THE METHODOLOGY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL REALISM
IN THE ACTING PERSON BY KAROL WOJTYLA

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by

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO KAROL WOJTYLA’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL REALISM
AS THE
PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY OF THE ACTING PERSON

Several commentators on Karol Wojtyla’s philosophical methodology in his book, The Acting Person,¹ have described it as a critical conjunction of a philosophy of consciousness with a traditional Thomistic philosophy of being. For example, George F. McLean refers to the methodology of this philosophical work as “a mutual enrichment of the philosophies of being and consciousness.” Wojtyla himself has recorded an indebtedness to systems of metaphysics especially in the Aristotelian Thomistic ethical tradition, McLean writes, as well as to phenomenology, especially in Scheler’s interpretation of this modern philosophy². Also, Kenneth Schmitz, an important Karol Wojtyla scholar, describes this methodology in terms of Wojtyla’s “philosophical originality”. He will use the vocabulary and many of the concepts of modernity modified for his own philosophical purposes, but he brings them into conversation with classical medieval metaphysical categories that essay to objectively explain reality.³


finally, Rocco Buttiglione writes in his book, *Karol Wojtyla*, that *The Acting Person* “is a rigorously philosophical book”, in which Thomist metaphysical anthropology becomes an hypothesis to be verified through phenomenological analysis, while still being a guide for this analysis and introducing possibilities of greater penetration into reality.  

Jaroslaw Kupczak, O.P., in a very accessible exposition of Wojtyla’s specific form of phenomenology, provides a remark from Wojtyla himself on the philosophical rationale of his methodology vis-a-vis its integration of pre-modern Thomist metaphysics with the modern/post modern advertence to human consciousness and subjectivity. Just as St. Thomas had used the “pagan” philosophy of Aristotle, “so Christians of every age should use the current philosophies to reveal the richness of Christian thought.” Several writers have further commented that this methodology which brings together the philosophies of being and consciousness cannot be characterized as a mere syncretism unorganized by any internal principle. It is rather a process with its own higher goal of a rigorous, systematic search for an encounter with the truth of reality, and is an approach that acknowledges and adapts all respected philosophical resources.

That this novel methodology could do the above was rooted in Wojtyla’s thorough knowledge of the traditions of philosophy: classical Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, medieval pre-modern Thomism, Enlightenment European philosophy, and modern/post modern twentieth century philosophy. But in this methodology he will adopt processes of philosophical

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inquiry critically, and this is one of the points that will be taken up in this thesis. Hence, a
disclaimer must be articulated immediately in the present study, that Wojtyla’s methodology is
not a ‘method’ or a set pattern of logical investigations that if followed will yield certain
“scientifically” factually exact conclusions. Rather, Wojtyla’s methodology, revealed in his
study on the acting person, is an exhaustive, questing inquiry into human being-ness that relies
on the contributions of a plurality of philosophical traditions to plumb the fundamental meaning
and truths of human existence. Wojtyla creatively combines his philosophical sources to enable
the fullest cognitive encounter with the reality of his subject, the human person manifested in
action. And he achieves an admirable depth of knowledge, authenticated and ratified by the very
truths and insights into “the thickness of reality” of the person, as this is discovered in his
integrated philosophical investigations.

Several authors have made the claim that in his study of the concrete human person,
Karol Wojtyla has “substantially contributed to the development of realistic phenomenology.”
And hence, the term, “phenomenological realism” has been used to name his creative use of
metaphysical explanation and phenomenological interpretation in a unified methodological study
of the human person. 8 Phenomenological realism then names the methodology that is the focus

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6This phrase is borrowed from William James. See William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism & A

7Hans Kochler, “Karol Wojtyla’s Notion of the Irreducible in Man and the Quest for A Just World Order”,
in Billia, Curry, and McLean, eds., p. 175.

8Kenneth L. Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama” The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol
Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II, with an appendix by John M. Grondelski (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1993), p. 46. It also can be noted that in the series of Annalecta Husserl, edited by Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), the 1974 volume is entitled, The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible
Worlds. Rocco Buttiglione writes that increased attention to realist phenomenology “starts to set the horizon within
which Wojtyla’s contribution is received.” The Acting Person is a culminating study in this focus. See Buttiglione,
p. 119.
of this thesis’s inquiry, specifically as this methodology reveals itself in Wojtyla’s creative enrichment of the philosophies of being and consciousness in *The Acting Person*. However, due to the wholeness or plenitude of what can be claimed is a single and novel methodology uniting old and new philosophy, it is also the case that realism itself, is the most apt term to characterized each and every aspect of the comprehensive methodology in *The Acting Person*.9

Hence, my thesis is that there is something quite new and original in Wojtyla’s mating of a phenomenological archeology of the acting person’s lived experience with older traditional analytical objectifications of the human being, that together increase our intellectual encounter with the reality of human personal being-ness. Thus there is a realism that characterizes Wojtyla’s form of phenomenological investigation itself10 even before the results of its form of doing philosophy are brought to bear upon the realistic metaphysical conclusions about the person in the older philosophies of being. Husserl’s faithful assistant and colleague, Edith Stein, intuited this realism. She wrote that both Husserl and Thomas were convinced that a “logos” “is the force behind all that is, and that our understanding can uncover step by step first one aspect of this [“logos”], then another, and so on, as long as it moves ahead . . . in accordance with the principle of the most stringent intellectual honor.”11

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10 It should be noted that phenomenology is not generally understood as a “realistic” philosophy; the phenomenologist holds that substance is hidden from our senses as opposed to traditional Thomistic realism that claims reality forms the mind. The more modest claim of phenomenology is to encounter the essence of a thing in the intentional bond; the essence as a given of consciousness arising from this bond indeed can be known with certainty, but the truth claim falls short of that of metaphysical realism. There is no analogy of being in traditional phenomenology, and the sensory phenomena have a different type of existence than the knowing subject, thus there is no sense of reality as proportionate being forming the mind. See, Herman Reith, *The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1958), pp. 171-172.

11 Edith Stein, p. 9. Moreover, there is a tradition of realism in Husserlian phenomenology which we will take up momentarily in the discussion, “Whose phenomenology?”
Hence, the relationship Wojtyla maintains between traditional metaphysics and contemporary phenomenology reveals a deep respect for the vitality in the intellectual realism of medieval Thomism as well as for the power of phenomenological analysis to unearth sedimented depths of the concrete truths of personhood in its probing investigations of our lived experiences. The latter then is a complimentary realism that can uncover truths provided by our knowledge by “direct acquaintance” of large unmapped aspects of reality missed in the theoretical knowing provided in metaphysical objectifications. So it is phenomenology alone that can provide the conditions of possibility for cognition of the “thickness of reality,” and as such supports the claim for its own brand of realism. Karol Wojtyla recognizes phenomenology’s realistic possibilities and that is why this modern philosophy is a critical component in his overall methodology for doing philosophy. Phenomenology in his view enhances Thomistic realism.

So keeping in mind both phenomenology’s in-depth probing of experience and Thomistic ontology’s claim to be a rigorous science, the goal of the present investigative study into Wojtyla’s methodology that is named phenomenological realism, is first of all, to comprehensively explain the manner in which Wojtyla’s philosophy creatively interrelates these philosophies. His philosophy combines a philosophy of consciousness that explores the “lived experience” (Erfahrung and Erlebnis) of the concrete acting person, with the realism of the Thomistic definition of the person as a particular suppositum, itself drawn from the definition of

12 Of course this is a very much in line with William James’s “radical empiricism”; European phenomenologist from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty were influenced by James and also Henri Bergson. See, William James, “Bergson and his Critique of Intellectualism” in John J. McDermott, Editor, The Writings of William James” (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 561-581. Wojtyla references both James and Bergson in The Acting Person, see notes 19, p. 304, n. 65, p. 314.

13 Wojtyla will employ this dual approach to experience in a manner similar to Max Scheler. We will take up this topic in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
the person by the philosopher Boethius.\textsuperscript{14} This investigation then will first focus on the history and definitions of philosophical schools of thought (Chapters 1-3), and then in the final chapters of this thesis, thoroughly explicate Wojtyla’s integrated philosophical methodology.

The second aspect of this goal is a search for adequate examples in the chapters of the book to support the claim of the novelty of Wojtyla’s creative synthesis made in this thesis. The purpose of the examples is an illustrative one. It is hoped that through carefully selected examples of Wojtyla’s actual application of a process of phenomenological investigation of the realistic objectifications of the person provided by metaphysics, it can be plausibly demonstrated that he does achieve a phenomenological realism in the sense that he has disclosed a phenomenologically discovered complexity or thickness of philosophically overlooked aspects of the reality of the human person. These disclosed manifolds of the mystery that is the person in turn become new potentially rich material for further ratiocination in the goal of understanding the human person. In other words, this integrated methodology does indeed hold out the possibilities for advancing our knowledge of the human person. In sum, the application of the phenomenological study of the person allows our cognitive powers to reach a fullness of participation in the truth of human personal reality, which is the very purpose to the metaphysical investigation of the person in Wojtyla’s form of Thomistic philosophical anthropology.

In this chapter a general introduction to Wojtyla’s philosophical methodology will be provided that includes the problematic which has driven his research, as well the theological presuppositions that would guide Karol Wojtyla in doing philosophy. These presuppositions are

\textsuperscript{14}Wojtyla finds Boethius’ definition of the person inadequate because personhood has a uniqueness to it in his view that goes beyond a generalized positing of someone as an individual in a species in nature. See Jaroslaw Kupczak, O.P., p. 103.
integral to Wojtyla’s stated goal to articulate a philosophical anthropology adequate to his claim for the possibility of ethical realism. Secondly, and in the light of these presuppositions, the criterion by which he can make truth claims for his strictly philosophical writings will be explained. The chapter will conclude with a first exposition of the human person as the actual logos by which his methodology can give an account of the reality which is the person. It is important to understand Wojtyla’s reasons as to why the person in his/her wholeness is the logos itself of his methodology. The thesis of the book is critically argued using the irreplaceable and unique possibilities of the person himself to give us the full truth of human personal being. This is because Wojtyla contends that the deliberate human act\textsuperscript{15} articulates and reveals the nature of the person, a revelation that can be given an exactness of expression in and by means of philosophical investigation. In sum, one must look to the person himself or herself to give a credible account of real truth of the human person.

The second chapter takes up the question as to which Thomistic tradition marks Wojtyla’s philosophy of being. Because in the twentieth century there were many rival Thomisms greatly at odds with each other in both their methods of doing philosophy and in the content of their conclusions, this is an important clarification to be made. The third chapter takes up an equally important issue, one that concerns whose phenomenology he has adopted. Once again it is nearly impossible to identify one form of phenomenology. Because it has become such a generalized term, used to describe such disparate philosophies from the idealism of Hegel

\textsuperscript{15}“It is only man’s \textit{deliberate acting} that we can an ‘act’ or ‘action’. Nothing else in his acting, nothing that is not intended and deliberate deserves to be so termed. In the Western philosophical tradition a deliberate action has been seen as the \textit{actus humanus}, . . . ; it is in this sense that the term is used . . . throughout this book”. \textit{The Acting Person}, p. 25.
to the concretism of Merleau-Ponty, this question does become an important one. Chapters Two
and Three will also deal with Wojtyla’s critical adoption of the actual distinct forms of Thomism
and of phenomenology. Thus they will include a discussion of the exact disagreements he has
continued to hold with these philosophies.

There will be a much more detailed explanation of the melding of the two philosophies in
Chapter Four, as the penultimate chapter of this thesis. Thus the second and third chapters’
identification of specified forms of phenomenology and Thomism, will become the basis to
articulate a comprehensive definition of the unified methodology which is Wojtyla’s
phenomenological realism. The explication and exposition of this methodology will be based
upon Wojtyla’s own clarification of his methodology in the “Introduction” to his book. His
insistence that the parameters of our knowledge of human personal being-ness are drawn by the
“great cognitive process which at its origin may defined as the experience of man,” are the
main subject of this chapter. Because he ascribes the very possibilities for experiencing to
consciousness, Wojtyla’s unique theory of consciousness, which is at odds with modern
phenomenology’s notion of intentionality, will be an important focus in this exposition.

The chapter will also present an elucidation of Wojtyla critical adaptation of the
phenomenology of the person found in the works of Max Scheler. This adaptation is central to
his methodology. Wojtyla acknowledges a great debt to Scheler because his work allows
Wojtyla to overcome the one-sided objective personalism of St. Thomas, “in which the side of

\[\text{References:}\]

16 *The Acting Person*, p. 3.
subjectivity lacks adequate development, as founded in human experience and phenomenologically makes this development. Thus some illustrations will exemplify the manner in which Wojtyla uses a Schelerian phenomenology to flesh out our insight into the subjective aspect of human personhood. There will be a second set of illustrations to provide an example of how the phenomenological analysis also “allows us to develop on the basis of personal experience a reflection which concludes in a confirmation of the Thomistic ontology of the person.” The phenomenological moments in this inquiry are methodologically necessary because, if in St. Thomas we are provided with understandings of the person in his objective existence and action, it is not possible to discover in his metaphysics of the person any insights at all of the living experience of the person. It should be noted, that while the chapter contains a summation, of the central assertions and conclusions Wojtyla provides about the reality that is the human person, this exposition remains secondary to this thesis.

A further comment, which is in fact an addendum to the thesis of the newness in his unification of philosophies of being and consciousness claimed in the present study, should be inserted at this juncture. The examples which illustrate his use of both the philosophies of being and consciousness will show an unbroken, continued interweaving of metaphysics and phenomenology. Wojtyla rarely uses a purely metaphysical explanation or a phenomenological analysis in any topic under consideration in this book; rather, he introduces both philosophical forms of inquiry to make his arguments. Pre-modern metaphysics in its ability to objectify and

18 Buttiglione, p. 82.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
modern philosophies of consciousness that bring to focus subjectivity thus reveal themselves as open and adaptable to the mutual enrichment of each philosophical tradition. Such compatibility between the traditions also gives credibility to Wojtyla’s decision to fully excavate the complexity of the metaphysically known human person through the phenomenological approach.21

The first four chapters of this thesis act as a prolegomenon for its final one, Chapter Five. The expositions they contain provided sufficient background for a genuine understanding of Wojtyla’s original philosophical methodology, one that has earned him his own book in the Wadsworth Philosophers Series.22 Hence, the material for the investigation in this final chapter will come from the “Introduction” to The Acting Person, and thus from Wojtyla’s personal explanation of his methodology. He introduces his overall approach to the philosophy of the acting person using three categories: experience, induction and reduction. The chapter will elaborate on his original definitions of these traditional steps in methodology and his Jamesian reliance on experience through each of these steps. Wojtyla never leaves experience. This fact is integrally tied to the criteria of truth and objectivity that Wojtyla employs in his philosophy. These criteria will be explained in the concluding sections of the chapter. Hence, Chapter Five will provide the detailed summary of the results of this thesis’ investigative goals.

The remaining sections of this first chapter will serve to provide a general introduction to the Wojtyla’s project in The Acting Person. Although Wojtyla was an ordained and theologically educated priest in the Catholic Church, in his academic career he was a fully lettered and well-

21Wojtyla makes this claim several times within the text; i.e., see The Acting Person., pp. 184-185.

qualified professional philosopher. He held the chair of ethics at the University of Lublin in Poland. And as is evident in the footnotes that he brings to support his claims in *The Acting Person*, he was thoroughly conversant with classic, medieval and modern philosophy. His choice to be a philosopher rather than a theologian in academia reveals the independent value he attributed to philosophy, which he understood to have the singular task of giving expression to basic understandings about reality and ultimate justifications for truth claims about existence.\(^{23}\)

Hence, he was completely aware of the paramount philosophical issues of his times, which arose in the modern turn to the subject and to consciousness. There could be no going back, given Kant’s challenge vis-a-vis the conditions of possibility in the subject for metaphysical knowledge, to essentialist philosophies of scholasticism.

However, even though Wojtyła was thoroughly informed in traditionalist Thomism, and had recognized its essentialist and objectivist flaws, and thus its inadequacy as a methodology for producing a comprehensive philosophical anthropology, he also recognized in turn several problems in the idealism and subjectivism of modern philosophies of consciousness. So it must be noted that the book, *The Acting Person*, is not written in a philosophic vacuum, but in response to specific problematics seen by the philosopher/ethicist, Karol Wojtyła.

The first of these stems from some serious problems he believed were harming twentieth century philosophy in general. The two great currents in Western philosophy in his view had each been badly hampered by a radical isolation from the general conversation which makes up the diversity of modern philosophy. Wojtyła characterized the results of this isolation as the absolutization of the dual aspects of experience: that of the outer world and of the inner one of

the self. This in turn developed into unsolvable philosophic disagreement between the philosophies of being and consciousness. Wojtyla understood the limits of both forms of philosophy, and thus sought a synthesis between classical realist anthropology and modern phenomenology’s great insights into the complexity of human subjectivity and consciousness.24 For the divergence of these two great currents in philosophical thought—between the subject and the object—had its counterpart in the experiences of human being of a cleavage between inner aspects of human existence from the outer ones. So Wojtyla will turn to the person, who is both subject and object of intellection25 to correct the limitations arising from the chasm between traditional philosophies of being and modern ones of consciousness that will allow the latter to support and enrich a realist image of the person.26

The second and more specific problematic that motivated Wojtyla’s study on the person was existential; it arose from the tragedy that was World War II and the rise of totalitarian collectivism. Wojtyla, who had come to adulthood under the repressive persecutions of German national socialism, and then entered into his academic career as philosopher under the limitations of the stifling oversight of the Marxist censor, had grown in his desire to renew philosophy so it would liberate peoples. The signs of the times were the assault on the dignity of the person. Thus, as George McLean writes, Wojtyla’s thought consisted precisely in opening new horizons for human life.27 In this respect he can be identified with the European movement that has been

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24George McLean discusses this problematic, see p. 24; also see Kupczak, p. 76.


26Ibid., p. 24.

27Ibid., p. 18
designated as personalism. As a movement it was not a system or a political machine, but rather a influential philosophical view which emphasized that human beings must be seen in all their dimensions—material, inward, transcendent aspirations. Personalism proposes that when society takes up its organizational decision making, “human persons must be viewed as source and locus of intrinsic value.” There are many philosophers loosely associated with this movement, such as Emmanuel Mounier, Maurice Blondel, and the French philosopher, Paul Ricoeur, who is quoted several times by Wojtyla in his book.

The third and most specific problematic addressed by Wojtyla in taking up his phenomenological study of the person arose due to his academic calling to be a professor of ethics. It is one that he formally states in his habilitation (for an accreditation to teach on the university level) on Max Scheler. It was the lack of objectivity and realism in the work of Max Scheler, whose phenomenology of values, in the book, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* was published as a new innovative grounding of ethical personalism. Wojtyla was very influenced by Scheler’s work. He writes in his preface to the English edition of *The Acting Person* about his indebtedness to Scheler, that the concept of the acting person which he presents in his book “was born . . . from my analysis of M. Scheler”. And Wojtyla eminently agreed with Scheler’s critique of the “aprioristic ethic of pure form” in Kant’s ethics of duty. However, he rejected Scheler’s decision to afford a primary epistemological role to feeling.

