BOUNDARYING, GEOGRAPHIC THOUGHT AND THE EXCEPTIONAL

GEOGRAPHIES OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLES

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty years, there has been a renewed interest in conceptualizing “boundaries” both within human geography, especially in political geography. Borders and boundaries have become integral facets of theorization, modeling, and interpretation of the production of place and identity at varying scales. This growth has led to growth of border studies and border theory (Paasi 1996, 2002, 2005; Michaelsen and Johnson 1997; Lugo 1997; Newman and Paasi 1998; Lamont and Molnar 2002; Kaplan and Häkli 2002; Grundy-Warr and Schofield 2005; Paasi 2005; Kossolov 2005; van Houtum 2005; Nicol and Minghi 2005; Brunet-Jailly 2005, 2007; Newman 2006b; Rumford 2006), to more ontological discussions of boundaries and boundary processes related to (spatial) cognition and geographic knowledge, representation, and reasoning (Tye 1990; Abbott 1995; Smith and Varzi 2000; Varzi 2001; Debarbieux 2004; Jones 2009; Schaffter, Fall and Debarbieux 2009). This dissertation addresses both the political geographical and ontological discussions through the presentation of a novel conceptualization of the boundary. This
conceptualization is significantly undergirded by readings in embodied cognitive science research. In particular, it follows a cognitive-cultural linguistics approach (Hampe, 2005) by focusing on processes of “boundarying” from cognitive to social spaces. This will be of interest to political geographers within border studies as well as those in the cognitive sciences. My novel conceptualization of the boundary, which makes up the core of this project, is based on this process of boundarying. It therefore acts as a unifying topic for the diverse literatures reviewed throughout this dissertation.

One contribution of this project is that it is interdisciplinary. The boundary is theorized by weaving together diverse literatures emanating from the cognitive sciences, philosophy, political geography, critical population studies, international relations, and political science on issues from embodiment philosophy and science, abstract thought and spatial cognition to sovereignty, territory, citizenship, displacement, and international humanitarianism. Traversing distinct academic fields that include topics from neural processes to state governance and displacement should not be undertaken lightly as many conceptual errors can be made in such a maneuver. However, this dissertation does not attempt a strong reductionism that causally links sovereign power, the politics of international humanitarianism, or the role of territory in the formation of states and citizenship to neurological processes such as backpropagation, nodal weighting in learning acquisition, and subject reaction times. That would, of course, be absurd. Instead, not only figuratively speaking but literally, the boundary traverses the spaces between disparate fields of study. I thus maneuver between them by being topically-bound (boundarying), not disciplinarily-bound (human geography), though as a
dissertation this project is rightly positioned within the academic field of human geography. This transition between academic domains is not done willy-nilly but conducted via thoughtful articulation of the intersections between these domains, and their discursive idiosyncrasies, along a specific line of inquiry. That line of inquiry is the boundary.

The purpose of this dissertation, then, is not to test a theory on boundaries so to generalize for the purpose of prediction. Instead, it provides cogitation upon the boundary and boundarying as an explanatory grounding, or first principle, for geographic thought. Therefore, this dissertation’s orientation and structure follows in the tradition of William Bunge’s Theoretical Geographies (1966). Although, it does so not in his spatial-quantitative orientation or goal of restricting the definition of Geography to a particular view of “science” but in his promotion of metageographical theorization – that is, explicit theorization of and contribution to geographic thought within the discipline of Geography. Therefore, following Bunge, this “author is a theoretical geographer” (x) fashioning a conceptualization of the boundary to extend the current scope of geographic thought. In this sense, “geographic thought” has two connotations. The first encompasses the current state of theorizations and methodologies within human geography. The second refers to the geographic nature of thought itself. It is on this second connotation of geographic thought that I fashion the concept of boundarying that is in turn submitted as a contribution to the first connotation. I thus begin in Chapter II with cognitive science literature and end this dissertation with a particular extension of the boundary into the specific field of political geography through a salient example of boundarying. That
example is the political category of citizen-subject termed “internally displaced persons” (IDP).

Political geography is particularly apt for a specific example of boundarying because boundaries, borders, borderlands, and frontiers were central concepts of Geography from its inception as an academic discipline in Europe and the US in the late nineteenth century (Paasi 1996) and also because of the recent popularity of “border studies” or “boundary studies” (Newman 2003; Paasi 2005; Jones 2009) as a backlash to post-Cold War hyperbole of a so-called borderless world (Ohmae 1990, 1996; Ó Tuathail 2000; Greig 2002; Newman 2006a). While this literature has made some conceptual inroads into interdisciplinary approaches to studying borders/boundaries, my conceptualization of the boundary is quite different from those currently in geographic thought. I provide an explanation of the boundary vis-à-vis embodied philosophy of mind and cognitive science to assess the role of boundaries and boundary processes in the full term of “geographic thought”. There are several works that share similarities to this one but are either incomplete discussions (Jones 2009) or they are not based in the embodiment thesis (Tye 1990; Abbott 1995; Smith and Varzi 2000; Gattis 2001; Varzi 2001; Debarbieux 2004; Schaffter, Fall and Debarbieux 2009). I review these projects in the following chapter.

I provide a demonstration of this embodied conceptualization of the boundary within political geography. This extension delimited further to works related to biopolitical critiques of modern governance. I rely heavily on Michel Foucault but I am interested most chiefly by Giorgio Agamben, and those who have expounded upon his
work, and the centrality he places on relations, boundaries, space and place (territory) in his critique of the metaphysics of sovereignty past and present (Agamben 1995, 2005; Minca 2005, 2006, 2007; Ek 2006; Elden 2006; Gregory 2004, 2006; DiCaroli 2007; Edkins 2007; Lacau 2007). Biopolitics is an agglomeration of political commentaries that take as the fundamental element of public politics and all things political to be the bodies of citizens. Ruminations of the goals, structures, and functioning of states is thus focused on bodies and the spaces they inhabit. Biopolitical commentary is based mostly on poststructural critiques of the central role of language in state’s regulation of the bodies with the goal of producing desirable citizen subjects. In this sense biopolitics is an assessment and critique of productive (Foucault 1977, 1980) and destructive power (Agamben 1995, 2005).

In a recent review of Giorgio Agamben’s biopolitical perspective (Minca 2006), the term “geo-biopolitical” (395) was used to emphasis the reliance upon spatial concepts and metaphors to describe the current state of affairs of modern state governance and the disposition of citizens within it. Following this emphasis of the spatial within the (bio)political, I term my geographically-minded reading of biopolitics “geobiopolitics”. From the position of geo-biopolitics, I demonstrate the interpretive power of my novel conceptualization of the boundary through the political category of “IDP”. To be clear, though, this dissertation is not about geobiopolitics or IDPs. The core element of this dissertation is a novel conceptualization of the boundary. It includes other topics as a means of illumination of the boundary. The boundary is such a fundamental concept that
I cannot, within this dissertation, exhaust the discussion to its fullest. However, I strive to be as exhaustive as possible within a particular account of the boundary.

This dissertation is structured into two projects in which two median chapters, III and IV, are provided to lay out clear theoretical relations between the first project and the second. The first part of this dissertation pertains to the core of this project, which is a novel conceptualization of the boundary centered on the idea of boundarying formulated through my geographically-minded reading of the philosophical position embodied realism by cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson in *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999). Chapter II is devoted to constructing the core of this dissertation, i.e., the boundary and boundarying, while Chapters III and IV provide a bridge to between the core and its extension into a political geographical frame. This extension is further delimited by my reliance upon “biopolitics”, i.e., political theories stressing the central role of the body in governance. A geographical orientation to biopolitical theories is referred to as a “geo-biopolitical” perspective (Minca 2006).

For my geobiopolitical perspective I rely on the works of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben. Of particular interest is the work of Agamben. He, following Carl Schmitt and Friedrich Ratzel, conceptualizes sovereign power, the modern state, and contemporary citizenship spatially. An important construct in his theorization of citizenship and sovereign power is the “exception”. “The exception is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole of which it is always already included” [original emphasis] (Agamben 1995: 25). The exception is an explicit boundary-concept, i.e., a classificatory concept structured by the
logic of boundarying and therefore provides an excellent example for a political extension of the boundary and boundarying. In the most succinct phrasing, this dissertation is a discussion of the extent to which the logics of boundarying form the basis of geographic thought, in both senses of the phrase. Thus, the second part of this dissertation is a utilization of a geobiopolitics based in the logics of boundarying. This utilization consists of a deconstructive genealogy of the citizen-subject “IDP”.

The IDP is described herein as categorization representative of Agamben’s concept of the exception. Thus, the paradoxical nature of the IDP is explored through the boundary-concept of the exception. While there are, no doubt, people who are enduring various traumas and hardships throughout the world that are labeled “IDP”, this categorization refers not to an essential element of their being but to the nature of their status within state-oriented geographical imaginations (Gregory 1994). It is therefore externally and institutionally-driven, yet it has profound experiential impact on those labeled “IDP”. The overriding factor in the manner in which they are, or are not, assisted is based solely on categorical interpretation and the meaning this categorization has in the political field in which it originated, namely the international arena, and, in particular, the legal frameworks of the United Nations. A limiting factor, then, in the protection and assistance of people in need is the manner of categorization reflecting a logic of boundarying particular to territorial sovereignty, which I theorize as the metaphysics of place. This last point is explored in the final three chapters through an interpretative exploration of the “IDP”.
The final chapter of this dissertation presents an alternative interpretation to the subject IDP in the form of “transnationally placed persons” (TPP). Following the claim that deconstruction necessitates reconstruction as a part of that interpretive method, the TPP is a reconstruction of the IDP based on a rejection of the territorial placements indicative of citizenship in a sovereign state imaginary. It is thus born of a reboundarying process. In short, just as classification is boundarying, reclassification is reboundarying that requires an alternative conceptual structure from which to base new boundarying logic (Bowker and Star, 1999).

Political classifications are normative boundaryings that involves a particular way of knowing and acting that yield specific experiential effects. Using alternative or marginalized knowledge to form new systems of classification is a means of resistance. Thus, reboundarying leads to countless social and material transformations unique to the people and places in which they are enacted or even resisted (Newman 2003; Toyota 2007; Debarbieux 2004; Jones 2009). These reclassifications produce “incongruous categories” (Foucault 1970) to those currently in play in geobiopolitical, state-oriented institutional practices.

The supposition of the TPP is such a reboundarying process. The logic for this reboundarying follows as such: “If the metaphysics of place provides the logic for state territorial sovereignty that leads to systems of classification of citizens that make possible categories and practices of displacement, then a new system without place as its ordering principle could provide a new topology disrupting transforming the logics and practices of displacement into something else. That new topology need not be so overly determined
that it too produces its own displacements, that is, those who do not belong within the new classification system. Instead, it can be an inclusive space of “whatever beings” (Agamben 1993: 1) in a “whatever place” with a “whatever politics” (Edkins 2007: 70). This thought experiment of the “whatever”, a character of the boundary, is explored in the final chapter.

While the conclusion of this dissertation is effectively an exercise in reclassification, this position and the content of it are unique and timely. First, within Chapter II and further in Chapter IV I discuss the importance of metaphors and epistemic structuring in normative practices. Of interest here is that there has been a historical transformation of normative epistemic structuring – common manner of conceiving of the order of things typically conveyed in the phrase “common sense” – commenced through the proliferation of dominant spatial conceptual constructs that provide the logical bases for various rational arguments on any number of topics from political ideology to theology to philosophy to scientific discovery (Foucault 1970; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987; Bohm and Peat 1987; Butcher 2004; Kinna 2005), linguistically represented as increasingly complex metaphors found in circulation in a given period. Second, alternative categorization is not a trivial practice nor is it merely an act of incongruent labeling within normative categorizations. Categories and classifications are higher-level products of the implementation of the logics of boundarying in a given context. Classification is an essential an act of human cognition as well as a fundamental political practice. The concept of the IDP emanates from a long-standing idea of sovereignty as an inviolable territorial right. Within most modern states this right
manifests as the assumption that all individuals born in a state’s territory are
primordially-bound to the institutions and national character defined by that state. This
does not mean that individuals actual reflect that character or follow state rules passively.
The TPP is a demonstration of an alternative classification practice that rejects the
metaphysics of place in the logics of boundarying that produce citizen-subjects. The
result is an example of an unbounded citizen under “territory without sovereignty”
imaginary. However, territory does not exist without sovereignty and vice versa.
Therefore, “territory without sovereignty” is more accurately described as “place without
authority”. This is neither anarchy nor democracy but contextual-dependent applications
of bounded individualism and collectivism rooted in pluralist and acceptant ideologies
(Blunt and Willis 2000). Therefore, the ideological basis of “whatever politics” is always
“to be determined”.

Since this dissertation is focused on constructing a concept for geographic thought
it is heavily positioned. Chapter II provides the positionality of both parts of this
dissertation on various philosophical, disciplinary, and conceptual grounds.
Epistemologically, I base my conceptualization of the boundary upon my own
geographically-minded reading of embodied realism, which is a philosophy of mind
posited by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) to resolve what they thought of as errors and
incongruous interpretations within traditional Western philosophy vis-à-vis contemporary
embodiment theses in the cognitive sciences. Also, I realize that there are many
approaches to cognition and many cognitive theories and philosophies of mind that deal
with topics not covered in this dissertation or by Lakoff and Johnson. However, I am not
attempting to synthesize the totality of research that exists on cognition and philosophy of mind. I am instead weaving together a diverse literature across disciplines to contribute to geographic thought. The rationale that guides my selection is relevance to the boundary. Review and synthesis is a process of discovery. Scientific discovery is not limited to methodological gyrations and technical maneuvers that bestow a sense of scientificity to academic labor. The discovery of my endeavor comes from resulting alternative understandings that emerge in the weaving together process.

While the geobiopolitical section and interpretive analytic of later chapters is influenced heavily by poststructural method and its linguistic approach to political interpretation, the assumed incongruities between embodied realism and poststructuralism are dealt with at length below. Methodologically, so far as the second part of this dissertation can be classified as qualitative, my exploration into the citizen-subject IDP is interpretive and fits generally into a qualitative research agenda. As for the interpretive method, I take from – but do not apply – Foucault’s genealogical approach and Derrida’s deconstructive method to form an ad hoc geobiopolitical interpretive analytic.

In sum, the purpose of this dissertation is to posit a novel conceptualization of the boundary through the concept of boundarying. I then extend this conceptualization into political geography through an example interpretation. It therefore has two parts boundarying and the deconstructive genealogy of the IDP. Due to the political exploration of the boundary and its example of a particular population, this dissertation is positioned within critical research within political and population geographies. It will be
informative for those interested in geographic thought, embodiment, spatial cognition and abstract thought, theorizations of space and place, poststructuralism, deconstructive and genealogical methods, the spatiality of political identity, and the politicization of humanitarianism. The following concluding section of Chapter I details the content of the remaining chapters and their sections and subsections.

Chapter Summaries

This dissertation has a total of seven chapters. Chapter II, *The Boundary*, has four sections devoted to the development of a novel conceptualization of the boundary vis-à-vis geographic thought based on an embodied realist perspective. It is not a complete exploration of the possibilities of this type of endeavor, but it does provide a clear basis for the boundary that can be elaborated upon or applied in subsequent projects, as in the example of the second part of this dissertation. The core of this dissertation, the boundary, requires in-depth accounts of foundational sources on a number of topics. Chapter II provides a review of relevant literatures pertaining to the boundary, and then, utilizes this literature to lay the ground for the development of the boundary in geographic thought. The first two sections, *Embodied Cognition* and *Embodied Realism*, provide the foundational information from the cognitive sciences. The final two chapters, *Borders, Boundaries, Binaries* and *Space, Place, and the Metaphysics of Presence*, build the basic rationale for the boundary and provide rudimentary framework for utilization of this conceptualization within the social sciences.
Chapter III, *Politicizing the Boundary*, has three sections, *Among the Social Sciences, Among Postmodernism, Poststructuralism, Deconstruction, and Genealogy*, and *Among Political Geographies*. Each one, respectively, provides an overview of the philosophy of the social sciences, the epistemological and methodological foundations of postmodernism, poststructuralism, deconstruction, and genealogy, and a review of the field of political geography, including critical geopolitics, legal geographies, and border studies. This chapter provides a transition from theorizing the boundary and boundarying to focusing this novel conceptualization on a particular topic within a specific field of human geography. Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII provide a demonstration of the efficacy of this concept of boundarying as an innovative interpretative framework. The second section of Chapter II, *Among Postmodernism, Poststructuralism, Deconstruction, and Genealogy*, has four subsections devoted to an explanation of each of the four topics of section title. It also provides a discussion of how poststructuralism and embodied realism can imbricate effectively within this particular project. The third section, *Among Political Geographies*, concludes the groundwork for the final four chapters devoted to an interpretative extension of the conceptualization boundarying through a political geographical example. It has three subsections pertaining to political geography, critical geopolitics, legal geographies, and border studies. The third subsection, *Border Studies*, reviews the history and current status of the study of borders and boundaries in political geography. This review is integrated into a further development of the boundary and boundarying that includes, yet extends well beyond, the current scope of border or boundary studies within political geography.
Chapter IV, *Geobiopolitics*, integrates boundarying within an assemblage of political critiques collectively referred to as “biopolitics”. My geographical reading of biopolitics, termed “geobiopolitics”, is informed mostly by two critical figures in biopolitical discourses, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, whose names correspond to the two subsections dedicated to relevant readings of these two prominent theorists’ works. Also, an interpretive analytic inspired by Foucault’s genealogical method and Derrida’s deconstructive method, each described in Chapter III section B, is detailed within this chapter.

Chapter V, *Deconstructive Genealogy of the IDP*, utilizes the deconstructive genealogical interpretive analytic of Chapter III within a discussion of a salient example of boundaryings within a political geographic arena. Chapter V has three sections, *Displacement, Sovereignty*, and *The UN System*, that provide the beginnings of both a genealogy of the IDP and a deconstruction of the metaphysics of place that structures the political boundaryings that produce displacements of individuals known collectively as internally displaced persons.

Chapter VI, *Spaces of Immunity, Spaces of Impunity*, provides a real example of displacement, Darfur, Sudan, to discuss the development of manifold boundaryings and rebounderyings at different scales involving three important topics in most reports of the “root causes” and intractability of the situation. This chapter has one section, *Environment, Identity, and Politics*, and three subsections pertaining to each topic of the section. The goal of these subsections is to demonstrate that various political practices, especially those typically defined vis-à-vis space and place, are boundaryings. Also, the
fluidity with which explanations of the conflict and status of IDPs in Darfur flow from environment (and thus economics due to the agrarian lifestyles of Darfurians) to identity to politics supports contemporary analyses of conflict that reveal the shifting, dynamic, contextual nature and often dispersed origins and developments of conflict and peace.

Chapter VII, *Transnationally Placed Persons*, is the final chapter of this dissertation. It concludes the genealogical and deconstructive aspects of the geobiopolitical interpretive analytic of the IDP. Deconstructive methods typically call for reinterpretation, or reconstruction, after deconstruction. The TPP is submitted for this purpose. The TPP is not the culmination of a novel conceptualization of the boundary but example of the utility of the conceptualization in the realm of political geography of which I chose to delimit my discussion of the boundary and boundarying. The TPP is not posited as a solution to state induced forced displacement but instead offers, to an extent, a post-state example of alternative thinking. It is literally a reboundarying in the form of reclassification of sovereignty and citizenship sans the metaphysics of place. Sovereignty without territory can be either unbounded oppression or global democracy depending on how it is conceived, practiced, and experienced. While some political boundaryings marginalize and limit to the detriment of some or many, others are liberating to those under various conditions of marginalization and exploitation, or in a general sense displacement.
CHAPTER II

THE BOUNDARY

We think of a boundary whenever we think of an entity demarcated from its surroundings. There is a boundary (a surface) demarcating the interior of a sphere from its exterior; there is a boundary (a border) separating Maryland and Pennsylvania. Sometimes the exact location of a boundary is unclear or otherwise controversial (as when you try to trace out the margins of Mount Everest, or even the boundary of your own body). Sometimes the boundary lies skew to any physical discontinuity or qualitative differentiation (as with the border of Wyoming, or the boundary between the upper and lower halves of a homogeneous sphere). But whether sharp or blurry, natural or artificial, for every object there appears to be a boundary that marks it off from the rest of the world. Events, too, have boundaries — at least temporal boundaries. Our lives are bounded by our births and by our deaths; the soccer game began at 3pm sharp and ended with the referee's final whistle at 4:45pm. And it is sometimes suggested that abstract entities, such as concepts or sets, have boundaries of their own. Whether all this boundary talk is coherent, however, and whether it reflects the structure of the world or the organizing activity of our intellect, are matters of deep philosophical controversy. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008)

This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, *Cognitive Science*, I provide a brief overview of the development of Cognitive Science, the discipline, with its contemporary theoretical camps. The second section, *Embodied Cognition*, is a geographically-minded reading of contemporary research in embodied cognition. By geographically-minded I mean that I, as a geographer, am not overly interested in the same topics and debates of those
working exclusively within the cognitive sciences. I am instead interested in how this work relates to my interests in geographic thought. However, this interest takes my investigation into a subset of cognitive science literature. I therefore do not review the entirety of the discipline of cognitive science nor do I review all of the issues of relevance to cognition. The third section, *Embodied Realism*, reviews Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999) embodied realist position. The fourth section, Boundarying, Space, and Place, is the section that presents my novel conceptualization of the boundary through a series of related discussions. It is divided into two subsections. The first subsection, *Borders, Boundaries, Binaries and Boundarying*, posits the process of boundarying my presentation of embodied realism. The second subsection, *Space, Place, and the Metaphysics of Presence*, addresses the concept of boundarying vis-à-vis space and place plus a discussion of the conceptual relationship between Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence with embodied cognition.

At the outset of this chapter I must reiterate the nature and purpose of this dissertation. It is not about political geography, geobiopolitics, IDPs, or aspects of sovereignty, the state, territory, or citizenship. It is about a novel conceptualization of the boundary and in particular the concept of boundarying. It is not methodologically-driven, but conceptually-driven. It does not test a theory but instead demonstrates the interpretative efficacy of boundarying through a salient example.
Cognitive Science

My treatment of the cognitive sciences is heavily oriented toward those writers advocating an embodied approach which are all based on the idea that cognition involves the entire body and is distributed throughout the brain but is adaptively unified in function (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Lakoff, 1987; Johnson, 1987; Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991). The term “cognition” thus refers to all brain activity, including perception, memory, abstract reasoning, and affective and conative processing because no cognitive function exists in isolation of any other. Also, embodied cognitive science implicitly or explicitly advocates positions within the philosophy of mind, for instance, monism vis-à-vis the mind/brain relation, some version of eliminativism regarding thought, mental states, and the Self (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Churchland 2002), non-objectivist (Hampe 2005), experientialist (Johnson 1987), and, to some degree positioned regarding reductionism (Parfit 2002; Kim 2002) and emergentism (Corning 2002; Ryan 2006) that attempt to reconcile metacognitive function and mereological paradoxes – part-whole and part-part relations. I return to these concepts below.

The remainder of this section is devoted to a brief history of the emergence of the discipline of Cognitive Science (CS) and its three major theoretical camps, symbolism, connectionism, and dynamicism and an overview of embodied cognition. I will then narrow my discussion to the works of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in the next section. That section is devoted specifically to their alternative philosophy of mind, “embodied realism”, and its rejection of tradition Western philosophies of mind due in
part to their reliance on basic folk psychology, i.e., “common-sense” views on the mind and how it works that are not physically possible in the brain or empirically falsifiable or verifiable (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Churchland 2002).


Cognitive science is the multidisciplinary scientific study of cognition and its role in intelligent agency. It examines what cognition is, what it does, and how it works. (90)

Cognitive Science, the full-blown discipline (CS), coalesced from works in many fields of the cognitive sciences in the mid-1950s (after a 1956 conference in particular). Its premier journal, *Cognitive Science*, began publication in 1977. CS descended from many fields that produced the conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and technical advancements necessary for the blossoming of a well-developed discipline by the 1980s. In chronological order of development they include; neuroscience, cybernetics, artificial intelligence/computer science, psychology, linguistics, philosophy of mind, anthropology, and sociology (...geography and history next?).

*Neuroscience* has taken a more or less supporting role in CS by providing a basic physiological understanding of brain morphology and neural functioning. It has become more prevalent as scanning technologies have become more precise, widely available, and applied in the cognitive sciences generally. The first truly influential field and precursor for the computational approaches of CS was *cybernetics*. The term “cybernetics” was coined by Norbert Wiener in 1948. In essence, cybernetics
mathematically modeled dynamic feedback between a cognitive actor (for instance a bee) and its surroundings (both social and physical). The objective was to model adaptive behaviors through the dynamism of ecological relations. From cybernetics came artificial intelligence (AI) and computer science in general.

During WWII, cryptography was vital to the war effort. Alan Turing of England was particularly important in that he and his colleagues were able to crack many German codes. After the war, Turing devised the theoretical basis for analogical calculation which he later applied to the study of linguistic reasoning. The result was the now famous “Turing machine”. This device, which calculates proper symbolic responses to a series of symbolic inputs under precise combinatory rules, was fundamental to establishing modern computer technologies. Working on an unfinished WWII Air Force artillery aiming machine, American John von Neumann, developed the “von Neumann architecture” which established the basic hardware design of modern computing by separating and selectively integrating, through cycled feedback, the memory unit and central processing unit of the rudimentary computers of the 1950s. Artificial intelligence and computer science in general was heavily funded by the U.S. government in the 1950s as the Cold War and American economic development and expansion was in full effect. From Turing’s and von Neumann’s work, among others, AI blossomed. Crucial to the early work in AI was the collaborative pairings of Herbert Simon and Allen Newell and Marvin Minsky and John McCarthy. The underlying assumption of their alternative computational theorizations shared a similar tenet; that all learning can be precisely calculated and therefore emulated by machines. This was the linchpin for cognitivism in
that modeling cognition meant rejecting behavioralism and getting on with direct theorizing of how cognition worked.

Psychology’s role in CS is just as foundational as engineering and computational sciences. The history of psychology’s role in CS is basically a history of methodological changes. In chronological order of influence, the important historical trends in psychology include; structural and experimental schools following Wilhelm Wundt and Edward Titchener, behavioral schools following Edward Thorndike, John Watson, Ivan Pavlov, B.F. Skinner, the Gestalt school, functional of John Dewey, and theoretical psychology of William James (derided as “speculative psychology” by Jerry Fodor (1975)), and, finally, cognitivism, which was also a general movement, “the cognitive revolution”, in the social sciences from which CS was born.

The cognitivist background of CS was developed dually by transformations in both psychology and linguistics, which led to the beginnings of “cognitive psychology” and “cognitive linguistics”. This is because cognitivism is based in modeling reasoning and most human reasoning involves language. Thus, the interdisciplinary works on cognition and language strengthened psychology and linguistics and by extension forged a major branch of CS. It is during this cognitive revolution, beginning in the late 1950s and completely dominated the social sciences by the 1980s, that philosophy of mind becomes prominent in the cognitive sciences. CS thus emerged with a fully realized philosophical branch.

There are three major camps in modern CS on the nature of cognition, symbolism, connectionism, and dynamism. These boundaries emerged from
concentration on particular philosophies of mind, theories, or topics of study. Each camp is organized around a particular metaphor that guides theories as to how the mind works. These metaphors include the mind as analogic computer (symbolicism), the mind as brain, that is, it emulates a neural network (connectionism), and the mind as Watt governor (dynamicism) (Eliasmith, 2003). Depending on the model and the cognitive modality being researched each approach can be complimentary or incompatible, for instance, dynamicism rejects a computational approach and accepts connectionism’s neural architecture approach, yet connectionists agree that the mind includes some form of computation but reject symbolists’ models of how that occurs.

Notably, each of symbolism, connectionism, and dynamicism rely on metaphor not only for explanatory purposes, but also for developing their conceptual foundations in understanding the target of the metaphor; that is, the mind. For symbolists, the properties of Turing machines become shared with minds. For connectionists, the character of representation changes dramatically. Mental representations are taken to consist of "sub-symbols" associated with each node, while "whole" representations are real-valued vectors in a high-dimensional property space.) Finally, for the dynamicists, because the Watt Governor is best described by dynamic systems theory, which makes no reference to computation or representation, our theories of mind need not appeal to computation or representation either. (Eliasmith, 2003: 494)

In the first and oldest case, also referred to as classicism, the mind is like a Turing Machine – analog calculator – based on processing symbols under specific rules of relations between them producing a LOT (Fodor, 1975) that can be modeled as the basis of linguistic reasoning. In the connectionist model, biological realism is the ideal, though this is not always the case, in which models are structured as abstract neural networks made up of neural nodes and axonal links. The problem is that while nodes and links follow a metaphorical pattern of brain architecture, the manner in which nodes and links
work in many models is not physically applicable to actual neural systems of the brain (Bechtel, Abrahamsen, and Graham, 1998). In the final model, put forth by Tim van Gelder (1995), the mind is understood as a neural network but can be more effectively modeled as nonrepresentational (anti-computational) and dynamical (instead of linear feedback, or backpropagation, modeling in connectionist accounts) using differential equations and circular and iterative systems. These many developments and the myriad others not discussed above have produced a vibrant and rapidly growing discipline with a strong interdisciplinary program. “The one thing that seems certain is change: cognitive science is being pulled vertically down into the brain and horizontally out into the environment” [original emphasis] (Bechtel, Abrahamsen, and Graham, 1998: 90).

This leads to the final interdisciplinary piece to the CS puzzle which consists of anthropologists and sociologists adding social science insights to the understanding and application of cognitive science theories ecologically (Nuckolls 1998). These are mostly tied to the embodied, philosophical, linguistic and psychological branches. “Social and cultural studies originating in sociology and anthropology are also coming to play a more influential role, whereas computer science (AI) and linguistics have become less influential” (Bechtel, Abrahamsen, and Graham, 1998: 93). It is in this burgeoning milieu that human geography’s future relations to CS can be placed.

Geography’s historical relation to the cognitive sciences has included Behavioral and Cognitive Geographies of geographic knowledge acquisition and use (Cox and Golledge 1981; Golledge and Stimpson 1997; Golledge 2002), Spatial Cognition (Freksa et al., 2000) and Spatial Information Theory (Frank and Kuhn (eds.), 1995), in addition to
science regarding computer representation and communication of spatial and geographic knowledge (Mark and Frank 1991; Golledge and Stimpson 1997; Peuquet 2002; Duckman, Goodchild, and Worboys 2003).

This history is decades old and has diversified since the 1990s with the proliferation of geographic information systems (GIS) and the science behind their development and use referred to as geographic information science (GISc) (Duckman, Goodchild, and Worboys 2003). GISc represents the proliferation of computer-assisted geographical sciences in the last twenty years and also the reinvigoration of the cognitive and behavioral geographies en vogue in Geography in the 1970s and 80s (Cox and Golledge 1981) through their new GIS applications (Golledge and Stimpson 1997; Duckman, Goodchild, and Worboys 2003). While GISc’s primary concern is simply to model spatial cognition, geographical knowledge, and information processing and then resolve issues involved in the computer representation of these topics, there are many topics, limitations, and technical, theoretical, and philosophical difficulties within this endeavor. It is within this broad description of GISc that the only well-developed link between CS and Geography exists. Within GISc is an implicit positionality encompassed by the term naïve geography (Egenhofer and Mark 1995).

Naïve geography is a field of study that is concerned with formal models of the common-sense geographic world. It comprises a set of theories upon which next-generation Geographic Information Systems (GISs) can be built. (1)

Naïve geography represents the overall flavor of GISc. This is quite different from my own project. An important contributing field to GISc research is that often utilizes theories of or related to embodied cognition is Spatial Cognition. Not all of
contributors are geographers, but all collaborate sufficiently to be included as part of the geographic literature.

Spatial cognition is concerned with the ways humans, animals, or machines think about real or abstract space and also with the ways spatial structures can be used for reasoning. Thus, space is considered both, as an object of cognition and a means of cognition. Spatial cognition is an interdisciplinary research area involving approaches from artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, geography, mathematics, biology, design, theoretical computer science, architecture, and philosophy… [original emphasis]

Research on spatial cognition has drawn increased attention in recent years for at least three different reasons: (1) basic research dimensions: there is a growing awareness of the importance of spatial cognitive abilities in biological systems, specifically with respect to perception and action, to the organization of memory, and to understanding and producing natural language; (2) computational dimension: spatial representations and spatial inference may provide suitable limitations to enhance the computational efficiency for a large and relevant class of problems; (3) application dimension: a good understanding of spatial processes is essential for a wide variety of challenging application areas including Geographic Information Systems (GIS), pedestrian and vehicle navigation aids, autonomous robots, smart graphics, medical surgery, information retrieval, virtual reality, Internet navigation, and human-computer interfaces. (Freksa et al., 2000: V)

Spatial Cognition too has a quite different agenda for its work than this dissertation. However, this literature still remains firmly within the naïve geography paradigm. I will review a small section of this literature on geographic boundaries, vagueness and mereotopology (Smith, 1995; Galton 1999, 2003; Mark, Smith, and Tversky 1999) in a subsequent section.

The literature specifically relating the topics of categories to boundaries, boundaries to abstract thought, abstract thought to spatial cognition, and all of these connections to geographic thought outside of the Spatial Cognition/GISc literature is quite small (Debarbieux 2004; Jones 2009; and a response to Jones: Schaffter, Fall and
Debarbieux 2009). In fact Jones (2009) is the only article to include embodied cognition and in particular Lakoff and Johnson to discuss geographic thought, categories, and boundaries. A missing, yet crucial, aspect however of this work is the role of entailments, linguistically manifest as metaphors, in reasoning. Creswell (1996) addresses this particular issue, but does not engage in embodied cognition directly or in the connection of metaphors, categories, and boundaries to geographic thought. I review this literature in a later section.

This section briefly described the development of the discipline CS and its camps. We are left with a general understanding of CS as an interdisciplinary field whose core not only transcends many disciplines but will increasingly fundamentally impact the future of the social sciences, including human geography. This dissertation follows this growing synergy between CS and the social sciences but not in the manner of naïve geography of Spatial Cognition. The goal of the next section is to describe the embodied cognition thesis that has the greatest transformation potential for human geography.

Embodied Cognition

CS has a long history of communication with a particular group of geographers, but has not as yet been integrated within the whole of human geography and its various fields. This is a product of the prejudices against the numerous flaws of positivist science in the social sciences, and rightly so. Allusions to neurons and perception activate academic gag reflexes stemming from this aversion to positivism and objectivism, especially those influenced by critical geographies and social theory. The result is a lack
of communication between human geography and embodied CS that has blinded human geographers to its potential transformational possibilities. *Embodied cognition is not positivist nor is it objectivist.* Various fields utilizing embodied cognition are producing vigorous critical social science research linking language, thought, identity formation, bodies, place-making, institutions, and power. This research theorizes how social cognition develops in context over time to produce the spatialities, both abstract and “real”, of our historically-contingent, dynamic, and contested world. A serious engagement of human geographers with embodied cognition research and its extension into social contexts will grant greater grounding and legitimacy for social spatial theorizing, not in simply a descriptive manner or a naïve geography paradigm but in a critical manner. But the extent and mode of transformation possible in human geography depends on how embodied CS is received and integrated. This and next three sections provide one example of these transformations.

Tied to the connectionist school and supported by the increasing applicability of dynamicism is a school of thought with several variations, i.e., mediated action, situated cognition, distributed cognition, and enactivism, all of which are collectively refer to as *embodied cognition.*

Embodiment in the field of cognitive science refers to understanding the role of an agent’s own body in its everyday, situated cognition. (Gibbs, 2006: 1)

Gibbs (2006) assesses the disparity between these more generic understandings of embodiment in the social sciences and those of embodied CS.

What must a body be like for it to support cognition, language, and consciousness? … One of the traditional beliefs in the cognitive sciences is that
intelligent behavior, including the ability to perceive, think, and use language, need not arise from any specific bodily form. … (2)

This traditional conception of the mind and body has imposed serious limitations on the scholarly study of mental life in cognitive science. Although psychologists and others readily admit that much knowledge is derived from sensory perception, few scholars, until recently, have emphasized the importance of kinesthetic action in theoretical accounts of how people perceive, learn, think, experience emotions and consciousness, and use language. This … traditional disembodied view of the mind is mistaken, because human cognition is fundamentally shaped by embodied experience. … Embodiment may not provide the single foundation for all thought and language, but it is an essential part of the perceptual and cognitive processes by which we make sense of our experiences in the world. (Gibbs, 2006: 2-4)

The embodiment thesis has a historical legacy tracing back through Immanuel Kant’s schemas and conceptual categories, John Dewey’s functional psychology, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Gibbs 2006). Central premises of embodied cognition include:

1. Reasoning is formulated mostly by unconscious neural activity and is therefore structured by the unconscious mind.

2. Reasoning is based in bodily experience. Neural activation in bodily experience is also present in conceptualization (Rosch 1975, 1978; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991; Grady 2000; Gibbs 2000, 2006; Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Coulson and van Petten 2002).

3. Image-schemas, linguistically manifest as metaphorical reasoning, are the basis for meaning, i.e., it is central to embodied cognitive semantics (Lakoff 1987), also referred to as situated embodied semantics (Zlatev 1999).
4. Humans think emotionally (Damásio 1994), which is a radical break from past theorizations that assumed cognitive, affective, and conative contents of the brain were independent.

