MAPPING NARRATIVES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND
(RE)BALANCING IN NEW CALEDONIA

A dissertation submitted
to Kent State University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Cadey A. K. Korson

December 2015
© Copyright
All rights reserved
Except for previously published materials
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**LIST OF FIGURES**  
VI

**LIST OF TABLES**  
VII

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**  
VIII

**CHAPTER 1**  
INTRODUCTION  
1

**CHAPTER 2**  
GOVERNING PLURAL SOCIETIES  
6  
MODELS OF POST-COLONIAL DEPENDENT GOVERNANCE  
6  
EXAMPLES OF POST-COLONIAL DEPENDENT GOVERNANCE  
9  
POST-COLONIAL RELATIONS AND THE INTEGRATION OF FRENCH OVERSEAS DEPENDENCIES  
17  
IMPLEMENTING SELF-DETERMINATION AND MODELS OF ADMINISTRATION  
21  
IMPLEMENTING SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH MULTICULTURAL INTEGRATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS  
23  
IMPLEMENTING SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH DEMOCRATIC AND FEDERAL SYSTEMS  
25  
The Role of Identity and Nationalism in Self-Determination  
30  
IMPLEMENTING SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY  
35  
INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS IN GLOBAL CONTEXT  
37

**CHAPTER 3**  
HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR THE NEW CALEDONIAN CASE STUDY  
43  
COLONIAL HISTORY  
43  
MISSION CIVILISATRICE  
44  
CODE DE L’INDIGÉNAT: LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
46  
EXPORTING THE FRENCH NATIONAL REVOLUTION: WWII  
47  
POST-WWII POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN NEW CALEDONIA  
49  
MATIGNON ACCORD: PEACE AFTER CIVIL WAR?  
58  
THE NOUMEA ACCORD: FRAMING FUTURE POSSIBILITIES  
62  
CONCLUSION  
65

**CHAPTER 4**  
RESEARCH DESIGN  
68  
DATA SOURCES AND INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION  
70  
BACKGROUND ON INTERVIEWEES  
81  
METHODOLOGY AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS  
87  
GROUNDED THEORY AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS  
88  
USING CHORD DIAGRAMS  
96

**CHAPTER 5**  
101
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMON DESTINY</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTIMIZATION, IDENTITY, AND SOCIAL REBALANCING</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITIZENSHIP</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL ELECTORATE, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND POLITICAL REBALANCING</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC REBALANCING AND PERCEPTION OF FRANCE</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE NOUMÉA ACCORD</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 9</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF NEWS ARTICLES COLLECTED</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ADDITIONAL SOURCES</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Political Parties on a political and economic scale………………………………………87

Figure 2. Connections between dominant themes…………………………………………………98

Figure 3. Correlations between identity, citizenship, and electorates…………………………129

Figure 4. Connections and co-definitions among select objectives……………………………133

Figure 5. Customary Governance Structure in New Caledonia……………………………………234

Figure 6. Framing of Objectives that define outcomes……………………………………………241
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. List of Research Subjects and Data Sources..................................................72
Table 2. Identification of the Electorate Category and Framing........................................92
Table 3. Electoral Rolls and Eligibility Criteria...............................................................115
Table 4. French Financial Assistance to New Caledonia in Pacific Francs.........................182
Table 5. Outcomes Advocated by Political Party............................................................219
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my doctoral advisor Dr. Dave Kaplan whose unflagging support and guidance has been invaluable throughout my graduate career. His advice and mentorship has helped me refine my research skills and successfully achieve my doctoral degree. I greatly appreciate his tireless efforts in completing recommendation after recommendation and wading through my endless dissertation drafts, publications, book reviews, and class papers. He has been both a role model and an inspiration. Thanks Dave!

I appreciate the work that Dr. Jennifer Mapes and Dr. James Tyner have done reviewing my proposal and dissertation in all its forms. I would like to thank Dr. Landon Hancock and Dr. Richard Steigmann-Gall for serving as members of my committee and providing valuable feedback on my dissertation. I am grateful to Dr. Mapes for challenging me to become a better writer and continuing to read my drafts despite my atrocious grammar. Her caring and consideration for me as a student and a colleague continues to encourage me.

During my fieldwork Dr. Mathias Chauchat helped me navigate the intricacies of New Caledonian politics and patiently answered my many questions. I want to thank Catherine Ris as well for organizing my lodging and internship with LARJE at the University of New Caledonia. I will always appreciate her introduction me to my three research assistants, without whom I would have never succeeded. The LARJE department at the University of New Caledonia was a source of great financial and practical support during my stay in New Caledonia. I would like to recognize the work of Sybille Poaouteta, Emilie Douyere, and Samuel Gorohouna. Their interpretation during interviews and subsequent conversations enriched my dissertation and eventual analysis. In particular, I want to thank Sybille for making all of those phone calls to
administrative assistants and politicians. She always knew just how much to push to get an interview. Without her help this would have been a much shorter and less interesting dissertation.

I would like to acknowledge the support of the Department of Geography at Kent State University. Funding from the department, the Kent State Graduate Student Senate, and the Graduate Dean’s Award made it possible for me to embark on this incredible research project. Without this help and the support of Dr. Kate McAnulty I would not have been able to achieve my goals for fieldwork. There are a number of graduate students within my department and at Kent State who have been a part of this process and who have encouraged me through the highs and lows of my graduate experience. Dr. Weronika Kusek, Indira Sultanic, and Amanda Sovicek have been a constant source of encouragement, sounding boards for my ideas (and my rants), and overall amazing women that I greatly admire. I am so thankful for their unfailing support and kindness.

A number of people throughout my academic career have made this dissertation possible. Dr. Mike Devivo at Grand Rapids Community College was the one who first set me on the path to geography one fateful day in cultural geography. His mentorship throughout the past eight years has guided me to some amazing departments and opportunities. Geography lives! I would also like to thank Dr. Larry Brown and Dr. Soren Larsen at the University of Missouri-Columbia for their continued encouragement and support even after I graduated. I greatly appreciate Dr. Larsen’s time and effort writing the many recommendation letters I requested. He was always the first to submit them! And finally, I want to thank Doc: who always encouraged his students to question everything.

I would like to thank my family for nurturing my pursuit of an advanced degree. My parents have made it possible for me to pursue my passion of international travel and provided
for my education. Their love, and support of my achievements, has been a great source of encouragement. I am constantly inspired by their love, dedication, and hard work. My grandparents have been a source of unfailing support. Their influence on my life and accomplishments is immeasurable.

Finally, I would like to recognize the two most important influences in my life and work. As in all things, without the Lord, none of this would have been possible. He has utterly blessed me in my academic career and in the amazing departments I have been a part of. My husband, Andrew, has been a constant partner in this crazy path that I committed us to. His patience with moving all over the United States (and across the Atlantic), and with my unending complaints and frustrations, awes me. It was his love and support that got me over the countless hurdles and rejections and through the eleven-hour days of non-stop writing. I will always be inspired by his commitment to overcome new challenges and unexpected situations. Thank you!
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As globalization and migration increase, traditional nation-states erode and debates about the cultural diversity of states, minority rights, and self-determination intensify. These issues exacerbate the ongoing struggle of indigenous and sub-national groups for political representation. These concerns are particularly relevant to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, whose administration of overseas collectives is contingent on effective multicultural governance. France’s colonial history, changing notions of inclusion and current struggle with sub-national populations underscore the importance of my research in the evolving territory of New Caledonia. Since the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, indigenous groups have been increasingly supported in their push for self-determination. The future of good governance in multinational states is contingent on understanding the efficacy of multicultural policies at both the state and sub-state level. It is critical that we understand how diverse cultures can be peacefully integrated without assimilatory practices. New Caledonia offers a unique case study where issues of self-determination, national identity, multicultural governance, and economic constraints can be examined through discursive political objectives. I will examine how these objectives frame the independence debate and hinder or promote the five potential outcomes of the referenda.
In 2011, the Committee of New Caledonian and French politicians involved in the Nouméa Accord called for the establishment of a Steering Committee on the Institutional Future of New Caledonia (SCIFNC) (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). The Committee included Jean Courtial (a French Councillor of State), Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien (a French law professor), and Stéphane Grauvogel (a delegate of the French Overseas Deputy General). Their goals were to outline the possible outcomes of the Nouméa Accord. According to international law, the Nouméa Accord, and Caledonian politicians, there are three basic options that the New Caledonian people can vote on in the referenda: full sovereignty, independent-association, or association. Full sovereignty would mean that New Caledonia would become a sovereign state, gain a seat in the United Nations, and all forms of French aid would end or be re-negotiated. Independent-association may be sought with France or a Pacific country or international organization. In this situation, New Caledonia would become a fully sovereign state and then cede certain powers to another country or group of countries. If independent-association is achieved, New Caledonians would likely cede powers of defense or something else to another state and strengthen their ties with that state or organization. Under the association option, New Caledonia would either solidify the status quo and maintain permanent association with France, or agree to another accord that further delays independence or sets up a schedule for the return of the remaining five sovereign powers held by France. One of the few remaining UN Non-Self Governing territories, New Caledonia’s struggle for self-determination is unique. The dominant indigenous group has played a significant role in the political development of the country despite continued French supremacy and efforts to create an indigenous minority.

This research aims to explore three questions. What are the dominant narratives underlying the independence debate? How are these narratives defined? How does the framing of
these narratives and the narratives themselves promote or hinder certain outcomes? To answer these questions, I collected information about how politicians from each of the major political parties in the Territorial Congress view the independence debate and upcoming referenda. I focused on party leaders and founders who are currently serving a term in the Territorial Congress. These individuals will guide New Caledonians through the first of the referenda. Many of them will most likely aid the country in its move to implement the result of the three referenda after 2022. Semi-structured personal interviews of the Caledonian political leaders in the Territorial Congress concentrated on self-determination, the referendum, cultural diversity and representation, and the role of foreign aid and mining. Interviews conducted by news agencies, news articles quoting politician’s, public speeches made by political elites, and party literature offered a corroboratory layer of data. Using a grounded theory constant comparative approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Hsieh and Shannon 2005), interviews, articles, documents, and speeches revealed dominant themes and specific objectives that concerned politicians in the context of the independence debate.

While a majority of the themes and objectives are strongly tied to and co-define each other, there are three that define political thought and actions in New Caledonia: political, social, and economic rebalancing. All of the themes and narratives can be organized under the umbrella of these themes. They define the very nature of the debate over independence in New Caledonia. The effort of indigenous Kanak to balance the scales of colonialism through independence and Caledonian’s effort to balance a strong indigenous population and minority rights with the rights of the whole. A discourse analysis helped identify how each theme and objective is defined and framed in contemporary political rhetoric. Taken together, this information presented a series of narratives and linked objectives influences how the potential options are presented.
Post-colonial relationships between colonizers and colonized islands resulted in a variety of dependent bonds. Not all colonized countries chose independence, leading to varying forms of federal and associated links and power sharing between mainland and island territories. Chapter Two summarizes the dependent forms of governance other colonial powers have maintained with their territories and explores options for autonomy within these territories at local and national scales. The colonial history of New Caledonia and oppression of Kanak from 1853 to the 1950s and the subsequent rise of the Kanak nationalist movement in the 1960s and 1970s are outlined in Chapter Three. The nationalist movement, heightened violence in the 1980s, and changes in the political orientation of the French government ultimately resulted in a series of agreements in 1988 and 1998 that would pave the way for a decision on independence after 2018. The Matignon Accord and Nouméa Agreements have heavily influenced the rhetoric current congressmen and women are using to argue in favor of independence and continued association with France. Chapter Four details the grounded theory approach, methods of data collection, and forms of analysis used in this research.

The following chapters are structured to show the progression and compilation of theories grounded in the data explored (Yin 2015). The chapters progress through the various forms of rebalancing discourse: pervasive in the perspectives and language of key decision-makers and caused by real and perceived political, social, and economic inequalities. In Chapter Five the meaning of political rebalancing is explored in the context of perceptions and interpretations of the Nouméa Accord, citizenship, the special electoral bodies, and perception of the UN. Chapter Six outlines the function of common destiny, identity, and victimization in solving or creating a need for social rebalancing. Chapter Seven reveals the connections between economic rebalancing, economic projects, and perceptions of France. Party objectives, narratives, and types
of rebalancing do not exist independently of each other: rather, party objectives co-define each other and form narratives about rebalancing that constrain or promote particular outcomes for the referenda. In Chapter Eight, I evaluate how the various narratives of rebalancing influence the five options for New Caledonia after the referenda. The chapter begins with a summary of the 2014 Steering Committees findings on each option and each party’s platform on independence. The following sections briefly explore how party narratives might influence the options for the referenda. Special attention is paid to how the narratives might promote one outcome over another based on the way in which they are framed.

New Caledonia has the opportunity to create new domestic and international political structures that will shape its future and change how we think of multicultural governance. Unlike other multinational countries a strong political bloc represents the indigenous population in New Caledonia. This community finds itself in the unique situation of being able to shape the country as equal partners in self-determination. Social inequalities, colonial legacies of injustice, economic dependence on France, and a desire to build a country based on all of its inhabitants’ cultures further complicate the choices faced in the upcoming referenda. This research finds that a majority of politician’s goals will be best met through independent-association with France. The nationalists would be satisfied with full sovereignty and the loyalists appeased by an agreement with France ceding control over areas that New Caledonia needs time to better develop. However, as the following chapters will show, the narratives and goals promoted by these political parties stem from complex networks of supporting discourses about inequality, victimization, identity, common destiny, and rebalancing. As a group, politicians need to clarify the options available to New Caledonian voters in 2018 and how the political, social, and economic landscapes will be impacted by each option.
CHAPTER 2

GOVERNING PLURAL SOCIETIES

Models of Post-Colonial Dependent Governance

Baldacchino and Milne (2009) outline the benefits and methods of dependent relationships between mainland states and their island dependencies. In general, mainland-island arrangements consist of federal power sharing that gives the relationship structure and disproportional systems of governance that respond to the specific context and needs of each territory. Island territories are often small, have unique histories, colonial legacies, physical geographies, and economic capabilities that require different forms of governance depending on these variables. One mainland state may set up different options for its dependencies while still maintaining the overarching federal system of regulation and power sharing. Federal systems provide a sense of uniformity for mainland states that have multiple dependent relationships. Within these federal structures, states and islands can choose from a variety of context-driven political systems. This allows customary or non-Western forms of governance to be integrated with Western federalism. Unions, federations, and federacies offer several options for organizing the federal relationship between mainland and island central governments.
The primary difference between unions and federations is the level of power sharing. In federal systems, the central government shares power with subnational government bodies. In union structured political systems the central government has ultimate authority. Certain rights are delegated to constituent units who participate in the central government. The central government may devolve some or no autonomous rights to the subnational governments. In mainland-territory relationships this means that the mainland has ultimate authority to delegate as many or as few rights and privileges to its territories. In some situations, these central governments and their subnational units form constitutionally decentralized unions. Unlike other unions, some agglomerated subnational units are awarded a modicum of autonomy through a common constitution. While the subnational units have some self-determination, they are uniformly tied to the central government that has ultimate authority (Baldacchino and Milne 2009).

In direct contradiction to unions, federations involve greater power sharing between central and subnational governments (Baldacchino and Milne 2009). Citizens directly elect the central government and determine it’s sovereign powers, which are codified in a constitution. Federal systems are classified by the degree of autonomy subnational units can exercise. Confederations are more autonomous because they combine several pre-existing units to form a central government body based on a limited purpose. The motivation of the common government is dependent on the motivation and cooperation of each individual government. Typically confederations are led by representatives from each subnational unit of government. While these systems benefit from direct government participation they lack strong consensus and democratic characteristics because of their temporary nature and loose, goal-oriented, affiliation. Another type of federation is a federacy. Federacies, are more decentralized than federal systems and
more permanent than confederations. Subnational units are linked to a larger central government, but they retain considerable autonomy. Local subnational governments have a minimal role in the central government and the relationship can be dissolved only by mutual agreement. Associated states retain many of the same characteristics, but can be dissolved by either of the participants (Baldacchino and Milne 2009).

Despite the variation in methods of integration, the dependent system has proved beneficial for island populations’ political and economic development (Baldacchino 2004; 2010; Baldacchino and Hepburn 2011; Baldacchino and Milne 2009; Dunn 2011; Hintjens 1997; McElroy and Mahoney 2000; Trompf 1993). Increased opportunities in trade, mobility, investment, standard of living, infrastructure funding, association with the European Union, and the protection of local identity (Armstrong and Read 2000; Betermier 2004; McElroy and Sanborn 2005;) have been identified. Several studies have shown that dependencies have progressed further along the demographic transition and made more social advancements than independent former colonies (Baldacchino and Milne 2000; Connell 2001; McElroy and Sanborn 2005). However these benefits are limited to sub-national populations that are strongly incorporated into mainland political systems, like France’s overseas departments. In both situations, colonial legacies and the federal power-sharing systems born from decolonization have resulted in the formation of island states with plural and often marginalized societies, unequal power structures, and sometimes-inadequate representation within their federal mainland-island systems. Various forms of multicultural politics within these federal power-sharing systems have attempted to alleviate the negative legacies of colonialism.
Examples of Post-Colonial Dependent Governance

The transition from colonial empire to federated mainland-island system restructured the relationships between colonial states. After decolonization, many former colonizers viewed their island subsidiaries as strategically and geopolitically insignificant. Unlike larger mainland territories that had more resources for subsisting independently from their colonizers, island territories were more limited by their isolation and lack of marketable resources. Sharing sovereignty with a mainland state offers small island territories economic protection and security that would be difficult to achieve as an independent state (Baldacchino and Hepburn 2011).

“Indeed, a close look at the sequence of decolonization these past seven decades suggests that territories with larger populations—and their elites—were much more eager to struggle for, and achieve, independence. In fact, there is a clear correlation between population size and year of independence” (Baldacchino 2010, 192). By the late 20th century overseas dependencies were being formally incorporated into the political systems of former colonizers. When the UN affirmed self-determination was possible in patron-state and island relations, former colonizers began integrating some of their territories into new post-colonial relationships (Aldrich and Connell 1997; Ramos and Rivera 2001; Lampe 2001; McElroy and Sanborn 2005; Cohn 2003; McElroy and de Albuquerque 1996). However, colonial forms of administration and decolonization often resulted in multiple groups competing for political power and representation in these post-colonial federal systems. Multicultural competition made the transition to representative and inclusive self-government difficult.

After the initial wave of decolonization after WWII resulting in the formation of numerous independent states, views on the valid expression of autonomy began to shift. McElroy
and Sanborn (2005, 2) explain this shift in terms of four key variables:

“First, in some cases metropolitan policy either neglected the territories because of more pressing matters or was inconsistent and/or lacked the flexibility for devising innovative solutions (Aldrich and Connell, 1997). Second, with the demise of the cold war, the dependent islands lost much of their strategic geopolitical value (Ramos and Rivera, 2001). Third, particularly since the escalation of global terrorist attacks, metropolitan policy shifted away from status concerns toward enlisting the territories in the fight against drug traffic, money laundering and illegal migration (Lampe, 2001). Fourth, the metropolitan powers became increasingly willing ‘to respect the wishes of the electorate(s) of the dependent territories on constitutional matters’ (Hintjens, 1997: 536), and islanders by and large have repeatedly opted to retain colonial ties.”

If a shift in international norms allowed for the possibility of autonomy and self-determination in dependent relationships provided an outlet for islands that wanted to retain ties with their colonizers, then it also paved the way for colonizers to hold on to strategically and economically important distant island colonies. Colonies rich in natural resources, like New Caledonia, sustained an economic benefit for their mainland benefactors. Unlike large colonies that had a greater capacity for self-sufficiency, mainland states could barter military and other types of protection with islands in exchange for continued access to resources. Economic benefits for mainlands are not limited to natural resources. Islands serve as “tax havens” and “offshore finance centers” (Dunn 2011, 2134). They also expand a state’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (Baldacchino and Hepburn 2011). A mainland with a number of distant island territories can significantly increase their EEZ because of an island's geographic position, compared to continental territories that have limited or no coastline. Island territories give mainland states control over two hundred nautical miles of coastline surrounding the island. This grants the mainland rights to the marine and energy resources and fees from foreign vessels contained within or traveling through this area. Island territory EEZ’s exponentially increase a mainland state’s power and control over marine corridors. Rather than colonizing land area, states are
taking control of marine spaces. The largest EEZ’s in the world are the result of island territories, with the exception of Russia who possesses considerable continental coastline. The US is the largest, followed by France, Australia, Russia, the UK, and New Zealand. Unlike the US who’s EEZ consists primarily of a large bloc in the Pacific Ocean, France has the most geographically diverse EEZ that is only slightly smaller that the US’. Strategically, these distant spheres of influence also broaden a state’s military power. Financial and social support can be exchanged for land or the right to install military bases. The strategic and economic importance of overseas island territories has resulted in greater efforts by mainland states to retain control over these areas: much more so than large continental territories able to sustain themselves. Instead, island territories offer an opportunity for mainland states to benefit from their geographic location and resources and island receive the protection and aid that allows them to enjoy higher standards of living and greater stability. This reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationship was less likely to occur between former colonizers and large mainland colonies that are more able to become self-sufficient, despite the lure of natural resources.

Contemporary examples of mainland-island relationships exist in a variety of forms in Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and France. To balance the needs of multicultural populations these states incorporate flexible federal structures and context-driven disproportionate systems of representation and rights allocation (Baldacchino and Milne 2009). Local autonomy in island dependencies varies, but each island territory retains some level of representation in the mainland’s government. Mainland governments typically possess ultimate authority in areas of defense and security, foreign political and financial relations, and public services, allowing local representatives power over the remaining domestic issues (Clegg 2011; Baldacchino and Milne...
The political structures between the states and their overseas territories combine elements of constitutionally decentralized unions, federalism, federacy, and associated state systems.

Domestic politics in Greenland are characterized by what Gad (2013, 219) calls “postcolonial sovereignty games: linguistic games allowed by the concept of sovereignty, played on the way to the realization of independence. These domestic games structure the relations between three political priorities: legal self-government, economic self-sufficiency, and aboriginal cultural identity.” This vision of Greenland competes with Danes’ vision of a Danish nation-state. A strong indigenous push for increased autonomy in Greenland led to a referendum in 2008 (Nutall 2008). As a result, Greenland transitioned to greater self-government under Denmark in 2009. However, the island continues to fight for greater autonomy through economic independence. To decrease dependence on Danish aid, Greenland’s inhabitants increased domestic control over oil and natural gas production and fishing. As control over natural resource and fishing revenues continues to shift to Greenlanders, the hope is that aid from Denmark will decrease even though profits will be shared between Greenland and Denmark for some time. By increasing their direct connections with the European Union Greenland is bypassing Denmark economically and aiming for greater autonomy within this federacy system.

Dutch overseas territories in the Caribbean have proved to be a financial burden rather than a strategic interest for the Netherlands. The inhabitants of these island nations benefit from the financial support of the Netherlands and the ability to freely migrate to Europe. However, the Dutch consider them a drain on resources, question the efficacy of local governance in the wake of rampant crime, and are frustrated with the lack of migrant assimilation into European Dutch communities (Oostindie 2013). Provisions enacted by the UN and the Dutch constitution, prevent the Netherlands from forcibly severing ties with their overseas dependencies. Instead, territories
are controlled by the Dutch constitutional monarch who manages foreign affairs, defense, and ensures governance. Under this federacy system, the representative of the monarch and a democratically elected parliament have significant autonomy and power over domestic policies within these islands.

Both Portuguese and Spanish island territories are autonomous regions with degrees of self-government characteristic of other federacies (Suarez de Vivero 1995). Ceuta and Melilla are part of a federal relationship with Spain because they host their own governments and enjoy representation in the Spanish parliament (Ceuta 2013). While still part of the unitary Portuguese state, the Azores and Madeira have their own regional assembly that is democratically elected (Suarez de Vivero 1995). The regional governments are led by state-appointed ministers who appoint the president and remaining members of the regional government. The regional government is responsible for enacting legislation that directly affects the region and its population, but does not have any impact on the mainland state or international affairs. The geographic isolation and insularity of these regions is the reason for their autonomy. The Portuguese government hoped to promote local development by encouraging civic participation in these island’s governments – something that was much less likely if they were more directly governed by distant Portugal. “The tendency to deepen their political autonomy, emphasizing the maritime dimension of their territory, results in greater claims for competences to manage the ocean, as well as in the emergence of tensions between central government and regional government” (Suarez de Vivero 1995, 47). Portugal’s hope is that increased economic autonomy will simultaneously promote and create a greater sense of regionalism and nationalism that will in turn foster greater autonomy within these islands.

The relationship between the UK and its overseas territories is characterized by
“symbiotic sovereignties” or a constitutionally decentralized union political structure where two different political authorities govern one place (Palan 2013, 102). Political relations between the UK and its Caribbean territories are defined by the West Indies Act of 1962 and the Anguilla Act of 1980 (Clegg 2011). Each territory has its own constitution outlining the jurisdiction and powers of the mainland UK (in areas of defense, external affairs, internal security and the police, external financial relations and the public service) and the local non-self-governing government (internal policy). Those territories that have not been subject to other colonizers, like Montserrat, the British Virgin Islands, and Bermuda, have greater political autonomy. Many of these small island nations owe their success to semi-sovereignty. Continued dependence on the UK provides a foundation of financial and political stability upon which these islands have developed profitable finance-based economies (Palan 2013). While independence movements have arisen, economic dependence on UK aid, recurring natural disasters, and political corruption have hindered independence movements in the British Caribbean (Clegg 2011).

Australian overseas territories have varying self-governance under a federation type system. The least autonomous are the non-self-governing territories of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands. The executive branch of the local government is controlled by an administrator appointed by the governor general of Australia (who is also jointly appointed by the British Monarch and Australian Prime Minister) (Mowbray 1997). Local elections are held to determine the representatives of the local government: the legislative council. The council, in turn, is subject to the state and federal governments of Australia. Increasingly integrated with the Australian political system, in 2010 Norfolk Island adopted commonwealth administrative laws in exchange for financial benefits (Norfolk 2014). With mixed responses from the public, the government of Norfolk retains some autonomy and local power, but has become more integrated
with the Australian central government. Similar commonwealth laws were also adopted on Christmas Island that is currently governed by an appointed administrator and a locally elected council (Christmas 2014).

Within the realm of greater New Zealand, the Cook Islands and Niue adopted a free association agreement with the government of New Zealand (Fraenkel 2012). Both territories are self-governing with New Zealand citizenship, shared rights, and aid. The Cook Islands are administered by an elected parliament and a customary council. The parliamentary democracy of Niue is composed of a Cabinet (Premier and three ministers) and a legislative assembly. Each atoll of Tokelau has an elected leader and village mayors that compose the village council. In addition to the village councils, there is a territorial assembly or national legislature. The executive branch or Council for the Ongoing Government of Tokelau includes a leader (leaders from each of the local governments rotate this position), three village leaders, two village mayors, and a representative from the national legislature council (Fraenkel 2012).

Part of the drive to increase the US presence in the Pacific stems from the Japanese military strike in Hawaii and the Pacific theatre during WWII (Crocombe 1995). The relationship between the United States and its federally administered territories can be organized in three relatively distinct categories: former territories that are independent but exchange aid for hosting US military bases, commonwealth states with limited representation in the federal government, and unincorporated territories directly administered by the US federal government (Background 2013). American Samoa is a mostly self-governing presidential representative democracy. The US President is the ultimate head of state, but the domestic governor and legislative bodies conduct most administrative affairs. Legislators are elected according to traditional Samoan customs through local councils. Not all of the terms in the US Constitution apply to the
population because American Samoa is an unincorporated territory. Without an organic act from Congress detailing the relationship between the domestic and federal government, the territory is also considered unorganized (American Samoa 2015). The US Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto Rico are unincorporated, but organized. Their domestic governments include a Governor, legislature, and an elected US Congressional representative. In 1993 the US Virgin Islands held a referendum to gain a sense of the populations’ stance on the future of the country. Of the seven options (statehood, incorporation, free association, full sovereignty, commonwealth status, compact of federal relations, and maintaining the status quo) the population voted for “Enhanced Territorial Status with the United States” but a lack of voters left the issue unresolved (The United States 2015). Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico are commonwealth states within the US (Guam 2015). A federacy, Puerto Rico controls domestic affairs while the US federal government controls its international relations and external powers (Puerto Rico 2006). Unlike American Samoa, a formal agreement between the federal government and the local government exists. The US constitution, with a few exceptions has been implemented (The Commonwealth 2015).

The mainland-island political systems implemented by these states have had varying levels of success. However, they should be considered part of a larger ongoing debate over systems of good governance for plural societies. The examples outlined here incorporate federal structures characterized by some degree of local autonomy. Mainland island relationships in the US and New Zealand nest customary governance and practices in more democratic and elected political systems. The US and Australian commonwealth systems give island inhabitants more rights in the mainland government. In each situation the territory typically depends on the mainland for external power relations and guidance while domestic politics are determined
internally rather than by appointed mainland officials. There are some exceptions in Portuguese
and Australian territories, but these tend to be islands with very small populations. The legacies
of two of the largest colonizers, France and Britain, have cultivated vastly different political
climes in their former colonies. “Whereas successor regimes to the British crown have used
their juridical independence to pursue a wide array of postco-lonial structures and policies,
polities and nations decolonized by the French Republic have retained a comparatively formal-
istic, top-down, and centralized approach to governance and state-society relations” (Miles 2014, 9).
While the British colonial enterprise pravedledged a mercantilist system, French colonization
was based on “cultural transformation” and “assimilation” (Miles 2014, 9). Although both
colonizers implemented race-based policies and privileged colonies with European settlers,
France’s assimilation paradigm sought to subsume and destroy local cultures deemed savage and
lesser compared to the unified French ideal (Miles 2014). Today, remnants of these paradigms
linger in British and French administration of island territories. In particular, France’s efforts to
retain control of overseas collectives, by granting special rights and privileges, are part of a
greater geopolitical project to promote a unified Republic.

**Post-Colonial Relations and the Integration of French Overseas Dependencies**

During decolonization, the French state found it unrealistic to continue colonial practices
promoting metropolitan citizenship and assimilation, while legally incorporating larger territories
(Strang 1994). Although France is moving towards a more decentralized federacy model where
federal authority is imposed only in special circumstances, the concept of an indivisible French
state remains a strong part of governing rhetoric (De Jong 2005). According to the 1958
Constitution, overseas departments (DOMs) and territories (TOMs) have authority over local
administration, while still remaining a part of the Republic. French dependencies include federally administered DOMs equivalent to their metropolitan counterparts and TOMs that have different levels of autonomy (Corbin 2011; Daniel 2005).

The French colonial empire was a centralized bureaucracy designed to encourage a unified French empire (Strang 1994). Ironically, this unification ideal and the tenets of the French Revolution only applied to a select community within the French mainland population. Elsewhere in France’s overseas colonies, segregation, forced labor, and inequality were rampant. In New Caledonia, segregation policies were based on a sense of racial superiority and perceptions of indigenous savagery and naïveté (Chappell 2010). It should be noted, that the use of racialized discourse to define and maintain political and economic institutions is not unique to French colonialism. However only the French case will be examined in detail here as it directly resulted in ethnic violence in New Caledonia and the agreements that would eventually lead to a decision on sovereignty in which the marginalized indigenous people could participate. In conjunction with the indigénat policies, the French practiced “association” (Hargreaves 1967, 134–143). Under association, the French government perpetuated a lack of education among indigenous people by refusing to spend money on educating its overseas subjects. This resulted in highly segregated and marginalized indigenous populations with few managing to become educated or migrate to Europe. Definitions of the French people have subtly changed over the last two hundred years as the French Republic itself becomes more decentralized. After the French revolution, the French people were a unified community that was expanded after WWII to include members of the overseas French population (Palayret 2004). Despite ongoing racism and marginalization, the inclusion of overseas members signified a return to one of the ideals of the revolution: equality. As a result overseas populations were awarded the right to self-
determination in the mid-1900s, but remained a part of the French universal identity. Constitutional revisions in 2004 increased political decentralization by offering greater local autonomy within its overseas collectives. While the state remained unified and indivisible, decentralization and increased autonomy in DOMs and TOMs have raised new questions about the definition of a French people (Palayret 2004).

France currently maintains five DOMs: Martinique, Mayotte, French Guiana, Reunion, and Guadeloupe. Each of these regions is presided over by a French appointed prefect, elect representatives to French legislative bodies, and have French citizenship (Kelly 2003). The departments also elect representatives to local General and Regional Councils. The remaining French holdings form a series of overseas collectivities and territories. French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and New Caledonia are administered by a French appointed prefect, chief administrator, or high commissioner and elect representatives to the French legislature. In Saint-Pierre and Miquelon the Prefect governs in conjunction with the Privy and General Councils. French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Saint Martin, and Saint Barthélemy have local presidents, legislative bodies, and supporting councils. Wallis and Futuna are governed by a French appointed chief minister who oversees the Territorial Council (including three kings from each of the local kingdoms and three others appointed by the minister) and the elected Territorial Assembly (Kelly 2003).

Despite the introduction of local governments, minority rights are still a prominent issue in France’s overseas collectives. Minority rights are the right to self-determination of personal identity distinct from assimilation (Palayret 2004). France has a poor track record with minority rights. Historically, the French state forced its overseas population to conform to an imagined cohesive French people regardless of local diversity (Strang 1994). It is no surprise that
marginalized groups like indigenous people rejected these assimilationist policies that undermined their distinct autonomy (Murphy 2008). It was not until widespread disputes in the 1960s and 1970s that the Republic began to acknowledge diversity and minority rights and move towards decentralization and local autonomy (Clegg 2011). The push for decentralization is also part of a strategy to prevent independence by offering pro-independence parties greater domestic autonomy (Baldacchino and Hepburn 2011; Hintjens 1997).

Citizenship, and who has the right to it, is a critical part of the debate and definition of the French people. For the French it was a way to assimilate its colonial populations. Access to citizenship was a racialized process, (although they claimed it was not) based on education, property ownership, or public service designed to make colonized populations feel included. In granting colonized populations citizenship, the goal was to “make colonial peoples more French, not less” (Thomas 2014, 67). While France tried to assimilate its overseas populations through citizenship and a sense of national unity, the UK redefined citizenship in the British Nationality Act of 1981. The British Nationality Act of 1981 created three groups of citizens in an effort to control immigration and restrict movement from former and current territories (Blake 1982; Hintjens 1997).

While more federally oriented British dependencies have British dependent territory citizenship, French and Dutch federacy-dependencies possess full citizenship (Hintjens 1997). Historically assimilatory strategies designed to create a unified citizenry resulted in a push in the opposite direction – towards the formation of ethnic nationalisms and ethnicity based political claims (Banting and Kymlicka 2004). The subtle transformation of the definition and application of French citizenship parallels the government’s acknowledgement of indigenous rights and cultural diversity (Palayret 2004). In New Caledonia, one of the most prominent changes brought
about by devolution was the acceptance of a future New Caledonian citizenship separate from a French citizenship under the Nouméa Accord in 1998.

Former colonized indigenous people that still remain under French sovereignty include: “the Amerindians of Guyana, the Mahoris of Mayotte, the Kanaks of New Caledonia, and Pacific islanders in Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia” (Trepied 2012, 2). After WWII, the indigenous populations of Mayotte, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna were given special status independent of the French Civil Code. This changed after Mayotte became a DOM and New Caledonia implemented customary law under the Nouméa Accord. The status quo has remained in Wallis and Futuna leading to a massive outmigration to the neighboring New Caledonia where indigenous people are recognized under common law. Today, French policy towards overseas indigenous populations is congruent with minority rights policy. Examples of concessions made by the Republic include: land reform, formation of a recognized indigenous identity, the integration of customary political practices, and a multicultural justice system (Palayret 2004). While significant strides have been made in recognizing indigenous rights, these minority rights are limited to indigenous populations because the French state fears other minorities will demand special rights that would disrupt notions of a universal French people (Palayret 2004; Barelli 2011).

IMPLEMENTING SELF-DETERMINATION AND MODELS OF ADMINISTRATION

Definitions of self-determination fluctuate with international human rights discourses, territorial power, and cultural diversity. During decolonization, self-determination was exclusively defined as the right to independence (Barelli 2011). More recently, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People expanded the right to self-determination to all minority groups, but limited the option for independence indigenous people affected by colonialism and who were geographically distant from their colonizers (Wiessner 2011; Kowal 2008; Berg 2009; Niezen 2003; Palayret 2004; Weller 2009; Kolvurova 2010). Self-determination can manifest in a variety of ways: through forms of recognition, control over land and territorial integrity, control over resources and livelihood, justice, recognition of human rights and punishment of rights violations, and the opportunity to freely express cultural diversity (Kolvurova 2010; Weller 2009; Berg 2009; Knight 1982; Barelli 2011; Niezen 2003). In practice, self-determination failed to be implemented in many places during decolonization. As a result, new geopolitical representations that undermined the state needed to be created in an effort to disrupt the notion of a unitary nation-state that abhors local autonomy or that Western political institutions should integrate customary or other forms of local governance (Lacoste 1993; Wesley-Smith 2007).

Self-determination movements are defined by the sources of claims and potential outcomes. Halperin, Schefer, and Small (1992) identify six types of self-determination movements: anti-colonial, sub-state, trans-state, self-determination of dispersed people, indigenous, and representative. Anti-colonial self-determination is the pursuit of greater autonomy from a colonial power. Sub-state self-determination is when a sub-national group within a state seeks greater autonomy: often resulting in greater power sharing or federalism. Trans-state self-determination is when a nation without a state seeks to create an independent state from more than one existing state or will pursue greater autonomy within those existing states. The opposite, self-determination for dispersed people can be mitigated through representation and democratic governance. Indigenous self-determination covers a wide range of
possible outcomes, but all include the desire for self-determination by groups with a distinct ethnicity and historical claims to pre-colonial or pre-invasion territories. Furthermore, internal self-determination might occur when an existing population seeks to create a more representative political system through multicultural integration or minority rights (Halperin, Schefer, and Small 1992).

Implementing Self-determination through Multicultural Integration and Minority Rights

Multiculturalism can inform policy at a variety of levels or act as a theoretical basis for governing systems. It promotes cultural diversity by fostering recognition and tolerance of cultural differences through the allocation of citizens’ rights (Kowal 2008; Johnson 2008; Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1994). Policies might include identifying and protecting cultural difference through freedom of individual choice and action, equality, promoting a universal sense of morality, and good governance (Kowal 2008). The connection between a community and its members is an important consideration in multiculturalism. Policies targeting individuals may ignore the need for collective rights (Johnson 2008). Banting and Kymlicka (2004) argue that multicultural policies do not need to promote either the individual or collective rights. Instead of focusing on assimilation or exclusion to create unified nation-states, governments should ensure that all actors have equal access to the state and that this access is not based on their own personal identity. Equal access to government institutions is possible through market-oriented approaches that promote multicultural cooperation via economic interconnection (Kukathas 2003). The goals of multiculturalism can also be realized through the establishment of institutions sensitive to the claims of all individual citizens (Cohen 1997; Dryzek 2000; Gutmann and Thompson 1996). This would require the implementation of minority rights that
simultaneously protect sub-national groups that do not alienate majority populations. Other models advocate including distinct groups in the decision-making processes and political systems that promote equal representation (Benhabib 2002; Fraser 1997; Young 1990; 2000). For Smooha (2002) it is possible to recognize ethnic affiliations without embedding them in the political system through multicultural democracies.

According to Banting and Kymlicka (2004) there are two primary forms of multiculturalism oriented around alternative definitions of group identity. Liberal multiculturalism acknowledges the desire to expand democratic multicultural politics while mediating fears of destabilizing ethnic politics. For indigenous groups, LM includes the:

“(1) recognition of land rights/titles, (2) recognition of self-government rights, (3) upholding historic treaties or signing new ones, (4) recognition of cultural rights, (5) recognition of customary law, (6) guarantees of representation/consultation in the central government, (7) constitutional or legislative affirmation of the distinct status of indigenous peoples, (8) support/ratification for international instruments on indigenous rights, and (9) affirmative action for the members of indigenous communities” (Banting and Kymlicka 2004, 248).

By providing sub-state national groups a form of quasi-sovereignty and contemporaneous equality within the state system, liberal multiculturalism legitimates institutions and policies in favor of diversity (Galston 2004; Larmore 1996; Rawls 2005). Commutarian multiculturalism interprets multicultural claims more selectively by imposing cultural identifiers on group membership (Banting and Kymlicka 2004). Commutarians argue that defining specific cultural practices as authentic makes it easier to protect those practices and groups. This approach assumes that authentic cultural identifiers can be identified and agreed upon. Multicultural policies that promote equality in diversity through citizens’ rights can be implemented through a variety of democratic systems and federal power structures.
Implementing Self-determination through Democratic and Federal Systems

Democratic political systems and federalist structures promote varying degrees of cultural collusion and cooperation. Although direct democracies are ideal for public participation and equal representation, the implementation of this type of democracy is impractical at a large national scale. Power structures conducive to multicultural governance also exist within parliamentary, presidential, and constitutional democratic systems. Although parliamentary democracies are considered more conducive to minority rights and voter participation, the debate over presidential and parliamentary systems is ongoing (Schmidt 2002; Lijphart 1992; Linz 1990a; 1990b). Numerous participatory and power-sharing models enacted at local and national scales have been applied to multicultural governance (Fraenkel 2006; Berg 2009). Negotiation democracies like consociational, consensus, partly majoritarian, and partly non-majoritarian systems limit decision-maker’s power, incorporate proportional representation, group autonomy, minority veto power, and advocate for the integration of opponents or increased competition (Scharpf 1993; Consociationalism: Lijphart 2004; 1991a; 1991b; 1991c; non-majoritarian democracy: Schmidt 2002).

Participatory and power-sharing models enacted at local and national scales have also been used to govern diverse populations (Fraenkel 2006; Berg 2009). The consociational model integrates “proportional representation, mandatory power sharing, group autonomy, and minority (or mutual) vetoes” (Fraenkel 2006, 318). The aim of this collective representation model is to make the government more responsive to minority concerns. It offers an alternative to secession and forces majority groups to allow minority groups to actively participate in governance (Nimni 2009). Indigenous groups have been successful in implementing favorable laws and policies, but the issues associated with multi-party electoral and federal systems remain. Subnational groups
like indigenous peoples still find it difficult to gain adequate representation and balance local autonomy with national unity (McLeay 1980; Knight 1982). Lustick et al. (2004, 223) find that power sharing is a long-term solution that more often results in “broader and noisier mobilizations but substantially lower threats of secessionism” while repression works in the short term but results in greater long-term threats of secession. The key, here, is undermining independence movements by equalizing minority and majority group power through disproportionate representation in various governing bodies and institutions. It is a balancing act.

Consociationalism combines conflict management through cooperation and agreement among elites (that represent each faction) and “segmented pluralism” or societal divisions (Lijphart 1977, 5). The goal of consociationalism is to make the government more responsive to minority concerns (Nimni 2009). For Lijphart (1977, 25) this form of governance includes: (1) “a grand coalition” of political leaders from the most significant segments of the plural society, (2) “the [right] to mutual veto or ‘concurrent majority rule’” – giving minority groups the right to veto or have a greater say on issues directly related to them, (3) a “proportional system of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds” (compared to the winner-take-all system), and (4) “a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs.” Smooha (2002) added that recognition and equality are critical components for the success of consociational political systems. Prior traditions of coalescent decision-making and segmented autonomy, strong ethnic loyalties and weak nationalism, some national feeling at the elite and mass levels, cooperation at the elite level resulting from similar interests, background, and outlook make states in the Third World pre-disposed to consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977). However, colonial indirect rule and other forms of colonial governance that resulted in a high degree of community isolation have left a legacy unfavorable
to consociationalism because communities have no basis for working together. In many cases, colonizers forced segments or communities to compete with each other for power or resources that directly contradicts the ideals of consociationalism. Therefore Reilly (2001) argued that within consociationalism minorities must define themselves into ethnic-based political parties to achieve some element of cooperation in an electoral system. In Belgium, this system takes the form of regional federalism and autonomy dominated by the majority ethnic factions in each region (Bieber 1999). Members of the government bodies are equally split between Flemish and French Belgians (Schneckener 2002). Consociational systems assume that ethnic cleavages will never lead to unification and therefore creates a system of representation that makes little effort to overcome these divisions (White 2007). Ethnic divisions are considered an easy method for dividing representation and regional jurisdictions (McGrattan 2014). For the Northern Ireland case, however, political leaders are found to have more divisive viewpoint than citizens who overcome ethnic boundaries everyday (McGrattan 2014).

Critics of consociationalism are skeptical of the possibility for success if accommodation is centered on the political elite. Covell (1981) in particular questions the long-term implementation of consociational systems in ethnically divisive states like Belgium. For consociationalism to be successful, elites and the political system must reject majority domination: an unlikely occurrence (Horowitz 2014). An alternative method of accommodation involves bargaining theories that emphasize the context of accommodation measures and issues being discussed. Context is addressed by acknowledging elite collusion in creating or exacerbating conflict as a political strategy in negotiation, “intra-elite conflict” within ethnic factions, the links between issues being bargained, and acknowledging that bargaining over one issue is part of a broader system of negotiation (Covell 1981, 215). Another option is centripetal
systems are designed to break down ethnicity and use electoral incentives to encourage cooperation and accommodation based on civic rather than ethnic nationalism (Horowitz 2014).

Beyond the scope of democracy, federalist power structures are essentially a form of politically and geographically segmented consociational government. Segment divisions are based on population concentrations or regional divisions that would create a natural climate for federalist authority (Lijphart 1977). Multinational federations include national minorities that are tied to the state through internal boundaries, but maintain a level of territorial autonomy (Dieckhoff 2004). Powers are distributed to sub-national units so that each group remains a distinct self-governing cultural group. Federal power structures, consociational models, and democratic political systems offer various forms of local autonomy and minority groups inclusion. However, multicultural governance can also occur at the sub-state level or within specific institutions and policies.

Since many sub-national groups are reliant on their central governments for necessary financial aid and other resources they are unable to consider independence. Relational models of self-determination play a critical role in creating fair and equal systems of governance within these federal sub-state political systems. Relational models emphasize the importance of access to political power and institutional involvement from a variety of levels (Murphy 2008). This process, Murphy argued, can only be achieved through an electoral political system. Electoral systems encourage cooperation and inclusion by promoting centrist political parties and multi-party coalitions to gain broad support from an electorate. Offering institutional motivation for politicians to seek electoral support from disparate groups can result in a moderating, cooperation-inducing political climate (Reilly 2001). Proportional election systems can also achieve plural representation by producing multi-party systems and coalitions with an executive-
legislative balance of power (Lijphart 2004). Alternative forms of electoral participation may include electoral law that distinguishes between an indigenous person voting as a citizen of their group rather than a citizen of their state (Murphy 2008). By encouraging cooperation, negotiation, and centrism, democracy can be re-defined as an ongoing practice in conflict management and resolution (Reilly 2001). Whether the electoral system is “plurality-majority”, “semi-proportional”, “proportional”, or “preferential”, providing the right to vote is itself a method of ensuring multicultural inclusion and equality for sub-state groups (Reilly 2001, 14).

The aim of these representative models is to better incorporate disparate and marginalized groups beyond the application of citizenship. Some argue this incorporation can only be achieved through ethnically defined electoral politics. Others advocate centripetal systems that reorient ethnic, cultural, or national affiliations, focusing those nationalisms on political processes like electoral systems of representation and civic nationalism that encourages minority groups to work together (Reilly 2001). Unfortunately centripetal systems integrated into liberal democracies may promote assimilation that results in a forced civic culture (Smooha 2002). A third option, “multicultural democracy,” incorporates “liberal and consociational democracy” and “recognizes ethnic differences but without making them official and without institutionalizing the essential mechanisms of consociationalism” (Smooha 2002, 425). Although indigenous groups have been successful in implementing favorable laws and policies, the issues associated with multi-party electoral and federal systems, including adequate representation and the simultaneous maintenance of local autonomy and national unity, remain prevalent (McLeay 1980; Knight 1982).
The Role of Identity and Nationalism in Self-Determination

Nationalism and national identity are critical variables in the formation of a group that seeks self-determination and can help sub-national groups gain collective bargaining rights or further alienate them from the national whole. National identity is variously defined as a cultural grouping, a political group with a shared culture and co-cultural leader (Hall 1993), a grouping of individuals based on common ethnicity, language, assumed blood ties, race, religion, region, and/or customs (Hobsbawm 1990; Kaplan 1994; Geertz 1963; Hechter and Levi 1979), a relational grouping defined by the presence of a distinct other (Triandafyllidou 1998; Herb and Kaplan 1999), a national consciousness represented by a shared language (Gellner 1964; Breuilly 1982), or a system of classification (Verdery 1993). In some instances, identity is linked to a particular territory or homeland (Smith 1989; Conversi 1995; Grosby 1995; Taylor 1996; Murphy 1996; Agnew and Brusa 1999; Knight 1982; Hakli 1994; Sack 1986; Kaiser 2002; Culcasi 2011; Kaplan 1994). Definitions of identity can be categorized according to whether they view identities as natural divisions (primordialist), tools of political elites (instrumentalist), constructed inventions (constructivist), a spontaneous reaction against the state (homeostatic), the cause of in-group and out-group border creation based on group interactions (transactionalist), or the result of the power of collective memory (ethnosymbolist) (Conversi 1995). In addition, they can align with combinations of these categories.

