A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM

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by

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I hope this dissertation contributes to understanding the concept of terrorism and to international cooperation efforts in the field.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Terrorism” as a concept was not coined at the time of the attacks of September 11, 2001; on the contrary, it has a long history, and there have been many states in the world that have been dealing with it for some time. The significance of September 11 was that the whole world was able to observe the magnitude and the cross-national characteristic of terrorism. It became quite obvious that terrorist attacks may be carried out anytime, anywhere, and any person regardless of his/her nationality. The September 11 attacks rendered it clear that terrorism is not a problem of a single country, but rather an issue requiring cooperation among many nations.

The most important explanation for the varying incidence of cooperation in international relations is the pattern of interests at stake, and the likelihood of cooperative behavior depends on the degree of compatibility among the goals of the states involved (Putnam and Bayne, 1989, p.3). This point also explains the standpoints of states towards international cooperation against terrorism. The acts shown to constitute terrorism by different states vary in level of violence, innovativeness, choice of targets, actors and effectiveness (Crenshaw, 1989). So far, states have been unable to adopt a common definition of terrorism, and hence they lack a common ground on which they can all agree on what they are fighting against. This lack of common definition of terrorism as a concept has been the focus of many scholarly studies, inter-state relations and
international organizations. However, defining terrorism has turned out to be one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary international legal and political arena (Koufa, 2001). Similarly, Spencer (2006) addresses terrorism as one of the most disputed concepts in social sciences, while Webel (2004) views it as contested as it is open.

The problem of ongoing disputes about the concept could best be explained by viewing terrorism as an “essentially contested concept” whose characteristics and consequences are specified as follows:

When the concept involved [in a conceptual dispute] is appraisive in that the state of affairs it describes is a valued achievement, when the practice described is internally complex in that its characterization involves reference to several dimensions, when the agreed and contested rules of application are relatively open, enabling parties to interpret even those shared rules differently as new and unforeseen situations arise, then the concept in question is an “essentially contested concept.” Such concepts essentially involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of the users (Connolly, 1993, p.10)

Due to its multidimensional structure and the number of parties involved who interpret rules differently as new and unforeseen situations arise, we can inarguably say that terrorism is an “essentially contested concept.” Therefore, although there is a common agreement on the abstract notion of terrorism, there are different understandings and interpretations.

Some argue that an inability to reach a common definition of terrorism may have been the high political risks involved in the task of defining such a concept (Lambert, 1990). Variations in interpretations might also be due to terrorism’s social, legal and political implications. The varied opinions regarding terrorism are clearly underscored in the UN Report of the Commission on Human Rights about Terrorism and Human Rights (2001), which states “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” This
expression is symbolic of the problems encountered at the stage of defining terrorism be
it before or after September 11. States are not willing to adopt an extensive definition that
does not fit within their political and social values. As Kastanidou (2004) argues,
“[t]errorism is a phenomenon pertaining to social and political life, and its definition
within the framework of criminal law cannot be disassociated from its social and political
milieu” (p.18).

Cultural values play an important role in constructing the definition of a concept
as well as in its interpretation and implementation. Due to the cultural particularity of
defining most concepts, including terrorism, international cooperation has not been very
effective in producing a unified definition or understanding. States aiming at developing
definitions of terrorism often produce ones that parallel their domestic and international
concerns. However, because of the subjective character of the concept of terrorism states
tend to only adopt definitions that comply fully with their cultural values.

The variance in the definition of terrorism is even more complex than complying
with cultural values. Often in numerous states there is more than one set of cultural
values. There are also a number of subcultures within the diverse organizations that fight
terrorism in any one country. Such differences in organizational cultures lead to the
question whether within one country there can be a shared understanding of terrorism. To
complicate issues further the perception across professions regarding terrorism can vary
as well. Hence the perceptions of politicians who deal with issue at the legislative and
diplomatic level could be different from those of police officers who are often at the front
line of the confrontation. Similarly, the judiciary whose issues are about due process,
justice and deterrence might have a different understanding from the politicians or police. While governments make their decisions in the name of the entire country, they often do not reflect the opinions of all sectors and groups in the societal and political structures.

Problem Statement

As stated in the previous section, the international community needs more cooperation against terrorism. However, due to several reasons attributed to the variations in understanding the concept of terrorism at the national level, the international cooperation has not reached the point where the international community desires it to be. Although there has been an abundance of research on the concept itself and the reasons for lack of cooperation, the focus of the research has mainly been on explaining terrorism as a concept and the causes of lack of cooperation at the national level (e.g., Kastanidou, 2004; Schmid, 2004; Schmid and Jongman, 2005). Most studies focus on the problem of establishing a common definition, and show it as the key for international cooperation. The reasons for insufficient cooperation and efforts to adopt an internationally agreed upon definition will be detailed in the literature review in Chapter II.

This dissertation study does not aim to establish and propose a common definition of terrorism; on the contrary, it offers a method taking into consideration variance in cultural and national settings, as well as variations in interpretations based on professions, into account, as opposed to the current efforts of fighting terrorism by gathering all the states under one common definition. It proposes to explore opportunities of international cooperation by measuring subjective interpretations of professionals from different organizations in charge of struggling against terrorism. However, this is not a
straightforward task to do. First of all, any method of collecting data to be used in such a study requires clarity to some extent of the concept being studied or, as is known among social scientists, operationalization. In the case of terrorism, the concept does not have many common points according to which the researcher prepares his questions to collect data. For example, acts that may be addressed as terrorism by a group of people could be attributed positive connotations of struggle by different people. Additionally, there is no common typology or set of characteristics of terrorism. Moreover, the interpretations of those characteristics may be completely different or even at odds with each other.

The researcher needed a framework to develop the “statements” of the “Q sort,” the method with which he will attempt to explore the differences in perceptions of the terrorism concept. The need for a framework has led the researcher to conduct a more extensive analysis of the concept of terrorism, and the reasons as to why nations do not adopt a common definition. For that purpose, this study approaches the definition problem (and not a definition) by developing a theoretical framework that borrows from philosophy. It then explores whether measuring perceptions of people in charge of fighting terrorism could contribute both to understanding the general portrayal of the terrorism concept at the national level, and to international cooperation against terrorism through comparison of those national depictions.

Research regarding cooperation against terrorism focuses mainly on the problem of definition (e.g., Schmid and Jongman, 2005; Hoffman, 2006). Although available research agrees that it is currently difficult to establish a global consensus on a definition for terrorism, an understanding of the reasons for the inability to arrive at such a
definition has not been examined systematically. Most of the research examines the
political obstacles at reaching a definition or address single cases to identify a definition.
Additionally most of the research conducted on the meaning of terrorism uses the “state” as the unit of analysis for deriving a common understanding of the meaning or
significance of terrorism. Such a focus, besides the difficulty it encounters for lack of consensus among various nation-states (i.e. international consensus), it is also challenged by the difficulty of the variance within the states’ borders (i.e. at the intra-national level).
This research aims to overcome such difficulties at the international level by using a comparative approach that looks at two nation-states, but that also focuses on intra-national variance by exploring the opinions of a variety of professionals within each of those states. Such a multi-layered approach that is guided by a theoretical framework is needed in order to understand the complexities involved in meaning formation of a concept such as terrorism. This understanding is an initial step towards overcoming the confusion that prevails at the international scene vis-à-vis acts of violence that some countries view as “terrorism” while others do not. Therefore, it fills a void in the literature in understanding concept formation. This dissertation will accomplish such an understanding of concept formation of the term “terrorism” by:

(i) investigating the problem of defining terrorism from a theoretical framework borrowed from philosophy,
(ii) foregrounding perceptions of people who deal directly with fighting terrorism, to overcome the limitation of ignoring intra-national variance, and
(iii) using both the theoretical framework, and intra-national variance cross-nationally to explain the formation of “terrorism” as a concept.

Research Questions

This study proposes to examine how people who fight terrorism in their countries perceive terrorism. Once such patterns are established at the intra-national level, a comparative method is utilized to understand the various perceptions of terrorism across professions and cross-culturally. Understanding perceptions of terrorism at such various levels can be utilized to facilitate global cooperation against terrorism. Establishing systematic knowledge about the commonalities and differences about the meaning of terrorism – both at the intra-national and international level – minimizes misunderstanding and makes communication about such a pressing terrorism more apt to bring about agreement and consensus. There are two general questions that the study attempts to answer.

[1] How is the concept of terrorism formed?

This question is addressed at a theoretical level in order to arrive at a framework from which to arrive at answers to the second question. As such this question includes issues regarding

[1.a] How is meaning achieved?

[1.b] What is the process that renders meaning different for different people?

[1.c] How does such a process apply to the definitions and meaning of terrorism?

[1.d] What kind of a framework of concept formation for terrorism is possible to use in research that aims to understand people’s perception of the term?
[2] What factors emerge from participants’ responses to a Q sort prepared to measure their perceptions about the concept of terrorism?

This question involves empirical research examining issues regarding
[2.a] What contributes most to perceptions of terrorism: professions or nationalities?
[2.b] How do different professions working with terrorism perceive its meaning?
[2.c] What are the commonalities and differences among such professions?
[2.d] How do citizens of different countries perceive terrorism?
[2.e] What are the commonalities and differences among such citizens?
[2.f] How do such factors inform global consensus and understanding about a future consensus on terrorism?

This study begins exploring the first question about the formation of the terrorism concept. In this section the issue is presented by borrowing from philosophy. Chapter II examines the foundation of the analysis and reviews the literature. The findings of the related sections answering the first research question and the literature review (Chapter II) will be utilized while establishing the “concourse of communication” that will be used to collect data for the purpose of answering the second research question. More specifically, the indicator/data level dimensions of the concept of terrorism and the controversial types of terrorism, respectively, will be the bases of the concourse of communication in Chapter III.

The second question uses a Q sort. The methodology used in the dissertation (Q methodology) is discussed in Chapter III. The analysis of data collected by the application of the Q sort on participants from Turkey and the United States is made in
Chapter IV. Chapter V is the final chapter and it discusses the overall findings of the dissertation research and presents future research suggestions.

Concept Formation and Terrorism

As stated above, terrorism is a concept having legal as well as social and political implications. Since using one or a few legal definitions of the concept would mean narrowing the scope of possible interpretations of terrorism, any scientific study focusing on what the concept might mean in the broadest sense must encompass as many alternative interpretations as possible. For this purpose, the formation of terrorism as a concept should be examined. The findings of this examination will be utilized in preparation of the “statements” which will be used to collect data to answer the second research question.

The study of social scientific concepts, such as terrorism, often borrows from philosophy’s “Concept Formation.” The following discusses how the concept of terrorism is examined according to the “Concept Formation” technique. However, I find it useful first to present some information about the philosophical background of the technique of “Concept Formation.”

*Concept Formation: The Elemental Scheme*

When a person (speaker) utters a word to another person (hearer) understanding what has been said requires a process in the hearer’s mind. First s/he attaches a meaning to the word in his/her mind depending on a number of factors including culture, educational level, ideology, IQ, class, etc. For example, if that word is a simple and
concrete term, such as “pencil,” the hearer will think and attribute a meaning to “pencil.” The meaning of the word would be an object that is made of carbon, plastic/wood and is used to mark erasable tracks especially on paper. Only then can s/he be able to show a “pencil.” The item shown can be mechanical or simple, plastic or wood, cheap or expensive, colorful or colorless …, but nobody anticipates a discussion on whether the item is a pencil or not.

However, that process for other words is not as clear as it is for the concrete word (term or concept) such as “pencil.” For an abstract term, such as “democracy,” people’s understandings will differ greatly, since democracy is used to refer to many forms of rulings as long as “ruling by the people” is involved at any level. In the end, what one identifies as “democracy” may not exactly correspond to other people’s understanding of the term, since the meanings that people attach to the concept are different.

In this dissertation Sartori’s (1984) Elemental Scheme will be used to explain this mental process of understanding meaning, as well as the defects within the scheme and the suggested remedies for those defects. Only after establishing the process of understanding meaning and its variations could such a complex term as terrorism be properly examined, and that will be attempted after a discussion of Sartori’s Elemental Scheme.

Sartori’s Elemental Scheme is best illustrated by a diagram showing the relationship among terms, meanings and referents (see Figure 1.1). The scheme denotes that the relationship between terms and referents is indirect, and it can only be possible through meanings in people’s mind. The Elemental Scheme is an improved version of the
“Ogden-Richards Triangle” (Ogden and Richards, 1923 [1959]) where those three principle elements were stated as (1) symbol, (2) thought or reference, and (3) referent. The “symbol” is a particular phonological or graphical form, the “thought” or “reference” is the meaning-content of the form, and the “referent” is the nonlinguistic issue about which the actual conversation is going on (Poythress, 1999). In another revision on the

![Figure 1.1 The Elemental Scheme (theoretical).](image)

Ogden-Richards’s Triangle, which was made by Ullmann (1962), those three elements were labeled as name, sense, and thing, respectively. For Ullmann, the “name” is the phonetic shape of the word, the “sense” is the information that the name conveys to the hearer, and the “thing” is the non-linguistic feature or event about which we are talking.

Sartori’s (1984) additive contribution to the work of Ogden and Richards includes several points. Sartori eliminates the imputed link between the term and the referent that was shown as a broken line. By that he puts more emphasis on the mediation of “meaning” in the relationship between those two elements (term and referent). He
replaces the first element “symbol” with “term,” and defines it as a word allocated to a
concept. Secondly, he prefers “meaning” to “thought or reference,” and explains it with
“connotation” (attributes of the term). Sartori’s renaming makes the terms in the Ogden
and Richards’ triangle clearer and more sensible for those whose academic training is not
in philosophy.

In later writings Sartori (1984) specifies the relationships between the elements of
meaning. The relationship between the term and the meaning, according to Sartori, can
either be equivocal (ambiguous) or univocal (clear); and the relationship between the
meaning and the referent can be vague (undenotative, not meaning anything) or adequate
(denotative). In the example of the “pencil” the relationship between the term and the
meaning is unambiguous since the term pencil is attributed to the same meaning in most
minds. Similarly, the relationship between the meaning and the referent is not vague
because the meaning (of pencil) in many people’s minds indicates the same object in the
real world. However, there are numerous terms in real life which are subject to
uncertainty, “defects” as shown in the Elemental Scheme (Figure 1.2.). These defects
lead to confusion and imprecision in the meaning of terms causing them to mean different
things to different people.

Terrorism is one such concept (term) that can be explored within this general
Elemental Scheme of meaning proposed by Sartori (1984). The balance of this chapter
frames the term terrorism within such an Elemental Scheme.
The Concept of Terrorism in the Elemental Scheme

When one utters the word (term) terrorism, it generates different meanings in the minds of different people. As Schmid and Jongman (2005) exemplify, those meanings may be crime, communism, political murder, killing of innocents or violence for political purposes, each “meaning” being related to a set of characteristics of the concept. The concept has so many characteristics, such as the existence of political motives, specific targets and perpetrators, violence, victimization of innocents, lack of legitimacy, inflicting fear and being bifocal. Due to the abundance of characteristics and that the term is used to refer to so many actions, the relationship between the concept of terrorism and the possible meanings of terrorism, according to Sartori (1984), is “defective.” To be exact, the relationship between the term terrorism and its meanings is “equivocal,” and it causes “ambiguity” (Figure 1.2.). As Crenshaw (1995) puts it, “[t]errorism is an ambiguous variable not easily measured or quantified, in part because there are multiple forms of terrorism, and they are easily confused with other styles of violence” (p.6).
This ambiguity or confusion can explicitly be observed on another revision in Figure 1.3. In the figure examples of meanings and their referents are presented for the purpose of illustration. When one hears the word *terrorism*, the meaning in his/her mind can be any one of those in the figure, or as any other type of terrorism not specified in the figure, and those meanings differ from each other greatly. This is why we can conclude that the relationship between the term and its possible meanings is “ambiguous.”

**Figure 1.3** Explanation of the term terrorism in the Elemental Scheme

On the right sides of the Elemental Scheme triangles (depicted in Figure 1.3) there is no observed defect. For those whose meaning of terrorism is separatist movements, the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) can be the referent. One can, of course, think that the referent of that meaning could also be the IRA (Irish Republican Army) or the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) organizations, which can be seen as a defect in the relationship. However, “referents are the real-world counterparts (if existent) of the world
in our head” (Sartori, 1984, p.24), and the Elemental Scheme does not limit the owner of the meaning with only one example in the external setting. As long as the hearer can say, “look, ETA’s actions are terrorism” in accordance with his/her thinking, we cannot talk about a defect. In fact, the defect (vagueness, since it is between the meaning and the referent) occurs when the hearer cannot specify the referent of the meaning he/she attached to the term.

Hence, it follows to conclude that the term terrorism suffers from ambiguity in the Elemental Scheme of meaning as presented by Sartori (1984). This does not imply that there should be one-to-one relationship between the term and the meaning, but rather that the intended meaning should be clarified. In other words, the defect in the meaning of the term should be resolved by way of defining it in a less ambiguous manner.

The following section discusses the issue of “defining” terms within the Elemental Scheme and explores the various ambiguities involved in definitions of the term terrorism.

*Defining Terms within the Elemental Scheme*

Sartori (1984, p.28) suggests that one way of curing concepts lies in defining them as long as we know how to define and for what purpose. Sartori offers two main types of definitions and, using the Elemental Scheme, explains what types of defects can be remedied by those definitions. A modified version of the suggested definitions is shown in Figure 1.4.
Since there are many terms that have more than one meaning, the relationship between the term and the meaning appears to be in the form of one-to-many. To declare what meaning is intended by the term, declarative definitions are used. Being the simplest way of defining, declarative definitions aim for the disambiguation of the term.

Denotative definitions regulate the relationship between the meaning and the referent, and intend to seize the referent by decreasing its vagueness (Sartori, 1984, p.30). However, according to Sartori (1984), denotative definitions confront such problems as establishing the boundaries, sorting out the membership of any referents, and deciding the cut-off point. Sartori examines denotative definitions under three sub-categories: (1) Operational Definitions establish the meaning of the defined term in terms of observable-measurable indicators, so that a clear and understandable description of the term can be provided; (2) Précising Definitions are established for a specific purpose through addition of extra criteria that reduce the extension (set of things meeting the definition) of the term; and (3) Ostensive Definitions are ones that do not go beyond pointing out single cases or
objects, and simply define them as a particular action or an object. However, ostensive definitions lack both declaration and denotation.

The differences among those types of definitions could be illustrated by an example: A possible declarative definition of the term “minor” (person) would be “a person of either sex who has not attained the age at which full civil rights are accorded.” If we define the term operationally, the definition could be “a person who is under the age of 18; or between the ages of 15 and 18 but his/her majority has not been decided by the court; or younger than 18 years of age but has not acquired his/her majority through marriage.”¹

A précising definition of the minor (if a victim of rape) becomes an application of the age factor as a cause of aggravation for a rapist, and a minor is defined as “a person who is younger than 15 years of age.”² While an ostensible definition involves pointing out a child as an expression such as: “This is a minor.”

Based on the above framework of understanding definitions of terms the following section examines definitions of terrorism in the common lexicon of legal, social and political writing. The objective of the following discussion is to underscore the process by which definitions of concepts (or concept formation) are arrived at rather than to provide a definition of terrorism.

¹ Adapted from the Turkish Civil Code.
² Adapted from the Turkish Penal Code.
Defining Terrorism and Concept Formation

The concept of terrorism is defined declaratively in most legal documents, such as the Turkish Counter-Terrorism Act. The Act defines terrorism in Article 1. as “…any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic … by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.”

Establishing a “non-objectionable” denotative definition of the concept of terrorism does not seem very likely due to the virtual impossibility of drawing the boundaries of referents of the concept. However, it is also the fact that this is the most current stage in the international community’s attempt to reach a common definition of the term terrorism. Yet, the available international denotative definitions (operational definitions, to be exact) can encompass only a small number of possible referents, such as causing death, serious bodily injury, damage to public or private property with political motivations. Problems regarding the absence of an internationally agreed-upon definition of terrorism denotes an absence of a declarative definition, since the concept has an operational definition, in spite of the risk of its being “a drastic and eventually distorting curtailment of [the concept’s] connotation” (Sartori, 1984, p.31). For example, the definition of terrorism that the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism established in 2001 is an operational one:

Any person who commits an offence within the meaning of the [draft Comprehensive] Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act (Schmid, 2004, pp. 387-388)

However, this definition suffers from “a drastic and eventually distorting curtailment of its connotation” as stated above, since it does not include all possible referents of terrorism. Therefore, some governments raised their objections about the definition, since it does not incorporate states and national armed forces as actors, does not differentiate between terrorism and freedom fighting/ fighting against foreign occupation, etc. (Schmid, 2004).

Likewise, both précising and ostensive definitions are even further from encompassing all the referents of terrorism since the former focuses on a few criteria that denote a small number of referents, and the latter does not go beyond pointing out single cases and simply call them terrorism.

In terms of an internationally agreed-upon definition of the concept of terrorism, I have discussed above that so far the defect results from the “ambiguity” between the term terrorism and its possible meanings in the Elemental Scheme (of term, meaning and referent), and ascertained that its remedy is to define terrorism “declaratively” at the international level, as opposed to establishing operational definitions. While pursuing the issue of how to define terrorism clearly, the purpose of this dissertation is neither to propose a definition nor explore the basis of arriving at one. The aim of this section on definitions of terrorism was to establish that declarative definitions of terrorism require the studying and the classifying of concept characteristics, or “concept formation.”
Although Sartori (1970) stated that “concepts are not only elements of a theoretical system, but equally tools for fact-gathering, data containers,” he did not show how the various levels of understanding which he proposed as the “ladder of abstraction” could be put into practice. In contrast, Goertz’s (2006) approach provides a more careful set of factors of concept formation including internal structure, its constituent parts, causality among those constituent parts and the whole object’s interaction with its environment that facilitate a classification of abstractions. For that purpose he proposes categorization of all multidimensional and multilevel concepts as follows:

1. Basic level: It is cognitively central, and as Collier and Levitsky (1997) state, it is the noun to which we attach adjectives, such as parliamentary democracy and democratic corporatism.

2. Secondary level: This is the level at which constitutive dimensions of the basic-level concept are stated. The multidimensional character of concepts appears when we move down to the secondary level.

3. Indicator/Data level: This level requires specificity, so that data can be gathered. It also allows us to categorize whether or not a specific phenomenon falls under the concept. At this level we get down to actual empirical data.

Goertz’s (2006) examination of concepts is similar to that of Munck and Verkuilen (2002, p.12) where the authors labeled Goertz’s three dimensions as “concept,” “attributes” and “components of attributes,” respectively. The analyst, according to Munck and Verkuilen (2002), must first determine the constitutive attributes of a concept, and then consider how these attributes are related to each other. Munck and Verkuilen’s
(2002) study contributes to the field by introducing “levels of abstraction” (in place of Sartori’s “ladder of abstraction”), according to which the structure of a concept is established. However, the authors relate the components of each level to another level, while they ignore the quality of those relationships (causal vs. ontological), as well as the relationships among the components of each level. On the other hand, Goertz’s (2006) study examines relationships both between and within dimensions. Those relationships will be clearly indicated during the examination of the concept of terrorism in the following subsections.

*Formation of the Concept of Terrorism*

After the necessary theoretical information regarding formation of concepts, we can now proceed to formation of the concept of terrorism, where the researcher utilizes the method proposed by Goertz (2006).

In Goertz’s terms, the concept of terrorism is both multidimensional and multilevel. At the basic level the dimension is “terrorism” since we add such adjectives as *state, religious, environmental* or *vigilante* to this noun. At the secondary level the *components of terrorism* would be used. These conditions come together ontologically, and constitute *terrorism*. In terms of the indicator/data level dimensions, each secondary level dimension is handled individually. For example, for the secondary level dimension of “target” the indicator/data-level dimensions could be *civilians, combatants* or *non-combatants*, which allows us to collect data regarding the “target” component of terrorism. In preparation of the chart, the researcher used the information he obtained through the literature review without giving priority to one understanding of terrorism
over another. For example, even if some authors do not recognize the “state” as perpetrator or sponsor of terrorism, since such recognition exists in the literature, the researcher included those as possible actors of terrorist acts. Overall, I propose the breakdown of the concept of *terrorism* as in Figure 1.5. The figure does not represent the relationships within and between dimensions. Those will be examined under sub-section “Extension vs. Intension” in later pages.

Another emerging issue in connection with breaking down a concept into its components is the problem of “negative pole,” which will now be discussed together with the consequences attributed to it.

*Negative Pole, Concept Formation and Social Science Research*

The process of concept formation includes also a mediation of negative-positive poles of meaning. Goertz (2006) writes that most social science researchers focus on the positive pole of meaning, which is the basic-level concept itself. However, the negative pole, the concept that is obtained through negation of the positive pole, should also be explained. The negation in that sense is made by using negative ends of the secondary-level dimensions.

In terms of the concept of terrorism, using negative ends of the secondary-level dimensions (components of terrorism) results in changing the basic level dimension from *terrorism* to concepts that are interchangeably-used (or confused) with terrorism. Table 1.1 illustrates the negation process.
Figure 1.5 Levels and Dimensions of the Concept of Terrorism

- **Basic-Level Dimension**
  - TERRORISM

- **Secondary Level Dimensions**
  - In form of serious crimes
    - against human beings
    - against social values
  - Target
    - civilians
    - combatants
    - non-combatants
  - Purpose
    - intimidation
    - coercion
    - propaganda
  - Political Character
    - overthrow system
    - destabilizing system
  - Actor
    - civilians
    - state
    - state-sponsored

- **Indicator/Data Level Dimensions**
  - Use of illegal/moral violence
    - use
    - threat to use
Table 1.1 Producing Negative Pole for the Concept of Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Pole (Concept, Basic-Level Dimension)</th>
<th>Secondary-Level Dimension</th>
<th>Negative End of the Secondary-Level Dimension</th>
<th>Negative Pole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TERRORISM</td>
<td>In form of serious crimes</td>
<td>Lack of serious crimes</td>
<td>Propaganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Targets other than combatants</td>
<td>Guerilla warfare, war, war crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>No other purpose beyond the act itself</td>
<td>Any mono-focal act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Character</td>
<td>Lack of Political Character</td>
<td>Ordinary crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>Lack of State involvement as actor</td>
<td>National self-defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Illegal/Moral violence</td>
<td>Lack of illegal/moral violence</td>
<td>Civil society movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To illustrate, the negative pole of terrorism relative to the secondary-level dimension of “political character” is done by negating “political character,” which is “lack of political character.” If the political character is removed from a terrorist event, the remaining act is no longer terrorism, but an act of “ordinary crime;” therefore, the negative pole of terrorism in that case is “ordinary crime.”

