GOVERNMENTALITY, BIOPOLITICS, AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE SPATIAL DIALECTIC PRODUCTION OF UYGHUR DURING THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’

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Firstly, this thesis is dedicated simply to ourselves. I am not, or moreover could not, just be here, authoring a text. Rather, I am a product of ‘ourselves,’ the expansive intertextual realm to social space, of which my position and situated knowledge produce my relational existence in society. Thereby, I acknowledge all those things that have assisted in bringing me to the position of this work and have made it possible.

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Chapter 1: Governmentality and Stateness

I. Introduction

Today, Abu Bakr Qassim, a Uyghur from Xinjiang, China is making pizzas at a small Halal restaurant called Piceri MeGusto in Tirana, Albania.¹ After the day’s work he will return home to his wife of one year, and newborn daughter. He happily took the job, quickly learning the tasks involved in the process and, by all accounts, he is quite good at his job, consistently making excellent pizza. Despite Qassim’s seeming contentment with his present circumstances, this small snapshot of his everyday life, the banal and often mundane present he experiences, says nothing of the past twelve years for him, or more poignantly, why he is in Albania making pizza at all.

In October 2001 the United States, along with other coalition member states, began military operations in Afghanistan. Qassim, and a group of twenty-one other Uyghur men, who had fled China in 2000 because of persecution, attempted to flee Afghanistan in 2002 for Pakistan due to the increasing violence. While crossing the border they were detained by Pakistani forces, and after the US offered $5,000 bounties

¹ The following account of Abu Bakr Qassim is derived from the following article and interview: (Shephard 2012; Shorrock 2012).
to Pakistani forces for any persons detained after fleeing Afghanistan, they were sold to the US. After being beaten and questioned at American’s Kandahar base they were transferred to the Guantanamo Bay detention center. The US rather quickly discovered that the twenty-two detained Uyghurs actually had no connections to al-Qaeda or the Taliban, and were not “enemy combatants.”

The US could not, fearing the inevitable humanitarian backlash, return Qassim, or the other Uyghurs, to China, as their guilt and certain execution were all but foretold. Despite the Pentagon clearing the twenty-two men for release, public concern in the US grew over knowledge that some of the twenty-two Uyghurs would be resettled in the US. Having those men who had been “declared the worst of the worst on our soil” was an unpalatable development for an American society in the throes of a new global ‘War on Terror.’ Over the next twelve years the US has attempted to find states willing to take on the detainees, with very limited expediency and success. Indeed, the US was unwilling to expedite the release of the innocent detainees given China’s significant role in assisting the US war in Iraq, for fear that China would back out; leaving US forces, and by extension the US’s population and territory, increasingly vulnerable. Additionally, other states were reluctant to grant the innocent detainees safe haven. States were concerned that accepting the detainees would deteriorate their relations with China, affecting their trade relationships, military assistance, or standing within the ‘international community.’ As a result Qassim and the others were to remain in the
Guantanamo Bay detention camp awaiting action by states that would calculate and determine their future.

In 2006 Qassim and three other Uyghurs were released when Albania decided to take them on. In the years since other members of the original twenty-two have been resettled in Bermuda, Palau, Sweden and Switzerland. As of this writing, five of the twenty-two remain detained at Guantanamo Bay; and there has not been any detainee released since January, 2011.

The situation of Qassim and the other Uyghur detainees is markedly illustrative of globalizing and incisive presence of the ‘War on Terror’ and its normalized notions of difference. Indeed, how are Uyghurs made to fit into dominant narratives of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ produced through the ‘War on Terror’? What is the role of states in producing difference: the rightness and wrongness of people and places? As the populations that make up states, how are societies responsible for how difference is mediated in the territorially bounded and defined state?

Governance and systems of conduct prove rarely to be stable and certainly ahistorical. The global ‘War on Terror’ has resulted in changing governance by states over populations. As the situation of Qassim and the other detainees’ shows, evolving governance within the state has become increasingly problematic for those individuals and populations deemed to be different. For instance, the reason for their detention by the Pakistani military after crossing the border was that they were in a space they
should not have been in; never mind that they were likely attempting to remove themselves from harm’s way in Afghanistan, and before that China. When the US offered monetary reward for any individuals who had fled Afghanistan and had been captured, their difference was valued and even calculated in monetary terms; simply because they had been in a place, Afghanistan, that the US determined they should not have been in. According to the values of American society, and by extension the United States that it comprises, the Uyghurs were not to be accepted because simply being associated with a place like Afghanistan meant one did not, or could not have a place in American society. From the position of the state, whether it is China, Pakistan or the US, the twenty-two Uyghurs had not conducted themselves responsibly. They had not adhered to the normative ways in which subjects of the state should conduct themselves; simply, it was their continued incongruence with space, which allowed their difference to be produced.

The desired conduct and subjectivity of people has been and continues to be redefined as the ‘War on Terror’ continues. As conduct is the object of government, and it is states which, through governmental apparatus, met out the norms of conduct spatially, it is paramount to understand the operation of states as governmental entities within the ‘War on Terror.’ I am particularly interested in the discursivity of the ‘War on Terror’ and its related governmental practice by states. Specifically, I am concerned with discursive state production of what and how ‘Uyghur’ is during the ‘War on Terror.’ How is the discursive ontological status of ‘Uyghur’ rationalized? After all, it is the
discursive governmental practice of states, as the dominant mode of social organization, which allows Abu Bakr Qassim to be alive, to work, to go home to his family tonight, while five of his friends remain in Guantanamo Bay, in indefinite ambiguity.

II. Governmentality

Governmentality is foremost the art, practice, rationality, and calculated means of government. The study of governmentality seeks an understanding of authority and the ‘conduct of conduct’ of government as anything but self-evident, giving priority to ‘how’ questions (Dean 2012, 16–21). Furthermore, and specifically of interest to a spatial understanding of governance and the ‘War on Terror,’ the priority of ‘how’ questions for government lends itself to formations of knowledge and expertise regarding certain places and people. An example: how does the People’s Republic of China (PRC) produce knowledge about its sovereign spaces; about Xinjiang? How is the population of Xinjiang known? How does knowledge regarding Xinjiang and its population ‘normalize and rationalize’ the PRC’s governance of sovereign territory/space or the populations of Xinjiang themselves? How does this knowledge and its normalization authorize the state, its territory and sovereignty (and social organization)?

Practices of government may be thought of as a diverse, relational collection of assemblages or regimes. While, though these assemblages are diverse, they cannot be
understood as reducible to a certain set of relations or a particular notion or value.

Additionally, the material practices of regimes of governance are composed of specific forms of knowledge, thought and truth, which dictate the structures of those practices and thus what can be known within a specific regime (Dean 2012, 40–41). Dean, following Giles Deleuze (1991), elaborates that these regimes may be broken down into four related, yet autonomous ‘dimensions;’ 1) fields of visibility of government; 2) technical aspect of government; 3) the approach of government as rational and thoughtful activity; and 4) the formation of identities (Dean 2012, 41–44). Similarly, Stephen Legg (2005) presents an assessment of Foucault’s governmentality and its possible connections with population geography. Legg, noting prior work on governmental rationality and practice by Rose (1996), Dean (1999) and Hindess (Dean and Hindess 1998), breaks down regimes of government and governmentality into five distinguishable, but not mutually exclusive dimensions; episteme; identities; visibility; techne; and ethos; thus, forming a “basis of an ‘analytics of governmentality’” relating specifically to a spatial understanding of government and population (2005, 147).

The connections between Legg’s five aspects of governance, and Dean’s similar four dimensions, suggest regimes of governance are organized through specific political rationality, wherein subjects are ordered through the construction of relationally, contextually and spatially contingent truths. This points to the ardent arbitrariness of identities; those populations produced through specific practices of government. Those subjected bodies retain value and meaning only within those certain governed spaces;
when acting outside those spaces they are either cast off or adjusted through practices of government.

First, fields of visibility of government are those material objects that make relations of authority apparent, whilst simultaneously obscuring certain relations. These objects take the form graphs, tables, maps, etc., which visualize the “fields to be governed.” These visualizations make it possible to see “who and what are to be governed” and the spatiality of authority and obedience. Certain regimes of practices are concerned with certain forms of visible governance and making specific relations of authority visible through space (Dean 2012, 41). Legg (2005, 148) identifies ‘visibility’ as referring to the “ways of seeing and representing reality.” These visible aspects of reality work to suggest certain relations “between subjects and space.” For instance, we may ask, how does the state become visible; in what ways does it practice governance spatially within its territory? How does the PRC become and remain visible in its sovereign space; in Xinjiang?

Second, technical aspects of government, what Dean has also called *techne* (Dean 1995), are those means by which “authority is constituted and rule accomplished.” They are those mechanisms, procedures, tactics and vocabularies that enact governance and make it possible to govern. Furthermore, the technical aspects of government impose limits on what can and cannot be done, thus realizing the values of governance. Taking into consideration techniques of government contests those
notions, or models, of government as solely a modus for the “manifestation of values, ideologies, worldviews, etc.” thus, elucidating the often mundane, ‘everyday,’ yet salient aspects of governmental assemblages. Techne is identified by Legg (2005, 148) as the “technologies of government;” the “ways of intervening in reality” through certain practices in relation to those visible and identifiable aspects of ‘truth.’ How might the spatiality of the state adjust to retain specific aspects of authority; how does producing certain spatial truths retain such authority? How do the practices and processes of sovereignty carried out by the PRC legitimate rule?

Third, government as rational and thoughtful activity, what Dean has also called the episteme of government (Dean 1995), “concerns the forms of knowledge that arise from and inform the activity of governing” (Dean 2012, 42). Of significance here is how practices of governing produce and are produced through forms of thought, knowledge and rationality; and how these practices “give rise to specific forms of truth.” Thought, and thus truth, is spatial, having both a time and space, and materializes in a definite form; it is here where the ‘-mentality’ of ‘governmentality’ is established. Government “has an intrinsically programmatic character,” in that the conduct of government endeavors to reform and regulate upon current governmental practices to improve upon what occurs within regimes of practices. Hence, government is both affirming and self-affirming in and through its’ practices, continually concerned with the ‘conduct of conduct’ and its’ own relevance and legitimation. (Dean 2012, 43)
Similar to Dean, Legg (2005, 147) describes ‘episteme’ as “distinctive ways of thinking and questioning,” which uses “certain vocabularies and procedures for the production of truth.” Here we may see truth as malleable, and that it is through practices of enunciation that truth is adjusted over space and time. Ordering of ‘truth’ is accomplished and produced through practices of government. ‘Truth’ regarding aspects of a given population may be adjusted or transformed by, for example, their own enunicative acts; or through produced knowledge, such as the act of speech about that given population by others. Through these distinctive and malleable ways of enunciation and truth construction, knowledge regarding people, places and things become normalized and naturalized. Ways of thinking become passive and sterile through specific and often banal, normative ways of questioning reality.

Fourth, the formation of identities through regimes of practices is concerned with the various individual and collective identities through which government operates. Here objects, and that which identifies those objects, are taken as a medium through which that which is knowable manifests. Questions revolve around “what forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different practices of government and what sorts of transformation do these practices seek?” (Dean 2012, 43) Additionally, how are those in authoritative positions to conduct governance; how are those bodies who are governed to conduct themselves and be conducted; how are certain populations to transform their conduct whence the rationality and values of government change?
‘Identities’ is described by Legg (2005, 148) to be “the epistemological conception” of those populations to be governed. Of importance is the position of those governed populations, their capacity of conduct. It is here where those distinctive ways of thinking about populations intersect with those ‘truths’ managed through governmental practices. How populations are seen, and thus represented, is continually mediated through truth regimes.

A prime and pertinent example of identities and mediated ‘truths’ is that of names for the spaces of western China. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Xinjaig (Province) and East Turkestan all may refer, literally, to the same bounded space in western China. XUAR refers to the governmental apparatus of the province, supported by the PRC; the name is specifically construed to produce the notion that the governmental aspects of this province are somehow more-or-less separated (autonomous) from that of Beijing and the PRC. This veil of autonomy for the Uyghur is represented, and rather obviously counteracted, in another name for this space: Xinjiang, or Xinjiang Province. Xinjiang is used to speak about the space, and often the bounded, territorial province itself, usually by Han Chinese, the PRC, or when speaking to non-Chinese; as those outside of China most readily know Xinjiang as the name of the northwestern-most province of China. Additionally and readily displaying the colonial nature of any naming of this area, in the Han language Xinjiang translates roughly to “new territory or new frontier” (Starr 2004, 6). The identifier East Turkestan is used by Uyghurs seeking to invoke opposition to the Chinese state and those sympathetic to the
Uyghur cause for independence. However, the term East Turkestan is also used by the PRC and the XUAR governments when invoking discourses of “terrorism” or violence when speaking about this space and/or its population; this specifically in attempts to associate those feelings of independence with aspects of violence and terrorism. Thus throughout this thesis, descriptors of this space will vary. When various actors, such as PRC government officials, speak of this space they do so within the wider context of spatial referents given their position within those extensive and permeating logics of space.

For the purposes of this thesis I will use the terms interchangeably, in accordance to what I am speaking about, or how whom I write about, speaks about the space; i.e. the government of the space (XUAR), or the space from the PRC’s point of view (Xinjiang/XUAR), or the space from the point of view of the PRC when speaking about Uyghurs (East Turkestan) and especially when associating Uyghurs with terrorism.

The fifth dimension identified by Legg, ethos, is described as “the moral form which distributes tasks in relation to ideals or principles of government; the orientation invested in practices” (2005, 148–149). Because this distribution of tasks is carried out through regimes of produced ‘truths,’ herein we may begin questioning: “who benefits from a regime of government? Where and with whom are values invested?” In other words, in what population(s) is value given; how is this value authorized; and who or
what benefits from its authorization? Does the greater population (Han, Uyghur, etc.) of Xinjiang benefit from the authority of the PRC; just the Han; just the Uyghur?

