SHIFTING FACES OF TERROR AFTER 9/11: FRAMING THE TERRORIST THREAT

A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Note on Transliteration

Transliteration from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet is based on the Library of Congress transliteration system (available at http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/russian.pdf). In an effort to make the text more readable and the vocabulary more recognizable, common spellings are used for words that have entered the English language: Chechnya (instead of Chechnia), Yeltsin (instead of El’tsin), or Dudayev (instead of Dudaev).
### List of Frequently Used Abbreviations

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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>DEP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETIM</td>
<td>East Turkestan Islamic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Federal Security Service</td>
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<td>HEP</td>
<td>People’s Labor Party</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Prevention of Terrorism Act</td>
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<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social movement organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>TULF</td>
<td>Tamil Union Liberation Front</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>XUAR</td>
<td>Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1 Problem Overview

The term “war on terror” has become associated with the global campaign against terrorism following September 11, 2001. While being a rather vague concept, with some arguing that the “war” has an ambiguous enemy (Decaux 2008) and unrealistic goals (Record 2003), the “war on terror” opened a new chapter in the history of counterterrorism. States ranging from Britain to Ethiopia and Bulgaria to the Philippines have joined forces to support the U.S.-led initiative against the alleged forces behind the monstrous attacks of September 11. International military campaigns under the banner of the “war on terror” have been conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq. The perceptions of terrorism and counterterrorism have changed across the world.

The events of September 11 questioned the conventional notion of terrorism. Following the attacks, headlines like these – “£3.5bn to fight new terrorism” (Fox 2002), “Dirty game of new terrorism” (Woolgar 2003), “The new terrorism comes to Europe” (Maddox 2004), or “How to fight the new terrorism” (Business 2004) – indicated that the world once again began reconsidering the nature of the contemporary threat. The scope of the 9/11 attacks suggested that terrorism today is more lethal, more dangerous, and more radical than the terrorism of the past decades. The “new” threat, in turn, required a new response.
Following September 11, deterrence methods of fighting terrorism were pronounced insufficient to meet the dangers of the “new” threat. As President Bush pointed out, the Cold War strategies of deterrence and containment became outdated: “Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation against nations, means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend” (Statesman 2002). “The only path to safety is action. And this nation will act,” continued the president, thus announcing the switch of counterterrorism from deterrence to preemption. In 2002, the National Security Strategy (NSS) marked a break with deterrence, calling for preemptive strikes, which materialized in the international campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The U.S.-announced “war on terror” has gained wide international support, and many states have joined the effort in international coalitions. For instance, Russia’s Vladimir Putin declared that terrorism became mankind’s global enemy: “no single state, and no single nation is guaranteed against the threat of terrorism,” the president stated (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union 2001). Ilir Meta, Prime Minister of Albania, was among those who was ready to “to line up without reserves” with the U.S. against the common enemy of terrorism (BBC Monitoring Europe 2001). Kofi Annan (2001) stressed the importance of a universal coalition against a common enemy of terrorism. The United Nations (UN) issued Resolutions 1368 (S/RES/1368) and 1373 (S/RES/1373) condemning the attacks of September 11 and calling for international cooperation against terror.

The “war on terror” has now lasted almost a decade. The “war” has changed the means of fighting terrorism: military force has become more widespread, and
international military operations today do not face as many criticisms as pre-9/11 counterterrorist campaigns. However, the success of the “war on terror” paradigm has remained questionable. While proponents of the “war” could point to the fact that no major terrorist attack has taken place in the U.S. since September 11, we can see that the “war on terror” has failed to protect U.S. allies in the fight against terrorism as exemplified by the 2003 attack in Istanbul, the 2004 bombing in the Philippines, the 2004 attack on Madrid, or the 2005 London bombing. In addition, counterterrorist campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced controversial results, and the fight against terrorism in these places is far from being over.

A lot of research has focused on the “war on terror.” Scholars have been preoccupied with the evolution of the “war on terror” (Brown 2007; Elshtain 2003; Goodin 2006), the question of how to win the “war” (Aslan 2009; Posen 2001), or the legal justification for the “war” (Decaux 2008; Evangelista 2008). Some have argued in favor of the “war” (Elshtain 2003; Dershowitz 2002), while others have found it to be ineffective (Blum and Heymann 2010; English 2009). Yet others have warned us of the negative effects of the “war on terror” in terms of its ability to abuse civil rights and liberties, promote repressive measures, and jeopardize democratic openness and accountability (Donohue 2008; Andreopoulos 2005; Jackson 2005). Thus, a lot of research has focused on how the “war on terror” has impacted the fight against terrorism.

However, the “war on terror” has affected not only terrorism. Crime, economic offences, or opposition movements have been targeted by the “war on terror” as well. For instance, the provisions of the “war on terror” regarding border control have contributed
to the capture of drug-related offenders on the U.S.-Mexico border (Bowers 2005). Uganda arrested on charges of terrorism the opposition leader Kizza Besigye and 22 other members of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) party (US Department of State 2007). In Swaziland, the new 2008 Suppression of Terrorism Act has become a tool for the government to prosecute and/or arrest journalists and political and human rights activists (Africa News 2008). In Azerbaijan, Eynulla Fatullayev, an opposition journalist, was sentenced to eight and a half years in prison on terrorism charges (BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit 2009). In Zimbabwe, activists of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) have been charged with terrorism (BBC Monitoring Africa 2009). Turkey has jailed journalists and protesters on charges of “membership of a terrorist group” (Economist 2011c). While news stories like these have become commonplace in the post-9/11 world, not much research has focused on the effects of the “war on terror” on phenomena other than terrorism. In this respect, this dissertation breaks ground investigating the effects of the “war on terror” on ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts.

1.2 Research Question

The “war on terror” has impacted ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. Following September 11, some governments facing the ethno-nationalist separatist challenge have addressed separatism with military force under the pretext of counterterrorist operations. For instance, Russia started the second Chechen conflict as a counterterrorist operation, and, following September 11, the Kremlin was able to persuade the West it was fighting
terrorism in Chechnya. In China, the Uyghur ethno-nationalist separatist movement became known as a radical Islamist uprising brought about by Al Qaeda cooperatives. Turkey has resisted negotiations with the Kurdish separatists on the grounds of their connections with terrorists. In Sri Lanka, the state was able to wipe out the Tamil uprising under the banner of the “war on terror.” Considering such trends, this dissertation explores how the “war on terror” has affected the way states deal with ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts.

A lot of research has focused on both terrorism and separatism. However, not much scholarship concentrates on the crossover between the two fields. This dissertation intends to amend this situation and uncover the implications that the “war on terror” has produced for ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. The significance of this research is further based on the necessity to evaluate the question whether the same means (namely, military force) can be justifiably used against the divergent threats of terrorism and separatism.

Thus, ethno-nationalist separatist movements refer to self-determination struggles that are based on a core ethnic identity. Such movements aim to gain territorial independence and can involve violence (e.g. the Kosovo war), or proceed peacefully (e.g. the “Velvet Divorce” in Czechoslovakia). Terrorism, on the other hand, refers to the intentional use of violence for social or political ends that strikes against noncombatants and is intended to produce an effect on a larger target audience. And while terrorist acts can be committed in pursuit of ethno-nationalist separatist goals (ethno-nationalist terrorism), not all separatist movements resort to terrorism.
The accommodation of ethno-nationalist separatist grievances oftentimes requires changes in the territorial status quo or power redistribution, which some governments might try to resist. In such cases, governments facing the ethno-nationalist separatist challenge might exploit the interconnections between terrorism and separatism and pronounce the entire separatist movement a terrorist threat. This dissertation explores the use of framing by governments in order to disguise their true challenges to gain more widespread support for the official policies. I analyze September 11 as a focusing event that allowed governments to shift their framing of ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. Thus, I compare the pre-9/11 frames of ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts with frames that emerged following the attack on the U.S. As a result, this research advances framing theory: I investigate the role of focusing events in the process of frame creation, and analyze how governments manipulate focusing events in order to engender a desired level of policy support.

1.3 Main Arguments and Hypotheses

I argue that September 11 has allowed governments to use the “war on terror” in framing their ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat. While framing separatism as terrorism was possible before September 11 as well, such framing did not gain wide international support. For instance, the Serbian efforts to frame the Kosovo conflict as a terrorist threat did not produce much support, and Serbia’s military campaign in the province was condemned by the international community (Pokalova 2010). Following September 11, the attitudes towards terrorism have changed, and military force has
become more widely acceptable against the threat of terrorism. As a result, framing separatism as terrorism after September 11 has allowed governments to avoid criticism for disproportionate use of military force, and to justify the harsh handling of ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as necessitated by the gravity of the “new” terrorist threat.

Framing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a threat of terrorism, I argue, not only violates democratic principles of governance, but also precludes peaceful venues for conflict resolution, justifies the employment of military means against the threat, criminalizes ethno-nationalist separatist groups, and creates precedent for future cycles of violence. Discursive constructions like these hamper political responses to political violence, and deteriorate the functioning of inclusive politics, which leads to the destruction of democratic values (Jackson 2005, 183). In addition, they cut off alternative approaches and strategies, which, in turn, can lead to the alienation of significant population groups. In this process, the enemy becomes stripped of “any genuine and justifiable political grievances” (Jackson 2005, 60). This perpetuates the cycles of violence where the opposition groups have more incentives to turn to violence than resort to dialogue.

The analysis of the Chechen ethno-nationalist separatist conflict supports these arguments. I investigate how the Chechen conflict was framed before and after September 11, and examine how the “war on terror” has affected the acceptance of the government framing of the conflict. Before September 11 the Kremlin portrayed the conflict in Chechnya as an operation to “restore constitutional order.” Moscow’s military handling of the conflict was criticized both domestically and internationally, and the war
in Chechnya was one of the reasons for the efforts to impeach President Yeltsin in 1999. Following September 11, however, the government framing of the conflict as a counterterrorist operation gained a wider acceptance, and in 2003 three Chechen groups were designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. and UN terrorist lists. Criticism of Russia’s military handling of the conflict subsided.

The Chechen conflict is examined in comparative context, and the Uyghur, Kurdish and Tamil ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts further provide evidence for the use of terrorist framing. All these conflicts started before September 11 and have been at certain times addressed through military means. The conflicts have been affected by the terrorist rhetoric following September 11, and the use of military force against the Uyghur, Kurdish, and Tamil separatists has become more acceptable. The common justification for framing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat has been the presence of terrorist groups within separatist movements. Thus, governments have equated ethno-nationalist terrorist groups with the entire ethno-nationalist separatist movements portraying these divergent threats as one.

However, I hypothesize that military force does not present an adequate response to ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations. I predict that the ethnic component makes ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations distinctly different from other types of terrorist groups – religious, left- and right-wing. Since military force does not address ethnic grievances, it therefore might not be justified against ethno-nationalist terrorists. In turn, if military force is not an effective tool against ethno-nationalist terrorism, more caution is warranted when justifying military force against ethno-nationalist separatists on the
grounds of a terrorist threat. Thus, I surmise that framing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts might not be justified by the presence of ethno-nationalist terrorist groups. To investigate these hypotheses I employ logistic regression analysis of factors that contribute to the demise of terrorist organizations.

1.4 Dissertation Structure

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review of framing theory. The dissertation is based on the assumption that reality is socially constructed. As a result, framing and discourse theories constitute the main theoretical background for the research. The chapter lays out the theoretical foundation for the analysis of the framing of ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat, and investigates the role of September 11, 2001 as a focusing event. The chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of the data and methods used for the dissertation.

Chapter 3 examines the role of September 11 in terms of both terrorism and ethno-nationalist separatism. As a focusing event, September 11 changed the perception of contemporary terrorism and introduced the notion of “new” terrorism. “New” terrorism, in turn, prompted the emergence of a new counterterrorist paradigm – the “war on terror.” The chapter traces the increased tendency after September 11 to treat terrorism as a monolithic threat and to equate different terrorist organizations with Al Qaeda. The chapter investigates the changes in counterterrorism brought about by the events of September 11, and analyzes the subsequent shift in counterterrorism from deterrence towards preemption, and the increased reliance on military means against the terrorist
threat. The chapter concludes with the analysis of how counterterrorist policies, in turn, have affected some ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts.

The dissertation proceeds with the case of the Russo-Chechen conflict in order to establish how September 11 affected the shift in framing of ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis of the framing of the Chechen ethno-nationalist separatist conflict before September 11. While before September 11 the Chechen conflict was framed by the government as an operation to “restore constitutional order,” the government’s use of military force was widely criticized. The conflict proved to be unpopular both domestically and internationally. With the start of the second Chechen conflict, however, the government framing shifted to that of a “counterterrorist operation.” Chapter 5 explores the changes in framing and examines how after September 11 the Russian government was able to gain more domestic and international support for its military actions in Chechnya.

Chapter 6 further explores the examples of the Chinese, Turkish, and Sri Lankan ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts in order to provide a comparative background for the Chechen case. These conflicts indicate that the Chechen case is not an isolated instance of framing an ethno-nationalist separatist conflict as a terrorist threat. Instead, framing separatism as terrorism presents a broader tendency, and several governments facing the ethno-nationalist separatist challenge have chosen to address this challenge through military means under the banner of the “war on terror.” Chapter 6 examines how the Chinese, Turkish, and Sri Lankan governments have used the focusing event of
September 11 in order to justify the employment of military force against the Uyghur, Kurdish, and Tamil ethno-nationalist separatists.

Chapter 7 turns to the analysis of military means under the “war on terror” as a strategy of fighting terrorism. This chapter addresses a potential counterargument according to which military means against ethno-nationalist separatists could be justified by the presence of terrorist groups within separatist movements. According to such logic, if the “war on terror” presents an appropriate strategy against ethno-nationalist terrorism, then framing separatism as terrorism could be justified. The chapter thus explores empirical data on terrorist organizations in order to establish whether contemporary terrorism is indeed “new,” and whether it warrants a new response strategy. I further examine factors that contribute to the demise of terrorist organizations in order to determine whether the “war on terror” presents a suitable alternative against ethno-nationalist terrorism, and whether the divergent threats of separatism and terrorism could be addressed with the same solution – military force. The last Chapter, 8, draws conclusions and outlines policy implications.
2. Framing and Discourse

2.1 Introduction

This dissertation is grounded in the assumption that reality is socially constructed. According to this assumption, our perceptions are malleable and change according to the way information is presented to us. Thus, framing theory constitutes the theoretical background for this research, centering as it does on the question of how the “war on terror” has affected ways of dealing with ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. Further, discourse analysis is used as a main method for constructing discourses, which are then analyzed together to build larger frames.

The analysis presents a case study of the Russo-Chechen ethno-nationalist separatist conflict and compares the framing of the conflict as advanced by the Russian government, the Chechen separatists, and the government opposition before and after September 11, 2001. September 11 is treated as a focusing event that facilitated the shift in the framing. While before September 11 the conflict was predominantly perceived as an “operation to restore constitutional order,” after September 11 the Russian government was able to reframe it as a terrorist operation. I argue that September 11 was instrumental for Moscow’s framing efforts, and allowed the Kremlin to gain domestic and international acceptance for portraying the conflict as a counterterrorist operation. As such, the focusing event of September 11 not only set the tone for framing the issue of
terrorism itself, but also served as a tool allowing some governments to adapt the terrorist framing to other phenomena, such as ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts.

Thus, the project contributes to the development of framing theory, as it not only compares divergent frames of the same events, but also investigates how focusing events can cause shifts in framing and how they can further serve as an instrument for governments to gain support for their policies. While scholars have studied the role of focusing events in policy formation (Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 2009), little research has been done on the role of focusing events in terms of framing. Some scholars have analyzed focusing events as a trigger for creating new frames (Bendrath, Eriksson, and Giacomello 2007; Jackson 2005). Others have studied how the new frames that emerge as a result of focusing events then affect policy issues at hand (Picou and Marshall 2007; Schnell and Callaghan 2005), or are applied to newly arising policy areas (King and Wells 2009; Olmeda 2005). This dissertation fills in the gap in terms of analyzing how focusing events not only produce new frames and allow for the application of new frames to new issues, but also serve as a tool that allows governments to reframe the already existing issues in terms of more attractive policy alternatives.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a summary of social construction theory. Section 2.3 constitutes a literature review of framing theory. Section 2.4 delineates the concept of discourse and discusses the interrelation between discourse and framing. Section 2.5 focuses on the effects of framing. Finally, section 2.6 outlines the data and methods used for the current project.
2.2 Social Construction of Reality

According to the social construction approach, we are not born into this world with predetermined sets of assumptions. Instead, our understanding of reality is largely dependent on the information we receive through verbal and nonverbal means of communication. We interpret recent events on the basis of previous knowledge. Our understanding of issues is shaped through socialization, communication processes, and language. In this process, the presentation of facts can determine opinions, and the power to shape facts in a certain light can help different actors achieve a desired effect.

The theory of social construction of reality can be traced back to the writings of Kenneth Burke (1945; 1950). Burke starts out by exploring the puzzle of why people act the way they do. Burke pays special attention to symbolic devices that affect motivation, and engages in the analysis of linguistic expressions. Berger and Luckmann (1966) explore the question of motivation further and conclude that reality is constructed on the basis of social communication. Accordingly, what people know is determined by the process of communication. Reality is further objectified in symbols that are exchanged through communication.

Schneider and Ingram (1997, 106) define social construction as a process through which “values and meaning become attached to events, people, patterns of action, or any other phenomena.” As a result, our insights are malleable, and are subject to frequent changes. As Gergen (1985, 268) points out:

The degree to which a given form of understanding prevails or is sustained across time is not fundamentally dependent on the empirical validity of the perspective
in question, but on the vicissitudes of social processes (e.g., communication, negotiation, conflict, rhetoric).

Applying the notion of social construction to political communication, Nimmo and Combs (1983, 3) find that:

(1) our everyday, taken-for-granted reality is a delusion; (2) reality is created, constructed, through communication not expressed by it; (3) for any situation there is no single reality, no one objective truth, but multiple subjectively derived realities.

As a result, social construction is closely linked to power politics. As Ball (1988, 17) points out, politics is a “conceptually constituted activity.” According to Ball, politics is comprised of different concepts that mutate throughout history, and political actors try to transform concepts, thus producing conceptual shifts. Power plays a key role in the process of reality construction.

According to Zaller (1992), political elites have control over how events are presented. Further, Goffman (1974, 83) refers to the process of “fabrication,” or the “intentional effort of one or more individuals to manage activity so that a party of one or more others will be induced to have a false belief about what it is that is actually going on.” Thus, social construction of reality is an outcome of what Schneider and Ingram (1997) term as framing dynamics, which involves the ability of elites to frame political issues. Social constructions emerge from a broader societal context through the process of framing dynamics, or specific interpretations of events, knowledge, or conditions. Thus, framing, discussed in the next section, provides a mechanism for elites to affect the process of social construction of reality.
2.3 Framing

Framing constitutes one of the primary means through which elites try to influence public opinion (Druckman and Nelson 2003). As Entman (1993, 55) notes, a “frame in a news text is really the imprint of power – it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text.” Political elites use frames in their efforts to generate a desired level of policy support (Gamson and Modigandi 1987; Callaghan and Schnell 2005). Through highlighting certain features of policies while not others, elites rely on framing to “manipulate popular preferences to serve their own interests” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 120). As Edelman (1993, 231) notes, governments “win public support for [their] actions only by creating and spreading beliefs about those who are deserving and those who are threats and about which policies will bring desirable results and which will be painful, unfair, or disastrous.” Thus, through influencing the importance that citizens attribute to certain policy issues, governments use framing to advance their agendas.

As Chong and Druckman (2007, 104) summarize, one of the main tenets of framing theory is the premise that “an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations.” Subsequently, framing stands for the process “by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104). Framing serves both as a map for constructing reality, as well as a means for developing certain conceptualizations. Thus, the definitions of frames and framing fall into two perspectives: sociological and psychological. The sociological
perspective analyzes framing as a process facilitating constructions of social reality, where a frame serves as a “schemata of interpretation” allowing individuals to process information they receive (Goffman 1974). The psychological perspective, on the other hand, treats framing as a means to engender specific policy responses through various presentations of an issue (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).

Proponents of the sociological interpretation of framing (Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974; Gitlin 1980) focus on the presentation of issues through the use of language, symbols, and stereotypes. For instance, Goffman (1974, 10) distinguishes between empirical and perceptual components of reality. Thus, Goffman uses the empirical notion of a “strip” defined as “any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity” which he then contrasts with “frames,” or “principles of organization which govern events … and our subjective involvement in them.” Frames are defined as “principles of selection, emphasis and presentation, composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (Gitlin 1980, 6). In other words, a frame is “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 143). As such, frames serve as plots that weave together pieces of information to present a coherent storyline (Entman 1993; Schneider and Ingram 1997; Pan and Kosicki 1993).

According to Entman (1993, 55) “frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions.” To frame an issue then means:
to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman 1993, 52).

Thus, Entman argues, framing of a political issue involves selection and salience, i.e. making the issue more noticeable, meaningful, and memorable through frequent references, repetition, and associations with culturally familiar symbols. Frames then perform the functions of defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgments, and suggesting remedies (Entman 1993). From this point of view, frames represent tools for political actors with the help of which they can define political issues and portray them in a certain light.

Further, elites can use frames not only to present issues at a certain angle, but also to engender certain public responses. This constitutes the psychological approach to framing (Kahneman and Tversky 1984), which analyzes framing as changes in public opinion caused by the definition of a problem (Iyengar and Simon 1993). In this sense, frames highlight certain facts while omitting others, which affects ways people think about relevant issues (Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Edelman 1993; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991).

As Gamson (1989, 157) points out, “facts have no intrinsic meaning.” Instead, Gamson argues, they acquire meaning in the process of their conveyance to the public. The same events can be related to the audience in numerous ways (Chilton 2004). As one of the main tenets of the prospect theory claims, people are more sensitive to prospective losses (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Levy 1992). Thus, people are more risk averse in terms of gains and are more risk seeking in the sphere of
losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). As a result, “losses hurt more than equal gains please” (Druckman and McDermott 2008, 317). Consequently, people would tend to be more responsive to positive presentations of information, and would tend to perceive an issue presented in a negative light as a problem.

Taking this into consideration, individual opinions can be shaped through certain emphases on issues of potential resonance (Druckman and Nelson 2003). Accordingly, alternative presentations of the same issue invoke different responses from the audience and can lead to a move in public opinion towards a certain side in the controversy (Zaller 1992; Berinsky and Kinder 2006), which is known as a framing effect (Chong and Druckman 2007). As Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) demonstrate using the analysis of the perceptions of the Ku Klux Klan, different frames of the same issue can trigger different perceptions. As a result, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997, 567) define framing as a “process by which a communication source … defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy.”

A further distinction in the understanding of frames focuses on frames as both “internal structures of the mind” as well as “devices embedded in political discourse” (Kinder and Sanders 1990, 74). Scheufele (1999) develops this distinction further and advances the notions of individual and media frames. Accordingly, individual frames correspond to mind structures, or Goffman’s (1974) “schemata of interpretation.” Media frames, on the other hand, serve as devices for transmitting political discourses to larger audiences.
News media serve as “a site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of social reality” (Gurevitch and Levi 1985, 19). As Lippmann (1920) notes, most images we form of reality are not produced as a result of direct experiences, but rather through media influence. As a result, the media provide us with information which we use to construct our own reality (Kraus and Davis 1976). Consequently, the media play an important role in framing.

In respect to framing, news media are capable of influencing what the public thinks about particular policy issues (McCombs and Shaw 1993; Dearing and Rogers 1996). For instance, analyzing the Persian Gulf crisis, Iyengar and Simon (1993) find that the media coverage of an event can produce a threefold effect: it affects agenda-setting, priming, and framing. Thus, the coverage of the Gulf crisis affected the perception of it as an important problem (agenda-setting), it affected the evaluation of the performance of George Bush (priming), and it affected the level of public support for official actions (framing).

Thus, the media can be a powerful tool in determining the political salience of policy issues. For instance, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) find that even relatively insignificant exposures to media coverage of specific events can lead to significant shifts in viewers’ perceptions of the importance of different issues. As Manheim (1987) argues, press agenda is intricately connected with public and policy agendas. The media, public, and policy-makers operate in environments with shared patterns of the perceptions of reality. Accordingly, the media can perform the agenda-setting function through determining which issues surface on the public agenda (Manheim and Albritton 1984;
Further, the media can affect not only what issue the public thinks about, but how it thinks about it as well. For instance, Sheafer (2007) finds that an increase in media coverage of an issue will lead to an increase in the issue salience. Further, Sheafer concludes that the tone (negative or positive) of media coverage affects the perception of the issue, with a more negative coverage correlating with the perception of the issue as a more important problem. Accordingly, Sheafer concludes, media coverage can influence political judgments of individuals. This refers to attributes, as opposed to issue salience, and corresponds to the second-level agenda setting (McCombs, Shaw, and David Weaver 1997).

The second-level agenda setting function of the media involves what Zaller (1992) discusses as the persuasive effect. This effect refers to the ability of the media to frame events through emphasizing certain aspects, which result in different public reactions. As Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997, 569) summarize, “media frames influence opinions by stressing specific values, facts, or other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame.” According to Graber (1984), the media play a significant role in helping people process and integrate new information into the already existing schemas. Due to the persuasive effect, elites can use the media as a tool to instill dominant frames.

Thus, as Bennett (1983) notes, the media can adjust their coverage to target specific audiences. Gamson (1989, 158) notes the presence of “symbolic devices” in the
media, which reflect messages from different “senders.” According to Gamson, multiple “senders” exist; therefore, different frames “may favor the interests of a particular organization whom the source represents, helping it to further its programs or neutralize its opponents” (Gamson 1989, 158). Johnson-Cartee (2005, 183), on the other hand, advances the notion of news promoters, or “individuals or groups who draw attention to occurrences, naming and identifying these occurrences as significant for others.” As a result, along with first- and second-level agenda setting functions, the media serve as a means of transmitting frames advanced by different actors.

As such, the media can be instrumental for governments in advancing official frames in efforts to legitimize a certain perspective on the events. The media present a major venue for political contest (Ferree et al. 2002). For instance, Manheim and Albritton (1984) examine the influence of external actors in terms of their purposive efforts to manipulate media coverage in order to reflect their interests, and find that through manipulations external actors can succeed in influencing the media public policy agenda system. Further, Tuchman (1978) argues that news coverage closely reflects the distribution of power in a society. Thus, media frames do not remain constant but change according to ideological considerations (Gitlin 1980). As Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997, 568) point out, media frames often originate outside the news organizations: “journalists’ common reliance on elite sources for quotes, insight, analysis, and information means that the media often serve as conduits for individuals eager to promote a certain perspective to a broader public audience.” As a result, analyses of media frames can reveal storylines advanced by those who have control over a certain media channel.
Thus, frames serve as both maps for understanding reality, as well as tools that help instill certain public responses. As such, frames are constructed with a specific focus on certain audiences. Elites can construct frames in order to engender support for their policies. Frames can further be transmitted to broader audiences via the media, which can be instrumental in affecting what the public deems important, as well as how an issue is perceived. As a result, elites try to gain access to, or control over media outlets in order to transmit their frames. Subsequently, we can analyze frames circulated in the media in order to establish the official position on issues, as well as to unravel conflicting positions. In order to do so, we can examine discourses, discussed in the next section.

2.4 Discourse

Frames and discourses are intricately interconnected. As Entman (1993) notes, framing offers a clue to deciphering the power of a communicating text. Hence, the “analysis of frames illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location – such as speech, utterance, news report, or novel – to that consciousness” (Entman 1993, 51).

Discourses are located in the language domain, while frames involve broader means of social construction of reality, including stereotypes and symbolic devices.

As Habermas (1979) notes, knowledge is influenced by language. According to Pan and Kosicki (1993, 70):

choices of words and their organization into news stories are not trivial matters. They hold great power in setting the context for debate, defining issues under
consideration, summoning a variety of mental representations, and providing the basic tools to discuss the issues at hand.

According to Cromby and Nightingale (1999), language performs the role of both the carrier of meanings and a medium through which meanings are communicated. Further, Johnstone (2002) concludes that humans are subject to language and thought processes, and language and thought are connected to ways humans conceive of things. Language is essential to our understanding of reality, and language can employ symbols that advance a certain definition or undermine another (Elder and Cobb 1983). Foucault (1972, 80) treats discourses “sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements.”

As a language category, discourses are “ways of talking and writing that carry a set of underlying assumptions about how the world does and should work” (Coy, Woehrle, and Maney 2008, 163). Accordingly, discourses are powerful tools for creating our worldviews and are manifested through speech, text, and language. As Tannen (1993) points out, discourses are embedded within broader frames: as interpretive roadmaps, frames are larger constructs than discourses, but incorporate discourses as one means of shaping reality. Frames and discourses are interconnected and mutually affect each other. Frames can influence discourses: they can determine which discourse becomes dominant, or harness the already dominant discourse (Coy, Woehrle, and Maney 2008). Thus, “a frame refers to both the constitutive elements of an issue around which details are built, and the borders of discourse on the issue” (Meyer 1995, 175). Discourses, in turn, are capable of restraining and shaping frames (Steinberg 1998). Thus, frames help bring into
focus issues that are of importance to society, and discourses further place these issues into language categories that are acceptable to the public.

As with frames, discourses are related to power. According to Chilton (2004, 4), “language and politics are intimately linked at a fundamental level.” Thus, the use of language is always political (Gee 2003). Hence, in efforts to shape public preferences, elites can produce and circulate certain discourses that are placed within a broader context of frames. For instance, as Ayotte and Moore (2008) point out, in the aftermath of September 11, language was used to construct the images of “us” and the “enemy,” those of “evil” and “security.” Further, they argue, the label of “rogue states” was invoked to place foreign policy decisions into certain contexts: the concepts of “rogue nation” and “nation of concern” were coined to describe states allegedly supporting terrorism. On the basis of their discourse analysis of the language on the “war on terror” Ayotte and Moore (2008, 85) conclude that such manipulations with the language and labels “ensure the absence of public reflection on the complex nature of terrorism,” and oversimplify the considerations on the appropriate response.

As Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) point out, discursive constructions determine what becomes appropriate for particular situations, and which perspective is adopted as a prism for dealing with different phenomena. In this respect, the “war on terror” presents an example of a language construct, which affects our understanding of terrorism, and influences our policy preferences for counterterrorism. As Jackson (2005) argues, the “war on terror” is not an objective representation of reality. Jackson performs discourse analysis of the language the U.S. administration used when referring to the “war on
terror.” Based on this analysis Jackson finds that the “war on terror” involves a “deliberately and meticulously composed set of words, assumptions, metaphors, grammatical forms, myths and forms of knowledge – it is a carefully constructed discourse” (Jackson 2005, 2). In fact, the “war on terror” can in reality be understood as the “war of words” (Silberstein 2002). Talking about the “war” highlights policy alternatives that are different from those associated with terrorism as a criminal activity, for instance. Thus, under the “war on terror,” the military solution to terrorism becomes a more justifiable alternative, since the definition of war implies confrontations with the use of armed forces.1

Discourses exist in a number of distinct forms. For instance, Gamson (1988) distinguishes between media discourse, official government discourse, and challenger discourse. In addition, discourses perform different functions. As Meyer (1995) finds, political discourse can incite, preempt, or suppress social movements. According to Meyer (1995, 173), in the presence of a conflict, political discourse can reflect the stance of the conflicting sides, as “challengers seek to redefine the issue of their concerns and shape viable political solutions.” In these diverse forms and manifestations, discourses serve as conduits of frames in the hands of elites.

I summarize the scholarly debates on the process of frame and discourse formation discussed above in Figure 2.1. Elites use frames to advance their agendas. Frames further become manifested in discourses that are circulated through the media.

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1 Oxford English Dictionary defines war as “hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state; the employment of armed forces against a foreign power, or against an opposing party in the state.” Online dictionary available at http://www.oed.com/.
The public thus becomes exposed to discourses and frames via the media, and public opinion changes in response to framing. Further, opinion polls present elites with an instrument to measure public opinion (Hinckley 1992). In addition, politicians further try to affect opinion polls (Lewis 2001). Opinion polls present both an indicator of approval of government policies as well as a target that politicians try to affect by employing particular discourses. Thus, depending on the outcomes in public opinion elites adjust their framing of issues.

![Figure 2.1. Evolution of framing.](image)

### 2.5 Effects of Framing

A lot of research in the sphere of framing effects has focused on individual perceptions and the influence of framing on individuals in the process of reality construction (Druckman 2001; Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998; Fagley and Miller 1990). Broader implications of framing, however, have been less explored. Thus, effects of framing as a tool through which elites can construct political issues have been understudied (Jackson 2005; Hancock 2011). And yet, Entman (1993) was raising concerns about the ability of framing to jeopardize democracy almost a decade ago.
Framing does not always produce negative effects. For instance, Coy and Woehrle (1996) discuss framing in terms of its ability to challenge the status quo positions on important social issues. As Coy and Woehrle argue, by presenting alternative accounts of events, framing can create “oppositional knowledge.” As a result, framing can contribute to the democratic tradition of policy debate by voicing diverse policy perspectives. For instance, as Coy and Woehrle (1996) find in their analysis of the responses of social movement organizations (SMOs) to the Persian Gulf War, differing SMO frames contributed to the creation of “oppositional knowledge,” which is essential in terms of democratic governance.

However, framing can produce an opposite effect in terms of democracy. Entman (2007; 2010) analyzes larger implications of framing in terms of political power and democracy. In this process Entman (2007, 166) finds that the media can produce bias, or “consistent patterns in the framing of mediated communication that promote the influence of one side in conflicts over the use of government power.” Framing can produce a slant favoring those actors who have relatively more power. This, in turn, can lead to the elimination of competing frames, and the establishment of a hegemonic frame that prevents possible dissent. As Callaghan and Schnell (2005, 7) argue, “contrary to pluralist theories of democracy, the frames of dominant players may be more powerful and crowd out other players’ frames.” As a result, framing can serve governments as a tool to mobilize support for their policies and to control dissent (Coy, Woehrle, and Maney 2008).
Due to a certain slant, or bias, discourse and framing can justify discriminatory policies. For instance, as Blackledge (2005) demonstrates using the analysis of the British “race riots” of Summer 2001, the media produced discriminatory discourses in regards to the notions of nation and immigration\(^2\). Further, Burton and Carlen (1979) find that official discourse constitutes an exercise in legitimation. As Burton and Carlen (1979, 138) note, “the syntax of the discourse has to elevate the legitimated paradigms of the state and its justice at the same time as it suppresses alternative paradigms.” Here, framing and discourses can serve as tools for governments to legitimate official storylines.

Framing can facilitate the preservation of the status quo. As Jackson (2005) points out, the primary reason behind the construction and implementation of political discourses is preservation and extension of power. Once a discourse becomes dominant, it is further reinforced through the prevalent language, words, symbols, and labels. This leads to the institutionalization of a discourse, which becomes embedded in societal values, and which is subsequently extremely hard to dismantle. According to Jackson, the institutionalization of the discourse of the “war on terror” has divided the international community into two camps: those of fighting against terrorism versus “rogue states.” However, the justification for the “war on terror” is widely disputed, and the emergence of the dominant discourse has produced certain negative consequences.

Thus, framing is a powerful tool in the hands of governments that can help them construct political issues to their advantage. The use of framing and dissemination of

\(^2\) For a further discussion on language, power and ideology see Wodak (1989).
discourses via the media would be an attractive option for governments, since the media impact on public opinion is more subtle than the effects of other more outright information campaigns (Bartels 1993). Framing presents a more democratic alternative than, for instance, totalitarian propaganda. As a result, framing can be more attractive as a policy mechanism to achieve desired results while avoiding criticism for undemocratic practices. However, framing, while presenting an appealing alternative to foster the desired public response, can lead to outcomes that can in turn endanger democratic principles of policymaking.

2.6 Data and Methods

The current project investigates how the counterterrorist paradigm of the “war on terror” has affected ways of dealing with ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. The study examines the interconnections between terrorism and ethnic conflict and analyzes framing as a mechanism that governments can use to portray their ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat. I argue that September 11 has facilitated such framing, and that framing separatism as terrorism has become more successful following the attacks on the U.S. in the eyes of the local public as well as the international community.

This project fills in some gaps in terms of framing theory. As Callaghan and Schnell (2005) summarize, a lot of research has explored how new frames emerge (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Edelman 1993; Tuchman 1978; Iyengar 1991; Ferree et al. 2002), and what effect frames produce on public opinion (Pan and Kosicki 1993; Jerit
2009; Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Brewer and Gross 2005). However, few researchers have engaged in the analysis of factors that affect changes in existing framing and discourse (Schnell and Callaghan 2005; Hanson 1995).

And yet, temporal examination of framing dynamics is important for revealing factors that affect the evolution of frames. As Coy and Woehrle (1996) and Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigall-Brown (2007) find, framing is not a static process; rather, it changes over time. However, as Entman (2010) notes, not much research has investigated temporal shifts in frames. The current analysis fills in this gap by comparing two sets of frames. I investigate how the Russo-Chechen ethno-nationalist separatist conflict was framed before and after September 11, 2001. The analysis of frames from two different time periods reveals the temporal dynamics behind framing. In addition, it brings out the role of factors affecting framing shifts.

Thus, this analysis investigates not only how frames change over time, but also which factors affect the changes. Namely, I apply the concept of focusing events as an opportunity for elites to reframe policy issues. Kingdon (1984) and Baumgartner and Jones (2009) discuss focusing events or critical junctures as exogenous shocks capable of affecting policy trajectories. Further, Callaghan and Schnell (2005) discuss focusing events in the context of their ability to trigger changes in framing of issues. According to Schnell and Callaghan (2005, 126), focusing events “introduce a fundamental difference in frames inconsistent with or unrelated to previous frames and thus have the capacity to reshape public opinion on the issue.” The current research examines the role of focusing
events further through analyzing them as tools in the hands of elites that facilitate issue framing.

This dissertation is based on the case study of the Russo-Chechen ethno-nationalist separatist conflict. While the Chechen case inspired a lot of research (see Chapters 4 and 5), the field lacks systematic analyses of the first and second Chechen conflicts that would take into consideration the accounts of the conflicts advanced by different actors. As a result, research on Chechnya has produced many contradictory storylines. This dissertation addresses this problem by producing the account of the conflict as advanced by the government, the separatists, and the government opposition. Comparisons between these accounts bring out the contradictory storylines. Thus, the systematic analysis of various sources points to the alternative accounts that the Russian government was trying to eliminate by establishing the Federal Press Center disseminating information on Chechnya. In this respect, comparisons between the government and separatist framing of the conflict bring out especially stark contrasts.

The Chechen conflict is a representative of a larger pool of ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts that started before September 11 and have experienced some sort of peaceful attempts to resolve the conflict but have been affected by the “war on terror” discourse. Thus, the Chechen conflict is examined in comparative context, with Chapter 6 of the dissertation focusing on the Uyghur conflict in China, the Kurdish struggle in Turkey, the Tamil uprising in Sri Lanka. These cases demonstrate larger implications of framing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat.
I argue that the Russian government was able to reverse the image of an unpopular ethno-nationalist separatist movement in Chechnya and reframe it as a terrorist uprising, subsequently justifying the use of military means in the republic as part of the international efforts in the “war on terror.” Prior to September 11, the Chechen conflict was recognized as an ethno-nationalist separatist issue. As the Soviet Union unraveled, Russia’s southern republic of Chechnya declared independence in 1991. The declaration was pronounced illegal by Moscow and the situation simmered until 1994, when a full-blown Russian military operation started the Chechen war of 1994-1996. The first conflict was portrayed by the government as an operation to “restore constitutional order,” but was widely unpopular both domestically and abroad. And while terrorist attacks were present during the first conflict, its ethno-nationalist separatist nature was acknowledged by the state, and Russia did not frame the conflict as a terrorist issue.

And yet, Russia’s experiences with terrorism during the first conflict provided the government with certain insights. Thus, public opinion of the government actions started improving after the Pervomaiskoe hostage crisis in January 1996. Following this shift in the polls, the government reframed the second Chechen campaign as a counterterrorist operation. The second Chechen conflict started in August 1999, with a series of controversial apartment bombings across Russia following in September. Domestically, the second conflict did not meet as much disapproval as the first conflict, and, following September 11, Russia was able to persuade the West it was fighting the “war on terror” in Chechnya. Subsequently, in 2003 several Chechen organizations were designated as terrorist groups on the U.S. and UN terrorist lists. Peaceful efforts to resolve the conflict
failed: negotiations with a moderate Maskhadov government did not materialize. Instead, in 2003 Russia chose to support Akhmad Kadyrov, handpicked by Moscow. The military alternative prevailed.

The study employs the notion of framing, both as a means to organize a storyline (sociological perspective) and a means to influence public opinion (psychological perspective). Thus, I analyze how the issue of the Chechen conflict was presented to the public, as well as how it was received by the audience. Focusing on the role of elites, namely the Russian government, I construct the framing of the conflict as advanced by Moscow, and compare this account to the frames proposed by the separatists, as well as the government opposition. The separatist and opposition frames are analyzed in order to control for the validity of the official framing. In addition, the opposition framing serves as means to verify the accounts of the conflicting sides – the government and the separatists.

Further, applying Chong and Druckman’s (2007, 116) concept of strong frames (frames that “emerge from public discussion as the best rationales for contending positions on the issue”), I analyze which frames became dominant during the first and second Chechen conflicts. Strong frames are more compelling than alternative accounts, and are widely acceptable among the population. In order to assess the success and acceptance of frames I analyze domestic and international responses to the Chechen conflict. To do so I use public opinion data, official statements, human rights reports, and international organization reports.
In order to construct the framing of the conflict as advanced by the government, the separatists, and the opposition, I analyze discourses circulated in the media. As opposed to interviews, where interviewees might inadvertently project their present opinions onto the past events, newspaper articles reflect opinions in circulation at the time of events. For this purpose, newspaper articles were retrieved through the East View electronic news database. The database contains archives of major Russian-language press materials and provides access to full-text newspaper articles. Articles from the earlier time period were retrieved from library archives during field research in Russia. Thus, the data for the dissertation consists of newspaper articles spanning December 1, 1994 – August 31, 1996 for the first Chechen conflict, and August 1, 1999 – April 17, 2009 for the second.

Newspaper articles were selected according to the following criteria. The general principle for inclusion was information regarding the conflict in Chechnya. The selected articles contained reports from the conflict zone, chronicles of the conflict, coverage of the political situation, religious aspects, domestic and international reactions to the conflict, and articles covering terrorist attacks in Russia during the specified time period. Articles that were not included in the dataset discussed the details of the military equipment of the conflicting sides, the situation of soldiers in Chechnya, and the situation in the Russian army. The logistical articles were left out, as not directly related to the research question. Articles covering individual opinions of politicians (except for the president) as well as criminal trials against individuals were not included due to their lack of contribution to the construction of overall discourses. Finally, coverage of
reconstruction programs in the republic and speculations of the future course of events were left out of the dataset, since these articles were mostly hypothetical in nature and did not uncover the discourses on the wars.

Several newspapers were used as sources for articles. Rossiiskaia Gazeta, an official Russian government daily newspaper, constitutes the main data source for the official discourse. This subset includes 197 articles for the first conflict and 341 articles for the second. Other sources for the official framing include official statements pertinent to the Chechen issue and terrorism retrieved from the Official Kremlin International News Broadcast database, and presidential addresses collected at the presidential website http://kremlin.ru/. The official justification for the treatment of the conflict is analyzed through the examination of legislation on the issues of the Chechen conflict and terrorism. Over 60 legal documents were accessed through the government database of legislation found at http://www.duma.gov.ru/.

In order to construct the opposition framing, I utilized the separatist portal Kavkaz Center http://kavkazcenter.com/. The portal was established in 1999, and, therefore, does not cover the period of the first Chechen conflict. In order to establish the separatist framing of the first conflict, I collected interviews with separatist leaders (Dzhokhar Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev) published in the press. Interviews were found with the help of the LexisNexis database and constitute 59 newspaper articles from major world publications. 99 articles were retrieved from Kavkaz Center for the second conflict.

