By means of analyzing public opinion, particularly of those who are more religiously active than others, this project identifies a potential source of foreign policy decision making in the U.S. In so doing, it tests the conventional wisdom which suggests that religious background—especially evangelical identity—is instrumental in driving a distinct set of foreign policy preferences. On the basis of a rigorous statistical analysis of survey data from the American National Election Studies, the project shows that the influence of religious factors on public opinion is more complicated than the simple logic of the conventional wisdom. While religious identity is rarely instrumental in shaping attitudes independently, beliefs in the authority of Scriptures, and worship attendance habits matter more. Even when such beliefs and behavior influence attitudes independently, they do not outperform the effects of political predispositions altogether. Also, religious factors seem to exhibit substantial mediated effects via political predispositions. Finally, contrary to popular understanding, the findings from this project suggest that in a comparison of chief executives since 1980, President George W. Bush did not have a unique impact on the foreign policy attitudes of the evangelical laity. On the whole, the analysis indicates that the foreign policy makers of this country are not constrained by public sentiments that are predominantly driven by religious considerations. When Americans think about the role of their nation abroad, their perceptions are conditioned by other important factors including political predispositions, demographic make-up, and socio-economic status.
EXPLORING THE INFLUENCE OF FAITH ON FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES

A dissertation submitted
to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Oindrila Roy

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To my grandmother, Indira Kundu for teaching me the worth of perseverance.
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Kent, OH
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Overview

The nature and scope of American foreign policy has undergone phenomenal change following the September 11 terrorist attacks. This remarkable transition has encouraged scholars and pundits to reconsider the motivations underlying American actions abroad. Within the subfield of foreign policy analysis (see Hudson 2005), the emphasis has been to analyze the domestic sources of foreign policy decision making. Consequently, the study of the impacts of societal factors including public opinion (Baum 2004; Jacob and Shapiro 2006; Aldrich et al. 2006) has emerged as an important area of enquiry. Public opinion is particularly relevant because the strength of a democratic polity is determined by its responsiveness to popular sentiments. Therefore, governmental decision making both in the areas of domestic as well as foreign policy is expected to reflect the preferences of the people inhabiting a democratic state (Robinson 2008). By means of analyzing public opinion, especially of those who are more religiously active than others, this project identifies a potential source of foreign policy decision making in the United States. In so doing, the study tests the conventional wisdom (for example, Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008) regarding the divine divide in foreign policy public opinion. The divine divide thesis suggests that Americans’ religious background—especially evangelical identity—is instrumental in driving a distinct set of foreign policy preferences. This project examines the extent to which the generic logic of the conventional wisdom may be applicable to public opinion across different foreign policy issue areas. In the following paragraphs, I discuss the theoretical background of the project, and how it utilizes the foreign policy analysis approach as the key theoretical tool. Thereafter, I describe the major
arguments underlying the conventional wisdom, and the reasons for which the current project seeks to reexamine it. Finally, I provide an outline of the other chapters included in the dissertation.

**Theoretical Background**

Four broad theoretical approaches are used by scholars of international relations to study foreign policy (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne 2008). These four approaches include realism, liberalism, constructivism, and foreign policy analysis. The present study is grounded in the foreign policy analysis approach because by analyzing the religious sources of public opinion it sheds light on an important aspect of the foreign policy making process. In the following paragraphs, I describe the dominant approaches used in international relations to study foreign policy. Thereafter, I describe how the foreign policy analysis approach is distinct from the other three. Finally, I indicate how the logic of the foreign policy analysis approach applies to the current study.

During the Cold War period, realism was the dominant theory within international relations (Walt 1998). Realist scholars study international politics essentially as a struggle for power, and view states as unitary actors in that struggle. According to Wohlfforth (2008), the wide varieties of theories within realism are rooted in three key assumptions – egoism, groupism, and power-centrism. However, within this eclectic tradition, it is possible to identify two prominent theoretical schools. These two schools are classical realism (Morgenthau 1950) and neo-realism or structural realism (Waltz 1959, 1979). According to classical realism as propounded by Morgenthalau (1948), states struggle for power because they are human-like, and hence driven by the instinctive desire to dominate. Structural realism (Waltz 1959,1979), on the other hand, argues that states struggle for power not because they are like human beings, but because of the anarchic nature of the international system that creates a security dilemma leading to struggle for survival. Realism’s approach toward foreign policy (for the classical as well as the neo-realists versions) is based on systems-level analysis focusing on the international system where the state is studied as a unified national actor.
According to Doyle (2008, p.69), “Liberalism contributes to the understanding of foreign policy by highlighting how individuals and the ideas and ideals they espouse (such as human rights, liberty, and democracy), social forces (capitalism, markets) and political institutions (democracy, representation) can have direct effect on foreign relations.” Walt (1998) identifies three main theoretical strands within liberalism – the interest-based approach (Wilson 1918), the regime-based approach (Doyle 1986; Kant 1970; Machiavelli 1950; O’Neal and Russet 1997; Schumpeter 1950) and neo-liberal institutionalism (Ikenberry 2008, 2001; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 2001). The interest-based approach that can be traced back to the writings of Wilson (1918) is based on the notion that a harmony of interests eliminating the prospects of war can be achieved through economic interdependence. The advocates of the regime-based approach, on the other hand, argue that world peace can be achieved and sustained with democratic regimes because democracies, unlike authoritarian regimes, are essentially peaceful. Finally, neo-liberal institutionalist scholars consider international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF to be the guarantors of international peace and co-operation. Thus, for scholars of liberalism, the principal actors in the foreign policy arena include states, international government organizations (IGOs), as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Consequently, their study of foreign policy conforms both to systems-level analysis where the international system is constrained by IGOs, and state-level analysis pertaining to factors such as regime type and economic structures.

For constructivist scholars (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Finnemore 1996; Hopf 2002; Johnson 2001; Houghton 2007; Nabors 2009; O’Reilly 2007; Risse 2000; Sjostedt 2007; Wendt 1992; Widmaier 2007), the social construction of reality is key in explaining the behavior of the actors that play an important role in the foreign policy making. According to Checkel (2008), the major thrust of constructivist scholars is on the language surrounding the decision making process. Hence, much of the research in this area is directed toward the relationship among social discourse, identity, and foreign policy. Constructivists argue that transgressing the different levels of analysis is
most appropriate for examining foreign policy (Brysk 1993; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).

Foreign policy analysis is distinct from the other three approaches in the sense that it considers the process involved in decision making to be as important as the outcome of it (for seminal contributions see Beal and Hinckley 1984; Snyder 1954; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1963; Sprout and Sprout 1956, 1965; Rosenau 1966, 1974). In fact, the distinguishing feature of this approach lies in analyzing the domestic factors that shape the decision-making process. In so doing, foreign policy analysis opens the “black box” of the nation-state. In the process of penetrating the state, scholars of foreign policy analysis are mainly interested in conducting state-level analysis on organizational behavior, inter-agency rivalry, and institutional frameworks (Allison 1971; Haperin 1974; Mabey 2011; Zegart 1995); societal-level analysis on the impact of factors like cultural heritage, societal groups, social movements and the media (Almond and Verba 1963; Entman 2004; Hallin 1986; Haney and Vandy Bush 1999; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Holland 1984; Malici 2006; Robinson 2002; Shaw 1996); and individual-level analysis focusing on the personalities and the belief systems of decision makers (Herman 1970; Janis 1982; Schaffer and Crichlow 2010).

Within the societal-level of analysis, a substantive body of scholarship (Almond 1950; Baum 2011; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1964; Caspary 1970; Converse 1964; Graber 1968; Lippmann 1955; Mueller 1973; Verba and Brody 1970) is devoted to the study of the structure of foreign policy public opinion. This is a highly relevant area of inquiry because public opinion is expected to play an active role in policymaking in all democratic societies.

My analysis in this study is grounded in the foreign policy analysis approach. While studying the effects of faith on foreign policy attitudes in the United States, I focus on the domestic sources of foreign policy decision making by disaggregating the black box of the nation-state. Both religious background and public opinion belong to the societal-level of analysis. Considering a large number of studies (Hinckley 1992; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Jentleson 1992; Page and Shapiro 1982;
Powlick and Katz 1994; Russett 1990; Shapiro and Page 1982; Wittkopf 1990) have already established that public opinion does have a substantial influence on foreign policy making in the United States, this project fits well with the basic tenet of the foreign policy analysis approach.

**Religion and Foreign Policy Public Opinion**

Religion has always been an integral part of American political life. In fact, Norris and Inglehart (2004, p.24-25) consider the United States to be a key exception to their theory of secularization and existential security, which argues that “due to the rising levels of human security, the publics of virtually all industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations.” As a result, the role of religion in shaping the political behavior of the American public has emerged as a major area of academic enquiry (see Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009 for a detailed discussion on the relevant literature). In addition to issues pertaining to domestic politics, the impact of religion on foreign policy-related public opinion has also attracted scholarly attention. The conventional wisdom (Rock 2011; Smidt 2005) regarding the effect of religion on foreign policy attitudes suggests that religious background—especially affiliation to the evangelical tradition—plays a predominant role in driving a distinctive set of preferences. If the conventional wisdom is valid, one would expect the foreign policy preferences of evangelicals to be very different from that of the members of other religious traditions. Such a scenario underscores the ability of religious identity to divide people on issues of foreign policy. A broader interpretation of the conventional wisdom suggests that beliefs and behavior can also lead to distinct viewpoints (Guth 2009a; Yankelovich 2005). Therefore, the attitudes of the traditionalists are also expected to be very different from that of the progressives and the seculars. The key argument of the conventional wisdom has far reaching implications. If indeed the divine divide thesis is valid, issues of morality are likely to emerge as the key drivers of public opinion. This not only entails the possibility of polarization, but also makes it likely for the foreign policy makers to be constrained by public sentiments that are largely driven by questions of faith.
Even though the conventional wisdom has gained some acceptance, it is possible to identify scholars (see Page and Bouton 2006) who tend to disagree with its claims. These scholars undermine the conventional wisdom by arguing that religious factors have limited ability to formulate such attitudes independently. Focusing on the primacy of political predispositions in driving foreign policy preferences, these scholars argue that religious background matters only to the extent that it shapes ideology and party ID, which in turn, condition foreign policy preferences. This line of argument questions the credibility of the conventional wisdom by suggesting that religious factors have limited impact on such attitudes beyond mediated effects via political predispositions. Other scholars (Putnam and Campbell 2010) seem to weaken the claim of the conventional wisdom by arguing that religious factors are hardly effective in shaping attitudes beyond the highly contentious issues of abortion and same-sex marriage.

In light of the concerns raised by the detractors of the conventional wisdom, I seek to reexamine the plausibility of the divine divide with reference to foreign policy attitudes. To that end, I explore the extent to which the basic postulate of the conventional wisdom is applicable across different issues areas. I explore the validity of the conventional wisdom by asking four fundamental questions. To begin with, I explore if at all, religious background has any impact on foreign policy preferences. Thereafter, I examine whether religious factors can have an effect on such attitudes that is independent of political predispositions. In a related question, I scrutinize how much of the effects emanating from religious factors is mediated by political predispositions. Finally, I analyze whether President George W. Bush’s religious rhetoric had any unique impact on the viewpoints expressed by evangelical Christians, as compared to other chief executives since 1980. The answers to these questions provide interesting insights into the relative importance of the different considerations that structure Americans’ views about their nation’s role abroad. They help ascertain whether moral concerns outperform partisan and ideological commitments while evaluating what might be the correct course of action.
After analyzing public opinion on three distinct yet unique aspects of foreign policy, namely, militarism, internationalism, and attitudes toward the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf, I find that religious background does play an interesting role. However, the ways in which it shapes public perceptions is more complicated than the straightforward logic of the conventional wisdom. While religious identity as such is rarely instrumental in shaping attitudes independently, belief in the authority of the Bible and worship attendance seem to matter more. Even when belief and behavior matter independently, they do not outperform the effects of political predispositions altogether. Moreover, religious factors seem to demonstrate substantial mediated effects via political predispositions. Finally, Bush’s faith-based approach does not seem to have an extraordinary effect on how evangelicals weigh in on foreign policy issues. Given the pattern of the findings, it is safe to argue that when Americans think about their nation’s role abroad, they are not singularly driven by questions of morality. In spite of all the God talk, political considerations play a decisive role. Even if the people of this country pay heed to religious considerations, they do not do so at the cost of their commitments to party loyalty and ideology. Thus, in the process of foreign policy formulation, decision-makers seem unlikely to be pressurized by public opinion that is exclusively driven by faith-based concerns.

The contribution of this project to the existing scholarship on foreign policy-related public opinion is twofold. Using a novel statistical technique, this study explores for the first time the scope of mediated effects of religious factors via political predispositions. Although previous studies (see Page and Bouton 2006) have discussed the likelihood of mediated effects, systematic efforts to capture the precise degree of such effects remains lacking. By clearly distinguishing independent effects of religious variables from effects that are mediated, this study sheds new light on the pattern of interaction between religious factors and political predispositions in shaping foreign policy preferences. Moreover, by reporting the degree of mediated effects the study is able to empirically demonstrate that the effect of religious background on foreign policy preferences is more nuanced.
than the simple logic of the conventional wisdom. The other contribution of the project lies in providing a longitudinal account of the causal relationship between religious factors and attitudes on militarism and internationalism respectively. In fact, after Hero (1973), this is the first study that utilizes a quantitative approach to the analysis of longitudinal variations in such attitudes. By studying the effect of religious identity across different points of time, this study is able to ascertain if President Bush had a unique impact on evangelical attitudes as compared to his predecessors since 1980. This clarifies whether evangelical distinctiveness as described in the conventional wisdom was a phenomenon peculiar to the faith-based rhetoric of the Bush era.

**Dissertation Outline**

The rest of the dissertation is subdivided into five chapters. *Chapter 2* identifies the popular and academic sources of the conventional wisdom. Subsequently, it deliberates on the implications of the conventional wisdom for the structure of public opinion at the domestic level, and its overall effect on the process of policy making. The domestic implications of the conventional wisdom are discussed in light of Hunter’s (1991) theory of culture wars. The implications of the conventional wisdom in the context of international politics is discussed with reference to Huntington’s (1993) theory of the clash of civilizations. Thereafter, the chapter provides a detailed discussions on the concerns that have been levelled against the conventional wisdom. In light of these criticisms, the chapter justifies the necessity for reexamining the conventional wisdom, and delineates the research plan that the project utilizes to do so. It concludes with a discussion on how the findings from this project seek to revise the conventional wisdom. Moreover, it provides a brief explanation of how the implications of the findings obtained from this project seem to differ from those associated with the conventional wisdom.

*Chapter 3* of the dissertation provides an empirical analysis of the independent and mediated effects of religious factors on attitudes toward militarism. It also analyzes whether evangelical distinctiveness on attitudes toward militarism was exclusive to the George W. Bush period as
compared to other presidential administrations. The chapter begins with a discussion on the approach used to conceptualize and operationalize militarism. Thereafter, it reviews the relevant literature, and explains the data and methodological tools used in the chapter. Much of the coding decisions and methodological steps outlined in this chapter are also applicable to the two other empirical chapters. After reporting the results from the empirical analysis, the chapter discusses the ways in which its findings update the conventional wisdom.

Chapter 4 analyzes the effects of religious background on attitudes toward internationalism. In addition to disaggregating the independent effects of religious variables from effects that are mediated, this chapter examines whether evangelical appreciation for internationalism was new to the first decade of the 21st century. In so doing, it scrutinizes whether evangelical support for internationalism was remarkably distinct under President George W. Bush as compared to that under his predecessors. On the basis of the findings derived, the chapter concludes with a discussion on the extent to which the conventional wisdom may be applicable to attitudes on international engagement.

Chapter 5 focuses on the effects of religious identity and religiosity in driving support for the Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf Wars. The main goal of the chapter is to compare the relevance of the conventional wisdom across the three conflicts. Therefore, this chapter analyses the independent and the mediated effects of religious factor for each of the three conflicts. These analyses shed light on whether or not the pattern of religious influence is similar across the three cases.

Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings obtained from the three empirical chapters. In the process, it compares the direct and mediated effects of religious factors across the three issue-areas studied in the project. The chapter also provides a detailed discussion on the ways in which the key findings are, and are not, consistent with the conventional wisdom. Subsequently, it describes how the conventional wisdom should be reviewed in light of the findings obtained in the project. The rest of the chapter delineates the key implications of the findings for the process of foreign making at
home, and its possible effects on global politics at large. The chapter concludes with a discussion on avenues of future research.
CHAPTER II: THE DIVINE DIVIDE THESIS AND ITS DETRACTORS

Conventional Wisdom: The Divine Divide

Although discussions on the role of personal faith in shaping foreign policy attitudes were somewhat relevant during the Cold War period, the issue became increasingly salient in the aftermath of the September 11 jihadist attacks. In fact, the religious underpinnings of the rhetoric surrounding the War on Terror in general, and the Iraq War in particular prompted several media pundits to pinpoint that Americans’ religious affiliation—especially that of evangelical Christians—was largely instrumental in driving a distinctive set of foreign policy preferences. A month before the onset of the war in Iraq, the NPR published a report (Bradley-Hagerty 2003) showing a clear-cut polarization among different religious groups regarding the issue. On the one hand, President George W. Bush found steadfast supporters of the war in evangelical Christians, who justified the preemptive action on theological grounds.¹ At the same time, other religious groups including Roman Catholics, Methodists, and Episcopalians remained strongly opposed to the decision as they perceived it as an unlawful and unwarranted move. A couple of months into the war, a *New York Times* piece (Goodstein 2003) elaborated on the possible reasons for evangelical eagerness in supporting the attack.² According to Goodstein, the invasion and defeat of Iraq opened up a predominantly Islamic nation to missionaries who were waiting to spread the teachings of Christ, and covert Muslims to Christianity. Thus, evangelicals looked at the war as a great opportunity. Such an evangelical

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approach, argued Goodstein, was in stark contrast with the line of action followed by Catholic, mainline, and Orthodox churches. Unlike evangelicals, the latter pursued interfaith dialogues following the 9/11 attacks as a means for peacefully resolving differences between the followers of Islam and the followers of Christ. A similar piece (Duhigg 2004) published in the Los Angeles Times reported that about a year after the war had started, there were as many as nine evangelical worship houses in the city of Baghdad.³ American organizations were spending at least $100, 000 on each of these places to attract converts. While describing the role of these churches Duhigg highlighted, “the missionaries—a mix of professional proselytizers and novices with little or no preparation—are buoyed by President Bush's evangelical bent, his oft-repeated biblical references and his vision of freedom spreading out from a saved Iraq.”

Similar sentiments regarding evangelicals’ misgivings about Islam and their related views on Iraq were documented in think-tank publications. A Pew Research Center report (2003a) suggested that in July 2003, 51 percent of White evangelicals thought Islam was more likely to encourage violence as opposed to 39 percent of Catholics and 38 percent of those who were secular. In another Pew survey conducted in the same year (2003b), 15 percent of evangelicals mentioned that their pastors had expressed support for the war, as compared to only 1 percent of mainliners, and none of the Catholics.

As these accounts of evangelical distinctiveness continued to gain currency, the conventional wisdom seemed to propose that in the United States, peoples’ foreign policy preferences were largely determined by their religious identity. However, it would be grossly inaccurate to assume that such a rhetoric originated from popular sources alone. In the post 9/11 period, scholarship on foreign policy public opinion was inundated by publications that advocated the so called “divine divide.” Therefore, it is equally important to elaborate on the academic sources of the conventional wisdom.

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In *Faith and Foreign Policy*, Stephen Rock (2011) went to great lengths to explain why evangelicals were more supportive of the use of force in foreign policy decision making, and why such a trend persisted in case of the Iraq War. Rock attributed this distinctiveness to the evangelicals’ unique understanding of God, His relationship with the United States, and their commitment to discipleship and mission. The very fact that evangelicals cultivate an authoritarian view of God as opposed to the Catholic and mainline emphasis on an image that is nurturing and benevolent, was considered to be critical. Moreover, Rock argued that evangelicals’ perception of the United States as particularly favored by God with the divine mission of converting the whole world into Christianity made them more aggressive than their counterparts in other religious traditions. Similarly, Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008) found that evangelicals were more likely to support the use of force in Iraq, and expressed stronger support for the War on Terror as well as Bush’s overall foreign policy. Smidt (2005) and Lugo (2007) also demonstrated that differences in religious affiliation was particularly important for explaining variations in attitudes toward the war.

In this context, it is important to review the contributions of those scholars (see Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Durham 2004; Froese and Mencken 2009; Guth 2009a; Gilpin 2005; Glazier 2013; Yankelovich 2005) who added nuance to the conventional wisdom by looking into the effects of religious beliefs and behavior. Within this body of literature, some scholars (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Durham 2004; Gilpin 2005) studied attitudes toward the authority of the Bible. These scholars suggested that belief in Biblical inerrancy/literalism—especially end of times theology—was particularly associated with militarism. Focusing on a slightly different aspect of beliefs, Guth (2009a) argued that religious traditionalism and moral absolutism were substantively predictive of support for the Bush Doctrine. Scholars Froese and Mencken (2009) found that those who favored a public policy grounded in sacred doctrines were more likely to favor military action in Iraq. While most of the scholars mentioned above dealt with religious beliefs of some form or the other, Yankelovich (2005) tied foreign policy preferences with religious behavior. Yankelovich
(2005) found frequent worship attendees were distinctly more optimistic about the American course of action in Iraq as opposed to those who reported occasional attendance. Even though the aforementioned scholars focus on the effects of belief and behavior as opposed to affiliation, they certainly add credibility to the conventional thesis. They do so by showing how peoples’ religious habits and beliefs can drive a distinct set of foreign policy preferences. Thus, it would not be a stretch to consider this body of scholarship to be a part and parcel of the literature advocating the existence of a divine divide in the realm of foreign policy public opinion.

Now that the popular and academic sources of the conventional wisdom have been clearly established, it is quite appropriate to raise some questions regarding its implications. Considering this dissertation looks into the domestic sources of American foreign policy, what are the repercussions of a divine divide as one unpacks the black box of the nation-state? Moreover, what are the consequences of such a divide when we consider American foreign policy in a more outwardly fashion, that is, in the context of the international political system at large? These are pertinent questions that are worthy of careful deliberation. At the domestic level, the kind of polarization proposed by the conventional wisdom theorists bears a strong resemblance with Hunter’s (1991) culture war thesis. According to Hunter (p. 46), a cultural conflict is characterized by “political and social hostility rooted in different systems of moral understanding. The end to which these hostilities tend is the domination of one cultural and moral ethos over all other.” The very fact that conventional wisdom proponents see religious background as the chief driving force behind foreign policy preferences does open up the possibility of conflict among different religious cultures over what might be the correct course of action. What makes this trend rather interesting is that it entails a set of foreign policy views that are primarily driven by questions of morality as opposed to ideology and partisanship. Hunter, however, would not be surprised by such a state of affairs as he believed that

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4 For criticisms of the culture wars thesis please see Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2011)
cultural divisions are more profound that the customary left-right divide, which is conditioned by economic ideals and class interests. To highlight this argument, Hunter (p.48) clarified that “it would also be a mistake to view the culture war as merely social referendum on Ronald Reagan, George Bush, or other presidents and their legacies. If this were the case, the present conflict would simply be a dispute between the “liberals” and the “conservatives.” The cleavages run much deeper.”

For Hunter, conflicts among different cultures would eventually divide the American polity into the progressive and orthodox wings respectively. The progressive alliance would involve people from different religious cultures who are open to adapting their historic faiths to the changing conditions in the contemporary world. The orthodoxy, on the other hand, would comprise of those voices from across the religious landscape that adhere to rigid and unchangeable measures of personal and collective good in accordance with their faith in a transcendent authority. As a result, orthodox Jews, Catholics, and Protestants would be routinely pitted against their progressive counterparts across a wide range of issue areas.

At first glance, this part of the culture wars thesis may appear to be inconsistent with the identity-centric rhetoric of the conventional wisdom. However, a close semblance may be identified when the conventional wisdom is considered broadly to include effects of religious belief and behavior. For instance, Guth (2009a) showed that regardless of affiliation, religious traditionalists were significantly more supportive of the Bush Doctrine as compared to those who were non-traditional. Mearsheimer and Walt’s (2006) piece on the “Israel Lobby” is also relevant in this context. Mearsheimer and Walt indicated that an alliance between conservative Jews and Christian Zionists has been particularly influential in shaping American foreign policy in favor of Israel. Mearsheimer and Walt’s description of this pro-Israel alliance bears some resemblance with Hunter’s orthodox alliance.

Although the polarization of foreign policy views along religious fault lines has some far-reaching implications at the domestic level, it would be rather naïve to analyze it as an isolated
phenomenon that is devoid of international consequences. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks Huntington (2004, p. 358) suggested, “This new war between militant Islam and America has many similarities to the Cold War. Muslim hostility encourages Americans to define their identity in religious and cultural terms, just as the Cold War promoted political and creedal definitions of that identity.”

