ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURE IN ENGLISH AND CLASSICAL CHINESE TEXTS

by SiYang Zhou

This study aims at examining different structuring of argumentation in English and classical Chinese texts as well as the modes of reasoning that dominate rhetorical practices in their respective cultures. Via this investigation, I hope to 1) articulate how models of argumentation in English and classical Chinese texts differ from each other; 2) to inspect the method and methodology of comparative rhetorical study between the two traditions. By doing so, I hope to complicate this field of research with a critique on the tendency of grasping similarities and differences in cross-cultural comparisons.
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Introduction

In theorizing cross-cultural studies, English equivalents are found to make reference to the culturally specific concepts in non-English. Terms in the original language exist as significations that require various kinds of explanations inserted in the writing. Ironically, translation cannot quite fulfill the task of transferring culture propensities as verbal substitutions. That raises the problems: to what extent shall interpreters rely on translation in inter-cultural study, especially in the field of comparative rhetoric? To what extent should the original terms be used in analysis? And how to close the gap between the signification and the final interpretations? The following several examples might help to make clearer what I am criticizing. Many Chinese people have often been asked the question, “What is Junzi 君子?” or “What is the translation of Junzi?” And to the increasing number of English speaking individuals who are familiar with Chinese culture, the answer “gentleman” or “a man of virtue” is usually not complete enough. A gentleman is a product of noble birth, and is expected to behave with a high standard of propriety, sophistication, and a lot more of other qualities while Junzi, according to Confucius’ definition, is an honored title for men of virtue and propriety from any social status. As Junzi and gentleman are different in many other aspects, translating Junzi to “gentleman” conveys an inexact meaning and expectations when it is used in a broader context. For instance, Confucius said, “gentlemen understand/are associated with righteousness, mean men know/are connected with profit”¹ (Analects 15). The statement points out different qualities of people in terms of their values and consequences of behavior. While “gentlemen” does not strictly refer to gentlemen, and “mean men” does not stand exactly for people who are mean, and the verbs used contains multiple meanings at the same time, the sentence can be interpreted in a number of ways in revealing the relationship among the objects being discussed. However, this translation alone affiliates the emphasis on profit with the quality of being mean, which puts forward an indication.

¹“君子喻于义，小人喻于利。”
of bias toward profit-seeking in classical Chinese culture. When the core meaning resides with individual words, a stiffened fitting into another linguistic system can easily create awkwardness. As a language originated from poetry writing, one of the essence of classical Chinese is its comprehensiveness and flexibility in word-meanings. Studies involving research on ancient Chinese cannot possibly avoid this crux. That is also why lots of cross-cultural studies between English and Chinese often express confusion and inscrutability in some traditional Chinese concepts. Such as way for Dao, nature for hsing, benevolence for the two notions—shan 善 and ren 仁. What cannot be included in verbal equivalents give rise to a dilemma in giving the right interpretation with appropriate writing in cross-cultural analysis.

Then will a broadened explanation with detailed translation be able to work against the dilemma? In searching for a nuanced understanding of original texts, I.A. Richards advanced the use of multiple definitions in his interpretations. In Mencius on Mind--An Experiment of Multiple Definition, His method gives a new way of comparison, but did not manage to avoid matching equivalents in the end. In one of his demonstrations of Mencius’ claims, he points out that “The first crux [of understanding]…concerns nothing less than Mencius’ statement or definition of the sense in which Hsing2 is good, the central point of his whole teaching. The statement (VI-I-6-5) [乃若其情，则可以为善矣] can be read—

A. If we are speaking of Hsing’s (man’s) feelings, then it can be considered as good (then one can therewith do good).

B. If we are speaking of Hsing’s propensities (i.e. the ‘beginnings’; II-I-6-5, p.14), then it can be good.

C. If we are referring to Hsing’s feelings then it is possible to do good.

D. If we take feeling only, then the above illustrations are all right.

2 Hsing, also spelled as xing, usually translated as nature.
E. If it (Hsing) is in accordance with its feelings then it can be good.”

(Richards, Mencius 13)

While expressing his confusion of the claim even with the help of multiple definitions, Richards betrays his design of comprehensive interpretation. He first assumes an equation between Mencius’ pivotal doctrine “renhsing benshan 人性本善” and “hsing is good”. Secondly, while according to his resource, hsing has three definitions: i) circumstances or facts, ii) proper, iii) feelings (Mencius 13), Richards applies only two of the three which could be fit into the same sentence structure and comes up with five versions of translation. When dealing with a more complicated context, it is almost inevitable that some meanings could be left out in the transaction. In such act of searching for the unknown account of variability with possible equivalents, different translation could grow almost ungainly after permuting and combining all of the possibilities. I.A. Richards did not aim at making equations in this comparative rhetorical study on Mencius, but he interprets the differences in meaning making between the two cultures based on such a collection of equivalents. Like some other comparative studies involving ancient Chinese, conclusions regarding the culture and ideologies are made usually from a literal reading of simplified translation. But the native’s view and understanding of a character or a term largely stems from the adaptation to the materials and cultural entities that illustrate and develop the notion over time. Among those materials, one major resources of knowing is texts. Interpreters’ effort of searching for verbal equivalents and definition is just the preparation to solve a problem. This kind of preparation reveals at least two major challenges: first, a lack of justification of the English synonyms; and second, a lack of demonstration of the relation between the term and the sociocultural context. Cross cultural or comparative rhetorical study is likely to be reduced to a metaphysical way of research when attempts to understand drift away from the sensibility of the culture— “the missing part of the context” (Richards, Philosophy 21) beyond words.

Such dilemma emphasizes the relationship between texts and culturally specific
sensibility in cross-rhetoric studies. As a young discipline, comparative rhetoric owes its growth to some major theoretical paradigms developed by individuals including Robert Kaplan, George A. Kennedy, and others. Analyses of English and Chinese texts are usually conducted with distinct approaches. From the Sophists to post-structuralism, theories of discourse in English build upon a tradition of research and communication in rhetoric and discourse studies, while the studies of classical Chinese focus more on general ideological representations. From Kaplan’s description of an oriental mode of thinking, to various disputes about Daoism (Taoism), to interpretations of traditional Chinese concepts such as _hsing_ in Richards’ study, many of comparative studies are conducted with few theoretical foundations or frameworks of the characteristics of ancient Chinese philosophy and rhetoric. Instead, efforts frequently result in an activity of matching and comparing equivalents with the assumption of the existence of counterparts on both sides. The outcome of such comparison is more impressive and approachable, but worth critical examination for most of the time. From my perspective, it is important to comprehend the reciprocal relationship between texts and the corresponding culture before one dive into any ideological representation. When reading texts from different rhetorical traditions which are comparable in one way or another, I always experience a process of gap-spanning from language to language, or culture to culture. Aside from discerning major cultural differences, the ways in which the texts are delivered are also worth being examined. In _Language and Power_, Fairclough gives emphasis to a basic discipline in studying the relation between ideology and text (with the assumption of understanding on the lexical and syntactical level)—first, is to “work out how the parts of the text link to each other,” and second, “to figure out how the text fits in with your previous experience of the world.” In short, it is necessary to “establish a ‘fit’ between text and world” (Fairclough 78). The “ideology” that Fairclough refers to in reading comprehension is a concept that “brought to discourse... as the background assumptions which on the one hand lead[s] the text producer to ‘textualize’ the world in a particular way, and on the other hand lead[s] the interpreter to interpret the text in
a particular way” (Fairclough 85). David Hall and Roger Ames refer to it as the “matrices of valuation which may be said to characterize the two cultural milieux” (111). In this study, I am going to borrow their concepts in my analysis. My investigation on the “ideology” focuses on the sociocultural values and modes of thinking that influence the two rhetoric traditions. To comparative rhetorical study, the practice of “gap-filling” (81) between texts and values is also necessary. The very task of filling the space between the words and the mind need not only to be examined and principled, but also doubled or multiplied as it engages with two kinds of texts and two cultures. In view of the reciprocal relationship between what is being read and what is being reinterpreted, since we are all interpreters who make “coherence…not made by the text itself” according to Fairclough’s clarification (78), we shall be responsible in both the methods we use, and the contents we focus on in the undertaking of inter-cultural comparison and communication. In terms of the method, translation as equivalents of the original texts can only serve as a beginning in such study; in terms of the content, juxtaposition of similarities and differences between two objects is not qualified enough as the main idea of comparative analysis. Interpretations and representations of complex values or the sensibility of certain cultures have to be tailored according to the framework of the comparative study.

Operating with this principle, this comparative study aims at filling the gap between the structuring of argumentation and the different modes of thinking in European-American rhetoric and classical Chinese rhetoric. Specifically, I will concentrate on the models of argument evidenced in English and classical Chinese texts rather than the lexical and semantic field. Doing so allows me to examine rhetorical practice in the discursive field where logic patterns play the dominant role. Aside from reviewing major theories and discussions on argumentation and the contemporary research of comparative rhetoric between English and ancient Chinese, I will begin with a justification of the method and methodology I will follow in this study. In this thesis, I give emphasis to i) the comparable components in
argumentative texts; and ii) the connections between a text and the values it embodies. I also hope to help reflect comparative rhetoric as an interactive discipline that serves to close the gap between and among languages and minds. My purposes and implications of this study are three-fold: i) to examine some rhetorical canons and theories in argumentation; ii) to explore methods of comparative study regarding argumentation; iii) to complicate understanding of Euro-American rhetorical traditions with view to its cross-cultural significance in the comparative rhetorical research.

**Chapter One**

**Reflections on Method and Methodology**

The dilemmas that translation and simple equations bring to comparative rhetorical study do not stay merely within the task of textual analysis. They affect the conducting of the entire study. In “Studying the Chinese Rhetorical Tradition in the Present,” LuMing Mao points out a couple of methodological challenges in the field of comparative rhetorical study—one is the attempt to develop some generally applicable theories at the risk of overlooking specifics and complexities; another is to compare certain theories or concepts inter-culturally with an unconscious assumption that they are equivalents, counterparts, or antitheses, which G. E. R. Lloyd calls a “piecemeal approach” (218). Those challenges are also embodied in the pitfalls of I. A. Richards’ experiment I mentioned above. In exploring methods of understanding on the semantic level, Richards steps from word interpretation into ideological representation. He first assumes that the sense of Mencius’ major thesis is “Hsing is good.” Then he proves his assumption by a trial of reflecting the meanings of the claim via a gathering of multiple definitions of one of Mencius’ statements. Regardless of its limited application, the assumption thus becomes almost an expectation in his interpretation thereafter. Even when such interpretation does not
fit with the syntax or logic, the occurrence is in turn perceived as evidence of ambiguity in classical Chinese—when he claims that “Chinese method of analysis, distinction, and definition still lend[s] themselves less easily to systematic precision of the kind needed” (Mencius 126). Leaving the critique on Richards’ method, we would be biased if devalue his modes of meaning and their implication in comparative rhetorical study merely based on the problem uncovered. Furthermore, it reminds us of some other methodological difficulties. If I.A. Richards’ skill of studying distinct modes of meaning is still not able to satisfy the need for comprehensive understanding, what are the antidotes for a “piecemeal approach” and generalization in the methodology of comparative rhetoric study? In what ways can the analysis of similarities and differences be genuinely beneficial to the young discipline of comparative rhetoric, since such comparison is never disinterested?