5. Knowledge is subjectively produced and is thus grounded in allocentric or egocentric relational knowledge, i.e., spatial reasoning. More importantly it is not produced by the mind but is the mind since the mind is the instantiated effect of levels of processing (Dunlosky and Metcalfe 2009).

6. Embodied cognition is based on an adaptive thesis (Edelman 1987; Damasio 1994, 1999) and is thus evolutionary, developmental, and emotional.

7. Brains exhibit modularity (Plumert and Spencer 2007), i.e., domain specificity (Hischfield and Gelman 1994), most prominently in perception. However, reasoning is not domain specific (a Chomskian view).

Regarding this spatial reasoning, the works of Eleanor Rosch, Leonard Talmy, and Ronald Langacker in the 1970s on basic-level categories and prototypes inspired the works of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Ray Jackendoff, Gilles Fauconnier, Mark Turner, and many others to study the relationships between perceptual and conceptual systems, and language. More importantly here is that this early work lead to the rise of embodied CS. The field that has added the most to this thesis is cognitive linguistics (including cognitive semantic and grammar) (Allwood and Gardenfors 1999; Zlatev 1999; de Mendoza-Ibanez and Pena-Cervel 2005; Langacker 2005).
Theorizing image schemas, frames of reference, and classifications requires taking the body seriously (Johnson 1987, 2005). The three important concepts for the origin of the embodied thesis in CS are *prototyping and categorization* (Rosch 1975, 1978), *image schemas* (Johnson 1987, 2005; Hampe 2005), and *reference framing* (Levinson and Wilkins 2006). There is a necessary connection between prototyping, image schema, and frames of reference in reasoning. All are involve particular types of spatial logic. They involve the *logics of the body*, i.e., knowledge of bodily regions to each other and the body in relation to one’s environmental milieu (egocentric knowledge) and *geocentric logics*, i.e., relational knowledge of one’s environment (allocentric knowledge) (Klatzky 1998). The latter further involves the *logics of figure-ground*. This is information about space, about material objects, about the relations between material objects, and about the relations between material objects and space.

A token is a unique perceptual entity. Tokens have qualitative characterizes that when isolated from a particular token can be abstracted into a type. Types are abstract concepts applied in comparison of various tokens for similarity and difference. Perceiving objects, recognizing different features of objects, and then using these features to produce categories are fundamental elements of cognition. The bodily and geocentric knowledge of types forms categories. Categories are a necessary element of cognition especially in complex forms of reasoning because they are based in a logic of simplification and are adaptively functional.

All human knowledge is dependent upon classification. Identification – the specification of what things are and what they are not, entailing at the same time some specification of their properties – is basic to classification. Two
interdependent processes are necessary to classification and identification: the specification of similarities, and of differences. Similarity and difference are implicit in the other; one does not make sense without the other. …

…Without categorization, the complexity of the human social world might not be manageable at all: ‘Categorization is a fundamental and universal process precisely because it satisfies a basic human need for cognitive parsimony’ (Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 72). (Jenkins 2000: 7-8)

Basic-level categories (Rosch 1975, 1978) are rudimentary embodied typologies that group entities based on the most salient aspects of embodied interaction with those entities. They are subjective categorizations used to group items according to a prototype for each category. These basic-level categories entail the bodily and geocentric logics related to them. Basic-level categories can be more highly abstracted so as to created new inclusions at a higher-level. All categorization levels are based on unique criteria that relate all items as equivalents at that level (relate all prototypes of a given level). The classical view of categories has a long tradition of assuming natural orders of things with clear boundaries between classes. Rosch’s work on basic- and higher-level categorizations added an experientialist spin to the theory of categories and classification systems. The most rudimentary or basic categories are those groupings that entail knowledge of the manner in one engages in the world. Most basic-level categories are of material objects and thus entail aspects of engagement, for instance surface details used to group entities (taxonomies) or understand part-whole functions (“partonomies”) (Tversky and Hemenway 1984; Tversky 1989). This entire process is based on comparison (establishing perceptual similarity/dissimilarity).
Image schema is an essential concept in the embodied cognition thesis. Also, humans are highly visual and thus image schemas mostly entail visualization (Dirven 2005; Shah and Miyake 2005; Rinck 2005). Hampe (2005) defines the general agreements embodied cognitive scientists have on what images schemas are and what they do.

- Image schemas are *directly meaningful* (“experiential”/”embodied”), *preconceptual* structures, which arise from, or are grounded in, human recurrent bodily movements through space, perceptual interactions, and ways of manipulating objects.

- Image schemas are highly *schematic* gestalts which capture the structural *contours* of sensory-motor experience, integrating information from multiple modalities.

- Image schemas exist as *continuous* and *analogue* patterns beneath conscious awareness, prior to and independently of other concepts.

- As gestalts, image schemas are both *internally structured*, i.e., made up of very few parts, and highly *flexible*. This flexibility becomes manifest in the numerous transformations they undergo in various experiential contexts, all of which are closely related to perceptual (gestalt) principles. [all original emphasis] (1)

When manifest linguistically, basic-level categories represent *prototypical knowledge* and image schemes represent *metaphoric reasoning*. The general process of metaphorical schematic prototyping is indicative of linguistic/cognitive framing. Frames of reference orient one’s understanding, learning, interpreting of a given entity. Frames of reference are conceptual structures that provide interpretive contextualization. They can be effective delimiters of possible alternative interpretations, of say a text, and they can also be rhetorical manipulators to persuade others to think or do something (Lakoff 2002,
I return to image schemas and metaphors in the next section because it is the core of Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis.

Regarding the modularity of mind there has been much debate (Hischfield and Gelman 1994; Newcombe and Huttenlocher 2000; Plumert and Spencer 2007). The issue of the modularity of spatial knowledge was taken up by Newcombe and Huttenlocher (2000). Within Newcombe and Huttenlocher’s (2000) book and from other evidence on child development, spatial knowledge is vital in developing other forms of knowledge. In fact, according to Lakoff and Nuñez (2000) mathematical knowledge is simply spatial thinking within a formalized logical system. Spatial cognition not only has a particularly large domain and develops differently from other abilities, but more importantly, spatial domains are active in nearly all forms of reasoning. This makes intuitive sense in that non-spatial entities are experienced ego- and allocentrically as “in space” and thus is always in some way spatial. This idea of spatial modularity being integrated into virtually all other forms of reasoning will be taken up in the remaining sections of this chapter.

Lastly, a major problem for monist accounts of the mind is the “common-sense” understanding that “I” am in control of “my” faculties. This effect has been attributed to metacognition, which is an evolutionary ability not only of humans but other animals as well (Foote and Crystal 2007). Metacognition literally means “cognition on cognition”. It is an important element in complex reasoning and it has three discernable aspects: knowledge, monitoring and control (Dunlosky and Metcalfe 2009).

Metacognitive knowledge pertains to people’s declarative knowledge about cognition. Declarative knowledge is composed of facts, beliefs, and episodes that you can state verbally. ...
Metacognitive monitoring refers to assessing or evaluating the ongoing processes or current state of a particular cognitive activity. ...

Metacognitive control pertains to regulating an ongoing cognitive activity, such as stopping the activity, deciding to continue it, or changing it midstream. [original emphasis] (2-3)

When modeled, this cognition-metacognition relation is understood as two reciprocally-looping levels of processing. Regarding simple cognition, coding and reasoning is mostly unconscious. Metacognition, though, is conscious activity. Regarding meaning, cognition is always of something. Metacognition is thus cognition about something which is of something which makes it reflexive by nature. Both cognitive and metacognitive functions are distributed in that there is no one central location for reasoning abilities. Brains are adaptive so to utilize any relevant domain for any problem solving task. Metacognitive functioning coordinates widely distributed cognitive functions to raise the efficacy of problem solving.

Two important effects that arise from cognition and metacognition are apperception (self awareness) and its sense of stability and cohesion. The collective experience of this is the stable self. Anything that is “not self” is thus an exterior “other”. This is the first basic-level categorization, in the form of a binary, of which each individual stands as his/her own prototype. This binary is so fundamental that it does not make the lists of basic-level categories though it is upon this binary categorization that embodied knowledge is founded. I return to this in a later section.

Within the embodied cognition thesis, cognition produces common-sense or folk theories of the world and self which are illusions that naturally follow from embodied
processes. The first illusion is that there is a mind in here and a body and world out there (Cartesian dualism). The embodied thesis states that the brain is throughout the body and therefore “the body” must be understood as inseparable from the brain (Johnson 1987).

While not all parts of the body are neural tissue, sensory information is differentially distributed throughout the body so that all somatic tissue either contributes information or benefits from embodied adaptive action. The “body/brain” is a more accurate description of either the body or the brain from this perspective. Likewise, the mind is understood as brain functioning and thus is not discernible from the body. If the body is seen as in the world by the mind and the mind is effectively inseparable from the body than the mind/body “stands between this fundamental distinction between subject and object, ambiguously existing as both” (Merleau-Ponty 1994: 408). The second illusion is that folk theories are a proper guide to understanding both the mind and the world. Embodied cognition rejects this as well. Having briefly defined the general thesis of embodied cognition, I turn to Lakoff and Johnson’s version that includes an accompanying philosophical position they refer to as embodied realism.

**Embodied Realism**

Embodied realism is not an “end-all be-all” philosophy that has reached some pinnacle of cognitive science “truth” or even high position within philosophy of mind. It has detractors on various issues of debate from camps within AI, neurobiology, and philosophy of mind (for debate see: Clarke 1999; Krzeszowski 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 2002; Sinha 2002; Rakova 2002). However, my interest in embodied realism is not based
on what it can say about neural capacities, source domains, or perceptual fields but what it offers as a general perspective from which to base my discussion of the boundary for geographic thought. It provides, in a sense, a ground or reference point upon which the boundary can ultimately rely.

I begin my explanation of embodied realism with a summarizing quote from *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999) and explain the position in further detail.

The mind is inherently embodied.

Thought is most unconscious.

Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. (1)

While the first two are general tenets of embodied cognition, the third is a position that Lakoff and Johnson have been the standard bearers for since their seminal work *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). It is the metaphorical basis of meaning that drew me to their work. It is on theory of conceptual metaphors that I draw most heavily for my conceptualization of the boundary and boundarying.

Embodied realism is “experientialist” instead of empiricist because it is non-objectivist. It is therefore conditionally empiricist because any empirical account of anything is an account based mostly on unconscious processes of subjective perception. It is monist and therefore accepts a materialist stance on the mind in that it is the result of neural activity. It is eliminativist in that it rejects as real entities mental states, beliefs, and attitudes of such importance in traditional Western philosophy of mind and cognitivism. Embodied realism’s realism is thus also conditional in that it accepts the existence of a material world yet it rejects the possibility to know that materiality as it is. The only thing
that can be known with confidence is that one cannot know materiality with any confidence. It is realist in its confidence in experiential explanations of cognition while it accepts that experience, knowledge, and language are subjectively produced. It is realist in its acceptance that knowledge is produced by the physical capacities of the brain while it accepts that neural capacities in reasoning are adaptive so as to be so vast as to seem nearly inexhaustible. In this sense, potential embodied reason is only bound by historical social constraints or loss of brain function due to degradation of normal brain capacity. In other words, while our brains are structurally limited, we limit our brains’ potential more than our brains’ potential limits us.

Reason has been taken for over two millennia as the defining characteristic of human beings. A radical change in our understanding of reason is therefore a radical change in our understanding of ourselves. It is surprising to discover, on the basis of empirical research, that human rationality is not at all what the Western philosophical tradition has held it to be. But it is shocking to discover that we are very different from what our philosophical traditions told us we are.

Let us start with the changes in our understanding of reason:

- Reason is not disembodied … but arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily experience. …
- Reason is evolutionary, in that abstract reason builds on and makes use of forms of perceptual and motor inference present in “lower” animals. …
- Reason is not “universal” in the transcendent sense; that is, it is not part of the structure of the universe. It is universal, however, in that it is a capacity shared universally by all human beings. …
- Reason is not completely conscious, but most unconscious.
- Reason is not purely literal, but largely metaphorical and imaginative.
- Reason is not dispassionate, but emotionally engaged. (2-3)

Lakoff and Johnson go on to elaborate upon their alternative philosophy that rejects various philosophical positions on the mind and traditional CS yet partially accepts or at least leaves open the possibility of profitable exchange on certain issues vis-
à-vis some of the positions they set out to dispel. I differ in some respect from Lakoff and Johnson’s embodied realism and thus weave together my own embodied realist position that is informed by but does not replicate Lakoff and Johnson’s. Regarding their position on several traditionally influential positions on the mind and language Lakoff and Johnson claim that,

What we now know about the mind is radically at odds with the major classical philosophical views of what a person is.

For example, there is no Cartesian dualistic person, with a mind separate from and independent of the body, sharing exactly the same disembodied transcendent reason with everyone else, and capable of knowing everything about his or her mind simply by self-reflection. …

There exists no Kantian radically autonomous person, with absolute freedom and a transcendent reason that correctly dictates what is and isn’t morally. …

The utilitarian person, for whom rationality is economic rationality—the maximization of utility—does not exist. …

The phenomenological person, who through phenomenological introspection alone can discover everything there is to know about the mind and nature of experience, is a fiction. …

There is no poststructuralist person—no completely decentered subject for whom all meaning is arbitrary, totally relative, and purely historically contingent, unconstrained by body and brain. …

There exists no Fregean person—as posed by analytic philosophy—for whom thought has been extruded from the body. …

There is no such thing as a computational person, whose mind is like computer software, able to work on any suitable computer or neural hardware …

Finally, there is no Chomskyan person, for whom language is pure syntax, pure form insulated from and independent of all meaning, context, perception, emotion, memory, attention, action, and the dynamic nature of communication. (3-6)
Regarding Chomsky, Lakoff was a key member of an opposing view of linguistics in the 1970s called generative semantics. This program has since failed and Lakoff’s post-generative semantics work, the subject of this section, has become central to the field cognitive grammar. This MIT (Chomsky) vs. Harvard (Lakoff et al.) feud was referred to in cognitive linguistics as the “linguistics wars” (Harris 1995). Chomsky’s theories have since been altered many times to keep up with changes in formal linguistic modeling. The important difference, apart from their personal animosities, is that an embodied approach views language as an integrated aspect of cognitive function not an isolated capacity of a disembodied mind.

Regarding phenomenology, much of embodied cognition is owed to Merleau-Ponty, yet a full extension of phenomenology into a philosophy of mind is untenable according to Lakoff and Johnson. Regarding poststructuralism, the relativism of the decentered subject is rejected but the arbitrary nature of signifiers to signifieds is not. The difference, in its most simple, is that, once learned, the sign has embodied meaning to an individual and that experientialism (“experiential realism” (Johnson 1987) later became “embodied realism” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999)) provides a philosophy for explaining the connection between language, reason, action in an embodied manner. Also, the political use of language is recognized by Lakoff especially (2002, 2008). In fact, the postmodern rejection of metanarratives is much like Lakoff and Johnson’s rejection of traditional Western philosophy. In other words, the rejection of the decentered subject does not necessarily reject the contributions of poststructural methods on political-social critique or the fact that categories, as in IDP, are political fictions inscribed upon bodies in the
world through political-social practices, whether discursive or non-discursive. Lakoff is active in political strategizing for Democrats, including aiding the Obama administration. His books *Moral Politics* (2001) and *The Political Mind* (2008) are examples of the application of *frames of reference* and *conceptual metaphor theory* to political discourse analysis. This is in essence what I am doing regarding the IDP. However, I weave together biopolitics and Lakoff’s style of political discourse analysis through the idea of the conceptual metaphor, which I now turn.

Central to any theorization of the role of language in embodied experience and abstract reasoning requires a mechanism that relates one modality to the other. For my purposes I rely explain the role of language in spatiality of thought and action through *conceptual blending* (Fauconnier and Turner 2002) and *conceptual metaphor* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). As explained above, perceptual encoding is a complex, adaptive process involving multimodal activation. This activation involves specialized neurons for any from contrast, angle, color, and depth so forth in visual systems to those involving pitch or tone in auditory function to those of the vestibular system providing gravitational orientation for balance. These are regionally distributed but adaptively bound so as to be holistically functional. In effect, since encoding is distributed throughout the brain and problem solving requires embodied logics and memories of various perceptual systems, then reasoning must be distributed as well, and, in fact, it is according to decades of experiments involving neural scanning of subjects during different problem solving tasks. Thus reasoning is not centrally located but multiregional depending on the reasoning task.
at hand. A fundamental concept for explaining this regarding language is conceptual blending (Fauconnier and Turner 2002).

*Conceptual blending* imbricates several conceptualizations from various disciplines which include gestalt, functional, and ecological psychology, set and categorization theories, representation, semiosis, logic, and semantics from linguistics and semiotics, and the anthropology of metaphors and rituals. Conceptual blending theory requires thinking of cognitive processes as occurring within an abstract cognitive space that has both conscious and unconscious elements. Physically this space consists of numerous domains devoted to encoding various aspects of embodiment. Mentally this space can be described initially as an open, empty space with structured potential for content. The distributed nature of cognition dictates that this is not physically the case, but it is functionally the case since cognition is, though no one knows how, adaptively unified. A famous problem of perceptual theories is referred to as the “binding problem”. The exact process by which distributed activation involved in “green” is somehow bound together with activation of “chair” to make green chair is not known. The assumption is that some metacognitive function of the brain “binds” percepts together into coherent wholes and that the same types of process occur during conceptualization. If binding occurs in this fashion, then embodied perception and conceptualization are mutually supported.

Regarding language I now expand on the description of embodied reasoning above. During a problem solving task activation will occur in a variety of domains. Activation in a source domains “A, B, and C” (neural structures devoted to elements of
preexisting concepts or perceptions) occurs while also stimulating another target domain “D” (neural structures devoted to ad hoc encoding and problem solving). Parts of A, B, and C known as entailments become associated with D so that learning has occurred by borrowing entailments. Conceptual blending has many types depending on the reasoning task (see Fauconnier and Turner 2002: chapter 3). Of importance here is that while D maybe be similar to A, B, and C in some ways, it is also unique. In fact, D may be unknown and A, B, and C are being used as possibly similar entities in lieu of actual information on D. The coherence of D as a meaningful/logical entity is only possible through the simultaneous activation of already meaningful elements (A, B, and C). This is essentially a modern form of associationism (Grady, 2005) – the process of association of ideas reminiscent of a Hegelian chain of synthesis. In this example, linguistic description of the entailments of A, B, and C become descriptive elements of D. This is the neurological foundation of metaphorical thinking. Metaphorical thinking is an adaptive function based in perception. By metaphorical I refer to all functions that explain one thing in terms of another, for instance metonymy, analogy, and allegory. This is the theoretical basis for conceptual metaphors of Lakoff and Johnson’s work.

Conceptual metaphors demonstrate that perception is an absolutely necessary element of meaning, which negates Fregean linguistics. Lakoff and Johnson’s strong conceptual metaphor thesis essential states: logic is metaphorical.

Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish—a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that
metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3)

… One way to find out is by looking at language. Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like. (4)

Some common examples of metaphorical thinking include “your life is going nowhere”, “Uncle Fred has passed on”, and “don’t burn past bridges”. The construction of “life as a journey” made the first statement intelligible. Next, the statement concerning Uncle Fred’s death is meaningful and logical as the absence of his anime which has left or travelled somewhere else. The persistence of Cartesian dualism in Western philosophy is understandable from this example in that without the ontological independence of the mind there is no argument for the soul and hence no redemption, condemnation, or reincarnation – appropriately named transmigration. And finally, the advice to not ruin past relations because they might someday be useful is meaningful and logical through a reference to having crossed a river in which the past relation is possibly useful in the future as a means of overcoming (bridge) an obstacle (river). All three statements are obvious in their metaphorical content. However, even in more obscure examples the point remains: B is meaningful through the entailments A. “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” [original emphasis] (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5).

Within abstract cognitive space, novel conceptualizations (D) literally “become”. These conceptualizations are meaningful by invoking image schemas, basic- and/or higher-level categorization, and can be used as frames of reference in further inferences.
The process of becoming in this sense involves making something literally *present* to one’s mind. Lists of image schemas and basic-level categories are replete with the *logics of presence* (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Fauconnier and Turner 2002). I return to this in a later section. Having defined the tenets of both embodied cognition and embodied realism I can now formulate my conceptualization of boundarying, the subject of the next section.

**Boundarying, Space, and Place**

This section presents my novel conceptualization of the boundary. I begin with the core issue of boundarying through a series of qualifications from embodied CS to embodied philosophy of mind. I then link this concept to geographic thought through discussions of space and place in the next subsection. The conclusion to the second subsection is a departure point from which I move from a theorization of the boundary to a theorization through the boundary.

**Borders, Boundaries, Binaries, and Boundarying**

The essential point to be made in this subsection is that the *basic process of embodied cognition is boundarying*. Demonstration of this requires several qualifications. Regarding the previous two sections, boundarying processes are rooted in perception, mostly unconscious, and ground embodied cognition. Consequently, my initial point is that boundarying prefigures image schemas and basic-level categories. The *first* point to be made on boundarying as the basis of embodied cognition is that reasoning is structured by perception. As I have explained above, physiology provides a ground upon which
cognition functions. A basic element at one level of cognition will have “echoes” in other levels of processing, though the relationship need to be understood as linear (van Gelder 1995). The second and most important point is that cognition is a product of distinction.

The cognitive process of distinction is what I refer to as boundarying. Yet boundarying is not simply cognitive distinction. The term distinction loses currency when cognitive distinctions are involved in social action and when the effects of distinction are analyzed. I use the term boundarying to refer to cognitive process of distinction, its effects, and also its socio-behavioral manifestations. I thus begin with a description of boundarying that goes “vertically down into the brain and [then] horizontally out into the environment” [original emphasis] (Bechtel, Abrahamsen, and Graham 1998: 90).

The greatest theoretical disparity between symbolism and connectionism is that the former’s models ignore the generative function of distributed neural activity at the preconceptual level. Most neural activity is unconscious and all reasoning involves activation across several domains, though, elements of cognition are highly specialized and thus are more domain specific than other capacities, as explained in the previous two sections. Spatial cognition involves the most inclusive domain. The most explicitly spatial region, the hippocampus, is a part of the limbic system and is located on the ventral medial surfaces of the temporal lobes. It is directly involved in converting short-term memory into long-term storage, encoding egocentric and allocentric knowledge, and contains neurons that activate in familiar milieus referred to as “place cells” (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2002). It also has the highest connectivity of any domain associated with perception, body-environment coordination, and reasoning. In fact, this region is active in
nearly all reasoning activities, which is logical from an embodied cognition perspective in that reasoning is understood as the abstract utilization of perceptual knowledge which is collectively spatial.

On an interesting side note, perhaps Yi Fu Tuan’s humanistic sense of place theory, *Topophilia* (1974, 1977) could have had a greater and longer-lasting impact on geographic thought had he known of place cells and the fact that they may be associated with somatic-markers (Damasio 1994, 1999). *Somatic-maker theory* explains how affect is tied to memory and behavior. Somatic-marking cells of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex generate positive and negative sensations in association with other stimuli to moderate behaviors by creating incentives. Incentives include acquiring positive stimuli, maintaining positive stimuli, avoiding negative stimuli, and escaping negative stimuli. However, I do not wish to promote a simple deterministic, behavioralist explanation. None of these behavioral types are simple stimulus-response governing systems. For humans, incentives are modified positively or negatively through social conventions that act on incentives, through types of reward and punishment, but are complex, dynamic, and contextual. While I do not agree with Tuan’s privileging of home over other places as a means of explaining behavior, the idea of somatic-marking of various emotions to places as well as objects has merit. When this thesis is applied to an understanding of social behaviors, it seems likely that place cells and their somatic-markings are active in various forms of place-making, including politics of place and even violent territoriality. This does not mean that a place cell makes people violent. That is absurd. It simply means that the affective content including even fanatical territoriality might necessarily
involve these cells and an individual’s association of place to certain knowledge, affect, and behavior. How might this explain the role of place-based knowledge in various social situations or even at a larger scaled analysis such as, “do image schemas of body-as-self and mind-in-control-of-body ground the logic of “private ownership”, enact the binary public/private spaces, and shape western societies?” While this is an interesting point and a possible avenue of research, elaboration of it is beyond this dissertation’s focus.

Returning to embodied CS of boundarying, perceptual distinction arose from evolutionary adaptations that have led to neural specificity, its counterpart, neural plasticity, and the modularity of mind (Edelman 1987; Hischfield and Gelman 1994; Damasio 1994, 1999; Newcombe and Huttenlocher 2000; Barrett and Kurzban 2006; Plumert and Spencer 2007). Brain physiology is structured this way because brains are functional. They work to adaptively learn which requires being creative, yet this requires massive neural processing which can be overwhelming if not for a basic parsimonious process that creates multiple effects simultaneously. That process is boundarying. Some neurons respond to specific environmental cues, for instance retinal cells to light or shape cells to lines or areas of contrast. I refer to this as autonomic boundarying. Boundarying involved in conscious reasoning I refer to as voluntary boundarying. Metacognitive functions regulate these boundarying and moderate their effects and associations in a reflexive, functional, and creative manner, though not necessarily in a correct manner since we are often wrong in novel problem solving tasks. While I have not conducted experiments to empirically demonstrate boundaryings exist, I do not think this is necessary. The evidence already exists in all of the CS research currently available. The
task is merely to reinterpret existing knowledge of embodied cognition to reflect the more fundamental process of boundarying. This also requires qualification on philosophical issues.

The philosophical aspects of boundarying follow from the works of Tye (1990), Jackendoff (1991), Martine (1992), Smith (1995), Abbott (1995), Smith and Varzi (2000), and Varzi (2001) that combined make three intriguing claims; that indeterminacy and vagueness, not determinacy and exactness, are necessary, primary, and common to thought, that understanding of boundaries based in folk physics is incorrect, and that boundaries make things, things do not make boundaries. I shall address each in turn.

On the first claim, my acceptance of this position requires adding that this fact is evolutionarily adaptive. An embodied understanding of cognition must take this into account if it is to establish any credible biological realism as a form of justification. To be adaptive within a complex environment, functional cognition must be able to make distinctions and act appropriately based on the physical or social criteria that frame the interpretation of any event. Thus, the primary function of cognition is distinction with adaptive association, which must be open to change. Moreover, if distinction processes have been evolutionarily selected from more basic physiology, it ought to be physiologically economical (parsimonious).

Autonomic boundarying does most of the heavy lifting in that our evolutionary histories have produced mechanism capable of making perceptual associations and differentiations simultaneously in multiple modalities in a manner that is holistically unified in experience and action. Neurologically, boundarying is a matter of differential
activation, which means selective activation with selective inhibition. The more information that can be derived about one’s environment, the greater the processing load on the brain. Compartmentalization and encephalization allows for overall increased capacity, but integration should be an exponentially more difficult task. This does not seem to be the case, which has led to the issue of binding explained above. Perhaps the binding problem is solved in that the basic processes of the brain are essentially the same qualitatively with only phenomenal difference (sights, sounds, emotions, tastes, etc.) that become overlapped by being egocentrically oriented. If we follow this point, then modularity of mind is the distribution of boundaryings on various modalities. The parsimony then comes from two offloading dimensions. The first is seen in domain specificity. The second is boundarying. So what is so economical about boundarying?

When described abstractly, boundarying becomes a matter of differential stress between cells within and across domains, whether this involves perceiving tokens or conceptual blending. The content of which depends upon the modality of perception. Stresses are relations. The parsimony of boundarying is that it produces four entities in one process that each can have an array of variation in strength and association. These entities are a boundary, a relation, and two sides. An entity is anything that has functional “entitiness”. Entitiness in my embodied lexicon refers to any element of cognition that has a level of cohesion allowing it to be included in perceiving, reasoning, and behavior.

Within both autonomic and voluntary boundaryings, there are negative and positive boundarying effects. When boundarying creates positive stress (compression) the consequence is a degree of unity. When boundarying creates negative stress (tension) the
consequence is a degree of independence. At a basic perceptual level, the combinations of positive and negative boundaryings produce the entities of one’s perceptual field. This process of boundarying is describable in various terms. One of these terms is context. Context is merely an understanding of the extent of entities whether they are events, collections of entities, or simply a surface. Context can be more generally described as the finitude of entitiness – boundarying creates context. Internalities of entitiness are understood to have some uniqueness that differs from the external, which can simply be “in” versus “out”, which is content. However, “content”, whether in/out, red/green, or salty/bitter, exists only because, as a result of myriad boundaryings in multiple modalities, there is more than one type. Without the ability to distinguish different qualities of tokens, there would not be an understanding of content – boundarying creates content. Another term related to boundarying is figure/ground, which has been understood in psychology for over a century. Figure/ground is the perceptual basis for the conceptual binary object/space, or thing/nothing. The act of boundarying thus establishes in a single maneuver context and content for entities that manifest perceptually as figure/ground relations – boundaryings create figure/ground. The continuous myriad constructions of figure/ground constitute the majority of cognitive functioning and the objects of our embodied minds.

Based in the context of figure/ground relations are Rosch’s basic-level categories. Entities of whatever type make up basic-level categories. Basic-level entities are unique and thus display differentiation between them (Tversky and Hemenway 1984). Basic entities are distinguished further into higher-level classifications. Classification stands as
the essential act of knowledge acquisition upon which embodied associations and actions are based. Classification is merely boundarying based upon a particular conceptual structure. Depending on the classification, the structure has an attribute criterion and an image schema that orders the sets, for instance a type of vertical series, a table of sets, or a network of relational links and point entity nodes. However, classifications are entities themselves and are understood in their own right as functional, adaptive, actionable knowledge. In this sense, boundaryings produce higher-level entities in the same fashion they produce basic-level entities. The difference is that basic-levels are internally homogeneous entities based on a simple prototype. Through boundarying, an economy of cognition is maintained throughout increasingly complex higher-level processing because the same general process is being repeated, i.e., boundarying. Classifications require boundaries, sets (independent entities or merely distinguishable spaces for entities of a particular type), and relationships between the sets to establish order. Boundarying creates are of that simultaneously in one process.

Returning to the first claim about vagueness and indeterminacy, the only criteria for an entity to exist is that the embodied mind distinguishes it as something independent in one way or another. It is assumed a material object exists that the perceptual capacities of a body can detect in an indirect manner, but it does not exist as we perceive it. Nothing transcendentally feels or looks or tastes in some way. That is a subjective attribute generated, as Merleau-Ponty stated, by that entity that stands between subject and object ambiguously existing as both. The exactness or truth conditions of the external status of known entities are unnecessary for producing goal-directed behaviors toward them.
Whether or not the knowledge and behaviors resulting from it provide expected results, however, is another matter. When social conditions arise that place imperatives upon exactness and determinacy, it is necessary to produce more complex boundarying techniques, strategies, and technologies to establish, agree upon, and discipline correctness and reduce vagueness. General cognition undisciplined by these normative standards of determinacy and exactness is always and necessarily vague.

On the second claim, that understanding of boundaries based in folk physics is incorrect, I turn to a discussion of modern physics (Lerner and Trigg 2005). Boundaries are typically understood objectively as incidental properties of things and not the producers of entities. However, no natural boundary exists as one perceives it because as embodied cognizers entities are always known conditionally, or experientially, as Johnson (1987, 2005) terms it. According to the generally accepted unification theory (alteration to the Standard Model of particle physics, and integration of macrocosmic special relativity, and microcosmic quantum mechanics) of quantum field theory, there are two groups of fundamental matter constituents called fermions (quarks and leptons), two groups of force carriers called bosons (vectors and gluons) and four types of interactions (weak and strong attractions, electromagnetic, and gravitational). The entirety of the universe is produced by the various interactions of these field quanta. There are corresponding fields of physics that focus on the physical manifestations (emergent substances and properties) that arise from these microcosmic interactions in spacetime. Spacetime in quantum field theory is essentially a rippling field. The field compression produces condensed ripples that have a variety of self-perpetuating effects
field quanta) that act as both particles and waves, this duality is called complimentarity. The median between the two grand cosmic scales, mesocosmic, is the realm of embodied understanding. This means that, even though these scales of cosmic existence are one in the same, the manner in which embodied cognizers understand entities is scaled and thus we must separate, during analysis, the cosmos into “levels”. This is a manner of perspectival or scene boundarying reflective of the structure of our perceptual fields, which are, of course, scaled to the body. However, what occurs as an accumulated phenomenon, one’s body for instance, is not explainable at a level analysis of parts. The mereological question of when a body is no longer a body once parts are removed – a top-down analysis – is a sorites paradox and a matter of the definition of “body”. The mereological question of what makes up any material body – a bottom-up analysis – is merely equivalence between the microcosmic and mesocosmic levels of material existence.

An interesting aspect of this related to boundaries is that folk physics breaks down and becomes inapplicable at both microcosmic and macrocosmic levels of analysis. When understood from a particular emergentist perspective, our embodied understanding of boundaries does not exist. We take surfaces of mesocosmic objects to be solid because we, as mesocosmic objects ourselves, have a level of microcosmic constitution that is relatively stable enough to resist dissolution and integration into other solid objects under certain conditions. This relative stability is fragile, as is the general conditions for life in the universe, and when conditions change so does that relative stability. However, stability is a perceptual illusion. Not only our own bodies are in constant flux, but also
other seemingly more stable objects. Field quanta are in flux as well. The ontological question of the identity of things in the universe is thus radically brought into question. There are many positions on this within the philosophy of physics (French 2006).

I adopt a position that accepts that the material constitution of the universe is reducible to field quanta, but that the extension of interaction of field quanta are limited and the accumulation of effects makes for relative degrees of heterogeneous emergences. The innumerable accumulations of heterogeneous field quanta interactions across space-time create emergent substances and their properties (emergences) that are only possible en masse. Emergences are thus not separable from their microcosmic creation but the derivative effects of microcosmic interactions are not explainable as effects at the microcosmic scale of analysis. Stability of mesocosmic emergences can be undermined through chemically or mechanically overcoming forces because chemical and mechanical substances and their properties are equally mesocosmically-scaled emergences capable of acting on emergent entities of that scale. In other words, dissolution and integration of an emergence occurs at the levels of constitution of that emergence and its lower ordered constituents.

In effect, the interactions of field quanta, governed by their individual properties and the four forces that govern them, produce scaled effects that have more or less strength and stability depending on the totality of interactions. The terminus of any extended effect is the surface of a constituent of the universe. However, each constituent whether it is a fermion, boson, element, or molecule has effects upon or is affected by other constituents to some degree. The weakest of the four forces is gravity. This is why
gravity orders the universe on macrocosmic scale and is infinitesimal at the microcosmic scale. Conversely, weak and strong nuclear forces have their greatest impact at a microcosmic scale and mean very little in explanation at the macrocosmic scale. Furthermore, the mesocosmic scale is replete with chaos, randomness, and relative degrees of freedom that make the mesocosmic scale seem detached from the grander, and more ordered, scales.

As material bodies we are held to the planet by gravity and move with it in space. As dynamic sites of varying materials in a constant state of flux, lifeforms are held together in only the most exceptional of conditions characterized as a constant state of flux. Growth requires the dissolution of other things in the organized integration of a life form. After maturity there is maintenance, reproduction, and eventual decay to be dissolved and integrated into another site or removed completely from the fragile cycles of life. The basic process of reduction with emergence is seen clearly in ourselves as lifeforms. The lesson physics provides on boundaries is that epistemological discussions of everyday boundaries do not match ontological discussions. Every surface when analyzed for exactness is reduced eventually to condensed ripples in space, neither particles nor waves.

In a typological discussion of boundaries of physical objects (surfaces) as opposed to abstracted boundaries, Smith and Varzi (2000) make a crucial distinction between *bona fide* and *fiat* boundaries. Bona fide boundaries are those myriad finitudes of perceptually distinguishable entities of the material world. Fiat boundaries are abstract, constructed, situational, dynamic finitudes of the mind. When physically-demarcated by a
barrier, the barrier itself has a bona fide boundary as a material object but the objects the wall delimits have no materiality. Since the barrier is a symbol to represent a conceptualization, the meaning of the boundary and its purpose is not fixed. While bona fide boundaries change as a result of mechanical and chemical laws of physics, fiat boundaries require reification and standardization because they are both conceptual and vague. An often used example is a mountain (Tye 1990; Galton 1996, 2003; Smith and Varzi 2000; Varzi 2001). While the top of the mountain has a physically-discernable boundary, the base of the mountain is vague or fuzzy. Where does the foothill belong? Are foothills a part of a mountains or not? Are they a boundary zones that are not part of either valleys or mountains? Where is the boundary between a foothill and valley or mountain? Vagueness, the ontology of bona fide boundaries, boundaries and categorization, and the status of fuzzy boundaries have gained in status as topics in spatial cognition/GISc and philosophy in the last twenty years (Tversky and Hemenway 1984; Tye 1990; Martine 1992; Abbott 1995; Lloyd 1997; Galton 1999, 2003; Burrough and Frank 1996; Smith and Mark 1998; Mark, Smith, and Tversky 1999; Smith and Varzi 2000; Varzi 2001; Debarbieux 2004; Tversky 1989; Jones 2009; Schaffter, Fall and Debarbieux 2009).