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30 The Acting Person, p. xiii.
Because Scheler portrays the whole person in ethical decision as in an immediate intuitive relation with value rather than the real thing, his thesis is incompatible with the realist Thomist conception of voluntary human act.\textsuperscript{31} And certainly, Wojtyla was firmly committed to a realist ethics.

Hence, despite the personalism, the opposition to Kantian formalism, and the essentialist casuistry of the scholastic ethical manuals in Scheler’s book, Wojtyla did not believe that this fine work could be adaptable to traditional Catholic ethics. It was unable to ground ethics in objective moral values.\textsuperscript{32} Scheler’s ethical essence is not the being of which the classical metaphysician speaks; he had overlooked the fact of human efficient causality as well as the normative character of conscience in his book. Thus Wojtyla recognized a challenging problematic: the imperative to retrieve the reality of the act, and to give the act a primary role within the entirety of ethical life as it lived and experienced.\textsuperscript{33} In reaction to this last problematic Wojtyla matured in his realization that in bringing modern and pre-modern philosophy into a partnership, “a philosopher’s work always simultaneously relates to a state of consciousness and an objective truth. In other words, it tries to give back to the objective truth an existential clarity within a specific ‘life world’.”\textsuperscript{34} So he also recognized that a return to the objective in ethics would entail dealing the problem of the subject or person, of the human being as a person.”\textsuperscript{35}


\textsuperscript{32}Schmitz, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{33}Krupczak, p. 60.

\textsuperscript{34}Buttiglione, p. 354.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{The Acting Person}, p. xiii.
Thus the book *The Acting Person*, due to this problematic, must be characterized as completely anthropological in character. Wojtyla articulates a philosophical anthropology. He does this by using the philosophies of being and consciousness to ground the objective possibilities of personal ethical decision making.

There are general characteristics of this study also, that can be elaborated and in fact have already been intimated in the above paragraphs. The first is that Wojtyla is greatly indebted to traditional Thomistic philosophical anthropology with its roots in the classical Greek and Judeo-Christian views on human nature and personhood. He has relied also on the Aristotelian metaphysical categories of potency and act to discover the reality of the person. Finally, he accepted the turn in mid-twentieth Thomism to the Platonic notion of participation as well as the turn to the concrete *esse* as limited realization (*methesis*). He was a participant in, and a colleague with, scholars in the European phenomenological movement and attended many conferences devoted to philosophy done from this perspective. In August 2005, the World Phenomenological Institute at its 54th meeting decided to institute a conference devoted entirely to the work of Karol Wojtyla. The resulting conference was held in March, 2006 at St. Joseph College, West Hartford, Connecticut with a great number of scholars presenting papers.

It should also be mentioned that Wojtyla has been associated with that creative and freshly new theological movement in Europe associated with Henri de Lubac; they worked together on the Vatican II document, “The Church in the Modern World.”

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37 The Thomistic intellectual roots of Wojtyla’s theory of person is taken up in depth in Chapter Two.

38 The volume containing these papers, edited by G. McLean, et. al, has already been referenced in this thesis; Chapter Three will take up the phenomenological approach of Wojtyla in depth.
the human being in this theology draws upon the Pauline doctrine of Christ as the new Adam and thus posits a universal humanity. Wojtyla did not accept the older scholastic distinction between natural and supernatural, humanness to him could never be depicted in terms of “a pure nature”; grace then would be the fulfilment of all native and innate human possibilities.\(^{39}\) In sum we can quote Rocco Buttiglione. He writes, that although it is “completely justifiable to read an ecclesial intention and the seeds of a theology in the background of the book,” nonetheless *The Acting Person* “is a rigorously philosophical book.”\(^{40}\) So his conclusion on the person would carry the claim of a universal applicability to all persons, philosophically justified.

Finally, the topic of a philosopher’s criterion of truth for the claims made in his work is an important subject to be addressed. The topic is covered in depth in the fifth chapter of this thesis, but a few points are appropriately made in this introduction. The novelty of Wojtyla’s approach in *The Acting Person* is that the truth claims are actually inherent in his notion of the person. In other words the *logos* of Wojtyla’s methodology, “the gathering in speech of the intelligible structure” of the reality that is a person, his combination of analysis and synthesis, his definitions, his insight into the principles underlying personhood, his argument and account, his discourse\(^{41}\) are all founded the person, who is both subject and object. Thus Wojtyla talks to persons about their own personhood in this book; they can recognize for themselves, based upon an expressed mutual experience, the truth of his conclusions.

There is a significant import to this fact. First, his methodology leads his reader through

\(^{39}\) *Ibid.*, p. 84.

\(^{40}\) Buttiglione, p. 353.

an inquiry that does not rely solely on discursive and conceptual argumentation, i.e. that presents the facts known about the ontic reality that is human personal nature. Rather this methodology also entails the interpretation drawn upon the experiential and ontological realm of personhood that is experienced in its concrete uniqueness by everyone who is a person. Secondly, the person him or herself will be the source of the logos of his methodology necessarily. Why? It is because the person experiences the self intimately and most completely. Wojtyla’s epistemological approach begins in the experience of one’s self; it proceeds from this experience of one’s self “to the elucidation of anthropological questions in the framework of the concrete person’s existing and acting.” Thirdly, the account given by the person as the unified source of an inner logos is objective. Because the person is both subject and objective of the experience, Wojtyla makes the claim that he or she knows objectively because objectivity belongs to the essence of experience, for experience is always one of something or somebody. One can think about one’s experience. Hence the criterion of truth lies in the recognition of one’s self as one reads his propositions, and therefore in the personal confirmation which it brings to readers as persons themselves. Their experiences will resonate with the insights expressed by Wojtyla.

To conclude this first chapter, Wojtyla will make his inquiry into the plenitude of the

42Wojtyla uses this Heideggerian distinction between the ontic and the ontological in several places in this book, a distinction that would arise due to his use of objective and subjective concrete data as the basis of his argumentation, for example, see The Acting Person, pp. 185-186. It is important to note the Wojtyla disagrees with Heidegger in that he accepts metaphysics. For Heidegger the basic relation is not a person’s relation to himself (his self-consciousness and subjectivity) but his relation to and immersion in the event of being in which beings manifest themselves. See, David E. Linge, translator and editor, “Editor’s Introduction”, Hans-Georg Gadamer: Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977,2008), p. iv.


44Karol Wojtyla, “The Person, Subject and Community”, p. 221.
reality of the human person in five steps. While this thesis does not engage the content of The Acting Person, these steps are summarized at this point so that my reader may some idea of how the methodology is based in a specific content. First he considers the concept of experience and introduces his methodology that combines the philosophies of being and consciousness in the general introduction to his inquiry. Secondly, he addresses the reflexive role of consciousness and the person’s fundamental experience of being the cause of his own actions—which are not just psychic events but real ones of the subject of action. Thirdly, he explains the transcendence of the person in action and the resulting self-determination realized by conforming to the truth of the good. Fourthly, he takes up the topic of integration and the fact that action arises out of personal unity. And finally, he speaks overtly to the notion of participation (which is a presupposition in his claims before this) and speaks to the fact that human beings live and act together. It should be noted that in general his methodology is secondary to his success in arguing his thesis to the actual content of that argumentation in these five steps. But this is not the subject of this thesis.

45 We will take up this first step in detail in Chapter Four of this thesis, because it is strictly devoted to his methodology. See The Acting Person, pp. 3 - 22.
CHAPTER TWO
WHICH THOMISM?

The source of the many diverse and contradictory forms of Thomistic philosophy that appear in twentieth century European philosophy is the single compendium of philosophy and theology written by St. Thomas Aquinas. Hence before tracing the twentieth century influences of the different strains of Thomism on Karol Wojtyla’s philosophy, a brief introduction to the actual philosophy of Aquinas is appropriate; this is especially so because Wojtyla retrieves and is faithful to pre-modern Thomism in his metaphysics in The Acting Person.46 For Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274, CE), philosophy was the search for the first principles of reality enabled by the habit of wisdom, which installs the ease of reflective understanding in the human intellect. Aristotle’s wise man, who knows the difference between appearance and reality, was the model for Aquinas’ definition of philosophy.47 Aquinas clearly differentiated between philosophy and theology based upon his distinction between natural and supernatural reason; philosophy for Thomas was the investigation of created reality insofar as it can be known by the light of human reason. This investigation is of the real and will enter inevitably into the most “abstract” of the real, the question of being abstracted from beings. It searches out being’s first principles, the


analogous manner in which every existent participates in being, and will probe Being Itself, or
divine Being. The name of this science of being, once again with an indebtedness to Plato,
Aristotle and Greek/classic philosophy, is metaphysics.48

The term for the type of intellectual discursive thinking in metaphysics—a form of
negative judgment, especially when it comes to the “natural” knowledge of the divine, is
“separation.”49 When “induction” as Aristotelian abstraction is addressed in Chapter Five of this
thesis, this form of thinking will be covered in detail. At this point, however, some general
summaries of how Aquinas structured his philosophical inquiries will be provided. Thomas had
a passion for order and hence his methodology was to create an orderly inquiry, called a Summa,
which means summary. A Summa is not a systematism, however, i.e., “a closed and deductive
system.”50 It is a summarized debate. “To the medieval mind, debate was a fine art, a serious
science, . . . because medievals believed, like Socrates, that dialectic could uncover truth.”51 The
structural outline of Aquinas’ Summa matched his theological view of reality; it begins in God,
and in an traditional exitus-redditus movement—from God and back to God, hence to creation
and then to re-creation in Jesus Christ.52 Within this big picture the work is broken down into
Treatises, initially sub-divided into Questions, then further divided into articles. The articles,

48 Aquinas, Saint Thomas”, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2nd ed. gen. ed, Robert Audi
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 36-37.

49 *Ibid.* For Aristotle the form is separate in speech as the first dialectical step of articulating the way form
is first sighted. See *Aristotle’s On the Soul and On Memory and Recollection*, translated by Joe Sachs (Sante Fe,

50 Thomas Aquinas, *A Summa of the Summa: The Essential Philosophical Passages of St. Thomas


which are really individual questions, have five structural parts—an articulation of the question (“Whether”), Objections or arguments, Thomas’s own position (“on the contrary”), answers offering proof of Thomas’ position, and finally, specific answers to the Objections. Hence, the philosophical methodology of the Summa follows the model of Socratic dialogue.\textsuperscript{53}

The goal of the dialectic in Aquinas’ philosophy was the realization/actualization of the \textit{telos} of the mind, i.e., ‘understanding.’ This actualization of reason, a state achieved in the apprehension of ‘first principles’ of the object of inquiry, must be explained in terms of the Greek \textit{arche},\textsuperscript{54} rather than any modern definition of the word principle. In the Thomistic project, first principles are one and the same as the final cause or \textit{telos} of the object to be known: hence they do not function as in some contemporary epistemologies, as foundations for a deductive process. Rather they furnish an “account of knowledge,” which is not based upon a first-person-subjective-ability to reach truth, but rather, from a third person point of view. This view of knowledge is one held and employed by Karol Wojtyla, so a more detailed quote is required.

But the Thomist, if he or she follows Aristotle and Aquinas, constructs an account both of approaches to and of the achievement of knowledge from a third person point of view. . . . Insofar as a given soul moves successfully towards its successive intellectual goals in a teleologically ordered way, it moves towards completing itself by becoming formally identical with the objects of its knowledge, objects that are then no longer external to it, but rather complete it. So the mind in finding application for its concepts refers them beyond itself and themselves to what they conceptualize. . . . The mind actualized in knowing responds to the object as the object it is and as it would be, independently of the mind’s knowledge of it. The mind knows itself only in the second-order knowledge of its own operations and is known also by others in those operations. But even such knowledge when achieved need not entail certitude of a Cartesian sort.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 16-18.

\textsuperscript{54} The starting point of reasoning hence, a ruling beginning. See Sachs, p. 200.

The above quote elucidates some important Thomistic assumptions vis-a-vis the realism of human cognition which ground the methodology of Karol Wojtyla. First, the human way of knowing is a rigorous consequence of what the human being is, given their natural cognitive endowments.56 Second, in the Aristotle/Aquinas view of knowledge, there is an “isomorphism” between the knower and the known, i.e., “a proportion between the ontological constitution of man and the ontological constitution of the proper object of his knowing”.57 Wojtyla’s dissertation under Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., a noted traditional twentieth century Thomist, was on faith in the writings of St. John of the Cross. He employs this Thomistic cognitional theory in his research on faith. Hence, he depicts faith as the “proximate and proportionate means” because it creates an “essential likeness” in the human intellect to the divine, so that through faith the divine essence is present to the intellect as the object known is in the knower.58

In the case of natural reason, the significance of this proportionality of knower and known is that it grounds the objectivity of human conceptualization. The experience of the presence of essence in an intentional mode, carried into expression through interpretation, are the important methodological steps in Wojtyla’s overall project for the articulation of a philosophical anthropology. Finally, the above quote clearly indicates why Wojtyla will break with the idealism of a Husserlian phenomenology which asserts apodictic certainty based upon the first

56 This is why the human person functions as the central ‘logos’ in Wojtyla’s inquiry into the “acting person”. There will be several examples of how this methodology works in the later chapters of this thesis.


person eidetic powers of the transcendental ego.\textsuperscript{59} We will take up these points in detail in the coming chapters.

The history of the Thomistic tradition of philosophy after Aquinas is one in which many of his views are supplanted even as they continued to be categorized as “Thomistic philosophy”. Hence scholasticism emerged in the history of Thomism, as a formalized, corrupted copy of its medieval prototype. Alasdair MacIntyre writes that scholasticism itself eventually degenerated into nominalism in its metaphysics, dogmatism in its theology, and into the production of manuals of casuistry in ethics.\textsuperscript{60} Scholasticism became fairly irrelevant during the era of Enlightenment philosophy. There was a revival of Thomism in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, spurred on by Leo XIII’s encyclical, \textit{Aeterni Patris}, which aimed at restoring the predominant place of Thomistic philosophy in Catholic higher academic institutions. Leo insisted that this recovery of Thomism was to be creative,\textsuperscript{61} however, the result of his encyclical was the rise of not only many diverse, but also rival Thomisms.\textsuperscript{62}

There were three thrusts of Thomism in the early and mid twentieth century, each of which Wojtyla encountered in his early academic career. There was traditional or essentialist Thomism, transcendental-Thomism, associated with Joseph Marechal, S.J. and the University of


\textsuperscript{60}Thus a “reforming” Thomist, Jean Danielou, S.J. writes that even in the thirteenth century scholasticism undertook an objectivist goal in dogmatic theology that severed theology from scripture. See Williams, p. 102.

\textsuperscript{61}Buttiglione, p. 81.

Louvain, and finally, existential Thomism, exemplified in the writings of Etienne Gilson. Because his dissertation advisor, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, was a leading advocate of the objectivist rationality, Wojtyla, was thoroughly acquainted with traditional Thomism. This form of Thomism emphasized Aristotle’s influence on the works of Aquinas, and emphasized that being was form which must be understood to be bound to matter as act is to potency. And the Aristotelian categories of potency and act will be utilized in Wojtyla’s methodology. However, Lagrange held that this traditional Thomism could assume the role of “the scientific mode of Christian thought.” Hence traditional Thomism must be characterized as ontic; it deals with reality as determinate being. Once his methodology is explained, it will be evident that Wojtyla completely breaks with its objectivist character in The Acting Person.

Transcendental Thomism arose to counter Kant’s challenge to realism in philosophy. It revived the importance of the passive or intuitive intellect described in Aristotle’s De Anima, as transcendent in its very make-up: open in an infinite manner to all being/Being itself. It was also concerned with Kant’s notion of “transcendental” or an inquiry into the conditions of what can be

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63 Kupczak, pp. 50-51.
64 McLean, p. 16.
65 Williams, p. 101.
67 Aristotle’s distinction between the passive and agent intellect in De Anima 3.5 was included in Aquinas’s cognitional theory. Wojtyla was thoroughly familiar with it. See Faith, pp. 74-75. This distinction is restored to prominence in its conversation with modernist theories of intellection by transcendental Thomism because it allows a break with rationalist conceptualism and pre-critical or naive realism. Transcendental Thomism uses this distinction to affirm the longing of what is still a human intellectual power, for being itself. In his dissertation Wojtyla refers to the natural desire of reason for infinity, Faith, p. 242. See Williams, p. 98.
known after the Kantian critiques of reason.\textsuperscript{68} This form of Thomism has also been designated as neo-Thomism, and besides its epistemological focus, the trend in this school of Thomism was to bring Aquinas’s writings abreast to what was most challenging in modern thought. Hence, Williams has written about this Thomism as a “transcendental-personalism”, because it has inculcated European personalist philosophy, such as that of Mournier and Blondel into the syntheses it has produced.\textsuperscript{69}

In a lecture on Thomistic personalism, Professor Wojtyla himself emphasized the important contribution the modern philosophy of personalism afforded to Aquinas’ writings on human beings. Thomas does not name human beings as persons directly but he does add the notion of “incommunicable substance,” hence “ontologically non-transferrable” to Boethius’s definition of the human being as “\textit{rationalis naturae individua substantia}.” Personalism adds many insights that unwrap the potential for understanding the human person in his /her uniqueness based upon classic Thomist theory about human nature, which enables an escape from both “Cartesian mechanism and neo-Kantian undue subjectivism.”\textsuperscript{70}

The third form of Thomism, that was indeed especially influential on Wojtyla’s thought and methodology, is termed existential Thomism. In its most basic definition, this last school of Thomism is associated with the work of the philosopher, Etienne Gilson. However, we will add under its umbrella a further discussion of the Platonic participatory Thomism of Cornelio Fabro. Fabro’s work on the notion of \textit{esse} coincided with the era of existentialist philosophy of Sartre,

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{68} Williams, p. 97, Kupczak, p. 51, Buttitigione, p. 35
\item\textsuperscript{69} Williams, p. 147.
\item\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 147-150.
\end{itemize}
Marcel, Buber, and Tillich. Hence there was a parallel, if not mutually influential, existential movement within the Scholastic-Thomistic circles in the mid-twentieth century, especially in Italy.\(^{71}\) It is true as noted in the explanation of transcendental-Thomism, however, that Wojtyla’s existentialist approach to the inquiry into the person will descend in its cognitive architecture of the person to the transcendent intentionality of its being towards infinity, which makes his existential Thomism quite different from the atheistic philosophy of Sartre and other existentialists in his mode.\(^{72}\)

Kupczak writes that the philosophy of Gilson represents this third form of Thomism. Its project can be summarized under two points. First, the goal was to reconstruct the teaching of Aquinas freed from all its scholastic corruptions, in the writings of such figures as Avicenna, Duns Scotus or Cajetan, that is, in all the historical misrepresentations of Aquinas’s method and thought in the centuries after his death. Secondly, Gilson proposed that philosophy in this vein should think about contemporary problems and issues \textit{ad mentum sancti Thomae} (from the mind of St. Thomas). Gilson held that Aquinas’s metaphysics was primarily existential in contrast to the essentialist direction scholasticism took after his death.\(^{73}\) It should also be mentioned that when Professor Wojtyla was actively teaching there, this third form of Thomism was very influential in the Catholic University in Lublin, Poland, especially through the influence of a Dominican scholar, Fr. Mieczyslaw Krapiec. In sum, Wojtyla’s Thomism can clearly be

\(^{71}\text{McLean, p.17.}\)

\(^{72}\text{Buttiglione, p. 36.}\)

\(^{73}\text{Kupczak, p. 51.}\)
identified with this third form of existential Thomism.\textsuperscript{74}

Kenneth Schmitz writes that there is a paradox in Thomas’s existential notion of being. The term being for Aquinas is noteworthy in the plenitude and fullness the term connotes. Thomas “finds in the unrestricted verbal infinitive: to be (esse), the expression of that which is shared universally by each and all being insofar as it is actual.”\textsuperscript{75} Schmitz compares Aquinas’s notion of being to that of Hegel’s one of being, the latter as a primitive unanalyzed totality. Hegel posits being in the universality of pure indeterminancy in which all determinations of being will be derived. In contrast, for Aquinas determinacy is present from the beginning as the actuality of things.\textsuperscript{76} To be ‘in act’ in Aquinas’s view of it means being actual, which can only happen in virtue of its active principle, the thing’s agency then. In other words, being is a notion that is both prior to and the source of the way a being happens, prior to its potency not after as it is in Aristotle’s determinate explanation of the being of things. What is maximal in any thing is its actuality, its being. Hence there is a completeness in Aquinas’s understanding of being, it has primacy and “ontological omnipresence”. In sum, being is what is richest and most complete in things and is metaphysically first for Thomas.\textsuperscript{77}

Thus it should be noted that the Thomistic understanding of act as primary in the ontological order dictates a specific interpretation in existential Thomism of the Aristotelian

\textsuperscript{74}Kupczak, p. 52, Williams, p. 146.