Among all the possible solutions, locating an appropriate approach of actual comparing possesses fundamental significance. As the method of interpreting texts, I suggest an approach of comparison that is also two-fold. “Emic” and “etic”, derived from linguistic terms “phonemic” and “phonetic”, are introduced as research methodology by anthropologists as distinct approaches of observation. Generally speaking, an emic approach associates analysis of cultural phenomena from the perspective of an insider, one who participates in the culture. An etic approach instead brings into the picture the perspective of an outsider of the culture being studied. Except from different positions they stand for, they indicate different patterns of analyzing as well. In Dell Hymes’ interpretation, an emic account focuses on features of the subject under investigation while an etic account plays the role of framework for emic accounts (Hymes 11). The etic and emic accounts help to organize analysis and principles with limited knowledge on either of the sides. Moreover, they ensure a multi-dimensional observation of a certain subject against unconscious inclinations in making comparisons. Such an approach answers to a methodological paradox as Mary Garrett points out: those who are interested in studying another rhetorical tradition for
the purpose of comparison must “start somewhere, with some questions and basic
organizing principles,” even though there is always the phenomenon that one imposes
the principles and concepts onto another cultural practice (54). Applying the etic/emic
approach first allows researchers to interpret with their sensibility inherited from one
culture; and second, to reflect upon their comparative methods and objects in the
study with a more rationalized perspective; and third, to work on the preciseness or
ambiguity, and inclusiveness of their interpretation. It helps to establish a
conversation not only between “the native” and “the non-native,” but from “I” to “the
Other” as well. Informed by the etic/emic approaches, I want to engage my study with
interpretations on the modes of thinking that generate argumentation in the two
cultures coupled with an investigation on their structures. With my emic accounts, I
will be able to select appropriate objects for comparison, and examine channels of
communication between the rhetoric of argumentation. I hope to reveal from my
study both some conclusion on similarities and differences, and possible inspirations
that can be drawn from the differences.

In spite of the framework that the etic/emic approach provides, comparative rhetorical
study puts forward more requirements on the emic analysis for most interpreters who
are usually native speakers of one of the languages. In my case, it is the attachment to
Chinese that I have to work with in this study. This give rise to the third
methodological challenge—“an orientalist logic [that] may continue to influence and
thus handicap our study of the Chinese rhetorical tradition” (Mao, “Studying” 220). In
one way, more visible than the prejudgment, assumptions, and expectations in such
kind of study, paradox and ambiguity tend to ferment within the course of cultural
conflation and conflict due to the writer’s intention of avoiding privileging one
rhetoric tradition over another. In another way, the interpretive procedure may result
in “essentializ[ing] the Other [while]…project[ing] and construct[ing] the West as the
idealized standard and the Other as its unchanging antithesis” (“Studying” 220).
Such study could usually be one that proceeds from an observation of “the Other”
rhetoric via the lens of the Western canon, and ends with an elaboration of or systemizing certain characteristics of that rhetorical tradition. Particularly, comparative rhetorical study between English and classical Chinese undertakes a good chance or risk of falling into this dilemma. One crucial reason is that Chinese philosophy does not have such an independent discipline of rhetoric as it does in the West with its ancient Greek knowledge base. However, with the growth of comparative rhetoric between English and Chinese, the focus of the study on Chinese rhetoric is becoming clearer “on this side of the Pacific” (“Studying” 216). Essentializing a rhetorical tradition could also be positive and necessary with cautious use (Spivak 205). In case of the Chinese rhetorical tradition, although it consists of many different kinds of languages and competing thoughts, it is referred to in singular instead of plural in comparative rhetoric studies so that its representative characteristics could be revealed as cultural phenomena. It serves as a “specific signifier to contest the dominance of the European American rhetorical tradition and to help articulate a rhetorical identity to challenge stereotypes and to celebrate differences” (Mao, “Studying” 217). In this thesis, I would like to comply with the principle in the comparative rhetorical study on argumentation. However, this does not mean that my study will involve all the major voices in classical Chinese rhetoric in order to establish valid “positive essentialism” (Spivak 205). With regard to the specifics of this study, I will take into account some sociocultural values and modes of thinking shared by major schools of classical Chinese philosophy which contribute to the development of classical Chinese rhetoric on argumentation.

In response to the three methodological challenges, I want to unfold my comparison in two ways:

1) In terms of the “what” of the comparison on writing structure, I will take a close look at the basic models of argumentation in the two discursive traditions. I will examine the connections between the sequential parts of an argumentation, which involves logic ordering and the ways in which these sections of a text work to
constitute a complete and coherent structure of logical reaction;

2) In terms of the “how” of the comparison on structuring, I will discuss the values and modes of thinking that discipline the formation as well as the function of argumentation. I will develop my understanding of the sensibility or expectations with which argument grows by analyzing the theories of the modes of argumentation.

This design attempts to circumvent the methodological pitfalls which are likely to lead a comparative rhetoric study to either partial judgment or generalization and equivocation of complexities. It is not to say that the approach of this thesis is beyond criticism. But by applying a reflective manner to the methodologies and methods of comparison, the study is prepared to explore a pattern of comparative rhetoric study beyond the simplistic grid of confronting the two rhetorical traditions in an antithetic state.

Chapter Two

Negotiations between Two Rhetorical Traditions: Some Characterization of Modes of Thinking

Some Arguments on the Logic in Classical Chinese Texts

Led by Robert Kaplan’s study on the cultural-specific logic, contrastive and comparative rhetoric study between English and Chinese starts its own path in post-modern rhetorical study with a concentration on logic pattern investigations. Aside from the “-isms,” such as Marxism or Orientalism that feature the underlying attitudes in different cultures, I am more interested in studying the traditions of modes of thinking embodied in persuasive writing. Many scholars have conducted studies on the features of Chinese thinking. But few of them include detailed analysis of the steps of logic in texts.
Critiques on the “non-logicality” of Chinese thinking vary in a number of ways. Another pioneer in comparative rhetoric, Robert T. Oliver, aims at suggesting rhetorical connections between the West and the East in his study of classical Indian and Chinese rhetoric. In his investigation of one of the essential schools of Chinese traditional philosophy, Daoism, he strives to identify a unique pattern of communication from the texts. Leaving aside the problem of whether or how rhetoric exists in the classical Chinese philosophy, Oliver comments on the Daoist thought as essentially irrational. In analyzing Daoist principle of spontaneity and intuition in discovering truth, Oliver claims that the Daoist practice “cannot be accomplished by reason or by analytical intelligence, but by a non-mental, non-active cultivation of insight” (32). Vernon Jensen concurs with Oliver in his observation that the rhetoric of Daoism avoids critical thinking, and breeds ideas based on feelings rather than the mind (Jensen 227). Without assuming that there might be some different logic patterns used in those argumentations, Oliver and Jensen’s comments share one feature of analysis. Their conclusions tend to derive from the leap from a literal reading to their impressions of reading. Those impressions are then transformed into theories that generalize features of Daoist rhetoric. Such interpretation imperceptibly brings forward the writer’s inferences about the studied culture, and converts the taste of the original intention and role of the research on rhetoric to a definition of the other culture. Especially in comparative rhetorical study of Daoism, inaccurate analysis of the semantics and textual linguistics of Daoist argumentation becomes evidence of incommensurability and illogicality of Chinese rhetoric. For example, Carl Becker refers to Daoism as some mystical philosophy that only attracts those who are “tired of competition, and… those [who are] resigned in the face of authoritarian administrations”(88) in his “Reasons for the Lack of Argumentation and Debate in the Far East.” What I want to emphasize first in those critiques is that it is important to make clear the nature and province of the verdicts that a comparative rhetorical study comes up with. Particularly, I argue that value of “the others” have every reason to be the materials of study in comparisons, but not to be translated and assessed
approximately. In other words, in terms of the interpreter’s ethos in a comparative rhetorical study, one is legitimate in explaining certain rhetorical phenomenon, but lacks adequate standpoints to render valuation of another culture without sufficient emic knowledge of that system of values. Therefore, it is important for the interpreter to be aware of the type of the statement and conclusion he or she includes in comparative rhetorical study since it will become a theorized voice eventually. Yet, the fine line between a rhetorical inference and a representation of another value could be very difficult to grasp sometimes. It raises again the challenges of framing comparative analysis with appropriate approaches and methods. And interpreters should be reminded from time to time that what they conclude has to comply with what they have examined. General interpretations based on some individual or partial observations piecemeal should be avoided.

In response to the idea that reasoning patterns in Chinese texts are fundamentally different from those in English, some contemporary rhetoricians search for more precise interpretations of the logic and the contents of Chinese writing. Among those efforts, a study conducted by Sharon Blinn and Mary Garrett provides a methodologically solid but interestingly biased refutation. In that study, they prove the feasibility of enquiry into another rhetorical system through the lens of the West. They first confine the research object in the *Intrigues of the Warring States (Zhan Guo Ce 战国策)*, the representative Chinese text from the school of legalism in ancient Chinese philosophy. Then by employing the Aristotelian topics (“a fortiori,” “topoi of comparison,” “cause to effect,” “testimony,” and “simple consequences” (96-104)) in analyzing passages from the book, their argument implies that it is feasible to study the rhetoric as well as the logic of classical Chinese with Western rhetorical sensibility, since traditional European rhetorical canons could be applied to the understanding of those texts. They argue through textual demonstration that because the classical text employs Aristotelian topics, Chinese thought is rational and its patterns of reasoning may not be that alien (95-96). While the comparison itself is well-organized, its
approach of study still needs a second inspection. LuMing Mao comments that such methods they use with the aim of enlivening the understanding of Chinese reasoning and conceptualizing the value of Aristotelian topics as cross-cultural analytical tools reveals a subtle bias in the research approach. He points out that the position of Greek rhetorical tradition in the West does not need to be inherited in comparative rhetoric “where the point of origin can be non-Western and where tools for cross-cultural comparisons can be based on non-Western terms or concepts” (“Reflective” 414). During the development of comparative rhetoric, there have been lots of studies that meet the first half of the condition—led by the theories who aim at introducing their history and profiling their culture in English language. But it is not that easy to find rhetorical works that meet the full condition. Among the rhetorical studies on the English and Chinese traditions, Xing Lu’s *Rhetoric in Ancient China* is a perfect example which aims at probing into the Chinese rhetorical tradition on its own terms. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames also shed new light on this field of research with a couple of their collaborative works. Starting from an exploration on Confucius in *Thinking through Confucius* to *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*, their discussions keep displaying inclusive comparisons between English and classical Chinese rhetoric and philosophy with both etic and emic approaches.

I want to introduce some concepts from Hall and Ames’ *Anticipating China* in developing my theoretical frameworks. First, I want to discuss some tendency that rhetors are likely to exhibit in their study of logic patterns from the two cultures; Second, I want to introduce some interpretation of the distinct modes of thinking; Third, I want to offer some suggestions regarding ambiguity and vagueness that features the rhetoric of classical Chinese.

