This thesis examines the history of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum located in Kashgar, Xinjiang, PRC, from the period of its construction in the middle of the 1600s to the present (2011) using varied sources, including textual sources, oral histories, and personal observations made by the author. It traces the development of the importance of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum in Uyghur collective memory and communal identity to understand the extensive changes that have occurred at the mausoleum physically and ritually since the 1970s. Contrary to much of the literature on the mausoleum, which sees changes at the site as the result of Han Chinese cultural colonization of the site and/or PRC state appropriation, this thesis illuminates the cultural agency of the Uyghurs themselves in relation to the site, giving Uyghurs a voice which would otherwise be overlooked.
SOUL OF THE MAZAR: THE KHOJA AFAQ MAUSOLEUM (1600s TO THE PRESENT)
AND UYGHUR COLLECTIVE MEMORY

A Thesis

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This thesis is dedicated to those kind people of the Altishahr who shared with me their stories and their friendship.
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INTRODUCTION

“You go on ahead inside. My daughter and I will not go in there. I will explain why later.”

-Uyghur man at the entrance to the tomb of Khoja Afaq, 2011

In a dusty neighborhood on the outskirts of Kashgar and nestled behind a grove of Chinese poplars rests a magnificent building known variously as the Khoja Afaq Mausoleum or the Tomb of the Fragrant Concubine. The site is traditionally taken to have been built around 1640 to house the body of the Sufi Muhammad Yusuf Khoja, one of the successors of the famous preacher of the Naqshbandi tariqa, Makhdum-i Azam Khoja (d. 1560), on the branch of the family line descending from Makhdum-i Azam's son Muhammad Amin (Ishan-i Kalan). The term khoja is rooted in the Persian word khwaja, meaning “master,” and refers to families in Central Asia tracing their descent in a spiritual silsila, or “chain,” back to the Prophet Muhammad. Khoja Afaq (d. 1693/4, also seen as Hazrat Afaq or a variation thereon in some sources), after whom the site now takes its name, was the son of Muhammad Yusuf Khoja, and is credited with spreading Naqshbandi ideas throughout Central Asia and China, performing miracles, and later ruling politically in the Tarim Basin. After his death, he was interred beside his father, and this saint’s tomb gradually developed as a center for pilgrimage for Muslims.

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1 Given the diverse nature of sources, the name Khoja Afaq appears in numerous forms, with the following among the most common transliterations seen in sources related to this study: Persian - Afaq Khwaja; Uyghur – Afaq Khoja; Chinese – A-pa-ke-huo-jia or A-pa Huo-jia. I have chosen to use the transliteration Khoja Afaq, giving the title before the given name as is common in English usage.


4 “Hazrat” is a common honorific in Persian: "Presence; dignity; majesty; dominion, power; an epithet often joined with the names of the Deity; also a title by which kinds and great men are addressed, similar to majesty, highness, lordship, worship, &c.; a royal court; a town residence; a settled abode…,” from Francis Joseph Steingass. A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary, (Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 2003), 422.

5 Edmund Waite, “From Holy Man to National Villain: Popular Historical Narratives about Afaq Khoja amongst Uyghurs in Contemporary Xinjiang.” Inner Asia, 8, no. 1 (2006): 9. Throughout this paper, despite some technical geographical and terminological conflicts, the terms Altishahr (the six major oasis cities of the northwestern and southern edges of the Taklamakan Desert, including Khotan, Yarkand, Yangihsar, Kashgar, Aksu, and Kuche) and Tarim Basin are used interchangeably. For the purposes of this paper, the term “Tarim Basin” does not include the more northeasterly cities of Karashahr, Turfan, Urumqi, and Qomul. The term “Kashgaria” has been avoided because of its obvious prejudicing of the city of Kashgar in a region that is quite multipolar in terms of significance.
throughout Xinjiang and as far afield as Gansu and Qinghai, and Linxia, and became a locus for the growth of Turkestani communal identity.\(^6\)

By the early twentieth century, a new element at the site introduced by the increasing Chinese presence in the region began asserting itself; that is, the identification of the mausoleum as also the tomb of the pseudo-legendary Turkestani Princess Iparkhan, the “Fragrant Concubine” (Xiang Fei in Chinese) of the Qing Emperor Qianlong’s court. While visiting the mausoleum in the summer of 2011, I witnessed what seemed to be evidence of a major new development in the history of the site: My Uyghur acquaintance, and his daughter, enigmatically refused to accompany me into the mausoleum grounds.

Exploration of the site revealed further intriguing features. There were few Uyghurs present on the mausoleum grounds at all, and those that were happened to be women employed as tour guides and ticket vendors, many wearing colorful atlas costumes and donning the characteristic Uyghur doppa. Upon leaving, I sat with my Uyghur friend and his daughter and listened intently as he described for me, over a bowl of iced dogh, why Khoja Afaq was a villainous character and how it was Khoja Afaq who had led the Dzungars, Manchus, and eventually the Chinese into southern Xinjiang.\(^7\) When queried on the fact that Khoja Afaq was also considered a saint and that Uyghurs actually used to engage in ritual pilgrimage to his mausoleum as a shrine, my friend simply said that it was because of an “ignorance of history” that people saw him in such a positive light. Later, repeated encounters with Uyghurs primarily in Kashgar, Yengisar, and Yarkand reinforced my impression that something quite significant had taken place in the historical memory of the Uyghurs of southern Xinjiang whereby they have

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\(^6\) The use of the term "Uyghur" will be limited in this thesis to refer to the non-nomadic, oasis-dwelling Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang after the 1935 adoption of this particular usage by the Sheng Shicai government (see Gardner Bovingdon. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 12). When referring to members of this ethnic grouping prior to 1935, this thesis adopts the generic "Turkestani" appellation. This is not based on any claim for the 1935 date as the “ethnogenesis” of the modern Uyghur ethnicity in China, but rather an acceptance that the supra-identity of "Uyghur” is of modern provenance and might be anachronistic when used in reference to earlier historical periods. Where there is confusion or a desire to speak diachronically of the Turkic Muslim oasis dwellers of Xinjiang as a whole over long periods of time, the awkward formulation of Turkestani/Uyghur is adopted.

\(^7\) In using “southern Xinjiang” I am referring to the Altishahr, or six major oasis cities of the western rim of the Tarim Basin: Yarkand, Kashgar, Khotan, Kuche, Aksu, and Yengisar. My Uyghur acquaintance was a general "businessman" in the Kashgar area who sometimes gives tours. He was in his late thirties and appeared to be of an above-average level of affluence for the Uyghurs of Kashgar. His daughter was a very fluent English-speaker in her early teens. We met one Sunday at the Kashgar market, where my acquaintance asked if I would be willing to spend time speaking English with his daughter. I agreed, and as a result spent several days exploring Kashgar and nearby areas (including Opal, the supposed location of the tomb of Mahmud al-Kashgari) with this acquaintance, his younger brother (a taxi driver), and his daughter.
begun to view Khoja Afaq, a Sufi saint in some instances considered at an equal spiritual ranking with Jesus of Nazareth and to whose shrine seven visits equaled one hajj to Mecca, as a villain, traitor, and enemy of the Uyghur people.\(^8\)

Research into this issue led me to the work of the anthropologist Edmund Waite. Between the years 1993 and 2004, Waite spent a significant amount of time in Kashgar tracing what he refers to as the “genealogy of contemporary antipathy towards Khoja Afaq.”\(^9\) His discovery of a discourse in Uyghur popular history, which views Khoja Afaq and Sufism in a negative light, has laid much groundwork for this present thesis, which examines the history of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum itself using Chinese and European primary sources from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as relevant sources for the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

Relying on the oral Uyghur testimonies from Waite’s article and his analysis of popular Uyghur historical literature, the work of Bruce Privratsky, Ildikó Bellér-Hann, Aléxandre Papas, and Devin DeWeese on Central Asian collective memory, communal identity, and religion, and my own observations visiting the site of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum and talking with Uyghurs from various walks of life in Kashgar, Yengisar, and Yarkand, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that since at least the nineteen-seventies (and most likely for some time before this, as will be mentioned below) some Uyghurs have been in the process of “strategically forgetting” the former role of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum in Turkestani/Uyghur communal identity. It does this by providing an overview of the development of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum as a site of saint veneration and pilgrimage beginning with its original construction and the subsequent role of the spirit of Khoja Afaq in legitimizing the Turkestani/Uyghur communal identity of those who flocked there, and the later change in attitudes toward the saint and the site of his tomb.

The thesis includes previously un-translated Chinese textual sources from the 18\(^{th}\) through 20\(^{th}\) centuries and combines them with European textual sources for the same period to create the first coherent English history of ritual practice and physical changes at the Khoja Afaq

\(^8\) One man in his sixties I met on a bus between Yarkand and Kashgar, who had at least two married adult sons and their wives and their families traveling with him, expressed extreme dislike of Khoja Afaq and said that the Sufi had betrayed the Uyghur people by marrying his daughter [sic] to the Han emperor and allowing the Mongols and the Qing to control the region. A twenty-something male history teacher I met in Yengisar and with whom I had lunch told me similar stories, and also offered to provide me with "Uyghur history books" which told the "real story" of Khoja Afaq. Unfortunately, I was unable to follow up on this latter offer.

\(^9\) Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 8.
mausoleum, a site which has served diverse functions as a center of politics, commerce, and as focused on in this thesis, religious and communal identity. In the process it also attempts to complicate the perhaps overly-common notion that Uyghurs are passive victims of Chinese official nationalist/colonialist appropriation of the site and that changes at the site are all the result of such appropriation. Such a notion ignores the role of Uyghurs in narratives concerning the Khoja Afaq mausoleum, placing this study in a position of "advocating for" or "representing" the subaltern Uyghurs, in the terms of postcolonial theory. It concludes that Uyghurs, through their own collective memory, are also active agents in what is happening at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum.

Figure 1. Khoja Afaq Mausoleum. Photo taken by author in July of 2011.

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HISTORIOGRAPHY

A Focus on Nationality Unity

As a major religious and political figure for not just the history of China but for that of all of Central Asia, Khoja Afaq has been the subject of numerous studies and plays a central role in general narratives of seventeenth century Xinjiang history and the spread of the Naqshbandi branch of Sufism. Though there are few secondary sources dedicated to an analysis of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum, several studies grapple specifically with some of the issues this study examines and do touch at least in passing on the mausoleum itself. The earliest is a 1994 article by James Millward, “A Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong’s Court: The Meanings of the Fragrant Concubine.” This article is an excellent starting point for an examination of the literature on the Khoja Afaq mausoleum, not only because it provides an overview of the Xiang Fei phenomenon, but also due to its focus on the view that what has been happening at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum is a form of cultural colonization by the Han Chinese.

In this article Millward examines the many historical and literary sources in Chinese and some more recent Uyghur retellings of the Xiang Fei legend and argues that the story holds many different meanings, but that there is a common denominator to all of them: That is, “…she appears as a symbol of Xinjiang… and an allegory for the incorporation of Xinjiang within the Qing empire, and, later, the Chinese nation.” Drawing extensively on the work of the Chinese scholar Yu Shanpu, whose 1985 work Xiang Fei gathered together large quantities of Chinese-language materials on the history of the legend and explorations as to its historical veracity, Millward provides important information on how the Khoja Afaq tomb may have come to be identified as also that of Xiang Fei through a complicated series of mistaken correspondences between the tomb of a local fertility saint, the Xiang Fei legend, and the romantic writings of Xiao Xiong, an adviser to the Qing General Zuo Zongtang in Xinjiang during the 1870s. According to Millward, because of the influence of Xiao Xiong’s erroneous writings, later

13 Yu Shanpu, and Dong Naiqiang. Xiang Fei. (Beijing: Shu Mu Wen Xian Chu Ban She, 1985).
Chinese travelers to the site subsequently also began to identify the Khoja Afaq mausoleum as the tomb of Xiang Fei.\textsuperscript{14}

Millward provides a foundation of cultural identifications in the minds of Chinese which would inform any conceptualizations of the Xiang Fei tomb. What is most important, however, is that Millward ties a “flurry” of interest in the Xiang Fei story in the early 1980s to an increased “encouragement of minority culture… in the 1980s and 1990s under the rubric of ‘nationality unity…’”\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, Millward’s work on Xiang Fei is part of a larger conversation on the role of Chinese national minorities in the construction of Chinese national identity, closely linked to Chinese “official nationalism” in the guise of \textit{minzu tuanjie}, or “national unity.”\textsuperscript{16}

Dru Gladney has posited that the minority peoples in China have played a “…pivotal role in influencing and constructing contemporary Chinese society and identity…”\textsuperscript{17} After the December 1978 reforms of Deng Xiaoping effectively ended the Marxist/Maoist period of China’s development, the country entered an era of considerable uncertainty and trepidation. The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 had essentially effaced all that was of Chinese culture, leaving a “crisis of faith” in Marxism and Chinese traditions for those in the 1980s and 1990s seeking to structure a Chinese identity in response to new commercial influences from the West and political and cultural agitation internationally and at home.\textsuperscript{18}

According to Louisa Schein, one of the major means by which the Chinese have sought to address this “crisis of faith” has been by turning to the “minority cultures” of China “as reservoirs of still-extant ‘authenticity.’”\textsuperscript{19} During the 1980s and 1990s, this “internal orientalism” as Schein describes it, overlapped with attempts by the Chinese state to “reconstruct a broader base of national authority as rapid changes [rendered] Maoist ideology irrelevant day by day” by

\textsuperscript{14} Millward, “Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court,” 439. The question of the erroneous nature of Xiao Xiong's references is addressed below.

\textsuperscript{15} Millward, “Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court,” 447.

\textsuperscript{16} I use the translations of \textit{minzu tuanjie} in Uradyn Erden Bulag. \textit{The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity}. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), as his study is the seminal work on the trope of \textit{minzu tuanjie} in post-imperial China.


increasingly relying on nationalism. The result has been an increase over the past three decades in Chinese “official nationalism,” in Benedict Anderson’s formulation, by which the Chinese state is attempting to stretch “the short, tight skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire.”

This is made rather clear in Uradyn Bulag’s masterful *The Mongols at China’s Edge*, concerning the trope of *minzu tuanjie*, “national unity,” in Inner Mongolia. Bulag provides an in-depth exploration of the concept of *minzu tuanjie* and defines it as “a ubiquitous and dominant discourse in twentieth-century China that aims to regulate ethnic relations in the attempt to create a seamless Chinese Nation… within the territorial and moral confines of China.” In other words, *minzu tuanjie* is a tool the Chinese state has put to use in its transition from empire to nation-state and, thus, Bulag categorizes it as a form of “official nationalism.”

Bulag demonstrates the operation of *minzu tuanjie* at work in Inner Mongolia as a hegemonic discourse of coercive power that “is meant to uphold the welfare of a wide community at the expense of a smaller one.” In essence, it is an ideological tool of the socialist nation-state to crystallize the national identity of its citizens by forcing them into the constructed identity. Bulag traces the story of the Han princess, Wang Zhaojun, who was married off to the Xiongnu Shanyu Huhanye in the first century before the Common Era, and shows how it has been appropriated by state discourse on *minzu tuanjie*. In the nineteen-eighties, at the same time as the resurgence of interest in stories of Xiang Fei, “historians rushed to churn out another round of Zhaojun literature to ‘restore’ *minzu tuanjie*” after the Cultural Revolution. Bulag points out that the traditional concept of *heqin*, the strategic marrying of Chinese women to foreign leaders to form alliances, has since the nineteen-fifties been put to use in the cause of *minzu tuanjie* for various minority nationalities in China.

