The Roma of Eastern Europe in Transition: Historical Marginalization, Misrepresentation, and Political Ethnogenesis

Michael Bobick
Senior Honors Thesis

Anthropology Department
Oberlin College

Professor Jack Glazier
Honors Advisor

Submitted April 24, 2002
## Contents

*Introduction*  
Romani History: “Pariah” Origins  

*One*  
Misrepresentations: Fictions and Facts  

*Two*  
Romani Ethnicity: Anthropological Perspectives  

*Three*  
Ethnicity, Identity, and the European Dimension  

*Four*  

*Conclusion*  

*Appendix A*  

*Appendix B*  

*Works Cited*
Introduction

I had just arrived by train in the rural Transylvanian town of Sighisoara, Romania. Having a few days to kill before returning to Germany, I was set to enjoy a relaxing weekend in the medieval Saxon citadel. Having previously traveled via Bucharest through other small towns in Romania, I had encountered “Gypsies” before. As is normally the custom in rural Romania, upon arrival at the local train station various people offered rooms for rent. After choosing a room from one enterprising teenager who promised me a great room in the citadel, we set off together for town. Along the way, I saw various groups of what appeared to be “Gypsies” hovering around, presumably attempting to receive something from me. Needless to say, I (like many romantic Westerners) was drawn to them, if only for my own curiosity. I asked my young Romanian companion about the Gypsies in town. He informed me in his broken English that his father was a police chief in town, and that he always had problems with Gypsies. What kind of problems, I inquired. His reply (as far as my memory recalls) went something like this: “Gypsies, I don’t have a problem with them, but they steal and are dirty. Don’t mess with the Gypsies – they will steal and rip you off.” He then warned me explicitly: “Don’t bring any Gypsies into the house. If you have problem with Gypsies, give my father a call,” (after which he promptly gave me a business card with the appropriate numbers).

This incident stands out among my various tangential encounters with Gypsies in Eastern Europe for many reasons. The frankness of the boy’s tone disturbed me. I was shocked to see such a biased assessment of “Gypsy” criminality in the countryside. Undoubtedly in Eastern European capitals where one sees their dire poverty and
marginalization, I expected the worst to be said about Gypsies, but I somehow naively believed that attitudes would be different in the countryside. For personal reasons not totally understood by me, this encounter sparked my anthropological interest in the Roma. During my time abroad in Europe (I spent the majority of my time in Munich, Germany), I had gradually become distanced from archaeology, my previous anthropological interest. Having spent my vacation months traveling through Eastern Europe, I became interested in post-socialist changes a decade after the fact. A strong wave of nationalism had engulfed Eastern Europe, and throughout my travels I saw how "unassimilated" national minorities were desperately searching for a place in the "new" post-socialist Europe.

This thesis primarily deals with how the ongoing political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe have affected one particular group, the Roma or Gypsies. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many initially greeted the radical reconfiguration of hegemonic governmental structures with nationalist zeal, and the democratization of socialist regimes was universally hailed as a victory for all. But for the Roma, a historically persecuted pariah group continually surrounded by misconceptions and Orientalist stereotypes, the radical transformation to "Western" capitalism and democracy must not be viewed in such a positive light. As an ethnic group the Roma exhibit a wide-ranging cultural variation, from the Sinti in Germany (who have been integrated in the German context for centuries) to Vlax Roma (enslaved in modern day Romania until the mid 19th century). Collectively Roma exhibit a tenuous identity and little solidarity. In this thesis I shall deal with two contexts: post-socialist Russia and socialist Hungary. In
both environments the Roma studied have shown a remarkable tendency to culturally adapt to the changing post-socialist conditions.

In the first section I will trace the historiography of the Roma in Europe. Linguistic evidence and the "Indic" origin theory will be examined. The lack of historical discourse on the part of the Roma is indicative of their marginalized status within Europe. Historically denied a voice in their portrayal, the Roma have been marginalized by non-Roma throughout history. Ascribed a "pariah" status within Europe, I will investigate historic examples of marginalization that include the enslavement of the Roma in the Balkans and their persecution under the Nazi regime. The history of the Roma must be understood in order to be able to comprehend their current predicament.

In the second section I will identify and deconstruct many of the misrepresentations common in historical, ethnographic, and social scientific texts. Much of the historic scholarship on the Roma is based on little empirical data. In addition to this lack of original scholarship, non-Roma predominately construct the history of the Roma. This constructed history is often more attuned to the historian's ideological tendencies, far removed from the reality. Much of the history written reflects the ideological climate of the time. The tendency to reconstitute earlier scholarly accounts of the Roma becomes a closed cycle of misrepresentation where accounts of the Roma reflect the hegemonic position of the historian and diminish the disadvantaged reality of the Roma. Fiction, chronicled through history, has the tendency to become fact in the minds of non-Roma.
In the third section, I introduce the topics of ethnicity and identity and develop a theoretical framework for analyzing the Roma past and present. After addressing the anthropological theories of ethnicity, I move on the national contexts addressed in the ethnographic evidence. Particular attention will be given to the distinct national contexts and their influence on the construction of Romani ethnicity. Special attention will be paid to the unstable transitional conditions present in post-socialist Eastern Europe. This section, through ethnographic examples (post-Soviet Russia and socialist Hungary), will illustrate how ethnicity and identity are grounded in more contemporary anthropological research. The micro contexts examined will illustrate the everyday process through which the Roma construct their ethnicity and identity.

In the final section I analyze the supranational dimensions of the Romani question, focusing specifically on the EU and its policies. A political struggle for recognition has emerged from their fragmented diasporic history, primarily led by both a Roma and non-Roma intelligentsia, perhaps pointing to a solution for the “Gypsy question,” once and for all. But to reduce all of the problems of this ethnic group to a “Gypsy question” is an oversimplification. One must indeed deconstruct the “Gypsy question” and those who have addressed it, most notably people ignorant of the Romani culture. Particular attention will be paid to the diasporic notions of the Roma in Europe. The history of Romani nationalism will be briefly addressed, in order to better understand the current political mobilization in Europe. Grassroots Romani political movements in Germany exemplify many of the trends in Romani political activism, beginning at the grassroots level and ending up at the supranational level. At the supranational level, the EU social “engineering” projects will also be examined in order to understand the
identity the EU is trying to create, and how the accession process will integrate the citizens of Eastern European nation-states into the EU. At the conclusion, the process of EU accession and the Roma dimension will be addressed.

Do the Roma constitute an ethnic group, or are they a cultural amalgamation, the historical product of romantic notions and the intellectual notions of the Enlightenment? How has the history of the Roma been misappropriated by outsiders, thus denying the Roma the power to assert their ethnic identity and culture? How are the Roma through the oft-posed “Gypsy Question” being used by supra-national institutions in Europe in conjunction with EU expansion? These questions have no simple answers, and can no longer be answered by outdated notions of Roma culture based on preconceived romantic notions and outdated historical misrepresentation. These preconceived notions and stereotypes must be openly challenged and “deconstructed” in order to reverse the simplified binary opposition inherent in much of the previous research dealing with the Roma. I use the entry in The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edition 1989) as an example of banal scholarship that exemplifies the stereotyping described above:

Gipsy, gypsy ... A member of a wandering race (by themselves called Romany), of Hindu origin, which first appeared in England about the beginning of the 16th c. and was then believed to have come from Egypt. They have a dark tawny skin and black hair. They make a living by basket-making, horse-dealing, fortune-telling, etc.; and have been usually objects of suspicion from their nomadic life and habits. Their language (called Romany) is a greatly corrupted dialect of Hindi, with large admixture of words from various European languages.

The definition illustrates, among other things, some of the false assumptions that have come to characterize the Roma: the dark skin color, the “pseudo” language, the nomadic existence. Much of the content in this dictionary entry has been used to marginalize and delegitimize the Roma as a distinct ethnic group.
Due to external constraints, this paper has no fieldwork component (save a few short discussions and informal interviews conducted during my travels throughout Eastern Europe) and is primarily based on secondary sources. I believe the Roma question is indicative of many of the transition processes taking place in contemporary Europe. This transitional phase of Europe raises as many questions as it purports to answer. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the geopolitical boundaries of not only Post-Soviet Central and Eastern Europe but also Western Europe were called into question. Would the East/West Grenze ("border") be disintegrated or would it simply be moved eastward, thus denying the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe full and unconditional access to the much promised and oft broadcasted benefits of capitalism, democracy, and all other benefits that fall under the rubric of the "free market."

East/West alterity is a reality, both mentally and physically. As the "Roma" question shows, European integration is forcing Europe to export its dominant ideology to the future Member States of Eastern Europe. Is this export an ideological conquest, or does it pragmatically reflect European consciousness in the 21st century?
One

Romani History: “Pariah” Origins

When discussing the history of marginalized populations, it is common that those in power often inevitably control the history of the group without power. This is the case when describing the history of the Gypsies. Outsiders, who often had little firsthand contact with the group being described, the Roma, or “Gypsies,” have inevitably written much of their history. From their initial appearance in Europe centuries ago, non-Roma saw the Roma as outsiders and viewed them with suspicion. From where did these people originate? Do they actually represent one ethnic group? Linguistic scholarship offers perhaps the only concrete evidence pointing to their origins and subsequent migration out of India. In this chapter, I first explore the historical accounts surrounding the migration of the Roma from India and appearance in Europe and then proceed to explore the linguistic evidence and how it corresponds with historical accounts. I will develop a historical background that must be taken into account when looking at the historical and contemporary socio-economic problems that marginalize and stigmatize the Roma as an ethnic group.

Historical Accounts

Initial accounts documenting the appearance of the Roma come from Persia and seem to be connected with a request made by a Persian monarch to the Indian King Shangul for musicians and entertainers. The monarch in question, Bahram Gur, reigned in Persia until 438. After the request was made (and fulfilled), Braham Gur dispatched,
after giving them wheat, cattle, and horses the subjects in question and ordered them to
toil in the fields and make music for the poor. However, within a year they had
slaughtered their cattle and consumed all of their wheat (Fraser 1992: 33-35). What is to
be drawn from this historic snapshot? This account is notable for it is one of the first
attempts to trace the origins of the Roma back to India and is also representative of many
misconceptions surrounding the Roma. One can easily draw parallels to many of the
folkloric traits often inherently ascribed to Gypsies. Today, the Persian migration theory
holds little credence with linguists and Romani-studies scholars. Linguistically, the
Romani and Domari languages have different origins and are not closely related. This
linguistic gulf undermines the India-Persia migration theory (the Doms being the group in
question, given to Bahram Gur) (Hancock 1998: 14). Often references to any migrant
group performing occupations similar to stereotyped “Gypsy” customs (such as
musicians, metalworkers, horse-traders, bear trainers, itinerant craft-makers, etc.) are
equated with the primordial history of the Roma. The search for the essence of the Roma
has captivated Europeans throughout history. Accounts of their appearance in Europe
differ by geographic region, and much of data in question is debatable.

The earliest reference to the presence of Gypsies in Europe (Constantinople) is
derived from a Georgian text, the Life of Saint George the Anchorite, composed around
1068 at the monastery of Iberon on Mount Athos. The account is notable for its
relational proximity to “Europe” proper. In 1050 wild animals devouring the game in an
imperial park plagued the Emperor Constantine Monomachus’ realm. The Emperor
invoked the help of “‘a Samaritan people, descendants of Simon the Magician, who were
called Adsincani, and notorious for soothsaying and sorcery,’ “ (Fraser 1992: 46). This
account is noteworthy for the nomenclature invoked. The word Adsincani was the Georgian derivative of the term the Byzantines commonly used for Gypsies. From Adsincani, the Georgian form of the Greek work Atsinganoi, or Atzinganoi, come the German Zigeuner, French Tsiganes, Italian Zingari, Hungarian Czigányok, and its many other associated forms. The term “Gypsy,” as we shall see, comes from Roma who presented themselves in Europe as penitents, ostensibly from Little Egypt. A sordid connotation had also come to be associated with these words, and they have come to be used as an insult in many cultural contexts (Fraser 1992: 46). This legacy is seen today in the continued negative connotation associated with the word. Fraser attributes much importance to the time the Roma spent in Byzantium and Greece. He hypothesizes that in Greece the Roma became familiar with the Christian world, encountered travelers, and may have learned additional languages. We have no way to establish the truth of these assumptions. In Greece the Roma may also have come into contact with pilgrims to the Holy Land, and from these pilgrims they could have learned of the privileged status afforded pilgrims within Christian Europe (Fraser 1992: 56). The pilgrim connection with the Holy Land is important when viewing their appearance in Europe, for it marks the Roma’s entrance not only into the European continent but also signifies the onset of their historical misunderstanding. From the disintegrating Byzantine Empire the Roma made their way into Western Europe via the Balkans.

After Islamic encroachments on the fringes of Europe, the end result was the Crusades, a series of holy wars lasting from approximately 1099 to 1212. One of the two main routes Crusaders took from Europe to Jerusalem went through northern Europe (via Holland, Germany, Poland, and southward along the Danube) and the other primary route
went through Hungary and Wallachia (present day Romania). The terminus of both of these routes was the Black Sea and eventually the Holy Land. At this time, the Balkans were undergoing a series of socio-economic changes brought on by increased traffic and trade. In comparison to the situation in Western Europe, which was experiencing an economic decline of sorts during the “Middle Ages,” there was a dearth of manpower in the Balkans, and the newly arriving Roma filled an economic niche (Hancock 1987: 11-13). This economic development is perhaps best viewed as a historic precursor to Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory.

**The Roma and the World Economic System**

According to Wallerstein, the origins of the modern world-system fall primarily between 1450-1640. The emergence of the modern world-system is primarily marked by the economic interdependence of different regional areas in terms of their position in the capitalist world economy. These geo-economic regions are divided into core, semi-periphery, and periphery on the basis of their relative position within the larger economic system. Mass-market industries and complex forms of agriculture are the primary economic activities of the core areas, along with a state that allowed this economic growth to occur (an example of the core would be England). Peripheral areas depended on cash crops from large estates, and primarily relied on coerced labor (Wallerstein 1977: 38). Poland and the various Balkan states would exemplify the peripheral regions of the world system. In contrast with state institutions of the core, the periphery lacked a strong central state. Landed gentry and nobility often governed peripheral areas and needed a large labor supply to feed the export-oriented economies. The reasons (cultural,
economic, etc.) for the enslavement of the Roma must viewed as a correlate of the ongoing economic processes not only in the Balkan region, but also in terms of their relation to the developing world economy. Contemporary problems of marginalization must be viewed in terms of their historic origins in the developing world-system.

The virtual absence of a working class initially made for a welcoming environment for the Roma in the Balkans. The peasantry had incrementally moved up in status, becoming the new “middle class” in Moldavia, Transylvania, and Wallachia. The situation was far from stable, however. In world systems terminology, one views the Balkans as a peripheral area (Wallerstein 1977). In addition to radical economic changes, religious turmoil also engulfed the Balkans.

Pilgrims, Spies, and “Pariahs”

Increased Muslim incursions into Europe took place between 1241 and the mid-1400s, and a strong anti-Islamic sentiment had become firmly established among the general populace (Hancock 1987: 12-13). Initially welcomed, the Roma were eventually enslaved for reasons described above. In the area that would become modern Romania the Roma were enslaved. Prejudice was not limited to the Balkans, however. Those Roma that fled persecution inevitably met with prejudice elsewhere in Europe. Although geographically isolated to greater Romania, this enslavement has had a large influence on the external and internal construction of Roma identity.

Historically, the Balkan region as a distinct geographical space has primarily been an amalgam of conquered, colonized, and newly “ethnicized” peoples. The recent Balkan wars can be viewed historically as the latest in a string of bloody conflicts
stretching back centuries into the past. (For a fictional account, albeit mildly pro-Serb, of historical ethnic conflict in Bosnia, see *The Bridge on the Drina* by Ivo Andrić). The Balkans had increasingly come under Ottoman influence, and for reasons unknown some Roma moved there. In continental Europe the Roma presented themselves as penitents, pilgrims from “Little Egypt.” It was from this narrative and their perceived place of origin that the term “Gypsy” originated.

In medieval Europe at the time, their claim to penitent status gave them an advantageous position as religious travelers. Because of the medieval attitude towards sin and punishment cultivated by the Roman Catholic Church, it was believed charitable persons would share in the blessings pilgrims would receive upon their pilgrimage. Rulers, always eager to attain influence and legitimacy from the Church, gave letters of recommendation in order to encourage goodwill and increase charity (Fraser 1992: 62-63). The practice of imperial issuance of safe-conduct documents was widespread in medieval Europe, and the Roma exploited this practice to their advantage.

Around 1417, some Roma received safe conduct papers from Emperor Sigismund at Lindau (near Constance in Germany), and were received with varying degrees of success in continental Europe. Declaring themselves pilgrims from “Little Egypt,” they employed a religious narrative to ingratiate themselves and reap the economic benefits afforded to pilgrims. According to the narrative utilized by the Roma, they described themselves as having initially abandoned the Christian religion and later repenting, a penance was imposed upon them. They were to wander the world and “expiate in exile the guilt of their sin,” (Fraser 1992: 65). From their appearance in Europe, they were economically dependent upon non-Roma for their economic and social subsistence.
From their initial appearance and their perceived parasitic existence, a prejudiced mentality developed among non-Roma.

From the onset of their appearance in Europe, the Roma failed to enter into historical discourse on the subject of their origins. By historical discourse I mean that the Roma, historically occupying a marginalized socioeconomic position, had little access to education, scholarly, or governmental means through which a proper history could be articulated. A people without power have no control over their perceived images in the eyes of outsiders. Relatively little unbiased scholarship has been conducted on the Roma until relatively recently (the latter half of the 20th Century). Many of the written accounts dealing with the Roma are of a derivative nature, often replicating material and mixing the fantasies of the chronicler, the end result being an aggregate of misconceptions often widely accepted as factually correct. The German chronicler Aventinus (Johann Thurmaier), writing in 1522, illustrates many of the narrative constructs described above and exemplifies the deterioration of public attitudes towards the Roma during the centuries since their initial appearance:

At this time, that thievish race of men, the dregs and bilge water of various peoples, who live on the borders of the Turkish Empire and of Hungary (we call them Zigeni), began to wander through our provinces under their king Zindelo, and by dint of theft, robbery and fortune telling they seek their sustenance with impunity. They relate falsely that they are from Egypt and are constrained by the gods to exile, and they shamelessly feign to be expiating, by a seven-year banishment, the sins of their forefathers who turned away the Blessed Virgin with the child Jesus. I have learned by experience that they use the Wendish language and are traitors and spies. Likewise others, notably the Emperor Maximilian Caesar Augustus, and Albert the father of our princes, testify to this in public edicts: but so deeply does idle superstition, like lethargy, imbue the minds of men that they believe them to be ill done by and suffer them everywhere to lurk about, to thieve, and to cheat. (Cited in Fraser 1992: 85-86).
Through thievish tropes and sordid imagery, a detrimental image of the Roma was branded into public consciousness (in as far as the historic record reflects public consciousness). Aventinus’ account, reflecting the views of a German scholar, can be extrapolated to the wider European historical context. This is not to say that all Europeans at the time of Aventinus disliked Gypsies, merely that positive images had not yet appeared. I now wish to use the geographic area encompassing modern Germany as an example of historic persecution of the Roma suitable for the wider European context.

German-Gypsy relations are characterized by a continuous historical persecution persisting until the end of World War II. In 1497, the legislature of the Holy Roman Empire intervened and further sullied their popular perception with allegations of spying. The European Christian public undoubtedly were influenced by the church, and once the ideological power of the Roman Catholic Church stigmatized the Gypsies, popular opinion inevitably grew against the Gypsies as a group. The Imperial Diet brought charges of spying against the Roma as a group and in the years that followed, the Roma were accused and subsequently expelled through edicts and declarations. Despite the proliferation of discriminatory legislation, one must take into account the wide discrepancies between legislation as initially intended and its implementation at the local level. The Holy Roman Empire in the late 15th/early 16th century was a conglomeration of principalities, including what would later become Germany, and had little centralized power or apparatus to implement legislation (Fraser 1992: 89-91). Varying historical circumstances and legislative edicts in different regions were brought about by the appearance of the Roma. I do not wish to survey every country in question, merely to see how historical circumstances and historical construction laid the foundation for
discrimination. The situation of the Roma in what is now present day Romania is important, for the sins of the past are inevitably still felt today.

**Gypsy Slavery in Romania**

Although the exact beginning of Romani slavery is unclear, they were enslaved by the proprietors of Orthodox monasteries and followed later by landowners (Crowe 1994: 107-108). Slaves are dehumanized and stripped of their identity. Article I (37) of the Moldavian Civil Code for 1822 shows the legal ambivalence about slavery, despite its recognition as morally wrong: “Although slavery goes against the natural law of man, it has nevertheless been practiced in this principality since antiquity…” (Cited in Hancock 1987: 16). Much like the historical slave markets of the American South, Gypsy slaves were bought and sold in Romania. The stigmatization of the Roma as a “pariah” group in the Balkans began with the institutionalization of slavery in Romania, and did not end with its abolition in the mid 19th century. The “pariah” notion is not limited to the Balkans, however. The Gypsies were inevitably persecuted in other European contexts, as the German example above illustrates.

In the introduction to *The Pariah Syndrome*, an account of Romani slavery and persecution, Ian Hancock, a prominent Romani linguist and scholar, describes much of the institutionalized pressure he encountered when preparing for publication related articles and documents on the subject of the Romani enslavement. What he speaks of represents a theme running through Romani history:
The world does not yet appear ready to believe that the enslavement of Gypsies ever happened, or that it was significant enough to warrant being brought to the attention of the larger community. In Romani, there is the saying ... "he who wants to enslave you will never tell you the truth about your forefathers." We cannot wait for others to document this truth; our forefathers' history must be told by ourselves. While the enslavement of Gypsies has been abolished for over a century, equally inhumane forms of oppression continue to be perpetuated into the present day ... Only cursory acknowledgement of the five centuries of slavery endured by the Balkan Gypsies has yet been made; no detailed treatments at all have appeared in English, (Hancock 1987: 2-3).

