GENOCIDE: WHO CARES?

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by

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ABSTRACT

Genocide: Who Cares?

By Isaac Daniel Buck

This paper examines six genocides that have occurred since the implementation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1951. After qualifying each as genocide and studying their basic facts, each genocide’s intervention is compared and certain questions are addressed. Who intervened to stop the genocide? Why did they intervene? What was the result? After studying intervention in each case, a pattern was discerned, separating the genocides that occurred in the Cold War era from the ones that occurred in the post-Cold War era.

During the Cold War cases, a capable and interested neighbor intervened to stop genocide in Uganda, Bangladesh, and Cambodia. Each of the three neighbors (Tanzania, India, and Vietnam) acted in self-defense after being attacked by the leadership of the genocidal state. In addition to the counter-attack, the neighbors stopped the killing and a political settlement ensued.

The three cases that were studied in the post Cold War era yielded different results. No international actor intervened to stop genocide in Rwanda (and it was stopped by an exile group), while genocides in East Timor and Bosnia were addressed by the United Nations and intervention followed with varied results. In Bosnia, the United Nations under-funded and under-equipped its force, and the genocide ended in partition. The situation in East Timor ended more successfully, with independence granted to the East Timorese. As aforementioned, in Rwanda the international community did nothing to stop the killing.

The results of this study lead to the conclusion that interventions conducted by an interested and attacked neighbor are the most timely and effective responses to genocide. Interventions undertaken by the international community have yielded mixed results and have often lacked coordination, interest, and political will. Until the United Nations has a sufficient interest in stopping the murder and displacement of innocent people, no change in how genocides are stopped and addressed seems likely.
GENOCIDE: WHO CARES?

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Listing</th>
<th>ix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Genocide in Uganda</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Genocide in Bangladesh</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Genocide in Cambodia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Genocide in Bosnia</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Genocide in Rwanda</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Genocide in East Timor</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: Analysis</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE LISTING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Number of Registered Prisoners in the Tuol Sleng Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Military Comparison, Vietnam and Khmer Rouge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A Humanitarian Crisis Beyond Comprehension: June 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rwandan Refugees in July, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cold War Genocides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Post Cold War Genocides</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

“A massacre is the most hideous act that men can perform. Under no conditions whatsoever can it have moral justification. Those who perform the act put themselves outside the pale of humanity: they are guilty of a crime that shrieks to heaven.”

A mere three years after the conclusion of the world’s second Great War, the fledgling United Nations, created to prevent war, protect human rights, maintain international law, and promote social progress and freedom, set out to define and denounce one of the largest lasting scars of that war – genocide. By the end of 1949, 41 states had signed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, including the United States, the U.S.S.R., and France. The new Convention went into effect on January 12, 1951.

Genocide, according to the Convention, was defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” by killing, inflicting physical or mental harm against the group’s members or their “conditions of life,” preventing the group’s reproduction, and removing children from the group. The Convention also called genocide “a crime under international law which (the contracting parties) undertake to prevent and to punish” by trying the responsible parties “by a competent tribunal of the State in that territory.” The signers agreed that “in order
to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation (was) required.”

Although this document – an extensive and optimistic call to humankind – has existed for over 50 years, genocides have occurred with frequency. This study examines six internationally-acknowledged genocides, each occurring since the establishment of the Convention. In addition to closely examining the conditions surrounding each genocide, the paper will focus on what type of intervention, if any, was employed to stop the genocide. The following important questions will be addressed in each case:

- Did the international community intervene to stop the genocide?
- What entity intervened to stop the genocide and what was that response?
- What were the circumstances in which the genocide was stopped if it was stopped?
- What ultimate conclusions can be drawn from these findings?

The six cases – both similar and varied in their nature – are all documented cases of genocides since the end of World War II. They range in date from the 1970s through today. They include genocides against ethnic groups, political enemies, and those with differing beliefs. The six studied here are:

- Idi Amin’s genocidal tenure as president of Uganda throughout the 1970s during which the fanatical leader caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans not belonging to Amin’s ethnic group
Genocide: Who cares?

- The genocide in Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) in 1971, when West Pakistani troops slaughtered millions and forced millions of other Bengalis from their homes
- The genocide in Cambodia in 1975-1979, during which Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge leadership were responsible for the deaths of nearly two million Cambodians while attempting to “cleanse” the population and implement a communist system
- The case of Bosnia from 1991 to 1995 when, during the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia republic, Bosnian Muslims were subjected to torture, rape, and death at the hands of Serbs
- The 1994 slaughter in Rwanda when Hutu extremist leadership played on ethnic differences and fears causing radicalized Hutus to kill nearly one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 100 days
- The genocide in East Timor in 1999 in which thousands were quickly forced from their homes by anti-independence forces

In each case, the discussion will take the following form. First, the basic facts of the genocide will be presented, including the identity of the perpetrators and the victims. Next, international and UN reaction will be presented, as well as any unilateral action by any other state(s). Finally, each case will discuss how the killing was stopped or when the stoppage occurred, as well as any political or governmental resolution of the issues at hand.
After studying the six cases we arrive at a counter-intuitive conclusion. One may assume that the era since 1990 has been one of increased global cooperation and awareness of regional conflicts. Such a time might be well-suited to international action to stop genocide, especially through the United Nations. Surprisingly, the findings do not mesh with this construction. The genocides that occurred in the 1970s – in Cambodia, Uganda, and Bangladesh – were stopped completely and quickly, not by the international community, but by an attacked, capable, and interested neighboring state. This unilateral response, that of a unilateral self-interested actor, seems to be the best method to stop genocide. Multilateral intervention in cases throughout the 1990s are fraught with underfunding, lack of consistent support, and an absence of political will to stop the genocide. Genocides occurring before this era of increased “international cooperation” were addressed with more decisiveness and effectiveness.

GENOCIDE IN UGANDA
1971-1979

“Stacks of ‘employees’ identity’ cards, the man’s name, his age, his employer – a picture of the man. Those haunting faces can never be forgotten, evidence of missing persons like the mounds of spectacles that one saw with deep grief at another time, another place – Auschwitz.”

It is estimated that under the Idi Amin regime of the 1970s, 300,000 to 500,000 Ugandans were tortured and murdered. Shortly after seizing power from President Milton Obote (who was out of the country), the paranoid Amin created death squads that immediately began executing military leaders who had not backed him politically. As time passed, the brutal Amin began sending thousands of innocent civilians to their deaths, and by 1977, 250,000 Ugandans had fled the country.

The story of Amin’s rule is almost too horrific to tell and his grotesqueness is simply unmatched. According to one story, after his coup Amin got back at a rival, Army Chief of Staff Muhammad Hussein, by having him killed. Then Amin stored Hussein’s head in his refrigerator. Another story accounts the monstrous murder of his former wife. When Amin’s ex-wife Kay became pregnant out of wedlock and had an abortion, Amin had her killed, and killed the entire doctor’s family as well. After Kay’s arms and legs were sawed off, Amin had them reattached backwards. He then had his children view the mutilated body, telling them, “See what happens to bad mothers!”
Much of the killing in Uganda was committed by two death squads, called the Public Safety Unit (PSU) and the Bureau of State Research (BSR). These two groups were made up of Nubians, descendants of Sudan, who reportedly had an ancient reputation of being “sadistic killers.” The PSU and BSR were both exceedingly violent and loyal in their service to Amin throughout his rule.

While Uganda spiraled into economic and social chaos, Amin’s main targets in the genocide were members of the Acholi and Lango tribes, who he believed were supporters of the former president, Milton Obote. Obsessed with his enemy Obote, Amin turned Ugandan ethnic groups against each other. Members of the Lugbara and Kakwa tribes (Amin’s ethnicity) were encouraged to kill Acholi and Langi.

Obote supporters were not the only citizens targeted. Amin forced approximately 50,000 Asians to leave Uganda in August of 1972. Many of those banished of Indian descent took refuge in Canada. Claiming that the common citizen would be benefited by the departure of the Asian minority, Amin redistributed seized property to loyal army officials.

Being a Muslim himself, Amin reached out to Ugandan Muslims and focused on killing Christians. Believing that churches housed his enemies, he quickly turned the genocide on church leaders, and many mysteriously disappeared. Christian leaders were targeted so aggressively that Church of Uganda ministers staged a protest against the government-sponsored terrorism in 1977. Towards the end of his reign, as Amin’s friends and allies dwindled, the leader became a somewhat pathetic character, as his
neuroses and eccentric ideas – and perhaps a case of neurosyphilis\textsuperscript{12} – led him to bestow outlandish titles upon himself – such as the King of Scotland.\textsuperscript{13}

Although international condemnations – even from the West – were frequent, no country tried to stop Amin’s genocide. World leaders accused and denounced Amin’s actions, but never intervened.\textsuperscript{14} Daniel P. Moynihan, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, called Amin’s actions “intolerable.”\textsuperscript{15} In February of 1977, United States President Jimmy Carter said that Amin’s deeds “have disgusted the entire civilized world,” and denounced “the horrible murders that apparently are taking place in that country,” perhaps tipping off a short standoff with Amin.\textsuperscript{16} At the same time, American coffee companies paid $150 million to Amin for coffee exports just in the first half of 1977, helping to solidify his power.\textsuperscript{17}

Amin may have been able to stay in power longer had he not invaded his neighbor to the south, Tanzania. Alleging that Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere was causing many of Uganda’s problems, and asserting that Tanzania had attacked Uganda,\textsuperscript{18} Amin attacked scant forces on a largely-unguarded Tanzanian border on October 9, 1978. By October 18, Amin had bombed Bukoba, an important commercial hub in northern Tanzania. Chaos ensued and citizens fled the village.\textsuperscript{19}

Tanzanian leadership, caught completely by surprise, first denied the existence of violence near the border. Radio Uganda quickly broadcasted false reports that Tanzanian troops had begun an invasion of southern Uganda.\textsuperscript{20} On October 25, 1978, combat between the two central African powers commenced when Tanzanian troops returned fire on Ugandan forces near the Ugandan village of Mutukula.\textsuperscript{21} Initial fighting was
dominated by hearsay and miscommunications, causing hesitancy on both sides. Ugandan soldiers were confused about the number of Tanzanian troops near the border, and Tanzanian leadership seemed unprepared for the incoming invasion. On the other hand, citizens of Bukoba, after enduring bombing from Amin’s forces for almost ten days, packed up and fled – and by the morning of the October 28, Bukoba was empty and shut down.

