ABSTRACT

RUSSIA AND THE “WEST”: A USEFUL PARADIGM OR AN IMAGINED ACTOR?

By Jeremy Andrew Martin

In much of the post-Soviet literature on Western-Russian international relations, it is argued or assumed that post-Soviet Russia is too weak to challenge the “West” and its policies and plans regarding former Soviet states. This paper will argue that the “West” is not monolithic, and examine the limitations this places on Western influence within the post-Soviet space. The paper will divide the West into two primary entities, the European Union and the United States, and compare the influence and limitations these entities have against Russian foreign policy interests in the former Soviet space. Using journalistic accounts of several highly referenced conflicts, this paper will offer a case study analysis of the causes of Russian foreign policy successes and failures during periods of opposition to either one or both of these Western entities, and discuss the implications of these causes.
RUSSIA AND THE “WEST:” A USEFUL PARADIGM OR AN IMAGINED ACTOR?

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ........................................................................................................ iii
Dedication ............................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................. v

Introduction........................................................................................................... 1

Part I: Theory and Literature ............................................................................. 2
   Literature Review ............................................................................................. 3
   United States and European Union: Analysis ............................................... 12
   Hypotheses/Propositions ............................................................................... 19

Part II: Case Studies ......................................................................................... 20
   Methodology.................................................................................................. 21
   Former Yugoslavia: 1991-1995 ................................................................ 22
   Kosovo: 1996-1999 .................................................................................... 27
   Nagorno-Karabakh ...................................................................................... 35
   Trans-Dniester/Transnistria .......................................................................... 38
   Russia-Ukrainian Natural Gas Dispute: 2005-2006.................................... 43
   Gazprom across Eurasia ............................................................................. 48

Part III: Implications & Conclusion ................................................................ 52
   Implications for Further Research............................................................ 56

Appendix A: Goal Type Limits on the Successful Use of Sanctions.......... 58
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Table, Successful Sanction Episodes by Goal Type ....................................................... 58
Table 2: Graph, Sanctions Success Means, Confidence Intervals, and Difference of Means

Results (α=.05) .......................................................................................................................... 58
DEDICATION

To God, my source and my strength, along with my family, friends, the faculty and staff of Miami University and all of those who supported me during these four years of college at Miami.
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Introduction

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s ability to project its interests across the world has been declining. The primary successor to the Soviet Union can hardly claim a fraction of the power its predecessor possessed across the globe. Russia cannot underwrite another Cuban Missile Crisis or provide security guarantees to every country seeking to break from American hegemony. Russia is a regional power with superpower perks. Russia has the Soviet Union’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council, most of the Soviet Union’s territory, the vast majority of the Soviet Union’s conventional weapons and the Soviet Union’s arsenal of nuclear weapons. All of these resources, save Russia’s institutional memberships, are in decline however. It appears to be inevitable that the West will eventually overtake the Soviet Union’s grasp on Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and many scholars have already accepted this a priori in much of research of Western-Russian relations.

If it is truly inevitable that Russia can no longer effectively challenge the West, why does Russia even try, especially within the post-Soviet space? Is it the result of an identity crisis, the lack of Western interest in the region, domestic pressure, or simply unrealistic beliefs about Russian power? All of these theories have been taken up at some point to explain Russia’s foreign policy. All of these theories are closely linked to the assumption that Russia cannot effectively challenge the West. Therefore, when these theories are presented, they all conclude that Russia will eventually fall in line with the West, as the old Soviet identity fades as a result of Western engagement, global circumstances bring Western interest into the region, citizens become disillusioned with radical groups that fail to bring victory against the West, or Russia finally “learns its lesson” and gives up on its unrealistic dreams. These conclusions paint a very predictive picture in scholarly research, but they all fall short in their explanatory abilities. The a priori assumption that the West can assert its dominance over Russian interests cannot by itself explain why the West continually accommodates Russian interests. If it is to be accepted that the West must be unified in order to assert dominance over Russia, as is the common excuse for Western failure, then the assumption of Western dominance loses even more of its explanatory value. The argument fails to explain what resources the actors within the West offer and need to assert general Western interests over Russian resistance. Are all Western states equal? Does every member have to agree on a common stance? Why do members disagree? Why do some members abstain from action? Is a unified Western stance purely synergistic or is some
members’ involvement in certain foreign policy areas, such as trade or military operations, unnecessary to overcome Russian resistance? The answer to these questions is the subject of this paper.

When we assume that the West is a monolithic or synergistic structure, we fail to explain why some Western actors would defect to the aid of Russia or prove unable to strengthen an alliance in conflict with Russian policies. The assumption that the West, as a whole, is an actor or dominated by a single actor in the international system fails to account for state or regional preferences, resources, and divergences of interest. Scholarly research that begins with any of these a priori assumptions engages in unrealistic descriptions and predictions that neglect limits and divergent interests. It also neglects the influence of the outcomes of prior conflicts and the distinctive traits of Western organizations and states within the international environment by assuming that Russia is operating under this belief that their conflict is persistently with the West as a whole. Most importantly, as will be addressed later in this paper, the idea of the “West” as a monolithic actor is based on few facts surrounded by a pool of counterfactual evidence, leading to a possibility that Russian regional interests may succeed under certain conditions other than Western disinterest.

Part I: Theory and Literature

This paper will challenge the concept of the West by dividing it into its two primary actors in Russian foreign relations, the United States and the European Union, and analyzing their foreign policy strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, this paper will attempt to determine the relationship between the strengths and weakness of U.S. and E.U. foreign policy resources and establish whether the relationship is synergistic or, rather, contradictory. Though this paper is concerned primarily with U.S. and E.U. foreign policy strengths and limitations which may allow Russia the opportunity to maneuver and exploit U.S. and E.U. weaknesses, this paper will also address some theories about the influence of Russian domestic politics in the international system. In Part I, this paper will conduct a review of the literature on Russian foreign policy, an analysis of U.S. and E.U. interests and resources, and provide several propositions on the strengths and limitations of the United States and the European Union in the context of Eurasian foreign policy. In Part II, these propositions will be tested systematically using journalistic accounts of several cases of policy conflicts between Russia and the “West,” including the case
studies used by foreign policy scholars who take the view of a unified West and more recent conflicts between Russia and the “Western” actors.

Literature Review

The concept of the “West” as an overarching structure has become a staple of Western scholarly analysis of Russian foreign policy. To condemn the general use of the term would be impractical, as the term is not only a spatial identifier, but also a historical, economic, and political identifier. The term is also fluid: states can be accepted or rejected as “Western” in spite of their geographical realities, as the cases of Australia and New Zealand clearly demonstrate. This prestigious designator typically describes states that have accepted the European norms of democracy, a market economy, and the norms of international law established in Europe. The measurement of how “Western” a country may be is based on how close they adhere to these norms as measured against the model of a Western European state. Additionally, Western states are largely bound together in multinational organizations, although no prominent organization exists that includes all countries commonly acknowledged as Western while excluding all others.\(^1\) In much of the literature on Russian foreign policy, the “West” can be defined as the United States, Western Europe, or both. Regardless of the appropriateness of the term during the Cold War, the unsupported use of the term is both misleading and inaccurate in the post-Soviet international environment. One can be anti-American, but pro-Western simply by holding a belief in the superiority of Western European values. As this critique of post-Soviet literature on Russian foreign policy will demonstrate, while the term “West” may be a useful tool in several types of analyses, the members of the “West” often have divergent interests, goals, and limitations in the field of international relations.

In regards to the question of the “West,” scholars have developed several alternative theories as to the nature of Western-Russian relations in the past two decades, which will be summarized and subsequently addressed one by one. The first theory, which this paper designates the Monolithic West approach, considers Russia to be a weak state incapable of challenging a consonant West unless the West is either disinterested entirely or in conflict over the value of asserting itself in a specific region. This theory, however, fails to explain occurrences of Russian foreign policy victories in areas of high Western interest and value. The

\(^1\) While NATO and the EU all comprise of countries that are commonly acknowledged as Western, NATO does not include Western countries in the Pacific, and the EU additionally excludes the United States and Canada.
second, the *Synergistic West* approach, differentiates between the United States and the European Union, but assumes these differences provide a synergistic strength to counter unfavorable Russian foreign policy initiatives, but it also fails to explain Russian foreign policy successes and fails to explain how the United States and European Union can pool their resources successfully to asset a common Western interest. The third places the United States as the sole hegemon and determinant factor in the region, while the fourth treats the European Union in the same manner, both weakening the influence of the “other” actor and disregarding the potential conflicts between the U.S. and the E.U. over foreign policy towards the post-Soviet region. The fifth and final approach is a state-centered argument, focusing on the conflicts between liberal and radical factions of Russian foreign policy elites, with the “West” seeking to bolster the liberals’ position, and avert the dangers posed by radical nationalist and communist factions. This theory, which is taken influenced by Michael McFaul’s works on Russian foreign policy, and often included with other theories, overstates Russian strengths and assumes the exact opposite of the previous approaches: that Russia would be able to overcome Western challenges to its hegemony if anti-Western elites were able to take control of the government. This theory not only relies on counterfactual assumptions, but it conflates Russia’s status with that of the Soviet Union. From this summary, this paper will proceed to an in-depth study of each theory presented.

The term *Monolithic West* approach best defines the Russian foreign policy analyses of Paul Kubicek, Allen Lynch and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Paul Kubicek’s analysis of the Russian foreign policy uses case studies of the Bosnian conflict, NATO expansion, the conflicts with Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, and finds that a lack of Western interest provided Russia the opportunity for success against its post-Soviet neighbors.² According to Kubicek, “Russia acts more assertively against weak target states when Western policy is either disinterested or in disarray,” while in cases where target states receive Western support or when the West “adopts a unified policy,” Russia is eliminated as a threat.³ As Kubicek declares, “Russia is largely a paper tiger,” and, “when faced with a determined Western policy, it will back down.”⁴ This is further developed by Allen Lynch who uses case studies of Trans-Dniestr conflict in Moldova, the Bosnian conflicts, NATO expansion, and the NATO campaign against

³ Id. at 567.
⁴ Id. at 568.
Using these case studies and comparing the actions of Russian foreign ministers Kozyrev and Primakov, Lynch finds that after 1993, Russian foreign policy shifted from the “premises of liberal internationalism toward a more realist…assessment of Russian interests and capabilities.” This shift reflects the realization that, as Lynch declares, “Russian influence has proved greatest where the Western stake is least intense and weakest where the Western stake is most intense.” This *Monolithic West* approach, assumes, as Lynch asserts, that Russia has not been able to exclude Western influence even in its most successful engagements. Similarly, Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that the West has the power to constructively engage Russia and transform it into a Western state, while successfully challenging Russian claims to hegemony in the post-Soviet region. While Russia attempts to exploit divisions among the United States, France, and Germany to gain a free hand in the post-Soviet space, Brzezinski argues Russia is “too weak to sustain regional domination,” and it is “unlikely” that the West would remain passive during these attempts. Kubicek, Lynch, and Brzezinski develop this *Monolithic West* approach and lead to the conclusion that in regards to the field of international relations, the West will bind together against Russian attempts to undermine its unity and overpower Russian demands in conflicts.

The *Monolithic West* methodology models the West as a solid rock capable of crushing any Russian attempts to oppose it. Kubicek, Lynch, and Brzezinski maintain that Russia’s ability to project its interests is inversely related to the “West’s” desire to counter those interests. On the contrary, however, these conclusions fail to distinguish between the desires of specific actors within the West, namely the United States and the European Union, to counter Russian interests. Furthermore, the *Monolithic West* approach fails to consider the limitations present within the international environment that may affect the U.S. and E.U.’s actual ability to break Russia’s hegemony on its post-Soviet neighboring. While other influential parties surely exist, the United States and European Union are the most powerful Western actors with the clearest distinction. The United States and European Union may agree on many issues, but they also have divergent interests toward Russia and, even in the cases of agreement among the members

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6 Id. at 23
7 Id. at 25.
8 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
of Western alliance, they will nevertheless pursue different policies under the umbrella of the same goal. Furthermore, there are differing limitations on the ability of the United States and European Union to pursue their chosen policies. The Monolithic West methodology, by its lack of distinction between actors that both fail to consistently pursue the same policy goals and do not predictably win every conflict with Russia, can claim little validity and explanatory power, leading us to look for other possible approaches.

Another approach taken by scholars, most notably Sherman Garnett, Vladimir Baranovsky, Leszek Buszynski, Eugene Rumer, and Celeste Wallander, differentiates between the primary actors of the West, the U.S. and the E.U., but includes a collaborative element to the relationship among the actors that produces an effect greater than the sum of the strengths of the actors, aptly coined in this paper as the Synergistic West formulation. Sherman Garnett’s examination of the West’s recent involvement in the post-Soviet space argues that among the specific actors of the U.S., E.U., and Russia, “no power in the region is so strong as to dominate it,” but finds that the a collaborative West will in fact be able to do so.11 Garnett argues that Russia can neither be a “serious strategic rival” or a “steady partner” to the West because it is “too weak and/or chaotic to do so,” and Russia’s policies are based on “potential or hopes for understanding from foreign powers.”12 Rumer and Wallander agree in addressing Russia as a “security consumer” rather than a provider.13 In the post-Soviet space, according to Garnett, “the position of the West…is a strong one, particularly if it intends to change the shape of international politics in the region.”14 Even with disagreements between its members, the West has the ability to overtake the post-Soviet space.15 Rumer and Wallander reach a similar conclusion, holding that Russia’s capability to use European powers such as France and Germany, to leverage its foreign policies against U.S. interests is “far more dependent on the quality of German and French relations with the United States than Russia’s ability to flex its diplomatic muscle.”16 Vladimir Baranovsky’s analysis of the Russian stance towards the West

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12 Id. at 69-70
14 Garnett, Sherman. p. 94
15 Id. at 94-95
16 Rumer, Eugene, and Celeste Wallander, pp. 69-70.
offers a similar interpretation of Russian foreign policy. According to Baronovsky, Russia sought to use European Union expansion as an alternative to NATO enlargement, but found that both European and U.S. dominated organizations were perceived as antithetical to Russian interests, howbeit, for different reasons. In the *Synergistic West* conceptualization, the “West” is a collection of players with similar overarching goal but differing focuses. Leszek Buszynski’s chapter follows this approach and finds that the Western alliance is firmly established and stronger than any ties Russia can form with individual members. While the Russian foreign policy community has developed into a split pro-American and pro-European view of Western engagement, Russian foreign policy elites have stressed both views at different times, and policies toward both actors were, “in many respects undifferentiated.” According to the *Synergistic West* theory espoused by Garnett, Baranovsky, Buszynski, Rumer, and Wallander, Russia must engage the West as a whole, as “the ties within the Western alliance are stronger,” and Russia will have to engage the West as a whole on Western terms.

