ABSTRACT

OZGULER, MUSTAFA, Ph.D., December, 2008

COMPARING AND ASSESSING THE PREPAREDNESS OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS IN COUNTER-TERRORISM, (NETHERLANDS AND UNITED KINGDOM) (309 pp.)

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Security and counter-terrorism have become important issues for national governments. To protect national security, governments have made substantial investments, legal frameworks have been enlarged, and police organizations and the military have been strengthened.

Although terrorist organizations and their tactics have been studied to a great extent, the quality of police organizations’ readiness to cope with terrorism has not been widely researched or compared. The covert nature of counter-terrorism policies and procedures has curtailed the quality of law enforcement agencies’ readiness for terrorism.

This study sought to learn how and to what degree police organizations improve their internal organizational systems of response to counter-terrorism, and how police organizations develop new policies and procedures to meet rising demands imposed by terrorism. A comparative study of the culture of the Dutch and the UK police agencies’ organizational responses to terrorism was conducted. Focused police organizations’ learning, change and policy initiatives in counter-terrorism were explored through interviewing with experts and gathering documentary evidence from both police...
organizations. The narrative interview data and documentary evidence were analyzed through a qualitative embedded comparative (multiple) case study approach.

The research discovered universal processes that are characteristic of Organizational Culture, such as organizational learning and organizational memory, and particularized adaptations to terrorism made by police agencies.

The research found that terrorist acts cause sudden organizational change. Although responses may not result in precisely similar changes, police organizations adapt to the socio-economic and political conditions of their societies. The Netherlands adapted through a unique approach of national coordination. The UK adapted differently by working toward achieving an institutional memory accompanied by grand effort in organizational learning, which required wide scale structural and operational change. Both the Netherlands and the UK adjusted well and in a manner consistent with this study’s theoretical logic model. Both police organizations responded as a learning culture, which led to increased knowledge about terrorism, internal processes and structural transformation within police bureaucracy, and policy initiatives intended to investigate, prevent, intervene on, and suppress terrorists and terrorism.

The study produced the Preparedness Model of Counter-terrorism (PMCT) which is a management style. Preparedness was defined as a state of development in organizational management whose outcome concentrates organizational resources on the readiness for and the ability to act against terrorism. The Preparedness Model proposes
that police organizations adequately address and respond to terrorism only if particular criteria are satisfied.
COMPARING AND ASSESSING THE PREPAREDNESS OF POLICE ORGANIZATIONS IN COUNTER-TERRORISM (NETHERLANDS AND UNITED KINGDOM)

A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>The Association of Chief Police Officers (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIVD</td>
<td>General Intelligence and Security Service (Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam PD</td>
<td>Amsterdam -Amstelland Regional Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNR</td>
<td>KLPD - National Crime Squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNRI</td>
<td>KLPD - National Criminal Intelligence Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSI</td>
<td>KLPD - Department of Special Interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Police</td>
<td>All regional police departments and the KLPD in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Constabulary (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>The Independent Police Complaints Commission (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Provisional Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRG</td>
<td>July Review Group within the MPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLPD</td>
<td>Netherlands National Police Services Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESLP</td>
<td>London Emergency Services Liaison Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI5</td>
<td>UK Security Service</td>
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</table>
MIVD          Netherlands Military Intelligence Service
MPS           London Metropolitan Police Service
NaCTSO        National Counter Terrorism Security Office (UK)
NATO          North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTb          National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (Netherlands)
NIC           National Information Center
RIC           Regional Information Center
SOCA          Serious Organized Crime Agency (UK)
SWAT          Special Weapons and Tactics
UN            United Nations
US            United States of America
UCTA          KLPD - Unit for Counter-terrorism and Activism
UK            United Kingdom
UK Police     All police constabularies and MPS in the UK
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It is my hope that this study contributes to a more democratic policing and a peaceful world.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

A. INTRODUCTION

Security and counter-terrorism have long been important issues for many countries around the world. Especially in the post-9/11 era, organizing security bureaucracies has become a high priority on the agenda of national governments. To protect national security, governments made substantial investments in personnel, equipment and other resources. National legal frameworks were enlarged to cope with international terrorism, new training programs were developed for police organizations and the military, and books and guidance materials were published for law enforcement use.

Although there are significant works on “learning terrorist organizations” (Jackson et al., 2005b) and terrorist strategies (Borum, 2005; de Mesquita, 2005; Esposito, 2002; Jackson et al., 2005a), relatively few publications center on organizational learning in counter-terrorism activities of police organizations.¹

The quality of police organizations’ readiness to cope with terrorism has not been widely researched. The covert nature of counter-terrorism policies and procedures has curtailed the quality of law enforcement agencies’ readiness for terrorism. Although

¹ In this study a police organization is any department, agency or entity organized at the local, state or national-level that deals with terrorism. This agency may function at the operational or political level
there are a few studies that compare and contrast countries’ responses to terrorism (Aktan & Koknar, 2002; Alexander, 2002; Lesser, 1999a), there is not much comparative research on police organizations’ responses to terrorism and counter-terrorism policies and procedures.

This study investigated the qualities of police management systems, which by virtue of their high-level of preparedness for terrorism exemplify well-structured and well-functioning police organizations. Preparedness refers to police organizations’ activity focused on learning about social radicalization and ideology of terrorism, organizational changes necessary to meet the demands of intelligence gathering and analyzing terrorist acts, and effective domestic and international responses to counter-terrorism. This study further defines preparedness as a state of development in organizational management whose outcome concentrates organizational resources on the readiness for and the ability to act against terrorism. This study conceptualizes this management style as the Preparedness Model of Counter-terrorism (PMCT).

In order to develop criteria that define the PMCT, the research methodology investigated police organizations under the stress of potential terrorism. The study explored a set of objectives. Those objectives are enumerated below in the form of questions. In order for a police organization to be prepared for counter-terrorism, to what extent and by what methods do police organizations:

- Learn from their past successes and their mistakes?
Learn from other police organizations through inspiration derived from their innovative practices?

Learn from research and theory?

Change their standard operating procedures (SOPs) based on their learning? and ultimately,

Contribute to and become part of the wide-spread policies and initiatives?

Police organizations’ global competitiveness no longer exists as a luxury with today’s global threat of terrorism. However, preparedness among international police organizations can be difficult to assess. Some countries’ police organizations may be more prepared than others to cope with the horrific consequences of terrorism. Given that police organizations have grown in composition and complexity, even the highest level of state officials may not know the quality of police organizations’ responsive abilities toward counter-terrorism. Compounding the difficulty of exploring police organizations counter-terrorism preparedness, there are fundamental structural and cultural differences among police organizations in the international community, thus a common measure of preparedness may be difficult.

This study was designed to compare police organizations in democratic states. Two countries were selected as targets of study. The study countries are the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries were chosen as study targets for reasons specified in Chapter III, Research Design and Methodology. This study does not test a
theory of organizational preparedness toward counter-terrorism. Rather, this study seeks to learn how and to what degree police organizations improve their internal organizational systems of response to counter-terrorism, and how police organizations develop new policies and procedures to meet rising demands imposed by terrorism.

With an understanding of the limitations of a comparative, international study of police organizations, this study can offer valuable indicators denoting the quality of police organizations’ responses. Although particular measures are difficult to ascertain across international boundaries, from the Netherlands to the United Kingdom, organizational categories are discernible and serve as the general framework of assessing counter-terrorism preparedness.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

A preliminary assumption of this study is that terrorist incidents are “unexpected” events to which police organizations must necessarily respond if they intend to meet their mission of community protection. The juncture of terrorist acts and police organizations focuses on an unmistakable irony: when a terrorist organization succeeds, police organizations fail. Terrorist success and police failure pose serious challenges to the internal structure and operation of police organizations.

A terrorist incident, from the perspective of police organizations, dramatically illustrates organizational flaws in policy, procedure, and training. Counter-terrorism operates well only if police organizations effectively intercept, disrupt and prevent
terrorist action. A police organization must be able to predict the timing and location of terrorist incidents well before they occur, and anticipate the counter-terrorist activities.

However, in the absence of terrorism, police organizations do not ordinarily plan for terrorist action. Effective prevention and effective operational response come only when police organizations keep up with the speed of shifts in terrorist organizations’ tactics. Even when police organizations have higher numbers of personnel, cutting edge weapons, cars, buildings, and surveillance or other operational capabilities, and achieve short-term tactical and operational success, preparedness may not be achieved toward terrorism.

A second assumption of this study addresses the organizational adequacy of police organizations. Such organizations must work diligently to anticipate terrorist action well before it occurs. Anticipating terrorism requires police organizations to develop and implement tactical and strategic planning outside of the immediate context of terrorism and all other crimes appropriately and effectively. Such future-oriented planning requires police organizations to develop organizational values that reinforce proactive policing in addition to a reactive policing.

The third assumption requires police organizations to become diligent actors in their own internal organizational change. Organizations change policies and procedures only when employees believe changes are necessary and required for their own and their communities’ safety. In a real sense, preparedness for terrorism demands not only material changes in policies, equipment, and security procedures, but also demands a
change in an organization’s worldview. Simply stated, if police organizations were mainly reactive, they must also learn to be continually proactive and develop organizational values and beliefs to strengthen a proactive mission. Proactive organization planning requires updated policies, procedures, and training.

C. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

In order to achieve its goals and objectives, this study entails the following organization:

Chapter 2 reviews the different literature related to the goal and objectives of the study. The first main section of the chapter covers the topics of "Understanding and Responding to Terrorism." The section explores different definitions, dimensions and explanations of terrorism, along with a discussion of alternative ways of response to terrorism. The subsection of "Operational Response to Terrorism" covers an analysis of how the new terrorism found itself in a target-rich environment in today’s world and how different countries responded to terrorist threats in their own settings. The other subsection of "Strategic Responses to Terrorism" presents different approaches toward finding long-term solutions to terrorism.

The section of "Organizational Reforms for Responding to Terrorism in Democracies" surveys the literature from democratic policing and some examples of organizational reforms in the field of homeland security. The section of "Organizational Learning: Making Police Organizations Learning Organizations for Countering Terrorism" covers some theories, such as organizational learning and learning
organizations, and concentrates how organizations can retain their experiences, convert them into knowledge and make good use of them for their future practices. The chapter also contains current practices and procedures on organizing security bureaucracies and counter-terrorism, as well as the ideal and the gap between them.

Chapter 3 describes the research design of the study. The chapter establishes the purpose, research questions, research strategy, the criteria for the case selection and the units of analyses. The methods section of the study explains how the problem was defined, the data were collected, and the interview protocol was constructed, as well as the validity and reliability issues. The analyses section reveals how the data were analyzed, and the themes that emerged and the limitations of the study.

Chapters 4 and 5 explore the cases of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom respectively. The chapters explain how police organizations in those countries implement their learning, change and policy initiatives in their counter-terrorism effort.

Chapter 6 compares the two cases. The chapter first presents the findings of the cases and compares them. And second explains how socio-political conditions in the Netherlands and UK affected the outcome of adaptation to terrorism.

Chapter 7 assesses the two cases, presents the Preparedness Model of Counter-terrorism, the lessons learned out of this study and the conclusions. The chapter also reflects the general limitations of this study and implications for future research.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarizes research literature on theories of and responses to terrorism, discusses necessary reforms in security bureaucracies to cope with terrorist activities, and assesses the political delicacy of state security v. civil liberties within democratic states.

B. UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO TERRORISM

1. Defining Terrorism

Terrorism has been a serious concern for the international community since 1937 (G. A. United Nations, 2006). However, the United Nations (UN) hasn’t been able to provide an agreed upon definition of terrorism until 2004. A UN panel in November 2004 agreed on an academic perspective, which described terrorism as any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act” (UN Office of Drugs and Crime, 2005). Since its establishment, the UN has issued 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols for counter-terrorism purposes. But many states have not been party to these international instruments or do not implement them, evidently for political reasons. In all, there are as
many as over one hundred definitions of terrorism (Record, 2003; Schmid, 2004; Schmid & Jongman, 2005).

Although the UN has not been able to offer a legal versus an academic definition, the Council of the European Union adopted a framework decision. According to a framework decision, particular offenses are considered as terrorist acts:

Given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization (The Council of the European Union, 2002, p. 4).

The framework decision describes the offenses as,

(a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death;

(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;

(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;

(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;

(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;

(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;

(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;

(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).

Beside these transnational-level definitions, there are many other legal definitions of terrorism. For example, the Turkish Anti-terror Law number 3713, describes terrorism as ("Turkish Anti-terror Law [Terörle Mücadele Kanunu]," 1991):

Any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the republic as specified in the constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the state, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the state, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.
The law also stipulates that the act must be committed by at least the involvement of two or more individuals. In the French version of the definition of terrorism an individual act can be terrorism. The U.S. Penal Code defines terrorism as “an act by an individual or group that uses intimidation or terror to disrupt public order” (chapters I and II of Title II) with a political motivation (Alexander, 2002). The U.S. Counterterrorism Policy’s guiding principle, on the other hand, is to prosecute all such acts whatever their motivations are (Wilcox, 2002). The Federal Criminal Code of the United States has defined terrorism in the way described below ("United States Code," 2000). It says

The term "international terrorism" means activities that -

(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;

(B) appear to be intended -

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;

or

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and

(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

The Code also provides the definition of terrorism and identifies terrorism’s essential elements. Terrorism must be “predetermined, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” ("United States Code," 2000). The USA Patriot Act ("Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism," 2001), on the other hand defines terrorism as the activities that

(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or of any state, that (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.

The UK Terrorism Act of 2000 defines terrorism similar to the previous description; however, the UK Terrorism Act (2000) adds the serious risk to public health and the disruption of electronic systems:

(1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where-

(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government [or an international governmental organisation][1] or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it-

(a) involves serious violence against a person,

(b) involves serious damage to property,

(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,

(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1) (b) is satisfied.

The UK Terrorism Act of 2006 introduced a number of new offenses. These new offenses are classified as “Acts Preparatory to Terrorism”, “Encouragement to Terrorism”, “Dissemination of Terrorist Publications”, and “Terrorist training offences” (Home Office).
A definitive characterization of terrorism presents difficulty for several reasons (Peck, 2006). First, the term terrorism has political considerations. Second, the term terrorism is a developing concept in the sense that terrorism becomes more amorphous and complex. Edward Peck’s (2006) comments present the difficulty of this task in a dramatic way:

In 1985, when I was the Deputy Director of the Reagan White House Task Force on Terrorism, they asked us — this is a Cabinet Task Force on Terrorism; I was the Deputy Director of the working group — they asked us to come up with a definition of terrorism that could be used throughout the government. We produced about six, and each and every case, they were rejected, because careful reading would indicate that our own country had been involved in some of those activities. . . . After the task force concluded its work, Congress got into it, and you can Google into U.S. Code Title 18, Section 2331, and read the U.S. definition of terrorism. And one of them in here says — one of the terms, “international terrorism”, means “activities that”, I quote, “appear to be intended to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.” . . . Yes, well, certainly, you can think of a number of countries that have been involved in such activities. Ours is one of them. Israel is another. And so, the terrorist, of course, is in the eye of the beholder.

Although it is extremely difficult to achieve a definition of terrorism, a definition of terrorism blurs more in consideration of international politics. A significant part of the
terrorism literature attempts to define terrorism or point out the need for a proper definition of it. For example, Cronin defines terrorism as “the threat or use of seemingly random violence against innocents by non-state actors” (2003, p. 33). Although there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, this study accepted Schmid’s comprehensive definition:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby — in contrast to assassination — the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (Schmid & Jongman, 2005, p. 28)

Although its definitions may vary, and not all terrorist incidents carry all of them, there are certain characteristics of terrorism that are common: violence, psychological impact and fear, perpetration for a political goal, deliberate targeting of non-combatants and unlawfulness or illegitimacy (Schmid, 2004). Alexander (2002) addresses the components of terrorism as the nature of the act, perpetrators, objectives, intended
outcomes and motivations, targets and methods. Alexander also states that terrorism has long been a threat to the world order, particularly becoming a global problem in the twenty-first century (p. 5). Undoubtedly, such a globally troublesome issue requires thorough understanding in order to produce informed and rational responses.

2. Understanding Terrorism

Terrorism has many forms and dimensions, and differs from traditional crime and forms of organized crime. Terrorism is a complex field of study (Hook, 2005; Tololyan, 2001) and has been investigated at multiple disciplinary perspectives. Some of these investigative perspectives are

- Psychological (Hallett, 2004; Marsella, 2004; Moghaddam, 2005a, 2005b; Paniagua, 2005; Pape, 2003; Shumate & Borum, 2006);
- Theoretical (Crenshaw, 2001; Rapoport, 2001; Schmid, 2004);
- Tactical and operational (Bruce Hoffman, 2001; Mariani, 2003; R. W. Perry, 2003; R. W. L. Perry, Michael K., 2003; Pope, 2005; Segell, 2006; Waugh, 2003);
- Behavioral (Borum, 2005; Gray & Wilson, 2006);
- Social (Deflem, 2004);
- Economic (American Foreign Policy Council., 2005);
- Historical (Troyer, 2003);
- Political (Alexander, 2002; Crelinsten, 1998; Esposito, 2007; Flint, 2003; Ogilvie-White, 2006; Sandler, Arce, & Daniel, 2003; Satanovsky, 2006; Schmid & Jongman, 2005; Siqueira & Sandler, 2006; Troyer, 2003; Wardlaw, 1989; Zulaika, 2003);
- Diplomatic (Gray & Wilson, 2006);
- Ethnic and religious (Esposito, 2002); and
- Conflict resolution (Siqueira & Sandler, 2006).

To understand the difficulty police organizations face when coping with terrorism, the sections below summarize key research on the nature and the causes of terrorism.

\textit{a. Political Explanations}

Terrorism has become a sort of fashionable or theatrical option (Hallett, 2004) for terrorists to incite violence against governments, policies, regimes, states, and political systems. Crenshaw argues that “terrorism is meant to produce a change in the government’s political position, not the destruction of military potential” (2001, p. 13). Since terrorists cannot overtly confront states, terrorists seek to instill mass fear among people through their unexpected actions to realize their goals. Although, terrorists “cannot expect to do significant direct damage on coercive powers of the modern state” (Hamilton, 1981, p. 229), those seemingly random acts of violence cause a high-level of
public anxiety which leads to questioning the credibility of governments whether they are capable of protecting citizens and even themselves (Wardlaw, 1989).

Hook (2005) indicates that terrorism is an asymmetric warfare and it has the power of sending symbolic messages at a global-level. Bombing U.S. based companies’ enterprises and embassies in different parts of the world sends a message toward U.S. global imperialism. More recent events, such as the bombings of the British Bank and Jewish Synagogue in Istanbul or the train station in Madrid, Spain were messages to those countries which supported the U.S. led invasion of Iraq.

b. Psychological Explanations

In psychological explanations, there is an attempt to explain the motivations (Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004), the attachment problems and identity associations (Forte, 2006), the psychological processes, and the conditions of individuals’ transformation of becoming terrorists (Forte, 2006; Moghaddam, 2005a). According to these explanations, terrorism can best be understood by recognizing the “psychological interpretations of material conditions and the options seen to be available to overcome perceived injustices particularly those in the procedures through which decisions are made” (Tyler & Huo, 2002).

Understanding the psychological aspects of terrorism, meaning, “understanding of the psychological complexities in which human beings—driven and characterized by diverse motivations, attitudes, and perceptions—come to endorse and prefer certain
behaviors over others” (Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004, p. 3) is seen as one of the indispensable aspects of the overall phenomenon:

All cultures have theories (even if only implicit) of human behavior and of the linkages between behavior and the constructed world in which people live. This constructed world is both shaped and sustained through the socialization process that merges each of us in interlocking institutions that include family, community, school, and the realms of politics, commerce, and religion. Ultimately, it is through change in this institutional matrix that the human psyche itself can be changed and reshaped toward broader and less ethnocentric views of reality—a reality that can accommodate and tolerate diversity, uncertainty, and trust.

Terrorism may be contained but never defeated as long as there are real or perceived threats and injustices that foster widespread hatred and revenge. There may be small and large military successes, but eventually there must be a coming to grips with the strengths and weaknesses of the human psyche and the cultural milieu in which it is fostered. (Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004, pp. 3-4)

Moghaddam and Marsella address that people live within their constructed world and this constructed world is both shaped and sustained within many institutions and social environments, such as family, community, school, politics, religion and the like, in which the socialization process occurs. Moghaddam and Marsella (2004) also address that the human psyche can be changed and reshaped within this institutional matrix.
For a better understanding of terrorist acts Moghaddam (2005b) uses a metaphor of the final step on a five level-narrowing staircase leading to the terrorist act at the top of a building, in which each floor is characterized by a specific psychological process. Believing real problems lie at the bottom, he defends that policies targeted to the people who are already at the top can only bring short-term successes. Those targeted terrorist groups will never be exterminated because some of the individuals among the majority of people, who remain on the ground floor and feel deprived and unfairly treated, will continue climbing up the stairs and ultimately become terrorists. They are socialized into the terrorist organizations by thinking that they have no other effective voice in society and terrorism is the only legitimate and effective tool to be heard. “As individuals climb the staircase, they see fewer and fewer choices, until the only possible outcome is the destruction of others, or oneself, or both” (p. 161).

Moghaddam (Moghaddam, 2005a, 2005b) also explains that this process never happens overnight. It is a psychological process, which includes relative deprivation and the identity-based “good-copy problem”. On the ground floor, people perceive injustice and feel relatively deprived and ultimately some of them will climb to the first floor and seek solutions and achieve greater justice. This climbing process continues as long as the individuals see that there is not much possibility for them to change procedures and decision making processes. After this initial take off, individuals become more prone to radical ideas. Escalation continues gradually as the individuals are influenced by their leaders to displace their aggression onto an enemy on the second floor, and engaging with terrorist organizations on the third floor as they see terrorism as a justified strategy. Once
they start to categorize the world as “us versus them” and to see the terrorist organizations as the legitimate organizations, they become ready to be recruited by terrorist organizations. The fifth floor is where the recruited individuals are selected, trained, equipped and sent on terrorist acts. Moghaddam asserts that the terrorist act is the final step of this five-floor process. The explanation of this five-floor process will be considered as the concept of radicalization for this study.

c. Individual and Societal-level Explanations

Terrorism is also considered at individual and societal levels. At the individual level, terrorists believe that they are fighting for a just cause and if they die they will be heroes. Although dying for a common cause may not be a rational way of thinking for many people, as they operate within groups, they feel compelled that there is no way to back out. Fitting Janis’s description (1972), terrorist groups are cohesive and unity is one of the most important features. They justify their hostility during their journey toward the top floor and they act consistently within the group. Even though the decisions of terrorist acts violate the individuals’ ethical norms, group pressures against nonconformity is greater (Lebow, 1984) and s/he has almost no other choice than to commit violent acts.

At the societal level, some underdeveloped or developing nations, namely the periphery, feel bewildered and deprived because of the exploitations of the developed and the hegemony, the core. They think that, the international system is designed in such a way that colonialism has just taken a different format and exploitation continues at the
contemporary level. Known as the “World Systems Theory,” the periphery becomes set against the western social values, their prosperity and systems (Frank, 1972; Wallerstein, 1974). Paniagua (2005) argues that some terrorists have a different agenda, to eliminate any political system that does not embrace their values or beliefs.

d. International-level Explanations

Moghaddam and Marsella (2004) also point out that although today’s international terrorism is mainly associated with the fundamentalist forms of Islam and some Middle Eastern sourced violence, there are many other conflicts, which they refer to as low-intensity wars, that are continuing in different parts of the world, including Sri Lanka, Aceh Indonesia, Rwanda-Congo and others. They also strive to understand the individual and local-level terrorist acts such as the Unabomber and the Oklahoma City bombings. Furthermore, the United States is seen as a terrorist nation in the eyes of some nations and people, because it uses military and diplomatic pressure in the realm of an “axis of oil”.

Marsella argues that today’s international terrorism occurs because of the competition and conflict among different historical worldviews and religious, cultural, economic and psychological ideologies. However, his approach goes beyond the primordial approach as Huntington (1991) argues. Marsella addresses the political, military, legal pressures and individual and collective terrorist behavior which make the issue of terrorism more complex than almost any other phenomenon.
In addition, “globalization has given a rise to international terrorism” (Satanovsky, 2006, p. 42). The internet and other forms of communication, transportation, and flow of financial assets have provided a tremendous amount of opportunities to terrorist organizations (Pape, 2003). Terrorist organizations abuse the personnel, financial, economic, and technological bases of the countries because of the opportunities provided by globalization (Satanovsky, 2006). Cronin (2003) argues that, the supporters of terrorism continue their support because they feel powerless in the globalized world which left them behind. Furthermore, state sponsored terrorism has opened up another page within the international arena. Some states support terrorism either because they do not have enough hard power to confront their enemies, or even if they do they are bound to a lot of international rules and norms. Some other states, on the other hand, use terror as an instrument of their foreign policies (Wardlaw, 2001) and this makes it difficult to investigate the terrorist cases. Marsella (2004) proposes that as long as global poverty, racism, oppression, conflicts in the Middle East, unstable and rogue nations remain, terrorism will survive.

3. The Nature of Response to Terrorism

Hoffman and Morrison-Taw (2000) argue that the tactics and policies toward terrorism must be part of a comprehensive national strategy within countries and part of global cooperation at the international level. In addition, in counter-terrorism response if the lessons of the earlier conflict are ignored then the same intelligence and operational
mistakes can be repeated. Hoffman and Morrison-Taw identify four crucial elements of successful counter-terrorism campaign:

- An effective overall command and coordination structure;
- Effective anti-terrorist legislation and measures to build public trust;
- Coordination among intelligence services; and
- International cooperation. (p. 19)

Hoffman and Morrison-Taw defend that an effective overall command and coordination structure is needed, because the lack of such a structure causes confusion, duplication, institutional competition, and failure in intelligence. However, this requires joint participation, joint training, intelligence gathering and use of authority of all relevant bodies of the governmental institutions. In addition, effective monitoring of these forces is crucial to make sure that they function efficiently and that democratic values and civil liberties are protected.

Legislation should legitimize the measures to build public confidence and protect the civil liberties to the extent that the civilian population should not be alienated. Legislation intended to impede support to terrorists may become double edged. Those measures may partially succeed in slowing the support for terrorists, but often the civilian population resents such impositions in the long run and ultimately the level of active and passive support increases (Bruce Hoffman & Morrison-Taw, 2000).
Brodeur et. al. (2003) argue that some incidents or indeed any terrorist incident or political unrest should not be considered as an opportunity for tightening the limits of freedoms. If civil liberties are suppressed and coercive measures are increased with the hope of defeating terrorism, then it is believed that the majority of the population will support terrorists (Bruce Hoffman & Morrison-Taw, 2000) and ultimately success becomes as hard as reaching a rainbow.

Especially in transitional democracies these suppressive and coercive measures are conducted by poorly paid, poorly equipped and poorly trained police forces. Since the mission of the police is mainly to support the political regime or a particular government, there are only a few accountability mechanisms in such settings. Criminal detection capabilities of the police are limited, and more importantly, police use most of their energy against the enemies of the regime rather than gathering criminal intelligence. The situation gets worse particularly when the terrorist organizations receive public support based on ethnic differences. When explaining methodological problems and challenges in assessing the effectiveness of various countries’ individual use of countermeasures against terrorism, Hoffman and Morrison-Taw (2000) explore previous studies and find that the places where the most stringent governmental policies are applied, the rate of terrorism is higher, although they think that political situation, culture, socioeconomic factors always need to be controlled. Concurring with Hoffman and Morrison-Taw’s (2000) findings, the Amsterdam-Amstelland Counter-terrorism Policy indicates that
There is not one single correct way of dealing with terrorism. . . . What is useful and required for a well-considered combination of different counter-terrorism? . . . Some measures are effective in a certain context whereas others are not. It is essential to realise specific tailor-made counter-terrorism measures per country or sometimes even per region.

Nonetheless, it is obvious that authoritarian policies are not effective under any circumstances (Bruce Hoffman & Morrison-Taw, 2000; Neild, 2002, 2003). Observations show that repressive actions neither reduce crime and violence nor produce positive results for citizens’ wellbeing. They only nurture further violence. In this regard, Neild’s (2003) observations in Latin America provide very important lessons:

[T]here is little evidence that expanding the powers of an operationally weak police force will help control crime. Rather, the likelihood is that it will increase police misconduct and reinforce public perceptions that nothing has changed, ultimately deepening the loss of confidence in the justice system and eroding the belief that democracy can improve the daily life of ordinary people (2003, p. 277).

Tyler and Huo find that “people’s perceptions of injustice and trust in the context of a personal encounter are linked to two process-based issues: the quality of decision making and how well they are treated by the authorities” (2002, p. 175). For that reason, the police should respond to issues with a high quality of decision making and they should be professional in their interactions with public, especially those who are at the ground floor as it is described in the Moghaddam’s metaphor.
Finding a clear answer to the question of “what security and policing agency or agencies should or should not be permitted to do, and what limits should be placed on how they do it” (Lustgarten, 2003, p. 319) would be the greatest help in defining the limits of counter-terrorism and ultimately democratic policing. Because, as Lustgarten states clearly, “in the modern world the dictatorial state is the greatest threat to individuals’ ability to live a peaceful life devoted to whatever activities they value” (2003, p. 320). Therefore, although it is essential for a peaceful life, the mere provision of maintaining order is not enough. Creating a “true security” in a democratic society goes beyond providing the physical security. It also involves having democratically effective institutions. More clearly, it requires the maintenance of a functioning democratic order, which incorporates the citizens into “making important decisions concerning their well-being to the enjoyment of democratic freedoms” (Lustgarten, 2003, p. 320). Only in this way can a democratic society preserve its values, institutions and processes. Naturally, this practice would impose its own limitations on the measures necessary for its own preservation. If law enforcement activities are not imposed with such limitations and if they violate democratic practices, the result would be that described as “democracy at risk of committing suicide for fear of death” as Tollborg (1995, p. 267) states.

Lustgarten emphasizes that “adherence to democratic praxes goes well beyond compliance with the rule of law, which is only one component of it” (p. 323). For national democratic security governance, he recommends two important tools:
- Effective public decision-making in the choice of the aims and operative framework of the agencies, and
- Creation of oversight machinery that is capable of ensuring that they respect democratic values.

Crelinsten’s (1998) observations indicated that the counter-terrorism mandate was expanded to include a range of phenomena and this led to a blurring of boundaries between internal and external security, police and military models of control, and public and private sectors. Crelinsten argues that as terrorism has been seen as an external enemy, soldiers have been motivated to fight, and ultimately increasingly militaristic policy solutions have been implemented in many countries. “Clearly, policing that relies on the identification of ‘dangerous classes’ is very likely to impinge on the rights of large numbers of people, many of whom are completely innocent” (1998). As a result, the societies found themselves in such a discourse that they had a new enemy to replace that of the Cold War, and they were galvanized to support another war effort. Furthermore, this increased level of threat gave those agencies the chance of justifying new and broader powers. They claimed more budgets, new jurisdictions, new power sharing arrangements and new networks of cooperation. More importantly, they were also implicitly given leeway in doing their jobs.

Crelinsten (1998) includes the role of the media, which may play a negative role in this process. If the media generate sensationalistic reporting, then the public is more likely to support such blurred operational mandates. This may lead to using police or
other security agencies to monitor selected groups of people as if they were potential criminals. Crelinsten thinks that this line must remain clear. Once it begins to blur, he argues, society itself is perceived to be threatened. “Instead of the classic external enemy or subversive agent acting within society to overthrow the state, one finds an internal enemy — elements within society — who threaten the identity, and by inference, the cohesion of that society” (p. 409).

4. Operational (Short-term) Response to Terrorism

No nation is immune from the possibility of terrorist attacks in today’s world. The more the world gets sophisticated, the more social, political and economic aspects of our lives get interconnected and complex. Such connectedness and complexity bring more opportunities to everyone, including the terrorists. Today’s terrorists have more capability than ever because of the unprecedented developments in communication, technology and transportation. They are communicating via the internet, telephone, and all other means of fast communication and they travel around the world with different identities. Today’s weapons are more destructive than ever. Although the fashion of conventional armed struggle is still in place in many parts of the world, the unconventional ones, such as nuclear, chemical, biological or even cyber attacks are not too far from certain agendas of terrorism in the near future.

Furthermore, the most developed countries are more vulnerable as they have more targets, such as nuclear plants, high density population areas, transportation systems, etc. compared to the less developed ones. Suicide attacks pose considerable danger to world
peace and are being used by terrorist organizations because they work as an efficient tactic. It creates fear on the other side (Pape, 2003). And, it is the police organizations’ task to prevent and respond to such and all other types of terrorist incidents.

Like any other criminal act, terrorist incidents are to be responded to quickly and efficiently. Undoubtedly, operational responses are the indispensable measures to reduce harm done by the terrorists. Those responsible figures are to be apprehended, prosecuted and brought to justice. Moreover, early intervention, interception and prevention of those incidents are the main pillars of a successful operational response to terrorism. Police organizations are to be prepared institutionally, technically and tactically. Also, intelligence gathering and all other cooperative initiatives are necessary to intercept, prevent and defeat those threats.

However, since terrorism has a changing nature, the police organizations need to be prepared now more than ever. There are many reasons for that. The numbers of terrorist organizations’ members have increased significantly. The “terrorist organizations Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and PKK/KADEK include thousands (intelligence sources indicate that the armed members of al-Qaeda and PKK/KADEK are more than five thousand) of trained activists and members, most of whom are ready to carry out armed activities” (Yayla, 2005, p. 16). They can easily hide behind their relatives and other innocent people. Terrorists are loosely monitored and loosely communicate with their leaders, because their leaders are known and closely watched by the intelligence communities. Terrorist organizations’ goals have become broader than before. They can
kill large numbers of people and destroy many infrastructures with technologically developed tools of destruction. Their actions are publicized much broader and faster than ever. They can find nuclear, chemical, and biological materials to use as weapons. Terrorists also can use high technology; they can enter into the cyber-world and communicate their actions or break into the governments’ or private computer network systems, and steal money and assets. They can disrupt communication, transportation and electricity systems and ultimately, as a result of harsh military and police interventions they can recruit more and get more support (Yayla, 2005).

Maybe the most dangerous aspect of terrorism is that the tactics they use are changing every day. Traditional, well organized, disciplined and large scale military interventions cannot effectively prevent such a phenomenon. Undoubtedly, only more sophisticated, specialized police units can handle the issue with the help of the rest of the police units, other institutions and citizens.

As a result of the nature of these phenomenon, many issues, such as border and transportation security, emergency management systems, information and infrastructure protection have included new forms and practices (Bolz, Dudonis, & Schulz, 2005). The new law enforcement capabilities and practices have been introduced such as task force initiatives, information sharing systems and cooperation with the private sector. On the national level in the U.S., a security advisory system was developed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (p. 44). New tactics were developed to fight

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2 In this study, “sector” denotes any area of service that meets people’s needs, such as education, water, electricity etc. and divisions of economic life, such as transportation, communication, insurance etc.
against terrorist tactics, which can be classified under four categories; 1) bombing, 2) assassination and assaults, 3) kidnapping and 4) hostage taking/skyjacking/barricade situations (Bolz et al., 2005).

When evaluating the chapters of his edited book and explaining the best practices, Yonah Alexander (2002) draws useful conclusions out of counter-terrorism efforts from North and South America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. He lists and explains the useful law enforcement lessons as well as political and legislative ones. According to his evaluation, Israel was successful because of its long-term strategic objectives:

- A comprehensive strategic concept presenting a multidimensional front for the ongoing battle rather than an ad hoc operation comprising only tactical and fragmented actions;
- A combination of various elements such as offensive and defensive actions, patience, determination, and cunning (and not necessarily firepower); and
- The cooperation of all the “players”- both civilian and military.

UK was successful because of its

- Effective legal policies, such as national legislation . . . [against] Irish violence and later to international terrorism;
- ‘Best practices’ lessons related to implementation of counter-terrorism strategies; and
Within the organizational structure... intelligence was particularly significant.

Argentina was unsuccessful, because

- Lack of preparation among the security forces and their inability to learn from past mistakes.

The Indian Central Government failed to strengthen the Punjab police in 1983 and the operation was unsuccessful because

- The forces neither organized nor trained to effectively counter terrorist attacks.

Turkey experienced duplication of efforts and setbacks for the common cause especially in the 1980’s and early 1990’s because

- Coordination and information sharing among the various intelligence and security services... were far from satisfactory.

Spain had much trouble in its war against ETA because of

- A poor system of information on terrorism toward foreign countries in its transition to democracy.

Columbia experienced “breakdown of law and order... and reliance of paramilitary forces to perform the functions of the government” (p. 392) because of:
Alexander firmly argues that “there are no simplistic or complete solutions to the problem of terrorism” (Alexander, 2002, p. 392). After laying out his global-level evaluations, he groups his proposed policy implications in three categories:

- The response should come from the state institutions as the threat challenges the authority of the state. But this response should be far from overreaction which may weaken the democratic institutions.

- Terrorists may restrain the level of political violence because they may find it politically expedient. But future incidents may be more costly.

- As the modern society and its infrastructure are more vulnerable, states need to develop credible unilateral and concerted responses.

