THE APPLICATION OF Q METHODOLOGY TO GENERATE
A FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY
OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY

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by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This research uses Q methodology to analyze Turkish law enforcement officers’ (LEOs) perspectives on terrorist organizations and terrorist acts. Q methodology comprises a data-collection procedure (the Q sort), a method of analysis (factor analysis), and conceptual framework that, in the context of this study, enables LEOs to represent their professional understandings of specific groups and events. The analysis results in functional categories of terrorist organizations based on the perceptions of LEOs, and this functionality leads to the practical applicability of the typology in terms of forecasting, or predicting, terrorist organizations’ behaviors.

LEOs’ perceptions are subjective scripts with cognitive reality (Allan, 2001, p. 288). The reality of terrorism influences investigators’ thoughts about and responses to terrorism; likewise, how investigators conceptualize terrorist organizations influences how terrorists are pursued and terrorist organizations are dismantled. The reality of terrorist acts and terrorists lies in two locations. One location is the reality of social life within which terrorists cause death and destruction. The second location lies in the ways by which terrorist investigators and policy makers conceptualize terrorist acts and terrorist organizations.
Terrorist organizations display an array of features and behaviors; that is, terrorist organizations have unique organizational natures. Responding to terrorism in terms of developing policies and practical guidelines requires familiarity with the nature of terrorist organizations in their socio-political context. Terrorism investigators, particularly in countries that have been dealing with terrorism for decades, are likely to develop expertise with respect to specific terrorist organizations and can be regarded as expert informers capable of providing cultural data about terrorist organizations. The Republic of Turkey is such a country in which are located informers such as these.

Application of Q methodology to investigators’ perceptions of terrorism and terrorist organizations can provide cultural data regarding terrorist organizations that can be used for practical and theoretical purposes. Practical purposes include management and operational needs of counterterrorism, such as predictions of terrorist attacks and terrorist organizations most likely to perpetrate attacks and the preparation of data-driven practical policies and guidelines to address terrorism. Management entails activities of administrators and is mostly related to the effectiveness and efficiency of counterterrorism services while operations involve counterterrorism activities of line officers, such as criminal investigations and intelligence analyses. Operational and management responses to counterterrorism eventually serve to prevent terrorism. This study will demonstrate that the application of Q methodology can respond to both management and operational needs and will illustrate the use of the application for an operational need: prediction of perpetrators’ organizations that are responsible for terrorist acts that have recently occurred. Theoretical purposes, on the other hand, are
related to hypothesis development. This study opens the door for theoretical studies through creation of a typology of terrorist organizations based on analysis of the cultural data.

**Problem Statement and Research Questions**

Response to the management and operational needs of counterterrorism has been an important issue in today’s world given that terrorist organizations have increased their capabilities and raised their expectations during the past decades. Globalization has influenced terrorism too by providing new weapons and tools to terrorists, such as communication and transportation, and granted them a global reach. Terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, can recruit new members beyond national boundaries and communicate with masses without language and other kinds of barriers. Terrorism incidents are now considered to be deadlier (Hoffman, 1999; NCTC, 2007, p. 2) and have become an issue of national security for many countries. Terrorists have improved their technological sophistication in many areas including operational planning, targeting, communications, and propaganda (Perl, 2007, p. 5). Enhanced capabilities and expectations have encouraged Al Qaeda, for instance, to challenge even the world’s number one super power, the United States of America. No country is immune now in term of the reach of terrorism and terrorist organizations.

In addition, there is a complexity in regard to comprehending terrorist activities and their organizations. Different kinds of terrorist organizations pose different kinds and levels of threat to national security and public order. It has become difficult to compare
terrorist organizations in terms of their characteristics, including motivations and capabilities (Cragin, Chalk, Daly, & Jackson, 2007, p. 2).

Terrorist organizations have unique traits that distinguish one from another, and effective policies require familiarity with the nature of specific terrorist organizations in their context. Crenshaw’s (1992) research suggests that generic responses to terrorism are not as effective as strategic, tactical responses predicated on facts of particular terrorism acts matched against organizational features of particular terrorist organizations.

Clearly, any policy toward terrorism, whether coercive or conciliatory, must be context-oriented and thus be developed on a case-by-case basis. Policy makers must have detailed knowledge of the group in question, including the type of psychological interactions within the group, relationships between leaders and followers, beliefs prevalent in the group, degree of commitment of militants, and psychological incentives for remaining in the group. It is important to know who occupies positions of the authority and what the sources are. There are no general prescriptions. (Crenshaw, 1992, p. 79)

Therefore, governments need to understand better the nature of terrorist organizations and should be able to distinguish terrorist organizations based on their characteristic features in order to allocate limited resources wisely and use them effectively. Counterterrorism communities should be able to assess differences among terrorist organizations and develop tactical strategies that are likely to be organization specific for the use of decision makers (both politicians and law enforcement agencies).

Developing a typology of terrorist organizations that may help to comprehend their nature is an important issue in the academic sector. Typology is an important concept, or variable, to be considered in analyses of terrorist actions, particularly when the issue is related to predictions of their behaviors and when the goal is identifying
relationships between a specific category of terrorist organizations and characteristic organizational features (see Schmid & Jongman, 2005, p. 40; also Shultz, 1978). Typologies can help researchers to distinguish terrorist organizations in accordance with such characteristics from a comparative viewpoint and to develop hypotheses regarding relationships between categories of terrorist organizations and their characteristics. Thus typologies can lead to theory building and to identification of new research areas (Schmid & Jongman, 2005, p. 40; Shultz, 1978).

However, a typology can pose problems in terrorism research, e.g., with respect to the definition of terrorism. There is no definition of terrorism that is agreed upon either among academicians or politicians. Schmid and Jongman’s (2005) analysis indicated that there are unsolved conceptual problems of terrorism. Hoffman’s (2006) 40 pages of literature review about the definition of terrorism shows that confusion remains among academics. In the practical world, as is frequently said, one person’s terrorists are another’s freedom fighters. Therefore, members of the United Nations still have not agreed on a specific definition of terrorism. Likewise, a typology of terrorist organizations has not been conceptualized in universal terms. There are numerous terrorist typologies to be found in scholarly works, almost as many as the number of researchers (Johnson, 1978; Schmid & Jongman, 2005). Like the concept of terrorism, it seems that a typology is a subjective concept that has been conceptualized by different authors for different purposes.

In this regard, while a number of academic typologies can be found based on certain characteristics, such as ideology, goals, actors, victims, and so on (Schmid &
Jongman, 2005, p. 40), practitioners tend to search for their own typologies. For example, a 20-year veteran of the United States intelligence community has stated that the traditional classifications of terrorist organizations, based on their philosophy or region of operations, may be the best classification for academic purposes, but do not respond to the needs of practitioners in real life situations (Nance, 2008, p. 12). Hence, Nance purposefully classifies terrorist organizations in terms of their relative level of experience and skillfulness in terrorist activities because he believes that the line officers on the street as well as the intelligence analyst should know how skillful each terrorist organization is and understand how each method of operation applies to its own special circumstances.

New ways to compare terrorist organizations enable researchers to construct more meaningful typologies (Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007), and this study attempts to provide another method for use in making comparative judgments in order to build functional typologies. Building a typology can be based on either empirical investigation or theoretical considerations (Schmid & Jongman, 2005, p. 39) and this study establishes a classification based on the former and presents an alternative systematic method that can be used to construct empirically-based typologies. Currently, there are few studies based on such methods—for example, Chenoweth and Lowham’s (2007) “cluster analysis” method—as are proposed in this paper.

New ways to look at and search for a typology of terrorist organizations is valuable for academics and essential for theory building efforts. In addition, such studies may significantly contribute to practitioners’ counterterrorism efforts. Counterterrorism
management needs tools to facilitate decision making, and operational tasks want aids to deal with terrorism and terrorist organizations. The application of Q methodology can help analysts develop such tools, as will be illustrated in this study. This study contributes to the conceptualization of a typology of terrorist organizations providing a different perspective and presenting a different application of methodology to generate typologies.

More specifically, this study will focus on a primary research question: How do Turkish LEOs conceptualize a functional typology of terrorist organizations in Turkey? This primary research question will be examined through three sub-questions: What categories of terrorist organizations exist in the Turkish context? What significant characteristics are associated with specific categories of terrorist organizations? And, do these categories have functional utility?

The literature review of this study will describe the historical context of terrorism in Turkey and address how terrorist organizations have been categorized conventionally. The analysis of Q sorts will indicate whether Turkish LEOs’ functional categories, if they exist, differ from conventional categories of terrorist organizations.

Based on the data analysis of Q-sort surveys, the research questions will be answered and a typology of terrorist organizations in Turkey will be generated. The typology will have practical implications. The following research goals and objectives are associated with these practical implications.
Goal and Objectives

Responding to terrorism in terms of counterterrorism operations, the management and prevention of terrorism requires LEOs to conceptualize the nature of terrorist organizations accurately. The term *nature* refers to terrorists’ organizational structure, leadership style, relationships with external entities, motivations, methods of operation, and financial and personnel means to achieve terrorist acts of different scales and types. This study focuses on how terrorism investigators, who are expert counterterrorism officials of their law enforcement agency (LEA), conceptualize terrorist organizations in terms of their nature.

It is important to note that Turkish LEOs’ perception of terrorism and terrorist organizations has been naturally formed under the influence of the Turkish legal code, particularly, the definition of terrorism in the Turkish Counterterrorism Act (1991):

Terrorism is any kind of act that constitutes crime committed by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of coercion and violence, and one of those of suppression, frightening, deterrence, suppressing, or threatening. (Turkish Counterterrorism Act, 1991, in Article 1)

Apparently one of the elements of the Turkish definition of terrorism is organized act. A terrorist organization is assumed to be necessary to conduct a terrorist attack, according to the Turkish definition, and actors of terrorism are identified as terrorism offenders. In Article 2, the Act also defines terrorism offender, saying that terrorism offender is the person who is a member of organizations that are formed for the purpose
of achieving those terrorist aims. The person (member) alone or with other members can commit the act of terrorism. In addition, Article 2 highlights two important points mentioning that, first, being a member of a terrorist organization itself also constitutes a terrorism crime even though the person has not committed a terrorism act; second, a person who is not a member of a terrorist organization, but commits a crime for the sake of a terrorist organization, is considered to be a terrorism criminal as well.

**Research Goal**

The goal of this research is to demonstrate that the application of Q methodology to Turkish LEOs’ perceptions of terrorist organizations can be helpful in identifying a functional typology of terrorist organizations, which in turn will have practical implications for counterterrorism. Practical implications include prediction of terrorist attacks and terrorist organizations most likely to perpetrate attacks as well as identification of terrorist perpetrators and their organizations after a terrorism incident has occurred. Q methodology permits the formal analysis of Turkish LEOs’ perceptions of terrorist organizations.

An accurate prediction about the occurrence of a terrorist incident is unlikely because surprise attacks are a hallmark trait of terrorists’ activities (Crenshaw, 2001). The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York City’s World Trade Center represents the hallmark surprise of terrorism. In addition, terrorist organizations may not always follow a strict strategic logic in their actions in terms of achieving their stated goals. Group processes also influence terrorist acts—namely, their magnitude of violence and
type of target (Crenshaw, 2001)—and become another factor that complicates predictions.

However, which terrorist organizations commit what type of attacks against what types of targets with what types of weapons are usually known by terrorism investigators. Different terrorist organizations employ different methods of operation and have specific preferences that can be seen as their signatures. As such, terrorist organizations’ capabilities, intentions, and their strategies to accomplish their intentions usually speak out about likely terrorist attacks and their perpetrators and can be used for the purpose of predictive interpretations. In addition, these kinds of predictive interpretations can be aids to criminal investigations of LEOs whose task is to identify and arrest perpetrators of terrorist attacks that have already occurred, and this can be an important purpose of studying the organizational characteristics of terrorists.

Counterterrorism units encounter challenges in their investigation of terrorist incidents and organizations. A bombing of a public market committed by a known terrorist organization at least provides an investigative starting point. However, when terrorist acts are committed by unknown terrorist organizations, investigators encounter the challenge of identifying which among many terrorist organizations might have committed the attack.

Today perpetrators of terrorist incidents and the organizations they represent are too often unidentified (Cordes et al., 1985; Goldberg, 2008; Hoffman, 1997; for the Middle East, Chasdi, 1995, 2002a). Many terrorist organizations do not claim credit for their attacks and remain unidentified in terms of their relationship to the terrorist attacks.
Cordes et al. (1985, p. 23) report that during the period 1968-1983, an average of 61% of terrorist incidents were unclaimed; the average rate of unclaimed terrorist incidents was 40% in the 1970s.

Goldberg’s (2008, p. 12) analysis of databases of the U.S. Department of State and the National Counterterrorism Center indicates that anonymous terrorism continues. Goldberg reports that since 1983, only 403 terrorist incidents out of 1379 acts were claimed by one or more terrorist groups; further, he reports that most terrorist attacks worldwide are unclaimed.

No matter the clues terrorists and terror attacks leave, the identification of terrorist perpetrators and their organizations depends on investigators’ skills, capabilities, and professional knowledge about terrorist organizations. Devising means for capturing investigators’ cultural consensus about the nature of specific terrorist organizations can aid the identification process.

Q methodology can preserve the cultural consensus in a given context and thus serve the purpose of identification; that is, Q methodology can serve as a way to harvest the indigenous and specialized knowledge of terrorism analysts. Q methodology was invented in 1935 by British physicist and psychologist William Stephenson (1953) and was subsequently adapted for assessment purposes primarily by Block (1961, 2007). The methodology was incorporated into political science in the 1970s (Brown, 1980) and has subsequently been used in a variety of areas, most importantly (for purposes here) in decision making (Durning & Brown, 2007) and even more specifically in security-related affairs (Aalto, 2003; Ascher & Brown, 1987; Brown, 2006; Brown, Sezgin, & Kanra,
2006; Diaz, 2009) and terrorism (Sezgin, 2007). However, even though Sezgin (2007) has adapted Q methodology to compare American and Turkish perceptions of the terrorism concept, the application of the methodology to examine the cultural consensus about the nature of terrorist organizations has not been conducted so far.

**Research Objectives**

This research has six objectives, which are elaborated below: (1) Review of literature on Turkish terrorist organizations; (2) analysis of Turkish LEOs’ conceptualizations of terrorist organizations; (3) creation of a typology of terrorist organizations based on LEOs’ perceptions as operationalized using Q technique; (4) enhancement of LEAs’ criminal intelligence capabilities through development of a tool for predicting organizations most apt to perpetrate attacks; (5) demonstration of how a qualitative social science methodology can help to build institutional memories of LEAs; and (6) demonstration of how a qualitative social science methodology can aid in creating objective, ideologically-free practical policies and guidelines for addressing terrorism through data-driven counterterrorism tactical strategies.

**Objective 1**

This study reviews the literature on terrorist organizations in the Turkish context in order to understand how academic studies perceive the phenomenon as well as to comprehend the context in which terrorist organizations have emerged and LEOs have developed their perspectives. Chapter II meets this purpose and also provides information about some specific terrorist organizations and their characteristics.
Objective 2

This study analyzes Turkish LEOs’ conceptualizations of terrorist organizations. The analysis of LEOs’ perspectives on the distinguishing traits of terrorist organizations yields to identification of terrorist categories. Chapter IV displays these categories of terrorist organizations.

Terrorism investigators can serve as expert informers in order to collect cultural data about terrorist organizations. Terrorism investigators in Turkey are LEOs who conduct criminal investigations of terrorism incidents after they occur and who carry out operations aimed at preventing terrorist acts. They are line officers responsible to judicial as well as to hierarchical authorities within LEAs. Investigators, under the supervision of public prosecutors, conduct arrests, interrogate suspects, and fulfill other investigative procedures in order to complete case files for courts. In addition, in close relationships with intelligence units of Turkish LEAs and other agencies responsible for national security (e.g., the National Intelligence Service), terrorism investigators pursue terrorists and their activities in order to disrupt and dismantle terrorist organizations before they conduct terrorist actions. Investigators have social relations with a large array of people from different public services related to national security. Thus terrorism investigators’ conceptualizations of terrorism and terrorist organizations can be considered a reflection of Turkish LEOs’ perceptions. In addition, investigators’ professional experiences with terrorism, terrorists, and their organizations through direct confrontations and routine activities of counterterrorism make terrorism investigators valuable sources (expert informers) that can provide cultural data about terrorist organizations.
The cultural data can be analyzed to reveal categories of terrorist organizations in the eye of the LEOs. Since the categories will emerge from the experiences of expert investigators in their functions, these categories are likely to reflect functionality. In other words, the categories are functional because they reflect the natural categories of the participants.

**Objective 3**

Achievement of the second objective enables creation of a typology of terrorist organizations in the Republic of Turkey. The cultural consensus of expert informants on the distinguishing traits of terrorist organizations yields a categorization of terrorist organizations, and the categorization enables creation of a functional typology. The typology will have a functional utility in terms of predictive interpretations about terrorist organizations with respect to their characteristic behavioral patterns and methods of operations. Chapter IV presents this typology.

The creation of a functional typology requires the comparison of terrorist organizations. A terrorist organization-by-terrorist organization analysis can lead to a comparative typology, a classification scheme in which terrorist organizations are distinguished by group-specific characteristics. Q methodology, by processing cultural data, enables obtaining profiles of specific terrorist organizations as well as comparisons of terrorist organizations.

**Objective 4**

This study, through provision of a prediction tool, illustrates a practical application of Q methodology: bolstering of law enforcement agencies’ capabilities of
criminal intelligence and criminal investigation of terrorism. The application of Q methodology presented in this study provides not only the necessary background information for criminal intelligence analyses, but also offers an active use of such information for criminal investigations of terrorism. The study provides a prediction tool to facilitate LEAs’ ability to predict terrorist attacks and terrorist organizations most likely to perpetrate attacks.

LEAs need such support tools more in terrorism investigations, which are commonly more difficult than standard criminal investigations. Silke (2005) writes that “police investigations of terrorist incidents are rarely straightforward” (p. 250) even though terrorism investigations do not seem much different from common criminal investigations. Terrorism and common crimes require standard investigative techniques, such as evidence collection and surveillance (Dyson, 2005, p. 55). However, the difference between terrorist and common crime investigation focuses on the nature of terrorist organizations and the often-radical behavior of terrorists.

Dyson (2005, pp. 55-57) outlines four differences between terrorist and common criminal investigations.

1. Terrorists’ motivations are different from those of other criminals: terrorists usually do not seek benefits of their self interest. Terrorists’ motivations and goals as well as the support of their terrorist organization strongly influence their tendency to remain within the defined boundaries of terrorists’ operational security.
2. Terrorists’ awareness of the high risk of police arrest and surveillance make terrorist investigations more difficult than most ordinary crime investigations.

3. Terrorists are usually more knowledgeable about police conduct, including investigation techniques, than ordinary criminals because terrorists usually receive special training to counteract police conduct. For example, they are likely to be trained in how to avoid police surveillance and the suspicion of people around terrorist safe-houses as well as how to behave during police interrogations.

4. Terrorist organizations have organization-unique codes of conduct. Members are forced to take precautionary actions against police surveillance, arrests, seizures of organization documents, and betrayals by their own members. Codes of conduct and terrorist training result in terrorist suspects who are unlikely to cooperate with investigators.

Consequently, it is difficult to reach individual perpetrators of terrorist incidents, and focusing more on terrorist organizations than individuals may be more helpful in terms of prevention of terrorist acts, specifically in a terrorism campaign. When terrorism investigators expect a series of future terrorist attacks, terrorism investigations become time-critical tasks. A terrorism investigator in this situation should accurately identify the target of the investigation without wasting time. The ability to identify which of many terrorist organizations perpetrated an attack contributes substantively to the arrest of perpetrators and may prevent further attacks.

The knowledge, skills, and ability of police to investigate terrorism successfully have always been a critical concern (Silke, 2005). Successful investigations contribute to
maintaining law and order, undermine the ability of terrorist organizations to polarize or radicalize the society, and help to calm wider community concerns in such societies. The failure of terrorism investigations, on the other hand, causes alienation of the police from their community, or society as whole, and increases a wider sense of discomfort and chaos (Silke, 2005).

There are studies to predict possible perpetrators of future terrorist attacks (Fienberg, 2008; Jonas & Harper, 2006; Nance, 2008; Sinai, 2007; Smith et al., 2006, 2008; Stungis & Schori, 2003). Other studies assess the selection of high-to-low potential targets on the part of different terrorist organizations (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Ekici et al., 2008; Shahar, 2008). However, there are few studies (e.g., Cordes et al., 1985) that illustrate a method for prediction in order to identify terrorist organizations that have perpetrated an incident. This study’s illustration, in chapter V, can be considered an attempt in this direction.

**Objective 5**

The study emphasizes that a qualitative social science methodology can help to build institutional memories of LEAs. LEAs particularly need such institutional memories in order to combat terrorism and terrorist organizations effectively.

Ozguler (2008, p. 60), in his interviews with police practitioners of counterterrorism, has identified several important problems of police organizations, which he groups into three categories: structural and operational problems, lack of organizational memory, and rivalry among organizations whose members deliberately hide their knowledge and experiences. An organizational memory cannot be built when
useful police practices of counterterrorism and newly acquired organizational knowledge are not transferred to other members within the organization. Organizational forgetfulness and inadequate communication can make police organizations repeat the same mistakes in their counterterrorism activities (Ozguler, 2008). Developing a learning culture and organizational memory within police organizations can help cure these problems.

Ozguler (2008), in his case study analysis of successful LEAs, has focused on organizational learning and organizational memory and has discovered universal processes in the organizational culture of LEAs in the context of countering terrorism. Ozguler finds that terrorist acts have caused organizational changes in police organizations in the UK and the Netherlands in various forms depending on the socio-economic and political conditions of the country that the organization serves. However, both organizations have developed a learning culture, which has led to enhanced knowledge about terrorism, internal processes, and structural transformation in order to increase police effectiveness against terrorism. In the context of the learning culture, these organizations have sought to achieve an institutional memory along with structural and operational changes that facilitate organizational learning.

The adaptation of Q methodology presented in this study can help LEAs preserve their expert members’ knowledge and skills and analyze such subjective knowledge that has been accumulated over the years of their history. Then, LEAs can use such data and analyses to prepare training programs for new investigators and accumulate knowledge shared by all members as well as to plan, if necessary, structural and operational changes.
**Objective 6**

The study emphasizes that the methodology presented in this study can be used to collect data about terrorist organizations’ behavioral and organizational characteristics. Then the data analysis can be utilized to create objective, ideology-free practical policies and guidelines for addressing terrorism. The methodology also helps insure that these policies and guidelines are organization specific.

For example, the strengths and weaknesses of specific terrorist organizations can be identified through the analysis. LEAs can make use of such strengths and weaknesses in order to dismantle these terrorist organizations. The financial problems of a terrorist organization, its command structure, and external relations can be examples of where to look in identifying the weaknesses and strengths of organizations.

In addition, given the link between categories of terrorist organizations and counterterrorism police units in Turkey, a categorization of terrorist organizations helps in the prescription of the required allocation of resources in counterterrorism units for effective terrorist intervention. A data-driven categorization of terrorist organizations may provide a basis for LEAs to allocate their resources more efficiently and effectively.

**Overview of Chapters**

In order to answer research questions and accomplish objectives and goals, the study continues with the following chapters.

Chapter II discusses issues around typologies, such as the necessity of generating typologies, ways to generate a typology, variables to consider in generating typologies,
and the functional utility of typologies, and focuses on a kind of functional utility—identification of terrorist organizations as perpetrators of past terrorism incidents. Second, the chapter presents the perspectives among academics reviewing typologies of terrorism in Turkey.

Chapter III discusses research design and methodology of the study and sheds light on participants’ characteristics and how the data have been gathered and processed.

Chapter IV presents the result of the data analysis and reveals categories of terrorist organizations in the minds of LEOs through examination of factors that have emerged as a result of the factor analysis. Then, based on this categorization, the chapter presents a typology of terrorist organizations in Turkey.

Finally, chapter V presents concluding remarks and the implications and limitations of the study, and suggests areas of future research. In the section on implications, the chapter presents a prediction tool that might be utilized by analysts to predict terrorist organizations in order to identify perpetrators (organizations) of terrorism incidents that have already occurred.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter focuses on generating typologies of terrorist organizations and on the functional utility of typologies to practitioners in their terrorism investigations as well as on how typologies of terrorist organizations are conceived by scholars in the Turkish context.

The chapter is comprised of three sections. In the first, typology development is identified as a necessary step in scientific progress and an important area of research in terrorism studies. It remains a work in progress among academics, even though an array of typologies can be identified. Terrorism is a subjective contextual concept that can be viewed from different perspectives in different times and locations. Typologies of terrorism reflect this subjectivity and other contextual matters, such as cultural aspects of social and political life and researchers’ interests and concerns.

However, typologies can be constructed based on universally identified frameworks or variables. The first section presents these variables, which will be the base of the framework in the data collection process of this study. Next, the section gives examples of significant typologies of terrorism in which terrorist organizations and their political orientations are traditionally and continuously identified as important dimensions in generating these typologies.
Typologies can be generated on the basis of empirical investigations or theoretical considerations; the section argues that Q methodology can be used for empirical investigations to generate a typology. In addition, the merit of a typology can be tested in terms of the functional utility of the typology. Q methodology can facilitate testing typologies as well.

The section describes what to expect from typologies and argues that practitioners can benefit from the functional utility of typologies. In this regard, the functional utility of a typology may be that the typology aids practitioners in their investigations of terrorism incidents.

The second section presents the logic of why police investigators need to identify terrorist organizations at the initial phase of investigations. It shows that the identification process can be a complex and challenging issue if a wide variety of terrorist organizations need to be considered and that at this point in the investigation, the classification of terrorist organizations can help investigators.

The second section also shows that most studies of terrorism focus on predicting future attacks of terrorists rather than revealing the perpetrators of past attacks. In addition, a growing body of recent literature in the area of information technologies has facilitated the identification of terrorist organizations who in the past perpetrated acts of terrorism. However, the literature tends to view terrorists from a different perspective in which terrorists are seen as individuals operating in loosely organized structures and networks. Therefore, the body of literature usually works with individual level rather than
organizational level data. In this regard, identification of terrorist organizations with organizational level data is largely neglected in the literature.

The final section summarizes how terrorist organizations in Turkey have been perceived by academics. Traditionally, in academics the typology of terrorism in Turkey has been constructed based on non-state actors. Actors of terrorism have been usually identified as terrorist organizations distinguished by their political orientations and ideology, such as separatist, leftist, rightist, and religious terrorists. Chasdi’s (2002b) study is the only one that adds other dimensions (ideology, goals, and recruitment) to a typology of terrorist organizations.

The final section continues to present the typology of terrorist organizations in Turkey from a historical perspective, which is by and large included in most studies that investigate terrorism in Turkey.

**Generating a Typology of Terrorist Organizations**

Typology development, according to Shultz (1978), is the first step of theory building. Therefore, Shultz identifies typology development as an important area of research in terrorism studies and calls attentions to a deficiency in the literature in terms of rigorous analysis that yields typology development. Since Shultz’s assertion, many typologies have been developed, but the search continues for a typology that can stand up to expectations, such as empirical testing and functional utility for predictions (Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007; Ganor, 2008; Schmid & Jongman, 2005).
Typology is necessary for scientific progress because it enables analysts to comprehend complex phenomena and discover new areas of investigation and can lead to new theories. Schmid and Jongman (2005) argue, “Typologies order a multitude of objects and/or phenomena and make them manageable for analysis” (p. 39). Johnson (1978, p. 274) says that typologies facilitate understanding of the phenomenon by showing differences among categories of units and decreasing complexity. To Roberts (1971, p. 216), typologies can help researchers discover relationships among these new categories, produce new hypotheses, and thus facilitate the development of new theories as well as identification of new areas of scientific investigation.

Developing a common universal typology of terrorism and terrorist organizations is problematic. Schmid and Jongman (2005, p. 39) argue that it is difficult to obtain generalizable typologies because the definition problem of terrorism has not been resolved (for the definition problem of terrorism, see Hoffman, 2006; Sezgin, 2007).

The problem of developing universally sound definitions and typologies of terrorism is related to how people conceptualize terrorism. Sezgin (2007), for instance, argues that nationality plays an important role in people’s conceptualization of terrorism and he has discovered, among people who fight against terrorism, that there are significant differences between Turkish and US conceptualizations. The priorities and concerns of these people are different in addition to their conceptualization of terms that are used to identify types of terrorism, such as state and religion (Sezgin, 2007). Thus subjectivity is an important issue that accompanies the concept of terrorism. The famous phrase that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter can be given as an
illustration of the subjectivity of the terrorism term (Anderson & Sloan, 2009, p. i; Symeonidou-Kastanidou, 2004). Meanwhile the term terrorism reflects cultural aspects of social and political life (Symeonidou-Kastanidou, 2004) and usually has a cultural meaning in the society within which the concept of terrorism has been perceived.

A typology of terrorism can reflect contextual matters. Post (2005), considering the psychological and behavioral bases of terrorism, argues that terrorism is “a product of its own place and time” (p. 616) and therefore, on the whole, each act of terrorism should be considered in its own political, historical, and cultural context. Researchers of terrorism may have their own concerns and interests related to terrorism specific to its context. Region-based research, like terrorism in the Middle East (Chasdi, 1995, 2002a, 2002b), terrorism in America (Smith, 1994; Smith et al., 2008), and terrorism in Europe (Wilkinson, 2009), usually directly reflects such concerns and contextual matters.

As such there are numerous terrorism typologies to be found in scholarly works. In this regard Johnson’s (1978) assertion is worth repeating, “there are almost as many typologies of terrorism as there are analysts” (p. 276).