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3 A complete list of articles is included in Appendix A.
Finally, Izvestiia, a daily newspaper, was used as a source for the opposition framing of the conflict. 310 articles were collected from Izvestiia for the first conflict, and 360 for the second. During the first conflict, Izvestiia remained an independent news media, with the majority of shares belonging to Vladimir Potanin of Norilsk Nickel and LUKoil. Potanin’s shares were managed by Prof-Media, a media arm of his Interros holding company. In 2005 the newspaper was bought by Gazprom, and in 2008 ownership transferred to SOGAZ. Thus in more recent years, Izvestiia’s ownership made it more subject to the official censorship. However, with Putin’s ascent to power, the entire mass media sector came under an increased government control.

The lack of independent media is one of the limitations of doing research on Russia. While during the Yeltsin era the media enjoyed relative independence (Mickiewicz 1999), Vladimir Putin, after becoming president, succeeded in removing the opposition in mass media (Russell 2007). The increase in the media control, in turn, affected the outcomes of the Chechen conflicts. Thus, the first Chechen campaign was carried out in a relatively open environment for the media, and many individual journalists covered the events from the frontline. Uncensored accounts of Russia’s handling of the conflict in turn impacted public opinion resulting in wide opposition to the use of military force both domestically and abroad. The second campaign, on the other hand, was carried out in a climate of secrecy, with the only source of information on Chechnya being the Federal Press Center. This rigid control of the information limited

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4 For more on the media control in Russia see Price, Richter, and Yu (2002), Belin (2002), Gakaev (2003), and Tsvetkova (2007).
public access to the news from Chechnya, and, therefore, facilitated official framing of the conflict.

Discourse analysis was the method for analyzing the collected data. Discourse analysis is instrumental in uncovering discourses, which can further reveal larger frames, since discourses are embedded in broader frames (Tannen 1993). In a broad sense, discourse analysis explores relationships between discourse and reality (Phillips and Hardy 2002). According to Gee (2003), the goal of discourse analysis is to apply “tools of inquiry” to texts in order to investigate a social problem. Further, critical discourse analysis is preoccupied with the role of power in social life. Critical discourse analysis examines the “connections between the use of language and the exercise of power” (Fairclough 1995, 54). According to Fairclough, critical discourse analysis involves the studies of interrelations between texts, discursive practices and social practices in efforts to explain social events. The current study adopts discourse analysis in its critical perspective as instrumental in tracing the sources of power and exploring the role of elites in the construction of frames. Content analysis supplemented discourse analysis as a useful tool for analyzing specific aspects of discourse (Bazeley 2007). Discourse and content analyses were performed with the help of the NVivo software using open coding (Gibbs 2007).

The qualitative analysis of discourses advanced by the Russian government, the separatists, and the opposition established the corresponding framing of the Chechen conflict before and after September 11. September 11 was analyzed as a focusing event

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6 For more on critical discourse analysis see van Dijk (1993), Tischer et al. (2000), and Blackledge (2005).
that allowed the Russian government to reframe the ethno-nationalist separatist conflict as a terrorist threat. Chapters 4 and 5 present the results of discourse analysis. Chapter 6 further explores larger implications of framing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat in comparative context analyzing the cases of China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka.

Chapter 7 moves into the quantitative examination of factors that contribute to the demise of terrorist organizations as perpetrators of terrorism. The goal of the quantitative analysis is to examine whether the “war on terror” presents an effective mechanism against ethno-nationalist terrorism, and whether, therefore, framing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat can be justified. The quantitative analysis assesses the potential benefits of the “war on terror.” September 11 changed ways of addressing terrorism, making the use of military force more widespread and more acceptable against terrorism. I argue that some governments took the interpretation of the “war on terror” a step further to employ military interventions against ethno-nationalist separatists on the grounds of fighting terrorism, justifying such measures by the presence of ethno-nationalist terrorist groups. However, I hypothesize that ethno-nationalist terrorist groups differ from religious, left- and right-wing groups due to the very ethnic factor, which needs to be addressed in order to fight such groups. The failure of the “war on terror” to address such unique characteristics makes the paradigm not only an ineffective strategy against terrorism, but also an insufficient justification for equating ethno-nationalist separatism with ethno-nationalist terrorism. The quantitative analysis is based on the descriptive statistical examination of characteristics of terrorist groups, and the logistic
regression analysis of factors that lead to the demise of terrorist organizations, which are
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
3. September 11 as a Focusing Event: Post-9/11 Counterterrorism and the “War on Terror”

3.1 Introduction

September 11 opened a new chapter in the history of terrorism. As a focusing event, September 11 changed the perception of the threat as well as means of fighting it. The scale of the attacks questioned the nature of contemporary terrorism, suggesting that the threat states are facing today might be significantly different from that of the past. Subsequently, September 11 prompted the evolution of the notion of “new” terrorism – a threat which requires new responses. As a consequence of the idea of “new” terrorism a new counterterrorist paradigm of the “war on terror” emerged. The “war on terror” and the ensuing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq shifted the focus of counterterrorism from deterrence to preemption, and military force has come to the fore as a means of fighting terrorism. In turn, it has become more acceptable in the eyes of the international community to employ military force not only against terrorism, but also against ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts framed as a terrorist threat.

This chapter examines the current trends in post-9/11 terrorism and counterterrorism, establishing a background for a further analysis of the use of the discourse on terrorism as applied to ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. Section 3.2 investigates the nature of contemporary terrorism as influenced by the events of
September 11. The section establishes the evolution of the notion of “new” terrorism and the emergence of a monolithic threat of terrorism. Section 3.3 analyzes the ensuing response to the “new” threat – the “war on terror” and its implications in terms of counterterrorism. Section 3.4 explores the effects of the “war on terror” on ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. I argue that September 11 and the “war on terror” allowed for the acceptance of framing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat and addressing them through military means. Section 3.5 draws conclusions and implications.

### 3.2 September 11, 2001 and “New” Terrorism

September 11, 2001, represents a watershed event in the history of terrorism. While the threat of terrorism has been present for centuries, and terrorist tactics have evolved in their complexity throughout time, September 11 became a focusing event that affected both the threat of terrorism and the perceptions of it. Following September 11, terrorism became a security priority. As Birkland (2004, 187) concludes on the basis of an analysis of news coverage of the attacks on the U.S., September 11 “opened the window of opportunity by changing the nature of ‘terrorism’ from a low-salience matter to a very real and visible problem.” In addition, the scope of the attacks, the death toll of which “was equivalent to twenty-seven years of The Troubles in Northern Ireland” (Goodin 2006, 114), suggested that terrorism has changed. The extent of the devastation prompted the belief that contemporary terrorists will not shy away from any means of delivering attacks, including weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear and biological weapons (see Heymann 2003). As a result, September 11 brought about the emergence of the notion of
“new” terrorism, which is perceived to be different from the more local, more limited, and more targeted terrorism of the past.

In response to September 11, President Bush announced that the U.S. was facing a new threat: “My resolve is steady and strong about winning this war that has been declared on America … It’s a new kind of war” (Jardine 2001). Britain’s Tony Blair pronounced “mass terrorism” to be “the new evil” (Evening Times 2001). The French President Jacques Chirac called the September 11 attacks “beyond crime,” stating that “we are faced with a conflict of a completely new nature” (Hillman 2001). Osama bin Laden was pronounced the “architect of new terrorism” (DeYoung and Dobbs 2001). Many of the world leaders expressed support of the U.S. in its fight against what President Bush termed a “new enemy” (Mackenzie 2001).

Such reactions to September 11 advanced the idea that terrorism today is more extreme, more global, and more dangerous than terrorism of the past (see Klare 2003; Leman-Langlois and Brodeur 2005). Thus, “new” terrorism is described as a global threat, with perpetrators operating in loosely organized international networks. It is allegedly assuming a radical turn, with “new” terrorists aiming to inflict higher numbers of casualties through indiscriminate targeting (Laqueur 2001, 2003). According to Laqueur, while terrorism of the past epochs was predominantly coming from the left, the anarchists, revolutionaries, or separatists, today it is assuming a radical turn, marked by an upsurge in fundamentalism and extremism. Laqueur asserts that today’s terrorism is characterized by fanaticism, with suicide bombing and indiscriminate killing being its integral parts. As a result, he claims, massive killing and destruction are not a problem for
radical religious practitioners of “new” terrorism. In this respect, Laqueur contends, “new” terrorism differs from that of the past, where slaughter was performed on a much lesser scale.

Jenkins (2006) seconds Laqueur in that terrorism today has changed. Reflecting on the evolving nature of the threat he revokes his famous statement saying “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead” (Jenkins 1975, 4; emphasis added) amending it into “many of today’s terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead” (Jenkins 2006, 119; emphasis added). According to Jenkins, terrorism today is less discriminate and is more violent. As he points out, contemporary terrorists have diversified their financial flows and rely on the newest forms of technology. They employ new models of organization, Jenkins argues, and make use of diffused and decentralized networks, as compared to more tight and centralized organizations of the past. “New” terrorists aim at global transformations, as opposed to limited political changes sought in the past, and, therefore, resort to more lethal methods aiming to bring about massive destruction with higher numbers of casualties (Howard 2009). According to this school of thought, “new” terrorism poses a greater threat than “old” terrorism, is harder to pinpoint and trace, and, consequently, is more difficult to fight.

And while the “newness” of terrorism today is widely disputed, the notion of “new” terrorism has affected the very understanding of the threat. Traditionally, scholars distinguish between different types of terrorist groups. Thus, ethno-nationalist terrorist

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7 Chapter 7 of the dissertation discusses the argument against the “new” threat of terrorism and analyzes empirical data, which supports the claim that terrorism today is not drastically different from terrorism of the past.
organizations are driven by the desire to establish an independent state or gain more rights within an existing state (e.g. Irish Republican Army (IRA), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)). Religious terrorist organizations claim their attacks are driven by a religious mandate; they aim at overthrowing secular regimes and try to impose religious tenets on the state (e.g. Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo). Left-wing groups aim to overthrow the capitalist system and are mostly driven by the Marxist-Leninist ideology (e.g. the Red Army Faction in Germany and Red Brigades in Italy). Right-wing groups include groups pursuing racist or anti-government beliefs (e.g. the White Legion in Ecuador or Oklahoma Constitutional Militia in the U.S.). The distinctions between different types of terrorist organizations, however, have become less pronounced.

After September 11, as Miller (2007, 331) points out, a tendency has become apparent to treat terrorism as a “monolithic threat.” This tendency has involved the blurring of differences between different types of terrorist organizations, as terrorism today is treated as the very threat to the existence of the state.9 As President Bush declared: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there.” He added, equating Al Qaeda with other terrorist organizations: “It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Koring 2001). Such conflation of terrorist organizations of various scopes has led to the perception of terrorism as a single monolithic threat. And even though treating terrorism as an undifferentiated threat and ignoring critical differences between the enemies have

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9 For more on the “war on terror” and the state see Sederberg (1995).
resulted in strategic errors on the part of the U.S. (Record 2003), the international coalition against terrorism today glosses over extensive variations between different terrorist groups. Following the United State’s “obsession with the notion of a monolithic al-Qaida” (Cronin 2006, 41), many states today equate Al Qaeda with other threats they are facing. And while relatively few states have been directly attacked by Al Qaeda (US Department of State 2003, 118-119), following September 11, Al Qaeda itself became a synonym for terrorism.

For instance, before September 11, the press did not report connections between the IRA and Al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{10} Following September 11, reports appeared claiming connections between the two groups (Urquhart and Hall 2001). Such reports spurred further investigations (Evans, Cobain, and McGrory 2002), and the Provisional IRA was placed on the same U.S. terrorist list with Al Qaeda (Clarkson 2001). In response to these actions, the IRA tried to distance itself from violence and embarked on the decommissioning initiative (\textit{Belfast News Letter} 2001), which has since been accomplished.

China before September 11 did not claim connections between Uyghur militants and Al Qaeda. In fact, China stated it was facing a separatist problem, and not a terrorist one.\textsuperscript{11} Following September 11, however, China declared that Uyghur terrorists were connected to Al Qaeda (Pan 2002). Turkey presents another example where the state did not invoke the links between the PKK and Al Qaeda before September 11. And yet, after

\textsuperscript{10} No articles dated before September 11 were found linking the IRA with Al Qaeda through the FBIS or LexisNexis collections.

\textsuperscript{11} See Chapter 7 for more details on the cases of China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka and the treatment of terrorism before and after September 11.
September 11, Egemen Bagis, Turkish foreign policy advisor declared that there were no differences between the PKK and Al Qaeda (*Turkish Daily News* 2005). Further, while Sri Lanka did not link the LTTE to Al Qaeda before September 11, after the attacks on the U.S. Sri Lanka declared it had evidence of cooperation between the two groups (*BBC Monitoring South Asia* 2008b). The LTTE, in turn, tried to resist the connection with terrorism calling itself an insurgent organization (Fair 2005).

Thus, September 11 as a focusing event changed the perception of terrorism. It resulted in the rise of the notion of “new” terrorism, which, in turn, affected the distinctions between different types of terrorist organizations. “New” terrorism has created an overarching image of a monolithic threat that has prompted states to blur distinctions between different types of terrorist organizations equating them with Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has become a synonym for numerous terrorist organizations that did not experience such references before September 11. The attacks suggested that terrorism today presents a “new” threat. Subsequently, September 11 created a window of opportunity for a paradigm shift in the policy area of counterterrorism. As a result, numerous measures and provisions have been adopted as part of the announced “war on terror.” Thus, September 11 has affected not only terrorism, but also counterterrorism. The next section turns to the discussion of counterterrorism after September 11.

3.3 September 11, 2001 and the Changing Response to the “New” Threat

As a focusing event September 11 changed ways of addressing terrorism. The scale of the devastation created the climate of urgency for adopting new measures against the threat.
As Elshtain (2003, 59) points out, “when a wound as grievous as that of September 11 has been inflicted on a body politic, it would be the height of irresponsibility and a dereliction of duty for public officials to fail to respond.” As a result, new counterterrorist provisions have been introduced, and the “war on terror” has become the predominant counterterrorist paradigm. And while the notion of the “war on terror” is not new, after September 11, the “war” has created a new focus in counterterrorism. With the military campaigns carried out against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, military force against terrorism has become more popular and more widely acceptable.

The “war on terror” itself presents a discourse, which has affected approaches to counterterrorism. For instance, as Jackson (2005, 2) finds on the basis of discourse analysis of speeches, addresses and interviews of the Bush administration, instead of an objective representation of the counterterrorist reality, the “war on terror” is “a deliberately and meticulously composed set of words, assumptions, metaphors, grammatical forms, myths and forms of knowledge – it is a carefully constructed discourse.” The language of the “war on terror,” Jackson concludes, is targeted at legitimizing the current approach to counterterrorism and marginalizing the alternatives. As scholars have pointed out, setting the fight against terrorism in terms of a “war” (as opposed to a police operation or negotiations, for example), places significance with military means, focusing on a military victory (see Decaux 2008; Howard 2002). As a result, terrorism is no longer treated as a crime, but is elevated to the status of an enemy at war, and the military alternative becomes the leading solution.
Prior to September 11, deterrence presented a predominant alternative against terrorism. Deterrence is a coercive measure targeted at influencing an adversary’s strategy and the adversary is believed to behave rationally. As opposed to preemption, which is a proactive strategy, deterrence is a defensive measure (Faria 2006). Deterrence focuses on preventing acts of terrorism through the threat of retaliation, and thus contains the aggressive behavior. As Freedman (2003) points out, deterrence was the primary choice to deal with adversaries, including terrorists, during the Cold War.

Thus, for instance, the U.S. counterterrorism before September 11 was mainly carried out by law enforcement agencies, and terrorists were treated as criminals (Golding 2002). As the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (1997) pointed out, “terrorism is a crime, whatever its motives or causes, and we [the U.S.] promote the rule of law to criminalize it and bring terrorists to justice.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation (1999) considered terrorists to be criminals, and police work, economic and diplomatic sanctions were the predominant alternatives, as illustrated by the responses to the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, the Beirut U.S. embassy bombings of 1983, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, or the 2000 USS Cole bombing.

Military force against terrorism before September 11 was not uncommon. For example, military force was used by Britain against the IRA, Israel against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Sri Lanka against the LTTE, France against the National Liberation Front (FLN), or Turkey against the PKK. However, such campaigns were

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12 For more on deterrence see Freedman (2003), Fisher (2007), and Davis and Jenkins (2002).
limited in scope and goals. Pre-9/11 military responses represented retaliatory, rather than preemptive strikes. Military campaigns were generally directed at terrorist groups operating on the territory of the same state (Northern Ireland) or disputed territories (Palestine). In addition, military responses before September 11 often entailed widespread criticisms.

For instance, the Israelis engaged in the “war against terror” in the 1970s and carried out retaliatory raids against the PLO. Israeli Premier Mier justified Israel’s military action under the “war against terror” saying: “we have to live, and in order to live, we have to make the Fatah conscious of the fact that Jewish blood cannot be spilled without terrorist blood being spilled as well” (New York Times 1972). However, Israel’s actions did not gain wide international support. U.S. President George H.W. Bush indirectly criticized Israel’s counterterrorist techniques stating: “I don’t think kidnapping and violence helps the cause of peace” (Blitzer 1989). In turn, British officials met for talks with representatives of the PLO – Israel’s enemy in the “war.”

International military operations that took place before September 11 were performed on a much lesser scale than the recent “war on terror” campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. They were not carried out by international coalitions, nor did they enjoy wide international support. For instance, U.S. President Reagan launched a retaliatory strike against Libya in 1986. The military campaign was a relatively short operation carried out against a state sponsor of terrorism by a single country. Reagan, who declared the “war on terror” in the early 1980s announced: “let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift
and effective retribution” (Hoffman 1985). Reagan justified the raid as self-defense: “When our citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world, we will respond in self-defense,” he stated, “If necessary, we will do it again” (Weinraub 1986a).

The U.S. actions against Libya were widely criticized. The UN Security Council proposed a resolution that would “condemn the armed attack by the United States of America in violation of the Charter of the United Nations” (Weinraub 1986b). The resolution was advanced by Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Arab Emirates. Bulgaria, China, the Soviet Union and Thailand also voted in favor. However, the resolution was vetoed by the United States, Britain and France. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl denounced the attacks stating that “a violent solution will not be successful and is not very promising” (Courier-Mail 1986). The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev pronounced the raid “a link in the chain of the challenging and provocative actions of the United States taken in response to the Soviet Union’s peace initiatives” (Courier-Mail 1986).

Further, the Clinton administration launched missiles against Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In reference to the strikes, Clinton stated: “Our target was terror” (Wiseman 1998). The Secretary of State Madeleine Albright justified the raid as part of the “war on terror,” and described the strikes as “a part of a long-term battle against terrorism and the terrorists who have, in fact, declared war on us” (Erlanger 1998). Ambassador Bill Richardson stated at the UN headquarters that the attacks were carried out in self-defense, and were in accordance with the UN Charter (Nichols 1998).
In response to Clinton’s actions, many states accused the U.S. of attacking sovereign countries (Deutsche Presse 1998). Russian President Boris Yeltsin called the strikes themselves acts of terrorism: “My attitude is indeed negative, as it would be to any act of terrorism, military interference, failure to solve a problem through talks” (York 1998).

Thus, military campaigns against terrorism before September 11 were carried out in retaliation, rather than as preemptive wars, which places them in the category of deterrence. And while military force was not uncommon, many international actors opposed it. Following September 11, however, the “war on terror” acquired a new meaning. As a global initiative, the “war on terror” has resulted in the 2001 military campaign in Afghanistan, followed by the strikes against Iraq in 2003 (Fawn 2003; Heymann 2003). As opposed to the more limited previous military campaigns, the Afghan and Iraqi operations have involved international coalitions and alliances, and have lasted several years.

In response to September 11, the United States changed its counterterrorist strategy. The U.S. created a new institution to deal with matters of counterterrorism: the Department of Homeland Security. In September 2002, President Bush adopted the new NSS. The NSS marked a break with deterrence, and introduced what became known as the Bush Doctrine.\footnote{For more on the Bush Doctrine see Shultz and Vogt (2003), Singh (2006).} The NSS (Bush 2002, iv) placed the military alternative first: “To defeat this [terrorist] threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal – military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to
cut off terrorist financing.” The “war on terror” became the main premise of the Doctrine, and preemptive strikes replaced deterrence strategies.

As Davis and Jenkins (2002, xviii) note, “the concept of deterrence is both too limiting and too naive to be applicable to the war on terrorism.” Preemption, as opposed to deterrence, is based on the assumption that an adversary will strike as an opportunity arises. As a result, preemption is targeted at eliminating the enemy before it attacks. Thus, a preemptive war is an effort to bring down an enemy “between the moment when an enemy decides to attack – or, more precisely, is perceived to be about to attack – and when the attack is actually launched” (Freedman 2003, 106). As a result, preemptive strategies are more expansive than those of deterrence, and more often rely on military means.

The switch to preemption was marked by shaping the response to September 11 in terms of a “war.” President Bush pronounced the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon an “act of war” (BBC News 2001). The president framed the response to terrorism as the “first war of the 21st century,” stating that the “war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Koring 2001). As a result, the Bush administration adopted the policy of striking at states supporting terrorism. The U.S. pursued military action, calling for the world leaders “to rally an international coalition to combat terrorism” (Barber 2001). President Bush called the strikes against Afghanistan “just,” stating that the U.S. actions were “supported by the collective will of the world” (Lines 2001).
In fact, international support for the U.S.-led “war on terror” distinguished the response to September 11 from the previous military campaigns. The international community rallied behind the U.S. in the military campaign against terrorism and an international coalition against terrorism was formed. Tony Blair described Britain’s support for the “war on terror” as follows:

None of the leaders involved in this action want war. We are peaceful people. But we know that sometimes to safeguard peace, we have to fight. Britain has learnt that lesson many times in our history. We only do it if the cause is just. This cause is just (Mirror 2001).

The French President Jacques Chirac stated: “The military operations … are aimed at punishing the guilty and destroying the infrastructure of the terrorist network and their support system in Afghanistan” (Daily Record 2001). The same source reported the support from world leaders as follows. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder expressed “unqualified solidarity with the United States of America.” Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi said: “Italy is by the side of the United States and all who are committed to the battle against terrorism.” Greek Defense Minister Akis Tsochadzopoulos called the military attacks “a legal way of answering the terrorism which led to the slaughter of innocent victims in the United States.” Russia concurred: “All means must be used in order to fight terrorists wherever they are.” Thus, while some of these states criticized the U.S. military action against terrorism before September 11, the post-9/11 “war on terror” enjoyed wide international support. States ranging from Indonesia to China and Russia have since employed military means against terrorism as part of the “war on terror.”

Following September 11, international agencies also supported the U.S.-led military campaign. For instance, the European Union’s (EU) Romano Prodi confirmed
that “At this difficult, solemn and dramatic moment, all Europe stands steadfast with the United States and its coalition allies to pursue the fight against terrorism” (Daily Record 2001). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) issued a military concept for defense against terrorism outlining four roles of military operations in the fight against terrorism (NATO 2002). On September 12, 2001, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1368 (S/RES/1368). The resolution condemned the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and called for international cooperation against terrorism. Resolution 1373 (S/RES/1373) followed on September 28 as part of such cooperation. The resolutions stressed the right of self-defense, and affirmed that “all means” should be employed to combat threats to “international peace and security,” thus effectively authorizing military action against terrorism (Svarc 2008).

Resolution 1373 was drafted by the U.S. and was passed unanimously (Wright 2003). The resolution calls for international cooperation against terrorism and focuses on the issues of financing terrorism, eliminating support to terrorists, information-gathering, information exchange, and international collaboration. The resolution encourages member states to take measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, to criminalize the financing of terrorist activities and to freeze the assets of individuals involved in terrorism. It requires that member states refrain from providing support to individuals involved in terrorist activities, prevent such support, deny safe havens to terrorists, and prosecute any efforts to assist activities connected to terrorism. Finally, Resolution 1373 urges states to engage in information sharing and international
cooperation against terrorism. Thus, the resolution at the UN level encouraged states to cooperate against the common threat.

Pursuant to Resolution 1373 numerous states adopted new counterterrorist legislation. Reports of compliance with the resolution are monitored by the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee. 193\textsuperscript{14} countries have filed reports on the compliance process, and the number of reports constitutes 709 documents submitted since 2001.\textsuperscript{15} I collected these reports and analyzed their content in order to establish how counterterrorist measures have changed following September 11.\textsuperscript{16} The analysis revealed that, out of 193 countries, 155 adopted new legislation targeted at fighting terrorism. 85 states out of this number adopted terrorism-specific legislation.\textsuperscript{17} Prior to September 11, only 28 out of 193 states had specific counterterrorist legislation in place.

New counterterrorist measures and provisions constitute another aspect of the “war on terror.” The sheer volume and scope of new counterterrorist legislation indicates that the treatment of terrorism has changed. Many of the newly adopted laws focus on financing of terrorism and money laundering activities. New measures provide for monitoring and freezing financial transactions, checking and reporting on suspicious bank accounts, scrutinizing non-profit entities, surveilling international financial flows, and preventing legalization of illegal funds. New immigration provisions have been introduced; these provisions strengthen immigration control, monitor illegal immigration,

\textsuperscript{14} 192 UN Member States and Cook Islands.
\textsuperscript{15} Country reports can be found at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/1373.html.
\textsuperscript{16} The list of new counterterrorist legislation by country is given in Appendix 2.
\textsuperscript{17} Terrorism-specific legislation refers to legislation treating terrorism as a unique offense, with the crime of “terrorism” appearing in the name of the legislation. This legislation can be contrasted with laws that treat terrorism as a category of other crimes, such as Penal Codes, for instance.
and introduce new identity checks, as well as updating visa and residence permit requirements. Border control has been affected by counterterrorist legislation as well. Measures have been taken to enhance border surveillance, increase border checks for movement of people and goods and intensify screening of passports and other travel documents at the border. Additional security measures have been introduced to target drug and human trafficking. New security measures also aim at strengthening and improving Armed Forces and maritime and aviation safety. Additional efforts have been targeted at intelligence gathering and international cooperation.

In addition, many of the new laws have legalized the employment of military force against terrorism. As the analysis of the reports pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1373 revealed, following September 11, many states indicated that they were ready to employ military force against terrorism. Among them are Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, India, Russia, the Philippines, and others. Many of these states were ready to resort to the military alternative prior to 9/11. However, as was discussed above, the military solution has gained a wider support since September 11. In this respect, new counterterrorist legislation has allowed governments to legally justify the use of military force.

For instance, the USA PATRIOT Act makes provisions for the employment of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The Kyrgyz Republic 2006 Law on Combating Terrorism establishes counterterrorist military units. Russia’s 2006 law on Counteraction of Terrorism outlines Article 6 on “Using Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Struggle against Terrorism,” as well as Article 9
“Participation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Conducting an Antiterrorist Operation.” These laws do not distinguish between different types of terrorism or terrorist organizations, treating terrorism instead as a monolithic threat to the very existence of the state. Such policies have been adopted in order to fight the “new” threat with the adequate response measures – military means. Introduced under the banner of the “war on terror,” many of these laws rely on unilateralism, preemptive warfare and militarism.

Thus, September 11 has changed ways of addressing terrorism. The counterterrorist paradigm shifted from deterrence towards preemption, and the “war on terror” has advanced the military solution to the fore. The use of military force against terrorism following the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq has become more acceptable both for the U.S. and international actors. The international community has become involved in military operations against sovereign states, and military force has been used against the threat of terrorism worldwide. New counterterrorist legislation, adopted in the wake of September 11 further legalized the use of military force against terrorism. The application of such legislation, as well as military force, however, has not been limited only to terrorism. In the absence of a universal definition of terrorism, some states have applied counterterrorist provisions to other challenges, including ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. The next section turns to the discussion of how the “war on terror” has affected such conflicts.
3.4 The “War on Terror” and Ethno-Nationalist Separatist Conflicts

As was discussed above, September 11 changed both the perception of terrorism and ways of fighting terrorism. Such changes, however, have not been confined solely to the phenomenon of terrorism. Due to the vague definition of the monolithic threat of terrorism and the absence of a universal definition of the threat, many states have applied counterterrorist measures to other challenges they are facing: opposition movements, economic fraud, crime, or ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. As a result, military force has been employed against phenomena other than terrorism, and military action has been justified by the new counterterrorist legislation.

The blurring distinctions between different types of terrorist threats have produced a rather vague image of the enemy in the “war on terror.” As Pluchinsky (2006, 53) points out, terrorism has become an “excuse to suppress opposition elements by designating them as terrorists, and, in some cases, if they are Muslims, linking them to al-Qa’ida.” As a consequence of such ambiguities, terrorism has come to encompass events that are not directly related to terrorism, including criminal acts with no political aspirations committed for economic reasons (Crelinsten 1998; Ganor 2005). As Hoffman (2006, 16) points out, the definition of terrorism “expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups outside a colonial or neocolonial framework as well as radical, entirely ideologically motivated organizations.”

In order to facilitate counterterrorist efforts, UN Resolution 60/288 (A/60/L.62) called for the Member States to reach an agreement on the legal definition of terrorism.
Until such agreement is achieved, however, as Crenshaw (2000, 406) points out, depending on who is defining the threat, the term terrorism can be used as a “pejorative label, meant to condemn an opponent’s cause as illegitimate rather than describe behavior.” The lack of a coherent definition, combined with the fear of “new” terrorism, has allowed states to apply the label of terrorism under the banner of the “war on terror” at their own discretion.

In this respect, new counterterrorist policies have particularly affected ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. New counterterrorist legislation has become instrumental for certain governments in justifying their actions targeting ethno-nationalist separatists, and separatism has become interchangeable with terrorism. For instance, pursuant to Resolution 1373, some states explicitly mention separatism as connected to the threat of terrorism. Thus, the Republic of Moldova, which has been involved in an ethno-nationalist separatist conflict with Transnistria, names among the hotbeds of extremism and terrorism “local conflicts, regional crises, separatism and regions controlled by secessionists’ forces” (S/2002/33 2002, 3). Azerbaijan called itself a victim of terrorism due to the ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and stated that “terrorism is closely related to aggressive separatism” (S/2001/1325 2001, 3). Further, Russia, involved in the ethno-nationalist separatist conflict with Chechnya, devotes a substantial portion of its 2006 Report (S/2006/98 2006) to countering terrorism, separatism, and extremism, placing these phenomena into a single crime category.

The vagueness of the term “terrorism” has allowed some states to frame their ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as terrorist threats and to address them through
military means under the banner of the “war on terror.” For instance, the Chinese government has used the “war on terror” rhetoric to target the Uyghur population of the Xinjiang province. While China acknowledged the separatist nature of the conflict before September 11, after the announcement of the “war on terror” Beijing linked the Uyghur Muslims to Al Qaeda and claimed it was fighting a terrorist uprising. Since then China has carried out numerous military crackdowns, and campaigns of arbitrary arrests, detentions without trial and torture in Xinjiang, justifying such actions as part of the “war on terror.”

Further, Turkey has been able to reframe its Kurdish ethno-nationalist separatist conflict as part of the “war on terror.” Turkey has employed military force in the Kurd-populated Southeast for decades. However, before September 11, Ankara faced pressure to find a peaceful solution to the issue, and its military action was widely criticized. Following September 11, Turkey has increasingly referred to the Kurdish issues as a terrorist problem linked to Al Qaeda. In 2008 in a clash with Kurdish militants Turkey crossed the Iraqi border on the premise that it was conducting a counterterrorist operation (BBC Monitoring Europe 2008).

Sri Lanka is another example of a state that has used military force against ethno-nationalist separatist insurgents for decades. However, only after September 11 was Colombo able to escalate the military campaign against the Tamil minority to a full-blown civil war and avoid international criticisms through justifying its actions as part of the “war on terror.” Moreover, in 2009 Sri Lanka announced victory over the LTTE

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18 For a further discussion of the Chinese, Turkish and Sri Lankan ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts see Chapter 6.
terrorists, and, despite the widespread human rights violations the state committed in the course of the conflict, it received international acknowledgment for defeating terrorism.

Thus, following the announcement of the “war on terror” and the international military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of military force has become more acceptable against ethno-nationalist separatism, which has become interchangeable with terrorism. And while ethno-nationalist separatism and terrorism have a long-standing history of intricate connections, separatism presents a different threat than terrorism. Ethno-nationalist separatism is a self-determination movement based on a common identity that strives for claims ranging from increased political rights to territorial independence. Terrorism, on the other hand, is the deliberate use of violence for political, social, or economic means. As the activities of such groups as the IRA or the PLO illustrate, separatist movements have employed terrorist tactics to advance separatist goals. Thus, ethno-nationalist terrorism is a subtype of terrorism that many states have confronted. However, not all separatists have resorted to terrorism, and examples of peaceful ethno-nationalist separatist movements can be found in history as well: for instance, secessions of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, Hungary from Austria in 1867, Norway from Sweden in 1905, or Czechoslovakia’s “Velvet Divorce” of 1989.

And yet, while ethno-nationalist separatism and terrorism present different threats, some governments have an incentive to portray separatism as terrorism. The accommodation of ethno-nationalist grievances can require a redistribution of power within the existing state or a territorial change (Horowitz 1981). Such alternatives might not be attractive to governments trying to preserve the status quo. As a result, instead of
accommodating ethno-nationalist grievances, governments often choose to fight separatism.

However, throughout history, the use of military force against ethno-nationalist separatists has been criticized by the international community. For instance, Russia was criticized for addressing Chechen separatism with military force (Cain 1999). Milosevic was criticized for his crackdown on separatist Kosovo (Kratovac 1998), and NATO bombed Serbia in response to its military action. In turn, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was recognized as a legitimate actor and was invited to the Rambouillet talks. Thus, before September 11 ethno-nationalist separatists also managed to acquire international recognition and garner support for their causes, and, subsequently, escape the label of terrorists. For instance, even despite its attacks in Munich, the PLO was granted the observer status to the UN in 1974.

After September 11, however, as military force became more widely acceptable against terrorism, governments facing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts have become able to frame such conflicts as part of the “war on terror.” The terrorist label has allowed governments to deprive ethno-nationalist separatists of legitimacy and criminalize them, thus avoiding the necessity to address the true grievances of a conflict. As a result, substituting terrorism for separatism can legitimize the government’s choice of response strategies that would otherwise not be warranted for addressing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. Thus, the “war on terror” has justified the military response to terrorism, making such policy options as negotiations a much less attractive alternative
As the data on ethno-nationalist conflicts demonstrate, following September 11, framing separatists as terrorists has become more acceptable in the eyes of the international community. Table 3.1 contains a list of ethno-nationalist conflicts active in the period of 1991-2009 that involved a disputed territory. Out of the total of 25 conflicts, only five did not experience the involvement of a terrorist wing of the movement. In 16 cases, recognized terrorist organizations acted as the opposition actor in the conflict. In 20 cases, separatist movements experienced the presence of a terrorist wing. However, not all these cases have been affected by terrorist designations, suggesting that framing plays a role in determining which conflicts become labeled as a terrorist threat.

Out of the 20 ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts where terrorist groups have been involved, seven (or 35 percent) were affected by the U.S. and EU terrorist designations: China, Kashmir, Palestine, Mindanao, Chechnya, Eelam, and Kurdistan. Following September 11, the U.S. designations included Chinese and Chechen groups. The EU list expanded from just the Palestinian case in 2009 to include the LTTE and PKK after September 11. Such discrepancies in designations suggest that the international recognition for ethno-nationalist separatist causes after September 11 has subsided, and more ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts have been affected by the terrorist framing.

Thus, due to the vagueness of the definition of terrorism and the blurring of distinctions between different types of terrorism, the “new” monolithic threat has come to
encompass other phenomena, including ethno-nationalist separatism. The “war on terror” allowed governments facing the ethno-nationalist separatist threat to frame it as that of terrorism. This, in turn, allowed governments to justify the employment of military force against separatism. I argue that the focusing event of September 11 has affected not only ways of addressing terrorism, but also ways of addressing separatism: governments facing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts have been enabled to frame their ethno-nationalist struggles as a terrorist threat and address them with military means under the banner of the “war on terror” with few criticisms from the international community.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC-R, FLEC-FAC)</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>China:</td>
<td>Uyghur separatists</td>
<td>East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>TEL, EO: East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
<td>1991 - present</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)</td>
<td>Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK)</td>
<td>The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kongo Kingdom: 1998 – present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ogaden: 1976 – present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oromiya: 1974 – present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Republic of South Ossetia</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Ossetia: 1991 – present</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)</td>
<td>United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assam: 1983 – present</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)</td>
<td>The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bodoland: 1989 – 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Kashmir Insurgents</td>
<td>The Save Kashmir Movement</td>
<td>Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)</td>
<td>Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)</td>
<td>FTO, EO: Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kashmir: 1984 – present</td>
<td></td>
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19 While China was not included in the UCDP/PRIO database, it presents another example of an ethno-nationalist separatist conflict affected by the presence of terrorist attacks.
|----------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| **India** | **Manipur:** 1979 – present  
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), Kuki National Front (KNF), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), The People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)  
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), The People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), The United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF), The Kuki Liberation Army (KLA), The Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) | No | No | No | No | No |
| **India** | **Nagaland:** 1955 – present  
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM, NSCN-K)  
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM, NSCN-K) | No | No | No | No | No |
| **India** | **Tripura:** 1978 – present  
The All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)  
The All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), The Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT) | No | No | No | No | No |
| **Indonesia** | **Aceh:** 1989 – 2005  
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)  
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) | No | No | No | No | No |
| **Israel** | **Palestine:** 1948 – present  
Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Palestinian National Authority (PNA), The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Resistance Committees (PRC)  
Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), The Popular Liberation Organization (PLO)  
Fatah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas, Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)  
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), FTO, EO: Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)  
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali Azawad: 1990 – present</td>
<td>Alliance Touareg Nord Mali pour le Changement (ATNMC), Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad (FIAA)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar Karen: 1949 – present</td>
<td>God’s Army, Karen National Union (KNU)</td>
<td>God’s Army, Karen National Union (KNU)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar Shan: 1959 – present</td>
<td>Shan State Army-South (SSA–S), Mong Tai Army (MTA)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Baluchistan: 1973 – present</td>
<td>Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), Baluchistan Republican Army (BRA), Baluch Ittehad</td>
<td>Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia Chechnya: 1994 – present</td>
<td>Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya</td>
<td>Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, the International Islamic Brigade, The Black Widows</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>FTO, EO: The Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, TEL, EO: The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, TEL, EO: The Islamic International Brigade</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal Casamance: 1988 – 2003</td>
<td>The Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka Eelam: 1975 – 2009</td>
<td>The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)</td>
<td>The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)</td>
<td>The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)</td>
<td>No</td>
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</table>
### Table 3.1. Terrorist designations after September 11.


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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thailand</strong></td>
<td>Patani Insurgents</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patani:</td>
<td>1965 – present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)</td>
<td>FTO, EO, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), KADEK, KONGRA-GEL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan:</td>
<td>1983 – present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), KADEK, KONGRA-GEL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 Conclusion

September 11 changed the perception of terrorism along with ways of fighting the contemporary threat. “New” terrorism, the notion which arose following September 11, has impacted ways of understanding the very threat of terrorism. The focus on “new” terrorism has resulted in blurred distinctions between different types of terrorist organizations, treating terrorism instead as a monolithic, undivided threat, often equated with Al Qaeda. This threat in turn resulted in the adoption of a new counterterrorist paradigm – that of the “war on terror.” Introduced in the wake of September 11, the “war on terror” called for international military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, thus switching counterterrorist efforts from deterrence to preemption. The “war on terror” justified the use of military means against terrorism, which in turn affected ways of dealing with ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts.

While terrorism and ethno-nationalist separatism are intricately interconnected, they represent different challenges for governments. However, some governments have the incentive to address the two phenomena as the same threat and fight it with military force. And while the military solution was used both against terrorism and separatism before September 11, after the attacks on the U.S. the conflation of threats became justified in the eyes of the international community. Vague definitions of terrorism and the “war on terror” have allowed governments to frame their ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat. Due to the increased fear of “new” terrorism, such framing has become more acceptable after September 11. The following chapters turn to the
example of the Chechen ethno-nationalist separatist conflict and establish the framing of the conflict before and after September 11. The Chechen case is thus used as an illustration of the framing dynamics introduced by September 11.
4. The Chechen Conflict before September 11, 2001

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the Russian government’s framing of the first Chechen conflict compared to the accounts of the opposition and separatists. The goal of the chapter is to establish how Russia’s framing of the first conflict impacted its justification for employing the military solution in Chechnya. Thus, the chapter explores the success of Moscow’s framing both domestically and internationally, and analyzes how the framing of the first conflict was connected to the issue of terrorism. My argument is that the Chechen ethno-nationalist separatist conflict was framed as an operation to “restore constitutional order.” As such, it was justified by presidential decrees focused on the issue of constitutionality of the government’s actions in the republic. While ethno-nationalist terrorism was present during the first conflict, the conflict itself was not branded as a counterterrorist operation, and separatists were not equated with terrorists. Even though the government attempted to retroactively justify its use of the military alternative as a response to terrorism coming from Chechnya, such framing was not successful and did not constitute the government’s predominant narrative. The government’s handling of the first Chechen conflict came under criticism both domestically and abroad, and the Kremlin’s framing of the conflict as an operation to “restore constitutional order” did not gain the desired support for Russia’s actions in Chechnya.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the historical facts of the first Chechen conflict. Specifically it looks at the factors that caused disagreements between the sides, and traces the start of the military campaign in the republic. Section 4.3 examines how the government, the opposition, and the separatists framed the first Chechen conflict. The government account is based on a discourse analysis of the Rossiiskaia Gazeta dataset. Moscow’s account is contrasted with those of the opposition (Izvestiia dataset) and the separatists (the Kavkaz Center dataset). The accounts establish how the conflict was framed by the conflicting sides. The opposition account is given as an alternative to the framing advanced by the warring parties.

Section 4.4 establishes the role of terrorism and radicalization in the framing of the first Chechen conflict. Section 4.4.1 examines how Russia used the rhetoric of terrorism in trying to retroactively justify its use of military force in Chechnya. The section analyzes what role this discourse played in the framing of the conflict as an operation to “restore constitutional order” in the republic. Section 4.4.2 investigates the factor of extremism in the first conflict. This section analyzes the role of the Islamic factor in order to establish whether the second Chechen conflict, proclaimed as a struggle in the global fight against Islamist extremists, was drastically different from the first conflict. Section 4.5 focuses on the legal regime of the first Chechen conflict and the acceptance of the government framing. The goal of section 4.5.1 is to establish the legal means by which Russia justified the presence of troops in Chechnya as in relation to a

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20 Articles used for discourse analysis are cited in the text according to the following format: (RG 12/06/1994 5), where (RG) stands for Rossiiskaia Gazeta (IZ – Izvestiia, and KC – Kavkaz Center), (12/06/1994) indicates the date of the publication, and (5) stands for the number assigned in Appendix A.
counterterrorist operation. Section 4.5.2 investigates domestic and international reactions to the framing of the Chechen conflict as an operation to “restore constitutional order” and Russia’s justification for the military solution. The last section, 4.6, draws conclusions on the framing dynamics of the first Chechen conflict.

4.2 The First Chechen Conflict

The conflict between Russia and Chechnya dates back centuries. While the first Russian attempts to settle in the Caucasus go back to as early as the 16th century, a more systematic conquest of the region started with Peter the Great’s campaign in the 1720s (Dunlop 1998; Evangelista 2002; Gammer 2006; Hughes 2007). The attempts to control the region faced fierce resistance, and the Chechen population engaged in several revolts against Russian rule throughout the years: Sheikh Mansur’s resistance in the 18th century, Imam Shamil’s movement in the 19th century, a series of confrontations in the 19th-20th centuries, anti-Bolshevik uprisings of the 1930s, and guerilla warfare of the 1940s.