Similar to Wang Zhaojun, whose tomb is also a major tourist site as a result of her role in popular Chinese consciousness and her connection to *minzu tuanjie*, Millward points out in a section entitled “Miss Minzu Tuanjie: Xiang Fei’s Great Deed” how Xiang Fei has also come to

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be recognized in the Chinese imagination as representative of national unity.\textsuperscript{27} This is obviously one of the great factors in the massive changes at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum over the past three decades or so, and is also the only factor addressed by most scholars working on the history of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum.

Although Millward does discuss Uyghur views of Xiang Fei, he makes no reference to how Uyghurs see the site itself, aside from remarking on how Uyghurs have connected Iparkhan/Xiang Fei with the site.\textsuperscript{28} Nor does he discuss how Uyghurs relate to the preeminent figure buried in the mausoleum, Khoja Afaq. Indeed, as will be seen below, when discussing the Khoja Afaq mausoleum, there is a general acceptance that the site has been “appropriated” by the Chinese state and \textit{minzu tuanjie} in the guise of Xiang Fei, driving Uyghurs away in a unidirectional Han Chinese colonization of religious space. Millward himself sees the process of change at the Khoja Afaq tomb as indicative of a "cultural process" of "Hanization" paralleling the larger political process of "Hanization" taking place across Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{29}

"\textit{Hanization}"

The theme of appropriation, colonization, and "\textit{Hanization}" is repeated quite explicitly in Thierry Zarcone's 1999 article “Quand le saint légitime le politique: le mausolée de Afaq Kwaja à Kashgar,” which includes the most comprehensive examination of the history of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum itself available in the literature. In it, Zarcone argues that the mausoleum of Khoja Afaq was used at various times by various political forces to legitimize their authority.\textsuperscript{30} Of great value for this present study is Zarcone’s accounting of the history of the tomb itself, providing specific dates for many of the major physical and socio-economic transformations of the site and then, later, its decline into disuse as a ritual center and its transformation into a “museum of atheism” by the Chinese state after 1949.\textsuperscript{31}

Only toward the end of his examination does Zarcone begin to discuss changing interpretations of the mausoleum, which include Xiang Fei and Khoja Afaq being allies of the

\textsuperscript{27} Millward, “Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court,” 445.  
\textsuperscript{28} Millward, “Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court,” 449.  
\textsuperscript{29} Millward, “Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court,” 441.  
\textsuperscript{31} Zarcone, “Quand le Saint Légitime le Politique,” 234.
Qing court. Here, Zarcone gives a nod to Pierre Nora in exploring the Chinese “manipulation des symboles” in the Chinese state’s transformation of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum into the tomb of Xiang Fei. Zarcone claims that "les Chinois" understand the political power of the site and their choice to make changes to the site “réconcilie et… légitime leur présence au Turkestan oriental,” though he does not clarify who he is referring to when using the word "Chinois."

Given his earlier statement that "la République populaire" has been responsible for transformation at the site, one assumes that he is referring to the Chinese state. Yet, he produces no evidence to support the contention that the Chinese state is involved in "manipulation des symboles" at the site at all. Although Zarcone might have been able to ascribe agency to the Chinese state for changes to the site if a connection between The Kashgar No. 1 Architecture Company, the tourist company/organization that has been running the site since the nineteen-nineties, and the government could have been clearly established, and also show that within such a relationship there is specific "manipulation" taking place, he does not do so.

He also does not examine the attitudes of Uyghurs toward the mausoleum, though in his adoption of the label of “lieu de mémoire” for the site, there is at least a hint of Uyghur agency. This agency, however, is not connected to the physical changes at the site, leaving the reader with the facile conclusion that the reason the Khoja Afaq mausoleum has changed over the past few decades since the nineteen-seventies is completely due to the "manipulation des symboles" by "les Chinois."

A third study on the Khoja Afaq mausoleum itself is a 2001 article in the Journal of the History of Sufism by Jean-Paul Loubes entitled “Rectification of Documents of Architecture – The Appaq Khoja Sufi Complex in Kashgar.” Loubes is specifically interested in “interculturality” in architecture and the “sinisation [sic] of Uyghur space” in Xinjiang. Loubes examines representations of the Islamic architecture of the Khoja Afaq complex in Uyghur and Chinese studies and finds discrepancies between these sets of diagrams. He argues that this discrepancy is the result of “rectification” by Chinese scholars who see the “irregular” Uyghur architectural diagrams as incorrect and attempt to adjust measurements and designs to fit into

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33 Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 21.
Chinese views of “regular” architecture. Following Zarcone, he claims that the altering of iconography in architecture books is "part of a manipulation undertaking."\(^{35}\)

Figure 2. Three different visual representations of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum compound. The figure on the left is what Loubes uses as the "accurate" layout of the site. The upper right hand figure is from a European perspective. The lower right hand figure is from a Chinese perspective. It is the "rectification" of the Chinese perspective as compared to the "accurate" perspective that leads Loubes to argue that "sinisation" is taking place at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum.\(^{36}\)

It is difficult to follow Loubes' conclusions about the "sinisation" of Xinjiang, or even that the "rectification" of the visual representations of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum site is due to Chinese ideological biases. One must wonder how a case for "sinisation" can be made when other visual representations of the site, such as the European perspective in the upper-right hand corner of Figure 1, also "modify the order of reality."\(^{37}\) It is obvious that "rectification" is taking place, and it is not unfathomable that "a special conception of space can induce the draughtsman to rectify what he believes to be a mistake."\(^{38}\) Whether or not this "rectification" is equivalent to "sinisation" is something that is not addressed at all by Loubes, and leaves in doubt his final

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Footnotes:

\(^{36}\) Loubes, "Rectification of Documents of Architecture," 129.
\(^{38}\) Loubes, "Rectification of Documents of Architecture," 118.
declaration that "In Xinjiang, the marching modernity will produce a new space. It will be a Chinese space." Indeed, is "rectification" modernizing Xinjiang or "sinisizing" it? Given the important political implications of the term "Sinicization," and its relative "Han colonization," the answer to this question needs to be more nuanced than Loubes' apparent definition of Sincization as the equivalent of modernization.

Despite the conceptual questions raised by his article, Loubes’ work is useful for the present study in that he has provided excellent diagrams of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum from multiple perspectives and has laid some groundwork for looking at how conceptions of space can be changed ideologically, if not physically. More importantly, Loubes' conclusions, and his arrival at them, continue the trend in scholarship on the Khoja Afaq mausoleum which focuses on the unidirectional Chinese "Hanification," or in Loubes' usage "sinisation," of Xinjiang and fails to attribute any agency in what happens in relation to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum to the Uyghurs.

A Touch of Uyghur Agency

An indispensable source on the Khoja Afaq mausoleum for the present thesis is Edmund Waite’s 2006 article “From Holy Man to National Villain: Popular Historical Narratives about Khoja Afaq amongst Uyghurs in Contemporary Xinjiang.” Unlike the several aforementioned studies, Waite gives more than just passing mention of Uyghurs, and provides an in-depth discussion of the changing relationship between Uyghurs and the Sufi saint. After a cursory overview of the history of the mausoleum site and a full accounting of Khoja Afaq the man and his legacy, Waite uses popular histories written in Uyghur and oral history which denigrate both Khoja Afaq and the Sufism that he preached to understand how some Uyghurs have increasingly come to see the former saint as a villain. One of the more influential Uyghur writers who has "played an important role in forging contemporary attitudes to Sufism" is Nizamidim Hüsayn, and Waite provides a detailed analysis of this reformist's articles on Sufism published in Shinjiangning Mädäniyiti. After this, Waite demonstrates through several oral accounts taken during his anthropological work in the Kashgar area between 1993 and 2004 how these histories

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40 Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain."
41 Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 12.
have influenced the Uyghur collective memory, and created a rising antipathy among Uyghurs toward Khoja Afaq and the site of his mausoleum.

Like previous scholars, Waite also sees the mausoleum site as having been politically appropriated and "desacralized" by the Chinese government using the Xiang Fei trope, though he offers no specific discussion of how appropriation took place. Rather, he sees Uyghur views of Khoja Afaq as a "Chinese spy" as a creative Uyghur response to "historical obfuscation and state propaganda" of the site as the tomb of Xiang Fei. He also sees these views as representative of minzu tuanjie and "the state’s appropriation of the tomb in a context where alternative sources of information were scarce." In this sense, Waite sees the mausoleum itself as one of the primary influences in Uyghur collective memory of Khoja Afaq. While this makes sense, it unfortunately ignores the role of the so-called "colonized" Uyghurs, and the impact their collective memory has had on the site. Despite the painstaking research on changing Uyghur perspectives on Khoja Afaq, in the final analysis, Waite is not much different from Millward, Zarcone, and Loubes in attributing changes related to the mausoleum to the Han Chinese and overlooking the impact of the voices of the Uyghurs themselves. Either he is unconcerned with the tomb itself, which is possible, or he simply has been unable to make the connection between the changing Uyghur attitudes that he has so diligently observed and the changes surrounding the Khoja Afaq mausoleum.

This connection is made more concrete by Aléxandre Papas. Papas has produced multiple articles and a monograph related to saints, religious space, and politics in Central Asia, but his “Les tombeaux de saints musulmans au Xinjiang” deals directly with the Khoja Afaq mausoleum at various points. In this article, Papas provides a history of the khojas of the Xinjiang region and of the Islamic cult of saints in general, and is able to add valuable first-hand testimonies concerning physical changes and lack thereof on the grounds of several mazars, or tombs of holy persons, including the Khoja Afaq mausoleum. With respect to the latter, Papas notes that he still saw several ritual items at the site in 1999, 2001, and 2004, including a large

42 Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 16-17.
43 Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 17.
cauldron for ritual feasts so important during shrine pilgrimage and other votive objects, indicating to him the continued ritual use of the location.

Important also for understanding the place of saint veneration in the lives of Uyghurs, Papas shows the resilience of the cult of saints through two strategies: “culte discret” and “culte éloigné.”46 “Culte discret” is ritual practice that continues to take place below the radar of administrative concern, primarily the furtive placement of votive offerings and the hanging of colored streamers. Papas also includes the continuation of inhumation in the cemetery surrounding the Khoja Afaq mausoleum as an indication of the survival of the cult of saints because it is “non loin de la source de baraka.”47 This cemetery, however, is sealed off from the mausoleum by a tall wall and one wonders if it is not the baraka from the mausoleum but rather simple burial custom (and the limited amount of available burial land!) that maintains this practice. “Culte éloigné” refers to mazars that are difficult to reach and outside of normal public life.

In his conclusion, however, it is not the “discreetness” or the “distance” which have sustained the cult of saints in Xinjiang but rather the “constance religieuse.”48 This is reminiscent of the Kazaks of Bruce Privratsky’s Muslim Turkistan, who maintained their religion quietly in their own ways, mostly domestically, when the forces of Soviet Communism drove them from their shrines. Papas does not go so far as Zarcone in applying Nora's appellation “lieux de memoire,” though he does claim that the tombs of saints have an irreducible quality and act as a link to the past, similar to Privratsky’s view of them as “legitimating memorials.”49

Of all the sources supporting the idea of Han Chinese "colonization" of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum site, Papas' article provides the most thorough examination of this phenomenon, providing both evidence- and theory-based arguments. He also is the only scholar to make the explicit connection between the efforts of Uyghur thinkers and changes at the mausoleum. According to Papas, what is happening at the site, and at Muslim sites throughout Xinjiang and the rest of China, is the combined result of "patrimoine culturelle" by the Chinese state and orthodox reformism from Uyghur intellectuals. "Patrimoine culturelle" comes from a Chinese administrative statute, which Papas unfortunately fails to cite, calling for the preservation and

"museumification" of sites relevant to the "patrimoine culturelle" of the People's Republic.\textsuperscript{50} This statute, thus, relegates holy sites such as the Khoja Afaq mausoleum to a "patrimoine national" which is part of the construction of the nation.\textsuperscript{51} As such, what is assumed to be happening at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum is not so much a "secularization" as a change from religious sanctity to the sanctity of the nation.\textsuperscript{52}

Taken together with the literature mentioned above on \textit{minzu tuanjie} and Chinese nationalism, Papas' points in this section come to the clear and not so easily denied conclusion that there is indeed a strong element of "appropriation" by the Chinese state taking place at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum. Papas, however, does not stop there, adding the important influence of reformist Islam among the Uyghurs, represented most clearly in the person of Nizamidim Hüsäyn, whose work is also mentioned and extensively analyzed by Waite. Yet, Papas does not specifically link such trends to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum, concerned as he is primarily with discussing the tombs of Muslim saints in general.

\textit{Discussion and Restatement of Thesis}

The major issue with recent historiography on the Khoja Afaq mausoleum is that it has only been treated specifically as a subject of examination in two studies: those of Zarcone and Loubes. Papas refers to the mausoleum frequently in his study, but his focus is on Islamic shrines in Xinjiang more generally. Loubes, for his part, does an admirable job of looking at space from the point of view of Chinese and Uyghur architecture. He fails, however, to provide a solid explanation of how these varying conceptions of architectural space influence and interact with each other and influence the physical space of and ritual practice at the mausoleum itself. Loubes simply skips over the "how" to arrive at the result that space in Xinjiang is becoming "Sinicized." This presents a unilateral view of Han "colonization" of Xinjiang, paying lip-service to Turkestani agency in terms of the original architecture of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum yet not analyzing how such conceptualizations influence the recent physical and ritual changes at the site. That he only sees a process of "Sinicization" taking place reveals his failure to admit Uyghurs as active agents in the spatial context of the mausoleum.

\textsuperscript{50} Papas, “Les Tombeaux de Saints Musulmans au Xinjiang,” 54.
\textsuperscript{51} Papas, “Les Tombeaux de Saints Musulmans au Xinjiang,” 54.
\textsuperscript{52} Papas, “Les Tombeaux de Saints Musulmans au Xinjiang,” 55.
Zarcone is obviously to be commended for his extensive and valuable work. Again, however, like Loubes, there is a gap in understanding *how* the Khoja Afaq mausoleum came to be so strongly identified with the Xiang Fei story or what thoughts Uyghurs have had about the site. Zarcone attributes the change to state manipulation of symbols yet provides no evidence of state policy changing the name of the site or the tourist infrastructure of the site. Zarcone fails to credit Uyghurs with an agency of their own in what is happening in relation to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum. In Zarcone’s view, the Chinese have simply taken over the site and pushed it into Uyghur memory. Despite the importance of Waite’s work for this thesis, he makes similar leaps of logic by claiming that the Chinese state has appropriated the site, yet provides no elaboration of this. Like Zarcone and Loubes, Waite surprisingly does not link the changes he has found in Uyghur society to the changes taking place in relation to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum. Papas, on the other hand, notes a Uyghur element in orthodox Islamic reformism working alongside the “patrimoine culturelle” of the Chinese state resulting in changes in both the practices and physical settings of Islamic saint veneration in Xinjiang. Yet he does not explicitly connect this with the site of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum.

What this thesis attempts to do, then, is to identify the trends in the Uyghur community noted by both Waite and Papas as illuminating a "subaltern" Uyghur narrative related to the physical and ritual changes in relation to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum site. This complicates the simplistic picture in the literature of monolithic Han Chinese "appropriation," "colonization," and/or "sinicization," etc, by focusing on the cultural agency of the Uyghurs themselves and illuminates two different “intersecting trajectories” of influence leading to change related to the site: Chinese official nationalism and Uyghur collective memory.  