Similarly, terrorism is distinguished from many “apparently” similar acts by its characteristic of “bifocality.” This is the “purpose” dimension of terrorist acts. Its negation means that a particular terrorist act does not have an ultimate purpose other than the attack at the immediate target. In that case, the event is any type of ordinary crime, not terrorism. Therefore, the negative pole of terrorism is “any monofocal act.”
The importance of examining the issue of negative pole for the concept of terrorism is that the new concepts provided by this negation process are also the concepts that are interchangeably-used with terrorism. Therefore, Table 1.1 explains the roots of the controversy among those concepts, by the help of a method in philosophy. In Chapter II the major concepts resulting from the negation will be examined further.

*Combining Dimensions to Build a Concept*

To this point I have traced the constituent parts (dimensions) of terrorism derived from a variety of theoretical frameworks, definitions and understandings of the concept. Such a tracing shows that there is not a single definition that includes all the identified dimensions. Different interests (socio-political, economic, and legal) require different entities to accept some dimensions while rejecting the others. For example, if a state were involved in state or state-sponsored terrorism it probably would not want to accept “the state” as actor in the definition of terrorism. As such the focus of this dissertation’s research requires the development of a multi-dimensional concept of terrorism and uses Goertz’s (2006) work to guide the process theoretically and operationally.

According to Goertz (2006), two major archetypical structures are used to create a multidimensional conceptual meaning: necessary and sufficient conditions and family resemblance. Goertz’s argument that each one of the necessary and sufficient conditions is a secondary-level dimension, and that they bind together to form the basic-level dimension can be applied to the concept of terrorism. In that case, we need to combine the secondary-level dimensions with the conjunction AND, which allows us to develop a phrase such as: “If an act is committed through the use of illegal/immoral violence AND
in the form of serious crimes, AND having a specific target AND purpose AND political character AND actor, it constitutes terrorism.” In other words, each one of those components is necessary and sufficient for any act to constitute terrorism; otherwise (if one or more components are not provided), the statement would not constitute terrorism.

However, the situation is not the same for the indicator/data-level dimensions. As opposed to the necessary and sufficient conditions structure, which requires the existence of all dimensions, the existence of at least one indicator/data-level dimension in each group would suffice to develop the secondary-level dimension. For example, “intimidation” is a sufficient condition for the existence of the “purpose” component, but not necessary, because the existence of “coercion” and/or “propaganda” can also serve the same purpose. In that case we cluster dimensions with the conjunction OR. For example, civilians OR states OR state-sponsored entities might be actors of terrorism. Similarly, commitment of an act against civilians OR combatants OR non-combatants (other conditions provided) might be considered terrorism. Then, as long as at least one indicator/data-level dimension is taken from each cluster, all the secondary-level dimensions, and therefore the basic-level concept are provided. Although it resembles Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1953) *family resemblance structure*—which maintains that concepts can have no essential or necessary characteristics, but that nevertheless there is a family resemblance that allows one group to gather many objects under one rubric—my approach to the concept of terrorism proposes to use family resemblance only during the examination of the indicator/data level dimensions. Yet, I propose to use necessary and sufficient conditions for the secondary-level dimensions.
In light of the structures proposed and the ontological or causal characteristic of the relationships among the dimensions, I can now revise the chart showing the levels and dimensions of the concept of terrorism (Figure 1.6.). As also shown in the figure, the relationship between the basic and the secondary-level dimensions is both ontological and non-causal, and the relationships between the secondary and the indicator/data-level dimensions are ontological.

**Intension vs. Extension**

Variations in intension and extension of the concept of terrorism should also be discussed in conjunction with the usage of necessary and sufficient conditions and family resemblance structures to clarify the development of a multi-dimensional concept of terrorism. Intension “consists of the ensemble characteristics and/or properties associated with, or included in, a given word, term or concept” (Sartori, 1984, p.24). On the other hand, “extension,” (or “denotation” as Sartori suggests), includes the cases that fall under a word, term or concept (Goertz, 2006). Quoting from Hospers (1967), Sartori (1984) states that “[t]he entire denotation of a word is the complete list of all the things to which the word applies” (p.24).

As discussed earlier, the relationship between the term terrorism and its meanings suffers from ambiguity, and the remedy could be disambiguation through declarative definitions. In developing a declarative definition of terrorism the actual use of necessary and sufficient conditions structure for the secondary-level dimensions seems to reduce the extension of the concept because the general rule for that philosophical structure is that the extension of a concept is reduced as its intension increases (Figure 1.7.).
Figure 1.6 Levels and Dimensions of the Concept of Terrorism with Types of Relationships
Although that is true, it does not constitute a problem in the case of terrorism since the ambiguity in the concept does not stem from the secondary level, but from the indicator/data level dimensions. The debates over the concept due to ambiguity do not allege, for example, that the concept should not have a target or an actor, but rather that it should have some more specific ones.

In contrast to necessary and sufficient conditions, the family resemblance structure requires that both the extension and intension of a concept increase at the same time (see Figure 1.7.). The use of family resemblance fits well the indicator/data level dimensions of terrorism since this dimension is the focus of debates, and serves the argument that is in the favor of a more encompassing declarative definition.

![Intension-extension relationship according to philosophical structure](image)

**Figure 1.7** Intension-extension relationship according to philosophical structure

**Summary**

This dissertation research does not intend to define terrorism, although it might contribute to the definitional efforts. As stated earlier, the focus of this dissertation is on
the fact that the concept of terrorism has always been and will always be subject to interpretation by governments, nations, professional groups, individuals, etc. As will be discussed in the literature review section, many factors (such as religious, cultural and national affiliation; national and individual interests) play a great role in shaping people’s and the mentioned entities’ perceptions about the concept. In order to explore how such factors influence people’s understanding of the terrorism, which is the main focus of this dissertation, a working definition of terrorism that is inclusive enough is required.

Using theoretical frameworks of “Concept Formation” borrowed from the discipline of philosophy this chapter discusses various inputs that complicate the meaning of concepts (including terrorism). Such a discussion leads to the development of a multi-level, multi-dimensional blueprint of definitions for the concept terrorism. Using Sartori’s Elemental Scheme of meaning I identify the issue of ambiguity as one of the contributing factors to the confusion in the meaning of terrorism. Ambiguity can be cured by declarative statements. Establishing declarative definitions requires exploring and then using components of the term to be defined. For that purpose I utilized the practical method of examining concepts, proposed by Goertz (2006). The author’s method is practical (as opposed to philosophical), and also helps establishing declarative definitions through clarification of relationships among components (dimensions) of concepts. Since the purpose of this dissertation study is not to establish a declarative definition of terrorism, the application of Goertz’s method will be used in a working definition of the concept for demonstration purposes.
Using Goertz’s (2006) classification of the basic, secondary and indicator/data level dimensions of concepts I operationalize the various components possible in the meaning of terrorism at such levels. To further expand the working definition I use to create further multidimensional conceptual meaning by allowing for combinations of meanings both at the secondary and at the basic level dimensions of meaning by using Goertz’s (2006) criteria of necessary sufficient conditions (leading to AND) and family resemblance (leading to OR).

Although the efforts to provide a blueprint of inclusive definition of terrorism so far serves for the development of a “concrete” definition of terrorism, all the levels and dimensions, that is not the intention and the definition is a research tool that enable me to focus on the core research problem. This study aims to examine whether different groups within and between countries vary in their conceptualization of terrorism.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Difficulty in Defining Terrorism

In Chapter I of this dissertation the researcher examined the difficulty in defining the term *terrorism* borrowing from the philosophical literature. In sum, it was argued that the definition of the concept of terrorism suffers from “ambiguity,” and the remedy was proposed as establishing “declarative definitions.” Despite such difficulties, the international community has been able this far to establish operational definitions, such as those in the *European Convention to Combat Terrorism* (1977) and the *UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism* (2001). However, it has been impossible to come up with a unanimously agreed upon declarative definition at the global level by states. Of course, this is due to international affairs where the majority of nation-states work by principles of realism that sway states to pursue their own national interests, instead of a common one. Put differently, at each player in international relations tries to capture its own “hare,” instead of cooperating and hunting “the stag.” That approach of states is also reinforced by the fact that *terrorism* is fundamentally and inherently political, and unavoidably about the pursuit, acquisition and use of power to achieve political change (Hoffman, 2006, p.3).
In terms of terrorism, the national interest manifests itself in different forms that are spread over a number of wide ranges including freedom-fighting/terrorism; state terrorism/national defense; and religious terrorism/misinterpretation of religious teachings. In this dissertation research on all of those interpretations is considered “political,” and unlike the discussion in Chapter I these are not based on “philosophical” concept formation, but on the political structuring of meaning. The balance of this section examines political reasons which prohibit states from adopting a common definition of terrorism. This discussion takes into account the debates over contrasting value judgments, such as the one referred to in the slogan “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”

In the general sense, terrorism is a phenomenon regarding both political and social life, and its definition as a crime cannot be separated from its political and social characteristics (Kastanidou, 2004, p.18). Therefore, each legal definition of terrorism as a crime should also reflect the opinion of the political and social culture to which it belongs. However, even adopting a “national” definition requires consensus among different segments of the respective population and the ability to be modified according to prevailing conditions of the times. Since temporal, spatial and institutional changes in the concept of terrorism will be examined elsewhere in this chapter, this particular section will only refer to the main obstacles for establishing a common definition regardless of intra-national differences.
An extensive literature review (e.g., Jenkins, 1992; Koufa, 2001; Houen, 2002; Combs, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Nacos, 2006; etc.) led to classifying the main obstacles for establishing a common definition under the following themes:

1. Terrorism is a politically and emotionally loaded subject, and is indiscriminately applied to all sorts of violence (Jenkins, 1992, p.13), which makes it difficult to establish a definition of the concept that encompasses only the intended actions.

2. Like most concepts, terrorism is also subject to perpetual transformation. It does not appear likely that a definition that responds to the requirements of the time can be just as effective in future times. A good example would be that the US needed to revise its existing definition of terrorism after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The USA PATRIOT Act of October 26, 2001 expanded the definition of terrorism by including domestic terrorism, and also increased the authorities of law enforcement in fighting terrorism (http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/highlights.htm).

3. There is not a consensus on the typology of terrorism (Combs, 2006, p.17). Building one to be used in this dissertation for research purposes required broad literature review and benefiting from several sources. National lawmakers may not want to include such controversial types of terrorism as state and state-sponsored terrorism. In that case, there will naturally be inconsistency among definitions, since their “intensions,” and therefore “referents,” will be different (Sartori, 1984; Goertz, 2006) (see Chapter I for those terms).
4. The concept of terrorism is usually subject to political evaluations. Even if there is a certain typology, interest holders may not accept a certain act as terrorism. For example, a state might have accepted “state terrorism” in its terrorism typology; however, it may not want to be referred to as terrorist when it applies force against separatist movements in its country. On the other hand, for some other states that use the same typology that particular state’s actions may constitute state terrorism.

5. Terrorist acts can be perpetrated covertly as well as overtly. In case of an accusation, the perpetrator may simply deny its involvement, such as in state-sponsored terrorism. Therefore, labeling an actor as terrorist may not go beyond an accusation without foundation. It would be difficult to include also those covert operations in the definition of terrorism, and if included, proving the accusation would be difficult, if not impossible (Murphy, 1989, pp.113-114; Nacos, 2006; pp.86-87).

6. *Terrorism* is so much interrelated with “apparently” similar acts, such as freedom-fighting. While the accuser claims that a certain act constitutes terrorism, the accused may seek shelter under the label of freedom-fighting. For example, focusing on the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli invasion, a bloc of nations led by the Organization of the Islamic Conference insisted on the exclusion of national liberation movements and resistance to foreign occupation from the context of terrorism (Nacos, 2006, p.26). Providing objective criteria for discrimination would be unlikely.

7. “Terrorist” organizations often use such names as commandoes, revolutionary, army, brigade, etc., which makes it hard to distinguish them from revolutionary or liberation movements. For that reason, categorizing organizations by their names or
labels, and defining a group of them as terrorist organizations accordingly is impossible (Hoffman, 2006, p.23).

8. Similar to temporal changes in the meaning of terrorism, states’ attitudes are subject to change towards the same type of activities or the organization. For example, an entity’s freedom fighter for today may become the same entity’s terrorist tomorrow. Similarly, because of the ideological characteristic of the term, today’s terrorist can easily be labeled as peacemaker tomorrow depending on the variable political factors at work (Noor, 2002).

It can be inferred from the analysis of the temporal changes in the concept of terrorism that it is the powerful (dominant) states which determine what kind of activities will be labeled as terrorism. For example, while a nation-state that is dominant in world politics supports an organization in another country for such reasons as gaining independence, fighting against invaders and overthrowing the legitimate government, the moment the nation-state finds it in its interest it may easily label the same organization as terrorist, and wage a war against it. Falk (2003) explains this policy change in terms of US-Afghan mujahedeen relations. The author suggests that the US supported the mujahedeen while they were violently opposing the Soviet intervention in the later stages of the Cold War, and labeled them “freedom fighters.” However, today they are addressed as terrorist by the US government.

9. The nature of the acts that are/can be considered terrorism is also changing, like the introduction of the term “gray area phenomenon,” which refers to threats against the stability of nation-states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and
organizations (Manwaring, 1993; Hoffman, 2006, p.18). Any definition of terrorism must foresee such developments or immediately adapt itself against them, which seems to be rather difficult.

10. It is possible that the opinion of strong states in an international organization is assertive over the weaker members of the organization. In such cases, even if a definition of terrorism is introduced as a common one among the members of the organization, it lacks grounds for common interpretation. Weaker states in the organization may not find the definition in accordance with their national interests, and therefore may interpret it differently. As argued by Moulaye el-Hassen, the Mauritanian Ambassador, about the UN Secretary General’s efforts to condemn terrorism after killings of 11 Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics, the UN was endorsing the power of the strong over the weak and of the established entity over its non-established challenger (Hoffman, 2006, p.24).

11. Most definitions of terrorism concentrate on behavioral description, and do not spell out who can use terrorism, and that causes moral judgment (Koufa, 2001, p.10). Similarly, although Jenkins (1992, p.14) states that the concept can be defined objectively in terms of the quality of the act, he admits that defining terrorism in this way is itself a value judgment.

12. The majority of the contemporary attempts at defining terrorism have focused on those against whom violence is practiced, and includes “innocents” and “noncombatants” as the target (Tuman, 2003). A state suffering from separatist movements in its country and trying to suppress them with its military is not likely to
agree with a definition that excludes “combatants” as target. In that case, the struggling state may put itself at risk of being labeled as state terrorist, since an organ of the state (police or military) conduct violence against people of the same state (separatists) in order to protect the regime or eliminate challenges (Koufa, 2001, p.12).

13. To have an agreed-upon international definition of terrorism, it is logically expected that individual governments have solved their definitional problems in their countries. Yet, the problem has not even been solved in individual countries: either they have a problem with managing their terminology or applying their own definitions in consistent ways (Houen, 2002, p.8). An example would be that the definition of terrorism in the United States has been modified, although indirectly, by seven amendments made in the Counter-Terrorism Act after the act was ratified in 1991. Similarly, there is no unified definition among different US departments and agencies, but each one of them has adopted its own (Hoffman, 2006, p.30).

14. In most cases the line between freedom-fighting and terrorist acts perpetrated by the same organization is blurry. For example, even if Chechens could be considered freedom fighters, the Beslan school hostage crisis in 2004 that affected innocent civilians cannot be compatible with the concept of freedom fighting.

15. Since defining terrorism nationally and/or accepting an international definition of terrorism brings additional obligations to nation-states, they may prefer to set themselves aside from definition efforts and international definitions.
Changes in the Meaning of Terrorism

The concept of terrorism was first used after the French Revolution of 1789, but it has been exposed to many transformations and interpretations since then. Similarly, in any given time the concept may be loaded with different meanings in different parts of the world. Those two kinds of changes in the meaning of terrorism will be examined below under the topics “Temporal Changes” and “Spatial Changes.” The third topic, Institutional Changes, about variations among understandings of terrorism will follow, where the researcher will discuss the reasons for the differences among official definitions of terrorism in a certain state.

Temporal Changes

Although terrorism as a concept was first used during the French Revolution of 1789, and therefore is relatively new, the phenomenon to which it refers is not (Wardlaw, 1982, p.18). Nevertheless, the usage of the term has been exposed to many changes over time (Nacos, 2006, p.20). If we exclude the first usage of the term terrorism during the Reign of Terror, the term and its understanding have always carried a negative connotation. Since there have also been some other terms with negative connotations and associated with violence, what distinguishes terrorism from those other terms, such as ordinary crime, war, guerilla warfare or political offense, should be clarified at the outset. I will discuss the differences and similarities of terrorism with those and other concepts in another section of this chapter (Comparing Terrorism with Interchangeably Used Concepts); however, before starting the discussion of the temporal development of terrorism, it is worth making a reference to the "bifocal character" of terrorism for
clarification at this juncture.

Khatchadourian (1998, p.6) explains the bifocal character of terrorism by making a distinction between the “immediate victims” and the “victimized” of acts of terrorism. For the author, "the immediate victims" of terrorism are individuals who are the immediate targets of terrorist acts, while "the victimized" refers to those who are the indirect but real targets. The bifocal character of terrorism distinguishes it from all monofocal acts of violence, such as murder, sabotage, kidnapping, hostage-taking, uprisings, rebellions, revolutions, coups d’etat, civil wars, wars and any other acts that may qualify as instances of freedom fighting. In the case of terrorism the immediate acts of violence, such as shootings, bombings, kidnappings and hostage-takings, are intended as means to certain ends. Although there is no consensus on a common definition of terrorism, there is no disagreement of this characteristic within the international community. This being the fact, Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu's (5th century B.C.) statement, "Kill one, terrify ten thousand" could obviously be accepted as a reference to the phenomenon that we today call terrorism.

Terrorism has stemmed either from the rulers or from the ruled, resulting in the dichotomy of “terrorism from above” and “terrorism from below” (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2005). Those sources have replaced one another throughout history. While the concept of terrorism described violent actions by those in control of a state (terrorism from above) in the aftermath of the French Revolution, the meaning of terrorism expanded to include violence by people against those in control of a state or government (terrorism from below) in the next century (Laqueur, 2002).
In this section I will use the bifocal character of terrorism to explore the concept historically. This permits me to refrain from the burdensome discussion of “state terrorism” and states’ activities that should be evaluated within the context of self-defense.

Taking the bifocal character of terrorism into account, and although its systematic manifestations had yet to emerge until the French Revolution, there were some activities that may qualify as terrorist even before the revolution. Between 66 and 70 A.D. the Sicarii, an extreme Jewish Zealot sect, provoked a revolt against Rome, especially by attacking crowds gathering on religious holidays (Weinzierl, 2004; Ford, 1985). Between the 11th and 13th centuries, a religious sect active in the competition over succession to the Caliphate of the Islamic Empire, better known as the Assassins, a radical Shiite Ismaili sect of Muslims, developed a specific religious doctrine justifying the murder of their religious and political opponents, the Seljuqs (Weinberg and Davis, 1989). The group was not involved in the Palestinian problem, but more in religious succession of Muslims (Wardlaw, 1982).

After the French revolution of 1789, the Committee of Public Safety under the control of Maximilien Robespierre, and the Jacobins adopted the Reign of Terror between 1793 and 1794. Referring to this period the 1798 supplement of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (Dictionary of the French Academy) defines terrorism as “système, régime de la terreur” (system, regime of terror) (Wardlaw, 1982, p.18). Although terrorism was adopted as a means to establish order in the anarchical period after the revolution (Hoffman, 2006, p.3), it also referred to violent actions committed by
people in control of the state, and it meant the mass guillotining of the aristocracy and other real or perceived enemies of the state (Nacos, 2006, p.20). Therefore, terrorism as a term begins to be used with the form of “terrorism from above.” The Reign of Terror was the first in history to attempt the elevation of primitive passion into a political philosophy, and to create an organization that tried to systematize murder and other lawlessness into a set of rules (Parry, 1976, p.39).

The terms terrorism and terrorists were first used in the English language in 1795 according to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) in response to the Reign of Terror in post-revolutionary France. The OED quotes British Statesman Edmund Burke’s comment of unleashing of “hell-hounds called terrorists” on people to refer to the Jacobin violence during the French Revolution (Guelke, 1998, p.3).

The Reign of Terror ended with the "Thermidorian Reaction" conducted against Robespierre and several leading members of the Committee of Public Safety on July 27, 1794 (9 Thermidor Year II according to the French Revolutionary Calendar). This action is also the turning point in the meaning of terrorism from positive to negative. Although the Jacobins had used the term in a positive sense, after the Thermidorian Reaction terrorism became a term of abuse with criminal implications, and every imaginable form of violence (Wardlaw, 1982, p.18).

With the experience of the French Revolution Europe started to question the authority of their rulers coming from centuries-old dynasties. With the spreading ideology of nationalism, statehood and citizenship became the common identity of a people, more central than a royal family, which resulted in the unification and creation of
new nation-states (Hoffman, 2006, p.4). Those and other factors, such as the Industrial Revolution, creation of new ideologies (e.g., communism and Marxism), and the exploitative conditions of nineteenth-century capitalism contributed to the new era of terrorism with revolutionary and antistate connotations. In this and the next century terrorism was predominantly originated from the left or by anarchists, social revolutionaries and national separatists (Laqueur, 2003, p.450). This was a shift from “terrorism from above” to “terrorism from below,” and governments took the advantage of this shift by successfully rejecting the terrorist label for their government’s or friendly countries’ violent actions (Nacos, 2006).

In 19th century Ireland, this new understanding was translated into agrarian violence against landlords and their agents (Guelke, 1998, p.3), and nationalist and separatist movements against the British rule (Hoffman, 2006, p.8). By the end of the century, terrorism was predominantly linked to antistate and antigovernment violence mostly because of bombings and assassinations by anarchists (Nacos, 2006, p.20).

The most important terrorist movement in the late 1800s was that of Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will or People’s Freedom), a small group of Russian constitutionalists founded to challenge the Tsarist rule. The organization tried to attract attention by attacking targets of symbolic value, such as the dynastic heads and subservient agents of the regime (Hoffman, 2006, p.6), or “political assassination,” according to Guelke (1998).

Narodnaya Volya developed a terrorism policy and initiated a terrorist campaign against Tsarist authorities (Wardlaw, 1982, p.19). Guelke (1998, p.3) explains this new policy not only as terrorism, but as a link between anarchism and terrorism. The
organization used methods of anarchists, but at the same time channeled masses towards an end. Wardlaw (1982), similarly, sheds light on the issue by stating that anarchist terror was characteristically an individual activity whereas Narodnaya Volya’s terrorism was a directed campaign. The organization continued its activities until 1881, the year when its members assassinated Tsar Alexander II, and then were suppressed.

Besides Russia and Ireland, some ethnic groups also applied terrorist tactics in the retreating Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century. The Armenian nationalist movement pursued a terrorist strategy in eastern Turkey to fight against the Ottoman regime and its security forces, while at the same time attracting international attention, sympathy, and support (Hoffman, 2006, p.11). In the Balkans, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) struggling against Ottoman rule in the region overlapping present day Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia waged guerilla warfare and sometimes terrorist tactics, such as bombings, kidnapping, as well as murder of civilians and officials (Combs, 2006, p.27).

In the early 1900s, there were many places where terrorism was largely employed. For this period, Wardlaw (1982, p.19) differentiates between terrorist groups and anarchists that employ terrorism. For him, groups in Ireland, Macedonia, Serbia, and Armenia were “terrorists,” while those in other countries, like France, Italy and Spain, were “anarchists using terrorism.”

In the years before World War I the Balkan states were engaged in revolutionary violence. Brigands, or *comitatus* (committee men) as they called themselves, were covertly sponsored by Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, and terrorized the countryside,
including their own fellow citizens, burning, murdering, and robbing all who stood in their way (Combs, 2006, p.27). This violence is important in terms of the birth of “state-sponsored terrorism,” and the trend continued in the Balkans until the outbreak of the First World War. Gavrilo Princip, who assassinated the Hapsburg archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Bosnia on June 28, 1914 and triggered the outbreak of WW1, was a member of Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnians) fighting against the Hapsburg suzerainty (Hoffman, 2006, p.11). The Serbian government and several Serbian nationalist groups, such as the pan-Serbian secret society and the Narodna Obrana (the People’s Defense) sponsored Mlada Bosna, the Black Hand and other terrorist organizations (Hoffman, 2006, pp.13-14; Combs, 2006, p.27).

Hoffman (2006, p.14) focuses attention on the developing concept of “state-sponsored terrorism” showing the obscure links between government officials/military commanders and transnational terrorist movements. The author also supports this argument by governments and/or their agents’ providing training, arms, intelligence and sanctuary for terrorist organizations.

In the 1930s the term terrorism was applied to the wave of assassinations, which culminated in the Marseilles assassinations in 1934, where the King of Yugoslavia and the French foreign minister were killed by Croatian separatists. Because of the international dimension of the event, an international reaction was prompted by the League of Nations, which resulted in the adoption in 1937 of two international conventions regarding prevention and punishment of terrorism and the setting up of an
international criminal court. However, the implementation of the conventions was blocked by the outbreak of World War II (Guelke, 1998, p.3).

During the interwar years, with the help of the rightist and frequently fascist ideologies (Laqueur, 2003, p.450), abuse of power by the state regained its former connotations, the main examples being Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia (Hoffman, 2006, p.14). In Germany and Italy the accession to office of Hitler and Mussolini depended on “mobilization and deployment of gangs to harass and intimidate political opponents and root out other scapegoats for public vilification and further victimization” (Hoffman, 2006, p.14), whereas Stalin’s policy of “The Great Terror” or “The Great Purges” between 1934 and 1939 depended on suppression of political opponents through the organs of the state, during which millions of people were executed, exiled or imprisoned in Russia (Litvin, 2001; Read, 2003).