Earlier universally sound typologies of terrorism, Shultz (1978) states, were limited in scope, dividing terrorism mainly into two groups, like Thorton’s (1964) enforcement terror and agitational terror, the first employed by those in power and the second by those aspiring to power. Walter (1969), in the similar vein, has labeled two categories: siege of terror (by rebels) and reign of terror (by power holders).

The dimension of actors (state and non-state) has frequently been added to typologies that have already included other dimensions. For example, Wilkinson (1974)
has emphasized motives in his typology that categorizes terrorism into three groups: revolutionary terrorism, sub-revolutionary terrorism, and repressive terrorism. Revolutionary terrorism aims to bring about a political revolution, sub-revolutionary terrorism is utilized for political motives other than revolution, and repressive terrorism aims to restrain people, primarily those in revolutionary or sub-revolutionary groups (pp. 36-40).

Schmid and de Graaf (1982), covering actors as well as motives and political orientation, have offered a more comprehensive typology of terrorism. First, terrorism is divided into three categories: political terrorism, criminal terrorism, and idiosyncratic terrorism. Idiosyncratic terrorism is employed for personal psychic satisfaction, criminal terrorism is employed for personal material gain, and political terrorism is committed for collective political motives. Then, based on actors involved in terrorism acts, political terrorism is divided into insurgent terrorism, vigilante terrorism, and state terrorism. State terrorism is directed against non-state actors by a state actor, vigilante terrorism occurs when a non-state actor targets another non-state actor, and insurgent terrorism occurs when a non-state actor targets a state actor. State actors are governments while those of non-state actors can be any actor other than governments. Finally, insurgent terrorism is categorized into three groups: social revolutionary terrorism, separatist terrorism, and single-issue terrorism. Single-issue terrorism narrowly focuses on particular agendas, like abortion policies and environmental and animal rights protection issues. Social revolutionary terrorism seeks a total social revolution through the taking of state power. Lastly, separatist terrorism wants secession of an ethnic or national group from a state.
Overthrowing foreign rule from occupied territories that are claimed by a group of people is also considered in this latter category of terrorism.

A recent example is provided by Harte (2005), who, based on actors, has categorized political terrorism into two main groups, state versus non-state terrorism, and has added a geographic dimension, cross-classified with these groups, of domestic versus international terrorism. Domestic terrorism occurs within a country and international terrorism crosses borders (Laqueur, 1987, p. 72). Furthermore, Harte divides state terrorists into two groups, regime and state-sponsored terrorists. Regime terrorists use a state’s public institutions directly to terrorize people who are either from across the border or within domestic boundaries. State-sponsored terrorists, on the other hand, are either employed or supported by a state and may engage in terrorism at both domestic and international levels.

Although there are typologies which have been developed on other bases as well, such as goals and proximate objectives of terrorists (e.g., Crenshaw, 1978), means (e.g., Karber, 1971), and mixed bases (e.g., Combs, 2000; Ganor, 2008; Kaplan, 2008), many scholars have preferred to utilize motivation and political orientation of terrorist groups as the bases of their categorization in order to study non-state, or insurgent type, terrorism (e.g., Caglar, 2006; Chasdi, 1995; Hoffman, 2006; Miller, 2006; Pape, 2003; Post, 2005; Rapoport, 2002; Smith, 1994; Smith & Morgan, 1994; Smith et al., 2006, 2008). The reason of this preference, Ganor (2008) argues, lies in the relative simplicity of identifying the motivations of terrorist groups. Manifestos, key documents, and
interviews with members of terrorist organizations enable researchers to identify the underlying motivations and political orientations of terrorists.

Many studies after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks which occurred in the U.S.A. have particularly focused on terrorist groups that have religious motivations and motifs, in other words, religious extremist terrorism. Hence, recent typologies of terrorism have elaborated religious extremist terrorism (for example, Hoffman, 2006; Post, 2005; Schmid, 2004; Sedgwick, 2004; Tan, 2008). In addition, recent studies, which utilize typologies of terrorism in research, tend to focus more on organizational structures such as hierarchical organizations versus networks of terrorist groups and individuals (see Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini, 2002; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Mayntz, 2004; Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005; Sageman, 2004, 2008; Xu, Hu, & Chen, 2009).

The bases for developing typologies of terrorism, or terrorist organizations, are not limited to examples provided previously. Many characteristics of terrorist organizations, or terrorism, can serve to classify them. Schmid and Jongman (2005) have identified 10 bases for classification which are most frequently used by researchers of terrorism: actor, victim, cause, external relations, means, political-orientation, motivation, demand, purpose, and target. These bases are similar to the variables in Shultz’s (1978) typology.

Shultz (1978) has identified seven variables that can make up a terrorist typology: causes, environment, goals, strategy, means, organization, and participation.

1. The *causes* variable involves conditions related to political violence, such as economic, social, political, and psychological factors. Shultz states that these
factors can be investigated in sub-categories, like long-term and short-term factors. Long-term factors refer to preconditions of terrorism such as economic depression, political deprivation, and societal inequities. Short-term factors refer to igniting events such as government repression, relative deprivation, and ethnic upsurge (for details about causes of terrorism, see Crenshaw, 1981).

2. The environment variable refers to geographic spheres within which terrorists operate. This variable may be investigated in two categories, external and internal environments. The external environment may look at global or systemic-level variations. For example, terrorist organizations may operate as autonomous non-state actors. The internal environment looks at the sphere within a nation-state, for instance, whether terrorist organizations operate in rural or urban areas (see also Cordes et al., 1985; Cragin & Daly, 2004; Ganor, 2008).

3. The goals variable is a reflection of the ideology of terrorist organizations and refers to long-term strategic objectives and short-term tactical objectives of these organizations. Examples of short-term tactical objectives are disrupting the government’s controls, demonstrating the strength of the movement, and building group solidarity. Overthrowing of the established order is an example of long-range strategic objectives (see also Cordes et al., 1985; Crenshaw, 1978; Cragin & Daly, 2004; Drake, 1998a, pp. 39-43).
4. The *strategy* variable refers the overall plan and identifies primary and secondary tactical positions in the overall plan. For example, Shultz (1978) suggests that political terrorism has tended to be a secondary importance in the overall plan of rural insurgency movements while urban guerrillas consider political terrorism as the primary tactical position (see also Cordes et al., 1985; Cragin & Daly, 2004; Crenshaw, 1991; Drake, 1998a, pp. 35-53; Sloan, 2006, pp. 59-69).

5. The *means* variable involves capabilities and techniques that a movement utilizes within its strategic framework in order to accomplish the goal of the movement. Capabilities refer to weaponry, mobility, media manipulation, and so forth. Techniques refer to types of operations, such as kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, assassination, and so on (for details, see Cordes et al., 1985; Cragin & Daly, 2004; Drake, 1998a, pp. 54-97; Dyson, 2005, pp. 55-57; Enders & Sandler, 1999; Hamm & de Voorde, 2005; Hoffman, 1994, 2006, pp. 229-256; Sloan, 2006, pp. 70-79; Smith, 1994; Wilkinson, 1997).

6. The *organization* dimension describes the nature and degrees of organizational structure. Planning, coordination, and application of terrorism require an organization in which a formalized structure enables these activities (for details about organization, see Cordes et al., 1985; Cragin & Daly, 2004; Drake, 1998a, pp. 163-174; Dyson, 2005, pp. 55-57; Ganor, 2008; Mayntz, 2004).
7. Finally, the *participation* variable helps to understand what types of individuals take part in terrorism. Thus the variable includes profiles and attitudes of members and the leader of the organization, taking into account such things as age, social background, education, occupation, “their willingness to employ,” and “attitude towards employing” (Shultz, 1978, p. 12) terror and violence, and ideology, and so forth (for demographics of participants see also Atkins, 1992; Falk, 1988; Smith, 1994; Turk, 1984; for attitudes of participants, see Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006; Cordes et al., 1985; Drake, 1998a; Hudson, 1999, pp. 43-44; Post, 1984, 2005; Sageman, 2008).

Victoroff (2005) has offered a more extensive variety of variables in terms of identification of typologies. These variables are perpetrator (individual vs. groups), sponsorship (state vs. sub-state vs. individual), relation to authority (anti-state/anti-establishment/separatist vs. pro-state/pro-establishment), locale (interstate vs. transnational), military status (civilian vs. paramilitary or military), spiritual motivation (secular vs. religious), financial motivation (idealistic vs. entrepreneurial), political ideology (leftist/socialist vs. rightist/fascist vs. anarchist), hierarchical role (sponsor vs. leader, middle management vs. follower), willingness to die (suicidal vs. non-suicidal), target (property vs. individuals vs. masses of people), and methodology (bombing, assassination, kidnapping/hostage taking, and so on).

Finally, Ganor (2008) has offered another list of variables that have been used in generating typologies of terrorist organizations. Including the previous variables, Ganor’s
list has added variables such as size of organization (skeleton vs. popular), extent of
public support of organization (alienated from vs. accepted by the population),
characteristic of decision making (rational vs. irrational), financial state of organization
(poor vs. rich), demand of organization (dogmatic vs. pragmatic), seniority of
organization (young vs. old), activities of organization (educational-welfare, violent, and
political), organization’s control of autonomous territory (control vs. does not control),
and organization’s place in organizational development (spin-off organization vs. mother
organization).

Each of these variables, either alone or coupled with others, can be used as a basis
to develop a typology of terrorism or terrorists organizations. It is, however, not an easy
task to develop a typology of terrorism.

Developing a typology of terrorism, Victoroff (2005) says, is a complex and
controversial task because “actors can be characterized across multiple variables” (p. 4).
In addition, classifications may not perfectly fit real life situations. For instance, state
terrorists and sub-state terrorists can be indistinct. This occurred in Colombia: military
officers acted in the conservative death squads of MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores—Death
to Kidnappers) (see Drake, 1998a, p. 82). As such, Victoroff (2005) argues that “typology
must be considered a heuristic compendium of ideal types, and classes should not
necessarily be construed as dichotomous” (p. 5).

Thus typologies of terrorism have been seen as ideal type classifications; they are
not “true” reflections of the real world. Impure cases and exceptions are frequently met
in real life situations (Schmid & Jongman, 2005, p. 49). However, one can understand
that to what extent a typology can be applied to a real life situation if it is possible to determine how much a case diverges from the given type (Eckstein, 1964, p. 20).

Building a typology can be based on either empirical investigation or theoretical considerations (Schmid & Jongman, 2005, p. 39). Terrorist organizations’ organizational characteristics, such as organizational structures and characteristics of their activities, can provide a fertile base from which to develop new empirically sound typologies if researchers use appropriate methods to compare these characteristics. Although plenty of theoretical studies can be found (examples have been already displayed), there are few studies that offer such methods (for example, Chenoweth and Lowham’s [2007] cluster analysis method). Q methodology can be used in this direction.

Q methodology can facilitate developing as well as studying typologies (Brown, 1980, pp. 92-103; Stephenson, 1939, 1950, 1953, pp. 153-189) and has already been applied in the study of types (e.g., Brown, 1986, 2001; Peritore, 1988, 1989; Sezgin, 2007). For example, Brown (1986), using Q methodology, has found empirical evidence that supports Lasswell’s (1930) typology of political actors (agitators, administrators, and theorists). In another study, Brown (2001) has depicted the nature of various organizations and shown that ideal types (theoretically developed) can serve as a measure of how organizations function in the real world. Brown (2001), in his Q factor analysis, has identified three types of organizations: organizations close to rational, ideal-type organizations that are responsive to clientele groups, and organizations that are driven by legal and political considerations. Peritore (1988, 1989) has studied opinions of Brazilian communist parties and his factor analysis of Q sorts has revealed three opinion types:
socialists, militant Marxist-Leninists, and Euro-communists. Sezgin’s (2007) Q study of
the conceptualization of terrorism in the U.S.A. and Turkey resulted in two distinguishing
types, which Sezgin has labeled conformist (U.S.) and permissive (Turkish). Thus these
extamples illustrate that Q methodology can facilitate the development of empirically
based typologies as well as the testing and improvement of theoretically developed
typologies.

Typologies of terrorism or terrorist organizations can be tested by examining their
degree of functional utility (Flemming, Schmid, & Stohl, 1988); i.e., their merit can be
judged in light of their functional utility. Schmid and Jongman (2005, p. 40), for instance,
argue that typologies could help in forecasting future behaviors of terrorist organizations
and thus would be able to serve both academicians and practitioners (e.g.,
counterterrorism officials) if adequate typologies could have been constructed. Since
there is a lack of such typologies, Schmid and Jongman continue, a more realistic
expectation from typologies can be their usage in identifying the type of relationship
between a specific category and its characteristic traits. For instance, a typology can
enable analysts to see an association between a specific category of terrorist organizations
and a certain type of ideology, terrorist methods, strategies, or likely targets. Thus the
potential utility of typologies of terrorism attracts two kinds of communities,
academicians and practitioners of counterterrorism.

One possible utility for practitioners of counterterrorism would be a typology that
could aid in the investigation of terrorism incidents after they occur. Investigators, with
the aid of typologies such as this, could identify terrorist organizations that are most
likely to be perpetrators of terrorist attacks that have already occurred. The next section addresses this identification issue.

**Identification of Terrorist Organizations in Police Investigations through Utilizing a Typology**

There is a strategic logic that requires police investigators to identify terrorist organizations at the initial phase of an investigation. Early identification of a terrorist organization can lead to the arrest of individual perpetrators of a terrorist attack as well as to the necessary maneuvers that can encumber the terrorist organization in action.

Identification of the terrorist organization helps police investigators identify the individual perpetrators by indicating where to look for them (Dyson, 2005, p. 329). The identification procedure can narrow the scope of the investigation to the specific group instead of otherwise looking for “the needle in the haystack.” The procedure may be particularly helpful in terms of solving the case if there has already been a pending investigation regarding the specified group (Dyson, 2005, p. 398). In terrorism-problematic areas, law enforcement agencies usually have existing or pending investigations and intelligence operations regarding terrorist groups.

Early identification of a terrorist organization about a terrorism incident that has already occurred enables police to focus on the “wire-pullers” of the terrorist attack in terms of preventing terrorists’ future attacks. Maeno and Ohsowa (2008) argue that terrorism investigation is a time-critical task. Investigators have limited time in which to arrest the so-called wire-pullers of a terrorist attack. (Wire-pullers are those people who create plots, develop logistics, and provide terrorist personnel.) The arrest of wire-pullers
is more critical than the arrest of individual perpetrators. In order to dismantle terrorist organizations, the arrests of wire-pullers are paramount. Wire-pullers, who cannot be easily and quickly replaced as are the individual terrorist perpetrators, are the keystone of their structure (Maeno & Ohsowa, 2008). So, arresting wire-pullers can help to dismantle terrorist organizations as well as to prevent their future attacks until terrorist organizations are, if not dismantled, able to replace these people.

However, the identification, or prediction, task is a complex and challenging issue for police organizations when there are a wide variety of terrorist organizations operating in a specific region, like Turkey. Methods of predictions can help police organizations identify the perpetrator-terrorist organization as well as prevent future terrorist attacks.

Most studies dealing with prediction focus on prevention of terrorist attacks and present methods of identifying possible perpetrators of future terrorist attacks (e.g., Fienberg, 2008; Jonas & Harper, 2006; Nance, 2008; Sinai, 2007; Smith et al., 2006, 2008; Stungis & Schori, 2003) or the attractiveness of specific targets to different types of terrorist organizations (e.g., Clarke & Newman, 2006; Ekici et al., 2008; Shahar, 2008). Compared to these issues, however, there are few studies that illustrate how to predict the perpetrator-terrorist organizations of an incident that has already occurred (e.g., Cordes et al., 1985). Although adaptation to this matter of procedures used in the previous group of studies is possible, none of these studies has addressed the issue of predicting perpetrator terrorist organizations.

In terms identifying perpetrators of past terrorism events, it is worth mentioning that traditional techniques of offender profiling that have been used in police
investigations (see Douglas et al., 1986) can be adapted for terrorism investigations (see Dean, 2007; Hinman & Cook, 1999; Silke, 2002). However, the adaptation of these techniques is difficult, unhelpful, and sometimes can be misleading. As an example, searching offenders based on similar incidents among certain ethnic groups, ages, or gender may dismiss other possibilities (see Dean, 2007; Silke, 2002). In addition, offender profiling usually requires individual-level data.

Similarly, in terms of opening ways of identifying terrorist organizations, there is a body of literature that has been growing in the area of information technologies and has focused on individual-level data analyses. Specifically, since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that occurred in the U.S.A., this group of studies uses other methods such as data mining, cluster analysis, social network analysis, link analysis, and so on (Cook & Holder, 2007; DeRosa, 2004; Krebs, 2002; Maeno & Ohsawa, 2008; Memon et al., 2009). These studies usually regard the organizational nature of terrorism differently, and from this standpoint, today’s terrorists (usually based on studying the Al Qaeda network) are as different as they are loosely organized and operate in diffused nonhierarchical structures (for example, see DeRosa, 2004, p. 5).

On the other hand, traditional understandings of terrorists, as they are perceived in Turkey, considers them in organizational forms (whether loosely organized or not) and thus focuses on organizational-level analyses. In organizational-level analyses, predicting terrorist organizations that are responsible for past events does not necessarily require individual-level information and is conveniently applicable to any terrorism incident as long as there are available data regarding existing terrorist organizations. In this regard,
Cordes et al.’s (1985) study, using organizational-level data, has still been the most significant study that illustrates how to predict terrorist organizations as the perpetrators of past terrorism incidents.

Cordes et al. (1985) have developed a conceptual framework for data collection and analysis in order to cover characteristics of terrorist organizations. They created a computerized database and included information regarding 29 terrorist organizations, based on the framework, and classified these organizations by region, such as the U.S., Ireland, Italy, Palestine, Asia, and so on. The authors have coded 150 attributes of terrorist organizations, such as group size and preferred tactics and coalitions with other terrorist organizations, and applied their methodology to demonstrate how to find answers for two specific questions: (1) Which organizations could be the perpetrators of an unclaimed terrorist attack or an attack claimed by several terrorist organizations and how can we rank the possible perpetrators? (2) Which terrorist organizations are most likely to attack American targets?

For the purpose of the prediction, Cordes et al. (1985) have identified several variables related to terrorists’ methods of operation which are more likely to be observable in most cases, such as number of fatalities, type of target, nationality of target, location of attack, and tactic of terrorists. Then the researchers grouped all past terrorist incidents with terrorist organizations that are known as perpetrators of such attacks. Then, according to the various combinations of these variables, they computed the proportion of times a particular group perpetrated a particular type of incident. Finally, they calculated
a conditional probability for each group that could have been responsible for unclaimed or multiply-claimed incidents.

Cordes et al. (1985) have used a region-based typology that facilitates comparison of regional groups in order to illustrate a way to make predictions. However, their typology may not be helpful for making predictions about terrorism incidents that occur in domestic settings. Therefore, such predictions in domestic settings, for instance in Turkey, need different typologies than those that are region-based.

Nevertheless, Cordes et al.’s (1985) study has shown that predicting terrorist organizations that perpetrated a past terrorism incident is possible through using organizational-level data. Such predictions, the study also implied, can be achieved if profiles of terrorist organizations, or types of terrorist organizations, can be obtained through accurate examination of their characteristics.

Classifications of terrorist organizations, or typologies, can facilitate predictions through decreasing the complexity of the prediction task and particularly where there are a variety of terrorist organizations operating in the same region. There are studies that show the utility of typologies in the task of prediction (e.g., Chasdi, 1995, 1997, 2002a; Cordes et al., 1985; Smith, 1994). However, Cordes et al.’s (1985) study is the only one that has shown how to employ a typology in practice in order to predict perpetrators (terrorist organizations) of a terrorist incident that has recently occurred.
Typologies of Terrorist Organizations in Turkey

Turkey has been suffering from terrorist organizations for more than four decades. According to the Turkish National Police (TNP), around 100 different terrorist organizations have been activated in Turkey (Caglar, 2006), most of which have disappeared. Survivors still pose a serious threat to the national security of the country even though the Turkish government has largely controlled terrorism in recent years (Caglar, 2006).

Terrorist organizations in Turkey are categorized primarily on the bases of political orientation and ideology. Academicians as well as practitioners in Turkey have usually classified terrorist organizations in four groups: leftists, rightists, separatists, and religiously inspired groups (e.g., Akgun, 2002; Aktan, & Koknar, 2002; Alkan, 2002, 2003; Bal & Laciner, 2001; Caglar, 2006; Celik, 2003; Cline, 2004; Durna & Hancerli, 2007; Ergil, 2000; Harris, 1980, 1985; Laciner & Bal, 2004; Mardin, 1978; Mango, 2005; Nikbay, Smith, & Mus, 2007; Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006; Rodoplu, Arnold, & Ersoy, 2003; Sayari, 1985; Sozen, 2006).

Chasdi (2002b), using a multidimensional classification of terrorist organizations, presents a different typology from the traditional conceptualization. Chasdi (2002b), in the case of Turkish terrorism, adjusts his three bases (ideology, goals, and recruitment) typology that was developed in his earlier work (Chasdi, 1995). He compiles the data related to terrorist events between 1994 and 1999 from various newspapers and databases, identifying 192 discrete events in relation to terrorist assaults in Turkey as well as Western Europe, the Middle East, and other countries.
Chasdi’s (2002b) study includes terrorist events carried out by terrorist organizations that are viewed under 19 groups. These terrorist groups include not only Turkish groups, but also non-Turkish groups operating abroad but carrying out attacks against Turkish targets, like 17 November (Greek), Kourken Yans’kian (Armenian), and Kurdistan Patriotic Union-PUK (Jalal Talabani’s party in Iraq). Chasdi (2002b) has investigated these groups under four main categories of terrorist groups based on his three dimensional typology: (1) ideo-ethnocentric groups, (2) ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups, (3) ethnocentric groups, and (4) theocentric groups.

Chasdi (2002b) has found that 50% of all terrorist acts were committed by ideo-ethnocentric, charismatic groups, mostly by PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan—Kurdistan Workers Party) with a ratio of 48.9% (89/182 acts) of the total attacks. PKK, having a charismatic leader, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and ethno-nationalist goals, is considered as an ideo-ethnocentric, charismatic terrorist group. Ideo-ethnocentric terrorist groups—those that do not have a charismatic leader, but do espouse a Marxist-Leninist ideology—carried out 8.3% of terrorist attacks and became the second most active type of group. Ethnocentric terrorist groups—those that do not have a charismatic leader or a Marxist-Leninist ideology—conducted 6.3% of terrorist attacks. Theocentric terrorist groups with a fundamentalist religious ideology carried out 6.8% of terrorist acts. An interesting result is that unclaimed terrorist acts accounted for 19.8% of all terrorist acts, which is the second highest category in term of ratio of terrorist attack, while uncompleted terrorist acts constituted 7.8% of the total.
In terms of the target selection of terrorist groups, Chasdi (2002b) says that the four categories of terrorist groups have identical preferences. Ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups carried out their attacks mostly directed at civilian targets with a ratio of 70/96, or 72.9%. Government targets were the second favored by these groups (19.8%), infrastructure targets were third (4.2%), and multiple targets (government and civilian together) were fourth (3.1%); other types of groups did not target government-civilian targets together. Ideo-ethnocentric groups favored civilian targets 56.3% of the time (9/16 acts) and government targets second at 43.8% (7/16). Ethnocentric groups, unlike other groups, primarily attacked government targets at 58.3% (7/12). Civilian targets constituted 25% of their attacks (3/12) and infrastructures were the target in 16.7% of ethnocentric attacks (2/12). Theocentric groups mainly targeted civilians and had the highest percentage, with the ratio of 84.6% (11/13), compared to other categories of terrorist groups. Government targets constituted only 15.4% (2/13) of theocentric attacks.

Thus Chasdi’s (2002b) study, in general, illustrates that terrorist organizations’ distinguishing patterns can be identical to different categories in an appropriate and functional typology. Furthermore, he demonstrates that the three dimensions (ideology, goals, and recruitment) can serve as bases for developing such functional typologies.

Other studies have usually investigated terrorist organizations within the framework of the traditional politically-oriented typology and mostly have been based on historical analyses.
Historically, after struggling against the post-war occupiers, the Republic of Turkey was founded on the last remaining part of the Ottoman State, which collapsed by the end of World War I. The newly born state implemented, in Sozen's (2006) words, “de-islamization, de-arabization and westernization reforms” (p. 132). Right after the beginning of these Turkish reforms, the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 backfired, with religious fundamentalist motives against the new regime (Hur, 2008; Laciner & Bal, 2004). In the following year, another rebellion, but this time with Kurdish and Armenian ethnic separatist motives, occurred on Mount Ararat (Agri) and continued until 1930 (Hur, 2008). The neighboring Soviets’ communist regime also threatened the Republic of Turkey in order to establish a Marxist-Leninist regime in this country. Hence, since its foundation as a new secular state (Republic of Turkey), there has always been a perception and fear of three threats: religious fundamentalism, ethnic separatism, and a Soviet invasion or its political domination (Sozen, 2006).

However, the contemporary terrorism that started to affect Turkish daily life can be reviewed, in Aktan and Koknar’s (2002) terms, in three terrorism waves. The first terrorism wave began in the late 1960s, developing within Marxist student movements against the regime (see also Harris, 1985; Mardin, 1978; Sayari, 1985) and ended with a military intervention in 1971. During this period of military operations, most leaders of these early terrorists were arrested, killed, or escaped to Europe and Middle Eastern countries (Sayari, 1985).

The second terrorism wave began in 1974, when most terrorist leaders were released from prison with an amnesty that the new government declared in the
normalization process following the military intervention (Harris, 1980; Sayari, 1985). The second terrorism wave produced more sophisticated terrorist organizations of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and was deadlier than the first wave (Harris, 1980; Mango, 2005). These terrorist organizations generally attacked law enforcement personnel, conservative politicians, businessmen, and “uncooperative” citizens (Mango, 2005). Additionally, different from the previous terrorism wave, these organizations were countered by ultranationalist groups (Akgun, 2002; Alkan, 2003). This wave continued until another military intervention (a coup) in 1980 (Aktan & Koknar, 2002).

Finally, the third terrorism wave, Aktan and Koknar (2002) say, began in 1984, right after the reestablishment of democracy in the country following the 1980 military coup (Caglar, 2006). A new kind of threat to the national security appeared with a motive different from the previous two waves: Kurdish separatists with a Marxist-Leninist ideology began to attack military outposts, governmental institutions, and civilians in the southeastern region where most Turkish citizens with Kurdish ethnic origin have settled. Other Marxist-Leninist and religiously motivated terrorists also accompanied the final wave (Alkan, 2003). The final wave has been the deadliest among the terrorism waves in Turkey. The separatist terrorism alone has killed more than 30,000 people\(^1\) including security forces, governmental officials, civilians, and terrorists themselves. Alkan (2003, p. 1) notes that terrorism took 5,000 lives prior to 1980 while the number of deaths has been more than 30,000 since 1980.

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\(^1\) According to some sources, it is believed that around 30,000-35,000 people were killed in the separatist terrorism, including civilians, security forces, and largely terrorists themselves (e.g., Rodoplu, Arnold, & Ersoy, 2003; Mango, 2005, pp. 31-57). The exact number of fatalities is unknown. Numbers given by different sources are based largely on official claims of terrorist casualties related to rural area military operations rather than reliance on the actual numbers of deaths.
The next section presents the typology of terrorist organizations in the final wave of terrorism, from the perspective of the traditional politically-oriented typology.

**Terrorist Organizations with Separatist Motives**

The contemporary separatist terrorism, with emphasis on Kurdish ethnic and national motifs, developed and grew among left-wing terrorist groups during the 1970s, began to rise in 1984, and became a separate phenomenon. Separatist terrorist organizations have embraced the Marxist-Leninist ideology and have emphasized the separation of Kurdish people from the Turkish state and establishment of a Kurdistan state (Alkan, 2002; Barkey, 2007; Durna & Hancerli, 2007; Laciner & Bal, 2004; Mango, 2005, pp. 31-57; Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006). In this context, these Kurdish separatists differ from those in previous Kurdish uprisings in which the instigators of rebellions were either religious or feudal tribal leaders and did not express themselves in terms of Marxism (for previous Kurdish uprisings, see Laciner & Bal, 2004). The separatist terrorism became a significant security issue during the late 1980s and 1990s (Aydiner, 2006). Today, Aydiner (2006) states, there are 19 less active and non-active terrorist organizations that have a separatist political agenda. However, PKK is currently the single, primary separatist terrorist organization in Turkey.

The roots of PKK can be traced back to the student movements of the 1960s. Leaders of PKK, coming from these revolutionary movements, founded the organization in 1978, and their main difference from other Marxist-Leninist groups was the strong emphasis on Kurdish identity (Barkey, 2007). The revolution they wanted to achieve was
going to “free the Kurds from the bondage of the Turkish yoke and from the Kurdish aghas (feudal landlords) who exploited the peasantry” (Barkey, 2007, p. 347). From another perspective, Laciner and Bal (2004) argue, PKK's establishment was the result of Marxist-Leninist groups’ rejection of this kind of nationalistic tendency.

Since its founding in Diyarbakir (a southeastern province), PKK has constantly been led by Abdullah Öcalan's leadership with the goal, at the very beginning, to achieve a communist revolution and to establish a separate Kurdish state through the means of armed struggles (Ankara Papers, 2004 cited in Durna & Hancerli, 2007). The Kurdish State would be independent and united, including territories of Turkey's east and southeastern regions as well as territories of Iraq, Syria, and Iran where most of the Kurds live. However, the target of the organization's attacks was primarily the Turkish state. To accomplish the communist revolution, the organization would promote the Marxist-Leninist ideology by use of propaganda, including violence as a means of propaganda, over the Kurdish people in Turkey, particularly its east and southeast regions, where people are largely traditional, undereducated, and tribal in nature (Durna & Hancerli, 2007).