**From the Beginnings to the "Invention of a Tradition"

*The Beginnings of Islamic Pilgrimage and Saint Veneration in Xinjiang*

The history of Islamic pilgrimage is rooted in centuries-old traditions of pilgrimage among the Bedouin of Saudi Arabia who, prior to Muhammad’s revelation, followed a primarily

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animist religion. In Islam, the Hajj is one of the five pillars of faith, requiring Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their lives if they are able to do so. Saint veneration also has a long pedigree among peoples of Muslim faith. Leading up to his discussion on the political dimension of holy sites in Xinjiang, Masami Hamada discusses some of the earliest rites of saint worship related to the imam Husayn (626–680), one of the most widely-regarded Islamic saints and for whom the Muslim holy day of Ashura, the day of his martyrdom in Karbala, has been celebrated by Muslims for over a thousand years.  

Specifically speaking, however, the provenance of pilgrimages and saint worship in Xinjiang is complicated by the extraordinarily convoluted cultural milieu that was and is the Silk Roads. As Rahilä Dawut points out very clearly, Xinjiang has been a crossroads of diverse religious traditions for millennia. Indeed, she mentions a long history of Islamic, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Buddhist influence in the region. We also know from various other sources that animist religions and Manichaeism were also important component parts of the religious makeup of Xinjiang. Dawut emphasizes that some Islamic mazars were once Buddhist pilgrimage sites and the worship of saints was well-ingrained in the region long before the coming of Islam. She also claims that “activities at the mazars not only adapted their form and content from Buddhism but also adapted the form of the offerings.” Jay Dautcher, citing Albert von Le Coq, claims that mazar sites have existed in Xinjiang for millennia. Millward also discusses the pre-Islamic religious makeup of Xinjiang and how it has survived Islamization in the form of legends and stories about specific mazars.

In his introduction to the special edition of the *Journal of the History of Sufism* focused almost entirely on mazars and saint worship in Xinjiang, Hamada Masami traces the beginning of religious pilgrimage back to the era after the disappearance of the Xiongnu threat and the recession of the Han dynasty in the third century of the Common Era, when independent Buddhist kingdoms flourished in the Tarim Basin. With the arrival of Islam, many mazars were

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56 Dawut, "Shrine Pilgrimage among the Uighurs," 59.
57 Jay Dautcher, *Down a Narrow Road: Identity and Masculinity in a Uyghur Community in Xinjiang China*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 58.
built in imitation of Buddhist sites, such as the tomb of Ashab al-Kahf, or actually on what were once Buddhist sites, such as the tomb of Kuh-i mar.59

From current sources it is difficult to determine when formal pilgrimage to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum began. This is an incredibly slippery question as the activities of early pilgrims or devout family members would probably not have left a trace in such early records. Even the provenance of Islamic shrine pilgrimage itself in Xinjiang is unclear. Papas is unsure when Islamic shrine pilgrimage began in Xinjiang, but according to him the tradition arrived with the Ishaqi Naqshbandi in the late sixteenth century. The Ishaqi were another branch of the descendents of Makhdu-m-i Azam Khoja, following his son Khoja Ishaq, and throughout the period from the mid-seventeenth century and well into the eighteenth century were at odds, sometimes quite violently, with the Afaq branch, of which Khoja Afaq is the eponymous ancestor. Papas supports his contention that shrine pilgrimage began with the Ishaqis by discussing pilgrimage practices in Xinjiang and how they relate to Ishaqi devotions. For example, he cites the importance of circumambulation, the fixing of prayer flags (tugh), and the combination of mazars with kaniqahs, special rooms for the practice of dhikr.60 Given such connections, Papas would like to date the beginnings of Islamic shrine/saint worship in Xinjiang to the sixteenth century. Pilgrimage to the site of Khoja Afaq mausoleum, specifically, may have begun prior to the interment of either Khoja Muhammad Yusuf or Khoja Afaq, as the site may have been sacred to Muslims already and, much earlier, perhaps had been a pre-Islamic shrine, as so many other sites in Xinjiang seem to have been. Only further investigation will be able to shed light on this question.

The Building of a Sacred Site and the Creation of a Muslim Identity

The earliest recorded mention of activity related to the khojas at the current site of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum is from a Persian hagiographic manuscript of undetermined date and authority entitled Manaqib-i Sayyid Afaq Khwajam (The Deeds of Sayyid Khoja Afaq), which is primarily concerned with Hasan Khwaja (1689-1730).61 This text refers to the decision of Khoja Muhammad Yusuf, the father of Khoja Afaq, to build a religious center with a tomb, a mosque,

60 Papas, Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan, 52-53.
61 Papas, Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan, 6.
and a khaniqah, or Sufi prayer room, at a location known as Bishkiram around the time of his return to Kashgar in 1638.\textsuperscript{62} 

According to Uyghur sources, the land at this location had been property of a Yar Muhammad Bey, who donated it to Khoja Yusuf for the building of the center.\textsuperscript{63} Rahilä Dawut, an expert on Sufi pilgrimage in Xinjiang at Xinjiang University, confirms this, and also adds a quote from Khoja Yusuf’s "will" stating that the site of the religious center was also to be the place of his interment and that those who were buried there would be placed among his devout followers on the Day of Judgment.\textsuperscript{64} The exact date of the building of this religious center is unclear, though many sources accept that it was finished sometime around 1640. Loubes states that the Khoja Afaq mausoleum was built in the middle of the seventeenth century, though he must be referring to Khoja Yusuf’s religious center, as will be made clear below.\textsuperscript{65} Alexandre Papas, perhaps today’s preeminent scholar of Khoja Afaq and Sufism in western China, accepts a loose dating of around 1640.\textsuperscript{66} 

I have unfortunately been unable to locate any physical descriptions of Khoja Yusuf’s religious center, aside from the enumeration of the buildings erected there. Given Khoja Yusuf’s economic situation, reliant as he was on zakat, the practice of obligatory charitable giving in Islam, and donations, one must assume that the religious center’s buildings were not on the grandiose scale of the mausoleum later built by his son. Thierry Zarcone remarks that the tomb built there was “simple,” and also mentions that it was “bâti en 1640 pour y recevoir le corps de Muhammad Yusûf Khwâja.”\textsuperscript{67} It might be fair to say that, if the tomb had been meant for his own burial and as the intended spiritual center of his following, if he had had more funding he would likely have built something more remarkable. On the evidence of the later monumental building and the architectural peaks reached by Khoja Afaq’s mausoleum, Li Kai, in a 1982

\textsuperscript{62} Papas, Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan, 68.
\textsuperscript{64} Davut, "Weiwu’erzu Mazha’er Chaobai yu Yisilanjiao," 46.
\textsuperscript{65} Loubès, "Rectification of Documents of Architecture," 117.
\textsuperscript{66} Papas, Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan, 140.
\textsuperscript{67} Zarcone, "Quand le Saint Légitime le Politique," 227-228.
article in *Kashigaer Wenyi*, also deduces that the buildings predating the Khoja Afaq mausoleum were “certainly crude.”

As to the precise location of the religious center, Papas places Bishkiram approximately five kilometers to the east of Kashgar, which is not exactly accurate as can be seen in Figure 3. The current location of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum is approximately five kilometers northeast of Kashgar in the district of Nai-ze-er-ba-ge Xiang (Näzärbagh Yesizi), Ai-ze-re-ti-li Cun (Häzrät Känti). Interestingly enough, there is another location in the Kashgar area that may also be called “Bishkiram” located about five kilometers to the north of the city (also noted in Fig. 3). In the various accounts of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum, the directions from the city vary between north, northeast, and east. As mentioned above, Papas places Bishkiram and Khoja Yusuf’s religious center five kilometers east of Kashgar. A 1794 book entitled *Kashige’er fu Yingjisha* [*Kashgar to Yangisar*], locates the tomb ten li northeast of Kashgar’s Huicheng [Muslim quarter].

Henry W. Bellew, the British Surgeon-General of India and member of the Second Yarkand Mission under Thomas D. Forsyth from 1873 to 1874, placed the mausoleum “two or three miles to the north of the city.” In an addendum to his *The History of the Khojas of Eastern Turkistan*, Robert B. Shaw, the British Imperial Commissioner to Ladakh, who visited the site in December of 1874, places the mausoleum “a couple of miles” east of Kashgar.

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69 Papas, *Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan*, 69.
70 Cited in Yu and Dong, *Xiang Fei*, 27. Li as a measure of distance is generally considered to be one half of a kilometer in modern times. This was not necessarily the case in previous eras, as a li could be related to physical distance and/or effort involved in the travel. As such, an accurate conversion for this particular text eludes me.
Part of the confusion of locations could be simple error on the part of reporters and the simple coincidence of another “Bishkiram” existing in that general direction. It could also be the result of poor mapmaking. It would be useful to actually visit the northern Bishkiram location noted in Figure 3 today and see what is there. Certainly Khoja Yusuf’s son, Khoja Afaq, who appears to have been with his father in Kashgar in 1638, would have known where the tomb his father had built for himself was located. Although there is no definitive evidence aside from the toponyms connecting the “Bishkiram” of Khoja Yusuf’s religious center with the “Bishkiram” later associated with Khoja Afaq’s architectural enterprises (and simply because Khoja Yusuf sought to be buried at the site of the religious center does not necessarily mean that he definitely was), most sources assume that the location of Khoja Yusuf’s religious center is the same.

74 Voennno-Topograficheskii Otdiel Glavnago Shtaba. XX (Kashgar). Karta iuzhnoi pogrаничной полосы Азиатской России. Relief map, 1:1,680,000. St. Petersburg, 1889.
location his son chose for the construction of the later structures. Despite the lacunae in the sources, this assumption certainly makes logical sense.

Continued building by Khoja Afaq began in 1653, upon the death of Khoja Yusuf, who may have been poisoned by rival Ishaqis (another Naqshbandi branch, also claiming lineage to Makhdum-i Azam Khoja, but through his seventh son, Khoja Ishaq). The site chosen for the construction of Khoja Yusuf's new mausoleum was previously known as Yaghdud/Yaghdu, according to the *Tadkhira-i ‘Azizan* of Muhammad Sādiq Kāshgarī, cited by both Papas and Zarcone. According to all sources available to me at this time, Yaghdu was indeed the original name of the current site of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum. After the death of his father, then, Khoja Afaq began the process of building a collection of structures that would come to be known not for Khoja Yusuf, but for Khoja Afaq.

His first act at Yaghdu in 1653 is stated to have been the building of a mausoleum for his father. Yet, there is still quite a bit of confusion in the sources on this. This could be the result of the great political confusion in the Altishahr at this time. The death of Khoja Yusuf ushered in the height of the conflict between the Ishaqis and Afaqis, with a simultaneous weakening of the central power of the Saidiyya Khanate (the Khan ‘Abdullah had placed his ambitious sons in power over certain oases, leading to internecine strife) and widespread attacks by Kyrgyz and Qalmaqs (variously in league with the Khans, the Ishaqis, and/or the Afaqis). Even the activities of Khoja Afaq during this period are unclear. Millward states that Khoja Afaq "may even have served as governor" of Kashgar under Khan ‘Abdullah. It is not clear where Millward gets this information, as Kashgar was increasingly out of 'Abdullah's hands and, until 1655, Khoja Afaq seems to have been engrossed in study at various madrasas in the region, after

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75 Millward states without question that Khoja Yusuf was poisoned by Ishaqis, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 86. Dawut is of the same conviction, "Weiwu'erzu Mazha'er Chaobai yu Yisilanjiao," 46. Papas, on the other hand, cites Ishaqi hagiographical sources as denying Ishaqi involvement in the murder, but admits that in the memory of the Afaqis the death was always seen as suspicious. Papas, *Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan*, 70.
78 Papas, *Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan*, 140.
79 Papas, *Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan*, 76-77.
which he was preaching for many years in various villages and engaging in local pilgrimage activities, attracting large numbers of followers.  

The first point one might make is to ask why the building of another mausoleum was necessary if Khoja Yusuf had already built one for himself? Secondly, Khoja Afaq's financial situation was deteriorating, and his group had very limited income-earning land, or waqf holdings, and their khaniqah and tombs were of poor quality. The holdings they did have were those passed down by Khoja Yusuf. Henry Schwarz, author of "The Khwājas of Eastern Turkestan," claims that after Khoja Yusuf's death, Khoja Afaq was "deprived of all official support and made extremely vulnerable to any hostile move against him." In such financial and political straits it seems unimaginable that Khoja Afaq would have been in a position as early as 1653 to build a new mausoleum.

A comment from Bellew in his Kashmir and Kashgar seems to shed a bit of light on this issue: "The mausoleum, with its attached monastery, was restored and greatly enlarged by himself over the grave of his father, which had been destroyed and burnt by the Calmac invaders." Bellew adds "Cirghiz and Cazzâc" invaders to this destruction in his History of Kashgharia. There is no specific date associated with this destruction, or the subsequent "restoration" and "enlargement," though Bellew mentions that Khoja Afaq's son, who was at that time governor of Kashgar, "was charged with its construction," and additionally built there "a college and alms-houses, much enlarged the area of the shrine."

Zarcone cites and expands on Bellew with information from Häsän Abdurehim's 1989 Islam Binakarliq Sânîti, stating that the religious center built by Khoja Yusuf in 1640 was "détruit et brûlé par les Kirghizs, il fut reconstruit par l'ainé des fils de Afâq." He also adds that a monumental gate, a mosque, a retreat room, and a monastery were built at this time, and that this construction was "certainement sur l'ordre de son père." It seems evident that based on their sources, both Bellew and Zarcone felt that the mausoleum was built by Khoja Afaq's eldest son,

81 Papas, Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan, 79.
82 Papas, Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan, 84.
84 Bellew, Kashmir and Kashgar, 322.
86 Bellew, Kashmir and Kashgar, 322.
87 Zarcone, "Quand le Saint Légitime le Politique," 228.
Yahya, at some point during the last years of Khoja Afaq's life, and that Khoja Afaq had ordered the construction. Indeed, Bellew even states that "These buildings were completed only shortly before the death of Afac."\(^{88}\) That would have been sometime close to and before 1693-1694.

Gunnar Jarring, the famous Swedish diplomat and Turcologist, also mentions the site as having been destroyed by "Kirghiz" and "Kazakhs," though one wonders how much of this was garnered from his reading of Bellew. As for when the mausoleum was "rebuilt," Jarring's version is slightly different from those of Bellew and Zarcone, claiming that a short time before Khoja Afaq's death, "his son had informed him that the family tomb in Kashgar had been repaired after having been ravaged by the Kirghiz and the Kazaks and was once more in worthy condition."\(^{89}\)

Two assumptions, one, that Khoja Yusuf's religious center and mausoleum were built at Yaghdud, and, two, that upon Khoja Yusuf's death Khoja Afaq was financially in no position to build a new mausoleum for his father, present three important questions. First, when specifically was the mausoleum destroyed? Second, who destroyed it? Third, when was the second mausoleum (or, per Bellew, "restoration" and "enlargement" of the destroyed mausoleum) built with its new additions?

