THE EFFECT OF BELIEF IN BECOMING A MEMBER
OF A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AND THE IMPACT OF THAT BELIEF
ON THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE EXERTED BY THE TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION MEMBERS IN TURKEY

A thesis submitted
To Kent State University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts

By

Bülent Yılmaz

August 2013
Thesis written by
Bülent Yılmaz
B.A., University of Bahçeşehir, 2008
M.A., Kent State University, 2013

Approved by

___ David A. Kessler  _____ Advisor

___ Richard T. Serpe  _____ Chair, Department of Sociology

___ Raymond C. Craig  _____ Associate Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. vi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................... 4
  Definition of Terrorism .............................................................................................. 5
  Individual-Based Explanation of Terrorism ............................................................ 9
  Personal Perpetrators of Terrorism ......................................................................... 14
  Terrorism in Turkey ................................................................................................ 21
  Main Terrorist Troops in Turkey ............................................................................. 24
    Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK) ...................................................................... 24
    Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKPÇ) .................................. 26
    Turkish Hezbollah ................................................................................................. 27

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................ 32
  Social Disorganization Theory .............................................................................. 32
  Marxist Theory ....................................................................................................... 34
  Differential Association and Social Learning Theory ........................................... 37
  Terrorist Group Membership and Active Involvement ......................................... 38
  Terrorist Groups and Recruitment ......................................................................... 42
  Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 46

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ....................................... 47
  Hypotheses ............................................................................................................. 48
  Variables .............................................................................................................. 48
    Dependent Variables ........................................................................................... 48
    Independent Variables ......................................................................................... 49
      Belief .................................................................................................................. 49
      Motivation .......................................................................................................... 51
      Terrorist Group Type ......................................................................................... 52
      Sociodemographics ......................................................................................... 52
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Link</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression Analysis</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Discussion of Key Findings</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations, Policy Implications, and Future Research</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Implications</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Research</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics................................................................. 55
Table 2. Regression Analyses of Terrorist Membership ................................. 57
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Apart from the efforts of myself, the success of any project depends largely on the encouragement and guidelines of many others. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the people who have been instrumental in the successful completion of this project. I would like to show my greatest appreciation to all staffs of Kent State University who played crucial role for my re-enrollment to the program. I cannot say thank you enough to Dr. David Kessler and Dr. Mark Colvin for their tremendous support and helping me to reach this point. I felt motivated and encouraged every time when I talked to them. Without their encouragement and guidance, this thesis would not have materialized. I am also particularly grateful for the assistance given by Audrey C. Kessler for her great editing help. A special dept is owed to Dr. Gürbüz Bolat who convinced me to finish my thesis despite my reluctance due to ongoing health problems. And finally, I would like to offer my special thanks to Dr. Serhat Demir, who reviewed the earlier draft of this thesis. In addition his incisive comments and detailed suggestions, his sincere friendship also greatly improved the final product. The guidance and support received from all these people was vital for the success of the project. I am grateful for their constant support and help.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When I was 20 years old, I was conscripted and sent to Southeast Turkey. In Turkey, they have compulsory military service. At the time, there was a gory conflict between PKK and the Turkish army. Every single day, military bases were under attack by well-organized PKK fighters. Turkish Special Forces and Commando units were carrying out attacks in retaliation against PKK camps inside and outside of the borders. Some days there would be hundreds of casualties on both sides due to the battles. Although seven terrorists were killed for every Turkish soldier, they did not seem to be on the verge of extinction. As a member of one of the most active commando units, we were told that PKK members were “subhuman” and deserve treatment worse than death. But my perceptions would change forever when I talked to a terrorist on the radio. He was very polite, defended his arguments calmly, and was very friendly. I talked to him for hours and understood that he is not a psychotic person nor does he have a mental disease; rather, he is someone who has strong beliefs in his struggle. Later on, we got several terrorists and they were also very smart and were strong in their beliefs and in the tenets of their terrorist organization. This study is the result of awareness. Contrary to popular psychological reductionism and harsh generalizations, ordinary people can be radicalized if they have a strong belief in the goals of a terrorist organization and what they stand for.
Although terrorism, both as a salient academic interest and a political issue, is a relatively new as a topic in the United States and became popular only after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the concept has been under focus for decades in Turkey. While Turkey has suffered greatly from terrorism, the concept only recently became a subject of academic interest in limited fields. The main focus almost always has been on fighting terrorism through conventional means, and academically supported approaches in this fight have either been ignored or have never existed. Terrorism literature in Turkey mainly examines the relationship between socioeconomic dynamics and terrorism with little focus on individual-level variables. However, an understanding of the motives of terrorism and terrorist actions on an individual level is necessary. Therefore, this study delves into an explanation of the impact of belief on becoming a terrorist organization member.

Contrary to common belief, there is not a single reason for becoming a member of a terrorist organization. Among many reasons, one can list quest for power, search for belonging, personal interest and sincere belief in the tenets of the terrorist entity.

In order to understand the impact of belief on recruitment in terrorist organizations in Turkey, this study first provides an overview of the terrorism problem in Turkey, focusing on the historical backgrounds of terrorist organizations in Turkey and their recruitment methods. Second, theoretical explanations of the terrorist recruitment processes and criminal behavior of the terrorist is examined while creating a theoretical base for the current study.
The main research question in this study is as follows: Does belief in the ways of the terrorist organization matter more than other factors that lead to active terrorist organization membership, and does belief increase the likelihood of engaging in criminal activities on behalf of the terrorist organization?

Following the main research question, this study employs a quantitative research approach in order to clarify the research question. Using official data obtained with limited usage permission from the Antiterror Department of the Turkish National Police, appropriate statistical analyses are made.

Basically, this research concludes that as the belief in the tenets of the terrorist organization increases, the likelihood of membership in the terrorist organization and the level of active involvement in terrorist activities also increase.
The aims of this chapter are to provide some of the most frequently discussed topics of terrorism and introduce the issues that are relevant to the main aim of the thesis. Thus, this chapter first discusses some of the factors that hinder a generally accepted definition of terrorism.

The systematic evaluation of terrorism and the related body of relevant academic literature is a relatively new area for academics studying the topic. For example, in comparison to other fields of study, it becomes salient that the literature on terrorism is in its infancy. While some researchers give importance to the components of fear infliction (Hoffmann, 1998) or the use of means that fall outside routine forms of political struggle (Tilly, 2004), other researchers believe that the most dominating feature of terrorism is that it aims to exert violence on civilians or noncombatants (Black, 2004).

Understanding the underlying causes of terrorism has played a vital role in discussions on the development of counterterrorism policies. It would not be possible to design an effective strategy to mitigate or totally eliminate the danger of terrorism without a clear understanding of how terrorist activities are driven and how terrorist groups recruit new members. That is important because if a country failed to develop policies that take the motivations of terrorists into account (such as a weak strategy), it would waste resources on policies or programs not get to the core of the problem. The
worst scenario is that failure would cause an increase in the number of deaths caused by terrorist attacks.

Definition of Terrorism

To get around the academic entanglement that overwhelms the scholarly discussions about what is or is not terrorism, it is essential to clarify the term in a systematic manner that allows for empirical observation and analysis. There is little agreement in the current literature on what could or could not be called terrorism or the act of terrorism itself (Crenshaw, 1992).

Terrorism is an ambiguous label and a difficult term define; according to Krueger and Maleckova (2003), there are more than 100 diplomatic or scholarly definitions. Generally both academics and politicians have used, for example, the terms terrorists and terrorism as similar labels to define (and describe) their enemies, and the derogatory nature of this value-laden term has been befittingly defined in the literature (White, 2001). As seen many times in the real world, the cliché one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter, demonstrates this pointless semantics. For instance, many attacks on Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah combatants and Palestinian soldiers have been cited as terrorism.

The word terror has a Latin origin, and it was first used in its contemporary form during the French Revolution. The term terror that we use currently is derived from the Latin word terrere, which means “to be filled with fear, to flutter with fear” (Kaplan, 2011). The concept of terrorism was introduced to the world literature by the British in 1798 and was considered as “the systematic use of terror.” The term terrorist in its
modern usage was introduced in 1947 to mean the tactics used by the Jewish people against the British on Palestinian territories (Seto, 2002, p. 1234). Additionally, the word *terrorist* was used to refer to the revolutionists in Russia in 1866 and the radicals and reformists known as the “Jacobins” during the French Revolution in the 1790s (Reitan, 2010).

The United Nations and its members declared that there is no universally accepted definition of the word *terrorism*, but instead “strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security” (U.N. General Assembly, 2005). The government of the United States depicts its officially accepted definition of terrorism in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656 f (d): “Terrorism,” it states, is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Section 2656 (a) of Title 22 of the United States Code).

However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conceptualized their own definition. Terrorism, as outlined by the DOD in 2000, is “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or try to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” For the DHS, the importance of its definition is that terrorism is considered to be a tactic or a specific way to “empower micro-actors to have a macro-impact, increasing the range of potential adversaries with the capability to do us harm” (Koestler-Grack, 2007, pp. 23). This definition attaches
importance to the tactical viewpoint of terrorism, which “targets the psychological, as well as the physical, wellbeing of our populace; the fear generated by unpredictable attacks is a key goal of terrorism.” (Hamilton & Cilluffo, 2007)

In a recent research study, various kinds of scholarly definitions were examined via content analysis (Schmid & Jongman, 1988). According to the results, the five components detected in definitions of the term terrorism with greater than 40% frequency were violence or force (83.5%), politics (65%), fear or terror (51%), threat (47%), and psychological effects and anticipated reactions (41.5%) (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 5). According to these findings, the general conceptualization of terrorism entails an act in which (1) violence or force is used or threatened, (2) it is specifically a political act, (3) it is aimed to elicit fear or tenor in order to reach its aim, and (4) psychological effects and reactions result (Schmid & Jongman, 1988).