Under the circumstances, the rise of the Christian Right as a prominent and distinctive voice in domestic politics has the potential to reinforce America’s global image as a Christian nation with an explicit agenda against Islam and its followers. Considering the current wave of the Christian Right movement has been far more successful than past waves in influencing a wide variety of policy decisions in Washington D.C. (Wilcox 2006), there always remains a possibility of it trying to influence foreign policy decision making with an eye toward portraying the nation as fundamentally Christian, and opposed to cultures that do not subscribe to the movement’s orthodox worldview.

Consequently, what are the implications of such a situation for global politics at large? Huntington’s (1993) famous prophecy about the “clash of civilizations” may indeed come true if the international community views American foreign policy as one that is tailored to promote traditional Christian values, which contradict the secular and pluralistic diktats of statecraft. In that case, it would not be unlikely for conflicts to emerge over cultural differences, as opposed to the ones driven by ideological divergence and/or economic disparities. This scenario is especially disconcerting because in the contemporary world, one of the biggest threats to American national security emanates from Islamic fundamentalist organizations.

**Questioning the Divine Divide**

In spite of the prevalence of the conventional wisdom, it is possible to identify prominent scholarly contributions that make claims contrary to the divine divide thesis. In the book, *Foreign Policy Disconnect*, Page and Bouton (2006) offers a step-by-step explanation of how individual Americans form their foreign policy preferences. In this schema, personal characteristics and experience (including faith) serve as the starting point. However, personal experience is only
important in terms of shaping an individual’s fundamental worldview regarding how things should usually work at home and abroad. Therefore, according to Page and Bouton, personal characteristics and experience rarely matter independently beyond shaping fundamental beliefs, values, and interests.

The worldview derived from personal characteristics, however, is critically important. It is crucial because it goes on to determine an individual’s political predispositions. Political predispositions in the form of party ID and ideology are key to this model. In fact, individual perceptions of foreign policy goals, international threat perceptions, along with foreign policy preferences are considered to be directly defined and conditioned by political predispositions. Consequently, the major take-away from Page and Bouton’s theorization is that religious identity and/or experience rarely control foreign policy preferences independently. More often than not, religious factors matter only to the extent that they work through political predispositions. Considering this piece indicated the primacy of ideological and partisan differences over religious ones in shaping foreign policy views, it definitely raises concerns about the overall credibility of the divine divide thesis.

In *American Grace*, Putnam and Campbell (2010) put forward an interesting argument while assessing the effect of religiosity on views toward a wide variety of politically relevant issues. They show that same-sex marriage and abortion are the only two issues were religiosity matters a lot. It matters much less when it comes to foreign policy issues such as the role of the U.S. in international affairs and foreign aid spending. For Putnam and Campbell (p. 387), “religiosity’s influence on public opinion thus has a narrow scope. It does not matter at all for some issues, matters only a little for most, and matters a lot for only two. Abortion and same-sex marriage are the glue holding the coalition of the religious together.” Similarly, Layman and Green (2006) argue that the so called orthodox-progressive religious divide is mostly applicable to morality-based issues that are both salient and amenable to partisan differences along moral fault lines. These scholars demonstrate that
the effects of religious commitment and doctrinal orthodoxy are indeed way stronger for views on moral issues as compared to defense-spending. In short, the scholars mentioned above mostly associate religious differences particularly with morally relevant issues. They weaken the conventional wisdom by not associating the divine divide with issues that are outside the ambit of the traditional discourse on morality politics.

While talking about religion and public opinion, Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2007, p. 199) establish a middle ground by suggesting that “with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the debate over international policy entered a new era in which opinion seems to crystallize differently based on each particular case or controversy.” In fact, they demonstrate that while defense-spending attitudes are generally insensitive to religious factors, public opinion on the Iraq War shows responsiveness to identity-based religious differences. This is an interesting finding because it shows that even when dealing with varied issues that are essentially related to national security, the effect of religious background is not necessarily the same. Wald and Calhoun-Brown’s conclusion is relevant because it adds a subtle nuance to the conventional wisdom. It proposes that whether or not the divine divide will drive foreign policy preferences, or for that matter national security-related attitudes, is contingent on the case at hand.

If indeed the findings of these scholars are accurate, and the independent effects of religious differences on foreign policy preferences are mostly negligible, what might be the implications of such a trend at the domestic level, and for the American image within the international political system at large? If the effect of religious differences is actually marginal, the contours of foreign policy public opinion should not be very different from what it had been in the past. Ideological and partisan inclinations as opposed to cultural predilections would continue to drive public opinion. Consequently, the possibility of a religious rhetoric taking over the public discourse on foreign policy issues is also reduced. When that is the case, America’s image in the international arena is more likely to reflect its ideological priorities over cultural ones. Such a pluralistic image may also be less
antagonizing for groups that perceive Christianity as a threat. This could, in the long run, pave way for greater inter-faith dialogues and eventual resolution of misunderstandings based on cultural differences.

**Why Revisit the Divine Divide?**

Given what has been discussed in the preceding sections, it is quite apparent that the conventional wisdom is not universally accepted. For those who advocate the conventional wisdom, variation in religious background largely explains why people have different sets of views on foreign policy issues. The detractors of the conventional thesis, on the other hand, tend to argue that the effect of religion in shaping foreign policy attitudes is mostly limited, and definitely not as obvious and overt as portrayed by the proponents of the divine divide. My principal aim in this dissertation is to address the scholarly debate by exploring three key questions. First, I study whether religious factors have any impact on the formulation of foreign policy preferences. Second, I examine whether such factors can have any effect on foreign policy views that is independent of political predispositions. Finally, I scrutinize the extent to which religious background affects political predispositions, which in turn drive foreign policy preferences. It is useful to revisit and reexamine the debate on the divine divide in order to assess the extent to which American public discourse on foreign policy is dominated by religious considerations. If the findings show that religious differences tend to outperform political predispositions, it would clearly suggest that for the American public, questions of morality are of pivotal importance when reflecting on issues concerning the position of their nation in the international platform. Such a way of thinking would be remarkably different from foreign policy beliefs that are driven by ideological, partisan, and geo-strategic considerations. It would also challenge the claim that religious concerns are hardly important for issues other than abortion and gay marriage.

Yet another question that cannot be avoided in this context is the effect of President George W. Bush’s faith-based leadership on the foreign policy preferences of the Christian Right. Bush has
often been cited (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Yankelovich 2005) to be unique as compared to his predecessors in terms of molding evangelical preferences in a specific direction. At the same time, it is possible to identify scholarly voices (see Bass and Rozel 2009) that tend to disagree with the claim, and refuse to assign George W. Bush a distinguishing role. Given this ambiguity, I examine whether evangelicals were actually distinctive under George W. Bush as compared to his predecessors since 1980. In a related question, I also explore whether evangelicals had different preferences as compared to their counterparts in other religious traditions during the same period. But what might be the implications if Bush actually played an exclusive role in shaping evangelical preferences? Such findings would seem to suggest that the chief executive’s ability to generate cues that resonate with the Christian Right is key in terms of driving their opinion in one direction or the other. It would also seem to expose evangelicals’ vulnerability to presidential manipulation by the skillful use of religious rhetoric.

In order to explore the questions outlined above, I look at the effect of faith in shaping three distinct yet related foreign policy attitudes. These three attitudes include views on militarism, internationalism, and the wars on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf respectively. The concept of militarism captures popular preference for American military assertiveness in the international arena. According to Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999), such a predisposition involves an inclination toward defending American international interests by means of military strategies as opposed to peaceful mechanisms. Internationalism, on the other hand, is studied in this project to examine preference for a more internationally engaged foreign policy, as opposed to one that is guided by isolationist tendencies. To quote Wittkopf (1990, 25), internationalism, as a foreign policy predisposition, entails support for “active American involvement in international affairs, favoring a combination of conciliatory and conflictual strategies reminiscent of the pre-Vietnam internationalist foreign policy paradigm.” Lastly, I examine the influence of faith in shaping attitudes toward the three wars. The rationale behind this exercise is to inspect the role of religious background in shaping
support for the Iraq War, and then to compare the findings from the Iraq War with the two other wars that are somewhat overlooked in the literature.

But why are these three attitudes important or worthy of consideration? The decision for examining militarism is justified on the ground that it appears to be a major theme in the conventional wisdom discourse. For instance, Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson (2008) and Rock (2011) have strongly argued in favor of evangelical distinctiveness in the area of militarism. Evangelicals are usually portrayed as “hawkish” and pro-militancy as compared to mainliners and Catholics who are portrayed as relatively “dovish” and antagonistic to the use of force. The concept of internationalism is equally important because it captures public views on the role of United States in the international system. It is interesting to study the religious origins of this attitude because evangelicals are believed have a unique set of ideas regarding the special relation of the United States with God (see Lugo, Hertzke, Cizik, and Rosenthal 2005), and the coveted role of the United States in spreading the mission of God across the different corners of the world. Finally, it is important to study the Iraq War as scholars and journalists (for details please refer to section on conventional wisdom) alike have found religious differences to be key in driving support for this foreign policy decision. The Afghanistan War has not been studied as much, but is worthy of being analyzed as it was an integral part of the War on Terror, and formulated toward the elimination of the al-Qaeda. Finally, the Persian Gulf War deserves scrutiny because orthodox beliefs have been found to be strongly correlated with support for the war in the past (see Jelen 1994).

In my analysis of the effects of religious factors on militarism, internationalism, and the three wars, I conceptualize the former in terms of religious “belonging” (or the effects of religious affiliation), “believing” (or the effects of personal understanding of theology), and “behaving” (or the

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effects of private and/or public religious practices). Such an approach toward the conceptualization of religion is well accepted in the literature (see Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009a). It is widely used because it is particularly valuable for capturing the multidimensional influence of religion via affiliation, beliefs, and behavior. For instance, if religious background was conceptualized solely in terms of religious identity, it would be impossible to exclusively capture other important effects such as those relating to variations in the level of spirituality. This is a legitimate point of concern because it is possible for people to be non-spiritual even when they officially identify with a particular religious denomination or tradition. The approach adopted in this dissertation allows me to compare the individual effects of affiliation, beliefs, and behavior in order to assess the distinct contributions of each of these dimensions in the formulation of foreign policy viewpoints.

Religious belonging as a conceptual category and a form of identity concerns itself with the effects of affiliation to religious communities. Such communities are viewed as “social collectives” (Wald and Smidt 1993) whose members have a common history and shared experiences, and tend to react similarly to socio-political developments. This approach originated with Durkheim’s (1915) ethnoreligious framework, which states that the effect of religion on politics takes place essentially through the mechanism of affiliation. American society may be broadly divided into six major religious traditions (see Kellstedt and Green 1993) including evangelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, black Protestant, Catholics, Jewish, and the non-religious. According to Green (2010, p. 23), “a religious tradition is a set of religious denominations, movements, and congregations with similar doctrines, practices, and origins.” Religious traditions, argues Green, enable members to make the connection between their faith and politics in three interesting ways. First, religious communities provide members with a set of “core values” that form the basis of their political choice. Second, they can influence members through “internal cues” from the denominational leadership. Finally, “external appeals” from the political elite in the form of religious cues can also act as a potent source of influence.
While religious belonging focuses on the social aspect of religion, religious believing is concerned with “religion as a mental phenomenon” (Wald and Smidt 1993), which is based on the personal-subjective understanding of religion. According to Wald (1992, p.27), religion when viewed as a mental phenomenon involves “fundamental beliefs, ethical codes, and symbols associated with a religious tradition, including what others call a theology or a belief system.” This approach is similar to the Weberian ([1930] 1992) line of enquiry, which emphasizes the importance of religious beliefs. According to Green (2010), religious beliefs affect public opinion on political issues mostly through the acceptance of the core values of a religious community by its individual members. Scholars have often times used attitude toward the authority of the Bible to operationalize religious believing (Jelen 1989; Kellstedt and Smidt 1993; Clydesdale 1999). On other occasions, religious believing has been accounted for by creating a measure for traditionalism which combines beliefs on a wide variety of issues such as the virgin birth, the resurrection, and the second coming of Christ (see Guth 2009a).

The final component of religious influence deals with behavior. Religious behavior includes public practices such as worship attendance, and more private activities like Scripture reading, and personal praying (Green 2010). Here, it is interesting to note that similar to religious beliefs, religious behavior has the potential to vary from one religious tradition to the other (Smith, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009a). The mechanisms through which religious behavior affects political attitudes are quite similar to that of religious belonging (Green 2010). Thus, frequent worship attendees or those who pray regularly are more likely to embrace the “core values” of their religious communities. Similarly, they are likely to be more receptive to internal as well as external cues.

I rely on the American National Election Studies (NES) surveys from 1980 to 2008 to explore the effects of religious identity and religiosity on attitudes toward militarism, internationalism, and the three wars respectively. On the basis of a series of regression estimates, I find that religion does matter in the formulation of foreign policy preferences. However, the ways in which it influences these preferences is much more complicated than what is usually suggested by
the conventional wisdom theorists. Moreover, the pattern of influence seems to be slightly different for each of the three issue areas studied in the project. In the following paragraphs, I outline the ways in which my findings revise and reconfigure the conventional wisdom.

The starting point of the conventional wisdom is that Americans’ religious identity is key in determining foreign policy preferences, and this is particularly true for the evangelicals. My findings show that with the sole exception of militarism, evangelical identity ceases to have any effect on foreign policy preferences that is independent of political predispositions. Evangelicals are, indeed, more favorable than others toward militarism. However, when it comes to views on internationalism and the three conflicts, evangelical identity in itself does not seem to yield a distinct set of preferences. More generally, religious affiliation per se does not play a substantial role in determining viewpoints. As a result, with the sole exception of militarism, evangelicals’ standpoint on a particular issue does not seem to be significantly different from that of mainliners, black Protestants, and Catholics. Such a finding definitely weakens the conventional wisdom which seems to highlight the primacy of religious identity in shaping attitudes.

However, these findings should not be interpreted to belittle the significant effects of religious identity in shaping political predispositions, which in the long run are critical in determining foreign policy preferences. For instance, being Catholic does not necessarily make one more dovish. But, being Catholic makes one less conservative and less Republican, which make one more dovish, in turn. This trend implies that the effect of religious identity in the context of foreign policy preferences is not as obvious and straightforward as suggested by the conventional wisdom. While interpreting these findings one also has to be mindful of the fact that affiliation-related effects were assessed after controlling for belief and behavior. So what was actually studied were the exclusive effects of affiliation. Not controlling for belief and behavior could have definitely made affiliation more important in this context. For instance, evangelicals could have appeared to be unique because they are more likely to report frequent worship attendance and traditionalist beliefs.
Unlike religious affiliation, belief (in the form of attitudes toward the authority of the Bible) and behavior (in the form of worship attendance) tend to matter independently in many cases. For instance, having a high level of faith in the authority of the Bible tends to give rise to a distinctive set of attitudes in case of militarism as well as internationalism. Similarly, frequent worship attendees appear to be distinct in their viewpoints as compared to those who report occasional attendance. This finding is similar to the conventional wisdom because it suggests that a certain form of religious belief and behavior can be instrumental in polarizing public opinion. But why is the effect of belief and behavior stronger than that of affiliation? This question may be answered in light of Hunter’s (1991) culture war thesis. Hunter argued that in contemporary American society, the traditional differences among religious groups were being steadily replaced by a new cleavage, which is characterized by a divide between the orthodox groups and their progressive counterparts across religious traditions. The fact that belief and behavior are stronger predictors of public opinion seems to be indicative of the fact that traditionalist beliefs and behaviors are more powerfully related to such attitudes as opposed to affiliation per se. For instance, in case of internationalism, frequent attendees have a distinct set of attitudes as opposed to the ones with infrequent worship attendance habits. This is true regardless of religious affiliation. So, the more prominent divide, in this case, is between traditionalists who attend church more frequently, and progressives who are infrequent attendees. And, this trend persists across different religious traditions.

While belief and behavior seem to be powerful predictors of views on militarism and internationalism, they cease to be independently effective in shaping attitudes on the three conflicts. In fact, none of the three aspects of religious influence seem to matter independently in case of the three wars. When religious factors matter for the conflicts, such effects are invariably meditated by political predispositions. This finding clearly contradicts the conventional wisdom by showing that religious experience in itself does not have any impact on war-related attitudes. At the same time, it corroborates Page and Bouton’s (2006) claim, which suggests that in most cases the impact of
religious factors is limited to mediated effects via political predispositions. But, why did religion matter in the other two cases, and not for the three conflicts? A possible explanation may be found in the way the three attitudes were conceived in the project. Militarism and internationalism were studied as broad attitudes. In fact, as per Wittkopf’s (1990) classic typology, internationalism and militarism constitute generic foreign policy orientations. Attitudes regarding three conflicts, on the other hand, were studied as responses to specific events. This variation in the scope of the attitudes can be a possible explanation for the way in which religion affected them.

Before moving on to the implications of these findings, it is interesting to reflect on the impact of President George W. Bush’s faith-based leadership on the perceptions of the Christian Right. Were the evangelicals different under President Bush as compared to other presidents since 1980? Moreover, were their attitudes substantially different under Bush as compared to the perceptions of their counterparts in other religious traditions? In this project I explore these questions by looking at the longitudinal change in public opinion on militarism and internationalism respectively. While analyzing the evolution of these attitudes for the evangelicals alone, I fail to find any special effects for the Bush administration years. In other words, the evangelicals do not seem to be remarkably different under Bush as compared to other presidential administrations studied in the project. Likewise, I do not find sufficient evidence to suggest that evangelical public opinion under Bush was substantively different than that of members in other religious traditions. But, why did evangelicals seem to be so different under President Bush when that is not the case in reality? One possibility could be that this impression was an artifact of all the God talk that dominated the presidential discourse (see Domke 2004) at the time. Scholars (see Urban 2006) have also identified close parallels between the neo-conservative propaganda for the Iraq War, and the eschatological belief in the “new millennium.”

Given the nature of the findings presented in the preceding paragraphs, what might be the major take-away from this project? On the whole, the analysis seems to confirm that religion is
important in the formulation of foreign policy preferences. However, the ways in which religious
background structures such preferences is more complicated than what is usually suggested by the
advocates of the conventional wisdom. Religious identity in itself rarely drives foreign policy
preferences. On many occasions, a certain form of belief and behavior seem to have a more powerful
impact. Simultaneously, it is possible to find strong mediated effects of religious factors via political
predispositions. Finally, in the longitudinal analysis, President George W. Bush’s faith-based rhetoric
seems to be hardly effective in driving evangelical public opinion in one direction or the other.

What might be the possible implications of these findings? Considering identity does not
matter a great deal, it becomes somewhat difficult to put different religious traditions into separate
camps in terms of their foreign policy preferences. Furthermore, on most occasions, it is not possible
to assign evangelicals a unique role. For instance, this dissertation demonstrates that evangelical
identity alone does not make one an ardent supporter of the war in Iraq. However, on numerous
occasions it is possible for public opinion to be polarized along the lines of religious traditionalism.
Certain belief and behavior measures tend to play a powerful role in driving a distinct set of
preferences. Hence, it would not be surprising for the religious orthodox to take a strikingly different
standpoint than their progressive and/or secular counterparts. This pattern is similar to Hunter’s
culture war alliances. But one has to be cautious in drawing such parallels because there are some
exceptional cases were even belief and behavior cease to matter independently.

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that regardless of the issue area, religious
background demonstrates consistent mediated effects via political predispositions. These subtle
effects should not be disparaged because they shed important light on the spiritual roots of political
differences. Moreover, political predispositions—especially Party ID—seem to have strong
independent effects across the different issue areas. Thus, even when religious factors matter
independently, they do not seem to outperform the effects emanating from political predispositions
altogether. This implies that religious considerations are yet to take over political considerations
completely. Therefore, it is safe to argue that when Americans decide on their foreign policy preferences, they do not just think about issues of morality. Even when they give weightage to moral factors, they do not do so at the cost of political considerations.

Finally, the findings from this project make it clear that evangelicals do not explicitly incorporate faith-based cues from the president into their thought process when it comes to foreign policy issues. What might that mean in terms of foreign policy propaganda from the chief executive? At least, as far as the findings from this project are concerned, it is obvious that it may not always be possible to rally evangelicals in favor of a decision by making religious appeals. This is not to suggest that such a rhetoric does not impact the evangelical opinion-leaders. But the evangelical laity per se does not appear to be particularly responsive to such cues.

What difference does all this make in terms of America’s international image? This dissertation has established that partisan and ideological cleavages continue to permeate the public discourse on foreign policy issues even when moral factors are important. It follows that religious factors are not singularly driving a distinct set of preferences. So, at least for the moment, it is unlikely for any section of the American public to send out signals—both to the foreign policy elite at home and the international community at large—endorsing a national image that is purely motivated by concerns over faith and morality.
CHAPTER III: FAITH AND MILITARISM

Overview

The study of popular support for the use of military force is an important area of inquiry for scholars of foreign policy analysis. This is not surprising because in democratic societies, decisions to exercise military force in the resolution of international conflicts is expected to be largely contingent on public approval. In this chapter, militarism is conceptualized in terms of militant assertiveness. According to Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999), militant assertiveness entails the propensity to defend American interests abroad by military actions as opposed to mechanisms that are more peaceful. I operationalize militant assertiveness by utilizing the variable measuring attitudes on defense-spending. Defense-spending attitudes carefully capture militant sentiments because a strong military is key to effective militaristic interventions. Moreover, defense-spending attitudes have been used in the past (see Jelen 1994; Herman, Tetlock, and Visser 1999) to assess public sentiments on the use of force in addressing conflicts abroad.

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, many scholars (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008; Froesce and Mencken 2009; Guth 2009a; Lugo 2007; Rock 2011) were encouraged to investigate the religious motivations underlying popular support for militarism. Most of these contributions may be safely assigned to the conventional wisdom camp as they highlight the role of religious factors in driving a distinct set of preferences. For instance, scholars Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008) clearly suggested that evangelicals were more militaristic than members in other religious traditions. Although the conventional wisdom is usually accepted, prominent scholars (see Page and Bouton 2006) have been skeptical about the ability of religious factors to structure such attitudes independently. Moreover, the claims made by
the conventional wisdom theorists tend to undermine the argument that religious factors seem to matter less beyond the hot-button culture war debates on abortion and homosexuality (see Putnam and Campbell 2010). Given this trend, I seek to address the scholarly debate by examining the different ways—mediate as well as unmediated—in which religious belonging, believing, and behaving shape attitudes toward militarism. In a related question, I explore if the effects of the religious factors are contingent on whether the chief executive adopts a faith-based approach to leadership.

I use the American National Election Studies (NES) cumulative survey data set to explore my research questions. I rely on the Karslon, Holm, and Breen (2012) method to distinguish the independent effects of the religious variables from those effects that are mediated by political predispositions. I respond to the question on presidential leadership in two stages. First, I run stratified ordered logit models for each religious tradition to examine the effect of presidential leadership within each group across different presidential administrations. Thereafter, I run a pooled ordered logit model with interactions between the affiliation measures and the different presidential administration measures to compare change in militarism across different religious traditions since 1980.

The analysis in this chapter yields some interesting findings. On the whole, the study suggests that religion does matter in shaping attitudes toward militarism. In fact, quite similar to the conventional wisdom, evangelicals tend to be distinctively more militaristic in their orientations even after controlling for the effects of belief, behavior, political predispositions, and relevant demographics. Belief in the authority of the Bible and worship attendance also structure attitudes independently. While beliefs in a higher of the authority of the Bible make people substantially more supportive of militarism, frequent worship attendance works against it. This is an interesting finding because regular church attendance is usually associated with greater support for militarism. In this analysis, however, it becomes apparent that when the effect of worship attendance is studied
exclusively and disaggregated from traditionalistic beliefs, it actually turns people away from militarism. In addition to the independent effects discussed above, religious factors also demonstrate substantial mediated effects via political predispositions. Finally, President Bush does not seem to have a unique impact on the preferences of the Christian Right as the evangelicals do not appear to be distinctively militaristic under his administration as compared to his predecessors since 1980.

The findings from this chapter tend to support the conventional wisdom in general. Evangelical identity in itself drives a distinct set of preferences, and belief and behavior also divide people in a substantive way. But considering the religious factors do not outperform the effects of ideology and party loyalty altogether, it is possible to argue that Americans’ perceptions on militarism are not singularly colored by their moral considerations. Religious concerns though of substantive relevance, are yet to replace political cleavages in shaping preferences on militarism.

The key contribution of this chapter lies in detangling the independent effects of the religious variables from the effects that are mediated by political predispositions. While previous scholarship has accomplished a great deal by capturing the scope of independent effects, the current study takes a step further by focusing on the mediated effects as well. As a result, the present study is capable of exploring a wide variety of paths—both mediated as well as unmediated—along which religion affects such preferences. Moreover, this is the first quantitative project since Hero’s (1973) seminal study that systematically explores longitudinal variations in preferences across religious traditions. Such an approach is helpful because it allows for a comparison of militant attitudes across different points of time. In so doing, it helps to investigate whether evangelical distinctiveness in terms of militaristic preference was unique to the Bush administration, or whether it had been a longstanding trend regardless of the religious inclinations of the chief executive.