The first and second questions are linked, and so can be addressed together with a clearer view of the historical context. Looking at the timeline from the death of Khoja Yusuf to the death of Khoja Afaq, we get the following picture. By the mid 1660s, Khan 'Abdullah had become a devotee and supporter of Khoja Afaq, and the latter was enjoying at least some benefit from this royal support.\(^{90}\) Indeed, Papas mentions that the Afaqis "partagent la direction religieuse du khanat" and were able to engage the Khan in destroying and burning what they deemed as apostate Ishaqi religious centers.\(^{91}\) In 1668, however, 'Abdullah left the Altishahr on hajj, and his son, Khan Isma'il, who was allied with Khoja Afaq's opponents, the Ishaqis, exiled Khoja Afaq from Kashgar in 1670.\(^{92}\)

\(^{88}\) Bellew, *The History of Kashgaria*, 72.
\(^{90}\) Papas, *Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan*, 69.
\(^{91}\) Papas, *Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan*, 81.
\(^{92}\) Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 86.
This began Khoja Afaq's itinerant period wandering and proselytizing as far afield as Kashmir, Fergana, Gansu, and Lhasa from 1670 to 1678. It was this period that Papas likens to the hegira in the minds of the Sufi faithful and to which he ascribes Khoja Afaq's apotheosis, both as saint and as political figure. It was in Gansu and surrounding regions that Khoja Afaq attracted followers among the Chinese Hui and stimulated the development of several branches of Afaq Sufis there. In Tibet, Khoja Afaq met with the Fifth Dalai Lama, to whom he represented himself as the rightful ruler of the Altishahr and requested a letter on his behalf to Dzungar Khan Galdan, whose empire at the time dominated all of present-day Xinjiang north of the Tianshan Mountains and beyond.

Although it is unknowable whether or not this letter from the Dalai Lama to Galdan influenced his decision, Galdan proceeded in 1678 to invade the Tarim Basin, first taking Kashgar and then Yarkand, and placed Khoja Afaq on the throne at Yarkand, with his son Yahya in charge at Kashgar. Schwarz believes the people of the Altishahr at this point probably saw Khoja Afaq as a "stooge" of the Dzungars. Within a short time of taking the throne, however, Khoja Afaq seems to have left power, either due to some manner of religious objection to the role (according to Shaw) or because he was forced out power (according to Schwarz), though he returned to power a few years later.

I cannot find any specific dates on these vicissitudes of the throne, aside from the fact that Muhammad Amin, the man who took the throne after Khoja Afaq's vacancy thereof, sent a message in 1683 to Bukhara asking for assistance against the Dzungars and then proceeded to lead a razzia into the Ili Valley, the Dzungar heartland. Bellew dates the overthrow of Muhammad Amin to 1680, which seems premature given Schwarz's citation of the 1683 letter. If we accept the veracity of the dating of the 1683 letter, then Khoja Afaq should have retaken the throne from Muhammad Amin sometime after that. Yahya remained governor in Kashgar

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98 Schwarz, "The Khwajas of Eastern Turkestan," 278.
until after Khoja Afaq's death in 1693-4, after which he was apparently murdered by his father's widow, Khanum Padshah (Yahya appears to have been born of another woman). 100

To return to the two questions of when the mausoleum was destroyed and by whom, it may be best to first consider the possibility of the site having been ruined by "Calmac invaders," as Bellew puts it, and/or by Kirghiz or Kazaks. 101 It seems these three different ethnonyms are often confused and conflated in the sources. Bellew cites Khudábanda of Aksu raising an army of "Cirghiz and Calmác" against Muhammad Amin. 102 Schwarz states that there is a misidentification in Shaw's sources between Kirghiz and Dzungar, though Schwarz does not expand on this. The original source as cited in Shaw's footnotes states that "the infidel Kirghiz" had taken possession of the country. 103 There seems to be no reason why this statement necessarily is a misidentification of Kirghiz for Dzungars. Perhaps Schwarz is alluding to the claim of these people being referred to as "infidel," though one must wonder if this term is being used literally in the sense of non-Muslim or loosely as a pejorative.

Imagining Kirghiz as responsible for the destruction of the site is not so difficult given the prominent political role played by the Kirghiz in the history of the Altishahr during the late seventeenth century and continuing on through into the second half of the nineteenth century. With specific reference to the period under consideration until the Qing conquest of the Tarim Basin in 1759, Schwarz says:

Eastern Turkestan as far east as Khotan was perpetually plagued by various Kirghiz tribes. They were usually their own agents, either plundering or passing through relatively peacefully. At other times, they allied themselves with other forces such as both factions of the khwājas, individual Chagataids and begs, and the Dzungars. At any given time, Kirghiz could be found in alliance with most or all of these forces…” 104

Given this estimation of the Kirghiz and positive textual evidence, it is readily understandable that one might insinuate that they were responsible for the destruction of Khoja

100 Schwarz, "The Khwajas of Eastern Turkestan," 279.
101 Bellew, The History of Kāshgaria, 70.
102 Bellew, The History of Kāshgaria, 71.
Yusuf’s religious center and mausoleum. The Kirghiz were among the main fighting forces in the internecine conflicts among the various oases. Yet, what would be the motive for attacking a religious center, unless it was related in some manner to the violent confrontation between the Ishaqis and Afaqis? As mentioned above, the Afaqis were involved in widespread destruction of Ishaqi holy sites throughout the period prior to Khoja Afaq’s exile. It doesn’t seem too far of a stretch to consider the possibility that a Kirghiz-related attack on an Afaqi had Ishaqi backing.

Whatever the motive, the inclusion by Bellew of "Calmács" (or Qalmaqs) among those responsible for the destruction of the site complicates the issue even further, but may also assist in determining a timeframe for when the site may have been ruined. The crux is determining at what point in the period from Khoja Yusuf’s death to the death of Khoja Afaq that Qalmaqs may have been grouped together with Kirghiz (and Kazakhs) in attacking a religious site associated with the Afaqis northeast of the main city of Kashgar.

Without specific sources, it is difficult to say when specifically the site was destroyed or who indeed was responsible. It is equally difficult to make any assumptions based on the historical context. For example, one could assume that after Khoja Yusuf’s death in 1653, his son would have been attentive to the upkeep of the site and would have repaired it in the event of its destruction. In addition, it was an important pilgrimage site during this time and its upkeep would have been crucial to attracting and maintaining Afaqi followers. Indeed, the fact that Khoja Afaq was involved in the destruction of Ishaqi religious sites speaks to the importance of these physical locations to the faithful. By the same token, however, the 1660s were a volatile time in the conflict between the two factions, and one can easily envision Kirghiz allied with the Ishaqis attacking the Afaqi holy site as part of this ongoing feud.

Footnote:
105 The details of the relations between the khoja groups the Ishaqis and Afaqis, their respective identifications as Black Mountaineers (Qarataghliq) / Black Hats and White Mountaineers (Aqtaghliq) / White Hats, and the connections these two groups had with particular Kirghiz groups will not be addressed in detail here. For a recent complication of the identifications among these groups, see Papas, Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan. On pages 71-72, Papas outlines the various theories concerning the identifications between these groups with their evocative names (including postulating on the symbologic importance of “mountains” in Central Asian mythologies) but comes to no conclusion aside from the rather profound statement concerning the entire confusion that “... me semble-t-il, c’est là faire excessivement confiance aux noms et à leur vertu de clarté, alors même qu’on a affaire ici à une opposition complexe, à un conflit rien moins que clair.” Indeed, if one considers the chaotically transient nature of Kirghiz alliance-making in the Tarim Basin, the utility of attempting to pin down to which group the terms are referring specifically and at which periods this equation holds is highly questionable, even if there were to be some evidentiary basis to link them to Kirghiz at all.
These same factors would likely have continued to play a role in the period of Khoja Afaq's exile from 1670 to 1678. With the Afaqi enemy essentially nonexistent, the Ishaqis would have had even more of a free hand to do as they wished with the Afaqi holy sites. Again, however, it seems unlikely that there would have been Dzungars involved during this period, though Qalmaqs certainly seem to have been a possibility. Shaw mentions that this period was one of peace and prosperity in the Altishahr, and "the people knew not whether there were soldiers in the land or not." Although it is certainly possible that there was still raiding by Kirghiz (and even Qalmaqs) during this time and perhaps even outright conflict, it seems less likely given the stable political conditions noted by Shaw. If the destruction had taken place during this period, it seems more likely to have been religiously-motivated.

If we take at face value Bellew's inclusion of Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Qalmaqs together as culprits in the site's destruction, it seems that the more likely period for the destruction of the site by a group combining all three ethnonyms would have been during the fitful years after the Dzungar invasion in 1678 and Khoja Afaq's ascension to power in Yarkand, with Yahya his son in Kashgar. Bellew has Khoja Afaq warring against the "Cirghiz" and the "Calmác" for "twelve years" before his power was consolidated during this period. This was also the period in which competition between the oases heated back up again after the period of relative peace before the invasion, with at least one oasis, Aksu, allying with both Kirghiz and Qalmaqs to attack Muhammad Amin at Yarkand.

One is tempted to believe that Khoja Afaq would have been attentive to the religious site built by his father, and would not have let it languish for long after being destroyed without quickly taking the necessary measures to repair it, especially given its importance for the Afaqi followers. Shaw mentions that one of the first things Khoja Afaq did after he took the throne in Yarkand after the Dzungar invasion in 1678 was to allocate funds from waqf holdings in Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan for the service of the Altyn Mazar (the shrine of Khoja Shadi) in Yarkand. Given such attention to the Altyn Mazar, Khoja Afaq's attention to his own familial mausoleum and the center of Afaqi pilgrimage must have been at least as strong. One must assume that Khoja Afaq, and/or Yahya, would have addressed any damage to the site at Yaghdu.

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with certain urgency. Yet, even with urgency, "restoration" and "enlargement" would not have happened overnight.

In summary, without more detailed sources, it is practically impossible to pinpoint the date of the destruction and burning of Khoja Yusuf's religious center. It is equally impossible to ascertain the specific point at which Khoja Afaq and/or Yahya undertook to "restore" and "enlarge" the compound. It is safe to assume that "restoration" and "enlargement" on the scale necessary for the mausoleum that is on the site today would not be an endeavor that could be completed in a short period of time. Most of the sources point to the completion of construction in 1693/4, at the end of Khoja Afaq's life. As such, Khoja Yusuf's religious center could have been destroyed at any time during Khoja Afaq's exile from 1670 to 1678, though it seems more likely that it was destroyed in the tumultuous years between 1678 and 1693/4 after Khoja Afaq's return to the Altishahr and before his death. Regardless of when it was actually destroyed, or by whom, it was finished by 1693/4. Loubes notes that the north mosque was also built near the end of the seventeenth century. According to Loubes, the mosque was built on the site where Khoja Afaq used to read the Quran and included a winter mosque with a domed prayer hall on the north side and a summer mosque on the south and east (which were built later). According to Bellew, upon notification from his son Yahya that the mausoleum was completed, Khoja Afaq replied that "he was coming immediately to lay his bones there," after which he soon died. His body was carried from Yarkand to Kashgar by his followers and 10,000 people attended his funeral. Papas, citing a Persian hagiographical document entitled *Tadhkirat al-Hidayat*, also places the number of funeral visitors at 10,000, and adds that they kissed the tomb. It was from this point on that the mausoleum took on an ever greater significance for the Muslims of Xinjiang, western China, and the greater Central Asia region, and in particular for the Turkic Muslims of the oases of the Altishahr, providing them with not only religious identity as Muslims, but also a sense of communal and even ethnic identity as Muslims.

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111 Papas, *Soufisme et Politique entre Chine, Tibet et Turkestan*, 188.
That Muslim identity can be synonymous with ethnic identity in the Turkestan context has been stated before.\textsuperscript{112} In the pre-socialist period, prior to the Communist takeover of Xinjiang in 1949, “Islam provided an important source of identification.”\textsuperscript{113} Dru Gladney cites the famous lines of Wilhelm Barthold that “When you ask a Turkestan what his identity is, he will answer that he is first of all, a 'Muslim'. “\textsuperscript{114} The particular connection between religion and Turkestan/Uyghur identity illuminated in the cult of saints, specifically that of Khoja Afaq, however, is more complicated than simple self-identification as \textit{Musulman}. As demonstrated by Devin DeWeese in his monumental work on Central Asian religion, \textit{Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde}, saintly lineages in Central Asian Islam can be incorporated into ethnic genealogies in a process of transmutation which melds ancestor and saint worship, in essence “‘constructing’ new collectivities,” or new peoples.\textsuperscript{115} Although Khoja Afaq was not the “bearer of a new religion,” as the people of the Tarim Basin had for the most part already begun the process of conversion to Islam as far back as the conversion of the Qarakhanid Satuq Bughra Khan and his "ten thousand tents of Turks" in the tenth century, he was preaching a Naqshbandi interpretation of Islam that might be seen as making innovative changes or even “restoring the rightful religion to a community gone (temporarily) astray,” as was the case with Ötemish Ḥājjī and Özbek Khan.\textsuperscript{116} That being the case, Khoja Afaq could indeed be considered as having played the role of DeWeese’s “hero/ruler/ancestor/bearer of the new religion” for those who flocked in pilgrimage to his tomb.\textsuperscript{117}

Such an interpretation seems to be supported in the connection between Islam, saintly lineage, and communal identity among the Kazaks examined by Bruce Privratsky in his study \textit{Muslim Turkistan}. In discussing the sanctity of Muslim shrines, Privratsky argues that sanctity comes not just from the saint himself, but through the legitimacy the saint gives to the Kazak ancestors: “Kazaks remember that their nomadic forebears visited these same places… and in this way the Kazak ancestors are conceived as Muslims.”\textsuperscript{118} More to the point, “Kazak

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Justin Jon Rudelson. \textit{Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China's Silk Road}. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Ildikó Bellér-Hann. \textit{Community Matters in Xinjiang, 1880-1949 Towards a Historical Anthropology of the Uyghur}. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 428.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} DeWeese, \textit{Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde}, 529 n 37.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} DeWeese, \textit{Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde}, 529.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Privratsky, \textit{Muslim Turkistan}, 189.
\end{itemize}
religion… config res the local Muslim saints in relation to the ancestor cult of the *ethnos*."\(^{119}\)

This is reminiscent of the essays edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger in *The Invention of Tradition*, which mention that in inventing traditions, one of the purposes of which was to establish communities, “even historic continuity had to be invented… by creating an ancient past beyond effective historical continuity, either by semi-fiction… or by forgery.”\(^{120}\) In this sense, one could say that shrine pilgrimage to honor saints as purported ancestors in Central Asia was and is an invented tradition which creates a delimited community of believers tied together by the idiom of genealogy.

Although neither DeWeese nor Privratsky are dealing directly with the Turkestanis/Uyghurs of the Tarim Basin, their work falls within a scholarly trend to revisit Central Asian religion from an emic approach, avoiding the undue emphasis placed on the pre-Islamic or pre-Buddhist so-called “shamanic” heritage of Central Asian peoples by Soviet and Western scholars of Inner Asia.\(^{121}\) DeWeese and Privratsky seek to focus more on the communal and domestic aspects of Central Asian society centered on reverence for ancestors. Ildikó Bellér-Hann demonstrates the applicability of such revision of Central Asian religion in the Uyghur context in her article “‘Making the Oil Fragrant:’ Dealings with the Supernatural Among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang,” where her emic “approach insists on the deeply Islamic nature of local practices…”\(^{122}\) Bellér-Hann reemphasizes this applicability in her historical anthropology *Community Matters in Xinjiang*, stating that “… it is conspicuous how beliefs underpinning religious action among the sedentary Turkic-speaking Muslims of Eastern Turkestan display remarkable similarities with contemporary ‘Kazak religion.’”\(^{123}\) With this validation, the present study maintains the premise that the original spiritual relationship between the Turkestani/Uyghur community and the Sufi saint Khoja Afaq is essentially one where the spirit

\(^{119}\) Privratsky, *Muslim Turkistan*, 239. Emphasis is Privratsky’s.