In addition, Pillar (2001, pp. 13-14) summarizes four distinctive components of terrorism that are shared among definitions of the term:

1. Premeditation — There must be intent and prior decision to commit an act that would qualify as terrorism; terrorism is not a matter of momentary rage or impulse.

2. Political motivation — It excludes criminal violence motivated by monetary gain or personal vengeance.

3. Targets are noncombatants — Terrorists attack people who cannot defend themselves with violence in return.
4. *Groups or agents* — The perpetrators are either subnational groups or clandestine agents.

In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (April 12, 1991) terrorism is conceptualized with the following statement:

Terror is all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which [are] outlined in the constitution, and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, harming the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or destroying or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, threatening the existence of Turkish Republic, [or] jeopardizing the public order or peace and security.

It is also important to make a distinction between different kinds of terrorism. Two well-known classifications in the literature are made in terms of the location of the terrorist activity and the identity and aims of the committer. The former classification make a distinction between domestic terrorism, which is performed within a single state, and international terrorism, which is a terrorist activity committed in another country or against a foreign target outside the terrorist’s state of origin (Sánchez-Cuenca & de la Calle, 2009). On the other hand, as Wilkinson (1986) states, most terrorism has some international dimensions to some extent, while domestic groups frequently seek assistance, guns, and an accommodation abroad. Another classification of terrorism deals with the identity of the terrorists, the aims they desire to achieve, and the entity against which they are performing their activities. Ignatieff (2001), for instance, made a distinction between six kinds of terrorism, each of which, he believes, requires a different techniques to fight against it:

1. Insurrectionary terrorism — aimed at revolutionary overthrow of a state
2. Loner or issue terrorism — aimed at promotion of a single cause
3. Liberation terrorism — aimed at the overthrow of a colonial regime
4. Separatist terrorism — aimed at independence for a subordinate ethnic or religious group within a state
5. Occupation terrorism — aimed at driving an occupying force from a territory acquired through war or conquest
6. Global terrorism — aimed at inflicting damage and humiliation on a global power

Contemporary research studies both kinds of terrorism and states’ attempts to fight against various kinds of terrorist acts. It should be noted that the following points are shared among the definitions of terrorism: the political motives of terrorism, its use by nonstate actors, its use of purposeful and random violence, its violence toward noncombatants, and its eliciting of fear.

Individual-Based Explanation of Terrorism

There are various explanations of terrorism in the literature. This section discusses a few of the salient ones.

The frustration-aggression hypothesis, originally described by Berkowitz (1965) states that terrorism is a response to frustration and goal-blocking conditions in people’s lives. Building on this viewpoint, Gurr (1970) stated that poverty, discrimination, and political oppression are specific conditions that trigger aggression and transform it into terrorism. Some researchers have criticized this theory, alleging that frustration without any other inciting conditions does not necessarily causes a person to direct himself into terrorist activities and harm other people (Zillmann, 1979). Deprivation may cause people
to have other kinds of reactions, such as escape, depression, withdrawal from social life, or motivation to find alternative ways to reach their aims.

Some researches point out that terrorism is not the strategy of last haven for people experiencing deprivation (Laqueur, 1999). Frustrated people do not always resort to terrorist activities. For that reason, deprivation seems to be a precondition but not a sufficient condition for terrorist activities to occur.

The narcissism-aggression hypothesis (Crayton, 1983), as described by Pearlstein (1991), provides a different explanation for why individuals commit terrorism. The underlying idea of this theory holds terroristic motives stem from the narcissistic nature of people. Narcissism is:

[a] range of psychoanalytic orientations, impulses, or behavioral patterns either wholly or overwhelmingly subject to ego concern, as opposed to object concern. Narcissism should be defined as an internal, intra-psychic, regulatory “tool” that enables the individual to defend the self from damage and harm. (Pearlstein, 1991, p. 7)

Pearlstein’s supportive evidence for the hypothesis is based primarily on the work of others; he obtained collected his information from terrorists’ autobiographies. This hypothesis has its critics. Horgan (2003) asserts that the hypothesis is well-conceptualized and well-constructed in comparison to other approaches based on critiques in the literature; however, Horgan notes that little information exists about the processes and concepts that Pearlstein used to depict people’s decision to exert terrorist activities (Horgan, 2003, pp. 12-14).

The negative-identity hypothesis (Knutson, 1981) holds that people assume a negative identity because of failures in their experiences. Hudson describes the formation
of negative identity as involving “a vindictive rejection of the role regarded as desirable and proper by an individual’s family and community” (Hudson, 1999, p. 17). This hypothesis states that individuals participate in terrorism because they have no alternatives when faced with failures and have no assistance from his friends or family. A significant point in this argument is predicting which individuals are at high risk of committing terrorism.

As stated in the frustration-aggression hypothesis, setting events, such as the deprivation conditions of poverty and political oppression, may not lead every individual to engage in aggressive behavior. The question lies in predicting which poor or politically oppressed individuals are most likely to commit terrorism. Studies on risk assessment suggest that an individual’s risk sensitivity is an important determinant in becoming a terrorist. Risk sensitivity is “a measure of an individual’s attraction or aversion to risk when an individual has some sense of the probability distribution of outcomes that confer satisfaction, or utility upon the individual” (Tversky & Fox, 1995).

Risk is assessed by looking at an individual’s economic or noneconomic losses or gains. Those who take the risk of making an economic or noneconomic gain that has an equal expected value are viewed to be risk-prone individuals. Their risk-taking judgment is based on how they perceive economic or noneconomic gain in comparison with other individuals (Kuznar & Lutz, 2007). In this regard, individual motivations play an important role. Because terrorist organizations typically are dispersed and highly networked, they are subject to the influence of individual motives, such as grievances
resulting from losses or desired gains. This approach does not preclude rational choice (Crenshaw, 1992).

The important point is that the distribution of wealth and social status will similarly predict risk-taking, regardless of motivation. It is the salient differences in the distribution of social status and wealth among people and groups that cause risk-taking, political activism, or revolution (Kuznar, 2001). Another similar and related approach is the concept of loss aversion. People feel more displeasure with a loss than they do pleasure with a gain (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 2009).

People will be more likely to take risks when confronted with losses than when feeling pleasure. For instance, "people are more likely to favor an experimental drug when the increases in patient survivorship are emphasized, and are more likely to reject the same drug when the patient death rate is emphasized" (Kuznar & Lutz, 2007, p. 346). Loss aversion may raise an individual’s risk sensitivity for sharp economic or social-status inequalities.

Kuznar and Lutz’s (2007) study provides evidence that the danger that Tamils in Sri Lanka collectively confronted with the loss of status coupled with their desperation to develop a better situations for themselves, led them to become risk-inclined radicals. In similar fashion, the lack of opportunities for raising their status or living conditions caused Irish Protestants to gravitate toward risk-proneness (O’Leary & McGarry, 1993). Frustration over losses and barriers to the improvement of economic conditions fueled their recruitment into the Irish Republican Army.
However, it should be mentioned that although risk sensitivity increases the probability of joining terrorist organizations, it does not mean that just any person will join such organizations. People may seek alternative nonviolent ways to react to those conditions. Violent reactions will be more likely when such nonviolent reactions fail (Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly, 1975). Kruglanski and Fishman (2006) classify psychological approaches to terrorism under two perspectives: syndrome and tool. The tool perspective draws attention to the psychology of the goal-means relationship. According to that perspective, terrorism is a fear-inducing tactic that is used to further one’s objectives. From that point of view, any social agent may turn into a terrorist.

This perspective can be seen in a wide variety of terrorist organizations with heterogeneous aims or ideologies. It is a top-down approach that makes a distinction between terrorists and terrorism. That is to say, it differentiates between the social entity or actor and the means for an aim. The focus is “the conditions under which an individual or a group would opt for a given course of action versus its possible alternatives, given these actors’ objectives” (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006, p. 194)

Kruglanski and Fishman (2006) alleged that the tool approach is more acceptable than the syndrome approach, because members of terrorist organizations form their aims by the means they have available. Gupta and Mundra’s study (2005) further depicts this perspective by providing insight on how suicide bombings are used as a strategic means in terrorism. The syndrome perspective, on the other hand, considers terrorism to be monolithic, meaning that terrorist behaviors have psychologically recognizable properties. Every behavior has a developmental base and a result. The main assumption
of this point of view is that the psychology and personality profile of terrorists is different from that of nonterrorists (Pearlstein, 1991).

Personal Perpetrators of Terrorism

Starting with the individual level of analysis, this body of literature focuses on the psychology of the individual perpetrator to tease out the conditions of terrorism. These research projects seek to uncover a particular mind of a terrorist or reveal a particular terrorist personality or profile. Victoroff (2005) conducted one of the most comprehensive reviews on the psychology of terrorism. He outlined one set of studies, which sought to identify certain psychopathologies to explain terrorist behavior; that is, terrorists are psychotic or psychopathic. A psychotic or insane person is marked by a mental disorder, which distorts perceptions of reality, in the form of a psychosis that prevents an individual from comprehending right from wrong.

A psychopath or sociopath, on the other hand, possesses a personality disorder: he or she can distinguish between right and wrong, choosing to behave in a selfish and remorseless manner (Victoroff, 2005). In this study, he further questioned whether terrorism was an antisocial or prosocial behavior. In some cases, terrorists were not outcasts and instead were often regarded as heroes in their own circles. Victoroff (2005) concluded that while psychoses and pathologies may have been present in some cases, terrorists were not necessarily sociopaths.