The rest of the chapter is divided into four major sections. In the following paragraphs I discuss the relevant literature, and the ways in which the research questions contribute to the existing scholarship. In the data and methods section, I describe my data, coding decisions, and the
methodological steps that I follow to analyze the data. Much of the coding descriptions and methodological discussions included in this chapter are also applicable to the other empirical chapters. Thereafter, I present my key findings and then elaborate on their implications for the scholarship on foreign policy analysis.

**Previous Literature**

Scholarship endorsing the conventional wisdom with regard to militarism may be broadly classified into arguments related to religious belonging, believing, and behaving respectively. Arguments based on religious affiliation have been used in several studies (Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008; Kurtz and Fulton 2002; Lugo 2007; Rock 2011; Wald 1992a) to explain the role of faith in determining distinct preferences on militarism. For example, Rock (2011) in his historical analysis found that since the Vietnam War, Roman Catholics and mainline Protestants have been skeptical of the use of force, whereas evangelical Protestants, in general, have been more supportive of war. Evangelicals were found to be more militaristic because they were encouraged at the denominational level to see “the world engaged in a struggle between the good and the evil, with one’s enemies the agents of Satan and one’s own country the special servant of God” (Rock 2011, p.62). Lugo (2007) and Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008) arrived at similar findings in their analyses of the Iraq War. Wald’s (1992a) piece on the Catholic bishops’ appeal for peace is another interesting study emphasizing the effectiveness of “internal cues” emanating from religious communities. In this article, Wald found that the bishops’ appeal (1983) was successful, at least in the short term, in swaying certain sections of the Catholic community against nuclear arms race. While discussing the foreign policy attitudes among mainline Protestants, Kurtz and Fulton (2007) highlighted the role of the church leaders in promoting pacifism among the parishioners through liturgy, rituals and educational events.

Religious beliefs have also been studied by several scholars (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Froese and Mencken 2009; Guth 2009a; Jelen 1994) as an important motivation driving
preferences regarding militarism. For instance, Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson (2008) found belief in Biblical inerrancy to be positively associated with support for militant foreign policy positions when it came to defending Israel. Here belief in dispensationalist theology associated with the end of times prophecy culminating in an apocalyptic battle between the supporters of Christ and anti-Christ is considered to be particularly instrumental. Similarly, Guth (2009a) found theological traditionalists to be significantly more supportive of the Bush Doctrine. In fact, in Jelen’s (1994) analysis of the Persian Gulf War, born-again Christians subscribing to an inerrant interpretation of the Bible were also found to be more supportive of the use of force in the context of international conflicts. Finally, effects of religious behavior have also been studied in this regard. As mentioned previously, religious behavior does seem to influence attitudes in a way that is similar to affiliation. Therefore, frequent attendees are more receptive to religious cues from the denominational leadership as opposed to those who attend infrequently. So, it is not surprising that the bishops’ appeal had a greater impact on those Catholics who were more involved with their churches as opposed to the ones who were not (Wald 1992a).

Although the scholarship on the conventional wisdom makes some compelling arguments in favor of a divine divide, some scholars remain skeptical about the ability of religious factors to condition attitudes independently, and without the mediation of political predispositions such as party ID and ideology. Due to the critical impact of partisan and ideological differences on foreign policy issues (Brewer et al. 2004; Jacobson 2005), the study of the effects of religious variables along with that of political predispositions is a relevant area of inquiry. The argument of those who believe that the religious variables have an effect independent of political predispositions is probably best articulated in Guth’s (2009a) study of the Bush Doctrine. According to Guth, not only do religious beliefs have mediated effects via political predispositions, they also tend to exercise a considerable amount of influence that is independent of the effects of political controls. Smidt (2005) and Baumgratner, Francia, and Morris (2008) also find religious traditions to have significant effects on
attitudes toward the war in Iraq after controlling for political variables. Such findings clearly run contrary to the claim that demographic factors and personal experience including religion have limited or no direct influence on foreign policy preferences, and that most of the time such factors work indirectly via “basic attitudes” like ideology and party loyalty (Page and Bouton 2006). So, unlike Guth, Page and Bouton tend to undermine the conventional wisdom by suggesting that being religiously traditional does not necessarily make one more militaristic. On the contrary, religious traditionalism makes one politically conservative and more Republican, and therefore more militaristic, in turn.

Due to this lack of consensus, I seek to address the scholarly debate by exploring whether religious variables have any independent effect on militaristic attitudes after controlling for the effects of party identification and ideology. If the findings support the claims made by the advocates of the conventional wisdom, at least some of the religious variables will remain statistically significant after controlling for political predispositions and would, at the same time, work indirectly through such controls. On the other hand, if the findings support the claims made by Page and Bouton (2006), the religious factors would not be statistically significant after controlling for political predispositions, but, would significantly influence attitudes via political controls.

However, while responding to this interesting debate, it is important to acknowledge the nuances within the scholarship that highlights the conventional wisdom. In Guth’s (2009a) study of the Bush Doctrine, although measures of religious belief and behavior remain statistically significant after controlling for political variables, most affiliation measures fail to demonstrate effects that are independent of political predispositions. This prompted Guth (2009a, p.258) to conclude that “clearly, it is religious and quasi-religious beliefs that are the most important factor, not affiliation

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6 A careful study of the tables in the book by Page and Bouton (2006), however, reveal that religious tradition (especially evangelical Protestantism) may be a more important predictor of defense spending attitudes than what is generally suggested by the authors.
per se, which is at best a weak proxy for those beliefs.” On the other hand, Smidt (2005) found religious affiliation to outperform the belief measures in predicting support for the Iraq War. In light of this debate regarding the type of religious influence that is most powerful, I examine what aspect of religion is likely to retain statistical significance after controlling for political predispositions. In so doing, I test whether certain aspects of religious influence are more likely to have independent effects as compared to the others.

Another interesting trend in this literature is that although several scholars have analyzed the role of religion in explaining militarism, much of their findings remain particular to specific events or periods. At least, in the recent past, there has been hardly any systematic quantitative study where researchers have compared the effect of faith on foreign policy attitudes across different time periods. Having identified this trend, I contribute to the overall scholarship by comparing the effect of religious background across five presidential administrations since 1980.

It is worthwhile to compare the five different time periods in view of the interesting literature on the relationship between President George W. Bush and the Christian Right not only in areas of social policy, but also with regard to foreign policy. However, this scholarship is by no means unequivocal. On the one hand, it is possible to identify scholars who consider the relationship between President George W. Bush and the Christian Right to be especially distinctive. For example, scholars like Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson (2008, p.311) argue that “unlike Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan who embraced the Christian Right but were not traditionalistic Christians, and unlike Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton who were Evangelical Protestants (southern Baptists) but did not embrace the Christian Right agenda, George Bush is the first president whom the Christian Right can legitimately call their own.” Yankelovich (2005) made a similar claim when he noted that the relationship

7 Hero’s (1973) seminal study of the foreign policy orientations of Catholics, Protestants and the Jewish from 1930s up until the Vietnam War is an important exception.
8 It is not possible to study the years before 1980 because of the unavailability of data. For a detailed discussion, see data and methods section.
between President Bush and “his religious constituency” was so unique and personal that it was unlikely for that bond to be recreated under any other president. This side of the literature, therefore, portrays George W. Bush as a unique source of faith based cues that enabled the members of his religious constituency to make an effective connection between their faith and their foreign policy preferences.

At the same time, there are scholars who do not subscribe to this line of thought. This is evident when Bass and Rozell (2009, p.480) note that “although it is true that Bush was much less constrained about expressing his religiosity publicly than many past presidents, it is an exaggeration to claim that he stood unique in this regard among America’s chief executives.” In view of this divide in the literature, I test if the effect of religious affiliation on militant attitudes during the Bush presidency years was significantly different from those during his predecessors. If the results support the claim of scholars who consider the Bush presidency to be unique in terms of religion’s influence on politics, the effect of evangelical identity will be significantly different during the Bush presidency years as compared to that of his predecessors. This test is particularly interesting because previous studies commenting on the unique religious influence of George W. Bush (or the lack of it) either relied exclusively on Bush era data (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008) or examined presidential behavior without studying the priming effects of such actions (Domke and Coe 2007).

**Data and Methods**

I rely on the NES cumulative dataset to examine the effects of religious affiliation and religiosity on militaristic attitudes from 1980-2008. Considering the NES questionnaires do not have repeated survey items measuring support for the use of military force, I use respondents’ position on the defense-spending scale as my response variable. This measure is informative because it reveals preference for building a strong military, which is a necessary condition for asserting military strength abroad. The measure is also reasonably broad since it captures attitudes on strengthening the military as a whole without narrowing down on any specific aspect of military strength. Moreover,
Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) used this measure as a key component of their military
assertiveness scale. Jelen (1994) had also used the measure as a proxy for militant attitudes in his
study of the Persian Gulf War.

In the NES surveys, the defense-spending scale was included for the first time in the year
1980. Thus, the analysis in this chapter begins with the year 1980. While using this measure it is
important to be mindful of the fact that it places respondents on a spectrum ranging from those who
support a great decrease in defense spending on one end, to those who support a great increase in
defense spending on the other. For the sake of analytical convenience, I fold and recode the original
seven-point scale to range from 0 (greatly decrease defense-spending) to 1 (greatly increase defense-
spending). It follows that those scoring a 0 on this scale will be least militaristic, whereas those
scoring a 1 will be most militaristic. Finally, respondents scoring .5 on the scale would be in the
middle and equidistant from the two extremes.

My key explanatory variables are divided into three categories—measures of religious
belonging, believing, and behaving respectively. I operationalize belonging by relying on the coding
scheme developed by Steensland et al. (2000) which was further fine-tuned for NES surveys by
Brooks and Manza (2004). The classification is based on theological and associational criteria related
to denominational creeds and membership status in religious associations at the national level. The
resultant coding scheme allows me to compare attitudes across seven religious traditions—mainline
Protestant, evangelical Protestant, black Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other religious traditions, and
the non-religious. Religious traditions effectively capture the effects of religious belonging by
combining smaller denominations with similar origins and doctrines into categories that are both
convenient and meaningful (Green 2010). I use mainline Protestant as the reference category for my
analysis. Considering mainliners and evangelicals are the two largest Protestant traditions in the
United States, it is interesting to compare evangelical attitudes with that of the mainliners. This is
also interesting in light of the recent rise of the evangelicals and the fall of the mainliners on the
Republican side. Moreover, previous studies (see Baumgartner, Franica, and Morris 2008; Froesce and Mencken 2009) have also used mainline Protestant tradition as the reference category for their analysis.

When it comes to operationalizing religious beliefs, it is possible to identify two approaches that are prominent in the literature (Guth et al. 1997). The first approach focuses on “theistic beliefs” in the form of attitudes toward God and afterlife. The other approach concerns itself with sources of “religious authority” by looking at measures such as attitudes on the authority of Scriptures. In this study, I operationalize religious believing by incorporating the Bible authority measure. According to Kellstedt and Smidt (1993), this measure is especially relevant in the American context. Although literal and inerrant interpretations of the Bible are usually associated with Protestantism in general and the evangelical tradition in particular, it remains a key aspect of religious traditionalism for members of many other traditions. Therefore, using this measure helps in ascertaining respondents’ level of commitment to traditional beliefs. Consequently, those scoring high on this measure may be categorized as religiously orthodox, whereas those scoring low may be identified as more progressive.

Moreover, this is the only religious belief item that has repeatedly appeared on the NES surveys since 1964. A challenging aspect of the Bible authority measure in the NES is that it uses two different variables to measure the belief. While the wording of the responses for the first variable (1964-1990) is based on the inerrancy approach, the second variable (1990-2008) is worded along the lines of the literalism approach. According to Kellstedt and Smidt (1993), these two approaches have the potential to yield different responses. Keeping this problem in mind, I combine the two variables on the basis of Kellstedt and Smidt’s discussion on what responses under each approach correspond to high, relatively high, or low views of Scripture. For example, an overall high view of Scripture corresponds to responses that agree to the statement, “the Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, world by world” in the literalism approach and, “the Bible is the actual word of God
and all is says is true” in the inerrancy approach. For the purposes of this study, the variable is coded to range from 0 (low authority of Scripture) to 1 (high authority of Scripture). So, respondents scoring a 1 on this measure would be most traditionalist in their religious beliefs, whereas those scoring a 0 would be least traditionalist.

In the existing literature, three major approaches have been used to measure religious behavior (Kellstedt et al. 1996). These approaches include measures of participation in public rituals, support extended to religious organizations, and the extent of private devotion. Due to the unavailability of other measures in the NES, I operationalize religious behavior by using the variable on the frequency of worship attendance. Originally this variable was coded to range from 0 (never) to 5 (every week). In this study, I rescale the variable to range from 0 (never) to 1 (every week).

In the light of previous literature (see Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008; Guth 2009), I control for the effects of political predispositions and demographics. These controls include the respondents’ self-placement on the liberal-conservative scale (seven-point scale recoded to range from 0 = extremely liberal to 1 = extremely conservative), the party ID scale (seven-point scale recoded to range from 0 = strong Democrat to 1 = Strong Republican), gender (0 = male/1 = female), age (original range of 17 to 97 folded and recoded to range from 0 to 1), race (operationalized using three dummies for whites, African-Americans and other races respectively; the dummy for Whites is used as the reference category because it is interesting to compare the views of African-Americans and all other non-White races to the Whites), region of residence (0 = other regions/1 = South), income (ranging from 0 = 1-16 percentile to 1 = 96-100 percentile) and education (ranging from 0 = grade school to 1 = advanced degree).

To control for the effects of presidential priming, I use a set of five dummies for the five presidents that I study during the period 1980 to 2008. Therefore, the presidential dummies that I

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9 I use single-imputation techniques to deal with cases of non-response on all my independent and control variables.

10 When using presidential dummies, standard errors are adjusted for the 12 clusters (the 12 survey years)
include in my study are, Carter (1980=1 and 1982-2008=0), Reagan (1980=0, 1982-1988=1 and 1990-2008=0), George H.W. Bush (1980-1988=0, 1990-1992=1 and 1994-2008=0), Clinton (1980-1992=0, 1994-2000=1 and 2002-2008=0) and George W. Bush (1980-2000=0 and 2002-2008=1).11 Due to the unavailability of data prior to 1980, I am only able to study the last year of the Carter administration. I use the Reagan years as my reference category because it is the first administrative period that is captured completely in the dataset. Using the first complete period is convenient because it makes it easier to systematically compare later administrations from a chronological perspective.

I take advantage of the Karlson-Holm-Breen (KHB) method to disaggregate the total effects of the religious variables into independent and mediated effects (via political predispositions). The KHB method is particularly useful for dealing with confounding effects in non-linear models (see Karlson, Holm, and Breen 2012).12 When comparing the coefficients across differently specified linear models, a change in the coefficients of the key independent variables can be directly attributed to the addition of a confounding variable. However, a similar comparison of coefficients is not possible across differently specified non-linear models (logit, probit, or ordered logit in the case of this chapter where the dependent variable is an ordered measure) because of the inability of such models to distinguish between change in coefficients due to confounding and change in coefficients due to rescaling. The KHB method solves this problem and allows researchers to identify differences in coefficients between full and nested non-linear models that are exclusively attributable to confounding effects.

11 1980 is coded as a Carter year because Reagan did not technically assume office until January 1981. The same logic has been used while coding for the other four presidential administrations. It is also important to note that due to the unavailability of data on defense-spending attitudes before 1980, only the last year of Carter administration could be included in the analysis. It is important to note that there were no NES time-series surveys for the years 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006.

12 Following Karlson, Holm, and Breen (2012), I use the term “confounding” to refer to all instances where the control variables are not only correlated with the original independent variables but also tend to influence the dependent variable after being introduced to the model along with the original independent variables.
Using the “khb” command on Stata, I regress the defense-spending scale on the religious tradition dummies, worship attendance, and Scriptural authority while controlling for the effects of political predispositions, demographics and the presidential dummies. This method allows me to compare the effect of the religious variables between the restricted model (without controls) and the full model (with all the controls). The model without controls looks at the effects of the religious factors without taking account the influence of political predispositions, relevant demographics, and variations in time. This model may be represented as:

\[ \text{Militarism} = \beta_a(\text{Tradition Dummies}) + \beta_b(\text{Scriptural Authority}) + \beta_c(\text{Worship Attendance}) \]

The unrestricted model, or the model with all the controls, assesses the effects of the religious variables after controlling for political predispositions, relevant demographics, and variations in time. The unrestricted model may be represented as:

\[ \text{Militarism} = \beta_a(\text{Tradition Dummies}) + \beta_b(\text{Scriptural Authority}) + \beta_c(\text{Worship Attendance}) + \beta_d(\text{Ideology}) + \beta_e(\text{Party ID}) + \beta_f(\text{Demographics}) + \beta_g(\text{Period Dummies}) \]

The point of running the two models separately is that if the effects of the religious measures are purely independent and unmediated, their coefficients in the two equations would be exactly identical. However, if any of the effects is mediated by political predispositions—or, altered by the addition of other controls—the coefficients would be different in the two models. Therefore, I also report the difference in coefficients attributable to the addition of the controls for each of the religious variables across the full and restricted models. Thereafter, I use the “disentangle” option with the “khb” command to examine how much of the difference in coefficients, between the two models, for each of the religious measures, is attributable to individual control variables.

I analyze the question about longitudinal change in attitudes across different administrations in two stages. First, I compare change in attitudes across different periods within each tradition. To do so, I stratify the data into seven religious traditions. Subsequently, I regress defense-spending attitudes on the presidential administration dummies, Bible authority, worship attendance, political
predispositions, and demographics for every single tradition. These models for each religious
tradition may be represented as:

\[
\text{Militarism}= \beta_a (\text{Scriptural Authority}) + \beta_b (\text{Worship Attendance}) + \beta_c (\text{Ideology}) + \\
\beta_d (\text{Party ID}) + \beta_e (\text{Demographics}) + \beta_f (\text{Period Dummies})
\]

In this model, the coefficients of the period dummies compare attitudes on militarism within a
religious tradition for each period with the reference category of the Reagan years. Finally, I run a
pooled model with interactions between the religious tradition dummies and the period dummies. I
control for the effects of the belief and behavior measures, political predispositions, and
demographics in this model. This model compares the change in militarism across different religious
traditions under chief-executives since 1980. This model may be represented by the following
equation:

\[
\text{Militarism}= \beta_a (\text{Tradition Dummies}) + \beta_b (\text{Scriptural Authority}) + \beta_c (\text{Worship Attendance}) + \\
\beta_d (\text{Ideology}) + \beta_e (\text{Party ID}) + \beta_f (\text{Demographics}) + \beta_g (\text{Period Dummies}) + \\
\beta_{ag} (\text{Tradition Dummies}\times\text{Period Dummies})
\]

The coefficients of the interactive terms formed by multiplying the period dummies and the tradition
dummies test whether the longitudinal change in attitudes for each tradition, under each
administration, was significantly different from the mainliners (reference group).

**Results**

I use the findings reported in Table 3.1. to test whether the religious variables have an
independent effect on militant attitudes after controlling for demographics, political predispositions,
and the different presidential administrations. In the first column of Table 3.1. (restricted model), I
report the coefficients of all the three religious measures without the contaminating effects of the
controls. In the second column (full model), I report the coefficients of the religious variables after
introducing the demographic and political controls. In the third column (difference in effects), I
report the difference in coefficients for each variable across the full and restricted models.
Table 3.1.: Comparing Effects of Religious Variables with and without Demographics & Political Predispositions on Militarism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Restricted Model (Without Controls)</th>
<th>Full Model (With Controls)</th>
<th>Difference in Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.18(.04)***</td>
<td>.07(.03)*</td>
<td>.11(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelicals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>-.38(.08)***</td>
<td>.11(.14)</td>
<td>-.49(.17)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.08(.04)*</td>
<td>.07(.04)</td>
<td>-.15(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-.43(.10)***</td>
<td>-.05(.08)</td>
<td>-.37(.13)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-.55(.09)***</td>
<td>-.38(.11)**</td>
<td>-.17(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-.35(.05)***</td>
<td>-.23(.04)***</td>
<td>-.12(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scriptural Authority</td>
<td>.77(.05)***</td>
<td>.52(.04)***</td>
<td>.25(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>-.11(.04)**</td>
<td>-.18(.05)***</td>
<td>.07(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17,927</td>
<td>17,927</td>
<td>17,927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Estimates of restricted model and full model obtained using “KHB” command on Stata. Difference in effects is also computed using the same command. Ordered logit estimators. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Mainline Protestants are used as the baseline category for religious group dummies. NES weight used is VCF0009a.

The information reported in the three columns of Table 3.1. reveals an interesting pattern. In the restricted model, all the religious affiliation measures, the Scriptural authority measure, and the worship attendance measure are statistically significant. Among the religious tradition dummies, evangelical Protestants are found to be more militaristic than mainline Protestants (reference group), whereas all the other traditions are found to be less militaristic than the mainliners. As far as belief in Scriptural authority is concerned, the coefficient for this variable is both positive and statistically significant. This implies that those with higher views regarding the authority of the Scriptures are significantly more militaristic than those with lower views regarding the authority of the Scripture. These findings seem to mesh well with the conventional wisdom. Evangelicals seem to have a viewpoint that is substantially different than that of other religious traditions. Therefore, in this
model affiliation to evangelical Protestantism does lead to a distinct set of preferences. Likewise, views on Scriptural authority seem to divide the public. Those believing in a higher authority of the Bible—and therefore expressing traditionalist beliefs—are found to be significantly more supportive of militarism as compared to those who do not.

The coefficient for worship attendance is rather interesting. The negative sign of this statistically significant variable suggests that a higher level of church attendance is more likely to work against militaristic orientations. Even though the pattern may strike to be surprising at first glance, it is definitely not unanticipated. Guth (2009a) in his chapter on the Bush Doctrine obtained similar findings and suggested that this measure, in reality, works against support for the Doctrine in the absence of conservative beliefs. In order to test if that explanation was true in this case, I first ran a bivariate ordered logit model where I regressed defense-spending on worship attendance. Thereafter, I ran the same model but with a control for Scriptural authority. My findings supported Guth’s (2009a) explanation in the sense that although worship attendance had a positive coefficient at the bivariate level, its direction changed as soon as I controlled for Scriptural authority in the second model. Therefore, an interesting take-away from this model is that frequent worship attendance in itself does not make one more supportive of militarism. In fact, when the effects of worship attendance are studied exclusively, and in separation from the effects of conservative beliefs, regular attendance makes people less supportive of militarism. This undermines the popular belief that frequent worship attendees are inherently more supportive of war. However, it does not contradict the conventional wisdom altogether because it suggests that people have significantly different preferences when they have different worship attendance habits. Therefore, variance in religious habits does seem to drive a distinct set of preferences in this case.
The picture painted in the restricted model changes to a certain extent when I consider the findings from the full model. Here, almost all the religious affiliation measures with the exceptions of the dummies for evangelicals, other religious traditions, and the non-religious cease to remain statistically significant. While the coefficient for the evangelical Protestants is substantially reduced in size, the directions of the coefficients for black Protestants and Catholics (vis-à-vis mainliners) change from negative in the restricted model to positive in the full model. Scriptural authority and worship attendance continue to have statistically significant coefficients in the full model even though their coefficients are somewhat reduced in size.

On the whole, the findings from the full model suggest that affiliation to the evangelical Protestant tradition, views on Scriptural authority and worship attendance have a direct and independent effect on militaristic attitudes after controlling for relevant demographics, party loyalty and ideology. Although the evangelical Protestant dummy is statistically significant, the coefficients for the other major religious traditions (namely, black Protestants, Catholics and the Jewish) fail to retain statistically significant effects in the full model. So the findings from the full model tend to justify the conventional wisdom to a large extent. Even though most affiliation measures do not matter, evangelical Protestant identity does lead to distinctive attitudes. Moreover, both Scriptural views and worship attendance seem to divide people in terms of their preferences on militarism.

Finally, the last column in Table 3.1., reports the difference in coefficient estimates, for each of the religious variables, between the full and restricted models respectively. The reported difference captures the extent to which the effects of individual religious variables are confounded by all the

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13 The point of running the model with all the controls is that the full model would only retain the independent effects of the religious variables by getting rid of any form of shared variance (see Claassen and Nicholson (2013) for a similar discussion). For example, if individuals with higher views of Scriptural authority tend to be ideologically conservative, and ideology affects hawkish orientations, then the full model, while reporting the coefficient of Scriptural authority will get rid of that part of the variance that is occurring via ideology, and would only report the independent effects of Scriptural authority on hawkish attitudes.
control variables. The column shows that the difference in effects for black Protestants and the Jewish are statistically significant. This suggests that the effects attributable to the two variables are substantially confounded by the controls introduced in the full model.

Statistically significant differences in estimates caused by confounding generally indicate two possibilities (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011). The difference is considered to be a spurious effect if the control measures are perceived to be the causes for the independent variables. However, the difference is considered to be an indirect effect if the controls are considered to be the consequences of independent variables.