Ugandan forces continued to advance south quickly capturing territory north of the Kagera River. By the end of October, 1500 Tanzanian civilians had been killed in the Kagera Salient, an area north of the Kagera River. Government officials had been decapitated and women were raped. Hundreds of women were imprisoned in slave labor camps. In a horrific and ironic twist, many civilians fleeing south, trying to escape Amin’s grasp, were killed or mutilated by landmines that Tanzanian forces had planted to prevent a Ugandan invasion.

Tanzania could not continue to keep quiet. Acknowledging the invasions and atrocities, a full-scale war effort was implemented. After weeks of preparing for battle, Tanzanian troops crossed the Kagera River to win back Tanzanian territory on November 14, 1978. As the troops advanced through the Kagera Salient, Amin’s forces were nowhere to be found. What the forces did find was grizzly. Bodies and body parts of civilians were strewn, serving as Amin’s lasting calling card. The soldiers not only found Tanzanian bodies throughout the Salient, but also discovered 120 bodies of Ugandan soldiers. Aware that no Tanzanian forces were present in the area, the advancing soldiers believed that the Ugandan soldiers had been killed in Uganda, perhaps by Amin.
Soldiers also began to discover citizens who were lucky enough to have survived the Amin attack.\textsuperscript{28}

To put increased pressure on the international community to act, especially the Organization of African Unity (OAU) who had recommended that the Tanzanians accept mediation as a way to end the violence, Tanzanian President Nyerere gave a public speech in early December.

Since Amin has usurped power, he has murdered more people than Smith in Rhodesia, more than Vorster in South Africa. But there is this tendency in Africa that it does not matter if an African kills other Africans. Had Amin been white, free Africa would have passed many resolutions condemning him. Being black is now becoming a certificate to kill fellow-Africans.\textsuperscript{29}

The international community did not respond. Tanzania was going to have to do all of the heavy lifting.

On January 21, 1979, Tanzanian forces crossed into Uganda, forcing Amin’s troops to flee and leave behind stashes of weapons.\textsuperscript{30} With Amin’s forces continuing to evacuate, the Tanzanian forces completely destroyed the Ugandan village of Mutukula, killing every Ugandan they could, leveling huts and buildings, and forcing survivors to run for their lives. The Tanzanian revenge had begun.\textsuperscript{31}

The brutality of the Tanzanian troops maddened Nyerere, and he immediately ordered his forces to distinguish between troops and civilians.\textsuperscript{32} According to Smith, Nyerere had no intention of fully invading Uganda. Although Tanzania would have been happy with Amin’s removal from power, Smith claims that Nyerere would have stopped in southern Uganda if the OAU had acted. “Had the OAU even at that stage … offered
protection for Tanzania by condemning Amin’s action, there would have been no further movement into Uganda.”

Nyerere explained his decision this way:

I was faced with a grave moral problem. Our advance had until that point been strictly limited to an objective to secure Tanzania against further attacks against Amin. The Ugandan civilians in the area across which we had advanced were henceforth at risk because they welcomed us as liberators. Amin made it plain that he would punish them. He would. His record proves that.

As Tanzanian forces continued to move into Uganda, Ugandan exile groups – representing millions of Ugandans – joined the Tanzanians. Amin’s troops continued the retreat, burning and destroying villages in the move northward. About 3,000 Libyan forces backed Amin and took the front lines of the battle as Ugandan troops withdrew.

It seemed as though two waves were sweeping Uganda, the first that of Amin and the largely Libyan and Nubian troops, pillaging and killing Ugandan citizens, the second that of Nyerere’s and Tanzanian forces, coupled with formerly-exiled Ugandan groups.

As Kampala fell in April 1979 and Amin’s scattered troops continued their march northward, Tanzanian troops were amazed at what they found. In the northern part of the country, where the Langi and Acholi tribes’ populations are concentrated, Tanzanian and Ugandan liberation forces found “an almost total absence of men aged twenty to fifty,” as a result of Amin’s genocide. As a result, thousands of surviving Ugandans rushed to thank the Tanzanian forces. An old friend of Nyerere’s, Yusufu Lule, an exiled leader, was chosen to be the president of Uganda. Eventually, Obote was re-installed as leader of Uganda in 1980. Amin fled to Sudan, and eventually to Saudi Arabia, where he died in 2003.


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Deming, Sullivan, and MacPherson, 29.

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Avirgan and Honey, 1982, 68.

Smith, 1980, 181.

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Avirgan and Honey, 1982, 70.

Avirgan and Honey, 1982, 70.

Smith, 1980, 182.

Smith, 1980, 182.

Smith, 1980, 184.

Smith, 1980, 186.

Avirgan and Honey, 1982, 134.


“Idi Amin,” Wikipedia.
From March to December of 1971, an estimated three million people were killed in Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) by the Pakistani army in attempts to quash nationalist fervor. By the end of the conflict, approximately one of every 25 East Pakistanis had been slaughtered. In addition to the creation of sex slave operations, an estimated 200,000 and 400,000 women were raped. By the end of 1971, over 10 million Bengalis had fled to India, destabilizing the region.

The history of East Pakistan is a tumultuous one. From its creation in 1947 until 1971, Pakistan was split into two parts – East and West. Divided by India, the territories were 1,000 miles apart. Long slighted by West Pakistan and its powerful elite, East Pakistan – populated by Bengali Muslims and Hindus – often felt misrepresented, as the power to control their language, culture, and economic power proved elusive. Songs written by Bengalis were banned, and Urdu became the national language – even though only 7 percent of all Pakistanis (mainly the elites) spoke it. Resources flowed regularly...
from East to West Pakistan, robbing the former of its economic prowess. This pattern of abuses from West to East turned East Pakistan into fertile ground for a nationalist movement.

Finally, in 1970, increased chaos and demonstrations against policies in the two territories forced new Pakistani President Yahya Khan to allow free elections throughout the entire country with the goals of forming a new constitution. The Pakistan Constituent Assembly, numbering 300 members, was split between East Pakistan (162 seats) and the West (138 seats). Quickly, the Bengali nationalist party (the Awami League) broke onto the scene in the East, gaining sweeping election wins throughout East Pakistan, taking 160 of the 162 assembly seats. The opposing Pakistan People’s Party won 81 of the 138 seats in West Pakistan. These election results showed political cleavage between East and West, and both parties were unable to reach a consensus for guidelines leading to the adoption of a new constitution. Talks between East and West Pakistan quickly broke down.

With the political storm brewing and constitutional chaos on the horizon, President Khan moved thousands of Pakistani soldiers from West to East Pakistan, and indiscriminant killing of civilians commenced on March 25, 1971 in Dhaka, the capital. After the army arrested the leader of the Awami League (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman), leveled houses, and killed hundreds, defiant Bengalis declared independence the next day on March 26. The Pakistani armed forces, reportedly killing 15,000 in the first three days of the conflict, came to be known for their cold-blooded slaughter, especially at Dahka.
University on the night of the 25th.\textsuperscript{10} Consider the testimony of survivor and student Kali Ranjansheel:

All the time the soldiers were cursing and swearing at us. The soldiers said “We will see how you get free Bangladesh! Why don’t you shout \textit{Joy Bangla} (Victory to Bengal)!” … After we came back, we were again ordered to carry the dead bodies to the Shahid Minar… As my companion and I were carrying the body of Sunil (our dormitory guard), we heard screams in female voices. We found that the women from the nearby slums were screaming as the soldiers were shooting at the janitors… I realized that our turn would come too as the Pakistanis started lining up those students who were before us, and were firing at them. My companion and I barely carried the dead body of Sunil toward a pile where I saw the dead body of Dr. Dev (Professor of Philosophy).\textsuperscript{11}

Hindus were the largest minority group of victims and the objects of much hatred from the Pakistani army. Many West Pakistanis were threatened by perceived Indian influences in East Pakistan and supported the idea of ridding the nation of Hindus, as well as scholars and students who were the leaders of the Bengali drive for independence. Writers, journalists, doctors, and artists were also targeted for execution, as the Pakistani army wanted to rob the Bengalis of their most intelligent and progressive citizens.\textsuperscript{12}

The genocide began with the slaughter at a university in Dhaka as mentioned, and quickly escalated. By the end of the first week, over 30,000 had been killed. Bengali men were overwhelmingly targeted at the beginning, as the Pakistani army worried about future freedom fighters. One estimate is that 80 percent of those killed in the genocide were men.\textsuperscript{13} Women were sexually abused and murdered as well. “During army operations, girls and women were raped in front of close family members in order to terrorize and inflict racial slander.”\textsuperscript{14}
Those responsible for ordering the killings were Pakistani generals: President Yahya Khan, General Tikka Khan, General Pirzada (Chief of Staff), General Umar Khan (Security) and General Akbar Khan (Intelligence). Although these five orchestrated the killings, officers and common soldiers carried them out.

Anti-Bengali racism was rampant, and hatred of Hindus energized the killers. Many of the Pakistani soldiers responsible for the killings saw Bengalis as an inferior race, as “scum and vermin that [should] best be exterminated.” Troops often compared Bengalis to monkeys and chickens and were allowed to kill them indiscriminately.

As mentioned earlier, nearly ten million Bengalis were forced to flee to India and about 30 million East Pakistani urban-dwellers fled to rural towns to escape the genocide. Bengali guerrilla leaders organized in the countryside through the summer of 1971 with help from Bangladesh’s concerned neighbor, India.