\(^{122}\) Ildikó Bellér-Hann, "‘Making the Oil Fragrant’: Dealings with the Supernatural among the Uyghurs in Xinjiang." *Asian Ethnicity* 2, no. 1 (March 2001): 10.

\(^{123}\) Bellér-Hann, *Community Matters in Xinjiang*, 306.
of the saint legitimized the identity and community of those who made their pilgrimage to his tomb, “redefining and remaking communal borders” between the faithful and infidel.124

From the Arrival of the Qing to the Fall of Yaqub Beg

The earliest mention of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum in available sources after his death comes from Chinese records from the mid- to late-eighteenth century. This is unfortunate for the purposes of this thesis as this large gap in the records covers the period of time during which it would be expected that pilgrimage to the site and ritual veneration would have been developing. Hopefully further research will turn up something useful for this period. The first source we do have is a 1760 decree by the Qianlong emperor issued after requests by members of the Qing military involved in the pacification of the Tarim Basin in 1758 for instructions on what to do with the ancestral tomb of the "rebellious" khoja brothers Burhan ad-Din and Khoja Jahan. Burhan ad-Din and Khoja Jahan were the grandsons of Yahya, the son of Khoja Afaq, so it seems apparent that the "ancestral tomb" referred to here is the Khoja Afaq mausoleum.125

“The rebels were Khoja Jahan, etc… Their ancestors who were the noble leaders of their people are not to blame. As of now all of Altishahr has been pacified and all of the tombs of the old khojas of Kashgar can be assigned someone to guard them. The gathering of firewood at or defiling the sites shall be forbidden. Repairs should be made as necessary. Choose excellent officials as managers and show the country’s understanding and sympathetic benevolence.”126

Although this mid-eighteenth century reference does not specifically refer to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum, in his 1819 Xiyu Shuidao Ji [Notes on the Water Routes of the Western Regions], Xu Song adds more detail from the Qianlong decree, stating that it and its related land holdings were being managed by twelve Muslim families.127 This makes it clear that the decree

124 DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde, 521.
125 Cited by Ji Dachun in Feng, Xiang Fei Kao Bian, 41.
126 Yu, Xiang Fei, 26. Cited from Qing Gaozong Shilu, v609, p6, not seen by present writer.
127 Xu Song, Shen Yunlong, and Gu Ban. Xi Yu Shui Dao Ji. (Taipei Xian Yonghe Zhen: Wen Hai Chu Ban She, 1966), 47.
is specifically concerning one site, and not multiple tombs. The narrative signage at the site itself in 2011 mentioned that Qianlong restored the site in 1795.128

If these references can be taken at face value, they demonstrate that the new Qing government was taking an interest in the religious aspects of power in the Tarim Basin. Both of these references fall within the first forty years of Qing domination of the region after their defeat in the late 1750s of the Dzungar Mongols.129 Throughout this period the Qing were dealing with uprisings from local leaders, which may have prompted such conciliatory policies toward Islam.130 Indeed, according to Fletcher, the Qing even appointed guards to protect the Khoja Afaq mausoleum.131 On top of that, the Qing waived taxes for Islamic waqf holdings.132

Despite specific reference to Islamic shrine pilgrimage, or pilgrimage to Khoja Afaq mausoleum, it seems fair to say either that such Qing policies reflected established practices, helping to soothe relations between local Muslims and their new masters, or that these policies were part of a revitalization program to win hearts, minds, and religious legitimacy similar to that initiated by Yaqub Beg later on in the 1860s (discussed below) after years of Chinese religious repression. Whatever it was, it would be necessary to have documentation from the Dzungar period to know the exact circumstances surrounding pilgrimage to the Khoja Afaq shrine during that time and to be able to make a comparison with the situation under the Qing, during which ritual practice at the site seemed to be happening at least on a scale warranting the attention of the Qing.

A later 1794 book entitled Kashige’er fu Yingjisha [Kashgar to Yangisar] confirms the existence of ritual practice and pilgrimage at the site:

“Around ten li133 northeast [of Kashgar’s Muslim quarter] is the khoja tomb. Muslims134 pray here quite devoutly. During prayer, men and women both offer money and rice

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128 Personal observation, summer 2011. Given a quote from Der Spiegel on the signage and the appearance of the same quote in Yu, Xiang Fei, the source of the information is debatable.
129 Schwarz, "The Khwajas of Eastern Turkestan,” 281.
133 One li is approximately equal to one-half a kilometer, though see footnote 70 above for a complication of this distance.
before the akhund. The akhund then recites scriptures and prayers, they pray, and then leave. In front, an area of fangsheng pools has been added. The dervishes there have put geese and ducks in every one of the pools and no one from outside dares take them.”

This shows not only religious activity taking place at the site, but also the interesting possibility that physical changes have been recently made to the site; specifically, the addition of pools. One can only speculate on when these pools were added or by whom. It is possible that they were added during Qing renovations of the site or were made possible because of Qing relaxations on waqf tax burdens. That they are cited in a work from 1794, before the supposed Qianlong restoration, would disqualify the emperor from having had a hand. Yet, given the questionable veracity of the source of the narrative signage and the 1795 restoration date, it is plausible that Qianlong’s restoration included the addition of these pools. Another possibility is that these pools had been there at least since the pre-1758 Dzungar period. Without further source corroboration it is impossible to say. What can be said about the site at this time is that there was enough of a reverence for the site to warrant the author of the aforementioned quote to state that people did not dare steal the ducks or geese.

In 1812, an education administrator from Hunan, Xu Song, found himself banished to Xinjiang for alleged criminal activities. During seven years of exile, he had the opportunity to travel throughout the region, taking meticulous notes of the regional geography, with a focus on hydrology. These notes were published in 1819 in his Xiyu Shuidao Ji [Notes on the Water Routes of the Western Regions]. While discussing the conflict between the Qing and Burhan ad-Din and Khoja Jahan in the 1750s, Xu Song mentions the previously-addressed 1760 Qianlong...
decree and, perhaps more significantly, provides the earliest physical description I have been able to locate of the mausoleum itself.

Xu Song locates the tomb of "Muhammad Yusuf" approximately ten li northeast of the Muslim quarter of Kashgar. As of at least the time of Xu Song's visit, which was sometime during the period between 1812 and 1819, there were "still twelve Muslim households in charge of managing the site's lands and offerings… using the proceeds from these for repair and upkeep of the site."\(^{141}\)

"Muslims say the tomb is a memorial hall and call it a mazar. On the surrounding brick wall there are arrayed wooden poles, the ends of which have horse and yak tails. There are deer antlers on its top. It is said these are offerings for good luck. Trees provide a shady cover. The space inside the building is expansive. The outer wall is blue glazed tiling with carved flowers and plant designs… When the sun goes down a drum, called the sun-sending drum, is beaten to send it on its way. The market is held on every seventh day and is called a bazaar. The day before the market men and women enter the memorial hall to pray for a good market. Stone pillars are carved on the outside of the door."\(^{142}\)

Again, it is obvious that religious practice is taking place at the site. What is even more noteworthy about this particular description is the reference to the presence of horse and yak tails on wooden poles and deer horns. There is no way to determine when the placement of these at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum became common practice, but as mentioned above in the discussion on the origins of pilgrimage in Xinjiang, such items are also common among Buddhists and other spiritual practitioners throughout Central Asia. In his later description of the site, after his 1874 visit, Shaw provides an in-depth and rather colorful discussion of these ritual items, concluding that this phenomenon must be the "survival of the customs of a primitive local demon-worship," due to the similarity with cairn-building and the use of related ritual items at hallowed spots throughout "Himalaya and far as into Burma."\(^{143}\) Gunnar Jarring mentions seeing such horns "often in the mountains or in the desert hung over solitary graves."\(^{144}\) These ritual items figure

\(^{141}\) Xu, Xi Yu Shui Dao Ji, 47.
\(^{142}\) Xu, Xi Yu Shui Dao Ji, 48.
\(^{143}\) Shaw, The History of the Khojas of Eastern Turkestan, 62.
\(^{144}\) Jarring, Return to Kashgar, 194.
prominently in most descriptions of the site well into the twentieth century, and appear to be fair indicators that ritual practice is taking place at the site.

The next reference to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum in sources currently available is from the early nineteenth century, during the repeated upheavals related to Khoja Afaq’s descendent Jahangir Khoja from the eighteen-teens through the eighteen-thirties. Citing the mid-nineteenth century Kazakh ethnographer, Chokan Valikhanov, Papas mentions Jahangir’s visit to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum in 1826, where he “prend le titre de Sayyid Jahângir Sultân et dirige l’oasis [Kashgar] aux côtés de contingent Kokandais.” In his *Holy War in China*, concerning the rebellions in western China in the eighteen-sixties, Kim Ho-dong also cites Valikhanov as mentioning that due to the repeated incursions of the khojas into the Altishahr throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the Chinese authorities had made it illegal “to assemble in the streets or to visit the shrine of Kwāja Afâq.” Luckily, during his time in Kashgar in the eighteen-fifties, Valikhanov seems to have taken note of the appearance of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum:

“...The mausoleum of Appaq [Âfâq] Khwâjâ, which is the finest building in the whole districts of Kashgar, is located six verstas northeast of the city, on the left bank of the Tûmân River. The mausoleum is built of brick. Its inner and outside parts are decorated with colored tiles. Its cornices are adorned with horns and antlers of mountain sheep, goat, and deer, which were sacrificed. Flags and staffs (bunchuks) adorn the entrance and the grave. By the mausoleum stands a big mosque with a beautiful dome, built by a son of the Khwaja.”

It can be seen here, then, that despite the fact that Valikhanov himself has suggested the illegality of visitation to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum, somehow ritual pilgrimage was still indeed taking place there during the eighteen-fifties, given the presence of such ritual items as the animal horns and flags. The location four miles northeast of Kashgar locates the shrine under

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147 A *versta* is an old Russian measurement of length, equal to 1.0668 kilometers.
discussion in the same general location as the current location of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum today.

The mosque noted as being beside the mausoleum must be the North Mosque (see Fig. 2) built by Yahya at the end of the seventeenth century, as mentioned by Loubes.149 That the dome was still in good enough condition to warrant being described as "beautiful," and given Valikhanov’s assertion that the shrine is “the best building throughout the whole of the Kashgar district,” leads one to believe that the site was being well taken-care of. Later in his account, Valikhanov also mentions that Khoja Afaq’s “tomb at Kashgar to this day attracts many pilgrims from various Mussulman countries.”150

This continuation of ritual visitation to the shrine is impressive given the calamities that the rebellious Afaqi khojas brought down upon the people of Kashgar during this period. Indeed, from the time of Jahangir to the Dungan revolt and subsequent rise of Yaqub Beg in the eighteen-sixties, the state of government in the Altishahr can be described in no better terms than almost complete anarchy, as Kirghiz groups, Afaqi khojas, local begs, the Qing, and Khoqand schemed and fought back and forth across the oases. According to Laura Newby, the War of the Seven Khojas and harsh Qing reprisals from 1847 to 1848 had devastating impacts on the local economy and society.151 She also mentions that there was “no widespread support” for the Afaqi khojas from the local population in any Qing sources, and cites Valikhanov’s statistics claiming 20,000 families had fled from Kashgar.152

The state of ritual practice at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum after Valikhanov’s visit in the eighteen-fifties seems to have continued to worsen, as, by the late eighteen-sixties, European visitors to Yaqub Beg’s Kashgar Emirate were commenting on how much the emir had done to restore the mausoleum to its former glory, provide it with additional waqf holdings, and build additional structures for education and worship on its grounds. Bellew mentions that in 1865, Yaqub Beg “restored all the shrines and monasteries which had fallen into neglect and decay under the Chinese rule. And amongst the first to be so rebuilt and enlarged were those of Hazrat

151 Laura Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760-1860. (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 225.
152 Newby, The Empire and the Khanate, 225.
Afac, Bibi Miryam, and Sultan Satoc in the suburbs of Kashgar. At each of these spots he built a new mosque, and college, and almshouse.\textsuperscript{153}

Perhaps the best witness to the physical changes to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum from the eighteen-fifties through the eighteen-seventies is Bellew, though Robert Shaw seems to have visited the site at least twice during his wide ranging travels in Central and South Asia. The first time was in 1869, and is recorded in his work \textit{Visits to High Tartary, Yârkand, and Kâshghar (Formerly Chinese Tartary)}, published in 1871. His notes on the Khoja Afaq mausoleum at this time are less useful for understanding any physical changes at the site and more so for seeing exactly how important the mausoleum was as a holy site and place of pilgrimage.

He tells the story of a wooden bridge built by Khoja Afaq which no one dared to demolish, due to their reverence (and perhaps fear) of the saint. Some "irreverent men" who had taken wood from the bridge soon died under mysterious circumstances. Yaqub Beg had wanted to replace the bridge and, realizing the place of the mausoleum in the people's hearts, first "brought an offering of ten camels, ten bullocks, and ten sheep, to the shrine of Hazrat Apâk," and then proceeded to demolish the bridge plank by plank. This wood was then placed at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum "as consecrated wood, not to be defiled by mean uses."\textsuperscript{154} In yet another indication of the importance of the site both spiritually and politically, Shaw mentions Yaqub Beg and one thousand horsemen headed to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum on Thursday, 28 January 1869, and returned on the Sabbath the next day.\textsuperscript{155}

Shaw's first visit was followed by that of Bellew in 1873, under the auspices of the Second Yarkand Mission led by Thomas D. Forsyth, with the goal of establishing relations between the British Empire and the new power in the region, Yaqub Beg. During this visit he had the opportunity to visit the Khoja Afaq mausoleum and provides the following description:

"The college, mosque, and almshouses attached to the shrine of Hazrat Afac are, taken all together, a very extensive range of buildings for this country, and shelter a population of about three hundred souls… The shrine itself stands in the centre of a court which is entered under a lofty archway covered with Arabic inscriptions on glazed tiles of blue

\textsuperscript{153} Bellew, \textit{Kashmir and Kashgar}, 324.
\textsuperscript{154} Shaw, \textit{The History of the Khojas of Eastern Turkestan}, 459-460.
\textsuperscript{155} Shaw, \textit{The History of the Khojas of Eastern Turkestan}, 283.
and white, and is contained inside an oblong building which was not opened to us. Its walls also are coated with glazed tiles; and its roof is flat and shows a small forest of poles, topped with brass pointers below which are fixed yak tails. All along the coping above, and on the ledge near the floor below are ranged horns of the ibex, stag, wild sheep, and gazelle…"\(^{156}\)

That Bellew mentions the ceiling being flat may be of note here, as the mausoleum is commonly identified by and described as having the dome-shaped ceiling characteristic of Islamic gumbaz. Indeed, Valikhanov mentioned it having a domed ceiling. It is possible that Bellew is simply referring to the ceiling area outside of the domed section, as can be seen in Figure 2 above. Again we see particular emphasis given to the presence of such ritual items as poles, yak tails (*tugh*), and animal horns. Indeed, the importance of the site as a center of shrine pilgrimage at this time can be summed up by Bellew's comment in *The History of Káshgharia* that "His grave is now the holiest shrine in the country, and is called Mazár fyzulanwár Astánac Hazrat Esḥán' Alishán Hazrat Afáč = 'The shrine bounteous in lights, the threshold of His Eminent Presence, the Most High Presence.'"\(^{157}\)

Shaw reiterates the religious importance of the shrine after his second visit to the mausoleum in December of 1874, when he wrote a detailed description and discussion of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum as an Appendix to his epitome of Muhammad Sadiq's *History of the Khojas of Eastern-Turkistan*. His focus, however, is less on the appearance of the mausoleum than the presence of the ritual items noted by Xu Song, Bellew and Valikhanov. He notes that "The shrine is marked by four tall masts decorated with yak tails (*tugh*) and flags inscribed with Arabic texts, and by numerous huge horns of the Ovis Poli… These are ranged along the top of the walls surrounding the shrine, and the finest are formed into two heaps, in front of a little pavilion where pious worshippers sit and meditate on the virtues of the saint."\(^{158}\)

In his description of the layout of the site and his activities there, Shaw reveals some interesting details about recent and future changes. First he mentions that, after walking counterclockwise around the mausoleum itself, he was led to "a newly erected mosque with wings, enclosing a square flagged court-yard, sufficiently large to contain several hundred

\(^{158}\) Shaw, *The History of the Khojas of Eastern Turkestan*, 62.
worshippers… the building could boast of nineteen low domes, and was all built of burnt bricks. It had been constructed within the last four months." After that he dined on a "raised and carpeted platform" (familiar to anyone who has spent time in the region) near a "large tank or reservoir," where he was told by a descendent of Khoja Afaq in charge of the site, the learning center, and the affiliated landed estates that "the place had been sacked repeatedly by the Chinese and the Kirghiz within the last decade, and even its library of old books destroyed." Across from their dining location "was an old mosque with carved wooden ceiling and pillars, and open, as usual in front and at one side."\textsuperscript{159}

The "newly erected mosque" is most likely what is at present referred to as the West Mosque (see Fig. 2), given the presence of the nineteen low domes (these can also be seen on Google maps as of April, 2013, see Figure 5). It is not clear, but the "large tank or reservoir" mentioned by Shaw may be the remains of the "pools of moving water" noted in the 1794 book entitled \textit{Kashige'er fu Yingjisha [Kashgar to Yangisar]}.\textsuperscript{160} Finally, it is possible that the "old mosque" referred to is what is now called the Double South Mosque, with its open and pillared areas (see Fig. 2). Sawada Minoru, who carried out a survey of Muslim mausoleums in the late nineteen-nineties, cites two unverified sources, one Chinese and one Uyghur, as maintaining the date of the construction of a "mosque to the west of the mazâr" to have been in 1876.\textsuperscript{161} All three of the current mosques at the site are to the west of the mausoleum, which presents a bit of a problem.