Ferracuti and Bruno (1981) stated that there were nine distinctive features of terrorists: (1) ambivalence toward authority, (2) defective insight, (3) adherence to normal customs and conventions, (4) emotional detachment from the consequences of
their actions, (5) sexual role uncertainties, (6) magical thinking, (7) destructiveness, (8) 
low education, and (9) adherence to violent subculture norms and weapons fetishes.

Finally, other researchers found a correlation between terrorists and attention- or 
sensation-seeking behavior, in that attention seekers were more likely to be drawn to 
groups that use showy acts of violence (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006).

On the other hand, as Victoroff (2005, p. 33) has stated that most of these theories 
failed to capture just how diverse a population terrorists comprised. Victoroff (2005) 
maintains that many of these psychological conclusions were impressionistic: “Without 
the use of valid and reliable behavioral measures and without a control group, one cannot 
conclude that the characteristics identified in the [various] studies distinguish terrorists 
from non-terrorists” (Victoroff, 2005, p. 33). Terrorists themselves were psychologically 
and even culturally diverse, acting upon different behavioral inclinations and patterns. 
Even within groups, leaders and followers tended to be psychologically distinct 
(Victoroff, 2005).

Post (2005) argues that the central strategy for political terrorism was 
psychological warfare, which used violence to communicate. He rejected propositions 
that favor individual abnormality or psychopathology to explain terrorist behavior; 
instead, he claims that “group, organizational, and social psychology, with a particular 
emphasis on ‘collective identity,’ provided the most constructive framework for 
understanding terrorist psychology and behavior” (Post, 2005, p. 634)

Much of the more recent literature tends to focus away from viewing terrorism as 
a metal or social disorder, favoring other cognitive psychological theories such as rational
choice. Pathologies or personality profiles do not solely explain why terrorists and terrorism exist, nor are they practical or useful predictors of terroristic action. As shown, it often is difficult to distinguish between a criminal and a terrorist with a larger political agenda. This perspective produces a limited and highly nuanced look into a particular individual’s or set of individuals’ reasons to use terrorism.

Reich (1990) warned that psychological accounts of terrorism can lead to overgeneralization and reductionism. Terrorism is varied and complex; terrorists themselves are a diverse population with differing motivations and political aspirations. Moreover, psychologically based theories do not adequately explain the “appreciation of palpable and psychic rewards of belonging to terrorist group (Reich, 1990, p. 286).

Other sets of theories propose that terrorism is a product of group psychology, ideology, processes, interactions, training and indoctrination, or the dynamics of collectivism or peer pressures instead of individual traits or predispositions. Terrorism can be viewed as a collective social and psychological response, and/or a tool or specific strategy to meet a group objective. Kruglanski and Fishman (2006, p. 198) note that terrorism can be framed as a collective struggle: “people with collectivistic versus individualistic motivations might be more inclined to endorse its use.” Membership in a terrorist organization offers individual recruits a defined identity with a delineated role, self-worth, and sense of purpose.

Post (2005, p. 634) argues that there was a clear fusing of individual identity and group identity regardless of the ideological affiliation of the organization. “There is a symbiotic relationship created between the individual need to belong to a group, the need
to ensure success of the group, and an enhanced desire to be an increasingly more active member of the group.” According to Post (2005, pp. 628-630):

As identities fused, the group’s struggle, actions, experiences, pride and shame, successes and failures became more personalized. With no other avenues to attain success or status, the group and its achievements became central to each member’s identity, providing a “reason for living” through fighting for “the cause.”

Individual and organizational goals became one and the same: If the group succeeded, then the individual member also succeeded; if the group failed, they each failed (Post, 2005). Members sought to increase the organization’s value, power, and prestige through increasingly dramatic and violent operations. Post (2005) noted that this overarching sense of the collective consumed the individual, providing the necessary justification for actions and absolution.

Additionally, Post (2005) emphasizes the critical role of leadership in terrorist organizations. Leaders created the clear, unifying message that conveys a religious, political, or ideological justification for action. They make sense of the group’s situation, identify the enemies, and unite the isolated and discontented members into one collective identity. In sum, Post maintains that “terrorism is a diverse and complex phenomenon for which there is no single overarching psychological explanation; each terrorism must be understood in its unique cultural, historical, and political context.” In the case of nationalist-separatist terrorists and extreme Islamic fundamentalists, “hatred has been bred in the bone,” instilled since childhood and reinforced through life (Post, 2005, pp. 615-622).
Gurr (1993, pp. 13-23) proposed a psychosocial concept called relative deprivation stemming from socioeconomic grievances as a foundational motivator of violence. Relative deprivation denoted “the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence.” It is important to note that these feelings of relative deprivation are perceived differences in the value of what is expected versus what is received, whether or not this is the case in reality; this is known as the want-get gap. Gurr (1993,p.23) He also argues that deprivation induces frustration, discontent, and outrage, coupled with other factors—such as communal myths and practices, past successes of violence and terror, and views on state legitimacy (or illegitimacy)—serve as a catalyst, and even justification, for collective violence against those perceived as responsible parties.

Laqueur (1999) argues that terrorism is “a response to injustice; if there were political and social justice, there would be no terrorism.” Terrorism is a “weapon of the poor” and a “strategy of provocation” as “terrorists seek to cause political, social, economic disruption, and for this purpose frequently engage in planned or indiscriminant murder.” He adds that terrorists are idealists inspired by ideology, “fanatical believers driven to despair by intolerable conditions.” Terrorism occurs wherever people have genuine legitimate grievances.

Hoffman (1988) agrees that terrorism stems directly from concrete grievances rooted in political discrimination, in the form of denied opportunities for participation and access to power. A group experiencing this bias usually forms a social movement to rectify these grievances and obtain either equal rights or a separate state. These factors—
discrimination, grievance, and mobilization—can provide direct motivations for the use of terrorism. Because violence—and just as important, the threat of violence—is directed toward a particular political goal, Hoffman asserts that terrorism is a purposeful activity, a “planned, calculated, and indeed, systematic” mean to oppose the government, garner attention and recognition, and achieve a desired objective (1988, pp. 383-385).

Stern (2003) argues that grievances give rise to terrorism in the name of God. From there, social networks, funding, and operations allow terrorist organizations to thrive. Leaders of the organizations exploit feelings of alienation and humiliation among members and potential recruits in order to create holy warriors. They point to demographic shifts, selective reading of religion and history, and territorial disputes to justify their holy wars. For Stern, “terrorism involves a collective action problem, in the sense that only those who contribute incur costs, but a broader collective shares the benefits.”

Stern (2003) notes that membership in a terrorist organization encompasses mixed motivations. Some operatives participate because of their search for adventure, while others are attracted to the glamour of belonging to a militant group. Some join to form friendships or other social ties, while others seek to advance their career. “In short, fun and profit—status, glamour, power, prestige, friendship, and money—provide powerful incentives for participating in terrorist groups” (Stern, 2003, p. 5).

Leadership is another important component of terrorism for Stern (2003); leaders can take advantage of the variety of operatives’ motives by playing up alienation and humiliation, demographic shifts, historical wrongs, and claims over territory. These
leaders foster group identity and cohesion, while dehumanizing the group’s purported enemies. They can harness real or perceived humiliation to create support for terrorist movements.

Stern (2003, pp. 282-283) concluded that after extensive study and interviews, “terrorism we currently face is not only a response to political grievances…it is a response to the ‘God-shaped hole’ in modern culture.” Groups have focused on a distinct anti-West ideology with rhetoric of a new crusade. “Religious extremists see themselves as under attack by the global spread of post-Enlightenment Western values such as secular humanism and the focus on individual liberties” (Stern, 2003, pp. 282-283) Stern argues that terrorists first feel a sense of alienation, humiliation, and outrage when they are treated as second-class individuals or are marginalized. (Stern, 2003) From there, terrorists adopt new identities as martyrs on behalf of a purported spiritual cause, which turned their former weak selves into strong and altruistic beings ready to sacrifice their lives in the belief that their death will serve the public good. Stern argues that the terrorists feel not only politically justified but also morally justified, as God is on their side.

While the literature is rich in uncovering the collective sociopsychological conditions for terrorism, it is still limited due to its inability to explain the occurrence of terror attacks. The direct causal linkage in this body of research is still questioned, particularly because the effects of group psychology on terrorism cannot be isolated. Moreover, terror attacks are not an automatic or immediate collective response. Other contributing factors outside group dynamics can lead to terror violence.
Terrorism in Turkey

Terrorism in Turkey has its origins in domestic terrorism, which began in the 1960s. Until the 1980s, terrorist activities were committed by ideologically motivated left-wing terrorist groups. In the 1980s, parallel with the continuing inland terrorism by left-wing terrorists, separatist terrorists also played important role in terrorism. Based on information obtained from the Antiterror Department of Turkish National Police (TEMUH), there are 12 active terrorist groups in Turkey. Including subgroups born from these main organizations, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base cited more than 30 active terrorist organizations in Turkey (MIPT, 2008), which ranged from leftist revolutionary groups to ethnic separatist organizations to religious extremist groups. Although the successful counterattacks of security forces hinder illegal entrance of suspects into the country, Turkey’s geographical position as a gateway between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East makes it a passing route for many terrorist groups (Cline, 2004).

