Chicago concrete is my cup of tea, the Tuilleries probably fell flat. Every tourist adventure, every foray into the field for enjoyment or analysis, is itself an interaction between the tourist and the land, the observer and the observed.

I'll try, of course, to paint a fair picture of this land, American epistemology. But all along the way I will acknowledge that I do paint, that what you see is not the land itself, but my portrait of it.

No painting can ever portray the fullness of what is. Great art merely shows some of it in a new way, starts the viewer off on a journey of his own.
"Things are in the saddle and ride mankind." Emerson

CHAPTER 2: THING CASTLE

Most students of human communication acknowledge a connection between language and the thought process (Chomsky, Gumperz and Hymes, Sapir, Schneider, Spradley, Turner, Tyler). Language, then, can serve as a clue to thought processes. Broad patterns of speaking—whether they be strategies for bounding, classificatory schemes (Witherspoon), myths (Levi-Strauss), idioms or joke forms (Basso)—reveal much of the ways in which a culture or a person structures thought.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have exposed one of the most important patterning forms of human speech: the metaphorical system. In Metaphors We Live By, they assert:

most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature...metaphor is not just a matter of language...human thought processes are largely metaphorical...Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person's conceptual system (4-6).

Arguing, for example, is understood in terms of war, and as a result we use phrases like attacking a position an indefensible strategy, a demolished point, to win an argument, to gain ground, he shot down my arguments, etc. We not only use many war terms to describe arguments, but we actually win or lose them, we see our co-arguer as an opponent, we actually gain ground, take a new line of attack. In short, "the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war"(p.4). The metaphorical concept structures both what we do (here arguing) and how we understand what we are doing (here talking about
arguing).

Furthermore, the metaphorical systems within a culture are both internally and externally consistent. Each metaphorical system exhibits internal 'systematicity', i.e., it can't be that "I'm feeling up" means I'm happy and "My spirits rose" means I'm sad, because the upward direction must always be metaphorically associated with happiness (pp.7-18). Across systems, 'coherence' entails, so that "[t]he most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture" as well as with the other metaphorical systems (p.22). In other words, it's no coincidence that MORE, GOOD, HIGH STATUS, and THE FUTURE are all up.

* * *

In most of American English, reality is conceived of as a thing. The metaphorical system REALITY IS A THING presents itself most directly in idiomatic expressions such as 'out of touch with reality', 'a firm grasp on reality', and 'grounded in reality'. Reality is something you can touch or something that something else can be grounded in. Something you can touch. Even our generic term for referring to an as yet unnamed--'something'--is structured in terms of thinghood.

If reality isn't something, it's nothing; in either case, a thing. One of our most basic dichotomies is something/nothing, and even if a word isn't some thing, it must be conceived of as no thing. Either way, conceptualization occurs in terms of thinghood.

Our linguistic semantics rest on the same fundamental
thingness. The English language is noun-heavy, relying primarily on words that follow a fundamentally non-active pattern. Whorf has posited that the semantic structure of a language may pattern the thoughts of the cultural members. Hopi language, for instance, resides primarily in process, emphasizing verb-forms and strongly de-emphasizing nouns. Most 'nouns', for instance, are simply static forms of the verbs. Following Whorf's logic for Americans, we would expect to find an emphasis on the category of 'thing', indeed the very organizing symbol we are pursuing.¹

Whorf's hypothesis, though, is rarely accepted in the extreme sense. Actors are understood to have far more control over their own lives, and epistemologies vary widely within and across grammatical systems. Whorf's hypothesis, then, is best looked at as a single piece of evidence, not a totalizing conclusion that summarizes a culture's epistemology.

Mathematics here parallels grammar. In geometry, a clear distinction is made between a slope of zero and no slope, as in math in general zero and the null set are clearly differentiated. Within the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical system, zero (or nothing) is clearly a thing, so a second concept of emptiness is created, an emptiness lacking even zero.

Americans themselves associate reality with thingness.

¹On a radically Whorfian level, it could be argued that my process/product dichotomy derives from the English verb/noun dichotomy, which itself is not based in nature or some objective reality.
Interviews I conducted between May and October of 1987 clearly support the metaphorical system REALITY IS A THING. Ranking five jobs in terms of 'realness', respondents almost always considered construction work the most real and travel agent or receptionist the least real. The following represents a rough breakdown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Most Real</th>
<th>Job</th>
<th>% Least Real</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>construction</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>retail sales</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>cook</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>receptionist</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>travel agent</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(n=20;11F,9M)

The order of declining realness--construction work, cook, retail sales, receptionist, travel agent--came out as I expected; the hierarchy is directly related to REALITY IS A THING. Consonant with the metaphorical system, the jobs most connected with things are considered most real and those least connected with things are considered least real. The construction worker makes things; the cook changes some things into other things; the retail salesperson simply handles things in order to sell them; the receptionist and the travel agent are not involved with 'things', they merely facilitate people being able to get to things.

My understandings are trustworthy only if coupled with similar understandings by natives. Other factors could have played a significant role in the ranking of the jobs, particularly matters of gender and sector (service vs. manufacturing). Construction work, for example, could be more highly ranked because traditionally male, and office receiving may be devalued because traditionally female.

Informants themselves, however, rarely acknowledged issues
of gender or social class. Much more often, real work was considered physical work, particularly physical work including hands. One woman, for instance, in ranking sculpting more real than teaching English, explained: "I guess I think if you're doing something with your hands...if you're making something, forming something," then your job is more real than if you're involved in something "obscure" like teaching English. A second woman insisted that a nurse's job is more real than a translator's, saying that "a nurse does tangible things, a translator is just like a conduit...[things just go through them]...they're not creating anything of their own."

The first woman insisted that creativity was an important gauge of realness, consistently ranking doctor higher than accountant, social organizer, and others. But when asked to compare ditch digging and organizing programs at a nursing home, she quickly chose ditch digging as the most real, forcing herself to reexamine and ultimately reject her use of 'creativity' as a gauge of realness. She restructured her formula to include utility, asking questions like where the ditch digger was digging, and determined that usefulness to society was of prime significance. Usefulness, she said, could be either mental or physical, and therefore a translator was as real as a nurse. But when asked whether, as a whole, the body or the mind (i.e., mental or physical processes) was more real, she didn't hesitate:

[T]he body has like got a grip, the body's more real than the mind...because the mind like keeps changing...[the body's] always the same basically.

It wasn't surprising, then, that in her final responses, the
ranking of the five jobs in the table above, she did not justify her choice of construction worker by reference to creativity or utility. Instead, she said it is most real "because it's more tangible."

Along with 'physical', 'tangible' proved quite a popular word in the interviews. I asked informants which of the four classic Aristotelian elements--air, earth, fire and water--they considered most and least real, and received roughly this distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Most Real</th>
<th>Element</th>
<th>% Least Real</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Earth</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Water</td>
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Once again, the answers followed expectations of consonance with the metaphorical system REALITY IS A THING. Earth, the most tangible of the four classic elements, is most associated with reality; air, the least tangible, is considered the least real; water, which can be touched but not held, and fire, which can be felt but not held, both fall midway between the real and the unreal.

The informants explanations mirrored my own. "Least tangible" was a phrase used often to explain the choice of air as least real. Similarly, earth was most often cited as most real along with an explanation of its thingness; one respondent said simply: "you're always standing on it, you can see it, and you live on it." What is most thingish is most real.

Earth as thing and air as not thing, then, directly
correlate with earth as real and air as not real. Many of our uses of 'ethereal' and similar words reveal further evidence for the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical system. Mental health, for example, a gauge of connectedness to reality, is filled with phrases from the earth/air dichotomy. The disturbed and eccentric are 'airy', 'flighty', or just 'out of touch', whereas normal people are 'grounded' or 'down to earth'.

Seen in this light, it is no coincidence that fairies and sprites are 'ethereal' and that witches fly through the air. The farther you go from reality, the farther you go from thing. And structured in terms of the air/earth conventional metaphor system, the farther you go from thing, the farther you go from earth. Those who are conceived of as far from reality--mystics, the insane, dreamers--are associated with air, the least thingish of the classic elements. Normal people--down to earth folks like you and me--live our lives on the ground, on this earth, that most thingish of things.

The American kinship systems gives further credence to the REALITY IS A THING system. As Schneider (1968) points out, Americans understand kinship as an entirely biogenetic concept. Furthermore, that biogenetic relationship is permanent, regardless of emotional fallings-out or personal disagreements:

The relationship which is 'real' or 'true' or 'blood' or by 'birth' can never be severed, whatever its legal position...It is culturally defined as being an objective fact of nature.... (1968:24)

'Blood', which is conceived of as a 'thing' (p.24), is closely connected with the notion of a 'real' relationship:

Consider the step-, -in-law, and foster relatives. The fundamental fact about these relatives is that they have the
role of close relatives without, as informants put it, being 'real or blood relatives.' A step-mother is a mother who is not a 'real' mother, but the person who is now the father's wife. A father-in-law is a father who is not Ego's own father, but his spouse's father. And a foster son is not one's own or real son, but someone whom one is caring for as a son.

Clearly 'thing', manifested here as blood, and 'real' share a close relationship in American culture.2

* * *

Etymology gives further evidence of the solidity of the metaphor system REALITY IS A THING in American English. Victor Turner comments on the value of etymological evidence in deriving current meaning:

By analogy with geology, archaeology, and depth psychology, it may be possible to regard the etymology of key terms in major languages as a many-leveled system whose strata are composed of successively deposited layers of historical 'experience'. Etymology is, after all, a mode of 'restoring the past', a form of linguistic 'self-reflexivity'. The many-leveled or 'laminated' geological crust of the earth is still 'alive' (think of the Mt. St. Helen's eruption); even more so is the human 'mind' or 'psyche', with its conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious levels, each subdivided into layers or bands laid down by repeated dramatic or 'traumatizing experiences'. Neurobiologists of the central nervous system recognize surviving 'archaic' structures in the brain, forebrain, and autonomic systems, which continue to interact with the neocortex. Similarly, a modern word's past 'senses' have influenced its present penumbra of meaning. (1982:16-17)

The word 'reality' derives from the Latin root 'res', meaning 'thing'. The history of the word in English builds on

2The American fascination with sociobiology may be explained to some extent by this blood-as-real folk category, and more broadly by the thing-as-real system.
the thinghood of reality. The Oxford English Dictionary (1961:309) lists as synonyms "in thing, in reality, really, actually (opposed to in name= nominally)".³ Thing equals reality. One of the crudest examples of this equation survives today in the term 'real estate'. Executors of wills, finding it necessary to distinguish between the material aspects of an estate and the non-material ones (such as title), chose to affix the word 'real' to the material ones. Real estate today applies to that most thingish (and as with Aristotelian elements--groundish) of things: land.

But the O.E.D. definition reveals more than quaint survivals and further evidence of the rootedness of the metaphorical system; it also shows the inherent metaphysical bias of the system. The definition sets 'in thing' and 'in name' in opposition. It says earlier that a thing is "That which is signified, as distinguished from a word, symbol, or idea by which it is represented; the actual being or entity as opposed to a symbol of it" (309). By assuming a distinction between signifier and signified, the definition ties itself into an objectivist account of the universe. In the metaphorical system REALITY IS A

³The use of the Oxford English Dictionary as an etymological source may bring questions about the distinctive Americanness of this system to the fore. The distinction between American epistemology and some broader culture group (Western, Modern, SAE, Indo-European) is a difficult distinction to make. Obviously many similarities exist from American to Britain or Germany or even France, and those similarities may include elements of a shared epistemology. Nevertheless, as I am confined by limitations of knowledge, resources, time and space, I have chosen to focus on the culture which for me is most accessible, the one I know best. For that reason my units of analysis derive mainly from America, although an occasional citation from the authoritative O.E.D. may mix things up a bit.
THING, then, America and Americans must view reality within an objectivist framework. Reality must be singular and absolute.

* * *

What are the ramifications of viewing reality as a thing in an objectivist framework? For one, the REALITY IS A THING metaphor system explains the existence of ontological metaphors in English. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:25 et passim) do not explain the existence of ontological metaphors in American English; instead, they assume that "they are needed to satisfy certain purposes that we have." But on what grounds is 'need' determined? Need is certainly a cultural determination, and it is likely that two Americans would feel the need for ontological metaphors simply because they are so strong a part of everyday speech. The metaphors, and by extension the need, are based on the strength of the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical system in American English, and are not necessarily universally cross-cultural.

Lakoff and Johnson miss only one step in their theory of

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4Any attempt to describe the objective account of the universe in a footnote is doomed to triviality. The objective account of the universe represents the single most respected philosophical tradition in the West and underpins many Western cultures. Briefly, though, the objective account holds that the world is made up of independent objects with independent properties, that we gain knowledge by experiencing the objects and learning about their properties and relationships. Our categories and concepts come from the objects's inherent properties, which are aspects of the world 'out there' as it exists.
ontological metaphors: the step provided by REALITY IS A THING. Reality, by definition, includes everything, so it certainly includes experiences such as events, actions, activities and states. Since reality is conceived in terms of thinghood in American English, experiences too must be conceived of as things. That step—the conception of experiences as things—represents ontological metaphoricalization.

The following proof should lay out clearly the process described above:

1. Reality, by its American definition, includes everything.
2. Experiences (events, actions, activities, states and other subjects of ontological metaphors) are real, since they are within 'everything'.
3. REALITY IS A THING.
4. Experiences are things.

Lakoff and Johnson simply begin with number four, using 'necessity' as their proof.

The REALITY IS A THING metaphor system also explains the process whereby ontological metaphors become container metaphors, another area that Lakoff and Johnson do not fully explore. A container metaphor is a broad category of metaphors that structures understanding of unbounded objects in terms of containers. A culture, for example, is not an easily bounded concept, but is sometimes thought of in terms of a container, as in "She's inside the culture" or "He's not in the mainstream." The process by which culture becomes container is again linked to the real/thing system. Since reality encompasses all concepts, culture is real. And since reality is conceived of as a thing, culture becomes conceived of as a thing. A thing means a bounded, discrete entity, and bounding entails quantification.
Quantification, in turn, allows the determination of holding
capacity, or 'containerization'. Culture, therefore, as a thing,
becomes conceived of as a container, which someone can be
'inside' of. The following logical progression illustrates this
process:

1. Reality, by definition, includes everything.
2. Culture is real.
3. REALITY IS A THING.
4. Culture is a thing.
5. A thing is, by definition, a bounded discrete entity.
6. Culture is a bounded, discrete entity.
7. Bounding is, by definition, quantification (Lakoff and
   Johnson:29-30 and this paper, introduction).
8. Quantification allows determination of ability to hold, or
   'containerization'(Lakoff and Johnson, op cit).
9. Culture is a container. (container metaphoricalization)

REALITY IS A THING, then, not only frames reality within an
objectivist framework, but also serves as the basis for the
pervasive ontological and container metaphors in American
English.
"The essential vocation of interpretive anthropology is not to answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man has said."

Clifford Geertz

CHAPTER 3: OTHER CASTLES IN OTHER VALLEYS

In the last chapter I explored some of the evidence that points toward the American understanding of reality as thing. I need to ask, though, whether the tendency to reify, the reliance on a notion of objective truth, the earth/air dichotomy and other concomitants of the REALITY IS A THING system are necessarily American. In other words, why assume that American epistemology differs in any significant way from the rest of the world's?

To answer that question I appeal to the ethnographic evidence: the Swan Pakhtun, to give one example, consider the occupation of 'surgeon' the lowest of all possible jobs (Lindholm 1985). If the Swat Pakhtun based their rankings on an epistemology similar to America's (more tangible is more real), that would not be so.

This 'appeal to the evidence', however, is facile at best. First, degree of reality and relative ranking are not necessarily correlates, as the American denigration of unskilled manual labor shows. Second, other cultural systems that may be unrelated to epistemology (aesthetics, ethics, etc.) could (and in fact do) play central roles in the Swat ranking of surgeon (Lindholm
The increasing ascription of reality as a job becomes increasingly physical, then, could operate just like America's, but be temporarily 'outranked' by another system. That's to say that central epistemological metaphors may operate similarly across cultures, shaped in outward form by the local color of particular localities.

Such an argument often holds true. Many societies exist, no doubt, which share epistemologies yet differ in outward form. More importantly, though, from my point of view, some cultures do operate with epistemologies radically different from our thingbound one. In some cultures, the 'minor changes', the discrepancies from our own system that in the above explanation represent merely 'local color', point the way toward differing conceptions of reality. They are themselves part of a symbolic universe that defines the culture. By revealing those other epistemologies, I will be putting America back in its local light, showing the REALITY IS A THING system as one example of a cultural epistemology, rather than the epitomizing example of the way to construe knowledge.