Indian leadership had been pleased with the Pakistani election results in 1970, and imagined the existence of a friendly neighbor in East Pakistan. Throughout much of 1970 and the beginning of 1971, India stayed out of the evolving conflict. Wishing for a quick and peaceful resolution, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was careful not to take sides. However, throughout 1971, the Indian government became increasingly more embroiled in the conflict, agreeing in April to allowing the Awami League to move its headquarters to Calcutta.

Starting in late March and after the massacre at Dhaka, India started building up its border forces to handle the refugee problem and to prevent Pakistani movement
Genocide: Who cares?

Indian radio stations also increased chatter through these months, claiming that the Pakistani army was involved in genocide. Indian leadership realized the importance of diplomacy in resolving the crisis, and tried to prod the international community into dealing with the situation. However, the international community pushed West Pakistan to end the violence it was causing in East Pakistan. Following this unsuccessful attempt to end the carnage in East Pakistan through diplomatic means, Indian leaders began to contemplate a policy switch. Prime Minister Gandhi on May 24, 1971, remarked:

What was claimed to be an internal problem of Pakistan, has also become an internal problem for India. We are, therefore, entitled to ask Pakistan to desist immediately from all actions which it is taking in the name of domestic jurisdiction, and which vitally affect peace and well-being of our own citizens. Pakistan cannot be allowed to seek a solution of its political and other problems at the expense of India and on Indian soil.

Following the inaction from the international community, Gandhi had decided to press Pakistan to end the scourge not only for the security of the Bengali people, but for her own citizens as well. India began supporting and training Bangladeshi resistance movements – namely the Mukti Bahini – in India in May. By the end of that month, Pakistani troops controlled East Pakistani villages but forces began to come under attack by “an increasingly well-organized resistance.” Although there was a noticeable decline in the morale of the troops, it was clear that the Mukti Bahini alone could not eject the Pakistan Army” from East Pakistan. Nevertheless, guerilla attacks increased, and by October, the conflict had grown. The situation began to resemble a “brief conventional war between Pakistan and the combined Indian and Bangladeshi forces.”
Border battles erupted and on December 3, 1971 President Khan ordered air
strikes against cities in western India, which officially marked the beginning of the war –
between his 365,000-troop army and India’s forces, numbering 833,000.29 Officials in
New Delhi weren’t surprised by the attack. “One of Indira Gandhi’s advisors remarked:
‘The fool has done exactly what one expected’.”30

Indian forces had to be cognizant of a two-front war, one in which they tried to
end the Pakistani army occupation in East Pakistan on the eastern front, and contain West
Pakistan on the other. Following the bombing of the air fields on the December 3, Indira
Gandhi called for an invasion of East Pakistan, which began on December 4. Khan’s
bombings did nothing to weaken the Indian Air Force and within 24 hours India had
taken control of the air war by destroying much of Pakistan’s bombing capabilities.31

Because of the distance between East and West Pakistan, forces on the ground in
East Pakistan were easily trapped by India’s advancing forces. Even though India also
attacked West Pakistan with relative ease – destroying communication, devastating bases
and airfields, and blocking ports and escapes in Karachi – the focus of the military
operations was in East Pakistan. Nine Indian infantry divisions tore through the East
Pakistani countryside, “bypassing intermediate cities and obstacles and pressing
relentlessly toward the capital at Dhaka.”32

Pakistani forces were quickly overmatched.

Overwhelmed by the speed and power of the Indian advance, Pakistan's
four divisions and smaller separate units fought a number of hard actions
but soon had their escape routes cut off and were without air support. On
December 16 Dhaka fell, and Pakistan's commander, Lieutenant General
A.A.K. Niazi, with about 75,000 troops, surrendered to Lieutenant
General J.S. Aurora, the Indian commander of the combined Indian and
Mukti Bahini forces. On the western front, India's forces had effectively contained Pakistani attacks and had made limited advances into West Pakistan.\textsuperscript{33} Immediately, India retained about 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in East Pakistan, but returned them to West Pakistan by 1974.\textsuperscript{34} India had rushed to end the conflict, preventing other international intervention (China and the United States had begun increasing rhetoric regarding their defense of Pakistan; the United States had already sent a fleet to the Bay of Bengal to show support for Pakistan).\textsuperscript{35} The war authenticated the independence of Bangladesh and added another chapter to the turbulent history between India and Pakistan. It also left thousands dead: 9000 Pakistanis were killed, and around 2500 Indian forces died in the fighting.\textsuperscript{36}

On their way out of the country, those Pakistani troops who weren’t taken prisoner by the Indian army made sure to leave lasting marks. They continued to destroy villages and kill innocent civilians, including intellectuals.\textsuperscript{37} Two days after the formal surrender, on December 19, 1971, Pakistani President Yayha Khan resigned his office due to increased internal pressure.\textsuperscript{38} The newly-formed Bangladesh also announced its new leader shortly thereafter; Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the exiled Awami League leader, became the new prime minister of Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{39}

6 Jahan, 1995, 373.


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Sisson and Rose, 1990, 235.

GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA
1975-1979

“In 1975, the Khmer Rouge also began executing rich people, although they spared the elderly owner of 800 hectares [2,000 acres]. They also executed college students and former government officials, soldiers and police. I saw the bodies of many such people not far from the village. Hundreds of people also died of starvation and disease in the year after April 1975, when medical supplies were lacking.”

Between 1975-1979, approximately 1.7 million Cambodians – about 21 percent of the total population – lost their lives to genocide via political killings, forced labor, and starvation under the rule of Pol Pot and the radical leftist Khmer Rouge. Renaming the country Democratic Kampuchea, Khmer Rouge leaders used fear to consolidate power. Reminding citizens of the American bombings of Cambodia during the Vietnam War in the early 1970s, and pointing out the inability of the government to feed an urban population, leaders forced urban Cambodians into rural areas. However, the real goal of the Khmer Rouge was to move the majority of the population into the rural areas to secure a power base and move its citizens out of corruptive cities.

The Khmer Rouge immediately started killing government officials and families of military officers when it came to power in April 1975, specifically targeting those with high-school-level educations and money. The effects were disastrous: 450 of 500 doctors nationwide were slaughtered, as were 15,000 of 20,000 teachers across Cambodia. Many citizens had to disguise themselves as poor migrant farmers or
peasants to avoid execution. Other middle class citizens were sent to “re-education centers” and brutal forced labor camps.\(^5\) Those not working hard enough, those protesting living conditions, practicing religion, having sexual relations, or grieving their situations, were also put to death. Hospitalized people were also executed. Many died because of forced marches, difficult labor, and from hunger, disease, and exposure. Victims were gunned down by automatic weapons, while others were killed by pickaxes and ax handles to save ammunition.\(^6\)

The genocidal policy of the Khmer Rouge was supplemented by Mao-inspired social changes forced on Cambodians. Banking was abolished, private property was taken, families were separated, and agricultural labor was enforced.\(^7\) The regime attempted to create a communist society by dividing Cambodians into two classes: “new people,” those former-urban inhabitants often with educations, and “old people,” poor peasants who lived in rural areas. The Khmer Rouge maintained a strict watch over its citizens, keeping records of families and individual movements. Although it varied, most “new people” were given the smallest rations, forced to work in the most inhospitable of conditions, and often executed without reason. The communist leaders treated “old people” slightly better, letting most stay in native villages. Even though the Khmer Rouge believed in its strict version of communism and encouraged its citizens to refer to each other as “comrades,” cronyism was rampant in the ruling class.\(^8\)

In addition to destroying much of the social fabric of the country, the regime shattered much of Cambodia’s multifaceted religious culture. The country’s approximately 50,000 Buddhist monks were forced into manual labor, Muslims were
forced to eat pork, and citizens found praying were executed. Christian clergy and Muslim leaders were slaughtered. Cham Muslims, a minority in Cambodia, fared the worst. The Khmer Rouge destroyed their villages, and approximately 87,000 – or 36 percent of their total population – were executed. By comparison, nearly 19 percent of the Khmer majority was killed, half of the rate of deaths of Cham Muslims. Chams were also relocated to disperse their populations throughout the countryside and were forced to change their clothing style and diet. Other minorities, such as citizens of Vietnamese decent, were often raped, mutilated, and executed, as were Thai minorities near the border with Thailand.

Internal paranoia – extensive in the new Kampuchean regime – led to increased purges in 1976 and 1977. The number of prisoners – often tortured and executed – also increased. One detention and torture center in southern Phnom Penh, called the Tuol Sleng Center, was a former high school. The following table presents the number of prisoners taken per year at the center.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>more than 6,000</td>
<td>nearly 10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though the Khmer Rouge prided itself on self-reliance, the regime began actively pursuing an outward-looking foreign policy. Pol Pot maintained relations with many communist states, including close friendships with China and North Korea. Democratic Kampuchea also established relations with Yugoslavia, Peru, Albania, Malaysia, Laos, and Egypt. However, relations had been historically strained with the neighbor to the east, Vietnam.
Even though both countries were communist, Vietnam (supported and supporter of the Soviet Union) and Democratic Kampuchea (close relations with China) were rivals. “But in spite of the replication of the Sino-Soviet dispute among the communist parties of Indochina, there was nothing inevitable about the outbreak of war.”

Additionally, a military clash would be disastrous for Democratic Kampuchea: Vietnam had ten times as many troops as the Khmer Rouge regime.

Nevertheless, border disagreements between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese intensified relations between the two powers. Anger still festered in Cambodia over the loss of some formerly colonized lands to Vietnam. Military confrontation began lightly in May 1975, as the Khmer Rouge attacked islands under Vietnamese control claiming ownership. Within weeks the surprised Vietnamese had stemmed the tide, reclaiming the islands by the end of May.