The most important time period for getting an insight on terrorism in Turkey is the period of political changes and social turmoil between 1950 and 1980. After nearly three decades of one-party governance by the Republican People’s Party, the Democrat Party won the 1950 elections. Some of the policies supported by the government and the economic problems of the time resulted in turmoil in society and many public riots, protests, and strikes. In 1960, with the government unable to stop the turmoil and minimize public discomfort, the military took control of the country (Erogul, 1987). After 18 months, in 1961, a new, more democratic constitution was accepted in the congress,
and civil rule came under the authority of the constituent assembly (Bal & Laçiner, 2001).

After a more democratic environment was founded by a new constitution, leftist movements started to increase in the country. The Communist Party of Turkey, the first communist party led by Mustapha Suphi, was founded in 1920 in Baku, Azerbaijan. However, it terminated its activities in 1925 when the Takrir-i Sükün Kanunu (Restoration of Order Law) was enacted. Until the 1960s, leftist movements conducted their activities via alternative nonpolitical platforms (especially with university students and academicians) and publications. As Laqueur (1999) states, those domestic developments along with the student movements in Europe gave courage to many leftist activists in Turkey. After the termination of the activities of the Socialist Turkish Labor Party in the election of 1969, some of these leftist organizations turned to violence as a way to achieve their political aims. These revolutionary ideologies were mostly accepted by university students (Bal & Laçiner, 2001). Public protests and violent reactions between different politically oriented labor unions and different student associations led to social turmoil. In response to these revolutionist and leftist movements, some nationalist and religious groups began to actively participate in the political struggle. This situation triggered new wave of terrorist activities in the country (Erogul, 1987; Laqueur, 1999).

As a result of the dominating violent environment in the country and the unsuccessful attempts of the government to deal with the situation, the military forced the government to fall. Martial law was declared in 1971 and lasted until 1974. After the
military ultimatum, the security forces arrested most of the terrorist groups’ members but especially their leaders. In 1974, when the application of martial law was terminated and the responsibility for order was given again to civil politicians, a general amnesty was announced, and many of the detained terrorists were released. During the violence among different ideological groups—especially between radical leftist organizations and extreme right groups—hundreds of people were killed. According to Uslu (2007), from 1975 to 1980, approximately 30,000 terrorist attacks were organized, and more than 6,000 people were killed in those attacks.

Domestic organizations were responsible for most of these terrorist activities. The only exception was Armenian terrorist groups, such as the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). ASALA was mainly operated by Libya, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Syria. It was a Lebanon-originated Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization that killed Turkish citizens (mostly diplomats) all over the world and conducted violent attacks throughout the country (Aktan & Köknar, 2002).

Rapid modernization and a high level of population migration from villages to cities started in 1950’s. For Laqueur (1999), the high level of urbanization and the uneven distribution of economic resources were two important reasons the government was unable to prevent terrorism and political violence in Turkey. As Karpat (2004) stated, between 1960 and 1970, the urban population of Turkey increased by 5 million and accounted for 39% of the total population in the country. Most of the people who immigrated from villages to cities relocated in low socioeconomic neighborhoods of the country’s suburbs. Most of these residents were conservative and in favor of the status
quo in the neighborhood. At the same time, however, feelings of resentment caused by the dominance of poverty, joblessness, and weakened family relations fostered an environment where not only radical leftist movements but also religious extremists flourished (Bayat, 2007).

Another significant time period for terrorism in Turkey is the phase that started in the late 1980s. After the 1980 military coup, the country was under military rule until 1983, when general elections were held with a new constitution. From the first armed attack of the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK) in 1984 until the time at which this is written the period is marked by increasingly violent terrorist activities led by ethnic/separatist and religious-motivated terrorist organizations.

Main Terrorist Troops in Turkey

Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK)

The PKK is a leftist Kurdish nationalist organization founded in 1974 by Abdullah Öcalan and officially recognized as the PKK in 1978. The ultimate goal of the terrorist organization is to found a Kurdish state by a communist revolution in predominantly Kurdish southeastern Turkey. The PKK began its terrorist activities in 1978 in the Eruh-Şemdinli district and have conducted terrorist activities since that time. The terrorist group is known for committing the most terrorist attacks in relation to casualties in Turkey. It soon started a violent campaign against people who explicitly assisted the government and Kurdish troops who originally had peaceful relationships with the Turkish government (Laqueur, 1999).
The PKK’s main goal was to initiate a revolution that would give freedom to the Kurdish people and establish an independent Kurdish territory. When the group was established, it continuously committed terrorist attacks to the Turkish government, stating that a Kurdish state can be founded only if the violent and colonialist Turkish government was defeated (MIPT, 2008). The PKK is under scrutiny for its desire to found an independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey. Such a state originally was formed in 1978 in the capital of the Turkish Republic, Ankara. By 1980, Turkey’s domestic security condition had clearly worsened due to randomly committed PKK terrorism.

By the early 1980s, the group had cruelly assassinated about 250 people. Since 1984, random violence and the terrorist activities committed by the PKK have caused the death of thousands of people. After the 1990’s, attacks were directed toward urban-based targets and mass deaths the rural areas. The group also attacked tourist resorts and kidnapped foreign tourists and targeted Turkish interests in Western Europe. At the same time, the PKK has kept its position as a subcontractor of international terror and drug-dealer organizations. It started interactions with some Middle Eastern, African, European, and Latin American terrorist troops as well as many other drug carriers.

Following Ocalan’s arrest by the Turkish government, Ocalan declared a cease-fire and stated his desire for a peace initiative with the Turkish government that would focus on the future of the Kurdish people. In 2002, the PKK changed its name to Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress. The cease-fire with the Turkish government ended in 2004, and terrorist attacks started again. In 2005, the group reverted to its original name. In 2005, the group declared a one-month cease-fire, but the attacks
continued afterward. In 2013, Ocalan started to negotiate peace terms with the government and announced a cease-fire; however, the PKK remains an active terrorist organization, especially in southeast part of Turkey and in northern Iraq.

*Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKPC)*

In 1966, Turkish communists changed their point of view about the way that they had tried to launch a Turkish socialist revolution. They realized that the Federation of Revolutionist Youth Association could be used to organize illegal communist activities among university students. However, the discussions on how to achieve a Turkish socialist revolution led to separation within the association. The separated group, which was controlled by Mahir Cayan, was identified through the use of urban guerilla tactics identical to those used by some Latin American groups. They called their group the Turkey Public Liberation Party-Front (THKP-C). Cayan and his comrades were killed in 1972 by military forces.

In 1974, general amnesty was offered by the government, resulting in the release of many terrorists. Some of the ex-members of the THKP-C reestablished the THKP-C in 1974. They also founded the Revolutionist Youth Association in 1976. During that time, a new discussion started between Ankara and Istanbul troops within the association, which led to a separate Istanbul group known as Dev-Sol and which was led by Dursun Karatas (Arinç, 2010).

On March 6, 1993, Bedri Yagan and his six comrades were killed in a police operation in Istanbul, and his group lost a significant amount of its power (Arinç, 2010). That police operation and the betrayal of Yagan weakened the Dev-Sol.
Karatas needed to collect the most outstanding members to reorganize again. He formed a new congress in Damascus. After this congress, he founded a new organization under the name of DHKP/C, which is a Turkish leftist-terrorist organization initially founded in 1978 as Devrimci Sol or Dev-Sol, which is a departed segment of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front (THKP/C). After the infighting, the group was renamed in 1994 as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C). The group espouses a significant level of Marxist ideology, is extremely anti-United States and anti-NATO, and is an anti-Western organization in purpose (Koseli, 2006).

Based on Turkish National Police official records from 1983 to 1994, the terrorist group assassinated slightly less than 100 police officers, 12 army members, four National Intelligence Agency members, two judges, three American citizens, and 35 civil people. During that time, the organization engaged in direct conflict with law enforcement 171 times (Uslu, 2007).

Additionally, based on information from the U.S State Department, there are 38 international terrorist organizations; the DHKP/C is the one of them (United States Government Accountability Office, 2004). Most Western countries, including the European Union have declared the KHKP/C a terrorist organization.

*Turkish Hezbollah*

The Turkish Hezbollah began in the early 1980s and, during that time, was located and held its operations in the southern part of Turkey. It functioned as a terrorist organization with the goal of establishing a Sunni Muslim theocratic state instead of the secular Turkish Republic. While the Turkish Hezbollah has the same name as the well-
known terrorist organization Lebanese Hezbollah, the Turkish Hezbollah does not have any identifiable official or technical connection with the Lebanese Hezbollah (United States Government Accountability Office, 2004).

The organization is composed of mostly Kurds, an ethnic group located in the southern part of Turkey and in Iran and Iraq. The Turkish Hezbollah also is accepted as the Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah (Hisbullahi Kurdi Shorishger) in Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, the Iranian revolution and the doctrines of Ayatollah Khomeini had a significant influence on the Turkish Hezbollah together with other Islamic radicals in Turkey (Uslu, 2007).

The radical standing of the Turkish Hezbollah stems from the threat of the Modern Kharijites. The first rebellion against the rulers of the Islamic world was started by the inflexible doctrines held by the Kharijites, or Hariciler. For the Kharijites, the world is divided into two divisions: true Muslims and nonbelievers. To destroy the infidels, the Kharijites declared jihad towards all other nonbelievers. The group also declared jihad toward all nonbelievers and quasi Muslims, arguing that it was legal to use any kind of operations to destroy all others besides themselves (Ozeren, 2005).