Hopi, Navajo, Chasidic and Dravidian, each in its own way presents an interesting contrast with the dominant assumptions of American epistemology, although each of the 'ways' builds from a somewhat similar process-dependence. Although the first three of

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1 Chapter 5 will in fact deal primarily with the conflicts between American epistemology and other cultural systems that are worked out in the day-to-day of the social sphere, particularly the discrepancy between a core element of the American thing-epistemology and the democratic tradition.
these cultures have had significant contact with American culture during the last century, I will treat each as a distinct culture, not as counter- or sub- to the dominant American system.

Where to draw the line around a culture is as difficult as where to draw the line around a storm. Does the eye of the storm count? Is a short break between two fronts part of the storm? What about the edges--the drizzling, the mist, the grey skies? Yinger (1982) charts the course here: in stating that a counterculture is a group whose norms and values "sharply contradict the dominant norms and values of the society of which that group is a part" (p.3). My definition of subculture will model itself on that of counterculture: a group whose norms and values differ enough with those of the dominant culture to be marked as 'other'. The key here is 'of which that group is a part'. I list Hopi and Navajo as outside American culture because although they have responded to American culture, their development has been molded mainly by forces internal to each. Their adaptations have grown around what Hodge calls the 'resistant institutional core', so that changes, although present, occur predominantly within an organic setting. The epistemology, in particular, has remained essentially local, not caught in the net of America's growing hegemony.² The cultures,

²One might argue that although changes have occurred around a resistant institutional core, they have occurred for so long and to such a great extent that their effects can no longer be considered minor. I don't mean to refute that. The effects on social structure, for instance, have been tremendous. I'm simply saying that the epistemological systems (my core concern) as they are revealed in language, ritual and metaphysics, have not been significantly altered in either Hopi or Navajo culture (see Whorf and Witherspoon).
then, exist independently, not in a part-to-whole relationship with American culture. This is not to say that American culture has not played a significant and at times primary role in Hopi and Navajo cultural change. Simply, their epistemological interaction is intercultural, not intracultural. One can easily argue, for instance, that French culture had a tremendous impact on post-Elizabethan England (and vice-versa) without implying a part-to-whole relationship.

Since I will concentrate on the rituals and epistemology of pre-twentieth century Chasidus, I list Chasidic culture as outside American culture despite the close association of the two during the last century. Dravidian culture, obviously, has never had any significant contact with our own.

* * *

Metaphor theory anticipates the incompleteness of the American REALITY IS A THING model. Theorists no longer understand metaphor as the substitution or comparison of one term for another. Rather, the principal and subsidiary subjects interacts to create a new whole. In the example MAN IS A WOLF, 'man' and 'wolf' interact, wolf serving as a filter for man so that

Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in "wolf-language" will be rendered prominent, and any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others—in short, organizes our view of man. (Black, 1981:75)

3 Black's terms, used to emphasize the similar function—subject—rather than to claim functional discrepancies like a subject-object division would. Other authors use vehicle/tenor, etc.
The focus here is on suppression and emphasis. If REALITY IS A THING suppresses, some elements of reality must be hidden. If some elements of reality are hidden, the system must be incomplete.

But that's theory. I've developed an inherently unfair hypothetical syllogism: in Chapter 2 I showed a varied number of reasons why I think that Americans think reality is thing-like, then I tagged that tendency to associate reality and thing a 'metaphorical system'; then, having reigned the phenomenon into my category, I made reference to the category's theory to say that the American notion of reality is incomplete.

Clearly that's not fair. Metaphor theory may be wrong (I certainly haven't proved Black's theory) or metaphorical systems may not exist at all. One significant problem with Black's metaphor theory is its inherent assumption of an objective truth. In the above example, for instance, it assumes that there exists somewhere an objective, totalizing definition of human and human traits that the subsidiary subset (here 'wolf') organizes. This is clearly contrary to Lakoff and Johnson's central argument of an experientialist approach to truth, of their rejection of a shopping-list approach to an object and its traits. At the very least, then, using both Black and Lakoff and Johnson creates a lack of internal consistency, a logical unsoundness in the theory. More importantly, though, using Black's theory in this context leads to an unpalatable (to me) conclusion—that reality does exist somewhere out there, and that each culture's epistemology is (by definition) an incomplete
metaphorical understanding of it. That may fit my carving analogy, but certainly not my creating one. For me, the sculptor is always artist, and as much as she cuts pieces off the block, she adds to the world something new. Finding truth is bounding and creating.

Black's notion of incompleteness, then proves unusable in this analysis of American notions of reality. Stripped of its objectivist assumptions and entailments, though, metaphor theory can be quite useful. Just as 'human' can be organized in terms of 'wolf', 'reality' can be understood in terms of another concept--'thing', 'process', 'wave', whatever. The interaction, not the incompleteness, holds the key here. And just as Black shows that 'man' can be understood in terms of 'wolf' or 'vulture' or another concept, so reality can be understood in terms of process or thing or whatever. The importance is in the options.

* * *

One consequence of the REALITY IS A THING system is the subset TIME IS A THING, i.e., the reification of the notion of time. Whorf (1939: 240-241) points out that English terms, like 'sky, hill, swamp,' persuade us to regard some elusive aspect of nature's endless variety as a distinct THING, almost like a table or chair. Thus English and similar tongues lead us to think of the universe as a collection of rather distinct objects and events corresponding to words....We might isolate something in nature by saying 'It is a dripping spring.' Apache erects the statement on a verb....The result corresponds to our 'dripping spring', but synthetically it is 'as water, or springs, whiteness moves downward.'

Similarly, English divides actions into objects because of
syntactical requirements. In response to a flashing, for instance, we say 'it flashed' or 'the light flashed', "setting up an actor IT, or A LIGHT, to perform what we call an action, FLASH. But the flashing and the light are the same; there is no thing which does something, and no doing. Hopi says only [the stative] rehpi" (263). The event, flashing, is described without reference to an object or an action.

Our tendency to treat natural entities as if they were humanly created objects seeps into the world of time. In English, Whorf says,

CYCLICITY brings the response of imaginary plurals. But a likeness of cyclicity to aggregates is not unmistakably given by experience prior to language, or it would be found in all languages, and it is not. (139)

American English does understand time in relation to space, and time can be 'long' or 'short'. Ultimately, "A 'length of time' is envisioned as a row of similar units, like a row of bottles" (140).

Hopi, by contrast, does not objectify time at all. Where in English I would say "I stayed ten days," in Hopi I would say "I stay until day eleven" or "I leave on day ten." Days can progress, but cannot be counted like objects in a group to become an aggregate. For the Hopis, time simply does not have that quality.

Similarly, although we normally say 'it's summer', the Hopis don't. To the Hopis, time cannot be objectified and set in relation to an object, 'it'. Time markers in Hopi form a formal part of speech by themselves, and cannot be used as subjects, objects or nouns.
One does not say 'it's a hot summer' or 'summer is hot'; summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. One does not say 'THIS summer,' but 'summer now' or 'summer recently.' There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of the subjective duration-feeling. Nothing is suggested about time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a formless item answering to our 'time.' (143)

Since the Hopi do not objectify time 'like a row of bottles', actions do not disappear into some vast universe of lost time.

[I]t is as if the return of the day were felt as the return of the same person, a little older but with all the impresses of yesterday, not as "another day," i.e. like an entirely different person [as in American English]. (151)

For this reason, the Hopi see continued repetition not as a comic or pathetic waste (as we do), but as a storing up, an accumulation, so that positive rituals performed 'when summer-phase occurs' build with those of other summer-phases and accumulate an invisible charge that affects future events.

Final evidence of a lack of a reification of time in Hopi culture lies in the verb tense system. The Hopi do not have tenses referring to past, present, or future. In fact, the only system of varied marking of verbs occurs in a division between what Whorf(113) calls 'reportive', 'expective' (which could be translated into English at any tense) and 'nomic' (the statement of general laws). Hopi divides validity; English divides time:

[T]o the Hopi there is no temporal future; there is nothing in the subjective state corresponding to the sequences and successions conjoined with distances and changing physical configurations that we find in the objective state. (62)

* * *

Hopi epistemology understands the continuing duration-feeling without recourse to a reified construct called 'time'; time is never conceived in terms of space. American notions of
reality as thinghood predispose the comprehension of time in terms of space, evidenced by the aggregation of cyclicity mentioned above by Whorf.

By contrast, traditional Jewish notions of the relationship between time and space, particularly those notions prevalent in the Chasidic world, envisage a reverse of the American ordering: time is seen as dominant, more real, and space is merely "frozen time."

In The Sabbath, Abraham Heschel, a Jewish philosopher-theologian, argues that Judaism molds itself predominantly in terms of time, a fact indicated by the culture's overwhelming emphasis on holy times and overwhelming de-emphasis of sacred space. Relating his understanding of the culture's relative ranking of space and time, he says:

"A special consciousness is required to recognize the ultimate significance of time. We all live it and are so close to being identical with it that we fail to notice it. The world of space surrounds our existence. It is but a part of living, the rest is time. Things are the shore, the voyage is in time....To the spiritual eye space is frozen time, and all things are petrified events....The boundless continuous but vacuous entity which realistically is called space is not the ultimate form of reality. (1951:96-7)^4

The doctrines of Chasidism, a (so-called) mystical branch of Judaism that flourished in the European Jewish world until the

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^4Although it would be difficult to find a more passionate or poetic denunciation of the REALITY IS A THING metaphorical system, one insider's words cannot stand alone as representative of the metaphysics of a culture. The danger of the one person-one culture approach has been well documented in critiques of Papago Woman and We [I] the Tikopia."
twentieth century, corroborate the philosophical ruminations of Heschel. In the Chasidic view, spirituality and temporality go hand in hand, contrasted against the tandem of spatiality and physicality. The Garden of Eden, for instance, is understood as initially a world of pure spirit and energy, a place (English misnomer) existing only within the realm of time. When the apple-essence is spiritually consumed, the world transforms itself into the physical realm, and Adam and Eve are aware of bodies (space) and nakedness (R. Tanya and other Lurianic scholars).

Chasidus not only ranks time/spirit above body/space, but actually comprehends the mission of the cultural/religious mandates as a concerted campaign for pure temporality. Existence entirely within time is the essence of immanence, of oneness with God. The mitzvot (obligations and good deeds) serve to liberate spiritual sparks inherent in every aspect of the physical world. The sparks were once whole, flaming oneness, but upon the transformation to a physical world they were broken into pieces (objectification) and hidden within klipot (shells or husks) from which they must be liberated. Their liberation and eventual complete reunification (the ultimate goal of the mitzvot), will result in "flip[ping] all of space into time"(Brand 1987). The attitude and process required for reunification and world temporalization are expressed in one term: dvaykut.

The midnight vigils give a final ritual example of the dominance of time-notions over space-notions in the Jewish understanding of reality. At the midpoint of darkness during the night, senior male members of a household awaken in order to
study and cry, to cleave to the immanent world, to perform 

dvaykut. Darkness, a negative, physical power, is seen as most 
vulnerable at its midpoint, where a seam runs through it. If it 
is 'attacked' then, if one practices dvaykut, recognizes God as 
Yotzer (immanent, the world as a spiritual and temporal 
manifestation of God), then the spiritual/temporal realm can be 
affected. There is a chance to reunify, to flip space into time, 
to "transform darkness," an aspect of the physical world, "into 
unity," the ultimate form of the temporal world (Brand 1987). 

Understood somewhat more practically (or comprehensibly, at 
least), a devout (i.e. culturally valued) Jew understands that 
the ultimate form of reality is Yotzer, that the physical world, 
although perceived as a fractured, fractious physicality, is in 
essence a unity, the spiritual and temporal oneness of God. 
Performing the dictates of the culture, the mitzvot, is at once a 
process of helping along that unity on an objective level, and of 
helping oneself more directly experience the unity of pure 
immanence.

So Heschel's understanding of ultimate reality as time-
bound, his understanding of space as merely a dependent sub-
category of time, finds company in traditional Chasidic 
understandings and rituals. And as he himself says, the thing-
lessness of reality also manifested itself in ancient biblical 
Hebrew:

There is no equivalent for the word 'thing' in biblical 
Hebrew. The word 'davar,' which in later Hebrew came to 
denote thing, means in biblical Hebrew: speech; word; 
message; report; tidings; advice; request; promise; decision 
sentence; theme, story; saying, utterance; business, 
occupation; acts; good deeds; events; way, manner; reason,
cause; but never 'thing'.

* * *

Dravidian, a language/culture group of southern India and northern Sri Lanka, shares with biblical Hebrew the absence of a term for thing. Tyler (1984:36) states that Dravidian lacks even "a metaphysical category corresponding to 'thing'." Dravidian also makes no distinction between rational thinking and feeling. The world, which is conceptualized experientially rather than objectively, can be equally approached through reason or feeling. Or, more accurately, one cannot divorce reason from feeling, so the world must be approached with reason and feeling, represented by one word in each of the Dravidian languages.

The thinking/feeling combination grows directly from the lack of 'a metaphysical category corresponding to thing'. As Tyler points out, the concept of 'thing' enables representation: one thing represents another thing. Without a world understood a priori as thing, knowledge and feeling must be one: an interaction among parts of a whole, or an interaction among elements of a process. Most of Indian philosophy, Tyler shows, develops from this metaphysical premise:

...[Indian philosophy] derives both the material world and the means of knowing it from intentionality and desire. These "feelings" are not irrational sources of subjective error that rationalism must contest and defeat in the quest for objective truth, but are instead the very source and enabling condition for any rationality whatever. What for SAE is only a disturbing philosophical afterthought in the form of phenomenology is, in Indian tradition, the starting point and foundation of philosophy. (1984:36)

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If the Dravidian notion of reality seems to preclude semiotics (the representation of one thing by another, arbitrarily labeled 'signifier') by denying the metaphysical category of 'thing', then the Navajo view of reality reverses the causality usually inherent in semiotics. For the Navajo, symbol precedes thing:

The symbol was not created as a means of representing reality; on the contrary, reality was created or transformed as a manifestation of symbolic form. In the Navajo view of the world, language is not a mirror of reality; reality is a mirror of language. (Witherspoon 1977:35)

This view, although radically different from the Hopi, Jewish and Dravidian views, also contradicts the American REALITY IS A THING. To the Navajo, reality is not a thing, reality is a process of interrelation among symbols, with language the symbol par excellence. Human reality, and with it thinghood, are one possible manifestation of that process. As Witherspoon states, the world itself is a "stage of symbolic action"(36), for the movements of the things which we see are only the manifestations of the thoughts and intents of inner forms. The thoughts and intents are primary; the externalized physicality secondary.

This world of the primacy of motion can best be glimpsed with an analysis of the Navajo linguistic system. Unlike English, which focuses almost exclusively on nouns, noun modifiers and noun connectives,

...the Navajo language is dominated by verbs. There seem to be few, if any, nouns that are not either passive forms of verbs or derived from verbal forms. Particles, prefixes, and postpositions are used primarily as verbal modifiers. The dominance of verbs in Navajo also corresponds to the Navajo emphasis on a world in motion. (48)

The Navajo kinship system parallels this order. Mis-
understood by generations of anthropologists because of their insistence on defining kinship in terms of shared biogenetic substance (see Schneider 1985), Navajo kinship resides in process:

The emphasis, focus, and literal frames of reference of Navajo concepts of ké solidarity are found in affective action, not in static substance. (Witherspoon 1977:88, my emphasis)

Just as a Navajo noun is almost always a verb in passive form, so a second kinship system, kéi, is based on the active system described above ('-i' is simply a marker to indicate specific case). This system is indeed based on thingness (number of relation-bonds apart), but, significantly, it is used only with complete strangers, and is the subordinate, marked case of the process-oriented kinship system.

As thing is a marked case of process, so rest is a marked case of motion:

[T]he principal verb in the Navajo language is the verb "to go" and not the verb "to be," which is of relatively minor importance in Navajo. This seems to indicate a cosmos composed of processes and events, as opposed to a cosmos composed of facts and things. (49)

Even in classifying objects at rest, the primary determinant is motion: objects are categorized (for syntactical purposes) in terms of ability to move or be moved.

The Navajo conception of reality in terms of motion and process rather than 'thing' manifests itself in the air/earth dichotomy described earlier for the American English system. As the analysis in Chapter 2 predicts, 'air' is the element most real for the Navajo:

What is the source or power of movement? The answer to this question is air, for air is the only substance or entity in the Navajo world that has the inherent capacity to move and
to bear knowledge. Air is the ultimate source of all knowledge and animation. (532)

The inner forms of people, the forms for whom this world is but a 'stage for symbolic action', are the small wind souls (who cause the fetus to grow and control involuntary processes) and the instanding wind souls (who control thoughts, speech, and actions). Similarly, it is the wind which gives the mountains power, moves sound and light and moves the clouds which create water. Finally, air lets everything live; it is the one element which living (and hence more real) creatures need most desperately.