While the *Synergistic West* approach acknowledges differences between the actors within the Western alliance, the differences are unexplained or ignored as irrelevant. The *Monolithic West* approach treated the West as a rock, while the *Synergistic West* approach depicts the West as a “hammer.” A hammer is typically made of two parts—a head and handle—that are distinct, separate, and both able to accomplish a hammer’s task, but are significantly more powerful together. Garnett, Baranovsky, Buszynski, Rumer, and Wallander make no distinction between the U.S. and E.U., as it does not matter which is the “head” and which is the “handle,” only that they form a hammer. Russia, therefore, according to this approach, will be unable to overcome the “hammer” and will be unable to fill the role of one of the parts and separate the two. This argument reiterates the Cold War paradigm, but Russia is not trying to wrestle the European Union from the United States, or vice versa. That is unnecessary because the West is not a “hammer” at all. The United States and European Union share many goals and interests, but they also share divergences. The United States and European Union do not form a synergistic link and they often prove contradictory to each other’s strengths and interests. The United States

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16 Ibid.
20 Id. at 49
21 Garnett, Sherman. p. 71 (Emphasis added)
is a military power in the post-Soviet region and the European Union is an economic power. The U.S. does not have the economic linkages to the post-Soviet states to pursue the policy options open to the European Union, while the E.U. lacks the military prowess of the United States to use force as successfully. On the surface, this may appear complimentary, but in the field of international relations, the two cannot share an equal footing, one must dominate. The Synergistic West approach ignores this conflict of interests and therefore fails to explain how these conflicts affect Western-Russian relations.

The explanatory insufficiencies of the Monolithic West and Synergistic West approaches have led many authors to simplify the Western actor relationship as under the leadership of a single dominant actor. The first approach, the U.S.-Dominated-West, explains the Western-Russian relationship in light of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. strengths and limitations within the post-Soviet space, while the second methodology, the E.U.-Dominated West, views the relationship as a matter of European economic and institutional coercive strategies against Russia and the other post-Soviet states. Michael Mandelbaum and Robert Levgold have championed the U.S.-Dominated West approach, while Stephen Cohen and Dmitri Trenin have reacted with an E.U.-Dominated approach. Michael Mandelbaum’s study argues that Russia seeks to regain control of most of its foreign Soviet possessions, most notably Ukraine, and while explicit deterrence is unnecessary given Russia’s military weakness, the United States should engage in “tacit deterrence,” a strategy of using diplomatic and economic measures as punishment tools, until Russia adopts the norms of the “West.” Robert Levgold’s agrees and find that Russian successes in the post-Soviet region are directly related to Russia’s ability to cooperate with the United States. Mandelbaum assesses Russia to be an “adolescent” that is big enough to avoid being controlled, but is “subject to influence.” Levgold finds that, “Today’s Russia is no match for the United States in any part of the world, save one: the post-Soviet space,” but shares Mandelbaum’s view that the United States should communicate a clear sense of limits and maintain dialogue until Russia becomes an “adult” and joins the West. 

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Levgold find that the U.S. is unable to directly coerce Russia, but may influence Russia’s actions until it becomes a cooperative member of a U.S.-led West.

The *U.S.-Dominated West* approach suffices for an understanding of U.S. foreign policy, as it addresses many of the limitations of the U.S. and potential to counter conflicting interests with Russian, but it fails as an explanation of Western-Russian relations. Not only does this approach fail to explore the European Union’s foreign policy interests and strengths, but it also fails to address instances where the European Union is able to succeed where the United States cannot. Mandelbaum’s approach attributes the European Union’s economic and diplomatic strengths to the U.S., while Levgold’s approach falls short in ascertaining how the West could counter conflicting interests with Russia in the post-Soviet space. Mandelbaum’s fault lies in failing to differentiate the diverging interests associated with the European Union’s economic and diplomatic strength. An actor that engages in extensive trade with the post-Soviet states and possesses the resources to incorporate post-Soviet states into its structure such as the European Union is, without doubt, going to behave differently than the United States, which relies on its military resources to punish and offer benefits, such as collective security agreements, to the post-Soviet states. Much to this effect could be said of the *E.U.-Dominated West* methodology, but the implications are not entirely symmetrical.

As stated previously, Dmitri Trenin and Stephen Cohen have championed the *E.U.-Dominated* conceptualization and it is largely a reaction to the *U.S.-Dominated West* approach. In Dmitri Trenin’s assessment of Russian security policy, Russia’s only option of improving its position in the international system is through a partnership with the West, but, rather than U.S.-Russian cooperation against terrorism, it is EU enlargement that “will force Russia to adopt norms and standards that would match those of Europe,” leading to Russia joining the West. Cohen agrees that the U.S. must break its “Pax Americana” of the West, because “if Russia is to ever integrate with the West it will be as a substantially European nation primarily through relations with the rest of the Continent, not America.” Cohen argues that it was American perceptions of post-Soviet Russia led to the development of an undemocratic, unstable Russia,

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but E.U. involvement would reverse the trend.28 Becoming Western, according to Trenin, is Russia’s only viable long-term security and institutional solution, and the European dimension is the primary method of Western entry for Russia, and Cohen adds that this development may be proceeding without the United States’ consent nevertheless, as the European Union and Russia have shared ties of history and territory, along with political consensus against many U.S. policies, such as a missile defense system.29

The *E.U.-Dominated West* approach adopted by Cohen and Trenin assumes the superiority of the European dimension of the West in countering Russian foreign policy aims. As stated previously, this approach fails to acknowledge U.S. foreign policy interests and strengths, but this approach expands beyond this failure. In their reaction against the *U.S.-Dominated West* methodology, both Cohen and Trenin argue that the E.U. can incorporate Russia into the West. This argument, however, offers little predictive ability. If the relationship that the EU is building with Russia will bring Russia to the West and force it to adopt Western norms, does that necessarily bring the end of the Russian dominance of the post-Soviet space? Democratic states have security interests as well as authoritarian states. It does not follow that Russian cooperation with the European Union will force Russia to restructure its relationship with the post-Soviet states. Rather, the West must assert its interests in the post-Soviet space, and the *E.U.-Dominated West* approach, with its focus on reacting against the *U.S.-Dominated West* approach, fails to explain how this may be achieved. This faulty line of reasoning also exists in the *State-Centered* approaches embraced by James Richter, Michael McFaul, Timothy Colton, and James Goldgeier.

In the *State-Centered* approach, Russian domestic politics are viewed as the determining factors in Russia’s relations with the West and its post-Soviet neighbors. James Richter’s study of Russian foreign policy elites divides them into liberal, statist, right-wing extremist, and left-wing extremist camps.30 While the latter three camps often find agreement in certain policies, namely, extending Russian state power over the former Soviet Union, rejecting liberalism and individuality, and maintaining a competitive stance to the West, the liberals are wholly isolated.31 Nevertheless, as Michael McFaul and his coauthors Timothy Colton and James Goldgeier find,

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28 Id. at 230-237.
31 Id. at 82-88.
the liberals were the political and economic “winners” during the post-Soviet transition in Russia have favored international cooperation rather than war, and democracy is the key to maintaining Russia’s non-aggressive stance toward the West.\textsuperscript{32} According to McFaul, if the communists or fascists would have won the leadership of Russia during the transition, NATO expansion, the NATO attacks on Serbia, and a host of other Western initiatives would have never occurred because of the threat of nuclear war with Russia.\textsuperscript{33} Taking a liberal internationalist view, McFaul argues that the promotion of democracy and market economies will lead every post-Soviet state into a “cordial relationship with Washington.”\textsuperscript{34} Expanding democracy is McFaul’s recommendation for the West, and James Richter develops this point.\textsuperscript{35} Richter argues that if the West, under the United States, ignores Russia’s claim to great power status and attempts to limit Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space, it risks “discrediting even further the liberal vision of Russia’s destiny as a Western country” and reinforcing extremism.\textsuperscript{36} On the other hand, if the West accommodates Russia in the pursuit to reestablish Russian dominance over the former Soviet Union, they will “doom these states to dependence on Moscow,” encouraging nationalists to pursue more gains and having the liberals ousted from power as the Russian public increases its support for the successful nationalists.\textsuperscript{37} Richter claims that the West must play a balancing act to promote democracy, and McFaul warns that any backsliding in Russian democracy could result in a new Cold War.\textsuperscript{38}

The \textit{State-Centered} conceptualization of Western-Russian relations not only deals with counterfactual predictions and warnings, but it overestimates Russia’s international strength and Western actors’ ability to influence Russian domestic politics. There is little evidence that the nationalists or communists will ever gain control of the post-Soviet Russian Government without adopting more moderate positions, and many of these parties are, in fact, already doing so. Furthermore, the \textit{State-Centered} approach attributes exceptional strength to Russia’s position.

\textsuperscript{34} McFaul, Michael and Timothy Colton. “America’s Real Russian Allies,” p. 49.
\textsuperscript{36} Richter, James. p. 87-89.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} McFaul, Michael. “Russia’s Many Foreign Policies.” \textit{Demokratizatsiya}, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 393-412
Russia has moved tactfully in the past and will not become an indiscriminate Western opponent in its future. The United States will either win in a military conflict with Russia or destroy the world, and the European Union will devastate the Russian economy in a sanctions conflict. On the other hand, however, the United States and the European Union do not have a strong influence on Russian domestic politics. Russia is not so small and weak a country that the United States and the European Union could pass sanctions or invade it without calamitous consequences, nor are Russian political parties so open to the West that they would allow themselves to be dictated by the U.S. and E.U. Moreover, it falls into the similar trap of assuming a democratic Russia to be a cooperative Russia that will cease its hegemonic hold over the post-Soviet space. The history of the United States and older European democracies such as the United Kingdom and France has demonstrated that democratic governance does not end a country’s bid for regional, or even global, supremacy. As this review of the State-Centered approach shows, these scholars not only allow flawed logic and counterfactual study to determine their conclusions, but they also fail to address why Russian democratization would cease Russia’s demand for regional hegemony and conflicts with the West over this domination.

United States and European Union: Analysis

Between the U.S. and the European Union, as well as other Western states, certain overarching goals exist, namely promoting democracy, human rights, and market economies worldwide. The European Union clearly defines in its establishing treaty that one of its primary objectives in a common foreign policy is “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”\(^{39}\) Furthermore, with respect to admission, the EU requires any European state seeking admission to be a functioning democracy with a market economy.\(^ {40}\) While the United States has no such stated foreign policy objective in its Constitution, the United States has demonstrated its intent to promote democracy, human rights, and market economies by its status as a founding member of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, and by taking the largest share of the financial burden of any individual state in these organizations’ functioning.\(^ {41}\) The United States and the European Union also work on several joint initiatives for the promotion of democracy,

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\(^{40}\) Id. at Article 6 (1).

\(^{41}\) The United States has the most shares of any individual state in both the IMF and the World Bank, while the United States pays the most dues to the United Nations. See Lehmann, Volker and Angela McClellan. “Financing the United Nations.” *FES New York Fact Sheet*, (April 2006).
human rights, and market economies. Furthermore, the United States and European Union share similar security goals.

Both the European Union and the United States have shared intentions to prevent international terrorism, non-proliferation, and regional destabilization. Both the U.S. and EU have passed legislation to combat terrorism and have taken strong stances against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The United States and many European Union states work together through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on security issues. Both the U.S. and EU have offered to arbitrate and have been asked to arbitrate in many disputes in the post-Soviet region, as well as oversee peacekeeping initiatives worldwide. Most of the EU member states are members of NATO, and NATO security goals reflect both European and North American security interests. Given these similarities, it is often quite appropriate to speak of a “West” in terms of promoting democratic values, market economies, and stable governments. The methods of promoting these values differ, however, and Western actors diverge on specific issues such as foreign policy interests in the post-Soviet space. This paper will challenge the proposition that the West is united in its position towards Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors and will consistently prevail in conflicts against Russian interests.

To establish this claim, it is necessary to explain the differences between the two major Western actors, the United States and the European Union, explain how they are more important than the shared goals and interests of the West, develop theories based on these differences, and test them against the case studies highlighted by the aforementioned scholars. The first major difference lies in military strength. The United States’ budget expenditure on its military accounts for 48% of the world’s total military spending, more than the entire Eurasian continent combined, and the U.S. is the largest contributor to NATO. The total military expenditures of the European Union’s member states comprise approximately 21% of the world’s total. This difference reflects the U.S. commitment to global military security as opposed to the more regionally and peacekeeping focused European Union. The European Union’s member states combined military personnel amounted to 1.86 million in 2005 while the United States military

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44 Ibid.
personnel numbered 1.37 during the same year.  

From these numbers, however, The European Union has provided peacekeepers to the Balkans, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and member states additionally provide units under NATO and U.N. authority. 

European Union military and security cooperation efforts fall under either the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, consisting of all European Union members, NATO members, and former Soviet republics, or the Partnership for Peace program, an extension of NATO to former Soviet republics and non-NATO European states. 

All of these organizations, save the European Union’s direct military institutions, have the United States as a member. The European Union’s military role has been limited to using its forces for peacekeeping, regional stability, and U.N. operations, while the United States has been involved in much larger-scale military operations and regime-changing operations, most recently Afghanistan and Iraq. The European Union’s members have maintained, on average, 4% of the total military force deployed in operations outside of their home nation, with a planned possibility of deploying up to 18% of its total force for operations. 

