Highway to the Danger Zone: The Effect of Foreign Intervention on Political Stability

Joshua T. Counselman

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Research Honors Program in the Department of Political Science.

Marietta College
Marietta, OH
April 25, 2014

Special thanks to Mark Schaefer, Ph.D; Mike Tager, Ph.D; and Matt Young, Ph.D for all of their support and guidance during the research process and during my four years at Marietta College. Their guidance and support made this study possible.
This Research Honors thesis has been approved for
the Department of Political Science and
the Honors and Investigative Studies Committee by

Dr. Mark Schaefer  
Faculty Thesis Adviser 
April 25, 2014 
Date

Dr. Matt Young  
Thesis Committee Member 
April 25, 2014 
Date

Dr. Michael Tager  
Thesis Committee Member 
April 25, 2014 
Date
Abstract

The past literature focuses on the effect of third-party intervention on the duration of civil wars. These studies, however, do not examine the effect of intervention before civil wars begin. In an attempt to better understand how different methods of intervention affect political stability, I examine five different methods – economic, indirect military, direct military, peacekeepers and NGOs. I argue that economic intervention and peacekeepers are more likely to increase political stability, while indirect, direct and NGOs are likely to decrease political stability. Using an OLS analysis, I examine the relationship between the five different methods of intervention and political stability from 1960 to 2000. Economic and indirect military interventions are found not to affect political stability.
Introduction

With the decline of conflict between two states, intrastate state conflicts have grabbed the attention of major actors around the globe. As large states fight each other less post-World War II, smaller states have begun to fight within their borders at a more frequent rate. Since larger states are no longer fighting among each other, they have more time to devote to trying to make weaker states stronger or more stable. The puzzle of this study is how does foreign intervention by states, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations affect political stability? Many countries face intervention from foreign entities that seek to benefit the weaker state through economic aid or military assistance. Majority of the previous studies focuses on how intervention affects intrastate conflicts that are already in progress. However, few studies examine the impact of foreign intervention before a conflict takes place, and whether foreign intervention ignites the flame of intrastate conflict.

The effect of foreign intervention on political stability within developing states is a significant question because foreign intervention may act as a destabilizing factor. If this is the case, foreign intervention provides another possible reason for the start or rekindling of intrastate conflicts. However, if foreign intervention assists in the prevention of intrastate conflict, it is significant information for states that offer economic aid or military assistance to developing states. This question seeks to provide an answer on the effect of foreign intervention before intrastate conflicts begin or restart. While the existing literature waits until conflicts are already underway to examine the effects of foreign intervention, this question seeks to discover whether foreign intervention prevents or fosters intrastate conflict among developing nations.

The independent variables of interest for this study are economic, indirect military, direct military interventions, peacekeepers, and the presence of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) in developing states. The control variables are GDP per capita, ethnic fractalization and country region. This study utilizes an OLS regression as well as case studies of Pakistan, Lebanon, and Haiti to test the effects of the variables of interest and their effect on political stability.

Different methods of foreign intervention cause states to become more or less politically stable. Savun and Tirone (2011, 2012) discover that economic aid to developing states increase the government’s ability to protect the state from negative economic shocks. I use the discoveries made by Savun and Tirone to argue that economic intervention does not create political instability. Instead, economic intervention increases the political stability of developing nations. Peacekeepers also increase political stability because the foreign soldiers are not under the command of the developing state’s government. The peacekeepers are still under the command of the international organization or state that deploys their services. This prevents the government from using the peacekeepers to attack its political opposition. However, unlike peacekeepers, indirect and direct military interventions are under the control of the state’s government, and it is free to use these weapons or soldiers against its opposition.

Nongovernmental organizations also cause political instability because these organizations may not share the same policies and goals as the state’s government. The differing objectives between NGOs and the state government divide the agenda of the state and cause the two entities to contradict the efforts of the other.

In the next section, I discuss the existing literature. In the third section, I develop a theory along with six hypotheses to test the importance of economic intervention, indirect military intervention, direct military intervention, peacekeepers, and the presence of nongovernmental organizations on political stability. In the fourth section of the paper, I
operationalize my dependent and independent variables. In the final section, I discuss the findings of this study, its implication, and I indicate some areas for future research based on my findings.

**Literature Review**

Majority of the existing literature on intervention examines it during an ongoing conflict and how military or economic intervention affects the duration of the conflict (Regan 2002, Regan and Aydin 2006, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000, and Gent 2008). Regan (1996) defines military intervention as the supply of troops, equipment, or intelligence and economic intervention is aid, trade, and economic sanctions. However, Savun and Tirone (2011, 2012) begin to examine economic intervention in states before conflicts occur. This study is an attempt to expand on the existing research of Savun and Tirone to go beyond only examining economic intervention. Auvinen (1996) uses protests to measure political stability in regards to IMF intervention. Despite the attempts of Savun and Tirone and Auvinen, the existing literature does not examine how different methods of intervention affect the political stability within a state. This section begins by reviewing the existing literature on political stability, and next, the relevant intervention literature.

**Political Stability**

Auvinen (1996) seeks to discover whether IMF intervention in states causes protests. However, there are two views about the IMF and protests. The first is that IMF supported policies cause protests while the other argument is that IMF policies enhance as states political stability. It is because of a poor economy that states are forced to seek IMF assistance and intervention. When the IMF measures affects the living standards of those that are political active or the poor, the risk of protests against the IMF policies increases. Auvinen argues that if
a state has had IMF austerity in the past, the citizens are more likely to reject another round of IMF policies.

Auvinen discovers that states that experienced multiple cases of IMF intervention that the citizens were more likely to protest. Also, the IMF is likely to cause protests in states that do not have a history with its policies. Auvinen claims that this may be caused because the severity of the IMF intervention took people by surprise, which results in protests. Authoritarian governments are better at preventing IMF caused protests than democratic governments.

According to Gates and Strand (2008), military intervention is an effective method for removing political leaders from power. In Yugoslavia, Milosevic lost control after the NATO intervention, and in Afghanistan, the Taliban lost control of the country after the United States intervened. The authors in this study are examining whether states are more likely to become democratic after experiencing military intervention. The authors argue that if political transformation is the goal of intervention, the focus of post-intervention has to be on rebuilding infrastructure and maintaining internal order. After intervention, if there are still internal concerns, the citizens may revert back to an authoritarian government to provide security.

The authors find that governments that form post-civil war or intervention are twenty percent less likely to last as long as governments that did not develop in a post-intervention environment. If the military loses during the intrastate conflict, the ensuing government is less likely to last then of the military and the government had not been defeated. However, military intervention alone does not have a significant impact on political stability. The authors define political stability as the survival time of different governments.

Hermann and Kegley, Jr. (1996) define political stability as the number of years a state has had the same type of government. The authors scale for political stability is four years or
less with the same type of government is unstable; between five and nine years is moderately stable, and states that have had the same type of government for ten years or longer are considered highly stable. The authors found that as governments become less stable that they are likely to become targets of intervention. Democratic states are drastically less likely to face intervention despite being unstable than those states that are not considered to be democracies and were unstable.

Feng (1997) states that one of the main reasons for political instability is poor economic growth. There are three types of political instability: ‘Irregular’ government change, ‘major regular’ government change, and ‘minor regular’ government change. For Feng, irregular political changes are coups d’états while regular political changes are those that take place within the confines of the existing structure of the state. Major regular changes are examples of citizens voting for a new government while minor regular change represents an adjustment in policies rather than a new government. Feng argues that minor regular change is the best out of the three types of political instability. Minor regular change allows states to develop long-term policies without fear of being ousted in the short-term.

**Foreign Military Intervention**

Regan (1996) defines intrastate conflict as combat between two groups within the boundaries of a state in which there are at least 200 deaths. Intrastate conflict is broken down into ethnically, religiously, and ideologically groups. Regan’s study examines both military and economic intervention. It examines whether intervention is successful in ending intrastate conflicts or not. Regan uses a cost/benefit analysis on the part of the intervener, but he also argues that the actors the interveners support and oppose will also conduct cost/benefit analyses. Intervention in intrastate conflicts can be either for the government or for the opposition forces.
For Regan, military intervention is the supply of troops, equipment, or intelligence and economic intervention is aid, trade, and economic sanctions.