Mythically, as well, air holds the central place for the Navajos: First Man and First Woman are known as 'mist people' or 'air people'; wind is the main information-giver, the secret-sharer, the guide, the protecting spirit; breath is repeatedly associated with strength.

In language, kinship, metaphysics and myth, then, the combination of process, motion and symbol hold a privileged position over 'thing'. For the Navajo, reality is definitely NOT a thing.

* * *

Clearly, then, others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given other answers. All the world does not understand reality in terms of thinghood. Continuing duration, motion, and an experientialist approach to the universe all receive primary positions in other lands and other cultures. And as differently as those cultures construe reality, each places
Which leads us, by way of India and Arizona, the Polish shtetl and the desert mesa, back to America. Does anyone, or any group, construe reality in terms different from the dominant THING model? Where in American culture, if anywhere, does process play a paramount role? Who understands reality as motion or action? When is experientialism valued? To begin to answer those questions, I'll turn my attention back home, but this time to those who stand at least a little out of the mainstream: the countercultures and subcultures, the deviants, dissenters and dreamers.

Why these other cultures understand reality in a way (or ways) so drastically different from America's is a question that could take at least another hundred pages to answer. Yinger (personal communication) suggests the possibility that cultures which emphasize an anthropocentric universe "may be those given to 'thingness'," whereas those who see humanity as part of a complex interdependence are more prone towards a Galilean way of seeing. Marx, as Yinger pointed out, believed that class played a more important role than culture in determining epistemologies. I agree with both Yinger and Marx. Undoubtedly, an anthropocentric approach tends towards hierarchalism and fractiousness, towards a splintering of environmental holism. Marx's denigration of the bourgeoisie's skewed epistemology reveals Marx's own process-orientation, but also nicely points out the prevailing thingishness of the English and German bourgeoisies's epistemologies of the time. Each answer, though, Yinger's and Marx's, brings with it another 'why'. Why does anthropomorphism lead to a thing-epistemology? Why does the bourgeoisie emphasize the same? I don't pretend to be able to answer either now, but I will note that it seems that the closer a culture gets to the twentieth century West, the more likely it is to attach itself to the thing-epistemology. English seems to have made the switch around the fourteenth century, when 'thing' stopped meaning assembly, saying, legal process, etc., and started meaning a signified objects. Modern Hebrew, as I noted earlier, incorporated in its rebirth a meaning of 'davar' as thing that its precursor had never contained.
CHAPTER 4: THE REVOLUTIONARIES

Where to draw the line? Popping up here, there, and everywhere, that question holds the key to this chapter, and in many ways to the study as a whole. Where to draw the line, for instance, around American culture? The Navajo proved a storm cloud before, and the weather is turning wet again. Drawing a line—like a border around reality. As I cut and carve the flow of the world that is, as I pluck bits from the stream, arbitrary as a child's net, do I wear the hat of bounder or creator? Am I the cultural cop, putting away the deviants? Or am I the waste disposal engineer, quietly cleaning up the bits and pieces that don't quite fit into my definition of 'clean'? Or, finally, am I the sculptor, the creator, defining America as only my mind's eye can, in the only way I can?

In a curious way, I stand in relation to American culture as America stands in relation to reality. America defines its reality; I define my America. As the introduction stated, every definition, every cut-carve, encompasses both bounding and creating. Aware of it or not, no artist is not also an enforcer, no enforcer not also an artist.

But can I admit all this and remain a scientist, even an interpretive one? I counter with the all-too-obvious: how can I not admit this and remain a scientist? That I present, in these mere seventy pages, anything more than a brief sampling of what America is, anything more than a brief sampling of American epistemology, anything more than a brief sampling, even, of American epistemology as I see it and as it bears on issues of reification and process, is ludicrous. I have cut and carved, I
know it, and I drag it out for you to see.

Is this portrait selective, then? Am I missing, or omitting, important parts of America? To answer, I pose another question: Is America missing, or omitting, important parts of reality? If Gehlen, Plessner, Geertz, Berger, Bateson and the rest of the gang (see introduction) are right, no. There is no fountain of truth, no Reality sitting somewhere beyond our conceptual reach, laughing at our ineptitude, no all-encompassing Union of Local Truths that gleams brighter than the sum of local flames.

To assume that I omit or miss, we must assume an American culture somewhere "out there", an objective, existing, almost tangible thing (that word!) waiting to be discovered. A Newtonian Sleeping Beauty dreaming of that ultimate, unbiased, perfect frame-of-reference observer to chart her beauties.

But we live in Einstein's time. There are no more privileged observers, no stationary points of reference. America moves relative to me and you, I move relative to you and America, you move relative to America and me, and my explanation of America's spacetime is America as I see it. And there is no more honest portrait than the one I see. We are all living on accelerated frames, to continue the analogy, and there is no braking, no way to stop for a moment, rest on the wings of the ether and see the world the way it really is.

Every analysis is itself an interaction, a mingling of me and America, a creation of me-America. I cannot find it without helping to define it, without being a partner in its creation. The interaction, reified, I call culture. I am like the particle
physicist, defining particles that she knows do not exist outside of her experiments, the particles that collapse from their pseudo-existence of wave-particle to join her in a transient creation, the particles that she uses to build and explain the self-conscious world of physicist-reality. Until I lift the lid on Schrödinger's box, the cat is alive, dead, and dreaming all at once. Only when I measure, when I record, when I analyze, is the cat's fate sealed. The cat and I, together, create reality. There is no reality without me, or at least no reality as we understand it.

* * *

To open the lid, then. To draw the line. Where does American culture begin and end? Should I include pictures of reality that oppose my dominant thing-model, yet flourish within America's borders?

Yes. To exclude obvious epistemological challenges to my dominant model would be to draw a line too harsh for my aesthetic tastes, to paint a picture not stirring enough, one unlikely to provoke the visceral tug of pleasure that great art does.

Deviants then. Challenges. If I'm right in Chapter 2, if the thing-model structures Americans's thoughts about reality, then how can other models challenge? How can a structured mind admit dissent?

The answer is that culture (American, to keep in context) does not so rigidly prevent alternatives as my first two chapters suggest. For my analysis to posit a monolithic, monarchical culture I would need to hearken back to a discredited
functionalism, at least. And to deny dissent (in addition to being too harsh a line to draw around the culture for my tastes) would be to deny change. On an epistemological island where the natives all think alike, who brings changes?\(^1\)

It is far simpler and more coherent to say that American culture is not monolithic, that it permits (tolerates? stomachs?) dissent. Some anthropologists, among them Mumford and Schneider (1968:107 et passim), have insisted that ambiguity and opposition are themselves the key determinants of a culture. A culture can't operate without opposition (Yinger [1982], AFC Wallace [1962], Slater [1971]) and that very opposition provides an anthropologist with the clues he needs to begin to understand the culture (Yinger, Turner, Schneider).

But how do I explain these contradictions, other than to invoke the names of some ancestral figures and rest with a contented nodding of my head? The easiest way, no doubt, is to say, quite solemnly, that the exception proves the rule. But Geertz (1975), among others, might object to this common-sense-as-science approach. Alternatively, I could pull out the all-purpose build-a-wall-between-us-and-them functionalist argument of "reaffirming collective identity." But more than Geertz et al would holler this time, pointing out rightly that members change groups and ideas flow across the wall.\(^2\)

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\(^1\)Imperialist boats, of course, the political economy wing of our field would answer (see Ortner 1984). But when the natives are American imperialists, the boat has sprung a leak. Who’s "hegemon-izing" us?

\(^2\)I don’t mean to say that this doesn’t operate symbolically at all, just that it’s by no means a sufficient explanation.
So, giving up on common sense and the good old conflict model, I need to probe deeper—for analogies from other fields (Bateson's idea 1972), then even deeper, towards the bedrock of explanations.

J. Milton Yinger, in his analysis of deviance and opposition, Countercultures, argues that countercultures are in some ways analogous to biological mutations (1982:285 et passim). A species's state remains unchanged over long periods of time, but the existence of recessive genes in the gene pool makes possible adaptation to environmental change. Or, more ecologically speaking\(^3\), both the species and the environment outside of the species contain matched propensities for change: the entire context is internally bound together.

Culture and counterculture live together in a manner similar to species and mutation. The mutation, or counterculture, provides a reservoir of alternatives to draw from in times of major ecological crisis (or 'change', to be less value-laden). And once again, the cybernetic approach—Yinger cites Gerlach and Hine (1973:260):

> [I]f you're not part of a mutation, you are part of the environment which selects for or against it. No one can escape an evolutionary role. (cited in Yinger 1982:288)

Which is simply to put a new twist on an old saying: If you're not a part of the solution, you're a part of the problem.

Philip Slater provides a similar explanation of what he calls the "alternatives" to the dominant culture:

\(^3\)Bateson's term; Yinger prefers "field" or "cybernetically".
These latent alternatives usually persist in some encapsulated and imprisoned form ("break glass in case of fire"), such as myths, festivals, or specialized roles. Fanatics continually try to expunge these circumscribed contradictions, but when they succeed it is often fatal to the society. For, as Lewis Mumford once pointed out, it is the "laxity, corruption, and disorder" in a system that makes it viable, considering the contradictory needs that all social systems must satisfy. Such latent alternatives are priceless treasures and must be carefully guarded against loss. For a new cultural pattern does not emerge out of nothing--the seed must already be there. (Slater 1971:110-11, cited in Yinger 1982:286)

Where Yinger focuses primarily on ideas and social groups that are at least somewhat conscious of their opposition to the dominant culture, Slater emphasizes the ritual aspects of the culture (myths, festivals, social roles) that contradict the pattern of which they are a part. 4

As we're about to see, this distinction between institutional and ritual (Yinger and Slater) echoes Victor Turner's distinction between the temporary communitas of ritual liminality and the more lasting (although less complete) communitas of institutionalized liminality. Turner (1969) paints a picture of the ritual process where the movement towards communitas (the state of Buber's [1970] "Ich-du"), entails a passing of the ritual participants over the cracks in the cultural sidewalk, the interstices of the social structure, the period of liminality. Turner delves into a number of cross-

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4 Yinger does include Slater in his chapter on social change, and expands on ritual contradictions in his chapter on symbolic countercultures. Although the latter chapter sets out a detailed explanation of the "how's" of internal ritual counter-epistemologies, the "why's" are subsumed under the general "why's" of Yinger's understanding of social change as a sort of non-Marxist cultural dialectics.
cultural liminal states and emerges with this (Levi-Straussian) series of "binary oppositions or discriminations" (1969:106), liminality represented on the left (coincidence?), status system and structure on the right:

Transition/state
Totality/partiality
Homogeneity/heterogeneity
Communitas/structure
Equality/inequality
Anonymity/systems of nomenclature
Absence of property/property
Absence of status/status
Nakedness or uniform clothing/distinctions of clothing
Sexual continence [or community]/[standard]sexuality
Minimization of sex distinctions/maximizations of sex distinctions
Absence of rank/distinctions of rank
Humility/just pride of position
Disregard for personal appearance/care for personal appearance
No distinctions of wealth/distinctions of wealth
Unselfishness/selfishness
Total obedience/obedience only to superior rank
Sacredness/secularity
Sacred instruction/technical knowledge
Silence/speech
Suspension of kinship rights and obligations/kinship rights and obligations
Continuous reference to mystical powers/intermittent reference to mystical powers
Foolishness/sagacity
Simplicity/complexity [in speech and manners]
Acceptance of pain and suffering/avoidance of pain and suffering
Heteronomy/degrees of autonomy (Turner 1969:106-07)

To Turner's list I add those other polarities that he mentions later in the text:

now/past-present-future
speculative/pragmatic
generative of imagery, philosophical/this-worldly
characterized by structurally inferior categories and groups/preoccupied with status
existential/cognitive
artistic and religious/legal and political

The reader will no doubt have noticed the similarity between some of Turner's ritual properties and my own distinction between
Significantly, many of these attributes are significantly epistemological rather than social structural per se.

As society increasingly diversifies, Turner sees the tendency for the ritual stage of liminality and its sidekick communitas to become institutionalized into the form of subjugated autochtones, individual societal roles (e.g., court jester), outsiders/strangers, millenarian movements, or structurally small nations (1969:108). Liminality, that is, in its modern setting becomes marginality or structural inferiority. But less is sometimes more. Structural inferiority or marginality almost always finds itself coupled with a moral and ritual superiority. Secular weakness conceals sacred power, and vice-versa.6

In all cases of secular weakness/sacred power, the group continues to promote countercultural values. Structure-savers, faced with the closet anarchy of sustained communitas, recognize its power. They may construct a series of taboos with which to handle the de-constructers (M. Douglas 1966, cited in Turner). The liminals may become polluting to the status-conscious; the structure-bound may see the structure-less as engulfed in a cyclone of magic and witchcraft. They are dangerous, the bound thing-epistemology and process-epistemology. More to come.

6Edward Said's name springs to mind here, but at this point I won't suggest anything more than the possibility that his much-discussed "orientalism" thesis ties into some very powerful theoretical issues, that other-ness may be one manifestation of the superior's ascription of liminality in an increasingly global social structure. Political economists may find a boat after all. Polemic may be the harbinger of a more grounded theory.
sometimes say, to us, to our children, and to society.

Of course the wall is not impassable, as the (pre-industrial) ritual process itself shows. Liminality is one stage of the process, the passing through from tired structure to renewed. The home of communitas, liminality serves as the structure-bound's retreat, a time to heal the wounds of status fights and soothe the aching limbs of structure in the calm waters of the uninhibited I-you. Turner, that is, assigns a separate epistemology to each side of his structurally split world: liminality brings with it communitas and the I-you; structure brings with it what I call the 'thing-epistemology', a close neighbor of Buber's I-it.

In Turner's view, modern society preserves the balance of traditional ritual. As the whole of traditional society has fractured, groups of marginals have picked up the piece of traditionalism, and like hermit crabs, made the liminal stage their home.

[W]ith the increasing specialization of society and culture, with progressive complexity in the social division of labor, what was in tribal society a set of transitional qualities "betwixt and between" defined states of culture and society has become itself an institutionalized state. (Turner 1969:107)

And as once the fixed path led from structure to limen and back, now a free-floating pendulum swings from the extreme of over-structure and its epistemology to the extreme of communal anarchy and its epistemology, centered always on the historic middle ground of tribal balance:

Exaggeration of structure may well lead to pathological manifestations of communitas outside or against "the law." Exaggeration of communitas, in certain religious or political movements of the leading type, may be speedily
followed by despotism, overbeaurocratization, or other modes of structural rigidification. (1969:129)

Society, Turner says, balances precariously between structure and communitas, between fascism and anarchy, a cultural judge mediating between the powerful husband and the powerless wife.

Turner leaves a portrait of a fluctuating but ultimately stable system. Although he emphasizes the dialectic of structure (with its accompanying epistemology) and liminality (with its epistemology), the dependence of each on the other, Turner sees structure as predominant, communitas as structure's refresher:

In the religion of preindustrial societies, [communitas] is regarded rather as a means to the end of becoming more fully involved in the rich manifold of structural role-playing. In this there is perhaps a greater wisdom...There is a mystery of mutual distance, what the poet Rilke called "the circumspection of human gesture," which is just as humanly important as the mystery of intimacy. (1969:139)

Turner's dominant-submissive ordering of structure and communitas leads him to brush off (dismiss? derogate?) Buber's admiration for communitas-based kibbutzim and kvutzot as well as the works of Rousseau, Marx, Louis Henry Morgan (1877) and Edmund Leach, calling them Edenic fantasies. Structure remains predominant, as it must for society to function in Turner's world. 7

I do not question the necessary predominance of structure in

7If Turner had come from another culture, a different weighting might have resulted. The communitas-as-refresher notion, for instance, may have come from the Christian Sunday-day of rest symbol. Traditional Jewish culture reverses that ranking, saying structure—the six week days—exists for the sake of communitas—the Sabbath (see Heschel 1951). Secondly, Turner was brought up "in the orthodox social-structuralist tradition of British anthropology" (Turner 1969:131), which may have influenced him towards emphasizing the dominance and wisdom of structure. Finally, the traditional English emphasis on interpersonal distance (contrary to America) may have played a role in his invocation of "the mystery of mutual distance."
the social world. As Margaret Mead once said, 'Who takes out the
garbage in utopia?' All collectives eventually develop some
structure, as the kibbutzim show. And even a culture fixed in the
flames of a process-epistemology exists in a social structural
world, as the Hopi clans and kivas show. I do take issue,
though, with Turner's quick attachment between epistemology and
social structural position. Although his model of steady-state
seems fair and well-documented for questions of social structure,
assigning epistemologies to the same model represents an overbold
step. He assumes that thing-epistemology always accompanies
structure and that process-epistemology always accompanies
liminality/marginality. Communitas is only for interludes and
inferiors.