And finally, on the third claim that boundaries make things, things do not make boundaries, embodied cognition is always experiential. “We should not look for boundaries of things but for things of boundaries.” (Abbott 1995: 857) For a thing to be known, boundaryings must take place. Similarity within the perceptual field yields positive boundaryings and a degree of unity. Difference within the perceptual field yields
negative boundaryings and a degree of independence. Whether it is a fiat or bona fide boundary, combinations of unities and independences produced through boundarying yields knowable and actionable entities. Boundarying is a process that involves making something coherent, or present, to the mind. This is an effect of being embodied. Everything that is or can be known must be understood in a manner resembling embodied perception. Thus, conceptualization takes the form of perceptualization. The reliance upon classification, image schemas and spatial metaphors attests to this perceptualization of conceptualization. What is known becomes present to the mind because the domains activated while reasoning are encoded with perceptual information gathered from embodied interaction within one’s perceptual field. This is how figure/ground works. Conceptualization then manifests as a coherent entity in the same manner as a perception, i.e., “to the mind’s eye”. In other words, through boundarying entities become. It is on this point that my positing of boundarying engages the more common social aspects of spatiality in human geography. Particularly, boundarying as the process by which entities become present to mind requires a direct engagement with space and place in human geography and then into discussion with Jacques Derrida’s critique of Western philosophy and science as a metaphysics of presence.

Space, Place, and the Metaphysics of Presence

Currently, the two most important concepts in Geography are space and place. This section describes space and place in embodied terms of boundarying. In short, place is the conditions of one’s embodiment resulting from reciprocal embodied interaction of
multiple actors and their material surroundings and space consists of the myriad effects of boundarying involving the most fundamental embodied basic-level binary, tangible/intangible. I begin with space.

With respect to space at least, philosophy is almost unanimous. A space comes into being as soon as a border is established and an observer looks at both sides of the border including at the border separating the sides. Without the border, no space, and the space has none. Without the observer, the same applies, even if there are only observers where distinctions are being drawn. Jacques Derrida was conscious of this. One of his questions is the perennial question of philosophy: what is space if, for a space to reveal itself, there is a boundary to be drawn, such that an observer may emerge looking at the space the boundary is brought forward in. (Baecker, 2005: 65)

This passage affords two important directions from which to draw theoretical connections from the definition of boundarying so far provided. The first is between space and boundarying. From an embodied perspective, what is referred to as space is a set of related entities that are perceptually, and subsequently conceptually, distinct from object entities. In fact, spatial knowledge is knowledge of absence and motion. Absence in the sense of intangibility and motion in the sense of experiencing tangible bodies (self or others) experiences of intangibility. Thus, an explanation of space begins with an understanding of spatial perception. The second is between Derrida and boundarying, which I return to later in this section.

While there is no shortage of literature, some of which has been discussed above, regarding spatial cognition, all of this literature at a basic level is reflective of boundarying. Boundarying is a parsimonious process that initiates four entities in one process, i.e., a boundary, a relation, and two distinguished side of a perceptual field (and cognitive space in reasoning). The modality of mind provides the brain with the
possibility to perform multiple boundaryings of a single perceptual or conceptual task on multiple modalities at once, thus reducing the temporal and processual burden of cognition on the brain while still increasing the overall complexity of cognition. Basic-level entities are derived from boundarying of one’s multidimensional perceptual field and subsequent selective reactivation of encoded information for problem solving. So is there a difference between spatial and non-spatial knowledge. Yes and no.

Evidence of explicitly spatial and non-spatial knowledge utilizes a limited understanding of the term space. Space equals either three-dimensional Euclidean container space or relational space. This evidence states that while spatial knowledge is used in all reasoning tasks, there are qualitatively different forms of knowledge in which some are spatial and others non-spatial. This makes sense from an embodied position but not so much from a disembodied view. From a disembodied view, all objects are somewhere and have some spatial dimension. Therefore, there are no non-spatial entities. While this is fundamentally correct, it misses an essential point. The delineation of spatial and non-spatial entities marks not an ontological division between things that have or do not have spatiality, since there is no such thing as a non-spatial object, but an embodied division based upon a first-order embodied boundarying, that is, the tangible/intangible binary.

Spatial knowledge begins with the experience of the finitude of the tangible body. The logics of intangibility are based on movement and a lack of tangible presence. The finitude of the body is thus a first-order binary of presence/absence. This grounds an embodied understanding of Euclidean space as egocentric space and forms a first-order
egocentric image schema of *extension* and *expanse*. The tangibility of non-spatial entities makes them perceptual and present to the mind. Non-spatial knowledge is of substance qualities and their properties. The mind produces knowledge of the tangible through multimodal surface perceptions. Basic-level categories are made of varying surface descriptions of different tangible entities. The logics of tangibility are formed by perceiving substances and their properties in a functional, adaptive manner. This is done by multimodal boundarying. It forms the logics of shapes and content and the image schemas associated with the interactions of independent objects. Bodies are not in vacuous space, so movements of bodies are understandable in reference to other tangible objects surrounded by absence. The inclusion of tangible objects within absence produces an embodied understanding of relational space.

The high connectivity of the spatial domain and its role in memory is sensible because humans evolved adaptively. And, to evolve along some physiological trajectory, positively selected adaptations must be functional. The fact that humans cognize quickly in most respects and with seemingly little effort means that cognitive functioning must also be parsimonious. Boundarying provides multimodal parsimony and the logics of tangibility/intangibility provide the basis for egocentric and allocentric cognition. For example, the embodied space historically theorized as Euclidean space, which I have defined as egocentrically grounded, is the experience of being figure (presence) within ground (absence). When the spatial image schema, expanse, is bounded is combined with non-spatial image schema, surface, expanse becomes contained and the image schema,
containment (Lakoff and Johnson 1999), can be used as for reasoning about allocentric relations or the inner spatial dimensions of objects.

The combination of boundarying with the tangible/intangible binary provides a base from which to interpret embodied cognition at a level not yet explored. For this I recall the figure/ground binary. The originary boundary is the surface of the primal tangible entity, the body. According to the economy of boundarying, the recognition of this surface involves the production of a boundary, two sides, and a relation. The boundary is the body. The two sides are the tangible internal presence of the mind and the intangible external absence of space. The body is figure and space is ground. The relation between the mind (and its content) and space (and its nature and contents of tangible things) is understandable universal in human history since the very process that makes possible the ability to produce knowledge of entities of the world also makes possible from the beginning the possibility to add content to (reason about) this originary boundarying. The reason this process is not seen in its unity is that we focus on figure and not ground. Figure can be unitary or complex, but the complexity has limits. Strategies of economy, for instance chunking information, are a means of increasing information processing and minimizing workload. Discussions of space disregard the necessity of the distinction between body and space and instead focus on bodies in space or the spatial aspects of bodies. Boundarying produces four entities, each of which can have contents and actions associated with them, but that does not always occur. Embodied minds are functional and therefore need only to assign embodied meaning to those boundarying effects that are relevant in a given context. Not only CS accounts of cognition but also
philosophies of mind might resolve some longstanding problems if the boundaries, relations, and figure/ground entities are taken as singly produced.

Having presented boundarying and the rudiments of embodied spatial knowledge, I turn to an interpretation of space for human geography. I begin with some definitions of space. From the list below, I define each space from the list in terms of boundarying.

1. Space has the potential for anything to exist “within” it.
2. Space has the potential to be structured and have content.
3. Space is potent, active, emotional, and political by the way people enact, perceive/conceive, and engage in it.
4. And, space is potentiality.

Statement 1 is simply the image schema, expansion, applied to the independence condition of a tangible object. Statement 2 defines space as the one of the “side entities” of boundarying. Once a boundarying process has occurred, one of the sides can have actionable content associated with it (figure). Statement 3 is an extension of 2 but recognizes the social importance of the content certain spaces, relational or expansionary, can have. Statement 4 is particularly interesting in that it refers to spacetime and cognitive space, which I explained in relation to modern physics and CS above. What I want to focus on is the relation between “cognitive space as potentiality” and Derrida’s deconstruction. I return to this in more detail in a later chapter.

Objects become present as they become perceptually or conceptually coherent. This is based on the conceptual reliance on perceptually encoded information that requires presence tangible presence within one’s perceptual field. Not all concepts are
merely representations of perceptions. Some are in fact opposites or negations of known entities or such abstractions that they have no worldly referents. It is on this notion of presence and the function of metaphors that embodied realism and deconstruction can be woven together. By woven together I mean that take from Derrida’s notion of \textit{deconstruction, metaphysics of presence, and différance} what I find to be acceptable stand alone concepts. By stand alone I mean that the acceptance of these positions need not also include certain positionalities that would conflict with the embodied perspective I have laid out thus far. This also goes for Foucault and Agamben who I turn to in the final three chapters.

Derrida’s deconstruction, which I explain in detail in Chapter IV, has many similarities to embodied cognition. He took seriously metaphors, binaries, and boundaries in the same manner in which Lakoff and Johnson view metaphorical potency.

Deconstructive criticism takes the ‘metaphoric’ structure of a text seriously. Since metaphors are not reducible to truth, their own structures ‘as such’ are part of the text. The deconstructive procedure is to spot the point where a text covers up its grammatical structure. (Sarup 1993: 50)

His understanding of textual meaning was based on an implicit understanding of the four fold effects of boundarying, though he did not state it as such. In particular he understood that a boundary was a distinction and that a distinction was a relation (1976). The very act of distinction gave a text its paradoxical meaning. It was its status as in-between that made it possible to know yet impossible to semantically fix. Textual meaning is always in a state of indistinction in that it gets its meanings from other texts but no one text stands as the ultimate fixed ground upon which all other textual meanings
are ground. This understanding of textual difference also applied to semantic relations at a smaller scale in his conceptualization of *différance* (Chapter IV). Madan Sarup (1993) summates Derrida’s understanding of the boundary.

It is said that every boundary, limit, division, frame or margin installs a line separating one entity or concept form another. That is to say, every border marks a difference. The question of the border is a question of difference. Derrida writes, ‘No border is guaranteed, inside or out.’ Applied to texts, this finding becomes ‘no meaning can be fixed or decided upon’. According to deconstructionists there is nothing other than interpretation. As there is neither an undifferentiated nor a literal bottom or ground, the activity of interpretation is endless. It is also a fact that every text tends itself to deconstruction and to further deconstruction, with nowhere any end in sight. Finally, no escape outside the logocentric enclosure is possible since the interpreter must use the concepts and figures of the Western metaphysical tradition. (Sarup 1993: 54)

As explained above, boundarying provides the four basic entities necessary for perception. Perception makes entities present to one’s mind and reasoning is the selective activation of a source domain to “borrow” entailments for a target domain used in problem solving. Originary boundarying produces the self, expansionary and relational space, and the wonder of the relations between things, especially self and world. This is the basis for basic-level categories and image schemas that are so integral to conceptual blending. Lastly, humans rely heavily on language not only to communicate but also to reason. The work of Lakoff and Johnson and others in embodied CS, specifically cognitive grammar, search for the utility of basic-level categories and image schemas in linguistic practice (Langacker 2005). The result is that metaphorical language is not only ubiquitous it is essential to effective communication and reason. This is because metaphors are the linguistic manifestation of entailments in conceptual blending. Reasoning is also metaphorical.
Since reasoning is perceptual and metaphorical, then metaphors used in reasoning will be perceptually structured. As Lakoff and Johnson have shown, this is the case. Thus, a commonality in thought of any kind is the reliance on metaphor. This is seen more in speculative thought than descriptive thought since description comes from experiential knowledge of an entity and speculative thought must involve conceptual blending. It is no surprise then that scientific and philosophical knowledge was described by Derrida as rooted in metaphor. Metaphors of presence are pervasive because they depict the way in which we perceive. Jacques Derrida (1976) wrote of the *metaphysics of presence* in Western philosophical and scientific traditions to expose this point, though he did so without reference to embodied cognition and conceptual blending. The relevant fact is that he realized that metaphorical logic is used to stand in for what is taken to be objectively justifiable logic. Metaphors in the texts he deconstructed obscured hidden assumptions that gave a text undue logic and justification. This logic was generally based on binary thinking that when overturned shifted the logic of the text from solid ground to thin air. The binary of presence/absence exists at the most basic level of cognition and manifests as metaphorical allusions, for instance as *Dasein* (being in the world) that connotes a sense of presence both with God and in time and space (here-now) (Sarup, 1993). This binary, of course as all binaries are, is the product of the originary boundarying.

So long as the total boundarying processes is ignored in reasoning, parts of process go unrecognized. In the formulation of self/other binaries this takes the form of constructing the other positively or negatively on various criteria without rationalizing
the relations self has to the criteria or even what it means to perform that othering process. This partial focus on the boundarying process first attests to its economy and second produces the possibility of elements of a binary to retain their meanings without question. Edward Said (1979) wrote on this issue in relation to the construction of the orient by Western colonial powers.

In the case of uncontested asymmetrical binaries that privilege one entity and subordinate another, hierarchies become accepted as fact and stand as a logical element in reasoning. Derrida’s deconstructive act was to recognize the hidden binaries that acted as logical support for certain truth claims in a text and overturn the hierarchy. Some binaries, due to their content, are socially important. Socially-relevant binaries are circulated and understood between individuals through semiotic systems and disciplinary practices within societies. Both deconstruction and embodied realism recognize the importance of binaries in the production of meaning as well as the metaphorical guise in which they linguistically manifest.

It is at this point I have fashioned enough grounding of boundarying that I can take on an example. The point now is to move away from the deep excursions into the mind and extent out into the social milieu of the embodied mind so as to express the value of boundarying to human geography and thus demonstrate that the boundary is indeed the core of geographic thought. To make this move I must perform two tasks. The first is to describe how I conceive of embodied social space. For this I provide a three-dimension description. The second task is to position my extension of boundarying into social space within the social sciences and human geography in particular. Since I am
choosing to extend boundarying into political geography via biopolitics, I pay special attention to those works in political geography pertaining to biopolitics and boundaries.

I conclude this chapter with my presentation of an embodied theorization of social space which involves the concept of place. In this description, language is an important medium in which physical, cognitive, and social spaces are linked. Semiotic systems are self-referencing (Chalmers, 2005). The symbolic signifiers have no independent meaning. Definitional meanings of signifiers come from positive boundaryings between distinguishable signifiers. Literally a word is associated with others so as to provide equivalences between words or combinations of words. “Definition” in this sense simply means reference to other words that too refer to others, and so on ad infinitum. Derrida referred to this definitional definition of language as différance. Différance follows an embodied understanding of language through boundarying.

All communication is in some manner perceptual. Linguistic boundarying is parsimonious in that autonomic and voluntary boundaryings of both positive (compression) and negative (tension) type produce, with relatively little cost once completely learned and habitually practiced, syntactic rules and semantic ontologies (networks of association) from which embodied content can be associated. Definitional meanings are merely the disembodied, unactionable structures of memorized boundaryings. Poststructuralists focused on this fact in their critiques of discursively produced entities and the inequalities that arose from the inclusion of those entities into the public episteme (popular thought), for instance the homosexual, insane, and infirm (Foucault 1977, 1979, 1980). However, once linguistic practice is applied in everyday
experience these contentless empty, disembodied structures gain meaningful, functional embodied associations that are rooted in the logics of perception (bodily and geocentric logics).

Regardless of the technologies used or the distance these communicative practices traverse, the medium of communication is always perceptual experience. No matter how interconnected people and places may seem, all communication takes places locally, that is, within one’s perceptual field. All communications are embodied. The technological ability to send communications (as perceptual cues) from one device to another so that individuals outside of each other’s perceptual fields can be affected by the other has been used rhetorically, along with the increasing speed and number of locations of travel, to lament “the end of geography”. Yet, no matter how “connected” people may be around the world, they are always somewhere and they are always acting and communicating locally, that is, humans are perceptually, and therefore communicatively, limited to their immediate, local, embodied surroundings. Whether they are intended for an individual sitting at the next computer in an internet café or the recipient of an email on the other side of the globe, communications are always perceptually local. There is of course a remarkable difference conceptually in the communicative practices of speaking to someone sitting 3 feet away and someone 20,000 miles away. It is the conceptual world that might be shrinking for some people, but the perceptual world in which communication is based is exactly the same as it ever was.

Linguistic boundarying works as follows. The initial linguistic autonomic negative boundaryings produce distinguishable signifiers (difference) that are
differentially related to one another (greater compression of tension) depending on the semantic ontology of any signifier. Linguistic voluntary positive boundaryings create particular relations (x is related to y) and thus simultaneously two related sides (X is related to Y). While these boundaryings collectively create the basis for the understanding of language, for linguistic ability to have evolved as similarly important capabilities do it must have been adaptively functional for an embodied mind. The functional aspect of language is not found in its exactness or determinacy. It is not found in the words or the things they represent. The meaning of signifiers to signifieds (words to entities) is found in the functional nature of normative symbolism in a given discursive community. Language is necessarily adaptive. It is a myriad of manifold relations between distinguishable entities that can be bound to the perceptual and conceptual entities of the embodied mind. It links the material world and the mental world through the ontologically ambiguous social world.

Any semiotic system is meaningless without experience. This was seen in John Searle’s (1983) Turing test he called the Chinese room. Searle wanted to know whether a computer could acquire meaning and not simply produce proper calculations from symbols and a defined system of rules for their analogical combinations. The idea was that there was a room with a computer in it and a man outside the room who puts cards with Chinese symbols into a slot in the computer in a particular order. Based on preprogrammed rules the computer would compute the correct response from the combination of symbols. The result, according to Searle, was that the computer could become more and more precise with its calculations with a continued refinement of the
rules and through a collective memory of true and false answers for responses that had
two or more possible answers. But, it had no idea what the symbols meant nor did it
understand the processes or their purpose. The Chinese room Turing test is an example of
the disembodied mind. It has only definition meanings and no embodied meanings.

Bodily and geocentric logics provide a means of discerning relevancy of symbols while
parallel processing of multiple bodily conditions during problem solving give these
various boundaryings meaning the Chinese room cannot have. The Chinese room is an
improper model for understanding embodied cognition because computers are not
designed to be holistically functional or understand the embodied logics of a tangible
entity in a world of tangibility and intangibility. They are made to simply calculate and
that is what they do very well.

Embodied cognition is experientialist because it is foremost rooted in experience.
By experience I do not mean some set of mental states that can be modeled and
computed. I mean that experience involves the dynamic involvement of physical,
cognitive, and social space. Experience enactivates (Thompson, Varela, and Rosch 1991)
the three in embodied cognition. Experience incorporates physical space which I equate
to raw materiality with cognitive space that is populated with the boundaryings of
tangible and intangible entities, their numerous embodied associations, and the
potentiality to make innumerably more boundaryings. And finally, it involves the unique
space of the social which provides a normative function that allows for the acquisition of
language and socially significant practices. It is from this normative realm that
definitional (disembodied) meanings become embodied meanings. The result of
disciplinary processes of social space forms communicative groups, known in different academic circles by such names as discursive, symbolic, or linguistic communities, communities of practice, social groups or networks, and cultures and societies in general. Regardless of name, the general idea is the same, members effectively communicate and communication is *embodied enaction*.

Place involves the making of social space from merely the physical materiality of one’s environment. It is always perceptual, and thus it is local and embodied. Place is the result of engagements in the conditions of embodiment in a given location, which can be a geographical location or geographically fluid sets of relations (bus, internet, or a plane). Place may be conceived globally, but it is experienced and enacted locally (Cresswell 2004). This is not a new idea. Research on the politics of scale and globalization has yielded two decades of debates on localness of globalization and the globalization of the local (Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1999; Herod and Wright 2002; Marston, Jones III, and Woodward 2005; Cidell 2006; Jones III, Woodward, and Marston 2007; Jones III, Woodward, and Marston 2007; Moore 2008; Donaldson 2008). Social space is that ambiguous element that binds cognitive and physical space symbolically together. *In this sense social space is not a space at all. It is an effect on embodied minds by way of mutual engagement in the local conditions of embodiment,* whether or not that engagement is symmetrical, asymmetrical, amicable, or hostile. This view of place as both cognitive and physical is similar to Nicholas Entrikin’s view of *The Betweenness of Place* (1991) in the subjective/objective continuum.
Contestation over embodied conditions is social voluntary boundarying. Social space gets its spatiality from physical and cognitive space. Social space includes intentional practices that (re)produce, regulate, contest, subvert, and rearrange both physical and cognitive space. Political geographers have studied these social practices since the beginning of the discipline (Paasi 1996), but not in this manner. I return to this literature in the next chapter. The control over the conditions of one’s embodiment is how I interpret the critical agenda of biopolitics. It conceptualizes modern practices in the regulation of bodies in space, the role of language and other disciplinary practices in the regulation of bodies and space, and is particularly concerned with these practices in the modern state.

An interesting anecdote regarding social space is Cartesian dualism and objectivist science in the structure of academic research. Judgments on rigor, validity, and contribution of original research are based in the metaphorical logic of Cartesian dualism. In the process of objective research, the researcher exits the subjective interior of the office or lab, which is a metaphor for the mind, and goes out into the field, which is a metaphor for the objective exterior of the world. In this metaphorical “real world”, the researcher freed from his the containment in the head gains presence with and thus transcendent knowledge of the objects of the world. Objectivist research is a transcendent maneuver to escape the limited subjectivity of the mind and return with unfettered objective knowledge of the world.

Another similar anecdote applies to an embodied description of making place. The laboratory is a conceptual space made into a particular place. The concept of the lab
is that of an ideal space in which elements are held in isolation and then related in particular measure with other elements so to produce measurable effects. The purpose is first to understand the nature of the elements through their isolated interactions and to generalize and predict so to apply what was learned and produce desired outcomes in subsequent trials. The conceptualization and practice of making place takes a similar form. The conditions of isolation, removal of “impurities” and “extraneous radicals”, the moderated or “policed” interactions of elements, the control of the total surroundings, that is, the boundary paranoia attached to the loss of a hermetically-sealed, closed space is the mentality adopted by individuals, groups, and states in the control of private property, community land, and territory. The militarization of the lab equals the mentality of states. The lab is a produced place and similarly, as I discuss in detail in later chapters, the state is a place-making practice. The place-based nature of the lab is grounded in the will to control elements in space. The place-based nature of the state is grounded in the will to control bodies in space. The lab controls the conditions of interaction of elements whereas the state controls the conditions of embodiment of bodies in space. The making of place, then, is the production, regulation, and contestation of the conditions of embodiment for bodies in space. Some strategies focus on the space (ground) to produce bodies (figures), whereas other strategies focus on the production of bodies (figures) that in turn produce particular spaces (ground).

The project that follows this chapter transitions from theorizations of embodied CS to critical social analyses of social space as I have just defined it. I do not abandon embodied realism for poststructuralism, but I do draw considerably from work that is
theoretically poststructural. However, I do not do so without a purposeful transformation of the literature reviewed. For instance, Foucault’s work has had a profound effect on my understanding of social space, the role of language and institutions, and the conceptualization of the body as a dynamic product of normativity, which involves both external and self disciplining. While this is not denied, negated, or contradicted in embodied CS, it is not as well theorized. However, I differ from poststructural analyses on different points and detail these differences below. One major difference, that enhances not contradicts a Foucauldian analysis, is that the role of language in discipline and the definitional definition of language in poststructural accounts conflict when described in a disembodied, decentered manner, as Lakoff and Johnson (1999) pointed out above. The explanation of definitional and embodied meanings of language conceptualized through linguistic boundaryings above provides a seamless stitch between Foucault’s genealogical accounts of power and my embodied realist account of social space.

My point is that I do not agree that a supposition is inseparable from the philosophical context in which it was derived. In other words, I reject a strong position of philosophical fidelity of a conclusion that can be derived differently or accepted to an extent by other positions. There are limitations to this cross-theoretical gleaning, but I believe my weaving method, which is itself a process of discovery, is executed with internal consistency. On this last point, critical social research seeks to question the givenness of social phenomena so to overturn any inequalities, injustices, or hardships associated with them. Methodologically, exploration and discovery arise not solely from
empirical methods or the employment of mathematical logic but also in the process of “writing as discovery”. Methodology is the logic that establishes the justification for using a method to test an epistemological stance on a given topic (Thompson 2003). Methods are systematized procedures that follow a logical form grounded in a particular perspective (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Language use is an informal logic and is a critical form of reasoning. It is therefore as methodological as other forms of “rigorous” logic (Priest, 2000). This returns the discussion, briefly, to vagueness and indeterminacy. While it is not necessary for the everyday embodied existence of our evolutionary environments, it has become an integral part of modern social space and thus is a desirable goal in academic institutions. However, the theoretical focus of this project gains its rigor in conceptual blending of various works from embodied CS to poststructural critique through the informal logic of language essential for complex forms of insight and discovery. Thus, the methodologically interpretive approach utilized in the following chapters is a systematic method of “formulation through exposition” that employs scientific idioms and philosophical conceptualizations through the informal logic of language.
CHAPTER III

POLITICIZING THE BOUNDARY

This chapter positions my novel conceptualization of the boundary within the subfield of political geography. It has three sections that position my extension of the boundary with an example within political geography, critical geopolitics and legal geographies, and border studies.

Among Political Geographies

My embodied realist position on social space rests on the assumption that politics, especially state politics, is involves the regulation of the conditions of embodiment of bodies, i.e., bodies in space. Political geography is a set of geographical inquiries on “politics” and “the political”, as well as how it should be studied (Agnew 2003; Häkli 2003). This includes the study of formal state-oriented politics refers to as “big P” politics as well as so-called “little p” politics that form politicized social phenomena enacted in the spheres of individuals’ everyday lives (Flint 2003). This general field has existed since the origins of Geography as an academic discipline in late nineteenth century Europe. It was oriented toward studying statecraft, international relations, and the frontiers and
Political geographic research over the years has brachiated into discernible yet permeable academic communities, i.e., electoral geography, critical geopolitics, and legal geographies, but all remain bound by a commitment to researching “the political”. Jones, Jones, and Rhys (2004) provide a definitional starting point into an understanding of political geography.

We define political geography as a cluster of work within the social sciences that engages with the multiple intersections of ‘politics’ and ‘geography’, where these two terms are imagined as triangular configurations. On one side is the triangle of power, politics and policy. ... The intersection of these three entities is the concern of political science. Political geography is about the intersection of these entities and a second triangle of space, place and territory. (2-3).

Where power is the commodity of politics, space is the commodity of geography. Political geographers then are inclined to describe the political as the spatial and vice versa. The “what” of politics manifests through the “where” of geography. Central to this what/where dynamic is the realization that spatialization is politicization and politicization is spatialization.

The history of political geography contains three distinct periods that emanate from academic transformations that affected the topical foci and methodological practices which brachiated the field and also from popular zeitgeists that at times suppressed and at others energized the proliferation of political geographic research. The first stage begins with political geography’s German origins in the 1880s and ends with the conclusion of...
WWII (Jones, Jones, and Woods 2004). Much of political geography of this period was concerned with Geopolitics, e.g., the geopolitisk of Rudolf Kjellen in Sweden, the geopolitik of Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer in Germany and the geopolitics of Halford Mackinder of Britain and Alfred Mahan of the United States, among others (Livingstone 1993; ÓTuathail 1996; Dodds 2005). Geopolitical research of this time consisted of theoretical treatises on the nature of the State, territory, sovereignty, and the balance of power between states (ÓTuathail 1996). The rest of political geography of this time was concerned with ideographic regional accounts of particular polities with concerted attention on describing different states and the regulation of their populations, economies and territories (Johnston, 2004; Jones, Jones, and Woods 2004). Political geography in this first era was influenced by Social Darwinism (also referred to as neo-Lamarckism (Livingstone 1993) evidenced by the circulation of imperialist discourses in geopolitical theorizations (ÓTuathail 1996).

The second stage of political geography lasted from the 1950s to 1970s. It was dominated by a pursuit for legitimacy (Livingstone 1993). After WWII, studying geopolitics in political geography was marginalized. The fear was that any research that studied or possibly asserted an exclusionary nationalism and irredentism would be associated with political sciences that founded Lebensraum – a state’s necessary territorial “living space”, Nazism, fascism, eugenics, and genocide (Dodds 2000; Dahlman 2005). Richard Hartshorne’s proposed during the 1930s that Geography was an “exception” to other disciplines methodologically in that it focused on location and areal differentiation and that agenda produced a different type of research than the types found
in other disciplines. This “exceptionalist” position supported a functional approach in political geography that focused on accounts of the internal structure and function of states and how they differed from one another (Livingstone 1993; Johnston 2004). This type of research was indistinguishable from the outmoded regionalism of early Geography that focused on location analysis and the mapping of patterns and trends, offering little in the way of understanding of the geographies of the political (Jones, Jones, and Woods 2004).

The third era encompasses the revival of politically-engaged, theoretically-vibrant geographies. The first stage of this transformation came after a considerable delay relative to the rest of Geography. While other fields had experienced a shift from regionalism and location science to positivist spatial science with a heavy reliance on quantitative approaches in the 1950s, political geography did not take up this orientation until electoral geography in the 1960s began employing statistical methods. Geography’s “quantitative revolution” is often described as beginning with the “Hartshorne-Schaefer debate” in the 1950s (Livingstone 1993). Kurt Schaefer rejected Hartshorne’s thesis of Geography’s “exceptional” place in academia – that Geography was methodologically distinct from other disciplines – and called for a focus on quantitative geographies that relied heavily on the scientific method, statistical (spatial) analyses, and nomothesis for generalization and prediction (Livingstone 1993; Johnston 2004).

The second transformation of this third era involved an array of structural, radical – meaning oppositional to the structures of power that produce inequalities – humanist, and critical realist perspectives often referred to collectively under the umbrella term
critical theories. The third transformation of political geography’s third era came from a broad movement referred to as postmodernism, which lead to the inclusion of poststructuralism and deconstruction in political geography (Johnston 2004).

The three eras of political geography just described have made the field of political geography heterogeneous. One can say that there is a proliferation of political geographies that consist of several distinct research communities. Jones, Jones, and Woods (2004) describe these communities as having four distinct research orientations from the state to the politics of the body. Political geographers from all three types tend to promote essentialist definitions of political geography either as having a central mission or core concepts or by conceiving of politics in a formalist fashion, i.e., focusing on types, structures, and functions of states, electoral practices, and international relations.

[Political geography] definitions reflected the influences of wider theoretical approaches within geography as a whole – regional geography and spatial science respectively – at particular moments in the historical evolution of political geography and have been generally superseded as the discipline has moved on. Still current, however, is a third approach which holds that political geography should be defined in terms of its key concepts, which the proponents of this approach generally identify as territory and the state. (2).

Political geographers of a fourth type promote an inclusive, heterogeneous definition of political geography that adds to the first three a politics of representation, the body, and the everyday. These are politics of a non state-oriented manner that generally occur at an individual or small group level. Identity politics, the environment, postcolonialism, and feminist perspectives are all relatively “new” politics, placed on the agenda by the political upheavals of the 1960.
John Agnew (2003) in forum in Political Geography on the directions, limitations, and strengths of political geographic research describes the sub-discipline since the 1960s as having theoretical and methodological heterogeneity. Some lament the loss of topical and conceptual focus in political geography and promote essentialist definitions and unilateral directions for the sub-discipline, for instance Kevin Cox’s (2003) promotion of territory and territoriality as the core of political geography. Agnew, however, lauds the tensions and endless attempts at epistemological and methodological unification because it engenders debate and resistance while keeping the field politically engaged and academically relevant. He praises the goal of “multi- or trans-disciplinarity” (Agnew 2003: 604). But he goes on to warn against becoming too diverse as to stop being a definable unit. He thus laments the lack of focus on geographical concepts that would fall under the trans-disciplinary banner. “In my view, we need to refocus publication in our major outlets around such concepts as territory, space, place, network, and scale” (604), but Agnew hedges on whether there should be methodological selectivity or whether research should aim to be emancipatory or objective.

Jouni Häkli’s (2003) assessment of political geography goes further away from maintaining an established core than Agnew’s. He establishes a pluralistic stance on what counts as political geography. “However, from a lack of unity it does not necessarily follow that no disciplining is needed at all” (657). He suggests that the underlying problem that has led to persistent fears of losing relevance in academia stems from an occupational concern for disciplinary boundary-making not from challenges in studying contemporary political geographies. This institutional problem of legitimacy and
relevance has, in his view, motivated political geographers to think less about directions toward being more politically-engaged and more interested in defining research agendas and practices that are unique and singularly claimed under the banner “Political Geography”. This is reminiscent of the broader inter- and intradisciplinary battles over the core of Geography.

An important issue in the relationship between ‘PG’ (the sub-discipline of political geography) and ‘pg’ (the political geographical world) is the question of agenda setting. The implication in most papers is that the form should follow the function, that is, political geography research should reflect changes in the political geographical world. From this vantage point any actions aimed at redirecting disciplinary discourses and practices seem like unwarranted use of disciplinary power. Instead, it should be the community of political geographers, and practitioners of related disciplines, who constantly negotiate the agenda through open communication. [original emphasis] (659).

Lastly, he calls for future directions that attempt to unify political geography’s State-centered Politics with the everyday politics of at various scales including the body and the role of language. On account of the latter, Murray Edelman (1977) informs sovereign geography project on how to initially engage political language.

Only rarely can there be direct observations of events, and even then language forms shape the meaning of what the general public and government officials see. It is language that evokes most of the political ‘realities’ people experience. The challenge is to learn how language and gestures are systematically transformed into complex cognitive structures….

Linguistic forms, public actions, and reactions to them that recur in everyday life are my data. In politics, as in religion, whatever is ceremonial or banal strengthens reassuring beliefs regardless of their validity and discourages skeptical inquiry about disturbing issues. …

If political language both excites and mollifies fears, language is an integral facet of the political scene: not simply an instrument for describing events but itself a part of the events, shaping their meaning and helping to shape the political roles officials and the general public play. In this sense, language, events, and self-
conceptions are a part of the same transaction, mutually determining one another’s meanings (3-4).

If there is to be a core of political geography then I agree with Agnew that it should take a “conceptual-descriptive form”. By this I mean that a project of either Politics or politics investigated through any of the methodologies of the social sciences falls legitimately within the realm of political geographic research, so long as it is internally consistent in explanation and clearly self-labeled as a political geography.

Overall these projects can be classified as those that (1) research a political/politicized topic through the geographical concepts of space, place, scale, identity or landscape, (2) conceptualize the relationship between contestation, legitimacy, power, knowledge, and legalities/legalization with geographical concepts, or (3) theorize geographical concepts as being political/politicized. This view leaves open political geography’s methodological possibilities from statistical to empirical to discursive/interpretative. The following section describes two subfields of political that have a explicitly discursive/interpretative orientation.

Among Critical Geopolitics and Legal Geographies

Critical geopolitics is a constellation of research founded in critical social theory and employs various deconstructive methods (Dalby 1991). All critical geopolitical projects are concerned with the political contestation over space articulated at varying scales of social existence. Critical geopolitics research often focuses on political discourse and applies a discursive analytic. The purpose of critical geopolitics in the late
1980s and early 1990s was to reject “geopolitics as a neutral and objective practice of surveying global space” (ÓTuathail and Dalby 1998, 2) and instead portray geopolitics as a set of related yet contested normative practices involving “geographical representations and practices that produce the spaces of world politics” (2).

Critical geopolitics has emerged out of the work of a number of scholars in fields of geography and international relations who, over the last decade, have sought to investigate geopolitics as a social, cultural and political practice, rather than as a manifest and legible reality of world politics. Critical geopolitics is informed by postmodern critiques that have placed the epistemological limits of the ethnocentric practices underpinning Cold War geopolitics in question…in sum, the *geo-politics of geopolitics* itself [emphasis in original] (2).

ÓTuathail and Dalby suggest that, under the influence of the postmodernisms of feminist theories, post-colonialism, and poststructuralism, critical geopolitics has advanced five unique engagements with geopolitics that have broadened understanding of this field of inquiry. First, it prescribes a position that takes seriously the processes “behind” the practice of statecraft. This includes studying the normative practices of controlling space (geopolitical statecraft) via discursive practices in which cultural mythologies are fostered to generate a shared “*geopolitical imagi-nation*” (3). These practices are understood as a contestation over the control of political institutions so to mobilize state resources to bring about a specific vision of sovereign space. Second, critical geopolitics assumes a “plurality of space and the multiplicity of possible political constructions of space” (3). The contestation over a shared “imagi-nation” is viewed as testament to this plurality and multiplicity of possibilities. Third, related to this plurality of space is a plurality of concepts and practices used in statecraft. Hence, geopolitics is seen not as a centered phenomenon but a decentered set of practices loosely tied together...
by hierarchical institutional relations. This follows poststructuralists’ decentered notion of power as sets of relations (Belsey 2002) discussed in the next chapter. Fourth, research employing a critical geopolitics strategy can never assume the “God trick” of an objective, politically neutral stance. Fifth, critical geopolitics is concerned with what Michel Foucault (1980a) termed ‘governmentality’. Foucault’s conceptualizations of governmentality and bio-power are reviewed in detail in the following chapter. Related to the critical geopolitics project in that it focuses on the state’s legal discourses and their effects on social space is legal geographies.