\textsuperscript{75}Schmitz, \textit{The Gift, Creation}, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{76}\textit{Ibid}. “Schmitz adds that for Hegel determinacy means “the reduction of indeterminacy through the inner onto-logical development of the categories of the system,” whereas for Thomas the mind will be drawn to abstract from its encounter with the universal yet determinate notion of being to its aspect of gift, to the Giver behind the gift, in philosophy to God as first Truth.

\textsuperscript{77}\textit{Ibid}. pp. 99-100. Hence the person in act will be the fullest realization of personhood for Wojtyla.
categories of potency and act—categories that Wojtyla will specifically employ when he addresses the metaphysical objective realism supporting his conclusions about the person.\textsuperscript{78}

There is this sense in Aristotle of the limitation of act by potency, but in existential Thomism that will not become a limitation of existence by essence. Certainly Thomas held that what is in another is in the mode of the receiver. So in Thomas’s philosophy of the will which is central to the metaphysical underpinnings of Wojtyla’s thesis, Goodness, Truth and Life, which are unlimited in themselves, become limited in the concrete personal realization of them. In the practical order, and Wojtyla does insist on the distinctive character of this order, or the order of coming to be, act is limited by potency. However, in terms of teleology, potency is limited by the primacy of act or being as final cause.\textsuperscript{79}

Thus Wojtyla will secure an appropriate place of the will in the structure of the person and then situate this in the wider context of being. We know and will as integral persons as existential beings in act. As persons who exercise the actualizing human act, we are in turn operating as both agents and originators of an existential realization of truth and goodness in act, but also will be the subject and recipient of the actualization of the human potential for the concrete being of the transcendentals, of Goodness, Truth and Life.\textsuperscript{80}

We should take up this topic in a little more depth. George McLean writes that existential Thomism is rooted in the re-discovery of the Platonic heritage in Aquinas’s thought. In the

\textsuperscript{78}\textit{The Acting Person}, pp. 25 - 28. In Wojtyla’s phenomenologicia realism however, even as he uses the tradition Thomistic language of potency and act, he is also discerning consciousness in the human act.

\textsuperscript{79}Schmitz explains this aspect of existential Thomism very well. See \textit{The Gift}, pp. 99ff; also \textit{At the Center of the Human Drama}, pp. 52-55.

\textsuperscript{80}\textit{At the Center}, Ibid.
1920's and '30's scholastic synthesis, the chosen key to Thomistic metaphysics was in the relational terms of causality and analogy, but the Italian Thomist, Cornelio Fabro argued that the Platonic notion of participation and the Augustinian influence on Aquinas were more important factors in interpreting Thomas.\(^{81}\) Fabro “followed the progressive enrichment of the notion of being under the light of the experience of the early Church fathers . . . [and] how the Greek notion of form was progressively enriched” by them. The result was two terms: form as related to matter and the other was “as the proper effect of the creator” \textit{esse} and its relation to essence. Being or ‘act’ in the latter case was “the image \textit{(mimesis)} or limited realization \textit{(methesis)}”, which are Platonic terms for his notion of participation.\(^{82}\) Hence “transcendental participation,” an understanding that each being participates or images the perfection of being itself, is a central guiding principle for existential Thomism.

However, beyond this tradition of metaphysics in which being is understood as concrete existential act, it is also the case that Wojtyla was greatly dependent on Aquinas’s philosophy of the human will, a philosophy that also points to the Augustinian influence in works of St. Thomas.\(^{83}\) For as we will see in the discussion on phenomenology, while Wojtyla is very indebted to Max Scheler’s ethics, Wojtyla’s realist ethics assert the objective or \textit{really} good that is achieved in freely willed ethical decisions, something not claimed by Scheler.\(^{84}\) Thus Rocco Buttiglione writes, “Wojtyla’s reading of St. Thomas takes his ethics and anthropology as a point

\(^{81}\) McLean, p. 16-17.

\(^{82}\) Ibid.

\(^{83}\) K. Schmitz, \textit{At the Center}, pp. 50-51.

\(^{84}\) G.H. Williams provides an excellent clarification of Wojtyla’s differences with Max Scheler. For example, see pp. 126-127, 133. Also see, J. Kupeczak, p. 23.
of departure . . . [but] he nonetheless continually refers to his metaphysics. It is, after all, impossible to understand and to participate in Thomas’s ethics if one does not grasp and accept his fundamental ontology.”

Existence is the definitive ethical ingredient of the ‘the good’ for St. Thomas, who also held that being, goodness and truth are convertible. This is so not only in the metaphysically abstract realm of pure being itself, but also in the concrete one of the practical order. In every experience of a particular good by the human will under the direction of reason, a relation is recognized with the Good in itself, and is in turn convertible with Being in this philosophy. Being, as convertible with the Good then is encountered in and through the very particularity of individual things and values chosen in human freedom. Thomas has taken up the metaphysical notion of participation in his ethics and hence, “the good is not only rooted in being as existential act, it is convertible with being, precisely with being as existential act.” The good in an ontological sense is immanent in each and every concrete particular experience even while it participates “within the horizon of absolute Good.” Thus due to Aristotle’s theory of potency and act, taken up by Aquinas in his philosophy, Wojtyla, is able to argue for a realist ethical ontology, that the human being fulfills himself or herself in ethical action and actually forms the self in terms of good or evil.

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85 Butiglione, p. 72.
86 Schmitz writes that Wojtyla thought that Thomas’s understanding of the interrelationship of the Good, the True and Being was one of his most original teachings. See *At the Center*, p. 52.
87 Schmitz, pp. 50-54.
88 Butiglione, p. 77.
89 J. Kupczak, p. 45.
At this point it is possible to summarize the most important influences of St. Thomas’s philosophy of being on Karol Wojtyla’s philosophical methodology in *The Acting Person*. Jaroslaw Kupczak, O.P. provides an excellent summary of these influential presuppositions on Wojtyla. First, his work is grounded in a vibrant first philosophy, i.e., it maintains a realist ontology. Secondly, he places a resolute trust in human experience and in human intelligence’s teleology towards the truth about reality. Third, while he combines a reverence for tradition, he is open to contemporary philosophy. Fourth, these first points enable Wojtyla to see the human person in all its complexity and richness. Some of these points have been given more emphasis than others in this exposition of the Thomistic influences on Wojtyla than others. However, it is hoped when Wojtyla’s Thomism is revisited in the sections of this paper which provide illustrations from *The Acting Person*, there will be a successful further clarification of “Which Thomism” is behind the philosophy of being employed in Wojtyla’s methodology.

The conclusion of this chapter will analyze in depth the novelty of Wojtyla’s transcendental Thomist personalism, briefly mentioned above in this chapter. Certainly, as the words indicate, Wojtyla has gone beyond Thomism in this viewpoint, but nevertheless his use of St. Thomas Aquinas predominates. But it is phenomenology, especially as it is applied in Parts III and IV of his book on the transcendence and integration of the person, which help Wojtyla move beyond Thomistic anthropology and its first forays into a personalism. The movement beyond St. Thomas comes as Wojtyla makes claims for human dignity and human potential that

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90 Kupczak, p. 57

91 Williams, pp. 187-191.

92 Buttiglione, p. 359.
are not rooted in the older studies of human nature or of the individual human being as an individual substance. Instead Wojtyla distinguishes between the nature that is human that can be generalized, and what is the absolutely unique and thus cannot be generalized, the human person. The latter in its realness can only be fully discovered by phenomenology.

We can give some excerpts to illustrate this point from The Acting Person.

“Viewing subjectivity solely from the metaphysical standpoint, and stating that man as a type of being constitutes the true subject of existing and acting, autonomous individual being, we abstract, to a large extent from what is the source of our visualizations, the source of experience. It is far better, therefore to try to coordinate and join together the two aspects, the aspect of being (man, person) with the aspect of consciousness; the aspect of acts (acting and action) with the aspect of experience.”

Hence, the fact that both these terms are used to explain his inquiry and its conclusions about the human person is an attestation to the one-ness of the methodology we have named phenomenological realism. As a further example: when he presents his argument for the unity of the person and his action, or for the existential relation between the person and his/her acts, Wojtyla reveals the mutual interdependence of metaphysics and phenomenology.

“[P]henomenology seems to infringe on metaphysics”, he writes, “and it is here that its reliance upon metaphysics is most needed.” Why is this so? Wojtyla goes on to explain, “for phenomena themselves can visualize a thing clearly enough, but they are incapable of a sufficient explanation of themselves.”

Let’s see how this dual approach works by turning to his systematic reflections on the person himself. He begins in a metaphysical discussion of man as a subject, “[h]owever we

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93 The Acting Person, p. 57.

94 The Acting Person, p. 70.
analyze the structure, conditions and source of action we cannot bypass its ultimate ontological foundation,” he writes; “we still need to differentiate in man a structural ontological nucleus that would account for the fact itself of man being the subject or the fact that the subject is a being.”

Thus first of all, using a combined ontic/ontological term, “man-person”, Wojtyla identifies its “basic ontological structure” turning to Boethius, definition, “individua substantia.” But, Wojtyla insists, the concept of “person is broader and more comprehensive than that of “an individual whose nature is rational”; so rational nature cannot serve to completely express the concept of the person.

Why not? The person is somebody, Wojtyla writes, not just a something and “the existence proper to him is personal and not merely individual—unlike that of an ontologically founded merely individual type of being.” There is a second step that must be taken then that moves past the insight of the man-person as the ontological basis of existence to an examination of his experiences and dynamic structures (which he has discussed at length under the heading of “man acts” and “something happens to man”). The latter “cut across the phenomenological field of experience, but they join and unite together in the metaphysical field. Their synthesis is the man-person.” Hence the full understanding of the person will only arise, that will include consciousness, efficacy and self-determination in Wojtyla’s synthesis, when the person as a

95 Ibid., p.72. (It must be noted that in the original Polish, Wojtyla uses the Thomistic term, “suppositum”, or objectively subsistent subject, that in his philosophical pre-suppositions is already linked to hypostasis of Christ, the new Adam. But the English translation changes his wording putting in the cumbersome phrase, “structural ontological nucleus.” See Williams, p. 191).

96 The Acting Person, pp. 72 -74.

97 The Acting Person, p.74

98 Ibid.
suppositum, a metaphysical subject of existence with all the dynamism of human being-ness, is more fully brought to light in “a phenomenological synthesis of efficacy and subjectiveness.” He will conclude that the fully comprehensive definition of the term person is only adequately achieved when ‘person’ is identified as the real existence of human nature. So in this discussion which seeks to understand what a person “is”, Wojtyla has used phenomenology to enhance the realism of Thomistic metaphysics.

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Ibid., p. 84.
CHAPTER THREE
WHOSE PHENOMENOLOGY?

The title of this chapter is an apt one because, as Hans-Georg Gadamer has written, “the question, ‘What is phenomenology?’ was posed to almost every scholar whom we can assign to the movement, and the question was answered differently by each one.”

Gadamer and most scholars who attempt to answer the above question will describe the philosophy that is phenomenology as a “movement” which has spread to many European, and now we can add, American academic centers of philosophy. It is a movement that can be traced back to a founder, Edmund Husserl, a professor of mathematics as well as philosophy in universities in Germany.

French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, has commented that because phenomenology existed as a movement that can be identified as a manner and style of thinking before it arrived at a complete awareness of itself as a philosophy, the responsible philosopher should not attempt to force such a living movement into a system. Thus some “loose strings” will accompany any definition that attempts to respond to the query, “What is phenomenology?”

This movement spread from Germany to France, Poland, and other European countries

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101 Edmund Husserl taught at Halle (1887-1901), Göttingen (1901-16) and Freiburg (1916 -1928). There were two philosophical groups influenced by Husserl during his teaching years; one at Göttingen itself and another in Munich. Max Scheler came into contact with Husserl through the Munich philosophical group which adhered to the realism of the early Husserl. See The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 403 and Sokolowski, pp. 212 -213.

during the twentieth century and is indeed a movement in an approach to knowledge that fits “very neatly” into the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{103} There are famous names now associated with this movement such as Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, John Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Pointy, and Roman Ingarden to mention a few. Each of these phenomenologists reveals his own personal philosophical standpoint in his basic application of the manner of thought he calls phenomenology.\textsuperscript{104} Nevertheless there are some general statements that can be made to help define phenomenology as an introduction to this approach to doing philosophy. First, Husserl, its founder, defended this philosophy as a “rigorous science”, one that in returning “to the things themselves” in our intentionality towards them as the original source of our intuitions, was also a limited step towards realism.\textsuperscript{105} It was also an escape from the subjectivism and idealism of Kantian formalism.

Secondly, the subject who thinks is still at the center of attention in this philosophy, but it is one, as Husserl discovered, endowed with an intentionality, hence with a consciousness that is not self-enclosed.\textsuperscript{106} This identifying quality of consciousness allows thought to begin in the real experience of the thing that is thought; through it we have access to the pre-reflective


\textsuperscript{104} Gadamer, in Linge, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{105} The term as used here simply refers to Husserl’s goal of restoring philosophy to its position as a “rigorous science”. See E. Stein, pp. 8 - 9.

\textsuperscript{106} Robert Sokolowski writes that phenomenology’s doctrine of intentionality of consciousness overcomes “the Cartesian and Lockean bias against the publicness of mind . . [it] allows us to recognize and to restore the world that seemed to have been lost when we were locked into our own internal world of philosophical confusions”. Sokolowski, p. 15.
givenness of things in a way that is not distorted by theories of anticipatory ideas of any kind. Thus Louis Roy, a Canadian philosopher of consciousness, will describe the very character of human consciousness as the “lived experience” of the mind’s intentional posture towards the real objects in the world.

Hence an early common factor to all who embraced phenomenology lies in this recognition of the intentionality of consciousness as correlated to the object of consciousness as such—noema is Husserl’s term for this. Gadamer writes that the factor that at first brought early phenomenologists together was “the cultivation of the power of intuitive description and intuitive exhibition of all the steps of thought.” These pioneers of this movement looked on the American pragmatist William James as their ally. There is a similarity and compatibility between the phenomenological examination of the given object of consciousness in its myriad manifolds, each to be analyzed and described, and James’s insistence in his doctrine of radical empiricism, that the scope of human experience as the basis of thought must be expanded to all experiences we have in thinking. The latter includes our own thoughts as we experience them.

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107 Gadamer, pp. 141 - 145.
109 Husserl employs the vocabulary of noesis and noema: “the ‘noetic moment’ of [the intentional relation] of the act is what makes it an act of thinking . . ., whereas the neomatic correlate is the object as thought . . .noema is reached only through a change of regard from the natural to transcendental attitude”. Noemata then are the inherent, intuitional components of mental processes. See Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney, editors, The Phenomenology Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 63, 135.
110 Ibid., p. 142.
111 Gadamer, p. 145.
and the relations between these thoughts. A common belief then in early phenomenology was that “whatsoever that becomes present to human consciousness qualifies as a legitimate “object” or ‘theme’ of phenomenological analysis (description).” Every experience falls within the horizon of our “life world” (a basic Husserlian term) and must come under the microscope of phenomenological observation and explanation.

In general then, phenomenology can be delimited as a dominant epistemological and cultural development of the twentieth century which includes many of that century’s most renowned philosophers. Of course it must share its importance with that other movement that took over European culture and the academy and perhaps overtook phenomenology: existentialism. With Husserl as its father, phenomenology insisted that appearances of things do truly manifest things themselves to the human subject seeking to know them. Their essences can be ours, in the human mental act of “seeing” them, i.e., in the phenomenological insight. Merleau Ponty actually makes the claim that phenomenology is the philosophy that is the study of essences, and which also puts them back into existence. In sum, a short, working definition of phenomenology for our purposes is: “the unprejudiced, descriptive study of whatever appears

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114 The statement refers to the fact that several predominant scholars associated with Husserl and phenomenology went on to embrace existentialism, i.e., Heidegger and Sartre. Karol Wojtyla, as we explain in Chapter Two, also is associated with Christian existentialism. See Gadamer in Linge, pp. 134 - 136. It should also be commented that there was of course that other great trend in European philosophy analytic philosophy.

115 Primozic, p. 10.
to consciousness, precisely in the manner in which it so appears.\textsuperscript{116}

Finally, phenomenology is a movement that can be circumscribed through negation. Its basic impulses are in opposition to several European philosophical doctrines such as psychologism,\textsuperscript{117} historicism, skepticism, positivism, idealism, and more lately, the deconstruction of language. It has a greater affinity to the scholastic belief in reason’s ability to reach truth\textsuperscript{118} than to these dominant European schools of thought. Rather, for phenomenology the existential and integrative dimension of understanding itself supersedes all attempts to justify the results of cognition through the strict adherence to a unitary scientific methodology.\textsuperscript{119} As we will explain in our forthcoming discussion of the notion of “life world”, human imagination has a large role in phenomenological analysis. Finally, because it does have some deep roots in Cartesian and Platonic philosophy, there is something quite traditional in the newness that is the phenomenological movements.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{116} Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney, \textit{The Phenomenology Reader} (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 1

\textsuperscript{117} Psychologism is the doctrine that reduces logical entities to mental states or activities. As will be examined shortly, Husserl’s \textit{epoche} or reduction is in opposition to psychologism: the former returns to the phenomenologically given whereas the latter goes back to intellectual principles. Gadmaer in Linge, p. 146.

\textsuperscript{118} However, like the realism associated with phenomenonology, this is not an objectivist form of truth that can be syllogistically proven, rather, the phenomenologist’s more modest claim is from working out a detailed descriptive analysis of the various forms of intentionality with precision and convincingness, one encounters the real in its essence—thus truth isn’t a matter of proof. One displays the real in its truth. See, Sokolowski, p. 216.

\textsuperscript{119} Of course this statement also represents Gadamer’s own hermeneutical pre-suppositions in his approach to phenomenology. See, Linge, “Editor’s Introduction”, pp. xx - xxxiii.