During WWII or its immediate aftermath there was a great deal of guerrilla warfare; however, little or no terrorism erupted (Laqueur, 2003, p. 451). Then, in the late 1940s and the 1950s, terrorism diverted its course towards revolutionary terrorism to be associated with colonial conflicts (e.g., as in Algeria). However, those groups were not called terrorists because of the discussions about whether it was appropriate to call those fighting against security forces as terrorists, or whether the terms should be applied only to violence directed against non-combatants (Guelke, 1998, p.4). Appealing to the sympathy in the international community for self-determination and national liberation, Hoffman (2006, p.16) adds the discussions about the dilemma between freedom fighting and terrorism. The author states that it was that sympathy and support for the rebels...
which created a need for less judgmental and more politically neutral language other than *terrorist* and *terrorism*.

Although it can be viewed in the revolutionary context, during the late 1960s and 1970s the usage of terrorism expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups outside a colonial or neocolonial framework, as well as radical, entirely ideologically motivated organizations, disenfranchised or exiled nationalist minorities—such as the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), the Quebecois separatist group FLQ (Front de Liberation du Québec), the Basque ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or Freedom for the Basque Homeland) (Taylor, 2002; Hoffman, 2006, p.16). Laqueur (2003) explains the ideologies of those nationalist organizations with Marxism-Leninism; however, this effect was not long-lasting.

In this period not only nationalist groups, but also groups struggling against *injustice*, so-called *left-wing terrorists*, adopted terrorism, especially in Europe and Latin America (Laqueur, 2003, p. 451). Similarly, in the United States some leftist terrorist groups opposing American intervention in Vietnam started to form (Hoffman, 2006, p.17). Black Panthers was another organization that functioned in the United States in the same time period. Founded in 1966, the organization adopted a doctrine calling for armed resistance to societal oppression for African Americans. However, being influenced by the ideas of people such as Karl Marx, Lenin and Mao, it tended to get organized as a revolutionary cadre organization, and struggled to achieve a socialist revolution until its disintegration in the 1970s (Clemons and Jones, 2001).
Discussions about left-wing terrorism was not limited to this period, but throughout the whole Cold War era, where government officials, terrorism experts, and the news media in the West, especially in the United States, denounced left-wing groups and movements inside and outside the United States as terrorists (Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989).

In the early and middle 1980s attention was directed again to state-sponsored terrorism due to suicide bombings aimed mostly against American diplomatic and military targets in the Middle East (Hoffman, 2006, p.17). Crenshaw (1995, p.10), on the other hand, attributes the rise of state-sponsored terrorism in the 1980s to attempts to explain Iran’s behavior after the Islamic revolution.

In the 1990s, some examples of revolutionary terrorism were observed, such as those in Bosnia (Combs, 2006, p.28) and in Rwanda. Both examples comply with the from below-from above dichotomy; however, there was another term the related terminology gained in that period: the gray-area phenomenon. The phenomenon refers to threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations (Hoffman, 2006, p.18), which may or may not be supported by other non-state entities or nation-states (Manwaring, 1993). Hoffman’s (2006) comment on the developments regarding terrorism is that “[t]errorism had shifted its meaning again from an individual phenomenon of subnational violence to one of several elements, or part of a wider pattern, of nonstate conflict” (p.18). The significance of such a shift was proved especially with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States, and the following actions undertaken by the US government.
Another perspective that was brought to the field of terrorism after the September 11 attacks was that the counter-action initiated by the US government was not only against Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization that was responsible for the attacks. As stated by President Bush, the US government’s “war on terror” would begin with Al Qaeda, but it would not end there (Hoffman, 2006). In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the US government started its armed struggle against Afghanistan where Al Qaeda was based. It continued with active military involvement in Iraq, and by threats on states that are allegedly involved in terrorism. In the meantime, the powers of law enforcement authorities and the military were expanded to respond to the crisis and to improve national security, which led to limiting civil liberties to a certain extent (Brady, 2004).

As can be seen in the examination of the changes throughout history the concept of terrorism has been loaded with many different meanings. Therefore, we can easily deduce that the meaning of the concept may change, and any regulation in the field of terrorism may need revision in the future. Also the effectiveness of regulations should be evaluated within the time frame for which they were made.

Spatial Changes

The previous section, where temporal changes in the meaning of terrorism were discussed could be said to reveal an important fact: the stronger party of international relations defines terrorism. For example, in the 19th century Ireland, landlords considered agrarian movements as terrorism, while the ruling authority assigned the same label to nationalist/separatist movements. In the same century the Tsarist authority considered Narodnaya Volya a terrorist organization. In the late 19th century and before WW1, the
superior forces of the time proclaimed Armenians, IMRO, Mlada Bosna, Black Hand, Croatian separatists as terrorists in terms of the tactics they employed. After WW1 it was the allied forces who labeled Nazism and Fascism as terrorist. Similarly, Stalin’s “Great Terror” is actually the title of a book by British writer Robert Conquest, published in 1968. The trend is still going on today.

In light of the analysis of the temporal changes, the researcher considers that the most significant change in the super powers’ attitude emerged between the revolutionary movements of 1940-1950s and 1960-1970s. In 1940s-’50s revolutionary movements against colonial forces were not called “terrorism,” because the colonizers were the superior powers which wanted to prevent sympathy and support for the revolutionary movements sought from other countries. In the 1960s-’70s revolutionary PLO, ETA and PLQ were all fighting against the superior powers of the time: Israel, Spain and Canada, respectively. In terms of struggling for independency, there is not much difference between those and the anti-colonization movements of the 1940s and 1950s; however, the superior powers preferred not to address those fighting parties as “freedom fighters,” which may attract the positive and supportive attitude of the international community.

The last issue also highlights the problem of differences in interpretation of the concept of terrorism on a regional basis, and the parties of the debates are the Western vs. non-Western states. As Hoffman (2006) argues, the difference between the West and non-West in the United Nations was most clearly demonstrated in the aftermath of the killing of 11 Israeli athletes by Palestinian gunmen during the 1972 Munich Olympics. Many countries supported Kurt Waldheim, the UN secretary general, who addressed the
event as terroristic, and encouraged the United Nations to condemn terrorist violence. On the other hand, some African and Asian countries evaluated the issue within the context of freedom fighting (Hoffman, 2006). Their argument was that, as Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, stated, “people who struggle to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, including force.”

There are two underlying causes for the third-world countries to justify their objection against the Western initiative. First, they claimed that all liberation movements are invariably decried as terrorism. Second, they argued that the main focus should be directed from the violence to its underlying causes, such as misery, frustration, grievance and despair (Hoffman, 2006). As long as states continue to pursue their own national interests by overlooking others’ the trend of interpreting acts in terms of terrorism is likely to continue. One of the purposes of this dissertation is to propose a method to reveal those spatial differences and to establish an environment for cooperation among states.

**Institutional Changes**

Just as the concept of terrorism has varied throughout history, and spatially, it is also subject to different interpretations by various agencies and departments of the state. This section explores the differences in interpreting terrorism among agencies.

It is a fact that, regardless of the type of the government, centralized or decentralized, there are several institutions dealing with the issue of fighting terrorism in any state. It is expected that each of those institutions has its own jurisdiction in fighting
terrorism. However, when the state in question is a centralized one, such as Turkey, there is only one national definition of terrorism, as opposed to a decentralized government structure (e.g., the United States) where the government’s related departments and agencies have the autonomy to adopt their own definitions next to the national one.

In this section the terrorism definitions of Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States are examined. While this section is about institutional differences in definitions of terrorism, the researcher considered it useful to include two government definitions (Turkey and the UK) in the analysis, so that limited boundaries of the institutional definitions compared to national ones could be better illustrated. Among the three countries of focus in this section Turkey is ruled by a centralized government with agencies having no authority to adopt their own definitions. The United Kingdom consists of four constituent countries (the UK, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales) with their own parliaments. However, the parliaments of the latter three constituent countries are dependent on powers granted by the UK parliament. Since terrorism and national security are not among those delegated matters and are the sole responsibility of the UK government, the individual constituent states are not able to hold different definitions of terrorism, so as a result different government departments and agencies use the one definition. On the other hand, the United States has a decentralized government structure. The federal government has the authority to pass laws for the whole country, while agencies and departments are autonomous enough to adopt their own regulations. So for example, the Turkish definition of terrorism, as stated in the Turkish Counter-Terrorism Act (1991) reads:
Terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, fear, intimidation, oppression or threat.

Although there is a great emphasis on actions against the state in that definition, illegal movements against fundamental rights and freedoms and public order and health are also referred to as terrorism.

The United Kingdom the Terrorism Act of 2000 defined the concept of terrorism very broadly. The full text of the definition—which is not reproduced here due to its length—does not stipulate that an act should have a bifocal characteristic to be considered terrorism. The targets of terrorist acts are shown to be both people and property. In addition, involvement of firearms or explosives automatically qualifies the act as terrorism.

Both of those national definitions are aimed to encompass as many actions of terrorism as possible. Neither of them distinguishes actions in terms of their sources (foreign or domestic) or targets (civilian, combatant or noncombatant) or the magnitude of the attack.

While it is reasonable for a centralized national definition of terrorism to be more general and more inclusive, it is essential to understand the reasons underlying differences in institutional definitions. One observes that departments or agencies may have different definitions of terrorism even if they function within the same state. This
issue may be seen as a spillover of the international definition problem to domestic policies (Hoffman, 2006). However, from another perspective those institutional definitions (such as those by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Defense, etc.) may be considered as reflecting the positions of their respective institutions (Whittaker, 2003, p.4).

To support Whittaker’s understanding of the reasons underlying differences in institutional definitions I present four definitions and show how such variations reflect the differing foci of the institutions. Those examples include definitions of the US State Department, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the US Department of Defense.

Example 1: The US State Department definition:

Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

Example 2: The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) definition:

The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

Example 3: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) definition:

Any activity that involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive to critical infrastructure or key resources; and is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States; and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.
Example 4: The US Department of Defense definition:

The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives.

The above definitions show that the US Department of State’s definition accepts attacks against noncombatant targets as terrorism, so that the definition encompasses assassinations of military attaches and military forces on peacekeeping missions, as well as military personnel who are not actively fighting at the time of the attack (Hoffman, 2006, p.31). Also the FBI’s definition states that both persons and property could be the targets of terrorist acts. Other than that, the definition may include a wide range of activities as long as they have a bifocal character, and are conducted with political or social objectives. The inclusiveness of the FBI’s definition corresponds with the agency’s responsibility to protect and defend the country against domestic and foreign threats. Additionally the Department of Homeland Security was established after the September 11, 2001 terrorist events, and its terrorism definition also reflects the reason for its establishment: mass destruction. That phrase distinguishes the Department’s responsibilities from those of other agencies (Hoffman, 2006, p.33). The other expressions in the definitions are the general characteristics of terrorist acts that can be found in any other definition. My comment on this definition is that it allows “states” along with civilians and subnational groups to be considered “terrorist.” Finally the Department of Defense’s definition—the most encompassing one of the four institutional definitions—does not exclude any actors (state or civilian) or targets (civilian, combatant or noncombatant) of terrorist acts. Considering the more limited mission of the DHS,
which is protecting the territory of the United States from terrorist attacks, it is reasonable for the definition of the Defense Department to be so inclusive.

As a result, it can be said that the differences among the definitions of the state institutions (in the US) does not stem from their different understandings of the concept of terrorism, but rather from the differences in their respective responsibilities in fighting terrorism.

Components of Terrorism

Similar to discussions on defining terrorism, the components of terrorism is not a settled issue. The information presented below consists of major components of terrorism in the related literature, and discussions around each component.

1- (Political) Motives:

The political element inherent in the term terrorism is essential to define and to distinguish the concept from ordinary crime or violence. In ordinary crimes perpetrators act for personal gain and satisfaction, material or otherwise; however, terrorism is a political concept (Nacos, 2006, p.23; Cronin, 2004, p.3) that denotes the commission of violent acts to make political changes (Cronin, 2004, p.4). Focusing on this characteristic, Moghaddam (2006) defines terrorism as the “pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change” (p.4).

Nacos (2006, p.23) states that there is no disagreement on the political characteristic of terrorism, despite the source of perpetrators’ motivations (secular or religious); however, the lines between ordinary crimes and political motivations are sometimes unclear. Combs (2006, p.15) explains the lack of clarity between crime and
terrorism as an outcome of the ambiguity of the political element itself. She argues that the ambiguous political element generally adds considerable confusion both to legal and political realms. She likens the political element to a “two-edged sword” that provides loopholes in the law, which are continuously abused by perpetrators of the most evil acts.

In terms of categorizing an act as terrorism, there is no limit to the types of acts. As long as the political purpose is provided, acts, such as those seeking payment of ransom, release of prisoners or publication of a terrorist message, causing widespread disorder, demoralizing society, breaking down the social order, the kidnapping of a foreign diplomat for example, or random violence against civilians designed to embarrass a government might be considered acts of terrorism (Jenkins, 2003, p.79).

As a result, it can be said that being politically motivated is a sine qua non characteristic of terrorism. However, it is not enough for an act to be considered terrorism since the existence of some other characteristics is also necessary. There may be other kinds of acts, such as freedom fighting and guerilla warfare, which have political character, but due to other characteristics of those acts they are not addressed as terrorism. In sum, every terrorist act has a political character; however, not every politically motivated act is terrorism.

2- Bifocal Character:

Technically speaking, the bifocal character is one of the major differences, which helps distinguish terrorism from other types of violence. In that respect, terrorism is violence directed at a wider audience than the immediate victim of the violence (Wilkinson, 1992, p.156). In other words, terrorist acts apply violence terrorizing the
immediate victims, while coercing individuals, groups, governments or countries connected with the immediate victims to do or to abstain from doing certain acts (Primoratz, 1991; Khatchadourian, 1998, p.3).

This characteristic of terrorism dominates in whatever the goal of a particular terrorist act is. Khatchadourian (1998, p.4) classifies those goals as immediate, intermediate and long-range (ultimate). While “retaliation” is an example of immediate goals, “publicity” is an example of the intermediate goals, and “regaining of a lost homeland” or “acquisition or exercise of power” are examples of long range (ultimate) terrorist goals. In all of these examples perpetrators try to inflict fear on both immediate victims of the acts and the wider audience.

3- Targets:

Every terrorist act has a target or targets. However, due to the bifocal character of terrorism the direct target of terrorist acts is different from the target of the message that the perpetrating terrorist organization aims to convey. While governments and different segments of the civilian populations constitute the indirect target, there is disagreement on what or who in reality the direct targets are.

Generally speaking, the direct target, whether persons or objects, has some symbolic value. As in the example of victimization by a suicide bombing in a market place, people killed or maimed may be considered “victims of opportunity” or those “who were at the wrong place at the wrong time.” Nevertheless in terrorist acts civilians are involved both intentionally and randomly. In contrast, in wars and other military conflict the targets of the warring sides are limited to the members of the armed forces
and when there are civilian casualties they are side-effects of such conflicts (Lackey, 1989; Wilkinson, 1992, p.156; Nacos, 2006, p.23). Although the target civilians are referred to as innocent bystanders or by other terms including the ones mentioned earlier, it does not always have to be so. In some instances terrorists direct their attacks intentionally against citizens of one or more countries or members of particular religions, racial or ethnic groups (Nacos, 2006, p.23). Especially in the past few decades, we have observed an increase in the victimization of many people by terrorists just for being citizens of certain states to which the perpetrators would like to send their messages.

In some circumstances, terrorists perform their attacks against a person, an object or a symbol that they consider guilty with the intent to punish them. Among this type of targets are people who have betrayed the terrorist organization or cooperated with a guilty party; a successful businessman whose business or lifestyle represents a system despised by the terrorists; or an object or a building that has a symbolic value assigned by the hostile government, institution or system (Jenkins, 2003, p.80).

Although I have so far used the term “civilians” to refer to the direct human targets of terrorist acts, terrorism specialists (e.g., Lackey, 1989; Primoratz, 1991; Khatchadourian, 2003) are not in agreement on whether an act constitutes terrorism if the military is the target (individuals or symbols or buildings). Such a debate in the literature has led to distinguishing between “non-combatant” and “combatant” targets. For example, the US Department of State’s definition of terrorism uses “noncombatants” while referring to the targets of terrorist acts and explains the term as “civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty.” Nacos (2006, p.24)
adds to the argument of identifying “non-combatant” targets as “government officials who are not engaged in combat.” On the other hand, the US Department of Justice definition of terrorism includes “noncombatants” as the target without any further elaboration. While the FBI’s and the Council of the European Union’s Framework Decision (13 June 2002) definitions include “persons” as a generic category referring to “non-combatants.” Finally, the US Department of Defense and the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act make no reference to the target element of a terrorist act in their definitions of terrorism.

Nacos (2006, p.24) explains the debate over the problem of defining and categorizing targets by way of giving an example of three incidents: the 1979-1981 Iranian hostage crisis in which American embassy staff including the US Marines who were there to guard the embassy building were taken hostages; the attack on the USS Cole in the Yemeni port during a refueling stop in 2001 with military personnel on board; and the 1983 truck bombing of the barracks of the US Marines that were dispatched to Lebanon as peacekeepers and who were minimally armed. In none of those situations, Nacos points out, were the direct targets involved in any armed conflict with the perpetrators. Nacos (2006) states that if “civilian” is used to refer to the targets of terrorism the case examples presented above do not qualify as terrorist acts. However, the examples could be referred to as terrorist acts if the category “noncombatant” replaced “civilian” as target. Nevertheless, using “non-combatant” does not provide the ultimate solution. A counter-argument against the use of “non-combatant” explanation by perpetrator groups is that the non-fighting military personnel are members of a hostile
military; and therefore, the attacks are justifiable and the definition including the noncombatant target should be rejected (Nacos, 2006, p.24). Combs (2006, p.14) argues that part of the problem regarding military personnel involved in peacekeeping missions stems from the fact that the term peacekeeping does not appear in the United Nations Charter, which causes confusion as to what peacekeeping really is and the regulations to be applied. However, according to Combs (2006), in the world today there are many military activities that are termed peacekeeping, and that in theory at least have non-combat status. Nevertheless, the variance in the interpretation of terrorism according to target is the result of lack of or inadequate definitions in international agreements or agencies such the United Nations.

4- Perpetrators:

There are two different main discussions in the literature regarding perpetrators of terrorist acts: (1) whether terrorism must be conducted by organizations, and (2) whether terrorism can be conducted by governments (Rubenstein, 1987; Crenshaw, 1995; Nacos, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; etc.).

According to the definitions used by the US government agencies and departments there is no difference between acts perpetrated by an organization or a single person in terms of qualifying as terrorism. Similarly, the size of the group is not a factor taken into account for qualifying the act as terrorism. However, according to the Turkish government definition of a terrorist act the fact that it is conducted by two or more groups is a requirement for acts to qualify as terrorism.
In the academic literature on terrorism Crenshaw (1995), Rubenstein (1987) and Hoffman (2006) express their oppositions against the official US definitions noting that politically motivated violence by individuals should be excluded from the terrorism definition. Conversely, Nacos (2006, p.24) argues that the commission of the act by an individual or organization should not make a difference in identifying it as terrorism. Hoffman’s (2006) argument emphasizes the notion that terrorist acts are committed by organizations based on a chain of command and cell structure. The debate produced by Hoffman’s (2006) and others’ emphasis on the organizational nature of terrorism leads to questions regarding the terroristic nature of the acts perpetrated by single persons such the Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, Unabomber Ted Kaczynski or the “Shoe Bomber” Richard Reid who were not (to our knowledge) part of a chain of command or a cell structure.

A second debate in the literature regarding terrorism acts and perpetrators focuses on the role of government as a perpetrator. To some (e.g., Cronin, 2004, p.4) the non-state character of terrorism is a focal element in its definition although states provide terrorist organizations with military, political, economic, and other means of support, terrorism is defined by its non-state character. Cronin (2004) argues that the use of force by the state can be referred to in various other ways than terrorism, both nationally and internationally. However, Cronin (2004) prefers to limit her interpretation to the wordings of official definitions, and abstains from considering their further implications.

By comparing three definitions of terrorism by the FBI, the US Defense Department and the US Department of State, Nacos (2006, p.25) finds that none of those
definitions explicitly includes states or governments as perpetrators of terrorist acts. However, the terminology in the definition of the US Defense Department is broader and can implicitly permit the inclusion of governments as perpetrators (Nacos, 2006, p.25).

In their book, Herman and O’Sullivan (1989) explore the reasons for the exclusion of governments or states and their agents as possible perpetrators of terrorism. They note that the reason for such exclusion mainly stems from the ideological Cold War biases of Western governments, Western terrorism experts, and the Western media, which portray the West as the sole victim of terrorist activities. The authors also state that the approach followed allowed governments to suppress severely terrorist organizations, such as the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy.

It is clear that within the various definitions of terrorism the relationship between terrorism and perpetrator is far from settled leading to confusion and ambiguity.

5- Violence:

Although there is no ambiguity about the violent character of terrorist acts, what constitutes “violence” is a major debate in the literature. Issues including characteristics of violence, perception of violence, whether violence needs to be fully perpetrated, and whether the threat of violence should be sufficient to satisfy this component of terrorism are subject to numerous debates and confusion. For Combs (2006, p.11), the completion of violence is not a necessary condition, but the capacity and the willingness to commit a violent act must be present in order for action to be considered terrorism. To Combs (2006) the same applies to the problem of “threat” to use violence. She elaborates that
“violence” does not have to be lethal to human targets, but the disruption to human lives such violence represents is sufficient to qualify it as terrorism.

6- Victimization of Innocents:

Opinions regarding whether it is a requirement for terrorist acts to victimize innocent people vary. A discussion of such requirement of the concept terrorism is best examined through historical and cross-cultural perspectives.

Victimization of innocents is a related issue to the bifocal character of terrorism, which requires that terrorist acts be directed at a wider audience than the immediate victims of the perpetrated violence (Wilkinson, 1992, p.156). While the literature does not debate the inclusion of this characteristic within the conceptualization of terrorism the expression “the immediate victims of the violence” is debatable.

In the basic understanding of terrorism, “to be in the wrong place at the wrong time” (Combs, 2006, p12) is sufficient to qualify persons as victims of terrorism, since the message conveyed by the terrorist(s) does not intend to identify particular receivers, but is rather a general one sweeping whoever happens to be there at the time. However, over the years and across national experiences indiscriminate or selective violence has not been a deciding factor in defining the act as terrorism. For example in instances including “state terrorism,” nineteenth century anarchists, assassinations, and terrorist acts against military targets the issue of “victim of terrorism” becomes more complex than simply one of innocent bystanders.

Although recently terrorism acts have deliberately aimed at innocent victims, terrorist acts had been carried out in the form of antistate and antigovernment violence by
anarchists towards the end of the nineteenth century when the perpetrators were selective in the targets of their bombings and assassinations (Nacos, 2006, p.20). The same is also true for military targets of terrorist acts. If we assumed that terrorism can also be committed against military targets, either combatant or non-combatant, or both, then it is clear that the range of the targets of terrorist acts go beyond “innocent bystanders.”

Cronin (2004, p. 4) makes a distinction between terrorism and state uses of force, and does not consider a state’s killing of innocent people as terrorism. However, as in the example of random arrests during the Stalin administration in the former U.S.S.R., the action of the government had a bifocal character (arrested people as the immediate victims and the overall public as the targeted receiver of the government’s message of obedience). Therefore, from such a stand these acts may be considered as acts of terrorism. In this or other examples of state terrorism, indiscriminate or selective violence by the government does not make a difference for the act to be considered as terrorism.

Jenkins’s (2003, p.81) approach to the issue of “victims of terrorism” includes both types of targets of terrorism: indiscriminate and highly selective. He uses “pure terrorism” to describe those actions that appear to be directed at random against civilian bystanders, and depicts them as an effective means of attracting attention and of creating alarm. As opposed to the general understanding in the literature, Jenkins (2003) argues that very few acts of terrorism appear indiscriminate since terrorists want to appear selective. In this case, selective but unpredictable attacks may cause greater alarm within the selected group.
Although seemingly there are contradicting views about the issue of innocence of victims of terrorism, I would suggest that the discrepancy stems from different interpretations of “innocence.” For a particular act to qualify as terrorism there is no difference between targeting of a government official deemed guilty by a terrorist organization and killing of a passerby who haphazardly was at the scene of a terrorist bombing. Both of those actions are committed to convey a message to another target. Therefore, even if the perpetrators accuse a government official, for example, of being involved in acts against them and kill him for those actions, the reflections of the terrorist act are broader than the act itself.

7- Lack of Legitimacy:

Although there are some violent acts similar to those perpetuated within the context of terrorism, the lack of legitimacy basically distinguishes terrorist acts from others. Therefore, acts including violence applied in a team play, an assassination of a political figure by a lunatic perpetrator; or a legal political party’s legitimate attempts to affect a political change do not qualify as terrorism. Terrorism involves the deliberate disruption of norms and the violation of generally accepted standards of decency (Combs, 2006, p.16).

8- Inflicting Fear:

That terrorist acts have some other effects beyond those on the immediate victims is a characteristic of terrorism. Like the bifocal character of terrorism, which stipulates a particular act’s purpose to stretch beyond harming the actual victims, terrorist acts also inflict fear on a wider audience than those immediate victims. In fact, the Latin word
terrere, which is the root of the word “terrorism,” means “to frighten” (Moghadam, 2006, p.4). By systematically using violence to create extreme fear and manipulating this atmosphere of fear, terrorists try to reach their political ends (Wilkinson, 1992, p.156; Jenkins, 2003, p.79).

Referring to Raymond Aron, Wilkinson (1992, p.156) points out that one of the major characteristics that distinguishes terrorism from other acts of violence is the psychological effects it brings about. The key point, for the author, is the involvement of violence that is totally disproportionate to the numbers of people actually involved or its purely physical result. Since terrorist violence does not discriminate among people in selecting its target (e.g., anyone can be its target), therefore, the potential of terrorist violence causes everybody to feel unsafe.

Types of Terrorism

According to Meehan (1965, p.40), “Science is systematic and logical. At the very lowest level of generality, scientific explanation requires the systematic ordering and classification of empirical data,” and for that purpose we use typologies. Typologies help the categorization of certain units of study, and bring information together according to specific sets of characteristics (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, p.39). They are intended to show differences within a class of phenomena, which may have been obscured by crude grouping into one category (Johnson, 1978, p.274).