Consociational and centripetal systems are promoted as possible solutions to ethnically and culturally divided societies. Both systems acknowledge the strong ties of ethnic belonging and use those ties to incentivize cooperation among groups and balance minority and majority power. Before attempting to implement consociational, centripetal, or other forms of power-
sharing political systems it is essential to understand the context and background of the societal divisions, or collectives, in a country.

Collective identification, on the other hand, evokes powerful imagery of people who are in some respect(s) apparently similar to each other. People must have something intersubjectively significant in common – no matter how vague, apparently unimportant or apparently illusory – before we can talk about their membership of a collectivity. However, this similarity cannot be recognized without simultaneously evoking differentiation. Logically, inclusion entails exclusion, if only by default. To define the criteria for membership of any set of objects is, at the same time, also to create a boundary, everything beyond which does not belong (Jenkins 2008, 102).

Collective identities, as Triandafyllidou (1998), Herb and Kaplan (1999), Jenkins (2008), and others have concluded, are simultaneously both internally and externally defined by interactions. Jenkins (2008) cited Mann’s (1983) characterization of categories and classes to describe the different labels internally and externally created. Internally generated labels and collective identities are groups. Externally defined labels are categories. Categorization has power. Those who create categorizations create collectives that may be treated a certain way based on their categorization (Jenkins 2008). For example, a census may divide a population according to income and then allocate resources based on the size or distribution of low or high-income populations. In the case of self-determination, collective identity is a tool of self-interest. In light of this, Jenkins (2000) argued that collective identities must be problematized and deconstructed to ascertain the self-interests and agendas self-determination rhetoric hides.

Complex networks of competing loyalties often characterize identity, ethnicity, and nationalism in these societies. Furthermore, the way in which a group defines its national identity can reveal their goals and willingness to integrate or separate from an existing state system. Nationalism is the expression of national identity, the sentiment that drives the desire for recognition or self-determination, and is loyalty to one’s nation group or collective (Brown 2008;
Nationalism can be a belief in primacy (Hall 1993), the search for identity and recognition combined with loose civil attachments (Geertz 1963), a method for teaching patriotism (Kedouri 1960), a mobilizing ideology (Nairn 1977), a feeling of belonging (Triandafyllidou 1998), a classifying discourse (Verdery 1993), or an anti-colonial struggle (Young 1976; Chai 2008). It can be a centripetal or centrifugal force. Unification through a sense of national identity or civic nationalism can provide the collective identity that multiculturalism lacks (Brown 2008). Also called liberal nationalism (Miller 2000; Margalit and Raz 1990; Tamir 1993), civic nationalism promotes loyalty to the state rather than individual ethnic or sub-national groups. If loyalty to the state supersedes ethnic loyalty, intra-state conflict is less likely. However, the formation of civic nationalism usually involves the creation of a strong, privileged ethnic core that can result in a reactionary ethnic minorities and an upsurge of majority counter-nationalist sentiment (Brown 2008). In some cases, civic nationalism is defined as patriotism, where an individual’s loyalty is to their state rather than their nation or identity group (Connor 2004). In New Caledonia, the “common destiny” discourse mobilized to promote civic nationalism, act as federative values, but have not been successful at transcending divisions between ethnic communities (Carteron 2009). Therefore the imagined political community or civic nation is characteristic of a sovereign nation rather than a multinational state. As Smith (1989) described, sub-national groups may become active and assertive, identify with a particular homeland, and gain economic unity and determination that results in a successful push for rights and equal citizenship. However this process ultimately culminates in the incorporation or assimilation of the ethnic groups after legal rights are granted. Ultimately, civic nationalism fails to protect minority rights and can result in counter measures by sub-national groups.
Critical to the process of nation-building (and thus the incorporation of multicultural policy during and after this process) are the “ways in which nations sharing a belief in their cultural-historical distinctiveness and right to political autonomy construct senses of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ […] since nation-building ultimately requires a selective approach to history in the service of promoting a distinctive national ideology” and the creation of “imagined communities” (Murphy, 2002, 193-194). These cultural and historical differences between communities create boundaries that form “imaginative geographies” (Said 1978, 54). Dalby (1991, 7) describes the role of otherness as an implicit component of discourse: “it involves the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological, and a crucially political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference.” These geopolitical representations of the other are used to influence public opinion and decision-making (Lacoste 1993). However, the formation of the other identity or the consolidation of sub-national identities is also a crucial strategy for gaining recognition or autonomy. Through ethnonationalism, sub-national groups can form a definitive collective identity that promotes ethnic difference as a cause for autonomy from the state (Niezen 2003). Organizing individuals into particular groups and assigning them specific characteristics like “indigenous” or “citizens,” creates an imagined geography that gives the organizer significant power over the rights these groups receive. For example, indigenous movements in New Caledonia, Guyana, and French Polynesia focus on emphasizing the distinction or difference between indigenous people and French citizenry (Trepied 2012). As a result, indigenous groups in these countries have called for independence and the formation of a nation-state or the granting of special rights based on their status as indigenous peoples under the
mandate of UNDRIP.

Plural societies are societies divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into distinct sub-societies represented by their own political parties (Lijphart 2012). The prevalence of plural societies in the wake of, and because of, colonialism presents unique challenges for unifying a country. As previous studies have shown, federalism, democracy, electoral systems, and other forms and methods of representational governance are promoted as a means of mitigating societal divisions. Within the legislative realm, self-determination may take the form of systematic non-representation in the national government, the rights of indigenous peoples, indigenous peoples relying on treaties with states, autonomy for minorities, cultural self-determination, and economic self-determination (Clark and Williamson 1996). Indigenous sovereignty or self-determination from an internal context can include devolution or accommodation by incorporating elements of self-governance within existing state institutions, the right to determine, practice, and alter social organization, the right to be consulted on decisions directly related to indigenous people or their culture specifically, or through the collective right to participate in decision-making (Nimni 2009; Lenzerini 2006; Barker 2005; Klabbers 2006; Progress 2010; Barelli 2011). Other forms of self-determination are oriented around recognition and land rights: redefining territorial borders or place naming (Clark and Williamson 1996). Regardless of the system, sub-national groups are more likely to turn away from independence movements if they have access to multiple forms representation and participation that promote shared decision-making between dominant communities (Murphy 2008; Fraenkel and Grofman 2006). Multiculturalism and internal and external self-determination can be realized through democracy, federalism, electoral systems, citizenship, and the application of minority rights.
Implementing Self-Determination through Territorial Autonomy

Territoriality is a significant part of carrying out sovereignty or control over the physical and thus political, social, and economic landscapes. Sack (1986) maintains that territory is a social construct embedded in economic and political contexts. It can have a number of impacts on power relations between the state and sub-national groups serving as a force of domination or self-determination. For example, territoriality can lead to boundary construction, enforcement of access and movement through those boundaries, create impersonal relationships by classifying space, and build or strengthen the ties between territory and the activities that take place within it (Sack 1986). One type of territoriality is homeland construction. Sub-national groups may define a homeland in an effort to create a distinct national identity or have greater control and self-determination through the occupation of, or connection to, a place. This tie is strengthened by the creation of a national identity based on a connection to a homeland – making the group indivisible from the physical location and legitimizing their right to inhabit it.

Control over territory is one strategy for gaining autonomy or sovereignty for sub-national and indigenous groups. In some cases this process is accomplished through the formation of a homeland. This territorialization of identity occurs through small-scale homeland construction. “Place serves as a constantly re-energized repository of socially and politically relevant traditions and identity which serves to mediate between the everyday lives of individuals […] and the national and supra-national institutions which constrain and enable those lives” (Agnew and Duncan 1989, 7). According to Kaiser (2002) homelands are created through localized place attachments, commemoration, maps, and symbolic national landscapes – essentially visibly and symbolically marking a group’s claim to a place. Homelands can also be created through occupation and control over a territory (Kaplan 1994). But these places are not
stagnant. They are subject to migration and population flows that complicate networks of interaction and community development (Diener 2007). These changes create fluctuating “imaginative geographies” and “sites of multiple belonging” (Said 1978, 54; Diener 2007, 461).

Whether framed in terms of homeland formation or political boundaries, for many, nationalism is intimately tied to the creation, maintenance, and control of territory. Nationalism is alternately defined as the process of border maintenance or creation; access to representation in state institutions; a territorial ideology; or a territorially defined imagined community (Conversi 1995; Grosby 1995; Agnew and Brusa 1999). Historically, identity politics in Europe have been tied to notions of space and territorial boundaries. The creation of nation-states ensured that national identity became synonymous with citizenship and well-bounded concept of territory (Mansbach and Rhodes 2007). It was not until post-WWII in Europe and in other parts of the world that these links were problematized. Colonial governments were faced with the problem of trying to unify distinctly multinational states or implementing a political system that would account for power sharing and force cooperation. The nation-state concept was not easily or successfully mapped on to these multinational landscapes because of strong competing identities and tribal groups.

Mikesell and Murphy (1991) combine the territorial and non-territorial aspects of nationalism and self-determination. Combining non-territorial factors like recognition, access, and participation (RAP) with territorial components like separation, autonomy, or independence (SAI) result in different forms of political systems. These factors frame sub-national goals, policy demands and ultimately political structures. States that are unwilling to cede territorial and total independence try to weave aspects of RAP/SAI into existing state systems. This may be useful for overseas dependencies, since they are an extension of the mainland state rather than a
disparate and completely autonomous population. In a relational model, it is critical to implement governing sites that effectively manage the relationships among self-governing populations living in networks of complex interdependence (Murphy 2008). At a macro level, Kymlicka (1995) concludes, self-government for minorities requires representation in intergovernmental organizations and reduced representation in federal institutions. Kymlicka (1995) is responding to the need for protection from the national government, but his argument ignores the need for even a modicum of power in order to achieve inclusion in international organizations. In addition, Murphy (2008) points out that Kymlicka’s (1995) argument does not solve the issues of interaction and cross-jurisdictional issues that indigenous and non-indigenous groups must deal with (i.e. transportation, resources, or environment).

INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS IN GLOBAL CONTEXT

Prior to WWII issues related to minority and indigenous groups were considered a domestic affair (Niezen 2003). Since WWII and the growth of the human rights movement more domestic issues of war and peace have become international concerns. The growing coalition of indigenous groups signified a new type of resistance. The transformation caused international organizations, like the United Nations, to implement a body of human rights policies and standards. Meanwhile, indigenous groups embedded in international networks have found visible and coordinated modes of lobbying on a global scale more effective than attempting change at a local scale within their countries. The push for independence among indigenous people in New Caledonia is unique compared to many other indigenous movements because of the political and demographic strength of the Kanak. In addition, some Kanak leaders have tapped into international support networks, brought the UN in as a counterweight to French power, and
pushed for closer ties with other international organizations in the South Pacific. In this way, the pro-independence Kanak have employed internal and external methods for achieving self-determination.

After WWII the concept of sovereignty underwent a significant transition. In this post-assimilationist period, sovereignty for indigenous people became the right to self-government, territorial integrity, and cultural autonomy. Indigenous groups were no longer viewed as a mere minority population “Refuting minority status was a refutation of the assimilationist ideologies that constructed indigenous peoples as ethnic minorities under the governing authority of the nation-state and a claim of the attributes of sovereignty customarily associated with nations” (Barker 2005, 18). “By taking on the self-definition of peoples with group and individual rights to self-determination, indigenous leaders were claiming a difference from minorities and a status akin to the status of nations” (Barker 2005, 19). This practice is largely due to the ongoing colonial legacies of exploitation and disempowerment under globalization. Sovereignty is historically contingent. Self-government is the right to determine, practice, and affect one’s own political institutions. For indigenous groups, self-determination means decolonizing paternalist political and social institutions and reformulate them to integrate customary practices. Indigenous groups are changing domestic and foreign affairs in their states by setting themselves up as capable of representing their own communities and able to self-govern in some areas.

Indigenous people have been defined “legally/analytically (the “other” definition), practically/strategically (the self-definition), and collectively (the global in-group definition)” (Niezen 2003, 19). Definitions typically include “descent from original inhabitants of a region prior to the arrival of settlers who have since become the dominant populations, maintenance of cultural differences, distinct from a dominant population; and political marginality resulting in
poverty, limited access to services, and an absence of protections against unwanted ‘development’” (Niezen 2003, 19). Indigenous people must be different enough that they warrant development attention, but not change too much if they want that attention to continue (Kowal 2008). Ethno-nationalism is nationalism based on a national identity defined by cultural characteristics and a desire for autonomy from the state. Unlike ethnonationalism, indigenism “is grounded in international networks” (Niezen 2003, 8). In the case of New Caledonia, pro-independence Kanak use both ethno-nationalism and indigenism to achieve their goals and frame their argument for independence.

Minorities are sometimes viewed as an impediment to the unity and prosperity of the dominant population (Niezen 2003). Perceptions and practices that result in greater competition for political recognition and power as a distinct society reinforce that discourse. For many indigenous movements the primary hindrance is competition over resources and “how to reconcile ‘competing’ indigenous claims with states for territory, resources, and cultural diversity” (Holder and Corntassel 2002, 141). Niezen (2003, 93) contended that the goal of indigenous people on a global scale was recognition of “human rights abuses under existing international law and the need to enshrine their rights to self-determination and ‘peoples’ in emerging human rights standards.” Carteron (2009) argued that the “living together” and “common destiny” discourses mobilized by different factions, act as a unifying force, but have not been able to transcend divisions between ethnic communities in New Caledonia. Other factors that can impact the influence of indigenous groups on governance are the type of electoral system, demographic strength of indigenous electorate, access to key legislative committees, the will of parties to include and facilitate indigenous interests, and the skill and determination of the representatives themselves (Murphy 2008).
From a legal standpoint, protection of indigenous people takes the form of ensuring cultural diversity (Wiessner 2011). Protection against legal and physical encroachment, protection of language, rituals, territory, and the development of media to encourage promotion of cultural heritage are particular aspects of this effort to protect indigenous cultures. While recognition and self-determination remains the goal of most indigenous groups, its interpretation differs greatly. For some, self-determination signifies control over land, resources, and livelihood (Niezen 2003). For example, Ecuador's Confederation of Ecuadorian Indigenous Nationalities has focused on the primacy of a pluri-national state and control over territory (Jameson 2011). For others it is a way to seek justice or an opportunity to freely express cultural and linguistic difference. Increasingly political resistance connects indigenous leaders with domestic and international law that provides legitimacy for local expressions of self-determination through laws and electoral practices (Niezen 2003). The existence of these laws and institutions recognizes indigenous groups as sovereign entities. A potentially marginalizing strategy of cultural preservation has also been implemented on a global scale. The internal and external definitions of indigenous groups formed for consumption by dominant society (as a means of lobbying) both constrain and enable indigenous groups. Indigenous worldviews maintain that citizenship takes place at multiple levels; “collective and individual rights are mutually interactive” (Holder and Corntassel 2002, 129). Group rights are indicative of struggles at the individual level that question the right of authority and collective governance.

From a global moral certainties perspective, the international movement for indigenous rights aims to: “(1) affirm local claims of difference using treaty rights, regional autonomy, and self-determination, (2) restore and reinforce ways of life (based on personal ties of kinship, friendship, and obligation) through the struggle for cultural and political recognition within
bureaucratic organizations, (3) use language and symbols from nation-states to clarify continuing claims of self-determination based on political integrity and autonomy of ancestors which preceded the formation or imposition of nation-states in and around ancestral territories, and (4) embrace a universal vision of human rights to protect and develop other sources of identity and power” (Niezen 2003, 215). Both the definition of nationality and the strength of identification affect attitudes towards minority rights (Pehrson et. al. 2011). When indigenous groups are viewed as the historical/cultural center of state identity or given equal rights there is greater support for indigenous rights.

While a number of constitutional reforms have been implemented in Latin America and elsewhere, numerous indigenous population continue to be marginalized. Scholars have argued that reforms are the product of elite placation, undercut more radical factions, and may arise from economic pressure on indigenous populations (Hale 2002; Brysk 2000; Yashar 1999). The superficial nature of these reforms may be the reason for their long-term failure. Indigenous movements have instead attempted to gain access to rights by creating “political imaginaries” (unification against a dominant elite), incorporating customary laws into justice systems, teaching “interculturality” or cross cultural understanding, and using identity creation and membership as means of arguing for distinct status or power (Jackson and Warren 2005, 548, 564). These efforts are not always successful, however. In Paraguay, indigenous people are framed as public enemies, in Guatemala indigenous movements are racially contextualized, and in Columbia indigenous peoples remain cut off from the more valuable traditional lands. Negative scripts caused by visible and violent indigenous insurgents have also hindered more moderate indigenous rights movements. Therefore, Jackson and Warren (2005) argue that successful indigenous movements combine cultural and historical revival with land rights and
local control over territory.
CHAPTER 3
HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR THE NEW CALEODNIAN CASE STUDY

COLONIAL HISTORY

An outpost for British and French missionaries, by 1853 the small island nation of New Caledonia was formally seized by France (Berman 2006). Congruent with colonial practices elsewhere; French policy subverted traditional notions of indigenous Kanak life and established a Western European model. The French colonial geopolitical program in New Caledonia incorporated assimilation, economic control, and minoritization through the mission civilisatrice and le code d’indigénat (Rumley 2006). The goal was to create an economically and politically powerful French settler majority that would undermine and control indigenous populations. Both the French State and the Catholic Church enforced legislation and other policies designed to subsume the traditional Kanak identity. Customary emphasis on land-clan relationships was destabilized through private property ownership, the formation of reservations, and the promotion of individualism (Leblic 1991). As a result, customary ties were broken down and the Kanak marginalized in a country they once dominated. At the same time a powerful French elite and landowning class arose. These factions and the tensions between them would form the basis of violence in the 1980s that would shape the political future of New Caledonia for decades.
Mission Civlisatrice

French colonial rhetoric justified intervention in its colonies through the mission civilisatrice. The goal of the civilizing mission was assimilate indigenous populations and incorporate them into the French state. France framed overseas indigenous populations as savages, whose social order needed to be civilized by ‘well-meaning’ western cultures (Bullard 2000). A central tenet of mission civilisatrice, the civilizing mission, was moralization.

Moralization was a paternalistic attempt to brainwash subjects, altering the identity of ‘savages.’ Torture was used to erase a person’s identity and then enforce a new set of values considered inherently true. For the Communards (penal colonists in New Caledonia) and the Kanak, this system endorsed gendered moral codes, patriarchal social structures, and the exclusion of women from political power.

Stage one of the civilizing process attempted to create a “dehumanized ‘savage’ population” (Bullard 1998, 321). France set out to civilize and moralize Communard political savages and Kanak indigenous savages in New Caledonia. Any person who would not assimilate or conform to French norms and values was considered a savage. Kanak rebellions strengthened the argument that this population of savages was incapable of self-government. Kanak attempts to preserve a non-submissive identity and their refusal to trade also “proved” their savage identity even while promoting a “resistant identity” (Bullard 2000, 65). The penal systems designed to civilize the Communards was extended outside the community boundaries to govern all aspects of social life and assimilate the population. The Kanak were portrayed as immoral and unable to exhibit true reason or humanity. The perceived moral inferiority of the Kanak was seen as the basis of their savagery. Perversity was a marker of their spirit’s degradation, their loss of contact with natural law, and their inability to recognize the truth of Christianity. The very
characteristics and traditions that made them Kanak and their inclination to fight the bonds of colonization were turned against them to justify greater and harsher control by the French administration.

In Kanak custom, the transfer of land is always in the form of a gift (Leblic 1991). When new groups or individuals would move to a new place the land, on which they would settle, was gifted to them by those who have lived there for a longer period of time. Not understanding Kanak land management strategies, Europeans believed indigenous peoples were poor land managers and began implementing European forms of land management, redistributed land to European settlers, and subsequently displaced Kanak populations. Kanaks were represented as “uncivilized” people who were unable to effectively utilize their land and thus undeserving of control over it (Berman 2006, 18). In stage two of the civilizing mission, displaced Kanaks were resettled on reserves where further migration was actively prevented and many were cut off from their homelands and source of identity (Leblic 1991). Implicated in the oppression of their own people, Kanak chiefs were paid a portion of the “head tax” that was required when a Kanak individual wanted to move outside a reservation (Berman 2006, 18). Clans and social networks were simultaneously disturbed or destroyed, preventing Kanaks from maintaining ties to their homeland or forming new ties in the reserves they were forced to move to. By the end of stage two, loyalty to one’s chief was viewed as disloyalty to the French state and a violation of the process of civilization (Bullard 1998). The French aimed to break customary ties and foment new ties to the French state through political and civic loyalty as in a nation-state system.

Stage three of the civilizing mission culminated in the French capturing and beheading Kanak leaders: symbolically and literally severing those uncivilized ties within the customary social structure (Bullard 1998). Equally important ties to traditional lands were also severed.
Because of their perceived savagery, the French felt justified in removing Kanaks from unproductive land and halting their immoral traditions (Bullard 2000). Land was confiscated from indigenous groups and people were moved to newly created reservations (Dornoy 1984). This process of “colonial collecting” and cutting indigenous ties to homelands deprived the Kanak of their culture (Bullard 1998, 323). French control over resources, including land, resulted in degradation of agricultural land, forced indigenous labor, and the importation of additional involuntary laborers from other French colonies (Rumley 2006).

In stage four of the civilizing mission, now submissive savages were prepared for progress (Bullard 1998). Kanak chiefs willing to assimilate became intermediaries imposed by French officials and served as local administrators (Dornoy 1984). The Kanak who married Europeans became part of a hybrid community and those that did not were increasingly marginalized and disciplined (Bullard 2000). The deconstruction of Kanak identity was not solely the colonial government’s purview. It was influenced and perpetuated by the Christian Church as well. Catholic and protestant missionaries repressed and annihilated many aspects of Kanak culture, implemented private land ownership and individualism and reinforced gender patriarchies (Berman 2006). Individual agriculture initiatives and private property destroyed customary ties to ancestral spirits and the land. Strict regulations on marital relations and the association of sex with sin served to regulate Kanak population growth. It was a population control strategy to prevent independence through electoral politics.

**Code de l’indigénat: legal framework**

Bridging the historical gap between the implementation of *mission civilisatrice* and the later policies of association, the *code de l’indigénat* was a legal framework that classified the
Kanak population as non-citizens with no political rights (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). This framework restricted their job prospects (creating a slave labor force), migration, and land ownership. In conjunction with the *code de l’indigénat* policies, the French practice of association prevented funding for local education (Hargreaves 1967). This created further segregation within the indigenous population and between the Melanesians and French who managed to achieve some form of education. Without an educated elite, there was little hope for an independence movement that could unite the now scattered and demoralized Kanak. “The educated Kanak was in effect trapped between the head and the body, as if in a noose camouflaged by the white hunter, choking, angry, rebellious, and ready to talk back eloquently to his captor” (Chappell 2010, 50). This system was highly effective in controlling indigenous people and provided a low cost labor source while maintaining divisions among the Kanak population itself. The *code de l’indigénat* was finally abolished in 1946, but its legacies and the tensions created by inequalities and degradations under French colonial administration would be the building blocks of revolt in the 1980s (Chappell 2013).

**EXPORTING THE FRENCH NATIONAL REVOLUTION: WWII**

Social Darwinism impacted Vichy France’s imperial episode just as it influenced the shift from assimilation to association. Social Darwinist determinism and a reductionist understanding of the other, as primitive societies and races, resulted in harsher forms of colonialism, directly and indirectly fueling indigenous nationalism, and contributing to decolonization (Jennings 2001). The policies exported in conjunction with the French National Revolution reinforced an already ruthless colonialism and introduced themes of authenticity, tradition, and folklore that promoted opposition to imperial France. Anti-colonial sentiment sparked by harsher policies
combined with a celebration and rejuvenation of traditional customs and culture sparked the emergence of a strong nationalist sentiment in a number of French colonies. These sentiments had various impacts on domestic independence movements in French colonies. Kanak educated in France during the 1960s and 1970s would be exposed to the results of anti-colonial movements and associated rhetoric sparked by the nationalist sentiment during the National Revolution.

Vichy ideology promoted national rebirth and authenticity while simultaneously rejecting the republican discourse and ushering in ultra-assimilation and departmentalization in the postwar era (Jennings 2001). Petainism was the ideological heart of the Vichy regime. Petainism allowed colonial administrators to strip indigenous rebels of their citizenship, relegate them to a subservient status, and rescind any liberalizing reforms. Officials created a landscape in which their own reductionist ideologies, folklore nostalgia, and language of particularism were turned against them. While simultaneously undertaking the restoration or reinvention of local tradition this reinvention of place created complex spaces of interaction and resistance. These spaces of resistance were fueled by the “imaginative power of nationalism” a core component of the National Revolution (Jennings 2001, 227). Vichy’s colonial project emphasized a return to and nostalgia for authentic French traditions. The exportation of these messages was ironic. Indigenous people identified with the desire to rediscover their own traditions to authenticate resistance to foreign domination, while the true goal of the National Revolution was to promote French identity and unity.

For colonizers the exportation of the National Revolution justified their “weltanschauung,” or global world-view: permitting inequality and exploitation (Jennings 2001, 30). For the colonized the National Revolution signified a move towards harsher colonialism and
catalyzed national liberation and independence movements. In the case of New Caledonia, the second emergence of nationalism occurred after WWII. Harsh restrictions on political and economic activity by De Gaulle were met with Kanak cultural resurgence and the formation of pro-Kanak political parties and French educated Kanak nationalist leaders.

POST-WWII POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN NEW CALEDONIA

The post-WWII political landscape in New Caledonia was characterized by increasing autonomy followed by a sharp return to increased French control. After WWII, the French government awarded French citizenship to the Kanak population (Leblic 1991). This was an attempt to further dissolve the indigenous Melanesian identity and replace it with a stronger tie to metropolitan France (Leblic 1991). Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz (2008) argue that in the European tradition citizenship is more neutral than nationality. France may have found it easier to try to prevent revolution by assigning indigenous Melanesians French citizenship, instead of attempting to successfully impose a sense of French national loyalty. Despite their status as citizens, Kanaks felt like servants of the Republic (Chappell 2010). As citizens of the greater French government, Kanak social structures (like chiefdoms and councils of elders) collapsed and became essentially meaningless in the new state system (Leblic 1991). “Deprived of signs and forms of identity, cut off from their collective roots, they become an individual among others, isolated from the market, [and] condemned to further exploitation or accelerated marginalization” (Leblic 1991, 1). These policies combined with the marginalization and systematic disintegration of Kanak identity resulted in much of the violence in the 1980s. Chappell (2013) offers a comprehensive and concise analysis of the rise of the Kanak nationalist movement and how it led to the violence of the 1980s.
Outnumbered by the indigenous population, and wanting to avoid being outvoted in a democratic system, the French state implemented a dual government in New Caledonia. The Melanesian population was divided between a tribal and special electorate and a civil European bloc. A General Council would preside over the European-Melanesian population and Melanesians were governed by a Kanak assembly. Shortly after, the General Council and Kanak assembly were combined into a single body. Although the Kanak population remained the majority, they received less General Council seats than the European population. This trend changed drastically with the rise of the multiracial Union Calédonienne (UC) political party. Formed by Lenormand and Pidjot, it comprised labor unionists, autonomists, and convict descendants against the clientalist oligarchy. Dramatically successful, UC won the majority of municipal elections in 1953 and Lenormand was elected president of the General Council. UC pursued socioeconomic planning to benefit all of society and create a shared Caledonian identity (Chappell 2013).

By 1956 the now socialist French government implemented the loi cadre giving overseas territories greater autonomy. Under this new legislation a French High Commissioner controlled defense, finance, foreign relations, public order, and international transportation. However, new domestic power was granted to a Governing Council containing six cabinet members led by a vice president and chosen by a Territorial Council elected through universal suffrage. This meant greater autonomy for the majority indigenous population, but greater marginalization of the now minority European population. Concerned with the perceived separatist leanings of the UC and the power of this multiracial organization, conservative members of the settler population in New Caledonia called for the Governing Council’s dissolution. By the end of June 1957 they succeeded. More concerned with control over nickel, de Gaulle accepted Conservative
allegations that the majority of the Territorial Assembly was illiterate Kanak. In preparation for the 1958 ratification of the new French constitution, the UC and conservative Caledonians alike chose to remain an overseas territory. The UC was promised a re-enforcement of the rights under the *loi cadre* and in return moved for proportional representation in the new Governing Council cabinet. Members of UC opposition refused to become part of the cabinet, resulting in a UC dominated Governing Council. Although they had refuted any separatist or independent motives, the Gaullist opposition and the new High Commissioner misinformed the French state claiming UC independent sentiments would lead to civil war. While High Commissioner Péchoux continued to undermine the *loi cadre*, Lenormand was imprisoned and then stripped of civil rights on charges of not attempting to prevent a crime (Chappell 2013).

With the enigmatic voice of the UC out of the way, and a large influx of immigrants from neighboring and African French territories, Melanesians were quickly being undermined. The perceived mismanagement of New Caledonia by UC resulted in the *loi Jacquinot* relegating the cabinet in the General Council to a purely consultative role. Seeking internal autonomy rather than outright independence, the UC retained a majority control of the Territorial Assembly in 1967. Consequently, the French National Assembly passed the Billotte laws in 1969 dividing New Caledonia into four departments each governed by a sub-prefect – essentially creating direct French control over New Caledonia. De Gaulle’s promises of autonomy in exchange for allegiance during WWII failed in the face of his desire for economic control and international power (Chappell 2013).

National prestige and false threats of internal violence were not the only reason for the resurgence of French control over New Caledonia. Valuable nickel was sold to Japan, exported to France, and accounted for 90% of the territory’s exports. Société le Nickel (SLN) controlled
the majority of mines and the only processing plant in the territory. By 1982 the French state purchased Banque Rothschild and thus held a controlling interest in SLN. Unskilled migrant workers from Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia competed with Melanesians for employment in the mines. Local oligarchs created smaller mining operations to feed SLN’s processing plant, Doniambo, located in the capital of Nouméa. The Vietnam War in 1965 led to an increase in nickel production and the expansion of SLN. The French state continued to subvert domestic attempts to negotiate with other nickel companies (like Canadian INCO) to ensure that New Caledonians would not think they could procure foreign investment on their own. In addition to economically and politically marginalizing the Kanak and in direct contradiction to UN Resolution 2621, France encouraged migration to New Caledonia to ostracize the indigenous population (Chappell 2013).

Greater opportunities for education in France resulted in both European and Melanesians attending University in France. The student revolutions taking place in France in May 1968 served to shape the ideologies of several important figures in the Melanesian nationalist movement. At the beginning, future independence leader Naisseline’s ideology was framed in terms of decolonization and socialism. Others, like the future leader of the Kanak socialist pro-independence party Tjibaou, promoted a cultural renaissance to overcome the effects of colonization. Naisseline and others would go on to form a group known as the Foulards Rouges (red scarves). The red scarves were students inspired by the anti-imperialist demonstrations in France and the work of Karl Marx. The release of an anti-French, anti-colonization tract resulted in the arrest of Naisseline and numerous other red scarves. The outcry from the arrest sparked a riot in September 1969. The UC reacted negatively to the demonstration and the Foulards Rouges: denouncing their actions and platform (Chappell 2013).
The anti-colonial struggle was fracturing in the late 1960s. Melanesians and Europeans working towards the same anti-colonial goals formed their own activist groups divided along ethnic lines. Although the conservative business elite was not explicitly anti-independence they were opposed to rule by Melanesians and political leftists. The Rassemblement Calédonien supported some aid to Melanesians, but quickly aligned with the Union des Démocrates pour la République and Henri Lafleur in support of the business elite. Soon after, Lafleur left to form the pro-decentralization, anti-independence Mouvement Libéral Calédonien. Also defecting from UC, Louis Kotra Uregeï formed the first indigenous party, called l’Union Multiraciaale de Nouvelle-Calédonie. In response to the fragmentation of independence parties and the decline of UC, Jacques Lafleur formed the Rassemblement pour la Calédonie (RPC). Its platform was based on multiracial loyalty to France and capitalist development. By 1978 the RPC had united with other Gaullist parties to form the pro-departmentalization Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la République (RPCR) (Chappell 2013).

Like the anti-independence parties, the pro-independence faction fragmented. Group 1878 began as an organization that called for the restoration of Melanesian lands or compensation for lands lost, nationalization of mines, redistribution of wealth and the confiscation of small businesses, and the establishment of a Kanak citizenship that could include non-Kanak. Group 1878 and several Foulards Rouges groups later formed the Parti de Libération Kanak (PALIKA) political party. PALIKA advocated for a Maoist interpretation of grassroots governance based on consulting with the people and politicizing their struggle. Their primary goals included returning Kanak lands, reintegrating traditional customary authorities, and creating a Kanak culture. As long as other ethnic groups in New Caledonia supported the idea of a Kanak socialist liberation, there was a place for them in the new state as well. Mining industries would also be nationalized.
and the revenues divided between tribal development and the central government (Chappell 2013).

In 1975 Premier Chirac told New Caledonian delegates they had a choice between departmentalization and independence. With this ultimatum, nationalists saw independence as the only means of escape from the French Republic. But, business elites were troubled by the possibility of marginalization and Kanak control over the domestic government if independence occurred. Leaders like Naisseline and Lenormand continued to argue that multicultural governance and the imposition of equality with respect for cultural diversity was the only way forward. The UC however, argued for total independence on the basis of first occupancy and victimization under colonialism. In the late 1970s tensions over land rights and pollution caused by mining increased and a number of protests and small-scale conflicts broke out. While New Caledonia was being supported by French taxpayers SLN was making billions from nickel. Then in the mid-1970s SLN asked for a 25-year tax exemption to expand the industry and build a processing plant in the Northern Province (Chappell 2013).

With the French government dominated by Mitterand’s socialist faction and the marginalization of Gaullist political parties in the legislature, the pro-independence coalition entered the 1980s with a glimmer of hope. In November 1984 the pro-independence parties (except LKS) formed a new coalition: Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS). Angered by Overseas Minister Dijoud’s attempted land reform the FLNKS factions became increasingly hostile. In 1978 Dijoud proposed a plan for land reform that would include ten years of development aid from France, job training and the incorporation of Kanak culture in education. At the last minute, however, he said that the plan required independence to be held off for ten years or the territorial assembly would be dissolved. His plan was passed much to the
anger of pro-independence parties. Land seizures, labor strikes, roadblocks, and other forms of protest by pro-independence factions resulted in counter measures by the settler population. The FLNKS essentially took control over a large portion of the state and created the Republic of Kanaky. Tensions were exacerbated by the expectation of a conservative shift in French politics in 1986 because the FLNKS felt it was running out of time (Chappell 2013).

The return to the political right in France in 1986 led to increased militarization and less tolerance against independence parties. Divisions within PALIKA over land reform divided the party. One faction promoted a classless society, greater distribution of wealth, and the nationalization of mining and agriculture. Naisseline’s faction argued for greater cooperation with other groups and promoted socialism rather than Marxism. This group would go on to form the Libération Kanak Socialist (LKS) party. The socialism of the UC and pro-independence faction more broadly promoted indigenous reciprocity and Christian sharing and compassion, but completely rejected colonialism (Chappell 2013).

Mitterand sent Edgard Pisani (a third world affairs specialist) to negotiate a more peaceful resolution to the imbalance in the Territorial Assembly and violence. Pisani asked FLNKS leaders to leave the meeting prior to negotiations. At an FLNKS meeting, Tjibaou asked militants to stand down so that negotiations could occur. When two of his brothers were returning to the Northern Province after this meeting they were gunned down at a settler roadblock. The event was considered another assassination attempt on Tjibaou. Despite confessions to the massacre, the settlers were freed and the ruling of self-defense held. Despite the potential for resolution between a centrist plan offered by Pisani and agreed to by Tjibaou, violence in the interior between militant FLNKS and settlers led to increasing instability (Chappell 2013). The situation was not helped by the eventual release of the settlers involved in the roadblock shooting.
By the end of 1985 Pisani had divided New Caledonia into four regions run by elected councils whose presidents answered to the high commissioner. A referendum would also be held in 1987 on the issue of self-determination. In the 1985 elections, the FLNKS gained control of three of the four regions (even though they did not gain a majority overall). With the return to conservative power in 1986 (under Chirac) the new Overseas Minister (Pons) planned to reduce regional powers and increase the power of the high commissioner. In response, the FLNKS coalition lobbied for the inclusion of New Caledonia in the UN Non-self-governing list. On an international scale this would necessitate a decision on independence at some point. As the 1987 referendum approached the military presence in New Caledonia (particularly in the rural bush) increased to 8,000 troops. The regions were condensed from four to three Provinces and the Southern Province expanded. Eligibility for the electorate who could vote on the 1987 referendum was set at three years residency and the choices were independence or incorporation. 98% voted to remain part of France, but 83% of Kanaks boycotted the vote. More violence between Kanak and police in 1987 and attempts to develop tribal lands resulted in a combined effort by Kanak militants to seize police weaponry and hostages to force negotiations before and during Presidential and Territorial Assembly elections. Violence between the FLNKS, settlers, and the police broke out (Chappell 2013).

The Events came to a pinnacle in Ouvea, a Loyalty Island, where Kanak seized a police station and took twenty-seven hostages. Their leader demanded the repeal of Pons’ statutes and the cancellation of the Territorial elections. Under pressure from political opponents, Chirac and Mitterand called for the military rescue of the hostages rather than continue negotiations. The military rescue resulted in the deaths of nineteen Kanak and the recovery of twenty-three hostages. The remaining Kanak, with those captured from a local village that had been
interrogated for information were sent to prisons in France (Chappell 2013).

At the same time political tensions were mounting, the Vietnam War created a nickel boom in New Caledonia (Henningham 1992). Demand for machines of war and the metals that create then led to a high demand for locally mined nickel. In an effort to maintain control of the region and its resources France encouraged European settlement as a means of marginalizing Melanesians. However, increasing European settlement did not undermine or water down over a century of domination fueled anti-colonial sentiments. Labor repression and drastic reductions in nickel prices following the end of the Vietnam War resulted in questions about the role of France and ongoing issues of inequality (Dornoy 1984). The violence of the 1980s was the result of renewed French political control fed by repealing the self-governing powers in an effort to better control the nickel industry from 1959 to 1969, massive French immigration (pushed by the state) to marginalize the indigenous population, and young French-educated New Caledonians were returning to a country they saw being recolonized by France (Chappell 2013). Polarization and segregation have been continuous themes throughout New Caledonian history. During the 1970s and 1980s polarization and segregation came in the form of divergent views regarding the goals of Kanak nationalists. Europeans viewed nationalists (indépendantistes in French) call for a “re-centering” of New Caledonia in the broader context of Oceania as a type of “reverse racism that would turn the colonial hierarchy upside down instead of as an invitation to build new kinds of alliances” (Chappell 2013, 4-5). Kanak nationalists sought the reclamation of their national identity and customary lands.

A rising wave of pro-independence rhetoric and anti-colonial violence culminated in the 1988 Matignon Accords (Berman2006). While Dornoy (1984) argues that this marked the advent of the Kanak nationalist movement, Rumley (2006) concludes that it is less about ethnic
resurgence and more about a reaction to French colonialism and repression. Influenced by black power movements in the 1960s and indigenous students returning from an education in metropolitan France, a new wave of nationalist movements began in the 1960s and 1970s (Henningham 1992). In response to growing unrest, France implemented a series of social and economic reforms that they hoped would draw attention away from nationalist concerns. They created institutions for land reform, economic development, and the protection of Kanak culture. France saw its colonies as a necessary means of showing their global power and in a show of strength they continued to subsidize European-level standards of living (Chappell 2013).

MATIGNON ACCORD: PEACE AFTER CIVIL WAR?

Despite granting French citizenship to Caledonians after WWII, promises of subsequent assimilation were not fulfilled; in large part due to the lack of educational and economic opportunities afforded Kanaks (Chappell 2010). Violence in the 1970s and 1980s was a result of continued marginalization within the nation, loss of land and identity, and unequal opportunity under French citizenship. In the 1980s there was a greater push for devolution from the left as opposed to the status quo assimilationist rhetoric promoted by the right (Muller 1991). In 1989, the goal of devolution and redirected focus on the regionalization of the TOMs in the South Pacific was to end the isolationism that had been entrenched through colonial rule (Muller 1991). Both factions of the French Republic, however, agreed that the introduction of technological advancements and urbanization would motivate the indigenous populations to refute their unique identity and become French. While the right continued to argue that TOMs were merely “feudalistic remnants not yet reconciled to the advent of a federal Europe” the left remained committed to political self-determination and regionalization (Muller 1991, 296).
Anti-colonial, pro-independence violence in 1988 and the re-election of French President Francois Mitterand eventually culminated in the Matignon Accord of 1988 (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). The aim of the Accord was to increase economic aid to indigenous Kanak regions, readjust the economic and social disparities between the indigenous and non-indigenous populations, return customary lands, increase Kanak participation in political systems, promote Kanak culture, create a Caledonian elite, and establish rural development programs (Horowitz 2004; Berman 2006). Tjibaou and Lafleur agreed to a new referendum (in ten years) with a more limited electorate (Chappell 2013). The country would be divided in three, albeit more autonomous, regions and 75% of aid would go to the poor more unequal northern and loyalty provinces. This key sharing or clé de répartition was an effort to rebalance the economic inequalities created by colonialism. France agreed to divide its aid unequally between the three provinces. French aid for the operating budget of each Province is divided into 50% for the South Province, 32% for the North Province, and 18% for the Loyalty Islands. The equipment allowance is divided into 40% for the Southern Province, 40% for the Northern Province, and 20% for the Loyalty Islands (Chauchat 2011). Paris would also directly administer New Caledonia for one year (Chappell 2013). The agreement was simultaneously an attempt by France to maintain control over its territory and gain indigenous complacency through modest devolution.

In addition to stabilizing the legislative branches in New Caledonia and the country’s autonomy, the Agreement established three Provinces (Province Nord, Province Sud and Province des îles Loyauté) with regional councils that would share powers on a territorial basis (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). The semantic use of province instead of region was deliberate. For the French, provinces are related to geography, culture, local people, and are
generally community based (Marrani 2006). In contrast, regions imply the largest level of local governance and are used to destroy local community. In terming the new regional divisions “provinces” the French were asserting the importance of maintaining a certain level of traditional culture and heritage in increasingly independent factions of New Caledonia. Whether this was a tactic used to mollify Kanaks incensed over colonial oppression or a legitimate acknowledgement of the significance of indigenous notions of the relationship between community, governance, national loyalty and identity is unclear.

This federal model enumerated Caledonian powers and left all unlisted powers under the purview of the Provinces (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). While, the state dealt with external relations of the territory, like immigration, the justice system, and the military, the territory was responsible for raising taxes and administering the local civil service (Marrani 2006). Each province was governed by a provincial assembly and chaired by a president. All three provincial assemblies together composed the national Congress that ruled on affairs of the state and is chaired by a President. In addition, Kanak chiefs formed a special ancillary council designed to account for Kanak interests and the High Commissioner remaining the Head of the Executive branch (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). It seemed as though this more decentralized model would better represent the Kanak people through the process of decolonization and provide a platform for independence, a new identity, and sense of nationalism tied to heritage and customary culture. Partial decentralization of power was aimed at showing Kanak people how to effectively govern at the local level and was part of the process of independence (Marrani 2006).

Government territorial arrangements can both encourage regional identities by partitioning the national space into units that have the ability to generate degrees of loyalty or
disloyalty or by promising devolution of power (Agnew 2001). Although codified in the French Constitution, the focus on consensus and common interest found in the Matignon Accords stems from more traditional Pacific culture (Brown 2013). The French government divided the country into three provinces to encourage local government and local alliances and they began to, at least they claimed to, hand over more power to these regional governments and indigenous inhabitants themselves. Agnew (2001) argues that after the agreements are made, the colonial government will often renege on its promises and subsequently provoke resentment from elements in regional populations. While the government did in fact implement the articles of the Matignon Agreement, they used other tactics, like dual citizenship and the economy to maintain a power imbalance between the French and indigenous populations.

Despite increased self-determination and greater Kanak participation in the political system, territorial-land disputes, issues over indigenous rights, and fear surrounding loss of identity continued. The signing of the Matignon Agreement and the pro-independence movement intensification also resulted in many Kanaks seeking to rediscover their traditional cultural identity (Horowitz 2004). According to Chappell (2010), cultural recognition is an essential component for independence. Remerging Kanak traditions and the desire by many to reestablish a unique Kanak identity seemed to grow parallel to the independence movement. So too did efforts at establishing a singularly Kanak sense of nationalism founded in a traditional spatial identity.

The Accord resulted in greater development aid in the poorer provinces and renewed talks between the FLNKS and the French state (Chappell 2013). The Consultative Customary council (now Customary Senate) was formed and enshrined the indigenous identity. The referendum provision in the Matignon Agreement signaled the agreement’s termination and a subsequent
vote on independence to be held in 1998. Before the expiration of the Matignon Agreement, a
new set of agreements was reached between the French government and the dominant political
parties in New Caledonia.

**THE NOUMEA ACCORD: FRAMING FUTURE POSSIBILITIES**

Nearly a decade after the Matignon Accord the governing elite of New Caledonia (FLNKS
and RPCR) and France would again agree to postpone the decision on independence. The 1998
Noumea Accord delegated greater autonomy to the New Caledonian government and agreed on a
referendum on independence after 2018 (Berman 2006). Parts of the Accord were later added to
the French Constitution. On November 1998, the Caledonian population ratified the Accord by
72% (Editors 2002). Subsequent French legislation (Editors 2002, 2): “1) created a shared
sovereignty and new relationship between France and New Caledonia, 2) called for a new
citizenship for New Caledonians, 3) called for elections in 1999 to replace the current Territorial
Congress, 4) began the irreversible transfer of administrative powers, 5) recognized indigenous
culture and identity, and 6) set up a fifteen to twenty year transition period preceding the
referendum on independence.”

The general structure of the domestic government was also revised. The new system
includes three provincial assemblies that elect their own regional president and from which
representatives are elected to the national congress for a term of five years. The national congress
includes thirty-two representatives from the Southern Provincial Assembly, fifteen from the
North, and seven from the Loyalty Islands. The eleven member executive government replaced
the French High Commissioner and proposes laws for the Congress’ consideration (Editor 2002).
The Accord established mechanisms to ensure the self-determination of New Caledonia and
argued for the UN approval of the French decolonization plan to ensure the successful and peaceful path to independence (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). The Accord sets up “a paradigm of constant negotiation and reinterpretation about the project of ‘decolonization’” allowing for a broad interpretation of the UN’s call for the return or reintegration of former colonies (Brown 2013, 172). The goal of the Agreement is the empowerment of the government and Congress through the gradual transfer of powers from France to New Caledonia (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). Furthermore, at any time after 2014, Congress would have the right to call for a referendum to vote on independence. The Noumea accord ensured that all powers, except for foreign policy, defense, law and order, justice, and currency, would be irrevocably transferred from Paris to Noumea (Brown 2013). While the organization of the political system from the state level to the territories, provinces and local communes was nothing new in New Caledonia, the power and responsibility granted to the different levels was (Marrani 2006). As more power shifted to local levels, more control of that power shifted from French New Caledonians to Kanaks.

First, in the Preamble, which the FLNKS attributes to Kanak members of the RPCR, France makes some surprising concessions: that its formal annexation of New Caledonia in 1853 did not constitute a legal agreement with the indigenous people; that the Kanak had their own valid civilization, which was marginalized and traumatized despite the progress colonization may have brought; that it is time to face up to "the shadows of the colonial period" and establish a new relationship with full recognition for Kanak customs and identity; that a New Caledonian citizenship should be created to allow the resident communities to pursue a common destiny; and that local voting rights should be limited to people of long-term residence. These ideas challenge the French claim to have decolonized in 1946 and legitimate a distinctly postcolonial Caledonian nationality, albeit a hybrid one still affiliated with France (Chappell 1999, 385).