\textsuperscript{120} In a general sense Husserl’s goal to build a rigorous science capable of uncovering the hidden truth seeking to disclose itself can be taken as analogous to the goal of the Platonic dialectic—which for Plato became a method by which philosophers could attain knowledge of forms. See \textit{The Cambridge Dictionary}, p. 233. The reductions as Husserl uses them, especially the final one, the philosophical reduction that encounters the transcendental ego within the ultimate horizon of the life world, represent an effort to build a foundation for phenomenology. One can detect a Cartesian moment in these reductions. See Gadamer in Linge, pp. 158, 164.
In this third chapter, I will first provide a concise explanation of the phenomenological “method”, i.e. how phenomenology proceeds in doing its work. Husserl’s own work is the main guide for this presentation. However I will also use some of the explanations of what contemporary phenomenology is, as well as details of its operations, from some recently published sources. It should be noted that as far as the question is posed as to “Whose Phenomenology?”, Karol Wojtyla has written that he arrived at his concept of the human act “within the framework of a phenomenological inquiry of Husserlian orientation”. He uses his first footnote in *The Acting Person* to express his great indebtedness to Edmund Husserl. He credits Husserl with the breakthrough in opening up experience from its previously restrictive interpretations of “sense” experiences. Wojtyla writes, “for phenomenologists, ‘experience’ means immediate givenness of every cognitive act in which the object itself is given directly—‘bodily’—or, to use Husserl’s phrase, is *leibhaft selbstgegeben*”. Because experience is central to his methodology, we will thoroughly discuss Wojtyla’s idea of experience in Chapter Five of this thesis.

Secondly, the particular understanding and use of this Husserlian approach by Max Scheler, who studied under Husserl himself but who was also “an entirely independent and brilliant figure” in the early days of this movement, will receive attention. Because he was influential in the circle of early phenomenologists and definitively determinative on Wojtyla’s

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121 Several have been referenced in this chapter. Also see Moran and Mooney.

122 Karol Wojtyla, “The Intentional Act and the Human Act, that is, Act and Experience,” *Analecta Husserliana* 5 (1976), n, 2, p. 276, quoted in Schmtz, *At the Center*, p. 61..

123 *The Acting Person*, Note #1, p. 301.

124 Gadamer, p. 135.
phenomenology, his views will be explored and summarized. Finally, Karol Wojtyla’s own creative and use of phenomenology independently of both these philosophers will be taken up in Chapter Four of this thesis. And only at this point can it be fully shown that although there are many important ways Wojtyla definitively breaks with Husserl and Scheler, he fully deserves to be included as a significant member of this living movement, and an esteemed colleague.

Because phenomenology is a philosophical movement that has matured in its own self understanding at the end of the twentieth century—i.e. how it has changed over the years that inculcates a diversity of original orientations into this form of philosophy, it will be useful to return to Husserl and his early works to capture some of his initial goals and important insights into what the expectations were for this new philosophy. These originating insights are not always articulated or even sometimes assumed by later twentieth century phenomenologists. But because they lie at the origin of the creative philosophical contributions by the phenomenological movement, they can contribute to clarifying this philosophy.

First, two factors were definitive influences on Husserl in his development of phenomenological philosophy even before he wrote his *The Idea of Phenomenology* in the first decade of the 1900's. The first influence was the thought of his teacher, Franz von Brentano, who retrieved the Scholastic notion of intentionality and employed it in his project of descriptive psychology. He has been called the “forerunner of phenomenology.”\(^{125}\) He made the distinction in what appears to consciousness between physical and mental phenomena. His studies established that we have direct and indubitable knowledge of the latter, our mental states or

\(^{125}\text{Moran and Mooney, p. 10. The following summary is from pp. 29-30. Scheler also reveals such influences.}\)
“psychical phenomena.” According to Bretano they are given to us directly as they really are. Hence all mental acts are directed to an object or content (therefore, intentional), and at the same time they carry a secondary awareness of themselves. So we have the reflexive possibilities of making our own thoughts objects of our thoughts. Bretano divided these mental acts into three categories: ideas or presentations, judgments, and the phenomena of love and hate. Finally, he not only made inner perception the psychological method in his work, but also he insisted on adherence to the strict law governing mental phenomena to achieve a scientific accuracy. Description rather than causal explanation lay at the core of this methodology. It is quite obvious that these ideas were influential on Husserl in his phenomenological philosophy.

Secondly, Husserl had discovered the importance of intuition and essence to cognition in his philosophical inquiry into mathematics in the latter years of the nineteenth century. He had observed the difference between numbers given intuitively and those symbolically intended. The former are given as objective correlates of acts of counting and thus are intuitively present. Hence even though most numbers are symbolically present and only a few are intuitively present, the whole notion of the essence of number is derived from the latter—those that are intuitively given.\(^{126}\) Intuition and essence will play a central role in Husserlian phenomenology.

Because a successful methodology for philosophy would be incompatible with that of the natural sciences, Husserl believed that the crisis of the European man was caused by philosophy’s blind allegiance to the latter’s methods. Also these sciences are merely positive ones—they provide truth about things but not about our possession of these truths. Hence in Husserl’s opinion, it was this positivist methodology, which when applied to the human sciences,

lay behind the havoc of relativism and skepticism marking Europe’s culture. He also was driven by a desire for clarity and certainty. He wanted to return to rationality in a Greek sense of the distinction between the worlds of appearances and of Truth.127 So as Lee Hardy writes in his Introduction to Husserl’s *Idea of Phenomenology*, by the beginning of the twentieth century Husserl had developed a sense of a philosophical vocation, and he dedicated himself to work on the phenomenology of knowledge. “Such a phenomenology would advance the ‘critique of knowledge’ in which the problem of knowledge is clearly formulated and the possibility of knowledge rigorously secured.” 128

The first stages of this critique lay in a newly discovered method of turning to the Cartesian *cogitatio* that requires the “phenomenological reduction.”129 The next two successive extensions of domain within this reduction were in the realm of immanent and aware cognitive operations, thus involving consciousness. These expansions are first, “ideating abstraction” and secondly, the correspondence of the act of knowing and the object known within the sphere of immanence and without any transcendence.130 Husserl’s Cartesian meditative steps that move by means of a Cartesian doubt to the sphere of absolute givenness allowed him to transition beyond any psychological phenomenon. The process thus opens to scientific investigation a detailed

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129 Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, p. 64.

130 These two expansions will be explained shortly. Hardy, pp. 5-8.
study of “pure phenomena” as well as a general doctrine of essences on the ontological level.\textsuperscript{131}

The reduction, or \textit{epoche} that suspends judgments of existence, and the first two successive steps contain the key to phenomenology’s ability to cultivate the powers of intuitive description through the intuitive exhibition of all steps of thought mentioned above. We will briefly explain these movements beginning with the phenomenological reduction.

Husserl writes that thinking from the natural standpoint is untroubled by the difficulties concerning the possibilities of things, but that is of central concern to philosophical thought.\textsuperscript{132} Also, the natural standpoint deals with aspects of being rather than with being as a whole. The natural sciences then are partial sciences. But philosophy responds to the imperative to go beyond these investigations to a science of the whole.\textsuperscript{133} So Husserl performs a “epistemological or phenomenological reduction,” which is at the same time an expansion of his investigation of knowledge and of the one doing the knowing beyond the psychological to the realm of existing, being itself or ontology. The rationale behind this move is that to understand something philosophically we have to trace it back to the experience in which we first became directly aware of the thing we seek to understand. Thus phenomenology studies how things appear to consciousness. Moreover Husserl has demonstrated that the fundamental things we encounter do meet our awareness of them in different fashions and hence, he also went on in his work to formulate careful descriptions of different forms of consciousness. There are different kinds of

\textsuperscript{131}See Husserl, “Lecture I”, pp. 15-21, also, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., p. 61.

\textsuperscript{133}Sokolowski, p.p. 52-53. This is a view traced back to Aristotle.
consciousness, such as perceiving, imagining, remembering, judging, writing, etc.\textsuperscript{134}

While its existence is not in question, the phenomenological reduction completely brackets out the natural world. It does not consider the cognizing subject in a correlation with an object in the world “out there.” This reduction precludes or completely bars us from using any judgments that concern spatial temporal existence. Husserl writes that we cannot presuppose anything pre-given; phenomenology begins with “some knowledge that it does not take unexamined from other sources but rather provides for itself and posits as primary.”\textsuperscript{135} Hence in the bracketed realm of the immanence of consciousness, the noema or intentional object as such is observed in the reduction. We are to concentrate our complete attention on our inner awareness of this sphere. It is ‘here’ that the philosophical task, the inquiry into essence, can happen. Knowledge is a title for “a highly ramified sphere of being that can be given to us absolutely,” in its details at a particular time. The “forms of thought are given to me insofar as I reflect on them, accept them and posit them in a pure act of seeing.” Husserl concludes that every intellectual experience can be made into an object of pure seeing and apprehension in terms of a pure givenness. Hence it makes no sense to doubt them\textsuperscript{136}.

After the step which descends into a sphere of complete immanence in the reflective apprehension of the acts of consciousness, there are two more successive expansions of this domain in the Husserl’s methodology. Husserl speaks of a process of “ideating abstraction” in which the essence sought can be exhibited and analytically partitioned in direct intuition. The

\textsuperscript{134} Velaquez, p. 173.

\textsuperscript{135} Husserl, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p. 24.
concern is with what is immanent in the intentional sense; for it belongs to the essence of cognitive experiences to have an intentio as they refer to something, an objectivity. Also the concern is two-fold—"both of these sides" in Husserl’s words. The relating itself to an objectivity belongs to the cognitive experience as well as the objectivity that can achieve a certain givenness within appearance. Due to the process of "ideating abstraction," it makes no sense to doubt the essence one has grasped in this direct intuition. So Husserl speaks of where “a purely immanent consciousness of universality constitutes itself on the basis of a seen and self-given particularity.

I have a particular intuition of red, or several intuitions of red; I attend to pure immanence alone; I perform the phenomenological reduction. I separate off anything red might signify that might lead one to apperceive it as transcendent, as, say, the red piece of blotting paper [57] on my desk, and the like. And now I actualize the pure seeing the sense of the thought red, red in specie, the identical universal that is seen in this or that; now the particularity as such is no longer meant, but red in general. If we in fact do this in a pure act of seeing, would it still make sense to doubt what red in general is, what is meant by ‘red’, what it is according to its essence? We see it, there it is; there is what we mean, this species red.”

Husserl’s makes the disclaimer that knowledge is more than a simple matter of seeing red. There are manifold forms and kinds of knowledge and also, one must investigate the ways in which these forms are related to each other, i.e., their (teleological) interconnections. But at every step the analysis will be an analysis of essence, an uncovering of the universal states of affairs that are constituted within immediate intuition. Hence there is a second expansion of domain within immanence that becomes necessary. The problem of correspondence—between

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137 Ibid., p. 41.
138 Ibid., p. 42
139 Ibid., p. 43.
the act of knowing and the object known—must be drawn into the sphere of immanence in a
phenomenological sense, that is as adequately and fully self-given. Then this relation can be
open to direct investigation within the phenomenological reduction. The phenomenological
version of the “correspondence theory of truth” is echoed in this last expansion, The act of
knowing as given in reflection is absolutely given. It intentionally contains the systems of
appearances whereby objects, persons, properties, universals, states of affairs all present
themselves.

For every possible objectivity there is a corresponding set of appearances whereby it
appears.140 This is so because the meaning of the word phenomenon is two-fold, given the
correlation between first, that which appears and second, the appearing itself. The task becomes,
within the framework of pure givenness, to track down all correlations and forms of givenness,
and to elucidate them through analysis, i.e., in terms of their essence.141 It must be emphasized
that this task is not between stepped down acts of the self-enclosed mind and an external object
as in the Cartesian meditations. It is rather a highly complex temporal system of mental
processes by which the givenness of the known object is constituted—for things to be given, they
must present themselves. Husserl calls this a “wonderful correlation,” not “a naive seeing,”
because there is always a strict correlation between the ‘real’ (noetic) and the intentional
(noematic) components in the act of knowing which can be wholly given in an act of reflective
apprehension.142

141Husserl, p. 69, 54-55.
142Ibid., p. 68. See also, Hardy, p. 9.
“We must see in which connection it [the two-fold thought phenomenon] appears as actual and genuine evidence, and what is actually genuinely given in this connection. This will be a matter of exhibiting the different modes of genuine givenness, and, in this regard, the constitution of the different modes of objectivity and their relation to each other: . . . of the cogitatio, . . . of the cogitatio re-lived in a fresh memory, . . . of the unity of appearances, persisting in the phenomenal stream, . . . of the change in such unity, . . . of the thing in ‘outer’ perception, . . . of the different forms of imagination and recollection, as well as . . . of manifold perceptions and other kinds of representations that are synthetically unified in corresponding connections. And of course there is also logical givenness, the givenness of universality, of predicates, of states of affairs, etc., and the givenness of absurdity, contradiction, of a nonexistent object, etc.\(^\text{143}\)

Lee Hardy sums up the task of the phenomenological critique of knowledge. It is to identify, analyze, and describe the various ramified systems of presentation and representations correlated to the various kinds of possible objectivities. This involves tracing, step by step, the forms of givenness in all their manifestations and thus the forms of evidence to show how we constitute the meanings existing in consciousness.\(^\text{144}\) Robert Sokolowski writes that Husserl’s discovery of intentionality, the adverbial property of each act of consciousness whereby it refers to its object, his analysis of categorial articulations, e.g. the relations of things—that we do not just perceive things, rather we can deal with the presentation of intelligible objects as experienced in the manner they are presented to us, and his insistence that we intend things in their absence as well as in their presence, remain as the grounding of the possibilities of this method.\(^\text{145}\)

Finally, in contemporary language, we make use of eidetic evidence in the

\(^{143}\)Husserl, p. 54.

\(^{144}\)Hardy, p. 11.

\(^{145}\)Sokolowski, pp. 216-217.
phenomenological methodology, a mature development of the chief characteristic of Husserl’s discoveries of the phenomena as given immediately in intuition, in turn as the realistic measure of all comprehension. Eidetic evidence arises from insight into essence; it exists due to the mind’s ability to grasp form or *eidos*.

Eidetic evidence is also referred to as an “identity synthesis.” In its thorough examination of the manifolds of appearance in an object it finally arrives at an identity which is its essence. Wojtyla brings eidetic evidence into his methodology in what he calls the phenomenological reduction. By the latter he means, “the moment of the fullest and simultaneously the most essence-centered visualization of a given object,” He explains that in his methodology this moment will necessarily be when the person is in act. It is the fullness of this experience that is Wojtyla’s focus then.

But of course, phenomenology has been a creatively and very openly employed methodology in the movement which has now lasted over one hundred years since Husserl first took up his philosophical ‘vocation.’ And as stated above, there are many famous twentieth century philosophers associated with it. Four somewhat overlapping tendencies that can be identified. Husserl is identified with what has been called “realistic phenomenology” and “constitutive phenomenology,” which we have briefly explained. There is also existential phenomenology associated with Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and hermeneutic

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149 *The Acting Person*, p. 78.
phenomenology of such philosophers as Ricoeur and Gadamer.\textsuperscript{150} We will not deal with the latter in this thesis.

It is Husserl’s phenomenology that is most applicable to this thesis, as Max Scheler is also associated with the form of phenomenology that attempts to accurately describe the nature of acts of consciousness in his quest to develop a realist philosophy of embodied emotions.\textsuperscript{151} Additionally, Scheler is recognized by Wojtyla as the primary source of his own phenomenological analysis of the acting person. Although Max Scheler belongs to the initial group of students or “disciples” of Husserl, he broke with Husserl’s philosophical doctrine in many significant ways. Scheler was a part of a “Husserl Circle” in Munich in the first decade of the twentieth century. He subsequently went to the University of Gottingen to study with him as well as to give lectures and finally, to write in early phenomenological studies.\textsuperscript{152} He became one of the four co-editors of Husserl’s phenomenological annual, and actually published his chief work, \textit{Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value} in two editions of this annual.\textsuperscript{153} Eugene Kelly writes that Scheler’s philosophical vocabulary began as early as 1905 to have a fundamental similarity to that of Husserl, but at the same time to carry a striking dissimilarity in its meaning and uses, even of the more technical terms.\textsuperscript{154} There were also jealousies at work

\textsuperscript{150}Moran and Mooney, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{151}Ibid., p. 16.

\textsuperscript{152}Sokolowski, pp. 212-213.

\textsuperscript{153}Peter Hebblethwaithe, “Husserl, Scheler and Wojtyla: A Tale of Three Philosophers”, \textit{The Heythrop Journal} XXVII, No. 4, October 1986), p. 442. The years these were published were 1913, 1916.

that undermine their relationship—Scheler was far more the dynamic and exciting lecturer.\textsuperscript{155}

Moreover, while Scheler like Husserl was interested in the primordial being that is essence, he was also an expert in the sociology of knowledge.\textsuperscript{156} Hence he held the conviction that “the sphere of a priori essential knowledge extended beyond the purely formal and rational domains to include the essential forms of cultural life (love, hate, sympathy, resentment and so on).” \textsuperscript{157} At the very least, one can summarily claim that a central focus of Scheler’s work was to oppose the mechanistic explanation of the world arising out of three predominant institutional influences on the modern Western Weltanschauung: from science, capitalism, and social forms,\textsuperscript{158} rather than to critique the possibility of knowledge through a Cartesian turn to cognitive experiences which perform the epoche and placed the world in brackets. A turn to Husserl’s life world therefore was essential for Scheler. This was a turn to the freshly experienced world by consciousness without any pre-given interpretations of things taken from science, capitalism, etc.\textsuperscript{159}

Thus a very central phenomenological category must be examined in order to explain the different direction and function ascribed to phenomenology in the work of Max Scheler as compared to Husserl. It is that of “the life world” or \textit{lebenswelt}. The life world as a technical

\textsuperscript{155}Hebblethwaite, p. 442.


\textsuperscript{157}Moran and Mooney, p. 200.


\textsuperscript{159}I must acknowledge Dr. Jeff Wattles’ assistance in this explanation.
term denotes lived experience of existence (Erlebnis) in both a direct immediateness and lived fullness; hence it is the source/locus of experience before any conceptualization. The *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* describes the life world as immediate, a lived present as well as an interiority of experience, directly disclosive and extraordinary. As such, the life world “reveals something real that otherwise escapes thinking”; and typical ones include art, religion and love.” Husserl of course recognized the importance of “the life world”. In his last reduction, the philosophical reduction, which was a “turn” to idealism and the constitution in time by the transcendental ego, he makes the life world the pre-given horizon of all thought. Thus, the life world for Husserl is crucial because it opens up a new and universal task to analyze and describe the meaning of the “infinity” of ever new phenomena which belong to it as “a new dimension” in which these phenomena come to light.

But his early colleagues in the rise of phenomenology would not follow Husserl in this turn to idealism. Rather the “life world” would function in all its uniqueness, finitude and historicity as the originating experience or *Erfahrung* in which phenomena appear and are appearing, that must be penetrated, essences intuited, i.e., seen, and descriptively unwrapped. The proper term for this last phenomenological step is “a living through” and will be discussed in

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162 Gadamer, pp. 151-156.