Herein I intend to provide both an analysis of the emergence and transformation of spatially constituted governance, while simultaneously calling into question the taken-for-granted-ness of the conditions of that governance, in the form of the state. Especially of concern is the interaction between governance, population and space in the realm of shifting rationalities of government and formation of identifiers. It is my contention that the state, as currently constituted in its modern, spatially fixed, monolithically treated form, belies its own contradictions as a governmental entity; thus the practices and conduct of the state must not be left unquestioned.

III. Conceptualizing the State and Capital

To begin engaging interactions between governmental regimes and population we must engage the current mode of practices that form the basis of social organization, which govern population: the state. Furthermore, there exists a need to engage the notion of the state and its constitution in relation to its coinciding processes of capital, territory, nature, and population, which also serve as a ground for social organization and mode of governance.

The emergence of a capitalistic mode of production coincides with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, a point in Western history associated with the first emergence of
the modern state. From this point until the early 1800s the mode of capital for emerging states was mercantile capitalism. Industrial capital was the primary mode of production throughout the 1800s and into the early 1900s; this followed by the Keynesian welfare model emerging during the Great Depression in the 1930s and ending roughly in the 1970s with Western states transitioning to neoliberal capital. Throughout this evolution of the mode of production in conjunction with what is known as the state, it is clear that the capitalistic mode of production has not existed without its coinciding processes of governmentality and stateness. Capitalism has emerged coterminously with the state. (Elden 2007, 570; Harvey 2003)

As a mode of social organization and governmental practice, the state and processes of capital must organize spatially. When crises or contradictions of capital arise a spatial reorganization through the state, occasionally in the form of geographical expansion, is necessitated; this proposed theory is termed a ‘spatial fix’ (Harvey 2003, 87–88, 115; Harvey 2001; Harvey 1999). Capitalism is based on continued, sustained growth; capital accumulation. Thus, capitalism is grounded, in part, on a logic of spatial expansion, what could be termed ‘capitalist imperialism.’ Harvey (2003, 26) defines “’capitalist imperialism’ as a contradictory fusion of ‘the politics of state and empire’ (imperialism as a distinctively political project on the part of actors whose power is based in command of a territory and a capacity to mobilize its human2 and natural

2 Continued discussion on the notion of humans or population being mobilized into efficient modes of economic practice will occur in subsequent discussion of Foucault’s biopower and biopolitics.
resources towards political, economic, and military ends) and ‘the molecular processes
of capital accumulation in space and time’ (imperialism as a diffuse political-economic
process in space and time in which command over and use of capital takes primacy).”
Harvey establishes both a territorial and capitalist logic of power, which are distinct
from each other, though they also “intertwine in complex and sometimes contradictory
ways” (2003, 29).

Now, let us step back and broadly consider the concept of territory. Stuart Elden
(2009, xxv–xxvi) contributes to our understanding of territory by defining it as “a
political and legal term concerning the relation between sovereignty, land, and people;”
while it is “traditionally understood to be a bounded space under the control of a group
of people, usually a state.” It should be understood that it is both the state that makes
the population, and the population that makes the state; and it is through territory
which this relation takes place. While population is necessary to maintain the territory
of the state, it is also necessary for furthering the notion of sovereignty. Notions of
sovereignty become increasingly significant as differing notions of the practice of
sovereignty arise based on differing governmental assemblages and structures.
Ultimately we will see in subsequent chapters that differences in the practice of
sovereignty will cause a problematization of the normative notion of the state, in that a
dominant notion of sovereignty arises through the ‘War on Terror’, while alternative
practices of sovereignty are required to undergo governmental adjustment, or face
termination.
As I elaborated in the prior section, within the modern state population becomes a significant resource. Elden (2007, 574), synthesizing Foucault, details the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 was not territorial, in that it was not original in creating space to be governed. What it did accomplish was shift the focus of government “to what goes on within the interior of the territory concerning” the population of the state. Bruce Braun (2000, 12) adds to this notion of an increased focus on the attributes of population within sovereign space, noting “that the problem of population and its improvement necessarily brought the state directly into contact with its territory—and more precisely, with the qualities of this territory.” It is the relations between territory, as the foundation of the state, and the population, as the moveable parts within the state, which play a key role for practices of government, of political rule. Indeed Elden (2007, 575) continues, contending “that the variables, the measures” of population and territory “become part of the means of political rule, a central theme within the mechanisms of government.” It is within the relations population and non-static territory through which things may be ordered within states.

Furthermore, sovereignty and its contingency are also deeply connected to notions of territory and borders. International law has qualified that, should a state be operating within the parameters of internationally accepted law, a state possess the following aspects: a permanent population; a defined territory; a government; and the capacity to enter relations with other states abiding by international law. This logic gives the state territorial integrity, contingent upon their allowance of other states to
maintain these characteristics; this notion also sets the stage for the emergence of private property. Contingent sovereignty, therefore, allows for a sovereign monopoly of the state over their population and territory should the state not interfere with the ability of other states to be sovereign. Contingent sovereignty became especially at issue during the Cold War, with interventions by the United States and USSR throughout the world, and perhaps has become more complex since its end, and continuation through the ‘War on Terror’ (Elden 2009, 139–151).

With the territorial and capitalist logics of power being simultaneously distinct, yet often similar, their relation is dialectical. The dialectical relation, Harvey (2003, 30) describes, “sets the stage for an analysis of capitalist imperialism in terms of the intersection of these two” logics of power (emphasis added). Harvey also elaborates upon “the importance of the state as a territorialized framework” wherein the processes of capital accumulation function (2003, 89).

The contradictions at the intersection of these logics, I argue, become apparent within the spaces, the territory, of states, and specifically within those ‘things,’ those ‘human and natural resources,’ which become the subjects of practices of government. The necessity for the (re)ordering of subjects, and thus space (spatial fix), derives from contradictions within the relations between states and capital. Governmental practices and calculations within the reified state allow us to simultaneously view the arbitrary
production and consumption of its subjects (human and non-human), all-the-while airing its limited, malleable and contradictory resolution.

Recently there has been a shift in the understanding and conceptualization of the state, largely from a revisiting of Michel Foucault’s work on the state (Jessop 2007). Previous and often popular conceptions of state theory rely on an essentialized or reified view of the state. Synthesizing Foucault, Jessop discusses Foucault’s “problematic of government” where he explores the “historical constitution and periodization of the state” and the important “dimensions of power relations and their associated discourses” of the state (Jessop 2007, 36). Jessop (2007, 37) then discusses Foucault’s assertion of the state functioning through governmentality which operates as “the ensemble constituted by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that permit the exercise of this quite specific, albeit very complex form of power, which has, as its principle target, population...” (Foucault 2007). Thus we can see Foucault rejecting the essentialized state, and rather, focusing analysis on the relational discourses that create what is known as the state. We may come to view the state as merely an assemblage of institutions, ideas, and practices rather than a monolithic sovereign entity. Foucault also elucidates the purpose of governmentality, which he asserts is the control and ordering of population to serve the purposes of the assembled and organized discourses manifest as the state.
To further our understanding of relations of the state to its population we turn now to the notion of biopower; the power over life and life’s representations. Foucault detailed two aspects of biopower:\textsuperscript{3}: anatamo-politics and bio-politics (1988, 138–141). These two concepts, Foucault expounds, are “not antithetical,” but “rather two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations” (1988, 139). Anatamo-politics centers on the human body; on disciplining the individual. Attention from governmental practices focuses on simultaneously increasing the usefulness and docility of bodies, while integrating them into efficient economic and social apparatuses. Through the logics of governmentality, bodies are to be optimized through disciplining practices (such as through militaries, schools, prisons or factories)\textsuperscript{4} to extort value while retaining authority.

‘Bio-politics,’ as described by Foucault, focuses largely on the “species body,” or the population; “the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes...” (1988, 139). Legg emphasizes that biopolitical practices, while playing themselves out spatially, inform each other through “infinite possible networks of cause and effect” and that a “failure to realise these connections allows technologies and strategies of government to appear natural and power-neutral” (2005, 3).

\textsuperscript{3} Biopower, I argue, is an \textit{episteme} of the state and of population. It is the rationale behind practices of the government over life; and with it come the coinciding dimensions of governmentality (see Dean (1999) and Legg (2005), governmentality).

\textsuperscript{4} Militaries, schools, etc. are those \textit{visible}, disciplining practices of an anatamo-politics. Here we are reminded of Dean (1999) and Legg’s (2005) dimensions of governmentality, specifically in this case, \textit{techne}. 
144). Maurizio Lazzarato (2002, 104) adds that “biopolitics is the strategic coordination of...power relations” with the purpose of extracting “surplus power from living beings”; it is a strategic relation.\(^5\) Biopolitics arose through the notion and study of population as a concept (demography)\(^6\) and is concerned with the ‘health of the population.’ Within biopolitical thought, Foucault (2007, 353) suggests, population should be thought of not as an absolutely value, but rather calculated in relative terms. Practices of government thus concern themselves with “propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity” and with the myriad conditions that cause these to vary” (Foucault 1988, 139); these identified as being measurable, calculable aspects of population. The state, as the ubiquitous mode of social and economic organization, is largely responsible for implementing the knowledges of demography with its coinciding practices\(^7\) in order to achieve its epistemic goals.

Through the production of useful laborers, docile bodies and the modification of population in relation to the state through demographic practices, both anatamo- and bio-politics seek to conceptualize specific identities; producing categories with which to place certain people, or populations, into.\(^8\) This categorization is fundamentally a

\(^{5}\) For further discussion on connections between governmentality and biopower/politics see (Nadesan 2008).

\(^{6}\) The practice of demography is the visible disciplining practice of a bio-politics. It is the techne that makes visible adjustments to the population through production of knowledge.

\(^{7}\) Again, this is a process of visibility and techne acting through the episteme.

\(^{8}\) Think back to the governmental dimension: identities.
boundary making process; a production of hierarchies. Thus we are left to question: how are certain people placed where; how is the transgression of boundaries to be dealt with; how is social and anti-social life conceptualized? Here is the calculated management of life, where some life is fostered, while others are disallowed until the point of death (Foucault 1988). Ultimately we are presented with a struggle over sovereignty between the state and society through governmental practice.

Connections between Legg’s five aspects of governance, and Dean’s similar four dimensions, and acknowledging Foucault’s work, suggest regimes of governance are organized through specific political rationality, wherein subjects are ordered through the construction of relationally and contextually contingent truths. This points to the ardent arbitrariness of identities; those populations produced through specific practices of government. Those subjected bodies retain value and meaning only within those certain governed spaces; when acting outside those spaces their meaning is lost, they are either cast off or adjusted through practices of government. It is the political rationality that orders the identities of populations; a power over life, biopower. We may refer to this relationship as a biopolitical relation.

Concurrently, Jessop ties governmentality to a historical analysis of the state. Jessop begins by discussing how Foucault works through the historical construction and periodization of the state, and creates the state as malleable; emphasizing the highly

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9 Here we see the ethos and its interaction with the other four dimensions discussed by Legg (2005).
variant forms of the governmental processes that make up what is the state.

Ultimately, Foucault elaborates that the state has certainly not always existed and certainly not always in the same uniform way (Jessop 2007, 37). Taking into account the varied forms of governmentality over time, we then may also acknowledge the highly variable and salient means through which ordering of populations and space has occurred. Thus, the work of Foucault and Jessop proves significant to our understandings of the functional, governmental relations between the state, capital, space and populations.

Creation of what is known as the state can also be seen in the often banal experiences and practices of the everyday. Joe Painter (2006), for example, furthers a notion of the state that rejects a view of the state as an institutional dominion apart from and having no relation to civil society. Painter highlights the potential geographical and scalar usefulness of a prosaic understanding of stateness by elaborating that “concern with prosaic practices highlights the socio-spatial unevenness of” governmentality “both between and within countries” (2006, 764). Thus, he creates the notion of prosaics as useful in interpreting the governmental and spatial relations between and within states and their functional relations to larger relational collectives of states, or their relations to capital, such as the United Nations or globalized interest of capital. Inherent in Painter’s assertion is the demystification of the state as a spatially absolute sovereign entity, emphasizing that as the functionality of governance inscribes itself upon people, things and space it does so incongruently. Painter asserts that
“prosaics challenges the idea of the singular master narrative of state formation” (2006, 764). Similarly to Jessop’s (2007) argument, he emphasizes the need to look past the notion of Western liberalism manifest in democratic stateness as an end point in the progression of civilized social and spatial organization, but rather acknowledge it as merely one of many possible governmental conditions.

Painter continues elucidating the importance of connecting the prosaic processes of stateness and governance with biopolitics saying, “the government of economic activity and the government of security—involve state institutions in the management of daily life to an[sic] historically unprecedented extent” (2006, 770–771). Taking the notions of the relational ordering of economic activity and everyday life we can see the functional connections of governance between the two; to this we may also add space, acknowledging that to carry out the efficient ordering of population within capitalistic structures the processes of government must also order space and constitute truth and nature\(^\text{10}\) in similarly beneficial systems. Thus, the relations between the varied governmental institutions and procedures and capital are manifest in the ordering of population and nature; and it is the everyday ordered experiences and

\(^{10}\) By referring to nature here, and throughout this chapter, I would like emphasize its connections to episteme, as detailed by Dean and Legg. Epistemes (truth regimes) produce knowledge and normalize/naturalize identifiers (how people, places and things are known). Some mentions of/examples using the word nature, or natural describe the process of epistemes normalizing things; while other mentions describe people, places or things being taken for nature, or naturalized (a process of normalization); “just the way things are.”
practices of population and nature that legitimate the continued existence of the relation between government and capital.

**IV. Conceiving the Neoliberal State**

To come to an understanding of the neoliberal state, one must first engage the emergence of neoliberalism as a form of capital. McCarthy and Prudham (2004) acknowledge the difficulty in pinning down the definition of neoliberalism stating that it “stands for a complex assemblage of ideological commitments, discursive representations, and institutional practices and outcomes.” They also acknowledge neoliberalism as having emerged in roughly the late 1970s, out of the Keynesian welfare model of capital (McCarthy and Prudham 2004, 275). Neoliberalism arose primarily through a reaction to the economic stagnation of the Keynesian model in two of the largest capitalist states, the United States and the United Kingdom, through political and economic reforms in the early 1980s.