His steady state seems an unchangeable field, a marriage
with dominant husband and submissive wife in constant argument.
The wife may sometimes get the upper hand, but over time the
basic power relationship stays constant, and divorce is
impossible.

But we live in an age of liberation. I don't mean to imply
that communitas (the wife) needs to overtake or separate itself
from the structure epistemology, just that it is possible. In
contrast, Turner's steady state seems a demarcated field over
which a game may range, but within whose borders it must be
played.

How then, on this demarcated field, should we deal with the
ethnographic evidence of the last chapter? Is Hopi culture,
intimate as it is with a process-epistemology, merely an extreme
swing of a dependable pendulum? Are Chasidism and the holistic I-thou that Buber derived from it a momentary lapse of structure? Are Navajo and Yap (among others), with their emphasis on affective action and not static substance, simply peregrinations of the steady state, brief jaunts away from its time-tested and constant home?

I could answer yes to all of the above. But why? Why assume that culture after culture, historical period after historical period, manifests only a temporary deviation from the epistemological norm, an expected occasional over-correction from a too-ordered precursor?

The theoretical structure has become too harsh, too rigid. To reinject Yinger (1982) into the equation seems an appropriate mellowing step. Process-epistemology (the emphasis on action over substance, relating over relata, etc.), a way of seeing similar to Turner's 'communitas', seems to me better represented in American culture as a recessive gene than one element of a pendulum swing. It is the countercultural challenger, certainly, jabbing at the dominant epistemology and waiting for its underdog chance. But we don't need to think of it as permanently challenging. A mutation can change the organism (for better or for worse) and the ecological balance can permanently shift. When Eohippus became the horse, turf became grass, and although a return to the Eohippus-turf world is biologically possible, it isn't automatic. The challenger can win.

That point bears remembering, for comparative, theoretical, and political reasons. The form of a cultural epistemology (American, to stay in context again) is not permanent, not even
if that permanency is conceived of in terms of a flux.\textsuperscript{8} The possibility of 'culturogenic' change, carried in Slater's "encapsulated" rituals and Yinger's countercultures, exists. Either one of the two seemingly prevalent epistemological genes--Turner's 'structure'-associated epistemology and 'communitas'-associated epistemology (or a gene left unstudied here) can become a determining factor in ecological change.

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\textsuperscript{8}Although the social structure, of course, may indeed be in such a steady-state flux.
Turner's "structure" roughly parallels my notion of the dominant American thing-epistemology. The preoccupation with state, differentiation, nomenclature and money that characterizes structure brings to mind thingness. Nomenclature, for instance, rests firmly on bounding, on cutting and carving, on somewhat arbitrarily differentiating created 'elements' from the flow; in other words, it rests firmly on the action that characterizes, sui generis, the thing-epistemology. Similarly, thing-epistemology expects structure's predilection for money and status: 'real' as a noun meant, among other things, a coin and a king from the fourteenth century to the nineteenth (OED:200). The "partiality/totality" dichotomy brings to mind the distinction between the Hopi's cyclic (whole) time notions and our own linear aggregate (splintered) notions. That distinction returns in Turner's observation of the tendency for liminality to be existentially rooted in the now and structure to discriminate among past, present, and future (1969:113). As Chapter 3 noted, the Hopi make no use of the concept of a past or future. Maybe most strikingly, Turner emphasizes "the close connection that exists between structure and property" (1969:129). And what word survives as the most obvious marker of the reality-as-thing cultural construction? "Real estate", the very word for property, solid land--the opposite of flow and fairies.

Turner's "structure", then, correlates closely with my "thing-epistemology." And although I do not accept his dialectic steady-state, I certainly embrace his "liminal/communitas" category as one challenger to the dominant epistemology. In sifting through the deviants, dissenters, and dreamers, then, it
will be more than useful to keep Turner's categories in mind as a sort of geiger counter of cultural opposition and alternatives.

And sifting through the dissenters is what I'm just about to do. Having decided to draw my cultural line generously around them, and having found a way to incorporate them into the cultural painting without undue clashing (and hopefully with added subtlety), I now begin the actual execution.

Deciding which dissenters to include isn't easy. In a culture as humanly large as ours, dissent pops out from every foxhole. I am, for instance, a dissenter, a cultural actor conscious of epistemologies and holding the desire to change (subvert?) the dominant model. But I do not dissent, as an individual, *ex nihilo*; I draw my ideas from cultural models (radical academic and theatrical, in my case), communal paradigms from which I construct my own montage. An analysis of individuals, no matter how broad, would tend towards a philosophical or psychological study. What I want to observe, from an anthropological angle, are the group formulations, the communal symbolic models from which individuals build their philosophies and psychologies.

It's said that you can find everything in America (another argument for the wide-line model of drawing the local epistemology), so even narrowing dissent down to *group* epistemological dissent leaves a broad field. I have chosen the following four counter-epistemologies, then, for their varying relationships to the dominant society and epistemology.

*Theater* represents the closest example of Slater's
"encapsulated" ritual, an institution/recurring festival rarely considered even to cohere, let alone to contain or promote an independent epistemology. The world of physics, by contrast, represents a part of society that exists primarily to determine meaning, an institution into which we have poured the authority for discovering the way the world really is. At the other end of the authority structure stands feminism, a self-conscious attempt by structural marginals/inferiors to reformulate or expand the dominant epistemology. Finally, the 'drug culture', represented here primarily by Timothy Leary, shows a group of non-liminals, individuals once favored (value?) by the social structure, who chose to disenfranchise themselves and radically attack the dominant society.

THEATER

My descriptions of theater's counter-epistemology, its role as a recessive gene/liminal state/countercultural challenger, will derive mainly from my own experiences. Recounted here, these experiences will constitute the most directly ethnographic record in the thesis. I have acted, in everything from professional Shakespearean repertories to church-basement community summer companies, with everyone from accomplished Broadway actors to high school students, for six years. So although I may occasionally summon up the names of tribal elders--Stanislavski, Beck, Schechner--I will for the most part rely on my own memories, on the picture that has developed in my brain of the unphotographable experiences of the years since 1981. Many
of my ideas grow (more like a vine than a tree) from a paper entitled "The Religious Elements of Theater: From Autoanthropology to Nomothetics" that I wrote for Milt Yinger's seminar in the sociology of religion. ⁹

Before delineating theater's epistemology, I need to show the group nature of the enterprise. An American, even an American academic, expects to see epistemologies (although she might not use that word) promulgated by institutions like religion or deviant groups like the hippies. She expects a coherent epistemology from theater the way she expects it from the auto workers union: not at all. Contrary to politicians, priests and physicists, actors and auto workers are not supposed to be enmeshed in a specific way of seeing the world.

One primary reason they're not is that they're not thought of in terms of a group. Communists, Calvinists, and Creationists, yes; actors no. But as I have outlined elsewhere (1986b), theater clearly holds together as a group. Subgroups like Beck and Malina's Living Theater serve as extreme examples of theatrical unity: members paired sexually (rejecting marriage), raised children, and conducted economic and political affairs in an entirely communal manner. A code of ethics on the wall of a rehearsal studio at my own Oberlin College insists that

⁹The term 'autoanthropology' refers to anthropology done in the home culture, the use of anthropological method to better understand ourselves (whoever 'ourselves' may be in each particular case). Schneider (1968) and Ortiz, among others, introduced the practice in the 60's. Its importance was brought home for me by a class that Vern Carroll taught in anthropological theory.
no actor ever negatively represent the theatrical enterprise to those outside of it. At the New Jersey Shakespeare Festival, where I once spent four months, director Paul Barry set dietary laws, dress codes and language restrictions (the forbiddance of commercial references and advertisements, for example) and held regular social events to promote esprit-de-corps.

It could be argued, of course, that such examples show allegiance primarily to the subgroup and only secondarily (if at all) to the group as a whole. My experience in the New York area belies this claim:

Certain microrituals (to contrast them with the macrorituals that theater performs qua religion in the wider society) serve to promote group solidarity even among the unemployed. The audition circuit, for one, gives actors an almost daily chance to see the same people and reaffirm their commitment to the enterprise; certain occupations, such as waitering (especially for catering companies) and word processing are actor-heavy, and certain firms hire solely or primarily actors, mainly through advertisements in the theater trade magazine, Backstage; the Off-Off Broadway complex, a series of unpaid showcases serves as a stepping stone for many unemployed actors; finally, superstitions (such as not saying 'Macbeth' aloud, not wearing green) and language (theater lingo) further strengthen group solidarity. (1986b:10-11)

But the most potent of unifiers and the clearest example of theater's group nature remains the actual poiesis of the macrorituals themselves--rehearsals and performances. Describing his experiences with the postmodern theater of Richard Schechner and others, Victor Turner relates:

It involves innumerable workshop sessions, some lasting for hours, others all night, in which breathing exercises, voice workshops, ingenious games, psycho-dramas, dancing, aspects of yoga...represent components. All these disciplines and ordeals are aimed at generating communitas or something like it in the group. (1982:119)

Turner's experience doesn't stand alone. In Between Theater and
Anthropology, Schechner identifies six essential "points of contact" between

the theatrical method and significant anthropological observations concerning ritual: Transformation of Being and/or Consciousness; Intensity of Performance; Audience-Performer Interactions; The Whole Performance Sequence; Transmission of Performance Knowledge; How Performances are Generated and Evaluated. (Freiman 1986c:3, based on Schechner 1985:6)

Following Turner and Schechner, then, theater stands clearly as a group, and one tending towards liminality and communitas. But before matching up the theater and Turner's (unexplained) Gestalt of liminal characteristics, I want to demonstrate theater's fundamental process-orientation.

Postmodern American theater divides process from product, the growing from the plant. Process represents the flow of the rehearsal period (itself almost always referred to as the rehearsal process)—the developing, the flowing, the creating; product represents that flow frozen over—developed characters, creation complete. And most importantly, process is emphasized. Characters can only become 'real' (and that is the word used), actors and directors insist, if the actor immerses himself in the flow of process. Any attempt to fashion a character, to focus on the end product, the final form, ultimately reduces to presentational, false theater, Stanislavski's "exaggerated false acting."

Improvisation, a hallmark of American theater from Vaudeville to Second City, also strongly reinforces the process-epistemology. Without words, without routines, without plot, in other words without any reified tools, actors must react, immerse themselves in the doing of acting. No possibility for end
product focus, no way to thingify the flow, exists. As a major activity of the American rehearsal process as well as an actual performance (from 'parfournir, OF "to complete", indicating a still-going-on-process) component or style, improvisation ranks process as the dominant way of seeing.

Perhaps most importantly, the very method of creating a character rests fundamentally on an active notion of process, both in postmodern theater and in American theater in general. One of the central steps that an actor uses in creating a character (in addition to improvisation) is the analysis of the script for a set of character objectives. Logically extended, this theory holds that each individual is driven by a set of intentions. The actor formulates these expressions in the form of active desires.

Trofimov in *The Cherry Orchard*, for instance, might phrase his objective in the famous "All Russia is our orchard" scene as "I want to impress Anya." The actor playing Trofimov would then strive in the course of the scene to re-act to Anya in terms of this intention. Never would he try to play "being sad" or "being intelligent" or being anything stative. The essence of good acting, or creating a 'real' character, is to do, not to be, to react, not to act. An actor who tries to play states, nouns, or adjectives like 'in control' or 'intellectual' or 'happy' dooms himself to "exaggerated false acting"; an actor who cleaves to verbs, who plays the scene trying to impress Anya, his focus on her, will succeed.

This approach emphasizes the relating, the fragile current
of connection between the actors on stage. This, it is believed, more honestly represents the actual people who live their lives in dynamic flux with others and their environment and not as static isolates, with reducable, listable characteristics.

The way that actors and directors use 'real' and 'false' shows how deeply imbedded process-epistemology is in theater. An actor who devotes herself totally to pursuing her objectives during a scene, rigidly fixing her attention on the flux, the process, is considered to have created a 'real' character. An actor who, to the contrary, focuses on attributes and emotions, who makes sure to show her anger and her irk, no matter how stirring and powerful is still considered to have engaged in 'false' acting.

A process-epistemology focused on action should, like the Navajo, reverse the degree-of-reality ranking of the earth-air dichotomy. Theater continues this pattern. Certain 'types' of actors are labelled "sprites" and "nymphs". "The muse" often substitutes for "theatrical inspiration." Certainly none of these terms refer to tangible, earthbound creatures. And ritually, actors cannot rest shoes on the dressing/make-up tables. A sociobiologist or fundamental functionalist might yell "cleanliness control," but as an interpretivist I see a prohibition that insures the representative of the base earth, shoes, staying away from the launching pad of the art's reality.

Many outside of theater don't consider theater real at all, but think of it as a temporary vacation from reality, a brief dream-flight away from the gravity-tiring ground. That may explain some of the thing-ers air-name calling (see below). It
also poses a problem for ascribing epistemology. Can something not itself real have a distinctive way of seeing the real?

To answer that question, it's important to return to the native's point of view (Geertz 1983:55-73). As I've argued elsewhere (1986a) from a philosophical perspective, stage characters are just as real as non-stage ones. Which is just to stand Hamlet on his head: all the world's a stage and we are merely players, backwards. But whether I'm right or not isn't important here; the significance rests with the fact that native theorists (myself among them) have expounded the belief that theater is real. And even those who do not hold such radical ontological beliefs (after all, a culture doesn't always agree with its native philosophers) do believe in the reality of the rehearsal process--its ability to reveal personal truths, to create genuine communitas. The outsiders argument, then, that theater isn't real, breaks down from the inside.¹⁰ Modern American theater believes that it is real, and has located that reality in the world of process.

Before I move into the terrain of physics, I want to show the fit between American theater's process-epistemology and Turner's list of liminal attributes. "Fairy," for example, an ungrounded creature, is a derogatory term applied to a certain perceived category of gay men, those often considered effeminate and "theatrical." That would be expected by process's general

¹⁰Even if theater is conceived of as play (note the homonym), the unreal-ascription still holds: play is 'make-believe', i.e., not real to most Americans.
reversal of the earth-air dichotomy. But it also ties in closely to Turner's model. "Theater," your average citizen will inform you, "has a lot more homosexuals than most professions." That may be true of not (more men may simply be open about it): if it is not, then the assumption may be a distance device (taboo?) to prevent contact (M. Douglas 1966); if it is true it could relate to the association of liminals with structural inferiors and marginals (here women) or with Turner's "minimization of sex differences." That in turn may connect with the liminals's tendency to avoid patterns of structurally 'normal' sexual relations. Very few actors, to continue the correlation, get or stay married. Which may in its turn go back to the public's general perception of actors as more orgy-prone than, say, accountants. The causality isn't at all clear, but the correlation is: actor/liminal as gay/female/unmarried/orgy-prone; regular American as straight/male/married/orgy-less.

Unmarried people, especially those engaged in (or perceived to be engaged in) orgies tend to be more ensemble-oriented. Actually, the ensemble is one of the clear markers of modern American theater. Several of Turner's elements of the liminal Gestalt click into place under the ensemble-matrix: "equality" and "absence of status"--all roles are of equal significance; "homogeneity"--any actor can play any part in many ensemble shows; "communitas"; and "anonymity"--an actor 'gets into character' and leaves the old idiosyncratic self behind.  

11Of course, actors aren't actors all the time. Although I am delineating this analysis to the times when they are actors, a
Leaving the old self behind leads into a second clustering of liminal attributes: what I call the no-self matrix. "Unselfishness," the first of the group, manifests itself in theater through both the ensemble dedication to "the process" over and above any individual ego and the well-worn saw that "the show must go on." Shows going on means people sometimes don't. At least that was the message forcefully presented to me at the New Jersey Shakespeare Festival when the director retold a tale of a past season when a blood-gushing wounded soldier bound his cut, stepped back into the fray and finished the swordfight and the show before being rushed to the hospital and sewn up. "Acceptance of pain and suffering" clearly belongs to the no-self complex. Similarly theater not only tolerates but encourages "foolishness," a necessary attribute of creativity, particularly during improvisations. The final link, "total obedience," represents one of the more interesting (and politically important) elements of the anti-structure complex. The director, like some Ndembu puberty group supervisor, decides: when the actor has bled enough, if the show will go on, how foolish to be, etc.

Absolute power, in turn, relates to "sacredness." Although a recounting of evidence about the insiders's beliefs on the sacredness of the theater is too lengthy for this format, I've parenthetical point may be in order. Actors, far more than say accountants, tend to define themselves by profession. The creation and presentation of self for an actor often rests on the acting.
documented it elsewhere (1986b). For a taste of it, though, I quote the following from Julian Beck's *The Life of the Theater* (1972#30):

...the theatre principally is the dancing place of the people
and therefore the dancing place of the gods who dance
in ecstasy only amid the people
And therefore we aim this theatre at God
and the people
who are the destination of the most holy
holy holy revolution.

