PROLEGOMENA TO A THEORY OF CINEMATIC BODIES:
WHAT CAN AN IMAGE DO?

by
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Prolegomena to a Theory of Cinematic Bodies:
What Can an Image Do?

Abstract

by

ANTHONY JOSEPH YANICK

What can and image do? My claim is that this question reveals a refrain common to a
distinct group of individuals in the field of film-philosophy. I propose to contribute a
stance towards understanding how images disclose novel aspects of experience and
challenge traditional ways of seeing. This opens us to a new way of thinking-with film. I find
that a Deleuzean film philosophical approach is most always grounded in an extended
theory of the body that develops through Gilles Deleuze’s particular reading of Baruch
Spinoza. I trace the logic of the body through this early monograph to the cinema books
in order to reveal it to be the underlying conditions for the cinematic body. I then conclude
to introduce a technique of seeing becoming-image that can uncover the experience of film
not through theoretical argument that pre-comprehends its meaning, but affirms the
image in discovering the conditions for the cinematic experience that is as much thinking-
feeling as it is perceptual.
PROLEGOMENA TO A THEORY OF CINEMATIC BODIES: WHAT CAN AN IMAGE DO?

Béla Tarr Werckmeister Harmonies¹

“It is as if the organisms were caught up in a whirling or serpentine movement that gives them a single ‘body’ or unites them in a single ‘fact,’ apart from any figurative or narrative connection.” Deleuze Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation²
What can and image do? My claim is that this question reveals a refrain common to a distinct group of individuals in the field of film-philosophy. I propose to contribute a stance towards understanding how images disclose novel aspects of experience and challenge traditional ways of seeing. This opens us to a new way of thinking-with film. I find that a Deleuzean film philosophical approach is most always grounded in an extended theory of the body that develops through Gilles Deleuze’s particular reading of Baruch Spinoza. I trace the logic of the body through this early monograph to the cinema books in order to reveal it to be the underlying conditions for the cinematic body. I then conclude to introduce a technique of seeing becoming-image that can uncover the experience of film not through theoretical argument that pre-comprehends its meaning, but affirms the image in discovering the conditions for the cinematic experience that is as much thinking-feeling as it is perceptual.

THE COGNITIVIST TURN IN FILM STUDIES

The development of film studies since the late 1980s is marked by the resistance of ‘Theory’ or ‘Grand Theory’ that is constituted by psychoanalytic/semiotic theories that dominated film studies since the 1970s. In the introduction to Post Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, editors David Bordwell and Noël Carroll clarify that a reconstruction of film studies is necessary that it does away with a single dogmatic approach to film: “The absence of a Party Line is . . . reflected in the fact that a number of essays in the volume proceed to construct their own positions without issuing denunciations of theory.” Carroll mentions that Deleuze has negatively influenced the growth of film studies that pre-exists their book amongst others. However, there is little criticism of Deleuze’s own scholarship as he is only mentioned a few times in the entire book. The problem that
cognitivist thinkers like Bordwell and Carroll find in Deleuzean film analysis is in ‘using’ Deleuze as a macro film scholar, shaping a sort of dogmatic image of Deleuzean film theory that resembles what they would call Theory.

They argue that a Theory approach operating as top-down inquiry only allows the film critic to take a theoretical position and apply it to the film as an example of this theory. Bordwell states:

Rather than formulating a question, posing a problem, or trying to come to grips with an intriguing film, the writer often takes as the central task the proving of a theoretical position by adducing films as examples. From the theory the writer moves to a particular case. Lévi-Straussian analyses of the Western, feminist conceptions of the body in film, Jamesonian accounts of the postmodernity of Blade Runner again and again research is seen chiefly as “applying” a theory to a particular film or historical period.7

Gilles Deleuze, in rejecting the domagtic image of thought in all his work (including his two-volume cinema series8), makes a similar attempt to critique Theory that provides a generalized account of society, history, language and psychology. Hence, there is a fundamental agreement between the ‘cognitivist turn’ and Deleuze’s ‘schizoanalytic’ one (following Robert Sinnerbrink I can classify as “philosophy of film” and “film-philosophy” respectively9) that refuse thinking about film from one perspective or theory that offer up endless reinterpretations of the same films. As such, one cannot simply apply Deleuzean concepts found in the cinema books to film; rather one must think-with film, attempting to find within it the images that “give rise to the new10”. One may also highlight another connection between these two, grounded on a similar question: can films affect us (our bodies and minds) and produce modes of behavior that are constructed through watching them? The obvious distinctions aside, they seem to be preoccupied with answering the
same questions of cinematic experience and cinematic affect approaching similar methodologies (psychology and neuroscience\textsuperscript{11}) along the way.

Gregory Currie, identifies two themes that characterize the cognitive approach:

(1) . . . we take films to be rationally motivated, and thus endeavour to make sense of a work at each of its various levels of presentation (as sensory stimulus in light and sound, as narrative, and as cultural object expressing higher-order meanings); and (2) that we approach the process of making sense of film as one that deploys the same cognitive and perceptual resources that we also deploy “in making sense of the real world”\textsuperscript{12}

Sinnerbrink adds a corollary that cognitivism relies “on ordinary processes of cognition — including commonsense intuition — as evidentiary sources for claims about our experience of film.”\textsuperscript{13} This position upholds a “common tendency to philosophically privilege conceptual theorization over film aesthetics . . .”\textsuperscript{14} that the position of film-philosophy (in which I might argue Deleuzean film studies is one part of) intends to refute.

In the following section, I will look at a number of recent Deleuzean film scholars that have not simply applied Deleuze’s concepts, but use a certain perspective to expand the taxonomy of images into new ways of thinking-with film. I find a commonality in their respective positions of the body and affect that premises the irrational pre-cognitive aspects of cinematic experience, opposing mind-based and rational models of Cognitivism\textsuperscript{15} premised on commonsense, causality and narrative.

**DELEZIAN FILM AESTHETICS**

Steven Shaviro’s *Cinematic Body*\textsuperscript{16} is perhaps one of the most important works of Deleuzean film scholarship, providing a means of thinking with film outside the binary between “bodies and images, or between the real and its representations.”\textsuperscript{17} Cinematic
bodies are “a question of discerning multiple and continually varying interactions among what can be defined indifferently as bodies and as images: degrees of stillness and motion, of action and passion, of clutter and emptiness, of light and dark.” From Shaviro’s perspective film “should be neither exalted as a medium of collective fantasy nor condemned as a mechanism of ideological mystification. It should rather be praised as a technology for intensifying and renewing experiences of passivity and abjection.”

Laura Marks’ *The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses* focuses on conceptualizing a “non-visual knowledge” that respect the body’s capacity for knowledge: it is a knowledge of “a particular sort of work where bodies and minds work together. This appeal to olfactory, tactile, and other nonvisual bodily knowledges . . .” Marks lends the concept of *haptic visuality* to claim that vision can be tactile, “as if touching a film with one’s eyes.” We must distinguish this from optical visuality that Marks explains as perceiving forms in space and thus insuring the separation between seer and seen (viewing body and object). Haptic visuality intends a different form of seeing that “move over the surface of its object rather than plunge into illusionist depth, not to distinguish form so much as to discern texture.”

Barbara M. Kennedy’s *Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation* chooses to focus on concepts central to Deleuze’s philosophy: sensation, affect, becoming and immanence. These concepts are set in motion by focusing on the sensations produced by the film’s image; movements, colors and rhythms play a main role in the aesthetic exploration. The book is most concerned with “how the visual experience of the cinematic encounter impinges upon the materiality of the viewer, and how affect and sensation are part of that material engagement.” It seems that the intended goal is to constitute a new aesthetics of film that provides a new perspective on emotional and sensorial impact, yet breaks
from traditional psychoanalytic models of identification by embracing Deleuze’s vitalist concepts.

Anna Powell’s *Deleuze and Horror Film* connects viewer and screen by understanding a film as event. Like Shaviro before her, Powell tells us “[w]e cannot maintain the distanced gaze of subjective spectator at objective spectacle, but respond corporeally to sensory stimuli and dynamics of motion. Fantasy is an embodied event.” Film as event for Powell produces an incorporeal change in the viewer before perception (before subjectivity in cinema is formed): “As the viewer’s embodied brain connects with the film as event, camera shake, blurred focus, abstraction and coloured filters directly affect our mechanisms of perception prior to the search for ‘meaning’.” She then looks through an entire range of Deleuze-Guattari concepts to show how each highlights the ‘fluid becoming[s]’ of the cinema viewer who is physically affected by the images on the screen.