164 Gadamer, p. 135.
more detail in Chapters Four and Five. For Scheler, it would be the whole beingness which is the person. Hence, for Scheler the life world/lebenswelt of the person becomes the focus of attention as compared to Husserl’s focus on consciousness in its multi-formations in which the noematic object can be approached through a multiplicity of noetic acts.

For Scheler what is intended transcends the subject who already has encountered it through valuing. It is the whole person, and not a transcendental ego, that enters into an immediate intuitive relationship with what are value suffused things, and as such, his view modifies Husserl’s famous “things themselves”.\footnote{G. H. Wiliams, p. 126.} Hence Scheler wants to remain faithful in any phenomenological reduction to objects given upon the natural standpoint as transcending but still possessed or contained by the experiencing person. Moreover, consciousness for Scheler, “in the fantastic complexity of just a moment of life,” is not always conscious of something because a “halo of potentialities is a part of my consciousness, though it lacks a focusing upon something.”\footnote{Kelly, pp. 18 - 22.} The modern axiom that consciousness is always ‘a consciousness of” was not held by Scheler. What is seen by the mind then are the meaningful phenomena of nature, which has replaced consciousness in the role it plays for Husserl. Thus it is nature that discloses itself differently to the one surrendering to it in the rich diversity of phenomenological cognitional attitudes.\footnote{Barber, pp. 168-171.} This view is better explained in terms of consciousness defined as the ‘lived experience’ of intentionality.

As we mentioned above, Gadamer praised Scheler as an independent and brilliant figure
with a truly disciplined, versatile mind. His inclusive investigation of reality incorporated essences in the realm of lived existence such as life, value, God, society, person, intersubjectivity, and Bretano’s phenomena of love and hate. In a word he went beyond his teacher, Husserl, and as Manfred S. Frings writes, his phenomenology “is distinct from all others by its wide subliminal range and aims.” Frings means by this that Scheler is not only concerned with logical rigor but also he will emphasize in his work the emotive aspects of consciousness or the subliminal “reasons” of the heart. Frings compares this latter realm to Pascal’s ordo amoris: there is a moral logos that has “reasons of its own” that reason itself does not fathom. These reasons will never be grasped by a value free rationality. Since the aspects of Scheler’s work that most influenced Karol Wojtyla in his methodology were in ethics and in his writings on the person as an “individual value essence,” these two topics will be briefly summarized to conclude this chapter. Because Scheler’s ‘material’ ethics and person as an individual value essence will be examined again in Chapter Four which examines Wojtyla’s creative adaptation of his colleagues in phenomenology, these summaries will be merely introductory and quite succinct.

As mentioned above, Scheler’s major work, Formalism in Ethics and Non Formal Ethics of Value was published first in Husserl’s Annual. It was later republished as a unified manuscript in 1921. The first part of the work is a critique of Immanuel Kant’s ethics, but also this criticism works as a prolegomenon to Scheler’s philosophical anthropology. As such it situates the foundation for ethics in the wholeness of the being of the person. The second part of the book contains an analysis of the human person whose existence consists solely in its fullness.

168 Frings, p. 182. Frings explains the specifics of Scheler’s unique subliminal phenomenology on pp. 182-183 in this book using seven specific headings.

169 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
in the realm of action.”¹⁷⁰ It will be the person in action, as an individual value essence, in which originating experiences of essential moral values are realized, that becomes for Scheler the locus of intuited phenomena of essential moral value. The person’s lived experiences of these moral values mirrored in and a content on consciousness becomes in turn the a priori for ethical considerations. They can be phenomenologically accessed. So an important purpose of this book for Scheler is to affirm the material content of ethics in which value itself is immanent, in opposition to Kantian ethics with its formal a priori in duty and responsibility.¹⁷¹

So for Scheler, an ethical experience is always an experience of value which we do not recognize intellectually but rather feel as the simplest element in our conscious acting.¹⁷² How then is value known? There is an emotional cognitional of value when it becomes an object of intentional feeling that in turn will direct acts of willing. Scheler’s ethics has thus been designated “an ethics of value” in contrast to “ethics of obligation.” This is because, although Scheler holds to good and bad values which can thus form good and bad persons, he dismisses any moral normative foundation for ethics.¹⁷³ Finally, it is important to note the social dimension of Scheler’s ethics as he has phenomenologically, and with extensive detail, examined both intersubjectivity, the ‘other’ as a thou, and the social forms of togetherness of persons.¹⁷⁴

The second central aspect of Scheler’s phenomenology is his personalism. As mentioned

¹⁷⁰ Frings, p. 21.
¹⁷¹ Buttiglione, p. 63.
¹⁷² Kupczak, p. 10.
¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 10 - 24; Wojtyla discusses this in his habilitation thesis and the topic will be further examined in the next chapter.
¹⁷⁴ Frings, pp. 81-119. It should be noted that Scheler parts from Husserl in regards to inter-subjectivity in that Husserl does not adequately treat inter-subjectivity. Gadamer edited by Linge, p. 154.
before, the person is defined by Scheler as reality that utterly is unique in existence and value—an “individual value essence.” He understands this uniqueness to be both divinely and individually determined, an on occasions has used the term “ideal value essence.” 175 Scheler rejects the use of substance to define a person that is so central to classic definitions, i.e., in Aristotle or Boethius. Instead Scheler turns to the foundation of what is the person in ‘acts’: “The person is the concrete and essential unit of being of acts of different essences . . .the being of the person is therefore the foundation of all essentially different acts.” 176

Also for Scheler, each person in personal uniqueness is only encountered and cognized by personal love; hence love has a decidedly cognitive role to play in Scheler’s personalism and consequently in his ethics. The person is a dynamic reality for Scheler also because the person becomes a person only in free, creative, spontaneous and above all, concrete action. Moreover, the whole person is contained in every fully concrete act, and varies in and through every act. 177 Finally, Scheler intends his definition of the person, even if one that can only be known through intuitive and participative love, to be understood on a metaphysical level: he held that the person, as an individual value essence, is an ideal ontological structure. 178 In the next chapter, in which the focus will be on Wojtyla’s creative adaptation of Husserlian and Schelerian phenomenology, we will quote from Wojtyla’s The Acting Person certain passages which reveal how very influential Scheler’s idea of the person was on Wojtyla’s own philosophical synthesis.


177 Miller, pp. 168-169.

178 Ibid., pp. 169-173.
The remaining two chapters of this thesis will deal directly with Wojtyla’s methodology in *The Acting Person*, i.e. they will attempt to discern and elucidate the manner in which it seeks to discover, explain and support his portrait of the human person. “For he intends to reach the deepest level possible in his knowledge about man: up to the last turn, to the essence”\(^\text{179}\) His book then is an attempt to be the most exhaustive insight into the man-person so far philosophically achieved. This chapter deals with his overall methodology that has been designated “phenomenological realism”. Chapter Five will take up Wojtyla’s original form of phenomenology. There are three points that must be fully clarified in this penultimate chapter: first, Wojtyla’s creative adaptation of the phenomenology of his mentors with its claim to reach the complete existential subjectivity of the person, second, his fusion of this, which is already a realist phenomenology, to the more radical realism of a strict metaphysics to penetrate to the objective being of the man-person. The third point looks directly at the resulting integration of the old and new philosophies. It should be noted that in this chapter the direct references to *The Acting Person* are explained methodology through secondary sources on Husserl and Scheler.

In regards to the first point, Wojtyla writes, “in our perspective it seems clear that neither

the concept of the “rational nature” nor that of its individualization seems to express fully the specific completeness expressed by the concept of person. . . . the completeness we are speaking of here seems to be something that is very unique . . . [rather than] concrete. In everyday use we may substitute for a person the straightforward ‘somebody.’”

Hence secondly, Wojtyla turns to phenomenology in order to directly access the subjectivity of the person, and in quest for the person’s *eidos* which in the manifolds of experience is at the heart and foundation of this latter philosophy, to integrate subjectivity and objectivity for a complete depiction of personal reality.

For there is no denying that the sphere of self-experience and self-comprehending serves as a privileged vantage point, a point specially productive of meanings. . . . from the very start we take, as it were a double stance: beginning ‘inside’ ourselves we go out of our ego toward ‘man’ and at the same time we proceed from ‘man’ back to the ego. Thus our knowledge of man proceeds as if in cycles. This course of the cognitive process is obviously valid, if the object of our cognition is not to be our ego alone but also the human being—all the more so if the human being is among others ‘myself,’ when he is also my ego.

But the third task becomes to demonstrate how Wojtyla’s personalism, that makes the existence of each concrete person the key to the meaning of the classic term *suppositum*, works in his methodology to unite his particular philosophies of being and of consciousness. For as we wrote in Chapter One of this thesis, the person himself or herself, as the unique source of knowledge of the person, is the logos of this methodology. Thus Wojtyla writes:

Dynamization by the personal being must lie at the roots of the integration of humanness by the person. . . . Of course nature as the basis of this dynamic cohesion really inheres in the subject, while the subject itself having personal existence is a person. Hence, every form of dynamization of the subject, every operation — whether it consists in acting or in happening, that is, in activation — if really related to humanness, to nature, must also be really personal. . . . Humanness or human nature is equipped with the properties that

\[\textit{The Acting Person, pp. 73-74.}\]

\[\textit{Ibid., p. 50.}\]
enable a concrete human being to be a person: to be and act as a person. Moreover, it prevents him from being and acting otherwise. . . . Hence, no other nature has any real (that is, individual) existence as a person — for this pertains to man alone.  

The above passage articulates Wojtyla’s claim that it is as a person, and only as a person that individual human nature has any real existence. Hence, as a “transcendental Thomistic personalist” he will investigate personal reality fully realized in action to comprehend and elucidate, i.e. to gain real knowledge of the person. This is the key element to his method.

Wojtyla is indebted to Max Scheler and to his work on person and action for many of his personalist insights. He also follows his form of phenomenology which looks to the concrete existential “life world” of the person in actual action for the “originating experiences” to be lived through, i.e., noted, described and analyzed in the investigation of personal reality. But he will break with Scheler over the issue of Scheler’s failure to attribute moral realism to existential human action, and this moral realism is centrally important in his methodological research on the person in act. Due to Wojtyla’s articulated great indebtedness to Scheler (quoted in the last chapter), the main emphasis in this chapter will be a summary of both the substantial indebtedness and the divergence between Scheler and Wojtyla that directly bear upon his methodology. This summary is the subject of the second part of this chapter.

But we will begin with Wojtyla’s phenomenological ties to Edmund Husserl, whom he acknowledges as “the master of phenomenology”. Wojtyla follows Husserl in refusing to

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182 Ibid., pp. 83-83.

183 Thus, Wojtyla believes that the type of reality studied determines the method. The man-person and personalism itself is a philosophy with its necessary method of self-reflection. We will discuss this in more depth with the conversation on Scheler, see Burgos, p. 108.

184 Ibid., p. xiii.
restrict experience to sense experience, and in holding that experience is the source of all of our knowledge.\textsuperscript{185} Thus he bases his philosophical claims, as does Husserl, on the self-evidences directly given in the uniqueness of human personal experience of itself—subjectivity can be given to the subject in an objective way—in which no external evidence intervenes. The horizon of the life world—already defined in Chapter Three—is the realm of these original experiences. It is in this realm, which for Husserl is reached in its full clarity in the correlates of human consciousness bracketed in the epoche from the natural world, that direct encounters with the thing itself in its immediate presence, in the present or in memory, occurs.\textsuperscript{186} These direct perceptions or intuitions become a source of cognition as they are able to be analytically described in all their details. Wojtyla’s methodology utilizes this Husserlian form of investigated inquiry, but for Wojtyla it is through the “life world” of the person in act and not in consciousness that the personal reality is directly encountered. Therefore, because the role assigned to consciousness in his methodology, while still central to his methodology, differs from Husserlian theory, it is important to explore Wojtyla’s divergence from what he understands to be that theory. He explicitly describes the latter as a Cartesian one, with essence divorced from existence.\textsuperscript{187} Hence in this chapter we will first explain Wojtyla’s own theory of consciousness and a related point, his original form of ‘bracketing.’

Thirdly, there are also significant ways in which Wojtyla parts with traditional

\textsuperscript{185} The Acting Person, n. 1, p. 301.

\textsuperscript{186} David Carr, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 127-128. Wojtyla’s indebtedness to Husserl’s “wonderful correlation” between that which appears and how it appears must be noted however, even though Wojtyla will break with Husserl in his delimitation of consciousness. See p. 46 of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{187} The Acting Person, n. 4, p. 301
Aristotelian-Thomistic gnoseology which will be covered in this chapter. These divergences will be addressed within the conversations of the chapter at appropriate moments. Finally, in Chapter Five we will supplement this ‘third person’ presentation of Wojtyla’s methodology by summarizing and explaining Wojtyla’s own exposition of his method in the ‘Introduction’ of *The Acting Person*. The final chapter’s elucidation of it will be more understandable due to the background information contained in the first four chapters.

Wojtyla accepts the received premises that make up the goals of phenomenology. Thus he adheres to its general definition: to describe phenomena in the broadest sense both in what appears and in how it appears—in how it manifests itself within consciousness. Hence, although he writes that he does not follow Husserl’s exact eidetic method, he does have the goal to define the “*eidos*” of the person. In this he joins Husserl in rejecting a priori cognitive theories and turns rather to a living contact with reality; his goal is to gain ontological access to reality as it actually exists. In this case it is the fullness of personal reality only manifested completely in deliberate human action. So Wojtyla utilizes a realist phenomenology like the early Husserl, but he already he breaks with Husserl’s notion of the epoche or the turn away from the “natural” world. The existential “life world” itself rather is instead the locus of reality for Wojtyla; the experiences that Wojtyla counts as important are the “originating experience” constituent of the concrete “life world” of the self of the person. Also, Wojtyla does not approach phenomenology

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188 *Ibid.* See also, pp. 57-58. Wojtyla’s goal is to capture the essence of human personal being.


190 *The Acting Person*, p. 25 The experiential insight into the person is superior in the acting person to that of the experience of what happens to the person. See pp. 61-62.
as a “rigorous science”; he believes that the phenomological method cannot reach the radical grasp of reality to the degree achieved in Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, hence the latter remains the ‘rigorous science’ in his view.\textsuperscript{191}

There are four points that can be made to unpack the claims in the above paragraph. First, Wojtyla makes the distinction between the ontic and the ontological, with the former naming determinate or metaphysical understandings—human nature then, and the latter denoting concrete existential reality—thus actual personal being in concrete time.\textsuperscript{192} His concern varies greatly from that of Husserl, whose is focused in his phenomenology is on the Cartesian world of pure consciousness and apodictic cognitive certainty. In fact, Wojtyla writes, “I would dare to say that the experience of man, with the characteristic separation , exclusive of man, of the inner aspect of the exterior seems to be at the root of the potent scission of the two main currents of philosophical thought, the objective current and the subjective one”.\textsuperscript{193} Also a difference of definition between metaphysics and ontology as a premise of his methodology reveals itself. For Wojtyla, ontology is ontological anthropology that “seeks for the last radicality in man and on the structures that give reason for his existence,” whereas metaphysics is a philosophy of being which “proposes transcendental concepts that are applicable—in theory to the whole reality: essence and act of being, act and potency, substance, etc.”\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{191}This dual methodological use of phenomenology and metaphysics has been the thesis of this paper.

\textsuperscript{192}There are several references in this book to the need to address “ontic reality” as well as ontological reality”. See \textit{AP}, p. 185.

\textsuperscript{193}Burgos, p. 116. Burgos is quoting the Spanish version of \textit{The Acting Person, Persona e Atto}, in this quote, p. 38. On this page (38) in the English version Wojtyla refers to the need to have two vocabularies: one for the objet aspect of the subject and another for the “composite and complex structure of the subject’s nucleus which is the ego”.

\textsuperscript{194}Burgos, p. 123.
Secondly, Wojtyla accepts Husserl’s claim that intuitions are “givenness” and thus the measure of all knowledge, and also hard won insights, thus “originary presentative intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition.” They should be accepted as what is immediately given, or simply as what it is presented as being, within the limits of this presentation.\textsuperscript{195} The radical empiricism of Husserl’s acceptance of many forms of intuition as the basis of our judgments about reality is also accepted by Wojtyla, and will form his understanding of the cognitive nature of experience itself. As mentioned above, he employs a radical empiricism to reach the \textit{eidos} of the person, if not exactly Husserl’s eidetic methodology. Hence, the intuition of essence is itself experiential. He looks to the experience that the human has of himself in both acting and what happens to him as the source to what can be articulated in the cognitive investigation of the person.

Secondly there is no credence given to intuitive knowing in traditional Thomistic theories of knowledge, hence Wojtyla breaks with classic gnoseology because he asserts “that the intelligence directly grasps the singular”.\textsuperscript{196} The intellect’s experience in the phenomenological intuition is a direct contact with reality, that gains privileged, not otherwise attainable material for analysis in the reduction as the second step in comprehension.\textsuperscript{197} The Thomistic interpretation of the cognitive process is sharply different; it is a representative theory of knowledge. The intellect does not and cannot know singulars. Rather knowledge begins in the senses, and the intellect abstracts from these initial percepts to generate the universal, and only

\textsuperscript{195} Moran and Mooney, pp. 7- 8; Moran quotes Husserl in Ideas I, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{196} Burgos, p. 107.

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., p. 119.
then do the intellect and the senses together move towards a knowledge of the singular.\textsuperscript{198} Wojtyla in practice rejects this long held and universally received theory of knowledge in Thomism, which he believes is a form of formalism. Abstraction moves away from experience, and as we explain in the next chapter, Wojtyla never leaves experience in his philosophical methodology.

Thirdly then, if all knowledge begins in experience for Wojtyla, and if the intellect participates in each and every experience, then “every experience is also a kind of understanding”.\textsuperscript{199} He follows Husserl’s lead in understanding what is meant by experience: those transactions in consciousness “that are intuitively seizable and analyzable in the pure generality of their essence” as opposed to ones first empirically received and then treated as facts.\textsuperscript{200} Direct experience of essences then is related to the human apperceptive ability: the mind can have a reflective apprehension of its own inner mental states. The mind can reflectively grasp mental acts as they occur through a common inner sense\textsuperscript{201} that enjoys an awareness of the operation of a primary act directed on an object. Husserl uses Bretano’s investigations on the notion of inner perception and agrees on the self-evident nature to our grasp of inner mental experiences.\textsuperscript{202}

Wojtyla makes these insights central to his methodology as he holds that such

\textsuperscript{198}Ibid., p. 121.

\textsuperscript{199}\textit{The Acting Person}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{200}Moran quotes Husserl, (\textit{Logical Investigations, Intro.} & \textit{1, p. 249}), in \textit{Introduction to Phenomenology}, p. 1. A clarifying note from Dr. Jeffrey Wattles—“fact and essence are both involved, one in the foreground and the other in the background depending on the mode of consciousness, hence a focusing of experience.”