*Profiles of Thoughts I: Logocentrism*

To start over, while focusing my rhetorical study on the division of argumentation, I
chose the process of reasoning as one of the objects of investigation. With some exploration of the understanding and misunderstanding of the practice of persuading in classical Chinese, I hope to reveal some underlying problems that we need to pay attention to in rhetorical analysis. But before identifying those discrepancies in different logic patterns, logocentrism needs to be nailed down in order to neutralize interpretations and analysis. The term logocentric was first coined by the German philosopher Ludwig Klages to refer to the inclination of locating the logos as the core of any text or discourse in Western thought. Webster’s dictionary defines it as a philosophy holding “that all forms of thought are based on an external point of reference which is given a certain degree of authority,” or one “that privileges speech over writing as a form of communication” (732). Works of traditional philosophers, including Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Ferdinand de Saussure, are claimed to embody logocentrism for their value of speech over writing. In Disputers of the Tao (Dao), Augus Graham, among the others, puts the logic patterns of the Chinese and of the Western in antithetical positions to reveal the limitation caused by logocentrism in comparative rhetoric study. According to him,

The Chinese assumption seems to be that you can criticize correlations but you cannot dispense with them. The Western tradition, on the other hand, has long persisted in trying to detach the analytic completely from its background in the correlative, dismissing the latter as loose argument from analogy which we need in practical life but exclude from strict logic. It is only in the last half-century, with Ryle’s exposure of the category mistake, Kuhn’s proposal that all science assumes paradigms subverted not by demonstration but by correlative switches, Derrida’s uncovering of chains of oppositions at the back of logocentric thought, that the West seems finally to be losing faith in its two-thousand-year-old enterprise. (323)

Based on the same perception, Hall and Ames distinguishes Chinese thought pattern as “correlative thinking” (131) in contrast to the “causal thinking” (130) that they
claim English rhetoric represents. The recognition of logocentrism does more than confine the different logic patterns of the two cultures in a simplistic and antithetical position. It helps readers to conceive of the value of each standard in studying the rhetorical traditions since “there are people living in it,” and knowing “not only what is but what should be” (Graham 350). The necessary condition that “secures” the persistence of either logocentric or correlative thoughts over time in each culture, according to Graham, lies in the fact that correlative thinking is “adequate” for common use of language. “Institutions in general require that (correlative thinking) for most of the time we adjust to pattern automatically, analyzing only when faced with an occasion for choice” (350). Hall and Ames then add to Graham’s speculation with the idea that the transformation of the Western logic occurred in facing the diversity in beliefs, cultures, and ethnicities that created so many “occasions for choice,” and pushed people “toward causal analysis and away from the comforts of correlative associations” (131). While this statement still has room for further debate, it reveals to us the need for “the virtue of declining logocentrism” (131) in inspecting cultures that reside outside the trend. In comparing a culture associated with correlative thinking, like the ancient Chinese, with one featured by causal thinking, “a recognition of alternative priorities with respect to the two modes of thought” (131) could help us better approach another culture, and conduct objective comparison as well.

Profiles of Thoughts II: Conceptualizing the First and Second Problematics in Classical Chinese and English Thinking

David Hall and Roger Ames characterize classical Chinese thinking with “correlative,” and traditional Western reasoning with “causal.” According to their definition, causal thinking, also used as the synonym of rational thinking, gives emphasis to the explanatory and persuasive power of palpable causation in analytic, dialectical and analogical argumentation (198). The notion of causal thinking, as credited by the physical sense of “cause,” is bound with “efficient” and “material” associations (45).
In contrast, correlative thinking exposes spontaneity and intuition in the course of languaging. In one way, it could be a beneficial condition in creating alternatives, inclusiveness and aestheticism of comprehension. In another way, correlative thinking is personalized and particularized (55). For instance, the ancient Chinese character Gu 古 signifies a number of referents. It has two basic meanings—cause and because. The meanings of the word as “cause” comes in two ways—cause as the noun “reason,” and cause as a conjunction “so,” or “therefore.” In terms of its other use, it has four definitions: i) incident, ii) old as the opposition of “new”, iii) intentionally, and iv) originally/ at first/of course. Often times in one sentence, the word could adopt two or more meanings leading to different translations into modern Chinese. According to the context, sometimes it has only one fit, other times it could have more possible meanings. Thus, reading texts in ancient Chinese is, for most of the time, a highly reflective but situated process. The criterion of preciseness of interpretation depends on the incrementally broadening contexts—the context of the sentence, of the paragraph, the passage, the argument, the book, and even the entire system of thought. The value of conceptualizing and textualizing correlations among subjects in Chinese culture is embodied not only in its composing but also in the reading of it. Therefore, writings with correlative thinking, especially in ancient Chinese language, require sensibility of the integrity of general ideas as well as coherence in the dynamics of expression. As both English and Chinese writings aim at analyzing or exposing the substance and significance of a certain subject, English texts value the demonstration of logical output while Chinese analysis strives in breaking down the complex correlations among items (129). Compared with the dialectical performance of causal thinking, the product of correlative reasoning largely consists of explanations, descriptions, and analogies.

Grounded on the perception that Chinese is dominated by analogical thinking with a concentration on correlations, while English features causal reasoning with the dialectical operation of objective accounts, Hall and Ames contend that the distinctive
systems of valuation reveal both advantages and disadvantages in their rhetorical practices. Ascending from the labels of correlative thinking or causal thinking, Hall and Ames characterize two kinds of thought patterns as the First Problematic and the Second Problematic. Analogical language is “the concrete language” (107) of the First Problematic, which is rooted in systematic operations of images, metaphors, similarities as well as particularity. Thought of the First Problematic is more experiential in analyzing, and is interested in stating becoming, change, and impermanence. Because it is more of a process of conceptualization with interplay and broad associations, paradox and vagueness occur sometimes in order to achieve correctness and comprehensiveness in depiction and argumentation. Second Problematic thinking refer to logical and single-ordered analyzing principled by Aristotle’s four causes of thought (cause, material, motive, classification), and is attentive in definition, taxonomy, regulation, clarity, and definitiveness (40-141). Yet, the two Problematics of Thought are concluded in order to point out some characteristics of reasoning and expressing according to the different kinds of discursive needs. The modes of thinking of one culture do not necessarily operate within only one type of problematic. For instance, a comprehensive consideration of relation, interaction, and correlated objects is essential to the preciseness and permanence of any definition and regulation in researches. On the other hand, as a basic form of expression, analogy per se is built upon logic. Hall and Ames identify in their work that “Argument by analogy receives wide support from mathematical operations” of the resemblance and attributes. “It is argument based upon meaningful relationships aesthetically construed that gives rise in both classical Greece and China to the mode of thinking we shall be considering under the rubric ‘analogical thinking’” (42). However, the First Problematic of thought is presented more frequently and specifically than the second one throughout comparative rhetorical study.

As both might start with what is “formed by analogy from the human realm…to a de-emphasis upon the use of analogy” (Hall and Ames 55), the origins of concepts differ in traditions of thinking in ancient Greece and China. In the formation of
Western intellectual culture, ways of knowing and reasoning develop from the Sophistic tradition to casual thinking founded by Aristotelian logic. With the value on causes and regulations that could be consistently applicable in discovering the world, the shift of thought from the use of analogy to “a dependence instead upon the privileging of analytic and dialectical modes of argumentation” (55) occurs when “philosophers began to develop their understandings increasingly by recourse to the speculations of other thinkers rather than by appeal to the immediacies of experience and imagination” (74). Compared with the Western tradition, different styles of discursive practice in Chinese tradition lead to different process of evolution in logic. One major distinction resulted from the characteristic of analogical thinking in Chinese reasoning pattern creates circling comprehension and theorization from personal perspectives to authoritative philosophy. Hall and Ames explains the phenomenon as “correlative thinking will involve the resort to analogies rooted either in the immediate perspective of the agent of understanding or in that which is to be understood.” As a result, “interactions among various thinkers will emphasize accommodation over dialectical disputation” (55). The verbal and social harmony is achieved in the West in a way that philosophers are pressed to grab some universally applicable principles “abstracted from the differences dialectically” in facing the huge diversity in every aspect of the society (42-55). Whereas in ancient China, it is achieved partly for the favor of “the ‘aesthetic’ accommodation of alternative views” over dialectical disputation (55).

The reciprocal relationship between analogical and causal reasoning as well as their subtle evolution into logic patterns could be traced if we take a look at two culturally representative examples—Aristotle as the rhetor of argumentation, and Laozi as the rhetor of Dao. In conceptualizing the abstract subject, rhetoric, Aristotle uses causal analysis most of the time, and fewer analogies as auxiliary method. In On Rhetoric, Aristotle starts with a definition of rhetoric—“an antistrophos to dialectic” (28). In Kennedy’s translation, he keeps the Greek term to preserve its complete meaning. He footnotes the multiple definitions of antistrophos as “…commonly translated
‘counterpart.’ Other possibilities include ‘correlative’ and coordinate.’ The word can mean ‘converse.’... Aristotle is, however, probably thinking of, and rejecting, the analogy of the true and false arts elaborated by Socrates in the Gorgias, where justice is said to be an antistrophos to medicine and rhetoric” (On Rhetoric 28-29). In the short definition, Aristotle articulates the complex relationship between rhetoric and dialectic first in terms of their distinctive but associated roles in relation to truth. The essence and dynamics of the concept are enveloped in the Greek term. No matter whether it is for abstract and profound ideas such as rhetoric, or for simpler notions of common knowledge, definition is always the base of Aristotle’s analysis. In Book I, he states that “things are ‘practicable’ in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them. Things are done ‘easily’ when they are done either without pain or quickly: the ‘difficulty’ of an act lies either in its painfulness or in the long time it takes” (Bizzell 192). In terms of the structuring of those definitions, a basic pattern of causal thinking can be perceived therein. That is an operation of induction and enthymememe displayed with hierarchy.

Such hierarchical use of induction and deduction can also be found in ancient Chinese, but is characterized by analogical reasoning. Take a typical Daoist argument for example, Laozi states in Dao De Jing (Laozi 道德经) that “The performing of gracious good is like the flowing of water”, that “(We could benefit from water in studying Dao.) Water is beneficial to almost everything, and is not in conflict of interest with anything. It can go to places that people would normally deem unsuitable to frequent. So its state of existence is close to Dao. Water knows where to find good places to go(—the right place); water knows how to go deep and broad(—insight and generosity); water is good at doing and spreading what is good to others(—benevolence); water is good at keeping time(—credibility); water is good at

3 “Shangshan ruoshui 上善若水” Usually translated as “The highest good is like water,” or “the highest excellence is like that of water”, an idea of resembling the traits of water in doing or being good. A literal translation of the core word shan is “good” or “benevolence.” In this statement, Laozi made a distinction of the good he is arguing from other states of goodness. What he refers to is good in a better sense, or a sense of “upper-class” goodness. The above version provided is in my own translation. Due to the focus of my analysis, I am not going to explain further on the precise meaning of the passage I cited. The translation is simplified for the purpose of analyzing.
managing and governing (—capacity of control); water has energy to do things (—manageability); water is prompt (—the right time). It is its appropriate fit with the world that makes water good. If we could learn from or imitate such leisure existence, we can deal with any encounters” (Laozi 46). Regardless of further explanation of its connotations and puns, it is not difficult to figure out the basic structure of this statement in brief translation. However, it is apparent that Laozi did not aim at defining what “gracious good” is dialectically, but at portraying it by analyzing the relationship among people, water, and way of living (which can be considered part of Dao’s concepts) via analogies and metaphors. In its rhetorical sense, such practice of “defining” Dao confirms Hall and Ames’ observation that correlative analysis reflects spontaneous thinking that “would accept the relevant complex of correlations as the analysandum, and would not violate the integrity of the correlated items” (78). Throughout ancient Chinese studies on argumentation, the value of articulating correlations in reasoning can also be seen frequently. For example, in Wenxin Diaolong (The Literary Sense and the Carves of Dragon 文心雕龙), Liu Xie states that argumentation is made up of elaborations of the reasons, correlations, and the rationale4 (691), and that sophisticated argumentation can generate meaning smoothly with a network of associations5 (690). In contrast, the dialectical operations of causal arguments can be featured as “the oppositional interplay of elements without the goal of contradiction, synthesis, or sublation” (Hall and Ames130). Both systems of argumentation work with correlations in a contradictory sense. Classical Chinese reasoning establishes its credibility and inclusiveness with the flexibility contained in correlations and interplay, while that of English are founded by generating certainty out of them.