Finally, Elena Del Rio’s *Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance: Powers of Affection* rejects Mulvey’s conception of spectacle on the grounds of its representative model, and instead proposes the “expression-event” founded on Deleuze and Brian Massumi’s work. Affects (incorporeal forces) become a concrete expression-event that attest to the assemblages power to act and potential for change; incorporeal means it is unassimilable to language, binary structures and ideological functions. While representation is mimetic, performance is creative in “their ceaseless activity of drawing and redrawing connections with each other through a process of self-modification or becoming.”

This is by no means an exhaustive list of film scholarship since the publication of the cinema books, but it does highlight some important co-existing themes that resurface in many of the studies: 1) attention to affect/sensation as a means of accessing pre-cognitive
knowledge; 2) the film event as a production of subjectivity as the key element of film experience and; 3) a focus on the body or bodies that constitute the film experience, whether they may be of characters, spectators or the bodies that may be “produced” (Shaviro’s cinematic bodies). It is the last one that explains the other two: the body is the locus of affect and experiences other bodies (in a film). The rest of this paper will unpack the Deleuzian concept of the body starting with his understanding of Spinoza’s body. The fundamental argument that should surface is the Spinozist logic of the body is enveloped or implicated in almost any Deleuzian reading of film and may prove to be of importance when interrogating ethico-aesthetic models film. However, this paper will only focus on the aesthetic potential while mentioning the ethical orientations that it implies only in passing.

**SPINOZA’S AFFECT: AFFECTUS AND AFFECTIO**

The body is vital to our Spinozist understanding of affect, in which we may qualify as an intensity of experience. An affect [*affectus*], following Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, is an a-subjective or pre-individual state of life constituted by a lived transition. It “involve[s] the concrete relation of present and past in a continuous duration”; that is, “they involve the changes of an existing mode that endures”. This movement occurs between extensive parts: we pass from one image to another, and in this transition we pass from greater or lesser states of reality or perfection from our previous composition. Furthermore, Massumi states that Spinoza’s affect “is an ability to affect and be affected . . . a prepersonal intensity . . . implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act.” Spinoza’s definition of affect cannot be equated with our commonplace definition of emotion (personal feeling), which is to say an internal state (representation) of
the mind derived from the situation, and thus the affirmation of the “autonomy of the affects”. Massumi’s distinction of affect and emotion follows this plane of thought:

Reserve the term ‘emotion’ for the personalized content, and affect for the continuation. Emotion is contextual. Affect is situational: eventfully ingressive to context. Serially so: affect is trans-situational. As processual as it is precessual, affect inhabits the passage. It is pre- and postcontextual, pre- and postpersonal, an excess of continuity invested only in the ongoing: its own. Self-continuity across the gaps. Impersonal affect is the connecting thread of experience.

Affect is a visceral pre-individual and a-subjective feeling that goes beyond signification as a non-representational mode of thought. Deleuze will highlight a second term used in Spinoza’s system, an affect is always implicated in ‘affection’ [affectio]: “a state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of another body”. The affects are not dependent on affection, the latter is said to envelope the former; it is what follows from the affections (perceptions or representations). We distinguish the idea from the affect:

... the idea is a mode of thought defined by its representational character... we call affect any mode of thought which doesn't represent anything. So what does that mean? Take at random, what anybody would call affect or feeling, a hope for example, a pain, a love, this is not representational. There is an idea of the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea of something hoped for, but hope as such or love as such represents nothing, strictly nothing. Every mode of thought insofar as it is non-representational will be termed affect. A volition, a will implies, in all rigor, that I will something, and what I will is an object of representation, what I will is given in an idea, but the fact of willing is not an idea, it is an affect because it is a non-representational mode of thought.

This distinction allows us to explain both the durative and existential functions of the affects. An affect belongs to essence in the form of duration and is implicated in affection, “a state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of another body”. Affection belongs to essence in the form of instantaneity expressing an absolute quantity of reality or of perfection. It doesn’t simply express this quantity; it always implicates or envelopes a variation of the power of action (affect). An affect, rather than a personal feeling caused
by an internal state, is caused by external affective relations and implicated or involved in
the expression of the state of the individual (affection). The mind does not compare its
current affection with the previous; rather the objective form of reality or the idea of the
affect that affirms a real transition (involving more or less perfection) that the body
undergoes. “These determinative affections are necessarily the cause of the consciousness
of the conatus.” This implicates that conscious experience emerges from the play of
forces and movement of matter instead of an intentional consciousness that masters it. It
is the continual awareness of the passage from joy to sadness or vice versa, a transitive
body of information that is necessarily confused by affections. According to Deleuze, we
define a body by the affects that it is capable of and therefore one must unpack the
concept of the body further.

WHAT A BODY CAN DO?

A body (I will refer to in reference to Spinoza as affective bodies) is constituted of
characteristic relations of movement and rest that are affected by external forces in a
great many ways; from another perspective, “the mind is able to perceive a great many
things, and this capacity will vary in proportion to the variety of states which its body can
assume.” The mind is not an inner theater of representation or transcendent mind, but
is the ideas of the body, the bodies that enter into composition and the external bodies
that affect it. When acted upon, a body retains the affect as a trace (vestigia), which is to
say retains an affection indicating it’s present state of constitution as a corporeal image: an
instantaneous effect of the mixture of two bodies. Every mixture of bodies can be
thought as an affection-idea. Spinoza says that it indicates the constitution of the modified
body more than the nature of the modifying body, and perceives the nature of the
modifying body as involved in the nature of the former. The body cannot determine the mind to think nor can the mind determine the body to a state of motion or rest. The ideas that constitute the mind involve all the bodies that affect it—that is, what determines it from outside—and express all that compose it. Spinoza’s theory of knowledge (each kind expressing a mode of perception) posits a mind that thinks nothing but its bodily modification—affection—each condition of the body’s reaction to another body that affects it. Affection is associated with the body’s physical reaction and its comprehension is the mind’s way of perceiving the reaction: it is “the eyes through which the mind sees.”

Deleuze’s understanding of Spinoza’s affective bodies discovers evidence that the body thinks through a registration of affect. What Spinoza is suggesting that one should be wary of considering the mind’s mastery over the body, thus short-circuiting traditional conceptions of the body as secondary, subordinated to consciousness and cognition:

... no body as yet has determined the limits of the body’s capabilities; that is, nobody as yet has learned from experience what the body can do, without being determined by mind, solely from the laws of its nature insofar as it is considered as corporeal. For nobody as yet know the structure of the body so accurately as to explain all its functions ... the body, solely from the laws of its own nature, can do many things at which its mind is amazed. (Schol. Pr. 2, III)

Considering the body from this perspective, Spinoza makes with great force (“practically a war cry”) an attack on transcendent ontology: “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, i.e., a definite mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else” (Pr. 13, II). There are thus, conditions that give conceptual thought its quality and force that are the result of a dynamics of bodies, providing for Spinoza access to the ideas. “What a body can do” will become a consistent refrain in Deleuze’s references to Spinoza as an ethological definition of the body through the concept of affect. The understanding of an
organism is not defined as a form, or the development of a form, nor by an organism’s behavior. It must be understood through Spinoza’s theory of affectivity, which lends itself a theory of the body defined by its affective movement and affective capacity, or the relations one enters and the affects of which it is capable. There must be conditions that give conceptual thought its quality and force that are the result of a (meta)physical dynamics of bodies (mechanical laws of nature—of movement and rest), providing for Spinoza access to the ideas, which leads to adequate thinking.

**THEORY OF AFFECTIVITY: DELUZE-SPINOZA AFFECTIVE BODIES**

We find in Spinoza, an affective dynamics of bodies as the locus upon which affect operates. Deleuze outlines two simultaneous definitions of the body in his re-reading of Spinoza’s modal expression in Part V of *Ethics*. The first is the “the kinetic proposition […] of the [complex] relations of motion and rest, of speeds and slownesses between [an infinite number of] particles, that define the […] individuality of the body.” This means that no two bodies have the same relations of motion and rest, or affective movement: varied (lived) transitions from one state to the other considered as a non-linear process that develops through complexity. The second is the dynamic proposition, in which “a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its individuality.”

The affective bodies of Spinoza are neither subject nor object, but modes that are dynamic forms inseparable from their extensive “characteristic relations” and intensive quantities: its modal relations go hand-in-hand with its power or its capacity to affect and be affected. The extensive properties refer to classical states of qualified measurable space
(for example, length and volume), which can be divided infinitely without changing its nature. The intensive properties are a bit more complex; when an intensive quantity is divided it necessarily complicates the relations themselves. Its intrinsic quality is not a mere appearance but is the affective capacity of changing the body in question. Before division is not the same as any part after division. For example, temperature is the critical parameter that changes water from its single point of attraction that defines it as a liquid to another single point that defines it as steam. Whereas many readings of the body begin in qualification and ideological domains (in meaning), Spinoza refuses to neglect the intensive aspect that accompanies its qualification. A body is defined not as a substance, but is at once a double system of reference: we have first, a plane of composition that consists of extensive parts communicating to infinity according to natural laws of movement and rest (existing finite modes); and second, there is the body and its power, its intensive relations that exhibit a maximum threshold and a minimum threshold of potential for entering certain kinds of relations (power - singular essence).