The employment of geographic thought to legal analysis is the purview of legal geographies (LG) (Mitchell 1997, 2001; Blomley 2003; Blomley 1994; Blomley, Delaney, and Ford 2001). LG constitutes an “entrance point” in the study of discursive practices of governmental actors in the production of space. LG is a less topically focused variation of critical geopolitics. The central tenet of LG is that law/legality, as an instrument of change, domination or resistance, and as a means through which justice might be given practical realization has, in innumerable ways, shaped – however provisionally – the basic terms and experience of social life. …

If social reality is shaped by and understood (or constituted) in terms of the legal, it is also shaped by and understood in terms of place and space (Blomley, Delaney, and Ford, 2001: xv).

This passage suggests then that legal geographies are not limited to public spheres but to any sphere of social space. “Law” is not objective or static but an ever-shifting product of negotiated contestation, open to multiple interpretations, and an active producer of space, place, and identity. The relationships between space, place, and identity are the core considerations of political geographies.
Among Border Studies

Geography in general is the study of the heterogeneous distribution of things and processes across space. As part of this project geographers have gone about finding, describing, and understanding difference in the world. It is therefore partly a project of discovery of physical and social boundaries and zones of differentiation and transition. Core concepts such as space, place, landscape, region, scale, location, and identity are all central to geographic thought and all understandable through description of their limits as much as their contents. In fact, one of the chief concerns of geographers at the beginning of Geography’s disciplinary history in the late nineteenth century was a chief concern with international boundaries, which was a colonial manifestation (Livingstone, 1992).

The proper study of an international boundary is, then, primarily concerned with the associations, of all kinds, of the different parts of the border area with each of the bordering states. The geographer in particular is interested in those associations which he observes in the features of the landscape, but he may not leave out of consideration other very important associations. In both cases the associations are of two kinds: those similar in character and those which, though perhaps dissimilar, have mutual interests. [original emphasis] (Hartshorne, 1933: 199-200)

In the post-Cold War world of advanced telecommunications, globalization, and global tourism spawned a reactionary reinvigoration of studying borders and boundary zones leading to a recent b/ordering turn for Geography and beyond. This recent “border turn” has led to a proliferation of the history of state borders and boundaries and their theorization (Paasi 1996, 2005; Newman and Paasi 1998; Häkli and Kaplan 2002; Agnew 2002; Newman 2006b), talk of borders as symbols and discourses involved in the politics of place (Paasi 2002; Virkkunen 2002a; Karppi 2002; van Houtum, Kramsch, and
Ziefhofer 2005; van Houtum 2005; Rumford 2006), and the focus on the reciprocal
dynamics of identity-making and place-making in borderlands (Bialasiewicz and
O’Loughlin 2002; Raento 2002; Kaplan 2002; Klemencic and Schofield 2002). In
response to this renewed interest in border studies Mignolo and Tlostanova (2006) have
claimed “‘Borders’ will be in the twenty-first century what ‘frontiers’ were in the
nineteenth” (205).

In positing an agenda for the next generation of border-related research, borders
should be seen for their potential to constitute bridges and points of contact, as
much as they have traditionally constituted barriers to movement and
communication. (Newman, 2006b: 143)

Within Newman’s text we have three important issues for my own project. The
first is that border studies is specific to a definition of social space that differs from my
own in that it is not considered to be an effect upon the relation between physical and
cognitive spaces and that it is not concerned with the elements of boundarying based on
embodied CS. The second is that border studies recognize that boundaries are also
relations. The third is that border studies recognizes the extensions from its analytical
perspectives to other more cognitive aspects of the process of “bordering” and the myriad
effects these processes can have over various temporal scales.

On the latter issue, the cognitive aspects related to social bordering was taken up
by David Sibley (1995) in which he addresses a fundamental aspect of societies, “Who is
felt to belong and not to belong contributes in an important way to the shaping of social
space.” (1). Sibley takes the concept of bordering into the realm of the psychological
through a psychoanalysis of othering, from an infant’s recognition of the self/other distinction to an analysis of the “geographies of exclusion” and belonging.

Political geographers are now concerned with the b/orders of space and proclaim that “b/ordering is an active verb” not a passive effect (van Houtum, Kramsch, Zierhofer, 2005: 3). B/ordering literature attempts to demonstrate that borders and bordering are fundamental elements of social life beyond their more popular international manifestations. But all of these political expositions of the borders and boundaries demonstrate the fixation of geographers to theoretically subordinate the boundary to space and place. While boundary thinking has become stronger today, the boundary remains conceptually confined, and thus limited, by geographers’ centralization of space and place in theory and practice.

Two publications that attempt to break out of this essentialization of space and place to the subordination of the boundary comes from van Houtum, Kramsch, Zierhofer (2005) and Mignolo and Tlostanova (2006). Notably, borders can trap as well as liberate socio-spatial identities. Thus, by virtue of their evasion of easy categorization and handling, their inherent ambiguity – poised between openness and closure, inclusion and exclusion, fear and political theorizing across the spectrum of the social sciences. It is here, through an infinity of bordering practices, that the political sphere is pried open and ‘up for grabs’. It is in the dynamic and fragile balance between the utopian and dystopian drawing of spatial boundaries that the make-up of a territory can be grasped. The woolly Janus-face of borders may stare off into space in two directions at once, but it will be up to us to widen their gaze to the myriad lines of sight waiting to be exposed (12)

Walter Mignolo and Madina Tlostanova provide a sociological theorization of international borders through a critique of the history of the production of knowledge in
the West. It is geographically-minded and lends itself to an embodied interpretation.

Their post-colonial theorization of “border thinking” is a resistant, alternative way of thinking.

Border thinking or theorizing emerged from and as a response to the violence (frontiers) of imperial/territorial epistemology and the rhetoric of modernity (and globalization) of salvation that continues to be implemented on the assumption of the inferiority or devilish intentions of the Other and, therefore, continues to justify oppression and exploitation as well as eradication of the difference. Border thinking is the epistemology of the exteriority; that is, of the outside created from the inside; and as such, it is always a decolonial project. …

Border thinking is the epistemology of the future, without which another world will be impossible. …

Epistemology is woven into language and … languages are embedded in the body and in the memories (geo-historically located) of each person. …

‘Borders’ are not only geographic but also political, subjective (e.g. cultural) and epistemic …

Borders could be ‘studied’ from the perspective of territorial epistemology (e.g. Western social sciences, see Horkheimer’s traditional theory) but the ‘problem’ of the twenty-first century will be not so much to study the life and deeds of the borders, but to think from the borders themselves. That is, dwelling in the borders means re-writing geographic frontiers, imperial/colonial subjectivities and territorial epistemologies. (Mignolo and Tlostanova, 2006: 205-214)

“Border thinking” is an interesting approach to revealing the underpinning political boundarying within social space not only in geopolitical contexts but everyday life while it also provides a zone from within the boundary to create new, resistant way of thinking. It also stresses the role of the body as a border character.

A recent book series from the University of Minnesota Press titled the Borderlines Series has produced several edited volumes on the topic of borders and boundaries in the production of various political geographies around the world. In particular, Borderscapes
(Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, eds. 2007) offers some more theoretical accounts of what borders and boundaries are (Sidaway, 2003) and how “b/ordering space” (Van Houtum, Kramsch, and Zierhoffer, 2005) is an essential political practice of “boundarying” (Toyota, 2007). Yes, boundarying is a term in use once in border studies literature to explain bordering and boundary-making as a political process. Moreover, within this theorization of political borders and boundaries, that is, political boundarying, there is already an inclusion of biopolitical theorizations of Michel Foucault, Carl Schmitt, and Giorgio Agamben, among others who I address in following chapters. Thus, there already exists a logical articulation point between embodied boundarying as an element of thought and political boundarying (Toyota, 2007).

Boundary effects such as us-them and me-you occur ubiquitously and provide the basis for various scales of existence, for instance cultural groups and political identities. Critical studies on the nature of borders and boundaries demonstrate the contested, socially constructed nature of boundaries as well as how vital these processes are in the constitution of social entities, including territories, identities, and relations.

The epistemic elements of boundarying, in particular the use of boundaries as conceptual structures, are an interesting point discussed in a later chapter. However, cultural geographical examples of epistemic boundarying could make for a dissertation in themselves. Some examples include the popularity of literary “boundary characters” and how they have evolved somatically from outsiders to role models or even heroes. Dracula, Frankenstein, and the werewolf were classic boundary characters that were uniquely different in that there is something familiar in those strange characters. They
were partially here/us and partially there/them in the form of the undead, reanimated human parts, and the transfiguration of man to beast. All were presented as the other in a negative manner or as “the other”.

In the twentieth century, boundary thinking became more widely accepted which led to the proliferation of boundary protagonists, i.e., homosexuals, transsexuals, superheroes. And in more fictional fare, recent lead characters who are traditionally vilified characters evil, alien, and dangerous antagonists are become popular protagonists, for instance serial killer Dexter Morgan. The inclusion of the boundary as a normal epistemic structure of thought, the history of which is explained in a later chapter, has provided the possibility for the inclusion of boundary characters within the normative field subjectivities. Thus, boundary characters are us and their ambiguity is ours as well.

There is a burgeoning literature on borders and boundaries that is slowly, unwittingly overlapping embodied cognition research. This dissertation makes explicit these connections. An example of this burgeoning synergism is seen in an excerpt from Phillip Steinberg’s (2009) recent suggestion that geographers re-theorize political boundaries as active, productive processes in the construction of the content of states.

In short, one cannot understand the construction of “inside” space as a series of territories of fixity, society, modernization, and development without simultaneously understanding the construction of “outside” space as an arena of mobility that is deemed unsuitable for territorial control. (Steinberg, 2009: 467)

This is reminiscent of Abbott’s (1995) call that boundaries make things, things do not make boundaries.

The spatial turn has encouraged us to look to space first, and borders second. Thus, in readings of Empire, the focus has been on the novel polycentricity of
sovereign governance, and with Agamben’s work on the internalization of external space and the breakdown of the binary structure of space, i.e. inside/outside. The contribution of these works to theorizing borders has been less well understood, and is still at a relatively early stage. …

The spatial turn may work to subordinate borders to spaces, as if the former were somehow dependent upon a prior spatial ordering. …

Borders are not to be conceived only as the edges of territory, zones of connectivity, or even spaces of governance. …

‘[B]order thinking’ is a major component of our consciousness of the world. (Rumford, 2006: 166-167)

Border studies literature such as this has effectively taken on the task of theorizing and reporting on the cognitive aspects of political borders and boundaries. And, as detailed above, boundarying effectively theorizes the basis of these processes. While Steinberg, Rumford and Mignolo and Tlostanova extend toward my conceptualization of boundarying, they do not go far enough to encompass the entirety of the centrality of the boundary in “geographic thought” or the primacy of boundaries over space and place. However, this existing research provides a viable field from which to fashion an interdisciplinary link between cognitive science and political geography. But, it should be remembered that my interest in borders and boundaries runs deeper than mere political boundaries and international border zones.
CHAPTER IV

POSTMODERNISM, POSTSTRUCTURALISM, AND DECONSTRUCTION

This chapter has three sections corresponding to the three topics of the chapter heading. All three share the position that there is no philosophy that proves foundational truth. They also agree on an account of language that emphasizes the arbitrariness of signs and the political nature of communicative practice. Therefore, when applied to these three positions, there is no one true reading of the texts involved the conceptualization and deployment of postmodern, poststructural, or deconstructive research. Thus, there is no true interpretation of the meaning of these terms. There is no agreement on the movements, methods, ideological directions, or interpretive limits. There is no agreement on whether or not these conceptualizations represent “methods” or “critiques” in an academic sense of these terms (Sarup, 1993; Dixon and Jones, 2005). However, each has left its mark on the social sciences. I begin with postmodernism.
Postmodernism

The term postmodernism is being used in many artistic, intellectual and academic fields. ... But one thing is clear: postmodernism is of great interest to a wide range of people because it directs our attention to the changes, the major transformations, taking place in contemporary society and culture. The term is at once fashionable and elusive. (Sarup, 1993: 129)

Postmodernism reject atomistic, passivistic, nomothetic, deterministic theories that claim to positively and absolutely produce truth knowledge of the world through rigorous, systematic methods of inquiry. Postmodernism in Geography has led to geographical inquiry concerned with theorizing the traditionally ignored complexities of the concepts space, place, power, and identity. It offers multiple, shifting, and resistant interpretations to traditional topics. It is academic pluralism. For those in academia seeking truth, pluralistic visions of research are antithetical to academic pursuits. I disagree with that position.

“Postmodern geographies” emphasize the unique, manifold, embodied, active, dynamic, and ambiguous character of spaces, places, and subjectivities (Hubbard et al., 2005). This tradition is characterized by the utilization of critical social theory – the moniker given to a heterogeneous constellation of epistemologies and methodologies that share a similar emancipatory ideology (ÓTuathail, 2002).

Calhoun (1995) describes critical social theory as an ideologically charged “interpenetrating body of work which demands and produces critique in four senses” (35).

A critical engagement with the theorist’s contemporary social world, recognizing that the existing state of affairs does not exhaust all possibilities, and offering positive implications for social action;
2 a critical account of the historical and cultural conditions (both social and personal) on which the theorist’s own intellectual activity depends;

3 a continuous critical re-examination of the constitutive categories and conceptual frameworks of the theorist’s understanding, including the historical construction of those frameworks; and

4 a critical confrontation with other works of social explanation that not only establishes their good and bad points but shows the reasons behind their blind spots and misunderstandings, and demonstrates the capacity to incorporate their insights on stronger foundations. (35)

Postmodernism can also be understood in a general sense through a series of distinctions between related terms, namely modernity, postmodernity, modernization, and modernism.

*Modernity* is generally held to have come into being with the Renaissance and was defined in relation to antiquity. ... in short, modernity can be taken as a summary term, referring to that cluster of social, economic and political systems brought into being in the West from somewhere around the eighteenth century onwards.

*Postmodernity* suggests that it came after modernity; it refers to the incipient or actual dissolution of the social forms associated with modernity. ... I think that postmodernity emphasizes diverse forms of individual and social identity. It is now widely held that the autonomous subject has been dispersed into a range of plural, polymorphous subject-positions inscribed within language. Instead of a coercive totality and a totalizing politics, postmodernity stresses a pluralistic and open democracy. Instead of the certainty of progress, associated with ‘the Enlightenment project’ (of which Marxism is a part), there is now an awareness of contingency and ambivalence. ...

*Modernization* is a diverse unity of socio-economic changes generated by scientific and technological discoveries and innovations, industrial upheavals, population movements, urbanization, the formation of nation states and mass political movements, all driven by the expanding capitalist world market. ...

*Modernism* concerns a particular set of cultural or aesthetic styles associated with the artistic movement which originated around the turn of the [twentieth] century and have dominated the various arts until recently. Modernism developed in
conscious opposition to classicism; it emphasized experimentation and the aim of finding an inner truth behind surface appearance. [emphasis added] (Sarup, 1993: 130-131)

What is collectively referred to as postmodernism originated in the arts. As a result much of the style of postmodern social science research follows the same patterns and orientation as that found in the arts.

The term postmodernism originated among the artists and critics of New York in the 1960s and was taken up by European theorists in the 1970s. One of them, Jean-Francois Lyotard, in a famous book titled The Postmodern Condition, attacked the legitimating myths of the modern age (‘the grand narratives’), the progressive liberation of humanity through science, and the idea that philosophy can restore unity to learning and develop universally valid knowledge for humanity. Postmodern theory became identified with the critique of universal knowledge and foundationalism. Lyotard believes that we can no longer talk about a totalizing idea of reason for there is no reason, only reasons. ... Many commentators stress that postmodernists espouse a model which emphasizes not depth but surface. They are highly critical of structuralism and Marxism and are antagonistic to any theory that ‘goes beyond’ the manifest to the latent. ... There are continual references to eclecticism, reflexivity, self-referentiality, quotation, artifice, randomness, anarchy, fragmentation, pastiche and allegory. Moreover, with the development of postmodernism in recent years, there has been a move to ‘textualize’ everything: history, philosophy, jurisprudence, sociology and other disciplines are treated as so many optional ‘kinds of writing’ or discourses. (Sarup 2003:131-132)

Postmodernism then can be understood in a more specific sense by what it offers as an alternative to that which it rejects. Instead of an orientation toward truth, postmodernism declares everything to be pluralistically interpretable and hence “textual”.

*Textuality* is a particularly potent term in deconstruction and poststructuralism. The linguistic theories undergirding poststructuralism and deconstruction have led to attempts to make poststructuralism into a complete philosophy (May 1995).
To demonstrate the relatedness and difference between the scientific and artistic phases of postmodernism, Michael Dear (1988) defines postmodernism as three modes of social transformation: *style, era,* and *method of inquiry.* Postmodernism as a transformation of style is most evident in urban architectural forms of the twentieth century. Postmodernism as an epochal delimitation denotes social transformations beginning in the mid-twentieth century that arose in contraposition to Enlightenment thinking and modernist movements that had become dominant in the West from the nineteenth century to the end of WWII. Postmodernism in this connotation refers to several epistemic transformations from the mid-twentieth century on that shared several commonalities.

Postmodernism – plus poststructuralism and deconstruction – are often criticized for epistemological relativism, especially regarding ethics (Sarup 1993; Belsey 2003). This has led to these movements being seen as socially hollow since they would appear to negate any morally-justifiable (emancipatory) social organization or agenda (Sarup 1993). Michel Foucault was particularly criticized in this manner. Foucault’s, and later Agamben’s, work left many readers feeling hopeless (May 1995). “The critical capacity of Foucault’s work is paralysed because the reader is made to think that the project of social transformation is vain, trivial, hopeless” (Sarup 1993: 98). The problem seen in this type of reading comes from a difference in the definition of emancipation.

Emancipation can have two distinct meanings. The first pertains to the release from physical bondage. When forms of violence are ameliorated, physical emancipation has been achieved. The second is social emancipation. This type includes the reduction of
coercive hegemony, uninformed consent, marginalization, and discipline of social space.

Postmodern emancipatory hope works toward denormalization of the totalizing practices that produce systems of inequality and oppression by critiquing these systems and the strategies, tactics, techniques, and technologies of power.

Poststructuralism

Poststructuralism is the name of an intellectual movement that rejects Enlightenment and modernist philosophies and the intellectual and social projects that emerged from them. Its tenets are linguistic indeterminacy, anti-humanism, anti-foundationalism, and the decentered subject.

Post-structuralism is highly critical of the unity of the stable sign (the Saussurian view). The new movement implies a shift from the signified to the signifier: and so there is a perpetual detour on the way to a truth that has lost any status or finality. Post-structuralists have produced critiques of the classical Cartesian conception of the unitary subject – the subject/author as originating consciousness, authority for meaning and truth. It is argued that the human subject does not have a unified consciousness but is structured by language. Post-structuralism, in short, involves a critique of metaphysics, of the concepts of causality, of identity, of the subject, and of truth. (Sarup, 1993: 3)

One of the main features of post-structuralist theory is the deconstruction of the self. In place of a unified and stable being or consciousness we get a multifaceted and disintegrated play of selves. (53)

Calhoun (1995) describes the relationship between postmodernism and poststructuralism. He defines postmodernism as a set of interrelated movements having four distinct trends. Two of these trends are relevant here.

Postmodernism as a theoretical and/or critical position derives substantially from poststructuralism. …
Closely related to poststructuralism in many accounts is the postmodern critique of “foundationalism” in philosophy and theory. At a minimum, this is an extension of Nietzschean and Heideggerian critique of metaphysics into an attack on all claims to an external standpoint for judging truth. In the work of [Richard] Rorty, for example, a level of necessary theoretical indeterminacy is made the basis for a call to abandon repressive demands for certainty in favor of a “liberal” toleration of diversity on even the most basic epistemological and ethical points. In other hands, antifoundationalism becomes an attack on theoretical systematicity itself. (100)

A central figure in the development of poststructural thought is Fredrick Nietzsche. Nietzsche was skeptical of totalizing thought systems. His distrust of “perspectives” came from his recognition of the political nature of truth. The Will to Truth was the production of “truth” as a metaphor for the righteousness of one’s perspective. The “will” to produce perspectives as truth came from a Will to Power inherent to human existence. Nietzsche saw truth as a solidification of widely circulated metaphors; a position perfectly in line with embodied realism.

The will to power interprets existence by identifying a hierarchy of forces between different forms of life and judging how far one force has become master over the other. The hierarchy of force represented by the dominance of a particular perspective upon life over other perspectives is the basis for the formation of every ‘truth’ and ‘value’. There is no ‘real’ world behind this hierarchical play of perspectives; will to power is the productive force that constitutes every level of life. Consequently, the conflict between interpretations and the quest for domination becomes fundamental to our experience of being. (Spinks, 2003: 151)

From these conceptual origins, a strand of anti-structuralist debate began in the 1960s. The focus was on the limitations of structuralism, their modernist assumptions, and the similarities these academic projects had to the perspectives of Nietzsche’s will to power. This soon became a basis for political movement after the 1960s, especially in France. Following the student protests of 1968, new philosophers wrote a new philosophy
for a post-modernist world. It was anti-establishment, nihilistic, pessimistic, and focused on linguistic analysis.

Post-structuralism is largely ‘a product of 1968’. Unable to break the structures of state power, post-structuralism found it possible to subvert the structures of language: ‘The student movement was flushed of the streets and driven underground into discourse.’ Its enemies became coherent belief systems of any kind, in particular all forms of political theory and organization which sought to analyse and act upon the structures of society as a whole. ...

It was stated that the ‘new philosophy’ is not just an aberration of a few intellectuals but must be seen as mirroring a widespread mood of disorientation among the generation of ’68. (Sarup, 1993: 105-106)

Sarup (1993) defines a broader movement of poststructuralism that has continued to develop since the 1970s as involving four critiques: the critique of the human subject, the critique of historicism, the critique of meaning, and the critique of philosophy. These critiques are also critiques of structuralism. However, the manner in which poststructuralism addresses these issues separates it from structuralism considerably.

Discourse is “language-in-use” (Van Dijk, 2007). Discourses are the result of disciplining rules placed upon discursive practice. These practices constitute discursive fields – conceptual entities such as truth, capitalism, justice, fashion, identity, etc. – and the entirety of these fields provides the limits to which one can legitimately interpret and engage one’s social milieu. The process of regulating and legitimating the rules of discursive formation is a central element in analyzing, understanding, and resisting productive power. It involves the coordination of physical space with social space so to direct one’s interpretation and engagement with it. Thus, power constitutes legitimate interpretations of the world because it constitutes the constellation of allowable
discourses that constitute particular types of entities. As far as I take discourse within a poststructural bent, the indeterminacy of discourse and its ability through initiation of conceptual blending to produce conceptual entities is perfectly complimentary to embodied realism. Therefore, the idea that discourses constitute the objects of which they speak does not mean that “the world” does not exist except through discursive practice. And, it does not mean that perception of materiality does not provide tremendous input and structure to how the arbitrariness of language acquires embodied meaning. It also does not mean that only discourse, not the body, has a meaningful connection between cognitive, physical, and social spaces. Discourses are disciplined so to regulate what fields of entities are legitimately able to be thought, at least publically. Michel Foucault, a central figure in poststructuralism, set out to demonstrate that discourses are not purely mental tasks but socially regulated practices.

Discursive relations are not, as we can see, internal to discourse: they do not connect concepts or words with one another, they do not establish a deductive or rhetorical structure between propositions or sentences. ... They are, in a sense, at the limit of discourse: they offer it objects of which it can speak, ... they determine the group of relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object, in order to deal with them, name them, analyse them, classify them, explain them, etc. These relations characterize not the language (langue) used by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is deployed, but discourse itself as a practice. ... [original emphasis]

We sought the unity of discourse in the objects themselves, in their distribution, in the interplay of their differences, in their proximity or distance – in short, in what is given to the speaking subject; and, in the end, we are sent back to a setting-up of relations that characterizes discursive practice itself; and what we discover is neither a configuration, nor a form, but a group of rules that are immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity. (Foucault, 1972, 47-48)
The difference between a decentered, linguistically-produced subject and an embodied subject is not as profound as it might seem. Poststructuralism rejects a unified, stable Cartesian subject, so does embodied cognition. For poststructuralism, language is the basis for the subject that has a body but is defined in disembodied terms. In other words, how does discipline affect an individual? This reads in Foucault’s work anyway in a behavioralist account. There are institutions. Institutions create and normalize subjectivities through discursive practices and non-discursive regulation of bodies in space. Bodies go in, subjects come out. Subjects engage in the same discursive and non-discursive practices as those legitimated institutionally, thus something happened in the brains of institutionalized bodies that made them subjects. Institutional effects on people are not uniform. What accounts for the differences? How does an embodied realist account for the institutional discursive and non-discursive practices? First, an embodied self is not unified or stable. Unification of thought and perception is a mysterious phenomenon in CS directly because CS demonstrated decades ago that cognition is distributed and modalities are domain specific. While cognition functions holistically and is functionally unified, cognition is a distributed process (see the “binding problem” above). Furthermore, while poststructuralism decenters the subject, which in essence disembodies it relative to linguistic explanations, embodied cognition states that most cognition is unconscious and structured not by reason or even linguistic computation but by experience. As explain above, language is experiential. Thus, while there are differences between poststructuralism and embodied CS there are many similarities. The similarities are to be expected to an extent since embodied CS is forwarded mostly by
cognitive linguists that support, in quite different ways, the explanations poststructuralists make regarding the arbitrariness of signifiers, the illusion of a stable self, and the intimate role language plays in constructing the entities of the mind. In fact, having moved from traditional cognitive science years ago to poststructuralism to embodied CS, I view embodied CS as the most radical in that the very idea of being logical seems to be nothing more than a coincidence of entailments between a source domain and a target domain. This immediately creates moral questions that directly impact politics at all levels (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Lakoff, 2002, 2008).

What poststructuralism offers is, in the end, an opportunity and a cause for reflection. It proposes a lexicon and a syntax, which is to say a vocabulary and an indication of the ways words legitimately relate to each other. But the language poststructuralism put forward...is more useful in prompting the uncertainty of questions than in delivering the finality of answers. ... In that respect, in its emphasis on the degree to which we make our own story, subject to certain specifiable constraints, poststructuralism is at once sceptical towards inherited authority and affirmative about future possibilities. (Belsey, 2002: 107) One of the main features of post-structuralist theory is the deconstruction of the self. In place of a unified and stable being or consciousness we get a multifaceted and disintegrated play of selves (Sarup, 1993: 53).

It is to this deconstruction method which I now turn.

Deconstruction

Jacques Derrida is the single most influential figure in development of a textual method called “deconstruction”. The link between embodied realism and deconstruction, due to its strong relativism, appears on the surface to be a hard sell. However, I have described above that Derrida’s works focus on very similar linguistic elements, that is, binaries, metaphors, différance, and presence, as those within embodied realism. In this
subsection I review these linkages as well as the deconstructive method as it applies to
my geobiopolitical interpretive analysis of the IDP.

Deconstruction is critique. It offers subversions of ostensibly “hidden”
assumptions that ground the truth elements of a given text. In short, deconstruction
attempts to reveal the contradictory status of any grounding concept employed to support
a truth claim. It then reinterprets that text in a way that ostensibly subverts the original or
popular meaning of that text. This is the methodological aspect I take from
deconstruction.

As a mode of textual theory and analysis, contemporary deconstruction subverts
almost everything in the tradition, putting in question received ideas of the sign
and language, the text, the context, the author, the reader, the role of history, the
work of interpretation, and the forms of critical writing. In this project a past
crumbles and something monstrous emerges: a future. [original emphasis] (Leitch
1983: xi)

Deconstruction relies on the concept of différance described above and a similar
concept, textuality. Textuality is not limited to written or spoken words or even the
totality of signs and their systematic deployment. Textuality is literally anything
interpretable. However, most deconstruction revolves around the analysis of speeches and
written documents.

Derrida raises crucial queries concerning what he calls the western philosophical
tradition. Cultural life involves texts we produce, says Derrida, intersecting with
other texts that influence ours in ways we cannot ever unravel. The task of
‘deconstruction’, a strategy gleaned from Derrida’s reading of Heidegger, is to
raise persistent questions about our own texts and those of others, to deny that any
text is settled or stable. The logocentric stance of modernity is radically disrupted
by stressing the indeterminacy of language. Though some, such as Richard Rorty,
take Derrida to be arguing that the modern era of Enlightenment is over, others
insist that he should be seen as still working within those parameters.
Whether or not Derrida would accept that his is a postmodern account, it is certainly the case that his concept of deconstruction has entered the canon—forgive me!—of postmodern critique. (Lyon 1999: 18)

Deconstruction, then, is postmodern in its reception into social cultural studies and is epistemologically and methodologically poststructural, though it has been argued by Derrida himself that deconstruction is not postmodern or poststructural. The differences between poststructuralism and deconstruction come partially from Derrida’s differences with Foucault in his understanding of critical interpretation.

There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, because at bottom everything is already interpretation. Each sign is in itself not the thing that presents itself to interpretation but the interpretation of other signs. (Foucault 1999: 279)

Deconstruction’s popular reception and application within cultural studies and social sciences has produced more moderate versions that, whether Derrida would have approved or not, has left us with less Derridean forms and definitions. I am not interested in Derrida’s complete vision of deconstruction. I am interested those elements that I can adaptively employ in the extension of the boundary into an interpretation of a political example of a modern boundary character.

In Of Grammatology (1976), Derrida describes a paradoxical project that attempts to address the irregularities in which theory and law in science were related. While laws describe regularities in observation of phenomena, theories explain hidden elements of phenomena that explain the occurrence of laws. Derrida’s project illuminated processes related to the postulation of theories, not laws, i.e., processes related to the structuring of logical truth within interpretive frameworks, not merely the interpretation of experiences. He was therefore interested in something more foundational in Western thought than
various interpretations of empirical observation and everyday experiences. He was interested in theory-making itself. He set out searching for and then overturning hidden elements that granted theories their legitimacy. Since deconstruction was based in textuality, Derrida employed his linguistic theorizations to deconstruct theory-making. In so doing, he rejected many dogmatic positions of Western thought.

As his explanation goes, within texts there are elements that provide support for logical propositions. These elements can be overturned, according to Derrida, so that the text’s logic is revealed to be contradictory and its claims vacuous. An alternate interpretation of the text can then be submitted. This process can be applied to anything interpretable since all things are texts, including Derrida’s own deconstructions.

[Derrida] pays close attention to philosophical texts and through them to some philosophical problems. … One of these is that language and words we use do not really have the common, ordinary meanings we suppose, because their origins lie deeper in hidden causes (frequently having to do with personal or political power) rather than in the obvious patterns of use we learned as we grew up. [emphasis added] (Garver and Lee, 1994: 212)

The hidden elements that can be discerned from a text are metaphorical allusions. In deconstruction, the ubiquity of metaphors is political. Metaphors stand in for some necessary foundational logic and thus grant a text its logical legitimacy. Textual assumptions are accepted without question mostly because the metaphorical elements are acceptable. These metaphors are not mere supplementary textual elements or merely poetic tools of expression. They are essential for the acceptance of a given proposition. This position on metaphor is explained through boundarying and embodied cognition. Thus, Derrida’s deconstruction, to a point, is applicable to boundarying.
Metaphor expresses the unfamiliar (known in literary jargon as the ‘tenor’) in terms of the familiar (the ‘vehicle’). In semiotics terms, a metaphor involves one signified acting as a signifier referring to a rather different signified. Since metaphors apparently disregard ‘literal’ or denotative resemblance they can be seen as symbolic as well as iconic. Metaphoric signifiers tend to foreground the signifier rather than the signified. Deconstructionists have sought to demonstrate how dominant metaphors function to privilege unmarked signifieds. (Chandler, 2003: 233)

Central to deconstructive analysis of metaphors is the analysis of the oppositional binaries they represent.

What are binary oppositions? They are a way of seeing, rather like ideologies. We know that ideologies draw sharp distinctions between conceptual opposites such as truth and falsity, meaning and nonsense, centre and periphery. Derrida suggests that we should try to break down the oppositions by which we are accustomed to think and which ensure the survival of metaphysics in our thinking. (Sarup, 1993: 38)

Practitioners [of deconstruction] seek to dismantle the rhetorical [and ideological] structures within a text to demonstrate how key concepts within it depend on their unstated oppositional relation to absent signifiers… Deconstructionists have also exposed culturally embedded conceptual oppositions in which the initial term is privileged, leaving “Term B” negatively ‘marked’. Radical deconstruction is not simply a reversal of the valorization in an opposition but a demonstration of the instability of such oppositions. (Chandler, 2003: 227)

Deconstruction’s textual method puts significant codes underpinning social existence “sous rapture” or “under erasure” (Sarup, 1993). To demonstrate that a given term is under erasure, it is presented while also crossed out because it is “inadequate yet necessary” [original emphasis] (33), for instance Being. Deconstruction “overturns” the assumptions of a metaphysical system because it rejects the validity of metaphysical systems of thought. Deconstruction is therefore philosophically anti-foundational.

Metaphysical systems are thought-systems that depend on first principles or logos. “First principles are often defined by what they exclude, by a sort of ‘binary opposition’ to
other concepts” (37). This dependence on metaphysical logos Derrida referred to as logocentrism. This means that “philosophy assumes that there is an essence, or truth which acts as the foundation to our beliefs; hence there seems to be a disposition, a longing, for a ‘transcendental signifier’ which would directly relate, correspond, to a secure stable ‘transcendental signified’ (i.e., a logos)” [original emphasis] (37). In Derrida’s account of metaphysical logos, the most dominant metaphysic in Western philosophy is “presence”. Therefore, the presence/absence binary is a ubiquitous metaphorical logic in philosophical suppositions. As I have explained above, this reliance on presence, the presence/absence binary, and the metaphors that represent them in linguistic practice are all explainable through accounts of embodied boundarying.

Derrida stresses that it is not enough to simply neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics [the thought-system intertextually referenced through metaphors by a particular text]. Deconstruction involves reversal and displacement. Within the familiar philosophical oppositions there is always a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other, holds the superior position. The first move in deconstructing the opposition is to overthrow the hierarchy. In the next phase this reversal must be displaced, the winning term put ‘under erasure’. [emphasis added] (Sarup, 1993: 51)

The metaphor employed by deconstruction to describe texts is the palimpsest.

Deconstruction utilizes the manifold, imbricated, and layered metaphorical logic of the palimpsest to interrogate and overturn the “hidden” binaries of a text. The deconstructive method begins with finding the ambiguous moments of writing in a text. This is followed by revealing the grammatical intertextual traces between texts. The logic behind them is presented in the form of metaphors. Metaphors are ambiguous because they represent two things at once, but only partially on each count. The object represented by the metaphor
is not meant to be taken fully into the text. Only its logical structure, its ability to
logically hold other parts of the text together in acceptable and meaningful ways, is
meant to be included in the text. This leaves the metaphorical element and that which it
replaces – the hidden element – both within and outside of the text. In the same manner
as the boundary, the metaphor is that which stands between that which it was and that
which it replaces. These are the ambiguous moments in the writing of a text. The hidden
elements are binary oppositions in hierarchical relations. In deconstruction, the binary is
determined to be inadequate by its own criteria and displaced from its assumed hierarchy.

This process destabilizes, even dissolves, some concepts while it forms new ones of its
own. These too become subject to deconstruction.

In each sign there are traces of other words which that sign has excluded in order
to be itself. And words contain the trace of the ones which have gone before. All
words/signs contain traces. They are like reminders of what has gone before. Every word in a sentence, every sign in a chain of meaning, has these traces in an
inexhaustible complexity. (Sarup, 1993: 34)

It should be pointed out that for Derrida ‘writing’ does not refer to the empirical
concept of writing (which denotes an intelligible system of notations on a material
substance); writing is the name of the structure always already inhabited by the
trace. [emphasis added] (41)

A deconstructive examination of a text can rely on the genealogical method to
unfold the traces of particular binary/metaphorical logos in a text. I turn to the
genealogical method in the next chapter.
CHAPTER V

GEOBIOPOLITICS

This chapter presents biopolitics in a manner that emphasizes its geographical elements, i.e., geobiopolitics. I have created inroads between embodied realism and the poststructural method deconstruction. Within this chapter I describe Foucault’s genealogical method so to combine deconstruction and genealogy into an interpretive analytic for the exploration of the political example of the modern boundary character, IDP. I then move on to the geobiopolitical conceptualizations of Giorgio Agamben. I then focus the discussion to “the exception” through a discussion of exceptionality in the metaphysics of sovereignty, which is derived from the works of Foucault, Agamben and Carl Schmitt. The exception is then interpreted within the conceptualization of the boundarying. The boundary as exception argument is then employed as a guiding element in my deconstructive genealogy of the citizen-subject “IDP”.

The concepts of biopower and biopolitics have become increasingly prominent in recent political thought, particularly within the European tradition of social and critical philosophy. Here one can mention Foucault’s first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, Agamben’s appropriation of Foucault’s concept of biopolitics in *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, and the most recent development of the concept of the biopolitical in Hardt and Negri’s critique of global capitalism, *Empire*. The theoretical significance of the concept of
biopolitics undoubtedly lies in its synthesis of processes such as the technological manipulation of our biological existence, the management of biological life as a resource, and the administration of human populations as the objects of social and political power relations. (Sinnerbrink 2005: 239-240)

Two important principles ground biopolitics. The first is the political nature of language. The second is the corporeal orientation of political practices. The political study of language comes from the study of “language-in-use”, otherwise known as discourse (Van Dijk 2007). The disciplinary nature of political discourse often produces social inequalities (Foucault 1972; Edelman 1977; Mills 1997). As stated above, language, bodies, and space are intimately tied to social space. The regulation of these elements is achieved through the control of the conditions of embodiment. This is my definition of power and it is not significantly different from that seen in poststructural and biopolitics literature.