Texts formed by the Second Problematic thinking are not difficult to comprehend with a map of logic. But for most readers who do not have enough knowledge of the

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4 The original text is “[叙]理成论.”
5 “…其义贵圆通.”
First Problematic thinking, classical Chinese texts are frequently read as preposterous metaphysics. The virtue of declining logocentrism and the awareness of First/Second Problematics are not enough in providing substantial help for understanding with an etic approach. I do not deny that ancient Chinese texts are decorated with vagueness both in words and in analysis. Partly for the complexities of correlations, partly for the alternatives of reference, ambiguity to a certain extent is seldom questioned in classical Chinese writing. In fact, as I will discuss further in the next chapter, it is slightly praised in ancient Chinese rhetoric. While a large part of ambiguity comes from the multiple definitions of words, writers are encouraged to streamline their use of words, to better create meaning to be flexible (Liu 690). But in English argumentation, Hall and Ames analyze its certainty from an interpretation of the value of definition that “a definition which places limits upon the sense and use of a given term presupposes a definitional context which itself sets limits upon the degrees of variability a stipulation may possess within that context” (94). No matter whether it is the ways of knowing or the methods of accommodating alternative views, these acts in the two cultures are “radically distinct among proponents of the two sorts of thinking” (102). Given the dilemma, Hall and Ames explore the applicability of “the recognition and cultivation of intertheoretical and intercultural vagueness in facing the futile discussions of relativism” (166). They classify the idea of vagueness into two catalogues—“conceptual and historical” (166). In terms of the latter type, stating the importance of various narrative accounts that unveiled lots of historical vagueness, the productiveness of vagueness regarding/from history is realized via the effort “to save these accounts…refuse in any final sense to privilege one account over others by cultivating tolerance in the active entertainment of alternative narratives” (Hall and Ames 167). In terms of the former one, conceptual vagueness, Hall and Ames highlight the term “cluster concept” to make a reference to the “accreted cluster of associations” (167) as a consequence of meaning-making when “an idea may be in principle specifiable within a theoretical or narrative context, in the absence of such a

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6 In the book, Liu wrote “…其义贵圆通，辞忌枝碎”
context it lacks a univocal sense. [So] Its practical meaning …is vague with respect to any number of theories or narratives.” Therefore, they entail the protection of “the vagueness of the notions central to the interactions as a means of serving the pragmatic ends of conversation” (167).

Chapter Three
Opening the Conversation: A Comparison of the Structures of Argumentation

In thinking of developing a conversation between English and Chinese rhetorical traditions, I choose Aristotle and Mozi as the conservationists for two main reasons:

1) For the consideration of their role in the early development of their respective rhetorical traditions. With all the development of rhetorical study, it is acknowledged that rhetoric and theories of rhetoric in ancient times are of great value as they represent the origin and the root of each rhetorical tradition. Just as the fact that Aristotle had profound impact in European-American thinking and rhetoric, the representative classical Chinese philosophers establish the Chinese rhetorical tradition. Although language changes and ancient Chinese is no longer the official language for daily communication, the classical language still plays a role in modern rhetoric under the name of “tradition.” Both Aristotle (384 B.C.-322 B.C.) and Mozi (480 B.C.-420 B.C.) represent the early ancestors of thinking in each culture. Before Aristotle, philosophers with major influence in ancient Greece are Isocrates and Plato; whilst before Mozi, noted philosophers are Confucius and Laozi.

2) For the consideration of the significance of their contributions to the development of logic in each rhetorical tradition. In ancient Greece, Aristotle is the founder of scientific research and philosophical exploration. His large number of works on logic was compiled into six books around the 1st century A.D. The conception of formal logic advanced by Aristotle in Organon dominated the Western form of thinking until the advances of mathematical logic in the 19th century. It is also referred to as
Aristotelian logic nowadays. Before him, there was no genuine research on the subject of logic as a discipline. His invention of syllogism in Modal Logic is transplanted and used in his study of rhetoric to discover modes of inference and dialectic argumentation. Mozi in ancient China did not establish a systematic study of logic. But he is the first Chinese sage who introduced and discussed its use in argumentation. Mozi was an ancient Chinese philosopher in the Warring States period (480 B.C.-376 B.C.). He established Mohism----one of the schools of ancient Chinese philosophy as part of the so-called pragmatic philosophy or non-metaphysics in China. Similar to The Analects of Confucius, the book Mozi is a collection of Mozi’s\(^7\) discourses and experiences recorded by himself, his disciples, and the later Mohists. It includes discussions on politics, warfare, philosophy, ethics, logic, and scientific technology etc. Greek logic, Hindu logic, and Mohism logic (also known as the argumentation of Mo or Mo Bian 墨辩) are the three logic systems founded in the ancient world. Mozi developed the concepts of bian (argumentation 辨), lei (category 类), and gu (cause 故) in the history of Chinese logic, and advanced the demonstration of logic use in Chinese tradition. I choose to use his texts as the main source of examples of classical Chinese for its significance to the development of logic in ancient Chinese rhetoric. His writing, as well as Aristotle’s work, will be the primary texts I will look into in this comparative study. These two resources will be used with two different functions: i) as the representative rhetorical theories at the time; ii) as texts that best embody distinct thinking patterns in the two traditions. The concentration on the use of logic in their work allows comparison of their rhetorical strategies or principles of argumentation.

\(^{A Discrepancy in the Concepts of Argumentation}\)

My comparison of the structuring of argumentation has to start with an elaboration of their different origins. Although the explanatory and persuasive nature of argument does not change in various cultures, the idea of argumentation differs from classical

\(^7\) Also written as Mo-Tzu.
Chinese to English tradition. First and foremost, the genre of argumentation shall be differentiated. The historical environment that cultivates rhetorical practice of classical Chinese determines its great distinctions. I will go through its background briefly here to provide some trace of the formation of classical Chinese rhetoric on argumentation. An identifiable history of ancient China begins with the Xia dynasty in approximately 2000 B.C., and descends through two different dynasties, Shang and Zhou, from 2000 B.C. till about 770 B.C. when the Warring States Period (770 B.C.-476 B.C) began. From Xia to Shang dynasties, Chinese rhetorical activities were featured by mythological and ritualistic communication inherited from the dominance of rituals. Starting with the Zhou dynasty, an aristocratic class is formed in the society. The value and virtue established by the Zhou aristocracy was widely spread, and became what is called the Rites of Zhou (Zhou Li). The dissemination of the Rites played an essential role in strengthening the early cultural values and social orders of the ancient Chinese world. They are also what Confucius dedicated himself to promote after Zhou’s decadency. During the time period from 722 B.C. to 221 B.C., which is historically known as the Pre-Qin Period, small states engaged in consistent warfare which was eventually ended by the unification of the Qin dynasty. Therefore, the time is also referred to as the Warring States Period. The power struggles and military expediency of each state increased the need of skillful advisers and military consultants (Lu 6). Under this cultural background, persuasive discourse of various kinds emerged mainly between political consultants and the rulers of those states. About 403 B.C., various discourses began to emerge into schools according to the general affiliations they share in politics and principles of virtue as well as in rhetoric. The one hundred schools of thought (bai jia zheng ming 百家争鸣) are formed during this course of free expression and intellectual vitality. Among the hundreds of schools, five of them became popular, and were accepted as the main stream discourse. The school of Confucius (551 B.C.-238 B.C.) is the earliest among
the five. The other four are Mingjia (546-295), Daoism (500-286), Mohism (480-420), and Legalism (280-233). The core thought that Confucius advocates is Li 礼 passed down by the Rites of Zhou; Ming jia’s essential contribution is its establishment of the view of ming (naming) and bian (distinction) in argumentation; Daoism stands for the view of Dao; Mohism, as part of it derived from Confucianism, is known for its advance of mo bian (Mohist argumentation), and the idea of jian ai (universal love 兼 爱) and fei gong (non-aggression 非攻); the advocacy that distinguishes Legalism from the other schools is its interests in governance and the viewpoint for the ruler of a state instead of the applicability for the mass population. The outstanding contribution of Mohism to ancient Chinese rhetoric is its advancement of the use of logic combined with his development in ming (naming) and bian (classifying and arguing) in argumentation. But what differentiates it from the argumentation of the other schools is not only its modes of reasoning, but also the specific type of argument it made with a concentration on the advocacy of Mozi’s core philosophy jian aĩi (universal love) and fei gong (non-aggression). It is for these two major reasons that the argumentation of Mo is referred to separately.

The strands of rhetorical practices derived from the five schools of philosophy are concluded differently by different scholars. But all of the interpretations agree on the point that the genre of argumentation is classified into different categories. According to Mary Garrett in her “Classical Chinese Conceptions of Argumentation and Persuasion”, the three key words that identify rhetorical practices are bian (dispute, debate, argue 辯), shuo (argue, explain, discuss, persuade 说), and shui (discuss, persuade, convince 说) (105-15). In Xing Lu’s summary, these are not all of what is used to classify the speech theory and practice in ancient Chinese. There are six terms
available in cataloguing: yan 言 (speech, language); ci 辭(mode of speech); jian 諫 (advising); shui/shuo 说 (persuasion, explanation); ming 名(naming); and bian 辨 (distinction, argumentation) (Lu 72). Yan and ci are used to describe forms of speech in theorizing language use; jian and shui/shuo are used to describe rhetorical practice of persuasion; ming and bian is the two earliest rhetorical terms created to conceptualize means of persuasion and argumentation. Xing Lu outlines the multiple definitions of each term in her work as follows:

“Yan: auxiliary,—speech, talks,—use of language (symbols)
Ci: modes of speech, types of discourse, eloquence, style
Jian: giving advice, persuasion
Shui/Shuo: persuasion/ explanation, idea, thought
Ming: naming,—symbol using,—rationality, epistemology
Bian: distinction, change, justice, —eloquence, arguments, persuasion, debate, disputation, discussion” (89).

The main thread of study on classical Chinese rhetoric is the ideas of ming (naming 名) and bian (distinction, argumentation 辨) according to Xing Lu’s analysis. Both concepts are used and developed by the five schools in argumentation over time. Designated through naming, dialectical and argumentative discourses are conducted by the members of Mingjia over issues of how the particularity and universality engaged in naming promoted or handicapped the maturing of social justice and the understanding of the universe. In the school of Confucianism, the idea of zheng ming (the rectification of names 正名) was advocated by Confucius. For him, the concept of ming was not only about names and naming, but also affiliated with titles. In the latter practice of ming, Mohism brought innovation to its application in classification. In Mo Bian (the Argumentation of Mo), which was written by the later Mohists, ming was catalogued into three uses—da ming (universal/common naming 达名); lei ming (naming by categories 类名); and si ming (particular/private naming
As pointed out by Lu, “Ming, in this sense, was understood as a means of labeling to classify and categorize the objective world and its function evolved from political interests to rational interests” (Lu 83). The notion of lei ming (naming by classifying) was further promoted by Mozi and the later Mohists. Zhi lei (understanding categories of classification 知类) is one of the rhetorical notions emphasized by Mozi. From his foregrounding of zhi lei, logical use of analogy is promoted in argumentation and debating. According to the book Mozi, the pattern of using categories and analogy in deduction becomes the main rhetorical strategy. For example, a common pattern of deduction can be seen in the passage “to steal fruit and steal horses was to commit an act of unrighteousness because it causes people to suffer, then to kill one person belongs to the same category of criminal. To kill one person is unrighteous, then to kill ten persons is of the same category of criminal to a greater degree. Therefore, it is fallacious if people know to condemn stealing but not killing. So is it to warfare” (Mozi 73-75). Aside from lei, another logical concept proposed by the school of Mohism was gu (cause, reason or because 故) (Lu 218). As I stated before, gu can be employed as both the “reasons” and the “because” that lead to a conclusion. In general, it gives rise to the principle of mastering the background knowledge of certain objects in argumentation. As the first school of philosophy which formulated an explicit theory of language, persuasion, and argumentation, the work of Mohism and that of Aristotle bear striking similarities in terms of rhetorical principles. Xing Lu commented in her introduction to Mohism that “if Confucianism is the most influential school of thought with regard to Chinese culture and political systems, Mohism is the school most resembling Western logical, religious, and ethical systems” (Lu 203). Even with the resemblance, such a comparison needs to be situated. The comparative study I am going to make will be based on the structures of argumentation instead of any general comparisons of their academic or sociocultural significance.
Based on the different formation of argumentative practice in ancient China, “argumentation” in classical Chinese is not an exact counterpart to the dialectic reasoning and analysis in English texts. Generally speaking, bian, shui/shuo, jian, and shu\textsuperscript{10} constitute the idea of argumentation in ancient Chinese. But all those subtly different genres of argumentation can be concluded as argument made to advise or persuade a specific type of audience for most of the time—the kings or the ruling population. This is another major difference between classical Chinese and English argumentation. The audiences of various arguments recorded in early Chinese classics are usually the controlling class of a society. But in ancient Greece, argumentation is used in a variety of fields targeting a diverse audience. According to Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, argumentation begins with ceremonial, political, and forensic speeches. The propositions are classified into ethical, physical, and logical topics (\textit{On Rhetoric} 49-51). In classical Chinese represented by the texts from the five schools, due to the specific need in oratory for military competition, most speeches and disputations were generated for advising and persuading. Ethical topics become the essential contents of most of the work as it enables persuaders to argue with an acceptable approach to the kings. Due to the extra concern for the audience, argumentations usually needed to be composed carefully so that the speaker’s idea could be delivered with minimized threats to himself. It gives rise to the tradition of “reasoning with skillful indication from metaphors (喻巧而理至)” (Liu 690) in classical Chinese rhetoric, so that persuaders were still able to defend themselves in facing risky tasks of persuasion. Jian and shui are the two genres that appeared more frequently in ancient Chinese philosophical discourse (Lu 82). In Lu’s interpretation, “the concept and practice of jian were needed as political expedients either for gaining more power or for self-defense” (78). Speakers engaging with the practice of jian were known as jian shi (advisers 諫士). Jian usually took the form of a dialogue and conversation with the ruler or the king in suggesting or promoting