One of the most widely cited campaigns of brutal subjugation of the Chechen population was that led by General Yermolov (Baddeley 1999; Dunlop 1998). Yermolov was appointed as Commander-in Chief in the Caucasus in 1816 and is known for his policies aimed at bringing the region to full submission (Lieven 1998). Thus, Yermolov’s methods included campaigns of ethnic cleansing, economic warfare, and scorched earth

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21 The current section covers the objective facts of the first Chechen conflict. The following sections, on the other hand, represent the analysis of interpretations of these facts, based on discourse and content analyses.

policies (Dunlop 1998). The General’s actions came to be widely hated by the Chechen population, and his policies contributed to the spread of revolts and active resistance to the Russian forces (Lieven 1998). This hatred endured for years: Lieven (1998, 307) describes an attempt in 1969 to blow up the monument to Yermolov in Grozny as a sign of a continuing spirit of the Chechen resistance. In 1991, the destruction of the monument was one of the first acts of the Chechen national revival.

As a result of these conquests Chechnya was absorbed into the Terek oblast centered on Vladikavkaz, where it remained until 1917. The collapse of the tsarist regime in 1917 brought about the tumultuous years which ended with the establishment of the Soviet Mountain Republic (Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) within the Russian Federation in 1921 (Lieven 1998). In 1922 Chechnya received the status of an autonomous region (Kalashnikov 2004), which was merged with the Ingush autonomous region into the Chechen-Ingush autonomous region in 1934 (Savichev 1991). In December 1936 the entity became an autonomous republic (Savichev 1991). However, while Chechnya enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy during the early Soviet period, the situation changed with World War II.

The Second World War brought about another tragic episode in the history of the Russo-Chechen relations: Chechnya lost its autonomous status, and hundreds of thousands of Chechens were deported to Central Asia (Flemming 1998). Many deportees died of hunger and disease on the way to Kazakhstan, and at least 100,000 perished in the first two years of exile (Gall and de Waal 1998). In this respect, as the event that constituted massive trauma suffered by the ancestors of contemporary Chechens, the
deportation represents what Vamik Volkan (1997) terms “chosen trauma.” The fear of another deportation escalated in the 1990s when contradictions between Moscow and Grozny grew (IZ 12/15/1994 36). Rumors that the Russian government had Stalin-like plans to deport the Chechen population yet again circulated in the Chechen media (IZ 12/21/1994 51). Yermolov’s policies were also referenced in describing Moscow’s actions in Chechnya (IZ 10/27/1995 255). As the separatists noted in 2004, “modern ideologists of conquest of Chechnya are sticking to Yermolov’s tactics too” (KC 02/25/2004 114). Thus, the deportation, along with Yermolov’s actions in the Caucasus, came to be associated with crimes committed by Russia against the Chechen ethnic group.

Chechnya’s status as an autonomous republic was restored in 1957 (Evangelista 2002). During the Soviet era, despite increased revenues from oil industries, the Chechen-Ingush region remained one of the least developed regions of the Soviet Union (Gall and de Waal 1998). About 90 percent of the republic’s income came from the federal allocations (IZ 02/08/1995 139). Socio-economic factors were part of the reason for national claims in the late 1980s (Lieven 1998). Along with socio-economic claims, Chechens demanded protection of the Chechen language and culture. National protests in Chechnya eventually developed into a movement for independence.

As the Soviet Union unraveled, a coup d’état was carried out in Chechnya. On September 15, 1991 the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet ceased its operation. A Temporary Supreme Council was formed in its place until the elections. On September 17, the National Congress of the Chechen People headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev
dismissed the Temporary Supreme Council and started the campaign for presidential and parliamentary elections in the republic. In reaction to the events, the government in Moscow on October 8 issued a declaration in which it asserted that the only legitimate government body in the republic was the Temporary Supreme Council. Disregarding Moscow’s declaration, the National Congress of the Chechen People held elections on October 27, 1991. Dzhokhar Dudayev won the elections (*Argumenty i Fakty* 1994). However, Moscow declared that the elections were unconstitutional and illegal (RG 12/27/1994 43).

On November 1, 1991 Dudayev declared the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic. On November 2 Ichkeriya was pronounced an independent state. In response to the proclamation of independence Boris Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in the republic on November 7. Russian troops were sent to Chechnya. However, on November 11 Yeltsin’s decree was annulled by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation (IZ 01/13/1995 98). The second attempt to send troops into the republic was made during the Ossetino-Ingush conflict, when Russian forces crossed the Chechen border but soon returned to Russia (IZ 01/17/1995 102).

In 1992 Chechnya declined to sign the Federation Treaty (RG 12/27/1994 43). In January 1993 the Russian delegation signed a protocol on delineating authorities with the Supreme Council of the Chechen Republic. The document was meant to become the foundation of the agreement with Chechnya, but was not approved by Dudayev (RG 12/27/1994 43). In March 1994 the State Duma urged Yeltsin to conduct consultations
with Chechnya in order to achieve a political solution to the situation (Postanovlenie GD N 75-I GD 1994). Thus, between 1991 and 1994 Chechnya had de facto independence.

Under Dudayev’s rule, the economic situation in Chechnya worsened. In 1993, the gross national product declined by 68 percent, and the gross domestic product declined by 65 percent as compared to 1991. Trade was down 68 percent, production of manufactured goods declined by 58 percent, and the production of food was reduced by 52 percent (Shakhrai 1994). Pensions and social payments were behind schedule, and unemployment was growing. The infrastructure was crumbling and industries were falling apart. Under these conditions, opposition to Dudayev grew. The opposition headed by Umar Avturkhanov, Doku Zavgayev, Beslan Gantemirov, and Ruslan Labzanov insisted that a referendum take place on June 5, 1993 to determine the future of Chechnya. The referendum did not take place. Instead, Dudayev’s forces confronted armed formations of the opposition, proclaimed martial law and instituted a curfew in Chechnya.

Some accounts point to Moscow’s funding of Dudayev’s opposition. For instance, Ella Pamfilova, a Duma deputy who visited Chechnya as part of the parliamentary delegation in 1994, estimated Russian assistance to the opposition to be over 150 billion rubles, not including the provision of weapons (Valiuzhenich 1994). As Pamfilova observed, soldiers and officers fighting in Chechnya confessed that they had been recruited by the Federal Intelligence Service and had signed secret contracts to serve in Chechnya. However, any such accounts were denied by the Kremlin (Rossiiskaia Gazeta 1994; Litovkin 1994). It was not until after the storm of Grozny on November 26, 1994
that General Pavel Grachev admitted that Russian planes had participated in the initiative (RG 12/06/1994 4).

After the failed attempt to capture Grozny, on November 29 Yeltsin addressed Chechnya with an ultimatum to lay down arms within 48 hours. He warned that in case the ultimatum was not met, a state of emergency would be announced in the republic (a state of emergency was not imposed during the first conflict (IZ 04/19/1995 166)). On December 1, 1994 Yeltsin issued a decree in which he demanded that those fighting in Chechnya lay down arms by December 15, 1994 (Ukaz Prezidenta N 2142 1994).

Another decree followed on December 9, 1994 describing measures to eliminate illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic (Ukaz Prezidenta N 2166 1994). Formations of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of International Affairs were sent into Chechnya on December 11, before the deadline set in the ultimatum. On December 27 Yeltsin issued a statement in which he justified the military solution to the Chechen issue as necessary to counter armed “bandit formations” 23 (IZ 12/27/1994 61). On December 31, 1994 the siege of Grozny started, marking the beginning of the first Chechen conflict.

Yeltsin was counting on a short victorious military operation (IZ 12/27/1994 61). The operation, however, turned into protracted warfare. Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya was widely criticized, and the government was urged to shift to a peaceful alternative both by domestic and foreign opposition. For instance, the State Duma issued a decree in March 1994 recommending political measures to regulate the relationships

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23 The term “bandit formations” is a translation of Russia bandformirovaniia. It is a derogatory term coined by the Russian government to designate Chechen fighters as illegal gangs with criminal connections.
between the Moscow and Grozny governments (Postanovlenie GD N 75-I GD 1994). Negotiations were attempted several times, with yet another round starting in May 1995 under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Negotiations were not very effective and fighting continued throughout the summer. Only after a terrorist attack on Budennovsk on June 14, 1995, was a military agreement achieved on July 30. On August 1 Chechen chief of staff Aslan Maskhadov signed a decree “On carrying out measures to ensure voluntary decommission of arms by the armed formations of the Chechen Republic and gradual withdrawal of troops from the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya” (Orlov and Cherkasov 1998).

In late 1995 Russia proceeded to hold elections in Chechnya. On December 17 Doku Zavgayev won the elections, becoming a Moscow-installed president of the republic (IZ 12/19/1995 262). Fighting continued and an attack on Kizliar in Dagestan followed on January 9, 1996. In the anticipation of presidential elections, Yeltsin in March 1996 issued a decree on the program for regulating the crisis in the Chechen Republic (Ukaz Prezidenta N 435 1996). The decree mandated the end of the military operation in Chechnya and the withdrawal of Russian troops. However, once Yeltsin was reelected, the situation in Chechnya deteriorated once again (IZ 07/12/1996 296). In April 1996 news of Dudayev’s death appeared in the media. Moscow saw this as an opening for new opportunities for solving the Chechen crisis (RG 04/25/1996 163). However, in July 1996 hostilities intensified (Evangelista 2002). Dudayev’s death did not preclude his forces from taking over Grozny in August of 1996. Russia was forced to negotiate, and
General Lebed signed the Khasavyurt agreement with Aslan Maskhadov on August 31, 1996.

The evolution of the Chechen conflict demonstrates its ethno-nationalist separatist nature. Centuries of history of the Russo-Chechen relations indicate the presence of long-standing ethnic tensions. Chechnya has continuously resisted Russia’s attempts to conquer its territory. Russia’s policies towards the republic came to represent Chechnya’s “chosen trauma.” Thus, Yermolov’s campaign in the Caucasus and Stalin’s deportations were widely cited in the 1990s as reminders of Russian atrocities committed against the Chechen population. During the first conflict the Chechen side was fighting for independence, and it was thus a separatist struggle.

4.3.1 The First Chechen Conflict: The Government Account

The government account of the first Chechen conflict is constructed on the basis of discourse analysis of 197 articles from Rossiiskaia Gazeta. The broader themes that emerged from the data include the status of Chechnya, the definition of the conflict, the justification for the means of dealing with the conflict, and the presence of foreign forces in the conflict. These themes reflect Russia’s stance on the Chechen issue, reveal the official framing of the conflict, and indicate the discourses which the government used to justify the military involvement in the republic.

In defining the status of Chechnya, Moscow argued that the Chechen Republic was an integral part of the Russian Federation (RG 12/27/1994 41). According to the Kremlin, Chechnya’s declaration of independence was unconstitutional, and Moscow claimed Chechnya should remain a sovereign republic within the boundaries of Russia (RG 07/04/1995 111). Russia continuously denied that Chechnya was an independent state, and declared that it was ready to allow for maximum autonomy of Chechnya under the status of a Republic of the Russian Federation (RG 08/27/1996 195).

Since Russia viewed Chechnya as part of its territory, the Chechen conflict was regarded as an internal affair of the state: “there [was] no invasion or occupation” (RG 12/27/1994 41). Describing the conflict, Moscow stated that:

Russia and Chechnya do not have disputable issues. The Russians and Chechens do not have contradictions. The question regarding the status of Chechnya is not disputable. This futile discussion is imposed upon Moscow. Negotiations can and must be held, but only to discuss the procedures for disarming bandit formations, laying down arms, civic integration of the Chechen society within Russia, to determine the extent of aid that Russia is ready to provide for Chechnya in order to overcome the devastation brought about by the Dudayev regime (RG 01/05/1995 50).

Blaming Dudayev’s regime for breeding “mafia cliques” in Chechnya (RG 12/20/1994 27), Russia called the conflict a “normal reaction of the state government to lawlessness within one of the state’s territories” (RG 12/06/1994 5). Consequently, Russia was not fighting against the Chechens, but rather against “illegal armed formations” (RG 12/08/1994 10). According to Moscow, Grozny was to blame for the volatile and dangerous situation in the republic (RG 12/20/1994 28), and Russia was sending in troops to help the people of the Caucasus (RG 12/15/1994 20).
Moscow tried to downplay the role of the ethno-nationalist factor at the outset of the conflict. According to Moscow, the term “Russo-Chechen conflict” focused on an inter-ethnic aspect of events and did not accurately portray the nature of the confrontation, which was purely a clash between Dudayev’s forces and the opposition (RG 12/20/1994 27). Thus, Russia claimed that the conflict was not between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, but between “illegal armed formations” and the federal government: “illegal armed formations have to be disarmed irrespective of their national composition or location” (RG 01/25/1995 76).

Russia was reluctant to use the term “war” as well. Instead, the government used the following terms: “measures to restore constitutional order, law and peace in Chechnya” (RG 12/08/1994 10; RG 12/02/1994 3; RG 01/10/1995 57; RG 01/18/1995 67); “operations to disarm illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic” (RG 01/10/1995 57); “cleansing of Grozny from mercenaries and fighters” (RG 01/10/1995 57); “power-struggle between illegal armed groups” (RG 12/08/1994 10). When confronted with the necessity to account for the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Chechnya, in addition to “measures to restore the Chechen Republic as a subject of the Russian Federation,” Moscow distinguished a “military phase of the restoration of law and order in the Chechen Republic” (RG 01/10/1995 57).

Moscow argued that restoration of constitutional law and order in Chechnya justified all means possible (RG 12/06/1994 5). Accordingly, Russia claimed it was forced to resort to the military solution (RG 01/18/1995 66). In his speech regarding the presence of the Russian troops on the territory of Chechnya, President Yeltsin described
the actions of the government as “justified by the threats to the unity of Russia, security of its citizens both in Chechnya and outside its borders, as well as the possibility of the destabilizing political and economic situation” (RG 12/14/1994 15). Yeltsin stressed the importance of peaceful negotiations, yet deemed negotiations as not feasible at the time due to the danger of a civil war. As Yeltsin noted:

During the previous three years the federal government was trying to persuade the so called ‘Chechen leadership’ that it was impossible to live in Russia but not be part of it. But the further, the more aggressive and insulting were the actions of Grozny. Negotiations fell through (RG 12/29/1994 45).

According to Yeltsin, the military action against Dudayev was inevitable: the president claimed it was the only remaining alternative for Russia to fight the “extremist” forces (RG 04/02/1996 158).

The Kremlin was declaring its preference for a peaceful solution in Chechnya even after Russian troops were on the ground in the republic: the Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev stated that the military solution would be invoked only if all peaceful efforts failed (RG 12/06/1994 4). According to Moscow, “despite numerous attempts on the part of the Russian government to solve the situation in the Chechen Republic via political means, such attempts to stop violence and bloodshed failed” (RG 12/22/1994 32). A police operation against Dudayev’s forces, Moscow argued, was precluded due to the fact that in the previous two years Chechnya accumulated large amounts of weapons, against which police forces would be ineffective (RG 02/08/1995 82). Thus, the 1994 December storm of Grozny was justified as the only response to Dudayev’s “fanatical resistance” (RG 12/16/1994 24).
The necessity to resort to the military alternative was also justified by the nature of Dudayev’s opposition forces: Moscow argued that it was facing a well-equipped and trained force, which included Chechen fighters as well as mercenaries from other states (RG 01/06/1995 53). While the government claimed the conflict was local in character (RG 12/06/1994 5), it at the same time made references to foreign involvement in the form of resources and fighters from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Baltic states, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Ukraine (RG 12/15/1994 20; RG 12/15/1994 19; RG 12/22/1994 34; RG 01/05/1995 49).

Government accounts of foreign involvement in the first Chechen conflict are rather incomplete and contradictory. For instance, one article details how Dudaev’s forces lacked the support of foreign volunteers that they had counted upon (RG 12/17/1994 25). Other articles cite the presence of as many as 600 (RG 08/07/1996 186), over 1,000 (RG 12/22/1994 34), and tens of thousands of foreign mercenaries (RG 12/27/1994 42) in Chechnya. Thus, references to the international aggression against the Russian Federation date back to 1994 (RG 12/27/1994 41). The involvement of Afghan mujahedeen, ultranationalists from other republics, Islamist extremists, terrorists, and Hezbollah fighters in the Chechen conflict was mentioned as early as 1994 and 1995 (RG 12/22/1994 34; RG 01/24/1995 74).

Thus, the government account of the first Chechen conflict is built around the perception of Chechnya as an integral part of the Russian Federation. The response to the conflict was framed in terms of intervening between the forces of Dudayev and his opposition. Even though Russia eventually admitted its clandestine support of Dudayev’s
opposition prior to December 1994 (RG 12/06/1994 4), its main claim for involvement was the defeat of “illegal armed formations” and “restoration of constitutional order.” Moscow’s framing of the first conflict revolved around the discourse of the constitutionality of Russia’s integrity; therefore, the Kremlin stressed the legality of its actions in the republic. The responsibility for starting the conflict was placed solely with Dudayev and his allies, while the actions of the federal government were described as targeted at protecting Chechnya’s population and restoring peace in the North Caucasus.

The presence of Russian troops was justified as necessary to preserve the integrity of the Russian Federation, to ensure security of Russian citizens in Chechnya, and to stabilize the economic and political situation in the republic. Russia portrayed Dudayev’s forces as a dangerous opponent, which required the resort to the military solution. Moscow’s military response was also based on the allegations of the presence of international mercenaries in Chechnya. Thus, as the government account illustrates, claims of the presence of Islamist extremists, Afghan mujahedeen, and professional terrorists are not unique to the second Chechen conflict. Instead, these claims helped Moscow justify its military response to the first Chechen conflict as well.

4.3.2 The First Chechen Conflict: The Opposition Account

The account of the first Chechen conflict as viewed by the opposition is constructed on the basis of 310 articles from Izvestiia. The main themes present in the opposition’s account are the definition of the conflict, criticisms of the official rhetoric on the conflict, criticisms of the military handling of the conflict, and criticisms of the official efforts to
limit access to information in the republic. These themes come together in providing an account that serves as an alternative to the accounts advanced by the conflicting sides, namely the Russian government and the Chechen separatists.

Discussing the Chechen conflict, the opposition pointed out that the Chechen issue clearly did exist in Russia: the history of the 19th century along with the 1940s and 1950s of the 20th century were replete with reminders of the existing controversies between Russia and Chechnya (IZ 12/28/1994 65). Criticizing the government’s portrayal of the events and the official rhetoric, the opposition called the war in Chechnya “the end of Russian democracy” (IZ 02/01/1995 127). As such, according to the opposition, the conflict prompted the emergence of numerous euphemisms that misrepresented the nature of the conflict in order to make its handling by the Kremlin more justifiable in the eyes of the population (IZ 12/20/1994 45).

_Izvestiia_ questioned why the government was using “to give an adequate response” instead of “shooting Chechens,” “a military operation to disarm [the Chechens]” instead of “war,” “targeting of strategic objects” instead of “bombing Grozny” (IZ 12/20/1994 45). _Izvestiia_ itself most commonly referred to the conflict as “war”: the percentage of usage for “war” in the _Izvestiia_ dataset is equal to 35 percent, as compared to 15 percent of _Rossiiskaia Gazeta_ and 68 percent for Separatists. The opposition argued that through coining such terms as “bandit formations,” “restoration of constitutional order,” or “armed uprising,” Russia misrepresented the nature of the

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25 Percentages represent the percentage of articles out of the total number of articles in a dataset where a particular term was used at least one time.
conflict and paved its way for the justification of the military solution (IZ 01/17/1995 102).

Moscow’s labels for the Chechens were compared to those of Soviet propagandists – with the commonly used terms “bandit formations” and “bandits” hardly representing the reality:

> It is clear that many criminals concentrated in the republic during the three years of the federal government inaction in Chechnya. But is it possible that only the worst are fighting today? Only bandits? No, things don’t happen that way. When there is a war on your territory, the best cannot avoid taking up arms (IZ 12/28/1994 65).

The opposition argued that the so called “fighters” comprised a large share of the population, too large to be just criminals (IZ 01/05/1995 77). As the human rights activist Sergei Kovalev observed, “today I see average dwellers of Grozny who took up arms. These are not bands but the [Chechen] people” (IZ 12/30/1994 72). Accordingly, the very fact of creating such euphemisms questioned whether Moscow itself was the main seat of “bandit formations” (IZ 02/03/1995 131). Thus, the opposition claimed that “bandit formations” were mainly working for the Kremlin (IZ 12/01/1994 1) and were created, armed and instructed by the Russian government (IZ 12/17/1994 40).

According to the opposition, the armed conflict in Chechnya started without exhausting all peaceful means of conflict resolution (IZ 12/01/1994 6). Russia chose ultimatums instead of a political process, which in the view of the opposition led to a further escalation of hostilities (IZ 12/01/1994 6). In addition, Russia did not comply with the terms of its own ultimatums: as Izvestiia noted, the ultimatum to lay down arms
expired on December 15, 1994; negotiations were planned for December 12, but the troops entered the republic on December 11 (IZ 12/29/1994 68).

According to the opposition, the Russian government often stalled negotiations and did not have constructive initiatives for a peaceful resolution, which led the opposition to believe that Moscow’s true goal was to avoid negotiations but yet blame the failure of the peaceful alternative on the Chechen side (IZ 12/23/1994 59). Sergei Kovalev made numerous attempts to bring the sides to the negotiating table; however, his efforts went largely unnoticed by Russia’s Security Council (IZ 12/28/1994 64). Some in the opposition camp pointed out that the military operation in Chechnya was beneficial for Moscow (IZ 02/02/1995 129). Military budget cuts, army reforms, social problems of army officers, and many of the other daunting issues all became insignificant in the situation of an on-going conflict (IZ 12/09/1994 25).

The opposition claimed that to facilitate its propaganda machine, Russia created a temporary information center, which filtered the information available to journalists and the public on the conflict in Chechnya (IZ 12/15/1994 34). To downplay criticisms of Russia’s handling of the Chechen conflict, the media was required to publish the center’s information along with its own; failure to do so led to license revocation (IZ 12/17/1994 40). While the center was intended to disseminate news on the conflict in Chechnya, journalists found it to be a censoring institution (IZ 12/17/1994 40). While thwarting journalists’ efforts to obtain information first-hand, the center favored such footage as the government’s delivery of humanitarian aid (IZ 12/16/1994 38). Thus, according to the
opposition, instead of helping mass media representatives, the center served as a filter between the press and the sources of information:

all these informational services were created not to provide detailed, up-to-date and accurate information about the course of the war to the press and the public. Their goal is to keep the press from information, and to impose the predominant official account of events on the society (IZ 12/21/1994 49).

The opposition claimed the center was trying to create “an image of an inhospitable Chechen and that of a noble figure of a warrior-liberator with the constitution in his hand” (IZ 12/22/1994 54). However, it lacked information on such simple statistics as the number of casualties (IZ 12/22/1994 54). Journalists who disputed information from the center faced harassment from the military personnel; in only one month of the conflict, 83 Russian and foreign journalists were subject to persecution (IZ 01/06/1995 79). Others had their materials confiscated (IZ 12/16/1994 38). As Izvestiia pointed out, most of the information received at the center was false and accounts were often contradictory (IZ 01/14/1995 99). The opposition claimed that the center was a propaganda machine, allowing Russia’s Security Council to justify its course of action in Chechnya, which resulted in the deaths of many civilians (IZ 12/30/1994 73).

Thus, the opposition referred to the first Chechen conflict as a war waged by the Russian government against the republic. The opposition did term the conflict “war,” and was critical of the government for creating an array of euphemisms, such as the “operation to restore constitutional order,” to denote the war. According to the opposition, the Russian government itself was implicated in forming and financing “bandit formations,” and was trying to avoid responsibility for its actions through creating more euphemisms.
Thus, the opposition was critical of Moscow’s failure to negotiate and opposition leaders continuously argued against the military solution in the republic. The opposition considered the military alternative as not only premature in this case, but also as an ineffectual way of dealing with the situation. Izvestiia predicted that Russia’s inadequate measures in the republic would turn the war into protracted warfare with guerilla and terrorist tactics (IZ 01/31/1995 122), which turned out to be the reality in both the first and the second Chechen conflicts.

4.3.3 The First Chechen Conflict: The Separatists Speak

The account of the first Chechen conflict as advanced by the separatists is based on 59 articles. The articles represent speeches and interviews given by the separatist leaders, and were collected through the LexisNexis database. The themes emerging from the data cover the status of Chechnya, the definition of the conflict, and criticisms of the official actions and human rights violations in Chechnya. The analysis of these themes allowed for the construction of the image of the conflict, which turned out to differ drastically from the official portrayal of the events.

According to Dzhokhar Dudayev, the leader of the breakaway republic of Chechnya, “the Chechen republic of Ichkeriya is a sovereign independent state, and the Chechen nation is a free people.” (KC 07/24/1995 25). Accordingly, Dudayev saw the actions of the federal center in Chechnya as an “undeclared war against the Chechen republic” (KC 12/03/1994 3). Criticizing Russia’s presence in the republic, Dudayev’s government believed that “not simply localized armed clashes are taking place on the
outskirts of Grozny, but a fierce struggle is unfolding between democracy, which is not yet very strong in Russia, and a new Russian totalitarianism” (KC 12/15/1994 6). Grozny believed that Russia had the same scenario ready for Chechnya as it did for Georgia, where Gamsakhurdiya’s regime was deposed and a Moscow-backed Shevardnadze headed the Georgian government in 1992 (KC 12/15/1995 45).

Grozny saw Russian troops as an occupying force (KC 01/17/1995 9), and criticized Moscow’s terminology for describing the sides in the conflict: referring to Russia, the field commander Shamil Basayev noted that “criminals are those who started the war, those who began the genocide of the Chechen people” (KC 08/04/1995 32).

According to Grozny, the Russo-Chechen war was the continuation of a 350-year-long history of conflicts (KC 11/24/1995 43). Therefore, the separatists referred to the conflict as “war” (the percentage of usage of the word “war” in the Kavkaz Center dataset is 68 percent, the highest as compared to 15 percent for Rossiiskaia Gazeta and 35 percent for Izvestiia). When sharing his opinion on the potential declaration of a state of emergency in Chechnya, Basayev questioned (KC 10/17/1995 39): “What state of emergency can be discussed while a real war is being waged here?”

While blaming the Russian side for starting the war, Grozny claimed it favored negotiations (KC 12/02/1994 1). As Dudayev declared, “the only path we [separatists] have chosen is to sit down at the negotiating table and solve all our disputes with the help of mediators who should not be from Russia or Chechnya” (KC 12/02/1994 1).

Discussing the possibility of negotiations, Dudayev stated:

Let them withdraw the way they entered, then everything will be okay. And our relations will be settled within 30 minutes afterwards. I mean this, I state and
confirm this. There have been no, and in the long term, there are no unsolvable questions between Russia and Ichkeriya. All the differences can be settled within 30 minutes through peace talks and without any manslaughter (KC 11/24/1995 43).

Dudayev further proposed two options that would lead to the termination of the conflict:

One: the unconditional withdrawal of the troops and negotiations and all of Russia’s questions and interests in the Caucasus and in Ichkeriya may be solved peacefully. The second road: the international community comes forward as the guarantor in settling our relations by introducing UN forces for control and cooperation (KC 11/24/1995 43).

However, Dudayev did not place much hope in the negotiations with Russia (KC 02/16/1995 14). Criticizing Russia’s stance on negotiations, Dudayev was convinced that Moscow “was interested not in establishing peace and tranquility in Chechnya but in prolonging the crisis” (KC 07/24/1995 25). When Russia was seeking talks with Chechnya in the early months of 1996, Grozny ascribed these efforts not to the genuine desire of the Kremlin to put an end to bloodshed, but rather to Yeltsin’s strategy for re-election (KC 03/18/1996 51). Thus, the separatists quoted Boris Yeltsin “promising a speedy end to the 14-month war, saying on more than one occasion that the Chechen conflict is the biggest impediment to his re-election” (KC 02/23/1996 50). At that point, Dudayev no longer saw any benefits to negotiations:

We are much more interested in continuing the war than Russia, because what is left for us? A destroyed economy, no industry, no production. People are left without a roof over their heads, without bread, without jobs (KC 03/19/1996 53).

According to Grozny, Moscow was the main perpetrator of human rights violations in the republic. In 1995 Dudayev estimated the number of civilian deaths caused by the conflict at a minimum of 25,000 people (KC 02/21/1995 15). According to Grozny, “the occupation troops are systematically burning villages and settlements and
shooting women, children and old people. Then they plunder” (KC 05/06/1995 17).

Describing the actions of the federal forces, Basayev noted (KC 10/17/1995 39): “that’s cynical to bomb villages, kill women and children.”

Such actions of the Russian troops, according to Grozny, rallied the Chechen population behind Dudayev. As Basayev noted, “it is Russian terror that brings new support to Dudayev” (KC 04/14/1996 57). According to Dudayev, the Chechen people had “never been as united as then [1995]” (KC 06/13/1995 20). Grozny declared that there was no shortage of people willing to fight in the armed forces:

The Chechen people, both children and adults, are professional fighters already. Our profession is to wage war. Well, that’s the way it is. It suits us better to wage war than to rebuild what they [the Russians] destroyed, plough the land, pick at the ruins, put up with their sabotage and their terrorism, their provocations, their lies and their violence (KC 09/12/1995 35).

Thus, the separatist account portrays Chechnya as an independent republic of Ichkeriya, which was drawn into the war by Russia. According to the separatists, Russia, as an occupying power, was trying to impose its rule in the republic through military means. Grozny referred to the conflict as war, criticizing Moscow for mislabeling the confrontation via purposefully created euphemisms. The Chechen leader Dudayev claimed he favored negotiations and argued that Russia did not exhaust all the venues for peaceful resolution of the conflict. Instead, he argued, Moscow was interested in waging war, and used negotiations only as an excuse for its actions. According to Grozny, Russia was to blame for starting the war. In addition to its ineffective handling of the war, Russia was also to blame for numerous human rights violations in the republic, which in turn
rallied the Chechen people behind their leader. Accordingly, Moscow was involved in crimes against the Chechen people and Russia was the main perpetrator of terrorism.

4.4.1 Separatism vs. Terrorism

This section looks at the presence of the terrorist factor during the first Chechen conflict. Terrorism became the main theme of the second Chechen conflict, and the second operation was declared to be a counterterrorist operation. While the next chapter examines the emergence of counterterrorist framing in the second conflict, this section analyzes the government’s reaction to terrorism during the first conflict. Chechen terrorist tactics go back to the very outset of the first conflict. However, Russia did not frame the first conflict as a counterterrorist operation, focusing instead on an operation to “restore constitutional order.” During the first conflict Russia did attempt to retroactively justify its military presence in the republic as a response to terrorist attacks, but such framing was not Moscow’s predominant account. The Kremlin admitted that it was fighting a separatist movement in Chechnya.

At the outset of the conflict Russia was reluctant to admit the ethno-nationalist separatist nature of the Chechen conflict. As Moscow pointed out in 1994, Chechnya was not homogenous in ethno-nationalist composition (RG 12/20/1994 27). Instead, Russia focused on the criminality of Dudayev’s regime, trying to downplay the importance of the ethnic factor, in order to avoid dealing with centuries of confrontations between Russia and Chechnya (RG 12/29/1994 45). Russia repeatedly claimed that there was no
conflict between Russia and Chechnya, that the conflict was purely with the “bandit formations” (RG 12/06/1994 5; RG 12/08/1994 10).

In its initial response to the crisis, international mass media referred to Chechnya as a separatist republic (RG 12/15/1994 21). Following these reactions, Russia did acknowledge the separatist nature of the conflict, calling separatism a “perfidious disease” threatening the unity of the state (RG 12/30/1994 48). Russia blamed Dudayev for speculating on the ethno-nationalist sentiments of the Chechen people in order to support his illegal regime (RG 12/30/1994 48). Calling separatism “political AIDS” (RG 12/30/1994 47), Russia claimed it was not the only state facing the challenge of separatism and, justifying its harsh treatment of the conflict, went on to state that it “will not be the last state which in a crucial situation will use the measures of the last resort” (RG 12/30/1994 48). Referring to other states fighting separatism – Turkey, Britain, India, Spain, and Canada (RG 02/02/1996 151), Russia called for the necessity of international cooperation against separatism (RG 12/30/1994 48). Since Russia’s attempts to justify its actions in Chechnya as a fight against separatism did not gain much domestic or international support and after the failure of the Russia-EU and Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) agreements (discussed in the section below), Moscow started making frequent references to the threat of terrorism. In February 1996 (RG 02/02/1996 151) Russia was claiming that Chechen separatism had transformed into terrorism.

While Russia made references to international professional terrorists fighting in Chechnya as early as December 1994 (RG 12/29/1994 45), its discourse on terrorism did
not develop until later in the conflict. Terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Chechen side date back to 1991, when the name of Shamil Basayev first became known to the Russian public. Following Yeltsin’s imposition of a state of emergency in Chechnya on November 7, 1991 in response to its declaration of independence a few days earlier, Basayev hijacked a TU-154 airplane on November 9 in Mineralnie Vody of Stavropol region. The plane was directed to Turkey, where the hijackers surrendered to the Turkish authorities and were sent back to Chechnya.

The first large-scale operation conducted by Chechen armed forces on the Russian territory took place on June 14, 1995. By then the fighting in Chechnya had continued for more than a year. The peace talks that started in May 1995 did not produce any tangible results and Russian troops were still active on the ground. Even though right before the raid premier Viktor Chernomyrdin was claiming that the situation in the region was well under control (IZ 06/16/1995 187), a group of about 100 Chechen fighters crossed the border and reached the city of Budennovsk of the Stavropol region of Russia (RG 06/16/1995 103). Headed by Shamil Basayev, the group took hostages in the city and held them for five days in the local hospital. The group demanded the termination of the war in Chechnya, withdrawal of the federal troops, and peaceful negotiations at the highest level between Dudayev and Yeltsin or Chernomyrdin (IZ 06/16/1995 188).

Following the Budennovsk events, the State Duma issued a decree in which it described the terrorist attack on Budennovsk as an outcome of ineffective actions of the federal forces, and urged the government to switch to negotiations (Postanovlenie GD N 893-I GD 1995). Basayev, in turn, warned Russia that he would stage more terrorist attacks if
negotiations failed (RG 07/08/1995 113). As a result, the dragging negotiations assumed a more rigorous turn, and a military agreement was reached between the sides on July 30, 1995.

The 1995 agreement was often overlooked, and Moscow held elections in Chechnya on December 17; Doku Zavgayev was announced the new president of the republic. The reaction of the Chechen side followed on January 9, 1996. A group headed by Salman Raduyev took hostages in a hospital in the city of Kizliar in Dagestan. The scenario was very similar to the Budennovsk attack and the demands included an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya (RG 01/10/1996 133). As in Budennovsk, the Chechens along with a smaller group of hostages left Kizliar and proceeded to Chechnya. On the way they were delayed in Pervomaiskoe on January 15, where federal forces attempted an attack on the procession to release the hostages. After four days of fighting the Russians failed to prevent the Chechens from escaping to Chechnya. As a justification for the attack Dudayev reasoned in an interview that he “ordered the Kizliar operation in reaction to the Russians destroying the Chechen town of Gudermes” (KC 01/12/1996 47).

Following the Kizliar/Pervomaiskoe attack, on January 16, 1996 a group of Chechens hijacked a passenger ferryboat in the Turkish port of Trabzon. The group demanded a halt to the attack on Pervomaiskoe, a halt to the fighting in Chechnya and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the republic (RG 01/18/1996 146). In the summer of 1996 the first Chechen terrorist attacks reached Moscow. On June 11 an explosion took place on a metro train in Moscow near the station Tulskaia. In July, consecutive
explosions occurred on trolleybuses on Strastnoi Boulevard and Prospekt Mira. After the attacks on Russia’s capital, the sides came to the negotiating table and the Khasavyurt agreement was signed on August 31, 1996.

Terrorist attacks during the first Chechen conflict clearly had ethno-nationalist motives,26 with the demands of terrorists focused on Chechnya’s independence, withdrawal of Russian troops, and a peaceful solution to the conflict. And while Russia declared in 1996 that “political terror” had become a sad reality in the country (RG 07/16/1996 177), it did not always equate Chechen fighters with terrorists. For instance, the government called the Budennovsk incident “the attack of separatists,” referring to Basayev’s forces as separatists, and not terrorists (RG 06/16/1995 103). In addition, Chechen forces were compared to the IRA (IZ 12/06/1994 17), with such references shifting to Al Qaeda during the second conflict (IZ 09/28/2001 531). While the percentage of usage of the label “terrorist” is high at 11 percent for Rossiiskaia Gazeta, the newspaper’s most common reference to the Chechens was “fighters” at 39 percent (see Table 4.1). In addition, if we trace the government usage of the label of “terrorists” over time, most of the usage coincides with the terrorist attacks on Budennovsk and Kizliar/Pervomaiskoe (see Table 4.2).

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26 For more on the characteristics of ethno-nationalist terrorism see Byman (1998).
Table 4.1. Most common references to the actors involved in the first Chechen conflict. Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Government (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) %</th>
<th>Opposition (Izvestiia) %</th>
<th>Separatists (Kavkaz Center)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fighters (boeviki)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29*</td>
<td>24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terrorists (terroristy)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dudayev’s supporters (dudayevtsy)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bandits (bandity)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>separatists (separatisty)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criminals (prestupniki)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bandit formations (bandformirovaniia)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bands (bandy)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBF (illegal bandit formations) (NVF)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>volunteers (dobrovol’tsy)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people’s guards (opolchentsy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td>7*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2. The government usage of terms “separatism” and “terrorism” over time (according to Rossiiskaia Gazeta).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>separatists, separatism</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terrorists, terrorism</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In contrast to the official account of the conflict, the opposition referred to the Chechen side mainly as “fighters” (29 percent). That was also the predominant term the Chechens used for themselves (24 percent). When speaking of terrorists, Izvestiia often applied this term to the government actions. According to the opposition, the Chechen war itself could be called a terrorist act (IZ 01/19/1996 276). Similarly, the separatists used the terms “terrorists” and “terrorism” in references to Moscow. As Dudayev claimed: “I have opposed all sorts of mafia for four years and all the terrorism, the entire arsenal of this disgusting empire [Russia], this evil empire and the vile centre set up with the use of force, but I failed to defend my citizens [from Russia’s terrorism]” (KC 01/25/1995 11).

Thus, while the official accounts made frequent references to terrorism, Russia did not frame the first Chechen conflict as a counterterrorist operation (percentage of usage for counterterrorist was equal 0, see Table 4.3). Instead, Moscow focused on the discourse of legality of the operation to “restore constitutional order.” In the decree outlining rules for mass media on how to cover the Chechen conflict (Rasporiazhenie N 229-p 1996), the Government of the Russian Federation mandated that the “nature of this [Chechen] enemy be portrayed as bandit, criminal, man-hating, and anti-Russian.” As a result, the Kremlin tried to portray its actions as targeted against the “criminals” (7 percent) and “bandits” (10 percent) harboring in Chechnya. Russian actions were justified as compliant with the constitution, therefore the focus was made on the labels “law” and “lawful” (13 percent), and “constitution” and “constitutional” (15 percent).
The use of terrorist tactics by the Chechen forces gave the Russian government reasons for new justifications of its handling of the conflict. Russia seized the opportunity presented by the terrorist attacks on Budennovsk, Kizliar and Pervomaiskoe to start framing the conflict as a terrorist threat. After the Trabzon incident, Moscow even stated that the Chechen problem had become an international issue, and that international cooperation was necessary to combat the threat of terrorism (RG 03/15/1996 155).

Further, Russia tried to retroactively justify the employment of military force in Chechnya (IZ 06/20/1995 195), and it declared that the state would not tolerate terrorism and would use adequate means to fight it (RG 04/02/1996 158). However, such framing was subordinate to the image of the Chechen campaign as an operation to “restore
constitutional order,” and the first Chechen conflict was not framed as a counterterrorist operation.

4.4.2 Separatism vs. Islamism

The second Chechen conflict was framed by the government as a counterterrorist operation. During the second conflict, the Chechen separatists became labeled as terrorists with the government claiming a substantial presence of Islamist extremists on the territory of the republic. Thus, in the post-9/11 world the Russian government has frequently invoked Chechen ties to global extremists. This section investigates the role of the Islamic factor in the first conflict in order to establish whether the second Chechen conflict was indeed as radically different from the first as the Russian government portrays it to be.

Islam plays an important role in the Chechen society. A Sunni Muslim republic, Chechnya, like the rest of the Soviet Union’s territories underwent a religious revival in the early 1990s. According to the Russian government, Chechnya was experiencing active Islamicization during that period (RG 12/08/1994 9). Accordingly, Russia reported that the Chechen parliament was getting ready to amend the constitution of the republic to incorporate Islamic sharia law (RG 12/08/1994 9).

According to Moscow, Dudayev declared jihad against Russia back at the very outset of the Chechen conflict (RG 12/16/1994 24). References to jihad continued throughout the conflict (RG 01/18/1996 145). Thus, Chechnya was accused of waging a religious war (RG 03/15/1996 155). One controversial sign of religious fanaticism of the
Chechen fighters was the phrase “Allah Akbar” (God is great), used by the Chechen fighters (RG 05/14/1996 164).

Separatists themselves mentioned “Islamic battalions” at the outset of the conflict (KC 12/02/1994 1), and Dudayev was reported to speak of the “holy war” (IZ 12/01/1994 2). The presence of suicide fighters was also documented at the early stages of the conflict (RG 12/30/1994 46). Such fighters were cited to be ready for such extremes as killing hostages and were prepared to die themselves in gazavat, or jihad (RG 06/17/1995 104; IZ 12/08/1994 21). As Shamil Basayev stated, “we [the Chechen force] consider ourselves warriors of Islam, and are therefore not afraid of death” (IZ 11/24/1995 257).

However, despite such accounts of religious motivation behind the actions of the Chechen side, Russia did not frame the first conflict as a religious confrontation. Further, Moscow’s accounts of extremism were often contradictory. Thus, for instance, despite the references to jihad, Russia acknowledged that Chechnya never engaged in religious extremism, not even during the Imam Shamil wars (RG 07/23/1996 181), or that jihad in Chechnya did not represent religious extremism, but was rather a way to disguise true motives (RG 01/18/1996 145).

Few references were made to such concepts as Islamism or Wahhabism during the first conflict (see Table 4.4). Further, not a single reference was made during the first conflict to Khattab, who during the second conflict became known for his extremist Wahhabi views, even though Khattab arrived in Chechnya in the early 1990s and was allegedly in charge of terrorist camps on the territory of the republic (IZ 12/03/1999 392).
Thus, while accounts of jihad and Islamist extremism existed during the first conflict, religious discourse did not play a large role in the framing of the first conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Government (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) %</th>
<th>Opposition (Izvestiia) %</th>
<th>Separatists (Kavkaz Center) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>extremists (ekstremisty)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mujahedeen (modzhakhedy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bin Laden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamism (islamizm)/Islamists (islamisty)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khattab</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahhabism (wahhabizm)/Wahhabis (wahhabity)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4. Most common references to religious extremism.

Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.

4.5.1 Legal Regime of the First Chechen Conflict

The second Chechen conflict was framed as a counterterrorist operation, and was therefore justified by Russia’s 1998 Federal Law on the fight against terrorism (Federal’nyi zakon N 130-FZ 1998). Further, in 2006 Russia adopted another Federal Law on counteraction of terrorism (Federal’nyi zakon N 35-FZ 2006). These pieces of legislation came to justify Russia’s military presence in the republic. The first conflict, on the other hand, lacked such legal justification for its actions in Chechnya. This section
analyzes the legal means Moscow employed in the first conflict and investigates how they affected the official framing of the conflict.

According to Russia’s law on defense (Federal’nyi zakon N 61-FZ 1996), military force may be used in cases of war during a declared state of emergency. As was discussed above, Russia claimed the conflict was an internal affair and thus avoided such references to the conflict as “war.” Further, as Orlov and Cherkasov (1998) point out, a declared state of emergency could have limited the actions of the federal forces in the region to the provisions outlined in the declaration. In addition, the imposition of any state of emergency, as well as its extensions, would have had to be approved by the Federation Council, which would have added an additional layer of checks on presidential actions (Orlov and Cherkasov 1998). However, a state of emergency was never declared. As a result, Russia did not have existing legal ground for sending troops to Chechnya. Instead, Moscow decided to justify its military action as an operation to “restore constitutional order” by producing new legislation.