For the Kanak specifically, the agreement resulted in the creation of a Customary Council and Customary Senate to oversee and approve Kanak identity-related issues (Palayret 2004). Kanak customary law and languages also had equal status with French civil law and language
(Chappell 1999). Customary norms of negotiation and consensus are again found in the context of the Noumea Accord (Brown 2013). Kanak leaders promoted independence as the culmination of the success of the Nouméa Accord and associated negotiations.

While some view the Noumea Agreement as a broad recognition of Kanak legitimacy and key to preserving Kanak identity, others consider the agreement a pretext for delaying independence while the Kanak population become a minority among European-Caledonian nationals (Carteron 2009). The Noumea Accord served as tool for indigenous leaders to protect the interests of indigenous people, even against the concept of a common destiny (Trepied 2012). Others have argued the Accords are merely an attempt by the French to re-colonize New Caledonia through targeted economic development or strategic bribery (Rumley 2006). The French state itself, presented its own stance as an arbiter, a neutral party that other groups and the international community could trust (Brown 2013). Like the Matignon Accords, much of the concessions in the Noumea Accords were designed to placate the Melanesian population. Examples include transferred ownership of nickel mines in the northern province to Kanak leaders, professional training for Melanesians, and the continued redistribution of customary lands (Connell 2003). The anti-independence leaders emphasized France’s willingness to negotiate for greater autonomy while still providing significant aid (Brown 2013). However, elite control over the nickel economy, international fluctuations in prices, overall dependence on this singular resource, and French aid has done little to alleviate widespread inequalities created by colonial and postcolonial practices. In addition, land redistribution had the unfortunate effect of solidifying a rural Melanesian poor (Connell 2003). This resulted in significant migration to the Southern Province and the periphery of Noumea in particular (McClellan 1999).

The outcome of the Nouméa Accord will be decided by the three referenda to be held in
2018, 2020, and 2022. Loizides (2014) contends that referenda are met with mixed results in post-conflict and ethnically divided communities. “Successful referenda in South Africa in 1992 and Northern Ireland in 1998 have been viewed as facilitating the respective peace settlements by engaging broader segments of the society in the peace process and limiting the role of violent opposition groups (Strauss 1993; Guelke 1999; McGarry & O’Leary 2009). But referenda might also have unintended side effects and inflame already unstable ethnic relations as suggested in East Timor and Kyrgyzstan. In the case of the 1999 referendum in East Timor, Paris (2004: 219) criticises the United Nations administration for organising a premature referendum on independence before providing security on the ground. Thousands of East Timorese were killed and about 400,000 displaced (Paris 2004: 219; Schulze 2001: 78), while in Kyrgyzstan the constitutional referendum of 2010 led to an estimated 400–500 dead and about 100,000 Uzbek refugees (Huskey & Hill 2011)” (Loizides 2014, 234). These examples point to the importance of timing and the specific wording of referenda. In a study of situations where the outcome of the referendum is opposite what was expected, Loizides (2014) found that early public participation promotes a better peace process. Furthermore, mandate referenda that “prepare the public for a peace settlement, incorporate early feedback into the negotiations, strengthen their credibility across ethnic antagonists and safeguard the peace process from subsequent and often unavoidable reversals in public opinion” are more likely to result in a successful peace process (Loizides 2014, 237).

**CONCLUSION**

Despite the constraint of powers outlined in the Nouméa Accord, New Caledonia is increasingly stretching its international relations. Both Caledonians and the Kanak have used
international and regional bodies to promote their own pro- and anti-independence agendas. The Melanesian Spearhead Group was even established in an effort to support the pro-independence movement in New Caledonia in the 1980s (Brown 2013). While the Caledonian leader, Philippe Gomès attempted to use New Caledonia’s path to decolonization to have it accepted into MSG thereby legitimizing it in the eyes of a groups created to support the indigenous population. Although this attempt failed, Roch Wamytan succeeded in garnering funding for MSG in exchange for adding French as one of the group’s official languages. While French DOMs and New Caledonia already receive non-reciprocal rights congruent with EU membership, New Caledonia has also received specific provisions New Caledonia can export goods to the EU while maintaining domestic protections, they do not have to adopt the euro, as French citizens they can gain EU passports, and they can vote on representatives for overseas seats in the European elections. France’s overseas collectives receive three seats in the European Parliament, one of which is specifically held jointly by the French collectives in the Pacific (Brown 2013).

The EU has promoted French Overseas Collectives as a bastion of European influence in the Pacific and as a counterpoint to Japanese and Chinese influences (Brown 2013). Towards this effort, France has been developing closer military ties with neighboring Australia and New Zealand. Through the FRANZ agreement, these countries have agreed to cooperate on disaster relief and military maneuvers. Joint military exercises have also included the United States. In addition, France moved the Pacific headquarters of their military from Polynesia to New Caledonia in 2008. This strategic significance is combined with the perception of French stability and democracy maintained in what is viewed as the Melanesian arc of instability. This allows the EU to project a form of laissez-faire soft power in the Pacific that nevertheless gives it a strong foothold in this region (Brown 2013).
The case of New Caledonia is critical to the overall re-imagination of sub-national, particularly indigenous, questions in the peripheral French space. Although the Nouméa Accord successfully recognized the rights of the indigenous people, the implementation of those rights in the context of citizenship remains to be seen. Furthermore, the effort towards fostering a common destiny is undermined by calls for new rights based solely on Kanak identity – counter to the notion of living or building together. This effort has been expanded through the promotion of customary law and a demand for greater power for the Customary Senate (Trepied 2012). “In this new ‘customary-indigenous’ perspective, official recognition of the Kanak people is no longer seen as a stage in a long struggle for independence, nor an arrangement that is inseparable from the project of citizenship and decolonization, but simply as the local application of international principles for protecting indigenous peoples, independently of the question of independence” (Trepied 2012, 14).
CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

Representatives from the Territorial Congress form the core governing body that will determine the timing of the three referenda and the questions asked. It will be the responsibility of these fifty-four individuals to oversee the implementation of the chosen outcome of the referenda. Data for this research is composed of semi-structured interviews conducted with eight congressional representatives who are leaders within four of the five party coalitions in the Territorial Congress. Additional information about the views of these politicians and six others representing all five political party coalitions were collected from popular New Caledonian newspapers *Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes, Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*, news blogs *L'Eveil Calédonienne* and *Calodoshpere*, and the French-Caledonian television program *Nouvelle-Calédonie 1ère*. Party statements and press releases, Congressional documents, and public speeches from the eight representatives, five other current representatives, and one former representative supplemented this data. My methodology is three-part. First, I used grounded theory to identify the dominant narratives (in the interview and textual data) underlying the independence debate. Second, axial coding and constant comparative analysis (which are part of grounded theory), discourse analysis, and chord diagrams were used to map and analyze how these narratives are defined and framed by different politicians. Finally, I evaluate the extent to
which these frames, and the narratives they characterize, support independence, independent-association, association, or a third accord. Taken together, these three questions offer a view of the current supporting structures underlying the current political decision-making climate and offer a prediction about the best compromises for the future.

The grounded theory methodology used here is an inductive approach. As such, the end product is a theory or series of theories that are directly generated from the information gathered. The particularity of grounded theory is the connection between data and theory: “the concepts out of which the theory is constructed are derived from data collected during the research process and not chosen prior to beginning the research” (Corbin and Strauss 2014, 6). The purpose is to disconnect the researcher from their preconceived ideas and notions and let the data guide their findings. While it is difficult to ignore one’s preconceived ideas, the process of grounded theory forces a researcher to immerse themself in the data. They must think about where it is leading them rather than where they want it to go. In grounded theory studies interviews and other types of textual data are commonly employed. Interviews were the core component of analysis because unlike news stories or surveys, politicians could direct the discussion in the way that was most important to them. I wanted to know how the most influential actors in the independence debate were framing the independence debate itself. Interviews with those individuals allowed me to gather information about their narratives directly from the source. New articles and other textual materials provided additional secondary sources of narratives that could further validate my conclusions and fill holes in my data collection. Using a grounded theory methodology supported by interviews and secondary textual sources allowed me to ascertain and explore the current narratives presented by politicians about the independence debate with as few filters as possible.
DATA SOURCES AND INTERVIEWEE INFORMATION

The independence debate is not just a political concern. Full sovereignty or any change in New Caledonia’s relationship with France will impact the country’s relations within the South Pacific, its economy, and its society. As a result, organizations, academics, and others have contributed to or are part of the negotiations over the future of the country. The spectrum of information and opinions that could be collected from all actors involved in the debate is staggering. Loizides (2014, 243) argues that political leaders are “critically important in contested peace processes” because they can either “mobilise voters for peace or alternatively frame potentially promising peace settlements as catastrophic.” I have chosen to limit my focus to the politicians who will ultimately be responsible for framing the question or questions asked in the referenda and many of whom will be responsible for carrying out the result of those referenda. Therefore, interview subjects were chosen from among the fifty-four congressional representatives elected in May 2014 based on their party affiliation and standing.

Within the Territorial Congress of New Caledonia there are fifty-four representatives selected from the three Provincial Assemblies. These fifty-four representatives belong to and align with five primary party blocs (CE, FPU, UCF, UC-FLNKS, and UNI-PALIKA). Within these blocs are numerous and often-changing political parties. From these five blocs, I was able to personally interview politicians who are either the founder or president of their particular political party or party bloc. These politicians are the most influential and, in some cases, longstanding politicians in New Caledonian politics. Table 1 lists the representatives interviewed. Interviews allowed me to ask politicians about their opinions and views on a certain issue, the independence debate, but they also allowed the interviewee to talk about what is important and central to them in the context of the independence debate. Therefore, I was able to
glean insight into exactly how different politicians and factions comprehend this issue. Interviews, in addition to speeches and news articles, easily fit into the grounded theory process of identifying and analyzing themes. Many of the names were provided by Dr. Mathias Chauchat who has studied New Caledonia’s politics and law at the University of New Caledonia for over two decades. Literature from other academic experts on New Caledonian history and politics corroborated the significance of actors like Philippe Gomès, Pierre Frogier, Charles Washetine, Paul Neaoutyne, Roch Wamytan, Daniel Goa, Louis Kotra Uregei, and Isabelle Lafleur.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congressional Representatives</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
<th>Provincial Congress Affiliation</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Party Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippe Gomès</td>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Loyalist</td>
<td>Calédonie Ensemble</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Documents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grégoire Bernut</td>
<td>Personal Interview</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Loyalist</td>
<td>Entente Province Nord</td>
<td>Front pour l’unité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News Article</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Frogier</td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Loyalist</td>
<td>Rassemblement-UMP</td>
<td>Front pour l’unité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Documents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Martin</td>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Loyalist</td>
<td>Avenir Ensemble</td>
<td>Front pour l’unité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaël Yanno</td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Loyalist</td>
<td>Mouvement Populaire Calédonien</td>
<td>Union Calédonie dans la France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe Blaise</td>
<td>Personal Interview</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Loyalist</td>
<td>Mouvement Républicain Calédonien</td>
<td>Union Calédonie dans la France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabelle Lafleur</td>
<td>Personal Interview</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Loyalist</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour la Calédonie</td>
<td>Union Calédonie dans la France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Goa</td>
<td>Personal Interview</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Union Calédonien</td>
<td>UC-FLNKS et Nationalistes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Documents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques Lalié</td>
<td>Personal Interview</td>
<td>Loyalty Islands</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Unir et Construire dans le Renouveau</td>
<td>UC-FLNKS et Nationalistes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. List of Research Subjects and Data Sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Interview Type</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roch Wamytan</td>
<td>Personal Interview</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Construisons notre nation Arc-en-Ciel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speeches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UC-FLNKS et Nationalistes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Documents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvain Pabouty</td>
<td>Personal Interview</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Dynamique Unitaire Sud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UC-FLNKS et Nationalistes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Kotra Uregei</td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td>Loyalty Islands</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Parti Travailliste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UC-FLNKS et Nationalistes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Washetine</td>
<td>Personal Interview</td>
<td>Loyalty Islands</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Parti de Libération Kanak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNI-PALIKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Neaoutyne</td>
<td>News Articles</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNI-PALIKA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personal interviews were conducted with five nationalists and three loyalists from all but one of the primary political party blocs: Charles Washetine, Daniel Goa, Roch Wamytan, Jacques Lalié, Sylvain Pabouty, Grégoire Bernut, Philippe Blaise, and Isabelle Lafleur. This list differs from my proposed list of interview subjects for a number of reasons. At first, the list composed for my dissertation proposal was based on my knowledge of politicians and their importance. According to Dr. Chauchat’s suggestions on his input regarding the influence of each politician, I included several individuals who were not on my original list, including: Washetine, Lafleur, Gomès, and Goa. Dr. Chauchat also advised that these individuals, among the others I have listed in Table 1 represent the dominant views on the independence debate. Second, the list was compiled prior to the May 2014 Territorial Congress elections. Meaning that not all of the representatives on my initial list were re-elected and new actors have taken the
stage in this debate. With a revised list based on the key actors, I proceeded to contact interview subjects.

Prior to arriving in New Caledonia I had trouble obtaining email addresses for contacting potential interviewees. As a result, I arrived in New Caledonia with only one scheduled interview. Even after my arrival it was difficult to contact individuals who relied much more on word of mouth recommendations and generally disliked the use of email in favor of phone contact. I was limited by my lack of local knowledge and was unable to contact many potential interviewees until late in my stay. Since Territorial Congress representatives are members of the national and provincial congresses (and often hold other local offices like Mayor) it was difficult to set a meeting time with some of them. While most offices and politicians were surprisingly approachable one I had contacted them about an interview, a number of individuals from leading loyalist political parties required official documentation and letters of reference (including a waiting period for processing) before they would even agree to discuss the possibility of an interview. As a result I was able to meet with a number of highly placed nationalists, but primarily met with less established loyalists (with the exception of Lafleur). Finally, a number of politicians I had hoped to interview are members of the Signatory Committee. This Committee and other invitees meet once a year to discuss amongst the factions and the French government the future of the Nouméa Accord. The committee was originally composed of the partners in the Nouméa Accord: France, nationalists led by FLNKS, and loyalists led by Rassemblement. The first Signatory Committee was held in Paris on May 2, 2000. The French delegation was led by the Secretary of State for Overseas France: Jean-Jack Queyranne. The nationalist delegation was led by Roch Wamytan who was President of the FLNKS at the time. The loyalist delegation was represented by Jacques Lafleur who was President of Rassemblement (RPCR) at the time.
Signatory Committee was mandated by the Nouméa Accord. Its goals included translating the tenets of the Accord into local contexts, preparing the texts necessary for the implementation of the Accord, and following up on the implementation of the Accord. Successive meetings included a greater number of political parties as factions shifted and divided in New Caledonia.

The annual Signatory Committee meeting held in Paris in 2014 took place mid-October. This was a little over halfway through my fieldwork. While I was still able to obtain interviews with some of the politicians who attended, several of them stayed in France after attending the meeting and their offices had no expectation of their immediate return. Despite these setbacks, the personal interviews I conducted do represent each of the primary political blocs except for CE, whose founder and stance on the independence debate are well documented in other sources.

The personal interviews were also conducted with representatives who are leaders in their political parties, are part of the newer generation and the 1980-generation, and offer a sample from each of the three provinces.

The setbacks listed above meant that I was unable to conduct interviews with all of the politicians I targeted. My initial goal was to interview two representatives from each political party represented in the Territorial Congress. Armed with a greater understanding of the convoluted and ever-changing networks of political parties in New Caledonia, I revised this goal to target at least two representatives from each of the major parties and their affiliated blocs. This includes: CE, FPU, UCF, UC, FLNKS, UNI, PALIKA, and PT. The UC-FLNKS and PT are generally affiliated and considered the UC-FLNKS and Nationalists and UNI and PALIKA are part of one bloc. At the very least, I hoped to interview one representative from each of the groups. I succeeded to some extent. I gained interviews with representatives of all but three of the eight parties listed above. As a result, I turned to other sources that could provide additional
information about these party’s and their members’ stance on independence. I researched local newspapers, party documents, and speeches given by the members of my potential interviewees list.

In particular, I targeted local newspapers and broadcasts that had conducted interviews with the individuals on my list. I found a number of these types of articles outlined in news documents attributed to all of the representatives listed in Table 1. A complete list of the news documents analyzed can be found in Appendix B. For subjects I had already interviewed, these documents and news reports validated, reinforced, or clarified my findings from the personal interviews. For those I was unable to interview, it provided a way for me to identify and analyze their narratives as part of the broader independence debate. While the reported views and views expressed through speeches and party documents of Gaël Yanno, Paul Neaoutyne, Pierre Frogier, Harold Martin, and LKU exist in conjunction with the personal interviews I conducted with their party counterparts, Gomès exists separately. Due to a scheduling miscommunication, I was unable to personally interview any representatives from his party. The views attributed to Gomès and CE are thus based on numerous news articles, speeches, and other party documentation.

Narrative data pertaining to the objectives of these individuals is solely based on information provided by news articles and government documents, press releases, and party literature. The news articles detailing the views of these representatives were collected from various New Caledonian newspapers (Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes, Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie), news blogs (L’Eveil Calédonienne, Calodosphere), and the French news program Nouvelle-Calédonie 1ère. These sources represent the most widely read or viewed news sources and various political factions in New Caledonia.
Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes is the only daily New Caledonian newspaper and has been in print since 1971. In the early 2000s the paper was bought by French media company Groupe Hersant Média. In 2012 the paper was sold to a company led by Bernard Taipe and control was later transferred to three local owners: media mogul Jacques Jeandot controls 59%, the Montagnat mining family controls 21%, and former supermarket chain owner Charles Lavoix controls 20% (Palmieri 2013). Nouvelle-Calédonie 1ère is publically owned, but operated by Reseau France Outre-Mer. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie is a weekly newspaper available online every Thursday. Isabelle Lafleur founded DNC in 2006 and serves as the director of publication. L’Eveil Calédonienne is an online news and print news platform. Its motto is “awakening daily; news in real time; all you need to know without necessarily asking; anything you do not necessarily read elsewhere” (Contact 2015). The newspaper favors political issues and debates since its start in October 2013 (de La Bourdonnaye 2013). The director of publication is Thierry Squillario a longtime journalist in New Caledonia. Calodoshpere is a popular New Caledonian blog that presents news articles exclusively online.

All of the news documents collected were instances where the news station had interviewed the individual and printed the transcript, hosted debates between politicians, re-printed political speeches, or quoted a politician. The news sources were dated from 2005 to January 2015. I chose to focus on recent articles because some of my research subjects have been newly elected to the Territorial Congress and because I wanted to analyze politician’s most recent stances on the referendum and independence given the short proximity to its occurrence. Their views from a decade ago may be slightly different than those expressed more recently as they try to swing votes for or against independence given the current social, political, economic climate. A majority of articles are from 2009-2014 during the previous an current Congressional
terms. The articles were selected by searching under politician’s names in the archives and online databases for each news source. Additional supplementary materials included: 1) documents from the political parties themselves (including party charters, election fliers, and public statements), 2) official presidential statements given by Martin and Gomès from 2008-2011, 3) speeches given by Wamytan to the United Nations in 2013 and 2014, 4) the Charter of the Kanak People by the Customary Senate, 5) summaries from the Signatory Committees from 2010-2014, and 6) the document produced at the behest of the Signatory Committee outlining the possible outcomes for the Nouméa Accord (entitled, Reflections on the Institutional Future of New Caledonia). A full list of the ancillary documents and the news articles can be found in Appendix B. These materials provide another layer of depth to my analysis of politicians’ views on the independence debate. It was important to include this material for important politicians who were not represented by personal interviews and to verify that all of the narratives presented by politicians were accounted for. This leads to better and more comprehensive and grounded theories at the end of the research, because as many views as possible are taken into account and verified.

Party charters, election fliers, and public statements posted on political party websites indicate that party’s specific platform. Fliers and public statements are geared towards specific issues or debates at the time of their publication. The Charters rarely change and are written when the party is founded. These documents outline the core values and beliefs of a party. The official Presidential statements are equivalent to a State of the Union address given in the United States. Typically they are more moderate in their speech, but the President will describe their plans for the future of the country. The speeches Wamytan gives to the UN are geared towards garnering UN support for the independence process in New Caledonia. This request is couched
in terms of carrying out the tenets of the Nouméa Accord and ensuring a fair outcome of the referenda, which includes a balanced electorate. The Charter of the Kanak People was a document drafted by the Customary Senate and Customary Councils with the participation of Kanak communities. Its objective is:

It is a matter of correctly setting up the rights of the autochthonous Kanak here in the country. At the level of the project for a new society, the new modern society must respect diversity by accepting the rights of the autochthonous people and it will have to spread out in all the branches of the organisation of the new modern society. It will be possible to call it, a societal readjustment of the systems of values (Charter of the Kanak People 2014).

The Charter is comprised of three chapters that 1) outline the core characteristics of the Kanak culture, 2) describe the basic structure, organization, and history of the Kanak civilization, and 3) reviews the Kanak right to self-determination. Following the 2011 Signatory Committee, signatory demands led the French Prime Minister to establish the Steering Committee on the Institutional Future of New Caledonia (SCIFNC) (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). The Committee’s objective was to determine the possible outcomes of the referenda in the context of the Nouméa Accord. Jean Courtial (a French Councillor of State), Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien (a French law professor), and Stéphane Grauvogel (a delegate of the French Overseas Deputy General) explored and outlined the three possible questions that could be asked in the referendum. These questions indicate the three main options for the future governance of New Caledonia. Based on the Nouméa Accord, the options include: full sovereignty (independence), sovereign state partnership (independent association), and extended or self-perpetuated autonomy (autonomy within the French Republic or provisional autonomy) (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). The report was made available in 2014.

In total, information was collected about the objectives of seven loyalists and seven nationalists. They represent all of the five party coalitions currently represented in Congress -
three are from the Loyalty Islands Provincial Congress which provides seven representatives total; two are from the North Province Congress which provides fifteen representatives; and nine from the South Province Congress which provides thirty-two representatives. Pierre Frogier is the only person included that is not currently serving on the 2014-2019 Territorial Congress. However, Frogier has long been an influential part of the Caledonian government and is currently serving a term as one of the New Caledonian representatives to the French Senate.

While the personal interviews I conducted offer a sample of the different party blocs, geographic jurisdictions, experience levels, and historical contexts politicians in the Territorial Congress represent, there are some limitations caused by this list. The lack of personal interview from a representative of CE makes my analysis of this party’s narratives less comprehensive than the parties represented entirely or in part by personal interviews. The views of Gomès and CE are heavily represented in the news, but a personal interview may have gleaned additional insight on topics not covered in the news interviews. Most of the topics I discussed with interview subjects were available online or in media accounts. However I believe that some politicians further clarified their views or may have been more open with me than they were in news articles.

In addition, fieldwork was essential to the end result of my research. The three research assistants who helped with interviews and interpretation came from a variety of backgrounds and mentalities. One was from a very old Caldoche business family, another was Kanak and grew up in the tribal North, and the final assistant had a French mother and a Kanak father. Their perspectives during and after interviews (and their discussions with me) helped me shape and better guide the interviews. Their feedback made the questions I asked more pointed and specific to their knowledge of each politician. This background information combined with their
sometimes-personal connection to an interview subject made the interviews more relaxed, collegial, and ultimately more informative because interview subjects were comfortable with the situation. Had I not conducted fieldwork in New Caledonia, I would not have gained an appropriate appreciation for the context of my research. The urban slums, rapid construction, and overall tone of the country would have escaped me. I believe that interviewees would have been much more reticent to communicate via skype or even email. Many members of the older generations still prefer face-to-face interactions and contact.

Interview questions focused on the politician’s history, the program for their political party, defining common destiny and self-determination, the roles of national identity, ethnicity, multicultural governance, control over land, and mining, French aid and dependence, citizenship, identity, immigration, and the economic and political future of the country. While these form the basic topics discussed, interviewees were free to expand on issues of particular interest to them. For a complete list of interview questions see Appendix A.

**Background on Interviewees**

Philippe GOMÉS was born in 1958 in Algeria. He was President of the Southern Province for five years following Pierre Frogier. At the same time, he also served as Mayor of the La Foa municipality from 1989-2008. He was also a Member of the Government under the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth Governments of New Caledonia under Harold Martin from March 2011-December 2012.

Pierre FROGIER was born in New Caledonia in 1950. He studied law and was later a professor of Law in Dijon France in the early 1970s. Shortly after he started a career in politics he became a member of the Territorial Government Council and retained a government seat in
1982. Frogier was elected President of the Southern Province and Mayor of the Mont-Doré municipality in 1987. From 2001-2004 he served as the President of the Government of New Caledonia. Since 2011 he has served as one of the New Caledonian Senators to the French Republic.

Harold MARTIN was born in Nouméa in 1954 to one of the original European families who settled in New Caledonia. Like many of his contemporaries, he studied in France in the 1970s, specializing in corporate farming and livestock. He has been the Mayor of Païta since 1995 and served as President of the Government of New Caledonia from 2007-2009 and 2011-2014. He was also the President of the Territorial Congress from 1997-1998, 2004-2007, and 2009-2011.

Paul NEAOUTYINE was born in eastern New Caledonia in 1951. During the 1970s he studied economics in Lyon France and was a member of the Group 1878 and *Foulards Rouges* or Red Scarves. In 1989 he was elected Mayor of Poindimié. He is currently the President of the Northern Province Assembly

Louis Kotra UREGEI was born in 1951 in Nouméa. After studying in France in the early 1980s Uregei returned to New Caledonia and founded the Union of Kanak Exploited Workers (USTKE) or *Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Kanaks et des Exploités* in 1981. In 2007 he founded a labor party: *Parti Travailliste de Nouvelle-Calédonie*. By 2009 he had been elected to the Provincial Assembly in the Loyalty Islands and then to the Territorial Congress.

Gaël YANNO was born in 1961 in Nouméa and studied economics in Paris in the 1980s and later public accounting. While maintaining a professional career in accounting, Yanno was elected to the South Province Assembly and Territorial Congress in 1989 until 1999. He created
the Popular Caledonian Movement party or *Mouvement Populaire Calédonien* in 2013 and was elected President of the Congress of New Caledonia in 2014.

Charles WASHETINE was born on the island of Maré in 1956. He studied the sociology of education in France in the late 1980s before returning to Maré. He considers himself an educator first. He has been a member of both the Provincial Assembly in the Loyalty Islands and the Territorial Congress since 1999. By 2000 he became the official spokesperson for PALIKA.

Daniel GOA was born in 1953 just outside of Hienghène in the Northern Province. He studied in France in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the anti-imperialist movements. His experiences in the metropole led him to join the Foulards Rouges movement and opened his eyes to the injustices occurring in New Caledonia in 1973. By the late 1970s he became more involved in the communist party. In 1980 he returned to his home to aid in the search for a new chief of his tribe and formed a development office designed to recruit new members into the UC. He has held some type of political office almost continually since the 1990s and in 2012 was elected the President of the UC party.

Jacques LALIÉ was born on the island of Lifou in 1954. He studied political science and economics in France where he participated in the activist association that eventually became the Foulard Rouges. In my interview he said that the Foulards Rouges started out as a political support group whose goals included changing the colonial system and ending the marginalization of Kanak. He said when he was growing up it was normal for the Kanak to be referred to as dirty Kanak and Caledonians would only share the scraps of what they had eaten to the indigenous population. While living in France, Lalié was strongly influenced by the Marxist debates among University students from French colonies while studying in France. His father was part of the RPCR coalition chaired by Jacques Lafleur in an effort to improve conditions for the Kanak. But
Lalié took this a step further by approaching Kanak recovery through a communist lens. In 2004 he founded the *Unir et Construire dans le Renouveau* party as a reaction to the failures of the UC on the Loyalty Islands.

Roch WAMYTAN’s path started somewhat similar to the famous Jean-Marie Tjibaou. He was born in 1950 in Nouméa and trained to be a priest in New Caledonia. When his seminary closed he went to France to continue studying theology and philosophy, but switched to economics. After returning to New Caledonia he continued working with his grandfather Roch Pidjot who was a member of NC in public administration. In 1989 his grandfather became the President of UC and Wamytan became a councilor in the town of Mont-Doré, then a member of the South Province Assembly, and eventually joined the Territorial Congress. Eventually he served as President of the Territorial Congress from 2011-2012 and 2013-2014. He was also a Member of the Government from 1999-2001 and 2002-2004.

Like Jacques Lalié, Sylvain PABOUTY’s political initiative stems from a reaction to the effects of colonialism. He views his civic participation as an obligation, an obligation to advocate for the Kanak people based on his personal experience. Since his parents moved to Nouméa in the 1950s and 60s for work, Pabouty has a keen understanding of the need for Kanak voices in the South Province. He argues that social problems are linked to urbanization and are more glaring in the South where migrants typically move to. Like many others, he studied in France during the 1980s and received a degree in economic and social administration. His party, DUS, is primarily composed of former PALIKA activists.

Phillipe BLAISE’s family has a long history in New Caledonia – spanning five generations. In addition, his father was a politician and militant during the 1980s. Blaise studied business in France before returning to the banking industry in New Caledonia. In 2006 he first
got involved in politics to protest the freezing of voting rights. Although he started his political career in the RUMP, he founded his own political party after Frogier agreed to raise the Kanak independence flag in 2011. His party, the MRC is part of a coalition with Yanno’s MPC and Lafleur’s RPC.

Isabelle LAFLEUR was born in Nouméa in 1954. She is the daughter of famous loyalist Jacques Lafleur who signed the Matignon Accord with Jena-Marie Tjibaou. She studied law in France in the early 1970s and remained in France until the early 1990s. She entered the political sphere in 2009 and after the death of her father in 2010 became the President of the RPC party. Unlike others in her party bloc, Lafleur considers herself French, not Caledonian or Caldoche. Despite being born in New Caledonia she studied and then lived in France from 1973 to the early 1990s. She is also the only loyalist interviewed who stated they are open to the option of eventual sovereignty for New Caledonia.

Grégoire BERNUT was also influenced by his politically active family. He studied economics for ten years in France before returning to New Caledonia in 2000. His first involvement in domestic politics was in 2004 as a special councilor for the Southern Province. Since then he has worked in both the private and public spheres. Most recently, in 2014 he was elected to the Territorial Congress.

Each politician is a member of a party that exists in an ever-changing series of party coalitions. Some coalitions are built on particular issues or platforms, while others stem from historical or ethnic allegiance. Table 1 offers a list of all of the current coalitions in the Territorial Congress to which these politicians belong. In Figure 1, left and right represent the liberal and conservative factions respectively. However, referring to them as liberal and conservative is slightly misleading because European and European inherited systems are
generally more leftist or liberal than American politics. Therefore I use the terms left and right. Economic policy is presented on a scale of socialist to liberal. Here liberal means a more capitalist interpretation of the economy and socialist means greater government or public control of the economy. Generally, pro-independence parties align on the leftist political sphere and are more socialist oriented on economic policy (see Figure 1). Among the political parties, PT and PALIKA support labor groups and labor rights so they tend to be more left and economically socialist than centrist parties like the FLNKS and UC. Among loyalist parties, CE may be the most centrist, with AE and RUMP promoting more liberal economic policies (see Figure 1). Members of the UCF coalition, which includes, MPC, MRC, and RPC tend to be less-centrist politically and far more conservative.

The loyalists consider themselves a French nationalist movement and a father figure to the Kanak, arguing that Kanak devolution is inevitable. Meanwhile nationalists consider loyalists to be part of an ‘axis of evil’, the enemy, unconstitutional, the ‘opium of the people,’ and ‘republican farandoles.’ Farandole is a French provincial dance that includes patterned steps and a series of steps where dancers join hands in a chain or a circle. The dance is linked to the carmagnole popular during the Reign of Terror and associated with the French Revolution. In addition, nationalists accuse loyalists of using scare tactics, promoting fear by equating independence with chaos and violence. Nationalists consider themselves to be the truly nationalist bloc, a coalition of parties trying to build New Caledonia through common destiny and as a joint project. Loyalists accuse nationalists of being selfish, uncompromising, ideological, violent, obstructing freedom, perpetuating social conflict, separatism, and hindering development. Loyalists emphasize that nationalists are violent to non-Kanak, consider non-Kanak to be second-class citizens, and believe they are ethnically superior.
Figure 1. Political Parties on a political and economic scale.

METHODOLOGY AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Categorizing information is a way of organizing and making sense of the world. Discourse analysis is the process of deconstructing these categorizations and can be used to understand how categorizations influence political claims and decision-making (Dalby 1991; Dodds 2005; Mamadouh and Dijkink 2006). Muller (2008) argues that discourse is shaped by the individual and acts as a collective participatory framework that shapes meaning. Discourses are part of a relational or supportive network that presents discourse as a context-driven statement that can be expressed through a variety of mediums (Foucault 1980). Taken together the networks create “discursive formations” and “bodies
of knowledge” (Tyner 2004, 13). Simply, this form of analysis examines the way in which language is used to accomplish various political projects (Tyner 2004). Formal geopolitics is the creation of theory and strategies to guide and justify the creation of regions with imagined attributes in everyday politics (O’Tuathail and Dalby 1998). To understand the motives and use of particular discourses in statecraft it is critical to identify and examine the “situated reasoning” that forms their foundations (O’Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 6). One approach to discourse analysis is the semiotic analysis of meaning and significance in text and the identification of storylines embedded in transcripts from interviews, focus groups, and surveys (Dittmer 2005; Hardwick and Mansfield 2009).

**Grounded Theory and Discourse Analysis**

The methodology that structures my approach to analyzing interview transcripts, news articles, and other forms of textual data is grounded theory. More specifically, I utilize both grounded theory and discourse analysis to identify and explore politicians’ narratives regarding the independence debate. Kohlbacher (2005, 12) describes the method of grounded theory as a form of content analysis where, “categories [are] the center of analysis: the aspects of text interpretation, following the research questions, are put into categories, which [are] carefully founded and revised within the process of analysis (feedback loops).” This type of grounded theory is organized into three core steps (2005, 13):

a. Summary: attempts to reduce the material in such a way as to preserve the essential content and by abstraction to create a manageable corpus which still reflects the original material. For this the text is paraphrased, generalized or abstracted and reduced.

b. Explication: involves explaining, clarifying and annotating the material. As a first step a lexico-grammatical definition is attempted, then the material for explication is determined, and this is followed by a narrow context analysis, and a
broad context analysis. Finally an ‘explicative paraphrase’ is made of the particular portion of text and the explication is examined with reference to the total context.

c. Structuring: corresponds more or less to the procedures used in classical content analysis and is also viewed as the most crucial technique of content analysis, the goal of which is to filter out a particular structure from the material. Here the text can be structured according to content, form and scaling. The first stage is the determination of the units of analysis, after which the dimensions of the structuring are established on some theoretical basis and the features of the system of categories are fixed. Subsequently definitions are formulated and key examples, with rules for coding in separate categories, are agreed upon. In the course of a first appraisal of the material the data locations are marked, and in a second scrutiny these are processed and extracted. If necessary the system of categories is re-examined and revised, which necessitates a reappraisal of the material. As a final stage the results are processed.”

This classical approach to coding diverges from the tenets of the grounded theory approach to coding I employ in this analysis. As Kohlbacher (2005) goes on to state, Mayring’s (2002) more rigid and structured approach to coding leaves little room for flexibility and adaptation as one progresses throughout the text. Instead, Glaser and others have advocated for a more open and inductive approach to coding that focuses on a “theory-based category system” that “can be changed during extraction [or structuring] when relevant information turns up but does not fit into the [existing] category system” (Kohlbacher 2005, 14). This is an important distinction, because the goal of this analysis is to be as inclusive as possible: to represent all of politicians’ narratives on the independence debate. Not to reject narratives or frames that do not fit well into the mainstream party rhetoric. Instead I highlight these areas of divergence in addition to more mainstream and collectively supported narratives.

During the summary process the body of text - interviews, news articles, and other documents, in this case – is consolidated through a looping process of reduction. This body of data will be collectively referred to as first-person narratives. Even though the texts are in different forms, they can be analyzed using the same methods and examined as a comprehensive
whole in case study research (Kohlbacher 2005). Kohlbacher (2005, 15) described this process in terms of Mayring’s (2000) “inductive category development.” According to this approach, the researcher first determines a general research topic or question. The next step is deciding how the categories will be defined and then inductively identifying them based on the information found in the material (Kohlbacher 2005; Kondracki and Wellman 2002). Throughout this stage, the categories and the research themes are continually refined to exist in agreement with each other. Categories are changed or revised based on the information found in the text and the research themes are changed to reflect those categories. Categories are collected and organized into themes to prevent redundancy and force comparisons to be made between codes (Elo and Kyngäs 2007). The end result is a series of inductively composed ‘grounded’ categories that will then be analyzed relative to the research questions. In this way, the research questions are based on information already identified in the texts and can result in true ‘grounded’ theory.

To identify the dominant narratives underlying the independence debate, I employed Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) inductive grounded theory approach using constant comparative coding: recording both descriptive and analytic codes that represent the dominant themes present in the textual data. This process, which results in grounded theories, allows me to identify politician’s narratives, framing of narratives, and examine how these frames impact the independence debate because I am analyzing their words and views directly. Categories are identified through the process of coding, where common themes, concepts, ideas, people, and agencies within a set of data that can be classified and compared are discovered (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). First, the texts are read. As I read through the interview transcripts, New Caledonian news sources, speeches, party documents and other materials, I made notes in the margins – essentially summarizing the material in each section. From these notes, codes emerge
from the text. After each document had been transcribed and translated, I began the process of open coding: identifying the main themes within each document, speech, or interview question. A set of common themes began to emerge. Categories are created as I discover links and connections between codes that can be consolidated into one theme. This process involves constant comparison and looping whereby the categories are constantly refined and the research questions subtly changed to reflect what is being discovered. The goal of grounded theory is to end with, rather than begin with, a series of theories. The theories are derived from the constant comparison of codes identified within the text being studied.

At this point, I began tracking the themes or categories through axial coding. Axial coding is the practice of identifying central categories or themes that can be connected to different subcategories that relate to them. Axial coding is like creating a web. The primary category is at the center of the web and the sub-categories are all connected to it. Like a web, sub-categories also express relationships between themselves, they too can be connected. Identifying and analyzing these webs and their components is a way to discover causal relationships between variables or themes and explore the impact of context. This is the second part of the “summary” stage of content analysis (Kohlbacher 2005, 13).
Table 2: Identification of the Electorate Category and Framing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Frame (Code)</th>
<th>Implication</th>
<th>Category/Theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The un-democratic nature of the electorate is a challenge to the fundamental values of New Caledonian society and is dangerous.</td>
<td>Current electoral body divisions in favor of Kanak are <em>un-democratic</em> and <em>dangerous</em></td>
<td>Sliding in favor of all inhabitants</td>
<td>Electorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who votes is central to the exercise of the right to self-determination of a colonized people.</td>
<td>Voters should be those that have the <em>right to self-determination</em></td>
<td>Frozen in favor of Kanak</td>
<td>Electorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The May election results were made with questionable lists showing that this system [the provincial electorate] has become a weapon against the colonized people, a system that claims to be democratic, but which turns against independence and autonomy.</td>
<td>Current electoral body divisions are un-democratic and a weapon against the Kanak</td>
<td>Frozen in favor of Kanak</td>
<td>Electorate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The narratives I identified and refined through open and axial coding include: different definitions of self-determination, reasons for pro- or anti-independence affiliation, relations with France and the UN, electoral politics, and definitions of identity, common destiny, victims, rebalancing, and citizenship. Rebalancing is a core discourse in elite political narratives. It is used as a broad term for creating political, economic, and social equality between ethnic groups. The term common destiny was first used in the Nouméa Accord in 1998. The term’s meaning has been transformed and expanded in the ensuing decades. However, in the Nouméa Accord, and at its core, it seems to indicate the ideal of a future sense of collective belonging among all of the inhabitants of New Caledonia. For example, the independence movement might be coded
as anti-colonial, pro-Kanak, separatist, an indigenous rights movement, or anti-France. Each of these particular codes has different connotations and therefore frames the independence movement in different ways that can impact public opinion. Each theme with its associated codes is tied to the person and party who said it. All of these themes, codes, and relationships were catalogued in excel spreadsheets. The spreadsheets list excerpts from the original text, categories (narratives), associated codes (frames), the author (or politician who was interviewed), the politician’s political party, stance on independence, the source, and the source’s date. Table 2 provides an example of the coding process: taking information from interview transcripts, news sources, and other texts, coding it, and then organizing those codes into categories. The category identified above refers to the electorate. Each of the text samples refers to a politician’s view on the current divisions within the three different electoral bodies. Specifically, they are referring to the provincial electorate: the voters that determine the Territorial Congressmen and a percentage of whom are part of the referendum electorate. Therefore all of these text samples are part of a broader electorate category or narrative. However, each view of the electorate is slightly different. These different views are summarized into frames. The frames are the codes that I have noted in the margins of my text materials. This process was continued through all of the documents and transcripts collected. Gradually, these networks of categories and frames formed what Tyner (2004) calls discursive formations. The final column, implications, refers to the next stage in my analysis: discourse analysis.

The goal of coding is to structure information in a logical framework that can then be analyzed (Cope 2005). Grounded theory sets up the structure, themes, and linkages to be explored further using discourse analysis. This is where I transition from identification of narratives (research question 1) to an analysis of the way in which those narratives are framed.
(research question 2) and then how those frames influence potential outcomes of the accord (research question 3). The framing step shown in Table 2 and the process of interpreting the importance or significance of that framing is part of discourse analysis. Burck (2005, 249) describes the process of discourse analysis in three steps:

“The researcher first examines the text in relation to how language is used to ‘construct’ the ideas or information. Second, the researcher looks for variability – the inconsistencies of meaning in the constructions and the assumptions they reveal. The third component is to highlight the implications of a particular account, to examine what the discourse achieves.”

The significance of politicians’ narratives and how they are framed is examined through discourse analysis. After frames are identified through coding and constant comparison, their meaning, genesis, and implications are explored using discourse analysis. This process targets research questions two and three: identifying and exploring the framing of narratives and better understanding how these frames influence the outcomes of the independence debate.

Continuing with the electorate example from Table 2, stage one of discourse analysis involved identifying how the electorate is defined. In this case, understanding the history and sentiment behind the electoral divisions. The three electorates were part of an agreement between France, the loyalists, and the nationalists in 1988 and 1998 to end the violence and tensions of the 1980s. The second stage is where I note the specific language used by politicians. For example, some referred to the electoral divisions are un-democratic, dangerous, and as a weapon or tool of marginalization. These discrepancies in loyalist and nationalist views reveal different understanding and the goals of each group. Both are using the electorate as a point of debate to try and tip the balance of the physical voting population in their favor. They use terms like democracy to perhaps appeal to the Westernized French government or United Nations. Both the Republic and the international organization are viewed as partners in this fight by the loyalists
and nationalists respectively. Additionally, both sides make the assumption that the electoral divisions are democratic to begin with. They are not. They were put in to place to be unfair on purpose to remedy the negative colonial legacies and marginalization promoted by the French. So the Kanak would have a greater self-determination and power in the territorial and provincial governments.

The final stage of discourse analysis examines the implications of these views or narratives. Table 2 outlines the implications for these views of the electorate. The nationalists view of the electorate as undemocratic implies that they want to keep the electoral bodes frozen, preventing any new voters from being added. Loyalists’ view of the electorate as undemocratic is based on the French ideals of equality and the universal right to vote. As a result they are in favor of expanding the electoral bodies or making them ‘sliding.’ This process was conducted for each code and category: identifying specific language and category definitions (frames), understanding their context and links with other codes and categories, and then determining the implications of those definitions and categories for the independence debate.

Less complex or frequently cited narratives (categories) were consolidated into separate groups and sorted based on their codes and the politicians’ affiliation or party. More complexly networked narratives were consolidated and then mapped out in a series of interrelated concept maps. Once the narratives and frames were consolidated or outlined on concept maps, I examined the definitions of the major themes, how they were co-defined, and how they created networks of discourse that support pro- or anti-independence outcomes. The discourse of (re)balancing is used by both loyalists and nationalists to promote association with France or full sovereignty. Chapters Five through Seven explore these discursive formation of (re)balancing
that pervades contemporary political rhetoric and shapes current economic, social, and electoral policy.

The last stage of this project is analyzing the implications: the extent to which these discursive code formations (or narratives and objectives) and the knowledges they produce influence specific options for the resolution of the independence debate and effective multicultural governance. How does the framing of these narratives and the narratives themselves promote or hinder certain outcomes? The themes derived from open and axial coding represent the goals each politician and party has for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord. After the discursive frameworks were identified, I explore how the narratives might impact the options offered in the referenda (i.e. full sovereignty, independent-association, association, or another accord). For example, the self-determination narrative is framed in three ways, as a: shared right, Kanak right, and right for all. This narrative and associated frames were identified using grounded theory and axial coding. Discourse analysis was used to further define and understand each frame. The right for all means represents the belief that self-determination is a right that should be available to all inhabitants of New Caledonia, including recent immigrants. This view is tied to notions of French liberty, minority-making techniques, and state power. The right for all mentality is one of the driving factors behind creating a sliding electorate or expanding recent immigrants inclusion on the special electorate. This could result in an electoral shift in favor of anti-independence groups if these individuals are added to the list.

**Using Chord Diagrams**

Chord diagrams are an essential part of visually representing the connections between goals and themes and which goals support each of the five outcomes. The diagrams are a way of
mapping how narratives are defined, connected, and which ones support each outcome. Chord diagrams and circle graphs have traditionally been used in mathematics, physics, and medical sciences. Very few qualitative or textual analysis studies have incorporated chord diagrams. The use of chord diagrams in textual analysis has been limited to social media projects that explore connections between topics and map networks of communication. Kim et. al. (2013) used chord diagrams as part of a dashboard that maps the geographic location of radical Islamic groups and the locations of their followers using twitter. De Pinho (2013) used chord diagrams to map the frequency and type of student communication on group projects.

In this study, chord diagrams are another form of concept mapping and analysis. Unlike traditional outward moving concept maps or thought clouds, chord diagrams show internal connections between concepts. I use chord diagrams to show how themes and goals are linked by networks that ultimately support or do not support the five possible outcomes. The chord diagrams were generated using the online feature of circos. Circos’ online platform allows users to upload data tables that generate the appropriate chord diagrams. The chord diagrams include several features. The most apparent feature is the visible links between terms. In Figure 2, these links are shown in different colors. Each term (theme, code, goal) composes a portion of the circle. The colored bands directly below the terms represent theme color. For example, one of the themes in Figure 2 is the “Role of UN” which is lime green. The relationship between this theme and those it is connected to (rebalancing and self-determination) are indicated by the chord diagram. The disconnected, but linked, brown and dark green chords indicate that the role of the UN is defined in terms of or is influenced by rebalancing and self-determination. The brown chord connected to the “Role of UN” bar indicates that different definitions of self-determination change views of the “Role of the UN.” In this case, the UN is viewed as a protector who can
ensure self-determination occurs for the Kanak (indicated by the light green chord) and the role of the UN is defined by its ability to ensure the right to self-determination for indigenous groups via UNDRIP (indicated by the brown line). The lime green chord means that the way in which the UN’s role is defined impacts definitions of self-determination.

Figure 2. Connections between dominant themes.
Figure 2 outlines the connections between all of the primary themes identified in the data for this study. These nine categories represent the major concerns of politicians and the defining narratives of the New Caledonian political sphere in regards to the independence debate and the future of the country. The chord diagram shows how the narratives are interrelated and co-defined and serves as a type of inverted concept map.

The concept maps I initially compiled to determine how each narrative is framed also revealed the interconnections and links between narratives and frames. Connections are created when the frames attributed to that narrative are defined by other narratives or frames. This creates a complex network of co-definition that makes up the networks of discourse that support each narrative. For example, how a politicians defines citizenship influences the divisions between the three electoral bodies. To be a member of the special or referendum electoral bodies, a person must be a citizen. Figure 2 shows this connection with the light burgundy citizenship chord connected to the electorate.

Figure 2 demonstrates that the rebalancing narrative (dark green) is connected, defines or is defined by, all of the other narratives identified. The concept of rebalancing is a pervasive discourse throughout the materials I gathered. In vivo codes referring to rebalancing are less numerous in the data than other in vivo codes. However, the context underlying other narratives and codes found in the text refer back to this idea of balance and attaining balance politically, economically, and socially. Ironically, both factions argue for a (re)balancing that would cause an imbalance in power between provinces, ethnic communities, classes, and voting populations. The prevalence of the rebalancing theme makes it useful for structuring the opening Chapters of my analysis. Particular attention is paid to how the three types of rebalancing represent layers of competing narratives and frames. The term itself is used as a method of structuring the narratives
and frames I identified. However, as the following chapters will show, it is also a term that should be understood in its historical context and as a buzzword deployed by politicians.