\textsuperscript{159} Shaw, \textit{The History of the Khojas of Eastern Turkestan}, 62-63.
\textsuperscript{160} Cited in Yu and Dong, \textit{Xiang Fei}, 27.
\textsuperscript{161} Sawada, "Tarim Basin Mazars," 45. The sources are entitled \textit{Ka-shi-di-qu} and \textit{Kashgar Yadikar}, respectively.
Shaw does mention that he had given a watch to the site caretaker to help "him to be more exact in fixing the direction of Mecca for the new mosques he was about to build." If there was indeed a new mosque(s) built in 1876, as stated by Sawada, perhaps it was the "new mosques" referred to by Shaw. Or it may have been an improvement of the "old mosque," the Double South Mosque. Regardless, any new mosque-building would have had two years to be completed between Shaw's gifting of the watch and the end of 1876. It also seems a bit doubtful that such a major undertaking at the site might take place with the drums of war beating ahead of Zuo Zongtang's famous expedition, the early spearheads of which had already begun marching from Jiayuguan in the spring of 1875. If there was a new mosque or mosques built in this two-year period, they are no longer in existence, or it was simply the renovation of the "old mosque." Of course, another possibility is that the 1876 building of a new mosque is actually a misdating of the West Mosque built in 1874.

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In addition to these important physical characteristics, Shaw's account again shows the very lively atmosphere of religious worship taking place at the site. This is not simply indicated by the presence of the animal horns, flags, and yak tails, but is explicitly described by Shaw with reference to the "boys and young men, hanging about there for the purpose of holding the horses of visitors and pilgrims," the presence of "pious worshippers," the evaluation of the site as "quite a little religious colony" with "collegiate buildings" and the "quarters of students who come to study theology here."\(^{164}\) It is obvious that the site, "the most celebrated Shrine in eastern Turkistan," was of special religious and social significance at this time.\(^{165}\)

**The Beginning of the Legend of Xiang Fei's Tomb**

This was also the period during which it seems that the site began to be identified as not only the tomb of Khoja Afaq, but also of his descendent, Iparkhan, the Fragrant Concubine (or Xiang Fei). Millward provides the best account of the Xiang Fei legend and its variations in English, but it might be useful to relate the story here in brief. After the pacification of the Dzungars by the Qing General Zhao Hui in 1757, the Qianlong Emperor requested that the general seek out the daughter of Khoja Jahan. This daughter, Iparkhan, was said to be of immense beauty, but also was blessed with a natural enchanting bouquet, which obviated her need for perfumes. There are several varying stories about her adventures in the imperial palace after her arrival in Beijing, and some accounts have her eventually returning to her native Kashgar, where she apparently died somewhere around the turn of the nineteenth century. At some point during the ensuing years, the mausoleum of Khoja Afaq came to be identified as also the final resting place of this Turkestan princess.

On the second day of January, 1878, Zuo Zongtang's expedition to claim Dzungaria and the Tarim Basin for the Qing ended victoriously with the capture of Khotan.\(^{166}\) Party to the expedition was a certain adviser to the General named Xiao Xiong, who had the opportunity to visit several of the oases of the Tarim Basin, including Kashgar.\(^{167}\) Around fourteen years later he penned a collection of writings, including poems, some of which touched on important

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165 Shaw, *The History of the Khojas of Eastern Turkestan*, 63.
166 Kim, *Holy War in China*, 176.
167 Millward, "Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court," 438.
mausoleums in Kashgar, entitled *Xijiang Zashu Shi* [Miscellaneous Record of the Western Territory].\(^{168}\) Millward considers this to be the first written reference to a "Xiang Fei tomb" in Kashgar.\(^{169}\) Two selections from this text are of interest here:

"Approximately five *li* east of Kashgar there is a sparkling park, and it is said to be the tomb of Burhan ad-Din. There are no other items in the park, only an empty pavilion, with a round top coming to a point."\(^{170}\)

"The Xiang Niangniang Temple is approximately five *li* northeast of Kashgar's Muslim quarter. The temple has a square shape and is covered with green ceramic tiles. It is hollow and has a round top. There are no statues, just a tomb. There is a thick growth of shady trees on all four sides of it, and water has been brought in to make a pool, which flows around [the site] and is clear and reflective… Muslim women have started holding a bazaar in front of the temple… It is comparable to the male bazaar… [After Xiang Fei returned to her mother's home the place became associated with mysterious powers]. Women who are seeking children, choosing a son-in-law, or having marital problems come on the day of the bazaar to devoutly pray. Their custom does not include the use of such sacrificial offerings as joss sticks or candles, but rather, they lean with their hand against the door and cry with extreme emotion, and take with them a small bit of sacred earth from beside the temple, which they mix with water and drink…"\(^{171}\)

There are some differences of opinion as to what locations these two different selections are referring. The descriptions are obviously at odds with each other in terms of directions out of the city, and at first glance one might want to conclude that they are describing different places. Ji Dachun believes that the descriptions are of one and the same place; that is, the Khoja Afaq mausoleum. He attributes the confusion to a mistake on Xiao Xiong's part.\(^{172}\) Millward, on the other hand, feels that these are descriptions of two different sites altogether, connecting Xiao Xiong's "Xiang Niangniang" temple with a fertility shrine to Anna Bibi ("or another shrine

\(^{168}\) I use the translation of the title provided in Millward, "Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court," 439.  
\(^{169}\) Millward, "Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court," 439.  
\(^{170}\) Cited by Ji Dachun in Feng, *Xiang Fei Kao Bian*, 40.  
\(^{171}\) From extract provided in Feng *Xiang Fei Kao Bian*, 83.  
\(^{172}\) Ji Dachun, in Feng, *Xiang Fei Kao Bian*, 41.
Ji Dachun's assertion that Xiao Xiong may simply have made a mistake seems more acceptable than Millward's claims, which are essentially baseless, but important for Millward's argument that it was this particular "misidentification" by Xiao Xiong that led to the incorrect identification of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum as the tomb of the Fragrant Concubine. Millward argues that the Xiang Fei legend was not current in Kashgar at that time based on an absence of reference to the story in Lady Macartney's writings. He states that even though Lady Macartney was a "flawed observer," "her husband would have brought such a story to her attention had he known of it… it is precisely the kind of story she would have related in her memoir."174

Millward's argument here is based on three major assumptions: One, that the existence of a story about the identification of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum would necessarily be dependent on its "currency" in Kashgar; two, that Lord Macartney probably would have heard the story; and, three, that Lord Macartney would have told his wife this story. Millward's logical stretches are less convincing than Ji's more realistic, evidential explanation; that it was simply a mistake made by Xiao Xiong, writing over a decade after his visit to the site. In her Xinjiang Youji [Xinjiang Travelogue] published in 1922, the economist Xie Bin, who visited the Khoja Afaq mausoleum sometime prior to that, also mentions the presence of women who come to the site to pray and lean on the wall crying.175 Such practice at the site is also noted by Lin Zhi in the late 1940s.176

There seems to be no evidential reason to doubt that both of Xiao Xiong's descriptions are of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum site, that by his time there was already a connection between the site and the legend of Xiang Fei, and that there was ritual practice taking place at the site. It may also be of note to mention that the fertility aspects of ritual at the site do not necessarily indicate a relationship to Xiang Fei, either. Anthropologist Jay Dautcher points out that "ingesting mazar soil is a widely documented part of mazar visitation throughout Xinjiang."177 Another item of concern is Xiao Xiong's failure to mention the presence of prayer poles and

173 Millward, "Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court," 439.
174 Millward, "Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court," 439.
175 Xie Bin, "Xinjiang Youji," in Feng, Xiang Fei Kao Bian, 81.
176 Lin Zhi, “Ji Xiang Niangniang Mazhaer,” in Yu and Dong, Xiang Fei, 211.
177 Jay Dautcher. Down a Narrow Road: Identity and Masculinity in a Uyghur Community in a Uyghur Community in Xinjiang China. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 58.
flags or animal tails and horns. It is impossible to say whether or not Xiao Xiong did not notice these items, or simply felt that it was not worth mentioning them in his descriptions.

After Xiao Xiong’s contributions to the record, there are few mentions of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum until the nineteen-twenties. In his 1882 work *Kashgaria*, the famous Russian General Aleksey Kuropatkin mentions the continuation of visitation to the tomb during his time there. According to Jun Sugawara, the Hartmann collection in the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft in Halle, Germany, possesses a 1904 tourist guide for Han Chinese tourists referring to the site as that of Xiang Fei. Wang Naifan mentions that the site underwent its "fourth renovation at the end of the Qing Dynasty," though this may refer to the rebuilding that took place during Yaqub Beg's reign. In 1918, there is mention by the warlord Yang Zengxin of a legal case related to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum. Owen Lattimore states in his *High Tartary*, published in 1930, that this legal case was still going on into the 1920s. Also, according to Jiang Longzhao, a several hundred gram golden new moon that was originally on the top of the tomb was stolen during Yang Zengxin's rule (1912-1918).

Mentioned briefly above, the economist Xie Bin visited the site of the Afaq Khoja mausoleum sometime around 1920. In her *Xinjiang Youji* [Xinjiang Travelogue], published in 1922, she described what she witnessed on the 28th of June:

"…After ten li we are in front of the temple. There are several dozen residences, just like a downtown street. There is a short wall around the temple. The concubine's tomb is situated in the northeast corner. It is round above and square below. The walls all have green ornamental tiles, which upon inspection look like colored glass. A [cauldron wrapped in gold cloth?] is fifty liang in weight. It is magnificent and majestic, and is

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179 Jarring, *Return to Kashgar*, 194.
180 Personal communication during the Twelfth Annual Conference of the Central Eurasian Studies Society in 2011.
185 For li, see note 75 above.
186 One liang is approximately equivalent to 31.25 grams.
many times larger than the mausoleum of the Muslim kings in Hami. There are several dozen tombs in the middle, tiered and arranged in rows... To the left of the main door is a dilapidated palanquin of rough workmanship and crude decoration, traditionally held to have been a gift from Qianlong. Some say it was used by Xiang Fei when she was alive... Each of the four corners of the tomb has a corridor which slowly circles upward to the ceiling. Lighting a candle to get a better view, [one could see] piles of bird feces and broken tiles everywhere, making it impossible to walk. Small minarets have been built on each of the four corners with a width of several chi, magnificent to look upon. Looking at the lower part of the wall, it was clean and shiny enough to create a reflection, without one bit of dust. Upon asking, [it was learned] that this was caused by women of the Chan ethnicity who come to pray and lean on the wall crying, which brushes and polishes it..."

There is quite a lot here pointing to continuing ritual practice at the site, notable among which being the practice of women crying on the wall. The possible presence of a cauldron, reference to which is a bit confusing in the original source, may also indicate the existence of ritual feasting as mentioned by Papas. Dautcher mentions the preparation of meals in a mazar's cooking pot as "one of the most critical elements in a successful mazar visit." The dilapidated state of the site seems to indicate perhaps a lack of attention, and Xie Bin's failure to mention any prayer flags, animal tails, or deer horns makes one wonder about the intensity of pilgrimage to the site at this time, though she may have simply failed to note their presence or simply not considered them as noteworthy. The existence of the palanquin (see Fig. 6) is new and, combined with Xie Bin's referring to the tomb as that of "the concubine," attests to the increasing identification of the site as the resting place of Xiang Fei. Lattimore confirms this in his comments on the site after his visit in 1926/7, where he states that the site was already connected to the Xiang Fei story and identified as her tomb. In terms of continuing pilgrimage to

\[187\] Possibly referring to the burial place of the Khans of the Qumul Khanate.
\[188\] A chi is approximately one-third of a meter.
\[189\] Chan zu is an old term for "Uyghur" according to notes in Feng, 1982, 82.
\[190\] Papas, "Les Tombeaux de Saints Musulmans au Xinjiang," 53.
\[191\] Dautcher, Down a Narrow Road, 58.
the site, he also says that the shrine had "a notable revenue collected from pilgrims, and from the sale or lease of burial sites near the sanctuary…".192

Figure 6. The purported palanquin used to carry the body of Xiang Fei back to Kashgar, as photographed by Jiang Longzhao and provided in his Xiang Fei Kao Zheng Yan Jiu, 1989.193

By Gunnar Jarring's February 17th, 1930 visit, the site was in "very bad repair," Jarring noting that "faience decorations had fallen down" and the presence of a large crack in the wall the probable result of an earthquake. Despite such dilapidation, there still appears to be significant ritual practice taking place at the site. Jarring mentions many beggars, a "mullah" guide, and loud voices coming from students in the madrasa. He also mentions the continued existence of "long rows of flags and standards with inscriptions in Chinese," brought by Hui Chinese. In addition, "Outside the gate was a sort of table, its sides faced with faience, which looked like an altar. It was covered with piles of steenbok [cliff-goat] horns, and with enormous curved antlers from Ovis ammon polii."194 (see Fig. 7). Jarring also notes that his guide led him to what was claimed to be Yaqub Beg's tomb on the site, and that Landsell also indicated the

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192 Lattimore, High Tartary, 322.
193 Jiang, Xiang Fei Kao Zheng Yan Jiu, plates.
194 Jarring, Return to Kashgar, 193-194. Jarring also mentions the possibility that Yaqub Beg's tomb was once here.
presence of the emir's tomb here. If this could be verified it would be yet another evidence for the importance of the site both politically and religiously for the people of the Tarim Basin.