The United States, however, in comparison, had 130,000 more troops than the European Union’s average deployed at its lowest point since 1950, and in 2003, the year the invasion of Iraq began, deployed 68,000 more troops than the maximum number of troops the European Union has allotted for possible deployment. 

Regarding military strength, the West is not at all equal: the United States is the dominant military arm of the world, let alone the West.

This dynamic, creates a strong divergence of interests. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has continually decreased its number of troops in Europe, calling upon the Europeans to contribute more of their resources to NATO. 

The European Union has established a military arm, the Eurocorps, and has used it to take over NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, but the European Union has maintained its military role as a
peacekeeping and stability force, and does not have total control of its military arm.51 The United States, as the world’s only superpower, maintains global reach capabilities, but these create unique limits. The United States has global obligations that often extend beyond its resources. The United States military is an all-volunteer force with the American public in strong opposition to a draft. The government also faces extreme political pressure when excessive casualties occur, either to civilians or to U.S. soldiers.52 The American military strategy is designed to support two major theater wars completely separate from each other, but as events in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, even this strategy pushes the American military to its limits.53 The need to reduce American casualties, maintain military preparedness for additional conflicts, maintain troops in Europe and Asia due to treaty obligations, and be limited to an all-volunteer force strongly encourage the United States to engage in coalition-building prior to using force.54 Consequently, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has favored building ad-hoc coalitions during world conflicts and bring neighboring states into an alliance during a potential conflict because the Cold War institutions such as NATO and SEATO called for U.S. allies to structure their forces for defense, focusing on heavy equipment, and not light, globally-mobile forces.55 The European Union, therefore, has maintained its primary role as a regional security provider with a sufficient force to preserve regional security on its own, while its light, deployable troops operate solely under U.N. or NATO guidance, eliminating the need for coalition building. The implications for both the European Union and United States are clear: the European Union, having only recently begun transforming its military to a global force, has limited deployment abilities, but a large sized military focused on regional conflicts, while the United States, the only nation with global attack abilities but limited manpower, must build “coalitions of the willing” whenever a military conflict arises that threatens its interests.

Military strength is both a powerful coercive instrument and a high-risk strategy. As long as Russia maintains an adequate nuclear arsenal and abides by the requirements of its international institutional memberships, no Western actor will resort to military intervention against Russia directly. The United States has the ability to use force to assert its interests

51 Ibid.
53 Id. at pp. 15-35.
54 As stated before, the United States maintains troops in Europe in support of NATO, but it must also maintain troops in Japan due to its post-WWII constitution, and in South Korea due to post-Korean War threats.
against any potential post-Soviet challenger without a large nuclear arsenal and can therefore challenge Russian interests abroad, but the U.S. does not pose an immediate threat to Russia itself. Given that Russia will almost certainly not launch a pre-emptive strike or invasion on the West, Russia’s existence as a state is guaranteed by international conventions.

Another divergence between the European Union and the United States lies in economic interests and resources. While the U.S. has the greatest individual share of the burden for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the combined EU member states far exceed the U.S. totals in both organizations. The European Union is the largest source of direct investment for the Russian Federation and is Russia’s principle trading partner.\textsuperscript{56} Trade with the European Union amounts to well over half of Russia’s total trade, but aside from providing about a quarter of Europe’s natural gas needs, and about 15% of Europe’s oil, Russian trade with the EU amounts to a mere 3% of the European Union’s total trade.\textsuperscript{57} The European Union’s trade patterns with Russia are duplicated across the post-Soviet space, and the European Union has the ability to offer membership to the European post-Soviet and Eastern European states, increasing the trade and flow of resources to these states. According to the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database for the years 2002-2005, Russian trade with the United States amounted to 4.9% of total Russian imports and 2.5% of total exports, while Germany alone comprises 13.9% of total Russian imports and 5.4% of total exports.\textsuperscript{58} Russia accounts for less than .1% of U.S. total trade.\textsuperscript{59} The United States imports more of its petroleum products from the European Union than from Russia.\textsuperscript{60} Not ignoring the fact that there are some specific commodities that Russia and the U.S. are trading, and that the lack of these commodities would hurt specific industries, it is nevertheless important to develop this divergence in the Western actors. Russia needs the European Union far more than the European Union needs Russia. While this dynamic also applied to the United States, it exists on less than one-tenth the scale. This trade pattern repeats itself across the Eurasian space: the United States is not a strong trading partner with any post-Soviet state. The economic leverage of the United States on the Russian Federation is extremely limited as Russia engages in more trade within the post-Soviet

\textsuperscript{56} Id. at 15-40.
\textsuperscript{57} Id. at 6-7.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} “General Imports of Crude Oil by Country, Not Seasonally Adjusted: 2006.” U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination Branch, Washington, D.C. 20233
space and has better trade relations with China and Japan. The European Union, however, trumps them all, and this leverage is both direct and indirect. The European Union can use its institutional and economic resources, namely membership and the economic benefits that arise from it, to lure post-Soviet states away from Russia’s sphere of influence, or it use its economic resources as coercive measures. The European Union can use economic coercion directly against the Russian Federation or it can target Russian interests abroad by employing economic coercion on any other Eurasian state without violating international law.

This does not mean that the European Union can engage in consistent economic blackmail, as the EU has become increasingly dependent on purchasing Russian natural gas and committed to strengthening the infrastructure needed to transport natural gas and oil. Furthermore, the European Union has one constative and three normative limits to its power and reach over the post-Soviet space. Before addressing the normative limits, the usefulness of its foreign policy tool, economic and institutional coercion, decreases in relation to the increase of demands on a targeted state. Economic sanctions are not as successful in highly violent conflicts, as the “stakes of the game” often far exceed the value of the European Union’s trade and diplomacy with the state in question. This objective limit to sanctions was tested statistically, with the results signifying, at a significance level of .05, that the number of successful sanctions episodes decreases once major policy changes are demanded, and hence the “stakes of the game” are raised, on the targeted state. The results are included in Appendix A.

Of the three normative limits, the first is explicitly stated in the name, it is European. The European Union has constitutionally limited its membership and benefits to European states with democratic governments and market economies. Geographically, this leaves only Kazakhstan with even the slightest potential of being a Central Asian candidate for EU membership. As for the political and economic criteria, these states must produce democratic governments and successful market economies before they are even considered for membership, and must have functioning political institutions and regional stability to be accepted. The second normative limit is linked to the first, the existing EU member states, including the new members, are strongly against increased membership. Fearing the consequences of providing for the economic

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62 Because part of Kazakhstan falls into the standard accepted defining boundaries of Europe, the Council of Europe has considered it a European state. In the Caucasus, Armenia falls entirely in Asia, but has been deemed culturally linked to Europe. See Huber, Denis. *A Decade Which Made History - The Council of Europe 1989-1999*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1999.
improvements of poorer states, the waves of immigrants from those new members, and the weakening of the decision-making abilities of the European Parliament, the European Union accepted Romania and Bulgaria on January 1, 2007, left room for the possibility of eventual membership for Turkey, Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, but have taken tough stances against further enlargement. The European Union has opted instead for a European Neighbourhood Policy, dedicated to expanding trade and financial assistance to promote market economies, prevent regional instability, and promoting democracy. Membership in the European Neighborhood, however, is limited to those states that border the European Union directly, or those that the European Union shares the Mediterranean or Black Sea with, excluding Russia. The third normative limit affects the European Union’s decision to employ economic coercive measures. While the European Union uses sanctions as its primary coercive foreign policy measure, the European Union has never employed comprehensive sanctions and typically acts within the framework of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, henceforth referred to as OSCE. The European Union will act independently in cases where one of two situations exist: the UN Security Council is deadlocked or limited by veto power and the situation in question involves a government engaging in mass killings of its citizens. European Union sanctions, however, take a different focus between neighbors and other states. The European Union imposes the majority of its sanctions to its defined neighbors for regional stability reasons, while the majority of sanctions against the rest of the world are for human rights abuses.

The main divisions here become obvious when Russian interests are compared with those of the United States and European Union. The United States is reluctant to involve itself militarily in regions not within its strategic interests, but quick to act militarily in its interests. The European Union, however, engages in many peacekeeping initiatives, but is extremely reluctant to go to war, opting instead for UN resolutions and sanctions. Russia’s dominance over

67 Ibid.
68 Id. at 17-42.
the post-Soviet space does not exist because the West is not interested. Rather, the West itself has differing interests and opposing methods of achieving those interests.

**Hypotheses/Propositions**

With the information provided, several propositions can be drawn that will be tested in several case studies in Part II. Regarding the first “Western” actor, the United States may threaten to use military force to assert its interests in Eurasian conflicts, but will not “go it alone” in any conflict.\(^{69}\) The United States government faces domestic opposition to excessive American casualties without justifiable interests, as well as being beholden to international commitments that demand the U.S. to remain capable of handling additional conflicts in any other region across the globe, as the analysis has shown. Therefore, the United States will seek to build and maintain a coalition with as many partners as possible in any Eurasian armed conflict given the ability of a violent conflict or possible counter-alliance to dramatically increase the cost of war for the United States in both economic and human terms. In conflicts other than war, given that the United States cannot legitimately use force, the United States will play a subordinate position to a larger organization until an armed conflict arises since economic sanctions issued unilaterally by the United States on Eurasian states have no decisive effect unless accompanied by, at a minimum, European Union support.

Regarding the European Union, the supranational organization will become involved in any conflict in a bordering region that has the possibility of destabilizing the region. Sanctions passed by the European Union and institutional incentives such as membership have a strong effect on conflicts other than war, but the effects of sanctions passed by the European Union in response to armed conflicts grow weaker as the conflict escalates. The European Union will limit the use of force by EU members in bordering regions to actions pursued under the scope of NATO. In armed conflicts outside of the European Union’s borders, the European Union will defer to OSCE, NATO, and the United Nations, only intervening under the peacekeeping banner.

The final proposition regards the Russian Federation, which will be the opposing party to the “West” in the case studies. Russian foreign policy attempts and will continue to attempt to maintain Russian regional hegemony over its post-Soviet neighbors. In contrast to the predictions outlined in the *State-Centered* approach, democratization in Russia will not guarantee

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\(^{69}\) Even in the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, where the United States has been noted for “going it alone,” the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, and Denmark contributed troops to the invasion, and U.S. troops amounted to approximately 85% of the total force
Russia’s cooperation with U.S. and European interests in the post-Soviet space. The regime in power over Russia may determine the method employed in maintaining Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet space, but a democratic regime will not undermine this central goal. Conflicts will continue in spite of the regime in power over Russia as the U.S., European Union, and Russia each have an interest in having influence over the post-Soviet states. These hypotheses will be tested in Part II of this paper using a selection of the most salient foreign policy conflicts involving the United States, European Union (or European Community), and the Russian Federation.

**Part II: Case Studies**

To demonstrate the validity of the theories presented in Part I, this paper will apply the theory to the cases most often provided by scholars as examples of Western power over Russian interests and more recent cases. Throughout the case studies, several themes are present. E.U. economic and diplomatic success exists in cases that: 1) directly threatened the E.U. member states economies or 2) were military conflicts of low intensity. E.U. failures or lack of action occurred when: 1) member states were not directly threatened with economic injury, 2) when there was insufficient EU support against the U.S. when it acquiesced to an alternative Russian position in light of its military limits, or 3) when the stakes of the military conflict exceeded the value of the sanctions laid upon them. The United States succeeded in military conflicts when it could garner a large military coalition to support its position, while the U.S. failed when significant actors such as the E.U. or Russia were in a position to reduce the strength or effects of the coalition. Alternatively, the E.U. success in military endeavors depended solely upon U.S. military involvement, while the U.S. depended solely upon either the European Union or United Nations for success in its economically coercive endeavors. Finally, the regime in power over the Russian Federation did not alter Russia’s claim to regional hegemony. Rather, it altered the method exercised in maintaining that hegemonic claim.

To offer a short example which would be prove too extensive to use under the methodology for the case studies this paper employs, during the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) these themes clearly present themselves. The European Union, with its significant economic and institutional resources, was able to act more freely in expanding NATO and the EU against Russian objections than the United States. The European Union took a very aggressive position towards expanding both
NATO and the EU, while the United States was the more hesitant partner. The Baltic States, Romania, Slovenia, and Bulgaria all had several European states supporting their admission in the first round of post-Cold War NATO expansions, while the United States, in deference to Russian objections, limited the admission candidates to only three states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.70 The expansions began as the Kosovo conflict became an escalating issue and the U.S. feared inducing strong Russian assistance to Serbia. This example demonstrates the E.U.’s strength, but failure to override U.S. objections, while also revealing the U.S.’s need to avoid potential increased casualties and counter-alliances that would demand a larger coalition be built. For Part II, this paper will compare the oft-cited conflicts in the Balkans and Caucasus and test more recent cases involving Russian energy policies.

Methodology

Testing the theory presented in this paper involved reliance on primary sources for the data presented in the case studies with the exception of employing Kreutz’s data on EU embargoes. This data came from journalistic accounts of events during the conflicts, excluding editorials and opinion papers, and including scholarly articles solely to provide an alternative interpretation of the information presented. To facilitate obtaining these primary sources, the LexisNexis® guided news search was employed and limited to published articles in the New York Times (U.S.), Eurasia Daily Monitor (U.S.), the Times (U.K.), the Guardian (U.K.), and press releases from the Associated Press, Agence France Presse (in English), and the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (in English).71 The dates extensively searched were limited to the period starting with the year the conflict became publicized by any of the news sources aforementioned or 1990 in cases that began before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and continued until the conflict being described had either ended or stalemated.72 The search included either month-by-month or year-by-year searches, solely dependent on the quantity of data retrieved. Specific articles were chosen on the subjective basis of their relevance to the issue and comprehensiveness of coverage. The cases presented were then grouped according to

71 The LexisNexis searches were conducted between the months of December 2006, and January 2007.
72 Judgments on whether a conflict had ended or stalemated were based upon general background information of the conflict.
their topical similarities, with a preference to time, and further broken down to case-by-case explanation.