In this study, my primary interest is in the confounding effects of political predispositions even though I control for a wide variety of factors. I specifically rely on the scholarship that forms the basis of the debate explored in this chapter to decide on the exact nature of the relationship between the religious measures and the political controls. Although Guth (2009a) and Page and Bouton (2006) disagree on whether religious factors exercise direct and independent effects on foreign policy attitudes, they seem to agree to the claim that when the religious effects are confounded by political predispositions, then that is typically a case of indirect effects. For example, Page and Bouton (2006, p.32) note that “we can usually be confident that personal characteristics like a person’s age, gender, religion or educational level affect his or her political attitudes, rather than vice-versa, because such personal or demographic characteristics are relatively fixed and generally unaffected (are “exogenous to”) by political attitudes.” Therefore, I conceive of the portion of the total difference in estimates which is attributable to political predispositions as a case of indirect effects.
Table 3.2: Effect of Demographics and Political Predispositions on Militarism from the Full Model (Table 3.1.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>1.50(.08)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>.86(.09)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.23(.05)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.27(.11)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>-.21(.10)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-Races</td>
<td>.08(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.23(.07)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.77(.11)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.38(.04)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17,927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Demographics and political predisposition estimates from full model (Table 1) using “KHB” method. Ordered logit estimators. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Whites are used as baseline category for race dummies. NES weight used is VCF0009a. Also obtained but not reported are coefficients for other presidential dummies. Reagan presidency years are used as the reference category for presidential dummies.

Before analyzing the indirect effects of the religious variables via political predispositions, it is worthwhile to note how the demographic controls and the political predisposition measures perform in the full model (Table 3.2.). Coefficients for ideology, party ID, age, gender, other races, income, education and residence in South are statistically significant. Politically conservative individuals are found to be significantly more supportive of militarism as compared to their liberal counterparts. Similarly, Republicans are more militant than democrats. This pattern is suggestive of the fact that people are not only divided along religious cleavages, but also seem to differ along political lines. Demographic characteristics and socio-economic status also play an interesting role. Women seem to be less supportive of militarism as compared to men. Moreover, older people tend to
hold more militant views than younger ones. African-Americans seem to be significantly less militaristic than Whites. Residents in the South are also remarkably more militaristic than people living in other parts of the country. Socio-economic status also contributes to the formation of attitudes on militarism in a meaningful way. In fact, people in higher income brackets tend to be way more supportive of militarism than those in lower-income categories. Education attainment, on the other hand, works against militaristic attitudes. As people get more and more education, they become less likely to support militarism. This evidence shows that peoples’ attitudes on militarism are shaped by a wide variety of factors beyond religious concerns and political commitments. Therefore, religion—albeit important—is one among many factors that structure such attitudes.

In Table 3.3, I report how much of the difference in estimates reported in the third column of Table 3.1., for each of the three religious measures, is attributable to individual confounding effects of ideology and party loyalty. Here, it is important to note that the differences between the full and restricted models reported in the last column of Table 3.1. represent the amount by which the effect of each religious measure is confounded by all the control variables used. In other words, the last column in Table 3.1. represents the sum total of the confounding effects of all the controls for individual religious measures. The ideology and the party ID columns in Table 3.3., on the other hand, report for every religious measure, that portion of the total difference which is attributable to ideology and party ID respectively.

The first column of Table 3.3. specifically reports how much of the effect of each religious measure is operating indirectly via ideology. For instance, if I look at the indirect effect of the evangelical dummy via ideology, it is possible to say that .02 of the total .08 difference in the coefficient estimates (reported in last column of Table 3.1.), for this particular tradition, as compared to the reference category of mainline Protestants, is occurring indirectly through ideology. Here, it is important to highlight that this indirect effect is both positive and statistically significant. This implies that evangelical identity makes people more conservative, and therefore more militaristic, in
turn. However, it is interesting to note that all the other religious tradition dummies have statistically significant albeit negative indirect effects via ideology. So for all traditions other than evangelical Protestantism, religious affiliation makes people more liberal, and therefore less militaristic, in turn. Thus, for the religious tradition measures, controlling for ideology in the full model was an important factor in producing the difference in estimates between the restricted and the full models. Another interesting pattern is that only two religious affiliation measures (black Protestant and Jewish) reported statistically significant differences in the last column of Table 3.1, raising the possibility that the other measures of religious belonging might be orthogonal. However, findings in the second column of Table 3.3 suggest that at least as far as indirect effects via ideology are concerned, none of the religious affiliation measures is orthogonal.

Table 3.3.: Decomposing the Indirect Effects of Religious Variables via Ideology and Party ID.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Party ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>.02(.005)***</td>
<td>-.04(.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>-.15(.01)***</td>
<td>-.31(.03)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.05(.01)***</td>
<td>-.11(.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-.16(.02)***</td>
<td>-.20(.03)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-.10(.01)***</td>
<td>-.07(.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-.08(.02)***</td>
<td>-.08(.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scriptural Authority</td>
<td>.11(.01)***</td>
<td>.01(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>.09(.01)***</td>
<td>.04(.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17,927</td>
<td>17,927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Indirect effects of the religious variables via Ideology and Party ID obtained by using “KHB” command on Stata. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. NES weight used is VCF0009a. Also obtained, but not reported are the contributions of individual demographic controls to the difference reported in the fourth column of Table 3.1.
Among other religious measures, views on Scriptural authority have a statistically significant indirect effect via ideology. In fact, .11 of the total .28 difference reported in the third column of Table 3.1. is occurring via ideology. This indicates that belief in a higher authority of the Bible makes people more conservative, and therefore more militaristic, in turn. Likewise, .09 of the total .07 difference reported for worship attendance in the third column of Table 3.1. that is occurring via ideology suggests that frequent worship attendance also make people more politically conservative, and that in turn makes them more favorable toward militarism. Here, it is useful to mention that the confounding effects of most of the other controls for this variable are negative. Again, the significant indirect effects for Scriptural authority and worship attendance suggest that even though the total difference in effects for these measures were not significant in Table 3.1., these variables are at least not orthogonal with regard to ideology.

The second column of this table specifically reports how much of the effect of each religious measure is operating indirectly via party ID. This column shows that all the religious tradition dummies have a statistically significant albeit negative indirect effect via party ID. Therefore, religious affiliation in general makes people less Republican and therefore less militaristic, in turn. Again, these findings suggest that each of the affiliation measures is, at least, not orthogonal with regards to party ID, even though the overall difference in estimates reported in Table 3.1. for some of the measures is not statistically significant. The fact that evangelical identity makes people less Republican may appear to be surprising at first glance. However, it is not totally unexpected as the effects of evangelical identity were studied after controlling for religious belief and behavior. Thus, the negative effect of evangelical identity on party ID suggests that in the absence of traditionalistic beliefs and behavior, evangelical identity may works against Republican loyalty. Views on Scriptural authority, however, do not have a statistically significant indirect effect via party ID. However, worship attendance has a positive and statistically significant effect via party ID. In fact, .04 of the
total difference in effects reported in Table 3.1. for this measure is occurring via Party ID. Thus, frequent worship attendance makes people more Republican, and therefore more militaristic, in turn.

Table 3.4.: Stratified Models of Overtime Change in Militarism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Mainline</th>
<th>Evangelical</th>
<th>Black Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>1.83***</td>
<td>1.76***</td>
<td>1.36***</td>
<td>1.60***</td>
<td>2.36***</td>
<td>2.27***</td>
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<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>-0.56***</td>
<td>-0.49***</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.56***</td>
<td>-0.36*</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.43*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.50)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
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<td>0.57**</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.74***</td>
<td>1.21**</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.77**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
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<td>0.84**</td>
<td>0.99***</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.05***</td>
<td>1.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
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<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.47)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<td>0.82**</td>
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<td>3.15***</td>
<td>1.78***</td>
<td>1.62***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.87)</td>
<td>(.40)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scriptural Authority</td>
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<td>0.64***</td>
<td>1.07**</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.58**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.70)</td>
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<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.34)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
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<td>-0.23**</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.50)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
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<td>0.28</td>
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<td>1.47**</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.09)**</td>
<td>(.34)</td>
<td>(.39)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.78***</td>
<td>-0.62***</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.62***</td>
<td>-0.79*</td>
<td>-1.18***</td>
<td>-0.92***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.38)</td>
<td>(.34)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
<td>0.42***</td>
<td>0.31**</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td>0.45**</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4,922</td>
<td>4,124</td>
<td>1,321</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>2,135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001. Ordered logit estimates, all tests two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses. Reagan years used as baseline category for presidential administrations.

In the next section, I explore the second important question raised in this chapter regarding the effect of presidential priming on militaristic attitudes since 1980. In Table 3.4., I report the
stratified models presenting longitudinal change in attitudes within each of the seven religious traditions. In my analysis, I focus specifically on the findings for the evangelical Protestant tradition because the scholarly debate regarding the unique role for President George W. Bush revolves particularly around the Christian Right. The second column of Table 3.4 reports the longitudinal change in attitudes within the evangelical Protestant community. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the Bush era suggests that during that period, evangelicals were significantly more militaristic than the baseline period of the Reagan years. However, the positive and statistically significant coefficient for the concluding part of the Carter period suggests that evangelicals were also more militaristic during the last one year of the Carter administration as compared to the baseline category of the Reagan years. Given the nature of the findings, it is possible to argue that George W. Bush did not quite have a unique impact on the evangelicals. Evangelicals seemed to be more militaristic both under George Bush and also during the final year of the Carter presidency. Another interesting finding from this model is the effect of worship attendance. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the worship attendance measure suggests that even for the evangelicals, frequent church attendance when dissociated from conservative religious beliefs, works against militarism.

The first cell in the second column of Table 3.5 compares the change in attitudes among evangelicals to the change in attitudes among the mainliners during the same period. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the concluding part of the Carter period suggests that change in militarism among evangelicals during the period was significantly more that the change in attitudes among mainliners during the same period. The coefficient for the George H.W. Bush period and the Clinton period do not report significant coefficients. However, the significant coefficient for the George W. Bush period implies that change in militarism among evangelicals during the Bush era was significantly less as compared to that for the mainliners. A comparison of the Bush era coefficients across the different religious traditions shows that only the evangelical coefficient was
statistically significant, implying that of the different religious traditions examined during the Bush era, change in attitudes among evangelicals alone was significantly different from the change in attitudes among mainliners (reference group). But what happens when one examines change among evangelicals as compared to mainliners across presidential administrations? In such a comparison, George W. Bush does not stand unique, as evangelicals remain significantly different from mainliners during under both George W. Bush and Carter during his last one year in office.

Table 3.5.: Interactive Model of Overtime Change in Militarism across Different Religious Traditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Mainline</th>
<th>Evangelical</th>
<th>Black Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>1.66*** (.06)</td>
<td>.11* (.05)</td>
<td>.22* (.11)</td>
<td>-.09 (.07)</td>
<td>.39** (.09)</td>
<td>.75*** (.10)</td>
<td>.26*** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td>.11* (.05)</td>
<td>-.06 (.19)</td>
<td>.11 (.07)</td>
<td>-.32** (.10)</td>
<td>-.55*** (.10)</td>
<td>-.35*** (.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW</td>
<td>-.51* (.08)</td>
<td>.002 (.08)</td>
<td>.39** (.13)</td>
<td>-.04 (.09)</td>
<td>.29** (.09)</td>
<td>.23 (.30)</td>
<td>.13 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>.11 (.25)</td>
<td>-.02 (.05)</td>
<td>.34* (.17)</td>
<td>-.07 (.11)</td>
<td>.57* (.22)</td>
<td>.37 (.21)</td>
<td>.30*** (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>.74*** (.19)</td>
<td>-.21*** (.06)</td>
<td>.06 (.11)</td>
<td>-.02 (.08)</td>
<td>.27 (.20)</td>
<td>-.13 (.19)</td>
<td>.10 (.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordered logit estimates, two-tailed tests. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. N=17,927. Also obtained but not reported are the coefficients of church attendance, Bible authority, and demographic and political controls. Reagan presidency is used as the reference category for presidential dummies. Mainline identity is used as reference category for religious tradition dummies. Reagan coefficient is obtained by reporting the effects of the group dummies.

Discussion

On the whole, the findings from this chapter seem to suggest that religious background plays an important role in shaping attitudes on militarism. In accordance with the conventional wisdom, evangelical identity does seem to drive a distinct set of preferences. In fact, evangelical identity is the only affiliation measure that makes people significantly more supportive of militarism. Religious belief in the form of attitude toward the authority of the Bible also matters independently. The findings show that people with traditional beliefs regarding the authority of the Scriptures are more supportive of militarism. This pattern corroborates the conventional wisdom by highlighting religious
motivations underlying preferences on militarism. Worship attendance habits seem to have an independent effect on preferences as well. However, the findings from this study regarding the effects of church attendance add a subtle nuance to the conventional wisdom. According to the conventional wisdom, frequent worship attendance makes people more supportive of militant actions. This study shows that even if worship attendance habits drive a distinct set of preferences, they do not necessarily make people more militaristic. On the contrary, when worship attendance is studied exclusively, and is dissociated from traditionalistic beliefs, frequent worship attendance makes people less supportive of militarism. Although these effects are important, they should not be interpreted to belittle the significant mediated effects of the religious variables via political predispositions. The mediated effects demonstrate how religious background determines political predispositions, which in turn drive preferences on militarism. Such findings are also interesting because they shed light on the religious roots of party loyalty and ideological positions.

Finally, findings from this project suggest that the faith-based approach of George W. Bush’s leadership did not seem to have any distinct impact on the attitudes of the evangelicals. In fact, members of the evangelical community seemed to be more militaristic both under Bush and during the last year of Carter presidency. Since the evidence does not seem to support a unique role for George W. Bush, it is worth exploring why he appeared to have played such a distinctive role in shaping the foreign policy preferences of the evangelicals. This perception could have stemmed from the fact that the Bush administration was actively pursuing a political rhetoric that was crafted to resonate with the worldview of the Christian Right. For instance, Domke (2004, p.2) suggests that, “the administration had converged a religious fundamentalist worldview with a political language to create a political fundamentalism that offered familiarity, comfort, and a palatable moral vision to the U.S. public in the aftermath of September 11.” The findings from this chapter, however, show that such a religiously charged discourse did not seem to have an extraordinary impact on the attitudes of the evangelical laity.
The key findings reported in this chapter have interesting implications for the scholarship on the structure foreign policy public opinion, and the ability of the latter to constrain foreign policy-related decision making. At the domestic level, the findings suggest that differences in religious identity and religiosity are powerful enough to independently drive a distinct set of preferences. But does that necessarily imply that religious cleavages are key in driving attitudes on militarism? Although religious considerations are important, they do not outweigh the effects of demographic, socio-economic, and political indicators altogether. As a result, religious identity or traditionalist beliefs do not appear to singularly drive public opinion. On the contrary, popular sentiments on the issue seem to be characterized by a set of cross-cutting cleavages.

But what does the pattern imply in terms of constraining role played by public opinion in terms of democratic decision making on issues of the use of military force? From the aforementioned discussion it is quite clear that the messages that are being sent by the public to the decision-making elite are not purely guided by questions of morality. Moreover, even when focusing on evangelicals alone, the members of this tradition do not seem to be overwhelmingly responsive to a presidential rhetoric that is skillfully crafted to resonate with the core beliefs of the tradition. Therefore, it is unlikely for the policy makers to be limited by public sentiments that are exclusively guided by questions of faith. Such a scenario has considerable potential to weaken Huntington’s (1993) prophecy about the clash of civilizations. At least, the American public appear to be unlikely to decide on issues of militarism with reference to their religious views only. They are likely to be guided by other factors as well, thereby making it difficult for militaristic conflicts to be justified along cultural fault lines alone.
Chapter 4: Faith and Attitudes on Internationalism

“For most of the last century, save-the-worlders were primarily Democrats and liberals. In contrast, many Republicans and religious conservatives denounced government aid programs, with Senator Jesse Helms calling them “money down a rat hole.” Over the last decade, however, that divide has dissolved, in ways that many Americans haven’t noticed or appreciated. Evangelicals have become the new internationalists, pushing successfully for new American programs against AIDS and malaria, and doing superb work on issues from human trafficking in India to mass rape in Congo.”


Overview

On reviewing the foreign policy accomplishments of President George W. Bush, some scholars (Burkhalter 2004; Huliaras 2006, 2008; Iverson 2007) were prompt to highlight the rising influence of evangelical Protestants in the area of foreign policy internationalism. In fact, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof (2002, 2010) went to the extent of describing the evangelicals as the “new internationalists” who emerged as unswerving proponents of international engagement with the dawn of the 21st century. However, not all scholars seem to agree with the “new internationalist” thesis. Scholars rejecting such a claim tend to argue that evangelicals have been steadfast supporters of foreign policy internationalism long before George W. Bush was sworn into power. The argument of those who do not consider evangelicals to be new to internationalism is probably best articulated in the writings of Kevin den Dulk (2007). According to den Dulk (2007, p. 215), “specific efforts on human rights are new to evangelicals, but to suggest more generally that evangelicals are “new” internationalists reveals a lack of historical perspective. If one uses a capacious definition of “internationalist” that includes most forms of deliberate engagement with foreign nations, evangelical internationalism has ebbed and flowed over time.”
In this chapter, I address this debate by examining whether support for internationalism among evangelicals was significantly different during the Bush administration as compared to that under his predecessors since the 1980s. In a related question, I also examine whether change in support for internationalism among evangelicals during the Bush administration was significantly different from that of their counterparts in other major religious traditions. This question helps to determine whether the evangelical support for internationalism during the Bush era was unique as compared to that of those affiliated to other religious traditions. My key contribution in this project lies in presenting a longitudinal account of the evolution of the causal relationship between religious identity and foreign policy internationalism across five different presidential administrations.

Scholars engaged in the aforementioned debate present excellent qualitative analyses of how evangelicals approach internationalism. This study distinguishes itself from previous studies by providing the first systematic quantitative account of the longitudinal change in attitudes toward internationalism for evangelicals as well as other religious traditions. In so doing, I am able to ascertain whether evangelical support for internationalism was unique to the Bush era, or if it has been a long-standing trend dating back to the politics of the Cold War years.

Before examining the two questions outlined above, I scrutinize the relationship between religious background and attitudes toward foreign policy internationalism. The literature on this issue area is rather interesting. For most foreign policy preferences, Page and Bouton (2006) make claims that are contrary to the conventional wisdom. However, when it comes to internationalism, the scholars seem to share an opinion that has much in common with the conventional wisdom. According to their theory of purposive belief systems, views on internationalism constitute an integral part of an individual’s basic attitudes such as party ID and ideology. Therefore, in case of internationalism it is possible for personal experience and demographics to have effects that are unmediated, and independent of political predispositions. Considering religious background forms an essential aspect of an individual’s personal experience, I examine whether religious affiliation,
beliefs, and behavior demonstrate any effect on internationalist attitudes that is independent of political predispositions. By doing so, I test whether religious factors can independently drive a distinct set of preferences in the area of internationalism.

I rely on the American National Election Studies (NES) cumulative datasets to examine the three major research questions outlined above. Following den Dulk (2007), I use the broadest possible definition of internationalism. Therefore, the use of the term internationalism in this chapter entails all deliberative engagements of the U.S. government with foreign countries across the world. After analyzing the data using the Karlson, Holm, and Breen method (2012), I find support for Page and Bouton’s (2006) thesis. Indeed, religious beliefs in the form of attitudes toward the Bible, and religious behavior in terms of worship attendance exhibit independent effects in shaping views on internationalism. Thereafter, I estimate logistic regression models on data stratified by religious traditions to examine whether evangelicals were significantly more internationalist during the Bush era as compared to that under his predecessors since the 1980s. The findings from this chapter, however, do not support the “new internationalist” label for evangelicals. This is evident from the fact that attitudes on internationalism among evangelicals during the Bush administration do not appear to be significantly different from that in the past. Finally, findings from the pooled regression model show that change in support for internationalism among evangelicals during the Bush era was not significantly different from the change among members of other religious traditions. Given the nature of the findings, it is possible to argue that evangelicals’ appreciation for internationalism was not newfound in the 21st century. On the contrary, the members of the community had been expressing their support for international engagement long before President George W. Bush was in the picture.

The rest of the chapter is divided into four major sections. In the next section, I provide a detailed review of the relevant literature. Here, I outline how my research questions fit in, and contribute to the existing body of scholarship. Thereafter, in the section on “data and methods,” I
describe data specific to this chapter and explain the methodological tools that I use to model my
data. In the results section, I present a discussion on my findings. In the concluding section of the
chapter, I reflect on how the findings relate to my research questions. Finally, I touch upon the
implications of the results obtained in this chapter for the broader scholarship on foreign policy
related public opinion.

**Previous Literature**

A good place to begin the discussion on the existing scholarship is by analyzing the existent
literature that deals with the effects of religious factors on attitude toward internationalism.
Arguments based on religious affiliation (den Dulk 2007; Guth 2009b; Wittkopf 1990) are critical in
explaining the role of faith in shaping attitudes toward international engagement. For instance,
Wittkopf (1990) found religious identity (i.e. affiliation to Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, and
other religious traditions) to be an important predictor of attitudes on the different facets of
international engagement, namely, the accommodationist approach, the internationalist approach, the
hardliner approach, and the isolationist approach. Using a more nuanced measure for religious
affiliation that divided Protestants into sub-categories such as evangelicals and mainliners, James
Guth (2009b) also argued that religious traditions were significantly different in terms of their
placement on Wittkopf’s classic categories of international engagement. In a slightly different study
dealing with the nature of elite cues within the evangelical community, den Dulk (2007) highlighted
the evangelical opinion leaders’ support for U.S. international engagement on the basis of religious
justifications. In this regard, he also described the important role played by firsthand experience from
missionaries in stimulating evangelical endorsement for U.S. engagement with the rest of the world.

Scholars (Amstutz 2014; den Dulk 2007) have also found religious beliefs to be important in
shaping attitudes toward foreign policy internationalism. For Amstutz (2014), support for
international engagement among evangelicals is largely grounded in their commitment toward
promoting the spiritual as well as the temporal well-being of people across the world. Such efforts,
he argued, are deeply driven by their faith in evangelism—the mission of spreading the good news of the gospel—and their belief in upholding the church’s redemptive mission by engaging with social ills at home and abroad. Den Dulk (2007), on the other hand, perceived evangelical beliefs—in the form of their distinct interpretation of morality—to be a critical “intellectual resource” in molding views on global engagement. Finally, religious behavior in the form of worship attendance and congregational conduct has also been analyzed to explain attitudes on internationalism. For instance, Wuthnow and Lewis (2008) have found rhetoric on global affairs at the congregational level to be particularly predictive of support for altruistic foreign policy goals across religious traditions.

Given the interesting implications of religious identity and religiosity, it is interesting to examine how the three different forms of religious influence interact with political predispositions in structuring public perceptions on internationalism. The work of Page and Bouton (2006) is interesting in this context. As mentioned earlier, Page and Bouton’s work is usually considered to be contrary to the basic thesis of the conventional wisdom, which makes a strong case for evangelical distinctiveness. Page and Bouton undermine it by suggesting that for most foreign policy issues, the effect of religious factors is rather mediated via political predispositions. However, these scholars seem to put forward a different line of argument when it comes to attitudes on internationalism. They argue that in the case of internationalism, personal experience and demographics tend to demonstrate independent effects because attitudes on internationalism constitute an important aspect of an individual’s basic attitudes. By making this argument they not only concur with the conventional wisdom, but also portray views on internationalism to be comparable with other basic attitudes such as party ID and ideology. In light of this interesting claim, I test Page and Bouton’s theory by examining whether some or all of the religious factors have any independent effect on attitudes toward internationalism when the latter is conceptualized in the broadest possible way to include all forms of U.S. global engagements. If the findings of this chapter support Page and Bouton’s (2006) thesis, at least some of the religious factors will remain statistically significant after controlling for
political predispositions. However, if there is no direct effect, all religious factors would lose statistical significance after controlling for party loyalty and ideology.

In the second part of the chapter, I focus on longitudinal changes in attitudes toward internationalism within the evangelical community. The literature on the evolution of evangelical views on internationalism is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, there are scholars (Burkhalter 2004; Huliaras 2006, 2008; Iverson 2007) who tend to associate evangelical support for internationalism specifically with the George W. Bush presidency. But such a claim is not immune to criticisms. In fact, many scholars (Amstutz 2014; den Dulk 2007; Clarke 2009) propose that the origins of evangelical appreciation for internationalism may be traced back to the crusade against godless communism during the Cold War years.

While reflecting on the nature and evolution of U.S. foreign policy under the leadership of President George W. Bush, some scholars (Burkhalter 2004; Huliaras 2006, 2008; Iverson 2007) and journalists (Bumiller 2003; Kristof 2010) have focused on the growing influence of evangelicals, especially in the area of internationalism. For instance, Burkhalter (2004) attributed the rising importance of assistance for fighting AIDS in President Bush’s foreign policy agenda to evangelical activism. In a similar vein, Iverson (2007) highlighted the dynamic role played by evangelicals in steering Bush’s foreign policy toward the crisis in Sudan. Huliaras (2006) argued that one of the critical factors that made Sudan a priority for the Bush administration as opposed to that of Clinton’s was the lobbying efforts of evangelical Christians in Washington D.C. In a different piece, Huliaras (2008) acknowledged the fact that evangelical lobbying succeeded with the Bush administration because it was especially inclined to accommodate the priorities of the religious group.