\textsuperscript{201}We will address Aristotle’s notion of a common sense in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{202}Ibid., p. 8
experiences allow us to integrate subjectivity and objectivity in a rich, direct and complex experience by the human self of itself. Furthermore Wojtyla would attribute an integrated character to experience—real experience is the coming together of singular experiences.\textsuperscript{203} Finally, and this topic will be discussed at more length in the next chapter, Wojtyla holds that experience of one’s subjectivity is not a derived or objectified experience, so experience of the self, which is locus of direct originary presentations, is radical experience in the strictest sense.\textsuperscript{204}

So experience is everything to Wojtyla; and he will never leave it. This fact leads to the fourth point implied in our introductory paragraph. Wojtyla, like Husserl, attributes the very possibility of the experiences that are the focus of phenomenology to the role of consciousness. He writes, “The essential function of consciousness is to form man’s experience and thus to allow him to experience in a special way his own subjectiveness”.\textsuperscript{205} But the manner in which consciousness plays out this essential role diverges in the phenomenological methods of these two philosophers. In Wojtyla’s estimation, Husserl makes a Cartesian turn to consciousness through the phenomenological reduction that brackets out the natural world. This is because for Husserl consciousness itself is characterized by intentionality. The noema of the intended object of awareness in Husserl’s philosophy is correlated with the intending consciousness. Wojtyla believes that in this explanation consciousness itself becomes a cognitive power in human beings. And in contrast Wojtyla restricts intentionality to human cognitive acts alone.\textsuperscript{206}

\textsuperscript{203}Burgos, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{204}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{205}The Acting Person, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{206}Ibid., p. 32. “It lies in the essence of cognitive acts performed by man to investigate a thing, to objectivize it intentionally, and in this way to understand it.” The will has limited intentionality, p. 144.
In sum, while Wojtyla does indeed agree with the fundamental feature of Husserl’s philosophy that consciousness must be considered in its totality allowing all the fertile givenness of the self’s experiences to come to the fore,\textsuperscript{207} he rejects the epoche of Husserl’s first phenomenological reduction as a desertion or leaving of experience in its pristine occurrence.\textsuperscript{208} The originating experience to be lived through, the natural attitude that Husserl brackets, is the field within consciousness of Wojtyla’s attention. Nonetheless the central issue for Wojtyla lies in the role he understands Husserl to give to consciousness. He writes, “[in traditional scholastic philosophy] though man existed and acted consciously, it was not in consciousness that his being and acting had their specific origin. In this connection we have to keep in mind that our own stand . . . is clearly against any tendency to attribute absolute significance to consciousness”.\textsuperscript{209} Hence consciousness is clearly not intentional in Wojtyla’s philosophy. Rather he claims, that because intentionality makes up the essence of human cognitive acts, the “\textit{the intrinsic cognitive dynamism, the very operation of cognition, does not belong to consciousness}.” So there is intentionality for Wojtyla and it will be important for self-knowledge of the human self, but it is not a quality of consciousness, and he will not engage in Husserlian reductions. He makes this choice so “in the name of integral human experience”,\textsuperscript{210} even though he joins Husserl in the important attention he pays to consciousness in his methodology.

There are two additional topical discussions that belong in this section of my thesis that


\textsuperscript{208}See Williams, p. 126. He also rejects Husserl’s philosophical reduction, Kupczak, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{209}\textit{The Acting Person}, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{210}Kupczak, p. 66.
compares the phenomenology of Wojtyla with that of Husserl. The first can be dealt with briefly, and it deals in a little more detail with Wojtyla’s notion of intentionality. The second pertains to the role Wojtyla gives to human consciousness in his methodology and it is indeed quite comprehensive and complex. In regards to the former topic, two further points can be made. First, even though he attributes intentionality to the human cognitive faculty, Wojtyla’s notion of intentionality diverges also from traditional scholastic usage of this term. In Thomistic gnoseology, the *intentio*, or inner word is not in direct correlation with the outer reality since “apprehension of the singular involves the use of a sensitive potency.” Thomas, as explained above, does not hold to the intellect’s direct knowledge of the singular. He distinguishes the difference between the mode of knowing and the mode of reality, and of *intentio intellecta* or inner word and *res intellecta* of the external thing. Thus, the scholastic notion of *intentio* and Wojtyla’s conception of intentionality are quite different. As mentioned above, Wojtyla follows Husserl in the belief that the intellect can grasp the singular through intentionality’s correlate. It is also the case that in the scholastic tradition the knowledge of the self’s subjective inner experience—an entirely inward correlation therefore, as a departure point for anthropological research is not considered.

Secondly, Wojtyla’s methodological turn to the life world (*Lebenswelt*) as the source of the many forms of consciousness was in line with a creative adaptation of this Husserlian category by some of his original followers, including Max Scheler. Their view of ‘the life world’

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212 Burgos, p. 121.
portrays an understanding of the realm of intentionality that reveals its influences on Wojtyla. Intentionality is a structure of the lived experience itself, of the life world and not something added to experiences taken as psychic states. “Intentio literally means directing-itself-toward. Every lived experience, every psychic comportment, directs itself towards something . . . [so] intentionality is not a relationship to the non-experiential added to experiences.”

Because each and every lived experience that makes up the life world has its cognitive moment according to Wojtyla, its own moment of understanding with its intentional correlates becomes an imperative one to be investigated. Hence, with Wojtyla’s insistence that through the life world we encounter the original, lived experience of full human personal reality, we can understand his focus on the human in act.

Because, as Wojtya writes, “experience is the specific form of actualization of the human subject that humans owe to consciousness,” and because his methodology is completely grounded in experience, it is necessary at this point to summarize Wojtyla’s theory of consciousness. This theory itself arises out of Wojtyla examination in phenomenological detail of the human consciousness of the person in act that opens direct access to consciousness. It is the subject of the first chapter addressed in this book, “The Acting Person in the Aspect of Consciousness.” To do this Wojtyla engages in a “bracketing” of a very different sort than the Husserlian epoche. An explanation of bracketing then is the place to begin in an exposition of

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213 See The Phenomenology Reader, pp. 258-260. The quote is from Heidegger, p. 258.

214 The Acting Person, p. 46.

215 Ibid., p. 28.

216 Ibid., pp. 25-59.
this theory of consciousness. Wojtyla disengages consciousness and singles it out to examine it in detail. He does so in order to consider it through itself. His purpose is methodological. In bracketing Wojtyla can take one aspect of an integral being—of the human person in act, i.e., consciousness, and by placing it outside of the brackets, examine this totality of the human person in act by the manner in which that aspect, so in this case, consciousness, affects everything in the totality.

The result of his bracketing is that he discovers and can define several functions of consciousness that will enhance our insight into the eidos of human personal reality. These functions become essential to his methodology because they will aid in the phenomenological investigation into the person. They are first, the “mirroring and illuminating function of consciousness”; secondly, its role in reflecting self-knowledge which results in the objective discovery of the self or ego by the person; third, the intimate dependence by human persons on consciousness to experience at all. And finally there is the reflexive function of consciousness which fosters the subjective experience of the self as the subject of one’s own acts, that is, as the concrete subject of the ego’s very subjectiveness. Because these four functions of consciousness contribute to the Wojtyla’s overall methodology, each deserves a brief elaboration.

When Wojtyla points out that consciousness has a mirroring function, he explains our universal experience of consciousness as a “consciousness of,” however, without characterizing acts of consciousness as cognitive functions. All that we know about the world and ourselves, of what we do and what happens to us, is contained in consciousness. “Consciousness is

217 Schmitz, Drama, p. 67.

218 The Acting Person, pp. 29-30.
restricted to mirroring what has already been cognized,” Wojtyla writes, and it does not constitute acts of cognition, “even if they are indubitably constituted in consciousness”.  

However, consciousness in this reflecting or mirroring role does have a quality of penetrating and illuminating whatever becomes in any way man’s cognitive possession. That is, it can keep the objects known “in the light” of its actual parameters. So Wojtyla will claim that consciousness is the understanding of what we have comprehended; it does have some cognitive traits. In sum, consciousness is not a subject or a human faculty, but it plays an irreplaceable role for the cognizing person. It gives the human self possession of all that he knows, which is held in consciousness. Moreover, consciousness interiorizes in its own specific manner everything it has mirrored, thus capturing it in the ego.

Secondly, consciousness is conditioned in its reflecting function: the various degrees of knowledge determine the different levels of consciousness. Wojtyla’s point here is nothing new. Husserl has identified many forms of consciousness. There is philosophical work on the differentiations of consciousness. But Wojtyla uses this characteristic of consciousness to highlight the self-knowledge that is mirrored by consciousness. Consciousness allows the cognitive grasp by the acting subject of its own ego as an object. He writes, “[C]onsciousness interiorizes all that the human being cognizes, including everything the individual cognizes from within in acts of self-knowledge, and makes it all a content of the subject’s lived experience”.


\[221\] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

Wojtyla’s methodological description of the lived through experiences of the acting person depend on this fact of the interiorizing and reflecting role of consciousness.

In addition consciousness itself can become the object of self-knowledge. “[M]an is conscious of his acting, he also knows he is acting; indeed he knows he is acting consciously. Self knowledge has as its object not only the person and the action, but also the person as being aware of himself and aware of his action. This awareness is objectivized by self knowledge.”

It then can become part of the biography of consciousness open to phenomenological examination. Hence Wojtyla will claim for consciousness an equal cognitive potential to that of recognized discursive operations of human reason, such as comprehending and objectivizing. But it is one that lies deep in the interior of the personal subject.

Thus we can consciously reflect on the contents of consciousness. They can be examined in the search of the eidos of the person. They must be seen as both extensive and marked by ever deeper layers of interiority. A person’s self-knowledge mirrored by consciousness is preserved deep within the memory of the self’s free actions as they are conscious events. Because there is a content to consciousness it can be examined for the meanings of the different objects manifested in it. Also, it is possible to speak of consciousness as the objective and special modality of a self’s self-consciousness. In this case, the self-cognizing subject yields concrete and detailed knowledge for self-knowledge, one that has as its object the unique, individual ego. The latter, in combination with abstract or general knowledge learned in the disciplined study of human

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223 Ibid., p. 37.
224 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
225 Ibid., p. 39.
beings, or with what we know of other persons, as a privileged knowledge of the unique self, "individuum est ineffabile," will produce the most thoroughly acquired knowledge of the human person we can attain, according to Wojtyla’s methodological presuppositions.226

Third and fourth, there is what Wojtyla names as the “ultimate reason for the presence of consciousness in the specific structure of the acting person”. There is first (and our third point) the fact “that the essential function of consciousness is to form man’s experience” and second, (the fourth point) this function is to allow the self to experience in a special way one’s own subjectiveness. So Wojtyla writes that “consciousness allows us not only to have an inner view of our actions (immanent perception) and of their dynamic dependence on the ego, but also to experience these actions as actions and as our own.”227 Since Wojtyla terms this “the subjectivation of the objective” which is to some extent identifiable with experiencing itself, the third function of consciousness is clarified — we owe to consciousness our ability as human selves to be able to have experiences.

Wojtyla’s methodology begins and ends in experience and the conditions of possibility to have experience are owed to consciousness. His methodology has been termed a phenomenological realism, and this realism comes to a culminating point in these first three functions of consciousness. He has demonstrated that there is a content to consciousness due to its mirroring function, that we can reflect upon it, and that direct experience of human personal reality could only happen due to consciousness. At this juncture it should be noted that he does not separate the moment of experienced subjectiveness from his consideration of the human


227 Ibid., p. 42.
being as the subject with a beingness of a determinate nature. Wojtyla’s treatment of
consciousness is integrated with his metaphysical understandings of the subject with a distinctive
nature leading to a particular manner of acting. Hence Wojtyla writes that when man is
approached as a type of being:

abstraction is made from that aspect of consciousness owing to which the concrete man
—the object being the subject—experiences himself as the distinctive subject. It is this
experience that allows him to designate himself by the pronoun *I*. We know *I* to be a
personal pronoun, always designating a concrete person. However, the denotation of this
personal pronoun, thus also the *ego*, appears more comprehensive than that of the
autonomous individual being, because the first combines the moment of experienced
subjectiveness with that of ontic subjectiveness, while the second speaks only of the latter
of the individual being as the ground of existence and action.\(^{228}\)

The fundamental significance of the reflective aspect of consciousness, when the experienced
ego is united with its ontological foundations is that consciousness co-constitutes the ego in its
own dimension as a *real* subject with the endowment to have experiences of its subjectiveness.\(^{229}\)

Hence the work of the combined philosophies of being and consciousness meet in the human
experience of the person to support the project of phenomenological realism.

In regard to the fourth point about consciousness Wojtyla explains that he is speaking
about a new trait of consciousness; it is reflexive. In other words, consciousness mirrors,
reflects, and is reflexive. In this last case consciousness is observed as able to turn back
naturally upon the subject, so that the subjectiveness of the subject is brought into prominence in
experience.\(^{230}\) Wojtyla attributes great importance to this last function of consciousness—which
enables the self to experience itself as the subject of its own acts and experiences. Because these

\(^{228}\) *The Acting Person*, pp. 44-45.


acts are free, the reflexive function of consciousness grounds the moral attributes of human personal nature. The consciously aware and thus free acting subject then becomes a concrete and individual moral agent due to the reflexive trait of consciousness.\textsuperscript{231} As Wojtyla credits Scheler with many of his insights on the human experience of moral value, we will take up this topic of moral experience in the section of this chapter devoted to Scheler. We can summarily say that due to this function of consciousness the human person is able to dynamize his efficacy in action and be self-determining.

“Consciousness opens the way to the emergence of the spiritual enactment of the human being,” as well as it “gives us insight into it,” Wojtyla writes. This last comment by Wojtyla also discloses a further reason he turns to the combined examination of what the philosophies of being and of consciousness contribute to the knowledge of the human person. The first claim indicates the need for radical realism as provided by metaphysics, and the second to the need to examine these types of claims under the microscope of the phenomenological examination of each and every detail of the lived experience of this spiritual enactment. The conditions of possibility for this choice of methodological approach however lie in the reality of human consciousness. Wojtyla writes, “Consciousness is not just an aspect but also an essential dimension or an actual moment of the reality of the being that I am”.\textsuperscript{232}

At this point we can take up Max Scheler. Wojtyla credits Max Scheler as a a major influence on his methodology, and as a source of his matured personalism. Wojtyla writes:

“Granted the author’s acquaintance with traditional Aristotelian thought, it is however the

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., pp. 47-49.

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., p. 46.
work of Max Scheler that has been a major influence upon his reflection. In my overall conception of the person envisaged through the mechanism of his operative systems and their variations, as presented here, may indeed be seen the Schelerian foundations studied in my previous work . . . First of all, it is Scheler’s value theory, . . . then it is the unity of the human being that it seems imperative to investigate. In fact, in spite of the fundamental Schelerian, and for that matter generally phenomenological, efforts conducive to the cognition of the complete man, this unity, its basis, as well as its primordial manifestation, are still missing in the present day philosophical conception of man—whereas in traditional Aristotelian thought it was the very conception of the ‘human act’ which was seen as the manifestation of man’s unity as well as its source”.  

This quote provides insights into Wojtyla creative adaptation of Schelerian phenomenology. According to his biographer, George Weigel, “Scheler’s personalism enabled Wojtyla to rescue moral philosophy from the dry abstractions of Kantian ethics and restored a dynamic ethos to human life.” An investigation of the exact manner in which Wojtyla adapts the phenomenology of Scheler to elucidate the depth of meaning of the reality that is the human person will be used at this juncture to illustrate how Wojtyla fuses the philosophies of being and consciousness based upon his work.

Three outline points will be covered in the proceeding exemplification. The first explains how Wojtyla, as loyal to the original philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, engages Scheler’s work. He finds in it the missing and very necessary compliment to Thomism’s objectivist synthesis on the unity that is the human person. Wojtyla wrote, “[T]hrough phenomenological analysis we have emphasized the existence of an ‘irreducible kernel’ of the

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233 The Acting Person, p. viii. The previous work that he mentions is Wojtyla’s habilitation dissertation on Max Scheler. Wojtyla had to translated Scheler’s Formalisms in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value into Polish in order to even read it well, hence he gained a very thorough knowledge of Scheler’s phenomenology.


235 One simply cannot detect a modernist challenge to classic and medieval philosophy in any of Wojtyla writings.
person which is easily understandable and interpretable through the classical notion of ‘subjectum.’ In this first point then we can detail how the Schelerian phenomenological descriptive analysis of the experience of values enables the fullest discovery of the human being as revealed in the person in act. 236

The second step is to demonstrate how Aristotelian notions of the human act, and of potency and act, in turn give Wojtyla the resources to make up what he believes to be the lacking in Scheler’s moral philosophy. Wojtyla’s background in both Thomistic ethics and metaphysics can give substance to Scheler’s quite original philosophy of the person as necessarily unified and reaching identity in action. The metaphysical analysis in Wojtyla’s methodology clearly articulates that the conscious, hence the free actions of the human person, which Wojtyla defines as also actions of self-determination and efficacy, support realist claims about the human dynamism towards self-fulfillment.

The third point follows logically; it is to delineate the result of this combination of Schelerian phenomenology and Thomism as Wojtyla’s mature philosophical anthropology. 237 Self fulfilment, which includes self-possession and self governance as well as efficacy and self-determination, forms personal moral agency. So in Wojtyla’s philosophical anthropology the acting person is personally creative of moral value or dis-value, and becomes as a person morally good or evil.

In regard to the first point it is important to note that there was an existing Thomistic


anthropology that Wojtyla used methodologically as a resource. However, he began to realize as his understanding of philosophy matured that his seminary classes about morality were incomplete in grounding an ethics relevant to the contemporary world. As a professor of ethics Wojtyla sought “an adequate anthropology” to ground and substantiate his ethical writings and conclusions. Thomistic anthropology never studied human existence based upon essential truths about human interiority—an interiority for Wojtyla and Scheler that is sourced in God. Moreover, the third person approach in Thomism did not include study of the human person from the perspective of the lived experience of being a person. In fact Thomas in his question, “On Man,” doesn’t use the term person primarily of man, but rather of God. He does use suppositum in the sense of subject in referring to Christ and to men as subsistent entities. And he includes in his notion of subject the characteristic of “incommunicable substance,” i.e., ontologically non-transferrable, but his work on person remains theoretical and abstract. The clear lines connecting the dignity of what is a person as possessed by Christ and by human beings were missing in Thomistic anthropology.

Wojtyla desired to be able to make the connection between what a person as revealed in Christ and ordinary human beings. He had endured the depersonalization of peoples by the successive totalitarian regimes governing Poland. His goal became to portray human existence normatively as personal existence. Hence he uses the person ‘according to Scheler’ as a manifestation at the realm of consciousness of the metaphysics of what is proper to person in the

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238 Kupczak, p. 5.
239 Buttiglione, p. 82.
240 Williams, p. 149.
work of St. Thomas. In sum, Max Scheler’s work on the person became extremely valuable to Wojtyla.

If Thomas had failed to delve into the complex reality of the human person as Wojtyla believed, the work of Max Scheler, as a “new” discipline of philosophical anthropology within the phenomenological movement, was a philosophy Wojtyla needed to explore. Scheler sought out the inner and more profound parts of human beingness in his philosophy. In an essay published in 1926, “Man and History,” Scheler characterizes this philosophy as a basic science that investigates the essence and essential constitution of human beings on every realm of his nature—the organic up to the spiritual—and thus one that comes to knowledge of the human being as a whole, as a unity of meaning. It is a science then capable of grasping the eidos of the human.