**The Balkans**

**Former Yugoslavia: 1991-1995**

When considering the case in light of the West vs. Russia, it can easily be judged to be a Western victory. As Kubicek explains, the Russian government “lacked the power to do anything,” once the August 30, 1995 air attacks began in Bosnia, and Russia was subsequently forced to “relent and take a backseat in the Bosnian operation.”73 Lynch argues that while Russia vetoed the U.S. proposal to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia in 1993 and delayed the early NATO threats of air strike with a guarantee to enforce the withdrawal of Serbian heavy artillery units from around Sarajevo, the August 30 air attacks “saw Russia effectively marginalized as a diplomatic and military factor.”74 Lynch argues that it was Serbian actions in Srebenica and Zepa that led to the attack, but finds that the attacks were the result of Russian failures to bring a negotiated resolution and hence, Russian weakness.75 If the situation were taking in light of divergent European Union and United States interests, as this paper’s theory presents, a different image emerges. As the case will show, the European Union effectively limited interference from both the United States and the Russian Federation through its sanctions and mediation efforts and was able to continue to do so until the conflict escalated beyond the European Union’s economic coercive strength. When the European Union turned to the United States for military assistance, Russia was able to assert many of its demands by threatening to arm the Serbs and force the E.U. to withdraw from the U.S.-led coalition.

The Bosnian conflict was first brought into the international community’s attention under the scope of the OSCE prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but the European Community took a leading role in 1991, imposing economic embargoes on Yugoslavia in response to the fighting over Croatian and Slovenian independence, with the U.S. joining immediately afterwards.76 The European Community issued an explicit warning to the United States and the Soviet Union that the Yugoslav conflict was a European matter and took the sole responsibility

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73 Kubicek, Paul. pp. 553-554.
74 Lynch, Allen. pp. 10-17
75 Id. at 16-17
for mediating a peace agreement among the secessionist groups.\textsuperscript{77} The European attempted to prevent dissolution by establishing a “troika” of foreign ministers to mediate a peace treaty, but intense German support for recognizing Croatia and Slovenia reversed the European policy.\textsuperscript{78} When the European Community agreed to recognize Croatian and Slovenian independence, the United States, the newly independent Russia, and the United Nations bitterly opposed the move, but the steadfast European Community forced the U.S. and Russia to recognize the new states.\textsuperscript{79} After the European Community pushed for United Nations peacekeepers and U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1992, the United States became involved in enforcing the U.N. sanctions through NATO.\textsuperscript{80}

The United States had reluctantly become involved in the former Yugoslavia after European Union requests for assistance.\textsuperscript{81} While it is notable that the United States took the lead in pushing for air strikes, this fits within the theory presented earlier when the circumstances are taken into account. The Russian government did fail to bring a negotiated resolution to the crisis, as the authors point out, but it makes little sense to make this evidence of weakness the United States and the European Union also failed to negotiate a peaceful resolution. The nationalist sentiments of many of Russia’s parties and constituents left Yeltsin with domestic pressure in support of a negotiated settlement but it provided no guarantees of alliance with Serbia since Yugoslavia was not even a former member of the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{82} The “traditional” alliance between the Serbs and Russians had not been invoked in Russian foreign policy since World War I. Both NATO and Russia had been given separate guarantees from the Bosnian Serbs to stop fighting and from Milosevic to stop supporting the rebels, yet the guarantees and cease-fires were repeatedly broken.\textsuperscript{83} Russia’s bargaining strength, therefore, only arose after the NATO decision to use air strikes, primarily led by the United States.

With the exception of Greece, NATO and the European Community were strongly in favor of the February 9, 1994 NATO threat to launch air strikes in response to the Bosnian Serb

\textsuperscript{77} “Europe, Not the U.S. or Moscow, Must Deal With Yugoslavia, Says EC.” \textit{Agence France Presse}. June 28, 1991.
\textsuperscript{82} Yugoslavia was the only communist state in Europe never to have been a member of the Warsaw Pact at any time.
siege of Sarajevo. The NATO air strikes deadline for the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their artillery 20 miles from Sarajevo was set for February 21, but the unexpected arrival of 400 Russian peacekeepers on February 20 led to NATO’s decision to suspend the attacks. Prior to the deadline, British Prime Minister John Major visited Moscow and proposed that Russia become one of the members of the G-7 with British, U.S. and German support, as a consolation for the air strikes. Limited air strikes did occur in April of 1994, however, after NATO aircraft shot down four Bosnian Serb fighters in the UN no-fly zone in late February and Bosnian Serbs attacked the UN-designated safe zone of Gorazde. Russian opposition to the strike ended as Bosnian Serb forces continued to attack Gorazde, and NATO maintained a limited military response to the Bosnian Serbs, acting only on UN commander requests. The events of 1995, however, led to the U.S. adopting an intense air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs that has been most often portrayed as Russia’s sidelining during the conflict.

The decision to launch extended air strikes cannot and should not be seen as the West’s victory over Russia. There were clear divisions of interests: the United States was moving toward opposing the arms embargo on Bosnia, the European Union was vehemently opposed to lifting the arms embargo and favored air strikes, and Russia was opposed to both. Buszynski finds that while Russia opposed the arms embargo and favored the Vance-Owen plan, pitting itself against the United States, these are not cases where “Russia was asserting itself diplomatically against the West,” as the Vance-Owen plan of dividing Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous ethnic regions and maintaining the embargo had British and French support. Buszynski argues that Russia had no power to demand concessions from the United States or the European Union, finding that when the United States and European Union agreed to the NATO air strikes, Russia was helpless to forestall the strikes. The facts, however, suggest instead that

89 Buszynski, Lesnek. pp. 72-73.
90 Ibid.
Russia posed the most serious challenge to the U.S. position, and the NATO agreement on air strikes was the least repugnant action to the Russian government.

Within the United States, President Clinton was facing intense opposition in Congress regarding the arms embargo against Bosnia. While President Clinton was against lifting the arms embargo, Republican majorities and moderate democrat support of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo had Republican leaders convinced they could override the President’s veto power. The arms embargo was seen by the Republican leadership as a means to end the war more quickly without excessive American casualties: the Bosnians would defend themselves with U.S. support. Clinton, however, believed that if the United States would lift the ban, France and Britain would remove their peacekeepers, and the U.S. would have to send ground forces into Bosnia against an Russian-armed Bosnia Serb force. The debate had been going on since 1994, with Clinton repeatedly attempting to appease the Republican-dominated Congress by proposing a United Nations resolution to lift the embargo against Bosnia, and a decision on November 30, 1994, to only abide by, but not enforce the embargo on Bosnia. While the United Kingdom and France opposed the U.S. lifting the embargo unilaterally, they were willing to agree to gradual removals of U.N. embargoes, but Turkey and many other Muslim states supported the immediate removal of sanctions. Russia, however, threatened to arm the Serbs if any measures were taken to lift the arms embargo. The decision to launch air strikes, therefore, was undertaken in light of American and European limits. The European Union had a vital interest in preventing the conflict from destabilizing the region, but relied on its diplomatic powers such as the sanctions and the United Nations, and had very limited military means without U.S. airpower. The European Union, therefore, needed U.S. participation in Bosnia, but could not risk the threat of increasing the strength of two already heavily armed militaries engaged in armed conflict. Coupled with the Russian threat of arming the Serbs, the United States would be faced with a broken coalition and would endure American casualties in an area

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vital for European, not American, security. The American decision to launch air strikes, therefore, reflected the U.S. need to maintain a supporting coalition to reduce potential American losses, and Congress soon fell in line with this decision.

While the former Yugoslavia does not fall within the range of the post-Soviet space, it nevertheless forms a very interesting test case for American and European limits. At the beginning of the conflict, the European Community, later forming into the EU, proceeded to take action against the former Yugoslavia by imposing sanctions and peacekeepers. Until Mid-1992, the European Community had prevailed over the United States and Russia over policy on the Balkans. Once the fighting escalated, United Nations measures brought the United States and Russia into the conflict, where the United States took the lead of a military coalition that had to balance its interests with those of Russia and the European Union. Russia did not take a complete “backseat” to the United States once the bombings began. The United States delayed its planned date to start the peace negotiations leading to the Dayton Accords to allow Yeltsin the opportunity to meet with Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian leaders in Moscow. The United States placed the Russian peacekeeping force under the American NATO commander in Bosnia, but in deference to Russian demands to both send peacekeepers into the region as a part of the Bosnian peacekeeping force and not have its peacekeepers fall under NATO command, the NATO commander could only pass orders to Russian soldiers in his capacity as an American general.96 In reality, this agreement on the status of the Russian peacekeepers did not change the command structure of the Bosnian peacekeeping force, but it was amiable to Russian demands while still reflecting the leading role in the peacekeeping mission that the United States had taken as a result of the air campaign.

While Russia did not get everything it wanted, it was still able to extract concessions from the United States because of U.S. limits. As this case demonstrates, the European Union’s policy interests prevailed over the United States and Russia until the European Union was no longer able to diplomatically control the armed conflict. The United States, while easily able to assert military power over the Serbs, could not risk excessive casualties in a strategically non-vital area. The U.S. decision to launch the air strikes was taken in light of Russian, European, and domestic pressure. In the choice between lifting the arms embargo and launching air strikes, the U.S. President could not appease both the Republican Congress and the European Union by

lifting the embargo and launching air strikes, else it would turn the Russians into Serbian military allies, while still leaving both Congress and the European Union largely unsatisfied. The U.S. could not choose to avoid taking any action because domestic pressure bound the president to action. Moreover, electing to lift the arms embargo would have placed the U.S. military in a potentially high casualty conflict, as the U.S. did not have the diplomatic power to either stop Russia from arming the Serbs or the EU from withdrawing from the Balkans. The air strike, therefore, was the only effective option the United States could choose within its limits.

Kosovo: 1996-1999

The Kosovo conflict offers another test of the hypothesis presented in this paper. The European Union was asserted its diplomatic interests against the U.S. by recognizing Serbia and Montenegro despite the human rights violations in Kosovo, forced the U.S. to back down from its unilateral sanctions threat and forced Russia to abandon its arms deal and join an arms embargo on Serbia that the U.S. and E.U. had agreed upon. When the conflict escalated, the United States became the predominant actor, and unlike the geopolitics of the Bosnian conflict, the U.S. had a much broader coalition with the ascension of three new NATO members and was largely able to stifle Russian opposition. The unannounced Russian advance to Pristina reflected the realization by Russian officials that the U.S. was in a much stronger position to exclude Russia from its coalition.

The crisis in Kosovo had roots in the early 1990s, when the autonomy that Kosovo held in the former Yugoslavia was rescinded, and ethnic Albanians, who made up for 90% of the population of Kosovo, faced government repression in its place.97 The conclusion of the Bosnian conflict had given hope to many ethnic Albanians who fled to Western Europe during the war, and demonstrations began in several Western European cities calling for Kosovo’s independence and UN protection.98 The ethnic tensions increased as the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who had offered free housing and credit to Serbs for settling Kosovo with little success, announced plans to increase the Serb population of Kosovo by sending Serbian refugees from Croatia into Kosovo to resettle.99 The Muslim ethnic Albanians, however, saw the plan as a move to colonize Kosovo with Serbs and eliminate the independence movement, while many Serbian refugees rejected the prospect of being sent to an area where Serbs have been emigrating.

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from since the Kosovo independence movement started. When the Dayton Accords settled the issues of Bosnia and Croatia, the people of Kosovo were left with a provision that called for negotiations without international involvement, and the U.N. temporarily lifted sanctions against Serbia. In January 1996, the European Union recognized the state of Serbia and Montenegro, while the United States refused to grant full diplomatic recognition, provide aid, or lift sanctions permanently until human rights abuses in Kosovo ceased and the Serbs indicted for war crimes during the wars with Bosnia and Croatia were extradited. With the European Union turning its back on Kosovo’s independence movement, and the U.S. only calling for Serbia to restore human rights to the region, many ethnic Albanians felt their peaceful resistance movement was failing to grab the world’s attention.

On Sunday, February 12, 1996, bombs exploded in a number of Serbian refugee camps in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo. No one was killed in the attacks, but a previously unknown organization, the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), claimed responsibility for the attacks and called both on Serbia to end its colonization campaign and on the United States to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Following the attacks, an official from Albania’s main political party called the attacks either false or the work of Serbian authorities to incite the Serbs against the Albanians, because the Kosovar Albanians had dedicated themselves to peaceful resistance. The Serbs, however, responded with increased repression of the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo. The Serbs’ move led the European Union to declare that its recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was “premature” and failed to take into account the human rights abuses in Kosovo. The next week, the Kosovo Liberation Army struck again with fatal shootings of an Albanian student and six Serbs, and a bombing that killed a child and three people, announcing that, “Support for the Serb aggressor and non-respect for the expressed will of the oppressed Albanian people mean that the armed conflict in Kosovo and the Balkans will

105 Ibid.
Rather than drive world opinion against the Serbs for their actions in Kosovo, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted in favor of lifting the sanctions on Yugoslavia in October 1996, in accordance with the Dayton agreement. Ethnic tensions continued to build up in October as Serbian police arrested three Albanians for terrorist activities, Serb nationalists desecrated Albanian graves and mosques, and the Kosovo Liberation Army threatened death to any ethnic Albanian who collaborated with the Serbian government.

The UCK remained underground until Serb policemen began retaliating against the Albanian population by killing and arresting suspected terrorists. Ten days before the Serbian presidential election of December 1997, and during a funeral for an ethnic Albanian killed by Serbian police attended by nearly 20,000 people, the Kosovo Liberation Army came out from the shadows as uniformed Albanians appeared in the crowds claiming membership to the UCK and vowing to fight for the liberation of Kosovo. Milosevic’s victory in the election under less than democratic principles sparked demonstrations in Kosovo, and violent police responses. Combined with the UCK’s terrorist attacks against Serbs and suspected Albanian Serb-collaborators, the passive resistance movement established by Kosovo’s leading ethnic Albanian party, the Kosovo Parliamentary Party, was displaced by the militant nationalism of the UCK.