The piece of legislation that effectively marked the beginning of the first Chechen conflict was Yeltsin’s Decree 2137 from November 30 (Ukaz Prezidenta N 2137 1994). The decree granted extensive powers to the military forces without declaring a state of emergency. As Orlov and Cherkasov (1998) discuss, the decree was criticized as unconstitutional, and was promptly replaced by Decree 2169 on December 11 (Ukaz Prezidenta N 2169 1994). Another decree that was criticized as unconstitutional was Decree 2166 signed on December 9 (Ukaz Prezidenta N 2166 1994). Decree 2166 confirmed the existence of “illegal armed formations” on the territory of Chechnya and
declared that the activities of such “formations” jeopardized constitutional order in the region. As a result, Decree 2166 urged the government to use “all possible measures” to ensure security and restore law and order. Decree 2166 was also criticized for allowing the use of military force in the absence of the declaration of a state of emergency, but was found constitutional by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (Postanovlenie KS N 10-II 1995).

No legislation was in existence in Russia to justify the first Chechen conflict as a counterterrorist operation. Following the attacks on Budennovsk, and Kizliar and Pervomaiskoe, Yeltsin issued a decree on measures to fight terrorism (Ukaz Prezidenta N 338 1996), which became one of the first pieces of legislation in Russia to address terrorism (article 66 “Terrorist Act” and article 213.3 “Terrorism” in the Criminal Code of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (Ugolovnyi kodeks 1960) were edited in 1994). Yeltsin’s decree urged the government to update the Criminal Code of the RSFSR in order to include provisions addressing the threat of terrorism (the new Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Ugolovnyi kodeks N 63-FZ 1996) included articles 205-207 addressing terrorism). However, terrorism under this decree was to be dealt with through the federal program against crime, and no counterterrorist operation against Chechnya was announced at the time.

Thus, the first Chechen conflict did not have a legal justification of being a counterterrorist operation. Instead, the conflict was framed as an operation to “restore constitutional order.” As such, the operation was criticized as lacking legal grounds for the employment of military force. Even though President Yeltsin signed a number of
decrees justifying the use of troops in Chechnya, such legislation was contested as unconstitutional (Postanovlenie KS N 10-II 1995). Further, the use of military force became one of the five charges brought against Yeltsin in the impeachment process in 1999 (BBC News 1999). Thus, the legal regime of the operation to “restore constitutional order” largely failed to provide the government with enough justification for using military force in Chechnya.

4.5.2 Frame Acceptance

The first Chechen conflict came under severe criticism both domestically and internationally. The government itself was divided on the issue of the war, and federal forces were accused of massive human rights violations in the republic. A majority of Russian citizens were against the military solution to the conflict, and Russia’s actions to “restore constitutional order” were perceived as inadequate.

Foreign governments initially approached the Chechen conflict as Russia’s internal affair. However, as military action continued in the republic, the West started voicing concerns. While the international community supported Russia’s desire to preserve its territorial integrity, it criticized Moscow’s handling of the situation via military means. In response to Russia’s military action, the EU-Russia agreement was postponed, and the Council of Europe suspended action on Russia’s membership application. Russia’s attempts to justify its military presence due to terrorist attacks did not gain much acceptance either. Chechen terrorism during the first conflict was seen as a reaction to Moscow’s actions, and Russia was urged to switch to peaceful alternatives.
4.5.2.1 Domestic Response

The handling of the situation in Chechnya provoked domestic criticisms. The democratic faction of Russia’s politicians feared that the war in Chechnya might put an end to Russian democracy (IZ 02/01/1995 127). The State Duma of the Russian Federation was urging the government to settle the North Caucasus crisis through negotiations at the very outset of the conflict (Postanovlenie GD N 75-I GD 1994), and even following the terrorist attacks on Budennovsk (Postanovlenie GD N 893-I GD 1995), and Kizliar and Pervomaiskoe (Postanovlenie GD N 8-II GD 1996). The federal government was blamed for high numbers of civilian casualties (IZ 12/24/1994 60), vast destruction of infrastructure and housing (IZ 12/21/1994 49), and the bombing of cities without evacuating the civilians (IZ 12/28/1994 64). The number of refugees was reported to have reached over 65,000 people by the end of December 1994 (IZ 12/28/1994 63). Russia’s Human Rights Commissioner Sergei Kovalev reported massive human rights violations in the republic (IZ 12/23/1994 59; IZ 02/01/1995 126; IZ 05/06/1995 173).

Popular responses to the conflict were also critical of the government’s actions. According to Levada Center (IZ 12/23/1994 58), among those responsible for hostilities in Chechnya, 31 percent of the population blamed Dudayev. 25 percent pointed at Yeltsin and his aides, 12 percent condemned Dudayev’s opposition, while 7 percent blamed Russian military and security services. Thus, while a majority blamed Dudayev, a large share of the population held the Russian side responsible for the events. In December 1994, 57.7 percent of the population thought the involvement of troops in the settlement of the conflict was wrong (IZ 12/17/1994 42). According to a survey conducted by a
sociological group “Opinion,” this number rose to 69.9 percent during December 11-12 (IZ 12/17/1994 42). Conversely, only 19.5 percent of respondents supported the employment of troops, with the number dropping to 12.5 percent after the troops were sent to Chechnya on December 11. During the conflict, Levada Center found that only 30 percent of the population supported harsh measures to restore order, while 36 percent advocated for peaceful means and 23 percent demanded the withdrawal of troops (IZ 12/23/1994 58).

The Russian public during the first conflict was skeptical of the information on Chechnya broadcast by the government. Only 14 percent of the participants in a cross-national Russian survey relied more on governmental sources of information on the events in Chechnya, while 46 percent trusted non-governmental sources (Migdisova et al. 1995a). As the conflict progressed and more and more people disapproved of the violence, they were seeking a leader who would adopt a peaceful solution. 42 percent of the people were ready to vote for a candidate supporting a peaceful solution in Chechnya in the upcoming presidential elections in 1996 (Migdisova et al. 1995b). 25 percent of the voters stated the Chechen issue would not be a consideration for their choice while only 8 percent were ready to vote for those supporting the war (Migdisova et al. 1995b). Thus, the Russian public was predominantly anti-war and against a military solution to the problem.

It was not until the terrorist attacks on Russia that the government’s actions started to receive approval. Thus, about 40 percent of Moscovites (a rather high number as compared to the approval ratings cited above) supported the government’s action in
Pervomaiskoe (RG 01/17/1996 143). Following the slight improvement in ratings, the government started paying more attention to the counterterrorist rhetoric. In July 1996, Boris Yeltsin declared that he would start paying special attention to counterterrorist activities of the Russian security services (RG 07/16/1996 177). And yet, during the first conflict the Russian population saw terrorism as an outcome of the Chechen war:

Terrorists are undoubtedly criminals, but crime of this type is usually closely connected to mistakes in big politics of the state. It is produced by an unparalleled terrorist attack, planned and carried out at the federal level – that of the Chechen war (IZ 01/19/1996 276).


4.5.2.2 International Response

At the outset of the conflict many international actors concurred with the opinion that Chechnya was an internal Russian issue (IZ 12/14/1994 31). For instance, President Clinton stated that Chechnya was an integral part of Russia, and Russia’s storm of Grozny was, therefore, the country’s internal affair (IZ 12/14/1994 31). However, by the end of 1994, international neutrality gave way to concerns as well as criticisms of Russia’s military actions (IZ 01/06/1995 81). The West gradually became alarmed about Russia’s use of millions of dollars of foreign aid granted by the West for peaceful purposes, and the state’s ability to pay its debt (IZ 01/10/1995 86).

Russia’s “internal affair” gradually became a matter of grave concern on the international arena. Clinton was among the first world leaders to send Yeltsin a letter in which he asked the president to stop the violence and minimize the casualties (IZ
Many others followed suit, and the Kremlin was soon facing international isolation (IZ 01/12/1995 94). Thus, the ratification of the partnership and cooperation agreement between the EU and Russia (signed on June 24, 1994) was postponed (Smyth 1995). The ratification process resumed only in October-November of 1996, following the Khasavyurt peace agreement.

Further, the PACE suspended its discussion on Russia’s application to the organization on February 2, 1995. The Assembly was openly critical of Russia’s politics in Chechnya:

> The Assembly thus unreservedly condemns the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by the Russian military, in particular against the civilian population, which is in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Second Protocol as well as of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, accepted by Russia as recently as December 1994 (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1995).

The membership process resumed in September 1995 after negotiations started between Russia and Chechnya in spring of the same year. Russia became a member of the Council of Europe on February 28, 1996.

We can see that Russia had the sympathy of the West in its desire to preserve the territorial integrity, but enjoyed no support for the means it chose to implement (IZ 01/17/1995 103). Russia’s military campaign was widely criticized on the grounds of human rights violations (Amnesty International 1996; Human Rights Watch 1995). Russia’s Samashki operation of April 1995 became the “Srebrenica” of the first Chechen conflict. According to the UN report (UN Commission on Human Rights 1996), Russian federal forces attacked civilians and civilian dwellings in the village. At least 103 civilians were killed in the operation, access to medical personnel was blocked, and
members of the male population of Samashki were arbitrarily detained and were further tortured or mistreated. Among other offences the report mentions summary executions (UN Commission on Human Rights 1996).

Russia’s terrorism rhetoric following the attacks on Budennovsk, Kizliar, and Pervomaiskoe did not gain much support in the West either. As President Clinton stated following Budennovsk, he disapproved of terrorism and sympathized with the hostages. He, however, did not support Russia’s politics in Chechnya (IZ 06/20/1995 191).

4.6 Conclusion

During the first Chechen conflict Russia acknowledged its ethno-nationalist separatist nature. Reluctant to admit that it was fighting a war, Russia framed the conflict as an operation to “restore constitutional order” and relied on the discourses of legality and constitutionality. Such framing differed from the accounts of the opposition (calling the conflict “war”), and the separatists (referring to the conflict as an act of Russian “aggression” against the republic). Portraying the conflict as a fight against Dudayev’s “criminal regime,” Russia was trying to gain sympathy in its actions to “help the people of Chechnya.” However, during the first conflict, the opposition framing of the conflict prevailed: Russia’s actions were widely criticized both domestically and abroad, and Moscow faced increasing pressure from the West to halt its military operation in Chechnya.

While Russia experienced terrorist attacks during the first conflict, the terrorism discourse did not become predominant in justifying its employment of military means.
Moscow tried to retroactively justify the use of troops through references to terrorism. However, such framing did not receive much acknowledgement as terrorism was seen as an outcome of Russia’s ineffective campaign in Chechnya. In fact, some concerns were voiced regarding Russia’s counterterrorist practices:

If in the fight against crime we committed outright violations of constitutional principles and human rights by giving emergency powers to our ‘services,’ in the fight against terrorism the very Russian state will become terrorist. Democratic reforms could then be forgotten (IZ 12/06/1994 17).

As a result, the first conflict was not framed as a counterterrorist operation. Nor was it framed as an operation against Islamist extremist forces. While accounts of the presence of Islamist extremists in Chechnya circulated during the first conflict, they remained vague and contradictory, and the government did not rely on the religious discourse.

From the legal point of view, the handling of the first conflict by military means came under criticism as unconstitutional. Yeltsin’s presidential decrees were contested in Russia’s Constitutional Court, and he was later charged with waging a war under the 1999 impeachment process. The government did not declare a state of emergency in the republic, nor did it justify the use of military means with counterterrorist legislation. The lack of legal justification for using military force further spurred criticisms of Russia’s war.

And yet, Russia’s experiences with terrorism in the first conflict presented the Kremlin with certain clues. As the polls indicated, public opinion of the government started to improve following the attacks on Pervomaiskoe (RG 01/17/1996 143). This suggested that the population was more afraid of terrorism than separatism, thus creating a pretext for Moscow to draft new counterterrorist legislation. Following the attacks on
Budennovsk and Kizliar/Pervomaiskoe, Yeltsin announced the sphere of counterterrorism to be under his special supervision. Russia announced that it entered a new “era of active counterterrorism” (RG 01/17/1996 143), and that it was ready to start forming new “special counterterrorist formations able to counteract Dudayev’s well trained fighters” (RG 03/15/1996 155). Thus, terrorism emerged during the first conflict as a potential discourse for justifying Russia’s military handling of the Chechen ethno-nationalist separatist issue.
5. The Chechen Conflict after September 11, 2001

5.1 Introduction

The chapter analyzes the framing of the second Chechen conflict as advanced by the government, the opposition, and the separatists. The chapter aims to establish how the framing of the second Chechen conflict affected the means through which the Russian government addressed the issue. The chapter traces the interconnections between framing and terrorism during the second conflict, and analyzes the acceptance of the frames both domestically and internationally. I argue that the Russian government succeeded in framing the second conflict as a “counterterrorist operation.” And while before September 11, 2001 this frame was only accepted domestically, following the attacks on the U.S., the “counterterrorist operation” frame gained a wider international acceptance. The counterterrorist operation was justified through a number of legal provisions, and the Kremlin was able to defend its use of military force by the presence of the terrorist threat.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 establishes historical facts of the second Chechen conflict. Namely, it looks at the ethno-nationalist separatist factor in the conflict and traces the evolution of the second campaign. Section 5.3 examines the framing of the second conflict as advanced by the government (Section 5.3.1), the opposition (Section 5.3.2), and the separatists (Section 5.3.3). The issues of terrorism and extremism are examined in Section 5.4. Section 5.4.1 analyzes the presence and nature of terrorist attacks during the second conflict. Section 5.4.2 investigates the role of
extremism in the conflict in order to establish whether the second Chechen campaign was radically different from the first. Section 5.5 focuses on the legal justification of the use of military force, and the acceptance of the government framing of the conflict as a counterterrorist operation. The last section 5.6 draws conclusions.

5.2 The Second Chechen Conflict

The Khasavyurt agreement signed on August 31, 1996 was followed by three years of uncertainty in Chechnya. Maskhadov’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Russo-Chechen conflict contributed to his success in the 1997 presidential elections, when on January 27 he won 58 percent of the vote (Eismont 1997). Shamil Basayev, who came second with 30 percent of the vote, became Prime Minister. Despite some irregularities, the OSCE recognized the elections as free and fair (Eismont 1997). Following the elections, Basayev formed opposition to President Maskhadov,28 which split the Chechen independence movement into Maskhadov’s moderate clan and Basayev’s more radical campaign (Malashenko and Trenin 2002). On May 12, 1997 Aslan Maskhadov and Boris Yeltsin signed a peace treaty on the principles of interrelations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya, which denounced the military solution to the Chechen issue (Rossiiskaia Gazeta 1997a).

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27 This section represents the factual outline of the second Chechen conflict as opposed to interpretations of the events given in the following sections.
28 The opposition included the former acting president and vice president under Dudayev, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Arbi Barayev, Movladi Udugov, Salman Raduyev and others.
As Malashenko and Trenin (2002, 26) note, in the interwar period Chechnya was pursuing three main goals: to build the Chechen state and consolidate society, to normalize the relations with Russia, and to gain international recognition. However, none of these goals was attained. Instead, as Kramer (2005a, 210) points out “three years of quasi-independence in Chechnya from September 1996 to September 1999 were marred by warlordism, rampant criminality, hostage takings, chaotic violence, grisly attacks on foreign aid workers and general lawlessness.” Grozny was counting on financial transfers from Moscow that were behind schedule (Chugaev 1997). On the verge of the second conflict, Russia’s State Duma issued a decree with a warning of a drastic increase in the level of crime in Chechnya (Postanovlenie GD N 3833-II GD 1999). Unemployment, crime, and the presence of large amounts of weapons all posed a problem for Chechnya. Kidnappings became rampant. For instance, in the six months of 1997, 76 kidnappings were reported (Rossiiskaia Gazeta 1997c). In order to deal with the situation, Maskhadov declared several states of emergency in 1998 (Orttung 2000, 73).

Chechen incursions into Dagestan date back to 1997 (for example, the Buinaksk attack on December 22), and fighting was reported as early as in 1998 (Izvestiia 1998). However, the beginning of the second Chechen conflict is associated with August 1999, when groups of Chechen fighters crossed the border into Dagestan from Chechnya and clashes between these forces and Dagestani police ensued (RG 08/10/1999 203). The Dagestani operation remains controversial, with some describing it as a Chechen invasion

(Willhelmsen 2005; Lyall 2006; Sussex 2004), while other accounts refer to the involvement of Russian secret services in provoking the Chechen forces to cross the border (Litvinenko and Felshtinsky 2004; Russell 2002). Despite the controversies surrounding the Dagestani events, Vladimir Putin, appointed Prime Minister on August 9, 1999, announced that “we are dealing with gangs of international terrorists” (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast 1999a). Further, the State Duma issued a decree on August 16 in which it declared:

> the invasion of illegal armed formations from the territory of the Chechen Republic into the territory of the Republic of Dagestan is to be considered an especially dangerous form of terrorism with the involvement of foreign citizens, meant to cause the secession of the Republic of Dagestan from the Russian Federation (Postanovlenie GD N 4277-II GD 1999).

In response to the fighting in Dagestan, Russia employed military force.30 Maskhadov, in turn, announced a state of emergency on August 16, 1999. The large-scale involvement of the Russian military in Chechnya, however, did not start until after a series of apartment bombings across Russia. On September 4th a bomb exploded in an apartment complex in Buinaksk, followed by similar explosions in Moscow and Volgodonsk. Following the apartment bombings the State Duma issued a decree in which it declared the failure of the Khasavyurt agreement:

> The [Russian] government’s policies towards the Chechen Republic as resulting from the Khasavyurt accords, the main conditions of which were deliberately not fulfilled by the Chechen side from the moment of ratification, caused enormous harm to the national security of the Russian Federation. This created favorable conditions for gaining strength and training illegal armed formations for the invasion into the territory of the Republic of Dagestan and spreading terror on the entire territory of Russia (Postanovlenie GD N 4293-II GD 1999).

30 For further details on Russia’s military involvement at the beginning of the second Chechen conflict see Evangelista (2002).
Following the denouncement of the peace accords, Russian federal troops entered Chechnya on September 30 (Evangelista 2002). Thus, Russia chose to address the second Chechen conflict through military means: “In purely military terms, by mobilizing 100,000 troops for the second Chechnya war (compared with 40,000 in the first one), the Russian armed forces adopted a tactic intended to suffer the fewest casualties possible, while killing as many Chechens as possible, including a large proportion of civilians” (Gomart 2008, 77).

Russia justified the necessity to employ the military in order to fight the threat of terrorism. Following the apartment bombings, Vladimir Putin declared in his address to the State Duma:

By blowing up the homes of our countrymen, the bandits are blowing up government and authority – nor presidential, municipal or parliamentary authority, but authority as such in the country (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast 1999b).

In his speech Putin described apartment bombings as “acts of terrorism,” called Chechnya “a seemingly lawfully existing huge terrorist camp” and talked of the necessity to conduct a “counterterrorist operation.” In response to the attacks, on September 15 minister of internal affairs Vladimir Rushailo announced the beginning of police counterterrorist operations “Whirlwind” and “Terek” across Russia (RG 09/25/1999 260). On September 23, 1999, a presidential secret decree on measures to increase effectiveness of counterterrorist operations on the territory of the North Caucasus effectively established the regime of a “counterterrorist operation” in Chechnya (Ukaz Prezidenta N 1255C 1999). In November, the State Duma announced that the “Russian
federation [was] conducting a counterterrorist operation to eradicate illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic” (Postanovlenie GD N 4556-II GD 1999).

And yet, the September apartment bombings, like the operation in Dagestan, remain controversial. As Shevtsova (2003, 36) points out, Russia claimed a “Chechen trace” in the apartment bombings even before starting investigations. However, none of the suspects prosecuted for the attacks was found to be Chechen. Thus, a trial following the Buinaksk case named several Dagestanis as responsible for the attacks (Vanin 2000; Evangelista 2002, 67). Further, on November 14, 2002 five residents of Karachaev-Cherkessia were accused of carrying out the bombings (Meier 2005). Suspects of the attacks in Moscow and Volgodonsk were tried in strict secrecy (Lapidus 2002, 43). As Lapidus points out, none were Chechen and all denied involvement in the attacks. According to Gilligan (2010, 31), an ethnic Karachai was prosecuted. By 2004 the federal prosecutor’s office announced the completion of the investigation of the 1999 bombings, but declared that “crime initiators remain unknown” (Meier 2005, 456).

Another controversial apartment bombing was thwarted in Ryzan on September 22, 1999, when Federal Security Service (FSB) officers were spotted placing hexogen (an explosive used in the previous apartment attacks) in the basement of an apartment complex. In response to the incident, the Ryazan police opened a “terrorist attempt” case (Kondratieva 2003). However, as Kondratieva notes, the case was promptly closed after the head of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev made a declaration on the following day.

31 For more on the apartment bombings and the Ryazan incident see Satter (2003) and Litvinenko and Felshtinsky (2004).
stating that it was a training conducted in Ryazan, and that there were no explosives involved. The Kremlin was further reluctant to conduct any additional investigations in the involvement of the FSB in the Ryazan incident (Voloshin 2000). Thus, when Sergei Kovalev requested information on the FSB training in Ryazan in 2003, his request was denied (Kondratieva 2003).

With fighting in Chechnya in the background, Vladimir Putin won presidential elections on March 26, 2000. Following his election, Putin started his policy of “Chechenization” by gradually delegating power to the local authorities in Chechnya.32 Back in October 1999 Putin announced that Russia no longer recognized the legitimacy of Maskhadov’s rule (Evangelista 2002, 69). As a result, after initially declaring direct presidential rule in May 2000, on June 8, 2000 Vladimir Putin abolished government representation in Chechnya and created a local administration (IZ 06/09/2000 452). Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov was appointed head of the administration. On December 20, 2000 Chechnya gained its representative in the Federation Council of the Russian Federation (IZ 12/22/2000 498).

Kadyrov’s appointment incited criticisms in Chechnya. Kadyrov was known for fighting against the federal forces and announcing jihad against Russia during the first Chechen campaign (IZ 08/19/2000 480). Consequently, his appointment as head of the administration provoked a “letter of 12,” which was a statement of disapproval coming from Chechnya’s administrators (IZ 07/07/2000 467).

In further efforts to create local administration, on December 12, 2002 Putin issued a decree calling a referendum on the Chechen constitution, and presidential and parliamentary elections (Ukaz Prezidenta N1401 2002). Following the referendum that took place on March 23, 2003, on April 1, 2003 the Constitution of Chechnya came into force and the head of administration Akhmad Kadyrov became acting president of the republic (IZ 04/03/2003 583). Further presidential elections took place on October 5, 2003, and Kadyrov was elected president.

Pro-Moscow Kadyrov was killed in a terrorist attack on May 9, 2004, and following another presidential election on August 29, Alu Alkhanov became his successor. Alkhanov later stepped down in February 2007, and Ramzan Kadyrov, son of Akhmad Kadyrov, became acting president. In the meantime, a parallel government headed by the elected Aslan Maskhadov continued to exist in Chechnya. Maskhadov was killed in March 2005, and was replaced by his vice president Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev. Sadulayev was killed in 2006 and was succeeded by Doku Umarov.

The fighting in Chechnya continued throughout 2009. Negotiation attempts were stagnant or non-existent. Negotiations started only after September 11 and the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan (Malashenko and Trenin 2002). As Malashenko and Trenin note, Moscow agreed to negotiate, but the initiative was coming from the Chechen side. Fighting was present in the republic throughout the decade, despite Moscow’s continuous declarations of having put an end to hostilities (Malashenko and Trenin 2002). As reports

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33 The referendum was pronounced neither free nor fair (International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 2003).
34 The PACE did not recognize these elections as legitimate either (IZ 10/08/2004 623).
of the fighting eventually subsided, Aleksandr Bortnikov, head of the National Counterterrorism Committee and director of FSB, abolished the regime of a “counterterrorist operation” in Chechnya on April 16, 2009 (IZ 04/17/2009 670).

During the second Chechen conflict, Russia adhered to a rigid information policy. As Shevtsova (2003) points out, after his election as president, Vladimir Putin tried to impose more control over mass media. To filter information on Chechnya, the Kremlin established a Federal Press Center. Since journalists were not allowed to travel independently to Chechnya, the Center was the only source of information during the second conflict (Gilligan 2010). Journalists whose accounts of the Chechen conflict diverged from the official version faced prosecution. For instance, Andrei Babitsky, a Radio Liberty reporter, who was critical of Russia’s actions in Chechnya, was charged with being a Chechen spy (Shevtsova 2003, 83). Further, during Putin’s second term the Chechen issue and bloodshed in the republic almost entirely disappeared from the political agenda (Kramer 2005a, 258). In 2000 (VCIOM 2000) only 14 percent of the population considered mass media coverage of the events in Chechnya as objective, while 38 percent saw it as inadequate, and 40 percent as not objective. Thus, while during the first conflict journalists could travel to Chechnya and could access information from alternative sources, the second campaign was characterized by secrecy and censorship of the information (Malashenko and Trenin 2002).

Thus, the second Chechen campaign was largely an outcome of Chechnya’s undecided status, which indicates the ethno-nationalist separatist roots of the conflict. Russia’s imperialist policies (KC 06/06/2004 138) and Chechnya’s “chosen trauma”
episodes of Stalin deportations and Yermolov’s campaign (KC 02/25/2004 114) were cited in the second conflict as they were during the first. And while a certain level of radicalization was present during the second conflict, the second campaign started with the operation in Dagestan, which preceded the disputed terrorist attacks in apartment complexes across Russia. Thus, Putin’s announcement of the campaign against “international terrorists” in August 1999 (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast 1999a) seemed premature at best, if not misrepresenting the nature of the conflict, with the Chechen side declaring it was fighting for independence (KC 11/05/2002 81).

5.3.1 The Second Chechen Conflict: The Government Account

The government account of the second Chechen conflict is based on the analysis of 341 articles from Rossiiskaia Gazeta. The broader themes emerging from the data parallel the themes of the first conflict and cover the issues of the status of Chechnya, the definition of the conflict, the justification of the ways of handling the conflict, and the participation of foreign forces in the conflict. These themes reveal the official position on the conflict, and point to the discourses with the help of which the Russian government justified the handling of the conflict with military means as part of the counterterrorist operation.

At the outset of the second conflict, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin described Chechnya as an inherent part of the Russian Federation (RG 09/18/1999 248). The

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35 For more on the radicalization of the second Chechen conflict see Evangelista (2002), Hughes (2007), and Tishkov (2004).
Russian government was reluctant to negotiate the undecided status of Chechnya,\(^{36}\) and claimed that the situation in the republic at the time precluded any further deliberation on the change of Chechnya’s status (RG 09/27/1999 264). Citing the growing lawlessness in the “rebellious republic” (RG 09/18/1999 249), Moscow proclaimed that the Khasavyurt agreement was no longer viable and could no longer serve as a guiding document regulating the relationships between Russia and Chechnya (RG 09/27/1999 264). As Putin remarked on the Khasavyurt agreement:

> It is my conviction that, using the 1996 accords, the extremist [Chechen] forces are trying to resolve the problem of the republic’s status unilaterally along separatist lines and exclusively in the interests of one side (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast 1999b).

Moscow claimed that by 1999 Chechnya came to harbor international terrorist groups (RG 09/30/1999 271; RG 10/01/1999 272), became a “safe haven for extremists” (RG 09/15/1999 241), and a “nest of international terrorism, where hundreds of extremists from many foreign countries were educated and trained to carry out terrorist attacks” (RG 10/29/2002 466). The Kremlin equated separatists with terrorists and bandits (RG 08/10/1999 203), and claimed that the issue of separatism was off the agenda (RG 11/26/1999 341). As reasons to avoid discussions of the issue of separatism Moscow cited not only the failure of the Khasavyurt agreement, but also Chechnya’s inability to govern itself. According to Russia, the Chechens had never had any experience running a state (RG 01/13/2000 363), nor had they reached a level of development suitable for state formation (RG 12/01/1999 344).

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\(^{36}\) The Khasavyurt agreement stated that the decision on the status of Chechnya had to be reached no later than December 31, 2001.
Instead of the label of an “operation to restore constitutional order” used in the first conflict, Moscow chose to portray separatism as terrorism from the outset of the second conflict. Moscow labeled armed clashes in Dagestan as “outbreaks of terrorism” (RG 08/11/1999 204). According to the Russian government, the second Chechen conflict started in response to the attempt of the Chechen forces to invade Dagestan:

Numerous bandit formations from Chechnya penetrated the neighboring territory of Dagestan and tried to capture three mountain villages – Ansalta, Rakhata, and Shadrada. The aim of the bandit endeavor is clear – to provoke the military action in response (RG 08/10/1999 203).

Accordingly, Moscow called the campaign a “well-planned action of certain foreign forces” (RG 09/08/1999 233), whose goal was to drag Dagestan into war with Russia so that Chechnya could then proceed to build an Islamic state on the territories of Chechnya and Dagestan (RG 08/12/1999 206).

Moscow claimed that Shamil Basayev and Khattab were heading forces of international Islamist terrorists in Dagestan (RG 10/23/1999 301). According to the government, these forces had been trained on the territory of Chechnya (RG 11/18/1999 333), and were linked to Dagestan’s extremist Wahhabi community (RG 09/29/1999 268). Even though then Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin had visited the Wahhabi community in Dagestan prior to the conflict and reported that the situation there was stable (RG 09/30/1999 271), the Kremlin portrayed Dagestan as a “safe heaven for Islamist extremists who had thoroughly prepared the attack in order to establish an Islamic state in the North Caucasus” (RG 09/15/1999 241). Thus, according to Russia, Moscow sent in troops to Chechnya to fight the “aggression of international terrorist organizations and bands of Wahhabis who [were] striving to create in the south of Russia
a new Islamic state based on the principles of ‘pure Islam’ that would span the territory from the Caspian to the Black Sea” (RG 12/01/1999 344). Thus, during the second conflict, the Kremlin equated terrorism with separatism, extremism, and military clashes.

Referring to the second Chechen conflict, Boris Yeltsin declared that Russia was “waging a difficult fight against international terrorism,” which the president linked to the “losses of lives in Moscow and Dagestan, in Volgodonsk and Buinaksk” (RG 12/07/1999 350). Following the September apartment bombings across Russia, the government immediately announced that the perpetrators were of Wahhabi identity (RG 09/08/1999 233), and claimed that the attacks were undoubtedly committed by the Chechen forces, pointing out the lead perpetrator – Khattab (RG 09/16/1999 243). Putin announced that the “aggression in Dagestan, terrorist acts in Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk are part of the aggression that had been planned in advance, thoroughly prepared, and generously financed by international centers” (RG 09/24/1999 255).

Thus, Moscow claimed during the second Chechen conflict that it was facing “not just disjointed criminal elements, but was dealing with well organized bands of international terrorists” (RG 11/10/1999 326). As a result, the Kremlin announced it had no choice but to use military force against the “venture of international terrorists in Dagestan” (RG 11/02/1999 317):

After the terrorist attack on Dagestan and bombings in apartment complexes in Moscow and other cities of the Russian Federation, the federal government was forced to resort to the extreme measures, those of employing the military against terrorist bandit formations (RG 04/04/2000 394).
As Vladimir Putin noted, Moscow was not ready to negotiate with “bandits” (RG 11/02/1999 318). Instead, Russia had to “strike against the terrorist nest, eliminate bases and camps of fighters, and eradicate the criminal infrastructure” (RG 04/27/2001 430).

According to Moscow, it was the raid of Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan that made the military solution necessary (RG 12/01/1999 344). According to Putin, the war that broke out against Russia was waged by international terrorists trained and financed from abroad, whose goal was to gain control over territories rich in resources (RG 09/25/1999 258). However, as Putin stated, there was no need to introduce a state of emergency in Chechnya (RG 08/12/1999 205), as the military action in the republic was an operation against terrorism (RG 08/14/1999 211). In response to the pressure from the West to negotiate, the Kremlin stated that it was not trying to decide the future status of Chechnya, but was only aiming to eradicate terrorism in the republic (RG 11/11/1999 327). President Yeltsin stated that even though the West failed to see it as such, Russia was involved in a campaign in Chechnya that was part of international efforts to combat terrorism (RG 12/07/1999 350).

Russia claimed international involvement in the conflict from the outset of the Dagestani operation:

Locations of camps training international terrorists on the territory of Chechnya are well known. The main Khattab base is located on the territory of a former pioneer camp near Serzhen’-lurt (RG 08/10/1999 203).

Thus, Russia claimed the presence of Arab mujahdeen among the Chechen forces from the outset of the conflict (RG 10/25/2002 463). The Kremlin publicized accounts of mercenaries and monetary support from Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Qatar, and Yemen (RG 08/10/1999 203; RG 09/07/1999 231; RG 09/24/1999 255; RG 09/28/1999 265; RG 11/13/1999 329; RG 05/24/2000 401; RG 06/16/2001 432). Accounts of foreign mercenaries ranged in numbers from 50 (RG 11/04/1999 320) to 100 (RG 09/21/1999 251), and to 300 (RG 01/18/2000 366). Moreover, Moscow claimed the involvement of Osama bin Laden in the Dagestani operation (RG 09/07/1999 231). Accordingly, bin Laden was reported to have given the Chechen fighters 25 million dollars (RG 09/09/1999 234).

Further, following the events of September 11, 2001, President Putin was the first world leader to have reached President Bush to express condolences (IZ 09/03/2004 609). According to Putin:

The Russian Federation has been fighting international terrorism for a long time now, relying exclusively on its own resources, and it has repeatedly urged the international community to join efforts. Russia’s position is unchanged: we, naturally, are still ready to make a contribution to the struggle against terror. … We also believe that what is happening in Chechnya cannot be viewed out of the context of the fight against international terrorism (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast 2001).

Thus, speaking of September 11, Putin made comparisons between the attacks on the U.S. and the fight in Chechnya (RG 10/09/2001 439). After September 11, Russia made references to Al Qaeda’s involvement in Chechnya (RG 01/19/2005 510), arguing that the conflict was part of the terrorist efforts to sustain the terrorist infrastructure connected to Al Qaeda and the Taliban (RG 09/16/2004 497).

However, just as in the first conflict, accounts of foreign involvement in the second Chechen conflict are incomplete and contradictory (RG 11/23/1999 337; RG
09/23/1999 254). The very international aspect of the events of the second Chechen conflict was disputed due to the absence of concrete names, states, and organizations (RG 09/07/2004 495). Further, Moscow mentioned that the interest of the Arab world in the Chechen conflict was subsiding (RG 10/14/2000 420), and that foreign financing of the second conflict was significantly lower than that of the first (RG 03/13/2001 428). Thus, even though the government framing of the second Chechen conflict was based on the image of international terrorist forces in the republic, just as in the first conflict, the very presence of these forces remained controversial.

The government framing of the second Chechen conflict was based on the perception of Chechnya as an integral part of the Russian Federation, similar to the first conflict. In this instance, however, Russia claimed that the Khasavyurt agreement failed and Chechnya became a breeding ground for terrorism (RG 09/30/1999 271). As a result, Moscow described its military action in the republic as a “counterterrorist operation,” meant to eradicate the presence of international terrorist groups in the republic (RG 12/07/1999 350). The framing of the second conflict was based on the discourse of terrorism, and Moscow’s actions were portrayed as part of the campaign against terrorism.

Russia’s employment of military force in the second Chechen conflict was justified as a necessary measure against terrorism. The military was claimed to be appropriate for fighting international terrorist groups, which, following September 11, were more frequently reported to be associated with Al Qaeda and the international threat of terrorism. Thus, Moscow’s second military campaign in Chechnya was framed as a
counterterrorist operation, which after September 11 became recognized as part of the international efforts against terrorism.

5.3.2 The Second Chechen Conflict: The Opposition Account

The framing of the second Chechen conflict as advanced by the opposition is constructed on the basis of the analysis of 360 articles from Izvestiia. The main themes that emerged from the data focus on the definition of the conflict, criticisms of the official framing of the conflict, criticisms of the ways of handling of the conflict, and criticisms of media policies during the conflict. These themes come together in representing the opposition account of the second Chechen conflict.

During the second Chechen conflict criticisms of the official government position by the opposition declined in rigor and volume as compared to the first conflict. Following the apartment bombings across Russian in September 1999, the opposition voiced concerns about the terrorist threat (IZ 10/01/1999 355; IZ 10/02/1999 357; IZ 03/16/2005 642). However, as during the first conflict, Izvestiia during the second conflict continued voicing concerns regarding Russia’s handling of the Chechen issue.

According to the opposition, events in Dagestan started as protests against the government in Makhachkala (IZ 08/11/1999 316). Thus, the second Chechen conflict originated within Dagestan, where the Wahhabi community came into conflict with

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37 See Chapter 2 for the discussion of the increased media censorship during the period of the second Chechen conflict.
“traditional Tariq Muslims”\textsuperscript{38} (IZ 08/04/1999 311). Accordingly, the Chechen regiments did not start the conflict, but crossed the border into Dagestan to support the local Wahhabis after the conflict had already started (IZ 08/04/1999 311). Moreover, Izvestiia pointed out, Shamil Basayev, cited by the government as one of the most radical leaders of “Islamic kamikaze” (RG 09/21/1999 250), was not a Wahhabi, but a follower of Tariq Islam (IZ 08/12/1999 317). Further, the opposition argued that Moscow misrepresented the nature of the threat in Chechnya: while the government claimed connections between Chechen fighters and bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, no proof of such links was given (IZ 10/11/2001 535).

The true reason for the second conflict, the opposition argued, was Moscow’s failure to reach an agreement with Chechnya regarding its future status (IZ 09/16/1999 343). According to the opposition, Vladimir Putin’s chances in the presidential elections scheduled for March 26, 2000 depended on his success in dealing with the situation in Chechnya (IZ 01/11/2000 413). Thus, Izvestiia portrayed Putin as planning a short triumphant campaign, and called him the “inspirer and organizer of a victorious march on the territory of Chechnya” (IZ 11/06/1999 380). The opposition argued that Putin’s stance on the issue was inflexible, since his “political future, his chances of becoming president of Russia were at stake in Chechnya” (IZ 11/17/1999 382).

Similar to the first conflict, during the second conflict the opposition continued to criticize the Kremlin for avoiding calling the events in Chechnya “war.” As Izvestiia pointed out, while Russian planes were spotted targeting the Chechen positions in

\textsuperscript{38} A Tariqa is a Sufi order.
Dagestan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Rushailo was claiming that there was no danger of war in the North Caucasus (IZ 08/04/1999 311). Further, government officials were reported denying Russia’s attacks in Chechnya, referring to Russian planes as “Unidentified Flying Objects” (IZ 08/27/1999 329). Izvestiia was critical of Moscow’s portrayal of the operation in Chechnya as a “calm stage of the campaign” or the “restoration of lawful government structures” while the Russian military was present on the ground (IZ 10/07/1999 360). Thus, the opposition ridiculed Moscow’s choice of words to describe the conflict: “counterterrorist operation” instead of “war,” or a “special operation” instead of “attack” (IZ 12/23/1999 403).

From the outset of the conflict the opposition was critical of the government’s rhetoric on the “counterterrorist operation,” comparing the present campaign to the first Chechen conflict:

After the ‘recurrence’ of Pervomaiskoe, the effective refusal of the leaders of the Chechen campaign to solve the problem via political means, the ‘blockade’ of Maskhadov, and reliance on other centers of political power that are not all that influential in Chechnya and not that legitimate from the point of view of constitutional law can all turn the war against terrorists into the war against Chechnya as it happened in 1994-1996 (IZ 10/13/1999 364).

Izvestiia pointed out that the Kremlin justified its actions as necessary against terrorism; and yet, the newspaper observed, it was impossible to talk of a limited counterterrorist operation in Chechnya, where “almost a quarter of the population became refugees” (IZ 10/02/1999 357). The opposition described the second Chechen conflict as “war,” arguing that the “counterterrorist operation became civil war a long time ago” (IZ 07/07/2000 467).
According to the opposition, Russia did not exhaust peaceful means of settling the Chechen issue (IZ 09/23/1999 347). Izvestia reported that Chechnya’s elected President Aslan Maskhadov condemned terrorism (IZ 10/12/1999 362), and stated that official Grozny was ready to cooperate in the search of perpetrators of the 1999 apartment bombings (IZ 09/15/1999 340). However, despite Maskhadov’s numerous attempts to negotiate, the opposition reported Moscow as reluctant to use peaceful methods (IZ 04/22/2000 445). Thus, Izvestia criticized Russia’s unwillingness to switch to negotiations and its claims that it had no other option but to resort to the military (IZ 10/02/1999 357).

Further, like in the first conflict, the opposition was critical of Russia’s propaganda on the second war. According to Izvestia, the Chechen campaign was conducted under a “secret regime” (IZ 09/23/1999 347), with General Kvashnin creating a “total information vacuum” around Russia’s military actions (IZ 10/19/1999 365). The opposition complained about the absence of information on the military operation in Dagestan (IZ 09/23/1999 347), criticizing inaccuracies in the reported facts (IZ 10/19/1999 365). Accordingly, information on the war reaching mass media was criticized as vague and contradictory (IZ 01/27/2000 420): “As a rule, there is no information from Chechnya today. There are only rumors, which, as is known, can be worse than the truth.” Referring to the lack of information on the conflict, the opposition observed (IZ 09/21/1999 346): “It can be said that Russia’s executive branch has already won the information warfare of the current Caucasus war.”
Referring to the federal press center, Izvestiia described it as the official propaganda machine (IZ 11/02/1999 376). Izvestiia summarized the work of the center as follows:

Imagine around ten rows of barbed wire with guards. The press center is located behind this fortification in one of Mozdok headquarters. … It is theoretically impossible to get to the press center even for a famous journalist – passes are not given out. We [journalists] have a tent, from which groups are selected every morning to visit the frontline. About eight people at a time. The selection principle is fairly simple: whether colonel Firsov liked your article, picture, or piece of reporting or not. … Attempts to cross into the Chechen territory on your own are checked mercilessly – journalists are arrested at checkpoints (even despite the official accreditation documents) (IZ 11/02/1999 377).

The opposition argued that Moscow was free to decide what specific information on Chechnya would reach the public (IZ 11/02/1999 377).

Thus, the opposition continued referring to the Chechen conflict as war, even though criticisms of official actions subsided as compared to the first campaign. The opposition was critical of Moscow’s term “counterterrorist operation,” comparing the conflict to the first war, and arguing that Vladimir Putin started the second campaign in order to strengthen his chances of winning the presidential elections. Accordingly, the opposition ascribed the reasons for the second war to the Kremlin’s failure to peacefully decide the future status of Chechnya, arguing that Moscow had not exhausted peaceful means of conflict resolution before sending troops to the republic. Moreover, Izvestiia was critical of the federal press center and Moscow’s efforts to filter information on the war. As the opposition argued, Russia successfully eliminated much of the opposition to its actions due to its information campaign (IZ 09/21/1999 346).
5.3.3 The Second Chechen Conflict: The Separatists Speak

The account of the second Chechen conflict as advanced by the separatists is based on 99 articles from *Kavkaz Center*. The themes that emerged from the data span the issues of the definition of the conflict, and criticisms of the official actions in Chechnya, the official rhetoric on the conflict, and the military handling of the conflict. The separatist framing of the conflict is based on the analysis of these themes and presents an image of the conflict that is rather different from that advanced by the Russian government.

According to the separatists, the second Chechen war was not their choice; rather, it was imposed on Chechnya by Russia (KC 12/14/2003 105) along with colonial policies “aimed at enslavement or extermination of the Chechen nation, which Moscow has been carrying out for several centuries” (KC 02/25/2004 114). Thus, the Chechen side claimed it was Putin who needed and started the war (KC 09/18/2004 140). Chechnya’s President Aslan Maskhadov argued that Russia orchestrated the “raid on Dagestan” when the “Russian secret services staged ‘an uprising in Dagestan’ to lure Chechen volunteers into this republic and have a pretext to talk about ‘Chechen aggression’ afterwards” (KC 11/08/2003 100). Further, the Chechen separatists did not claim responsibility for the apartment bombings across Russia with Maskhadov arguing that the Kremlin was the perpetrator of the attacks and that it used them as a pretext to invade Chechnya:

The second war began after the Russian secret services masterminded blasts of apartment buildings in Buynaksk, Volgodosk, and Moscow. It was by sheer chance that one more building was not blown up in Ryazan. All these cold-blooded murders were perpetrated by the Russian authorities in order to shift the blame on the Chechens and label them as ‘international terrorists’ (KC 11/08/2003 100).
Speaking of terrorism, the Chechen side argued that Moscow used the term “counterterrorist operation” in order to disguise the “grave crimes against humanity” that it was perpetrating against the Chechens (KC 05/28/2004 126). Accordingly, it was “Putin who called the war ‘terrorism’ and provided for its endlessness” (KC 10/31/2002 79). In turn, the separatists referred to Russia’s actions in the republic as terrorism, describing the actions of the federal forces as “terrorist attacks against peaceful civilians committed by Russian ‘death squads’” (KC 04/22/2004 118). Denying the existence of the threat of terrorism in Chechnya, the separatists argued that the conflict was “classical sabotage and guerrilla warfare, which started right at the moment of the incursion of Russian criminal militarized gang formations consisting of mercenaries and butchers into Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” (KC 02/08/2004 110).