From 1980 to 1985, Hezbollah was divided into two parts. Ilımciler, which stands for armed struggle, fought cruelly against the Menzilciler group which believed that struggle could be held peaceably. The killing of the Menzilciler leader, Fidan Gungor, by Ilimciler members, almost minimized the fight between Ilimciler and Menzilciler members in 1994; however, peace was not achieved, and the groups have remained enemies (Ozeren, 2005).
The authority in these terrorist organizations generally is held by two individuals: the spiritual leader and the political leader. Both are at the top of the hierarchical structure of the Turkish Hezbollah. The spiritual leader does not have the right or authority of decision-making or the implementation of the terrorist commitments. The major importance of the spiritual leader is related to supporting the members of the organization by directing them with religious doctrines. The major importance of the political leader is related to implementing the activities of the organization. He has the authority to change or modify the variables related to terrorist acts. While the leadership positions are not intended to be held by one leader, Huseyin Velioglu holds exceptional power as both the political leader and the spiritual leader (Ozeren, 2005).

After a significant amount of effort by the leadership, the Turkish Hezbollah selected new enemies (mainly the PKK terrorist organization) and held operations to kill PKK terrorists in the cities of southeastern Turkey. The PKK also was located in southeast Turkey, where it used ferocious methods and a dogmatic ideology to collect assistance for its terrorist acts against the Turkish government (Aydintasbas, 1999). The Turkish Hezbollah desired to find its place as a key force in the region and could not concede power to its main enemy. Although the Turkish Hezbollah had an antisecularist standing, its members did not select any kinds of the state apparatus because they wanted to avoid directly facing state authorities (Aydintasbas, 1999).

Because the Turkish government’s main counterterrorism attention at this time was directed at the PKK, some people alleged that the government supported and funded the Turkish Hezbollah as a counterbalance, but the government denied that allegation.
Independent of official government support, the Turkish Hezbollah’s aim was to combat the PKK, which allowed the Turkish Hezbollah to commit acts terrorism with no fear of reprisal from the government. Charges of connections to the Turkish government are further indicated by the fact that from its founding until 2000, the Turkish Hezbollah had not committed any violent actions toward the Turkish police or security forces (Arinç, 2010). The Turkish Hezbollah did not target the state because in the early stages of the movement, its aim was to control religious groups and Kurdish troops in the area and then take control of the entire country (Nugent, 2007).

In 2000, one Turkish Hezbollah member described the types of violence they would use against those who did not obey their set of doctrines. This member said that beatings, assaults using meat cleavers, kidnappings, shootings, arsons, and attacks with acid on women who do not dress in an Islamic manner are activities of the Turkish Hezbollah (Ozeren, 2005).

The group’s condition significantly changed in the mid-1990s, as the PKK’s threat to Turkey diminished, culminating in a 1999 cease-fire. The PKK became a focus of the Turkish government when the group started to attack secular academics and journalists, feminists and religious Muslims who did not share the group’s goal of foundation of an Islamic state in Turkey. Comprehensive operations against the group by the Turkish police started in 2000, resulting in the killing of hundreds of militants throughout southeastern Turkey. Turkish police, scrutinizing the fraudulent usage of a kidnapped businessperson’s credit card, were led to a small house in the city of Beykoz, where a
shootout ensued and the group’s leader, Huseyin Velioglu, was killed. Many of its remaining members have escaped to Iran and Iraq (Arinç, 2010).

Kidnapping either aimlessly or for other reasons is another distinctive method of operation among the Turkish Hezbollah. The attacks were against PKK members, other religious organizations, and businessmen. Additionally, these kidnappings usually ended with torture and death. They used extreme coercive methods during the torture. Victims were tied up and gagged after the brutal torture. Some victims were even buried alive and left to die (Uslu, 2007).

After 1994, police operations to minimize the commitment of terrorist attacks by the Turkish Hezbollah continued; however, because of the secrecy and the complicated structure of the Turkish Hezbollah, cell operations were lengthy. Police operations in 1997 and 1998 raised the amount of intelligence available to the Turkish police (Ozeren & Sever, 2011).
CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Like other crimes, terrorism involves deviant behavior and can be explained by various criminological theories. A single theory may simply not be capable of providing an adequate explanation of terrorism because terrorism is a multidimensional phenomenon. First, it is a social and cultural problem. Most terror-related conflicts stem from ethnic- and heritage-based issues. Second, regardless of ethnicity or race, ideological dynamics play a role in terrorism. Basically, terrorism involves an organized group of individuals acting on behalf of a particular cause. Issues of ideological base, leadership, recruitment, and retention of members should be addressed in the research along with questions regarding the commitment of criminal activities by these groups. In light of this view, a number of criminological theories have been reviewed in the following paragraphs as they relate to the phenomenon of terrorism.

Social Disorganization Theory

Social disorganization theory explains the observed relationship between inequality and crime by examining the zone differences in delinquency rates. The theory was introduced by Shaw and McKay (1942) to explain urban crime and deviance. They suggest that social disorganization is the result of social characteristics that undermine informal social controls within the community and are directly related to high crime rates.
as opposed to urban ecology, depressed economic conditions, or rapid social changes (Bursik, 1988).

Comparing low and high socioeconomic communities they found that low socioeconomic status communities suffer from a weaker organizational base than higher socioeconomic status communities. Therefore, these communities have less ability to engage in both social control and the appropriate socialization of their residents (Sampson & Groves, 1989).

After assessing data collected from different studies, they realized that the zones of transition were characterized by high concentrated poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and high residential mobility (Bursik, 1988). Therefore, Shaw and Mckay argue that these neighborhood characteristics of structural disadvantage led to “social disorganization” by weakening the community’s ability to provide informal social control and socialize youth, thereby leading to higher levels of crime (Shaw & McKay, 1942).

The most significant finding of their study was that the rate of delinquency in the lower-class neighborhoods was highest near the inner city and decreased as one moved toward the more affluent areas (Akers & Sellers, 2009). Communities lacking in social capital are less effective in applying social control to reduce violence as compared to communities with higher levels of social capital (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 2003).

The systemic model of social disorganization theory tries to illuminate the phenomenon related to the characteristics of the local environment, such as poverty, population turnover and heterogeneity, and their impact on crime through the mediating effects of social ties, cohesion, and control among residents (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993).
Strong social ties and cohesive relationships between neighborhood residents are expected to facilitate responses to community problems (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993).

**Marxist Theory**

The writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had fundamental effects on world politics since the 19th century. The philosophy of Marxism developed and published by those philosophers was a reaction to the Industrial Revolution and the dominance of capitalism (Hicks, 1974). According to the Marxist perspective, injustice and inequality are two inescapable characteristics of capitalism and are the main causes of domestic and international conflict (Burke, 2009). The working class, known as the proletariat, composed the numerical majority of the community in the capitalist system (Pearlstein, 1988).

Marxism, also called Scientific Socialism, is composed of a set of social, political, and economic theories and ideas and has been used to explain social phenomena in many different fields. Marxism can be considered as a reaction to the Western Industrial Revolution and the rise of industrial capitalism as the major economic method (Hicks, 1974). There are three aspects of Marxist ideology: philosophy, economics, and history. First, Marxism is a philosophy. Marxist philosophy is based on the ideas of human character and about how human beings function in the world. Marx is interested in the relationship between materialist and idealist philosophy (Smith, 1997).

In the Marxist bunch-of-thought system, revolutionary strategy has as its goal the seizure of power and the construction of socialism. There are different kinds of
revolutionary strategies implemented in order to seize power. Examples can be seen in Russia’s, China’s, and Cuba’s communist revolutions (Smith, 1997).

For Marx and Engels (1965, p. 367) crime was simply the product of unjust and alienating social conditions—“the struggle of the isolated individual against the prevailing conditions.” With respect to the capitalistic way of thinking, the bourgeoisie stands for a relatively small proportion of the population. At the same time, it dominates the means of production and controls the political institutions, including the state.

The bourgeoisie is considered to have the ability to manipulate the justice system and use political power to promote its own interests (Burke, 2009). For that reason, workers are not given a chance to determine their social and economic conditions: They are repressed by the imperialist state policy through military or economic coercion. Marxist ideology, therefore, aims to mobilize the proletariat to defeat the capitalist mode of production and establish a socialist system, ultimately reaching the point of a classless society, which is called the communist system (Hicks, 1974). This system can be created only by revolution.

Two important elements must be in place for a successful revolution to take place. The first element is the central instrument for the revolution: a revolutionary political party that leads the proletariat and holds them together. The second element is armed resistance, which is purportedly the only means by which the struggle against imperialism can be achieved; the proletariat must form guerilla and militia forces as an alternative military power to the ones controlled by the capitalist system (Yayla & Hastings, 2005).
Those sociological and political changes had big impacts all around the world. For example, the successful socialist revolution in Russia in 1917 affected many surrounding countries, including Turkey. One of the goals of the new regime in Russia was to adopt the Marxist ideology and establish communist regimes in the countries located in different parts of the world (Ekici, 2006). Serving this purpose, the Turkish Communist Party was founded in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1920. After the foundation of the democratic Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first president of Turkey, banned all activities related to Marxist ideology (Ekici, 2006). Turkish communists went underground and secretly continued their activities until the 1960s.

The new Turkish constitution adopted after the military coup in 1960 enlarged political freedoms and permitted communist activities. Consequently, the first communist party, the Turkish Worker Party (TIP), was legitimately represented in the National Assembly, which recruited and encouraged many younger groups to act in legal ways. The main groups of that period were the Fikir Kulubu (Opinion Club) and Turkiye Devrimci Genclik Federasyonu (Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation). These youth organizations, under the names Devrimci Sol or Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left), shifted their strategy for the revolution in the late 1960s and divided into two major groups because of their different points of view for revolutionary strategy: the Turkish People’s Liberation Party and Front, under the leadership of Mahir Çayan, and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party and Front, under the leadership of Dursun Karatas (Ekici, 2006).
Differential Association and Social Learning Theory

The last criminological theory that will be used in this study is differential association and social learning theory. Social learning and differential association theories of crime are applicable to the explanation of terrorism. Both of the theories hold that individuals develop a criminal identity in an environment where criminal behaviors are valued by their loved ones (Bandura, 1973).