As neoliberalism is merely the current guise of capital, so too must the governmental institutions and practices of the state evolve accordingly. Castree (2008, 142) elucidates some of the concurrent relational characteristics of the state to neoliberalism and of neoliberalism to the state, stating, processes of privatization, marketization, deregulation, reregulation, the “efficient and competitive” restructuring of the public sector and reordering of civil society as a social safety net, constitute the
most recent relationship between the processes of stateness and capital. Inherent within all of these processes is the reconstitution of the functional relations between people, capital and the state as Castree (2008, 143) surmises, accenting the geographicalness of this analysis, the neoliberal state is a global project that “involves a (re)negotiation of the boundaries between the market, the state, and civil society so that more areas of people’s lives are governed by an economic logic.” The processes of governmentality become reconstituted under neoliberalism to function for the optimization of capital and the efficient ordering of people and space. Thus the neoliberal state presents new challenges

The importance of nature is not lost in Castree’s discussion of the neoliberal state; just as population is ordered in new ways, so too is nature. Nature also presents a venue through which to see the changing relations between the processes of governance, neoliberal capital and population. Sustained economic growth, an endemic facet of capital and dependent on a limited set of resources, continually offers challenges to the legitimation of the state and capitalistic institutions; thus nature must be continually reconstituted by the processes of governmentality, neoliberalism and dominant discourses. Discussing capital, Castree (2008, 146) articulates: “Fractions of capital face the continuous challenge of achieving and then sustaining accumulation in the face of countervailing forces that are internal and external to the capitalist system (for example, interfirm competition, economic crisis, or public opposition to certain commercial practices).” Concurrently, Castree discusses the state, “though it has
multiple objectives, must find ways to discharge its duties effectively while avoiding fiscal, rationality, or legitimation crises.” As the processes and institutions of capital and the state are inextricably linked, they must discursively promote certain naturalized truths, and the ordering of population in ways that maintain the status quo and promote the neoliberalization of space, things and people. As Castree (2008, 148) continues, he relates the position of the state as it “cannot avoid taking some responsibility for the relationships between the capitalist economy, civil society, and the natural environment.” Given that the state’s relational position has allowed it to possess significant legal and governmental power, and that states comprise the majority of the earth’s surface, it is inevitable that the state must negotiate the use of resources, with population being a key resource, and the interests of capital and society.

In anticipation of later arguments I now turn to China in the time since the communist revolution in 1949 and its relation to nature. As Judith Shapiro (2001, 1) says, many “environmental problems have roots in human relationships and are ultimately social, political, and cultural problems.” Speaking more directly about Maoist China she suggests that “when...people mistreat each other through suppression...political labeling, ostracism, punishment, terror, and forcible relocations, they also treated nature badly” (Shapiro 2001, 1). I argue instead that governmental assemblages work to produce truths, thus ordering things ‘natural, ‘human’ or otherwise, in the interests of those assemblages; this notion of treating both nature and people badly is not specific to Maoist China or the current Chinese state. Shapiro (2001,
203) discusses the Maoist era “efforts to control humans in nature, and nature in humans,” in connection with the current push by the PRC for rapid development and exploitation of resources, leading to an environmental crisis in the state. Thus, it is through the organization of states, through governmental assemblages that phenomena which specific segments of society deem to be “environmental crisis” or “political suppression” comes to exist. The issue, ultimately, is in those assemblages which leave people, or the environment, in a state of meaninglessness; exposing them to potential expiration, sans even the remotest significance beyond their value to the enaction of governance. The task of the state becomes the extraction of surplus value from its commodities; those things which the state maintains sovereignty over, i.e. space, people or resources.

The implications are far-reaching; beginning, there is no singular communist state; similarly, there is no singular capitalist state. States are but assemblages of ideas enacted by and through populations across space. China, I argue, is as a hybrid state embodying both the authoritarian aspects of socialism and practices of global, neoliberal capital propagated in the West. China, by operating at the level of a state, and maintaining a place within the global economic system functions capitalistically, all the while, deploying synonymous governmental practices utilized by so called “Western capitalist democracies.”
While certainly not the same situation as the Uyghur in China, the situation of the Kurds in Southwest Asia offers some similarities and connections to biopolitics. These similarities are addressed, though not explicitly, by Carl Dahlman (2002) as he gives insight into the geopolitics of marginalized populations, specifically addressing the Kurds and Kurdistan. Dahlman discusses the deterritorialization of a population, in a colonial context and how the loss of a sense of place may affect the homogeneity of a population. He goes on to discuss the significant changes and new issues facing the Kurdish population during the ‘War on Terror’ and the importance of expatriate Kurdish groups to the cause of Kurdish nationalism. The geopolitical imaginations of the Kurds and the governments of Turkey, Syria and Iraq play a significant role in how states interact with population; how does Kurdish space interrelate with the territory of the aforementioned states? This interaction with population is based on information collection and territorialization, who are and are not Kurds (boundary making). And finally, once information about people and places is produced, how Kurds, in addition to other groups, are subjected to certain discourses and ‘truths;’ how do Kurds come to embody said ‘truths’?

V. Methods: An Analytics of Government

I now turn specifically to an area of inquiry concerning spatial governance and stateness—an analytics of government. As Mitchell Dean (2012, 30) says, “an analytics
is a type of study concerned with an analysis of the specific conditions under which particular entities emerge, exist and change.” Furthermore, Dean (2012, 31) states, drawing from Michel Foucault’s work on governmentality, “an analytics of government attempts to show that our taken-for-grANTED ways of doing things and how we think about and question them are not entirely self-evident or necessary.” First, an analytics of government accomplishes this by focusing on identifying problematizations; that is, “the action of calling into question the ‘conduct of conduct.’” Moreover, problematization is an analysis of the “different and particular contexts in which governing is called into question” (Dean 2012, 38). Second, an analytics of government gives priority to ‘how’ questions; emphasizing a need to “attend to the practices of government that form the basis on which problematizations are made and what happens when we govern and are governed” (Dean 2012, 39). Thus, an analytics of government is concerned with the conditions and contexts of governing; and, what “specific forms of knowledge and expertise” authorize governmental entities; how certain forms of thought normalize and rationalize governmental techniques and practices in relation to specific objectives or phenomena (Dean 2012, 39)?

As I conferred earlier while discussing the dimensions of governmentality the production of truth regimes (epistemes) requires enunciative acts, which are visible in that they are enounced to others through various mediums; technical in that their enunciation is calculated within a given relationally contingent truth regime; identifying, in that they are enounced about a thing; and come to influence our ethical (ethos)
interaction and relation with things, thus (re)informing our epistemologies. This process and practice of enunciation produces and is produced through discourse; it is the relation between enunciation and thought. An analysis of discourse therefore, presents itself as a means for an analytics of government.

Discourse, like any word, is nearly impossible to pin down to one distinct meaning. While this may be the case, discourse can mean a regulated practice that accounts for an individualizable group of statements, or put more simply, the general domain of all utterances about something. Discourses do not exist in isolation and are dependent on the social context of their creation; therefore the origin and direction of discourse changes at key shifts, or points in history. Thus, discourse is the site of struggle, is constantly changing and unstable; simultaneously powerful and vulnerable. Ultimately discourses exist in varying states of opposition and conflict. Yet another facet of discourse is that it includes and excludes both the material and the abstract. This allows for an understanding of discourse, and the internal mechanisms that create and perpetuate it, to illuminate how relations of power and knowledge play out across space. Discursive structures are the rules and norms that govern discourse, and thus are an intrinsic part of discourse analysis. This brings to light questions of access to discourse; who is included and excluded from participation in varying discourses, for what reasons? Thus, understanding the conditionality of participation leads to further understanding of power, knowledge, representation and identity. (Macdonnell 1986; Pecheux 1982; Foucault 1977; Foucault 1972; Foucault 1970)
To carry out discourse analysis I will utilize a grounded theory study. The goal of grounded theory in academic research is to generate a theory, an analytical representation of a phenomena relating to a specific situation. The researcher collects data, which display how the actors in a specific situation act and react to the given phenomena. Often those utilizing grounded theory seek a detailed understanding of people’s experiences. While collecting data the researcher goes through a process of coding and categorizing the data. Coding is a fundamental aspect of grounded theory study, as it allows for careful and detailed analysis of text; statements actors produce regarding experience of phenomena. First open coding, forming initial categories about the phenomena and discerning several properties that dimensionalize the data, creating subcategories. Secondly, axial coding, which is presented using a coding paradigm, identifies a central phenomena, explores the conditions that influence the phenomena, specifies strategies: the actions that result from the phenomena, identifies the context and intervening conditions that influence the strategies and demarcates the consequences of the strategies for the phenomena. Thirdly, selective coding is carried out where the researcher identifies a contextual timeline that incorporates the categories of the axial coding model. Lastly, the researcher develops a conditional matrix that clarifies the contextual conditions influencing the phenomena in question. (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2006; Cloke et al. 2004; Denzin and Lincoln 2003; Creswell 1998)

13 For an expanded grounded theory involving situational analysis and mapping see (A. Clarke 2005; A. Clarke 2003)
Furthermore, grounded theory study and the coding process may allow for the emergence of ideas regarding a given phenomena. This opposed to a forced emergence of ideas, thus emphasizing the validation rather than verification of the produced theory. (C. Dwyer and Limb 2001)

Central to understanding discourse is an understanding of text, as text is the medium of discourse. Texts are organized and semiotic, symbolic combinations that are clearly defined and thus exist in the physical form of writing, speech, pictures, music among other symbols (Lehtonen 2000). In his essay, *The Death of the Author*, Roland Barthes (1978a, 146) explains how text is more than just mere communication, saying, “…a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture.” Barthes exposes the lack of a singular origin of meaning, acknowledging that discourse speaks within text rather than the author; and displays the intertextual aspects of the text as it is formed by a myriad of statements. Additionally, Foucault (1972, 99) expounds upon intertextuality saying, "every statement is specified in this way: there is no statement in general, no free, neutral, independent statement; but a statement always belongs to a series or a whole, always plays a role among other statements, deriving support from them distinguishing itself from them: it is always part of a network of statements, in which it has a role, however minimal in may be, to play." What becomes immediately apparent through a use of
Barthes and Foucault’s work is that the context of signs and statements within a text is the relation, which creates and perpetuates discourse.

What I will endeavor to accomplish in the remaining chapters, utilizing various theorizations on stateness, governmentality and biopolitics, is threefold: first, is to produce an understanding of the global ‘War on Terror’ through governmentality and stateness: second, to produce an understanding of the PRC’s reaction and subsequent governmental adjustments during the ‘War on Terror;’ and third, to expound upon the PRC’s construction of and government over Xinjiang, its spaces and population.
Chapter 2: The Global ‘War on Terror’

I. Introduction

To begin framing current global, geopolitical discourse dominated by the ‘War on Terror’ there is a need to briefly explicate the significance and effects of this discourse in that it constructs meanings. Taken from Michel Foucault’s concern with discourse, it is the practices that produce the objects of which it speaks; hence, discourse takes the form of contextually produced statements. The meanings produced through statements manifest materially both in the spaces of which they speak and those people, or things which they invoke; thus, meanings have a spatiality and reproduce spatial imaginaries when cognized. The discursively constructed meanings of places and people in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ discourse creates a space of possible signs and signified meanings for specific, identifiable spaces and populations.

Paul Reuber (2003) discusses specifically the connection between language, discourse and the constructions of the global ‘War on Terror.’ In describing the intersection of language regimes and geopolitical discourse he says, of the importance of language, that “it is the instrument not only to define Good and Evil, but also to locate and confine such stereotypes in space, creating different territories separating between “us” and “them” (2003, 44–45). Considering Reuber’s assertions, it becomes
readily apparent that the wide reaching and pervasive influence of geopolitical discourse over those objects, both spaces and people, which order is sought. Processes of governmentality require visible identification of subjects, so that those rational, logical technologies of government may be applied through corresponding epistemic regimes of truth.

The newly constructed global ‘War on Terror’ certainly did not simply manifest from nothing (Dalby 2011), but presents a clear context of discourses interacting to produce space; the global ‘War on Terror’ is foremost a spatial practice. Before examining the specific aspects surrounding the construction of the ‘War on Terror’ there is necessity to step back and consider the contexts of this production. The contexts for producing the ‘War on Terror’ began in 1945, in the aftermath of World War II as the United States and the Soviet Union both emerged internationally while increasing their influence in Europe after defeating Nazi Germany.

II. Contexts of the ‘War on Terror’

Constructing the realm of relations that has necessitated the ‘War on Terror’ has largely been a consequence of the United States coming to international prominence after World War II (Khalidi 2005, 152–153). With the dropping of two nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and affronting the Soviet Union in Germany and Europe throughout the late 1940s, in part by creating North American
Treaty Organization (NATO), and financing the rebuilding of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, the United States displayed its presence on the global stage through banal, but also spectacular means. A key policy initiative that, in affect declared the Cold War and signified globally dominant US presence was the March 12, 1947 speech by President Harry S. Truman, which dictated what would later be referred to as the “Truman Doctrine” (Hook and Spanier 2009, 42). Truman detailed the current situation in Greece, then besieged by the Greek communist party, supported by the Soviet Union’s eastern European satellite states, before describing a world in which the United States could only survive, should freedom flourish. Truman continued, positing the only way for the US to reach this objective would be to “help free peoples to maintain their institutions” and territorial integrity “against aggressive movements” that impose totalitarian regimes. Moreover, he suggested that the mere presence of those totalitarian regimes “undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States” (Hook and Spanier 2009, 42; Jones 1955, 17–23). The ‘Truman Doctrine’ convinced the United States Congress to financially and militarily, through the form of aid and armaments, support Greece and Turkey. Truman’s invocation of “free peoples” can be seen as an open gesture to all states possessing territory and population that US foreign policy was foremost concerned with the

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12 Recall our earlier discussion on territory; specifically in that notions of territory and sovereignty cannot exist without a constituent population, and that dominant notions of the practice of sovereignty are furthered by states with the threat of governmental adjustment, or state termination.
thwarting of communism within their sovereign space, and would provide the means necessary to carry out its termination.