The Matignon and Nouméa Accords laid the groundwork for a future decision on full sovereignty in New Caledonia. However, these agreements also began a process of reconciliation and reparations meant to alleviate the problems caused by French colonial practices and to prepare the country for possible independence. This process is best framed in terms of rebalancing. The term rebalancing, or rééquilibrage, and its connection to reducing the inequalities caused by colonialism is not new to the Caledonian political lexicon. The concept is pervasive and a part of numerous other debates central to the question of independence (see Figure 2). Interviews suggest that there are three main areas of inequality that must be rebalanced: economic, social, and political. While loyalists and nationalists agree on the need for and importance of rebalancing, they differ on how to achieve it. Chapters Five through Seven identify the nine narratives found in the data gathered. Using the concept of rebalancing as an overarching structure, these chapters will outline and define the way in which these narratives are framed and explore the connections visualized in Figure 2. The (re)balancing discourse is a complex web of competing visions defined by the legacies of colonialism, economic dependence, national identities, inequality, and third party actors.
CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL REBALANCING

Figure 2 shows the connections between narratives identified in interviews and other materials from leading politicians in New Caledonia. Of all the narratives, rebalancing has the most connections to other narratives. Therefore, this term, and its frames are a useful starting point for identifying and deconstructing other narratives and frames. Many of the other frames are part of the rebalancing narrative because they are strategies for achieving a new balance between internal communities and New Caledonia and France. The concept of rebalancing originated with the Matignon Accord.

The Melanesian community, originating in Territory of New Caledonia - the first victim of the imbalances resulting from the colonization - must be the main beneficiaries of measures implemented to restore to a greater cohesion and enable it to achieve a better geographic and economic balance (Matignon 1989).

Initially it referred to economic restructuring and French aid. Specifically, Jacques Lafleur’s shares in SMSP were transferred to the Northern Province, the key sharing program implemented, and a Kanak training program called 400 cadres was created (Fisher 2013). Negotiators of the Matignon Accords recognized the imbalance and economic inequalities created by colonialism (Rich, Hambly, and Logan 2008). Development and wealth was centered around the capital and rural areas dominated by Kanaks were impoverished. Rebalancing would,
ideally, be achieved by dividing the country into three provinces and ceeding political and economic control to Kanaks in the Northern Province and Loylty Islands. Ten years later in the Nouméa Accord, the term refers to the transfer of sovereign powers:

The Transfer of Sovereign Powers - Justice, public order, defense, money, and international affairs remain the responsibility of the state until the new political organization resulting from the consultation of interested populations provided for in Article 5. During this period, New Caledonia will be trained and associated with the exercise of responsibilities in these areas in order to rebalance and prepare for this new stage (Nouméa Accord 1998).

Several of the objectives outlined by politicians can be framed in terms of the struggle for political (re)balance destabilized by unequal colonial relationships. The Kanak have made significant gains in political representation and recognition. Kanak nationalist parties dominate Provincial Assemblies in the North and Islands while maintaining a small but significant presence in the South Province Assembly. The Nouméa Accord also granted power to a Customary Senate responsible for consultation on issues related to Kanak culture. Despite these gains, some Kanak still believe the political scales are unbalanced and push for greater political power. At the same time some loyalists resent the minority rights and special privileges gained by the Kanak population.

Until now, political rebalancing has been part of the decolonization narrative established by the Accords. Today, political rebalancing is defined by views on self-determination, decolonization, the transfer of powers, the referenda on independence, and the electoral bodies. Politicians’ interpretations of these themes correspond to their stance on political rebalancing in favor of Kanak or Caledonian populations. In the midst of this tension, the UN is considered an impartial protector of indigenous rights for nationalists and a watchdog to loyalist parties frustrated with seeming favoritism.
SELF-DETERMINATION AS A RIGHT

During decolonization, self-determination was exclusively defined as the right to independence (Barelli 2011). By 2007, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples redefined who has the right to self-determination and what self-determination means:

Article 3 - Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 4 - Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.

UNDRIP (2007) states that all people have the right to self-determination:

Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, affirm the fundamental importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

However, only indigenous groups affected by colonialism and geographically distant from their colonizers can express self-determination through full sovereignty (Berg 2009; Niezen 2003; Palayret 2004; Weller 2009; Kolvurova 2010).

Loyalists and nationalists agree that self-determination implies the right to decide on the future of one’s country. They even agree that it is an inherent right. But there is strong divergence on who has this inherent right. Loyalists maintain that the inherent right to determine one’s future should be available to everyone living in New Caledonia:

One man, one vote […] You need to ask people what they want. We are talking about self-determination. Self-determination means that one day you can vote (Blaise Interview 2014).
Self-determination is the right to arrange themselves. In the current state of the situation, I believe that somewhere, we have more or less reached self-determination […] So while we see today in relation to your question of self-determination stops at a big word, because it is the right of peoples to arrange themselves. Because today, in my opinion, we have almost reached that. Since today the key to our future is in our hands and the hands of France (Bernut Interview 2014).

Loyalist blocs UCF and FPU view self-determination as a shared right for all inhabitants of the country seeking a voice on the future of their country. The inclusive approach to political rebalancing stems from the French concept of universal suffrage, liberty, and equality, common destiny as equal rights for all, and the minority view of Caledonian victimization and Kanak privilege following the Accords. In later sections, I explore the extent to which this inclusive vision of self-determination underpins the loyalists’ argument for an inclusive special electorate and comprehensive citizenship.

Nationalists believe political rebalancing will be achieved through the exclusive right to self-determination. The view that self-determination is a right that should be restricted to the Kanak or the Kanak and other victims of history is the result of French colonialism and victimization and supported by a restricted citizenship that creates the frozen electorate. Nationalists range from the more exclusionary frame that promotes self-determination as a right only for Kanak or Melanesians to sharing the right with other “victims of history” and those excluded through colonialism.

Since over 30 years now one has agreed to share this right to self-determination that belongs to us, the colonized people, others are not colonized, they are part of the history of colonization but we were really colonized by a people that is the French people. And that is the challenge to Kanak people is how to share with others who are there already for a long time, there are some who are there from the beginning of colonization, so how to ensure to share this right then with the others (Wamytan Interview 2014).
[T]he issue of independence is above all a right. All peoples have the right to decide what they want for their future (Washetine Interview 2014).

This sharing is on behalf of the Kanak, giving them power over inclusion – a direct response to the perpetual view of France as a colonizer and perpetrator of historical victimization of Kanaks. Anti-colonial self-determination and indigenous self-determination is characterized by groups with distinct ethnic and historic claims to a pre-colonial territory (Halperin, Schefer, and Small 1992). For Kanak, the right to self-determination is therefore a method for Kanak to regain the dignity that was lost during colonization and a principle of decolonization after WWII and international agreements under the United Nations. These two frames are interwoven by Roch Wamytan (Interview 2014):

Self-determination is a right because of the fact that we were colonized by another country, another people came from faraway Europe who did not ask permission, they took possession of New Caledonia. Then they colonized New Caledonia, and since 1946, at the level of the United Nations there has been a decision to give freedom to the people who were colonized by European powers.

For members of UC-FLNKS, DUS, and UNI-PALIKA the right to self-determination is shared among others who have been victims of colonization (Kanak, Communards and their descendants the Caldoche, and other forced laborers brought to New Caledonia during French colonialism) and is therefore something that is owed – particularly to the Kanak.

[I]n 1983, 30 years ago now, during the negotiations at Nainville-les-Roches (France) between representatives of the French State, the Independence Front and the ‘Rally for Caledonia in the Republic’, the Kanak People, wishing to exercise its right to self-determination, nevertheless agreed to include in the referendum electorate those considered to be ‘victims of history’, in other words the descendants of settlers, convicts and ‘Communards’. It is for this reason that the electorate for the referendum on self-determination was extended to those to whom the Kanak were willing to reach out to build the future country together (Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 5).
The question was about that the Kanak people have the right to be decolonized, but what about the other people who live in NC. The decolonization of Kanak people doesn't mean the other people have to leave. All these people built the country (Goa Interview 2014).

All peoples have the right to decide what they want [desire] to do for themselves, for their country, for their land [homeland], for their subsoil [underground], their environment ... and their right there to share it with others, those who came [later]. They were considered to have been somewhat victims of colonization, because they lived in the same exclusion (Washetine Interview 2014).

This shared approach to political rebalancing results in a restricted definition of the special electoral rolls and future citizenship. Which is why the referendum itself is described as a Kanak right, the ultimate expression of self-determination. The Labor Party (PT) however, views self-determination as a uniquely Kanak right:

This story [the Accords] will inevitably lead to independence and the Kanak will claim their rights, others will go along. ‘[…] The electorate is frozen more restrictive than provincial referendum, and it is favorable to Kanak’ (Policy Explanations 2013).

Here LKU is arguing that the Accords must lead to full sovereignty because the Kanak have the upper hand in the restricted referendum electorate. Moreover, he is saying that the other communities in New Caledonia must accept the restricted electorate and its bias in favor of the Kanak.

Loyalists believe political rebalancing is only possible through the inclusive right to self-determination. In reference to the negotiations preceding the Events in the mid-1980s, Blaise says:

We came with the vision, one man, one vote. The Kanaks came with the vision, only Kanak people can vote. And in their speech they were victims of history, which is a way to say we have a lower dignity. So we couldn’t strike an agreement and a few months later we have the events: violence, deaths (Blaise Interview 2014).
An inclusive right to self-determination is the result of perceived Caledonian victimization, French values of liberty and equality, and the idea of holding a common destiny through a shared right to decide the country’s future. This view is supported by a sliding electorate and inclusive or expanded citizenship. Indeed, loyalist leader Blaise views an exclusive or restricted right to self-determination and the right to vote on Provincial elections as undignified.

The Role of the United Nations: Watchdog or Guardian of Self-determination?

Nationalists view the UN as their protector or guardian who has granted them freedom of self-determination.

Decolonization and freedom is a right granted and ensured by the UN […] At the UN level there has been a decision to give freedom to the people who were colonized by European powers (Wamytan Interview 2014).

[Néaoutyine stated] I want to reassure those who allow themselves to be overwhelmed by the irrational fear of an uncertain future by reminding them that the Nouméa Accord, the political decolonization process guaranteed by the French and regularly monitored by the United Nations, will culminate in a genuine democratic act. Caledonian citizens will be able to choose freely and consciously, in time, the future that we want for our country (The Vows 2014).

For some nationalists, UNDRIP and the UN’s commitment to indigenous self-determination is taken to mean that independence will surely result from the referenda. In some ways this view is supported by the perspective that the Kanak as the original victims of colonization and only truly indigenous people in New Caledonia should outnumber other communities in the referendum electorate. The UN also serves a secondary, and more practical role as a counterbalance to French power by monitoring the progression of the Nouméa Accord.

Since the Committee of signatories of 2007 in Paris, and for seven years we raised this issue of the electoral roll, but facing the silence or shortcomings of the French State we came before the United Nations five times in one year to claim each time
the strict respect of the Nouméa accord concerning the establishment of electoral roll of the provincial special electoral body and that of the self-determination referendum so as to avoid the many maintained ambiguities which are found sources of fraud. The last Committee meeting of the signatories in Paris from October 3rd has decided to postpone again the issue at stake. Now, we find ourselves in an impasse. The time has therefore come Mr. Chairman, five years from the end of the third decade for eradication of colonialism and four years from the referendum provided by the Nouméa accord to solicit the United Nations and, in particular, the Committee of 24, a formal mediation with France so that the referendum on self-determination scheduled for 2018 happens in conditions of transparency and sincerity and that no one can challenge the ballot results (Wamytan Statement to the UN 2014, 2).

Wamytan, in particular, has a close relationship with the United Nations. He was one of the most outspoken advocates for returning New Caledonia to the list of Non-Self Governing Territories, which led to the renewal of emancipation efforts in the country after 1986. Since then, the UN has been an observer of the decolonization process. The UN monitors France’s involvement and receive regular reports on the transfer of powers and progression towards the referenda. As a result, the members of UC-FLNKS and UNI-PALIKA view this international organization as a protector of self-determination and indigenous rights: an ally that can balance the power of France.

No one has forgotten, in fact, how this same UN was slammed in March [2014], when its delegations that visited Noumea focused on the restricted electorate and the process of decolonization. Philippe Gomès, member of the second district, had called the move a ‘farce’, Jean-Claude Briault, a member of the Martin government at the time, deemed it ‘inappropriate’ while Pierre Frogier, president of Rassemblement-UMP, called it an ‘affront’ (Squillario 2014).

[Yanno stated] this [UN] mission brings tension and confusion, when we need clarity and serenity (Squillario 2014).

Loyalists view the UN as a watchdog that exists to stir up ‘tension’ and ‘confusion.’ Since France is a sovereign state the UN has a narrow jurisdiction over domestic issues. Their involvement is limited by the goodwill of the French government. New Caledonia’s place on the
list of Non-Self-Governing Territories means that the UN does have some authority to oversee and make recommendations for the administering power and the local government. However loyalists believe that the UN is overstepping its bounds by sending observer missions to the country. Furthermore, Wamytan’s call for UN intervention on the electoral issue has been met with little success. The UN has no basis for demanding France had over the allegedly missing information about the 1998 Nouméa Accord referendum roster. As a result of these juxtaposed views the UN seems to have remained a silent sympathizer to the indigenous-nationalist struggle without making any huge moves to counter French policies in regards to their handling of the referenda or electoral rolls.

After the UN Special Committee’s second visit to New Caledonia early in 2014, their recommendations included (Report of the UN Mission 2014, 23-24):

The mission also stresses the importance for all concerned to guarantee the full implementation of the Nouméa Accord by urgently undertaking genuine efforts to address current shortcomings in its implementation, particularly concerning the restricted electorate provisions.

The mission calls upon the administering Power to take all measures necessary to address the concerns expressed with regard to the question of the promotion of the systematic influx of foreign immigrants into the Territory.

The mission considers that for the future of New Caledonia it is essential that the recommendations contained in the 2011 report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, in particular those concerning Kanak participation in the political arena and governance (see A/HRC/18/35/Add.6, paras. 72-76) and those relating to social and economic disparities (ibid., paras. 84-88), be urgently implemented.

The UN mission paid particular attention to the electoral debate by urging all actors involved to undertake ‘genuine efforts’ to fix the problems associated with membership in the referendum electorate. One of their conclusions was critical of “misleading” and “insufficient” “information and awareness-raising campaigns targeting voters with respect to the right to vote” in the
provincial elections and the referenda (Report of the UN Mission 2014, 22). While the UN document is careful to blatantly point fingers, it does identify the shortcomings of the French government on protecting New Caledonia from the massive influx of Pacific and European migrants. Particularly since it has long been a French practice to marginalize Kanak by encouraging immigration. The UN is a steadfast supporter of the indigenous right to self-determination and responsible governance. However, this international body is also subject to the dictates of its members and France is part of the powerful UN Security Council.

DECOLONIZATION, THE NOUMÉA ACCORD, AND TRANSFER OF POWERS

The Matignon and Nouméa Accords are decolonization contracts between the French Republic, nationalists, and loyalists. However, only nationalists link self-determination to the concept of decolonization. They view the process of decolonization as part of the greater effort towards rebalancing the country: socially, politically, and economically. Again there is a pervasive theme of being owed, of righting the wrongs done by colonization. Rebalancing as part of the decolonization and self-determination narrative is achieved through freezing the provincial electorate, completing the transfer of all sovereign powers from France, and giving the Nouméa Accord full constitutional status (FLNKS 2001). For many, the natural conclusion of decolonization is independence or full sovereignty. Lalié (DNC 2014) even goes so far as to say that decolonization and independence will lead to greater Kanak control of the country. Goa (LNC 2013) states that decolonization should only be a bi-lateral discussion between the French Republic and Kanak nationalists – excluding loyalist Caledonians.

Much of the debate over the future of New Caledonia stems from different interpretations of the Nouméa Accord and how it frames the goals of decolonization. Signed to end a civil war
and create a project of peace in 1998, this document is still highly contested over fifteen years later.

The Matignon-Oudinot and Noumea Accords are decolonization agreements, which had the effect of restoring and maintaining peace in New Caledonia. Strictly speaking, they are not peace agreements as some senior French officials have claimed. These agreements were intended to place the Kanak back in a central position, and prepare the country to exercise its right to self-determination by fostering the emergence of a common consciousness within a New Caledonian citizenship arrangement. This in turn has its foundation in the definition of a special electoral body for provincial elections and the special electoral body for the poll on the passage of the territory to full sovereignty (Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 6).

We signed [the Nouméa Accord] with our European conceptions, trying to build a multicultural society that would be based on universal principles that could fit anyone whatever their skin color, religion, or ethnic origins (Blaise Interview 2014).

To the members of UC-FLNKS and UNI-PALIKA independence is the natural result of the decolonization process and the ultimate goal of the Nouméa Accord.

So today the Noumea Accords, it is the agreement of intelligence [cleverness or understanding]. And this is a decolonization Agreement, and as it is a deal of intelligence, it means that one day we will all agree on decolonization (Lalié Interview 2014).

For nationalists, self-determination is unequivocally defined as an inherent right. Its logical then, that nationalist Kanaks would seek full sovereignty as a means of control. Control that has been in short supply under French colonization. As a result, independence is equated with emancipation, liberation, and protection from exclusion. It is also defined as power to control decision-making.

The Matignon Accords have pointed this out to many they should be able to, like the Kanak were colonized, they can be independent. But it's true that it's a little complicated because they are the people who came [arrived later]. They arrived from France, particularly from the penal colony, they have arrived from Asia for work, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, and also Pacific peoples who arrived here. And
sometimes it's a bit complicated to share their idea or project of an independent country. And that's all the challenge of independence project led by Kanak.

Independence and a break with French rule, is for some nationalists, an opportunity to create a human-centered society:

The target of independence has to be a project for the society. People in the center of the project. Even though we are in 2014 and we have a lot of international companies here, it is important that human beings are at the center of the project and we have to do the project around the society (Paboty Interview 2014).

Victimization and French colonialism has strongly influenced views of the Nouméa Accord and its implementation. It is presented as a process towards full sovereignty, something that is unfinished and owed, yet irreversible.

We were made to swallow twenty years of Nouméa Accord so we want independence immediately (Néaoutyine 2014).

While this view does not directly alter the definition of the special electorate, it does influence how nationalists’ view a future New Caledonian domestic government. If decolonization means independence, and independence is defined as protection from exclusion, control over decision-making, and a human-centered society, it follows that a future government would include greater representation for Kanaks and broader integration of customary forms of governance.

Loyalists believe that the Nouméa Accord opens the possibility for outcomes other than independence:

Some here want to have no referendum and find another solution, such as is found in 1998, which was the Noumea Accord that installed, all that leads us here, and allowed in 1988 to no longer have civil war (Lafleur Interview 2014).

According to the UCF, the Accord was responsible for giving a voice to Caledonians and its goal was to build a multicultural society. For the FPU and CE the Nouméa Accord sets a precedent
for peaceful dialogue, consensus among factions, and mutual recognition. This vision is shaped by a perceived favoritism towards minority rights and the Kanak community under the Matignon Accord. The Nouméa Accord, loyalists therefore argue, created the foundation for a multicultural society with universal rights and inclusive mutual recognition of all populations living together in New Caledonia – a rejection of minority privilege. A multicultural society parallels loyalists’ vision of common destiny as living together with an inclusive citizenship. At the domestic government level, this view promotes a system of representation that embodies the multicultural population.

In an effort to foster political rebalancing between France and New Caledonia, the Nouméa Accord codified a process of devolution. Over two decades, France would cede all powers except for the five sovereign powers to the domestic government in New Caledonia. The referenda will mark the final decision on the remaining powers. There are two main views on the transfer of the remaining sovereign powers. The loyalists almost unanimously believe the transfer should be frozen. France would retain control of the five sovereign powers and continue to control the media. Loyalists argue that French control of the media prevents it from becoming a puppet of the New Caledonian elite and dangerously corrupted. There is a fear that the media will be used as tool to influence public opinion against association with France. Some loyalists who are open to the possibility of eventual independence advocate for the prolonged and slow devolution of the remaining powers – giving New Caledonia time to develop and support these institutions and gain essential training and experience handling them. Not surprisingly, nationalists argue for the immediate completion of the power transfer. While the powers that have already been transferred are irreversible, nationalists argue that to freeze the transfers now is equivalent to not upholding the Nouméa Accord. They fear that a third accord or continued
association will play in to France’s historical efforts to promote New Caledonian dependence on France. The Matignon and Nouméa Accords combined with French citizenship and an artificial standard of living were French attempts to maintain and encourage this dependency.

**ELECTORAL BODIES: FROZEN OR SLIDING**

The right to vote is a method of ensuring multicultural inclusion and equality for sub-state groups (Reilly 2001). It can also be a form of marginalization. In New Caledonia, the right to vote for provincial elections and the referenda is strongly linked to victimization, France’s colonial role, definitions of self-determination, citizenship and the Nouméa Accord. For nationalists, political rebalancing means creating equilibrium in immigration that reinforces a frozen electorate. Loyalists view the frozen electorate as an affront to the Republican ideals of equality and liberty and argue for a more inclusive voting body.

The Nouméa Accord and subsequent Organic Law of 1999 established three voting blocs in New Caledonia: 1) the French municipal, legislative, and presidential elections; 2) the domestic provincial and congressional elections; and 3) the referendum on independence (Brown 2013). All New Caledonian citizens and French nationals are members for the first electoral roll. According to the French Electoral Code, individuals must be registered in their home municipality or the one where they live (Maclellan 2006). To vote on the provincial and congressional assemblies, an individual must be part of a special electorate. The Electoral bodies compose a complex network of eligibility requirements based primarily on date and length of residence in New Caledonia with automatic inclusion given to all Kanak (Maclellan 2006; 2013) (see Table 3).
Table 3: Electoral Rolls and Eligibility Criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1998 Referendum Electorate</th>
<th>Full Electorate (General List)</th>
<th>Special Electoral Roll (Caledonian citizens)</th>
<th>2018-2022 Restricted Special Electoral Roll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resident of New Caledonia since November 6 1988</td>
<td>Universal Suffrage</td>
<td>Eligible to participate in Matignon Accord Referendum (November 8 1988)</td>
<td>Prove 20 years residence in New Caledonia prior to December 31 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered on electoral roll on November 9 1988 (for Matignon Accord)</td>
<td>Annex Table: Members of the full electorate but NOT the Special Electoral Roll</td>
<td>Registered before the 1998 referendum AND have ten years residency by 1998</td>
<td>Eligible for Nouméa Accord Referendum (November 8 1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility Requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Customary Civil Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>One parent born in New Caledonia AND main moral and material interests in the territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If born before January 1 1989: must be a resident of New Caledonia from 1988-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If born on or after January 1 1989: must be 18 years old by the date of the referendum AND have one parent who is a member of the electoral roll for the 1998 Nouméa Accord referendum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The restrictions on citizenship and voting rights are highly contested. The restricted provincial electorate began to balance the Kanak and non-Kanak voting population and created a 60-40 split in favor of loyalists. Additional restrictions clarified in 2007 further narrowed the referendum electorate, creating more of a 50-50 split between the two factions. In both situations, recent immigrants are marginalized and the indigenous population’s political power is promoted. Nationalists would say this is a fair solution to France’s historic push for immigration and intentionally creating a Kanak minority. A lack of electoral restriction is viewed as an underhanded attempt to avoid fulfilling the principles of UNDRIP and self-determination. Loyalists argue that the voting restrictions go against the very principles of the French Republic and the concept of liberty and equality.

On March 15th 1999, the French Constitutional Court ruled that French citizens in New Caledonia, regardless of their date of arrival – but having lived there for at least ten years – could participate in provincial elections. Independence leaders believed that the special electoral roll would be frozen after 1998 (Maclellan 2006). Meaning that all future voters would have to be descendants of those present in 1998. However, some argued that the ten-year residency requirement applied to any election date, even after 1998: congruent with the Constitutional Court’s ruling. Therefore, individuals who could prove habitation in New Caledonia since 2004 would be able to vote in the 2014 congressional and provincial elections.

French nationals in New Caledonia who were excluded from the 1998 Nouméa Accord referendum argued that these eligibility requirements were illegal under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They wanted to be reinstated on the special electoral roll. In January 2005 the European Court on Human Rights upheld the restrictive eligibility requirements. The debate was eventually resolved in 2007 by the French Congress. The
Congress stated that the special electoral roll should be restricted to individuals that were 1) registered voters prior to the 1998 referendum and 2) met the ten-year frozen residency requirement. The residency requirement is frozen, meaning that individuals had to have been residents for ten years since 1988. Individual who do not meet these requirements are part of the “Annex Table.” Each year however, magistrates from Paris rule on individuals hoping to move from the Annex Table to the Special Electoral List (Maclellan 2013). This includes young people who have turned 18 and others who have gathered evidence to prove their registration and ten-year residency. The most recent debate regarded this process.

First, pro-independence parties argue that approximately 1,800 young Kanaks, who obviously fall under the eligibility requirements, are only registered on the general roll and not on the special electoral role (Maclellan 2013). Second, pro-independence parties led by Roch Wamytan challenged approximately 6,720 voters who nationalists believe should be removed from the special electoral roll (Chappell 2014). In response, anti-independence parties have sought an end to voting restrictions and the creation of a sliding citizenship that would un-freeze the ten-year residency restriction (Maclellan 2013). Wamytan’s challenge was taken to the French court of appeals, the European Court of Human Rights, and the UN. The result was three provincial commissions (that included a judge, French state official, and local politicians) tasked with reviewing each case for exclusion and inclusion on the roll. The political divisions in each commission resulted in widely varying results in each province. Most exclusions were validated in the North and few in the South. In the end it was a moot issue because the four loyalists representing New Caledonia in the French Parliament merely dismissed the issue and the French court of appeals dismissed all pending cases. A commission led by the UN Decolonization Committee was called in by Wamytan in June 2014 reiterated that the Nouméa Accord is
interpreted differently (Chappell 2014).

Some resolution finally came about during the 2014 Signatories Committee in Paris. Each provincial commission would be revised to include one or two judges and one loyalist and one nationalist elected official (Chappell 2014). The commission would also continue to include a local mayor and French official, but in a purely consultative role. In addition, the requirements for consideration on the restricted special electoral roll (for the referenda) was further clarified (See Table 3). If a person cannot claim twenty years residency or was eligible for the Nouméa Accord referendum in 1998, they must meet one of the following criteria: they must be born in New Caledonia and have at least one parent who was eligible for the 1998 Nouméa Accord Referendum, or; they must have their primary moral and material interests in New Caledonia and have at least one parent who was born in New Caledonia. Membership in the restricted special electoral role and the special electoral roles are heavily based on residency, economic connection to, and sense of belonging in New Caledonia.

Loyalists believe that the provincial electorate and the electoral body that can vote on the referendum should be sliding.

Because for us French people, hail to the French revolution and the rights and it is a sacrifice to accept that some French citizens cannot vote for the provincial elections and the referendum which are very important because they provide the congress which decides taxes and for everyday politics, so it is hard to accept that (Blaise Interview 2014).

In fact the electorate, it is very simple. It is a demand of the pro-independence leaders all the time. Because the problem was actually the separatists in the 1980s. They were afraid of mass immigration waves that threatened to overwhelm them, drown them. It is a reality. This was a danger. The result is that the Noumea Accord was signed on the basis of a sliding electoral body. That is to say 10 years in order to vote. Except that the organic law that was signed just after 1999 was drafted in such manner that it [the electorate] may not be slippery. And that led, in 2007, to an amendment to the French Constitution. And then, after that were events that led to the recent applications for removal (Bernut Interview 2014).
A sliding electoral body would allow more Caledonians and their children the right to vote on the referendum. The primary electoral narrative presented by the loyalists is one of exclusion. Some even claim that electoral exclusion is a form of Kanak victimization. Loyalists argue that the 2007 provincial electoral body excludes a number of Caledonians and other who should be allowed to vote on the referendum. The current definition of the electoral body is viewed as unjust and disrespectful, sparking a violent reaction among constituents and has created a ‘festering wound.’ This festering wound is exacerbated by attempts by nationalist parties to remove approximately 7,000 Caledonians from the provincial register. Loyalists like Poadja consider this attempt undemocratic and dangerous. They claim it is based on a biased interpretation of the Nouméa Accord perpetuated by Kanak afraid of marginalization.

[Poadja said, the] undemocratic nature of the electorate is a challenge to the fundamental values of New Caledonian society and is dangerous (Mainguet 2012).

Narratives of fear, exclusion, and democratic injustice are not limited to loyalist rhetoric. The sliding electorate is linked to fears of French government manipulation and nationalist concerns about France undermining democracy. France is portrayed as both a colonizer and a villain in this situation. A villain who intentionally disrupts and hinders the decolonization and independence process by siding with Caledonians on the electoral debate. Nationalists accuse France of intentionally withholding information about the 1998 electoral registers leading to a loss of trust and confidence between the two.

[T]he May election results were made with questionable lists showing that this system [the sliding electorate] has become a weapon against the colonized people, a system that claims to be democratic, but which turns against independence and autonomy (Wamytan 2014).
Congruent with UC-FLNKS, DUS perceives France as a neo-colonial power that: perpetuates inequalities, victimized and minoritized the Kanak, and continues to hinder independence by failing to freeze the electorate based on the agreed terms of eligibility. Linked to the electoral debate and the cause of much of it is the immigration of metropolitans and others to New Caledonia. Nationalists do not hesitate to accuse France of actively promoting immigration and thus the minoritization of Kanak. Immigration is considered a deliberate form of colonial settlement, a barrier to full sovereignty, and submerges Kanak independence. One form immigration takes is the importation of French public servants who contribute to wage inequalities and are accused of hindering local employment in the public sector.

The history of decolonization has also shown the need for vigilance when we see what the colonial system has been capable of: excluding indigenous peoples from the right to vote, colonial settlement, real-fake colonial referenda, rigging of elections, etc. (Wamytan Special Committee on Decolonization 2013).

Regarding the right to vote, including the right to vote for the self-determination referendum, they [the UN] apply the principle of the affected or concerned people. That is to say that the population is not the colonized people here. But it depends on the entity, the entity here is New Caledonia, New Caledonia decides if the notion of ‘population concernée’ is to be applied. If New Caledonia decides that no, it's only Kanak people who should be expressed because it is they who have been colonized, the UN says ok (Wamytan Interview 2014).

According to nationalists, the sliding electorate threatens decolonization by undermining the spirit of the Nouméa Accord (as outlined by Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014), perpetuating inequality, and excluding Kanak who should be allowed to vote on the referenda. Goa and Wamytan even go so far as to compare the electorate to the Lemoine Statutes. France is accused of perpetuating a slippery electorate that promotes restricted suffrage, rigged elections, and real-fake referenda. They reference the actions of Machoro and protests against false systems. Eloi Machoro was a militant independence leader during the 1980s (Maclellan 2006).
The Statutes, named after the Overseas Secretary of State Georges Lemoine, further delayed independence and reiterated French control despite giving marginal concessions to the Kanak (Fisher 2013). In response to the Lemoine Statues Machoro used a traditional ceremonial axe to break a ballot box in Canala and raised support for boycotting the elections (Maclellan 2006). Machoro’s act marked the beginning of the Events.

For the nationalists, France has been a key player and hindering force to the resolution of the electoral debates. The French government is repeatedly accused of manipulating the situation to perpetuate a colonial dependent relationship.

The UC with other independence parties set in place this project to check the validity of the electorate, the people who can or cannot vote according to the Noumea Accord. There are 6,700 people were taken off the list. This was rejected by the courts and is now in appeal. It is still the same spirit from Nainville les Roche that outside people shouldn't be able to vote in the future because there is not a Caledonian society or people. There are 3 parts, people for independence and those against and the state who is a moderator. But if they do not freeze the electorate then the state is not impartial (Goa Interview 2014).

The continued refusal of France to turn over voting lists and registers from 1998 has spread fear among nationalists.

There are three parts: people for independence, those against it, and the state who is a moderator. But if they do not freeze the electorate then the state [France] is not impartial. The loyalists have the right to speak and be part of the decision just like in Nainville-les-Roches. One of the key issues is the electorate and for the moment it is not respected by the state so they are not impartial. We wrote to the Overseas Minister to ask for an answer about the electorate and transfer of competencies and communes and we didn't get the answer we wanted so we are waiting. In November we hope to have an answer because the President of France is coming then and we will have a protest. The UC, if the state doesn't freeze the electoral body, we will vote once, but not the other two times. Normally there are three referenda, but we will only vote once. If the electorate doesn't respect the agreement, the result of the referendum will not be a fair vote. Machoro broke the ballot box because the vote shouldn't take place if it is not fair. If the first referendum is based on a false result/electorate the other two do not have to happen, we will go back to the state and be a colonized people again (Goa Interview 2014).
France will do everything possible to prevent our countries attaining full sovereignty: attempts to neutralize and to destabilize pro-Independence political parties and national liberation movements, killings of pro-Independence leaders, manipulation and destabilization practices tried and tested in former French colonies. ‘Françafrique’ is an example (Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 12).

Without these lists it may be impossible for nationalists to succeed in gaining a 50/50 split in the referendum special electorate. Which would mean that it would be even more difficult for them to convince and even greater population of loyalists or people on the fence to vote in favor of an option that includes full sovereignty. It is clear to nationalists that France continues to act like a colonial overlord, promoting what Wamytan calls a red line policy against independence. The red line policy is “the policy of the French Government, which aims to make the Kanak a minority in order to maintain its sovereignty and interests in New Caledonia and Oceania” (Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 2).

These [Matignon and Nouméa] agreements are important steps on the road to emancipation and decolonization. But there remains a long way to go against a State which pursues a principle with its overseas territories: the red line of prohibited independence […] This red line of forbidden independence also clouds the issue of the establishment of the lists of citizens eligible to take part in voting for the elections due in May 2014 (Wamytan UNGA 2013, 2).

In particular, Wamytan and other nationalists are critical of the annual decisions on who is added or removed from the special electoral roles. In response to the 1,900 Kanak excluded from the special electoral list and addition of 3,000 foreign born during the April 2013 annual ruling on the lists, he said to the UNGA:

It is therefore essential that France keep its word and that the lists be drawn up in a completely transparent and equitable way in order to avoid the risk of electoral malpractice. The State cannot remain restricted to a constant position of neutrality, always maintaining an equal distance between the parties; its role as a major player in decolonization must be played transparently and fairly in the process of preparing the electoral rolls (Wamytan UNGA 2013).
France’s actions are critically viewed by nationalists who claim the state continues to be unsupportive, ambiguous, anomalous, and fraudulent despite their claims to be an impartial arbiter of the transition to the conclusion of the Nouméa Accord. Nationalists’ preoccupation with the electoral lists is the result of increasing political marginalization due to an increase in internal and external immigration. As loyalists advocate for a sliding electorate, nationalists are actively trying to freeze and even reverse the expansion of the electoral body. They argue that the freezing of the electorate outlined in the Nouméa Accord was not respected. Instead nationalists and Kanak have been abused and wronged: they are once again victims.

The question of the electorate, in principle, must finally define it, to prevent a French immigration can, whenever upset a balance that has already been arrested. It is this constantly French immigration, which makes it difficult to make at some point that this country can access the full sovereignty. It's hard at one point to tell who is a citizen, build citizenship and common destiny. This is difficult because every time if not stop this immigration, one can admit immigration but should not she have the right to vote because it upsets a delicate balance (Pabouty Interview 2014).

The first big argument was over the electorate in 1998. […] they won’t go to the referendum if the electorate is not frozen. If all the time people from outside come to the country and vote, they will mess up the vote, they want to freeze the electorate. So they received a call from France saying that it is ok, the electorate is frozen, we can go to the Noumea Accord and the referendum (Goa Interview 2014).

[A] lot of people were brought from outside and from France to work here and they are under a long term contract that cannot be broken (except in extreme cases) – so those people from France are here for the long term and New Caledonians have to wait for them to resign to get those jobs. They would like a revolution of their mentality. The people coming from other places are having a counter effect on the political favoritism of people here. Since 1995 around 30,000 French from the metropole came here and 15,000 Polynesians and those people are coming here and having jobs in administration and they are entrepreneurs (Lalié Interview 2014).
Nationalists claim that immigration is a deliberate French strategy to marginalize indigenous populations. They point to previous examples in other French overseas territories. This is one of the reasons nationalists continue to call on the help and oversight of the UN: an international body that is their only recourse for counterbalancing French power.

In addition, the Kanak People is being suffocated by a large-scale immigration policy from the French overseas territories and from France. The Kanak People is increasingly becoming a smaller minority in its own country. The migratory flow has increased significantly since the signing of the Matignon and Noumea Accords [...] This immigration is mainly into the Southern Province where the specter of partition is taking shape through settlement mostly by Europeans. The scenario is well known, it failed in the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) in 1980 but worked for the island of Mayotte in the Comoros Islands in 1975. The UN has also been criticizing France since 1975 for the illegal occupation of Mayotte. Over 20 resolutions were passed for that purpose, so far with no tangible results. This mass immigration harms the decolonization process and the right to self-determination and Independence of the colonized people, the Kanak people, and that of the New Caledonian citizens to whom the Kanak People has reached out to build a free and independent country. The goal is clear, it is to populate New Caledonia (in line with Prime Minister Mesmer’s circular in 1972) in order to submerge the Kanak demographically and thus deprive them of access to Independence (Wamytan Special Committee 2013).

At present, we entertain doubts and are assuming, and this needs to be verified, that the colonial settlement, which is still ongoing from mainland France, is a ‘deliberate’ form of colonial settlement. This would mean that some people, who arrive, especially for positions in the public service, are encouraged to come to New Caledonia because they meet the criteria to be able to vote in the poll on the accession of the territory to full sovereignty. However, according to the Plan of Action for the Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, ‘Administering Powers should ensure that any exercises of the right to self-determination are not affected by changes in the demographic composition of the Territories under their administration as a result of immigration or the displacement of the peoples of the Territories’ (Wamytan Special Committee 2013).

In the past, political balance has been upset by rampant immigration. This immigration, which they argue was intentionally encouraged by France, has made the Kanak a political minority within their country. The freeze itself would promote voting rights for those living in New
Caledonia prior to 1998, born in the country, or those holding customary status. These requirements are part of the nationalists’ effort towards a political rebalancing.

The pro-independence parties advocate for restricted voting rights, in part, because of French–orchestrated migration during the nickel boom in the 1970s and subsequent intentional marginalization of Kanak voters (Chappell 2014). A frozen electorate is a method for reversing the imbalances that immigration has created, subsequently removing some Caledonian from the register that do not meet the requirements. While the nationalist’s electoral narrative might seem overwhelmingly exclusionary, Wamytan (2013) reminds us that the right to vote on the referenda is an aspect of self-determination and that self-determination that is the inherent right of the colonized indigenous people in New Caledonia. According to UC-FLNKS, DUS, and UNI-PALIKA, this right is one that has been shared with other “victims of history” including the Communards and their descendants. Some nationalists like Louis Kotra Uregei from PT believe the referenda are the gateway to independence and the electorate should exclude the debated Caledonians. For many, however, the goal is not to exclude all non-Kanak, just those who do not meet the criteria set out in the Nouméa Accord.

RESTRICTED, OPEN, OR DUAL CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship was redefined with the transformation of liberation movements into movements for self-determination (Banting and Kymlicka 2004). International and local discourses on human rights and views of the ‘other’ inform governance and self-determination. Perceptions of citizenship reflect and sometimes mirror those boundaries. Imagined spaces are created by grouping communities under common labels like ‘indigenous’ or ‘citizen.’ Labeling these groups gives the organizer significant power over the rights these groups receive. For
example, the UN decided that only indigenous groups geographically distant from their former colonizers have the right to self-determination in the form of independence. The UN has created an imagined space occupied by indigenous groups that meet these criteria. The UN, as an international organization, also has the power to get involved in sovereign state issues by giving these indigenous groups the right to exercise self-determination. Citizenship will then change depending on how self-determination is exercised by the indigenous group.

Indigenous movements in New Caledonia, Guyana, and French Polynesia emphasize the differences between indigenous people and French citizens. Unique minority rights have been granted to indigenous populations as a result (Trepied 2012). The indigenous label gives Kanak special rights to independence and reparations outlined by the UN. Moving forward, the citizen label will determine a person’s right to work, vote, and participate in the future of New Caledonia.

“During this period, signs will be given of the gradual recognition of a citizenship of New Caledonia, which must express the chosen common destiny and be able, after the end of the period, to become a nationality, should it be so decided, The entitlement to vote in elections to new Caledonia’s own local assemblies will be restricted to persons with a certain period of prior residence in New Caledonia. In order to take into account the limited size of the employment market, provision will be made to give priority access to local employment to persons residing on a long-term basis in New Caledonia […] At the end of a period of twenty years, the transfer to New Caledonia of the reserved powers, its achievement of full international responsibility status and the conversion of citizenship into nationality, will be voted upon by the people concerned. […] One of the principles of the political agreement is the recognition of a citizenship of New Caledonia. This reflects the chosen common destiny and would be organized after the end of the term of the agreement, in nationality, if it is decided. For this period, the notion of citizenship is restricted to the electorate, for elections to the institutions of the country, and for final consultation. It will also be a reference for the development of the provisions to be defined to maintain local employment […] A reference to the name of the country will be placed on identity documents, as a sign of citizenship” (Nouméa Accord 1998).

The Accords first introduced the concept of a New Caledonian citizenship (Marrani
New Caledonian citizenship is localized and held concurrently with a French nationality (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz 2008). Citizenship was organized “as a transitory solution between the one of ‘French citizenship-French nationality’ and that of ‘full citizenship-New Caledonia nationality’” (Marrani 2006, 25). Although “New Caledonian citizenship-French nationality” recognizes the particular rights of the indigenous population, they are still considered part of the French nation (Marrani 2006, 25). Kanak are viewed as an overseas French community within the greater French nation, despite significant recognition of their own cultural identity. French views of a collective overseas and metropolitan population have long been used to justify and reinforce continued territorial inclusion in the French state. French leaders have deployed the concept to refuse calls for greater autonomy and independence in New Caledonia. “In the case of New Caledonia, the conservative French view seems to be that ‘relinquishment’ by France of New Caledonia to full self-determination will imply a setback to French nationalism, a blow to national revival or have some kind of negative impact on French regional and global interests” (Rumley 2006, 241). This ideology rings hollow as a number of the loyalist leaders I interviewed view their Franco-New Caledonian identity as distinct from the French metropolitan identity.

We people here in NC are different from the people in France. We have different values. It is quite funny when young people from NC go to France they feel like they are in a foreign country, almost like if you were in Canada. We speak the same language, we see the same movies, but we are not the same people because we don't live in the same society (Blaise Interview 2014).

The Nouméa Accord has been criticized for giving second-class citizenship to French nationals, but not citizens, living in New Caledonia. Defining New Caledonian citizenship and membership is a critical part of the eligibility requirements for the provincial and restricted special electorates. The electorates are divided into those who have the right to express their opinion in the final referendum on independence, those who are New Caledonian citizens, and those French
nationals who live in New Caledonia and are or are not citizens (Chauchat and Cogliati-Bantz, 2008).

The right to citizenship and eligibility to become a citizen is complicated by recent immigrants, national identities, and electoral law. Table 3 shows that all members of the special electorate that has the right to vote on provincial and territorial elections are citizens. Citizenship is primarily based on how long an individual has resided in New Caledonia. In this case, ten years of residency were required by 1998. However not all citizens are part of the restricted special electorate that are able to vote on the referenda. The problem is that most recent migrants are not considered citizens and have no well-defined means of applying to become a citizen until the referenda are concluded. Debate among politicians over the fate of these recent immigrants is a source of contention. There is broad agreement among nationalists and loyalists that citizenship implies the right to vote in provincial elections and to hold local employment (see Figure 3). If citizenship is awarded to more recent immigrants they will flood the voting population and most likely further marginalize Kanak in the electorate. Tensions about citizenship are thus based on nationality (Kanak, Caledonian, or something else) and the immigrants living in New Caledonia who do not currently have the right to vote in provincial elections. Most nationalists favor a more restricted singular or dual citizenship. Congruent with their other policies, loyalists advocate for an inclusive citizenship.
According to Lafleur (Interview 2014), inclusive citizenship is based on the idea that independence and restricted citizenship will lead to isolation and without immigration there can be no development.

So when the French come here, metropolitan, they no longer have the right to work is local employment. We closed in on ourselves. And to be successful, a country needs people, and for a cheaper life, because that is the big issue here, it must be numerous. If you have a market that is too small and cannot afford to support people, life will become more expensive. And that is very difficult to explain to Caledonian. To live on an island 20,000 km away from the metropolis, in a little world, you cannot negotiate prices on the outside. You are dependent on whatever happens. And the cost of living is increasing and people do not understand why. So I am afraid that this [restricted] citizenship closes the country even more and will not allow its development (Lafleur Interview 2014).

The UCF and FPU promote a Caledonian citizenship that meets the goals of common destiny and self-determination as a right for all. Since common destiny is about all of the inhabitants
living together and they consider self-determination to be something that everyone should have a right to, they believe citizenship should be inclusive, not exclusive.

So the idea of a common destiny, actually is related to the notion of citizenship. For us, the party from which I come, eventually citizenship it must be the common point between the gathering Pacific values, values Kanak and French values. These are also fully compatible, since freedom, equality, brotherhood with respect for elders, customs etc. are quite reconcilable (Bernut Interview 2014).

You cannot be a respectable citizen without sacrificing your personal history. That is why I believe in New Caledonia sometimes we need to forget we a French and take the example of the English speaking countries because your vision is more universal because … France has lived too long as a mono-ethnic country so it does not have the software to adapt to this new reality in the world. But what happens in New Caledonia happens in a lot of places. It is more acute because there is a contrast between white or Asian people and the Kanaks, because they are living in a Neolithic civilization two centuries ago, but the problem is the same people will experience in a lot of countries (Blaise Interview 2014).

Loyalists argue that citizenship should be based on unifying factors like a common memory, shared history, equal rights, and the will to live together rather than ethnicity or colonial impact. This type of citizenship, they argue, would be a better draw for much needed immigrants with technical and specialized skills. In response to Kanak criticisms of open citizenship, loyalists claim that “respectable citizens” sacrifice their personal histories for the greater good.

All nationalists support a restricted citizenship – at least initially. They recognize that at some point a decision will have to be made on the percentage of the population that cannot vote on the referenda. But for now, there is widespread agreement that citizenship should be restricted to those allowed to vote in provincial elections, including other “victims of history.” On this topic, the UC-FLNKS and DUS are both inclusive and exclusive. They agree with others that the right to vote and to hold local employment should be among the defining factors determining citizenship.
In order to support or promote local employment, New Caledonia provides a measure of benefits for the citizens of New Caledonia, and people who can demonstrate a sufficient period of residence, aimed at promoting the exercise of employment, provided they do not infringe the individual and collective benefits enjoyed at the date of their publication of the other employees. Such measures are applied in the same way for the public services of New Caledonia and the municipal public service. New Caledonia can also take action to restrict the attainment or the exercise of a profession for people who cannot justify a sufficient length of residence (Organic Law Article 24 1999, 13).

However they also believe that citizens should have or have cultivated a sense of belonging to the island territory. According to UNI-PALIKA, citizenship might be restricted to the victims of history, but it is also viewed as inclusive: sharing resources without aggregating communities, leading to a sense of belonging and patriotism. The biggest issue regarding citizenship is the inhabitants that are not eligible to vote in Provincial elections because they currently do not have any official status in the country.

If we stay within the framework of the Nouméa Accord it is planned like this: Caledonian citizens who can vote on the referendum and other citizens become nationals. For others it's part of the negotiations, the discussions for the final transfer [of powers] with the State and some communities will wish to remain French […] In fact, to simplify things, the subject of the discussion will be about the 25,000 [who are not already citizens]. If the referendum is held next year, and the result is positive, what will we do with the 25,000 people? And what do they want to do? Do they want access to the nationality of the country or keep French nationality and still live here? So you have to draft a statute for them. Because they are currently Caledonians here who have dual nationality, Australian, Algeria. Algeria has given [citizenship] to descendants of Algerian nationality, because Algeria recognized that there is a piece of their people in the Pacific (Wamytan Interview 2014).

Some loyalists and nationalists are promoting the formation of a double or dual citizenship. Where, if independence occurs, citizens can choose whether they want to have Caledonian or French and Caledonian citizenship. In a few cases, nationalists instead promote a dual ethnic nationality rather than dual citizenship. Dual nationality could take the form of a Kanak
citizenship that acknowledges New Caledonian nationalist or tribal and clan affiliations. With the rampant increase in immigration from Europe and the Pacific it will be important to determine what status the 25,000 will have after a decision on the referenda is made. The inclusion of these non-Kanak populations in the provincial electorate will significantly change the political landscape. Most of these populations typically align with loyalists, further marginalizing the Kanak. But it is their fear of Kanak control and the possibility that Kanak nationalists in an independent New Caledonia would force them to assimilate to Kanak culture that drive them to align with anti-independence loyalists. If an agreement could be reached about the possible options for these inhabitants after the referenda, it might go a long way to allaying their fears and result in greater cooperation in the negotiations preceding the referenda.