In March 1998, the situation in Kosovo had brought the United States, the European Union, and Russia into conflict. The European Union and the United States pressed the U.N. for sanctions on Yugoslavia and the European Union demanded the right to send monitors to Kosovo. In response, Russia voiced its willingness to veto any U.N. steps against Yugoslavia. On March 21, 1998, six U.S. citizens working for the non-governmental organization “Peace Workers” were arrested by the Serbian police for failing to register their residency in Pristina, and U.S. lawmakers were refused visas for a second time when they

planned to observe unofficial Kosovo elections. The U.S. citizens were quickly released, but the U.S. government was now even more determined to build a case for international involvement. The United States, while claiming it could still act alone in levying sanctions against Serbia, nevertheless dropped its demand for sanctions but limited its demands for an arms embargo with Contact Group support. The Contact Group, comprising of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States, united in support of an arms embargo, with Russia taking the largest step of stopping all undelivered weapons to Yugoslavia that were previously promised in a $1.5 billion dollar deal. On March 31, 1998, the United Nations restored the arms embargo on Yugoslavia, this time only applying to Serbia and Montenegro.

In response to the U.N. embargoes, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic initiated a referendum for Yugoslavia on whether they should accept international mediation, a move that sparked U.S., E.U. and OSCE outrage. Russia, however, called the referendum “a sovereign right of Serbia,” and supported bilateral negotiations between Serbia and Albania to settle the Kosovo issue. The Serbs voted against foreign mediation in April 1998, and the Contact Group responded with increased sanctions if Serbia did not begin negotiations over Kosovo by early May. The document imposing the sanctions, however, also denounced the Kosovo Liberation Army’s use of terrorism against the Serbs. The Russians, while tacitly agreeing to the sanctions and vehemently supporting the denunciation of terrorism, nevertheless opposed the use of sanctions after the measures were passed. The deadline passed as Milosevic rejected the Contact Group’s demands, and the EU responded with sanctions and demands for NATO intervention. The Russians countered by refusing consent for NATO action and arranging negotiations with Milosevic over the Kosovo issue, to which NATO largely backed away from

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123 Ibid.
their threats of immediate military action. NATO did, however, announce a decision to launch air exercises over the Balkans as the Milo\v{se}vic-Yeltsin negotiations began.

While Kosovo may lie outside of the post-Soviet space, Russia nevertheless took a keen interest into the conflict and it thus becomes a necessary case study for this paper. Russia’s willingness to act in concert with the Contact Group over an arms embargo came after the United States had dropped its threats of acting alone in applying sanctions on Yugoslavia and the European Union pressed strongly for an arms embargo. The U.S. threat to sanction Yugoslavia would not have seriously hurt the Yugoslav economy, as even in 2000, when the United States drastically increased trade to Serbia and Montenegro following the conflict, U.S. goods amounted to .02% of Yugoslavia’s imports and Yugoslavia exported .002% of its goods to the United States. The move was mostly symbolic but also designed to pressure the European Union into agreement. When the EU agreed to the proposed arms embargo, Russian resistance was dropped. Russia would lose over a billion dollars from the agreement as it would scuttle an arms deal with Yugoslavia, but would gain an arms embargo that would also affect the Kosovars and would maintain its key role as a negotiator in the conflict provided the conflict did not escalate. For Russia, the monetary loss would be compensated by the domestic support, international prestige, and diplomatic leverage the Russians would gain from forcing concessions from the U.S. and EU on the scope of the arms embargo and future negotiations. Without an escalation of violence within Kosovo, the United States would never have been able to garner European Union support for armed intervention, leaving the Contact Group dependent on all members, including Russia, for further action. The conflict in Kosovo did, however, become increasingly violent, and the U.S. was then able to assert its abilities to provide a military solution.

In September 1998, the United States pushed for a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force against Serb military units in Kosovo if the ethnic conflict continued, as U.N. authorization was the only mechanism to legitimize international involvement agreed upon by all members of

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the Contact Group. Russia balked at the United States’ insistence on a resolution that would not require an additional U.N. vote to determine if military force is required, forcing the U.S. to remove from the resolution any provision that would directly or indirectly sanction the use of force without additional U.N. authorization. Milosevic accepted U.N. monitors in mid-October of 1998, and averted NATO action for the rest of the year. In January of 1999, however, Milosevic’s Yugoslavia was again bound for confrontation with NATO, as the heads of the both the U.N. peace monitors in Kosovo and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo were expelled from the country, and Milosevic resisted all U.N. attempts to investigate suspected massacres of ethnic Albanian in Kosovo.

On March 23, 1999, NATO, with strong U.S. support, authorized strikes against southern Serbia and Serb-controlled portions of Kosovo. Russian Prime Minister Primakov, in the middle of a flight to the United States, turned around in protest and Russia withdrew from the NATO Partnership for Peace program the following day when the strikes were launched. Within the course of a week, Russia circulated a U.N. resolution demanding a halt to the bombing, threatened to provide defensive weapons to the Serbs, and sent a Russian warship from Sevastopol to the Mediterranean. Russia’s actions in protest against the NATO bombing led to U.S. concessions on whether Yugoslav troops could remain in Kosovo alongside the peacekeeping force, but Russia could not provide direct support for Yugoslavia. In April, a Russian convoy of 73 trucks bound for Yugoslavia carrying fuel, food, medicine, and other

equipment seen by NATO as military in nature was stopped on the Hungarian border.\textsuperscript{134} NATO also established a naval embargo on Yugoslavia preventing oil from reaching Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{135}

As the bombing continued for months despite Russian resistance, Yugoslavia finally gave in to Allied demands in early June, accepting peacekeepers and withdrawing its forces from Kosovo.\textsuperscript{136} Russia’s ability to assert its interests in Yugoslavia was ineffectual in stopping the NATO air strikes even after NATO aircraft accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy until Milosevic gave in to NATO demands.\textsuperscript{137} NATO bombing continued after Milosevic agreed to remove his troops from Kosovo, but Russia’s refusal to support a U.N. resolution necessary for the United States to create a peacekeeping force led to a NATO bombing moratorium of several nights. In response, Russia agreed to support the resolution on June 9, 1999.\textsuperscript{138} Russian participation in the peacekeeping force, however, remained unclear.

NATO peacekeeping plans for Kosovo involved dividing Kosovo into five sectors and installing a force of 48,000 troops under the command of British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, with the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, and Italy each gaining a sector.\textsuperscript{139} No definite resolution on the size of Russia’s peacekeeping force or where it would be stationed existed as NATO plans went underway. U.S. President Clinton stated that he did not expect Russian troops to be under NATO, and the U.S. and Russia would most likely agree to follow the Bosnian model of having Russian troops reporting to a Russian general based in NATO headquarters while operating under the tactical command of the NATO commanding officer in his non-NATO capacity.\textsuperscript{140} NATO’s ambiguity on the status of the Russian peacekeeping force quickly changed on June 11, 1999, as Russian troops, in a desperate move to ensure their participation in the peacekeeping force, Kosovo’s capital of Pristina hours before NATO moved into Kosovo and in direct defiance of the assertion by Russia that it would not send its forces into Kosovo without

\textsuperscript{134} Gordon, Michael R. “Crisis in the Balkans: the Suppliers; Convoy Sent from Russia is Blocked by Hungary.” \textit{New York Times}. April 12, 1999.
\textsuperscript{136} Perlez, Jane. “Crisis in the Balkans: The Overview; Russians Balking as Gains are Made on Kosovo Talks.” \textit{New York Times}. June 8, 1999.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
prior NATO authorization.\textsuperscript{141} Russian President Yeltsin claimed that the preemptive move was a mistake, but 200 Russian paratroopers in armored personnel carriers blocked the British 5\textsuperscript{th} Airborne Brigade’s entrance into the Pristina Airport for over a week until the Serbian military units, who were allowed to use the airport’s facilities under a military agreement with NATO, withdrew.\textsuperscript{142} The Russian move sparked doubts within NATO over Russia’s ability to control its military. Russian plans to reinforce the troops were blocked by NATO over-flight denials, but an agreement was reached after a week since the Russian takeover of the Pristina airport. Russia agreed to share three sectors of the five sectors with NATO, be placed under the tactical command of KFOR, the NATO mission, but would be able to place a much larger peacekeeping force in Kosovo, take joint command of the Pristina airport, retain the right to refuse NATO orders, and operate in their own “zones” within the sectors.\textsuperscript{143}

As the violence in Kosovo grew despite economic coercive measures, the European Union became increasingly deferential to U.S. policies. Russia, however, continually asserted its objections to military force, while the United States had garnered sufficient alliance strength to begin the attacks. Unlike the geopolitics of the Bosnian conflict, Yugoslavia was now surrounded by NATO members, and these new NATO members significantly decreased the risks of potential Russian involvement in Yugoslavia’s favor. Russian threats, despite being less endangering to U.S. interests, were still formidable enough to lead to some minor U.S. concessions, and the need to bring Russia back into the alliance to support a Security Council resolution on the peacekeeping force led to a bombing suspension. The United States was still responsive to Russian protests, but was able to act more boldly in the Balkans compared to its earlier involvement in the same general region as a result of a larger NATO.

This did not leave Russia without options, however. The events of the Kosovo conflict show that once the peace process had begun, Russia launched demands that it be included in the peacekeeper force with its own sector. The outcome of the Russian advance to Pristina prior to NATO’s advance demonstrates one of the limits of the United States in countering Russian foreign policies. The European Union largely dismissed Russia’s role in the peacekeeping force,

but the United States faced a new challenge. The NATO air strikes were a success within the United States, but domestic opposition arose to American ground forces being sent into the region, and few NATO members would contribute large amounts of troops to the Kosovo peacekeeping force. The new NATO allies in Eastern Europe provided the United States protection against Russian involvement by denying the Russian military air over-flight and ground transportation privileges to Kosovo, but these new allies could not produce enough soldiers to reduce the burden on the U.S. troops going into Kosovo. The resulting differences among the United States, the European Union, and the new NATO members left Russia in an ambiguous situation: they were certainly going to be included in the mission, but the size, patrol area, and command structure of the Russian force would not be determined until after NATO established itself in Kosovo. Russia’s decision to enter Kosovo early thus forced NATO to accept the Russian force and give in to several Russian demands, as NATO could block further reinforcements but could not remove the Russian force already in place. The European Union, having lost its economic power over the region as a result of the increased intensity of the armed conflict, deferred to the United States for military leadership, but it cared little for Russia’s military concerns. The United States, however, could not risk scuttling Russian support for the peacekeeping force and attempted to deny Russian peacekeepers a Kosovo sector and large force by delaying Russia’s entry into the Kosovo peacekeeping force until after NATO sectors had been populated by its peacekeepers and operations began. The Russian military’s move into Kosovo prior to the commencement of the NATO ground operation, therefore, prevented NATO forces from beginning their operations and provided Russia leverage against NATO in negotiations, guaranteeing Russia its own zones within several NATO sectors, a sizeable contingent of forces, and a separate status from NATO.

The Caucasus

Nagorno-Karabakh

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan demonstrates a failure of both the U.S. and E.U. to counter Russian interests in the post-Soviet space. The European Community’s arms embargo on Armenia and Azerbaijan failed due to Russian assistance to the Armenians, and the U.S. military effort failed due to its need for a large coalition. With Russian Army deserters joining the ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and bringing Russian military equipment with them, along with Russian withdrawals that left arms and equipment for the ethnic
Armenians, the European Community’s arms embargo was insufficient to stop the flow of arms to the separatists fighting for independence from Azerbaijan. The U.S., while successfully building support for an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe resolution that limited the Russian peacekeeping force to allow for Western alliance members to make up a majority of the forces in the peacekeeping mission, nevertheless failed to implement the resolution. With the majority of the European Community’s peacekeepers involved in the Bosnian conflict, the U.S. failed to generate a sufficient coalition to outnumber the Russian peacekeepers, leaving the U.S. with no option to enter unless it either expended unacceptable amounts of resources to send a large force or, even more deplorable to the American people, be placed under Russian commanders.