### 5. Strategic (Long-term) Response to Terrorism

Terrorism requires long-term comprehensive responses. Instead of relying completely on operational responses and trying to kill or apprehend all terrorists, detect all terrorist plots, intercept and prevent all terrorist activities, “draining the swamp” of terrorists by investing in international infrastructural, economic development is an option, even though it seems a very long-term investment.

Military efforts contribute to making terrorism more difficult to address (Lesser, 1999b). However, this does not mean that the high-level of efficiency and capability of
responding to terrorism incidents should become secondary. It is imperative for any law enforcement agency to have the capacity to respond to violent incidents, including terrorism. This should be achieved at a multi-agency-level and be a concerted action of relevant societal stakeholders and institutions. The police should place themselves as the facilitators among anti-terrorism stakeholders. If the root causes of terrorism lie within the fabric of society, police should activate and mobilize societal resources in order to eliminate or mitigate the causes and conditions of terrorism. Once the society itself takes meaningful steps toward such an end, then it would be more difficult for the terrorist organizations, to find support for their further activities.

After the 7/7 London bombings, the former foreign secretary Robin Cook admits that terrorism is bred within poverty in which both real and perceived problems exist as the psychological explanation of terrorism:

The breeding grounds of terrorism are to be found in the poverty of back streets, where fundamentalism offers a false, easy sense of pride and identity to young men who feel denied of any hope or any economic opportunity for themselves. A war on world poverty may well do more for the security of the west than a war on terror (Pless, 2005).

Turkey is located on the cross-roads of the World and has long been the target of terrorism. Turkish experience provides useful lessons in countering terrorism. Gökhan Aydıner (2006), the former regional governor of the emergency management region in Southeastern Turkey, and the former director general of the Turkish National Police,
demonstrated that if a deprived society finds support with consistent social support policies, terrorist activities and violent terrorist incidents decrease significantly. Governor Aydiner applied a series of consistent social support policies along with operational responses to terrorism from 1999 to 2002. He developed social support policies, such as providing vocational courses, seed money for first businesses, and further financial and social assistance to the regional people. The effect was a decrease in the overall numbers of terrorist incidents.

Governor Aydiner attests that serious, continuous support enables regional people to be productive that in turn improved safety and social life. Governor Aydiner said, “instead of giving them fish, teaching them how to fish socializes them significantly and makes them part of the country instead of seeking for opportunities and unreal hopes of the terrorists” (2006).

Once a society’s people believe that they have a safe future, there appears to be a reduction in violent attempts to manipulate governmental authorities. Several research studies also indicate that reducing repression and increasing economic opportunity decreases recruitment of terrorist organizations (Faria & Arce M., 2005). For that reason, counter terrorism policies have to be at the macro-level, so that the level of coercion decreases at the individual-level and the probability of climbing to the upper floors can be reduced. As R. James Woolsey states “we will have hard decisions to make if we are to drain the swamps from which terrorists come and where they find sustenance and support rather than merely swatting individual terrorist mosquitoes” (2002, p. vi).
Figure 1. The Numbers of Terrorist Incidents in Turkey between 1984 and 2005

Figure 1 shows the statistical figures of the numbers of terrorist incident in Turkey between 1984 and 2005. The Turkish experience also teaches that the implementation of social support projects have to be sustained in order to continue a reduction in terrorist incidents. When, however, social support projects declined with the abolition of emergency management administration in 2003, the terrorist incident rate increased.

\[\text{Data obtained in the report of the Counterterrorism and Operations Department of the Turkish National Police (June, 2006).}\]
6. Conclusions: Understanding and Responding to Terrorism

Research literature indicates that the overall goal of law enforcement policies and practices focuses on the short- and long-term prevention of violence. The achievement of such an optimistic goal presents challenges but such a goal is not entirely out of reach.

The culture of policing requires immediate and active responses to particular incidents. However, the nature of those responses should always be accompanied by long-term strategies to prevent violence. Otherwise, as the literature indicates, terrorists take advantage of the absence of long-term prevention strategies. Moghaddam argues that short and long-term responses are necessary and can be adopted in tandem. He recommends that long-term solutions should be effectively given higher priority, otherwise, even though the terrorists are likely to be killed through military responses, they will be replaced quickly (Moghaddam, 2005b).

Although it does not offer a single and easy remedy for terrorism, the literature indicates that solutions must be coherent with the clear understanding of the overall phenomenon of terrorism along with appropriate remedies.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS IN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM


Terrorism has long been an important problem for many countries. However, when America was stunned on September 11, 2001 by the terrorist attacks, it became the number one agenda of global affairs. In response to these attacks the U.S. Government
reinforced national security in many ways. The central security bureaucracy was reorganized along with other security strategies: tighter controls were instituted on immigration and airport security and surveillance was increased on potential suspects. The reorganization of federal national bureaucracy combined all or parts of 22 federal agencies and brought a large number of employees under one cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security in 2002. That was the largest governmental reorganization since the beginning of the Cold War. In the rush to create the DHS to protect national security, the protection of national security has not been the only concern, and may even have been compromised.

The rationality of the policymaking involved in reorganizing national security efforts have been limited by time constraints and bureaucratic politics, in addition to the complexities of the security risks. The Bush Administration’s strategy of constructing an enormous centralized bureaucracy was not informed by much of the relevant scholarship on national security or on bureaucracy (Karmarck, 2002). The apprehension and detention of thousands of aliens without any court order was the most salient feature of the post 9/11 era. The invasion of Iraq and the way of its handling bred great discontent against the U.S. across the world.

Turkey has been under the influence of continuous terrorism for decades. An estimated 30,000 to 35,000 Turkish citizens were killed in terrorist attacks from 1984 to 2000. While the government did not negotiate with the terrorists (Aktan & Koknar, 2002), the government applied an emergency management administration in the
southeastern region of the country between the years 1987 to 2002. During those years, both military operations and police response were adopted along with social support projects, although a majority of military and police projects were not well integrated.

In 2003, Turkey was hit by the Al Qaeda terror. Jewish and British targets were bombed with enormous human and material damage. Although the investigations of the cases were completed in a matter of two weeks, the lessons learned were not shared effectively among the Turkish counter-terrorism units.

A similar wave of terror hit the UK with the July 7 and July 21, 2005 attacks on the London public transport system (Segell, 2006). Although its initiatives started before, the central government of UK also realized major reorganizations within its national security bureaucracy. In 2006, the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) was established, which was the biggest shake-up in British policing structure since 1964, when the boundaries of the existing 43 forces in England and Wales were established. As elaborated in Chapter V, the UK Government also enacted tighter legal measures and realized major structural changes to detect and prevent further terrorist attacks.

While organization of national security bureaucracies pose mixed pictures, the way the operational responses are handled pose blurrier ones. Although both military and police repressive actions have never produced positive results in the long run, short-term responses are seen as almost the main character of global counter-terrorism efforts.
Military interventions are often criticized because they do not hold accountable the real culprits of terrorism; however, military interventions may likely induce more terrorism. Crelinsten argues that “the best way to gain support and recruits for the terrorist cause is to become excessively repressive in your cracking down on the terrorists” (Lougheed, 2001). Moghaddam and Marsella (2004) argue that minor and major military achievements have no significant impact on the root causes of terrorism. Military operational successes create “bottomless holes” so deep that even the largest and strongest armies have filled them. Five years after the 9/11 incidents, Esposito (2007) comments on the counter-productive strategy of military aggression against terrorism:

Neither Iraq nor Afghanistan can be pointed to as success stories. Far from it, they are both in very precarious situations in which America is seen as part of the problem not the solution and yet the fear is that without a strong Western presence, things will get worse. The flaunting of international law Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, rendition and torture of prisoners and the erosion of civil liberties at home have further affected America’s image and credibility. Anti-Americanism has increased not only across the Muslim world but also globally. The American-led war against global terrorism is regarded as a war against Islam and the Muslim world. Ironically, polls show that many in the world now see the U.S. as arrogant, ruthless and a danger to world peace.

In addition to such foreign policy practices, repressive police interventions have been under criticism as well, not only because of their harsh nature and unprofessional
handling but also their long-term ineffectiveness. Neild (2003) argues that police abuse and violence bring further violence. Either in dealing with traditional crimes or terrorism, police organizations that are less sensitive to the protection of human rights and the principles of democratic policing haven’t been effective in their efforts in the long run. Those paramilitary type police organizations function as the primary mechanism of state control in many countries regardless of their regime types in today’s world. Although they have dual roles: to protect and serve citizens, and to protect the regime, Neild (2003) asserts that “in either role, police are directly involved in the protection or violation of fundamental human rights” (p. 277). She emphasizes that more democratic countries focus on criminal targets rather than political ones. Terrorism is political violence and terrorists do not think they are criminals (Hallett, 2004). Terrorists also think that, “they are not motivated by any self interests but, rather, are committed solely to the interest of others, the oppressed” (Hallett, 2004, p. 50).

While national police organizations learn to cope with terrorism, relatively little comparative research has been conducted on law enforcement’s organizational progress toward effectiveness of anti-terrorism strategies (Bruce Hoffman & Morrison-Taw, 2000). Neild (2003) examines the nature of law enforcement services from human rights and democratic values viewpoints in a Latin American context. She observes that throughout Latin America, criminal justice systems molded by authoritarian regimes for the purposes of social control and regime protection are poorly equipped to tackle crime. Although human rights violations continue to a lesser extent, police abuse conducted with
impunity has been a major characteristic during the transitional period to democracy (Neild, 2002).

Neild (2003) also observes that in Latin America “democratic governments and institutions display little ability to confront growing levels of collective insecurity without resorting to abusive policies” (p. 292). Socially embedded authoritarianism encourages a repressive nature of law enforcement services especially when crime rates increase. Ineffective police services cause people to feel unprotected or even victimized by the system. During times of crisis, “governments experience a sharp rise in the political price they pay for ineffective, brutal and corrupt law enforcement” (Neild, 2003, p. 281). Yet, many Latin American governments have authorized the military to conduct policing activities in the face of police ineffectiveness. However, Neild argues, these authoritarian practices have had only a limited effect on crime rates and have undermined accountability and due process rights.

Similar to Neild, Gordon (2001) observes the similar nature of conduct within transitional democracies. She states that in the previous term of policing in South Africa, “[the police] role in ordinary crime prevention and control was a distant second to enforcing the apartheid regime” (p. 128). The result of such a harsh nature of conduct was that the police were seen as part of the enemy and ultimately legitimate targets in the struggle for liberation. Secondly, Gordon reminds Bayley’s warnings that Most of the world’s police forces are “regime police,” answerable to the government’s needs and “organized to be responsive upward”. The undemocratic
essence of such policing is its inability to respond to public demands and the resulting unwillingness of members of the public to turn to the police for anything less than emergency situations. (p. 147)

Koçak (2006-2007) argues that in most cases, the police are focused on solving the cases without considering the overall framework of the strategic responses to terrorism. After every incident, the police find themselves in a rush to collect as much information as possible and bring the terrorists to justice as soon as possible. They consider themselves the heroes or the saviors of their country and the regime. They sacrifice their time and energy with a lot of patriotic sentiments. Meanwhile, incorrect or unanalyzed intelligence and mismanagement may cause frequent failures and mistakes in police counter-terrorism. Since past experiences are not classified, analyzed, and used as references in training sessions adequately, next generations do not receive the acquired expertise. Learned lessons can have limited impact on the particular settings or branches. Because cases are only analyzed within the local settings, they never become part of the national-level institutional memory. Since rigorous training programs are not available, which are designed based on the national-level experiences, international wisdom and theory, similar mistakes are likely to occur everywhere every day. Even though each case is reported to the headquarters, and the central body classifies them and issues executive orders for the nature of the future service styles, they are far beyond providing necessary updates to the line officers.
2. Organizing Security Bureaucracies in Democratic States

Reducing the vulnerabilities of an open society, balancing risk and security, and building stronger organizations to prevent future attacks are the difficult challenges of a nation’s security bureaucracy. Organizing the security bureaucracy or positive initiatives for police reforms have always faced significant problems such as competing interests between institutions, insufficient resources and mutual distrust between police and community.

Gordon (2001) thinks that those problems are not intractable. As long as the ultimate aim remains as the core focus of attention, many restructuring or implementation problems can be solved without difficulties. The essence is to realize the fact that organizations are created for solving the problems of the society. And in this case, the problem is to detect criminals and terrorists in the most effective way, and to design strategic policies for a more peaceful society. As Richard Kornicki (2004), the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) project director states, "tackling serious organised crime must be among the most important tasks anywhere in the public sector. . . . The real purpose lies in creating greater operational effectiveness” (p. 1). In this sense, the police or any other law enforcement organization exists to protect the society from the harms of any crime or crime of terrorism.

The creation of organization requires the construction of its internal structure and also organizational strategy, systems of communication, skilled staff, and more abstractly instilling among employees shared organizational values. This rational framework of
incorporating the multiple factors that contribute to organizational success challenges the conventional approach of “rearrangement of lines and boxes” (Donley & Pollard, 2002). Karmarck (2002) remarks that

The natural instinct of those schooled in twentieth century bureaucracy would be to try and organize these boxes into a comprehensible hierarchy. But reorganizing these boxes into one box would not solve the essential problem . . . homeland security . . . does not fit into one box and it does not lend itself to traditional bureaucratic government … the problems of the 21st century will not fit into the bureaucratic boxes of the 20th century (p, 4).

The literature indicates that establishing a police organization requires a multi-dimensional approach. “There has to be a massive shift in traditional policing culture, including a commitment to shared intelligence, and willingness to embrace new ideas for the new agency to work” (Cowan, 2004). Within the framework of democratic accountability, openness and participation should be at the center of an organization’s culture Gordon (2001). Even in some Latin American countries such as Panama, El Salvador, Haiti and Guatemala, interventions and peace processes helped major police reforms that have addressed every aspect of the institution. These police forces were welcomed warmly by local communities (Neild, 2003).

In a general sense, it is thought that the highest-level of attention and even tension from all political entities are directed toward the policies on security and the establishment or reorganizations of security bureaucracies. Even the U.S. Supreme Court
(1981) once verbalized that “It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no government interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation”. However, when it comes to reality, oftentimes the rational approach is missed. Policy processes may bring a large span of participants as well as interests. During the establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for example, instead of “recognizing the threat, and identifying the modes of delivery for destructive acts” (Comfort, 2002, p. 1), deliberations revolved around many sorts of conflicts of interest. Control over budgets, personnel, and scope of authority became the main issues (Bettelheim, 2002). However, these issues were not the major factors that affect how well governmental agencies perform in identifying and disrupting security threats. The real need was to improve security through adopting new strategies of interaction and feedback, to improve the collection, synthesis, and analysis of intelligence among existing organizations with responsibilities related to security (Comfort, 2002).

Peters (2002) ensuring homeland security should involve more than creating a new department. Providing effective, timely, accurate sharing of information among the security agencies requires a less bureaucratic and a less top-down organizational style. The establishment of a single governmental agency with broad powers of search and control requires building skills in effective management and strengthening interactions with civilian organizations (Comfort, 2002). Even newly established organizations have to make continual assessments of adopting different strategies and different modes of action in securing the country as well as different organizational approaches rather than
standard bureaucratic public agency modes. This ever changing nature of strategies has to be the reflection of the national security policies.

Getz (2002) argues that ambitious reforms in security bureaucracies would not be either easy or popular anywhere in the world, but in any case, they should not improve at the expense of civil liberties. In democratic states organizing security bureaucracies needs to “be preceded, by a national dialogue about the implications of the war on terror for the constitutional system” (Stuart, 2003, p. 311).

3. Creating Learning Organizations in Response to Terrorism

Same as people, organizations need to learn and develop. However, some organizations become more capable in retaining the knowledge and experiences they acquire as a result of their activities. If an organization cannot retain and process its experiences and enhance their systems, then the quality of their operations becomes questionable. In this sense, no matter how much an organization is experiencing financial, equipment and human resource problems, if its system does not update and change itself progressively based on internal and external demands, then it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for that organization to satisfy its internal and external consumers. Such organizations are bound to survive with their inefficiencies leaving their members with daily experiences of frustrations, because, the individual members of those organizations cannot convey what they know and what they experience into the system. Their organizations do not or cannot ask, or analyze and process what they learn in their careers.
Consequently, because of the lack of an effective sharing system, employees’ knowledge remain tacit and never materializes for the use of others and system updates. Following the status quo, without questioning the current needs or repeating the same mistakes everyday because they are easy and safe to do, causes discomfort among the cadre who believe that those practices are no longer the right ways of doing things. They want change for quite some time and ultimately lose their confidence and hope. Especially in counter-terrorism, when terrorism continues to affect the country at a growing scale and ineffective applications continue for decades, the frustration of police officials turns in to depression.

Peter Senge (1990), known as the father of the concept of “learning organization”, defines learning organizations as the “organizations where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning to see the whole together” (p. 3). Senge argues that the world has become so interconnected, dynamic and complex that not only the individuals but also the organizations must become “learningful.” Senge’s proposal defends that individual, group and institutional-level learning are to be blended in a meaningful pattern. Individuals and groups learn and contribute their knowledge and expertise into the system. If the organizations are incapable of getting those contributions, then the knowledge and experience of the individuals and groups leave the organization when they leave. Or indeed, the individuals’ knowledge remains tacit even as they are inside the organization. That knowledge and experience can never find a chance to contribute
neither to the organizations’ memories nor to the innovative challenges. In learning organizations theory,

Employees may come and go, and leadership may change. But an organization’s memories preserve behaviors, norms, values, and “mental maps” over time. As an organization addresses and solves problems of survival, it builds a culture that becomes the repository for lessons learned. And it creates core competencies that represent the collective learning of its employees, past and present. As members of the organization leave and new ones join and are socialized, knowledge and competence are transferred across generations of learning (Gephart & Marsick, 1996, p. 38)

In learning organizations, “learning processes are analyzed, monitored, developed, managed, and aligned with improvement and innovation goals. Its vision, strategy, leaders, values, structures, systems, processes and practices all work to foster people’s learning and development and to accelerate systems level learning” (Gephart & Marsick, 1996, pp. 37-38). Systems-level learning is more than the sum of individual assets. Because, learning occurs at the systems-level in which “organizations synthesize and then institutionalize people’s intellectual capital and learning that are housed in their memories –their cultures, knowledge systems, and routines- and in their core competencies” (Gephart & Marsick, 1996, pp. 37-38).

Senge (1990) argues that since learning and being part of a team is inside the human nature, it is possible to create learning organizations. He recognizes that members
of an organization need conditions and tools or mechanisms to expand their capacities in order to realize fundamental shift of mind and ultimately to realize continuous change and upgrade their services. For this reason Senge (1990) identifies five disciplines essential to the development of learning organizations: personal mastery, mental models, shared vision, team learning and system thinking.

A learning organization provides opportunities and communication tools between its employees and its system. That way, the employees feel “in” on things and perform in a more motivated fashion because they feel that their efforts and achievements are recognized. Motivated by achievement and recognition, employees look for all possible avenues to learn more and excel in their jobs, because motivation factors such as sense of achievement, recognition, responsibility and advancement motivate employees more than the hygiene factors such as salary, job security and working conditions (Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959). Once the employees feel that their contributions are considered seriously, they continue to share and contribute to a greater extent. Because, as Senge iterates, they feel themselves connected, generative and most importantly may be part of something larger than themselves (Senge, 1990).

Ultimately, the feeling of ownership of the specific projects arise, and the employees start to consider their organizations as their own companies which make the organizations more effective. However, the channels must be open and not blocked by the bureaucratic or strict hierarchical structures. Senge believes that, only those organizations, which “discover how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to learn at
“all levels” (Senge, 1990, p. 4) can excel, and the ones in which everyone follows the orders of the top manager cannot. Although top management may realize changes quickly, oftentimes people who work on the ground do not like to be told what to do (Senge, 1996). For that reason, in learning organizations, leadership and management provide support to all individuals and teams. They model learning behavior, provide systems and resources for learning, welcome new ideas, disseminate knowledge and share leadership (Gephart & Marsick, 1996).

The aspirations of the learning organizations theory give a sense that the lessons learned would be transferred to the new comers in a systematic way. However, Kerka (1995) argues that the theoretical framework of the learning organization theory has not been critically analyzed. In real life, it is quite difficult to identify the learning organizations. It is also problematic to diagnose and quantify the extent in which the police organizations provide opportunities to their employees to materialize their knowledge and expertise into their systems.

On the other hand, Senge addresses a dangerously important issue of the delusions of learning from experience. He notes that “the most powerful learning comes from direct experience . . . through direct trial and error – through taking an action and seeing the consequences of that action; then taking a new and different action” (1990, p. 23). But, he asks, what happens when we do not have the opportunity of seeing the consequences of our actions. If the consequences are distant in time or distant within a
larger system, then, he warns, it is impossible to learn from our own experiences because the consequences are beyond our learning horizons.

In counter-terrorism, the consequences of the controls, including the coercive controls fulfilled by the police, are distant in time. Most police actions and harsh nature of operations remain as the inconsistent punitive actions (controls) for the ground floor people’s hearts and minds who feel deprived and unfairly treated. Regardless of the level of success of those operations, they are bound to be perceived as inconsistent punitive action in the long run, because the consequences of police operations indeed are in the distant future. As Senge points out, human beings have a tendency to focus on snapshots of isolated parts of the systems and not the full patterns (Senge, 1990). Although individual-level learning is important at the technical level, the real solution to terrorism is beyond the day to day direct experiences of policing. From this broader perspective, policing in counter-terrorism can only be considered successful, when it functions in coherence with the broader solutions, which is providing social support to the masses at the ground floor, as pictured in the metaphor of a narrowing staircase (Moghaddam, 2005b).

Scientific approach and social research can provide information about the real problems of the phenomenon and possible solutions. Even if a police organization becomes operationally specialized in a particular branch -counter-terrorism in this case- at the technical level, it can only excel in operational effectiveness, not in producing strategic solutions to the overall phenomenon. For that reason, such operational actions
should be blended and supported with theory and research, because theory and research have the ability to picture the full pattern of the phenomenon and they help the practices to be parts of the overall strategic policies. In this regard, Koçak (2006) argues that all police interactions with terrorism suspects can even become part of strategic solutions. Police officials can establish genuine relationships with the suspects during the indictment and interrogation processes.

Perhaps more importantly, employees should work in such a way that they are committed to their organization’s goals and through collaboration with colleagues create a team spirit necessary to achieve those goals. The effective operation of a complex organization, such as the Dutch Police and UK Police, requires more than intelligence gathering and analysis, surveillance equipment, or higher numbers of personnel. A police organization can be effective in counter-terrorism if its employees are committed to the organizational vision of protecting their society from terrorism.

The learned lessons can help to pave the road ahead. And only through such systematic responses can a police organization make sure that there is no unfilled gap remaining. If police organizations consider what they learned and update their system, then they can move forward and carry their institutional minds ahead of terrorists. Once the value of the institutional mind is appreciated and updated carefully, every single member of that organization can have the opportunity of adding another contribution to it and excel the system. Otherwise, everyday becomes another day with possible surprises and new outwitting lessons given by the terrorist organizations, first for the police.
organizations and second to the rest of the society. From this perspective, we can say that, if the police agencies’ minds are not ahead of terrorist organizations, then those agencies’ accountability become questionable. It is the same with the long-term preventive policy issues as well. The society entrusts their security, and their right for living without fear of crime, to the police organizations. They are the responsible institutions in the people’s eyes which are supposed to prepare and propose policies that address the root causes of terrorism.

4. Conclusions: Organizational Reforms in Response to Terrorism

The reviewed literature indicated that police organizations need to be in strategic responses rather than merely focusing on operational responses. Police organizations can only be effective if they are prepared in such a way that every single experience and information should add quality to their further actions. The actions of police organizations must reflect more systematic and more tactful approaches than terrorist organizations’ do. When a police organization is enhanced by systematic learning and remains in compliance with the overall social and political solutions, then every single action of police will mitigate negative acts of terrorism.

Considering the current practices and the literature, the following conclusions were identified:

- If terrorist tactics are changing, terrorist organizations are becoming learning organizations with their tactics, training and recruitment methods (Borum,
2005), then it would be essential for police organizations to develop their systems by learning.

- Terrorism has changed the concepts of both defense and law enforcement in the contemporary world. The enemy is no longer recognizable or in some cases unidentifiable. For this reason, today’s counter-terrorism requires a more sophisticated approach than traditional warfare and traditional crime prevention tactics. Police organizations should have comprehensive, dynamic, multi-dimensional, and coordinated strategy of operation through change.

- Most police organizations find themselves alone in battling crime and terrorism without comprehensive collaboration. They should work with other agencies and the society, and be part of the broader response system, whereby they can play active roles in policy making. Acting together with broader systems and having broader perspectives would bring democratic policing practices.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

A. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a dynamic force, which becomes more complex and more amorphous over time. The disguised and concealed nature of terrorists and their activities requires police organizations to become acutely aware of terrorism’s dynamics, and as a result, to develop tactics that can keep up with a continuously changing terrorist environment. Measures and evaluations of the static structures and the technological capabilities of police organizations may not find a significant relationship between police organizations’ level of preparedness and the likeliness of a terrorist incident. The disjuncture between police preparedness for terrorism and the shifting nature of terrorism creates a problem that requires a comparative investigation of police organizations’ dynamic aspects and assessment of their qualities.

A research design refers to a logical plan to conduct a study of a particular phenomenon (Yin, 2003). In this study a research design was formulated to investigate the assumption that the suppression, intervention, and prevention of terrorism can be accomplished only if police organizations prepare for the many facets of terrorist activities in different socio-cultural contexts. First, this study was designed to learn police organizations’ approaches to adequate preparedness for terrorism. Second, this study explored international police organizations in order to understand how police
organizations’ contextual culture affected preparedness for terrorism. Third, this study compared and assessed police organizations’ preparedness across international boundaries.

B. PROBLEM DEFINITION

A method of data collection and interpretation in this study was the researcher’s career as a police professional. In that capacity, and within the parlance of qualitative methodology, the author was an “observing participant.” Observing participation has limitations. First, a police professional has bureaucratic boundaries which constrain his/her role as a researcher whose interest focuses on a wide range of organizational knowledge. Second, a police professional is totally enmeshed in his/her career. While such enmeshment has the advantage of offering a first-hand view of incidents, enmeshment socializes a police professional to fit the mold cast by police organizational culture. A difficulty arises when the role of an observing participant clashes against the worldview of a police professional. In that situation an observing participant and police professional must consciously learn to differentiate his/her perspectives as an observing participant from those of a police professional. That clash between the role of researcher and occupational professional has been specifically described in ethnographic literature (Fleisher, 1998).

The problem statement was defined after the researcher conducted personal communications with academics and police professionals from the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Turkey, and the United States. Those personal interviews in combination with
a background review of literature on terrorism, on police organizational culture, and on organizational change and the researcher’s personal experience as a police professional enriched the development of this study’s research problem. Additionally, the researcher’s professional involvement in organizational issues also helped considerably in developing a research design and methodology. In his professional role the researcher had experience with organizational development, project management, instructional design, and instructional training assessment. The researcher was able to hold focused interviews and, develop enriched models of analyses and interpretation.

With more than a year of discussions with colleagues in police organizations across international boundaries, the researcher identified and categorized this study’s main concepts. Further discussions with colleagues and professionals in organizational development and terrorism imbued the categories of interview questions with a high level of face validity consistent with the study’s theoretical model of organizational change spurred by terrorism.

“Insiders” in police organizations are bound by policies that prevent the disclosure of sensitive information. Non-disclosure regulations acted as a constraint on the data presentation and discussion in this study. Many problems and issues were openly discussed with the researcher that couldn’t have been shared and discussed with civilians or organizational outsiders. This limitation is balanced by the strong advantages of being a police professional with long relationships with international colleagues. The length of relationship with those colleagues provided impeccable credit for holding
candid discussions, not only during the problem definition phase but also during the interview processes. The researcher met with colleagues at international conferences, and through other means of communication. During these encounters, the researcher deepened, clarified and re-thought some of the issues that eventually led to this study’s central research problem.

Discussions with the professionals focused on three key issues. The first issue was the structural and operational problems of police organizations in their preparation for terrorist activities. The second issue was police organizations’ lack of organizational memory. A lack of organizational memory meant that some police organizations “forgot” practices useful in terrorism preparedness or did not have the organizational communication networks necessary to adequately transfer newly acquired organizational knowledge to other members within the organization. Together, organizational forgetfulness and inadequate communication put police organizations in danger of repeating the same mistakes in their counter-terrorism activities. The third issue revealed professional rivalry among police organizations whose members intentionally hide their experiences and their tacit-level knowledge in a sense of jealousy. Even if organizational experiences were shared to some degree, discussions revealed that intra-organizational rivalry among different silos within an organization or rivalry among large organizations caused major gaps in communication flow and information distribution and in some case even caused police organizations to duplicate organizational responses at a national level. Professional jealousy, inadequate intra- and inter-organizational communication, and a lack of “community” culture among police organizations caused inefficiency, duplication
of effort, increased investment in financial and personnel resources, and may have even weakened to some degree police organizations’ ability to suppress, prevent, and intervene on terrorism.

There were also disadvantages afforded by observing participation. Counter-terrorism officials created an isolated world, and some candidly admitted they were living in ivory towers. The researcher observed that, in some instances, counter-terrorism police professionals had professional pride that protecting the national security gave them a perception of distinction from and greater value than other public or police serviceman. Some counter-terrorism professionals even claimed that they had almost nothing to learn from other police organizations, as their cases were unique. Counter-terrorism professionals, they thought, were the frontline warriors defending their country; disclosure of even the simplest detail about their job would be equivalent to a betrayal of their country and their war on terror. Cloaking counter-terrorism activities with a mythical cloth gave them immunity from many external forces, even from accountability. These counter-terrorism professional believed their tactical approaches to counter-terrorism were almost the only alternative that could be implemented under the circumstances. Therefore, their responses were incomparable to any other case in the world.

C. STUDY PURPOSE

The purpose of this study was to explore and compare how international police organizations prepare for terrorism and then improve their organizational processes as a
result of terrorism. This study explores organizational change in response to terrorism using data obtained in two case studies.

Yin attests that exploratory case studies should meet three criteria (2003). Table 1 outlines this study’s exploratory criteria and each criterion’s framework.

Table 1
The Criteria and the Framework of the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA OF A CASE STUDY</th>
<th>FRAMEWORK FOR DATA COLLECTION ON INTERNATIONAL POLICE ORGANIZATIONS’ RESPONSE TO TERRORISM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is to be explored?</td>
<td>Gather data on learning initiatives, the changes in the areas of training and SOPs and the policy initiatives of police organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the purpose of the exploration?</td>
<td>Gather data on whether police organizations realize learning initiatives, change initiatives and policy initiatives and if so, how well police organizations accomplish their objectives relative to each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the criteria by which the exploration will be judged successful?</td>
<td>Gather data that provides information about those systematic initiatives and changes, and how (based on what) those changes have been achieved.</td>
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</table>
By exploring how police organizations prepare themselves for terrorism and assessing their readiness as single organizations and as international police agencies, this study attempted to discover the fundamental qualities of effective, counter-terrorism police management.

D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study focused on a primary research question. That question was: subsequent to terrorist incidents and the ever-changing nature of terrorism, to what extent and by what means did international police organizations develop systems of corrective action to prevent terrorism and respond more effectively to terrorism? This question was investigated with a comparative, case study methodology. This case study methodology was designed to explore the following research questions:

The primary research question generated a series of sub-questions. In actual or potential circumstances of counter-terrorism, to what extent and by what means do police organizations

- Learn from their own past experiences and prevent a repetition of errors;
- Learn from other police organizations and borrow innovative practices then mold these practices to their own organization setting;
- Learn from research and theory on terrorism and organizational responses to major incidents, such as the World Trade Center incident on September 11, 2001;

- Change organizational systems based on multiple sources of organizational learning; and ultimately,

- Contribute to and become part of a well-designed, international response to terrorism?

E. RESEARCH STRATEGY

To study police organizations’ preparedness for and response to terrorism the study used a qualitative embedded comparative (multiple) case study approach.

Several alternatives to this research methodology were considered. Quantitative methods used in many fields of social sciences would not provide the types of data needed in this study (Bruce Hoffman & Morrison-Taw, 2000). This study focuses on organizational dynamics and processes, organizational perceptions and beliefs, and organizational values. While survey research could provide those data, a survey would be highly difficult if not impossible to implement in a police organization, particularly on a topic as sensitive as terrorism. This study intended to examine the “grey” areas in organizational culture and management. Those grey areas are accessible best through inter-personal methods.
A qualitative research design seemed well-suited for a study that “involves portraying a holistic picture of what the phenomenon, setting, or program is like and struggling to understand the fundamental nature of a particular set of activities and people in a specific context” (Patton, 2002, p. 227). In order to analyze the narrative data within the cultural logic of police organizations, the research relied on focused interviews with members of police organizations and documentary evidence.

In a case study approach, main and subareas of interest can be described, illustrated, explored and evaluated (Yin, 2003). Since case studies must rely on multiple sources of evidence (ibid, p. 14), in this study, the researcher triangulated different sources of information. In this case, although counter-terrorism training programs, books, and manuals have increased significantly in the post 9/11 era, there was a need to identify what was needed for organizations to improve their systems. In order to make solid discovery, the study sought information on what was really occurring. Police organizations’ learning, change and policy initiatives in their counter-terrorism efforts were explored through a case study approach.

D. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

This study uses the following conceptual definitions. The definitions offered are consistent with definitions of similar concepts appearing in scholarly literature on police organizations and terrorism:

(1) **Organizational culture** is a pattern of basic assumptions invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with the
problems of external adaptation and internal integration that all works well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 1985).

(2) **Democratic Policing** denotes a process in which the police are politically neutral, accountable to the public, powers are used according to the rule of law, (Marx, 2001) respectful of the international principles of human rights, responsive to the needs of individual citizens and subject to external supervision (Lustgarten, 2003; USAID, 2005).

(3) A **Learning Initiative** denotes:

The sustained changes that involve intentional action by or within a group at some point—such as one or more of the following: intentional seeking of new knowledge or new ways of doing things; intentional evaluation of behaviors, new or old, that leads to effort to retain valuable behaviors and discard others; and/or intentional dissemination of knowledge within a group or among groups when such knowledge is deemed useful or beneficial (Jackson et al., 2005b).

(4) An **Internal Learning Experience** denotes the organizational practices of retaining and making use of the existing knowledge and direct experiences
of the organizations. More specifically it is the consideration of mistakes and successes.

(5) An **External Learning Experience** denotes the vicarious experiences which are the direct or indirect observation of other police organizations’ ways of doing things.

(6) **Learning from Research and Theory** denotes acquisition and use of research literature or direct experimentation in order to develop new organizational techniques or systems.

(7) **Organizational Learning** denote the development of tangible activities within a police organization: “new governing ideas, innovations in infrastructure, and new management methods and tools for changing the way people conduct their work” (Senge, 1999, p. 33).

(8) **Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)** denotes the rules, regulations, organizational structures, systems, operational tools, mechanisms, among other organization processes.

(9) **Organizational Change** denotes shifts within the organizations to build their capacities for ongoing change. This may involve strategies, structures and systems. Any planned (based on learning) shifts within the training programs, organizational structures and operational procedures will be accepted as change.
(10) **Policy Initiative** denotes any action or an attempt by police organizations to change overall policies and procedures. If a police organization works with other organizations, citizens or other entities and plays its role consistently with and as a part of those long-term responses, then those initiatives are referred to as policy initiatives. Cooperative initiatives with other police organizations are also considered as parts or extension of these initiatives. The goal of these initiatives is to create impact on the overall policies and practices toward producing strategic solutions (Burton, 1990).

(11) **Preparedness** is a state of development in organizational management whose outcome concentrates organizational resources on the readiness for and the ability to act against terrorism.

**F. SELECTION OF CASES**

The selection of case study sites is the second important step after the specification of the primary research question (Yin, 2003). This study’s units of analysis were police organizations.

In order to identify police organizations with a strong representation of high-quality responses to terrorism, the researcher first considered the reviewed literature. The literature indicated that, the new millennium has witnessed a new type of terrorism, starting from the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there were attacks in Bali in 2002, Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 (Deflem, 2004; Levitt, 2004; Satanovsky,
Based on the literature review, consideration of the geographical factors, and data availability, two democracies were selected: the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK). These countries were selected for a number of reasons. The UK had considerable organizational experience in the field of counter-terrorism. As a western democracy, the UK dealt with Provisional Republican Army (IRA) and al-Qaeda terrorism. The UK was stunningly hit by the al-Qaeda terrorists in 2005. Because of its considerable experiences in dealing with different types of terrorism, the researcher considered that police organizations in the UK were more representative of a police organization that had been forced to undergo internal change due to terrorism. In addition, the UK Government had a considerable amount of policies and practices against terrorism. These policies and practices were documentary sources.

The Netherlands was selected because of its unique organizational response to terrorism. After Spain, the Netherlands became the second country in continental Europe which had experience in counter-terrorism after the murders of a Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002, and the filmmaker and writer Theo van Gogh in 2004 (NCTb, 2005). Given the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 the threat of terrorism was imminent for the Netherlands.