Scheler’s ‘new science’ and its methodology are key to Wojtyla’s phenomenological methodology or philosophy of consciousness utilized in The Acting Person. He follows Scheler in the conviction that the only perspective by which we can understand human reality will lie in the turn to our experience of concrete existential life world in which we actually exist. In The Acting Person, then, he is reconstructing a foundation for his ethics. Scheler has given him the tools to intuitively engage the human person’s moral experience of life on the very stage in which this drama occurs—in the consciousness that mirrors this drama in and for each individual person. So as Wotyla claims, it is Scheler’s value theory that is pre-eminently important to

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241 Ibid., pp. 358-359.
243 Ibid.
Wojtyla’s methodology.\textsuperscript{244}

A second point about Wojtyla’s use of Schelerian philosophy concerns Scheler’s insight that the person is not just an object to be studied by metaphysical separation and abstraction, but rather the unity of being of acts. For Scheler an act cannot be an object of inner perception:

\[\text{if an act can therefore never be an object, the person who lives in the execution of acts can a fortiori never be an object. The only and exclusive kind of givenness of the person is his execution of acts (including the execution of acts reflecting on acts). It is through the execution of acts that the person experiences himself the same time, Or, if we are concerned with other persons, the person is experienced in terms of post execution, coexecution [sic] and pre-execution of acts. In these cases of the execution of acts of other persons, there is no objectification. . . . [these acts and the person] remain transcendent to psychology.}\textsuperscript{245}

It exactly this Schelerian insight that founds Wojtyla’s methodology in The Acting Person.

Finally, Wojtyla does adopt the Schelerian system of phenomenological analysis of the person’s experience of moral value. He agreed with Scheler’s claim that human intuitions, including moral intuitions, can reach a certain “knowledge of the heart”. “Scheler’s careful analysis of moral sentiments, especially empathy and sympathy, was also important, for it helped break modern philosophy out of the prison of solipsism—empathy and sympathy necessarily involve an encounter with another”.\textsuperscript{246} Furthermore, Wojtyla agreed with Scheler that ethical reasoning should be grounded in analysis of the realities of moral choosing, as opposed to a Kantian formalistic ethics.

But at this juncture it is important to note how the Thomist Wojtyla corrects Scheler on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item Williams gives a summary of this theory. See pp. 126-127.
\item Acheler, \textit{Formalisms}, p. 387.
\item Weigel, p. 129.
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\end{footnotesize}
the essential definition of the meaning of personhood. He introduces the moral realism of his Thomism to his adaptation of Scheler’s ideas on the person and act. First of all he retrieves the scholastic term *actus humanus*. There is a full and complete content of philosophical meaning in this term. It implies, first of all, that human action instances voluntary or free human agency. Although Scheler does hold “the person is the concrete and essential unity of being of acts of different essences and hence, the foundation of all essentially different acts,” he also rejects the use of “substance” to define the person in the exercise of moral agency. Personal unity is more fluidly founded in personal action. Wojtyla adopts the Thomistic notion of ontological non-transferable *suppositum* in its *wholeness* in contrast to this position, and because of this, makes the incommunicable person—essentially as well as actually in existence—the center of unity to be phenomenologically investigated.

As we wrote in Chapter Two, in existential Thomism, given the principle of the analogy of being, all existence must be understood as implying the fullness of actualized being. Scheler’s “essence’ cannot meet the realism test of Wojtyla’s adequate anthropology. His person, defined as an”individual value essence” cannot match the *esse* that is the person of classic metaphysics. Hence, Wojtyla could not completely adopt Scheler’s methodology. Because there are limits to the phenomenological grasp of the essences of ethical values, which does indeed go further than Kant’s mere formalisms, Wojtyla’s insistence on moral realism would nonetheless need the ultimate categories provided by metaphysics to complete his philosophical project. Therefore, because it cannot touch the existential reality of the ethical life itself, Wojtyla was not willing to

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247 Miller, p. 165. Miller is quoting Scheler from *On the Nature of Sympathy.*

fully endorse Schelerian constructions from experience/within experience.\textsuperscript{249}

But he does bring the work of Scheler into important conversation with traditional metaphysics. So Aristotelian conceptions of potency and act which themselves point to “the potential substratum of actualization can be used to explain why the designation of \textit{actus humanus} or man as the subject who acts,” possesses the potentiality to be the source of action and the dynamic basis of conscious, hence free action.\textsuperscript{250} Then Wojtyla is able to claim on the basis of his fusion of scholastic notions of the human act with those of Scheler that there are “ontological meanings” contained in the lived experience of the human act as well as “psychological meanings”\textsuperscript{251} and the latter become the content of phenomenological analysis.

Thus from the perspective of existential Thomism Wojtyla can come to the synthesis he needs for an adequate philosophical anthropology. He adopts what he considers “Thomas’s most original teaching . . . [the] development of the interrelationship between being, truth and the good”. And Wojtyla, as an existential Thomist, will carry this further because he also uses the Thomistic notion—previously introduced in Chapter Two—of existential act as “necessary for a fully adequate account of human action.” This means being is convertible with every particular good because each and every free act represents the concretion of the dynamism proper to man.

Moreover action commands primary attention in Wojtyla’s project. As eminently practical, action, it is convertible with being, and precisely with being as existential act. (\textit{Esse actu}). . . . And so, because the convertibility of being and the good lies at the root of the theoretical and practical orders, their convertibility seals an identification that preserves the primacy of being, inasmuch as the good (which has priority in the practical

\textsuperscript{249} Schmitz, \textit{Drama} pp. 44-45.

\textsuperscript{250} The \textit{Acting Person}, pp. 25-26.

\textsuperscript{251} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 27.
order) is identified with being as absolutely primary.”

As we also explained in the chapter on Thomism, Aquinas’s metaphysical realism as adopted by Wojtyla the “transcendental existential Thomist”, through the notion of participation, allows the explanation of free personal action that in the light of his doctrine of convertibility, can also account for the claim that a person becomes better or worse through the actualization of his personal being in each and every act. Concrete material values, i.e., the embracing of justice, the decision to be loyal, or commitment to develop one’s talents—when taken up by free conscious action actualize personal being then.

The third point to be addressed will also be the conclusion of this chapter. It examines the results and implications for his methodology of Wojtyla’s merger of traditional philosophies of being with contemporary philosophies of consciousness in the original synthesis of his articulated philosophical anthropology. A first result of this combination is that a Husserlian/Schelerian philosophy of consciousness works to establish the fact of subjective interiorization that “allows for a grafting of the discovery of subjectivity into the trunk of philosophy of being.” So Wojtyla writes, “consciousness opens the way to the emergence of the spiritual enactment of the human being and gives us an insight into it.” Hence when the human being as a determinant suppositum, is experientially revealed as a free self-determining

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252 Ibid. P. 54-55.

253 We discussed the concept of participation in Chapter Two as it had been developed by Cornio Fabro, whose works Wojtyla encountered in Rome. Fabro enriched the notion of form (as related to matter) until it also was the proper effect of the creator—esse—as related to essence. Hence in participation it becomes mimesis or limited realization. See. McLean, p. 17.

254 Ibid., p. 52.

255 Buttiglione, p. 367.
actor in time and history, the realist claim is that human beings make their own world.

In short, the philosophy of consciousness experientially grounds ontic claims of human efficacy, self-determination, self-governance and self-possession. It describes the person’s experience of himself or herself—“as the one who acts, as the subjective agent of action”. So Wojtyla employs phenomenological descriptive analysis in his methodology to show that this experience is also one of ownership. We experience our own the moral value of good and bad; partly through our own attitude toward these values, approving emotions and disapproving ones. Objectively, then, both action and moral values belong to a real subject, who is the agent of both “equally formally and existentially.” A combined phenomenology of action with the metaphysical realism of Thomas leads to the conclusion that the conscious thus free human person is also conscious of his own causation in his actions. In sum, the person knows of his or her personal efficacy and self-determination as revealed in the experience of acting. This knowledge becomes the philosophical premises to Wojtyla philosophical anthropology.

Wojtyla himself explained his adaptation of Schelerian phenomenonological analysis in his Introduction to The Acting Person. He first acknowledges what he learned from Scheler, and then why he cannot in the end agree with the conclusions in Formalism. In the former case, Wojtyla agrees with Scheler that the uniqueness of the person can only be encountered through the intentionality that lies at the core of intuitive and participative love. The premise is that persons are unique, and therefore cannot be objectified to gain full knowledge of personal reality.

\[256\textit{The Acting Person}, pp. 47-49.\]


\[258\textit{Miller}, p. 171.\]
Wojtyla agrees completely with this. The question becomes: how does one know the “whole” of man which entails not just knowing through reason alone but also through feeling? George Williams in his book on Karol Wojtyla explains this succinctly. The whole person for Scheler, “enters into an immediate intuitive relationship with value-suffused things (Sachen) as distinguished from things in themselves (Dinge).” This becomes the phenomenological experience. Secondly, an investigation of the phenomena of the different values must occur. These are given in intuitive experience and can only be reached as given through living through the experience. Hence for Scheler, “values are given in intentional feeling immediately as colors are to seeing, in an original relation to the objects of feeling, although these values are independent of them as their qualities.”

As one reads The Acting Person, one can recognize the debt to this basic methodology of Schelerian phenomenology. But one can also immediately realize that Wojtyla has recognized a disproportionate stress on feeling as cognitively important in the perception of values. This method alone cannot encounter the objective realism of revealed and authoritative ethics, Wojtyla will write in his habilitation doctorate. In Wojtyla’s view, while there is self-possession and self-governness in the experience of the acting person, persons in their moral choosing experience pre-eminently a drive toward moral truth. This drive can be phenomenologically ascertained. Also there is the experience of duty which is the experience of a dependence on moral truth. There is the experience of conscience with its intuition of true goodness. Hence, the Thomist Wojtyla does part with Scheler. One finds in moral experience as “lived through” notions of duty and moral norms as well as the imperative to respond

\[259\] Williams, p. 126.
affirmatively to the truth of the good. Contrary to Scheler’s, Wojtyla did not believed that the emotional cognition of a value occurring in an intentional feeling could inform an act of willing. Thus realist notions of moral agency and self-determination would be undermined by Schelerian anthropology. 260

Wojtyla makes his criticism of the emotionalism of Scheler’s philosophy in a section of *The Acting Person* called “The Emotionalization of Consciousness” 261 and a brief summary of its main ideas will conclude this chapter. Emotions do affect our reasoning, Wojtyla writes, and we experience our bodies as well as our interiority. In the former case there is a world of sensations and feelings, and these must be qualitatively ranked as they influence reasoning and action. Diverse feelings emotionalize consciousness, blend with its mirroring and reflexiveness and can modify consciousness. The result is a breakdown of self knowledge and the objective attitudes that rank feelings. Moreover, the inner cognitive moment of experience itself that consciousness mirrors and brings to experience itself can be emotionalized. In the end Wojtyla summarizes the problem of Scherlian ‘emotionalism’ as one that would hinder the goal of his methodological project, an adequate philosophical anthropology. There would be a corruption at the heart of the descriptive analysis of the person’s lived experience. The emotionalization of consciousness halts subjective completeness, leaving primitive emotional awareness instead as the experience investigated.

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261 *The Acting Person*, pp. 50-56.
CHAPTER FIVE

IN HIS OWN WORDS:

THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY OF THE ACTING PERSON

Karol Wojtyla explains the phenomenological methodology of his book in the short “Introduction” to The Acting Person. It is just twenty-two pages long. This chapter will present a summary of his own elaboration of his unique method of phenomenological interpolation into classical realism’s statements on the human person. And it too will be much shorter than previous chapters in this thesis. We will provide a general overview of his unique approach to the study of the human person, then explain the three categories Wojtyla takes up to explain his methodology—experience, induction and reduction. The chapter ends with a discussion on the criteria on which the truth of Wojtyla’s work can be judged by his readers. How does Wojtyla verify the truth of his conclusions?

First, in an overview of this introductory chapter, it is possible to uncover two goals that Wojtyla entertained for the study of the acting person: the first a positive one and the second, an argument he wishes to make against contemporary methods of studying the human being. As to the first, Wojtyla writes that human beings have “conquered so many secrets of nature” but “the conqueror himself must have his own mysteries ceaselessly unraveled anew.” 262 Wojtyla also

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262 Ibid., p. 21.
believed that, given the “personalistic problems” in our contemporary age, a “new and profound analysis” of the human being, “an ever-new synthesis” was important. He felt that contemporary human beings risk “becoming too ordinary” to and for themselves, and the results were apparent in the loss of wonderment about human personal reality. Wojtyla does not specifically mention the inhumanity of the totalitarian regimes that crushed the world during the twentieth century as a motivation for this study, but he does remark in this Introduction that “various trends in the development of mankind . . . with all the resulting inequalities and their dramatic consequences—are a powerful impulse for the philosophy of the person.”

Secondly, Wojtyla who completes an extensively comprehensive portrait of personal reality in this book, wanted to design a corrective to behaviorist and functionalist studies of human beings. These approaches base their conclusion on the observance of outward behavior of human beings. He also agreed with Max Scheler that Kantian ethics, despite its notion of persons as “ends”, was greatly inadequate due to Kant’s formalism—failing both to understand our social nature as well as the effect of the body itself on human beingness. Moreover, Wojtyla rejected any apriorisms; rather he begins in the cognitive center of experience. Finally, Wojtyla makes a distinction between what he terms phenomenalism, or the empiricist studies of the person, and phenomenology. The latter expands the notion of experiences to include the apprehension of all that is mirrored in the reflecting and reflexive consciousness. His purposeful turn to action to reveal and manifest the inner as well as the outward realities of the person is


meant on his part to compensate for the methodological incompleteness of these other forms of human studies.

There are some general observations that can be articulated about his methodology before taking up his categories of experience, induction, and reduction. First Wojtyla demonstrates an attunement to Aristotle’s notion of how knowledge is produced. Aristotle thought all knowledge began in experience. Rocco Buttiglione describes Wojtyla’s form of phenomenology as metaphenomenology: Wojtyla deepens his relationship to Aristotle by way of Bretano. Traditional methods of phenomenology have not dealt with human agency directly. Thus Wojtyla’s goal is one of “coming to grips with human reality at the most propitious point available, and his focus in this book becomes the “category of person and action” . . . [that expresses] the dynamic unity of the human being.”

He will note in a reference to Aristotle and metaphysics that this unity or whole that is the acting person, which has heretofore escaped the immediacy of inspection in the very experience of it, must first arise from an ontic one. But for his study this is not goal of the analysis. Rather Wojtyla attempts in his methodology to plumb as fully as possible the comprehensive whole in the experience of human acting that must include our entire experiential subjectiveness of the ego. “The action of human beings,” Buttiglione writes, “escapes the comprehension and description which traditional methods of phenomenology attempt,” whether they focus on the transcendental genesis within consciousness constitutive of the life world or

\[266\] Buttiglione, p. 119.

\[267\] Ibid.
Hence, Wojtyla will write that he recognizes the difference as well as the disparity of dealing with two forms of the experiences of the acting person—immanent as well as outer experiences of other persons. Nonetheless he held that the interpretation and conceptualization of these experiences from the manifold of their singular understandings was possible despite the obstacles. Moreover, he insisted that this approach would “open new possibilities and wide vistas for investigation.” Wojtyla introduces a rather novel term, “intersubjectivation” to speak about the fact that human experience is a complex process which integrates both subjectivity and objectivity—our own and of others. Objectivity in other methods of study was reduced to the external aspects of human experience—our experiences of other human persons, but in this study a presupposition is that the human being is both the subject and the object simultaneously. Due to the “stabilization of the object of experience” drawn from the manifold of inner and outer experiences that make up human experience through “induction,” the subjective event of the experience of one’s ego can and does become a “factual datum.” Thus it is available for reflection and a content for ratiocination. Hence when the person is revealed through action, “the associated intersubjectivation of person and action” will work to open for exfoliation the wealth and diversity of the complex realm of experience.

Another point Wojtyla makes in regard to “intersubjectivation” is a reiteration of the importance of consciousness to his project. The activity he investigates to capture manifesting

\[268\text{Ibid.}\]

\[269\text{Ibid., Wojtyla discusses intersubjectivation on pp.16-17.}\]

\[270\text{Ibid., p. 17.}\]
personal reality is conscious activity. Consciousness is especially significant to human action because it is tied to its voluntariness. However, he also insists, repeatedly indeed, that consciousness is not an independent subject nor does it direct will and activity. In his essay “Person, Subject, and Community,” Wojtyla explains further his philosophy of consciousness. “The reality of the person, however, demands the restoration of the notion of conscious being, a being not constituted in and through consciousness but that instead somehow constitutes consciousness . . . [and] conscious activity.” He also criticizes Husserl for the exclusion of consciousness from “really existing being” in this essay.271

In the “Introduction” he will simply note that his study “is not going to be conducted on the level of consciousness alone.” Rather he desires to capture the dynamic reality revealed in action which is the efficacious personal subject, which always manifests itself through consciousness. So consciousness has a vital importance to very possibility of his project, but not as absolutized or “pure” consciousness.272 In Note 14 of this section he explains that the goal is to directly reach through action as the key the revelatory meaning of the person, and hence stopping at the level of consciousness would thwart the investigated project before the dynamic reality of the person is intuitively grasped. And in Note 15 he adds that the there has been a continued problem with the identity of consciousness in the history of philosophy. His position is succinctly stated: the “continuity and identity of consciousness reflects and also conditions the continuity and identity of the person.”273

271Crisis, pp. 42-43.


273Ibid., Notes 14,15, p, 303.
A final clarification Wojtyla makes in his general overview of the book’s methodology is concerned with the “whole” which is the person, always a unified reality. For this reason, he writes, his methodology unites rather than separates anthropology and ethics.\textsuperscript{274} There is a moral modality to human actions that contributes to the dynamic reality in its full completeness of the person. He remarks that although contemporary philosophy tends to treat the problems of ethics separately from anthropology, this has not usually been the case — i.e, the Nicomachean Ethics dealt with action and the human being. The moral value of a person’s action will deepen our insight into personal reality; indeed this moral aspect is intimately related to the dynamic or existential possibilities of persons who will be discovered as efficacious, self-governing, and self-determining in this study. So the most comprehensive explanation of the reality of the person must include the moral characteristics of human beingness; they too must be uncovered.

Wojtyla’s initiates the introduction of his method with an a lengthy conversation on experience, and we will now take this topic. First, Wojtyla asserts the ubiquity of what is and what must count as human experience—experience is everything and one can never leave it. Secondly, Wojtyla’s openness to intellectual events or inner perception as truly integral to experience will be summarized. Thirdly, a brief assessment of the process of “consolidation” in the definition of experience according to Wojtyla is necessary. Finally the fact that both induction and reduction are operations within experience and draw from it will be explained to complete this discussion.

First then, Wojtyla insists that experience and experience alone is the basis of all of our knowledge. But the project in \textit{The Acting Person} is to objectivize that “great cognitive process”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 11-14.}
which is the human being’s experience of himself or herself. Even when human beings experience reality beyond themselves they experience themselves.\textsuperscript{275} We have explained before that experience is a direct cognitive contact with reality in Wojtyla’s thought; it contains an inner moment of understanding, awareness or insight. It indicates the directness of cognition itself. Hence through our experiences we cognitively grasp the meaning of things and trust-able knowledge of reality. That we can experience is of course due to a special actualization of the human subject due to consciousness. And due to the reflexive function of consciousness the human being can experience himself or herself as a subject who is the source of action.