While the cease-fire agreement brokered by Russia between Armenia and Azerbaijan in May 1994 and the establishment of a CIS peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh has been dismissed by many scholars as a case of Western disinterest, journalistic accounts of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict suggest that both the United States and the European Community attempted to take a leading role in the conflict but failed to overcome the obstacles created by Russian forces in the area. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Armenian claims of human rights abuses committed by Azeris on the Armenian majority living in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan had led to violence prior to independence from the Soviet Union. Following independence, the Armenian government supported the union of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region under the principle of self-determination with the Azeri government strongly opposed to a breakup of its territory. Russia and Kazakhstan immediately began a mediation effort, resulting in a September 1991 truce with the Russians and Kazakhs acting as guarantors and observers of the truce until formal peace talks would begin. Within two months, however, fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh region resurfaced, and in December 1991, Yeltsin withdrew the formerly Soviet Interior Ministry troops that had been stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh for years under Gorbachev’s orders. Remaining units under the military command of the Commonwealth of Independent Stat left after the conflict escalated and

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Azerbaijani shelling killed two soldiers in 1992.\textsuperscript{147} The units withdrew, leaving behind equipment and deserters who joined the Armenians.\textsuperscript{148}

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereafter referred to as CSCE), later named the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the NATO Cooperation Council, later the Partnership for Peace, in late 1991 to early 1992. The CSCE attempted to broker a peace settlement in the summer of 1993, but the ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh accepted neither the CSCE talks nor a tripartite plan drawn up by Turkey, the United States, and Russia, despite Azerbaijani and Armenian acceptance.\textsuperscript{149} The ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh resisted all attempts to broker a cease-fire after the failure of a 1992 ceasefire until 1994, including mining a road that effectively halted an OSCE envoy bound for the region in July 1993.\textsuperscript{150} As these cease-fires initiated by Moscow and CSCE still failed to stop the fighting, both Turkey and Iran threatened to intervene, prompting Russia to threaten military action to protect its former Soviet borders.\textsuperscript{151}

While the United States never intervened militarily, it did attempt, against Russian objections, to spearhead a decision to send CSCE peacekeeping force to enforce the May ceasefire successfully negotiated by Russia in 1994, while the European Community had imposed an arms embargo on both Azerbaijan and Armenia as early as 1992.\textsuperscript{152} The May ceasefire was brokered by Russia working with the CSCE Minsk group, but while the non-CIS members of the Minsk group—France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Turkey and the United States—favored a multinational peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh that included European Community members, Russia insisted on the role of the CIS alone as the policing agent of the former Soviet Union. As Kubicek argues, the OSCE decision to send Western European peacekeepers along with CIS peacekeepers represented the rejection of Russia’s claimed right to police the former Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153} Kubicek, p. 564.
While the OSCE rejected Russia’s right to dominate the peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh, limiting it to about one-third of the total force, the agreement remained only in principle.\textsuperscript{154} To this date, the OSCE has never sent peacekeepers into Nagorno-Karabakh, the region remains a de facto independent republic, and Russian soldiers are stationed in Armenia under CIS agreements, enforcing the borders. This case clearly illustrates the limits of U.S. and E.U. power. The European Community’s embargo on Azerbaijan and Armenia failed to resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh because the conflict had already reached full-scale mobilization in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The embargo would prevent large amounts of weapons from entering these countries, but it would not remove the weapons already accumulated. The United States, with all its military might, could have threatened to disarm Armenia and Azerbaijan by force, but the United States, having to shoulder nearly the entire burden of peacekeeping if NATO intervened militarily, faced neither a direct threat to U.S. security allies nor vital interests in the area. The European Union was unable to commit large amounts of resources to the area because it was currently heavily engaged in the Bosnian conflict, leaving the United States without a strong coalition and ensuring American domestic support would falter immediately if the conflict re-escalated and Americans became apart of the casualty counts. Because the conflict involved OSCE states, the European Community took diplomatic and economic steps against Armenia and Azerbaijan, but it would only negotiate through the OSCE, to which Russia was a member. The United States worked through the OSCE to garner a cease-fire and establish a multilateral peacekeeping force of mainly European Union troops, but was unwilling to accept the risks of becoming militarily involved in the region without an overwhelming alliance. The European Union, while committing to a peacekeeping mission, nevertheless found itself without sufficient resources to shoulder the burden of such a mission and without the support of the U.S. to accept that burden. The failure to send peacekeepers into Nagorno-Karabakh did not arise from a lack of interest, but rather a lack of sufficient resources to undermine Russia’s claim to the peacekeeping mission in the region and enter Nagorno-Karabakh with an overwhelming force.

\textbf{Trans-Dniester/Transnistria}

The Trans-Dniester conflict reveals the overarching limit to military coercion, as neither the U.S. nor the E.U. could risk using force against Russian forces directly. The 14\textsuperscript{th} Army’s

existence in the Trans-Dniester region prior to Moldova’s independence prevented the U.S. from using its military resources, and has left the European Union as the dominant actor in this issue. The European Union, however, has failed to generate any substantial gains in the Trans-Dniester region, as EU members do not wish to sacrifice natural gas supplies to sanction Russia over an issue that does not directly threaten the European Union, and, given the fact that Russia’s presence in the Trans-Dniester region predates Moldova’s independence, Russia’s membership in the OSCE and U.N. Security Council has largely protected it from diplomatic moves to remove the troops.

Similar to the timing of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the separatist movement in Moldova began prior to independence from the Soviet Union. The separatist movement began in response to the Moldovan nationalist calls for unification with Romania and the government’s pro-Romanian language policies. The separatists, living mainly in the Trans-Dniester region, were largely ethnic Russians and Ukrainians opposed to the pro-Romanian nationalist movement gaining ground in the rest of Moldova. The Trans-Dniester region was occupied by the Soviet 14th Army prior to independence and was under CIS command until Yeltsin nationalized the unit into the Russian military in 1992. Under CIS command, the 14th Army remained in Moldova to protect ethnic Russians, but the Supreme Soviet and Yeltsin’s vice-president called the unit to intervene in the conflict. After Yeltsin nationalized the 14th Army as a Russian unit, the Moldovan government called its withdrawal and ethnic Moldovans harassed the unit. However, with the 14th Army now under Russian command, Russia was able to assert its place with neighboring Ukraine and Romania in the peace negotiations between the separatists and the Moldovan government.

The Europeans and United States had both taken up the issue of the Trans-Dniester conflict. Moldova was admitted to the CSCE in January 1992, and the CSCE offered to send observers to the conflict. After the cease-fire was signed in late 1993, the CSCE called on Russia to remove the 14th Army from Moldova. Since the beginning of 1992, the European Union has signed several partnership agreements with Moldova, provided foreign aid, and the

United States granted Moldova Most-Favored Trade Status in July 1992. The European Union launched a Border Assistance Mission to Moldova, and both the U.S. and E.U. have imposed travel bans on the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria. The United States and European Union have observer status to the negotiations ongoing between Moldova, the Republic of Transnistria, the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine, known as the 5+2 format. To this day, however, both the United States and European Union continue to call for the withdrawal of the 14th Army from Moldova, but the army remains nonetheless.

The failure to force the 14th Army’s withdrawal from Moldova has continued to be a thorn in the side to both the United States and European Union. The United States has stated its desire Russia’s presence in Eastern Europe reduced, while the European Union seeks to end the conflict and guarantee future stability along its border with Moldova, but to both of these interests the 14th Army’s presence may prove antithetical. The 14th Army, however, cannot be forced to leave by either the European Union or the United States. The United States lacks the institutional power to remove the troops diplomatically, as Russia holds seats in both the OSCE and the United Nations Security Council, and embargoes would fall in contradiction to European natural gas interests. The military option is clearly out of the question, as the United States could never bear the political costs of starting a non-defensive war with a nuclear power. The European Union, while it could seriously damage the Russian economy through the use of sanctions, has rejected the idea as an insufficient cause to risk hurting its primary natural gas supply and setting a precedent of undermining the OSCE, its own security institution, giving Russia a legitimate precedent of ignoring the OSCE in future crises.


The failure to counter Russia’s claimed role as the sole peacekeeper in Georgia stems largely from the European Community’s reliance on the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe to negotiate the settlement and the U.S. failure to garner E.U. commitments to a peacekeeping force. Given the fact that the conflict and escalated to a major conflict prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, E.U. sanctions were already ineffective at stopping the violence, while the U.S. found itself in yet another situation where it would have to

163 Ibid.
outnumber the already present Russian peacekeeping force to assert its interests in keeping 
Russia from using its military to control its neighbors. Similarly to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, the European Community lacked the manpower to deploy peacekeepers, and the sheer 
size of the Russian force in Georgia led to an implicit acceptance of Russia’s peacekeeping force 
in Georgia as a U.N. mission.

Often dismissed as a case of Western indifference, Russia’s relations with Georgia its 
independence point to more than simple Western disregard. The European Community relied on 
the CSCE as its diplomatic tool within the region because there was armed conflict, while the 
United States made several diplomatic overtures to no avail. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, both the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were incorporated into Georgia. 
Citing ethnic conflict, South Ossetia’s leaders sought to rejoin the Russian Federation, while 
Abkhazian separatists wanted total sovereignty.

After the ethnic conflict in South Ossetia brought over 80,000 refugees into Russian 
territory, the Russian Parliament granted Yeltsin authority to impose “tough economic sanctions” 
on Georgia in November 1991, effectively beginning Russia’s involvement in Georgia’s internal 
affairs.164 The South Ossetian conflict was contained through joint Russian, Ossetian, and 
Georgian peacekeepers, but conflict in another Georgian province sent Georgia and Russian into 
armed conflict. After three weeks of fighting in the Georgian region of Abkhazia, Russia offered 
to send another peacekeeping force into Georgia, which was promptly rejected by Georgian 
officials.165 Russia did, however, already have troops stationed in Abkhazia as the Soviet Army 
had several bases in the region, and these were nationalized into the Russian military.

In September 1992, the Russian Parliament denounced and sanctioned Georgia for its 
actions in Abkhazia, calling on Georgia to stop its military campaign in Abkhazia and withdraw 
its military from the region.166 In response, the Georgian government denounced Russia for its 
interference and for imposing an arms embargo on Georgia.167 As the conflict grew increasingly 
tense, Georgian and Russian warplanes started to fire on each other. In response, Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin declared in October 1992, that Russian troops would be sent to take

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166 Vinitskaya, Galina. “Russian Parliament Urges Georgia to Stop War in Abkhazia.” *TASS*. September 25, 1992
167 Kasoyev, Mikhail. “Georgian Government Denounces Russian Parliament Resolution.” *TASS*. September 28, 

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control of the railways and coast of Abkhazia.\textsuperscript{168} One week later, Russia sent the Black Sea Fleet to Abkhazia, a move that unilaterally violated the agreement between Ukraine and Russia to share control of the Black Sea Fleet.\textsuperscript{169} The conflict continued to grow for over 8 months between Russia and Georgia as instances of armed conflict increased between the two forces.\textsuperscript{170} In July 1993, Russia brokered a cease-fire agreement that led to Georgian troop withdrawals monitored by 200 Russian peacekeepers, nine United Nations observers and a joint commission of 30 Abkhazians, 30 Georgians, and 30 Russians.\textsuperscript{171} However, neither the Georgians nor Abkhazians would fully withdraw, sparking a new conflict and leading to Russia’s decision to cut electricity to Abkhazia.\textsuperscript{172} It was not until December 1993, when Georgia lost the provincial capital of Abkhazia, Sukhumi, that a lasting cease-fire was signed.\textsuperscript{173} The cease-fire, mediated by the United Nations with Russian assistance, called for the exchange of prisoners, a U.N. peacekeeping force, and the safe return of refugees.\textsuperscript{174}

While the Russian government assisted in peacekeeping, both the Georgian government and the United States were wary of creating a longstanding Russian presence in Georgia.\textsuperscript{175} As far back as October 1992, the United States suggested that Georgia appeal to NATO for help in the conflict, but the appeal was never made.\textsuperscript{176} The United Nations, however, was low on funds and manpower as it had deployed peacekeepers across the world, with large contingents in Somalia and Bosnia, leaving the United States to shoulder the majority of the costs of additional peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{177} In June 1994, the United Nations passed a mandate for the UN observer mission in Georgia that while “not explicitly approving it,” nevertheless accepted the Russians as the sole peacekeeping force in the region.\textsuperscript{178} The UN observer mission expanded Russian peacekeeper deployment into Georgia and sanctioned the Russian units already stationed in Georgia since their deployment during the Soviet era.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{168} Friedman, Brian. “Yeltsin: Russia Taking Full Control of Railway, Coast in Abkhazia.” \textit{Associated Press}. October 6, 1992.
\textsuperscript{171} “Soldier Begin Withdrawing from Georgia War Zone.” \textit{Agence France Presse}. August 15, 1993.
\textsuperscript{172} “Russia Slaps Sanctions on Abkhazia, Blames Both Sides for War.” \textit{Agence France Presse}. September 18, 1993.
\textsuperscript{173} Nullis, Clare. “Georgians and Separatists Sign Peace Deal.” \textit{Associated Press}. December 1, 1993.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} Kasoyev, Mikhail. “USA Advise Georgia to Appeal to NATO, Georgia Lingers.” \textit{TASS}. October 3, 1992.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{179} “Russian Peacekeepers Deploy in Abkhazia.” \textit{Associated Press}. June 27, 1994.
The United Nations’ “implicit” acceptance of Russian peacekeepers was the result of both American and European limitations on countering Russian interests in the region. NATO was willing and able to enter the conflict at Georgia’s request, but without such an offer, NATO had no legitimate cause to use military force in the region. Because Russia had brokered the peace settlement and already sent peacekeepers into the region, Russia granted itself a place within any potential U.N. peacekeeping force. The European Community, with many of its member states already committed to other U.N. peacekeeping initiatives and faced with an armed secessionist government, could not gather sufficient contributions from its member states to send peacekeepers into the conflict. Rather, the Community opened itself to the OSCE and its larger membership pool, which included Russia and the United States, to garner the necessary resource commitments for a peacekeeping mission. Countering the Russian initiative, therefore, required the United States to exceed Russian commitments and shoulder the majority of the costs. The European Community would not become directly involved without a heavy contribution from its primary supporter, the United States. Without an American contribution that would exceed the current and planned Russian commitments to Georgia, the United States would not only fail to entice European Community members to contribute to the mission, but it would also be a minority partner to the Russians if Americans were sent to the region. On the other hand, the economic costs and potential casualty risks of such a contribution would be unacceptable to Congress and the American public. The United States could not project its interests in the region without a large coalition to shoulder most of the burden of peacekeeping while the members of European Community were involved in other conflicts and did not have the resources the accept the burden of a new mission. The inability to form a coalition that was acceptable to both the United States and the European Community led to a grudgingly approved Russian peacekeeping mission in Georgia.

Natural Gas

Russia-Ukrainian Natural Gas Dispute: 2005-2006

The Russian-Ukraine Natural Gas Dispute was a European Union success in terms of its economic and diplomatic coercive capabilities. The natural gas cut-off directly affected European Union members’ gas supplies and the possibility of E.U. retaliatory action against Russia and Ukraine effectively ended the dispute within days. For the United States, however, its limited economic coercive strength became apparent as it continued to pressure the Russian
government for its policies after the gas supplies were restored. The European Union demanded a full restoration of natural gas to its member states and a definite plan to avoid threatening European Union natural gas delivery in the future, to which Gazprom and the Russian government quickly agreed, but the U.S. call for Russia to end its use of natural gas as a political tool was met with harsh rejection and criticism from the Russian government. This case provides a unambiguous example of the divergence of economic power between the U.S. and the E.U. in the post-Soviet region.