The kinetic proposition derives two laws of affective movement: one of composition and the other of decomposition, which determine the conditions in which a relation is actualized or ceases to be actualized. When a body “encounters” another, each possessing in a certain relation an infinity of simple bodies (or parts) that define a body’s structure, they affect each other and either can or cannot directly combine. If they directly combine, this means that the parts of one relation adapt to the parts of the other in a third relation composed of the two previous ones and the corresponding mode comes into existence (as a higher individual). If they cannot directly combine, they are either mutually indifferent or one decomposes the other, the body is destroyed. Deleuze highlights an important effect of these corporeal encounters:
The order of causes is therefore an order of composition and decomposition of relations, which infinitely affects all of nature. But as conscious beings, we never apprehend anything but the effects of these compositions and decompositions: we experience joy when a body encounters ours and enters into composition with it, and sadness when, on the contrary, a body or an idea threaten our own coherence.61

The dynamic proposition considers the capacity of the body to enter in relation with one another. An encounter between bodies is a relation of intensities, thus a matter of powers: “The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished . . .” (Post. 1, III)62. The power to act (potentia) or the capacity for affecting and being affected is what defines a body in its individuality alongside of a second power (potensas), which is its formal composition (relations between bodies). Spinoza has already shown us this; a body can have more or less intensity, more or less potential. Thus, an ontological proposition may be stated in this way: intensive relations define the body in itself, replacing its essence. “The more intense a thing is, [the] more precisely is that intensity its relation to being: the intensity of the thing is its relation with being.”63 We know little about our bodies until we account for the differential intensive relations that compose us as individuals and Deleuze will invoke Nicolas De Cusa’s concept of possest to illuminate this move to define a body by its power: “Possest is precisely the identity of the power (puissance) and of the act by which I define . . . So I would not define something by its essence, what it is, I would define it by this barbaric definition, its Possest: what it can do. Literally: what it can actually do.64”

The Spinozist body we have described through a particular reading of Deleuze defines a body dynamically. It is filled by intensive affects it is capable of at a given power (degree of potentiality), but its relations of movement and rest also determine it. This dynamic body and its relation must not be confused with extensive bodies and organizing
structures, the process it’s completely sub-representative. This supplants the “molar” organization of the body as a centered organized whole with a “molecular” consistency of local actions without reference to a center; it is at once individual and more than individual (transindividual body\textsuperscript{65}). Any definitions that only consider the molar organization of the body (individual identity based on deviation from a norm) separate the individual body from its power, that is, from its “objective being”\textsuperscript{66}. The body is a self-creating assemblage of developments of affecting and being affected by external bodies in perpetual encounters. The capacity to be affected provides us with an opening to intensify our power. To enhance one’s own power is not an ego-driven venture, but an affirmation of the relations and position within a network of affective movement. This places significance on affects, and the relations that we enter into, which ultimately determine our power to act.

Because affect is a visceral, pre-individual and a-subjective feeling that goes beyond signification as a non-representational mode of thought, affective bodies open a path to express the ways they do their own kind of thinking irreducible to the traditional notion of thought defined as rationality. For this non-representational thought to occur it must be within the framework of, and a response to its material relations. Freidrich Nietzsche takes up this problem.

**AFFECTIVE PHYSICS OF FORCE:**
**DELEUZE-NIETZSCHE ASSEMBLAGES OF FORCE**

Nietzsche is an ally in the war against the thought of the body subordinated and obedient to the commandments of the mind, foregrounding an internal dynamism that resonates with Spinoza’s affective dynamics of bodies. Consider this passage from *Will to Power*\textsuperscript{67}: “The human body, in which the most distant and most recent past of all organic
development again becomes living and corporeal, through which and over and beyond which a tremendous inaudible stream seems to flow: the body is a more astonishing idea than the old 'soul'. What Nietzsche is proposing is a return to faith in the body as opposed to the soul (synonymous with the autonomous subject) as our most certain being. To consider the body as the true self rather than some immaterial mind lead to Nietzsche’s admiration for the non-rational processes of humans. He gives us a good definition of the body in the following quote again taken from *Will to Power*:

> What my idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the process goes on.

In this conception of a body we find the coexistence of active (dominant/joy) and reactive (dominated/sadness) forces, whose relationship constitutes a unified multiplicity or an assemblage of forces, an expression of the quantity of force. Any two forces in mutual “relations of tension” form a body where each force either obeys (dominated) or commands (dominant) “whether it is chemical, biological, social or political”.

For Nietzsche, what a body can do are the forces that belong to it, and therefore defining what it can do by a relation of forces—not unlike Spinoza’s power. Deleuze’s monograph of Nietzsche holds an acute perception of the Spinoza-Nietzsche body:

> What is the body? We do not define it by saying that it is a field of forces, a nutrient medium fought over by a plurality of forces. For in fact there is no “medium”, no field of forces or battle . . . Every force is related to others and it either obeys or commands. What defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of forces constitutes a body . . . Being composed of a plurality of irreducible forces the body is a multiple phenomenon, its unity is that of a multiple phenomenon, a “unity of domination”.
Nietzsche, like Spinoza before him, makes it possible to interpret the singularities of the body by undertaking a discourse on power (puissance), rather than an essence. To have a body means to be already composed of singularities\textsuperscript{73}, which do not exist pre-formed—as the universal category of essentialist thinking would argue—but a body emerges from the immanent genesis of their composition. In this way, Deleuze finds two aspects of the Spinozist body essential in the context of Friedrich Nietzsche’s own work, which Michael Hardt is attentive to point out in his study of Deleuze\textsuperscript{74}. The first is the power to be affected is always in an actualized relation with other bodies and never as a possibility. A second aspect is that receptivity is never merely passivity according to power; it is to be considered “an affectivity, a sensibility, a sensation\textsuperscript{75}”. The relations of bodies generate a sensibility that is a proto-affectivity or a capacity for action.

These two points highlight an aspect of affect that is important to this study: the relationality of affect, that is to say, affect is relation, and by extension being is relation and not something concealed inside living beings\textsuperscript{76}. This relational conception of the body is the base for rethinking interiority and exteriority. Subjectivity is not something premised on limiting the borders of the self to the spatial boundaries of the body or the Cartesian cogito; rather, we must consider that with what ‘agrees’ with our nature is internal to us in the sense that it augments our power. It is with the concept of affect that succeeds in stripping any sense that upheld a distinction between subject and object or cause and effect; fundamentally non-individualistic and impersonal, and is for this reason implicated as the co-constitutive aspect of all life. It makes no sense to think of the individual in isolation from its world—what it affects and is affected by—thus expanding the boundaries of individuality to include mental and corporeal relations with the environment. It is in relation with external stimuli that causes one to spontaneously or
instinctually act. These relations may or may not be evaluated or signified, which leads us to a second important aspect of affect we must retain: affect allows us the ability to go beyond signification and representation.

We have glanced at the metaphysical affinities of Spinoza and Nietzsche’s definition of a body by what it can do, relating it to concepts of power, force and affect. Yet, there seems to be a lack of literature that draws out these affinities, at least until Deleuze. His reading points to an interesting intersection as an ethological study of the body.

**AN ENTHOLOGICAL ENCOUNTER: SPINOZA-NIETZSCHE AFFECTIVE ASSEMBLAGES**

The kinetic proposition of bodies (extensive characteristic relations) is inseparable from the dynamic proposition of the capacity to be affected (its sensibility, intensive relations); there is a “strict order of equivalences” between the two, which leads us once again to state the ethical question in line with this determination of bodies. Deleuze writes:

> . . . relations are inseparable from the capacity to be affected. So that Spinoza can consider two fundamental questions as equivalent: What is the structure (fabrica) of a body? And: What can a body do? A body’s structure is the composition of its relation. What a body can do corresponds to the nature and limits of its capacity to be affected.77

Given that affectivity activates a mode of affecting and being affected, the entire anatomy of the individual is transformed in its relations with others78. In both Spinoza and Nietzsche, affectivity complicates a set of relations that involve a plurality of bodies that can compose or decompose depending on the complexity of various situations. Affective transition is a non-linear process that develops through complexity and as a result, we unveil the problematic underlying stable categorization of possible relations of bodies in advance. As Deleuze points out in *Logic of Sense*: “in the depth of bodies everything is
mixture . . . there are no rules, however, according to which one mixture rather than another might be considered bad. The praxis implicated in this ethical imperative is one of experimentation in order to arrive at a practical conception of joy (“this rich sense of power of the affectivity of bodies must be accompanied by an elaboration of the activity of bodies in practice”).