The Netherlands has been known throughout Europe for its unique national-level counter-terrorism. The Dutch Police Organization has long been known as one of the most developmental police organizations, especially with its innovative police training programs and organizational processes. It is currently one of the most cooperative
countries in Europe for information exchange with other police organizations. For example, the Matra programs have been solely supported by the Dutch Government for Eastern European and Mediterranean countries for many years. Furthermore, the researcher’s professional experience with the Dutch Police indicated a strong, nationally organized police training system, with specialized, innovative training programs, such as the action learning method. The inclusion of the Netherlands in this study provided a broad perspective on innovation and creativity in police training.

Countries selected in this study were information-rich cases of police organizations’ counter-terrorism responses and it was hopeful that these organizations would serve as the best possible source of information. The researcher has had many years of cooperation and involvement with the selected police organizations, especially in the fields of organizational development and training. The researcher’s role and previous contacts with the selected organizations, including on-site visits, helped to locate and interview the most knowledgeable counter-terrorism personnel.

**G. CONSTRUCTION OF THE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL**

The researcher’s police experience and knowledge in counter-terrorism influenced the design of the interview protocol. The interview protocol was constructed independent of variations in terrorist acts. Rather, subject areas were defined, which could gauge systematic or consistent behavior versus exceptional or uncommon behavior of police organizations. Although each terrorist incident might be different, the study focused on
the systematic responses of police organizations to the incident or to the possibility of an incident.

An array of questions, each linked to an operational concept, were developed and pretested with several researchers and police professionals to determine if the questions were clear and consistent with the research goals and objectives. During this rehearsal phase, some questions were interpreted differently by some of the professionals. However, after some changes and adjustments the researcher was convinced that the questions would be consistently clear to a counter-terrorism expert in selected police organizations. Pretesting led to the following interview questions:

- How does your agency function in counter-terrorism at an operational level?

- In your opinion, what are the unique characteristics of your organization in counter-terrorism?

- Can you briefly explain the philosophy of your organization in counter-terrorism?

- Can you explain the command structure of your organization in counter-terrorism?

Learning Initiatives:

- What happens after a terrorist incident in your department? Do you think things change considerably? If so, how?
Do you think your department considers the lessons learned when changing or updating the systems, such as training programs or SOPs?

Does your institution have a set of best practices? If so, how are those practices generated? Are best practices in other countries considered?

Are those best practices updated? If so, how?

Do you think that training programs are updated or changed after the incidents?

If you think that your organization is a learning organization, how is learning integrated into the training programs?

What approaches, structures and contents of counter-terrorism programs have been changed?

Could you please show me your training programs before and after the update, if it is appropriate to your rules?

Why did these changes take place? Who developed the training program update? Or did you introduce new programs?

Do you think your department is a learning organization? If so, how is learning integrated into the SOPs?

Change Initiatives:
Could you please explain what changes have been realized in your organization after the terrorist incidents? What are the structural and operational changes? Changes may include the legal framework, rules, regulations, equipment, plans, and practices.

In your opinion, why have those changes been generated?

How have those changes been implemented?

Policy Initiatives:

How does your agency’s counter-terrorism operate at the policy level?

Does your agency make proposals to change policies? If so, what are the law proposals that your agency has submitted in order to change the overall policies and practices.

Does your agency have external initiatives? If so, how and what are they? (cooperation with other agencies, new or updated joint ventures, and working with society)

In your opinion, why were those proposals and initiatives generated?

How have those initiatives been implemented?
H. DATA COLLECTION

Research data came from three sources:

- The insiders’ perspectives on terrorism and their organizations’ responses to terrorism;
- Government documents and printed official materials; and,
- The researcher’s professional observations as an observing participant.

1. Informed Consent Procedure

The Kent State University Institutional Review Board (IRB) examined and approved this study for the use of human subjects (Appendix D). As stipulated by the Application for Approval to Use Human Research Participants of the Kent State University Institutional Review Board, the respondents were not asked to report any actual case, name or place. Respondents were given the option of changing or altering their comments at any time until the end of the study. Two copies of consent forms (Appendix A and B) were submitted to them, and signed copies were kept on a file in the Department of Political Science at Kent State University (KSU).

2. Interviews

Interviews were based on expert sampling and snowball sampling methods. Expert sampling depended on locating those personnel in police organizations, who had
the most knowledge of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and organizational responses to terrorism.

Sample size affects validity. However, Patton (2002) does not set a rule for the sample size in qualitative inquiry:

The validity, meaningfulness, and the insights generated from qualitative inquiry have more to do with the information richness of the cases selected and the observational/analytical capabilities of the researcher than with sample size. (Patton, 2002, p. 245)

The researcher did not set an interview quota. He continued interviews for each case until the information started to become redundant, and certain themes started to reappear. Further interviews were held over the phone or by meeting at international conferences. He stopped the interview process, when data saturation was reached to meet the objectives of the study. Therefore, the sample size of this study was realized as a result of saturation.

Through the researcher’s professional connections, he made the initial contacts with the experts from the selected countries, and emailed the interview protocol prior to conducting face-to-face interviews. Advanced review of the protocol significantly shaped the interview process. Some of the chosen experts recommended other experts (snowball sampling) whom they believed had expertise more relevant to the research goals and objectives than their own. Chosen experts contacted snowballed experts and arranged appointments on behalf of the researcher. The snowball sampling method
allowed the researcher a greater opportunity to interview more experts with a high-level of expertise in counter-terrorism and organizational change. Finally, the researcher traveled to the selected countries and conducted expert interviews.

Prior to interviews experts were told that their names or other identifying information would not be revealed in any case study or written or published document, nor would personal and professional characteristics of expert interviewees permit their identification as individual participants in this research. If experts agreed to the conditions of informed consent, they were asked to “sign” the informed consent forms with a coded designation, such as N1, N2, and N3 or UK1, UK2, and UK3 and so on. Experts were asked if they would allow a voice recording of the interview. Two respondents from the Netherlands and one respondent from the UK refused to consent to voice recording. If voice recording was denied the researcher wrote interview notes. When expert interviews had to be conducted over the phone, informed consent was explained and an expert verbally agreed to an interview; subsequent to the interview, written informed consent documents were filed in accordance with the Kent State University IRB’s rules and regulations. Consequently, eight experts from the Netherlands and seven experts from the UK were interviewed.

Focused semi-structured interviews were held by applying the interview protocol (Appendix C). The purpose of semi-structured interviews grants interviewees opportunities to speak freely and openly in natural way of speaking. The procedure of advance mailing of the interview protocol gave interviewees time to consider their
responses. Such an opportunity was methodologically and theoretically significant given the complex and often abstract nature of the experts’ responses. A natural way of thinking about counter-terrorism and police organizational responses would less likely impose researchers’ categories of information onto experts’ thoughts and speech.

3. Selection of Documents

During the interview process, the researcher asked experts for the most appropriate unclassified documents, given the goals and objectives of this research, to use as data. Experts either submitted some printed materials or recommended their organizations’ web sites on counter-terrorism activities or submitted general organizational information about their agencies. The researcher also received training materials, charts, reports and similar training and policy materials. Written documents were used directly as data or for triangulation purposes. The list of the documentary evidence was presented as an appendix of the study. Appendix G lists documentary evidence collected in this study.

I. DATA MANAGEMENT and ANALYSIS

Some experts allowed their interview to be digitally voice recorded. Those digital recordings were transferred to a computer and transcribed verbatim using Transcriber software program (Transcriber, 2005). Some documents were downloaded from the official web sites of the government institutions. Some other digital documents, which
were brought from the field studies, such as reports, Power Point presentations, and photographs were transferred to a computer and saved in folders labeled for each country.

Data were managed with the *Atlas.ti* software program (ATLAS.ti., 2005). Data for each case study were uploaded into an “idea container,” which *Atlas/ti* calls a “Hermeneutic Unit.” A Hermeneutic Unit contains documents, or source material. Documents include transcribed interviews, un-transcribed audio interview files, downloaded documents, and all other digital data. In a Hermeneutic Unit, each document was named as a “primary document.” Primary documents are the analytic units in *Atlas/ti*. The aggregate of primary documents were the source of key words or terms.

The analysis of interview data begins with the identification of key words and terms or expressions. Key words, terms, and expressions that carry meaning within the underlying theory of the study are called codes. A code is a shorthand mechanism that subsumes simple facts. A simple fact, for example “traveling abroad” was coded as “External Learning Experiences.” A complex and abstract concept may be “experts’ narrative descriptions and perceptions of the Madrid train bombing.”

Codes are logical relationships derived from the analysis of interview data. Such codes are a fundamental tool in the management of data. Codes permit the organization and classification of data. Codes are by definition “grounded” in expert interviews and supplementary types of data. The critical point in code analysis (also referred to as thematic analysis) is that codes reflect experts’ thoughts, opinions, beliefs, and perceptions (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). Thus, a theoretical model constructed on a logical
arrangement of codes is a cultural analysis expressed by experts. As much as cognitively possible, researchers resist usurping experts’ ideas with their own. The codebook, presented in Appendix E, was used for the analysis.

Codes are micro-level hypotheses. Such hypotheses make an argument that a simple fact or a complex and abstract concept are elements within a broad conceptualization of events. In this case, the event in question focuses on police organizational response to terrorism. Codes may be corroborated by published analysis and other types of organizational documents through the process of triangulation. Codes are also affirmed by a consensus of experts. While the identification of codes is a laborious process, the interpretation of codes requires the skill of an analyst.

During this textual-level working phase, the data segments were visually connected with the codes, quotations and memos. A code marks a quotation. Quotations coded for particular topics can be easily retrieved any time. An analyst may wish to comment on the quotation. A memo can be affixed to the quotation so that later in the analysis a sequence of thoughts about quotations or ideas deriving from quotations is retrievable.

**J. RELIABILITY**

Reliability is defined as,

A measurement procedure yields consistent scores when the phenomenon being measured is not changing (or that the measured scores change in direct
correspondence to actual changes in the phenomenon). If a measure is reliable, it is affected less by random error, or chance variation, than if it is unreliable (Schutt, 2001).

A code is a type of “score.” By ascribing the same code to different passages of an interview, an analyst is ascribing equal “meaning” or value to those passages. An interview uses a question as a stimulus to gain a response. If all expert respondents understand the question in like fashion, their responses should be similarly coded (scored). However, if questions are poorly worded or ambiguous experts’ responses will likely have a wide range of variation. That range of variation will lead to a range of different scores caused by a misworded or confusing question.

Pretesting helps reduce the likelihood of ambiguity, confusion in the intent of an interview question, and unclear wording of an interview question. The interview protocol used in this study was pretested on police professionals who had experience in counter-terrorism and showed that expert respondents had similar understandings to the same questions. The researcher was convinced that the experts responded to similar underlying concepts, and thus were discussing the same “subjects” during the interview process. As the questions elicited similar responses, it was concluded that the qualitative assessment of cultural consensus was achieved. Thus the interview protocol and the overall concepts of the study were reliable.

The researcher then had two experienced researchers review the coded transcript in order to increase the reliability. In addition, a case study database was built to secure
the reliability of this study, so that other researchers could replicate the study and conclude with similar results. All of the interview data and the documentary evidence were filed in the Department of Political Science at Kent State University.

Social science demands replicable research. It must be recognized that without clear documentation of research methodology (protocol development, sampling, and interview procedures) and of research design (an underlying conceptualization of research strongly influences one style of research over another [experimental v. quasi-experimental v. non-experimental v. survey v. interview]), future researchers studying police organizations’ responses to terrorism, may arrive at widely divergent conclusions. For that reason, documents and transcriptions were secured and made available for other reviewers.

**K. VALIDITY**

Validity is achieved when the statements of conclusions about empirical reality are corroborated. This study focused on what police organizations did in response to terrorism and how they did it. Research conclusions were determined based on the insiders’ perspectives, documentary evidence, review of literature, and the researcher’s observing participation and experience as a police professional.

Qualitative research has been criticized as subjective social science. Put another way, qualitative investigators subjectively collect data and fail to develop a sufficient
operational set of measures. To meet the test of construct validity Yin (2003) recommends two steps:

- Select the specific types of changes that are to be studied (and relate them to the original objectives of the study) and,

- Demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific types of change that have been selected. (p.35)

This study clearly specified the types of changes that were to be studied: the systematic changes within the learning initiatives, change initiatives, and the policy initiatives of the police organizations in the field of counter-terrorism. The interview protocol was pretested and the overall concept of the study was shared with the counter-terrorism professionals prior to implementation of the study. During the implementation, it was demonstrated that specific types of organizational behaviors reflected the specified changes. For example, if a police organization considered its past experiences (mistakes and successes), sent its officers abroad to learn from other police organizations, and attempted to learn from research and theory before making organizational changes and enhancements in its policies and procedures, then it was accepted that learning initiatives were related to change initiatives.

The researcher preferred long narratives, in order to present the richness of the ethnographic data, and to provide a thick description, which includes the threads of the different areas of the culture. In addition, by providing long narratives the researcher
aimed to allow readers to observe that the tone of the narrative data and the researcher's interpretations are compatible with each other.

For validity purposes, the researcher had the key informants review the draft report for each case to ensure that the research concepts and descriptions of organizational processes were correctly understood. The researcher sent the draft case reports to at least two informants from each focused country and received their feedback. All informants verified that the draft work did reflect their perspectives. The purpose of this feedback process was “not only to test for factual and interpretive accuracy but also to provide evidence of credibility the trustworthiness criterion analogous to internal validity in conventional studies” (Yin 2003b, p. 373). The completion of member check confirmed that the researcher’s interpretation of findings and his analyses indeed conformed to the changes that were the focus of the study.

L. EXTERNAL VALIDITY

External validity refers to cross-population generalizability; that is, the ability to generalize conclusions from one to another similar population (Schutt, 2001).

However, it is important to note that, understanding the generalization of a case study depends upon the understanding of the difference between statistical generalization and analytical generalization. Statistical generalization is fulfilled through sampling and generalizing the result to a known universe, whereas analytical generalization strives “to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory.” (Yin, 2003, p. 37) Yin also
attests that “if a sampling logic had to be applied to all types of research, many important
topics could not be empirically investigated” (p. 48). For example, if a researcher prefers
“to be at all faithful to the complexity of reality, [then s/he] must incorporate dozens if
not hundreds of relevant variables” (p. 49). For this very reason, a case study approach
with replication logic was applied to the cases in order to gain external validity.

M. THEORETICAL LOGIC MODEL OF COUNTER TERRORISM

A successful analysis of a phenomenon requires a rigorous thinking style,
sufficient level of evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations.
Police organizations’ organizational responses to terrorism can be grouped into three
categories. The first category includes those things a police organization actually did in
response to terrorism. The second category includes those things that might have been
but weren’t. The third category posits conceptual, or theoretical, relationships between
components of actual police organizations’ responses to terrorism. The third category
yields a theoretical logic model.

A logic model systematically describes in a visual way to understand the
conceptual relationships in a chain of events or activities stimulated by particular events.
(W.K. Kellog Foundation, 2004) A theoretical logic model can be a tool to predict police
organizations’ conceptual responses to terrorism, or a tool to synthesize the actions of
police organizations. This study used an “organizational level logic model” to describe
the conceptual relationships.
Figure 2. Theoretical Logic Model of Police Organizations’ Actual Responses to Terrorism

Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual logic model derived from the analysis of the two police organizations’ responses to terrorism. Simultaneously, this logic model predicts how police organizations will likely respond to triggering events. This logic model synthesizes a theory of internal organizational change prompted by an external catastrophe. This logical model describes how learning, organizational change and policy initiatives stand in a causal chain ultimately leading toward preparedness for terrorism.

The components of the logic model are linked causally by a sequence of actions. The triggering events (terrorist incidents or threat of terrorism) activate a series of initiatives: Learning Initiatives, Organizational Change Initiatives, and Policy Initiatives.
The triggering events initiate the learning processes. Learning initiatives lead to organizational change processes. Finally, the organizational change initiatives lead to the policy initiatives.

Learning initiatives include internal learning experiences, external learning experiences and learning from research and theory. Organizational change initiatives include changing training programs and standard operating procedures. Policy initiatives include all activities toward making an impact on policy making and practices of larger systems. The model predicts that if all initiatives are satisfied in a time-sensitive causal chain then police organizations move toward preparedness for triggering events.

The application of this cycle of connected initiatives can be described as follows.

**N. MAJOR ELEMENT IN A POLICE ORGANIZATION’S CONCEPTUAL LOGIC MODEL IN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM**

Four major organization processes emerged from the analysis of expert interviews. The analyses resulted in four major themes. These are

**Triggering events:** These events entail any major incident or a threat that creates a sense of urgency and causes the initiation of organizational or political actions toward countering terrorism. A crisis, a major terrorist incident or a series of incidents and threats opens up a window of opportunity (Kingdon, 2003) for change within the police organizations.

**Learning Initiatives:** These initiatives consist of three sub-components:
**Internal learning experiences**: This sub-component explains an organization’s progress based on the lessons learned from their mistakes and successes.

**External learning experiences**: This sub-component entails any systematic attempt of an organization to learn best practices from other organizations. These attempts may include visiting other organizations, joining seminars, workshops or conferences, or any interaction with other police organizations in order to take lessons from their successes or failures.

**Learning from research and theory**: This sub-component entails any systematic attempt of an organization to learn through scientific inquiry. If an organization cooperates with universities or research institutions, or hires researchers, or produces research based publications, or actually executes experiments in order to learn and make changes, then all of those activities are considered within this theme.

**Change Initiatives**: These initiatives consist of two themes:

**Change in the training programs**: This sub-theme refers to any new training program or any modification within the existing training programs based on experience or learning, whether they are for initial or in-service training activities.
**Change in the standard operating procedures:** This sub-theme refers to any systematic organizational change in structures, processes, policies and practices.

**Policy initiatives:** These initiatives entail the organizations’ cooperative initiatives toward other institutions and other initiatives toward changing the overall policies and practices.

**O. LIMITATIONS**

This study identified and elaborated on organizational capacities of focused police action to counter-terrorism.

First, as expected, any project concerning the topic of terrorism requires a level of delicacy. For that reason, this study did not include names, places (other than the names of countries and police organizations) or dates that may put the states’, institutions’ and individuals’ security at risk. Also, the police organizations limited the amount of information available to the researcher depending upon the security risk of the information.

Second, this study did not focus on any joint operation toward solving a specific terrorism case. It sought to investigate whether the selected countries were willing to be inspired, or were actually implementing good practices elsewhere by enhancing their systems, specifically through updating their counter-terrorism policies and practices.
Third, the study did not attempt to observe the results of the implemented programs or policies. However, the study sought to find relevant information about whether the organizations equip themselves with the necessary tools and initiatives, which would enable them to achieve expected results.
CHAPTER IV
THE NETHERLANDS

A. INTRODUCTION

The Netherlands is located in one of the more technologically advanced regions of Europe. With an ethnically diverse population, approximately 16 million citizens live in an area of 41,000 sq km [15,800 sq miles]. In a country where so many people reside in close proximity to one another, the government has a great responsibility of ensuring safety for its citizens.

The Netherlands has a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system (Schilstra, 2006). The Dutch form of government, known as a parliamentary democracy, meets the goal of keeping the country safe and secure. A parliamentary democracy practices a separation of powers among the legislative, the executive and the judiciary branches. The Dutch Police meet the responsibility of securing public safety through the reduction of street crime, suppression of anti-social public behavior, and generally through the continuous implementation of anti-crime measures. The Dutch Police function under the oversight of the Dutch Government. In cases of use of force, for example, police action receives the Dutch government’s close scrutiny (Blok, 2004).

B. POLICING IN THE NETHERLANDS

There are 25 regional police forces in the Netherlands. The National Police Services Agency (KLPD) acts as the 26th police force. All of these 26 police forces are
referred to as the Dutch Police. The administrative responsibility for the Dutch Police resides at the regional level with municipal mayors and at the governmental level with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Regional police forces are broken down to districts or divisions. The Police Act of 1993 describes the tasks of the Dutch Police. Mayors, chief public prosecutors and chiefs of police forces define police policies (Schilstra, 2006). Details of police policies are formulated by the KLPD’S chief executive officers. Regional police forces have wide discretionary power both in their management and the implementation of their duties. When enforcing criminal law, the police act under the authority of public prosecutors (Blok, 2004).

The KLPD functions under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. As a national-level police organization, the KLPD fulfills its independent, supporting and coordinating tasks through several departments. The departments of the KLPD include the National Crime Squad, the National Criminal Intelligence Department, and the Department of Special Interventions (DSI), the Department of International Police Cooperation, Special Criminal Investigation Department, Water Police, Traffic Police, Aviation Police, Railway Police, Mounted Police and Tracker Dogs Department, Operations Support and Coordination Department, Royalty and Diplomatic Corps Protection Department and the Logistics Department. Among these departments, the National Crime Squad, the National Criminal Intelligence Department and the DSI have direct counter-terrorism tasks and responsibilities (KLPD, 2007).
The National Crime Squad concentrates on terrorism, drugs, firearms, explosives, money laundering, and cross-border human trafficking. The National Criminal Intelligence Department provides information to all Dutch Police departments, the Royal Military Constabulary (*Koninklijke Marechaussee*), and the Public Prosecutors Service. In counter-terrorism, the National Crime Squad contributes substantially “both in the context of the ‘Guard and Protect’ programme and its coordination role” (KLPD, 2007, p. 3). The DSI is responsible for intervening and preventing extreme cases, for example, a major terrorist attack or a large scale operation on a criminal network, and arresting or eliminating suspects who commit terrorist crimes or mass violence. The DSI operates as an umbrella organization and operates together with the Marine Corps Intervention Units and the Royal Military Constabulary during all violent cases. Such joint operations take place under the leadership of DSI (KLPD, 2007).

The police forces in the Netherlands act under the authority of public prosecutors when carrying out judicial services and enforcing Dutch criminal law (Blok, 2004). In counter-terrorism, public prosecutors advise police forces. During a national situation, the Public Prosecution Service has the authority over operations and assigns the police to trace and arrest suspected terrorists (NCTb, 2005, 2006b).  

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*National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism* (NCTb) was established in 2004 to coordinate counter-terrorism initiatives in the Netherlands. NCTb is further explained later.
C. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS

The theoretical Logic Model of Police Organization’s Responses to Terrorism (Figure 2) proposes a chain of systematic responses stimulated by terrorism and other catastrophic events. This chapter discusses a chain of events stimulated by Dutch police organizations’ responses to specific terrorist acts.

Out of an analysis of Dutch interview data three initiatives emerged. These initiatives are Learning Initiatives, Change Initiatives, and Policy Initiatives. Triggering Events prompted these initiatives. Recalling from Figure 2 Learning Initiatives is composed of internal learning experiences, external learning experiences and learning from research and theory. Organizational Change Initiatives include changing training programs and standard operating procedures (SOPs). Policy Initiatives include all activities toward making an impact on policy making and practices of larger systems. The following sections explore and describe the counter-terrorism activities in the Netherlands.

D. TRIGGERING EVENTS FOR COUNTER TERRORISM EFFORTS

The Netherlands, despite its cultural nature of peace and social acceptance, hasn’t been exempt as a target of terrorism.

Most strongly affecting the Netherlands’ response to terrorism was Triggering Events. The comments of the respondents and the documentary evidence corroborated

\[ \text{Initiatives are aggregations of highly similar code information focused on a particular topic. In this case code aggregations refer to trigger events and organizational learning, change, and policies.} \]
the fact that triggering events or crises opened up new venues and new windows of opportunities for change in the field of counter-terrorism in the Netherlands. Confirming to Kingdon’s theory, crises were responded to immediately with stronger policies. New organizations were established, new sections or departments were added to the existing organizations, the relationships among the organizations were redefined and reorganized, and legal changes were realized.

After the 9/11 incidents counter-terrorism efforts started to be unified and broadened across the Netherlands. The murder of politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 gave a second momentum to Dutch responses to terrorism and kept the issue of counter-terrorism within the political agenda. Respondents concurred that although these incidents were wakeup calls, the incidents in Madrid and the murder of artist Theo Van Gogh in 2004 created a sense of urgency in the Netherlands. That sense of urgency fueled the counter-terrorism action at all levels of the Dutch Government. The Government issued an “Action Plan of Counter-Terrorism and Safety of 2001” (Amsterdam PD, 2005). That Action Plan implemented a large number of national protection and security measures. The Parliament of the Netherlands asked for firmer measures for counter-terrorism and provided new financial, personnel, and material resources. A fundamental increase of powers in criminal procedures and considerable expansion of the capacity of counter-terrorism institutions were initiated in the fight against terrorism (Amsterdam PD, 2005). A respondent commented
Every crisis spawned new kinds of policies. So the parliament in the Netherlands asked for new and stronger policies and further regulations and our organization got more money and people to do all the work on counter-terrorism. You see in the development of the organization, you see a crisis, you see a lot of money coming and a lot of questions from the parliament for newer policies, firmer policies, stricter policies to make counter-terrorism more effective in the Netherlands.

The terrorist attacks increased the sense of urgency toward terrorism in the Netherlands, and the threat was considered serious by the society as well (Amsterdam PD, 2005; NCTb, 2007a, 2007b). The threat of terrorism affected the open nature of Dutch society to the extent that a threat of politically and ideologically motivated terrorism could lead to a “danger of polarisation and animosity between certain communities along ethnic and ideological dividing lines.” (Amsterdam PD, 2005). The Dutch authorities realized this potential danger of polarization. The authorities developed counter-terrorism policies in accordance with the new threat of terrorism. Dutch officials recognized the fact that the terrorists might pragmatically select targets and could quickly form their terrorist cells and networks (NCTb, 2007b). A perpetual threat also came in the form of terrorists’ inconspicuous infiltration of society and long preparation for terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the nature of terrorist attacks often required little preparation by terrorists. Semi-autonomous terrorist cells increasingly focused on soft approachable targets (Amsterdam PD, 2005). Although the nature of new terrorism was not unique to the Netherlands, it was new to Dutch society. Within the Western World,
the Netherlands was one of the first nations to be faced with the emerging threat of terrorism.

Overall, four incidents in the Netherlands played a significant role in the overall counter-terrorism initiatives. These were the 9/11 terrorist incidents, in 2001, the murder of a Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, in 2002, the terrorist incidents in Madrid, in 2004, and the murder of the well-known artist Theo Van Gogh, in 2004. This series of triggering events caused a series of political actions and organizational re-arrangements of protective forces in the Netherlands. New organizations emerged for national coordination, existing organizations were re-structured, institutions started to collaborate along with other political and social arrangements at the local and national-level. But more importantly, the organizations started to learn, including the police organizations.

E. LEARNING INITIATIVES

The interview data indicated that, while the triggering events were unfolding, the Dutch police organizations launched large scale learning initiatives. Interview data clearly indicated that an immediate response of the police organizations to terrorism was a search for learning opportunities about terrorism and the prevention of terrorist attacks. Below is a discussion of learning initiatives.

1. Internal Organizational Learning Experiences

The Netherlands never had a major incident of terrorism prior to Pim Fortuyn’s politically motivated murder. Without a need to respond to terrorist incidents, the Dutch
government agencies were slow to develop a counter-terrorism department. Once triggering events activated the political agenda, a Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus was developed at local and national levels. The emerging counter-terrorism department had unique organizational features; however, that department still was compatible with the logical framework of this study.

a. Learning from Past Experiences and Using the Existing Structures

Interview and documentary data indicated that the existing organizational structures of the Dutch Police were revamped after a consideration of experiences learned from other crime fighting strategies. For example, when confronted with terrorism, the Amsterdam -Amstelland Regional Police Department (Amsterdam PD) developed their counter-terrorism tactical strategies based on regular police work and their suppression techniques of organized crime:

There is a certain overlap between (organised) criminal activity and terror linked activities. Nearly all major terrorist groups make use of organised crime in order to obtain the funds required for their terrorist actions. This connection increases as communities who were willing to support certain terrorist actions in the past are becoming less inclined to do so. When dealing with crime in the region, said support is becoming a more important factor in the prevention of terror. Due to these closer ties with organised crime more of the powers and tracing down methods used with regard to organised crime can therefore be applied in the search for terrorist activity. This applies in particular to the following types of
crime: drug trafficking, arms trade, extortion, credit card fraud and passport fraud (Amsterdam PD, 2005).

The Amsterdam PD concluded that since terrorism is a form of organized crime, training the existing SWAT team in counter-terrorism would be a more feasible option, instead of setting up a new counter-terrorism SWAT team. A respondent said, “[their] starting point is regular police work, when [they] do protection and security in general. [They] have to add specific elements of terrorism in it. It is not the other way around.” When the Amsterdam Police Department learned more about terrorism, they taught relevant aspects of terrorism such as radicalization, to the street workers, school administrators and other social servants as a new component to their existing cooperation on crime.

The interviews indicated that the Dutch Police regularly share their experience and learn from each other. A best practice attained by a police department is shared with the Police Academy of the Netherlands and the Board of Commissioners. In the Netherlands, the chiefs of 26 police organizations meet bimonthly to discuss both incidental and systematic issues prepared by its sub-committees. When the Board of Commissioners agrees to change procedures, such as in crisis management or investigation policies, the procedures are standardized nationally. Best practices are studied by the sub-committees and distributed to other police organizations. If there is demand for a specific experience, the Police Academy can develop training courses for

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6 As explained in the literature review chapter, this study used Moghaddam’s five step process for the concept of radicalization.
the police departments. A respondent commented that “the Police Academy plays a significant role in terms of converting those experiences into lessons.”

The interview data revealed that the KLPD evaluates all counter-terrorism investigations or operations upon their completion. These evaluations provide internal feedback on the quality of information gathering and operational tactics. By evaluating the qualities of the investigations, the KLPD has the opportunity to develop better investigation and prevention methods. KLPD also meets regularly with other intelligence agencies on systematic bases, or when incidents occur, and seek to learn other organizations’ perspectives on counter-terrorism. At the same time, in order to enhance their practices, the agents of KLPD welcome other organizations’ criticism about KLPD’s stance on terrorist events and receive their recommendations.

The Dutch Government employs Crime-Figure Analysis Inspections biannually in order to systematically measure with statistical scales the effectiveness of anti-crime and counter-terrorism. Quantitative measures of organizational processes are the basis of policy development and modification. These inspections provide external feedback to the system of police services in the Netherlands. These internal and external feedback mechanisms are possible because the Dutch police organizations record every aspect of their efforts in counter-terrorism in written or other formats. While the judicial aspect of documentation entails evidence necessary for the court processes, the professional aspect entails the technical and tactical information necessary for the new generation of employees and more importantly for the growth of institutional worldview focused on
organizational learning and change in response to external and internal pressure. A respondent said

[T]here is an automatic way that I am already a senior that I can give my way of researching and things that I can all hand it over to the newer generation. . . . So, the structure of our department is still that I write everything down that I am doing: all kinds of ways of researching, as well as research of the results, I write it down incessantly. That means, when I get killed by a car accident, then tomorrow morning somebody else can go in my system and all the intelligence and all the information is still there.

The Dutch Police keep the capability of maintaining a continuous progress because of their institutional memory, so that they can take lessons and improve their systems based on their experiences. The institutional memory is strengthened by the contributions of all counter-terrorism members at all levels.

b. Learning from Innovative and Multi-Disciplinary Approaches

The interview data and the field observations indicate that the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus vigorously searches for innovations, from new technical equipment to implementation of national-level coordination systems. Ideas and innovative approaches are encouraged and valued. The combination of these ideas and innovative approaches provides a learning environment. A respondent’s comment clearly describes the general approach of the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus:
The innovation agenda, that’s one thing we learned, we are developing right now. It is our internal imagination that we are describing our working processes, so we put it on paper. All the learning experience, all the knowledge within the heads of the senior people are written down in manuals, protocols and stuff like that. That’s what we are doing at this moment. . . . As we try to develop new projects together with our partners and to make things better and we try to learn in those projects; we try to pilot things, test things, and learn from it and then make a decision whether or not to go on with the things we do.

The KLPD collaborates with other institutions and learns about other approaches to discover the gaps that terrorists might utilize. For this purpose, the KLPD mutually exchanges two officers with other institutions, such as customs administration and banks, for year-long periods. A team of two counter-terrorism officers works within another agency in order to learn the nature of the work and to educate themselves on where to look for evidence and how to conduct an investigation in an efficient way in different settings.

A mundane detail may not mean anything to a customs officer, but may mean a lot to a counter-terrorism police officer. Learning the nature of procedures and the conditions at other settings during the temporary assignments, counter-terrorism personnel think and act more creatively and can see possible gaps in those systems that could be used by terrorists. Likewise, by learning the nature of police work, the customs officers provide better help to the police during investigations. Through this innovative
and collaborative approach, the Dutch Police are better able to know how to look for information, where to look for it, and what type of analysis they need to use to solve the cases. Furthermore, the Dutch Police have the opportunity to give more effective advice to other institutions in order to make their systems safer.

Another innovative practice of the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus is known as the “person-specific approach”. This approach informs suspects involved in terrorism-related activities that law enforcement agencies consider them persons of official interest. Because persons of interest are kept under observation, the individuals around them become aware that they may all become the subject of state interventions. Ultimately the likelihood reduces that those persons of interest are involved in terrorism, and they are no longer usable as terrorist operatives (NCTb, 2007c).

The counter-terrorism unit searches for innovative practices to prevent terrorism. Counter-terrorism unit members argue that being reactive by trying to catch the criminals or terrorists after the incidents can only be considered as an “operational perspective” and such a perspective inadequately tackles terrorism. Preventive methods have continuously been developed through innovative approaches and sound policing tactics. A respondent commented

Our goal is to eradicate the threat. This is our passion. Allocating so many officers after a bomb attack is a very mundane way of policing. Indeed, allocating so many officers for the prevention of those attacks is much more important. The name of our unit is Unit for Counter-terrorism, not Unit for Terrorism.
For a better response to terrorism, the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus uses a multi-disciplinary approach and recruits qualified people with specific skills. When there is a need for experts in legal, technical or sociological fields, candidates with expertise from those fields are recruited rather than filling the positions with police officers. For example, KLPD has forensic experts, computer forensic experts, accountants, historians, linguistic experts, and Middle East experts. These experts interpret the results of the investigative operations and make recommendations to strengthen the counter-terrorism responses.

In sum, the Netherlands’ innovative and multi-disciplinary approaches have played significant roles in their development of the counter-terrorism apparatus, and those approaches have become an everyday practice of the counter-terrorism activities.

2. External Organizational Learning Experiences

External organizational learning experiences as an aid to counter-terrorism emerged as a strong organizational process in the interview and the documentary data. The regional police organizations, the KLPD and other components of the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus focus on external organizational experiences. All components of the apparatus seriously take into account the best practices of other police organizations in counter-terrorism. The members of the apparatus visited countries where major terrorist incidents occurred. Those visits allowed a mutual exchange of organizational experiences among countries. The organizations support international travel to support the transfer of best practices. The members of the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus join
international conferences, meet with their colleagues, visit other police organizations’ sites and bring new practices to their own settings. One respondent succinctly described external learning: “We try to learn from the incidents abroad. We try to learn. We try to steal and make it better.” A second respondent explained external learning this way:

I started to read this book. And that gave me a lot of points that I could grab. The second thing I did was to go to England and to send one of the colleagues who joined my team in England with one assignment and it was “steal everything that we can use”. And my colleague was in London for one week and she was able to get all the information on CD-ROM, in maps, [and brought back] a whole suitcase of information.

The researcher’s field observations showed that professional courtesy is an important variable in external learning experiences. Although they may be from different countries, police officers trust each other, not only because of similarity in their professional cultures but also because of their common enemy of terrorism. The Dutch Police have met with courteous colleagues wherever they visited. A respondent said, “I joined over there the counter-terrorism branch, the special branch, the information [center], the intelligence [branch]. Once you are inside, they show you everything.”

The Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus has been keen on worst case scenarios approach and ensures that governmental agencies and companies in different sectors periodically fulfill concerted exercises. A worst case scenario approach was largely based on external learning experiences. When explaining his experiences, a respondent
shaped his comments in such a way that he was impressed with the lessons he learned in New York:

I was lectured a unique lesson in New York. . . . The guy said, “exercise, exercise and exercise. If you don't exercise you don't know what to do when it goes wrong.” . . . And we learned that lesson. . . . A couple of years ago we didn’t exercise a lot. . . . The British are very good at it. They have a button up system. . . . It means that at the lower-level they ask what sort of exercises do they want to do? They go out and execute the exercise. . . . It is an interesting system.

These comments reaffirm the fact that sometimes others’ drastic experiences may become inspirational tools to enhance the systems and have a profound effect on efforts of organizational change at home.

Organizations have identified best practices. Any practice that is useful or effective, or perceived as a powerful tool to achieve good results is designated as a best practice. Best practices are considered seriously by other organizations, because police professionals are more likely to trust one another’s recommendations and their own first-hand observations. A respondent explains this style of learning: “For example, I come to you and ask ‘what is your best practice?’ and you say something and I take this as a best practice by believing and trusting you. I mean, I ask experts who have actually tried and gotten a good result out of that particular practice.”