However, Barkey (2007) states, PKK redefined its ideology and goals after the end of the Cold War and then again defined it after the organization lost its strength. In this period, “It began to downplay its Marxist-Leninist roots and then sought to define its aims for the Kurds in the form of successive federations—Arab Kurdish in Iraq, Turkish-Kurdish in Turkey, and Persian Kurdish in Iran” (Barkey, 2007, p. 348). Later on, PKK declared that it advocates equal rights for Turkey's Kurdish citizens, a dialog with the
Turkish state, and the democratization of Turkish institutions (Barkey, 2007). It is a fact that Abdullah Öcalan’s arrest led to the current changes regarding PKK's goals and objectives (Barkey, 2007; Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006). However, PKK’s attacks both in rural and urban areas have continued even though there have been ceasefires unilaterally declared by the organization.

Since its foundation, PKK has formed guerrilla forces both in Turkey and neighboring countries (currently in northern Iraq) and has continued to operate in rural areas of the southeastern region of Turkey, attacking Turkish military, police, temporary village guards, and civilians. Additionally, PKK has applied urban terrorism, such as assassinations, bombings, and suicide bombings (Ergil, 2000; Nikbay, Smith, & Mus, 2007; Nikbay, 2009). Nikbay et al. (2007), for instance, report that there have been 16 completed and 7 uncompleted suicide attacks in which 17 officials and 6 civilians were killed and 97 officials and 74 civilians were wounded by PKK (p. 81).

Nevertheless, since 1984, thousands of people have lost their lives (including terrorists themselves) in terrorism incidents with most of them relating to the Kurdish separatist terrorism conducted by PKK. The majority of the terrorist attacks were bombings and shootings and the most affected areas were the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey (Rodoplu, Arnold & Ersoy, 2003).

**Terrorist Organizations with Religious Motifs**

The rise of contemporary terrorist organizations that have religious motifs goes back to the 1979 Iran Revolution (Alkan, 2002; Caglar, 2006). In this period, Alkan
(2002) argues, interpretation of Islamic publications that were published in Iran and Egypt had an impact on the emergence of this type of terrorist organization. These publications, presenting a different interpretation of Islam than traditional Turkish Islam, made certain bookstores as a gathering and discussion place for some religious groups. From these gatherings, the terrorist organizations with religious political agendas were generated (Alkan, 2002).

Beside the inspiration of Iran’s Revolution, the Iran regime also purposively tried to transfer the Iranian way of Islamic revolution to other Muslim-populated countries through offering direct support to likeminded terrorist organizations. This Iranian support also had an impact in Turkey (Alkan, 2003). Hizbullah in Turkey (different from Lebanon’s Hezbollah), for example, enjoyed Iran's support during the 1980s, when the organization was established (Alkan, 2003).

From another perspective, the emergence of terrorist organizations with religious motifs can be understood within the domestic politics of Turkey. The movement of political Islam emerged long before the Iran Revolution, that is with the establishment of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP) in 1969 and the “incremental institutionalization of Islam as focus of Turkish nationalist values” that was begun in the 1950s (Celik, 2003, p. 64). Celik (2003) argues that within this movement of political Islam, a group with reactionary ideas to the state ideology of Kemalism2 broke its ties with nationalist conservative movements and became an independent movement after the

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2 Kemalism, or Atatürkçülük, is the name of the political doctrine that guided the newborn secular Turkish State to establish its reforms after the collapse of the Ottoman State and is called by the name of the founder of the Republic of Turkish State, M. Kemal Atatürk.
1980 military coup. In addition, Celik continues, it is believed that this movement, while rightist and leftist ideological movements were under the pressure of authorities during the military coup, was to be tolerated and somehow supported by the same authorities. The rationale behind this assumption is that Islam began to be conceived by the Turkish authorities as well as by the United States as a tool to stop communism and Soviet influence in this country (Celik, 2003).

Hizbullah was the most significant organization of the 1990s in this category of terrorist organizations and is still among the primary ones that have remained active. To Aydiner (2006), there have been five active and nine less active and non-active terrorist organizations with religious motifs in Turkey. Hizbullah was established by the groups that gathered around bookstores containing radical publications during the 1980s and appeared as a terrorist organization in the early 1990s when the organization started to fight against PKK in the southeastern region of Turkey.

The competition between the two rivals, Hizbullah and PKK, increased the destruction of terrorism in the region and enabled Hizbullah to grow and become one of the two major terrorist organizations in this specific region (Alkan, 2003). Both PKK and Hizbullah recruited primarily among Kurdish people of the region. Clashes between Hizbullah and PKK accounted for 700 killed in 1993 (Demirel, 2001 cited in Alkan, 2003). Hizbullah also splintered into two groups (Hizbullah-Ilim and Hizbullah-Menzil) in 1993 with violent clashes accounting for an additional loss of approximately 200 lives (Alkan, 2003). In these clashes, one of these groups (Hizbullah-Ilim) has gained total victory over the other group and has managed to survive so far.
Even though Hizbullah emerged with a religious agenda of establishing an Islamic state in Turkey, the organization did not attack governmental targets until the early 2000s. The organization’s targets were mainly members of rival groups and their own members who were thought to be police informants. Its favored terrorism actions were kidnapping, interrogation by torture, and assassination (Enseye Kurşun, 2005).

In addition to the Hizbullah terrorism, PKK also established pro-religious sub-organizations in the southeastern region of Turkey in order to take advantage of religion in promoting PKK goals (Caglar, 2006). However, these sub-organizations can be considered in the less active category (Aydiner, 2006).

The other remaining four active terrorist organizations in the religious category are the Islamic Great East Raiders' Front (IBDA/C), the State of Caliphate, the Army of Jerusalem (Tevhid-Selam), and Al Qaeda’s Turkish elements (TNP, 2009). These terrorist organizations, except for Al Qaeda, primarily conduct assassination-type terrorist acts against rival groups and sometimes government targets.

Al Qaeda’s Turkish elements (AQT) have a different political agenda from domestic terrorist groups, that is, they primarily follow Al Qaeda’s goals and objectives. It is believed that Al Qaeda aims to establish an Islamic caliphate in order to provide the unification of the Islamic world and primarily fights against the “far enemy” in Al Qaeda terms, namely the United States, as well as against its partners who are the most significant obstacles to Al Qaeda’s goal (Sageman, 2008, p. 42). AQT became known when they conducted suicide bombings in Istanbul in 2003 as a part of Al Qaeda’s global campaign of terrorism. The group’s targets, which are consistent with the Al Qaeda’s
strategy, were the British consulate building, the HSBS bank as a Western business, and two Jewish synagogues.

**Terrorist Organizations with Marxist Ideology**

Terrorist organizations with Marxist-Leninist ideology first appeared in the late 1960s, initiating the first wave of terrorism; they grew in number of organizations during the second wave of terrorism and were dismantled by the 1980 military coup (Aktan & Koknar, 2002). A few of these organizations survived and actually recovered in the third wave terrorism by the late 1980s (Alkan, 2003). Recruiting new members, as before, around universities and student movements, terrorist organizations such as Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left), Turkiye Komunist Partisi/Marksist Leninist-TKP/ML (Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist Leninist), Turkiye Komunist Emek Partisi/Leninist-TKEP/L (Turkish Communist Labor Party/Leninist), and Turkiye Ihtilalci Komunistler Birligi-TIKB (Revolutionary Communist Union of Turkey) started to re-engage in terrorism (Alkan, 2003).

Aydiner (2006) notes that there are currently four leftist terrorist organizations active along with 93 less active and non-active terrorist organizations of leftist groups. The active terrorist organizations are Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi Cephesi-DHKP/C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party Front), Marksist Leninist Komunist Parti-MLKP (Marxist Leninist Communist Party), Turkiye Komunist Partisi/Marksist Leninist-Konferans-TKP/ML-Konferans (Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist Leninist–Conference), and Maoist Komunist Partisi-MKP (Maoist Communist Party).
Among these currently active terrorist organizations, DHKP/C appears to be historically the most significant one in terms of its capabilities. The origin of DHKP/C, historically better known as Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left), goes back to the 1970s' THKP/C (Sozen, 2006; Alkan, 2002). THKP/C had conducted urban terrorism activities, such as armed robberies and kidnappings, including of businessmen and an Israeli consul (Alkan, 2002; Harris, 1980). In 1972, leaders of THKP/C were killed in an armed conflict with security forces, which later resulted in separations and factions within the organization. Dev-Sol, which was established in Turkey’s Istanbul province by 1978, was one of these factions (Alkan, 2002).

In 1989, leaders of Dev-Sol, who were captured during the 1980 military intervention, escaped from prison and reactivated the organization. Dev-Sol’s main targets were imperialist and capitalist figures and facilities (Cline, 2004). However, its activities began with extortions and robberies to fund the organization, but then expanded to include attacks on security forces (Alkan, 2002).

In 1992, the organization split into two parts as its leadership was blamed for being authoritative and centralized, causing them to attack each other (Alkan, 2002). In 1994, with the victory of one of these groups, the factional infighting within the organization resulted in the establishment of DHKP/C (Cline, 2004).

DHKP/C primarily operates in Turkey’s most populous and largest cities (e.g., Istanbul) and the Black Sea Region (north of Turkey) (Alkan, 2002). In recent years, DHKP/C has tried to spread into rural areas as well (Cline, 2004).
DHKP/C, like its ancestor, has conducted sophisticated terrorist attacks under high security conditions. The organization attacks Turkish police and military targets and businessmen as well as US and NATO military personnel and commercial and cultural facilities (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006). DHKP/C carries out high-profile assassinations, like the assassination of a former prime minister (Nihat Erim), assassinations of eight retired military commanders as well as of two public prosecutors, a British insurance manager, and a famous industrialist (Ozdemir Sabanci). DHKP/C killed 53 people—23 civilians and 30 police officers—in Turkey between 1998 and 2002 (Mango, 2005, p. 25).

The organization has conducted suicide attacks occasionally since 2001 (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006; Nikbay et al., 2007), although the champion of this type of terrorism in Turkey is not DHKP/C. Nikbay et al. (2007) state that DHKP/C is the perpetrator of five uncompleted and two completed suicide bombings in which primary targets were police units; the total casualty is 3 officials and 1 civilian killed, 21 officials and 5 civilians wounded (p. 81).

**Summary**

Typologies of terrorist organizations, in those cases where the classification possesses a functional utility, can serve scientific progress as well as practitioners’ tasks. In this regard, a functional typology can aid practitioners’ identification of terrorist organizations that have perpetrated recent terrorism attacks. The merit of a typology lies in its functional utility.
Typologies of terrorist organizations can be developed based on theoretical works as well as empirical studies. Q methodology opens an additional door for developing empirically based typologies of terrorism and terrorist organizations and thus enriches researchers’ tools for generating typologies.

Terrorist organizations are viewed as important actors of terrorism, particularly in non-state and insurgent types of terrorism. In addition, political and religious orientations of terrorist organizations have frequently been the bases of typologies and classifications of terrorist organizations.

Finally, Turkey has a 40-years history of terrorism. Because of its history, there are many studies about terrorism in Turkey, most of which are historical analyses. These studies usually classify terrorist organizations into four groups, such as rightists, leftists, separatists, and religious. These studies show that there is a broad variety of terrorist organizations to study and on the basis of which to create typologies of terrorist organizations in Turkey.
CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Overview

This study is designed to investigate the assumption that the application of Q methodology to Turkish LEOs’ perceptions can yield functional categories of terrorist organizations that exist in the minds of LEOs. The study constructs a functional typology based on this categorization. The typology facilitates forecasting terrorist organizations’ behaviors as well as the identification of perpetrators, in terms of their organizations, of terrorism incidents.

To generate the typology and categorization, this study gathers data regarding LEOs’ perceptions of specific terrorist organizations through application of a structured Q sample complemented by subsequent qualitative interviews. The Q-sort technique helps to assess the most characteristic and most uncharacteristic traits of terrorist organizations in the eyes of LEOs while the subsequent interviews help determine how well the sorting process has been accomplished. The data gathered through the application of Q technique are analyzed using the PQMethod computer program (Schmolck & Atkinson, 2001). The Q sorts are factor analyzed, and the emerging factors reveal the categories of terrorist organizations and the typology.
By way of brief summary, Q technique involves the \textit{Q sorting} of a set of descriptors (referred to as a \textit{Q sample}) in terms of a specific rule (referred to as a \textit{condition of instruction}). In this instance, the Q sample is comprised of the $N = 80$ terrorist organization descriptors contained in Appendix H. For example:

1. The organization’s leadership and other organs under its command are elected by members within the frame of democratic principles.

2. The organization attacks foreigners.

3. The organization commits violence against its own members and sympathizers.

4. The organization commits assassinations.

\[\ldots\]

80. The organization commits kidnappings.

Comparable to a sample of persons in survey research, the Q sample is considered to be representative of the universe of all characteristics of terrorist organizations.

The elements of the Q sample are typed onto cards (one element per card) and this set of characteristics is then used by a judge (i.e., a person carrying out the assessment) to provide a Q-sort representation of the organization (e.g., organization X) by distributing the elements from “most characteristic of X” (+5) to “most uncharacteristic of X” (-5) as shown in Figure 1.
If two judges (A and B) provide their assessments of organization X, and if they have similar perceptions of X, then the correlation of their respective Q sorts ($r_{AB}$) should produce a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Likewise, if the two judges agree in their assessment of organization Y, then $r_{AB}$ for Y should likewise be positive and significant. Moreover, if the profiles of organizations X and Y are quite similar—i.e., if X and Y have similar characteristics—then the coefficients for these assessments should also be significant. On the other hand, if X and Y are quite different in their characteristics, then the Q sorts that picture these modes should be uncorrelated.

Once all judges have described all organizations, the collection of Q sorts is correlated and factor analyzed using the PQMethod program. In this context, organizations with similar characteristics (i.e., as reflected in the judges’ Q sorts) appear together on the same factor (i.e., will have significant and positive loadings on the same factor), and organizations with different characteristics appear on separate factors.
(hypothetically, factors I, II, and III), which constitute an empirical typology that distinguishes different kinds of organizations. The advantage of this approach is that the typology that emerges is the result of harvesting the collective wisdom and knowledge base of experts.

This study incorporated Q methodology considering its suitability for investigating the range and diversity of subjective experiences and perspectives. The methodology enables the researcher to identify the variance and range of TNP perspectives on terrorist organizations. In addition, the methodology aids in the identification of similarities and differences among subjective perspectives and thus facilitates the construction of broad categories of the phenomenon under investigation. These categories enable the generation of a typology. The methodology also facilitates the investigation of patterns and relationships within and between categories that are constructed. The patterns and relationships enable researchers to benefit from the functional utility of the typology.

Moreover, Q method assists in the production of quantitative assessments regarding the terrorist organizations being investigated. The quantitative assessments regarding each category of terrorist organizations facilitate predictive interpretations about terrorist organizations’ behavioral characteristics. Furthermore, these quantitative assessments can help practitioners identify what type of terrorist organizations is likely to have been the perpetrator of a terrorism incident that has recently occurred. A systematic prediction tool can facilitate such identification processes. The provision of such a tool is a consequence of this study.
Q-Sample Design and Framework

Q-sort analyses have been used to evaluate observers’ understandings of organizations (Brown, 2001) and can serve to assess Turkish LEOs’ perceptions about terrorist organizations. For instance, there are several studies in which Q technique has been used to assess the nature of organizations in term of their functioning (Brown, 2001), personality characteristics of organizations and organizational culture (Chatman, 1989; O’Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell, 1991; Sheridan, 1992), and organizational images (Treadwell & Harrison, 1994), and agency values (Martin & Steelman, 2004) and political party opinions (Peritore, 1988, 1989). Likewise, terrorist organizations are such entities that have unique organizational characteristics that can be understood by observers.

In this study, the observers of terrorist organizations (i.e., Turkish LEOs) are members of another organization (TNP), rather than of terrorist organizations, and have developed similar understandings about terrorist organizations. These similar understandings represent the organizational culture of their agency in which members deal with terrorist organizations as part of their daily routines.

Culture can be defined as “a set of cognitions shared by members of a social unit” (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991, p. 491). Organizations are, by definition, “internally structured groups that are located in complex networks of intergroup relations characterized by power, status, and prestige differentials” (Hogg & Terry, 2000, p. 121).
When values and beliefs are largely shared by members of a social unit, there exists an organizational culture (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991).

The theory of organizational culture addresses culture as the result of group members’ accumulated knowledge, which involves adaptation to their environment as well as internal integration processes (Schein, 2004, p. 18). Drawing from its anthropological conceptualization, organizational culture emerges through accumulated learning of a group during its history, and learning occurs simultaneously with behavioral, emotional, and cognitive processes (Schein, 1990). Thus Turkish LEOs develop similar perceptions of terrorist organizations emanating from the accumulated learning.

Hence, Turkish LEOs, being observers, can provide data about terrorist organizations as well as simultaneously their personal perspectives that reflect the culture developed within the TNP. Consensus between LEOs’ opinions about terrorist organizations indicates existence of such cultural reflections.

In order to collect the data from Turkish LEOs, this study has derived a Q sample comprised of statements about general characteristics of terrorist organizations. Thus the Q sample in this study is a representation of the universe of all characteristics of terrorist organizations.

McKeown and Thomas (1988, pp. 28-30) argue that an adequate Q sample can be achieved in two ways. The first way is through unstructured sampling in which Q-sample statements are selected based on their relevance to the topic without assuring
complete coverage of all sub-issues. Thus the sampling serves to provide a cross-section of topics, opinions, attitudes, and assumptions.

The second type of sampling is structured sampling in which sub-issues are systematically identified and selected. A structured sampling can be performed through deductive or inductive design. A deductive design is performed based on hypothetical or theoretical considerations and thus facilitates theory building. An inductive design can be achieved through observing patterns and salient themes, within the process of the statement collection from the “concourse of communication” (McKeown & Thomas, 1988, p. 28).

This study uses a deductive structured design in order to systematically select Q-sample statements obtained from the concourse of communication. The structured design has been developed based on an adaptation of Shultz’s (1978) seven variables of typology: causes, environment, goals, strategy, means, organization, and participation. Shultz’s conceptualization of typology has been preferred in terms of its parsimoniousness and adaptability for the purpose of this study. As such, 10 major themes are identified as the key components of the structured design. These are: (1) ideology, (2) external relations, (3) objectives, (4) strategy, (5) capabilities, (6) techniques, (7) targets, (8) organization, (9) participation, and (10) attitude.

1. Ideology is adapted from Shultz’s (1978) participation variable. Ideology can be defined, in Drake’s (1998b, p. 54) terms, as beliefs, values, principles, and objectives that can define and distinguish a group’s aim and political identity. Ideologies of terrorist organizations, in a larger extent, can be reviewed in
various categories, including political ideologies and motives, such as fascism, anarchism, conservatism, liberalism, communism, separatism, single-issue politics (e.g., animal liberation, anti-abortion, and anti-nuclear power), and religious motivations as well as motivations related to material benefits (organized crime). Material benefits rarely refer to terrorists’ main motivation. However, there are organized criminal groups that use methods of terrorism to achieve political objectives, such as securing public sector contracts and passing or stopping laws in order to safeguard group interests. These groups can be addressed as terrorist organizations (see Drake, 1998a, pp. 17-22).

2. *External relations*, adapted from Shultz’s (1978) environment variable, refer to terrorist organizations’ relations and connections with entities from their environment. These entities may involve foreign states, sympathizers in the country and abroad, other terrorist groups, legitimate political parties, criminal organizations, and public officials. External relations can be identified through asking questions about support a terrorist organization may receive from the outside world of the organization (see Cordes et al., 1985, pp. 74-75).

3. *Objectives*, adapted from Shultz’s (1978) goal variable, may refer to tactical objectives. Drake (1998a, pp. 39-42) has summed up these objectives under seven categories: threat elimination, disorientation of target, attrition, provocation, compliance with the demands of organizations, endorsement, and advertisement (see also Crenshaw, 1978; Thornton, 1964).
Threat elimination: Terrorist organizations may attack people and institutions who pose a serious direct threat to the existence of the organization, such as informers, police investigators, judges, and other government officials (Drake, 1998a, p. 39).

Compliance: This objective is achieved when psychological targets (government, institutions, society, and so on) comply with the demands of terrorist organizations because of fear of terrorism (Drake, 1998a, p. 40).

Disorientation: Terrorist organizations can strategically act in a way that their psychological target becomes baffled and loses its orientation through increasing anxiety in the society and the disruption of everyday life. Thus terrorists expect the chaos created in the society will induce the psychological target to react in the desired direction. The difference from the compliance objective is that terrorist attacks related to the disorientation do not indicate a way of relieving anxiety (Drake, 1998a, p. 40).

Attrition: Terrorist organizations may aim to break the resistance of their psychological target. In this regard, terrorist organizations continuously commit small-scale attacks and hope that the cumulative effect of these attacks will influence the will of their psychological targets. Continual small-scale attacks against security forces in the hope that they will withdraw from a targeted territory can be given as an example of attrition (Drake, 1998a, p. 41).
Provocation: Terrorist organizations may seek to provoke a response from their psychological target. For example, actions of terrorist organizations may aim at stimulating harsh security measures in which people who are uncommitted previously to the terrorist cause could be alienated. Thus terrorist organizations hope that the government is hated and loses its legitimacy in the eye of the public. Another way of provocation is for terrorist actions to induce a military coup in order to overthrow the government (Drake, 1998a, p. 41).

Advertisement: This is related to seeking publicity. Terrorist organizations may want their existence and cause to be known and use terrorism primarily for this purpose (Drake, 1998a, p. 42).

Endorsement: This is related to popularity. The aim of endorsement is to gain and mobilize support from a targeted population. The population may include sympathizers of the organization, similar minded groups, or merely groups uninterested in the terrorist cause (Drake, 1998a, p. 42).

4. **Strategy** refers to the overall plan of a terrorist organization to achieve their goals and identifies the organization’s primary and secondary tactical positions in this plan. Thus strategy determines how a terrorist organization uses its resources, such as deployment of members, materials, ideas, symbols, and forces (Shultz, 1978). The theme strategy, adapted from Shultz’s strategy variable, includes characteristics such as rural activities, guerrilla warfare, mass movements, and activities to damage the economy of the country as well
as strategic choices regarding the level of violence in a terrorism campaign, ranging from non-violence to high-level violence (see Hoffman, 2006, pp. 229-256).

5. *Capabilities*, adapted from Shultz’s means variable, refer to tactical and technical skills of terrorist organizations’ members, their ability to counter law enforcement intelligence techniques, and other abilities of members related to intelligence gathering, weaponry and funding supply, and media as well as other means of mass communication usage (see Cordes et al., 1985; Cragin & Daly, 2004; Drake, 1998a, pp. 54-97; Dyson, 2005, pp. 55-57).

6. *Techniques*, in Shultz’s (1978) terms, refer to means utilized within the strategic framework of terrorist organizations. In this study, techniques include common terrorist tactics (see Cordes et al., 1985. p. 21; Enders & Sandler, 1999; Hoffman, 1994, 2006, p. 35), such as assassinations, kidnappings, attacks on installations, bombings, hijackings and hostage takings, as well as more specific types of attacks, such as armed robbery (Hamm & de Voorde, 2005) and suicide attacks (Pape, 2003). Claiming responsibility and leaving the “signature” of the organization at crime scenes (Goldberg, 2008; Hoffman, 1997; Rapoport, 1997) are also considered in this theme.

7. *Targets* refer to types of immediate targets (those are easier to identify rather than those psychological targets or target audience) of terrorist attacks. A terrorism incident usually includes two types of targets. One is the physical
target, which is the immediate target of a terrorist attack, and the other one is
the psychological target, which is intended to be influenced by the attack
(Drake, 1998a, p. 1; Schmid, 2003). However, based on the first group of
targets, this study includes targets such as Western institutions, religious
minority groups, business, military, police, government, terrorist
organizations’ own members, and opponent groups even though there are
many ways to categorize targets. These categories of targets, whether
including all of them or partially, have been generally investigated in
terrorism analyses and are mostly available in databases of terrorism (see
Cordes et al., 1985; Mickolus et al., 2004; Global Terrorism Database, 2009).
In addition, the category of opponent groups (see Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca,
2006) in this study represents a broad category of targets, including those who
have a different worldview or political standpoint, and covers groups of
political parties, religious sects, ethnicities, and so on. Targeting intellectuals,
civil society leaders, and other publicly known figures are considered in this
category of targets as these figures can be opposing groups from the
perspective of terrorist organizations.

8. Organization, adapted from Shultz’s (1978) organization variable, refers to
the nature and structure of organizations and includes characteristics such as
democratic and authoritarian organizations, centralized and decentralized
structures, as well as factionalism, safe houses, and confidentiality within
terrorist organizations (see Cordes et al., 1985; Cragin & Daly, 2004; Drake, 1998a, pp. 163-174; Dyson, 2005, pp. 55-57; Ganor, 2008; Mayntz, 2004).

9. Participation, adapted from Shultz’s (1978) participation variable, describes group size and recruitment sources, such as family relations and ethnic orientation, as well as members’ background, for instance, whether members come from a wide range of social backgrounds, whether they come from a military and police background, whether females serve in attack forces (for example, see Atkins, 1992; Falk, 1988; Sageman, 2004, 2008; Smith, 1994; Turk, 1984), and whether participants follow a charismatic leader (Chasdi, 1995, 1997, 2002a, 2002b).

10. Attitude, separated and adapted from Shultz’s (1978) participation variable, describes members’ internalization of organizational values, whether they have hate and rancor against the outside world, their willingness to die, and whether exit from their organization is easy, as well as characteristics regarding how restrictive, or selective, terrorist organizations are in their killings. Selectivity of killings can be understood by looking at individual incidents and number of fatalities as well as injuries in each incident and the amount of destruction. Terrorists’ selectivity of targets ranges from low to high, damaging property rather than killing, selective killing (targeting specific individuals), less selective killing (deaths of innocents can be accepted as a collateral damage), and non-selective killing (indiscriminate killings or intentional mass casualty attacks) (on the issue of attitudes, see

These 10 major themes have been the basis of a systematic effort to identify sub-themes within each major theme. For instance, *ideology* is identified as a major theme, and its sub-themes have indicated varieties of *ideology*, such as fascism, anarchism, communism, conservatism, separatism, liberalism, single issues, criminal, and religious (for the structure of major themes and sub-themes, see Appendix E). Table 1 shows the major themes and accompanying Q sample statements that represent sub-themes.

**Table 1  Q Sample Structure**

<table>
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<th>Major themes</th>
<th>Statements</th>
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<tr>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td>9, 10, 12, 28, 48, 55, 65, 74</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Numbers in the cells refer to statements; e.g., 4: “The organization commits assassinations.” Statements appear in Appendix H.
Major themes and sub-themes constituting the framework have provided the basis for examining the distinguishing characteristics of terrorist organizations. The framework has served to help create the final content and form of the Q-sort item set.

**Q-Sort Item Set**

The Q-sort item set is an instrument generated through collecting descriptor statements of terrorist organizations’ characteristics in the guidance of the framework. Descriptor statements were assembled from academic literature (journals and books) by the researcher, whose past experience in contributing to the concourse of communication as a police professional in the TNP facilitated his ability to choose the most salient themes that correspond to terrorist organizations’ characteristics. Then, from among the descriptor statements, the researcher purposefully selected Q-sample statements, each representing sub-themes of the framework that had been already developed. The total number of Q-sample statements is \( N = 80 \) (8 times 10 major themes) and constitutes the Q-sort item set. The statements are randomly numbered (see Appendix H).

The statements were taken from studies that cover a large variety of attributes of terrorist organizations (e.g., Atkins, 1992; Bell, 2000; Chasdi, 1995, 2002a; Cordes et al., 1985; Cragin & Daly, 2004; Crenshaw, 2001; Drake, 1998a, 1998b; Falk, 1988; Ganor, 2008; Gurr, 1988; Hoffman, 2006; Khatchadourian, 1998; Mayntz, 2004; McCauley & Segal, 1987; McCormick, 2001; Oots, 1986; Shultz, 1978; Smith, 1994; Turk, 1984; Victoroff, 2005). In other words, the academic studies have become the sources that this study has utilized to explore the concourse of communication (see Stephenson, 1986).
For example, Drake’s (1998a) eight types of ideologies are described in sentences, such as the following:

35. The organization asserts that it acts for the sake of protecting the state, the regime, or the social order.

Another example of such statements drawn from a different source is the following, which is taken from Gurr’s (1988) description of a terrorist organization: “… [a terrorist organization] caused more noise than injury….. the principal targets were property” (p. 50), and appears as follows in this study:

55. The organization targets properties or installations rather than people.

Thus the selection process of the sample statements has assured that all sub-themes under the 10 major themes have been included in the Q-sort item set.

**Appraising the Quality of Statements**

The sample statements needed to be translated into Turkish in a way that the statements could be understood and assessed by participants without confusion. In addition, it was necessary to establish a balance between positive and negative statements. The researcher’s past experience in the TNP and his language skill responsive to the Turkish police culture enabled him to make such a translation as well as to establish the balance between statements. A Turkish student of Kent State University checked the translation of the statements and found no problem related to the translation. The researcher with his general knowledge of terrorist organizations in Turkey assessed the statements in terms of the balance between positive and negative statements in order
to determine whether the balance could be maintained for different participants filling out the survey for various terrorist organizations.

The statements most preferably should be divided in two equal groups of negative and positive statements—i.e., statements characteristic of and statements uncharacteristic of a particular terrorist organization—prior to the Q-sorting task. As a practical matter, the two piles of statements would not always be equal. For instance, some statements assessed as uncharacteristic for one terrorist organization might be assessed as characteristic of some other terrorist organization. As such, the number of positively and negatively assessed statements would be different for different terrorist organizations.

The researcher engaged in the division of the statements for various terrorist organizations and concluded that the sorting behavior could be performed without much difficulty. However, there was a need for a pre-test of the survey instrument in terms of its translation quality and practicality.