Some journalists (Bumiller 2003; Kristof 2010), have also expressed similar sentiments. On the basis of interviews with evangelical leaders, Bumiller (2003) described the Bush White House to be more conducive to evangelical lobbying in the area of human rights as compared to other Republican administrations under Reagan and George H. W. Bush. Writing in 2010, *New York Times*
columnist Nicholas Kristof went on to describe evangelicals as the new internationalists for their commendable contributions toward fighting AIDS, malaria, human trafficking, and sex-abuse in the developing world over the last decade. Kristof’s portrayal of the evangelicals as “new internationalists” is in tune with Allen Hertzke’s (2004, p. 13) account of evangelical human rights activism that “burst unexpectedly on to the international stage with the dawning of the twenty first century.”

In this context, it is interesting to review the arguments of scholars disagreeing with the portrayal of evangelicals as the new internationalists. Although Amstutz (2014) acknowledged the evangelicals’ steadfast opposition to communism during the Cold War, he traced the actual rise of evangelical engagement with foreign policy to the early nineteen nineties. According to Amstutz (2014, p.4), “Beginning in the post-Cold War era, Evangelicals have become more involved on a number of foreign concerns and have sought to influence foreign policy decision making. They have done so by emphasizing fundamental religious and moral values and by mobilizing specific public policy initiatives on issues like religious freedom and human rights.” In a similar vein, den Dulk (2007) pointed out that even though concerns for human rights maybe new to evangelicals, portraying them as the new internationalists reflects a dearth of historical perspective. He suggested that using a more capacious interpretation of internationalism that encompasses not just humanitarian assistance, but also other forms of global engagement would reveal that evangelical association with internationalism is by no means new. For den Dulk, evangelical engagement with American global affairs attained maturity during the Cold War days when leaders of the community justified their support for U.S. containment by denouncing atheistic communism. Focusing on the Cold War era, Clarke (2009) also argued that the election of Ronald Reagan explains the beginning of evangelical

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14 In an earlier piece Kristof (2002) did touch on the important role played by evangelicals during the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 under the Clinton administration.
engagement with U.S. foreign policy. Reagan, according to Clarke, was particularly successful in 
mobilizing the Christian Right against the godless politics of communism.

Given the divide in the literature regarding the specific time period during which the 
evangelicals began to actively embrace and support foreign policy internationalism, I examine 
longitudinal changes in attitudes toward internationalism among evangelicals across five different 
presidential administrations since the nineteen eighties. Keeping in mind the concerns raised by den 
Dulk (2007), I use the broadest possible conceptualization of internationalism to include all forms of 
deliberate foreign policy engagements by the United States.15 If the findings of this chapter support 
the “new internationalist” thesis, evangelicals will be significantly more supportive of foreign policy 
internationalism during the George W. Bush administration as compared to that under his 
predecessors. However, the chapter would support the critics of the thesis if the findings do not 
report significant and positive changes in attitudes toward internationalism among evangelicals 
during the Bush years as compared to previous administrations.

In the final section of the chapter, I examine whether change in attitudes toward 
internationalism for evangelicals during the Bush years was significantly different from their 
counterparts in other religious traditions. Green (2005) noted that in the period following the 
September 11 attacks, the entire “religious landscape” distanced itself from isolationism in favor of a 
more internationally engaged U.S. foreign policy. But, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, 
many of the scholars arguing along the lines of the new internationalist label for the evangelicals tend 
to assign a unique role to the Christian Right. Keeping this trend in mind, it is interesting to test 
whether the evangelicals were significantly different from other religious traditions during the Bush 
administration. The thesis for the unique role of the evangelicals will be supported if the findings of

15 It is important to remember that some of the literature reviewed in this paper covers the attitudes of the opinion 
leaders within the evangelical community. The emphasis of this paper, however, is on analyzing the attitudes of the 
evangelical public. Therefore, the tests performed later in the paper aim at capturing the support for internationalism 
among the rank and file.
the chapter demonstrate that change in attitudes among evangelicals was significantly different from that of other religious groups during the Bush era. The thesis, however, would fail to gain credence if change in attitudes among evangelicals is not significantly different than that among other religious traditions during the same period.

**Data and Methods**

I take advantage of the NES cumulative dataset to examine the role of religious belonging, believing, and behaving in shaping attitudes toward US international engagement since 1980. Bearing in mind den Dulk’s (2007) concerns regarding the problems associated with adopting a rather narrow definition of internationalism, I conceptualize attitudes toward international engagement (dependent variable), in the broadest way possible. Therefore, the dichotomous measure that I use to operationalize the response variable is based on the survey question that requires respondents to either agree or disagree with the statement, “this country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.” For analytical convenience, I code responses expressing sentiments against international engagement as 0, and those demonstrating support toward a more internationally engaged role for the United States as 1.

Similar to Chapter Two, the key explanatory variables that I use for this chapter are classified into measures of religious belonging, believing, and behaving respectively. Therefore, I operationalize religious affiliation by comparing attitudes on internationalism across seven major religious traditions—mainline Protestant, evangelical Protestant, black Protestant, Catholic, Jew, other religious traditions and the non-religious. I measure religious believing by analyzing attitudes on the authority of the Bible. Finally, I operationalize religious behavior by including a measure for the frequency of worship attendance. The control variables used in this chapter are also exactly similar to the ones used in Chapter Two. These controls include the respondents’ self-placement on the liberal-conservative scale, the party ID scale, gender, age, race, region of residence, income, and level of education. To control for the effects of different presidential administrations, I use a set of
five dummies for the five presidential administrations that I study during the period 1980 to 2008. These five dummies capture the last year of the Carter administration, the Reagan period, the George H. W. Bush period, the Clinton period, and the George W. Bush period. With the sole exception of the dependent variable, the coding scheme used for all variables in this chapter is exactly similar to the one utilized in Chapter Two. Therefore, details on the coding for the variables used in this chapter may be found in the Data and Methods section of the previous chapter.

I begin my data analysis by testing whether religious identity and religiosity have any independent effect on attitudes toward international engagement, or, whether the effect of such factors is mostly mediated via political predispositions. To that end, the analysis that I perform in this chapter is exactly similar to the steps followed in Chapter Two. Therefore, I begin with the restricted model which estimates the effects of the religious variables without controlling for the effects of political predispositions, demographics, and variation in time. As in the case of the previous chapter, I use mainline Protestant as the reference category for the affiliation measures. This model may be represented by the following equation:

\[ \text{Internationalism} = \alpha + \beta_a(\text{Tradition Dummies}) + \beta_b(\text{Scriptural Authority}) + \beta_c(\text{Worship Attendance}) \]

Thereafter, I run the unrestricted model with all the controls. This model estimates the effects of the religious variables after taking into account the effects of political predispositions, relevant demographics, and variation in time. In keeping with the previous chapter, I use the Reagan period as the reference category for the presidential administration dummies. This model may be represented by the following equation:

\[ \text{Internationalism} = \alpha + \beta_a(\text{Tradition Dummies}) + \beta_b(\text{Scriptural Authority}) + \beta_c(\text{Worship Attendance}) + \beta_d(\text{Ideology}) + \beta_e(\text{Party ID}) + \beta_f(\text{Demographics}) + \beta_g(\text{Period Dummies}) \]

As mentioned earlier, it is interesting to run the two models separately because it helps to detect change in the effects of the religious variables due to the addition of the controls. Hence, I also report the exact difference in coefficients for each religious measure across the two models. As in the case
of Chapter Two, I also obtain and report that part of the effect for each of the religious measures that is mediated by party ID and ideology respectively.

Thereafter, I test whether evangelicals were significantly more internationalist under Bush as compared to other presidents since 1980. I do so by stratifying the data into six religious traditions, and regressing support for internationalism using a logit estimator on the set of the presidential dummies, religiosity, political predispositions, and relevant demographics for each religious tradition. It is not possible to stratify the data for the Jewish tradition because of the unavailability of observations for the group during the Carter period. Hence, I combine the Jewish respondents with the dummy variable for other religious traditions. The model that is used to estimate change in internationalism within each religious tradition across the different administrations may be represented by the following equation:

\[
\text{Internationalism} = \alpha + \beta_a(\text{Scriptural Authority}) + \beta_b(\text{Worship Attendance}) + \beta_c(\text{Ideology}) + \\
\beta_d(\text{Party ID}) + \beta_e(\text{Demographics}) + \beta_f(\text{Period Dummies})
\]

Finally, I run a pooled logit model to test whether longitudinal change in support for internationalism, during each administration, for each group, was significantly different from that of the mainliners (reference group). This test helps to determine whether change in attitudes among evangelicals during the Bush administration was unique compared to the changes in attitudes among members of the other religious groups. This model may be represented by the following equation:

\[
\text{Internationalism} = \alpha + \beta_a(\text{Tradition Dummies}) + \beta_b(\text{Scriptural Authority}) + \beta_c(\text{Worship Attendance}) + \\
\beta_d(\text{Ideology}) + \beta_e(\text{Party ID}) + \beta_f(\text{Demographics}) + \beta_g(\text{Period Dummies}) + \beta_{ag}(\text{Tradition Dummies*Period Dummies})
\]

**Results**

The findings reported in the first column of Table 4.1. describe the effects of the religious variables without controlling for political predispositions, demographics, and the presidential administration dummies. The findings derived from this model show that religious identity (with the exception of Catholicism and other religious traditions), beliefs, and religious behavior are statistically significant predictors of attitudes toward internationalism. The coefficient for the
evangelical dummy suggests that evangelicals are significantly less likely than mainliners (reference category) to support an internationally engaged U.S. foreign policy. Black Protestants and those with no religious preference are also significantly less likely to support internationalism than the mainliners. The Jewish, on the other hand, are significantly more likely to support foreign policy internationalism as compared to the reference group. Moreover, religious behavior in the form of worship attendance is found to be a significant and positive predictor of support for internationalism. This implies that individuals attending worship services frequently are more likely to be favorably disposed toward an internationally engaged foreign policy as opposed to those reporting infrequent worship attendance. Religious belief in the form of Bible authority, however, is found to be a negative but significant predictor of internationalist attitudes. This suggests that belief in a very high authority of the Bible is most likely to work against support for foreign policy internationalism.

Table 4.1.: Comparing Effects of Religious Variables with and without Demographics & Political Predispositions on Internationalist Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Restricted Model (No Controls)</th>
<th>Full Model (With Controls)</th>
<th>Difference in Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelicals</td>
<td>-.12(.05)*</td>
<td>.03(.06)</td>
<td>-.15(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>-.54(.08)***</td>
<td>-.09(.07)</td>
<td>-.45(.11)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.14(.08)</td>
<td>-.03(.08)</td>
<td>-.11(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>.74(.24)***</td>
<td>.59(.24)*</td>
<td>.15(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-.02(.09)</td>
<td>-.01(.09)</td>
<td>-.01(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-.30(.06)***</td>
<td>-.17(.06)**</td>
<td>-.12(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scriptural Authority</td>
<td>-.62(.07)***</td>
<td>-.14(.05)***</td>
<td>-.48(.09)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>.59(.03)***</td>
<td>.35(.04)***</td>
<td>.23(.08)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19,039</td>
<td>19,039</td>
<td>19,039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Estimates of restricted model and full model obtained using “KHB” command on Stata. Difference in effects is also computed using the same command. Logit estimators. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Mainline Protestants are used as the baseline category for religious group dummies.

If the effects of the religious variables are purely independent and unaffected by the inclusion of the controls, their coefficients will remain unchanged in the full model that controls for the effects of party ID, ideology, demographics, and the presidential administrations. The full model is reported in the second column of Table 4.1. However, the findings reported in the second column of Table
show interesting differences from the estimates of the restricted model reported in column one. In the full model, most of the religious affiliation measures (other than the dummies for Jewish and those with no religious preference) fail to be statistically significant. In fact, the coefficient for the evangelical dummy is not only statistically insignificant, but also changes from being negative in the restricted model, to positive in the full model. The coefficients for religious belief and behavior, however, continue to report statistically significant coefficients in the full model with all the controls. The coefficient for the Scriptural authority measure remains significant and negative. This implies that beliefs in a high authority of the Bible continue to work against internationalism even after controlling for demographics, political factors, and variation in time. Worship attendance also continues to have a positive and statistically significant coefficient in the full model. This indicates that the even after controlling for other factors, frequent worship attendance works in favor of foreign policy internationalism. However, the size of the coefficients for belief and behavior are considerably reduced in size in the full model.

The overall findings from the full model seem to corroborate Page and Bouton’s (2006) thesis. Although most of the affiliation measures fail to remain statistically significant in the full model, measures for belief and behavior continue to demonstrate independent effects even after controlling for a wide variety of factors. This suggests that personal experience in the form of belief in the authority of the Scriptures, and behavior in terms of worship attendance can independently structure views on internationalism. The findings also support the conventional wisdom by showing that a certain form of religious belief and behavior are capable of independently driving a distinct set of preferences in the issue area of internationalism.

Finally, the last column of Table 4.1., reports the differences in coefficients, for each of the coefficients across the full and the restricted models respectively. Significant differences in effects open up the possibility for interesting mediated effects of the religious variables via political predispositions. However, prior to analyzing these mediated effects, it is important to review the
impacts of the control variables on views toward internationalism (Table 4.2). As far as political predispositions are concerned, only party loyalty is found to report a statistically significant but positive coefficient. This implies that Republicans were significantly more supportive of internationalism as compared to Democrats. This is rather surprising because previous literature (Wittkopf 1990) has portrayed Democrats to be significantly more internationalist in orientation than Republicans. As for the demographic controls, women are found to be significantly less internationalist than men. Both education and income are strongly significant and positive predictors of internationalist attitudes. These findings, however, corroborate the findings of Wittkopf (1990) regarding the role of demographics in shaping attitudes toward foreign policy internationalism.

Table 4.2: Effects of Demographics and Political Predispositions on Internationalist Attitudes from the Full Model (Table 4.1.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.01(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>.37(.12)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.17(.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.04(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>-.01(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Races</td>
<td>.05(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.61(.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.53(.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence in South</td>
<td>.02(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19,039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Demographics and political predisposition estimates from full model (Table 4.1.) using “KHB” method. Logit estimators. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Whites are used as baseline category for race dummies. Also obtained but not reported are coefficients for other presidential dummies. Reagan presidency years are used as the reference category for presidential dummies.

I report the mediated effects of religious affiliation and religiosity via political predispositions in Table 4.3. Specific effects of the different religious measures occurring via ideology are reported in the first column of Table 4.3. None of the religious measures seem to have any mediated effects on attitudes toward internationalism via ideology. This is not very surprising considering ideology in itself failed to be a significant predictor of such attitudes in the full model.
(see Table 4.1). The second column of Table 4.3, on the other hand, reports how much of the effects, for each religious variable is occurring indirectly via party ID. Unlike ideology, most religious measures have significant mediated effects via party ID. This is, again, not surprising because party ID was a significant predictor of attitudes toward internationalism in the full model. All the religious affiliation measures reported significant and negative indirect effects via party ID. For instance, the significant coefficient of the evangelical dummy suggests that -.01 of the total difference in coefficients (as reported in the last column of Table 4.1) is occurring indirectly via party ID. What this implies is that affiliation to the evangelical tradition makes people less Republican and therefore less supportive of internationalism in turn. The fact that evangelical identity makes people may be surprising at first glance. However, it is not totally impossible because the full model controls for the effects of Biblical authority and worship attendance. So what becomes apparent here is that in the absence of conservative beliefs and behavior, evangelical identity can actually work against Republican loyalty. This finding is similar to the trend identified in Chapter 3.

The worship attendance measure also reports significant and positive mediated effects via party ID. It shows that frequent worship attendance makes people more Republican, and therefore more supportive of internationalism, in turn. The Scriptural authority measure, however, does not report any significant mediated effect via party ID. So, even if the findings from the full model suggest that a certain form of belief and behavior can independently drive public opinion on internationalism, the findings from Table 4.3. make it clear that religious affiliation and behavior also have substantial mediated effects on such attitudes via party ID.
Table 4.3: Decomposing the Indirect Effects of the Religious Variables via Ideology and Party ID

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Party ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>.00 (.002)</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>-.001 (.01)</td>
<td>-.13 (.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.0003 (.002)</td>
<td>-.04 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-.001 (.01)</td>
<td>-.09 (.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-.001 (.01)</td>
<td>-.02 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-.001 (.04)</td>
<td>-.03 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scriptural Authority</td>
<td>.001 (.01)</td>
<td>-.005 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>.001 (.01)</td>
<td>.03 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19,039</td>
<td>19,039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Indirect effects of the religious variables via Ideology and Party ID obtained by using “KHB” command on Stata. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Also obtained, but not reported are the contributions of individual demographic controls to the difference reported in the fourth column of Table 4.1.

In the following section, I explore the second important question examined in this chapter by analyzing the longitudinal change in attitudes on internationalism among evangelicals across five presidential administrations since 1980. The purpose of scrutinizing this question is to test whether evangelicals were significantly more internationalist during the George W. Bush administration as compared to his predecessors since 1980. In Table 4.4., I present the stratified models examining longitudinal changes in attitudes toward internationalism within each religious tradition. As mentioned earlier, the Reagan period is used as the reference category in all the models. The second column of Table 4.4. represents the longitudinal change in attitudes on internationalism among evangelicals after controlling for the effects of Bible authority, church attendance, political predispositions, and relevant demographics. The findings from this model suggest that out of the various administrations studied in the chapter, the last year of the Carter administration was the only
time when evangelicals were significantly more supportive of internationalism than that during the Reagan years (reference category). Heightened emphasis on the containment strategy following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 can probably explain this trend. The coefficients for the George H. W. Bush dummy, the Clinton dummy, and the George W. Bush dummy, on the other hand, were all negative but not significant. This implies that during each of these three periods, evangelicals were less supportive of internationalism than that during the Reagan years, but the difference in attitude was not statistically significant. Given these findings, it is possible to argue that evangelicals were clearly not significantly more supportive of internationalism during the George W. Bush period as compared to the Reagan years. It follows, at least for those instances when internationalism is conceptualized in the broadest possible way to include all forms of deliberate engagements by the U.S. in the international arena, the findings from this model do not find any evidence in favor of the new internationalist label for evangelicals.

In this context, it is interesting to note that in the stratified model with evangelicals (column 2), belief in Scriptural authority was not a significant predictor of attitude toward internationalism. In fact, Biblical authority was a significant predictor only among mainliners. The effect of worship attendance, however, was both positive and highly significant. Stratified models for mainliners (column 1) and Catholics (column 3) also represent a positive and significant coefficient for worship attendance. This suggests that among the three major religious traditions in the United States, frequent worship attendance tends to work in favor of internationalism. Among evangelicals, party ID was a very strong and positive predictor of internationalist attitudes. The coefficient for party ID in the stratified model for Catholics was also positive and highly significant. However, in none of the other models did party ID report a significant effect on internationalist attitudes. Women among evangelicals were found to be less supportive of internationalism, and the same pattern is reflected in the models with mainliners and Catholics respectively. Within each religious tradition, educational attainment was a positive and strongly significant predictor of internationalist attitudes. Income also
played a similar role within each tradition with the sole exception of those with no religious preference.

Table 4.4: Stratified Models of Overtime Change in Attitudes toward Internationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Mainline</th>
<th>Evangelical</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Black Pr.</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>.79(.04)**</td>
<td>.36(.06)**</td>
<td>.71(.11)**</td>
<td>.91(.09)**</td>
<td>.83(.19)**</td>
<td>.28(.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush (Sr.)</td>
<td>.32(.05)**</td>
<td>-.02(.07)</td>
<td>-.12(.13)</td>
<td>.26(.10)**</td>
<td>-.27(.24)</td>
<td>.21(.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>.14(.16)</td>
<td>-.23(.15)</td>
<td>.17(.20)</td>
<td>.43(.15)**</td>
<td>-.01(.23)</td>
<td>.16(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
<td>.01(.26)</td>
<td>-.01(.17)</td>
<td>.11(.23)</td>
<td>.29(.13)*</td>
<td>-.26(.27)</td>
<td>.14(.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>.30(.17)</td>
<td>.41(.12)**</td>
<td>.41(.09)**</td>
<td>.25(.25)</td>
<td>-.09(.42)</td>
<td>.28(.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.33(.17)</td>
<td>.24(.15)</td>
<td>-.03(.22)</td>
<td>.12(.28)</td>
<td>-.28(.44)</td>
<td>-.53(.25)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Authority</td>
<td>-.34(.11)**</td>
<td>-.22(.17)</td>
<td>-.15(.15)</td>
<td>.47(.21)*</td>
<td>.29(.29)</td>
<td>-.17(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>.45(.09)**</td>
<td>.44(.10)**</td>
<td>.40(.10)**</td>
<td>-.14(.21)</td>
<td>.22(.30)</td>
<td>.49(.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.17(.07)*</td>
<td>-.27(.06)**</td>
<td>-.24(.10)*</td>
<td>.05(.09)</td>
<td>.07(.27)</td>
<td>-.10(.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.07(.26)</td>
<td>.08(.09)</td>
<td>-.34(.21)</td>
<td>-.31(.26)</td>
<td>-.15(.36)</td>
<td>.28(.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>.13(.21)</td>
<td>.01(.13)</td>
<td>.02(.20)</td>
<td>-.25(.60)</td>
<td>-.64(.33)</td>
<td>-.04(.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-.03(.17)</td>
<td>-.01(.12)</td>
<td>.06(.10)</td>
<td>-.43(.21)</td>
<td>-.18(.39)</td>
<td>.16(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.83(.22)**</td>
<td>.50(.10)**</td>
<td>.70(.15)**</td>
<td>.90(.16)**</td>
<td>.89(.39)*</td>
<td>.23(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.81(.18)**</td>
<td>1.75(.13)**</td>
<td>1.14(.16)**</td>
<td>.74(.24)**</td>
<td>1.58(.19)**</td>
<td>1.58(.18)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.02(.06)</td>
<td>.02(.07)</td>
<td>.10(.12)</td>
<td>-.13(.07)</td>
<td>-.15(.19)</td>
<td>-.05(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.58(.18)**</td>
<td>-.16(.22)</td>
<td>.03(.23)</td>
<td>-.21(.74)</td>
<td>.12(.38)</td>
<td>-.09(.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4820</td>
<td>4418</td>
<td>4714</td>
<td>1615</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>2447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Logit estimates, all tests two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses. Reagan years used as baseline category for presidential administrations.

Table 4.5 represents the pooled model with interactions between the religious tradition dummies and the presidential administration dummies while controlling for Bible authority, church attendance, political predispositions, and relevant demographics. This model tests the longitudinal
change in attitudes toward internationalism across different religious traditions. Mainline identity is used as reference category for the religious tradition dummies, and the Reagan years is used as the reference category for the presidential administration dummies. The second column of Table 4.5 includes the coefficients of the interactions between the evangelical dummy and the period dummies. The coefficients reported in this column test whether longitudinal change in attitudes toward internationalism, in each period, for the evangelicals was significantly different from that of the mainliners (reference category).

Table 4.5: Interactive Model of Overtime Change in Attitudes toward Internationalism across Different Religious Traditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Mainline</th>
<th>Evangelical</th>
<th>Black Pr</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>.79(.04)***</td>
<td>-.44(.03)***</td>
<td>-.07(.10)</td>
<td>.17(.06)**</td>
<td>.10(.19)</td>
<td>-.53(.09)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.24(.03)**</td>
<td>.05(.10)</td>
<td>-.16(.11)</td>
<td>.43(.19)*</td>
<td>-.14(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush Sr.</td>
<td>.32(.06)</td>
<td>-.35(.03)***</td>
<td>-.46(.10)***</td>
<td>-.46(.10)***</td>
<td>-.60(.24)*</td>
<td>-.15(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>.16(.16)</td>
<td>-.38(.05)***</td>
<td>-.01(.17)</td>
<td>.23(.11)*</td>
<td>-.21(.20)</td>
<td>-.04(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.</td>
<td>.05(.26)</td>
<td>-.02(.08)</td>
<td>.03(.13)</td>
<td>.11(.30)</td>
<td>-.33(.25)</td>
<td>.08(.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logit estimates, two-tailed tests. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. N=19,039. Also obtained but not reported are the coefficients of church attendance, Bible authority, and demographic and political controls. Reagan presidency is used as the reference category for presidential dummies. Mainline identity is used as reference category for religious tradition dummies.

The first cell in the second column of Table 4.5 compares the change in support for internationalism among evangelicals to the change in support for internationalism among the mainliners during the last one year of the Carter period. The significant coefficient for the last year of the Carter period suggests that the change in attitudes toward internationalism among evangelicals was significantly different from that of the baseline category of the mainliners. More precisely, change in attitudes among evangelicals was significantly less compared to the change among mainliners. The coefficients for the George H.W. Bush and the Clinton period are also similar in the sense that they suggest that change in attitudes among evangelicals during each of these two periods was significantly less from that of the mainliners. The same, however, cannot be said about the coefficient of the interactive term formed by multiplying the evangelical dummy and the George W. Bush dummy. This coefficient being non-significant suggests that change in support for
internationalism among evangelicals during the Bush era was not significantly different from that among the mainliners. In fact, like evangelicals, Catholics, black Protestants, members of other religious traditions, and the non-religious do not report any significant change in attitudes toward internationalism as compared to the mainliners during the Bush era. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the evangelicals were not unique in terms of change in their attitudes toward internationalism during the Bush era as compared to their counterparts in other religious traditions.