Attempts to replicate international practices may not be effective outside the context in which they developed. Nevertheless, interview data indicate others’
experiences do provide an impetus and inspiration of organizational changes at home. A respondent describes the process of learning from others’ experiences as an “intellectual leap:”

It is also very important to realize that you can’t transfer a best practice from another country directly to your country, because the context is different. But you have to try to learn and make the intellectual leap to make it applicable in your own country. And that’s what we always try to do. So when we see a good idea in other countries, we try to make it applicable in our own situation.

In some cases, there is no need for major intellectual leaps. In today’s contemporary world, police organizations are similar. The Amsterdam PD perceived itself as similar to the London Metropolitan Police Service. A Dutch respondent explained the reasons why they had selected London:

Why London? In general, we think that the police systems are quite similar in England and in Holland. So the philosophy was that everything that works over there can work over here as well. Because there is not a big difference in culture, there is not a big difference in the approach of policing. And we say they do have the experience, 20 years of Irish terrorism.

Moreover, sometimes taking lessons from elsewhere may even give an initial impetus at home. The case of Amsterdam PD supports this proposition. The Dutch respondent cited that their starting point was the lesson they learned from London:
We started a project team. I became a project leader. I have a small team of 6 people. And we have to develop new methods. We have to develop new approaches [and new methods of] learning and [have to] use the experiences from England. . . . And of course in an indirect way we learned from the experiences in Madrid. . . . The experiences in London provided us with a guideline for our activities.

External organizational experiences helped to improve counter-terrorism techniques, equipment, technology and the counter-terrorism systems in the Netherlands. For example, Amsterdam PD enhanced their crisis management system and many of their technological equipment, such as the X-ray system which can look through walls, by learning from the British System. Another respondent explains how the KLPD makes use of external information:

I have been abroad many times as part of our studies about the quality of the analysis reports. I have looked at the best practices. I have been to England, the USA, Switzerland, and Italy, and asked them how they do it. I learned at least one thing from each one of those places. I have been to New York for example. The NYPD has a Center for Information Analysis and Coordination. I asked them how they evaluate the information, what the criteria of the quality of the analysis reports are, and how they evaluate open source information. I also asked about how they combine classified and non-classified information and the usefulness of this information, in case someone is brought to the court.
In addition to travelling abroad, the Dutch Police invite foreign experts to give seminars on specific topics. The KLPD also works with other European police organizations and share information on an ad hoc basis. They also help other countries’ police organizations in their fight against transnational crime networks or terrorist groups.

Although external learning experiences have a significant role, or at least become a catalyst in the development of the Dutch Police in counter-terrorism practices, it is important to recognize that in the end, the overall structural innovations within the Dutch system are attuned to Dutch administrative and judicial systems.

All things considered, especially in counter-terrorism, the Dutch Police and the Dutch counter-terrorism Apparatus in general, have been open to implementing best practices, using counter-terrorism exercises, and crisis management systems regardless of the source of knowledge. The Dutch never hesitated to invest money, time or whatever it takes to strengthen organizational approaches to counter-terrorism.

3. Learning From Research and Theory

The Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus incorporates scientific knowledge in strategic counter-terrorism responses. The Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus grasps that counter-terrorism requires a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach. Most of the counter-terrorism efforts in the Netherlands rely on high quality efforts of a diverse work force. The KLPD recruits experts and academics based on counter-terrorism needs. The outcomes of previous operations are scientifically evaluated every other year to aid in the
emergence of future counter-terrorism strategies.

The Police Academy of the Netherlands works with universities to create exchange programs and update counter-terrorism curriculum for its cadets and in-service training courses. The Academy also organizes international conferences on policing to refresh counter-terrorism policies and practices.

Police organizations emphasize personal development of senior-level personnel in counter-terrorism. To this end, the police organizations organize expert meetings and encourage particular personnel to participate in conferences and workshops and to take master’s-level crisis management courses (Amsterdam PD, 2005).

In all, the analysis of data supported that learning from research and theory came into view as one of the most important factors in the development of the counter-terrorism policies and procedures in the Netherlands. A core value in the Dutch counter-terrorism organizational apparatus is scientific inquiry. Agencies’ organizational cultures are strongly influenced by current literature and new methods and tactics to cope with terrorism.

**F. CHANGE INITIATIVES**

The data indicate that the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus had a significant developmental era after the global-level terrorist incidents. The documentary evidence also supported the finding that the terrorist incidents provided the ultimate impetus within the political and institutional levels for action. The unfolding nature of terrorist incidents
triggered the political agenda for the creation of new institutions or the rearrangements of
the existing institutions. The plans that were prepared earlier found a chance to be
implemented. A series of reforms was realized both at the regional and national levels.
A flux of new bills, rules, provisions and policies came one after another. Policymakers
and local and national-level decision-makers pushed for the activation of previously
prepared plans for new initiatives.

Through internal and external organizational learning experiences and learning
from research and theory, the regional police organizations and the KLPD have attained a
great deal of organizational learning processes during their counter-terrorism effort.
These learning processes resulted in ever-changing and developing systems within the
Dutch Police as well as the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus in general. Extensive
change efforts took place, new components were added to their training programs and
organizational structures were modified.

1. Establishing New Response Mechanisms

Following the triggering events, an immediate response to the terrorism originated
within the KLPD. The KLPD assumed all operational, tactical and strategic
responsibility, and assigned the existing but very small unit, Unit for Counter-terrorism
and Activism (UCTA) under the DNR, for organizing new counter-terrorism activities.
Because there were not as yet terrorist incidents, there was no counter-terrorism unit in
any other police force. According to the respondents, the UCTA was expanded as the
triggering events unfolded, and improved through the learning initiatives.
The KLPD also developed institutional protocols to cooperate with Dutch intelligence and other law enforcement agencies. The KLPD acted on a broad scale across the Netherlands, and initiated regional police organizations’ counter-terrorism effort. Regional police organizations grew critical in success of counter-terrorism, and worked with other local organizations, such as the fire brigade, health services, and municipalities. Eventually, regional police organizations and the KLPD formed a national-level counter-terrorism system.

On the local level, the regional police organizations implemented their own counter-terrorism organizational initiatives. For example, the Amsterdam PD established a Counter-terrorism Project Team to prepare their organization for operational responses. A respondent said, the Chief of the Amsterdam PD used the motto of “We don’t have signs, we don’t have information, but we have to prepare our organization. And it is better to be prepared, of course, than to react.”

On the national level, the counter-terrorism campaign was led by the Minister of Justice, while the crisis and disaster policy was coordinated by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The Justice and Interior ministries signed a protocol of “Circulation of Surveillance and Security” in 2001. The protocol included the following issues:

- Cooperation among the police, national intelligence and military;
- Protection of individuals, units and services; and,
- Establishment of the Department of Surveillance and Protection.
Based on the “Circulation of Surveillance and Security” protocol, the KLPD worked with the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the Military Intelligence Service (MIVD), and initiated a joint working group, the Fellowship, to search for possible joint activities on the national level. KLPD, AIVD and MIVD appointed a representative to the joint working group. This collaboration created a nationwide series of innovative and coherent counter-terrorism systems.

The Fellowship’s recommendations created Regional Information Centers (RICs) in 25 regions and one National Information Center (NIC) was established in the center of the country. A Department for Surveillance and Security was established to coordinate all of the national counter-terrorism initiatives under the Ministry of Interior in 2002. All police organizations started to communicate nationwide more efficiently through the new system of linked centers. This new system of information was used to prepare a list of strategic and potential terrorist targets. By working collaboratively with the relevant sectors such as energy, transportation and water, a system of protection was established.

The newly established NIC and RICs as well as the existing security systems were reinforced with equipment and personnel, and the overall system was restructured. Some crucial tasks, such as operational check-lists of VIPs, the Royal Family, railways, ports, airports, energy sources, and others, the protocols with other ministries, the distribution of emergency calls (112), and mutual agreements among police organizations, were all reorganized. Police, fire and the emergency medical services connected and organized
nationally. Finally, the EBB became the NIC and the KLPD became the national coordinator for the surveillance and protection system in the Netherlands.

The way those new units were established posed a contemporary picture: An independent assessment team was established to recruit experts for the newly established counter-terrorism units. Applicants were tested objectively based on the developed assessment tools. A respondent explained that, as a result, civilian experts were recruited with an overwhelming majority over the sworn personnel for the newly established counter-terrorism units, to the extent that there were only 7 or 8 police officers out of some 90 personnel within those units at the initial stages. Although some reactions occurred within the police because of the hiring of many civilians, the KLPD was determined to follow a proper policy in its venture.

As part of the solution package of the Dutch Government, further arrangements were fulfilled. The capacity of the General Intelligence and Security Service was increased, especially in the areas of protection and security. An Alert System was developed following the Madrid incidents and both the police and the AIVD intensified their surveillance of individuals potentially involved in terrorism.

In addition, a system of coordination, called “Info Box”, was instituted. The Info Box, consisting of the representatives from the KLPD, the General Intelligence and Security Service, the Military Intelligence Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Investigation Service of the Tax and Customs Administration and the Public Prosecution Service, work collaboratively and meet regularly to compare and evaluate
relevant information. (Amsterdam PD, 2005) The following activities were developed as a result of the Info Box system, only until by the year of 2005 (Amsterdam PD, 2005):

- Developing and implementing a standard model of risk assessment;
- Increasing the quality of risk-threat analysis;
- Enhancing the process and organization of the information position;
- Setting up an information and analysis centre;
- Updating the inventory of risky objects, vital infrastructure and soft targets;
- Developing and implementing indicators of terrorist individuals; and
- Further improve the information exchange with the AIVD/National Criminal Investigation Bureau and the NCTb.

The unique system of Special Units and the Department of Special Intervention (Dienst Speciale Eenheden; DSI) were established within the KLPD in 2006 (NCTb, 2006b) as a result of the national counter-terrorism efforts of the Fellowship. The system of DSI is a systematized umbrella agency based on the different levels of operational needs. The goal of the system was to improve the cohesiveness of the operational aspect of the Dutch counter-terrorism system (NCTb, 2007c). This system is comprised of four different units (NCTb, 2007c):

- Arrest and Support Units: These are the units within the regional police forces or the Military Police (Koninklijke Marechaussee: KMar) for ordinary criminal situations regardless of any links with terrorist activities;
- Intervention Unit: This unit is composed of personnel from the military (2/3) and the police (1/3) for small-scale, high-risk operations;

- Marine Intervention Unit: This unit is for large-scale or complex operations and to support Intervention Unit when necessary;

- Expertise & Operational Support Unit: This unit is composed of snipers from the police and the military at equal numbers.

Another unique feature of the system of DSI is that the police and the military work together under the same oversight. The system functions automatically, based on the level of threat without further coordination effort each time.

As a result of organizational change initiatives, the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus continued to develop collaborative response mechanisms among institutions. The counter-terrorism system was designed to produce coordinated responses to possible terrorist activities (NCTb, 2007c), rather than maintain an array of individual, non-collaborative responses. Eventually, the apparatus has been functionally unified, improved and has gained a unique shape.

2. Introduction of Counter-terrorism Components into Training Programs

Learning initiatives taught police organizations that their personnel must receive training to be prepared for the imminent threat of terrorist incidents. In Amsterdam, the counter-terrorism Project Team developed a training program that was combined with the
training division for the department. The training program provided a strong message. That message focused police attention to local terrorist activities and then expanded that message to all street-level regional police officers. The new training program gave trainees indicators of terrorism and radicalization. Those indicators combined theory and experiences gained in London. A specialized training program was prepared for detectives and forensic experts who needed more detailed information on terrorism. The training program packages included multimedia components, trainer guidelines, and terrorism-related educational technology.

Although specialized counter-terrorism training had not yet been institutionalized, the existing training programs were expanded with special components of counter-terrorism. This researcher’s experience with the Dutch Police training system demonstrated that pre-service and in-service training programs were well designed with training outcomes implemented within the Dutch Police. A respondent said:

Counter-terrorism is a broad container item. You can say a lot about counter-terrorism. It could be operational, or technical or so on. It depends. But if it is operational we try to fit it in within regular programs within the Police Academy. We tune in specifically, for example, on counter-terrorism crises management or police investigations with counter-terrorism component. Lessons are integrated in both programs.

The Dutch Police use training as an effective tool to increase its organizational efficiency. To strengthen their operational capabilities, regional police organizations and
KLPD train their existing personnel in counter-terrorism, rather than establishing new counter-terrorism units and hiring additional personnel. The members of the National Crime Squad participate in physical training exercises every three months, and annual theoretical training, which include topics such as radicalization, indicators of terrorism, and the use of the internet. New members of the department receive specialized training before taking up their positions. All of these training programs were modified to include counter-terrorism components, which resulted from learning initiatives of the Dutch Police. The Dutch Police Academy also plays a significant role in developing those new components.

3. National Coordination of Dutch Counter-terrorism Effort

The overall data and the researcher’s field observations indicated that local perspectives and operational policing may not be able to perceive the overall magnitude of the actual threat of terrorism at all times. In the course of time, even the abnormalities may start to be seen as normal occurrences in a local setting. A normalization of the local community likely diminishes the sense of urgency to maintain a continuous vigil for terrorism at the local level. Therefore, a vigilant and broader look was necessary to understand what actually was occurring on a national-level. The Dutch Government recognized that, especially in counter-terrorism, a coordination function was critical. That coordination function implemented the national linkage of all local and national-level counter-terrorism initiatives.
a. Organizational Structure of the National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism

New legislative initiatives were enacted to better prosecute the perpetrators of terrorist acts, and the newly established surveillance and protection system was revamped in 2004. These initiatives were concluded with the establishment of the National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCTb) to coordinate all counter-terrorism efforts in the Netherlands. The initial impetus to establish such an organization came from the desire to identify weak points of the counter-terrorism structure. A respondent explained the source of the idea:

A private consultant was hired to make an assessment of this, somebody who had a long experience within the government, . . . who had experience within the intelligence community. He identified about twenty different players in counter-terrorism. And those twenty figures at different levels were interviewed and based on a SWOT Analysis.\(^7\) Strong and weak points were identified. And since a private consultant did it, he was more or less in independent position.

A national counter-terrorism organization like the NCTb had been planned earlier but implementation waited for a window of opportunity. A respondent commented:

The international incidents, the Madrid attacks actually inspired us to do this. It gave a sense of urgency to the organization that was needed. I think that’s the

\(^7\) SWOT Analysis is a method of evaluation of a system and denotes Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats that are involved.
main issue. We really look very good at the attacks, and ask ourselves a question, could those things happen in the Netherlands on a threat basis. Are there people in the Netherlands capable and willing to do something like those incidents at Madrid? Were there links between our radicalized groups and the people who did the Madrid attacks for instance?

The NCTb was assigned to combine and coordinate counter-terrorism initiatives, develop counter-terrorism policies, and analyze intelligence and other supplementary information to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts (NCTb, 2005). The Department for Surveillance and Security was integrated within the newly established NCTb after the incidents in Madrid.
Figure 3. The Organizational Structure of the Dutch National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism

Figure 3 shows the organizational structure of the NCTb. The organization functions with six departments. Although NCTb’s organizational structure appears similar to other types of organizational structures, interview data and field observations demonstrated that the NCTb’s structure was in fact functionally different than traditional, silo-structured bureaucratic organizations.\(^8\)

\(^8\) Silo-structured organization model can be described as hierarchical organizations, in which divisions do not communicate with and take advantage of each other at a satisfactory level, and pursue their own goals rather than pursuing the overall goals of the organization.
The Expertise and Analysis Department of the NCTb collates, integrates and analyzes information about radicalization and terrorism, and acts as a clearing house for information from the KLPD, the General Intelligence and Security Service the Military Intelligence Service, and other related institutions such as the Royal Military Constabulary, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the research community. The Expertise and Analysis Department brings into line research and the up-to-date picture of terrorism and counter-terrorism activities, and publishes studies, and produces periodic threat analyses reports, including national and international-level, long-term strategic analyses.

Published four to six times a year, the National Terrorist Threat Assessment Reports provide a clear picture of the overall security situation in the Netherlands. Through these reports, the department identifies potential threats to the country as a whole, and makes predictions of potential terrorism in the future. The trend reports, advisory proposals and other studies help in the understanding of the terrorism phenomenon and the development of better terrorist intervention strategies and the identification of gaps, overlaps and conflicts in bureaucratic functions (NCTb, 2005). Possible developments and venues for further proliferations of terrorist actions are described by taking long-term considerations into account. Although the reports are comprehensive, they are readable in length, language and content. With this capacity, the reports contribute decision and policy-making processes by giving realistic information. Reports are submitted to government bodies, policy makers and politicians.
Furthermore, the reports provide information on international dimensions of counter-terrorism activities, including the EU and global level. Reports also make connections between the Netherlands and the rest of the world by providing the synopsis of the developments regarding counter-terrorism and the international mechanisms. As a result, proactive informed internal and foreign policies are brought to the government’s attention.

The Policy and Strategy Department functions at two levels: At the national level, it works together with the relevant ministries and agencies. Using the advisory reports prepared by the Expertise and Analysis Department, the Policy and Strategy Department develops strategic frameworks and drafts concrete policy options for the government, and policy papers for the legislative body. At the international level, the department works with international organizations and other governments and promotes Netherlands’ counter-terrorism interests and helps the development of international policies. The NCTb ensures that those strategic policies and communication strategies are clear and unambiguous (NCTb, 2005). One of the respondents explained the role of the department in a succinct way:

All resources together could have threat analyses. And most of our counterparts in other countries stop there. They make the analysis, they give that to the government and that's it. We started where all the others stopped. Based on the analyses in certain departments, based on proposals, policy implications, if this is the case then this is what needs to be done. If this is the analysis, then this is the
threat, and this is how we should respond or react to it. So, it is not just analysis; it is not just information, it is not just bringing together the different sources of information, but it is also drawing conclusions from those analyses.

Expectantly, the policy alternatives are prepared based on its inclusive analyses and the progress that has been achieved by the counter-terrorism apparatus.

The Coordination and Crisis Management Department coordinates all institutional activities toward counter-terrorism on an incidental and a systematic basis. The systematic coordination involves a broad range of activities, such as reviewing the systems of operational counter-terrorism units, dealing with the spread of terrorist statements through satellite channels and the internet, and sharing information and expertise on counter-terrorism with institutions and local bodies. All these efforts by the department ensure that all of the counter-terrorism activities, especially the activities at the operational-level, are integrated, coherent, and coordinated.

The Coordination and Crisis Management Department also runs and coordinates the “Alert System”, to serve as the basis for all counter-terrorism measures to be taken by the governmental institutions and for the sectors. In case of an acute threat, the department coordinates the process to make sure that the right people are receiving the right information at the right time. In this process, the department does not put all citizens, institutions and sectors into one category, and differentiates all entities appropriate to their respective alert levels based on the factual information. Based on the threat levels, the government receives policy prescriptions; intelligence services receive
coordinated information; law enforcement agencies receive immediate coordination and
the updated to-do lists; and private sectors receive specific measures to be taken. As one
government document on surveillance and protection reflects "[a] threat to a specific
sector does not necessarily imply that the risk for the entire country has increased to the
same extent" (NCTb, 2006a).

In addition, the department advises the relevant political, judicial and local
authorities on the deployment of appropriate operational units based on the level of the
incidents. In the system of DSI, the department takes a role with national situations by
heading the policy team to advise the minister of justice on the issues of the DSI units’
planning and deployment (NCTb, 2006b). For efficient response, “the department [also]
develops a drilling and training policy and a crisis management strategy especially for
terrorism” (NCTb, 2005).

The Surveillance and Protection Department coordinates the surveillance and
protection of critical individuals, services or objects, such as the Royal Family, political
leaders, diplomats, embassies, and military and civil buildings. While the responsibilities
for safety rest with police departments and other security institutions, the department
makes solicited or unsolicited recommendations based on assessment reports and other
intelligence. These recommendations include possible new counter-terrorism models and
preventive measures. The department also makes sure that protocols function well
among regional police departments, and provides additional equipment and other
resources (NCTb, 2005). The modi operandi of the terrorist cells are also examined to
develop preventive measures and advice. The department does not dictate a set of preventive measures to other institutions. By employing a collaborative approach, the department ensures that the other institutions feel that they make an important contribution and provide genuine support. A respondent’s comments were noteworthy in this matter:

So we brought the parties together, they talked and then went back to their own organizations and went to work on what measures are necessary for a certain alert system. Then we came back to try to coordinate the measures with each other and then, in their own organizations and made them definitive. That’s the way to treat a terrorist attack.

The Civil Aviation Security Department ensures the security of civil aviation and airports based on the standards set within the National Civil Aviation Security Plan. The security plan includes all of the focal points, such as passenger, cargo and airport protection. The Civil Aviation Security Inspectorate, systematically assesses the quality of civil aviation security and reports to the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb, 2005).

The Communication Section keeps the public and business sector informed about terrorism and the efforts of the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus. The Section performs its tasks by developing communication plans and protocols with other parties by gauging the public’s information needs and by informing the media on terrorism related issues.
b. Organizational Features of the National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism

The uniqueness of the Dutch counter-terrorism National Coordination System does not only come from collating and analyzing the information on terrorist activities or coordinating the operational governmental bodies, but it also comes from analyzing all counter-terrorism efforts of all government, local, business and social institutions. The NCTb coordinates all relevant entities within the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus in a way that every entity inevitably has to be inside the overall system. To ensure this coordination, the NCTb functions like one brain, by bringing and considering all variables together, and provide different types and levels of services appropriate to the needs of the consumers. All regional police organizations, the KLPD, the General Intelligence and Security Service, the Military Intelligence Service, the Royal Military Constabulary, fire brigades, emergency services, other relevant state institutions, seaport, airport, and railway administrations, as well as the private sectors have to be in the overall system. Every institution has to work coherently with others and enhance its own system progressively so as to catch up with the current system of the counter-terrorism apparatus. The executive branch and the legislative branch of the Government are well informed through evidence-based assessments and through progress reports consisting of all institutions’ activities and situations.
NCTb’s success does come from its unique approaches. First, “quality” is the most noticeable tenet of the organization from top to bottom. One respondent’s comment confirms this finding:

When the coordinator was appointed, he said, “I don't want any legal power to enforce others. But I do want a job based on quality. I'll prove to them that it is useful to work with me.” He defends that power comes from the quality.

In order to achieve quality, the NCTb pays great attention to scientific inquiry and works with research institutions and universities. During its scientific inquiries with universities, the NCTb discovered that there was little research in the field of terrorism in the Netherlands. For that reason, the NCTb allocates funds for joint research projects with the universities. As a result of these cooperative effort, a graduate program has been introduced and joint research projects were conducted. Many research projects have been outsourced to the academic community on issues, such as radicalization, the influence of media, polarization and segregation. Indeed, most innovations are being introduced as a result of these joint projects. A respondent’s comments best describes the current culture of the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus:

[W]e try to develop new projects together with our partners and to make things better and we try to learn in those projects, we try to pilot things, test things, and learn from it and then make a decision whether or not to go on with the things we do.

The NCTb goes beyond working with universities to develop research in counter-
terrorism. It brings other institutions, such as the Ministry of Justice, and several major universities together for the initiation of research projects and contributes funds to these joint initiatives in order to develop research questions for research proposals, and the NCTb ultimately ensures that those funded projects are implemented. As a result, the NCTb publishes major studies such as suicide terrorism, the use of internet in terrorism, and financial dimensions of terrorism. Such publications provide global perspectives of the phenomenon of terrorism, its financial and international dimensions and its connections with other organized crime networks. The NCTb functions as an advisory entity of the government, and an objective and realistic knowledge disseminator to a broader audience.

Second, the NCTb personnel are carefully selected. Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, and teamwork is the priority within the organization. The NCTb’s experts and researchers publish integrated multidisciplinary analytic reports, trend reports, threat assessments and publishable academic pieces. With the help of such a diverse intellectual foundation and research capability, the NCTb processes acquired data and information, and provides consultation services to third parties on the issues of intervention strategies and interpretation of the phenomena in the area of terrorism.

By bringing the intelligence and security communities and the academia together at different occasions, the NCTb also contributes to inter-agency trust among those parties to create a positive synergy and ultimately to foster a high quality, integrated response to terrorism.
Third, the NCTb tests and improves its own structure, and makes other organizations and wider systems test and improve their own structure on a regular basis. As a part of the Alert System, the organization produces extensive programs, which include workshops, tabletop exercises to practice decision making procedures and similar operational exercises (NCTb, 2007c). All relevant entities, from special teams to the Royal Netherlands Air Force and from water and energy suppliers to other listed sectors, practice those exercises based on the agreements made among agencies and with the NCTb:

In June, an operational exercise will be staged for the airport sector. And in the autumn, operational exercises will be held for the gas, electricity and nuclear sectors. Next April, a tabletop exercise will be held for the financial sector. And throughout the year, workshops will be held for the “newest” sectors. (NCTb, 2007c)

By making other organizations test their own structures, the NCTb ensures that they recognize their own strengths and weaknesses, learn from their own experiences during real-life concerted exercises, and ultimately improve their systems both internally and collectively. In this sense, the NCTb acts like a connecting tissue among the entities, ensures that all parties work coherently and that the overall counter-terrorism apparatus progresses continuously. When explaining NCTb’s role, one of the respondents uttered, “in case of an attack, we have to be as professional as we can be.” The NCTb coordinates other institutions’ joint exercises based on worst case scenarios.
In addition to the national level, by including the Special Intervention Units, Dutch local police forces and their counterparts in a neighboring country, the NCTb coordinates larger scale preparatory exercises based on the EU level agreements (NCTb, 2007c).

Fourth, the NCTb was not designed to slow the actions of the agencies because of coordination, or to make other institutions wait for the assessment reports or alert levels. It is imperative that any governmental institution or any respective body or sector must take immediate action in case of an acute threat or incident (NCTb, 2006a). The ultimate goals of national coordination are to expedite concerted interventions during incidents and to increase the efficiency of interventions. For this reason, the NCTb helps the institutions to realize more tangible cooperative initiatives that empower the overall counter-terrorism apparatus of the Netherlands.

The NCTb maintains a sound service for the security services. It provides larger perspectives, comprehensive information, alternative policy options and efficient coordination. Although the main purpose of the NCTb is counter-terrorism, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that through NCTb, all of the country's security institutions progressively discover how to work together on other security issues as well. In addition, such a structure is a great breakthrough to overcome the silo structures of the governmental organizations, and reinforcement of the interaction among the public and private sectors and the citizens.

The NCTb plays a role in a variety of fields, from derailing the radicalization
process to establishing interconnected operational systems, and advising institutions from the local to governmental administrations. Instead of trying to bring all relevant institutions under one umbrella as in the case of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Netherlands’ NCTb approach seems unique considering its roles and capabilities. This model makes all parties work coherently, cooperatively and collaboratively. A respondent’s comments are noticeably meaningful to this end: “I don't think we are vulnerable at this moment. Two years ago, we were very vulnerable. We needed to create a division [like the NCTb].”

The Dutch have developed this model by questioning their existing counter-terrorism apparatus rigorously without the fear of recognizing their own mistakes, and more importantly, without the fear of change. As a result, they have created a counter-terrorism model that many other European countries try to emulate.

G. POLICY INITIATIVES

Policy initiatives are an organization’s initiatives aimed at changing the overall policies and practices by working together with other institutions. The Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus was provoked by the triggering events and went through learning initiatives and change process. Through those change initiatives, the Dutch Police learned to collaborate and create solutions to emerging issues. From Fellowship to Info Box and from the National Surveillance and Protection System to the System of DSI, the Dutch police organizations were always involved in joint response mechanisms. Data from interviews and documentary evidence indicate a strong inter-agency collaboration
among agencies ever since the initial stages of counter-terrorism efforts in the Netherlands. The overall data indicate that national coordination and institutional cooperation are foremost tenets of the Dutch counter-terrorism apparatus.

A collaborative nature of organizational change initiatives has led the Dutch Police and the counter-terrorism apparatus in general, to achieve sound policy initiatives. The data and the field observations showed that the Dutch Police are aware of the fact that police responses are not, and cannot be the only solution in the struggle against terrorism. A respondent commented on the vision of the Dutch Police:

We write down the concept to get all the organizations on board, going in the same direction. We believe in, let's say, prevention, but we are not the only ones who can act on the issue of prevention. We need more. If we want to improve awareness, then it is not only a police issue but we have to be partners in achieving that.

With this awareness, both the regional police organizations and the KLPD take serious steps toward facilitating inter-agency collaboration along with other players in counter-terrorism, for example, community citizens, non-governmental organizations, local administrations, and other institutions of the national government.

1. Local Level Policy Initiatives

The Dutch Police work with the relevant departments of local administrations and guide them in more purposeful directions to solve the problems or to identify them at
their developmental stages. Especially in counter-terrorism, the regional police organizations are well connected to their local administrations. Moreover, the police are able to evaluate the observations of the local public officials, and ultimately to help them take appropriate steps in counter-terrorism.

The Police obtain the opinions of the local officials to determine their courses of action toward terrorism prevention. Furthermore, with the help of local role players, the police seek possibilities on how to increase awareness and vigilance within the society, so that through society’s “open eyes and ears” the police can be helped. By working with other public officials closely, the police keep better track of social radicalization. A respondent said, “looking at the terrorist attacks in London, you can't rely on central intelligence organization anymore. You have to use the information that is on the local ground.”

Police policy initiatives are instrumental tools others can use. For example, in dealing with radicalization the police provide indicators to the teachers and social workers on how to recognize radical, socially destructive changes in the behavior of juveniles. A respondent explained this process:

You can say, they are the ones like the police officers in a specific neighborhood. The teacher can see the changes in behavior. And not that it proves the change, but you can notice it, get curious, and then you put the pieces together. And then you can get a profile of a youngster, who is into the process of radicalization. And then you can intervene. And that intervention can be made by the police. It
can be made by, let's say, the imam of the mosque; it can be a teacher.

Sometimes it's like a case study. “This is the youngster, what do you know? What do you see? What can you do and who is in charge?”

Meanwhile, the police continue with the street workers, school administrators and other community stakeholders to find appropriate remedies for youngsters who are becoming radicalized with the ideas of terrorist organizations. Once radicalization is discovered, then a local setting and the police follow up on the case until solutions are found. If the individuals convert their radical ideas into terrorist actions, then the regional police track down those individuals or deport them to disrupt their actions (Amsterdam PD, 2005). Yet, this style of suppression is not unique to terrorism. The Dutch Police added such counter-terrorism components as a new dimension in their crime fighting strategies. The Amsterdam Police developed a diversity component, for the in-service training programs for the training of its police officers, to deal with discrimination candidly, and ultimately slow the process of radicalization within Dutch society. The core objectives of the diversity plan are presented in Table 2.⁹

⁹ Some of the spellings of quoted portions of this study follow the European standards.
Table 2
The Amsterdam Police Department Diversity Course Objectives

THE CORE OBJECTIVES OF THE AMSTERDAM-AMSTELLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT DIVERSITY PROGRAM

- Developing, implementing and monitoring of chain management and activities across the chain, aimed at:
  - our multi-cultural and diverse society by preventing polarisation, mobilising positive forces and stopping discrimination, radicalisation and extremist ideas;
  - a multi-cultural and diverse police force by preventing polarisation, mobilising positive forces and stopping discrimination, radicalisation and extremist ideas;

- Developing, implementing and monitoring force-wide activities across the chain aimed at:
  - improving the level of professionalism of community police officers;
  - improving and standardising of the management process in terms of efforts and results and capacity management within the district teams;
  - increased satisfaction of citizens with regard to police services and increased willingness to report to the police;
  - improving the flow of information to victims and optimisation of victim mediation and recovery of damages.
Implementing and monitoring of networks, the use of (technical) aids (setting and enforcing limits, selecting and identifying) and powers that may contribute to achieving the aforementioned objectives.

Field observations support that diversity objectives create an institutional image that gives the police a leading role among other agencies in counter-terrorism efforts and a more genuine look and position toward citizens. By adopting such a diversity program, the Amsterdam PD not only responds to terrorism in a best way but also becomes an example to other institutions. The department understands the fact that, serving a diverse society can best be achieved through a diverse police force.

In addition to such community policing initiatives, the counter-terrorism efforts of the regional police organizations are reinforced with larger initiatives at the local levels. The collaborative initiatives of regional police organizations have contributed to the creation of a well-integrated and coordinated counter-terrorism system in the Netherlands. Regional police organizations have assumed the responsibility as the first responders and started working with local authorities. Local collaboration reduced reliance on centralized bureaucracy and produced more tangible results in police effectiveness. For example, Amsterdam PD worked with all relevant and responsible institutions at the local level, and launched the Amsterdam-Amstelland Counter-terrorism Policy in 2005, together with the local response mechanism, called Vijfhoek, which was established during the Iraq crisis in 2003. Vijfhoek is “a consultation platform, consisting of the local municipality, the Public Prosecutor, the police, the fire brigade and the public
“health service” (Amsterdam PD, 2005). The counter-terrorism policy specified the administrative, judicial and police-level implications (Amsterdam PD, 2005):

After the Madrid attacks during the spring of 2004, the Vijfhoek investigated to what extent Amsterdam is prepared for terrorism and has developed a strategy that aims to reduce the risk of an attack, as well as the consequences of an attack.

... 

After the attacks in Madrid and the increased threat of terrorism, a portfolio manager has been appointed within the force responsible for further developing counter-terrorism. This policy plan is part of that development.

This counter-terrorism policy drew the main principles of prevention as well as the coordinated response mechanisms at the administrative, judicial and police levels. The policy was prepared to organize institutions, citizens, companies, commerce, ports, airports and all other entities. Public confidence became the key concern of the policy. The goals of the policy were defined as follows (Amsterdam PD, 2005):

- Reducing the chance of an attack (reducing the likelihood);
- Limiting the consequences (victims/damage);
- Tracking down the perpetrators.

Amsterdam-Amstelland counter-terrorism Policy followed the idea that “counter-terrorism is most effective within a structure and organisation of crisis management in which the organisations involved collaborate with clearly defined responsibilities and
under unambiguous leadership” (Amsterdam PD, 2005). As a result, the existing relationships among the public institutions and private sectors were rearranged and their responsibilities were redefined. The policy gave a task to the police to “develop a series of measures for organisations and companies to implement in order to reduce the likelihood of an attack.”

The Amsterdam PD made sure that all institutions, citizens, companies, commerce and other entities, such as ports, roads, waterways, railways, and airports were organized under a comprehensive cooperation, coordination, and communication system. For this reason, the department clearly specified roles and responsibilities, and goals. Relevant public agencies and private sectors started to take roles in administrative exercises with scenarios of terrorist attacks. The PD investigated and certified the participating agencies based on redefined safety standards. Consequently, multi-disciplinary quick response teams were set up and they became more coordinated and faster at the regional level. By achieving such coordinated actions, “public confidence” is gained and it becomes “clear to all citizens that the authorities are capable of acting in a timely and adequate manner” (Amsterdam PD, 2005).

As a result, the Dutch Police took steps to respond to terrorism by establishing sound relationships with local governments. Although the regional police organizations are not under the command of the KLPD, they act in tune with the national policies.
2. National Level Policy Initiatives

In the Netherlands national-level counter-terrorism policies are developed and coordinated by the NCTb. The NCTb prepares policy alternatives for decision making to determine potential threat to the Netherlands as a whole (NCTb, 2005). The NCTb also provides perspectives of possible venues for more institutional collaboration by operationalizing the roles for each institution under international, political and administrative conditions. These perspectives consider previous legislative initiatives, governmental actions and institutional arrangements. For example, when a person-specific approach or border control systems are evaluated, the NCTb reports consider the historical development of the initiative, rephrase and clarify the original purpose of it and ultimately review all relevant bodies' and institutions' achievements in a succinct manner. This feature of the NCTb presents a strong foundation for a rational policy making process in counter-terrorism. Based on the gathered information and analyses, the NCTb drafts concrete policies for the government and the legislative body:

The information that flows in from these sources is analysed and underlying patterns and implications are identified. This provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of terrorism and counter-terrorism. It also generates the insights needed to develop substantive and cohesive counter-terrorism policy at national and international level.

[The] advisory reports interpreting the information supplied by the intelligence providers and containing proposals for pending policy issues, proposals for
measures to be taken by NCTb or third parties and assessments of threat levels for sectors taking part in the Counterterrorism Alert System (NCTb, 2005).

Incidental and systematic national coordination integrates the parties involved and the overall policies and practices growing in coherence. Politicians, public officials and the public are informed through coordinated assessment reports and organizational changes are realized in a range of policy fields.

This nationally connected policy making mechanism results in the production of coherent policies. As an example, the government is frequently advised to tackle the issues of “radicalization and recruitment, which increase the risk of terrorist attacks. Both local and central government are taking measures to identify, prevent, isolate, intervene in and curb radicalization and recruitment before it is too late” (NCTb, 2005).