\textsuperscript{10} 上书. It is a genre similar to jian.
political and military strategies. Although both jian and shui include extensive use of analogy and metaphors, the techniques of persuasion varied between the two. One of the differences is that jian is grounded with more ethical appeals while shui “appealed to the audience with utilitarian considerations and an analysis of practical benefits” (Lu 81). Consequently, discourse of shui provides plans or clever schemes for military, diplomatic, and governing affairs whereas jian gives more concern to ethics and the mistakes of the king. The examples of classical Chinese speeches I am going to use are texts of jian mostly derived from the book of Mozi. The reason for my choice is two-fold: first, I use texts of jian over shui for the skillful practice of persuasion rather than promotion. As has been introduced, jian was speech or disputation given by the adviser to the king to make certain suggestions convincing. Such speeches aimed more at “what to do” than “how to do”. For example, The Intrigues of the Warring States that Blinn and Garrett chose for the comparative study is a collection of speeches made by the representative of the school of Legalism to promote its principles and methods of governing to the rulers. The texts I’m going to use from Mozi are disutations targeted at rectifying the rulers of their possible wrongdoings. They are usually composed deliberatively rhetorical. Second, Mozi is known as the first school of philosophy that explicitly put logic to use in argumentation. It might not fully embody a sophisticated use of rhetorical components compared with the later work, but it displays the prime form of deduction and induction in structuring analogical argumentation. Moreover, what distinguished him and his philosophy from the other schools was not only his contribution to the development of logic use and scientific technology, but also his implementing the advocacy of fei gong (the principle of non-aggression) with full strength. In that time of turmoil, Mozi went to persuade the kings who intended to invade. If his advising failed, he would lead some of his disciples to the targeted state, and help it with its defense. It was with such enforcement that his and the later Mohists’ theories continued being solid.

Between the Structures Themselves

Aristotle points out in his theories of rhetoric that as speeches composed differently
correspond to different genres, they follow “a structural pattern” in delivery (On Rhetoric 257). The structure of argumentation is first revealed in Book III of On Rhetoric regarding arrangement and delivery of speeches. According to Aristotle, a speech begins with prooimiom (introduction), and developed by antiparabole (reply by comparison). Epanodos (recapitulation) is needed sometime “when there is debate on two sides of a question (for there is often both accusation and response)” (259).

Following the basic structure, prothesis (statement of the proposition) and pistis (proof of the statement) are needed as what constitute the introduction and reply. In general, the necessary parts of a complete speech are prooemium, prothesis, pistis, and epilogue (summary conclusion) (259). Thus, “a simple but versatile” (White, Billings 84) model of argumentation is shaped as:

I. Introduction (prooimiom)
   A. Lead-in
   B. Overview of the situation
   C. Background information

II. Position statement (Prothesis-thesis)

III. Appeals (ethos, pathos, logos) and proof (pistis)

IV. Refutation (epanodos)

V. Conclusion (epilogue)
   A. Highlights of key points presented
   B. Recommendations
   C. Illuminating restatement of thesis (White and Billings 84)

According to specific situations of argument, persuaders choose to provide necessary information in the opening, and close the speech in view of the different needs of the whole process of reasoning. In addition to the basic structure of dialectic analysis, Aristotle lays emphasis on the use of ethos, pathos, and logos appeals in argumentation that resonates with the idea of “deliberative rhetoric” (On Rhetoric 52) in his recognition. This classical model of argumentation reveals on the one hand a
framework of demonstrating dialectic reasoning; on the other hand, a pattern of thinking in English culture as processing of enthymeme—a kind of demonstration that “differs from the syllogism of strict logic” (Bizzell 180). According to Aristotle’s definition, a syllogism is “a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things' supposed results of necessity because these things are so” (Prior Analytics 108); while an enthymeme is a “rhetorical syllogism” and “the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction” (Bizzell 180-2). Enthymeme becomes “the substance” of persuasion and “the business of dialectic” (179-82) in Aristotle’s analysis. It is clear that Aristotle structures argumentation based upon a rhetorical use of syllogism in order to secure the rhetoric of dialectic discourses— “with regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof: just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric” (182). But there could be case when the proposition of an argument is able to stand as long as a syllogism could be established in the process. For example, suppose white horses are not horses. The statement can be proved by a type of syllogism, camestres11 (Prior analytics 230-231), in which the logic equation goes as “if all A are B, and no A are C, then no B are C.” The demonstration is as follows:

Premises A—there are yellow horses and black horses

Premises B—there are horses

Premises C—there are white horses.

All yellow horses and black horses are horses, and no yellow ones and black ones are white horses, therefore no horses are white horses.

In the records of the school of Mingjia, one of its representatives, Gong-sun Long 公孙龙子 argued with a city guard by using this syllogism in order to pass through the gate (Gong-sun Long 6). In its extreme, such a syllogism reveals limitations in reasoning as what it deals with is more of a presentation of logic than an inquiry of

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11 Transformed from the primary syllogism “if all B are A, and all C are B, then all C are A,” the formula of a camestres situation is “Aab, Eac, therefore Ebc” which means “if all A are B, and no A are C, then no B are C.”
the substance of objects. Of course, this example is just an informal display of inference. Generally speaking, enthymeme founded a solid framework for logic processing in argumentation. As a logic system that has dominated the European tradition of thought for thousand years, Aristotelian logic featured by syllogism and enthymeme possesses its absolute authority until the emergence of mathematical logic which was advanced from it in the 19th century. Aside from the basic process and rhetorical appeals revealed from the classical model of argumentation, people then found more requirements on logic proof of various evidences in analysis.

When it comes to the modern world of more complex rhetorical situations, the use of argumentation and the audience diversify. The Toulmin model was invented to understand the use of evidence and appeals. It concentrates on a more specific structure of reasoning in addition to the classical model. Stephan Toulmin argues that aside from proving the statement by evidence, the arguer must investigate and defend for the evidence and the assumptions he or she makes from the evidence as well. A logical demonstration of certain topic alone is not adequate in solving complicated human issues. The system of the Toulmin model of argumentation can be seen as:

I. Claim (the thesis or premise of the argument that the arguer wants the audience to accept.)

II. Data/grounds (the facts and/or logical reasons that demonstrate the truth of the claim. Evidence is different according to different disciplines. For example, it could consist of results of experiments or mathematical analyses in report for scientific research or quotations from works of literature.)

III. Warrants (assurance that the data are based on solid principles, thus contributing to the validity and trustworthiness of the claim.)

IV. Backing (Assurance that the warrant is sound)

V. Qualifiers/ rebuttal (any exceptions to the rule or claim under certain circumstances.)

(White and Billings 111-118)
Different from the classical structure that targets the oral practice of persuasion, Toulmin’s model is generally applicable to the various types of modern argumentation. The introduction section and writer’s clarification of his or her ethos in the classical model is merged into the opening part for the claim in this model. Logic is developed in a hierarchy that each of the next stages is given to support the previous one until the reliability of the evidence reaches its maximum. It raises more attention to an inclusive examination of the evidence provided and other possibilities.

In Chinese rhetorical tradition, the structure of argumentation is not unified explicitly until the formation of *ba gu wen* (eight-ply essay 八股文)\(^\text{12}\) in the Ming dynasty (1368 A.D.-1644 A.D.). *Ba gu wen* is just a particular form of writing until it was institutionalized to be the common structure of argumentation in the national examination at that time period. But its “officialization” made it a recorded model of argumentation. The structure of writing in classical Chinese can be found in it as well as in the composing of poetry that features the beginning of Chinese literature. It can be sketched as:

I. *Qi* 启/起(opening-up)
   i) Lead-in
   ii) Overview of the situation
   iii) Background information

II. *Cheng* 承(supporting)
   i) More introduction of the topic if needed
   ii) Claim/Thesis
   iii) Statement
   iv) Analysis or reasoning of the statement

III. *Zhuan* 转(transition)
   i) Contradistinction/Counter-argument

\(^{12}\) It is also referred to as eight-legged essay. i.e. Ulla Connor’s *Contrastive Rhetoric*, 1999, p.37.
ii) Warrants

iii) Rebuttal

IV. He 合 (closing)

i) Revisit the claim

ii) Conclusion

iii) Advocacy

Originated from poetry and couplets usually composed of four sentences in classical Chinese, this model of writing was first used to describe the functioning of each sentence. It becomes the primary structure of *ba gu wen* in the latter development. The main body of such kind of writing is consisted of the part *cheng* and *zhuan* in which a regulated mode of reasoning, *si bi* (four groups of contradistinction 四比)\(^\text{13}\), must be employed. Although its formula brought extreme difficulty to an effective argumentation (since it is not naturally feasible for lots of times), it required more demonstration of either refutation or support. In addition to the writing of argumentation, other writings in Chinese (explanatory or descriptive essays not included) also follow this model as it plays the role more of a logic pattern than a structure to comply with in Chinese culture. The subheadings I listed in the model are not an elaboration of all that a writer needs to cover in his or her writing. Responding to various genres in Chinese, a writer may choose to fulfill one or several of them in actual writing. For instance, poetry writing will not leave as much room for the writer to develop an argument as in a traditional form of argumentation. Therefore, some concluding sentence in a poem could also be the final warrant that the poet wants to present. Advocacy is not required in every piece of writing, so is the overview of the background knowledge. Similar to the English structure of writing, the place where a thesis or claim shall be presented is not settled in every piece of writing. Many times

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\(^{13}\) While it’s referred to as “four” contradistinction, the argumentation of this section is actually constructed of two groups of analysis. One group for the pros, and the other for the cons of certain proposition. Each group is required to be written as a couplet. In all, there shall be eight sentences as couplets to each other in this section. That is one of the reasons why the genre is named as “eight-ply essay.”
it will be in the opening or the second part, at other times it could also be placed at the end. I will use one of Mozi’s writing to illustrate this pattern of structure.