Similar to the first conflict, during the second conflict the Chechen side described the events as “war”:

We would also like to remind that this is a war. Russian troops are the invading troops by status, and all actions carried out by the Chechen Mujahideen against them are legitimate acts of war (KC 12/11/2003 104).

The separatists advanced the following terms to describe the Chechen side in the war: “Chechen army,” “Chechen militia,” “fighters of the Chechen Resistance,” “self-defense groups,” “fighters for independence,” and “Chechen patriots” (KC 06/17/2003 91). The label “Chechen Mujahideen” was used in the context of guerilla warfare to designate fighters carrying out “combat operations and raids” (KC 02/08/2004 110). To describe the Russian side, on the other hand, the separatists referred to them as “invader’s troops,” “state gang formations,” “gangs of mercenaries,” “federal militants,”
“colonizers,” “Russian mercenaries,” and “Russian fascists” (KC 06/17/2003 91).

Referring to the actions of the federal forces, the separatists noted:

Russian troops have virtually become punitive death squads that unleashed the unprecedented terror against our peaceful civilians: against women, children and the elderly. Chechen youth became the number one target for physical elimination and maiming, with no distinction being made on the political or ideological basis. The extermination of the gene pool of the Chechen nation is going on right in front of the entire world (KC 12/14/2003 105).

According to the Chechen side, Putin was carrying out imperialist colonial policies in Chechnya, guided by “absolute violence and ruthless and bloody suppression of any attempt of national self-identification of subdued nations, let alone their attempts to attain sovereignty” (KC 08/06/2004 138). As a result, Grozny claimed that Moscow was “staking all on military victory,” and was therefore reluctant to negotiate (KC 11/06/2002 84). The Chechen side blamed Putin for countless casualties in Chechnya due to his rigid adherence to a “military solution to settle what essentially is a political issue” (KC 02/09/2004 111).

Criticizing Moscow’s failure to come to a negotiating table, Khattab stated:

There are no negotiations. I think that negotiations - big game. During a month or two, they [the Russian side] could not agree to fix a place for the meeting, when this question is possible to solve in one hour, this is one additional proof of this game (KC 11/18/2001 60).

In this situation, Maskhadov claimed that a political solution could be reached within a short period of time: “30 minutes are enough for the two presidents to meet and to get this bloodshed to stop, to get this terrible war to stop, to come to an agreement” (KC 09/18/2004 140). According to the separatists, Grozny made an effort on about 30
occasions to persuade Russia to negotiate; however, “the Russian leadership turned a deaf ear” to such proposals (KC 11/20/2003 102).

In reference to Moscow’s political action in the republic, the Chechen side was critical of Russia’s efforts to install a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya arguing that the 2003 elections were not legitimate due to the “continuing war and the occupation of a considerable part of Chechen territories” (KC 11/08/2003 100). The separatists claimed that Kadyrov’s government was an “invaders’ puppet administration” (KC 05/12/2004 123). Further, Aslan Maskhadov denounced the elections stating that the voter turnout did not constitute more than 3 to 5 percent of the population (KC 11/08/2003 100). As a result, Grozny announced that Russia “foisted its man [Kadyrov] on the Chechens” (KC 02/09/2004 111) and pointed out that Moscow’s “referendum and election shows” in Chechnya were only destined to cause further rounds of violence (KC 11/08/2003 100).

Grozny pointed out that Moscow conducted its “brutal operations under a blanket of secrecy” (KC 11/05/2002 81). In this situation, the Chechen side was critical of Russia’s propaganda on the war and Moscow’s efforts to claim the presence of “international terrorism” in Chechnya (KC 11/05/2002 83). President Maskhadov claimed that there was no “international terrorism,” nor outside support or foreign intervention in the Chechen conflict; he argued “all of these [were] fiction” (KC 09/18/2004 140). According to Grozny, Russia tried to portray the Chechen side as Al Qaeda’s cooperatives “in order not to enter the negotiations and to continue the slaughter in Chechnya” (KC 11/05/2002 82).

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39 The elections were pronounced illegitimate by Moscow Helsinki Group (Cecil 2003).
The separatists claimed it was Moscow’s propaganda that was trying to prove the international connections (KC 03/13/2005 143). Grozny ridiculed Putin’s claims that gangs in Chechnya “come from abroad” (KC 04/09/2005 150), pointing out that:

Russia had drawn attention to foreign Arab fighters in Chechnya and accuses rebels of links to radical Islamist groups like the Afghan Taliban and al Qaida, though their influence in the region is hard to gauge (KC 11/06/2002 84).

In addition, the Chechen side was critical of Russia’s references to Islamist extremists (KC 08/06/2004 138) or Wahhabis in the republic (KC 04/07/2005 149). Refuting connections to Al Qaeda, Shamil Basayev stated (KC 03/24/2005 146): “I am not acquainted with Bin Laden and have had no contact with him… Anyway, Putin has already ‘appointed’ him as my commander.” According to Basayev, Khattab did not know bin Laden either, nor was he a member of Al Qaeda (KC 03/24/2005 146).

Thus, along the lines of the first conflict, the separatists framed the second Chechen conflict as war. The Chechen side argued that the war was imposed on the republic by Russia and that the military “counterterrorist operation” masked Putin’s efforts to carry out imperialist policies of subjugating the Chechen people (KC 08/06/2004 138). According to Grozny, it favored negotiations, and Russia was to blame for the failure of the peaceful solution. The Chechen side criticized Moscow’s claims of international presence in Chechnya as well as the Kremlin’s efforts to install a pro-Moscow government in the republic. Accordingly, the separatists predicted a further escalation of violence due to Russia’s incompetent handling of the Chechen issue.
5.4.1 Separatism vs. Terrorism

This section traces the use of terrorist tactics by the Chechen separatists. While the Chechen side resorted to terrorism during the first conflict, the first Chechen campaign was not pronounced a counterterrorist operation. The second campaign, on the other hand, started as a “counterterrorist operation.” At the outset of the fighting in Dagestan, before the apartment bombings across Russia, the Kremlin stated it was an international threat of terrorism. Moscow dismissed the separatist nature of the conflict.

Russia’s definition of Chechnya shifted from its being an integral part of Russia during the first conflict (RG 12/27/1994 41) to being a base of international terrorism during the second conflict (RG 10/29/2002 466). Moscow’s references to separatism declined during the second conflict, as can be seen in Table 5.3. Thus, the percentage of articles using the term “separatism” declined from 4 to 1 percent, while the usage of “terrorism” increased from 5 to 21 percent. The separatist challenge became blurred with terrorism, and separatism and terrorism became a single threat. As Yeltsin pointed out in his statement on the situation in Chechnya:

Today our country is waging a difficult fight against international terrorism, which insolently defied the peoples of Russia. It is a fight for the lives of Russians, many of whom we lost in Moscow and Dagestan, in Volgodonsk and Buinaksk. It is a fight to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. In addition, it is a part of joint efforts of the international community to fight international terrorism (RG 12/07/1999 350).

Separatism became even further marginalized after the apartment bombings in 1999. Following the attacks, the Kremlin noted that under the circumstances, recognizing an independent Chechnya would mean that terrorists who perpetrated attacks in
Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk had achieved their goal (IZ 09/24/1999 348). According to Moscow, Chechen terrorists did not pursue independence, since they already had *de facto* independence after the Khasavyurt agreement was signed in 1997 (RG 10/29/2002 466). However, along with eradicating the threat of terrorism, the counterterrorist operation in Chechnya was meant to “restore democracy and human rights in the Chechen Republic, preserve the territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Russian Federation” (RG 04/18/2000 398).

While some terrorist attacks were committed in the interwar years, the second Chechen campaign started in response to the events in Dagestan and the 1999 apartment bombings, which followed the deployment of federal forces in Chechnya. Several explosions occurred in the South of Russia while Yeltsin and Maskhadov were negotiating a peace agreement in spring 1997, with the future of Chechnya still unclear. On April 23, 1997 an explosion happened at the Armavir railway station (Krasnodarskii Region). On April 28 it was followed by a similar explosion at the railway station in Piatigorsk, Stavropolskii Region. While official Grozny denied any connections to these attacks, the explosions were blamed on the Chechens (*Rossiiskaia Gazeta* 1997b). According to the officials, Salman Raduyev, “one of the terrorist leaders,” took responsibility for the explosions (RG 03/14/2000 386).

The series of terrorist attacks that precipitate the second Chechen conflict started in August 1999. However, the majority of terrorist attacks ascribed to the Chechen separatists took place after Moscow’s announcement that it was fighting international terrorism in August 1999 (see Table 5.1). Following the outbreak of fighting in Dagestan,
an explosion occurred in the Okhotny Riad mall in Moscow on August 31. Officials claimed a connection between the explosion and the events in the North Caucasus (IZ 09/02/1999 331). However, as Litvinenko and Felshtinsky (2004, 118) point out, it was highly unlikely that Chechens were perpetrators of the attack in the mall, the director of which, Umar Dzhabrailov, was himself a Chechen.

Figure 5.1. Terrorist acts perpetrated by the Chechen separatists over time. Source: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=4&search=chechens&count=100&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table. Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed on June 8, 2011.

This explosion was followed by a series of apartment bombings in Russia. On September 4th, a bomb went off in an apartment complex in Buinaksk, Dagestan. On September 8th an explosion occurred on Gurianov street in Moscow, followed by a blast on Kashirskoe shosse on September 13th. Another explosion happened in Volgodonsk on September 16th. Following the explosions in Moscow, head of the FSB public relations center Aleksandr Zdanovich announced that the explosions were “a true terrorist war” (RG 09/14/1999 240). According to Moscow, as a result of the explosions, 305 people
died and 500 were injured (RG 09/09/2000 417). The Kremlin claimed the attacks were ordered by Khattab, and were perpetrated by Wahhabi extremists:

The defeat of bandit formations, and created by them centers of Wahhabism in this republic [Dagestan], incited anger and hatred among their supporters, trained in Khattab’s camps. They responded with the September explosions in apartment bombings in the cities of Russia (RG 04/27/2001 430).

Thus, following the apartment bombings, before any investigations and trials took place, the Kremlin announced that the perpetrators of the attacks were undoubtedly linked to “Chechnya, a bandit hole of bloodthirsty Khattab” (RG 09/16/1999 243). Putin stated that it was “absolutely clear that terrorists who organized the explosions in Moscow are hiding on the territory of Chechnya and are supported by extremist forces” (IZ 09/16/1999 342). According to the Kremlin, it was Russia’s failure to defeat terrorism back in Budennovsk (when Moscow sat down to negotiate with the Chechen side) that was responsible for the spread of terrorism across the country (RG 09/18/1999 248). As a result, Vladimir Putin declared that terrorism had to be dealt with immediately, and that “forces and measures adequate to the threat” had to be employed against it (RG 09/17/1999 245).

Basayev and Khattab were named as the masterminds behind the attacks, and even Osama bin Laden was mentioned in connection to the bombings (RG 09/24/1999 255). However, Basayev denied his, as well as Khattab’s, involvement in the apartment bombings (Wines 1999). As Basayev stated, “they [Moscow] also pinned the bombing of houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk on us without any proof and started the war, but if I had blown up those houses, I would never deny it” (KC 03/24/2005 146). Khattab further claimed he was fighting against the Russian army, and not women and children (RFERL
The Chechen side argued that the bombings were undoubtedly organized by the FSB “on Putin’s orders” (KC 04/01/2002 70). Further, Chechen President Maskhadov denied any connection to the attacks (Weekend Australian 1999), and offered assistance in the apartment bombing investigations (IZ 09/15/1999 340). Thus, it remains questionable why Basayev did not take responsibility for the apartment bombings when he did claim other terrorist acts: the 2002 theater attack (Fray 2004), Kadyrov’s assassination (Page 2004b), and the 2004 Beslan siege (Page 2004a) among them. The Kremlin’s opposition also referred to Moscow’s Basayev-Khattab version of the attacks as a “myth” (IZ 10/28/1999 373), thus further questioning the origins of the attacks.

Another wave of explosions in Moscow took place after Putin appointed Akhmad Kadyrov as head of the administration in Chechnya in June 2000. On August 8th an explosion occurred in an underground passage on Pushkin square in Moscow. One of the official versions claimed a “Chechen trace” (IZ 08/08/2001 517). On February 5, 2001 a bomb exploded in Moscow’s Belorusskaia metro station. On October 19, 2002 another explosion happened in front of a McDonalds restaurant in Moscow. A Chechen was arrested as a suspect (IZ 10/26/2002 560).

On October 23, 2002, a group of Chechen fighters headed by Movsar Barayev took around 900 hostages in the theater on Dubrovka in Moscow.40 According to the government, the attack was planned by the “leader of Chechen separatists Aslan Maskhadov” (RG 10/26/2002 464). As the Kremlin claimed, negotiation attempts with terrorists did not produce any results (RG 10/26/2002 464). Subsequently, on October 26

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40 For more on the Dubrovka siege see Dunlop (2006).
the government decided to storm the building using a soporific gas, as a result of which all hostage-takers and over 100 hostages died (RG 09/03/2004 494). As previously in Budennovsk (1995) and Kizliar/Pervomaiskoe (1996), the hostage-takers demanded the termination of the war in Chechnya (RG 12/25/2002 470; IZ 10/25/2002 554). Barayev’s group demanded a halt to the counterterrorist operation (RG 09/03/2004 494).

Further explosions followed Putin’s efforts to establish a Moscow-controlled administration in Chechnya. After the 2003 referendum, two suicide bombers set off explosives at the rock concert “Krylia” (Wings) in Tushino, Moscow. Officials claimed that suicide bombers who perpetrated the attacks were connected to Shamil Basayev (RG 09/02/2004 492). The Kremlin, however, denied that the attack was perpetrated in connection to any specific dates (RG 07/12/2003 482). In May 2003 Basayev announced a start of the operation “Boomerang,” a retaliation campaign not only against the federal troops, but also against Russian cities (RG 07/12/2003 482).

After Kadyrov’s election as president of Chechnya in October 2003, more suicide terrorist attacks followed in Moscow: on December 9, 2003 in front of the hotel National, on February 6, 2004 on the metro train near Avtozavodskaya station. Following these explosions, Moscow security services advanced an argument that Chechen terrorists plan attacks on significant dates: the explosion in front of National happened on December 9th, the date when Yeltsin signed his 1994 Decree 2166 allowing the deployment of troops in Chechnya (IZ 02/07/2004 596). Akhmad Kadyrov himself was assassinated in an attack on May 9, 2004. On August 24, 2004, planes TU-154 and TU-134 crashed as a result of explosions onboard. After yet another presidential election in Chechnya on August 29,
2004 when Alu Alkhanov became president, a female suicide bomber set off an explosive device in front of the metro station Rizhskaya in Moscow on August 31. According to Moscow, Islambouli Brigades, allegedly linked to Al Qaeda, claimed the explosion (RG 09/02/2004 491).

One of the last attacks claimed by Basayev was the siege of School No.1 in Beslan, North Ossetia.\textsuperscript{41} Once again, a group of Chechen fighters headed by Doku Umarov demanded that Russia withdraw troops from Chechnya and grant Chechnya independence (RG 09/18/2004 500). Following the attack on Beslan, Aslan Maskhadov expressed his condolences and stated that the only reason that such attacks are perpetrated is the “ongoing war in Chechnya” (KC 09/18/2004 140). However, Moscow stated that the Beslan attack was 99 percent the responsibility of the terrorist “Reich,” and only 1 percent Russia’s responsibility due to its inability to defeat terrorism (RG 09/07/2004 495). According to Russia’s security services, the attack was perpetrated with Al Qaeda’s involvement (IZ 09/04/2004 612).

Thus, terrorist attacks during the second Chechen conflict fall into two groups: those that are controversial and contested (the numerous explosions and suicide bombings), and those that were publicly perpetrated by groups of Chechen fighters (Dubrovka and Beslan). And while the new development in explosions was the presence of suicide bombers, explosions themselves were numerous in Moscow in the first conflict as well: an explosion on a metro train near the Tulskaia station on June 11, 1996, an explosion on a trolleybus on Strastnoi Bulvar on July 11, 1996, or an explosion on a

\textsuperscript{41} For more on Beslan see Dunlop (2006).
trolleybus on Prospekt Mira on July 12, 1996. The hostage-taking campaigns on Dubrovka and in Beslan, on the other hand, much resemble the raids on Budennovsk and Kizliar/Pervomaiskoe, when a group of Chechen fighters took hostages and demanded Chechnya’s independence and withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. As a result, terrorist attacks on the Moscow theater and in Beslan can be classified as having ethno-nationalist motives, just like the attacks on Budennovsk and Kizliar/Pervomaiskoe during the first conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Government Conflict II (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) %</th>
<th>Government Conflict I (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) %</th>
<th>Opposition Conflict II (Izvestiia) %</th>
<th>Opposition Conflict I (Izvestiia) %</th>
<th>Separatists Conflict II (Kavkaz Center) %</th>
<th>Separatists Conflict I (Kavkaz Center) %</th>
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<td>fighters (boeviki)</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>49*</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorists (terroristy)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>29*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43*</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bandits (bandity)</td>
<td>27*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bandit formations (bandformirovaniia)</td>
<td>21*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bands (bandy)</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>separatists (separatisty)</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>13*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>criminals (prestupniki)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Dudayev’s supporters (dudayevtsy)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 5.1. Most common references to the actors involved in the second Chechen conflict.

Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.
And yet, the Russian government referred to the Chechen fighters as “terrorists” from the very outset of the second conflict. “Terrorists” at 39 percent of word usage (compared to 11 percent during the first conflict) along with “fighters” at 46 percent became the most frequent label for the Chechen side (see Table 5.1). The usage of the term “separatists” in the government database remained similar to the first conflict with a slight decline from 10 to 7 percent. As can be seen from Table 5.2, there is a much larger gap between the application of the terms “separatists, separatism” and “terrorists, terrorism” in the second conflict. In addition the usage of “terrorists, terrorism” was high at the very outset of the conflict and did not increase significantly following the attacks on Dubrovka and Beslan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August 1, 1999 – October 22, 2002 (October 23 – Dubrovka) %</th>
<th>October 23, 2002 – August 31, 2004 (September 1, 2004 – Beslan) %</th>
<th>September 1, 2004 – April 17, 2009 %</th>
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<td>separatists, separatism</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terrorists, terrorism</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2. The government usage of terms “separatism” and “terrorism” over time (according to Rossiiskaia Gazeta).

The application of the term “terrorists” increased from 11 to 29 percent for Moscow’s opposition as well. However, the opposition referred to the Chechen side as separatists more than in the first conflict (an increase from 5 to 13 percent). And while the usage of “terrorists” increased, the term was used mostly to describe terrorist attacks. Thus, Izvestiia criticized Moscow’s references to “international terrorist” arguing that the terrorist threat in Russia had domestic roots, and was based on Russia’s own political mistakes (IZ 09/28/1999 352).42 For instance, referring to the attack on Beslan, the

42 See also Light (2007).
opposition pointed out that the attack was first and foremost an outcome of the Chechen conflict (IZ 09/07/2004 613).

The separatists, in turn, applied the term “terrorists” (usage at 43 percent) to the actions of the Kremlin (KC 11/05/2002 82; KC 04/24/2004 119). The Chechen side called their own actions “only retaliatory actions in response to terrorism of the Russian state” (KC 01/11/2004 106). As the separatists noted:

Russian propaganda claims that the Chechen Resistance is some sort of a ‘branch of international terrorist network.’ Chechen Commanders are always presented as some insane fanatics and terrorists, who are thinking about nothing but blowing somebody up and dying. At the same time they keep telling about some mythical terrorists in Chechnya, who are allegedly coming to make some money on the war against Russia (KC 04/24/2004 119).

According to the Chechen side, the “so-called ‘Chechen terrorism’ [was] completely rooted in the Kremlin’s traditional imperial policies” (KC 02/08/2004 110). Thus, describing the events on Dubrovka, the separatists stated:

There is no excuse for taking civilians hostage. The Moscow outrage was an act of terrorism, as Russia insists. But it was a smaller act of terror within a greater one: Moscow’s ongoing war to crush the Chechen independence movement, an inconvenient cause ignored by the outside world. The hostage-taking in Moscow was a desperate act by desperate people without voice or hope (KC 11/05/2002 81).

The second Chechen campaign was proclaimed a “counterterrorist operation,” with the usage of the term increasing from 0 to 18 percent (see Table 5.3). Russia’s discourse on legality and constitutionality gave way to justifying the campaign as an operation against terrorism. Thus, the usage of “law, lawful” declined from 13 to 7 percent, and the usage of “constitution, constitutional” went down from 15 to 7 percent.
The Chechen side, on the other hand, called the conflict predominantly “war” at 82 percent, and criticized the label “counterterrorist operation” as misleading:

Sooner or later cynical definition of war as being an ‘antiterrorist’ operation, and declaring an entire nation to be terrorists could not help it expose its true essence before the eyes of the Russian electorate, who are trying so hard not to notice it (KC 10/31/2002 79).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Government Conflict I</th>
<th>Government Conflict II</th>
<th>Opposition Conflict I</th>
<th>Opposition Conflict II</th>
<th>Separatists Conflict I</th>
<th>Separatists Conflict II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>war (voina)</td>
<td>22* 15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>82* 68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terrorism (terrorizm)</td>
<td>21* 5</td>
<td>14*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46* 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antiterrorist, counterterrorist (antiterroristicheskii, kontrterroristicheskii)</td>
<td>18* 0</td>
<td>18*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict (konflikt)</td>
<td>10* 29</td>
<td>9*</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law, lawful (zakon, zakonnyi)</td>
<td>7* 13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44* 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constitution, constitutional (konstitutsiia, konstitutsionnyi)</td>
<td>7* 15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20* 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extremism (ekstremizm)</td>
<td>4 2</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33*</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criminal (kriminal’nyi)</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>separatism (separatizm)</td>
<td>1* 4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3. Words used in reference to the second Chechen conflict.

Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.

The analysis of terrorist attacks during the second Chechen conflict does not point to a drastic change in the tactics. The second conflict experienced the emergence of suicide bombers, but the large-scale campaigns of Dubrovka and Beslan followed the patterns of Budennovsk and Kizliar/Pervomaiskoe, where a group of Chechen fighters
took a large number of hostages and demanded Chechnya’s independence and a halt to
the war in Chechnya. Despite these similarities in the terrorist tactics employed by the
Chechen side, the Russia government framed the second conflict as a counterterrorist
operation. Moscow justified its military operations in Dagestan and Chechnya as
necessary against terrorism. A lot of the Kremlin’s justification was based on the 1999
apartment bombings in the Russian cities, even though these attacks happened after the
deployment of Russian troops against the Chechen forces. The issue of separatism, on the
other hand, almost disappeared from Moscow’s political agenda.

5.4.2 Separatism vs. Islamism

Dzhokhar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov were fighting for a secular Chechnya.
However, Dudayev established a Supreme Islamic Council back in 1991. In 1997 a
constitutional amendment declared Islam the state religion (Malashenko and Trenin
2002). In 1999 Shamil Basayev formed a Shura Council which contested Maskhadov’s
authority (Gammer 2006, 213). In response to the pressures from his opposition, in
February 1999 Maskhadov disbanded parliament, suspended the constitution and ordered
a transition to sharia law (Izvestia 1999). Thus, religion played a role throughout the
years of the Russo-Chechen conflict.43

However, religious discourses of the Russian government and the separatists
during the second Chechen conflict present rather conflicting pictures. Russia justified its

43 For more on the role of Islam in the second Chechen conflict see Malashenko and Trenin (2002), Hahn
use of military force in Chechnya as necessary against the threat presented by extremist Wahhabis, who were the alleged perpetrators of the apartment bombings in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk (RG 11/26/1999 341). Moscow described Wahhabism (a religious branch within Sunni Islam, predominant in Saudi Arabia)44 as a “deadly evil,” an intolerant and extremist movement (RG 09/28/1999 265). As the Kremlin claimed, Wahhabism was directly connected to terrorism (RG 11/17/1999 332), and Chechnya, along with Afghanistan, was the main center for breeding Islamist extremists (RG 05/19/2001 431). With the frequency of usage at 11 percent (see Table 5.4), the terms “Wahhabism, Wahhabis” constituted Moscow’s predominant discourse on the religious factor during the second conflict. According to the Kremlin, Khattab (the highest usage at 15 percent) was the main leader of the extremist forces, leading a battalion of foreigners called Jamaat Islami (Zhitich 1999).

Thus, Moscow claimed that Chechen terrorists were carrying out attacks against Russia due to religious beliefs, outlined in the sharia law (RG 09/28/1999 265), rather than in pursuit of separatist motives (RG 05/19/2001 431). The Kremlin argued:

Muslim fundamentalists are openly promoting nationalist animosity, thus creating a real threat to national security and territorial integrity of the state. They call for a forced change of the current state regime, not hiding their main goal: to unleash large-scale religious and ethnic conflicts under the banner of creating a single Islamic state in the Caucasus (RG 09/27/1999 263).

Russia justified its use of military means in response to jihad declared against it (RG 10/13/1999 285). Accordingly Moscow was fighting religious mujahdeen (RG

44 For more on Wahhabism see Tishkov (2004) and Sakwa (2005).
09/29/1999 267), financed by foreign forces (RG 10/01/1999 275), and connected to the Afghan Taliban (RG 10/08/1999 282).

However, Moscow’s portrayal of Islamist extremists and Wahhabi terrorists led by Khattab was widely disputed. For instance, Chechnya’s President Maskhadov denied the allegation that Chechnya wanted to build a Caliphate in the North Caucasus (KC 09/18/2004 140). In his explanation of the ideological base for the Chechen movement, Maskhadov noted:

I would like to state again that we are not international terrorists or fundamentalists. We are Chechens fighting for our national independence. We did not invent the idea of national liberation, we inherited it from our fathers and from our grandfathers. We are carrying on with what they started centuries ago, when there were no such things as ‘international terrorism’ or ‘fundamentalism.’ We simply want to free ourselves from the colonial oppression of a barbaric state, and this is what we are doing (KC 11/08/2003 100).

In response to Moscow’s discourse on Wahhabism, the separatists defined a Wahhabi as the “Russian version of an Islamic extremist” (KC 09/18/2004 140), and stated that Wahhabism was “no more than the propaganda term” (KC 11/21/2001 61). Dagestan’s Mufti Akhmed-haji Abdullaev pointed out that Wahhabis were not religious fighters (IZ 08/18/1999 324). Further, as the opposition noted, Khattab’s role in the conflict was highly exaggerated (IZ 07/07/2001 512): “[Khattab is] no more than a military instructor, and his surreal success is mostly the result of propaganda.” While Khattab first appeared in Chechnya in 1994 (RG 11/02/1999 315), his name was not mentioned even once during the first conflict (see Table 5.4).

Further, jihad was declared against Russia by the Chechen side (e.g. Dudayev and Kadyrov) during the first conflict. Describing “jihad” during the second conflict, the
separatists stated their goals as follows (KC 06/09/2003 90): “we are planning to liberate our Homeland from under the yoke of the invaders, to liberate the Chechen people from oppression, but the will of Almighty Allah is on everything.” Russian “invaders” were juxtaposed to Chechen “mujahedeen”: “Mujahedeen who took up arms and who are fighting against the federal forces of the invaders” (KC 09/18/2004 140). Thus, the term “mujahedeen” was used by the separatists as a synonym to “fighters” (KC 08/06/2004 138).

Islamic battalions and suicide fighters were also mentioned in the first conflict. During the second conflict Moscow claimed that the appearance of female suicide bombers from Chechnya was a direct outcome of the spread of Wahhabism (RG 09/02/2004 492). According to the Kremlin, Shamil Basayev had trained around 400 Islamist suicide fighters ready to carry out terrorist attacks on the territory of Russia (RG 09/21/1999 250). The separatists, on the other hand, claimed the spread of “Shaheeds” (martyrs) was due to the years of war in Chechnya (KC 01/16/2003 88).

Thus, many of the religious references during the second conflict originated during the first Chechen operation. However, while the first conflict was not framed in religious terms, the second conflict became known as a Wahhabi invasion led by Khattab’s forces, linked to international extremists and Islamist terrorists. And while a certain amount of religious radicalization was present during the second conflict, as the opposition noted, the spread of extremism in Chechnya was an indirect consequence of the employment of military force in the republic back in 1994 (IZ 09/12/2000 484). Further, such extremism mostly followed the start of the second campaign in August
1999, rather than preceded it: it was not until 2007 that Doku Umarov proclaimed himself
Emir of the Caucasus Emirate.

Contradictions exist as to how the government and the separatists viewed the
religious factor during the second conflict, and the government did not produce a
coherent account of extremism in Chechnya. Thus as Malashenko and Trenin (2002, 87)
point out, “no one among experts, politicians, or secret services can cite an exact number
of Islamists in the North Caucasus, nor the share they constitute among the Muslim
population. Numbers fluctuate between 5 and 20%.” Thus, the role of Islamist
radicalization during the second Chechen conflict remains ambiguous.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Government Conflict II (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) %</th>
<th>Government Conflict I (Rossiiskaia Gazeta) %</th>
<th>Opposition Conflict II (Izvestiia) %</th>
<th>Opposition Conflict I (Izvestiia) %</th>
<th>Separatists Conflict II (Kavkaz Center) %</th>
<th>Separatists Conflict I (Kavkaz Center) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khattab</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahhabism (wahhabizm)/Wahhabis (wahhabity)</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremists (ekstremisty)</td>
<td>9*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bin Laden</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahedeen (modzhakhedy)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamism (islamizm)/Islamists (islamisty)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4. Most common references to religious extremism.

Numbers indicate the percentage of articles in the dataset in which the term was used. While some terms
have frequency of usage equal to 0, it does not mean that the word was not used in the dataset. 0 indicates
that the percentage of usage is so small, it is close to 0.

* indicates a statistically significant difference in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the government numbers.
5.5.1 Legal Regime of the Second Chechen Conflict

The second Chechen conflict was framed as a counterterrorist operation, and was justified by the corresponding counterterrorist legislation. The first pieces of legislation addressing terrorism were introduced during the first Chechen conflict. However, Yeltsin’s initial decrees were rather limited and did not make provisions for a counterterrorist operation. Thus, while the first conflict did not have a legal base for the employment of military force, the second conflict had legal justification for sending troops to Chechnya.

In the interwar period, Russia adopted a National Security Doctrine (Ukaz Prezidenta N 1300 1997). Following the events in Dagestan and the apartment bombings in 1999, President Yeltsin stated that the Doctrine needed further revisions due to the threat of terrorism that arose in conjunction with the events in the North Caucasus (RG 10/06/1999 281). Further revisions to the Doctrine were made in January 2000. The Doctrine states that Russia is facing a growing threat coming from international terrorism (Article 1). Describing Russia’s national interests, the Doctrine mentioned terrorism in connection to territorial integrity and ethnic and religious conflicts (Articles 2 and 3).

After the start of the second Chechen conflict, no state of emergency was declared. Instead, Russia justified the use of armed forces in August 1999 as a counterterrorist operation under the provisions of the 1998 federal law on the fight against terrorism (Federal’nyi zakon N 130-FZ 1998). The regime of a “counterterrorist operation” in Chechnya was established by Yeltsin’s secret decree in September 1999.
(Ukaz Prezidenta N 1255C 1999). Accordingly, as Vladimir Putin noted, Russia did not need to declare a state of emergency, since the 1998 law had all the necessary provisions for the campaign (RG 10/02/1999 276): “It [the law] defines a zone with a special regime, the so-called zone of a ‘counterterrorist operation,’ gives an opportunity to involve the armed forces, border patrol, FSB, etc.” As the Human Rights Commissioner Oleg Mironov observed, “according to the 1998 federal law ‘On the fight against terrorism,’ the actions of federal troops in the North Caucasus are legal and justified” (RG 09/27/1999 263).

The 1998 law defined a “counterterrorist operation” as:
- special measures aimed at stopping a terrorist action, ensuring the security of individuals, neutralizing terrorists, and also minimizing the consequences of terrorist action;
- a counterterrorist operation zone is the particular areas of land or water, vehicle, building, structure, installation, or premises and the adjoining territory or waters within which the aforementioned operation is carried out (Article 3).

The 1998 law stressed the importance of the FSB in carrying out the fight against terrorism. However, the Defense Ministry was listed as an entity participating in the fight against terrorism as well (Article 6), and the use of military force was effectively legalized by Article 11:

In order to conduct the counterterrorist operation the operational staff to control the counterterrorist operation has the right to enlist the necessary forces and resources of those federal organs of executive power that take part in the fight against terrorism in accordance with Article 6 of the present federal law.

The vague provisions of the 1998 law offered the government an opportunity for broad and arbitrary interpretations, and legalized the large-scale employment of military force under a “counterterrorist operation.” As a result, the 1998 law was often criticized for a significant restriction of human rights (see Cherkasov and Grushkin 2005).
The use of military force in counterterrorist operations was further legalized by the 2001 presidential decree on counterterrorist measures on the territory of the North Caucasus (Ukaz Prezidenta N 61 2001). In 2002 President Putin adopted the federal law on extremist activity (Federal’nyi zakon N 114-FZ 2002), which further legalized the fight against terrorism under a broader category of extremism (Article 1). A 2005 amendment to the federal law on defense (Federal’nyi zakon N 61-FZ 1996) further outlined provisions for the use of military force in counterterrorist operations (IZ 03/17/2005 643).

A more extensive piece of legislation, adopted after September 11, 2001 was the Federal Law on counteraction of terrorism (Federal’nyi zakon N 35-FZ 2006) that followed the creation of the National Counterterrorism Committee in February 2006 (Ukaz Prezidenta N 116 2006). As the FSB director Nikolai Patrushev explained, the new law reflected the changes in international counterterrorist measures that emerged after the 2001 attacks on the U.S. (RG 03/21/2006 527). Thus, in a letter to the UN Security Council Committee Russia justified the implementation of new counterterrorist legislation as necessary in order to bring domestic laws “into line with the provisions of the international treaties of the Russian Federation” (S/2002/949).

The 2006 law adopted a much broader definition of terrorism than outlined in the 1998 law, and a counterterrorist operation was defined as:

a complex set of special, operational-combat and army measures accompanied by the use of military equipment, armaments and special facilities which are aimed at suppressing an act of terrorism, neutralising terrorists, ensuring the security of natural persons, organisations and institutions, as well as at reducing to a minimum the consequences of an act of terrorism (Article 3).
The new law explicitly outlined the use of military force, thus shifting the focus from the FSB in the 1998 law to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Articles six “Using Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the struggle against terrorism,” nine “Participation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in conducting an antiterrorist operation,” and ten “Accomplishment by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of the tasks aimed at suppressing international terrorist activities outside the Russian Federation” all focus exclusively on the employment of military force in the fight against terrorism.

Thus, unlike the first conflict, the second Chechen campaign had a legal justification of being a “counterterrorist operation.” Along with the 1998 law, a number of further legal provisions were adopted that legalized the use of military force in counterterrorist operations. Since the Chechen conflict was announced a zone of a counterterrorist operation in September 1999, these laws and provisions effectively justified the use of armed forces in the Chechen campaign. Further, following September 11, Russia was able to adopt an even more extensive piece of legislation, a large share of which was dedicated to the use of Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in counterterrorist operations.

5.5.2 Frame Acceptance

While the first Chechen campaign was severely criticized both domestically and abroad, criticisms during the second conflict subsided. Domestically, the second conflict started with a rather high level of approval for military action in Chechnya. The population,
affected by the 1999 apartment bombings was ready to support the government’s military handling of the conflict. As the fighting proceeded, however, such support declined, and more people expressed a preference for negotiations. Thus, while domestic approval of military means was initially high in 1999, it declined over time, and subsequent increases in the approval level followed major terrorist attacks of September 11, Dubrovka, and Beslan.

In the international realm, on the other hand, Russia faced numerous criticisms at the outset of the second campaign. The West voiced concerns about Russia’s military handling of the conflict, and refused to see the threat in Chechnya as terrorist. In response to Russia’s military campaign, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank threatened to cut off financial flows, the EU warned of economic sanctions, and the PACE suspended Russia’s voting rights. The criticisms, however, subsided following September 11, 2001 when the U.S. announced its support for Russia’s struggle against terrorism. Subsequently, Chechen field commanders and Chechen groups were placed on international terrorist lists, and Russia’s counterterrorist operation received international acknowledgment.

5.5.2.1 Domestic

The Russian public largely supported the start of Moscow’s counterterrorist campaign in Chechnya. The 1999 apartment bombings induced fear among Russians, and 44 percent of the population were afraid that they, or people from their environment, could become victims of a terrorist attack (IZ 09/28/1999 350). Russia justified its second Chechen
campaign as necessary against terrorists “blowing up people in their sleep” (RG 10/23/1999 301), and Moscow claimed a counterterrorist operation could not be conducted without military involvement (RG 03/23/2004 487). Further, Russia claimed that in 1999 the Russian troops in Chechnya did not meet any hostility from the local population, since the Chechens had hoped that the military would be able to free the republic of bandits (RG 10/19/1999 294).

The Kremlin claimed that Russian society realized the graveness of the threat presented by international terrorism (RG 11/15/1999 331). Even the opposition pointed out that “very few in Russian society today doubt that the military action in Dagestan is the result of an unprovoked aggression of international Islamist terrorism” (IZ 09/21/1999 346). These claims were supported by opinion polls: according to a VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) survey conducted in September 1999, 64 percent of participants were in favor of air bombings of Chechnya in case the Chechen side failed to put an end to terrorist attacks. At the same time, 64 percent of respondents supported the idea of deporting all Chechens from Russia (IZ 09/28/1999 350).


45 Sergei Kovalev, an ardent critic of the Chechen war was removed from his post of Human Rights Commissioner in March 1995.
situation in Chechnya has not changed at all in the recent years despite all the claims of the Russian officials. I am convinced that the main criminal in the events in the North Caucasus is the federal government and our high command.”

However, while the federal forces were accused of conducting cleansing campaigns among the population (IZ 07/11/2001 513), the use of disproportionate force against civilians (IZ 09/26/2001 529), extrajudicial arrests and killings (IZ 03/05/2002 544), disappearances (IZ 06/24/2004 603), destruction of property (IZ 06/22/2005 647), and other violations, criticisms of the second Chechen campaign were not as vocal as those during the first conflict. Critics of official actions faced harassment and prosecution. Anna Politkovskaya, famous for her coverage of the Chechen conflict, and who criticized Russia’s policies, was shot dead in October 2006. Stanislav Markelov, a human rights lawyer who investigated Chechen cases, including the Budanov case,46 was killed in January 2009. Natalya Estemirova, a human rights activist and a critic of Russia’s Chechen campaign, was killed in July 2009.

And yet, domestic support for the counterterrorist operation in Chechnya declined as the fighting continued. As seen from Figure 5.2, the support for the military campaign was high at the outset of the conflict. This support declined before September 11, 2001, and increased again after the attacks on the U.S. Following September 11, the support for the military action stabilized with further spikes corresponding to the Dubrovka attack in October 2002, and the Beslan siege in September 2004. As the Chechen campaign dragged on, the Russian population expressed a preference for negotiations, which can be

46 For more on the Budanov case see Politkovskaya (2004).
explained by the phenomenon of war-weariness.\(^47\) Thus, the second campaign is significantly different from the first in terms of domestic support. The first conflict started with little approval for the military solution, and the federal actions were widely criticized. The second conflict, on the other hand, started with few criticisms and a high level of approval of the federal actions, which, however, subsided as the fighting progressed.

![Military Action vs. Negotiations](image)

Figure 5.2. Russian opinion on military action in Chechnya as opposed to negotiations. Data Source: Levada Center, http://www.levada.ru/chechnya.html.

5.5.2.2 International

Even though Russia claimed it was fighting international terrorism, Moscow described the second Chechen conflict as an internal issue (RG 10/02/1999 278). As a result, Moscow stated it was not obliged to provide explanations to international criticisms (RG 11/02/1999 317). The latter, however, were numerous at the beginning of the conflict.

\(^{47}\) For more on war-weariness see Mueller (1989).
While the West initially approved of Russia’s actions in Dagestan, once the operation moved to Chechnya, criticisms of the military involvement followed (RG 10/23/1999 301). Thus, while James Rubin, a State Department spokesman, condemned “the actions of armed groups from Chechnya against the legitimate government and peaceful residents of Dagestan,” he refused to call the Chechen groups in Dagestan terrorist, arguing that “these events are of another nature” (RG 08/13/1999 207). While following the apartment bombings the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed U.S. willingness to cooperate with Russia against terrorism (RG 09/22/1999 252), the U.S. was concerned about the escalation of the military action in Chechnya (RG 10/01/1999 272). President Clinton voiced concerns about human rights violations in the republic. The president stressed that the U.S. was sympathetic to Russia’s efforts against terrorism, but it did not approve of Russia’s methods (RG 12/08/1999 351). The U.S. saw the development of the situation in Chechnya as “undesired and unacceptable” (IZ 10/21/1999 366), and Clinton announced that “Russia will pay a heavy price for its actions in Chechnya” (IZ 12/08/1999 395).

Further, the EU warned Russia of economic sanctions and suspension of new agreements in case Moscow failed to stop the fighting in Chechnya (IZ 12/08/1999 395; IZ 01/26/2000 419). The EU Council further urged Russia to refrain from using disproportionate force (RG 12/08/1999 352). The European Parliament, along with the OSCE and PACE, condemned Russia’s military action and urged Moscow to negotiate with Maskhadov (RG 10/23/1999 301; RG 12/17/1999 357; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 1999). The IMF and World Bank issued declarations stating
they would terminate financial flows to Russia if the military campaign in Chechnya were to continue (RG 10/23/1999 301).

The European Council issued a special declaration on Chechnya, in which it condemned Russia’s military action (Helsinki European Council 1999). As the PACE noted:

The Assembly recognises the right of the Russian Federation to preserve its territorial integrity, to fight terrorism and crime and to protect its population, including the population of Chechnya and neighbouring republics and regions, from terrorist attacks and acts of banditism. … Nevertheless, it stresses that the means used to achieve such goals must be in accordance with the international commitments of the Russian Federation and must exclude, in particular, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force affecting the civilian population (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2000).

As a result, the PACE recommended a review of Russia’s membership in the organization. Following a number of visits by the PACE’s Lord Judd to Russia, in April 2000 the PACE recommended withdrawing Russia’s right to vote and suspending its membership in the Council of Europe (IZ 04/08/2000 440). In January 2001, the PACE was still expressing concerns over human rights abuses in Chechnya (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2001). Following September 11, the PACE continued criticizing Moscow’s military action in Chechnya and calling for negotiations in its further resolutions in 2003 (Res. 1315), 2004 (Res. 1402), and 2006 (Res. 1479). However, no further discussions followed on suspending Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe in connection with Chechnya.

Amnesty International (1999b) reported violations of international humanitarian law by Russia’s federal forces. Rape, torture, disappearances and other abuses were reported by numerous international agencies (Amnesty International 2002a, Freedom
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House 2006, Human Rights Watch 2001). The West criticized Russia for creating a “humanitarian catastrophe” (RG 12/01/1999 344). Moscow, however, argued that Western media were creating a misleading image of the events (RG 10/23/1999 301). The Kremlin blamed such abuses on the Chechen terrorists and not the Russian forces (RG 10/13/1999 285). According to the Kremlin, the Chechen side was perpetrating a genocide against the Russian population in Chechnya (RG 01/06/2000 361; RG 04/01/2000 393). As Moscow observed:

The more successful is the counterterrorist operation in Chechnya, the more vocal are the criticisms in the West. Even though it seems that Western countries are also victims of terrorism, especially Islamist terrorism (RG 01/25/2000 372).