The theory of differential association asserts that crime is rooted in normative conflict (Sutherland & Cressey, 1978). Generally, in industrialized societies, definitions of legal codes that favor law violation exist alongside definitions unfavorable to law violation. With differential association, people experience these conflicting definitions about appropriate behavior. Thus, definitions favorable and unfavorable to delinquent or criminal behavior are learned through communication within intimate personal groups. This differential learning includes the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes—whether toward viewing legal codes as rules to be observed or broken. A person becomes delinquent when definitions favorable to violation of law exceed definitions unfavorable to violation of law (Sutherland & Cressey, 1978). Social learning theory also posits that crime is learned and reinforced, especially within groups (Akers, 1985).

These three theories provide the theoretical basis for the purposes of this study in explaining why people become terrorist organization members and whether belief in the terrorist organization’s goals makes a difference in becoming a member of the organization and involvement in the criminal activities of that organization. Before
creating an empirical methodology to examine these relationships, however, a brief review of recruitment processes of terrorist organizations is given below.

Terrorist Group Membership and Active Involvement

Terrorist groups must recruit new members in order to perpetuate their existence and provide current members with new skills and viewpoints. They lose members because of death, capture, escape, and departure from the group. Filling vacancies is a requirement to ensure the survival of the organization and the continuation of the fight for the cause. The recruitment process is highly complicated. There is no single, uniform recruitment process because there are distinct regions and nodes in which terrorist groups operate. Therefore, different terrorist groups follow different recruitment patterns (Cragin & Daly, 2004).

Tylor and Horgan (2006) suggest that it is more appropriate to investigate the individual involvement process in terrorism than to look at individual qualities and psychology. The process refers to the pathways of an individual’s involvement with terrorism, similar to other types of criminal behavior. Pathways consist of many transitions (life events) that are related to an individual’s long-term and complex process of change.

The process of becoming involved with terrorism has three dimensions: “setting events” that are related to the individuals’ socialization into family, work, religion, and the like—in other words, the individual’s past contextual influence; personal factors unrelated to the psychological and environmental context that an individual experiences at the time of involvement—in other words, the individual’s emotional state; and, the
social/political/organizational context, which provides opportunity for political, ideological, and organizational expression (Taylor & Horgan, 2006, pp. 591-593).

Gerwehr and Daly (2006) present some of the recruitment patterns that might be used by Al-Qaeda. In the net pattern, terrorists engage the target population, viewing the population as homogenous and receptive enough to be approached. Receiving a videotape from the leader of the organization or being invited to the same social activity are both examples of engagement with the target population. As can be expected, some of the target population may respond positively while some others may not. Such an approach is used when there is little opposition to the group. The most important variable in this pattern is the demographic-psychographic homogeneity of the targeted audience.

The funnel method is applicable when an individual sympathizes with the group but does not have sufficient identity and motivational requirements to be fully transformed into an actual member. This pattern assumes that the target population is ripe, so that recruiters could be sent out for propaganda-spreading purposes. The more that potential recruits demonstrate commitment to the group’s ideology, the faster they can become actual members. A recruiter’s techniques play a critical role in how long it takes to transform sympathizers into actual members.

When the target population is inaccessible because of the distance between the terrorist organization and potential recruits, the group seeks to create a context in which self-recruitment is possible. For example, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party used its leader’s death penalty conviction as a recruitment tool in European countries (Cline, 2004). Similarly, Al-Qaeda gained new members after the 9/11 attacks on the United States
(Rosenau, 2005). Terrorist groups’ preferences for individual characteristics have been an issue of concern for many scholars.

Krueger and Maleckova (2002) argue that terrorist organizations prefer volunteers with higher levels of education and skills. Intelligence, insight, the ability to conceal information, caution, and prudence are some of the skills that terrorist groups seek. Depending on their ideology and preferred types of violence, terrorist groups may target unemployed and socially alienated individuals, although this statement cannot be generalized. Less educated, adventure-seeking, or skilled individuals can be targeted for recruitment as well. In addition, regional differences may have a considerable impact on the target population of terrorists. For example, members of terrorist organizations in Western countries may be more educated, intellectual, and idealistic compared to those operating in African or Latin American countries. But regardless of their skills and educational level, recruits are expected to have the personality that the particular terrorist organization seeks.

A recruit moves from the sympathizer stage to the stage of being an actual terrorist over time, depending on his or her dedication to the organization. Recruitment usually starts in support organizations, such as student activist groups or the organization’s social activity groups. This process varies according to the type of terrorist group. For example, joining an ethnic separatist group may depend considerably on social support, whereas joining a revolutionary terrorist group may depend on "social opprobrium" (Hudson, 1999, p. 25).
Shaw’s (Shaw, 1986) personal pathway model asserts that the process of recruitment starts with the early socialization of the recruit after narcissistic injuries and escalatory events, including confrontation with police. Those who have suffered from early damage to their self-esteem have contradictory perceptions about their family beliefs and lack social actions are identified as the population at risk. At-risk populations also appear to consist of those who have been unsuccessful at obtaining a desired status in the society and been frustrated as a result.

Thus, joining a terrorist group becomes the symptom for the individual. Confrontations with security forces during these stages often provoke the individual and lead him or her to more violent activities. An individual’s personal connections play a critical role in the duration of becoming an actual terrorist.

In the public and proximate quadrant the recruiter communicates with the individual face-to-face or in a small group, such as prisons and refugee camps. The recruiter seeks individuals who are ripe for recruitment, as in the infection pattern. In the public and mediated quadrant, terrorists use mass media, including websites. There is no physical communication between the recruiter and the target population. This quadrant is amenable to the net or seed crystal pattern. If a specific individual is targeted by the terrorist group, the recruiter will use the private and proximate type of communication, which is influential on peers and relatives, and promises for conformity. Such communication takes place in intimate settings outside of the public eye. Finally, the private and mediated quadrant uses a different approach that combines mass media with intimacy (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006).
Terrorist Groups and Recruitment

As mentioned above, terrorist groups must recruit new members in order to continue their operation. They must have the ability to keep existing members inside the group and add new recruits to replace those they have lost. Berohn, Blimes, and Mewhinney (2005) break down the factors affecting recruitment into two groups: internal and external effects. Regarding internal effects, they argue that the ideology of the group and the number of the group’s attacks will impact recruitment. Dissatisfaction with the ruling government and ideological zeal are important motivating factors for new recruits.

On the other hand, regime type, economy, government response, and political structure are categorized as external factors. Terrorism is more common in countries with high levels of political and civil rights compared to those countries that have lower levels of political and civil rights (Berohn, et al., 2005). Faria and Arce (2005) argue that recruitment to terrorist groups can occur in two ways. New recruits can be convinced by organization members through a recruit’s belief in the same political cause. Individuals also may be voluntarily recruited through their strong belief in the cause, as are some revolutionaries. Faria and Arce (2005, p.263-273) call them “hard-core” type recruits. These recruits are so dedicated to the ideology of the terrorist group that they can and will fight for the cause regardless of the means.

Making a distinction between guerilla recruitment and other terrorist recruitment types, Faria and Arce (2005) note that terrorist recruitment is a “byproduct of popular and hard-core support for terrorist activities” (2005, p. 265). The ideologies, goals, and structures of terrorist organizations may have a direct influence on recruitment. For
example, unlike other terrorist organizations, ethnic terrorist groups have distinct patterns and qualifications. Contrary to public opinion, terrorists are not recruited in the technical sense—that is, they are not brought into the organization by a dedicated individual whose job it is to bring people into an organization they might otherwise be reluctant to join, such as the military. For example, jihadists typically first meet through social circles, friendship, or kinship. Then they begin to attend the local mosque together and, if it is a radical mosque advocating violent solutions to establishing a Salafi state, they gradually become radicalized (Sageman, 2004).

One of the major factors in recruitment to jihad is the role of Islam. Explanations relying merely on Islam may reflect prejudice. As Taarnby (2005) mentions in a research report submitted to the Danish Ministry of Justice, “When terrorists readily hijack commercial airliners, public schools, and relief workers, it should come as no surprise that they also hijack Islam to further their cause. Their claim to represent an Islamic truth is far too often left unchallenged” (Taarnby, 2005, p. 29).

It is believed that terrorist organizations have preferences for particular individuals when recruiting new members. For example, Al-Qaeda became selective about the quality of jihadists after improving its recruitment pool throughout the 1990s. According to Faria and Arce (2005, p.263-273) “zeal and commitment” were the principal criteria that the leaders of the organization, Osama bin Laden and Eymen Ez-Zewahiri sought in new recruits. Personal skills and preexisting target access are preferred by the organization when recruiting new members (Faria & Arce, 2005). Enhancements in recruitment pools gave the organization the opportunity to:
seek and recruit persons who already have particular technical knowledge in areas such as chemistry and engineering or operational skills such as bomb making or weapons use, rather than having to invest in developing all of these in basic recruits. (Borum, 2004, p. 480)

Recruiting new members is detrimental and cautious work for terrorist organizations for various reasons. First, the recruiter has to overcome several obstacles in dealing with the reluctant individual or sympathizer. The recruiter must provide necessary information with regard to the organization’s ideology, structure, and activities to prospective members. This process is necessary in order to convince potential recruits to join the organization, especially in cases where the recruit is a volunteer but still has suspicions about some of the organization’s activities. For the recruiter, the process consists of “clandestine spotting, assessing, developing, and formally pitching the agent” (Sageman, 2004, p. 122). Sageman notes that not all organization members will want to recruit new members because if they are discovered, they may spend years in prison or even cause many others to be prisoned as well. killed.