**CONCLUSION: POLITICAL REBALANCING**

Political rebalancing is one of the three overarching themes that represent the rebalancing discourse in political rhetoric. Together with economic and social rebalancing, political rebalancing epitomizes the sense of competition between ethnic and cultural communities in New Caledonia. The scars left by French colonialism and modern immigration have exacerbated tensions between Kanak and Caledonians, between Kanak and French, and among the other populations inhabiting these islands. Political rebalancing, like the other forms of rebalancing, is driven by perceived and real inequalities that exist between these communities. The political rebalancing theme can be divided into four narratives: self-determination as a right; decolonization, the Nouméa Accord, and the transfer of powers; frozen or sliding electorate; and citizenship.
Figure 4. Connections and co-definations among select objectives.
While Figure 2 showed the connections between all narratives, Figure 4 shows connections between a selection of frames that define those narratives. The frames and narratives included here represent all of the instances where two frames, narratives, or a frame and narrative are linked in the text. The three types of rebalancing are separated so that the frames and narratives that define or are defined by them are more visible. Each narrative is defined by a series of frames that represent politicians’ interpretations of that narrative. A number of these frames are co-constructed, they are used to legitimize and validate a number of narratives or political stances. As with the previous Diagram, the solid colored bars represent the color assigned to a specific frame or narrative. For example, political rebalancing is represented by a light rose color. Since none of the chords are attached to the rose colored bar, the diagram is showing that political rebalancing itself does not define any of the other frames listed.

Political rebalancing is defined by five other frames and narratives: views of the electorate, the victimization narrative, the Nouméa Accord, inequality, and national identity. The mustard, aqua, blue-gray, grey, and yellow chords linked to self-determination show that it is defined by the view of France as a colonizer, the goal of a Kanak identity, the victims of history frame, the Kanak victim frame, and the inclusion in the electorate. In turn, the hot pink self-determination chords show that self-determination solidifies the Kanak victim narrative by supporting the right of an indigenous group to determine its future, contributes to the marginalization of French immigrants (victims) excluded from the referendum, determines who is a member of the electorate un international law, and is a right held by the victims of history (see Figure 4). The Nouméa Accord (black chords) plays role in defining the electorate, common destiny, economic, social, and political rebalancing, defining citizenship, and placing France in a
protector role to ensure the referenda are carried out. The electorate is also defined by nearly all of the other narratives because they all contribute to arguments for or against restricting the electoral bodies. The electorate (yellow chords) contributes to the French victim narrative by excluding recent immigrants, the perception of France as a colonizer because of their reluctance to turn over the voting registers for the referendum on the Nouméa Accord, the definition of citizenship after the referenda, political rebalancing, common destiny, self-determination, and victimization. The electorate, victimization, common destiny, and the Nouméa Accord contribute to definitions of citizenship. Regardless of the outcome of the referenda, the issues identified here will have to be addressed. Identifying the discursive networks and issues that contribute to the drive for political rebalancing is the first step towards understanding the contexts of these issues and ultimately negotiating the goals of both nationalist and loyalist factions.

Limiting or expanding who has the right to self-determination is at the core of political rebalancing. The Nouméa Accord and views on the goal of decolonization both reflect and shape these definitions - which in turn, shape membership in the electoral bodies and citizenship. The Accord defines the transfer of powers and is a symbol of decolonization. Restricted or open visions of self-determination translate into restricted or open policies on citizenship and the electoral bodies allowed to vote on the Provincial assemblies and the referendum. Colonial legacies and ongoing inequalities have led nationalists to promote a more limited Kanak or shared right to self-determination. This narrow framing of self-determination is supported by a restricted definition of citizenship and special electorate that may lead to a referendum in favor of independence. Loyalists argue in favor of a multi society consensus where self-determination is a right for all that would result in a more open citizenship and expanded electorate. These
frames would be more likely to lead to a referendum that results in continued association with France. Parties’ stance on the transfer of powers is directly related to whether they want to move ahead with or stall independence. Divisions between factions and the framing of political rebalancing narratives are the result of colonial legacies. For loyalists, colonial legacies of inequality have emphasized the need to promote inclusion in all facets of the political sphere. This includes the electoral bodies and methods of inclusion represented by political, economic, and social rebalancing (see grey-brown chords in Figure 4). Nationalists believe restricted electorates, citizenship, and self-determination will right the structural and social violence committed during colonization by balancing the power between the original inhabitants and Caledonians. These frames must be taken into account in any negotiations for post-referendum divisions of power.
CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL REBALANCING

The goal of social rebalancing, according to political leaders, is mitigating inequality among New Caledonians. The nationalists broadly cite colonization and victimization as reasons for social rebalancing. They focus specifically on Kanak marginalization and victimization under colonialism and the resulting shared inequality. Loyalists talk about social rebalancing in terms of economic causes of income inequality and the high cost of living. In both cases, the concept of ‘common destiny’ is used as a broad catchall method for social rebalancing. Based on the information I gathered, the primary split in definitions of common destiny can be summarized into the difference between the act of ‘living’ in a country together and the act of ‘building’ a country together. Nationalist bloc UC-FLNKS frames social balance in terms of social justice and legal pluralism. The processes of attaining social justice and enacting legal pluralism are critical components of building an effective multicultural state. Broadly, nationalists seek social rebalancing by building strong communities that are tied together by multicultural institutions.

Loyalist leaders are more likely to point to the fact that the different communities are already living together and common destiny has been realized. Therefore, social rebalancing via common destiny can be expressed in terms of national identity. National identity has the potential to help create social balance by framing the different ethnic populations in terms of one
cohesive body united through civic nationalism that puts each community on equal footing.

Towards this end, loyalist blocs UCF, FPU, and CE call for an end to minority preference and segregation. They argue against what they view is the current system of race-based recognition that favors Kanak. Instead loyalists promote trust and solidarity between New Caledonian communities to combat social inequalities.

**CONFLICTING NATIONAL IDENTITIES**

Within the network that supports the social rebalancing theme is the national identity narrative. An essential part of nation building is the formation of a selective collective memory that promotes a shared “cultural-historical distinctiveness and right to political autonomy” that leads to an us versus them mentality (Murphy 2002, 193). This selective collective memory becomes the foundation of a distinct national identity and sense of nationalism. Citizenship and nationalism, in turn, influence groups’ objectives for self-determination (Brown 2008; Kedouri 1960; Smith 1989; Breton 1988; Nairn 1977; Billig 1995). The type of nationalism expressed directly correlates to a group’s desire for full sovereignty, autonomy, and recognition. In New Caledonia, both loyalists and nationalists acknowledge the legitimacy of a Caledonian or plural national identity. For loyalists this means integrating Kanak, Pacific, and French values. But for nationalists this means integration, but with a Pacific/Kanak core. Smaller factions within the nationalist bloc promote a French-Caledonian national identity or a completely Kanak identity. Framing national identities is strongly linked to French colonialism and shared suffering. Different perceptions of who has suffered, how to go about healing those wounds, and how to peacefully integrate the population inform the framing and definitions of national identity.
A Common French-Caledonian Identity and *Caldochitude*

French social cleansing between 1864 and 1897 resulted in the deportation of about thirty thousand political prisoners and convicts to New Caledonia. This included Parisian Communards and Algerian rebels (Chappell 2014). Geographically and emotionally disconnected from their homeland and not welcomed in New Caledonia, the Communards chose to focus their identity on the future, an identity “to be” (Bullard 2000, 209). By claiming to symbolically die of nostalgia, the Communards were able to continue to claim loyalty to France in the context of exile. This set them apart from the indigenous population. Eventually overcoming the fatal threat of nostalgia they created a modern French psyche with a profound sense of absence at its center that was to be filled with politics, productivity, or warfare (Bullard 2000). Amidst competition between farmers, ranchers, and the penal colonies, two-dozen white settler families created a business oligarchy. The second generation of French free settlers and Communards (the first generation of local born French) became known as the *Caldoch* (Chappell 2014). The Caldoche were the first to promote autonomy in New Caledonia in the late 1800s (Aldrich and Connell 1992). By the 1950s, they had formed a progressive party, UC, to promote greater self-government, but not independence. The *Caldoch* identity has become more of a counter-identity, a political tool, used to counter the power of the Kanak identity and to rally Caledonians. Recently, the *Caldoch* identity has been superseded by an integrative and mixed Caledonian identity that better accounts for the contemporary ethnic landscape of New Caledonia.

The Communards exiled to New Caledonia were joined by free settlers and, later, Asians and other Pacific Islanders. There were two very diverse perceptions of this mixed ethnic
Conservatives argued for an ethnic melting pot where different communities would live together peacefully (Aldrich and Connell 1992). But, this idealistic view crumbled in the face of Caldoche settler violence and rampant racism. At the same time the Caldoche used arguments about the prevalence of métissage or mixed-race to undermine the concept of an original people. Defining a majority of the indigenous population as mixed called original land claims or first-people land claims into question. This allowed white settlers to argue they were the original owners of their lands and claim them without having to give reparations to Melanesians. Melanesians reacted to the mixed-race argument by refuting the touted success of assimilation. Instead they argued that ethnicity and culture are economically and politically defined rather than based on race or physical characteristics – thus retaining their cultural distinction.

Countering the strong reemergence of a Kanak culture and in response to power limitations imposed by the Noumea Accords is the resurgence of a Caldoche identity. Despite varied attempts to form a cohesive identity, many Caldoche view it as a forced identity, with little depth and a lack of commonalities or consistency (Carteron 2009). They view themselves at not equal to the Pacific Community, but as representatives of a sub-French and European culture. The Caldoche identity was constructed, in part, on other traditions of French colonial resistance like la Negritude. La Negritude is actually the basis for the term la Caldochitude (Brown 2013). Angleviel (1999) suggests that New Caledonia’s ethnic landscape is dominated by creolization. The creole Caledonian identity comprises an ethnic mélange of European, Javanese, Vietnamese, and Wallisian-Futunan groups next to a strong Kanak identity. Caldoche view themselves as different from metropolitan French, but rely on métropole power against the Kanak and the
independence movement. Eric Douyère (1997) suggests this might stem from a fear of being the lone faction against rising Kanak political power.

The ramifications of the assimilation or Caledonization argument are evident in the victimization narrative used by Kanak to support independence. Caldoche, recent European immigrants, Asians, and Polynesians argue that the current population should inform decision-making in New Caledonia and that historical events are irrelevant (Aldrich and Connell 1992). Melanesians argue that colonization created inequalities in New Caledonia that can only be mitigated through the unequal distribution of power and special rights given to the “victims of history.” Interestingly, many Melanesians include the Caldoche population in the membership of victims of history because France exiled them to penal colonies in New Caledonia. The tension between the conservative Caldoche vision of a harmonious society and Melanesians’ fight against assimilation has led to increasing ethnic polarization and bled into the independence debate.

The beginnings of a Caledonian identity are derived from the recognition of double legitimacy in the Matignon Accord. Double legitimacy is the belief that both the Kanak and the French convicts and political prisoners (and other forcibly moved to New Caledonia) have the right to self-determination and were victimized under French colonialism. A bridge was made between the Caldoche and the “New Caledonians whose ancestors and fathers are buried in this land” (Jouve 1997, 88). For the first time, convict ancestry was beginning to lose its stigma and the Caldoche population celebrated its culture through festivals, literature, museums, and other events (Chappell 2014). While members of Caldoche society redefined their identity in a more positive way, they continued to distance themselves from Kanak: promoting assimilation and
perpetuating racism. The hope today is that an emphasis on a Caledonian identity rather than a distinct *Caldoche* identity will encourage cooperation between the white population and other non-Kanak communities. Members of the Caledonian identity are tied together loosely by their long history of settlement in New Caledonia. Today mixing is a part of the *Caldoche* identity and exemplifies a shift in ideology from racist to promoting mutual accommodation (Chanter 2006).

This alternative identity is in response to and in my opinion serves as a significant other in relation to the growing Kanak identity and threats to European-Caledonian political representation. According to Triandafyllidou (1998, 594), the identity of a nation is defined and redefined by the influence of “significant others.” These others can be “other nations or ethnic groups that are perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, authenticity and/or independence” (Triandafyllidou 1998, 594). As the process of independence progresses and Kanaks are given greater autonomy and are forming their own identity and nationalism, the *Caldoche* population and other minorities are fearful of their future in New Caledonia. By forming their own identity, even if it is somewhat forced and artificial, they are forming a unit that can collectively bargain for rights, and their own space in the New Caledonian landscape just as the Kanak have done and continue to do. While many Kanak nationalist leaders refer to a *Caldoche* population, loyalist leaders tend to talk in terms of a Caledonian population. This slight difference may be another symptom of the *Caldoche* fear of marginalization. Loyalists are quick to align the smaller *Caldoche* population (whom the Kanak have acknowledged have a legitimate right to vote on the referenda) with the broader and less distinct Caledonian population composed of more recent immigrants. The difference in categorizing these populations is slight, but significant in terms of collective bargaining and negotiation. Aligning the *Caldoche* and
Caledonian populations create a much larger bloc to balance Kanak influence. The divisions between the indigenous and _Caldoche_ populations are a significant issue that will need to be addressed in the coming years.

A small minority of loyalists argue that the Kanak, New Caledonians, and other minority populations are part of French identity. This approach exemplifies the national consciousness through shared language approach to national identity (Gellner 1964; Breuilly 1982). Bernut (Interview 2014) claims that the French language is the ultimate unifying variable and indicator of an overarching French identity. That is not to say that there are not differences between the metropolitan and Pacific French, as Bernut (Interview 2014) acknowledges:

> For me, the Kanak are French. It is clear to me. Plus they have a common point among all the Kanak languages spoken in the Territory, they have a common language is French.

While the national identity is tied to France, Bernut (Interview 2014) claims that a Caledonian identity should integrate French and Pacific values and is more egalitarian and open to the world. The country may be politically French, but it employs a more multicultural model of society. Others, like Lafleur (Interview 2014) situate this integrated identity in terms of regionalism or a regional nationality. In this case, the Caledonian identity is similar to a regional French identity like the Corse of Corsica or the Bretons in Brittany. Taking this argument a step further, Blaise (Interview 2014) views French as the public identity and Kanak or something else as a private identity:

> [T]here is a time to be a Kanak and a time be French and live in the common space. I think that is the vision we have. You can live according to your traditions when you are at ethnic gatherings for weddings or anything, which is related to the life of your community. And there is a common space where the rule must be the same for everyone […] But I don't think cultural diversity is a problem, it is a
good thing if you see clearly what is your space. See in France, F France has a tradition of integration. I think it is a lie. You cannot ask people to forget who they are, but you can ask them to live according to the common rule in the common society. You cannot turn Arab or Asian people into Europeans, that's nonsense. We can respect them as citizens of a modern country, enjoy the same rights, the same prospects of success in society, provided they make the distinctions between what is private and what is public.

I am deeply French. My culture is French. And I live in a part of France, so in Caledonia, Caledonia like Britons are in Brittany and Corse in Corsica. They are in a part of France. And I am in a part of France […] Well that's what being Caledonian is. It is living in a province of France. The people of Hawaii, for example, they live on an island, but they are American (Lafleur Interview 2014).

Both Lafleur and Blaise’s perspectives on identity, while tied to France, allow for a level of pluralism not found in Bernut’s rhetoric.

Nationalists do not argue that there is a strong French national identity in New Caledonia. They do not agree with Bernut that it applies to the entirety of the country. Instead, most nationalists use the term Caldoche to refer to a specific sub-group of French-Caledonians. The term Caledonian itself is complex and multifaceted in the New Caledonian lexicon. For some it represents an expression of nationalism or common citizenship based on the name of the country. For others it describes a united culture among all of the people living in the country. And yet, it can also be used to refer to the non-Melanesian, primarily white, ‘other’ population. Beginning in 1972 the term Caldoche was a primarily pejorative term referring to local born Europeans (Chappell 2013). Caldochitude arose as a constructivist national identity in response to the ‘other’ – the Kanak independence movement and cultural resurgence. Intimidated by the possibility of increasing Kanak power under the Matignon and Nouméa Accords and the eventual referenda there were and are real fears of a Kanak dominated government. Some of these fears are based on a reverse political minority making, or the perceived desire for Kanak
assimilation of non-Kanak, or racism. Later, the use of *Caldoche* was expanded to specifically refer to French-Caledonians, French with distinct values and practices, or those with no connection to the territorial homeland. To some extent the *Caldoche* label has been expropriated in much the same way that the pejorative French term *Canaque* became Kanak: a counter-identity that (re)balances the divisions created by a perception of minority privilege.

**Kanak Identity and Culture**

Indigenous groups may be alternately defined according to their presence prior to settlement by currently dominant populations, cultural difference, distinction from the dominant population, and political marginalization resulting in poverty, limited access, and a lack of protection against unwanted development (Niezen 2003). Indigenous groups tread a fine line between being distinct enough to justify development attention, but not develop to the extent that they lose that distinction and development assistance (Kowal 2008). Maintaining difference is a key strategy for gaining autonomy or independence. However, it can also prevent constructive relationships and cooperation within multinational states. For Kanak nationalists, social rebalancing requires the resurgence of a Kanak national identity that can act as a unifying force.

Kanak culture began with the migration of the ancestral Melanesian people to parts of New Caledonia. All land in New Caledonia is considered Kanak land because they were the first settlers or original people (Leblic 1991). Space is an interconnected network between man, land, and the god-myth; it comprises important places of lived experience, and sacred encounters. The land is a living history of a community. Groups and individuals maintain that historic and personal connection with their homeland despite migration, segregation, colonization, or
displacement. “The composition and identity of groups is therefore inseparable from the history of the appearance of men in the region, expressed by the myth of origin – which refers to a much more encompassing social history - and their special way to occupy the space and understanding” (Leblic 1991, 2). Place names represent a particular family group or clan that belongs to that locale. Surnames signify a particular place. Each group records the memory of movement from their homeland in oral traditions. These historical and mythological oral traditions structure and frame relationships between groups at all social levels (Leblic 1991).

Social organization in Kanak culture is expressed in a system of hierarchies. Elders are organized according to seniority and surround a primary chief who acts as the ruler. Supplementary roles are assigned to individuals and groups within each clan or village. Collectively, the group functions as a unit rather than as part of a definitive hierarchy characterized by members of higher or lower rank. These units are spatially distributed, and structured within vast networks of familial and alliance-based relationships. The integration of individuals and groups at a local and national level results in the balanced division of tasks, responsibility, and authority and, historically, ensured a coherent sociopolitical system. Foreigners or groups who migrated to a different area were assimilated into the existing local system (Leblic 1991). In this way, spatial identities are maintained and shared through oral tradition even when migration occurs or new members are added to the existing community (Horowitz 2001). The perpetuation of this memory allows families and groups to retain both land rights and maintain alliances with others from that place of origin. “All along this trajectory between the old place and the new, a clan’s history is inscribed in the landscape in the form of particular features that recall historical events and ancestral actions” (Horowitz 2001, 40).
oral memories serve as claims for hierarchical status, outline networks and relationships between clans, define their origins, sources of support, and the networks of relationships that form identity (Horowitz 2001).

Since territory is a social construct embedded in economic and political contexts (Soja 1989; Sack 1986) and is assigned meaning through human belief and action (Knight 1982) it is important to frame territory in terms of the dynamic relationship between the physical landscape and the social contexts and ideologies that give it meaning (Murphy 1990). The indigenous inhabitants of New Caledonia, the Kanak, are intimately tied to the physical landscape. “Place serves as a constantly re-energized repository of socially and politically relevant traditions and identity which serves to mediate between the everyday lives of individuals […] and the national and supra-national institutions which constrain and enable those lives” (Agnew and Duncan 1989, 7). Although French colonial practices transformed traditional land management, thus transforming Kanak identity, the critical relationship between individual, land, and identity remained. Traditions, family names and histories, and the Kanak culture are represented through place and expressed in terms of the physical landscape (Leblic 1991). Since the territorialization of identity can occur through small-scale homeland construction (Diener 2007) the application of self-determination, minority rights, and multicultural governance cannot be separated from the discussion of land and geopolitics.

Disconnected from traditional lands and forms of identity, the resurgence of the Kanak culture in the 1960s was the result of a conscious effort to reformulate the Kanak identity. Bensa and Wittersheim (1998) argue that contemporary Kanak nationalists have drawn inspiration from a variety of anticolonial influences and melded them with indigenous cultural perspectives. The
reconstructions of identity, in some instances informed by European ethnographic literature, stress the importance of Kanak ties to the homeland and nature (Horowitz 2001). One particular inspiration has come from a European educated Kanak national, Nidoshe Naisseline. In 1969 Naisseline returned to New Caledonia and founded a protest group, the “Foulards Rouges” (Red Scarves), that later became a pro-independence political party (Chappell 2010, 38). In what would become the primary movement for independence and ultimately lead to the signing of the Matignon and Noumea Accords, Naisseline’s syncretism of Third World and Oceanian discourses sparked the “Kanak Awakening” (Chappell 2010, 38). This concept of combining elements from traditional and non-traditional Kanak heritage and identity has been a source of national mobilization, but also regional division. Leblic (1991) argues that Kanak identity and tradition has been transformed by their colonial and post-colonial history: some elements surviving and some changing. Land and social hierarchies, the influence of the Christian church, and political experience from the colonial system has resulted in an amalgamated or syncretic Kanak identity. These altered traditions form the basis of the Kanak identity and land claims which combine traditional notions of clan as the holder of land with the creation of a democratic, secular, socialist state.

Central to the affirmation of Kanak culture and identity is the recognition of a painful historical past and preservation of indigenous culture and their relationship to ancestors and the homeland (Carteron 2009). As Kanak culture and identity changes and a new sense of nationalism forms, the role of memory is increasingly important. Memory includes the mythical elements of traditional culture and the actual history and historical knowledges of Kanak and their colonizers. As some Kanak research and reify their identity, they are forced to use accounts
of European ethnologists and others to inform themselves of cultural practices and history. Thus the forming of individual and collective identity and nationalism is a process that addresses the pains of the colonial era, but also combines colonial and indigenous knowledge to form something new and unique that has the power to unite.

The continuing loss of cultural identity among Kanaks is a critical force in the push for independence. Smith (1989) argued, in more deterministic language, that national loyalties and ethnic fusion are only possible if a homogenous ethnic core and a shared sense of ancestry and identity exist. Therefore, myth, memory, symbols, and values, are essential for the development of a struggling or growing identity, because they are the tools that facilitate strong national and ethnic bonds (Smith 1989). The "living together" and "common destiny" discourses mobilized by different factions, act as federative values, but they have not acquired an ideological status able to transcend divisions between ethnic communities (Carteron 2009, 10). France broke the indigenous culture without fully replacing it – full assimilation did not succeed – leaving Melanesians marginalized in the Western New Caledonian culture (Chappell 2013). Therefore the imagined political community is characteristic of a sovereign nation rather than a cohesive nation state or multinational state.

Chappell (2010, 57) argues that there is a resurgence in traditional Kanak nationality that supports a federative ideology, “the indigenous notion that identity is defined by a web of social exchange relations.” These webs or networks that were so prevalent among historical clans and groups may help transcend diverse ethnic communities and divisions among indigenous populations today. Political ethnicity “is the deliberate politicisation and mobilisation of these ‘consciousnesses’ in order to achieve certain political and economic objectives” and political
conflicts use ethnicity as organizing principle (Ajulu 2002, 252). Certain pro-independence movements in New Caledonia are using political ethnicity to mobilize anti-colonial, pro-independence sentiment among Kanak.

Kanak nationalism varies from a belief in primacy, to a mobilizing ideology or an anti-colonial struggle, to a feeling of belonging, or a classifying discourse (Hall 1993; Kedouri 1960; Nairn 1977; Young 1976; Chai 2008; Triandafyllidou 1998; Verdery 1993). Colonial assimilation was designed to forcefully unify communities, and therefore resulted in well-defined reactionary ethnic-based political movements (Banting and Kymlicka 2004). During decolonization, liberation movements developed into self-determination movements whose goals included redefining citizenship. Groups that historically lacked rights aligned to ensure that these rights are granted in post-decolonization governance. National identity and in-group creation form the foundation for defining citizenship and the right to self-determination. Since politics and rights are indivisible from the social and ethnic divisions in New Caledonia, it makes sense that ethnic divisions will be a part of the fight for autonomy or as a reaction to minority rights. Inequalities were created by the French indigénat and civilizing mission policies and continual subjugation of the indigenous people. But the legacies of these policies also formed the basis for a strong collective memory (victimization and ‘victims of history’ narratives) used to justify and bargain for greater autonomy and bolster the Kanak national identity.

For nationalists Kanak identity is created, not invented, and is characterized by the importance of collective rights and core Kanak values:

After, perhaps, to accompany, to complete it, as told JMT, the future is before us, so I think that there is a large part of the project company, when one speaks of Kanak identity, there is much that we must create, not invent, but created, the future is before anything […] It is above all values, because after what areas we
can always technically work, propose, but it meets a number of values, values that we respect a lot in Kanak society, although sometimes we get lost. In Kanak societies in the Pacific companies, I mean, for example, the value of respect, it is for us to organize society for the value to respect is always in style (Pabouty Interview 2014).

In New Caledonia you have a lot of people belonging to groups and those groups are communities, but actually Kanak are the only ones who are a people, the other are pieces of people who came here. The goal is to find common values, a common framework of living together, but letting everyone in those groups keep their own culture. It is not about imposing Kanak customs but finding a middle ground (Wamytan Interview 2014).

Kanak identity is tied to the cultural and economic importance of land. Nationalist leaders highlight the importance of integrating customary values like dignity, hospitality, generosity, and respect. In this way, the continuation and primacy of the Kanak national identity can lead to social (re)balance and heal the social inequalities and marginalization perpetuated by colonialism. The formation of ‘other’ identity or the consolidation of sub-national identities is a crucial strategy for gaining recognition or autonomy. Unlike the civic nationalism promoted by loyalists, many nationalist leaders focus on ethnonationalism. Through ethnonationalism, sub-national groups can form a definitive collective identity that promotes ethnic difference as a reason for autonomy from the state (Niezen 2003).

In fact today, in fact, as we have not attained full sovereignty, Kanak is a term, you know, no community, but ethnic. But as part of a process of independence, accession to full sovereignty, the term Kanak is a nationality (Pabouty Interview 2014).

Caledonian nationalism: This is what we are currently working on. At the core of the claim to the right [of self-determination] is the Kanak. It is also those who were affected by colonization. And all that was done for thirty years since the FLNKS was created is oriented around the Kanak nationalist claims. But logic would dictate that to emerge Caledonian consciousness of belonging to a country that is in the middle of the Pacific, Melanesia, Oceania, it is a Caledonian nationalism that will emerge (Wamytan Interview 2014).
So in this project company, one citizen at the center, of course we are not in other countries, it is not in Europe, it is in Asia, we are still in the Pacific, and is Kanaky, so obviously the Kanak identity must be emphasized. The Kanak identity must be emphasized [...] So obviously, that's why I said when accessing the full sovereignty, there is a sovereignty project to go with, and therefore in this project company there, there are people at center of the device, and then as we are Kanaky the Kanak identity, actually it is a vast identity to define the Kanak identity there must permeate the entire Caledonian society (Pabouty Interview 2014).

Nation building requires a selective view of history that promotes a distinct national identity where political claims are based on a sense of us versus them (Murphy 2002). Imagined cultural or political geographies are created by organizing populations into groups with distinctive identifiers like “indigenous” or “citizen.” Nationalist narratives tend to focus on the concept of a Kanak identity that is grounded in ethnicity and the idea of being the original people. But they also talk about belonging to a greater community that incorporates people from the Pacific region and others who have been the victims of colonialism. It is clear that Kanak remain at the center of any future New Caledonia. Identifying themselves as indigenous and as the original inhabitants gives the Kanak and their leaders the power to advocate on behalf of an identified group. Certain rights may be inherently given to these groups, once labeled, or they may become eligible for certain rights because they have been labeled in a certain way.

Kanak national identity is not inherently primordial, people can become Kanak, but it is a mobilizing ideology tied to common ethnicity, language, assumed blood ties, race, territory, and customs (Hobsbawm 1990; Kaplan 1994; Geertz 1963; Hechter and Levi 1979). Just as some loyalists consider the Kanak French, some nationalists argue that all inhabitants of New Caledonia can and should become Kanak by adopting the Kanak culture.
And the term Kanak, it is for us a nationalist term. Like the inhabitants of the Americas are American, and the people of France are French (Lalié Interview 2014).

In UC the notion of Kanak, there is not a New Caledonian people. Kanak is not an ethnic or racial identity. Kanak refers to all the Caledonian people. Kanak is not a national identity, Caledonian is a national identity. You have the different communities living in New Caledonia, and the objective of the Kanak society is to build a multiracial society [...] This vision is contentious, it is difficult to be accepted by everyone. Because the Caledonians refuse to be considered Kanak and Kanak means independence so it is politically oriented and not everyone accepts this. What we talk about it is Kanaky New Caledonia like Papua New Guinea (Goa Interview 2014).

Both Lalié and Goa believe that all inhabitants of New Caledonia should become Kanak. For LKU and the Parti Travailleuse the national identity should be Kanak and although citizenship allows for dual ethnic allegiance, he argues in favor of preferential rights.

Pabouty (Interview 2014) views Kanak national identity in integrative terms, with the Kanak and French, Pacific and Western, traditions rather than the imposition of Kanak culture on all people. He believes that Kanak culture should irrigate New Caledonian society and values to create pluralistic forms of economy and law (Pabouty Interview 2014). Colonization has already created a melting pot, an integrated society:

[...] indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different and to be respected as such (Customary Senate 2014, 4).

At the same time, it is important to note that Kanak identity cannot be disconnected from the history of the independence movement or the legacies of colonialism and victimization. Kanak nationalism is equated with sovereignty, independence, a multi-racial society, reclaiming dignity, national identity, and the possibility of a Kanaky-New Caledonia. It is tied to political and institutional recognition. Some even argue that New Caledonian society means that there is a
Melanesian core or that Kanak identity is at the center of society. Loyalists describe Kanak identity and culture as undemocratic, violent and aggressive. They contend that Kanak national identity is ethnically based (Melanesian) and therefore non-Kanak cannot become Kanak.

And the question that one evokes [brings to mind] at the moment [just] when these movements, it was anti-imperialism. But in the end, we see that things have moved. There is less talk ... let's say that imperialism and colonialism are always more or less present, but the designs [conceptions, ideas] change, we talk about globalization. So is that it is this phenomenon that has halted the anti-imperialist movement? Is that it had an impact on the willingness of people to be free or not? It is not at all a fashion [trend, style]. Imperialism was violent. Today it is more subtle and pernicious and it brings about less of peoples reactions. So this is a subject. There is some form of standardization in the phenomenon of globalization. Which was not the case even in the 60s where we can see the Portuguese colonized a certain way, and the English too. Today, with globalization we have entered a form of standardization, we are in a permanent acculturation with a model that is the same everywhere. Things have moved and people are not moving in the same way either (Washetine Interview 2014).

There are real fears among Kanak and other sub-national groups that globalization is resulting in the standardization and acculturation of traditional cultures. Some nationalists contend that globalization is resulting in a loss of humanity and promoting a less rich Western culture that undermines the culturally rich indigenous traditions. This is troubling, considering that distinctive identities are part of a sub-national group’s argument for greater autonomy or sovereignty.

**Plural Identity, Multicultural Society, and the Caledonian Identity**

While loyalists and nationalists may privilege French or Kanak identity as the dominant affiliation, there is a strong basis (even within these views) for a plural Caledonian national identity. Kanak, Caledonian, French, *Caldoche*, and other identity groups are intimately tied to
historical memory, emotions, and political discourse. The term itself, rather than its meaning or practice, often becomes a point of contention. With a few exceptions, politicians generally agree on the need for a plural or multicultural national identity. Pluralism can be practiced differently, but reconciliation is essential to the integration of French, Kanak, and Pacific customs and values. On one hand, identity is an ideal type, a very personal connection to a community with strong ethnic foundations. On the other hand, identity in New Caledonia is rational-legal: connected to an institutional framework that incorporates indigenous customs into governance, policy, and justice (Breton 1988). Both require integration and further reconciliation.

Even though, both sides agree that integration is necessary, they cling to the idea of a French or Kanak core identity. Gomès (Address 2009) offers a federal model that creates a New Caledonian-Kanak national identity with Kanak as a sub-division. Frogier advocates for a plural identity based on a mix of French and Kanak values. Lafleur (Interview 2014) leaves room for the possibility of a plural society saying that Caledonian identity is the hat that fits many ethnic heads:

I think that there are identities, like Wallis, like Kanak who are proud to be Wallisians, being Kanak else who are proud to be Indonesian, but above all of us, we have a hat that is Caledonian. We have all these ethnic groups, which are the wealth of this country, but it is primarily Caledonian.

Lafleur and Yanno perceive the need for a more multicultural society where Kanak is an ethnic affiliation rather than a competing identity. Gomès (LNC 2005) claims that a Caledonian identity should be built on the integration, appropriation, or mixing of the various cultures: a non-racial communal Caledonian identity that integrates French, Caledonian, and Kanak values. However this identity is still intimately tied to France – in a way similar to French regions like Corsica or Brittany.
Other loyalists believe the Caledonian identity rests on a sense of belonging and a link to the territory that cultivates patriotism; the values of diplomacy and reciprocity; or non-independence. Plural society can be a place where culture is self-defined, multiculturalism is based on political rights and equality of access, collective culture, and the formation of an universal society without consensus. Gomès (2009, 29) even goes so far as to call for a racially blind society that is united through its territorial ties and a sense of belonging:

[W]e do not have a black New Caledonia and a white New Caledonia, New Caledonia is a country whose land is in our blood, it belongs to us, and we must build together.

[We] live in a country where you have people with different skin colors and traditions, but who live in fraternity and tolerance of each other (Blaise Interview 2014).

Wamytan (Interview 2014) presents an argument for a plural society with a Kanak core that unites “pieces of other cultures” saying:

The country is made up of aggregated people with the original people at the center […] Indigenous people must be recognized, but everyone should be recognized in the process […] do not give up your culture, continue to live according to your Polynesian culture.

He continues on to say that there should be a “feeling of being Caledonian first instead of French first” (Wamytan Interview 2014). While Wamytan and other nationalists repeatedly place the Kanak or the original people at the center of the Caledonian society, they make room for the recognition of other identities and distinct cultures that have settled in New Caledonia: emphasizing the importance of recognizing the equality of difference and allowing people to practice their own culture. To some nationalists, like Wamytan the Caledonian identity encompasses all inhabitants – it is a form of nationalism that represents a sense of belonging to the Pacific:
[We must] transition from a Kanak nationalism to a Caledonian nationalism, to a Caledonian consciousness of belonging to a country that is in the middle of the Pacific, Melanesia, Oceania (Wamytan Interview 2014).

So far the political struggle was carried by the Kanak. These are the Kanak that were at the heart of the changes we've had so far, and little by little, and elsewhere have also come to consider those who had come to appreciate the history, can also claim local citizenship, and indeed nationality. So that, in some way, for others, the so called victims of history at one time, their own future is taking shape here, with the original people. And there's a very strong feeling, some in the Caldoche community, a lot who have no connection to their homeland. The same goes for those who have been deported by the Commune, following the War of Algeria in the 60s ... so there's a number of communities who eventually validate the idea that they have a country here. So it's a quite a journey [a process] in time. I think the events in the 1980s gave a sudden, forced, boost to the idea that there is a people who are in the process of being set up [configured] here, through its history, and it is a Caledonian people with different components (Washetine Interview 2014).

Others talk about a Caledonian humanity that is composed of Kanak, Melanesians, Europeans, and the Metis. This view is part of the victims of history narrative. It means that the Kanak have the inherent right to self-determination, but they have shared that right with other communities that are also victims of history. In the same way, a composite Caledonian identity has been created.

Nationalist and loyalist definitions of a plural or multicultural national identity have a distinctive territorial component. They unite all populations through a shared connection to the New Caledonian territory and a sense of belonging, which is further reinforced in the eligibility requirements for the referendum electorate. The territorial component is supported by a constructivist vision of identity. In this case the integration of French, Kanak, and Pacific values is a constructivist approach to creating a national identity that can cut across a number of different cultures. Even here, identity is a tool of political elites, a mobilizing ideology. There are some adamant detractors, like Goa (Interview 2014), who believe a true Caledonian identity does
not yet exist and Blaise (Interview 2014) who sees it as an artificial representation of common destiny. By promoting an inclusive, integrative approach to national identity, every population feels included, a sense of belonging that foments a shared commitment to the future development of New Caledonia and less likelihood of ethnic violence. If exclusion continues it is likely that perceived threats to majority or ethnic power would be aggravated. Caldoche and minority fears of Kanak power and Kanak fears of a permanent French-Caldoche-Caledonian alliance under association will continue to divide inhabitants. Kanak nationalists feel entitled to minority privilege as result of their marginalization and victimization under colonialism. Unfortunately this sentiment, and the rights granted in the Nouméa Accord as a result, has led to Caledonian animosity.

VICTIM AND VICTIMS OF HISTORY NARRATIVES

The victim narrative is a defining factor employed by nationalists to gain concessions in the Accords, electorate, and the movement for full sovereignty in general. To loyalists the victim narrative is a uniquely Kanak mentality linked to the original people and their enslavement. Loyalists view it as an excuse to avoid adapting to the current division of political power or as the blatantly erroneous assumption that colonial problems have not yet been solved. However, the collective memory of colonization and associated victimization is a key part of the ethnosymbolist Kanak national identity based on the power of collective memory. A national identity is instrumentalist because the victimization narrative has become a tool used by political elites to promote the right to independence (Conversi 1995).
The victim narrative pervades the nationalists’ arguments and is a tool used to legitimize their right to self-determination and validate a sovereign New Caledonia. The historical injustices and suffering wrought by French colonial practices, struggle for rights and recognition, current electoral imbalance, influx of French public servants, and daily struggle for resources are all examples of Kanak victimization. These examples also, according to nationalists, validate their right to self-determination and full autonomy. Under French colonization the Kanak were made nothing, commanded, and possessed without permission. And yet nationalists argue, there have been few efforts made towards reconciliation.

The primacy of the Kanak identity and semi-exclusive views of citizenship and self-determination are at least partially founded in the victim narrative present among all nationalist narratives. For nationalists, the ever-present narrative of victimization is linked to the ongoing French presence. The *système d’indigénat* divided Kanak, created permanent destabilization, was a form of cultural genocide and exclusion.

Colonisation hits all the Chieftainships in the Kanak country. In practically all the regions on the mainland, the violence of colonisation created the disappearance of Clans and Chieftainships, the displacement of all, or part of, tribes, and entire regions. These acts of violence resulted in long term traumas affecting both customary structures, and humans living hereabouts […] The setting up of reservations, during the period of time called the ‘Indigénat’ (native population) was an instrument of segregation and control of the Kanak People, while favouring land grabbing for colonisation. (Charter of the Kanak People 2014, 10-11).

According to nationalist leaders, colonization resulted in the suppression of autonomy, population displacement, degradation, loss of dignity and led to unconscious contempt, suffering foreign control, violence, riots, land theft, and segregation. A connection between land, nature,
and Kanak is at the core of their animist belief system and their social organization. The colonial experience was highly traumatic to both the people and the land:

The name, given in Kanak language, links the person to its Clan and to the land. It describes the history of the Clan in the generational cycle of life in space and time […] Kanak has belonged to this land for over 4000 years. The Kanak civilisation, also called the ‘Yam civilisation’, tamed in an uninterrupted way the natural areas, from the mountain to the sea, and beyond the horizon. It is the spirit of the Ancestor that organises and feeds the spiritual connection of the Clan and its members with Nature […] The social organisation is based on the respect of the Ancestors’ spirit in a given territory, on the management of the natural environment, on Clans’ complementarity and solidarity […] It is the land where we discover, where we learn, the roots of our life, the cement and backbones of the Kanak Society (Charter of the Kanak People 2014, 17-23).

According to nationalists, the legacies of colonialism include long lasting environmental problems, racism, and Kanak marginalization.

The independence referendum has been asked for by the pro Independence group since their first independence claim (1975). But the State has constantly put it off, claiming that the country was not ready. So from one agreement to another, the electorate for the referendum has been expanded. FLNKS has accepted many concessions. But today’s conflicting interpretations are ushering in disturbing trends. The French Governments’ intentions concealed behind virginal neutrality and relayed by those of the anti-independence factions, who are becoming increasingly strident, are continuously pushing further for the expansion of the special electorates. It is imperative that we denounce these abuses that threaten the decolonization process in progress, but that also threaten peace in New Caledonia. The history of decolonization has also shown the need for vigilance when we see what the colonial system has been capable of: excluding indigenous peoples from the right to vote, double college, colony for settlement, real-fake colonial referenda, rigging of lists, etc. (Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 7-8).

Colonialism has also created geographic imbalances between prosperous and heavily population Nouméa and the rural bush. This has created problems associated with urbanization and a lack of adequate housing and infrastructure because of massive internal and external migration to the capital.
We will not reinvent the wheel. We have to create wealth first in order to have tax on wealth and then do redistribution for inequalities. We have to identify which sectors we need to develop in order to have a dynamic economy. We already have this information so we need to continue to develop those sectors that are still working today. We have some new sector to develop like wood or agriculture, we import a lot. And it raises prices. For independence we have to develop these sectors. We prefer importing before from France, but in the future we can have our own project. There are too many things to do. It is a new, young country so lots of things to do. Economie de comptoir – colonial way. Dependent system here (Pabouty Interview 2014).

Both nationalists and loyalists agree that inequalities caused by colonization preserve imbalances, foster economic dependence, and have created an artificial standard of living that is perpetuated by continued French aid. Their ideas for correcting these economic imbalances will be outlined in the following chapter. It is interesting to note that this is one area where loyalists and nationalists agree. However, nationalists seem to have a much greater preoccupation with France’s complicity in causing inequalities, economic or otherwise. Nationalists use the victim narrative to express France’s culpability and blame the state’s colonial practices for the problems plaguing New Caledonia today.

In some cases, the victim narrative is used to justify the exclusion of non-Kanak or those populations not subject to colonization. However, despite harsh criticism against France many nationalists recognize that injustices were also perpetrated against other “victims of history.” These victims include the Kanak, Communards (French rebels sent to penal colonies on New Caledonia), Algerians, and forced laborers brought from other Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia.

[T]he so called victims of history at one time, their own future is taking shape here with the original people […] all peoples have the right to decide what they want for their future. And we have always considered that the history of colonization and all that it has meant, it goes against the principle of humanity. So for us colonization was first that. I mentioned earlier that Kanak penned
[confined] in reservations. This is the fate endured by a number of workers like Indonesian, Javanese who ... so for us it is inconceivable. So the Kanak people considered that to restore their rights, it goes through the same command of the decision on the future of his country. So for us the question of independence arises in a natural manner. All peoples have the right to decide what they want or desire to do for themselves, for their country, for their homeland, for their subsoil [underground], their environment, and their right there to share it with others, those who came [later]. They were considered to have been somewhat victims of colonization, because they lived in the same exclusion (Washetine Interview 2014).

Although not members of the original people, nationalists have extended the shared right to self-determination to these populations, integrated them into the body of citizens and created a communal sense of belonging. These are not the people nationalists are fighting to have removed from the electoral register.

Dalby (1991, 7) describes otherness as involving “the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological, and a crucially political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference” where the characterization of difference and the production of discourse is geopolitical. The constructed community of victims is an imagined community. Its restricted membership and unique historical attributes have allowed nationalists to deploy the victim narrative as a political bargaining chip: creating restricted electorates that will have a significant influence on the referenda on independence, gaining control of the mining industry in the Northern province, and restricting citizenship.
A ‘COMMON DESTINY?’

If the victim narrative is one cause for social rebalancing and plural national identities are part of the process to achieve social rebalancing, then common destiny is the goal of social (re)balance. The Nouméa Accord (1998) calls for “establishment of a new sovereignty, to be shared in a common destiny.” But what is meant by a common destiny? Does this refer to a community of self-governing New Caledonians who represent a diversity of cultures? Or does this refer to a new contract between the French state and their overseas population? In the Preamble of the Nouméa Accord, common destiny is linked to identity and its material representations, citizenship, and rebalancing:

These difficult times need to be remembered, the mistakes recognized and the Kanak people’s confiscated identity restored, which equates in its mind with a recognition of its sovereignty, prior to the forging of a new sovereignty, shared in common destiny (Nouméa Accord 1998).

It is now necessary to start making provisions for a citizenship of New Caledonia, enabling the original people to form a human community, asserting its common destiny, with the other men and women living there (Nouméa Accord 1998).

The present is the time of sharing, through the achievement of a new balance. The future must be the time of an identity, in a common destiny (Nouméa Accord 1998).

The full recognition of the Kanak identity requires customary law status and its links with the civil law status of persons governed by ordinary law to be defined, and provision to be made for the place of customary bodies in the institutions, particularly through the establishment of a Customary Senate; it requires the Kanak cultural heritage to be protected and enhanced and new legal and financial mechanisms to be introduced in response to representations based on the link with land, while facilitating land development, and identity symbols conveying the essential place of the Kanak identity in the accepted common destiny to be adopted (Nouméa Accord 1998).
While the Nouméa Accord does not clearly define common destiny it does acknowledge the need for something new that can be a project of cooperation for all New Caledonian inhabitants. The Accord refers to a “new sovereignty” and a “new balance” as something that is shared. Common destiny is also defined as a project related to identity and the formation of a human community. Interpretations of the common destiny ideal, by nationalists and loyalists, barely resemble these vague notions of collective sharing and cooperation outline in the Nouméa Accord.

Well these are empty words. Because everybody is using these terms with different meanings. Common destiny is French diplomatic idiom, which has been used in the past in French Polynesia. In fact for us French loyalist, common destiny means political equality, it means that if you build a citizenship, everyone which has citizenship should have the same rights and the same dignity, and the same right to speak about the future of the country (Blaise Interview 2014).

Some, like Blaise (Interview 2014) argue that common destiny does not exist: it is a misunderstanding, semantics, a diplomatic term with no real meaning. Loyalists’ view of common destiny is more broadly based on a fundamental belief that cultures enrich each other. This idea, that cultures enrich each other, underpins almost every definition of common destiny: the push for integration, core French values, and the idea of peacefully living together. If the core belief is that cultures enrich each other, than living together in a peacefully integrated society would be the preeminent definition of common destiny.

The common destiny is the Caledonia is an example for the world, because there are all ethnic groups in that territory and they manage to live together. She has been an example to the world when Tjibaou and Jacques Lafleur stopped the civil war. we managed, there was racism that had settled in Caledonia and after that disappeared. People have said we will live together. And we all lived together very well (Lafleur Interview 2014).
Living together means creating a society with equal opportunity, basic rights, no chauvinism, includes all ethnic groups living in harmonious coexistence through sharing and respect, and shares the land. Carteron (2009) argued that the “living together” and “common destiny” narratives mobilized by different factions can act like federacies. They have the power to organize and structure relationships based on scales of autonomy and cooperation if they manage to transcend divisions between ethnic communities. Until then, imagined political communities like indigenous victims act like a sovereign nation, not a cohesive nation-state or multinational state. Loyalists, like Lafleur and Yanno maintain that a harmonious coexistence can be achieved through physical integration, intermarriage and greater mixing of the different ethnic groups to create a multiethnic population that mixes at the everyday scale. Integration and coexistence can also be achieved through appropriation and mixing of French, Kanak, and Pacific values. For the FPU this means mutual recognition, and making mutual concessions so that all inhabitants can live together in a harmonious coexistence.

So the idea of a common destiny, actually. It is related to the notion of citizenship. For us, the party from which I come, eventually citizenship it must be the common point between the gathering Pacific values, values Kanak and French values. These are also fully compatible, since freedom, equality, brotherhood with respect for elders, customs etc. are quite reconcilable. And the notion of common destiny, that's it for us. I'll try to summarize it in simple words. We are against independence, but we like Kanak. You see the difference. That is to say, that's the common destiny. It is finally learning to live together, learning to recognize themselves, regardless of the side also learn how to build something together, share things together (Bernut Interview 2014).