Regan assumes that when third parties intervene, they are doing so to bring an end to the ongoing intrastate conflict. The main goal of the intervening power is to provide stability for the government and the region. Regan argues that intervening third parties do not become involved to prolong the intrastate conflict, but rather to end the conflict on the terms of the intervening state and to return stability to the region. Intervening parties and those involved in the intrastate conflict conduct cost/benefit analyses on whether to continue fighting or to end the conflict. Regan discovered that military intervention is used 70% of the time, economic is used 7%, and an economic and military mix is employed 23% of the time. A mixed intervention of economic and military is the most likely to lead to a successful end of conflict.

In this article, Regan (2002) focuses on third party intervention and the effect it has on the duration of an interstate conflict. Regan assumes that outside states intervene as a way to manage a conflict and decrease its duration, magnitude, or violence. Third parties have to create a situation where both sides agree that it is preferable to settle than to continue fighting. The costs associated with settling can be manipulated by intervening states through asymmetrical intervention, which is favoring one side over the other. Intervening states must consider whether it is worth continuing to fight until victory is achieved or settling the conflict. Intervention on behalf of the government is likely to shift the balance of power to the point where the opposition forces deem that it is in their best interests to negotiate instead of continuing to fight. In the case of an ethnically fractionalized intrastate conflict, Regan argues that military intervention is not the correct approach because the reason for ethnic conflict is when one group has a
preponderance of the wealth in society. An intervening party should provide benefits that encourage the opposition to end fighting and come to the negotiating table.

Regan also expects that the time of intervention impacts the duration of a conflict. He argues that if intervention is early that opposition groups will be weak and more likely to be defeated. Intervention early on in an intrastate conflict is expected to increase the costs of forming an opposition group, which makes it less likely that the group fully develops to oppose the government. If the opposition group is allowed to form and develop, it may be willing to take on higher costs because the group believes that it has a chance to defeat the government. Regan actually discovers that intervention later in the conflict is more likely to cause it to end sooner than if intervention occurred early in the conflict.

Regan and Aydin (2006) argue that the diplomatic efforts of third parties shorten the duration of civil wars. The authors argue that the time of diplomatic is an inverted U shape. The authors argue that the success of intervention depends on the time of intervention. Military and economic intervention without diplomatic intervention increases the duration of an intrastate conflict. Although the intervening party is trying to bring both sides to the negotiating table, military and economic intervention only fuel the desire to continue fighting. The recipient of the intervention does not see it as a reason to stop fighting, but a reason to continue fighting with its newly increased resources. Also, the use of economic or military intervention by intervening states may be used to propel the side they support to victory or encourage a stalemate between the feuding parties. The authors view economic and military intervention as important, but the success of using these two techniques depends on whether diplomatic mediations accompany economic or military intervention. The authors found that military and economic intervention
was not statistically significant. Diplomatic intervention is more likely to be successful in the middle of a conflict than at the beginning or end.

The Regan articles (1996, 2002, and 2006) show a progression in the research of foreign intervention. The research begins by simply testing whether economic or military intervention is more likely to end a conflict. It then turns to how intervention affects the duration of intrastate conflicts. The final segment examines the timing of intervention and which is most successful in ending the conflict. However, the one constant of the Regan research is that there has to be a conflict present within the state. These three article each deal with foreign interveners getting involved in an intrastate conflict that is already ongoing. The studies never examine how intervention affects states pre-intrastate conflict. Intervention does not only occur during times of conflict, but it can occur anytime that is something that Regan and the existing literature have all overlooked to this point. Much of the existing literature studies intervention and its effect on ending intrastate conflict while few scholars studied the effect of intervention before the onset of an intrastate conflict. The United States provides set amounts of economic aid to Egypt and Israel every year even though there has not been an ongoing intrastate conflict every year during the duration of the economic intervention. This study seeks to examine five subcategories of intervention – economic, nongovernmental organization, indirect military, peacekeepers, and direct military – on pre-intrastate conflict because intervention does not only occur when there is an ongoing conflict.

Findley and Kwang (2006) argue that states are likely to intervene if other actors intervene, interests in the state where there is a civil war, and structural factors. The focus of this study is on the potential intervener. Intervening third parties are likely to act in accordance with other states. If rivals or allies become involved, states are either more or less likely to get
involved depending on their relationship with the other intervening states. The authors argue that intervening states support the government if they share common interests. If a state does not have common interests and wish to remove the government, the intervening state is likely to support the opposition group in an attempt to balance against the advantages of the government. There are three factors that affect whether a state intervenes or not: First, there are ‘fixed’ characteristics that determine whether a state intervenes or not; second, ‘fixed’ characteristics of the conflict also affects whether states intervene or not; third, changes in the conflict affect the timing of intervention. The authors argue that civil wars and ethnic conflicts are the most likely to attract third party intervention. States are also more likely to intervene in ethnic or ideological conflicts. The authors found that when a rival intervenes, the likelihood of intervention increases. When a state is an ally of the government that is fighting a civil war, the likelihood of intervention to support the government increases.

As the power of the United States continues to decline, other states may begin to challenge it when it intervenes in a weaker state. In a couple of decades, if the United States intervenes in a state, China, Russia, or a coalition of rival states may intervene on the opposite side to try and further limit the influence of the United States. If states intervene because a rival intervenes, this could become a reality in the future if the United States power continues to slip in the international system. Since states are likely to become involved after a rival intervenes in a state or conflict, intervention may lose its appeal if other states are willing to become involved. States may become more selective when deciding to intervene or not intervene at all to avoid a confrontation with a rival state. However, the opposite may happen and intervention may become more likely once a rival intervenes. The current case of Ukraine indicates that once a
rival, Russia, involves itself in the conflict, another state, the United States, is soon to become involved as well.

Carment and Rowlands (1998) make several assumptions about intervention. First, interveners are rational actors. The decision to intervene is a difficult decision that comes from the main decision makers of states and IGOs. Second, interveners have specified objectives. The goals of intervening states can range from humanitarian efforts to preventing one side from winning the conflict. Third, the consequences of actions are just as important as their content. The authors lay out intervention strategies that include no military involvement, troops in low intensity peacekeeping and forceful military intervention. Interveners conduct a cost/benefit analysis on each type of intervention, and will only use to full military intervention if the other two fail. When determining the outcome for an intrastate conflict, intervening states have to be aware of the costs associated with its ideal outcome for the conflict. States are tasked with deciding how much force to use during the intervention. There are two determinants for the cost of intervening: First, the costs connected to the intensity used by the intervening state; second, the costs associated with the strength of the opposition. The authors conduct a game to determine the steps and motivations of interveners. The intervener chooses strong, weak, or no intervention, and the combatants can either accommodate or resist. The importance of the conflict and the strength of the combatant affect the level of intervention by the intervener.

States do not intervene on whims, but weigh the strength of the opposition and the possible acquired costs to engage in foreign intervention. With the intervening states being rational actors, states only intervene if they can benefit from the action. If the intervening state has interests within a state, it is going to intervene to preserve those interests whether it’s to support a government or to protect its claim to oil fields within the state. Foreign actors
intervene because they have an interest in the outcome whether it is having peace for oil extraction or to continue propping up an ideologically similar government that is being challenged. However, states may make mistakes in their calculations on whether to intervene. Whether intervention is strategically used or a mistake, it affects the recipient nonetheless.

Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) break intervention down into third party involvement and the civil war state’s environment. Also, the dimensions of civil wars are broken up into the characteristics of the civil war state and characteristics of the civil war. States with grievances against the government makes an intrastate conflict’s duration longer. Larger states make it more difficult for governments to regain control over the state and make the duration of the civil war longer. The more actors in a civil war that have an interest in maintaining the status quo is likely to cause the conflict to be shorter in duration. The more asymmetrical the advantages of the state are over the opposition decreases the duration of the intrastate conflict. The authors argue that when third parties intervene for a side, the duration of the conflict will be shorter, and intervention for the government will cause duration to be shorter than support for the opposition. It is expected that when both sides receive support that the duration is longer. However, the authors discovered that support for either the opposition or government actually increases the duration of a conflict. The authors’ findings support their argument that balanced intervention increases duration.

Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) argue that the support group, government or opposition, is more likely to be victorious while the other group decreases in the likelihood of a military victory. However, the authors further argue that support for the government is less likely to cause a negotiated settlement while support for the opposition forces increases their support. Balanced intervention will increase the likelihood of a negotiated settle and decreasing
the likelihood of a military victory for either side. Civil wars are likely to end in negotiation when intervention supports the government. Intervention for the opposition is more likely to cause a sooner negotiated settlement.

Pickering and Kisangani (2006) define unilateral intervention as foreign military intervention in another state to influence economic, social, or political conditions. The authors argue that hostile intervention should reduce the quality of life within the state. The quality of life in the state only improves after the removal of the oppressive government. Intervention that is supportive of the government is less likely to have the negative effects that are associated with intervention that is hostile toward the government. The authors argue that violent, military intervention does not always produce a stable environment for democratization, economic growth, or increasing the quality of life. The authors found that military intervention in nondemocratic states has the ability to produce an environment for democratization.

The use of military intervention has the potential to disturb the stability of the state. If, as Pickering and Kisangani (2006) state, military intervention affects economic growth and the quality of life, it directly affects the lives of citizens. When citizens are directly and negatively affected by intervention, they are likely to oppose the foreign intervention and protest against it in an attempt to force the intervening state out or to force the government of the state to stop relying on the intervening state’s military. If citizens are not directly affected by intervention or if the intervention has a positive effect for the citizens, they are not likely to take to the streets in opposition to the foreign intervention.

According to Peksen (2012), if there is intervention in support of the government, it signals that there is international support for the government and provides credibility and legitimacy for the government. This also increases the military capabilities of the state and
allows the state to have the advantage in military power. Intervention in favor of opposition groups causes the government to increasingly view these groups as a threat, which causes the government to use force to try and defeat the opposition groups. Military intervention may not cause a change in the government if the intervening power does not use massive military forces. However, the use of massive military forces could cause the complete collapse of the government, as well.

Gent (2008) argues that states intervene as a way to have the greatest amount of influence over the outcomes of the conflict. Intervention is most expected when one side has a significant power advantage. It is extremely unlikely that opposition groups have a preponderance of power over the government. Some of the government’s advantages over the opposition are its legitimacy, sovereignty, army, and access to resources. It is difficult for opposition groups to be successful without external intervention. However, opposition biased intervention is more likely when the group originally has higher military capabilities before the intervention. When an opposition group receives intervention, the likelihood of the opposition being able to win the conflict increases. Intervention in support of the government is more likely when there is a strong opposition group. Since government intervention is based on the strength of the opposition, a weaker government is not going to be as successful as a stronger government against an externally backed opposition group.

Government favored intervention is less likely to have an impact on intrastate conflicts because intervention only comes in the most difficult cases. Gent discovers that opposition favored intervention is more likely to increase its chance of victory in the conflict. Third parties are likely to intervene for opposition groups when these groups were most likely to defeat the
government. This reiterates that intervention is most likely when the government will have the greatest impact on the outcomes of the conflict.

Gent’s argument follows a similar vein of thought as Carment and Rowlands (1998) who assumed that intervening states are rational actors. Gent argues that states only intervene when they are likely to have the greatest influence over the negotiation process. Foreign states intervene because they have an interest in the state where the conflict is occurring, and the intrastate conflict provides these foreign states with the opportunity to intervene when they have the greatest chance to influence the negotiations. This provides states with the ability to increase their interest in the state by providing themselves spoils of the conflict during the negotiation process. If states do not have an interest in the conflicting state, they are not going to intervene because it is not in the best interest to the state to get involved in the conflict.

**Economic Intervention**

Griffin and Enos (1970) examine why states provide foreign assistance. The authors argue that although individuals may be philanthropic, states are not naturally philanthropic. The authors also argue that ideology does not affect a state’s foreign aid expect only when very little is at risk. Economic aid for the authors is an example of power politics. Foreign aid is a stronger state’s attempt to control weaker states. The amount of aid is determined by the political support the recipient can supply to the intervening state. Not all aid assists or is helpful to the recipient country. There is a low correlation between aid and GNP growth. The authors discovered that the more aid received, the lower the rate of GNP growth.

Savun and Tirone (2011) describe democracy aid as foreign aid given to states for the promotion of democracy, which is used to foster democratic openings in nondemocratic states or continue a democratic transition. Democracy aid can provide a means for constraining domestic
political violence. The authors divide democratic assistance into three categories that consist of state institutions, civil society, NGOs, and media, and electoral assistance. Democracy aid also strengthens a state’s judicial institutions. Since judiciaries are weak under authoritarian regimes, the courts lack power and standing, but democracy aid can aid in strengthening the court through training and reforms.

Democracy aid decreases the risk of political domestic violence through strengthening institutions, legitimacy, and the promises of the new democratic government. By using democracy aid to strengthen democratic principles, the new government is less likely to face challenges over their power. The authors argue states that receive high levels of democracy aid are less likely to have a civil war. The authors discovered that the amount of aid actually does decrease the likelihood of conflict during democratic transitions.

Savun and Tirone (2012) argue that foreign aid reduces the risk of civil war by strengthening economic growth in weak states. However, aid is not guaranteed to spark growth in a state’s economy. The authors argue that foreign aid cannot rescue states from poverty, but it can stave off civil war in low-income states. Weak states are more susceptible to conflict because lack of financial resources. Aid can lessen economic shocks in two ways: First, it can act as insurance against shocks, and second, aid can make a state more resilient to economic shocks by providing liquidity, investments, and reducing exposure to sharp decreases in imports. Weak states are unable to manage and adjust to economic shocks because of the restraints on their economies. As aid increases or reduces a state’s dependence on commodities, it lowers the risk of destabilization and conflict. Aid is most valuable to a state after an economic shock. The government’s ability to prevent the formation of opposition groups depends on its ability to
provide public goods to citizens. However, when there is an economic shock, the state has to cut back on public goods, which are likely to lead to intrastate conflict.

Although foreign aid has no direct effect on reducing conflicts in states, it can aid in preventing conflict by growing the economy and reducing reliance on a primary export commodity. Aid prevents conflict in states by allowing the states to not have to cut social spending for its citizens. When there is an economic shock, a state’s main source of revenue, taxing, will decrease, but foreign aid fills in where taxation has declined to prevent the state from having to cut spending. The authors discovered that in the presence of an economic shock, a one-unit increase in aid will lower the likelihood of conflict onset by 1%. Small increases in aid can have significant effects in preventing conflict onset after an economic shock.

**Peacekeepers**

Fortna (2003) breaks peacekeeping down into unarmed observer missions or traditional peacekeeping. Peacekeepers are not deployed during wars, and they may be sent only to easy cases. If a conflict was violent, peace is less likely to last because violent conflicts are likely to lead to another conflict. Peace, after a conflict, is easier to maintain in intrastate conflicts because it limits the number of outside states that can end the peace and restart the conflict. The author expected for peace to last longer when there was a decisive victory. Fortna found that the presence of peacekeepers reduces the risk or renewed fighting by 30%. Observer missions reduce another conflict by 30% while traditional mission reduce conflict by 40%.

Fortna argues that peacekeepers after a civil war cause a longer lasting peace. The author examines the relationship between UN peacekeepers and peacekeepers by other organizations and peace duration. Peacekeepers are coded as any or none, and are again broken into groups, but this time there are more than two groups. The categories of peacekeeping missions include
none, observer, traditional, multidimensional, and peace enforcement. Peacekeepers were not used after conflicts where either the government or opposition was victorious. However, peacekeepers were heavily deployed in situations where a treaty was signed between the government and the opposition to keep the peace between the two sides. When there were more than two actors in a conflict, peacekeepers were more likely to be used than if the conflict was between only two actors. Also, states that have large militaries hardly ever experience peacekeepers after a conflict. Fortna discovered that the use of peacekeepers after the Cold War prevented the reoccurrence of conflict decreased by 70%. Traditional peacekeeping and observer missions decreased the risk of war by 86% and 81% while multidimensional missions reduced conflict by half, and enforcement missions were under half.