Of all of Russia’s energy sector activity, the Russian-Ukrainian Gas Dispute has been the most cited in both scholarly research and the news. In 2005, Russia’s state owned natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, announced that it would raise the natural gas prices for the Baltic States, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Of these customers, only Ukraine and Moldova failed to reach any agreement with Gazprom by 2006. Between Moldova and Ukraine, however, Ukraine became the center of attention in December and January of 2005-2006. On September 1, 2005, Gazprom officially announced that it would raise Ukraine’s price for gas from 50 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters to 180 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters and would pay for natural gas transit through Ukraine in cash, rather than with natural gas supply.180 Ukrainian officials refused to agree to a price that was close to the market rate for Europe and sought to establish gas contracts with Turkmenistan to reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russia, but Turkmenistan would not agree to any contract without Russian approval.181 By mid-November, the Russian government, the majority stakeholder in Gazprom, became openly frustrated with Ukraine’s refusal to negotiate. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov postponed his planned visit to Ukraine in November “indefinitely” and publicly denounced Ukraine for refusing to switch to cash payments for natural gas at a press conference following a Commonwealth of Independent States meeting.182 Fradkov’s deputy stated on November 29 that Russia would not accept any barter arrangements for natural gas including Ukrainian arms, effectively scuttling a proposal conceived by Ukrainian officials.183 With every alternative to the cash payments proposed by Ukraine rejected by the Russians, the Ukrainian government initiated a new plan to internationalize the dispute. On November 30, the day after the Russian rejection of any barter

180 Zlodorev, Dmitry. “Gazprom to Export Gas to Ukraine at European Prices.” TASS. September 1, 2005.
183 “Russia Won’t Conclude Arms Barter Deals with Ukraine,” TASS. November 29, 2005.
arrangement, Ukraine threatened to reduce transit deliveries of Russian gas to Europe if Russia continued to pressure Ukraine over switching to cash payments, sparking European Union involvement.  

The debate continued into December as Gazprom, banking on the European Union’s distaste for Ukraine’s threat to reduce transit deliveries to Europe, announced that it would cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine if no agreement is reached by Jan 1, 2007. Gazprom officials made it very clear, however, that the cuts would not affect Europe, but 80 percent of all Russian natural gas supplies to Europe passed through Ukraine. Within days, Gazprom officials announced that it would increase the proposed natural gas price for Ukraine to $220-$230 per 1,000 cubic meters, claiming that Ukraine “wasted time” by trying to negotiate and market prices increased since the earlier offer was made. Following the announcement, Ukraine made several efforts to coerce Russia into dropping its cut-off plans, including demanding a higher price for the Russian lease of its Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol and asserting its right to take 15% of all Russian natural gas being transited to Europe irregardless of the intended destination for the gas.

Gazprom, however, did offer an alternative to market prices for Ukraine in December, stating that it wanted to buy a majority stake in Naftogaz Ukrainy, Ukraine’s state oil and gas company, but the offer was rejected less than a week before the deadline. The Ukrainian government argued that accepting the offer would mean the giving Gazprom control of the entire Ukrainian gas pipeline system. On December 29, the United States urged Russia and Ukraine to compromise, seeing the issue as a “bilateral matter,” but “significant and important” to U.S. interests. Despite both the U.S. and European Union urging compromise and Ukraine defiantly opposed to renegotiation, on January 1, 2007, Gazprom suspended natural gas supplies

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186 Ibid.
and “Ukraine Stakes Claim to 15 Percent of Russian Gas Transiting to Europe.” *Agence France Presse*. December 27, 2005.
190 Ibid.
intended for Ukraine at 6:40 am GTM, pumping only enough gas for Russia’s European customers.192

By January 2, however, several European countries reported delivery shortfalls as high as 50%.193 Russian officials claimed the shortfalls were the result of Ukraine’s siphoning of the gas bound for Europe, but the European Union demanded that Russia fulfill its contractual obligations or face retaliatory action.194 In response, Gazprom responded by promising to pump extra gas through the pipeline to restore full supplies to Europe in 24 hours.195 On January 3, the gas cut-off strategy effectively ended as Russia increased the gas supplies to compensate for Ukraine’s siphoning, thereby providing all European customers, including Ukraine, with their promised amounts.196 Later that same day, however, the Bush administration criticized Russia for its actions, finding that the restoration of supplies “does not resolve the issue.”197 On January 4, 2006, Russia and Ukraine signed a contract providing for Gazprom to sell natural gas to the company Rosukrenergo for $230 per 1,000 cubic meters, which would add Central Asian gas to the blend and sell it to Ukraine for $95 per 1,000 cubic meters.198 Ukraine would pay the market price for the Russian gas it siphoned from the pipelines bound for Europe and would receive $1.60, instead of the previous $1.09, for every 1,000 cubic meters of gas transferred through Ukraine every 100 kilometers.199 While the European Union as a whole praised the deal, several officials within the EU called for new measures to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas.200 Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State, stated that the gas cut-off was “obviously political,” and intended to punish Ukraine for moving toward a Western-style democracy.201 In response to EU criticism, Russia reaffirmed its commitment to the delivery of gas to its “European Union partners,” and pledged to work with EU members on building new

195 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
pipeline systems with fewer transit countries.202 At the same time, however, the Russian government snapped back at U.S. criticism, stating that the issue was a bilateral disagreement between neighbors, and a Russian official stated at a press conference that, “The European Union, unlike the United States, has welcomed the deal,” and the United States should cease its criticism.203

Russia’s success against Ukraine during the gas crisis rested on maintaining a continual supply of gas to Europe. The European Union and the United States both pressured Russia and Ukraine to resolve the conflict before the gas cut-off, but Russia was able to avoid European Union action by guaranteeing a continuous supply of gas. On the other hand, the weak economic ties between the U.S. and Russia, especially in the natural gas sector, minimized the potential for American backlash to affect Russian interests. The European Union, while highly critical of Gazprom’s threats against Ukraine, had no legitimate claim against Russia given the conflict was between two sovereign states that were not in arms against each other. When the natural gas supplies to Europe were reduced due to Ukraine’s siphoning of the pipeline, the European Union had legitimate authority to act to protect its financial security. The European Union demanded the restoration of full supplies to Europe, and both the United States and European condemned Russia for its actions against Ukraine. Gazprom, in an effort to appease the European Union, pumped extra gas through the pipeline to make up for the gas taken by Ukraine, effectively muting the effects of the cut-off. If Russia did not come to an agreement immediately, Ukraine would keep getting Russian natural gas for free. The results of the Europe Union’s demands were mixed, however. With both Russia and Ukraine facing retaliatory action, the rushed negotiations forced Ukraine to pay more for natural gas, but much less than Gazprom had demanded. The European Union received guarantees from Russia that it would ensure the complete fulfillment of natural gas contractual agreements, but the Russian government responded disdainfully to U.S. statements and pressure. With the little economic power the United States held over Russia, it is not surprising that Russian government officials would reject U.S. pressure and issue condescending replies.204 For many Russian nationalist politicians, especially the Russian Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, this moment of

203 Ibid.
American diplomatic impotence was one of their biggest opportunities to fuel nationalist sentiments in Russia.

Gazprom across Eurasia

As for other cases of natural gas disputes, the United States was consistently unable to force any changes in Russian economic policy due the limited U.S. trade and economic linkages between the U.S. and Russia. The European Union, however, was successful in cases where natural gas cut-offs threatened the supply of natural gas to member states, such as the Russian-Bulgarian Gas Dispute and the months prior to the planned second cut-off to Belarus. The Belarusian cut-off threat was met with harsh criticism and threats from the European Union, but Russia and Ukraine agreed to increase supplies through the Ukrainian pipeline, effectively silencing European criticism. The European Union treated each case as a bilateral matter, unwilling to risk threatening its own natural gas supplies in support of a non-member unless its members’ gas supplies were indeed threatened by the conflict. The cases addressed in this study include the gas disputes with Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, and Bulgaria from 2004-2007, and the European Union forced a change in policy and tactics in both the second Belarusian and the Bulgarian cases.

In addition to increasing the price for natural gas for Ukraine, Russia’s gas monopoly Gazprom engaged in rate increases throughout the region. These rate increases were consistently accompanied by Russian offers to concede infrastructure in lieu of the new rates, strongly suggesting that Russian rate increases were intended to increase either Russian control of its neighboring states or increase the cost of seceding from Russian control. These were often met with American and EU criticism, but the successes and failures of the Russian government in these endeavors point demonstrate the overall weakness of American economic power in Eurasia as well as the constraints on the European Union’s ability to use economic coercion on Russia. Gazprom raised natural gas prices for several of its neighbors, but the cases of price hikes for Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, and Bulgaria from 2004-2007 each provide a distinct piece to the understanding of American and European limitations and strengths.

At the same time Gazprom increased the rates in Ukraine in 2005, Moldova was ordered to pay double its previous price of 80 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters, or also face shut-offs on
January 1, 2006.\textsuperscript{205} Moldova’s natural gas debt to Gazprom and its daughter company Gazexort amounted to 663 million dollars, but the Transnistria region accounted for 555 million dollars of that debt.\textsuperscript{206} On January 1, Gazprom shut off the natural gas to Moldova, and while the crisis in Ukraine lasted only three days, Moldova was forced to purchase gas from Ukraine’s strategic reserves for over two weeks.\textsuperscript{207} On January 16, Moldova agreed to a price of $110 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas for the first quarter of 2007, while turning over Transnistria’s entire share of the Moldova’s gas company Moldovagaz, amounting to 13 percent and bringing Gazprom’s total share of the company to 64 percent.\textsuperscript{208} The European Union praised the deal as a spokeswomen for the European Union admitted that the EU had “no plans to get involved” in the talks, and would only send energy experts to review Moldova’s gas supply in response of Moldova’s request for help in negotiations.\textsuperscript{209}

In December, 2005, Georgia agreed to pay 110 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters, almost double the $64 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters the 2003 contract with Russia stipulated.\textsuperscript{210} The Georgian Economy Minister claimed that price increases “are a game that Russia can only play once,” and threatened to dismantle the gas pipeline to Armenia or seek alternative suppliers in retaliation.\textsuperscript{211} Gazprom, however, played the game again in 2006, threatening to cut off gas supplies to Georgia in January 2007, if they did not agree to pay $235 per 1,000 cubic meters.\textsuperscript{212} Georgia accepted Russia’s terms because the planned delivery of natural gas from Azerbaijan would not be sufficient to meet their needs.\textsuperscript{213} This price increase came along with Russian transport sanctions after Georgian officials arrested four Russian military officers for espionage.\textsuperscript{214} Azerbaijan had been importing natural gas from Russia as well, but refused to purchase the gas at $235 per 1,000 cubic meters, up from $110 in 2006 and $60 in 2005.\textsuperscript{215} 


\textsuperscript{207} “Moldova, Russia, Strike Gas Price Deal.” \textit{Agence France Presse}. January 16, 2006.

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{209} “EU Welcomes Russia, Moldova Gas Price Deal.” \textit{Agence France Presse}. January 17, 2006.

\textsuperscript{210} “Gassprom to Supply Gas to Georgia at $110 per 1,000 Cubic Meters.” \textit{Prime-TASS English-language Business Newswire}. December 23, 2005.

\textsuperscript{211} “Georgia Cautions Russia on gas Price Hikes.” \textit{Agence France Presse}. November 2, 2005.

\textsuperscript{212} “Gazprom, Georgia Clinch 2007 Supply Deal.” \textit{Agence France Presse}. December 22, 2006.

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.

Azerbaijan chose to import gas from Iran until a British Petroleum-led drilling and pipeline project in Azerbaijan’s own Shah Deniz field could be completed.216

Armenia, which had maintained close relations with Russia, was also subjected to a price hike to $110 per 1,000 cubic meters, from its previous rate of $56 per 1,000 cubic meters.217 On January 13, 2006, after months of negotiation but under no threat of a gas shut-off, Armenia signed a preliminary agreement to the price hike to begin in April.218 In April, Armenia formally agreed to pay Gazprom $110 per 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas, and transfer control of an Armenian-Iranian pipeline and power generating unit at an electric plant.219 While Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia faced gas price increases in 2006, Gazprom left the price for natural gas at $46.68 per 1,000 cubic meters for Belarus.220 Gazprom stated its reasons for maintaining the current price for Belarus were three-fold: Belarus was a part of the Belarusian-Russian Union State, Gazprom owns Belarus’ section of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, and that Gazprom and Beltransgaz planned to establish a joint venture to operate the Belarusian gas transportation system.221 Unmentioned by Gazprom officials, but demonstrably the most important factor in the decision to maintain the price levels, was the fact that Alexander Lukashenko, the President of Belarus and avidly anti-Western and pro-Russian, was running for a third term re-election in 2006. The Russian government openly supported Lukashenko for re-election and the low natural gas prices effectively subsidized the Belarusian economy during the election year. As evidenced in 2004, two of the stated reasons for maintaining the price, the ownership of the Yamal-Europe pipeline and the joint venture project, as well as the $46.68 price itself, were gained after Gazprom shut off gas supplies intended for Belarus in January 2004 for its debts. Belarus conceded to Russian demands for a higher future price for natural gas and ownership of several Belarusian state companies as payment in kind for its accumulated debts after Gazprom shut off the entire pipeline in February 2004 after claims that Belarus was

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218 Ibid.
219 “Armenia Agrees to Give Russia’s Gazprom Control of Part of Pipeline, Electricity Unit.” The Associated Press. April 6, 2006.
221 Ibid.
siphoning gas intended for Europe.\textsuperscript{222} The gas supplies were resumed after Belarus signed a temporary price agreement and with Gazprom and several independent Russian firms operating with Gazprom, but the Russian government clearly maintained the Belarusian price for natural gas in 2006 primarily to support Lukashenko’s re-election.\textsuperscript{223}

In March 2006, after Lukashenko’s re-election, Gazprom did, in fact, demand a price increase for Belarus or it would initiate another shut-off when the contract expired in December.\textsuperscript{224} By December 2006, the European Union had taken issue to the Belarus crisis, fearing that the cut-off could hurt the European economy. In response to the threat, Gazprom and the Ukrainian government offered to increase production through the Ukrainian pipeline to offset any losses, effectively silencing European opposition, but forcing Russia to acknowledge European demands.\textsuperscript{225} On January 1, 2007, with European support waning and a culminating shut-off threat, Belarus agreed to pay the $110 per 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas and give Gazprom a 50 percent share of Beltransgaz, abating a natural gas shut-off two minutes before the deadline.\textsuperscript{226}