In order to prevent radicalization, the overall system operates coherently. While the Immigration and Naturalization Service seeks to control undesirable guest speakers from entering the country by monitoring the visa process, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the customs authorities and the Royal Military Constabulary work collaboratively to stop suspicious individuals at the Dutch border. The Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, works with credit institutions if individuals or foundations become involved in terrorism or extremism. The Dutch Government also has been increasing its collaboration with the United States and other western countries on a systematic basis to curb terrorists ties abroad (Amsterdam PD, 2005).
The institutions within the counter-terrorism apparatus also contribute for a more coherent service style as a whole. For example, after the investigations, if the police find some gaps among systems or find failures in a particular system, and if a policy needs to be changed within the state institutions, then they make a proposal of policy change through the Ministry of Interior. If a policy change is necessary within a particular sector, again the police make a proposal. Consequently, the police prepare reports based on the analyses of the results of their activities and produce policy recommendations not only for the legislative body of the country but also for other institutions and sectors. These policy recommendations may range from drug, immigration and customs policies to terrorism or any national issue concerning security. NCTb ensures that there is no information asymmetry during such processes.

On the national level, institutions are ideally supposed to collaborate. All of the local information is evaluated and interpreted at the national level, whether they are part of larger schemes or international ties. The evaluated information coordinates with other institutions’ information, such as Immigration, the railroad police, the harbors and the airports. Expectantly, everything does not work smoothly. For example, at some stage in the information exchange process among the institutions, the military intelligence may have stricter rules on security clearance or the police may not always be willing to reveal the exact names of the suspected individuals to other institutions at the beginning of an investigation. But what is important is that the system that brings the agencies together does exist.
H. SUMMARY OF THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS

The case of the Netherlands presents significant findings toward achieving the goal and objectives of this study. The exploration of the counter-terrorism initiatives in the Netherlands conforms to the Theoretical Logic Model of Police Organizations’ Actual Responses to Terrorism, in which the triggering events cause learning initiatives, learning initiatives result in change initiatives, and change initiatives result in policy initiatives. The comprehensive picture derived from the interview data, on-site observations and documentary evidence point to a high level of counter-terrorism preparedness of the Dutch Police.

By learning from internal and external experiences and research and theory, the Dutch Police strengthened their institutions, added new components to their structures and realized major reorganizations in counter-terrorism. Regional and national-level information centers, the Info Box System, and the System of Special Intervention were established.

In the Netherlands, counter-terrorism policies pose a coordinated picture. The problems are well understood because of the multidisciplinary and multi-institutional characteristics of the nationally coordinated counter-terrorism apparatus. Policies are applied through collective participation of the institutions. The Police are directly involved in policy making processes and work with citizens and other agencies. The NCTb plays a critical role in these processes as a coordinating link among institutions and as an encyclopedic function in policy making.
Overall, the lessons learned from the case of the Netherlands are that a purposeful inquiry, willingness to learn and a will for change opens up new horizons to a nation. The Police can play an instrumental role in initiating a national-level scheme of preparedness toward counter-terrorism.
CHAPTER V

THE UNITED KINGDOM

A. INTRODUCTION

While the Netherlands has not had a significant terrorist incident on its territory, the United Kingdom (UK) is known as one of the most experienced countries with terrorism in the Western World. The country struggled with domestic terrorism for decades, specifically the IRA terrorism and foreign terrorism with the al-Qaeda, which introduced a new paradigm in terrorism.

Composed of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the UK is a parliamentary democracy and one of the most prosperous nations in Europe. Similar to the Netherlands, it is a densely populated country with a diverse society. More than 60 million people live in the area of less than 250,000 sq kilometers [95,000 sq miles]. It is a constitutional monarchy and has no written constitution. The statue law, common law and conventions define the relationship between the state and the citizens. The UK is a founding member of the Commonwealth and of the NATO. It is also one of the five permanent members of the UN (United Nations, 2006)

B. POLICING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Policing in the UK has long been known for its strong tradition of civil policing. Civil policing adheres to the doctrine of minimal force toward the public rather than implementing paramilitary force to coerce the population (Wilkinson, 2007).
The UK has a decentralized policing system. The *Home Office* has ministerial responsibility for policing in England and Wales where there are 43 regional police forces. The *Scottish Ministry of Justice* is responsible for policing in Scotland, and the *Secretary of State for Northern Ireland* is responsible in Northern Ireland, which is divided into eight districts under the *Police Service of Northern Ireland*. The London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS: Scotland Yard) has the area of Greater London and plays a national role in some specialist units including counter-terrorism.

The police forces in England and Wales employ over 228,000 personnel, including over 140,500 police officers, nearly 75,000 police staff and over 13,400 Police Community Support Officers (Home Office, 2008a). Police forces are headed by chief police officers who have the title, Commissioner in the London Metropolitan Police Service, and Chief Constable in all other police forces.

*Police authorities* in each region consist of local magistrates, councilors and community representatives who support the work of police services, set annual priorities and targets, and have oversight of all police duties. Police authorities have independent roles, and ensure that local police forces operate efficiently and effectively by holding the chief police officer accountable. They also set the local strategic goals and priorities of policing in their settings (Home Office, 2008a).

The Home Office manages policing by working with chief police officers and police authorities. However, the management of policing is structured in a three way system of responsibility. First, the Home Office funds the police and acts as overseer and
coordinator. Second, chief police officers are responsible for the direction and control of their regional forces. Third, the police authorities fulfill the function of outside observers and supporters in order to ensure that police services operate efficiently and effectively at the local level. The goal of this three-way system prevents political interference and avoids empowering the entire police services to a single police organization (Home Office, 2008a).

The Home Office makes sure that police organizations hold professional standards and maintain high performance. The Home Secretary holds the power of corrective action toward underperforming police organizations. The National Policing Improvement Agency identifies and diffuses good practice, and assists police forces to deliver the national “mission critical” priorities, and provide operational policing support.

All regional police forces are monitored by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Constabulary (HMIC). The purpose of HMIC is to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of policing in the UK through inspection of police organizations. The HMIC (2008) functions to ensure

- Agreed standards are achieved and maintained;
- Good practice spreads among police organizations; and
- Performance is improved.

HMIC was established in 1856 and operates independent of the Home Office and of the police forces. The HMIC “also provides advice and support to the tripartite
partners (Home Secretary, police authorities and forces) and plays an important role in
the development of future leaders” (HMIC, 2008).

Although there is no single national police authority or an agency, the *Association of Chief Police Officers* (ACPO) functions to connect police organizations in the UK. ACPO functions as an independent, professional, and strategic body among the
government, Association of Police Authorities and police organizations nationally on
behalf of the police service rather than on behalf of the chief police officers. Having the
status of a private company, ACPO is governed by a Board of Directors, and funded by
Home Office grants, contributions of police authorities and membership subscription.
UK members are chief constables, deputy chief constables, and assistant chief constables
throughout the UK (ACPO, 2008).

The *Independent Police Complaints Commission* (IPCC) was established in 2004. The IPCC is a Non-Departmental Public Body. By the Police Reform Act of 2002, it is
entirely independent of the police, interest groups and political parties, and the
government. The IPCC handles complaints against the police. It sets the standards for
the way the police handle complaints and “help[s] the police learn lessons and improve
the way they work” (IPCC, 2008b).

The *National Policing Board* is the highest level strategic body, and helps
strengthen the governance of policing in England and Wales. Chaired by the Home
Secretary, the Board consists of the following members (Home Office, 2008a):
▪ Representatives of the Home Office including the Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing and senior officials;

▪ The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) including the President of the Association;

▪ The Metropolitan Police Commissioner;

▪ The Association of Police Authorities represented by the Chair, Vice-Chair and the Chief Executive;

▪ HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary; and

▪ Chair and Chief Executive of the National Policing Improvement Agency.

The Board functions (Home Office, 2008a) mainly to

▪ Agree the Home Secretary’s annual national strategic priorities for policing and key priorities for the National Policing Improvement Agency;

▪ Set agreed priorities for the police reform programme;

▪ Enable Ministers, the professional leaders of the Service and police authorities to monitor progress in implementing the reform programme and identify and overcome barriers to delivery;

▪ Provide a regular forum for debate and three way communication between the tripartite partners on the opportunities and challenges facing policing.
While there is no single national police agency, the governmental entities described above make policing functionally effective, coordinated and accountable. The following laws define the legal framework of general policing.

*The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984* defines the core framework of police powers and safeguards. The police stop and search, arrest, take into custody, investigate, identify and interview detainees according to the law and to its accompanying *Codes of Practice*.

*The Police Reform Act of 2002* defines the limits and conditions of policing by making provisions “about the supervision, administration, functions and conduct of police forces, police officers and other persons serving with, or carrying out functions in relation to, the police” (Home Office, 2008a). While the law enhances the police powers and effectiveness, it makes stipulations about standards of improvement of UK policing. For example, the law requires police forces to prepare annual policing plans to be consistent with the government’s strategic priorities for policing. It also requires police authorities “to produce a three year strategy plan consistent with the national policing plan” (Home Office, 2008a). Through its statutory codes of practice, the law provides powers to ensure the consistent application of good police practice across the country. The law also establishes the IPCC for the investigation of complaints against the police.

*The Police and Justice Act of 2006* reforms and introduces new arrangements and enhancements in police governance, police standards and performance, police powers and community safety.
C. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The UK responds to terrorism on national and local levels. The government fulfills the strategic roles on the national level, and works closely with local authorities and police. Known as CONTEST, the UK enacted a long-term counter strategy for international terrorism in early 2003, which has four strands: prevent, pursue, protect and prepare (Home Office, 2008b). The major contributors of the strategy are

- Government departments;
- Emergency services;
- Voluntary organizations;
- The business sector; and
- Other governments across the world.

The first strand, prevent, is mostly considered as “preventing extremism,” which is driven by community-led working groups to develop practical recommendations for dealing with violent extremism. Such responses are supported by the Department for Communities and Local Government. The department is responsible for the improvement of the capacity of disadvantaged communities and the reduction of extremism (Home Office, 2008b).

The pursue strand relies on a coordinated approach; namely, the Home Secretary is responsible for counter-terrorism across England, Wales, and Scotland. When dealing with terrorist incidents and a need for government support, police organizations notify the
Home Office. The government’s crisis committee –known as Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR), convenes under the leadership and coordination of the Home Office. The committee assumes the strategic control and coordinates the resources of all relevant governmental agencies and local authorities, such as the security and intelligence agencies, the police, military and emergency services. The committee also acquires scientific and specialist advice from other available sources.

The Joint Intelligence Analysis Center collates, evaluates, and provides timely intelligence by drawing relevant agencies together. The Center has the capability to provide long-term studies about terrorism and threats, and to make immediate assessment of current incidents. A government liaison team is deployed to the region in order to link the committee and the police command center. A crisis committee receives regular 24/7-updates to ensure that all decisions are based on accurate and up-to-date information, and takes into account operational and political implications. Citizens are informed of necessary instructions, either by the police or the government, depending on the nature of an incident.

The Home Office also leads and manages the UK’s counter-terrorism exercise program as a part of the government’s emergency services training and practice programs, which covers all incidents, including natural disasters and accidents (HM Government, 2008).

On the local and regional level, police and emergency services work in tandem during terrorist incidents. Regional resilience teams are set up to assemble key players
and provide efficient communication among the central government and regional responders. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat was established in 2001 (Lovegrove, 2006) in order to

- Identify and predict emergencies;
- Maintain a state of readiness;
- Build resilience for the future;
- Provide leadership to the resilience community; and
- Promote effective management.

The Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 was enacted to respond to the demands of large scale incidents and to produce long-term emergency preparedness and response mechanisms. The act requires the development of Regional Resilience Forums in order to respond to and manage disasters. In these forums, the chief officers of the police, fire, ambulance, utilities, business representatives, local authorities and transport operators are represented (Lovegrove, 2006).

The UK has refined a Gold, Silver and Bronze System of incident command response. In the event of a terrorist incident, the police take the operational leadership by receiving support from other governmental departments and agencies. A police officer in a commander position chairs the Gold Group and remains in command until the end of the coordinated response. The representatives from the emergency services, local authorities, health, environmental agency, utility companies, transport and the Health and
Safety Executive join the group and set the overall strategy for the situation. The individual organizations are responsible for providing resources through their Silver Commanders. The tactical responses belong to the Silver Commanders. The Gold Group remains in contact with the Silver Commanders, however does not interfere with tactical response. While the Silver Commanders follow the Gold Strategy, Silver Commanders develop and coordinate tactical plans and have a Bronze Commander deliver that strategy through his command team (Lovegrove, 2006). In the event of an incident, all three groups remain in contact and do not interfere with each others’ responses.

In Greater London and in the City of London, which is the financial heart of the UK, counter-terrorism activities are organized by the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP). The panel consists of representatives from the MPS, City of London Police, British Transport Police, the London Fire Brigade, the London Ambulance Service and the local authorities. The Port of London Authority, Marine Coastguard, Royal Air Force, Military and voluntary sector are also represented. LESLP can also invite representatives from other agencies into the Panel depending on the nature and type of incident. The Group meets once every three months chaired by the Emergency Preparedness Operational Command Unit of the MPS (LESLP, 2007).

The MPS Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) functions as the main counter-terrorism operational entity in the UK. Although there are nine regional information (intelligence) centers (RICs) throughout the country, there is no single operational-level, national counter-terrorism institution in the UK (Warnes, 2007).
Protect and Prepare strands are provided by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), which is a unique police unit co-located with the Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure. The Office is funded by and reports to ACPO (NaCTSO, 2008):

The office offer[s] specialist advice regarding the security of explosives and precursor chemicals (including fertilisers), pathogens and toxins, radiological sources and other toxic chemicals. [The office also provides] guidance in relation to business continuity, designing out vehicle borne terrorism, the protection of crowded places and reducing opportunities for terrorism through environmental design.

The NaCTSO also “trains, tasks and coordinates a nationwide network of centrally funded, specialist police advisers known as Counter Terrorism Security Advisers” (NaCTSO, 2008). The advisors help, advise and guide a variety of sectors on the national level.

The Security Service (MI5) is domestically responsible for the protection of the country from threats, including terrorism. The Service functions under the statutory authority of the Home Office and serves as the focal point for counter-terrorism planning, intelligence and preparatory exercises and other tactical preparation on a national level. All police forces’ intelligence or CTC units work in partnership with the Service. Considering its national and multi-agency functions, MI5 functions as the main coordination body of counter-terrorism activities in the UK.
The legal framework of counter-terrorism activities in the UK is defined by a series of legislation:

The *Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000* legislates the shared methods of surveillance and information gathering used against crime and terrorism, and provides a range of investigative powers to a variety of public authorities. The updated version of the law regulates the interception of communications, including the Internet and the use of strong encryption. The law also ensures that the powers are subject to be controlled by independent judicial oversight (Home Office, 2008b).

*Terrorism Act of 2000* is the main piece of counter-terrorism legislation, especially toward international terrorism. The Law makes it illegal for terrorist groups to operate in the UK, and enhances police powers, such as wider stop and search power, and the power to detain suspects after arrest. According to the Law, the police can arrest individuals, who incite terrorist acts, or seek or provide training for terrorism at home or overseas, or provide instruction or training in the use of firearms, explosives or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons (Home Office, 2008b).

*Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001* provides stronger police powers to investigate and prevent terrorist activities, as well as other serious crimes. The Law intends to cut off terrorist funding, encourage better information exchange among governmental agencies, improve security of nuclear and aviation industries, and regulate similar administrative and strategic objectives (Home Office, 2008b).
The *Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005* “allows control orders to be made against any suspected terrorist, whether a UK national or a non-UK national, or whether the terrorist activity is international or domestic” (Home Office, 2008b). The law requires the Home Secretary to report regularly to the Parliament about how the law’s powers are exercised.

The *Terrorism Act of 2006* contains the tools for the police, the intelligence agencies and for the courts. The act brought new offense types to the terrorism legislation (Home Office, 2008b):

- *Acts Preparatory to Terrorism:* This aims to capture those planning serious acts of terrorism.

- *Encouragement to Terrorism:* This makes it a criminal offence to directly or indirectly incite or encourage others to commit acts of terrorism. This will include the glorification of terrorism, where this may be understood as encouraging the emulation of terrorism.

- *Dissemination of Terrorist Publications:* This will cover the sale, loan, or other dissemination of terrorist publications. This will include those publications that encourage terrorism, and those that provide assistance to terrorists.

- *Terrorist training offences:* This makes sure that anyone who gives or receives training in terrorist techniques can be prosecuted. The Act also criminalises attendance at a place of terrorist training.
The Act also amended previous legislation, particularly to extend police powers to detain suspects after arrest for up to 28 days.

D. TRIGGERING EVENTS FOR COUNTER TERRORISM EFFORTS

Terrorism has long been a phenomenon in the UK, since the inception of the troubles in Northern Ireland. In fact, the counter-terrorism policing in the UK goes back to the early 1880s with the emergence of the Special Irish Branch, later Special Branch, at Scotland Yard. Since then, the Special Branch has provided intelligence for counter-terrorism activities (Warnes, 2007). Beginning in the late 1960s the UK dealt with the IRA terrorist attacks on its territory and abroad.

Consistent with the logic model in Figure 2, interview and documentary data indicated that triggering events initiated almost all counter-terrorism efforts in the UK. To be sure, major terrorist incidents and terrorist threats have had significant effects on counter-terrorism policies and practices. Indeed, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and the attacks in Bali in 2002, Istanbul in 2003 and Madrid in 2004 reshaped the UK’s structural and operational policies. Terrorism, like those examples just cited, were a new type of threat, a threat extremely different from the IRA threats on the UK. A respondent said, “[the UK] had no suicide attacks before 9/11. We had a threat once, but it didn't materialize. So we never ever looked at any detail on how we had to deal with a suicide terrorist.”

Expectantly, the attacks in other countries created a sense of urgency inside the police bureaucracy, which initiated an array of preparatory activities in order to respond
to a possible attack. However, it was the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005 that stunned the UK and caused an extreme sense of urgency within the police and the government. The attacks were realized by al-Qaeda-tied home-grown cells manned by British born terrorists. On July 7, 2005, three explosions occurred on the London Underground and a fourth occurred on a public transportation bus in Central London. The explosions killed 52 people. On July 21, 2005, four men attempted to detonate four devices on the public transport network in London, but the devices failed to detonate. During the search for suspects and investigations, an innocent person, Charles De Menezes, was killed by the MPS firearms police officers on July 22, 2005 (MPS&MPA, 2006).

The data indicated that the authorities had recognized the nature of domestic and trans-national terrorist threats and the ultimate goals of terrorism, and understood the urgency to prepare for terrorism. Peter Clark (2007) the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the MPS, and the UK Police National Coordinator, pointed out that

> We can no longer wait until the terrorist is at or near the point of attack before intervening. It might give us the strongest evidence to do so- to capture the terrorist with the gun or the bomb. But the risk to the public, in the age of suicide bombers and no notice attacks, is simply too great. (p. 3)

Similar to the case of the Netherlands, the data supported the finding that terrorist incidents and the triggering events provided the ultimate impetus for action and opened
up the opportunity of learning and change in counter-terrorism efforts on the political and institutional levels in the UK.

E. LEARNING INITIATIVES

The overall data indicated that the UK Police had been continuously learning to respond to outside terrorists. As triggering events unfolded, UK authorities found themselves trying to understand the new types of terrorism compared to IRA era terrorism. The implementation of their learning initiatives was conformed to the logic model in Figure 2, which consisted of the internal and external learning experiences and learning from research and theory.

The UK’s counter-terrorism culture recognized a need to recall lessons learned in previous experiences with terrorism and combine those with the lessons learned in the exposure to the new terrorism.

1. Understanding the New Terrorism

The interview data showed that new terrorism was different than the old-style terrorism. The incidents in the UK confirmed that while the old-style terrorism targeted the strategic assets and political figures, new terrorism widened its range of targets. The new terrorism targeted the general public, business, and transportation, and other vulnerable assets to create social chaos and economic and political disorder. Those respondents who had roles within UK counter-terrorism operations at different levels
within the organization were clear about terrorism’s logic and short and long-term goals. A respondent said

If there was a massive attack in London, if we lost key figures, such as a member of the royal family or the prime minister or someone like that, you would see a change in government. There will be a change in the leadership of the government. There is no doubt about it. It would be that important. And that's exactly what terrorists want of course.

The UK Police realized the fact that political structure may no longer be the only target of terrorism. Many other structures and sectors, including the business sector, might come under terrorist threats. A respondent explained the magnitude of the phenomenon:

In 1996, an explosion occurred and over two thirds of businesses that were hit by the explosion did not survive, never came back into business. The businesses folded and the government said this should not happen. We want businesses to keep working, even though their premises may be destroyed. It does not mean to say that the shopkeeper, the office, or they should be able to survive and work elsewhere. So with that principal in mind, the task was given to the police to develop some awareness, some understanding the importance of principles of business continuity and basic security.

The interview data reveals that the impact of an incident was not limited to only the affected area. Terrorist incidents have a domino effect: a cumulative effect occurs
when the effects of an attack on a particular area have repercussions in other areas. This
chain reaction may even have profound effects on the stability of a country. A
respondent discussed this chain effect:

I'm not talking about small businesses, small shops. I'm talking about large
businesses employing large numbers of people, important businesses: banks,
water, electricity companies, those that provide a service to many other people.
These are the important businesses. A small shop may go, but it doesn't have a
huge impact on everybody else. But there are a number of businesses that we
recognize are very important, because they employ many people. They provide a
service to many people. Telecommunication companies, electricity, gas, nuclear
power, food, health, big supermarkets, they provide a big service. If they were to
go and not provide a service, that would impact on many people. So they are the
key businesses we need to protect and we need to provide advice and guidance to
them. . . . The key principle here is trying to make sure that if an attack does
happen, it doesn't impact the economy of the UK significantly. If an attack
affects the economy in the UK, it causes problems, it has a knock-on impact on
the government. As we saw in Spain, it can change things, the attacks on Madrid,
within a few weeks, the government changed. There was an election and the
government lost. One, two, three attacks can have a significant impact. So I
think it's recognizing the importance of business, the economy, to the stability of
the country.
Old-style terrorist acts were committed by terrorist organizations, which had an organizational structure with hierarchical relationships, organizational culture, and internal discipline, as well as financial and other support mechanisms. Old-style terrorism had a division of labor. Some terrorists were planners, others supported action plans that lead to terrorist acts, and still others were triggermen who committed terrorist act and escaped the scene in order to survive and commit future acts.

In the new terrorism on the other hand, the terrorists are organized in an international movement or in a loose network without hierarchical structures and a division of labor. Such a loose network cannot effectively be dismantled through systematic tactical operations. Terrorist cells act independently without hierarchical structure and lateral coordination, which makes these terrorist networks difficult to intercept and disrupt. A respondent described the difficulty with new terrorism:

We are not attacking an organization here. We are not trying to infiltrate an organization because there is no organization. But with the IRA, we had an organization. And we attacked it from above, below and within to such an extent that we knew everything that was going on. We had informants at the highest level. We had technical cover at the highest level. Anything the IRA was doing, we pretty much knew what they were doing, which is why they put down their arms at the end of the day because they were being defeated by us, by the intelligence operations.
Social structural changes in terrorism were matched by operational changes. The old-style terrorists acted against professional, political, and scientific personnel with a hope to influence government policies. Old-style terrorists’ goals, at least in the UK, did not focus on killing citizens; rather, terrorists gave warnings just before explosions occurred in order to limit the number of hurt or killed bystanders. The new terrorists, however, seek to inflict fear and carnage on as many people as possible to attain their goals. New-style terrorists’ violence is indiscriminate. The UK Police faced this differentiation between old and new-style terrorism probably more intensely than any country in Europe. A respondent described this experience as one of the insiders:

In the past you’re talking about people telephoning and saying, “yeah, we left the bomb here and left the bomb there.” Their priority was to plant the device, [and] escape. The main important thing was for them to get away without being arrested or injured. Now, you have got a completely different type of threat. The new terrorists don't have to be as organized or as precise as these previous groups were. Because anyone can make a device from acetone or peroxide and home grown materials, that are commercially available, and walk into a crowded shopping mall. There isn't the need for the precision or the operational planning that the other groups used to do. That's the key factor. So, in some ways, the threat is greater because these people are more amateur, if you see what I am getting at. They don't have to plan carefully; they don't have to work out a route of escape. They don't have to know the movements or timings of an individual, because they are not looking to target a specific individual or a particular
building. They just want to inflict the maximum number of casualties possible. So from their point of view, all they need is a crowded public area. It’s so much easier for them to do it. And also again the device, easy to construct, homemade materials, acetone peroxide, commercially available, make their own devices, straight into a train, a bus, or public area. So that's why the threat has changed significantly.

Another respondent explained the difference between the old and the new terrorism from a comparative perspective:

In the past if you look at the nationalist, political terrorist groups, particularly the IRA in the UK, but in terms of those groups generally, there is a big shift in the nature of the threat, for a number of reasons, which I’ve put together in some thinking. Firstly, because of the nature of the threat, the religious ideology and motivation behind the nature of the threat, means that there is no longer any kind of logical control on the terrorist attack. Maybe not with the PKK, but with the IRA, you did see telephone warnings that they’re going to let off a bomb in a populated area, warnings. They were concerned about bombings like Omar and others where you had mass casualties where it backfired against them. It is different now. These groups are looking to inflict the maximum number of casualties. They are looking for mass casualty, multiple attacks, and possibly suicide attacks.
New-style terrorists are ready to die, believing they will be martyrs to the jihad. Socially fragmented terrorist “groups” were not organizations in a traditional sense. Such social fragmentation and separation makes it difficult to detect them before their attacks or stop them on the spot right before their actions. A respondent explained the dilemma that the UK Police experience and the difficulty of handling it:

If I am a suicide terrorist, I've got a bomb strapped to me, I have made my mind up that I am going to die. How do you stop me from carrying that action out? Because if I am heading toward the target and you stop me, you become the target. I might not make it to the target I want to, but I am going to die. I've made my mind set, I am going to die, so you become the target. With IRA terrorist that doesn't happen. [If] you stop an IRA terrorist, [they] put their hands up. They don't want to get killed. It doesn't happen. So what you're missing is any chance, and I call it fighting time. You have no fighting time with a suicide terrorist. The moment you challenge a suicide terrorist there are just as likely to detonate the explosives on them. The second you challenge them, bang! … So if you haven't gotten this fighting time, you've got to have some completely new procedures for actually dealing with a suicide terrorist. The second problem is this: I might be wearing a jacket, I might have explosives concealed around the middle, you can't see it.

In responding to the new style of terrorism, the UK Police recognized that their understanding has profound effects on the quality of their responses. As a result, the UK
Police made assessments about the impact of such terrorist incidents, especially after the July 2005 incidents. They recognized the dimensions of the physical, as well as the psychological damage of terrorism on the country and on people. All respondents concurrently possessed a picture that they were concerned with the overall nature of the phenomenon of terrorism, rather than being drowned in the techniques and tactics of operational policing. This greater perspective provided the UK Police the opportunity of catching the crucial elements of the phenomenon. For example, they realized that the concept of radicalization had been used mostly after the 9/11 incidents as if it was a new phenomenon. However, such an understanding would provide a shorter vision because it didn’t give a chance to make a connection with their past experiences. A respondent explained the intellectual challenge they had gone through and the potential deception that they could possibly fall:

Radicalization is not a new process. People seem to think that it is. But it isn't a new process at all. What makes someone wish to commit mass murder? Now that is a good question. That’s the same argument for a young provision IRA man who puts a bomb down for instance, and sets the timer and walks away, and then when it goes bang, 30 odd people are killed. That is exactly the same process that's happened to him, that’s happened to a Muslim that actually because of an additional religious factor that you have to program in. In other words, being a shahid or being a martyr is factored into their religion and that makes them want to do it even more. They give up their lives. But it is still a radicalization process.
It is still a path from being an angry young man who thinks they have a legitimate protest about something, to becoming a mass murderer.

The literature on terrorism and organizational learning argues that counter-terrorism specialists gain a better understanding and more rational responses to terrorism when terrorism can be explained within its historic context. Harsh crackdowns may pose an unjust or unfair picture, and therefore they may lead to further radicalization within different levels of the society. Recognizing this fact, the UK Police made an aggressive effort to understand and monitor new terrorist organizations amid the urgent need of protecting their country.

The effort toward understanding terrorism helped the UK Police to play a role as a democratic police force in counter-terrorism activities. The overall data strongly provided the finding that the UK Police carefully questioned the fundamental role of policing and particularly the essential procedures of counter-terrorism. The respondent continued elaborating on this intellectual challenge that the UK Police went through, and the ideal role of police services in counter-terrorism:

And police service absolutely have to understand that, because you cannot deal with terrorism by running counter-terrorism operations. You cannot deal with terrorism by gaining mass amount of intelligence. You cannot deal with terrorism by locking terrorists up. You cannot deal with terrorism by putting protection measures in place that but make it very difficult to attack the target. The only way you can deal with terrorism is by preventing it. And the only way you
prevent it is to remove the causes of it. Everything else we do is handling the symptoms. Everything else we do is putting a sticky plaster over a symptom. Then you say “what is the police service’s role in all this?” Should the police simply concentrate on dealing with the symptoms? Is that what they have got to do? Have they got to, simply say, we will chase the terrorists? We will make it difficult for them to operate. We will lock them up. We will use the legislation and we will make it hard for them to move that funds around. We will make hard for them to move around the country. We will do all that. But that's not the case. That is part of their responsibility. But they also have got to be part of a bigger partnership that is actually trying to deal with the underlying causes of terrorism. Because if they are not, all they will do is add fuel to the flames. If they don't recognize the impact of their actions, they will simply add fuel to the flames. . . .

If the police service doesn't understand that, and doesn't work with the greater agencies to try manage that, then we are not going to get very far, because managing the symptoms of terrorism isn't the answer. You've got to get to the underlying causes of terrorism.

The spirit of the respondent’s comments was evident to the researcher in almost every setting within the UK Police divisions. From interviews with the respondents to shorter conversations with other colleagues to the documentary evidence, the total body of data showed that the UK Police were in search of excellence in counter-terrorism
policing. The UK Police show an effort to grasp the causes of terrorism. A respondent described their journey of understanding and responding to terrorism:

Now let's not kid ourselves. Police services are humble people. Policemen are humble people. They are not governments. They do not determine foreign policy. Therefore, we have to work within a much bigger problem. And the bigger problem is that as in Mohammed Sadik Khan, one of the 7th July bombers, “I am doing this because of the foreign policies of your country. I am attacking your people, because your government is democratically elected. You elected it, therefore you are responsible.” That's the full pattern. So the first thing is, understanding exactly what terrorism is. Making sure that once you understand what terrorism is, you only use extreme powers that are available to the police service against terrorists and not against other people. So for instance we can detain a terrorist I think now it is 28 days. You don't use those powers against people who are trying to just protest; it’s very easy to happen. You don't use those powers against them. You use them only against people you believe are suspected of actual terrorism. So you have to be very clear about what terrorism is. You don't overstep the mark. Because you only have to do is get this balance right between an absolute duty to protect the people of your country . . . and human rights.
The UK Police adhere democratic policing whose principles dictate the use of police powers to protect the citizens without an exacerbation of potentially violent situations.

New terrorism has become more difficult to prevent because new terrorism is less tangible. Fighting against new terrorism often requires proactive measures and wide surveillance capabilities. But taking such measures and especially taking preemptive operational steps often present non-democratic images. The UK Police has faced criticism from particular segments of society. A respondent described the difficulty that the UK Police experienced in taking preventive actions:

What we have now is we have this loose al-Qaeda sort of inspirational network at the top. We have many many people who have very extreme views around the country, operating from universities, from mosques, from public meetings and everything else, constantly trying to identify this radicalization process, individuals, angry young men and women as I call them, who might wish to take the fight directly to the West using a perverted form of Islam to justify what they are doing, the Jihad that we hear of so much about. Taking those people and they may be very very loose groups, 2 or 3 people here, 2 or 3 people there, when they are ripe, take them out the countries, send them to the training camps, where they get hugely indoctrinated, they are sent back and they are almost told get on with it. There is no central direction, they have been given the training, they come
back, get on with it. And eventually, this group of people will carry out a terrorist attack.

Furthermore, the overall data indicated that new terrorism and the difficulties in response to it, led the UK authorities to seek short and long-term policy options, including stronger and proactive solutions within the legal framework. For that reason, the Terrorism Act of 2006 introduced new types of offenses, such as “Acts Preparatory to Terrorism” “Encouragement to Terrorism,” “Dissemination of Terrorist Publications,” and “Terrorist Training Offences.” A respondent explained the reasons of such a response:

The threat is different, [because] most countries base their defensive structures on deterrence. If you target a hardened location or building, you put bodyguards around someone, the reason they are doing it, is because if the person is in an attack, they will be arrested, imprisoned, wounded or killed. Now, if you're dealing with a logical, nationalist group or political group perhaps, they would be deterred and go somewhere else. If you are looking at a group of people who want to die, and see this is a part of jihad and actually want to be martyred, then that does not pose the same threat to them. They are willing to go, forget rationality, in order to attack. So, for all these reasons the threat mutated and that's why you've seen this response now.

With the nature and magnitude of the terrorist threat well understood, the UK Police has initiated a full-range of learning initiatives in order to design appropriate
response mechanisms. These initiatives were shaped in three different categories: Internal Learning Experiences, External Learning Experiences, and Learning from Research and Theory.

2. Internal Learning Experiences

The UK had to deal with the old-style IRA terrorism for decades, and the new style al-Qaeda terrorism since 2005. The IRA was a structured organization with rules and modes of operation. The UK Police developed particular policies toward handling the incidents and countering the old-type of terrorism by getting more skilled and proficient at intelligence gathering and strategic tactics. From line officers to upper management, the institution of the police organization went through a learning process, and took significant steps toward preparedness. A respondent explained how the previous process used to work:

Before 9-11 we had a massive amount of experience of dealing with terrorism. But the terrorism we dealt with was the terrorist who came along, put a bomb down, set the timer and walked away. And that meant that we always had a chance here, because the guy did not want to get killed. If you challenge them, they were going to give up. If you caught them with explosives, they were going to give up. And it happened time and time again. And if they left the bomb ticking away, you had a chance of dealing with the bomb, it was a static anyway, you could move people away from it, the target was pretty fixed, and we had some very very solid policies, procedures for dealing with that sort of attack. So
for instance, the IRA were very clever at giving you a very short notice warnings
of bombs going down. We had developed very good systems to manage that
process. You know, uniformed officers, inspectors out there, knew how to deal
with it, they would move people away very quickly. And most of the time we
managed to get people away from scene of a bomb. It was a very well rehearsed
process.

According to the interview data, during the years of their struggle with the IRA
terrorism, the UK Police showed considerable efforts toward institutional learning. UK
Police studied each terrorist incident and rehearsed responses to future incidents.
However, in spite of their effort, the MPS realized that the experience that they gained
could not be retained, analyzed, and shared. New generations could not take advantage
of previous experience at a satisfactory level. The acquired knowledge of experienced
officers left the organization as they retired or left. The organization never had a chance
to fully utilize the experiences, because individual-level experiences couldn’t find a
means to be translated into a higher level institutional experience. Although the members
and the organization as a whole continued their effort, the traditional modes of operation
prevailed. The new members used unsystematic means to learn counter-terrorism
techniques, and acted based on experiences of their senior colleagues. Counter-terrorism
training courses provided only the basic content. As expected, learning only basic
approaches to counter-terrorism had a less than satisfactory result. A respondent
explained it this way:
The problem we always had was that the experience, the knowledge, if you'd like, rested within the organization, the people of the organization. So it was handed down by word of mouth, by example, by training within the organization. This is what used to happen. So for instance, this is how you conduct a surveillance operation, this is how you conduct an inquiry, and that training was a rolling in the workplace, training program. There were dedicated courses but actually they just gave you the basics. You went back into the workplace and you learn from your peers, you learn from the senior people there, and it went on and on. That's how it used to happen. We realized that actually that wasn't a clever way of doing things.

Because of the experienced difficulties in accumulating and transferring the knowledge, and not having a system to build upon, the MPS felt the need for a common base, an institutional memory, in which everybody’s experience could be accumulated and analyzed, common modes of practices were defined, and ultimately best practices could be shared.

a. Establishing the Institutional Memory

As the major responsible figure, the MPS’s first comprehensive attempt in establishing an institutional memory was working with Centrex, today’s National Policing Improvement Agency. A joint study conducted a comprehensive analysis of training needs. Ultimately, with the coordination of ACPO, a program was created to
develop well-trained counter-terrorism personnel. A respondent gave the historical account of this process:

With the help of what used to be Centrex [NPIA], we carried out a training needs analysis of the work of the special branch officers. What does a Special Branch officer actually do, what are the skills, what are the competencies a Special Branch officer needs to have, what is the training they need to have? So we did a very comprehensive training-needs analysis, which was incredibly useful in bringing for the first time, all the knowledge, all the experience of what it was like to be a Special Branch Officer. The different tasks Special Branch officers did, how they did that, the best practices and everything else, started bringing it all together for the very first time. And we started changing the training programs to match against the core competencies that we were looking for at the various levels of the organization. So for instance, one of the problems we had were, senior officers, inspectors coming into take charge of special branches without any previous special branch experience. So they had a very specific training development requirement. So we put together a development program specifically for that. So they could come in, they didn't need to know the fine detail of everything, but they needed to have a strategic awareness of what they were doing. And we had a development program or support program for them.