Theory

The puzzle of how the nature of foreign intervention affects political stability is addressed through the examination of different methods of intervention. The nature of intervention provides the recipient government with different opportunities to use the new resources from the intervention. Economic intervention is unable to be used in the same manner as direct military intervention. The nature of intervention allows the recipient government to use the resources with either limitations or unrestrained. The different methods of intervention allow governments varying freedom to use the resources.

The freedom to use the materials from third-party intervention as the recipient government deems is vital to stability within the state. The more freedom to use the resources provided increases the options for the state. Economic intervention provides the recipient government with less of an ability to use the economic assistance as it deems, but direct military intervention gives the recipient government extensive flexibility on deciding how to utilize third-
party soldiers within the state or the newly supplied military weapons. The flexibility of an intervention method is important because it provides the government with more or less discretion on how to use its newly acquired resources.

Intervention methods with greater flexibility are likely to have greater consequences in regards to political stability. The government does not have any or has limited restraints on its ability to use its newly gained resources within its borders. The lack of controls on the government’s ability to use the resources gained from third-party intervention allows the government to actively engage opposition or rival groups before they are able to challenge the government for power. By actively seeking out and engaging rival or opposition groups, the government creates political instability by trying to ensure its power position within the state. The methods of intervention that hinder the recipient government’s actions limit its ability to actively pursue opposition forces. These types of intervention increase political stability because the government does not have the flexibility with the new resources. Economic intervention, both positive and negative, limits the government’s ability to engage its opposition. Foreign assistance increases the governing party’s wealth and power, but it does not provide them with the freedom to use its new wealth however they deem inside the state. Sanctions also limit the government’s ability to engage its opposition because the sanctions limit the economic power of the government. Tough sanctions limit the ability of the government to acquire needed resources or to purchase military arms.

Methods of intervention that allow the recipient government to use its new resources freely have a greater effect on stability within the state. The nature of intervention negatively or positively affects the political stability of states based on the freedom that the method provides the recipient government. Intervention that provides military arms or foreign soldiers provides
the government the freedom to use these new resources as it deems fit within the state.

However, economic intervention, such as foreign aid and sanctions, limits the ability of the state to use the new funds or constrains the wealth of the state and the government. If the government wants to use its foreign aid to purchase weapons, it has to weigh the benefits of using the aid to buy the weapons rather than using the funds in the state’s domestic economy. Governments also need to find a foreign state to supply it with weapons if it intends to use its foreign aid to purchase military weapons. However, foreign soldiers and military weapons are not associated with the same dilemma as economic intervention. The recipient government is already supplied with foreign soldiers or weapons, which allows it to use the new resources as it desires without any limitations. Methods of intervention that do not place limitations on the recipient government are going to decrease the political stability within states, while intervention that limits the actions of the government increases the stability of the government by hindering its actions.

**Hypothesis #1:** *As states receive economic intervention, political stability is more likely to increase.*

States that receive economic intervention are less likely to experience political instability because the economic aid protects the government from economic downturns. Savun and Tirone (2011, 2012) discover that economic aid protects states from economic downturns and shocks by providing reserve funds. If states receive economic intervention, it prevents political instability by having reserve funds in the case of an economic downturn or shock. The reserve funds allow governments the ability to prevent the effects of economic downturns from reaching the citizens. By protecting a state’s citizens, the government is able to prevent protests from forming because the citizens never experience the effects of a decline in the economy or an economic shock.
Economic intervention is likely to increase political stability because this method of intervention limits the government’s ability to act freely with its new resources.

**Hypothesis #2:** *As states receive indirect military intervention, political stability is more likely to decrease.*

**Hypothesis #3:** *As states receive direct military intervention, political stability is more likely to decrease.*

States that receive indirect or direct military intervention are more likely to experience political instability. The governments of states are going to use their new military resources to enhance their position and security within the state. However, the new use of military force against opposition forces is going to alarm the citizens of the state which causes them to protest the government’s use of force. The government is more likely to increase its use of force to disperse any forming opposition groups or parties. For indirect military intervention, the presence of military equipment and advisors from a third party is going to increase the strength of the government. The use of the increased strength of the government leads citizens to come out in opposition to its use of force toward citizens. For direct military intervention, the presence of foreign soldiers within a state causes the citizens to become suspicious of the government. The citizens become concerned about the growing power of the government. If there is an opposition group, the government is able to use the foreign soldiers to disband the opposition group ensuring that the party in power does not face a challenge to its leading position. The more that the government depends on the use of force from an intervening state causes citizens to oppose the government. As the opposition to the government increases, more citizens form or join opposition groups to the growing repressive government, or citizens take to the streets in protest movements as the government increases its use of force and repression.
**Hypothesis #4**: *As the number of peacekeepers within a state increases, political stability is more likely to increase.*

The presence of peacekeepers from intergovernmental organizations and states prevents conflict from escalating in a state. Many peacekeepers are not allowed to use force while on peacekeeping missions. Fortna (2003) discovers that peacekeepers are rather successful at securing peace and stability in states during their missions. The decrease in conflict that occurs with peacekeepers present increases the political stability of the government in control and decrease the likelihood of citizens organizing protests against the government. This limitations associated with peacekeepers prevents governments from using peacekeepers to increase its power and control over the state. The observational role of peacekeepers limits their ability to escalate or start conflicts. Peacekeepers are unlike foreign soldiers and weapons that are at the government’s discretion.

**Hypothesis #5**: *An increase in the presence of NGOs is more likely to decrease political stability.*

NGOs are likely to have an impact on the government of the state whether intentionally or unintentionally. Also, NGOs may have different priorities than the current government and seek to undercut the government’s authority by pursuing its own interests. Foreign states may use NGOs as a way to funnel money into the state. The influx of a foreign currency through NGOs is going to have a destabilizing effect on the state’s economy. In the existing literature, the economy is an important variable in the stability of governments. Economic downturns can cause protests and political instability. While foreign aid is going to the government to use and protect against a stagnant economy, money flowing into NGOs
allows these organizations to use the money as they see fit even if it runs counter to the government’s interest.

**Research Design**

For this study, I conduct three case studies and an OLS regression to test the effects of economic, indirect, direct interventions, peacekeepers, and nongovernmental intervention. The main focus of this study is the effect of these different types of intervention on states’ political stability. The unit of analysis for this study is individual countries. This section follows a similar break down of intervention categories to that used by Yoon (1997). In general, the case studies examine the presence of each type of intervention. The three case studies provide an in-depth description of the effects of intervention, while the regression analysis provides a global study of interventions effect on political stability.

**Political Stability**

The dependent variable for this study is political stability. The measure of political stability is similar to that used by Auvinen (1996). In Auvinen’s study, protests indicate the political stability of a state after IMF reform policies. In the case studies, the existence of protests when intervention is present indicates that intervention is affecting the political stability of the government. However, the number of protests is a better determination of political stability than the mere existence of protests, but this study, in regards to case studies, is not going to rely on the number of protests within a state. The intent of the case studies is to indict whether protests are present in states that receive either of the types of intervention. For the OLS regression, this study uses the NAVCO 2.0 dataset that defines protests as a nonviolent or violent social movement directed toward the government.¹ This study also operationalizes protests as

¹ [http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html](http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_navco_data.html)
the presence of social movements within the state. If a type of intervention is unpopular with the populous, there should be more protests associated with that subcategory of intervention.

**Intervention**

The main independent variable for this study is intervention. However, intervention is unpacked into economic, nongovernmental organizations, indirect military, peacekeepers, and direct military intervention. This study follows Yoon’s (1997) break down of intervention, but adds on two other types of intervention: NGOs and peacekeepers. Yoon created four categories of intervention that included no intervention, nonmilitary intervention, indirect military intervention, and direct military intervention (585). Although this study utilizes the categories of economic, indirect and direct intervention developed by Yoon, the data in this study comes from Pat Regan’s (2002) article, *Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict*.\(^2\) The data from Regan is divided into the categories as created by Yoon.

Economic intervention is the first subcategory of intervention. It is measured in the supply of money to a government or other means of economic assistance such as debt forgiveness. Economic intervention follows Savun and Tirone (2012) where economic aid protects the government from economic shocks. The amount of aid that a state receives insulates it from economic downturns. A government that is insulated from negative economic forces does not experience political instability because of the extra revenue from foreign aid. Sanctions are also included as an aspect of economic intervention.