In the first half of the 19th century, talk of liberation of the Gypsies' spread around the Balkans. After initial smaller scale liberations, the Roma achieved complete legal freedom in 1864 when Prince Ioan Alexandru Couza restored the liberated Gypsies to their estates (see Hancock 1987 for a complete account). Newly liberated and without the benefit of any sort of resettlement policy or safety net, the Roma were once again left to fend for themselves in an environment that viewed them as slaves. The physical liberation of the Roma did not coincide with a social component, such as an attempt at Romani integration within the larger society or de-stigmatization of the Gypsies as an ethnic group. Despite being free, anti-Roma prejudice had become salient.

**The Historical Development of “Antigypsyism”**

The historical roots of “Antigypsyism” must first be brought to light in order to understand the persecution of the Roma during the Holocaust. Reasons for the institutionalization of prejudice against the Roma can be historically traced to a number of different factors, which I shall attempt to summarize. The religious turmoil that encompassed Europe (particularly the development of a distinct Muslim – Christian dichotomy) left those distinctly non-Christian in a marginalized position, regardless as to
whether the actually practiced a non-Christian religion (or non-practice was assumed). The association of the first Roma in Europe with Islamic incursions and Asiatic invaders resulted in persecution and the ascription of a “pariah” status (Hancock 1997b: 20). The medieval Christian doctrine associating light with purity, and darkness with sin hindered assimilation attempts, for many Roma were phenotypically distinct. Many of the early allusions to the appearance of the Roma explicitly mention their darkness, which many believed to be an acquired phenotype, resulting from a sinful way of life, instead of a genetic manifestation. These prejudices became incorporated in folkloric traditions, and often justified and encouraged prejudice against the Roma (Hancock 1997b: 20-21). Thus, religious presumptions and misconceptions by non-Romani actors introduced de-facto discrimination at many different societal levels. These early discriminatory practices may have acted as a catalyst for the crystallization of a distinct Romani culture, or Romanipe.

The Romani culture, Romanipe, discourages close social relationships with non-Roma. The exclusive nature of Romani society manifests assumptions, often made by those outside Romani society, that Roma are hiding something or are up to devious behavior. Hence, the early accusations against the Roma of espionage should be viewed with this idea in mind. The maintenance of cultural and/or religious boundaries must historically be taken into account when viewing anti-Gypsyism and anti-Semitism (Hancock 1997b: 21). Because of persecution and legislation forbidding settlement, many Roma relied on a wide variety of means of livelihood to survive that stood in direct contradiction to the predominant peasant ideology of work and land tillage. These included occupations such as fortune-telling, horse-trading, bear training, and other
associated crafts such as sieve making, spoon making, basket weaving. Non-traditional (especially when contrasted with much of the dominant peasant culture) occupations of this sort only helped to reinforce and strengthen the mysterious image of the Gypsy (Hancock 1997b: 21-22). These outside misconceptions inevitably formed an image of the Roma that was salient to non-Roma, yet reflected little of the reality that the Roma endured. The exclusive nature of Romani society has also kept the non-Roma populace at arm’s length, and until recently has prevented social scientists from gaining an unobfuscated, intimate account of Romani existence. This is changing, with more prolonged research at the micro-level, but much will need to be done before the “otherness” is obliterated (Hancock 1997b: 24).

The tendency for outsiders to project their own fantasies and yearnings for freedom on the Roma elevated their perceived existence to artistic leitmotifs and symbols of freedom. The term “Gypsy” has become so inundated with fantastical and projected stereotypes that its meaning has been taken out of the hands of the particular group it proposes to describe (Hancock 1997b: 22). Since the 19th century, a literary “gypsy” has emerged, epitomizing freedom: from responsibility, from moral constraints, from hygiene, from the normal occupational routine, etc. Lack of access to media (the “print capitalism” so important to nation-building in Anderson’s terminology) has denied the Roma any voice in their portrayal (Hancock 1997b: 23-24). (See the following chapter on Misrepresentation & Lemon 2000 for literary stereotyping). The lack of tangible control (with regard to tangible aspects of Romani culture throughout history) is also reflected in their non-territorial existence.
By the simple fact that they Roma have no national, military, territorial, political, or economic strength makes them the an ideal target for scapegoatism, on both the individual and institutional level. This non-territoriality manifests itself predominantly in post-socialist Europe, where many Roma now find themselves outsiders in any territory, and increasingly seek asylum in Western Europe (Hancock 1997b: 23). This situation has changed in the context of the newly emerging “unified” Europe. I will return to this in my final chapter.

The Persecution of the Roma

As described above, the historical roots of anti-Romani sentiment come from a wide variety of areas, ranging from racism, religious intolerance, outsiders status, and literary fantasy to simple cultural boundary maintenance. If the Roma have encountered constant persecution, is it any wonder that they avoided and limited non-Romani contact? In many Central and Eastern European countries, the newly liberated slaves encountered hostility from other Romani groups who had achieved a degree of settlement in countries, such as the Sinti in Germany. Eighty years later after their initial liberation, events in Germany under the Hitler regime showed how attitudes towards the Roma had truly “changed” (or merely reconstituted in different forms) in Europe.

Criminality had also become a de facto attribute of Romani identity, with the publication of Cesare Lombroso’s *L’uomo deliquente* in 1876, which included a chapter on the criminality of the Roma, whom Lombroso described as “a living example of a whole race of criminals.” (Lobroso, as cited in Hancock 1997b: 27). All of these
prejudices helped cement the base of a pyramid of persecution that culminated with the systematic extermination of the Roma by the Nazi regime.

From their arrival in Europe centuries ago, the Roma had consistently been persecuted and marginalized. Police persecution of the Roma in modern Germany did not begin with Hitler, however. In 1904 the Prussian Landtag (legislative assembly) unanimously adopted a proposition regulating the movement of Roma and their means of livelihood. Munich, the capital of Bavaria and an early stronghold of Hitler, was at the forefront of the persecution of the Roma and Sinti (see Eiber 1998 for a complete account of persecution in Bavaria). A quarter of a century later saw the appearance of Alfred Dillmann's _Zigeunerbook_ (the "Gypsy Book"), which, among other things, consisted of arguments for controlling the Roma, a register of over 5,000 individuals, and included Roma photographs from various police records (Hancock 1997b: 29). The introduction to Dillmann's _Zigeunerbook_ maintained that:

...The German people were "suffering" from a "plague" of Gypsies, who were "a pest against which society must unflaggingly defend itself," and who were to be "controlled by the police most severely," being "ruthlessly punished" whenever necessary (Hancock 1997b: 29).

This criminal-biological typing resurfaced in the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, which were the beginnings of the basis for the Final Solution.

The history of the Roma in the Holocaust is an emerging area of Holocaust studies. Much of what has historically dealt with the victims of the Holocaust has almost exclusively focused on the extermination of the Jews, although newer research has probed the depths of the Romani Holocaust (_porrajmos_, or "the devouring" in Romani). (For a documentary account of German Sinti and Roma under the Nazi regime, see the film "Das Falsche Wort," (1987) by Melanie Spitta and Katrin Seybold). Hitler's race
policy targeted specifically two “cultural” groups, the Roma and the Jews. Estimates as to the number of Roma murdered in the Holocaust range from as low as twenty thousand to as high as four million, with half a million becoming the “default” figure (Hancock 1997b: 37). Many Roma murders were unrecorded, often occurring before internment at concentration camps. Of those that survived, tellingly none was asked to testify at the war crimes trial nor were they explicitly mentioned as the only ethnic group besides the Jews specifically targeted by the Nazi regime. Reparations from the German government have not been forthcoming, most likely due to external and internal political pressure from the German political establishment. Reparations payments are an extremely sensitive topic in contemporary Germany society and remain politically volatile.

Language – Romani as a Unifying Factor?

Before moving on to a description of recent linguistic evidence support the Indian origin of the Roma, I wish to cite examples to show how lexical usage can come to be felt in concrete political terms. One controversial issue at a 1995 OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) conference dealt with the use of the word Rom (and its etymological derivatives), and a resolution by the Romanian government. The Romanian government wanted to replace the words Rom and Romani with Tigan in official government discourse. The word Tigan is a synonym for “slave” during the almost six centuries of Gypsy slavery. Hancock likens the use of the term describe Roma as similar to the use of the term “nigger” to describe African Americans (Hancock 1987: 39). This is ironic, for the word Romanian, not initially regarded as a nationality, originally meant a low status individual. “The rumain during earlier historical eras just
meant a peasant in an enserfed position,” (Gheorghe 1997: 159). Now, since Romanian socialist ideology resurrected the primordial Dacian nature of the Romanian people, they exult in its usage and deride parallel Romani efforts at linguistic liberation. Those who control the official discourse on nationality inevitably control the power it wields.

**Romani Lexical Impoverishment**

Views of the Romani language have long been used to relegate their culture and origins to secondary status. In an article entitled “Duty and beauty, possession and truth: lexical impoverishment as control,” Ian Hancock briefly details the primary means by which subordinate identities are manipulated by those in power. In addition to discrimination through legislation, through inaccurate media representation, and through other fictional (poetry, film, literature) portrayals, the Romani language itself has also been targeted (Hancock 1997a: 180). Misconceptions of the Romani language cover a wide variety of sources, from late 19th century popular accounts, such as Paul Kester’s account of the Romani language in his *Tales of the Real Gypsy*, published in 1897:

> The Gypsies, like the birds and all wild things, have a language of their own, which is apart from the language of those among whom they dwell ... the Gypsy language is deep and warm and full of the charm of the out-of-doors world, the scent of the clover and the ripple of streams and the rush of the wind and the storm (Kester 1897, cited in Hancock 1997a: 180).

Misconceptions of the Romani language are not limited to history. One scientific account by Doris Duncan (presumably a linguist), which appeared in a journal of popular linguistics, *Quinto Lingo*, shows an equally glaring lack of concrete scholarship seventy years later:
All authentic gypsy [sic] communication is, and must be, oral. As they settle for a time in a new country, they acquire some of that country’s words and incorporate them into Roum, more popularly called Romany. It is believed that the Roum language began as a very small one, concerned with the family, the tribe, the horses and herd, words required for a simple existence. It must be very old, for Roum is highly idiomatic, and the complications of verbs and genders is endless … Roum is a disorderly language and must be learned phrase by phrase … A major problem is that no gypsy really knows what a verb is, and it wouldn’t matter anyway if he did, because this is the way it must be said, (Duncan, cited in Hancock 1997a: 180-181).

Despite Duncan’s meager contribution to linguistic scholarship, some of what she says is indeed true. All languages have adopted words from different languages – English, arguably a “pure” world language in the eyes of American and British nationalists, only retains approximately 28 per cent of its original Anglo-Saxon lexicon (Hancock 1997a: 181). Countless authors have attributed lack of character virtues as being reflected in the “impoverished” Romani language. Terms such as duty, possession, truth, beautiful, read, write, time, danger, warmth and quiet have all been denied existence in the Romani language. The latest claim is made in Isabel Fonseca’s *Bury Me Standing: The Gypsies and their Journey* where she maintains that no Romani words exist for time, danger, warmth, and quiet (Hancock 1997a: 181-183). More often than not, these linguistic “facts” reflect the lack of original scholarship of the author and ensure that racist anti-Gypsy attitudes will continue to be accepted as fact.

These outdated views inevitably have parallels in the human sciences, as evidenced by some of the outdated notions of race and cultural evolution employed by some 19th century armchair anthropologists. What is salient about this scholarship with the Roma is the fact that these beliefs are still widely held, and one faces an uphill battle when positively portraying the Roma in post-socialist Europe. Much of the current
Romani scholarship, despite its strong activist thread, can be viewed as a corrective measure to decades of bad scholarship. The assertion of the Romani language is important, for linguistic coherence adds much to the cauldron of ethnicity. Anderson reflects on the influence of language and its coagulating tendencies:

> It is always a mistake to treat languages in the way that certain nationalist ideologues treat them – as emblems of nation-ness, like flags, costumes, folk-dances, and the rest. Much the most important thing about language is its capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect particular solidarities, (Anderson 1991: 133).

When viewed as a central organizing factor in terms of group coherence (the Roma as an ethnic group who speak Romani), the linguistic misrepresentations above become even more detrimental, in effect reducing the Roma ethnically to an aggregate of outcasts, as reflected in their linguistic incoherence. Hancock, himself a Rom, has a vested interest in destabilizing the stereotyped identity of the Roma; in order to forge a new, transnational Roma identity, the old, prejudiced notions of the Roma must be dismantled. I now wish to move on to a discussion of the linguistic origins of the Roma and see how India as a primordial homeland comes into the picture.

**Linguistic Evidence and Indic Origins**

Linguistic evidence offers the firmest ground upon which one can establish the original, primordial “Indic” origin of the Roma as a distinct ethno-cultural group. Whether or not the Roma or Gypsies who fall under the rubric of the Romani “Diaspora” strongly identify themselves with India today is another story. I only wish to briefly address the contemporary linguistic research that seeks to establish and date the original migration of the Roma out of India. Hancock, a Romani linguist, offers perhaps the
best-grounded theory for the linguistic origins of the Roma and how cultural aspects of the Roma today must be viewed in conjunction with the original conditions of migration.

Hancock asserts that the Romani language is *koine*, a type of contact language developed from a medley of battlefield languages spoken in northwestern India (Hancock 2000:1). It is worth quoting at length the definition of Koinization at length:

> Koinization is the process which leads to mixing of linguistic subsystems, this is, of language varieties which either are mutually intelligible or share the same genetically related superimposed language. It occurs in the context of increased interaction among speakers of these varieties. A koine is the stabilized composite variety that results from this process. Formally, a koine is characterized by a mixture of features from the contributing varieties, and at an early stage of development, is often reduced or simplified in comparison to any of these varieties. Functionally, a koine serves as a lingua franca among speakers of the different varieties. It may also become the primary language of amalgamated communities of these speakers (Siegel 1985, cited in Hancock 2000: 1-2).

Hancock views the Roma as an aggregate group of a warrior caste. This formation of an Indic warrior caste in northwest India is attributed to the increased Muslim incursions by Mahmud of Ghazni, who was trying to spread Islam into predominately Hindu Indian territory. The warriors in question were of a non-Aryan nature, since Aryans believed non-Aryan life was less precious than Aryan life. Thus, the majority of the conscripts in the armies assembled were of a mixed-caste, non-Aryan nature. Approximately when did this exodus out of India begin?

Hancock cautiously ventures to establish a date of 1013 or 1015 AD as the initial time of departure, with the geographic location somewhere in Kashmir. Of the seventeen Ghaznavid raids between AD 1001 and AD 1027, only two of them took place in areas that match the corresponding linguistic evidence. Hancock dismissed the multiple migration theories, for much is left unexplained (Hancock 1998: 15-17). How did such
the people included in such divergent migrations manage to relocate and reunite before forming the single population that eventually entered Europe? These are some of the probing questions other theories tend to neglect, but which the single exodus, koinization theory adequately answers. However, what is the linguistic basis for the military koine hypothesis?

Hancock establishes a firm basis for the military origins of the Romani language by careful study of the New and Old Indic language tree. Having minimal linguistic training, I outline Hancock’s theory in depth, which is cited below:

1. Features of the Romani language identify it as a “new-Indic” language rather than an old-Indic language, which dates its time of departure from India as no earlier than ca. 1000 AD (Hancock 2000: 7).

2. The Romani language can simply not be traced to one single branch of the Indic languages, and shows features of several different branches (Hancock 2000: 7).

3. Romani includes a substantial Dardic component, a language isolate spoken in the Pamir region. This is particularly important because this is the same area through which the Ghaznavids moved into India (Hancock 2000: 7).

4. Romani terms for non-Romani peoples point to binary military/non-military relationship. The Romani term for non-Roma, gadžo, is traceable to an original Sanskrit form (gajjha), which means “civilian,” (Hancock 2000: 7).

5. The Romani language has a military vocabulary of Indian origin, including the words for “soldier”, “sword”, and “battle cry.” However, specialized vocabularies, such as for metalworking or agriculture, consist entirely of words not brought from India (Hancock 2000: 7).

6. Some Roma groups in Europe today maintain emblems and symbols corresponding to the Rajputs symbols and identifying insignia (Hancock 2000: 7).

7. Cultural practices similar to original Indian goddess worship are seen in various Romani groups today. These cultural similarities may indicate a cultural affinity (Hancock 2000: 7).
8. Roma have told their often-uncomprehending interlocutors of a defeat at the hands of Islamic forces. The oral tradition of some European Roma groups also includes stories of conflict with Islam leading to their original westward migration (Hancock 2000: 8).

9. The aggregate nature of Romani is evidenced from a large number of synonyms of Indic origin in modern Romani (Hancock 2000: 8).

What is not clear from the linguistic evidence is why they failed to return to India. However, what is apparent is that their separation from India could have caused a social and linguistic trauma. Completely isolated with only their language and amalgamated ethnic identity, they adopted a bipolar identity, on one hand being a composite population, but on the other hand a separate, distinct population. Thus the Roma/non-Roma dichotomy must be viewed as a historical product of their initial migration and continued persecution. This Romani worldview can help explain the dichotomous nature of Roma society (between Rom and Gadžo). However, its willingness to accept non-Roma, if they are willing to accept and submit to an overarching Roma identity may also be the result of the original aggregate nature of the Roma (Hancock 2000: 9). I wish to briefly conclude with a summary of the historical and linguistic accounts dealing with the history of the Roma, and attempt to connect them with the next chapter, which deals with misrepresentation.

**Conclusion**

From their initial appearance in Europe, the Roma have historically been regarded as a distinct other, often in opposition to the sedentary “localized” population. Historically denied the opportunity to articulate their own narrative in historical discourse, the Roma were subsequently denied the opportunity to articulate and define a
Bobick

positive identity. Over time, due to a wide variety of factors ranging from enslavement in the Balkans (modern day Romania) to medieval Christian beliefs with regard to phenotypic purity, the Roma have been forced into a “pariah” group status. Words commonly used to describe the group (Gypsy, Zigeuner, Tigan, etc.) have taken on a sordid connotation. Miscomprehension of their language has proceeded in tandem with historical errors about Roma beginnings and the nature of Romani society.

However, to view the current day predicament of the Roma and their assertion as a distinct minority group worthy of recognition and representation on a transnational level, one must also view and critically “deconstruct” many of the misrepresentations and literary images which romanticize the Roma and their “nomadic” way of life and add fictional distance to their everyday existence as a marginalized ethnic group. I use the word deconstruct not in the Derridean sense, merely to mean a critical re-evaluation of the sources at hand. Having established a historical basis for the Roma in Europe, I now move on to a chronicle of Roma misrepresentation.
Two

Misrepresentation – Fictions and Facts

Introduction

The search for the “essence” of the Roma has been a preoccupation for non-Roma since their first appearance in Europe over seven centuries ago. Wild rumors, exotic stereotypes, literary tropes, and suspicion have followed them throughout their history in Europe. The Oxford English Dictionary citation in the introduction exemplifies the false foundation for much information about the Roma. From this insecure base, non-Roma extrapolate Roma-specific information and subsequently built upon it as fact. The tendency to essentialize and idealize the Roma is not limited to any particular sphere or genre and is manifested even among reputable academic sources. Angus Fraser, in his historical account of the Gypsies in Europe, entitles a chapter on their origins in Europe “The Great Trick.” Although Fraser’s title reflects historical events that were described in the previous chapter (the penitent Roma arriving in Europe), it nonetheless could leave the reader with a sour taste, and might subconsciously strengthen the stereotyped images of the “thievish” Gypsy. In this chapter, I intend to explore various misrepresentations of the Roma, in order to show how misrepresentations shape interactions between Roma and non-Roma, both in history and the present.

Is there a true “Gypsy?”

In Search of the True Gypsy asserts that the Roma have been misrepresented throughout history as a single entity, with little empirical evidence existing that suggests
they constitute a single group. Some may judge the author, Wim Willems, incorrect is his assertion that no objective, “true” Gypsy exists, but nonetheless he does bring up an interesting issue. How much of the Romani existence has been artificially constructed by outside those ignorantly residing outside Romani culture? I do not intend to say that indigenous scholarship carries more weight vis-à-vis other scholarship. Rather I wish for the reader to keep in mind the limited Romani output in their historiography. Willems’ thesis is widely disputed by scholars from a wide variety of disciplines. Ian Hancock, a Rom and a linguist, is Willems’ scholarly opposite, as evidenced by Hancock’s large Romani scholar / Romani activist output (see Hancock 1987: Introduction).

Willems, in his books, attempts to deconstruct the predominant metanarrative of the Gypsies through a careful examination of previous historic sources and scholarship. I say attempt because in my opinion Willems falls short on a number of fronts. The fact that he limits himself to three primary scholars (H. M. Grellmann, George Borrow, and Robert Ritter) minimizes the wider applicability of his ideas. While these three individuals undoubtedly exerted a large influence on the then emerging field of Romani studies, it is presumptuous to suppose that these three individuals and their followers influenced the field of Romani studies in the hegemonic fashion Willems asserts. The three individuals (Grellmann, Borrow, and Ritter) who form the core of Willems’ thesis are non-Roma and thus “external” to Romani culture. It seems a bit presumptuous to base a book on the term “Gypsy” when the author himself uses only select sources undoubtedly influence by their own subjectivity. Willems fails to take into account internal discourses on the Roma, instead primarily relying upon the works of these three individuals and their followers. To my knowledge, Willems did not interview or seek
contact with any existing Romani groups, which undoubtedly could have clarified his ideas and voiced a contemporary viewpoint on Romani group coherency. Despite the fact that he asserts a true “Gypsy” does not exist, it would still nonetheless be helpful to interact with the products of this Western construct (i.e., the “Gypsies”). Willems describes (in a similar vein to Hancock 1997b) how from the onset of researching Romani culture, a stigma became attached to the group and its lexical derivatives that is to this day continually being manifested. The primary reasons for this stigma are the result of a conceived religious-political and socio-economic deviation from the norm (the term “norm” here denoting the “civilized” societal norm of the time) (Willems 1997: 17). Much of this essentializing and stigmatization is supported by ethnographic evidence gathered by social scientists. The ethnographic evidence [ethnicity, identity formation, outside forces acting on the Roma] is of a more situational and contextualized nature, showing wide variability within certain ethnographic settings.