“(1)…The most dreadful thing nowadays is to attack another state. People don’t condemn it. (2) Instead, they praise the deed, and call it righteous. (3) If to kill one person is to commit an act of unrighteousness, and [the killer] shall be sentenced to death; then to kill ten people is to commit the same unrighteousness to a greater degree, and [the killer] shall be sentenced to some retribution ten times greater than the death penalty;… (4) At the moment, all gentlemen\textsuperscript{14} in the world will condemn him for his wrongdoing, and call it an unrighteous deed. (5) Nowadays, there are somebody committing even greater unrighteousness — attacking other states. (6) But people don’t condemn him. (7) Instead, [there are people] praise such kind of action, and call it righteous. (8) They indeed don’t know it is unrighteous, and even record his (the attacker’s) words to pass down to the succeeding generations. (9) Even suppose they know, how to explain their act of writing his words down and handing them over? (10) Now, if there were a man who, upon seeing a little blackness, should say it is black, but upon seeing much, should say it is white, then we should think he could not tell the difference between black and white; if there were a man who, upon tasting some little bitterness, should tell it is bitter, but upon tasting much, should say it is sweet, then we should think he could not tell the difference between bitterness and sweetness.

\textsuperscript{14} The original word is \textit{junzi} whose meaning has been discussed in the opening part of this thesis. Literally it is translated as “gentleman.”
He: gentlemen are confused of the criterion about righteousness. (Advocacy: Intrusion shall be condemned.)

state is committed people do not know that they should condemn it. (12) On the contrary, it is applauded, called righteous. (13) Can this be said to be knowing the difference between the righteous and the unrighteous? (14) Hence we know the gentlemen of the world are confused about the difference between righteousness and unrighteousness.”

This is one of the passages from Mozi’s argumentation of fei gong I (Non-Aggression I). As I stated earlier, in consideration of the audience, critique at that time was composed with caution. Both diction and arrangement of an argumentation have to be made implicit yet indicative. If we put aside the skill of diction, one of the methods left for the writer to make his proposition conceivable is to emphasize it by repetition. Of course, the structure of argumentation has to be clear in order to express the statement effectively. At first sight, as stated in the caption of the example, the thesis of this argumentation can be read as “people nowadays are confused about the criterion of righteousness.” Although it is not given in straight-forward terms in the opening part, the author criticized through an introduction the situation that people at that time didn’t know what to praise and what not to. Via a definition of unrighteousness in the second part, cheng, the writer positioned his statement to clarify what he meant by arguing “gentlemen now are confused about the criterion of righteousness.” In the third part, zhuan, Mozi offered backings for his proposition. First, he examined the deed of recording the attacker’s argument with two opposing premises to emphasis its harm. Then he offered more qualifiers to demonstrate how “people are confused about the criterion about righteousness.” In the concluding section, he paraphrased his thesis in a more explicit way to strengthen his critique of the decadency in people’s moral standards. However, if Mozi’s proposition was as general as “people are confused of the criterion of righteousness,” the argument would not be rigorous in that throughout his demonstration, he argued over one aspect of its performance—people are unaware of the unrighteousness when the consequence

15 Part of the translation takes reference from Xing Lu’s translation in her texts.
of an unjustifiable action is too big to perceive. His accumulated illustration over this aspect of the confusion suggests attention to the cause as well as the substance of such confusion—capitulation of morality to the dominant power and violence. More specifically, the ruling class of the society holds such power and responsibility in generating confusion on a massive scale. In view of the consequence, the arguer could only insinuate what was wrong with social justice, instead of straightforwardly criticizing his intended audience. Textual evidence of this interpretation can be found in two places. Firstly, only the rulers have the power to launch massive killing and invasion. Secondly, the only reason why “somebody” would be “praised” for slaughter was that he is the king, one who owns all the power in a feudal monarchy. The representatives of the “gentlemen,” who include the officials and the aristocracy of the empire, would be the first crowd to echo with and “record” the king’s ambition. Therefore, based upon the primary assumption of the statement, Mozi was rather criticizing the king’s attempt of attacking, and arguing that initiating intrusion is by no means righteous no matter how the surroundings “justify” for it, and that the ruler should be responsible for the massive decadence of morality in his empire. In this sense, the real argument Mozi was presenting under the primary one filled with repetitive analogies was:

**Introduction of Thesis** (sentence 1-2)
People are confused of the criterion of righteousness. And the unwise ruler is the culprit of collective immorality and massive death

**Data/Ground I** (3-4)
The people understand what is, and what is not righteous

**Data/Ground II** (5-7)
The reason why they become confused of the criterion is because of the influence of power and violence
It is via such analogical reasoning that Mozi promoted the idea of “non-aggression” with his brand of argumentation. As Mozi explained himself, “in the case of the ruler’s committing violence in the state, to go and warn him will be called insolence, and to offer warning through those around him will be called meddling with counsel” (Lu 205). Criticisms regarding the indirectness in classical Chinese texts (Connor 39, *Mencius on the Mind* XV) are worthy of a second thought. Indeed, the classical Chinese way of developing an argument over a certain issue is different from the
Western approach. On one hand, it could not be arranged in a way of displaying the pros and cons, or listing causes as demonstration of reasoning since it depended largely on the adaptation of the rulers; on the other hand, analogical thinking enables institution to argue with metaphors and culturally specific associations. Although such performance of reasoning is valued, it does not lessen the rational nature of argumentation in classical Chinese. The logical structuring is the platform based on which the design of analogies, propositions, and advocacies emerge. However, a circling pattern of arguing can be detected in this structure of argumentation as the final statement echoes with the opening thesis (as illustrated by the dot-line in the figure). It is a feature of Chinese writing to emphasis the thesis statement at the end of an argumentation as its completion.

As illustrated by the figure, Toulmin’s model of writing can be transplanted to this text of jian from Mozi. But this doesn’t ensure a general applicability in all of the classical Chinese argumentation. The model of qi-cheng-zhuan-he can serve as the common structure of writing in Chinese because of its general conceptualization of the sense of composing. In this example, it can be interpreted as the structure of argumentation that shares similarities with the English model. But unlike the classical or the Toulmin model of argumentation, qi-cheng-zhuan-he is not a principled illustration of dialectical arrangement of causes and evidences. The concrete models and principles of structuring an argument in classical Chinese lie not only in this representation of the general pattern of writing, but more in the modes of reasoning, such as the principle of ming (naming) and bian (argumentation, distinction). Mozi’s theory, as the first school of philosophy that established explicitly a logical strategy of argumentation, is worth examining in its theorizing of deduction and induction with the tradition of ming and bian in Chinese writing. After comparing the basic models of argumentation, I am going to investigate in the following study some rhetorical principles in classical Chinese that work as the frameworks of argumentation. In addition, I am going to examine whether or how those principles can be compared with Aristotle’s components of argumentation.
Aside from 明 and 辩, the core of Mozi’s theory on logic mainly deals with three concepts: 貫 (cause, reason, because 故), 理 (rational 理), and 类 (category 类).

However, according to different scholars, interpretation of Mozi’s rhetorical principles might differ. In Xing Lu’s review, the rational system of argumentation of Mohism is composed of 明故 (understanding cause and because), 小法 (knowing how to classify), and 知类 (knowing the kind or category) (218). As a form of advancement in Mohism, these three components Xing Lu focuses on are coined by the later Mohists. Either way, the two groups of components deal with the similar units in Mozi’s rational system. 貫, 理, 类, according to Mozi, are three principles of inference in argumentation. However, he neither explored the logical relation among the three to establish a discipline of logic, nor did he demonstrate the means of inference by 貫, 理, and 类 as rhetorical theories in his philosophy. Different from Mozi, Aristotle employs variables to syllogism, from which he invented logic equations to found his discipline. By making this distinction, I am not suggesting that development on logic study in the two cultures differs since then. But by starting from this observation of Mozi’s elaboration of logic, I hope to reveal some propensities in the processing of Chinese reasoning.

Mozi established his concept of 貫 which is elaborated specifically by the later Mohists. According to their definition, 貫 refers to “reasons” or premises for drawing inferences. The concept is classified into Major reasons (大故 大故) and Minor reasons (小故 小故). In one of the later Mohists’ texts, Major reasons was identified as “having this, it will not necessarily be so: lacking this, necessarily it will not be so” while Minor reasons was “having this, it will necessarily be so: lacking this, necessarily it will not be so” (Lu 217). In Aristotle’s study, Major reasons are like sufficient conditions, and Minor reasons necessary conditions. That is, suppose there is variable A, and variable B, and a third situation C which is constant. Major reasons are for situations when “C if A implies C”. Minor reasons are for situations when “B
if B implies C.” However, Mohists didn’t calculate the variability in each branch. Instead, Major and Minor reasons are used to describe the distinction between the sufficient situation and the necessary condition. Later Mohists illustrate the idea as: i) a major reason situation is like eyesight “with which one can see, but without which one cannot see;” ii) a minor reason situation is like two ends “with which a line is not necessarily formed, but without which a line cannot be formed” (Mozi 284, Lu 263). Although without particular advancement in the study of pure logic, Mohists stated explicitly such logical patterns in their work in reference to a basic form of inference in argumentation. In spite of this, Mohists’ articulation of logical relations was for most of the time abstract. As for the second component, li 理, it mainly refers to the notion of rational. Mohists stated their intention of isolating the term as a suggestion of valuing the rationality and the substance of the relation between dialectic objects over the quantity of evidence (Lu 321). If applied in Gong-sun Long’s argument of “White horses are not horses,” Mozi’s refutation would be wrestling with the li that the state of existence will not change with appearance, so horses in any colors are all horses. In terms of the third component, lei(类), is a crucial term in the field of Chinese argument. Comparatively speaking, different from Aristotle’s inference of the “implying” relationship16, Mohists apply the “kind” relationship in their argumentation. A basic principle as well as the model of Mohist reasoning process is yi lei qu (to accept according to the kind 以类取) and yi lei yu (to propose according to the kind 以类予) (Mozi 321). A simple demonstration of the model is that if two things are of the same lei, they are put into the same category, and the same conclusions can be drawn when comparing with the other; when they fall into two different categories, they are not comparable, and the same conclusion cannot be drawn for them(Lu 215). But the concept of lei is more complicated rather than a simple meaning of “category.” As one of the essential methods of Mohist argumentation, lei provided principles in classification as well as in making inference.

16 It refers to the way Aristotle describes the relationship among premises in a logic equation. He always stated it as “A implies B” or so.
Mohists systematized things into two general categories: sameness and difference. Each of them is sub-categorized into different kinds of sameness and different kinds of distinction in order to provide preciseness for inference based upon lei. Following their own pattern of arguing in correspondence with the sameness and difference, the later Mohists demonstrated the importance of lei in generating an argument: “The proposition is something which is engendered in accordance with the thing as it inherently is, becomes full-grown according to a patter, and “proceeds” according to the kind. It is irresponsible to set up a proposition without being clear about what it is engendered and grows up from. Now a man cannot proceed without a road; even if he has strong thighs and arms, if he is not clear about the road it will not be long before he gets into trouble. The proposition is something which ‘proceeds’ according to the kind; if in setting up a proposition you are not clear about the kind, you are certain to get into trouble” (Mozi 480, Lu 216).