“What a body can do” will become a consistent refrain in Deleuze’s references to a study of ethology, through which Deleuze can consider the body in Spinoza and Nietzsche together (Spinoza-Nietzsche). What the concept of affect gives us is an ethological – rather than some other – conception of the body (“What Nietzsche calls affect is exactly the same thing as what Spinoza calls affect, it is on this point that Nietzsche is Spinozist.”) In its proper sense, ethology is the study of animal behavior in a natural environment. However, Deleuze finds a transversal relationship between the ways that Spinoza (and I include Nietzsche) classifies the body according to affect-power and ethologist Jacob von Uexkull’s assessment of animal behavior, which allows him to expand the meaning of the discipline to be a study of bodies, animals and humans by the affects they are capable of. Deleuze and Guattari pose the mechanical laws (of composition/decomposition) as an ethical orientation in A Thousand Plateaus: “we know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, with to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body”. One must study the affects of each particular body (charting of the affective capacities or assemblages of forces), but also the situations that determine how relations of composition may be successfully entered.
There are three factors according to Deleuze that constitute an ethological study: 1) the relations of speed and slowness and of the capacities for affecting and being affected (dominating and dominated) that compose a particular body—they are determined by thresholds (maximum/minimum) and variations that are peculiar to them (singularities) and select from the world what affects or is affected by them; 2) the way in which these relations are realized according to empirical circumstances and ways the capacities are filled that determine a composition or decomposition of a particular body; 3) the relations or capacities between different things—a question of knowing how bodies enter into composition with one another in order to form new, more extensive relations, or whether capacities can form a new, more intense capacity. In this way both Spinoza and Nietzsche are ethologists concerned with the body’s composition, its potential to enter into relations with other bodies, and the transformations a body may endure. Spinoza-Nietzsche provides a means of conceptualizing a body as an affective assemblage: an assemblage of forces, powers, or affects. These are Spinozist bodies after dispensing with God, where the essence of the body is replaced with a purely modal expression of the affects one is capable of. The body as an affective assemblage is a map that has both latitude (dynamic capacity to affect and be affected) and longitude (kinetic composition of force relations): latitude is made up of intensive parts falling under a capacity, and longitude of extensive parts under a relation. By including Nietzsche’s body in the synthesized “affective assemblage”, it not only gives us Spinozist’s bodies that creatively constitute its essence, but also allows us entry into considering the aesthetic dimension of this concept of body.

AESTHETICS OF EXISTENCE: ART AS PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Deleuze’s reading of art through Nietzsche affirms sensation as productive forces of transformation, thus producing a concept of art as (creative) force: a stimulus of the will or the capacity to energize power relations. Art in this way is combat against the will to domination (we might read this as an escape artistic judgment) and therefore belongs to creative force or the will to power. Art is never disinterested or sublimating as in Kant, rather it is “affirmative in relation to active forces, to an active life.” This highlights the way in which the work of art is not simply representation, but of a movement of force insomuch as it brings a new arrangement into existence: as an affective assemblage that affirms the active force of the work in itself and shapes our sense of it. As Deleuze says, “[w]e will never find the sense of something . . . if we do not know the force which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force.”

The body as an affective assemblage and its logic of relations present in nature are also what comprises the body of art. Life itself becomes the material for a work of art and the artwork in a way creates itself through a capture of forces (“force which appropriates the thing”) entwined in a relational circuit of affective assemblages. In this way, we might think aesthetics as a philosophy of Nature: a naturalization of art as an affirmation of “a self-movement of the expressive qualities.” Nietzsche saw two potentials in nature: 1) nature is material for an artistic creation and 2) nature is itself the creative force, molding itself. If life is, as Elizabeth Grosz tells us, “contingent on harnessing materiality that it is forced to encounter what opposes it and is capable of undoing what it has been and is,” then the artist’s general aim is to harness material and to make sensations occur in the work of art.
Any attempt at an aesthetic theory in Spinoza is problematic considering his central doctrines tend to neglect aesthetics altogether, and from the little that he explicitly says there doesn’t seem to be an adequate philosophical basis for aesthetics to draw from. I wish in this final section to construct a fictional aesthetic theory—one that wouldn’t be Spinoza’s own, but when read alongside of Deleuze-Nietzsche isolates an affect-based aesthetic: this is not so much a perspective of an art discipline as an aesthetic of artistic engagement. We may not find in Spinoza’s oeuvre a means of judgment and appreciation of art, but through the concept of affective assemblages that premise an ethico-aesthetic model for life as well as art—and “life as a work of art”—we can prepare the way for theorizing the transformative power of art. In this way, in an encounter with art, affective assemblages should be assessed in relation to their augmentation, or diminution, of a body’s potential. I will focus on the aesthetic of the cinematic image in relation to these affective assemblages that affirm life as a work of art, and in doing so open the pathways towards theorizing how a film can transform the spectator through forces of intensities. This leads us to a question of ethics in Spinoza’s sense, but for the purposes of this paper the focus will be on the aesthetics of the image rather than the ethics of affect. We must look at how these affective assemblages operate within the domain of the cinema.

**CINEMATIC BODIES: CENTERS OF INDETERMINATION**

Deleuze’s two volumes on cinema are grounded in an extended theory of the body: its “the body’s immersion in matter […] that ‘explains’ cinema”. Joe Hughes describes the ‘Bergsonian body’ that will make up Deleuze’s cinematic bodies: “the body is an image; it participates directly in the flux of matter; it is a center of indetermination which allows me to select, organize, and transmit received movements. But it is just as clear that the
body is not yet any kind of full constituted body. It is an unconstituted, unindividuated, ‘gaseous’ body. There are two important concepts that make up the Deleuzean perspective on cinema: The cinema constructs a plane of immanence (‘flux of matter’) and the ‘interval’ as a center of indetermination. The closing section to this chapter will attempt to recast cinematic subjectivity by unfolding these two concepts from the perspective of affective assemblages and Spinoza’s theory of affectivity. Thus I intend to highlight how Spinoza’s ontology of the body and its corresponding logic resurfaces in the cinema books to produce cinematic concepts antagonistic towards embodied subjectivity.

First we have the plane of immanence of cinema constituted by unindividuated matter, an infinite set of all images in universal variation acting and reacting upon one another. The image exists in-itself on this plane and is identified with movement: “The in-itself of the image is matter: not something hidden behind the image, but on the contrary the absolute identity of the image and movement leads us to conclude that the movement-image and matter are identical [...] the material universe, the plane of immanence, is the machinic assemblage of movement-images.” Let’s consider this from our Spinozist perspective of the individual (body).

In Spinoza there is no sense to the concept of a simple individual. An individual is a composite of an infinite of parts (“corpora simplicissima” or simple bodies). This is to say, bodies are complexes of simple modes of extension distinguished only by their “motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance.” Spinoza then goes on to make another argument that all bodies are determined to motion or rest by another body, which likewise has been determined by another, and that body by another, and so ad infinitum. Simple bodies are always grouped bodies therefore integrate into composite individuals (grouped in infinite wholes or sets) that not only constitute the human body,
but ‘one Nature’ that is itself Individual varying in an infinite number of ways. This one Nature is not a universalizing concept but a changing whole in universal variation with itself, Spinoza’s ‘one Substance’ or plane of immanence: “the sum of all the ‘variations of matter in movement,’ or ‘the face of the whole universe’ under the attribute of Extension.” We find in Cinema 1 a very similar definition of the cinematic plane of immanence: “It is a set, but an infinite set. The plane of immanence is the movement (the facet of movement) which is established between the parts of each system and between one system and another, which crosses them all, stirs them all up together and subjects them all to the condition which prevents them from being absolutely closed.” It has no form, only relations and connections of simple bodies integrated ad infinitum; thus, it is unformed matter imperceptible, invisible or indirectly sensible.