United States’ influence emerged not just in Europe in the 1940s, but throughout the rest of the world in later decades through a number of significant instances: orchestrating the overthrow of the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddegh, in 1953 (Kinzer 2008), the Korean and Vietnamese containment wars, and the Cuban missile crisis, among others. The emergence of the US and the Soviet Union after WWII positioned the two states in opposition, and this oppositional relation would direct the foreign policy of all states attempting international relations. The global emergence of the US may be seen as required for a number of reasons, though chief amongst them, for the purposes of this thesis, were two related issues: first, to affront and contain the USSR and the conceived threat of global communism, and second, as Harvey made poignant earlier, satiate the driving capitalist logics of capitalist and territorial imperialism, which necessitate the production of certain, specific stateified spaces.

Throughout the Cold War the United States produced an oppositional façade wherein the United States was the world’s dominant power while conceiving the USSR as a potential threat to this dominance. Constructing this dichotomous relation proved profitable, though with the collapse of the USSR certain circuits of capital ceased blatant necessity. Indeed, arms production and dissemination to state governments, such as
states throughout the Middle East in the 1970-80s (Tyner 2005, 54–55; Khalidi 2005), served domestic capitalistic interests, while also achieving foreign policy objectives by attempting to produce states that were amiable to the interests of the US or the USSR. While this “combination of capitalist opportunities and Cold War practicality” justified neo-colonial construction of states, with the collapse of the USSR, the means of construction became thoroughly limited (Tyner 2005, 55). Capital concerns played a key role during the Cold War, and thus these arraignments, though not the specific relations themselves, would be required to continue, should the United States and the West remain globally dominant in addition to providing the standards of living and political legitimacy required for their constituent populations.

While capital is significant to our conceptualization of the ‘War on Terror,’ the economic arraignments called “capitalism” should not be treated as retaining some omniscient molding power, determining the reality around us (Boal et al. 2005, 10). Indeed, what is termed “primitive accumulation,” that is, the dismantling of state controls and the entrapment, displacement, and dispossession of populations by the West (in particular the United States), can be used to describe the currently operating logics of capitalist and territorial imperialism (Boal et al. 2005, 11). This concept, first used by Karl Marx, describes the overtly “colonial” character of the neoliberal times at hand, rife with the influence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), post-Cold War, and the age of terror and its wars (Boal et al. 2005, 11–12).
As William Clinton became President of the United States, foreign policy was adjusted in the 1990s to continue “capitalist expansion” through democratization of space and opening of markets. Capitalistic imperialism remained the objective of US foreign policy, while discursively US style stateness was promoted through “enlargement,” rather than through Cold War rhetoric of “containment.” The resulting world system was based on neoliberal “minimally regulated capitalism,” inducing predatory global exploitation (Tyner 2005, 57; Falk 2003), though, necessarily without the highly visible, identifiable, constructed “good” and “evil” aspects of the world. Indeed, “good” and “evil” figures would require mobilization (Elden 2009, 161), in part, through spectacle (Boal et al. 2005) and enunciative production by governmental assemblages in the West.

III. Producing the ‘War on Terror’ through Practices of Governance

In his speech the night of September 11, 2001, then United States President George W. Bush identified that the freedom of the United States was under unprecedented attack by terrorists motivated by “cultural difference, irrational jealousness, and ultimately, the fact that evil exists in the world”; and furthermore, that these attacks were “not in response to any actions undertaken by the United States” (Tyner 2005, 49). Bush went on, explaining: “Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature” (Bush 2001a; Singer 2004, 143); and that: “We will make no
distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them” (Bush 2001a). The next day, after completing a meeting with his national security team, Bush made similar comments, stating: “this enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world…we will rally the world;” continuing; “the freedom-loving nations of the world [sic] stand by our side. This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil” (Bush 2001b). He strengthened the oppositional discourse, while implicating other states in his master-narrative of terror just two months later in a joint press conference with President Jacques Chirac, stating: “[o]ver time it’s going to be important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity, you’re either with us or against us in this fight against terror” (Bush 2001e). These statements by Bush achieve a number of ends through utilization of practices of government: episteme, identities, techne, visibility and ethos.

First, the production of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ figures in the world proved a return to the Cold War binary, US and USSR relation. Just as the US, USSR relation was justified through ideological difference, identified as democratic capitalism and socialist communism, the ‘good’ and ‘evil’ identified by Bush carried explicit identification of religious difference as he continually invoked Christian scripture on the night of September 11 and throughout the following weeks (Tyner 2005, 50; 61–65). Indeed, Bush’s remarks exhibit his operation within, and construction of, certain assemblages of governmental practices and specific regimes of truth; how the US is to know the world. Bush produces ‘truth’ about the, largely unknown, terrorists, ultimately casting them as
motivated purely by evil. Additionally, Bush produces those whom the ‘evil’ terrorists
direct their violence and vitriol by identifying the good, “freedom-loving people and
nations” of the world, united with the American people whom, he says, represent “the
brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world” (Bush 2001a). Through
these comments Bush displays and rationalizes his epistemological position as a
purveyor of governance; thus the relation between government and constituent
population is rationalized: Bush the governmental leader of the state is ‘good’, so those
of his constituent population who follow the mandates of the state are also ‘good’. As
Bush went about establishing these identities he did so visibly, in that his speeches,
addresses to the nation, and interviews were broadcast through various media
providers, and consequently covered and dissected by news agencies ad nauseam.
Thus, his or any highly ranking members of the US governments’ statements are made
readily available. This visible practice also represents a technical aspect of governance
as it has become customary for those in government, such as the president, to speak to
the state’s constituent population, or anyone else who will listen, through these
channels; or for example, the press secretary at the White House to release statements
to the media. Furthermore, these technologies of government, which make visible the
identification of subjects, have themselves been rationalized over time by their
contextual use. It has become expected that those who govern states to operate
through these networks. Bush’s identification of the ‘good’ and ‘evil’ subjects at play in
the aftermath of September 11 affects the moral and spatial imaginaries of the American citizenry; their ethos.

A second consequence produced through Bush’s statements is the spatial rationality for war against those ‘evil’ subjects. On September 20, 2001 Bush, addressing a joint session of congress, the American people, and other listeners, said, “America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism” (quoted in Tyner 2005, 50). The same day, Bush added: “And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime” (Bush 2001d). Just a few days earlier he similarly commented, regarding those nations who would be friendly to the United States, “they know my intentions are to find those who did this, find those who encouraged them, find those who house them, find those who comfort them, and bring them to justice. Those who harbor terrorists will be brought to justice” (Bush 2001c). Furthermore, Bush’s “with us or against us” statement “crudely dichotomizes” spaces, positioning the US state against “elsewhere”, while “against” establishes the US as hostile or antagonistic towards an amorphous other (Inwood and Tyner 2011, 445); an ‘other’ Bush implicates as simply any state, population or space whose ethos runs counter to that of the discursively produced US epistemological position. The statements throughout this section contain
a significant similarity: the production of dichotomous stateness. In the new world order forwarded by the Bush government and the US, states are seemingly left a choice, to follow in lockstep US policy and rhetoric of freedom, democracy and capitalism, or be cast off, as a space and people which may harbor the evil of the world, whose sovereignty is suspect, and thus has failed at stateness. This abject false dichotomy is not unlike that which served as the epistemological backdrop for the Cold War, though a primary difference with this new world order would be a focus on sovereignty and its relation to territory and population. This new war, a ‘War on Terror,’ would be fluid, contingent and without borders; it would be a deterritorialized and global conflict (Tyner 2005, 50).

Sovereignty and its contingency is significantly at issue in the new global war on terrorism. While many of Bush’s statements allude to the issue of contingent sovereignty, so do the statements from those serving in his administration. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in the weeks after September 11, said of terrorists and those places in which they exist: “Terrorists do not function in a vacuum...they work, they train and they plan in countries...and they’re benefitting from governments...allowing them to function on their territory and tolerating – if not encouraging – their activities” (Rhem 2001). Rumsfeld’s statement clearly addresses the issue at hand for the West: that

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13 As Bush only uses the term ‘nation’ in his statements, one may contend that I am conflating notions of states and nations here. I then point to discussions in chapter one on the emergence of the state, sovereignty and population; the state cannot exist without a constituent population, thus states are merely made up of nations and nations make up a state.
some forms and practices of government are clearly ineffective. From the administration’s position, this ineffectiveness is borne through a dysfunctional and backwards relation between certain states and their population and territory. Legitimate and concrete sovereignty that asserts salient order over both a state’s territory and population, the United States argues, lacks in states that harbor terrorists. After September 11, the West has used the absence of absolute sovereignty in certain states to profess an end of international security, and moreover that the internal security and interests of Western states, and their allies, is compromised as a result. The discourse on security-absence and ineffective sovereignty proved a pretext for direct military and sovereignty-restructuring measures taken by the US and its allies in the ‘War on Terror.’

The United States’ concern over sovereignty was in many ways shaped in the summer of 2002. This was first exemplified when Bush, while speaking before the U.S. Military Academy in June 2002, stated that “the United States was within its rights to use any and all means to ensure the security of its territorial integrity and of all its citizens” (quoted in Tyner 2007, 174). Secondly, this concern was again demonstrated when, in September 2002, the White House released its National Security Strategy; also widely known as the “Bush Doctrine” (ibid). Within the document itself, Bush articulates the United States’ “common sense” self defense strategy for itself and its allies, would be to act against “emerging threats before they are fully formed”; a clear endorsement of preemptive, unilateral military action. Continuing, he states that “[i]n
the new world order we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action” (Tyner 2007, 174; Bush 2002). Though this document appeared in 2002 its concepts had been in the making since the fall of the USSR in 1991. Indeed, the National Security Strategy had its origins in a 1992 document drafted by Paul Wolfowitz, then undersecretary of defense for policy for then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. Though initial drafts of the document were altered in the final Defense Department report, the original document’s sentiments were carried on through the 1997 founding of a key neoconservative Washington D.C. based think-tank, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). These key ideas continued through PNAC included the necessity for the US to assert military power “even in conflicts that otherwise do not directly engage U.S. interests”; and that US foreign policy should center on establishing and protecting a new order that has at its center the interests of other advanced economies, to discourage them from “aspiring to a larger regional or global role” while accepting US hegemony (Tyner 2007, 175; Dalby 2007; Callinicos 2003, 50; Gellman 1992). Similarly, the National Security Strategy contains whole sections regarding global economic development (Bush 2002). These sections include details on the benefits of unhindered markets, democracy and the rationale for United States’ pursuance of these aims, while cooperating with economic powers, yet retaining global supremacy.

Wolfowitz, Cheney and other members of PNAC would go on to serve as central members of the Bush administration throughout the 2000s, and have to this point, shaped the post-Cold War international foreign policy environment; the ‘nature’ of state
interaction and relation. It is clear both the *National Security Strategy* and ideas furthered by PNAC have as their chief concern, the conduct of state sovereignty. The inclusion of economic goals and the need to establish a “new order” after the end of the Cold War clearly signal US foreign policy objectives based the coercive restructuring of states. Through this logic, states are to be remade into the rhetorical image of the United States, often through violent practice.

Just five years after the events of September 11, the United States and its “coalition of the willing” (Tyner 2010; Tyner 2005) found themselves fighting wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, in addition to the global war on the amorphous concept of terrorism and those whom perform and facilitate it. It is in this context that then vice president Dick Cheney said that, “the fact of the matter is that we are in a global conflict. Our strategy that we adopted after 9/11 -- of progressively going after the terrorists, going after states that sponsor terror, taking the fight to enemy -- has been crucial in terms of our being able to defend the United States” (Cheney 2006). Through Cheney’s comments it continually becomes apparent that the spatial identification of states, which are amiable to terrorism, and the identification of the need to, broadly, defend the United States is paramount. Economic and political interests and the influence of the United States have expanded globally following the collapse of the USSR. Certainly throughout the 1990s neoliberal reforms within the US and policies furthered by the World Bank and IMF throughout the world have put an emphasis on unfettered free markets and the privatization of resources, to the satisfaction of Western business
interests. Consequently definitions of the extent of US strategic interests, as defined by those governing the US, have expanded significantly (Elden 2009, 159–160); this as, the mandates of neoliberal capitalism call for the state to act merely as a “night-watchman” while corporations conduct business in the unrestrained marketplace facilitated by democratic governance and global interconnectivity.

With a change of political leadership in the US in 2009 there has been little significant change in conducting the ‘War on Terror’ given that there have been no large scale alterations to the National Security Strategy, to the use of unilateral military action or to the US’ dominant notions sovereignty. Indeed, before becoming president, Barack Obama expressed his vision for the role of the United States internationally saying, “where the stakes are the highest, in the war on terror, we cannot possibly succeed without extraordinary international cooperation. Effective international police actions require the highest degree of intelligence sharing, planning and collaborative enforcement” (Obama 2004). As Obama maintains the United States’ internationally influential position, the US is still engaged in highly visible military action in Afghanistan, Iraq, and anywhere where terrorists are thought to operate, and the interests of the US may be compromised. These very global actions remain validated through discourses of opposition, wherein freedom, democracy and capitalism are pitted against wanton “evil”, senseless violence and an absence of appropriate governmental structures.
Contrary to its rhetorical underpinnings of security for freedom, democracy and the elimination of evil, the ‘War on Terror’ is fought over the way in which a state conducts its governance. US government discursively produced enunciation is the subtext for the preferred assemblages and practices of government within states. Proponents in the West of the new world order endorse these practices of government; namely that of unrestricted, open markets. Through this logic of government, states are to, often through violence practice or use of military force, reshape themselves into the preferred governmental assemblage of stateness; indeed, obvious examples of this process appear in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Pakistani government’s toleration of civilian deaths due to US drone attacks. Legitimation of this violence requires the construction of truth, the utilization of visibility and spectacle.