Russia’s rhetoric on Islamist terrorism did not prove successful before September 11. While the U.S. designated Osama bin Laden as a terrorist in 1999, the list did not include Basayev and Khattab (RG 10/27/1999 308). The situation changed following the attacks on the U.S. After the attacks, the U.S. National Commission (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004) found substantial links between Al Qaeda and the Chechens. International terrorism became a common enemy for Russia and the U.S. (RG 10/17/2001 440).

After September 11, in an interview with Izvestia Condoleezza Rice stated:

We know that there are terrorist elements in and around Chechnya and we urge Chechen leaders to disassociate themselves from the terrorists who might be found among their ranks. We cannot fight international terrorism in Afghanistan and welcome it in Chechnya (Izvestia 2001).

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48 Shamil Basayev and several other Chechen leaders were put on a wanted list for acts of terrorism by INTERPOL before the start of the second Chechen campaign (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union 1999).
The U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell noted after the attacks: “Americans will now better understand the nature of the Chechen conflict” (IZ 09/26/2001 529).

International criticisms of Russia’s Chechen campaign significantly subsided following September 11 (IZ 09/26/2001 529). In 2002 the UN Commission on Human Rights did not issue a resolution condemning Russia’s actions in Chechnya for the first time since the start of the fighting in 1999 (IZ 05/15/2002 550). In May 2002 Colin Powell declared “Russia is fighting terrorism in Chechnya. There is no doubt about that” (IZ 11/02/2002 570). In 2003, the U.S. designated three Chechen groups as terrorist organizations. Executive Order 13224 (2001) listed the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, and the Islamic International Brigade in February 2003, and Shamil Basayev and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in August 2003.49 Basayev and Yandarbiyev, and the same three organizations were included in the UN list of organizations connected to Al Qaeda and the Taliban (UN Security Council Committee 2011). Following the Beslan attack in 2004, the UN Security Council convened in an emergency sitting upon a request from Russia (Walsh and Timchenko 2004), and Resolution 1566 condemning terrorism was passed (S/RES/1566).

49 None of these groups is listed on Russia’s list of terrorist organizations recognized by the Supreme Court (http://nak.fsb.ru/nac/ter_org.htm).
5.6 Conclusion

Russia started the second Chechen campaign as a counterterrorist operation. The issue of separatism rarely surfaced on the Kremlin agenda, and Russia argued that it was fighting the threat of international terrorism in Chechnya. Moscow denied it was fighting a war, but instead was relying on the discourses of terrorism and Islamist extremism. Such framing differed from the framing of the conflict as “war” by the opposition and the separatists.

The government’s framing of the second Chechen conflict predominated, and was facilitated by terrorist attacks perpetrated on the territory of Russia, especially the controversial apartment bombings of September 1999. The analysis of terrorist attacks, however, points to the existing continuities in patterns of terrorist acts during the first and second conflicts. Thus, during both conflicts, Chechen groups perpetrating the attacks demanded Chechnya’s independence and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. And while the second conflict was characterized by a certain level of religious radicalization, it was seen as an indirect consequence of the employment of the armed forces in the republic back in 1994. The interpretation of the role of Islam by the government, relying on the Wahhabism discourse, was drastically different from the separatists, who described “jihad” as a war against invaders, and “mujahedeen” as fighters in the conflict.

Russia’s framing of the second conflict was greatly facilitated by the existing counterterrorist provisions. Thus, the 1998 federal law justified Russia’s use of military
force in a counterterrorist operation. However, the framing of the conflict as a
counterterrorist operation at the outset of the campaign was only accepted domestically,
while international actors expressed concerns about Russia’s use of disproportionate
force and human rights abuses in the republic. It was not until September 11, 2001 that
the West started changing its opinion on the situation in Chechnya. Only after the U.S.
embarked on the “war on terror,” did it designate three Chechen groups on its list of
terrorist organizations. The UN followed suit and recognized the same organizations as
terrorist. Such international acceptance allowed Russia to further portray the Chechen
conflict as a counterterrorist operation and adopt even more extensive counterterrorist
provisions in 2006. Further implications of the change in framing of the Chechen conflict
after September 11 are discussed in the concluding section of the dissertation.
6. Global Implications of the “War on Terror”: China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka

6.1 Introduction

The analysis of the Chechen conflict has indicated the presence of government efforts to frame the ethno-nationalist separatist conflict as a terrorist threat. As can be seen from Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, however, the Chechen conflict is not an isolated case that has been affected by such framing. Accordingly, changes in the designations of the conflicts in China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka suggest that framing separatism as terrorism after September 11 has become a broader tendency. This chapter turns to the analysis of these cases in order to establish the comparative context for the Chechen conflict and to examine how the “war on terror” has affected other ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts.

Similar to the Chechen conflict, ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts in China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka started before September 11, 2001 and continued after the attacks on the U.S. The conflicts have undergone attempts to peacefully resolve the confrontations. However, such efforts have failed and military means of addressing ethnic issues have prevailed. Before September 11 the involvement of the military in these ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts was criticized by the international community. Following September 11, the criticisms subsided as the governments in China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka resorted to terrorist framing of the conflicts, which allowed them to justify the military solution as part of the “war on terror.”
In China, the government resorted to terrorist framing after September 11. The Chinese conflict has been affected by terrorist attacks from the outset; however, before September 11 such attacks were attributed to the Uyghur separatists. Following September 11, the Chinese government declared it was facing a terrorist threat coming from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a group which, according to the government, had connections with Al Qaeda. Thus, following September 11 China claimed it was under attack from international Islamist terrorists, and justified its military actions in Xinjiang as part of the “war on terror.”

Turkey presents another example of government efforts to frame the Kurdish ethno-nationalist separatist conflict as a counterterrorist operation. Turkey has addressed the conflict militarily justifying the employment of military force by the presence of the PKK, a Kurdish organization which resorted to terrorism. However, before September Ankara faced criticisms for its actions and the EU pressured Turkey to resolve the Kurdish issue. After September 11 the criticisms subsided and Turkey has been able to pursue its military operations in the Kurdish provinces.

While China and Turkey have pursued military counterterrorist operations, such actions have failed to resolve the situation, and, along with the Chechen case, these ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts continue to this day. In this respect, the Sri Lankan case demonstrates a different dynamic. In 2009 Sri Lanka stepped up its military campaign against the Tamil insurgents and declared victory in May of the same year. Similar to the rest of the cases, Sri Lanka faced criticisms for military actions before September 11. However, after September 11, the LTTE lost its status of a legitimate actor
in the conflict, and Colombo was able to justify the escalation of the military campaign as necessary against the threat of terrorism. Subsequently, Sri Lanka was able to wipe out the Tamil opposition movement, which to this day remains defeated.

The case of Sri Lanka represents an outlier among the cases under consideration here. In contrast to the rest of the cases, Sri Lanka was able to defeat its Tamil opponents, while the rest of the governments have failed to achieve victory via military means. Due to its use of terrorist framing Sri Lanka was able to justify the escalation of the military campaign which came to resemble a full-blown civil war. Thus, this case demonstrates how an all-out military campaign can bring success, revealing at the same time the dangers of a disproportionate military escalation of counterterrorist operations. While Sri Lanka was able to defeat the Tamil rebels, the costs of this victory have provoked international concerns and the UN has produced a report investigating the grave human rights abuses committed during the campaign. This case illustrates how military means of achieving victory in this case have possibly undermined the very democratic principles of governance in the state.

This chapter consecutively turns to each of these cases and analyzes the role of framing in detail. These case studies are constructed on the basis of the analysis of hundreds of newspaper articles retrieved through the East View, FBIS, and LexisNexis databases. Published interviews with state officials, public statements, and counterterrorist legislation were analyzed in order to establish official state positions on the conflicts. Section 6.2 looks at China, 6.3 – at Turkey, and 6.4 – at Sri Lanka. Section 6.5 draws conclusions from the evidence presented by the comparative cases.
6.2 China vs. the Uyghurs

China has experienced separatist movements in a number of its provinces, including those of Tibet and Xinjiang. The least known of these, the Uyghur separatist movement, made headlines after September 11, 2001. Following the attacks on the U.S., China has portrayed the Uyghur ethno-nationalist separatist conflict as part of the global “war on terror.” Subsequently, the state has been able to justify its military response to Uyghur sentiments as adequate against the terrorist threat.

Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghurs populate the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), referred to as East Turkestan or Uyghuristan by the separatists (Reed and Raschke 2010). The Chinese conquered the territory of Xinjiang in the 18th century. However, the region remained largely beyond the purview of the central authorities until the 1940s. In 1949 the territory became part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Rich in natural gas, oil, and other mineral resources, the region is now regarded by China as an integral part of the state (Bovingdon 2010).

The region gained autonomy in 1955 when the territory became the XUAR. The principle of autonomy was spelled out in the 1954 Constitution, according to which, autonomous areas enjoyed broad powers of self-government. The constitution formally recognized the equality of nationalities, the freedom of minority nationalities to advance their political, economic, and cultural development, and gave the right to self-government

50 For more on the Uyghur ethnic group see Roberts (2009), Bovingdon (2010), Rahman (2005), and Reed and Raschke (2010).
51 For more on the history of Xinjiang see Millward (2004) and Bovingdon (2010).
bodies to use their local national languages. The principles of autonomy were further protected by the 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.

In practice, however, China pursued a policy of assimilating minority nationalities (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1981). China’s main tool for managing the ethnic question in Xinjiang since the 1950s was the presence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the province (Bovingdon 2010). In order to ensure complete control over the region the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) instituted a policy of government-supported immigration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang. The regime justified the migration policy as necessary to promote economic development, and used it to increase the constituency loyal to Beijing in the XUAR. To consolidate Han rule, China established Production and Construction Corps (PCC) in the 1950s (McMillen 1981; Rahman 2005). China has also managed the selection and appointment of the leaders of the local administration: since the founding of the XUAR in 1955 the chairman of the local government has been Uyghur, while the secretary of the CCP Committee of the XUAR has been Han (Rahman 2005).

To further assist with the assimilation, China has targeted the Uyghur culture. For instance, Beijing initiated alternations of the Uyghur language intended to bring the language closer to Chinese (Rahman 2005; Dwyer 2005). Religion became another target. A period of relative religious tolerance followed the era of repression and persecution during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s (Wren 1983b). However, while the 1982 Constitution declares religious freedom, with this freedom

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52 For more on the migration to Xinjiang see Qiang and Xin (2003).
further protected by the 1997 White Paper on the Freedom of religious belief in China (Freedom of religious belief in China 1997), the government launched a campaign in promoting atheism in the 1990s. Song Hanliang, secretary of the autonomous regional party committee, justified the necessity to “conduct education on atheism among party members, cadres and the masses in a planned manner” in order to promote the “ideological and organisational construction” in Xinjiang (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1990). The resulting campaign included a tighter control over religion, including purges among the clergy (Long 1990). Throughout the years, China placed further restrictions on religion (Bovingdon 2010; Reed and Raschke 2010).

China’s policies in Xinjiang promoted anti-Han sentiments among the Uyghurs. The Uyghur population resisted Chinese control even before the establishment of the XUAR through the founding of the First (1933-1934) and Second (1944-1949) East Turkestan Republics. During the Hundred Flowers campaign in the 1950s, the Uyghurs expressed opposition to “Han colonialists” (Bovingdon 2010, 50). In 1968 the Uyghurs established a secret East Turkestan People’s Party, which was persecuted by the Chinese government (Rahman 2005). The Party advocated for an independent East Turkestan (Reed and Raschke 2010).

Organized Uyghur protests against the Chinese official policies broke out in the 1980s.53 Demonstrations started in protest against nuclear testing in Xinjiang, which was interpreted by the Uyghur population as a government attempt to exterminate their ethnic group (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1982b). In response to the unrest, Deng

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53 For more on the protests see Bovingdon (2010) and Millward (2004).
Xiaoping himself visited Xinjiang to inspect the situation, and replacements among the senior leadership of the region followed (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1982a). As a legal means to prevent separatism, in 1982 China adopted a new constitution, which prohibited “any acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or instigate their secession.”

More demonstrations followed in 1985, protesting China’s extension of family-planning policies to minorities, including the Uyghurs (Wren 1983a). Gradually, protesters started demanding independence from China. The government criticized ethnic unrest, and condemned the Uyghur efforts to “split the motherland and destroy ethnic unity” (Herald 1988). In 1989 China outlawed separatist protests by adopting the Law on Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations. The Law explicitly prohibited assemblies, processions and demonstrations “harming the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.”

Despite the prohibition, protest activities increased after the collapse of communism in Europe in the 1990s, and the Uyghurs demanded the reestablishment of the East Turkestan Republic (Deutsche Presse 1997). China responded with crackdowns. Addressing the People’s Congress of the autonomous region in 1992, Tomur Dawamat, Governor of Xinjiang, announced: “this year Xinjiang will focus on cracking down on sabotage activities by national separatists” (Preston 1992). To deal with the unrest, the government set up counterterrorist groups within the People’s Armed Police (Crothall 1996). The heavy-handed “Strike Hard” campaign started in 1996. The campaign included summary trials and executions, which further alienated the Uyghur population
from the government (Poole 1997). More violence followed, and the Uyghur separatists started engaging in acts of terrorism, such as the Urumchi bus bombings in 1992 and 1997 (see Figure 6.1).

![Figure 6.1. Terrorist acts perpetrated by Uyghur separatists over time. Source: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=uighur+separatists&sa.x=0&sa.y=0. Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed on June 8, 2011.]

In countering this violence, China acknowledged the separatist nature of the conflict, and Beijing did not frame the events in Xinjiang as a counterterrorist operation. Ablait Abdureschit, Governor of Xinjiang, described the conflict as follows: “we have had the struggle against separatist activity throughout our history. It has never ceased” (Kenstel and Albright 1999). As a result, China reformed its provisions towards ethnic minorities, making them more generous on paper. In 1999 China issued the National minorities policy and its practice in China, stressing the importance of the “unity and cooperation among the various ethnic groups” (National minorities policy and its practice in China 1999). Shortly before September 11, 2001, Wang Lequan, secretary of the CCP Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Committee, stated that terrorism was not a
problem in Xinjiang and that the “society [was] stable and people [were] living and working in peace and contentment” (Pao 2001).

China’s handling of the Uyghur issue was widely criticized before September 11. The human rights situation resulted in international concerns and criticisms. For instance, the U.S. tried influencing the politics in Xinjiang, including the provision of support to the separatist-backed Uyghur radio broadcasts (see Bovingdon 2004). However, the situation changed after September 11.

Following September 11 China announced it was facing a terrorist threat in Xinjiang. When China’s President Jiang Zemin contacted President Bush to offer condolences, he condemned terrorism and expressed readiness to cooperate with the U.S. against the common enemy (Kan 2010). China named terrorism as one of its security priorities, and on September 20 Beijing affirmed its “unconditional support” for the U.S. counterterrorist efforts (Dorgan and Lubman 2001). China, in turn, received an acknowledgement from the U.S., which it used against the Uyghur separatists. As President Bush declared, “President Jiang Zemin and the Chinese government stand side by side with the American people as we fight this evil force” (Dowdney 2001). Terrorism replaced separatism as a primary security concern: the 2002 China’s National Defense White Paper stressed the importance of international cooperation against terrorism, pointing out that China had had first-hand experiences with the threat (China’s National Defense in 2002).

54 In contrast, the 2000 version of the White Paper on Defense does not elaborate as extensively on the terrorist threat (China’s National Defense in 2000).
In October 2001 Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi described China as a victim of international terrorism, stating that the government had “conclusive evidence” of the involvement of “East Turkestan elements” in terrorist activities:

We also have evidence which suggests that they [separatists in Xinjiang] have acted in collusion with international terrorist forces, and they are responsible for a series of terrorist violence activities like bombings, assassinations, poisonings, abductions and robbery which have led to a lot of casualties and property losses. … Therefore we believe that our fight against East Turkestan terrorism and terrorists is also part and parcel of the international effort to combat terrorism (Schauble 2001).

Addressing the UN, China’s Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan linked China’s problems in Xinjiang with the U.S.-led war on terror. “China’s also threatened by terrorism,” Tang stated, pointing out that “the Eastern Turkestan terrorist forces are trained, equipped and financed by international terrorist organisations” (South China Morning Post 2001).

Subsequently, in November 2001 China issued a report describing the activities of “‘Eastern Turkistan’ elements.” The report detailed terrorist acts committed in China and abroad, and claimed the connection between the “‘Eastern Turkistan’ Terrorists and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden” (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 2001).

Following the change in the official rhetoric China engaged in the “Strike Hard,” and “Strike Hard, High Pressure” campaigns in Xinjiang. In December 2001 China adopted the Amended Criminal Law of the PRC. The Amendments expanded the list of offences to be considered terrorist acts and increased punishments for the crimes of terrorism. However, due to vague definitions, the Amendments were criticized as a tool for the government to use against separatists in Xinjiang (Amnesty International 2002b).
Under the banner of the “war on terror” the government stepped up its brutal crackdowns, with the most recent campaigns following in 2009 and 2010. The campaigns relied on the raids carried out by the police and military forces. As a result, hundreds of people were arrested (Becquelin 2004; Chung 2006; Kan 2010), and China’s actions in Xinjiang were criticized as violating human rights (Amnesty International 2002b; Reed and Raschke 2010). Rebiya Kadeer, a prominent Uyghur businesswoman criticized the government’s crackdowns in Xinjiang: “since 9/11, the Chinese Government has used our Islamic faith against us and labeled the Uighurs as terrorists to justify crackdowns and security sweeps as part of the global war on terror” (US Congress 2009b). Kadeer further condemned China’s rhetoric on the “war on terror”:

The worst is China’s use of the global war on terror to hold us [the Uyghurs] as a people to three alleged crimes: terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. To pin that on the entire population in the media and the minds of Chinese is worse than restrictions on language, on religion, on the ongoing forced transfer of young Uighur women to work in factory sweatshops (Marquand 2009).

In January 2002 China issued another report on East Turkestan terrorist forces operating on the territory of the XUAR. The report asserted that the East Turkestan terrorists were “responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang, resulting in the deaths of 162 people of all ethnic groups, including grass-roots officials and religious personnel, and injuries to more than 440 people” (“East Turkistan” terrorist forces cannot get away with impunity 2002). The report further claimed links between the East Turkestan forces and Osama bin Laden, whose goal was to help East Turkestan forces

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55 Rebiya Kadeer was arrested in 1999 on charges of revealing state secrets. She was subsequently pronounced a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International (Schauble 2000). Kadeer was released only in 2005.
“launch a ‘holy war,’ with the aim of setting up a theocratic ‘Islam state’ in Xinjiang.” The report then justified the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang as “not directed at any particular ethnic group or any particular religion, but at criminal activities of violence and terrorism, in order to better protect the common interests of the country’s various ethnic groups and safeguard normal religious activities.” As Wang Lequan, secretary of the autonomous regional party committee, noted, the crackdown in Xinjiang following September 11 was “part and parcel of the international anti-terrorist struggle,” and he further described it as “conducive to security in neighbouring countries and regions as well as stability in the world” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 2002a).

In the wake of September 11, China’s rhetoric received international approval. In September 2002 the UN placed the ETIM on the list of groups associated with Al Qaeda (Security Council Committee 2009). Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Richard Armitage announced that the ETIM “was a terrorist group, that it committed acts of violence against unarmed civilians without any regard for who was hurt” (Gazette 2002). Subsequently, the U.S. designated the ETIM as a terrorist organization under the Executive Order 13224 (2001). According to James A. Kelly (2002), Assistant Secretary of State, the U.S. designated the ETIM as a terrorist organization “not as a concession to the PRC, but based on independent evidence that ETIM is linked to al-Qaeda and has engaged in deliberate acts of violence against unarmed civilians.” China itself formally designated the ETIM as a terrorist organization in December 2003 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 2003), after President Hu Jintao announced that “though the war on terror has made significant headway since the Sept. 11 incident, we must recognize that
threats of terrorism are still very much around and its challenge to the world remains formidable” (Xinhua 2003).

However, the ETIM designations remain controversial. The ETIM initially emerged as the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP) in the 1940s to counter the Chinese military forces.56 After September 11 China described the ETIM activities as follows:

After the peaceful liberation of Xinjiang, the “East Turkistan” forces were not reconciled to defeat. Supported by international anti-China forces, they waited for the chance to engage in separatist and destructive activities. Under the influence of extremism, splittism, and international terrorism in the 1990’s, some “East Turkistan” forces in China and elsewhere shifted to separatist and destructive activities with the main measure being terrorist violence. They planned and executed a series of bloody terrorist incidents (Xinhua Domestic Service 2003).

And yet, while the Chinese government claimed that the group was active in the 1990s, no references were made to the ETIM at that time.

According to sources other than the Chinese government, the group remained largely inactive until 2007, as can be seen in Figure 6.2. Nor did the ETIM claim responsibility for the terrorist attacks committed in the 1990s (Kan 2010). This can be contrasted to a later acknowledgement of the use of violence. ETIM’s leader, Hahsan Mahsum, justified violence against China as a response to the state suppression: “any rational human being has the duty to fight against invaders to protect his homeland.” In the same interview Mahsum denied any organizational links or financial ties with Al Qaeda (Eckholm 2002). On the verge of the 2008 Olympics the ETIM openly declared a war on China: “we, members of the Turkestan Islamic Party, have declared war against China. We oppose China’s occupation of our homeland of East Turkestan, which is a part

56 For more on the ETIM see Reed and Raschke (2010).
of the Islamic world” (Wong 2008). Thus, the designations of the ETIM as a terrorist organization preceded the attacks claimed by the group, suggesting that the designations were based more on the allegations of the Chinese government rather than on ETIM activities.

![Figure 6.2. Terrorist acts perpetrated by the ETIM over time.](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=30022. Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed on June 8, 2011.)

However, while the Chinese government succeeded in framing the Uyghur conflict as a terrorist threat, it has failed to resolve it. Despite the crackdowns following September 11, ethnic riots broke out in Urumqi again in July 2009. Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei called the riots a “grave and violent criminal incident plotted and organized by the outside forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism” (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2009). The renewal of ethnic tensions in Xinjiang illustrates the failure of a military solution to address the Uyghur separatism. Similar to Chechnya, in response to the government’s harsh policies the separatist movement in China radicalized, and the ETIM became an undisputed threat in the late 2000s.
The Chinese case illustrates how framing has worked in an authoritarian regime. While the framing efforts resemble those in Russia, the Chinese regime faced fewer domestic criticisms, and the alternative framing of the conflict is almost non-existent due to the harsh repression of the media, journalists and activists, and those who express opposition to the state. The dangers of framing here become even more paramount, since China was able to control alternative accounts and persuade the international opinion in the rightness of its position. And even though the U.S. later acknowledged that “even the very existence of ETIM is subject to some debate” (US Congress 2009a), the ETIM remains on the list of terrorist designations to this day.

6.3 Turkey vs. the Kurds

Turkey has faced the challenge of Kurdish separatism for decades. The state has addressed the issue via military means and has frequently resorted to martial law and the state of emergency to govern the southeastern territories. Military campaigns replaced one another. However, while Turkey’s actions were widely criticized before September 11, after the attacks on the U.S. the world has acknowledged that Turkey’s strategy is part of the “war on terror.”

The Kurds of Turkey are part of the Kurdish ethnic group which inhabits parts of Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a large Kurdish population became part of the Republic of Turkey. Modern Turkey was established in

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57 For more on the Kurds in Turkey see Gunter (2008) and Chaliand (1978).
1923. The creation of the new state was preceded by the Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne. In terms of the Kurds, the Treaty of Sevres guaranteed their autonomy. However, the Treaty of Lausanne, which formalized the founding of Turkey, denied the existence of various ethnic groups in the state (see Ataman 2002). The Kurds became Turkish citizens without distinct cultural and political rights reserved for them.

The Treaty of Lausanne became the foundation for Kemalist ethnic policies, based on the notion of “Turkishness” (see Criss 1995). Nationalism came to define the indivisibility of the new state and minority groups were denied self-determination rights. Diverse ethnic groups were pressured to assimilate into a single Turkish nation. As a result, the Kurds received a label of “mountain Turks” (Brown 1995), and were forced to assimilate (Angrist 2004). The Kurds lost many of the privileges allowed under the Ottoman Empire including the use of the Kurdish language, the wearing of traditional Kurdish clothes, and Kurdish cultural activities (Kilic 1998).

The transition from the Ottoman Empire, which recognized minorities and granted them extensive rights (Cornell 2001), to a highly centralized Turkey, invoked numerous protests on the part of the Kurdish population. Several revolts happened throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The revolts were crushed by the Turkish military and much of the southeast of the country was under martial law for decades. Following a military coup in 1960 that deposed Adnan Menderes, a brief period of political relaxation followed (Poulton 1997). The region remained largely quiescent until the 1970s.

58 On the emergence of the Turkish state see Ahmad (1993), Lewis (2002), and Zurcher (2004).
59 For more on the Kurdish uprisings see Entessar (1992) and Laciner and Bal (2004).
Following the 1971 military coup and the imposition of martial law, Kurdish activism was once again on the rise. As part of this activism, in 1978 Abdullah Ocalan founded the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK initially espoused a Marxist-Leninist ideology and proclaimed the creation of a Marxist Kurdish state as its goal (Cornell 2001). This marked the modern stage of Kurdish separatism, and more repression from the Turkish state followed. Another imposition of martial law in the east followed clashes between Sunni sects and the minority Alevi in the province of Kahramanmaras in December 1978. In 1979 the PKK committed its first attack against Mehmet Celal Bucak, a Justice Party politician.

Another round of repression against the Kurds followed the 1980 military coup and the imposition of the nationwide martial law (Yavuz 2001). Article 26 of the 1982 Constitution banned the use of the Kurdish language. Further, the 1983 Law 2932 declared Turkish to be the mother tongue of Turkish citizens. The Turkish government claimed that no Kurdish problem existed: the Evren – Ozel government was reported to deny the existence of the Kurdish issue, relying instead on military force to address the problem (Voice of the Turkish Communist Party 1987). According to Prime Minister Ozel, “there was no discrimination [against the Kurds] either under the Ottoman empire or since the Republic was formed” (Le Figaro 1988). Numerous atrocities committed against the Kurdish minority accompanied the military campaigns (Az 1990). In response to the government’s use of military force to keep the Kurdish areas under control, the PKK began its guerilla warfare campaign in 1984.
Turkey declared that the PKK was a terrorist organization. In 1997 the United States officially recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization as well (Ralston 2006). Ocalan, however, denied that the PKK was involved in terrorism (Al-Hayah 1993). Instead, he claimed that “terrorism is what Turkey does to the Kurds” (Die Zeit 1991), and called the state military operations “Turkish terrorism” (Sueddeutsche Zeitung 1991). Ocalan expressed his support for a peaceful solution and negotiations (2000 Ilıbin’e Dogru 1991), and stated that he used violence only because he was forced to do so by the Turkish state (Al-Hayah 1993).

According to Ocalan, the PKK was interested in resolving the Kurdish issue in a democratic manner, through the establishment of a Turkish-Kurdish federation (Serxwebun 1991). Turkey responded, however, that the constitution defines Turkey as a unitary state, and it will remain as such (Cumhuriyet 1991). In 1987 Turkey repealed 1980 martial law, except for the eastern provinces. There, martial law was replaced by a state of emergency, which was lifted only in 2002. Fighting continued and Kurdish rights were further repressed. For instance, Leyla Zana, a Kurdish politician, was stripped of her parliamentary immunity and sentenced to 15 years in jail after giving a speech in Parliament in Kurdish in 1991. Blamed for ties with the PKK, Zana was “blindfolded, tortured and paraded naked before male prisoners” (Economist 2011a). As Ocalan summed it up, justifying his fight against Turkey: “In Turkey, they say there are no Kurds, that they don’t exist. The government says this” (Gunter 1998).

It was only in the 1990s that Turkey started changing its policies towards the Kurds. The first Turkish official to recognize the existence of Kurds was Prime Minister
Suleyman Demirel, who stated in 1991: “Turkey has realized that the Kurds’ existence is a reality…. Recognizing the reality of the Kurds does not obstruct maintaining Turkey’s unity” (Hurriyet 1991b). Demirel declared: “Turkey’s borders, flag, and official language cannot be debated, but ethnic groups’ demand to retain their own ethnic identity and culture should not be rejected” (Hurriyet 1991a). In 1991 President Turgut Ozel rescinded the ban on the use of the Kurdish language imposed by Law 2932. During the 1991 elections, 22 members of the Kurdish People’s Labor Party (HEP) were elected to parliament (Kibris 2011).

In response to Ozel’s move away from military means of addressing Kurdish separatism, Ocalan stated that he “might opt for a diplomatic-political solution” (AFP 1991). In the same interview Ocalan declared that the PKK was no longer seeking independence, just “free political expression” for the Kurds. Commenting on the issue of autonomy Ozel responded: “Autonomy cannot be established. The question of autonomy cannot be realized. This is due to the fact that the Kurds in Turkey will become second-class citizens the moment they acquire an autonomous status. They are first-class citizens at present” (Milliyet 1991). Despite this, however, Ozel’s reforms led to the PKK unilateral declaration of a ceasefire in 1993. Terrorist attacks committed by the PKK sharply declined, as can be seen from Figure 6.3.
However, the rapprochement did not last long. After Ozel’s death in 1993, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller initially considered the “Basque model” in order to address the Kurdish issue through granting more rights and autonomy to the Kurdish population to distance the Kurds from the PKK (Brown 1995). However, Ciller soon gave up on this alternative and declared an all-out war on the PKK. As she stated, “Turkey is determined to wipe out PKK (Workers Party of Kurdistan) terrorism and sees it as the foremost element threatening democracy in the country” (*Anatolia* 1993). The PKK ended the ceasefire and started its campaign against Turkey’s tourism industry by staging terrorist attacks in resort areas (*Kurier* 1993). The number of terrorist attacks spiked (see Figure 6.3).

In July 1993 the HEP was closed down by the Constitutional Court, and six HEP Members of Parliament were arrested (Kibris 2011). The pro-Kurdish Democratic Party (DEP) was banned in 1994. The imprisonment of several DEP deputies invoked
criticisms from the West: the Council of Europe recommended suspending Turkey if it did not improve the human rights situation, the U.S. urged Turkey to turn to a political solution for the Kurdish issue, and the OSCE sent a delegation to monitor human rights in the country (Turkish Daily News 1995b). However, throughout these years, several pro-Kurdish parties were shut down. Thus, the People’s Democratic Party (HADEP) established in HEP’s place was banned in 2003 on the grounds that it supported the PKK. The Democratic Society Party (DTP), founded in 2005, was banned in 2009 for links with the PKK. Thus, after Ozel’s death, the Turkish state effectively equated all Kurdish aspirations including political parties with the PKK and branded the PKK as terrorists and all Kurds as PKK supporters (Barkey 1996).

And while the PKK has undoubtedly presented a security challenge to the Turkish state, the group has made efforts to channel the struggle into a peaceful solution. Over the years the PKK announced several ceasefires. For instance, in 1995 Ocalan stated that a political solution was necessary and expressed his readiness to negotiate (El Pais 1995). This was accompanied by a decline in the PKK terrorist attacks (see Figure 6.3). Following his capture in 1999, Abdullah Ocalan denounced violence, calling for the PKK “to end the armed struggle and withdraw their forces outside the borders of Turkey for the sake of peace from September 1, 1999” (Birmingham Post 1999). Following the denouncement, the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by the PKK fell significantly (Figure 6.3). Following September 11, 2001, and the increased references to the association of the PKK with Al Qaeda, the PKK officially disbanded in 2002 renaming itself into the Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK). The group
renounced violence, and its spokesman declared that “the PKK has accomplished its
mission and ceased all its activities” (BBC News 2002). The organization further renamed
itself as the Kurdistan People’s Congress (KONGRA-GEL).

However, despite the fact that the PKK denounced violence and that over the
years the group shifted its demands from independence to autonomy and increased rights
for Kurds within the boundaries of the existing Turkish state, Turkey has resisted the
PKK’s politicization efforts. As Aydinli (2002, 212) puts it

Ocalan and the PKK may be attempting with their calls for a democratic solution
to turn military defeat into political victory, but Turkey seems to be preparing a
fullfledged effort to halt any international political recognition—often referred to
in Turkey as ‘politicization’—of the PKK and the Kurdish issues.

In this respect, Turkey has consistently resisted pressure from the West to find a political
solution to the Kurdish issue.

Turkey became a candidate member to the EU in 1999.60 Turkey applied for the
European Economic Community (EEC) membership in 1987, following which Turkey’s
human rights record came under close scrutiny (Arikan 2006). Human rights in Turkey
have been violated for decades.61 Numerous reports exist, implicating the state forces
involved in the fight against Kurdish separatism in human rights abuses (Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada 1996). After becoming a candidate state to the EU, Turkey has
agreed to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria that guarantee minority rights.

Specifically, the EU asked Turkey to resolve its Kurdish problem via peaceful means
(Yavuz 2001). And yet, despite the EU pressure, Turkey persisted in referring to the

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60 For more on Turkey and the EU see Arikan (2006).
61 For more on human rights in Turkey see Kilic (1998).
Kurdish problem as an internal issue, and accused the EU of being sympathetic to Kurdish terrorism (Aydinli 2002).

In the 2000s Prime Minister Ecevit “continued to argue that Kurdish was not a language, only a dialect, and that there was no Kurdish ethnic problem in Turkey, only a question of economic development in the southeast” (Gunter 2008, 88). Only in 2003 the Parliament passed laws relaxing restrictions on the Kurdish language and in 2004 the state TV broadcast a program in the Kurdish language and Leila Zana was released from prison. However, human rights violations continued (Amnesty International 2010).

Especially controversial is Turkey’s counterterrorist legislation, which has been criticized on the grounds of human rights abuses (Aktan and Koknar 2002; Sozen 2006). The main document justifying the use of military force against Kurdish separatism was the 1991 Anti-Terror Law. The broad definition of terrorism in the Law allowed for broad interpretations which were extended to non-terrorism cases as well.62 Article 8 of the Law (repealed in 2003), which penalized “written and oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation,” made it possible to prosecute for propaganda those who voiced dissent or support to the Kurdish cause.

In 2005 a new Criminal Code came into force. The controversial Article 301 of the Code on the denigration of Turkishness, Republic, and institutions and organs of the State, has been widely criticized as an instrument to silence dissent (Amnesty International 2005). The Article allowed Turkey to prosecute for denigration of

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62 See the Issue Paper by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1996) for examples of trials involving the Anti-Terror Law.
Turkishness even the Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk. In 2006 Turkey replaced Anti-
Terror Law of 1991 with new legislation. However, the definition of terrorism remained
vague, with Article 6 on terrorist offences broad enough to accuse those who do not
subscribe to the official state position of terrorism. Following his visit to Turkey in 2006
Martin Scheinin, the UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, criticized the definition of
terrorism in Turkish law, recommending that the definition be brought in line with the
international standards (Human Rights Watch 2010).

And yet, after September 11, the EU criticisms of Turkey’s human rights record
subsided. As Michael Leigh, Director General in Charge of Enlargement of the EU
Commission, noted, not only Turkey, but the whole EU was involved in the “war on
terror” (Anatolia 2006). In 2005 the EU started formal accession talks with Turkey
(Gunter 2007). The PKK was designated as a terrorist organization on the EU 2009 list of
terrorist organizations (Common Position 2009/67/CFSP). Turkey has used September 11
as an opportunity to gain international recognition for its actions against Kurdish
separatists.

In November 2003 Istanbul came under terrorist attacks, claimed by Al Qaeda
(Chazan 2003). Following these attacks, Turkey persuaded the West that it was under
attack from international terrorism, and that the PKK was no different from Al Qaeda
(even though the PKK is a secular organization and is not guided by religious principles).
For instance, Egemen Bagis, Erdogan’s foreign policy advisor and the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) deputy stated: “There should be no distinction between
terrorist organizations. The PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department, is the same as al Qaeda and Zarkawi” (Turkish Daily News 2005).

President Abdullah Gul further urged the United States to treat the PKK as it does other terrorist organizations (Anatolia 2007b).

Despite the fact that the PKK had renounced violence, the U.S. Department of State placed it on its list of terrorist organizations (Executive Order 2001). As President Bush noted after September 11, “the United States and Turkey share a strong commitment to freedom and democracy. Our two countries have cooperated on the global war on terror and stand together to advance freedom and peace throughout the region” (Anatolia 2005). In her speech, the U.S. official Nancy McEldowney equated the PKK with Al Qaeda:

There can be no division between us and no double standard in our words or in our deeds. It makes no difference whether the bomb explodes in Istanbul or in New York. It makes no difference what slogan of hatred or distortion the terrorists hide behind. And it makes no difference whether the name is Osama bin Laden, or Abdullah Ocalan, Al Zarkawi, or Karayilan (McEldowney 2005).

As a result, Turkey did not face many criticisms following its latest incursion into Iraq’s territory under the banner of the war on terror. Republican People’s Party (CHP) chairman Deniz Baykal justified the cross-border incursion as “necessary to drain the swamp which is a fertile ground for terrorism” (Anatolia 2007a). Before the operation, the U.S. recognized the PKK as a common enemy. As President Bush observed after a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan,

We had a long discussion about a common concern, and that concern is the PKK. The PKK is a terrorist organization. They’re an enemy of Turkey, they’re an enemy of Iraq, and they’re an enemy of the United States (Bush and Erdogan 2007).
Subsequently, the U.S. approved of Turkey’s counterterrorist operation. Moreover, the “Americans have even sent high-tech specialists to work alongside the Turks to provide ‘real-time’ intelligence to help Turkish helicopters and artillery to target the PKK in its mountain fastnesses” (Economist 2008). Thus, the 2008 Iraqi operation was recognized as part of the war on terror.

Over the years Turkey carried out several cross-border operations. And while some of them enjoyed support from the international community, before September 11 Turkey was still encouraged to find a political solution to the Kurdish issue, and the PKK was not equated with Kurdish separatism. For instance, in response to the 1992 Iraqi operation, the State Department spokeswoman Margaret D. Tutwiler stated “We welcome the Turkish Government’s efforts to act with restraint in response to P.K.K. terrorist provocations, and we urge that every possible step be taken to avoid the death or injury of innocent citizens” (New York Times 1992). During the operation U.S. planes were spotted in the region, and the U.S. was reported to help the wounded PKK militants (Hurriyet 1992). The Council of Europe, Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International criticized Turkey for human rights abuses (Nokta 1992).

In March 1995 Turkey sent 40,000 troops to Iraq for a six-week military campaign against the PKK (Sayari 1997). While President Clinton gave tacit support to the operation (Turkish Daily News 1995a), Turkey was criticized for crossing the border (Dunya 1995). Following the operation, the EU demanded that Turkey change its actions against terrorism and solve the Kurdish problem through a political solution (Milliyet 1995). The European Commission further urged Turkey to improve its human rights
situation (AFP 1995). Following September 11, however, such expectations subsided. As the Special Envoy to Counter the PKK General Joseph Ralston (2006) stated: “the U.S. will not negotiate with the PKK. We will not ask Turkey to negotiate with the PKK.” As a result, the 2008 Iraqi operation was acknowledged as a necessary step against the international threat of terrorism.

The Turkish case illustrates how the framing of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist separatist conflict as a terrorist uprising became acknowledged after September 11. Like Russia, Turkey tried to frame the conflict as a terrorist threat before September 11 as well. However, its actions did not gain much support. After September 11, however, Turkey was able to persuade international actors that it was fighting terrorism. Even the EU, which was critical of Turkey’s handling of the Kurdish issue, confirmed the designation of the PKK as a terrorist organization. And while the EU’s cooperation can be partially attributed to the recent Kurdish reforms, no such rapprochement followed the liberalization that occurred before September 11 in the 1990s.

From the very start of the conflict, Turkey was faced with a single organization – the PKK – which it was able to designate as its terrorist enemy. However, the spikes in the PKK terrorism seem to have followed Turkey’s ineffectual policies towards Kurdish separatism (Figure 6.3). Here, military force was unsuccessful against a designated terrorist organization, which indicates that the military solution fails to address terrorism, let alone separatism. As a result, the Kurdish troubles continue, with recent clashes escalating in 2010.
6.4 Sri Lanka vs. the Tamils

Sri Lanka has been fighting an ethno-nationalist separatist uprising from its Tamil minority. Like Turkey, Sri Lanka experienced the presence of an extremist separatist wing – the LTTE – from the outset of the conflict. Similar to the rest of the cases, Sri Lanka addressed the issue with military force, announcing it was fighting terrorism, and not separatism. Like Russia, China, and Turkey, Sri Lanka’s framing efforts became more successful after September 11. Unlike the rest of the cases, however, Sri Lanka’s counterterrorist campaign escalated into a civil war in 2009, which was won by the government forces, and the state has currently defeated the separatists. As such, this case demonstrates the success of the military campaign against terrorism. However, the extent of the use of military force in Sri Lanka, with hundreds of thousands of civilians affected leaves the question whether such sacrifices are justifiable in the name of the “war on terror.”

Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain as a unitary state in 1948. Under the British rule the Sinhala and Tamil communities were integrated into a centralized state; however, the colonial rule largely contributed to the crystallization of the lines of distinction between the two ethnic groups.\(^\text{63}\) The British ethnic policies played a role in the accumulation of ethnic grievances.\(^\text{64}\) In the British colony the Tamil-speaking Hindu minority gained a privileged position over the Sinhala-speaking Buddhist majority due to

\(^{63}\) For more on the colonial period see Bandarage (2009).
\(^{64}\) For the evolution of the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka see Ponnambalam (1983), Spencer (1990), and Wilson (1988).
educational and employment advantages (Bush 1990). Since English education became the “primary means of economic advancement, social mobility and elite status” under the British rule (Ponnambalam 1983), the Sinhalese became politically underrepresented. As a result, Sinhalese protests and riots were not uncommon.

Upon independence, the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict intensified. The Tamils found themselves increasingly marginalized, as the state implemented affirmative action programs meant to benefit the Sinhalese (Marks 2007). In 1956 Sri Lanka adopted the Official Language Act 33, often referred to as the “Sinhala Only” Act, which made the Sinhala language the only official language of the state. The Act required Sinhala proficiency for education and employment, and, therefore, evoked a lot of resistance. The Tamil Federal Party engaged in a peaceful resistance campaign (Colombo 1957), but violence and rioting followed (Ponnambalam 1983).

Since the early days of the conflict, the Sri Lankan government refused to acknowledge the ethnic nature of the problem. Prime Minister Bandaranaike refuted the validity of demands advanced by the Tamil Federal Party (Colombo 1957). In 1958 Sri Lanka imposed a state of emergency and adopted the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act 28. The Act made provisions for the use of the Tamil language in the northern and eastern provinces, but not the rest of the Sri Lankan territory. Ever since, Sri Lanka has remained under a state of emergency almost continually (see Manoharan 2006). In 1972 Sri Lanka adopted a new post-colonial constitution, which gave a special status to Buddhism and contained reaffirmations of the 1956 Official Language Act.
Government policies further incited Tamil resentment. In the 1970s the country experienced a proliferation of radical groups and nationalist movements, including the Sinhalese Marxist People’s Liberation Front (JVP) insurgency in 1971. The Tamil Union Front (TUF), later renamed the Tamil Union Liberation Front (TULF) was formed in 1972. In the 1977 parliamentary elections, the TULF won every constituency but one in the Tamil areas (Kearney 1985). In its election manifesto (1977) the TULF declared separatism as its goal:

The Tamil United Liberation Front seeks in the General Election the mandate of the Tamil Nation to establish an independent sovereign, secular, socialist State of Tamil Eelam that includes all the geographically contiguous areas that have been the traditional homeland of the Tamil speaking people in the country.