With the three principles gu, li, lei, Mozi and the later Mohists established their methods of inference in argumentation—shuo (speak, perform 说). The three premises of inference and the modes of shuo work together in making up the basic model of Mohist argumentation. Shuo is, in fact, constituted of nine parts. Four were invented by the later Mohists, and they conceptualize methods of inference with analogical reasoning. The four parts proposed by the later Mohists are pi (illustration 辟), mou (parallelism 侔), yuan (adduction 援), and tui (inference 推) (Graham 483). Pi aimed at illustrating the reasoning with metaphors and analogies; mou deals with the analysis and comparison of the propositions in various efforts of naming; yuan referred to the reinforcement of one’s own argument instead of analyzing the refutations; tui was to perform different inference on the same statement that both speakers made leading to a conclusion that the opponent could not accept based on what were acceptable to both parties. Among the other five parts proposed by Mozi, the notion of zhi (rebuttal 止) represents the act of demonstrating how the “cons” to the opponent’s inference work. According to Mozi and the later Mohists, the three
major principles of inference: *gu* (cause and because), *li* (objective truth, rationale), *lei* (category); and the methods in reasoning: *pi* (illustration), *mou* (parallelism), *yuan* (adduction), *tui* (inference), *zhi* (rebuttal); together with the shared rhetorical principles of *ming* (naming), *bian* (distinction, argumentation), and *ci* (rhetoric of expression) constitute the essential framework of argumentation. But different from the Aristotelian tradition of demonstrating logical inference with the models of reasoning, the classical Chinese argumentation didn’t employ those methods in any particular order (Lu 220). Its logic pattern is embodied in its principle of expression more than the structure.

Therefore, compared with the model of *qi-cheng-zhuan-he*, modes of argumentation can better illustrate the logic processing or reasoning patterns of classical Chinese argumentation. For instance, Mozi based the previous argumentation on a naming of unrighteousness, and categorizing different forms of unrighteousness. Then he used *tui* in sentences 7-9 to prove that people’s criteria of righteousness are twisted. The following sentence 10 employed *pi* to illustrate the formation and the cause of confusion in moral standard. *Yuan* comes after in sentences 11-12 to support the hidden argument that “gentlemen’s criterion of righteousness is deteriorated by the influential power.” Although in lots of cases, such kind of structural interpretation can be applied to a large number of argumentations in classical Chinese, some of them fall outside the catalogues for each school of thoughts has its own style of writing. Still, all of them employ the strategies of *ming* (naming) and *bian* (argumentation, distinction). *Lei*, as a principle derived from the two basic modes of reasoning, determined the general model of argumentation with comparisons, analogies, and interpretation of the correlations in *Mo Bian*. Sometimes a Mozi’s or Mohist’s argumentation was structured completely with those components. For example,
“Mozi said to the king of Chu: Here is a person who, putting aside his elegant carriage, desired to steal his neighbor’s shattered sedan; …putting aside his meat and grains desired to steal his neighbor’s husks. What kind of a man would this be? The king of Chu answered that he must be suffering from kleptomania. Mozi continued: the land of Chu amounts to five thousand square while that of Song is only five hundred, this is similar to the contrast between the elegant carriage and the shattered sedan. Chu possesses Yun Meng which is full of rhinoceroses and deer. The fish, tortoises and crocodiles in the Yangtze and the Han Rivers are the richest in the empire, while Song is said to possess not even pheasants, rabbits, or foxes. This is similar to the contrast between meat and grains and husks…When your ministers and generals set out to attack Song, it seems to me there is the same analogy. I can see, my Lord, you will be violating righteousness to no advantage.”

The entire argumentation uses pi with two groups of analogies in order to juxtapose the king’s intention of attack with stealing for few benefits. It is a common method of Mozi to argue about the propensity of certain action in texts of jian. Such a framework of paralleled analogies is a regular component of many other classical Chinese argumentations. From the previous passage of Mozi to this one, viewing the composing of a Chinese text with different approaches could provoke different perspectives on its structure. Although the classical model of argumentation, Toulmin’s model, and the Chinese model of qi-cheng-zhuan-he embody a similar procedure in unfolding argument, it would be perfunctory to draw any conclusion on the distinct logic patterns based on the similarity or difference among the structures. Beginning with this comparison, what is more important is to examine the modes of thinking and their philosophical origin that guide the rhetorical practice.
Chapter Four
Interpreting the Minds behind Argumentation

Provided with the observations on the models and modes of argumentation in English and classical Chinese, I would like to complete my comparative study with a brief investigation on what differs reasoning patterns in the two cultures. Aside from Hall and Ames’ interpretation of the First/Second Problematics, I hope to go in detail in examining the diverse modes of thinking that control practices of persuasion and reasoning.

From Writers’ Position to the Tendency of Generating Proposition

Due to the particularity of audience in such kind of classical Chinese argumentations, the arguer’s position is often situated and restricted. Employing ethical approaches and appeals in reasoning offers them more opportunity to express their argumentations effectively. But this is not the only cause of its concentration on ethics. The text materials that are often examined in comparative study are mostly selected from the classics of the five schools of thoughts in traditional Chinese philosophy. Three of them are dedicated to promoting their ethical values in life, governance, politics, and military or diplomatic affairs via their argumentations, Mozi included. Based on these factors, the classical Chinese rhetoric of argumentation being examined in comparative rhetorical studies is usually more particularized than that of traditional European-American rhetoric. The adaptation of writers to the specific type of audience of persuasion becomes a feature of classical Chinese rhetoric through the long evolution of writing. In spite of such particularities, similar attitudes and expectations of argumentation can still be found in discursive and rhetorical practice in English and classical Chinese. In either of the systems of reasoning, the arguer’s effort of justifying or lightening their gestures as persuaders can be detected frequently. A basic manifestation of such effort is to propose ethical advocacies in argumentation. In the early feudal monarchic society that Mozi was born in, arguments had to be made tactfully so that the writer could stay out of trouble with his
argument delivered successfully. Addressing issues relevant to social justice and good sense helps arguers like him to amplify chances of successful delivery of analysis or critiques. In the European-American rhetorical tradition, Aristotle points out in his theory of rhetoric that “authors should compose without being noticed and should seem to speak not artificially but naturally…thus, it is clear that if one composes well, there will be an unfamiliar quality and it escapes notice and will be clear. This, we said, was the virtue of rhetorical language” (On Rhetoric 222-23). What helps in building the ethos then, as Aristotle explains early in Book II of Rhetoric, is speaking “goodness”— “Good sense, good moral character, and goodwill” that render credibility to orators (Bizzell 213). In this sense, practices of persuasion in different cultures shares the “suggestive process of ‘saying the right thing’” (Burke 50) in securing arguers’ position as well as his propositions.

From Methods of Argumentation to Inclinations of Arguing

Since the orator has to minimize room for any possible refutations in his argumentation, topics of goodness are “whatever is chosen for its own sake” (On Rhetoric 16). In classical Chinese argumentation, philosophers like Mozi value the articulation and rectification of the substance or truth of certain objects in their analogical analysis, and associate such practice with the idea of goodness in Chinese culture. Most works of the five schools of thoughts are either explanatory or propounding writings for the traditional ideas of shan (benevolence), ai (love), li (rites), dao (the way) and more which are basically notions of ethics, morality, virtue, and manner. Almost every argument employs ethical topics partly because it is an effective breakthrough for persuasion, partly because it is the subject of those works. In comparison with the rhetoric of English argumentation, such tradition in classical Chinese raises the problem of how “deliberative” classical Chinese rhetoric performs.

As the first one who gave description to logic models in rhetoric, many of Mozi’s conclusions show impressive resemblance with Aristotle’s Topics. For instance, the method of tui (inference 推) in Mo Bian refers to the demonstration of what one will
not do/ do not want/ has not done equals what one will do/ want/ has done. The example given by the later Mohists in their book is as follows: Gong Meng Zi first said, “There is no ghost and no god.” Then he said, “Gentlemen shall learn to worship.” Mozi replied, “It is like to say ‘there is no such thing as guest, but gentlemen shall learn the way and the courtesy to treat guests’; “there is no fish, but we shall have fishnet” (482).

Similarly, in Topic 6, Aristotle describes a method of using what the opponent has said upon him or herself in a different way as a piece of refutation in argument. Aristotle concluded the method as “in general, it is out of place [atopos] when someone reproaches others for [failing to do] what he does not do—or would not do—himself” (On Rhetoric 194). His example for illustration is: Iphicrates asked Aristophon if he (the latter) would betray the fleet for money. After Aristophon denied it, Iphicrates said, “If you, being Aristophon, would not play the traitor, would I, Iphicrates?” The premise or context is that the opponent is the one who seems more likely to have done wrong. (194)

Aside from it, the idea of bian (argumentation, distinction) as well as Mozi’s principle of lei (categories) can also find similar descriptions in Aristotle’s Topic 9 regarding the act of division. The word bian refers to two characters with the same pronunciation. Therefore, the idea of bian involves two aspects—to argue and to make distinction. Mohists’ notion of bian as making distinction can be interpreted as: “(1) to clarify the portions of ‘is-this’ and ‘is-not’, to inquire into the principles of order and misrule; (2) to clarify points of sameness and difference, to discern the patterns of names and objects; (3) to set the beneficial and the harmful, to resolve confusions and doubts” (Graham 475). Mozi specifics such practice of lei into two catalogues: sameness and difference. Sameness is consisted of i) chong tong (identical 重同)—the practice of using two different names for the same object; ii) ti tong (unity 体同)—being part of the greater whole; iii) he tong (togetherness 合同)—two things being in the same space; and iv) lei tong (of a kind 类同)—being the same in some
respect because both things are related to one thing. Difference included i) er (two 二)—being totally different; ii) bu ti (not unity 不体)—not sharing the same structure; iii) bu he (not together 不合); iv) bu lei (not of a kind 不类)—not belonging to the same category (Mozi 192, Lu 215-216). Mozi and the later Mohists considered mastering of “kinds” (sameness and difference) as a crucial skill of detecting fallacies and developing inference in reasoning. However, Mozi’s criteria of lei did not derive from a scientific research of classification and categorization. They are rather products of conceptual separation of the various statues of being similar or different based on sense and experience. As an essential element of epistemology, the dependence on sense is not rejected by rational thinking. Xing Lu points out in her book that in viewing the subject of knowing, Aristotle identifies the significance of “sense” in his epistemology. In *Metaphysics*, he concludes two sources of knowing: “by senses and… by art and reasoning” (Lu 209). Even though, the occupancy of sense in the rhetorical practice of the two cultures differs. Sense in European-American rhetoric of argumentation calls to the operation of ethos, pathos, and logos appeals. Aside from this application, it also assists the pursuit of definitiveness out of ambiguities. In classical Chinese analysis, it is employed to inspire sensibility as well as connections via analogy. In other words, it helps to shape rhetorical strategies such as “accept according to kind, propose according to ‘kind’” (Graham 483) in *Mo Bian*.

From the basic structure of *qi-cheng-zhuang-he* to the value of arguing for goodness with rectification of “names” and the “kind”, *Mo Bian* does not design the writing of argumentation with a specific procedure of demonstrating logic in reasoning. Instead, its “deliberative” work on rhetoric lies more in the cooperation of diction and analogical analysis. In classical Chinese manifestation of proofs and rationale, aestheticism in expression is another major aspect of perception of writing. As could be reflected from the passages of Chinese examples in the last chapter, analogical reasoning allows a kind of rhythmic and antithetic composing of argumentation. But
the valuing of poetic writing is not an act of “art for art’s sake.” In terms of the function of paralleled composing of analogies and examples in writing, Graham interprets in his work that it is “not in a fumbling search for the syllogism, but to show where the mutability of words in different combinations vitiates inferences” (155). However, as rhythmic as the classical Chinese textual arrangement could be, its demonstration of reasons are sometimes not as explicit as that in English argumentation.