Spectacle was clearly provided in the crashing of two passenger planes into, and consequent collapse of, the World Trade Center towers. The subsequent media coverage included repetition of images, sounds and dialogue which continually evolved over the following weeks and months, and persists into the present day (Boal et al. 2005). To further and maintain the aura of spectacle and the complex geographical imaginations of the global ‘War on Terror’ the victims of terrorism on September 11 are continually “painted with the same broad brush” as are “victims of natural hazards” (Mustafa 2005, 87). Accordingly, all victims on September 11 “experienced similar suffering from the hazard” of terrorism “and entire populations of the United States or Western Europe” are likewise vulnerable to future threat (Ibid). As this relation of
victimization and hazardousness is produced, the US both metaphorically and literally treats terrorism as a disease of the state, manifest within its population and territory, “whose outbreaks must be isolated, controlled and finally eliminated” (Mustafa 2005, 87; J. K. Mitchell 2003). The US subsequently encourages and incentivizes, through its position as the global hegemon, other states in adopting these practices of sovereign stateness and these very geographical notions of vulnerability, threat and terror.

United States foreign policy since the end of World War II has presented a dominant notion of stateness causing states to question and reconstitute their governmental practices. The contexts of the ‘War on Terror’ produced by the US carry their own specific and evolving notions of state practice, just as the contexts of the Cold War did. As we will discuss in chapter three, the PRC, which itself also emerged as a state of international significance in 1949, is continually confronted with the need to reassess its governmental and state practices in the face of changing world systems. As the PRC would go about defining its territory, population and sovereignty throughout the latter half of the 20th century issues with Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang continually dictated the PRC’s foreign and internal policy decisions. The US is clearly continuing its construction of a seemingly never ending ‘War on Terror,’ with no visible end in sight. Now I question, how is the PRC reacting; and how has the context of the emergence and persistence of the PRC as a state affect this reaction?
Chapter 3: China and the ‘War on Terror’

I. Introduction

With the discursive production of current geopolitical relation explicated, I now turn to the PRC’s place within this discursive field. As a consequence of the new geopolitical relational context, the PRC is adjusting to the foreign policy dictates of the ‘War on Terror.’ The global ‘War on Terror’, produced in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, caused an alteration in the operation of governmental assemblages. Processes of stateness required recalculation in order to be in agreement with dominant notions of state practice, furthered by the West. Thus, as normative epistemological thought would have it, all things operate in binaries, and states were presented a binary choice: to question their governmental practice, adjust and submit to the status quo, or defy the new order and be adjusted through alternative means. Questions posited to states included: how are the governmental practices of the state to be altered to conform to the new world order in, new, internationally acceptable ways? What now is to be the state’s relation to its population; to its territory? The ‘War on Terror’ has produced identifiable good and evil figures, and notions of sovereignty, thus,
exception; who is to be included or excluded in this new order; in new practices of
government and stateness? Indeed, the PRC was confronted with these issues given
their globally, relationally dependent position. Before confronting the PRC’s direct
reaction to the new terror war, there is necessity to understand the PRC’s governmental
processes in the contexts preceding this new world order; the contexts through which
the PRC both operates internationally and arrives at its desired governmental practices.

II. Constructing the PRC: Territory

Just as the late 1940s proved significant for the United States and USSR in
solidifying their international status, this time proved substantial for developments in
China, as the Chinese revolution in 1949 effectively reconstituted the state. Though the
Chinese Communist Party fulfilled its revolutionary objectives in 1949, the revolution
itself began in 1927. Initially the revolution began with Mao Zedong and others
emphasizing agrarian Marxist revolution splitting with Chiang Kai-shek, and in the late
1920s and early 1930s with other communist groups, following instructions from
Moscow, leading small attacks on inland cities (Meisner 1999, 31–32). Throughout the
1930s the communist revolutionaries were pitted in a struggle against Chiang’s
Nationalist armies; while during WWII the opposing groups facilitated an uneasy truce
(Meisner 1999, 34–36; 50). In 1946 Mao’s communists and the nationalist armies, now
supported rhetorically by and with weapons from the US, resumed their civil war. By
October 1, 1949 Mao was in Beijing bringing the PRC into existence, and Chiang and his nationalists fled to Taiwan, establishing the Republic of China government, supported by the United States (Meisner 1999, 50).

Though the new state was proclaimed in October 1949, the PRC had yet to fully solidify control over both its desired territory and population (Meisner 1999, 64); thus its resources. Remnants of Nationalist armies and warlord armies who had been allied with the Nationalists retained control over areas on South China, the interior, the West, Northwest and Taiwan. Throughout late 1949 and 1950 the PRC would militarily quickly, militarily extend its control over the Southern and interior provinces facing little resistance, while controlling the Western and Northwestern territories was somewhat more difficult. Those in the PRC government believed Tibet to be rightfully part of the modern Chinese state, going back to its incorporation within the territory of the Qing Dynasty; though Tibet had been independent since the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 (Meisner 1999, 65). Tibet offered significant strategic territory in resources and as a buffer to the newly formed state of India, and in October 1950 PRC military forces took control of Tibet. The 1959 Tibetan uprising caused the spiritual leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama to flee to India and in 1960, set up a Tibetan Government in Exile (McConnell 2012, 79). The Tibetan Government in Exile, McConnell (2012) argues, governmentally constructs its exiled Tibetan population “as an entity over which it has responsibility and thus as an object of government” (McConnell 2012, 91) for a future state in Tibet; a process of “governmentalisation to practise the state”, despite the current lack of a
Tibetan state (emphasis in original McConnell 2012, 93). The Dalai Lama continues to speak out against the PRC control of Tibet and comment on international relations affecting the PRC. Of the ‘War on Terror’ and the relations between states it fosters, the Dalai Lama (2002) says: “Human conflicts do not arise out of the blue. They occur as a result of causes and conditions, many of which are within the antagonists’ control. This is where leadership is important. Terrorism cannot be overcome by the use of force because it does not address the underlying problems. In fact the use of force may not only fail to solve the problems, it may exacerbate them, and frequently leaves destruction and suffering in its wake.” Statements like this, and the presence of a government in exile, much like that of Taiwan’s, continues to present sovereignty and legitimation issues for the PRC.

In addition to Tibet, the presence of the Republic of China on Taiwan proclaiming to be the legitimate government of all of China remained a key sovereignty issue for the PRC. In the summer of 1950 the PRC planned an invasion of Taiwan, though in late June President Truman ordered a fleet of the US Navy to occupy the strait between the island and mainland under the auspices of the Korean War, effectively terminating the PRC’s plan (Meisner 1999, 66). Throughout the remainder of the 20th century the PRC continued to sporadically attempt to deal with the issue of Taiwan and its exiled government. Scholars analyzing the Taiwan issue generally agree that if the PRC were to attempt to resolve the sovereignty issue Taiwan presents, the likelihood of extreme insurgent presence after invasion exists (Puska 2006, 68), in addition to the continued
Western support of Taiwan, thus deterring the PRC from taking any significant action. Since the production of the ‘War on Terror’ the PRC is also potentially deterred from dealing with the Taiwan issue because of the ‘Bush Doctrine’s’ emphasis of preemptive unilateral action. This shows the PRC must react to, and take into account in a multitude of relational contexts when making foreign policy decisions based on sovereignty.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) first entered Xinjiang in September and October 1949, setting up and maintaining governing structures in the region for a number of years until the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was able to solidify full party control (J. Millward 2007, 237). Additionally the CCP’s efforts were hampered by the influence of the USSR in region and the party’s lack of experience in the region and with the non-Han elites there (ibid). Throughout the remainder of the 1950s the PRC dealt with a number of “nationalist uprisings” of varying scales by local Uyghur and Kazakh populations, resisting the PRCs “nation building” practices (Bovingdon 2010; J. Millward 2007; Bovingdon 2004a; Bovingdon 2002). With sporadic violent events and protests in the province continuing on an almost yearly basis into the present\(^4\) it is certain the PRC has only variably maintained absolute sovereignty over this space.

In these three cases, and the production of Chinese state, the leaders of the CCP “have spent decades pursuing the dream” expressed by “Chiang Kai-shek during the

\(^4\) For a thorough list and descriptions of these events in Xinjiang from 1949 to 2005 see (Bovingdon 2010, 174–190)
Republican era” of “transforming the heterogeneous peoples and lands previously governed by the Qing empire into a unified nation-state” (Bovingdon 2010, 159). By producing a new state, the PRC, the CCP is introducing new governmental assemblages to the spaces they conceive as ‘China.’ We have seen through examples of PRC expansion and attempted reterritorialization in Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang the state goes through a process of identifying its’ desired sovereign space. Once identified, the PRC went about making these spaces visible; recalling past governmental structures, such as the Qing Dynasty’s presence, though intermittent, and often through proxy structures of governance, in Xinjiang and Tibet; and the Republic of China’s establishment of a government for all of mainland China on Taiwan. Once identified and visible, the PRC utilized technical aspects of government; in this these examples from shortly after 1949 the PLA was utilized to establish the state’s territory and sovereignty. These practices evolve, transform and adjust to the want of the state as both time and space progress; the practice of the PRC is no different. Practices of the state ultimately shape and are shaped by the PRC’s episteme; how the PRC conceives of, questions and thinks about what it is, where it is, how it is.

III. Constructing the PRC: Population and Nature

Just as the PRC constructed and ordered its territory in the years after 1949, Mao’s China went through similar processes of disciplining its population. As Meisner
accounts, the new state’s relationship to its population in the 1950s was characterized by practices of repression, fear and terror. Mao’s decree regarding “Regulations Regarding the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries” in February 1951 officially sanctioning state practices of repression and violence, though CCP controlled areas of China had experienced similar practices throughout the civil war, and earlier; this measure taken by Mao broadened what constituted opposition to the PRC (Meisner 1999, 71). Highly visible, public arrests, trials, tortures and executions occurred extensively throughout the state, with newspapers publishing “long lists of the names of those executed and...accounts of alleged political crimes and punishments” daily (Meisner 1999, 72). Despite lack of concrete figures or consensus, Meisner estimates about 2,000,000 people were executed in the first three years of the PRC’s existence, and roughly another 2,000,000 imprisoned or placed in forced labor camps (ibid). While these statistics appear astounding, to be encumbered merely by the sheer numbers or the scale of these violent state practices serves only to obfuscate their ultimate utility as a techne of state power and thus a means of making sovereignty.

In a chapter on Mao’s Great Leap Forward and its ensuing famine between 1958 and 1961, Tyner (2012) details state practices of the PRC in relation to its population and the consequent “letting die” of approximately 40 million people. Additionally during this period an estimated 2 million people died at the hands of the state for opposing its policies and speaking out against the genocide of 40 million others (Tyner 2012, 81). Throughout Mao’s Great Leap the spatial reorganization of rural peasants
into farming collectives and communes was significant to the state’s desired transition from subsistence farming to industry. Peasant collectives were to produce a, usually outlandish and continually rising, quota of food to be sold to the state, who in turn sold a portion of it back to the peasants, while selling the rest internationally, either to acquire commodities or repay debts (Tyner 2012, 89). These adjustments in governmental practice were to vault China into a place as the “preeminent world power,” based on the “discipline of people and the regulation of populations to work harder, to work longer, to sacrifice more, and to expect less” (Tyner 2012, 88). Maoist China would be characterized by these highly visible practices of government centered around disciplining knowledge through violence (Tyner 2012, 83–84; 88). Mao, and by extension the state, made a “society that was prepared to let die millions of its own subjects to satisfy state goals” (ibid, 156).

The processes of government detailed above have as a focus, the ordering of nature, both human nature and the physical environment we call nature. As Shapiro (2001) makes clear the ordering of either nature is dependent on the disciplining of both human and physical possibilities and phenomena. Additionally Shapiro (2001, 4) offers a four part framework for understanding Maoist China’s ordering of nature and consequent production of an ordered population. Political repression, as we saw in examples of the PRC very visibly eliminating those who dissented against the state.

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15 Recall our earlier discussion on nature in chapter one.
Utopian urgency was on display in the PRC’s desire to immediately rise in international status, causing the Great Famine. Dogmatic uniformity in the nature of both people and land was desired by the state. This was significantly on display in the Taklamakan Desert in Xinjiang. During the Great Leap famine thousands of relocated Han youth were tasked with “reclaiming” the desert as arable land; leading to the initial starvation and death of those relocated peasants and long term environmental devastation in the area. State-ordered relocation forced Han populations into “wasteland areas” to reclaim land for farming, enhance military capabilities or increase “national security by increasing the percentage of Han Chinese in minority areas,” as was the case in Xinjiang.16 These governmental aspects of Maoist China did not disappear as the PRC evolved as a state following the end of Mao’s rule over the PRC. Indeed, these practices continue to inform how the state knows and makes its population, as well as how these practices bolster the PRC’s lasting culture of impunity (Tyner 2012, 100).