A few years after the initial steps toward gaining an institutional memory, the HMIC conducted a thematic review of the Special Branch. This was the first such review
and again it was coordinated by the ACPO. The HMIC made a series of recommendations, including better use of technology, a higher level of national coordination, better counter-terrorism training programs, and similar programs to create a well-educated workforce prepared to handle threats of and actual events of terrorism. The HMIC inspection led to a UK national coordinator within the MPS. The UK national coordinator made a significant step toward organizational growth when he authorized a policy manual, which provided written guidance on the precise roles and operational functions of the Special Branch. The UK national coordinator set up a project team to create a specialized policy manual. That team interviewed members of the Special Branch and experienced officers across the UK. Those interview data were integrated into the training-needs-analyses. The outcome was a Manual of Special Branch Operations. In a few years, the manual was developed with exercises and scenarios, and loaded up to the intranet of the MPS for self-learning.

Ultimately, the MPS developed a manual that was searchable, updated and contained a history of institutional experiences, best practices, and similar necessary tools, such as training and mentoring programs. Today, the manual meets the needs of all levels of the organization. Line-level officers can learn how to conduct an operation and, the management cadre can learn how to manage operations. The manual functions as a living document, and always subject to constant review and updating. If a police officer finds a better way of doing any procedure, then that practice is identified and formulated as a best practice, and ultimately it becomes part of the manual, which functions as a core
structure of the institutional memory. The manual became a comprehensive, historically-based tool for counter-terrorism officers.

In order to reinforce the manual and counter-terrorism responses, the MPS started using the existing system created in 1995 to respond to terrorist incidents. That system was called *Operation Rainbow*. After the creation of institutional memory *Operation Rainbow* became a systematized feedback network linking information learned from a terrorist incident to uniformed police officers. This feedback mechanism linked line-level, uniformed police officers’ observations to the headquarters of the organization through an information conduit. Daily experiences of all members of the organization started to be added to institutional memory. From the top to the bottom of the organization, every member had the opportunity to become a functional member of the system.

Over the years, recording events has become an important practice of the UK Police, especially in counter-terrorism activities. Such experiences are captured and recorded into documents for common use. A respondent explained the reasons and the logic behind this practice:

Well, you have to recognize if there are serious consequences to an incident, it may well be that we will be criticized in court. We may have lawyers take us, the victims may criticize us and that's always a possibility. The way that the law works in England, if we have not provided a duty of care to people, then it is always possible that we could be criticized in court for a lack of action or we have
not carried out/discharged our duties correctly. So one of the things that we are very, very mindful of is, we write, we have to write. All senior commanders would write logs of decisions, their decision making. That is all recorded and is available to be used as evidence, either for or against. So we write a lot of information. We are encouraged to write. Many times that works for us, because it is good evidence for us. It's not always negative, because as you'll be aware, you make an instant decision. In your mind you think it is a correct decision. Later, someone could say that was a wrong decision, but I held that honestly and truly to believe that was a good decision to make at the time.

Structured debriefings, including information on operational responses to terrorism, are an important learning mechanism for the UK Police. Trained moderators hold structured debriefing sessions. A respondent said “We go through our responses and the men that whose role is there? It is important that we analyze what we did, and did we learn anything?” Through such open debriefing sessions, policy and tactics mistakes are detected, and solutions proposed. Debriefings provide even more material for training manuals and are a key process in the development of an organizational memory.

The interview data indicates that in their counter-terrorism activities, the UK Police has arrived to the stage where they record all events, analyze and learn the lessons out of those analyses, and ultimately include them into the organizational memory. For sure, achieving such progress hasn’t been easy. The researcher’s field observations and the study of the interview and documentary data revealed that the strength of UK
Policing’s organizational culture was its ability to adapt rapidly to changes in the social and political community.

An ability to rapidly adapt was based on and strongly emphasized three organizational values. The first value was the open recognition of mistakes. The second value was a strong resolve for corrective action for mistakes. The third value was an emphasis on organizational growth to meet ever-changing external pressures of the international community. A respondent candidly explained their organizational culture geared toward rapid adaptation:

I think the process we have got, if we look at what we do now, it has evolved over many years where we have made mistakes. But we've recognized we need to change our practices, our procedures to make sure that we achieve as best as possible a response and handling situation. Many times we have been criticized in the past, deservedly so. Criticized for how we dealt with things and I think what we've recognized now is being honest and accountable, it sometimes pays off.

Such institutional practices lead the UK Police to capture their organizational experiences and transform those experiences into lessons, which improve strategic approaches to terrorism and strengthen their institutional memory. Institutional memory and internal learning experiences are profoundly influenced by the feedback mechanisms for internal and external learning. The institutionalization of organizational learning
initiatives depended on internal and external feedback systems. First internal and then external feedback mechanisms are discussed.

b. Internal Feedback Mechanisms for Learning

The interview data and documentary evidence indicate that organizational learning and effectiveness within the UK Police are an outcome of internal feedback mechanisms. The inspection divisions of the police departments provide feedback about the performance of their organizations through their incidental and periodic inspections. They have certain scales for each field of service. Performance levels of all fields, including the field of organizational learning, are published as a part of the annual reports. In those reports, the actual performances and the targeted levels are presented comparatively.

Within the MPS, organizational learning and information sharing has become an institutional priority and part of the performance measurement process. The MPS’ senior management cadre scrutinizes organizational learning issues at the top level. One of the five deputy positions of the Commissioner of the MPS is dedicated to performance and strategy. The MPS measures the organizational progress annually (MPS&MPA, 2007). Careful attention to its learning and performance has paid off. “The MPS was rated good or excellent in four of the seven categories of the Home Office Annual Police Performance Assessment Framework” (MPS&MPA, 2008).
c. **External Feedback Mechanisms for Learning**

The UK Police also learn through external feedback systems. The HMIC, the IPCC, police authorities and the Home Secretary can inspect or investigate police organizations. These investigations focus mostly on performance effectiveness and serious complaints of the public. Those inspections create recommendations that enter the feedback system to the police. The IPCC reports provide "educated recommendations" for each person of authority who had a role in a serious case and therefore played a key role in the development of police organizations in the UK. The IPCC also encourages police forces to record police complaints consistently in order to ensure public confidence in the complaint system. This consistent recording also serves to establish "a sound evidence base to inform development of future policy and practice at local level and nationally" (IPCC, 2005, p. 22).

The UK Police are scrutinized on the local level. Police authorities and local-level partnerships provide feedback about the quality of police services. For example, *London Emergency Services Liaison Panel* (LESLP) examines agencies, including the police, and produces recommendations. MPS and the City of London Police pay attention to LESLP’s recommendations, (Lovegrove, 2006) which function as an external feedback mechanism:

It is right to say, however, that we are a learning organisation that has already examined the recommendations in the publicly accessible report published by the
London Assembly and made plans to ensure that future responses by this force will have paid heed to them.

Amongst the many recommendations for the emergency services and agencies to consider, the main focus of our review in response to the report so far has been:

- Communications technology;
- Media messages and partnerships; and
- Communications with the communities.

LESLP’s recommendations indicate and reinforce the fact that external feedback mechanisms provide scrutiny over organizational processes and police services.

The interview data and documentary evidence indicate that the value of external feedback mechanisms. External feedback was considered valuable, because of its objective nature, and therefore its usefulness for organizational change to generate high-quality service. Concurrent with the perception of objective external feedback, the tone of the investigations was equally prone to both the resolution of current cases and production of instruction to enhance the organizational systems that enable a reduction in the repetition of mistakes. The outcomes of the external feedback system became recommendations for national-level guideline for the HMIC, ACPO and for the police authorities. The external feedback process was instrumental to the formation of programmatic and operational standards for the rest of the country. ACPO plays a significant role at the highest level in ensuring that those recommendations are
implemented according to their spirit before further external inspections occur. Most recommendations propose common solutions to general problems.

\textit{d. Institutionalization of Organizational Learning Initiatives}

After the investigations of the shooting of an innocent person, Jean Charles de Menezes, by the MPS firearms officers at the Stockwell Underground Station on 22 July 2005, the IPCC published two reports, namely \textit{Stockwell One} and \textit{Stockwell Two} (IPCC, 2008a). Both reports had significant roles in counter-terrorism policies and procedures and policing in general in the UK. In May 2006, the MPS established an organizational learning group to respond to IPCC investigations and to enhance its organizational structure by improving the capacity of corporate knowledge. The highlights of the July Review Group (JRG) demonstrate how the MPS is institutionally open to learning and changing (MPA, 2007). Emphases were added to particular findings in Table 3:
Table 3
Terms and Reference of the July Review Group

- Coordinating the MPS response to the publication of Stockwell One and Stockwell Two.

- Support the Stockwell Gold Group in ensuring that the officers and their families who are directly affected by the report are properly supported, treated fairly and kept informed.

- **Taking the MPS forward with an implementation plan arising from adopted recommendations.**

- Identifying further risks and opportunities for the organisation from events in July 2005.

- **Disseminating best practice from the adopted recommendations across departments.**

- **Communicating effectively to share learning from Stockwell across all areas of policing.**

- Ensuring that all the adopted recommendations from events in July are auditable and accountable.

- Checking that the adopted recommendations are being implemented and sustained.

- Leading and developing the Knowledge Management Centre (KMC).
• Researching best practice, both internally and externally, into how organisations learn.

• Contributing towards the MPS’s value of learning through experience, by developing protocols for the commissioning of reviews.

• Inspecting key areas of business within the organisation in relation to July 2005, to ensure that learning is implemented and embedded.

• Supporting the management of issues from July 2005 at a strategic level, through the Kratos Review Group, Gold Groups and Diamond Groups.

• To share MPS learning from July 2005 with HMIC and ACPO, to ensure a consistent application of best practice throughout England and Wales.

The JRG acts as one of the gatekeepers of the MPS’ institutional memory and organizational learning initiatives especially in counter-terrorism, by making sure that the internal and external feedbacks are turned into meaningful and usable lessons. The JRG observes the implications and reports to the management to ensure implementation of learned lessons. For example, upon the IPCC recommendations to “videotaping the briefings of firearms officers,” the JRG makes sure that those recommendations become part of standard operating procedures and are practiced properly by the organization.
(1) **JRG Organizational Learning Model**

Figure 4 shows the organizational learning model developed by the JRG (MPS, 2007a). The group strives to create a simple corporate organizational model so that it can be understood and used by everyone, and at the same time it is specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timely. Figure 4 illustrates that the organizational learning model has five components, which are Origin, Accountability Hierarchy, Platform, Delivery and Inspection Review.

![Organizational Learning Model Diagram](image)

**Figure 4: Organizational Learning Model of the London Metropolitan Police Service July Review Group**
(a) Origin

The *Origin* of organizational learning comes from two main groups of sources. The first group consists of people’s thoughts about the organization’s performance. These are the innovative ideas that come from good and bad experience, debriefings after incidents, empirical evidence which are the findings of research and the communities’ requests from the police. The second group consists of internal and external feedback mechanisms, such as the IPCC, Department of Professional Standards, HMIC, ACPO, Home Office, Metropolitan Police Authority and the legislation. These internal and external feedback mechanisms are seen as critical variables for change.

(b) Accountability Hierarchy

_Accountability Hierarchy_ is seen as an important mechanism to achieve organizational learning. The Gold Commander is a senior officer, or lead member of a committee at the top of the organization, sets the strategy for organizational learning based on the organizational priorities. The Silver Commander decides how goals can be achieved. The Bronze commander will actually realize them. That would bring accountability to make sure the goals are achieved.

(c) Platform

Platform denotes the means for implementing change, such as the SOPs, guidelines, rules and policies. New structural and operational changes are materialized as new or amalgamated units, new regulations and procedures.
(d) Delivery

Delivery can be achieved through training or an implementation plan, which includes the answers of how, who, when and the cost. The new changes have to be introduced to the members of the organizations through in-service training programs or implementation projects.

(e) Inspection Review

Inspection Review is the last portion of the planned organizational learning model. This stage is necessary to make sure the cycle of process is actually working according to its spirit. The inspections could be internal or external.

The JRG prepares organizational learning diagrams about particular issues and presents them to the management board through the deputy commissioner who is responsible for organizational learning. For example, with the issue of learning from major terrorist incidents, the JRG prepares a diagram, which includes the description of the situation and is a model for high risk areas for implementation, and passes it to top management. Through the implementation of the Organizational Learning Model and similar organizational learning efforts of the MPS (2007a), the issue becomes a:

- Corporate issue.
- Independent of business groups.
- Provide the drive and focus.
- Lifts it above Management Board.
- Becomes an organisational priority.

(2) Organizational Learning and Organizational Values of the MPS

The JRG also functions as a watchdog of the organizational priorities and values of the MPS. Table 4 summarizes organizational values of the MPS (emphasis was added). The point of these values highlights a single cultural lesson: people who do their jobs according to policy and standard practice are not blamed if mistakes occur on the job.

Table 4
The Values of the London Metropolitan Police Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working together with all London’s citizens, our partners, and our colleagues:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- We will have pride in delivering quality policing. There is no greater priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- We will build trust by listening and responding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- We will respect and support each other and work as a team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>We will learn from experience and find ways to be even better</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We are one team – we all have a duty to play our part in making London safer

The MPS is keen on organizational learning but not repetition of mistakes. The 10-year old *Morris Inquiry* on how the MPS treats its staff and the *Stephen Lawrence*
Inquiry on racism left significant scars on the organization's policies and practices. Although similar mistakes have not been repeated because of regular scrutiny, the JRG raises the bar and does not satisfy with organizational stagnation, even if such stagnation yields positive outcomes. JRG studies (MPS, 2007a) identified the following organizational shortcomings:

- Loss of historical/organizational memory.
- No corporate organizational learning ownership.
- Lack of accountability in organisational learning.
- Working in business group silos.
- Difficulties putting policy into action.
- No checks and balances - robust inspection and review.
- No performance indicators for organisational learning.
- Organisational perception that “we never learn”.
- Repeating mistakes.
- Tolerating getting things wrong.

Although professional mistakes are tolerated to a degree, the UK Police recognize that organizational mistakes have limits. Repetition of organizational mistakes is not tolerated by the public eye. One respondent said, “[w]e feel that the public will
tolerate us making mistakes once. But they don’t expect to make them again. So we're looking to change things to make sure we get things right the first time if we can.”

The MPS was open to organizational change. However, in high-profile law enforcement agencies across Europe and in the United States, organizational change does not include tolerance for even a single serious mistake. Organizational pride did not rely on protecting the status quo, but rather organizational pride was predicated on the organization’s willingness to change. Organizational learning is considered as the propeller of change and organizational performance. The JRG lists (MPS, 2007a) the reasons why the MPS needs organizational learning:

- MPS values: “Learning from experience, finding ways to be even better.”
- Organisational Reputation.
- Regular scrutiny e.g. IPCC, MPA, Public Enquiry.
- Legislation, Corporate Manslaughter etc.
- Need for a recognised process of Inspection and Review.
- Encourages self learning.

In addition to learning from experience, the MPS strives to enhance organizational learning even at the entry level. During basic police training, cadets are responsible for writing what they learn to get used to writing and learning from their own experiences in the future. A respondent said
The whole culture now at Hendon [basic training academy] is rather than learning rote things, like laws and things, individuals are responsible for their own learning. These are the issues that we feel we are addressing as an organization now for organizational learning. We feel that too often the learning is with an individual. An important person will learn from experience. But is it really being embedded into the role. So when he moves to something else, someone else comes in, is it lost? . . . We're not pretending we got this right yet, but we know it's there.

Consistent with the basic training, organizational learning became an integral part of the management training programs and promotional courses as well. Prospective leaders are encouraged to expect their teams to be part of the learning objectives of the organization at each stage they take role.

(3) Organizational Learning and Silo-Structured Organization Model

The JRG recognizes that organizations, especially the large ones, are silo-structured entities with each silo containing even smaller silos. This means that learning experiences are less likely to be shared with other silos, especially as silos grow distant from one another. Distances between silos can increase professional rivalries inside the organizations. Such problems become more critical as the number of entities with different missions increase. However, organizational goals can never be achieved at the
highest levels without corporate ownership; there is always a need for a common ground to share and learn from one other.

Different units of an organization may have different kinds and levels of equipment, technology or systems, which other units don’t have or don’t use often. Professional rivalry may deepen differences between [silos/units] at the expense of the overall organizational effectiveness. Even if experiences are shared within a unit or a sector, those shared experiences may remain bound to a particular silo. The danger of falling into insulated silos materialized in the MPS as a function of its organization size. In recognition of this pitfall, a respondent explained the danger of silo isolation:

Working in silos, by silos we mean where you work in your own world. . . . Different departments have different ways of embedding organizational learning. But so often, it doesn't go outside that business group into somewhere else. Say for surveillance for example, different departments will do surveillance covert policing but they don’t always all do it the same way, with the same standards. And when they have an experience of, say trying new technology, not all of them will know what each other is doing. . . . At worse, you can have professional rivalry.

The MPS strives to overcome silo isolation by establishing a common organizational learning mechanism, which permits silos to work together in their learning initiatives. A respondent explained this proposed mechanism, which is the adaptation of Gold-Silver-Bronze operational system to the organizational learning:
In command and in control, we have a model called gold, silver and bronze. We would like to see that rather than just being in operations, the same things apply to organizational learning. So rather than being a wishy-washy kind of type thing, the gold says strategically “these are the things you have to learn, these are the objectives.” Silver comes up with an implementation plan for that and then someone at bronze, say for example a chief inspector, actually goes out and makes those changes. For example, [if] we don't record our decisions so we're not accountable when people look at what we have done. Silver will go and find a solution for recording decisions more effectively; it could be something like that. And then the bronze will actually go out, buy the equipment, test it, and make it happen. . . . Rather than organizational learning being a thing that gets forgotten until the next big incident comes along. There is actually an accountability to make sure it happens.

The MPS used other strategies to overcome the silo pitfall. MPS brought different levels of personnel together and briefed them so they understood one another's role, spoke the same corporate language, shared responsibility, and ensured teamwork during operations. The outcome of those strategies was to avoid mistakes. A respondent said: "sometimes what you actually do is really good and you've learned."
(4) **Organizational Learning and Accountability**

The MPS considers that organizational learning also has the aspect of accountability. If the members of an organization do not record what actually happened, then it becomes difficult to hold a person accountable. Not recording what exactly happened is not only the danger of losing the experiences gained, but also the danger of not being able to describe what exactly a member should be doing in similar situations. Without recording the events clearly, organizational learning becomes difficult to implement. The JRG defends that, being specific, measurable, accurate, relevant, and timely is only possible with recording the events. A respondent said

> When people come in to look at your accountability and it isn't written, it's hard to demonstrate in the confidence about what happened. Checks and balances is about holding people to account what they should be doing. Measuring organizational learning is very hard. . . . We think a good way of measuring organizational learning is you get less recommendations from the IPCC. Because we don’t make so many mistakes, we don’t repeat mistakes, so we don’t make the same mistake again and we get better public satisfaction so the public thinks that the police are more professional and they are happy with our actions.

The JRG considers that the organization should allow its members to make mistakes only once and if they repeat, they should take the responsibility for their actions. A respondent said
Our argument is that the damage when we get it wrong repeatedly, is far worse than the investment that would be in it. And little phrase of my chief superintendent that “on the management side in policing, we assume knowledge of our practitioners, the practitioners who are doing it see their managers understand them, maybe everyone drowns in the sea of assumption.”

The JRG argues that, recording what actually happened seems to be the most feasible way to make individuals accountable and stop them from blaming others. Such a measure and system would bring more professionalism and more confidence to the organization. The members of the JRG defend that true knowledge can best be created through recording. They use the motto of "if it’s not written down, it didn’t happen" and add that, experience that is not written has no value because unwritten experience is neither transferrable nor reliable. A respondent said “If we implement this [recording], it shows we do actually learn from our experience, which is one of our values, which is one of the things the public expect us to do.”

The JRG determined that the MPS needed a central process at the top level to hold people accountable for learning from experience. The group proposed a new aspect to the organizational level inspections, in which individuals are encouraged to take lessons from their experiences. A respondent gave an explanation of how this proposed inspection would work:

The purpose of the inspection is, it doesn't matter where you are, that everyone learns lessons, maybe from July about how we deal with things, to be more
effective next time. And then, if the model for organizational learning works, people don't need to be told what to do. They actually have a process of learning themselves and putting that into practice.

The JRG thinks that a higher level inspection for organizational learning is essential because that is also an effective way to get through the barriers of working in silos. Otherwise, the individual silos would continue to pursue their own priorities, rather than working for the common organizational goals. A respondent said

We are very touched about ivory towers working here. . . . If you don't measure something, people don't do it, because they have competing priorities. And we think it's important that we have someone a level of inspector commissioner who is saying, this is important and holding you to account from making the changes. Interoperability in sharing, same thing as silos really, it's about making sure things work together: Integration.

The data and the field observations showed that organizational learning has many positive implications as long as it has become an organizational priority. Rather than people just doing things in their own way, organizational learning offers a structured, practical, simple, recognizable, and auditable model. It provides drive and focus for the organization. Recording experiences, through writing or other means, such as voice recording or audio-visual recording, provide such an opportunity that those experiences can be known and understood throughout the organization, and members of the organization can tie those experiences into their own self learning. It can also be
incorporated into basic and leadership training curriculums. Therefore the model demonstrates that individuals, and the organization as a whole, can learn from experience. It is also proven that, it is useful for internal and external inquiries against the organization, because the organization can defend itself better when it is recorded than it would otherwise.

e. Difficulties in Organizational Learning

The JRG has identified some of difficulties within the MPS (MPS, 2007a). These are:

- Rigidity;
- We already do it approach;
- Resistance;
- Being a Large Organization;
- Legal Limitations; and
- Over empowerment.

The interview data indicated that, organizational learning may become rigid if it is applied proscriptively. If it is not applied flexibly, then it may not fit the situation. It has to be compatible with existing procedures to the extent that it adds value, rather than becoming another layer of bureaucracy. It also needs to be integrated with the existing learning processes. In addition, organizational learning does not come for free and it certainly requires an additional cost.
During his studies and fieldwork the researcher observed that the foremost difficulty for organizational learning is the “we do it already” type resistance. A respondent explained that similar sayings such as "we do that already" or “we have done that already and it doesn't work" are stumbling blocks for organizational learning as well as for the development of any agency. In change initiatives, such obstacles become critical, because for many, going with the status quo is always seen as secure and an easier option.

The interview data indicate that the other difficulty in organizational learning is that policies or reforms produced at the higher level may not be able reach the street-level because of many problems within the organization, such as lack of leadership and lack of communication. Under such circumstances, either some key players resist and do not apply, or the messages do not reach the grassroots level. As a result, reform initiatives may pose a danger of not producing even the initial results on which the ultimate reforms can be built upon. A respondent explained this difficulty:

We have something we use in order to not be in an ivory tower too much. The question we are often asking at meetings if you're making policy or something is “What would the constable on the street having to do the work, what would they think of this policy, any policy? It doesn’t matter what policy it is.” Because what happens is, us, up here in the ivory tower, make a policy, are unaware of their liking. They are not their policy. So they are not doing it. How do you
make sure that policy actually happens on the street and that’s the measurement that we need to pick up.

The interview data also indicated that, internal limitations such as leadership and communication problems become more serious in larger organizations. The size of the organization has been another important limitation. Because processes become more complex in larger organizations, things become impersonal and responsibility fades away rather than individuals become important and take responsibility. Several respondents defended that individuals do not learn, because everything is too big for them to grasp.

The legal framework emerged as another reason for difficulty in organizational learning from the interview data. The information and the experience cannot be shared and studied during the legal processes in order not to obstruct justice. It is known that the legal processes usually take years in most cases. A respondent said

It is an exceptionally sensitive and kind of high profile area. It’s almost like we were doing organizational learning with our hands tied, because we are telling people to change but not being able to share the reasons for it, because of legal processes. Mr. Clark has talked about that recently, how we have not been able to share our successes and what we've learned and what we've done in terrorism, because of the legal framework. It takes two years to get people to court and sentenced. And that, however simple we try to be, it is within the environment of legal processes, which is frustrating sometimes.
In majority of the cases, during the time of long legal framework, issues may lose their gravity and the police may also lose the opportunity of receiving political or public support to reform its policies and procedures.

The field observations within the MPS indicated that even though public indignation arises after terrorist incidents police powers should not be enlarged beyond a reasonable framework. This may not be the best interest of policing from the organizational learning perspective because, instead of taking lessons and developing their systems, enlarged powers may lead the police to harsher or careless practices.

3. Learning From Research and Theory

The interview data and the field observations indicate that the UK Police learn from theory and rely heavily on research in their policies and procedures. They investigate, learn, test and then design their activities according to the results they get from their learning. When they decided to develop an institutional memory, they made a training-needs analyses with the experts from the field of education. When they decided to institutionalize their organizational learning initiatives, they used academic resources. A respondent said, “[t]his book is the European Foundation for Quality Management which is academic in basis, but it is a model for organizational learning. It says comparing and consulting is the best way of doing things.” Along with their long-term projects, they always find themselves in search of new models or new ways of doing things. Their post 9/11 era activities exemplify their commitment and their institutional attention to scientific inquiry.
The interview data and the documentary evidence provided a series of indications that the UK Police learn from research and theory in their counter-terrorism effort. After the 9/11 incidents the UK Police started to work on new strategies, especially to deal with suicide terrorism. In order to design an effective response mechanism, Operation Kratos was initiated as a national police response to protect the public from suicide bombers (MPS, 2007b). One of the main goals of the introduced response was to learn and develop techniques and preventive measures toward suicide terrorism, and to seek best practices from other countries that had experience dealing with the issue.

As a foremost initiative to design a response mechanism, the UK Police preferred to work with academic institutions so that they could understand the dimensions and the possible effects of suicide attacks. A respondent said

We did a lot of things. We worked with academic institutions; we spoke to a lot of police services and security services overseas. We wanted to really understand the capabilities of suicide terrorists, the type of say, bombs they use to carry, the explosives, we did a lot of work; we wanted to understand the effect of those bombs for instance. . . . We are not afraid of going to academics and asking them for their thoughts. Particularly in the field of terrorism, we have a very good link with St. Andrews University, where there is center for terrorism research. And we use academics, who have carried out research.

Rather than to rely on bounded rationality type decision making style, the UK Police learned from theory and actually conducted experiments firsthand, in order to
observe the actual results and evaluate them. They conducted research together with academics to create a “pool of knowledge” as one of the respondents characterized, and ultimately produced policy options to use in their policy making processes.

Along with other materials, the researcher had the opportunity of watching and examining some video recordings of their experiments, in which they simulated suicide terrorist attacks. Experts from the police, the intelligence units and other relevant institutions conducted a series of experiments at the Home Office Transportation Laboratories and elsewhere. For example, in order to understand what actually can stop a bomb loaded truck, they crashed trucks with different weight loads into barriers and concluded that only the Corus barriers, the reinforced steel, were effective in protecting government buildings, whereas concrete barriers were not good, and plastic walls or rhino barriers were useless. They also tested different bombs and measured their impact. A respondent described the experiments:

We went down to an establishment where we detonated suicide bombs against a variety of number of targets, including armored cars, because we were interested in about their effect on armored cars; very, very frightening. . . . We blew up on the cars with suicide bombs. We put 5 kgs of explosives around a dummy with ball bearings and we stood them various distances away from armored cars for instance. . . . Once we really understood the capabilities of suicide terrorists, for instance, we understood that if a suicide bomber got within 5 meters of an armored car that we are using to protect our prime minister, they would kill the
prime minister. The armoring would not stop the blast. The blast from the bomb would get into the car and it would kill the occupants. 10 meters away, the ball bearings would not penetrate the armor but the blast gets in and it just opens it up like a tin can.

The UK Police were not satisfied with only their research. They conducted research with other nations as well. They strived to understand how others resolved the similar problems. A respondent said, “[w]e worked well ahead of research; we also worked very closely with the Americans and we ran a number of joint projects with the Americans.” Following their multi-disciplinary research, they concluded that there was no available solution or a success story to really incapacitate suicide terrorists immediately before their momentary action of blowing themselves up. A respondent said

We realized that, in order to do it accurately, we would have to incapacitate somebody almost immediately. There couldn't be a 2 or 3 second gap; it has to happen “bang!” like that. So we tried a whole range of things from Tasers, from CS spray, pepper spray, every method we could think of that we tried to incapacitate somebody very, very quickly, which will allow officers to move in, check to see whether they were carrying explosives or trying as you said in Turkey grab them so they can't set the explosives off. . . . We involved the medical profession, we involved the military in this, we went everywhere to try and get the best possible advice to what we can do.
Another empirical experiment the UK Police conducted was that they developed special ammunition for suicide terrorism. The bullets are hollow-tipped; they remain in the body and make a larger impact, and do not go through and hit others.

It is important to note that the UK Police continue their research until they find solutions to their problems fully. They do not put the research projects aside simply because they cannot reach their goals at the beginning. A respondent said, “[t]echnology is moving on and we have not given up to find a method and this may be one of the things I will be looking at now, a method hoping to incapacitating somebody sufficiently.” Because they couldn’t find a solution to stop a suspected suicide terrorist, the UK Police drafted a policy of shooting the person in the head without warning, with the order of a police commander. A respondent explained the reasons for this policy:

One of the problems we had, is that if you are relying on intelligence. Let's do the scenario game. There I am standing with my explosives hidden underneath my jacket. You are the firearms officer. Somebody has told you that I am a suicide terrorist or they think I am a suicide terrorist. Your only option, because we tried everything else, is either to grab me, but there are other people standing around, and if you do that, not only could you be killed but members of the public. So your other option is to shoot me in the head without warning. Because if you warn me, I go bang!

The draft policy was tested against the representatives of every agency that would be involved in a shooting case. The government, politicians, judiciary, coroner’s office,
lawyers, chief constables, senior civil servants, and barristers were all put in a scenario, in which they were asked to decide what they would have done against suspected suicide terrorists, had they been a police commander. The policy was adopted only after the results of the experiment. This example of adopting a policy after an experiment indicates that the UK Police also learn and define their policies based on research and theory. The data strongly indicate that, seeking scientific knowledge is one of the first initiatives of what the UK Police do when they come across a problem. To find long-term solutions to their problems, they do not hesitate to work with other institutions and partners. The UK Police work not only with the governmental institutions and the universities, but also with private industry. Demanding for innovations, they have become the movers and shakers of research in the field of security. A respondent outlined their approach in this venture:

We use academics, government departments, the police, and private business, specialists business to look at ways that we can reduce the threat of certain types of materials. They also do research on technology, to make it easier for us to detect the chemical, biological agent for example, technology to help us with CCTV. There is an awful lot of sharing of knowledge, because the people involved in this, is a very, very small number of people, highly paid researchers and analysts. Why do we use all these different people? Because there is a benefit for the private security firms, not man security guarding, these are very specialist companies that if they invest money into technology that we are saying is really important, the benefits for them may accrue later when they have produced
something that is exactly what we want them to produce. That's the benefit. So there is a firm called Kinetic. It’s a very, very influential company, very, very important company, does a lot of very high technology. And yes, we use these people, because the police will ask them, “This is what I want. I want this technology to detect this. Can you do it?” . . . They will spend the money to produce it, but if they produce what they want, they have the endorsement and say this is exactly what's required. I think it can work well.

The overall data indicated that the UK Police seek for innovative solutions to respond to terrorism appropriately. They know that their challenge will never end, and they can never stop terrorist activities completely. But they do their best in their attempt to make things difficult for potential terrorists to obtain the tools or weapons to cause carnage. Referring to an IRA terrorist’s words, “[w]e only have to be lucky once. You have to be lucky all the time.” a respondent said, “[n]o matter what we do, a terrorist can still get through, but our task is to make it more difficult.” They think that in order to be lucky all the time, they need to make the environment hostile for the terrorists. It should be difficult for them to operate, train, communicate, and get equipment and explosives. They see learning from research and theory as one the foremost options for them to be more effective.
4. External Learning Experiences

Another foremost theme that emerged from the interview data was the external organizational learning experiences of the UK Police. The data shows that the UK Police pay significant attention to and learn from international police organizations’ practices before designing their policies and procedures. The data provided clear indications about their external organizational learning experiences, especially in the 9/11 era.

UK Police learned from their own experiences with terrorism and collaborated on large scale of research initiatives with universities, private consultants and companies. However, the UK Police needed to learn more about the suicide terrorism from other experienced countries. To that end, UK Police made on-site visits to get first hand information from international colleagues. A respondent said

After 9-11, I was part of the team that started to draw up new policies for dealing with suicide terrorism. And the first thing we did was (going through your list) we carried out an awful lot of research on what happens around the world. . . . So having done the research, we then decided we were going to go to visit a number of countries, and actually spend time with those countries. So obviously we went to Sri Lanka. Because the Sri Lankans had been dealing with probably one of those most successful terrorist groups there ever has been, the Tamil Tigers. The Black Tigers, the Suicide Tigers had very, very successful attacks against Sri Lankan as well as Indian ministers. Rabbi Ghandi was attacked by a Tamil suicide bomber and killed. So, going to Sri Lanka was really important, we
learned a huge amount from them. We learned about the types of suicide belts people used, the fact that they used them around their body and in bags even in mopeds, on bicycles, even, believe it or not, on a donkey once, which is just unbelievable. We learned that the actual organization itself, the terrorist organization itself, carried out enormous amount of research to get the effectiveness of them. We were actually seeing documents of where they carried out research. What they did, they had a car, they put a dead pig, and a dead goat in the back of the car, another dead pig in front of the car, and they set off devices to get the right metal, and then worked at how much the ball bearings penetrated the flesh of the animals. Seriously, these things don't happen by chance. They really work were very hard to get the right combination. And of course they export a lot of that, expertise to other places. We were pretty sure there was a lot of expertise sent to Palestine.

Visiting other countries, the UK Police had the opportunity to learn an international comparative perspective. They became aware of not only the tactics and techniques used by the terrorist organizations, but also the best practices of other police organizations. A respondent outlined the results of their observations:

There is a lot of discussions going on and a lot of similarities between the Tamil Tigers. We then went to Israel. We spent a lot of time in Israel with the Israel Security Agency [to see] their process and procedures for dealing with suicide terrorists.
We went around Europe and we spoke to other police forces in Europe to see what they were doing, how they were deciding and we discovered actually that there wasn’t a lot happening in Europe to be honest with you. There wasn’t a lot of research being done. We were well ahead of the research.

The researcher recognized that the UK Police take lessons from all countries, economically more or less developed, technically more or less capable, wherever there is counter-terrorism experience. With this approach, they have the opportunity of first, observing all levels and kinds of practices comparatively, and second, understanding different kinds of terrorist tactics that they may experience in the future. A respondent said

So the lessons were learned from Israel, Sri-Lanka and other countries, who had faces of terrorism and had learned ways to counter that and it is a new type of threat. So there is a learning curve there, in terms of operational tactics to counter suicide terrorism. … But, lessons had to be learned from other countries that have had that experience, because obviously it is not one that we have had.

Organizing international training programs is another way of learning for the UK Police. When they organize some training courses for their international colleagues, they learn from their experiences while they teach theirs. A respondent said

If we can learn from another country, then we will only be too glad to; and if we can share our experience again with other countries, we happily do that. We do that for this office sometimes. We arrange with training, people come over. One
of the things that we did, we realized, we had to get more intelligence. We were
talking about how we adapted, that is one of the ways we adapted. That is one of
the biggest ways to adopt it.

Looking at the comprehensiveness of external learning initiatives, the UK Police
implement counter-terrorism best practices wherever they originate. For example, the
MPS visits the Civil Aviation Authority or smaller police departments in the UK to
exchange ideas and to learn more about their organizational learning practices. The point
is that organizational territoriality or “ego” does not limit their vision when it comes to
counter-terrorism. In this sense, they are organizationally humble and open to learn.
The MPS’ organizational dignity is based upon the quality and the capability of learning,
not on the number of personnel or as a representative of the Western world. A
respondent said

We have to change, and we have to learn from our experience of combating
terrorism, we have to learn from other countries, from their experiences, and that's
what we try to do specifically in this office. That is the very reason for our being
set up in the first place. . . . We will learn and we will try to make sure that we
will learn from our colleagues from wherever that might be and take their
learning.

Learning from other police organizations takes many forms. The data indicated
that the UK Police’s learning was multi-dimensional. They not only learned about how
to prevent terrorist incidents, but also about operational tactics and post-incident response
alternatives from other police organizations around the world. A respondent explained how they benefited from their external learning experiences:

Learned from others? Absolutely! Also there are two kinds of key examples there. One is operational example, where they've learned from other countries in terms of tactical operational skill. The other one is the change in the whole structure of the organization to better deal with the nature of the threat. … I think that the only thing they can do is turn to other countries where police officers and policing bodies had actually dealt with these on the ground to learn from their lessons. How did they evacuate the public? How did they respond, if they got any kind of warning? Not only that but also in terms of follow up, how do you respond once something has happened like that? How were the emergency services organized to respond, the first responders and so on? But there are also the tactical aspects. How you would isolate a possible suspect? How you would deal with that and what lessons could be learned in terms of stopping that threat? But again obviously it's something that the UK has not experienced before.