The government’s intransigence on the Tamil issue also contributed to the formation of armed resistance groups. In 1976 Velupillai Prabhakaran formed the LTTE, formerly known as Tamil New Tigers (TNT). The LTTE (1979) justified its resort to violence as follows:

we are not a group of amateur armed adventurists roaming in the jungles with romantic political illusions, nor are we a band of terrorists or vandals who kill and destroy at random for anarchic reasons. We are neither murderers nor criminals or violent fanatics as your Government [Sri Lanka] often attempts to portray us. On the contrary, we are revolutionaries committed to revolutionary political practice. … The guerilla warfare, the form of the popular struggle we are committed to is not borne out of blind militancy or adventurism but arose out of the historical necessity, out of the concrete conditions of intolerable national oppression.

Following the 1977 elections, the United National Party (UNP) adopted a new constitution in 1978. The 1978 Constitution established Tamil as a second national language of Sri Lanka and recognized the rights of the Tamil to education in the Tamil language, to the use of Tamil in public service, as well as to official communications in...
Tamil. Thus, the 1978 Constitution reversed some of the discrimination policies spelled out in the 1972 version. At the same time, however, Sri Lanka clamped down on the Tamil separatist movement. The government issued the proscription of the LTTE in 1978. In 1979 the state adopted the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and imposed a state of emergency in Jaffna. The military, guided by the PTA, was sent to Jaffna against terrorists.

The state responded to the Tamil ethnic issue with repression. As President Jayewardene pointed out: “it is no longer possible to argue, debate or talk with them [Tamils]” (Daily Telegraph 1983). In the same interview, commenting on the TULF election into Parliament in 1977 the president said: “They used to speak on behalf of the terrorists.” As a result, the terrorism discourse became predominant in describing the Tamil issue, and the 1979 PTA became the main instrument of fighting separatism.

The PTA was introduced in 1979 as a temporary piece of legislation, which, however, became permanent in 1982. The Act suspended the right to be presumed innocent, allowed for arrests without charges, and enabled detention of suspected terrorists for up to 18 months without charge or trial. Provisions of the act allowed for the extraction of confessions under torture.65 The vague definitions and vast provisions of the Act enabled the government to target the members of the Tamil community, and have been widely criticized on the grounds of human rights abuses (Ponnambalam 1983; Amnesty International 1980, 2011; International Commission of Jurists 2009).

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65 For more on the cases of arrests and trials under the PTA see Amnesty International (2011).
In response to Amnesty’s criticisms, the Sri Lankan Government stated that “the human rights organization’s report did not refer to the magnitude of the terrorist activity which the security forces were trying to contain” (Daily Telegraph 1983). As a result, in addition to the PTA, under the banner of the fight against terrorism, Jayewardene adopted a 3rd Amendment to the Constitution, allowing him to call for presidential elections before the end of his term. After winning the elections in October 1982, Jayewardene held a referendum to prolong the life of Parliament for another six years, which further alienated the Tamil constituency. To further combat terrorism, another state of emergency was declared in May 1983. The army was employed against the Tamil activity, a curfew was imposed and press censorship was introduced (Sunday Herald 1990).

As the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict evolved, Sri Lanka experienced a number of anti-Tamil riots, such as in 1958, 1960, 1977. The episode that started the contemporary phase of the confrontation known as the first Eelam War (1983-1987) dates back to 1983. In July 1983 Charles Anton, a leader of the military wing of the LTTE, was killed in clashes with the army (AFP 1983a). More clashes followed, and on July 23 the Tamil militants staged an ambush in the course of which 13 Sinhalese soldiers were killed (AFP 1983c). In reaction to these events, violence broke out leading to anti-Tamil riots. The riots left at least 80 people dead, thousands of people homeless, and numerous Tamil detainees killed in prisons (AFP 1983b).

Sri Lanka responded to the riots with military force. Commenting on the possibility of negotiations with the LTTE President Jayewardene stated: “I shall have a
military solution to what I believe is a military problem. After doing so, I shall tackle the political side” (Times 1986). The president described the Tamil issue as a “disaster” and drew parallels with India’s conflict in Punjab and Britain’s struggle in Northern Ireland (New York Times 1984). By the time the violence broke out in 1983, the terrorist discourse was already well entrenched in the Sri Lankan political establishment and the president referred to Tamil separatists as “terrorists” (Daily Telegraph 1983). Following the riots, Sri Lanka banned the democratically elected pro-separatism opposition TULF and adopted a 6th Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibited violence against the territorial integrity of the state. In addition to the military handling of the conflict, the government’s actions effectively criminalized Tamil separatism.

Sri Lanka’s response to the events of 1983 spurred further violence. As Marks (2007, 493) points out, the “July 1983 riots radicalized large sectors of the Tamil community, especially the youth, and provided abundant, motivated manpower.” In response to the events that led to the riots, the LTTE declared in their memorandum (1983):

It is the plight of the Tamil nation of four million people and their legitimate struggle for political independence based on the democratic principle of national self-determination. The Tamil nation was forced into this political path as a consequence of nearly thirty five years of violent and brutal oppression practised by successive Sri Lankan Governments aimed at the annihilation of the national entity of the Tamils. Decades of peaceful, non-violent, democratic political struggles to gain the very basic human rights were met with vicious forms of military suppression. The intensified military occupation of Tamil lands, the intolerable terrorism of the armed forces, the implementation of racist and repressive legislations, the mass arrest and detention of political activists – all these draconian methods were employed to stifle and subjugate the will of our people to live free, and stamp out their legitimate struggle for justice.
The LTTE stated that it exhausted the peaceful democratic means of advocacy, which only invoked a military response from the state and justified its resort to armed resistance in order to “defend themselves against a savage form of state terrorism” (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 1983).

International reactions to the Sri Lankan conflict were mixed. Both Britain and the U.S. approved of the government’s actions against terrorism (Colombo International Service 1985; Colombo International Service 1984b). An Israeli Interest Section was established in Sri Lanka in order to help the state “curb terrorism” (Colombo International Service 1984a). However, such cooperation resulted in a “‘population-as-enemy’ philosophy, harsh reprisals, and emphasis on the military to maintain order rather than to function as a shield behind which a political solution could be put in place” (Marks 2007, 499). As a result, Amnesty International raised concerns about extrajudicial killing (Christian Science Monitor 1984), and criticized the Sri Lankan government for civilian casualties (Burmiller and Kastor 1984). India’s Prime Minister Gandhi, in turn, expressed concerns over the situation in Sri Lanka and called for “utmost restraint” (Domestic Service 1984).

And while no international consensus existed on the Tamil issue in the 1980s, the Tamil grievances were validated by India’s involvement. In 1985 India persuaded Sri Lanka to sign a ceasefire with the Tamil militants. Despite the LTTE Proscription and the ban on the TULF, the Tamil delegation to Thimpu included representatives of both (see Bandarage 2009). Thus, the LTTE was acting as an internationally acknowledged representative of the Tamil separatist movement.
As the ceasefire failed due to the Sri Lankan government’s refusal to consider a political solution involving power-sharing (Uyangoda 2007), India intervened in the conflict, thus further illustrating the acknowledgement of the LTTE as a legitimate party in the conflict. The intervention produced an Indo-Sri Lanka peace agreement, signed on July 29, 1987. In accordance with the agreement, Sri Lanka adopted the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, making Tamil the official language, along with Sinhala. Further, the 16th Amendment adopted in 1988 made both Sinhala and Tamil the languages of administration. These actions represented the first steps of the Sri Lankan government towards granting Tamils equal rights since the recognition of the Tamil language in the 1978 Constitution. In turn, the LTTE terrorism declined (Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4. Terrorist acts perpetrated by the LTTE over time.

The agreement, however, produced much domestic opposition in Sri Lanka, seen as imposed by an outside power (Hancock 1999). Peace talks stalled (Van de Voorde 2005), and the Eelam War II (1990-1994) followed. At the time, describing the conflict,
despite the declining number of terrorist attacks, President Wijetunga pointed out that “there is nothing like ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, but it is only the menace of terrorism that exists in the country” \(\text{(Virakesari 1994)}\).

This episode of violence came to an end when in 1994 the Kumaratunga government made an offer to the LTTE to negotiate \(\text{(AFP 1994)}\), and the number of terrorist attacks declined (Figure 6.4). In January 1995 the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government signed the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities. President Kumaratunga proposed a unilateral devolution package, meant to grant Tamil majority areas substantial autonomy. The package, however, was rejected by the LTTE and reforms never materialized (Uyangoda 2007). The failure of the Kumaratunga reform initiative led to the start of the Eelam War III (1995-2002) in 1995, after the government once again shifted its efforts to a military assault on the LTTE. Government officials once again came to the agreement that the LTTE had to be defeated militarily prior to a political solution (Marks 2007, 510).

Sri Lanka’s portrayal of the Tamil issue as a terrorist threat led to the designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization by the U.S. in 1997 (Kronstadt and Vaughn 2009). Following the 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Africa, in response to Clinton’s encouragement for a global effort against terrorism, President Kumaratunga warned the international community to be “eternally vigilant to insure that terrorists do not find loopholes in our laws or use procedural delays to circumvent the emerging international consensus against terrorism” \(\text{(Crossette 1998)}\). At the same time, Amnesty International (1999a) continued criticizing the Sri Lankan handling of the conflict.
And while the LTTE has been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks,\(^\text{66}\) the group denounced violence even before September 11, 2001. In 2000 the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire and urged the government to negotiate. Following the attacks on the U.S. the LTTE tried to further distance itself from terrorism.\(^\text{67}\) The number of terrorist attacks committed by the LTTE declined (Figure 6.4). In October 2001 the LTTE supported the alliance of Tamil political parties, which formed the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). This move was described as a “post-September 11 effect,” and Dayan Jayatilleke, a Colombo political analyst commented on it as follows: “the LTTE is worried that it may be targeted in the international war against terrorism. It now wishes to develop a democratic front organisation as a pre-emptive measure” (Harris 2001).

In February 2002 Sri Lanka signed a ceasefire agreement with the LTTE, brokered by Norway. The agreement was followed by six rounds of negotiations. The agreement called for “internal self-determination in areas historically inhabited by Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 2002b). In the same article, commenting on the agreement, the LTTE negotiator Anton Balasingham called it “not a paradigm shift on our part but a paradigm shift on the part of the Sri Lankan government as well.” Mr. Balasingham further added in the same commentary:

> It [the agreement] is as far as the LTTE is concerned in line with the policy of the LTTE advocating for the last decades or more. That is a regional autonomous model based on the right to internal self-determination of our people in the historical areas where the Tamil and Muslim people live. This model of self-

\(^{66}\) For more on the LTTE terrorism see Van de Voorde (2005) and Pape (2003).

\(^{67}\) The diaspora support for the separatist causes also declined after September 11 as the LTTE lost financial support from many countries (Marks 2007).
government we were referring to has to be couched or properly conceptualised within an appropriate constitutional form. That is why we decided that we would opt for a federal model. This federal model will be within a united Sri Lanka, which will be appreciated by the Sinhalese people. I wish to reiterate that our struggle was based on the concept of self determination as articulated in the UN charter and other resolutions and instruments.

The LTTE leader Prabhakaran expressed his approval for a federal solution to the Tamil issue:

We are prepared to consider favourably a political framework that offers substantial regional autonomy and self-government in our homeland on the basis of our right to internal self-determination. If this internal element of self-determination is blocked or denied and the demand for regional self-rule rejected, we have no alternative other than to secede and form an independent state (Statesman 2004).

Negotiations were suspended in April 2003, following the LTTE complaints that the government was not implementing the decisions made during the previous rounds of negotiations (Uyangoda 2007). As Prabhakaran observed, “if the government rejects our urgent appeal, adopts delaying tactics, we have no alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of our nation” (Statesman 2004). He added, criticizing the official negotiation efforts “We are living in a political void, without war, without a permanent solution to the ethnic conflict. Our liberation struggle will be seriously undermined if this political vacuum continues indefinitely.” Kumaratunga’s government responded with the suspension of Parliament, declaration of a state of emergency, and dismissal of key ministers handling peace talks with the LTTE (Kronstadt and Vaughn 2009).

After Mahinda Rajapakse’s election to the presidency in 2005, Sri Lanka once again shifted the handling of the Tamil issue to military force (see Lewis 2010). Violence escalated in 2006 starting the Eelam War IV (2006-2009). The government framed the all-out campaign against the LTTE as part of the global “war on terror” and was able to
escalate its military campaign to an unprecedented level. In this respect, Sri Lanka’s use of the terrorism discourse allowed the government not only to avoid criticism for the employment of military force against the Tamils, but also to raise its military campaign to a civil war level. As a result, the state forces were able to wipe out Tamil contingents and declare victory over the LTTE.

As Foreign Affairs Minister Rohitha Bogollagama stated, “there was no ethnic problem in Sri Lanka and the problem that did prevail in the country was that of terrorism” (BBC Monitoring South Asia 2008a). Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. secretary of state, confirmed that Washington saw the conflict in Sri Lanka as another front in the “war on terror” (Tisdall 2006). After the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, Rajapakse announced that “the United States and the European Governments must give credit to him for defeating terrorism since it was their war and his government followed what George W Bush said” (BBC Monitoring South Asia 2009). And that is what happened with the UN Human Rights Council (S-11/1) congratulating Sri Lanka on its victory and welcoming the “continued commitment of Sri Lanka to the promotion and protection of all human rights.”

Sri Lanka’s handling of the Tamil issue was recognized as a success in the global “war on terror” and the LTTE remained designated as a terrorist organization. In 2003 then Deputy Secretary of State Armitage (2003) claimed that

if the LTTE can move beyond the terror tactics of the past and make a convincing case through its conduct and its actual actions that it is committed to a political solution and to peace, the United States will certainly consider removing the LTTE from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as well as any other terrorism-related designations.
However, despite the LTTE’s denouncement of terrorist tactics, the organization remains on the U.S. terrorist list (Executive Order 2001). Further, the EU designated the LTTE as a terrorist organization in 2006 (Council of the European Union 2006).

However, while the LTTE stands defeated, the case of Sri Lanka illustrates the success of military force that came at a great cost. After the initial acknowledgement of Sri Lanka’s success, international actors initiated a close scrutiny of Colombo’s actions. In the course of this investigation, the International Crisis Group (2010) found that during the latest anti-LTTE campaign the Sri Lankan government engaged in intentional shelling of civilians, hospitals, and humanitarian operations. The recently issued UN report (Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka 2011, ii) found gross violations of human rights during the conflict, and declared that “the conduct of the war represented a grave assault on the entire regime of international law designed to protect individual dignity during both war and peace.”

Thus, while military force allowed Sri Lanka to defeat the threat coming from the Tamil separatists, the extent of the employment of military force has undermined the very democratic principles of governance in Sri Lanka. In the course of the war, more than 70,000 people died, tens of thousands of Tamils have continued living in the war-torn areas where the military retains close control, and tens of thousands of refugees are unable or unwilling to return to their homelands (Wade 2010). According to the UN report (Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka 2011, ii), some of Sri Lanka’s actions could “amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
The military success in Sri Lanka presents an outlier among the cases considered here. Unlike Russia, China, or Turkey, Sri Lanka was able to defeat the ethno-nationalist problem by portraying it as a terrorist threat. Among the cases, Sri Lanka is the smallest state, geographically isolated with no porous borders for separatist contingents to escape. In a confined space, by increasing its military forces by thousands, Sri Lanka was able to escalate the military campaign and stamp out the ethno-nationalist threat. In so doing, the state relied heavily on the use of the “war on terror” discourse. For instance, as the U.S. pointed out, Sri Lanka framed its Tamil issue in terms of a terrorist threat:

President Rajapaksa framed the victory as part of the global fight against terrorism, declaring in a May 19 speech before Parliament, ‘Ending terrorism in Sri Lanka means a victory for democracy in the world. Sri Lanka has now given a beginning to the ending of terrorism in the world’ (Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate 2009).

Thus, this case demonstrates how military force can be successful in fighting ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts if it not limited or constrained.

6.5 Conclusion

The analysis of the cases of Russia, China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka indicates that framing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as terrorist threats can present an attractive alternative to governments. Driven by the desire to retain the status quo and avoid secession, governments can be willing to substitute terrorism for separatism and fight it with means deemed acceptable for the terrorist threat. Thus, military means have become more popular and more justifiable in fighting separatist uprisings.
However, the above analysis suggests that military force might not be the most successful strategy in fighting either ethno-nationalist terrorism or separatism. In all these cases ethno-nationalist terrorist attacks followed the employment of military force by the state, thus suggesting that ethno-nationalist terrorism was an outcome, rather than the cause, of the conflicts. In addition, following September 11, when framing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat became more successful in the eyes of the international community, the number of ethno-nationalist terrorist attacks in all cases was on the decline, suggesting that such framing was not based on immediate reality.

In all cases, except Sri Lanka, framing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat and employing military force failed to produce the intended results. In Russia, violence continues, and it has affected neighboring regions. In China, the government was successful in eliminating alternative accounts of the conflict, and yet, Uyghur separatism has not subsided. Turkey has been able to persuade the EU, a long-time critic of its handling of the Kurdish issue, that it is fighting terrorism. However, Kurdish claims for independence continue. Such outcomes again question the legitimacy of framing separatism as terrorism, and indicate that military force might not be the best alternative in addressing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. In each case, the employment of military force questioned the democratic nature of governance, and invoked much domestic and international criticism.

On the basis of the Sri Lankan example, however, one might argue that military force can be successful if properly employed. And yet, while Sri Lanka has currently defeated the Tamil separatists, the long-term effects of the campaign are hard to assess at
the moment, since the events are so recent. What is possible to evaluate, however, is the impact of the campaign on the democratic principles of governance in Sri Lanka. On May 31, 2011 a seminar opened in Colombo, intended to teach the world how to eliminate terrorism. The seminar, however, raises concerns about how much repression can be tolerated in the name of security. With the current UN investigations into Sri Lanka’s war revealing brutal human rights violations, the success of the campaign is undermined by the means implemented. With so much importance placed with the military, as the National Peace Council, an NGO points out, Sri Lanka is risking turning into a militaristic society, which can in turn lead to “unwanted military rule nursed by a democratically elected government” (Economist 2011b).
7. Military Means and Terrorism: Can the “War on Terror” Fight the “New” Threat?

7.1 Introduction

The dynamics of the Chechen conflict illustrate how the government was able to employ military force against separatists and to justify federal actions as necessary against the threat of terrorism. However, while presenting an attractive alternative to Moscow, the employment of troops in the region has failed to produce peace and stability. After 20 years of the separatist struggle in Chechnya, the region remains highly unstable, and the independence campaign, along with terrorist attacks, continues. Moscow’s handling of the conflict through the discourse on the “war on terror” led to the gradual radicalization of the movement, with Doku Umarov proclaiming himself the Emir of the Caucasus Emirate in 2007. The Chechen violence spilled over to the broader North Caucasus region and has reached Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Hostilities have continued even after the declaration of the end of the “counterterrorist operation” in 2009.

In China, the employment of military force against the Uyghur separatists has not resolved the conflict. Instead, the movement radicalized, and the ETIM terrorist attacks followed. Ethnic riots in Xinjiang escalated once again in 2009, and the region is still involved in violence. In Turkey, the military handling of the Kurdish problem has invoked criticism since the start of the conflict back in the 1970s. Such criticism subsided

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following September 11, and Turkey has been able to carry out the military campaign in the southeast, even despite the fact that the PKK engaged in a peace process. The Kurdish issue still remains on the Turkish agenda, with more clashes escalating in 2010.

Sri Lanka has used military force against the separatist Tamil minority since the start of the conflict in the 1970s. Sri Lanka’s PTA legalizing the employment of the military dates back to 1979. Since then the state has adopted numerous provisions outlining the use of military force in the Tamil provinces. And even though the LTTE has repeatedly denounced violence, in 2009 the state engaged in an all-out counterterrorist operation, the extent of which questioned Colombo’s choice of tactics. Among the cases of ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts that have been affected by the terrorist framing after September 11, Sri Lanka represents the only case where the state has declared victory over the ethno-nationalist insurgents. However, the cost of the victory in terms of grave human rights abuses has questioned the very success of Sri Lanka’s military operation.

Thus, the cases of the Chechen, Uyghur, Kurdish, and Tamil conflicts present examples of ethno-nationalist separatist struggles that have been addressed with military means. In all these cases, following September 11 the governments have been able to justify the use of military force as counterterrorist operations under the banner of the “war on terror.” However, while framing separatism as terrorism has become more widely acceptable following September 11, and Russia, China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka have not encountered as many criticisms as before the attacks on the U.S., the benefits of such framing in terms of conflict resolution remain questionable.
Framing separatism as terrorism in these cases has been facilitated by the presence of ethno-nationalist terrorist attacks. As a result, some may argue that the use of military means in these cases is justified against the threat of ethno-nationalist terrorism. In turn, if military force presents an effective tool against ethno-nationalist terrorism, framing separatism as terrorism can then be justified if separatists resort to terrorist tactics. Thus, in order to determine whether framing separatism as terrorism is indeed a valid justification for the use of military force, we need to examine whether military force presents an appropriate strategy against ethno-nationalist terrorism.

This chapter examines the “war on terror” as a counterterrorist paradigm. I analyze the notion of “new” terrorism that led to the rise of the “war on terror,” and investigate factors contributing to the demise of terrorist organizations. The analysis of empirical data on terrorist organizations does not support the notion of “new” terrorism, nor does it indicate that military force can effectively address factors that play a significant role in fighting different types of terrorist organizations. The data suggests that military force does not represent the best alternative against ethno-nationalist terrorism, and, therefore, framing separatism as terrorism remains problematic.

Section 7.2 discusses the use of military force against ethno-nationalist terrorism, suggesting that ethno-nationalist terrorism might be different from other types of terrorism due to the ethnic factor inherent in it. Section 7.3 then turns to the examination of the empirical data on terrorist organizations. The section examines the nature of today’s terrorism and assesses the temporal trends in the development of terrorist organizations. Attributes of terrorist organizations are analyzed over time in order to
determine whether today’s terrorism is significantly different from that of the past.

Section 7.4 analyzes factors that contribute to the demise of terrorist organizations.

Logistic regression analysis of attributes of terrorist organizations such as size, type, goal, bases of operation, years of existence, as well as control variables of country income, civil liberties, armed conflict, and ethnic and religious fractionalization is employed to shed light on the question whether the “war on terror” addresses factors, important for eliminating the terrorist threat. Section 7.5 draws conclusions and policy implications.

### 7.2 Military Means and Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism

As was discussed in Chapter 2, military means present a popular alternative against terrorism, and many states, including Britain, Israel, Turkey, and the U.S. have resorted to the military solution. Moreover, after September 11 and the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, military means have become more widely acceptable on the international arena, and many countries have adopted new provisions outlining the use of military force against the threat of terrorism. As a result, criticisms against the use of military force to address terrorism have subsided.

As Carr (1996/97) points out, military force presents an attractive alternative for states that allows them to produce an image of a strong opponent to terrorists. Additionally, in terms of ethno-nationalist terrorism, proponents of military force can argue that this solution has contributed to the demise of many ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations. Thus, if we look at the breakdown of how terrorist groups ended before and after September 11 by type, we see that military force against ethno-nationalist
terrorist organizations has become more successful (Table 7.1). The success of the military alternative has declined across all types of terrorist organizations, except ethno-nationalist terrorist groups, where 5 percent of groups were defeated with military means after September 11 as opposed to only 2 percent before the attacks on the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How terrorist groups ended</th>
<th>All groups</th>
<th>Ethno-nationalist</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Left-wing</th>
<th>Right-wing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Force</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Political Solution</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1. How terrorist groups ended by type before and after September 11.
Source: Jones and Libicki (2008)
*Percentages of the total number are given. Percentages might not add up to 100% due to rounding.

However, despite the attractiveness of the military solution, many scholars have questioned the effectiveness of military means against ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations. For instance, Jones and Libicki (2008, xiii) find that the demise of most terrorist organizations requires a combination of several policy tools, such as “intelligence work, military force, political negotiations, and economic sanctions.” Accordingly, Jones and Libicki (2008, 107) conclude that alone “military force is too blunt an instrument to defeat most terrorist groups.” As Hoyt (2004, 162) puts is, if not combined with political objectives, “the use of military force may prove spectacularly unsuccessful.” Thus, as Miller (2007) illustrates with the example of Quebec, Canada’s employment of military force against the Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) only exacerbated the militant group. Only when the state supplemented the use of military
force with improving the conditions and expanding the rights of the French-speaking citizens of Quebec, was Canada able to reduce violence in the province.

Further, previous research indicates that military means against terrorism do not produce long-term effects. For instance, examining the case of Israel, Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (2004) find that major retaliation campaigns do not cause significant changes in the patterns of terrorist attacks and do not divert them from their natural rate. Moreover, besides producing only temporary results, military force can be counterproductive. Thus, as Clarke and Newman (2007) demonstrate, killing terrorists can turn them into martyrs, which can lead to more bitterness among the already disenfranchised population. In this respect, ethno-nationalist terrorism seems to be significantly different from other types of terrorism due to the very ethnic component present in this case. As Long (1990, 64) points out, for ethno-nationalist terrorism, ethnic identity is “invariably the most important element in creating a sense of grievance and in articulating the political resolution of such a grievance.” This ethnic element establishes a greater audience of members of the same ethnic group for ethno-nationalist terrorists.

As a result, as Byman (1998) points out, harsh measures against ethno-nationalist terrorism not only alienate the contestant ethnic group from the state, but also mobilize popular support for the ethno-nationalist insurgency. For instance, in Sri Lanka, the state’s military campaign in response to the LTTE and the ensuing constitutional amendment of 1983 prohibiting the espousal of independence led to the renewed escalation of ethnic clashes. As a result, militant groups grew in number, and the financial support for the terrorist causes from the Tamil community and the diaspora
increased. The number of guerilla attacks rose significantly (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajan 2005).

Considering such evidence from previous research, the question remains whether military means present a suitable alternative against ethno-nationalist terrorism. The ethnic component present in ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations seems to make them distinct from other types of terrorist groups, which suggests that military force might not effectively address the grievances behind such groups in order to eliminate their existence. In the light of military force becoming more widely acceptable following September 11, more evidence is needed to support the claim that military means can better fight contemporary terrorism. The sections below address this need in terms of investigating characteristics of terrorist organizations and factors that affect the probability of their demise, paying specific attention to the ethnic factor in ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations.

7.3 Is “New” Terrorism Really New?

As was discussed in Chapter 2, the “war on terror” came about as a response to the events of September 11, 2001 as a strategy to combat “new” terrorism. Military force against terrorism has been justified as adequate against the “new” terrorist threat, which today is believed to be more dangerous, more radical, and more lethal. However, many scholars have disputed the “newness” of today’s terrorism (Copeland 2001; Duyvesteyn 2004; Gearson 2002; Hoffman 2002; Tucker 2001).
The overarching contention here is that the distinctions between “old” and “new” terrorism are somewhat exaggerated; even though technology, communication, financing, resources, and organization of terrorist groups have improved, terrorism today still aims at influencing broader target audiences as it did decades ago. As Enders and Sandler (1999) point out, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War produced an increased fear of terrorism back in the 1990s. However, on the basis of a time-series analysis, the authors found no significant changes in the patterns of terrorism following the end of the Cold War. Further, Duyvesteyn (2004, 449) finds that many continuities in “territorial focus, transnational links, and network structures” make contemporary terrorist organizations less distinct from those of the past.

Jenkins (1992) was discussing “new” trends in terrorism back in the 1990s. He was noting that a large proportion of terrorism came to be associated with the Middle East, a lot of terrorist attacks were a spillover effect from guerilla wars, and that European terrorism was largely ideologically or ethnically driven – trends that are not radically different from today’s terrorism. Moreover, different accounts point to a rising prominence of different types of terrorism at different times. Thus, what was once considered radical might no longer be regarded as such: as Rapoport (2001) illustrates, terrorism has experienced certain waves, which at different times have brought different types of terrorism to the fore. According to Rapoport, today religious terrorism is on the rise. Further, Cronin (2002/03), for instance, associates left-wing terrorism with the Communist era, right-wing terrorism with Fascism, while ethno-nationalist/separatist
terrorism is intertwined with the decolonization movement. Today, Cronin seconds Rapoport, “sacred” terrorism is gaining prominence.

Such criticisms of the notion of “new” terrorism are further corroborated by new empirical evidence. Until now, little empirical data has existed on the perpetrators of terrorism (terrorist organizations). And yet, it is ultimately terrorist organizations at which counterterrorist policies are targeted, and, therefore, more research is needed on the perpetrators of terrorism. However, most large-N research was focused on incidents of terrorist attacks (Piazza 2006; Eubank and Weinberg 1998; Li 2005). In this respect, the Jones and Libicki (2008) project represents a significant step forward in the study of terrorist organizations as perpetrators of terrorism. Using the RAND-MIPT database, Jones and Libicki coded 648 terrorist organizations operating between 1866 and 2006 reflecting the start and end year of terrorist organizations, their size, type, and goal. If an organization no longer existed as of 2006, the database reflects the way it ended. In the dissertation I utilized the Jones and Libicki dataset in order to further investigate how “new” today’s terrorist organizations truly are.

I used the data on 639 terrorist organizations. These groups fall into the following categories, coded by Jones and Libicki on the basis of the RAND-MIPT data. According to their type, the groups are broken down into religious, ethno-nationalist, left-

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68 See Eubank and Weinberg (1994).
69 The most widely utilized databases are ITERATE (Mickolus et al. 2006) and MIPT (National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, MIPT terrorism knowledge base: A comprehensive databank of global terrorist incidents and organizations, available at http://www.mipt.org).
70 9 terrorist organizations from the original Jones and Libicki dataset were dropped at the diagnostics stage of the statistical analysis for this research. These groups were deleted as influential outliers pulling the data. The nine organizations are: Irish Republican Army, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Ejercito del Pueblo en Armas, Carapaica Revolutionary Movement, Ananda Marga, National Anti-Corruption Front, Maoist Communist Center, Armed Revolutionary Left, and Anti-Communist Command.
and right-wing groups. Religious terrorist organizations comprise only 22 percent of all groups. Ethno-nationalist and left-wing organizations each constitute an equal amount of 36 percent, while only 6 percent of groups are right-wing. According to the size, organizations vary among those with fewer than 100 members (10s), 100-999 members (100s), 1,000-9,999 members (1,000s), to 10,000 or more members (10,000s). 361 groups out of 639 fall into the first category, thus indicating that the majority of terrorist organizations are rather small. 169 organizations have 100 to 999 members and 79 range in the 1,000s. Only 30 groups have 10,000 or more members.

Terrorist organizations vary according to the goals they pursue. From narrow to broad, terrorist organizations can pursue the goals of the preservation of the status quo, policy change, territorial change, regime change, establishment of an empire, and a social revolution. Only 15 percent of terrorist organizations pursued the broadest goals of staging a social revolution (11 percent) or building an empire (4 percent). 35 percent of organizations aimed at a regime change and the remaining 50 percent had the limited goals of advocating for the status quo (3 percent), and policy (20 percent) or territorial change (27 percent).

In addition to these categories, I coded the terrorist organizations as active (0) or those that ended their existence (1) on the basis of the dates of existence indicated in the Jones and Libicki dataset. As of 2006, out of 639 terrorist organizations, 239 were active, while 400 organizations had ended their existence. In addition, I introduced a variable of the number of bases where a terrorist group operated. On the basis of the Jones and Libicki dataset, terrorist organizations were coded as 0 if they operated in a single
country and 1 if they operated in multiple countries. This variable was introduced as a proxy for controlling for the internationalization of terrorism, tracing whether groups based in several countries have different trajectories of development from organizations operating from a single base. Out of 639 terrorist organizations, 498 operated in one country, while 141 had multiple bases.

The analysis of the characteristics of 639 terrorist organizations indicated that religious organizations do not tend to be bigger than other types. According to the notion of the rising fundamentalist terrorism represented by Al Qaeda, we would expect religious terrorist groups to have broader, more extreme goals than other groups. Yet, only 4 percent of religious terrorist organizations pursue the extreme goal of social revolution, as compared to 24 percent of left-wing groups. 52 percent of religious terrorist organizations aim at regime change, compared to 46 percent of left-wing groups.

However, in order to determine whether today’s terrorism is radically different from terrorism of the past, we need to conduct a temporal analysis of the developments among terrorist organizations. To do so, I broke down the data on 639 terrorist organizations according to five decades (Table 7.2 and Figure 7.1). A clearer picture in contemporary trends emerges from these data.
Table 7.2. Attributes of terrorist organizations over decades.

Total number includes terrorist organizations surviving from previous decades. Percentages might not add up to 100% due to rounding.

* indicates a statistically significant change in percentages at 0.05 level as compared to the previous decade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>182</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
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<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td>122</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Goal</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status quo</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial change</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>38*</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empire</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Social revolution</td>
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<td><strong>Bases</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>One base</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple bases</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2. Attributes of terrorist organizations over decades.
Changes in Type

Decades

Numbers

Religious
Ethno-nationalist
Left-wing
Right-wing

Changes in Size

Decades

Numbers

10s
100s
1,000s
10,000s
Figure 7.1. Attributes of terrorist organizations over decades.
The data show a steady increase in the total number of all terrorist organizations throughout decades. However, there are few statistically significant changes from decade to decade, suggesting that the newer trends resemble the past developments. What emerges is that indeed, religious terrorism has been on the rise since the 1980s, which supports Rapoport (2001) and Cronin’s (2002/03) conclusions. Left-wing terrorist organizations have significantly declined in the last decade, while right-wing terrorist organizations remained at the same level. Ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations, which represented the largest number of organizations throughout all five decades, remained at a stable level. These trends suggest that different types of terrorist organizations follow different patterns. As a result, different terrorist organizations present different threats: some rising (religious), some declining (left-wing), and some persistent (ethno-nationalist), which indicates the dangers of treating terrorism as a monolithic threat.

Terrorist organizations today do not seem to be larger in size than those of the past. In fact, the number of larger organizations has remained stable, while the number of smaller organizations has increased. And while these data do not account for technological advances, new ways of organization, or resources and weapons that terrorist organizations rely on, the rather consistent composition of terrorist organizations indicates that terrorist groups do not attract an ever-increasing number of members.

Analyzing the breadth of goals that terrorist organizations have pursued over time, we can conclude that terrorist goals today are consistent with those of the past. The number of organizations pursuing the broadest goals of empire and social revolution has remained stable, while the number of organizations pursuing regime change has declined.
Instead, we see a growth in the number of organizations pursuing a more concrete goal of territorial change. Terrorist organizations are not becoming more international, either. In fact, the number of organizations operating in multiple countries has declined.

The analysis of these data suggests that terrorist organizations today are not significantly different from organizations of the past. No drastic shifts in the development of terrorist organizations throughout the last five decades have been revealed. Terrorist organizations today do not tend to be bigger, nor do they pursue broader goals, indicating that terrorism today does not attract more people with more vague, unrealistic goals. Thus, the analysis did not indicate a unique tendency today that would warrant the label of “new” terrorism. On the contrary, what emerged from the data indicates a rather gradual development that might not justify a change in the counterterrorist paradigm that the “war on terror” introduced.

What the data did indicate, however, is the importance of distinguishing between different types of terrorist organizations. Breaking down terrorist organizations according to different types reveals different trends in their development. Such different trends indicate the dangers of treating terrorism as a monolithic threat, as has been the tendency under the “war on terror,” discussed in Chapter 3. Treating terrorism as one unified threat undermines the qualitative distinctions that might affect how different terrorist organizations end their existence. The next section investigates factors that contribute to the demise of terrorist organizations and analyzes whether military force can successfully address factors important for eliminating different types of terrorist organizations.
7.4 The “War on Terror” and the Demise of Terrorist Organizations

The empirical data on terrorist organizations does not support the idea of “new” terrorism, suggesting, as a result, that the “war on terror” might not be justifiable as necessary against the “new” threat. However, a shift in the counterterrorist paradigm might be warranted, if, in fact, the policies of the “war on terror” can effectively eliminate terrorist organizations. This section analyzes factors that contribute to the demise of terrorist organizations and assesses the impact of the “war on terror” on such factors. I argue that the “war on terror” and its preemptive strategies fail to encompass measures necessary to defeat terrorist organizations.

In order to assess the effectiveness of the “war on terror,” we need to examine factors that contribute to the demise of terrorist organizations. In this respect, scholars have focused on causal mechanisms that can lead to the reduction of terrorist threats. For instance, Ted Gurr (1971) advances the argument that deprivation leads to conflict. According to the relative deprivation theory, politically and socio-economically deprived groups would have incentives to engage in terrorism (also see Crenshaw 1981; Maleckova 2005; Piazza 2006). Thus, Abadie (2006) finds that poor economic conditions can produce political unrest. Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2004) corroborate these findings, arguing that groups that are unhappy with their economic conditions might resort to terrorism. These findings suggest that improving economic conditions might be necessary to fight terrorism.

A large body of literature focuses on the connections between terrorism and democracy and civil liberties (Eubank and Weinberg 1994 and 2001; Gause III 2005; Li 2005). Some scholars have found that democracy provides a more favorable climate for terrorism to flourish (Wilkinson 1986; Schmid 1992). Li (2005) finds that democratic participation can reduce the number of terrorist attacks in a country. Others have found that civil liberties present a variable that exerts an effect on terrorism. For instance, Krueger (2007) argues that curtailing civil liberties can lead to more terrorism.

Other studies on how to reduce the terrorist threat have focused on the relationship between terrorism and armed conflict. For instance, Hoffman (1992) sees terrorism as an outcome of armed conflict. Stepanova (2008) describes terrorism as the most common outcome of ethno-political violence. Gilbert (2003) finds that rebels can use terrorism as a mechanism of self-defense. Finally, scholars have argued that terrorism is closely related to ethnic and religious tensions (see Byman 1998; Pluchinsky 2006; Habermas 2004). As a result, in order to assess ways of fighting terrorist organizations we need to look at such factors as economic conditions, the level of civil liberties, the presence or absence of armed conflicts, and ethnic and religious factors.

This section builds on the Jones and Libicki research, which explores how terrorist groups end and which policies have the potential to fight the terrorist threat. Jones and Libicki compose a complex variable measuring the values for the longevity and survival of terrorist organizations, controlling for the way organizations ended (accounting for whether victory was achieved).72 The authors then use ordinary least

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72 See Appendix C in Jones and Libicki (2008, 197) for a detailed description of the dependent variable.
squares regression analysis to investigate which factors contribute to the success of terrorist organizations.

To predict the success of terrorist organizations, Jones and Libicki control for the country income, country freedom, and the size, type, and breadth of terrorist organizations. Country income, based on the World Bank Indicators database, reflects the economic development of states where terrorist organizations are based, and ranges from 0 (lower income) to 1 (lower middle), 2 (upper middle), and 3 (high income). The variable of freedom, based on the Freedom House data, is broken down into free (2), partly free (1) and not free (0). The coding of the characteristics of terrorist organizations was discussed in the previous section.

On the basis of the ordinary least squares regression analysis of these variables, Jones and Libicki find that larger terrorist organizations tend to be more successful. The two other variables that were significant at 0.05 level were control variables for the types of ethno-nationalist and religious terrorist organizations. These correlations suggested that the success of ethno-nationalist and religious groups was higher than that of other groups. Based on these results, Jones and Libicki come to the conclusion that their analysis was not able to confirm many of the hypotheses about the survival of terrorist groups (namely that poor economic conditions provide supportive environments for terrorists, that regime type matters, and that the breadth of terrorist demands affects the survival of terrorist organizations).

However, while Jones and Libicki account for the economic and regime variables, they do not control for the involvement of the state in armed conflicts, as well as ethnic
and religious diversity of countries that might have an effect on the outcome of terrorism. To control for these factors, after replicating the Jones and Libicki model (Model 1 in Table 7.3), I constructed an extended model (Model 2 in Table 7.3). I retained all of the original Jones and Libicki variables, with the dependent variable being a complex measure of success of terrorist organizations.

In addition, to test whether terrorism is correlated with armed conflict, I added the variable measuring the presence or absence of armed conflicts on the territory of the main base where terrorist organizations operated. The variable reflects whether an armed conflict was present (coded as 1; 0 if absent) in the last year recorded for the terrorist organization (end year if the group no longer exists). The data for this variable was obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch et al. 2007). To control for whether diversification of population plays a role in terrorism, I added two variables of ethnic and religious fractionalization of the main base of operation. These variables were incorporated to indicate whether ethnicity and religion (substantial factors for ethno-nationalist and religious terrorism) would exert an effect on the success of terrorist groups. The measures for ethnic and religious fractionalization come from Alesina et al. study (2003), and range from 1 (highly homogenous) to 93 (highly diversified) for ethnic and 0 (highly homogenous) to 86 (highly diversified) for religious fractionalization.

The extended Model 2 also included a dummy variable for territorial change, with 1 standing for a terrorist organization seeking territorial change and 0 for other goals.

73 The replication results in Table 7.3 are based on the data I received from Jones and Libicki through email communication. The data reported in the Jones and Libicki Appendix produced slightly different results due to some inconsistencies in coding. However, the differences were not statistically significant. For the rest of the models, the data from the Jones and Libicki’s Appendix was used.
This variable was included since territorial change was the only goal that steadily attracted a growing number of terrorist organizations throughout decades and had a significant increase in the recent years (see Table 7.2). Therefore, this variable was intended to check whether the goal of territorial change impacts the dependent variable of the success of terrorist organizations. Finally, I included the variable of bases, used as a proxy for the level of internationalization of terrorist organizations. This variable aimed to test the hypothesis stating that international terrorist groups are more difficult to fight.

The results of Model 2 were not strikingly different from the original Jones and Libicki analysis. Both the peak size and religious variables retained their significance showing again that larger groups and religious terrorist organizations tend to be more successful, while the ethno-nationalist variable lost its significance. The last significant variable of bases supported the hypothesis that international terrorism is more successful, showing that terrorist organizations operating in multiple bases do better than those with a single base. However, while Model 2 is consistent with the Jones and Libicki findings, due to the nature of the complex dependent variable measuring success of terrorist organizations, both Models 1 and 2 might be producing distorted results. Thus, longevity of terrorist organizations, treated as part of the dependent variable, can in fact exert an effect on the success of terrorist groups, which questions the direction of causation in these models.
In order to eliminate this potential bias, I respecified the dependent variable. Instead of the complex measure including group longevity, I treated the survival of terrorist organizations as their success. This variable reflects whether terrorist organizations are active (0) or ended their existence (1). Treating endurance as the dependent variable still reflects the survival ability of terrorist organizations, but also allows for avoiding the causality considerations from Models 1 and 2. Since this variable is dichotomous, I employ logistic regression analysis for the rest of the models. Thus, Models 3-7 (Table 7.4) show the analysis of the probability of terrorist organizations to end.
## Table 7.4. Logit regression Models 3 – 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3 General</th>
<th>Model 4 Ethno-Nationalist</th>
<th>Model 5 Religious</th>
<th>Model 6 Left-Wing</th>
<th>Model 7 Right-Wing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.345* (.137)</td>
<td>.999** (.251)</td>
<td>.251 (.362)</td>
<td>.181 (.288)</td>
<td>- .446 (.959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak size</td>
<td>-.331* (.143)</td>
<td>-.661* (.257)</td>
<td>-.297 (.340)</td>
<td>-.199 (.284)</td>
<td>- 1.519 (1.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>-.228 (.530)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-nationalist</td>
<td>-.493 (.558)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>- 2.747** (.563)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breadth</td>
<td>-.276** (.099)</td>
<td>-.072 (.270)</td>
<td>-.328 (.258)</td>
<td>-.203 (.140)</td>
<td>-.389 (.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial change</td>
<td>- 1.216** (.307)</td>
<td>- 1.504** (.408)</td>
<td>- 2.470* (1.181)</td>
<td>- .602 (1.190)</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bases of operation</td>
<td>.648* (.267)</td>
<td>1.170* (.468)</td>
<td>1.737** (.623)</td>
<td>- .242 (1.190)</td>
<td>1.119 (2.804)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict</td>
<td>-.610* (.250)</td>
<td>-.493 (.461)</td>
<td>.287 (.560)</td>
<td>- 1.371** (1.518)</td>
<td>- .154 (1.700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>.011* (.005)</td>
<td>.028* (.011)</td>
<td>-.004 (.012)</td>
<td>.014 (.011)</td>
<td>.019 (.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious fractionalization</td>
<td>.002 (.005)</td>
<td>-.001 (.008)</td>
<td>.003 (.011)</td>
<td>-.003 (.008)</td>
<td>.039 (.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years existed</td>
<td>-.062** (.011)</td>
<td>-.062** (.017)</td>
<td>-.231** (.057)</td>
<td>-.060** (.018)</td>
<td>-.021 (.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>-.240** (.079)</td>
<td>-.382** (.017)</td>
<td>.693** (.230)</td>
<td>-.699** (.206)</td>
<td>.136 (.716)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.573** (.809)</td>
<td>2.271* (1.098)</td>
<td>- 1.278 (1.285)</td>
<td>6.229** (1.375)</td>
<td>2.254 (3.396)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi2</td>
<td>237.16</td>
<td>97.44</td>
<td>55.57</td>
<td>46.26</td>
<td>15.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-square</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates significance at the .05 level.
** Indicates significance at the .01 level.
*** Only 3 right-wing organizations pursued the goal of territorial change. The variable was therefore dropped since it would otherwise predict success perfectly.
In Model 3, longevity of terrorist organizations is treated as an independent variable and ranges from 0 to 140. The final change to the original models was substituting the variable of freedom. Regime type might not accurately represent the motivation of terrorist organizations, while civil liberties that citizens enjoy might have a greater impact on their desire to resort to terrorism (Enders and Sandler 2006). The variable of civil liberties is also derived from Freedom House (2007), and reflects the level of liberties citizens possessed in the last year recorded for a terrorist organization (if data were unavailable for that year, the year closest to the last). The range varies from 1 to 7, 1 standing for the lowest level of civil liberties and 7 – the highest (the range was recoded, as Freedom House treats 1 as the highest level and 7 – the lowest).