At this point, I haven’t directly approached two qualifying elements of this plane: unindividuated matter in universal variation of action and reaction constitutes it—although this is implicit in the determination of bodies produced in an unindividuated way (by simple bodies which are “actual infinites”). The individual (finite) body is as an enfleshed field of actualization of passions or forces immersed in in the full intensity and luminosity of becoming, or another way to put it is a molecular—sub-representative—level (of affects, sensations, desires, those relationships not yet individuated or assigned to a subject) that constitutes the infinite affective continuum of physicality. If we are to understand affect as a transversal dynamic between individuals or bodies; rather than a one-way relation, each affect is a function of its own nature and also the nature of its other. When one body enters into a relation with another it has the effect of changing the potential of both, insofar as the body is affected by as much as it affects another body. In other words, the very basis of the formation of the body and the constitution of the subject is a process of
confluences of forces and dynamics on the sub-representative level; that is, external forces\textsuperscript{109} constantly affect the modes (“universal action and reaction”) to the point where we can say that there are no longer subjects, only individuating intensive affects. Spinoza’s ontology of the affects becomes imperative to understanding the pre-individual and pre-cognitive aspects of subjectivity that compose this ‘gaseous state’ where my body is “rather a set of molecules and atoms which are constantly renewed\textsuperscript{110}” and the affective continuum is “a world of universal variation, of universal undulation, universal rippling: there are neither axes, nor centre, nor left, nor right, nor high nor low.\textsuperscript{111}”

To return to the context of the cinema books, the plane of immanence poses the problem that no distinction could appear strictly through the perception of an aggregate of images in universal variation. Hence, Bergson states “nothing really new could happen except through the medium of certain particular images, the type of which is furnished me by my body\textsuperscript{112}”. The body is a privileged image that “I do not know only from without by perceptions, but from within by affections [which] always interpose themselves between the excitations that I receive from without and the movements which I am about to execute\textsuperscript{113}”, and this coincides with the interval that generates centers of indetermination. As spectators, we experience the world of film as centers of indetermination\textsuperscript{114} (a Deleuzean cinematic body) in that filmic images affect our awareness within the interval. The art of cinema has the power to create a world that can facilitate the viewer’s subjectivity formed by the materiality of the visual field rather than defined by the quality of interiority\textsuperscript{115}. To feel oneself affected within the interval is an operation through which our subjectivity is formed and depends on the encounter between the material image and a particular center of indetermination.
Indetermination is used here in the specific sense of “the range of responses available for selection as the appropriate response or action with respect to an analyzed stimulus or perception”. When images on this plane of immanence are apprehended in relation to the body (as center of indetermination) a production of subjectivity occurs. The privileged image, or the contingent center, is an assemblage of the three material aspects of subjectivity; this is to say that the interval—as a temporal gap between action and reaction—is a principle of synthesis of movement-images. Thus every image has two sides, which D.N. Rodowick explains clearly: “One side is a receptive, sensorial surface that filters stimuli, ignoring external influences irrelevant to the body and isolating others that become ‘perceptions’ . . . a delay where the actions undergone are forestalled in anticipation of proper responses . . . reactions executed on the other side are no longer the simple prolongation of external movements; in fact, they transform these movements, producing something new.” Movement is what produces subjectivity, not the two spatial “ends” of the interval.

Subjectivity therefore is nothing but a mixture of the varieties of “world images” that we find in Cinema 1: stimulus-perception, response-action and interval-affection. These are a result of two systems of reference: the first in relation to the plane of immanence in which “each image varies for itself and . . . is patient of the real action of surrounding images”; and the second in relation to the interval where “all images change for a single image and . . . they reflect the eventual action of this privileged image.” The movement-image (the shot) has a “dual point of view of specification and differentiation” which depends on the whole that it expresses and the object between which it passes. When viewed from a side of differentiation if it is referred to the changing whole in universal variation with itself and “becomes established between objects.” When viewed from a
side of specification if referred to an interval where “distinct kinds of image appear, with signs through which they are made up, each in itself and all of them together”. Thus each shot is composed of a vertical and horizontal axis that “constitute a signaletic material which includes all kinds of modulation features, sensory (visual and sound), kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal, and even verbal (oral and written).”

The interval of Cinema I then is the constitution of subjectivity through anticipation, selection and action. Paraphrasing Bergson, Michael Shapiro writes “To perceive is to subtract in order to come up with a sense of the world, selected from all possible senses. Inasmuch as each body, as a center of indetermination, selects an aggregate of images from the totality of the world’s images. One of Deleuze’s major tasks in the cinema books is to explore how cinema makes it possible to surpass the human condition by producing the effect of evacuating subjectivity as the privileged image in the aggregate of images; this is the center of indetermination of the time-image that instead of a production of subjectivity we have a subjectless subjectivity. Lets consider a bit more what I mean here.

Spinoza’s affect is what the subject does not have, thus there are two levels of life in this idea: I feel a life being constructed simultaneously with my life; it is co-existing, yet on the other hand apart from me. In other words, I co-exist while at the same time I am separated, out-of-field or peripheral. To understand this, I must introduce the concept of the Other that exists in the field of experience in which I am situated (where subject and object are constituted). A quote from Difference and Repetition will clear up what I mean by the Other:

. . . in order to grasp the other as such, we were right to insist upon special conditions of experience, however artificial - namely, the moment at which the expressed has (for us) no existence apart from that which expresses it:
the Other as the expression of a possible world . . . In the psychic system of the I-Self, the Other thus functions as a centre of enwinding, envelopment or implication.126

It is not a question as to whether or not the possible world “actually” exists because as expressed it subsists in its expression. It’s a world without subject whose action is of “a hollow presence, but one which is enough to force the old universe back into me . . . to make me conscious that this time it is really me who is . . .127” affected. The Other as possible world is a subjectless subjectivity due to the fact that “the movement of expression is itself subjective, in the sense that it is self-moving and has determinate effects.128” As a centre of envelopment it is the expression of the plurality of “roads not taken,” an intensive sign that exists purely in a state of implication within a system (in our case the system is the actualized body). How does this function in art? For this, I must take one final detour through Deleuze and Guattari’s final work together.

In *What is Philosophy?*, art is the creation of percepts and affects, which taken together define sensation:

What is preserved—the thing or the work of art—is a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects. Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects. The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself.129

In this way, art functions as a means of capturing the “inorganic life” of sensation that stands as its own expression whose mode of existence is a possible way of life. Here, I must emphasize a modal distinction between two processes irreducible to each: ‘form of expression’ and the ‘matter of expression’. The former is produced as a process of actualization that organizes expression in its own specific form (actualization of
potentiality which is the reality of the virtual), while the latter is produced as a process of realization that embodies the existence of a possible world.

I must highlight this slight divergence from Spinoza, as I have already stated that the power to be affected is always actualized in relation with other bodies and never as a possibility; it is thus an individual form of expression (sensation is tied to an individual form whose lived experience they are). It is through a creative reading of Leibniz that we have “the possible as aesthetic category”, and it is here that sensation can exist as possibility without necessarily existing in absolute form. The matter of expression is a “plane of consistency” filled by the dynamic potential that embodies a sensation: it gives it a body or a life. I must consider Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of matter in correlation with Hjelmslev’s “purport”, which “has no possible existence except through being substance for one form or another”. Sensations embodied in a work of art are autonomous affective assemblages that may enter into a relational circuit with an observer. Even with the category of possible worlds in the aesthetic realm, Spinoza’s reflection is no less important—we do not yet know what sensations the body is capable of, “[e]ven when they are nonliving, or rather inorganic, things have a lived experience because they are perceptions and affections.”

Thus, we need another concept aside from the individual body in our Spinozist conception of affective assemblages that would affirm this possible body consisting of unpossessed (autonomous) affective assemblages. If we are to define a body by the affects it is capable of this is because the life of the body, according to Deleuze, is constituted by its events, which doubles the personal life. Let’s consider this passage from Logic of Sense:

With every event, there is indeed the present moment of its actualization, the moment in which the event is embodied in a state of affairs, an individual, or a person . . . But on the other hand, there is the future and
the past of the event considered in itself, sidestepping each present, being free of the limitations of a state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual, neutral, neither general nor particular, eventum tantum.\textsuperscript{133}

Again, the present moment of its actualization, the moment in which it is embodied in a state of affairs, is the Spinozist conception of the center of indetermination I have already described and relates to the field of actualized experience. The second points to an impersonal and pre-individual “fourth person” or “they” where everything is both collective and private:

The splendor of the “they” is the splendor of the event itself or of the fourth person. This is why there are no private or collective events, no more than there are individuals and universals, particularities and generalities. Everything is singular, and thus both collective and private, particular and general, neither individual nor universal.\textsuperscript{136}

Given this impersonal and singular (in the sense of being neither collective or private) perspective, affects in work of art are not attributable to actual individuals\textsuperscript{137}, but is an unrestricted event. The question then becomes how does this impersonal affect relate to our individual bodies? I introduce the concept of haecceity\textsuperscript{138} that is a non-personal mode of connectivity that provides a means for the external force of pure affects or percepts that condition the production of subjectivity. Haecceities embody both sensation (longitude signaling sensation) and affect (latitude) and relate to our individual body by conditioning our subjectivity.