IV. The PRC after Mao

After Mao’s death in 1976 more moderate leaders of the CCP took control of the party and state (Meisner 1999), with Deng Xiaoping affectively coming to power in 1978. This more moderate turn moved away from Maoist era population reorganization policies, such as those that led to the Great Famine genocide or blatant, state directed

16 For an extensive look at the demography of Xinjiang, and movement of Han to Xinjiang see (J. Millward 2007, 308–310; Toops 2004a; Toops 2004b; Toops 2000; Q.-L. Yuan 1990).
purges of non-party members or “counterrevolutionaries.” Instead Deng and other top party officials would focus on economic development and modernization with the goal of long term growth, through “support of intellectuals” and “rapid development of science and technology” (Meisner 1999, 433), which would, in Deng’s words, allow China to “stand up in the world” (ibid, 440). These economic-population practices were widely supported and opened up China to Western capitalistic structures; while suppressing political resistance and treating it now as a form of criminal activity, rather than ideological irrationality, persisted as a state practice, as notions of “productive labor and thought reform” (Shaw 1998) and a culture of impunity remained an integral aspect of Chinese society and practice of the state. As Deng and his allies in the CCP, the so called “Practice” faction, consolidated power in the late 1970s through a “façade of unity and stability,” they adopted the patently governmental slogan “practice is the sole criterion of truth” (quoted in Meisner 1999, 433). A subtext of this statement might read: as the state practices rationality (its episteme) those who identify through the sovereign are likewise practicing rationality; therein the self-fulfilling notion of governmentality. Hence, rational, self-governing populations are produced and maintained, so long as they practice the state. These governmental notions adopted by Deng and his followers whom continue to govern the PRC, are also saliently biopolitical, in that it seeks to produce citizens of and for the state, whom practice and exist solely through the state.
V. Post-Cold War, Central Asia and Xinjiang

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 the PRC abruptly faced changing relations in the spaces to its west, Central Asia (Kerr 2010; Kerr and Swinton 2008; Stobdan 1998). To its west the PRC now bordered four new republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The end of direct relations between these new states and the Soviet Union created something of an economic vacuum; economic spaces which the PRC sought to both fill and produce. Additionally, with the ‘liberation’ of ethnically Turkic Central Asian populations the PRC saw potential for unrest in Xinjiang province in which significant populations of ethnically Turkic Uyghur, Kazakh and Kyrgyz live. After sporadic unrest and occasional, small scale violence perpetrated by an assortment of separatists in Xinjiang throughout the 1990s (Bovingdon 2010, 105–134; J. Millward 2007, 334–345; J. Millward 2004; Bovingdon 2002) the PRC sought legitimate means through which to alter their governance and more ardently solidify their sovereignty over Xinjiang. The venue created by the PRC in an attempt to manage its sovereignty issues was the intergovernmental organization called the Shanghai 5, in 1996. Original members of the Shanghai 5 included China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan; with the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001 the organization was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO would become the PRC’s attempted catalyst for spurring regional cooperation, economic interconnectivity, and collective security through combined military and anti-terror exercises. Additionally, as I will later argue in chapter four, the process of
initiating the SCO provided the PRC with means, and the international status (Deng 2005, 59; 63), for greater governmental and biopolitical control over population, specifically in Xinjiang (Kerr 2010; J.-D. Yuan 2010; Shichor 2008; Roberts 2004). This process of facilitating regional connectivity on the PRC’s terms was further complicated by increased US, specifically military, presence in Central Asia (Kerr 2010, 142) throughout the 1990s, and increasingly since September 11, 2001 (Shichor 2008, 62–63); a clear example of the PRC being forced to adapt to US created international contexts as a development of the ‘War on Terror.’ As Deng (2005, 51) points out, since the end of the Cold War, “international status” through an emphasis on “both material power and international legitimacy” is “the most desirable value of Chinese foreign policy.” The PRC’s reaction and facilitation of the US led ‘War on Terror’ in conjunction with its utilization of the SCO are just two of the ways the PRC goes about producing this much desired status.

The objectives of the SCO, as a PRC initiated organization, centered on mediating the new relations with Central Asian states through the PRC with a focus on the population and territory of Xinjiang. As Xinjiang constituted the PRC’s western border with Central Asia it proves central to the PRC’s desired role in the region. Indeed, the objectives of the SCO materialize out of the PRC’s requirement for unrequited growth and a definite presence, or status, within the neoliberal capitalist system; clearly indicative of a capitalistic imperialist logic of space. This accumulative growth through gaining access to valuable resources in a stable Xinjiang and Central Asia is the economic
utility the PRC sees in the SCO (Kerr 2010, 137–140; J.-D. Yuan 2010; Shichor 2008, 66–72; Chaudhuri 2005); and the state specifically connects this utility to the state’s priority since the late 1970s of increasing economic development (Shichor 2008, 56; Garver 2005, 205; Wan 2005, 294). Increased economic activity moving from Central Asia through China would have to be negotiated, physically through Xinjiang’s borders and spaces in order to ultimately benefit state practice and its objectives. Indeed, this required spatial utilization of Xinjiang by the PRC, because of increased development in China since the late 1970s, specifically the east coast, exemplifies the state’s ‘spatial fix’; it’s capitalistic imperialism of Xinjiang. As Clarke (2008, 7) points out, the PRC’s reorientation of Xinjiang’s economy in the 1990s towards Central Asia, after emphasizing a liberalization of economic practices on the eastern coast of China, leading to increased growth which required perpetuity, coupled with the potential influence of external events on Uyghur discontent, led to increasing problematic aspects of the PRC’s governance over Xinjiang.

The balance between the liberal economic practice of opening borders and security within the boundaries of the state (Basaran 2008) typifies the concerns of the PRC in regards to the population of Xinjiang and the economic interconnectivity brought by the SCO. A combination of borders and the PRC’s need for securitization of sovereignty in Xinjiang has led to practices of government by the PRC, often through the SCO, that simultaneously exclude those populations of Xinjiang partaking in the so called “three evils,” terrorism, separatism and religious extremism (Kerr 2010, 143–145;
Shichor 2008, 56–62), and freely allow, both discursively and in practice, those populations which responsibly conduct themselves through the state to participate in the development of the state. Thus, as Xinjiang’s borders have been opened to people and economic activity with lessening restriction, the PRC has used “firm and often brutal means” (Shichor 2008, 56) in dealing with the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, often identified as restive, violent, extremist, or in some way perpetrating the “three evils.” Furthermore, the PRC’s adept utilization of the US produced ‘War on Terror’ contexts allows the state to maintain control over life in Xinjiang with impunity. The contexts of the ‘War on Terror’ allow for, and indeed demand states maintain and exercise absolute sovereignty over territory and population. It is in these relational contexts of post-Mao emphasis on development, the economic-population policies furthered through the SCO, and the Maoist legacy of impunity towards difference, that the PRC considers Xinjiang in its’ reaction to the global ‘War on Terror.’

VI. Xinjiang Before the ‘War on Terror’: Violence and Criminality, but not Terrorism

Changing governmental issues throughout the 1990s in Xinjiang required the PRC to alter their discursive practices towards the making of state sovereignty in Xinjiang; the discursive production of Xinjiang’s population and territory. Despite sporadic, violent events throughout the 1980s and 1990s, though notably with few directed at the state, PRC officials in Beijing and the XUAR government downplayed their significance
and severity, likely out of concern over continued foreign investment and development in the region (Shichor 2006, 106; J. Millward 2004, 10–11; Guang 2004). Guang (2004, 523) even declares that the state “treated those activities [of the 1980s and 1990s] as ordinary criminal acts rather than terrorist acts.” Indeed, these violent events are resoundingly treated as merely violent, criminal activities, as displayed by then Secretary of the XUAR CCP Committee, the highest XUAR government post, Wang Lequan’s statements in 1998: “Since early 1996, a series of criminal activities involving violent attacks have taken place in Xinjiang [...carried out by] a handful of criminals” (emphasis added) quoted in Shichor 2006, 101). Statements such as this one continued into the 2000s, in addition to increased PLA and joint SCO exercises in Xinjiang.

Throughout August 2001 the PLA conducted military exercises involving some 50,000 troops and hundreds of military vehicles, in one of the largest military exercises conducted in East Turkestan by the PLA to date. Shortly afterwards, on September 2, 2001, just nine days prior to September 11, then Chairman of the XUAR Abdulahat Abdurixit said in reference to the level of violence in the region, criminal or otherwise, that the situation was “better then [sic] ever in history” (Reger 2009b, 52–53), while that same day Wang Lequan added, that Xinjiang “society is stable and people are living and working in peace and contentment” (J. Millward 2004, 11). Additionally, one day prior to this, Abdurixit said in a statement, that “There has been no room for national separatists and religious extremists. By no means is Xinjiang a place where violence and terrorist accidents take place very often” (quoted in Bovingdon 2010, 106). Wang
continued the pre-September 11 exoneration of Xinjiang saying on September 3, “The destructive activities of national separatists and religious extremists and their efforts never affect Xinjiang’s stability...Xinjiang is not a place of terror” (quoted in Shichor 2006, 107). This array of statements, while associating Xinjiang with criminal violence, though downplaying its significance, attempts to disassociate Xinjiang with terrorism while emphasizing its stability throughout the years prior to 2001. Despite this sentiment displayed by top PRC officials, their conception of state sovereignty in Xinjiang and terrorism would take an abrupt turn in September 2001.

VII. Xinjiang and the ‘War on Terror’: Constructing Violence and Terrorism

In the aftermath of September 11 PRC officials made a concerted effort in the following weeks to align its position on global terrorism with US policy (J. Millward 2004, 11; Bovingdon 2010, 106). In a statement by Yang Jiechi, the PRC ambassador in Washington D.C., emphasized China’s equal vulnerability to terrorists and stressed the threat of “terrorism” in Xinjiang, and that the PRC would “[position itself] side by side with the United States in the war against terror” (quoted in J. Millward 2004, 11). This new stance on terror would require the PRC to revise its discursive production of Xinjiang’s population and territory. Xinjiang would no longer be a place of sporadic separatism or criminals, rather, a place wholly enmeshed in global terrorist activity and
acts that were once “criminal” or “separatist” in nature, according to state officials, would now be synonymous with the global terror epidemic faced by the world.

In October 2001 in a PRC Foreign Ministry Press Conference, Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Sun Yuxi (2001) began to conceptualize the threat the PRC felt from Xinjiang. He said: “We are opposed to all forms of terrorist activities. Take the East Turkeystan [sic] terrorist force for example. They not only conduct terrorist acts in China’s Xinjiang, but also have links and collaborate with overseas terrorist groups. They undoubtedly pose threat to China.” In November 2001 Tang Jiaxuan (2001), the PRC Foreign Minister, repeated this sentiment, though explicitly referring to the space by the usual Uyghur nationalist term, ‘East Turkistan.’ He declared that “East Turkestan terrorist forces have long received training, financial aid and support from international terrorist groups [...] East Turkestan is [...] a part of international terrorism and should be resolutely fought against.” These statements by state officials are made about the same populations they had in the past dismissed and only treated with cursory concern as criminals (Shichor 2005, 125). Their abrupt adjustment in terminology to the use of “terrorist” and “terrorism” readily display the PRC’s changing “wide, flexible and inclusive definitions of terrorism” (Shichor 2006, 101). The “wide, flexible and inclusive” definitions of terrorism allows for much latitude on the part of the state in deciding what constitutes acts of terrorism and their corresponding penalties (Scobell 2005, 307).
The PRC State Council would go on to release two documents through its Information Office in January 2002 and May 2003 regarding Xinjiang’s “terrorist forces” and the space’s history and development respectively (PRC State Council 2003; PRC State Council 2002). These documents would become significant in their ‘detailing’ of aspects of “terrorism” in, and the history of Xinjiang; associating violent events in Xinjiang throughout the past two decades with well-funded and international in reach and motive, Uyghur terrorist organizations (J. Millward 2004, 11–14). Additionally in 2005, still Party Secretary of the XUAR, Wang Lequan warned that “in Xinjiang the separatists, religious extremists and violent terrorists are all around us—they’re very active” (quoted in Sommerville 2005). Indeed, Chinese academics agreed with Wang that, as now separatism, criminality and terrorism had become synonymous, “separatist threats and activity had exploded in that four year period” since 2001 (Bovingdon 2010, 106). In July 2002 the XUAR government in conjunction with the PRC, aired a sixty minute documentary titled “On the Spot Report: The Crimes of the Eastern Turkestan’s Terrorist Power” detailing Uyghur terrorist activity in Xinjiang throughout the 1990s and its “connections” to international terrorist organizations, alleging connections of Al-Qaeda (Shichor 2006; Meng 2002). According to the state, not only had terrorism in Xinjiang dramatically increased in affect and frequency since 2001, but said terrorists had been operating inside Xinjiang, with connections to Islamic extremists abroad, throughout the prior decade.

The PRC’s sudden turn in its framing of the situation in Xinjiang during
September 2001 and the following months and years was foremost an adjustment in the
state’s mentality of governance over Xinjiang. These adjusting practices of governance
indeed significantly reflect the changing geopolitical contexts spurred by the US ‘War on
Terror’, as well as developments in Xinjiang and Central Asia over the prior decades.
Specifically of concern is the changing identification of separatist criminals as
populations (usually Uyghur) whom in the past had been specific to Xinjiang, but
suddenly, are now well connected to global terrorism and religious extremism, though
continuing to operate and focus on anti-state objectives in Xinjiang. These changing
practices of governance serve to obfuscate the boundaries between social and anti-
social behavior; between criminality and terrorism. These practices serve the mediation
of difference in the state. Ultimately this governmental boundary produced and
transformed by the PRC mediates life and death in the state; to be sovereign “is to
exercise control over mortality” (Mbembé 2003, 12). In the final chapter I will seek an
understanding of governance within the PRC and of the Uyghur during the ‘War on
Terror.’
Chapter 4: Governing China and the Uyghur during the ‘War on Terror’

I. Introduction

As Foucault reminds us, "At the very outset, from the very root, the statement is divided up into an enunciative field in which it has a place and status, which arranges for its possible relations with the past, and which opens up for it a possible future" (Foucault 1972, 99). With this statement Foucault presents the spatiality of the statement. He describes the ‘place’, or ‘status,’ of a statement in that given a statement’s privilege within an ‘enunciative field’, or discourse, the statement may construe context; producing and dictating order, both spatially and temporally. Thus, the statement proves itself to be equally elastic and malleable, relating to the past and to possible futures, from the produced and privileged position of the present; and it is from this positional present which I will now turn my attention to the spatial constructions of the PRC, with sovereignty over the population and territory of Xinjiang as the object of governance during the ‘War on Terror.’
II. History of Xinjiang, its “Terrorist Forces” and Development

Both the 2002 Document, titled “‘East Turkistan’ Forces Cannot get away with Impunity” and the 2003 Document, titled “History and Development of Xinjiang”, released by the PRC State Council’s Information Office were made to produce the future of state sovereignty in Xinjiang. The introduction of 2002 Document begins at the global scale with the PRC stating that: “Terrorism is a big public hazard in the world today, posing an enormous threat to the peace, security and order of the international society.” From the beginning the state positions the notion of terrorism as something which may affect anyone, anywhere, at any time. This notion is decided in line with the United States’ discursive production of the ‘War on Terror.’