The translated Q sample was administered to five qualified Turkish counterterrorism officers (all members of the TNP), who were initially contacted by telephone. All officers responded to the survey and stated that the statements were easily understandable, and also that the statements were easily piled, sorted, and rank-ordered. The survey materials—cover letter, instruction sheet, sample statements, score sheet, and survey evaluation sheet—were subsequently sent to participants through electronic mail; returned materials were likewise transmitted by e-mail.
Description of Sorting Process

The sorting process of the Q survey follows a certain format. Participants print the statements and cut them out, as indicated, into small cards with one statement to a card. Participants, based on their knowledge of specific terrorist organizations, were instructed to assess each descriptor statement in terms of whether the statement is most characteristic or most uncharacteristic of a terrorist organization compared to the other descriptor statements in the Q-sort item set. Participants grade a statement +5 when they regard the statement as highly characteristic of the organization under the assessment, -5 when participants regard the statement as uncharacteristic of the organization, and 0 when they regard the statement as neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic. Then, participants sort the remainder of the statements according to their relative degree of characteristicness, or salience, between the two extremes of the continuum. Finally, participants fill the bell-shaped distribution charts (see Figure 1 above), entering the statement numbers so as to preserve a record of the way in which they were sorted. Since the grading chart is based on a forced distribution, participants were forced to identify the most important characteristics of terrorist organizations.

Participants

This study focuses on how terrorism investigators, who are counterterrorism experts in the TNP, conceptualize terrorist organizations. Thus survey participants are these investigators. Terrorism investigators primarily perform two kinds of tasks in their
units: precautionary operations to prevent terrorism incidents and investigative activities to capture perpetrators of terrorist incidents when they occur.

Participants in this study provide cultural data about attributes of terrorist organizations in Turkey. When a study collects cultural data, expert informants, rather than randomly selected respondents, are needed (Bernard, 2009, p.174). Purposive sampling and snowball sampling are two ways of reaching expert informants among several others. In purposive sampling, researchers rely on their judgment to locate participants. In snowball sampling, key individuals help researchers identify other likely candidates (Bernard, 2009, pp. 174-179). This study has used both of these ways to identify and locate its participants.

**Sampling, Contacting, and Processing**

For the participant sampling, two criteria were identified: (1) participants would know specific terrorist organizations through their law enforcement experience, and (2) participants would have updated knowledge about specific terrorist organizations. To locate possible participants, telephone contact was established with Turkish LEOs who were serving or had served within counterterrorism units. Additional potential participants were also solicited in person in Turkey. Although the researcher personally collected some of the data through conducting the survey in counterterrorism units during the month of October 2009, most of the data were collected via e-mails.

Additional participants were obtained from the counterterrorism units of three large cities of Turkey. Terrorist organizations, in the form of various factions, have been
operating in major large cities (such as Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, and Diyarbakir), and in these four cities, counterterrorism investigations and arrests of terrorists have tended to be the highest in number (TNP, 2005, 2006). Consequently, the counterterrorism units of these provinces are among the most active and should be the major source of locating participants.

Counterterrorism units of large cities have been fruitful places to make initial contacts and to establish connections with other eligible participants. Officers of these units, in addition to participating in this survey, assisted by identifying eligible participants through snowball sampling of participant networks. These connection efforts revealed that eligible participants, who had formerly served in large cities, had been assigned to other cities as well as other units unrelated to counterterrorism, or had been promoted to higher administrative positions within the TNP. In addition, two participants had recently retired. In total, 60 potential participants were identified through the counterterrorism network based on their expertise with regard to specific terrorist organizations.

Which terrorist organizations would be involved in the study was discussed with some participants who were contacted during the initial phase. Eleven terrorist organizations were identified by the participants as the most active terrorist organizations in today’s Turkey: PKK, AQT, Hizbullah, IBDA/C, DHKP/C, TIKB, TKEP/L, MKP, TKP/ML–TIKKO, MLKP, and Devrimci Karargah (DK) (see Appendix F for short

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3 Hizbullah, which is known as one of the active illegal political organizations by the counterterrorism community, is not considered as a terrorist organization in this study. Personal communications with the participants have indicated that no-evidence proves that Hizbullah has used violence or threatened to use violence in Turkey so far. Hence, Hizbullah has been omitted from consideration in this survey.
descriptions of these organizations). Five key investigators were asked to provide Q sorts for each terrorist organization, the aim being to obtain a total of 55 responses (5 assessments of 11 terrorist organizations).

Contact was eventually made with the most knowledgeable counterterrorism investigators who have developed expertise on specific terrorist organizations and who have been serving in different geographic regions of Turkey. A common trait of these officers has been that all of them have served in the counterterrorism units of large cities, either currently or previously. These potential participants were personally contacted by phone.

Some attempts to contact participants were unsuccessful. Among the eligible potential participants, one officer directly refused to participate, mentioning his workload. Seven officers initially agreed to participate, but in the end did not respond to the survey. Finally, there were unsuccessful attempts to establish contacts with two officers.

The survey forms were sent through e-mails to all contacted officers who agreed to participate in the study, except for 22 participants whom the researcher personally contacted in counterterrorism offices, including two retired officers who were visited in their former offices. Officers and retired officers were informed that participation was not obligatory and that they could withdraw at any time during the survey. These officers showed a willingness to participate, but most of them preferred to take the survey forms with them and to fill them out during convenient times. Survey materials were distributed to those willing to participate and oral instructions were provided about how
to respond. These participants turned in the forms at later time. Among these 22 participants, 12 agreed to fill out the forms in the presence of the researcher, at their offices, or in former offices.

Of participants who received the test materials through e-mail, 28 responded. Thus a total of 49 participants (28 + 21) out of 60 eligible officers participated in the study and produced 61 Q sorts for 11 terrorist organizations. Three participants produced 9 Q sorts, each producing 3 Q sorts for 3 different terrorist organizations. The 3 participants have expertise with respect to the same 3 terrorist organizations: those are the religiously motivated organizations of Hizbullah, IBDA/C, and AQT. In addition, 6 people produced 12 Q sorts, each having expertise concerning 2 terrorist organizations: 2 participants provided assessments of TIKB and also of TKEP/L. Two people who responded for MLKP also responded for TKP/ML-TIKKO. The same person who produced 1 Q sort for MLKP also produced 1 Q sort for MKP. Finally, the same person who produced 1 Q sort for AQT also produced 1 Q sort for IBDA/C. The rest of the participants, 40 people, produced the remainder of the Q sorts, each responding for only a single terrorist organization.

In sum, participants produced 5 Q sorts for each of 4 terrorist organizations: DHKP/C, DK, MKP, and TIKB; 6 Q sorts for 5 terrorist organizations: AQT, Hizbullah, IBDA/C, PKK, and TKP/ML (TIKKO); 7 Q sorts for MLKP; and finally 4 Q sorts for TKEP/L.
**Expertise and Experience of Participants**

Participants have had law enforcement experiences in the TNP for various years of service, ranging from 4 to 30 years, with an average of 14.3 years. Officers’ services specific to the counterterrorism field also have the same pattern, with 12.5 years on average (see Figure 2).

![Figure 2 Participants' year of experience in the TNP.](image)

It is worth noting that participants who responded for 2 terrorist organizations, TIKB and TKEP/L, have a higher range of average years in the service of the TNP than participants who have responded for other terrorist organizations: an average of 19.8 years for TIKB and 20.5 years for TKEP/L (see Table 2). One reason for this is that, according to participants’ account, it is difficult to find eligible participants to respond for TIKB and TKEP/L due to these organizations’ relative inactivity in Turkey in recent
years. The older generation of counterterrorism officers is more likely to be knowledgeable about these two terrorist organizations than is the newer generation.

Participants have enough years of experience to know a specific terrorist organization, particularly in large cities where participants have been kept continuously busy with dealing with terrorist organizations. All participants have served or are currently serving in large cities.

<table>
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<th>Terrorist Organization</th>
<th>Participants’ Average Years of TNP Service</th>
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<td>TKP/ML (TIKKO)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, participants are generally knowledgeable about terrorist organizations’ current situation. The researcher has made sure during the participant identification process that participants who have been assigned to other units unrelated to counterterrorism—6 participants only—have been following the related terrorist organization’s agenda and actions in Turkey, at least through the media. The researcher also made sure that these reassignments, as well as the retirements of 2 officers, took
place in recent years and that participants were likely to know the current situation of the terrorist organization for which they were responding. The researcher has gotten this assurance through discussions with the participants and looking at the dates during which they dealt with the terrorist organization in counterterrorism tasks (see Appendix I).

**Analysis of Data**

The Q sorts were correlated and factor analyzed using the PQMethod program (Schmolck & Atkinson, 2001) and eight principal components were rotated using a combination of varimax and manual rotation procedures. The significance of factor loadings is determined by the standard error of a zero-order loading: \( SE = 1/\sqrt{N} \), where \( N \) refers to the number of statements (80 in this case); hence, \( SE = 1/\sqrt{80} = 1/8.94 = 0.112 \). Loadings exceeding \( 2.58SE = (2.58)(0.112) = \pm 0.29 \) are considered statistically significant \( (p<.01) \).

A determination was made to alter the varimax solution based on an overriding theoretical consideration (on theoretical rotation, see Brown, 1980, pp. 224-239; Brown & Robyn, 2004); namely, that the terrorist organization DHKP/C, which is identified in the literature and from interviews with participants as one of the most significant terrorist organizations in Turkey, should appear as defining for one of the factors. In the varimax solution, Q sorts representing DHKP/C had mixed loadings, i.e., significant loadings on more than one factor; consequently, these Q sorts would have played no role in the estimation of factor scores for the statements in any of the factors. Realignment of the factors (and the accompanying alteration in the patterns of factor loadings) enabled the
analysis to involve perspectives about DHKP/C without losing much information about
the other terrorist organizations associated with Factor A.

Five of the eight original factors were retained for description and interpretation.
Two of the eight were eliminated due to the fact that they were not purely defined by at
least two Q sorts. A third factor was removed from further consideration given that it had
only one pure loading, which is generally regarded as inadequate (Brown, 1980, p. 232).
The remaining five factors provide the basis for the interpretations in the next chapter and
are displayed in Table 3.

The factor loadings that are underlined in the Table 3 designate the pure Q sorts
that define each factor. For instance, Factor A is defined by 4 Q sorts: PKK1, PKK2,
PKK4, and PKK6. These Q sorts have loaded highest on Factor A. In addition, the
loadings of these Q sorts have exceeded the significance level of .29 in Factor A only, but
not in the other factors. PKK3 and PKK5, on the other hand, are not purely defining Q
sorts even though they have loaded significantly highly on Factor A. These two Q sorts
are not used to estimate factor scores for Factor A because they are significantly
associated not only with Factor A, but also with Factor E. Likewise, the other factors
have also been defined based on purely defining Q sorts that are not significantly
associated with other factors: 6 Q sorts define Factor B, 6 Factor C, 5 Factor D, and 17
Factor E.
### Table 3: Factor Loadings

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Code = participant code number
A, B, C, D, E = the five factors
_ _ = defining factor loadings to two decimal points
However, not only the Q sorts that purely define factors, but also the remaining Q sorts have generally loaded significantly highly on specified factors: Q sorts about PKK (i.e., PKK1, PKK2, PKK3, PKK4, PKK5, and PKK6) have loaded significantly highly on Factor A, those about IBDA/C on Factor B, those about AQT on Factor C, those about Hizbullah on Factor D, and those about Marxist groups generally on Factor E. Therefore, the remaining Q sorts, although not defining, have significant associations with these specified factors, too.

The underlying meaning of each factor is determined by looking at the composite factor arrays provided by the PQMethod program (for composite factor arrays, see Appendix H). A factor array can be expressed as $z$ scores for each factor or as a model Q sort in which the factor scores have been converted into whole numbers (from -5 to +5) in order to facilitate the interpretations of the factors., which begin with examinations of the most salient statements associated with each composite Q sort, particularly those ranked highly positively (+5, +4, and +3) and highly negatively (-5, -4, and -3). The next chapter is devoted to these interpretations.
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Overview

The data analysis of this study has revealed five factors. In other words, Turkish LEOs’ perspectives of terrorist organizations have clustered around five factors, which in turn refer to categories of terrorist organizations and their categorical characteristics. These categories and characteristics constitute a functional typology in the minds of Turkish LEOs. Based on categorical characteristics, the five factors have been labeled ethno-separatist, provocative religious, intimidator religious, self-conscious religious, and communist, even though these words cannot represent all aspects of their categories.

The typology of terrorist organizations has been developed based on Q sorts and it is assumed that individual participants’ Q sorts reflect the cultural information that has been learned by participants within their organization. The apparent consensus among participants indicates that such a reflection exists. The consensus about traits of groups of terrorist organizations also identifies perspectives about categories of terrorist organization.

In this context, participants’ perceptions reflect the accumulated knowledge of their organizations. This is justified by the fact that the participants were selected based on their expertise with respect to terrorist organizations and have been recognized as
expert terrorism investigators by their colleagues within the same organization, namely the TNP. Counterterrorism investigators go through the necessary stages of education and training about terrorist organizations and must gain enough practical experience to be promoted to investigative positions. Participants’ demographics about years of experience in the TNP as well as their experiences of terrorism investigation in metropolitan areas indicate that the participants have gone through such socialization processes within the TNP and have gained enough investigative experience to know terrorist organizations.

The following sections discuss the five factors that have emerged as a result of the data analysis, with emphasis on the most characteristic and uncharacteristic as well as the most distinguishing statements of each factor. The final section presents a typology of terrorist organizations.

**Factor Interpretation**

There were no a priori assumptions regarding how terrorist organizations should be distinguished from one another or that could provide the basis of the categorization of terrorist organizations as well as of the typology, nor was there any preformulated idea about what the composite perspectives emerging from individuals’ perceptions would look like. The participants themselves assessed the statements based on their knowledge and expertise about specific terrorist organizations. The data analysis has simply revealed the natural differences among the participants’ perspectives and has shown how those perspectives are grouped.
Factor A: Ethno-Separatist

Before interpreting the most characteristic and most uncharacteristic statements of Factor A, which Q sorts are associated with the factor need to be determined (see Table 4). Four out of 61 Q sorts, those about the ethno-separatist terrorist organization PKK, have defined Factor A. In addition, two Q sorts about PKK, even though they are not purely representative of the factor, have loaded significantly on Factor A.

Table 4 Factor loadings in Factor A

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<thead>
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Code = participant code number
__ = defining factor loadings to two decimal points

Table 4 shows that two Q sorts associated with Factor A (PKK3 and PKK5) also have a significant correlation with Factor E, even though they have less association with E than with A. Likewise, 13 Q sorts that refer to communist terrorist organizations of
Factor E have significant associations with Factor A. Among the latter group of Q sorts, particularly those about TIKKO and MKP, are those with mixed loadings, indicating that these two terrorist organizations are likely to be perceived as a combination of Factor A and Factor E. In other words, these organizations significantly associate with both ethno-separatist PKK and communist terrorist organizations and are likely to bear characteristics of both Factor A and Factor E.

A review of the composite Q sort reveals the underlying characteristics of the factor. Figure 3 illustrates the composite Q sort for Factor A.

| Most uncharacteristic |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Most characteristic |
|-----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|-----------------------|
| -5                    | 24| 1 | 9 | 16| 2 | 3 | 10| 4 | 14| 19| 13 |
| -4                    | 26| 20| 17| 22| 6 | 8 | 15| 5 | 40| 37| 27 |
| -3                    | 59| 35| 21| 30| 7 | 12| 18| 11| 42| 43| 75 |
| -2                    | 36| 29| 34| 28| 31| 25| 23| 44| 69|  |    |
| -1                    | 45| 54| 60| 39| 33| 41| 32| 48| 73|  |    |
| 0                     | 55| 66| 51| 49| 53| 38| 50|  |   |  |    |
| +1                    | 56| 70| 57| 52| 76| 46| 67|  |   |  |    |
| +2                    | 71| 64| 58| 77| 47|  |   |  |   |   |    |
| +3                    | 74| 72| 61| 78| 65|  |   |  |   |   |    |
| +4                    | 79| 62| 80|  |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |
| +5                    | 63| 68|  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |    |

**Figure 3  Composite Q sort for Factor A, N = 80 characteristics.**

The statements placed under +5, +4 and +3 and those statements scored -5, -4 and -3 reflect what is most characteristic and most uncharacteristic of the terrorist organization of Factor A. Hence, these statements strongly reflect the participants’ view of the terrorist organization.
The participants comprising Factor A agree with the following statements as “most characteristic” (+5):

13. Rural area activities are primary.
27. The majority of members come from a specific geographical origin and local culture.
75. The organization aims to defeat security forces through the waging of guerrilla warfare.

The statements scored +4 are:

19. Questioning decisions of the leadership is not possible within the organization.
37. Decisions are made at the top of the organization and performed in a hierarchical structure.
43. The organization carries out bombings in cities.
69. The organization commits suicide attacks.
73. Members of the organization have received military training in camps located in foreign countries.

The participants think that the strategy and recruitment source of the ethno-separatist terrorist organization are the most important characteristics in terms of defining the organization, and since the defining Q sorts of Factor A are connected to PKK, this section will focus mainly on PKK. Recruiting members from a specific geographic origin and local culture, PKK embraces a strategy that aims to defeat security forces through waging guerrilla warfare. Following this strategy, PKK gives priority to rural areas. The literature review has indicated that these rural areas are primarily located in the southeastern region of Turkey, and the recruitment source is primarily Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnic origin (e.g., Barkey, 2007; Durna & Hancerli, 2007; Mango, 2005).
The participants also strongly emphasize, in the +4 statements, that PKK applies not only rural guerrilla tactics, but also urban terrorism tactics through carrying out bombings in cities. Suicide bombings are particularly important within PKK’s urban terrorism tactics. Attack forces receive military training in camps located in foreign countries to perform these tactics and carry out attacks in a hierarchical structure in which decisions are made at the top of the organization. Questioning of these decisions is not possible within the organization because of its authoritarian character.

The literature review has indicated that PKK has carried out 16 suicide bombings in Turkey between 1996 and 2007 (Nikbay et al., 2007). The organization had rear bases, which were also used as military training camps, in various foreign countries, but currently has its most important camps in Northern Iraq where attack forces are trained for both rural and urban operations. The leader of the organization, who is now in prison, has a significant influence on and unquestionable authority in the organization (Barkey, 2007; Mango, 2005). Likewise, decisions of the leaderships, such as where and how to attack, cannot be questioned by members who are supposed to carry out these attacks.

The statements scored -5 (“most uncharacteristic” of the terrorist organization) in the factor are as follows:

24. The organization avoids targeting police.

26. The organization wants to establish a state regime based on religious principles.

59. Female members are unlikely to operate in attack forces.

The statements scored -4 are:

1. The organization’s leadership and other organs under its command are
elected by members within the frame of democratic principles.

20. The organization is unlikely to have a connection with political parties in the democratic system.

35. The organization asserts that it acts for the sake of protecting the state, the regime, or the social order.

36. Police or army officials join the organization because of their discomfort with the present system or on-going affairs in the country.

45. The organization has difficulty financing its actions.

The participants strongly reject (-5) the ideas that PKK is primarily an organization of men and avoids attacking police. It is a fact that PKK has women militants in its guerrilla-type attack forces that operate particularly in rural areas where military targets are more available. On the other hand, the organization favors attacking police in urban areas.

The participants equally reject the idea that PKK wants to establish a state regime based on religious principles. PKK is ideologically against religion and tradition. This is compatible with the worldview of PKK’s Marxist ideology: The concept of religion is seen as like a narcotic that is instrumentally used to manipulate and control people by power holders pursuing their own interests. Breaking the religious and traditional ties of its members, for example, PKK has been able to recruit female members from among Kurdish people who are known to be religious and traditional.

Additionally, the participants strongly emphasize the authoritarian nature of PKK by rejecting, at the negative side of the scale (-4), the idea that leadership and other organs under its command are elected by members within the frame of democratic principles. Rather it is believed that these apparent leaders, whether in the middle rank or
top chain of command, are appointed to such positions by the imprisoned but still strong leader of the organization.

The participants equally reject the idea that PKK wants to protect the Turkish state, the regime, or the social order, and thus point out the revolutionary nature of the organization, which is against conservatism. In this sense, it is understandable why the participants think that police and army officials, who tend to be conservative (and want to protect the state, regime, and social order) are unlikely to join PKK.

The participants strongly emphasize that PKK has a connection with a political party in the democratic system, that is, the Democratic Society Party-DTP (at the time of the survey), which is considered to be the successor of previous political parties, like DEHAP and HADEP, that were already banned by the Turkey’s Constitutional Court. Such suspected connection has recently led DTP, like these previous political parties, to be banned by the Court also, in December 2009.

Finally, the participants strongly reject the idea that the organization has a financial problem. PKK has been funded through donations by PKK’s legal and illegal sub-organizations, particularly in Western Europe (Barkey, 2007; Uslu & Aytac, 2007), in addition to criminal activities, such as drug trafficking (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006; Pek & Ekici, 2007). Furthermore, one of the participants, in personal communications, stated that PKK has gained substantial income from extorting money under the guise of taxation, especially of Kurdish businessmen abroad, as well as extortion under the veil of tariffs from smugglers (of goods such as fuel, electronics, and weapons) along Turkey’s borders with Iraq and Iran.
The participants scored the following statements +3:

14. The organization attacks to force its real target, which is generally not available as a direct victim of violent action (e.g., the state, the army, and the public), to be responsive to its demands and to comply with the organization.

40. The purpose of the organization’s actions is to call attention to its existence and principles at the international, national, or local levels.

42. The organization attacks military personnel and their installations.

44. The organization wants to found a new state by saving an ethnic group, which is thought to be represented by the organization.

48. Martyrdom, or being killed for the sake of the movement, is the most respected issue among members.

50. The organization receives a significant degree of support (e.g., political and economic) from its large number of sympathizers abroad.

67. The organization commits actions aimed at damaging the economy.

The participants emphasize two objectives of the organization: advertisement and compliance. PKK seeks publicity and wants to call attention to the cause of the organization. The organization seeks compliance of the psychological target with the organization’s demand, such as forcing people to support the organization, or forcing the government to release the leader of the organization from prison or to negotiate with the prisoner on certain issues, and so on.

The participants scored the ideology of the organization, separatism, at +3, which, although weaker than +4 and +5, indicates that ideology is still significant. The reason may be that PKK now places less emphasis on separatism than ever before. PKK originally aimed to found a Kurdish state separating territories and ethnic Kurds from Turkey. However, there has been a change in the discourse of PKK in terms of its stated
goals, which is thought to be a strategic move. Nowadays, the Factor A participants, in their personal communications, state that cultural rights and the cultural unity of the Kurdish people, not only in Turkey, but also in neighboring countries, are largely emphasized by the leader of the organization.

The participants emphasize the organization’s large group of sympathizers abroad. These sympathizers, economically and politically, support PKK, e.g., by collecting donations and organizing mass demonstrations against Turkey for the sake of PKK causes. In addition, these sympathizers also constitute an important source of recruitment for the organization.

The participants agree that other characteristics of the organization are acts that aim to damage the economy of Turkey, attacks against Turkish military personnel and their installations, and the concept of martyrdom that is emphasized among members of the organization, perhaps among candidates for suicide bombers.

The participants scored the following statements -3:

9. Exit from the organization is easy and does not pose a serious threat to the individual who wants to disengage.

17. The organization advocates that states are unnecessary; instead, that publics can administer themselves with volunteer structures.

21. The organization is unlikely to recruit members primarily from the personal followers of an admired and charismatic leader who controls the organization.

29. The organization has infiltrated major government organizations and bureaucracies.

54. The organization has difficulty surviving because it has not gained enough public support.
55. The organization targets properties or installations rather than people.

56. The organization generally uses homemade weapons with simply available materials.

The participants reject the idea that the organization embraces an anarchist ideology in which states are seen as unnecessary. Rather, the organization wants to found a new state and government authority.

The participants agree that the organization has a leader who is seen as charismatic and who controls the organization. The charismatic leader also helps the organization attract people for the cause of the organization and to recruit new members. The organization has enough public support to survive. However, exiting the organization is not easy for members who decide to disengage from terrorism. These individuals’ lives are threatened by the organization.

The participants reject the idea that the organization has infiltrated major government organizations and bureaucracies. Even though PKK may have an influence over local levels of governance, such as municipalities in the southeastern region of Turkey, participants think that the central government and its bureaucracy are out of reach of the organization, in terms of its external relations.

Finally, the participants reject the view that the organization uses homemade weapons with simply available materials and targets properties or installations rather than people. Rather, the organization’s weaponry choice largely involves commercial weapons, such as machine guns and military-type explosives and mines, which have been used to kill rather than to damage property. The history of thousands of dead people associated with PKK terrorism since 1984 perhaps led the participants to rank statement
55 as -3. Death along with destruction that has been observed in a typical PKK attack may also have caused the participants to think that PKK primarily kills.

**Factor B: Provocative Religious**

Six out of 61 Q sorts, those related to the provocative religious terrorist organization (IBDA/C), have defined Factor B. Table 5 shows that Q sorts loading significantly and highest on Factor B are pure representatives of the factor as these Q sorts do not have a significant correlation with any of the other factors. Q sorts other than those connected to the IBDA/C terrorist organization are not significantly associated with Factor B either, except in the case of MKP1. MKP1 is a Q sort about a communist terrorist organization called MKP and is negatively associated with Factor B. (This means that some traits of MKP are opposite in valence in comparison to the traits that will be mentioned in the description of Factor B.) Since Factor B is all about the IBDA/C terrorist organization, the interpretation of the factor also reveals the characteristics of IBDA/C.

**Table 5  Factor loadings in Factor B**

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Code = participant code number

___ = defining factor loadings to two decimal points
A review of the composite Q sort for Factor B reveals the underlying characteristics of the factor. Figure 4 illustrates the composite Q sort.

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**Figure 4 Composite Q sort for Factor B, N = 80 characteristics.**

The statements scored +5 by the participants of Factor B are:

25. The organization makes use of propaganda of deeds by accepting its violent actions publicly or leaving its “signature” at incident scenes.

26. The organization wants to establish a state regime based on religious principles.

46. Cells of the organization or sub-committees in cities can make decisions to attack and execute on their own and without resorting to the central leadership’s approval.

The statements scored +4 are:

40. The purpose of the organization’s actions is to call attention to its existence and principles at the international, national, or local levels.

43. The organization carries out bombings in cities.
45. The organization has difficulty financing its actions.

54. The organization has difficulty surviving because it has not gained enough public support.

56. The organization generally uses homemade weapons with simply available materials.

The participants strongly emphasize that the organization, IBDA/C, is a religiously inspired terrorist organization. IBDA/C wants a state regime based on religious principles and owns sporadic cells that can independently act. Each cell acts on its own, based on principles of the organization and sometimes against predetermined targets that have been declared by the leadership through IBDA/C’s own media instruments. Members of a cell can decide when, where, with whom, and how to attack without resorting to a central leadership’s approval.

The participants also strongly maintain that IBDA/C claims credit for its terrorist acts. This characteristic is particularly important for the participants (police investigators), perhaps, because IBDA/C claims responsibility even for those attacks that the organization did not carry out, like the attack of AQT’s Istanbul bombings in 2003. One of the reasons for such mistaken claiming could be that the leaders of the organization have been unlikely to know whether and which cell or cells of the organization have begun to operate because of lack of control.

The participants agree by the rank of +4 that the objective of the organization’s attacks is to gain publicity. For this purpose, the organization carries out bombings in cities with simply available, homemade weapons, like pipe bombs. The relatively poor weaponry choice of the organization may stem from the financial problems of the
organization. The participants maintain that the organization has such a problem.

Furthermore, financial problems may be related to the lack of enough public support for the organization. IBDA/C does not have enough public support and thus can barely survive.

On the negative side of the scale, the statements scored -5 by the participants of Factor B are:

8. The organization wants to establish a regime based on a single race and a homogeneous social structure in which attachment and loyalty to the state are considered to be fundamental.

13. Rural area activities are primary.

37. Decisions are made at the top of the organization and performed in a hierarchical structure.

The statements scored -4 are:

1. The organization’s leadership and other organs under its command are elected by members within the frame of democratic principles.

36. Police or army officials join the organization because of their discomfort with the present system or on-going affairs in the country.

38. The organization enjoys facilities and direct support (i.e., arms, training, safe haven camps, and technical support) provided by foreign states.

73. Members of the organization have received military training in camps located in foreign countries.

75. The organization aims to defeat security forces through the waging of guerrilla warfare.

The participants strongly reject the ideology of fascism and a hierarchical organizational structure, which are most uncharacteristic of the organization. Thus the participants reinforced their agreement about the ideology and organizational structure of
IBDA/C that have been already mentioned in the positive side of the scale. Furthermore, strongly rejecting the idea that the organization primarily operates in rural areas, the participants emphasize that IBDA/C primarily operates in urban areas.

With the statements ranked -4, the participants strongly disagree that the leadership and organs under its command are elected by members. It is the fact that the members of IBDA/C have an admired, natural leader who can hardly be replaced, even though he has been in prison. Military and police professionals, the participants maintain, are unlikely to be members of the organization.

The participants agree that IBDA/C is unlikely to be supported by foreign states or enjoy facilities and military training camps in foreign countries. Hence the organization is unlikely to wage guerrilla warfare with the aim of defeating security forces.

On the positive side of the scale, the statements scored +3 by the participants of Factor B are:

9. Exit from the organization is easy and does not pose a serious threat to the individual who wants to disengage.

23. The objective of the organization’s actions is to baffle its real target (e.g., the state, the army, and the public) and force it to react in a desired direction by increasing anxiety in society at large and disrupting everyday life.

28. The existence of members’ feelings of hate and rancor against the outside world is a distinct characteristic.

41. The organization seeks to provoke a response of its real target (e.g., the state, the army, and the public) in a demanded direction.