The interview data indicate that being open to the rest of the world provides a wider perspective to the UK Police and gives them the opportunity to be prepared toward new terrorist techniques and tactics. But the UK Police are not limited to their international efforts only. Other sources, such as their diplomatic channels and military forces around the world provide them considerable amount of processed information, so they can design their preventive policies domestically. A respondent explained how the
flow of external information helps them to design their internal disruption of possible terrorist threats:

The military are now providing us with many reports about what's happening in Iraq and Afghanistan. So we try to understand about how is terrorism evolving in Iraq and Afghanistan. We get reports from all around the world. So we try and learn what are the terrorists doing now that is different than what we used to know. Is there anything we need to change? And here is a good example in my own work. In Iraq, they were attempting to use chlorine as a bomb, not very successfully. So what happens is, the government and ourselves look at chlorine and we instituted a program, because we had concerns that people look in the internet, they get ideas, maybe they might do something with chlorine in the UK. So we have a program to try and warn people about do not sell chlorine. Protect those sites that contain large quantities of chlorine. So that's a very good example of we learn something and we try to update it. But it's not perfect. I think nobody would ever say that what we do is, we always pick up everything.

The overall data indicated that the UK Police are always interested in what is going on around the world in terrorism. They are keen on learning the terrorist tactics, how they are diffused and how police organizations respond to those activities. Their organizational culture allows them to go and learn all about them genuinely and include them into their organizational memory. Therefore, external organizational learning initiatives are an inseparable part of their learning initiatives in counter-terrorism.
F. CHANGE INITIATIVES

The interview data and the documentary evidence indicated that following the triggering events, the UK Police have realized a series of changes within their organizational structures and operational procedures. Because the new terrorism posed many dimensions, the UK Police sought for contemporary solutions in addition to their immediate investigative responses. The alternative solutions and the direction they took materialized as a series of change initiatives based on their learning initiatives. The changes they realized were concurrent with the long-term strategic policies toward terrorism. The clear understanding of the new terrorism led authorities to respond to the threat with appropriate responses. A respondent said

While 9/11 was clearly a watershed event which highlighted the changed nature of the threat posed by the religiously motivated terrorism …, the need for UK Policing to change its counter-terrorist structures and operational policies, became apparent following a series of terrorist investigations in the UK.

The overall data provided the evidence that, “change” had always occupied an important place within the organizational culture of the UK Police. More importantly, it was also found that change was not a phenomenon that had just emerged and evolved after the 9/11 incidents. The UK Police had always been organizationally responsive to the terrorist incidents since their inception. For example, beginning with the IRA terrorist activities in early 1970’s, the Anti-Terrorism Branch was established in order to carry out investigations. The murder of the UK ambassador in The Hague, in 1979, led
to the formation of *Police Working Group on Terrorism* within the MPS. Since then, the unit has been responsible for international liaison on counter-terrorism and cooperation among police organizations globally. *Operation Rainbow* was initiated in 1995, as a response to the 1993 Bishopsgate bomb in the city of London. This overt anti-terrorism policy of Operation Rainbow resulted in CCTV system in London, informed awareness among citizens, and other communication and patrolling systems among police officers. The system is being used not only in the prevention of terrorism but other criminal investigations as well. Therefore the UK Police have always responded to terrorism through changing their structure and establishing new systems.

Expectantly, the post 9/11 era and especially the 7/7 incidents were responded to with significant changes by the UK Police. The *Special Branch*, the intelligence unit, and the *Anti-Terrorism Branch* within the MPS were amalgamated as *Counter Terrorism Command* (CTC) as of October 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2006, because of the need for the unification of both aspects of counter-terrorism: intelligence and investigation. The need for this unification became more apparent especially after the July 2005 events. One respondent said

Post 7/7 with the changing scenario, and I think particularly with the changing nature of the threat and the realization of the threat, there has been a major change in the two bodies (they worked very closely but they were two separate bodies) of effectively being amalgamated into one command, the Counter-terrorist Command. And I think the reason behind that now is the linkages and the time factors. The nature of the threat has changed and mutated into a far more serious
threat from the traditional, provisional IRA nationalist type threat. The time frame has got shorter in terms of gathering information pertaining to an attack and an attack occurring. And the level of the threat has changed. … And I think the idea is that there is a solid link, because you are getting the intelligence coming in. It is being processed and you can feed it straight through into the evidential and investigative side, in terms of preparation either for arrest and/or beyond that for the court.

The overall data observably indicated that this amalgamation was realized for better coordination and to reduce duplication between the Special Branch and the Anti-Terrorism Branch. Some respondents on the other hand, indicated their concerns that the extermination of previously constructed deliberately-firewalled, or siloed system might result in the entering of sensitive information into the evidential chain, and ultimately reaching the public court. They think that this may weaken the counter-terrorism system in general.

In addition to MPS, other major constabularies (police departments) such as Greater Manchester, West Midlands and West Yorkshire have also established their own CTCs, in which both intelligence and investigation blended under one structure (Warnes, 2007). In addition to such restructuring initiatives in major police forces, the Regional Information Cells (RICs) were established in 9 regions as new hubs of information. RICs have been established within critical local areas across the UK for police intelligence gathering, surveillance, analysis and financial investigations (Lovegrove, 2006). Further
mergers and restructuring of policing terrorism in the UK at the national level are still being discussed by the HMIC and ACPO (Hindle, 2007).

In addition to the large scale structural changes, some other initiatives also took place: For example, as explained in the learning initiatives section, the July Review Group (JRG) was established within the MPS to respond to the 7/7 incidents and to institutionalize organizational learning. JRG Challenge Panel was established to scrutinize the progress made by the JRG and to contribute to setting and reviewing the direction of their work (MPA, 2007). Knowledge Management Centre was established in order to provide timely and accurate information to the Crisis Management Team during crises. Kratos Review Group was established “to support the ongoing development of tactics, weapons, equipment and training to ensure that the MPS can respond effectively to the threat posed by suspected suicide bombers through Command and Control and threat-based tactics” (MPA, 2007).

Change initiatives for the counter-terrorism purposes were not limited within the units directly related to counter-terrorism. Other support units also changed their standard operating procedures and structures as a result of the terrorist incidents. For example, the MPS Directorate of Information established the Integrated Intelligence Platform, which enabled users to search for information held in several separate systems as a response to the 7/7 incidents. The Directorate of Legal Services established a counter-terrorism team to assist senior management and other counter-terrorism units of the organization in their legal challenges. Other units, such as the Air Support Unit, the
Marine Support Unit, the Mounted and Dog units changed or altered their procedures to support counter-terrorism activities (MPS&MPA, 2006). The Basic Training Academy and the Leadership Academy changed their curriculums toward counter-terrorism matters and organizational learning.

Along with the structural and operational changes, numerous changes in policies and procedures were realized within the MPS and the UK Police in general. As explained in learning initiatives of the UK Police, a policy was developed toward suicide terrorism, in which a suspected individual, who is believed to be a potential suicide bomber, according to intelligence reports, could be shot in the head with the order of a senior officer in charge, in order to protect others’ lives. As a supporting mechanism, briefings to the firearm officers started to be video-taped per IPCC recommendation.

In fact, the more change initiatives are observed the easier it gets to understand the nature of cultural characteristics of the UK Police. Since the experiences are recorded and analyzed, mistakes are questioned through internal and external feedback mechanisms and organizational learning has become an institutional priority, constant or system-wide mistakes cannot survive for a long time. Furthermore, if organizationally sound, need-led and effective solution packages arise from some of the members of the organization or from other external feedback mechanisms, they are more likely to be realized. Innovative ideas are not clogged with strict hierarchical rules. Instead, the system welcomes feedback from all sides. Any new information, knowledge or experience may cause an amendment to the manual of the covert counter-terrorism
investigations. Although change does not happen overnight and it requires constant studies and considerations, the UK Police do not experience “fear of change” in contrast to current practices around the world. A respondent described this cultural characteristic of the UK Police:

If there is something fundamentally important to change, then that will happen. That could be anything from safety procedures. Let’s say for an example, safety procedures for police officers in their response to a suspect package, we will change that. Some of the other minor changes may be difficult to change completely and you have to take into account everything else that police response officers have to deal with. But yes, we will do that if there is something significant and important to change.

In sum, the UK Police have gone through massive structural and operational changes in their response to terrorism. For sure these changes occurred in many ways and dimensions in every police force. However, the overall data strongly indicated that the greatest change occurred within the minds of police professionals. Consistent with the logic model of this study, the UK Police became more and more open for change, as they continued to learn.

G. POLICY INITIATIVES

The interview data presented that UK Police have a clear understanding of the police role within the modern world, particularly toward society, government, politics and the business sector. The Police recognize the importance of their role for their
country. For this reason, they design their role and their stance in a way that a police job is not only catching the criminals and bringing them to the justice. Rather than seeing their role only from such an operational perspective, especially in counter-terrorism, they value the quality of their response to the extent that they need to work with society, partners and other institutions.

1. Working with Society

Table 5 (MPS&MPA, 2007) shows the mission of the MPS, which includes its seven strategic outcomes, outcomes sought and the goal of being the safest major city in the world.
Table 5

The Mission of the London Metropolitan Police Service

**OUR MISSION: WORKING TOGETHER FOR A SAFER LONDON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DELIVERING 7 STRATEGIC OUTCOMES</th>
<th>OUTCOMES SOUGHT</th>
<th>TO MAKE LONDON SAFEST MAJOR CITY IN THE WORLD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Focus</td>
<td>Communities are engaged with, confident in &amp; satisfied with our police service</td>
<td>Key Long – term Performance Measures: related to the Governments’ first 3 Public Service Agreements and the Policing Performance Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Terrorism, Security &amp; Protection</td>
<td>Security is improved &amp; the public feel reassured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safer Neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Crime, disorder, vulnerability &amp; harm are prevented &amp; reduced</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal Networks</td>
<td>More offenders are brought to justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital City Policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Quality</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Together</td>
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SUPPORTED BY: LIVING OUR VALUES & ENSURING WE HAVE

| A modern & diverse workforce | Enabled staff | Better use of resources | Cohesive partnership working | Clear communication |
The mission is formulated into three components. The first component consists of seven strategic outcomes. These are Citizen Focus, Counter Terrorism, Security & Protection, Safer Neighborhoods, Criminal Networks, Capital City Policing, Information Quality and Together. Within this component, the mission affirms that “Citizen Focus” and “Counter-Terrorism, Security and Protection” are declared as primary strategic outcomes.

The second component, “outcomes sought”, declares how the strategic goals will be achieved and consists of four vehicles. These are

- Communities are engaged with, confident in & satisfied with our police service;
- Security is improved & the public feel reassured;
- Crime, disorder, vulnerability & harm are prevented & reduced; and
- More offenders are brought to justice.

In this component, community engagement and public assurance are observed as the primary vehicles by the organization.

The third component declares the ultimate goal of the MPS, which is “To Make London Safest Major City in the World”. The organization’s goals are to reduce crime rates, bring more number of offences to justice and to gain public satisfaction and confidence in accordance with the government’s first three Public Service Agreements and the Policing Performance Assessment Framework.
The mission of the MPS also asserts that above goals and processes are to be supported by the organization’s values and stipulations of a modern and diverse workforce, enabled staff, better use of resources, cohesive partnership working, and clear communication.

Confirming to the above mission statement, the UK Police pay great attention to their relationship with the community and other stakeholders. The UK has a diverse society. For this reason, the police try to directly interact with the community, understand their socio-cultural and political perspectives, and discuss police policies and practices with the citizenry. A respondent explained their efforts to encourage open police-community interaction:

We spend a lot of time discussing with, say Muslim community leaders, the impact of these policies. Because, when I said to you about this balance between security and human rights, you have to work out what is going to be the impact of this policy? How do we manage that impact? If we shot somebody who is innocent, the message is that, is going to send to the community, is got to be intense. So how do we manage that? So, part of the policy also is, how do you manage the community impact? That is an important part of what we are trying to do. Now we have a fairly intensive program of community engagement in relation to terrorism.

Such a genuine approach does not only help the police to establish solid relationships with the community, but also helps them to collect real intelligence.
Through the help of the community, the UK Police collect more relevant information about possible terrorist cells. A respondent said

There are perhaps five thousand young Muslims in this country, who are angry and are being worked on and indoctrinated into the way of the terrorist. And we can't cover five thousand people. So, all the work that we do is fantastic. I mean we have had some brilliant things. But where we will get the leads from, the real intelligence from, will not be from Guantanamo Bay interrogations, will not be, from other parts of the Middle East, will not be from high-level agents within Al-Qaeda. It will be within the community. It will be within the . . . mosque. And trying to penetrate those is incredibly difficult.

The UK Police’s interaction with the community goes beyond the nature of verbal communication. They strive to establish a long-term relationship with the community, based on mutual trust. A respondent said, “when I talk about long-term intelligence opportunity I am talking about police officers building up contacts in the community over a five to ten year period.” Such long-term relationships are reinforced with tangible forms of community policing effort, such as putting the citizen-focus as an institutional priority, and engaging with them through projects and partnerships.

One of the most important tenets of these engagements and activities is that the MPS works with the representatives of different professions, groups and segments of the society, and shares its proposed policies before changing them. A respondent listed the participants of one of their policy making processes:
The point is that we wanted to test our theories against these people, who were absolute experts in their fields: experts in the law from the Home Office on policy, people that would investigate the incident afterwards, and the media was there. We had government, we had politicians, we had the judiciary which included a barrister who was an expert in criminal law on self defense, we had judges, we had senior civil servants from the home office, we had the very top of the organizations, we had chief constables, chief of police were there, we had media, [and] representation from one of the major TV stations.

The City of London Police also uses a combined e-mail, pager and text facility to communicate with the community and inform them on how the police wish them to respond. A respondent said, “[t]his facility proved exceptionally useful during the tragedy of the 7th July last year and allowed key stakeholders to manage the expectations of their staff.”

Overall, the data indicated that the UK Police pay great attention to establishing trust-based relationships with society through their community policing effort. The police forces engage with different segments of the society by employing citizen-focused service style, including them in their policy making processes, and implementing multi-disciplinary activities.
2. Working with Partners

The interview data and the documentary evidence indicated that in order to provide more instrumental protection the UK Police also work with different partners, such as hospitals, universities, self-storage companies, and chemical and biological companies. A respondent said, “to provide effective counter-terrorism and proactive security, it is essential to engage fully with the business community.” The data indicated that working with the larger environment takes the form of guidance to those different institutions. Through these engagements, the police give warnings and provide guidance to the sellers of peroxide, fertilizers or other materials which can be used in terrorist attacks. The Police also work on the critical national infrastructure and crowded places which could be targets of terrorists. A respondent said, “[w]e work within crowded places to empower them to prevent an attack. And should the worse happen, to manage a terrorist incident and to allow them to plan, so that their business can return to normal as soon as possible.”

The data indicate that the UK Police recognize that law enforcement do not have all the answers in the fight against terrorism, and employ multi-sided and multi-disciplinary approaches in their responses. For this reason, the police fulfill collaborative initiatives through projects, in which goals and objectives are clearly defined, and more importantly processes are comprehensive and collaborative. For example, the City of London Police implements a series of initiatives under the Project Griffin to identify terrorist undertakings. The project is run with three strands: In the Awareness Day,
specialists deliver presentations on terrorist activities to business people; under the 

*Bridge Call* strand, business partners are kept up to date about the latest terrorist threats, 
so that they can take their own measures and help the overall response mechanisms. The 
third strand, *Cordon Deployment*, is activated, in which police officers are released from 
their regular functions to undertake other duties to respond to incidents. This project was 
rolled out across the UK, and thousands of business partners joined the collaborative 
counter-terrorism efforts (Lovegrove, 2006).

*Operation Buffalo* is another partnership initiative with the business sector in 
London, in which under-cover officers test the quality of security arrangements of 
companies, by trying to penetrate them. This project is seen as an essential tool to for the 
business sector, so that they can harden their physical security measures (Lovegrove, 
2006).

Both, the interview data and the documentary evidence signify that the UK Police 
recognize the importance of the business sector in their counter-terrorism effort. If 
terrorist attacks disrupt a sector, then the economy would be affected negatively and the 
overall cost would increase. For that reason, incorporating the business sector into 
counter-terrorism activities is seen as important to the stability of the UK. A respondent 
said

There are a number of businesses that we recognize are very important, because 
they employ many people. They provide a service to many people. 
Telecommunication companies, electricity, gas, nuclear power, food, health, big
supermarkets, they provide a big service. If they were to go and not provide a service, that would impact on many people. So they are the key businesses we need to protect, and we need to provide advice and guidance to them. Realistically, they take some of our advice, but many times they don't do as much as we want them to do, because we don't force them to do that.

The interview data indicated that the UK Police see themselves as the integral part of the overall structure and the future of their country. This consciousness is operationalized with instrumental and wider perspectives on overall policies. The respondent continued by explaining how they see things, and how the UK Police see themselves as part of the overall systems:

Let me give you an example. At the moment, we got a trial in the UK. [There is] a trial of several people who tried to plot the crashes of airplanes from the UK to America. Just imagine, the impact had they succeeded, the impact of the UK's relations with America would have deteriorated. The impact on air travel would have been severely impacted on, severely dented. The Heathrow Airport is a huge contributor of money to the UK economy, it is vital we protect Heathrow, we protect air travel. The impact on Heathrow could have been billions and billions of pounds, because airlines may have diverted, potentially, they have diverted their flights to go from other airports in Europe, but not to Heathrow. The significance is colossal and if you think this is like a roller coaster and it gets momentum behind it and when an incident happens and you can get potential
consequences at the end of the roller coaster. So that attack, the consequences could have been absolutely devastating to the UK. So, that's why I say, never underestimate what could happen.

The overall data indicate that the UK Police bring the business sector into their counter-terrorism efforts because they have a great impact on the country’s economy and stability. The Police inform and guide them in order to make them resilient to the terrorist threats.

3. Institutional Cooperation

The data also provided information on how the UK Police mobilize the business sector and other segments of the society into their counter-terrorism effort. The UK Police achieve this by collaborating with other institutions and using their power in line with the counter-terrorism agendas. A respondent explained how they bring other institutions into their ventures:

In my particular agency, we work very, very closely with government departments, because we rely on them helping to support us in our work. Many of these government departments have responsibilities for some of the businesses and companies we deal with. Let me give you a good example. The Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform used to be known as the Department of Trade and Industry, which is easy to understand. And what they deal with, they regulate electricity companies and gas companies. So, if we work
together, we encourage them, make business, do what we want, subtly but carefully. So I think that's a good example of where we can work together.

A foremost element in the data was institutional cooperation. The data showed that the UK Police bring business and the community by building partnerships: “The ‘glue’ that holds the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism efforts together is the number of effective partnerships with the business and residential community” (Lovegrove, 2006). The data also showed that the UK always had response plans for incidents at different levels, in which all relevant institutions function together. These plans were developed based on the experience of many years of practice. Since, terrorist incidents required larger mechanisms to respond, the UK Police have become parts of multi-institutional response plans and systems. A respondent said

We do drills. We have all the emergency services, because it's just not the police. It's very important that we have the fire brigade, the ambulance service, the national help service, the doctors that are able to deal with casualties. So there is a very much multi-agency response that is there, that is arranged and we have practiced, but like any incident, is always different so we can only provide a general response.

The Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 was enacted to improve the preparedness of the UK. The law required the development of Regional Resilience Forums and the introduction of long-term emergency preparedness and response mechanisms. The UK Police have become instrumental parts of these multi-agency forums and mechanisms.
For example, the MPS and the City of London Police took important roles in the London Regional Resilience Forum. In the Forum, the emergency services, local authorities, health, the environment agency, utility companies, transport and health and safety executive are represented, and a number of sub-groups of advisors and experts work on different subjects in order to prepare plans compatible with each other and to respond quickly when incidents occur (Lovegrove, 2006).

The UK Government and the emergency services run exercises in order to train institutions toward terrorism, natural disasters and accidents. The data indicate that the UK Police join those exercises, and when terrorist incidents occur, they become instrumental in collaborative responses. The Home Office organizes exercise programs every year (Home Office, 2008b). The programs include

- Three annual large-scale live exercises which involve police forces, other government departments and agencies testing counter-terrorist contingency plans;
- Strategic level decision making by senior government officials; and
- Paper exercises where decisions are discussed rather than played out.

The Police always join those multi-agency preparatory exercises. In the event of an incident caused by a terrorist attack, the police coordinate the overall response based on the Command System as explained in the Framework of the Counter-terrorism Activities in the UK.
The overall data clearly indicated that the UK Police forces actively work with all relevant agencies at the local-level actively. The data also indicated that through newly established RICs, the police forces contribute to the national initiative of intelligence coordination. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Cell at the National Intelligence Agency coordinates information not only from the police, but also from various government departments as a single point of contact (Lovegrove, 2006). A respondent said, “Security Service leads the way for us on this. They have promise. Any scrap of intelligence related to terrorism goes to the Security Service, we don't keep it for ourselves. We pass it to the Security Service.”

The Police National Computer system contains the information of persons of interest to law enforcement agencies, offenders, and all UK registered vehicles. The City of London Police has the capability of Automatic Number Plate Recording system through its extensive CCTV coverage, which is connected to the Police National Computer System.

Overall, the data indicate that working with society, partners and other institutions and actively engaging in joint exercises, forums and projects, the UK Police are in the policy making processes at the local and national levels. The engagement of larger partners provides the police with larger perspectives and enables them to better contribute to the counter-terrorism activities.
H. SUMMARY OF THE CASE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

The overall data indicated that the UK Police have shown a great effort to understand the new terrorism as they had engaged with the old-style terrorism for decades. Having understood the nature of new terrorism the UK Police institutionally went through a learning process, and took significant steps toward preparedness by establishing an institutional memory.

The members of the UK Police record what actually happens when they are performing their duties and contribute to the enhancement of the institutional memory. The institutional memory plays an important role in the UK Police’s counter-terrorism preparedness, by enabling them to learn from their own experiences, from research and theory and from other police organizations’ experiences.

The UK Police are scrutinized by internal inspections and external feedback mechanisms such as IPCC, HMIC, ACPO, police authorities, and other local level panels. Those internal and external feedback mechanisms provide educated recommendations and enable the UK Police to implement more effective learning mechanisms. As a result, organizational learning was institutionalized within the UK Police.

Learning from research and theory emerged as another major component of the case of the UK. The UK Police work with academics and conduct experiments before defining their policies. The interview data clearly indicated that external organizational learning initiatives are an inseparable part of the UK Police’s learning initiatives in
counter-terrorism. Their organizational culture allows them to go and genuinely learn from other organizations around the world.

The interview data indicated that the UK Police realized major policy and structural changes as triggering events unfolded and as they learned. Similar to the Netherlands, the UK Police established regional information centers in order to collect information on the national-level. The massive change came with the amalgamation of Anti-terrorism and Special Branches as Counter-terrorism Command within the MPS. Same as the MPS, other major constabularies also merged their operational and intelligence units and established their counter-terrorism command units. Several working groups and panels were also established within the MPS to support those changes and to reinforce the institutionalization of organizational learning.

The overall data indicated that the policy initiatives of the UK Police were shaped in three components: working with society, partners and other institutions. They value working with citizens and the business sector, and establishing or being inside the partnerships in which common preparatory activities are rehearsed. Such engagements with larger partnerships provide the UK Police with larger perspectives and make them one of the major contributors to the UK’s counter-terrorism effort.
CHAPTER VI
COMPARING THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM CASE STUDIES

A. INTRODUCTION

The core assumption of this study rests on the theory that corporate organizational culture (analogous to human socio-cultural, political systems) respond to environmental events, particularly radical social and physical environmental changes (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). This study offers a conceptualization (theory) of organizational short- and long-term planning in police organizations in response to external catastrophic events. “Planning” refers to police agencies’ organizational change in internal bureaucratic structure, such as implementing new divisions devoted to counter terrorism, and processes, such as enhanced intelligence gathering. External events, in this case terrorist events, initiate organizational responses within the complex bureaucratic structure and processes of police organizations.

This study posits that an organizational culture is adaptive if it undergoes internal responses that permit the organization to adapt to environment change and accomplish its mission. An adaptive organization is a “learning organization.” A learning organization will quickly discover whether its responsive strategies will have the desired outcome. On the other hand an organizational culture that is non-responsive to radical external events eventually weakens and cannot accomplish its mission.
If a police organization is a learning organization, then its internal mechanisms produce a series of smooth and orderly responses. The Theoretical Logic Model of Police Organizations’ Actual Responses to Terrorism (Figure 2) portrays this series of responses by linking the sequence of causal actions: terrorist incidents instigate the learning initiatives, learning initiatives lead to organizational change initiatives, and the organizational change initiatives lead to policy initiatives. If a police organization is not a learning organization, then the series of responses show rigidity and resistance and in the end, the causal sequence of events would not be realized and a society remains exposed to terrorist activity.

The theory of organizational culture was an application of anthropology's theory of culture as an adaptive mechanism standing between the human community and physical world (Schein, 1985). The theoretical logic model is an expression of a wider notion of adaptation of organizational culture to a socio-political environment. The theoretical logic model of this study proposes a universal theory of organizational adaptation in police organizations. The term universality refers to a generalizable theory that organizational culture’s responses to environmental shifts follow a structured path.

This research illustrated that the core logic of organizational culture is an ability to change, adapt, and adjust quickly to rapid changes in surroundings. The chapters on the Netherlands and the United Kingdom described the extent and methods that respective police organizations take action against catastrophic events of terrorism. Research findings indicate that terrorism causes sudden organizational change. Although
responses may not result in precisely similar changes, police organizations adapt to the socio-economic and political conditions of their societies. The Netherlands adapted through a unique approach of national coordination. The UK’s adaptation was different. The UK Police deliberately worked toward achieving an institutional memory accompanied by grand effort in organizational learning, which required wide scale structural and operational change. Nevertheless, in the end, both the Netherlands and the UK adjusted well and in a manner consistent with this study’s theoretical logic model. Both police organizations responded as a learning culture, which lead to increased knowledge about terrorism, internal processes and structural transformation within police bureaucracy, and policy initiatives intended to investigate, prevent, intervene on, and suppress terrorists and terrorism.

This chapter synthesizes the preceding chapters by comparing the findings of the Dutch and UK case studies.

B. A COMPARISON OF THE DUTCH AND THE UNITED KINGDOM POLICE ORGANIZATIONS

The research strategy was a qualitative, comparative case study with the goal of proposing a comparative study of police organizations’ approach to preparedness for and response to terrorism. This section brings the findings of the two cases together and presents a comparative perspective on how the Dutch and the UK Police have prepared for and responded to terrorism.

Table 6 comparatively presents the learning initiatives of the Dutch and the UK Police. A learning initiative was:

Sustained changes that involve intentional action by or within a group at some point—such as one or more of the following: intentional seeking of new knowledge or new ways of doing things; intentional evaluation of behaviors, new or old, that leads to effort to retain valuable behaviors and discard others; and/or intentional dissemination of knowledge within a group or among groups when such knowledge is deemed useful or beneficial. (Jackson et al., 2005b)

The Dutch Police and the UK Police used their existing knowledge and previous experience and adapted them into new situations. While the Dutch Police added new components of counter-terrorism to their existing structures and practices, the UK Police established an institutional memory as a warehouse of knowledge gathered as the police organization had already been dealing with terrorism. A record of terrorist events is a basic tenet of both police organizations; however, the UK Police became keen on recording events as well as convening structured debriefings, which analyzed events and converted lessons of analysis into coaching on the non-repetition of procedural errors.
Table 6
A Comparative Outline of Learning Initiatives of the Dutch Police and the United Kingdom Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH POLICE</th>
<th>UNITED KINGDOM POLICE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Learning Experiences</strong></td>
<td><strong>Internal Learning Experiences</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Used existing knowledge and experience from other branches to supplement new components of counter-terrorism.</td>
<td>▪ Used previous experience and existing systems in counter-terrorism and established an institutional memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Events are recorded for further analyses.</td>
<td>▪ Recording events, holding structured debriefings, and analyzing and learning from events and debriefings became the major tenet of counter-terrorism policing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information Sharing and Organizational Learning</strong></td>
<td><strong>Information Sharing and Organizational Learning</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Board of Commissioners meets bimonthly and share experiences and best practices. Experiences and best practices are converted to lessons.</td>
<td>▪ Organizational learning and information sharing became an institutional priority and part of the performance measurement process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ External learning and adaptation of best practices and equipment are realized successfully.</td>
<td>▪ ACPO ensures that learned lessons are shared and implemented nationally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ The MPS strives to create a simple</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A corporate organizational learning model consistent with its values and accountability. The model is also seen as a break-through of silo-structured organizational practices.

### Internal Feedback for Organizational Learning

- The National Police (KLPD) analyzes and evaluates all investigations, meets with other intelligence agencies and provides internal feedback.
- Through their incidental and periodic inspections, the inspection divisions of the police departments provide feedback about the performance of their organizations.

### External Feedback for Organizational Learning

- Government’s biannual Crime-Figure Analysis Inspections provide external feedback.
- Local governments provide collaborative solutions.
- NCTb provides guidance and coordination.
- Home Office, ACPO, HMIC, IPCC, Police authorities and local-level partnership mechanisms provide close scrutiny over police departments.
- Educated recommendations contribute concrete solutions to the problems.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Learning Experiences</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ International travel, on-site observation, professional and scientific meetings are supported and encouraged. Lessons learned abroad inspire new policies and practices.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learning from Research and Theory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Innovative policies and practices, and a multi-disciplinary approach became essential in the nature of counter-terrorism activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ There is a heavy reliance on research and first-hand experiments to develop techniques and preventive measures particularly toward suicide terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ There is a strong emphasis on scientific inquiry. Academics are recruited, research based practices are valued and supported. The counter-terrorism apparatus works with universities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ There is a strong emphasis on scientific inquiry. They work with universities and international partners as well as supporting private enterprise for innovation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Dutch and UK regional police departments within both police organizations internally share systemic and operational information. The Dutch Police achieve information sharing through bimonthly Board of Commissioners’ meetings; the UK Police share information with and through ACPO. Structured meetings ensure that learned lessons are shared and implemented nationally when applicable. A noteworthy
feature of UK Police is that organizational learning and information sharing became an institutional priority and incorporated into the performance measurement process. The UK Police created a corporate, organizational learning model.

Both police organizations receive feedback internally about their counter-terrorism practices. The counter-terrorism investigations conducted by the police departments in the Netherlands are evaluated by the National Police (KLPD). In the UK, the police departments are reviewed by their inspection units. A common element is that police departments receive external feedback from the local governments as a result of police departments’ affiliation with local-level government. However, while the external feedback for organizational learning is limited to the Government’s biannual Crime-Figure Analysis Inspections and the NCTb coordination in the Netherlands, the UK Police face diverse external feedback mechanisms. Home Office, ACPO, HMIC, IPCC, Police authorities and local-level partnership mechanisms provide close scrutiny over UK police departments. Those external feedback mechanisms provide educated recommendations which contribute to concrete solutions to the organizational or procedural problems.

The UK and Dutch police organizations support external learning experiences and learn from research and theory. There is a strong emphasis on scientific inquiry. Police organizations support international travel, on-site observation, professional and scientific meetings, and collaborate with academics, research institutions, and universities. A notable difference is that the NCTb in the Netherlands produces more scientific writings,
academic publications and reports, whereas the UK Police is more prone to conduct first-hand experiments and leave the academic writings to other institutions.

Overall, both police organizations worked toward learning initiatives to more effectively respond to terrorism. Both police organizations illustrate the initial stage—learning initiatives, in their progressive adaptation to terrorism. The UK and Dutch police organizations’ responses to terrorism support the proposed Theoretical Logic Model of Police Organizations’ Actual Responses to Terrorism (Figure 2).


Table 7 compares the Dutch and UK police organizations’ change initiatives.

Both police organizations have achieved significant structural and operational changes following the implementation of learning initiatives. As a response to terrorism, inter-organizational agreements were made among the police and other organizations in the Netherlands. These agreements connected the local organizations, such as the fire brigade, health services, and municipalities. Local-level partnerships were established to reinforce counter-terrorism responses. While the Netherlands were realizing those new arrangements, such connected systems had already been functional in the UK as a country experienced in counter-terrorism. However, local-level partnerships were reinforced as the terrorist threats unfolded.
In the Netherlands the existing Unit for Counter-terrorism and Activism of the KLPD was expanded and strengthened and a counter-terrorism project group was established within the Amsterdam PD as an immediate structural change. In the UK, the existing counter-terrorism units went through significant changes. The existing Special Branch, the intelligence unit, and the Anti-Terrorism Branch within the MPS were amalgamated as Counter Terrorism Command in 2006, because of the need for the unification of both aspects of counter-terrorism after the July 7, 2005 explosions occurred on the London Underground and on a public transportation bus in Central London. Other major police departments such as Greater Manchester, West Midlands and West Yorkshire also established their own CTCs, in which both intelligence and investigative units were blended under one structure.
Table 7
A Comparative Outline for Change Initiatives within the Dutch Police and the United Kingdom Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH POLICE</th>
<th>UNITED KINGDOM POLICE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural and Operational Changes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Structural and Operational Changes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inter-ministerial cooperation was</td>
<td>• The culture of change and adaptation was existed since the beginning of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>established for better surveillance and protection.</td>
<td>IRA terrorist activities. The Anti-Terrorism Branch was established in early 1970’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inter-organizational agreements were signed among the police and other</td>
<td>and the Police Working Group on Terrorism in 1979.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizations. This connected the local organizations, such as the fire</td>
<td>• Operation Rainbow was initiated in 1995 to increase communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brigade, health services, and municipalities.</td>
<td>between citizens and the Police. This resulted in CCTV system in London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local-level partnerships were</td>
<td>• The Special Branch, the intelligence unit, and the Anti-Terrorism Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>established to reinforce counter-terrorism responses.</td>
<td>within the MPS were amalgamated as Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) in 2006, because</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The existing Unit for Counter-terrorism and Activism of the KLPD was</td>
<td>of the need for the unification of both aspects of counter-terrorism after the 7/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expanded and strengthened.</td>
<td>incidents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Fellowship, a joint working group among the National Police (KLPD),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Intelligence and Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Service (AIVD) and the Military Intelligence Service (MIVD).

- Regional Information Centers (RICs) in 25 regions and one National Information Center (NIC) was established.

- The Info Box, a system of coordination and information exchange among intelligence and other relevant institutions was instituted.

- The system of Special Intervention was established within the KLPD to meet the operational needs of counter-terrorism. Police and military works under same units.

- A unique system of national coordination, the National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCTb) was established.

- The National Terrorist Threat Assessment Reports, the trend reports, Other major police departments established their own CTCs, in which both intelligence and investigative blended under one structure

- Regional Information Cells (RICs) were established in 9 regions as new hubs of information.

- The July Review Group (JRG) was established within the MPS to respond to the 7/7 incidents and to institutionalize organizational learning.

- JRG Challenge Panel was established to scrutinize the progress made by the JRG.

- Knowledge Management Centre was established in order to provide timely and accurate information to the Crisis Management Team during crises.

- Kratos Review Group was established to support the ongoing development of tactics, weapons, equipment and
advisory proposals and policy development function of the NCTb changed the nature of terrorist intervention strategies and the identification of gaps, overlaps and conflicts among agencies.

- Major policies were implemented, such as shooting a suspected individual in the head who is believed to be a suicide bomber in order to protect others’ lives.
- Internal policies were changed and enhanced based on IPCC and other feedback mechanisms.

**Changes in Training Programs**

- New components of counter-terrorism included the existing pre-service and in-service training programs.
- Basic Training Academy and Leadership Academy changed their curriculums toward counter-terrorism and organizational learning.

Such different scales of organizational change within both countries are a consequence of the lack of terrorism in the Netherlands, but continued terrorism in the UK. No further terrorist incidents occurred in the Netherlands. As a result the Dutch Police responses did not require significant structural changes, such as the establishment of new counter-terrorism units or revamping of existing units into large-size departments. Instead, the Netherlands perceived terrorism as a comprehensive issue and as a result, nationwide structural changes were realized. Nationwide change initiatives included the
establishment of Fellowship, Info Box, RICs, NIC, the system of Special Interventions (DSI Units), and ultimately the National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCTb).

The unique system of national coordination in the Netherlands, the NCTb, presented a new concept of coordination. The National Terrorist Threat Assessment Reports, the trend reports, advisory proposals and policy development function of the NCTb changed the nature of terrorist intervention strategies and changed the identification of gaps, overlaps and conflicts among agencies in the Netherlands. The organization appeared as a connecting tissue not only among the institutions but also among all parties such as citizens, media, and academics and so on.

Although the RICs were established in the UK similar to the Netherlands, all of the national coordination was entrusted to the Security Service (MI5). The MI5 fulfills this task mainly by bringing the information together from its own sources, from RICs and CTCs, and by working with sectors through the National Counter-terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO).

Whereas the Dutch Police became part of the national coordination, the UK Police relied on MI5 for operational matters in national-level, counter-terrorism. In addition, the UK Police created a process to enhance institutional memory and demonstrated immense effort to institutionalize organizational learning. The external feedback mechanisms, Home Office, ACPO, HMIC, IPCC, Police authorities and local-level partnership mechanism, ensured the realization of policy changes.
A comparison of organizational responses illustrates how socio-political conditions in the Netherlands and UK affected the outcome of adaptation to terrorism. Both police organizations illustrate the second stage—change initiatives, in their progressive adaptation to terrorism. The UK and Dutch police organizations’ responses to terrorism support the proposed Theoretical Logic Model of Police Organizations’ Actual Responses to Terrorism (Figure 2).