Space commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes and distances to be covered. It is produced with this purpose in mind; this is its raison d'être [original emphasis] (Edelman, 1977: 142-143).

Political discourses are central to investigations into the production of social space due to their legal force. Sovereign practices follow the geographical imaginaries of the legal discourses that construct state institutions, territories, and citizen-subjects. These are political boundaryings. They create distinctions, relations, and objects simultaneously, though further inscription, similar to further domain associations, need not be spelled out in every legal instance. The discursive focus can be placed on creating a particular distinction, relation, or object. In the case of territories and citizens, the legal force is placed on all for entities. In territory-making, borders are essential to distinguish
territorial content. Nationalism provides the internal content (we/figure) with external contrast (them/ground) and international relations provide exactly what the term states. In citizen-subject-making, bodies treated as point in a set where the properties of the set define the properties of the point. Citizens are linguistically constructed through legal discourse as basic-level citizen categories. Foucault stated that discourses produce the objects of which they speak. This statement did not imply the boundarying meaning I posit, but it is similar in that the productive power of discourse comes from its inherent simultaneous limitation through production. Discursive practices within a discursive community are rhetorical practices. They solicit selective activation and inhibition of information in a variety of domains so as to produce desired abstractions that have no tie to the world until they are integrated within the conditions of embodiment of that community. Once normalized, these definitional entities become embodied entities. Discourse is an aspect of social space because it has effects on the relation between physical and cognitive space. *Biopolitics is embodied politics.* The primacy of semiotic systems of the political realm of social space stems from their ability to normalize. These systems are the conceptual link in the production of embodied politics. The primary political process of social space is the normalization of the conditions of embodiment. The resulting effect is power. Power, in my embodied realist definition, is an effect of normalization from the regulation of social conditions of embodiment of those within the sphere of that effect. This effect is heterogeneous in every conceivable modality of embodiment because it is not an historically and geographically equipotent force. In fact, its greatest effects are quite localized in those locations intimately involved in the
production of political boundarying and the processes of establishing the qualities of normalization. These locations are border areas, political and economic capitals, and the infrastructure that enables the first two. The rise of border studies in the last twenty years reflects not only a rise in the academic awareness of the importance of borderlands in state and cultural production but also the rising significance of these necessary elements of state and group making. The study of these processes must take into account how these related entities of political or cultural boundarying are originated, maintained, altered, and resisted. Place-making is the behavioral manifestation of boundarying, but these practices get their logic from the discursive practices that make these place-making practices into desirable, actionable goals. In the case of modern sovereign states we can call these combined effects “sovereign imaginaries”.

Discourse analysis is a heterogeneous set of methodologies stemming from sociological and cognitive theories applied to the study of discourse and its myriad cognitive and social effects. Exposing the intentions of the producers of the instructions “written into” and then disciplined within social space is the central goal of critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA attempts to expose the often hidden inequalities produced in discursive practices to reveal how “social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted” (Van Dijk, 2001: 353). CDA therefore is more than the analysis of a written or spoken text, but an analysis of society that treats both discursive and non-discursive practice as interpretable and fundamentally linked.

The political theorists from which I base my discussion of biopolitics – Schmitt, Foucault, and Agamben – were all influenced by legal philosophers such as David Hume,
John Austin, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke and others. I thus recognize that biopolitics did not originate with them but has many genealogical traces that reach back centuries. But, it is not my intention to review the history or breadth of legal philosophies or sociological theories on law and sovereignty. I am weaving together a unique set of literatures relative to a novel conceptualization of the boundary.

The term “geo-biopolitical” was first used in Claudio Minca’s (2006: 388) review of Agamben’s conceptualization of the *exception*. To avoid confusion henceforth I use “geobiopolitics” to refer to the critical perspective on social space as I have defined it above. I use the term “politics of life” to refer to Agamben’s biopolitical conceptualizations. And, I use the term “biopolitics” to refer to either Foucault’s conceptualizations of bio-power and governmentality or simply the general idea that politics of social space is corporeal.

Geobiopolitics provides an alternative position from which to reinterpret the emergence of the citizen-subject IDP originating from the sovereign imaginaries of the modern state that have produced a newly formulated category of citizen. IDPs become only through the sovereign imaginaries of those involved in the production and regulation of state-oriented geopolitical social spaces that have (1) led to embodied conditions of displacement of sovereign citizen-subjects in state territories and (2) externally determine these bodies to be “internally displaced”. These imaginaries are metaphorically grounded upon the fundamental conceptualization of *placement*. Placement as a natural state of being of citizen-subjects is therefore assumed as a necessary condition for legitimate
inclusion within a state’s population, topological status of a state body in a territorial set. Bodies within a population are understood as “citizens” within the state so long as they exhibit proper forms of citizenry (citizen-subjectivities). The problem of displacement emanates not from the location of bodies but from the sovereign imaginaries that dictate which bodies belong. Physical displacement then is merely a by-product the production of these types of social space.

The remainder of this chapter provides the geobiopolitical content of my “interpretive analytic” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 104-125) of the IDP. It takes from deconstruction the analysis of metaphors and binaries in the formation of logic within a text. It takes from genealogy a unique form of historical analysis that links discursive and non-discursive practices together. I am not applying genealogy or deconstruction but instead taking conceptual and methodological elements of each and assembling them together into an *ad hoc* interpretive analytic to critically assess the citizen-subject IDP as a citizen-category based on the boundary.

Key figures in my geobiopolitical perspective on the IDP are Foucault, Derrida, and Agamben. I am not however attempting to produce a Foucauldian, Derridan or Agambenian project. Derrida made famous the process of deconstruction from which I borrow. A central idea in Derrida’s deconstruction is that underlying philosophical assumptions of a given text rely on underlying binary logic for support hidden by the use of metaphors. This binary logic assumes the role of a foundational truth upon which propositions on a given topic can be made. The deconstructive act is to find the contradiction in the binary logic presented in the text and provide a new interpretation
with new metaphors to support the “reconstructed” position. Whereas Derrida informs on a particular deconstructive maneuver within my interpretive analytic, Foucault provides the genealogical scheme by which to investigate the IDP. He also contributes heavily through his biopolitical conceptualizations. Agamben has a purely conceptual influence. His understanding of biopolitics is spatial and emphasizes the displacing aspect of modern forms of sovereign power.

There are many differences as well as points of conceptual overlap and articulation between Foucault and Agamben (Sinnerbrink 2005; Minca 2006; Fassin 2007; Mills 2003; Patton 2007). The next two sections introduce some relevant conceptualizations from these two figures. The material presented is not a complete review of either their works or of the problematic issues brought out in various critiques of their works. I relate their work as it pertains to the boundary as exception. I begin my discussion of geobiopolitics with the works of Michel Foucault and then move to Giorgio Agamben.

Michel Foucault

Foucault’s writings tempt us to general interpretations along two primary axes. In the first dimension he appears as a philosophical historian, progressively developing a series of complimentary historical methods: an archaeology of discourse...; a genealogy of power relations ...; and a problematization of ethics. In the second dimension he appears as a historicist philosopher, offering, parallel to his methodological innovations, successively deeper and mutually supporting theories of knowledge, power, and the self. (Gutting 2005: 2-3)

For geographers engaged in Foucault’s conceptualization of productive power, his assessment of space as fundamental to disciplining bodies is of particular importance. It is through Foucault’s genealogical works that he developed his understanding of the role
of the body as a medium within the general practices of power/knowledge which form the core of modern governmental rationality, *governmentality* (Foucault 1980b), that is, his genealogies more than his archaeologies developed his biopolitical critiques.

From the 18th century onwards, biological existence is no longer a neutral, unchanging substrate upon which political existence is superimposed. Consequently, a new politics emerges ... biology is drawn into the domain of power and knowledge. The establishment of norms, hierarchies and statistical analyses gain in importance in relation to the creation of legal frameworks. Rather than exercising its sovereign right to curtail life in periodic, spectacular manner, politics focuses increasingly on the fostering and direction – the *government* – of life. [original emphasis] (Marks, 2006: 333)

Foucault’s term *power/knowledge* (1980a) represents a twofold conceptualization in which knowledge is understood as a byproduct of power instantiated in social relations and how power employs knowledge to reproduce its effects. By power he meant the activation of influence by various means so to produce desired social effects. The body has a central role in this process as the focal point in the enacting of power – Foucault referred to the body as a “relay point” and “circuit in the flow of power relations” between individuals (1977) – as well as the bearer of power’s effects. Power in this sense is productive not destructive. What counts as legitimate knowledge in a given social group is a constrained product – what Foucault referred to as a “rarity” (1972) – of political contestation not an objective, value-free pursuit of universal truths. This is quite similar to social space and power as I have described them.

I take from Foucault two concepts I deem applicable to boundarying, the episteme and genealogy. The former comes from his earlier archaeologies, so I begin there. Within his archaeology of the human sciences (1970), Foucault traced the co-historical
development of scientific knowledge and state government. Foucault was interested not in causal relations and the pursuit of some truth or origin nor was he interested in mere corollary relations but was instead concerned with finding contingent events for the emergence of particular problems-to-be-solved within governmental rationality (Foucault, 1980a). The new human sciences enabled and reciprocally were enabled by new state institutions that legitimated while they also employed new scientific knowledge. The emergence of new sciences was therefore coupled with transformations in governance that used developing scientific rationality as justification for burgeoning institutional powers of states. Foucault then sought to trace the emergence of certain problems-to-be-solved that simultaneously emerged as scientific, as well as political, economic, and social, problems which included illegitimate subjects such as the deviant, the insane, and the infirm among many others.

Within his archaeologies of the human sciences, Foucault understood power/knowledge as enacted through ubiquitous networks of power relations (1977) in society. The body is a relay for power relations and the subjectivities enacted by bodies was the effect of these power relations (Foucault, 1980a). Foucault was not concerned about the cognitive means by which this process occurred or how his conceptualization of the technologies of self was cognitively possible in the manner in which he described it. Instead, he was concerned with the effects of the overall process including the material, institutional practices that supplemented the discursive elements of power/knowledge. What I take from Foucault is therefore understood within the embodied cognition perspective I have detailed above. These conceptual imbrications do not negate his
overall understanding of power/knowledge or biopolitics, but it does leave behind any
philosophical extensions he made. Foucault’s later genealogies were philosophically and
historically informed by his earlier archaeologies. Within his genealogical accounts of
power Foucault used the phrase *technologies of self* to define how individuals actively
participate in their own subjugation to disciplinary practices and therefore *become
subjects* of disciplinary practices, both discursive and non-discursive (Foucault, 1978).

While archaeology informs genealogy, they are not the same types of projects.

Archaeology can be regarded as the analysis of the system of unwritten rules
which produces, organises and distributes the ‘statement’ (that is, [sic] the
authorised utterance) as it occurs in an archive (that is, an organised body of
statements). ... In this sense, archaeological analysis can be seen as a historically-
based study of what the discourses within the archive allow to be stated
authoritatively. ... Archaeological analysis is not interpretative; that is, it does not
offer explanations of what happened in the past – it simply describes what
happens and the discursive conditions under which it was possible for that to
happen. (Mills, 2003: 24)

Archaeology attempts to “uncover” how the systematicity of scientific and
philosophical thought is tied to the rules governing language. Archaeology seeks out
discontinuities in the *epistemes* of a given historical moment and uncovering the hidden
rules that limited what could be thought, said, and practiced at a given moment within a
given community. The *episteme* is “the body of knowledge and ways of knowing which
are in circulation at a particular moment.” (Mills, 2003: 28) It is not controlled by any
individual or institution but it is produced and regulated by rules of formation that work
through individual and institutional practices even without direct acknowledgement of
those enacting or being affected by them. Conceptually, the episteme is that most basic
and essential order that produces a broad intertextual coherence to the discourses of a
given community at a given time.

In Foucault’s scheme, two main *epistemes* – as he calls them – may be discerned
in western thought. Neo-classical thought, dating from the seventeenth century,
had no place for human beings. But the modern *episteme*, on the other hand,
characterizing the nineteenth century onwards, actually constitutes ‘man’ as both
object and subject. (Lyon 1999: 19-20)

Michel Foucault’s archaeological projects revealed major shifts, or
“discontinuities”, in the way in which discourses were regulated (Foucault 1970, 1972).
These shifts produced new discursive objects within each new period. Completely new
ways of speaking about the world and engaging in it resulted from these discontinuities.
The first major discontinuity arose in the shift from *monarchal sovereignty* to the
anatomo-politics and biopolitics of *disciplinary power* of late colonialism. The second
came in the shift from disciplinarity to present day *governmentality*. I will explain each
discontinuity in turn.

A major transformation of regulatory practices appeared at the end of the
seventeenth century from a *power of death* to a *power over life*. This was “a power bent
on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to
impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them” (136). This transformation of
power represents a discontinuity from power as a ritualistic regulation of elite nobility in
Europe to the production of the masses referred to within a new episteme as *populations*.
Both forms of power are oriented toward the body – toward producing particular
subjectivities. In the first instance productive power is enacted upon the elite and in the
second instance it is oriented toward the making of citizenry. With productive power
focused on the elite, energies are spent on the control of space and bodies limited to
central, defensible locations. Moreover, legitimate discourses are those emanating from
*God-centered* institutions of the church and the crown. The general acceptance of the
Divine Order circulated and legitimized in medieval institutions in Europe produced “the
world” in logical manner that rationalized and justified sovereign power of the age. The
spatiality of this period resembles a vertical series within which the cosmos was ordered
into a hierarchical *series* of categories depending on perceived sacred, secular, and
profane attributes. Theology was the ultimate discipline. It was the highest form of
knowledge. It was the highest form of practice. Governing bodies gained legitimacy
through the church and the church gained protection through the sovereigns they
recognized as legitimate.

The control of vast and far off lands and the growth of numerous and diverse
populations produced a need for new forms of regulation. This led to the development of
new strategies, techniques, and technologies to govern the birth, development, education,
health, reproduction, and death of bodies. Disciplinary power augmented, not replaced,
earlier forms. This period was dominated by two projects (1) “augmentation of the
revenues that flow into the national treasury” (Foucault, 1999: 94), and (2) “augmentation
of the numbers of the population (95). Deliberation on the “due regulation of things” (95)
lead to the development of knowledges that aided in the augmentation of resources and
populations. A host of disciplinary practices were devised to regulate the newly formed
effects of power called “state territories” and “civilian populations”.
In concrete terms, starting in the seventeenth century, the power over life evolved in two basic forms; these forms were... two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these poles...centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an anatomopolitics of the human body. The second... focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes... Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed [emphasis in original] (139).

In the modern episteme, Man-centered scientific institutions became central to an externally-oriented power directed toward producing mass population not elite society. A self-regulation of bodies of nobility was transformed into an anatomopolitics and biopolitics of the masses. The spatiality of disciplinary power is quite different from ancient sovereign power. The controlling of territories for the purpose of disciplining bodies required a vast array of spatial strategies and techniques. Anatomopolitics and biopolitics that formed disciplinariness power required new episteme and techne (methods) of modern statecraft (Foucault 1977, 1980) which dealt with space in a fundamentally different manner than in the past. Territoriality, confinement, and omnipresent vision (what Foucault referred to as the gaze) became central to disciplinary power (1977). Moreover, this new spatial arrangement always kept as its raison d’être the production and disciplining of bodies. This spatiality was rationalized through the metaphorical logic of the “tableaux” (Foucault 1970; Butcher 2004). The table, which is most explicitly represented in this era by the development of Set Theory, does not replace but adds to the God-centered verticality of the Divine Order. To the divine series was added the Man-
centered horizontal categorization, or classificatory tabulation, of all mundane things. The period of proliferation of techniques and knowledges manifest as the Scientific Revolution. “Science” – though it was understood quite differently in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it is today – eclipsed theology as the most important and central knowledge for politics. Rationalists and empiricists developed the needed logical and practical means of creating – instead of perfectly knowing – knowledge. The production of knowledge was needed to efficiently and effectively classify and analyze a new world opened up by the endeavors of Man, not God.

By the end of the seventeenth century, scientific disciplines (Man-centered) had replaced theology and the church (God-centered) as the source of political knowledge and legitimacy. “Legitimate” subjects of political science, economics, and biology produced state/citizens, management/labor, and healthy/infirm subjects. In disciplinary societies, crimes are sociological and psychological problems correctable through institutional treatment. This way of thinking produced many corrective disciplines for “illegitimate subjects”, for instance criminology/psychology/medicine and the deviant/insane/infirm. Juridical action was reasoned through the truth of science not the Divine Truth of God. Insanity and criminality were thereafter supported scientific positions in which “experts” from academic fields, that produced such disciplinary subjects, were brought in to testify to the truth of psychiatric dispositions of defendants. The hysteria of women and phrenological “evidence” of deviance are salient examples.

Also, the right to rule was derived not from the divine right of the sovereign to rule “his” subjects, but from the right of the people (Man) to rule themselves (himself).
The Enlightenment provided the rationale for individual liberty, freedom, justice, and equality for “all men”. The exclusion of women in their political fate and the restrictions placed on those who would be accepted as members in the category “men” was overlooked at the time. Nevertheless, according to Foucault, the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment thinking were contingent events in the emergence of modern governmental rationality and its effects. It is during this period that people as bodies-of-populations are now conceived much differently than before.

The period of disciplinarity too underwent a transformation in the nineteenth-century which led to the current state of modern governmental rationality.

When police is no longer an ideal to be sought by government but one of its techniques, when economy is no longer an art of household management but a key dimension of reality, when population is inscribed within the laws of scarcity, and when family is no longer contiguous with political authority but external to it, we have crossed the threshold to an entirely new mentality of government. From the end of the eighteenth century, the art of government of the state will no longer be simply concerned with the proper ‘disposition of things’. The term ‘disposition of things’ comprehends the ordering and regulation of humans in their relations to a whole series of heterogeneous entities (e.g. proper behaviours, dress and diet; wealth, industry and subsistence; the soil, land and climate) and the orderly settlement and movements within and between productive households arranged within the territory. The point at which population ceases to be the sum of the inhabitants within a territory and becomes a reality sui generis with its own forces and tendencies is the point at which this dispositional government of the state begins to meet a government through social, economic and biological processes (Foucault 1999 95-96).

The totalization of biopolitics in all manners of governance is what Foucault refers to as bio-power (1978). This is the modern condition of state power. Bio-power is the activation of relations through interventions upon the vital aspects of an individuals’ life. By way of interventions a body either becomes a subject or resists imposed
subjectivities. A whole new set of strategies and techniques of governance were needed to enact bio-power. Disciplinarity and state territoriality were not replaced but were augmented throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Bio-power regulates social custom, health, reproduction, the family, and of course the body. Bio-power is also referred to as “governmentality”.

In *Power/Knowledge* (1980a), Foucault defines in an interview his understanding of the role of the body within *governmentality* plus his understanding of the political relationship between discontinuous historical political periods sovereign governance in the West.

You depict in *Discipline and Punish* a political system where the King’s body plays an essential role . . .

In a society like that of the seventeenth century, the King’s body wasn’t a metaphor, but a political reality. Its physical presence was necessary for the functioning of the monarchy.

And what about the Republic, ‘one and indivisible’?

That’s a formula that was imposed by the Girondins and the idea of an American-style federalism. But it never operated in the same manner as the King’s body under the monarchy. On the contrary, it’s the body of society which becomes the new principle in the nineteenth century. It is this social body which needs to be protected, in a quasi-medical sense. In place of the rituals that served to restore the corporal integrity of the monarch, remedies and therapeutic devices are employed such as the segregation of the sick, the monitoring of contagions, the exclusion of delinquents. The elimination of hostile elements by the *supplice* (public torture and execution) is thus replaced by the method of asepsis—criminology, eugenics and the quarantining of ‘degenerates’ (55)

In *The Order of Things* (1970), Foucault described an epistemic history of Europe that periodically shifted in a fundamental way following the same socio-political discontinuities explained above. These shifts consisted of the inclusion of new
foundational structures of legitimate knowledge. The underlying mechanism by which knowledge was produced and others evaluated as either legitimate or illegitimate came from its conceptual structure and metaphoric logic (Butcher 2004). Epistemic periods are thus broad historical transformations in the way people of a given cultural milieu understand their world cosmologically. It is therefore no surprise that Foucault, Derrida, and cognitive linguists focus on metaphorical logic and conceptual structure in theology, philosophy, and science. This is perfectly understandable from the embodied cognition perspective I have presented above. Changes in way philosophical and physical matters are understood is based on the perceptual logic invoked by conceptual blending. This process is based in boundarying and thus provides conceptual structures that can shift from a boundary based on the process of distinction, a relation based on the result of distinction, or either of the opposing entities resulting from the distinction. Epistemic periods are those eras in which some metaphors, representing one or more products of boundarying, are circulated more prominently within a given discursive community because they form the currently normalized conceptual structure of theological, philosophical, and scientific understandings of the time. Episteme are effects of power of social space.

In Foucault’s account, the most fundamental shift in conceptual structure occurred over the course of the seventeenth century. Prior to the seventeenth century, legitimate knowledge had to structurally correspond to Divine Order which was the conceptual ordering principle. The prevailing legitimizing discourses of time were theological. The predominant metaphor of the time was therefore the vertically-oriented, hierarchical
series. This was replaced in the disciplinary societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which were epistemically dominated by Man instead of God. The predominant legitimizing discourses of the time were philosophical, specifically natural philosophy which is now referred to as physical science. The reemergence of the human sciences within this period was a replacement of a God-centered cosmology with a Man-centered cosmology. The ordering principle of the sciences was not so much the hierarchical series, but the horizontally-oriented, classification table.

The spatiality of the table or set logic thinking is most saliently observed in state territoriality. This conceptualization arose from the modern episteme. This way of thinking was undergirded by the metaphorical logic of the table (Foucault, 1970; Butcher, 2004). The anthropological classification of people into races and nations construed these new subjects as belonging to/in particular places. In other words, people are now understood, not due to custom, tradition, or legal servitude but by the nature of their being, as necessarily placed.

In Governmentality (1980a), Foucault describes power relations indicative of modern governance as resembling network logic. This metaphorical logic corresponds to his understanding of the fluidity of power relations. The twentieth century was replete with network metaphors in philosophy and science and that was reflected in popular and political constructs. Societies, from virtual communities to state-citizen relations, are depicted in terms of nodes and links. The network includes similar metaphors of rhizomes, links-nodes, and lattices. “Networking embraces a wide range of activities – cultural, political and economic” (Kinna 2005: 117). Social networking, enhanced
considerably by smaller and more powerful communications devices, is not only a means of creating cultural, political and economic relations but also resisting them. “Networks can be local, regional, and even international” (Kinna 2005: 117) just as space can be “seen as constructed out of the multiplicity of social relations across all spatial scales” (Massey 1994, 4). Network thinking in manner similar to Foucault’s has become the basis for many anti-establishment actions from local economic practices (Gibson-Graham, 2006) to political resistance. Social networking aids in:

…the furtherance of rebellious life-styles, institutional subversion and ‘refusing’: challenging the institutional order through radical criticism, ‘the dissident way, the comic resistance, the emphatic difference, the intransigent act… networking has a ‘psychosocial’ dimension. The purpose of waging this kind of struggle is to combat domination and self-consciously seek to maintain … personalistic human relationships (Kinna 2005: 117).

Another example of epistemic transformation comes from library classifications systems. Prior to the Scientific Revolution classification systems were organized along the Divine Order from theology down to the order of the seven sentences shifted to tabular schemes demonstrating the horizontal relations between worldly entities (Butcher, 2004). This too has shifted in modern times in the form of virtual hyperlinked texts following semantic ontologies; logics of the series, the table, and the network.

It was in his later genealogical works that Foucault engaged in paradoxical thinking that resembles a different form of logic. This enigmatic form of thinking is epistemically structured by the boundary. This is the logic of the exception taken up by Schmitt and Agamben in their conceptualizations of sovereignty. The theoretical breakthroughs of the twentieth century in physics have employed paradoxical, ambiguous
thinking. These breakthroughs have challenged the fixity of traditional theories that are based folk physics – as in Newtonian mechanics – and replaced them with metaphors of ambiguity, uncertainty, and relativity. This was explained above. The importance of this discussion for epistemic concerns is that theoretical physics of the early twentieth century that led to general relativity and quantum mechanics required a new conceptual structure apart from the series, the table, or the network. I am not suggesting that there was no way of thinking outside of these three conceptual structures generally, but that within such historically-rich, institutionally regulated discourses in which cosmological theory is rooted, conceptually and thus mathematically, was bound to common-sense metaphorical logic of the time. The introduction and popularity of the boundary as a conceptual structure for understanding relativity and quantum mechanics required a radical epistemic transition from this metaphorical constraint. The boundary was thus introduced as the primary image schema with which to understand celestial motion, the counterintuitive equivalence of mass and energy as they relate to motion, physics at high energies and speeds, microcosmic position (Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle) and composition (complementarity of field quanta). Bohm and Peat (1987) recognized this conceptual transformation and describe it similar to my explanation, though they make no reference to embodied cognition.

[The] notion of metaphor can serve to illuminate the nature of scientific creativity by equating, in a metaphoric sense, a scientific discovery to a poetic metaphor. For in perceiving a new idea in science, the mind is involved in a similar form of creative perception as when it engages a poetic metaphor. (33)
...metaphors can sometimes have an extraordinary power, not only to extend the thought processes of science, but also to penetrate into as yet unknown domains of reality, which are in some sense implicit in the metaphor. (41)

Foucault took up a form of Nietzsche’s genealogical approach as means to explore the local effects of the history of systems of thought in the West. It does not aim to find a true beginning or meaning of something. It also does not aim to (re)construct a linear history of a subject to the present. It “makes strange” familiar social beliefs and established scientific or political truths that construct and justify particular forms of power that has brought some local effect into being. It does this by showing alternative and subversive histories in the development of beliefs or truths which leave their effects open to reinterpretation. For instance, in The History of Sexuality, Volume I (1980b), Foucault traced the occurrence of sexuality and its regulation from the Greeks and Romans to modern Western societies to demonstrate how the “homosexual” was a nineteenth century construct of the medicalization and psychopathologization of sexuality as a means of population control. Social sciences provided the knowledge of the human subject that led to biological (as opposed to earlier religious) conceptualizations of ‘normal’ sexuality and sexual “deviance”. The public institutions of education, military, and health normalized these conceptualizations by disciplining bodies to act in a “normal” manner. “Homosexuality” was therefore a problem for modern governance since it was counter to legitimate forms (reproductively-oriented) of sexuality. The problem of sexual deviance was that it conflicted with the “proper” regulation of the population. There was a whole history of corrective strategies to cure individuals of their deviance. Scientific “correction” was the only palliative.
A technical matrix was established. By definition there ought to be a way of solving any technical problem. Once this matrix was established, the spread of bio-power was assured, for there was nothing else to appeal to: any other standards could be shown to be abnormal or to present merely technical problems. We are promised normalization and happiness through science and law. When they fail, this only justifies the need for more of the same. (Dreyfus, Rabinow, and Foucault 1983: 196)

Foucault’s genealogical history of the “homosexual” reveals moralistic problems of discursive power. Genealogies are moralistic problematizations of power and its effects. They open up spaces for subjugated subjects to be alternatively interpreted – for instance that homosexuality is not a disease nor does it require correction. In this manner genealogy is both methodologically deconstructive and ethically emancipatory.

Genealogy [taken up by Foucault] is a development of archaeological analysis which is more concerned with the workings of power and with describing the ‘history of the present’. It is a form of historical analysis which describes events in the past but without explicitly making causal connection... Foucault’s concern with genealogical analysis is not to focus on an ‘analytics of truth’ which he argues many philosophers in the past have done, that is, to analyse the conditions under which we might consider certain utterances or propositions to be agreed to be true. Rather, his concern is with an ‘ontology of ourselves’, that is, to turn that analytic gaze to the condition under which we, as individuals, exist and what causes us to exist in the way we do. (Mills, 2003: 25)

Genealogies do not seek any privileged position from which to access a true interpretation. Foucault, as Derrida does, rejects any form of totalizing system of thought. They do not, however, reject systematic forms of inquiry. The point is not to throw out systematic forms of thought and inquiry, but to reject the stability of any totalizing system. Foucault’s genealogical analyses are ethical projects because they provide “historical knowledge of struggles” (Foucault 1980a: 82) over what he called subjugated knowledges.
[B]y subjugated knowledges one should understand ..., namely, a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity. (82)

Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today. (83)

Genealogy and deconstruction are different but can be, if taken limitedly, complimentary. Derrida’s deconstruction strives to reveal hidden elements that bind a text logically together. This is more similar to archaeology than to genealogy. There is no reason to reject the idea that some statements within an archive of a given period involved in the formation of an episteme are not metaphors for conceptual structure or hide binary oppositions. Foucault’s archaeological analyses are limitedly related to Derrida’s deconstruction and the same manner in which they are theoretically similar to embodied realism.

Genealogy, I repeat, is a form of critique. It rejects the pursuit of the origin in favour of a conception of historical beginnings as lowly, complex and contingent. It attempts to reveal the multiplicity of factors behind an event and the fragility of historical forms in this view of history… (Sarup 1993: 59)

What I take from genealogy and deconstruction are the elements that are similar to embodied cognitive linguistic theories. I then incorporate both into an ad hoc deconstructive genealogy of the IDP as a boundary entity. To arrive at the exceptional nature of the IDP, I turn to the geo-biopolitical conceptualizations of Giorgio Agamben.
Giorgio Agamben

An important difference between Foucault and Agamben is their use of term *power*. This distinction can be summated as being a difference between the productive *placement* of Foucault versus the destructive *displacement* of Agamben.

While biopolitics, as taken up in the work of theorists such as Michel Foucault, on the one hand, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, on the other hand, emphasizes the relations between politics and death, biopolitics, in their views, is less concerned with the primacy of death than with the production of life both as an individual and a social category. In Giorgio Agamben’s formulation, the new biopolitics is the deadly administration of what he calls ‘bare life’ and its ultimate incarnation is the Holocaust with its ominous specter of the concentration camp. In this formulation, the Nazi death camps become the primary exemplar of control, the new space of contemporary politics in which individuals are no longer viewed as citizens but are now seen as inmates, stripped of everything, including their right to live. (Giroux, 2007: 307)

Another related difference is that while Foucault thought the modern episteme brought about bio-power, Agamben sees biopolitical power as originating in ancient sovereign power. Viewing bio-power as a recent phenomenon, Foucault warned of its horrors because “the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence”, i.e., his/her security and health (Foucault 1980, 139). This biopolitical interpretation of modern governance is understood by Agamben as an ancient and fundamental reality. Accordingly, “*the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power*. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception” [original emphasis] (Agamben 1995: 6). While Foucault provides a productive account of sovereign power with which Agamben agrees, Agamben provides an account of its necessary opposite; destructive power.
I begin my discussion of Agamben’s politics of life by agreeing with William Connolly (2007) in his criticism of Agamben’s conceptualization of sovereignty as overly pessimistic, deterministic, and simplistic, but then carry on with Agamben’s idea of the exception because it highlights so clearly political boundarying and boundary thinking.

Agamben contends that biopolitics has become intensified today. This intensification translates the paradox of sovereignty into a potential disaster. The analysis that he offers at this point seems not so much wrong to me as overly formal. It reflects a classical liberal and Arendtian assumption that there was a time when politics was restricted to public life and biocultural life was kept in the private realm. What a joke. Every way of life involves the infusion of norms, judgments, and standards into the affective life of participants at both the private and public levels. Every way of life is biocultural and biopolitical. (Connolly, 2007: 29)

I agree with Connolly’s assessment that all political life is not reduced to bare life. Agamben’s analysis of sovereign violence and his position that the concentration camp is the modern “nomos” of the State holds true for some people in the world, not all. There are states in which populations are treated as bare life and whose fate in the territory to which they are bound by territorial sovereignty exposes them to violence with impunity. It is for these persons and the states in which “exceptional persons” may exist en masse that I find Agamben’s work most enlightening. Also, while I agree with Connolly’s assessment that biocultural and biopolitical life is historically ubiquitous, but this politicization of the body is certainly more intense in technologically-advanced states. The concept of populations developed their political centrality, as Foucault described, simultaneously with the technological means to regulate ‘national populations’.

Giorgio Agamben’s theories on sovereignty, law, citizenship, and the modern state are an inquiry into the centrality of legal indeterminacy in the politics of life (Fassin,
To Agamben, the exceptional status of the sovereign and the role of violence in sovereign power “remains a blind spot…or something of a vanishing point that the different perspectival lines of Foucault’s inquiry … converge toward without reaching” (Agamben, 1995: 6). In *Homo Sacer* (1995), Agamben begins his treatise on sovereignty by describing a set of relations between political entities. The first binary between two political characters comes from his reading political documents from ancient Rome. This binary between two political characters emerged out of a fundamental binary in the Roman geographical imaginary, that is, between nature and culture. Related to the first element was bare life (*zoē*) and to the other was political life (*bios*). Agamben’s central thesis is that the status of an individual as either *zoē* or *bios* has been the underlying concern of sovereign power in the history of western civilizations. Political life is *definable* by law (ideally determined) while bare life is *defined* by its lack of political determination (vagueness). A political life is one that belongs because it is determined. *Bios* is *placed* because its membership is *defined* and is therefore *protected* from violence. *Zoē* on the other hand is *displaced* because its membership is ambiguous and therefore is *exposed* to violence. Agamben refers to this bare, exposed life as *homo sacer*. “*Life that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed is sacred life*” [original emphasis] (Agamben, 1995: 82). The difference between *bios* and *zoē* is based merely on the decision of membership. This is the basis of sovereign power, according to Agamben. The one who determines the legal status of a life within a polity – the one who determines membership – is the sovereign. This means that within modern governance, vagueness and indeterminacy, not exactness and determinacy are the natural states of
being for citizens (Laclau 2007). Law provides the possibility for determinacy, but the
sovereign makes the decision as to its applicability. Sovereign power originates from the
fact that lives can be legally abandoned by law by the sovereign’s power of legal
interpretation. The result is the exposure of zoē to punishment, even death.

For Agamben, the paradox of sovereignty resides in the fact that the state requires
a final authority to resolve questions of law, while the final authority is
insufficiently informed by any law that precedes it. (Connolly, 2007: 26)

This is the basis of the sovereignty paradox which Agamben describes
topologically as an exceptional relation. The exceptional status of the sovereign comes
from the ability to suspend the law and change it though anyone endowed with this right
is considered to be sufficiently within the population so as to be a member of it. This
status is thus exceptional. The ambiguous status of homo sacer is equally exceptional in
that bare life is sufficiently within the group to be considered for a subject of a particular
sovereign power but no sufficiently within the group to be a legally defined, and
protected, member.

Political theorist Carl Schmitt influenced Agamben greatly. He conceived of state
sovereignty as paradoxical, opportunistic, exploitative, and contradictory based on its
exceptional status. He also viewed political theories of the state as founded upon
secularized theological ideas that entered into secular law through the codification of
Christian doctrine. The logic is as follows: God represents the ultimate authority who
creates, regulates, and has the power to destroy the world because He permeates the
world but is not bound to it or by it. The sovereign is therefore a political metaphor for
God. Since God is the metaphysical exception, the sovereign is the political exception (Schmitt, 1976 and 1985).

There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he [sic] is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists.

All law is “situational law.” The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its totality. He has the monopoly over this last decision. (Schmitt, 1985: 13)

More directly related to Agamben’s concerns is Schmitt’s theory of the state of emergency as a state of exception. “The exception is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole of which it is always already included” [original emphasis] (Agamben, 1995: 25). For Agamben, the exception has always been the foundation of sovereign power, yet in modernity the state of exception has become more than a temporary strategy to deal with extreme circumstances. It is the basis for modern governance. Citizens in the state of exception are neither protected nor assisted by the state but are instead treated as possible threats to a society that must be defend at any cost. The Nazi regime was used as the exemplar of sovereign power in the state of exception. Two main points come from this example. First, it is an extreme situation and therefore provides ample evidence for the creation of homines sacri and violence with impunity. Second, it is in fact an extreme case but not an example of a distinct or unique case. The most important and sobering point Agamben makes is that the Nazi regime and the Holocaust are politically understandable – not morally justifiable – political events, even predictable to an extent, within the logic of the politics of life.
Drawing on the logic of Set Theory, Agamben builds on Schmitt’s concept of the exception by positioning it within four topological relations, that is, various types of positive and negative boundaryings. The fourth relational category is the exception. The political situation that exemplifies the exception is the state of emergency where laws are temporarily suspended for the purpose of safeguarding the welfare of the population. The protection and assistance of citizens is, ostensibly, the raison d’être of the state. This is a biopolitical conception of the state-citizen relation and the extent to which these obligations apply is bound by territory. However, within a state of emergency, it is necessary to use violence and restrict civil liberties of a population in order to defend it. Foucault’s biopolitical lectures on sovereignty of 1975-1976 titled Society Must Be Defended (2003) are founded on this idea that the state is exceptional regarding its own laws.