The next independent variable of interest in intervention is nongovernmental organizations. There are a wide variety of definitions for NGOs, and as Schuller (2007, 97) states, “it is easier to define what an NGO is not rather than what it is”. In the case studies,

\(^2\) http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~pregan/replicationdata.html
NGOs are operationalized as organizations that do not have any connection to the government of the state. NGOs are measured by their presence within a state as well as the number of NGOs located within the state. If a state has a large number of NGOs, these organizations are likely to impact the governing of the state. For the regression analysis, the NGO variable is operationalized as USAID assistance and involvement in foreign states. USAID maintains information on its activities and involvement in foreign states. Many NGOs do not provide the same quality of information of investment and activity as USAID maintains, and since USAID maintains its involvement in foreign states, it provides the best opportunity to study the effects of NGOs on political stability.

The next subcategory is indirect military intervention. This subcategory follows Yoon’s (1997, 585) description as the supply of arms or the placement of military advisors in a nation. Indirect military intervention is measured through the amount of military arms sold or supplied to a nation. Also, another measure would be the number of foreign military advisors or officials working within the developing nation. The measure of indirect military intervention includes different types of arms that are provided which include naval and aircraft supplied to the government of a state.

Another subcategory of intervention of this study is the use of peacekeepers. Again, the more peacekeepers provided to a nation by an IGO indicate the level of intervention. A measure of intervention using peacekeepers is the presence and number of peacekeepers that an IGO or third party actor deploys in a state. This study utilizes peacekeeping data from Fortna’s (2004) article, *Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace*

---

3 http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?_program=/eads/gbk/tablesByAgency&agcode=usaid
After Civil War.⁴ The effect that peacekeepers have on the stability of a nation is measured by the number of protests or violence during their time in a state. This measurement indicates whether the intervention of peacekeepers aided in establishing or decreasing political stability within a state.

Direct military intervention is the final subcategory within foreign intervention. Again, it follows the definition used by Yoon (1997, 586) as the deployment of soldiers, aerial bombings, or naval bombardment. Direct military intervention is measured by the number of soldiers that were moved to neighboring nations or within the nation itself. The presence of troops from a nation indicates the state’s willingness to intervene in the affairs of another nation. In addition, the number of airstrikes and naval bombardments will be included in the measurement of direct military intervention. Concerning covert actions, drone strikes and other actions are included in the measurement of direct military intervention.

Controls

The first control variable is economic growth. If a nation is growing economically, it is more likely to be politically stable. Economic development is measured by the average income levels within a country, GDP per capita.⁵ Also, another measurement of economic development will be the growth rate of a nation’s economy. As the average income rises in a nation, the country should become more stable (Posner 1997). An economy that is growing will increase popularity for the current government thus making it more stable (Feng 1997). A nation with a developed economy will be more politically stable.

The next control variable is ethnic fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003). States that have severe ethnic fractionalization are less likely to be political stable. The measurement for

⁴ http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/research.htm
⁵ http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD
this independent variable is the different ethnic groups located within the country. The presence of multiple ethnic groups that a nation affect a state’s political stability. When ethnicity becomes a political tool, other ethnicities become concerned (Slack and Doyon 2001). When different ethnic groups interact, violence is often a result of that interaction (Jalali and Lipset 1992).

The final control variable for this study is the region that the state is located (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Regan (1996) argues that states intervene to make a region more stable. If a region is stable, it is less likely to experience intervention, but if a region is unstable, it is ripe for foreign intervention. Although one state in a stable region might be unstable, the stability of the region should prevent intervention into the state. Regions that have unstable governments are more likely to experience outside intervention.

Methods

The methodologies used to answer this question are three case studies and an OLS regression analysis. This study relies on both qualitative and quantitative data. Case studies allows for the ability to focus on different subcategories of intervention to determine if political stability comes from certain subcategories or not. Case studies allow for the ability to study the effects of the different subcategories of intervention on political stability. Also, it provides the ability to focus on the independent variables of interest and how these different types of intervention positively or negatively affect political stability.

This study utilizes most different case studies. The cases for this study are Lebanon, Haiti, and Pakistan. This study examines Pakistan from 1954 to 2005, Lebanon from 1950 to 2002, and Haiti from 1990 to 2010. These three states experience the different types of intervention in this study. These three cases also have different measures for the three control variables. The cases are from different regions which allows for the study to examine how
different regions are affected by the different subcategories of foreign intervention. Also, these three states have varying levels of ethnic fractalization. The variation in control variables allows this study to examine the effect of intervention on states that are not similar which makes this study more generalizable. Each case study does not have to exhibit each subcategory of intervention.

The OLS regression analysis examines protests and intervention between 1960 and 2000. The regression analysis allows for a global study to test for correlation between different methods of intervention and political instability. For testing hypotheses, the standard to reject the null is a statistical significance in the ninetieth percentile. Statistical significance at this level shows correlation and allows for the rejection of the null hypothesis.

Case Studies

Pakistan

Pakistan has seen significant economic intervention in the form foreign aid (Khan and Ahmed 2007). Between 1960 and 2002, Pakistan has received about $73 billion in the foreign aid (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 215). However, this aid has not been used to benefit the whole of society, but it has been limited to benefiting those individuals who are in influential positions (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 216). During the 1950s, there were significant cases of political instability within Pakistan (Islam 1972, 510). Foreign aid is an extremely important source of revenue for Pakistan, and in 1960, foreign aid made up around seven percent of Pakistan’s Gross National Product (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 220). The massive flow of foreign aid in the 1960s into Pakistan threatened its political stability, but not through protests or social movements against the government, but because the aid caused a high economic growth rate (Islam 1972, 502). The flow of foreign aid into Pakistan continued to a rapid rate through the 1970s which allowed the government to begin public investment programs such as roads, electric power, and
an increase in social services (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 220). However, foreign aid began to decline during the mid-1970s, but the United States began increasing aid again with Soviet involvement in Afghanistan (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 220). In 1987, the United States supplied $4 billion in aid, and 57 percent of that was in economic aid and the remaining was in the form of military aid (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 220). Between the 1960s and 1980s, Pakistan was one of the largest recipients of economic intervention through foreign aid in the world (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 223). During the 1990s, foreign aid declined drastically because of the passage of the Pressler and Brown Amendments that limited aid (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 221). After September 11, 2001 and Pakistan joining the War on Terror, United States foreign aid to Pakistan increased by seven percent to $777 million (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 221).

Despite the large amounts of aid flowing into Pakistan, the polity did not see a drastic change in its living standards, but rather, the aid was used to benefit the political elites and delay their fall from power (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 223). However, in the 2000s, foreign aid was used to insulate the state from the negative economic effects of the ongoing Afghan War and the 2005 earthquake (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 235). United States foreign aid to Pakistan after September 11, 2001 was intended to provide stability for the state and the government (Cohen and Chollet 2007, 11). However, the use of foreign aid to insulate the state from downturns in the economy, United States economic assistance has had very minimal effect on Pakistan’s political stability (Cohen and Chollet 2007, 14). Despite the flow of foreign aid into Pakistan, aid does not hold the large role in the Pakistani economy that it held during the 1960s to 1980s (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 236). The authors conclude that foreign aid is a curse and not a benefit for Pakistan (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 236). However, they come to this conclusion not because
it produces political instability, but because it produces economic dependency and limit the growth of the economy (Khan and Ahmed 2007, 237).

The major focus of United States economic assistance to Pakistan is to ensure short-term military cooperation rather than to protect Pakistan in the event of negative economic downturns (Cohen and Chollet 2007, 15). United States military assistance began in 1954 began when President Eisenhower announced that the United States is going to provide military assistance to Pakistan with the intent to strengthening defensive capabilities in the Middle East (Spain 1954, 738). The deal allowed for the United States to establish military bases in Pakistan in exchange for providing defense aid to Pakistan (Spain 1954, 739). As a part of the deal, Pakistan received $25 million for military equipment and supplies, but in order to receive the military equipment and supplies, Pakistan had to agree not to use the military aid aggressively against its own citizens or other states (Spain 1954, 747-748). In return for the military assistance, Pakistan had to agree to participate in a regional defense pact with the United States as well as other states in the region (McMahon 1988, 813). The main uproar over the United States supplying Pakistan with military aid came from India and Russia, but not the Pakistani citizens (Spain 1954, 740).