The two ethnographic texts I deal with (Lemon 2000 and Stewart 1997) focus on the Roma in Russia and Hungary. Russians often speak of the Roma as engaging only in economic speculation. During the socialist period in Hungary the Roma as a community predominantly rejected the socialist work ethic and its subsequent ideology (Lemon 2000: 70 and Stewart 1997: 238-242). Being ascribed a peripheral status and occupying non-traditional occupations, the Roma in Russian and Hungarian contexts were often “suspicious” in the eyes of non-Roma interlocutors. Diversity within the Romani community was simply not addressed, despite occupying distinct cultural niches. Outsiders projected whatever romantic images they wanted on the Gypsies as a group. When contextualized in the post-socialist transition, economic speculation in the late 80s
and early 90s was an economically viable economic niche in Russia, albeit long stigmatized by the dominant Soviet ideology. The Roma simply took the initiative to diversify in Russia before it was socially acceptable to the majority of Russians. However, in order to understand Romani scholarship, one must look back to the work of H.M. Grellmann. Almost all reference sources on the Roma point back to the scholarship of H.M. Grellmann, a German historian who is responsible for the earliest comprehensive historical monograph on the Roma.

Willems begins his study by focusing on the work of the German historian H.M. Grellmann, whose authoritative text on the Gypsies was cited up to the mid 20th century as the first complete academic account of Gypsy life. However, after careful scrutiny, Grellmann’s work is better noted for its lack of original scholarship than for any groundbreaking research.

**H.M. Grellmann and the Authentication of Misrepresentations**

H.M. Grellmann, who first published his book in 1783, produced images of the Roma that have far outlasted his short-lived scholarly preoccupation with the “Gypsies.” Arbitrary and variable “Gypsy” groups were combined by Grellmann and lumped into the simple, ill-defined “Gypsy” category in order to support his early diasporic notions of their culture (Willems 1997: 46-47). Social, historical, and cross-national differences were simply glossed over for the most part. I do not wish to argue now on the validity of the Gypsies as a single cultural entity; rather I want to explore some of Grellmann’s influence on the way the Roma were viewed and studied, and how Grellmann shaped the future discourse of Romani studies in its formative years.
Grellmann’s corpus on the Gypsies is an overreaching essentialization, which has wrought its influence on the field of Romani studies for far too long. I begin with a few of the most glaring popular misconceptions and misrepresentations. At the end of this subsection, I briefly return to a description of the intellectual climate in which Grellmann wrote and compare it to the contemporary discourse on the Roma.

Grellmann’s book, *Die Zigeuner* [The Gypsies], published in 1783, was the first comprehensive historical work on the subject. What provoked an initial academic interest in the Gypsies? How did the “Gypsies” become such an interesting topic, appearing in Europe centuries earlier and undoubtedly already encountered by a large proportion of the population? Much of the initial public interest surrounding the Gypsies can be traced back to a sensationalized episode of cannibalism in the then Hungarian Honth district in 1782. One-hundred-and-thirty-three persons were arrested for allegedly robbing travelers and then devouring their flesh. Fifty-three men and thirty-one women admitted their guilt, and on November 8th, 1782, Josef Kelez de Fületincz, the Hungarian Governor, carried out the sentence. Of the eighty-four suspects, forty-one were executed; some beheaded, some broken on the wheel and hanged, others crucified and quartered (Willems 1997: 24-26). Eventually the case authorities investigated further and ascertained that no incident of cannibalism occurred. The damage was already done, however. Historically, Gypsy persecution is the norm rather than the exception, so why bother to even mention this incident? When viewed as an isolated incident, it is simply another piece in the mosaic that forms the history of this persecuted group; when viewed in context as an event that contributed to the construction of one of the prominent historical monographs on the Gypsies, its importance increases exponentially. In a
diachronic fashion, Grellmann is the first scholar to offer a complete synthesis of Gypsy identity.

In a pseudo-ethnographic fashion, Grellmann's study proposed to investigate their appearance, mores, and customs in depth. In actuality, Grellmann based most of his work on secondary sources of a non-scholarly nature. Travel reports, various learned connections, and periodicals were Grellmann's "primary" sources. Most of the periodical citations come from a single journal, the *Wiener Anzeigen*. Willems researched the journal articles cited by Grellmann, and discovered that in actuality the article in question was a series of articles. Plagiarism is the optimal word for Grellmann's work.

Grellmann is faithful to the initial structure of the articles, sometimes borrowing entire passages word for word (Willems estimates Grellmann "borrowed" around seventy-five percent of the text!). The *Wiener Anzeigen* journal is described as a periodical modeled in the spirit of the Enlightenment. It printed articles of general use, and sought to serve the nation (the Austro-Hungarian empire) and help "morally" elevate society (Willems 1997: 61-63). It seems that the goals of the *Wiener Anzeigen* and H.M. Grellmann coincided. This is clearly deduced from Grellmann's gratuitous praise of Austro-Hungarian policy. A Hungarian minister, Samuel Augustini ab Hortis, who had previously written on the natural history of Hungary for various periodicals, wrote the articles cited by Grellmann. Whether ab Hortis ever actually had firsthand ethnographic interactions with the Gypsies is questionable (Willems 1997: 293). Grellmann falsely based much of his ethnographic deductions (which in fact border on blatant plagiarism) on information pertaining to one geographic area, Hungary. Anybody even remotely familiar with the Roma will agree that there is a remarkable degree of diversity among
Romani communities even within the specific geopolitical confines of a nation-state. Undoubtedly this was the case with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose borders spanned a wide swath of the European continent and encompassed wide cultural variability. Romani cultural diversity was and still is widespread, and must be viewed contextually and situationally in order to be correctly understood. The methods employed by Grellmann to discover the ethos of Romani culture and its Indic, Eastern origin stand in ambivalent contradiction to the Enlightenment project he supports.

Grellmann and subsequent “Gypsy” scholars infused much of their research into what today could be classified as “ethnic” or “minority” peoples with a Herderian concept of *Nationalgeist*, or national expression. The search for a cultural ethos was manifested in a scholarly quest for a “holy grail” that encompassed the elemental foundations of peoples. According to Herder, the language of a particular people revealed their essence (Willems 1997: 295). Once a sufficient *Nationalgeist* was found (as manifested in the group’s native tongue) that “explained” all of the customs of a particular people, they could then be integrated hierarchically into scholarly accounts. Thus, by discovering and establishing the Eastern, Indic origins of the Gypsies, Grellmann provided ample evidence for the unifying factor that was the essence of Gypsy culture, their Indic tongue. Hierarchically, Grellmann lumped the Roma among the lowest *Volk*, as evidenced by the disparaging nature of his scholarship (see quote below). Grellmann’s faith in the Enlightenment and the subsequent social policy derived from it, which purported that through the iron will of government-directed intervention people could be improved, assimilated and changed, directly contradicts the Herderian ethos he initially sought among the Roma. The Gypsies as an Eastern, “Oriental” people had
preserved their cultural essence because of their origin (Willems 1997: 295-296). How was the Enlightenment going to change this? In his chapter entitled “Essay on the Improvement of the Gipseys [sic].” Grellmann praises the Enlightenment policies of Maria Theresa:

It would be a lamentable case, if the before mentioned regulations were merely pious wishes. Let us hope something better! The work has been commenced; - a great empress, Theresa, laid down a plan to win over these poor unfortunate people to virtue and the state. But it is to be regretted, that the execution of her wide dispositions, respecting the Gipseys [sic] in Hungary, seems to have been entrusted to people inadequate to the task (Grellmann 1807: 102).

Grellmann’s text praises the assimilation attempts of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. The Austro-Hungarian rulers believed strong state influence in the affairs of the Roma was needed to enable them to advance and “modernize,” thus allowing them to form a viable part of a civilized society. Hungary at the time of Maria Theresa and Joseph II nurtured a growing spirit of “Magyarization,” much to the detriment of the minority Roma. Franz Liszt, perhaps owing to his fascination with Gypsy music, attempted to give Hungarian Gypsies a greater role as the creators of “Hungarian” music (Crowe 1995: 78-80).

Hungarian state policy dictated a policy of Magyarization. “All citizens of Hungary, irrespective of their native language, comprise in the political sense only one nation, the Hungarian nation, which is one and indivisible in accordance with the historical concept of the Hungarian state,” (Kohn, cited in Crowe 1995: 81-82). In the eyes of Grellmann, nurture, through compulsory education and instruction, was needed to subsume the Eastern nature of the Gypsies by Western Christian values:
Africa makes them no blacker, nor Europe whiter: they neither learn to be lazy in Spain, nor diligent in Germany: in Turkey, Mahomet, and among Christians, Christ, remains equally without adoration. Around, on every side, they see fixed dwellings, with settled inhabitants; they, nevertheless, proceed in their own way, and continue, for the most part, unsocial wandering robbers (Grellmann 1807: B).

Ideas similar to Grellmann’s are still echoed in “modern” discourse on the “Roma” question, especially on the European level (which I address in Chapter 4).

In a historical survey of “Zigeuner” (Gypsies) in German reference literature, Rao and Casimir survey general German-language encyclopedia entries from between 1819 and 1986. Their findings echo the threads of discourse that are contained in this chapter. Encyclopedias as sources of general knowledge have a fairly wide distribution and are intended for consumption by the reading public at large. The simplified and standardized information contained within is “stripped” down for the non-professional, and as such the images constructed in their entries have all the more power to influence public discourse on the subject matter at hand, in this case the Roma (cf. Willems and Lucassen 1990):

Die Begriffsbestimmung des ‘Zigeuners’ war weniger von seinem eigenen Denken und seinen spezifischen Verhaltensweisen als von der jeweils epochalen Bedeutung abhängig. Im Laufe der Geschichte entwickelte sich ein Katalog von Definitionen, die teilweise widersprüchlich und zumeist unzulänglich sind ...

[The definition of the Gypsies was less dependent on its own ideas and specific patterns than from the epochal meaning. In the course of history there developed a catalog of definitions, that are partially inadequate and contradictory]


Factual observations as to the economy and the nomadism (or lack of it) among the Roma are not mentioned, and the ideological implications are glossed over. In a predominantly sedentary society such as Europe, the nomadic life-style label is easier applied than removed (Rao and Casimir 1993: 117). As evidenced by the survey of encyclopedia
entries, the projected facts on the homogenized unity of the group as a *Volk* [people] and the misconceptions in it change diachronically through time from blatant misrepresentations to neutralized facts. “Fictions” repetitiously reconstituted throughout history become “facts” with time. In conclusion, the authors state that “facts” about the Roma were indeed found. Yet it remains to be answered to what degree these “facts” in actuality reflected the social atmosphere of the time or reflected empirical data. Through stereotyping and passive acceptance of misrepresentations, the members of the stereotyped population are “de-individualized,” thus rarifying and further impersonalising the complex, subtle, multifaceted relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed. The reading public-at-large consumes and then appropriates these facts, until they trickle down to the general population. Second-rate scholarship that reflects the social climate of the time institutionalizes misrepresentations for future generations. This is the thread of academic discourse that dominated the field of Romani studies for centuries. Remnants of this thread are still found in many contemporary publications, which seek to link the Roma in Europe today with lower-caste groups in India.

**Modern Misrepresentation**

Mark Braham, in his report, *The Untouchables: A Survey of the Roma People of Central and Eastern Europe*, continually harps upon a “supposed” lower caste background for the Roma in India. This primordial lower-caste origin theory is refuted by current linguistic evidence (see Hancock 2000 and my history chapter). A primordialist view that presupposes a lower-caste position for the Roma as a distinct cultural group can be adopted in contemporary European contexts to explain their low
socio-economic position in Eastern Europe today. The ancestors of the Roma belonged
to a low class in India, so why should they occupy anything different in a European
context? This philosophy becomes an irrational, cyclical argument, in which any positive
socio-economic progress is seen as going against the Roma’s history:

Their problem is as old as Brahmanical Hinduism when India’s caste
system was laid down and economic and social functions had evolved into
a rigid hierarchy of prestige and power. At the bottom of the scale were,
and still are, the *haryans*, the ‘untouchables’, the ‘permanently defiles’.
Among them were the *Dom* or *Doma* ... For reasons as yet unknown, vast
numbers of Doma migrated westward in a succession of waves between
the 7th and 9th centuries AD ... During the course of their travels, the
Doma became known as the *Roma*, and became Europe’s ‘untouchables’
as well (Braham 1993: 1, my emphasis).

Braham’s report, which subsequently details the deteriorating conditions in which the
Roma live in post-socialist Europe, is notable for its attention to the plight of the Roma,
and contains recommendations for the amelioration of their deteriorating condition.

However, as the citation above indicates, Braham’s account (a report sponsored by the
UN) can also be noted for its overreaching essentializations and misrepresentations of the
Roma. These misrepresentations can be partly conceived as a product of history. Since
the Roma were ‘untouchables’ in India, why should they be anything different in other
contexts? Generalizations and irrational pronouncements like this one can be deduced
from Braham’s UN report, if its “research” content is extrapolated and taken at face
value. If these are the types of reports supra-national institutions depend on to dictate and
implement policy, is it a wonder why the Roma are continually misunderstood and denied
a tangible role in discourse? Among other things, Braham places part of the blame on the
Roma, because violence “may also be a consequence of their own lifestyle, i.e., what they
have done, or are doing, to generate reaction against them,” (Braham 1993: 9). If this
logic held true, one could rationalize institutionalized racism and deconstruct the civil
rights movement by saying that African-Americans live differently and made certain
economic choices (i.e., mass migration to northern states for jobs in urban manufacturing
centers, which resulted demographically in population sedimentation in urban ghettos, the
subsequent "Culture of Poverty," etc.). Therefore, African-Americans as a unified,
"ethnic group" (like the "Gypsies") share the blame for the racist behavior and
discrimination directed towards them today. Historical inequalities laid the basis for
modern inequality. A more rational explanation of the present day conditions in which
the Roma live can be seen as a lack of real, practical power within the hegemonic power
structures that dictate social and economic policy. How far apart in reality are the ideas
of Grellmann and Braham?

The purported nomadic nature of the Roma offers one a glimpse into how
misrepresentations come to be taken as fact. Popular notions of the Roma celebrate a
nomadic lifestyle when in actuality the great majority of Roma are and have been
sedentary for centuries (Cf. Stewart 1997 and Lemon 2000 for an in depth treatment of
specific historical contexts and the effects of state policy on Romani nomadism).
Nomadism, which for decades has ceased to exist among the vast majority of Roma,
nonetheless remains imprinted in the popular imagination. Denial of religious and
localized connections is also evident in much of the literature dealing with the Roma
today. This could be attributed to a desire to deny the Roma an official religion or local
culture, due to the wide variety of cultural manifestations present within spectrum of the
Roma. This denial could also reflect the desire of the majority, those with the power to
define, to marginalize the Roma with a cultural tunnel vision, which distinguishes and
defines Romani culture by its oppositional elements (Lemon 2000: 3). However, recent ethnographic evidence stands in contradiction to all of these presumptions. Much of the discourse with regard to the “Gypsy question” has taken on subtle ideological refashioning under different regimes, but has resisted long term structural change. Art, particularly literature, also is to blame. From Alexander Pushkin to Fyodor Dostoyevsky to Thomas Mann, symbolic literary characterizations, synecdoches, and leitmotivs of the “Gypsy” lifestyle abound in literature.

Literary Misrepresentation

Literary portrayals of Gypsies are also to blame for much of the stigma and stereotypes continually associated with Romani culture, especially among the reading public-at-large. In Russia, the Roma occupy quite a different socio-economic level when compared to other Roma populations in other contexts such as those Roma residing in Romania or in Hungary. Viewed as a part of the Russian cultural ethos, the Roma in Russia are economically strong, numerically weak (when compared to other minorities), and politically impotent. What are some of the particular factors that condition the Russian Roma’s existence within Russian society? What role does literature play in the articulation of Romani culture to the Russian public? In this section, I hope to give a short overview of some of the literary uses of Gypsies and Romani culture, and show how literary “truths” translate into the tangible reality. Just as every literary tradition has its own canonical classics, every literary great who employs “Gypsy” imagery manifests and develops stereotypes and misrepresentations, which in turn become apparent and
Pushkin and Russian Roma

In Russia, as stated above, the Roma occupy quite a different societal position. This position can partially be attributed to popular perceptions of the Roma derived from Pushkin’s literature and his fascination with Gypsies. In the context of Russia, Pushkin was no ordinary author — his work is said to transcend the Russian existence and embody the core of Russian literature and high-culture. Pushkin’s romantic portrayals of Romani culture were in turn adopted by the increasingly literate Russian populace as literary “truths,” and in turn were integrated into everyday cultural notions of what constituted “Gypsiness.” As said before, Pushkin was no ordinary writer — his writings were said to “transcend and bridge cultures,” which were universally understood (Lemon 2000: 35).

Interlocutors in ethnographic dialogue often brought up Pushkin and his literary tropes:

On the one hand, they would exalt them as “nature’s poor sons,” citing poetry by Alexander Pushkin that they said “captured Gypsy song,” as if transcending the everyday. On the other hand, in speaking of Gypsies outside the realm of poetry or theater, they would curl their lips and speak of smells, bare feet, lies, and fingers reaching for money (Lemon 2000: 2).

This citation above exemplifies the external projections of performance encountered in everyday life by Roma in Russia. Due to externalizations and essentializations, Roma are constantly “performing” their identity for the public at large, be it in the metro, at the market, or on the stage. The point I wish to stress is not merely that Romani performance in Russia elevated a certain cadre of Romani performers, but simply to stress the influence of external factors on the articulation of Romani identity. Gypsy serf choirs in
Czarist Russia elevated the performative aspects of Romani cultural identity, which were in turn nurtured early on by Leninist minority policies, which enabled a small Romani intelligentsia to develop. Romani performance was also celebrated, and institutionalized at the Moscow Romani Theater (For a description of the Moscow Romani Theater, see Lemon 1991 and Lemon 2000). These literary manifestations in and of themselves should not be viewed in exclusivist terms; other social, political, and economic factors must be taken into account when contextualizing Romani existence in Russia. Literary stereotyping of Romani culture is not limited geographically to Russia, however.

“Pariah” Representations in Literature

In a Nobel-prize winning book by Ivo Andrić, a Yugoslavian diplomat of Serbian ancestry, Roma are portrayed gruesomely as merciless executioners. In the particular scene cited below, “gipsies” hired by the Ottoman rulers to mete out punishment impale a saboteur, who begs for mercy in vain:

‘Listen, by this world and the next, do your best to pierce me well so that I may not suffer like a dog.’
Radislav bent his head still lower and the gypsies came up and began to strip off his cloak and shirt ... the body of the peasant, spread-eagled, writhed convulsively; at each blow of the mallet his spine twisted and bent, but the cords pulled at it and kept it straight ... At every second blow the gipsy went over to the stretched-out body and leant over it to see whether the stake was going in the right direction and when he had satisfied himself that it had not touched any of the more important internal organs, he returned and went on with his work (Andrić 1977: 48-49).

Mercilessly ignoring the exhortations of the condemned, the “gipsies” are portrayed as pariah mercenaries, loyal only to their employer. Despite the fact that Ottoman rulers possibly employed Roma as “pariah” executioners, the literary presentation undoubtedly is detrimental to their cultural imagery. In a synecdochic fashion, literary representations
and chance encounters are generalized by non-Roma in wider, everyday contexts and interactions. Representations like this show the manipulated image and externally projected identity of the Roma. In the same story excerpted above, the power to chronicle and represent the past and present for future generations is not lost to Andrić:

It was known he [Effendi, the schoolmaster] was writing a chronicle of the most important events in the history of the town. Among the citizens this gave him the fame of a learned and exceptional man, for it was considered that by this he held in some way the fate of the town and of every individual in it in his hands (Andrić 1977: 128).

Like the local historian who shapes and records local history for future generations, literature manifests much of the current cultural Zeitgeist and influences contemporary discourse through the construction of tropes. On the one hand members of a pariah caste who avoid honest work and the associated peasant ideals such as land cultivation that denote “civilized” living (as evidenced in the Hungarian context by described by Stewart 1997), on the other hand dutiful, steadfast, exacting executioners in the Balkans. Which of these discursive, contradictory images must one accept as truth?

Media representations offer perhaps a better view of the larger societal forces that influence external constructions of Romani identity. As the media collages in Appendix A indicates (taken from Hancock 1987), the Roma have little power to articulate a positive (or neutral, for that matter) image of their culture (see also Dellal 1999). A wide variety of themes ranging from Gypsy rowdiness to Gypsy hustlers to Gypsy seduction can nonetheless form a detrimental image of the Roma in the public conscious. Although there has recently been a positive tendency toward Romani issues (especially in the European context), there is much to be undone before a positive identity will be forged among the Roma.
Undoubtedly the misrepresentations that coincide with historical “truths” (the foundation of which Grellmann and his followers laid) will continue to strengthen the hegemonic structures that continue to deny the Roma the power to shape their own identity. Demonization does not begin with the onset of the study of history, however. Fairy tales and folktales also demonize the Roma in ways similar to the historic stereotyping of the Jews.

**Demonization in Fairy Tales and Folklore**

Fear-provoking and freakish images are what the majority of children (in perhaps their most malleable stage of psychological development) articulate when Gypsies come to mind. How many times has a young child heard stories from fear-invoking parents or grandparents about threats to “sell bad children to the Gypsies,” or getting sinister warnings not to venture to forbidden areas for fear of being “kidnapped by the Gypsies?”

How have these stories come into being, and to what extent have they misinformed the general public and misrepresented the Roma? Romanticized in literature, stereotyped in the mainstream media, and marginalized in the social reality. The Roma are an enigma to the general public. “In the minds of the majority population the ‘Gypsy’ embodies either what people desire or what they curse, what they hanker after or what is forbidden. Thus the ‘Gypsy’ (in the context of fairytales) provides the raw material for both demonisation and romanticisation,” (Strauss 1998: 84).

Fairy tales are fertile ground for the incorporation of detrimental images of the Roma in the formative ages of child development. Ines Köhlerzüll, a literary historian who worked on the *Encyclopedia of Fairy Tales*, describes the pseudo-scientific
transportation of clichés through literature: “The so-called Gypsy literature transports clichés in a pseudo-scientific way and hands them down over the centuries. In the collection of sagas the real living conditions of the Sinti and Roma are rarely or never thematised,” (Köhlerzülich 1995, cited in Tebbut 1997: 85). Fairy tales and false encyclopedia entries share a common function – they continue to shape misrepresentative images of the Roma as a cultural group. From the poetry of Shell Silverstein to the stories a young child hears from Grandma, the Gypsies are a misunderstood and misrepresented enigma to most. When stereotypes are the only ideological constructs one has at hand for characterization of an entire ethnic group, is it abnormal that essentialisms dominate?