With sacredness comes "sacred instruction." Barry stands as a prominent example. He insisted that theater is religion, a statement that I accepted until I realized he meant it literally. In a letter he later sent me, Barry asserted that God sent different prophets to different people at different times and implied that he and his theater carry God's message to New Jersey today. That message, and with it the sacred instruction on how to pass it along, are hedged about by the ritual circumscriptions that I noted earlier. And with both Beck and Barry's assertions of theatrical sacredness and their methods of sacred instruction (recall the Oberlin theater's code of ethics prohibiting revealing anything negative about the art) comes Turner's "continual reference to mystical powers." I mentioned the muse earlier, the avoidance of the mention of Macbeth, and I cite once more Schechner's (1985) points of contact between ritual and theater, many of which are suffused throughout with continual reference to the divine.

Present-tenseness and simplicity represent the final two striking correlations between Turner's liminal list and the theater. "Living in the moment" stands as one of the most
important of the actor's dicta, a central organizing direction for emphasizing the need to concentrate on the relating mentioned above. The opposite of living in the moment, thinking of a part of the scene to come, the lines about to be said, the way the last five minutes went, etc., is the path straight to false acting, theater's greatest taboo. Similarly, simplicity is mandated. While constructing the objectives (see above) an actor strives to use simple (generally one or two syllable) verbs that relate directly to the other actor(s) on stage or to the environment. Any attempt to over-intellectualize the character's motivations, including to attempt to fix those motivations in memories or aspirations (past or future), is also believed to lead to false acting. Which doesn't mean an actor doesn't take character history into account while discovering the motivations, just that once the simple one-line one-verb one-object motivations are discovered every effort is made to play them "in the moment." A fact that once again hearkens back to Hopi, to the no-tense world of process, to the anti-thing camp. And in this battalion (although not in the Hopi's one) to anti-structure and institutionalized liminality.

* * *
If theater represents institutionalized liminality, the ritual stage encased in modernity's lamination and left on the mantle, then modern American physics is the laminating machine running down, modernity entering the postmodern world.

In the centuries since the advent of modernity, Western culture has poured more and more of its epistemological duties into the mouth of science. It has been argued that Newton paved the way for a godless era, that the ramifications of the integrated mechanics led to the Great Machine and its at-least Deist conclusions. Whether we can accept such a profound causality is questionable. But in the hundreds of years since Newton, physics has substantially increased its prestige-ranking in the philosophical world. Scores of books and articles, for instance, have been written on the effects of quantum theory and relativity to the worlds of philosophy, psychology, information theory, and even literary theory (see Meyerson, Capek, Stapp). Harold Puthoff and Russell Targ of the Stanford Research Institute have even attempted to apply quantum theories to such occult fields as telepathy and remote viewing.

As physics has come to be regarded as one of the epistemological inquirers par excellence, it has also internally solidified. Regardless of the flow to and from the outside culture, physics has through the years fashioned an increasingly self-consistent symbolic world. Although it might be going too far to assert that physics now represents a culture separate from its host, its autonomy is marked.
Several occurrences on the modern scene make this clear. For one, much of modern science occurs in an international setting, across nations and continents, cultures and culture groups. Although national styles of focus and emphasis may differ drastically (see Vucinich), an integrated whole clearly exists. Academia has not been ignorant of this trend. Although mainstream sociology and anthropology have for the most part regrettably neglected the study of science, separate departments in the history, sociology and philosophy of science have sprung up at a number of universities. The University of Pennsylvania, a leader in the field, now publishes a regular journal devoted to the history and sociology of science, *Isis*.

All of which is not surprising. Although Kuhn did not use the word, he clearly analyzed the manner in which distinct subcultures can and do appear through science. As a paradigm develops in a field, the scientists become less likely to write for a general public and more likely to write in a way that will only be understood within their group. The symbol system expands, but only extends to those within the narrow confines of the paradigm.

But although this 'culturality' may not be surprising, it could be troubling. Not troubling because of its distance from the host culture; as I have noted above discourse continues to flow strongly, particularly in the epistemological arena. But if modern physics represents something of an internal international subculture, then how can I analyze its epistemological relationship vis-a-vis America?

The notion of national styles that I mentioned above
provides the beginning of an answer. Modern physics as a
discipline and a quasi-separate cultural world may be available
to everyone from a Vietnamese fisherman to a Tallensi farmer, but
significantly, very few of them ever do choose to take it up.
Outside of a small group of 'western' nations composed of the
United States, Britain, West Germany, France and a few others,
physicists are few and far between. Furthermore, those few
Tallensi or Vietnamese who do choose to become physicists almost
always attend schools located in that small group of western
countries, beginning the process of acculturation both inside and
outside the physics labs.

But to say that modern physics resides in the western world
is not to prove its distinctive Americanness as regards
epistemology. That is a proof I cannot give. As a somewhat
detached subculture developed in the international cauldron of a
few western nations, physics remains more autonomous than most of
the subcultures with which the dominant American culture
interacts.

As I remarked in an earlier footnote, the distinction
between American epistemology and some broader culture group
(whether it be the generic 'western culture', MacCannell's
'modern culture', Whorf's 'SAE', or the linguists's 'Indo-
European') is itself a difficult distinction to make. Obviously,
many similarities exist between America and Britain, America and
Germany, even America and France, and those similarities may
include elements of a shared epistemology. Nevertheless, as I am
confined by limitations of knowledge, resources, time and space,
I have chosen to focus on the culture which for me is most accessible, the one I know best. For that reason my units of analysis derive mainly from America, although an occasional citation from the Oxford English Dictionary may muddle the picture.

If that problem holds for American epistemology in general, it particularly holds for the world of physics. Which is not to say that I've given up on detailing a specifically American subculture of physics when it comes to the interaction between the dominant thing—epistemology and quantum physics. In the last thirty years quantum physics, and particularly the philosophical elucidations of quantum physics by physicists, has come to be more of a strongly American enterprise. This may be explained by institutional structure, resources, and so on, but even if that is true the connection between culture and institutional strength represents an important subfield of the sociology of science that cannot so easily be dismissed.

Furthermore, those quantum physicists who have recently come from outside the United States often come from two of the nations most closely related, etymologically and politically, with us: Great Britain and West Germany. The epistemological link between these three countries may be more than incidental: as once the German language helped give birth to English by crossing the Channel, so German scientists of the twentieth century (many of whom eventually came to live in this country) helped give birth to quantum physics by crossing the Atlantic.

In the pages that are to follow, I'll focus mainly on the American children of those 'western' (or 'modern' or 'SAE' or
whatever) parents, the scientists of the Lawrence Berkeley Lab, Georgia Tech, the Institute for Advanced Study, and other centers of the particularly American modern physics. And it is those very physicists, the Americans, whose contributions represent some of the most exciting (in American terms) epistemological work of this century inside or out of physics.

* * *

The geography of quantum physics's epistemology is dotted with concepts seemingly foreign in the realm of science—mysterious cities of nothingness, plains of process, valleys of holism and forests of experientialism—landmarks that would seem more fitting on an LSD trip or in the philosophical world of a Mahayana Buddhist.

It seems as if I've already left that land, already abandoned the insider's point of view. Just by breaking up quantum physics's epistemology into pieces like 'nothingness' and 'process', I've negated the very holism around which much of quantum physics hovers, the idea that no thing exists independently, that all of the universe patterns, that it is one.

But in another way I've found the land, adopted the native's practices as my own, for although physicists may yearn to finally prove that unbroken unity, they speak along the way of mesons and positrons, the weak force and the sixth dimension. Those very unreal (their term) constructs, the things which do not in any way truly exist, themselves provide the path to holism. In much the same way, I hope my unfair constructs, the buckets into which
I've sorted my knowledge, provide the path to quantum physics's unsortable epistemology.

* * *

"Commonsense contradictions are at the heart of the new physics," says Gary Zukav, author of a recent novice's guide to the field. That's not surprising. In fact, it means we're on the right track towards a counter-epistemology. Common sense, as Geertz has shown, provides the last-ditch defense of cultural values, the system into which the very basics are poured (see also Yinger 1982). To counter common sense, then, as modern physics does, counters culture. The mutation is in the pool.

If any one feature of this new mutation stands out among the rest, if any seems to organize them all, that feature is nothingness. Henry Stapp of the Lawrence Berkeley Lab has put it clearly:

If the attitude of quantum mechanics is correct, in the strong sense that a description of the substructure underlying experience more complete than the one it provides is not possible, then there is no substantive physical world in the usual sense of this term. (Stapp n.d., cited in Zukav 1979: 105)

As Stapp's quote shows, nothingness has a sidekick, namely experientialism.

Stapp himself does not believe that quantum mechanics's descriptions are ultimately complete. That completeness theorem, the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics led by Niels Bohr, states that quantum mechanics measures our experiences, not some observable "out there" beyond our reach. Probabilities and aggregates are physics's domain, the interpretation holds, not
absolute explanations of individual events.\textsuperscript{12} Stapp, rejecting that hypothesis, believes that models of reality are possible. He believes in superluminal connections, in the relativistically impossible transfer of knowledge faster than the speed of light, in the implications that holds of a universal organicism, an all-pervading unity.

Which all sounds very mystical. And very confusing. But at its heart, the Stapp-Copenhagen dispute represents a simple debate fought over a simply startling question: Is the universe founded on fundamental nothingness, or is it ultimately of one piece, a God-like supercreature communicating with itself?

Although much of America would prefer it, modern physics does not provide a "none of the above" answer. Only two choices exist, both of which provide radical challenges to the dominant American thing-epistemology: nothingness and superunity.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12}The Copenhagen here provides an interesting parallel with Henry James's American pragmatism. James held that the mind deals with ideas, that it can't ponder reality itself, just ideas about reality. In his view, truth is the match-up to experience, not to some absolute reality. Lakoff and Johnson would emphatically agree. So, it seems, would neurophysiology, which posits that the brain receives signals from nerves, never actually experiencing any element of reality directly.

\textsuperscript{13}Actually, two other options are given, both of which occupy extremely marginal positions in modern physics. The first, the Many Worlds Theory, posits that every time more than one possibility exists and only one occurs, the others actually occur in alternate universes. In the Schrodinger's cat example, for instance, the cat both dies and lives, even after the experimenter's observation. If the observer sees a living cat, the cat died in another universe, etc. The second position, superdeterminism, holds that each interaction occurs exactly as it must; there is no choice, no probability, no anything except a blind, ultimate, predestined fate. Both of these theories are built around the assumptions that 1) models of reality are possible (contra the Copenhagen interpretation), and 2) locality
Nothingness, no-thing-ness, suffuses many areas of modern quantum physics. Modern Big Bang theory, for instance, put forward by Alan Guth (then of Stanford), postulates that the universe was born out of nothingness. Not some infinitely massive, compact pinhead of matter as was once believed, but nothing-ness:

"...the whole system of the world--space, time, matter--all seem to have sprung into existence from nothing. "I have often heard it said that there is no such thing as free lunch. It now appears possible that the universe itself is a free lunch," said Alan Guth, the creator of the inflationary theory. The universe indeed seems to have come from the vacuum; i.e., from nothing. (Szamosi 1986: 248)"

Inflationary theory holds that a false vacuum (a vacuum somewhere above the lowest energy state) repulsed itself, causing a superluminal expansion of spacetime which increased the energy in the universe. After expanding, the universe settled down to a true vacuum. Nothing was excited, it burped, the universe was born, and then nothing relaxed.

Which is almost exactly analogous to another part of quantum physics, particle interactions. Just as the nothing emitted the universe and then relaxed to a lower energy state, so an electron emits a photon and drops to a lower energy level. But the electron itself was born of the same nothingness that the photon was. Quantum electrodynamics (S-Matrix theory in particular) holds (there are discrete parts of the universe, contra Stapp), so that both conclude that contra factual definiteness fails. Although the first of these (the Everett-Graham-Wheeler hypothesis) is occasionally discussed in physics, the second is more often considered metaphysical. (Zukav 1979:320)
holds that particles themselves are merely "intermediate steps in a network of interactions" (Zukav 1979: 266). Feynman vacuum drawings, the product of American physicist Richard Feynman, describe interactions in the following way:

[W]here there was no-thing, suddenly, in a flash of spontaneous existence, there are three particles which vanish without a trace. (Zukav 1979:257)

Nothing gives something, which returns to being nothing.

This no-thing-ness central to quantum physics has its root with other elements of the new physics, particularly relativity. Einstein's great $E=mc^2$ showed, epistemologically, that no essential distinction exists between energy (process) and matter (thing). Particle mass, for instance, is now measured in terms of electron volts, an energy measure. Thing is understood in terms of process, a situation reminiscent of the Navajo epistemology's inactive as marked state of the active. Process is paramount. As Zukav puts it, mass is "energy of being."

Two final examples of physics's essential no-thing-ness should hammer the point home. First, particle spin, one of the essential determinants of a particle's identity, involves "The idea of a spin without the existence of something spinning..." (Born 1951:206, cited in Zukav 1979:227). Second, the electromagnetic force$^{14}$, which is understood at least partially as a wave, is itself irreducible. It doesn't wave through anything; it just waves (Zukav 1979:151-156). The way particle spin spins without spinning, electromagnetic waves wave without waving.

$^{14}$More properly, the electroweak force, which is one of the three basic (i.e., as yet undeconstructed) forces of the universe.
Spinning and waving are what matters, not what spins or waves.

If the proof of physics's preoccupation with nothingness seems to have led to a discussion of the paramount of process, good. That's where we're going next. Subatomic particles, as it turns out, have never been seen. Not even by an electron microscope. Like rabbits after the first snow, the only evidence we have of them are the tracks they leave behind. Their effects on photographic plates, their remnants of action, point the way. This reliance on action-not-object for the proof of physics's most fundamental theories reveals just how deeply process is embedded in the field's epistemology. Spinning, waving, and tracking.

The evidence continues to pile up. Particle physicists refer to particle-smashing experiments as "resonance hunting" experiments, since particles are understood primarily as resonances--interactions of energy fields (Cole 1987:24). As Zukav puts it:

If there is any ultimate stuff of the universe, it is pure energy, but subatomic particles are not "made of" energy, they are energy....Subatomic interactions, therefore, are interactions of energy with energy. At the subatomic level there is no longer a clear distinction between what is and what happens, between the actor and the action. (1979:212)

Finkelstein's (Georgia) theory of quantum topology takes the current state of particle understanding and pushes it to its radical-process end:

[T]he basic unit of the universe is an event, or a process. These events link in certain ways (allowed transitions) to form webs. The webs in turn join to form larger webs. Farther up the ladder of organization are coherent superpositions of different webs. (Zukav 1979: 295, my emphasis)
String theory (or superstring, as it is sometimes called) pushes Finkelstein even farther, by tying both the particle and the cosmological ends of quantum physics together. Edward Witten of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, the principal proponent of the theory, holds that the universe is composed of strings. Not strings as in kites or cheese, but unobservable mathematical curves. Some 'fundamental stuff' makes up those curves, and that 'stuff' is generally considered to be spacetime. Empty space and empty time. Nothing. No-thing-ness. And those loops of nothingness vibrate, that is, engage in an ongoing process, to create the ongoing illusion of things. Calling the illusory particles "points [of interaction]", K.C. Cole describes superstring this way:

[String theory is proposing that these points, in fact, are tiny loops, or closed "strings,"...The strings, too, vibrate invisibly in subtle resonances. These vibrations, so the theory goes, make up everything in the universe. Imagine a closed string--a loop--of some kind of fundamental stuff. Now imagine that the loop rotates, twists and vibrates.... As the loop wriggles, it resonates in many different modes, like a 10-dimensional violin string sending out cosmic versions of A or E flat. These vibrations...determine all the possible particles and forces of the universe. (1987:22-23)

Witten, obviously, has pushed far beyond the Copenhagen interpretation's assertion that no models of reality are possible. He represents in many ways the fallout of Bell's theorem, a 1964 mathematical proof that either the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are incorrect or the principle of local causes fails. When the Clauser-Freedman experiment (Berkeley) verified beyond a doubt the correctness of quantum mechanics's statistical predictions, the house fell through. If
you assume models of reality are possible (contra Copenhagen), then local causes must fail.\textsuperscript{15}

Jack Sarfatti in 1975 proposed that the universe is connected intimately with itself, in a way that transcends both space and time. The universe connects with itself, Sarfatti theorized, by a "superluminal transfer of negentropy (information) without signals" (Zukav 1979:310). In this theory, no thing moves; "Nonetheless, there is an 'instantaneous' change in the quality (coherent structure) of the energy in both areas..." (IBID).