Sharing the United States as a common enemy, rhetoric between the two sides was lighthearted through 1976, covering up increasing tensions between the countries. However, on April 30, 1977 – the two-year anniversary of the fall of South Vietnam to North Vietnam – the Pol Pot regime attacked southern Vietnam, killing hundreds.

Throughout the spring, border incursions by the Khmer Rouge continued through the spring systematically. The Vietnamese government “claimed that it then offered to settle the border questions peacefully with the Khmer Rouge but the offer was refused.”

It seems that the Hanoi leaders were under pressure from local authorities to respond to Khmer Rouge attacks. But in September they still hoped that the conflict could be resolved without resort to all-out war. They were pre-occupied with internal problems, and were hesitant to break openly with Phnom Penh, because of the likely repercussions in Hanoi’s relations with Beijing.
As a peaceful resolution continued to prove elusive and Vietnam’s patience expired, it finally responded militarily. In December of 1977, fighting had increased along the border – this time with a substantial Vietnamese force. Democratic Kampuchea officially and temporarily cut diplomatic ties with Vietnam, citing aggressive behavior from their eastern neighbor. The fighting at the end of 1977, in the southeastern Cambodian border province of Svay Rieng, demonstrated Vietnam’s military might. But by early January 1978, Vietnam had withdrawn from Cambodia, after having advanced to within two dozen miles of Phnom Penh. Pot and other Khmer Rouge leaders claimed a major victory.

Becoming increasingly delusional, the Khmer Rouge leaders seemed to be unaware of the fight they had started. Claiming victory, Democratic Kampuchea grossly underestimated the military advantage that the Vietnamese had. The following table compares the military numbers between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea in 1977.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Socialist Republic of Vietnam</th>
<th>Democratic Kampuchea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>615,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>12,000 people; 300 aircraft</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>200 armored carriers and few tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>50 million</td>
<td>7 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As major conflict became a reality, the Vietnamese were still afraid of what an invasion may look like to the international community. The SRV (Socialist Republic of Vietnam) began a rhetorical campaign, first to validate the impending military strike, and secondly, to attempt to bring about change in Cambodia from the inside-out, by overthrowing Pol Pot using Vietnamese spies and sympathizers from within. The Khmer
Rouge purges continued and Pol Pot moved soldiers into the Eastern Zone close to the border to rid the country of traitors. SRV leadership quickly realized that an insurgency would be unsuccessful. By the end of 1978 Vietnam committed to full-scale war. On December 25, 1978, Vietnam launched an attack on Cambodia from the east with forces numbering 150,000. Within two weeks, on January 7, 1979, Phnom Penh fell. By mid-January, Vietnam had appointed a puppet government and the Khmer Rouge forces “reverted to a guerilla war.”

Vietnam did get what it wanted as a result of the conflict – a friendly neighbor next door in Cambodia, further illustrating Vietnamese power in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Vietnam found itself in a difficult situation in dealing with the Khmer Rouge, especially in the eyes of the international community.

As reported in a January 22, 1979 issue of Newsweek:

The "rebels" swept across Cambodia in a lightning offensive. Phnom Penh fell without a fight. Pockets of resistance were overrun or simply bypassed. And in the words of Radio Phnom Penh, the tyrannical regime of Prime Minister Pol Pot abruptly "ceased to exist" last week. But the Cambodian "insurgents" were in fact Hanoi-controlled proxies, and their victory was achieved only with the aid of tanks, artillery, jet fighters and twelve battle-hardened divisions – all from Vietnam. The conquest of Cambodia was a case of naked aggression, and it left Hanoi the undisputed master of Indochina, and a force to be feared throughout Southeast Asia.

Vietnam's blitzkrieg set off alarms around the world. Non-Communist nations in Asia wondered if they would become dominoes in Hanoi's path (page 35), and the Foreign Ministers of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, meeting in Bangkok last week, called for the "immediate and total withdrawal" of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. The Carter Administration condemned the invasion and sought to head off any confrontation between the respective patrons of Vietnam and Cambodia: the Soviet Union and China. Moscow and most pro-Soviet
Communist states – with the exception of Romania – swiftly recognized the new regime in Phnom Penh. But China could do little more than grouse, and nurse its badly wounded prestige.\(^{29}\)

Vietnam’s actions were not authorized by the international community; in fact, Vietnam was condemned for its “naked” aggression. In December of 1979 – nearly a full year after the fall of Phnom Penh – the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) met in Kuala Lumpur and denounced the invasion. “They (ASEAN) will continue to recognize the deposed government of Pol Pot as a means of demonstrating their dislike of Vietnam’s puppet regime,” reported the December 22, 1979, issue of The Economist.\(^{30}\) While many countries continued to denounce the invasion,\(^{31}\) the Soviet Union was in support of the intervention, perhaps further damning the case of the Vietnamese, at least in the West.\(^{32}\)

On November 14, 1979, the United Nations General Assembly widely criticized the Vietnamese offensive. Douglas Roche, United Nations representative for Canada, said, “if serious problems actually existed on the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border, it would be hardly necessary to occupy the entire country to resolve them.”\(^{33}\) The representative from Pakistan, Niaz Naik, took his analysis a step further: “Such intervention cannot be justified under any circumstances or on any grounds, moral or political. External military intervention to overthrow the lawful government of a country constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”\(^{34}\)

Following the invasion, the Vietnamese installed a regime in Cambodia, with Heng Samrin, a Khmer Rouge defector and rebellion leader, in charge of building the new government. Samrin led the government until 1985, when Hun Sen became Prime
Minister of Cambodia. Vietnam influence in Cambodia remained strong until the late 1980s.35

4 Brown, Ian, Cambodia, (Herndon, Virginia: OxFam GB, 2000), 25. 
5 “Democratic Kampuchea,” Wikipedia. 
6 “Democratic Kampuchea,” Wikipedia. 
8 “Democratic Kampuchea,” Wikipedia. 
9 “Democratic Kampuchea,” Wikipedia. 
12 “Democratic Kampuchea,” Wikipedia. 
15 Morris, 1999, 75-76. 
17 Morris, 1999, 92. 
18 Morris, 1999, 92. 
19 Morris, 1999, 98. 
22 Morris, 1999, 100. 
26 Morris, 1999, 103. 
27 Morris, 1999, 106. 
28 Morris, 1999, 111. 
30 “Cambodia; Between the rock and the hard place,” The Economist, December 22, 1979, 45. 
By the end of 1994 in Bosnia, just less than 2.75 million citizens were internally displaced, 26,000 had disappeared, 50,000 had been tortured, 20,000 to 50,000 women had been raped, and approximately 250,000 people had been killed due to genocide and war. According to Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, “genocide was carried out in the literal sense of the word on approximately 77 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territory.” The majority of the killings and evacuations were completed by Serbs, attempting to keep the crumbling Yugoslav republic together.

The former Yugoslavia, which throughout its existence had been a model for multiculturalism, began to show signs of problems in the late 1980s: a weakening of the federal state, astronomical inflation, the fall of the friendly Soviet Union, and increased racial and ethnic tension. As the economy worsened, each of the eight republics that had made up Yugoslavia “began to look inward and to rely increasingly on its own largely ethnic leadership.”
Yugoslavia finally broke up on June 25, 1991, when Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. Serbia, one of the eight initial republics, desperately tried to keep Yugoslavia together, and was largely supported by the United States and many European countries. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which supported local Serb militias, attacked Slovenia first, but fighting soon spread into Croatia. Some European states stepped in and forced a cease-fire in Slovenia, quickly ending violence and granting it independence. But fighting in Croatia was out of control, as many Serbs living in Croatia feared ethnic violence from the Croats. By August of 1991, the Serbs controlled one-third of Croatia. Thousands were killed and hundreds of thousands more were displaced.

To respond to the international crisis, the United Nations sent in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to assist in ending the conflict in Croatia. Security Council Resolution 743 in late December 1991 authorized “demobilization, disarmament, and conflict resolution, as well as to provide humanitarian relief.” UNPROFOR was on the ground by March of 1992.

The conflict quickly swelled into neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina after Bosnia declared independence in October of 1991. Bosnia was 44 percent Muslim, 17 percent Croat, and 31 percent Serb. High numbers of Bosnian Serbs supported a united Yugoslavia and the creation of a larger Serbia. Nevertheless, as Bosnia continued to pursue independence, JNA troops began assisting and arming Bosnian Serbs. As a result, Bosnian Serbs began ethnically cleansing Bosnian to change its ethnic composition.
By March 1992, Bosnian Serb forces (aided by the JNA and numbering 90,000 troops) controlled up to 70 percent of Bosnian territory. The weak Bosnian Muslim forces scrambled to create a patchwork security system and defenses were not in place until May of that year. These defense forces – which numbered around 50,000 – proved inconsequential and irrelevant. “In terms of military strategy, some analysts contend that most of the fighting was not between the militaries but consisted of soldiers killing or otherwise ethnically cleansing civilians.”

As Serbian forces continued to advance, the Bosnian government could only hope to control Sarajevo and the central territories. The Serbian forces – who did not endure many casualties and continued to meet little resistance – soon controlled much of Bosnia. These forces aided local Serbian militias, who slaughtered and displaced Bosnian Muslims and Croats. By the end of May of 1992, Serb militias had forced 300,000 Bosnian Muslims and Croats from their homes. By June of 1992, approximately 750,000 total Bosnians were refugees. Just a couple of months later, two million refugees had fled.

By forcing Muslims out of desired territories, Serbs had created “ethnically monolithic territories in Bosnia.” In addition to simply displacing both Bosnians Muslims and Bosnian Croats from their homes, Serbs used other means to terrorize the populace. Rape was used as a tool not only to disgrace women but also to reconfigure the ethnicity of Bosnia. Additionally, the perpetrators not only wanted to transform the ethnicity of Bosnia by forced evacuation, prison camps, starvation, killings, and rapes,
but they wanted to create hatred between the ethnic groups throughout the former Yugoslav republic to “prevent the likelihood of multiethnic reconciliation.”