Figure 7. Jarring’s "steenbok" horns and *Ovis ammon poli* antlers outside the gate to the Khoja Afaq complex, 1930.

Figure 8. Outside the gate to the Khoja Afaq mausoleum complex, 1930.

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196 Jarring, *Return to Kashgar*.
197 Jarring, *Return to Kashgar*. 
Thirteen years later in 1943, Liang Hancao, a major military figure in the Republican government, published his *Xixing Luanchang* [Ramblings on a Western Journey], in which he describes in both prose and verse his visit to Kashgar and the "Xiang Niangniang" temple in the afternoon on February 23 of that same year. Fortuitously, Liang provides close detail for the appearance of the mausoleum, noting both the presence of animal horns and the palanquin:

"...the gate of the mausoleum faces south. It has green tiles and is grand and spacious, with a height of probably two zhang. Arabic script is etched above the door. There is a mosque on the right after entering the gate, and there are animal horns on brick pillars [east and west of?] the [mosque's structure?]… After walking forward a few more dozen steps, there is a large shrine to the right. It is square, takes up about one mu of land, and is nearly two zhang in height…"

Liang doesn't provide any information on whether or not there are other people visiting the shrine or what they might be doing there, but it does seem that with the existence of the "animal horns" on the gate, ritual practice seems to be ongoing at the site. One must wonder if these "brick pillars" are the same as or similar to what Jarring described outside the gate in 1930, or if they are the actual columns of the gate itself. His description is a bit confusing, however, as he mentions a mosque "on the right after entering the gate." As far as the sources show, there has never been a mosque to the right after entering the gate. The Double South Mosque is, however, on the left immediately after entry through the gate. It is possible that Liang was simply mistaken in his description, or made a typographical error. He obviously is not talking about the mausoleum itself, as he does go on to mention that the shrine was farther on the right.

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198 Zhang is a unit of measurement approximately 3.33 meters in length.
199 Mu is a unit of land measurement, approximately equivalent to one-fifteenth of a hectare.
A few years later, in 1947, the dome of the mausoleum seems to have collapsed after being seriously damaged by an earthquake. Wang Naifan notes that the damage was not limited to the dome and that there was no way to fix it at the time. Jarring claims that this was because the Republic of China government did not care about the site, and that it was only after the People's Republic of China government came to power that it was repaired "with Mao's help" in 1956. A dedication in Uyghur from 1956 can still be seen on the mausoleum to this day.

The descriptions of two Han Chinese visitors to the site, in 1948 and 1950 respectively, attest to the rather rich continuing tradition of pilgrimage to and mazar festivals at the shrine. Lin Zhi mentions in 1948 that the mausoleum "to this day is still venerated by our Uyghur.

201 Jiang, Xiang Fei Kao Zheng Yan Jiu, plates.
202 Wang Naifan, undated, in Yu, Xiang Fei, 218.
203 Jarring, Return to Kashgar, 188.
204 Lin Zhi utilizes the Chinese weizu here, the first of the Chinese sources used in this thesis to use such nomenclature.
brothers" and that "when it is the season for the peach blossoms to show their beauty, people from Kashgar, especially [Uyghur/Hui] 205 come to participate in the 'Xiang Niangniang maza...' and then goes on to provide a description of the mazar festivals still taking place there at this time:

"...Some Uyghur men and women play instruments and sing songs by the riverside, some take rides on boats... There are also various kinds of peddlers, stores, and restaurants... From morning until night, on all four walls of the tomb there are Uyghur women kneeling and weeping, airing their grief... This exciting festival will continue on for several months..." 206

It is obvious that pilgrimage and mazar festivals are still taking place at the site, despite Lin Zhi's confusion that this has something to do with Xiang Fei. Lin Zhi also mentions that he has heard of the practice of women taking home soil from the site, mixing it with water, and then ingesting it. This "heard of" seems rather to be Lin Zhi's familiarity with Xiao Xiong's description of the site from 1877, as the wording of the description of the practice and the reasons for it are almost identical in both texts. He also provides a brief description of the physical site which adds little to what has already been provided by other sources, and does not seem to indicate any significant changes to the site. Surprisingly, Lin Zhi does not remark on the damaged dome. The lack of attention to the presence or lack of animal horns, prayer flags, or poles may be simply explained by Lin Zhi's focus on the mazar festival itself and the activities taking place as opposed to the physical appearance of the mausoleum.

This state of affairs continued into 1950, when it was also described by Ma Ming in an extended article in the periodical *Luxing Zazhi* [Travel Magazine]. In addition to some notes on the appearance of the site similar to many sources, he also states that:

"Surrounding the temple are small groups of Uyghur women. Each woman picks up a small stone and sticks it in a crack between the bricks of the wall. Some then pull out the stones others have stuck into the cracks and then place them elsewhere. After finishing placement of the stones, they wipe the palms of their hands on the temple's walls and then

205 Here Lin Zhi uses *Hui*, so it is unclear which group is being referenced.
wipe their faces… There are also two mosques beside the Xiang Fei Temple, one larger than the other… All day the mosques are full of people reciting the Quran. Of especial strange interest is that those people in the small mosque are of another branch of Islam, whose main clerics are called 'Sufis…' There is also a pool of a large area of several hundred mu in front of the mosques. The banks of the pool are covered with stalls selling tea, and those drinking tea play musical instruments and dance local Uyghur dances. Some people crazily beat drums, suddenly flinging the drums into the sky and then catching them again…"207

Based on this description, one can see that pilgrimage to the site is still taking place into the 1950s. Lin Zhi and Ma Ming's depictions of the mazar festivals associated with the site, although colored by their own views of religion and ethnicity and despite their own misunderstandings of the ritual activity taking place there, are the most thorough views of mazar festivals specifically at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum. There is no mention of such ritual items as animal horns or prayer flags and poles, but it is difficult to imagine their absence given the very excited atmosphere of the festivals and their important place in ritual activity at the site for so long.

**Turning Away From Khoja Afaq and Sufism**

"I believe that the performances during the Xiang Fei Temple fairs will inevitably change and a whole new atmosphere will be created." -Ma Ming, 1950

Despite this difficulty, however, it appears that at least by 1978 the animal horns could no longer be found at the site, as noted with surprise by Jarring.208 Wang Naifan mentions that the site underwent a major renovation in 1972.209 Perhaps the animal horns were removed during this renovation, or perhaps they were removed for some other reason. Zarcone conjectures that this is an indication that the site has been "désacralisé," and that those who removed the animal horns knew that without them, the site would have little or no religious significance.210 This may very well be the case. Zarcone seeks to ascribe this removal to the Chinese government, but

208 Jarring, *Return to Kashgar*, 194.
210 Zarcone, "Quand le Saint Légitime le Politique," 234.
there is no evidence convincing enough to prove that these items were not removed by Uyghurs themselves. Zarcone seeks to support his contention by citing an analogous action by the Republican government in 1938 in Yarkand, when prayer flags were removed from a holy site.\textsuperscript{211} Yet, as will be seen below, the prayer flags at the Khoja Afaq mausoleum were still in place and part of ritual practice at least into the 1990s.\textsuperscript{212} If the Chinese government was involved in removing the animal horns as part of a policy of "desacralization," one must wonder why the prayer flags were not also removed.

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 10.** The Khoja Afaq mausoleum complex as conceptualized in Herdeg, 1990.\textsuperscript{213}

Jarring himself provides a possible clue as to what must have been happening at the site by at least the 1970s. There was still an akhund working at the site named Hassan Ömer, who

\textsuperscript{211} Zarcone, "Quand le Saint Légitime le Politique," 234.
\textsuperscript{212} Millward, "Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court," 440.
told Jarring that people still came to Friday services at the mosques and early morning prayers before work, and that "there was always much going on" on religious holidays. Yet, the mullahs and ishans were rarely seen any more, and "were not as important as before… there were no beggars." Most tellingly is Jarring’s final judgment of the site: "There was more life around Afaq Khoja’s tomb fifty years ago. Today there is peace and quiet, the atmosphere is more refined, but not nearly as exciting. The character of Islam in Kashgar has changed.”

Indeed, it seems that the changing character of Islam in Kashgar in the 1970s was paralleling, or at least foreshadowing, a change in the character of Uyghur communal identity and how Uyghurs identify themselves with respect to Islam, and Sufism and Khoja Afaq more specifically. An exploration of this change lays at the foundation of Edmund Waite’s 2006 article “From Holy Man to National Villain: Popular Historical Narratives about Afaq Khoja amongst Uyghurs in Contemporary Xinjiang.” While involved in anthropological work in Xinjiang between the early nineteen-nineties and early two-thousands, Waite was “struck by the frequent vehemence with which Afaq Khoja was lambasted… for encouraging fatalism, passivity, ignorance, socio-political divisions and for corroding the advanced civilizational heights of the Säidiyakhan dynasty.” In his article he seeks to understand this negative perception of Khoja Afaq, attributing much of it to “efforts of Uyghurs to forge historical narratives… which seek to account for their perceived predicament as a disadvantaged minority” in China.

In his article Waite examines books and articles on Khoja Afaq by Uyghur writers from the late nineteen-eighties and also provides several oral testimonies from urban Uyghurs on Khoja Afaq. The first is a local history of Kashgar called Short Historical Descriptions [Tarikhtin Qiskichä Bayanlar] by a retired college lecturer, Ibrahim Niyaz. In short, the treatise seeks to glorify the culture and civilization of the Yarkand Khanate of the sixteenth century while denigrating the “cultural, moral and political degeneration accompanying the growth of Sufism.” Niyaz characterizes Khoja Afaq as a tyrant and oppressor who created a

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214 Jarring, Return to Kashgar, 190.
215 Jarring, Return to Kashgar, 191.
216 Jarring, Return to Kashgar, 196.
217 Waite, “From Holy Man to National Villain,” 8.
218 Waite, “From Holy Man to National Villain,” 8.
219 Waite, “From Holy Man to National Villain,” 11.
“superstitious, oppressive, backward, warlike, fearful, bandit-ridden and ignorant” climate falling far short of the achievements of the Säidiyakhanids.²²⁰

A series of articles by the historian and editor, Nizamidin Hüsäyin, parallel this narrative of a Yarkand Khanate Golden Age under the Säidiyakhan dynasty followed by decadence caused by Sufism. Hüsäyin is much more vehement in his anti-Sufism, according to Waite, describing Sufism as a "plague," describing Khoja Afaq as an opportunist who perverted “true” Islam, viewing the results of Khoja Afaq's Sufism as making “people shy away from development and instead remain lazy, ignorant,” and characterizing Khoja Afaq's followers as hashish-smokers.²²¹ Two historical novels entitled Apaq Khoja by Abduväli Äli likewise repeat this particular “golden age” trope, where Sufism has encouraged “ignorance, oppression and conflict” by comparison to the peace and prosperity of the Säidiyakhanid era.²²²

The oral testimonies provided by Waite are worth quoting in their entirety for the light they shed on certain Uyghur attitudes toward Khoja Afaq.

The first was expressed by a college teacher in his early thirties and reflects ideas similar to those mentioned in Uyghur historical writing above:

“Before Apaq Khoja our civilisation was very advanced and religious belief was strong. But Apaq Khoja burnt all books apart from the Quran… Apaq Khoja took lots of economic wealth and property. He was very repressive. He deliberately kept people illiterate so he could control them more effectively. People in their ignorance believed he was holy… After the time of Apaq Khoja, Xinjiang became very backward. His followers smoked hashish. They would play drums and go into a trance. He ordered his followers not to marry. From then on the Uyghurs knew nothing. The Uyghurs become [sic] very docile and from then on we could be easily conquered by other people.”²²³

Another testimony, from a young hotel employee:

“Many people believe Apaq Khoja destroyed our culture. Many people believe that before Apaq Khoja our culture was very developed. For example at the time of the Qarakhanid dynasty there was Mähmut Qäshqäri, who wrote the Turkic dictionary and

²²⁰ Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 12.
²²¹ Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 13.
²²² Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 13.
²²³ Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 15.
Yusup Khass Hajib who was a famous poet. Then also at the time of the Säidiyakhan there was Amanasahan who compiled the twelve Mukams and Abduräshid Khan. However, Apaq Khoja also burnt books and made people ignorant. He sided with the Chinese and supported them – he brought them to Xinjiang. Although later descendents of Apaq Khoja rebelled against the Chinese government in the nineteenth century it was too late. That is why we hate Apaq Khoja.”

Waite is essentially providing a history of Uyghur intellectual attitudes toward Afaq Khoja, Sufism, and Islam in general, from the nineteen-eighties on. This dovetails nicely with what Rudelson has stated in Oasis Identities about Uyghur intellectuals with regard to Islam, which they view “as a negative force” that has “stifled modernization and made the Uyghurs passive; they maintain a Marxist view of Islam as an opiate of the masses.” An important question then remains as to when these intellectual attitudes documented by Waite began to have currency among the Uyghur masses. Waite seems to feel that the work of Uyghur intellectuals in the 1980s has been the primary catalyst for changing attitudes to Khoja Afaq. Yet, it does not seem too far-fetched to see these thinkers and their works as manifestations of trends already occurring in Uyghur collective memory. Indeed, the combination of several decades of secularizing work by Uyghur intellectuals may have already by the nineteen-seventies begun to influence the thinking of the portions of the Uyghur population. Rian Thum claims that antipathy toward Khoja Afaq can even be traced back as early as Nätzärghoja Abdusemätov's 1920 History of the Taranchis, in which Khoja Afaq is implicated in the arrival of the Dzungars. In addition, the 1966 to 1976 PRC Cultural Revolution's heavy-handed treatment of religion, which saw Islamic leaders attacked, Qurans burned, and mosques destroyed, actions in which Uyghurs themselves were participants, cannot be ignored as a possible strong secularizing force on Uyghur thinking as early as the late nineteen-sixties. The Chinese government's easing of restrictions on minority ethnicities to "openly pursue their agendas" in 1978 and the subsequent outpouring of intellectual work on the history of the Uyghurs, including

224 Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 17.  
225 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 136.  
226 Thum, "Beyond Resistance and Nationalism," 298.  
227 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 104.
the vilification of Khoja Afaq, may have simply been opening the floodgates for sentiment that had been accumulating for some time already.\footnote{Rudelson, \textit{Oasis Identities}, 32.}