Continuing, the introduction states since the 1990s “East Turkistan forces” have planned and carried out many violent “incidents in the Xinjiang Uygur [sic] Autonomous Region of China” and other countries, with the objective of creating an “East Turkistan” state. The introduction then laments the “jeopardized...lives and property...and social stability in China” and neighboring states. Throughout the remainder of the document the identifier “East Turkistan” is always associated with “terrorist forces” and “Eastern Turks” who are described as to have living in what is now Xinjiang.

The first section of the 2002 Document is a history of “Xinjiang” that attempts to separate and disassociate Uyghurs exclusively from the region, while incorporating Han history and Chinese governmental influence and control into the region. With
numerous references to Turks who were “old colonialists” to the region, the Document says the term “East Turkistan” was first forwarded “at the end of the 19th century” by those whose aim was the dismemberment of China. Conversely, and absurdly, the Document does go on to associate the identifier “Xinjiang” with the region going back to 60 B.C.E., when “Xinjiang became part of Chinese territory” and that “from that time on, the central government has never ceased jurisdiction over Xinjiang.” As numerous scholars (Starr 2004; Bovingdon 2004b; J. A. Millward and Perdue 2004; J. A. Millward and Tursun 2004) make obvious, the use of “Xinjiang” as an identifier for the region did not appear until the mid-1900s at the earliest; nor did any central, governmental entity retain complete jurisdiction over “Chinese territory” in the region. This section in particular displays a concerted effort on the part of the PRC to extend the state into the past so as to legitimate its present condition.

The remainder of the 2002 Document describes in “detail” the various violent undertakings of the “East Turkistan terrorists” throughout the 1990s and up until 2002, as well as the establishment of “secret training bases” and terrorist activity outside of PRC borders. The Document concludes that the aim of the “terrorists” is to “split China” and that action is and must be taken to control those terrorists; though here the State Council also qualifies, that the state has not taken advantage of the “September 11 incident” to institute “suppression” in the region.
Millward (2007, 13) points out a number of issues with the document, mainly that it is “less than systematic in its treatment of terrorist of separatist organizations,” with scattered references to specific organizations throughout. He notes that both the Chinese and English versions of the document rely “on such vague generic terms as “the ‘East Turkistan’ terrorist organization,” which it intersperses confusedly with references to specific groups.” Relatedly, he observes that the continual and interchangeable use of the singular form phrase, “the ‘East Turkistan’ terrorist organization” in the English language version of the document, are in the Chinese version, either singular or plural, as Chinese lacks a definite article. Thus, Millward (2004, 13) concludes that the English language version “implies that there is a unified East Turkistan terrorist organization of considerable strength.” In August 2002, despite apparent issues with the 2002 Document, the US government used the 2002 Document to designate the East Turkistan Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization associated with al-Qaeda. The statement of the US utilized “much of the language” of the 2002 Document, and attributed all of the “acts of terrorism” over the past decade described in the 2002 Document to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Consequently, the US designation of the ETIM resulted in the globally reproduced notion, through “press accounts and think-tank pieces,” of a well-organized “anti-American and anti-Chinese” Islamic terrorist force in Xinjiang (J. Millward 2004, 14).

The 2003 Document begins much like the 2002 Document, though ultimately focusing on the history and development of the region. Sections one through four begin
by extending the state, governance and Xinjiang into the past, though in this case more explicitly incorporating Han ethnicity into the history, and going back to 206 B.C.E., rather than the 60 B.C.E. date given in the 2002 Document. The rest of the text extols the virtues of economic and social development brought by the CCP after the “peaceful liberation of the region in 1949.” Sections five through eleven consist of a litany of statistics and measures of well-being and progress in the province for all people ad nauseum. Development led by the state is positioned as true progress that is beneficial for all peoples of the province, while also positioning the condition of backwards “rural ethnic minorities” as only improving through state programs and assistance.

In September 2009 the PRC State Council issued another white paper document titled “Development and Progress in Xinjiang,” specifically focused on those subjects (PRC State Council 2009). This updated version of the 2003 Document is again a litany of statistics and measures, this time with graphs and charts, of economic and social well-being in Xinjiang. In the final section of the 2009 Document, titled “Safeguarding National Unity and Social Stability,” increased and progressive development is positioned as the cause of unity amongst all peoples in the province, while disruptive “terrorist, separatist” forces seek anti-state and dis-harmonious ends. Specifically, this section produces the “terrorist” Uyghurs as anti-Han, wishing to annihilate and expel them from “East Turkistan.” Additionally, the Document invokes “a number of bloody incidents of terror and violence aimed at the Beijing Olympics” in 2008, and the riot in
Urumqi, the capital of the XUAR, in July, 2009 as being organized by “terrorist, separatist forces abroad.”

Throughout the 2003 and 2009 Documents two concepts forwarded by the PRC become apparent: first that the state, while acknowledging “ethnic minorities,” identifies and treats its subjects with singularity. It is clear from this that the PRC does not differentiate between docile, laboring bodies; and that it is only when an individual body transcends that standard does the state identify it beyond this normative way. Second, is that the PRC forwards the virtues of development as both incentive and justification for there to be no “terrorist” or “anti-state” activity in Xinjiang. The PRC continually characterizes its “improvements” to and “progress” in the general condition of Xinjiang’s territory and population as the purpose of sovereignty; a purpose that territory is helpless to resist and the population is expected to subjugate itself to.

III. Documenting ‘Uyghur Terror’ through Film

Throughout late 2001 and early 2002 the XUAR government, with direction and assistance from the PRC in Beijing produced a documentary film, the “On the Spot Report: The Crimes of Eastern Turkestan Terrorist Power” (Meng 2002). This documentary sought to detail the effects of organized terror in Xinjiang, and aired twice on July 23 and 24, 2002 on Channel 4 China Central Television (CCTV), with simultaneous English language broadcast on CCTV Channel 9. Additionally, the documentary film was
shown privately to Western scholars invited to China, at which time they were also
given copies of the film for dissemination in the West (Shichor 2006).

Yitzahk Shichor was one of the Western scholars invited to view the
documentary in China in August 2002. In his 2006 summary of his experience being
shown this documentary and its implications, Shichor states that the purpose of this
article is to “for the first time in public, [give] an English summary of the original Chinese
transcript of the TV documentary that I was given by my hosts...this rare documentary
reflects Beijing’s representation of “Eastern Turkestan terrorism” (2006, 90). The
documentary claims to include irrefutable evidence of “Eastern Turkestan terrorism,”
though it only chronicled events from the 1990s. As Shichor (2006, 101) states: “The
preparation of this documentary, nearly a year after 9/11, betrays a PRC attempt to
exploit the new situation and ride on the emerging global wave in the fight against
terrorism.” Portions of the film indeed show numerous graphic images of dead bodies
in burnt out buses after bombings and Uyghurs “training” in camps outside of China;
though, echoing Shichor’s (2006, 100–108) criticism, the PRC has yet to provide and
physical evidence of these images being related to specific, organized terrorist groups
operating and focused on Xinjiang. Ultimately, this film suffers from many of the same
faults as the 2002, 2003 and 2009 Documents.

Returning our attention to chapter one, the documentary, as well as the
numerous documents produced by the PRC State Council, are foremost a practices of
government concerned with visibility. This visible practice of a government, producing documentation of events through written, audio and/or film mediums is a long standing and accepted and rational practice of government. Regardless of debates over the factual nature of the information presented in these documents and film, that the information is produced and disseminated through the state apparatus, fulfills the state’s objectives of presenting knowledge and knowledge production as rational activity. In short, states have the ability, through governmental practice, to rationalize to other states their biopolitical practices towards population.

Work by Joshua Inwood (2012) clearly demonstrates this relationship between states in regards to how biopolitical disciplining of bodies and knowledge is carried out in the spaces of government. This work centered on the staging and cover up of the massacre in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1979. In this case, the Greensboro city government, North Carolina state government, and the United States government framed the violence in Greensboro as having happened in the place but that its causes were not of the place. The state accomplished this by associating outside extremisms with those involved in the violence. It was emphasized by the various governments, that, despite the fact that those individuals involved were from Greensboro, the clash of leftist ideas of the unionized textile workers and the racist and fascist views of the Ku Klux Klan and American Nazi Party members who killed them, merely played themselves out in the city. Hence, there has been a concerted effort by the city and state governments to distance themselves and their space from the incident itself, and the
“extreme” ideas which “caused” it. This distancing is problematic in a number of ways, but namely, that these governments deny the role racism played, and continues to play in the spaces of the city.

This example of events in Greensboro is pertinent as we have seen throughout the past two sections that the PRC continually associates various “extremes” with the Uyghur; specifically terrorism. Terrorism as a label carry’s connotations which are vilified in current ‘War on Terror’ contexts. Thus, the label and its connotations frame the people and the place, Xinjiang, as a space that is dangerous, unknown and vulnerable; and therefore, as a place where the state must exert control and strengthen sovereignty.

IV. Governmentality, Territory and Population: Solidifying Sovereignty in Xinjiang

Attempts to produce a useful Xinjiang, free of such extremes as terrorism, begin in the realm of government over both territory and population. Ultimately the object the PRC’s governance is the spaces of Xinjiang, its people and places. Governance in Xinjiang must utilize international, relational contexts, like the ‘War on Terror,’ or its regional and global status, to adjust practices of government in the interest of sovereignty. The PRC’s sovereignty in Xinjiang is contingent upon the use of the past, to create a sovereign future for the state.
The utilization of the SCO is a fundamentally governmental practice by the PRC. The PRC foremost identified an economic need, or problematic of the state: to maintain the increases in standard of living brought to its east coast urban areas throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Fixing this problematic was imperative to the legitimacy of the CCP and the state, as the populations and spaces of China’s east coast urban areas constitute the state’s political base. To adjust state practice to solve this issue, the PRC identified the spaces of Central Asia and its territory in Xinjiang as a potential spatial fix. The region’s largely unexplored and unused natural resources significantly improved their potential (Toops 2004c). Additionally, the SCO, as one of the technical apparatuses for fulfilling this spatial fix, was used to identify aspects of Xinjiang’s space that could impede its use as a spatial fix. This resulted in the identification of populations which fulfilled the characteristics of the “three evils,” separatism, splittism and terrorism; all characteristics, especially the conflation between terrorism and separatism during the ‘War on Terror,’ were made to exist for the Uyghur.

Just as the PRC adjusted governmental practices directed toward the territory and land of Xinjiang, so too did it adjust its governance over Xinjiang’s population during the ‘War on Terror.’ According to Puska (2006, 68), the PRC sees any domestic insurgency in Xinjiang as manageable, in the sense that large scale and continuous military presence and operations to deal with this concern are unnecessary. Rather, the PRC’s emphasis on development, discipline and singularity in one’s subjection to state identity are viewed as more adequate and beneficial means for dealing with a Uyghur
population that, to this point, has only displayed a potential for large-scale insurgency, without the actual manifestation of action typical of an insurgency; like those in Iraq or Afghanistan. Despite the PRC’s proclamations and attempts to be seeking development in Xinjiang that increases standards of living for all people, regardless of ethnicity, such reliance on neoliberal capitalism to improve conditions for all citizens equally has proved to be impracticable. Indeed, development in Xinjiang has occurred unevenly, with Han Chinese, especially those who migrate to the province from the east, being considerably more well connected to the state government, acquiring the majority of benefits (Reger 2009a; Reger 2009b). Moreover attempts by the PRC to discipline and militarize the population of Xinjiang, regardless of ethnicity, through Han language schools and institutions in urban areas has led to significantly increased disparity, and especially since 2001 (Schluessel 2009; Brophy 2005; A. Dwyer 2005).

Through the various development and education programs forwarded by the PRC in Xinjiang, the state is attempting to foster productive spaces and self-responsible, productive populations for those spaces. These spaces become disciplined and militarized, as they are imbued with the institutionalized and governmentalized practices of the neoliberal labor market. Concurrently, as the facilitator of economic relations, only the state and what the state deems acceptable capital pursuits may utilize spaces, land, resources and available labor power. Through dissemination of documents and films, and the combination of constructed truths about terrorists by the
West, the PRC ambiguously produces terrorists of Xinjiang; thus, states, whether it be the US, China or any state, produces the potential for any Uyghur to be a terrorist.

For the state to retain strict sovereignty over Xinjiang, its subjects must identify through the state. This desired singular identity is part of the governmental rationality of neoliberal states, whereby the singularity of being alive allows for bodies to most efficiently circulate value within the capitalist state (Barkan 2009, 255–256). Warren Montag (2005, 17) describes this process as “necro-economic” logical of capital, wherein bodies are “exposed to death and compelled to accept the rationing of life by the market,” and by extension, the state. Barkan (2009, 256) adds that, “Life, once politicized as necessary for the continued accumulation of capital, becomes expendable at the moment when it no longer assists in the circulation of value.” If labeled a terrorist, in Xinjiang or elsewhere, one no longer is a responsible subject. One can no longer circulate value, as according to the discourse of the ‘War on Terror,’ a terrorist is simply “evil,” having no regard for the life or property of those around them. These relational contexts coalesce in the spaces of states, as those bodies that are deemed to not adhering to rationalized governmental practices may be removed actively from society with impunity.

The extension of governance over life allows the PRC to create populations, to produce boundaries of socially acceptable and unacceptable existence. In affect, Uyghurs may be rewarded by practicing life through the sovereign, or identifying with
Chinese-ness; while others practicing Uyghur-ness are left open to the possibility of disciplining and punishment with impunity by the state. In the next two sections, we will first explore the securitization of life in Xinjiang and the dialectic production of life and death in a sovereign Xinjiang.