In contrast to the threats carried out against former Soviet states, in December 2006, Russia signed an agreement to raise natural gas prices for Bulgaria, a state that was accepted for membership into the European Union and due to accede on January 1, 2007.\textsuperscript{227} Gazprom had been pressing Bulgaria for a change to a contract signed in 1998 that provided Bulgaria 42% of its natural gas supply as in-kind payment for the transit of natural gas through Bulgaria, effectively making the price for natural gas for Bulgaria $83 per 1,000 cubic meters.\textsuperscript{228} Gazprom pushed for the cancellation of the contract that was due to expire in 2010, and its replacement with a contract stipulated cash payments for transit and market prices for natural gas, raising the prices for natural gas in Bulgaria 30-40 percent, a proposal that Bulgarian officials flatly rejected.\textsuperscript{229} In December 2006, however, an agreement was reached for the new

\textsuperscript{222} Kalinovsky, Valery. “Gas Dispute Between Russia and Belarus Flares into Diplomatic War.” \textit{Agence France Presse}. February 19, 2004.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{225} “EU Urges End to Russia-Belarus Gas Dispute.” \textit{Agence France Presse}. December 28, 2006.
\textsuperscript{227} “Bulgaria and Russia’s Gazprom Sign Agreement on Gas Price Hike.” \textit{Agence Presse France}. December 18, 2006.
\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{229} “Russia, Bulgaria Fail to Agree on Gas Transit, Supplies.” \textit{Prime-TASS English-language Business Newswire}. February 1, 2006.
price to be raised, \textit{gradually}. As Bulgarian Economy and Energy Minister Rumen Ovcharov stated, this was the “first time” Gazprom signed a contract that allows for a gradual increase in prices.\textsuperscript{230} The contract guaranteed increase deliveries of natural gas to Bulgaria, increasing Gazprom’s revenue and establishing a market price, and through Bulgaria’s pipeline at higher tariffs that would increase Bulgarian revenues until 2030.\textsuperscript{231}

In every case but Bulgaria, Gazprom’s threats to these states would not have posed a threat to the European Union. Belarus presented a possible scenario, and the European Union raised objections to the threatened cut-off, but these objections subsided when Ukraine promised to increase transfers through its pipeline to make up for any potential siphoning of natural gas bound for Europe. The United States raised objections to Russia’s moves against its gas customers since the Ukraine gas cut-off, but has remained unable to force any changes in Russian policy. The European Union, while it managed to force Russia into a deal with Ukraine, would not risk its own economic security for the sake of non-members. When the European Union threatened to impose sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Russia, it was met with great success for the European Union, but the European Union’s members have only done so when the crises directly threatened the European economy.\textsuperscript{232} Bulgaria was not yet a member, but a gas shut-off would have occurred on the day it became a member, leaving the European Union in a legitimacy crisis. Had Russia shut down natural gas supplies for a new European Union member, the EU response would have been equally, if not more, devastating for the Russian economy. In the other cases, however, Gazprom and the Russian government had a free hand to threaten its neighbors by guaranteeing European Union safety from any delivery losses, and by being willing to sacrifice the very limited losses generated by the United States’ practically insignificant trade links with Russia.

\textbf{Part III: Implications & Conclusion}

As the case studies have suggested, the United States may exercise military strength to counter Russian interests and the European Union can rely on its economic strength for the same.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{230} “Bulgaria and Russia’s Gazprom Sign Agreement on Gas Price Hike.” \textit{Agence Press France}. December 18, 2006.
    \item \textsuperscript{231} Ibid.
    \item \textsuperscript{232} The European Union has modeled its sanctioning authority around the World Trade Organization principles, which allow for dispute resolution. For Russia, this nearly guarantees European Union non-interference with bilateral agreements with non-members, as long as agreements with EU members are unaffected. The United States, however, has imposed sanctions on Russian companies without WTO authorization, but as stated before, these sanctions have little effect on the Russian economy.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
As argued by many of the authors addressed in the literature review, this should create a synergistic effect that leaves Russia vulnerable to Western pressure. The research in this paper suggests, however, that not only is the West often at odds over certain policies, there combined pressure is not in the least bit synergistic, but contradictory. The economic coercive power of the European Union fades as conflicts become increasingly violent, and the use of military power by the United States is illegitimate in non-combat situations. The European Union defers to the United States to assert the primary share of the West’s military strength while the United States has little to no authority compared to the European Union in non-violent conflicts. This not only means that only one of these actors is salient at any point during any Eurasian conflict, but also, in consideration of their constraints and limitations, no actor can be certain at the onset of a crisis that they will be the “winner” in a conflict of interest.

The United States must draw from large alliances to reduce potential losses of both manpower and resources in military conflicts, providing Russia with an opportunity to spoil U.S. designs. As the case studies have shown, the United States was often forced to concede Russian involvement in several crises, especially when Russia possessed the ability to significantly raise the costs of U.S. military involvement without directly threatening U.S. national security. The European Union, with its economic power, cannot be effectively challenged by Russia, but Russia does possess significant amounts of natural resources that could threaten the European economy should Russia stop supplying them to Europe. Russia relies on the EU as a customer and Russian sanctions would prove to be more devastating to the Russian economy as the European Union could always turn to other suppliers, but economic coercion hurts both the European Union and Russia. In this light, while Russia would avoid sanctioning Europe, the European Union will not risk creating this threat until conflicts become threatening enough to its member’s security to outweigh the losses generated by EU action. Furthermore, given that sanctions become increasingly ineffective as conflicts grow in violence, the EU would also avoid a sanctions quarrel with Russia in a high intensity war.

In addition to the specific limitations outlined previously, several broader strengths and limitations exist that may affect future outcomes. The United States has global reach and global responsibility as the world’s only remaining superpower, giving it both the ability and responsibility to assert its interests globally. This large area of responsibility, however, limits the focus of U.S. power. The United States currently has the military resources to prevail over any
country in the world, but not every country. This saying comes with a corollary: it cannot
assume the costs of conflict with any country that will reduce its ability to maintain supremacy
over any other country. The United States, therefore, must keep costs down, leaving the U.S. to
rely on partners and allies to shoulder some of the burden.

The European Union, however, has a much more limited reach. While the United States’
interests are far more spread across the globe, the EU devotes the vast majority of its foreign
policy attention toward regional policies. This provides the EU with the greatest potential to
become involved in much of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, but this is countered by the
limits of EU strength and the location of the rest of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence.
Central Asia is outside of Europe; only Kazakhstan has received any acknowledgement—from
the Council of Europe—as being apart of Europe. This, however, means very little as the
European Union has largely concluded that it will not expand much more. The European Union
has incorporated most of Eastern Europe at tremendous cost to itself. Expansion was pursued
forcefully by most of the members, but support for continued expansion has dropped
considerably. The European Union is an exclusive organization, and seeks to remain as such.
This leaves the post-Soviet states, with the exception of the Baltic States, without strong EU
support and largely at the hands of Russia, especially in cases of internal conflicts or bilateral
conflicts. As long as Russia enters armed conflicts in the name of promoting human rights or
enters into economic conflicts with the assurance that the European Union will not suffer from
its bilateral “negotiations” with neighboring states, the European Union is very much willing to
look the other way.

This situation will change in the future, however. The ascension of Romania to the
European Union has brought Moldova to the EU border, increasing Russia’s risk of drawing the
European Union into Russia’s conflict with Moldova. Also, Turkey’s future ascension will bring
to the EU the issue of the Caucasus, but Turkey’s ascension has proven to be a problem Russia
will not have to face until at least the next decade. The halt in European Union expansion has
given Russia the opportunity to consolidate its interests in a more limited region, but this halt is
by no means permanent. European Union has the power to confront Russia over conflicting
interests and prevail, provided these conflicts expand beyond bilateral disagreements between
Russia and its non-EU neighbors and these conflicts do not involve the inclusion of arms.
Military conflicts, however, have become increasingly less prevalent in Eurasian politics and
have played against Russia’s earlier ability to use its peacekeeping forces to control its neighbors. Russia may be less able to use its military to maintain a hold over its neighbors as a result of the growing stability of the region, but Russia can rest assured that it will never see all of its former Soviet empire engulfed by the European Union.

The European Union, while holding the Western award for being the most capable of countering Russian interests, can only expand as far as Europe is identified geographically, and will almost certainly never include all of the geographical Europe. Central Asia remains outside of the European Union’s neighborhood, but this has not limited all of the Western actors. The United States has played an increasing role in Central Asia following the September 11 attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan. The United States established a military presence in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan through the leasing of Soviet-era bases, and Russia was unable to do anything more than increase the number forces stationed on Russian bases in these areas. The United States offered several economic packages to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for their support in the War on Terror, but these pale in comparison to the risks of losing trade with Russia. The rationale for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s support for the U.S. stemmed from U.S. military power. At a much greater cost, the United States would still have been able to launch the attacks on Afghanistan without Kyrgyz or Tajik support but the effects of these attacks would have been devastating to Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors, who would have little protection from the potential flood of Aghan refugees, Taliban militants, and al-Qaeda operatives without the U.S. patrolling their borders.

In addition to addressing the European Union’s economic and institutional leverages and limitations, this paper demonstrates the power of the U.S. military in asserting its military interests, and the reach of the United States military allows for the United States to become involved in any conflict. The limits of U.S. power, therefore, do not stem from actual strength or reach, but rather the perception thereof. A more in-depth analysis of U.S. military strengths and limitations is appropriate given the current involvement of U.S. troops in combat in Afghanistan and the occupation of a two bases in Central Asia, one in Uzbekistan and the other in Kyrgyzstan, by American service members. For the United States to invest its military resources into a conflict, it must have overwhelming superiority and a nearly guaranteed chance of success.

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because it must keep civilian and U.S. casualties to a minimum while maintaining readiness across the globe for any additional conflicts and maintaining its endorsement of an all-volunteer military. The limits of the United States, therefore, stem from the need to create super-alliances to reduce American casualties and costs while maintaining numerical superiority, as well as the desire for these alliances to include ad-hoc coalition members to allow the United States to “get out” as soon as possible without creating new permanent military commitments. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has demonstrated these needs, reaching out for “coalitions of the willing” before the attacks, and debating after the attacks on the soonest possible moment to withdraw from the conflicts without losing. The implications of these facts are clear: the United States will not sacrifice its own strategically objectives for Russia’s sake in armed conflicts, but the U.S. will accommodate most Russian demands to maintain an alliance during a conflict. Additionally, the U.S. will not maintain a significant presence in any area that is no longer strategically vital. Even when the United States becomes involved in an area under Russia’s sphere of influence, it is most likely a temporary arrangement, as the United States is a technically superior military, but a small one without the ability to maintain new permanent bases in new areas. In the EU’s bordering states, U.S. involvement brought EU involvement, and while these areas were not post-Soviet states and Russia was often a partner, it meant the end of Russia’s potential dominance over that state.

Implications for Further Research

Several other implications can be drawn that would be useful for further research. As can be inferred from the case studies and research, Russia seeks to maintain its hegemony in the post-Soviet space. Most of the literature on Russian foreign policy takes a similar view, but in their prescriptions often ignore the fact that this is the most salient goal of Russian foreign policy. The regime shift from Yeltsin to Putin led to a shift to an economics-based foreign policy where Russia asserts control over its neighbors through economic transactions rather than through cooperative security. This change, however, whether it is temporary or permanent, does not affect the outcomes of conflict with a Western actor, rather it affects which Western actor will become the dominant opposition. As such, we can expect that the Russian foreign policy interest in maintaining hegemony of the post-Soviet space will remain stable and as states are “lost” to NATO and the EU, Russia will continue to struggle to prevent further occurrences.
Westernization and democracy in Russia will not eliminate these national security interests, as the *State-Centered* approach argues. Both liberals and extremists within Russia both view the Russian Federation as the leader of the post-Soviet world. It would be unrealistic to argue that a strong democratic Russia would abandon its interests in the post-Soviet region to any Western actor, rather it would seek to strengthen its hold over the region on the basis that *it is a Western power* and entitled to the same hegemonic claims as the United States and European Union. Integrating Russia into NATO or the European Union would provide further legitimacy to this claim. While very few people would expect Russia to join either organization, Russia has become increasingly linked with these organizations and events covered in this paper have demonstrated that Russia has consistently attempted to use these links as a potential leverage against intrusions in its diplomatic designs. Without preconditions for membership to guarantee Western involvement in all post-Soviet states, Russian integration into any one of these organizations would guarantee Moscow’s immunity from U.S. or EU pressure, and all of these actors are aware of this fact. Integration is unlikely and Westernization will not change Russian interests. From all the implications presented in this paper, we can be reasonably sure that limits do exist for both U.S. and EU possibilities for countering Russian interests, and at the very least, Russia can expect to maintain its hegemony over its post-Soviet neighbors well into the future.
Appendix A: Goal Type Limits on the Successful Use of Sanctions

Table 1: Table, Successful Sanction Episodes by Goal Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal Type</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>% Successful</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Modest Policy Changes</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>20.41%</td>
<td>.4072055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Destabilization &amp; Disrupting Military Adventures</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43.75%</td>
<td>.5040161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Major Policy Changes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7.41%</td>
<td>.2668803</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Table 2: Graph, Sanctions Success Means, Confidence Intervals, and Difference of Means Results (α=.05)

![Graph showing two distributions and confidence intervals]

Using 1945 as a starting point and eliminating sanctions with no listed “success scores,” 108 cases were selected from *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. In the book, they were separated into five categories by the policy goals of the sender. Because of overlap of cases between the types of goals identified in *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, as well as the similarities between goal types in terms of the severity, the categories “Destabilizing a Government” and “Disrupting Military Adventures” were grouped together, as well as “Impairing Military Potential” and “Other Major Policy Changes.”