**Discussion**

One of the key goals of this chapter was to ascertain whether Page and Bouton’s (2006) claim regarding the structure of attitudes on internationalism was accurate. Page and Bouton argued that views on internationalism were distinct from other foreign policy-related attitudes because they constituted an integral aspect of an individual’s basic attitudes. Therefore, it was prone to be directly shaped by an individual’s personal experience including those that stem from religious experience.

The findings from this chapter support Page and Bouton’s claim. Indeed, belief in the authority of the Bible and behavior in the form of worship attendance do drive a distinct set of preferences. This finding also corroborates the conventional wisdom by showing that religious belief and behavior can independently drive a distinct set of preferences when it comes to internationalism. But what remains interesting about the findings is that affiliation to the major religious traditions does not seem to affect views on internationalism in a significant way. This finding has the potential to undermine the conventional wisdom by suggesting that religious identity as such is unlikely to determine attitudes in this issue area. The only exceptions to this trend are the Jewish and the non-religious. While affiliation to Judaism makes people significantly more supportive of internationalism, being non-religious tends to tilt people more toward isolationism. However, none of the major religious traditions including the much talked about case of evangelical Protestant identity seem to have any independent effect on such attitudes.
The distinctive finding for the Jewish tradition corroborates previous literature. In fact, the Jewish have been traditionally portrayed in the literature (see Free and Cantril 1968; Green 2005; Hero 1973; Hughes 1978; Witkopf 1990) as long-standing champions of internationalism. This literature argues that the Jewish have been supportive of internationalism not only because of their loyalty to Israel, but also because of their liberal attitudes, high socio-economic status, and urban lifestyle. The support for isolationism among the non-religious is also not unanticipated. For instance, Green (2005) found that the unaffiliated were the only religious tradition that were predominantly in favor of isolationism as compared to other groups.

Another interesting theme in the chapter was to examine the new internationalist label for the evangelicals. The main question underlying the theme was whether evangelicals’ support for foreign policy engagement was unique to the Bush administration years. The analysis presented in this chapter fails to provide evidence in support of this claim. On the contrary, the findings suggest that evangelicals were significantly more supportive of internationalism in the past. In fact, evangelicals seemed to be distinctively more internationalist during the last one year of the Carter administration. This finding adds strength to the scholarship (see den Dulk 2007) that suggests that the origins of evangelical internationalism may be dated back to the Cold War era politics against atheistic communism. In this context, it is equally interesting to note that during the Bush years, the evangelical approach to questions of internationalism was not very different from that of their counterparts in other religious traditions.

If there is not enough evidence supporting the uniqueness evangelicals, it is important to explore why they seemed to be different under the Bush White House. One possible explanation could be that the Bush administration was remarkably more responsive to evangelical activism. For instance, Hook (2008) found that the administration’s decision to establish the Millennium Challenge Corporation with the goal of eliminating world poverty was considerably influenced by evangelical lobbying efforts. Moreover, as den Dulk (2007) suggested it could also be the case that those who
talked about the new internationalist label linked it specifically with efforts of humanitarian assistance. This study, however, shows that the new internationalist label becomes inappropriate when internationalism is defined in the broadest possible way, and when the focus is shifted from evangelical activists to the evangelical laity. The findings from this chapter clearly demonstrate that the evangelical public’s support for internationalism is by no means peculiar to the first decade of the 21st century.

Finally, it is worth deliberating on the overall implications of this study in terms of the role of public opinion as a possible source of foreign policy decision making. The findings from this chapter indicate that public opinion on international engagement is to some extent motivated by religious factors such as belief in the authority of the Bible, and worship attendance. This implies that the attitudes of the traditionalists may be significantly different from that of their progressive and secular counterparts. But, at the same time, party ID and socio-economic status have a very strong impact on such attitudes. So when people are thinking about whether or not the United States should engage with the rest of the world, their views are not singularly motivated by their religious beliefs and behavior. Their views are structured by their party loyalty as well as other factors such as their income and educational attainment. Therefore, as in the case of defense-spending attitudes, it is unlikely that the foreign policy elites of this country will be constrained by popular sentiments that are purely motivated by religious factors.
Chapter 5: Faith and Attitudes toward Conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf

“The case for using force to bring about disarmament and regime change in Iraq was clearly and convincingly made for anyone who has eyes to see and ears to hear. Our choice is to pay less now and deal with this problem or we can pay a lot more later and deal with a nuclear-armed Saddam.”

---Southern Baptist Convention
February 5, 2003

“The recourse to war, according to our Christian tradition, is an admission of human failure. By such action, we admit our lack of commitment to use other means to resolve human conflict. It is a resounding ‘no’ to God’s eternal ‘yes’ to humanity.”

---United Church of Christ
February 22, 2003

“To permit preemptive or preventive uses of military force to overthrow threatening or hostile regimes would create deeply troubling moral and legal precedents. Based on the facts that are known, it is difficult to justify resort to war against Iraq.”

---United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
February 26, 2003

Overview

Of all the international conflicts that have occurred in the recent past, the Iraq War was probably most critical in terms of polarizing the religious elite of this country. While most evangelical church leaders extended their full support to the Bush administration’s decision of preemptive action, mainline and Catholic worship leaders expressed their disapproval in no uncertain terms (Rock 2011). Such a divisive atmosphere encouraged several scholars (see Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008; Froese and Mencken 2009; Guth 2009a; Smidt 2005; Yankelovich 2005) to scrutinize the role of religious background in driving public support for the war. These scholars contributed to the conventional wisdom by suggesting that religious experience was instrumental in driving a distinct set of attitudes toward the war. They expected religious background to be powerful
enough to independently structure views on the war, without the mediation of political predispositions. This line of argument definitely runs contrary to Page and Botuton’s (2006) claim regarding religious factors having a limited effect on foreign policy preferences. As mentioned earlier, these scholars argue that such factors matter only to the extent that they shape political predispositions, which in turn condition attitudes on foreign policy issues.

In this chapter, I seek to explore the scholarly debate by examining whether religious influence in the forms of religious belonging, believing, and behaving had any effect on attitudes toward the Iraq War that was independent of political predispositions. Thereafter, I examine the same question with regard to the Afghanistan War and the Persian Gulf War. The rationale behind this exercise is to scrutinize the applicability of the conventional wisdom in explaining support for the Iraq War, and then to compare the role of faith in this war with the two other wars that are relatively understudied in the literature. It is interesting to compare the findings from the Iraq War with the Afghanistan War because both were conceived as key components of the broader War on Terror. The Persian Gulf War is also interesting because public support for the war has been linked to religious motivations in the past (Jelen 1994).

This chapter contributes to the existing scholarship along two interesting lines. First, using a fresh empirical technique, it distinguishes the independent effects of the religious factors from effects that are mediated by political predispositions. In so doing, it exposes the different avenues through which religious background may affect views on the three conflicts. By capturing the scope of mediated effects for the first time in the context of the three conflicts, the study sheds light on the subtle ways in which religious background may shape public attitudes. Thereafter, in comparing the three conflicts, the study is also able to ascertain whether the nature of religious influence is uniform, or variable across the different cases.

I use the American National Election Studies (NES) datasets to examine the role of religion in shaping war-related attitudes. More specifically, I derive data for my analyses of the Iraq War and
the Afghanistan War from the NES 2004 Time Series Study. As far as the Persian Gulf War is concerned, I rely on the NES 1991 Pilot Study dataset to examine the effects of religious variables in determining public opinion toward the war. In order to model the data I take advantage of the Karlson, Holm and Breen (2012) technique. This method allows me to disaggregate the total effects for the religious variables into independent and mediated effects.

The findings from this chapter fail to provide any evidence in support of the conventional wisdom. In fact, for all the three cases, religious identity and religiosity cease to demonstrate any effect that is independent of political predispositions. However, the findings do capture some interesting mediated effects for the religious variables. The nature of the mediated effects also seems to be somewhat distinctive in case of the Iraq War. On the whole, the findings from this chapter suggest that the effect of religious factors on war-related attitudes is more complicated than what is suggested by the simple logic of the conventional wisdom.

The rest of the chapter is divided into four major sections. The following section includes a detailed review of the relevant literature. In the data and methods section, I provide a description of my data and describe the methodological tools that I use to analyze the data. In the results section, I discuss the major findings of this chapter. To conclude, I reflect on how the overall findings relate to the research questions explored in the study.

**Previous Literature**

Much of the existing scholarship (Baumgartner, Francia, Morris 2005; Cimino 2005; Lugo 2007; Marsden 2008; Rock 2011; Smidt 2006) on the role of faith in shaping popular support for the Iraq War makes a strong case in favor of evangelical distinctiveness. According to Rock (2011), evangelical Protestants were more likely than Roman Catholics or mainline Protestants to support the war in Iraq because of two key factors. The first reason is directly related to their core value of “evangelism.” This value entails a profound commitment toward spreading the message of Christ by attracting new followers to the faith. In Rock’s opinion, evangelicals were fervent supporters of the
war because they saw in it a great opportunity to convert Muslim Iraqis to Christianity. In fact, Kyle Frisk, executive administrator of the National Association of Evangelicals went on to declare that “Iraq will become the center for spreading the gospel of Jesus Christ to Iran, Libya, throughout the Middle East.” (Duhigg 2004)

The other important factor that Rock highlighted was evangelical attitudes toward Islam. He argued that unlike mainliners and Catholics, evangelicals harbor a deep-seated feeling of dislike toward Islam. This is largely due to the fact that evangelical leaders have repeatedly rejected the claim that Muslims and Christians worship the same God, thereby instilling a sense of cultural “otherness.” According to Cimino (2005), the post 9/11 period witnessed the emergence of a remarkably stronger rhetoric against Islam from the evangelical leadership. He described this rhetoric as one that portrays Islam as an essentially violent faith, and draws sharper demarcations between the religion of the Muslims and that of the Christians. Such an attitude toward Islam argued Rock, was instrumental in encouraging evangelicals to support the war in Iraq.

It is well documented in the literature that in addition to promoting evangelism and anti-Islam sentiments, evangelical leaders were particularly proactive about expressing their direct support for the Iraq War. According to Marsden (2008), prominent figures within the evangelical tradition such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson strongly advocated theological justifications for the war. This is in stark contrast with Catholic and mainline protestant leaders who consistently expressed their disapproval for the war (Smidt 2005). Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2005) contend that such cues from the elite leadership had a profound impact on how the evangelical laity evaluated the decision to go to war in Iraq. In fact, Lugo’s (2007) study demonstrated that 60 percent of the evangelicals continued to support the war in Iraq in October 2006 when the support for it had sharply declined among the overall population.

Various scholars (Durham 2004; Froese and Mencken 2005; Gilpin 2005; Glazier 2012; Guth 2009; Jelen 1994; Kirkemo 2011) have also found religious beliefs to be important in shaping war-
related attitudes. For instance, Guth (2009a) found theological traditionalism to be a significant and positive predictor of support for the Bush Doctrine. This pattern is in tune with Jelen’s (1994) seminal study of the Persian Gulf War. Jelen found that Protestants endorsing Biblical literalism and reporting born-again status were more likely to support traditionalist foreign policy approaches involving the use of force. In fact, believing in a rigid interpretation of the Bible (see Gilpin 2005; Kirkemo 2001) has been widely studied to investigate the religious motivations for supporting the war in Iraq. Durham (2004) argued that belief in the Biblical prophecy regarding the second coming of Christ was critical in creating support for the war. Among the believers, support for the war was strengthened by the fact that Saddam Hussein was trying to rebuild the historic city of Babylon, which is also the professed site for the rise of the anti-Christ.

In this regard, it is worthwhile to take account of the scholarship that draws interesting parallels between the end of times theology and the neo-conservative philosophy that constituted the bedrock for the decision to invade Iraq. For example, Urban (2006) identified a close affinity between the neo-conservative ideal of a “new American century” and the eschatological belief in apocalypse culminating in the new millennium. Here it is important to note that Urban associated such beliefs particularly with the evangelical community. In yet another article, Urban (2007) argued that President Bush’s foreign policy discourse advocating the war in Iraq was skillfully coded to appeal simultaneously to the millennial beliefs of the Christian Right and to the neo-conservative ideal of American benevolent hegemony. In a similar vein, Bacevich and Prodromu (2004) stated that after 9/11, President George Bush’s religious beliefs neatly concurred with the worldview of the neo-conservatives.

The final component of religious influence, as studied in this project is religious behavior. Some scholars (Brown, Brown, and Blasé n.d.; Yankelovich 2005) have studied the role of religious behavior in shaping war-related attitudes. For instance, Yankelovich’s (2004) survey analysis suggested that frequent worship attendees had greater confidence about the prospects of success in
the Iraq War as opposed to others. Moreover, those who attended religious service regularly were less likely to be concerned about casualties and other war-related costs. On a slightly different note, Brown, Brown, and Blasé (n.d.) argued that socio-political discussions among the laity within worship spaces play a critical role in determining war-related attitudes.

The arguments made by the aforementioned scholars add strength to the conventional wisdom thesis. However, as mentioned earlier, the conventional wisdom is not beyond criticism. Arguments suggesting that the effects of religious influence on foreign policy preferences are mostly mediated by political predispositions (see Page and Bouton 2006) definitely undermine the credibility of the divine divide thesis. In light of this divide in the literature, I seek to revisit the debate by scrutinizing whether religious variables play an independent role in shaping support for the Iraq War after controlling for the contamination effects of party identification and ideology. If the findings of this chapter support the claims made by the advocates of the conventional wisdom, at least some of the religious variables will remain statistically significant after controlling for party loyalty and ideology. On the other hand, the conventional wisdom would be considerably weakened if religious factors cease to remain statistically significant after controlling for political predispositions, and only demonstrate significant mediated effects via ideology and party ID.

The other interesting trend in the literature is that although several scholars have studied the role of faith in shaping support for the war in Iraq, there has been hardly any systematic quantitative study exploring the religious sources of attitudes toward the Afghanistan War. Having identified this pattern, I try to contribute to the overall scholarship by investigating the religious sources of attitudes toward the Afghanistan War, and then compare those findings with the findings from the first case of the Iraq War. Such a comparison is useful to ascertain whether the pattern of religious influence was similar across the two key conflicts that defined the War on Terror.

Finally, I study the role of religious factors in shaping support for the Persian Gulf War. With the sole exception of Jelen’s (1994) research, this war is also somewhat understudied in the
literature. I distinguish the present study from the previous study by utilizing a more nuanced measure for religious affiliations. While Jelen compared war-related attitudes between Catholics and evangelicals alone, I add nuance to the analysis by comparing attitudes across seven major religious traditions. Such an analysis helps to formulate a more complete and detailed picture of differences in attitudes across the various religious traditions. Moreover, I also add to the previous study by using a novel statistical technique to disaggregate the independent effects of the religious variables from effects that are mediated by political predispositions. Such an approach enables me to identify the various routes along which religious influence shaped support for the Persian Gulf War. It is interesting to compare the role of religious background in the Persian Gulf War with the two other wars because it shows whether the pattern of religious motivations underlying public sentiments toward this war was any different from the two other wars that took place in the post 9/11 period.

**Data and Methods**

I rely on the NES 2004 Time Series Study dataset to examine the role of faith in determining support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. I operationalize the dependent variable measuring support for the Iraq War by using the survey question that asks respondents whether they thought the war was worth the cost. This is a binary variable where responses considering the Iraq War as worth the cost are coded as 1, and those considering the war as not worth the cost are coded as 0. Similarly, I operationalize the dependent variable measuring support for the Afghanistan War by using the survey question that asks respondents whether they thought the war in Afghanistan was worth the cost. This is also a dichotomous variable where all responses describing the war in Afghanistan as worth the cost are coded as 1, and all responses describing the war as not worth the cost are coded as 0.

Like the two previous empirical chapters, the key independent variables for the two wars are categorized into three categories—measures of religious belonging, believing, and behaving respectively. With the exception of the believing measure, belonging and behaving are
operationalized in the exact similar way as in the cases of Chapter Two and Chapter Three. Thus, affiliation is operationalized by comparing attitudes across seven major religious traditions, and behavior is operationalized by using the worship attendance measure. The coding scheme used for the variables is exactly similar to the approach described in the data and methods section of Chapter Two.

Unlike the cumulative dataset used in the previous chapters, the NES 2004 Time Series Study measures attitudes toward the authority of the Bible by using the literalism measure alone. Therefore, for the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars, religious belief is operationalized using the literalism measure. The original variable was coded to range from 1 through 3 (1= “The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word”; 2= “The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word”; and 3= “The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God”). I recoded the variable to range from 0 (“The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God”) to 1 (“The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word”).

Similar to the independent variables, I use the same set of political and demographic controls as used in the previous chapters. Hence the controls used for attitudes on Iraq and Afghanistan include measures of ideological placement, partisanship, gender, age, race, income, education, and place of residence. The variables are coded using the same scheme described in Chapter Two. However, income and education are coded in a slightly different fashion because of differences in response categories across the datasets. As a result, the original seven categories for the education variable are folded and recoded to range from 0=8th grade or less to 1=advanced degree. In case of income, the original twenty three categories are folded to range from 0=none or less than $2,999 to 1=$120,000 and over. I use the NES weighting variable V040101 to address issues of oversampling.

In order to study the role of faith in determining support for the Persian Gulf War, I take advantage of the NES 1991 Pilot Study dataset. This pilot study was part of a larger panel study
conducted during the years 1990, 1991, and 1992. The dependent variable measuring support for the Persian Gulf War is operationalized using the survey question that asked respondents – “do you think we did the right thing in sending U.S. military forces to the Persian Gulf or should we have stayed out?” I code the responses to this question to range from 0 (should have stayed out) through 1 (did the right thing).\(^{16}\)

I use the same independent variables that I use for the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars in my analysis of the Persian Gulf War. However, unlike the Biblical literalism measure used for the two other wars, I operationalize religious believing in this case by combining responses to questions on literalism and inerrancy for the Persian Gulf. This composite measure for the attitude toward the authority of the Bible is coded by using the same approach followed in Chapter Two. In my analysis of the Persian Gulf War, I use the same set of political and demographic control variables that I use for the other two wars. In order to maintain consistency in terms of coding, controls used for the Persian Gulf War are coded in the same way as those for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

I begin my analysis with the examination of the religious sources of support for the Iraq War. I rely on the Karlson Holm and Breen (KHB) method to disaggregate the total effects of the religious variables into independent effects and mediated effects (via political predispositions).\(^{17}\) I use the “khb” command in Stata to regress the variable measuring whether the Iraq War was worth the cost on the religious tradition measures, the Bible authority measure, and the worship attendance measure while controlling for political predispositions, and relevant demographics. This method allows me to compare the effects of the religious variables between the restricted model (without controls) and the full model (with controls). The restricted model without controls may be represented by the following equation:

---

\(^{16}\) It was not possible to use the question on whether the war was worth the cost for the Persian Gulf War because the NES 1991 Pilot Survey data set does not include that question.

\(^{17}\) I use single-imputation techniques to deal with cases of non-response on all my independent and control variables.
\[ \text{Iraq Attitudes} = \alpha + \beta_a(\text{Tradition Dummies}) + \beta_b(\text{Scriptural Authority}) + \beta_c(\text{Worship Attendance}) \]

This model helps to assess the effects of the religious variables without the interference of the controls. Thereafter, I compare the findings from this model with the full model, or the model with all the controls. The full model may be represented by the following equation:

\[ \text{Iraq Attitudes} = \alpha + \beta_a(\text{Tradition Dummies}) + \beta_b(\text{Scriptural Authority}) + \beta_c(\text{Worship Attendance}) + \beta_d(\text{Ideology}) + \beta_e(\text{Party ID}) + \beta_f(\text{Demographics}) \]

I also report the difference in coefficient estimates between the restricted and full models, which captures how much of the effect for each religious measure is confounded by the addition of all the controls in the full model. I use the “disentangle” option while running the “khs” command to examine how much of the difference in coefficients, between the two models, for each of the religious measures, is attributable to individual control variables. I use the same methodological strategy to study the direct and indirect effects of the religious variables in determining support for the Afghanistan War. Finally, I use identical steps to analyze the role of faith in shaping attitudes toward the Persian Gulf War. Like the previous chapters, I use mainline tradition as the reference categories for the group dummies.

**Results**

The findings reported in Table 5.1 assess the role religious factors in shaping support for the Iraq War. The first column of Table 5.1 (restricted model) reports the coefficients of the religious measures in the absence of political and demographic controls. The findings derived from the restricted model show that evangelical identity, affiliation to black Protestant churches, and belief in Biblical literalism are statistically significant predictors of attitudes toward the Iraq War. The coefficient for the evangelical dummy indicates that evangelical Protestants were significantly more likely than mainliners (reference category) to support the war in Iraq. Here, it is interesting to note that the evangelical Protestant dummy is the only affiliation measure in the restricted model that has a positive and significant coefficient. The coefficient of the dummy variable for black Protestants is
statistically significant but negative. This indicates that black Protestants were significantly less likely than mainline Protestants to support the war. As far as religious belief is concerned, the measure for belief in Biblical literalism is both positive and significant. This denotes that those endorsing a literalist interpretation of the Bible were more likely to support the decision of going to War in Iraq than others. Finally, the measure for religious behavior in the form of worship attendance is positive but not significant, implying attitudes toward the war were not substantially different across different levels of worship attendance. The findings from the restricted model seem to support the conventional wisdom as evangelical identity is found to drive support in favor of the war. Moreover, the significant coefficient for the Bible authority measure also favors the conventional wisdom by showing that support for the war can be driven by a particular set of religious beliefs.

### Table 5.1.: Direct Effects of the 3BS on Whether the Iraq War Was Worth the Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Restricted Model (Without Controls)</th>
<th>Full Model (With Controls)</th>
<th>Difference in Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelicals</td>
<td>.52 (.24)*</td>
<td>.29 (.25)</td>
<td>.23 (.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>-1.19 (.39)**</td>
<td>.37 (.55)</td>
<td>-1.56 (.71)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>.07 (.24)</td>
<td>.44 (.24)</td>
<td>-.37 (.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-1.16 (.66)</td>
<td>.91 (.65)</td>
<td>-1.07 (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-.14 (.48)</td>
<td>.38 (.48)</td>
<td>-.52 (.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>.35 (.29)</td>
<td>.67 (.30)*</td>
<td>-.33 (.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>.38 (.23)</td>
<td>.25 (.24)</td>
<td>.14 (.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Authority</td>
<td>1.00 (.30)**</td>
<td>.50 (.33)</td>
<td>.50 (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; ### p<.001. Estimates of restricted model and full model obtained using “KHB” command on Stata. Difference in effects is also computed using the same command. Logit estimators. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Mainline Protestants are used as the baseline category for religious group dummies.
The findings from the full model, with all the controls, are reported in the second column of Table 5.1. These findings, however, fail to provide any support for the conventional wisdom. In the full model, none of the religious affiliation measures, with the sole of exception of the dummy for the non-religious, is statistically significant. The evangelical Protestant dummy is not only statistically insignificant, but also reports a coefficient that is substantially smaller in size. As for the black Protestant dummy, the direction of the coefficient changes from negative in the restricted model to positive in the full model. The coefficient for this measure in the full model is also not significant. Similarly, the measure for belief in Biblical literalism fails to be statistically significant in the full model.\(^\text{18}\) In fact, the inclusion of political and demographic controls reduces the size of the coefficient to half of what is reported in the restricted model.

The coefficient for the non-religious dummy is rather interesting. Although this measure is not statistically significant in the restricted model, it does report a significant and positive coefficient in the full model. In fact, the affiliation measure for the non-religious becomes statistically significant only when the control for Party ID is added to the model. The pattern described above suggests that this is most likely a case of suppression effect, were Party ID is the suppressor variable. Hence, while the dummy for the non-religious has a much smaller and non-significant coefficient in the restricted model, the coefficient almost doubles and becomes statistically significant once Party ID is specifically controlled for.

On the whole, the findings from the full model do not render any support to the conventional wisdom. This is evident from the fact that none of the religious measures demonstrate any independent effect after political and demographic controls are introduced to the model. Here, it is important to note that the case of the non-religious dummy cannot be used to support the conventional wisdom, either. It does not provide credence to the thesis because the statistically

\(^{18}\) Here, it is interesting to note that the Bible Authority measure remains statistically significant in the un-weighted version of the same model.
significant coefficient of this measure is due to suppression effect, where the variable is significant only in the presence of a control for Party ID, which acts as a suppressor variable.

Finally, the last column in Table 5.1. reports the difference in coefficient estimates, for each of the religious variables, across the full and restricted models respectively. The reported difference captures the extent to which the effect of individual religious variables is altered by all the control variables. This column shows that the difference in effect for black Protestants is statistically significant. Significant differences suggest that the effects attributable to black Protestant identity are substantially changed by the controls introduced in the full model. The lack of statistical significance for the rest of the religious measures, on the other hand, opens up the possibility for these variables to be orthogonal with regard to all the controls introduced in the full model.