Equal rights, equal dignity, the right to vote on the referendum, and Christian values are part of what loyalists hope to integrate into the common framework. Just like nationalists want to integrate some of their own customary values and practices. The difficulty is finding a workable balance between each faction’s values. According to Gomès, integration and reconciliation can
lead to a sense of shared future through the creation of common identity symbols. Specifically, the Nouméa Accord requires the country decide on a common flag, anthem, country name and currency. This is an effort to cement the idea of a shared future or shared destiny:

During this period, signs will be given of the gradual recognition of a citizenship of New Caledonia, which must express the chosen common destiny and be able, after the end of the period, to become a nationality, should it be so decided (Nouméa Accord 1998).

Part of the common destiny narrative is framed in terms of reconciliation. Forgiveness, healing the wounds of racism and social protest, and mutual recognition are all part of the reconciliation process and linked to common destiny. For example, Bernut (Interview 2014) and Frogier (NC 1ere 2014) saw the raising of two flags, the French tricolor and the Kanak independence flag as a significant move towards mutual recognition.

Not all definitions of common destiny present a positive outlook. In some ways, Loyalists argue common destiny has already failed to unite ethnic and political divisions, reduce economic inequality, and end racism. While the Matignon Accords may have ended racism between Kanak and French (according to Loyalists) it has not tempered growing racism amongst Kanak and Wallisian populations led by “war chiefs.”

For some time, racism sprung from Wallisians and Kanak ethnicities and it's very difficult. There is an anti-white racism that goes up, there is an anti-racism Kanak comes up. And that is very dangerous for peace. Peace is very fragile. Very, very fragile. So politicians are irresponsible in the sense that what they both did, they are not able to continue to apply to live this handshake. And it is our role, newly elected to do that. While there are many, there often, I often say it's war chiefs. There is always one who wants to be, who wants to take over another, and that is what is wrong in Caledonia. We not afford to do that. We are not strong enough to do that. Peace is fragile. Democracy is fragile. So we must preserve it. And common destiny will, this is actually all these, there are a lot of interbreeding in NC. And all these people were living very well and that is why we must continue to preserve the peace. All these cultures that enrich each other, and prove to the world that we can live with lots of different ethnic groups. This is
proved so far, and there is no reason for it to stop. It is for us to preserve that. That's the common destiny. It is able to live together, whether you white, black, Javanese, Caribbean (Lafleur Interview 2014).

There has been massive indigenous immigration from Wallis and Futuna to New Caledonia because France continued their policy of giving indigenous Pacific Islanders in Wallis and Futuna special status outside the civil code, while the Kanak gained customary status in New Caledonia (Trepied 2012). Furthermore, loyalists contest that nationalists view common destiny as assimilation and subservience, as a tool of vengeance.

There are ditches where ethnic cleavages join social divisions and there are political cleavages where geographical divisions overlap, [...] the embers of latent social protest, the embers of an ordinary racism, guts the speaker ... the future is a time to heal the wounds, it is the price of peace (Gomès Address to Congress 2009).

Where loyalists talk about integration and living together, nationalists talk about integration and building together. For nationalists common destiny is linked to the concept of victims of history and double legitimacy. Double legitimacy is the idea that both Kanak and the Communards were victims of colonization and the French state (Chappell 2013). This gives New Caledonians double the right to self-determination and ties them together by a common history of struggle. There is some overlap. Nationalists have a greater tendency to think in terms of processes, construction, and building. So when they talk about living together, it is in terms of constructing a shared framework to live together. The UC-FLNKS defines common destiny as a shared project based on building a common framework that incorporates unifying symbols, reconciliation, common values, and a sense of belonging. Nationalists are quick to say that a foundation of common values should not negate an emphasis on both commonalities and distinctiveness. Specific examples of this integration include the creation of legal and
institutional pluralism based on Kanak/Pacific humanism. Integration also includes the construction of a common future based on dialogue, consultation, and recognizing the unique rights of colonized people. Some nationalists, like LKU, view common destiny as the exclusive right of the affected population or those mentioned under the Nouméa Accord.

But when talking about common destiny, the challenge now, materializes itself like that, with the common destiny. We try to be together and we try to achieve a common awareness of being Caledonian because we all belong to the NC [...] It is not about imposing Kanak customs, but finding a middle ground [...] in NC you have a lot of people belonging to groups and those groups are communities, but actually Kanak are the only ones who are a people, the others are pieces of a people that came here [...] the goal is to find common values, a common framework of living together but letting everyone in those groups keep their own culture” (Wamytan Interview 2014).

[T]he reconciliation and symbiosis of these two visions in the context of a common destiny called a mutual understanding, an understanding of oneself and the other, which alone can lead to relations based on respect and good faith … and lasting social peace (Customary Senate 2014, 4).

Reconciliation is also part of the nationalists’ common destiny narrative. Forgiveness and mutual understanding are at the core of reconciliation. Mutual understanding, nationalists argue, will lead to respect and good faith and social peace.

A common destiny, the emergence of a nation, depends on our ability to reduce or negate the social inequalities related to history (Washetine Interview 2014).

Integration is strongly linked to the idea of building together. This joint project is part of the decolonization process, is framed as a societal pact, and emphasizes the creation of a middle ground from of integration rather than Caledonian assimilation (to become Kanak). The goals of the social project include finding that middle ground, reducing inequality, fighting injustice and exclusion, managing interdependencies, and engaging in sustainable human centered development. For UNI-PALIKA common destiny and social rebalancing are attempts to end
inequality, which ideally would lead to peacefully living together. An example of a societal pact that can be built together is a Caledonian citizenship. Nationalists argue that this citizenship might be Kanak centered but employ unifying symbols that tie all populations together, and protects local employment. Another example is the construction of a sense of Caledonian responsibility through education and training.

Common destiny seems to be a buzzword: easily used, but not easily or clearly defined. The Nouméa Accord defines it in terms of creating a new project that is based on a shared identity and rebalancing. The primary difference between nationalist and loyalist views of common destiny is the distinction between building and living together. Nationalists view common destiny as an ongoing process that has not been achieved. Continued inequalities and the marginalization of Kanak are cited as major barriers to achieving a shared and balanced society. Loyalists counter that common destiny is something that has already happened. The diverse communities that inhabit New Caledonia are already living together peacefully and intermixing with each other.

CONCLUSION: SOCIAL REBALANCING

Internal social rebalancing stems from historical contexts like the Nouméa Accord and victimization frames and Kanak identity and inequality (see disconnected chords linked to social rebalance in Figure 4). Options for social rebalancing include using France to prevent minority privilege and promoting electoral exclusion or inclusion (dark green chords). France’s colonial and post-colonial role (light grey, grey-brown, and yellow chords) and victimization have caused or exacerbated social inequalities in New Caledonia. The very fact that social rebalancing and
reconciliation is still discussed emphasizes the ongoing role of racism and discrimination. Nationalists and loyalists dream of a common destiny, a plural society that lives together or comes together to build a unique multicultural society based on a sense of belonging. But this vision is problematized by Kanak seeking additional reparations and thus supremacy for victimization under French colonialism and Caledonians who reject notions of minority rights. Common destiny is thus defined by definitions of Caledonian citizenship (burgundy chord), plural identity (purple chord), the Nouméa Accord (black chord), and inclusion in the electorate (yellow chord). In turn, common destiny (teal chords) influences arguments about expanding the electorate and citizenship, and is tied to economic rebalancing strategies through public ownership. The Kanak identity (aqua chords) is intimately tied to the victim narrative, but plays a role in shaping social rebalancing through a restricted electorate and right to self-determination.
As Niezen (2003) and Dieckhoff (2004) argued, negative perceptions of other populations make negotiation and effective governance in plural societies difficult. Their solution involves greater justice and fairness for both minority and majority populations (Niezen 2003; Dieckhoff 2004). Caledonian fears of a Kanak dominated independent government and
Kanak fears of continued marginalization problematize effective cooperation. Unification through a sense of national identity or civic nationalism may provide the collective identity that multiculturalism lacks (Brown 2008). This seems unlikely if New Caledonia does not choose an option that includes full sovereignty and thus the creation of a national civil identity distinct from France and French power. Also called liberal nationalism (Miller 2000; Margalit and Raz 1990; Tamir 1993), civic nationalism promotes loyalty to the state rather than individual ethnic communities or sub-national groups. If loyalty to the state supersedes ethnic loyalty, intra-state conflict is less likely. However, the formation of civic nationalism usually involves the creation of a strong, privileged ethnic core that can result in a reaction amongst ethnic minorities and a counter upsurge of majority nationalism (Brown 2008). A consociational or centripetal system might resolve ethnic tensions related to unequal power relationships paving the way for a more inclusive civic nationalism. Within consociational and centripetal systems, ethnic divisions are encouraged as a means of defining political communities that are then forced to work together. Each group maintains its own ethnic identity, but a sense of communal nationalism based on citizenship or loyalty to the state of New Caledonia, Kanaky-New Caledonia, or Kanaky could result. Fears of Kanak or French domination need to be mitigated before the country can move forward. Consociational and centripetal systems offer an opportunity to achieve this. The “common destiny” discourse was mobilized to promote civic nationalism, but it has not been entirely successful at transcending divisions between ethnic communities as evidenced by multiple views on national identity.

Plural societies are sharply divided sub-societies defined by a unifying feature and represented by their own political parties (Lijphart 2012). In New Caledonia pro-independence
parties are mostly Kanak and loyalist parties are predominantly Caledonian. Wesley-Smith (2007) would argue that these divisions require a renewed balance between local identities and networks of governance and ethnic nationalism. Examples of this do exist in New Caledonia. Policies enacted to promote social rebalancing include the formation of a Customary Senate and efforts to integrate Western and customary forms of governance. The rise of a multi-partisan desire for a plural Caledonian identity is another example of social rebalancing. Both are examples of recognition and sub-national autonomy that create a new balance between the Caledonian political majority and the majority Kanak population. However, divergent views on common destiny and continued calls for a core identity hinder the creation of a truly integrative national identity. The victim narrative is a source of contention, exemplifying the broader debates over exclusionary language and policy versus integrative electoral bodies and citizenship.
CHAPTER 7

ECONOMIC REBALANCING

Political and social rebalancing are deeply connected to and supported by economic rebalancing. The political role of France has contributed to its economic policies designed to exploit New Caledonia and use aid money to placate dissenting factions of the population. France’s history of colonization and victimization has also caused a lot of the economic imbalance that currently exists. It has also resulted in the current division over the contested provincial aid allocation divisions or key-sharing program. Their culture of aid has done little to mitigate this imbalance. Instead it has led to deepening dependency and a lack of domestic economic growth in areas other than nickel mining. Both nationalists and loyalists share a common vision of New Caledonia’s economic development, although they may disagree somewhat on actual methods of implementation. Nevertheless, both agree that the mining industry can serve as a crucial foundation for funding of other economic sectors designed to reduce French dependence. Internal rebalancing within New Caledonia and external rebalancing between France and New Caledonia are key to the future viability of the country – especially if the referenda result in some type of sovereignty.
THE ROLE OF FRANCE: COLONIZER OR PROTECTOR?

Perceptions of the French state have long been contentious. Domestic politics in the metropole have had a significant effect on New Caledonian politics and French policy towards their territory. After WWII De Gaulle granted New Caledonia and its indigenous population some democratic rights, including the right to vote (Chappell 2014). The Socialists gave New Caledonia territorial autonomy in the 1950s only to have it rescinded by the Gaullists in the 1960s. In the early 1980s Mitterrand promoted pluri-ethnic autonomy while the Gaullists under Chirac fought this policy. In response, the Socialists negotiated the Matignon and Nouméa Accords in 1988 and 1998. Following the Nouméa Accord Chirac and then Sarkozy attempted to hinder the transfer of powers to New Caledonia. The current French administration under Hollande has made some changes to French officials in favor of less antagonism towards nationalists (Chappell 2014).

Changing political policies towards New Caledonia have not disrupted strong economic ties. The way in which politicians view France and its role in New Caledonia is linked to economic relationships. For nationalists, France is primarily viewed as a colonizer and villain: hindering independence for continued economic benefit. To them, the only way to end this parasitic relationship is to completely break ties with France. Loyalists consider France as an absent benefactor and protector from external exploitation. Therefore, loyalists advocate for strengthening ties with France to continue to benefit from this protective relationship. Current French aid and control of the mining sector have perpetuated already hazardous inequalities cause by colonialism.
France as a Colonizer and Villain

Nationalists overwhelmingly view France as a colonial actor. Interviews, articles, and other sources revealed that the colonial history of New Caledonia and its legacies are ever present in the minds of nationalists. Interestingly, loyalists argue that colonization in New Caledonia has completely ended and the only legacies of it are inequality in the Southern Province – inequalities created by the key sharing system (clé de répartition) under the Matignon Accords. In an effort to rebalance the economic inequalities created by colonialism, France agreed to divide its aid unequally between the three provinces.

State investment financing in the territory will be distributed as follows: 3/4 for the Northern and Loyalty Island provinces and 1/4 for the Southern province, based on the 1988 budget (Article 4 Accords de Matignon-Oudinot 1988, 7).

Anti-independence sentiment is presented in many forms. Nationalists argue that the establishment of a social hierarchy based on wealthy privilege has undermined reform. The Accords were an effort by France to delay independence an effort that was concealed behind a “virginal neutrality,” (Wamytan 2013 Special Committee). They claim that France wants to create a Francafrique or neocolonial puppet government system and that French encouragement towards regional integration is called a Trojan horse move.

But there remains a long way to go against a state, which pursues a principle with its overseas territories: the red line of prohibited independence. It does so on the grounds of its place in the world, its higher interests and its position as second-ranking maritime power in the world through us, the inhabitants of these territories. It is clear that the strategies initiated by France in some of its powers can be analyzed using this prism. The same can be said for the alternatives proposed for the Noumea Accord exit process as from 2014. They are actually a kind of remake of the ‘French Union, community or cooperation’ better known as the concept of ‘Françafrique’, kind of partnership whose common feature is to leave the sovereign powers to the former colonial power (Wamytan 2013 UNGA).
It is a move to promote dependency and containment. In other words France, according to nationalists has drawn a red line against independence and destabilizes nationalist parties in an effort to protect their interests in New Caledonia. Nationalists claim, they do this while telling the world they are an impartial arbitrator of decolonization – when in fact they engage in a pyromaniac/fireman maneuver. Wamytan, Goa, and Lalié, for example, still view France in a colonial role.

Since the signing of the Matignon Accords, the French Government has adopted the attitude of an arbitrator between ‘two communities’: one for Independence and the other anti-Independence. This is a maneuver that can be described as the well known ‘pyromaniac / fireman’ maneuver. Because the French State is not the arbiter of colonization in New Caledonia, it is the main player in it (Wamytan Special Committee on Decolonization 2013).

While the Republic provides aid to New Caledonia, it also restricts voting rights (electoral debate), is a vehicle for globalization and neo-colonialism, and fosters dependency and intentional minority creation. According to UNI-PALIKA the victimization of Kanak during colonization and after has led to a desire to control resources, a sense of being owed independence, and a re-imagination of the Kanak identity as a struggle. The very process of identity creation is a struggle. But Kanak actually define their identity as struggle rather than the process of struggle.

[According to Neaoutyine, France] creates conditions of neo-colonial excess to destabilize New Caledonian institutions (Mainguet November 2012)

France’s role as a colonizer is defined, by nationalists, in terms of historical and contemporary victimization through deliberate attempts to promote immigration that marginalizes Kanak. Victimization also occurs as France continues to refuse to turn over the
1998 referendum electoral list so that nationalists can determine who is and is not eligible for the 2018-2022 referenda.

I'm from clans who are from the Northern Province, and the East Coast, Touho where there has been colonization, but in a hard way. Where there have been riots, I cannot say too much rebellion, with land theft. At the beginning of colonization, as Touho and Hienghène as on the West Coast, Koné and Voh have experienced this situation. And this historical situation of injustice today it is not fixed, since we are still, despite some developments, some changes I'd institutional. But roughly speaking, in general, global repair this historic injustice it is not repaired […] in the South, where I would say the colonial power is still intact, the situation has not changed much (Pabouty Interview 2014).

French colonial legacies and neo-colonial practices (imports, aid, providing civil servants) have led to continued inequalities. Nationalists argue that France continues to promote policies that are anti-independence.

In addition, we are witnessing our country gradually being placed in a situation of economic dependency by the French State. Indeed, not having the slightest intention to withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region "the new place for global growth" as recently stated by U.S. President Barack Obama, France maintains its overseas territories in a situation of being welfare handout recipients through "targeted and selective", immigration excessive tax exemption, financial transfers and public servant salary index-linking, all of which contribute to creating an artificial bubble in which occurs artificial growth with high incomes, a high cost of living and major social inequalities (Wamytan Special Committee 2013, 14).

Nationalists view France as a contemporary neo-colonial actor, sovereign foreigners that continue to colonize the Kanak people. They also accuse France of dragging New Caledonian into the global economy and as a result undermining customary economic and social structures.

Violent imperialism has given way to pernicious and subtle globalization (Washetine Interview 2014).

People are becoming more individualistic, because people have changed their lifestyle. They went from food self-sufficiency to an employee world (Wamytan Interview 2014).
It is difficult, therefore, simply because, in fact it is the current situation that makes it difficult. I would say the economic situation. Parents, for example, have less and less time to be able to talk to their children less and less time to teach them a little bit their tradition etc. Today it is difficult for a family whose father is unemployment is not working, and then the mother makes cleaning lady, it is difficult to send their children during the holidays, the Islands, at home, it's hard because it's too expensive. This is the context, I would say today that economic fact that it makes difficult (Pabouy Interview 2014).

Globalization, the most recent iteration of neo-colonialism has corrupted New Caledonia with Western consumerism, standardization, and acculturation. Nationalists contend that violent imperialism has given way to ‘pernicious and subtle globalization’, creating an inherited imposed burden to be managed. Although not implicitly discussed in this dissertation, globalization and the trends that follow it are a major concern for Kanak nationalists. Significant out migration from the Northern and Island Provinces to the capital has resulted in increasing individualism among once collectivistic Kanak. Structural variables often hinder these migrants from retaining customary ties with their clans and tribes. As a result, the younger Kanak generations are growing up more ignorant of the customary ways of life and much more integrated with the global Western culture of individualism.

**France as a Protector and Supporter**

France’s role as an absent guardian with a laissez-faire method of protection offers a sense of well-being and safety without the animosity of neo-colonialism. Much different than nationalists view of France as a colonial overlord. There is a strong trend among loyalists to argue against independence because of France’s guardianship. Possibly stemming from the French paternal system of colonization, loyalists maintain that France serves a variety of crucial
roles essential to the very survival of New Caledonia and its people. Fear of exploitation is also a contributing factor to loyalists’ perceptions.

We are a small country with few people who are protected by the power of France, even if it is weak today. But protected against the violence of big companies like Vale. We are protected against the appetites of China, Australia, the US. And people do not always realize that (Blaise Interview 2014).

Commensurate with the pro-association argument, loyalists argue that France offers 1) external protection against exploitation by other powerful states and MNCs, 2) internal checks and balances that protect against corruption and discrimination, and 3) aid necessary for the country’s survival.

Warnings of external exploitation by China, Australia, and the United States exemplify the loyalists’ fears. There seems to be a general consensus or assumption that New Caledonia’s nickel resources would immediately result in foreign exploitation is France was not ‘protecting’ the country’s mineral interests.

Finally, we must never forget that the Republic is as the reef around our island: it protects us. It protects us first some of us. Recent events bear witness that there is some in our Bainimarama on a small country … It also protects us from external predators. Again, let's look at all these ‘independent’ states that surround us: they were re-colonized economically, financially and politically by regional powers. At the UN, it is China that tells them when to raise the finger today. Do we want such a destiny for our country (Gomès 2013)?

That is to say, I do not believe in clear independence; that is to say that if tomorrow there should be independence, breaking with France in quotes, I think very quickly New Caledonia would catch up with the surrounding powers, to whose ranks China, or the United States or Australia etc. in addition Here we are a country in which there’s nickel, There are potential in terms of raw materials and natural resources. Not just nickel, we agree, There are yet had a story on TV. Inevitably one will attract the appetite of international powers, which radiate in the area, most prominently China or even the United States (Bernut Interview 2014).
According to Gomès, France is the “reef” around New Caledonia that protects it from “external predators.” Other loyalists share the same view: arguing that France is the only thing that stands in the way of dependency or re-colonization by another state. It is not just other powerful Pacific states that loyalists argue France protects New Caledonia from. They also refer to the violence of MNCs and talk about how easily New Caledonia could become a puppet of corporations. This is not to say, however, that loyalists will not acknowledge their current dependency on France. France is merely seen as the lesser of the possible evils. Moderate loyalist Isabelle Lafleur (2014, Interview) said:

One has to develop, there is a wealth in the Pacific that is very important […] Everything goes through the Pacific. And I think not only what is represented as nickel, as a resource we will remain independent. One day we will be dependent on someone else. And I think we have more to fear from the other great powers as France has always supported us.

Lafleur and others believe that New Caledonia is not yet prepared for independence. Someday, the country may develop enough to be able to take over control of their sovereign powers, but not at this moment. Therefore, France serves a crucial role to protect New Caledonia from harmful external and internal actors. Internally, loyalists fear a “Pandora’s box of corruption” and Kanak violence (Blaise 2014 Interview). According to the UCF and CE, France provides aid and checks and balances, preserves rights, and prevents exploitation. It also ensures economic development and supports the education, healthcare, and financial systems in New Caledonia. As a powerful state and the ultimate executive authority over the New Caledonian government, France is well placed as a counterweight to domestic politics. It provides checks and balances and preserves the rights of all Caledonians, but especially the non-Kanak. In particular France ensure economic autonomy, recognition, and ongoing aid as a partner in the development process.
In 2011, France invested an estimated 132 billion pacific franc in New Caledonia (see Table 4). This aid accounts for approximately one-third of New Caledonia’s four hundred and eighty-two billion pacific franc annual revenue. Today the amount is even higher. France currently contributes around 150 billion dollars to New Caledonia. Financial aid from France supports integrated banking system, education, and healthcare, a steady flow of imports, and training programs that assure economic development. Approximately one hundred and twenty of the one hundred and fifty billion pacific francs are remitted to France because it is used to support French public servants working in New Caledonia. Loyalists like the FPU view France as a force that can rescue the country in its times of need, and insurance plan that asks little and takes little. Nationalist’s view of French aid is oriented around continuing aid after independence. Congruent with the victimization theme, aid is considered a colonial debt. After

| Table 4. French Financial Assistance to New Caledonia in Pacific Francs.¹ |
|---------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Metropolitan Transfers          | 111,122  | 116,594  | 133,189  | 131,899  | 131,607  | 133,609  | 132,656  |
| (in millions of Pacific Francs) |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Total Revenue                   | 242,741  | 320,980  | 400,485  | 407,008  | 426,120  | 453,641  | 482,135  |
| (in millions of Pacific Francs) |          |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Metropolitan Transfer as Percent of Total | 46%      | 36%      | 33%      | 33%      | 31%      | 30%      | 28%      |

independence French aid will continue in the form of a limited mutual agreement designed to help New Caledonia learn to become sovereign and military protection of the marine corridor.

DESTABILIZING AN AID CULTURE: REDUCING FRENCH DEPENDENCY

One aspect of geoeconomics examines the economic situation of a particular country from a global scale and associated methods of wealth collection through market control (Cowan and Smith 2009). This approach emphasizes supranational relationships and the way in which social relations are reinterpreted through market economies (Cowan and Smith 2009). Internal colonization, for example, describes how supranational relationships and unequal control over the market result in the reinterpretation of social networks. Specifically, internal colonialism is the institutional devaluation of sub-national populations resulting in collective inequalities: a form of “systematic inequality” (Penderhughes 2011, 236). This leads to uneven development, inequality, and the formation of regional identities (Agnew 2001). Combined with the devolution of power, these variables often produce regional movements that begin with decolonization and democratization, before experiencing supranationalism and a widespread identity crisis (Agnew 2001). French assimilatory practices, economic control, marginalization, and colonial governance exemplify internal colonialism. The systematic inequalities created under colonial rule have not been adequately mediated (if not outright perpetuated) in contemporary institutions and governance. The Matignon and Noumea Accords are prime examples of French attempts to perpetuate internal colonialism and retain control over sub-national populations and resources.

Despite the advancements made towards decentralization and independence via the Accords, a highly controlled dependent relationship between New Caledonia and France
remains. Land redistribution under both agreements merely created a rural Melanesian poor and resulted in another reason for migration to the capital (Connell 2003). Recognizing the importance of economic independence, pro-independence leaders have promoted domestic business creation and greater local control over the mining industry. However, financial assistance and technical dependence on France has fostered unwillingness among individuals to form businesses without direct government support. Tension between maintaining traditional identities and assimilating to dominant socioeconomic structures has resulted in the failure of many rural development projects (Horowitz 2004). This dichotomy is similarly present in debates over mining and associated land rights. At a local scale, conflict over mines revolved around local inhabitants’ desire for power over decision-making and recognition of land rights. Local leaders’ concern with self-determination of land rights stems from increasing integration into the global market and a perceived loss of traditional authority. Support or resistance to economic development is thus measured according to recognition of land rights and authority (Horowitz 2002).

As a relatively autonomous overseas territory of France, New Caledonia enjoys an “assisted economy,” funded by and growing on massive transfers of public aid from France and the EU with little supporting infrastructure (Freyss 1995, 203; Horowitz 2004; Rumley 2006; Chappell, 1999; McClellan, 1999). This system is a deliberate attempt to foster economic dependence and reduce calls for political independence (Slatter 1989; Freyss 1995; Horowitz 2004). Rumley (2006) contended that the Matignon and Nouméa Accords were French attempt by the French to re-colonize New Caledonia by artificially supporting the cost of living, creating dependence through significant financial aid, undermining local political expertise by flooding
institutions with French public servants, controlling the mining industry, and strategic bribery. The influx of French aid at every economic or political crisis point has created economic dependency that makes metropolitan aid more available at every level of society and tends to sap individual entrepreneurship (Freyss 1995). Loyalists and nationalists tend to agree that one of the most pressing ways to reduce French aid is by reducing the number or salaries of French public servants that work in New Caledonia. Wage control can be accomplished by capping salaries and letting inflation naturally reduce them according to Blaise (Interview 2014). Other efforts might involve restructuring wages or replacing French public servants with trained Caledonians and Kanaks. Both sides agree on diversification in the export market and greater local production to compete with French importers. For both, local production is a top priority and a key aspect of regional development projects. In addition, they call for tax reform to increase domestic GDP and reduce the need for French aid to support key services.

While French aid is considered a colonial debt by some nationalists, it has nevertheless caused rampant inequality. Efforts to combat this inequality are aimed at creating economic projects that promote local production and reduce dependency on that aid. While each party has created its own economic policies, there is some continuity among them. Many nationalists agree that regional integration and cooperation with international organizations like the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the Pacific Islands Forum are the solution to combating French aid and MNC power. Creating free trade agreements among member states and taking advantage of the marine economy could create mutually beneficial trade networks. Nationalists acknowledge that true economic development will require the Caledonian people to reduce their reliance on a consumerist society. Perceptions need to change for real change. One of the big problems is
externally oriented investment by wealth Caledonians. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the referendum and the lack of a sense of belonging, they choose to invest in France or Australia rather than New Caledonia. Nationalists argue that this capital flight must be prevented and is better oriented towards fostering local businesses and employing Caledonians. Reducing their reliance on French aid is a necessary part of rebalancing and becoming more economically autonomous.

**Key Sharing Program and Provincial Inequality**

The key-sharing program is another aspect of French aid designed to reduce inequalities. Under the Matignon Accord, the country was divided into three Provinces that would receive unequal shares of New Caledonia’s revenue and French aid. The key-sharing program was an effort to rebalance the economic inequalities created by colonialism. Colonialism created an economic and industrial core in the capital, Nouméa. While the regions surrounding the capital developed quickly with the influx of French money, investment, and migrants, rural New Caledonia was less profitable. This created a great imbalance in development, standards of living, quality of living, and employment opportunities. The Southern Province, in which the capital and core of economic development is located is given 50% of the allocated funds from the country’s revenue (Chauchat 2011). The Northern Province receives 32% and the Loyalty Islands receive 18%. The equipment allowance divides revenues into 40% for the Southern Province, 40% for the Northern Province, and 20% for the Loyalty Islands. In addition to unequal distribution of revenues, French aid is also unequally distributed. The country as a whole received nearly one hundred and fifty-six billion pacific francs from France in 2013.
Since the famous allocation keys in place to encourage the North and the Islands, they should have cause to stabilize or increase the population of these two provinces, particularly the Islands Province, with fewer people than there were a few years ago, continued to empty the benefit of the Southern Province. That is to say, they have migrated to the PS. This is normal, they have the right to go anywhere in NC, they are home. Except that behind it created needs that could not be met somewhere. Because this influx of population in the south of the NC which had fewer resources because of the fixed allocation keys, communities were not capable of, it was too fast, to find a solution. We find ourselves in a situation in which applications continue to grow and people continue to live in squats (Bernut Interview 2014).

Some argue that internal immigration has made the key sharing program a source of inequality. In 1999 the population was divided between the three provinces: 68% lived in the Southern Province, 21% in the North, and 11% in the Loyalty Islands. By 2014, the population distribution between the provinces is 74.4% living in the Southern Province, 18.8% living in the Northern Province, and 6.8% of the population is living in the Loyalty Islands. A significant influx of external migrants as well as internal migrants from the Northern and Island Provinces significantly increased the population in the South: especially in and around Nouméa. As a result, some loyalists believe that the key sharing allocation should be revised and the heavily populated Southern Province given a larger share of French aid.

It is difficult for them, because in fact there has been a colonial era that disrupted [disturbed] separatists a lot. Or it is possible more, I can speak of colonialism, when I see that the institutions we have three provinces, the Northern Province which is led by the separatists, the Islands Province which is led by the pro-independence and Southern Province, led by non-independence. The Government is collegial, so it makes everyone work, proportional democratic representation, so the separatists have political power. They have the financial power since the Matignon and Noumea did that to rebalance Caledonia, they have more money than the PS. This is exactly the problem is, we had a census here we are almost 200,000 in PS with a budget where it happens more to deal with the people of the Northern Province and the Islands Province come (Lafleur Interview 2014).

Although provincialization historically created a system of power sharing it has become ineffective and led to institutional fragmentation according to loyalists.
So all that to say that there are two solutions: build social housing but it will not be enough, and there rehabilitate squats. That is to say to these areas, sometimes become zones of lawlessness, of frequentable areas. That is to say, that families can have the water ... and as part of the release of the Noumea Accord, it will necessarily renegotiate the allocation keys (Bernut Interview 2014).

By revising the key sharing system or the provincial system of governance as a whole, the FPU in particular argues that a more proportional institutional balance among the regions could be created.

The Southern province which hosts a majority of the population would receive the additional funding it needs to create an infrastructure to support this growing population. There seems to be an underlying current among loyalist rhetoric that the current system, which was designed to funnel additional money to the less population but poorer Northern and Island Provinces is not achieving these stated aims. For loyalists, the extra money given to these areas where the population is decreasing is obviously not helping create industries or jobs in these areas. Therefore loyalists believe this money would be better spent on the goring population in the Southern Province.

Nationalists do not advocate for the reformulation of key sharing, but they do propose better regional cooperation. Instead, collective development projects including customary land development, land reform, and rural economic development could encourage Kanak to stay in rural areas rather than migrate to Nouméa – eliminating the need to reformulate the allocations. Provincial balance could instead be cultivated through initiatives targeting sustainable tourism, ecotourism, and tourism projects with regional cruise lines. If the key sharing divisions remain the same, it is certain that the nationalists who control the Northern and Island provinces will be pressed by loyalists to show quantifiable results to justify the status quo.
MINING AND THE NEW CALEDONIAN ECONOMY

The nickel industry is at the core of economic rebalancing plans for New Caledonia and addressing socio-economic inequalities. New Caledonia is the fifth largest producer of nickel ore and contains the fourth largest reserves. In 2000 the nickel industry contributed to 92.1% of export revenues although a large percent of those are expatriated (Henningham and May 1992). Nickel extraction and refinement accounts for only 10-25% of GNP (Horowitz 2004) and 5.6% of salaried employment (ISEE 2001). Used for protective plating, stainless steel, and the production of other alloys the country is the largest producer of ferronickel (an iron and nickel alloy) (Ali and Grewal 2006). However, nickel is vulnerable to fluctuations in international market prices. Since 2007 prices have been falling from $23.50/lb. because of the economic recession. Only recently have nickel prices begun a moderate increase (in 2012 it was $8.00/lb.) (Historical Pricing 2013).

Colonialism stripped many indigenous groups of control over their ancestral lands, and the resources that were part of them. In New Caledonia, this process began as early as 1847 when French company Société Le Nickel (SLN) first began extracting nickel (Ali and Grewal 2006). At this time nickel was used in a nickel-copper-zinc alloy to create items that could be silver-plated. Later nickel was used in the production of coins. As local autonomy in New Caledonia increased and French control began to dissipate, pro-independence indigenous leaders recognized that if the country were to become independent, it would need a stable and profitable economy. Historically, mining operations have not played a major role in the independence movement because mining has a lot of support from the French government, occurs in sparsely populated areas that are usually not good for agriculture (so are seen as having little value), and
the Kanak have largely remained outside the market economy and are thus less aware of the benefits and costs of mining (Horowitz 2004). Where problems have arisen among Kanak communities, mining companies have mostly been able to reach an agreement by providing benefits like employment. For a long time, France refused to allow foreign investment in the nickel mining industry, strengthening their monopoly of control over the New Caledonian economy. It was not until the nickel boom in the 1960s that France encouraged nickel companies to expand to non-French trading partners (Connell 2003). By the early 1990s, liberalized restructuring allowed multinational conglomerates and the indigenous Kanak population to take part in the mining industry (Ali and Grewal 2006). While indigenous control over the mining industry has increased dramatically in recent decades, Kanak controlled corporations are far from implementing a completely sustainable form of self-determination.

Although the French state legally has little involvement in mining unless it involves atomic substances, the High Commissioner (appointed by the French government) maintains a position on each mining consultative body and is subsequently able to influence decisions made concerning mining operations (Baker and McKenzie 2013). Tax incentive schemes further allow France to influence the way in which the mining sector operates at the state administrative level. However, the Congress and individual Provincial governments control most regulations and enforcement of mining law. Much of the current debate regarding nickel mining is centered on the construction of two particular mines: Koniambo and Goro. The geographic location and ownership of the two mines represent the two models for the future economic development of mining and the country more broadly.
Following a neoliberal business model, the Goro mining project is almost entirely foreign owned, nearly all profits and benefits are exported, and little concern is given for environmental and human-health related damage. The mine was originally owned by three parties: the Canadian International Nickel Company (INCO) controlled 69%, Japan owned 21%, and the French government owned 10% (Horowitz 2012). In 2006, INCO’s shares were bought by a Brazilian multinational mining company, Vale, located in Toronto Canada. Only 5% of Goro is owned by New Caledonia. This share is part of the French government’s and is divided between the three provinces: 5% to South and 2.5% to North and Loyalty Islands (Serre 2005). Goro’s operations also benefit from a fifteen-year tax exemption followed by a five-year tax reduction. It imports a significant portion of its labor. In addition to the lack of economic benefit for New Caledonians, Goro’s owners have taken little more than token steps to even attempt to mitigate the environmental and health hazard issues resulting from the mining processes.

Unlike the Goro operation, the mine at Koniambo represents a move towards a system congruent with Corntassel’s (2002) sustainable self-determination and is a testing ground for socialist economics in New Caledonia. In April 1990 the Mining Society of the South Pacific’s (SMSP) owner Jacques Lafleur, the conservative President of the Southern Province and an anti-independence leader, sold his company to the Northern Province at the behest of France and ERAMET (SLN’s parent company and 55% French owned and 45% US owned). Control of SMSP was then transferred to pro-independence leader Raphael Pidjot (Ali and Grewal 2006).

The indigenous Northern Province and independence movement now had a foothold in the country’s biggest economic sector. Pro-independence sentiments and growing unrest in the 1980s and 1990s were used by SMSP to pressure the French government to hand over the rights
to the mine in Koniambo (Horowitz 2004). Codified in the Bercy Accord, which was part of the Noumea Accord, SLN sold the Koniambo mine to SMSP under the condition that they would partner with another transnational corporation (Maclellan 2013). SMSP maintained 51% ownership of Koniambo, but partnered with Canadian company Falconbridge on the administration of the mining operation (Ali and Grewal 2006). In 2006 Falconbridge was sold to UK-Swiss owned corporation Xstrata and the former chief operating officer of Falconbridge Ian Pearce became the Chief Executive of Xstrata Nickel (Xstrata Executive Committee 2012). Since then, SMSP has endeavored to build new relationships with Korean and Chinese companies to move business partnerships away from French influence, while retaining 51% ownership (Maclellan 2013). Plans for new processing plants in Goro and Koniambo are underway, but far from completed or operational. While a refinery in the Southern Province would provide some additional benefit for local communities, the publically owned processing plant in the North would, theoretically, be more likely to reduce inequalities and reinvest in the community and Province.

The Koniambo Project represents an important move for nationalists and loyalists. Both sides view it as an opportunity to test a more socialist economic model and the ability of publicly owned businesses to reduce economic inequalities. Greater domestic control over the mining industry also gives the government the opportunity to use revenues for a variety of development programs. For nationalists in particular, Koniambo represents economic independence from France and the expression of self-determination and sovereignty over their territory (Horowitz 2004).

For a long time France carried out a practice of neoliberal multiculturalism where
indigenous leaders who conformed to French ideology were given control over resources and simultaneously marginalized local opponents (Finley and Brook 2012). However decreasing nickel prices combined with labor repression resulted in a questioning of the French role and imposed inequalities that ultimately led to the rise of Kanak nationalism (Dornoy 1984). Even with some indigenous control of nickel mining, the industry has still produced significant inequality because of imported labor and elite control. As a result, non-European migrants often side with Europeans for fear of job loss and repatriation (Connell 2003). Today France’s economic interest in New Caledonia has diversified. In addition to ongoing nickel extraction, the French state also seeks to maintain control over offshore fishing rights and some of the largest discovered natural gas deposits (Rumley 2006). “Adding New Caledonia’s 1.74 million square kilometer EEZ to that of France, for example, increases that of the latter by a factor of six (Maclellan and Chesneaux 1998, 237)” (Rumley 2006, 233). The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surrounding New Caledonia gives France control of any aquaculture and strategic naval importance.

Rebalancing the Mining Industry and Foundations for Development

For the FPU, social rebalancing is all about trust and balance which paves the way for political rebalancing based on creating a cooperative mining strategy with domestic control of the mining sector.

The second thing is the nickel industry … the mining industry is a place where we can find a common interest with both sides of the political debate. The problem is that NC needs to have a common policy on mining to face MNCs and to do that we need to cooperate and understand that we are all complementary and that is we find a way to build something in common it will be good for the whole country –
right now each party has their own policies on mining […] In the mining industry the first thing would be to recognize that all the mining industries here have complementary skills. SMSP owns a small amount of land but they have good technology. SLN owns a lot of land but does not have all the technology. So if they could cooperate they could grow […] And in the same way it would have SMSP can feed SLN-rich ore that would draw in the massive Koniambo. This is to ensure that companies, instead of being fierce competition, and shoot himself at the expense of the interests of the Caledonians, it would have to be able to get along with her, to face the economic, market conditions together (Bernut Interview 2014).

Gomès, Pabouy, and others also advocate for greater public control of industries like nickel. Public control of industry would return control over revenue distribution and allocation to the Caledonian ‘public.’ Leaders hope that greater public control over mining and other industries will result in more effective distribution of revenues to the public services that need it. Nationalists, like Pabouy, also seem to be suspicious of MNC motives and actions. A belief that is most likely supported by historical French exploitation of the nickel industry that resulted in little benefit for Kanak inhabitants.

Another point is that here we have some natural resources that we can manage to better redistribute the wealth. We have two mining projects. In the north the nationalist party has control of the mining projects and they did it in a good way in order to make sure that people here would benefit from the project. In the south we are not sure what the company is doing, because they are doing whatever they want to do (Pabouy Interview 2014).

According to UNI-PALIKA who has close ties to the Koniambo mine, nickel offers a foundation of funding for economic diversification. Funding that would be more likely to be reinvested in New Caledonian if the mines are publicly owned. While nickel, nationalists argue, can serve as the foundation for development and fund diversification, they understand the importance of promoting locally made products and therefore reducing food imports from France. This project
would simultaneously help develop the agricultural sector for regional export in addition to increasing the country’s self-sufficiency.

Our feature, our manner [path] of designing development (which is currently the prerogative of the provinces, but we want to expand throughout the country), is to work on the basis of mining resources to diversify the economy. We know today agriculture is somewhat moribund, tourism was hard to surpass 100 000 tourists. On these issues, the question of the distance vis-à-vis countries other major countries that could be purveyors of tourists, it is a handicap. But the other handicap is the cost of living is super expensive. It works there. It is through the implementation of major social reforms, especially the tax-related reforms. This is a big mess [construction site] that is open today (Washetine Interview 2014).

It is just over all that was us, they made us suffer ... the others who command, who do everything and we are nothing, we suffer. That means we can conduct agriculture policies, agricultural ... support the development of the local market. Today, it is important, it is the supermarkets and importers are rain or shine. And we would like to change this, trying that for example what is gained on the mine could go on agricultural development, the development of fishing to produce for local production substitutes for imports to better control imports (Lalié Interview 2014).

According to nationalists, local and majority public control of nickel prevents MNC exploitation and ensures that the distribution of mining wealth is more egalitarian. Where loyalists advocate for continued French control, and thus protection, of the mining industry, nationalists argue the same goal can be accomplished by public control of the mining sector.

We depend too much on nickel industry and the transfers from France. I do not believe in the capacity of political power to promote economic diversification. […] I believe in the fact that people will find their own way if we create the conditions, the good economic climate. So we need to keep the tax rate to a reasonable level (Blaise Interview 2014).

To reduce dependency loyalists advocate for, using the Northern mining plant as a center of economic development, creating a cooperative mining strategy among parties and encourage sharing resources between SMSP and SLN. AN agreement between SMSP and SLN would, they argue, encourage regional cooperation. A partnership between the publically owned SMSP and
the French/multinational owned SLN would ensure that New Caledonia could retain local control of mining operations and encourage community participation in the process. Loyalists also believe this partnership would encourage sustainable development, increase employment, and form an east-west balance. All of this would be possible because a greater portion of the mines would be domestically controlled. The local population could have more control over decision-making.

CONCLUSION: ECONOMIC REBALANCING

The role of France as a colonizing force (mustard chords) is linked to the victim narrative, common destiny, the Nouméa Accord, economic and social inequalities, and the view of France as a colonizer who exploits New Caledonia (see Figure 4). According to political leaders, France’s role as a protector also necessitates economic rebalancing designed to mitigate economic inequalities (black chord) – in the same way that its colonizer role presupposes the need for social and political rebalancing. France acknowledges its culpability in the preamble of the Nouméa Accord (1998):

On 24 September 1853, when France claimed ‘Grand Terre’, which James Cook had named ‘New Caledonia’, it took possession of a territory in accordance with the conditions of international law, as recognized at that time by the nations of Europe and America. It did not establish legally formalized relations with the indigenous population, The treaties entered into with the customary authorities in 1854 and subsequent years did not represent balanced agreements but were, in fact, unilateral instruments.

Nationalists and loyalists agree that the dependent relationship created with France is unhealthy and unsustainable. In practice they agree on a number of methods for reducing French aid.
However, loyalists maintain that New Caledonia should retain strong political ties with France despite moving towards a less economically dependent relationship. Nationalists argue that dependency and economic balance cannot be achieved without a complete break from France. One area of agreement is greater domestic and public control of the mining industry. Domestic control would ensure that more mining revenue returns to the Caledonian economy and could be used to reduce inequality and fund the growth of other economic sectors (i.e. agriculture and food production and aquaculture). Economic rebalancing (blue chord) has also influenced how the electorate is structured and the Kanak victim frame – to give greater power to marginalized Kanak seeking public control over mining industries.
Figure 4. Connections and co-definitions among select objectives.

Economic rebalancing is composed of a complex series of economic projects proposed by political parties. In general, economic projects are aimed at reducing inequality (black chord) and dependency on French aid (mustard chord) by shifting control of industries and businesses to a public model, diversifying the economy, emphasizing local production, reducing imports, tax
reform, and reform of the public servant salary model. Unfortunately the economic infrastructure created by capitalism in New Caledonia has perpetuated an infrastructure based on uneven development, problematizing the possibility of positive relationships between the goals of local communities and industries (Horowitz 2012). Although many of Kanak were rapidly integrated into the market economy at the beginning of the colonial period, the indigenous cultural-economic sphere is marked by a discourse and practice emphasizing equality (Merle 1995; Naepels 1998; Bensa 1995). This orientation means that possessing greater wealth than one’s neighbors is not a mark of high social standing, a concept in direct contradiction with Western notions of capitalism and market economy (Horowitz 2002). As a result, development projects are unsuccessful because success is contingent on integrating dominant Western socio-economic structures that are repressed by Kanak leaders who are opposed to French control but not always the French government itself (Freyss 1995).

Loyalists and nationalists share many of the same ideas for economic rebalancing or economic development. To reduce inequalities they advocate improving purchasing power parity, creating a democratic economy, increasing education and specialized training, correcting the artificial standard of living by reducing the cost of living, land reform, wealth sharing to prevent violence, increasing access to local employment, and regional development among the provinces in the form of education and immigration of skilled labor and businesses. Some loyalists promote a liberal economic plan, citing the Marshall Plan, but adapted for New Caledonia.

It's a real Marshall Plan that should be involved. We need, at the same time, improve the purchasing power of the most disadvantaged populations and the middle class, fight against the high cost of living, increasing access to local employment and ensure greater tax fairness (Gomès Address 2009).
The original Marshall Plan was designed to raise standards of living and fuel economic growth by using the US aid to stimulate European productivity and import more European products (Sanford 1982). These goals would be achieved by expanding agricultural and industrial production, financial and budgetary restoration, and by stimulating regional and international trade (Tarnoff 1997). For New Caledonia, like other European Territories at the time, some of the aid money was set aside for development in sectors like nickel mining (Tarnoff 1997).

CE’s economic project also involves increasing competition, especially to combat the dominance of French imports and chain stores. Leaders of CE, like others believe that greater public control of industry will make it easier to funnel mining revenues into other economic sectors and diversify the economy. Tax reform is also part of the economic strategy to combat the French monopoly on imports. Gomès also encourages New Caledonia’s participation in regional organizations as a way to create networks within the Pacific region. These are common themes in loyalist and nationalist rhetoric about economic rebalancing.

Because we are … our economic model is based on the exchange of nickel ore against imported manufactured items and food. We have a local production, but it is very narrow. So if tomorrow we were independent and we lost the [...] fixed rate of exchange the wages would be lower but then people would have to buy the same items we import – cars, food, gasoline, anything – for the same international prices, so they would be one-third or one-half poorer. And that would be a catastrophe for the country, for the people (Blaise Interview 2014).

Nickel will not support New Caledonia fully, it is impossible. You have to live in other sectors (Lafleur Interview 2014).

Everybody is talking about that. We depend too much on nickel industry and the transfers from France. I do not believe in the capacity of political power to promote economic diversification. [...] I believe in the fact that people will find their own way if we create the conditions, the good economic climate. So we need to keep the tax rate to a reasonable level (Blaise Interview 2014).
For the UCF, economic rebalancing is about reducing inequality through tax reform, diversifying the nickel industry, remaining open to immigration and skilled labor, and rural development.

Education, one loyalist leader believes, is at the core of any effort to balance economic inequalities and provide new opportunities for young Kanak and New Caledonians.

Another reason why we have the problem with these inequalities is the inequality in education levels. Illiteracy is really high in New Caledonia, and the situation has been worsening for the past forty years because in the 1980s when we had the political events many children left school for political reasons and today we have to deal with the children of these children. They have been bred in families with two generations of un-schooling, motivated by political discourse, and in the end you will find the one-third of Kanak population is illiterate and in today’s world even for low qualification in jobs, if you can't read and cannot write, you are dead. So there is a correlation between this problem and the problems of inequality. In New Caledonia forty years ago, anyone could go to the nickel factory with any school and could have a career – those days are over (Blaise Interview 2014).

Blaise identifies education as a critical cause of inequality that has led to economic inequality between Kanak and non-Kanak communities. He claims that Kanak have a tradition of not attending school as a form of political protest. This has led to successive generations of uneducated parents and children who have few job opportunities.

First of all we need to be open to the world because we are too few people. You cannot expect from 250,000 people the number of soldiers, pilots, or specialists in computer science that you can find in a country of several million people. So we need to remain open to the outside world, and we need to educate people here. I am quite pessimistic of the prospect of the Kanak people if they don't have a change of mentality regarding school. Today the reject of France brings a rejection of school and that is a big mistake for them because they are condemning their children to be slaves in the world we live in (Blaise Interview 2014).