**THE “THISNESS” OF THE CINEMATIC BODY: HAECCEITIES**

Six years prior to the publication of *Cinema 1* Deleuze gives us a cinematic understanding of the body. In *Dialogues*\textsuperscript{139} Deleuze will first introduce haecceity as an extended concept of a body (an affective “thisness”) consisting of “cinematic relations”:

A thing, an animal, a person are now only definable by movements and rests, speeds and slownesses (longitude) and by affects, intensities (latitude).
There are no more forms but cinematic relations between unformed elements there are no more subjects but dynamic individuations without subjects, which constitute collective assemblages. Nothing develops, but things arrive late or in advance and enter into some assemblage according to their compositions of speed. Nothing becomes subjective but haecceities take shape according to the compositions of nonsubjective powers and effects. Map of speeds and intensities.  

Is this not a clear development from the ethological concept of affective assemblages introduced earlier? I would argue that this cinematic understanding of the body is constituted in the interval, defined as a singular assemblage of forces and its relations. It also provides a way of seeing Spinoza’s body and Nature as cinematic, without center, and in a state of perpetual variation. In the same way that the existence of our bodies may be thought of as an affective assemblage, we are haecceity, which is to say particulars in relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness—forming fields of intensity and collections of affects. It is a transitive assemblage of desire in relations of proximity or co-presence with other assemblages.

There are two varieties of haecceities that occur in A Thousand Plateaus that co-exist: “assemblage haecceities (a body considered only as longitude and latitude) and interassemblage haecceities, which also mark the potentialities of becoming within each assemblage (the milieu of intersection of the longitudes and latitudes). But the two are strictly inseparable.” The former gives rise to concrete actualizations on the representative plane (actual plane of organization) and the latter, which are constituted by immaterial affects/forces, serve as attractors or a constellation of attractors that serve as singular points of potential becoming within assemblages on the sub-representative plane (virtual plane of consistency). We may consider a rather lengthy description Deleuze and Guattari provide in its entirety:

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[147] We may consider a rather lengthy description Deleuze and Guattari provide in its entirety:
It should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a decor or backdrop that situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and people to the ground. It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity; it is this assemblage that is defined by a longitude and a latitude, by speeds and affects, independently of forms and subjects, which belong to another plane. It is the wolf itself, and the horse, and the child, that cease to be subjects to become events, in assemblages that are inseparable from an hour, a season, an atmosphere, an air, a \textit{life}. The street enters into composition with the horse, just as the dying rat enters into composition with the air, and the beast and the full moon enter into composition with each other.\footnote{144}

With this concept, the cinematic model of the unitary subject is exchanged for impersonal assemblages. The subject dissolves in the flux of “becomings, which have neither culmination nor subject, but draw one another into zones of proximity or undecidability.”\footnote{145} The interval then is an “interrelationship of forces with specific tendencies in responding and functioning that stabilizes a duration with a specific speed relative to other durations […] determined by the specific configuration of forces that constitutes it.”\footnote{146} Now this is not just a semiotic design, but has a preeminent role as a kind of experience, which we may designate an affect of force.\footnote{147} There is no longer any proper sense to the body, \textit{only a relational circuit and a distribution of states that is part of the range of the assemblage (“The thing and other things are no longer anything but intensities”).} Cinematic bodies are constituted when one enters into a relational circuit, which is to say, become a working part of the assemblage (my body, the screen, brain-body-screen). It cannot be an experience of lack which that produces an identification; rather it’s an excess of forces and potential which maintains the individual within an enduring relational condition. The excess that conditions this constitution is a haecceity or event. The actualization generated by this circuit does not answer the question of “what is a cinematic subject/body?” but is rather is one solution to how the subject/body comes to
exist: a modal impersonal subject/body. Inspired by Shaviro’s cinematic body, Massumi writes:

Actually existing, structured things live in and through that which escapes them. Their autonomy is the autonomy of affect . . . The escape of affect cannot but be perceived, alongside the perceptions that are its capture. If there were no escape, no excess or remainder, no fade-out to infinity, the universe would be without potential, pure entropy, death . . . This side-perception may be punctual, localized in an event (such as the sudden realization that happiness and sadness are something besides what they are). When it is punctual, it is usually described in negative terms, typically as a form of shock (the sudden interruption of functions of actual connection). But it is also continuous, like a background perception that accompanies every event.150

In this way the surface of perception relates to a sub-representative problem: it is at the same time the perception and more than perception (a “side-perception” manifesting either in shock or involved our perception as a background). We see double: the visible (perceptible or identifiable elements of perception) and invisible (the imperceptible which undermine and transform these identifiable elements) in reciprocal presupposition. Massumi’s double language of an event gives us a way to speak about this experience, which is simultaneously: an image-event at the surface which are the subtractive, limitative and derived functions of the image and an expression-event in the depths that are inexplicable functions of emergence as an immediate differing force of intensity incarnating a modification or change151.

**SUMMARY OF THE BODY**

We began the exploration of the body with Spinoza, in defining an affective body by two propositions: the kinetic proposition of relations of motion and rest and the dynamic proposition of capacities to affect and be affected. We can understand a body based on its material relations with other bodies and its power or the affects it is capable of. Following
this, a body is neither subject nor object but a self-creating assemblage of developments of affecting and being affected by external bodies in perpetual encounters, and a capacity that opens the ability to intensify our power (to reach its full potential). It is at the level of the body that non-representational thought occurs within and in response to its material relations; this kind of thinking is irreducible to the traditional notion of thought defined as rationality, and in fact the cognitivist’s would most likely marginalize this type of thinking by labeling it irrational. In the cinema studies one must consider this non-representational thought as a semiotics of matter and movement that produce subjects of force: Deleuze’s taxonomy is a *material semiotics of force*, rather than a semiotics of signified meaning (this is a major difference with Bordwell’s model in *Making Meaning*).

Our second destination was Nietzsche and his body as an expression of the quantity of force. This means that any two forces in mutual relations will form a body where each force is either reactive and obeys or active and commands. The obvious Spinoza influence on Nietzsche aside, we find that these two concepts of the body are defined by what they can do rather than what they are; that is to say, they both fall under an *ethological* study interested in the singularities of the body. Thus, we synthesize the two, terming them affective assemblages, and defining them by a longitude and latitude. Two consequences of this synthesis are of direct importance: 1) similar to Deleuze’s modification of Spinoza’s modes, we are able to speak of Spinoza without the transcendence of any God, where bodies express the whole creatively such that the whole (plane of immanence) is created through its modal expression; and 2) Nietzsche provides an opportunity to speak of aesthetics in the Spinoza system as an aesthetics of existence while also linking art, life and the body itself.

According to an ethological perspective, a body is not considered under
phenomenological interests of the lived body, nor through the Cartesian scientific body, it can be anything: an animal, a body of sounds, a mental image, a human, a linguistic concept, a collective, etc. Consistent with Spinoza whose plane of immanence—the plane of Nature that distributes affects—does not distinguish between what is natural and what is artificial, since artificial things are defined by the arrangement of motions and rests in the same way as a nature thing.

The third body is the *cinematic body* or center of indetermination, and one might think of each cinematic body produced as an affective assemblage that has a latitude made of intensive parts falling under a capacity, and longitude of extensive parts under a relation. In *The Cinematic Body*, Shaviro’s largest contribution in my opinion is the gesture it lends to the reader as a means of operating with the image, which is exactly what cinematic bodies do. It’s the gesture of an ethologist, which is why it is surprising that Shaviro only mentions Spinoza and Nietzsche in passing. With the purview of affective assemblages, it may be argued that we reach what is only implicated in Shaviro’s cinematic bodies, which inform their very production. However, this only describes the individual body in cinema (whether it’s a cinematic body, an image, the spectator’s or the character’s). This is our reasoning for introducing the last, and perhaps most interesting, bodies in film: haecceity.

Haecceities are impersonal and singular bodies that assume a function of conditioning the individual subjectivities that are produced. The *production of subjectivity* is related to Shaviro’s cinematic body while the *subjectless subjectivity* is the impersonal Other that conditions each production. Like Deleuze-Guattari’s aesthetic conception of *pure affect* and *percept*, haecceities embody both sensation (longitude) and affect (latitude). Therefore it is not the affective assemblage that fills the center of indetermination but is rather produced
by it; what fills it is a haecceity, thus an aesthetic dimension of the image describes a haecceity through its speeds and slownesses (longitude) and intensities and affects (latitude): it is no longer an image – it’s a body state; a speed and slowness. One description of haecceities falls under the dimension of the aesthetics of mood, concerned with the expressive aspects of the image. As Sinnerbrink tells us, “A film-world must be aesthetically disclosed or rendered meaningful through the evocation of appropriate moods in order for such cues to show up as affectively charged with meaning in the first place.”