Conclusion

Grellmann’s *magnum opus* of Gypsy lore inevitably served a purpose, which in hindsight is easier to judge. Grellmann, by the simple act of publishing a large work where few previously existed, filled a consumer void in the 19th century. Much like Anderson’s thesis that “print capitalism” served as the basis for nationalism in the modern nation-state, Grellmann’s “print-capitalism” influenced the contemporary construction of Romani identity. Grellmann’s lackluster scholarship on the Roma crystallized and guided the field of Romani studies and “Gypsy Lore” for centuries, and as an increasingly literate populace demanded scholarship, Grellmann delivered. Since the Roma appeared in Europe centuries earlier, the non-Roma public sought explanations for the origins and nature. These foreigners, with foreign customs, speaking a foreign tongue, and having a foreign complexion perplexed the emerging conscious of the nation
state. The increasing reading public demanded "Gypsies," and Grellmann filled that void with his questionable scholarship. Binary oppositions between Roma and Non-Roma developed, and the world was separated into black and white, Roma and non-Roma.

From their initial appearance in Europe, the power and knowledge to define and characterize "Gypsies" has been usurped by outside interlocutors and lies disproportionately in the hands of non-Roma. He who controls discourse ultimately controls knowledge. History, along with literature, initially weaved together the threads of misrepresentation that are only recently becoming unwound by the Roma. The spheres of artistic reality and the concrete political reality are intimately linked, as any controversial piece of art shows. However, to view the Roma simply as historically misunderstood victims simplifies their plight enormously and does not take into account the highly contextualized and situational nature of Roma existence and Romani identity. Each situation and each geopolitical area has a wide variety of interacting variables that determine the situational position of the Roma. Unless the problems of the Roma are contextually viewed, no attempt to solve their problems will be successful. Just as Soviet minority policy offered differentiating discourses and narratives that in turn amalgamated into contemporary and historical Russian Romani identity, the situation of the Roma in Hungary shows parallels, despite different policies under the Hapsburg Empire and the subsequent socialist regime. The end result is that the Russian Roma today occupy different positions within Russian culture and society when compared to other minorities, while the Roma in Hungary were subsequently conditioned differently and thus today are differentiated contrasted vis-à-vis other minorities. These different historical developments are reflected in how Roma articulate their identity, both internally and
externally. As I bring in ethnographic evidence in the next chapter (which focuses on ethnicity, identity, and specific ethnographic evidence from Hungary and Russia), one can see how Hungarian Roma and Russian Roma articulate their cultural identity and ethnicity, and how the particular historical conditions and policy shaped the construction of Romani identity and ethnicity.

Who determines who is a Gypsy? Are there certain criteria for membership? The determination of membership in a particular group is not solely in the hands of the group in question. Power to determine who constitutes a “Gypsy” is determined primarily by four parties: the group being defined, i.e. Gypsies, the authorities (Church and state), academics, and the general population at large. The control of ethnic identity is disproportionately in the hands of non-Roma. These four variables continually come into play, and at different points in history occupy different niches. In recent years this trend has slowed, and Roma are continually reasserting themselves through involvement in local government, various NGOs, and other supra-national institutions such as the UN, OSCE, etc. I explore this phenomenon at the end of this thesis. Having established a basis for Romani misrepresentation, I introduce the topics of ethnicity and identity, specifically addressing how these topics are used and constructed both within Romani society and by outside interlocutors.
Three

Romani Ethnicity: Anthropological Perspectives

Introduction

When identifying a particular ethnic group, either externally or internally, the concept of ethnicity yields the power to mobilize certain populations and at the same time Balkanize others. What is the theory, if any, behind the use of this term and its ascription to particular groups? Ethnicity as a concept is primarily a construct of the 20th century thinking, recently appearing in the anthropological literature in the 1960s. However, as evidenced by the recent “ethnic cleansing” in the Balkan wars and increasing incidents of ethnic strife worldwide, the term has undergone a transformation of sorts. With the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and the proceeding “unification” of Europe, ethnicity in the European context seems to be caught between opposing poles; the Herderian view that the language of a particular group articulates the identity and ethos of a culture (as evidenced by the conflict over language in Macedonia between the majority Macedonians and the minority Albanians), and the “modern” dream of pan- (West) European unity, as articulated in the European Union and its policies. The policies of European unification have the possibility to eventually efface ethnicity, but this is perhaps generations in the future. Ethnicity still is, despite supranational policies aimed towards diminishing its influence, a salient concept in Europe. How does Romani ethnic identity and its articulation fit into this emerging portrait of Europe?

Traditionally, the Roma have been represented as a disunited group, with some scholars questioning if “Gypsies” actually exist. These scholars view the Roma as a
social construct, the end-result of Western yearnings for freedom (Willems 1997). In this section, I hope to examine how actors have manipulated Romani ethnicity, both internally and externally. Internally, I wish to explore how Roma themselves manifest and articulate their ethnic identity, and explore the situational context of daily existence. Externally, I intend to examine how outsiders conceptualize the Roma. Is Romani ethnicity a closed system, the result of a primordial Romani ethos, or is it merely an acquisitional factor in certain social systems. These manipulations and the actors involved cover a wide spectrum of competing spheres of influence, and concern a wide variety of topics. On one hand, Romani intellectuals dictate and articulate ethnic identity through various statements that governments and supra-national institutions use when developing social policy. On the other hand government demographers manipulate Romani ethnic identity (demographically and numerically) in censuses for political ends. External and internal articulations of ethnic differences occurring during daily life also come into play, and are arguably just as important as social policy on the macro level. Everyday interactions are also important for a variety of reasons.

The fact that everyday social reality articulates one “popular“ discourse manifested in reality, which is dependent on the actor’s point of view, situational positioning, and contextualized history is an important point in the development of ethnicity. For example, the banal discourse on the Gypsies as criminals and vagabonds is opposed to the internal cultural view held by some Roma of the inherent superiority of the “Gypsy” way. What discourse came first – is one a response to the other, or has there always been a cultural dialectic? The opposition of one discourse to another, such as the government discourse on the nation (i.e., the nation as “One multicultural nation and
people,” a Magyar nation, etc.) often opposes the everyday reality. I am of the opinion that in such cases (where macro discourses contradict themselves at the micro level) the micro-social context will tend to dominate, especially in cases of government impotence. Government ineptitude was often historically the case in much of Eastern Europe directly before and immediately after the fall of Communism, especially in terms of ethnic policy. This is not to deny the larger macro context of ethnicity — it will undoubtedly be manifested in the micro context, but situational factors dictate individual’s interactions more often than government sponsored narrative discourse. Ethnicity can rest upon varying foundations, which may range from socio-cultural reasons to economic reasons to simple political pragmatism. How has ethnicity changed throughout the historical European discourse? How is Romani ethnicity articulated in contemporary Europe?

**Ethnicity**

Ethnicity as an anthropological concept primarily falls into three theoretical models: primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist. Primordial theories of ethnicity mirror the Herderian concept of cultural ethos by viewing ethnicity as based on a real, tangible, objective foundation. Instrumentalist approaches can be viewed in conjunction with the functionalist intellectual movement. Ethnicity was viewed as a product of political myths created by elites. Certain symbols and referents become tangible within the ethnic group in question, and group coherence is imposed in a top-down manner. Ethnicity is a product of the dynamics of competition among elites, who primarily determine the boundaries within the society in question. Constructivist theories of ethnicity (notably Barth 1969) treat ethnicity as being rooted in a distinct situation and context. Ethnicity is a process of continual ascription. Ethnic boundaries, in the
constructivist sense, are fluid and mercurial, highly situated and contextualized. In addition to these theories, Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawn et al. (1983) have recently theorized on the creation and transformation of ethnicity, in essence shifting the focus of ethnicity from “what drives ethnic group action” to “the existence of the group itself,” (Young 1993, cited in Vermeulen and Govers 1997: 1). Ethnicity in reality is difficult to simplify into theoretical models, with ethnicity becoming the optimal term in almost any conflict situation involving two different groups.

With the onset of the post-colonial era of globalization, ethnicity has been interjected into many contemporary debates to help explain and elucidate a wide variety of phenomena. Seemingly anything remotely related to any cultural relations at either the micro or macro level has been influenced by the concept of ethnicity. Social change, political mobilization, identity formation, social conflict, political conflict, race relations, nation building, nationalism, integration, and assimilation have all used the concept of ethnicity. To describe all of these phenomena and their relation to the concept of ethnicity is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, I hope to investigate how ethnicity among the Roma has changed, and in particular how the term has shifted from having a more cultural connotation to a having a distinctly political connotation in the European context, as evidenced by much of the contemporary debate about the “Gypsy” question and EU expansion.

As Nash (1989) remarks, ethnicity is built upon common physical and ideological foundations such as body (ethnic expression in common biological population), language (spoken and written forms specific to the cultural group at hand), a shared history and origins (the imagined sense of shared struggles, common purpose, often group
dependency), *religion* (a set of shared beliefs, not necessarily an doctrine), and *nationality* (a right to territory, equality with other nations, and all the “symbolic and political accoutrements of a sovereign and independent people”) (Nash 1989: 5-6). Ethnic groups are cultural groups who share a common history, religion, language, belief in a “nation,” and possibly a common biological basis as well. These factors are by no means exclusive traits that all ethnic groups must possess in order to “quality” for legitimacy. These factors rather help to build an ideological base upon which one can identify, in subjective terms. Ethnicity is a way of defining cultural “otherness” within a heterogeneous society, often a society in which the particular “ethnic” group in question often occupies a minority status. Ethnicity, whether self-applied or ascribed, separates. These separations are not necessarily black/white binary oppositions, for ethnic identity in and of itself can be fluid and contingent. In addition to separating, ethnicity also unites. Transnational diasporic minorities are often homogenized with the application of ethnic terminology. As stated above, the anthropological theory behind the term ethnicity falls into three views, the primordialist approach, the instrumentalist approach, and the constructivist approach. In terms my investigations into Romani ethnicity, I shall primarily focus on the constructivist approach.

**Constructivist Theory and Barth’s Boundaries**

Constructivist theories of ethnicity concentrate on the situational and contextual nature of ethnicity. The focus on the active articulation of ethnicity helps one develop a clear view of its political dimensions and elucidates the ethnic base for political mobilization. Cohen argues that “ethnicity” represents a shift towards new theoretical
and empirical concerns. The ubiquity of ethnicity as an anthropological concept signals a fundamental change, one that must be understood from several different historical, theoretical, and ideological angles (Cohen 1978: 380-381).

The “sudden” emergence of ethnicity in the 1960s can be attributed to a multitude of factors within the discipline of anthropology. Important among these are the end of the colonial era and the ever-eroding foundation of British functionalism. Within British social anthropology, socio-cultural units were seen as relating to the societal “whole,” thus complementing the prevalent organic analogy. After the “fall” of functionalism, macro ethnography and its subsequent view of cultural groups as closed, homogenous entities became obsolete. Ethnic (or tribal) groups were often ascribed an external identity regardless of internal mechanisms of ascription (see Southall 1976 for a reevaluation of Evans-Pritchard’s ethnic identity ascription among the Nuer and Dinka). From British functionalism comes the joke about two indigenous tribesmen asking each other, “Who’s your anthropologist?” The implications are clear – colonial governments (and indirectly the anthropologists who worked under the colonial regimes) previously controlled much of the power with regard to ethnic ascription, since inevitably they demarcated, administered, and taxed the indigenous tribes. However, now ascription power is becoming dispersed with the onset of more dialogical field methods. This dramatic shift away from the objective, macro perspective brings to the surface some theoretical questions with regard to ethnicity. Should ethnic units be isolated on the basis of external socio-cultural categories, or should they be seen as valid only when they reflect the beliefs and ascriptions of the particular people in question?
Ethnicity opens up categorization to non-members (the objectivist emphasis) as well as to a person’s own identification with a particular ethnic group (the subjectivist emphasis) (Cohen 1978: 381). Anthropologists and their categorizations are often problematic topics, especially in the postmodern fog that permeates debate in the era of cultural studies and reverse anthropology. How are these concerns represented within the anthropological literature on the Roma? I now examine Barth’s theory of ethnicity before moving on to the pertinent ethnographic evidence on the Roma.

Barth, in his introduction to *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, primarily views ethnicity as a subjective process, a process through which groups identify themselves and use ethnic labels and categories to define themselves and their interactions with others (Cohen 1978: 383). Of particular interest to Barth are the fluid boundaries that persist between ethnic groups and the social relations that are maintained across these boundaries. “Ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundation on which embracing social systems are built,” (Barth 1969: 10). Barth “liberates” ethnic groups by allowing them near-complete subjective ascription rights, and theorizes against essentializing and totalizing paradigms. It is worth quoting Barth at length:

Ethnic categories provide an organizational vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems. They may be of great relevance to behaviour, but they need not be; they may pervade all social life, or they may be relevant only in limited sectors of activity . . . 1. When defined as an ascriptive and exclusive group, the nature of continuity of ethnic units in clear: it depends on the maintenance of a boundary . . . 2. Socially relevant factors alone become diagnostic for membership, not the overt, ‘objective’ differences which are generated by other factors. It makes no difference how dissimilar member may be in their overt behaviour – if they say they are A, in contrast to another cognate category B, they are willing to be treated and let their own behaviour be interpreted and judged as A’s and not as B’s; in other words,
they declare their allegiance to the shared culture of A’s (Barth 1969: 14-15).

Barth’s main contribution to the corpus of ethnic conceptualization primarily lies in his view of ethnicity as being the end result of a subjective process of group identification that allows the people the use of ethnic labels to define themselves and their interactions with others. Much of the recent anthropological literature on the Roma deals with distinct, contextualized local populations. This may seem to limit the applicability of the ethnographic date to a wider European context. However, I believe the processes involved in ethnic identification and articulation of ethnicity are an important starting point for political mobilization and ethno-genesis. Romani political mobilization and ethno-genesis are important factors in the context of Europe today, with the increasing influence of the European Union and its liberal policy dictates. Without an identifiable ethnic foundation for group commonality at the micro, local level, no concrete macro organization and its subsequent benefits will be possible.

**Anthropological Literature**

I begin this section by introducing what I find to be one of the more problematic accounts of the Roma. The ethnography in question, *Gypsies, The Hidden Americans*, by Anne Sutherland, is based upon two years of fieldwork with Roma in California. “My primary objective in writing this book was to dispel the misconceptions (i.e., Gypsy as metaphor for freedom; Gypsies as thieves) and to bring some objectivity to the subject of Gypsies” (Sutherland 1986: preface). Sutherland concerns herself with the questions of how the Rom as an ethnic group have constantly adapted to a multitude of languages, countries, economic systems, and environments, and how “they became so flexible,”
presumably in order to enable their culture to survive. However, this is not apparent from her research methodology and her rigid theoretical influences.

Sutherland describes the clichéd prejudices and stereotypes of Roma, and articulates how she intended to penetrate the Romani culture and dispel some of the misrepresentations that abound. Her ethnography contradicts many of her initial goals, for her work focuses almost entirely on the Romani institution of marime and how it is the underlying structural unification of Romani culture. One who becomes marime is a polluted Rom; one defiled; rejected or branded an outcast by a kris (legal forum, tribunal, trial). Outside connections and constructions with non-Roma are left unexplored for the most part. The only non-Roma in her ethnography are social workers (who dispense the main form of income to her subjects, welfare checks) and various other bureaucratic officials superficially investigated by Sutherland, such as the police. In the ethnography, Sutherland portrays her Romani interlocutors as manipulating the police when the need arises. Police and other outside figures are only engaged when disputes or grudges need to be settled externally. Her anthropological work does not paint a flattering picture of the Roma in America, and in my opinion only further entrenches the detrimental stereotypes. Sutherland describes how the non-anthropological audience constantly misreads her ethnography. She remarks how a police officer she encountered gleaned information about Romani cultural practices, hoping to use the anthropologist’s deductions in a criminal context, should the need arise. Perhaps her objective “facts” about the Roma came to be used in other contexts as objective facts often are. Having introduced Sutherland’s ethnography, I shall now address some of the theoretical problems I find within Sutherland’s methodology and work.
To Sutherland, the concept of *marime* is first and foremost the most important concept when referring to all aspects of Romani culture. "*Marime* is a key concept that allows them to talk metaphorically about categories of people within and outside the group, relative moral worth, social and economic status, and even general health and fortune," (Sutherland, 1986 preface). It may be a key concept, but she elevates *marime* to the level of cultural "ethos" of the Roma. Would the Roma studied by Sutherland still be Roma if they did not practice *marime*? Sutherland takes the institution of *marime*, which is still a strongly held belief in some Vlax Roma culture, and builds upon it. The concept of *marime* becomes the societal basis for all Romani social activities, regardless of situational factors. When I think of parallel examples of this flawed theoretical doctrine, the early armchair anthropologists come to mind, mining various travel accounts for data that could be fit into their preconceived theoretical beliefs. I liken her course of research to an outsider observer (the ever-knowing anthropologist) who does not look at the wider context of the society being studied. She simply fills in research problems encountered by taking established concepts and extrapolating them to a much wider context. Theory becomes a pre-fabricated structure that integrates and accommodates fieldwork. Instead of presenting an incomplete picture of a certain culture or society, which is a perfectly viable end product of ethnographic research, Sutherland tries to encompass anything and everything with her application of the institutional practice of *marime*.

Other anthropologists have been critical of Sutherland’s theoretical approach. Lemon (2000) criticizes the overly structural nature of Sutherland’s work: “Sutherland wrote her ethnography at a time when Mary Douglas’s *Purity and Danger*, along with other structuralist works, dominated much of cultural anthropology. Although Douglas
never intended to argue that the relation of purity/pollution rules to social boundaries was unique to any particular culture, many Western anthropologists writing about Roma took them up as key to Gypsy culture.” (Lemon, 2000: 197). The methodology employed by Sutherland seems flawed as well.

Sutherland continually talks about how successfully the Roma she encountered manipulated the *gaje* (non-Roma), yet for some reason she thinks the anthropologist is immune to this fact. In addition to this, she conducted her fieldwork in English, as opposed to Romani. I find this problematic for two reasons: first, this would limit her linguistic competence and second, by the simple fact that she uses her subject’s second language, the depth of her research would be limited to a rather superficial level. Many Roma are functionally illiterate in their non-native language (English in this case). English is the language Sutherland conducted her field research in. She, according to her preface, learned Romani by herself in order to be able to glean facts from conversations that the Roma assumed she could not comprehend, not to interview informants first-hand. The approach taken by Sutherland still seems problematic. The context of much of her fieldwork is also curious – she exclusively deals with Roma in the context of the welfare office (and its associated social workers) or in an educational context, in which she occupied a position of power. Sutherland served as the Principal of the ‘Romany School’ in Barvale, California. This position would offer her undue influence and a position of power (i.e., people would be more likely to pander and indulge her particular research goals and queries in the hopes of gaining influence with a prominent *gaji* official). I find this approach problematic in comparison with the dialogic context of modern fieldwork. Sutherland seems to want to be able to offer an authoritative account, yet she limits her
cultural immersion in the group, in essence becoming one of the “duped” \textit{gaje} (non-Roma) often spoken about.

Ethnicity is not directly addressed as such, yet it is a thematic aspect of her ethnography. From the ethnographic situations portrayed, one deduces that ethnicity among the Roma studied is an organizing factor within Romani society. By organizing factor I simply mean that mechanisms have developed (\textit{marime}, \textit{kris}) within Romani society that inscribe ethnicity. Romani ethnicity is not simply an ascribed choice in the Roma studied by Sutherland. Internal societal mechanisms “manufacture” a group coherency through threat of alienation and physical expulsion.

I chose to introduce this particular work because of its problematic methodologies and theory, not because of its stellar anthropological content. Using this ethnography as a basis, I now introduce two recent ethnographies that contextualize the situational marginality of the Roma. Not simply relying on information gleaned from secondary sources, these ethnographies exemplify the middle ground in terms of their view of the Roma, situated somewhere between a pan-European (macro) view of the Roma and the distinct micro-context that ultimately is the basis for Romani ethnicity and identity.

\textbf{Between Two Fires: Roma in Russia}

Elevated as part of the Russian cultural heritage in Czarist times, the object of Leninist and Stalinist policy during the Soviet regime, later left to fend for themselves after the break up of the USSR, the Roma in Russia have been conditioned by their context in Russia. A historically contingent minority, the Roma in Russia must be viewed with regard to their unique context in Russian society. The history of the Roma
in Russia is intimately bound up with some classical literary ideas of Russian high culture. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Russian poets and writers became fascinated with Romani serf choirs, and this cultural “cross-pollination” amalgamated the worlds of both Russian and Romani elites. Leo Tolstoy’s brother married a Gypsy, as did other prestigious Russian aristocrats. But for all this high culture, how is Romani ethnicity articulated in everyday discourse? The ethnographic evidence shows a remarkable situational degree of adaptation, with performance and performativity being optimal terms. By situational adaptation, I simply mean that Romani ethnicity is fluid in daily interactions. Being Roma often becomes a performative act, with one performing ethnicity in daily interactions with non-Roma. Many Roma in Russia use the historic theatrical tropes of performance in their everyday lives and social interactions. The performative nature of ethnicity displayed by Roma in Russia should be viewed in the context of Barth’s theories.

Barth emphasizes the maintenance of ethnic boundaries despite the varying intra-group levels of participation and membership. All member of an ethnic group need not satisfy a checklist of ethnic criteria. Social interaction forms the core of ethnic demarcation, for an isolated ethnic group has nothing to contrast itself against. A is A only so far as a B exists as a contrasting element. The Roma in Russia, despite being essentialized and reduced to performative tropes, thrive as an ethnic group because of the continued flow of ideas across ethnic boundaries. External identification is only part of the picture however. The ethnic self-identification of Roma and Russia offers an interesting insight into the processes of ethnic ascription. According to Barth, ethnic
boundaries, not the enclosed cultural matter, make up the core of ethnicity (Barth 1969: 15).