55. The organization targets properties or installations rather than people.
58. The organization cooperates with similar-minded groups.

64. The organization relies to a large extent on the media and other instruments of mass communication for its purposes.

The participants have identified two objectives, provocation and disorientation, as significant characteristics of the organization. IBDA/C aims to provoke its psychological target as well as to baffle and force it in order to obtain a reaction from the psychological target in a demanded direction.

IBDA/C relies, to a large extent, on its media instruments to pursue its goals. In fact, IBDA/C’s media instruments, such as printed periodicals, keep the organization alive in terms of providing the base for the propaganda and communication that independent cells need. Thus these cells, the participants state in personal communications, know what the leadership wants them to do and they receive guidance, for instance, about how to produce homemade weapons.

The organization tends to target properties and installations rather than people and to act in coalitions with similar-minded groups. In addition, members of the organization have feelings of hate and rancor against the outside world that is beyond the organization and its members. On the other hand, exiting from the organization to this outside world does not pose a serious threat to the lives of the members who want to disengage from terrorism.

On the negative side of the scale, the statements scored -3 are:

10. Mass casualties are consciously intended. The more destruction caused by an attack the better the result.

11. There are martial wing members who stay in safe houses and cells determined by the organization.
42. The organization attacks military personnel and their installations.

50. The organization receives a significant degree of support (e.g., political and economic) from its large number of sympathizers abroad.

51. The organization is unlikely to attack citizens from religious minority-communities.

62. Members of attack forces are well trained in terms of tactical skills and capabilities.

69. The organization commits suicide attacks.

The participants agree that the organization is unlikely to have a large number of sympathizers supporting it abroad. The lack of such support along with the little domestic support perhaps strongly influence the capabilities of the organization as well as its recruitment pool.

Members are unlikely to be highly skilled in terms of tactical operations; hence, they do not attack military installations and personnel. In addition, members do not stay in safe houses and cells isolated from the outside world; rather they may live with their families. Perhaps the organization is unable to maintain full-time terrorists due to the lack of finances.

Thus IBDA/C attacks religious minority communities, like Christian churches and Jewish synagogues, which are relatively easy targets (civilians). Mass casualty attacks in which people are killed indiscriminately are not expected to be perpetrated by IBDA/C. Suicide attacks are not expected either.
**Factor C: Intimidator Religious**

Six out of 61 Q sorts, all of which describe AQT, have defined Factor C. Table 6 shows that all Q sorts about AQT together purely define the composite factor, which is labeled “intimidator religious.” Thus the characteristics of Factor C closely reflect characteristics of AQT.

Table 6 also shows that there are other Q sorts that are significantly associated with Factor C. These are Q sorts about two different communist terrorist organizations, DHKP/C and DK. These Q sorts have not been used to estimate the scores of Factor C as the Q sorts do not have pure factor loadings; i.e., they are loaded significantly on another factor as well.

**Table 6  Factor Loadings in Factor C**

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Code = participant code number
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A review of the composite Q sort for Factor C reveals the underlying characteristics of the factor. Figure 5 illustrates the composite Q sort.
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Figure 5  Composite Q sort for Factor C, N = 80 characteristics.

The statements scored +5 by the participants of Factor C are:

48. Martyrdom, or being killed for the sake of the movement, is the most respected issue among members.

69. The organization commits suicide attacks.

73. Members of the organization have received military training in camps located in foreign countries.

The statements scored +4 are:

25. The organization makes use of propaganda of deeds by accepting its violent actions publicly or leaving its “signature” at incident scenes.

26. The organization wants to establish a state regime based on religious principles.

43. The organization carries out bombings in cities.

65. The loss of people who accidentally stand near the location of a violent action is seen as acceptable collateral damage for the organization, although it is not demanded.

71. Technical skills of the organization’s members are outstanding (e.g.,
designation of bombs, use of computer technology, and use of weapons and tools which require advanced skills). They keep up with technological improvements in the terrorism field.

The participants strongly emphasize that the organization in Factor C receives military training in camps located in foreign countries (e.g., Afghanistan and Pakistan) and learn terrorism tactics. Thus AQT members have gained outstanding technical skills, such as designations of bombs and use of weapons and technology. In return, these members conduct bombings and martyrdom operations, such as suicide attacks, in which the accidental killing of innocent people standing nearby is seen as acceptable collateral damage.

Martyrdom is an important concept for AQT members, emanating from their belief. Their organization aims at establishing a religious state regime and for this purpose makes uses of propaganda of deeds. In this regard, AQT claims responsibility for its terrorist attacks.

On the negative side of the scale, the statements scored -5 by the participants of Factor C are:

7. The organization pays little attention to counter-intelligence techniques in terms of documentation and clandestine acts.

15. The organization avoids attacking establishments of Western countries, i.e., businesses, diplomatic bodies, and international institutions.

51. The organization is unlikely to attack citizens from religious minority-communities.

The statements scored -4 are:

8. The organization wants to establish a regime based on a single race and a homogeneous social structure in which attachment and loyalty to the state are considered to be fundamental.
13. Rural area activities are primary.

22. The organization has changed its strategy from violence to non-violent activities and now prefers to stay away from violence at this point.

34. Actions of the organization are planned and performed ineptly.

78. The organization uses non-violent methods including mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, and constitutional politics, e.g., through political parties, human rights movements, and associations, and so on.

The participants place strong emphasis on the transnational as well as offensive nature of the organization. AQT attacks establishments of Western countries, such as businesses, diplomatic bodies, and international institutions. Religious minority communities, such as Jewish and Christian Turkish citizens, are not immune from AQT attacks either. AQT is a persistent and violent terrorist organization that is unlikely to cease violence temporarily or use non-violent methods, such as mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, and constitutional politics.

The ideology of the organization is against fascism or racism. Globally, AQT members see members of Al Qaeda as brothers without distinguishing their races and nationalities. Religion provides the base that unites them.

AQT has higher capabilities. The participants strongly agree that the organization knows how to avoid police surveillance and how to engage in clandestine acts and documentation. In addition, AQT attacks are unlikely to be ineptly planned or performed.

Finally, AQT is an urban terrorist organization. The organization primarily operates in cities rather than rural areas and so is unlikely to perform guerrilla operations.

The statements scored +3 by the participants for Factor C are:
2. The organization attacks foreigners.

10. Mass casualties are consciously intended. The more destruction caused by an attack the better the result.

28. The existence of members’ feelings of hate and rancor against the outside world is a distinct characteristic.

38. The organization enjoys facilities and direct support (i.e., arms, training, safe haven camps, and technical support) provided by foreign states.

40. The purpose of the organization’s actions is to call attention to its existence and principles at the international, national, or local levels.

52. The organization commits actions that require detailed intelligence work, planning, and coordination.

62. Members of attack forces are well trained in terms of tactical skills and capabilities.

The participants emphasize that AQT indiscriminately attacks with the intention of causing mass casualties. Perhaps indiscriminate attacks led participants to believe that members of the organization have feelings of hate and rancor against the world outside of the organization.

The participants re-emphasize AQT’s capabilities. The organization has the capacity to commit sophisticated actions that require detailed intelligence work, planning, and coordination. As such, members are well trained in terms of tactical skills to perform such sophisticated attacks.

In addition, the participants agree that AQT enjoys facilities and direct support provided by foreign states. Likewise, foreigners, such as citizens of Western countries, are significant targets of the organization.

On the negative side of the scale, the statements scored -3 by the participants are:
3. The organization commits violence against its own members and sympathizers.

24. The organization avoids targeting police.

29. The organization has infiltrated major government organizations and bureaucracies.

44. The organization wants to found a new state by saving an ethnic group, which is thought to be represented by the organization.

61. The organization wants to overthrow the established order, asserting that there is a continuous conflict between the bourgeoisie and the workers, and that the state puts pressure on the public in order to protect the privileges of the bourgeoisie.

66. The organization commits series of acts in such a way that international or public opinion can tolerate them and the government does not strongly react to them.

75. The organization aims to defeat security forces through the waging of guerrilla warfare.

The participants reject the ideologies of separatism and communism for the organization. AQT believes that the believers of the religion should not be separated and that communism is against any religion. Therefore, AQT is anti-communist and anti-separatist. The organization, referencing religion, does not care whether an attack would be found tolerable by “others.” Perhaps members of the organization think that they should be accountable only to God rather than to people or states.

AQT does not involve guerrilla warfare against security forces, nor does it attack its own members and sympathizers. However, AQT does attack police. Finally, participants believe that AQT has not infiltrated major government organizations or bureaucracies so far.
**Factor D: Self-Conscious Religious**

Five out of 61 Q sorts, which describe Hizbullah (HZB), have defined Factor D. Table 7 shows that the 5 Q sorts together define the pure composite factor, which is named “self-conscious religious.” Although a sixth Q sort, HZB3, significantly loaded on Factor D, the Q sort has not been used to define this factor since it is also significantly associated with Factor E. Nevertheless, the table indicates that only the HZB terrorist organization is represented in Factor D and the 6 Q sorts about HZB have loaded highest on this factor. Therefore, the characteristics of Factor D are also HZB’s characteristics.

**Table 7 Factor loadings in Factor D**

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Code = participant code number
___ = defining factor loadings to two decimal points

A review of the composite Q sort for Factor D reveals the underlying characteristics of this factor. Figure 6 illustrates the composite Q sort.

The statements scored +5 by the participants of Factor D are:

22. The organization has changed its strategy from violence to non-violent activities and now prefers to stay away from violence at this point.

26. The organization wants to establish a state regime based on religious principles.

27. The majority of members come from a specific geographical origin and local culture.
The statements scored +4 are:

16. The organization collects intelligence not only about the targets of its attacks, but also about larger populations of individuals and institutions, like the way intelligence agencies collect information.

19. Questioning decisions of the leadership is not possible within the organization.

37. Decisions are made at the top of the organization and performed in a hierarchical structure.

39. The structure of the organization provides full confidentiality regarding illegal activities. Members cannot know operational details of the organization other than as required by necessity.

52. The organization commits actions that require detailed intelligence work, planning, and coordination.

The participants strongly emphasize that HZB has a religious political agenda and that its members largely originate from a specific geographical area and local culture, that is, Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish ethnic origin from the east and southeastern regions. The participants equally underline the fact that HZB has been currently disengaged from

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Figure 6  Composite Q sort for Factor D, $N = 80$ characteristics.
terrorism acts. The participants, in personal communication, stated that there has not been any terrorism incident associated with HZB since its last terrorism act in October 2001 and that HZB leaders decided to disengage from terrorism in 2003.

The participants also agree that HZB is a hierarchical organization in which the leadership has unquestionable authority. In addition, the structure of the organization provides full confidentiality for its activities.

HZB has conducted sophisticated terrorism acts that have required detailed intelligence work, planning, and coordination, and this shows that the organization has high capabilities. Perhaps its capabilities can be partly explained with respect to HZB’s intelligence gathering capacity. The organization has gathered information about larger populations and institutions of the society, and its intelligence efforts have not been limited to the target of the attacks that they have planned to perpetrate.

The statements on the negative side of the scale, ranked -5 by the participants of Factor D, are:

7. The organization pays little attention to counter-intelligence techniques in terms of documentation and clandestine acts.

34. Actions of the organization are planned and performed ineptly.

75. The organization aims to defeat security forces through the waging of guerrilla warfare.

The statements ranked -4 by the participants are:

30. The organization conducts hostage takings, such as hijacking of transportation vehicles and involvement in barricade-and-hostage events.

43. The organization carries out bombings in cities.
46. Cells of the organization or sub-committees in cities can make decisions to attack and execute on their own and without resorting to the central leadership's approval.

55. The organization targets properties or installations rather than people.

67. The organization commits actions aimed at damaging the economy.

The participants strongly emphasize the capabilities of the organization. HZB pays attention to counter-intelligence in terms of clandestine acts and documentation, and its attacks are not ineptly planned or performed.

The participants strongly agree that the organization is not likely to wage guerrilla warfare, or commit acts to damage the economy. HZB does not carry out bombings in urban cities, is not involved in barricade-and-hostage incidents, and does not hijack transportation: these are not typical terrorist acts of HZB. It is unlikely that these attacks would be carried out by HZB members on their own initiative as the organization has a central authority. Finally, the participants strongly reject the idea that the organization attacks properties rather than people. Rather, HZB targets to kill rather than simply damaging a property or installation.

The statements scored +3 by the participants of Factor D are:

3. The organization commits violence against its own members and sympathizers.

4. The organization commits assassinations.

18. Recruitment is mainly based on family and close neighborhood relations.

33. The organization selects targets among opponents groups, like an ethnic group, religious sect (from either minority or main society), political party, and groups who have a distinct worldview or political standpoint.
48. Martyrdom, or being killed for the sake of the movement, is the most respected issue among members.

74. Targets are carefully selected considering the justifications of the organization. The belief is that attacks should be carried out in a manner that prevents loss of innocent people.

80. The organization commits kidnappings.

The participants agree that HZB targets its own members and sympathizers, for instance, to punish them for the sake of organizational survival. Kidnappings and assassinations are the hallmark of the terrorist organization. For example, HZB, the participants in personal communications stated, kidnapped its own members who are suspected of being police informers, tortured them during interrogation, and then killed them based on their confessions under torture.

The organization also kills people from opponent groups, like leaders of religious groups or people who simply become known publicly but speak out against the HZB cause. The organization also fought against an opponent terrorist organization, PKK, in the 1990s and lost many of its members in armed conflicts. Thus targets are carefully selected by the HZB leadership based on their justifications.

Martyrdom is an important concept among members of HZB. The concept, the participants in personal communications say, is also used as an important instrument in terms of recruiting new members. HZB organizes group travels to graveyards of the fallen members who lost their lives in armed conflicts with PKK. However recruitments, the participants agree, are usually based on family and close neighborhood relations.

The statements on the negative side of the scale, ranked -3 by the participants, are:

1. The organization’s leadership and other organs under its command are
elected by members within the frame of democratic principles.

10. Mass casualties are consciously intended. The more destruction caused by an attack the better the result.

17. The organization advocates that states are unnecessary; instead, that publics can administer themselves with volunteer structures.

36. Police or army officials join the organization because of their discomfort with the present system or on-going affairs in the country.

42. The organization attacks military personnel and their installations.

61. The organization wants to overthrow the established order, asserting that there is a continuous conflict between the bourgeoisie and the workers, and that the state puts pressure on the public in order to protect the privileges of the bourgeoisie.

68. The organization attacks installations and facilities.

The participants emphasize that HZB is anti-anarchist and anti-communist in its ideology. Unlike anarchism and communism, HZB wants to establish a state order based on religious principles.

HZB is the kind of organization in which democratically sound elections for the leadership are unlikely; there are no police or military officials who join the organization; and attacks are not carried out against the Turkish military personnel or military installations, or any other types of installations and facilities.
**Factor E: Communist**

Seventeen out of all 61 Q sorts of the study have defined Factor E. The 17 Q sorts are all about various terrorist organizations that embrace communist ideology and seek a Marxist revolution in Turkey (see Table 8).

**Table 8  Factor loadings in Factor E**

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Code = participant code number

__ = defining factor loadings to two decimal points

Table 8 shows that 17 of 37 Q sorts about communist terrorist organizations have been used to define the pure composite factor, which is labeled “communist.” However, more than half of the Q sorts (20 of 37) have not been used to estimate the factor scores of Factor E because these Q sorts are also significantly associated with other factors even
though these Q sorts, like the defining Q sorts for Factor E, have loaded highest on Factor E. All Q sorts about MLKP contributed to Factor E and 4 out of 5 TIKB Q sorts defined the factor, while one of them (TIKB5) did not, as the Q sort also significantly loaded on Factor B. Similarly, 2 of 5 Q sorts about DHKP/C defined Factor E, while 3 of them had mixed factor loadings between Factor E and A as well as Factor C; 2 out of 4 Q sorts about TKEP/L defined Factor E while others had associations with Factors A and B; 1 of 5 Q sorts about DK defined Factor E, and all others associated with Factor C; and 1 of 6 Q sorts about TIKKO defined Factor E, and the rest of them associated with Factor A. On the other hand, none of the 6 Q sorts about MKP contributed to the definition of the typical communist terrorist organization (see Table 9).

Hence, the factor loadings indicate that characteristics of DHKP/C associate with those of PKK as well as of AQT, that characteristics of DK associate with those of AQT, and that MKP and TIKKO associate with PKK. Finally, 2 Q sorts about PKK and 1 Q sort about HZB are also associated with Factor E (see Table 8 above).

Nevertheless, loadings of Factor E show that 6 out of 7 communist terrorist organizations with their characteristics, more or less, have contributed to defining the typical communist terrorist organization, through representative Q sorts. In addition, all Q sorts about terrorist organizations that bear a communist ideology have loaded highest in Factor E, except MKP4. Therefore all communist terrorist organizations have a significant association with this factor.
A review of the composite Q sort for Factor E can help to reveal most underlying characteristics of the typical communist terrorist organization. Figure 7 illustrates the composite Q sort.

Table 9 Q sorts about communist terrorist organizations of Factor E.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Defining Q sorts</th>
<th>Non-defining Q sorts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>20.</td>
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<td>MKP5</td>
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</table>

The statements ranked +5 by the defining Q sorts of Factor E are:

39. The structure of the organization provides full confidentiality regarding illegal activities. Members cannot know operational details of the organization other than as required by necessity.

43. The organization carries out bombings in cities.

61. The organization wants to overthrow the established order, asserting that there is a continuous conflict between the bourgeoisie and the workers, and that the state puts pressure on the public in order to protect the privileges of the bourgeoisie.
Figure 7 Composite Q-sort for Factor E, N = 80 characteristics.

The statements ranked +4 are:

11. There are martial wing members who stay in safe houses and cells determined by the organization.

19. Questioning decisions of the leadership is not possible within the organization.

25. The organization makes use of propaganda of deeds by accepting its violent actions publicly or leaving its “signature” at incident scenes.

37. Decisions are made at the top of the organization and performed in a hierarchical structure.

52. The organization commits actions that require detailed intelligence work, planning, and coordination.

The participants strongly emphasize that the typical terrorist organization of Factor E seeks a Marxist revolution and embraces communist ideology. The structure of
the organization provides full confidentiality in regards to its terrorist activities.

Bombings in urban areas constitute the hallmark of the organization.

The participants strongly underline the organizational structure in which decisions are made and performed in hierarchical chains. The leadership at the top of the chain has an unquestionable authority over members of the organization. There are also safe houses and cells structured under the leadership in which martial wing members are isolated from the outside world. The terrorist organization, formed under this type of organizational structure, is able to conduct sophisticated terrorist actions that require detailed intelligence work, planning, and coordination.

The statements on the negative side of the scale, ranked -5 in Factor E, are:

8. The organization wants to establish a regime based on a single race and a homogeneous social structure in which attachment and loyalty to the state are considered to be fundamental.

26. The organization wants to establish a state regime based on religious principles.

36. Police or army officials join the organization because of their discomfort with the present system or on-going affairs in the country.

The statements ranked -4 are:

13. Rural area activities are primary.

34. Actions of the organization are planned and performed ineptly.

35. The organization asserts that it acts for the sake of protecting the state, the regime, or the social order.

59. Female members are unlikely to operate in attack forces.

69. The organization commits suicide attacks.
The participants strongly stress that the communist terrorist organization is anti-fascist, anti-religious, and anti-conservative. Perhaps because of the revolutionary nature of the organization, it is also unlikely to have police and army officials join the organization.

The participants strongly reject the idea that rural area activities are given priority by the organization. Rather, the typical communist terrorist organization mainly operates in urban areas, where workers are available to mobilize for the cause of the organization. Rural area activities, such as establishing rural guerrilla units and mobilizing villagers, may have a secondary importance.

The participants strongly emphasize that the typical organization has high capabilities. It is unlikely that the terrorist organization acts ineptly in planning and performing its attacks. Women operate in attack forces, and thus perhaps the organization increases its capability in terms of planning and execution.

Furthermore, it is unlikely for the typical communist terrorist organization to commit suicide attacks: the participants, in personal communications, stated that among Marxist terrorist organizations only DHKP/C conducted suicide bombing operations, according to police records.

The statements ranked +3 by the defining Q sorts are:

23. The objective of the organization’s actions is to baffle its real target (e.g., the state, the army, and the public) and force it to react in a desired direction by increasing anxiety in society at large and disrupting everyday life.

40. The purpose of the organization’s actions is to call attention to its existence and principles at the international, national, or local levels.
60. The organization commits armed robbery for funding.

62. Members of attack forces are well trained in terms of tactical skills and capabilities.

68. The organization attacks installations and facilities.

74. Targets are carefully selected considering the justifications of the organization. The belief is that attacks should be carried out in a manner that prevents loss of innocent people.

76. The organization carries out attacks to gain support of the targeted population (e.g., similar minded communities).

The participants emphasize the objectives of the organization: disorientation, advertisement, and endorsement. The organization aims to baffle and force its psychological target to react in a demanded direction, seeks publicity, and wants to gain the support of targeted groups.

Perhaps for these purposes, the organization attacks installations and facilities, like government and business institutions. The organization also selects targets of attacks carefully considering the organization’s justifications and carries out these attacks in a way that shows the organization’s caution to avoid loss of innocent lives. Perhaps members’ skill also helps the organization display such a selectivity level in terrorist actions. Members of attack groups are well trained in terms of tactical skills, such as use of weapons and tactics of attack and escape maneuvers.

In addition, the typical communist terrorist organization also conducts armed robberies. Even though robberies are criminal acts, and criminal acts contradict the image that the typical organization tries to project in the public arena, armed robberies frequently become an important financial source for the organization. The justification is
that the organization seizes the money in order to produce a public good, to achieve the revolution.

The statements ranked -3 are:

7. The organization pays little attention to counter-intelligence techniques in terms of documentation and clandestine acts.

10. Mass casualties are consciously intended. The more destruction caused by an attack the better the result.

24. The organization avoids targeting police.

44. The organization wants to found a new state by saving an ethnic group, which is thought to be represented by the organization.

46. Cells of the organization or sub-committees in cities can make decisions to attack and execute on their own and without resorting to the central leadership’s approval.

70. The organization aims to change governmental policies regarding only a particular issue.

75. The organization aims to defeat security forces through the waging of guerrilla warfare.

The participants emphasize the revolutionary goal of the organization. The organization wants to change the existing order and system completely rather than seeking a political change about a single issue. The organization does not want to found a new state separating some part of the country either: it wants to control the whole country. However, the participants maintain that the typical organization is unlikely to
embrace a strategy of revolution aimed at defeating security forces through waging guerrilla warfare\(^4\).

The organization emphasizes central control of the leadership in which security measures are amply taken to protect the organization and its activities from penetration by law enforcement.

Finally, the organization is likely to target police, which are mostly seen as legitimate targets for the typical communist terrorist organization. However, while attacking police or other targets, mass casualties are avoided as much as possible.

**Distinguishing Characteristics of Factors**

So far, the analyses of the composite Q sorts have been made separately in order to examine what is most characteristic and uncharacteristic of each typical terrorist organization. Next, the study compares the types of terrorist organization based on the five factors. Factor scores of distinguishing statements are used to see differences as well as similarities among types of terrorist organizations.

The factor analysis has revealed that 76 out of 80 statements served to distinguish between pairs of factors while only 4 statements did not. These 4 statements are consensus statements among the five factors and represent their similarities (scores to the left are for factors A to E, respectively):

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
2 & 2 & 1 & 2 & 2 \\
\end{array}
\]

\(^5\) The organization aims to stop or annihilate individuals, institutions, and establishments whom it presumes to be

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\(^4\) It is worth noting that Q sorts about communist terrorist organizations that emphasize rural guerrilla activities are either non-defining (i.e., MKP) for this factor or those Q sorts that tend to cluster between two factors, Factor A and E (TIKKO and to some extent DHKP/C).
The organization has infiltrated major government organizations and bureaucracies.

Criminal activities that do not necessarily require violence (such as fraud, drug trafficking, theft, and so on) are frequently used to fund the organization.

Members of the organization come from diverse social origins, such as criminals, students, businessmen, bureaucrats, politicians, and so on.

These statements indicate that Turkish terrorist organizations in general target institutions and people who are seen as direct threats to their existence. In addition, terrorist organizations are considered generally unable to infiltrate major government organizations and bureaucracies. On the other hand, two statements—whether members of terrorist organizations come from diverse social backgrounds and whether they perpetrate criminal activities that do not necessarily require violence—generally are not considered by the participants to be salient characteristics of any of the terrorist organizations.

On the other hand, the distinguishing characteristics of terrorist organizations in each factor can be examined with the statistically significant distinguishing statements (at $p < .01$ and $p < .05$) and their factor scores. However, since almost all of the statements (76 out of 80) are distinguishing, only those significant at $p < .001$ will be examined.

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5 Significant distinguishing statements are identified based on the formula for the standard error of the difference ($SED$) for factor scores: $SED_{X-Y} = \sqrt{SE_X^2 + SE_Y^2}$, where $SE_X$ and $SE_Y$ are the standard errors of factor scores for Factors X and Y. (These formulas are incorporated in the PQMethod software program.) In order to consider a distinguishing statement significant at the .001 level, the difference between the $z$ scores has to exceed $3.29(SED)$ (Brown, 1980, p. 245; Stephenson, 1978).
**Factor A: Ethno-Separatists**

Factor A has five highly differentiating statements. In other words, five characteristics strongly distinguish the typical ethno-separatist terrorist organization from each of the other types, namely, the provocative religious (Factor B), intimidator religious (Factor C), self-conscious religious (Factor D), and communist (Factor E) (scores to the left are for factors A to E, respectively):

3  -2  -3  0  -3  (44)  The organization wants to found a new state by saving an ethnic group, which is thought to be represented by the organization.

5  -5  -4  -1  -4  (13)  Rural area activities are primary.

5  -4  -3  -5  -3  (75)  The organization aims to defeat security forces through the waging of guerrilla warfare.

3  -1  -1  -4  0  (67)  The organization commits actions aimed at damaging the economy.

-4  1  2  2  -1  (20)  The organization is unlikely to have a connection with political parties in the democratic system.

Statement 44 clearly indicates that the typical Factor A organization has a separatist ideology that distinguishes it from the others. While three of the typical terrorist organizations are against separatism, there is not a clear preference (0) for the Factor D (self-conscious religious) terrorist organization.

Statement 13 is highly differentiating (+5) for Factor A, the ethno-separatist type. None of the typical terrorist organizations other than the ethno-separatist gives priority to rural areas. Factor D, the self-conscious religious type, does not indicate a clear preference (-1), but the other factors (B, C, and E) clearly reject giving priority to rural areas. Rather, these types of terrorist organizations may be more active in urban areas.
Statement 75, in association with statement 13, displays clearly that none of the typical terrorist organizations, except the ethno-separatist type, aims to defeat security forces by means of guerrilla warfare.

The scores of statement 67 show that Factor A (ethno-separatist) is highly differentiated with its preference (+3) for acts aimed at damaging the economy while Factor D (self-conscious religious) is unfavorable to these kinds of attacks (-4). Factors B, C, and E, on the other hand, do not display a predisposition.

Finally, statement 20 clearly indicates that the ethno-separatist terrorist organization has a connection with political parties in the democratic system while the Factor C and D terrorist organizations do not have such apparent relations. The scores of Factor B and E, on the other hand, do not present a clear preference (+1 and -1, respectively).

**Factor B: Provocative Religious**

Factor B has many (12) highly differentiating statements (scores to the left are for factors A to E, respectively):

- **4 -5 0 4 4 (37)** Decisions are made at the top of the organization and performed in a hierarchical structure.
- **2 5 -1 -4 -3 (46)** Cells of the organization or sub-committees in cities can make decisions to attack and execute on their own and without resorting to the central leadership’s approval.
- **2 -3 1 2 4 (11)** There are martial wing members who stay in safe houses and cells determined by the organization.
- **-3 3 -1 -2 -2 (9)** Exit from the organization is easy and does not pose a serious threat to the individual who wants to disengage.
- **-4 4 -2 0 1 (45)** The organization has difficulty financing its actions.
The organization generally uses homemade weapons with simply available materials.

Actions of the organization are planned and performed ineptly.

Members of attack forces are well trained in terms of tactical skills and capabilities.

Members of the organization have received military training in camps located in foreign countries.

The organization enjoys facilities and direct support (i.e., arms, training, safe haven camps, and technical support) provided by foreign states.

The organization has difficulty surviving because it has not gained enough public support.

The organization has changed its strategy from violence to non-violent activities and now prefers to stay away from violence at this point.

Statements 11, 37, and 46 reveal the organizational nature of the provocative religious terrorist organization of Factor B, which, unlike other typical terrorist organizations, does not have safe house structures in which members are isolated from the outside world (statement 11, -3). It is not a hierarchical organization in which decisions are made at the top of the leadership (no. 37, -5) either. Rather, there are independent groups who can decide and act on the basis of their own decisions (no. 46, +5). In addition, members of these groups can leave their groups; i.e., exit from the provocative religious terrorist organization, unlike other organizations, is easy for those who want to disengage from terrorism (statement 9).
Statements 34, 45, 56, and 62 are also highly distinguishing for Factor B and shed light on the low-profile capabilities of the provocative religious terrorist organization. Unlike other typical terrorist organizations, there is a clear indication of the existence of financial problems (statement 45, +4) as well as of the organization’s weaponry arsenal, which mainly consist of homemade weapons (no. 56, +4). The typical organization has problems in terms of members’ tactical skills as well. Members are not tactically well-trained (no. 62, -3) and display poor performance (no. 34, +2).

Statements 38, 54, and 73 provide indicators of the external relations of the terrorist organization that draw a relatively low profile for Factor B as well. There is a clear indication that the provocative religious terrorist organization is unlikely to have relations with foreign states (statement 38, -4). The organization receives neither support of foreign states nor is it able to use camps in foreign countries for military training (no. 73, -4). In addition, the lack of public support is highly distinguishing (no. 54, +4) for the organization even though there is another type of terrorist organization (Factor E) that suffers from the same problem to a relatively lesser degree (+2).