V. A Bio-secure Xinjiang

In Chapter one and earlier in Chapter four I discussed biopolitical objectives of the state; that is, to foster life, to promote and value a certain, specific form of life. This molded life must fit within the state’s conception of its sovereignty as the state relates to other states, in addition to fitting within internal practices of stateness. One of the PRC’s biopolitical objectives is to foster life in Xinjiang through increased economic development, which is in line with the state’s imperial-capitalist logic. The life that is fostered to achieve the objectives of the state must be continually secured against threat and possible vulnerability. Numerous scholars have discussed the connections between Foucault’s notions of governmentality and biopolitics and the securitization of life as biosecurity (Ingram 2010; Hinchliffe and Bingham 2008; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008; Bingham, Eenticott, and Hinchliffe 2008; Elbe 2005).

In reflecting on Hinchliffe and Bingham’s (2008) article, Bingham et al. (2008, 1529) suggest that one important aspect of the study of practices of biosecurity is the opportunity to engage the “‘interferences’ and interactions between the various actors
and things attempting to create secure arrangements.” Similarly to Hinchliffe and Bingham, Alan Ingram (2010) discusses potential for research in connecting aspects of Foucault’s governmentality with the biosecurity literature, where it increasingly concerns security and globalized phenomena such as HIV/AIDS, or other global in scale, health concerns. Ingram (2010, 299) notes that when biosecurity threats arise, specific significance is given to “anticipation, preparedness, emergence and pre-emption” in space. Elbe (2005) details the treatment of HIV/AIDS as a security threat through global state, biopolitical practices which normalize the disease through practices of “new racism.”

Elbe (2005, 410–413) specifically details some consequences of states treating HIV/AIDS as a security threat; first with the letting die of populations as an effective way of controlling the infected populations. Second, the quarantining, or spatial segregation of infected populations, so as to save those fostered lives which are not infected, thus normalizing one population’s status as superior to another; and third, the rationing of medicines, treatment and care, so as to direct more resources towards populations which conduct themselves responsibly. Elbe argues that such state practices of biopolitics normalize ethics as, through the identification of abnormality in population and the treatment of abnormality as security threat, the ethos of a population is made to align with the rational episteme of the state. Indeed, here we may recall our discussion in chapter two as Mustafa (2005) discussed popular metaphors surrounding “terrorism” and its connotations increasingly being treated as a hazard. Here we may
see terrorism as something which states and their subjects should be prepared for and from which life should be protected; specifically through the identification of difference within populations. Relatedly, Katharyne Mitchell (2011, 305) adds to our understanding of securing life and establishing difference amongst bodies in space through the “zero tolerance” contexts of the ‘War on Terror,’ saying that “global threat and fear produces the perceived necessity for new kinds of ‘expert’ security apparatuses and partnerships to translate and decode potentially in-secure bodies and spaces.”

Mitchell (ibid) stresses that these new security apparatuses of the ‘War on Terror’ demand the supposed necessity to manage “all ‘abnormal’ bodies and spaces” at the global scale.

As shown above, the construction of less-than-human entities, terrorists in this case, is an inherently geographic process, as it is predicated upon the delineation of population; this is a boundary making process. Given the inherent geographicalness of this process we may begin to see its connections to processes of securing life. As Basaran (2008, 339) explains “borders are strategically used to change the balance between security and liberties: to increase policing powers and to exclude people from legal rights and procedures.” Thus, biopolitics becomes a mechanism for the mediation of difference within society; a normalizing force that instills within society boundary and threshold defining concepts, such as racism, sexism or classism and their concurrent practices, which are used to subject certain bodies to the possibility of being ‘let die,’ or killed with impunity at the hands of the sovereign.
We may look at what makes the PRC seek a “secure arrangement” in relation to threats to its sovereignty, emanating from population within its’ territorial spaces. Through practices of securitization and militarization of space in Xinjiang, the PRC seeks to ‘secure life’ that aligns with the rationality of the state. Throughout the past twelve years, I argue, the Uyghur are continually viewed by the Chinese state as a biosecurity threat. This biosecurity threat conceptualized and produced through the state and dominant international contexts create Uyghurs as terrorists. This creative process was seen, as detailed in chapter three, in the about-face of PRC discourse regarding Uyghurs and what the state now defines as “anti-state” activity in Xinjiang. The continued integration and inclusion of Xinjiang into China during the ‘War on Terror’ is predicated upon the differentiation and dispossession of Uyghurs, despite the fact that the PRC still requires a docile population to occupy its territory. Mitchell (2011, 305) makes this point exceedingly salient, relating that “the resulting exile of ‘intolerably risky communities’ opens up the potential for new counterterrorist pacification strategies and new forms of territorial and capital integration and accumulation through dispossession.”

Through the past two sections, it becomes apparent that the PRC and racial-capitalistic states more broadly, produce, though biopolitically informed governmental practice, Uyghurs either as docile, self-responsible, productive laboring bodies through the state; or as irresponsible, none productive, bodies, that may be disallowed life, or
killed at the discretion of the state. Regardless of the trajectory of an individual Uyghur’s life, they are dispossessed of the ability to live it.
Chapter 5: Conclusions

I. Governmentality, Sovereignty and Production

Governmental practice informed by the biopolitical calculation and valuation of life, subject populations to the discursive rationality of the spatially absolute state. It is through the subjugation of populations within a definite territory that states produce their sovereignty. Sovereignty manifests in those spaces and populations that subject themselves fully through the sovereign, embodying it wholly, while rapidly subjecting their life to death at the hands of the sovereign without fear of death.

The dominant notions of stateness produced by global ‘War on Terror’ incisively cause states to adjust their sovereignty, often violently. This, in an attempt to secure the lives and form of those spaces and people that subject their lives solely through the sovereign, from those lives which are made to be incongruent with the spatial dictates of the sovereign state. Thus is the spatial dialectic of stateness, amplified by the ‘War on Terror.’ Within the same space states must produce a sovereign populace, while simultaneously and discursively excluding those populations who do not adhere to the governmental structures of the state.

Therein lays the dialectic production of the Uyghur; a population that is rhetorically and spatially included within the territory and population of the PRC, so long
as the individual Uyghur identifies and conducts themselves through the rationalized epistemic, governmental state. Should the individual Uyghur disavow the state and its sovereignty over life, the individual could be either ‘disallowed life’ or killed with impunity by the sovereign. Relatedly, this phenomenon plays itself out at the level of the population, wherein whole populations that remain incongruent in relation to the sovereign may be produced with impunity.

II. Future Work

After reaching an understanding of governmental practice and its consequences in Xinjiang during the ‘War on Terror,’ the potential for future examination of the political geographies of Xinjiang abound. Work by Giorgio Agamben (2005; 1998) on the sovereign state of exception and the production of *homo sacer*, or ‘bare life,’ deals with the inclusion of populations within states, but only through their exception to the rule of the sovereign; these populations are in effect, included under the rule of the sovereign solely through their own exclusion. Agamben’s work could be used to significantly develop conceptual understandings of the Uyghur’s sovereign life (and death) during the ‘War on Terror.’

Achille Mbembe’s (2003) concept of necropolitics was taken up by geographers Michael McIntyre and Heidi Nast in a series of papers regarding what they term the “Bio(necro)polis” and surplus populations (McIntyre and Nast 2011; Nast 2011;
This conceptual work provides a framework that could be useful for situating the dialectic production of docile laboring populations and surplus expendable populations, specifically by the PRC in Xinjiang.

Additionally, the preceding work on governmentality and the Uyghur during the ‘War on Terror’ creates a useful foundation of conceptual information for the continued exploration of the effects of governmental practice on health amongst Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. This conceptual framework could be reworked to specifically focus on gendered health or drug use disparities between Uyghur populations, and those populations in Xinjiang who are fully subject to the sovereign, in a comparative study. Rather than abruptly terminating this thesis with these points, I would like now to remind of Mr. Qassim and the twenty-one other Uyghurs held at the Guantanamo Bay detention center.

III. Ontology and Difference

How were the Uyghurs held in Guantanamo Bay determined to be incongruent with various sovereign spaces in which they exist? How is their status, their being in reality determined? Don Mitchell (1995, 103) states that, “there is no such (ontological) thing as culture.” He continues, emphasizing that, “rather, there is only a very powerful idea of culture, an idea that has developed under specific historical conditions and was later broadened as a means of explaining material differences, social order and relations
of power.” For Mitchell there is no absolute pre-existing meaning, or end to culture. Later in his paper, Mitchell (1995, 112) displays the governmental aspects of the use of culture in mediating difference, stating: “The power of ‘culture’ resides in its ability to be used to describe, label or carve out activities into stable entities, so that they can be named an attribute of a people.”

This final statement by Mitchell is exceptionally telling of the use of culture as a governmental practice for producing difference amongst peoples. It is this practice of reifying difference that underlies the discursive production of things, of people and the nature of space. Governmental practice rationalizes the ontological status of culture and difference.

As a member of society, whether I imagine myself as a citizen of the US, a cosmopolitan citizen of the world (Appiah 2007), or a student undertaking the task of knowledge production (Bauder and Engel-Di Mauro 2008; D. Mitchell 2008; Bauder 2006; Blomley 2006; Philo 2005), how am I responsible for imagining and considering ‘difference’ in society? Imagining and considering people responsibly, for the purpose of knowledge production, as I am a student, should be a thoughtful activity. My ethos, my orientation in practicing self-government, is the values through which I produce knowledge, how I go about knowing the world. Thus exists a primacy on thinking and questioning.
For the responsible knowledge producer thinking may be simultaneously imagined “as an active response to historically situated problems and as a key driver in shaping new topologies of power” (emphasis added, Collier 2009, 93). Relatedly, not only is the systematic practice of thinking, thought and rationality the object of analysis, but additionally it allows for ‘conditions of possibility’ to emerge (Collier 2009, 94). Indeed, thinking can be understood “as a ‘dynamic and heterogeneous process’ of critical reflection and intervention” not bound in “a ‘formal system that has reference only to itself’” (Collier 2009, 95; Foucault 1984, 388). Hence, the process of thinking, and consequently acting on that thinking, perhaps in the form of knowledge production, “involves ‘a degree of constraint as well as a degree of freedom’, that makes possible a certain critical distance from existing ways of understanding and acting” (Collier 2009, 95–96). Finally, can that distanced work of knowledge production exist in the problematized space of the text?

The work, it has been said, “can be held in the hand, the text is held in language, [and] only exists in the movement of a discourse…the Text is experienced only in an activity of production” (emphasis in original, Barthes 1978a, 157). As the Text can cut across work(s), it is unceasing in its excursion “to the limit of the rules of enunciation (rationality, readability, etc.)”; thus “posing problems of classification (which is furthermore one of its ‘social’ functions)” because of the Text’s subversive “experience of limits” (ibid). While the work is the object of consumption, Text is paradoxical, irreducible, unauthorized, leading to, at least relational language, wherein no language
has primacy over other language, but moreover, “the transparence of social relations”; the Text is “social space” (emphasis added, Barthes 1978a, 158–164).

As a social space the Text is not the totalizing realm of the author. Rather, it is something constantly “in production,” a plural space where significance and meaning is as much made by the reader as the language of the text (Barthes 1981, 37–38). In this way, intertextual meaning “explodes and scatters” throughout the Text, venturing through a myriad of “avenues of meaning” (Barthes 1988, 262) with no avenue being totalized or authorized through a single omniscient locus of meaning. These notions of meaning are brought to bear in the positing of ‘readerly’ and ‘writerly’ texts (Barthes 1974). The writerly text is “ourselves writing,” which allows the reader to be an active writer of text, to produce meaning throughout, within and beyond (Barthes 1974, 3–5). The readerly text positions the reader solely as that; a reader, a mere consumer of the authorized and prescribed signification within text, the seeming ‘reality’ with which they are presented (ibid).

To practice the writerly is to knowingly practice within the nexus of form, writing and social commitment (Barthes 1984); to knowingly explore distance in relation to the mythologies of normative form(s) (Barthes 1987; Barthes 1983; Barthes 1972); to knowingly produce writing that assembles networks of signifiers, and not offering prescribed signifieds, while questioning the use of language in relation to the human subject of the text, noting that we ourselves (the writer, reader, subject(s)) are part of
textuality (Barthes 1974); to knowingly disturb boundaries of the ‘real,’ even refusing to reject naturalized forms with demystifying language (Barthes 1978b; Barthes 1977; Barthes 1975). Together these practices present a text that is completely reversible, which may begin from any point, and “a mode of meaning that does not offer a final, stable signified” (Allen 2003, 93; Barthes 1974).

This leaves me, the student, within a myriad of possibilities. I am provided the conditions for possibility. How do I conduct myself in relation to knowledge production and writing? How am I to practice myself, my use of language, within the prescribed form and style of ‘thesis’? Retrospectively, I have attempted to practice the ‘writerly’ text, while surely it is not completely so, as relatedly, no thing could be absolutely ‘this’ or ‘that.’ I have governed myself, in this particular instance, to think and question the ontological status of subjects through text.

Governance, the conduct of conduct, the practice of conduct, is never static; rather, it remains in constant transformation. This continual transformation of governance forces the instability of difference and the ontological rationalization of the practice of discursive possibility. It is this rationalization of difference by government that is the grounds for discursively producing the global ‘War on Terror;’ a never-ending relational context of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ populations; a war against an idea supposedly inherent to certain people in the world.
Qassim and his counterparts were expected to adhere to the spatiality and subjective rationality of the state. When they did not, they were identified and fled China for Afghanistan and eventually were sent to Guantanamo Bay; a process which saw them literally caught up in a maw of self-rationalizing practices of government.

Twelve years later five Uyghurs remain detained, their lives continually occasioned, calculated and valued by states. As this institutionalized process of ambiguity progresses, Qassim continues to reflect on their plight and his own position in being allowed to re-enter society, asserting, “We were all together. We’re innocent, they’re not?”

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18 (Shephard 2012)
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