The political character that exemplifies the exception is the sovereign. The sovereign is the one who creates, suspends and alters the law. “He” is sufficiently within the polity so that he is in a direct relation to law. However, he is also sufficiently outside of the polity so as to “rise above” its jurisdiction so to be able to suspend law. “The paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order” (Agamben, 1995: 15). The sphere of the sovereign therefore transcends the sphere (jurisdiction) of law. The sovereign therefore also has the power to suspend the limits of legal.

The “sovereign” structure of the law, its peculiar and original “force,” has the form of a state of exception in which fact and law are indistinguishable (yet must,
nevertheless, be decided on). Life, which is thus obliged, can in the last instance be implicated in the sphere of law … only in an exceptio. [original emphasis] (26-27).

The political act that exemplifies the exemption is the sovereign ban. The devise by which the sphere of the ban comes into existence is law. The sovereign ban is not the application of law but the suspension of it.

A relation of exception is a relation of ban. He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable. … It is in this sense that the paradox of sovereignty takes the form “There is nothing outside the law.” The originary relation of law to life is not application but Abandonment. (28-29).

While law rhetorically is understood as naturally determining, law by nature is ambiguous so to be applicable in manifold contexts (Agamben, 1995 and 2005). Moreover, while juridical practices focus on legal determination, executive powers of the sovereign are founded upon the suspension of legal determination. This distinction between juridical and executive power, referred to by Agamben as the law and the sovereign respectively, is the fulcrum of his argument of the ban.

Based on the sovereign ban, Agamben argues that sovereign power originates from the “force-of-law”, where force is sovereign violence and law has juridical power in name only. The relation between law and sovereign is an exceptional, yet necessary, one. Law is an empty, yet necessary, signifier. It has definitional meaning as a legal script, but is has no force in social space on its own. Agamben makes this point by performing a Derrida-like deconstructive maneuver. The force-of-law is the starting point for his deconstruction of the exceptionality in sovereignty. His “metaphysics of sovereignty”, then, is based on an interrogation of exceptional power. Agamben’s deconstruction goes
both ways. It is a critique of both the emptiness of force-in-law as well as the emptiness of the force-in-law (2005). In other words, Agamben, following Schmitt, understands executive power as violence permitted by the suspension – absence – of law while he conceives of juridical power as a determining practice that has not the ability to enforce itself. There is neither “force” in law nor “law” in force. This does not mean that law enforcement is unlawful. It means that the acts of violence within law enforcement contradict the very laws of protection and non-violence that law enforcement is ideally meant to uphold. This leads Agamben to the conclusion that the modern state has effectively normalized the state of emergency thereby exposing all citizens to possible violence with impunity. This means the current state of citizenship is one that is in constant abandonment of laws guaranteeing the security and protection of citizens that the sovereign is by definition obliged to provide. This total situation is contradictory and therefore paradoxical.

Another paradox, other than the exceptional nature of the sovereign, lies in relation between legal vagueness and sovereign power. Laws are designed to be so general as to be applicable to numerous cases. Sovereign power lies not in the enacting of laws but in the ability to either suspend or apply law in any given instance. The generality of law creates the conditions necessary for sovereign power to exist within a legal framework. The force-of-law condition is produced within the ambiguity of law. So, when laws are more specific, the degrees of interpretive freedom, and thus the ability to suspend them, decrease. Alternately, when laws are more general, the degrees of
interpretive freedom increase. According to this reading of law and power, the relation between the sovereign protection and legal protection is *necessarily contradictory*.

The sovereign and *homo sacer* are exceptional characters. They are the two poles of a sovereign binary in which one cannot exist without the other.

Just as law, in the sovereign exception, applies to the exceptional case in no longer applying and in withdrawing from it, so *homo sacer* belongs to God in the form of unsacrificeability and is included in the community in the form of being able to be killed. *Life that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed is sacred life.* [original emphasis] (Agamben, 1995: 82)

*homo sacer* is not sacred in opposition to the profane. *Homo sacer* belongs neither to the profane nor the sacred. And by not fully belong to the humane is exposed to death. It is a mundane object in-between the binary of sacred/profane but it is also an object in-between nature/culture. It is denied the dignity of either the supernatural or and humane. It is an ambiguous, displaced character.

What defines the status of *homo sacer* is therefore not the originary ambivalence of the sacredness that is assumed to belong to him, but rather both the particular character of the double exclusion into which he is taken and the violence to which he finds himself exposed. This violence—the unsanctionable killing that, in his case, anyone may commit—is classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as homicide, neither as the execution of a condemnation to death nor as sacrilege. [original emphasis] (Agamben, 1995: 82)

The in-betweenness of *homo sacer* is further described by Agamben through the werewolf. The werewolf cannot be included as a human because he is part *wolf* (nature) though he is always already included in humanity because he is part *were* (culture), which is Old English for a human male. The werewolf lives in an exceptional space of in-betweenness as do both *homo sacer* and the sovereign. The werewolf can be killed with impunity because it is not regarded the same protection as the human. Moreover, it must
be punished for what it is because its partial inclusion with the human sphere threatens the public sphere. The status of the werewolf parallels that of homo sacer in the modern state citizen.

Agamben’s work is useful not only because of his concern for the exception, which is literally political boundary thinking – but also because of his rich use of spatial terminology. The two most prominent spatial metaphors in Agamben’s logic are the relation and the sphere. The exception is the relation structured by boundary logic and the sovereign sphere is a social space opened up by the decision of the ban. The sovereign decision therefore opens up the spheres in which those who are members of the whole are in perpetual legal categorical suspension. Greater strategies, techniques, and technologies of the state to monitor and discipline citizen-subjects and invoke violence with impunity have extended the sphere of the sovereign. Much of Foucault’s work on domestic regulation and the production of subjects in the West dealt with exactly this point.

[Homo sacer’s] entire existence has been reduced to a bare life stripped of every right by virtue of the fact that anyone can kill him without committing homicide; he can save himself only in perpetual flight or a foreign land. And yet he is in a continuous relationship with power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death. He is pure zoê [bare life], but his zoê is as such caught in the sovereign ban and must reckon with it at every moment. [emphasis added] (Agamben, 1995: 183)

Homo sacer is made possible by the territorial basis of states and the assumption of supreme right of determination over that territory and all things in and of it. The concept of territorial sovereignty produces the sovereign sphere.
The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life—that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed—is the life that has been captured in this sphere. [original emphasis] (1995: 83)

The sovereign sphere is an exceptional social space produced by the decision of the ban. The exceptional relation of the ban opens up the political space by which sovereign violence can be enacted with impunity – the relation of ban creates the sovereign sphere of homo sacer. An interesting distinction for elucidation of international relations in the modern state is the difference between homo sacer and the foreigner. From the view of a particular sovereign state the foreigner lies outside of the set to which homo sacer is only partially a member and thus outside that sovereign sphere.

The exceptional space of the sovereign sphere is a two-fold element of social space. On the one hand it is a space of immunity for the sovereign within which to enact moments of sovereign power upon vulnerable lives while on the other it is simultaneously a space of impunity for the bodies of homines sacri upon which sovereign violence can be imposed. Of grave concern for Agamben is that the spaces of impunity will become permanent modes of governance within a perpetual state of emergency when all law pertaining to the biopolitical rights of a citizen (their protection/security assistance/needs) are suspended and all violence committed upon the exposed bare lives of homines sacri is permitted. Agamben interprets the political spaces of the modern nation-state as those that increasingly use the state of emergency as the normal mode of governance thus effectively exposing all citizens to possible violence and centralizing the bare lives of homines sacri within the political norm. Instead of making homo sacer (zoē)
into citizens (bios), the state of emergency (state of exception), effectively transforms all citizens into *hominès sacri*. This is the central political concern for Agamben in his conceptualization of *homo sacer* and the state of exception. The resulting increase in the state of emergency as the norm of state governance establishes a type of territory Agamben refers to as the camp. The camp is used in reference to the concentration camps of WWII that Agamben used as examples of the topological production of the exceptional spaces of zoē. The camp is a boundary space in which the borders between in and out are not at the limit of territory but make up the content of territory.

*The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule.* In the camp, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial arrangement, which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order.” [original emphasis] (Agamben 1995: 168-9)

The birth of the camp in our time appears as an event that decisively signals the political space of modernity itself. It is produced at the point at which the political system of the modern nation-state, which was founded on the functional nexus between a determinate location (land) and a determinate order (the State) and mediated by automatic rules for the inscription of life (birth or the nation), enters into a lasting crisis, and the State decides to assume directly the care of the nation’s biological life as one of its proper tasks. (Agamben, 1995: 174)

Furthermore, there is a conceptual point to be made stemming from this boundary-oriented conceptualization of “the camp”. That point is the conceptual distinction between refugees and IDPs in reference to the exception. Refugees, having crossed a State boundary, have moved outside of sovereign jurisdiction of their home state. From their home state’s perspective, they are effectively foreigners, which is then a reward for displacing them. From an international perspective, refugees are removed from their proper locations and held in paradoxical suspension as *hominès sacri* where
the goal is to force their right to return (relocalization). Only IDPs who have remained in their home state yet are “displaced within” fit the criteria of *hominæ sacri*. An IDP is that which “cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always already included” (Agamben 1995: 25). The quintessential trope for Agamben’s “refugee” is thus the IDP.

The citizen-subjects of the refugee and the IDP exist in UN discourses as a product of institutional reasoning. This reasoning is structured by the *logos* of sovereignty. The *logos* of state sovereignty is the metaphorical logic of *place* which allows for the production of state-territory-citizen nexus. The politicization of place, militarization to Foucault (1980), yields “territory”. The state-territory-citizen nexus is therefore fundamentally a triad of *sovereign-place-subject*. In this triad the concept of *sovereignty* establishes the justification for this power dynamic and sovereign rule enacts and regulates it. The binary represented by this primacy of place is *placed-displaced*. While the former is associated with order, security, and peace, the latter is associated with chaos, threat, and violence. My genealogical trace is of the contingent biopolitical and geopolitical events that allowed the emergence of the IDP. My deconstructive maneuver is to interrogate the metaphysics of place within the biopolitical sovereign imaginary that yielded the citizen-subject “IDP”. Before I begin this deconstructive genealogy I relate the metaphysics of place to my conceptualization of the physical-social-cognitive space triad.

The *exception* is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole of which it is always already included. Agamben’s
sovereign spheres are exceptional social spaces and their nature is produced by the logic of the boundary. The logic of the boundary is neither “A” nor “not-A”, it is a representation of ambiguity. When the metaphorical logic of the boundary is used to constitute an entity, it will exhibit an ambiguous, paradoxical nature. When that ambiguity is applied to citizenship that boundary object becomes an exceptional object. Consequently, the use of the boundary as a metaphorical logic for political resistance and alternative engagement creates new modes of thinking and new possibilities for political action which is quite revolutionary.

Perhaps the only escape from the camp is to become, as Agamben claims, “nature life”, that is, to exist outside of the sovereign sphere. In The Coming Community (1993), Agamben suggests that a post-sovereignty world be a boundary space of “sovereign limbo”, that is, an existence outside of territory in a whatever place with “whatever being” (Agamben, 1993:1) living in it. It is a place without sovereignty, enemies, hierarchies, or antagonisms. This idea was based on St. Thomas Aquinas’ writings of a necessary place of limbo for the souls of the innocent yet unbaptized babies who are at once free of both sin as well as knowledge of God. Those who have not been baptized do not know God and thus cannot receive salvation in heaven. Those whose only sin is original sin cannot go to hell. A boundaryspace must then exist, according to Aquinas, to represent the exceptional character of these beings. When applied to exceptional beings on earth whatever beings would practice a “whatever politics” (Edkins 2007: 70). This is not a passionless politics of “who cares”, but a politics that isn’t polarizing or destructive. It is an inclusionary and adaptive politics that makes a pluralistic boundaryspace. This
boundaryspace, when practiced, best exemplifies the potentiality of mental space. It is charged with the potential to be differentiated but it is minimally expressed so that its potential is retained. That potential is founded in unity (political positive boundaryings).

Thus, contestation over social space, that is, the struggle to regulate the social conditions of embodiment, is minimized in whatever politics. This place promotes “whatever thinking” and whatever being grounded in an existence that merely recognizes difference without polarizing it. It is a suppression of the negative boundarying practices that have created our world of militarized borders while also it is an endorsement of positive boundarying practices that recognize basic difference while still holding members in a pluralistic relation of community. I return to this in the final chapter.
CHAPTER VI

DECONSTRUCTIVE GENEALOGY OF THE IDP

This chapter begins an interpretive analysis of the sovereign imaginaries that yield the geopolitical problematization (Campbell, 1998) known as “internally displaced persons”. Problematization is a two part process. On one hand, the discursive practice of construing someone or something as a problem to be resolved is a process of problematization. On the other hand, critically assessing these “problems” as discursive constructs effectively problematizes problematizations. Moreover, problematizations not only discursively construct the objects of which they speak but also construct them in a manner that justifies particular solutions. The distinction between definitions and problematizations is fundamental since the metaphysics of place is based on binary logic that assumes placement is an essential and preferred category while displacement is a supplementary and undesired category. The effect is that conceptualizations of sovereignty and sovereign power assume the legal placement, and hence protection and assistance, of citizens under territorial sovereign rule.

The “IDP” is a biopolitical problematization in that UN discourses construct it as a “problem of bodies in space”. It is also biopolitical in that the
state is biopolitical, as described above, and the UN is a state-oriented international governmental apparatus. Members of the categorization “IDP” are not just displaced bodies, but also internal to the space in which they belong. For these bodies to be considered internally displaced they must first be understood within a geographic imaginary structured by *place*. However, if displacement is a problem, then placement is the norm. According to Agamben’s account of sovereign power and others’ critical appraisal of practical sovereignty (Agnew, 2009), which I detail below, political placement of a citizen-subject paradoxically requires displacement as the norm, not placement. It is the contradiction within the sovereign-law relation that yields the paradox of legal placements in sovereignty discourses and legal displacements in sovereign power. While sovereignty proclaims the placement of bodies, sovereign power enacts the regulation of bodies in space through series of perpetual displacements. This dynamic relation is contradictory.

This chapter has three sections that combine to produce the first part of a deconstructive genealogy of the IDP in relation to the core of this dissertation, i.e., the boundary. The first section introduces the geopolitical concept of displacement and the metaphysics of place within normative conceptualizations of sovereignty. The second section reviews these normative conceptions of sovereignty and provides some geographically-minded critiques, especially territorial critiques. This section provides the deconstructive aspect but it does not reinterpret the IDP into an alternative subject. I leave that for the final chapter. The third section is a genealogy of the IDP. It is a report on the contingencies of the UN system necessary for the emergence displacement,
displaced peoples, and finally internally displaced persons. The following chapter provides a review of an important case in the development of the Guiding Principles of Internally Displaced Persons (UNHCR 1998). That example is the Republic of Sudan. As Sudan and in particular Darfur are concerned, I am not interested in positing the truth of what has developed in that country but a review the relevant “facts” as the UN understands and responds to them.

Displacement

The problem of displacement is not simply a matter of lost livelihoods or merely violent removal of bodies from their previous “placements”. Groups experiencing violence need not be classified as displaced to gain attention and invoke legal apparatuses of the UN regarding their protection and assistance. This is seen currently in the rescue operation in Haiti after the January 12th, 2010 7.0 earthquake and its numerous aftershocks. The fact that those displaced by violence require proper categorization for effective assistance is the problem. It is a problem of territory. It is based in the metaphysics of place.

Also, not all internal displacement events, regardless of the numbers of people affected, qualify as recognizable events to the UN. Court ordered evictions, anti-loitering laws in public spaces, the privatization of public spaces, and other legal restrictions regarding the placement of individuals and the movement of citizens of one territory to another are not only violent but also state induced. The difference is that economic inequalities and political inequalities, while related forms of marginalization and/or
exploitation, are treated differently by the UN. Economic inequality is inherent to capitalism and capitalism is the system chosen by dominant states, the U.S. in particular, that dominate geopolitical discourses of the UN and the prevalent sovereign imaginaries that undergird them. The problematization of displacement as a great humanitarian crisis is thus restricted to particular types of displaced persons and not those who have been forcibly evicted from their homes because they were not economically successful. I am therefore interested in the boundaryings involved in the creation of a particular citizen category that generates a specific type of “placement problem”. Since this is based in the discourses of state sovereignty, I am interested in the metaphysics of place within the UN’s sovereign imaginary that yields such a geographical problematization as the “IDP”. A deconstructive genealogy of the “IDP” thus problematizes this problematization. This critical interpretation will rely heavily on Agamben’s work on the sovereign exception and law in the modern state.

IDPs are citizen-subjects similar to refugees yet the “IDP” is considerably more politically vulnerable to persistent violence and hardship (Cohen and Deng 1998a and 1998b). This citizen category also fits precisely within Agamben’s topology of relations as an exception. The IDP is thus indicative of Agamben’s notion of homo sacer, the binary opposite to the sovereign. Both members of this binary are exceptional. An exceptional object is a boundary object. The sovereign and homo sacer are both exceptional objects. The link between them is the sovereign moment when the decision to suspend the law (ban) is made. Sovereign moments are instantiated when the binary relation between the privileged element of the sovereign and the subordinate element of
zoē is reenacted. These sovereign moments occur within the sovereign sphere. The sovereign sphere is that political space in which the sovereign assumes the right to enact the sovereign decision and where the object of that decision (zoē) is laid bare to the sovereign. When violence is enacted as a result of the ban, sovereign moments produce *spaces of impunity*. Violent acts of spaces of impunity are those practices that alter the biopolitical conditions of zoē, which include displacement. When these violent acts are focused on peoples for their national, racial, religious, and/or ethnic character, the UN uses terminology such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing to describe them. Only in spheres devoid of sovereigns their subjects are spaces of impunity absent (Agamben 1993; Edkins 2007; Rasch 2007).

The absence of sovereignty does not negate the possibility of violence. Instead it removes the contradictory mechanism of sovereignty that grants legalized violence. Ambiguity in law and its applicability create the possibility of sovereign power through the enactment of sovereign moments within which the ambiguities of law are decided. The sovereign right to enact the sovereign ban and conduct violence with impunity is bestowed by law. The manner in which this right is bestowed is through place. Place provides the contractual link between sovereign and subject and thus establishes the biopolitical *sovereign-place-subject* triad. In the form of the modern state, this triad manifests as the state-territory-citizen nexus.

The reason bodies must be placed is because place within a biopolitical sovereign imaginary is what grants the sovereign the right to decide the applicability of law and hence invoke the sovereign ban that produces the possibility for spaces of impunity.
Those who are not of a particular place are therefore paradoxical. On one hand being legally placeless frees a body from the triad that might envelop it within a space of impunity. On the other hand all bodies are somewhere and all inhabitable spaces – at least for large groups of people – are claimed by some sovereign entity. Thus, there is no “placeless place”, that is, there is no place for a mass of people to go on this planet in which they would be free of sovereign power. This includes placeless persons such as “stateless people”, “refugees”, “asylum-seekers”, and “internally displaced persons”.

While the fact of being within the sovereign sphere of a state opens up the possibility that a body may be exposed to violence with impunity, the alternative decision is, of course, also possible. In other words, it is possible that a sanctioned state actor will not choose to invoke the ban or enact violence upon an exposed body. Each sovereign moment is unique. Spaces of impunity are historically developed by the conjunction of multiple contingent events that allow for or even demand that an actor or actors invoke violence. This confluence of contingent events and myriad social pressures upon sanctioned state actors can be quite complicated. Moreover, the analysis of any one event can be devoid of crucial, often personal, information of those involved. However, I am interested in state-induced forced displacement events and the international response to these events. This requires a discussion of territorial sovereignty.

Sovereignty

My engagement with sovereignty literature is purposely delimited to biopolitical conceptualizations for reasons of continuity. The deconstruction of sovereignty entails
revealing contradictions within the sovereign imaginaries that justify it. Sovereignty’s exceptionality, as I have reviewed it above, stands as its contradiction. But what is the root of the exceptionality. In other words, what keeps a sovereign power bounded to the law in which it supersedes? The answer is territory. More specifically the answer is place and the manner in which place becomes the logos of sovereignty is through the metaphorical logic of the placed/displaced binary. Only in the metaphorical logic of the binary of place/displace does sovereignty gain its ostensive justification. While law has no force, according to Schmitt and Agamben, force has no law. Law fixes, determines, clarifies, makes coherent and present, or in other words it “places” its objects. Force, that is, the sovereign power of enforcement, removes, uproots, makes ambiguous and absent, or “displaces” its objects. The basic contradiction of sovereignty is that it is a discourse that its enforcement requires enacting its opposite.

One might argue that confinement which is an enforcement of law is placement. Certainly, the forced placement of an individual in a cell is a fixation of a body in space. The right of the sovereign to perform this act of confinement is too legally based. However, the act of confinement is the total abandonment of the legal rights of an individual. It is the lost of legally recognized rights of an individual that makes confinement displacement. In fact it is an extreme case of power in that it is the total control over the conditions of one’s embodiment.

There are several definitions of sovereignty pertaining to matters of its nature, origins, effects, purpose, responsibilities, rights, necessities, and limits. Most importantly for political geography, sovereignty is based on territoriality (Agnew 1997, 2005, 2009;
Häkli 2001; Cox 2003; Sidaway 2003), though the very territorial basis of sovereignty is much in question. I return to this question below. Most contemporary texts on the subject take the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 as the dividing line separating ancient conceptualizations of sovereignty founded on city-states and kingdoms from contemporary sovereignty tied to the nation-state (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998; Taylor 1994; Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Väyrynen 1998; Foucault 2003; Simpson 2004). The state, the nation, and the territory have since become the dominant political entities of the modern world.

The making of a nation-state involves the creation of a network of legal conceptualizations, political actors, and institutions that make up the basis for the state-territory-citizen nexus. This nexus is grounded conceptually, both internally and externally, by the concept of sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is the right of the state to rule a territory and the resources and people that exist within it without interference by foreigners. External sovereignty refers to the fact that sovereignty is must be recognized for a state to participate in foreign relations. External sovereignty, then, is a category of relation demarcating recognized legitimate status of a political entity as a bona fide state. However, in spite of the rhetoric of sovereign equality in the international field, there is clearly a hierarchy among states (Simpson 2004). This brings the territorial integrity of sovereign states in question despite the fact that territory, literally place, is the foundational concept that holds sovereignty, and thereby the state, together (Agnew 2005, 2009). There are rules for recognition and cliques among states based on cultural

Sovereignty by general definition is the supreme right of rule over a particular territory and the people native (“born”) to that territory. The current state of the world today is, obviously, dominated by the geographical imaginary of territorial state sovereignty. All geographical imaginaries are spatially ordered. These orders are structured by image schemas that take linguistic form through spatial and bodily metaphors. Sovereign imaginaries are a particular type of geographical imaginary. They too are spatially ordered and metaphorically structured. Regardless of one’s particular definition of sovereignty, sovereign rule involves the regulation of two fundamental elements: bodies and space. Consequently, while sovereignty is based on place, sovereign rule is based on the regulation of bodies in space. But, more fundamentally, both space and place are perceived, conceived, and enacted through boundarying that creates the four entities necessary for all cognition; a boundary, a relation, and two sides (even if it is simply figure/ground or A/not-A).

As explained above through the works of Foucault, the manner in which sovereign power of the modern state regulates bodies and space is quite different than sovereigns of the past. The sovereign power of the modern state is biopolitical, that is, it is focused on normalization of bodily spaces to the point of penetrating into the body itself through the politicization of medicine and medicalization of the political. The strategies, tactics, technologies, and techniques of biopolitical regulation and counterresistance in modern states intuitively incorporate embodied logic into sovereign
power. Biopolitics is embodied politics and thus resistance to biopolitical regulation is embodied resistance. Suicide bombings are a prime example of the reclaiming of one’s body and the space it occupies as an act of biopolitical, that is, embodied, resistance. Effective resistance to biopolitical injustices must make political embodiment – the politics of bodies in space – a central concern. This is the core issue of *transnationally placed persons* of the final chapter.

On matters of its nature, treatises in the history of the conceptualization of sovereignty agree on some fundament properties. Sovereignty is generally taken to be absolute, inalienable, and indivisible. The differences on these issues come from disagreements on origins – that is, from divine rights, contractual relations between state institutions and a commonwealth, free will of the people, or individual sovereignty proposed by Frederick Nietzsche (Sparks 2003) which today serves as a philosophical stance for many libertarians, anarchists, and to some extent the UN on issues of human rights (Normand and Zaidi 2008). On the matter of popular and individual sovereignty one key issue stands out, human rights. I return to this issue in detail in the next section.

It is not so much the definitional meaning of sovereignty that interests me but the embodied meaning. Problematizations built on moralistic discourses and impassioned pleas. The politics of borderscapes (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007) is often a “politics of belonging” (Westwood and Phizacklea 2000) and is not contained to one side or the other but is inclusive of the boundary zone in which national differences are produced, reified, policed, contested, and transgressed. Belonging is embodied in conception, experience, and practice and it is an emergent property of communities as often as it is
nationally imposed by states (Paasi 1996). In this sense, political theories of sovereignty, sovereign power, and citizenship are ultimately about belonging and are therefore embodied and impassioned. It is the impassioned politics of Foucault, Derrida, and Agamben that draws me to their work.

The work of Giorgio Agamben attempts to do just that, placing at its center the project of conceiving a community beyond the tradition of sovereignty. (DeCaroli 2007: 43-44)

Jacques Derrida’s views on sovereignty mirror Agamben’s on issues of the marginalized and the outsider. He relies on the works of Georges Bataille who built upon Carl Schmitt’s discussion of the exceptional nature of sovereignty. Schmitt’s writings therefore can be considered a genealogical contingency in the emergence of later theorist such as Bataille, Derrida, and Agamben.

Agamben’s metaphysics of sovereignty is central to my discussion of the IDP because it is so focused on boundary thinking. The exception is the focal point, but all other theorizations are based in some form of boundary theorization, for instance, the camp, whatever being and the post-sovereign place, the sovereign and homo sacer, and the law and sovereign power. All are based in a logos of place-based binaries; decision/indecision (fixed/ambiguous), in/out (bios/zoē), and placed/displaced (belonging/banishment). It is in this last point of banishment the produces the character of homo sacer that Agamben’s work most explicitly defines political boundarying. While the establishment and recognition of international boundaries is a process of negative boundarying upon populations, it also holds a positive boundarying effect for states. This means that individuals are territorialized and hence made foreign to one another, while
states having been differentiated territorially are then held in an “international relation” to each other. States are not foreign to each other; they are members of a group of states, unequal as they might be. In the state-oriented geographical imaginary citizens are basic-level categories and the international community is a higher-level categorization. At this level, members are founded on a spatial logic invoking image schemas of containment, ownership, and control which gives the territorial concept of sovereignty its metaphorical logic. Members are then bound together by an inviolable sovereignty principle akin to the superimposition of the mind/brain over the body.

As we can readily see, sovereignty ongoingly generates a number of difficult problems: questions of universalism and particularism; definitions of international relations in terms of the presence of sovereign states as primary actors while the “system itself” is defined by the absence of sovereignty. The historic discourse of sovereignty is a formulation of mastery over internal or domestic space and vulnerability in the external zone of competing sovereignties.” (Elshtain 1998: 11)

Individuals, on the other hand, are members of different states and can therefore be understood as, after having been separated by negative boundaryings to establishing state boundaries, foreign to each other. Steven DeCaroli (2007) illuminates the underpinnings of this idea by calling on political philosophers to take seriously the role of territory and territorialization in sovereignty and sovereign power. He does so through the concept of banishment in Agamben’s work.

A necessary condition for the possibility of banishment is a boundary—real or virtual, terrestrial or divine—outside of which one may be abandoned. It is not coincidence that we see this same conceptual demand also appear in the modern definition of sovereignty, where the twin elements of political authority and a bounded territorial jurisdiction are united. The union of these two elements form a simple, yet entirely apt, definition of what sovereignty came to mean in early modern Europe, and of which most subsequent definitions are merely a variant: “supreme authority within a bounded territory.” The connection between authority
and territory is fundamental, and it is precisely on the basis of this relation that banishment is a possibility. …

Consequently, sovereign power ought not to be envisioned as a force from the outside, but rather as an integral part of the political field itself, inseparably linked to the ongoing process of legitimization. Sovereignty is the embeddedness of authority within a field of application—comprised of both a space and a multitude, a territory and a citizenry—and it is this *legitimized connection between authority and territory* that warrants further attention, because if politics is to be placed on a new footing it must do so by reformulating this relation. [original emphasis] (46-48)

DeCaroli’s description of banishment is displacement. His understanding of how it is produced through the enactment of sovereign power resembles Agamben’s work and is defined herein as processes of boundary-making that in the production of displaced citizen-subjects in a state. His second position that authority is granted through territory also echoes my supposition on the metaphysics of place undergirded sovereign imaginaries. However, I reject his explanation of the territorial totality of sovereign power. The problem with this description is that it promotes a typical areal understanding of power typical of the “territorial trap” (Agnew and Corbridge 1995). The territorial trap assumes that the sovereign sphere exists throughout the whole of a territory. This idealist extension grants an ontological independence to territorial entities which reifies them and grants them, at least discursively, political agency. Instead, sovereignty begins as sovereign imaginaries that are discursively structured through law and reified, albeit paradoxically, through sovereign moments. The actual instantiation of that right is not everywhere all of the time. As discussed earlier, power is concentrated in locations of technological surveillance and behavior modification (Davis 1990) and reified in the physically-built environment for the purpose of regulating the conditions of social
embodiment. These areas resemble the laboratory. The greater the hermetic level of place, the greater the machinations of power. And, to reiterate, power is a normalizing effect of social space aimed at bodies and the spaces they inhabit. The effects of power modify the relationship between physical and cognitive space. Monitoring to induce the internalization of the gaze (Foucault 1978), policing errant practices, mediating social relations, and producing public spaces are all forms of regulation of embodiment and every moment of embodied engagement with this regulation is an enactment of sovereign moments.

In such borderscapes as airport security zones and border crossings are a confluence of sovereign power akin to the state of emergency/exception of Carl Schmitt. All border crossers are zoē. All manifestations of productive power, namely political subjectivities and the physical, cultural, and economic markers incorporated into the construction of those subjectivities, are on display, exposed, interrogated, checked, screened, scanned, and verified to limit the right to leave or enter a territory. This process is not limited to just individual persons who have violated a crime but to entire peoples (those who display particular subjectivities) who are considered “threats” to the state and are thereby regulated and controlled by containment. Border practices of states are an important process in constructing the content of the state.

James Sidaway conceptualizes sovereignty geographically as “a perspective or visualization” (2003: 161) and conceives of the political, economic, and social landscapes of a state to be byproducts of choices made by political actors. These “sovereigntyscapes”
can be read as sovereign texts in which the effects of sovereign power can be traced and interpreted.

Such an understanding of sovereignty, as a way of seeing (and as an element or form of expression of what Foucault called ‘governmentality’), offers a productive subversion of the understanding of states as ‘containers’. This supplements those who have correspondingly pointed to the ideological processes whereby (imaginary) distinctions are drawn between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the state; between the ‘national’ and the ‘inter’ or ‘trans’-‘national’ … The state is therefore revealed as but one of a number of expressions or mediations of power, rendered in routine, mundane acts and discourses (as well as in more spectacular acts such as Independence) (161).

Sidaway suggests that sovereigntyscapes offer an innovative perspective for political geography and “enable some wider reflections on manifestations of sovereignty. It is hoped that these will prove instructive to broader theorizations of a central object of political geography; the contested and uneven development of territorial states” (158). Sidaway refers to a “global geography of sovereignty” (160) that would consider the particular geographical imaginaries and related practices involved in the making of the mosaic of sovereigntyscapes of states.

Here again embodied realism and the analogy of the laboratory are useful. As with any object of one’s cognitive space, boundarying is necessary to constitute its clarity, stability, fixity, and coherence. Since states do not simply exist as a natural part of materiality but are enacted as effects of social space, the definitional and embodied meanings of one’s environment must be disciplined into a place containing the content of “state”, “territory”, and “nation”. This means that political social space tied to the state is enacted so as to unify the physical and cognitive on the basis of national identities and bounded state territorial.
My deconstructive maneuver has three parts. The first is this section in which I present, and then critique, normative conceptions of sovereignty. The second part includes within the deconstruction a genealogy of the problematization called the IDP. The final part reinterprets the IDP within a deconstructed sovereignty based on the contradictions within the metaphysics of place, especially regarding “displacement”. The final task for this section, then, is to present a foundation for a rejection of the metaphysics of place produced within the normative presentations of sovereignty. The contradictions that support such a rejection are revealed within the long history of the critique of sovereignty. I have gone over much of the major criticism of the contradictory nature of sovereignty above, save a final, important one, namely the territorial trap.

John Agnew (1997, 2005, and 2009) has contributed much to the conceptualization of the state, sovereignty, and citizenship within geographic thought. His latest text on sovereignty (2009) provides numerous examples of the contradictory nature of sovereignty discourses. These examples are provided to demonstrate that sovereign power is not territorially bound, inalienable, or omnipresent as political discourses of sovereignty from states suggest. He views sovereignty not only as contradictory to its rhetorical construction but also entirely fluid, contingent, contextual, and negotiated. Agnew’s critique of sovereignty emanates from what he calls the “territorial trap” regarding the modern state and states’ assumptions of territorially-based sovereignty. The territorial trap is a major contradiction of place within the metaphysics of place in the sovereign imaginaries of UN logic. It has three underlying assumptions.
The first, and most deeply rooted, is that modern state sovereignty requires clearly bounded territorial states. The modern state differs from all other types of organization by its claim to total sovereignty over its territory.

The second crucial assumption is that there is a fundamental opposition between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs in the modern world. This rests on the view common to Western political theory that states are akin to individual persons struggling for wealth and power in a hostile world. … This fixes processes of political and economic competition at the level of the system of states.

Third, and finally, the territorial state acts as the geographical ‘container’ of modern society. Social and political organizations are defined in terms of this or that state. Thus, we speak and write unself-consciously of ‘American’ or ‘Italian’ society, as if the boundaries of the state are also the boundaries of whatever social or political process we might be interested in. Other geographical scales of thinking or analysis are thereby precluded. (Agnew 1997: 51)

ÓTuathail and Dalby (1998), ÓTuathail (1996 and 2002), Campbell (1992 and 1998), and Agnew (2009) concur that the geopolitical picture painted by geopoliticans is not meant to be a true depiction of international reality but a global problematization that justifies geopolitical actions as the most logical outcomes. Geopolitical problematizations in this sense are not so much about the objects of which they speak as they are about preconditioning desired or at least acceptable solutions. In either case, the objects of political discourse, their various relations, and the distinctions that formulate them as independent or dependent in some regard are produced in a parsimonious process of linguistic political boundaryings. The geopolitical practices that follow are the manifestations of regulatory practices on the conditions of embodiment for all parties being regulated, i.e., linguistic political boundaryings and practical political boundaryings combine to produce particular social space effects. Those effects I call geopolitical power.
Returning to the metaphysics of place, place is the guarantor of the sovereign relation between law and sovereign authority. The metaphysics of place grounds sovereign thinking in a metaphorical logic that justifies and naturalizes this connection. To be placed is to be ordered, fixed, designed, categorized, controlled, and determined. In Agamben’s bios/zoē binary, place is an element of culture. To be displaced is to be disordered, fluid, chaotic, random, uncontrolled, and vague. Displacement then is an element of nature. It is a bare condition of life prior to the inclusion of life into the sphere of culture. Culture, then, at its most basic level is a set of practices that produce various types of bodily placements. The current state of affairs in the state-territory-citizen nexus is rife with state violence against citizens. This is not merely the violence of rogue or failed states that resemble the power plays between powerful groups under civil war, but legal violence perpetrated on citizens with impunity though they have committed no crime. According to Agamben, we are all suspects and therefore exposed to scrutiny and possible violence. What would a politics be like that wasn’t placed in this “metaphysical” sense? I return to this in the final chapter.

I have established a general sense of sovereignty and the idea of sovereign power in the sovereign imaginaries of states from a geobiopolitical perspective. I have laid out the basis for the metaphysics of place that is understood within a cognitive linguistic paradigm, embodied cognitive grammar. I have described how the metaphysics of place grounds the necessary element of territory within the metaphysics of sovereignty. But, this is not the end of the deconstruction. I now turn a genealogy of the IDP.
The UN System

In this section I review the development of the problematization “IDP” within the UN. I do this by providing a genealogy of some important institutional and conceptual contingencies within the UN system that allowed the political categorization “IDP” to arise. An important distinction must be made at this point. This section and the following two chapters have two related but different objects of study. The first is the production of *hominès sacri* within Sudan. The second is the problematization, produced through boundaryings producing the category, “IDP”. To provide an example of UN categorization practices I present a brief history of the conflict and state-induced forced displacement in Darfur, Sudan. I therefore describe in the following chapter the political boundaryings that produced a metaphysical displacement of certain citizens in the state of Sudan. I then return to a discussion of the boundarying practices of the UN in the final chapter. While the two discussions are necessarily related, the discussion of Darfur displacement is a commentary on the boundaryings of the government of Sudan upon its citizens and therefore reflects the imposition of the sovereign ban within a state. The discussion of the category “IDP” deals with the political categorizations of the UN involving these state-produced *hominès sacri* and, in the final chapter, the alternative futures conceptually possible within Agamben’s whatever place, which I refer to as “transnationally placed persons”. The two categorizations – *hominès sacri* produced by the ban – is a not causally related to the IDP produced by the UN but contingently related in that the IDP would not exist as an object of UN discourse if it not for the topological displacements citizens that is only possible in a state territorial system.
The genealogy of the IDP is couched within the deconstruction of territorial sovereignty and consists of relevant history in the development of the category. While, deconstruction is meant to end with an alternative interpretation, genealogy is meant to end in the emancipation of subjugated knowledges. Subjugated knowledges provide orientation and content for alternative interpretations. 