From a self-identification with African-Americans (performers like Michael Jackson and Stevie Wonder) to the “performance” of historically contingent theatrical tropes (the enactment of theatrical aspects in everyday social interaction), the Roma in Russia defy any sort of reification or essentialization. Lemon frames Romani performance in general with three rationales in mind. First, various Romani performers in Russia achieved fame as stage performers, which in turn elevated them socially from non-performing Roma. This elevation of a distinct cadre of Romani performers resulted in the development of structured “class” relations within the Romani community. Second, “pan-European ideologies about performance and dramaturgic models of interaction are all too often transposed into accounts of Romani culture,” (Lemon 2000: 21-22). Thus, performance ideologies obfuscate understanding of social interactions between Roma and non-Roma. Third, ideas about performance and performativity elucidate the basic processes of understanding “how” and “why” people divide the “staged” from the banal or authentic, and how ideologies (racial, national, cultural, ethnic) infuse and strengthen such divisions. Stripping down these conflicting ideologies focuses not only on the content contained within, but also on the ordering and indexical meanings (Lemon 2000: 22,25). For example, the colorful nature of “traditional” Romani dress indexes the “free will” of the romantic portrayals contained in Pushkin’s works (Lemon 2000: 25). The situational context, not any fixed signifier, becomes the primary arbiter of ethnic expression. In the previous chapter, I described how different genres of literature produced discursive manifestations of “Gypsy” imagery. I now wish
to explore how the ethnographic evidence offers a micro-contextualization of the processes involved in the articulation of ethnicity.

A large portion of Lemon's ethnography, *Between Two Fires*, takes place within the context of the Moscow Romani Theater. Many of her informants are Romani intellectuals, who as a group can be viewed as the product of the class structuring process that began with the elevation of certain Roma as performers in the late-Czarist times. In addition to performers and intellectuals, Romani traders, Romani metalworkers, and native Russians are included as informants. This methodology is multi-vocal and multi-sited, and resists any attempt at the essentialization and totalization of the Roma as a cultural group. There is no primordial ethos for the Roma in Russia that the anthropologist seeks to discover. The Soviet minority policies described by Lemon are important, because unlike the situation in other Eastern European countries, the Roma in Russia were never fully proletarianized. Work cooperatives were formed, but for the most part they employed a small minority of Roma. The fall of Communism and the turbulent post-Soviet times thus did not affect the Roma in Russia as much as in other socialist countries such as Hungary, where the Roma today make up a large, visibly impoverished minority. Occupying different structural positions and different status groups as a result of different localized factors and policy discrepancies, the Roma in Russia stand in contrast to the Roma studied by Stewart (1997) in Hungary. I now examine daily life among the Roma in Russia, in order to later contrast to the position of the Roma in Hungary, whose situation I examine later.
Romani Byt (Daily Life)

Cautiously avoiding “wild” Gypsies and fortune-tellers, while enchanted by the literary images of Gypsies, Russians and Roma negotiate two opposing spheres of reality—two distinct “Gypsies” exist in Russia (Lemon 2000: 28). On the streets and in the bazaar, Roma are ascribed a racialized status based on the context and location of their social action. A multitude of factors determined how outsiders index the Roma. In the turbulent years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russians used race and racialized tropes to help comprehend the radical economic and political changes (Lemon 2000: 58). Post-Soviet Russians found “Gypsies” where they projected them to be, not where they were in reality.

“Real,” authentic “wild” Gypsies were said to be found on the street, not among the numerous professional occupations, as was often the reality. The Russian population at large metonymically extrapolated chance encounters on the street with a small number of Roma and perceived occupation niches. External uncertainty about the immediate future became manifested in discourse on race. Economic instability and the increased visibility of foreign faces pushed Russians to ideologically integrate (to “trope”) their experiences with minority populations without knowing the specific reasons for Romani economic diversification (for example, why Kelderara women telling fortunes at metro stops only worked in female groups). These misconceptions only furthered misrecognition of the Roma on a wider cultural scale. In terms of being the object of violence, Roma were far less likely to than other non-Russians, especially “hot blooded” Chechens, Armenians, Azeris, Abkhazians or Africans, who were viewed as “invaders” in the post-Soviet void and thus more likely to become the target of racial violence.
Race, long obfuscated by Soviet class ideology, became a salient concept in post-Soviet Russia.

**Roma and Race in Russia**

The constructivist nature of “blackness” is contextually different in Russia than in America. However, at its base there is still an indexical, external nature to the term “black” (*chjeryny*) in Russia. Being indexed as “black” in Russia entails being “ethnic” looking (one with “olive” skin, dark hair, and dark eyes, among other things). However, phenotypes are also ideologically supplemented with generational “blood” tropes that are mobilized and become salient in political arguments. Race and *natsiya* (“nation” or “nationality”) reflect an amalgamation of economic and moral statements — statements that reflect the plight of the “Russian people.” The Russian people inhabit a mineral rich country exploited by foreigners, according to one narrative (Lemon 1995). In the post-Soviet era, Russian intellectuals who turned to trade, previously an illicit “pariah” niche under Communism, described themselves as becoming “black.” One intellectual (who had turned to commerce) declared: “We are all becoming Gypsies,” (Lemon 2000: 73). According to Verdery, state socialism hardened and enabled the reproduction of ethnic boundaries under acute shortages, the “economy of shortage.” Social networks constricted under economic stress, and members of the one ethnic group would restrict goods and services to their own members. Restriction of inter-ethnic trading only intensified and solidified ethnic boundaries (Verdery 1993: 177). State socialism, far from rendering racial ideologies meaningless, crystallized them. Romani ethnic identity in Russia is multi-faceted, in that it evokes not only cultural stereotypes but also
economic, racial, and social projections. Russians identify themselves by what they are not, “black,” and non-Russians identify themselves by what they are not, namely Russian. Each community imagines and demarcates themselves by tropes of another (Roma becoming Russians, Russian becoming Gypsies, etc.). Russians, however, are not the only ones who project historically contingent imagery upon the Roma as a cultural group.

Many Roma themselves internalize projected “inherited” traits and “performed” these projections in their everyday interactions with non-Roma. One Romani performer escaped misplaced anti-Semitism on public transportation by “performing” her way out of trouble:

Discrimination – there isn’t any of that [in Russia]. Haven’t I told you yet how it saved me that I am a Gypsy? I am on the bus, and a drunk, a Russian, was hovering near me. He said, “Huh, look here! Kikes! Jews! We should just kill them all!” and he came up closer – he held his hand over me. And I look at him and I say [she illustrates with a shoulder shimmy], “I’m a Gypsy!” He fell on his knees then and started to sing the song, “Dark eyes” and I answered him, “Passionate eyes!” And the bus stopped, and I ran away! (Field notes 1993, in Lemon 2000: 74).

On one hand evoking Soviet ideology by denying discrimination and the associated stigma attached to being seen as a “Gypsy,” her racialized phenotypes, the “dark eyes” that initially provoked the incident, offer her a convenient way to displace and disperse racial discrimination. Many Romani social actors themselves internalized these “proof-by-performance” tropes. This internalization can be viewed partially as the end-result of various historical contingencies. Often Roma themselves remarked that blackness (in the culturally constructed Russian sense) was a distinguishing characteristic of a “true Gypsy,” (Lemon 2000: 75). Ascriptions of “blackness” also upended racial hierarchies.

In describing their “civilizing” trend towards settlement and the adoption of Russian social trappings, some Roma reversed the Russian view of Gypsy economic
activities, claiming: “We are all becoming Russian,” (Lemon 2000: 75). Previously, Russians described themselves as “becoming” Gypsies, yet now Roma ambivalently remark on their tendency toward “becoming” Russian. African-American notions of race also played a role in the internalizing of performance stereotypes. African-American performers on MTV fascinated young Roma and they often nurtured a racialized affinity with them. American rap and jazz movements paralleled the Russian notions of Gypsy musicality – they [African Americans] were “like us.” America, the source of the pop culture vogue in post-Soviet Russia, was equated with “blackness.” “The Statue of Liberty – isn’t that where Michael Jackson dances in the video?” (Lemon 2000: 75).

Since America was positioned as “better” than the Soviet Union (socially and economically), Roma in Russia identified with a subsection of American culture over the “secondary” Russian cultural heritage, thus reversing the “valence” of the stigmatized “blackness” and subsequent “Gypsiness,” (Lemon 2000: 76). As a broadly defined and context-dependent signifier, “blackness” acted as a “shifter,” pointing more to the instability of relations than referencing a stable group (as stated above, “blackness” loosely referred to anyone with a “swarthy” complexion, i.e., most non-Russians) (Lemon 2000: 78). On a micro-level, ethnicity was a fluid, unstable variable, being for the most part situationally and contextually contingent. The situational nature of ethnicity does nothing to de-legitimize the ethnic group in questions, for rarely are ethnic boundaries stable in any objective sense. This is quite different than the situation of the Roma in Hungary.
Time of the Gypsies: Roma in Hungary

Long subject to assimilation attempts by various Habsburg monarchs, the Roma in Hungary compared to the Roma of Russia occupy quite a different structural position within Hungarian society. Roma in Hungary were praised for their musicality by Franz Liszt and later proletarianized through socialist policy. The Roma studied by Stewart professed little interest in their history nor sought a connection to the ancestral Indic homeland. This a-historical view can be contrasted with Roma in Russia, who often donned Indian saris for portraits and displayed a strong cultural affinity to India through consumption of Indian movies and media. Stewart views the ethnic identity of the Roma as primarily articulated in the present, with little regard for their history, collective or individual. Before moving on to a discussion of Stewart’s ethnography, a brief description of the fieldwork setting merits attention.

In 1984, Stewart began fieldwork in Harangos, Hungary, and stayed there for approximately fifteen months in a local settlement known as “The Third Class,” (Stewart 1997: 10). Stewart lived among Vlach Roma, descendents of Roma who arrived in several migratory waves from the Romanian provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia in the 19th and early 20th centuries (they were most likely descendants of Roma previously enslaved). Demographically, Vlach Roma account for approximately 20 percent of the Hungarian Roma population. The other eighty percent are divided into so-called Hungarian Gypsies, Romungros, who speak Hungarian and make up seventy percent of the Hungarian Rom population. The remaining ten percent are Boyash Gypsies, who arrived from Romani and Serbia in the 19th century. Ordinary Hungarians and officials viewed the Vlach Roma as the “worst” of the Gypsies (Stewart 1997: 10-11). The Vlach
Roma alone speak the Romani language and for the most part live in separate settlements. In his ethnography, Stewart focuses on many under-researched aspects of Romani life; the ways Rom dealt with socialist assimilation policy, how the Roma integrated and upended social hierarchies in daily life, and how they manipulated state-sponsored assimilation attempts and fit them into their own world-view. Stewart divides his ethnography into three distinct sections. These sections serve as a basic structural outline for my discussion of Stewart’s work.

The Gypsy Way: Daily Life Among Vlach Roma in Hungary

Representations and misrepresentations are dealt with by Stewart; how the Roma represent the hostile non-Roma world to themselves, and how non-Roma often ascribe a secondary derogatory status to the Romani culture they encounter on a daily basis. The idea of work exemplifies the ideological refashioning in Romani culture. The way Roma and non-Roma view the ideology of work elucidates the dichotomous Roma/non-Roma schism in Hungary. The status ascribed by the Roma themselves to “work” is a prime example of the construction of romanes, or the Gypsy way. The mythic “free lunch,” or the act of harvesting wealth from non-Roma without having “sown its seeds” was the epitome of proper work, according to the Roma (Stewart 1997: 19-20). Roma take an inherently superior view of themselves and their lifestyle vis-à-vis the gazos (non-Roma). In Harangos, the Gypsies often talked about how “stupid” (prosto) and “foolish” (dilo) the gazos were in comparison to the “cunning” Roma (Stewart 1997: 19). Romani butji, or “Gypsy work” – the cunning and wit that allowed the Rom to live freely, to reap without sowing, was a central idea of the Romani work “ethic.” The Roma scavenged
discarded food from dustbins in order to fatten up pigs for slaughter (at state industries, with the profit realized by the Roma), and often gleaned produce from collective farms that never harvested it. They did everything possible to avoid the stigma attached to work that would be viewed in a Western context as “proper” daily wage labor. The essence of romani butji involved exchanges with gazos, viewed by the Roma as exploitative (they themselves being the exploiters, not the exploited) (Stewart 1997: 25). The reality was quite different. Stewart’s observations of romani butji raised paradoxical questions.

When discussing the advantages of Gypsy work, the Roma suggested that they were exploiting and thus supported by the peasants, in addition to the perception that they lived freely in an “uninterrupted free lunch,” (Stewart 1997: 25-26). This seemingly simple ideological reversal has widespread reverberations. The Roma constructed a worldview that upended the traditional work ethic and allowed the Roma appear to prosper despite their marginal position within Hungarian society. Wage labor was relegated to secondary status vis-à-vis romani butji, but in reality most of the economic backing for romani butji, romanes and its associated activities (drinking, gambling, horse-trading, etc.) came from wage labor within the state-socialist system. Before moving on to a discussion of wage-labor and state socialist policy, ethnicity and identity from the Romani viewpoint needs to be addressed.
Historical Identity

In contrast to the traditional peasant view of identity and ethnicity being constructed in some primordial past, Romani identity was learned and constructed in the present. Instead of an ideology of descent permeating “traditional” worldviews, Romani identity was socially acquired and was thus available to those who would be considered non-Roma. Through an acquisition of the Romani language and *romanes*, or the “Gypsy way,” an outsider could become a Gypsy by living with the Roma and learning from them (Stewart 1997: 59). Romani identity was established by relating as equals to other Roma. This identity was manifested and reinforced through shared activities, commensality at meals, dress, language, and other cultural activities that “nurtured” Romaniness (Stewart 1997: 59). A shared feeling of equality was the end result of the common “brotherly” narrative of the group. This brotherly feeling, a kind of flat hierarchy, was an equalizing mechanism that leveled internal discrepancies between the statuses of individual Rom. The trope of brotherhood strengthened community identity vis-à-vis non-Roma.

Gypsy social life had the tendency to balance out and negate individuation and differentiation through various leveling mechanisms. In the community, “being” a Rom implied a public assertion to *romanes* (the “Gypsy way”) through continual maintenance of strong social relations with fellow kin, residents, and other Roma. In the settlement, this was manifested in a tendency to homogenize various social activities such as eating, dress, and drinking. The ultimate end-result was an appearance of equality and similarity. Identity is acquired for Hungarian Roma, not ascribed in some distant past. The Romani notions of ethnic construction fundamentally oppose the rigid binary
oppositions of primordialism and its “us/them” exclusivity, although outsiders may be ignorant to the selfascriptive aspects. Stewart describes how the Roma he lived with asserted that group identity was acquired through “joint action” within the community. Someone born a gazo (non-Roma) who lives with Roma and adopts their lifestyle can indeed become a full, respected member of the community. “Gypsy social identity is based on a transcendence of the divisive interest of particular families through the construction of a communal brotherhood,” (Stewart 1996?: 152-153). Ethnic boundaries in the Hungarian context studied by Stewart are community boundaries; adherence to romanés and group coherence denotes ethnic membership. Having established a basis for Romani ethnic identity, I move on to a discussion of relations with non-Roma and the influence of state socialist policy.

**Beyond the Ghetto: Roma, State Socialism, and Gazos**

With the onset of state socialism and its associated policies of assimilation via proletarianization, the Roma were once again the objects of policy in Hungary. What initially began with the Austro-Hungarian absolutionist ruler’s attempt to make “new peasants” (and instill the peasant work ideology) out of the Roma continued in the 1950s with the Hungarian Communist Party attempt to resolve the “Gypsy” question (Stewart 1997: 97). When using the term peasant work ideology, I mean the traditional peasant idea that work and land are intimately bound together, with one reaping material benefits from the tillage on one’s own plot of land. However, despite Communism’s radical ideological break with the past, its policies mimicked past assimilation attempts and differed only superficially. Instead of tackling the social prejudice that hindered
structural integration into the wider society at large, communist party officials invested heavily in a policy of integration into the socialist labor force (Stewart 1997: 98). Assimilation through work would be the basis of all subsequent socialist state policy directed towards the Roma. When viewed ex post facto, the gains were more statistical than concrete, however.

In 1964, one in six Roma in Harangos were employed in full-time work. In 1983, nine out of ten men were employed full-time in the state sector. The numbers seem to be the results the Hungarian socialist government hoped for, but the question arises, how much did these policies actually instill the socialist work ideology in the Roma? The socialist work ideology was the embodiment of proletarian ideals, the realization of the “Socialist Man.” This ideology was strengthened through various work-related labor competitions, although the extent this ideology was adopted in tangible terms remains negligible. Contrary to their perceived resistance to wage labor, Roma adapted to the socialist wage sector and inverted its ideology. They did not view the factory as any sort of socialist community, and displayed little affinity to the Parquet factory outside of the labor performed there (and its associated monetary gain). The ideological seeds spread by socialism never germinated. The Roma as a group recognized the fact that “wheeler-dealer” skills of romani butji, “Gypsy work,” helped rather than hindered individual workers within the state socialist sector. The inability of the socialist economy to fix hourly wages enabled the Roma, who were often variably paid based on variables such as productivity, to “deal” and use these skills to their advantage, against the prevailing socialist work ethic. The political economy was intimately bound up with notions of ethnicity and identity. Personal ties were also important in the socialist “economy of
shortage” (Verdery 1993), and once again personal ties with bosses, not hard work, enable one to access the coveted positions and jobs. Despite the hoped for influence of the socialist “collective,” Magyar-Roma work relationships never forged the hoped-for proletarian solidarity (Stewart 1997: 105-106). Stewart actually worked in a factory with both Magyars and Roma. He observed the “socialist” work ideology firsthand and remarks on how little socialist policy ever translated into the hoped for concrete results:

In fact, as we have seen, and despite all the internal contradictions of a community based on brotherhood, Gypsy communal life had continued to thrive despite the effects of industrialization and without the help of nannying gazos. By contrast, even though the Rom worked beside the Magyars, the solidarity that resulted from this shared experience in the Parketta [the factory] was extremely fragile; mutual tolerance might have been a better characterization of the relationship. The Gypsies insisted that their gazo colleagues at the Parketta were “good” or “easy” (laso), but relations between the two groups remained minimal. (Stewart 1997: 106).

Socialist attempts to change the work “ethic” among the Roma were not fully realized. The Roma went through the motions in the factory, and Romani adaptations to the socialist work environment effaced the influence of the socialist collective. As evidenced by Stewart’s observations on the factory floor, state socialist policy did not succeed in its goals of “proletarianizing” and assimilating ethnic minorities through wage labor. I now turn to the Roma view of work. How did Stewart’s Romani interlocutors view and weigh the wage labor they performed on a daily basis?

Despite the fact that the wages earned by the Roma enabled them to survive materially, they talked of work as “suffering” (briga), “heavy” and “oppressive” (phari), in contrast to the “light” and “good” romani butji, (or “Gypsy work”) (Stewart 1997: 107). Generous state sickness payments were taken advantage of by many Roma at the factory. Despite heavy investment on the part of bureaucrats, the Communist policies did
not result in the sedimentation of Marxist class ideology in the Roma (i.e., Roma ethnicity was not effaced). In fact, communist policy indirectly (through its generous social welfare programs) nurtured and encouraged the strengthening of Romani identity as a whole. The Roma re-appropriated the ideology and the material conditions the socialist economy into the Romani worldview. Apart from their dealings at the factory, how did the Roma interact on a daily basis with non-Roma?

Relations with gazos (non-Roma) are intimately bound together with socialist assimilation policies. Implementation of socialist policy offered differentiating narratives and ideologics that both non-Roma and Roma used to view one another. Communist policy, aiming to lift the “false consciousness” induced by the class society, was the primary goal, logically followed by eventual assimilation. Being a part of the “lumpen proletariat,” Communists viewed the Roma as having little in the way of inherent ideological consciousness. Thus, socialists policy makers viewed them as fodder for the socialist project. However, as described above, the Romani ideological void was nonetheless not receptive to socialist machinations. The Roma themselves were not the only ones accused of having a “Gypsy mentality,” (Stewart 1997: 132). Hungarians often perceived of communist bureaucrats as displaying parallels to Roma. Often Hungarians viewed state officials who hoped to integrate the Roma into the wider Hungarian society as having a “Gypsy mentality.” Unlike the ideal Magyar peasant with “things to do,” ordinary Hungarians perceived the Communists as having “nothing to do,” save useless policy development, the implementation of which would never be fully realized (Stewart 1997: 132). Much like Gypsics who subverted and ideologically reinvented the peasant
work ethic, communists undermined the ideology they wished to instill through their gross misconceptions and subsequent enactment of policy.

Social reformers needed only to instruct Roma in the ways of “living as proper Hungarians” and their ideological void would be inscribed. However, what are some of the wider implications of ideological refashioning? How is it integration into the wide Romani worldview? Does the failure of Roma assimilation in Hungary reflect the weakness of socialist political economy? Or can it be viewed as reflecting perceived stereotypes of Gypsy slackness? In order to adequately answer these questions, I now move on to the final section of Stewart’s ethnography, which deals with the ways Roma reinvent the world around them, in order to reverse hierarchical ideological structures. I briefly touched upon these themes earlier, and shall to return to them in depth.

The Reinvention of the World: The Horse Market and Romani Brotherhood

The reinvention of the world is a central theme in Stewart’s ethnography. Through a hermeneutical manipulation of daily social interpretations, the Roma viewed themselves as prospering in the face of an often-harsh reality of grinding poverty and social marginalization. Despite being for the most part financially dependent upon wage labor earned in socialist industries, the Roma complained daily of the “suffering” they would endure at work, “suffering” that enabled economic survival. Romani butji (“Gypsy Work”), described earlier, was the opposite of the “suffering” the Roma endured at the factory. Buying and selling horses epitomized romani butji, despite the economic loss it often entailed.
The Horse Market as Ideologically Charged Space

One can easily ascribe the Roma's fascination with horses as a marker of their "status" as an ethnic group, since the Roma have been symbolically associated with horses. Forever juxtaposed with images of caravans and a nomadic lifestyle, the Roma Stewart encountered had a much more complicated relationship with horses (Stewart 1997: 144). Despite the fact that horse-trading was not a lucrative business venture, Roma pursued it despite its negative economic benefits. Why was such importance attached to horses, despite their limited usefulness within an increasingly industrialized context? I offer a quote from one of Stewart's informants, Šošoj:

We deal with horses; it's in our hair. I grew up with horses, and I simply couldn't live without them. I'm completely used to having them by me, although, as you know, they don't work for us. We keep the horses rather than the horses keeping us. We could put the money to other uses, for instance, to buy the children what they need. But, you see, with horses it's like, if one hasn't got them, others say, "Let God strike him down; he's just like a poor Romungro [a Hungarian speaking Rom, often "assimilated"] who hasn't got anything." That's why I have horses. Not just me but the Rom in general. We go to the markets, we sell and we buy, we swap: We know how to do it. – Šošoj (Stewart 1997: 141).