In spite of all the utility of typologies, developing a common typology of terrorism is problematic. The fact is that the word terrorism has been often used as a loose, blanket term for all sorts of violent acts against communities, governments or
countries by individuals or groups (Khatchadourian, 1998, p.93) this usage, to a large extent, has threatened the concept’s coherence (Guelke, 1995, p.2). The discrepancy among the situations to which terrorism is applied is the most startling aspect of the issue of definition, and the term cannot be treated as if it were a neutral, technical term for a particular category of violence (Guelke, 1995). As a result, the absence of a common definition of terrorism causes problems in typology building (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, p.39). Therefore, developing typologies of terrorism remains prone to interpretations and reflects particular concerns of the people involved in their construction. In the end, as Johnson (1978, p.276) states, we have come up with as many typologies of terrorism as there are analysts and it is clear that there is little agreement on the principles of constructing a typology and the assignment of a particular instance of terrorism to one category.

In an attempt to gather all major definitions and also typologies of terrorism, Smith and Jongman (2005) identify 10 common bases for classification. These are (1) actor-based, (2) victims-based, (3) cause-based, (4) environment-based, (5) means-based, (6) political orientation-based, (7) motivation-based, (8) demand-based, (9) purpose-based, and (10) target-based.

For the purposes of this dissertation I prefer to use “political orientation-based” typologies. Since the main question of my study is about the different meanings of terrorism as a concept including political interpretations, the political orientation-based typologies appear to be the most fitting within this study’s framework.
In addition, the coverage of the concept of terrorism as used in the dissertation should be large enough to include all possible actions that might be addressed as terrorism as long as they are politically motivated.

Although there is abundance of political orientation-based typologies, just as there are many terrorism typologies as stated above, I need one that includes as many different types as possible. Therefore, in parallel with the purposes of my dissertation I decided to use mainly the one offered by Schmid and de Graaf (1982). Since this typology did not respond to all my needs, I had to supplement it with other typologies by Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1976), Ganor (2006) and Koufa (2001). For the modified typology I will use in this dissertation which will lead me during the literature review and the collection of data, see Figure 2.1.

The compounded typology of terrorism makes a distinction among three main types of terrorism (political, criminal and idiosyncratic). Those are the types that will form the focus of the research. Although it is not implied by Schmid and de Graaf, the generators of the classification, it is obvious that an extensive understanding of the concept of terrorism had been used during the sorting. The reason behind this categorization is the desire to generalize the negative connotations of terrorism to other cases that involve acts of terrorism. For example, a criminal act, such as a bank robbery (done for individual material gain) or a violent act conducted for psychic gain could be labeled as terrorism to discredit those actions. On the other hand, an act of political terrorism can be considered a criminal act as long as it is defined in criminal codes. To
Figure 2.1 Typology of Terrorism

TERRORISM

Political Terrorism

- Insurgent (individual vs. state)
  1. Social revolutionary terrorism
  2. Separatist terrorism
  3. Single-issue terrorism

- Vigilante (individual vs. individual)
  1. Crime-control
  2. Social-group-control
  3. Regime-control

Criminal Terrorism

- State (state vs. individual)
  1. Regime (government)
  2. International State
  3. State-sponsored

Idiosyncratic Terrorism

1. Social revolutionary terrorism
2. Separatist terrorism
3. Single-issue terrorism
some extent it is correct to say that all of those acts constitute *terrorism* if they *terrorize* people.

An overlap among those terms is obvious; however, we still need to draw lines in order to distinguish those main types of terrorism. Schmid and de Graaf’s (1982) explanation to this classification is as follows: If an act is committed for personal material gain it is called criminal. If the act is committed for personal psychic satisfaction it is called idiosyncratic (pathological). If the act is committed for collective motives without direct personal material of psychic intensions it is called political terrorism.

Criminal terrorists use illegitimate means to achieve personal gains, and idiosyncratic terrorist acts are committed by emotionally disturbed people (Hacker, 1978, p.23). On the other hand, political terrorism is calculated, goal directed violence employed in pursuit of political objectives, such as affecting the views and behavior of specific groups (Shultz, 1978, p.8).

**Political Terrorism**

This dissertation focuses only on “political terrorism,” and refers to the two other categories only due to their heuristic explanatory values. The preference of the dissertation which gives the priority to political terrorism is derived from the literature and the debates in the international community. Similarly definitions of terrorism at the national level (such as that at the Turkish Counter-Terrorism Act) and at the agency level (such as those by different US departments and agencies) support this dissertation’s prioritizing of political terrorism since they reflect definitions of political terrorism.
Following the study of Schmid and de Graaf (1982) this dissertation distinguishes among three main types of political terrorism: (1) insurgent, (2) vigilante, and (3) state terrorism. This categorization is based on the relationship between the actors and the target of (political) terrorist acts. Insurgent and vigilante terrorism involve a non-state actor and state terrorism is perpetrated by a state apparatus, while in vigilante and stateterrorism the non-state is the target and in insurgent terrorism the state is the target. For the three types of political terrorism in further detail, see Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Categorization of Political Terrorism by the Actor and the Target.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Political Terrorism</th>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Terrorism</td>
<td>non-state</td>
<td>state</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vigilante Terrorism</td>
<td>non-state</td>
<td>non-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Terrorism</td>
<td>state</td>
<td>non-state</td>
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1. Insurgent Terrorism

Insurgent terrorism can be defined as violence perpetrated by those who seek to challenge or depose existing social or political structures (Lerner and Lerner, 2006, p.85). Many types of terrorism that may be identified as different from each other still fall under this general form (type). Schmid and de Graaf (1982) include the following three categories under insurgent terrorism:

a) Social revolutionary terrorism (left wing-right wing, religious)

A revolution is the complete overthrow of the established government by those who were previously subject to it (Khatchadourian, 1991), and social revolutionary terrorism can be characterized by violence aimed at taking state power and at
revolutionizing the whole society. To some extent, this sub-type of terrorism overlaps with what Hess (2003, p.341) terms “repressive terrorism.” Repressive terrorism, according to Hess (2003), stems from the struggle of non-privileged strata of a society against the dominating group to have rights that give them equal access in political and economic fields. Perhaps the most controversial type of terrorism in this category is religious terrorism, which has been a highly debated issue especially since September 11, 2001. Religious terrorism can be defined as “any act of violence or threatened use of violence by a group or individual with the intent of intimidating individuals, citizens or governments in the furtherance of religious objectives” (Perlmutter, 2004, p.2).

b) Separatist terrorism (secessionist, ethnic, national, irredentist)

Separatist terrorism can be described as violence calling for secession of an ethnic or national group from a state, or violence carried out by a group of people who support the return to a territory that belonged to the group but is now under foreign rule. The perpetrators are not concerned with the social order in other parts of the state other than the one to which they lay claim. Nationalist terrorist groups are those seeking political self-determination by struggles in the territory they seek to liberate or by being active both in their home area and abroad (Wilkinson, 1991, p.191).

c) Single-issue terrorism

It can briefly be described as ad hoc terrorism by one or a few individuals advocating coercively that the state grant some privilege to a group with which the terrorists sympathize (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982). Single-issue groups are narrowly
focused on one particular agenda point or a package of related issues (Nacos, 2006, p.74). The principle issues under this category are environmentalism, animal rights and abortion.

2. Vigilante Terrorism

In a general sense, vigilante terrorism refers to non-state groups’ use of illegal force on other non-state groups or individuals in society. It typically emerges in zones where the state is viewed as ineffective or corrupt (Abrahams, 1998). Although vigilante groups historically served as extra-legal enforcers of establishment supremacy, vigilante acts in this classification refer to terroristic violence by non-state actors against non-state targets, which is not exercised on behalf of the state (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982, p.59). In other words, vigilantism is a collective response that has a mandate from those whom it claims to protect (Vetter and Perlstein, 1991, p.43).

Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1976) distinguish three broad categories of vigilante terrorism:

1. Crime-control vigilantism: violence by private persons against people who are believed to be committing acts proscribed by the formal legal system. This type of vigilantism may occur in any society where the government is believed to be ineffectual in protecting people and property.

2. Social-group-control vigilantism: violence directed against groups that are competing for, or advocate a redistribution of, values within the system; e.g., violent acts by the Ku Klux Klan against African Americans to force them to their previous positions.

3. Regime-control vigilantism: violence by public or private organizations to preserve the status quo at times when the formal system of rule enforcement is viewed as
ineffective or irrelevant; e.g., coups d’état or assassinations of political figures who might attempt to change the status quo when they are elected.

3. State Terrorism

Next to the dichotomy of freedom fighting and terrorism, whether “state terrorism” exists is also an issue highly debated in the literature (Crenshaw, 1995; Rapoport, 2004; Ganor, 2006; Nacos, 2006; etc.). The actual debate is not over the states’ right of defense against both internal and external factors, but the way it is implemented and also the label that is attached to such acts. This dissertation research includes “state terrorism” as a term and its different manifestations, while remaining cognizant of the opposed opinion and its basic premises but also refer to scholars’ opposite opinions.

Among authors who support government or state terrorism as a concept, Crenshaw (1995, p.4) argues that governments and their agents can practice terrorism domestically or internationally. Similarly, Jenkins (2003, pp.80-81) states that governments may use terrorism as an instrument like revolutionary and other antigovernment forces. Laqueur (1999) explains states’ support of terrorism by their search for a cheaper and less risky alternative to military conflicts.

Those who deny such a concept of state (government) terrorism might simply be ignoring the time when the concept of terrorism was first used or they might believe that the concept has been subject to a complete transformation in meaning. As explained in detail in the historical analysis of the concept, the concept of terrorism was first used to refer to violence carried out by the state. Those were the agents of the state (The Committee of Public Safety), who carried out the chaotic period known as the Reign of
Terror between September 1793 and July 1794 in post-revolutionary France (Combs, 2006, p.27). Combs (2006) points out the fact that, although most definitions crafted by states do not include “state terrorism,” and states focus on substate groups as perpetrators, “states have been, and continue to be, involved in a wide variety of violent acts against their own citizens and those of other nations” (p.26). Similarly, Crenshaw (1995, p.4) admits that terrorism practiced by governments and their agents is usually carefully concealed to avoid public attribution of responsibility.

Rapoport (2004) does not use state (government) terrorism or any other term that may refer to government violence in the “four waves of modern terrorism” (anarchist, anti-colonial, new left and religious) by which he examined the history of terrorism.

Ganor (2006) suggests that states may engage in violent activities, states that they are called “war crimes” in the context of war, and “crimes against humanity” in other situations. Furthermore, as the author writes, states can be involved in terrorism in various ways: (1) by supporting terrorist organizations, providing financial aid, ideological support, military or operational assistance, (2) by initiating, directing and performing terrorist activities through groups outside their own institutions, and (3) by intentionally attacking civilians in other countries in order to achieve political aims without declaring war, through their own official bodies—members of its security forces or its intelligence services, or their direct agents. However, this categorization needs further scrutiny: the author does not accept, whether intentionally or unintentionally, acts perpetrated by states or their agents against civilians within their (civilians’) own territories.
On the other hand, Rummel (1994) proposes another concept that might include different violent actions by governments or states: *democide*. After defining *genocide* as “the killing of people because of their ethnic, racial, religious, and/or linguistic group membership; *politicide* as “the killing of persons because of their politics or for political purposes;” *mass murder* or *massacre* as “the indiscriminate killing of persons by a government;” and *terror* as “government killing, whose meaning is usually that of the extrajudicial execution, slaying, assassination, abduction or disappearance forever, of targeted individuals;” Rummel defines democide as “the murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder.” It is interesting to see that although the author accepts the concept of “government terror,”[^3] he does not mention it in the definition of “democide,” a term that is his own creation. Then the author sets himself aside from discussions about whether there is such thing as state or government terrorism by placing genocides within the context of democide. It is the same attitude that he had followed in his other book, *Democide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder* (Rummel, 1991). What is more interesting than Rummel’s detachment of state terrorism from the context of democide is that Nacos (2006, p.31) drops the term of “government killing” from Rummel’s definition of *terror* when she claims that Rummel “does not include state terrorism or government terrorism as definitional concepts” (p.31).

Opinions of individual scholars and states vary about including states as perpetrators in definitions or understandings of terrorism. Just as this dissertation included other controversial components (e.g., civilian/combatant distinction as targets),

[^3]: What the author describes is actually *terrorism*, since he refers to action.
and types (e.g., idiosyncratic terrorism) of terrorism, it will also study “state terrorism” as a type of political terrorism. In this dissertation, the researcher will use the following definition of state terrorism made by the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism in 1973:

[T]error inflicted on a large scale and with the most modern means on whole populations for purposes of domination or interference in their internal affairs, armed attacks perpetrated under the pretext of reprisals or of preventive action by States against the sovereignty and integrity of third States, and the infiltration of terrorist groups or agents into the territory of other States.

The definition examines state terrorism according to the location of the state’s action (domestic and international) and whether the state is directly or indirectly involved in terrorist acts. This dissertation will use the Koufa’s (2001) criteria for categorization of state terrorism as falling under three types: (1) regime (government) terrorism, (2) international state terrorism, and (3) state-sponsored terrorism.

Regime (Government) Terrorism

Regime or government terrorism is the earliest type of state terrorism (Kastanidou, 2004, p.18), and to be exact it refers to the first use of terrorism as a concept during the Regime de la Terreur. In this type or form of state terrorism, organs of the state conduct violence against its own population or the population of an occupied territory, in order to protect the regime or eliminate challenges (Koufa, 2001, p.12).

Government terrorism typifies dictatorial, totalitarian or militarist regimes (Kastanidou, 2004, p.19); however, being a global phenomenon it is not confined to a particular ideology or location (Koufa, 2001, p.13). It is characterized by such actions as the kidnapping and assassination of political opponents of the government, systems of
imprisonment without trial, persecution and torture, massacres of racial or religious minorities or of certain social classes, and incarceration of citizens in concentration camps (Koufa, 2001, p.12). There were a number of examples of government terrorism in the twentieth century, such as those in Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mussolini’s Italy, Hitler’s Germany, Argentina, Cambodia, Uganda, Iraq, Sudan and many other places (Nacos, 2006, p.31). The author focuses attention on the magnitude of the damage that can be created by government terrorism, and states that no other example of non-state political violence can be comparable to the effects of government terror.

**International State Terrorism**

While the concept of state terrorism usually refers to regime or government terror in domestic or occupied territory (Koufa, 2001, p.14), international state terrorism extends the limits of state terrorism to states’ terroristic activities outside their countries. Although international state terrorism resembles state-sponsored terrorism in terms of consequences, what distinguishes the two is the actor state’s direct involvement in the action (international state terrorism) or its involvement through supporting some terrorist organizations operating outside the state’s structure (state-sponsored terrorism).

Lambert (as cited in Koufa, 2001, p.18) defines international state terrorism as follows:

>[E]very type of objectionable act—or arguably objectionable act—that a State may take on the international level, including military maneuvers and war games in the vicinity of another State which present a threat to that other State, the transport of nuclear weapons through the territory of other States and international waters and the development, testing and deployment of nuclear and space-weapons systems.
State-sponsored Terrorism

It can be broadly defined as states’ overtly or covertly supporting or assisting terrorist groups or agents for the purpose of subverting or destabilizing another state or its government (Kastanidou, 2004, p.19), in such forms as planning, aiding, directing and controlling terrorist operations in another country (Koufa, 2001). The key point in state-sponsored terrorism is that terrorist activities are carried out in one state while being sponsored by another state.

Although Nacos (2006, p.32) suggests that governments support terrorist groups in other countries to further their own foreign policy goals, and limit the target of those groups with “civilians,” there is utility in expanding the target including combatants and non-combatants in the target country. The benefit of the sponsor state in such an action, as opposed to direct involvement, is the possibility to deny the connection (Koufa, 2001, p.14), and most of the time they do so (Nacos, 2006, p.32). Similarly, its financial cost is low, while financial and political gains are high (Simonsen and Spindlove, 2004, pp.29-30). On the actor side, the democratic status of the sponsor state does not make any difference in terms of involvement in sponsoring terrorism in other countries: they can have democratically elected governments or non-democratic regimes (Kastanidou, 2004, p.19).

Combs (2006, p.33) views state-sponsored terrorism as an expansion of the concept of licensed pirates, and an institutionalized form of foreign policy for many nations in the twentieth century. However, states’ involvement in revolutionary wars in other countries in the second half of the twentieth century, as the author suggests, blurred
the line between the warring sides and innocent bystanders. In the 1980s the concept of state-sponsored terrorism was attributed by the West to Iran’s behavior after the Islamic Revolution, and the seizure of American diplomatic hostages in Tehran “marked the origin of the term’s growing currency” (Crenshaw, 1995, p.10).

Comparing Terrorism with Interchangeably Used Concepts

Not every violent act is terroristic, because terrorism is used as a means to reach an ultimate end with the purpose of bringing about certain definite changes in the action (Hacker, 1978, p.3). However, the fact that a common definition of terrorism does not exist causes the usage of other terms for acts involving violence and the term terrorism in place of one another. On one hand, because of the negative connotations of terrorism, terrorists hardly call themselves terrorists, but more respectable terms such as freedom fighters, liberators or armies (Moghadam, 2006, p.3). On the other hand, virtually any act of violence perceived as directed against society—be it antigovernment dissidents or governments, organized-crime syndicates, common criminals, rioting mobs, people engaged in militant protest, individual psychotics, or lone extortionist—may be wrongly labeled as “terrorism” (Hoffman, 2006, p.1). The reasons for incorrect labeling may vary, from ignorance to willingness to demonstrate the magnitude of the effect generated by the act. However, terrorism is not a synonym for violence in general or insurgency, and there are important differences between terrorism and other types of violence (Wilkinson, 1992, p.156).

Crenshaw (1989, pp.5-6) sees terrorism as a means and states that it is logically separable from the ends it purportedly serves. For the author isolation of terrorism from
specific political goals is critical; namely, not all nationalists, revolutionaries or far-right extremists are terrorists, and no particular ideology or religion is responsible for terrorism.

The confusion of “terrorism” with other concepts persists even if the problem of means and ends is solved. One of the problems, as argued by Crenshaw (1989, p.8), is the tendency to type all users of terrorism as “terrorist organizations.” The author offers the Israeli attitude toward the PLO, and states that such a label would be a misnomer when applied to groups for which terrorism may be quite a peripheral tactic and those that rely on some forms of struggle other than terrorism. Likewise, since terrorism has negative connotations, and its distinction with interchangeably used terms follows inconsistent patterns, “it is easy to attribute terrorism to one’s enemies and anything else to one’s friends” (p.12). On the other hand, terrorist groups avoid using the word “terrorism” and name themselves with terms such as freedom and liberation armies or other military organizational structures, actual self-defense movements and righteous vengeance (Hoffman, 2006, p.22). In sum, as the author suggests, terrorists clearly do not see themselves as others do.

Crenshaw (1989, p.8) also focuses attention on the confusion of guerilla warfare-terrorism, since both activities are convenient methods for challenging the power of the state and involve low-level violence by weaker parties in conflicts. The problem of correct labeling gets even worse with the addition of the concept of “urban guerilla warfare” especially by groups having substantial popular support or control of a territory.

Another problem that can be cited is the question of whether non-innocents can be included among the immediate victims of terrorism. The problem is important, because
those who consider the harming of innocent people as an essential feature of terrorism would tend to consider “freedom fighting” as involving the harming of non-innocients (Khatchadourian, 1998, p.5).

For those and similar reasons, this section is devoted to clarification of the confusion between terrorism and other major terms. Below, I will examine each of those terms separately, and try to clarify the differences between the confused terms with terrorism and terrorism.

**Freedom Fighting**

Perhaps the most troublesome concept that is confused with the concept of terrorism is “freedom fighting.” The confusion between terrorism and other concepts has been reflected in the well-known phrase “One man’s freedom fighter is another’s terrorist.” Such a phrase and the discussion it instigates expose the extent to which the issue of terrorism is open to subjective evaluation. Due to this openness to subjective evaluation, occasionally organizations attempt to take the label “freedom fighter” with positive connotations suggesting moral approval, instead of “terrorist” that necessarily has a negative connotation (Graham, 1997). This section intends to clarify the confusion between terrorism and freedom fighting. Here there will also be a discussion of freedom fighting in view of some other concepts.

As opposed to the general misunderstanding about the concept, freedom fighting does not have to be violent, but peaceful movements, such as active nonviolent resistance practiced by Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King and their followers, peaceful strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins, and other forms of civil disobedience may also be seen as
examples of freedom fighting (Khatchadourian, 1998, p.94). Keeping this fact in mind, Khatchadourian (1998) defines a freedom fighter as “an individual who in fighting against an unjust or evil political ruler, system, or regime does not indulge in terrorist activities at all or only occasionally indulges in relatively small-scale acts of that kind” (p.94). However, this definition does not delineate the ultimate limits of the activities that are considered freedom-fighting; and therefore, a more comprehensive explanation is required.

Being an umbrella term, freedom fighting is a “range” that covers a wide variety of activities. Likewise, the term, as defined by Khatchadourian closely relates to terrorist activities, and therefore terrorism.

Khatchadourian (1998, p.94) writes that activities within the concept of freedom fighting may include those engaging in rebellion or a guerilla war of national liberation, such as Chechens’ armed struggle for independence from Russia. Fighting by small, irregular urban or rural bands of fighters may also be included in the concept of freedom fighting, such as the Shiite bands that occasionally ambush small Israeli forces or fight the Israeli-equipped Christian militia in South Lebanon. Similarly, guerilla warfare once carried out by South African nationalists against the white South African government can also be considered as freedom fighting.

These and other manifestations of freedom fighting are different from terrorism in the following way (Khatchadourian, 1998, p.95-96):

(1) The struggle for collective freedom is their defensive purpose,
(2) They avoid deliberate targeting of civilians, and limit themselves to the
military forces they combat,

(3) They lack the bifocal character; that is, it is not the practice of freedom
fighters to resort to means, such as coercion, hostage-taking or killing, to
convey a message to the government.

In spite of this explanation regarding the confusion between terrorism and
freedom fighting, Khatchadourian (1998, p.94) demonstrates the complexity of the issue
by inserting another term “acts of terrorism” into the discussion. For the author, terrorism
and freedom fighting stand at the two ends of a continuum, and in between there are
several acts that may be labeled with either one of the terms because of freedom fighters
that perform terrorist acts. Depending on the density of the acts of terrorism, a freedom
fighter may be considered more of a terrorist than a fighter for freedom, or vice-versa.
However, this may not necessarily reflect the opinion of terrorists. Due to negative
connotations of terrorism and consequences stemming from those connotations, terrorists
do not like to be treated as terrorists, but prefer to be considered as freedom fighters. This
title allows them to be treated as prisoners of war and therefore to be prosecuted as
common criminals in ordinary courts of law if captured (Hoffman, 2006, p.26). Hoffman
(2006) also offers the explanation given by terrorists for the reasons they use terrorist
tactics (although they claim to be freedom fighters) to be their numerical inferiority,
limited firepower and other resources compared to those of nation states.

The international community faces another obstacle during the interpretation of
armed people’s struggle aimed at liberation and self-determination, or whether an action
could be considered as freedom fighting or terrorism: Although the assessment should be done according to the principles of international law, some states and regional organizations arrange the issue differently than the general rules (Hafner, 2006, p.38). In this context, the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, adopted in Ouagadougou on 1 July 1999, could be cited. Although Article 2 of the Convention makes reference to the international principles, it completely separates “peoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination” from being considered terrorist crimes.

Applying the principles of just war theory, Khatchadourian (1998, p.98) writes that an act gains the label of freedom fighting if it meets the following criteria: (1) just cause, (2) right intention, (3) innocent immunity, (4) proportionality, (5) necessity, (6) chance of success, and (7) just peace. If a particular act does not comply with those criteria, it is likely that the act would be considered as terrorism.

Guerilla Warfare

Guerilla warfare is one more concept often misused and confused with terrorism. “Guerilla” means “little war” in Spanish, and as a term it evolved from Spanish resistance to the invasions of Napoleon in 1808 (Martin, 2006). During this resistance the British military helped Spanish guerillas in this war to make successful attacks against the French, which ultimately became a prototype for the liberation wars in the twentieth century (Combs, 2006, p.27).
Guerilla warfare has some characteristics that are contrary to wars. For Leiser (1977, 1986) the essentials of guerilla warfare are characterized by small-scale, unconventional, limited actions carried out by irregular forces against regular military forces, their supply lines, and communications. Khatchadourian (1998, p.96) examines the concept under rural and urban guerilla fighting and offers an example for each: while the Southern Lebanese Shi’ites fighting against the Israeli military can be considered rural guerrilla warfare, the Palestinian intifada is an urban phenomenon.

Differentiating guerilla warfare from other types of armed struggle may not be an easy task for several reasons. However, this is not the case with terrorism and guerilla warfare, given the issue of legitimacy. Since terrorism implies illegitimacy (Rubenstein, 1987, p.17), the differentiation is a necessity for condemnation of terrorism and the positive consequences attached to guerilla fighting. To benefit from the advantages and especially legitimacy of this label many groups that are involved in political violence, including terrorist groups, describe themselves as commandoes, fighters, warriors, guerillas or revolutionaries, regardless of their sizes (Nacos, 2006, p.20).

In terms of differentiating from other concepts, guerilla warfare faces the most significant confusion with terrorism. Guerillas employ the same tactics as terrorists, such as assassination, kidnapping, hit- and-run attack, bombings of public gathering places and hostage-taking, for the same purposes like intimidation, coercion and by this means affecting behavior (Hoffman, 2006, p.35). Both groups are small in size (Moghadam, 2006, p.5; Leiser, 1986), and follow the same dress code (they do not distinguish themselves from other groups by wearing same type of uniform or carrying membership
cards) (Moghadam, 2006, p.5), and they are often indistinguishable from noncombatants (Hoffman, 2006, p.35).

Nevertheless, since the French Revolution, when the term “terrorism” was first used, it has become increasingly difficult to make a distinction between acts of terrorism and guerrilla warfare (Combs, 2006, p.27). Not being pure categories and having characteristics of other groups, as well as with the inclusion of the new category of “insurgency,” the lines among guerilla warfare, terrorism and similar concepts are getting more blurry (Hoffman, 2006, p.35). However, the following differences could be used as a guide for that purpose:

1- Holding of Territory: Due to their larger group of armed individuals (Hoffman, 2006, p.35) guerilla groups may seize and hold a territory depending on their size and structure (Moghadam, 2006, p.5). Terrorist groups, on the other hand, are not armed units functioning in the open, and do not attempt to seize or hold territory (Taylor, 2002; Hoffman, 2006, p.35).