*The supposition of the TPP is posited as a simultaneous completion of both maneuvers.* This genealogical section then consists of this developmental history, whereas the final chapter contains the deconstructive genealogical conclusion. Between this history and the TPP is a example of The Republic of Sudan with special reference to its western Darfur region.

At the onset of my discussion of the UN I need to be clear on several issues. I understand that a treatment of the UN as a uniform entity is not consistent with how the UN is organized and operated or reflective of contestations indicative of the practical geopolitical processes within it or surrounding it (ÓTuathail and Dalby 1998; Loescher 2001; O’Loughlin 2005; Smith 2006). Also, I realize that sovereignty as a concept and practice is not uniform and that negotiations in an international arena are often compromises or impasses regarding particular elements of sovereignty (Krasner 2001). Furthermore, not all states share the same views on sovereignty and the rights and limits of sovereign power. Yet, since the UN ostensibly works by consensus, even if it is widely coerced by Great Powers, decentralized to the point of dysfunction, and often impotent in cases as in humanitarian crises (Powers 2002; Alger 2006, Normand and Zaidi 2008; Loescher 2001; Stoddard 2006; Hanhimäki 2008), then the juridical and executive practices of the various bodies of the UN are symbolically consensual. I realize not all
192 members have the same share of power or voice/vote on some of the most important issues. However, my interest is not in the organizational dynamics of the UN (Alger, 2006). I am not interested in the geopolitical networks or the idiosyncrasies of practical geopolitics at the UN (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998; ÓTuathail 2002). I am not interested in the procedures of how a law or practice comes into being (Smith 2008). I am not interested in those elements because I am interested foremost on the concept of the boundary relative to a particular example and along a specific line of reasoning.

Boundarying permeates all processes, so a project involving boundarying in all of these lines of research I have negatively distinguished from my interests is beyond the scale of my project. Thus, I have delimited my present interests.

Contradictions in the metaphysics of place in a geobiopolitical assessment of sovereignty subvert the acceptance of the metaphors of placed/displaced in the normative categorization of citizens. The essential, privileged position is that of placement or topological belonging. Within a given territory, those who do not belong are foreigners, but foreigners are such by being absent. Those that are present but do not belong are displaced. Homo sacer is present but does not belong. This presence is not simply being within a territory. It also means being of that territory, i.e., being a citizen of that territory. These grant the territorial sovereign state system a sense of legitimacy and logical justification (Agamben 1995 and 2005; Agnew 1997, 2005 and 2009).

Contradictions come from difference between sovereignty and sovereign power and in the status of citizens relative to these two entities. Regarding sovereignty, the citizen is
placed. Regarding sovereign power, the citizen is displaced. This is the situation in Agamben’s vision.

But this deconstructive act does not suggest simply a poststructural dismissal of the discourse of placement and displacement due to the arbitrariness of definitional meanings. Definitional meanings must be disciplined and practiced through social space if they are to be meaningful. This requires embodied learning. Regardless of the arbitrariness of the terms, the contradictory nature of the metaphoric logic, or the exceptional nature of law and the state-territory-citizen nexus, the boundaryings of states and their proxies produce traumatic conditions of embodiment for their targets. In some cases they produce violent spaces of impunity. It is the violence unleashed in these spaces that has attracted the attention of groups around the world to pressure international governmental organizations (IGO) to act on their behalf. It is, ostensibly, with this sense of moral responsibility and charity for fellow humans regardless of nationality, religion, race, or ethnicity that the UN works to provide protection and assistance to those in need. It is the embodied meanings of IDPs the make this topic relevant and it is the understanding of others’ embodied experiences (empathy) that human rights has become a central issue at the UN and in critical discussions of sovereignty (Campbell and Shapiro 1999; Connolly 1999; Dillon 1999; Normand and Zaidi 2008; Campbell 2007).

The end of a period of two devastating world wars gave rise to three very important elements of twentieth century sovereignty that are four important contingencies in the genealogy of the IDP; the conceptualization of universal human rights, the institutional structures for international development and globalization, the UN, and the
totalization of the nation-state. There are countless other resolutions, treaties, institutional changes, and other particular events that provided the means by which displacement as a UN problematization and mass event within numerous states arose. However, I restrict my discussion to these four elements because they provide four pillars upon which the current rise of IDP is based. The pillars then are: human rights, neoliberalism, the nation-state, and IGOs. All four produce pressures on internal and external sovereignty and provide the geobiopolitical contingencies for displacement. During the Cold War these pillars were instrumental in providing a context in which refugees were a prolific problematization. The post-Cold War order with the rise of transnational regional powers and their reorganization of sovereignty has provided a new context in which refugees are dwindling and the “internally displaced” are on the rise.

The issue of human rights was a part of the sovereign imaginary of UN at its origin and was championed by such figures as Eleanor Roosevelt. This ideology gave rise to the institutional bodies obliged with problematizations such as displacement. When limiting the discussion of the UN to the years just prior to its emergence, much of its conception and structure is modeled after American idealism that says little about U.S. geopolitical practices (Alger 2006). This is due in great part to the involvement of Franklin D. Roosevelt in its emergence and acceptance as an international organization (Hoopes and Brinkley 1997). FDR used the term “United Nations” to refer to the Allies powers in WWII. Its founding charter beings with the line “We the peoples of the United Nations” echoing the U.S. constitution. But while the UN was loosely based on American progressivism and liberalism which draws much U.S. conservative ire (Muravchik 2005),
it is an Americanism without teeth. The UN, lauded by some reviled by others, has been plagued from the beginning with the force-of-law. It is all law with no independent force or deterrent behind it. This was by design.

While the United Nations came into effect as a working body with the ratification of its Charter on October 24th, 1945, its sovereign imaginaries have as long a history as the nation-state. It is from the development of such conceptualizations as Enlightenment liberalism, nationalism, and American progressivism that human rights at the UN emerged (Alger 2006). Without these developments there is no such thing as human rights and most probably no United Nations. In fact, the Atlantic Charter, based on the agreement between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, set the agenda for what would become the post-WWII political and economic world order. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 was based on FDR’s Four Freedoms speech to Congress in 1941 (Hoopes and Brinkley 1997) and was the basis for the enactment of the United Nations, NATO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Law of the Sea, and other foundational agreements that provided the legal and institutional frameworks for modern neoliberal globalization (Hanhimäki 2008). Much of these agreements go back further to Woodrow Wilson’s world vision listed in his Fourteen Points speech to Congress in 1918 (Hoopes and Brinkley 1997). While the Fourteen Points were never ratified as a foundation for the League of Nations, Wilsonian idealism was influential not only in the League of Nations but also its successor the UN (Hanhimäki 2008).

The UN, then, is a next-generation international body; the League of Nations being the defunct original. Both were direct responses to the aftermath of world wars that
had horrific effects on the political, economic, and social fabric beyond the European
continent. The wars created a public outcry for peace at home and a justification for the
creation of an international governmental organization that provided an institutional
framework for Great Powers to mold the world in their image and small states to find
protection against other states (Alger 2006). Human rights discourses then were
important in two major respects. The protection of human rights was the justification for
WWII and the post-war prosecution of the Axis powers. It was also a major point in
dealing with the millions of people affected by the ravages of war and political upheaval
often associated with it. The protection of human rights then was the justification for the
development of a post-WWII geopolitical order that was shaped by the Cold War
(Normand and Zaidi 2008).

The UN is composed of five “Principle Organs” and numerous organizations tied
to each of the organs. In New York City there is the **General Assembly** of 192 states, the
**Security Council** of 15 members, of which the US, China, Russia (previously the USSR),
the UK, and France are permanent members, the **Economic and Social Council** of 54
members, and the **Secretariat**. In The Hague, Netherlands is the **International Court of
Justice**. Offices of the various organizations are headquartered in various cities around
the world. Thus, when referring to the UN it often more appropriate to refer to it as the
UN system to encompass the vastness and complexity of this international governmental
apparatus (Alger 2006).

The two most important organizations on human rights and displacement in the
UN are the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) that came into existence in
2006 to replace the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Alger 2006). The guidelines of the former are rooted in the Universal Bill of Rights, which consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with two Optional Protocols (Normand and Zaidi 2008). It entered into force in 1976. The guidelines of the latter are rooted in two documents on the recognition and treatment of refugees; the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees adopted in 1951 and the 1967 Protocol that broadened the original scope from Europeans displaced by WWII to any persons displaced by conflict (Alger 2006). There are many agreements and resolutions that are pertinent to the offices of the UNHCR and UNHRC, yet all of them are conceptually tied to their seminal documents. Both are specialized bodies organized under the General Assembly and both are headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.

The idea of displacement and aid of refugees originated prior to the UN when, at the Yalta Conference, the fate of Europe’s displaced peoples was decided (Hoopes and Brinkley 1997). Plans were made to return and repatriate those uprooted by war. FDR spearheaded the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1943, in which “United Nations” referred to Allied nations. The organization set up over one hundred displacement camps, first in Europe, then in Asia. This was absorbed by the United Nations International Refugee Organization in
1946 which ceased operations in 1952 with the commencement of operations of the UNHCR (Alger 2006).

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established on December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. The agency is mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third country. It also has a mandate to help stateless people.

In more than five decades, the agency has helped tens of millions of people restart their lives. Today, a staff of some 6,600 people in more than 110 countries continues to help about 34 million persons. (UNHCR 2006a)

Displacement thus began as a rehabilitation project for Europe, those peoples whose bodies actually counted as redeemable victims of war (Tyner 2009). It was this geopolitical context of two world wars and the territorial freezing of bodies within the global divisions of the Cold War that produced the geobiopolitical contingencies of refugee populations post-WWII. The end of Cold War shifted the rationale of states and the UN toward the displaced. The idea was to keep them within their home states and seek resolution to their situation in situ. The loss of Cold War support and the inability to “offshore” population problems in the form of refugees, created conditions of increasing internal turmoil within fragile states, particularly in Africa (Denham and Lombardi 1996; Shapiro 1996; Slawner 1996; Bates 2008). Two constellations of events relevant to this project resulted from these geopolitical transformations.

The first involves the shifting scale of politics, rising talk of the “imminent demise of the nation-state” (Stråth and Skinner 2003: 1), territorial sovereignty, and
nationalism, the inviability of post-colonial state boundaries, and the growing need, or perhaps inevitability, of stateless regions (Denham and Lombardi 1996; Slawner 1996; Shapiro 1996; Krasner 1999; Prempeh 2006). The second involves the growth of international protection and assistance to the growing number of “internally displaced”. This required conventions on regional displacement, which led to the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and the proliferation of international governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide the necessary mechanisms to increase and expedite protection and assistance to these groups (Grabska and Mehta 2008a, 2008b; Mehta 2008; Assal 2008; Muggah 2008). The development of the UNHCR is one manifestation of the second trend.

The UNHCR describes its origins and development on its website entitled “A Global Humanitarian Organization of Humble Origins”.

The UN refugee agency emerged in the wake of World War II to help Europeans displaced by that conflict. … By 1956 UNHCR was facing its first major emergency, the outpouring of refugees when Soviet forces crushed the Hungarian Revolution. Any expectation that UNHCR would become unnecessary has never resurfaced. In the 1960s, the decolonization of Africa produced the first of that continent’s numerous refugee crises needing UNHCR intervention. Over the following two decades, UNHCR had to help with displacement crises in Asia and Latin America. By the end of the century there were fresh refugee problems in Africa and, turning full circle, new waves of refugees in Europe from the series of wars in the Balkans. (UNHCR 2006b)

While the idea of displacement is rooted in the origins of the UN and was the central problematization of vulnerable peoples during the Cold War order, the problematization “IDP” did not arise until the late-1980s when the old order began to breakdown. The flow of people from one side of the Cold War divide to the other was a
political win for either the Soviets or the Americans (Korn 1999). If one was in a socialist or communist state it was logical, even emancipatory, to allow them to enter into a free, democratic, i.e., capitalist, state. The opposite was also logical. When the Cold War ended, it was no longer in the interest of western states to accept refugees. The 1990s were thus a decade of humanitarian intervention and an explosion of humanitarian organizations to aid those who would ten years earlier have been accepted as refugees. Thereafter, they were encouraged to remain in a state of “placed displacement” and supported through “IDP camps” (Stoddard 2006). The loss of the old order also led to massive internal reordering of many states that were dependent upon Cold War support. Eastern Europe, especially the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa were regions hit the hardest by this reordering. It is no surprise then that these regions supplied the most bodies counted and classified as “IDP”. Geopolitical boundarying practices led to massive geobiopolitical boundarying effects.

Massive displacement of people within countries and across borders has become a defining feature of the post-cold war world. It is also a major feature of human insecurity in which genocide, terrorism, egregious human rights violations and appalling human degradation wreak havoc on civilians. The need of internally displaced persons (IDPs), people forcibly uprooted in their own countries, for international protection from conflict and one-sided violence was one of the factors that prompted a shift in global policy and security thinking. Over the past two decades, a strictly state-centered system in which sovereignty was absolute has evolved to become a matter of international concern and scrutiny. This evolution largely grew from the efforts of the human rights movement, which had long championed the view that the rights of people transcend frontiers and that the international community must hold governments to account when they fail to meet their obligations. It also arose from the efforts of the humanitarian community to reach people in need. The deployment of large numbers of relief workers and peacekeeping operations in the field to protect civilians reflects this new reality as do preventive and peacebuilding efforts. (Cohen 2009: 1)
The General Assembly voted in 1992 to request the Secretary General to appoint a special investigator into a newly labeled form of displacement. While “internally displaced persons” were always included in the idea of displacement, the distinction of being internally displaced was not used until the end of the Iran-Iraq War and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (E/CN.4/1992/S-1/8). Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Francis Deng as his special investigator. His first comprehensive study (E/CN.4/1993/35) on the topic of “internal displacement” was accepted by the General Assembly in 1993. Deng’s subsequent analytical reports, case studies, progress reports, and, interestingly, criticisms of the inadequacies of the UN system and international community at large in its inabilities and unwillingness to effectively address forced displacement in general and internal displacement in particular (E/CN.4/1993/35 and E/CN.4/1994/44). His practical recommendations were used as seminal texts in the formulation of the UN Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons in 1998. That document in turn has stood as the foundation of numerous state and regional guidelines for dealing with internally displaced persons. Deng stepped down as the Secretary-General’s Representative on Internally Displaced Persons in 2004 and was replaced by the current representative Walter Kälin who has continued Deng’s cries for the universalization and international enforcement of the “Responsibility to Protect”, often referred to as R2P (E/CN.4/2005/84). The latest report on the conditions of IDPs around the world and the UNHCR’s response to them is as follows.

UNHCR’s original mandate does not specifically cover IDPs, but because of the agency’s expertise on displacement, it has for many years been assisting millions of them, more recently through the "cluster approach." Under this approach,
UNHCR has the lead role in overseeing the protection and shelter needs of IDPs as well as coordination and management of camps.

At the end of 2008, there were an estimated 26 million IDPs around the world and UNHCR was helping about 14.4 million of them in 22 countries, including the three with the largest IDP populations - Sudan, Colombia and Iraq. (UNHCR 2006c)

The emergence of the “IDP” as a full-fledged legal category remains hindered by the sovereignty principle. So long as homines sacri remain within the territories they are involuntarily bound within, unfettered support to these people will remain elusive. This is the result of the necessary role of place in sovereignty. Also, this reliance on place grounds the categorical content of “internally displaced”.

This introduction to the emergence of the IDP is supplement in the following chapter through an example of an important case of mass internal displacement. How effective is the UN system in its geopolitical mission to “promote international peace and security” between states? How does the very idea of providing aid in conflict affect the humanitarian mission? These questions are answered with reference to Darfur and the biopolitical imaginaries of aid grounded in the goal of promoting universal human rights while providing “protection and assistance” for vulnerable peoples. I turn now to the case study of The Republic of Sudan with special reference to its western Darfur region.
CHAPTER VII

SPACES OF IMPUNITY, SPACES OF IMMUNITY: DARFUR, SUDAN

This chapter is meant to introduce an example of the ban and the production of banishment or displacement. The example is the Darfur region of The Republic of the Sudan This dissertation concludes with a proposal as to how IDPs can be unmade following Agamben’s understanding of freedom from the sovereignty ban. This process would involve a profound transformation in the sovereign imaginaries of international governmental and non-governmental humanitarian aid organizations. However, I do not provide actual strategies or mechanism for such a transformation because this proposal is a gedanken (“thought experiment”) extending from Agamben’s conceptualization of a “whatever place” and not meant as a currently practical approach to providing aid or procuring comprehensive peace agreements. This reflects my original declaration that I am interested in the boundary as the basis for geographic thought in both of its defined meanings. The IDP, the exceptional nature of state sovereignty and citizenship, and the role of place as territory in securing a basis of sovereign power are all interests because they relate to the boundary and boundarying. The “whatever place” with its “whatever politics” of “whatever
“beings” is constructed completely by the exception, which is the potentiality of boundarying. By this I mean that while actual boundaryings allow for the presence of the four entities and the possibility to build content to them through conceptual blending on multiple modalities, the “power” of boundarying, or the nature of its effects, stems from the enactment of distinction. This is why sovereign power is a process of political boundarying. Sovereign power becomes as an effect through moments of determination or decision. The power of the sovereign comes from boundarying, the ability to make a distinction. Autonomic boundarying is the process of perceptual distinction. Voluntary boundarying is the potentiality to make abstract distinctions. These distinctions may produce unity or division, which comes from the content of the relations made between the two sides of the distinguishing boundary. Topological relations of any type are made in this fashion. Moreover, all boundaryings are embodied and therefore interpretable within that theoretical frame. This having been said, any discussion of conflict is a discussion of socio-political boundaryings. And, based on understandings of our evolutionary development and historical past, these boundaryings often involve territory. Conflicts are by nature oppositional and thus involve the four entities of boundarying in a particular way. Socio-political oppositions are always about the meaning of the relations between the two sides, and often in relation to a third entity (land, resources, etc.), which is conditioned (gains content from) by conceptualizations such as nation, religion, tribe, etc. This is identity. It must be relational because identities are meant to distinguish one among others, either held in a necessary positive relation or negative relation. Regardless, the identity is tied to something because it can stand as present as an independent entity.
And, since political boundaryings leading to social unity or violent division necessarily involve identity, all other content related to the contestation of two sides necessarily involves identity. However, an important point is that recognition of difference is not cause by itself for group conflict or even social tension in relation to a third entity. Something else is always involved. Moreover, as conflicts develop so do the content of the relations between entities. This can be between the combatants, between members of a group seen in splinting of factions, or between the combatants and a third entity involved in the conflict. All of this is boundarying. All thinking of this kind is boundary thinking.

This chapter has two goals. The first is to briefly introduce the development of the conflict in Darfur. The second is to explore the general effect of the metaphysics of place on the conflict and the aid of conflict victims. On the latter goal, much work has been done on state-directed violence and the problems of humanitarianism, this chapter demonstrates how, through the protection of state sovereignty, the UN not only enables the long-term existence of spaces of impunity where vulnerable people are made, but re-enacts them within through its own sovereign sphere. If the problem of displacement as described by my geobiopolitical perspective is to be remedied in situations like Darfur, a radical theoretical shift in legal protective apparatuses must take place. This would involve a shift from restrictive state-oriented strategies that produce spaces of impunity to individual-oriented strategies that place state sovereignty at risk. This would involve conceiving of either sovereignty without territory, perhaps for humanitarian organization to protect peoples from violence, or territory without sovereignty, which would have to
be redefined as place without authority. I tackle this question in the final chapter through Agamben’s whatever place.

Displacement in the Republic of Sudan has a long, complex history. The ongoing process of state-induced forced displacement in Darfur has produced 2.7 million refugees and IDPs since 2003. As yet no state-oriented solution has resolved the many issues tied to displacement in Darfur. This includes the Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006.

Sudan has become a focus of attention in the west since the end of the Cold War and its replacement the “War on Terror” proclaimed the new geopolitical order. Throughout its modern history since independence in 1956, it has been in conflict in one region or another. In fact the two greatest periods of civil, the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) and the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), saw only eleven years of peace in its first 49 years of existence. Over the centuries, the western Darfur region has seen its share of conflict. It was a staging area for interstate fighting in the 1970s. It had its own small-scale civil war in the mid-1990s. This history of conflict boiled over in 2003 as the region, especially in the west and north broke out into war. The region has been a growing focus of attention thereafter due to the cries of “genocide” by various activists, journalists, scholars, and humanitarian organizations. Homes were destroyed. Family members were wounded or forced into bondage. Rape was used as a weapon. And murdered was an everyday occurrence. Those attacked have scattered to various locations disrupting social dynamics irrevocably (Flint and De Waal 2005:16).

Most have remained within Sudan. One reason for this is the sheer size of Darfur which is as large as France and Texas. Physical displacement does not make one mobile,
at least not over long distances. In lieu of new homes or transnational connections, these people formed spontaneous sites of accumulation around water wells and partially arable land. They group together for mutual assistance and self preservation through numbers. International humanitarian aid camps have since been erected to service these people.

This situation has persisted for years with no effective solution in site. The problem is the sovereignty principle. So long as the Sudanese government refuses to allow an armed force into Darfur to protect the camps and remaining villages, those in IDP camps will remain vulnerable to attacks (Brun 2001; Mooney 2005; Islam 2006; Beyani 2006).

While remaining within their home state these people exist within the sovereign sphere of the government of Sudan which was responsible for displacing them. So long as they are displaced, banned, from law, they exist within a space of impunity. The sovereignty principle therefore produces an international *space of immunity* for the government of Sudan that makes possible the *space of impunity*. Spaces of impunity become permanent modes of governance in states of emergency when all law can be suspended. This is the case in regions within Darfur and in IDP camps. In the last twenty years the UN and international humanitarian organizations have codified legal apparatuses that can protect and provide for refugee needs. IDPs on the other hand, are condemned to spaces of impunity through the sovereignty principle which is based in logic of territory, i.e., the metaphysics of place. Explanations for the conflict and displacement focus on environmental, ethnic, and political root causes. The following section provides a short overview of the environmental, identity, and political issues involved in the evolution of conflict and displacement in Darfur. Flint and de Waal (2005), while referring to its
neglect within Sudan referred to the region at the time of independence as a forgotten place. “Darfur was a Backwater, a Prisoner of Geography.” (16)

The following section is presented as a history of the development of the conflict within Darfur. It is not meant as a definition of conflict or as an example of a particular type of conflict. While conflicts have certain general characteristics due to the physiological nature of human beings as territorial, cooperative, strategic, bi-pedal, weapons users, I am neither a structuralist on conflict nor a primordialist on identity. Conflicts, like any other human endeavor have unique histories and are ultimately individually experienced while collectively practiced. It is an event that surely rings true how embodied is one’s existence. The following history pieces together several chronologies of events related to the environmental, identity, and political changes to the region related to the current situation.

Environment, Identity, Politics

Darfur constitutes the western portion of the Republic of Sudan, is roughly about the size of France, and takes up about one fifth of the total area the largest country in Africa (Figures 2). Central to Darfur is a volcanic massif, Jebel Marra, which peaks at 10,000 feet and generates orographic precipitation sufficient for daily water needs in addition to sedentary farming. Nomadic camel (abbala) and goat herding predominate in arid northern Darfur while (Figure 3) while mixed livelihoods of cattle (baqqara) herding and sedentary farming predominate in southern Darfur. Livelihoods are largely determined by local ecology in which yearly precipitation and market trends favor either herding or farming (Young et al. 2005).
Precipitation in Darfur is decreasing while also becoming more variable in frequency and intensity which has led to numerous droughts over the 100 years (Thomas 1997) during which Darfurians typically have adapted their livelihood strategies to eating, growing, and dealing in wild foods and basic resources, seeking alternative employment within or outside of Sudan, relying on remittances, selling off land rights and property, and most importantly increasing community sharing practices (de Waal 2005b). As the land dries the soil becomes less fertile and biodiversity decreases which furthers soil degradation (An et al. 2006). This along with a steady increase in population has led greater need for land, seed and water. Degradation has been exacerbated by exploitative livelihood practices that lack well-planned sustainable development strategies to reduce environmental degradation (Young et al. 2005). Dry periods have been correlated with periodic increases in conflicts between farmers who need more land to maintain production and herders who require more grazing fields to support their herds (de Waal 2005b). These types of conflicts are part of the overall history of conflict in Darfur but do not solely account for the intensity and extent of the violence since 2003.

All Darfuri groups are “Africans” with equivalent variation of melanization in each. All are Muslim though most Darfurian Arabs are Ansar, those who ascribe to Mahdiism and are associated with the Umma Party, while many non-Arab groups, while those loosely grouped together in western representations of the conflict under the label “African” (Mamandi 2007), are Sufi (Karrar 1992). Depending on the classification scheme used, there are between forty to ninety ethnic groups and sub-divisions of each in
Darfur (Figure 4). Successive waves of immigration added to the existing indigenous groups of Darfur’s southwest (Daju), north (Tunjur), and center (Fur) (Prunier 2005).

The first of three waves of migration occurred between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries that began the multiethnic mosaic of Darfur. The first to arrive was the Nilo-Saharan from what is now Chad. These were the Masalit, Bidayat, Zaghawa, and Berti who settled the dry areas surrounding Jebel Marra to the west (Masalit), north (Zaghawa and Bidayat) and east (Berti). These groups span the Chad-Sudan border and are mainly abbala. The second was the Nubian Meidob and Birgid peoples who came from the Nile valley to the northeast. The third group was the Juhayna Arabs who travelled south through the Sahara to settle throughout Darfur. They include the Beni Halba, Habbaniya, Ziyadiyya, and Rizeigat. The Rizeigat, the largest and most powerful of the Arabs, trace their lineage to the Qoreish, Mohammed’s tribe, and are a central group in current conflict.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries nomadic Nigerians moved east and many were “Arabized” and converted to Islam (Sharkey 2007). This included the Hausa, Kanuri, Kotoko, Fulbe (Fulani), and Maba. They mixed with Arab herders to the point that they are now often referred to as a baqqara Arab sub-group. The last significant immigration was the awlad al-Bahar (sons of the river) (Hasan 1967). The “riverine Arabs” are distinguished from their Juhayna “native Arab” cousins in that the latter are nomadic herders while the former are urban merchant traders (jallaba), Sufi fuqara (proselytizing holy men), and other elites related to three dominant Nile Valley tribes in northern Sudan; the Shaygiyya, Ja’aliyyin, and Dangala (MacMichael 1967; Hasan 1967).
The plurality of Darfuri identities Alex de Waal (2005a) categorizes into *Sudanic* and *Islamic* types. Sudanic identities are permeable groupings formed from an imaginative geography *rooted in place* (African traditions). Islamic identities are rooted in Arab-Islamic traditions *from a distant place* (the Hejaz). Their merger created the Fur identity of the Sultanate. Their polarization has created the ethnic division blamed for the Darfur conflict from those ascribing to a primordial “ancient tribal hatreds” assessment. These explanations do not adequately account for the permeability of identity in Darfur or for the relatively peaceful and economically symbiotic coexistence between these many peoples.

African ethnicities are not atavistic, primordial survivals of archaic primitive cultures, but rather modern products of the African encounter with capitalism and the nation-state in the colonial and post-colonial eras. …ethnic pluralism is and will remain a fundamental characteristic of African modernity that must be recognition and incorporated within any project of democratic nation-building (Berman, Eyoh, and Kymlicka 2004: 3).

Darfur literally means the “homeland of the Fur”. Its name dates to the Sultanate in the mid-seventeenth century. Sulayman Solongdongo (1650-1680) was the son of a Keira (Fur) mother and Arab father (O’Fahey 1980). The Keira originate from the central higher elevations of Jebel Marra, whereas their Kunjara cousins hail from the Jebel Marra lowlands (de Waal 2005a). Islamization and Arabization linked the Sultanate to the world through trade and pilgrimage routes for Hajj travelers while the Keira dynasty rooted it in Africa (O’Fahey 1980).

The Sultanate expanded through assimilation. Those who assimilated politically became “Fur” while those who declined were driven south and labeled “Fertit”. This
produced a boundary between *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* (Figure 5), which was viewed as a pool of economically exploitable *zurqa* (black) *abeed* (slaves).

This process of conquest, Islamization, incorporation and border delimitation stabilized the Sultanate over a territory comprising 80% of today’s three Darfur States. Within that world and for the next two centuries a complex society developed whose lineaments constitute a key counterpoint to the present crisis either because they survived or because what changed was started from the baseline it set (Prunier 2005 10).

Dar Fur was vast which made control over its many groups difficult. Those who wished not to pay taxes simply moved away from administrative centers. Land use, not ownership, was codified into royal privileged estates called *hakurat al-jah* (estates with honors) and feudal land tenure estates called *hawakeer* (singular *hakura*, “estates”) beginning in the eighteenth century (O’Fahey 1980; Rünger 1987). Therefore Darfurians can be understood as those that have rights to land and those who have longstanding grievances because they less or no land rights who have recently made their grievances clear in the form of Arab militias known by their opponents as the *Janjawiid* (Haggar 2007; Tubiana 2007).

The Sultanate was first defeated by Zubayr Rahma al-Mansur, an Arab trader – including slaves – from Khartoum, after Mohammed Ali, *wali* of Egypt, led Turco-Egyptian (Ottoman and Egyptian) forces into Sudan in 1821. The British under Lord Gordon took control of Sudan briefly from 1877 to 1885. The Mahdi revolution (1881-1885), which led to the death of Gordon in Khartoum in 1885, took most of Sudan with the help of Baqqara Ansar cavalrymen from Darfur. The Mahdi died in 1885 at the end of the Mahdi Revolution (1881-85), but established the period of Mahdiism which lasted
until the final defeat of the Mahdi army in 1899. The British Empire in conjunction with Egypt defeated the Mahdi state in 1898. After the Mahdiyya, Ali Dinar, a Fur royal claimed himself Sultan and reestablished the Dar Fur Sultanate. After pronouncing allegiance to the Central Powers in WWI, the British attacked and defeated him in 1916 (Holt and Daly 2000).

Within the Condominium, Darfur was administered as closed district under the Native Administration (Daly 2007). Colonial authorities left the existing hawakeer land system intact but systematically reversed the detribalization effect of Mahdiism by increasing the power of tribal chiefs and replacing local leaders when necessary to assure acceptance of British Policy (Holt and Daly 2000; Daly 2007; Abdul-Jalil, Mohammed, and Yousuf 2007). British Policy codified and reified differences in Sudanese identities through British Anthropology that described, classified, and inventoried people by race, breed, stock, and purity of type (MacMichael 1967). The institutionalization of differences of identity negated the possibility of forging a unifying Sudanese national identity (Woodward 1979; Deng 1995; Lesch 1998; Johnson 2004; Sharkey 2007) and sent Darfur down the road to war. It also made Darfur a Sudanese backwater, a prisoner of a new colonial geography. In the status of a condominium, the Sudan was of two states, Egypt and Britain, but it was included in neither. Its territory defined and divided. Its people defined and divided.

Darfurians did not use the term “African” to differentiate non-Arabs prior to the twentieth century (de Waal 2005b), yet they readily understood the numerous ethnic (tribal-linguistic) and religious (Sufi-Ansar) distinctions in an affable manner. These
divisions were polarized by successive regimes, their opposition, and by racially asymmetrical militarization (Johnson 2004; De Waal 2007a, Abdul-Jalil, Mohammed, and Yousuf 2007, Tubiana 2007; El-Din 2007; Haggar 2007; Flint 2007). In the 1970’s Chadian President Tombalbaye adopted an ideology based on “African authenticity” that excluded Muslims while in opposition in an attempt to create a Saharan homeland for Arabs Qaddafi of Libya supported a Chadian Muslim group called FROLINAT that included Arabs and Zaghawa – including Zaghawa future Chadian President Idris Deby. From this band of militias came two Arab-Islamic groups called the Islamic Legion and the Arab Gathering from which weapons and an Arab supremacist ideology poured into Darfur (Haggar 2007). The Arab Gathering in particular with its racist doctrine codified in Qoreish 1 and 2 which aimed to marginalize non-Arabs, disrupt non-Arab livelihoods and cleanse Darfur of “Africans” by the year 2020, became the backbone of today’s Arab militias known as the Janjawiid (Haggar 2007). The desire to enact relations of unification polarized existing differentiations. Ethnic boundarying followed the militarization of the region.

A military coup in 1989 led by now-President Omar al-Bashir seized control of Khartoum from Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. Hasan al-Turabi, head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan provided Bashir’s junta its Islamist vision through the National Islamic Front (El-Din 2007). The NIF broke off peace negotiations with the main southern rebel group, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and exacerbated tensions in Darfur by giving preferential treatment to Arabs and supporting those in the Arab Gathering. The NIF replaced local administrators and judges with those
from Khartoum, undermined local courts so that Arab raiders would not be held accountable, and rhetorically connected the war in the south with the “Africans” of Darfur – principally the Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit.

In 1991, a Fur named Daud Bulad sought the aid of the SPLA to begin an offensive in Darfur (Johnson 2004). Bulad was captured, his accomplices killed, and the incident was used as evidence that the SPLA was moving into Darfur (Flint 2007). The effectiveness of the Arab militias used to defeat Bulad alerted the NIF that the nomadic Arabs of Darfur were a cheap and ready counter-insurgency force to be unleashed whenever and wherever needed. Government-backed Arab raids began in the early 1990s under a new climate of impunity. Fur majority vote and political status in Darfur was weakened in 1994 when Jebel Marra was split between three new Darfur states. Also at this time the Native Administration in Dar Massaleit was reorganized to empower an Arab minority (Tubiana, 2007). The militarization and polarization of western Darfur led to full scale war between the Massaleit and Arabs from 1994-1999, but the violence was not contained there. By 2001, the call had gone out for help in neighboring states to join the auxiliary forces of the Popular Defense Forces (Janjawid). 20,000 joined and were awarded a horse, gun, money, loot…and impunity (Flint and de Waal 2005).

By 2002, militiamen organized by the Arab Gathering, most notably two Abbala Rizeigat named Musa Hilal and Abdalla Safi a-Nur (Haggar 2007), began attacking the Fur villages of Jebel Kargo, Boni, and Idalghanam in southern Darfur (Totten and Markusen 2006).
They would sweep down on a village before dawn. Men were killed and often mutilated, women raped, and children sometimes abducted. Villages were burnt, livestock seized, fields torched, and all infrastructure methodically destroyed. … Tens of thousands had fled the land, often seeking safety high in Jebel Marra. It was a prelude to the firestorm that would soon sweep all across Darfur.

During that critical year of 2002, it became clear that the Janjawiid enjoyed complete impunity. In the words of a tribal leader in Dar Zaghawa who was once not unfriendly to the government: ‘When the Janjawiid burned a village, our people went to the police, but the government didn’t care about it. But if Zaghawa attacked Arabs, they went quickly to kill the Zaghawa.’ Worse even than impunity, people suspected that powerful men in government in Khartoum were giving the orders. Determination to resist was growing [emphasis in original] (Flint and de Waal 2005: 64-5).

In September 2001, President George W. Bush sent Senator John Danforth to broker a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan (signed January 9th, 2005), but rebel groups could not agree on a unifying position. As negotiations progressed the peace process involved only the SPLA and Khartoum. Continued attacks and exclusion from the peace process led members of the Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa on February 26th, 2003, to attack of the town of Gulu. The Secretary-General of the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), Minni Minawi, released a statement declaring the objectives of the movement: unity of all Sudanese citizens and the end of cultural, religious, political, and economic marginalization and manipulation by the NCP. On March 18th, the Sudanese Army with its support militias attacked Dar Massaleit. The SLA retaliated by attacking the town of Tine near the Chad border, then El Fashir airport. This was followed by the capture of Kutum, a city west of El Fashir (Totten and Markusen 2006).

Since 2003 the rebellion has fractured, transformed, and now appears reunited again. In 2004, SLA/M split between Abdel Wahid and Minni Minawi (De Waal 2007a).
In June 2006, the SLA/M-Minawi signed a peace agreement with the government and has since aided the government and Janjaweed counter-insurgency attacks referred to as “Janjaweed 2” (Flint 2007: 159). Also, some Arab groups have sided with non-Arabs in opposition to the NCP government. SLA/M-Wahid and Khail Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) make up two of the older and larger groups, but emerged after the first rebel assault. The GoS on the other hand has continued support for the Janjaweed and has shielded itself from external scrutiny by labeling the civil war “historic ethnic violence” and agreeing to maintain the status quo through negotiations (de Waal 2007a).