Horses are not only symbolic capital that differentiates Roma from others (gazos, Romungro, etc.), horses and the activities associated with them are part of a larger internal mechanism that re-appropriates and reinvents the cultural reality of everyday Romani existence. Horses are a marker of a distinct Romani sphere through which ethnicity is nurtured, developed, and reinforced. Through this "sphere," a cycle of buying and selling re-negotiates power relationships with non-Roma and at the same time reinforces brotherhood. Before moving on to a discussion of the implication of this "reinvention," I wish to address the actual activities of the Roma and their horses in the market context.
The livestock markets of Hungary were severely limited in the 1950s under Stalinist policies. However, in the mid 1980s the socialist government relaxed restrictions, and they became large gatherings, attracting people from far and wide. The Roma were ubiquitous in the market context during the mid-1980s as horse dealers and horse traders. Despite the deleterious economic nature of horse dealing for the Roma, who more often than not had no practical need for horses in their daily lives (vis-à-vis Magyar peasants who depended on horses more so for farm work, not prestige), the Roma persisted in practicing, and even celebrating, the horse market and its associated activities. I offer a cursory excerpt of Romani dealings at the horse market in order to proceed with an analysis.

Magyar peasants often remarked to Roma at the markets, “If I buy a horse, I’ll keep it for thirteen years, not swap it away in two weeks’ time,” (Stewart 197: 157). In comparison to the peasant who, when at the market, bought and sold horses like consumer goods, the Roma often circulated their horses in order to attain prominence as middlemen, ideologically circumventing the dominant peasant hegemony. The circulation (forgat) of horses metaphorically symbolized and articulated their position outside the realm of normal society. Despite the fact that gazos could not grasp their activities within their limited world-view, the Roma reveled in their market roles. Working as “brokers” (cincár) or “intermediaries” (követítő), Roma were able to close deals, bargain, and in a sense lubricate the market (i.e., they made horses and money circulate) with their speech and tenacity for wheeling and dealing. The Rom cincár (“brokers”) more often than not helped gazos close deals (Stewart 1997: 158). The Roma, through romani butji, brought activity and spectacle to the otherwise dull,
economically driven livestock market. It was in this position as “bosses” of the market that the Roma reinvented their world and perceived of themselves as “managers of men.”

Occupying the lowest social rung of Hungarian society, the Roma did not accept the rational, classical economic notions of the market. The Roma of the market did not only dominate the “dealings” of the market, they also anachronistically adopted the dress of the gentry, in order to symbolically assert their (supposed) superiority in the market context. Many Rom dealers dressed like the landed gentry of old, as if to say that like the gentry administered their estates, the Roma administered and “mastered” the market.

External markers strengthened perceived ethnic roles. However, in the context of the mid-1980s Hungary, real economic power resided in those who chaired the cooperative farms. Some Roma, in order to lay claim to the ideology of the cooperative leaders, often came to the market dressed in the green coats of farm bureaucrats, complete with briefcases (empty!) at their side, (Stewart 1997: 160-161). Throughout the market spectacle, dominance and power was also asserted through Romani “speech” (vorba):

I need to have speech. If I don’t have that, then I can’t do anything. You see, most people don’t have this … You have to talk someone into buying a horse. You have to talk the horse up [literally, beside it] so someone will buy it. You have to take a person’s hand to make them do business – otherwise they won’t come together. People can’t talk to each other from a distance, not at all … You talk two or three words, and the fee just comes to you. If you don’t talk, you won’t get the fee. (Stewart 1997: 161).

Through speech, the Roma “interpret” and bring together two clients who may or may not have similar economic goals in mind (in the market context). When successful, the Roma who brokered deals were often ecstatic. “Through speech,” the Roma often said, “we make money turn around, turn around and come to us,” (Stewart 1997: 162). To the Roma involved in the market, it was an “arena” where, through the performance of heroic
rhetorical feats, glory and power through performance could be achieved by the Romani social actors. In this setting, the hierarchical tables of power were inverted by the Roma.

Having ideologically dispossessed the market, the conditions (at least to the Roma participating) intended to favor the "superior" Roma over the "simple" gazos (Stewart 1997: 162). By liquefying their money into horses in the market context, and by "attracting" money to themselves through deals and heroic market acts, the Rom realized a profit. Profit, not in the sense of a concrete economic gain, but a kind of cultural profit. The Romani views on currency illustrate the cultural capital gained at the market.

Hungarian forints realized at the market became "silver" (rup) to the men, "silver" won from the gazos. The "profit" realized from a deal, regardless of whether there was a monetary gain, was a source of brotherhood among the Roma. Money earned by wage labor carried the stigma of the state and all its institutionality and was to be saved (in the eyes of the state and the Magyar peasants). However, the "free-flowing silver" acquired at the market allowed the men to celebrate their "good mood" (voja) with their "true brothers," (Stewart 1997: 163). More often than not, even if a deal did not result in a profit for the Roma they often called for a drink with their "brothers." Horses and their associated dealings became a represented form of "(male) Gypsy potency" that allowed the creation of a "fantasy social order," (Stewart 1997: 180). The Roma appropriated the horse market as a "third space," or a space that lies beyond simply binary dualisms. The "lived" social space of the market is where the Roma subvert (through reversal) the dominant ideology (For an anthropological treatment of third space, Kahn 2000). I now will explore the connections between ideology of the market and the idea of "brotherhood" among the Roma men in particular.
**Mulatšago and Brotherhood**

The *mulatšago*, or “celebration” is the most important social context for men in the community. During the *mulatšago* brotherhood is manifested by all through commensality and speech. At a *mulatšago*, typically men would gather, drink, and sing together. Money for the *mulatšago* came indirectly from wages earned at the factory, more directly from horse market dealings. Through a *mulatšago*, men put aside all of their squabbles and trivialities and joined together equally as brothers, engineering “a space for the symbolic production of their own sociality,” (Stewart 1997: 181-182). The songs performed by the Roma reflected some of the ongoing struggles of Romani existence in the world, and sometimes dealt with more personal topics. In essence, the *mulatšago* was an exaggerated formalization of *romanes*, the “Gypsy way,” or the crux of Romani identity.

“Respect” (*patjiv*) and equality were the foundations upon which the *mulatšago* rested. Community was manifested, developed, and articulated during the *mulatšago*, instead of merely being ascribed. “Everything was supposed to be done to create the impression of a united group of perfect brother. As they talked and sang, the men sat crammed on top of each other as if willfully playing down the separation between self and other,” (Stewart 1997: 187-188). Through the *mulatšago* and the commonality of song, equality was ritualized and inscribed within the Romani community. Ethnicity was not ascribed in some sort of primordial way for the Roma, it had to be acquired and propagated through ritualized activity.

Ethnicity among the Roma studied by Stewart is a stable attribute in the eyes of non-Roma, viewed as a primordial attribute – they are Roma, and they cannot change
that. However, as the ethnographic evidence shows, *romanès* is situational and constructed, and is by no means stable. Parallels exist between Romani ethnicity in Russia and Hungary, and I now shall synthesize the ethnographic evidence.

**Conclusion**

The Roma of Russia and the Hungarian Roma described here have little commonality, apart from their perceived existence as "Gypsies." What parallels, if any, can be deduced from the ethnographic evidence? In both contexts the Roma upended traditional hegemonic power structures for their own benefit. From the anthropological literature, one can glimpse the micro processes that lie at the base of ethnicity. Both contexts differ greatly, yet one sees similarities.

In Russia, some Roma have taken historical notions of performance and integrated them into daily life. Romani performance on the stage has trickled into the streets in Russia. Subjective ascription is not only internalized among the Roma, external projections also symbolically differentiate Roma from outsiders. Here one could observe that the ethnic boundaries of the Roma are permeated, if not partially defined by the externalized construction of Romani ethnicity (performance, "blackness," etc.). There is arguably no objective basis for ethnicity, rather two subjective ascription processes feeding off one another.

In the Hungarian context, group coherence is a larger part of ethnic identity. Perhaps the tendency of the group to predominate in Hungary has to do with the fact that Stewart studied one particular group in one area. Thus, Stewart would have observed the group processes at work as opposed to the individual articulation of ethnicity. The fact
that Lemon's ethnography is multi-sited should not be overlooked. Having studied Roma in a wide variety of Russian contexts, her observations would undoubtedly show the more general processes of self-identification present in the daily life of Romani individuals. No broad generalizations or essentializations can be made, for the two contexts described exhibit too wide a degree of situational differentiation. Both anthropologists touch upon the subject of ethnicity but approach it from two different angles – Stewart from the point of view of the group, Lemon from the individualized perspective of many respective Roma communities.

Russia, with its widely varying population and gene pool, would offer a much larger spectrum upon which one could contrast Romani ethnicity. In Hungary, ethnic homogeneity is prevalent, with the majority population being Magyar. Thus in the Hungarian case there could be a tendency to dichotomize ethnicity, which is evident from the evidence Stewart presents. Adherence to the Gypsy way is more important than being born a Rom. Yet, key to both of these ethnographies is the fact that contemporary social contexts are the result of wider historical processes and external ascription. Hungarian Roma see themselves as prospering despite their observable poverty. They have also been conditioned by various historic amelioration (assimilation) attempts made on their behalf. Far from accepting these social experiments for their supposed end-result, the Roma refashioned these incursions into their Romani worldview. Despite the fact that Romani identity is self-ascribed in the "Third Class," external projections still dictate discourse on their behalf. Theatricality and performance may influence the discourse on the Roma in Russia, yet this is not the whole story. The micro contexts show how much discrepancy exists between the rarified macro discourse and the
observed daily context. The Roma as a group cannot be essentialized and treated as a European problem. Distinct contexts produce distinct populations with widely different problems. Approaching the Roma as a single entity only mirrors, in my opinion, the historic failures of old (Austria-Hungary, various socialist attempts, etc.). Undoubtedly further changes in Europe will offer opportunities for ethnic adaptation and increased identity politics, but hindrances and barriers will also come into play. Increasingly, membership in a nation-state is coming to rely on the economic benefits accrued to members, as evidenced by the constant deluge of refugees to EU states. How do the Roma, traditionally viewed as outsiders, fit in with this? In order to examine these questions, one must look at the larger context.

The wider processes at work within the world-system (political, economic, social, national) have upended the previously “stable” socialist regimes and unleashed a torrent of conflicting ideologies. Russians, previously the inhabitants of a world superpower, find themselves at the whim of the IMF and other liberal policy dictates from the West. Hungarians, previously situated within the Warsaw Pact, now find themselves at the doorstep of an expanding European Union. The rise of supranational institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) offers concrete ways for the Roma as an ethnic minority within Europe to systematize and codify their human rights as citizens. However, as evidenced by the ethnographic data described above, ethnicity and identity and their associated cultural baggage are ideologically charged and historically sensitive. The Roma/Sinti dichotomy in Germany, which I describe below, shows the tenacious thread connecting heterogeneous peoples of a “homogenous” ethnic group. In the next section of this essay, drawing upon the ethnographic evidence included in this chapter,
exploring the Roma in the wider European context and examining the shifting basis of ethnicity. I believe that in the emerging "New Europe," Romani ethnicity and identity are taking on a more political connotation. Who will speak for the Roma, and will their distinct problems be addressed by Europe in the 21st century?
Four

Ethnicity, Identity, and the European Dimension

Introduction

The recently elevated position of the Roma in the context of the emerging unified Europe becomes evident when one examines the numerous policy statements, human rights reports, and conferences held on their behalf in the last decade. This discourse undoubtedly emanates from somewhere. Who articulates this discourse, and for what reasons? The terms “Roma” and “Romani” have, in the context of post-socialist Eastern Europe, developed an increasingly political connotation. What are the background reasons for this ideological shift from a historically perceived “pariah” group to an emerging political force? Romani political ethnogenesis is not easily defined in concrete ideological terms, for it encompasses competing discourses at the local, national, and supranational levels. In the process of ethnogenesis, various non-Roma have become involved in the Romani struggle for political rights. At each structural level there are different degrees of mobilization. On the ground, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of both a foreign and Romani nature are the first “shock” troops deployed on behalf of the Roma. Government offices (of the nation states of Eastern and Western Europe) deal with minority rights, articulate legislative policy, and respond to the needs and demands of supranational institutions such as the EU (European Union) and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). The information flow is not of a simple top-down hierarchy. At every level (supranational, national, local) there are various politicized interlocutors who enter the fray, more often than not in the form of some sort of NGO intervention. In this chapter, I attempt a synthesis of the politicization
of Romani ethnicity in the context of contemporary Europe, and investigate the goals and long-term effects of this mobilization on the Roma as a group, and speculate as to their future within the unified Europe as "imagined" by the EU.

Diaspora?

Much of the contemporary discourse on the Roma in Europe takes on a "diasporic" tone. However, are the Roma, who as an ethnic group display widely varying connections with both their local and historically perceived "Indic" heritage, a true diaspora? Is the invocation of diaspora simply a means to a political end? With the generalized politicization of ethnicity in the post-socialist European context (especially evident in the Balkans), being termed a "diaspora" increases the political clout of the minority group in question (Clifford 1994). Writing on the borders of diaspora, Clifford delimits diaspora's borders by what it defines itself against. "Diasporas are caught up with and defined against (1) the norms of nation-states and (2) indigenous, and especially autochthonous, claims by "tribal" peoples," (Clifford 1994: 307). Diasporas are by their very nature anti-essentialist and resist strict definition. Within the modern nation-state, diasporas often run contrary to the narrative of the nation-state and its territory. This is especially evident in the context of the perceived "ethnic" nation-states of Eastern Europe. However, despite their competing "ideologies of purity," diasporas, because of their multi-local transnational nature, can never be exclusive. Taking the form of multiple, multi-local attachments, diasporas both accommodate and resist the cultural norms and values of the host countries (Clifford 307: 1994). Much like the wide situational variability of ethnicity and identity among the Roma, the perceived
Bobick

 politicization and diasporization of the Roma as a group unearths a dichotomy within Romani society. This dichotomy is by no means unique to the Roma. Do Romani intellectuals actually speak for the Roma? When forging any sort of large, coherent group identity there is some top-down ideological machinations. If French intellectuals had not spoken the words liberty, equality, and fraternity, the modern French consciousness would undoubtedly have been inscribed with another narrative. Perhaps Romani intellectuals see themselves as crusaders in forging the new Roma consciousness in 21st century Europe. As with any sort of top-down machination an ideological schism develops between those who dictate (intellectuals and Romani social actors on the NGO scene) and those who are labeled as a result of these dictates (the majority of Roma who reside outside the discourse on their behalf). The Roma are an interesting case when viewed as a “diaspora.”

Despite the linguistic connection to India discovered in the 18th century, many Roma in Eastern Europe neither profess nor seek connection with their ancestral homeland. Much of the historical discourse emanates from a Romani intelligentsia, working within the framework of a removed, non-Romani world. The macro-level discourse (as articulated by Romani intellectuals, NGO executives, and national-level bureaucrats and MPs) is far removed both pragmatically and theoretically from the marginalized micro-context in which most Roma live. In order to ascertain the political effectiveness of the Roma diaspora I shall briefly examine the origins of Romani nationalism that initially spawned the Romani rights movement that exists today. A cynic might observe that the Roma are the “unimagined” communities in the context of the modern European nation-state. However, their cache as a diasporic minority within
Europe increases their internal coherence (the envisioned self of the “imagined community”) (see Anderson 1991). This coherence I speak of is at this point crystallizing at the macro level of institutional discourse (with the pan-Roma micro coherence to appear sometime in the future). With the (proposed) expansion of the EU and its subsequent “Europeanization” policies, the Romani diaspora becomes politically salient at the European level. With the liberalization of borders, heightened consciousness about minorities, and the increasingly fluid state of European nationalities, the Roma are in transition, situated on the precipice of European integration.

**Romani Nationalism in Europe**

With increased political mobilization in the last decade and the emergence of a transnational Romani movement, Romani political ethnogenesis is likely to be viewed as a recent phenomenon. However, contrary to this assumption, Romani nationalism began much earlier than the post-socialist context familiar to most. Associated media reports from the late 19th and early 20th centuries describe gatherings that, when viewed in historical sequence, mark the beginnings of the Romani movement. In one such gathering reported for the June 12th 1913 issue of *Near East Magazine*, “a vast concourse of Gypsies” gathered in Romania for the dedication of a statue of Mihail Kogălniceanu, a 19th century journalist/activist who was influential in bringing about an end to Gypsy slavery in Romania (Hancock 1991: 140). Prior to Stalin’s repression in 1929, Romani organizations flourished in the Soviet Union. The Pan-Russian Romani Union organized and supported thirty odd Romani artisan cooperatives and over fifty collective farms, in addition to publishing Romani language journals (Hancock 1991: 140). With the
exception of an international conference organized by the General Association of Gypsies of Romania, the international dimension was second to country specific organizations. Much of the political activities took place in a localized micro context, and as such enabled individual problems to be addressed. The emergence of the modern "transnational" Romani movement in Europe can be traced to the late 20th century, specifically to the first World Romani Congress in 1971.

Held in London from April 8th to April 12th the event, organized by the International Gypsy Committee, was primarily funded by the World Council of Churches and the Indian government. The Indian sponsorship of the conference illustrates one of the first concrete ties (diplomatic and scholarly) with their ancestral "homeland." Among other things, the congress established Romani-specific symbols, including a national flag and a Romani anthem. The Romani flag, according to one Romani activist, embodies the hopeful, romantic picture of idyllic Romani life.

Few people would recognize the Romani flag if they saw it... the bottom half is green to represent grass, the blue top half represents the sky, and a red wheel in the foreground represents the journey we made from India 1,000 years ago. Our flag represents a romantic picture of Romani life. It's a hopeful image of the freedom we – the gypsies – are often perceived to have, but have rarely found. In today's Europe, it could just as well consist of a barbed wire fence with a concrete background (Bowers 2000: 54).

Appendix B includes a picture of the Romani flag and the lyrics of the Romani anthem. The Romani activist quoted above (a co-founder of the environmental group Earth First! UK) further positions the history of the Roma in terms of the ongoing struggle against globalization. His thoughts foreshadow a neo-primitivist sense of existence (neo-primitivist in the sense of one voluntarily choosing a simpler, non-corporate existence, not in any sort of developmental schema). These thoughts, arguably an amalgam of
external and internal Romani discourse, reflect the appropriation and reversal common in much of the Romani political movement. Much of the symbolism conjured by the transnational Romani movement is intended to appeal to the widest Romani audience possible, and in my opinion exemplifies some of the tenuous aspects of Romani ethnic identity and political mobilization. As the ethnographic evidence indicates, the ethnic identity of the Roma is conditioned by many local and historical factors, and varies widely, depending on variables like self-ascription and other selective factors (occupation, lifestyle, external perception of, etc.). In addition to establishing some symbols for the Roma “nation,” the 1971 conference posited lexical clarifications.

The ethnic term “Roma” can be traced to this first World Romani Union Congress. All labels of non-Romani origin, such as Gypsy, Zigeuner, Gitana, etc. were condemned, and the sponsor organization renamed itself the International Rom Committee (Hancock 1991: 145). With the first conference, the pioneer activism of the transnational Romani movement laid down an ideological foundation. However, with the onset of the second World Romani Conference in Geneva seven years later, the previously unified Romani movement began to show some signs of fracture.

The next congresses, in Geneva (1978) and in Göttingen, Germany (1981) stressed two important ideological points. The Geneva conference emphasized the Indic connection initially asserted in 1971 (despite the fact the Indian connection had been known for almost two centuries), with numerous Indian dignitaries in attendance. During the Geneva conference one notices the first supranational Romani connection emerge. A petition to the UN formally requesting “consultative status” was developed and
Bobick

presented, and eventually in 1979 formal approval was granted (the bureaucratic wheel turns slowly).

Thus far, in terms of the World Romani Congresses, we have observed the systematic development of a Romani ethnic conscious, complete with symbols and the evocation of an ancestral homeland. However, when taking into account the timeline of Romani existence, a systematic historical thread of persecution becomes apparent. The third World Romani Congress, held in Göttingen, Germany, focused almost exclusively on issues pertaining to the Roma and the Holocaust (the Pořajmos, or the "devouring" in Romani). In addition to the testimony of numerous survivors, the conference produced resolutions intended to address the issue of reparations (Hancock 1991: 146). Thus far reparations have not been forthcoming from the German government. I now wish to break with my historical ideological analysis of the transnational Romani movement to contextualize a more localized example of Romani ethnogenesis. This example will elucidate some of the apparent contradictions of Romani political mobilization in Europe.

Sinti and Roma in Germany – Historical Dichotomy or Progressive Ethnogenesis?

The terms Sinti and Roma are distinctly different in Germany. The situation of the Roma and Sinti in Germany is an interesting concrete example of modern Romani politicization in a European context, and perhaps offers a rough structural blueprint for the current mobilization of the Roma in Eastern Europe. The term Sinti for the most part refers to people of Romani origins who settled in German lands. The Sinti are believed to have arrived in Germany in the 16th century. On the whole they are more integrated
into German society than their Eastern brethren are in their respective countries. Some Sinti even served in the German *Wehrmacht* (Army) during World War II (see Alt and Folts 1996 for firsthand accounts). Sinti view themselves as ethnically distinct from the “wild” Roma who inhabit the post-socialist periphery. For the most part the term Roma refers to those recently arrived Roma who often seek refugee status in Germany. In terms of political significance, the Sinti are recognized as German peoples, whereas the German government often views Roma as refugees or economic migrants. Initially the Sinti who survived Nazi persecution returned to Germany, and after the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany they slowly regained a foothold within German society.

Progress was slow, however. Having their Nazi-era repatriation claims wholeheartedly rejected by the German government (i.e., the refusal of the German government to recognize deliberate racial persecution of Gypsies), German Sinti proceeded to consolidate themselves ideologically into various civic and political associations. Legally, the repatriations denial was reinforced by a *Bundesgerichtshof* (Federal Court) decision that affirmed the Nazi persecution of the Gypsies as “measures aimed at the prevention of criminality,” not racial persecution (Matras 1998: 52). This denial, while initially viewed as a defeat, led to an increasing awareness of the extent of the Holocaust and its associated after effects continually dealt with in the Sinti/Roma community. By increasing historical awareness within the Romani community and appealing publicly for policy changes, the Sinti and Roma in Germany hoped to gain increased recognition as persecuted victims of National Socialism.