2- Target: Like terrorism, guerilla groups apply selective violence; however, their choice of target is military while terrorism’s targets are mainly civilians (Combs, 2006, p.27). Guerilla warfare is characterized by its limited actions against regular military forces, their supply lines and communications (Leiser, 1986), while terrorists, deliberately avoid engaging enemy military forces in combat (Hoffman, 2006, p.35).

3- Bifocal Character: In terms of separation of means and ends, terrorism and guerilla warfare display differences. Having a bifocal character, terrorism separates victims from the ultimate goal (Combs, 2006, p.12), or “plays to an audience” as the
author suggests. In other words, terrorists got involved in actions although they may not desire their immediate actions (Fromkin, 1975, p.693). On the other hand, being bifocal is not a requirement for guerilla warfare; guerillas may attack their ultimate targets just as military forces do.

War

There is potential confusion about the concepts of war and terrorism. This is best displayed in the debate between Richard C. Reid, the shoe-bomber who attempted to blow up a US airliner, and the judge of the court in Boston where he was sentenced to life. During the trial, Al Qaeda member Reid insisted that he was a soldier and at war with the United States, and the judge responded that Reid was not an enemy combatant or a soldier, but a terrorist (New York Times, 31 January 2003).

Reid thought he may benefit from the protections granted to war criminals; because military forces enjoy immunity from any international and foreign jurisdiction (Hafner, 2006, p.39). The confusion between being a soldier at war and a “terrorist” might have stemmed from a misunderstanding or mislabeling. Terrorists, like guerilla groups, tend to view themselves as armies, although both groups are much smaller in size than national armies, which brings about further confusion. Although those acts involve violence, they also vary from one another. Demonstrating the differences between war and terrorism is therefore useful for the purposes of this study.

Even though national wars have been responsible for more death and destruction than terrorist acts, the fundamental difference between the two types of violence is the fact that wars are regulated by rules and accepted norms of behavior. The rules of war
were first proposed by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius and then in the Geneva and Hague Conventions on Warfare of the 1860s, 1899, 1907, and 1949 (Hoffman, 2006, p.27).

Those conventions regulate the following areas:

1- Civilian immunity: The international war regulations grant civilians immunity from attacks; however, civilians constitute the majority of terrorist targets (Hoffman, 2006, p.27). In other words, civilian casualties are the side effect of military operations in an ordinary war, while they are the direct and intentional target of terrorist acts (Khatchadourian, 1998, p.2). War regulations offer maximum protection to the civilian noncombatant, regard them as innocent persons even in time of war, while terrorists practice persistent and deliberate harm to them (Combs, 2006, p.13).

2- Prohibition of taking civilians as hostages: It is prohibited to take civilians as hostages in wars, but not only have terrorists taken civilians as hostages, in many instances they have brutally executed them (Hoffman, 2006, p.27).

3- Outlaw reprisals against either civilians or POWs: The Conventions impose regulations governing treatment of captured or surrendered soldiers (POWs); on the other hand, it has been observed that terrorists abused and murdered military officers, even when they were serving on UN-sponsored peacekeeping or truce supervisory missions (Hoffman, 2006, p.27).

4- Recognition of neutral territory and the rights of citizens of neutral states: While the conventions recognize neutral territory and the rights of citizens of neutral states, terrorists disregard the concept of neutral state and the rights of its citizens by
attacking civilians in countries far from their “theater of operation” (Hoffman, 2006, p.27).

5- Inviolability of foreign representatives: Regulations of war require the inviolability of diplomats and other accredited representatives, as opposed to applications of terrorists who repeatedly attack embassies and other diplomatic installations (Hoffman, 2006, p.27).

Terrorist acts, on the other hand, do not abide and often contradict all the above rules. As a result, an accurate comparison cannot confuse usage the concept war with terrorism.

Ordinary Crime

Ordinary crime is another such concept that is often misused and confused with terrorism. Although both “ordinary crimes” and “acts of terrorism” could materialize in very similar forms, such as murder, arson or kidnapping, there are some fundamental differences between the two and they could be categorized under the following topics:

1. Motivation: Motivations of ordinary criminals and terrorists differ from each other. Although both groups employ violence as a means to reach their targets, the ordinary criminal’s motivation is primarily selfish, personal, and usually material (Hoffman, 2006, p.36), as opposed to that of the terrorist, which is political (Nacos, 2006, p.23).

2. Psychological Repercussions: Although ordinary criminals use some short-term act of violence to terrorize the victim, it is not designed or intended to create psychological repercussions beyond the act itself (Hoffman, 2006, p.36). However,
psychological effects generated by terrorist acts are intended to target a wider audience and to be long-lasting.

3. Conveying of Message: The ordinary criminal’s act is not meant to have any effect beyond the particular incident or the immediate victim, and the violence applied is not conceived or intended to convey any message to anyone other than the immediate victim (Hoffman, 2006, p.36). On the other hand, it is the fundamental characteristic of terrorist acts that the main purpose is to send a message to especially governments for the purpose of forcing them to engage in or to abstain from engaging in an action.

4. Influencing Public Opinion: The ordinary criminal is not concerned with influencing public opinion, as opposed to the terrorist who use violence to make an influence on the public opinion on the way to achieving an ultimate end (Hoffman, 2006, p.36).

5. Egocentric vs. Altruistic Goals: The ordinary criminal pursues his/her egocentric goals and is driven by some personal need or grievance. However, being an altruist, the terrorist believes in serving “a good cause designed to achieve a greater good for a wider constituency… that the terrorist and his organization purport to represent” (Hoffman, 2006, p.37). To be labeled as terrorist, the person must have a cause at least in his/her own mind (Kellen, 1982, p.10).

In this respect, the terrorist is also very different from the lunatic assassin in terms of their purposes, although their tactics and targets may be identical. While the terrorist’s goal is political, the lunatic assassin’s is more often basically idiosyncratic (Hoffman, 2006, p.37).
As a result, precise use of the concept terrorism or crime must be cognizant of their differences.

International Efforts at Definition

As examined in the previous section, what was understood as terrorism has gone through different stages starting from the time when the concept was first used. Similarly, definitions of terrorism have also continued to undergo changes; however, it has not been possible to adopt a universally acceptable definition (Combs, 2006, p.10).

The section “Concept Formation and Terrorism” in Chapter I examined defining the terrorism concept and highlighted the need for establishing declarative definitions to eliminate the determined problem of ambiguity in defining terrorism. Although it has not yet been possible, as Combs (2006) writes, the international efforts have turned to developing operational definitions.

Starting with the League of Nations’s efforts at definition in 1937, a brief analysis of the international struggle in that context will be presented below.

In October 1934 King Alexander I of Yugoslavia was killed by Croatian separatists during a formal visit to France, along with the French Foreign Minister and two bystanders. The assassins fled to Italy. Due to the international characteristic of the incident, the League of Nations launched an attempt and in 1937 was able to come up with the following definition of terrorism in a convention: "All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public" (Saul, 2005, p.63). Mostly
because of the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, two years after the adoption, the 1937 Convention never entered into force (Gioia, 2006, p.4).

The 1937 definition was a “declarative” definition. However, since it failure the international community has changed its attitude by addressing the problem gradually, crime by crime or issue by issue (Koufá, 2001). In other words, the international community sought the solution to defining terrorism in establishing operational definitions. Gioia (2006, p.4) names that kind of approach as “sectoral,” and states that it aims at identifying “offences which were seen as belonging to the activities of terrorists and working out treaties in order to deal with specific categories thereof.” As will be seen below, the United Nations has put forward different definitions. However, none of global conventions has provided a satisfactory generic definition (Hafner, 2006, p.35).

Those attempts were important not in terms of having a common and satisfactory international definition of terrorism, but in terms of showing “a rough consensus on the meaning of terrorism” (Jenkins, 1992, p.15). Although the United Nations General Assembly had not agreed on what it meant by “terrorism,” in 1985 it unanimously condemned terrorism and stated that terrorism did not solely refer to the specified acts in international treaties (Jenkins, 1992, p.15).

The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention on Terrorist Bombing on 15 December 1997, in which “terrorist” is defined as

…any person that commits an offence within the meaning of the Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility: (a) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or (b) with the intent to
cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, where such
destruction results or is likely to result in major economic loss. (Gioia, 2006, p.8)

Although several components of terrorism are referred to in the definition, it helps define
terrorism from the perspective of terrorist bombings, and can only be generalized to other
events to some extent.

The UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism was established to deal with the problems of definition in 1996. While the Committee was still working on the definition problem, the UN General Assembly adopted the *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* in 1999, and defined “terrorist” within the context of the convention:

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this convention, if that person, by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully or willfully, provides, collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
(a) an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or
(b) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act (www.un.org)

The problem with this definition is that it makes reference to 11 other international conventions and protocols which the UN had adopted since 1963, none of which, however, covers terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, therefore leaving a gap for a more comprehensive definition (Schmid, 2004).

The UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism was able to complete its work in 2001 and to produce a definition of terrorism, which reads:

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the [draft Comprehensive] Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(d) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(e) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or
(f) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act (www.un.org)

However, this definition caused some states to raise their concerns about some issues inherent in the related debate. Those concerns included the lack of clarity whether governments/states could be considered as “terrorist,” the terrorism-freedom fighting dilemma, and whether national armed forces could be targets of terrorism (Schmid, 2004).

It can be concluded that the 2001 definition did not help solve those major controversial issues.

While the debates on the draft comprehensive convention were almost concluded, the 11 September 2001 attacks underlined the importance of the efforts of definition. However, the definition efforts after September 11 were also impeded by the same reasons that remained from the comprehensive convention, such as those specified above (Gioia, 2006, p.13). Including the efforts of Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, all attempts for a common definition by the international community have so far failed.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Overview

One of the focuses of this study is comparing different perceptions of terrorism. It aims to discover how perceptions of people living in different countries vary regarding the concept of terrorism. The researcher claims that understanding similarities and differences in perception of what constitutes terrorism cross-nationally or comparatively increases the opportunities for international cooperation and can contribute to countering such acts of violence. In particular, the study focuses on perceptions of members of different professions dealing with counter-terrorism in different states, since these groups of professionals are responsible for making decisions in favor of or against international cooperation, and for implementing such decisions.

As was determined in Chapter I, terrorism is an essentially-contested concept, hence it is interpreted differently at different levels, such as individual, professional and national. In this study I focus on finding out about different interpretations of the concept among several alternatives, and therefore require a methodology that focuses on subjectivity. Q methodology, utilizing factor analysis and interviewing, is a mixed methodological approach and is interested in subjectivity. In this method of analysis participants are presented with a set of statements about a topic and asked to order them from “most agree” to “most disagree” (Brown, 1980 and 1986). This method allows the
researcher to collect people’s points of view regarding a particular issue in a manner which is subject to statistical summary, description and comparison (Brown, 1993). Since the participants’ responses are based on their own judgments and opinions, Q methodology appeared to be well-suited for the purposes of this particular study.

The Q methodology research design employs factor analysis for quantitative analysis (Stephenson, 1953). It begins with an examination of “concourse of communication” (Stephenson, 1978), and the concourse serves as the source for the statements. In this study the concourse consisted mainly of historical events and different opinions obtained from different sources, which are allegedly related to terrorism.

The concourse from which the Q sample of statements emerges does not include all indicator/data level dimensions and types of terrorism as determined in Chapter II, but only major indicator/data level dimensions and controversial types of terrorism. Adding more statements increases their number, but makes no consequential difference in the analysis.

Population and Participants

A group of participants in Q methodology is referred to as a P set. Since this is a comparative study, two countries were the basis for establishing the P set: Turkey and the United States. Furthermore, within each country the study aims to measure perceptions regarding the concept terrorism of three professional groups: politicians, law enforcement officers, and judges/prosecutors. Other than the professions of the participants, their individual characteristics were not used as a criterion in their selection, since the main purpose of this part of the study is to better understand possible
differences cross-nationally among groups of professionals who are decisions makers on counter terrorism about their perception of the meaning of terrorism.

For the purpose of collecting data the researcher visited Turkey between 18th and 26th March 2007, with the partial sponsorship of KSU (Kent State University) Graduate Student Senate. The initial intention was to survey five people from each of the three professional groups studied; however, due to data collection obstacles certain changes in the P set were made. Although the researcher had the necessary connection with members of Parliament in Turkey, the decision to change the Presidential and general elections to an earlier date in July, 2007 rendered it difficult to have them allocate 30 minutes of their schedule for the survey. Therefore, the researcher interviewed two parliament members, and had to supplement the remaining interviews with three advisors to other parliament members.

A similar problem occurred with the Turkish judges and prosecutors. Although the researcher called a number of them for participation in the survey and explained the required anonymity of the participants, none of them agreed to participate. The common reason given to their declining was the necessity to get permission from the High Board of Judges and Prosecutors. Similarly, they were also hesitant about disclosure of their names (even if the researcher assured them about anonymity), and concerned about lack of available time, media exposure, and that the results of the study would be misinterpreted as reflecting the general opinion of all Turkish judges and prosecutors. Therefore, the researcher had to look for retired judges/prosecutors and found two retired prosecutors; and had to interview three independent lawyers who had many common
traits with the judges/prosecutors and probably reflect similar points of view since they were educated in the same institutions and have received similar training. The researcher had no problem interviewing law enforcement officers (police officers), and had five of them working at the main headquarters and in the field to complete the survey.

On the US side of the Q study, although the researcher had some difficulty in finding participants, once he reached them he did not run into any obstacles. Since individual characteristics of the participants were not a concern for the study the researcher did not consider that interviewing participants only from Ohio would constitute a problem. None of the US participants to whom the researcher applied expressed their hesitations such as those raised by their Turkish counterparts. Table 3.1 presents the list of the survey participants with their selection criteria.

Table 3.1 Survey participants with their selection criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Categorized as</th>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>Parliament Member</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>Advisor to Parliament Member</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Legal Affairs</td>
<td>Prosecutor (Ret.)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Legal Affairs</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Police officer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>City Mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>County Commissioner</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>Attorney General</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>State House Member</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>Legal Affairs</td>
<td>Prosecutor</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Police officer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The participants in the survey were not compensated for their participation. For the Turkish participants a version of the Q sort written in Turkish was used (Appendix C). Before starting the Q sort each participant was presented with the original “Approval to Use Human Research Participants” (Appendix D) and the “Letter of Consent” (Appendix E), both of which had been approved by the Kent State University Human Subjects Review Board. Prior to handing back the consent form the researcher asked the participants to read, sign and date it.

The researcher assured participants of the confidentiality of the survey. Each participant was surveyed privately; either in his/her official offices or, since Q studies require a large empty table for the organization of the statements, in available meeting rooms. After receiving the oral and signed consent of each participant, the researcher explained the characteristics of Q studies in general and the way he/she was required to sort the statements.

Having made sure the requirements were clearly understood, the researcher told each participant that he would be available for further questions throughout the survey. To some extent, further elaboration of the information placed in the statements varied between the US and Turkish participants. A number of statements referred to facts concerning the United States or to those selected from the American literature (e.g., the USS Cole, Dirty Harry, Ku Klux Klan). Other statements, however, referred to the Turkish group. With both groups the researcher answered as objectively as possible. For example instead of identifying the PKK as a terrorist organization, a separatist group or
freedom fighters, the researcher informed the participant of the physical acts and aims of that organization.

**Materials and Procedure**

The Q sample consisting of 57 statements that made up the Q sort was based on philosophical examination of the concept of terrorism. The researcher developed the logical structure (Figure 3.1), according to which the contents of the statements were determined. The logical structure consists of two main effects (major indicator/data level dimensions and controversial types of terrorism) and their components. The first main effect focused on the indicator/data level dimensions of terrorism as a concept, as examined in Chapter I, and comprised the seven most controversial in the literature. The second main effect centered on the types of terrorism (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter II) and involved nine of those types around which most debates generate. While writing the statements the researcher benefited from different sources, both academic and popular including the Internet, books and magazines. All of the statements were reviewed and revised by Dr. Brown, Professor of Political Science at Kent State, a member of dissertation committee and a nationally recognized expert in Q methodology. After the study on the development of the Q sort was completed, the researcher translated the statements into Turkish, and had Serhat Demir, Ph.D. candidate from the KSU Political Science Department, review the translation and provide an independent assessment. Since the terrorism terminology has developed in Turkey as a result of the Turkish government’s struggle against several types of terrorism for more than 40 years, the
translation of the terrorism related words did not constitute a problem. There were no words in the statements which were impossible or even difficult to translate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Effects</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Major indicator/data level dimensions</td>
<td>a. against social values</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. against human-beings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. target: civilians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. target: non-combatants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. target: combatants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f. overthrowing system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>g. destabilizing system</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Controversial types of Terrorism</td>
<td>h. regime (government) terrorism</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i. international state terrorism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>j. state sponsored terrorism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>k. vigilante terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>l. social revolutionary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>m. religious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n. separatist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o. single-issue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p. freedom-fighting dilemma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q sample (N) = [(Main effects) (Replications)] - n(dropped statements) =

\[
[(A) (B) (m)] - n(dropped statements) \]

(A)(B) = (7)(9) = 63 combinations

Replication for each combination = 1

n(dropped statements) = 6 (dh, eh, ek, fk, do, eo)

N = [(7)(9)(1)] - 6 = 57 statements in the Q sample (in Appendix B)
Figure 3.1 The logical structure of the Q sample

Although there should have been \((7 \times 9 = 63\) statements in the Q sort, the researcher discovered out that six statements had to be dropped because they did not make any sense, hence only 57 were utilized. For example, the combination of “eh” requires a statement about a government’s struggle against its own combatant forces. Although a reverse maneuver (military vs. legitimate government) could be thought of, it does not look logical for a government, which lacks physical combating power itself, to
struggle against its own military. Similarly, the combination “fk” requires the existence of some vigilante acts committed for the purpose of overthrowing the current government. That also does not make sense, since vigilante acts are committed against other people whom the perpetrator considers guilty and would like to punish. For similar reasons, no statements were prepared for the combinations dh, eh, ek, fk, do and eo (six in total). Then each statement was assigned a random number from 1 to 57. The list of the Q sample is found in Appendix B (in English) and in Appendix C (in Turkish).

The 57 statements were printed on white 2" × 4" cards. In addition, the researcher prepared a ruler-like piece of paper on which were printed 11 numbers ranging from -5 to +5 to represent various degrees of agreement/disagreement along the scoring continuum. In this system -5 represented statements with which the participants most disagreed, +5 represented those with which the participants most agreed, and 0 represented statements about which the participants had no opinion or felt neutral. After the necessary explanations, the participants were asked to sort the cards from most agree to most disagree along the scoring continuum.

The greatest obstacle that the participants encountered was the obligation to place a predetermined number of statements (as specified by the researcher) under each point along the continuum. This issue, referred to as the forced distribution, is conventional in Q technique (Brown, 1980, pp.288-289), and its purpose is to induce participants to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement with each statement.

According to the forced distribution procedure followed for this study, the participants were asked to place two cards under -5 and two cards under +5; three cards
under -4 and three cards under +4; four cards under -3 and four cards under +3; six cards under -2 and six cards under +2; eight cards under -1 and eight cards under +1; and 11 cards under 0 (Figure 3.2). The participants were allowed to change their preferences until the end of the Q-sorting process; and then Q sorts were recorded. On average the data collection from each participant took 25 minutes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Disagree with</th>
<th>Neutral, no opinion</th>
<th>Most Agree with</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-3</td>
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<td>item</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
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</table>

**Figure 3.2** Items (statements) of the Q sample designed for forced distribution (57 items)

After the data from all participants from both of the countries were collected, they were entered in the computer using the computer program PQMethod (Schmolck and Atkinson, 2001).

**Analysis of Data**

Being the variables of the study (McKeown and Thomas, 1988), each participant served as an operant depiction of his/her opinion regarding the concept of terrorism. The standard procedure for the analysis of the Q sorts starts with establishing a correlation
matrix. The formula used for calculating the standard error of a zero-order correlation is
\[ \sigma_r = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}}, \]
(Schmolck and Atkinson, 2001, PQMethod computer program version 2.11), where \( N \) is the number of statements (57 in this case); therefore, the value is \( \frac{1}{\sqrt{57}} = 0.13 \). Regardless of sign, any correlations are considered significant \((p<.01)\) if they are at least 2.58 times the standard error. Therefore, in this study correlations greater than \((0.13)(2.56) = 0.33\) are significant. The PQMethod software program factor analyzes the correlation matrix using the centroid method. As in the case of correlation, factor loadings greater than .33 were considered significant at the .01 level. Table 3.1 displays the factors loadings provided by this analysis.

The next step was to discover the underlying meaning expressed by participants of each factor through construction of a composite Q sort for each major underlying factor by the help of the PQMethod program (see Appendix H for both composite factor arrays\(^4\)). Each composite Q sort allowed the researcher to get patterns that emerged according to the overall placements of statements. Analyzing the meaning of the composites started with examination of the statements that ranked highly positively \((+5, +4 \text{ and } +3)\) and highly negatively \((-5, -4 \text{ and } -3)\) in terms of the factor scores. In light of this part of the analysis a broader view of the factors, which distinguishes each factor from all of the others, was obtained.

\(^4\) A factor array is expressed in terms of \( z \) scores, which can be converted to scores expressed in whole numbers which correspond with the scoring distribution used by the participants in the study. These converted scores are referred to as factor scores and provide the composite Q sort for each factor.
Table 3.2 Factor Loadings

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code= participant code number
A, B= the two factors
(   )= defining factor loadings to two decimal points

Chapter IV begins with an overview of the factor analysis, and continues with the in-depth analyses of the factors including their controversial statements. Differences of 3 or more units between the statement scores in the composite Q sorts will be considered highly variant (i.e., significantly different, \( p < .01 \)), and the researcher will focus on those pairs during the comparison.
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Overview

Factor analysis through utilization of Q methodology was conducted to see whether there are significant differences between citizens of different states, and also among members of different professional groups within a state. Since the professional groups did not cluster for each of the states or cross-nationally, but established a mixed and common picture for the entire nation to which they belong, professional differences in the perceptions of the concept of terrorism will not be the focus of this analysis. Instead, the emergent factors will constitute the balance of discussion.

Two strong significant factors emerged from the factor analysis. One of the factors (Factor A) was supported by 15 defining sorts, while the second factor (Factor B) was supported by 12. The indication of this result is that among the participants of the study there were two different clusters of views regarding the perception of the terrorism concept.

The data analysis also revealed some important characteristics of the factors. Therefore, the researcher assigned a label for each of the factors to reflect the overall perception of the factor regarding the concept of terrorism: “conformist” for Factor A and “permissive” for Factor B. Although labeling is not a methodological requirement, it focuses attention on the major perceptions of the factors. Nevertheless, the researcher
acknowledges that a one-word label is far from representing the complexity of the whole factor. Those labels especially indicate the statements which distinguish the factors from one another.

Since the focus of the study had been on the perceptions of people whose responsibilities were to fight terrorism, no demographic information about the participants was used in addition to the Q sorts. This is justified by the fact that the participants were selected from certain professional groups; namely politicians, law enforcement and legal affairs. It is assumed that all individuals form those groups have gone through the necessary stages of education and training for those professions, hence creating them into a class of professionals more than a socio-demographic or economic class. Their races, ethnicities, gender, and socioeconomic backgrounds were assumed not to have a significant effect on their perceptions about terrorism.

Two sources provide the basis of the data that will be discussed in this chapter: Appendices F and G. Appendix F presents a table including factor loadings,\(^5\) nationalities and professions of participants (P set). On the other hand, Appendix G provides a table that shows the Q sample and composite factor scores (factor array) along with distinguishing statements for the factors and consensus statements.

The following sections discuss the two factors emerging as result of the analysis of the data.

---

\(^5\) In R methodology factor loadings are correlation coefficients that indicate the strength and direction of a linear relationship between two variables. In Q methodology persons have the status of variables, hence the factor loadings indicate the extent to which each Q sort is similar or dissimilar to the composite factor array for that type (McKeown and Thomas, 1988).
Factors

The researcher had no assumption regarding whether or to what extent the perceptions of the concept of terrorism differ among the members of different professions or among citizens of different states. Therefore, the researcher based his preparation on the existing literature objectively. The Q sample used in this dissertation is a product of an extensive literature review, especially about the components and controversial types of terrorism. As a result two clearly identifiable factors emerged Factor A mostly consisting of Turkish participants and Factor B of US citizens.

Factor A

Figure 4.1 illustrates a composite Q sort for Factor A (for the original Answer Sheet see Appendix A). The characteristics of the members of the P set whose Q sorts were clustered as Factor A can be found in the table located in Appendix F.

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<th>Neutral, no opinion</th>
<th>Most agree with</th>
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Figure 4.1 Statement Q sort composite for Factor A
Fifteen out of 30 participants loaded on Factor A, 14 of whom were Turkish citizens, while the remaining 1 was from the US. Among the Turkish citizens there were 5 police officers, 3 lawyers, 2 retired prosecutors, 2 parliament members and 2 advisors to parliament members. The only US citizen in this factor was a mayor. Although the only US participant is in this factor, she has the lowest possible factor loading in the factor. For clarification, Table 4.1 was prepared by the researcher to show factor loadings and characteristics of the participants in Factor A.

Table 4.1 Factor Loadings, Nationality and Profession of Participants in Factor A

<table>
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<td>US</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

code = participant code number
( ) = defining factor loadings to two decimal points

The analysis of data will begin with a review of the composite Q sort, during which the overall attitude of the participants in Factor A will be discovered. For that purpose the statements that were placed by the participants from –5 to +5 will be analyzed. As indicated before the statements placed under +5, +4 and +3 represent most
strongly agreed statements by the participants, while those statements scored –5, –4 and –3 are the most strongly disagreed ones. In other words, those statements represent most agreed and most disagreed opinions, respectively, of the participants regarding the concept of terrorism. Those statements are first examined, and then an overall analysis of the factor is presented. With the exception of one participant, all of the members in Factor A are Turkish nationals; therefore, it can be said that this factor clearly reflects opinions of the Turkish participants. This statement can be made more assuredly since the loadings of the study’s only remaining Turkish participant did not fit in the other factor, either.