Most of the six million Darfur inhabitants in 2003 have been affected by the conflict and 2.5 million (UNHCR 2006b) have been displaced, most massing in IDP camps. Mortality estimates since 2003, which are highly political and difficult to assess, range from about 200,000 to 400,000 (Reeves 2007). The environmental stresses on herders and farmers are important, but as Alex de Waal has noted, there have been greater droughts in the past without such massive violence (2005). Boundarying practices over local and regional identity mixed with a volatile political history in the evolution of displacement and violence with impunity in Darfur.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, humanitarian interventions rose and the meaning of refugees in the international community changed. The total number of political refugees has since decreased as “preventative protection” strategies in the form of “R2P” has dominated the international community’s policy for handling the forcibly displaced (Hyndman 2000; Edkins 2000; Williams and Bellamy 2005; Seybolt 2007; de Waal 2007b; Mamdani 2009). As a result, there has been a rise in the number of IDPs
worldwide (UNHCR, 2006). The reduction in states’ ability to offshore population problems in the form of refugees has led instead to states outsourcing their responsibilities to care for citizens. This has led to the corporatization of humanitarianism into a global business of governmental contracts and numerous subcontracts to service the displaced (Hyndman 2000; Edkins 2000; Mooney 2005; Stoddard 2006).

It should not be surprising then that those countries with the highest IDP totals are states in political turmoil. International justification for the localization of the displaced – in the form of IDP camps – is now cast as issues of international security (Duffield 2001). Displaced peoples have gone from threatened lives to threatening lives that must be contained and made into categorical types (ethnic-tribal, rural, traditional) of passive recipients of foreign (cosmopolitan, urban, civilized) aid (Hyndman 2000; Edkins 2000). The result is set of entrenched discourses of “protection through prosperity” which in turn ostensibly increases “security through development” (Duffield 2001). This popularized such mottos as “local solutions for local problems” (Bradbury 1998) and “African solutions to African problems” often used in reference to Darfur. These slogans have two important meanings: solving displacement issues in complex humanitarian emergencies requires intimate knowledge of the situation yet localization of root causes of displacement masks issues of external origin and solution. These realizations should not be surprising. Humanitarianism has always been an eminently political project (Duffield, Macrae, and Curtis 2001) and critiques of the humanitarian system and its core ideals – impartiality, neutrality, and humanity – that underwrite it are not new (Macrae 1998).
Humanitarianism began with small-scale, independent, philanthropic endeavors and evolved into the aid business (Stoddard 2006). It now has regulatory standards on accountability, transparency, and delivery (Walker and Purdin 2004). A growing number of universities are now developing programs to produce a diverse pool of labor trained specifically for humanitarian fields. The politicization of humanitarianism evolved from the adaptation of the humanitarian system to service donor interests by restructuring in a corporate model to compete for funding. The humanitarianization of politics developed out of the decade following the Soviet collapse. Humanitarian interventions of the 1990s had limited successes, mostly in natural disasters, and numerous failures particularly in complex humanitarian emergencies. The subsequent military engagements in the “global war on terror” have further complicated humanitarianism by erasing the line between aid delivery and military operations. Humanitarian organizations’ in their new role as “force multipliers” humanitarianism has come under question and aid personnel have become military targets (Stoddard 2006: ix-xiv).

Analytically framed by Agamben’s politics of life, critiques by Edkins (2000), Hyndman (2000), and Elden (2006) of humanitarianism emanate from their observations of inequities operating from an international frame. Edkins (2000) explains that the plight of vulnerable citizens has, like in the case of NATO forces in Kosovo and “Faith-based” groups in Sudan, been used as a justification to promote western political and cultural agendas. Kosovar aid camps effectively created bare lives that were at once highly politicized yet had no political life (Campbell 1998; Hyndman 2000). They became problematized bodies usable in the geopolitical imaginations of national and international
actors. Humanitarianism has not, in cases of complex humanitarian emergencies, liberated but further entrenched the inclusion of bare life in the political field. The work of both authoritarians and humanitarians in this view appears to be bringing about the same social transformations.

This move of biological life to the center of the political scene in the West leads to a transformation of the political realm itself, one that effectively constitutes its depoliticization. That depoliticization takes place side by side with the politicization of bare life. Bare life is politicized and political life disappears (Edkins 2000: 4).

The implication of the argument in this article is that although the power of the sovereign state over the lives of its populations has been successfully challenged in the post-Cold War period and the notion of humanitarian concern as overriding sovereignty widely accepted, this is not a liberation or an emancipation but merely the beginning of another and more authoritarian form of sovereign control over life. Just as the role of the revolution in the transition to modern state rule can be seen as an ironic strengthening of central authority, so the role of humanitarian intervention can be seen as a tightening of a global structure of authority and control (16).

Many weak and fractured states in the Global South are as much victims of external conditions and colonial histories as they are blatantly self-defeating (Bates 2008). Political actors tend to employ strategies that act to consolidate financial and political power among elites for their general benefit no matter their ideological foundations. “The state makers’ order is all about the construction and reconstruction of authority” (van der Wusten 2005: 74). In situations of actual or perceived threats these strategies become more pronounced and severe.

[S]earching for wealth and power, political elites reconfigured African political institutions, transforming them from multi- to single- or no-party systems or replacing civilian governments with military regimes. They also narrowed the range of those entitled to political benefits. Rather than political independence serving the collective welfare, then, it instead conferred narrowly circumscribed privileges upon those who won out in the competition for political office. …in the
post-independence era, [Africans] increasingly came to view their leaders as a source of insecurity and the state as a source of threat rather than of well-being (Bates 2008: 52-3).

In states such as Sudan, Iraq, Colombia, Afghanistan, Palestine, and the Democratic Republic of Congo to name a few, the desire to keep the State afloat has led to vast portions of these states’ populations being deliberately displaced – or disarticulated – from normal State-citizen relations.

Aihwa Ong (2005 and 2006) theorizes the (dis)/(re)articulation of citizenship as a global phenomenon driven by neoliberalism, which has reformed the spatial structure of the State and provided the contingent pressures on weak states to displace “costly” citizen-subjects. She views neoliberalism not as a political or economic doctrine but a set of strategies employed by numerous, variegated actors to position themselves as benefactors of globalization. One prominent outcome of this has been a reorganization of citizenship and sovereignty. Governments are becoming more transnational as they open up to foreign capital flows whereas citizenship is becoming more exclusive as states focus their investments in social capital on those who can aid the state in its neoliberal practices. Those who are not represented become trapped in an ambiguous space of localized non-citizenship – one who must remain within state boundaries yet one who cannot participate in that state as a fully recognized citizen.

The dis-articulation and re-articulation of citizenship elements mean that political resolutions are contingent, varied, and ambiguous. We are moving beyond the recent past when citizenship as a package of territorialized rights seemed immutable to the flux and conjunctures of global flows (Ong 2005: 699).
These transformations are advantageous for the affluent for which transnational relations are typically designed to benefit. However, in weak and failing states these transnational rearticulations have had grave consequences for millions.

The new alignments of citizenship elements, I argue, are fundamentally linked to dynamic and varied conditions engendered by mobile neoliberal technologies of governing and self-governing. There are spatial and temporal dimensions to the disconnection and reconnection among citizenship elements and techniques of unfettered capitalism. First, components formerly tied to citizenship – rights, entitlements, as well as nation and territoriality – are becoming disarticulated from one another and rearticulated with governing strategies that promote an economic logic in defining, evaluating, and protecting certain categories of subjects and not others. … Variations in individual capacities or in performance of market skills intensify existing social and moral inequalities while blurring political distinctions between national and foreign populations. … Second, articulations also refer to discursive practices as ongoing negotiations of citizenship in conditions of displacement (Ong 2006: 16-17).

Ong suggests that these disarticulated citizen, which is equivalent to “displacement”, are neoliberal exceptions have been placed in a unique position where having been stripped of citizenship they can now use their abandoned status as a means of rearticulating themselves into new independent forms of citizenship. In other words, abstract concept of Agamben’s camp can become a whatever place populated by whatever beings by overturning the territorial basis of sovereignty. Ong (2006), following numerous others (Townsend, Porter, and Mawdsley 2004; Bebbington 2004; DeChaine, 2005; Rosenau, 2002; Vedder 2007), suggests that humanitarian NGOs should increase their participation in supporting the emergence of local non-State governance of displaced peoples because of their unique position as a “third society” (Stoddard 2006) that can act as a buffer or “boundary institution” between the ravages of globalization and fluidity of citizenship status on one hand and the difficulties of sustainable development
amid stable, equitable governance on the other hand. However, reliance upon neoliberal, corporatized, development-oriented NGOs will only lead to repetition of negative history (Lischer 2005, Goodhand 2006). The most fruitful results of NGOs in devastated locations has been from local-oriented, locally-administers enterprises (Duffield 2002). The goal is to focus on productive local enterprises and downplay the effects of globally-oriented imperatives.

Development is related to two aspects of state making: the mechanism of mobilization and the level of infrastructural power. Mobilization is achieved through coercion or through capital. … The level of infrastructural power is also closely connected to the level of social development. Many of the devises that are the basis of infrastructural power…are derived from social organizations outside the state and then put to use on behalf of the state (van der Wusten 2005: 75).

Unfortunately, and perhaps ultimately unavoidably, in countries whose governments are systematically disarticulating segments of their populations humanitarian assistance actually aids in the production of the very conditions it sets to alleviate. This was seen during the Operation Lifeline Sudan mission that began in 1989 in north and south Sudan to aid peoples displaced by the civil war (Keen 1994; Reeves 2005; Rigalo and Morrison 2007). The government and the southern rebel group, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army, manipulated the aid process to conduct war efforts and gain favor from outside entities. In terms of aiding people or diminishing the conflict, OLS was sporadically successful and in economic terms prolonged the conflict (Keen 1994; Reeves 2005; Keen and Lee 2007; Macrae et al.1997).

States are presumed by international organizations to be international actors (bodies) with political lives. By way of the sovereignty principle this “international
community” has a political will to preserve the existence of its members and does this through political and financial support, though it is often exploitive. Fatal punishment (devolution/dissolution) of states is rarely supported and is instead reserved for individuals (through criminal trials) who “improperly” run state apparatuses. This demonstrates the difference between the inequalities of lives among international bodies and that of national bodies. The political lives of states are vital to the continuation of the international systems, whereas individual bodies are not vital to the existence of the state itself. States willing to engage in development schemes and accept structural adjustment programs, foreign investment, and downsize government expenditures on social programs are frequently given a pass on their transgressions in domestic humanitarian issues. Giving and receiving development and humanitarian aid is a means of buoying failing states and preserving the idea of the stability of sovereign state system. To a recipient state – that has intentionally produced vulnerable populations that assistance is meant to serve – engaging with humanitarianism is a strategy to maintain a political life within the international community while at the same time disarticulating non-vital populations from its citizenry.

Aid camps can effectively trap displaced persons in complex humanitarian emergencies in the politics of so-called “safe areas”, “zones of peace”, or “sanctuaries” (Hyndman 2000; Edkins 2000; ÓTuathail 1999; Mitchell 2007; Hancock and Iyer 2007). Prospects of aid and community draw the displaced into spaces of vulnerability where leaving is tantamount to suicide. Alternately, waiting renders them susceptible to attacks, natural disasters, the limits and variability of long-term aid, and the suffering of slow
death by starvation or disease (Mooney 2005). These spaces produce the embodied conditions of the exceptional lives of *hominès sacri* in which displacement takes on meaning beyond metaphysical suspensions of protective law. These internal spaces of impunity are only sustainable long-term through the preservation of the exceptional spaces of immunity through the international recognition of the bios of states engaged in the displacement of their citizenry. This situation, as Mahmood Mamdani (2007, 2009) explains, creates a right to punish not a responsibility to protect.

Since independence, successive regimes in Khartoum have continued the Southern Policy of the British that centralized development and power on Khartoum, which is dominated by three riverine Arab groups called the Shaygiyya, Dangala, and Ja’aliyyin. Climatic misfortune, ill-conceived and mismanaged development projects, corruption and forced SAPs worsened Sudan’s plight by furthering its indebtedness to the WB, IMF and Arab lending institutions (Johnson 2004). Financial stresses and foreign pressure pushed the Sudanese economy to focus on export agriculture. In Darfur this has favored herders because livestock is more profitable than millet, sorghum, and gum Arabic – the most abundant agricultural products of Darfur (Bryceson and Jamal 1997). Funding of the 2nd Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) grew immensely under the NIF who continued the policy by previous regimes of subsidizing cost through misappropriation of foreign aid (Keen 1994). Darfur’s transformation into a space of impunity, which predates but was exacerbated by the NCP, is primarily the result of a history of internal colonialism periodically driven by issues of political and economic consolidation of weak autocratic regimes in a state riddled by environmental and demographic challenges, no
unifying national identity, massive foreign debt, and a complex history of militarism
(Johnson 2004; Prunier 2005; De Waal 2005a and 2007a; Flint and De Waal 2005; Daly
2007; Collins 2008).

Through successive states of emergency and counterinsurgency since 1989,
Khartoum has established contingent practices for the recent displacement events of
many non-Arabs in Darfur. In particular, the abbala Rizeigat who have been politically
neglected and deprived of land rights, other Darfurians with historical grievances, and
foreign profiteers have exacted horrendous crimes on those branded as “rebel-
supporters”. These violent boundarying practices follow an imaginary logic of difference
so extreme as to arouse the obliteration of that difference through mass violence. Having
been othered, perpetrators of violence with impunity refer to their victims as “foreigners”
when they are not, “zurqa” (blacks) though they share the same degree of melanization,
and “abeed” (slaves) in reference the history of Arab slave raiding in Southern Sudan.
Since the violence did not begin as “tribal hatreds” but as a civic rebellion against
political and economic marginalization and prolonged state-supported violence by
external actors seeking to polarize the region for their own political and economic gain,
reference to ethnic slurs and racial epithets is evidence to the claim that, though identity
is intimately tied to group violence, identity differences are not causes of violence but are
recruited to justify and perpetuate political and economic competition and the
amelioration of grievances (Barth 1969; Turton 1997; Kriesberg 1999; Woehrle and Coy
2000). All of these practices are political boundaryings. Distinction makes social
difference. Grievance makes an antagonistic relation. Discursive and non-discursive practices mark out these boundaryings as conflict.

This interactionist definition follows Kriesberg’s (1999) account of social conflict that takes serious the intragroup dynamics of identity formation and transformation as well as intergroup dynamics over the course of a conflict. In essence, being “Arab” does not necessitate conflict with non-Arabs. But in the formation of social conflict such group identity factors can become defining markers to rally support for grievances experienced by members of a recognizable group. This group identity could preexist or could form as the result of the recognition of shared grievances by individuals and then unifying behaviors ensue. Identification within a group is necessary for the realization of group goals (Woehrle and Coy 2000). This may include discursive strategies in the form of a common name, slogans, and symbols or practices of group affiliation and solidarity. Copying larger group identity markers for smaller group goals can also be a helpful strategy, which gives a conflict greater meaning than the context in which it originated.

As negative social boundaryings between groups become increasingly aggressive, the positive social boundaryings within groups increases. Aggressive intra- and intergroup relations reify identity boundaries, can take on hateful propagandist elements, and exhibit violent behavioral manifestations. Border studies literature discussed above deals exclusively with these types of social boundaryings. While conflict escalation forms through progressive negative boundaryings, positive peace must therefore come from dismantling these divisions. Amelioration of grievances is one solution, if possible, but also the deconstruction of identity differences is a powerful tool for peace. Conversely,
the destruction of identity formation in an opposing group is a devastating strategy of war. This is the essence of genocide (Shaw 2003). These negative boundarying processes are part of the divided history of Sudan (Deng 1992, 1995; Lesch 1998; Jok 2001; Johnson 2004; Boswick 2004; Prunier 2005; de Waal 2005a, 2005b; Flint and de Waal 2005; Daly 2009).

Selective engagement in the international field places Sudan in an ambiguous, contradictory space of cooperation and antagonism. Through its limited cooperation with international community in intelligence and humanitarian aid, participation in negotiations that it has shown no intention of implementing, and obfuscation on its involvement with the Janjawid and its responsibilities to disarm them, Khartoum has used the logic of the exception to its advantage. Khartoum’s ambiguous status places it within a position of requiring foreign assistance while accepting it provides the NCP with protection from punishment. Also however, by reaffirming its human rights foundation, the UN is obliged to give aid to Sudan. By giving aid the international community is doing something to prevent suffering and human rights abuses but not enough to stop the reproduction of violent spaces of impunity. This reduces the perceived need for an intervention into the body of state of Sudan while it inversely confers the exceptional position of the NCP as Sudan’s legitimate national sovereign whose interventions upon the bodies of Sudanese has been decried by the UN itself as criminal and the US as genocidal. In the calculation of the inequality of lives in the international field State lives trump citizen lives.
It is largely due to [aid agencies’] efforts that mortality rates for over 2 million displaced persons have been so significantly reduced ... But aid and humanitarian agencies can only do so much. To a large extent the Government of Sudan is content to let them do their work. Khartoum has largely succeeded in the aim of forcing Darfurians into camps where they can be controlled and monitored, and kept alive by the international community (Grono 2006: 43).

By relieving the NIF of its responsibilities to protect and assist its citizens, international assistance has in fact assisted in sustaining the exceptional spaces that make vulnerable lives. This occurred in south Sudan with Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) (Minear 1991; Deng 1992; Keen 1994; Macrae et al. 1997; Mayotte 2002; Ojaba, Leonardo, and Leonardo 2002; Rigalo and Morrison 2007) and it is happening today in Darfur (Keen and Lee 2007). The NCP has literally gotten away with genocide by forced displacement (Patrick 2005) by invoking its rights as a political body in the international community. This occurs only because other states and international organizations such the UN recognize Sudan’s political life (bios). From this position Khartoum is protected to a certain degree by law and by the collective will of states to uphold the political lives of state bodies. It is under these circumstances that the UN or other international organizations could accept into the international field the bare lives of IDPs in states where the displaced are literally being eliminated, at least temporarily, to reestablish their political lives. This comes from the reclaiming of the camp, as Ong suggested (2006). I conceive of both peace and conflict as products of struggle. Neither are inevitable nor are they a natural state of social relations. Both conditions must be planned, diffused, practiced, and fostered. According to Pratt (2004) and Ong (1999, 2005) considerations of viable resistance to the violence of the sovereign ban requires strategies of
disarticulation from violent state relations and rearticulation along communal lines to create an independent unifying group identity, a strategy on shared goals, mobilization of resources and labor to realize these goals, and sustainable, adaptable political and economic organization of the group. All of these suggestions are boundarying practices as are the dis/rearticulations of states under neoliberal pressures.

In the more affluent Global North the nation-state will continue for the foreseeable future, but in the South the future is not so certain. I am not suggesting a coming anarchy for failed states but hold out hope for a new, eclectic state of affairs where local governance in Stateless areas may be at least conditionally embraced. Stateless areas exist at varying scales around the world and will continue to exist. In fact, one would fall into the territorial trap if one suggested that there were no stateless areas. There are more stateless areas than state areas because sovereign moments of sovereign power extend only so far spatio-temporally. But, cognitively the state permeates social space, especially those of developed states.

Many non-governmental organizations are better suited to meet the needs of the population more so than the State, especially in Darfur (Abdul-Jalil, Mohammed, and Yousuf, 2007). Local, demand-side, livelihoods-oriented development taps these self-governing organizations to promote sustainable self-reliance. This form of assistance has had an ignominious history when small-scale projects are tied to open markets. Where viable, livelihoods assistance should focus first on sustainable subsistence or else on exports in which communities have the means to realistically compete in an open market long-term and without social or environmental injustices. This must be fostered as a
central focus of international aid through the support of burgeoning indigenous NGOs (Stoddard 2006).

The works cited in humanitarian efforts in Darfur and elsewhere suggest that the time has come to establish a legitimate legal platform for IDP protection (Cohen, 2009). Affirming the UN’s commitment to enforcing states R2P by weakening State sovereignty was one step, but through the case of Darfur it is obvious that these measures are mostly rhetorical (Grono 2006; De Waal 2007b). Stuart Elden (2006) notes how the UN’s undermining of traditional territorial sovereignty of state in complex humanitarian emergencies has both positive and negative outcomes and therefore should be engaged with caution. Caution for whom? IDPs? The world’s poor? Obviously, the answer is caution for states within the international system and the transformation of the developing world through neoliberal expansion of developing countries corporations and the politics that comes with it. Those that suffer are those who are disarticulated/displaced by their governments. In a world with ambiguous territoriality, permeable borders, and distributed sovereign, “who is the sovereign who decides” (484) the exception? This was Agamben’s original question. Those are dangerous waters for states, but for those seeking new frontiers and finding none, within ambiguity there is the possibility to decide. In the right to decide there is potentiality. In the next and final chapter I complete the deconstructive genealogy by describing the transnationally placed person through whatever being of whatever place. I provide an example to illustrate my point.
CHAPTER VIII

TRANSNATIONALLY PLACED PERSONS

The thesis of this dissertation was that the boundary is the basis of geographic thought, in which “geographic thought” represents both the current state of disciplinary philosophical and theoretical thinking in Geography as well as the basis of thought itself. Geographic thought in the latter sense was described through the parsimonious process of boundarying that was grounded in embodied cognitive science research. I chose to extend my discussion of the boundary into political geography because of the plenitude of border studies literature in that subfield. I then provided a political theory that based in the logic of the logic of the boundary. Literally this boundary thinking is produced through the use of a boundary as a basic-level category that equates to “vague entities” and then orders the relations of other entities (classifications) on the boundary as an image schema. The exception is such an entity. Perceptualization and conceptualization were described through boundarying. Language and sovereign power were also described through the process of boundarying. The indeterminacy of sovereign subjects was described as having the same natural state of vagueness and indeterminacy as bona fide and fiat boundaries and objects of discourse. I
reviewed the works of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida to show how deconstruction and genealogy imbricate with my version of embodied realism along a particular line of reasoning. Political boundarying was then explained through a particular set of theorizations referred to as geobiopolitics. This position was used to define sovereignty, the state, territory, citizenship, and sovereign power. This discussion centered mostly on the works of Giorgio Agamben and his understanding of the modern state as formed through the “logic of the exception”. I then utilized this logic to form an interpretation of a political example of an exception, or “boundary entity”. The example was the UN problematization of “internally displaced persons”. The remainder of this final chapter returns to the deconstructive genealogy of the IDP to posit the alternative imaginary “transnationally placed persons”. This is a gedanken in which I extend Agamben’s (1993) whatever being of whatever place through my conceptualization of boundarying.

The IDP is a citizen-subject produced within an imaginary based in the sovereign logics of place. In other words, state territorial logic is based in the metaphysics of place in the form of state sovereignty. However, this is contradictory in Agamben’s view of sovereign power in that the natural status of a citizen is indeterminate suspension. Indeterminate suspension of an entity is understood as the root process in boundarying. Distinction is a process whereby absence becomes presence, nothing becomes something. It is the basis of embodied cognition and it produces the structure for the four entities of thought, a boundary, a relation, and two sides. This is done in one parsimonious process. The structures of these four entities can then be associated with domain content from the various modalities of the mind producing the myriad, content-rich entities of the mind.
Sovereign power is based in boundarying because it lies in the ability to determine the political status of a citizen-entity. Nationalism and other identity content are fashioned as the example or “type” category for a citizen (bios). The relation between the token and type, any actual citizen and the example is a comparative relation made in various sovereign moments. Sovereign moments are events that instantiate the sovereign decision, which in boundarying terms is the root boundarying process of distinction. The decision renders a citizen-entity as placed or displaced, as politically-determined and thus protected or displaced and exposed to violence with impunity.

International neoliberal political economic stresses on less competitive states has led to recent, post-Cold War, sovereign decision-making that has produced mass “disarticulation” (Ong 2005, 2006) of citizens in the process of those states’ institutional transfigurations toward globalizing relations. The result is populations of hominess sacri. These exceptional persons are often environmental displaced as a result of their political displacement by the sovereign ban. Thus, hominess sacri are often exposed to economic hardships and even mass violence with impunity as the case of Darfur reveals. In response to the new form of displaced, in which the IDP replaced the refugee as the worst problematization of the twenty-first century, international governmental systems, as in the UN, have tried to solve the problem by treating symptom not the cause. This will not end any time soon.

In conclusion to the deconstructive genealogy I offer an alternative imaginary to the one producing the problematization “IDP”, i.e., transnationally placed persons. In review of this imaginary, without the dismantling or at least gross transformation of the
current state of the state-system and its totalizing global capitalist economic agenda, it seems implausible that the following imaginary would be possible. However, as stated numerous times throughout this dissertation, my interest lies in the boundary as the basis of geographic thought. The remainder of this dissertation is a thought experiment that aims to complete the extension of my novel conceptualization of the boundary through a political geographical example. Further discussion on any of the topics and issues examined to varying degrees of depth in the chapters above are thus left for future research.

In essence, in light of the failure of the R2P agenda in Darfur, I present a compromise between the dismantling of the territorial state, which is not happening any time soon, and the current state affairs for *hominum sacri* like those in Darfur. In essence, the proposal emulates international zones and stateless areas which to varying degrees already exist. Between inclusion and exclusion is exception. I propose an exceptional space in which sovereignty is deconstructed in a case by case basis by its various elements (Krasner 1999, 2001), referred to by others as *graduated sovereignty* (Lawson 2004), flexible citizenship (Ong 1999, 2005, 2006) or *embedded borderings* (Sassen 2006) among others.

It should be noted that my deconstruction of sovereignty is not meant to suggest that the idea itself necessitates violence with impunity. As discussed above, sovereign moments only provide the opportunity for the decision to abandon life from law and thus expose that bare life to violence. The decision is not an all or nothing act and the violence allowed for in the spaces of impunity is not inevitable, just more likely. As Krasner
(1999, 2001) states, the concept of sovereignty has provided the basis for a growing transnational system of political and economic affairs that can benefit the various nations of the world. However, what are the costs of the transformation of states to accommodate these transnationalisms? If the facilitation of states within the international system is going to continue in the foreseeable future, then actual palliatives to displacement will be necessary. This requires thinking about transnational reconstructions. The following imaginary of the TPP follows this logic.

The logic of my deconstruction of sovereign power is based on place and goes as follows. The notion of sovereignty is a relational concept. The particular type of boundarying that yields the binary sovereign/subject is hierarchical and requires a ground upon which to justify the relation. In the modern state that justification comes from territory. References to place and being placed are ubiquitous because they are necessary in the justification of sovereign practice. The result of the use of place metaphors in the logic of sovereignty produces the territorial trap. The territorial trap is a false assumption of the place-based nature of sovereign power which comes from the discourses of sovereignty. While sovereignty is about placement, sovereign power is displacement because it relies on the root process of boundarying, distinction. *Homo sacer* lies between a fully realized legal entity protected by law and having full legal status and an absent non-political entity from nature. According to a boundarying-oriented reading of Agamben’s work, the natural status of modern citizenship is one based on being perpetually displaced in this process of incomplete boundarying. Those living in states transforming as Ong and Sassen have described experience the abstraction of the camp to
some degree as a reality. IDPs living in unprotected camps are such *hомines sacri*. The justification for these practices goes as such: ‘I as sovereign might have to kill you to protect you’ and ‘I as subject might have to give up my (bios) life for my own protection’. Having given up bios, zoē is then subject to violence with impunity. This is quite a biopolitical contradiction. Without place in the sovereign-place-subject triad, there is no sovereign power because there is no displacement. That placement/displacement process is a boundarying process that only exists through the contradictory relation between the law and the sovereign.

Displacement devastates the embodied conditions of individuals on the most basic level. The ability to make place is reduced, if not lost, when livelihoods are disrupted (Young et al. 2005). In other words, the loss of basic life necessities precludes the possibility of cultural life. The UN attempts to remedy this situation discursively through the promotion of human rights and practically through the “protection and assistance” of the displaced. However, this humanitarian practice re-enacts biopolitical governance of individuals as merely bare life (zoē) or “wards” of an international paternity (Hyndman 2000; Stoddard 2006; Mamdani 2009). This is revealed in the conditions of embodiment in IDP camps. Problematizations of vulnerable persons in the UN system are thus established, under good intentions, as zoē. This leads to an important theoretical interpretation of the refugee/IDP distinction vis-à-vis internal and external sovereignty, that is to say, how refugees and IDPs are conversely constituted by the UN and the state within those respective sovereign spheres. According to Agamben’s notion of *homo sacer* and the refugee, the sovereign sphere of the state displaces citizen-subjects through the
ban. They are thus exposed as *homo sacer* within a space of impunity in which violence can be enacted without repercussions. If they cross an international border they are then considered, by having removed themselves from the territory in which they are supposedly bound, international bodies. No matter where they go in a world divided by territorial states they are always displaced unless they are fully integrated as citizen-subjects within another polity. The legal apparatuses that support refugees and ostensibly protect them stand in contradiction to the very principle the UN is based, the sovereignty principle. Whether or not a body is in its proper place or not, it is always in a state territory unless it is within a designated international territory. This particular relation between states and citizens feeds the very biopolitical assumptions that lead to the sovereign moments of the ban, and possibly, violence enacted with impunity. When refugees are within the purview of international governance, the UN has exclusive territorial rights to those within their purview as given legal by the international apparatuses pertaining to refugees. Can a host state legally refuse to allow UN assistance and protection to refugees? No. However, the assumption that refugees are beholden to the UN and not their new sovereign (host state) violates the sovereignty principle. This is the same principle that disallows a legal entrance into a state for the protection and assistance of IDPs. Why the double-standard? This follows the protection of the state system, the sovereignty principle, and the international displacement of refugees to alleviate the host state of biopolitical responsibilities of protection and assistance.

Among many others, two points can be made from this. The first is that the UN’s logic that it has no legal right to intervene in IDP cases is contradictory to its legal right
to intervene on behalf of refugees. The second is that the UN’s protection and assistance programs perpetuate the status of zoē of the displaced. Refugees, if they cross over an international border, are legally able to request refugee status. Until then, they are illegal migrants. They are not acceptable citizens in states to which they flee and even after refugee status is granted they are not fully citizens in any state. IDPs, on the other hand are externally labeled as such having been displaced politically and/or environmentally by their home state. They are provided services at the discretion of the state that has displaced them. They are not legally entitled to either protection or assistance. Within the sovereign sphere of the UN (international sphere), the zoēfication of the displaced in the form of refugees, their camps, and their ambiguous status effectively reproduces an IDP within the international sphere. From the perspective of the international sovereign sphere, the IDP is a refugee in the foreign territory of the home state. Host states are subject to refugee protection laws, home states are not subject to any legal violation of their sovereignty on behalf of displaced persons. This makes IDPs in home states refugees to the UN.

I propose for reflection a new, boundary space to replace those spaces of impunity within home states (IDP camps) and spaces of immunity outside of them (refugee camps). I propose that the exceptional spaces in which refugees and IDPs already exist be used for their own protection while relieving their home states of any R2P duties or sanctions. I propose an exceptional space that exists as whatever place with whatever beings until such time that sustainable solutions are found. This type of place, which leaves as perpetually open the political conditions of embodiment of its inhabitants. To
describe this type of place I use the example of the film by Steven Spielberg (2004) called *The Terminal*.

*The Terminal* is a movie about an exceptional man named Viktor Navorski (played by Tom Hanks) from the fictitious country of Krakozhia. Viktor becomes trapped in JFK international airport. His home state’s government was overthrown in a coup which the US did not recognize its legitimacy as a sovereign government. Thus, his passport was invalid so he could not enter the US by leaving JFK airport into New York City. He was however able to remain in the airport terminal because it was not officially US territory. He was also able to claim asylum which he would be granted since his country was at war. He refused to claim a fear of returning home and was thus not granted asylum. He could not leave the terminal nor could he get on an airplane to return home since he had no valid passport. He was thus trapped in an international boundaryscape from which he was unable to leave without either displacing himself from his sovereign by requesting asylum or by violating immigration laws by entering the US illegally thereby exposing himself as *homo sacer* to another sovereign. Within the terminal Viktor was both protected yet vulnerable. It is interesting that Viktor was portrayed as a naïve, yet loveable and kind man, innocent of the world around him. This resembles Agamben’s whatever being in whatever place. Whatever being is a potentiality. It is the essence of boundarying. It is that ability to create something, not from nothing but, from whatever. Whatever being is literally *being the boundary.* Whatever place is the boundary, the threshold to something. Viktor Navorsky is an exceptional, stateless, naïve whatever being, but he also learns to live in the terminal. He
learns a new language from travel books and conversational dictionaries. He makes a home in an abandoned section of the terminal, as in the uninhabited regions of a state’s territory. He finds employment while merely passing his time creating “construction art”, which was a sparkling fountain pool of broken mirrors, colored glass and spackling, from what was broken water fountain. This is seen in IDP and refugee camps as temporary livelihoods. And, as only Hollywood could deliver, he found love. The appropriate mate for such a boundary being is, of course, another boundary being in the form of an airline stewardess, Amelia Warren, played by Catherine Zeta Jones. Amelia is troubled by a life without any commitments. She lives in two cities, dates a married man for years thinking he will leave his wife, which he does not, and is continually torn by the life decisions she cannot make. Her lack of commitment mirrors Viktor’s displacement in the terminal. While Viktor seems quite comfortable as whatever being in whatever place, his love hurries through this boundariescape always seeking happiness on one side or the other.

What would whatever being in whatever place be like for IDPs and refugees? The answer to the question is decided in Agamben’s original question: “who is the sovereign who decides” (1995: 484) the exception? Those who decide should be those within the ban. In other words, spaces of impunity should be used as legal platforms to produce whatever place, whatever beings within it, and whatever politics that comes from it. If the possibility for oppression in the nation-state began when people relinquished their right to self-determination, then true democracies begin when homines sacri reclaim the right to decide and make their own determinations, at times this is a violent process. To avoid violent resistance, the international community could be open to new, perhaps radical,
solutions. The response to this proposal cannot be that states collectively protect individual lives since this already does not apply to states that produce vulnerability. The response cannot be that there is only so much we can do since the legal apparatuses for refugees also violates the sovereignty principle. The difference is that host states are generally willing to let UN agencies concentrate refugees into camps to keep them from increasing the population pressures of their own state. So long as the power of the decision rests elsewhere democracy will be unattainable for the displaced. Instead of exchanging one imposed sovereign for another (national for international) the UN should support the emergence of democracies wherever and in whatever manner they may appear.

This whatever place without (external) authority could work, to some extent, as life did for all time prior to the state system, if it is based on a legally protected transnational citizenship established in places modeled after the terminal. The problem is not that forcibly displaced people are unable to self-govern. The problem is their ability to do so under external pressure, manipulation, and without sustainable livelihoods. The problem always is the international will to do something constructive about the problem if it might include establishing a precedent for the deconstruction of territorial sovereignty. So in the short-term this is a pipedream, but it demonstrates the alternative imaginaries that could if only there was a will for this way.

The ultimate question for those negotiating peace is what must be saved and what is expendable. Will the international community continue to guarantee the continuation of inequalities of life by protecting states that produce lives at risk? Is it not the duty of
these bodies – mandated to protect victims from human rights abuses – to reduce vulnerability? Is there the collective will to save lives at the expense of state sovereignty?

Nonetheless, concepts of sovereignty as responsibility and the responsibility to protect remain far ahead of international willingness and capacity to enforce them. The failure of states to protect their citizens has too often met with a weak international response. It is therefore critical that the United Nations, concerned governments, regional bodies and civil society assist states in developing their own capacities to prevent mass atrocities while also pressing for the development of the tools needed to enable the international community to take assertive action when persuasive measures fail and masses of people remain under the threat of violence and humanitarian tragedy. (Cohen 2009: 1)

[T]he key message remains that there is much more that the international community can do to stop the atrocities occurring on a daily basis in Darfur. But … years into the conflict we are beginning to see a decrease in moral outrage over Darfur and international community fatigue. The fear is that we will soon settle for Darfur as a low intensity conflict, handing over responsibility to the humanitarian agencies – as we have in so many other places in Africa – only to look back in a decade or so and vow “never again”, when it was within our means to ensure that it never happened on this scale in the first place (Grono 2006: 48).

Only time will tell changes in the legal protections of state sovereignty will lead to lives saved. In the meantime, humanitarian aid organizations, journalists, activists, and academics continue to do what they can while IDPs wait in their spaces of impunity. This reflective proposal was not meant to be the answer to IDP problems. It is a contribution to geographic thought on the topic of the boundary and specifically the foundational nature of “boundarying” in geographic thought that includes not only concepts and perspectives in human geography but also, and most importantly, the geographic nature of thought itself. In light of this, the goal of this dissertation was to contribute to the social sciences in general and more specifically to realize in a more fundamental way
what Mignolo and Tlostanova (2006) envisioned for geography: “‘Borders’ will be in the twenty-first century what ‘frontiers’ were in the nineteenth.” (205).
APPENDIX
Figure 1. Map of Darfur, Sudan.
Figure 2. Generalization of livelihoods around Jebel Marra (de Waal, 2005b).
Figure 3. Darfur biomes and ethnic geography (Ibrahim, 2006).
Figure 4. Extent of Islam under the Fur Sultanate (de Waal, 2005).


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