Romani civic organizations like the *Verband Deutscher Sinti* (League of German Sinti) and a civic partnership with *Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker* (Society for
Endangered Peoples) enabled Roma and Sinti in Germany to challenge long-held biases through media campaigns. (The League of German Sinti and the Society for Endangered Peoples jointly sponsored the 1981 Göttingen conference). Various media campaigns enabled the replacement of the derogatory Zigeuner (Gypsy) with the now accepted Sinti and Roma. Initially discussed on the agenda of the first World Romani Congress in 1971, it took over a decade to enter into popular discourse.

In my discussions with various Europeans interlocutors who lived in my apartment building in Munich (of varying nationalities and ethnic backgrounds), I encountered a wide variety of responses to my queries about their views of “Gypsies.” One German responded with a politically correct “Man darf sie nicht Zigeunern nennen, sondern man soll sie Roma und Sinti nennen,” (One is not allowed to call them Gypsies, rather they should be called Roma and Sinti). One Polish student who lived next door to me asked me why I would want to study Gypsies, and could not comprehend someone holding even the remotest academic interest in them as an ethnic group. Why study “schmutzig” (dirty) Gypsies when one could study the real victims of history, the Polish people?

Through newly founded organizations and direct political actions (for example, Sinti held a rally in Bergen-Belsen and a hunger strike at Dachau), the Roma and Sinti in Germany used the symbolism of the Holocaust and the modern consciousness of racial persecution to enlighten German society about their continued repression (Matras 1998: 56). By stressing their status as an ethnic-cultural minority, part of the German nation, they eventually attained government funding for Romani-specific representative organizations and civic associations. However, all was not well when Roma refugees
(mostly from Romania) suddenly showed up on German soil. When large numbers of Roma applied for asylum as stateless refugees, they caused a schism within the Romani civil rights movement in Germany. This schism challenged not only the Sinti in Germany, but also the policies of the German government. Initially the German government granted residency permits to Romani refugees before German reunification, but after 1990 the Romani question in Germany was handled on the international level. This mirrored the general tendency of Romani activism to occur at the supranational level.

After refugees from the newly “free” post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe poured into Germany, the German government enacted bilateral treaties with the refugees’ countries of origin, which consisted essentially of extending German foreign aid and token support for Romani development projects in return for uncomplicated “processing” and admission of returnees (Matras 1998: 60). Much like the West German government’s policy toward civil dissidents from East Germany throughout the Cold War, West Germany “sold” Romani refugees back to their country of origin for superficial foreign aid. With the Romani question taking on an international dimension, international organizations such as the UN, the EU, and OSCE became the loci of discussion of Romani issues. Before moving on to the supranational dimension, I wish to address some of the ideological fruits gained by the Romani civil rights movement in Germany in order to better understand the different problems addressed by national policies vis-à-vis supranational policy.

First, the Romani civil rights movement in Germany was initially a grassroots movement and not initially an ideological movement from the outside. Romani
intellectuals from the outside entered the discussion only after the internal movement had
taken hold. The initial grassroots origins are important, for they enabled the newborn
movement to emerge naturally in its situational context. This positioned the movement to
better address the particular problems of Sinti and Roma within the Federal Republic of
Germany. The pan-European Romani nationalism emanating from Eastern Europe now
grabbing headlines is *ex post facto* for German Sinti and Roma, who have partially
secured minimal government rights and funding (however, the reparations are still a
salient issue). The political climate of Germany during the 1960s and 1970s is not
Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The situation of the Roma under different regimes and
conditions produced localized Romani populations with distinctly individualized
problems. With the onslaught of EU accession negotiations for the post-socialist states of
Eastern Europe, the issue of minority rights and protections is now center stage. But one
must question the merits of supranational solution – is it the best way to go about solving
the historically contingent and highly localized problems of the Roma in Eastern Europe?
How will the problems of local Roma populations be addressed? Will bureaucrats draft
cosmetic solutions, with these solutions swept away once the initial economic benefits of
accession become accrued?

**The Politicization of Romani Ethnicity - The EU Dimension**

In the current era of post-modernity (or for that matter reflexive modernity,
globalization, post-fordism, or post-industrial society), transition and transformation have
become the optimal terms to describe the contemporary European *Zeitgeist*. This is
especially evident when one considers the remarkable experimental union that is
currently being undertaken by the countries of Western Europe in the form of the European Union. With the introduction of the Euro, the economic unification of Europe is nearing completion. Politically, the European Parliament and the monstrous EU bureaucracy see themselves as establishing the foundations of a new political order. However, the prevailing question of the European Union is of social nature – how is the European Union reforming the nationals of various European states tangibly into European citizens? These questions are themselves not completely answerable in the brief treatment I give, but they are important for a fundamental understanding of the European Union and an understanding of the ideological discourse dictated to the hopeful nation-states of Eastern Europe.

**The European Union – New Order or Old Hat?**

According to Shore (1999), Europe itself is a contested and imagined concept, a region “created by intellectuals to persuade others to think about their relations with their neighbors in a particular way,” (Wallace, cited in Shore 1999: 53-54). Much like Westerners exoticize the “Orient,” Europeans constantly essentialize their continent, the “Occident.” Europe is a “master symbol,” a “polysemous” entity canvassing a wide mosaic of languages, cultures, and peoples. Geographically ill defined, the borders and boundaries of Europe are primarily dictated by political ideology, not geography (Shore 1999: 54). This may seem like a truism, since there is always some political imposition from above, even in the most “natural” of borders. Yet, in the context of the EU, it is a doubly “imagined” imposition, an ideologically dictated area and an imposed supranational bureaucracy. Is Greece, because of its Hellenic civilization and British
cultural patronage, European? Membership in the “imagined” European community has historically been determined by ideology and politics. In the post World War II Europe liberal ideology tends to outweigh other factors when demarcating the characteristics of a European nation. However, this liberal ideology must be viewed as a product of the destruction of World War II and cannot be viewed as an isolated construct. The EU project is the end result of the transnational connections (economic, social, intellectual, governmental) that emerged after 1950 and as such must not be viewed as an abrupt construct in European historiography. Europe as an imagined concept acts as a distinct “shifter,” functioning discursively (Gal 1991). For Eastern Europeans, “Europe” can be viewed as less a concrete region than as “a symbolic counter of identity, very much like a ‘shifter’ in linguistic analysis,” (Gal 1991: 444). The valence of the terms Eastern and Western Europe, having no fixed objective meanings, change meanings and reflect different beliefs according to their use. For a Euroskeptic, Europe in the context of the EU has no ideological base, for their beliefs predetermine the salience (or lack) of the term.

Johler takes a polemic view of Europe as a crossroads that corresponds to an “abstraction” that has neither political legitimacy nor any guarantee of “integration,” (Johler 1999: 69). Integration in “Europe” rests primarily upon a subjective belief in the European nation as a distinct status group or entity vis-à-vis non-European nations. Much like NATO membership previously hinged on an adherence to the American ideology with regard to the Soviet Union, membership in the European Union today primarily rests on an adherence to liberal European ideology. Ironically enough, political legitimacy and integration of its citizens are the two (supposedly) dominant
metanarratives of the EU. But how well is the EU integrating its citizens, and what prospect do Eastern Europeans have in the new Europe?

The (Production of) Model European Citizens?

_Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship_ (Article 17 of the Treaty establishing the European Community). In concrete, noticeable terms, EU citizenship offers four tangible rights. These rights are: the right to move freely in the territory of EU member states, the right to vote and campaign in local and European Parliament elections, the right to protection in non-EU countries in which one’s own Member State is not represented, and the right to petition the European Parliament and Ombudsman, (EU Website, 2002). Offering a flexible citizenship in the era of increased global interconnectedness, the EU policies provide a pass into a rich economic fiefdom.

EU citizens can freely work and live in regions based upon choice (economic, social, geographic, etc.) and are not limited to the borders of their respective nations. However, in practice, on the micro level of social interaction, what does EU citizenship tangibly mean to EU citizens? The ideological ‘construction europée,’ or ‘die europäische Konstruktion’ [roughly translated as ‘European construction’] is a massive bureaucratic undertaking and at the same time a revealing cultural metaphor. Simultaneously denoting both industrial modernist tendencies and post-structural post-modernist tendencies, the EU metaphor betrays its utilitarianism and undermines itself dialectically. On one hand, it exemplifies a model vision of European unity, a new supranational European system of governance that will render war, chaos, economic
turmoil, and ethnic conflict obsolete. Yet, it also alludes to the “mechanistic and managerial” approach EU bureaucratic elites approach European integration in practice (Shore 1999: 54). In short, EU elites see themselves as political architects fabricating a new order that will transcend and demolish the previously fractured competitive nation-states of Europe. Are Europeans actively accepting the EU?

Euroscepticism is one hindrance to EU policies. Until now, the European Union has primarily been the domain of bureaucrats in Brussels who answer not to European citizens but rather to the national governments of Member States. Thus, from its inception, the EU has been characterized by a gap between bureaucratic theory and the consciousness of its citizens. The widening “democratic deficit” and the European “cultural deficit” threaten to undermine the EU, due to its lack of cultural legitimacy among citizens (Shore 1999: 56). Unlike national cultures that provide integrative narratives and allow for localized adaptation, Europe lacks a common cultural ground upon which to unite, save the ill-defined notion of Europe itself. Shore reflects on the EU as a supranational organization without a mandate:

The EU is thus an embryonic state without a nation; an administration without a government. It aspires to be a democracy, but cannot become one until there exists a self-identifying European or demos. And democracy without a demos is simply cratos (power) masked by telos (idealism) … (Shore 1999: 57).

Although Shore (writing from the UK) can be said to take a hard position within the spectrum of Euroscepticism, I find his comments worthwhile for a variety of reasons. The fate of the EU and its power base betrays itself with its proposed goal of an “ever-closer Union among the peoples of Europe,” as stipulated by treaties no normal European citizen knows or comprehends (Shore 1999: 57). These ill-defined integration narratives
stand in the face of modern European history and nationalism. The EU has attempted multiple social engineering experiments. In 1984 (how ironic!) the ‘People’s Europe Campaign’ (itself an explicit attempt to invent distinctive European symbols such as the new European logo, flag and anthem, license plates, and a reconfiguration of the calendar to include ‘European Years’ and local ‘Europe week’ festivals) hoped to instill concrete symbols that would capture the minds and hearts of future EU-citizens. The EU has sponsored various cultural initiatives intended to awaken the European consciousness (European prizes for literature, architecture, conservation, sport, etc.). The Euro, perhaps the largest common currency experiment ever attempted, is a pillar of European integration, “a powerful factor in forging a European identity which will provide a physical manifestation of the growing rapprochement between European citizens,” (Santer, cited in Shore 1999: 58). Now, these experiments are neither harmful nor detrimental, but one must look at the situation realistically and wonder if a common currency, resplendent with bland symbols such as bridges and buildings, can ever awaken a European consciousness? For example, the Deutschmark symbolized the rebirth of Germany from the ashes of World War II and embodied the German Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) – how do the bland Euros stack up in the minds and hearts of a new generation of Germans accustomed to Deutschmarks über alles? One must view the introduction of the Euro not as a final step of European integration. It should be viewed rather as the onset of a transitional stage for Europe, an experimental transition that will attempt to instill a new pan-European consciousness, undoubtedly with much to follow in future generations.
Much as the post-World War II period was characterized in Europe by ideological indoctrination (anti-fascist, democrat-oriented socialist West or anti-capitalist, pro-communist East), the post-nation state Europe of the 21st century is heavily indoctrinating its future citizens. Education and information, along with mass media, are powerful tools with regard to the manufacture of consent (Herman and Chomsky 1988). Mass education, along with conscription, taxation, and state violence were previously the “foremost technologies” for the installation of a nationalist consciousness among the citizens of emergent nation states (Shore 1999: 59). Historically not oblivious to these factors, the EU has appropriated some of these methods in their re-writing of European history, de-emphasizing traditional nationalist biases and emphasizing a European perspective.

The EU historiography views the last 3,000 years of European history “as a kind of moral success story: a gradual coming together in the shape of the European community and its institutions,” (Shore 1999: 59). In an evolutionary sequence that would bring tears to Leslie White’s eyes, European history (as embodied by historians recognized by the EU) begins in the prehistoric era and selectively advances from ancient Greece and Rome, to the spread of Christianity, the scientific revolution, the Age of Reason, the Enlightenment, and the triumph of liberal democracy. The EU intends to use these historic periods and “triumphs” to cement an historical and ideological core within the citizens of Europe. In its barest terms, nationalist ideology is being remanufactured, repackaged, and substituted for a new European ideology (Shore 1999: 59-60). The symbols and emblems of the nation-state are being redefined and reshaped to suit the new supranational ideology of the EU.
The EU’s policy of politicizing culture, in an attempt to crystallize support for European integration, characterizes the EU’s corporate managerial approach to ‘European identity’ and ‘culture-building.’ In an Orwellian fashion, the EU is attempting to infuse a European consciousness into its citizens and create from a hitherto nation-state oriented citizen the ideal “European” political subject. Shore describes this as the “Europeanization of Europe,” or, perhaps more appropriately, “Europe’s colonization of itself,” (Shore 1999: 63). How do European “subjects” cope with this cultural imperialism? Colonial subjects are in a double bind, at once uprooted from their indigenous traditions and thrust into an imperialist power structure that does not fully accept them as equals. Africans, Asians, Americans, Muslims – the traditional non-European “Other” – have previously provided the only non-European other one is able to contrast. The colonial metaphor may be polemical in its juxtaposition of the EU bureaucrats with colonial administrators. However, there is an element of asymmetry with regard to bureaucratic power relationships in both contexts.

The idea of European identity is without a concrete ideological base acceptable to the majority of Europeans. Various group solidarities such as class-consciousness or European intellectual culture may have salience at the pan-European level, but there is no metanarrative that offers all Europeans an ideological base upon which EU citizenship can be built. This is perhaps best embodied in Joseph Conrad’s Kurtz who, instead of asserting the superiority of European values and civilizations, finds himself reflecting upon the darkness and horror of himself and his center (Shore 1999: 64). The EU is a dialectic organization fraught with contradictions. Hoping to create a pan-European citizen for the postmodern era of globalization, it relies on the grand narratives of the
Euro-centric worldview of modernity. How are the distinctly conditioned citizens of Eastern Europe (who view Europe contextually as a “shifter” in national discourse), along with their respective minority populations, expected to become integrated into a Europe that has not yet sufficiently “Europeanized” itself?

EU Accession, Eastern Europe, and the Politicization of Romani Ethnicity

Having laid bare the ED ideology and its “Europeanization” policies, I now wish to examine the specific effects of the EU and its proposed expansion on the Roma and the ongoing Romani political ethnogenesis. With the fall of socialist Eastern Europe, the Roma had the chance to mobilize on a pan-European level, thus moving beyond the previous local and national organizational attempts at amelioration. Demographically, the Roma of Eastern Europe make up a proportionally larger segment of the population than in the West and occupy a weaker socioeconomic position within Eastern European societies. The primary organizations dealing with the Roma in Eastern Europe are supranational institutions (the EU, OSCE) and various NGOs. I do not intend to merely summarize the policies of these organizations. Rather, I examine some of the more general policy trends and use a few selective examples to illustrate my argument.

The Roma Issue

The term “Roma” is a broad term that refers to a wide variety of peoples who, to outside interlocutors, are often perceived as a homogenous ethnic entity. The Roma consist of a wide variety of diverse cultural groups and localized populations who resist
essentialization. One must not disregard the fact the term Roma is, despite the fact that it is the Romani word meaning "man," an imposed construct (originating from the Romani intelligentsia who frequent conferences and help develop policy) that is not universally salient at the micro level. Yet, when conceptualizing the Roma and their disadvantageous position at the level of policy, many bureaucrats have a tendency to view the Roma as a coherent ethnic group and view any intra-group tensions as evidence of some sort of detrimental ethnic characteristic.

Despite their perceived coherence, there is no single salient characteristic that is common to all Roma. The Romani language is only spoken by approximately one-quarter of Roma, and there are among 50-100 distinct dialects mutually comprehensible only at the rudimentary level (Kovats 2001: 97). This diversity, combined with an ever-increasing number of "leaders" and intellectuals who purport to speak for the Roma (often without accountability), allows for a multitude of statements about the Roma to be made and taken at face value. Supranational institutions face an enormous challenge when formulating pan-European Roma policy, for it must cover a seemingly non-existent Romani ethnic consciousness. I shall now briefly touch on two OSCE reports from the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, before moving on to the EU approach to the problem.

**OSCE and Security – the Specter of Romani Terrorism?**

The first HCNM report (van der Stoel 1993) primarily deals with thematic dimensions of the Roma's problems as opposed to quantitative data dealing with their actual conditions. The report places Romani issues squarely within the contemporary
political context of the ongoing Eastern European transitions (Kovats 2001: 98). By situating the Roma within the transition present in Eastern Europe, the first report connects the problems of the Roma to the wider political economy and its turbulent transition to a market-based system. Unemployment, poverty, income differentials, housing problems, health, and education all are thematized theoretically in the first HCNM report. In conclusion, the report stresses the need for “objective analysis” of the situational context of Romani problems but cautions against policy that could possible exacerbate “intra-community tensions [Roma/non-Roma],” (Kovats 2001: 98). The second HCNM report (van der Stoel 2000) breaks with the thematic threads developed in the first report.

The second HCNM report primarily focuses on four themes: discrimination and racial violence, education, living conditions and political participation (Kovats 2001: 98). However, the second report’s primary thrust approaches the Roma problem in terms of “cultural” issues and discrimination and de-emphasizes the wider connection to the political economy. Individual country-specific policies such as welfare entitlements, market developments, health, education, and housing are all left out (for the most part) of the report (Kovats 2001: 99). This approach tends to blame cultural factors and the onset of industrialization for the 21st century problems of the Roma. Undoubtedly these problems have historical roots, but they must be viewed in terms of as many explanatory variables as possible, not simply attributed to historical and “cultural” deficiencies. The fact that OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) is concerned with the Roma problem at all attests to its (perhaps) future security implications for Europe. Some have even speculated on “Gypsy violence, even terrorism ... [that] could be the
dystopian vision of an ethnic conflict in the heart of Eastern Europe, although remarkably
far from the perceived reality, evidently unnerves bureaucrats enough at least to begin to
engage in discourse to address the problem. I take the view that Romani issues have
come to the forefront of supranational political discourse primarily because of its
economic dimension as opposed to a concern for political or security problems. This is
best exemplified by the EU policies.

**Economic Fears – EU Accession and the Romani Dimension**

Although the EU may profess to engage Romani issues because of concern for
discrimination and human rights, this tells only one side of the story. With the expected
accession in the future of some or all of the future Communist states of Eastern Europe,
the EU suddenly seems interested in exporting its problems to these “buffer” zone border
states. Numerous governmental arrangements with countries that border the EU deal
primarily with increased spending for border fortification and the quick reprocessing and
return of rejected asylum applicants (Castle-Kanerova 2001: 120-121). This trend to
“externalize” EU immigration control to nations outside the EU gives a choice to would-
be member states – either do the EU’s bidding, or face eventual rejection in accession
talks. Western Europe is colonizing Eastern Europe with gusto. This is an interesting
example of a powerful supranational organization forcing an economically lesser nation-
state to wholeheartedly adopt the policies of another political regime. Perhaps the EU
has taking to following America’s lead in the distribution of foreign aid, perhaps best
exemplified by the exchange of the ex-Yugoslav President Milosovic in return for foreign aid, a diplomatic *quid pro quo*.

With the externalization of immigration policy and the subsequent tendency to label Roma asylum seekers “economic migrants,” the EU finds a clean solution to their fears and at the same time conveniently imposes and transfers their ideology (and its contradictions) upon future Member States. This implicit hand washing belies the EU’s own hypocritical stance, on one hand criticizing would-be member states for various human rights violations yet on the other hand labeling Roma refugees economic migrants (and addressing the issue as a socio-cultural problem) (Castle-Kanerova 2001: 122). The EU is in essence saying to future Member States: “We don’t want your Roma problem—Deal with it yourself first, and then you can join the club!” By not addressing the deeper issues at hand and simply ascertaining wholeheartedly that the Roma problem is one of economic motivation, the EU can be implicated in the “velvet ethnic cleansing” that has infiltrated minority policy in Eastern European countries (Castle-Kanerova 2001: 123). Ethnic cleansing is perhaps too harsh a term for the systematic structural persecution of the Roma, but the recent (1992) Czech citizenship law exemplifies this “velvet” government persecution.

The Czech citizenship law in question essentially denied Czech citizenship to any person who did not have a mastery of the Czech language or anyone who had committed a criminal offense within five years (Human Rights Watch 1998). Ethnic Czechs who committed crimes gained citizenship due to their native Czech language skills, while many Roma, functionally illiterate in Czech or those that had committed any criminal offense within five years, were denied citizenship. With the highly publicized debate
surrounding his law (and its vocal support by the “liberal” Czech President Vaclav Havel), it was amended in 1996, with the amendment essentially negating the criminal aspect of the law. Despite this change, little tangible effort was made to inform Roma about the waiver. Some Roma reported deliberate misinformation from government officials (Human Rights Watch 1998). Despite these examples of passive oppression, the EU continues to issue declarations and conclude accession talks, continually effacing the marginal reality with their dominant economic (and social) policy goals.

Much of the accession holdup deals primarily with economic issues, with social issues relegated to the second tier. One might say this is a cynical viewpoint. I disagree, for as of yet, no binding legal instruments within the EU deal with ethno cultural diversity and rights for ethnic groups. While binding agreements exist for the protections of gender and sexuality in the EU, most of the statements dealing with the protection of ethnic groups are of a non-binding nature, according to Boris Tsilevich, a Latvian MP (Tsilevich 2001). While many of the related ethnic minority problems are of a distinctly local nature, it would seem fruitful to evaluate policy in situ locally. However, with the absence of a concrete, Union-wide framework for the protection of minority rights, the EU is in essence politicizing minority discourse through its various non-binding resolutions without effectively following through with its policy declarations. With this halfhearted supranational politicization, along with NGO mobilization on various levels, the Roma have become a politicized minority within Europe with little outlet for their efforts, save superficial monetary grants. In order to better understand the contemporary political situation of the Roma, the role of NGOs needs to be discussed before moving on to a synthesis of the issues at hand.
NGOs and the Roma – Opportunistic Activism or Grassroots Development?