One more important issue should be addressed at this point. The researcher stayed together with each participant while s/he was doing the Q sorting. The participants were told that they were free to make changes until they completely finished the sorting, the researcher observed that the Turkish participants started placing the statements mostly on the negative side of the array (disagree to some degree), while the US participants started placing the statements on the positive side. This observation could be based on several reasons. The difference could be due to the participants’ world views: for example the Turkish people are pessimistic, and the US participants are more optimistic. The difference may also stem from the context of the statement. As the sorting proceeded, the participants had to follow the rule of “forced distribution,” and no matter what their initial preferences of placing the statements were, they had to replace them a few points away from their first places. Therefore, the place of each statement relative to the other statements in each personal and composite Q sort is just as important as the current
ranking of the statements. Q methodology is a holistic process, and the meanings emerge out of the entirety of the Q sorts. For this reason each Q sort should be examined in its entirety.

Participants of Factor A agreed with those statements and ranked them as +5 “most-agreed:”

# 21 By providing logistics, shelter, and training to the PKK, or by failing to recognize it as a terrorist organization, many Western states sponsor the PKK, and can therefore be considered as engaging in state-sponsored terrorism.

# 24 No truly-interpreted religion allows civilians’ lives to be the target of political gains.

The following statements were ranked as +4:

# 7 Targeting human beings is not the sine qua non of terrorism. The destruction of public facilities and transportation systems (e.g., as committed by the PKK) are also terrorist incidents.

# 20 Systematic and intentionally violent acts by Israel against Palestinian civilians are a sort of terrorism.

# 53 States that aim to undermine other states or governments by sponsoring terrorist organizations in those countries should themselves be considered terrorist.

Since the vast majority of Factor A consisted of the Turkish participants, it would be useful to present a brief context regarding Turkey and the Turkish people, including terrorist activities in that country. Such a background would permit those “most agreed” statements to be better understood and interpreted. Ninety-nine percent of the Turkish people are Muslim; however, Turkey is a secular and democratic state. Turkey has experienced several episodes of terrorism for about 40 years. Among those the PKK separatist organization has caused the most casualties. Approximately 35,000 people were killed over a period of 15 years of violence that started in 1983 (Aydiner, 2007).
Although the activities of the PKK in Turkey were minimized, the organization is still active and occasionally attacks Turkish targets. It is thus assumed that Turkish participants completed their Q sorts with memories regarding the PKK still fresh.

Out of five statements that were ranked +4 or +5, three statements are about state terrorism. The participants clearly recognize state terrorism (state-sponsored terrorism and government terrorism). They believe that some Western states supported the PKK organization in several ways, and think that all states sponsoring terrorist organizations in other countries should themselves be considered terrorist.

The focus of statement #20 is “state terrorism,” because it indicates a government as the perpetrator and civilians as the target. The participants of Factor A clearly label such acts as terrorism.

Statement #24 rejects “religious terrorism.” However, due to the condition placed in the text of the statement, the participants who most-agreed with this statement would accept that violence that seems to be resulting from religions in fact stem from misinterpretation of their teachings.

Statement #7 agrees that property belonging to the public can also be a target of terrorism. Since the PKK organization’s attacks against property are given as an example in the statement, the focus of the participants in Factor A is expected to be on those specified attacks. Clearly, the Turkish participants agree that attacks against public facilities and transportation systems qualify as terrorist acts.

The following statements were ranked as -5, “most-disagreed” in the Factor A composite array:
# 6  Al Qaeda’s fight against Western values are based on Islamic principles, hence cannot properly be regarded as terrorist.
# 33  Recitation of religious words during executions of foreign soldiers and civilians by beheading is evidence that some religions permit terrorist events.

The participants in Factor A ranked the following statements as -4:

# 11  States like Israel in Palestine and the USA in Afghanistan are not responsible for civilian casualties when civilians are used as human shields to cover strategic targets. Such states cannot be accused of terrorism.
# 15  Regardless of the part of the world in which actions occur, there are religions that justify attacks against innocent human beings.
# 38  If there are some terrorist activities carried out in country A against country B, country B’s fight against these activities in the territory of country A without declaring war can be defined as state-terrorism.

The general view of the most-disagreed statements in the Factor A composite array depicts some interesting results that can be connected to some of the most-agreed statements in the same array. Out of five statements ranked as -5 and -4 three statements are related to “religious terrorism” (#6, #33 and #11), and two statements (#11 and #38) are about “international-state terrorism.”

The statements regarding religious terrorism clearly reject the idea that ideologies of terrorists could be based on religious values. In two of the statements explicitly (statement #6) and implicitly (statement #33) participants deny that Islam allows terrorism. In addition to Islam, the participants believe that no religion in the world allows violence against innocent victims (statement #15). This issue also correlates with the participants’ belief that no truly-interpreted religion allows civilians to be targets of terrorist acts (statement #24), which was ranked as +5 in the same array. As a result, it can be stated that religions themselves are not the sources of terrorism, but their
misinterpretations. However, it is not clear from the statements whether misinterpretations are done on purpose or as a result of ignorance.

The remaining two statements in this group (statements #11 and #38) should be assessed together with statement #20 that was ranked as +4 in the same composite sort. In light of those three statements the participants’ understanding regarding international-state terrorism emerges. For the participants, what qualifies as terrorism is a state’s actions in another state’s territory that the targets civilians. On the other hand, a state’s use of force against terrorist organizations whose target is that particular state, but operating in another state’s territory, is not considered terrorism (international-state terrorism) by the participants of Factor A. As a result, the criterion that renders terrorism is the target factor of the actions. The participants’ answers also indicated that human casualties used as human shields to conceal the state’s ultimate target qualify as terrorism. It is clear for the participants that wherever there are civilian casualties the action is identified as terrorism.

The participants ranked the following statements as +3:

# 9 It is unjust to consider people fighting the occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorists or insurgents simply because they are against the social values imposed by the occupiers.

# 16 Although separatist movements may address their messages to the government, it is human beings that are affected by their actions, and this is what qualifies those groups as terrorists.

# 49 The use of Islamic teachings to justify political overthrow has, in fact, no other meaning than the misinterpretation and misuse of those teachings in support of the organization’s ideology.

# 50 As long as they are illegal, all separatist movements are terroristic by nature since they aim at overthrowing the sovereignty of states.
The following are the statements that were ranked as -3 by the participants of Factor A:

# 17 In terms of sending a message to the government by committing acts against people, there is not much difference between a violent environmental activist group and an illegal separatist movement.

# 25 If the target of a separatist movement is military or security personnel, then the attacks are considered guerilla activities. However, if the target is civilians, then they are terrorist acts.

# 39 A state should be able to support groups operating against another state’s political system as long as the supported group’s target is government forces and not civilians.

# 41 Revolutionary groups may target state forces, but their action is actually in response to government terrorism.

Seven out of eight statements in this group are about one single broad topic: “indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation.” The only remaining statement (statement #49) is about religious terrorism, and it states that Islamic teachings are misinterpreted and misused in favor of terrorist organizations’ ideologies. The researcher views this last statement as supportive to the discussion of Factor A participants’ beliefs about religious terrorism discussed above, and relates its inferior ranking to the “forced distribution” of statements in Q methodology.

In terms of the state’s indivisible unity, the participants do not distinguish between their own states and other states: the state is “divine” (the researcher’s labeling), and should be protected from all kinds of confrontations against its presence and unity. Statement #39 shows this belief of participants regarding other states and governments.

According to Article 1 of Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), "state" means a geographic sovereign political entity with a permanent population, a defined territory, and a government. The “state” is based on existence of all

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6 The phrase is taken from the terrorism definition in the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act.
of those four components at the same time. However, acts such as revolutionary and separatist movements or foreign occupation threaten both the components and the state. An evaluation of the statements ranked as +3 and -3 in Factor A reveals that the participants consider all acts targeting the state’s components as terrorism. For the participants, all separatist (statement #50) and revolutionary (statement #41) movements are terrorism, since they target the sovereignty of governments and the unity of the territory. Since military or security personnel are also considered a part of the “state” like civilians (the people) attacks against those personnel are also regarded as terrorism (statement #25).

The participants do not justify violence against government even if its activities are perceived as unjust. Any revolutionary movements against the state depending on that perception are acts of terrorism (statement #41). This understanding may stem from the perception of “divineness” of the state, which means that the state is given priority to individual interests.

Evaluation of statements #16, #25 and #50 jointly makes more sense than evaluating them independently. Overall, the pattern of the fit of these statements shows that all separatist movements are terrorism regardless of the immediate target (civilians or security forces) or the ultimate target (the government). Although this last issue (bifocality of terrorist acts) resembles violence by environmentalists, participants of Factor A do not consider such acts to be as important as those by separatists in terms of labeling them as acts of terrorism.
Finally, participants in Factor A consider that citizens have the right to defend their states (statement #9). The participants do not think that people fighting against foreign invasion deserve being labeled as terrorists or insurgents since they are resisting social values imposed by occupiers of their states.

The remaining statements in the composite factor array (model Q sort for Factor A) are also important in the evaluation of the entire composite array due to their positions relative to the other statements that were assigned higher rankings. In general, obedience to the government is observed and freedom fighting is supported, but terrorist acts emanating from either entity are not. Vigilante acts and single-issue violence (attacks targeting abortion clinics, those by environmentalists and animal rights activists, etc.) are not considered terrorism as strongly as other issues discussed above, such as accepting the “state” as perpetrator of terrorist acts, denial of truly-interpreted religious teachings as source of terrorism, consideration of attacks against unity of the state as terrorism, and support for the concept of freedom-fighting.

The evaluation of the highly-ranked statements in the composite factor array for Factor A’s unified and coherent attitude mainly focused on the acceptance of “state terrorism” as a term and rejection of the idea that truly interpreted religions justify terrorism. In light of the coherent theme, the theme that distinguishes the factor perspective, the researcher preferred to label Factor A “conformist.” Although this label may have negative connotations, the intention of the researcher is to illustrate that for the participants in Factor A the “state” has the highest priority both in domestic affairs and in
the international relations when it comes to defining terrorism. There are three sub-themes that helped determine the overall coherent theme.

The first sub-theme demonstrated that participants of Factor A strongly believed that no religion sanctions violence against civilian targets unless it is misinterpreted. Statements #6, 15, 24, 33 and 50 support this theme.

The second sub-theme for Factor A involves the issue of state terrorism. While the participants of the factor believe that there is such a thing as state terrorism and its several manifestations (international state and state-sponsored terrorism) they nevertheless disapprove of it. Statements #11, 21 and 39 support this theme.

The third sub-theme relates to the unity of the state. This theme shows the participants’ strong conviction about the “divineness” of the state and their condemning attitude towards all acts of terrorism against the unity of the state. The participants label acts threatening either the divineness or the unity of the state as terrorism. This theme rejects any separatist and revolutionary movements against the state, and requires resistance against such acts. Statements #9, 16, 17, 25, 38, 41 and 49 support this theme.

The emergent themes from Factor A differ from those in Factor B. The following discusses the results form Factor B and its emerging themes.

*Factor B*

A composite Q sort for Factor B is illustrated in Figure 4.2 (for the original Answer Sheet see Appendix A). The characteristics of the members of the P set whose Q sorts were clustered as Factor B can be found in the table located in Appendix F.
Most disagree with Neutral, no opinion Most agree with

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-5</th>
<th>-4</th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>51</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.2 Statement Q sort composite for Factor B

Out of 30 participants, 12 participants, all of whom were US citizens, loaded on Factor B. Those 12 participants consisted of 5 prosecutors, 3 police officers, 1 county commissioner, 1 state house member, 1 Attorney General and 1 state senator. For clarification Table 4.2 shows factor loadings and characteristics of the participants in Factor B.
Table 4.2 Factor Loadings, Nationality Profession of Participants in Factor B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJ2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>(73)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP4</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>(66)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(66)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP5</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>County Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ4</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL5</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL4</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ1</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP2</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>State House Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>(54)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Attorney General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Prosecutor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Code= participant code number
( )= defining factor loadings to two decimal points

Since the method of analysis has been discussed during the examination of Factor A (see p.110), I will proceed with the analysis of Factor B’s high ranking statements. Just as Factor A was almost totally represented by the Turkish participants, this factor is uniquely represented by the US participants; hence, it reflects the opinions of the participants from the United States. The factor loadings of the two remaining US participants did not fit in either of the factors within the framework of this research.

Participants of Factor B agreed with the following statements and ranked them as +5 “most-agreed:”

# 18  It is not the ideology of freedom fighters that qualifies them as terrorists, but their inhumane acts.
# 26  Bombing an abortion clinic is a violent activity against people and property. The action itself has an ideology and therefore should be considered terrorism.
The following statements were ranked as +4:

# 7  Targeting human beings is not the sine qua non of terrorism. The destruction of public facilities and transportation systems (e.g., as committed by the PKK) are also terrorist incidents.

# 34 The Al-Qaeda attack against the USS Cole would suffice for the organization to be called terrorist, since the ship was not involved in combat at the time of the incident.

# 54 Nationalist, ethnic, religious, cultural or economic revolutionary groups gain the status of terrorist groups when they employ terrorism as a strategy to weaken current legitimate political systems.

No dominant themes emerged here in those most-agreed statements as did in Factor A. The participants of Factor B accept different facts as components of terrorism in those statements, such as the existence of a political ideology (statement #26), violence against social values (statement #7) or noncombatants (statement #34) and weakening of legitimate political systems as purpose of terrorist acts (statement #54). In addition, the participants differentiate between terrorism and freedom fighting, and support the idea that what labels freedom fighters as terrorists is their involvement in inhumane acts (statement #18). Since participants of Factor B are US citizens they probably have experienced terrorism to a lesser extent than the Turkish citizens who are participants of Factor A. This explains the fact that the most-agreed statements do not cluster under one or two topics since the issue of terrorism is a theoretical one as opposed to those in Factor A who experienced terrorism repeatedly in reality.

The following statements were ranked as -5, “most-disagreed,” in the Factor B composite array (model Q sort for Factor B):

# 4 Since they aim to punish those who oppose social values, vigilante acts should not be considered as terrorism.

# 6 Al Qaeda’s fight against Western values is based on Islamic principles, hence cannot properly be regarded as terrorist.

The participants in Factor B ranked the following statements as -4:

# 9 It is unjust to consider people fighting the occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorists or insurgents simply because they are against the social values imposed by the occupiers.

# 27 Chechen fighters’ acts against innocent civilians were insufficient to justify a change in label from “freedom fighters” to “terrorists.”

# 42 Hezbollah’s attacks against Israeli troops during Israel’s invasion into South Lebanon were based on religion and should therefore not be considered terrorist.

In this group statement #27 shows consistency with statement #18 (ranked as +5) in terms of changing the label of freedom fighting to terrorist. The essence of the statements is that it is the terrorist tactics that cause freedom fighters to be labeled terrorists. However, the participants do not accept people of Iraq or of Afghanistan who fight against the occupiers as freedom fighters, but view them as terrorists (statement #9).

The participants in this factor accept both Hezbollah (statement #42) and Al-Qaeda (statement #6) as terrorist organizations. However, it is not clear by examining only those two statements whether the participants believe in religious terrorism or simply regard the actions of those organizations as terroristic. This issue should also be evaluated with the participants’ attitudes towards statements placing more emphasis on religion as a source of terrorism.

In addition, vigilante acts were given the highest ranking (+5) by the participants (statement #4). Since in the examined group there is no other statement showing perceptions of the participants towards the state, it is not reasonable to evaluate this
statement alone. However, depending on the rankings on other statements, the researcher can confer a more specific interpretation to this statement.

The participants ranked the following statements as +3:

#11 States like Israel in Palestine and the USA in Afghanistan are not responsible for civilian casualties when civilians are used as human shields to cover strategic targets. Such states cannot be accused of terrorism.

#14 Regardless of the state policies that they may dislike, the main target of revolutionary groups is people, and for this reason they can be categorized as terrorist groups.

#17 In terms of sending a message to the government by committing acts against people, there is not much difference between a violent environmental activist group and an illegal separatist movement.

#24 No truly-interpreted religion allows civilians’ lives to be the target of political gains.

The following are the statements that were ranked as -3 by the participants of Factor B:

#5 In today’s world, states have their own social values and legitimate ways for changing those values. Any other methods used for this purpose are clearly acts of terrorism.

#12 Terrorism is used as a kind of warfare between states in today’s world. This is a new rule of international relations, and it is not just or ethical for states to be called terrorist for that.

#29 If two neighboring states, say India and Pakistan, occasionally attack each other’s military facilities and border monitoring stations, these are clearly acts of terrorism.

#41 Revolutionary groups may target state forces, but their action is actually in response to government terrorism.

The main theme emerging from this group of statements is that terrorism is not seen as an international phenomenon. Rather, it is seen as mainly referring to domestic issues. In that connection, three statements (#5, 14 and 41) support the idea that governmental regulations should be respected and all other acts should be considered
terrorism. When conflicts spill over to the international arena, the participants in Factor B do not perceive them as acts of terrorism, and refer to them with some other terms (statements #12 and 29).

In domestic politics single-issue terrorism is given as much importance as separatist movements. Evaluated together with statement #26 (ranked as +5), violence against abortion clinics and violence by environmentalists (statement #17) are clearly considered as acts of terrorism.

From a number of statements in this group the researcher infers that the US participants have respect for the concept of “state” and its authority to make its own rules in international relations, at least from the vantage point of terrorism. As in the example of statement #29, clashes between two states against each other’s noncombatant targets are not considered terrorism. Similarly, during an invasion of a country, civilian casualties caused by the invading state are not considered as a pretext for the act to be named as terrorism.

The general attitude of factor B’s participants towards religious terrorism is contradictory. In statement #24 the participants do not accept that truly-interpreted religions allow civilians’ lives to be the target of political gains. On the other hand, the participants also support that there are some religions in the world that justify attacks against innocent human beings (statement #15 ranked as +2). The discrepancy may stem from the fact that the participants evaluate religions as a whole, with all of their interpretations and the actions that seem to be emanate from those religions. The remaining statements that were assigned relatively lower rankings do not diverge from
the general picture established by the participants’ perceptions about the state and religion, which was drawn by the other statements as discussed above.

The examination of the highly-ranked statements in the composite factor array for Factor B to investigate the factor’s unified and coherent attitude allowed the researcher to label the factor “permissive,” as opposed to the label “conformist” for Factor A. This was the case due to the participants’ general understanding of the “state,”7 Three sub themes prevalent in the data supported this overall coherent theme.

The first sub-theme is the respondents’ emergent belief in the rightful actions of the state both domestically and internationally. Therefore, for the participants the state cannot be a terrorist, and even causing civilian casualties is not an exception to this general rule (statement #11). Whatever is done against the state could be considered terrorism, even if those counter-actions are taken by local people fighting against the occupying state (statement #9). In addition, all vigilante acts are considered terrorism since, basically it might show lack of confidence in the state’s provision of justice (statement #4).

The second emergent sub-theme is that the country’s being subject to separation by terrorist attacks, and the power of government that may appear in the form of terrorism are not much of a concern for the participants associated with this composite factor array. On the other hand, revolutionary movements against the state are highly condemned and considered acts of terrorism (statements #14, 41, 54).

———

7 Governmental regulations must be respected; states can mostly be targets of revolutionary terrorism; states are involved in terrorist acts neither against their own people nor other governments nor other nations.
The third sub-theme correlates with single-issue terrorism. The participants highly ranked the statements regarding violence against abortion clinics and violent acts perpetrated by environmentalists as terrorism (statements #26, 17). This understanding of terrorism can be traced back to the pre-September 11, 2001 period. At that time terrorism was explained by emphasizing “political motivation” whereas the post-September 11 focus has been on religions as motivators or states as perpetrators.

Figure 4.3 displays the relationships among various opinions about the concept of terrorism graphically.

![Figure 4.3 Graphic displaying the factor structure](image-url)
Up to this point the analyses of the composite Q sorts have been made separately, and the statements that are similarly ranked in the factors have been referred to wherever determined. The researcher will manage the issue of consensus statements to systematically examine the congruent statements between the factors.

Consensus Statements

Consensus statements are those that do not distinguish between the two factors which in this case are Factor A (whose individuals are predominantly Turkish) and Factor B (whose individuals are US citizens). The PQMethod software used for the analysis of the data provided us with such a big number of 20 consensus statements (18 statements are significant at \( p < .01 \) and 2 were significant at \( p < .05 \)). Due to the difficulty of handling so many consensus statements, the researcher examined only the statements that have the same ranking in both composite factors arrays (Table 4.10), but ignored others with different rankings. Four out of the determined 10 consensus statements meeting that criterion were assigned the ranking of 0; however, there are also statements ranked the same from -5 to +4.

The researcher concluded that the participants placed statements under lower rankings after observing the difficulty the participants’ experienced in abiding by the rule of forced distribution during the sorting procedures. This was especially the case when the participants did not have clear-cut opinions. To control for systematic error of low-ranking due to uncertainty, only the statements that were assigned high rankings are discussed below.
Among those high-ranking statements the consensus was provided at -5 with statement #6 regarding Al Qaeda’s label as a terrorist organization. That statement clearly accepts that Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization. However, a more detailed discussion is needed to explain the interpretation of the second part of the question, which is about the foundation of Al Qaeda on religious principles. The participants’ response to the statement might mean two things: Al Qaeda is based on Islamic principles, or it is not. In both cases it is a terrorist organization and the participants in both composite arrays support this idea at the highest level. On the other hand, in accordance with the other statements regarding religious terrorism where the participants of Factor A declined religion as a motivator of terrorist acts, it can be inferred that the same group of participants do not accept that Al Qaeda is based on religious principles. However, since the participants in Factor B have some mixed opinions about religious terrorism, it is not so easily possible to establish such a straightforward expression for that factor.

Statement #7 is about recognizing public facilities and transportation systems among social values and acceptance of acts destroying them as terroristic. Analyzed together with the preferences about the other statements, the participants of Factor B, who are US citizens, can be said to have been influenced by attacks against abortion clinics and material damage caused by environmentalists, and especially the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 which were against both people and property. Similarly, the participants of Factor A, who are predominantly Turkish (with the exception of one person), might have been influence by their own internal circumstances in their views
since the PKK organization has attacked schools, construction machinery and public buildings.

Summary of the Results

Chapter IV of this dissertation addressed the results of the data analysis. The chapter began with an overview of how the two factors emerged and presented separate analyses of both factors. The consensus statements were examined in a separate section in search for congruence between the factors.

The statements in the Q sort were originally prepared to measure the way participants from differing occupations dealing with terrorism across two states view the concept terrorism. The occupations included police officers, members of parliament, advisors to parliament members, prosecutors (active or retired), lawyers, mayor, state senator, county commissioner, state house member and Attorney General, while the two states were Turkey and the United States.

The data analysis provided an additional result, namely the participants’ perceptions of the “state.” The data analysis identified two factors each of which was almost exclusively populated by participants from one of the two nationalities (either Turkish or US). Fourteen out of 15 participants in Factor A are Turkish, while all of the 12 participants in Factor B are US citizens. Although there is one citizen of the US in Factor A, she has the lowest loading in the factor.

The different perceptions of the “state” also contribute to understanding the differences between perceptions regarding the terrorism concept. The statements in the Q sort were prepared to include all types of political terrorism; however, in the light of the
### Table 4.3 Consensus Statements for Factors A and B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>CONSENSUS STATEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 In acts of violence by the government, individual guilt is less important than collective obedience, and this encourages feelings of injustice among people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>2 It is a mistake to label as terrorism some countries’ actions against people in other countries. Those are not acts of terrorism, but clashes of civilizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 Since they supported the Marxist government of Afghanistan—which opposed conventional values, came to power by a coup, and was involved in acts of terrorism—the Soviets could also be considered terrorist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>6 Al Qaeda’s fight against Western values are based on Islamic principles, hence cannot properly be regarded as terrorist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>7 Targeting human beings is not the sine qua non of terrorism. The destruction of public facilities and transportation systems (e.g., as committed by the PKK) are also terrorist incidents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>1 When directed against human beings to change their behaviors towards the government, random arrests (e.g., during Stalin’s administration) are acts of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 It is inappropriate to label the Ku Klux Klan’s acts as “hate crimes.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 It is a terrorist organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 The purpose of peacekeeping forces is the furtherance of the peace process. In the light of this humanitarian purpose, therefore, all acts against peacekeeping forces by local revolutionary groups should be considered as terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>4 Revolutionary groups may target state forces, but their action is actually in response to government terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>4 Policies such as those regarding the environment, gender preferences, or animals reflect a country’s socio-political system. Activities within the context of issues such as these and that are committed outside legal boundaries are acts of terrorism since they aim to weaken the state’s socio-political system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
literature review done for this dissertation, the researcher expected the differences to appear around the most controversial types of terrorism, such as state and religious terrorism. The results confirmed those expectations.

The state presented the highest priority in definitions of terrorism in Factor A, both as target and as actor of terrorist acts. The participants have respect for the complex phenomenon of the state, which consists of the government, territory, people and sovereignty. All the actions directed against those components are clearly considered terrorism from the standpoint of the individuals in Factor A. The sources of these actions could be domestic, as well as international, and there are some states involved in terrorism.

The participants in Factor B have respect for the rightfulness of the “state,” and they conceive it as a non-separable entity. Only revolutionary acts could threaten the state, which are clearly defined as “terrorism” by the participants. In their perceptions the state is not an active agent of terrorism, and it is only involved when it is the target of revolutionary movements. Besides, participants in Factor B support the idea that there are some states in the world that are ruled by dictators, and those rulers may be involved in government terrorism (statement #19). However, this statement was not assigned a high ranking, and it completely referred to states other than the US.

Participants of Factor B are not concerned with the state at the same level as those in Factor A. They have few concerns about the state’s actions both in domestic and international affairs. It can also be inferred that Factor B participants view the state as capable of defending itself, so it does not need the support of the people. On the other
hand, the participants in Factor A perceive themselves as a piece of the complex entity of the state. This difference provided the basis for the researcher’s label of “conformist” for Factor A, and “permissive” for Factor B. Those in Factor A considered that the state should always be given the highest priority because it is subject to terrorist attacks from internal and external groups. The participants in Factor A support the state’s unity, but also acknowledge its vulnerability against terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the participants of Factor B perceive themselves as distant from the state.