On June 5, 1992, via UN Security Council Resolution 758, UNPROFOR was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina and centered in Sarajevo. In addition to Resolution 758, Security Council Resolutions 761 and 764 increased the presence and size of UNPROFOR throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and called for the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the Sarajevo airport, so humanitarian aid could be flown in. From July 1992 to April 1995, over 170,000 tons of food and humanitarian items were flown into Bosnia.

As violence continued, on August 13, 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 771 demanded the allowance of humanitarian aid delivery. But it quickly became obvious that the force – less than 8,800 troops – was too small. Subsequent sanctions slapped on Serbia by the UN actually worsened the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia, preventing arms and necessary equipment from getting to the government of Bosnia. In the spring of 1993, UNPROFOR was given a wider mandate, as the Security Council permitted UNPROFOR to use force to prevent attacks against civilians. To assist with this mandate, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali requested 34,000 additional UNPROFOR troops – and was given 7,500.

Throughout much of 1993, UNPROFOR remained inadequate to stop the violence and handle the scope of the humanitarian challenge, as the UN was able to handle just over half of the food requirements for Bosnian civilians.

This was not a financial problem – in fact, adequate funds were available – but one of political will... Fighting continued to block or slow
humanitarian convoys, particularly with the outbreak of fighting in central Bosnia in 1993, which cut the convoy routes; all the while, ethnic cleansing continued virtually unabated.\textsuperscript{24}

The following table presents the vast numbers of those in need in the former Yugoslavia in June 1993.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requiring aid throughout former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>4,269,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees in former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>847,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced in former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1,634,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced Bosnians</td>
<td>2,280,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Serbs became keenly aware of the inaction by the international community, and, in fact, played on the inability of UN forces. In April 1993, the UN had created safe zones throughout the country for displaced persons to relocate and escape the violence. However, security at these zones – like the force on the ground, which numbered 22,500 troops by this time\textsuperscript{26} – was remarkably insufficient. Those in the safe zones were no safer than those in the countryside – and, often less safe. “The purpose of safe areas was to protect civilians within them from violence, although the military weakness of UNPROFOR made this term such a misnomer that citizens of safe areas suffered more from raw violence and insecurity than did many civilians living in places without an international presence.”\textsuperscript{27}

The situation continued to worsen. By the end of 1993, 2.7 million required some humanitarian assistance, but only 20 percent of aid was reaching those in need.\textsuperscript{28} The inadequacy of the undersized UNPROFOR was obvious.

After UN authorization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – which was initially brought into the conflict by protecting no-fly zones over Bosnia in October of 1992\textsuperscript{29} – began bombing Serbian installations in April 1994 to protect the UN
observers and attack Serb ground positions. In response, Serbs began kidnapping and killing humanitarian personnel. “They held over three hundred UN soldiers hostage – chaining several to such potential targets as bridges to serve as human shields.”

Overall, according to Weiss, “air strikes remained largely symbolic and only marginally punitive.”

As the UN continued to struggle to protect its own peacekeepers, Bosnians were left completely undefended against the violence. Srebrenica, which was set up as a safe zone in 1993, was overrun by Serbs in July 1995. Bosnians who had fled their homes to Srebrenica years or months before now fled Srebrenica – amid Serb attacks. And, as Serbs forced the evacuations of the former safe zone, they collected and killed 6000 Bosnian men of military-age. The Serbs also attacked Potocari, Zepa, and Goradzde, forcing thousands of refugees out of the area amid torture and slaughter.

Strikes intensified under “Operation Deliberate Force,” when NATO forces bombed Serb positions on the ground on August 31, 1995. Serb forces were increasingly hemmed in and were faced with increased international pressure. Finally, after battle gains by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croat forces, Serb forces began losing occupied territory. In particular, wins by Bosnian Croats at Bihac (in Western Bosnia) and the Croat army at Knin (near the Croat-Bosnia border) led to thousands of Serb refugees streaming out of Bosnia. As Serbs continued to flee Bosnia, NATO air strikes stopped, and the weakened Serbs agreed to peace talks on September 20, 1995.

On November 21, 1995, all parties agreed to end the violence in the Dayton Accords and on December 14, the parties formally signed a peace deal in Paris.
of the territories was turned over to a NATO Implementation Force numbering 60,000 troops. In addition to agreeing to this, the parties in Dayton also agreed to a “creation of a new federal constitution, compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal, full access by human rights monitors, free and fair democratic elections, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and joint arms control.” The territory was divided into two “semaiautonomous areas,” named the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51 percent of the territory) and the Republika Srpska (49 percent).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Weiss, 2005, 88.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Weiss, 2005, 89.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Friedman, 2004, 57.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Weiss, 2005, 89.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Friedman, 2004, 57.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Friedman, 2004, 58.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Weiss, 2005, 90.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Weiss, 2005, 90.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Given the magnitude of the task, they had to resort to using garbage trucks and by mid-May some 60,000 bodies had been picked up and summarily buried. In the hills, the bodies of the victims often remained where they had fallen after finding a temporary refuge, and were often piled to a height of four or five feet, rotting for weeks and months since there was nobody to bury them. Some rivers, such as the Kagera, were filled with bodies and this in the end seriously polluted Lake Victoria where 40,000 bodies were eventually picked up and buried on the Ugandan shore.”

From April until July 1994, between 800,000 and 850,000 people were slaughtered in Rwanda, eliminating about 11 percent of the country’s total population. By the end of the genocide, nearly one million had been killed, as many as 250,000 women had been raped, and 2.1 million Rwandans had become refugees – in a total of 100 days. The genocide split the two prevalent Rwandan ethnic groups: Hutus (85 percent of the population) slaughtered the Tutsis, which were about 14 percent. Moderate Hutus were also killed.

The Tutsis had been the favored group of the European colonizers and enjoyed the power and benefits of the elite class. But the privileged position of the Tutsis was reversed upon Rwandan independence in 1961.

As Rwanda began electing its own leaders for the first time, the Tutsis quickly came under attack by the Hutu majority. As the Hutus gained control of Rwanda and violent clashes continued into the 1970s, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis fled to Uganda,
where an expatriate movement was established. During this time, Rwandan Hutu political leaders fed off anti-Tutsi propaganda and Tutsis were banned from public offices. The living conditions for Rwandans continued to decline throughout the 1970s and 1980s under President Habyarimana, as coffee – the main export – prices fell, debt grew, and GDP and production slipped.⁷

In 1990 the expatriate Rwandan community in Uganda organized and invaded Rwanda, starting a civil war between the two groups. Called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and numbering nearly 10,000 soldiers, the forces nearly captured Rwanda’s capital, Kigali, before being fought back by Habyarimana’s government.⁸ After years of fighting, peace talks began in 1992 – and culminated in the 1993 signing of the Arusha Accords after both sides agreed to a cease-fire.⁹ The Arusha Accords – signed by the RPF and the government of Rwanda – called for “national reconciliation and power-sharing measures, including provisions for the repatriation of the Tutsi refugee population; incorporation of the Tutsi minority into the government power structure, through ministerial and legislative positions; and the integration of the RPF into the regular army.”¹⁰ The agreements weakened Habyarimana considerably by dividing his power.¹¹

The UN’s first act in Rwanda was to monitor the situation at the Ugandan-Rwandan border, preventing movement of weapons.¹² The UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on June 22, 1993 with Security Council Resolution 846 to “(quiet) the government’s fears of the RPF being rearmed from Uganda.”¹³
Following UNOMUR, and to maintain the cease-fire, the UN followed up in October 1993 by establishing the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and sending in about 2,500 troops by April 1994. The mandate of UNAMIR was to continue to maintain the cease-fire, while assisting with the RPF assimilation into the government’s forces and securing the country.\textsuperscript{14} Romeo Dallaire, a Canadian general, was made commander of the UNAMIR force.\textsuperscript{15}

As anti-Tutsi and anti-RPF hatred blared on Rwandan radios, extremist groups tried to convince Rwandans that Tutsis were the enemy. Nevertheless, mixing between the two groups was prevalent, from living conditions and neighborhoods to intermarriage.\textsuperscript{16} Years later, this would make the killings especially easy; Tutsis had nowhere to hide because Hutus lived right next door.

As President Habyarimana returned from a meeting with RPF forces “in an attempt to salvage the objectives of the Arusha Accords,” his plane was shot down on April 6, 1994.\textsuperscript{17} It is widely accepted that blame rests with the Presidential Guard, in an attempt to prevent success of Arusha. Immediately, “Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the Interahamwe [militia of Habyarimana’s party], and the Impuzamugambi [another militia], as well as ordinary citizens – began to massacre Hutu opposition leaders,” publicly stating that the RPF and opposition Hutu groups were responsible for the assassination of Habyarimana.\textsuperscript{18} Kigali was shutdown and chaos reigned in the streets. The genocide had begun.

The genocide began on April 6, 1994 as the Interahamwe quickly became the responsible party for committing many of the killings. By the end of April, an estimated...
200,000 had been killed.  Most of the genocide’s victims were hacked by machetes although some paid money to be shot. Babies were smashed on rocks, women were raped, and others were buried alive. Some were forced to shoot members of their family to preserve other family members’ lives. Injured people were killed, as well as college students and professors. Systematically, the killers mutilated the victims, both before and after death. The horror was nearly indescribable. A psychiatrist, quoted by Prunier, said, “brutality here does not end with murder. At massacre sites, corpses, many of them those of children, have been methodically dismembered and the body parts stacked neatly in separate piles.” According to a Tutsi teacher who lost most of his family: “The people whose children had to walk barefoot to school killed the people who could buy shoes for theirs.”