So you have to send young people, like you, to be trained for that [skilled jobs], that can do it all. For now we cannot, it is not enough, there is not enough people for that. So for now we brought in people from outside. And then we said, and local employment, why not go ahead. And why? Because we have to bring in people from outside, because none are here (Lafluer Interview 2014).
To complicate matters, the development of New Caledonia has moved beyond mineral extraction. While nickel remains a core part of the economy, jobs for uneducated youth in the mining sector have decreased. Blaise and Lafleur stress that in the contemporary global economic landscape, an education is critical for success. A lack of education prohibits individual economic development and economic advancement for the country as a whole. Without specialists and trained service industry workers advancement from a mining based economic to a service or information technology based economy will be nearly impossible.

Transitioning away from a dependence on the mining industry is important for both loyalists and nationalists. Both encourage decreasing New Caledonia’s dependence on French aid.

So first of all you need to train people, you need to reduce the share of public servants in the workforce in NC. We have too many public servants that would amount for almost 25% or 1/3 of the people. But you need to be sure that the people will succeed, you need to control the level of wages for the public servants and let inflation bring up wages in the private sector so the difference would be nonexistent. And then when a public servant retires you should not replace them like they do in France. Only one out of two. But you need to protect people against competition or unfair competition. I am a liberal, I believe in the power of competition, but I am also very realist that if someone gets into competition without the weapons to succeed is dead (Blaise Interview 2014).

In addition, we are witnessing our country gradually being placed in a situation of economic dependency by the French State. Indeed, not having the slightest intention to withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region ‘the new place for global growth’ as recently stated by U.S. President Barack Obama, France maintains its overseas territories in a situation of being welfare handout recipients through ‘targeted and selective’, immigration excessive tax exemption, financial transfers and public servant salary index-linking, all of which contribute to creating an artificial bubble in which occurs artificial growth with high incomes, a high cost of living and major social inequalities (Wamytan UNGA 2013, 14).

To accomplish this New Caledonia needs to train and employ their own public servants, create a solid tax base that can replace some of the aid money from France, and reduce the cost of living
so that people are able to reasonably contribute to tax revenues. Blaise advocates for keeping the current aid rate at the same level and allowing inflation to decrease it naturally.

The first thing that should be restructured is the tax system. This tax system relies to much on the global situation and the LME (the London Exchange of nickel prices). So if we are going to lower this reliance, that would be good and it could be done through tax restricting. One example is the VAT, which is something that does not exist in NC. That could lead to lowering of prices of products here. And in the same way it could lead to strengthening company’s actions, export, and development (Bernut Interview 2014).

Like the other parties, FPU’s economic policy promotes tax reform, increasing exports, locally owned businesses, and diversification. Bernut (Interview 2014) is critical of the division of powers among provinces and therefore the management of resources:

Each province has competences in tourism, employment, and environment, on their own with different structures and actions. This involves three more time people than needed. So this should be concentrated into one department with less people. The second thing is the nickel industry … the mining industry is a place where we can find a common interest with both sides of the political debate. The problem is that NC needs to have a common policy on mining to face MNCs and to do that we need to cooperate and understand that we are all complementary and that is we find a way to build something in common it will be good for the whole country – right now each party has their own policies on mining.

He, like other loyalists and nationalists, understand that nickel is the core of the New Caledonian economy. This core has been destabilized, in Bernut’s opinion, by ineffective management. These problems could be remedied by creating a cohesive countrywide set of mining policies. Bernut also acknowledges the fear shared by many loyalists of MNCs or other countries taking advantage of a New Caledonia without France’s protection. However, if the country created a comprehensive mining strategy, they may be more likely to counter these international powers.

Nickel is the sinews [nerve center] of war. That is to say, we will not find a priori, it is our belief, we will not find it to be any institutional solution without solving the issue prior the question of nickel between loyalists and separatists. Why is it necessary? Because today it there's three plants on our soil and it would require a
minimum of complementarity and negotiations, a strategy that is finally implemented for that competition benefits the NC and does not come to his detriment. And unfortunately it is clear now that there are as nickel strategies as there are political parties (Bernut Interview 2014).

For the UC-FLNKS economic rebalancing specifically refers to rural development as a strategy for reducing inequalities. This is not surprising given the primarily Kanak demographic of their constituents. The Northern and Loyalty Islands in particular suffer from economic inequalities compared to Nouméa and the Southern Province. Both DUS and UNI-PALIKA also encourage rural development. Like loyalists, nationalists promote using revenues from the nickel industry to fund development projects and other sectors (like agriculture and aquaculture) that will help diversify the domestic economy. For nationalists, the ultimate goal of boosting domestic economic sectors is lessening the country’s reliance on French imports and aid.

And so, it necessarily good, we talk about wealth creation from natural resources, mineral and stuff like minerals etc., which are exportable. There is that. And then, so not much of sustainable development, but actually there to avoid, to make it less dependent, the NC to reducing dependence vis-à-vis the outside world, in particular vis-à-vis imported products, consumption ... and all that. So we think here at home in terms of agriculture has the ability, at a number of things, to ensure, for example, for drinking and stuff that are untapped today or little use. Because until now, there has always favored the things that are, because it sells well, and other things we left them aside (Pabouty Interview 2014).

Our feature, our manner [path] of designing development (which is currently the prerogative of the provinces, but we want to expand throughout the country), is to work on the basis of mining resources to diversify the economy. We know today agriculture is somewhat moribund, tourism was hard to surpass 100 000 tourists. On these issues, the question of the distance vis-à-vis countries other major countries that could be purveyors of tourists, it is a handicap. But the other handicap is the cost of living is super expensive. It works there. It is through the implementation of major social reforms, especially the tax-related reforms. This is a big mess [construction site] that is open today (Washetine Interview 2014).

This is part of what Pabouty (Interview 2014) calls a “counter colonial economy.” This is an economic project designed to reduce New Caledonia’s dependence. The goal is to increase
exports and reduce imports. UNI-PALIKA adds that the creation of local businesses can help create a stronger export economy.

Anyway, there are many things to do. It's still a new country. When we spoke of imported products, we are still in the spirit of colonial counter economy (Pabouty Interview 2014).

We assume that New Caledonia is rich in raw materials, either nickel, tourism, land ... explorations on hydrocarbons, nickel under the mother, fish ... so here we risk of impoverishing itself, it imports everything and have nothing [nothing is made here] (Lalié Interview 2014).

All of the nationalist leaders encourage continued participation with regional organizations. The Melanesian Spearhead Group in particular is cited. For nationalists, these regional organizations are ways to circumvent French control and ways to strengthen New Caledonia’s ties to the Pacific rather than their dependence on France.

The separatists have projects in terms of economic projects, which are more oriented towards the region. Through the group Spearhead, we want this to be as a political space, solidarity between the Melanesian countries, but that it is also an economic space, economic exchanges. As soon as there is between Fiji, Vanuatu and the Solomons and exchanges. But we're in the Iron Group Lance, as a Movement, but we want the country to enter this exchange system. But that's in the Melanesian Group, but we want it to be extended to the whole of the Pacific (Pabouty Interview 2014).

For its part, the FLNKS by its institutional representatives in Kanaky will reinvigorate the partnership with the Melanesian Spearhead Group through senior staff training, economic and trade cooperation, the development of trade, etc. The position of Chair of the regional organization will be in the hands of the FLNKS after the summit in June this year and will be a historic opportunity to anchor New Caledonia even more deeply in the Pacific and Melanesian environment (Wamytan UNGA 2013, 16).

Wealth redistribution is another pervasive theme in nationalist narratives. Wealth redistribution refers to better management of public funds.

Because the concern of the Government, the future state is to ensure that what we can gather in wealth redistribution is better. It is the public who can do it, whether
the provinces or the Government Caledonian Kanak future that can make this redistribution of wealth (Pabouty Interview 2014).

The argument is tied to the key sharing allocation and the debate over provincial finance divisions.

It's true that 72% of the population of the NC live in Greater [the agglomeration of] Nouméa. And so they want to change. We say that, no, the imbalances still exist due to the very long history. Of course there are ongoing discussions with the Presidents of the various collectives to see how to change things, to find ways, including PS to meet his own needs (Washetine Interview 2014).

Some loyalists argue that migration to the southern province requires a redefinition of the key sharing divisions. The population in the Southern Province has increased while the populations in the Northern and Loyalty Islands has decreased. Meaning that the Southern Province should have a greater share of the country’s revenues to take care of the larger population. Nationalists contend that taking this money away from the Northern and Island Provinces will negatively impact the development of these regions. The money, they argue, funds businesses and training programs intended to promote economic development in rural communities. Tax reform and reducing the salaries of (primarily French) public servants is another primary tenet of nationalists’ economic programs.

But we want to say that it is up to us to decide what we want to do in terms of cooperation. This is out of a central power scheme held by others. Vigilance also. Because we see that even if it is not the state often has a stranglehold on the domestic policies of countries, today it is rather the multinationals. So too, we are vigilant because the shape of independence can be undermined tomorrow, even if we have the political power. But if we do not have control of economic power that allows us to live and service [infrastructure] our country, we will be totally dependent on other countries (Washetine Interview 2014).

All these things we cannot do now because we do not have the powers [jurisdiction over], the control over these areas, it is under French control. But after independence we can talk about these things. We have other powers around,
and it is about finding support from them to help people here in NC live as good as possible (Goa Interview 2014).

Goa and Washetine bring up an important argument in the context of economic strategies and their implementation. One of the five sovereign powers still retained by France is foreign affairs. Certain political parties like FLNKS have found a loophole by holding observer or special status in regional organizations like the PIF or the MSG as a political party. However, the country’s ability to negotiate and enter into trade agreements with other countries and MNCs is limited by French control over the remaining sovereign powers. Political parties seem to agree that dependence on French aid and imports is a detriment to New Caledonia’s economy. Revising the current civil servant system, creating taxes that encourage domestic production or regional imports rather than French imports, and cooperative public control of the mining sector are areas of agreement. These are solutions that transcend ethnic tensions and may provide a place to begin negotiating a future for New Caledonia where each faction can agree on a common goal.
CHAPTER 8

OPTIONS FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE ACCORD

A broad literature exists on the possible relationships between former colonizers and their overseas island territories. The precedent for mainland-island relationships is extensive. Examples from Europe, the United States, and the South Pacific typically characterize a federal power structure with varying levels of local autonomy and rights shared with mainland citizens. Numerous studies have found that dependent relationships like association and shared sovereignty can be more beneficial than independence for some island countries (see Baldacchino 2004; 2010; Baldacchino and Hepburn 2011; Baldacchino and Milne 2009; Dunn 2011; Hintjens 1997; McElroy and Mahoney 2000; Trompf 1993; Connell, 2001; McElroy and Sanborn 2005). In France decolonization resulted in independence for the colonized country or integration as an overseas department or territory. Departments enjoy the same rights and privileges as the metropolitan regions while territories have limited autonomy (Corbin 2011; Daniel 2005). Despite increasing decentralization the indivisible Republic rhetoric remains strong (Palayret 2004; De Jong 2005).

The precedents set by other French collectives may outline possible options for New Caledonia. However, New Caledonia is in a unique situation because of the irreversible power
transfer and level of local autonomy guaranteed by the Nouméa Accord. New Caledonia enjoys a significant level of autonomy and cultural pluralism (Young 1976). Its status as a sui generis territory means that New Caledonia is a federacy. The relationship between France and the territory mirrors a decentralized federal model, except that the New Caledonian government has a limited role in the French government and their relationship can only be ended by mutual agreement (Baldacchino and Milne 2009). The term sui generis literally translates to something being in a class of its own. The statutes outlined in the Nouméa Accord offer new possibilities for New Caledonia unique to other French Overseas Departments (DOMs) and Overseas Territories (TOMs). In addition, as a member of the UN Non-Self Governing list, New Caledonia is subject to the edicts and process of decolonization outlined for members of this list.

Implicit in France’s taking on its UN responsibilities as administering authority, is an acknowledgement that New Caledonia is a non-self-governing territory, the future of which would therefore be bound by UN decolonisation principles. These principles provide a pointer to the possible future status of New Caledonia. The principles are laid out in two linked UNGA resolutions (1541 and 1514). UNGA Resolution 1541 of December 1960 provides for three options by which a territory ‘can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government: (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State’ (Annex). The principles include a commitment to an outcome based on ‘the free and voluntary choice by the peoples concerned’ (Principle VII (a)). In the case of the integration option, the outcome is to be based on ‘equal status and rights of citizenship between the peoples of the erstwhile territory and the independent territory to which it is to become integrated’ (Principle VIII), begging questions about the special citizenship rights France provided under the Nouméa Accord (i.e., the restricted electorate for the final referendum on New Caledonia’s future status) (Fisher 2013, 195).

The text above states that the UN identifies three possible solutions for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord: full sovereignty, independent-association, and association. Within these three options, my research has revealed a split among politicians who are open to independent-
association with France or independent-association with a South Pacific International Organization like the Melanesian Spearhead Group. As a result of this distinction, I evaluate the option of independent-association with France separate from independent-association within the Pacific. This increases the number of options to four. Furthermore, a third accord has been discussed among select loyalists and nationalists. A third accord that continued to grant more sovereign powers to New Caledonia and further delayed a final decision or move to full sovereignty could fall under the association option outlined by the UN. New Caledonia would be continuing a conditional association rather than a permanent one. This again increases the options for the referenda to five possibilities. The spirit of the Accord (based on Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien’s 2014 analysis), however, seems to limit these five options to full sovereignty or some type of independent-association. Association, and with it the possibility of a third accord, is not conducive to the ultimate goal of the Nouméa Accord:

Ten years on, a new process needs to commence, entailing the full recognition of the Kanak identity, as a pre-requisite for rebuilding a social contract between all the communities living in New Caledonia, and entailing a shared sovereignty with France, in preparation for full sovereignty. […] The State acknowledges that it is appropriate that New Caledonia achieve complete emancipation at the end of this period (Nouméa Accord 1998).

Interestingly, a contingent of both loyalists and nationalists believe that the outcomes of the referenda are pre-determined. Loyalists believe the 60/40 division in favor of loyalists in the New Caledonian government will translate to a 60/40 split in favor of maintaining ties with France. Nationalists believe that the Kanak majority within the population and the freezing of the electorate will give them an advantage in favor of full sovereignty. The referenda are merely the democratic acts that lead to political decolonization (Néaoutyine 2014). Instead of a consensus
solution, Goa (LNC 2013; DNC 2014) argues that people must battle together for independence through the referenda.

Although the Nouméa Accord calls for three successive referenda on independence, loyalists like Gregoire Bernut and Philippe Gomès believe that there should only be one referendum held. In the Declaration of his party, *Calédonie Ensemble*, Gomès writes:

[B]ecause there will be winners and losers the referendum will inevitably raise the questions of the acceptance of those who were beaten […] it is unrealistic to think we could gather around a table […] winners will inevitably be prisoners of their victory in the face of the vanquished humiliated by their defeat.

Instead Gomès argues for one informed referendum where the options for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord are clearly presented by all sides. The fear narrative is not unique to Gomès nor is the possibility of political violence in the wake of the referenda. Here Gomès talks about the referenda as if they are predetermined, destined to fail and destined to lead to nationalist-led violence. However, fear and uncertainty are common themes found in loyalist critiques of the referenda and independence.

[…] that is the right to vote and the right to local employment. That's citizenship for now. As it will evolve? I fear that if we close ourselves off, it will be even more restricted. And for New Caledonia that is not a good thing, people should be able to come here, live here (Lafleur Interview 2014).

Well most non-Kanak are scared of independence because what they hear in the speeches of the nationalist movement is a threat to them. And during the last 40 years there has been a lot of violence against the ones who are not Kanak. So they know that in an independent country, they would be under-citizens. It is very clear when you listen to what the most radical of the nationalists say. Even if they have white people with them and try to have a different image. The fact is, when you scrape the surface you very easily find the rest of this discourse/speech [ethnic superiority]. They tend to be more on the pro-French side. You will find that is true among most of the Wallisians. Some leaders like Sako who tried to negotiate a place for the Wallisian people with the nationalists based on the fact that they are both people from the pacific ocean. Well that is, in my opinion, that is a very intellectual way of seeing each other. Because in the places where there is unrest
like Canala or Saint Louis, you don't find many Wallisians in there. There used to be Wallisians in Saint Louis, but they were expelled. I think that if we had, against us, a true nationalist, multiracial movement we would have lost a long time ago. But their main weakness is that they are too ethnic and they cant bring confidence to the other communities so most people know they need to remain French if they want to survive (Blaise Interview 2014).

The referenda are repeatedly framed in terms of violence, chaos, and ethnic tension. The violence in the 1980s, although deadly and grounded in ethnic divisions, never rose to the extremism of ethnic cleansing. Some have described it as a civil war, but the more common reference is the Events. The threat of violence in the context of the independence debate today is cited (almost exclusively) by loyalists refers to protests in the wake of the referenda.

While some of our people [loyalists] are scared by the violence that the nationalists may extort [or result] on us do not to go to the referendum and reach the conclusion of the Noumea agreement there will be dangerous. But democracy is not dangerous: democracy is democracy (Blaise Interview 2014).

[I]t is totally unrealistic to think that we can be gather around a table, with the independence to discuss together after they have undergone one, two, or even three successive failures. Winners will inevitably prisoners of their victory in the face of the vanquished humiliated by their defeat. We must avoid that the winners of the referendum are prisoners of their victory over the vanquished humiliated by their defeat. However, the issue of independence, which is delayed for thirty years, can not be dodged forever. It must therefore be asked, but not in terms of front and sterile opposition between those who are for and those who are cons: you have to put it in terms of projects for our country, building a shared set of alternative output of the Noumea Accord. This is the new horizon that we offer (Gomès 2013).

Gomès is one of the most outspoken loyalists who believe a series of referenda will lead to violence. The idea behind one informed referendum is making sure that the population and all political actors understand the choice before them, and the consequences that will result from their ultimate decision.

They are afraid of what will happen to them. You cannot ask business leaders to invest, when you invest is expensive, it is on the long term. When we do not know
what will become of not investing. So the territory’s economy is very fragile (Lafleur Interview 2014).

The independence that could result from the referenda is described as an institutional void; the nationalists plan a mere fig leaf. In the meantime, the country’s political uncertainty has, according to loyalists, created economic uncertainty, an unwillingness to invest internally, fear, and economic fragility.

The Nouméa Accord and international law restrict and open new possibilities for a post-referendum New Caledonia. According to the Nouméa Accord, three referenda on the future of New Caledonia must take place between 2018 and 2022. However, the Accord does not define what question or questions must be voted on in the referenda. International law offers three possible questions or outcomes: full sovereignty, independent-association, or full association. The data shows that these options have been expanded and refined into five possible choices facing New Caledonians: full sovereignty, independent-association with France, independent-association with a country or international organization in the Pacific, full association, or a third accord. Chapters Five through Seven identified and deconstructed the themes and narratives that influence decision-makers’ stance on independence. The following sections in Chapter Eight will explore how those narratives and the way in which they are framed promote or hinder each possible outcome.

OPTIONS FOR THE OUTCOME OF NOUMÉA ACCORD: STEERING COMMITTEE

Each year following the signing of the Nouméa Accord a group of Caledonian politicians gathers in Paris for the annual Signatory Committee. Both loyalists and nationalists meet with
French officials and discuss the progress made towards the outcome of the Nouméa Accord. After the 2011 Signatory Committee, the French Prime Minister created the Steering Committee on the Institutional Future of New Caledonia (SCIFNC) in response to the demands of the signatories (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014, 3). The goal of SCIFNC was to determine the options for the completion of the Nouméa Accord independent of the political parties. Jean Courtial (French Councillor of State), Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien (French law professor), and Stéphane Grauvogel (delegate of the French Overseas Deputy General) explored and synthesized the institutional options for the future of New Caledonia: presenting their findings in a cohesive Report to the Prime Minister in 2014. The eighty-six page document outlines three primary options for the institutional future of New Caledonia based on the Nouméa Accord: full sovereignty (independence), sovereign state partnership (independent association), and extended or self-perpetuated autonomy (autonomy within the French Republic or provisional autonomy). Independent association can be realized through a partnership with France or another independent state or international organization. This expands the number of options, in reality, to four. As part of option three, association with France (or self-perpetuated autonomy), New Caledonians could choose to enter into a third accord that would again delay a decision on independence. Thus, there could be up to five options for New Caledonia in the upcoming referenda. These options are: 1) full sovereignty, 2) independent-association with a sovereign Pacific state or international organization, 3) independent-association with France, 4) association with France, and 5) a third accord. Despite these options, the authors readily admit that the spirit of the Nouméa Accord requires eventual full sovereignty. Therefore, options three and four do
not completely adhere to the text of the Nouméa Accord, but can still be asked as part of the referenda.

The first option for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord is full sovereignty. The term full sovereignty is used instead of independence because independence fails to acknowledge the necessary interdependencies of seemingly sovereign states. In today’s globalized world, complete independence is nearly impossible. Therefore, the term sovereignty or full sovereignty is more often used. Full sovereignty would certainly fulfill the spirit and mandate of the Nouméa Accord (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). Initial cooperation with France after independence would necessarily be narrow. At first, the country would focus on creating its own institutions, dealing with transferred powers, and developing the state. Courtial, Mélin-Soucramanien, and Grauvogel (2014) argue that New Caledonia should rely on France for the first several years after independence. Cooperation in areas like education, defense, foreign relations, justice, and public health could help New Caledonia better develop institutions to support these formerly French controlled powers. The authors offer several examples of these types of cooperative agreements from the decolonization of Côte d’Ivoire. The treaties included: consultation on foreign policy issues, military assistance, a five-year aid package, cooperation on judicial procedure, higher education, culture, and civil servants. However, this system created an almost puppet government and perpetuated dependency on France and Europe. Therefore, Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien (2014) advocate for the termination of French aid after full sovereignty is achieved. In a fully sovereign New Caledonia, sovereignty would be determined by the state’s population. A decision regarding Caledonian citizenship and the possibility of dual nationality would need to be addressed. After full sovereignty, New Caledonia and France could
reach an agreement about dual nationality or France could enact a law providing for New Caledonian nationals (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014).

The second option for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord is independent association. Under independent association, New Caledonia would first become sovereign and then choose which powers to delegate or share with a foreign sovereign state. New Caledonia would give up some of its sovereignty to a foreign state or regional network. New Caledonia would be able to partner with France, a Pacific country, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, or others. Although France retains control of the sovereign power of international relations, New Caledonia and the political parties that represent it have made significant connections with regional and international organizations. These organizations offer an important opportunity for independence parties advocating independent association and rebalancing more broadly. New Caledonia currently headquarters and a member of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) that includes 22 island states and territories and their colonizers (Australia, France, New Zealand, the UK, and the US) (Rumley 2006). France essentially banned any political discussion including New Caledonian independence at the SPC.

As a result the South Pacific Forum (later the Pacific Islands Forum) was founded in 1971. The SPF initially prevented France and all of its territories from becoming members in the organization. However, after signing the Nouméa Accord, New Caledonia became an observer and then associate member of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) composed of all of the self-governing and fully sovereign states Pacific Islands. PIF also includes dialogue partners or states with regional interests in the Pacific like France. This organization made a special associate
member status for New Caledonia and continues to affirm the importance of self-determination and the full implementation of the Nouméa Accord (Fisher 2013).

New Caledonia is also a member of the international economic community called the Melanesian Spearhead Group. Current members include Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and the FLNKS party in New Caledonia (Rumley 2006). The Group was initially formed to support Kanak claims to independence in New Caledonia. Recently it has shifted to an economic focus. In 1993 the Group formed a Free Trade Agreement and followed up with the creation of a Free Trade Zone in 2006 (Fisher 2013). As part of the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and other regional states ties to Australia and New Zealand are likely to grow (Rumley 2006).

These types of partnerships are defined by their density or duration, are constitutionally based or merely consist of the exchange of resources (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien (2014) emphasize the importance of a fully sovereign partnership. Each state involved is fully sovereign and can terminate any agreements at any time. The partnership could be implemented in two different formats: through an international legal agreement or as a domestic law in each state’s constitution. By anchoring the agreement in the domestic laws and constitution of each state, it is less likely that fluctuation in the political majority will result in the dissolution of the agreement. While not limited to a partnership with France, Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien (2014) argue that their common history, language, and culture provide a solid foundation for continued association. Regardless of the partner state or states, the authors emphasize the importance of a strong partner or regional network that can foster beneficial interdependencies and serve as a protector. Under this system, dual nationality
would be provided to those who wish to maintain ties with France or their home country. An examination of comparable agreements finds that partnerships are often long term and incorporate both an international agreement and supportive domestic laws. Like the first option, independent association is congruent with the Nouméa Accord because New Caledonia becomes fully emancipated and all sovereign powers are transferred from France.

The third option for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord is extended or provisional autonomy. These options are similar to independent association except that France would retain or be delegated control of the sovereign powers (public order, justice, defense, currency, and foreign affairs) in a form of federalism or decentralized autonomy (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). Although New Caledonia would remain part of the French Republic, its autonomy would be even further extended. The authors explore examples from the UK and New Zealand where this combination of federacy and unity with the state have been implemented. This option would require asymmetrical federalism, adequate Caledonian representation in France, internal federalism and balance, a more effective method of political decision-making (alternative to consensus), and the creation of an agreeable definition of citizenship. Federal or quasi-federal systems with varying autonomy allow regional units greater control and autonomy over certain aspects of political, social, and economic life (Dieckhoff 2004). Multinational federations like France and its Overseas Collectives include national minorities that are tied to the state through some form of territorial autonomy and internal boundaries. Within this model, power distribution can ensure that each national group is able to remain a distinct self-governing cultural community. Unfortunately, this option does not fully comply with the Nouméa Accord.
Therefore it might be implemented as a provisional agreement where the attainment of full sovereignty is merely delayed (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Outcomes of the Nouméa Accord</th>
<th>UC-FLNKS</th>
<th>UNI-PALIKA</th>
<th>DUS</th>
<th>Lafleur (UCF)²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independence/Full sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent-Association (with France or with another state or international organization)</td>
<td>UC-FLNKS</td>
<td>UNI-PALIKA</td>
<td>DUS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Association with France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UCF FPU CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Accord</td>
<td>DUS</td>
<td>UCF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Outcomes Advocated by Political Party.

There are strong political loyalties to the options presented by the Steering Committee. Almost all loyalists outright reject the possibility of independent-association, but leave the option for a third Accord that might lead to eventual full sovereignty open. Table 5 indicates the options for the outcome of the Accord and which party blocs are willing to entertain those outcomes.

According to the Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization, colonies have three options for decolonization: integration with equal rights (independent-association), free association (association), or independence (full sovereignty). The following sections examine political leaders’ perspectives on the possible outcomes of the Nouméa Accord. These individuals will be among the fifty-four congressional representatives that determine the questions asked and voted on in the referenda. A number of them will also be implementing the outcome of the referenda.

² Isabelle Lafleur is currently anti-independence. However, she is open to the possibility of independence in the future, provided New Caledonia continues to develop and becomes less reliant on French aid and support. This view is not shared across the coalition of parties that compose UCF.
PARTY PLATFORMS AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES ACCORDING TO THE LOYALIST COALITIONS

Union pour Calédonie dans la France (UCF) Coalition

Anti-independence leaders of the UCF argue that independence will lead to a loss of French aid, an increase in inequality, and will result in the sacrifice of political liberties. The referenda therefore should result in association with France.

My opinion is that we need to re-organize the status quo. There are some French, we can farther than today. Because we are already very far from the Republic – one step beyond and we will be independent. Some people try to sell us an independence that will be left and a federal state, but the French political tradition is based on the unitary republic. If France was a federal state like Australia or the US there would be no debate we could incorporate a New Caledonia state and things could be clear, but if we build something that would have the name ‘state’ in New Caledonia, there would happen in a few years conflicts of legitimacy between the authority of the state and the local power. I am convinced that if after this kind of political innovation, if we had unrest, a civil war – anything, and a local political leader contested the authority of the French power, France would not be in a position to bring in the police, gens d’armerie, or the military. Because then this local person may be legitimate to ask for the mediation of the US, and then who would be sent to New Caledonia. Blue helmets from Papua New Guinea, from Fiji, from the spearhead countries. We know what that means to us. So I fight against the idea of the ‘false good idea’ of New Caledonian state because that is a lie that is independence in disguise of autonomy. We need to know who in the end has the last word and that must be the French state. Whatever happens, even if we have unrest or insolvency there cannot be two masters on a ship (Blaise Interview 2014).

The referenda, they say, have created economic uncertainty and a fear of unknown violence. The UCF advocates for permanent association with France because leaders believe that New Caledonia and its government are not ready or prepared for independence.

But in my opinion is that the Caledonia, and I shocked many when I say that, is not ready for independence. If one day it had to be independent because the population would have decided, we must be ready for that, you have to be trained for that, be educated, have the skills. We are transferring a lot of powers
[authorities]: law, civil law, commercial law, the right to judge, they all come from the outside. So I think we are a small population on an island, far from everything, and what is important is to be trained for that. It is legitimate for the Kanak, because it is an ideology that they have had for a long time access to that independence. Me, my feelings, I am very down to earth, is independence, if we are prepared, if one is able to assume financially, humanly, technically, yes. But for now this is not the case, it is absolutely unable to fend for himself (Lafleur Interview 2014).

While Lafleur (Interview 2014) leaves open the option for eventual independence, she is not hesitant to say that the lack of a local skilled and educated class along with the idealism of nationalist parties has left the country unprepared for the responsibility of independence. A third accord is therefore a different way to frame continued association. Unlike the option for permanent association, a third accord would provide a definitive end date for New Caledonia to prepare for the possibility of full sovereignty.

**Front pour l’Unité (FPU) Coalition**

The theme of consensus is pervasive in the FPU’s vision of association with France. Bernut (Interview 2014) highlights the need for dialogue and discussion prior to the referendum. He advocates for a freely negotiated option where the parties could reach a consensus that includes remaining integrated with France.

The idea is to maintain the current status. It is already very autonomous, but there remain a lot of powers [authorities] to be transferred. So the idea is to find a solution, according to the expectations of each other, which creates a consensus […] (Bernut Interview 2014).

That is to say, I do not believe in clear independence; that is to say that if tomorrow there should be independence, ‘breaking with France,’ I think very quickly New Caledonia would be scooped up by the surrounding powers, to whose ranks China, or the United States or Australia etc. (Bernut Interview 2014).
FPU’s leaders argue that New Caledonia already has a significant level of autonomy, so permanent association would include status as a special territory in France, shared sovereignty and territory, and liberal decentralization. Liberal decentralization would mean continuing New Caledonia’s autonomy from France, a kind of laissez faire self-governance without French involvement.

**Calédonie Ensemble (CE) Party**

As a loyalist party, CE is against independence. Independence is framed as a “leap into the void” and as an unknown outcome. Therefore, Philippe Gomès advocates for one informed referendum rather than three, which he believes would prevent increasing Kanak violence after each subsequent referendum.

The referendum of the Noumea Accord would lead to chaos, we have always considered in Caledonia Together, the referendum, as provided by the agreement would lead to chaos. First, because by opposing advance winners and losers, the referendum will inevitably raise the question of acceptance of the result by those to be beaten. Then, because it is totally unrealistic to think that we can be gather around a table, with the independence to discuss together after they have undergone one, two, or even three successive failures. Winners will inevitably prisoners of their victory in the face of the vanquished humiliated by their defeat. Last but not least, because none of the options posed by the referendum is completed. If "yes" to independence won, no part of this independent state status is known. Nor its institutional organization, nor the system of civil liberties or the nationality or the place of non-nationals, nor the economic and financial relations that would remain, if any, with France. Clearly, if independence is chosen by the Caledonians, it’s a real leap into the void that is proposed by the Noumea Accord. And in the same way, if this is the option that France wins, we know nothing about the future institutional organization of the country, because the Noumea Accord has nothing definite about it (Gomès 2013).

Like, the FPU he argues that negotiations should take place prior to any referenda. Prior negotiations will allow the parties to define their goals, platforms, and define emancipation and
independence. This information can then better inform the populace and their choice during the referenda.

Other political movements - independence and non-independence - Want to go to triple referendum under the Noumea Accord, likely to occur after 2014. If this were the case, there would be chaos. First, because it would draw the Caledonians against one another, partly because it would lead to an institutional void. Indeed, if the ‘yes’ to independence won, no part of the independence option is understood or known. Similarly, if the proponents for staying in France were the majority, the Nouméa Accord does not provide an option for the institutional organization of New Caledonia emancipated within the Republic. Rather than a blind referendum Caledonia Ensemble offers negotiate with the separatists and the government, following the provincial election of 2014, a new political agreement defining the contents of the two social projects Possible future: that of independence and the maintenance within the Republic. This is because we will build together the two branches of the alternative policy that is offered to our country that the election results will be accepted by all. It is through this process of dialogue and mutual respect that we can overcome our differences and the Caledonian can vote knowingly. It is this method that offers Caledonia Together for the release of the agreement: that of an informed referendum leading to a choice for the future appeased. Released in which we focus our project for our country: that of New Caledonia and several emancipated asserting its own identity within the Republic (Gomès 2013).

Why an informed referendum? [Gomès responds] “Because the Noumea Accord provides that the Caledonians first choose their future independence or continued in France and trying to give content then. We, we propose to do the opposite: both projects, that of independence and that of an emancipated country in the Republic, must be clearly defined before being submitted to a vote of the people. Why a referendum for peace? Because this approach requires us to conduct negotiations on the two branches of the alternative, before the referendum, instead of being forced to negotiate, later, on the only path chosen by the people. We think this way, each political sensitivity will be better able to take on the choice made by the Caledonians for the country's future, whatever it is” (Frédière 2013).

CE is split on the idea of consensus. Gomès believes that consensus would result in a guillotine referendum where each party would pick and choose the aspects of the Nouméa Accord that they want to implement rather than accepting all parts of the document as a whole.

Calédonie Ensemble, from the outset, favored a "consensual solution" because we believe the referendum out of the agreement - for or against independence - a
referendum is "guillotine", which will draw the Caledonians against each other, generating ethnic, social and political tensions (Gomès 2013).

However, Poadja (a Kanak congressman from CE) argues in favor of a need for consensus among actors. Association is defined by CE as a shared project or shared alternative that will lead to peace. Emancipation will occur through shared sovereignty between New Caledonia and France. According to Gomès, the idea is to maintain the current system; which he believes already provides New Caledonia with extreme autonomy, sovereignty, and limited emancipation. CE allows for a potential independent-association relationship with France on the condition that New Caledonia cedes all of the five sovereign powers to the French Republic.

PARTY PLATFORMS AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES ACCORDING TO THE NATIONALIST COALITIONS

The goals of nationalist parties can be broadly organized in terms of Mikesell and Murphy’s (1991) table on policy solutions to minority-group aspirations. The territorial objectives of nationalist parties are ultimately independence, even though they would accept independent association. Although independence has not yet been decided, nationalists in New Caledonia have gained aspects of territorial separation and autonomy. Separation might include “exemption from societal norms” and be legalized through “community autonomism” (Mikesell and Murphy 1991, 589). In New Caledonia this is exemplified through tribal communities and the return of customary lands. Autonomy might be expressed through “control of minority
The Nouméa Accord ensured the devolution of powers from France to New Caledonia and the Matignon Accord divided the territory into three Provinces that gained some self-governance and autonomy.

The Kanak in New Caledonia have succeeded in all of the non-territorial objectives outline by Mikesell and Murphy (1991): participation, access, and recognition. Participation typically implies some type of power sharing or involvement in policy decision-making. Possible avenues for participation include: proportional representation, ethnic quotas in public servant positions, or special majorities in legislative bodies. The Kanak dominated North Province and Loyalty Islands benefit from proportional representation in the Congress. They often gain a majority or nearly all of the seats in the Provincial Assemblies. In addition Kanak nationalists and loyalists enjoy a significant level of participation in the territorial Congress and Executive if not in French legislative bodies. Within nationalist discussions of economic rebalancing, a number of policy demands concerned with access were brought up. Mikesell and Murphy (1991) relate access to a lack of discrimination, employment opportunities, opportunities for advancement, and special subsidies. These objectives can be solved through affirmative action programs, anti-discrimination laws, and assistance programs. Both the Matignon and Nouméa Accords have made provisions for Kanak job training, education, and have encouraged local employment. However issues of access remain a concern for many Kanak living in rural areas. Finally, recognition is accompanied by acknowledgement and respect of a minority group’s unique characteristics through the institution of an official language of special cultural institutions. These were also addressed as part of the Preamble of the Nouméa Accord. These
objectives and results combined imply that New Caledonia is more pluralist on Mikesell and Murphy’s (1991) scale.

Union Calédonienne-Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (UC-FLNKS) Coalition

The leaders that I interviewed and collected information about in UC-FLNKS believe that the future domestic government, under independent-association or full sovereignty, should be characterized by a democratic system that integrates Kanak and French values.

After one has advantages the advantages are to rediscover our freedom. We are not free here since it's another country that tells us a number of things including sovereign powers. Because there are all the powers [authority, jurisdictions] transferred to New Caledonia, but on the issue of sovereign powers, it is the state that is not ours, strangers [foreigners, aliens] who are present here which dictates their own laws. So the advantage is first to rediscover together all these powers exercised not by a people in a given country, and from there this people and this country decides what to do with their own freedom. But people are sovereign in their decisions. This is the first advantage (Wamytan Interview 2014).

And that is the challenge to Kanak people is how to share with others who are there already for a long time, there are some who are there from the beginning of colonization, so how to ensure to share this right then with the others. And we still feel that there is always a kind of friction between this project the vision of this country should become independent because it is our right, it is a right and then the others who are here with us and that hinder [impede, slow], because they are not so keen to be independent, because they are afraid or they do not see why it should be independent and they think in terms of the benefit. While we is not in terms of benefits we reason, our logic is not benefit us is above all a right. We were colonized and ask only that makes us our freedom. And this is the fault line [dividing line] between us and others (Wamytan Interview 2014).

To decide what we want to do for our future. Disconnect our management of the country over a Western France that puts us in a consumer society becomes infernal today. For us, our claim is to be able to opt for social justice, allow political decisions that govern our lives. So opt for a policy of social justice, which accounts for human values and the other more. Perhaps also a policy that
considers more the environment […] So we, are thought to be, to have sovereignty, it allows us to make decisions that will enable us to live better. To live in harmony with wealth, the needs and the future of our country is far from the world and today is somewhat sacrificed on the interests that are not necessarily ours. That does not mean that we do not want to be in the development of the world, we simply want to be, have the power to decide (Lalié Interview 2014).

In particular, they propose a system of legal multiculturalism or pluralism. This is where their continuity with loyalists ends. According to nationalists, independence is the cumulative result of social justice and would ensure freedom, dignity, and sovereignty.

But the central issue is to permanently close the parenthesis [digression/ close a chapter on], of colonialism. Because having another country who put you under the influence is there. After one has the option following the three options, either to be completely independent, or to partner with France and then to integrate fully and there colonization is closed, colonialism. Since restored the colonized people that possibility to tell which way I'll go […] Of the two options [in the referendum], the preference order of priority is the full and complete independence. Independence in association necessarily with France. And a final integration. As we are in the Pacific, for example if tomorrow working on a federation Melanesian States, with Solomon, Papua New Guinea, if these countries manage to federate, integrate, in these cases New Caledonia could integrate itself in the Federation of the Melanesians States, since it is our area. If you want politically I lay open, the second formula of the association is left open. The association with the French state is an option in the second option (Wamytan Interview 2014).

New Caledonia cannot avoid independence. The point is to get ready and contact NC neighbors so when it is time to talk – the idea is to put police behind the fronts and the other countries will be there to support New Caledonia in the talks. Their vision is to build a country with all the citizens that were here to build this country and reinforce the mining countries to have more weight internationally and also countries. We also represent French culture in the middle of an Anglophone pacific […] UC chose independence and then independence with association. But you can’t talk about association until after independence happens because that is what the Noumea agreement requires. Because we are under French control we cannot discuss state to state, we are not on the same level yet (Goa Interview 2014).

Certainly, like all independent countries, there will be agreements, contract management, things that can be shared with other partners, including France,
Australia, the USA, Japan over dynamic or geopolitical interests that engage us all in the Pacific Basin. Because we feel good that there is a shift of interests, since there are riches on earth, but now it goes to the riches diving. So it is also necessary that we be there for our decision can weigh. Otherwise we will find ourselves always suffer the decisions of people who do not have the same interests. And also with a little to preserve our humanity Caledonian, which is Kanak or Métis finally Melanesian or European origin (Lalié Interview 2014).

Them they want us to stay as we are, we are the absolute sovereignty is proposed to have the power of decision, even after passing the agreements with France on the management of areas, but not on the full skills. So we may terminate the agreements when we are not in agreement, or that we are disappointed because we have control over the decision. But compared to the geopolitical interests of France may wish to monitor the economic zone, but otherwise if they are not we will work with other countries. That is why we must explain because there is more independent countries. Independence We talked to place things, but there is no independent country. Even France is no longer independent, so the notion of independence is more the concept of decision making, but that means that there are accompaniments [strings attached] (Lalié Interview 2014).

Under independent-association, New Caledonia would become an autonomized territory of France or the region. The relationship would be federally structured with greater autonomy given to New Caledonia. The option for eventual full sovereignty would remain open and New Caledonia would engage in regional consensus or receive financial assistance from France.

**Dynamique Unitaire Sud (DUS) Party**

Sylvain Pabouty, President and founder of *Dynamique Unitaire Sud*, views independence as emancipation from a colonial power. Fear of the unknown, he argues, holds critics of independence back.

Obviously the party, the movement to which I belong, and that is the DUS, composed mostly of former PALIKA militants, campaigning in the South, is strongly positioned in the independence camp (Pabouty Interview 2014).
Along with that option for us FLNKS with the independence movement in general, they must also accompany this, a separatist project. That is to say that would give guarantees to those who are wondering which ones not hesitate radically are against independence, period. For those who say you never know, or maybe not. This is because they have no real answer except the fact that we must move towards independence, to access the full sovereignty. But it is necessary that the independence movement gives them guarantees, guarantees on citizenship guarantees on land, guarantees I would say when I talk about the nationality, citizenship, is that they can have the double -nationality or not for a while, or not etc. etc. These are things that they arise, they are very practical, that for now the independence movement did not give clear answers, we must work on it […] So we need the nationalist movement to be able to say, to be able to tell the Caledonians who voted, they have no fear, no it will not be chaos as claimed by the loyalists, and finally the non-independence. To say, here is how we will manage sovereign powers, for a while, with such powers, either with France or with countries in the region etc. etc. Because there are countries in the region that are independent, and with whom we can work on some issues (Pabouty Interview 2014).

Pabouty (Interview 2014) acknowledges that nationalists’ plans for independence are unclear. As a result Caledonians want guarantees in the form of citizenship, land, and the option for dual nationality. Although he acknowledges the option of a third Accord (quasi-independence) and says that independence is always the first choice, Pabouty (Interview 2014) does outline an option for independent-association.

After, I think the Noumea Accord, this irreversible process of the Noumea Accord is a result of a previous situation of the Matignon. This is a sequel only better, there is a progression. And the Noumea Accord, the Matignon is an improvement over earlier statutes. So anyway, a situation after the Noumea Accord can not be below the Noumea Accord, it must necessarily be more of the Nouméa Accord. That's why I was saying that if we implement all the features of the Noumea Accord, it would put us in a quasi-independent status. And after the Noumea Accord, one must discuss these sovereign powers. I'll just add that this is, as the situation after going to be a quasi-independence (Pabouty Interview 2014).

He emphasizes that this option means cooperation between states as equals. Independent-association is a form of independent shared sovereignty like the relationship between France and the European Union. This relationship is possible with France or within a regional Pacific
organization. A partnership with a regional organization is more symptomatic of consensus and collegiality, and would necessitate the integration of Kanak, French, and Pacific values.

Union Nationale pour l’Independence – Parti de Libération Kanak (UNI-PALIKA) Coalition

For UNI-PALIKA the referenda, which all of the historically excluded can participate in, are a truly democratic act and represent the culmination of political decolonization.

We the issue of independence is above all a right. All peoples have the right to decide what they want for their future. And we have always considered that the history of colonization and all that it has meant, it goes against the principle of humanity. So for us colonization was first that. I mentioned earlier that Kanak penned [confined] in reservations. This is the fate endured by a number of workers like Indonesian, Javanese who ... so for us it is inconceivable. So the Kanak people considered that to restore their rights, it goes through the same command of the decision on the future of his country. So for us the question of independence arises in a natural manner. All peoples have the right to decide what they want [desire] to do for themselves, for their country, for their land [homeland], for their subsoil [underground], their environment ... and their right there to share it with others, those who came [later]. They were considered to have been somewhat victims of colonization, because they lived in the same exclusion. So for us it is inconceivable to live under the dictates of the powerful, multinational, the world of money. So to get out of there, the option is the independence of the country. And independence is above all to put the country's resources to the service of the greatest number [of people] (Washetine Interview 2014).

The leaders of UNI-PALIKA make a point of saying that the referenda should be informed – an argument first made by Philippe Gomès the President and founder of Calédonie Ensemble. However UNI-PALIKA still believes in holding three referenda unlike Gomès. UNI-PALIKA claims that association would lead to confusion and New Caledonia would become a mere
puppet government of France. Therefore, full sovereignty or independence is the first option for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord.

[T]he issue of independence is the case of countries that have been decolonized in the 1960s. France has decided to, for example, to give independence to African countries. But that's a unique transformation [change]. It's more of France ... they have simply put people but continues to produce the same things. This is called ‘fantoches’ or puppets. So, that type of independence is not what we want here (Washetine Interview 2014).

Full sovereignty is the ultimate expression of decolonization, but Caledonians fear it because they “fear a socialist stamp on the output of the agreement” (Néaoutyine LNC 2014). There is a second option however. UNI-PALIKA would support a system of independent-association with France or as part of an international regional organization. Finance in particular would be an area of collusion.

So to give independence can be broken down in several ways. Independence, we all know that countries today say, or want to be independent are no longer at all. Take the example of a sovereign country like France, which today has decided to abandon a number of sovereign prerogatives. France no longer has its own currency, it is no longer independent in the matter of security ... it works in an institution that is NATO. So for us independence, it is above all that the people here decide their own future. How is this done [achieved]? In terms of cooperation it is still possible to imagine, because it is not possible to imagine living completely closed in on ourselves, we need to live within a region. That's why we made the effort to work in conjunction with the countries of the Melanesian group. We try to work with countries in the area of cooperation. So the idea of working in particular with France is not excluded. After it will be to say what is the perimeter that we would be prepared to accept, and who should play in a shared manner between the state and us, a free and independent country.

Néaoutyine and Washetine view independent-association as a middle ground option between full sovereignty and association. Washetine argues that the whole idea of consensus goes against the Nouméa Accord. But for Néaoutyine, in particular, the whole concept of independent-association as a result of the referenda represents a consensus solution. Nationalists achieve full sovereignty
and loyalists could succeed in retaining ties with France by ceding some powers to it after independence is achieved.

POST-REFERENDUM DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT, CONSENSUS, AND DEMOCRATIC MULTICULTURALISM

Aside from party divisions over independence or association, there is a debate regarding the future structure of the domestic government in New Caledonia. Regardless of the result of the referenda, there is a good chance that the domestic political institutions in New Caledonia will undergo at least some revision to alleviate the concerns of the losing side. The current political system in New Caledonia combines parliamentarianism, representative democracy, and collegiality.

There are three Provincial Assemblies, directly elected on a five-year basis. Of the members of the Provincial Assemblies – forty members in the South, twenty-two members in the North, and fourteen members in the Islands fifty-four are elected by popular vote to five-year terms in the unicameral Congress. Proportional representation means that the South receives thirty-two seats, the North fifteen, and the Loyalty Islands receive seven. The Congress elects an Executive Government or cabinet of five to eleven members that are responsible to the Congress. The head of the Executive Government is the President of the Territorial Government. The proportional voting procedure ensures that the main parties together make up a collegial government. The Congress Executive consists of a President, eight Vice-Presidents, two secretaries, and two questeurs that are elected annually. Each year a Standing Committee and Standing Committee President are also elected. The Customary Senate is a consultative body that
oversees matters concerning the Kanak population specifically. It contains two representatives from each of the eight customary regions.

There is little doubt that multiculturalism informs governance in New Caledonia. The minority rights assigned through the Nouméa Accord both recognize and maintain cultural difference through citizens’ rights. The Kanak enjoy certain rights as members of a customary society that are not available to all citizens of New Caledonia.