Finally, it is highly distinguishing that the typical provocative religious terrorist organization does not display a clear preference (+1) about a radical change toward embracing non-violent activities while other types do display such predispositions (statement 22). The continuous inactivity of the organization that has been observed in recent years, probably, does not enable the participants to make such inferences.
**Factor C: Intimidator Religious**

Factor C has four highly differentiating statements (scores to the left are for Factors A to E, respectively):

1. **The organization avoids attacking establishments of Western countries, i.e., businesses, diplomatic bodies, and international institutions.**
   - Score: 1 -1 -5 1 -2 (15)

2. **The organization uses non-violent methods including mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, and constitutional politics, e.g., through political parties, human rights movements, and associations, and so on.**
   - Score: 1 0 -4 2 1 (78)

3. **Decisions are made at the top of the organization and performed in a hierarchical structure.**
   - Score: 4 -5 0 4 4 (37)

Statement 15 is highly distinguishing for the Factor C organization (intimidator religious). Attacking establishments of Western countries is the hallmark of the organization even though another typical terrorist organization (Factor E) has such a predisposition as well.

The scores for statement 78 clearly indicate that the typical intimidator religious terrorist organization rejects using non-violent methods while other typical organizations either have such a predisposition or do not have a clear indication of such predispositions.

Finally, unlike other typical terrorist organizations, the intimidator religious terrorist organization of Factor C does not provide a clear indication of whether it has a hierarchical organizational structure. Statement 37 indicates that other terrorist organizations are hierarchical (+4) except in the case of Factor B (-5).
Factor D: Self-Conscious Religious

Factor D has eight highly differentiating statements (scores to the left are for Factors A to E, respectively):

-2 1 -4 5 -2 (22) The organization has changed its strategy from violence to non-violent activities and now prefers to stay away from violence at this point.

0 0 2 -2 -1 (31) The organization aims to conduct large scale and high-level violence within short time periods.

4 4 4 -4 5 (43) The organization carries out bombings in cities.

0 0 1 -3 3 (68) The organization attacks installations and facilities.

0 -2 -3 3 -1 (3) The organization commits violence against its own members and sympathizers.

-2 0 1 4 1 (16) The organization collects intelligence not only about the targets of its attacks, but also about larger populations of individuals and institutions, like the way intelligence agencies collect information.

The scores of the Factor D (self-conscious religious) terrorist organization, unlike those of other terrorist organizations, clearly highlights (+5) that the organization stays away from violence at this point (statement 22). While the rest of the typical terrorist organizations are unlikely to disavow violence, there is not a clear indicator of such a preference for the Factor B organization. Likewise, conducting large-scale and high-level violence cannot be a strategy embraced by the self-conscious religious organization (statement 31). On the other hand, statement 31 does not support inferences for other types of terrorist organizations.

Statements 43 and 68 are about techniques of terrorist organizations and are highly differentiating for the Factor D organization. The organization, unlike other
terrorist organizations, is unfavorable to carrying out bombings in cities (no. 43, -4) as well as attacks on installations and facilities (no. 68, -3). (This pattern is also true for the period of time when the organization was most actively engaged in terrorism.) All other types of terrorist organizations favored bombings in cities, but do not display a clear preference for attacks on installations, except in the case of Factor E.

Statement 3 is about a target type, i.e., terrorist organizations’ own members. The self-conscious religious terrorist organization, unlike other terrorist organizations, is favorable (+3) to this kind of target. Factors B and C terrorist organizations are unfavorable toward targeting their own members, while scores for Factors A and E do not clearly identify a preference.

Finally, the ability of intelligence gathering is the hallmark of the Factor D terrorist organization. Statement 16 shows that the organization collects information about larger populations of individuals as well as institutions. Other terrorist organizations do not have a clear preference for or against this kind of activity, except the Factor A terrorist organization, which is unfavorable (-2) to this type of intelligence gathering.

**Factor E: Communist**

Lastly, Factor E has three highly differentiating statements:

\[ 0 \quad -2 \quad -3 \quad -3 \quad 5 \quad (61) \]

The organization wants to overthrow the established order, asserting that there is a continuous conflict between the bourgeoisie and the workers, and that the state puts pressure on the public in order to protect the privileges of the bourgeoisie.
The organization attacks installations and facilities. 

O 0 1 -3 3 (68)

The organization has difficulty surviving because it has not gained enough public support.

-3 4 -2 -1 2 (54)

The typical communist terrorist organization of Factor E displays a highly differentiating statement about its ideology. Other typical terrorist organizations are unfavorable to the Marxist ideology while the score of Factor A does not indicate a clear meaning for the ethno-separatist terrorist organization. The ethno-separatist type of terrorist organization used to seek a Marxist revolution during an earlier time of the organization, but today whether the organization embraces such an ideology is unclear.

Statement 68 is highly differentiating for the typical communist terrorist organization. It is favorable to attacking installations and facilities (+3) while the self-conscious religious is not (-3) and others do not have a strong predisposition one way or the other.

Finally, it is highly differentiating for the organizations that it does not have strong public support (statement 54, +2). However, it can be inferred that the typical communist terrorist organization could survive with this problem while the lack of public support might be at a critical juncture for Factor B (+4).

**Typological Summary**

A typology has been created in this study based on categories disclosed by the factor analysis and with the help of the major themes and sub-themes of the framework of this study. The framework provided the universal characteristics of terrorist organizations, and the examination of the factor scores has facilitated discovery of the
characteristics of each category of terrorist organizations in Turkey. The discovery of the relationship between characteristics and categories of terrorist organizations has led to the development of the typology in Table 10, which displays the most characteristic and uncharacteristic traits of terrorist organizations in Turkey.

Table 10 has been created through examining characteristic and uncharacteristic traits of the typical terrorist organizations, based on the factor scores of a magnitude ±2 and greater, for each of the five composite Q sorts. The table shows that the typology presented in this table identifies, to a large extent, the variance among categorical characteristics of terrorist organizations.

Type I

The ethno-separatist terrorist organization bears the ideology of separatism and has an autocratic and hierarchical organizational structure, but also utilizes a decentralized decision-making structure, in order to achieve objectives such as compliance, advertisement, threat elimination, disorientation, and attrition. To achieve its goals and objectives, the organization develops ties with political parties in the democratic system, uses military training camps abroad, and enjoys facilities and support provided by foreign states. In addition, the organization is likely to cooperate with criminal organizations and also receives varied support from its sympathizers both abroad and in Turkey. The organization is unlikely to infiltrate major government organizations and bureaucracies.
Table 6  Types and characteristics of terrorist organizations in Turkey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Type I: Ethno-Separatist</th>
<th>Type II: Provocative Religious</th>
<th>Type III: Intimidator Religious</th>
<th>Type IV: Self-Conscious Religious</th>
<th>Type V: Communist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unlikely: democratic</td>
<td>Unlikely: hierarchical/ democratic/safe house</td>
<td>Unlikely: decentralized</td>
<td>Unlikely: decentralized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External relations</td>
<td>Likely: political party/ abroad camps/ abroad sympathizers/ foreign state/ criminals</td>
<td>Likely: lack of domestic sympathizers/ coalition/</td>
<td>Likely: abroad camps/ foreign state/ abroad sympathizers/</td>
<td>Likely: –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Likely: foreigners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlikely: –
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Type I: Ethno-Separatist</th>
<th>Type II: Provocative Religious</th>
<th>Type III: Intimidator Religious</th>
<th>Type IV: Self-Conscious Religious</th>
<th>Type V: Communist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> rural/guerrilla warfare/damage economy</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> rural/guerrilla warfare/tolerable violence</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> high level violence</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> cease violence/non-violent movements</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> –</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> rural/cease violence/tolerable violence</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> rural/cease violence/tolerable violence/ mass demons, and const. politics/guerrilla warfare</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> guerrilla warfare/damage economy/high level violence</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> rural/guerrilla warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Techniques</strong></td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> bombing/suicide attack/assassination</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> hostage</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> suicide attack/claim/bombing/armed robbery</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> assassination/kidnapping</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> bombing/armed robbery/attack installations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> armed robbery/hostage</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> hostage</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> non-violent methods</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> hostage/taking/attack installations/armed robbery/suicide attack</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> suicide attack/hostage/kidnapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> well-funded</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> homemade weaponry/use of media/ineptness</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> sophisticated act/well-tactical training/high-technical skill</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> large intelligence/sophisticated act/well-tactical training</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> sophisticated act/well-tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> homemade weaponry/high-technical skill/ineptness</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> well-funded/well-tactical training/counter-intelligence</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> lack of counter-intelligence/ineptness</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> lack of counter-intelligence/ineptness</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> lack of counter-intelligence/ineptness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> ethnic/women/charismatic leader</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> –</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> family &amp; neighbor</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> ethnic/family &amp; neighbor</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> former police &amp; army officials</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> former police &amp; army officials</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> former police &amp; army officials</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> former police &amp; army officials</td>
<td><strong>Unlikely:</strong> former police &amp; army officials/div. social origins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitude</strong></td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> martyrdom/less selective violence</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> martydom/less selective violence/hate</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> martyrdom/selective violence/internalization of values</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> martyrdom/selective violence/internalization of values</td>
<td><strong>Likely:</strong> selective violence/martyrdom/internalization of values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unlikely:
- easy exit/
- non-killing/
- selective violence

Unlikely:
- non-selective violence

Unlikely:
- selective violence

Unlikely:
- non-selective violence/
- non-killing/
- easy exit

Unlikely:
- non-selective violence/
- easy exit

Note: *Italicized* characteristics are scored ±2; the remainder are scored ±3 and higher, representing the most characteristic and uncharacteristic traits of each typical terrorist organization.

The organization follows a Maoist strategy in which priority is given to rural area activities and to the waging of guerrilla warfare. The organization also wants to damage the economy of the country. Meanwhile, the organization carries out bombings in urban areas and uses other techniques as well, such as assassinations and suicide attacks, targeting Turkish police and the military. The organization is unlikely to commit armed robberies or engage in hostage-taking incidents. The organization uses conventional weapons and is likely to be well funded.

Members of the ethno-separatist terrorist organization generally come from a geographic (ethnic) origin and local culture and are followers of a charismatic leader who controls the organization. Female members have important roles within the organization: They are likely to operate in attack forces. Former police or military officials are unlikely to join this organization.

 Martyrdom is an important concept among members of the organization. They are less selective in terms of targeting. While they attack certain targets, such as the military and police, people nearby the location of these targets are also likely to die or be wounded because loss of innocent lives is seen as acceptable collateral damage. Finally, exiting from the organization is not easy for members who want to disengage from terrorism.
**Type II**

Terrorist organizations with a religious political agenda have been shown to be functionally divisible into three groups, which are labeled on the basis of their objectives: provocative, intimidator, and self-conscious.

The *provocative religious-type* terrorist organization seeks a regime change based on religious principles and is unlikely to be a hierarchical organization. Rather, the organization has a decentralized organizational structure in which cells, or groups, can make and implement decisions by themselves. The organization is unlikely to structure these groups in safe houses.

The provocative religious terrorist organization has difficulty surviving because it has not gained enough public support. However, it cooperates with similar-minded groups. The objectives of its attacks can be disorientation and advertisement as well as provocation, threat elimination, and attrition. The organization is unlikely to give priority to rural areas or guerrilla warfare. The organization, in planning terrorist acts, is unlikely to calculate others’ opinions, for instance, whether public opinion or the government would consider the forthcoming terrorist act tolerable. Rather, the aim of the act could be provocation of the psychological target.

The provocative religious terrorist organization, to achieve its goals and objectives, conducts bombings in cities and assassinations, but does not favor suicide attacks and hostage takings. The organization generally claims credit for its attacks. The targets of its attacks can be religious minorities or opponent groups, but are unlikely to be military personnel or the organization’s own members. In these operations, the
organization generally uses homemade weapons with simply available materials and uses its own media instruments as a way of communication and propaganda. The organization suffers from ineptness in its operations and has financial problems as well as a lack of skills in terms of counter-intelligence and tactical capabilities.

Members of the provocative religious terrorist organization are unlikely to be former police or military professionals, and females are not involved in carrying out attacks either. Non-selective, indiscriminate attacks are not seen justifiable by members and they are more favorable toward attacks on properties or installations rather than people even though members feel hatred and rancor towards the world outside of the organization. Exit from the organization is unlikely to pose a serious threat to the lives of members while martyrdom is considered sacred among them.

Type III

The intimidator religious terrorist organization wants to establish a religious regime in Turkey and set up an organizational structure in which full confidentiality is emphasized. The organization has ties to foreign states, uses military training camps abroad, and receives a substantial amount of support from sympathizers abroad. The organization does not have difficulty surviving because of a lack of support from domestic sympathizers. It is unlikely that this organization would infiltrate major government organizations and bureaucracies or have ties to a political party.

The intimidator religious terrorist organization, in order to achieve objectives of compliance and advertisement, aims at conducting a high level of violence in a short period of time. The organization is unlikely to change its strategy towards non-violent
methods. The organization also does not consider whether its actions are found to be tolerable by others, like the public and governments. However, it is unlikely for the organization to give priority to rural areas or to wage guerrilla warfare.

The intimidator religious terrorist organization is favorable about conducting suicide attacks, bombing, and armed robbery, and generally claims credit for its attacks. Targets of the attacks can be Western institutions, foreigners, religious minority groups, Turkish police, and the military. The organization is unlikely to attack its own members. Members receive good tactical training and have outstanding technical skills. They can carry out sophisticated terrorist attacks, which require detailed intelligence work, planning, and coordination. Members are recruited from within the pool of family and close neighborhood relations. Former police and military officials are unlikely to join this organization.

Martyrdom is a sacred concept for members of the organization. In addition, they feel hatred and rancor toward the world outside of the organization. Members perform non-selective mass casualty attacks as well as selective attacks in which losses of bystanders and innocent people are seen as acceptable.

Type IV

The self-conscious religious terrorist organization seeks a regime change based on religious principles through being organized around autocratic leadership. It is a hierarchical organization in which decisions are made by top leadership without leaving space for decision making to cells of the organization. Confidentiality is an important
concept and facilitated by use of safe houses and cells. The organization is unlikely to infiltrate major government organizations or to develop ties with a political party.

The organization’s major objective is to eliminate threats in order to achieve the survival of the organization. However, the organization has changed its strategy recently and has ceased violence. The organization is unlikely to engage in guerrilla warfare, damage the economy, or embrace a short-term, high-level violence strategy. The organization, before the change, was favorable to carrying out assassinations and kidnappings. The organization is unlikely to conduct bombings, suicide attacks, hostage taking, attacks on installations, or armed robbery. Targets of the organization’s attacks, if it engages again, could be its own members, opponent groups, and religious minority-communities, but not the military.

The self-conscious religious terrorist organization is capable of conducting sophisticated acts and of gathering intelligence about larger populations of individuals and institutions. The organization is capable of taking measures in terms of counter-intelligence efforts. Attack forces are qualified in terms of tactical skills; ineptness is therefore unlikely in acts of this organization.

Members of the organization come from a specific geographic location and local culture (ethnic origin) and have been recruited based on family and close neighborhood relationships. Former police and army officials are unlikely to join this organization, and females are unlikely to operate in its attack forces. Martyrdom is sacred for members. They internalize the organization’s ethic and moral values so that members do not act contrary to these values. Selective violence is justified by members while non-selective,
indiscriminate attacks are not. However, usually people rather than properties are targeted so that members are likely to kill in terrorist operations. Finally, exit from the organization is not easy.

**Type V**

Lastly, the typical *communist* terrorist organization seeks a Marxist revolution and organizes itself around an autocratic leadership. It is a hierarchical organization in which confidentially and central control in decision making is emphasized. Structuring safe house and cells facilitate this confidentiality and central control. In addition, the organization cooperates with similar-minded groups.

In order to achieve its goals and objectives—such as disorientation, advertisement, endorsement, threat elimination, or attrition—the organization carries out bombings in cities and attacks installations. In addition, the organization conducts armed robberies for funding. It is unfavorable toward waging guerrilla warfare or giving priority to rural area activities. The typical organization is also unfavorable toward conducting suicide bombings, hostage takings, and kidnappings. When the organization commits an act of terrorism, it is likely to claim credit. Targets of the attacks can be Turkish police, the military, other government targets, businesses, and Western institutions, but are unlikely to be foreigners in general. The organization can carry out sophisticated terrorist acts and does not suffer from a lack of counter-intelligence or problems of ineptness. Attack forces are well trained in terms of tactical skills.

Members of the typical communist terrorist organization are unlikely to be former police or army professionals or people who come from diverse social origins. However,
women members are likely to operate in attack forces. Martyrdom is a salient issue among members. They internalize ethical and moral values of the organization. Members are also favorable toward selective violence rather than indiscriminate attacks. Finally, exit from the organization is not easy for members.

In sum, five types of terrorist organizations have emerged with likely and unlikely characteristics, indicating similarities as well as differences among types. The information concerning characteristics as reported in Table 10 helps in understanding favorable as well unfavorable preferences of behaviors related to each category of terrorist organizations and thus provides valuable insights in terms of predicting behaviors.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study has collected data about Turkish LEOs’ perspectives about general characteristics of contemporary active terrorist organizations that have emerged in Turkey. Q methodology has made it possible to obtain the LEOs’ subjective scripts that represent the cultural knowledge accumulated in their organization during its history of struggling against terrorism as well as the discourse of communication within the Turkish National Police. Q factor analysis of LEOs’ perspectives about terrorist organizations has helped to reveal the ways in which terrorist organizations have been conceptualized by the Turkish police.

The factor analysis has revealed functional categories of terrorist organizations and the typology perceived by Turkish LEOs in the process of practicing their professional tasks. The typology is contextual; in other words, the typology has been developed and grounded in the context of time and location. The typology is also functional: It reflects the reality of terrorist organizations as well as Turkish LEOs’ practical applications for dealing with these organizations.

The factor analysis has also revealed a typology of terrorist organizations in Turkey that is partly conventional and partly not. The conventional conceptualization categorizes terrorist organizations in Turkey in three or four groups, such as separatist,
religion, leftist, and rightist. In recent years, rightist terrorism has been less emphasized. The typology that has been revealed in this study, on the other hand, has shown that the conventional typology is somewhat functional; i.e., the conventional categories and the functional ones overlap to some extent. Keeping categories of separatist and leftist (communist), the typology conceptualized by Turkish LEOs has divided the religious terrorist organizations into three categories, which have been labeled provocative, intimidator, and self-conscious.

Thus, based on the data analysis, the typology presented in this study has categorized terrorist organizations into five types, each of which has been labeled in terms of its salient characteristics, such as ideologies and objectives, which do not necessarily reflect all salient characteristic traits of the typical terrorist organizations.

(1) The first type, the *ethno-separatist* terrorist organization, wants to divide the territory of Turkey based on ethnic origins in order to found a new, separate state. The organization seeks objectives of compliance and advertisement.

(2) The second type, the *provocative religious* terrorist organization, aims to establish a religious regime in Turkey. The typical organization conducts sporadic terrorist acts that may sound provocative to some psychological targets.

(3) The third type is the *intimidator religious* terrorist organization. This organization, too, has a religious-political agenda, but it aims at conducting a high level of violence in a short period of time in order to force its psychological target to comply with the organization’s demands as well as to increase its publicity.

(4) The fourth type is the *self-conscious religious* terrorist organization, which seeks a change of regime based on religious principles. However, the organization’s objective is mostly related to survival efforts and elimination of threats to its survival.

(5) The final type is the *communist* terrorist organization, which seeks a Marxist revolution in Turkey. The typical organization aims at achieving the
objectives of advertisement and endorsement as well as disorientation of its psychological target.

Apparently these five types of terrorist organizations refer to non-state actors only.

In light of this functional typology based on the analysis of perspectives of Turkish LEOs, practical as well as theoretical implications can be suggested. In particular, the predictive value of the typology, which relies on numerical assessments for categorical characteristics provided by Q methodology, enables LEAs to bolster their capabilities related to criminal intelligence and the criminal investigation of terrorism. The next section will touch upon the issue of how Q methodology, its data, and the typology presented in this study can be used in this direction. Further research areas will then be addressed in terms of the functional utility of the typology.

**Implications for Police Practices**

The practical implications of this study involve the issues of criminal intelligence analyses and investigations of terrorism incidents as well as developing better police practices against terrorism and terrorist organizations and institutional memory-building efforts of police organizations. This section highlights possible contributions of this study to such police practices and then focuses on a prediction tool that has been developed by the researcher to aid terrorism investigations.

The adaptation of Q methodology to study terrorist organizations (the framework and Q sample statements), the data of Turkish perspectives about terrorist organizations, and the process of the data analysis can, in combination, help to develop better police practices in order to struggle more effectively and efficiently against terrorism in the
Turkish context. The methodology presented in this study as well as its data analysis facilitates the conduct of various kinds of analyses about assessments of terrorist organizations and their activities. Variables that need to be considered in such analyses are embedded in the Q sample statements, and their factor scores (see Appendix H) identify the variation quantitatively.

In terms of criminal intelligence (see Ronczkowski, 2006), the factor scores represent a cultural consensus about the characteristics of terrorist organizations in Turkey and can be used as background information in the Turkish context. This background information, together with active intelligence efforts targeting members of these terrorist organizations, can be used to conduct criminal intelligence analyses that could lead to the capture of these members (Forst, 2009, p. 342). Such analyses can facilitate the capture of terrorists before they are able to conduct their attacks as well as after terrorist incidents occur. In this regard, background organizational information is essential in the prediction of the likely behaviors of terrorists.

In real world counterterrorism situations, terrorism investigators often make predictions about the likely perpetrators of a terrorist incident under investigation. (Perpetrators are thought of as terrorist organizations rather than individuals in these predictions.) This study, based on the data analysis presented previously, suggests a way to make such predictions. The process to be described enables those who are not necessarily terrorism investigators to make such predictions at a basic level. In addition, the set of procedures that has been suggested here can be used as an investigative tool for terrorism investigators.
The more LEAs know about the strengths and weaknesses of terrorist organizations, the more they will be able to contribute to the security of people as well as their national security. For example, LEAs, in order to dismantle a terrorist organization in a short period of time, may be advised to focus and target funding resources of the terrorist organization if it has a weakness in terms of funding. Factor scores can be used to assess such strengths and weaknesses.

Similarly, factor scores and categories of terrorist organizations in this study enable quantitative comparisons among terrorist organizations and facilitate threat analyses on the bases of the intentions and capabilities of terrorist organizations. Threat analyses allow LEAs to allocate their resources, like money and personnel, more wisely and help them determine priorities of counterterrorism (for details of threat analyses, see Cragin & Daly, 2004). In this regard, the type of terrorist organizations that poses a greater threat to national security, or public order, must be given priority in terms of struggling with terrorist organizations.

Factor scores and categories of terrorist organizations also can be used to conduct analyses about attractiveness of targets to specific types of terrorist organizations (for details of such analyses, see Clarke & Newman, 2006; Ekici et al., 2008; Shahar, 2008). Factor scores in this study provide quantitative assessments about what types of terrorist organizations (five categories) engage in what types of terrorism attacks (techniques) against what types of targets as well as capabilities of terrorist organizations (for relevant statements see Table 1 above) and thus enable LEAs to develop target-specific precautionary measures, like target hardening, against possible terrorist attacks.
Furthermore, given the existing link between categories of terrorist organizations and counterterrorism police units in Turkey, it can be argued that allocating different divisions based on categories of terrorist organizations that emerged from the data analysis (e.g., religious, communist, and separatist) may be appropriate in terms of effectiveness if these units want to maintain such divisions. This study is unable to advise establishing a division, or specialization, based on categories of terrorist organizations, but asserts that the specialization can be grounded on the basis of the data analysis if counterterrorism units need such specializations.

In terms of increasing knowledge of LEAs, the study has an important implication for police organizations’ institutional memory-building efforts. LEAs can use this methodology in order to compare and assess terrorist organizations and thus can make use of LEOs’ expertise. Hence, LEAs can increase their learning capacities and memory-building capabilities, which are problematic in many police organizations (see Ozguler, 2008, p. 60). The methodology presented in this study makes it possible to collect cultural data and to make the data communicable for organizational learning and memory-building purposes.

The methodology presented in this study can also be used elsewhere. The methodology, without the data, is like an empty shell. The cultural data (LEOs’ perspectives) facilitates the use of this methodology, and its effectiveness depends on the quality of the data. The methodology can work in other geographical contexts as long as the quality of the data is provided because the methodology has been adapted here based on universal characteristics of terrorist organizations.
A Prediction Tool

This study presents a prediction tool and describes how it can be used for predicting terrorist organizations. A prediction can be performed through either forecasting future terrorist attacks or identifying possible perpetrators of terrorist attacks after they have occurred. Achieving one of these goals can pave the way to achieving the other. This section shows a way to facilitate the second type of prediction.

The prediction process begins with the assessment of a terrorism incident. First, the analyst needs to identify the target type of the attack, type of attack, and level of selectivity of the attack—based on the number and casualties of the attack—as well as the strategic choice of the organization, the capabilities of the perpetrators, and other perpetrator characteristics, such as gender and willingness to die, that can be helpful for prediction.

Second, the analyst looks at corresponding statements presented in this study. Through matching the statements with the characteristics of the incident, the analyst identifies which statements fit the incident characteristics. The association between the incident characteristics and statements helps the analyst identify predictive variables. Table 11 presents a checklist of statements to facilitate identification of possible predictive variables as well as to facilitate subsequent processes. The statements in the table have been transformed for the purpose of prediction, but are given the same statement number from the original Q sample statements.
Third, using Table 11, the analyst gives scores for each type of terrorist organization in relation to statements that have been already identified as predictive variables—and to only these relevant statements, not others. To facilitate the scoring, the analyst utilizes the factor scores arrived at from this study (see Appendix H). Factor scores in the range -1 to +1 are scored 0 as they have unclear or neutral meaning; the rest of the scores are recorded with their positive and negative values.

Fourth, the analyst sums the scores in each column of the Table 11 and these sums provide an indication as to which type of terrorist organization is the likely perpetrator of the terrorist attack. The type of terrorist organizations which receive the highest score can be considered as the first degree suspect while the second highest one becomes the second degree suspect, and so on. Two or more units of difference between scores can be considered a significant difference that differentiates scores from another one.

**Table 71 Prediction tool**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDICTIVE STATEMENTS</th>
<th>TYPES</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TARGET</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2. Foreigners.</td>
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<td>3. Terrorist organization’s own member or sympathizer.</td>
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<td>6. Businessman or corporation.</td>
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<td>15. Establishment of Western countries. [REVERSE SCORE SIGNS]</td>
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<td>24. Police. [REVERSE SCORE SIGNS]</td>
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<td>33. Opponent group.</td>
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<td>42. Military personnel or installation.</td>
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<td>51. Religious minority. [REVERSE SCORE SIGNS]</td>
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<td>77. Government—public official, juridical person, parliamentarian, or high rank politician.</td>
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</table>
# Predictive Statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictive Statements</th>
<th>Types I</th>
<th>Types II</th>
<th>Types III</th>
<th>Types IV</th>
<th>Types V</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Attack</strong></td>
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<td>4. Assassination.</td>
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<td>30. Hostage—hijacking of transportation vehicle or barricade-and-hostage event</td>
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<tr>
<td>43. Bombing in city.</td>
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<td>60. Armed robbery.</td>
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<tr>
<td>68. Attack on installation or facility.</td>
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<tr>
<td>69. Suicide bombing [SCORE +4 FOR DHKP/C]</td>
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<tr>
<td>80. Kidnapping.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>59. Female in attack force. [REVERSE SCORE SIGNS]</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capability</strong></td>
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<td>7. Little attention to counter-intelligence techniques in terms of documentation and</td>
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<td>clandestine acts.</td>
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<td>34. Planned and performed ineptly.</td>
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<td>52. Action that requires a detailed intelligence work, planning, and coordination.</td>
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<td>56. Homemade weapon with simply available materials.</td>
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<td>62. Attack force well trained in terms of tactical skills and capabilities.</td>
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<td>71. Outstanding technical skill.</td>
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<td><strong>Selectivity</strong></td>
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<td>65. Loss of innocent people near by the location of the attack.</td>
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<td>74. Carefully selected target to prevent loss of innocent people.</td>
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<td>55. Targeting a property or installation rather than people.</td>
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<td><strong>Willingness to Die</strong></td>
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<td>48. Demanding martyrdom.</td>
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<td><strong>Strategy</strong></td>
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<td>13. Rural area activity seemingly primary.</td>
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<td>31. Large scale and high-level violence in a short time period.</td>
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<td>75. Defeating security forces through waging guerrilla warfare.</td>
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<td>67. Act to damage the economy.</td>
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<td><strong>Total Score</strong></td>
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<td>Type I = PKK, Type II = IBDA/C, Type III = AQT, Type IV = HZB, and Type V = the typical communist terrorist organization.</td>
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**Notes:**

1. Give the value of 0 if a factor score of a statement is -1 or +1.
2. If the attack is a suicide bombing, create a sixth category for the terrorist organization DHKP/C which receives a score of +4 for statement 69. The rest of the scores for the sixth category will be the same scores as for type V.
The procedures described permit predictions as to type, but they can also be extended to predict specific organizations within types. Further elaboration is particularly important in the case of the Type V terrorist organization as it is a composite of six different terrorist organizations. As is apparent, identification of the individual terrorist organization as a perpetrator of an attack that has occurred requires additional background information, such as political events in the context of time and location, political-events calendars of terrorist organizations that show the meaning of the date of the incident for individual organizations, geographic locations in which terrorist organizations are actively engaged, and other information that might be identified with active criminal intelligence work, and so on. However, this identification process is beyond the concern of this study.