Sarfatti's radical theory of superunity, although not widely accepted, follows rather directly from much of the legacy of quantum physics. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, for instance, originally showed that either the momentum or the position of a particle, \textit{but not both}, can be determined by an experiment. Heisenberg essentially destroyed the old concept of 'observer'. The scientist in some way 'creates' the world, since her interaction affects results: she chooses whether to find a particle with position or a particle with momentum. Discovery after discovery, theory after theory later verified this radical epistemological switch.\textsuperscript{16} This led to a myriad of metaphysical

\textsuperscript{15}Zakov: "The principle of local causes says that what happens in one area does not depend upon variables subject to the control of an experimenter in a distant space-like separated area. The principle of local causes is common sense. The results of an experiment in a place distant and space-like separated from us should not depend on what we decide to do or not to do right here"(1979:304).

\textsuperscript{16}Zakov believes that our dominant American epistemology asserts the fundamental separateness of objects and events. This, he holds, represents part of our sense of separateness from others
questions:

May the universe in some strange sense be 'brought into being' by the participation of those who participate?...The vital act is the act of participation. 'Participator' is the incontrovertible new concept given by quantum mechanics. It strikes down the term 'observer' of classical theory, the man who stands safely behind the thick glass wall and watches what goes on without taking part. It can't be done, quantum mechanics says. (Wheeler et al, cited in Zakov 1979:54)

Such speculations, represented above by a prominent Princeton physicist, led to questions about the process of 'studying'. A particle's isolation, its separateness from the universal environment, itself is a physicist-created idealization. One significant viewpoint derived from that fact holds that quantum mechanics allows us to idealize a photon from the fundamental unbroken unity so that we can study it. In fact, a 'photon' seems to become isolated from the fundamental unbroken unity because we are studying it. (Zukav 1979:95)

Sarfatti created his superholism theory from this important tradition, physics's central epistemological tenet of an interactive, holistic, self-creating universe.

In the final analysis, I must pour the analytic buckets back into the pool, put Humpty-Dumpty back together again. Pushing him off the wall, breaking modern physics's epistemology into parts, represented the arbitrary act, the act contrary to the insiders's own epistemology. But just as they separate and from the environment of which we are a part. His belief melds well with the picture of a thing-bound dominant American epistemology that fixes itself in a world of separate objects. The theory also produces interesting ramifications when combined with Bellah et al, Bateson, and Lakoff and Johnson.
'particles' from the fundamental unbroken unity so that they can study it, I separate (and so in some way create) elements of a prevailing counterepistemology so that I can study it, and in a particularly physics-like twist, its interaction with the dominant American epistemology of thinghood. As they dream of a simple mathematical expression to describe the fundamental unbroken unity, the essential no-thing-ness, I dream of a single simple sentence that could convey the world of no-thing, holism, experientialism, process and reality-creation that is modern physics. We'll both have to wait.

* * *

85
FEMINISM

If physics stands as a shining example of a mainstream group awarded the authority to make profound epistemological inquiries, then feminism represents the other side: the marginals, never thought worthy to entertain philosophical thoughts, demanding the right and authority to make their particular epistemological views heard. Physics was the good old boys gone bad, feminism isn't good, old, or boys. Just, according to the thing-epistemology, bad.

To call this section an inquiry into the epistemological beliefs of feminism is a misnomer. Feminism is a blanket term, covering everything from support for equal wages to the espousal of radical pedagogic techniques. Unlike theater and physics, no schools exist to pass on the paradigm, no structural system sustains its members. Which should, in and of itself, intrigue. The first two examples in this chapter have been structure-bound groups, theater as an encapsulated ritual, physics as an actually mainstream structural group promulgating subversive epistemological beliefs. But feminism, structureless, represents the first liminal on Turner's model, a group of people excluded from the social structure.

But more than Turner's model of a knee-jerk opposition to the structure it is excluded from, feminism provides an example

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1 Feminists do involve themselves in structure in many ways, particularly politico-legal structures and institutionalized academic structures. Nevertheless the determining feature of their involvement is their marginality, their opposition to the structure and its patriarchal epistemological biases.
of one of the first conscious counter-epistemologies in the modern era. Aware of the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis (although not necessarily accepting it in toto), feminism has made bold attempts to reformulate language, both syntactically and semantically. Similarly, aware of the modernist and postmodernist debates over form and function, feminism has realized the hidden transferral of values implicit in classic pedagogy and set out to reform those teaching methods.

Although ignoring political, legal, and minority aspects of feminism is to paint a skewed picture, I do not aim to paint at all. It is not an isolate, feminism, which I hope to portray, but rather a relationship, the interaction between feminism's self-conscious epistemology (or rather parts of feminism's self-conscious epistemology) and the dominant American (male) model. For this reason, I will focus on those self-aware theorizers, the pedagogues and linguists.²

²It is essential to realize that these theories are not always generally accepted, either in the structure world as a whole or even inside the feminist discourse. The epistemological explanations of aesthetics and generalized writing styles are by no means unquestioned. Nor are the suggestions for a new aesthetic made or inferred by Penelope and Wolf, Stein, Millet, donovan, etc. always followed.

But for the purposes of this study, these facts are not important. As a self-conscious self-creating epistemology, feminism's conscious creations are important, particularly the attempts to create and identify a distinctive way of seeing the world. Whether what these writers say is generizable to women as a whole proves insignificant in an analysis of feminist epistemology.
radically from standard classroom technique. The rotating chair, for instance, is to the Socratic method what Thomas Jefferson's dream is to King George. Instead of a single teacher controlling the agenda and deciding who may and may not speak, each member (student or teacher) chooses the next speaker, and the agenda is shaped collectively rather than hierarchically.

Feminism's emphasis on interdisciplinary studies represents another attack on the structurally standard ways of academia. Institutions, it is believed, and with them the institutionalized divisions of knowledge into departments and fields, derive from the patriarchal hegemonic structure and as such help to pass it along. Although each discipline or field may have acquired important knowledge, a student can best acquire that knowledge by approaching it from an interdisciplinary angle, by standing outside of the rigid structure.

The emphasis on democratization and standing outside the structure in feminist pedagogy manifests itself as one of feminist literary criticism's most potent concerns: the role and plight of the marginal. In "Madwoman in the Attic," a classic of feminist literary theory, Gilbert and Gubar assert the necessity of paying attention not only to the obviously important Jane Eyre, but also to the minor characters whose lives have often been overlooked or brushed aside. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern may be dead, but only because we haven't paid much attention to them.

If feminism demands bringing minor characters back into the fold, understanding as marginals ourselves that they too have
been overlooked and ignored, then it demands also that 'minor' authors be re-discovered. The canon must be de-canonized. The aesthetic endemic to the patrimony must be expanded at least, perhaps rejected. Standards must be revolutionized. Women's (and other minorities's) miniscule printing history represents not merely a lack of access to the means of production, but a fundamentally exclusionary process. Reinterpreting our standards, going back over diaries, letters and romance novels once disparaged and seeing them in a new light, provides one of the first steps towards revolutionizing the dominant aesthetic standards.

The advocates of a distinctive women's writing style, like the literary theorists, begin with the recognition of the connections between aesthetics, epistemology, and language. As Penelope and Wolfe say:

We must wrestle with English in our efforts to remake it as a language adequate to our conceptual processes. From Virginia Woolf and Gertrude Stein to Kate Millet and Susan Griffin, the relationship between consciousness and linguistic choice is confronted, played with, and articulated as the self expressing itself in and through a language remade, reordered: the feminist aesthetic. (1983:135)

Their quote of Josephine Donovan (1975:78) states the matter consummately:

[A]esthetic judgments are rooted in epistemology: one cannot understand why someone thinks something is beautiful or significant until one understands the way s/he sees, knows the world.

The counter-epistemology that feminist literary theorists would like to create fits well within Turner's liminal Gestalt. Gertrude Stein, for example, extols the virtues of the present tense. She speaks of the need for a new tense which she calls
'present immediacy' that she believes should be the foundation stone for story writing. Her consciousness of the role of language and her attempt to reformulate American English in terms of holism provides an intriguing example of liminal attributes:

[T]he 'internal history' of a country always affects its use of writing. It makes a difference in the expression, in the vocabulary, even in the handling of grammar....I had this conception of the whole paragraph....I had this idea of the whole thing...They conceive of it as pieces put together to make a whole, and I conceived it as a whole made up of its parts...the element of punctuation was very vital. The comma was just a nuisance. If you got the thing as a whole and the comma keeps sticking out, it gets on your nerves; because, after all, it destroys the reality of the whole. So I got rid more and more of commas....That is the illustration of grammar and parts of speech, as part of the daily life as we live it. (1974:153)

If Stein illustrates well the 'totality' aspect of Turner's liminal state, Maud Haimson represents the anti-bounding bias expected by a counter-epistemology in my dominant thing-system. In her short story, "Hands", characters don't have regular, fixed names. Instead, their names evolve ecologically, as a part of the context:

The cave woman picked up a small rock, touched it all around, and brought it to the older woman. The older outside woman took it, touched it and holding it asked the inside woman if she'd been outside. The stone woman shook her head and taking a look at her stove picked up some rocks and put them in her many pocketed cloth-like thing going to the ground, pockets in the back too with bulges from stones. She followed the other woman out. (1975:60, cited in Penelope and Wolfe 1983:127)

And once again antibounding links with experientialism; as Penelope and Wolf note,

[W]hat she wears is more than a product, or material object, or categorized, fixed label....It has characteristics, but it too is engaged in the processes connected with its being and functions.(1983:127)
Stein believes that the processes of writing must be included in the writing itself, that a written object isn't an object, but the record of a process. Her preference for verbs and adverbs, like the Navajo and Hopi preference, reveals her inclination towards the process-epistemology:

In the Making of Americans a long a very long prose book made up of sentences and paragraphs and the new thing that was something neither the sentences nor the paragraph each one alone or in combination had ever done, I said I had gotten rid of nouns and adjectives as much as possible by the method of living in adverbs in verbs in pronouns, in adverbial clauses written or implied and in conjunctions. (cited in Penelope and Wolf 1983:129)

Verbs of action, conjunctions of interaction make up her world, not nouns of stasis.

Kate Millet also strives for that world of interaction:

[H]er life overflows the narrow, restrictive syntactic boundaries of the conventional sentence that is 'a complete thought,' because there are no 'complete thoughts', as our moments touch moments in other lives, as the places of touching are not 'places' but interfaces from which other possibilities come into being with their own touchings beyond our own. (P&W, 130)

Since they've been my source for the literary criticism subsection of this epistemological analysis of feminism, I'll give Penelope and Wolf the wrap-up:

The natural imagery of growth, proliferation, and evolution replaces nature as object and product. Flux is the only experience; stasis is impossible. Labels and abstract nouns as viable perceptive categories give way to active, process verbs.... (1983:137)

DRUG CULTURE

The Lesson of Water

What one values in the game---is the play Fluid
What one values in the form--
is the moment of forming
Fluid

What one values in the house--
is the moment of dwelling
Fluid

What one values in the heart--
is the beat
Pulsing

What one values in the action--
is the timing
Fluid

Indeed
Because you flow like water
You can neither win nor lose

Timothy Leary, VI-5 from Psychedelic Prayers After the Tao Te Ching

In the drug culture's world, air and water overpower earth. Water flows, preferring process, and air allows flight. Both strongly oppose the earthbound thingness of the dominant American epistemology. Drug language, like poetry and water, prefers process. The same verb-preference observed in Navajo, feminism, theater, and Hopi repeats itself here: to take drugs is to 'turn on', to engage in process. To Timothy Leary, the process is paramount; even if during the course of a trip some state of consciousness seems particularly appealing, Leary emphatically declares the need to continue with the process: "Consciousness could flick in and out of any imaginable happy/horror chamber. The trick was not to get caught, not to freeze the flow of reality" (1983:66).

Language of journeying accompanies language of process. 'Launching off', for instance, means to take psychedelic mushrooms (psilocybin). Leary speaks of having "shared voyages"
with people, which means taking drugs with them. An 'inner explorer' is a person who uses psychedelic drugs. When you're on drugs, you 'trip', another journey-word.

The journey-imagery is closely associated with air-imagery. 'I'm high' is a substitute for 'I'm tripping', and 'high as a kite' is another. A third expression used for the same purpose is 'flying'. The three metaphorical systems, process, journey and air, remain intimately bound.

These drug expressions do not at all resemble expressions used for states of consciousness induced by alcohol, narcotics or downers. Words such as 'wasted' connote an association with garbage, which usually resides on the ground. 'Fucked-up' similarly brings to mind extreme physicality, coming as it does from the root fokken, to strike hard with a stick, and meaning now to have violent or meaningless sex. 'Plastered' also carries associations with physicality, particularly with walls, prime examples of bounding. 'Trashed' and 'shitfaced' hearken back to 'wasted' and an association of excrement and garbage. Finally, 'smashed', 'bombed', and 'blasted' all produce images of a destroyed thing.

Leary and the drug culture not only use process-language, but advocate communitas. His work at a prison while he was still a professor at Harvard reveals his emphasis:

It seemed that two major factors were bringing about changes in the convicts: first, the perception of new realities helped them recognize that they had alternatives beyond the cops and robbers game; then, the empathetic bonding of group members helped them sustain their choice of a new life.

Leary's summer research institute in Mexico attempted a
communitas-based community; he called the people there 'utopiates' and used the same word to refer to the psychedelic drugs. Summing up, he said: "The six weeks at Zihuatanejo had given us a glimpse of utopia" (83:143). Turner's observation that liminals often attempt to create utopias seems applicable here. "Within a few days we realized that we were developing the ultimate-destination resort. Hotel Nirvana...." Similar examples of communitas in the drug culture include the Big House Leary set up in Millbrook, a place where everyone could come and be equal, and Ken Kesey and his traveling bus. Woodstock, among others festivals, springs to mind as an epitomizing example of much of the drug culture's communitas-based epistemology.

Opposition to personal property, as we would expect, goes hand-in-hand with communitas. The examples of Kesey's bus and Leary's Big House are clear. Leary says "if your concept of 'real estate' is neurological rather than mammalian, then your habitat defines your launching pad." This statement may seem somewhat packed, but seen in the light of his clear preference for neurological over mammalian (which he perceives as territorial, property-oriented), Leary seems to be advocating that we define our reality in neurological and not thingbound terms. If you follow a self-created reality, he believes, you have a launching pad from which you can journey through the air, away from this bounded territorial mammalian earth ground of structure and property.

Leary's belief in the creatability of reality derives from
his experience with LSD. During a part of the tripper's experience, she is entirely able to re-imprint herself, to prepare an altered reality for herself for the time when she emerges from the trip. "Consciousness," he says, "is energy received by structure" (1966) which sounds very similar to Turner's notion of communitas as a structure-refresher. Except that Leary draws radically different conclusions: he sees the liminal stage as a way to change, not just reaffirm the old structure, to re-im-print, not just re-in-vigorate. For Leary, the liminal stage is more than structure's refreshments stand. After a good trip, Leary says, "Your old reality fades a bit, and you incorporate a new reality" (1983:87). For Leary that's what change is all about, a new creating, not a steady state pendulum determining our knee-jerk reactions to the last era.

I'll let Leary have the last words here:

I have remained unenthusiastic about pious teachers who set up schools, hierarchies, and special rituals...[We should] avoid secrecy, beaurocracy, masters, followers, dogma, and fixed ritual...make accessible to everyone what had for centuries been shrouded in occultism. (83:150)

* * *

In the final analysis theater comes closest to an example of Turner's liminal model. The elements of sacredness, the present-tenseness, the emphasis on simplicity, the total obedience, the no-self complex and the communitas-inspired ensemble seem to slide in toto from Turner's list of liminal attributes into the repertory of modern, institutionalized liminals doing on a societal level what the ritual stage once did on an individual level: reversing, refreshing, questioning.
The only tight spot in the otherwise perfect fit proves to be theater's (unexpected to Turner) preoccupation with 'creating reality' on stage, a preoccupation that pops up again in modern physics. Creating reality, as Heisenberg, Wheeler et al point out, is the prime occupation of every physicist.

Furthermore, physics fits into the process-epistemology model, emphasizing no-thing-ness, process and interactions. But instead of being the expected marginal/inferiors, they're the structural superiors, institutionalized science's top echelon of epistemological inquirers. Antibounding this time finds its home near the top.

And also near the bottom where feminists, whose gender is often called 'airy', 'flighty', or 'spacey' (airnames all) soar into the world of process, recognizing their marginality and seeking to infuse the dominant culture with their own distinctive aesthetic and underlying epistemology. Focusing on wholeness, communality and present-tenseness, they know all along that they seek to change the dominant epistemology.

As does the drug culture, whose loud opposition to structure and property and admiration for communitas was coupled with a clear cognizance of the liminal re-imprinting process. That knowledge found expression in the belief in the createdness of reality, a belief that the drug culture shares with feminism and physics, Gehlen and Geertz.