In post-socialist Eastern Europe the third sector, namely public interest foundations and NGOs, has been an active participant in the “transition” process. Amid the turmoil of rapid economic, political, and social change, it was believed that the third sector would provide an intermediary impetus in the development of a civil-minded, democratic society. With the dismantling of the socialist bureaucracy, many intellectuals who initially formulated social policy believed that NGOs would help ease those left behind with the transition to a market based economy. However, many of the NGOs that initially filled the void were completely dependent upon foreign money, and a widening gap developed between local NGOs and their increasing donor dependency (Trehan 2001: 136). Many NGOs (but not all) operate with little oversight and often subscribe to “naïve ideological agendas” based on concepts popularized within the framework of Western liberal democracy, such as empowerment, sustainability, and human rights (Trehan 2001: 137). These concepts, the product of modernity and European rationalism, appear wholly foreign to the newly democratized nation-states. NGOs, replete with hard currency and grandiose plans, are welcomed in Eastern Europe with open arms. Not accountable to the state or the citizens they purport to serve, NGOs essentially are only responsible to their governing boards and sponsors, often completely removed from the day-to-day operations and the NGO staff in the “field.” Trehan cites warnings by three Hungarian social scientists against the dangers of unchecked NGO growth in the Romani sector:
They [Havas, Kertesi and Kemeny 1995] argued against the ‘rigid ethnic coupling’ (e.g. ‘Romani-specific’ programmes), as this ultimately results in further segregation of Roma from the majority society, and also the top-down structure of most organizations, whereby ‘grants and subsidies are swallowed up at the upper levels, and the effect of the organizations’ work remains unnoticeable in the communities living in the direst circumstances’ (Trehan 2001: 138).

While it might seem chivalrous to want to ameliorate the plight of the Roma, there are larger issues at hand the need to be taken into account. The widening ideological gap between the NGOs, their purported constituency, their perceived lack of a grassroots support, and the trend towards NGO professionalization raises tough questions. Who are Romani and non-Romani NGOs responsible to?

In order to attract capable management and increase professionalism in the third sector, many NGOs began to offer competitive salaries and benefits packages normally reserved for those who frequenting corporate boardrooms. One needs only to look at the various job offers in The Economist to see the current degree of NGO professionalization. The emergence of an NGO “ethno-business,” attracting people who would previously have entered the private sector (and academia), has shifted the typical NGO worker from a low-wage idealist to one who views NGO work as having “career potential,” (Trehan 2001: 138-139). As the NGOs growth expands, they come increasingly to resemble businesses in their management style. Trehan asks: Has the globalization of the world political economy and its “corporatist thinking” permeated the third sector? In addition to this corporate trend, many NGOs themselves employ tokenism with regard to the Roma on staff. Often the bulk of earmarked funds go to NGOs headed by non-Roma, since Roma are perceived as difficult “partners” for development projects due to “internal political imbroglios,” (Trehan 2001: 140). The reluctance to engage in pragmatic
discourse with the Romani constituency they claim to help strengthens misconceptions about Roma in general. One can wonder if there is much difference between the historic misrepresentations described in the chapter above and the plethora of NGO publications that purport to “explain” the plight of the Roma from a rational “European” point of view.

Conclusion

One must not forget the fact that Eastern Europe is not Western Europe, and its history has left it ideologically conditioned in a certain way distinct from the West, rebuilt by the Marshall Plan. The trends observed in the NGO sector mirror the legislative policies of Eastern European governments that hope to eventually join the EU. Like the numerous non-binding policy statements on behalf of the Roma that lack institutionalized strength and the bureaucratic machinations required to give them credence, NGOs themselves offer no guarantees and have little oversight. This reliance upon idealism and lack of concrete oversight threaten to efface their purpose. NGOs, like the EU minority policies, are likely to be viewed by governments eager to join the elite economic club of Europe as worthy of temporary monetary handouts. This cosmetic effort to ameliorate the Roma problem will enable them to reach the minimum accession standards required for EU membership. After accession and the integration into the grand EU narrative, the newly “accepted” nation states of Eastern Europe will have no tangible reason to improve the condition of their minorities. There exists the tendency that the new Member States will become complacent, much like some Western European nations. Numerous structural legal and judicial changes have been made in future EU Member states to appeal to the liberal ideology of European integration. What is missing
from the picture is credible oversight. The supranational trend in Europe has elevated the
discourse politicizing Romani ethnicity to a European level, but the concrete results have
not been forthcoming. The proverbial carrot has been dangled in front of the Roma. Will
a new European image emerge out of the ideological maelstrom that is contemporary
Europe or will the Roma fall into the cracks of the seemingly "ever closer" European
Union? Only time will validate the changes. Will they result in pragmatic changes in the
lives of marginalized minorities such as the Roma, or will they only serve to reveal their
cosmetic nature in future generations?
Conclusion

The initial events surrounding the turbulent fall of socialism in Eastern Europe were not solely the domain of the political economy and its associated agendas. Ethnicity emerged from a socialist deep-freeze and began to play an increasingly larger role in how individuals defined themselves within the nation-state. Now, instead of simply being a Romanian, an individual could be a Hungarian or Saxon living in Transylvania (in both cases a Romanian citizen) instead of simply a Romanian. Ethnic identity is no longer the domain of individual nation-states – it has been rendered fluid in the context of Europe.

In contrast to oversimplified (Western) notions as to the actual workings of socialism, ethnicity was not obliterated in Eastern Europe. Rather, under socialist discourse, ethnicity was simply a taboo domain within the framework of the predominant socialist ideology. It would be easy for Westerners to view the boiling over of the recent post-socialist ethnic cauldron as indicative of the socialist tendency to efface real problems in favor of broad ideological solutions that would never be implemented or realized. This is simply not the case, however. The abrupt reconstitution and redistribution common in post-socialist Eastern Europe (the redistribution of previously owned state property, de-collectivization, etc.) fueled the ethnic tinderbox that we know today. Instead of attributing the causes of these ethnic tensions to the deficiencies of communism, one must look at the root of these problems as originating in the post-socialism period and its associated turbulent transitions (Verdery 1996: 88). Previously homogenization was the rule under communism, with international proletarian solidarity tending to usurp ethnic identity. With socialist ideology no longer dictating the dominant governmental discourse, ethnicity has permeated into almost all walks of life in post-socialist Eastern
Europe. The events of 1989/90 can be viewed as an ethnic watershed, one that allowed ethnicities previously subsumed to socialist dogma to be heard, seen, celebrated, performed, and persecuted. However, how can one integrate the emerging cauldron of ethnicity in Eastern Europe with the Roma case?

Inevitably one must look first to theory. Central to Barth’s theory of ethnicity is a subjective ascription process. Ethnic groups have fluid boundaries that change with the situational context of their existence. The boundaries produced by this process in essence delineate the ethnic group in question from the wider societal context. The example of Romani ethnogenesis is perhaps more complex than a simple Barthian ascription process. In addition to the group subjectivity and boundaries, other components of ethnicity such as language, history, religion, and nationality (all of the ingredients of the “imagined community”) need to be taken into account. Barth’s theory still is relevant more than three decades after its inception, but one must build upon it as a theoretical base, with corresponding layers of theory corresponding to the specific contours of Europe. As Gal (1991) has shown, Europe has the tendency to shift and dichotomize when used in discourse. The predominant ethnic groups that constitute the nation-states of Eastern Europe (Magyars in Hungary, Poles in Poland, etc.) are desperately trying to efface or minimize their perceived involvement in the socialist project. Romani ethnicity is cautiously balanced between these competing national discourses, having been neither effaced under socialism nor celebrated after its demise. From this historiography of the Roma, one sees ethnicity shift from having a sordid, negative connotation to having perhaps a neutral, political connotation in the contemporary European context.
Early in history the Roma were ascribed a pariah status and as such outside interlocutors ethnically demarcated them. The Roma were denied agency in the construction of history and their ethnicity was a secondary, primordial attribute, objectively ascribed. Barth specifically addresses the Roma as such:

European pariah groups of recent centuries (executioners, dealers in horsecflesh and -leather, collectors of nightsoil, gypsies, etc.) exemplify most features: as breakers of basic taboos they were rejected by the larger society. Their identity imposed a definition of social situations which gave very little scope for interaction with persons in the majority population, and simultaneously as an imperative status represented an inescapable disability that prevented them from assuming the normal statuses involved in other definitions of the situation of interaction (Barth 1969: 31).

Romani ethnicity, despite the initial development of some Romani nationalism, remained for the most part unchanged to the external non-Romani observer. Internally, undoubtedly the diverse situational contexts across socialist Eastern Europe conditioned individual Roma groups to fit the local reality. However, with the dismemberment of post-socialist regimes, an ideological tidal wave obliterated the previous regimes. By no means is history forgotten, however. This is one of the first real opportunities for Romani ethnicity to develop with generational change. Slowly shedding the trappings of their ascribed pariah status, the Roma are now entering the ethnic fray on their own terms, not in terms of how others view and (mis)recognize them. The societal taboos described by Barth above have long since become obsolete and hold little salience with Europeans, yet the associated negative connotation of the pariah origins still remains.

One must only look at the articulation of ethnicity overall in Eastern Europe to see the widely dichotomizing tendencies of ethnic discourse. Take a citizen of the former Yugoslavia. He/She is no longer simply a Yugoslav. Rather, the individual is now
Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian, or Macedonian. It is a seemingly simple black/white delineation, with ethnicity becoming an indexical “shifter” within Europe. The subjectivity of ethnic ascription is reflected in the wider historical discourse being articulated. The Roma have no entered the fracas that is ethnicity in Europe. Now that the Roma have achieved at least superficial recognition as a cultural group, they have the chance to subjectively articulate their ethnicity on a wider European level. To the citizen of Europe who has grown complacent with their place in the respective nation-state, this may seem like a small step. For the Roma, no step is too small. Now that at least superficially EU bureaucrats are giving the Roma their ears (and to a smaller extent their wallets), somebody must seize the opportunity. I say somebody for perhaps it would be too idealistic to hope that a fledgling Romani political movement, coming from such widespread backgrounds and context, could hope to tackle the deep-rooted historical problems of the Roma as a whole. However, now that ethnicity and fluidity are no longer mutually exclusive terms in Eastern Europe, Romani ethnicity will undoubtedly be transformed along with the larger societal picture. Whether this remarkable transition will be positive or negative, history will be the judge.

Undoubtedly the transitions encompassing Europe will be felt long into the future, as physical borders allow an even greater diffusion of people, commerce, and perhaps more importantly, ideas. This thesis, while perfunctorily addressing the wider European (EU) concerns, addresses these issues in the context of the situation of the Roma in Europe. The “colonization” of Europe in the post-socialist era has radically upended hegemonic power structures many thought permanent. With the disintegration of the physical East-West border, mental alterity has come center stage. The Mauer im Kopf
(mental wall) is no longer a distinctly German issue – it has many manifestations throughout Europe. Until now, the respective ideologies of capitalism and communism had determined the parameters of this ideological contest. Amid this turbulent ideological transformation sit the Roma.

Historically denied the power to articulate themselves in history, they were relegated to the margins of history, with much of the scholarship reflecting a distinctive Euro-centric bias. Was this an organized attempt to efface the Roma and relegate them to a sub-human status within European society? In hindsight one can judge what the historian produces in terms of the wider social environment that spawned it. The times of H.M. Grellmann have passed, giving way to a more context-sensitive scholarship of the Roma. One cannot deny the fact that persecution inevitably followed the Roma wherever they ventured in Europe. With recent historical, anthropological, and sociological research perceptions of the Roma are slowly changing. Now, previously effaced variables such as the political economy of the time and the distinct localized context of the Romani communities are being taken into account. Perhaps the 21st century will mark the beginning of a Roma fluorescence in Europe. Much needs to be done first.

In order for the Roma to gain acceptance within the power structures of Europe, the cycle of misrepresentation needs to be broken. This is easier said than done, however. Media campaigns and various other programs that build “cultural capital” need to be heavily promoted not only in Eastern Europe, but also in the West. But herein lies the danger that Romani specific programs will exacerbate already strained ethnic tensions. Any coordinated campaign must be designed with this in mind, for otherwise ethnic tensions may become even more strained. Education policies need to tell the
history of not only the Roma, but of other marginalized people in Europe. A polyphonic, multivocal history of Europe needs to be articulated that not only highlights traditional European high culture and its various achievements, but also the wider society at large, minorities included. With the success of cultural initiatives like this, the Roma have the chance to finally become accepted members of European society.

When viewing the problems of the Roma, one must resist the tendency to homogenize, for simplified problems only result in watered-down solutions that help no one. Policy makers and bureaucrats could stand to step down from their plush pulpits and listen to those familiar with the micro context of Romani existence like the Roma themselves, social workers, anthropologists, etc. Policy dictates that have no basis in the localized context help no one. Without a firm ground upon which to base policy, there is little hope for amelioration. The everyday reality of Romani existence is more important than the bland policy dictates produced on behalf of the Roma. Despite the rather negative tone that accompanies this conclusion, I believe the EU offers the most hope for the Roma. Despite its ideological machinations and policy dictates that hope to instill a new “European” consciousness in its citizens, the EU is perhaps best poised to help the Roma in the future.

For EU to help the Roma it must first deal with its own identity crisis and legitimate itself with its respective European citizens. Without a legitimate base upon which to base future policy, the EU is lecturing to the students before the bricks of the university have been laid. The recent swing from center-left to right in Europe evidences this lack of legitimacy within the EU Member States. If binding resolutions and bureaucratic institutions are enacted by the EU that protect the rights of minorities such
as the Roma, some improvement will undoubtedly come, but first things first.

Bureaucratic institutions without a civil social component can exacerbate ethnic tension instead of ameliorating it. A recent article in *The Economist* takes a conservative view of the Roma question, yet at the same time undoubtedly reflects the discourse occurring on many levels in Europe with regard to European integration in general and the Roma question:

> The EU is the Gypsies' best ally. On a visit to Slovakia in February, Guenther Verheugen, the EU commissioner for enlargement, made a point of sticking his head inside a Gypsy shack and promising $10 M[illion] for specific Gypsy development projects in the country this year. “We cannot expect”, he said, “that a solution to this problem, which arose hundreds of years ago, will be found within a few years.” Careful words. But then Mr. Verheugen is in an awkward position. He is adamant that the “Gypsy question”, as it is queasily termed, will not hold up enlargement, but he also knows it must begin to be tackled at source before there can be any movement of labour. An exodus of Gypsies into the EU, everyone agrees, would be a political disaster for an expanding union. (*The Economist* 2001: 29).

Despite Verheugen’s appraisal of the “Gypsy question” and the EU’s vested interest in solving it, the EU feels that it will eventually be tackled once the Union becomes established. I believe part of the EU hesitation on expansion has to do with a lack of self-confidence in Member States. Once the EU has solved this identity crisis among its citizens and banished Euroskepticism, expansion of the Union will naturally follow. However, despite all of the professed benefits of the EU’s policy, it is hypocritical, a fact not missed by *The Economist*:

> At national and supranational level, the story is the same. Governments are keen to involve Gypsies in solving their own problems, but are frustrated by the lack of leadership. Privately, EU officials say they do not trust Gypsy leaders enough, yet, to let them administer a single euro. Over the centuries, not much has changed (*The Economist* 2001: 32).
Despite this negative outlook, the opportunity for change exists. This opportunity, in and of itself reflects some of the wider pan-European processes at work. To let this opportunity slip away would not only be detrimental for the Roma, for the whole of Europe as well. If Europe can solve its internal cultural deficiencies and develop a coherent framework for integration, the opportunity exists to develop a true pan-European consciousness. Here I do not mean integration simply in terms of EU accession. Rather, I intend the term integration to have a pragmatic salience within the citizens of Europe, i.e., a real European consciousness. If these bureaucratic machinations are successful, the ideological landscape of Europe will be radically altered. This success I speak of must not be measured in opinion polls and currency exchange rates, rather it should be viewed in terms of generational development. Ideological development and refashioning is a slow process, and breaking old “isms” (conservatism, liberalism, nationalism, socialism, communism, etc.) is easier said than done. But herein lies the opportunity for change amid the turbulence of the ongoing transition. This change will undoubtedly take time. The historically rooted problems of the Roma cannot be looked at in terms of the cost-benefit analysis prevalent in Western discourse. Now is the time for tangible change, not only for Europe, but for the Roma as well.
Appendix A
Media Representations of Gypsies
(All images taken from Hancock 1987)

My mother said
I never should
Play with the Gypsies
In the wood.
If I did, she would say
You naughty girl to disobey,
Your hair won't curl
And your shoes won't shine
And my father said that if I did
He'd wrap my head with the tea pot lid.

This children's rhyme warns of dire consequences if the Gypsies in the wood are approached, even physical violence from the girl's father.

Zoltan the Gypsy Chief discovers that every puff of an L&M tastes as good as the first.

Zoltan the Gypsy Chief is willing to trade a chicken, a goat, a slightly-used earring and his mule for a packet of L&M's.
Appendix A (continued)

Roving gypsy swindles carpenter of $37,000

Hartford Courant - A 40-year-old gypsy and putting-year-old "Theo, a real exhibition" says a gypsy woman is "He lost the ward because the gypsy told him it was fake - a conspiracy with the gypsy -"

On Language

Gypsy curse not only con

It's Gypsy season, so don't get gypped!

Deceptive Toy Prices

Gypsy American Kids

You are being fooled by deceptive toy prices. Public officials caution shop owners and parents against over-estimating prices. Board of trade to stop this madness.

Cure for a Gypsy Curse

It is essential that Gypsy children, like the ones on the right, should go to school. The problem is how to provide regular lessons for people on the move. One solution, says Glenny B. Billings, is to have the Gypsies.
Family attacked
Stockholm - An inquiry is to be held into an incident in which a police car was attacked by youths in a "raiding attack" on a gypsy family in Stockholm, Sweden.

Refusal of funeral
for Gypsy allowed

Gipsy branded mistress
with red-hot cleaver

Residents 'scared' by
the gipsies

Kent may be in for
a gipsy invasion

WE EXPOSE THE DEATH-CURSE GYPSIES

MP asks expulsion
of gypsy immigrants

Two Tribes of Gypsies

Eat, Drink, Fight in Park

"Why don't they let me die in peace?"

ASKS GIPSY SOPHIA

Family attacked

Stockholm - An inquiry is to be
held into an incident in which a
police car was attacked by youths
in a "raiding attack" on a gypsy family in
Stockholm, Sweden.

Refusal of funeral
for Gypsy allowed

Gipsy branded mistress
with red-hot cleaver

Residents 'scared' by
the gipsies

Kent may be in for
a gipsy invasion

"Why don't they let me die in peace?"

ASKS GIPSY SOPHIA
Appendix B
Source: http://www.romani.org/local/romani_anthem.html

ROMANI NATIONALISM, FLAG AND ANTHEM
Opre Roma!

"Roma denotes them as a nation," says WR Rishi (1). "In 1971 the International Gypsy Committee organized the first World Romani Congress. This took place in a location near London ... funded in part by the World Council of Churches and the Indian Government; representatives from India and some 20 other countries were in attendance. At the congress, the green and blue flag from the 1933 conference, now embellished with the red, sixteen-spoked chakra, was reaffirmed as the national emblem of the Romani people, and the anthem, Dzelem dzelem, since sung at all congresses, was adopted."(2)

"The World Romani Congress has adopted a Romani flag which is respected by all the Roma the world over. It comprises of blue and green traditional colors with the red wheel in the center. Blue is the blue sky and the heavens. Green is the land, organic and growing. The blue symbolizes eternal spiritual values; the green earthly values. The wheel in the center symbolizes movement and progress. It may not be out of place to point out here that the Indian national flag has also got Ashok Chakra in the center."(1)

Appendix B (continued)

DJELEM DJELEM - THE ROMANI ANTHEM
Written by Zarko Jovanovic, 1969
Adopted as the official Romani anthem at the
First World Romani Congress in
London, England, April 8, 1971

Romani

Djelem, djelem, lungone dromensa
Maladilem baxtale Romensa
Djelem, djelem, lungone dromensa
Maladilem baxtale Romensa.
Ay, Romale, Ay, Chavale,
Ay, Romale, Ay, Chavale.
Ay Romale, katar tumen aven
Le tserensa baxtale dromensa
Vi-man sas u bari familiya
Tai mudardya la e kali legiya.
Aven mansa sa lumiake Roma
Kai phutaile le Romane droma
Ake vryama - ushti Rom akana
Ame xutasa mishto kai kera.
Ay, Romale, Ay, Chavale,
Ay, Romale, Ay, Chavale.

English Translation by Ron Lee

I have travelled over long roads
I have met fortunate Roma
I have travelled far and wide
I have met lucky Roma
Oh, Romani adults, Oh Romani youth
Oh, Romani adults, Oh Romani youth
Oh, Roma, from wherever you have come
With your tents along lucky roads
I too once had a large family
But the black legion murdered them
Come with me, Roma of the world
To where the Romani roads have been opened
Now is the time - stand up, Roma,
We shall succeed where we make the effort.
Oh, Roma adults, Oh, Roma youth
Oh, Roma adults, Oh, Roma youth.

Romani

Gyelem, gyelem, longone dromensa,
Maladilem bakhatal Romensa.
A, Romale, katar tumen aven,
E tserensa, bakhatal dromensa.
A, Romale,
A, Chhavale.
Vi mansa su bari familiya,
Mudardala e kali legiya;
Aven mansa sar e lumiyatse Roma
Kai phutaile e Romane dromensa.
Ake vriama, usti Rom akana,
Amen Khudasa mishto kai kera.
A, Romale,
A, Chhavale.

Alternative translation by Dr. S. Sashi

I've travelled, travelled long roads,
And stopped with happy Rom
Romanies, from where have you come
With tents set on fortune's road
Romanies, o fellow Rom

Once I had a great family
The Black Legion murdered them
Now come, all the world's Rom
For the Romani road has opened
The time's arrived to arise
We shall stand up as one
Romanies, o fellow Rom
Works Cited:


1995. “‘What are they writing about us Blacks?’ Roma and ‘Race’ in Russia.” Anthropology of East Europe Review 13(2): online version.


Bobick


**Films**


*T’an Bakhtale!: Roma (Gypsies) in Russia* (USA), dir. Alaina Lemon and Midori Nakamura, 1994.