As the reasoning patterns in Chinese and English do not strictly operate with their corresponding Problematic of thought, argumentations is not dominated by a single mode of thinking. The interplay of causal and analogical reasoning is bound with the practice of persuasion no matter if it is in Chinese or English culture. Aristotle states in his theory that “Paradigms are most appropriate to deliberative oratory.” He inspected the application of enthymemes in argumentation, and points out that it should rather be inserted in “and not spoken continuously; otherwise, they get in each other’s way” (On Rhetoric 274). What indeed makes a difference in argumentation between the two cultures, then, leaving aside the consideration of various lexical expressions, lies in modes of demonstration of logic and evidence. Such demonstration in English, since Aristotle’s tradition, is supposed to have a “bear(ing) on what is disputed” (273). For example, in her essay “Professions for Women”, Virginia Woolf opens: “When your secretary invited me to come here, she told me that your Society is concerned with the employment of women and she suggested that I might tell you something about my own professional experiences. It is true I am a woman; it is true I am employed; but what professional experiences have I had? It is difficult to say. My profession is literature; and in that profession there are fewer experiences for women than in any other…” (235). During the narration, each evidence is provided against the first statement. Disputation is gradually presented, and finally focused on the “professional experiences of literature” as the writing proceeds.
Different from the concrete logical process that the classical and the Toulmin models of argumentation present, the structure *qi-cheng-zhuan-he* is really a simplified principle of arrangement in Chinese, which is suitable for lots of genres because of its generalization. To make a more comprehensive and inclusive characterization of the rhetorical practice in classical Chinese, one has to take into consideration the various methods and methodologies each school advanced. In other words, the rhetoric of classical Chinese cannot be tweaked into a single set of principles or characteristics or theories from its very beginning. This creates a fundamental difficulty for comparative rhetorical study between English and Chinese. It is also the force that motivates me to frame this comparative study on argumentation within the very representatives of the two rhetorical traditions.

Works of Aristotle and Mozi are not only the milestones of rhetorical study in each system, but the bases of traditional values in their respective cultures. The structuring of argumentation according to the European-American and the Chinese traditions are strikingly similar at first sight. Not only their basic models, but also some guidelines of conducting arguments resonate with each other on the surface. The principles of argumentation of Mohism are to: “i) use names to refer to objects; ii) use propositions to dredge out ideas; (iii) use explanations to bring out reasons; iv) accept according to kind, propose according to ‘kind’” (Graham 483). Aristotle concludes four ways of securing a good argument: “i) the securing of propositions; ii) the power to distinguish in how many ways an expression is used; iii) the discovery of the differences of things; iv) the investigation of likeness” (*On Rhetoric* 34-35). Aside from the comparisons between the structures and the modes of persuasion each of them established, it is also beneficial to observe the two schools of logic in studying the diverse reasoning patterns. As essential research materials of logic in the two traditions, the theories composed by Aristotle and Mozi can also reveal fundamental values that dominate different cultures of argumentation.

(1) In terms of the language and composing of theories on rhetoric and logic, Aristotle provides a systematic and comprehensive discussion on logic and its application in
rhetoric. Compared with his work, Mozi’s theory is more dispersed. Provided with the language differences, the general structure of Mozi’s work is not as clearly constructed as in Aristotle’s theory, which makes comprehension of his theory on logic difficult. In the *Mozi*, he and the later Mohists elaborated on over a hundred pieces of concepts regarding logic. But they are not linearly ordered and clearly demonstrated in the writing.

(2) In terms of the methods of inference displayed in their work, Mozi did not develop his theory on logic in a scientific and technological way. He classified and defined different forms of deduction and induction in his work by description and analogies. But this is the earliest attempt of studying and employing logic in argumentation among the five schools of philosophy in ancient China. In the English rhetorical tradition, Aristotelian logic dominates early practices of reasoning. Aristotle’s elaboration of demonstration of deduction and arguing by examples originates from the use of enthymeme in the rhetorical practice.

(3) In terms of the discipline—logic, Aristotle invented the employment of variables in his description of logic patterns, and advanced them into a scientific subject. In *Organon*, he provides logic equations with explicit forms, using variables such as “A,” “B,” and “C” to constitute equations in description of the diversification of syllogism. In Mozi’s theory, he used referents such as “shi (it),” “ci (this)” in signification of forms of logic. But such description turned out to be abstract. However, it reflects a crucial discrepancy in their recognition of logic. The application of variables and equations of Aristotle results in a concentration more on the form of inference. The premises and process of inference are given and settled, which means certain conclusion can be drawn regardless of the substances or objective truth or proposition under observation. Mozi’s practice of argumentation took into consideration both the form of inference and the correlation of objects. The contents of propositions determine what kind of the connections and relationship will be examined in Mohist practice of reasoning. Such operation echoes with a Mohist value of rhetoric—to argue for ethical concerns. Frederick Mote noted that “Mohists became deeply involved in
questions about the sources of knowledge, uses of names, and methods of inference, and always showed a preference for common-sense attitudes” (97).

(4) In terms of the general significance of their contributions on logic development in each of the rhetorical traditions, the classical Chinese rhetoric gained its analogical inference from the value of classification, naming and so on while Euro-American rhetoric inherits its certainty in argumentation from Aristotelian logic patterns. In contrast, Mohist argument allowed “flexibility and applicability with regard to particular situations” (Lu 223). Mozi used patterns of logic as tools in argumentation, while Aristotle discovered the value of logic as a scientific subject. All of these characteristics of the two minds led to distinct notions and inclinations of argument in the two traditions. Mozi and Mohism paid more attention to its actual use in persuasion as well as in articulating values according their specific needs. And Aristotle aims more at justifying proposition in a situated context. His work acquires a style of scientific proof, so do the classical and Toulmin models of argumentation.

**Chapter Five**

**Conclusion**

I began this thesis with a critique on the method and methodology of some past comparative rhetorical studies as a preparation for my research. To articulate my critique on simplification in rhetorical comparisons, I would like to first employ one of Kenneth Burke’s propositions here. He identifies that

> The business of interpretation is accomplished by the two processes of over-simplification and analogical extension. We over-simplify a given event when we characterize it from the standpoint of a given interest—and we attempt to invent a similar characterization for other events by analogy. The great difficulty with the method in the judging of historical events is that it requires the rectification of false analogies
through trial and error, whereas the vast bungling complexes of history do not recur. (107)

In studying rhetorical traditions—the living history of languages—how could we work against such simplification to achieve successful communication? Comparative rhetorical study between English and classical Chinese, from my point of view, falls easily into an analogous process as Burke has pointed out. To illustrate my point, I have carried out this comparison of the structuring of argumentation in English and classical Chinese, with a hope of some new insights emerging in the process.

My study starts with a comparison of the models of argumentations in the two cultures. It is designed not with an intention of articulating similarities and differences, but of framing a limited scale of comparative rhetorical study which is capable of revealing complexities and diversity from the seemingly flat objects. The structural comparison between the models of argumentation shows that the general logic process in writing shares a lot in common. They start with an introduction of background knowledge and a thesis statement, followed with the pros and cons of the argument, which could be more convincing if the evidence and refutations could be justified by secondary resources, and closed with further considerations. It reflects in a way that dialectical reasoning is the shared style of knowing even in culturally conditioned epistemologies. However, the comparison between the models can only be valid when their components and the reasoning patterns that dominate structuring of writings have been investigated. It is by observing the origin or formation of research objects that one can create accurate interpretations in rhetorical study. In this case, it is the reciprocal relationship between the texts and the values and modes of thinking that functions in comparison and communication. However, it is not easy to prevent such kind of study from becoming a subjective interpretation of the ideologies or cultures instead of a research of the phenomena per se. If considering comparative rhetorical study as an act of “gap-filling” in cross-cultural communication, a direct interpretation of some text and its rhetorical features is at its best an effort of crossing
over rather than closing the gap. But many studies have been conducted to establish solid methods and methodologies in the undertaking. In my study, I hope to join those voices by my effort of filling the space between the texts and the modes of analyzing and reasoning in different cultures.

Examining the models of argumentation reminds us that what is working in the process of composing is not the frameworks, but the principles and methods of reasoning that bring about distinctions in argumentation. However, there is no absolute conclusion in whether the two systems of argumentation are similar to or different from each other in this study. A collection of simplified similarities and differences are not qualified enough to be the substance of such kind of cross-cultural investigation and communication. In this comparative study, I look through the procedures of argumentation in the two cultures to help map the sphere where modes of reasoning and expression intersect, and even overlap together, with their uniqueness. The heart of the confrontation lies in the characteristics of causal thinking and analogical thinking in each mode. Although they are used to portray rhetorics of the Euro-American tradition and the classical Chinese respectively in some studies, I want to challenge the absolute division, and specify such usage via a reflective interpretation of the different patterns of persuading and reasoning. As Aristotle revealed thousands years ago that logic and analogical analysis are not two parallel patterns of reasoning, a strategic employment of such characterization can help to improve our understanding of the culture of correlative thinking. As analysis in both cultures target at finding evidence and defining relations among objects, the argumentation of classical Chinese texts evolved reasoning more with an analogical pattern. The structure of argumentation in this rhetorical tradition is more difficult to conclude since there were a variety of genres and rhetorical principles involved. Combining with a general framework of writing, *qi-cheng-zhuan-he*, analysis of the models of argumentation in classical Chinese can be better approached with an investigation into the modes of arguing. I first emphasized that the effort of persuading in ancient China is correlated with early rhetorical practices of naming and
categorizing. Throughout the heyday of the five schools, ways of ming (naming) and bian (argumentation, disputation, distinction) kept being altered and specified. Mozi was the first to value bian as an important concept. Furthermore, according to authoritative review in Chinese academia, Mohism “is the only school of Chinese thought which has developed a scientific logic with both inductive and deductive methods” (Hu 61). However, he didn’t pursue the study of logic as a discipline.

Facing the need of the time, Mozi’s rhetoric of argumentation is more concerned with “the moral state of bian shi [the arguer, speaker, rhetor], the practical function of speech, and was interested in the notion of bian as a system of distinction, argumentation, and disputation” (Lu 203). In view of the audience, who was often times a king or a planner of an attack, Mozi ranked high the ethical approaches in his argumentations. That gives Mozi’s rhetorical perspective a particular propensity in the contents of analysis. Mohists’ consideration of social justice, their high standard of the morality, and the principles in logical delivery of argumentation took crucial roles in Mohism. As a result, Mohists’ rhetoric of argumentation is characterized by three principles: “studying the history for sources, surveying the lives of ordinary people for justification, and checking the application of the argument against the welfare of the state and the interests of the people” (Lu 205). But as indicated by the classical and Toulmin model of argumentation, Euro-American rhetoric emphasizes a primary arrangement of causes and supports as the foundation of reasoning. The Toulmin model advanced the arrangement into a more delicate weaving of evidence and justification in facing perplexed issues of modern times. From Aristotle’s theory on logic and rhetoric to the modern interpretation of data processing—deduction, induction, and articulation on the relationship among the argumentative elements are what root Western argumentation.

Among the various articulations of the characteristics and influence of causal thinking and analogical thinking, it is important to know how each pattern of reasoning operates with its own logical principles. What Aristotle inspired us included not only the dialectic method of analyzing and knowing, but also the need of standardizing the
discipline of comparative rhetoric. Such standardization challenges the preciseness of research in the field as well as the flexibility to adjustment in the course of communication. As Hall and Ames interpret, “understanding is always a matter of negotiation on the part of all members of the conversation” (103). And approaching from one logic pattern to interpret the other will not in itself solve the problem. Neither will the pure endeavor of concluding similarities and differences function for any substantial progress in the “conversation.” With this comparative rhetorical study on the structuring of argumentation in two cultures, I conceive that to some extent, Euro-American rhetoric provides a strategy of understanding while classical Chinese rhetoric adds another space for understanding.
Works Cited

Scholarly Works in English


**Chinese Texts**