Regardless of when Uyghur collective memory and attitudes toward Khoja Afaq began to change, starting in the late 1970s the physical appearance of the Khoja Afaq mausoleum began to change drastically, as did ritual practice at the site. There seem to have still been pilgrims coming to the site in 1982, but these pilgrims were being increasingly joined by large numbers of Han Chinese and, later, foreign tourists.\footnote{Li Kai, "Aba Hejia Mu de Xunli – Jian Yinzheng Xiangfei Mu he 'Aba Hejia' Mu de Guanxi," in Feng, \textit{Xiang Fei Kao Bian}, 48-49.} Indeed, an Italian traveler, Tiziano Terzani, visited the site in the early 1980s and mentioned that the site already had formal tourist guides who were identifying the site as "Xiang Fei's tomb" and tying it to nationality solidarity.\footnote{Tiziano Terzani, \textit{Behind the Forbidden Door: Travels in Unknown China}. (New York: H. Holt, 1986), 228.} As can be seen when comparing Figures 11 and 15, there is a large area of rose gardens in front of the mausoleum now where once there was a large field of tombs. According to a Uyghur caretaker of the site speaking to Terzani, trees were planted in front of the site in 1978, an act which also caused the removal of what had come to be known as Yakub Beg's tomb.\footnote{Tiziano Terzani, \textit{Behind the Forbidden Door}, 229.} The Chinese government renovated the site once again in 1982, and in 1988 the State Council listed the site as a National Level Artifact Protection Unit. As touched on above, Millward mentions that there were still prayer flags at the site as of 1994.\footnote{Millward, "Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong's Court," 440.} Waite also mentions that pilgrimage to and ritual feasting at the site were still taking place in 1993-1994, with meals being prepared in a large cauldron at the site and food being given to poor people and schoolchildren.\footnote{Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 19.}
By the end of the 1990s, the site seems to have become, in the words of Sawada Minoru, "a refined tourist resort," with crowds of visitors and tourists and souvenir shops.\textsuperscript{234} Despite this, Papas noted in August of 1999, June of 2001, and August of 2004, that there were still "des marques de culte au milieu des touristes…," including a censer on the left wing of the mausoleum and prayer flags on the right wing.\textsuperscript{235} It would have been very helpful if Papas had provided photographs or at least sketches of these items. As the burning of incense seems not to have been an important part of traditional ritual practice at the site, one wonders if this so-called "censer" is not actually a cauldron for the preparation of ritual feasts. If it is truly a censer, this would rather indicate the touristification of the site for Han Chinese visitors, as such incense censers can be found in most "temples" throughout the People's Republic. One also wonders whether this is not simply related to the tourist industry because of the interdiction of ritual feasting at the site by local authorities in 2000.\textsuperscript{236}

\textsuperscript{234} Sawada, "Tarim Basin Mazars," 45.
\textsuperscript{235} Papas, "Les Tombeaux de Saint Musulmans au Xinjiang," 57.
\textsuperscript{236} Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 19.
In late July, 2011, I found myself, like so many other travelers before me, wandering out of Kashgar toward what used to be known only as the Khoja Afaq mausoleum. My first visit was in the evening on the back of a motorcycle driven by a partially drunk young Uyghur acquaintance. Another Uyghur youth followed us on a second motorcycle. Upon arrival, we found that the site was already closed, as were all of the souvenir shops and restaurants. At this point the young Uyghur men began to tell me the history of Khoja Afaq, and how he had led the Uyghur people down a dwindling path to its current predicament under the heel of the Han. They then led me on a harrowing high-speed jaunt via motorcycle through the narrow pathways within the various remaining graveyards surrounding the mausoleum, searching for relatives who they claimed had been killed by the Han Chinese.  

After locating the grave of some of these relatives, the Uyghur youth piloting my motorcycle dismounted, began praying fervently, and weeping. The other youth then also proceeded to chant. My limited linguistic abilities precluded any attempt to discern what was being said. Once this rather unexpected scene ended, we went to yet another grave, where the second Uyghur youth wept while the first chanted. This reminded me of what Papas mentions with regard to “culte discret,” including the continuation of inhumation in the cemetery surrounding the Khoja Afaq mausoleum as an indication of the survival of the cult of saints because it is “non loin de la source de baraka.” (See Fig. 12). After this, we returned to the city, and I returned to my hotel room at the Chini-Bagh.

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237 These two young Uyghurs were in their late teens and came from what appeared to be from economically-disadvantaged backgrounds. I met them by chance as I walked by a restaurant, in front of which they were sitting drinking beer. They struck up a conversation with me, so I sat down with them. Once they noticed my interest in Khoja Afaq, they told me their personal views on the man and offered to take me to the mausoleum, an offer I accepted.

The next day I met with other Uyghur acquaintances and headed out to the site once again. The Khoja Afaq mausoleum is located approximately five kilometers northeast of the city of Kashgar. The first turnoff from Izlati Road [Aizilaiti Lu] toward the mausoleum is called Xiang Fei Road [Xiang Fei Lu], and is identified by a blue street sign on which is written “Xiang Fei Lu” in large white Chinese characters followed by smaller pinyin. The words “Apaq Khoja Road” were written in small Uyghur script at the top edge of the sign. (See Fig. 13). As can be seen, the so-called "colonized" Uyghur cultural presence at the site still lives on at least on the margins of this road sign, which retains the identification of the site for Uyghurs as that of Khoja Afaq’s mausoleum, not that of Xiang Fei. On the other hand, at the next intersection there was a brown Tourism Bureau sign with an arrow guiding tourists to turn right. “Xiang Fei Home” [Xiang Fei Guyuan] was written in large white Chinese characters next to a white silhouette of the tomb. The much smaller Uyghur on the sign read “Iparkhan’s tomb” while the English read Apaq Khoja Tomb. (See Fig. 13). It would be interesting to learn when and by whose authority these different signs were designed and erected.
Upon arrival in front of the mausoleum entrance there were a dozen or so tourist stores selling various souvenirs, most of them with signs reading Hetian (Khotan) Jade or something similar. One shop sign said “Xiang Fei Handicrafts.” Many of these shops were filled with copies of Castiglione’s purported paintings of Xiang Fei and other related souvenirs. To the left of the main entrance was a Uyghur restaurant, reminiscent at least somewhat of the "festive" atmosphere of eating and lounging which took place during the mazar festivals of yesteryear, where I later had a bowl of iced dogh.

To the right of the main entrance to the mausoleum grounds was a ticket booth-cum-China Post. On the green sign there, the site was called “Xiang Fei Tomb” in Chinese, and again, there were Castiglione paintings pasted about. Tickets gave the site the appellation "Apaq Khoja." Farther on the right were a series of wooden white narrative signs. Interestingly enough, these signs provided explanations of the site in Uyghur, Chinese, and English, with Uyghur being listed first. They also referred to the site as the "Apaq Khoja Mazar," with "Xiang Fei Tomb" appearing only in the Chinese description and only in parentheses. (See Fig. 13).

Figure 13. Taken by author in 2011.
To the left of the front gate were a ticket reception stand and the locked entrance to the functioning religious section of the grounds – specifically, the Double South Mosque. Contrary to what has been stated elsewhere, access for mosque attendance was not limited by tourist infrastructure, at least at that time.\(^{239}\) Like many other Muslim religious sites in the Altishahr, and throughout China for that matter (for example, at the Great Mosque of Xi’an and the Altun Mosque in Yarkand), there was a separate entrance for religious adherents. The devout do not need to buy tickets to gain entrance.

Once through the tall gate there was a white sign in Chinese, Uyghur, and English guiding tourists to the right, to the mausoleum itself (see Fig. 14). Again, one can see that the site is identified in Uyghur, Chinese, and English as the Khoja Afaq mausoleum first, with Iparkhan/Xiang Fei being mentioned only in parentheses.

![Figure 14. Taken by author in 2011.](image)

At this point I was directly within the confines of the mausoleum grounds proper. At some point, probably either in 1978 or 1982, a large field of tombs in front of the mausoleum had

\(^{239}\) For example, see Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 7.
been demolished and replaced by a large square of rose gardens and grape trellises where tourists can take pictures (there was now even a sign indicating the best viewpoint for photography), ride camels, and watch “nationality” dances. Looking at the mausoleum's front side, to the right there was a set of wooden bleachers. I didn't ask the tour guides what these bleachers were used for, but one can imagine that they might be for audiences enjoying shows put on at the site demonstrating "nationality" culture.

![Figure 15. Taken by author in 2011.](image)

A series of blue narrative signs framed in metal was located to the left of the mausoleum. One was a map titled “Planar Schematic of the Apaq Khoja Mausoleum.” Another began the narrative of the site and was entitled “Tomb of Apaq Khoja (Xiang Fei Tomb).” The first and second narrative signs were primarily descriptive of the site, its location, and layout, including that of the rest of the grounds (the mosques, etc). The first 4.5 lines of the final narrative sign related that the Apaq Khoja mazar was renovated by Qian Long in 1795 and as a result became associated with Qian Long. The remaining twelve lines discussed Xiang Fei and included the following statement: “That there have been so many stories surrounding Xiang Fei transmitted
after her expresses the great wish of all nationalities for solidarity and mutual love since ancient times.” After that, there was surprisingly an unattributed quote from *Der Spiegel*: “The love between the emperor and this Uyghur girl is proof of the great solidarity among all the nationalities of China.”240 (See Fig. 16)

![Figure 16. Taken by author in 2011.](image)

This latter would seem to be a definitive proof of total appropriation of the site in line with what has been claimed by Millward, Zarcone, and Loubes, were it not for the other inklings of Uyghur cultural agency at the site and "culte discret" still to be observed there, evidenced by the reverence still held for the cemetery surrounding the mausoleum. That the site still draws religious adherents to the mosques located on its grounds, too, speaks to the staying power of the site's attraction to the faithful. Indeed, despite the apparent lack of interest among Uyghurs to visit the mausoleum itself, the presence of the restaurant, mosques, and signs in Uyghur, etc, point to a continued role of the location in the lives of at least some Uyghurs. Waite mentions this as well, stating that some local Uyghurs still relate stories of Khoja Afaq and even defend his legacy from popular criticism.241 Indeed, aside from a few exceptions, most of the textual

240 This citation seems to have been the quoted statement of a “responsible Muslim” in Yu, *Xiang Fei*, 230, where he provides the citation as *Der Spiegel*, Vol. 45, 1983. The use of Yu Shanpu’s work as a source for this narrative signage is interesting given Yu’s conclusions that the Apaq Khoja mausoleum is indeed not the actual resting place of Xiang Fei.

241 Waite, "From Holy Man to National Villain," 18.
materials at the site still identify it as the Khoja Afaq mausoleum, mentioning Xiang Fei only in passing. This seems to run counter to Zarcone's claim that at some point the site (and even the entire surrounding village) would be known only as "Iparhkan." 242

Conclusion

In fact, the entire narrative in the historiography of the monolithic Han Chinese appropriation of the site is overly facile, ignoring as it does the other major "trajectory" of Uyghur collective memory. As can be seen from looking at the history of the site, the Turkestan/Uyghur relationship to the site began at least in the seventeenth century. From this early time, Khoja Afaq played the role of a "hero/ruler/ancestor bearer" of a new interpretation of the Islamic faith for the people of Altishahr and beyond, becoming a saint who (re)legitimized the identity and community of those who made the pilgrimage to his tomb. From the late eighteenth century until the nineteen-sixties, there is ample evidence of repeated episodes of destruction, decay, rebuilding, and expansion. Throughout all of this period, the role of the mausoleum in Uyghur collective memory seems to have continued unabated, as the sources demonstrate the lively atmosphere of scholarship, ritual, festivals, and markets that drew the faithful from distant parts to convene in these activities which identified them as Turkestan/Uyghur. The collective memory role of the site is not the only role illuminated by the sources, as the important functions of the site for political, commercial, and social (all of which may also be subsumed under the general term "community") activities are also clearly indicated in the sources.

It was only in the nineteen-seventies that this state of affairs began to change significantly. Yet, again, this change was not necessarily the result of Han Chinese discourses on Khoja Afaq and Xiang Fei. Nor is it necessary to accept Waite's hypothesis that Uyghur narratives denigrating Khoja Afaq are the result of some creative Uyghur response to "historical obfuscation and state propaganda" of the site as the tomb of Xiang Fei. This latter possibility again ignores the very obvious conclusion that Uyghurs have been and continue to be perfectly capable of developing their own discourses about Khoja Afaq and his mausoleum. The impact of the Cultural Revolution on the thinking of some Uyghurs, the work of Uyghur intellectuals

and reformers, and a desire to explain why the Uyghur people seem downtrodden within the Chinese state have prompted some Uyghurs themselves to begin "strategically forgetting" the role of Khoja Afaq and his mausoleum in their collective identity.

This "strategic forgetting" itself, however, has been just as incomplete as the so-called Han Chinese appropriation of the site. Survivals of Uyghur agency, in the form of Papas' "culte discret", including continuation of burial in the vicinity and the attraction the site still has among Uyghurs, positive or negative, still exist. Moreover, despite the admitted heavy-handed efforts of the Chinese state to appropriate the site using the trope of minzu tuanjie and Xiang Fei, that the site still retains its original identification as Khoja Afaq's mausoleum speaks to the important role the site continues to play in Uyghur collective memory.

Appendix: Timeline of Turkestani/Uyghur History and the Khoja Afaq Mausoleum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Turkestani/Uyghur History</th>
<th>Khoja Afaq Mausoleum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1638</td>
<td>Decision by Muhammad Yusuf to build a religious center at Bishkiram</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1640 (?)</td>
<td>Completion of Muhammad Yusuf's religious center,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1678-1693/4 (?)</td>
<td>Escalation of the Ishaqi/Afaq conflict, decline of the Saidiyya Khanate</td>
<td>Destruction of the site by Kirghiz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1693/4</td>
<td>Completion of rebuilding of the site by Yahya, Khoja Afaq's son</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758</td>
<td>Pacification of the Tarim Basin by the Qing Empire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760</td>
<td>Qianlong Emperor decree to protect the site</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1794</td>
<td>Description of the appearance of and ritual practice at the site in Kashige'er fu Yingjisha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1795</td>
<td>Restoration of the site by Qianlong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812-1819</td>
<td>Xu Song's description of the mausoleum and ritual practice at the site, first reference to animal horns and poles decorated with flags or animal tails</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>Khoja Jahangir's largest agitation</td>
<td>Visit by Jahangir to the mausoleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1850s</td>
<td>Repeated uprisings and invasions in the Altishahr region</td>
<td>Qing authorities interdict assembling in the streets or visiting the mausoleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850s</td>
<td></td>
<td>Description of the mausoleum and ritual practice by Valikhanov, continued presence of animal horns and ritual poles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860s-1870s</td>
<td>Establishment of Yaqub Beg's emirate</td>
<td>Extensive rebuilding and expansion of the site, reports by European travelers of significant ritual activity, including the presence of animal horns and ritual poles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Capture of Khotan by Qing armies led by Zuo Zongtang</td>
<td>Xiao Xiong's descriptions of the site, including discussion of rituals carried out primarily by women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kuropatkin notes ritual practice at the site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td></td>
<td>Landsell appreciates the collection of Ovis poli antlers at the site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese tourist guide identifying the site as the tomb of Xiang Fei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~1920</td>
<td></td>
<td>Xie Bin describes the site and ritual practice related to female fertility and the existence of the Xiang Fei palanquin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jarring describes the site, ritual practice at the site, and animal horns, tails, and prayer flags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1934</td>
<td>Establishment of the East Turkestan Republic</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liang Hancao describes the site and the presence of animal horns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-1949</td>
<td>Establishment of the Second East Turkestan Republic</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td></td>
<td>Collapse of dome after earthquake</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event/Comment</td>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Lin Zhi describes the site and continuing ritual practice there, in particular that of women</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Ma Ming describes the site and continuing ritual practice</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Absorption of Kashgar into the People's Republic of China</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Repair of collapsed dome</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1956-1976</td>
<td>PRC Cultural Revolution</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Major renovation of site</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Beginning of PRC Reform and Opening Up</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jarring notes the absence of animal horns, planting of rose gardens in front of the mausoleum</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Early 1980s</td>
<td>Easing of restrictions on religious minorities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Increase in Uyghur agitation in Xinjiang</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Publication of popular histories and historical articles denigrating Khoja Afaq, increase in Han tourism to the site</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Site renovated by the PRC government</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Site listed as a National Level Artifact Protection Unit</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Baren Township incident</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Continued presence at the site of prayer flags, continued ritual practice at the site</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Interdiction of ritual feasting at the site</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Publication and subsequent state burning of Abdulwali Ali's novel <em>Apaq Khoja</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Kashgar incident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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