The prevailing socioeconomic and political conditions in a country may provide a suitable environment for terrorist organizations to recruit new members. Rosenau (2005) mentions that some East African countries, such as Kenya and Tanzania, offer ideal conditions in which Al Qaeda can recruit new members. These countries have substantial Muslim populations, unsecured borders, widespread corruption, and poverty.

Moreover, the inability of police to investigate and control illegal activities provides a safe haven for the operation of terrorist organizations and black markets. Although any country in the world may offer a potential recruitment pool for terrorist
organizations, three elements are required for a substantial pool: “lack of state capacity, a mobilizing belief and appropriate agitators” (Rosenau, 2005, p. 5).

Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003) showed that the recruitment process for terrorist groups is predominantly informal. After interviewing 35 incarcerated terrorists from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, they concluded that only a few went through a formal recruitment process before actively joining the terrorist groups. Those who were formally recruited were asked to swear their allegiance or were formally interviewed before being accepted by the terrorist group.

The majority of terrorists reported that they knew their recruiter prior to joining the group. The recruiters were either one of their family members or someone they knew from their community. The exceptions were two Islamic Jihad members who reported that they were recruited involuntarily. These two terrorists were asked to be collaborators with the Islamic Jihad or be exposed. On the other hand, some terrorists reported that they did not go through any recruitment process; rather, they joined as a result of knowledge of the organization gained from active members, their families, or siblings (Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003, pp. 173-174).

Wade (2000) argues that recruitment is heavily influenced by the groups’ ideology and goals. Two recruitment strategies are most frequently used by revolutionary groups. One of the most salient strategies is policy-based (ideological) recruitment. It relies on recruiting revolutionary challengers and mobilizing them against those who support the current regime. If an individual’s preferences are closer to those of the
revolutionaries, then they join the movement. Revolutionary elites are more likely to follow this type of recruitment strategy.

The second strategy, incentive-based recruiting, is one of various recruiting strategies that fall outside the realm of policy-based recruitment. Government policies or individual political affiliations do not affect this type of recruiting. DeNardo (1985, p. 46) mentions that incentive-based recruitment is “constant across the entire political spectrum, depending only on the ‘vigor’ of the organization.” Applying the rational choice perspective to revolutionary recruitment, Wade (2000) argues that revolutionary elites are assumed to be rational individuals who work in an environment of risk. They must be able to maintain a secretive and disciplined core group of decision makers. Therefore, they weigh the costs and benefits of their recruitment strategy.

Conclusion

These theories provide the theoretical basis for the purposes of this study in explaining why people become terrorist organization members and whether belief in the organization’s goals makes a difference in recruitment and attachment to the organization.
CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The research approach used in this study is secondary data analysis. The data set used for this study was obtained from the Turkish National Police. It consists of numerical information gathered from interviews of terror-related suspects. The interviews are actually texts of official interrogations and were obtained while an attorney was present. Thus no bias nor negative effect on the integrity of the responses is expected. However no more information is available about the whole interrogation process such as the actual setting. The data were provided by the Turkish National Police with limited use. Case identifiers and any information that might lead back to the individuals were taken out from the data set by the original collectors. The raw data set was coded in a Microsoft Excel file and was converted into Stata Statistical Software format and cleared by the researcher. The details of how the raw interviews were codified into Microsoft Excel is unknown.

Based on official data, a cross-sectional research design is used in this study. The relationship between several relevant variables is examined using multivariate statistical analysis techniques. Cross-sectional research design in considered suitable for a large group of subjects when the target group is from a wide geographical area (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000)
The unit of analysis in this research study is the individual terrorist group member. There are a total of 500 individuals examined in the data set. These individuals are convicted terrorists or terrorist suspects who are either candidate or veteran terrorists.

The main hypothesis of this study states that belief in a terrorist organization’s goals increases the likelihood of membership in a terrorist group and engagement in violent activities.

Hypotheses

The study has two hypotheses:

H1: Belief in the tenets of the terrorist organization affects likelihood of membership.

H2: Belief in the tenets of the terrorist organization affects the level of active involvement in terrorist activities.

In order to test these hypotheses, several measures were constructed from the data set and used in regression analysis. The variables are explained below.

Variables

Dependent Variables

There are two dependent variables in this study. The first is terrorist group membership. This variable measures the status of the respondent within the group. The respondents who are candidate members to the organization are given the score of zero (0), while the respondents who are members to the organization are given the score of one (1). The resulting variable is a dichotomous variable.
The second dependent variable is a measure of the terrorists’ activities. In the data
set, the respondents are asked how many criminal activities they have engaged in for the
terrorist organization. They also are asked the length of their membership in the
organization. In order to compute the activity variable, the number of activities was
divided by the length of membership. The result is a measure of activity intensity.

*Independent Variables*

*Belief*

One of the focuses of individual-level studies on terrorists is whether terrorist
group members are criminally prone individuals. Research has shown that not all
terrorists are criminals (Silke, 2003). Therefore, the main question here is why nonviolent
people would become violent and cold-blooded law-breakers when they become
terrorists. Studies show that unlike gangs or criminal entities, terrorist groups do not
specifically search for criminals to recruit to their organizations (Jenkins, 2011; Klein,
2005; Lennings, Amon, Brummert, & Lennings, 2010; Miller & Mills, 2010; Stahl,
2006). Thus with recruitment, a sense of attachment and belonging occurs with the
terrorist group members, and they resort to violence on behalf of the organization and do
not necessarily consider their actions as crime in the general sense (Silke, 2003). Here,
belief is a measure of attachment and adherence to the terrorist organization. In the data
set, the respondents were asked various questions that measure their attachment to the
tenets of the terrorist organization and apathy and enmity toward the laws and rules of the
mainstream society and the government.
The belief variable (essentially an index variable) was created by combining multiple interview questions that measure the phenomenon. The index is composed of the following questions: (1) The Turkish government is an oppressive country and should be overthrown, (2) We are in a state of war against the Turkish government, (3) One should sacrifice all for freedom from the oppression of the government, (4) A worthy cause deserves worthy lives, and (5) All problems of our nation will be solved if the government is overthrown. The Cronbach’s alpha\(^1\) value (scale reliability coefficient) for the index is 0.7201. While no certain cut-off point is set for this statistical value, the generally accepted minimum value for reliability is considered to be 0.7 (Chatterjee, Hadi, & Price, 2000). Thus, the belief variable used in this study is regarded as a reliable measure of respondents’ attachment and adherence to the tenets of the terrorist organization to which they belong. In order to create the belief variable, all five of the variables measuring various aspects of the attachment to the organization were added together. Each of these variables range from 0 (disagree) to 2 (agree), where 1 represents neither agreement nor disagreement. The resulting variable ranges from zero to 10.

While this variable is operationalized to measure terror suspects’ attachment to the tenets of their respective organizations, the items that comprise the variable capture mostly feelings of hatred toward the ruling government or the state, which is considered despotic and oppressive. Whether asking for a part of the land to be separated from the main land in order to establish an independent state or whether to establish a new regime on the main land, the basic idea behind terrorist groups in Turkey is to overthrow the

---

\(^{1}\) Cronbach’s alpha is a measures internal consistency of whether a set of variables measure a one-dimensional latent construct (Peterson, 1994).
government based upon the argument that the government is tyrannical and violent action is the sole path to achieving the goals of the terrorist organization.

Thus, while the variable is defined as the belief in the tenets of the terrorist organization, the belief here refers to the methods of the terrorist organization and not necessarily to the core idea. In other words, belief here refers to the means not the end. The end goal might vary from organization to organization, yet the means always seem to be the same: overthrow the state through violence. Here belief is a measure of acceptance of those common means.

The results of the statistical analysis suggest that economic reasons are an important factor in membership and active involvement. This result also supports the social disorganization theory.

Motivation

In the data set, the respondents were given the following reasons for joining the terrorist organization and asked to choose the one that most closely represents their main initial motivation for joining: (1) inquisitiveness, (2) personal reasons, (3) socialization, (4) lack of family control, and (5) economic reasons. In order to measure motivation, five dichotomous variables were created from the choices; one was omitted as a reference group. Four dichotomous variables (inquisitiveness, socialization, lack of family control, economic reasons) are included in the analysis that range in values from zero to 1. The reference group is personal reasons.
Terrorist Group Type

A measure of the type of the terrorist organization was created as a dichotomous variable where the reference group is leftist/radical (value is zero). The main group represented by the variable is separatist (value is 1).

Sociodemographics

Sociodemographic variables are essential elements in statistical analyses that strive to establish theoretically accurate and reliable models for testing relationships between individual attributes and criminal behavior because most individual-level crime theories base their crucial assumptions on the demographic properties of individuals (Demir, 2009). Thus, demographic characteristics can account for statistical explanations of crime and correlates of crime (Fox, 2000).

Economic status is included in the models in order to control for the effect of social disorganization; work status is included in the models as a proxy measure of Marxist theory as explained in the theoretical framework section of this paper.