Two civil states are in force in the territory: a special status and common law. This is the decree of 21 June 1934 instituting in New Caledonia a civil state of indigenous citizens of particular status, in order to take into account customary procedures for certain acts, including marriage and adoption. The coexistence of these two civil states is recognized in the 1958 Constitution, which guarantees for citizens of overseas French, conservation and respect for their personal status; which implies in particular the recognition of customary forms of family organization and transmission of assets. The customary status is currently governed by a decision of the Territorial Assembly of 3 April 1967, recently completed by the Organic Law of 19 March 1999. These are the mayors and officers of the civil state who keep records of customary civil status (Customary Society 2012).

These rights include automatic inclusion on the Provincial electorate and Referendum special electorate and governance under customary civil law rather than French civil law.

Individuals whose personal status is within the meaning of Article 75 of the Constitution, the Kanak customary status described by this Act, shall be governed by customary civil law (Organic Act Article 7 1999, 6).

Customary status also affords Kanak representation in the customary senate, which informs on issues related to Kanak identity. Approximately 39% of the population in New Caledonia holds customary status.

Any project or proposed law of the country related to identity symbols, as defined in Article 5, customary status, the customary land regime and
especially the definition of leases to govern relations between customary landowners and operators in these lands and customary discussion regime, boundaries of customary areas, as well as election procedures customary senate and customary councils is transmitted to the customary Senate by the president of the congress (Organic Law Article 142 1999, 57).

The Customary Senate is consulted, as appropriate, by the President of the Government, by the president of Congress or the president of a provincial assembly on interesting projects or proposals deliberation Kanak identity. It can be consulted by the same authorities on any other project or proposal for deliberation. It can also be consulted by the High Commissioner on matters within the competence of the State (Organic Law Article 143 1999, 58).

Customary lands cover approximately 27% of the total land area in New Caledonia (Customary Society 2012). These areas are under the particular jurisdiction of customary councils, clans, and tribal governance. They are inalienable, non-transferable, and not open to seizure. The organization of customary lands, jurisdictions, and the political system can be organized into this chart created by the Customary Senate (Customary Society 2012):

![Customary Governance Structure in New Caledonia](image)

Figure 5. Customary Governance Structure in New Caledonia.
Finally, legislation and programs designed to promote Kanak customary languages and culture were created to preserve their distinct identity in the face of increasing marginalization by Caledonians and recent immigrants. Eight customary languages, based on the eight language families, are taught in junior high and high schools throughout New Caledonia (Customary Society 2012).

In order to contribute to the cultural development of New Caledonia, the latter after consultation with the provinces, the State concludes with a special agreement. It deals in particular with the Kanak cultural heritage and the Tjibaou cultural center. Kanak languages are recognized as languages of instruction and culture (Organic Law Article 215 1999, 105).

However, according to Banting and Kymlicka (2004) multiculturalism also rejects policies that promote assimilation or selective exclusion. How can a government assign and uphold minority rights without inherently excluding the majority population? This debate is pervasive in the New Caledonian context. Blaise’s response to whether multiculturalism exists in New Caledonia is telling:

[I]n New Caledonia we have built a political system that takes into account the nationalist movement since we have cut New Caledonia into three provinces. Two belong with the racial population of the nationalist movement – they are headed by Kanak people and that will not change for generations because they are in a majority in the North and almost alone in the Islands with 98% of the people. So we have a long way before taking the Island province. So this multicultural or – I don't know if its multicultural – in fact we take into account the minority that already exists. The government is collegial which means that the congress elects members of the government on the same ratio as the elected people in the Congress. But the problem with that is that it is very hard to lead this government because when they don't want to sign a text you need to buy the agreement with gifts in exchange of their vote. That is not a good way of leading a country, so in many ways this can only be helped by asking for a return to the majority rule. You know in the modern democracy you can be elected President with 51% of the votes and no one will contest that – you won. And the other one lost. Because you need someone to lead the country so democracy is an imperfect system, but it is the less stupid we have found. So my opinion is that we have explored the limits
of what we can do to inform the minority in the government. Going farther would be a political impotency (Blaise Interview 2014).

There is a sense among nationalists that integration between Kanak, French, and Pacific values needs to continue to occur. And that it should be formally integrated with the judicial and governing system to create symbiosis between the populations. Caldoche and Caledonian fears of a fully sovereign new Caledonia controlled by Kanak nationalists may also be a contributing factor. Some loyalists like Blaise argue that the minority rights given to Kanak far surpasses the mandate of the Nouméa Accord and which should certainly not be extended further. Others may believe that maintaining these minority rights and further cultivating programs like legal pluralism will help pacify Kanak without needing full sovereignty.

With fear of exclusion and marginalization on both sides, Banting and Kymlicka’s (2004) liberal multiculturalism seems to be an ideal solution for New Caledonia because it is the attempt to create more space for democratic multicultural politics – something advocated for by loyalists and nationalists promoting integration and democracy. Liberal multiculturalism also seeks to mitigate fears of ethnic politics creating destabilization by providing sub-state groups a form of quasi-sovereignty and equality within the state system (Banting and Kymlicka 2004; Galston 2004; Larmore 1996; Rawls 2005). For indigenous groups, liberal multiculturalism includes: (1) recognition of land rights, (2) recognition of right to self-government, (3) upholding treaties, (4) recognition of cultural rights, (5) recognizing customary law, (6) representation or consultation in the central government, (7) constitutional or legislative confirmation of the distinct status of indigenous peoples, (8) support/ratification for international agreements on indigenous rights, and (9) affirmative action for indigenous communities (Banting and Kymlicka 2004, 248). All of these requirements are already in place to some extent in the domestic governance of New
Caledonia. However, some loyalists argue that the sub-national rights awarded to the indigenous population are counter to the ideological equality promoted by the French Republic since the Nouméa Accord and multiculturalism itself.

The formation of a consultative customary body, collegial representation in the executive, and parliamentarianism already promotes several of the ideals of multiculturalism. However, both nationalists and loyalists are calling for changes in the political structure to ensure equal representation of the population. Self-determination is possible through policies aimed at recognition, and control over land, resources, justice, recognition of human rights and punishment of rights violations, and the opportunity to freely express cultural diversity (Kolvurova 2010; Weller 2009; Berg 2009; Knight 1982; Barelli 2011; Niezen 2003). A number of these forms of self-determination have already been granted under the Nouméa Accord. The Accord set up an institutional basis for customary governance and created programs to encourage Kanak culture that are examples of recognitions and the right to express cultural diversity. The Accord further granted control over certain areas of land and resource rights giving Kanak the opportunity for economic self-determination. Finally, the Accord sets up a system of legal pluralism in the justice system. The legal pluralism called for in the Nouméa Accord has been an ongoing platform for nationalists advocating for greater multicultural integration in New Caledonian institutions. Nationalists are calling for greater integration of customary modes of governance, legal pluralism, and democracy.

The Kanak identity has to irrigate all the sectors and in all those sectors it can be an inspiration for doing thins. One example is consensus, the government here is a consensus type government. So people who are a member of the government, from all the parties, everyone is in the government. They are all represented, and this is a Kanak way of doing things, consensus. It is also and Oceanian, Pacific
way. This is one of the examples of how the Kanak identity can irrigate all of the sectors. Consensus government is unique in the world (Pabouty Interview 2014).

[The Nouméa Accord calls for] Redefining the legal status of acts of customary authorities to give them full legal force. Promoting the role of traditional authorities (social prevention and criminal mediation association in the preparation of decisions of local assemblies) (Regional Caribbean Seminar 2001).

According to UC-FLNKS, legal pluralism means that the justice system integrates aspects of customary mediation and local context. The Charter of the Kanak People (2014) defines legal pluralism as:

The co-operative legal pluralism: The solution retained by the Kanak people is to set it up through writing, and adopt the common system of Kanak values, then to register it in a system of co-operative legal pluralism where coexist together, on the same level of equality, common law and customary law. The customary legal system should be more flexible and more pragmatic, because it will be a matter of respecting principles and not written codified rules.

Similarly, UNI-PALIKA argues that a future government must integrate characteristics of customary governance – a form of political rebalancing at the national scale. UNI-PALIKA and UC-FLNKS advocate for better management of provincial governments so that they can serve as a checks and balances system – something that greatly concerns many loyalists.

Some loyalists view consensus as another form of political rebalancing. They argue that emancipation can still be achieved through shared sovereignty and general agreement or consensus. Consensus is defined as majority agreement on an issue. However the majority can be defined in a variety of ways. For example, I believe loyalists view the majority and therefore consensus solutions in political terms – politically, loyalists hold the majority of power. This is exemplified by their repeated denial of the possibility of independence due to a 60/40 political split in representation. However if the majority is defined in terms of the population of New Caledonia the 60/40 split becomes a 40/29/31 (Kanak, European, other) split favoring the Kanak
Loyalists also advocate for integrating Kanak customary and French values and greater democracy. Some promote social democracy, a form of majoritarian democracy that is not collegial and does not include minority rights, and others promote a more direct participatory democracy and power sharing.

[We] need to find ways to transform the legitimate aspiration for dignity of marginalized Kanaks into a more noble way that provides access to responsibilities, welfare, and material success without sacrificing political liberties … (Blaise Interview 2014)

With few distinctions, the UCF outlines a plan for the structure of the New Caledonian government after association. The government would be based on a democratic, majority-rule type system. For Blaise (Interview 2014) this means no federalism, collegiality, or preferential minority rights. For Yanno (DNC 2013) this means a federal relationship within the French Republic, consensus, and a negotiated future. For Lafleur (Interview 2014) the domestic government would be both collegial (with an elite class that shares power equally) and proportionally (the number of representatives is based on population) democratic to prevent corruption. For the FPU the New Caledonian government would be characterized by majority based power sharing, participatory democracy, and require proportional representation in Congress. Under association, CE characterizes the domestic government as a social democracy that combines “ground floor earth sharing” and “liberty, equality, fraternity” and prioritizes respect and freedom (Gomès LNC 2014).
INCORPORATING PARTY OBJECTIVES INTO POTENTIAL OUTCOMES

The pro and anti-independence outcomes promoted by each party are a simplified means of summarizing complex networks of narratives and perspectives. In Chapters Five through Seven, I identify the dominant narratives underpinning the independence debate and explore how those narratives are framed or defined. Chapter Eight begins with a discussion of the possible outcomes and how parties frame their pro or anti-independence narratives. However, dividing parties into pro and anti-independence camps oversimplifies their platforms, affiliations, and goals. In this section I give equal weight to every goal (or frame) identified in political narratives irrespective of whether the frame is associated with a loyalist or nationalist party. Nationalists will always promote independence in some form and loyalists will always advocate for association with France. But each politician identified specific objectives that are part of a network that supports a particular outcome.

I initially used a concept map to outline the dominant narratives and their associated definitions or frames that can impact the outcome of the referenda (see Figure 6). Ovals represent the narratives that can influence the outcomes and the rectangles are the way in which political parties frame those narratives. For example, the stance on sovereignty narrative represents a politician’s platform on independence. Beneficial means that a politician supports independence and detrimental means that they do not support independence. Stance on sovereignty is valued equally with the other twelve narratives. Figure 6 summarizes the narratives and frames
identified and explained in Chapters Five through Eight.

Figure 6. Framing of Objectives that define outcomes.

The way these objectives or narratives are framed and how they co-define each other can be used to identify which of the five options facing New Caledonia meet a majority of the politician’s objectives. Each frame supports, does not support, or has no discernable impact on each of the five possible outcomes. As explained in the methodology, I categorized each frame according to whether it supports, does not support, or has no impact on each of the five outcomes using the information gathered from interviews, news sources, and other party documents. The following sections explain how each frame was categorized and the reasoning for that categorization.
Electoral roll eligibility restrictions have not prevented an increase in the number of voters registering for the special electoral role. Despite an increase in the number of eligible voters and an increase in participation, overall participation has dropped from 77% in 2004 to 73% in 2009 and 70% by 2014. At the same time, pro-independence parties are gaining ground in the national Congress. In 2004 congressional seats were about 67% loyalist and 33% nationalist. By 2009 this had changed to 57% loyalist and 43% nationalist and in 2014 54% loyalist and 46% nationalist. If the additional eligibility restrictions required for the referendum electorate are taken into consideration, the split between pro and anti-independence voters is estimated closer to 50/50 (Bolis 2014). The goal here is to examine my third research question: how does the framing of the narratives identified in Chapters Five through Seven and the narratives themselves promote or hinder certain outcomes? There are five options that can be voted on during the three referenda: full sovereignty, independent-association with France, independent-association with another state or international organization, association with France, or a third accord. While I do not advocate for one outcome over another, the following assessment provides a useful starting point for examining the potential outcomes of the Nouméa Accord and the extent to which certain narratives and objectives outlined in Chapters Five through Eight support these outcomes.

Legality of Outcomes, The Nouméa Accord, and Decolonization

In their report on the institutional future of New Caledonia, Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien (2014) offered five options or five questions that could be asked in the referenda. Of those five options, they found that association with France or a third accord that lengthened
New Caledonia’s association with France did not entirely uphold the spirit of the Nouméa Accord (Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien 2014). They are part of a grey area that is not entirely legal vis-à-vis the Accord, but is not out of the realm of possibility either. The Nouméa Accord legally supports all of the outcomes, but is more likely to support full sovereignty or independent association because that is its ultimate goal. It does leave room for the less likely possibilities of association with France and a third accord as a means of further preparing New Caledonia for eventual sovereignty.

According to the political parties, all of the options outlined are possible vis-à-vis the Nouméa Accord. Nationalists believe that the Nouméa Accord allows for full sovereignty and independent-association. Loyalists believe the Accord make exceptions for association with France or a third accord if either of those options receives a majority vote in the referendum. The United Nations and international law also uphold these possible outcomes with the exception of a third accord. A third accord would mean another delay in making a final decision on full sovereignty that does not respect the timeline agreed to by France, the signatories of the Nouméa Accord, and the UN. Simply based on legality, the most likely options are full sovereignty and independent-association.

The Nouméa Accord also outlines a process for the decolonization of New Caledonia:

Decolonization is the way to rebuild a lasting social bond between the communities living in New Caledonia today, by enabling the Kanak people to establish new relations with France, reflecting the realities of our time. […] Ten years on, a new process needs to commence, entailing the full recognition of the Kanak identity, as a pre-requisite for rebuilding a social contract between all the communities living in New Caledonia, and entailing shared sovereignty with France, in preparation for full sovereignty (Nouméa Accord 1998).
Nationalists tend to frame decolonization as a process whose only terminus is full sovereignty and therefore an independent New Caledonia. Decolonization framed as independence is more likely to result in full sovereignty or independent-association and not likely to result in association or a third accord. Others frame decolonization in terms of rebalancing to promote a common destiny, which can be achieved as part of any outcome. In this case, decolonization as common destiny would make any of the options likely because a common destiny and rebalancing can be achieved through any of the outcomes. The idea of a common destiny is defined in numerous ways. Framing decolonization in terms of common destiny merely means that decolonization is part of the development process of New Caledonia. Decolonization is a process experienced by all inhabitants of New Caledonia so, in terms of common destiny, it does not present a strong argument in favor or against any particular outcome.

The Accord itself seems to clearly call for full sovereignty. Loyalists argue that New Caledonia is not ready for complete independence and should continue sharing sovereignty with France. Some loyalists are open to the possibility of eventual full sovereignty while others hope that another delay will make some pro-independence communities complacent with the status quo.

**Common Destiny**

Common destiny itself is a popular sentiment that is both well and ill defined. Many iterations have been outlined in Chapter Six. It is most frequently defined as living together or building together. Common destiny as living together is used by loyalists and emphasizes New
Caledonian populations living together peacefully and a cooperative relationship (living together) with France. This framing makes an association relationship or a third accord the most likely outcome. Full sovereignty or independent-association are less likely to satisfy this type of relationship with France given the Republic’s desire to maintain control over mining and other economic interests in New Caledonia.

The building together approach to common destiny is dominant among nationalists who view common destiny as a process that is not yet complete. Building a common destiny together is an internal process where France is excluded because of its colonial role. As a result this requirement is more likely exemplified in an independent relationship where France has less power and involvement. Association with France or a third accord would give France the power to perpetuate New Caledonia’s dependence on French aid, imports, and public servants from the mainland.

Internally, common destiny is defined as reconciliation, the desire for equal rights, integration, and in some cases, leaders argue that it promotes racism. Reconciliation is possible through any of the possible outcomes. However, none of the outcomes strongly promote reconciliation, making it likely to occur with any outcome. Integration, while promoted by both sides, is more of a loyalist discourse in the sense that integration, like living together, is framed in terms of internal integration and external integration with France. Integration with France is most likely to occur through association or a third accord. However, nationalists and loyalists also seek internal integration among the diverse populations inhabiting the country. Integration can mean integrating customary and French forms of governance, values, or law. This is likely to
occur under any of the outcomes because most decision-makers argue that this is a necessary part of living together peacefully.

Although loyalists seem more apt to ignore the racial undertones present in the independence debate, Kanak nationalists are very aware of them. Racism is present between Kanak and Caledonians, between Kanak other Pacific Islanders who have migrated to New Caledonia, and between recent European migrants and Kanak. Given France’s approach to minority rights and tolerance of other cultures, association or a third accord might be less likely to end lingering racism. Racism between Kanak, Caledonians, and Pacific Islanders might be best solved through independent-association where New Caledonians are forced to cooperate and build strategic relationships with other Pacific countries. Some of the problems that foster racism among these groups might be solved by closer ties with other Pacific countries on immigration, or economic development. But given France’s current stance on ethnicity and ability to ignore racial issues, association with France may serve to only exacerbate these problems in New Caledonia. Equal rights are a loyalist vision of common destiny that promotes greater inclusion of all inhabitants of New Caledonia. This means broadening membership in the special electorate and giving more inhabitants the right to citizenship. This would skew the expanded voting population in favor of association or a third accord. It would also win over non-Kanak minority populations who fear marginalization by Kanak and desire greater power in the domestic government. This makes full sovereignty and independent-association less likely.
Victimization, Identity, and Social Rebalancing

The victim narrative, social rebalancing, and definitions of identity are intimately tied together (see Figure 2). Those who believe the Kanak were the only victims of colonialism also emphasize the dominance of the Kanak identity, assimilation to Kanak culture, and promote an extreme view of Kanak rights above all others. This perspective is most likely to result in full sovereignty or independent-association within the Pacific. Independent-association with France is possible and association or a third accord is not likely. Social rebalancing as a means of reversing Kanak marginalization is more likely to occur if the country became fully sovereign or independent because the Kanak would have greater control of the domestic government without intervention from the French state. Kanak marginalization is not likely to be reversed if the country becomes permanently associated with France or if a third accord is agreed to because France and loyalists will continue to marginalize Kanak power.

A slightly more generous view argues that Kanak were not the only victims of colonization. The Communards, forced laborers, and other colonized people were also victims of history. Those who agree with this argument are more likely to view identity in terms of a Caledonian national identity or a plural identity that respects diversity and rejects a unitary vision of identity. A Caledonian or plural identity that integrates all communities is likely to result in any outcome. The victims of history narrative also supports the current eligibility requirement for the special electoral roll and the restricted electorate that would result in any of the possible outcomes. Both of these arguments are commensurate with the idea of Kanak marginalization and social rebalancing that might include minority rights or special privilege for these groups. The victims of history narrative is thus likely to result in any of the outcomes.
A small group of loyalists believe French-Caledonians were the victimized (given Kanak violence in the 1980s) and uphold a French identity in New Caledonia based on a common language and history with France. This view is more likely to promote an associative outcome or likely to promote an independent-association with France that would ensure a continued close relationship with France. This population would also believe that Caledonians are being excluded and that social rebalancing would insure this population garners greater power and ends minority rights that prohibit total equality. The final requirement in social rebalancing is the acknowledgement of segregation in the contemporary New Caledonian society. This concept is directly connected to the idea of racism explored as a failure of or obstacle to common destiny.

Segregation refers to the social inequalities that exist in New Caledonia. Kanak tend to hold lower paying jobs and suffer higher rates of poverty. For rebalancing to occur, the cost of living and unemployment rates among Kanak needs to decrease. French imports, aid, and public servants have artificially inflated the cost of living. According to nationalists, full sovereignty or independence that lessens French control over public servant wages, the economy, and their monopoly on imports would help decrease social inequalities. Currently France controls a large portion of and provides a vast amount of the imported goods available in New Caledonia. Many local grocery stores purchase goods almost exclusively from their partner companies in France. In conjunction with French aid, this is another method for continuing dependence. Independent-association, association, and a third accord leave room for policy to be enacted to reduce inequalities, but are less likely to result in significant change.
Citizenship

Citizenship, like identity can influence how people think about independence and what an independent New Caledonia would look like. Currently citizenship is defined as the right to vote in the provincial electorate and the right to hold local employment in New Caledonia. After the referenda a decision will have to be made on the members of the Annex Table. The definition of citizenship reevaluated to either include or exclude members of this population. While the inclusivity or exclusivity of citizenship may not have a direct impact on the outcome of the referenda it is certainly a contributing factor in the decision of which outcome is the best for the future of a peaceful New Caledonia. The status quo is an exclusive citizenship based on the current restricted electorate and could result in any outcome. The restricted electorate offers an even split between nationalists and loyalists.

Kanak who fear marginalization if recent immigrants are given citizenship may tip the balance towards independence. However if voters and politicians believe that the post-referendum citizenship will be Kanak (citizens of Kanaky) they may be more likely to choose an association relationship that would ensure France could be a counter balance to Kanak power. In this case, association or a third accord is more likely. If citizenship is defined more inclusively any of the possibilities are likely. Caledonians who know that they will retain equal footing with the Kanak population may fear independence less and may be more willing to accept full sovereignty or independent-association.
**Special Electorate, Self-Determination, and Political Rebalancing**

Certain objectives are framed in a way that would result in the redefinition of the special and restricted electoral rolls. As a result the 50/50 split between pro and anti-independence factions predicted for the restricted electoral roll could shift in favor of Kanak or non-Kanak voters. Self-determination as a shared right, political rebalancing through freezing the electorate, and an exclusive frozen special electorate exemplify the current interpretation of the Nouméa Accord. These views could result in any of the outcomes. If self-determination is defined as a uniquely Kanak right then the restricted electorate should only consist of Kanaks. A restricted electorate defined in these terms is more likely to vote in favor of full sovereignty or independent-association.

On the other hand, the right to self-determination for all would allow all or nearly all inhabitants of New Caledonia to participate in the referenda. Equal rights as part of common destiny, political rebalancing through the termination of minority rights, political rebalancing through equal rights, and instigating a sliding or inclusive special electorate would all result in a similar outcome. Allowing nearly all of the inhabitants in New Caledonia to vote on the referenda would significantly tip the scale in favor of a non-independence outcome. Association would be more likely, full sovereignty would be not likely, and a third accord could be likely to result. Equal rights for all inhabitants is less likely under independent-association because nationalists (who are not as supportive of recent immigrants) and loyalists would have equal power. A sliding electorate may also result in independent-association with France since it represents a middle ground between the two widely divergent views.
Economic Rebalancing and Perception of France

Economic rebalancing and economic projects are framed in relation to perceptions of France. Politicians view France as a helpful partner and protector or as a colonizer and villain. This view of France directly impacts each party’s plan for economic rebalancing. Within party narratives on economic rebalancing there are three areas of agreement: reducing inequality, reducing dependence on France, and increasing local control of the mining sector. For nationalists, reducing inequality is best accomplished by becoming fully sovereign and then perhaps working with France or another state or organization on mutually beneficial economic agreements. Full sovereignty or independent-association are more likely to result in this outcome. For loyalists, reducing inequality is possible only through continued partnership with France in a permanent association. A compromise between these situations might be independent-association with France. Reducing economic dependency on France and retaining greater control over mining is most likely to occur under full sovereignty where the government of New Caledonia or its citizens could have greater control over internal policy and industries.

If France is viewed as a supporter and protector of New Caledonia and its interests an associative relationship or independent-association with France would be the best way to continue that protection. However if France is considered a colonizer or villain that seeks to control and exploit New Caledonia for its own gain then full sovereignty or an independent-association relationship where New Caledonia is a sovereign partner are more likely to achieve this goal. Similarly, if a party and the population views full sovereignty as beneficial to the future of New Caledonia it logically follows that they will vote in favor of an outcome that includes some level of independence. However if full sovereignty is framed as detrimental to the future
development of New Caledonia, votes are likely to favor an associated outcome whether it is full association or a form of shared sovereignty.

CONCLUSIONS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE NOUMÉA ACCORD

Taken together, the narratives and frames identified in Chapters Five through Seven present a series of narratives and frames that support each party’s pro or anti-independence stance. These thirty-nine frames represent the primary narratives found in loyalist ad nationalist rhetoric about the independence debate. They can be summarized into nine themes: self-determination, identity, rebalancing, citizenship, the role of France, the role of the UN, common destiny, the electorate, and victimization. These nine themes are further grouped into narratives on: self-determination as a right, the goal of decolonization, the goals of the Nouméa Accord, the stance on the transfer of powers, electorate eligibility, citizen membership, definition of national identity, victimization, definition of common destiny, the role of France, the role of the UN, stance on French aid, stance on key sharing, plans for the mining industry, general plans for the economy, and desired outcomes for the independence debate (see Figure 6).

The loyalist and nationalist parties primarily identify as either pro or anti-independence. In general the narratives identified and interviews suggest that full sovereignty may be nationalists’ first choice, but they are certainly open to allocating certain powers to France or another state after independence. They recognize that New Caledonia has come a long way in its development, but understand the country’s current limitations. The loyalist leaders, with the exception of Lafleur, unwaveringly focus on association as the only option open to New Caledonians. Lafluer argues that New Caledonia might not be ready for independence right at this moment, but she does not rule out the possibility for eventual independence. In the previous
sections, I examined the narratives and objectives of each party individually. By approaching party objectives in this manner, I found that nationalist and loyalist narratives have greater instances of cooperation than initially recognized.

In particular, both factions agree on several points regarding decreasing New Caledonia’s reliance on French aid and encouraging growth in the domestic export market. While nationalists and loyalists may not agree on whether the key sharing allocations should be revised, they both recognize that the inequalities that exist between provinces should be remedied. Both sides find continuity in the idea of common destiny being a project that is accomplished together and recognize that there is room for improvement. A significant portion of both loyalists and nationalists also seem to recognize the need for a multicultural or plural national identity that integrates French, Pacific, and Kanak values and customs. Areas of difficulty remain in regards to who has the right to self-determination and therefore who has the right to become a citizen and vote on the referenda.

For right now, at least, this is the biggest issue facing the Territorial Congress in the next few years because the electoral divisions and membership has the power to tip the balance in either direction. If the electorate remains frozen, the voting population will have to determine whether they want to: further delay a decision on full sovereignty or continue the status quo and risk long term investment in the country and Kanak discontent, balance French and Kanak interests and goals by choosing independent-association with France or another state and run the risk of a post-sovereignty Congress not reaching a consensus about what powers to cede to whom, or become fully sovereign and loose French aid and oversight but gain freedom from a
dependent situation. These are not easy choices, nor are they simply a matter of independence versus non-independence.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

The current Territorial Congress in New Caledonia will be responsible for conducting the first of three referenda on independence in 2018. They will be the ones deciding which questions are voted on. The wording of these questions will be very important for deciding the future of the country. According to the Nouméa Accord and international law, there are three primary options for the referendum: full sovereignty, independent-association, or association with France. Full sovereignty means complete independence. Under independent-association, New Caledonia would become fully sovereign, but could then cede some of its powers to another country (like France) or an international organization. Based on my research and the study conducted by Courtial and Mélin-Soucramanien (2014), politicians would choose between independent-association with France, another Pacific state, or with an international Pacific organization. Association with France would cement a system much like the status quo. A fifth option is a third accord. A third accord would be a combination of the first three options. New Caledonia would enter into another accord with France and a decision on full sovereignty, independent-association, or association would be delayed.
The historical precedent for post-colonial mainland-island relations is extensive. Greenland has attempted to economically bypass Danish control by decreasing their reliance on aid from Denmark. Instead Greenland has sought trade agreements with the European Union as a whole allowing them to become more self-sufficient. The Netherland’s Carribean have domestic governments that are locally elected in a loose federal relationship with the mainland state. Portugal and Spain’s island territories have sought to encourage locally elected government governments to increase political participation and autonomy through civil and economic responsibility. Many of the UK’s overseas collectives have adopted local constitutions. The UK retains responsibility for external powers and each territory has sovereignty over domestic concerns. These territories remain reliant on the UK aid to develop successful economies because they are generally small islands with little ability to compete independently on the international market. Australia’s island territories typically host locally elected legislative bodies with executives appointed by the Australian state. Some have adopted commonwealth status in exchange for Australian aid. New Zealand’s territories are some of the few islands to have made a significant attempt to incorporate customary councils and customary forms of governance. Parliamentary democracies in these territories mix customary councils with elected parliamentary systems and territorial assemblies. Some US territories have integrated forms of Western and customary governance. Others have adopted a commonwealth model with elected local governments, US Congressional representatives, and have adopted the US constitution.

Post-colonial dependent relationships between France and its overseas countries have mirrored some of these policies. Generally relationships are structured by a federal model where the status of the island country (as a DOM or TOM) determines the level of domestic autonomy.
Historically, France pushed for assimilation of its island colonies and inhabitants. While the unified French Republic ideology still exists, the state is more accepting of local identities. This trend is exemplified by the decision to grant special rights to some indigenous populations in DOMs and TOMs. However, France remains hesitant to grant additional minority rights, because of its increasingly multinational mainland population.

In the context of the New Caledonian independence debate, this research seeks to answer three questions: 1) what are the dominant narratives underlying the independence debate, 2) how are these narratives defined and 3) how does the framing of these narratives and the narratives themselves promote or hinder certain outcomes? The theories derived from this research are based on my findings to these three questions. In Chapters Five through Seven, I identified nine dominant themes that structure politicians’ concerns and goals for the independence debate: self-determination, identity, rebalancing, citizenship, the role of France, the role of the UN, common destiny, the electorate, and victimization. These nine themes can be further divided into narratives on: self-determination as a right, the goal of decolonization, the goals of the Nouméa Accord, the stance on the transfer of powers, electorate eligibility, citizen membership, definition of national identity, victimization, definition of common destiny, the role of France, the role of the UN, stance on French aid, stance on key sharing, plans for the mining industry, general plans for the economy, and desired outcomes for the independence debate. These narratives and the ways in which they are framed form the core of independence and anti-independence rhetoric.

Perhaps most notably and importantly, the independence debate in New Caledonia is underlined by a pervasive discourse of (re)balancing. The concept of rebalancing links all of the themes and narratives (Figure 2). The desire for rebalancing is both internally and externally
defined. Internally, it is the tension between Caledonian and Kanak supremacy within a multicultural society. Externally it is the desire for greater economic or political autonomy from France. Self-determination, decolonization, the Accord, the transfer of powers, the special electorate, and citizenship are all areas of contention and potential sites of political rebalancing. Self-determination is alternately defined as a uniquely Kanak right, a shared right between the victims of French colonialism, and a right that should be available to all inhabitants in New Caledonia regardless of when they migrated there. Nationalists consider the UN a guardian who safeguards and ensures the Kanak right to decide on the political future of their country. To loyalists, the UN is a meddling watchdog that is trying to complicate an uncomplicated debate. If the Nouméa Accord is defined in terms of decolonization and independence the transfer of power should continue, according to nationalists. However, if the Nouméa Accord merely provides the right to a decision on independence, as loyalists argue, the transfer should be frozen until a final decision on independence has been made. A frozen electorate might give nationalists a greater chance to ensure full sovereignty, but it marginalizes recent immigrants and others who do not meet the eligibility criteria. This is why loyalists argue for a sliding electorate that would include some of these people, but would ultimately marginalize Kanak voters. Citizenship, like electorate eligibility is based on length of residency. Nationalists promote a restricted citizenship while loyalists argue for an open definition that would include more of New Caledonia’s inhabitants.

**Grounded Theory #1:** Restricting or expanding the right to self-determination is the central concern of political rebalancing in New Caledonia. The Nouméa Accord and perspectives on the outcome of decolonization (Figure 4: black chords) reflect and influence these definitions and determine membership in the electoral bodies and citizenship. Restricted or inclusive
definitions of self-determination (Figure 4: hot pink chord) translate into restricted or inclusive policies on citizenship and the electoral bodies allowed to vote on the referenda. For loyalists, colonial legacies of inequality emphasize the need for inclusion throughout the political sphere. Nationalists believe a restricted electorate, citizenship, and self-determination will rebalance the inequalities (black chords) caused by structural and social violence committed during colonization by increasing Kanak political power.

**Grounded Theory #2:** The social rebalancing theme is influenced by and influences national identity, common destiny, and the victimization narrative (Figure 2: dark green chords). Common destiny is the goal of social rebalancing: it is the solution to the social inequalities pervading New Caledonia. Loyalists define common destiny as living together and nationalists define it as building together. Both promote integration as part of this project. But nationalists view integration in terms of political and legal pluralism where customary and Western logics are mixed. Loyalists define integration as ethnic mixing, perhaps believing enough mixing will resolve ethnic-based social and political tensions. The parties maintain three types of national identity. A Common French-Caledonian Identity or *Caldochitude* has arisen as a form of counter-identity. It is a political tool for collective bargaining designed to (re)balance the divisions created by a perception of minority privilege. Kanak identity is based on a dichotomy between maintaining difference as an independence strategy and preventing cooperation within the multinational state because of this difference. The Kanak identity is linked to the collective memory of victimization, which helps the indigenous argument for autonomy but prevents healing between the Kanak and French and Kanak and *Caldoche*. Loyalists consider the victim narrative a nationalist tool designed to involve the UN in New Caledonia’s domestic affairs and
promote the right to full sovereignty. Nationalists argue that the narrative legitimizes self-determination and justifies rebalancing in favor of the Kanak (Figure 2: dark blue chords).

However, it is also a way to unify all communities impacted by French colonization. The middle ground is defined by a desire for a plural Caledonian identity that is supported by the Nouméa Accord, electoral definition, a sense of belonging, and a tie to the territory.

**Grounded Theory #3:** Economic rebalancing stems from a need to end financial inequalities domestically and reliance on French aid. Both loyalists and nationalists want to reduce reliance on French aid through public servant wage reductions, diversification, and tax reform. There is also multi-partisan agreement on using the mining industry to fund diversification in other economic sectors. However different views of the role of France cause divergence on France’s future political and economic role in New Caledonia. Loyalists consider France a force of protection against other predatory multinational corporations and states seeking to exploit their nickel resources. Nationalists argue that France is a barrier to economic development because the Republic promotes dependence through aid, import monopolization, and by upholding an artificial standard of living. All of these frames impact the possibilities open to New Caledonia after the referendum and influence the questions that will be asked during the referenda.

Therefore, in Chapter Eight I outlined each party’s platform on the outcome of the independence debate. I examined the way in which each party framed the narratives derived from their rhetoric on the outcomes of the Nouméa Accord. The narratives identified in relation to the potential outcomes include: decolonization, independence, the Nouméa Accord, options for the outcome of the Accord, the referenda, self-determination, and the transfer of powers.
Chapter Eight looks specifically at the framing of independence, the referenda, and the options for the outcome of the Nouméa Accord. While all of the political leaders were quick to take a stance for or against independence, many were open to exploring other options. Although in some cases these options were ill defined and exceedingly vague. As part of this analysis, I examined party’s views on what the domestic government in New Caledonia should be with or without full sovereignty. Loyalist and nationalist agreement on the need for integrating French, Pacific, and Kanak values was juxtaposed by competing calls for consensus and majoritarian democracy. Finally, I explored the ways in which the narratives identified in my research influence the possible outcomes or choices for the referenda.

Full sovereignty is the first choice of all nationalist leaders. But they need to convince loyalists and their constituents that New Caledonia is prepared to take on the powers previously managed by France. UC-FLNKS’ commitment to regional organizations shows a willingness and ability to manage foreign affairs, but concerns about the economic impact of the loss of French aid must be addressed. Nationalists will also need to allay fears of a Kanak nationalist take-over in the wake of independence. The Kanak are the demographic majority in the country, but not the political majority. Nationalists might garner support and simultaneously stem fears by creating a clear plan for power sharing and expanding the right to citizenship for recent immigrants after independence. Independent-association seems like a clear compromise for loyalists and nationalists. A lack of trust between ethnic communities, however, makes this option difficult in practice. Loyalist arguments against this option can be summarized into three criticisms: French rejection, marginalization, and unpreparedness. Even if sovereignty is achieved, and nationalists agree to cede some major powers to France, loyalists are not convinced that France would want
the burden of an independent New Caledonia. Nationalists counter that the same economic and strategic advantages that have motivated France to hold on to New Caledonia so long will also convince them to enter into a mutually beneficial agreement with a sovereign New Caledonia. Generally, loyalists are skeptical that nationalists would agree to cede some powers after independence is achieved. However the interviews I conducted show that nationalist leaders understand the limitations of their small country and are willing to work with France as long as it is on ‘equal’ ground. Loyalists hold fast to the notion that New Caledonia is unprepared and ill equipped to face independence and instead promote continued association with France. While loyalists may lure Kanak voters into seeing the benefits of remaining part of a powerful state like France, they will have a difficult time convincing nationalist leaders. Nationalist leaders are convinced that moving steadily towards full sovereignty is the best option for the country. If loyalists succeed in luring Kanak voters to the anti-independence camp, they will have a difficult time retaining their voters after the referendum. Inequality created by an artificial standard of living, the employment drain of French public servants, and the suppression of domestic industries because of the domination of French imports are all issues that need to be addressed in the context of French aid. The final option, a third accord, does receive some multi-partisan support. Any further delay on a final decision would negatively impact long-term investment because of New Caledonia’s unknown future. There could also be some blowback created by delaying a decision that has already been over twenty years in process.

**Grounded Theory #4:** Framing the independence debate in terms of (re)balancing politicizes economic, social and political problems that could be dealt with regardless of the outcome of the referenda. As a couple interviewees stated: many of the inequalities that are tied
to the independence debate or are simply overlooked should be solved before the referenda – this may even negate the need for a referendum at all. Politicians have used the rebalancing narratives and associated discourses to reframe the independence debate in a way that obscures the real issue: how can all New Caledonians build a peaceful multicultural society that integrates and includes all inhabitants.

Colonial legacies and the federal power-sharing systems borne from decolonization have resulted in the formation of island states with plural and often marginalized societies, unequal power structures, and sometimes-inadequate representation within their federal mainland-island systems. Various forms of multicultural politics have attempted to alleviate these consequences of colonialism. Banting and Kymlicka (2004) combine both sides of the minority and collectively equal rights arguments in his vision of multicultural governance. He argues that multicultural policies are not inherently exclusionary. Multiculturalism rejects homogenous and assimilative nation-states and policies that promote selective exclusion. Instead, citizens are encouraged to maintain their ethno-cultural identities while equal access to institutions and citizenship is implemented throughout a country. This project can be realized through liberal multiculturalism. Liberal multiculturalism accomplishes equal access with ethnic difference by encouraging democratic multicultural politics through recognition, guarantees of representation, and some self-governance for minority groups. This idea is to give all actors representation and to respect both the majority and minority population’s particular forms of customary governance. Liberal multiculturalism establishes institutions and policies in favor of diversity, giving sub-national groups quasi-sovereignty and equal representation within the state system (Galston 2004; Larmore 1996; Rawls 2005).
To some extent, these policies have already been implemented in New Caledonia through the Nouméa Accord. Moving forward, regardless of the outcome of the referendum, the tenets of liberal multiculturalism need to be considered. There is real fear in New Caledonia that an anti-independence outcome for the referenda will result in violence or a Kanak takeover that would leave non-Kanak communities marginalized and without representation. Nationalists too fear that without a sovereign New Caledonia the Kanak will continue to be politically and socially marginalized by recent immigrants. These fears can be addressed by restructuring the system of political representation in New Caledonia and more clearly outlining the options for a post-referendum New Caledonia. Nationalists and loyalists need to come to an agreement now about citizenship status and voting rights for recent immigrants. Even if this population cannot vote on the referendum, they need to know that they will have the opportunity to gain citizenship and the rights inherent to that status after the referenda are held. Greater integration of customary forms of governance and legal proceedings may also help alleviate the concerns of nationalists and Kanak who feel their identity is marginalized in the political and legal landscape. In addition to clearly laying out the options for the referenda and how those options would play out in the post-referendum environment, politicians need to focus greater attention on the social and economic issues currently plaguing the country. Many of the party goals identified in this research do not require a decision on independence to be solved. Political, social, and economic rebalancing may be aided by a final decision on the future of the country, but change can start in the years leading up to that decision. The colonial legacies facing New Caledonia, competing ethnic factions, economic inequality, a politically strong indigenous population, and French intervention make the New Caledonia political development case study unique. The diverse communities that make
up this country have a wealth of options before them. If they can learn to disconnect their goals from historical injustices and work together to create a system that integrates customary and Western notions of governance, they have the chance to create a new model for multinational governance elsewhere and provide hope for other marginalized indigenous populations.
REFERENCES


Dittmer, Jason. 2005. NATO, the EU and central Europe: Differing symbolic shapes in Newspaper accounts of enlargement. Geopolitics 10: 76-98.


Schneckener, Ulrich. 2002. Making power-sharing work: Lessons from successes and failures in


APPENDIX A

Introduction …
FR: Pourquoi est-ce que vous avez décidé devenir un politicien ?
EN : Why did you decide to become a politician ?

Le Programme de votre Parti Politique:
EN: What is your party’s platform on independence, departmentalization, or another accord? Do you see these as the only options facing New Caledonia in 2018 ? (for example : What are the alternatives to independence?)
FR: Quel est le programme de votre parti sur l'indépendance, la départementalisation, ou un autre accord? Croyez-vous que ce sont les seules options qui s'offrent à la Nouvelle-Calédonie en 2018? (par exemple : Quelles sont les alternatives à l’indépendance ?)

EN: If independant, would you accept an associated state with France ?
FR: Si la Nouvelle-Calédonie devient indépendante, accepteriez-vous un Etat-associe avec la France ?

EN: What do you see as the benefits and drawbacks of becoming independent or a D/TOM – remaining part of France?
FR: Quels sont, selon vous, les avantages et les inconvénients à devenir indépendant ou à rester un DTOM?

EN: What is the concept of “common destiny” and what does it mean to you?
FR: Qu’est-ce qu’est l'idée de «destin commun» et qu'est-ce qu'elle signifie pour vous?

L’Auto-détermination:
EN: How would you define self-determination?
FR: Comment définiriez-vous l'autodétermination?

EN: In the context of the independence debate, what is the importance or role of:
FR: Dans le contexte du débat sur l'indépendance, quelle est l'importance ou le rôle de:

- National Identity/Nationalism (for example New Caledonian citizenship and identity)
  FR: Identité nationale française / nationalisme calédonien (par exemple la Nouvelle-Calédonie citoyenneté et identité, ou double nationalité ?)

- Ethnic Identity

286
FR: l’Identité ethnique

- Multicultural Governance, the Customary Senate
  FR: Gouvernance multiculturelle, Le Senat Coutumier

- Territory and control over land
  FR: Territoire et la question du contrôle du foncier

- The Mining Industry: How will independence or D/TOM status impact the nickel mining industry?
  FR: L’Industrie minière - Comment l'indépendance ou un statut de D/TOM impactera l'industrie minière de nickel?

- Economic Aid from the French government … Is there an effort to decrease dependence on French aid? If New Caledonia becomes independent do they have the revenue to make up for the lost French aid?
  FR: Développer les aides économiques du gouvernement … Est-ce que un mouvement pour réduire la dépendance sur les aides économiques du gouvernement français ? Si oui, comment ? Le gouvernement de Nouvelle-Calédonie a-t-il les revenus pour maintenir toutes les choses qui ont financé par France si l'indépendance se produisait?

L’Avenir de la gouvernement Nouvelle-Calédonienne:

EN: If New Caledonia does not become independent, what level of autonomy would you want?
FR: Si la Nouvelle-Calédonie ne devient pas indépendante, quel niveau d'autonomie voudriez-vous?

EN: What is the economic future of New Caledonia? What is the economic plan going forward and how might this be influenced by independence?
FR: Quel est l'avenir économique de la Nouvelle-Calédonie? Quelles sont les perspectives économiques pour l'avenir et comment pourraient-elles être influencées par l’Indépendance?

EN: How will New Caledonian citizenship be defined in the future?
FR: Comment la citoyenneté calédonienne serait-elle définie dans le futur?

EN: What role do immigrants play in the independence debate?
FR: Quel est le rôle des « immigrants » (ou personnes qui est ni Kanak ni Européenne) dans le débat sur l’autodétermination interne ou externe?
Les Autres Questions:
Il y a une identité calédonienne? Quel est le positionnement de cette communauté vis-à-vis du débat sur l'indépendance?

EN: How will the ethnic diversity of New Caledonia be protected in the future?  
FR: Comment la diversité ethnique de la Nouvelle-Calédonie pourrait-elle être protégée dans l'avenir?

Quel est l’impact de la migration sur la communauté Kanak, leur cohésion culturelle, la force de l’identité, et le mouvement pour l’Independence?
APPENDIX B

List of News Articles Collected


3 Questions à Alain Christnacht. 3 July 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

3 Questions à Jean-Claude Briault. 28 February 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

3 Questions à Sonia Backès. 25 April 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


A la Foa urbaine et rurale. 26 June 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Bernut, Gregoire. 15 January 2015. 3 Questions à Gregoire Bernut. *Demain en Nouvelle-Caledonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Calédonie en semble partira seul. 11 April 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Calendrier institutionnel. 8 May 2014. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

Cartes sur Table. 3 July 2014. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

Ce qui les attend. 22 May 2014. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Commémoration. 26 June 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Commémorer la poignée de main. 13 June 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Coopération régionale. 6 June 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Diversifier les exportations pour éviter une trop forte dépendance au nickel. 11 April 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

Droit de réponse. 16 May 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


ERRATUM! 1 August 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Être plus ambitieux pour la jeunesse calédonienne. 10 October 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>
Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

Et si on éclairait aussi l’avenir nickel… 11 July 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


INTERVIEW VICTORIN LUREL « La Nouvelle-Calédonie n’est pas un enjeu de politique nationale entre la majorité et l’opposition » 17 October 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-
Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


La crevette, une filière à ne pas lâcher. 10 April 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

La croissance économique. 31 July 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


La (folle) semaine parisienne. 10 October 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

La grosse décote de confiance. 7 March 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


La ressource au centre de la future controverse nickel. 18 April 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

La SLN dans le rouge… voit l’avenir en rose. 11 July 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Le 5/2 ne plait guère à Vale. 10 April 2013. Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie. Available at

Le gouvernement en marche mais amputé. 3 July 2014. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Le temps des majorités de circonstances. 9 May 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

Lever de boucliers contre le charbon. 28 March 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


L’heure de vérité approche. 28 March 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


L’inquiétante inertie politique. 4 April 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Maingourd, Chloé. 1 August 2013. Ayrault appelle à la responsabilité. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Mainguet, Yann. 5 November 2012. « Rompre avec les pratiques de marchandage » *Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes*. Available at <http://www.lnc.nc/article/pays/rompre-avec-les-pratiques-de-marchandage>


Mainguet, Yann. 3 September 2014. « Créer une administration dédiée à l’identité kanak ». *Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes.* Available at <http://www.lnc.nc/article/pays/creer-une-administration-dediee-a-l-identite-kanak>


Mise en demeure et mise au point. 8 August 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie.* Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Pas si insipide que cela. 1 August 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Pour une collectivité de la république française de type fédéré. 1 August 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Pourquoi l’union de la droite est devenue une chimère… 21 March 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-

Provinciales - îles. 8 May 2014. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


« Que chacun trouve sa place dans ce futur statut » 22 August 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


« Que le Rassemblement UMP assume son héritage ». 4 April 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Rendez-vous avec Yanno / Loueckhote le débat. 2 May 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Sondétour, M. 11 July 2013. 25 ans et la Kanaky est là! *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

Taxe minière. 6 June 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Une économie couci-couça. 21 March 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>

« Une solution consensuelle est possible ». 3 July 2013. *Demain en Nouvelle-Calédonie*. Available at <www.dnc.nc>


Wamytan, Roch. 16 July 2013. Le Pamphlet de Roch Wamytan. Calodosphere, Available at <http://caledosphere.com/2013/07/16/le-pamphlet-de-roch-wamytan/>


Yanno, Gaël. August 2013. Pour une collectivité de la république française de type fédéré. Demain en Nouvelle-Caledonie, Available at <www.dnc.nc>

List of Additional Sources


Statuts de Union Calédonienne. 2015. Mouvement Union Calédonienne. Available at <http://unioncaledonienne.com/?page_id=1574>