**Lebanon**

Military intervention begins the moment that soldiers or military forces from one state cross the border of another state for the purposing of becoming involved militarily in that state (Rasler 1983, 431). Lebanon also experienced economic intervention during the 1950s and 1960s (Anderson 1987, 7). Economic intervention was encouraged in Lebanon because it provided much needed revenue that the government was not able to collect through taxation (Anderson 1987, 7). In addition, the United States sent soldiers in the late 1950s to Lebanon as per the request of President Chamoun (Brands, Jr. 1987, 614). The United States militarily
intervened in Lebanon as a way to show that it was not just a negative influence in the Middle East, but also a positive, stabilizing force (Brands, Jr. 1987, 623). Syria engaged in military intervention three times during 1976 in January, April, and June (Rasler 1983, 431). Syria moved 15,000 soldier across the border into Lebanon during 1976 (Rasler 1983, 431). The Syrian offensive within Lebanon did not end until October 1976, but the formation of the Arab Deterrent Force turned the event from Syrian military intervention into a peacekeeping effort (Rasler 1983, 432). The Arab Deterrent Force was formed by the Arab League hoping to end the civil war that was raging within Lebanon (Burk 1999, 62). After the end of the Syrian military intervention, Syria retained control over the northern Lebanon (Rasler 1983, 441). Syria has at least been an occupying force in Lebanon from October 1976 all the way to 2001 (Thompson 2002, 92). Lebanon has been occupied by Syrian armed forces for at least twenty-five years since the end of the Lebanon civil war that the Syrian military was given the responsibility to end (Thompson 2002, 92).

In 1992, Syria was supposed to withdraw its military forces from Syria under the Ta’if Accord, but Syria maintained that it was waiting until after the new government in Lebanon had been formed before withdrawing (Thompson 2002, 91). Syria’s claim to staying in Lebanon beyond the 1992 election resolved around the outcome that it produced from the civil war instead of the laws that were written under the Syrian forces (Thompson 2002, 91). Although the Lebanese government has not been hostile toward the presence of the Syrian military, some factions within Lebanon are beginning to protest the presence of the Syrian armed forces (Thompson 2002, 92). In 2001, at least 200 Lebanese Christians took to the streets to show their opposition to the ongoing presence of Syrian military in Lebanon (Thompson 2002, 72). If key groups join in with the opposition to the Syrian forces, the Lebanese government will either have
to distance itself from Syria or it may collapse under the pressure from its citizens (Thompson 2002, 92).

In the early 1980s, the United Nations dispatched peacekeepers to Lebanon to monitor a ceasefire line from the recent civil war (Burk 1999, 62). However, in June of 1982, the United States intervened in Lebanon to form a ceasefire line after an Israeli invasion into the southern part of the state (Burk 1999, 62). Later in the same year, the United States would intervene again as a part of an international peacekeeping force after a massacre of Palestinians within Lebanon (Burk 1999, 62). The United States deployed Marines to the airport in Beirut while French, Italian, and British soldiers were deployed to other areas within the capital (Burk 1999, 62). These states stayed to oversee the elections in 1983, and would begin to patrol through Beirut in support of the new government and its military despite its contested claims to power (Burk 1999, 62). Once the peacekeepers began to promote peace for the new government, they were met with resistance in the capital from Muslim forces that opposed the new Lebanese government (Burk 1999, 62). The peacekeepers experienced mortar attacks, car bombs at the United States embassy, and on October 23, a truck bomb was used to attack the United States Marine barracks at the Beirut which killed 241 (Burk 1999, 62).

Haiti

Under the Clinton administration, the United States intervened in Haiti, but it stopped short of a full military intervention invasion (Weber 1995, 273). The United States used a negotiated settlement that prevented the invasion, but still accomplished the desired outcome of replacing General Raoul Cedras’s military regime (Weber 1995, 273). President Clinton sent United States soldiers under a United Nations mandate to Haiti to assist in reinstating Haitian President Aristide (Jefferies 2001, 81). The only focus of the military intervention was to
reinsert the displaced president of Haiti and not to try and solve the struggling economy or any of the other issues that plague the state (Jefferies 2001, 81). The intervention placed the United States and the United Nations side by side in peacekeeping roles in Haiti, and replaced General Cedras’s regime with President Aristide’s government (Weber 1995, 273). The United States also engaged in indirect military intervention by providing five million dollars for the retraining of a civilian military (Jefferies 2001, 81). The goal of this indirect military intervention was to make the Haitian military more responsive to United States directed control of the military (Jefferies 2001, 81). The Clinton administration was able to avoid the political backlash that would have come with a military invasion of Haiti and accomplish the same desired outcome with the negotiated intervention (Weber 1995, 274).

Another form of intervention in Haiti is through nongovernmental organizations. There are about 300 officially recognized NGOs in Haiti, and most of the aid that flows into the state comes through the NGOs first (Schuller 2007, 96). The vast amount of NGOs in Haiti and the fact that a lot of the economic aid comes through these organizations before it reaches the polity makes it difficult not to include NGOs as a form of intervention within Haiti (Schuller 2007, 96). The United States defines NGOs as local organizations that receive U.S. foreign aid (Schuller 2007, 97). However, in Haiti, NGOs have to be focused on development within Haiti and must be apolitical (Schuller 2007, 98). The former Haitian Minister of Social Affairs stated that with foreign economic aid going directly to these nongovernment organizations “makes it hard for the government to establish priorities and ultimately undermines the ability of the state to govern” (Schuller 2007, 99). This means that almost all economic aid that enters Haiti comes through the roughly 300 NGOs instead of the government (Schuller 2007, 100). In Haiti, projects have a tendency to appear overnight without a discussion or prioritization of the most important issues
to the Haitian population (Schuller 2007, 111). It is not the government that is in charge of development in Haiti, but it is the NGOs that are in charge of how Haiti develops since they receive majority of the economic assistance that enters the state (Schuller 2007, 114).

The lack of development can be placed on the constant peacekeeping and economic intervention that Haiti has constantly experienced for about two decades (Zanotti 2010, 756). Before the earthquake in 2010, there were around 8,000 to 9,000 nongovernmental organizations in Haiti, and the NGOs have different agendas and varying amounts of capital at their disposal (Zanotti 2010, 757). There are three distinctive qualities to Haiti: First, NGOs function on a multilateral or bilateral process through which they sponsor programs; second, peacekeepers are in charge of maintaining security in the state; third, the Haitian government has an extremely weak administrative ability (Zanotti 2010, 757). About seventy percent of Haiti’s budget comes from foreign economic assistance (Zanotti 2010, 758). NGOs in Haiti are being used by foreign governments to promote their agendas in weak, developing state (Zanotti 2010, 758). The NGO centered intervention cause political instability and violence that would ultimately lead to General Cedras’s coup against President Aristide (Zanotti 2010, 758). In addition, NGOs limit the administrative powers of the Haitian government because most of the economic assistance goes to these organizations instead of to the government (Zanotti 2010, 761).

**Analysis: Case Studies**

**Economic Intervention**

Each of the three cases experienced economic intervention. Pakistan has been one of the states that received the most economic foreign assistance in the world. Although the amount of aid has decreased drastically from its earlier amounts, Pakistan is a main receipt of United States economic intervention because of their vital location for the Afghan War. Despite Pakistan being a major recipient of foreign aid and having it make up a large portion of its Gross National
Product, Pakistan did not experience any political instability through protests because of the economic intervention. Actually, Pakistan used its foreign aid to protect the state from the negative economic ramifications of the Afghan War and an earthquake in 2005.

Lebanon experienced high amounts of economic intervention during the 1950s and 1960s because the government could not get enough money from domestic taxes to function. Economic intervention filled in the gaps that created by the government’s inability to raise enough money through taxes. Again, despite the fact that economic intervention played a massive part in funding of the Lebanese government, it did not create political instability through protests. Most of the instability within Lebanon arose from the ethnic and religious fractionalization in the country. Also, in the case of Haiti, the state is heavily dependent upon economic intervention for revenue to allow the state to function. However, the money is not going directly to the government, but it is getting placed in hands of nongovernmental organizations. Again, despite the presence of high amounts of economic intervention, Haiti has not experienced any political instability because of the economic intervention flowing into the state.