In the first half of April, UNAMIR could not successfully maintain the cease-fire between the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) – run by radical Hutus, perpetrating the genocide – and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). As thousands of Tutsis began to be slaughtered, UNAMIR switched from trying to maintain a cease-fire to evacuating UN personnel. During the first days of the killings, UNAMIR evacuated 3,000 expatriates and 190 UN civilians from Rwanda.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, gave a major report on April 21 on the situation in Rwanda, referencing the ongoing civil war in the country and the chaotic situation that gripped it. Although Boutros-Ghali cited staggering death tolls and wide-ranging killings, the genocidal, systematic killing of the
Tutsis was never mentioned. Those responsible for the killings were simply referred to as “unruly soldiers.”

On that same day, the UN Security Council voted to reduce the number of troops for UNAMIR – from 2,500 to 270 – through Resolution 912. Although Resolution 918 called for troop levels to rise back to 5,500, according to Weiss, “nothing materialized for lack of political will and transport.” And, even though Dallaire kept nearly 500 troops under his command, the force was obviously unable to stop the killings. Dallaire, as quoted in Melvern:

My force was standing knee-deep in mutilated bodies, surrounded by the guttural moans of dying people, looking into the eyes of children bleeding to death with their wounds burning in the sun and being invaded by maggots and flies. I found myself walking through villages where the only sign of life was a goat, or a chicken, or song-bird, as all the people were dead, their bodies being eaten by voracious packs of wild dogs.

The world remained quiet on the matter, but the UN did slap Rwanda with an embargo, which was largely ineffective because the genocide was carried out with knives and machetes. World powers did not act with haste to stop the killings. Even on April 28, with the genocide three weeks old, US State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelley “was asked whether what was happening in Rwanda was genocide.” Her response, as quoted by Melvern:

The use of the term genocide has a very precise legal meaning, although it’s not strictly a legal determination. There are other factors in there as well … When in looking at a situation to make a determination about that, before we begin to use that term we have to know as much as possible about the facts of the situation … This is a more complicated issue to address, and we’re certainly looking into this extremely carefully right now. But I’m not able to look at all of those criteria at this moment.
As April came to a close, the RPF had made substantial gains into Rwanda, “infiltrating men and materiel into Kigali at night and slowly and systematically expanding their area of control.” As the RPF inched closer, the violence continued. Pockets of hundreds and thousands of Tutsis hiding from Hutu militias began to spring up throughout the countryside.

And at the end of the first two weeks in May, the RPF had managed to win nearly half of the country. The RPF forces had grabbed the northwest and southeast territories, and heavy fighting still existed in Kigali. On May 22, the RPF had brought the airport under its command, and by May 23, it had conquered the presidential palace. RPF forces not only wanted to end the genocide, but take over power in Rwanda from the Hutu extremists. As the RPF continued to close in on Kigali, extremist Hutus – including members of the government – began to leave Kigali.

In June 1994, as Hutu government officials fled Kigali, France decided to intervene. After getting an endorsement from the UN, the French-led Operation Turquoise was established on June 22. France’s intervention here was not to stop the genocide, but rather to further aid the population at risk. The groups needing protection in late June 1994 were mainly the fleeing Hutus.

Extremist Hutus welcomed the French and RPF forces disdained them. According to Prunier, Rwandan radio was excited for the coming troops, telling the girls to put on “a good dress to welcome our French allies. The Tutsi girls are all dead, so you have your chance,” it blared.
The operation, which only called for two months of French troops on the ground, dispatched 2,500 forces in a week.\(^{37}\) After setting up and monitoring refugee camps at Cyangugu and Kibuye, French troops stayed near the populated areas; those in the countryside basically had no protection.\(^{38}\) The French worried about retribution attacks from the Tutsis to the Hutus.

Camps outside of Rwanda began springing up to take care of the amassing population of Rwandans forced out of their country. Outside of the reach of Operation Turquoise and outside Rwanda’s borders, the situation at Goma Camp, Zaire was particularly gruesome. “After a week, there were 600 deaths a day and after two weeks the 3,000 mark had been reached.”\(^{39}\) “Bodies were lying everywhere. All available shelters were crammed with dying people and corpses kept falling into the lake, further polluting the water.”\(^{40}\) Ironically, many of those in these camps were Hutu extremists, responsible for the genocide. Hutus believed they were receiving their “divine retribution” for committing the genocide. The media coverage of the conditions, while prompting capable actors to send aid, also blurred the line of responsibility and dulled the connection between the Hutus – who now were suffering mightily on the front pages of the world’s newspapers – and the genocide which they caused.\(^{41}\) The following table lists the numbers of Rwandan refugees at camps throughout the Great Lakes Region in Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4: Rwandan Refugees in July, 1994(^{42})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benaco Camp, Tanzania</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burundi Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bukavu Camp, Zaire</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goma Camp, Zaire</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gikongoro Camp, Rwanda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cyangugu Camp, Rwanda</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On July 4, 1994, as Kigali fell to RPF forces, Hutus continued streaming out of the city. Radio channels told Hutus to flee to Zaire, “for the RPF were devil-like fighters and were going to kill them all.”

The mass exodus is described by Prunier:

The enormous crowd of at least 300,000 people was a mixture of many: dispirited Interahamwe who did not even bother any more to kill the few Tutsi who walked alongside them, civil servants and their families riding in a motley fleet of commandeered ministry vehicles, ordinary peasants fleeing from their own blind terror, exhausted FAR troops trying to keep a minimum of discipline, abandoned children with swollen feet, middle class Kigali businessmen in their overloaded cars, whole orphanages, priests, nuns, and madmen.

The results created the “fastest and largest exodus ever recorded,” and the overcrowded camps – most outside of Rwanda – were laden with disease, from cholera to dysentery. Refugees, living in squalor of diarrhea and vomit, also died of starvation. After media coverage of the conditions, the Clinton administration – under Operation Support Hope (OSH) – immediately sent aid workers and military backup, along with millions of liters of water and thousands of tons of food. The airlift took three days to implement. OSH spurred other international involvement, as other states sent troops, vehicles, hospital supplies, water purification systems, and expertise.

The RPF completely controlled Kigali by mid-July, but the city was desolate. Only 50,000 people were left in the city; the pre-genocide population of Kigali was 300,000. The infrastructure – from hospitals and schools to homes and livestock to government services, was completely destroyed. “Everywhere there were ditches filled with rotting bodies.”
UNAMIR was drawn down and ended in April of 1996. But throughout 1995 and 1996, security at the refugee camps in Zaire continued to prove elusive. Vigilantes often took control of the camps, distributing the aid as they wished. By the end of September, a total of two million Rwandans had fled to other countries and nearly two million were internally displaced, leaving behind a massive humanitarian problem.50

After the RPF took control of Kigali, Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, became the President of Rwanda, with RPF leader Paul Kagame as Vice President in order to share power between the different groups. Kagame became President in 2000, and still holds that office.51

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2 Prunier, 1995, 265.
4 Weiss, 2005, 105.
5 Weiss, 2005, 97.
6 Weiss, 2005, 97-98.
7 Weiss, 2005, 98.
8 Weiss, 2005, 99.
11 “Arusha Accords,” Wikipedia.
14 Weiss, 2005, 100.
17 Weiss, 2005, 100.
18 Weiss, 2005, 100.
19 Weiss, 2005, 100.
20 Prunier, 1995, 256.
21 Prunier, 1995, 256-257.
22 Prunier, 1995, 256.
23 Prunier, 1995, 256.
24 Prunier, 1995, 250.


Weiss, 2005, 102.

Melvern, 2000, 174-175.

Weiss, 2005, 102.

Melvern, 2000, 178.

Melvern, 2000, 187.

Melvern, 2000, 201.

Melvern, 2000, 204.

Weiss, 2005, 103.


Weiss, 2005, 103.


Prunier, 1999, 297.

Prunier, 1999, 298.

Prunier, 1999, 298.

Melvern, 2000, 218.

Melvern, 2000, 217.


Melvern, 2000, 218.

Melvern, 2000, 218.


Melvern, 2000, 222.


7

GENOCIDE IN EAST TIMOR
1998-2002

*Then an Indonesian screams an order and we hear machine guns running through [sic] the men. We see the boys and men dying right there. Some see their husbands die. We look at each other stunned. We think they are going to kill us next. All of us just turn and pick up the children and babies and run screaming, wild, everywhere.*

After more than 400 years of being ruled as a Portuguese colony, East Timor, a small island territory bordering Indonesia, was to be granted political autonomy in 1978. However, just three years before, in the autumn of 1975, with the East Timorese movement FRETILIN, (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor) on the edge of a left-leaning administration and potential independence, neighboring Indonesia became concerned about its small south Pacific neighbor and – sensing a power vacuum – began quietly intervening to promote the establishment of a right-wing government. As Portuguese forces were leaving, Indonesian forces were amassing.²

And, with increasing fear regarding the future of the island, Indonesia invaded East Timor on December 7, 1975, in hopes of making a potential conflict look like a civil war.³ UN Security Council Resolutions 384 and 385 called for the removal of Indonesian forces from East Timor in December of 1975, but Indonesian leadership ignored UN demands. After Indonesia annexed East Timor on July 17, 1976, many in the international community were concerned, but some major powers – most namely the
United States, Australia, and Japan – pushed the UN to ignore the invasion – perhaps because of Indonesia’s economic prowess.  

Indonesia used an active propaganda campaign both in East Timor and internationally to explain the invasion of its neighbor. Leadership used different excuses during the occupation. President Haji Suharto claimed that Indonesia was preventing the spread of communism and concerned about a smaller neighbor that needed help from its more-powerful neighbor. Indonesian leadership claimed it was developing East Timor for its benefit, not occupying it.

During the Indonesian occupation, violence against East Timorese was rampant. *The Australian* described a recently-filed UN report regarding the brutality of murders against East Timorese:

> It documents a litany of massacres, thousands of summary executions of civilians and the torture of 8,500 East Timorese – with horrific details of public beheadings, the mutilation of genitalia, the burying and burning alive of victims, use of cigarettes to burn victims, and ears and genitals being lopped off to display to families. Thousands of East Timorese women were raped and sexually assaulted during the occupation and the report concludes that rape was also used by the Indonesian military as a weapon of war.