Model 3 presents results that are substantially different from those of Model 2. The size of terrorist organizations is still significant, and suggests that bigger groups are less likely to end. “Religious” also remains significant with a negative correlation: religious groups are more likely to survive. The variable of bases, however, changes its direction. Here, terrorist organizations operating in several bases are more likely to end than those operating from one base, suggesting that international terrorist organizations might not be more dangerous than local ones.

Other variables of interest become significant. The variable of longevity indicates that longer-lasting organizations are less likely to end. Thus, both the size and longevity make a terrorist organization stronger. Next, the variable of income becomes significant as well. While Piazza (2006) finds that poverty and terrorism are not correlated, his analysis investigates the relation between poverty and terrorist attacks. Thus, while
terrorist attacks might not be correlated with the level of economic development, Model 3 suggests that terrorist organizations in poorer countries tend to be less likely to end their existence. Contrary to the expectations on the level of civil liberties, the analysis suggests that the more civil liberties citizens enjoy, the more likely terrorist groups will be to endure.

The breadth of demands advanced by terrorist organizations also becomes significant. Groups pursuing broader goals are less likely to end. The narrower the goals, on the other hand, the more likely groups are to end their existence. The goal of territorial change seems to affect the survival of terrorist organizations: groups pursuing territorial change end less frequently. Terrorist organizations, operating in countries involved in an armed conflict are also less likely to end. Therefore, terrorism as an outcome of armed conflicts is more durable. Finally, the fractionalization variables produce interesting results. While religious fractionalization has no statistically significant effect on the survival of terrorist organizations, ethnic fractionalization does not prolong the life of terrorist organizations. The more fractionalized a state is, the more likely terrorist organizations are to end, which is somewhat contradictory to Piazza’s (2006) finding that homogenous states are less prone to terrorism.

The analysis based on Model 3 suggests the following conclusions regarding counterterrorist policies. Bigger terrorist organizations with a long history of existence present a bigger threat. Since they have survived for many years, traditional deterrence methods against terrorism might not be the best alternative in such cases. As a result, a preemptive military response might be more appropriate. More extremist terrorist groups
pursuing broader unrealistic goals are a greater challenge, since they possess a higher level of survivability. These groups are hard to negotiate with; therefore, military force might be justifiable against them. Further, military force might be justified against terrorist organizations acting as combatants in armed conflicts, since armed conflict prolongs the life of such groups. In addition, military response to terrorism might be warranted by the fact that civil liberties negatively affect the probability of terrorist groups to end. Thus, by curtailing civil liberties in the short run through imposing military counterterrorist operations, we might hypothetically contribute to the demise of terrorist groups.

These conclusions based on Model 3 are in line with the “war on terror” policy, which tends to treat terrorism as a “new” more dangerous threat, which deterrence methods fail to eliminate. In fact, such arguments justified the employment of military force against terrorism by the Russian, Chinese, or Turkish governments. However, the “war on terror” also tends to treat terrorism as a monolithic threat – which is how Model 3 treats it. And yet, distinctions between different types of terrorist organizations play a crucial role in determining which specific factors affect their survival. The conclusions based on Model 3 present the dangers of treating terrorism as a monolithic threat, since they can lead us to premature policy conclusions. Thus, if we control for different types of terrorist organizations, the data yields different results, which suggest that different types of terrorist organizations require different means of addressing them. To illustrate this, I broke down Model 3 into Models 4-7, with each Model representing types of
terrorist organizations: ethno-nationalist, religious, left- and right-wing. The results of these models are significantly different from Model 3.

Among all groups, only ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations are affected by size and country income. The size variable is consistent with the notion that ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations enjoy a wider support among the population than other groups (Byman 1998), which suggests that such groups might attract more members. The income variable, on the other hand, is supportive of the relative deprivation theory (Gurr 1971), especially considering that ethnic groups that engage in violence oftentimes feel disadvantaged (Horowitz 1985). Thus, ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations in poorer countries tend to last longer. Further, the goal of territorial change is significant, which is self-explanatory since the vast majority of ethno-nationalist terrorist groups pursue territorial alterations (143 terrorist organizations out of 229 ethno-nationalist groups pursued territorial change). The variables of bases of operation, civil liberties, and years of existence are consistent with the general model (Model 3). The ethnic factor, however, is again unique for ethno-nationalist groups. This suggests that ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations are in fact significantly different from other terrorist groups, and would require an approach addressing their ethnic grievances.

For religious terrorist organizations, only the variables of territorial change, bases of operation, years of existence, and civil liberties are significant. The first three of these variables are consistent with the results in Model 3. Civil liberties, however, are positively correlated with the probability of terrorist groups to end. Curiously, civil liberties have a different impact on religious terrorist organizations than on other types,
indicating that with an increase in liberties, religious terrorist organizations are more likely to end. There seems to be a peculiar correlation between religion, liberties, and conflict, which Habermas (2004) discusses in more detail. This observation has important implications for policies against religious terrorist organizations: counterterrorist policies should be targeted at increasing civil liberties, while repressive measures might be counterproductive.

Left-wing terrorist organizations indicate yet another interesting tendency. Among all types of terrorist organizations, only left-wing groups are correlated with armed conflict, showing that armed conflict prolongs their existence. Considering that left-wing groups often pursue revolutionary goals (46 percent out of 229 left-wing terrorist organizations pursued regime change), and armed conflicts produce environments conducive for such aspirations, it is not unexpected that these organizations persist under the conditions of armed conflicts. This suggests that armed conflicts need to be eliminated in order to fight left-wing terrorism. Finally, none of the variables in the model produced any significant impact on right-wing terrorist organizations. This is the only type of terrorist organizations, the demise of which was not predicted by any of the variables included in the model.

The analysis of all these models illustrates the dangers of employing the same means against different types of terrorist organizations. As the analysis indicates, the only variable that exerted consistent influence on different types of terrorist organizations was the years of existence. And even then, this variable failed to predict the survival of right-wing terrorist organizations. The analysis shows that different factors are unique to
different terrorist organizations, as we see with the significance of the ethnic factor for ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations, or the civil liberties factor for religious terrorist groups, or armed conflict for left-wing organizations. As a result, different factors need to be addressed in order to effectively fight the divergent threats.

The analysis points to the dangers of treating terrorist organizations as unified, as such treatment can result in counterproductive results, which is exemplified by the positive correlation of religious terrorist organizations with civil liberties as opposed to the negative correlations with all other types. In this respect, the analysis suggests that military force might not be the best alternative since the military solution does not accommodate ethnic grievances, nor does it reduce poverty or increase civil liberties. Thus, this analysis indicates that the “war on terror” might be counterproductive, since the policy tends to discard important differences between types of terrorism.

7.5 Policy Implications

The analysis above does not indicate that terrorist organizations have experienced changes, drastically different from the previous development. Instead, the temporal analysis of the recent trends suggests that terrorist organizations undergo a rather gradual evolution. As a result, the data on terrorist organizations does not support the idea of the “newness” of terrorism. Consequently, the change in counterterrorist paradigm might not be justified by the changing nature of the threat.

Further, the analysis of the factors that contribute to the demise of terrorist organizations suggests that the “war on terror” might not present the most appropriate
alternative against terrorism. As the analysis indicated, different types of terrorist organizations require different approaches. The tendency of the “war on terror” to treat terrorism as a monolithic threat, equating various terrorist organizations with Al Qaeda, and the predominant reliance on military means fails to address the unique characteristics of different types of terrorist organizations. And so, as the data indicate, treating terrorism as a monolithic threat can lead to the adoption of inappropriate counterterrorist policies that might turn out counterproductive.

Based on the analysis, we see that different factors affect the probability of different terrorist organizations to end. Thus, the ethnic factor indeed seems to be a significant variable affecting the existence of ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations. As a result, counterterrorist policies against this type of terrorist organizations need to focus on the ethnic factor, which might involve such policies as addressing ethnic grievances of the militant group, increasing ethnic awareness among the population, and revising cultural and political rights of the ethnic group in question. In addition, the significance of the income variable in this category suggests that the improvement of socio-economic conditions of the contestant ethnic group might reduce the threat of terrorism. Military means against ethno-nationalist terrorist groups, on the other hand, might further alienate the population (Byman 1998), making membership in terrorist organizations more attractive among representatives of an ethnic group. This could, in turn, result in terrorist organizations that are larger in size, which, according to the data, are harder to fight. Thus, military means of fighting ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations might be counterproductive.
Thus, the empirical data analyzed above fails to provide evidence for the
effectiveness of the “war on terror” and military means against ethno-nationalist terrorist
organizations. Since military force does not address the ethnic component of such
organizations, it should be used sparingly and with caution against ethno-nationalist
terrorism. In this light, framing separatism as terrorism remains problematic: the lack of
evidence in support of the effectiveness of the military solution against terrorism does not
present justifiable grounds for employing the same means against the divergent threats of
separatism and terrorism.

Framing separatism as terrorism can produce additional effects which might
impact further efforts of conflict resolution. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2,
framing can produce bias towards ethno-nationalist separatists. In this respect, by
portraying them as terrorists, the government deprives ethno-nationalist separatist
movements of legitimacy, marginalizes the movements, and criminalizes separatists, thus
engendering more support for its own policies. Framing separatists as terrorists favors the
power of the state, which is no longer pressured to negotiate with separatists and to
reconsider the power status quo. As was seen with the Chechen conflict after September
11, such framing eliminates the opposing views of the conflict, and the government
position becomes the predominant frame. Framing thus enables the government to control
dissent and justify discriminatory policies. As a result, framing can be used as a tool to
legitimize the use of military means against ethno-nationalist separatist movements.

Thus, while framing separatism as terrorism presents governments with an
attractive alternative, its potential negative effects undermine the prospective gains. As
the example of Sri Lanka illustrates, the costs of achieving victory through military means under the “war on terror” may be extremely high. And even though military force has gained more popularity against terrorism after September 11, and more governments have justified the military solution against separatism as part of the “war on terror,” empirical data presents little justification for either the effectiveness of military force against ethno-nationalist terrorism or the appropriateness of framing separatism as terrorism.
8. Conclusion

8.1 Substantive Conclusions

The findings of this dissertation indicate that September 11 and the ensuing “war on terror” have affected the way states deal with ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. Following September 11 states have become able to frame their ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat and address them through military means under counterterrorist operations. Such actions, in turn, have received wider acknowledgement after September 11, since the perception of terrorism has changed, and states today enjoy wider support in their efforts against the “new” threat.

The scale of September 11 prompted the evolution of a notion of “new” terrorism, which is believed to be more dangerous, more deadly, and more radical than terrorism of the past. Thus, President Bush announced that terrorism declared a new war, and many states followed suit stressing the newness of the terrorist threat. “New” terrorism has become increasingly associated with Al Qaeda, and many terrorist organizations of distinct ideologies (ethno-nationalist, religious, left- and right-wing) have become associated with bin Laden’s group. As a result, a tendency has become apparent to treat terrorism as a monolithic threat, blurring the distinctions between the different types of threat.

The “new” threat of terrorism in turn prompted the emergence of the new response strategy of the “war on terror.” While the notion of the “war on terror” itself is
not new, after September 11 it has designated a shift in the counterterrorist paradigm. The deterrence strategies were announced as remnants of the Cold War era and were pronounced inadequate against the “new” threat. Preemption replaced deterrence, and military force has become an appropriate counterterrorist strategy. And while military force against terrorism was not uncommon before September 11, the attacks on the U.S. have made military operations against terrorism more acceptable in the eyes of the international community. As a result, international coalitions against terrorism joined effort and launched military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq.

The increased global support for military operations against terrorism has allowed governments facing unpopular ethno-nationalist conflicts to reframe perceptions of such conflicts. Framing separatism as terrorism has allowed governments to avoid criticisms for employing military solutions against separatism and gain more domestic and international support for their actions. The findings from the analysis of the Russo-Chechen ethno-nationalist separatist conflict suggest that September 11 was instrumental in government efforts to frame separatism as a threat of terrorism.

Russia’s first Chechen campaign was framed by the government as an operation to “restore constitutional order,” while the government opposition and separatists called it “war.” The conflict was legally justified by presidential decrees, and no state of emergency was announced. Nor did Russia justify its military action in the republic by counterterrorist legislation. In contrast, the Kremlin pronounced the second conflict a “counterterrorist operation” from the outset, and justified the legality of its actions by the 1998 and 2006 counterterrorist legislation. And while before September 11 the terrorist
rhetoric did not gain much international acknowledgement, following September 11 Russia has gained international support in its actions against terrorism.

Thus, even though Russia announced a “counterterrorist operation” in 1999, the terrorist framing only gained international acknowledgement after September 11. The first conflict was widely criticized. Domestic public opinion indicated that the conflict was widely unpopular. The State Duma was urging the Kremlin to switch to negotiations. International criticisms threatened sanctions and isolation. The beginning of the second conflict in 1999 enjoyed a wider domestic support due to the apartment bombings across Russia in September 1999. However, international actors continued to be critical of Moscow’s handling of the Chechen issue. It was only after September 11 that the criticisms subsided, and in 2003 three Chechen groups were labeled terrorist by the U.S. and UN terrorist lists. The government framing of the second conflict as a “counterterrorist operation” prevailed.

One could argue that the designation of Chechen groups as terrorist followed a major terrorist attack on the Dubrovka theater in 2002. However, the analysis of terrorist attacks during the first and second conflicts suggests that the patterns of terrorism changed little. Chechen separatists resorted to terrorist tactics during both conflicts. Demands of hostage-takers were rather similar during both campaigns and focused on the termination of the war in Chechnya, Chechnya’s independence, and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the republic. However, during the first conflict the Russian government referred to the perpetrators of the attacks in Budennovsk in 1995 and
Kizliar/Pervomaiskoe in 1996 as separatists and responded to the attacks with negotiations. No terrorist designations followed.

In contrast, the second conflict was announced as an operation against terrorism from the very outset of hostilities in August 1999. This label did not follow any major immediate terrorist attacks on the territory of the Russian Federation, but in fact preceded the apartment bombings that took place in September 1999. It was the apartment bombings that consolidated the Russian public opinion in favor of the federal actions. However, the apartment bombings themselves remain highly controversial, with the Russian government reluctant to pursue further investigations into the nature of the attacks. Major terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Chechen militants followed in 2002 in the Dubrovka theater and 2004 in Beslan.

Russia reluctantly acknowledged the ethno-nationalist separatist nature of the first conflict, while claiming that the second conflict was purely an operation against terrorism. However, the analysis of the evolution of the conflict suggests that the second conflict had ethno-nationalist characteristics as well. What made the second conflict somewhat different was a certain level of radicalization of the Chechen separatists. However, such radicalization seems to have followed the ineffectual handling of the Chechen issue by the federal center instead of being the reason for hostilities. Thus, it was not until 2007 that Doku Umarov, the Chechen leader at the time, proclaimed himself Emir of the Caucasus Emirate.

The links of the Chechen separatists with Al Qaeda also remain unclear. While the Russian government claimed international connections of the Chechen movement
back in 1994, accounts of the amount of economic support from other countries or the presence of foreign mercenaries have remained contradictory and incomplete. Chechen Islamic battalions, on the other hand, were present during the first conflict and do not represent a unique feature of the second conflict. Jihad against Russia was also declared during the first conflict. In fact, Akhmad Kadyrov, appointed in 2000 head of Chechen administration by Moscow, had previously engaged in jihad.

Thus, even though some elements of the government’s framing of the second Chechen conflict as a “counterterrorist operation” remain controversial, the framing received international acknowledgement following September 11. The Chechen case is not an isolated instance of the government use of the focusing event of September 11 as a justification for military operations against ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. Ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts in China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka further illustrate how September 11 facilitated shifts in framing.

In China, Uyghur separatists pursued a struggle for independence for decades. The Chinese government acknowledged the ethno-nationalist separatist nature of the conflict before September 11 and outlawed separatist activities back in 1989. Chinese crackdowns against the Uyghur separatists were widely criticized. However, the situation changed following September 11. Even though Wang Lequan, secretary of the CCP Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Committee, on the verge of September 11 stated that terrorism was not a problem in Xinjiang, following the attacks, China announced it was involved in the struggle against terrorism. Following September 11, China’s rhetoric
received international acknowledgement and the ETIM was placed on the UN and U.S. terrorist lists.

In Turkey, Kurdish ethno-nationalist separatism has been a perpetual problem. Perceived as a threat to the unity of the Turkish state, the Kurdish issue has been addressed through military means for decades. Turkey’s handling of the Kurdish issue was criticized, and the EU pressured Ankara to resolve the human rights situation. Following September 11, however, the EU acknowledged the gravity of the terrorist threat Turkey was facing and started formal accession talks in 2005. Following the 2003 Istanbul bombing, Turkey was able to portray the Kurdish issue as linked to the international terrorist threat represented by Al Qaeda terrorism, and the PKK has remained on the U.S. and EU terrorist lists despite the fact that its leader Abdullah Ocalan denounced violence and announced a ceasefire back in 1999. Turkey proceeded with an international campaign against Kurds in Iraq in 2008 calling it a counterterrorist operation.

Sri Lanka’s faced an intensification of ethno-nationalist separatist sentiments at independence in 1948. In 1979 Sri Lanka imposed the PTA, which legalized its military action against the Tamil separatists. Sri Lanka’s actions before September 11 were criticized, and the LTTE was treated as a legitimate actor in the conflict. After September 11, the LTTE lost such an acknowledgement, and Sri Lanka was able to engage in an all-out campaign against Tamil separatists. The LTTE, despite its denouncement of violence, remains on the U.S. and EU terrorist lists. In 2009 Sri Lanka announced victory over the
LTTE. The case of Sri Lanka demonstrates how military force can bring victory if used indiscriminately against the entire affected area.

The analysis of the Chinese, Turkish, and Sri Lankan cases supports the findings from the Chechen case. In all these instances, the conflicts started before September 11 and were at certain times addressed through military means. Before September 11 state military actions against separatists were criticized as disproportionate. Following September 11, however, the governments in China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka were able to reframe the unpopular ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts and address them through counterterrorist operations under the banner of the “war on terror.” These cases illustrate how September 11 played a crucial role in government framing efforts and in the success of the terrorist framing. Thus, the changed perception of terrorism following September 11 facilitated governments’ efforts in reframing ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat.

8.2 Theoretical Conclusions

The findings of this dissertation further advance the studies of framing. The analysis has indicated that framing of an existing policy issue is affected by focusing events, which supports the previous scholarly findings (Jackson 2005; Picou and Marshall 2007; Schnell and Callaghan 2005; Hancock 2011). Thus, September 11 has affected perceptions of terrorism and has resulted in subsequent changes in counterterrorist policies: the “war on terror” came about as a response to the focusing event. As a result,
focusing events can reframe the perception of an existing policy issue and can affect the nature of policies adopted in response to the new frames.

Further, the analysis of framing of the Chechen conflict as advanced by the government, government opposition, and separatists highlighted discrepancies in discourses used by different actors. Such discrepancies brought out the government efforts in reframing an existing policy issue. The temporal analysis of these frames then highlighted the role of focusing events in the success of government efforts to reframe existing policy issues. Thus, comparisons of divergent frames before and after September 11 facilitated the analysis of the role of focusing events as manipulated by governments.

The present analysis indicates that focusing events can present the elites with a tool to reframe existing policy issues. In this respect, this research fills an existing gap in the literature on framing by examining how focusing events can present an opportunity for governments to reframe existing policy issues in order to gain more support for the official policies. Thus, as the examples of Russia, China, Turkey and Sri Lanka indicate, governments have used September 11 in their efforts to frame unpopular ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts as a terrorist threat. In all these cases, reframing of an existing separatist issue has allowed governments to justify their military response under the banner of the “war on terror.” And while their use of military force against separatism was widely criticized before September 11, reframing separatism as terrorism after September 11 has allowed governments to gain more legitimacy in the eyes of domestic and international audiences.
As a result, the process of frame formation, as presented in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 can be revised as follows (see Figure 8.1). Elites use frames to advance their agendas. They rely on public opinion to measure the level of support for their policies. Focusing events, in turn, affect how the public perceives a certain policy issue. Thus, the elites can manipulate focusing events in order to create frames that would enjoy a wider public support. Based on the reactions to a focusing event, governments can produce new discourses that are then circulated in the media. Subsequently, new frames and discourses emerge in response to focusing events that allow the elites to advance their preferred policy solutions.

![Figure 8.1. Evolution of framing.](image)

In terms of ethno-nationalist separatism, framing presents governments with a tool to justify the use of military force. As the analysis has indicated, while military force against separatism presents a popular alternative, it is rarely justified in the eyes of international actors. As a result, governments using military force against separatism face numerous criticisms, as examples of Russia, China, Turkey, and Sri Lanka illustrate.
The use of military force against terrorism traditionally did not enjoy wide support either. However, this changed after the focusing event of September 11, after which military means against terrorism have become deemed as more justifiable among the international community. Subsequently, by framing separatism as terrorism governments can achieve legitimacy for their actions and avoid criticisms for the use of disproportionate force. In turn, such framing allows governments to retain the territorial and power status quo and avoid addressing ethno-nationalist separatist grievances.

And yet, while framing presents governments with an opportunity to gain support for their policies, the present analysis has indicated that military force against separatists has not resulted in peace. On the contrary, the struggle in Chechnya spilled over to the bordering regions of the North Caucasus. The separatist uprisings in China and Turkey have recently intensified and have led to further violence. Only in Sri Lanka the government has announced victory over the Tamil rebels, but the costs of the victory question the very legitimacy of the state actions. Thus, framing separatists as terrorists does not seem to present a successful alternative for conflict resolution. The effects of framing further lead to the criminalization and marginalization of separatists, which can lead to further violence.

Thus, while the perils of framing become apparent through the continuing violent struggles for independence, framing itself, once instituted, is hard to dismantle. For instance, in the Chinese case, in its review of the Chinese conflict in Xinjiang, the U.S. House of Representatives admitted in Resolution 497 that “the authorities of the People’s Republic of China have manipulated the strategic objectives of the international war on
terror to increase their cultural and religious oppression of the Muslim population residing in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” (H.R. Res. 497). And yet, the U.S. has not reversed the ETIM terrorist designation, and China continues to address the Uyghur issue as a terrorist threat. As a result, caution should be exercised in acknowledging framing, and framing effects should be considered at policy deliberation stages as potentially negative outcomes of a proposed policy solution.

8.3 Policy Implications

With the change in the U.S. administration, references to the “war on terror” have become less frequent. In fact, President Obama has been portrayed as soft on terrorism (Economist 2010). And yet, much continuity has persisted in counterterrorism after the Bush era (see Desch 2010). In reaction to the 2009 Christmas bombing plot President Obama addressed the nation reiterating his predecessor’s rhetoric: “We are at war. We are at war against al-Qaeda, a far-reaching network of violence and hatred that attacked us on 9/11, that killed nearly 3,000 innocent people, and that is plotting to strike us again. And we will do whatever it takes to defeat them” (USA Today 2010). Such policy persistence provides evidence to the notion that once a policy is introduced, it is hard to reverse.74

Thus, the policy of the “war on terror” has persisted for almost a decade, and has impacted many phenomena besides terrorism. The “war on terror” has reached many places in the world, and its effects have produced global implications. The global reach of

74 See Pierson (2004) for the notion of path-dependence.
the “war on terror” and its persisting effects point to the necessity of careful policy
deliberation in order to ensure the adoption of the best possible policy alternative that
would produce the least amount of negative consequences.

In this respect, the research presented in this dissertation suggests that separatism
and terrorism should not be addressed with the same means. The analysis has revealed
dangers of framing ethno-nationalist separatism as terrorism, and has indicated that
military force used against both ethno-nationalist separatism and ethno-nationalist
terrorism might not be the most effective alternative. The quantitative part of the analysis
suggested that the presence of ethno-nationalist terrorism in a separatist conflict does not
present sufficient justification for the military solution. Thus, empirical data indicated
that the ethnic component present in ethno-nationalist terrorism exerts a significant effect
on the ability of terrorist groups to survive and should therefore be addressed in order to
fight ethno-nationalist terrorism.

In terms of policy implications, the significance of the ethnic component in ethno-
nationalist terrorism suggests that policies against this type of terrorism should focus on
addressing ethnic grievances of the militant group: increasing cultural rights, improving
socio-economic conditions, and enhancing political representation of the contestant
ethnic group. In contrast, the employment of military force against ethno-nationalist
terrorism might lead to the radicalization of the movement, which might in turn lead to
further violence, as the example of Chechnya illustrates. This, in turn, suggests that
framing ethno-nationalist separatism as a terrorist threat might produce further negative
implications, and might not be justified by the presence of ethno-nationalist terrorist
groups within separatist movements.

Thus, this dissertation has pointed to the negative effects of the “war on terror” in
terms of its impact on ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. This research leads to further
questions of what constitutes the most effective policies against the threats of terrorism
and separatism, how to ensure that adopted policies do not produce negative effects on
other policy areas, and how to prevent the use of focusing events in efforts to gain a
desired level of policy support. These questions provide venues for further research and
point to the necessity for further investigations of the consequences of September 11.
Appendix A

List of articles used for the discourse analysis of the framing of the Chechen conflict before and after September 11, 2001

The articles were retrieved through library archives or online databases as indicated below. The list is broken down into three groups used accordingly for constructing the discourses advanced by the Russian government (Rossiiskaia Gazeta), the government opposition (Izvestiia), and the separatists (Kavkaz Center). The list is given in chronological order. Articles are cited in the text according to the following format: (RG 12/06/1994 5), where (RG) stands for Rossiiskaia Gazeta (IZ – Izvestiia, and KC – Kavkaz Center), (12/06/1994) indicates the date of the publication, and (5) stands for the number assigned in the list below.

I. Rossiiskaia Gazeta
Articles were collected through library archives and East View electronic database. Total number: 197 articles for the first conflict and 341 articles for the second conflict.

Conflict I (December 1, 1994 – August 31, 1996)

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**II. Izvestiia**

Articles were collected through library archives and East View electronic database. Total number: 310 articles for the first conflict and 360 articles for the second conflict.

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### III. Kavkaz Center

For the first conflict, 59 articles were collected through the LexisNexis electronic database. For the second conflict, 99 articles were retrieved from the analysis and interview sections of the separatist portal http://kavkazcenter.com/.

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24. 07/23/1995  *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*. Dudayev says Chechen peace talks unlikely to resolve conflict
25. 07/24/1995  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Groznyy peace talks “in the hands of petty-minded fools” - Dudayev
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27. 07/26/1995  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Basayev takes firm stand on Chechnya’s independence
28. 07/27/1995  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Dudayev defiant, says talks pointless and fighting to continue
29. 07/31/1995  *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*. Chechen leader Dudayev says accord with Moscow is not valid
30. 07/31/1995  *The Herald*. Dudayev disowns Moscow accord
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35. 09/12/1995  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Dudayev prepared to carry on his cause to the end
36. 09/19/1995  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Chechen field commander Basayev threatens Russia with “sea of blood”
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39. 10/17/1995  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Chechen commander Basayev interviewed on elections, village bombing and OSCE
40. 10/23/1995  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Chechen leader Basayev's threat to turn Moscow into “desert”
41. 11/07/1995  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Chechen commander Maskhadov says two missing Russian soldiers safe
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42. 11/24/1995  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Chechen commander Basayev warns radioactive packages planted in Russia ready to explode

43. 11/24/1995  *Moscow News*. Dzhokhar Dudayev gives candid interview: ‘Bring Gorbachev back to leadership’

44. 12/14/1995  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Dudayev pledges that the war in Chechnya will go on

45. 12/15/1995  *Moscow News*. Aslan Maskhadov: ‘We are warriors, not assassins’

46. 01/05/1996  *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*. Dudayev vows to continue war in Chechenia

47. 01/12/1996  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Dudayev predicts “hundreds of similar operations” to Kizlyar

48. 01/19/1996  *Moscow News*. Dudayev: ‘It’s impossible to stop the war’

49. 02/12/1996  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Dudayev threatens “third world war” in Turkish press interview

50. 02/23/1996  *The Moscow Times*. Dudayev: ‘We are prepared to fight indefinitely’

51. 03/18/1996  *The Independent*. Chechen leader swears revenge on Moscow

52. 03/18/1996  *The Toronto Sun*. Chechens won’t negotiate

53. 03/19/1996  *The Moscow Times*. ‘The plan is to kill me,’ Dudayev says

54. 03/23/1996  *The Independent*. Russians try new tactics to flush out Chechen fighters

55. 04/03/1996  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Reaction to Yeltsin’s peace plan

56. 04/09/1996  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Peace negotiations

57. 04/14/1996  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Peace process

58. 06/27/1996  *Moscow News*. Shamil Basayev: “I hope for peace, but I don’t believe it”

59. 08/19/1996  *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*. Chechen rebel leader Maskhadov says peace is closer than ever

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Appendix B

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by country

The list was compiled on the basis of reports by Member States pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). 193 countries have submitted a total of 709 reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee since 2001

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<td>Associations act (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Act on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious freedom act (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criminal code (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Financial intelligence centre act (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electronic communications and transactions act (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration act (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection of constitutional democracy against terrorism and related activities act (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration act (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Anti-money-laundering act (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>Amendment of the penal code, the criminal proceeding code and the act on economic offences (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law on money laundering (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law regarding the identification of rendering of services (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law reporting of unusual transactions (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Money laundering prevention act (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suppression of terrorism act (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Act on penalty for financing of serious crimes (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Act on criminal responsibility for terrorist crimes (2003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Switzerland | Amendments to penal code (2003)  
|            | Fight against terrorism law (2004)  
| Syria      | Law No. 23 on the central bank and the money and loan system (2002)  
|            | Law No. 59 on money laundering (2003)  
|            | Law No. 28 on the creation of private and mixed public-private banks (2005)  
|            | Law No. 33 on combating money-laundering and terrorist financing (2005)  
|            | Law No. 24 on banking (2006)  
| Tajikistan | Act on refugees (2002)  
| Tanzania   | Passports and travel documents act (2002)  
|            | Anti-money laundering act (2006)  
| Thailand   | Amendment to penal code (2003)  
|            | Anti-money laundering act (2003)  
|            | Law on performing services for swift money transfers (2003)  
| The Former Republic of Macedonia | Law amending the penal code (2004)  
|            | Law on the prevention of money laundering and other proceeds from crime (2004)  
| Timor-Leste | Citizenship law (2002)  
|            | Passport regime law (2002)  
|            | Civil aviation law (2003)  
|            | Immigration and asylum law (2003)  
|            | Internal security act (2003)  
|            | Civil identification law (2004)  
| Tonga      | Criminal offences (amendment) act (2002)  
|            | Money laundering and proceeds of crime (amendment) act (2005)  
| Trinidad and Tobago | Anti-terrorism act (2005)  
| Tunisia    | Act No. 75 concerning support for international efforts to combat terrorism and prevent money-laundering (2003)  

Turkey  
Amendment to penal code (2004)  
Law 5532 amending anti-terrorism law 3713 (2006)

Turkmenistan  
Act on combating terrorism (2003)  
Act on migration (2005)  
Act to combat the legalization of income derived from criminal activity and the financing of terrorism (2009)

Tuvalu  
Extradition act (2005)  
Proceeds of crime act (2005)

Uganda  
Suppression of terrorism act (2002)

Ukraine  
Act on amendments to the criminal code and the code of criminal procedure of Ukraine (2003)  
Act on combating terrorism (2003)

United Arab Emirates  
Anti-money-laundering law (2002)  
Law on financial free zones (2004)  

United Kingdom  
Anti-terrorism, crime and security act (2001)  
Proceeds of crime act (2002)  
Extradition act (2003)  
Prevention of terrorism act (2005)  
Immigration, asylum and nationality act (2006)  
Terrorism act (2006)

United States  
Crimes against charitable Americans act (2001)  
USA PATRIOT act (2001)  
24-hour rule and the trade act (2002)  
Homeland security act (2002)  
Intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act (2004)  
Terrorist penalties enhancement act (2004)  
Emergency supplemental appropriations act for defense, the global war on terror, and tsunami relief (2005)

Uruguay  
Act No. 17,835 of 23 September on the strengthening of the system for the prevention and control of money-laundering and the financing of Terrorism (2004)

Uzbekistan  
Act No. 661-II of 26 August on combating the legalization of income derived from criminal activity and the financing of
terrorism (2004)
Act on export controls (2004)

Vanuatu
- Extradition act No. 16 (2002)
- Financial transactions reporting (terrorism amendment) act No. 2 (2002)
- Proceeds of crime act No. 13 (2002)
- Counter terrorism and transnational organised crime act No. 29 (2005)

Venezuela
- Organic law on refugees and asylum seekers (2001)

Vietnam
- Criminal procedure code (2003)

Yemen
- Civil code (2002)
- Act No. 35 on combating money-laundering (2003)

Zambia
- Prohibition of money laundering act No. 14 (2001)
### Appendix C

Timeline of key events in the history of the Chechen Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Chechnya was conquered by Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Chechnya became part of the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Chechnya became an autonomous region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Chechnya merged with the Ingush region to form the Chechen-Ingush autonomous region, which became the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ordered the deportation of the Chechen population to Siberia and Central Asia on the grounds of alleged collaboration with the Nazi Germany. Chechnya lost its autonomous status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was restored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November, 1990</td>
<td>The Chechen National Congress was formed in Grozny. Dzhokhar Dudaev became chairman of the Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 27, 1990</td>
<td>The Chechen Supreme Soviet under the leadership of Doku Zavgaevy issued a declaration of State Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
September, 1991  The Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush Republic stopped functioning. A Temporary Supreme Council was elected in its place. Under the leadership of Dzhokhar Dudaev, the Chechen National Congress dismissed the Temporary Supreme Council. Doku Zavgayev resigned.

October 8, 1991  The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation recognized the Temporary Supreme Council the only legitimate power in Chechen-Ingush Republic.

October 27, 1991  Dzhokhar Dudayev won the elections in Chechnya and became president of the Chechen Republic.

November 1, 1991  Dzhokhar Dudayev declared sovereignty of the Chechen Republic.

November 2, 1991  The Chechen Republic was pronounced an independent state of Ichkeriya.

November 7, 1991  Boris Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Chechnya.

November 11, 1991  Yeltsin’s declaration of a state of emergency was annulled by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

1992  Chechnya adopted a new constitution.

1993  Facing increased opposition, Dzhokhar Dudayev dissolved Parliament and introduced direct presidential rule.

Summer, 1994  Armed clashes started in Chechnya between Dzhokhar Dudayev’s forces and opposition groups.

August, 1994  Dzhokhar Dudayev introduced martial law.

November 26, 1994  Storm of Grozny.

November 29, 1994  Boris Yeltsin addressed Chechnya with an ultimatum to lay down arms within 48 hours.

December 1, 1994  Boris Yeltsin issued Decree N 2142 requesting that
the warring sides in Chechnya lay down arms by December 15, 1994.

December 9, 1994 Boris Yeltsin issued Decree N 2166 on measures to eliminate illegal armed formation on the territory of the Chechen Republic.


December 31, 1994 Storm of Grozny.


April 7-8, 1995 The Russian forces carried out a Samashki operation in Chechnya.

June, 1995 The first round of negotiations started between the Russian and Chechen delegations under the auspices of OSCE.

July 30, 1995 Russia and Chechnya signed a military agreement terminating the fighting.


April, 1996 Dzhokhar Dudayev was killed. Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev became his replacement.

July 3, 1996 Boris Yeltsin was re-elected president of the Russian Federation in the second round of presidential elections.

August, 1996 Separatist forces took over Grozny.

August 31, 1996 The Khasavyurt agreement was signed between Russia’s General Lebed and Chechnya’s Aslan Maskhadov. The status of Chechnya was postponed until December 31, 2001.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December, 1996</td>
<td>Russian troops completed the withdrawal from Chechnya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 27, 1997</td>
<td>Aslan Maskhadov was elected president of Chechnya. Shamil Basayev was appointed Prime Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1997</td>
<td>Boris Yeltsin and Aslan Maskhadov signed a peace agreement delineating the relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February, 1999</td>
<td>Aslan Maskhadov disbanded Parliament, suspended the constitution, and ordered transition to sharia law in Chechnya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August, 1999</td>
<td>Armed clashes started in Dagestan. On August 7 the Chechen forces under Basayev and Khattab crossed the border into Dagestan. After an initial return to Chechnya, the forces crossed the border again on September 5. Russia responded with military strikes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 16, 1999</td>
<td>Aslan Maskhadov announced a state of emergency on the territory of Chechnya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 30, 1999</td>
<td>Russian Federal forces entered Chechnya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 1999</td>
<td>Aslan Maskhadov announced martial law in Chechnya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 26, 2000</td>
<td>Vladimir Putin was elected president of the Russian Federation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 2000</td>
<td>Vladimir Putin declared direct presidential rule from Moscow in Chechnya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 2000</td>
<td>Vladimir Putin appointed Akhmad Kadyrov Head of Administration in Chechnya. Fighting in Chechnya continued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23, 2003</td>
<td>Chechnya held a referendum on its constitution, and presidential and parliamentary elections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

March 14, 2004  Vladimir Putin was re-elected president of the Russian Federation.

May 9, 2004  Akhmad Kadyrov was assassinated in a bombing.

August 29, 2004  Alu Alkhanov was elected president of Chechnya.

March, 2005  Aslan Maskhadov was killed. Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev replaced him. Sadulayev was in turn killed in June 2006, and was succeeded by Doku Umarov.

July, 2006  Shamil Basayev was killed.

February, 2007  Ramzan Kadyrov became acting president of Chechnya.

October, 2007  Doku Umarov proclaimed himself Emir of the Caucasus Emirate.

April 16, 2009  The counterterrorist operation in Chechnya ended.
Appendix D

List of major terrorist attacks carried out on the territory of the Russian Federation (outside of the Chechen Republic) committed by and/or attributed to Chechen perpetrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 9, 1991</td>
<td>Mineral’nye Vody (Stavropol region): TU-154 airplane was hijacked and directed to Turkey, where the hijackers surrendered to the Turkish authorities and were sent to Chechnya. Shamil Basayev was one of the hijackers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 26, 1994</td>
<td>Kinzhal (Stavropol region): a bus traveling from Vladikavkaz to Stavropol was hijacked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 1994</td>
<td>Mineral’nye Vody (Stavropol region): a bus traveling from Stavropol to Mozdok was hijacked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 28, 1994</td>
<td>Pyatigorsk (Stavropol region): a bus traveling from Pyatigorsk to Sovetskii was hijacked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 14, 1995</td>
<td>Budennovsk (Stavropol Region): a group of Chechen militants headed by Shamil Basayev took over 1,000 hostages in the city of Budennovsk and held them in a local hospital 5 days. Following ensued negotiations with Russia, the hostage-takers and hostages traveled to Chechnya, where the hostages were released. Over 100 people were killed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
January 9, 1996  Kizliar (Dagestan): a group of Chechens headed by Salman Raduyev took over 2000 hostages in a local hospital. From Kizliar the group proceeded to Chechnya through Pervomaiskoe (Dagestan), where it was delayed by the Russian forces. On January 15 in Pervomaiskoe the federal forces attempted an operation to release the hostages. The fighting went on for four days. The hostage-takers escaped to Chechnya.

January 16, 1996  Trabzon (Turkey): a group of Chechens hijacked a passenger ferryboat leaving for Sochi, Russia.

June 11, 1996  Moscow: a bomb exploded on a metro train close to the station Tulskaya.

July 11, 1996  Moscow: an explosion took place on a trolleybus on Strastnoy Boulevard.

July 12, 1996  Moscow: an explosion took place on a trolleybus on Prospekt Mira.

November 16, 1996  Kaspiysk (Dagestan): an explosion took place in an apartment building where Russian border guards resided.

April 23, 1997  Armavir (Krasnodar region): an explosion took place at the railway station.

April 28, 1997  Pyatigorsk (Stavropol region): an explosion took place at the railway station.

January 1, 1998  Moscow: an explosion took place at the metro station Tretyakovskaya.

August 31, 1999  Moscow: an explosion took place in the Okhotny Ryad shopping mall.

September 4, 1999  Buinaksk (Dagestan): an explosion took place in an apartment building.

September 8, 1999  Moscow: an explosion took place in an apartment building on Guryanov street.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 13, 1999</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>an explosion took place in an apartment building on Kashirskoe shosse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16, 1999</td>
<td>Volgodonsk (Rostov region)</td>
<td>an explosion took place in an apartment building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 22, 1999</td>
<td>Ryazan (Ryazan region)</td>
<td>several people were spotted placing explosives in a basement of an apartment building. The FSB announced it was a security training exercise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 8, 2000</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>an explosion took place in an underground passage at the Pushkin square.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 5, 2001</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>an explosion took place at the Belorusskaia metro station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9, 2002</td>
<td>Kaspiysk (Dagestan)</td>
<td>an explosion took place during the Victory Day parade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 19, 2002</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>an explosion took place in front of a McDonalds restaurant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 23, 2002</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>a group of Chechens headed by Mvorsar Barayev took around 900 hostages in the theater on Dubrovka. The siege lasted several days when on October 26 the Kremlin decided to storm the building. A soporific gas was used during the attack. All the hostage-takers were eliminated; over 100 hostages died. The Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, and the Islamic International Brigade became known as groups, involved in the Dubrovka theater operation.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5, 2003</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>two female suicide bombers set off explosions at the rock concert “Krylia” in Tushino.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75 All three groups were designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. Executive Order 13224 (2001) and the UN list (UN Security Council Committee 2011). However, out of the three groups, only the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs was implicated in terrorist attacks after the Dubrovka incident. The Global Terrorism Database (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) reports a total of six attacks following Dubrovka and up to the end of the counterterrorist operation in April 2009 attributed to the group.
December 9, 2003  Moscow: a female suicide bomber set off an explosion in front of the hotel National.

February 6, 2004  Moscow: an explosion took place on the metro near Avtozavodskaya station.

August 24, 2004  Moscow: planes TU-154 and TU-134 that had left from Moscow’s Domodedovo airport crashed as a result of explosions on board.

August 31, 2004  Moscow: a female suicide bomber set off an explosion in front of the metro station Rizhskaya.

September 1, 2004  Beslan (North Ossetia): a group of Chechen militants seized a school in Beslan. The perpetrators took over 1,000 hostages and held them until the storm of the school started on September 3. Over 200 people died. The Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs was reported to have carried out the siege.

August 13, 2007  Moscow: a bomb explosion derailed the Nevsky Express train that had left Moscow for St. Petersburg.
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