Wojtyla focuses on this action, the human act as part of our overall experiences of the human world, as the source of revelatory fullness of insight into human reality. That “man acts” is the phenomenological given. Action serves as the particular moment of apprehending or experiencing a person. So then the content of this experience, especially when carefully and diligently “lived through,” will supply all the material Wojtyla needs to interpret and conceptualize the category of human personal reality. He writes that in other studies action was examined and the person supposed, but in the case of the acting person action itself takes precedence. It is inspected as manifesting and revealing the person. So the process is reversed.\textsuperscript{276} There is also a second point Wojtyla makes in regard to the experiences of the fact that man acts. It is in regard to the complex nature of these experiences. Human beings experience others as well as themselves, hence there are inner and outer aspects in the humanity’s experiences of itself. The former is more direct and is unique, so there is a disparity in their

\textsuperscript{275}This fact was explained in Chapter Three and is one that Bretano has clarified.

\textsuperscript{276}\textit{The Acting Person}, p. 11.
cognitive value, but together all of the experiences of man contribute to the ‘whole’ of what is being investigated in this book.

Secondly, Wojtyla writes about sense and intellectual experiences that must “interpenetrate, interact, and mutually support each other to make the whole which is human experience.” The two disparate forms of experience—Wojtyla distinguishes them as sense/intentional-intellectual acts—together constitute the basis for developing our knowledge of the human being. One’s inner experience is untransferable by and out of the ego, and is only attained in our own examination of it, but we can recognize another’s expressed articulation of inner experience as similar to our own. And then there is the experience of other human beings in act that constitute “outer experience” also. So all together in the totality of cognition these inner and outer aspects will come together, complementing and compensating each other.

But in a retrospective view of this complexity, and this is our third point, there will only be the intrinsic simplicity of human experience. Wojtyla points to inherent sameness in the objects in the experience of man which is due to the intellectual element in experience. This is not an a priori but rather a process of consolidation or formation of intellectual objects from experience. Rocco Buttiglione sums this simplicity very well:

All of this can seem complicated but it actually deals simply with the source of human experience, the aspects in which it presents itself. Human experience is profoundly unitary because different acts of experience converge in that object which is man and they nourish the knowledge of man. The external experience enlightens the internal experience and is enlightened by it. So also the experience which I have of the other man clarifies what which I have of myself and is also illuminated by it. . . . Experience is a structured, organic whole, not only in the sense that it has to do with the very object of knowing and not with isolated sensations, but also in the sense that different acts of

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277 Ibid., p. 8.
experience compose themselves in an organic whole which is *human experience*.²⁷⁸ In addition, the inner experience of the subject and the outer one of other people can and does become a sharing in the possession of the essence or qualitative identity of the object.²⁷⁹ This is a point that Wojtyla makes in his discussion of induction.

Finally, we can add to Wojtyla’s own explanation of experience that in his two step methodology, both induction and reduction are both experiential. This will become obvious in the explanations of these terms. Induction is a process of seeking the sameness or unity within experience and is easily seen as experiential. But reduction too is experiential. Because experience is real contact with the world, and in reduction Wojtyla seeks to comprehend it, this will be an intellection of experience. So even the process of comprehension is immanent in experience. Wojtyla therefore never leaves the living process that is experience.²⁸⁰ His methodology can be correctly classified as radically empirical.

The first stage of Wojtyla’s methodology is induction. Given its meaning in contemporary logic this can be a confusing word. Wojtyla assumes Aristotle’s definition of this term. Wojtyla prefaces his usage of induction with reference to the Aristotelian usage, and hence induction as a process in thought in his book arises out of a traditional scholastic synthesis in the production of knowledge. So if experience provides the contents that are proposed to understanding, then induction is the first of two intellectual steps in which the knowledge of the

²⁷⁸Buttiglione, p. 124.
²⁷⁹Burgos, pp. 111-112.
²⁸⁰Burgos, p. 119.
dynamic reality of the person is brought to full conclusion.\footnote{Ibid., p. 112.} A look at the history of this term can clarify the traditional methodology in his approach. In short, the unifying of experiences is the step which brings in proposed content for philosophical reflection, while the next two steps Wojtyla follows in his reasoning return to the work of the comprehension of this content.\footnote{Wojtyla final step is the actual joining of the two philosophies which has been explained in Chapter Four of the thesis.}

For Aristotle, induction was a solution to the problem of how many events or individuals of a kind justified a generalization. In this most traditional of its uses inductive generalization would lead to the intuitive grasp of first principles.\footnote{Kelley Ross, “The Arch of Aristotelian Logic”, \textit{Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, \url{http://www.friesian.com/arch.htm}, p. 1.} Aristotle’s notion of “a common sense” or \textit{sensus communis}, is a factor behind the use of this process. There are two traditional meanings to this word in scholastic and classical philosophy and both are relevant to Wojtyla’s induction. The first, derived from Aristotle’s \textit{De Anima}, is that there is a common root of the outer senses, a common sense. This is the faculty that combines sense experiences/information and makes judgments about what is given in them. But the \textit{sensus communis} also refers to a form of shared acceptance of common beliefs about what entails the common good for a human community.\footnote{Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, pp. 19-23.} This latter idea is evident in the ideas of Vico and also in the Scottish “common sense” philosophers who were actually quite influential on the American founders’ political philosophy.\footnote{No doubt Wojtyla read these philosophers as he demonstrates comprehensive knowledge of most of the schools of philosophy.}

The notion of common sense itself springs from Aristotle’s division of the two branches
of reason: *nous* and *dianoia*—or intuitive intellection of the first principles that are the basis of reasoning, and discursive thinking which makes deductions from first and secondary principles.\textsuperscript{286} Induction thus is a spontaneous process that can be used to unify the elements of experiences with a deliberate attention to doing so. This involves recognizing the commonalities, tendencies and regularities in the phenomena that present themselves to us in experience. Systematic thinking about a content cannot begin until induction recognizes the unity of meaning in experience. Certainly in this view, one could come to the intuition of the first principle “that the thoughts of which I am conscious of are the thoughts of a being I call myself, my mind, my person”.\textsuperscript{287} In sum, in induction the person cognitively accesses experiences in a direct and integrated way using both intelligence and senses to reach a unity of meaning—in this case “of apprehending the person through action.” It also achieves this unification without the subject leaving the experience with all its multiplicity, so it should not be confused with abstraction: it is a non-objectified thus, not a conceptualized process of understanding.\textsuperscript{288}

Wojtyla describes this process as the “grasping of essential sameness” or the stabilization of the object of experience—all performed from the point of view of the apprehension of the person.\textsuperscript{289} So for him the task of induction is to consolidate a unity of meaning from the complexity that he has circumscribed as the “experience of man.” Manuel Burgos comments that

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\textsuperscript{286} Scott Philip Sequest, *America and the Political Philosophy of Common Sense* (Columbia and London: The University of Missouri Press, 2010), p. 45.

\textsuperscript{287} *Ibid.*, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{288} Burgos, p. 113.

since the person works out the induction, this placing of knowledge “in its species” process replaces the typical separation of the objectivation of person and action. The subjective event in induction allows a real, concrete factual datum to become the subject of reflection. It should also be restated that this factum involves both inner and outer experiences of “man-acts”, hence the term inter-subjectivation. Hence there are extensive intellectual resources provided to the one who has formulated the induction. This will in turn set the scene for further detailed understanding that comes in reduction. But it is also introduces the possibility for communication and intersubjectivity—itself capable of generating further experiences to be brought to induction. And so the process proceeds. “Consolidated experiences include personal elements—self experience—and interpersonal elements—the experience of others. The unification of those elements in an essence or “eidos” allows the creation of a unity of meaning that can be shared.”

As mentioned above, Wojtyla specifically refers to the consolidation of experience in his explanation of the “experience of man”; it brings together inner and outer aspects of experience, as well as that of acting and of the experience of happening to oneself.

The next and culminating step in Wojtyla’s methodology is named “reduction,” which is not at the same as the reductions in Husserl’s phenomenology as Wojtyla interprets it. It does not suppress the profusion of detail in the object of experience. Rather, reduction in this context is a re-directing in order to “examine, explain and interpret” the rich reality of the person revealed in action and held, or “irreducibly given” in the experiences of man. In short, reduction allows Wojtyla to explore, to plumb and to discover the treasures that are the understandings integral to

\[290\] Burgos, p. 113.

\[291\] Burgos, p. 114; The Acting Person, p. 15.
these experiences, and to submit them to rigorous analysis and explanation to bring out more fully the apprehension of the dynamic reality of the person.\footnote{The Acting Person, pp. 15-16.} For, he writes, to “experience is one thing and to understand and interpret (which implies understanding) is another.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 17.} Wojtyla expresses a two-fold goal for this second step of reduction: the first is interpretation, which seeks to produce an intentional image adequate to induction’s stabilized object. The second is one of conceptualization, the expression of those understandings intrinsic to experience. But because understanding is also transcendent to experience, reduction also serves the purpose of communication. Wojtyla adds mutual communication and exchange of understandings is the way knowledge develops.\footnote{Ibid.}

A comparison and a contrasting of these two steps that deal with the content of experience can help bring out what Wojtyla understands by this term, reduction—and he sometimes uses the vocabulary of ‘metaphysical reduction’ or ‘metaphysical analysis.’\footnote{Ibid., pp. 82, 96-97.} First, with experience there is a direct and singular contact between the intellect and the object that is immediately given. Hence, induction, which never leaves the experience, does not rise to the objectification of knowledge. Reduction, in contrast, works to specify and express the intelligibility dormant within the unity of meaning reached by induction. To do so reduction leaves the experience: it is transcendent to it—but only to return over and over to it, and so remains nonetheless “an inherent factor of experience.” Both induction and reduction deal with
what actually exists, writes Wojtyla, but reduction’s processes of understanding and interpretation involve the discursive powers of human intellection. So secondly, because reduction follows the experience with reasoning and explaining that step by step traces the object given in experience—a living through then, it does produce the “image that is adequate and coincident with the object itself.”  

Burgos refers to the “mission of reduction,” which “is the most perfect possible intellection of experience” from induction-produced “originating and irreducible data.” A third comparison then between these two steps is that the first, induction, hides and/or does not make evident all the meanings in the moment of understanding within experience. So the work of reduction is to unpack and illuminate, thus reveal from the complex dimensions of experience the understandings therein to reach a comprehension of the meanings. Burgos writes that “the Wojylian reduction has a vocation for radicality . . . “because it specifically sets out to penetrate to the deepest possible level of research, . . . to get actually to the essence of man.” In conclusion, when induction and reduction work together a greater grasp of the person’s eidos is achieved than that contained in the original data.

The chapters of *The Acting Person* illustrate Wojtyla’s original phenomenology. They are the best example of his methodology, and could be characterized as providing an experience of it. Hence the best way to know his methodology comprehensively is in the reading of this book. The last question that is addressed in this thesis is: how does Wojtyla’s methodology

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297 Burgos, p. 114.

actually work? This question introduce the notions of warrants of truth; it is an important one in contemporary philosophy and should be addressed. However, there is a preliminary disclaimer to be made. Wojtyla is working on a deeper, more original level in his investigation; he is not engaged in proving his conclusions. Rocco Buttiglione writes, “it is not a question of demonstrating phenomenologically that man is a person, but seeing with the aid of phenomenology in which way he is a person, in which way the metaphysical structures proper to his being are reflected in his consciousness.”²⁹⁹ Wojtyla’s work is not a reflection on the history of philosophy nor an attempt to force assent through some logical rigorism, but rather an “articulated discourse” on the fundamental structure of experienced personal life that elicits self-reflection on the part of his interlocutors to confirm and even enrich his account. Hence the issue of truth claims is not completely relevant to what he is trying to do.

Nonetheless three criteria of the truth claims are offered to conclude this thesis. But a general answer to the issue of truth claims is the pragmatic one: a true conclusion is one that can be verified by experience. Each and every descriptive and analytical conclusion that Wojtyla makes is verifiable by experience.³⁰⁰ However, the notion of criteria of truth will be discussed under three themes: in regards to the processes of induction and reduction, under the word recognition, and finally in lieu of the very logos of the person as suggested in the first chapter of this thesis.

Traditionally, the vocabulary of induction refers to the facts that are the contents of

²⁹⁹ Buttiglione, p 356.

³⁰⁰ There are many examples of this claim throughout the book. One that could be offered is from the end of Chapter One and is a summary on the subjectivity of the person as fundamental for the realist goal of his study. Wojtyla writes, “man has appeared in our analysis as the subject, and it is he as the subject that is experiencing himself.” See The Acting Person, p. 57.
consciousness, or “intuitive truths” if you will. There have been three tests of the genuine validity of intuitive or experiential conclusions and they are self-evidence, necessity and universality.\(^{301}\) Induction is a pre-conceptual experiential cognition. Induction, as pre-conceptual and experiential, is a process that involves a direct contact within the details of experience with ‘being’ or the \textit{eidos} or essence of “the stabilized object”. Hence, in looking at how it works other considerations than positive criteria of truth are needed to explain the validity of its claims. So we can return to the first of the “three tests” mentioned above. The first of these tests is the one relevant to Wojtyla’s first step of induction. It refers to the evidence reached when one has indeed made direct contact with the object of experience, hence one knows one has indeed ‘stabilized the object’, reached its \textit{eidos} in gaining a unity of meaning. Wojtyla’s phenomenological concentration is of the irreducible world of the subject, so it reaches subjectivity in a direct and originating way in the only place it can be reached, as revealed in “man-acts.” This is the “originating experience” or \textit{‘Erfahrung.’} So the supporting claim of experiential understandings—how it works then—in induction is one of the self-evidence of the understandings directing encountered or ‘clearly apprehended’ within the privileged place of the experience of one’s subjectivity itself.

We can apply the second test, necessity, to what Wojtyla terms reduction. Wojtyla speaks about “examining, explaining and interpreting” in a way that is both transcendent to and intrinsic to experience. \textit{There is always a return to experience} in reduction to examine what really exists, and never any type of abstraction as in representational theories of cognition. The word for this is interpolation—in this second step one is bringing the expression into the original

\(^{301}\)Segrest, pp. 110ff.
experiences of induction. There is an intentional image produced and brought to expression, but interpretation is that of the object in the stabilizing experience known in the direct self-evidence of induction. Hence, the images are the necessary ones that reflect “in correct proportions” the object which is the revealed content of man-acts. Because they arise from within experience, these intentional images still are experiential. They are particular cognitions which force themselves upon us in the process of “living through” (Erlebnis) in the phenomenological penetration of the given.

Finally, there is the test of universality, and it can help explain how inter-subjectivation, which is an over-all dependence on the life world of the person, works in Wojtyla’s methodology. This “life world” plumbed by Wojtyla in its depths in the unified experience of the subject of his own actions is merged with the experiences of other persons. Wojtyla has been able to represent human subjectivity comprehensively as it is actually experienced in this integration of experiences in the life world of “inter-subjectivation.” The third test of ‘universality’ has been met because he has fused the external experience of other persons which has long been studied with that of the actual interior experience of “an ontological dimension non-reducible exclusively to subjectivity.” Hence he is able to make the human person articulate his own reality—to become the criterion of his methodology while also being able to make the universal experience of all persons as contributors to this articulation.

It is possible at this point to introduce the criterion of recognition. Rocco Buttiglione provides a succinct explanations of the warrants of truth based upon the experience of

\[302\] Quite frankly, I am indebted to William James for this explanation, See Segrest, pp. 155-156.

\[303\] Burgos, p. 115.
recognition. For his criterion of truth, Wojtyla is content with the interpretation he can communicate that will bring to a higher degree of consciousness in the reader what happens in each’s common experience.  

He bases all his truth claims on “the experience of Man” and on in which way the metaphysical structures proper to his being are reflected in his consciousness. Furthermore “in experience man encounters reality and reality comes to dwell with him. This reality is made out of things but is made also and above all of other people. This is the basis of the experience of man.” The person experiences his own “I” but also has experiences of other persons. This dual experience thus provides a completeness of experience to draw upon in the task of articulating the truth of reality of human personal being. Moreover, manifolds of the experience of personal human beingness are unified in the single person, therefore, illuminating and clarifying this reality, which in turn nourishes knowledge.

What does all the above imply in the search for a criterion of truth? By choosing the experience of the person as the confirming warrant of truth in his methodology, Wojtyla is able to work out his philosophy as a reflection on the very experience which every reader as a person can use in his or her own thinking on the subject. Wojtyla is fully elucidating the moment of understanding in a shared common human experience. Rocco Buttiglione explains how this warrant works. “It proposes a hermeneutic of human existence which requires confirmation through the experience of each reader. Each reader is, in fact, asked to compare the results at which the book arrives with those which emerge for his or her own being in the world as well as

304 Ibid., p. 122.
305 Buttiglione, p. 124.
306 Ibid.
his or her own personal reflection. In this way philosophy gains its proper status as reflection
upon an experience." Thus Wojtyla does not propose to prove his conclusions. He assumes a
recognition in the reader, who has reflected upon and compared his or her own experience with
one the portrayed in this book. The reader is thus empowered to recognize the mutuality of the
experiences portrayed. In this recognition the truth of the analysis is experienced.

Finally, the idea of the *logos* of the person himself or herself as a factor in the warranting
the truth of Wojtyla’s phenomenological analysis of personal reality has been introduced in
Chapter One, and will be explained at this point. The notion of the *logos* of the person arises
from the Greek experiential discovery of reason. In classical Greek exegesis of the experience of
human reason, the term *nous* was employed to refer to the human faculty of gazing at being and
the term *logos* as the one of being able to analyze the content of the mind’s encounter with the
vision of being. So *logos* carries the connotation of articulation or the capturing in speech the
intelligible structure of a thing. It does not refer to a systemizing method of reaching truth in this
context.

Medieval philosophy followed this Greek paradigm of human reason, using the terms
*intellectus* or the simple grasp of the mind’s eye to perceive reality, and *ratio* as discursive
reason’s work to bring encountered reality into objectification through all the forms of discursive
thought, such as abstracting, specifying, comparison, etc., i.e., the reality perceived by the

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307 Ibid., p. 118.

The primary meaning of pointing to the *logos* of the person as the criterion of truth is drawn from these classical understandings of reason. If one reflects on Wojtyla’s description of his method, it becomes apparent that his understanding of induction and reduction is at one with these two united operations of reason coming out of traditional philosophy. Since he never moves to objectification in his step of reduction, it is the Greek rendition of reason that is more reflected in his methodology. He has used this mode of operation of reason itself as the basis of his two-step phenomenological investigations. This apparent trust in reason’s ability to know can be introduced as a criterion of truth in his synthesis.

There is a related sense in which the person is the *logos* or founding power of phenomenological expression in his methodology. We will end with this. It has to do with Wojtyla’s theory of consciousness, and the fact that it mirrors everything enacted by human cognitive powers and experienced by the person in act. Consciousness does become as one writer has described it, “the lived experience of human intentional acts” and all that has been brought to articulation in the experience of them. The consciousness of the acting person, with all its moments of understanding in the experience of the acting person by himself or herself is the one in which these understandings become fully elucidated by Wojtyla. Hence the life world of the acting person, mirrored in consciousness and plumbed by Wojtyla, becomes a source of a project in which the *logos* of the person can be unveiled and manifest itself in consciousness as the fertile source of all that he will discover and explain in his investigations.

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310 Roy, p. 3.


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