These killings, carried out by Indonesian troops, continued unabated for decades. Many states were aware of the situation that existed, but blocked intervention, including and especially the United States. The United States openly assisted Indonesia with weapons and aircraft, and United States Ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan even “deliberately obstructed censure of Indonesia” in front of the United Nations in 1978.
Though a number of states signified in one form or another that they accepted that Indonesia possessed sovereignty over the territory, the majority did not. As long as Indonesia remained the key state of the region, and was in the hands of a leadership resolute in its determination to retain the territory, little movement could be expected on this issue.  

Starting in the early 1990s, the international community received a number of signs that things were extremely dire in East Timor. One of these episodes, in the fall of 1991, was the Santa Cruz massacre in which 271 Timorese were slaughtered by Indonesian military forces while attending a memorial for a killed student. The military, using automatic weapons that were supplied by the United States, also wounded nearly 400. Hundreds more simply disappeared.

In 1998, a change in Indonesian leadership from President Suharto to B.J. Habibie and a change in policy brought the issue of East Timorese independence back to the forefront. A popular consultation was set for August 8 in which the option of independence would be evaluated and discussed. This caused an increase in the activities of anti-independence paramilitary groups and a humanitarian crisis. By July 1999, over 60,000 East Timorese had been internally displaced.

To address the increasing violence, UN Security Council Resolution 1246 established the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in June 1999. UNAMET was sent to help the East Timorese register for a referendum on independence. On August 30, 1999, 79 percent of East Timorese voters cast their ballots for independence in the referendum. Immediately following the vote, pro-Indonesia militias and paramilitaries slaughtered 2,000 people, raped hundreds of women, and by September had turned 75 percent of the country’s population into refugees. The army
also destroyed much of the island’s infrastructure, from utilities to schools to health care services.\textsuperscript{15} Hundreds of thousands of East Timorese became refugees in Indonesia and approximately 600,000 became internally-displaced. Lack of clean water, food, and shelter left the population vulnerable to spreading diseases. Food and blanket airdrops began in September by the World Food Program (WFP).\textsuperscript{16}

The UN responded with Security Council Resolution 1264 and created International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in mid-September 1999. Nearly 10,000 INTERFET troops led by Australia entered East Timor in late September 1999.\textsuperscript{17} In addition to Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia gave the most troops for the operation.\textsuperscript{18}

The implementation of INTERFET immediately reduced the number of Indonesian forces in East Timor, as the Australian-led forces oversaw the relatively-peaceful evacuation of the Indonesian troops. Additionally, militia troops simply fled upon the arrival of the international force. Raids from Indonesia still continued, but largely the militias had dispersed.\textsuperscript{19}

INTERFET quickly restored residents back to their homes - 70,000 residents were back in Dili within ten days of its start.\textsuperscript{20} INTERFET also included a large humanitarian component; 191 tons of rations were airdropped daily in the first two weeks of the mission. Safe haven camps for displaced people were established, clean water was secured, and weapons belonging to militias were quickly confiscated.\textsuperscript{21} INTERFET is widely-viewed as a successful operation with quick and coordinated action. However, security had been established, but East Timor’s infrastructure remained blighted.\textsuperscript{22}
In February of 2000, INTERFET was officially turned over to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) – a UN peacekeeping force – following the passage of Security Council Resolution 1272 in October 1999. UNTAET was established to continue to provide security, secure social and civic needs of the East Timorese, and to deliver additional humanitarian aid. Specifically, UNTAET had three areas of focus: Governance and Public Administration (GPA); Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation (HAER); and military. By the summer of 2000, 167,000 displaced persons had returned from Indonesia to East Timor. In 2001, 175,000 had returned to their homes, and as the crisis subsided, East Timor drafted a constitution in 2002. On May 20, 2002, East Timor was recognized as independent and Xanana Gusmao became the new state’s first president.

4 Weiss, 2005, 132-133.
7 “History of East Timor,” Wikipedia.
12 Weiss, 2005, 133.
13 Weiss, 2005, 133.
“History of East Timor,” Wikipedia.

Weiss, 2005, 133.

Weiss, 2005, 135.

“We History of East Timor,” Wikipedia.


Weiss, 2005, 136-137.


Weiss, 2005, 137.


“We History of East Timor,” Wikipedia.
This paper began by asking these questions: first, did the international community try to prevent or intervene to stop the genocide? Secondly, what entity intervened to stop the genocide and what was that response? Next, what were the circumstances in which the genocide was stopped if it was stopped? Finally, what ultimate conclusions can be drawn from these findings? The chart at the end of this section summarizes the important aspects of each case, from basic details of the genocide to parties responsible for intervention. This is useful to compare each case in one location, side by side.

First, a few words on context are appropriate. When we examine the reactions of the international community or the concerned neighbors to a genocide case, we must keep in mind the prevailing thought and international norms of the time. The period from 1989 to 1991 marks the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the fall of the Berlin Wall; this period turned the page on the international system. The systemic change also changed the focus of the international community. Regional and ethnic conflicts, long trumped by Cold War politics, returned to front-page news. The norms of the Cold War and those of the post-Cold War era establish the context for our examination.

COLD WAR CASES
Similarities

The genocides and interventions before the 1990s – Bangladesh, Uganda, and Cambodia – all closely resemble each other. All three feature desperate and fanatical genocidal leadership, either trying to hold on to territory (Bangladesh), hold on to power (Uganda), or radically alter the way of life of its citizens (Cambodia). All three of the respective leaderships committed genocide against their own citizens.

Strangely, all three also attacked a neighbor. In Bangladesh, the Pakistani army had declared war on India and caused millions of refugees to flee there. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge government started bombing Vietnamese villages near the border. And in Uganda, Idi Amin aggressively invaded Tanzania in 1978 to hold it accountable for Uganda’s problems.

India, Vietnam, and Tanzania had all been formally attacked by the genocidal state’s leadership. All three of these aggressive attacks allowed the neighbor to claim self-defense and counter-attack. In addition to launching a counter-invasion, the neighbors forced the genocidal leadership out of power and ended the killing quickly. All three cases featured an attacked, concerned, and capable neighbor that came in and stopped the genocide.

Furthermore, all three neighbors acted unilaterally and no international body intervened. The genocides would likely have continued had it not been for the intervention of the neighbor.

Disparities
There are few differences between each of the Cold War genocides examined here. The nature of the genocide differs slightly. In Uganda, a fanatical leader was trying to keep control of his country. Bangladesh was fighting for independence from West Pakistan. The Khmer Rouge was “cleansing” its population to alter the political landscape of Democratic Kampuchea.

**Reaction of the international community**

Those intervening to stop genocide were not universally rewarded by the international community. The world frowned on the action taken by Vietnam and India to stop the genocide. Vietnam was largely condemned for its aggressive action in Cambodia, and India quickly moved out of newly-formed Bangladesh to avoid any further international condemnation and confrontation. Conversely, Tanzania, which was very concerned about international reaction, was widely praised for forcing Amin from power.

States that intervened to stop genocides in states where the leadership responsible for the genocides had strong allies (West Pakistan, Democratic Kampuchea) were met with condemnation from the international community (India, Vietnam). Ships from the United States were sent to the Bay of Bengal to respond to India’s intervention, and Vietnam was widely condemned by the United Nations. However, Tanzania met no such resistance, perhaps in part because of Amin’s lack of powerful allies.

**Final settlement**

Each of these genocides ended when the intervening force drove the genocidal leadership from power. In Cambodia the Vietnamese set up a puppet leadership regime
friendly to Hanoi. In Uganda, Yusufu Lule, friendly to Tanzanian President Nyerere, was installed as the interim president and Amin fled to Sudan. In newly-independent Bangladesh exiled Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became the initial prime minister of the country.

**POST COLD WAR CASES**

**Similarities**

As to the post-Cold War cases, similarities between the cases are less apparent. Genocides, well documented in Bosnia in 1991, Rwanda in 1994, and East Timor in 1998, have not caused other states to intervene. In fact, in all three cases – all of which have been addressed by the United Nations in either resolutions or deeply involved peacekeeping missions (Bosnia) – an attacked, concerned, and capable neighbor did not exist. The international community, absent from all cases in the 1970s, is an actor in all three cases – either acting effectively and successfully or largely inconsequentially.

**Disparities**

The basic background of each genocide in the post Cold War era can be better defined by their differences than their similarities. Besides occurring within a decade of each other, the four cases do not share many commonalities except for their status as genocides. The 1991 case in Bosnia featured a state in the midst of a breakdown, with ethnic groups and territorial leadership trying to secure representation and power. In Rwanda, one ethnic group attempted to completely eliminate the other, aided by government-provoked fear. In East Timor, a populace voted for independence, only to have those opposed to independence try to stomp out the movement.

**Reaction of the international community**
The interventions differ as well. The international community played large roles in Bosnia and East Timor. In Bosnia, in addition to the UN troops on the ground, NATO bombed Serb ground positions, signifying participation in the conflict. In East Timor, the response was by both the UN and the Australian-led multinational force.

In Bosnia, the force approved by the UN was woefully under-prepared to stop the genocide. As a result, the situation worsened and the conflict was not settled until Muslim and Croat forces turned back the Serbs more than two years later with NATO bombing assistance. Besides delivering little aid, the international community did not quickly and effectively stop the genocide in Bosnia. But, the international community did facilitate the Bosnian peace agreements, which led to the de facto partition of Bosnia. Many Serbs got what they wanted: avoidance of direct Bosnian Muslim or Croatian rule.

In East Timor, the intervention was handled quickly and effectively. Tens of thousands returned to their homes within weeks of INTERFET’s implementation. Even by the time the multilateral force was on the ground, anti-independence forces were fleeing. Led by concerned neighbor Australia, the multilateral intervention in East Timor is widely viewed as successful.