Based on these three case studies, the presence of economic intervention within a state is not likely to cause political instability through protests. In particular, the case in Pakistan meets exactly what the theory for this study expected to discover in regards to economic intervention. Pakistan was able to use its foreign assistance to protect that state and its citizens from the negative economic consequences of the neighboring Afghan War and a devastating earthquake in 2005. This study’s theory ran parallel to the finds of Savun and Tirone (2012) which discovered that increases in foreign aid is likely to reduce the likelihood of a civil war. Also, in the cases of Lebanon and Haiti, economic intervention did not cause citizens to take to the streets to protest.
their government over the presence of this subcategory of intervention. These three case studies confirm this study’s first hypothesis that economic intervention is more likely to increase political stability. Since neither case experienced political instability because of foreign nations providing economic assistance, the first hypothesis cannot be rejected.

**Nongovernmental Organizations**

Only one case in this study was examined in regards to the presence of nongovernmental organizations within the state. According to Zanotti (2010), Haiti has between 8,000 and 9,000 NGOs acting within the state. The fifth hypothesis for this study is that nongovernmental organizations cause political instability within a state. However, according to the case study, this hypothesis is rejected because the presence of nongovernmental organizations never caused a political instability through protests. There were no protests because of how NGOs were using the economic assistance for development within Haiti. However, the theory of this study is correct in that NGOs limit the ability of the government to function in Haiti. Economic assistance does not flow to the Haitian government, but rather it flows through the hands of nongovernmental organizations. Since Haiti has an astronomical amount of NGOs acting within its borders, the government’s hands are tied because it is not the recipient of the foreign aid. Also, each NGO has a different agenda and varying amounts of capital to use on development projects within Haiti. These organizations may not share the same agenda as the Haitian government because foreign governments use NGOs as vehicles to advance their own interests in Haiti. Nongovernmental organizations are a destabilizing force within Haiti, but they do not cause instability as define by this study.
Indirect Military Intervention

Again, each of the cases witnessed indirect military intervention within their borders. In the case of Pakistan, the indirect military intervention did not cause political instability through protests. Pakistan received this subcategory of intervention by coming to a deal with the United States that it would participate in a regional defense pact and the United States would supply it with defense aid. Also a part of the deal between the United States and Pakistan was that the military aid could not be used aggressively against Pakistan’s polity or against another foreign state. This part of the agreement conflicts with the theory of this study in regards to indirect military aid. The theory was that governments that receive indirect military intervention are going to use their new resources to better secure their position within the state and to engage militarily any opposition forces present within the state. The case of Pakistan does not support this theory because the agreement prevented the government from using the military aid from the United States in an aggressive manner.

Also, in the cases of Lebanon and Haiti, indirect military intervention did not cause political instability either. There were no protests over the United States intervening to establish a ceasefire line after the Israeli invasion in the early 1980s. In Haiti, protests did not develop over the United States planning to invade Haiti to overthrow the military government that had displaced an elected president. Also, there were no protests against the United States when it reached a diplomatic agreement for the military government to step down and for the elected government to return to power. No political instability arose out of indirect military intervention in the three cases. The second hypothesis which stated that indirect military intervention is likely to decrease political stability can be rejected. None of the three cases experienced a decrease in political stability because of the presence of indirect military intervention within the state.
**Peacekeepers**

Only two of the cases in this study were examined in regards to peacekeepers and political instability. In Lebanon, some would argue that the Syrian forces that intervened during the civil war became peacekeepers after the end of the conflict; however, for this study, it is considered direct military intervention, so for this study, the United States and some European states are the only forces considered as peacekeepers. After the United States intervened to establish ceasefire lines, there was genocide of Palestinians. The United States and some European states entered Beirut as peacekeeping forces for the upcoming election and to provide stability for the new government after the election. However, Muslim groups that opposed the new government began to launch mortar attacks and vehicle bombings against the government and the peacekeeping forces in Beirut. In the case of Lebanon, peacekeepers did not increase political stability because of the mortar and vehicle attacks.

As a part of the diplomatic deal that prevented a United States invasion of Haiti, it instead created a joint effort between the United States and the United Nations to deploy peacekeepers in Haiti to protect the government and provide stability following the transition. However, despite the reaction to peacekeepers in Lebanon, Haiti did not experience political instability because of the peacekeepers, and the reinstated elected government would go on to have a peaceful transition to another elected government. The fourth hypothesis for this study states that peacekeepers are likely to increase political stability. However, this hypothesis cannot be rejected or confirmed from the two case studies. In one case, there was a decrease in political stability while in the other there was no decrease in political stability.
Direct Military Intervention

Only of the cases for this study experienced direct military intervention. In 1976, Lebanon experienced direct military intervention three times from Syria during the year, and after the third time, Syria remained in Lebanon at least until 2001. Syria remained in the Northern part of Lebanon after the end of the civil war in October of 1976. The continued presence of the Syrian armed forces in Lebanon has not been handled well by some portions of the Lebanese polity. In 2001, Lebanese Christians took the streets to protest the continued presence of Syria in Lebanon twenty-five years after the end of the 1976 Lebanese civil war. There is concern that if the opposition and protests toward the continued Syrian presence continue to grow that the current Lebanese government could completely collapse or be forced to distance itself from Syria. The Lebanese government has not tried to force Syria out of the state, but it has allowed it to remain for the twenty-five years since the end of the civil war. If the protests against the direct military intervention of Syria continue, it could have devastating effects on the government and the state.

Analysis: OLS Regression

The regression results of this study begin to offer insight into the effects of different methods of intervention on political stability. While only two – economic and indirect military – of the five different methods are statistically significant, it offers insight into whether the nature of third-party intervention impacts the political stability of states. Table 1 presents the results of the OLS regression with the unit of analysis being the country. A negative coefficient indicates the variable does not cause political instability through protests; conversely, a positive coefficient indicates the variable does cause political instability through protests. The two independent variables of interest have a negative relationship with political instability through
protests. The results above begin the discussion on third-party intervention and their effect on political instability.

Table 1: Third-Party Intervention Model on Political Stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protests</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Statistical Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Intervention</td>
<td>-.1201</td>
<td>.0294</td>
<td>0.000****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Military Intervention</td>
<td>-.0657</td>
<td>.0293</td>
<td>0.025**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Military Intervention</td>
<td>.0331</td>
<td>.0306</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeepers</td>
<td>-.0228</td>
<td>.0714</td>
<td>0.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Intervention</td>
<td>.0088</td>
<td>.0066</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>.5419</td>
<td>.2551</td>
<td>0.034**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>.1645</td>
<td>.1685</td>
<td>0.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>.1653</td>
<td>.1376</td>
<td>0.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>.0656</td>
<td>.1420</td>
<td>0.644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>.2752</td>
<td>.1573</td>
<td>0.080*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>.5296</td>
<td>.1822</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>.0004</td>
<td>.0004</td>
<td>0.928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.1118</td>
<td>.1124</td>
<td>0.320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 1122   Wald Chi² = 70.13   p ≤ .10* ≤ .05** ≤ .01*** ≤ .001****

The first hypothesis argues that as states receive economic intervention, political stability is more likely to increase. Table 1 indicates that economic intervention has a negative relationship with political stability. This result confirms the hypothesis that economic intervention produces political stability within states. This study confirms the argument of Burcu and Tirone (2012) that states foreign aid increases political stability. Positive economic assistance allows the government to use its increased economic resources to protect its citizens from negative economic shocks and limit the negative effects incurred by the citizens. Further, economic intervention does not allow the same freedom as other methods of third-party intervention. The limitations placed on the government’s freedom to use its newly gained resources prevent it from using the resources against its opposition forces. The inability to use
its new resources against opposition forces protects stability in the state by limiting or preventing conflict. The limitations from economic intervention prevent conflict or protests from occurring in the state which protects and increases the political stability of the state. The case studies of Pakistan, Lebanon, and Haiti also support the conclusion that economic intervention does not cause political instability through protests. None of the cases indicate that economic intervention causes political stability and the regression analysis indicates the same findings as the case studies.