The second difference between the two factors is the participants’ assignment of priority to single-issue terrorism and vigilante acts. The Turkish participants do not consider those types of acts as important as the US participants. While the Turkish participants agree only with the term “environmental terrorism” by assigning the ranking of -3, and no higher rankings for the statements in this group, the US participants assigned +5 and +4 for statements regarding single issue terrorism, and -5 for vigilante acts. The preference of the participants in both groups reveals the importance assigned to single-issue and vigilante acts as manifestations of terrorism. While the American participants in Factor B assign high ranking to the statements about those two topics, the Turkish participants placed them in lower rankings. For Factor A the reason for such sorting may not be that they do not support labeling such acts as terrorism, but relative to the other statements, especially about state-terrorism and religions, the forced-distribution procedure might have led them to assign lower rankings to those statements. On the other hand, the participants in Factor B might have perceived vigilante and single-issue acts as terrorism and a challenge against the state’s unquestionable authority.
The third important difference is expressed in the perceptions of religions as a probable source of terrorism. Factor A participants assigned most of the highest rankings to that issue. They noted that religions cannot be sources of terrorism, and that it is the misinterpretation of religious teachings that render them sources of terrorism. On the other hand, the participants in Factor B show contradictory views about the issue of religion as a source of terrorism. Individuals in both factors indicate that some religions may justify terrorist acts, but participants in Factor A relate this fact to misinterpretation of religious teachings, and state that no truly-interpreted religion allows violence against civilians. On the other hand, it is not possible to draw an overall conclusion from the preferences of the participants in Factor B. Although they considered Al Qaeda and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations, their contradictory views about religions as possible sources of terrorism do not allow the researcher to make an inference about their opinions regarding the relationship between religions and terrorism.

Differences among participants’ perceptions regarding the freedom fighting vs. terrorism dilemma at the individual level may not be central in international relations. However the difference between the two perceptions is a significant issue. The overall attitude of the participants in Factor A is supportive of freedom fighting. However, their support is mitigated by the freedom fighter’s inhumane acts or violence against civilians. Although the support for those statements is at different, individuals in both factors are in agreement on the issue of freedom fighters. Nevertheless, when the participants in Factor B are asked about their rankings on the issue of current expressions of resistance in Iraq and in Afghanistan, they do not consider it free, and identify it as terrorism.
CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Statement of the Problem and Initial Discussion

The first sections of Chapter I presented the problem of lack of international cooperation against terrorism. The attempts to provide cooperation focus on an agreed-upon definition of terrorism; however, due to many reasons as discussed in Chapter II, it has not been possible and it does not seem likely that a definition of the concept upon which all states agree will be established in the near future. Part of the problem is an outcome of “national interest.” In other words, states do not want to accept a definition of terrorism that contradicts their perception of what is good for their nations. Nevertheless, what has been ignored in cooperation efforts against terrorism is an examination of whether nations have some intersecting common interests that may lead to a unified definition. There is no doubt that terrorism is a subjective phenomenon, and people’s understandings of it vary to a large extent. In spite of this subjectivity, in an effort to provide international cooperation among people, specifically among those who fight terrorism in their countries, this study explores the perceptions of “what constitutes terrorism.”

To examine the question of this dissertation the researcher first had to address an essential quandary, namely an understanding of the meaning or the formation of the
concept of terrorism. This was essential to understand since there is no common definition of the concept. As such it was necessary to gather all possible interpretations including those from which problems emerge, and systematically examine them. This examination allowed the author to develop a wide range of aspects that are included under the term terrorism. Once the various permutations of the concept terrorism were understood, they were then used to examine the major question of this dissertation.

Briefly, this dissertation study is unique in two ways. First, it examined the formation of the concept of terrorism from a philosophical perspective to scientifically explore the reasons for lack of a common definition. Second, it proposed and searched for the utility of eliciting the subjective understandings, as opposed to an “assumed” national one, for use in building international cooperation efforts regarding terrorism.

The first issue—understanding the formation of the concept of terrorism—was handled at a theoretical-universal level, and the claims made about it are assumed to be applicable regardless of national, ethnic, cultural or professional differences. The results of the comparative study have confirmed the assumption. The second issue was a comparative study using Q methodology about how various professionals working to fight terrorism in two countries, Turkey and the United States, understand terrorism. While it would have been ideal to conduct research in more than two countries, time and other resources rendered it difficult. However, a two country comparative design is a first step towards answering the major questions set up for this study. Participants from Turkey and the US working to fight terrorism included the following professions: politicians, law enforcement personnel and legal affairs officials. A Q sort based on the
findings of the formation of the concept of terrorism and the literature review was presented to the participants. The Turkish participants were provided with a translated Q sort, while those from the US reviewed the Q sort in English. The examination of the Q sort uncovered two factor groups, both of which revealed some significant differences regarding the perceptions of the concept of terrorism between the two countries. However, no significant differences among or between the professions were identified from the Q sort.

The following is a summary of the findings presented in terms of the two major research questions.

The First General Research Question

The first question this dissertation study set out to answer was “How is the concept of terrorism formed?” The details of the process followed to answer the question are in Chapter I under section “Concept Formation and Terrorism.” The analysis of the question was addressed theoretically by borrowing from philosophy. Based on such an analysis the researcher was able to establish a framework on meanings of terrorism to help answer the second research question about what influences people’s perceptions about the meaning of terrorism.

Formation of the Concept of Terrorism

The research began with an examination of the mental processes that people must go through to attach meanings to “terms.” This examination also revealed the facts regarding the emergence of different meanings for different people. The next stage was to apply the process to the definitions and meaning of the concept of terrorism. The
importance of this stage was that it helped show the “defects” often involved in defining a concept such as terrorism, and also showed the cures to correct those defects. The researcher determined that the problem with defining terrorism was that the term terrorism was ambiguous and the problem of ambiguity could be remedied by “declarative definitions.” The value of this finding was to show that the definition problem is not likely to be completely solved by “operational definitions” as in common practice.

This examination was followed by identifying the process of formation of the concept of terrorism. Since the researcher also wanted to use the findings of the formation in the research to answer the second general research question of this dissertation, he preferred to use a study that serves his purposes. Goertz’s (2006) study served the researcher’s purpose in two ways. First, it both classifies concepts into their components (dimensions). Second, it explains how those dimensions could relate to each other. The latter issue allowed the researcher to apply the philosophical structures of “necessary and sufficient conditions” and “family resemblance” among those dimensions.

Although the literature review (Chapter II) provided information about components of the concept of terrorism, it also showed that not many sources have explored how those components of terrorism are brought together to build the concept. There are such phrases as “the concept of terrorism does not have necessary and sufficient conditions, but different terrorist acts have characteristics that cause them to be addressed within the big picture of terrorism, just like members of a family are different
people but they look alike” (e.g., Daase, 2001). However, none of the studies reviewed showed how this idea of “resemblance” could be used in practice. The first general research question required a clarification of the dilemma between terrorism and such concepts as war, propaganda, guerilla warfare and civil society movements. The examination of the “negative pole” of the concept of terrorism provided the basis of such a clarification. Table 1.1 proposes a solution to explain the differences between terrorism and other concepts that are incorrectly and interchangeably used with terrorism. In that table, the terms placed in the negative pole of the concept of terrorism were discovered through negation of the secondary-level dimensions. In each step of the negation of the secondary level dimensions a different concept emerged in the negative pole of the concept of terrorism, which illustrates the source of the problem. The evolving dimensions of the terrorism concept provided during this part of the research were used in the formation of the Q sort to answer the second general research question.

The Second General Research Question

The second general research question asked about what contributes to people’s perceptions of terrorism. More particularly with the use of Q methodology the question was “what factors emerge from participants’ responses to a Q sort prepared to measure their perceptions about the concept of terrorism?” The Q sort that was prepared to answer this question focused on finding out whether professions and nationalities influenced perceptions of terrorism. The overall findings of this part of the analysis were that nationalities play a significant role in shaping people’s understandings of the terrorism
concept, while the researcher did not observe any significant variation among the understandings of people from different professions. However, as explained in the following sections, more focused research is needed to provide more conclusive results regarding the commonalities and differences about the meaning of terrorism according to professional variation.

**Q Sorts Factors Contributing to the Meaning of Terrorism across Professions and Nationalities**

The analysis of the data collected through the use of the Q sorts revealed two factors, the details of which were described in Chapter IV. The two emerging factors depended almost exclusively on nationality differences, while the differences in professions of the participants did not have a significant effect.

Participants of the first factor (Factor A) consisted of 15 people: 14 Turkish (from all three groups of professions) and 1 US citizen (a politician). On the other hand, all 12 participants of Factor B were US citizens. Therefore, the researcher occasionally refers to Factor A as the Turkish factor, and to Factor B as the US factor. The remaining 2 US and 1 Turkish participants’ factor loadings did not fit into either of the factors, hence were left out of the analysis.

Due to the coherent theme shared by the participants of each group, the researcher labeled each factor to describe the characteristics/themes of each group’s perception. The labels are “conformist” for Factor A, and “permissive” for Factor B. More information about the labels and emergent themes will be presented for each factor separately. Since
detailed results of the Q sort were already discussed separately for each factor in Chapter IV, the following summarizes the highlights of the significant findings.

**Factor A (Conformist)**

The state and religions are given the highest priority by the participants of Factor A. For those participants no religions justify attacks against civilians, but religions are also shown to be sources of terrorism through misinterpretation of their teachings. States, on the other hand, are involved in terrorism, both domestically and through perpetrating terrorist acts in other countries and sponsoring terrorist organizations struggling against foreign governments. States could be targets of terrorism by citizens who are involved in separatist or revolutionary movements. However, the participants of Factor A are not supportive or approving of such terrorist activities. The researcher observes that the participants of Factor A towards both religion and the state, are one of conformity. Their belief in all religions is strong and they argue that religions properly interpreted have nothing to do with terroristic violence. The research results show unwavering respect for and belief in religions and the state’s benevolence, as well as respect for the state’s authority separate from the people.

In Turkey the state is referred to as “the father,” and the country as “the mother.” While the father symbolizes authority, the mother is the symbol of affection. The father is more revered and is able to acts more independently (with less accountability) than the other members of the family. These perceptions conform to the findings of the Q sort regarding the state and its terrorism actions with the Turkish group. The state is as highly revered as religion, and its authority is not questioned—even if it misuses it through
violence. As a result while the state may get involved in terrorist acts, revering its unity and authority makes it over and above any rapprochement (in the form of attack on state symbols). Hence retaliation against the state for any reason is strongly condemned by this group.

**Factor B (Permissive)**

No common themes emerge within Factor B, comparable to Factor A’s religion or the state. No clear pattern of answers emerges from the participants’ views about whether religions could be sources of terrorism. Terrorism is not seen as an international phenomenon, but as an issue that relates mostly to domestic affairs. For the participants states cannot be actors of terrorism; when they are involved in disputes with other states or people of other countries their involvement is different from terrorism. Both domestically and internationally all actions of the state are right, and all governmental regulations should be respected. Therefore, all revolutionary movements are considered terrorism (since they are against the state), as well as all vigilante acts (since they deny mediation of the “fair” state in disputes). Due to the general attitude of the participants towards the state, the researcher labels Factor B “permissive.” Compared to the participants in Factor A, those of Factor B are indifferent to and have less respect for the authority of the state.

**Convergence among the Two Factors, The Conformist and The Permissive**

As discussed in detail in Chapter II, there are several types of terrorism that relate to either domestic or international issues, or both. For example, vigilante acts could be
considered a domestic problem, while state sponsored terrorism is directly related to international relations. Similarly, a revolutionary movement could be considered a domestic issue, unless it is supported by foreign actors. The important point in this discussion is that any effort to provide international cooperation against terrorism must first clarify the status of the particular “terrorist” act in terms of being domestic or having international extensions. For example, US citizens may have no role in helping the Turkish people against local revolutionary movements in Turkey (with no foreign support of any kind). Similarly, Turkish citizens have no grounds for assisting the US people against local vigilante acts, even though many people of both national groups may agree that vigilante acts are terroristic.

From that perspective (domestic vs. international), the data analysis revealed that in general there are two issues that can be the focus of international cooperation against terrorism: state and religious terrorism. Therefore, the remainder of this section will summarize the congruence between the two factors in relation to religious and state terrorism.

As discussed above, the opinion of the participants of Factor A about religion as a motivator of terrorism is much clearer than that of the participants of the Factor B. In other words, the Turkish participants distinguish between truly interpreted religions and their misinterpretations in terms of being motivators of terrorist acts. To illustrate, while the participants were asked about a particular terrorist organization’s (Al Qaeda) reliance on religious teachings and being a terrorist organization, they regarded it as a terrorist organization in both factors. The implication of this finding could be that participants
from different nationalities should be asked more specific questions. Instead of being asked about all religions, they should be asked about certain organizations or events.

With regards to the second issue, “state terrorism,” the analysis of the data revealed that the participants’ perceptions concerning that type of terrorism are deeply rooted in their regard and attitude toward the state. The researcher does not consider it likely that, in generalizing the findings of the Q sort, the Turkish people, who view the state as an authoritative and independently-acting entity, could easily cooperate on state terrorism with the US people, who have little concern about the role of the state in international affairs.

Implications for Practice

This dissertation study was based on the observation that international cooperation against terrorism is impeded by lack of a common definition of the concept. The researcher’s overall findings show that, although such expressions seem to aim at analyzing and then at solving the problem, they further complicate it. The dissertation first questions whether there is a common national interest in terms of fighting terrorism. It then proposes that perceptions of people fighting terrorism should be taken into account in establishing the meaning of the concept of terrorism at different levels (professional or national). Only after such a process is completed can cooperation initiatives become constructive.

The review of the related literature showed that there are different types of terrorism, and international cooperation may not be necessary for every one of those types. First of all, the areas in which international cooperation is needed should be
determined. As explained in the previous section, vigilante acts may be considered completely domestic, and no international cooperation may be needed. Therefore, the types of terrorism against which opportunities of cooperation is sought should be determined firsthand.

Another implication of this study may be that the current cooperation efforts target the whole state with all institutions regardless of their opinions about the issue. However, such a generalized solution may not be necessary, but inter-institutional cooperation might be both more realistic and lucrative. Those particular institutions are the ones which put cooperation efforts in practice, not the whole state and society.

Limitations of the Study

The researcher encountered several limitations at different stages of the dissertation research. The following is a review of each one of them.

This dissertation is a comparative study, and it required research in two different countries: Turkey and the United States. Being enrolled in a doctoral program in the United States, the researcher prepared the statements that would be used in the research in English, and then translated them into Turkish. Translation of the terms did not constitute a problem due to the developed terrorism terminology in Turkey. However, the Turkish participants occasionally asked about cases placed in the statements that were more specific to the US experience, such as the USS Cole, Dirty Harry, Ku Klux Klan, etc. It is not expected of the Turkish participants to know all about those cases, but the researcher observed that once the participant asked a question about a statement s/he would generally place such a statement at a lesser degree than the other statements about
which the participant did not have a question. The researcher tried to cope with that problem by giving the necessary information about that kind of statements in advance. However, the researcher remains concerned but suspicious about the forcing of participants to sort out issues with which they were not very familiar.

Securing individuals to participate in the research was a major problem in both of the countries. Although the methodology used in the dissertation (Q methodology) does not require a large number of participants, reaching those people and inviting them to participate in the research was a major obstacle in the research in the United States. Once the researcher reached the prospective participants and invited them for an interview the US participants were very helpful. Some participants explained that they were free to express their opinions because they were living in a democratic country. They also added that they have to abide by law regardless of their opinions.

On the other hand, the researcher faced several problems in two out of three professional groups selected for interview in Turkey. The researcher’s visit to the Turkish National Parliament coincided with a busy schedule for the parliament members. Therefore, it was difficult to contact five politicians who were willing to spend about 30 minutes responding to interview questions. As a result the researcher interviewed 2 parliament members and 3 advisors to parliament members with the assumption that they also think similarly to the parliament members. The problem could have been avoided by stretching the schedule for the interviews over a longer period of time. However, this was not possible for the researcher since it would require spending more time in Turkey and using up more resources than were available to the researcher. Similarly, the researcher
could not find any active judges or prosecutors who were willing to participate in the interview. Although the researcher assured them about the confidentiality of their identification they did not change their opinion. They wanted the researcher to obtain permission from the High Board of Judges and Prosecutors, again a process that would have required more time and resources than was available to the researcher. As a result, the researcher interviewed 2 retired prosecutors and 3 lawyers with the assumption that the lawyers are the pool from which judges are selected and that they also receive the same education as judges and prosecutors.

“Terrorism” is known to be a field with extensive literature. In terms of the number of written sources, it is true. On the other hand, the researcher determined that the sources either examine a limited number of issues about terrorism over and over, or write about specific cases, or are written subjectively and often with prejudice. Additionally, most of the studies are not written systematically. Moreover, there is disagreement on almost every issue including types and components of terrorism. In every step of the study, the researcher had to select from the existing literature by showing the reasons for his preference. The criteria determining such a preference, however, have been all guided by requirements of the research questions and the methodology.

Future Directions in Related Research

The dissertation study is the first in the field of terrorism to develop a wide ranging conceptual framework of the meaning of terrorism and use it to explore the influence of professions and nationalities of such a concept. As such the study had a
number of limitations. However, it is the opinion of the researcher that the study has laid
down the foundations for future research work both by the researcher himself and others.

Future research using Q methodology is needed to explore the differences in
perception of terrorism among different professions working with terrorism in the same
and different states. Such research will need to carefully select the participants and
requires more time and resources than was available for the writing of this dissertation.
Also similarities of perception about terrorism among the different professions working
with it are essential to establish through systematic research.

The researcher proposes a research design to accomplish this objective. The
proposal first requires determination of the concepts that are confusing or
interchangeably used, and then preparing a separate category for each one of those
concepts. Afterwards, for each category four or five statements (similar to those that were
used in this dissertation research) should be prepared. After each statement participants
should be asked to categorize their opinion about the degree they perceive the act on the
statement as terroristic. For the purpose of recording their preferences a Likert scale (e.g.,
from 0 to 5) could be used. The questionnaires could be filled out by people from
different professions from a number of countries. However, the number of the
participants should be larger than that of the participants in this dissertation study.

During the analysis of the data collected interaction terms could be developed,
such as politicians and country A citizens, police officers from country A and police
officers country B, etc. Several regression analyses could be run including those
interactions to explore the variations in the perceptions of the participants quantitatively.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A

Blank Q Sort Sheet
APPENDIX B

Q Sort in English
Q STATEMENTS

1- In acts of violence by the government, individual guilt is less important than collective obedience, and this encourages feelings of injustice among people.

2- It is a mistake to label as terrorism some countries’ actions against people in other countries. Those are not acts of terrorism, but clashes of civilizations.

3- Since they supported the Marxist government of Afghanistan—which opposed conventional values, came to power by a coup, and was involved in acts of terrorism—the Soviets could also be considered terrorist.

4- Since they aim to punish those who oppose social values, vigilante acts should not be considered as terrorism.

5- In today’s world, states have their own social values and legitimate ways for changing those values. Any other methods used for this purpose are clearly acts of terrorism.

6- Al Qaeda’s fight against Western values are based on Islamic principles, hence cannot properly be regarded as terrorism.

7- Targeting human beings is not the sine qua non of terrorism. The destruction of public facilities and transportation systems (e.g., as committed by the PKK) are also terrorist incidents.

8- The existence of institutions (e.g., schools, abortion clinics, stock markets, etc.) reflects people’s social values. Any illegal act against those institutions should therefore be considered an act of terror.

9- It is unjust to consider people fighting the occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorists or insurgents simply because they are against the social values imposed by the occupiers.

10-When directed against human beings to change their behaviors towards the government, random arrests (e.g., during Stalin’s administration) are acts of terrorism.

11- States like Israel in Palestine and the USA in Afghanistan are not responsible for civilian casualties when civilians are used as human shields to cover strategic targets. Such states cannot be accused of terrorism.

12- Terrorism is used as a kind of warfare between states in today’s world. This is a new rule of international relations, and it is not just or ethical for states to be called terrorist for that.
13- When people take the law into their own hands, as in vigilante groups, they are concerned with creating justice, which is political in nature. But in this way they resemble terrorist organizations and their struggle against the state, and should therefore be considered terrorist.

14- Regardless of the state policies that they may dislike, the main target of revolutionary groups is people, and for this reason they can be categorized as terrorist groups.

15- Regardless of the part of the world in which actions occur, there are religions that justify attacks against innocent human beings.

16- Although separatist movements may address their messages to the government, it is human beings that are affected by their actions, and this is what qualifies those groups as terrorists.

17- In terms of sending a message to the government by committing acts against people, there is not much difference between a violent environmental activist group and an illegal separatist movement.

18- It is not the ideology of freedom fighters that qualifies them as terrorists, but their inhumane acts.

19- Dictators are terrorists since they act against their own people—e.g., Cambodia’s Pol Pot, Uganda’s Idi Amin Dada, and Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir.

20- Systematic and intentionally violent acts by Israel against Palestinian civilians are a sort of terrorism.

21- By providing logistics, shelter, and training to the PKK, or by failing to recognize it as a terrorist organization, many Western states sponsor the PKK, and can therefore be considered as engaging in state-sponsored terrorism.

22- It is inappropriate to label the Ku Klux Klan’s acts as “hate crimes.” It is a terrorist organization.

23- Revolutionary acts of violence are aimed at the state’s ideology or structure, and they can be justified as long as they are not committed against civilians.

24- No truly-interpreted religion allows civilians’ lives to be the target of political gains.

25- If the target of a separatist movement is military or security personnel, then the attacks are considered guerilla activities. However, if the target is civilians, then they are terrorist acts.
26- Bombing an abortion clinic is a violent activity against people and property. The action itself has an ideology and therefore should be considered terrorism.

27- Chechen fighters’ acts against innocent civilians were insufficient to justify a change in label from “freedom fighters” to “terrorists.”

28- Limiting fundamental freedoms is an act of terrorism (e.g., what Saddam Hussein did after he became Iraq’s president in 1979), since acts such as these are directed against the current political system.

29- If two neighboring states, say India and Pakistan, occasionally attack each other’s military facilities and border monitoring stations, these are clearly acts of terrorism.

30- There may be some situations in which a country is under occupation and some local organizations attack the military facilities of the invader in that country. Those attacks should be seen as guerilla warfare (not terrorism), and so it is not fair to call other states that assist those organizations sponsors of terrorism.

31- I see no reason for people like Dirty Harry to be called terrorists. Although what he did was against the law, he did it for the good of the people he was serving.

32- The purpose of peacekeeping forces is the furtherance of the peace process. In the light of this humanitarian purpose, therefore, all acts against peacekeeping forces by local revolutionary groups should be considered as terrorism.

33- Recitation of religious words during executions of foreign soldiers and civilians by beheading is evidence that some religions permit terrorist events.

34- The Al-Qaeda attack against the USS Cole would suffice for the organization to be called terrorist, since the ship was not involved in combat at the time of the incident.

35- Attacks against social institutions of any kind—banks, schools, abortion clinics, etc.—necessarily have a political character, and since those attacks place pressures on governments to change their policies, attacks such as these constitute a type of terrorism.

36- Hostile acts against humanitarian UN peacekeeping forces are examples of terrorism.

37- A government’s action that destabilizes the state, in all its complexity, should be considered terrorism unless the attempts to change remain within the limits of democracy.

38- If there are some terrorist activities carried out in country A against country B, country B’s fight against these activities in the territory of country A without declaring war can be defined as state-terrorism.
39- A state should be able to support groups operating against another state’s political system as long as the supported group’s target is government forces and not civilians.

40- Although vigilante groups are not against the legitimate government, their acts ultimately cause destabilization of the system, therefore are not different from other types of terrorism.

41- Revolutionary groups may target state forces, but their action is actually in response to government terrorism.

42- Hezbollah’s attacks against Israeli troops during Israel’s invasion into South Lebanon were based on religion and should therefore not be considered terrorist.

43- Although they predominantly attack military personnel, the IRA and the ETA should be considered terrorist organizations.

44- Policies such as those regarding the environment, gender preferences, or animals reflect a country’s socio-political system. Activities within the context of issues such as these and that are committed outside legal boundaries are acts of terrorism since they aim to weaken the state’s socio-political system.

45- Chechens who fight Russian combatants in Chechnya are best considered freedom fighters rather than terrorists.

46- There is little difference between a national terrorist organization’s struggle to overthrow a legitimate government and the assignment of a friendly puppet government by another state.

47- Ayatollah Khomeini’s statement that “We must strive to export our Revolution throughout the world” meant that Iran would sponsor terrorist activities against legitimate governments in other countries.

48- Since they aim to overthrow legitimate movements with the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence, coup d’etats, such as those in some Latin American, African and Asian countries, are a type of revolutionary terrorism.

49- The use of Islamic teachings to justify political overthrow has, in fact, no other meaning than the misinterpretation and misuse of those teachings in support of the organization’s ideology.

50- As long as they are illegal, all separatist movements are terroristic by nature since they aim at overthrowing the sovereignty of states.
51- In terms of defending territory, there is no difference between Afghan resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s and against the US today.

52- A good example fitting the criteria of state terrorism was the US government’s policy to aid anti-Castro guerrilla forces, which ended up with the Bay of Pigs invasion aimed at destabilizing the Cuban government.

53- States that aim to undermine other states or governments by sponsoring terrorist organizations in those countries should themselves be considered terrorist.

54- Nationalist, ethnic, religious, cultural or economic revolutionary groups gain the status of terrorist groups when they employ terrorism as a strategy to weaken current legitimate political systems.

55- In a secular state, freedoms granted for religious practices are predetermined. Consequently, armed or unarmed acts outside the limits of those freedoms weaken the state’s authority and may be considered terrorist in nature.

56- Most separatist movements have nothing to do with protecting the rights of a particular subgroup of the population. They are simply terrorist groups since their ultimate goal is to weaken the state by destabilizing the political system.