Table 5.2.: Coefficients of Demographics and Political Controls from Full Model on the Iraq War (Table 5.1.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>1.15(.49)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>4.09(.32)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.08(.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.30(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>-.20(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Races</td>
<td>.24(.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.61(.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.27(.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.44(.20)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1.149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Demographics and political predisposition estimates from full model (Table 1) using “KHB” method. Logit estimators. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Whites are used as baseline category for race dummies.

In Table 5.2., I report the coefficients of the political and demographic controls from the full model. Ideology, party ID, and residence in South report positive and statistically significant coefficients. In fact, moving from an extremely liberal to an extremely conservative position on the ideology scale increases the probability of supporting the war in Iraq by .20. Moreover, moving from a strong Democratic position to a strong Republican identity increases the likelihood of supporting
the war by .68. Finally, if a person resides in the South, the probability for that individual to support the war is .09 greater as compared to those residing elsewhere. This suggests that political predispositions and residence in South play a critical role in determining war-related attitudes. Gender, age, race, education, and income, however, do not have any significant effect on attitudes toward the war.

**Table 5.3.: Indirect Effects of the 3Bs via Party ID and Ideology on Whether the Iraq War Was Worth the Cost.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Party ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>-.01(.02)</td>
<td>.14(.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>-.13(.06)*</td>
<td>-1.48(.19)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.08(.04)</td>
<td>.30(.14)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-.12(.07)</td>
<td>-.93(.31)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-.12(.06)</td>
<td>-.39(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-.06(.04)</td>
<td>-.28(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>.09(.04)*</td>
<td>.14(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Authority</td>
<td>.14(.06)*</td>
<td>.20(.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N               | 1,149     | 1,149     |

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Indirect effects of the religious variables via Ideology and Party ID obtained by using “KHB” command on Stata. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Also obtained, but not reported are the contributions of individual demographic controls to the difference reported in the fourth column of Table 5.1.

In Table 5.3., I report how much of the difference in estimates reported in the last column of Table 5.1., for each of the three religious measures, is attributable to individual confounding effects of ideology and party loyalty respectively. The first column of Table 5.3. specifically reports how much of the effects, for each religious measure, is occurring indirectly via ideology. For instance, if I look at the indirect effects for the black Protestant dummy, it is possible to argue that -.13 of the total -1.56 difference in coefficients (as reported in the last column of Table 5.1.) for this particular variable, as compared to the mainliners, is occurring indirectly via ideology. This implies that even though there is no direct connection between black Protestant identity and support for Iraq War, this
religious identity makes people less conservative, and therefore less supportive of the war, in turn. In this context, it is interesting to note that black Protestant identity is the only affiliation measure that has a statistically significant indirect effect via ideology. Even evangelical identity, which was highly significant in the restricted model, does not seem to have significant mediated effects via ideology. The measures for worship attendance and Biblical literalism, however, report positive and statistically significant indirect effects via ideology. In fact, .09 of the total .14 difference in coefficients reported for the worship attendance measure is occurring indirectly via ideology. Similarly, .14 of the total .50 difference in coefficients reported for the Biblical literalism measure is occurring indirectly via ideology. This suggests that both frequent worship attendance and faith in Biblical literalism make people more conservative, and as a result more supportive of the war in Iraq, in turn. This pattern of mediated effects for the belief and behavior measures suggest that the effect of religious factors in determining support for the war is way more complex than the simple thesis of the conventional wisdom.

The second column in Table 5.3. specifically reports how much of the effects, for each religious measure, is occurring indirectly via party ID. Results from this column suggest that the belief and behavior measures do not have any statistically significant indirect effect on Iraq War attitudes via party ID. Three religious affiliation measures (i.e. black Protestants, Catholics, and the Jewish), on the other hand, report statistically significant indirect effects. For instance, as far as black Protestants are concerned, -1.48 of the total -1.56 difference in coefficients (reported in the final column of Table 4.1.) is occurring indirectly via party ID. In case of the Catholics, -.30 of the total -.37 difference in coefficients is occurring via party ID. Finally, for the Jewish, -.93 of the total -1.07 difference is occurring via party ID. Therefore, for all the three affiliation measures, religious identity makes people less Republican, and therefore less supportive of the war, in turn.

On the whole, the findings from the models examining the influence of faith on Iraq War related attitudes seem to support the arguments of Page and Bouton (2006). This is evident from the
fact that while some of the religious measures report significant mediated effects, none of them seem to have substantial independent effects in the full model. As mentioned earlier, the significant coefficient for the non-religious cannot be used to support the conventional because it represents a case of suppression effects. In the following paragraphs, I present findings from regression models studying the influence of religious variables in shaping attitudes toward the wars in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf respectively.

**Table 5.4.: Direct Effects of the 3Bs on Whether the Afghanistan War Was Worth the Cost.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Restricted Mode (Without Controls)</th>
<th>Full Model (With Controls)</th>
<th>Difference in Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>.12(.25)</td>
<td>.15(.25)</td>
<td>-.03(.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>-.1.61(.32)**</td>
<td>.18(.45)</td>
<td>-1.79(.57)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.03(.25)</td>
<td>.32(.26)</td>
<td>-.35(.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>.96(.60)</td>
<td>1.17(.61)</td>
<td>-.21(.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-1.15(.45)*</td>
<td>-.65(.45)</td>
<td>-.49(.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-.52(.30)</td>
<td>-.14(.30)</td>
<td>-.38(.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>.30(.25)</td>
<td>.19(.26)</td>
<td>.11(.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Authority</td>
<td>-.18(.28)</td>
<td>.19(.31)</td>
<td>-.37(.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>1,159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Estimates of restricted model and full model obtained using “KHB” command on Stata. Difference in effects is also computed using the same command. Logit estimators. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Mainline Protestants are used as the baseline category for religious group dummies.

I use findings from Table 5.4 to test whether religious factors had a direct effect in shaping attitudes toward the war in Afghanistan. Findings from the restricted model (without any controls) are reported in the first column of Table 5.4. The results reported in this column suggest that the dummy variables for black Protestants and other religious traditions had statistically significant effects on attitudes toward the war. In fact, both black Protestants and members of other religious
traditions were significantly less likely to support the war in Afghanistan as compared to the reference category of mainliners. The measures for both belief (in the form of a literal interpretation of the Bible) and behavior (in the form of worship attendance) were non-significant in this model.

Findings from the full model (with all the controls), on the other hand, are reported in the second column of Table 5.4. None of the religious variables report statistically significant coefficients in this model. The final column on Table 5.4. presents difference in coefficients for each variable across the full and restricted models. The black Protestant dummy is the only religious measure reporting a statistically significant difference in estimates across the two models. This suggests that the effect of black Protestant identity are significantly confounded by the introduction of political and demographic controls in the full model. The overall findings reported in Table 5.4. do not support the conventional wisdom thesis as none of the religious measures seem to be statistically significant in the full model. However, statistically significant difference in estimates for the black Protestant dummy certainly raises the possibility of interesting mediated via political predispositions.

**Table 5.5.: Coefficients of Demographic and Political Controls from Full Mode on the Afghanistan War (Table 5.5.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.28(.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>2.43(.31)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-1.06(.18)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.44(.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>-1.04(.36)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Races</td>
<td>-.43(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.79(.37)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.76(.35)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.36(.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Demographics and political predisposition estimates from full model (Table 5.5.) using “KHB” method. Logit estimators. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Whites are used as baseline category for race dummies.

Before going into a detailed analysis of indirect effects, it is worthwhile to review how the control variables performed in the full model. The coefficients for the political and demographic
controls used in the full model are reported in Table 5.5. Findings presented in this table suggest that party loyalty, gender, African American identity, education, and income are statistically significant predictors of attitudes toward the Afghanistan War. Here, it is important to note that the coefficient for ideology is not significant implying that ideological orientation did not substantially matter in shaping attitudes toward the war. Party ID, on the other hand, was a strong and positive predictor of Afghanistan War-related attitudes. Females were significantly less likely than males to support the war. Moreover, African Americans were significantly less likely than Whites to do the same. Both income and education reported positive and statistically significant coefficients in the full model.

Table 5.6: Indirect Effects of the 3Bs via Party ID & Ideology on Whether the Afghanistan War was Worth the Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Party ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>.002(.01)</td>
<td>.06(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>.03(.05)</td>
<td>-.89(.14)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>.02(.04)</td>
<td>-.20(.09)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>.03(.05)</td>
<td>-.54(.19)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>.03(.05)</td>
<td>-.28(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>.02(.03)</td>
<td>-.19(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>-.02(.04)</td>
<td>.10(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Authority</td>
<td>-.03(.06)</td>
<td>.11(.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 1,159 1,159

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Indirect effects of the religious variables via Ideology and Party ID obtained by using “KHB” command on Stata. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Also obtained, but not reported are the contributions of individual demographic controls to the difference reported in the fourth column of Table 5.4.

I use findings from Table 5.6. to analyze how much of the effects for each of the religious measures is occurring indirectly via political predispositions. The first column reports indirect effects via ideology. Considering the ideology variable failed to report a statistically significant coefficient in the full model, it is not surprising that none of the religious measures reported significant mediated effects via ideology. However, the second column that reports indirect effects via Party ID presents some statistically significant coefficients. In fact, dummy variables for black Protestants, Catholics, and the Jewish report statistically significant and negative mediated effects via Party ID. This is a
pattern similar to the one observed in case of the Iraq war. The coefficients for worship attendance and Biblical literalism, however, do not report significant indirect effects via party ID.

**Table 5.7.: Direct Effects of the 3Bs on Support for the Persian Gulf War.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Restricted Model (Without Controls)</th>
<th>Full Model (With Controls)</th>
<th>Difference in Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>.11(.15)</td>
<td>.13(.16)</td>
<td>-.01(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>-1.53(.21)**</td>
<td>.11(.30)</td>
<td>-1.64(.32)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.20(.14)</td>
<td>-.05(.14)</td>
<td>-.14(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-.56(.38)</td>
<td>-.55(.38)</td>
<td>-.02(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-.45(.39)</td>
<td>-.26(.39)</td>
<td>-.18(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-.31(.18)</td>
<td>-.27(.18)</td>
<td>-.04(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>.05(.14)</td>
<td>-.04(.15)</td>
<td>.10(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Authority</td>
<td>-.27(.09)**</td>
<td>.03(.10)</td>
<td>.24(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td>1,848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Estimates of restricted model and full model obtained using “KHB” command on Stata. Difference in effects is also computed using the same command. Ordered logit estimators. Standard errors in parentheses. Mainline Protestants are used as the baseline category for religious group dummies.

Finally, I rely on the findings from Table 5.7. to examine whether religious factors had a direct effect in shaping attitudes toward the Persian Gulf War. The first column of Table 5.7. reports findings from the restricted model (without controls). The results from the restricted model suggest that affiliation to black Protestant churches and opinion on the authority of the Bible were significant predictors of attitudes toward the war. The direction of the coefficient for the black Protestant dummy indicates that black Protestants were significantly less likely than mainliners to support the use of military force in the Persian Gulf War. However, those who upheld a high authority of the Bible were significantly less likely to support the war as compared to those who did not. The pattern derived from the restricted model changes substantially when I consider findings from the full model.
(Table 5.7., second column). This is evident from the fact that none of the religious measures seem to have a significant coefficient in the full model. Moreover, the coefficient of the black Protestant dummy changes from negative and significant in the restricted model, to positive and non-significant in the full model. The difference in estimates across the full and restricted models is reported in the last column of Table 5.7. As with the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the black Protestant dummy is the only religious measure reporting a statistically significant difference across the two models.

**Table 5.8.: Coefficients of the Demographic and Political Controls from the Full Model on the Persian Gulf War (Table 5.7.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.26(.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>.94(.17)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.61(.11)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.39(.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>-1.35(.23)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Races</td>
<td>-.07(.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.77(.23)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.71(.22)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>.24(.12)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Demographics and political predisposition estimates from full model (Table 5.7.) using “KHB” method. Ordered logit estimators. Standard errors in parentheses. Whites are used as baseline category for race dummies.

The results presented in Table 5.7. seem to contradict the conventional wisdom thesis as none of the religious measures is statistically significant in the full model. However, before exploring the indirect effects of the religious measures it is useful to review how the political and demographic controls performed in the full model. The coefficients of the controls are reported in Table 5.8. The findings presented on Table 5.8. suggest that party ID, gender, African American identity, education, income, and residence in South are significant predictors of attitudes toward the war. As in the case of the Afghanistan War, the ideology variable does not have a statistically significant effect in this model. Although party ID, income, and education report a positive coefficients, gender and African
American identity are negatively associated with support for the use of military force in the Persian Gulf War.

Finally, results reported in Table 5.9. test whether religious measures had indirect effects via political predispositions in determining support for the use of military force in the Persian Gulf War. The mediated effects via ideology are reported in the first column of Table 5.9. As the ideology measure was not significant in the full model (see Table 5.8.), it is not surprising that none of the religious measures demonstrated significant indirect effects via ideology. The second column on Table 5.9., however, reports some significant indirect effects via party ID. In fact, similar to the Afghanistan and the Iraq Wars, dummy variables for black Protestants, Catholics, and the Jewish have significant negative mediated effects via party ID. The coefficients for the behavior and belief measures, on the other hand, fail to demonstrate any significant indirect effects via party ID.

**Table 5.9.: Indirect Effects of the 3Bs via Party ID & Ideology in Determining Support for the Persian Gulf War.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Party ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>.01(.01)</td>
<td>-.02(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>-.02(.02)</td>
<td>-.30(.06)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.01(.01)</td>
<td>-.09(.03)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-.01(.02)</td>
<td>-.21(.06)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-.02(.03)</td>
<td>-.01(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-.01(.01)</td>
<td>-.04(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>.01(.01)</td>
<td>.04(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Authority</td>
<td>-.01(.01)</td>
<td>.01(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td>1,848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Indirect effects of the religious variables via Ideology and Party ID obtained by using “KHB” command on Stata. Standard errors in parentheses. Also obtained, but not reported are the contributions of individual demographic controls to the difference reported in the fourth column of Table 5.7.

The findings for the three separate wars do not suggest identical trends. However, it is possible to argue that, on the whole, the results for all the three cases seem to undermine the conventional wisdom. This is evident from the fact that none of the religious measures in any of the cases reported a significant effect after controlling for political predisposition and demographics. In
the following section, I provide a more detailed discussion of how the trends identified for the Afghanistan War and the Persian Gulf War compare with the pattern associated with the War in Iraq.

**Discussion**

The main goal of this chapter was to explore whether the conventional wisdom is applicable to the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf respectively. If the conventional wisdom was valid, at least certain aspects of religious influence would have affected attitudes on the three conflicts without the mediation of basic attitudes such as party ID and ideology. However, the findings from the chapter show that such is not the case. Religious background in terms affiliation, beliefs, and behavior fail to independently structure war-related public opinion in all three cases. Even though religious factors do not report significant independent effects, they do matter via political predispositions. Therefore, in general, it is possible to argue that the conventional wisdom does not apply to any of the cases under review. The way in which religious factors shape war-related public opinion is more complicated than the simple reasoning of the divine divide thesis. This is not to say that religious background does not matter all. Religious factors are definitely relevant, but only to the extent that they shape political predispositions, which in turn, drive war-related attitudes.

The three cases studied in the chapter seem to present some broad similarities. In all the three cases, the different modes of religious influence do not report any independent effects. Party identification, on the other hand, acts as a significant and positive predictor of attitudes across the three conflicts. Republicans are found to be consistently more supportive of the conflicts as compared to Democrats and Independents. This is not unusual because the three conflicts took place under Republican administrations. Another striking similarity among the three cases is that for each one, Catholic, Jewish, and black Protestant identity have a significant but negative mediated effect via party ID. This implies that Catholics, Jewish, and the black Protestants were not disapproving of the wars *just* because of their religious identity. They were disapproving because their religious
identity made them less Republican, which in turn, made them less likely to support the war. Considering this pattern of influence is relevant for all three cases, it clearly dilutes the credibility of the conventional wisdom by showing that religious identity in itself is not predictive of war-related views. Religious identity becomes meaningful only when considered along with the effects on party loyalty. Moreover, it also suggests that the Jewish, the Catholics, and the black Protestants consistently tilt away from the Republican side when it comes to the three wars studied in the project.

In spite of the general similarities, there are some interesting findings for the Iraq War, which set it apart from the other two conflicts. A remarkable aspect of the conflict in Iraq is that it is the only case where war-related attitudes are substantially driven by ideological considerations. Indeed, politically conservative individuals are found to be significantly more supportive of the war as compared to moderates and liberals. But, why is ideology a significant predictor of views on the Iraq War alone? The most likely explanation for this may be found in the ways in which the conflicts were conceived. While the Persian Gulf War and the Afghanistan War were responses to actual attacks, the Iraq War was advocated and justified by the neo-conservatives on grounds of preemptive action (Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis 2003). As a result, it is possible to argue that ideology became particularly important for the public to evaluate whether attacking Iraq was acceptable and necessary.

Perhaps more important for the immediate purposes of this chapter is the second set of differences, which is reflected in terms of the significant indirect and positive effects of the belief and behavior measures via ideology. These coefficients show that frequent worship attendance and beliefs in Biblical literalism make people significantly more conservative. Because these aspects of religious influence make people more conservative, they show greater support for the Iraq War. So, even though there is no direct connection between religiosity and war-related public opinion, religiosity continues to matter via ideology. The unique role of belief and behavior in this case is not surprising. Some scholars (see Bacevic and Prodremu 2004; Urban 2006, 2007) have already discussed how the close affinity between the neo-conservative goal of American benevolent
hegemony and the Christian Right’s belief in end of times theology had been skillfully utilized to justify the war. Considering frequent worship attendees are more receptive to internal as well as external religious cues (see Green 2010) it is quite self-explanatory that religious behavior operationalized in terms of worship attendance was a positive (albeit indirect) predictor of support for the Iraq War.

Another distinct finding from the Iraq War is the significant and negative mediated effect of black Protestant identity via ideology. For all three conflicts, black Protestant identity made people less Republican, and therefore less supportive of war, in turn. But, in case of the Iraq War, black Protestant identity also made people less conservative, and hence less approving of the conflict. This is an interesting finding because it shows that the effect of black Protestant identity on political predispositions significantly structured public opinion against the Iraq War.

These findings have interesting implications for the role of public opinion as a key source of foreign policy decision making. The findings discussed above clearly show that the American people were not divided along lines of religious identity and religiosity while expressing their views on the three conflicts. So, the polarization that was apparent among the religious elite in the case of the Iraq War was not replicated among the masses for either of the conflicts. Moreover, the views of the religious traditionalists believing in a high authority of the Bible and reporting frequent worship attendance were not significantly different from their progressive counterparts. On the contrary, party loyalty seemed to be the most prominent cleavage for all the conflicts. This pattern was at least true in the initial phases of the conflicts because the data used in the study captured attitudes during the early stages of the wars. These finding add strength to Page and Bouton’s (2006) thesis by establishing the primacy of a basic attitude in driving a distinct set of war-related attitudes. The fact that the influence of religious measures were limited to mediated effects via party ID, and sometimes ideology, also add to the credibility of their theory.
Considering political predispositions—especially party ID—outperformed religious measures in all three cases, it is clear that public views on the wars were not overtly motivated by questions of faith. In the three cases under review, the people of the United States did not signal any desire for a policy that would be motivated by questions of moral propriety alone. Therefore, as far as public opinion is concerned, it is difficult to analyze the three conflicts along the lines of Huntington’s (1993) theory of the clash of civilizations. Huntington predicted that in the post-Cold War era, political differences would be completely replaced by cultural ones. The findings from this chapter make it amply clear that the people of America did not structure their views on the three conflicts along religious lines. Their views were predominantly driven by party loyalty instead. Hence, Huntington’s prophecy about the withering away of political differences seems to be a far cry from the ground realities shaping public sentiments. The structure of public opinion identified in this chapter is also less worrisome than the possibility of a clash of civilizations. The findings presented in this chapter suggest that the common people of the country do not approach international conflicts from a religious perspective, which might further antagonize fundamentalist groups that perceive Christianity and the Western way of life as a threat to their own culture. However, this should not be interpreted to suggest that questions of faith and morality did not matter for the religious activists in the United States. Instead, the findings should be used to highlight the fact that when it comes to international conflicts, the viewpoints of the religious opinion leaders may not always overlap with that of the laity.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Overview

In democratic societies, public opinion is considered to have a constraining effect on foreign policy decision making. Thus, the analysis of public opinion sheds light on a key domestic source of foreign policy formulation. In this project, my principal aim was to examine the effects of religious background on foreign policy attitudes. In so doing, I sought to test the conventional wisdom, or the so called divine divide thesis. According to the proponents of the conventional wisdom, religious background—especially evangelical identity—is instrumental in driving a distinct set of foreign policy preferences. The origins of this belief may be traced back to media coverage as well as scholarly contributions by foreign policy analysts (please refer to Chapter Two for a detailed discussion on the popular and the academic sources of the conventional wisdom).

In spite of the popularity of the conventional wisdom, it is possible to identify an interesting body of literature that tends to undermine its claims. For instance, some scholars (see Page and Bouton 2006) argue that religious background in itself is not powerful enough to structure foreign policy preferences. Religious experience matters only to the extent that it shapes political predispositions, which in turn drive public opinion. Therefore, according to this theory, being evangelical does not necessarily make one a champion of the Iraq War. Being evangelical makes one more conservative, and more Republican, and therefore more supportive of the war, in turn. Yet others argue (for e.g., Putnam and Campbell 2010) that the effect of religiosity and religious identity is usually more prominent for issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage. Beyond that, the effect religion on public sentiments is somewhat limited. This line of argument weakens the credibility of the
conventional wisdom as foreign policy issues fall outside the scope of the discourse revolving around the hot-button culture war issues of abortion and gay marriage.

In light of this disagreement in the existing literature, I sought to analyze the effect of religious identity and religiosity on public sentiments concerning three distinct yet related aspects of U.S. foreign policy. These three issue areas include militarism, internationalism, and views on the Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf Wars respectively. I tested the conventional wisdom by analyzing three questions for each of the three areas. First, I analyzed whether religious affiliation, belief, and behavior had any effect on such attitudes at all. Second, I tested if these factors had any effect that was independent of political predispositions. Finally, I explored whether the effects of the religious factors were mediated by party ID or ideology. If the conventional wisdom is correct, at least one of the aspects of religious influence would independently structure attitudes after taking account the effects of political and demographic controls. On the other hand, if the conventional wisdom is irrelevant to the three cases, the influence of religious belonging, believing and behaving would be confined to mediated effects via political predispositions. In a related question, I also examined whether the influence of evangelical identity was unique under the leadership of President George W. Bush for views toward militant assertiveness and internationalism. This question tested the contentious claim regarding Bush having developed an exclusive and unprecedented rapport with his religious constituency in the area of foreign policy decision making. If indeed this claim is valid, the effect of evangelical identity would be distinct under Bush as compared to that under his predecessors since 1980. Moreover, evangelical attitudes under Bush would also be significantly different from the attitudes of members in other religious traditions.

On the basis of a rigorous statistical analysis of American National Election Studies datasets since 1980, I argue that religion does play an interesting role in structuring foreign policy preferences. However, the ways in which religion matters is much more complex than what is suggested by the advocates on the conventional wisdom. While religious affiliation in itself is hardly
relevant, belief in the form of attitudes toward the authority of the Scriptures and behavior in the form of worship attendance seem to matter in a more prominent way. Moreover, religious factors also exhibit interesting mediated effects on foreign policy preferences via political predispositions. Finally, George Bush’s evangelical approach to leadership does not seem to have a unique impact on the foreign policy preferences of the Christian Right.

In the following paragraphs I discuss the ways in which my overall findings are consistent with the conventional wisdom, and the ways in which they are not so. Thereafter, I discuss the key implications of the findings for the structure of foreign policy public opinion, and its effects on the process of policy making. Finally, I discuss how the findings presented in the project open up interesting avenues of future research.

**Revisiting the Conventional Wisdom**

In Table 6.1., I compare the independent effects of religious belonging, believing, and behaving across the three distinct issue areas. This table helps to conveniently identify the instances where the findings corroborate the conventional wisdom, and the cases where they fail to do so. The crux of the conventional wisdom lies in establishing evangelical distinctiveness with regard to foreign policy public opinion. In this project, evangelical identity does lead to distinctive attitudes when it comes to militarism. In fact, in a comparison of the seven religious traditions, evangelicals are the only group that are significantly more supportive of militarism. This is, indeed, in tune with the core logic of the conventional wisdom. Scholars advocating evangelical distinctiveness (see Rock 2011, p. 57) have suggested that evangelicals seem to be particularly favorable toward militarism because within the tradition, members are encouraged to approach international conflicts as a “cosmic battle between the forces of good (God and the United States) and evil.” However, for all other issues, evangelical identity does not seem to affect public sentiments in a substantial way. What is most interesting is that evangelical identity does not seem to have any independent effect even for the Iraq War, which has attracted so much attention from the advocates of the divine divide thesis.
Bearing in mind the major findings across the three empirical chapters, it is possible to argue that evangelical identity per se does not always lead to a distinct set of foreign policy preferences. Moreover, evangelical distinctiveness in the case of militarism appears to be more of an exception than a general rule.