3. A Comparison of the Policy Initiatives of the Dutch Police and the United Kingdom Police

Table 8 comparatively presents the policy initiatives of the Dutch and the UK Police organizations.
Table 8
A Comparative Outline for Policy Initiatives of the Dutch Police and the United Kingdom Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NETHERLANDS</th>
<th>UNITED KINGDOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National-Level Policy Making</strong></td>
<td><strong>National-Level Policy Making</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice are responsible for counter-terrorism policies.</td>
<td>- The Home Office is responsible for developing counter-terrorism policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The NCTb drafts concrete policies for the government and the legislative body.</td>
<td>- The Security Service (MI5) is domestically responsible for the protection of the country from the threat of terrorism. All police forces’ intelligence or CTC units work in partnership with the Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Incidental and systematic national coordination integrates the parties involved and the overall policies and practices growing in coherence.</td>
<td>Considering its national and multi-agency functions, M15 functions as the main coordination body of counter-terrorism activities in the UK.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local-Level Policy Making</th>
<th>Local-Level Policy Making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The collaborative initiatives of regional police organizations have contributed to the creation of well-integrated and coordinated counter-terrorism systems</td>
<td>- Local level response mechanisms were established through partnerships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- In London, counter-terrorism activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
consisting of local municipalities, the Public Prosecutors, the police, the fire brigades and the public health services at the local-levels.

- All of the local information is evaluated and interpreted at the national level by the NCTb, whether they are part of larger schemes or international ties.

## Working with Society

- The Police work with local officials and provide guidance to increase awareness and vigilance within the society.
- The Police reinforce the value of diverse society by creating an institutional image which gives the Police a leading role among other agencies in counter-terrorism effort and a more genuine and flexible face and position toward citizens.
- Police works directly with citizens as a part of community policing strategies in
- “Citizen Focus” and “Counter-Terrorism, Security and Protection” are the institutional priorities of the UK Police.
- Trust-based relationships with society are established through community policing effort.
- The police directly interact with the community and their leaders, and try to understand their perspectives by talking with them openly about police policies.
- Police use a combined e-mail, pager
counter-terrorism matters along with other crimes. and text facility to communicate with the community and inform them on how the police wish them to respond to terrorist threats.

**Working with Partners**

- The Dutch Police make sure that all institutions, citizens, companies, commerce and other entities, such as ports, roads, waterways, railways, and airports were organized under a comprehensive cooperation, coordination, and communication.
- The Dutch Police investigate and certify the participating agencies based on defined safety standards.
- Multi-disciplinary quick response teams were set up for more coordinated and faster response at the regional level.
- The Police systematically engage with the business sector to warn and to provide guidance to the sellers of peroxide, fertilizers or other materials, which can be used in terrorist attacks.
- The NaCTSO trains, tasks and coordinates a nationwide network of specialist police advisers to help, advise and guide a variety of sectors on the national level.
- Project Griffin is implemented to identify terrorist undertakings. Business people are informed and kept up to date about terrorist activities.
- Operation *Buffalo* is another partnership initiative to make
companies harden their physical security measures.

**Institutional Cooperation**

- The NCTb makes sure that institutions cooperate based on the evaluated information.
- The NCTb implemented drill and training policies and alert systems to coordinate preparatory activities nationwide. Info Box, Special Intervention System and all other collaborative systems are coordinated.
- The NCTb also provides perspectives of possible venues for more institutional collaboration by operationalizing the roles for each institution under international, political and administrative conditions.

- The Government and the emergency services run exercises in order to train institutions toward terrorism, natural disasters and accidents.
- The Home Office organizes exercise programs every year.
- The UK Police become parts of such greater systems and act instrumentally in those systems both before and after the terrorist incidents.

In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice are responsible for national counter-terrorism policies. However, the National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCTb) drafts concrete policies for the government and the
The incidental and systematic national coordination integrates the parties involved and the overall policies and practices are implemented in coherence.

The UK’s Home Office has responsibility to develop counter-terrorism policies. The MI5 functions under the statutory authority of the Home Office. The MI5 fulfills the place of the NCTb in the Netherlands, and serves as the focal point for the counter-terrorism planning, intelligence and preparatory exercises, and national-level tactical preparation. MI5 functions as the main coordination body for all counter-terrorism policies and practices in the UK.

On a local level, in both countries relevant institutions are organized under local partnerships, such as *Vijfhoek* in Amsterdam and London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) in London. Those local-level initiatives are coordinated by the NCTb in the Netherlands and MI5 in the UK.

Community policing strategies in the Netherlands and UK require the police to work directly with community citizens. Although different in detail, the Dutch and UK police organizations build community-based trust-based relationships; and as a consequence, community citizens expect direct contact with the police in the event of a terrorist incident.

Both police organizations institutionalized working relationships with their countries’ economic, political and social structures. For this reason, both police organizations ensure that all institutions, companies, commerce and government and
private sectors, such as ports, roads, waterways, railways, and airports, are organized under a comprehensive plan for cooperation, coordination, and communication. The comprehensive plans ensure that representatives of business community and government institutions are trained and guided in counter-terrorism responses. The comprehensive plans in both countries materialize during national and local level multi-agency preparatory exercises.

C. SUMMARY

A comparison of organizational responses illustrates how socio-political conditions in the Netherlands and UK affected the outcome of adaptation to terrorism. Both police organizations illustrate the third stage—policy initiatives, in their progressive adaptation to terrorism. The UK and Dutch police organizations’ responses to terrorism support the proposed Theoretical Logic Model of Police Organizations’ Actual Responses to Terrorism (Figure 2).
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS: ASSESSING THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM CASE STUDIES

A. INTRODUCTION

Organizational culture is analogous to the culture of human communities. The concept of culture is applied in two ways to analyze the Dutch and UK Police organizations’ responses to terrorism. In its first application culture is an abstract concept that social groups possess, in which knowledge is transmitted between generations of group members. In that application Culture (signified by large ‘C’) is a “universal” process shared by and characteristic of all human communities. Cultural knowledge includes a unique set of opinions, beliefs, attitudes, values, and positively and negatively sanctioned rules of behavior (Schein, 1985). Cultural knowledge enables the distinction from one human community or social group to another. In its second application culture (signified by a small ‘c’) refers to particular “local-level,” or “particularized,” characteristics of specific human societies and by extension, organizational cultures.

Theorists argue that universal processes of Culture combine with local-level processes of culture (Allaire, 1984; Becker, 1960; Morgan, 1997). For example, the culture of Microsoft, the Dutch Police, and the UK Police noticeably differ; however,
since Microsoft and the Dutch and UK Police are organizational cultures they share universals of Culture and local-level cultural processes.

The purpose of this study was to conduct a comparative study of the culture of two police agencies’ organizational responses to terrorism. The research discovered universal processes characteristic of Organizational Culture, such as organizational learning and organizational memory, and particularized adaptations to terrorism made by police agencies.

The study’s line of thought was guided by the following questions:

- What is the “nature” of terrorism? The nature of terrorism needs a unique definition that allows for the distinction between terrorism as a type of socio-political thought that generates “unpredictable” violence, such as New York City’s 9/11, and other types of socio-political thought that generates “predictable” violence, such as war.

- What causes terrorism? Socio-economic and political contexts that spawn terrorists and the causes of terrorism are vastly complex and well beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, the study reviewed shared scholarly thought on causes and conditions of terrorism.

- What does terrorism cause? This was the study’s central operational question. This research sought to identify and describe particular organizational changes in police agencies induced by terrorism, and to identify universal properties of
organizational culture that functioned as the processes by which police agencies adapted to terrorism.

Expert respondents in the Dutch and UK Police organizations explained terrorism and their organizations’ responses to terrorism. Embedded within those explanations of organizational responses are the rules of the cultural “logic” of particular police agencies. Logic refers to the manner in which members of a police organization, from the most senior to the newest members, thought about and responded to terrorism. Organizational theory argues that such cultural logic is transmitted through group socialization (Schein, 1985). By definition, Organizational Culture refers to a collection of beliefs, opinions, and rules of behavior of social groups. Thus, the Dutch and UK Police showed similar contextually induced responses toward terrorism as an effect of terrorism’s common features and distinctive responses as an effect of cultural variations in the Dutch and UK Police.

B. PREPAREDNESS MODEL OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

The Theoretical Logic Model is an inductive model whose concepts derived from Dutch and UK expert respondents’ interviews. The logic of each police organization’s culture was derived from interviews with expert respondents. This study’s analysis was grounded in the perceptions, beliefs, opinions, and experiences of expert respondents with years of experience with terrorism. Out of the analysis of expert respondents’ interviews emerged the Theoretical Logic Model of Police Organizations’ Actual Responses to Terrorism (Figure 2). When police agencies’ cultural logic combined with
particularized responses to terrorism, the result was a style of counter-terrorism management in police organization. That style of counter-terrorism management was called the *Preparedness Model of Counter-terrorism*.

The Preparedness Model was the outcome of the inductive analysis of interview data. In other words, the features of the Preparedness Model were embedded within (grounded in) the cultural logic of expert respondents’ interview data. The Preparedness Model proposes that police organizations adequately address and respond to terrorism only if particular criteria are satisfied:

- Learning initiatives are implemented and learned lessons are available and frequently updated, so that the members and every branch of an organization can learn and adapt to new conditions.

- Organizational structures, policies and processes are changed based on the learned lessons.

- Policy initiatives are implemented by contributing to and becoming part of the wide-spread policies and initiatives, as terrorism cannot be solved by policing responses only.

- The police function under a comprehensive national coordination, in which all relevant institutions and systems are integrated.

Yet, preparedness is not a onetime restructuring of an organization or an establishment of a new organization or component of an organization. Rather,
management preparedness must be a process of continual progress, in which organizations update their systems by implementing learning, change, and policy initiatives. Updating an organization’s knowledge base, in the case of the Dutch and UK Police, was derived from their agencies’ past experiences, from other organizations, and from research and theory. Organizations with the capacity of learning from those sources can change and improve their systems. Police organizations that cannot achieve adaptation, in other words, that cannot successfully implement learning, change, and policy initiatives will not effectively respond to ever-changing tactics of terrorist organizations.

Figure 6 illustrates how the Preparedness Model functions. The overall system is illustrated as a set of gears system. All gears lead to one another and all of the gears function under the greater gear of national coordination. The triggering events cause the learning initiatives and the learning initiatives spawn the organizational change initiatives. Further incidents promote both of these initiatives. With the help of learning and change initiatives, the system gains enough capacity to work with other institutions functionally and ultimately becomes part of the local and national policy-making mechanisms, as well as the national coordination. The overall system establishes the foundation of the Preparedness Model of Counter-terrorism.
C. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DUTCH and UNITED KINGDOM POLICE ORGANIZATIONS’ RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

This section presents the lessons learned from the reviewed literature and from the assessment of the Dutch and UK police organizations’ responses to terrorism, and provides recommendations to cope with the threat of terrorism.
1. **Terrorist incidents and/or threat of terrorism can be used as opportunities to change and develop police organizations.**

Triggering events, terrorist incidents and/or threat of terrorism, act as external stimuli that affect police organizations. Confirming Kingdon’s theory (2003), crises open up windows of opportunity for change within police organizations. If they are learning organizations, police organizations respond to those crises successfully through a series of adaptation processes.

![Figure 6. A Model of the Impact of the Triggering Events on the Adaptation Process of Police Organizations](image)

Figure 7 represents this adaptation process. If a police organization is a “learning organization,” then the triggering events provide a significant impetus for the start of learning initiatives. Learning initiatives are followed by organizational change initiatives.
and policy initiatives. If the organizational culture is non-responsive to external stimuli then that police organization cannot accomplish such an adaptation process.

The Dutch and the UK police organizations have responded to the external stimuli and gone through successful adaptation processes. Further crises have contributed to a further impetus for the continuation and acceleration of these processes.

2. Counter-terrorism requires strategic (long-term) responses in addition to operational (short-term) responses. The characteristics of operational responses should be far from overreaction, which may worsen the situations.

Causes of terrorism are diverse and they are based on many variables such as socio-economic, political, ethnic, and historical. For that reason, the war on terror cannot be won by military or paramilitary responses. The real victory comes with long-term, strategic, and wide-spread policies and initiatives. As a part of these policies and initiatives, genuine police responses can make significant contributions to this end. Short-term operational responses can only be meaningful as long as they are part of those strategic responses. Otherwise, those operational successes may even provide inconsistent negative stimuli on targeted populations and produce negative results.

Understanding the nature of terrorism, the Dutch and the UK police organizations have become parts of greater response mechanisms, and provide consistent positive responses in counter-terrorism.
3. **Prevention must come first in counter-terrorism: Police strategies must be designed in a way that intelligence gathering on radicalization process is to be as important as terrorist operatives’ activities.**

Police organizations have to have a clear understanding of radicalization in order to respond to terrorism effectively. As the psychological explanations of terrorism suggest (Forte, 2006; Moghaddam, 2005a; Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004), radicalization is a multi-level process. At the end of this process, the individuals arrive to a stage where force is the only means to an end. For this reason, the police have to be able to address early intervention models together with wide-range partnerships and produce broader policy alternatives.

Because of the difficulty in gathering intelligence on to what extent those individuals get radicalized and commit terrorist acts, designing an organizational response becomes a complicated issue. Structuring a response to radicalization requires a coherent and close cooperation of intelligence and operational policing. Considering this reality, the UK Police amalgamated these functions under one command, and the Netherlands established a comprehensive national coordination. The results are yet to be observed; it is clear that prevention has become a priority in today’s counter-terrorism policing. If that is the case, then this turns into a management problem, because an understanding of radicalization becomes as important as intelligence gathering of the independent cell structure of new terrorism. Ultimately, in addition to intelligence
gathering and understanding of radicalization, police strategies and tactics become a crucial piece within the endeavors of prevention.

For explained reasons, police organizations, which are supposed to deal with terrorism need to show appropriate levels of efforts to all these three areas.

4. True Democratic Policing is the key for success in counter-terrorism: 

*Increased accountability brings increased successes in the long-run.*

Democratic policing (Gordon, 2001; Neild, 2002, 2003) literature indicates that criminal justice systems molded by authoritarian regimes for the purposes of social control and regime protection are less capable to further police organizations’ effective ability to tackle crime and other violent behaviors.

This study found that democratic regimes further their police organizations’ ability of external adaptation and internal organizational integration to handle terrorist incidents. The Dutch and UK police organizations are accountable to their immediate environments, the local citizenry and local governments. Improving the human side of policing is the ultimate goal of both police organizations. The internal and external feedback mechanisms provide effective scrutiny on the Dutch and UK police organizations’ policies and practices. These mechanisms provide useful answers to Lustgarten's (2003) previously quoted question of “what security and policing agencies should or should not be permitted to do, and what limits should be placed on how they do it?” Although such democratic mechanisms seem to limit the boundaries of the space in
which the police operate, the findings demonstrated that through their educated recommendations, those mechanisms and democratic institutions bring the police and the citizens closer, and make police organizations more democratic and more professional.

5. Establishing institutional memory has the utmost importance in becoming a learning police organization and eventually success in counter-terrorism. Police organizations can ensure that they are not repeating the same mistakes only if they have a well functioning institutional memory.

In order to respond to terrorism effectively, police organizations must be keen on learning from their past experiences, namely their successes and mistakes. However, this is only possible if they establish institutional memory and have their personnel record of what actually happened after the incidents. By acquiring their employees’ contributions to the institutional memory, analyzing and designing lessons out of those experiences for future employees, organizations can ensure that they learn from their experiences and not repeat mistakes. If the lessons of the earlier conflict are ignored then the same intelligence and operational mistakes can be repeated (Bruce Hoffman & Morrison-Taw, 2000). For this reason, police organizations must have a corporate model of organizational learning unique to their structures. This corporate model must introduce systems such as derailing silo structures, and establish feedback mechanisms, and provide solutions to the difficulties in organizational learning. When police organizations synthesize and institutionalize people’s intellectual capital and learning (Gephart &
Marsick, 1996; Senge, 1990), then the organization takes a significant step toward becoming a learning organization.

6. **Institutional attention to scientific inquiry is one of the main pillars of policing, including in counter-terrorism activities.**

Learning from research and theory can be achieved through working with academics, conducting experiments, and establishing research partnerships for innovative solutions to the problems in counter-terrorism. In addition, an organization can make sense of the consequences of its large structure’s actions only through scientific approaches and evaluations.

7. **Learning from other police organizations is no longer a luxury, especially in countering the new terrorism.**

Police organizations dealing with terrorism must pay special attention to external organizational learning initiatives. Best practices in international police organizations may provide fundamental inspirations within a police organization’s counter-terrorism efforts.

Although different in some details, the Dutch and the UK police organizations implemented unique learning initiatives and developed exemplary organizational learning models based on experience, scientific inquiry and best practices.
8. Effective counter-terrorism requires appropriate structural and operational changes within the police organizations.

Terrorist activities posit considerable changes, and so must the policing. Effective counter-terrorism requires not only appropriate changes within the structural and operational aspects of police organizations, but also establishment of hybrid and unique entities such as Fellowship, Info Box, Regional Information Centers, National Information Centers, System of Special Interventions, National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, National Counter-terrorism Security Office, July Review Group, and many others. The Netherlands and the UK introduced many innovative change initiatives both within the police organizations and among the counter-terrorism institutions.

9. “Being in policy making process” must be an overarching strategy for police organizations, so that they can address counter-terrorism appropriately.

Terrorism is largely related to socio-economic and political conditions. Its roots and effects go beyond only one organization’s scope. From recognizing radicalization and socially destructive changes in the behavior of juveniles to understanding the political economy and global politics, police organizations are central to counter-terrorism and must be sensitive to the international changes around the world long before they occur. Sensitivity to radicalization and budding terrorism is only possible when police organizational culture accepts and supports multi-dimensional interaction with citizens, private and business sectors, and national and international stakeholders in
counter-terrorism. To do otherwise, police organizations would find themselves in endless struggles to root out the causes and conditions of terrorism and gauge the magnitude of the effects of the terrorism and its underlying driving forces. For those reasons, police organizations have to be keenly aware of, and almost be able to predict, changes in socio-economic and political conditions both nationally and internationally.

The Dutch and UK police organizations presented examples of how police organizations can be interconnected with their environments. From the local to the national level, both police organizations became part of multi-agency initiatives, exercises and projects. By implementing such policy initiatives, police organizations can become aware of changes in different fields and take proactive steps.

10. As the modern society and its infrastructure have become more and more vulnerable, a credible national coordination is essential in countering terrorism. Credible national coordination requires comprehensive and contemporary approaches.

Providing security to a nation is no longer limited to organizing security bureaucracies only. The interconnected nature of today’s socio-economic and political structure requires a national coordination in which multiple social, political, and law enforcement systems must be in close cooperation and communication. The effects of terrorism are not limited to immediate impacts only. As the systems are interconnected, for example the political structure of a country is directly affected from the economy, all relevant public and private institutions have to be under a comprehensive coordination.
From the immediate-response point of view, all stakeholder institutions, such as police, intelligence, fire, health, emergency management services, and emergency-calling systems have to be integrated toward a coordinated response to terrorism. Military units must also function as supporting elements if the scale of the phenomenon requires so. The multi-agency style counter-terrorism preparatory exercises are essential to maintain well-trained police agencies whose scope of activities must exceed local-level customary police activities.

National coordination is achieved both in the Netherlands and in the UK. However, considering the nature of the phenomenon of terrorism and the interconnectedness of systems, the Dutch Model of national coordination is seen as more viable. Such a system of coordination is essential to meet the challenges of today’s security problems, including terrorism.

D. GENERAL LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Methodological limitations, such as the difficulty of studying the delicate issue of terrorism, were discussed earlier; however, this study faced more general limitations. Significant general limitations are described below.

First, terrorism is an issue that encompasses a broad range of socio-political and economic variables on an international scale. This study was restricted to a particular focus on the organizational effects of terrorism on police organizations. Although narrative interview data provided detailed information about the context of terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies in the Netherlands and U.K. this study was conducted on a
relatively small international scale. Terrorism studies argue that terrorism is a broad issue and should be understood on an international stage and should examine more than organizational responses of counter-terrorism. While this study offers insights into organizational adaptation to terrorism the findings are tempered by a limited scale.

Second, this study’s internal validity (internal generalizability) can be considered very high. A case study approach provides rich information about the real-life contexts in two mid-size European countries’ police organizations. However, a small sample of countries limits this study’s external validity. The scope of the study was somewhat enlarged through interviews with the Cleveland (Ohio) Police Department (CPD). Those interviews provided narrative data that indicated the CPD response to counter-terrorism mirrored the PMCT model. The Cleveland Police has the same approach as the UK’s and the Netherlands’ police organizations. Triggering events cause the initiation of a series of adaptation processes of learning, changing and policy making. CPD findings strengthen to a limited degree the external validity of the PMCT Model.

Third, time and financial restraints limited the number of expert interviews. A larger sample of experts, practitioners, citizens, and even terrorist operatives can provide a deeper understanding of the terrorism phenomenon, as well as the quality of police organizations’ responses.

Fourth, terrorism is a politically sensitive issue. Governments have different perspectives on terrorism. Terrorism scholarship indicates that researchers have had difficulty with the development of a common conceptualization of terrorism.
Governments and international organizations cannot settle on a common description of terrorism. The struggle for international power has implications on terrorism. A study of international terrorism would benefit by interviews with the senior-most political representatives of countries, such as the presidents, prime ministers, and ministers that experienced or are likely to experience terrorist attacks.

Fifth, the covert nature of counter-terrorism policies and procedures imposed significant limitations. Considering the difficulties in gathering or reading classified material, this study was limited to non-classified data.

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

A qualitative embedded comparative case study approach provided narrative and documentary data out of which emerged a grounded theory of organizational responses to terrorism and a model for counter-terrorism management. The model and the theory can be extended with further research. Further studies can have multiple research designs that:

- Include the perspectives of citizens, street-level police officers, terrorist operatives and higher level governmental officials;
- Expand the data base by sampling cases from different cultures to provide additional findings and more international perspectives;
- Generate more culturally sensitive questions about police organizations in societal context to help create insightful interpretations of qualitative data;
- Combine statistical research designs, such as surveys, and statistical analysis of qualitative data;
- Conduct multi-disciplinary research projects that integrate the theory and methodologies of political science, criminology, and psychology to create holistic theoretical models that serve as the basis of policy prescriptions.

Such expansions and innovative research designs can help better understanding of police organizations’ responses to terrorism, and consequently the theory and the model can be modified.

**F. SUMMARY**

This study has shown that police agencies’ counter-terrorism activities are an outcome of the universal nature of organizational culture’s processes of adaptation (learning initiatives; institutional memory) to a shifting social and political world and to particular cultural characteristics of police organizations that are situated in and influenced by the culture and politics of their own nation.

The critical need for counter-terrorism imposes a significant burden on national and international police organizations. The case study approach allowed the researcher to catch a glimpse of the operations inside police organizations, which faced terrorism. A comparative research design allowed for the identification of similarities and differences between the U.K. and the Netherlands.

The outcome of this comparative study was the Preparedness Model of Counter-Terrorism (PMCT). The PMCT defines preparedness as a state of development in organizational management whose outcome concentrates organizational resources on the readiness for and the ability to act against terrorism. The Preparedness Model proposes
that police organizations adequately address and respond to terrorism only if particular
criteria are satisfied, in which learning, organizational and programmatic change, and
policy initiatives are achieved and operate under comprehensive national coordination.

The purpose of this study was to build an overarching theory of change for
organizations. The proposed theory exceeds the boundaries of police organizations and
proposes universal dynamics in organizational change under high levels of external
stress. The Preparedness Model captures a broader organizational theory that focuses on
the dynamics of organizational change when faced with crises, like terrorist incidents.

This research found that organizational change occurs through feed-back loops;
that is, organizational change occurs when initiatives, such as organizational learning that
inspires innovative policy, strengthen one another within the socio-economic and
political conditions of their societies.

In sum, the study offered a universal theory of organizational change when
organizations face external pressure of terrorist violence. The universal theory
encompassed integrated theories of organizational learning, learning organizations,
institutional memory, and organizational development.
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APPENDIX A

KENT STATE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
CONSENT FORM

Department of Political Science
Consent Form

Comparing and Assessing the Preparedness of Police Organizations in Counter-terrorism
(Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States)

I want to do research on Comparing and Assessing the Preparedness and Proactiveness of Police Organizations in Counter-terrorism. I want to do this because I would like to research to what extent the police agencies are prepared and are proactive against terrorism comparative to each other. I would like you to take part in this project. If you decide to do this, you will be asked to be interviewed for 20 to 60 minutes.

The interview will be on a systematic base. You may limit the amount of information at each level depending upon the security risk. You may also change, alter or withdraw your statement at any level of this study. Your name will not be included in this study and it will not be disclosed to anyone or to any institution. Therefore, you will not be asked about any specific case, operation, name or place that may put the states’, institutions’ and individuals’ security at risk.

If you want to know more about this research project, please call me at +1 330 389 0187 or my advisor Dr. Daniel Flannery at +1 330 672 7917. The project has been approved by Kent State University. If you have questions about Kent State University's rules for research, please call Dr. Peter C. Tandy, Acting Vice President and Dean, Division of Research and Graduate Studies (Tel. 330 672 2704).

You will get a copy of this consent form.

Sincerely,

Mustafa Ozguler

I agree to take part in this project. I know what I will have to do and that I can stop at any time.

________________________________________________________
Signature  Date
APPENDIX B

AUDIOTAPE CONSENT FORM

I agree to audio taping at_____________________ on______________________.

____________________________ _____________________________________

Signature Date

I have been told that I have the right to hear the audio tapes before they are used. I have decided that I:

_____ want to hear the tapes _____ do not want to hear the tapes

Sign now below if you do not want to hear the tapes. If you want to hear the tapes, you will be asked to sign after hearing them.

Mustafa Ozguler and other researchers approved by Kent State University may not use the tapes made of me. The original tapes or copies may be used for:

_____ this research project _____ teacher education _____ presentation at professional meetings

_______________________________________________________

Signature Date

Address:
APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Country:_______________

The name of the agency:_______________

Interviewee:_________________________

As a part of exploratory study of Comparing and Assessing the Preparedness of Police Organizations in Counter-terrorism, this interview will serve the research on to what extent the police agencies are prepared against terrorism comparative to each other.

As explained in the consent form, your name will not be revealed and your voice record will not be shared with anybody or with any other institution. I kindly ask you to make a conversation about the role and systematic activities of your department against terrorism. Again, the conversation will not include any names, any specific details of operations.

- Could you please tell your name and your position within your institution/department?
- Could you describe your function in your setting?
- How does your agency function in counter-terrorism at an operational level?
- In your opinion, what are the unique characteristics of your organization in counter-terrorism?
Can you briefly explain the philosophy of your organization in counter-terrorism?

- Can you explain the command structure of your organization in counter-terrorism?

Learning Initiatives

- What happens after a terrorist incident in your department? Do you think things change considerably? If so, how?

- Do you think your department considers the lessons learned when changing or updating the systems, such as training programs or SOPs?

- Does your institution have a set of best practices? If so, how are those practices generated? Are best practices in other countries considered?

- Are those best practices updated? If so, how?

- Do you think that training programs are updated or changed after the incidents?

- If you think that your organization is a learning organization, how is learning integrated into the training programs?

- What approaches, structures and contents of counter-terrorism programs have been changed?

- Could you please show me your training programs before and after the update, if it is appropriate to your rules?

- Why did these changes take place? Who developed the training program update? Or did you introduce new programs?
Do you think your department is a learning organization? If so, how is learning integrated into the SOPs?

Change Initiatives

Could you please explain what changes have been realized in your organization after the terrorist incidents? What are the structural and operational changes? Changes may include the legal framework, rules, regulations, equipment, plans, and practices.

In your opinion, why have those changes been generated?

How have those changes been implemented?

Policy Initiatives

How does your agency’s counter-terrorism operate at the policy level?

Does your agency make proposals to change policies? If so, what are the law proposals that your agency has submitted in order to change the overall policies and practices.

Does your agency have external initiatives? If so, how and what are they? (cooperation with other agencies, new or updated joint ventures, and working with society)

In your opinion, why were those proposals and initiatives generated?

How have those initiatives been implemented?
APPENDIX D

KENT STATE UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
APPROVAL FORM

KENT STATE UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL TO USE HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
Send completed forms to one of the reviewers designated by your Department or Katherine L. Bix, Research and Graduate
Studies, 113 University Auditorium

LOG NUMBER 08-15

Please type all information. HANDWRITTEN FORMS WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED. Move through the document
using Tab or Mouse. To insert the editor Key, press a tab, enter the name.

Name: MUSTAF A. GOGLER
Telephone: 330-348-8187 Address: 1849 ALDOS QUINT PL

Department: POLITICAL SCIENCE Faculty Rank/Student Status: PHD STUDENT

Project Title: Investigating and Assessing the Preparedness of Police Organizations in Counter-terrorism

Type of Project: [ ] FACULTY RESEARCH [ ] External Funded [Agency: ] Include copy of proposal
[ ] STUDENT DIRECTED RESEARCH (Advisor: Dates: Winter, Ph.D.)
[ ] Other [ ] Determination [ ] Course Requirement
[ ] Other [ ] Cover (Specify:)

Duration of Project: Starting Date: (but not before approval is obtained)

I certify that the research procedures for this project and the method of obtaining consent to participation
are approved by the Kent State University Institutional Review Board, will be followed during the period
covered by this research project. Any future changes will be reported to the Board for approval prior to implementation.

If the project involves approval of human subjects, an Investigator (and the faculty advisor if the PI is a student)
must sign below to certify the following statement: "I have not begun research on other institutions before having obtained
their permission to do so.”

Marcia Odgers, Ph.D.
Principal Investigator

DATE: 7/10/07

Faculty Advisor (PI is a student) Date: 7/10/07

Action Taken: By Reviewer:
[ ] Approved, Level I [ ] Withdrawn
[ ] Approved, Level II [ ] Deny

Confidentiality: [ ] Identifiable medical information
[ ] Waiver of Consent

DATE: 7/26/07

Reviewer: Signature

DATE: 7/26/07

Department: Date

Approval: [ ] Conclusive [ ] Conditional Approval (Continuing or Continuing)
APPENDIX E

CODEBOOK

**Aim of terrorism:** Terrorism’s goals and objectives, such as spreading fear, causing psychological damage to the population, using violence against people or the causing of serious damage to property that disrupts daily life in order to bring about social change or to influence political decision-making.

**Alert system:** It is kind of an early warning system which the society is warned, when there is information about a possible terrorist attack or a threat. It has three to five levels, which can be minimal, limited, substantial or critical, depending on the design of the system.

**Being open to the society:** This occurs when a police organization keeps the public informed about terrorist threats or terrorist incidents. It is also involved giving information to the media about terrorism-related topics.

**Best practice:** Any practice that is considered useful or effective, or perceived as a powerful tool to achieve good results.

**Better use of existing powers and structure:** This occurs when a police organization focuses on its existing policies and practices in order to make a leap to new forms of applications during the adaptation process.

**Change in training programs:** This occurs when a police organization makes changes in its training programs or when introduces new training initiatives on counter-terrorism.
**Change of SOP:** This denotes any change within the rules, regulations, organizational structures, systems, operational tools, mechanisms, among other organization processes.

**Clear goal definition:** This denotes organizations’ actions to develop strategic policy and procedures to ensure that the further steps are clear and unambiguous.

**Coordinated reorganization:** This denotes police organizations’ collaborative initiatives in their reorganizations processes in their counter-terrorism activities.

**Developing training programs:** This denotes the development of a training program in counter-terrorism within police organizations.

**Early intervention:** Taking measures to limit the potential impact of terrorist acts. This may entail proactive steps against radicalization and recruitment, making early warnings, or taking appropriate measures in administrative, financial and legal fields.

**Global Perspective:** Taking terrorist incidents and threats around the world into consideration and developing proactive measures to prevent similar activities at home.

**Incident + Change of SOP:** When a change of SOP occurs after a terrorist incident.

**Incident + expansion:** This denotes expansion of counter-terrorism units after terrorist incidents.

**Incident + institutional cooperation:** This denotes cooperative initiatives of police organizations with other agencies following a terrorist incident.

**Incident + learning + change of SOP:** This denotes when a learning initiative and a change of SOP occurs after a terrorist incident.
**Incident + political action:** This denotes and political decision making process in counter-terrorism after a terrorist incident.

**Incident + sense of urgency:** This denotes immediate reactions within the society of governmental agencies after a terrorist incident or threat of terrorism.

**Innovative approach:** This occurs when police agencies support innovative initiatives to implement within counter-terrorism activities.

**Institutional cooperation:** This denotes police organizations’ collaborative initiatives with other agencies in counter-terrorism.

**Institutional memory:** This denotes police organizations’ written manuals, policies or protocols in which the learning experiences are reflected and all practices are fulfilled based on written descriptions. It is a pool of knowledge in which all members of a police organization can make contributions so that future policies and practices become based on previous experiences.

**International cooperation:** This denotes police organizations’ cooperative initiatives with other police organizations other than their own countries.

**International dimension of terrorism:** This denotes terrorist networks or activities around the world. This code is used when a police organization takes those facts into consideration in its counter-terrorism activities.

**Knowledge transfer:** This denotes relaying the gained knowledge and experiences to new generations or the new comers to a police organization. This may take forms of from word of mouth to written manuals or instructions.
**Learning from its own experiences:** This denotes the organizational practices of retaining and making use of the existing knowledge and direct experiences of the organizations. More specifically it is the consideration of mistakes and successes.

**Learning from other organizations:** This denotes the vicarious experiences which are the direct or indirect observation of other police organizations’ ways of doing things.

**Learning from research and science:** This denotes acquisition and use of research literature or direct experimentation in order to develop new organizational techniques or systems.

**Local coordination:** This occurs when a police organization works with local administrations, municipalities and/or other agencies for counter-terrorism purposes.

**Local Information:** This denotes a police organization’s direct interactions with citizens or other agencies for counter-terrorism purposes.

**Multi-disciplinary approach:** This denotes a police organization’s initiatives by using other fields of expertise, such as psychology, sociology or other hard sciences, such as chemistry, bio-technology, etc.

**National Coordination:** This denotes a structured coordination among governmental agencies specifically for counter-terrorism purposes.

**Police cooperation:** This occurs when a police agency works with international police organizations.

**Policy initiatives:** This denotes any action or an attempt by police organizations to change overall policies and procedures. If a police organization works with other
organizations, citizens or other entities and plays its role consistently with and as a part of those long-term responses, then those initiatives are referred to as policy initiatives. Cooperative initiatives with other police organizations are also considered as parts or extension of these initiatives. The goal of these initiatives is to create impact on the overall policies and practices toward producing strategic solutions (Burton, 1990).

**Preparatory exercises:** This denotes planned joint rehearsals by institutions against terrorist activities.

**Preventive measures:** This denotes any activity done by a police organization to prevent terrorist activities. This may take the forms of derailing radicalization to dismantling a terrorist cell.

**Proactive Policing:** This denotes a police organization’s proactive policies and procedures to prevent terrorism.

**Professional Response:** This denotes police organizations’ planned responses in which the standards are defined earlier rather than reactive responses.

**Radicalization and recruitment:** This denotes the process in which individuals go through a psychological path until they become operatives within terrorist activities.

**Regional & Local coordination:** This denotes cooperative policies and procedures in place in local or regional settings.

**Reinforcement of existing structures:** This denotes making existing policies, procedures or organizational structures adapted to new situations, especially for counter-terrorism purposes.
**Review of the overall structure:** This denotes the inspection of a unit or a police organization in order to realize reorganization for counter-terrorism purposes.

**Scientific Approach:** This denotes police organizations’ initiatives by using scientific research or taking advantage of existing research.

**Sound police work:** This denotes strategic approaches of police organizations, in which policies and practices are designed based on knowledge and experience.

**Specialization:** This denotes the establishment of counter-terrorism units within police organizations.

**Strategic Approach:** This denotes police organizations’ long-term initiatives, in which steps are taken predetermined targets.

**Structural change:** This denotes any organizational change within police organizations.

**Threat Assessment:** This denotes making assessment to determine potential threat of terrorism to a country.

**Training all police personnel:** This denotes training initiatives, which encompasses all line-level personnel in order to make them aware of terrorist activities in their daily works.

**Training the specialized units:** This denotes any training activity given to the personnel within counter-terrorism units.

**Travel to abroad:** This denotes any travel to other countries to observe counter-terrorism initiatives of other police organizations.
Understanding the new terrorism: This denotes a cognitive process of police organizations in order to comprehend new directions of terrorist incidents.

Using Training Experts: This denotes police organizations’ use of instructional designers during the development processes of training programs and materials.

Working with other institutions: This denotes police organizations’ collaborative initiatives with other institutions.

Working with sectors: This denotes police organizations’ collaborative initiatives with business and governmental sectors, such as energy, banking, water, transportation, education, etc.

Working with society: This denotes police organizations’ collaborative initiatives with citizens.
APPENDIX G

THE LIST OF THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

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