57- Being labeled a freedom fighter or terrorist depends on the orientation of the person doing the labeling. We cannot simply label a group by looking at its action in relation to the destabilization of the political system.
APPENDIX C

Q Sort in Turkish
ANKETE KULLANILACAK İFADELER

1- Devlet tarafından yürütülen şiddet eylemlerinde toplumsal itaat devlet idarecilerinin şahsi sorumluluklarından önde gelir ki, bu durum halk arasında adaletsizlik duygularını körükler.

2- Bazı devletlerin başka ülke insanlarına karşı yürüttükleri eylemlerin terörizm olarak vastıflandırılmaları doğru değildir. Bu eylemler terörizm değil, medeniyetler çatışması kapsamında değerlendirilmelidir.

3- Afganistan’ın geleneksel değerlerine karşı, ihtilal ile iktidara gelmiş ve aynı zamanda terör eylemlerine karşı bulunan Marksist hükümeti destekleyen Sovyetler’in bu politikası bir terör eylemidir.

4- Toplumsal değerlere karşı gelenleri cezalandırmaya yönelik olduklarından, ihkak-hak eylemleri terörizm kapsamında değerlendirilmemelidir.

5- Günümüz dünyasında devletlerin kendi sosyal değerleri ve bu değerleri değişirebilecek yasal yöntemleri vardır. Bu amaçla kullanılabilecek diğer her türlü yöntem terörizm kapsamında değerlendirilmelidir.

6- El-Kaide’nin Batı değerlerine karşı mücadelesi İslami prensiplere dayanmaktadır, bu yüzden El-Kaide terörist bir örgüt olarak isimlendirilemez.

7- İnsanları hedef alması terörizm “olsuzsa olsuz” bir kuralı değildir. Kamu binalarının ve ulaşım sistemlerinin tahrip edilmeleri de (PKK’nın eylemlerinde olduğu gibi) terör eylemleridir.

8- Bir ülkedeki kurumlar (okullar, kürtaj klinikleri, borsa vs.) o ülke insanların sosyal değerlere yanıt verme hâlindedir. Bu yüzden, bu kurumlara karşı yapılabacak her türlü illegal hareket terörizm kapsamında değerlendirilmelidir.

9- İşgalciler tarafından empoze edilmeye çalışan sosyal değerlere karşı geldikleri gerekçesi ile Irak ve Afganistan’da işgale karşı mücadeleye edenlerin terörist veya asi olarak vastıflandırılmaları doğru değildir.

10- Stalin döneminde Sovyetler Birliği’nde örnekleri görülen rastgele tutuklamalar, insanların hükümete karşı tutumlarını değiştirmeye matuf olduklarından, terörist eylemlidir.

11- Stalin döneminde Sovyetler Birliği’nde örnekleri görülen rastgele tutuklamalar, insanların hükümete karşı tutumlarını değiştirmeye matuf olduklarından, terörist eylemlidir.
12- Terörizm, günümüz dünyasında devletlerarası mücadele yöntemi olarak kullanılmaktadır. Bu uluslararası ilişkilerin yeni bir kuralıdır ve devletlerin salt bu yüzden terörist olarak isimlendirmeleri adaletli bir uygulama değildir.

13- Siyasi nitelik taşımalı itibari ile, şahıs olarak adaleti temin etme çabaları, devlet karşısında terör örgütlerinin mücadelelerine benzemektedir. Bu yüzden bu eylemler de terörizm kapsamında değerlendirilmelidir.

14- Hangi devlet politikası ile hoşnut olup olmadıktara bağlı olmaksızın, devrimci grupların asıl hedefleri halktır ve bu husus da onların terörist olarak nitelendirilmelerine sebebiyet verir.

15- Eylemlerin dünyanın neresinde meydana geldiğine bakılmaksızın, masum insanlara karşı saldırıları meşru gören dinler mevcuttur.

16- Ayrılkçı hareketlerin mesajlarının hedefi hükümetler olmasına rağmen, eylemlerden zarar görenler insanlardır. Bu yüzden bu eylemler terörizm olarak vasıflandırılmalıdır.

17- Şahıslara karşı işlenmelerine rağmen hükümetlere mesaj iletmelerine mahiyetinde olmaları bakımından, çevreciler tarafından icra edilen şiddeti olayları ile ayrılkçı hareketler arasında pek fark yoktur.

18- Özgürlük savaşlarının terörist olarak vasıflandırılmalarına sebep olan ideolojileri değil, onların arasına müracaat ettikleri insanlık dışı faaliyetleridir.

19- Eylemleri kendi halkları aleyhine olduğundan; Pol Pot (Komboçya), İdi Amin Dada (Uganda) ve Ömer El-Beşir (Sudan) gibi diktatörler teröristtirler.

20- Eylemleri kendi halkları aleyhine olduğundan; Pol Pot (Komboçya), İdi Amin Dada (Uganda) ve Ömer El-Beşir (Sudan) gibi diktatörler teröristtirler.

21- PKK’ya lojistik, siğınma ve eğitim sağlama veya bir terör örgütü olarak tanınmama suretiyle Batılı birçok devlet PKK’yı destek olmaktadır. Bu yüzden bu devletlerin “terörü destekleyen devlet” olarak değerlendirilmeleri gerekir.

22- Ku Klux Klan’in eylemlerinin “nefret suçları” kapsamında değerlendirilmesi hatalıdır. Bu örgüt terörist bir örgüt değildir.

23- Sosyal devrimci güçlerin şiddet içeren eylemleri devletin mevcut ideolojisi ve yapısına yöneliktir. Bu yüzden, sivillere karşı işlenmediği surece, bu eylemlerin haklılıkları savunulabilir.

24- Doğru biçimde yorumlanmış hiçbir siyasi amaçlar için sivillerin hedef yapılamasına izin vermez.

26- Kürtaj kliniklerinin bombalanmaları şahıs ve mala karşı yürütülen kanunsuz eylemlerdir. Bir ideoloji kapsamında yürütülen bu eylemler terörizm olarak nitelendirilmelidir.

27- Zaman zaman masum sivillere yönelik yürüttükleri eylemler Çeçen savaşçıların özgürlük savcısı olmaktan çıkarıp terörist olarak vastıtırlarına imkan vermez.

28- Mevcut siyasi sisteme karşı olduğu için, Saddam Hüseyin’in 1979’da Irak Bağlantısı olmadan sonra yaptığı gibi, temel özgürlüklerin sınırlanması terörist bir eylemdir.

29- Hindistan ve Pakistan gibi iki komşu ülkenin birbirlerinin askeri tesisleri ve sınır karakollarına sık sık yaptıkları saldırılar açıkça terör eylemleridir.

30- Hindistan ve Pakistan gibi iki komşu ülkenin birbirlerinin askeri tesisleri ve sınır karakollarına sık sık yaptıkları saldırılar açıkça terör eylemleridir.

31- Kirli Harry gibi kişilerin terörist olarak vastıtırları doğru bulmuyorum. Her ne kadar hukuka aykırı ise de, bu kişinin yaptıkları, hizmetinde olduğu halkın menfaatine idi.

32- Barış güçlerinin amacı başlamış bulunan barış sürecinin devamını sağlamaktır. Amacı insani vasıf taşması sebebiyle, barış güçlerine karşı yerel devrimci gruplarca yürütülen her türlü eylem terörizm olarak nitelendirilmelidir.

33- Dine ait bazı sözlerin söylenmesi suetriyle yabancı asker ve sivillerin başları kesilerek öldürülmeleri, bazı dinlerin teror eylemlerine cevaz verdiği gösterir.

34- Amerikan USS Cole savaş gemisine karşı yaptıği saldırı El-Kaide’nin bir terör örgütü olarak tanımlanmasına yeterlidir, çünkü hadise sırasında gemi savaş durumunda değildi.

35- Her türlü toplumsal kurumlara (bankalar, okullar, kurtaj klinikleri vs.) karşı yapılan saldırılar mutlak surette siyasi niteliğe sahiptir. Hükümetlere belli konulardaki politikaların değiştirilmeleri konusunda baskı uygulamaya yönelik olduklarından bu saldırılar terörist mahiyettedirler.

36- Birleşmiş Milletler’e ait insani barış güçleri aleyhine yürütülen hasmane hareketler terör eylemleridir.
37- Bir hükümetin, tüm kurumları ile kompleks bir yapı olan devleti zaafa uğratabilecek eylemleri, demokrasi sınırları içerisinde kalmadığı sürece, terörist eylemlerdir.

38- A devletinin topraklarında B devletine karşı terörist hareketlerin yapılmasa da, B devletinin savaş ilan etmeden bu eylemlere karşı söz konusu topraklı yürüteceği eylemler devlet terörü olarak vasişlandırılmaktadır.

39- Hedefleri sadece hükümet güçleri olup siviller olmadıkça, devletlerin, başka bir devletin siyasi sistemine karşı faaliyet gösteren grupları destekleyebilmesi gerekir.

40- İhkak-ı hak'ı yöntem olarak benimsemiş gruplar meşru hükümete karşı değildir. Ancak, neticede sistemin zaaf ugramasına sebebiyet verebileceği, bu örgütlerin eylemleri terörizm için diğer çeşitlerinden farklı değildir.

41- Devrimci grupların devlet güçlerini hedef almaları muhtemeldir, ancak bunlar aslında hükümet terörü tepki mahiyetindedir.

42- İsrail’in 2006 yılındaki Güney Lübnan işgali sırasında Lübnan Hizbullah’ının İsrail askerlerine karşı saldırılardan daha dayanık ve terör eylemi olarak nitelendirilmelidir.

43- Ağır hâklı olarak askeri hedeflere saldırıların yaşandığına rağmen ETA ve IRA terör örgütü sayılmadılar.

44- Çevre, cinsel tercihler, hayvanlar vb. ile ilgili politikalar o ülkenin sosyo-politik yapısını yansıtır. Bu ve benzeri alanlarda hukuka aykırı olarak yürütülen eylemler terörizm kapsamında değerlendirilmelidir, çünkü bu eylemler ülkenin sosyo-politik sisteminin zayıflatmaya yöneliktir.

45- Çeçenistan’da Ruslara karşı savaşan Çeçenler özgürlük savaşçısıdır, terörist değil.

46- Mevcut sistemin değiştirilmesi bakımından, işgaci bir devletin işgal ettiği ülkede kuko bir hükümet yerleştirmesi ile bir terör örgütünün meşru bir hükümeti devirme mücadelesi arasında fazla fark yoktur.

47- Ayetullah Humeyni’nin “Devrimimizi tüm dünyaya yaymaya çalışmalıyız” şeklindeki sözleri diğer ülkelerdeki meşru hükümetlere karşı terörist hareketlerin destekleneceği şeklinde anlaşılmaktadır.

48- Meşru hükümetleri siyasi şiddet kullanma tehdidinde bulunma ve/veya bizzat kullanma suretiyle devirme amacına matuf olduklarından, bazı Latin Amerika, Afrika ve Asya ülkelerinde görülen askeri ihtilaller devrimci terörün bir çeşididir.
49- Siyasi bir sistemin yıkılması için İslami öğretmenlerin kullanılması, aslında öğretmenin suistimali ve örgütün ideolojisi lehine yorumlanması anlamına gelmektedir.

50- Illegal olduklarını sürece tüm ayrılıkçı hareketler tabiatları itibaryle terör hareketleridir. Çünkü, bu hareketler devletin belli topraklar üzerindeki egemenliğini ortadan kaldırmaya yöneliktir.

51- Toprakların savunulmasından Afganlardan 1980’lere Sovyetler’e direnme ile bugün Amerikan kuvvetlerine karşı direnişleri arasında fark yoktur.

52- Devlet terörünün güzel bir örneği, ABD’nin Küba hükümetini devirmek amacıyla takip ettiği ve Domuzlar Körfezi çıkarması ile neticelenen Castro karşısında güçleri destekleme politikasıdır.

53- Terör örgütlerini destekleme suretiyle başka devletleri veya hükümetleri zaafa uğratmayı hedefleyen devletler de terörist sayılmalıdır.

54- Milli, etnik, dini, kültürel ve ekonomik devrimci güçler terörist örgüt vasfını, meşru siyasi sistemleri zayıflatmak amacıyla terörizmi siyasi strateji olarak kullanırdıklarında kazanırlar.

55- Laik bir devlette dini hayatın yaşanabilmesi için sahip olunması gerekli özgürlükler önceden belirlenmiştir. Silahlı veya silahsız, bu özgürlüklerin sınırlarını aşan eylemler devletin otoritesini zayıflatır ve bu yüzden terör eylemi sayılmalıdır.

56- Pekçok ayrılkçı hareketin belli topraklar üzerinde yaşayan belli grup insanların haklarının korunması ile ilgisi yoktur. Nihai amaçları mevcut siyasi sistemi bozmak suretiyle devleti zaafa uğratmak olduğundan, bunlar açık terö eylemleridir.

57- Özgürlük savaşısı veya terörist olarak nitelendirilme veya terörist olarak nitelendirilmiş, bunun yanınındaki kişilerin değerlendirmesine bağlıdır. Bir gruba, mevcut siyasi sistemi zaafa uğratan fahriyetleri sebebiyle bu şekilde bir nitelendirmeye tabi tutmamız isabetli olmaz.
APPENDIX D

Approval to Use Human Research Participants
KENT STATE UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL TO USE HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
Send completed forms to one of the reviewers designated for your Department or Katherine Light, Research and Graduate Studies, 112 University Auditorium

Form can be downloaded from http://www.kent.edu/erzr/alpha/forms/

Please type all information. **HANDWRITTEN FORMS WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED.** Move through the document using TAB or Mouse. Do not use the enter Key. To mark a box, click with the mouse.

Name: Erkan Selgin
Telephone: 330-676-1229 Address: 1888 Algonquin Place, Kent, Ohio 44240 Email: eselgin@kent.edu

Department: Political Science Faculty Rank/Student Status: PhD Candidate

Project Title: A Comparative Perspective of International Cooperation against Terrorism

Type of Project: □ FACULTY RESEARCH □ External Funded (Agency: ) Include copy of proposal
□ STUDENT DIRECTED RESEARCH (Advisor: )
□ Thesis □ Dissertation □ Course Requirement (Course #: )
□ Other (Specify: )

Duration of Project: Starting Date: 02/15/2007 (But not before approval is obtained) Ending Date: 02/30/2007

I certify that the research procedures for this project and the method of obtaining consent (if any), as approved by the Kent State University Institutional Review Board, will be followed during the period covered by this research project. Any future changes will be submitted for Board review and approval prior to implementation.

If this project involves approval/permission from other institutions, the principal investigator (and the faculty advisor if the PI is a student must) sign below to certify the following statement: "I/we will not begin research at other institutions before having obtained their permission to do so."

Principal Investigator 02/15/07
Faculty Advisor (If PI is a student) Date 02/18/07

Action Taken:

**By Reviewer:**

□ Level I, Category: 2
□ Level II, Category: 2
□ Level III, To Full Board
Project Involves:
□ Deception □ Waiver of Consent □ Identifiable medical information

Primary Reviewer 2/13/07
Administrator, IRB

Co-Reviewer (Level II) Date

IRB Level III Action:
□ Approved □ Disapproved □ Contingent Approval (Comments or Contingencies):

Chairperson, IRB Date

Approval to Use Human Research Participants
APPENDIX E

Letter of Consent
SURVEY COVER SHEET

I am a Ph.D. candidate at Kent State University, and writing my dissertation on international cooperation against terrorism. I would like you to take part in this project. If you would like to participate I will submit 57 Q statements and ask you to put down the numbers next to each statement in one of the cells in the provided Answer Sheet according to your preference.

If you take part in this project your name or any other information regarding your identification will not be asked. Since this study is a comparison of perceptions of the concept of terrorism in different professions, you will be mentioned as a member of the groups I interview; either law enforcement, the judiciary or politicians. No further reference will take place regarding your identification. If you do not want to take part, you may stop at any time.

Q-Methodology is not a common analysis method; therefore, you might not have had an experience with it before. Before starting the questionnaire I will make necessary explanations that would help you. The general rule, however, if that the number next to each statement should be written only once in the cells in the Answer Sheet. No statement can be excluded from the Answer Sheet. The design of the cells in the Answer Sheet may not exactly meet the order of your preferences, which is a common feature of this method; you are asked to categorize your preferences. For example, the number of the “Most Agreed” statements is limited to (2). If you have chosen more statements, you have to pick the (2) most agreed one among them.

If you want to know more about this research project you can ask me at any time. The project has been approved by Kent State University. If you have questions about Kent State University's rules for research, you can call me at (330) 676 1229 or send a message to my email account, esezgin@kent.edu, or you can also call Dr. John L. West, Vice President and Dean, Division of Research and Graduate Studies at (330) 672-2704.

Sincerely,
Erkan Sezgin
KSU Political Science Ph.D. Candidate

CONSENT STATEMENT

I agree to take part in this project. I know what I will have to do and that I can stop at any time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
APPENDIX F

Factor Loadings, Nationality and Profession of Participants
Factor Loadings, Nationality and Profession of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>code</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Profession</th>
</tr>
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<td>TJ5</td>
<td>(85)</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP3</td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Parliament Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJ2</td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Prosecutor (Ret.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP4</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Adviser to Par. Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJ3</td>
<td>(76)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJ4</td>
<td>(71)</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL5</td>
<td>(69)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
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<td>06</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL2</td>
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<td>04</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL3</td>
<td>(66)</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-14</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>Prosecutor (Ret.)</td>
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<td>18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL4</td>
<td>(51)</td>
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<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP3</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>(73)</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP4</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>(66)</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>State Senator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL3</td>
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<td>(66)</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP5</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>(64)</td>
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<td>County Commissioner</td>
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<td>AJ4</td>
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<td>(64)</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Prosecutor</td>
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<tr>
<td>AL5</td>
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<td>(61)</td>
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<td>Police Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>AL4</td>
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<td>(60)</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJ1</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Prosecutor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP2</td>
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<td>(55)</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>State House Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>(54)</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Attorney General</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJ5</td>
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<td>Adviser to Par. Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL1</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>Police Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

code= participant code number
A, B= the two factors
( )= defining factor loadings to two decimal points
APPENDIX G

Q Sample and Composite Factor Scores
Q Sample and Composite Factor Scores

( ) distinguishing statements for a factor ($p<.01$)
* consensus statements for both of the factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor Scores</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>01*</td>
<td>In acts of violence by the government, individual guilt is less important than collective obedience, and this encourages feelings of injustice among people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 -2</td>
<td>02*</td>
<td>When directed against human beings to change their behaviors towards the government, random arrests (e.g., during Stalin’s administration) are acts of terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>03*</td>
<td>Dictators are terrorists since they act against their own people—e.g., Cambodia’s Pol Pot, Uganda’s Idi Amin Dada, and Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0) -5</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>Limiting fundamental freedoms is an act of terrorism (e.g., what Saddam Hussein did after he became Iraq’s president in 1979), since acts such as these are directed against the current political system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+1) -3</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>A government’s action that destabilizes the state, in all its complexity, should be considered terrorism unless the attempts to change remain within the limits of democracy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-5) -5</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>It is a mistake to label as terrorism some countries’ actions against people in other countries. Those are not acts of terrorism, but clashes of civilizations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+4 +4</td>
<td>07*</td>
<td>States like Israel in Palestine and the USA in Afghanistan are not responsible for civilian casualties when civilians are used as human shields to cover strategic targets. Such states cannot be accused of terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-1) +1</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>Systematic and intentionally violent acts by Israel against Palestinian civilians are a sort of terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+3) -4</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>If two neighboring states, say India and Pakistan, occasionally attack each other’s military facilities and border monitoring stations, these are clearly acts of terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2 +2</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>If there are some terrorist activities carried out in country A against country B, country B’s fight against these activities in the territory of country A without declaring war can be defined as state-terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>There is little difference between a national terrorist organization’s struggle to overthrow a legitimate government and the assignment of a friendly puppet government by another state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-4)</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>A good example fitting the criteria of state terrorism was the US government’s policy to aid anti-Castro guerilla forces, which ended up with the Bay of Pigs invasion aimed at destabilizing the Cuban government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-1)</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Since they supported the Marxist government of Afghanistan—which opposed conventional values, came to power by a coup, and was involved in acts of terrorism—the Soviets could also be considered terrorist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Terrorism is used as a kind of warfare between states in today’s world. This is a new rule of international relations, and it is not just or ethical for states to be called terrorist for that.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>By providing logistics, shelter, and training to the PKK, or by failing to recognize it as a terrorist organization, many Western states sponsor the PKK, and can therefore be considered as engaging in state-sponsored terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-4)</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>16*</td>
<td>There may be some situations in which a country is under occupation and some local organizations attack the military facilities of the invader in that country. Those attacks should be seen as guerilla warfare (not terrorism), and so it is not fair to call other states that assist those organizations sponsors of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>A state should be able to support groups operating against another state’s political system as long as the supported group’s target is government forces and not civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-3)</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ayatollah Khomeini’s statement that “We must strive to export our Revolution throughout the world” meant that Iran would sponsor terrorist activities against legitimate governments in other countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+2)</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>19*</td>
<td>States that aim to undermine other states or governments by sponsoring terrorist organizations in those countries should themselves be considered terrorist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Since they aim to punish those who oppose social values, vigilante acts should not be considered as terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+5) 0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>When people take the law into their own hands, as in vigilante groups, they are concerned with creating justice, which is political in nature. But in this way they resemble terrorist organizations and their struggle against the state, and should therefore be considered terrorist.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>It is inappropriate to label the Ku Klux Klan’s acts as “hate crimes.” It is a terrorist organization.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-2) 0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>I see no reason for people like Dirty Harry to be called terrorists. Although what he did was against the law, he did it for the good of the people he was serving.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+5) +3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Although vigilante groups are not against the legitimate government, their acts ultimately cause destabilization of the system, therefore are not different from other types of terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-3) +1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>In today’s world, states have their own social values and legitimate ways for changing those values. Any other methods used for this purpose are clearly acts of terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-1) +5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Regardless of the state policies that they may dislike, the main target of revolutionary groups is people, and for this reason they can be categorized as terrorist groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-2) -4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Revolutionary acts of violence are aimed at the state’s ideology or structure, and they can be justified as long as they are not committed against civilians.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1 -2</td>
<td>28*</td>
<td>The purpose of peacekeeping forces is the furtherance of the peace process. In the light of this humanitarian purpose, therefore, all acts against peacekeeping forces by local revolutionary groups should be considered as terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-2) -3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Revolutionary groups may target state forces, but their action is actually in response to government terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2 +1</td>
<td>30*</td>
<td>Since they aim to overthrow legitimate movements with the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence, coup d’etats, such as those in some Latin American, African and Asian countries, are a type of revolutionary terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 -1</td>
<td>31*</td>
<td>Nationalist, ethnic, religious, cultural or economic revolutionary groups gain the status of terrorist groups when they employ terrorism as a strategy to weaken current legitimate political systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>32*</td>
<td>Al Qaeda’s fight against Western values are based on Islamic principles, hence cannot properly be regarded as terrorist.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-5) -1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Regardless of the part of the world in which actions occur, there are religions that justify attacks against innocent human beings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Line Number</td>
<td>Statement</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>No truly-interpreted religion allows civilians’ lives to be the target of political gains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Recitation of religious words during executions of foreign soldiers and civilians by beheading is evidence that some religions permit terrorist events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>36*</td>
<td>Hezbollah’s attacks against Israeli troops during Israel’s invasion into South Lebanon were based on religion and should therefore not be considered terrorist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>The use of Islamic teachings to justify political overthrow has, in fact, no other meaning than the misinterpretation and misuse of those teachings in support of the organization’s ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>38*</td>
<td>In a secular state, freedoms granted for religious practices are predetermined. Consequently, armed or unarmed acts outside the limits of those freedoms weaken the state’s authority and may be considered terrorist in nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Targeting human beings is not the sine qua non of terrorism. The destruction of public facilities and transportation systems (e.g., as committed by the PKK) are also terrorist incidents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td>Although separatist movements may address their messages to the government, it is human beings that are affected by their actions, and this is what qualifies those groups as terrorists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>41*</td>
<td>If the target of a separatist movement is military or security personnel, then the attacks are considered guerilla activities. However, if the target is civilians, then they are terrorist acts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>The Al-Qaeda attack against the USS Cole would suffice for the organization to be called terrorist, since the ship was not involved in combat at the time of the incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43*</td>
<td>Although they predominantly attack military personnel, the IRA and the ETA should be considered terrorist organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>44*</td>
<td>As long as they are illegal, all separatist movements are terroristic by nature since they aim at overthrowing the sovereignty of states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Most separatist movements have nothing to do with protecting the rights of a particular subgroup of the population. They are simply terrorist groups since their ultimate goal is to weaken the state by destabilizing the political system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>The existence of institutions (e.g., schools, abortion clinics, stock markets, etc.) reflects people’s social values. Any illegal act against those institutions should therefore be considered an act of terror.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>In terms of sending a message to the government by committing acts against people, there is not much difference between a violent environmental activist group and an illegal separatist movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48*</td>
<td>Bombing an abortion clinic is a violent activity against people and property. The action itself has an ideology and therefore should be considered terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>49*</td>
<td>Attacks against social institutions of any kind—banks, schools, abortion clinics, etc.—necessarily have a political character, and since those attacks place pressures on governments to change their policies, attacks such as these constitute a type of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+3)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Policies such as those regarding the environment, gender preferences, or animals reflect a country’s socio-political system. Activities within the context of issues such as these and that are committed outside legal boundaries are acts of terrorism since they aim to weaken the state’s socio-political system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>It is unjust to consider people fighting the occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorists or insurgents simply because they are against the social values imposed by the occupiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+1)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>It is not the ideology of freedom fighters that qualifies them as terrorists, but their inhumane acts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+4)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Chechen fighters’ acts against innocent civilians were insufficient to justify a change in label from “freedom fighters” to “terrorists.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+1)</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Hostile acts against humanitarian UN peacekeeping forces are examples of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Chechens who fight Russian combatants in Chechnya are best considered freedom fighters rather than terrorists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+2)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>In terms of defending territory, there is no difference between Afghan resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s and against the US today.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-1)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Being labeled a freedom fighter or terrorist depends on the orientation of the person doing the labeling. We cannot simply label a group by looking at its action in relation to the destabilization of the political system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX H

Composite Factor Arrays
Statement Q sort composite for Factor B

**ANSWER SHEET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Disagree</th>
<th>-5</th>
<th>-4</th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Most Agree</th>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>31</td>
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