The second hypothesis argues that as states receive indirect military intervention, political stability is more likely to decrease, but the results of this study indicate that indirect military intervention does not cause instability through protests. The results allow for the rejection of the second hypothesis because of the negative coefficient associated with the statically significant results. This indicates that indirect military intervention is more similar to economic than direct military intervention. This method of intervention places limitations on the government’s ability to use its increased resources such as military advisers or military weapons. Unlike direct military intervention where the third-party intervener directly uses aerial and naval bombardments or provides soldiers to the state, indirect military only goes as far as providing military advisers and military arms to governments. The role of military advisers is not to directly command the military of the recipient state, but to provide recommendations and advice to the military commanders or the state’s government. The limited role of military advisers similarly constrains the government’s actions similar to the way that economic intervention limits its actions.

However, this conclusion contradicts the government’s ability to freely use military weapons. There could be a similar clause to that in the Pakistani case described by Spain (1954)
where the United States included a provision in the arms deal to prevent the government from using the military weapons against its citizens. Once the government has the military weapons, it seems simple for the government to be able to use its new military resources as it deems appropriate even if it meant using the weapons against its citizens. However, the results of this study indicate that this is not the case. One of the reasons that indirect military intervention does not cause political instability is that the third-party prevents the government from using the arms against its citizens like in the Pakistan case. The third-party intervener is able to limit the actions of the government by providing clauses that prevent the recipient government from performing certain actions with the military weapons such as attacking its own civilians. This is one of the ways that the recipient government is further limited in its actions beyond the nature of the intervention.

Direct military intervention, peacekeepers and NGOs are not significantly significant in this study. Since none of these three variables are statistically significant, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. This indicates that direct military intervention, peacekeepers or NGOs do not affect political stability through protests. However, these three variables may affect political stability in another manner rather than protests. An example of intervention affecting political stability in another manner other than protests is from the case of Haiti. In the study, NGOs did not cause protests, but nonetheless, the NGOs affected the political stability of the government in Haiti. The results of this study indicate that these three variables do not impact political stability by causing protests within the state.

**Conclusion**

The research question of this study is how does foreign intervention by states, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations affect political stability?
This question is important for political science because it indicates whether any of the five natures of intervention increase or decrease political stability within a state. The independent variables in this study are economic intervention, nongovernmental organizations, indirect military intervention, peacekeepers, and direct military intervention. This study uses the three case studies of Pakistan, Lebanon, and Haiti to test the independent variables as well as an OLS regression analysis to conduct a global study.

This study confirmed that economic intervention increases the political stability within a state. The case study of Pakistan confirms this theory because the government used economic assistance to protect the country from the negative economic ramifications of the Afghan War and a 2005 earthquake. Also, both Lebanon and Haiti receive economic intervention and neither of these cases experienced any protests or political instability because of the economic intervention being provided by a foreign state. The OLS regression also indicates a negative association of economic intervention with protests. The negative coefficient shows that economic intervention does not cause political instability through protests which confirms, along with the case studies, the first hypothesis.

All three of the cases received indirect military intervention, and none of the cases witnessed a decrease in political stability following the indirect military intervention. The results from the case studies are similar to the results from the regression analysis. Both methods of analysis indicate the same result which allows this study to reject the null for the second hypothesis. Indirect military intervention does not cause political instability through protests as indicated by both the case studies and regression analysis.

Peacekeepers were able to provide stability in Haiti follow the transition from a military government back to the elected government. However, in Lebanon, the peacekeepers and the
government were attacked by aspects of the citizenry. The United States and European peacekeepers experienced mortar strikes and deadly vehicle bombs while in Beirut following the 1983 election. Finally, direct military intervention was only evident in this study in Lebanon. The Syrian military intervened three times during the 1976 civil war, but after the end in October of 1976, the Syrian military remained in northern Lebanon. In 2001, some aspects of the populous took to the streets to protest against the continued military presence of Syria in Lebanon. These protests, if large enough, could cause the collapse of the weak Lebanese government. The third hypothesis state that direct military intervention is more likely to decrease political stability is confirmed in the case of Lebanon. In regards to nongovernmental organizations, the hypothesis is rejected because although NGOs are a destabilizing force, the instability does not meet the definition used in this study. This study also rejects the hypothesis that states indirect military intervention decrease political stability.

One of the main weaknesses of this paper is that not every one of the independent variables was included in each case study. For example, direct military intervention and nongovernmental organizations were only present in one case each. Since each independent variable of interest was not covered in each case study, this has the potential to produce a false reject or confirmation of a hypothesis. A potential area of future research is on nongovernmental organizations. There is currently a lack of research that has focused on the role of NGOs within states. As the Haiti case portrays, NGOs are not necessarily a positive for states because they are able to limit the ability to the government to receive foreign assistance to help the state develop. A possible research topic on NGOs is to examine to what extent NGOs portray their funders interest in the host state. This topic is important because if NGOs are receiving the vast majority
of economic assistance, the interests of other states is going to be placed about the interest of the home government in how the state develops.

Another weakness of this study is that it only examines whether a certain method of intervention occurred. It did not examine the level or amount of intervention or the conditions associated with the different methods of intervention. Based on the results of this study, exact numbers or ordinal data categories based on the amounts of intervention. This study simply sought to examine whether different methods of intervention affect the political stability of the recipient states. Since this study only examines the presence of different methods of intervention, it is limited in its ability to fully explain the impact of differing methods of intervention on political stability. This study does not account for all NGO activity throughout the world, but only uses USAID data. By using data that accounts for all NGO activity around the world, this study could have better tested the relationship between NGOs and political stability. However, USAID provides the most comprehensive data for a single NGO.

Future research needs to expand beyond this study and include exact numbers or ordinal data to provide a better understanding of how differing methods of intervention affects political stability. By going beyond whether intervention is present to how much intervention occurs, future studies will be able to test at what level does economic assistance increases political stability or whether at certain levels, assistance does not increase political stability but causes instability. These are questions that can only be answered by going beyond whether intervention occurs to how much intervention occurs and how do those amounts affect political stability.

Another area of future research is to operationalize political stability differently. The case study of Haiti shows that intervention is able to affect stability that is not through the formation of protests. Other possible definitions of political stability are conflict onset or state
repression. Protests require a lower standard as a measure of political stability, and for example, conflict onset requires a higher standard to meet than protests. Conflict onset indicates the beginning of a civil war or interstate conflict, while protests do not require the start of a civil war. Since this study uses a lower standard of measurement for political stability, it is potentially missing more severe measurements, such as conflict onset.

An additional idea for future research is whether different methods of intervention restart ended conflicts. If there are previous hostilities between states or within a state, providing assistance militarily or economically may not be the best decision for maintaining peace. An area within this question is how long after the end of a conflict should third-parties wait before restarting assistance. Some conflicts may end with a peace agreement while other may end abruptly. How does the ending of a conflict affect whether intervention restarts the conflict or starts a new one, or does intervention prevent the restarting of conflicts. These are some questions in regards to the future of intervention research and more research needs to be conducted on interventions impact on political stability.

This study indicates how five different natures of intervention affect the political stability of states. Based on this study, if foreign governments want to make a state more political stable and prevent protests, economic or indirect military intervention are the best options for foreign governments. Nongovernmental organizations and direct military intervention are shown to have a negative effect on political stability when used within states. Majority of the existing literature on intervention focuses on intervention during a conflict and how it affects duration, but this study begins to expand away from the existing research to view whether intervention is able to stabilize foreign governments.
References


Gates, Scott, and Havard Strand. 2008. “Military Intervention, Democratization, and Post-
Conflict Political Stability.” Resources, Governance, and Civil Conflict, eds. Magnus

Gent, Stephen. 2008. “Going in when it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil


Hermann, Margaret G., and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. 1996. “Ballots, a Barrier Against the Use of
Bullets and Bombs: Democratization and Military Intervention.” The Journal of Conflict

The Economic Journal: 82(325), 502-530.


Quarterly: 47(4), 71-94.

Khan, Muhammad Arshad, and Ayaz Ahmed. 2007. “Foreign Aid – Blessing or Curse: Evidence


Research Quarterly: 65(3), 558-571.

Pickering, Jeffrey, and Emizet F. Kisangani. 2006. “Political, Economic, and Social
Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention.” Political Research Quarterly: 59(3),
363-376.

and Organization (October): 344-365.