**Table 6.1.: Comparing the Independent Effects of Religious Belonging, Believing, and Behaving across Three Chapters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Militarism</th>
<th>Internationalism</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Persian Gulf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Pr.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Authority</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17,927</td>
<td>19,039</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>1,848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.S. = Not significant; + = Positive and significant; - = Negative and significant.

But, does the conventional wisdom apply to other religious traditions? In other words, does religious belonging, in general, lead to distinct preferences? The findings do not seem to provide adequate evidence to suggest that such might be the case. Affiliation to black Protestantism or Catholicism do not independently contribute to a specific set of preferences in either of the three cases. Jewish identity also does not matter independently except for the case of internationalism. Similarly, belonging to the eclectic group of religious traditions also does not matter except for the case of militarism. Having no religious tradition, however, has independent effects for both internationalism and militarism. In fact, not belonging to any religious tradition makes people significantly less supportive of both militarism and internationalism. Therefore, the only group measure that seems to remotely echo the logic of the conventional wisdom is that of the non-religious. The significant effect of not belonging to any religious tradition for the Iraq War, however, has to be discounted because it was a case of suppression effects as opposed to an instance of independent effect. So, in light of the above discussion, it is safe to suggest religious identity in itself
does not necessarily lead to a distinct set of preferences. In this context, it is important to remember that in this project, the effects of identity were assessed after controlling for religious beliefs and behavior. The effect of identity could have been more pronounced had it been studied without including controls for religiosity. For instance, not controlling for beliefs and behavior could have made evangelicals appear distinctive because members of this tradition subscribe to more traditional beliefs and behavior. But, not accounting for belief and behavior would have created a misconception regarding the distinctive effects of identity, when in reality such effects are attributable to the level of religiosity.

Table 6.2.: Comparing the Mediated Effects of Religious Belonging, Believing, and Behaving across the Three Chapters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Militarism</th>
<th>Internationalism</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Persian Gulf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>+I/-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Pr.</td>
<td>-I/-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>-I/-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-I/-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>-I/-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-I/-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>-I/-P</td>
<td>-P</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bible Authority</td>
<td>+I</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>+I</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worship Attendance</td>
<td>+I/+P</td>
<td>+P</td>
<td>+I</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17,927</td>
<td>19,039</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>1,848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.S. = Not significant; +I = Positive and significant mediated effect via ideology; -I = Negative and significant mediated effect via ideology; +P = Negative and significant mediated effect via party ID; -P = Negative and significant mediated effect via party ID.

However, this should not be interpreted to suggest that religious belonging does not matter at all. Table 6.2. compares the mediated effects of the religious variables across the three different issue areas. From the findings reported in this table, it is quite clear that all affiliation measures have significant mediated effects via political predispositions for the first two cases. The mediated effects are somewhat limited when it comes to the three conflicts though. Only three religious traditions—black Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish—report negative mediated effects for the three wars. Other measures of affiliation including evangelical identity do not seem to have any mediated effects via party ID and ideology on the three conflicts. On the whole, the mediated effects discussed above
establish that the impact of religious identity on foreign policy preferences is not as direct and simple as described by the conventional wisdom. In fact, the findings seem to be more supportive of Page and Bouton’s (2006) argument, which states that the effect of religious factors on foreign policy preferences is best captured through mediated effects via basic attitudes such as party ID and ideology.

What is really interesting about the three conflicts is that black Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish identity consistently report negative mediated effects via party ID. This implies that for each of the three wars, affiliation to the three religious traditions mentioned above makes people less Republican, and thus less supportive of war, in turn. Moreover, for the Iraq War, black Protestant identity reports a negative mediated effect via ideology. So, for this tradition, religious identity also makes people less conservative, and therefore less supportive of war, in turn. These findings regarding the black Protestant tradition are interesting because they highlight how affiliation can have a consistent—albeit mediated—effect in driving public sentiments against war. Much of the conventional wisdom concerns with how religious identity—especially evangelical Protestantism—makes people more favorable toward wars. This finding adds nuance to that body of literature by showing that affiliation to black Protestantism can indeed consistently sway people away from supporting wars. This effect may not be independent of political predispositions, but is definitely indicative of a pattern that is instrumental in turning people against decisions of war.

In this project, effects of religious belief and behavior have also been studied as a part of the conventional wisdom. It is appropriate to include such modes of influence within the ambit of the conventional wisdom because they also work as religious motivations underlying foreign policy preferences. Therefore, the conventional wisdom will be validated if religious belief and behavior independently structured a distinct set of viewpoints. Religious belief in the form of attitudes toward the authority of the Bible reported significant independent effects for both militarism and internationalism. As a result, beliefs in a higher authority of the Bible were instrumental in driving a
distinct set of preferences for these two issue areas. In case of the former, beliefs in a higher authority of the Bible made people significantly more supportive of militant assertiveness. This finding is in tune with previous literature (Barker, Hurwitz, Nelson 2008; Jelen 1994) suggesting that an inerrant interpretation of the Bible—especially dispensationalist beliefs in the end of times theology—is associated with greater support for militarism. For internationalism, on the other hand, beliefs in a high authority of the Bible made people significantly less supportive of internationalism. This suggests that people with traditional beliefs seem to be less supportive of international engagement as compared to their progressive counterparts. A possible explanation for this trend may be found in the traditionalists’ commitment to “separatism” (Amstutz 2014, p.34), which states that “authentic faith requires separation from the world in order to fulfil the mandates of biblical religion.”

Thus, in case of both militarism and internationalism, this particular form of belief in the authority of the Scriptures has an independent impact on public opinion. At least for these two attitudes, religious beliefs seems to function in a way that is similar to the logic of the conventional wisdom. However, religious belief does not matter at all for the three conflicts, making it slightly difficult to validate the conventional wisdom as a general trend. Considering beliefs have independent effects for some issues and not for many others, it is important to highlight that the effects of views on the Biblical authority tend to be varied and issue specific. Although such beliefs tend to matter more than identity, they do not necessarily act independently on all occasions.

Religious behavior, measured in terms of the frequency of worship attendance, reported some interesting effects as well. Similar to religious believing, behavior had significant independent effects on militarism and internationalism. These significant independent effects support the conventional wisdom because the findings suggest that at least for the first two issue areas, variation in the level of worship attendance is causally linked with the structure of foreign policy preferences. What is probably more interesting is the way worship attendance shapes views on militarism. The conventional wisdom usually links frequent worship attendance with greater support for militarism.
(see Yanekelovich 2005). However, the findings from this project discredit that theory by showing that frequent attendance in itself does not necessarily lead to greater support for militarism. In fact, when the effects of conservative beliefs are purged from that of worship attendance, the latter actually works against militarism. This is a noteworthy finding as it adds a subtle nuance to the popular belief regarding the effect of church attendance on militaristic attitudes. The effect of religious behavior on views toward internationalism is, however, positive. This suggests that frequent worship attendance makes people more supportive of internationalism. This, again, highlights that in the absence of traditionalist beliefs, worship attendance actually works in favor of greater international engagement. The conventional wisdom finds little support when it comes to views on the three conflicts though. As shown in Table 6.1., religious behavior does not seem to matter independently for any of the three wars studied in the project. Thus, as with religious belief, behavior also fails to uphold the conventional wisdom on all occasions. Its effect seems to vary from one case to the other, and it is not always as direct as suggested by the conventional wisdom.

In addition to the independent effects discussed above, belief and behavior seem to report some interesting effects that are mediated by political predispositions. As shown in Table 6.2., the belief measure has significant mediated effects for both militarism and attitudes on the Iraq War. It is interesting to point out that the mediated effects of this measure are specifically via ideology. So, in either case, belief in a higher authority of the Bible makes people more politically conservative, and therefore more supportive of militarism and the Iraq War, in turn. Another noteworthy finding is that although belief reports independent effects for views on internationalism, it does not have any mediated effect on this attitude. Moreover, religious belief has no effect—neither independent, nor mediated—for attitudes toward the conflicts in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.

The worship attendance measure also has some important mediated effects. Unlike religious beliefs, it reports mediated effects both via ideology and party ID. For internationalism and militarism, worship attendance reports positive mediated effects via party ID. This implies that
frequent worship attendance makes people more Republican, and therefore more supportive of the two attitudes. For militarism and the Iraq War, worship attendance reports mediated effects via ideology as well. This means that frequent worship attendance makes people more politically conservative, and hence more supportive of both militarism and the war in Iraq. Similar to religious beliefs, worship attendance fails to have any impact on the conflicts in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf respectively. These mediated effects for both belief and behavior suggest that the effect of religiosity on foreign policy attitudes may not always as direct as suggested by the advocates of the conventional wisdom. In order to get the complete picture, it is important to look into the mediated effects that make the relationship between religion and foreign policy preferences more intricate.

The fact that none of the measures of religious influence seem to matter independently in the case of the three conflicts is worthy of some discussion. On the one hand, the lack of religious motivations in shaping public opinion makes war-related attitudes rather distinct from the two other areas studied in the project. At the same time, such a finding directly challenges the conventional wisdom by showing that the influence of religious factors on war-related attitudes is limited to mediated effects, as suggested by the detractors of the divine divide thesis. But why might the attitudes for the three wars be so different from the two others? One possible explanation may be found in the way the three attitudes were conceptualized in the project. While the first two were defined as broad orientations similar to Wittkopf’s (1990) classic typology of generic foreign policy attitudes, the latter represented responses to specific international developments. Given the findings from this project, it is possible to suggest that the effects of religious factors do not seem to be very obvious when it comes to attitudes on specific cases.

Another important aspect of the project was to analyze whether George W. Bush’s faith based leadership had any distinct impact on the foreign policy preferences of the evangelicals. This question was explored by looking at the longitudinal variations in attitudes toward militarism and internationalism across different presidential administrations since 1980. In either case, evangelicals
did not seem to hold distinct attitudes under George Bush as compared to that under his predecessors. This pattern indicates that the evangelical laity is not particularly responsive to a discourse that is carefully coded to resonate with their religious convictions. Consequently, it limits the ability of the chief executive to garner support for foreign policy actions on the basis of religious justifications from the evangelical people. This is not to suggest that such a rhetoric has no impact on evangelical activists. But, the findings make it quite clear that it is of little significance when it comes to the rank-and-file.

The discussion of the findings from this project should not be interpreted as a crusade against the credibility of the conventional wisdom in its entirety. This study does not by any means indicate that religious background is inconsequential in the formulation of foreign policy-related attitudes. On the contrary, it sheds light on both the obvious mechanisms of religious influence, and the not-so-obvious ones that take place via political predispositions. In that way, it shows that the impact of religion on foreign policy attitudes is rather nuanced, and in order to grasp the intricacy of the relationship it is important to look into the various layers of religious influence that determine public opinion on such issues. By so doing, the study cautions against the propensity to draw unqualified conclusions based on the conventional wisdom.

**Implications & Agenda for Future Research**

The findings discussed above have interesting implications for the structure of foreign policy public opinion, and its implications on the policy making process at large. The above discussion suggests that in certain cases, religious factors can indeed shape attitudes independently. But when religion matters independent of political predispositions, the effects of belief and behavior seem to be more powerful than that of religious identity. This suggests that public sentiments are not necessarily divided along the lines of religious affiliation. So, on many occasions the preferences of the evangelicals may not necessarily be different from that of mainliners, or Catholics. On the contrary, it is more likely for the views of the religious traditionalists to differ substantially from that of the
progressives and the seculars. Hence, the views of those believing in an inerrant interpretation of the Bible seem to be significantly different from that of those who approach the Scriptures from a more liberal standpoint. And, this trend is valid regardless of variations in religious affiliation. In that case, it is possible to argue that the divide between religious traditionalists and the progressives has a greater impact on foreign policy preferences than the “old religion gap” (Green 2010), or the conventional divide based on religious affiliation.

Such a pattern is somewhat similar to the culture war alliances described by Hunter (1991). Hunter argued that affiliation based alliances were being steadily replaced by new ones that were characterized by divides between the orthodox and the progressives. Thus, traditionalists within the same religious tradition were holding views that were contrary to their progressive counterparts. Similarly, the prominence of belief and behavior over affiliation with regard to foreign policy preferences suggests that when religious matters independently, clashes over such issues are more likely to take place between traditionalists and progressives within the same tradition, as opposed to between members of different traditions. As Hunter had suggested, traditionalists across religious traditions may clash with progressives on foreign policy issues across religious traditions. 19

However, one has to apply a great deal of caution while applying the Hunter analogy to the structure of foreign policy preferences. For Hunter, the most crucial cleavage structuring American public discourse was the one between the religious orthodox and the progressives. Differences over morality appeared to be the central force driving public opinion. But this dissertation does not find religion to be the predominant source of influence in shaping foreign policy preferences. Although religious background plays a significant role on some occasions, the trend is by no means universal. For instance, the fact that religious identity and religiosity do not independently affect views on war-

19 This should not be interpreted to mean that the old religion gap has disappeared completely. On the contrary, the analysis suggests that when it comes to foreign policy preferences, the differences based on believing and behaving seem to be relatively more prominent.
related attitudes dilutes the strength of the conventional wisdom. Moreover, even when it matters
independent of political predispositions (as in the cases of militarism and internationalism), it does
not necessarily outperform the impact of other important factors including political predispositions
and demographics. In fact, as discussed in the previous section, the impact of political
predispositions—especially party loyalty—is significantly more consistent across the different issue
areas. That party ID plays such an important role for all the three cases studied in the project adds
strength to Page and Bouton’s (2006) claims. Socio-economic status in the form of income and
education also play an important role. Therefore, difference along religious lines is not the only
factor driving foreign policy public opinion in the United States. So, when the people of this country
think about such issues their reactions are not primarily driven by religious concerns. Political
commitments, and demographic factors also play a key role in structuring such attitudes. Thus,
instead of religion being the chief divisive force, the structure of American public opinion on foreign
policy issues seems to be characterized by a range of cross-cutting cleavages.

Considering this project is grounded in the foreign policy analysis approach, it is absolutely
essential to analyze the structure of public opinion in terms of its implications on the policy making
process. Before analyzing what the findings from this study mean in that context, it is useful to think
about two potential scenarios. If the effect of religiously motivated public opinion on the foreign
policy making process is analyzed along a spectrum, it is possible to envision two extreme situations.
One end of such a spectrum would be characterized by the scenario where religion plays a decisive
role in driving public opinion. The other end of the spectrum would represent the situation where
religion does not matter at all. The first scenario is somewhat similar to Huntington’s (1993)
arguments regarding the clash of civilizations. If religion plays a critical role, people would interpret
international conflicts from a predominantly religious standpoint, and concerns over political factors
such as party loyalty and ideological commitments would take a back seat. In that case, public
opinion would constrain decision makers to respond to international conflicts in a way that caters to
the religious sentiments of the people. The second scenario at the other end of the spectrum would represent the exact opposite situation. In this case, cultural concerns would be completely discounted and political predispositions would play a major role in driving public opinion. Consequently, decision makers would be only accountable to ideological concerns and partisan values as opposed to cultural imperatives.

In light of the findings presented in this study, the effects of public opinion on the foreign policy making process does not seem to resemble either of the two extreme scenarios outlined above. Religion does not seem to be the predominant factor driving public opinion. Even when religious matters independently, it does not eradicate the effects of political predispositions and relevant demographics altogether. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the effect of political predispositions—particularly party loyalty—seem to be more consistent and powerful on attitudes across different issue areas. Thus, it is unlikely for policy makers to be constrained by public sentiments that are fundamentally driven by questions of faith and morality. Therefore, the resultant policies are less likely to reflect moral imperatives as opposed to political ones.

Such a scenario is relatively less worrisome than the situation where religion plays a key role in driving foreign policy preferences. For instance, had religion been critically important, there could have been some pressure from the traditionalist section of the population on the policy makers to define American identity in the international platform as one that is essentially Christian. Such a portrayal of the national image would have antagonized fundamentalist groups and state leaders that consider Christianity and the western way of life as a threat to their own culture. This would have ignited hatred from such groups toward the United States, and invited possibilities of threats to national security. Fortunately, the situation is more optimistic. The findings from this study show that religion is only one of the many factors driving public opinion. This reduces the possibility of policy makers being pressurized to define America’s international image along religious lines alone. Hence, the resultant national image is relatively less likely to alienate international actors that remain hostile.
to Christianity and western lifestyle. This, in turn, lessens the likelihood of security threats from fundamentalists groups that seek to challenge occidental culture.

The discussion regarding the implications of religiously motivated public opinion on the foreign policy making process remains incomplete without an analysis of the mediated effects that occur via party ID and ideology. This project shows that even when religious factors cease to matter independently, they continue to shape public opinion indirectly via political predispositions. This pattern naturally leads to the normative question as to whether independent effects are more worrisome than mediated effects and vice versa. When the effect of religious factors on foreign policy preferences is independent, religious considerations play an active role in determining preferences. Thus, the message that policy makers receive from the public reflect religious motivations in a direct way. But, the role of religion in shaping foreign policy preferences is less obvious when it comes to mediated effects. In case of the latter, religious factors matter only to the extent that they shapes political predispositions. Political predispositions, in turn, determine and condition foreign policy preferences. For instance, frequent worship attendance in itself does not make people more supportive of the war in Iraq. Frequent worship attendance makes people more conservative from an ideological standpoint, and therefore more supportive of the war. As a result, there ceases to be a direct link between worship attendance and preferences on the Iraq War. By that logic, religious preferences are unlikely to play an active role in driving such preferences. Therefore, public opinion is less likely to signal a preference for religious imperatives in guiding foreign policy decision making. That being said, one has to be mindful of the fact that even though mediated effects do not entail direct involvement of religious considerations, they certainly shed light on the religious roots of partisan and ideological differences over foreign policy preferences.

Finally, it is worthwhile to reflect on the effects of George W. Bush’s faith-based approach to leadership on the foreign policy preferences of the Christian Right. George W. Bush’s religious rhetoric in the period following the September 11 attacks was characterized by the dominance of
religious cues that were skillfully utilized to promote a form of “political fundamentalism” (Domke 2004). But the findings from this project show that such an approach to leadership and foreign policy did not seem to have an unusual impact on the preferences of the evangelicals. As discussed previously, this pattern suggests that evangelicals were not particularly vulnerable to the presidential rhetoric. Such a finding shows that the usage of religious language and symbols does not necessarily give an edge to the president in terms of his ability to rally the evangelicals. Therefore, more innovative propaganda techniques have to be utilized to justify foreign policy decisions in the future.

The research presented in this dissertation opens up interesting avenues for future research. One of the main findings reported in this project suggests that the preferences of the non-religious seem to be significantly different from that of the members of all other religious traditions. While much has been discussed about why evangelical attitudes on foreign policy issues are distinct, the literature remains relatively silent regarding what makes the attitudes of the non-religious so different. For instance, why are the non-religious consistently averse to internationalism? Or, what is it about the identity that makes the non-religious disapproving of militant assertiveness?

The question regarding non-religious distinctiveness is especially interesting in light of the growing percentage of the “nones” in the American population. According to a Pew Research Center report published in the year 2012, “In the last five years alone, the unaffiliated have increased from just over 15% to just under 20% of all U.S. adults. Their ranks now include more than 13 million self-described atheists and agnostics (nearly 6% of the U.S. public), as well as nearly 33 million people who say they have no particular religious affiliation (14%).” This naturally makes one wonder whether the rise of the non-religious is related to the eventual decline of the influence of religion on foreign policy? Rock (2011) suggests that such a scenario is definitely probable. If that is the case, it is all the more interesting to explore the different facets of non-religious identity that contribute to their distinctive foreign policy preferences.
Another interesting demographic shift in contemporary American society involves the rise of religious minorities. A Pew Research Center Study (2013) on the demographics of the legal immigrants to the United States suggests that, “While Christians continue to make up a majority of legal immigrants to the U.S., the estimated share of new legal permanent residents who are Christian declined from 68% in 1992 to 61% in 2012. Over the same period, the estimated share of green card recipients who belong to religious minorities rose from approximately one-in-five (19%) to one-in-four (25%).” This trend gives rise to new and interesting questions regarding the role of religion in shaping foreign policy public opinion. Will the increase in religious minorities contribute to greater exposure to diversity and inter-faith dialogues across religious traditions, thereby fostering a more secular approach to foreign policy? Or, would the recent rise in religious minorities fuel xenophobic tendencies that would eventually make religious factors more powerful in driving foreign policy preferences? Moreover, would this demographic shift reinstate the predominance of the old religion gap based on affiliation as opposed to the new divide between the traditionalists and the progressives within religious traditions?

Finally, it is quite appropriate to discuss directions of future research in light of recent international developments. Since 2010, much of international politics has revolved around a series of movements aimed at bringing about regime changes in the Middle East. The destabilizing effects of such developments have often times prompted the U.S. to take a stand either through limited intervention as in the case of Libya, or through diplomatic strategies as in the case of Syria. Given Israel’s tense relations with these states, one cannot but wonder whether religious considerations would come to play a more critical role in shaping attitudes on such issues. If indeed religious factors become more important, would the structure of public opinion be predominantly driven by the old religion gap, or the new religion gap? Would evangelicals and the Jewish demonstrate attitudes that are distinct from members of other religious traditions? Or, would conservative Protestants ally with conservative members of the Jewish tradition against their respective progressive counterparts? How
similar or different would these popular alliances be from Miersheimer and Walt’s (2006) Israel Lobby? These are relevant questions that will contribute to the enrichment of the overall literature on foreign policy public opinion.
Bibliography


## Appendix A: Variables and Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Survey Question/Description</th>
<th>Coding</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable [Ch.3]: Defense-spending Attitudes</td>
<td>Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven’t you thought much about this?</td>
<td>7-point scale where 1= greatly increase defense-spending and 1=greatly decrease defense-spending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable [Ch. 4]: Internationalism</td>
<td>Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.”</td>
<td>1=No 0=Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable [Ch. 5]: Support for Iraq War</td>
<td>Taking everything into account, do you think the war in Iraq has been worth the cost or not?</td>
<td>1= Worth it 0=Not worth it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable [Ch.5]: Support for Afghanistan War</td>
<td>Taking everything into account, do you think the U.S. war against the Taliban government in Afghanistan was worth the cost or not?</td>
<td>1=Worth it 0=Not worth it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable [Ch. 5]: Support for Persian Gulf War</td>
<td>Do you think we did the right thing in sending U.S. military forces to the Persian gulf or should we have stayed out?</td>
<td>1=Did the right thing .5=Depends 0=Should have stayed out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable: Affiliation [Ch. 3-5]</td>
<td>Respondents’ religious identity in terms of denominational affiliation. For the purposes of this study smaller denominations were combined to create larger religious traditions.</td>
<td>Dummies for mainline Protestant, evangelical Protestant, black Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other, and non-religious.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable: Worship Attendance [Ch. 3-5]</td>
<td>Do you go to (church/synagogue) every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?</td>
<td>1= Every week .75=Almost every week .50=Once or twice a month .25= Few times a year 0=Never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable: Biblical Authority [Ch. 3-4; Chapter 5: Persian Gulf Only]</td>
<td>Attitudes toward the authority of the Bible. Measure created by combining questions on literalism and inerrancy.</td>
<td>1=High .5=Medium 0=Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Survey Question/Description</td>
<td>Coding</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable:</strong> Biblical Literalism [Ch.5: Iraq and Afghanistan]</td>
<td>Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? The Bible is the actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word; The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word; The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God.</td>
<td>1=The Bible is the actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word .5=The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word 0=The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable:</strong> Party ID [Ch. 3-5]</td>
<td>Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? If Republican or Democrat: Would you call yourself a strong (REP/DEM) or a not very strong (REP/DEM)? If Independent, or other: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?</td>
<td>7-point scale coded where 1=strong Republican and 0=strong Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable:</strong> Ideology [Ch. 3-5]</td>
<td>When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, extremely conservative, or haven't you thought much about this?</td>
<td>7-point scale where 1=extremely conservative and 0=extremely liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable:</strong> Gender [Ch.3-5]</td>
<td>Respondent Gender</td>
<td>Male=0 Female=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable:</strong> Age [Ch. 3-5]</td>
<td>Respondent Age</td>
<td>Due to linear transformation age variable folded and collapsed to range from 1(maximum)-0(minimum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable:</strong> Race [Ch. 3-5]</td>
<td>Respondent race</td>
<td>Dummies for Whites, African-Americans, and Others</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable:</strong> South [Ch. 3-5]</td>
<td>Census Region</td>
<td>South=1 All Other=0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable:</strong> Income [Ch.3-4]</td>
<td>Respondent Income</td>
<td>Ranges from 0 to 1 where 1=96-100 percentile and 0=1-16 percentile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable:</strong> Income [Ch. 5]</td>
<td>Respondent Income</td>
<td>Ranges from 0 to 1 where 1= above 120,000 and 0= 0-$2,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable:</strong> Education [Ch. 3-4]</td>
<td>Respondent Education</td>
<td>Rangers from 0 to 1 where 1=advanced degree and 0=grade school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable:</strong> Education [Ch. 5]</td>
<td>Respondent Education</td>
<td>Rangers from 0 to 1 where 1=advanced degree and 0 grade school or less</td>
</tr>
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<td>Variable</td>
<td>Survey Question/Description</td>
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