The createdness of reality is a crucial point. If you create reality, you need not be bound by some previously demarcated steady state. Epistemology, that is to say, need not
always accompany social structure. If reality is created, process-epistemology can pop up anywhere: at Princeton in the form of string theory, at Oberlin with the rotating chair, in the White House with psilocybin (see Leary 1983). Turner's model, by contrast, insists on the unchangable steady-state, the land where structure determines thing-epistemology and anti-structure determines process-epistemology.

Looking back, Yinger's model of evolutionary change does seem far more suited than Turner's steady state pendulum to these four groups. Each of the four, particularly physics, feminism and the drug culture, seems something of a mutation, a change on the symbol-level world of the chromosome. Whether the mutation's ultimate success would lead to species extinction or perfection, to an over-armored dinosaur or an adaptable chameleon, remains uncertain.

What is certain is that the mutation can change the organism, create a new symbolic world. Process-epistemology sometimes rules the roost. Navajo preference, like feminism's, rests (or doesn't rest) on motion, on the air end and the verb. Hopi, like the drug culture, flows in process, in the epistemological system that Turner associates with liminality but that in more than one culture inhabits the world of the dominants. And even when the dominant culture does hold a radically thingish epistemology, as in America, members of a

3 Just a thought: a steady state, a demarcated field--bounded entities, things. An evolution, an endless evolving--a process, without bounds. Is my own bias determining my model?
structurally superior group can hold a process epistemology, as the American physicists who are currently reformulating the face of science show. Each group, then, advocating a slightly different twist from the dominant thing-epistemology, represents a unique counter, a distinct mutation fighting to control the symbolic code of the cultural DNA.

Cultural contradiction, opposition, ambiguity: the tools for digging deeper, for finding out what holds the culture up, say Schneider, Turner and Yinger. Following Basso's (1979) distinction, I'll leave the 'interpretive' (or symbolic) models behind and push on into the 'social' models; say arrivaderci to the 'thick description' of local happenings and begin to search out the social ambiguities, the use and abuse of 'reality' by the individuals themselves. In other words: Goodbye America, Hello Americans. As we'll see, they're more than geographically connected.
CHAPTER 5: riverrun

If the last chapter was the game handbook, this one is a strategist's guide, a showing of the game films to the players themselves. No game, no matter how complicated, can be appreciated or even understood with a knowledge of only the rules; the strategy, the why's of this feint and that attack, represents the beauty of the game and holds the conscious attention of the players.

The rules themselves, of course, do not always form a seamless whole, a simple mandate of practices for a single purpose. Rules evolve in response to various requirements—the promotion of excitement, for instance, coupled with the inhibition of violence. Some of the rules are born of the need to promote that excitement, some out of the need to inhibit that violence, and bound they may hold together as a coherent system. Players, brought up under the mediating set of rules, may believe that the game they play is actually a manifestation of one of the needs, not both: one hockey player may emphasize grace, and one violence. Who chooses what depends on a bookload of variables,

1Literary/Philosophic footnote: 'riverrun' is the first word of James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake. The general consensus is that it is uncapitalized because there really is no beginning; everything comes in context.

Literature, of course, is itself both a process of bounding and creating, as Joyce's choice of the uncapitalized first word shows. Something is always left out. Joyce was an exception. Most who draw broad distinction between the art/humanities and the sciences tend to think of the former as essentially creative and the latter as essentially bounding, i.e., demarcating significant facts for analysis. But as I have tried to show, every endeavor must needs contain both. Literature often claims to be purely creative; chemistry to be purely analytic (bounding); I hope that anthropology comes to do and admit both.

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everything from town of birth and coaches to individual personality and role in the game.

And even after you pick your place in the game, or rather your circumstances and you pick it together, dilemmas pop up. What if the game interferes with your religion? What if you can't stay married and be on the road a hundred and eighty days a year? What if you have to sleep with somebody, or get involved in some shady dealings? These are the times that try men's souls.

We are, of course, the players, and the American thing-epistemology is our game. The strategies we use to play by or around or against the rules come to be somewhat standardized; since the game remains pretty much the same, many of our tactics become canonized. Whoever heard of playing football without a down-and-out? But the strategies reflect not only the make-up of the game; to some extent they also reflect the way we'd like the game to be. And just as changes come about in the rules of games when those very rules come into conflict with other 'games' in the society, so our strategies can either reflect or reform the dominant epistemology. Prohibition isn't always permanent, but the weight of the law can come down hard.

On then to the strategies: the contextual use and abuse, by social actors, of our conceptual rules for the thing-reality.

* * *

To me, writing on a computer isn't 'really' writing. To you, voting socialist isn't a 'real' alternative. But a book can come
off a computer and a socialist candidate can collect votes. Living on a kibbutz isn't a 'real' lifestyle and academia isn't 'the real world', but thousands of people live on kibbutzes and millions live in academia. Why then do we use the word 'real' in these contexts? Quite simply, we use the word 'real' to define reality on our terms, to limit the frame of discourse to our size frame. If I don't like your haircut, I'll tell you to get a 'real' haircut. In my reality, contextually defined, your haircut is so far from the norm that it doesn't deserve to be called 'haircut'.

A splash of graffitti on the wall of a dormitory at Drew University illustrates the concept well: "Reality is for people who can't handle drugs." As a tactical shot in this game, that's true. People who don't want to 'handle' drugs define them as outside of reality so that they don't have to handle them. Of course it works the other way too: members of the drug culture, feeling alienated from the dominant thingish conception of reality, redefine reality as something that only an unable non-user would want anyway. Tactical shot number two. But trying to pull away from either perspective, it becomes clear that a brain is just as 'real' (whatever I mean by that) whether chemically-induced synapses are firing or not.

Advertising provides a rich field for the analysis of social strategy in the reality game. Coke, for instance, is 'the real thing', and by rather pointed implication no other colas are. Beef is 'real food for real people', which means either other possible nourishments are so far from food that they don't
deserve the label or people who eat them aren't quite people, or both. 'Real' vanilla is defined by a standards agency as the specific part of the plant from which vanilla is derived, but exact chemical duplicates from other parts or other plants must be labeled 'imitation'. Milk is defined as the secretion from a cow's udders plus certain other chemicals, but if different (not the specified other) chemicals are used a dairy may not use the insignia 'REAL'. The same with mayonnaise: Miracle Whip must call its product 'salad dressing' because its chemicals are not in accord with a set of guidelines defining 'real' mayonnaise. In all of these cases, reality is defined as that which is within the advertiser or standardizer's interests. Coke is real and Pepsi isn't, because Coke decides.

Contemporary idioms pave the same path. 'Get real' means get like me; your ideas or actions are straying far enough from (my) reality that they're nonsense. Or it means something like 'unreal', which expresses disbelief, but more importantly, removes the surprising event from the realm of the suprising into the realm of the unreal and so negates the necessity of interpreting it. 'It's been real' says what we just had was good and deep and important. 'Get a real ____' as in haircut or job or meal, defines reality once more on the speaker's terms; the addressee's haircut or job or proposed meal is not real, and if she wants to think of herself as being clean, employed and fed, she'd better get real. If the idioms I heard when I was a vegetarian were true in any actual sense, then I spent that part of my life eating plastic apples and glass eggs, because I was constantly implored to 'eat something real'.
Two non-idiomatic forms of the word 'real' work in much the same way. 'Realize' means to understand—to make real for an individual; or to get profits—to make potential money into real money. Remember a 'real' once meant a king and a coin. 'Really' is used as an intensifier, similarly to 'very' or 'truly'. Not all languages, of course, intensify by insisting on actuality. In America we social strategists say 'really hungry', but in Hebrew, for instance, you'd say the equivalent of 'hungry hungry', and if you were really really hungry you'd say hungry hungry hungry. In English English you'd say 'quite hungry' (and maybe 'chap'), quite coming from 'quietus,' Latin for 'fixed' or 'quiet'. Significantly, Americans intensify descriptions by insisting on their realities. Even the two other primary intensifiers--'very' and 'truly'--derive from words about reality. 'Very' comes from the Latin 'veritas' which meant 'truth' and 'truly' comes from the same root in English.

Art and entertainment provide more fodder for the analytic cannon. A line of a poem by Nikki Giovanni springs to mind: "Because what's real is really real." In order to affirm that she can be both an advocate of feminist Black power and an unabashed fan of men in tight pants, Ms. Giovanni feels compelled to insist three times (no casual three: as a poet, her words are preciously chosen) that both her desires are real. Neither one is beyond the range of discourse, even though Black feminism commonly excludes tight pants-lovers and tight pants-lovers commonly exclude feminists. Both are real, Giovanni proclaims, and can be real together.
Giovanni doesn't stand alone in the art world in defining reality. A recent production of an original production here at Oberlin College contained a monologue on rap music that emphatically declared that rap is 'real music for real people'. Reacting to a local environment in which a White conservatory sets the cultural standards for what constitutes 'real' music, a Black artist attempted to bring his music and his people back within the domain of the 'real'.

Recent television's weekly Real People show, although less stirring, provides an equally pertinent example of artistic frame-setting: reacting to a society that harbors at-least occasional doubts as the the 'real-ness' of television characters, the network decided not to use trained actors for the show, and chose to highlight this fact by calling the people 'real'. An actor might argue that even actors are real people, but when the network is defining reality, no one's listening.

Direct ethnography (often called 'eavesdropping' in autoanthropology) provides some of the most direct examples. A friend of mind who works in psychological counseling once told me about a personal emotional trauma that was in the process of ending her marriage. After describing the emotional ins and outs, she responded to a question I asked about future vocational plans by saying "I've been taking life one day at a time...I haven't had time for the real world, real life." By setting her own emotional world and the 'real' world in opposition, she implicitly defined her emotional traumas as unreal. In so doing, she lessened the intensity of their impact.

Another friend described the attempts of a clinic she worked
with to redefine their image:

I had to go out and get a real haircut, real clothes. This clinic has, I guess, a radical lesbian feminist image, so we dress...you know, for real...No Birkenstocks, no beads, no long hair.

Real haircuts and real clothes are the ones that a radical lesbian feminist does not wear, a feminist social worker feels compelled to say, adopting the tactics of the mainstream as her own.

* * *

Why? Why do NBC and a radical feminist both argue by framing discourse, whether that discourse is framed towards or against them? The rules of the game are clear, reality is thing, but why does our culture mandate (suggest? require?) framing a disagreement by determining the range of discourse. Coke could say 'the best thing' as easily as 'the real thing'; you could say 'I don't like quiche' as easily as 'real men don't eat quiche'; I could say I'm 'quite' hungry. But we don't. Instead, we create (or play with or strategize or define or manipulate) our reality.

The giant 'why' returns to the discussion of the rules of the game, Chapter 2. REALITY IS A THING predisposes American conceptions towards an objectivist account of the universe, towards the perception of a singular, absolutely true answer to each question.

A series of single, absolutely true answers makes up one big single, absolute reality. And an absolute reality admits no dissent. If you and I disagree, we can't both be right. Either a particle is there or it isn't. Theatrical characters are real
or they aren't. Real estate is territorial or mammalian. A woman's name is 'inside woman' or 'cave woman', not both. A single reality, made up of a long list of Newtonian knowable truths, stops arguments in its tracks. How can you disagree with what is?

* * *

But American culture and society demands argument. Our legal system is based fundamentally on the belief that argument leads the way to understanding. Even our most hardened criminals are given the right to argue their cases, and the attorney who defends them is not sullied by their crime; to the contrary, a courtroom defense lawyer remains a highly valued position in American culture.

Similarly, our political system founds itself on the assumption of the value of vigorous debate. Not only elections, but the very system of governing itself works through the sometimes furious exchange of opinions. The foundations of our modern state, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, strongly assert not only the right, but the necessity of argument in the creation of a state. The democratic tradition and the philosophy of social freedom formulated by Thomas Jefferson and his contemporaries states that all opinions are valid, that a free and open discourse lies at the heart of a morally good society.

And those Jefferson-inspired sentiments remain operative today. The United States is one of the few nations in the world
in which both Nazi and Communist parties operate freely. The recent nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court was assailed for, among other reasons, his refusal to support the right of radical revolutionaries to call for an armed uprising against the government. Obviously the freedom of opinion is respected.

Those who do not oppose censorship are those whose religious subcultures have most strongly cosmos-ized their nomos (see Berger), those who assert their own rightness and righteousness as the will of God first and America second. They have validated their thing-epistemology as the absolute, unassailable will of an absolute, unassailable God.

For the rest of us in American culture though, censorship is seen as a grave wrong. Whenever we or our press talks about oppressive regimes in the rest of the world, we cite instances of rigged elections, and significantly, censorship of the press. The growing admiration of Americans for Mikhail Gorbachev derives in no small part from his loosing the reins on press control and political dissidence. And back home, the Scopes Monkey trial stands as a hallmark of American culture, having generated books, movies, and the career of at least one cultural hero.

These two cultural symbols, then, reflect an inherent tension in American culture. On the one hand stands objective truth, REALITY IS A THING, representing the belief in a singular unassailable truth. On the other hand stands the notion of open discourse, the belief in the right and necessity of a pluralist community of opinions.

So how do we sit on both sides of the fence at once? It's the baseball player faced with breaking up: how do you tow the
line between career and marriage? On the one hand, our 'game' demands a dissent-rebuking singular absolute reality. On the other hand, a key cultural symbol, democracy, demands the opposite. Which one goes, marriage or job?

Neither, of course. Our strategy walks the tight rope, keeps us in good with the wife and the boss. It is the manipulation of reality on a day-to-day level that mediates between these two opposing cultural notions. The only way to remove an opinion from the range of discourse without incurring the negative labelling of 'censor' is to define the opinion as outside the realm of objective, fixed reality. I still don't like your haircut, but I know you as an American have the right to wear it, so I define it as outside the realm of the essentialist definition of 'haircut' within the objective reality. That way I'm no censor, but the haircut's got to go.

But we have met the enemy and he is us. To preserve the fixed, objective reality, to keep playing the game, we adopt the hallmark tactical move of the process-epistemology, the creation of reality. We redefine reality, create a new meaning for quiche and food and men.

On the level of practice the split epistemologies begin to merge. My separate categories blend out of separateness into a single new structure: the structure of the tactics. Each American, faced with the contradictions and ambiguities of a culture that contains thing and process elements, develops a coping strategy. Process-tactics, like creating reality, are used by thing-ers to maintain the thing-system. And thing-
tactics, like the feminist clinic worker's invocation of real
clothes and haircuts, are used by process-ers. Aristotle uses
Galileo and Galileo uses Aristotle.

This is no simple story of the genius of American
cooptation, no smug smile or sad gaze at Eldredge Cleaver voting
Republican or hearing the Grateful Dead in harmony at the
supermarket. This is a story of double-effect: of actors from
both sides of the fence sitting on it and taking what they need
from where they need it. Of process affecting thing and thing
affecting process. Of the context evolving--the mutation
affecting the organism and the organism affecting the mutation.
Of horse and turf together. Which could seem to hearken back to
Turner's steady-state model but doesn't, because individuals in
this modern era are confronted by nonstop change, by inventions,
discoveries, immigrants, theories, and technologies. The use of
the old methods to deal with the new problems doesn't always
work.

As Sahlins has recently said, using traditional strategies
on new (outside) phenomena may not produce the expected results;
the new inventions, discoveries, immigrants, theories, and technologies may
have their own ways of responding. Change, then, may result from
the failed attempt to reinforce the game through the use of
traditional strategy (Sahlins 198x in Ortner 198x). Whites
changed the Sandwich Islanders, the plow changed our ancestors,
the television and the computer are changing us.

So the growing influence of process on thing in our daily
strategies, the tempering of Aristotle with Galileo, may grow
from the new inventions, discoveries, immigrants, theories, and technologies.
with which we have recently been confronted. Psilocybin, for instance, seems not to care whether you prefer thing-game preserving tactics. Like the plow, it organizes not only social relations but ways of thinking and seeing the world—epistemologies. And photons and the electroweak force don't care if you and I would prefer a clockwork Newtonian world. We can try over and over again (and Einstein did) to find ways around the experiments, to apply our time-tested tactics of thinghood. But the waves keep waving, and waving through no-thing at that.

* * *

We know the tactics are changing, that individual Americans are coming to use that distinguishing mark of process, the creation of reality, as a prime tactic. Idioms with 'real' in them are very recent phenomena; so are advertisements that tell us what's real and what isn't. And even the use of 'really' as an intensifier, although with us in a minor form since Shakespeare, has only lately come to be the prime usage.²

But are the rules changing with the tactics? Is the game being altered? It seems like the answer is yes. Physics's apparently 'counter' epistemology comes from the top of the structure; individual physicists's tactics for adapting to the new discoveries have led to the transformation of physic's way of seeing the world. That in turn has seeped down into biology, cognitive science and psychology, and even literary theory, philosophy and art. Could John Cheever or Northrop Frye have

²See the definition rankings in A.H.D., Webster's, and O.E.D.
existed before Einstein?