Following the four-step process specified above, predictions have been made of likely perpetrators through examination of randomly selected terrorism cases. The prediction tasks have been performed using (1) Table 11, (2) the factor scores in Appendix H, and (3) the Global Terrorism Database-GTD (2009), which provides information regarding terrorism incidents that have already occurred in Turkey. In this case, that part of the GTD was used that includes terrorist incidents that occurred in Turkey between 1998 and 2007. This segment of the GTD contains 327 observations of which a perpetrator organization was identified in 178 of the attacks (54.4%). Information provided by the GTD includes target types, names of the terrorist organizations as perpetrators, locations of incidents, and narrative summaries of these incidents.
A random sample of 6 cases out of the 327 terrorism incidents was obtained, each case involving a different terrorist organization of the typology. The STATA computer program (StataCorp., 2007) generated sample cases randomly from the GTD. Skipping random cases whose perpetrators are the same terrorist organizations as well as those unknown to the GTD and then picking up the first cases that involve a different terrorist organization, new random samples (each involving 10 cases) were generated until obtaining a randomly selected sample of 6 cases: PKK, IBDA/C, Hizbullah, AQT, DHKP/C, and TIKKO (TKP/ML).

A seventh case was added because the GTD indicates that there is only one case (TIKB) that associates with one of the remaining terrorist organizations.\(^6\)

Ignoring foreknowledge of the perpetrator organization in these seven cases, the four-step process described above was followed, and in each case the sum of scores for each typical terrorist organization successfully indicated the perpetrator’s typical organization. The predictions and their results are displayed in Appendix G. In addition, using the prediction tool, five Turkish police investigators in Turkey have examined the same cases that have been described in Appendix G, without having the information about the actual perpetrators, and these investigators have produced similar predictions.

However, it is worth noting that the typical communist terrorist organization (Type V) in this study is less likely to represent TIKKO, MKP, DK, and DHKP/C than other communist terrorist organizations. Attacks by these four terrorist organizations

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\(^6\) Due to incomplete data, the GTD does not include terrorist attacks involving three terrorist organizations: MLKP, TKEP/L, and DK (Devrimci Karargah). MKP has apparently been involved in only one terrorist activity, but this was reported to be in collaboration with PKK, so that the GTD does not distinguish an MKP attack separately.
seem bloodier than those by other communist terrorist organizations. In addition, DHKP/C is known as the only communist terrorist organization in Turkey that carries out suicide bombings. When a suicide bombing is involved, therefore, DHKP/C should have a higher factor score than that obtained for the typical communist terrorist organization. The typical score for suicide bombings (statement 69) is -4. To assess DHKP/C’s actual score for statement 69, the individual Q sorts about DHKP/C were examined and it was found that the average of the score for DHKP/C was +4. A similar problem occurs when assessing the statement about assassination (statement 4). The participants’ Q sorts indicate that different communist terrorist organizations have different patterns of preferences for assassination, particularly for these four terrorist organizations. Therefore, predictions about these organizations should be performed carefully.

Nevertheless, there is a way to decrease such misjudgments emanating from the representation problem; that is, one can identify all relevant statements that associate with the incident characteristics and thus decrease the impact of problematic statements in the sum of scores. There is more work to be done in terms of identifying problematic statements as well as modifying how to use this tool in more effective ways. Case studies can provide progress in this direction, but this must be the subject of future studies.

Finally, the prediction tool has some other limitations. There have been 11 terrorist organizations for which data have been collected, and these organizations are currently considered the most active terrorist organizations in Turkey. However, there have been other terrorist organizations that can be considered in the less active category (see Aydiner, 2006) in addition to recently identified terrorist organizations of which
LEOs are less familiar. Individual terrorists who do not act within an organization also can exist even though this is not common. The predictive tool can provide only a checklist of characteristics to consider for this category of terrorists, as the factors scores are irrelevant to these terrorists. Hence, the predictive tool can aid in identifying perpetrators’ organizations at the basic level, but requires further elaborations about other possible perpetrators as well.

Identification of terrorist organizations that have perpetrated a recent terrorist act is certainly a process in which “active” intelligence information, forensic evidence, crime scene investigation, and subsequent police interviews as well as background information of terrorist organizations should be evaluated together. The prediction tool can significantly contribute to the identification process, but the process remains incomplete without further elaborations.

Implications for Theoretical Work

The results of the data analysis—namely, factor analysis of the Q sorts and the typology developed on the basis of that analysis—can facilitate theory-building efforts in the field of terrorism studies. The typology has identified characteristics, or variables, that are associated with certain categories of terrorist organizations in Turkey. The relationships among these variables and the categories of terrorist organizations can help researchers develop hypotheses that may lead to the discovery of the nature of these relationships, such as causalities and interactions among variables. Thus, by facilitating hypothesis-building efforts, the typology that has been developed in this study can lead to
new theories or enable other scientists to test theories that already exist. The likely hypotheses built on the basis of the Turkish experience of terrorism are more likely to serve in understanding the behaviors of terrorist organizations in Turkey, but may also involve lessons that will be helpful in understanding behaviors of other terrorist organizations elsewhere.

In addition, Q methodology and the Q-sort item set developed in the process of this adaptation of the method can work elsewhere and thus facilitate the discovery of perspectives about terrorist organizations in different geographical contexts. Additional discoveries, in turn, may help researchers attain a universal understanding of terrorist organizations. The methodology presented in this study enables researchers to compare different perspectives about terrorist organizations in the globe and thus see similarities and differences among these perspectives. A consensus among these perspectives can help to identify a universal understanding of the typology of terrorist organizations. In addition, the universal applicability of the methodology opens new research areas where researchers can make cross-cultural comparisons.

**Research Limitations**

A potential limitation of this research concerns how adequately participants managed to reflect their perspectives utilizing Q technique. For instance, some participants expressed difficulties in understanding the meanings of some Q statements.\(^7\)

\(^7\) For example, one participant inquired about the meaning of the word “businessmen,” the Turkish translation of which is likely to be conceptualized as a Western-style large business owner who is in the middle class; however, small dealers and small business owners, like grocery store owners, may be
Several respondents who performed their Q sorts in the presence of the researcher were able to ask questions when they experienced difficulties in understanding some statements, after which they were able to continue the ordering process. However, many participants responded to the survey via e-mails and did not have an opportunity for further clarifications at the time of their Q sorting.

One participant who responded to the survey through e-mail reported as follows in his follow-up survey evaluation sheet:

The statement describes a large variety of target types. The organization targets some groups who have a political standpoint although the organization does not target ethnic and religious groups. Therefore, I placed Statement 33 under the marker of 0.

The researcher subsequently contacted the participant and explained the exact meaning of the statement. The statement naturally provides some examples to aid in understanding the meaning of the term of “opponent groups.” The participant, on the other hand, had thought that all of the examples needed to be present at the same time in order to conceptualize the opponent group correctly, and this confusion had led him to rank the statement as 0. The researcher, having provided an explanation on the phone, then asked the participant what score would now be assigned the statement, and he indicated that there were other more important statements so that he would not have given a score considered to be in the lower class. The participant asked whether the concept of businessmen includes such small business owners and received a clarification; i.e., if these people are attacked because of being the owners of their business, but not other reasons, then they should be considered as businessmen. For example, a grocery store owner can be attacked by a religiously motivated terrorist organization if the store sells alcoholic drinks.
higher than +1. The respondent’s answer shows that the confusion did not significantly influence his ordering preference, although the possibility always exists.8

Another e-mail participant said in his survey evaluation sheet that statements 12, 23, and 65 are not well stated so that participants could have become confused had they spent more time thinking about them. The participant did not mention whether he personally was confused, but indicated the possibility of confusion due to the potential ambiguity of these statements.

It cannot be assured that ambiguities or misunderstandings did not affect the scoring of the statements, particularly on the part of those participants who responded to the survey via e-mail. However, it can be assumed that these possibilities did not seriously affect the survey results. Even though the dilemma associated with the wordings of the statements could have posed a serious threat to the validity of the study, fortunately the feedback provided by the participants through the survey evaluation sheets and personal contacts of the researcher provided assurance that the statements were generally correctly understood. The dilemmas described above have occurred in the case of a few participants and in regards to a limited number of statements. It is possible that there are additional participants, among those respondents who did not express their feelings at all, who were unable to express their perspectives because of their misunderstandings of the statements, but again, these would likely be limited in number.

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8 Even so, it is important to note that changes in the scores for individual statements have practically no impact on correlation coefficients and factor loadings. A problem potentially arises only when the misinterpretation of many statements is involved.
and the affected statements would likewise be limited and thus far from affecting the survey results.

Hence, despite these dilemmas, it can be argued that the perspectives of the participants have been successfully obtained by the study and that minor problems have not significantly influenced the ordering choices of participants.

**Recommendation for Police Investigators**

Police investigators can increase the quality of the data needed for future studies while investigators continue to perform their routine tasks, such as questioning and taking statements from suspects. This study has illustrated the application of Q methodology to generate a typology of terrorist organizations and how to make use of the methodology for practical purposes. The accuracy of the typology as well as its practical usefulness depends on the quality of the data, which in turn depends on the amount and accuracy of knowledge about terrorist organizations that has been obtained. This study has identified the kind of information required in order to assess terrorist organizations’ characteristics through presentation of a framework used to collect data. The framework has described 10 major themes and their associated sub-themes even though there might be additional themes yet to be identified. Police investigators, using this framework in questioning terrorists who are captured or surrendered, can increase the quality of the data needed for future studies.

For this purpose, police investigators can develop a standard questionnaire based on the framework. Many terrorists disengage from terrorism and make confessions (see
Bayraktutan, 2007), and their answers, especially when gathered in terms of the themes revealed by this study, can increase the knowledge about terrorist organizations. A questionnaire such as this would be particularly useful with newly-emergent terrorist organizations and those about which LEAs have less knowledge.

**Recommendations for Future Research Areas**

This study is the first\(^9\) to adapt Q methodology to develop a typology of terrorist organizations. For this purpose, the researcher has also adapted Shultz’s (1978) conceptual and typological framework. The adapted framework has proved useful in organizing Q sample statements in a systematic way as well as in interpreting the data-analytic results that have been obtained from the Turkish context. Future research can make use of this adaptation to develop typologies in different contexts.

Furthermore, it is possible to identify several specific research areas in relation to this study. First, future research, either using the Q-sample statements from this study or working with another set, is needed to explore in more detail the typical communist terrorist organization in Turkey. This study has determined that there is a large variety of perspectives within this type, but the single factor analysis from this study has been unable to capture all the variances. A factor analysis of Q sorts only about Marxist terrorist organizations could perhaps reveal more functional categories with different sets of characteristics.

\(^9\) Sezgin (2007) adapted Q methodology in another way in order to develop a conceptual framework for understanding the meaning of terrorism.
Second, other types of terrorist organizations in the typology can be explored through an in-depth analysis as well even though these types are well represented in the factor analysis of this study. For instance, conducting a factor analysis only among Q sorts about PKK can reveal different perspectives about this organization.

Third, as an extension of this study, new Q sorts could be added about terrorist organizations, whether those that are newly emergent or those that have remained inactive so far. An expanded database of this kind would provide a new set of Q sorts that could be used to replicate the present analysis. Such an enriched replication could provide more reliable results about the typology of terrorist organizations in Turkey. In addition, security professionals may benefit from the enriched replication.

Fourth, it is possible to replicate this study with the same Q sample statements, but administered in other contexts. A replication such as this could be used to make cross-cultural comparisons that could help to identify similarities and differences among terrorist organizations in different contexts.

Finally, this study has developed a prediction tool in an attempt to help analysts anticipate terrorist organizations that are most likely to be perpetrators of terrorism incidents that have already occurred. However, the applicability of the prediction tool and its limitations must be explored in further studies through conducting case studies.
References


StataCorp. (2007). *Stata Statistical Software: Release 10*. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.


APPENDICES
## Appendix A

### Blank Q Sort Sheet

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<tr>
<th>Most uncharacteristic</th>
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Most uncharacteristic features are placed at the top and most characteristic features at the bottom.
Appendix B

Q Sample Statements in Turkish

1. Örgüt liderliği ve buna bağlı organlar üyeler tarafından demokratik prensipler çerçevesinde seçilirler.

2. Örgüt yabancıya yönelik saldırı eylemleri yapar.

3. Örgüt kendi üyelerine ve sempatizenlere karşı yönelik şiddet eylemleri gerçekleştirir.

4. Örgüt suikastlar düzenler.

5. Örgüt kendi varlığına direk tehdit olarak algıladığı kişi, kurum ve kuruluşları durdurmayı veya yok etmeyi amaçlar.

6. İşadamları ve ticari şirketleri örgütün eylemlerinde hedefleridir.

7. Örgüt, dokümantasyon ve gizli hareket etme açısından istihbarata karşı koyma tekniklerine çok az riayet eder.

8. Örgüt, devlete bağlılık ve sadakatın temel prensip kabul edildiği homojen bir sosyal yapıya ve tek bir irka dayalı bir rejim kurmak ister.

9. Örgütten çıkma kolaydır ve ayrılmak isteyen kişiler için ciddi bir tehdit oluşturur.

10. Toplu katliamlar bilerek amaçlanır. Ne kadar çok tahribat verirse bir eylem, sonuç o kadar iyiştir.

11. Örgüt tarafından belirlenen hücre evlerinde kalan askeri kanat mensupları vardır.

12. Örgüt üyelerinin örgüt kurallarının ve değerlerinin (grup etiği ve moral değerler gibi) aksine hareket etmeleri pek mümkün değildir.


14. Örgüt, şiddet eyleminin direkt mağduru olması genellikle mümkün olmayan asıl hedefinin (devlet, ordu, halk vb.) boyun eğmesi ve isteklerine cevap vermesi için saldırı eylemleri yapar.

15. Örgüt Batılı ülkelerin kurum ve kuruluşlarına (ticari işletmeler, diplomatik çevrelere, ulusal arası kuruluşlar vb.) saldırmaktan kaçırır.
16. Örgüt sadece eylem yapacağı hedef hakkında değil, fert ve kurumların oluşturduğu daha geniş topluluklar hakkında istihbarat toplar.

17. Örgüt devletlerin gereksiz olduğunu, bunun yerine halkın idare edebileceğini savunur.

18. Örgüte üye katılımları daha çok aile ve yakın çevre ilişkilerine dayalı gerçekleşir.

19. Liderliğin kararlarını sorgulamak örgüt içerisinde mümkün değildir.

20. Örgütün demokratik sistemdeki siyasal partilerle bağlantısının olması pek olası değildir.

21. Üye katılımlarının daha çok, örgütü de kontrol eden karizmatik bir lideri kişisel olarak takip edenler arasında gerçekleşmiştir, örgüt hakkında pek söylenemez.

22. Örgüt şiddetinden şiddet içermeyen aktivitelere doğru stratejisini değiştirmiştir ve şimdi bu aşamada şiddetden uzak durmayı tercih eder.

23. Örgütün eylemlerinin amacı, asıl hedefini (devlet, ordu, halk vb.) şaşırtmak ve toplum içerisinde büyük oranda endişeyi artırarak günlük hayatta karışıklığı onu (asıl hedefini) kendi arzuladığı bir yönde reaksiyon vermeye zorlamaktır.

24. Örgüt polisi hedef almakta kaçınır.

25. Örgüt şiddet eylemlerini kamuoyunda üstlenmek ya da olay yerlerinde imzasını bırakmak suretiyle yaptıklarının propagandasını yapar.

26. Örgüt dini prensiplere dayalı bir devlet rejimi kurmayı ister.

27. Üyelerin büyük çoğunluğu belirgin bir fiziki coğrafya ve yerel kültürden gelir.

28. Üyelerinde dış dünyaya karşı din ve nefret duygularının bulunması belirgin bir özelliğidir.

29. Örgüt, belli başlı devlet kurumlarına ve bürokrasiye sızmış bulunmaktadır.

30. Örgüt, toplu taşıma araçlarını kaçırma ve barikat kurarak rehine alma tarzında rehine alma eylemleri yapar.

31. Örgüt, kısa zamanlı periyotlarda geniş ölçekli ve yüksek seviyeli şiddet eylemleri gerçekleştirmeyi amaçlar.

32. Örgüt asıl hedefininin (devlet, ordu, halk vb.) direncinin kırılmayını amaçlar.
33. Örgüt, etnik grup, dini grup (azırlık ya da toplumun çoğunluğuna ait), siyasi partiler ve ayrı bir dünya görüşü ve siyasi duruşu olan gruplar gibi karşıt grupları hedef olarak seçer.

34. Örgütün eylemleri beceriksizce planlanıp uygulanır.

35. Örgüt devleti, rejimi veya toplum düzenini koruma saiki ile hareket ettiği söyler.


37. Kararlar örgütünün en tepesinde alınır ve hiyerarşik bir yapıda uygulanır.

38. Örgüt yabancı devletler tarafından sağlanan direk destek ve imkanlardan (silahlama, eğitim, kalacak güvenli kamplar, teknik destek vb.) faydalanır.

39. Örgüt yapılanması illegal faaliyetler için tam bir gizlilik sağlar. Üyeler ihtiyacın gerektirdiğinden başka örgütün işleyişi hakkındaki detayları bilemezler.

40. Örgütün eylemlerinin amacı, uluslar arası, milli ya da yerel seviyede, varlığını duyurmaktır.

41. Örgüt asıl hedefini (devlet, ordu, halk vb.) istenilen yönde hareket etmesi için provoke (tahrik) etmeye çalışır.

42. Örgüt askeri personel ve tesislerine saldırı eylemleri yapar.

43. Örgüt şehirlerde bombalama eylemleri gerçekleştürir.

44. Örgüt, kendisince temsil edildiğini düşündüğü bir etnik grubu kurtarmak suretiyle yeni bir devlet kurmayı ister.

45. Örgüt faaliyetlerine mali kaynak temin etmede güçlük çekmektedir.

46. Şehirlerde örgütün hücreleri veya alt komiteleri merkezi liderliğin onayını almadan kendi kendilerine kararlarlar alabilir ve uygulayabilirler.

47. Örgüt, suç örgütleri ve maddi kazanç amacı güden diğer gruplarla işbirliği yapar.

48. Şehitlik ya da hareketin amacı için öldürülmek örgüt üyesi arasında en çok itibar gören konudur.

49. Şiddet içermek zorunda olmayan suçla ilgili faaliyetlere (sahtecilik, uyuşturucu ticareti, hırsızlık, vs.) örgütü maddi gelir temin etmek için sıkılıkla başvurulur.
50. Örgüt, yurtdışında çok sayıdaki sempatizanından önemli ölçüde destek (siyasi, ekonomik, vb.) alır.

51. Örgütün dini azınlık gruplarına saldırıları pek olası değildir.

52. Örgüt detaylı istihbarat çalışmasını, planlamayı ve koordinasyonu gerektiren eylemler icra eder.

53. Kendisini özgürlük savaşısı ve insan hakları savunucusu olarak gören örgüt, otoriter olarak gördüğü rejime karşı hareket eder. Ülkede demokratik reformlar ihdas etmeyi ister.

54. Örgüt, yeterince halk desteğini elde edemediği için varlığını devam ettirmede zorlanmaktadır.

55. Örgüt, eylemlerinde insanlardan ziyade mülkiyet veya yapıları hedef alır.

56. Örgüt genelde bulunması kolay olan materyallerden mamul ev yapımı silahlar kullanır.

57. Örgüt üyeleri çok çeşitli sosyal tabakalardan, suçlular, öğrenciler, işadamları, bürokratlardan, siyasetçiler, vb. gelir.

58. Örgüt benzer düşüncede gruplarla işbirliği yapar.

59. Bayan üyelerin eylem birimlerinde görev almaları pek olası değildir.

60. Örgüt maddi gelir temin etmek için silahlı soygun yapar.

61. Örgüt, burjuvazi ve işçi sınıfı arasında sürekli bir çatışmanın olduğunu ve devletin burjuvazinin ayrıcalıklarını korumak için halka baskı yaptığı iddia ederek mevcut düzeni devirmek ister.

62. Eylem birimlerinin üyeleri taktik beceri ve kabiliyetler açısından iyi yetiştirilirler.

63. Örgüt, komplike koordinasyon, detaylı planlama ve lojistik desteği gerektiren terör eylemlerini gerçekleştirebilecek yeteri kadar sayıda aktif üyesi sahiptir.

64. Örgüt amaçlarını gerçekleştirebilmek için büyük oranda medya ve diğer kitle iletişim araçlarına dayanır.

65. İstenilmemesine rağmen, şiddet eyleminin yakınında bulunan insanların can kayıpları örgüt için kabul edilebilir sivil kayıplar olarak görülür.
66. Örgüt, seri eylemlerini uluslararası ya da kamuoyunun tolede edebileceğini ve hükümetin de kendilerine karşı şiddetli bir reaksiyon göstermeyeceği şekilde icra eder.

67. Örgüt ülke ekonomisine zarar vermeyi amaçlayan eylemler icra eder.

68. Örgüt tesis ve binalara saldırılar düzenler.

69. Örgüt intihar saldırıları düzenler.

70. Örgüt sadece belli bir alandaki hükümet politikalarını değiştirmeyi amaçlar.

71. Örgüt üyesinin teknik becerileri olağanın üstündedir (bomba düzenenekleri, bilgisayar teknolojisi kullanımı, ileri seviyede beceri gerektiren silah ve malzemelerin kullanımı gibi). Terörizm alanında takip edilen gelişmeler takip ederler.

72. Liderlik, fikir ayrılıkları ve örgüt içi rekabetler nedeni ile örgütsel birliği sağlamak zorlandığına inanılır.

73. Örgüt üyeleri askeri eğitimi yabancı ülkelerde bulunan kamplarda alır.

74. Eylem hedefleri örgütün haklılık nedenleri gözönünde bulundurularak dikkatli seçilir. Saldırıların masum insanların can kayıplarını önleyecek şekilde gerçekleştirmesi gerektiğine inanılır.

75. Örgüt güvenlik güçlerini gerilla savaşı sürdürmek suretiyle yenmeyi amaçlar.

76. Örgüt hedef kitlenin (benzer düşüncede olan toplulukların vs.) desteği almak için saldırılar düzenler.

77. Örgüt kamu görevlilerine, adli personele, parlamentolere ve yüksek seviyede siyasetçilere saldırı eylemleri düzenler.

78. Örgüt, toplumal gösteriler, sivil itaatçılık ve anayasal siyaset unsurlarını da içeren (siyasaal partiler, insan hakları hareketleri, dernekler ve bunun gibi vasıtarla) şiddet dışındaki metotlar kullanır.

79. Sürekli gelir akışını sağlayabilecek suçlara konsantr olan bir suç örgüt olduğu örgüt için pek söylenemez.

80. Örgüt adan kaçırma eylemleri yapar.
Appendix C

Approval to Use Human Research Participants

August 27, 2009

Murat Koçak
Department of Political Science

Re: #09-289: “Turkish police perceptions of terrorist organizations”

Dear Mr. Koçak,

I am pleased to inform you that the Kent State University Institutional Review Board has reviewed and approved your Application for Approval to Use Human Research Participants as Level II research through the expedited review process. This was approved on August 27, 2009. Approval is effective for a twelve-month period, August 27, 2009 through August 26, 2010.

Federal regulations and Kent State University IRB policy require that research be reviewed at intervals appropriate to the degree of risk, but not less than once per year. The IRB has determined that this protocol requires an annual review and progress report. The IRB will forward an annual review reminder notice to you by email as a courtesy. Please note that it is the responsibility of the principal investigator to be aware of the study expiration date and submit the required materials. Please submit review materials (annual review form and copy of current consent form) one month prior to the expiration date.

HHS regulations and Kent State University Institutional Review Board guidelines require that any changes in research methodology, protocol design, or principal investigator have the prior approval of the IRB before implementation and continuation of the protocol. The IRB must also be informed of any adverse events associated with the study. The IRB further requests a final report at the conclusion of the study.

Kent State University has a Federal Wide Assurance on file with the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), FWA Number 00001853.

If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me at 330-672-2704 or jagger@kent.edu.

Sincerely,

Judith Jagger
Interim Research Compliance Administrator

Cc: Steven Brown

Division of Research and Sponsored Programs
Office of Research Safety and Compliance
(330) 672-2704 Fax: (330) 672-2638
P.O. Box 5190, Kent, Ohio 44342-0001
Appendix D

Letter to Participants

Dear Mr. /Ms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I am a Ph.D. candidate at Kent State University sent by the Turkish National Police to complete the graduate studies program and have been writing my dissertation on Turkish police perceptions of terrorist organizations. I would like you to take part in this project. If you would like to participate, I would ask you to print the questionnaire materials; fill in the Score Sheet in accordance to the questionnaire instruction; and then answer the 4 questions regarding your experience of the survey in the Survey Evaluation Sheet.

This study will obtain profiles of specific terrorist organizations that have been still active in Turkey based on expert opinions. For this purpose, I want to ask five (5) expert opinions for each terrorist organization. For this reason, I try to reach the most knowledgeable counterterrorism officials in Turkey to urge them to participate in this project. You have been, too, selected and sent the questionnaire materials because of your expertise about specific terrorist organizations.

As the end product, this study will compare characteristics of terrorist organizations and develop a typology of terrorist organizations in Turkey based on participants’ opinions. Developing a typology is important to this study because typology development is considered to be first step of theory building. Typology enables to better understand terrorist organizations and thus assists academicians to develop their scientific inquiries.

This study will also have significant implications for practitioners. An investigative support-tool for counterterrorism investigators will be developed that allows using participants’ opinions systematically in order to identify likely perpetrators of unclaimed terrorist actions. As you know, identifying perpetrators of a terrorism incident that has occurred mostly begin with identifying the right terrorist organization as the target of the investigation. An investigation process is more difficult when a terrorism incident is unclaimed and the terrorist organization responsible for the attack remains unidentified.

Academic studies show that most terrorism incidents in the world have been conducted by unknown groups. Terrorist organizations mostly cannot be identified at the
initial stage of terrorism investigations. Furthermore, there are indicators showing that this trend is growing worldwide. Now, terrorist organizations tend not to claim their responsibility for their attacks.

This study develops a systematic method that can help terrorism investigators in this identification process. Particularly, new or less experienced terrorism investigators may need such helps in their tasks. Transferring past experiences of terrorism investigators to new generation investigators and to investigators elsewhere in the country is an important issue for the Turkish National Police (TNP). Building institutional memory is problematic within the large community of counterterrorism as well as in the TNP. There has been a lack of studies that can help to solve this problem. As you know the TNP is a dynamic organization in which counterterrorism officials, like other officials, are frequently assigned to new positions and new police departments. Promotion of officers is also an important factor in these reassignments. Frequent assignments are an obstacle in institutional memory building efforts. In addition, because of hard work within counterterrorism units, counterterrorism officers are mostly unable to convey their thoughts, knowledge, and skills into systematic analyses, and thus their contributions to institutional memory building mostly remain limited.

This study can significantly contribute to institutional memory building efforts of the TNP through presenting a scientific methodology which can transfer experts’ perspectives of terrorist organizations. In this context, based on the data collected by this study and on its analysis, training materials can be prepared for the use of Turkish police. Therefore, your participation is important to the TNP and counterterrorism community in terms of your possible contribution in achieving these goals.

If you take part in this project your name or any other information that can possibly reveals your identification will not be asked in the questionnaire. I, as your colleague, know how important it is for you to keep privacy. Since this study is about profiling terrorist organizations, you can be mentioned only as a member of the Turkish National Police and counterterrorism community in a specific geographic area. No further reference can take place regarding your identification. According to the approval of the Turkish National Police with the reference of “07.04.2007, B.05.1. EGM.0.72.02.03 /857” and “24.12.2006, B.05.1. EGM.0.72.04.02,” your participation does not cause an inconvenience. However, participation is not obligatory. If you do not want to take part, you may not answer the questionnaire and do not need turn it in. The return of the questionnaire form to me is going to be regarded as your consent to participate in this questionnaire.
If you want to know more about this research project you can contact with me via e-mail. The project has been approved by Kent State University. If you have questions about Kent State University's rules for research, you can call me, or those contacts mentioned below.

Sincerely,

Murat Koçak

KSU, Political Science Ph.D. Student
Tel: +1 330 794 5224
e-mail: mkocak@kent.edu

Other contacts

Dr. Steven R. Brown
Faculty advisor
Tel: +1 330 672 2719
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Dr. John L. West,
Or
Vice President for Research &
Dean for Graduate Studies
Tel: +1 330 672 2581
## Appendix E

### Structure of the Framework for the Q Sample Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Themes</th>
<th>Sub-Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>(1) fascism, (2) anarchism, (3) conservatism, (4) liberalism, (5) communism, (6) separatism, (7) single-issue politics, (8) religious, and (9) criminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Relations</strong></td>
<td>(1) political parties, (2) government organizations &amp; bureaucracy, (3) foreign states, (4) training camps in foreign countries, (5) sympathizers abroad, (6) domestic sympathizers, (7) coalitions with other groups, and (8) criminal organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
<td>(1) threat elimination, (2) compliance, (3) disorientation, (4) attrition, (5) provocation, (6) advertisement, and (7) endorsement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy</strong></td>
<td>(1) rural activities, (2) guerrilla warfare, (3) mass movements, (4) damaging the economy, (5) temporary cease violence, (6) low violence, and (7) high violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities</strong></td>
<td>(1) ineptness, (2) sophisticated attacks, (3) tactical skills, (4) technical skills, (5) finance, (6) weaponry, (7) intelligence, (8) counter-intelligence, and (9) use of media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Techniques</strong></td>
<td>(1) kidnapping, (2) hostage taking, (3) bombing, (4) assassination, (5) attack on installations, (6) suicide bombing, (7) criminal activity, (8) armed robbery, and (9) claiming credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targets</strong></td>
<td>(1) foreigners, (2) Western institutions, (3) business, (4) military, (5) police, (6) other government officials, (7) opponent groups, (8) religious minority groups, and (9) terrorist organizations’ own members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization</strong></td>
<td>(1) democratic, (2) authoritarian, (3) centralized, (4) decentralized, (5) factionalism, (6) use of safe houses, and (7) confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participant</strong></td>
<td>(1) size of members, (2) gender, (3) charismatic leader (4) family &amp; close neighborhood, (5) former police &amp; military members, (6) regional origins, (7) diverse social background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitude</strong></td>
<td>(1) damaging property, (2) selective killing, (3) less selective killing, and (4) non-selective killing, (5) hate, (6) martyrdom, (7) internalization of values, and (8) exit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F

Descriptions of Currently Active Terrorist Organizations in Turkey

Al Qaeda’s Turkish Elements (AQT)

The group is publicly known as “Al Qaeda.” However, to identify the group from Al Qaeda globally (Usame bin Laden’s Al Qaeda), this study has preferred to use the name of Al Qaeda’s Turkish Elements (El Kaide Turkiye Unsurlari)-AQT, which is given by the Turkish police. Thus AQT refers to a network of people or groups in Turkey who have been associated with Usame bin Laden’s Al Qaeda. The association claimed could be either a political affiliation or inspiration. Some AQT members received their military training in Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviets War, but not necessarily in Al Qaeda training camps.