When the killing began in Rwanda, the UN facilitated the evacuation of expatriate personnel and little more. The responsible party for stopping the genocide was the RPF – a group of exiled Tutsis living in Uganda.

No attacked, capable, interested neighbor

Interestingly, in the three cases following the Cold War, no attacked, capable, and interested neighbor existed, and thus the genocides were resolved much less quickly – or
not at all. Because no neighbor had a vested self-interest in what happened just across its borders – or what was happening across the borders was not yet affecting neighboring states – the only intervention present was from international organizations. And, because intervention was led by disinterested parties, the genocides continued.

It can be argued that the only crises after the Cold War that were effectively stopped were in East Timor and Rwanda (after three months of horror). Both of these cases, ironically, had an interested and capable neighbor (just not one that was directly attacked). In East Timor, Australia stepped forward to lead INTERFET. In Rwanda in one sense we can label the RPF a non-state actor coming largely from the outside. If one treats the RPF as an outside actor (because of years of exile), decades of anti-Tutsi government action could begin to resemble the aggressive move that warranted intervention in the 1970s.

**Final settlements**

The final political settlements differ as well. In East Timor, independence was granted. In Rwanda, new leadership took control. In Bosnia, a multi-ethnic state was preserved through effective partition.

**Lack of aggression from genocidal power**

So, why did those committing genocide prior to the fall of the Soviet Union invade neighboring countries, and those post-1990 genocidal states did not? A wild, genocidal dictator, pre-1990, could invade his neighbors (Pol Pot, Idi Amin) under the cover of Cold War politics. After 1990, the dictator is aware of a more unified
international community and greater media attention. Perhaps this causes greater caution. The 1991 Gulf War could have caused such caution, hypothetically.

When the world’s powers were focused on the East/West conflict and politically divided regarding aggression, genocidal states attacked their neighbors, and the neighbors were forced to effectively restore the status quo. Since 1990, genocidal dictators don’t attack neighboring states because of their fear of an international response – everybody is watching. And, because they don’t attack their neighbors, no neighbor responds to stop the killing. Because the international community is sensitive to state against state aggression and not as concerned when genocide is taking place, the international community largely allows genocides to go on, unabated – or reacts with painstaking tardiness and lack of will (Rwanda, Bosnia). As a result, the genocides continue, unrelieved by the disinterested international community and weak, unconcerned, and unattacked neighboring states.

LESSONS
Most successful intervention

So what works best? First and foremost, when leadership committing genocide invades or attacks a neighboring state that is interested and capable of defending itself, the genocide is stopped as a result of the counter-attack. When no attacked, capable and interested neighbor exists (Bosnia), intervention either does not occur or is inadequate. In cases where there exists an outside actor that is interested (Rwanda, East Timor), intervention occurs with quick and successful results.

Is there hope?
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty published *The Responsibility to Protect*, a study of past intervention and guidelines for the international community in the future. The group’s ultimate goal is to have its recommendations taken up and instituted in UN procedure and action.

After studying past interventions in Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia, the report touches on the issues of sovereignty, intervention, and overall, human security. The report pushes the international community into a “change in perspective” from the past, by calling for “the responsibility to protect implies an evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those seeking or needing support, rather than those who may be considering intervention.”¹ In addition to a shift of viewpoint, the report also gives the international community the ability and responsibility to intervene within a state. The responsibility still first “rests with the state concerned, and that it is only if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, that it becomes the responsibility of the international community to act in its place.”²

Specifically, the RTP also addresses the importance of genocide prevention. The treatment of genocide – as the RTP suggests – should not be seen as simply intervention after the start of the conflict, but involvement by the international community should begin well before, addressing the root causes of the crisis, like poverty, potential for war, and weak leadership.³

In addition to stressing prevention, the piece tries to alter the approach to future intervention by turning the focus to human security. “The growing recognition worldwide that concepts of security must include people as well as states has marked an
important shift in international thinking during the past decade.”⁴ At the end of the report, ICISS lays out ways to stoke political will by calling on the unique responsibility of the Secretary-General, the importance of fair and evocative media messages, and the action of other non-governmental groups.⁵

Meanwhile, somewhere on the globe, genocide continues tonight. People are dying in Darfur.

In Darfur, Sudan, since 2003, more than 180,000 people have died, two million have been forced from their homes, and 200,000 have fled into Chad, Sudan’s western neighbor⁶ as armed groups, including the Janjaweed, supported by the Sudanese government, have killed and displaced civilians. Currently, as a result, an estimated 2.3 million in Sudan need humanitarian aid.⁷

Tonight, the Janjaweed will force another family from its home, kill their cattle, and steal their money. Their neighbors will be slaughtered for fighting back. They will then be forced to move west into Chad without food or water. The Chad government will be unable to support them. There they will remain for months, waiting for aid, desperate to return home. Some in their family will die of malnutrition.

They wait on the world to talk and debate about word meaning. This family – and thousands more like it – will wait, incapable of doing anything else.

The killing continues. Who cares?

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5  The Responsibility to Protect, 2001, 72-73.
### TABLE 5: COLD WAR ERA GENOCIDES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dates</strong></td>
<td>1/71-4/79</td>
<td>3/71-12/71</td>
<td>4/75-1/79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deaths</strong></td>
<td>300,000-500,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime / Responsible Parties</strong></td>
<td>Idi Amin</td>
<td>President Yahya Khan, Pakistani army</td>
<td>Pol Pot, Khmer Rouge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat</strong></td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Internal/External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td>Military, executions, firearms</td>
<td>Military, executions, firearms</td>
<td>Military, work, starvation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason</strong></td>
<td>Paranoia, Fear of President Milton Obote</td>
<td>Prevention of Bengali independence</td>
<td>Creation of communist state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>Christians, Asians, Acholi and Langi tribes</td>
<td>Intellectuals, Bengalis, Hindus</td>
<td>“New people,” intellectuals, middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td>Militaristic</td>
<td>Divided, crumbling</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations’ Reaction</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Resolutions</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None relevant until 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Intervention</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Int’l Successes</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Int’l Failures</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ended Genocide</strong></td>
<td>Tanzanian invasion</td>
<td>Indian invasion</td>
<td>Vietnamese invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Invasion by Neighbor?</strong></td>
<td>Yes, total invasion</td>
<td>Yes, provoked by Pakistani attack</td>
<td>Yes, provocation at border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result of Intervention</strong></td>
<td>Installed government, complete end of genocide</td>
<td>End of genocide, Bangladesh independence</td>
<td>Puppet government installed, complete end of genocide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE 6: POST COLD WAR GENOCIDES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bosnia</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>E. Timor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dates</strong></td>
<td>10/91-12/95</td>
<td>4/94 – 7/94</td>
<td>8/98-5/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deaths</strong></td>
<td>250,000 (Including war)</td>
<td>800,000-850,000</td>
<td>1,000 (650,000 displaced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime / Responsible Parties</strong></td>
<td>Slobodan Milosevic, Serbs of the former Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Hutu Extremists</td>
<td>Anti-independence movement, militias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat</strong></td>
<td>Internal/External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td>Military, Rape, Concentration Camps, Firearms</td>
<td>Common Citizens, Machetes, Firearms</td>
<td>Military, Firearms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason</strong></td>
<td>Breakup of FRY</td>
<td>Retribution, Fear</td>
<td>Self-Determination for E. Timor, Fear of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>“Bosniaks,” Bosnian Muslims</td>
<td>Tutsis and Moderate Hutus</td>
<td>E. Timorese, Fretilin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td>Crumbling</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>E. Timor - Weak; Indonesia – Int’lly Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations’ Reaction</strong></td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>Initial evacuation, UNAMIR Late</td>
<td>UNAMET, authorized INTERFET (Aust.), UNTAET (Int’l)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Resolutions</strong></td>
<td><strong>758:</strong> Expanded UNPROFOR to Bosnia and Herzegovina; 761, 764: Increased UNPROFOR, called for Serbian withdrawal from Sarajevo airport; 771: Ch. 7 for UNPROFOR to deliver aid; 781: No-fly zone 787: embargo on FRY; 824: Est. Safe Zone in Srebrenica</td>
<td><strong>812:</strong> UNOMUR; 872: Reduce UNAMIR; 909: (4/6) commends UNAMIR, cease-fire working; 912: regret, cut to a few hundred; 918: condemns killings, ongoing violence, size up to 5500 troops; 925: (6/94) acts of genocide, no authority for UNAMIR; 929: Op Turquoise; 997: extends mandate of UNAMIR, reduces troops</td>
<td><strong>1246:</strong> Established UNAMET; <strong>384, 389:</strong> E. Timor self-determination, called for Ind. withdrawal, ceased intervention efforts; <strong>1264:</strong> Est. INTERFET (Ch. 7), led by Aust.; <strong>1272:</strong> Est. UNTAET (Int’l PK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Intervention</strong></td>
<td>UNPROFOR – inadequate, authorized NATO Bombing</td>
<td>UNOMUR and UNAMIR – too small</td>
<td>UNAMET – registered voters; INTERFET – humanitarian aid, added security; UNTAET – civil services, admin., maintain order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Intervention</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>RPF, Operation Turquoise, Operation Support Hope</td>
<td>INTERFET, led by Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Int’l Successes</strong></td>
<td>Minimal humanitarian assistance; NATO bombing forced Serbs to retreat</td>
<td>Operation Turquoise may have prevented additional deaths</td>
<td>INTERFET stopped killing, est. law and order, delivered aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Int’l Failures</strong></td>
<td>Force too small, ethnic cleansing unabated</td>
<td>Too late</td>
<td>Late</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ended Genocide</strong></td>
<td>Peace talks, December 1995</td>
<td>RPF Invasion from Uganda</td>
<td>Multinational force led by Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Invasion of Neighbor?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result of Intervention</strong></td>
<td>Partition, end of genocide</td>
<td>New administration, end of genocide</td>
<td>Partition, end of genocide, E.T. indep.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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