'Change' has become one of the rallying cries of American culture. Not yet as loud as 'truth' or 'objective reality', but getting louder all the time. We emphasize the process of changing, shaking our heads one way or the other at the way they took down old Uncle Ed's farm and put the condos up. And we've even begun to teach change—mandating 'Life Cycle' classes as part of the health curriculum in public high schools,\(^3\) emphasizing now those parts of our lives which manifest process. We have even begun to talk about 'the invention of tradition' in history, realizing that even what seemed most static—tradition—is itself a part of process.

But I don't want to go too far. I only want to suggest that we are beginning to change, to proceed into the world of process, to recognize the significance of form as well as function. Postmodernism implicitly recognizes the significance of seeing both process and thing. The thing being analyzed, the content, is generally considered to hold the privileged position in academia. But postmodernism attempts to balance thing and process by saying the form of the analyzing is as important as what is analyzed. The telling is as important as what is told. If I teach you democracy in a dictatorial classroom, I send mixed messages at best, and at worst undermine the very subject I am attempting to pass on. The teaching matters as much as what is taught, process as much as thing.

Anthropology has not been entirely immune from the general American drift towards a more evenly balanced epistemological

\(^3\)As in New Jersey, for instance, my home state.
The classic style of the monograph, for instance, has come under increasing scrutiny. Victor Turner has pleaded that anthropology become "something more than a cognitive game played in our heads and inscribed in--let's face it--somewhat tedious journals" (1982:101). Bateson has called for the necessary reunification of what he calls 'mind' and 'nature'. Turner has, even more daringly, advocated a technique for teaching anthropology that should ring as noticeably process-oriented: using ethnographies as playscripts. As he has eloquently and accurately put it:

I've long thought that teaching and learning anthropology should be more fun than they are...Alienated students spend many tedious hours in library carrels struggling with accounts of alien lives and even more alien anthropological theories about the ordering of those lives. Whereas anthropology should be about, in D.H. Lawrence's phrase, "man alive" and "woman alive," this living quality frequently fails to emerge from our pedagogics, perhaps, to cite Lawrence again, because our "analysis presupposes a corpse. (82:89)

Or, as e.e. cummings puts it, "knowledge/ is deadbutnotburied imagination." Analysis does presuppose a corpse. The shell of a human once the life has left, a corpse is the perfect metaphor for a thing without process. Imagination, creativity: these are the life-force, the process complement to the thinglike body.

Our anthropological writing has so consistently drawn its inspiration from the thing (analytic bounding) tradition that it has neglected the artistic (creative) process epistemology. But as America changes, as our epistemology begins to mirror our

4Although the self-consciousness one would expect to accompany the drift has been noticeably absent.
practice-level juggling act of thing and process, our writing begins to appear to us as more and more of a rigid structure, an incomplete picture. Counting chickens and analyzing kinship isn't enough anymore; we want creation—a portrait of a culture's lifeblood, or at least a good read. The telling is beginning to be recognized alongside the what-is-told.

But our literary rigidness engenders more than bored anthropologists. Our traditional literary genre plugs into one half of our increasingly dual epistemology: the thing half. By aligning our 'telling' with that epistemology, we may alienate our 'what-is-told'. Take my section on feminism, for instance. It represents a classically anthropological approach, an analysis clearly steeped in traditional writing style. As such, I tied myself strongly into the thing-epistemology, into the analytic bounding and structure.

But is that fair to feminism? Have I stepped outside of the insider's point of view and taken refuge in my own conventions and traditions? Geertz's revolutionary call for understanding from the native's point of view builds from an assumption that we can most readily comprehend a culture through its own categories, that their way of making sense out of the world is far more likely to be revealed by their internal orderings than by our external, imposed orderings. By relegating feminism's process-epistemology to nothing more than an object of study within my analytic approach and write-up, I have denied them their autonomy as an epistemological system. And by denying them their autonomy I have put on my blinders, relegated them to a less-than-full
position and myself to a less-than-full understanding.

It has become acceptable to say that our own cultural rubrics do not necessarily apply cross-culturally, that 'religion' might not be a useful device for describing Chinese civilization and that 'kinship' might not help in Yap. As Schneider has shown (1985), the use of our rubrics to analyze others may teach us more about ourselves than others, although we may continue to think we're learning about the others. More recently, Charles Briggs (1986) has shown that as we come to accept Schneider's tenets, our hegemonic theories have been pushed underground into the realm of methodology. Our ways of finding out about alien cultures reflect "our theories of communication and of social reality" (p.120). Our reliance on those local, folk categories, he says,

acts as a hidden filter, blocking our ability to hear what 'they' are saying while allowing the comforting sound of our own preconceptions about language and life to be echoed in our data. (p.125)

As long as we continue to assume the universality of our cultural categories or folk methodologies we are doomed to never understand others as they understand themselves.

In the end, it's our desire to extend our own relevance that snaps back on us. As Geertz has said:

To see ourselves as others see us can be eye-opening. To see others as sharing a nature with ourselves is the merest decency. But it is from the far more difficult achievement of seeing ourselves amongst others, as a local example of the forms human life has locally taken, a case among cases, a world among worlds, that the largeness of mind, without which objectivity is self-congratulation and tolerance a sham, comes. (1983:16)

Schneider's critique has only begun to be seriously heeded. Briggs's still echoes unheard, a challenge ringing from the far-
away land of sociolinguistics. While Briggs's challenge travels at the speed of sound across that great divide, I'll offer another from my even more distant place. Not only do our analytic rubrics and ethnographic methods often cast a filter between us and our object: our very method of communicating with ourselves inside academia distorts whatever it is we may have seen through those filtered rubrics and methods. By writing in a static, analytic style we impose an epistemology that may be alien to the very people we study.

Penelope and Wolf, for instance, the major source for my analysis of literary feminism, themselves regret the necessity of writing in a style that alienates some of the very women they are trying to reach. The alienation will continue, they say,

As long as there is a 'prestige dialect' that everyone aspiring to status is expected to acquire, and as long as publishers, editors, and reviewers sanction only those works written in the prestige dialect.... (1983:138n)

Their understanding of the links between language and epistemology (detailed earlier) renders their statement powerful: they are expected to adjust to the dominant epistemology before they are taken seriously.

I have been complicit, from a different angle, in their cooptation. I have tried to understand feminist epistemology in an epistemology alien to the very one I study. Like imposing biogenetic kinship on the Yap or referential-content interviewing on Mexicanos, I have constructed a wall of my own assumptions between myself and my subject.

Schneider showed that the assumption that kinship deals with human reproduction has clouded our understanding of Yap. Briggs
showed that the assumption that interviewing is a culturally-neutral device has led to misunderstanding Mexicano culture. Now I point out that the assumption that journal and monograph writing should follow a distinctive style "modeled rather abjectly on those of the natural sciences" (Turner 1983:89) has led to our misunderstanding those cultures or subcultures that eschew a thing-epistemology.

Or even, as I have shown, supplement a thing-epistemology with a process-epistemology, such as ours. Wouldn't anthropology seem more 'alive' (Lawrence via Turner) if our writing embodied both halves of our way of seeing the world? As much as we have come to alienate and marginalize others by assuming an extended importance for our folk beliefs and traditional ways, we have come to alienate ourselves by focusing on only half of our own beliefs and ways. If we grow to learn the utility of both, we may be less likely to misunderstand and alienate others, and more likely to understand and enjoy ourselves.

* * *

Such a proposal by no means exceeds the range of the possible. We have within our communicative repertoire a number of methods that do not exclude process, and some which even highlight it. Turner's suggestion for a performative anthropology, for instance, might allow us to portray and comprehend more process-oriented and liminal groups than the current journal style. Annual meetings of mixed paper presentations and play performances might provide a more humanly fulfilling experience than the current meetings. Similarly,
journals which encourage creative, playful prose or even ethnographic poetry might produce a more balanced understanding of others and a greater sense of completeness for ourselves. And all of this might have the added attraction of bringing our theories and journals back within the grasp of the layperson, who seems to have been arbitrarily excluded by a multiplying web of abstruse terms and dry prose.5

Such suggestions are of course only preliminary, pre-liminary, before we enter the liminal structureless stage of reformulating ourselves. As we know by now, that stage is the imagery-generator, the brainstorming session in which to renew or change the structure. It seems most appropriate that only by going beyond the pre-liminary stage, only by boldly stepping forth into the life-and-death of the liminal, can we enter the watershed era of ideas, the time when we will create new forms to express both elements of our epistemology.

This paper, then, only points the way towards that day. It is process--the pointing--as much as it is product--the paper.

If I have not yet followed the dual form of writing that I advocate, I can only echo Penelope and Wolf, to say for now that I must work at least within earshot of the 'prestige dialect', the prestige epistemology. Within that earshot, though, I have done what I could to keep audible both halves of our epistemology,

---

5To the argument that we can't expect our senior anthropologists to don costumes and wade through poetry, I can only respond by saying that 'real anthropologists don't mind a bumpy road'. Anthropology has always cherished that versatile, rough-and-ready image among academics, and a little physical theater and spiritual poetry would only add an eccentric twist to the Indiana Jones image.
to balance system with practice, steady state with change, playful prose with standard analytic writing, in order to present the American epistemology from the insider's point of view.

Because I am an insider, an individual acting on the level of practice. I am the cultural actor, using both halves of the dual epistemology—thing and process—in a strategic attempt to define my reality of America. As one native to another, I'll conclude on a familiar note. This paper, my strategic attempt, is a thing, certainly. You hold it in your hands, a bounded discrete object. But it is also a process, a first step in understanding ourselves, in journeying towards America.
APPENDIX

The following represents an example of the matched-epistemology writing style that I advocate. It is important to note that I do not call for a transformation of all anthropological writing, merely that which attempts to describe cultures or subcultures with epistemologies radically different from our own. The following section on the drug culture, for instance, would stand side-by-side with the standard analytic style used in Chapter 2. See Chapter 5 for a more detailed explanation of why I propose this, and how I feel it would improve in one fell sweep the anthropological enterprise's understanding and enjoyment, as well as contribute to current trends in de-imperializing our methodologies and theories.

This section can be compared against the more conventional section included in the body of Chapter 4.

DRUG CULTURE

The Lesson of Water

What one values in the game--
   is the play
      Fluid

What one values in the form--
   is the moment of forming
      Fluid

What one values in the house--
   is the moment of dwelling
      Fluid

What one values in the heart--
   is the beat
      Pulsing

1There are contrary to what you might think no spacing problems or typos in this section.
What one values in the action—
is the timing
Fluid

Indeed
Because you flow like water
You can neither win nor lose

Timothy Leary, VI-5 from *Psychedelic Prayers After the Tao Te Ching*

Air and water overpower earth. Water flows, process proceeds, air allows flight. Drug language like poetry prefers process. 

"[W]e all launched off" (Leary [after L] 1983:65) means we took mushrooms together means we added psilocybin to ourselves. We "shared voyages" (IBID) means we took drugs with. We turn on; Leary was the first "to turn on Robert Lowell" (L 83:67) which means he gave him shrooms. We verb, always action process like a journey. "Ralph turned out to be a natural inner explorer" (83:85) Leary said, flashing back. He turned out to be a natural inner explorer, but we turn on, tune in, drop out says Leary, always process always turning tuning dropping never really there. Flowing is water and flying is air. We get high and we trip, journey and air, never ground. I'm flying I say which means I'm more than high which means I'm not on or concerned with this thinglike structure ground. Sometimes I'm even high as a kite. And when I'm flying I might be tripping too, always a journey but an air or waterflow journey.

This is not like drinking. When I drink I'm wasted which is thingarbage usually on the ground or fucked-up which means etymologically to strike hard with a stick fokken and now means to have violent or meaningless sex a very physical act or I'm
plastered very house propertylike on a wall something bounding or I'm shitfaced which is waste on my face which is the ground and nogood or I'm smashed which means I'm in pieces and was once a thing. Which is all very different from airjourneying.

Airjourneying is very flow like the poem before and a little like this writing and maybe Timothy Leary says it best again when he talks about making sure the process never stops even when consciousness seems really good "Consciousness could flick in and out of any imaginable happy/horror chamber. The trick was not to get caught, not to freeze the flow of reality" (1983:66 who cares when or where). And in another time place Leary said that "Psychedelic poetry, like all psychedelic art, is crucially concerned with flow" (1966:no page numbers in this book read the whole thing not just a quote).

The whole thing (I know you read the parentheses) like communitas like Turner like holism like what my friend said taking drugs is he said "holism--a dismantling of the bifurcation" and Leary tried to make holism-communitas. Like at a prison where he worked when he was with Harvard still he said he needed to unbound to make communitas to dismantle the bifurcation like my friend said to see beyond the arbitrary way of seeing we have

It seemed that two major factors were bringing about changes in the convicts: first, the perception of new realities helped them recognize that they had alternatives beyond the cops and robbers game [look that's unbounding]; then, the empathetic bonding of group members helped them sustain their choice of a new life [look that's communitas]. (83:89)

And other places Leary aimed for communitas like the giant summer research institute camp he made in Mexico "The six weeks at
Zihuatanejo had given us a glimpse of utopia" (83:143) and Turner said that liminals often find create utopias at least in their minds which is where Leary wants it to be anyway and he even calls the group down there in Mexico 'utopiates' and also calls the psychedelic (not heroindownerscocainealcohol) drugs the same word 'utopiates' and he also said that down in Zihuatenejo 1963 "Within a few days we realized that we were developing the ultimate-destination resort. Hotel Nirvana...." which reminds the reader who is looking for communitas of the Big House he later set up in Millbrook which was a place where everyone could come and be equal and flow and no one owned any property there because property like Turner says is structure and they weren't like that up there at Millbrook and neither was Ken Kesey and his West coast very different communitas gang that lived for a long time in a bus and Leary talking about Millbrook says that "if your concept of 'real estate' is neurological rather than mammalian, then your habitat defines your launching pad" which is pretty complicated but he prefers neurological to mammalian which he thinks is territorial and knows the word real is in real estate I think so means defining your reality in neurological not thingbound terms and if you do your reality neurologically then you have a launching pad which means you can fly journey and get away from this bounded territorial mammalian earth ground of structureproperty.

which he thinks you can do because he thinks you can create your reality but not all the time just sometimes, in between the normal periods of earthbound existence when you take psychedelic drugs and give yourself the ability to imprint
are you listening Victor? to reimprint yourself even though you'll go back to the world of imprinted reality and he says "Consciousness is energy received by structure" in the book with no page numbers (1966) and I think he means when you're flying you're off the ground you're liminal but it's not just a rest stop for structure it's a way to change it Victor, it's a way to re-im-print not just re-in-vigor-ate, a way to change the words not just make the old ones strong again

because like quantum physics and some theater people and feminists Leary believes that you can create reality just like Berger and Bateson and Geertz and the gang imply and sometimes even say

and if you can create reality then the liminal stage is more than a refreshments stand it's an idea land a vacation where you learn something not just rest up for work again it's like the Jewish Sabbath a time that you learn from and live for and hope to bring some of into the world of structure which you enter again

that's what the liminal stage is if you're Timothy Leary or a member of the League for Spiritual Discovery and like he says "It always works this way after a good trip. Your old reality fades a bit, and you incorporate a new reality" (83:87). Which is what change is about, not a steadystate pendulum determining our kneejerk reactions to the last era says Leary and physics et al

and maybe just maybe the native's point of view is sometimes
a little deeper than we'd like it to be especially if the
native is our culture's own counter and that depth of theirs is
digging right under the very ground we stand on thing.

and finally (where I put it) Timothy Leary makes very clear
how he fits right into that whole Turner liminal Gestalt
(although he disagrees (and so do I) radically about the
implications of that on actual cultural social epistemological
change) by knocking structure and closed morality and status and
inequality (Turner's terms all) as he does here in his section's
last words which he deserves

I have remained unenthusiastic about pious teachers who set
up schools, hierarchies, and special rituals...[We should]
avoid secrecy, beaurocracy, masters, followers, dogma, and
fixed ritual...make accessible to everyone what had for
centuries been shrouded in occultism. (83:150)

* * *

and this isn't a part of Leary's drug chapter so I kept my word,
it's just a little note that I think deserves more than a foot or
to be booted to the bottom, or kicked around, etc.
and that note is that I think the section on the drug culture had
more to say than the section on feminism and I think a lot of that
had to do with form and postmodernism is not dead. which is to
say that Geertz is not dead because function here is to relate
insider's form and the best way to do that may be to follow
insider's form

By trying both I allow the reader to choose, to follow the
process of this paper instead of automatically assuming that it
is a bounded, completed thing. I offer the process of revision
rather than the revised product, which in and of itself represents a very feminist offer. And I democratize style: that is, I write in more than one way, and denigrate none of them, another trick in the feminist book. 'Epistemology' may be my next word, or 'flyjourney', because to provide less of a choice would be to cast this entire analysis in the plaster of a single epistemology.
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