It is believed that AQT wants a regime change in Turkey that would be based on religious (Islamic) principles and operates in some large cities and some cities of eastern Turkey. However, AQT, following Al Qaeda’s global campaign of terrorism rather than AQT’s own agenda, conducted two suicide bombings in November 15 and 20, 2003. In both cases, the attacks were identified as simultaneous truck bombs. The targets were the British consulate building, the HSBS bank, and two Jewish synagogues in Istanbul. Thus Western and Jewish institutions and economic figures are best-known targets of the group.
**DHKP/C**

Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi Cephesi (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party Front) is publicly known with the initials DHKP/C. DHKP/C’s root goes back to the 1970s THKP/C (Turkish People's Liberation Party Front) and later Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left). DHKP/C has operated with the current name since March 30, 1994 (Alkan, 2002, pp. 67-69).

DHKP/C wants to establish a new regime in Turkey, based on Marxist-Leninist principles. To them, this goal could be accomplished through tactical application of both rural and urban guerrilla terrorism, so that the organization continuously operates in large cities and the Black Sea Region of Turkey (Alkan, 2002, pp. 69-70).

DHKP/C is known to conduct political assassinations under high security conditions (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006). For instance, the first attack of DHKP/C was the assassination of a former Justice Minister, Mehmet Topac, in Ankara (Alkan, 2002, p. 69).

**Devrimci Karargah-DK**

Devrimci Karargah (Revolutionary Headquarter) has been recently founded and so is less known to the public. It is known that the organization has connections with other terrorist organizations, including PKK. Some Devrimci Karargah members, for instance, have been trained in PKK’s camps in northern Iraq.

The organization embraces the Marxist ideology and has an ambition to adopt DHKP/C’s reputation of violence; to Devrimci Karargah, other revolutionary forces have failed and need a unitary organization, that is, Devrimci Karargah.
Devrimci Karargah became known with a mortar attack targeting a military headquarters in Istanbul on August 7, 2008. Later bombings occurred in Istanbul targeting symbols of “imperialism,” such as the political party building of the ruling party and banks. Likely targets of the organization are public officials and high politicians.

**Hizbullah**

Hizbullah in Turkey should not be confused with Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Hizbullah in Turkey was founded in the early 1980s and became the sole rival of PKK in the early 1990s, particularly in the east and southeast parts of Turkey where Turkish citizens of the ethnic Kurdish population predominantly live. Hizbullah’s counter attacks, assassinating PKK members in urban areas, began when PKK reached the top in both its rural and urban guerrilla activities in this region.

Hizbullah embraces a religious (Islamic) ideology and wants a regime change in Turkey in this direction. However, it seems that Hizbullah has ended its violence after countrywide counterterrorism operations of Turkish police in the early 2000s. Now, nonviolent activities to continue its existence and recruit new members dominate Hizbullah’s strategy.

Kidnapping people and assassinating them after violent interrogations as well as assassinations on streets were the hallmark of Hizbullah’s activities in the 1990s. Targets were usually members of opponent groups and Hizbullah’s own members who were suspected to be police informers.
IBDA/C

Islami Buyuk Dogu Akincilar Cephesi-IBDA/C (Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front) is known with the initials of IBDA/C and has been active since the 1970s. IBDA/C has a radical religious ideology and targets mosques, churches, institutions of religious minorities (Christians and Jews), TV transmitters, newspapers or related associations, entertainment places, banks, and statues of Ataturk, founder of the Turkish Republic. IBDA/C conducts bombings and Molotov cocktail attacks.

IBDA/C claims responsibility for its attacks as well as other terrorist organizations’ attacks, such as AQT’s 2003 suicide bombings in Istanbul. The reason behind wrongful claims might be explained, to some extent, by IBDA/C’s unique organizational structure in which cells in large cities operate independent of a hierarchic authority and organizational control.

MKP

Maoist Komunist Parti’s (Maoist Communist Party)-MKP origin goes back to the early 1970s TIIKP (Turkish Revolutionary Workers Party), and then TKP/ML (Turkish Communist Party/Communist-Maoist), which is publicly known as TIKKO, that is, the military wing of the organization. The organization splintered in two groups in the mid-1990s: one was TKP/ML-DABK (Determination of Eastern Anatolia Region Committee), which would later rename itself as Maoist Communist Party-MKP in 2003, and the other one was TKP/ML-Konferans (Conference). HKO (People’s Liberation Army), which is MKP’s military wing, can also be seen in public records.
There is more emphasis on rural guerrilla activities in MKP’s revolution strategy than in its brother organization, TKP-ML-Konferans (still known as TIKKO). Thus MKP applies rural guerrilla tactics around the city of Tunceli and rural areas in the Black Sea Region as well as urban guerrilla terrorism in metropolitan areas. MKP conducts assassinations and hit-and-run attacks targeting security forces as well as civilians (villagers).

**MLKP**

Marksist Leninist Komunist Parti (Marxist Leninist Communist Party) is publicly known with the initials MLKP. Two terrorist organizations with Marxist-Leninist ideology that had been active since the early 1970s united and formed MLKP in 1994, and a third one joined this organization in 1995 (TKP/ML-Hareketi, TKIH, and TKP/ML-YIO) (Alkan, 2002, pp. 77-78).

MLKP emphasizes urban guerrilla tactics targeting police and other government officials as well as opponent groups. The organization is known to be active particularly in violent mass demonstrations in Turkey’s largest cities.

**PKK**

Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party) is publicly known with the initials PKK. PKK, with emphasis on ethnic claims, was founded in 1978 in Turkey. Kongreya Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistane-KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress), Kongra Gele Kurdistan-KONGRA-GEL (Kurdistan People’s Congress), and Koma Civaken Kurdistan-KCK (Kurdistan Democratic Confederation) are other names that have recently been used by PKK and refer to the same organization.
(It is suspected that KCK has intended to become an umbrella organization for Kurdish movements in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.) In addition, Hezen Parastina Gel-HPG (People’s Self-Defense Forces) can be seen in public news since HPG has been currently serving as the military wing of PKK in Turkey.

PKK has changed the discourse about its goal and ideology over time. While until the late 1990s the organization emphasized the Marxist-Leninist ideology and foundation of a new independent Kurdish state, now PKK, without emphasizing Marxism, has been talking about democratic reforms and cultural rights rather than separation from Turkey. However, the discourse change has not helped terrorism end so far as the discourse has not paralleled PKK’s behaviors. Rather, the discourse change as well as the frequent changes in the name of the organization can be considered as PKK’s tactical maneuvers and an adaptation to a new political atmosphere and new circumstances.

PKK has continuously targeted Turkish security forces with rural guerrilla warfare and has applied urban guerrilla terrorism tactics in an effort to weaken the Turkish government. PKK has also attacked Kurdish villagers to force people to support the organization for its cause. Thus PKK has been considered to be responsible for thousands of deaths, including security forces, civilians, and terrorists themselves.

**TIKB**

Turkiye Ihtilalci Komunistler Birligi (Revolutionary Communist Union of Turkey) is publicly known with the initials TIKB. TIKB was founded in 1979 to accomplish a Marxist-Leninist revolution in Turkey. Even though TIKB has been less active in recent years, it has committed assassinations, armed assault, and robbery in the
past. TIKB’s most serious attack was an assassination of an opponent political party township leader in 1997 in Istanbul (Alkan, 2002, pp. 80-81). In addition, TIKB has conducted bombings in which properties rather than people have usually been targeted.

TEKP/L

Turkiye Komunist Emek Partisi/Leninist (Turkish Communist Labor Party/Leninist) is publicly known with the initials TKEP/L. Even though its origins go back to the 1970s THKO (Turkish People’s Liberation Army) and 1980s TKEP (Turkish Communist Labor Party), the organization was activated with the name of TKEP/L in the late 1990s as a splinter group of TKEP. LGB (Leninist Guerrilla Units) is the name of TKEP/L’s military wing that can be seen in public claims of the organization for its attacks (Alkan, 2002, pp. 84-85).

TEKP/L seeks a Marxist-Leninist revolution in Turkey and conducts bombings against government and military targets. In bombing, TEKP/L usually targets properties rather than people. Like TIKB, TEKP/L too is considered to be among less active terrorist organizations.

TKP/ML (TIKKO)

Finally, Turkiye Komunist Partisi/Marksist Leninist (Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist Leninist) was founded in 1972 and has been publicly known with the initials TKP/ML and usually TIKKO (Turkish Worker-Peasant Liberation Army), that is, the initials of the military wing of TKP/ML. Although the group has splintered in two groups, as MKP and TKP/ML-Konferans (Conference), TKP/ML and TIKKO names have referred to TKP/ML-Konferans.
TKP/ML (TIKKO), seeking a Marxist-Leninist revolution, operates both in rural (particularly Tunceli) and urban areas. TIKKO commits similar attacks against similar targets with the splinter group, MKP. In addition, TIKKO conducts bombings in cities. One of the most serious attacks by TIKKO was a car bomb that targeted the Provincial Governor of Cankiri in 1999. The bomb killed four people and injured nine others including the governor, police officers, and civilians.
Appendix G

Case Studies Assessed with the Prediction Tool

Case 1.

Incident summary provided by the GTD:

07/14/1999: Members of . . . were suspected of killing five villagers in a southeastern province of Erzincan, Turkey. The attack occurred when assailants opened fire on villagers traveling by tractor on a country road. (Global Terrorism Database, 2009, GTD ID: 199907140001, ¶ 1)

The GTD provided additional information. This was a successful armed assault in which automatic weapons were used. Civilians were targeted indiscriminately; five people died. The organization did not claim responsibility.

Prediction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDICTIVE STATEMENTS</th>
<th>TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Mass casualty.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Rural area activity.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scores are factor scores displayed in Appendix H; the list of predictive statements has been displayed in Table 11.

Opening fire with automatic weapons on traveling villagers shows that the terrorists indiscriminately killed these people. Since the attack occurred on a country road and against villagers, the location of the attack is a rural area. Therefore, two statements of the prediction table were used as they well fit the characteristics of the incident. The sum of the scores shows that Type I terrorist organization, PKK, appears to be the only
one that can be suspected as the perpetrator of the attack among other types since they have negative signs. Negative signs show that they are unlikely to be the perpetrator so that the prediction can safely point to PKK. Actually, the GTD provides the information that PKK is identified as the perpetrator of the attack.

**Case 2.**

Incident summary:

05/04/2000: On the evening of May 4, 2000, the former head of the National Action Party, Seyfettin Ozbulten was assassinated. He was shot outside his home in Diyarbakir, Turkey. No one has taken credit for the attacks but the police speculated that . . . was responsible. (Global Terrorism Database, 2009, GTD ID: 200005040003, ¶ 1)

Prediction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDICTIVE STATEMENTS</th>
<th>TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Opponents group.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Assassination.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scores are factor scores displayed in Appendix H; the list of predictive statements has been displayed in Table 11.

Being a former head of a political party, the victim seems to have been assassinated for his opponent position so that the two relevant statements have been used for this assassination incident. The sum of scores shows that Type IV terrorist organization, Hizbullah, can be the first-degree suspected organization for this attack since the organization has the highest score (+6). In addition, Type II terrorist organization, IBDA/C, can be the second organization with the score of +4. The GTD also records Hizbullah. (Additionally, IBDA/C is unlikely to operate in this geographical region, Diyarbakir.)
It is important to note that Hizbullah has changed its strategy since 2003 and does not currently engage in violence. This radical change must be considered in any prediction task related to an incident that has occurred after 2003.

**Case 3.**

Incident summary:

01/07/2001: Two gunmen attacked a police vehicle in Istanbul, Turkey, injuring one officer. The assailants then fled on foot. Authorities believe that . . . were responsible. (Global Terrorism Database, 2009, GTD ID: 200101070003, ¶ 1)

Prediction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDICTIVE STATEMENTS</th>
<th>TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Police. [REVERSE SCORE SIGNS]</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62. Well trained in terms of tactical skills and capabilities.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. Carefully selected target to prevent loss of innocent people.</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scores are factor scores displayed in Appendix H; the list of predictive statements has been displayed in Table 11.

The attackers targeted a police patrol vehicle, which was a specifically selected target. They wounded only the police officer; no one from the public was injured. In addition, the attackers managed to escape without being killed or captured, which shows that they were trained in terms of tactical skills. These characteristics are indicated in the three statements and scored accordingly. The sum of scores indicates that the Type V terrorist organization, the communist type, is more likely to have perpetrated this attack. The GTD likewise records DHKP/C, which embraces the ideology of communism. None
of the other types has a score that is close to the score of Type V so that the prediction is safe.

*Case 4.*

**Incident summary:**

03/05/1999: A car bomb attack targeted the Cankiri Provincial Governor, Ayhan Cevik, while he was driving in Cankiri, Turkey. Four people were killed and the Governor and nine others were wounded. The . . . claimed responsibility for the attack. (Global Terrorism Database, 2009, GTD ID: 199903050002, ¶ 1)

In addition, the researcher, through searching on Internet, has found that there were high school students as well as police officers recorded as victims of the incident.

**Prediction:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDICTIVE STATEMENTS</th>
<th>TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77. Government--public officials, juridical persons, parliamentarians, or high rank politicians.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Assassination.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Bombing in city.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Action that requires a detailed intelligence work, planning, and coordination.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65. Loss of people near by the location of the attack seen acceptable.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scores are factor scores displayed in Appendix H; the list of predictive statements has been displayed in Table 11.

The target was the Governor, a public official, and he was specifically singled out to be killed so that it was an assassination. The attack involved the use of a bomb and required detailed intelligence work and planning, such as the time and location that the Governor passed, the timing of the bomb, and so on. Finally, there were civilian casualties. The way the attack was planned shows that the perpetrators did not expend
much effort to avoid civilian casualties. The statements in the table fit well with the incident characteristics. The sum of the scores indicates that two types of terrorist organizations could have committed this act, Type III and Type V. Since the Type III (AQT) terrorist organization, as the study has indicated, only emerged in 2003, it is not possible for AQT to have carried out this attack; therefore, the Type V terrorist organization, the typical communist, is the more likely perpetrator. The GTD record also indicates a terrorist organization devoted to the ideology of communism, TIKKO, as the perpetrator of the attack.

However, it is worth noting that the typical communist terrorist organization in this study is less likely to represent TIKKO, MKP, DK, and DHKP/C than other communist terrorist organizations. The literature review of this study has indicated that these organizations seem bloodier than other communist terrorist organizations so that statement 65 should have a higher score for these organizations. The factor analysis did not identify this group of terrorist organizations in a separate factor; therefore, predictions about these organizations should be carefully made.

**Case 5.**

Incident summary:

01/16/2000: A bomb exploded at the Hurriyet Media Towers newspaper facility in Istanbul. Two trucks nearby were damaged. The attack was claimed by the organization. (Global Terrorism Database, 2009, GTD ID: 200001160003, ¶ 1)

Prediction:
PREDICTIVE STATEMENTS | TYPES
---|---|---|---|---|---
6. Businessman or corporation. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2
33. Opponent group. | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0
43. Bombing in city. | 4 | 4 | 4 | -4 | 5
68. Attack on installation. | 0 | 0 | 0 | -3 | 3
55. Targeting a property or installation rather than people | -3 | 3 | 0 | -4 | 0
TOTAL | 1 | 9 | 4 | -8 | 10

Scores are factor scores displayed in Appendix H; the list of predictive statements has been displayed in Table 11.

The GTD maintains that there was no injury or fatality, and the incident summary shows that the attackers targeted property rather than people. It was a bombing and in the category of the attacks on installations. The Media Towers seems to represent both business and an opponent group. The five statements fit these characteristics well, the sum of scores indicating that the Type V and Type II terrorist organizations are more likely to have committed this attack. In other words, IBDA/C with the score of +9 and the typical communist terrorist organization with the score of +10 (no significant difference between the two scores) are two typical terrorist organizations to be suspects of further investigations. The GTD record indicates IBDA/C as the perpetrator of the attack, and this shows that the prediction of case 5 is in the right direction.

Case 6.

Incident summary:

11/20/2003: 15 people were killed and several hundred injured in an explosion an HSBC Bank in Istanbul, Turkey. The explosion had an ammonium nitrate base. Authorities believe the assailants were linked to . . . and one was killed in the explosion. (Global Terrorism Database, 2009, GTD ID: 200311200006, ¶ 1)
Additionally, the GTD states that the attack was a part of multiple incidents and two different terrorist organizations are reported to have been associated, even though in the summaries only one terrorist organization’s name appeared. The other incident is summarized:

11/20/2003: 15 people were killed and several hundred injured in an explosion at the British Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. The explosion had an ammonium nitrate base. Authorities believe the assailants were linked to . . . and one was killed in the explosion. (Global Terrorism Database, 2009, GTD ID: 200311200005, ¶ 1)

The GTD maintains that cumulatively 32 people died in these two attacks and these figures of the fatality have been distributed for these cases for the purpose of statistical accuracy.

Prediction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDICTIVE STATEMENTS</th>
<th>TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of Western countries.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[REVERSE SCORE SIGNS]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide bombing [SCORE +4 FOR DHKP/C]</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outstanding technical skill.</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass casualty.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scores are factor scores displayed in Appendix H; the list of predictive statements has been displayed in Table 11.

The British consulate and the HSBC Bank are establishments of Western countries in Turkey. The attack was a suicide bombing. The huge destruction with simply available materials shows that the technical skill of the perpetrators was outstanding.

Finally, it was an indiscriminate mass casualty attack. The four statements fit the incident well and the sum of scores shows that it is a safe prediction (+17) to say that the
perpetrator is likely to be a Type III terrorist organization, AQT. The GTD confirms this result.

**Case 7.**

Incident summary:

09/28/1999: Three unidentified attackers threw petrol bombs at the Democratic Left Party (DSP) office building in Istanbul, Turkey. No casualties were reported, but the building sustained minor damage. Informants reported that the assailants were chanting . . . slogans during the attack. (Global Terrorism Database, 2009, GTD ID: 199909280002, ¶ 1)

Prediction:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDICTIVE STATEMENTS</th>
<th>TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77. Government--public officials, juridical persons,</td>
<td>I 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parliamentarians, and high rank politicians.</td>
<td>II 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Bombing in city.</td>
<td>III 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. Carefully selected target to prevent loss of</td>
<td>IV -4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V  5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scores are factor scores displayed in Appendix H; the list of predictive statements has been displayed in Table 11.

Note that the Democratic Left Party was the ruling party at the time of the attack, in 1999. Therefore, the attack probably was carried out against the Party because it represented the government, not an opponent group. Thus the attack is related to statement 77 rather than 33. Following the incident characteristics as they are recorded, it might be a bombing and the attack might be carefully carried out in order to prevent loss of innocent lives. The sum of scores indicates a Type V terrorist organization (communist), which is compatible with the actual perpetrator identified by the GTD (organization TIKB).
However, more information may be needed in order to identify the selectivity level of the attack: Whether the attackers wanted to damage the property or attack people, whether there were people at the office at the time of the attack, and what petrol bombs mean. It seems that they were Molotov cocktails, which were unlikely to be understood as conventional bombings by the participants who gave these scores.

Consequently, an alternative prediction was created:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REDICTIVE STATEMENTS</th>
<th>TYPES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77. Government--public officials, juridical persons, parliamentarians, and high rank politicians.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. Targeting a property or installation rather than</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To this table, two types of terrorist organizations are almost equally likely to be the perpetrator of this attack, Type II (IBDA/C) and Type V (communist). A one unit difference between indicator scores is unlikely to be significant.
## Appendix H
### Statements and Factor Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Factor Arrays</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 The organization’s leadership and other organs under its command are</td>
<td>-4 -4 -2 -3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elected by members within the frame of democratic principles.</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 The organization attacks foreigners.</td>
<td>-1 1 3 -1 -2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 The organization commits violence against its own members and</td>
<td>0 -2 -3 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sympathizers.</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 The organization commits assassinations.</td>
<td>2 2 1 3 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 The organization aims to stop or annihilate individuals,</td>
<td>2 2 1 2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutions, and establishments whom it presumes to be a direct threat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to its existence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Businessmen and corporations are the targets of the organization.</td>
<td>-1 1 1 0 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 The organization pays little attention to counter-intelligence</td>
<td>-1 2 -5 -5 -3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>techniques in terms of documentation and clandestine acts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 The organization wants to establish a regime based on a single race</td>
<td>0 -5 -4 -1 -5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and a homogeneous social structure in which attachment and loyalty to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the state are considered to be fundamental.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Exit from the organization is easy and does not pose a serious threat</td>
<td>-3 3 -1 -2 -2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the individual who wants to disengage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mass casualties are consciously intended. The more destruction caused</td>
<td>1 -3 3 -3 -3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by an attack the better the result.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are martial wing members who stay in safe houses and cells determined by the organization.  

Members of the organization are unlikely to act contrary to organizational rules and values, i.e., to the group’s ethics and morals.  

Rural area activities are primary.  

The organization attacks to force its real target, which is generally not available as a direct victim of violent action (e.g., the state, the army, and the public), to be responsive to its demands and to comply with the organization.  

The organization avoids attacking establishments of Western countries, i.e., businesses, diplomatic bodies, and international institutions.  

The organization collects intelligence not only about the targets of its attacks, but also about larger populations of individuals and institutions, like the way intelligence agencies collect information.  

The organization advocates that states are unnecessary; instead, that publics can administer themselves with volunteer structures.  

Recruitment is mainly based on family and close neighborhood relations.  

Questioning decisions of the leadership is not possible within the organization.  

The organization is unlikely to have a connection with political parties in the democratic system.  

The organization is unlikely to recruit members primarily from the personal followers of an admired and charismatic leader who controls the organization.  

The organization has changed its strategy from violence to non-violent activities and now prefers to stay away from
The objective of the organization’s actions is to baffle its real target (e.g., the state, the army, and the public) and force it to react in a desired direction by increasing anxiety in society at large and disrupting everyday life.

The organization avoids targeting police.

The organization makes use of propaganda of deeds by accepting its violent actions publicly or leaving its “signature” at incident scenes.

The organization wants to establish a state regime based on religious principles.

The majority of members come from a specific geographical origin and local culture.

The existence of members’ feelings of hate and rancor against the outside world is a distinct characteristic.

The organization has infiltrated major government organizations and bureaucracies.

The organization conducts hostage takings, such as hijacking of transportation vehicles and involvement in barricade-and-hostage events.

The organization aims to conduct large scale and high-level violence within short time periods.

The organization aims to break the resistance of its real target (e.g., the state, the army, and the public).

The organization selects targets among opponents groups, like an ethnic group, religious sect (from either minority or main society), political party, and groups who have a distinct worldview or political standpoint.

Actions of the organization are planned and performed ineptly.
The organization asserts that it acts for the sake of protecting the state, the regime, or the social order.

Police or army officials join the organization because of their discomfort with the present system or on-going affairs in the country.

Decisions are made at the top of the organization and performed in a hierarchical structure.

The organization enjoys facilities and direct support (i.e., arms, training, safe haven camps, and technical support) provided by foreign states.

The structure of the organization provides full confidentiality regarding illegal activities. Members cannot know operational details of the organization other than as required by necessity.

The purpose of the organization’s actions is to call attention to its existence and principles at the international, national, or local levels.

The organization seeks to provoke a response of its real target (e.g., the state, the army, and the public) in a demanded direction.

The organization attacks military personnel and their installations.

The organization carries out bombings in cities.

The organization wants to found a new state by saving an ethnic group, which is thought to be represented by the organization.

The organization has difficulty financing its actions.

Cells of the organization or sub-committees in cities can make decisions to attack and execute on their own and without resorting to the central leadership’s approval.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The organization cooperates with criminal organizations and groups that have monetary goals.</th>
<th>2 0 -1 -2 0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Martyrdom, or being killed for the sake of the movement, is the most respected issue among members.</td>
<td>3 2 5 3 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Criminal activities that do not necessarily require violence (such as fraud, drug trafficking, theft, and so on) are frequently used to fund the organization.</td>
<td>0 0 0 1 -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The organization receives a significant degree of support (e.g., political and economic) from its large number of sympathizers abroad.</td>
<td>3 -3 2 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>The organization is unlikely to attack citizens from religious minority-communities.</td>
<td>-1 -3 -5 -2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>The organization commits actions that require detailed intelligence work, planning, and coordination.</td>
<td>0 -1 3 4 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>The organization, seeing itself as a freedom-fighter and human rights advocate, opposes the regime, which is viewed as authoritarian. It wants to establish democratic reforms in the country.</td>
<td>1 -2 -2 -2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>The organization has difficulty surviving because it has not gained enough public support.</td>
<td>-3 4 -2 -1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>The organization targets properties or installations rather than people.</td>
<td>-3 3 -1 -4 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>The organization generally uses homemade weapons with simply available materials.</td>
<td>-3 4 0 -1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Members of the organization come from diverse social origins, such as criminals, students, businessman, bureaucrats, politicians, and so on.</td>
<td>-1 -1 -1 -1 -2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>The organization cooperates with similar-minded groups.</td>
<td>0 3 0 0 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Female members are unlikely to operate in attack forces.</td>
<td>-5 2 -1 2 -4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The organization commits armed robbery for funding. -2 0 2 -2 3

The organization wants to overthrow the established order, asserting that there is a continuous conflict between the bourgeoisie and the workers, and that the state puts pressure on the public in order to protect the privileges of the bourgeoisie. 0 -2 -3 -3 5

Members of attack forces are well trained in terms of tactical skills and capabilities. 0 -3 3 2 3

The organization has a sufficient number of active members to commit terrorist actions requiring complex coordination, detailed planning, and logistic support. 0 -1 2 2 0

The organization relies to a large extent on the media and other instruments of mass communication for its purposes. -1 3 0 1 0

The loss of people who accidentally stand near the location of a violent action is seen as acceptable collateral damage for the organization, although it is not demanded. 2 1 4 1 0

The organization commits series of acts in such a way that international or public opinion can tolerate them and the government does not strongly react to them. -2 -2 -3 0 -1

The organization commits actions aimed at damaging the economy. 3 -1 -1 -4 0

The organization attacks installations and facilities. 0 0 1 -3 3

The organization commits suicide attacks. 4 -3 5 -2 -4

The organization aims to change governmental policies regarding only a particular issue. -2 0 -2 -1 -3

Technical skills of the organization’s members are outstanding (e.g., designation of bombs, use of computer technology, and use of weapons and tools which require advanced skills). They keep up with technological improvements in the terrorism field. -2 -1 4 0 1
72 The leadership has difficulties in maintaining the unity of the organization because of differences in ideas and internal competition.

73 Members of the organization have received military training in camps located in foreign countries.

74 Targets are carefully selected considering the justifications of the organization. The belief is that attacks should be carried out in a manner that prevents loss of innocent people.

75 The organization aims to defeat security forces through the waging of guerrilla warfare.

76 The organization carries out attacks to gain support of the targeted population (e.g., similar minded communities).

77 The organization attacks public officials, juridical persons, parliamentarians, and high ranking politicians.

78 The organization uses non-violent methods including mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, and constitutional politics, e.g., through political parties, human rights movements, and associations, and so on.

79 The organization is unlikely be a criminal organization, which concentrates on those crimes that bring in a constant flow of income.

80 The organization commits kidnappings.
## Appendix I

Participants’ Organization Specific Experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code of Participant</th>
<th>Q-sort for TO</th>
<th>Par. Time of Observation</th>
<th>Served in Large Cities</th>
<th>Par. Year of TNP Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>AQT1</td>
<td>2003-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>AQT2</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>AQT3</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>AQT4</td>
<td>1999-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>AQT5</td>
<td>1997-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>AQT6</td>
<td>2003-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>DHKP1</td>
<td>2001-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>DHKP2</td>
<td>1998-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>DHKP3</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>DHKP4</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>DHKP5</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DK1</td>
<td>1999-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DK2</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DK3</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DK4</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DK5</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>HZB1</td>
<td>2003-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>HZB2</td>
<td>1997-2008</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>HZB3</td>
<td>1999-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>HZB4</td>
<td>2002-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>HZB5</td>
<td>1996-2003</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>HZB7</td>
<td>1992-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>IBDA1</td>
<td>1997-2008</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>IBDA2</td>
<td>1999-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>IBDA3</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>IBDA4</td>
<td>2003-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>IBDA5</td>
<td>6 YEARS</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>IBDA6</td>
<td>1997-2003</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>MKP1</td>
<td>1996-2004</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>MKP2</td>
<td>1998-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>MKP3</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>MKP4</td>
<td>1993-2002</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>MKP5</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>MLKP1</td>
<td>1994-2009</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
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Participant’s time of observation shows the period that each participant dealt with—through terrorism investigations—only that specific terrorist organization the participant responded for, not the period of the counterterrorism service of the participant.