Crime literature suggests that age is an important predictor of criminal behavior because crimes are mostly committed at early stages of life (between 13 and 24 years of age) and, unless criminal behavior becomes a life-style, the habit starts to decrease at later stages of life (Farrington, 1986). Therefore, age is included in the models as a control variable. Based on theories in which it is argued that males are more likely than females to commit crimes (Messerschmitt, 2003), gender also is included in the models. Likewise, educational attainment (a measure of success in life), marital status (a measure
of social bonds), occupational status (a measure of stability and social control), and economic status are added to the models as control variables.

Research shows that no consensus exists to support the assumption that systematic personality differences can differentiate terrorists from nonterrorists (Silke, 2003). Psychological components of terrorism also are related to sociological variables. For example, the syndrome approach states that terrorism has some external root causes—such as poverty, low education, and political oppression—that are common to all types of terrorism.

A corollary of this perspective is that the removal of these root causes will help end terrorism. However, the empirical support for the proposition that poverty and political oppression are the root causes of terrorism is elusive. Poverty and socioeconomic conditions can be contributing factors, but they are not the root causes of terrorism (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003).

Although some studies lend empirical support to the hypothesis that poverty is correlated with terrorism (Collier, 2000; Khashan, 2003), the majority of studies have failed to indicate the correlation between them (Horgan, 2003; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Piazza, 2006; Tilly, 1978). For example, Hassan (2001) notes that although some of the suicide bombers of Hamas in Palestine are promised that the organization will regularly make payments to their families, economic gain is not the sole motivation for suicide bombers. It is believed that desire and support for the movement motivate suicide bombers.
The relationship between education and terrorism is elusive as an explicit cause of the activity. Despite the common belief that uneducated people are more likely to join terrorist groups, research on the subject shows that educated individuals may be more likely to join a terrorist group if they believe that they can have leadership positions or if the legal sector offers fewer payoffs than participating in a terrorist organization (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003). Evidence presented by Hassan (2001) about Hamas’ suicide bombers shows that educational attainment is a precursor to an individual’s determination and commitment to a cause.

Terrorist groups may not prefer uneducated individuals, married individuals, or sole wage earners. Krueger and Maleckova (2002) have shown that little connection exists between education or poverty and an individual’s participation in terrorism. Using public opinion polls, they concluded that suicide bombers are more likely to come from educated families and have highly regarded occupations. Russell and Miller (1983) gathered information from newspapers about 350 terrorists from different countries in Asia, Europe, and Latin America and found that the majority of terrorists are well-educated. It is notable that more than 50% of these terrorists had completed some university training or had graduated from a university.

**Ethnicity**

Unlike U.S. ethnic background or racial affinity, ethnicity is not studied as a correlate of crime because there is no body of evidence to show that ethnic or racial diversity matters in the decision to engage in crime in Turkey. However, given the nature of this study and the fact that some terrorist organizations only accept members from a
certain racial or ethnic background, this measure is included in the models. Ethnicity is a
dichotomous variable where the reference group is Turk (value is zero).

Religious Link

Religious affiliation is a measure added in the analysis because some terrorist
organizations exploit religious affiliation for their purposes as in the case of the PKK
adding Alevi individuals and Hezbollah adding exclusively Sunni individuals to their
ranks. This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is Sunni (value is zero).

Descriptive statistics for the variables explained above are given in Table 1.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Activity</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>1.595</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanatory Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>8.545</td>
<td>0.987</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>24.882</td>
<td>19.655</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>57.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status (married)</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>5.651</td>
<td>2.003</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Status (working)</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity (Kurdish)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0.567</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Link (Alevi)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Status</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1.459</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inquisitiveness</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Control</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Reasons</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (separatist)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regression Analysis

There are two dependent variables in this study. The first dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that measures terrorist organization membership. Given the nature of this variable, binomial logistic regression was used with maximum likelihood estimation. The other dependent variable is a continuous variable that measures intensity of terrorist activity.

For binomial logistic regression, the Stata statistical software was used. Before the final maximum likelihood estimation, collinearity among the independent variables was checked\textsuperscript{2}. The collinearity statistics showed that there is no multicollinearity in the model because the largest variance inflation factor is not greater than 10 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980; Greene, 2003).

Other diagnostics were completed for the model, including outliers and influential cases based on the procedures recommended by Long and Freese (2006). No outliers or influential cases were detected\textsuperscript{3}.

For ordinary least squares regression analysis of the continuous dependent variable, the Stata statistical software was used. Before deciding on the final model, regular regression diagnostics for outliers, nonlinearity, heteroskedasticity, and multicollinearity were completed using appropriate procedures.

The results of both statistical analyses are shown in Table 2.

---

\textsuperscript{2} For this diagnostic, the “collin” command in Stata was used.
\textsuperscript{3} Standardized residuals were examined on a scatter plot for outliers. Cook’s distance values were examined for influential cases.
## Table 2. Regression Analyses of Terrorist Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Membership</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Activity Intensity</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belief</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47**</td>
<td>1.52***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.95**</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Membership</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Dependent Variable: Activity Intensity</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.62**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status (married)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Status (working)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity (Kurdish)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Link (Alevi)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Status</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>-0.63***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inquisitiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.86**</td>
<td>0.79**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Control</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Reasons</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.34***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type (separatist)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.39*</td>
<td>0.67*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td>10.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.04)</td>
<td>(2.53)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td>470</td>
<td>468</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-squared</td>
<td></td>
<td>89.54***</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>10.61***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors in brackets.
* Denotes t-value significant at .05 (2-tailed).
** Denotes t-value significant at .01 (2-tailed).
*** Denotes t-value significant at .001 level (2-tailed).
As seen in the table, the main explanatory variable is significantly associated with the dependent variables for both of the models. In the first model where the dependent variable is membership, belief is highly significant and thus the hypothesis that belief in the tenets of the terrorist organization affects the likelihood of membership is retained. There is a positive relationship between belief and likelihood of membership. Economic status and educational level significantly and reversely affect the likelihood of membership. As the level of education and economic prosperity increase, the likelihood of membership decreases.

In the second model where the dependent variable is intensity of terror related criminal activities, the main explanatory variable is highly significant. In other words, as the belief in the tenets of the terrorist organization increases, the intensity of the criminal activities committed on behalf of the terrorist organization also increases. Here also the hypothesis that belief in the tenets of the terrorist organization affects the level of active involvement in terrorist activities is retained. In this model, membership is added as an additional explanatory variable. Along with belief, membership also affects the level of involvement in terrorist activities. Here, the level of education is not significantly associated with the dependent variable while economic status is.

Conclusion
This chapter statistically examined the relationship between belief and membership and belief and terrorist activity. As hypothesized, as the level of belief increases, the likelihood of membership in the organization and the intensity of active involvement in
terrorist activities also increase. The results of the statistical models are discussed within a wider context in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Summary and Discussion of Key Findings

In this chapter the findings of the study on terrorist organization membership is discussed along with recommendations and policy implications.

The future of a terrorist organization depends on successful recruitment of new members and the strict belief of its members in the goals of the organization. This study examined the relationship between belief and terrorist activity and found that as the level of belief increases, the individual terrorist organization member is more likely to engage in violent crimes on behalf of the organization.

Limitations, Policy Implications, and Future Research

Limitations

The data set used in this study was created based on interviews (interrogations) of terrorists. In that sense, the data are based on self-reports. While self-reports are highly useful for collecting detailed information about the sociological, psychological, and environmental factors that affect an individual’s behavior (Thornberry & Krohn, 1994), they also may have flaws, such as under- or over-reporting, response falsification, bias-associated recall errors, and the testing (interview) effect (Thornberry & Krohn, 1994). In the data set used for this study, the text of the interviews contains limited or no
information on the reasons why terrorist organizations prefer certain individuals over others or the criteria terrorist organizations use for recruitment decisions. Thus the researcher cannot deeply delve into those issues for research purposes.

Another issue with the current research is generalization. Although within the data set used in the study, there are individuals from different regions of Turkey, the data are limited by the individuals’ location of capture or arrest. Likewise, the findings of the study should be considered carefully when attempting to research other terrorist groups operating in different countries.

Policy Implications

The profiles of recent Boston bombers have taught us that if people believe in the tenets of a terrorist organization they can start to move by self-enlistments. The profiling of these bombers shows that they are not psychotic persons nor do they have mental diseases; rather, they have strong beliefs in their struggle.

It is not easy to predict the future success of terrorist organizations, but we can develop new strategies that will contribute to their failure. Among those strategies are the quality of understanding the belief system of people who are prone to participate in terrorist organizations and political reforms in relevant regions. The bitter experience of Turkey has shown that military and forceful confrontations with terrorism do not necessarily eliminate the threat effectively. While Turkey succeeded in some cases, in other she failed to do so. The case with the PKK has taught us that seeking venues of mutual understanding can help remove the threat of terrorism better. One venue might be to let terrorist organizations seek their goals on a legitimate basis. The idea of a race-
based political party was not appealing at first, but nowadays peace negotiations continue with the insurgents via the political party. These developments in Turkey show that plural and more responsive approaches toward specific societies would alleviate grievances terrorist organization exploit.

Remembering the communist hunt in the United States in the 1960s, legalizing every thought—no matter how undemocratic they are—might be a political hot potato because not every political environment is ready for such an action. Yet a middle ground can be and should be found in order to prevent more tragic events other than the loss of a couple of votes.

Future Research

While terrorist organization members do not necessarily have criminal tendencies, when crimes are committed for the sake of the organization and are based on their belief that their actions are just, they can easily engage in criminal actions. Somehow when they become members of a terrorist organization, they are indoctrinated with excuses and justifications that allow them to easily engage in criminal activity. Therefore, based on that insight, further studies should explore the terrorist mind with the goal of understanding how this indoctrination occurs.
REFERENCES