Furthermore, we can consider the center of indetermination in at least three ways. First, the direct engagement of sensation with the spectator as expressed in Cinema I as “the brain”. These are the affective assemblages or cinematic bodies that are produced when entering a relational circuit with screen, body and film-world. Further, there are incorporeal effects that give us two more considerations. As found in Del Rio, the interval as the body of the character (re)presented on the screen (affective assemblages represented), but there is one more radical concept. We may determine a third, more abstract consideration of the interval or body: between the assemblages of images (in-themselves) on screen, aside from its representative content. I would like to extend that this leads us towards a haecceity.

The implication of these three characterizations of the interval provides a new way of analyzing an image, in that all elements of the cinematic experience may be considered as bodies in themselves, endowed with a power of affecting any other within the screen as well as the spectator’s body. We must produce a diagram of the connections between assemblages and their operations to recognize how the productive potential of any assemblage.
The cinematic image will be considered in itself an affective assemblage, each shot is composed of a vertical and horizontal axis that constitute a signaletic material. On the horizontal axis, there are the expressive and material components of an assemblage (i.e. material – machinic assemblages of bodies, actions and passions and expressive – collective assemblages of enunciation, of incorporeal transformations of bodies)\textsuperscript{157}. The vertical axis has territorial and re-territorialized sides that play a part in stabilization and “cutting edges of deterriorialization, which carry it away\textsuperscript{158}”. An assemblage is a machine of \textit{semiotization} (making things mean in a particular kind of way) that arranges things in time and space in a particular way; it’s the extrinsic appropriation of a particular territory.

The machinic components are extrinsic and emphasize the objectivity and productive role of an assemblage, its result is a new means of expression or in other words a new territory (spatial organization) or behavior. What carves an assemblage out of the world of a film is a series of events; in other words, anything can be extracted from the situation presented in a film and can become an assemblage \textit{qua} the powers of film (its expressive function). Sound, image, characters, machines, colors/light, all of these things can be arranged in a film in order to create a territory as a new means of expression. On one hand, machinic assemblages produce affections that are realized directly on the body of the spectator. On the other hand, the film itself is a series of events (incorporeal acts/expressions) that determine many assemblages of images that act on one another. These two do not oppose one another but again are levels that resonate between one another. The difficulty in diagramming the continual processes of becoming involved in film is substituted by a diagram of the connections between assemblages and their operations to recognize how an assemblage can elicit affects, produce effects and even constitute a new reality (making unexpected connections).
BECOMING-IMAGE:
SPINOZA’S VISION BEYOND PERCEPTION – A CONCLUSION

If the surface of the cinematic image is at the same time perception and more than perception, mind-based models of meaning production (the most popular is probably Bordwell’s *Making Meaning*) which privileges natural perception are inadequate to theorizing about cinematic potential. I will conclude by introducing a model of engagement with images we may call *becoming-image* that takes into consideration both the individual affective assemblages and haecceity (the impersonal autonomous ones). Zizek writes, “Deleuze celebrates the art of cinema: it ‘liberates’ the gaze, images, movements, and, ultimately, time itself from their attribution to a given subject…” We can extend this with a passage from *Cinema 1*, where Deleuze describes cinema’s advantage: “just because it lacks a center of anchorage and of horizon, the sections which it makes would not prevent it from going back up the path that natural perception comes down.” What this means is this lack of anchorage allows for a recover of the expression-event that perception (image-event) abandons in its selection. Bergson tells us that the act of perception: “puts us at once into matter, is impersonal, and coincides with the perceived object.” The individual act of perception thus coincides or co-existing with this impersonal matter similar to the discussion of the Other above.

Spinoza’s eye is no less coincident with material, in fact it is one example of a body, which Deleuze describes in a lecture on Spinoza, that is born out of relations between individual parts and the parts of others that surround it; the eye affects the other parts and is affected by them. In Spinoza’s *Optical Letters* we see how Spinoza’s own ideal clarity of vision is developed through his practice of lens-grinding: the materiality of the glass expresses the potential of a clarity of vision that is not just a unified focus (selective
visual perception), but is clear only within the context of peripheral focus (the affective potential “background” perception). This peripheral focus, I would argue is the idea of a body situated in the context of the world that Massumi would most likely attach to an expression-event (the unified focus attached to image-event) which tends towards uncovering a haecceity. The perceived form of the object is seeing, in a real way, the capacities or potentials that the body can act on the object at the particular moment it finds itself in; in Spinoza, it is a sort of panoramic vision (unified + peripheral focus) that makes up an ideal clarity of an image. Therefore it is the mind that sees not the eyes, although the eyes undergo modifications thus changing what the mind imagines, it’s the mind that affirms the image in discovering the conditions for the experience that constitutes the periphery focus of vision itself. I want to say that this ideal clarity makes up an experience of thinking-with film: vision that is as much thinking-feeling as it is perceptual.

One does not enter the image as a site of identification, subordinating it to resemblance or similitude from the point of view of direct perception; rather, to really see is to enter an image’s flow, hitch along with its movement in “an act of thinking that displaces the field of intelligibility, modifying the conditions of the problems we pose for ourselves”. Let us consider haecceity in this case. A haecceity carries the virtual potentiality and all its capacities to affect and be affected alongside a concrete actualization as a trace, thus haecceities make-up the peripheral focus that Spinoza is attentive to. We may never reach pure immanence, but the haecceity function as the road signs that direct us along the way towards its limit. Thus Spinoza may have provided us with a technique of seeing: becoming-image. Haecceities constitute the image’s particular way of going, a movement and rhythm that allows us to attune ourselves and take up its movement. When we take up an image’s movement, the image moves with us at the same
time, and we meet in a new territory bringing about a new body (affective assemblage). That is a new composition of relations between the elements in the assemblage that results in a new means of expressing how to operate in this world—new ways of seeing, thinking and feeling—each which plays a role in grasping the image with ideal clarity. This is to say that it makes visible the imperceptible composing forces: powers, speeds and slownesses (where unified and peripheral focus are both taken into consideration). Becoming-image is generative of a new way of being that is a function of forces rather than resemblances.

I propose this concept in order to contribute to Robert Sinnerbrink’s challenge of “translating the kind of experience [films] afford into aesthetically receptive and theoretically inflected film criticism”\textsuperscript{168}. This is not an understanding of the image is as a form of proof, but it’s a stance towards understanding how “they aesthetically (that is to say, cinematically) disclose novel aspects of experience, question given elements of our practices or normative frameworks, challenge established ways of seeing, and open up new paths for thinking.”\textsuperscript{169} The aesthetic power of cinema is determined when the spectator in engaging a relational circuit with the screen encounters other bodies as assemblages of images, which provokes thought. It has the power to produce new forms of subjectivity by modifying the body’s characteristic relations and intensive capacities. The cinema has the power to (re)organize, to find new ways of transcending ordinary experience and endowing new sensibilities. From this perspective, the cinema is not concerned with the selection of a world, but with the question as to how can the powers, speeds and slownesses be composed, such that it forms a higher individual, ad infinitum? Therefore, a cinematic ethics is developed through experimenting with the image rather than interpreting signification and prescribing moral action; instead we must ask, what affects can cinema create: “what can an image do?”\textsuperscript{170}
NOTES:

3. Much of recent film scholarship takes a polemic stance against a wide range of theories such as Lacanian psychoanalysis, Structuralism, Post-structuralism, Semiotics and Marxism. These divergent bodies of thought David Bordwell and Noël Carroll reduce to the term “Grand Theory”.
5. ibid. (xv).
6. ibid. (37).
7. ibid. (19).
11. Deleuze was increasing interested in Neuroscience as the field developed. See: Elliott, Paul. “The Eye, the Brain, the Screen: What Neuroscience Can Teach Film Theory,” Excursions, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (June 2010), 1-16.
14. ibid. (7).
18. ibid.
19. ibid. (64).
22. Marks 2000: 162. Haptic vision is a tactile form of perception, where “the eyes themselves function like organs of touch” (Marks 2000: 162). One might think of cinematic experience as an atmospherization of the contents of the image, a haptic sense of feeling perceived beyond the visual elements of the film.
23. ibid. (162).
28. ibid. (207); this borders on “using Deleuze” in some ways.
30. The concept expression-event will be revisited again, later in this paper.
32. I am here making this claim based on a passage from Brian Massumi: “With the body, the ‘walls’ are the sensory surfaces. The intensity is experience. The emptiness or in-betweeness filled by experience is the incorporeal dimension of the body . . . This is not yet a subject. But it may well be the conditions of emergence of a subject: an incipient subjectivity.” Massumi, Brian. *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Duke University Press, 2002. pg. 14.
35. Although, in many English translations of *Ethics* we find “emotions” replace “affects”, we should reserve the emotions as a separate concept altogether.
36. For more on autonomy of affect cf. Massumi 2002b.
38. See Massumi on “visceral sensibility” (Massumi 2002b: 58); “Visceral sensibility immediately registers excitations gathered by the five “exteroceptive” senses even before they are fully processed by the brain . . . The immediacy of visceral perception is so radical that it can be said without exaggeration to precede the exteroceptive sense perception.” (Massumi 2002b: 60).
39. Others have defined the affect on the non-representational or sub-representative level: Claire Colebrook: “. . . affect is not the meaning of an experience but the response it prompts” (Colebrook 2002: xix). Simon O’Sullivan describes it as “the stuff that goes beneath, beyond, and even parallel to signification” (O’Sullivan 2001: 128). Felix Guattari: “a pre-personal category, installed ‘before’ the circumscription of identities, and manifested by unlocatable transference, unlocatable with regard to their origin as well as with regard to their destination” (Guattari 1996: 158).
40. Deleuze 1990a: 220; also (Deleuze 1988: 49): “. . . state of an affected body and implies the presence of the affecting body”.
42. Deleuze 1990a: 220.
43. Spinoza: “Most of those who have written about the Affects, and men’s way of living, seem to treat, not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but
of things which are outside nature. Indeed they seem to conceive man in nature as
a dominion within a dominion . . . [Yet] nature is always the same, and its virtue
and power of acting are always one and the same, i.e., the laws and rules of nature
. . . The Affects, therefore, of hate, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves,
follow from the very same necessity and force of nature as the other singular
things.” (Spinoza 1970: 491–2)
44. *Ethics* definition of desire, III.
45. *Ethics* Post. 3, II.
46. *Ethics* Prop. 14, II.
47. *Ethics* Prop. 12,13 II.
48. “The idea of any mode wherein the human body is affected by external bodies must
involve the nature of the human body together with the nature of the external
body.” (*Ethics* Prop. 16, II).
49. *Ethics* Prop. 16, Corr. 2, II. and *Ethics* Prop. 17, II.
50. *Ethics* Prop. 2, III.
51. Deleuze 1990a: 22. The sense of “comprehension” is not conceptual understanding
but a logical necessity in Spinoza’s system.
56. The assemblage Deleuze-Spinoza is a particular interpretation of Spinoza and cannot
be considered the commonplace understanding of him. Anytime I am speaking of
Spinoza without directly quoting his passages, there is a good chance its not
Spinoza but a “monstrous” version, a Deleuze-Spinoza.
58. ibid.
59. . . . we see movement in terms of composition and affection, but we lack specific
knowledge of the force behind the movement. A mode passing into existence
entails an infinity of extensive parts, which are determined from without to come
under the relations corresponding to its essence or its degree of power.” (Deleuze
1990a: 229).
60. Spinoza’s human body “requires a great many bodies by which it is, as it were,
continually regenerated” (*Ethics* Prop 19, Dem, II).
62. My blue SP book: 130. Passivity and activity relate to Spinoza’s theory of inadequate
and adequate ideas (which I will discuss in later).
63. Cf. Deleuze, Gilles, “power (*puissance*), classical natural right - Cours Vincennes :
November 29th, 2013).
64. ibid.
65. The term “transindividual” covers much of Gilbert Simondon’s *L’Individuation psychique
et collective*: Simondon defines transindividual as encompassing knowledge,
affectivity, and more generally, spiritual life (Simondon 1989: 104).
66. Two references: (Deleuze 1988: 3) and (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 279).
68. ibid. (347-8).
69. ibid. (339).
70. ibid. (367).
73. Deleuze 1990a: 197: “toward the idea of a distinction or singularity belonging to modal essences as such.”
76. Michael Hardt writes affectivity “affords Deleuze [a] means of posing inner experience as a mode of corporeal exteriority [and the] receptivity of a body is closely tied to its active external expression . . . ” (Hardt 1993: 54); Erin Manning defines relationality of affect as “the with-ness of the movement of the world” (Manning 2007: xxi); Steve Goodman describes affect as “the ontological glue of the universe” (Goodman 2009: 195); Brian Massumi: “affect is the connecting thread of experience. It is the invisible glue that holds the world together. In event. The world-glue of event of an autonomy of event-connection continuing across its own serialized capture in context.” (Massumi 2002b: 217).
77. Deleuze 1990a: 218.
78. The analytic reading of Spinoza misses this dynamic or plastic form of the body in all its relations, and therefore is mistaken when they describe it as the material life of a human being.
80. Hardt cites an important passage from Deleuze’s study on Nietzsche: “The very last section of Nietzsche and Philosophy approaches this problem: Nietzsche’s practical teaching is that difference is happy; that multiplicity, becoming and chance are adequate objects of joy by themselves and that only joy returns…. Not since Lucretius has the critical enterprise that characterizes philosophy been taken so far (with the exception of Spinoza). Lucretius exposes the trouble of the soul and those who need it to establish their power—Spinoza exposes sorrow, all the causes of sorrow and all those who found their power at the heart of this sorrow—Nietzsche exposes ressentiment, bad conscience and the power of the negative that serves as their principle.” (Hardt 1993: 190).
85. A question may come up at this point: is the study ethological or is the body ethological constituted through such a study? For Deleuze, this is the schema of an ethological study, in which the body becomes constituted as ethological.
86. These three factors are paraphrased from SPP: (Deleuze 1988: 125-6).
87. This removes the substantial and makes substance turn upon its finite modes: “All that Spinozism needed to do for the univocal to become an object of pure affirmation was to make substance turn around the modes - in other words, to realise univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal return.” (Deleuze 1994: 304); Accepting this modification of Spinoza’s plane of immanence, which Deleuze has already accomplished in DR, allows us to think of Spinoza’s material universe and the cinematic universe together, and thus think of Deleuze-Spinoza’s molecular subjectivity of relationality and connectivity with the world a meta-cinema as well.
89. Following this: “According to Nietzsche we have not yet understood what the life of an artist means: the activity of this life serves as a stimulant to the affirmation contained in the work of art itself, to the will to power of the artist as artist.” (Deleuze 2006: 102).
90. Deleuze 2006: 3.
93. Cf. Morrison 1989. There is no discussion of art in his works, but there are passing references to the restorative powers of entertainment, which seem to be aligned for Spinoza with health. In the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza admits that we can “enjoy pleasures just so far as suffices for the safeguarding of our health.” (Spinoza 1985: 12).
94. In an interview about Foucault’s notion of life as a work of art, Deleuze writes that: “[E]stablishing ways of existing or styles of life isn’t just an aesthetic matter, it’s what Foucault called ethics, as opposed to morality. The difference is that morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a special sort, ones that judge actions and intentions by considering them in relation to transcendent values (this is good, that’s bad . . . ); ethics is a set of optional rules that assess what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of existing involved. We say this, do that: what way of existing does it involve?” (Deleuze 1995: 100).
95. How a spectator, who is passively affected by images of the film, can become active, and not simply as a hermeneutic meaning-making analysis?
96. I will develop a theory of the interval through the lens of Spinoza’s theory of affectivity. I am indebted to others who have explored this path: Shaviro 1993; Del Rio 2008; Powell 2007.
97. Cf. Hughes, “Believing in the World: Toward and Ethics of Form” (in Guillaume and Hughes 2011). Joe Hughes grounds the cinema in a theory of the body and we take this as our starting point as well.
98. Hughes 2012: 84.
99. The plane of immanence is metaphysically consistent with Spinoza’s ‘one Substance,’ ‘one Nature,’ or God in the sense that the plane is to immanent to anything but immanence is Nature that is immanent only to itself.
100. Deleuze 1986: 58-9; A consequence of this is that the world of cinema is identical to the material world in which we live; he even goes as far to say that the plane of immanence is cinema in itself, “the universe a metacinema”. (Deleuze 1986: 59).
101. *Ethics* Lemma 1, II.
102. *Ethics* Lemma 3, II.
103. *Ethics* Postulate 1, II; Spinoza’s definition of *individuum*: “When a number of bodies, whether of the same or different size, are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another, or if they so move, whether with the same or different degrees of speed, that they communicate their motion to one another in a certain fixed manner, we shall say that those bodies are united to each other and that they all together compose one body or Individual, which is distinguished from the others by this union of bodies.” (Spinoza 1994: 126).
104. Deleuze 1990a: 119; Felicity Coleman in *Deleuze and Cinema: The Filmic Concepts* (Colman 2011: 27): “This ‘cinematographic whole’ is given through camera movements, cessations and ruptures (C1: 27). But it is a false sense of unity given by the movement-image, as Deleuze argues that any cinematic ‘whole’ is always ‘open’ (C1: 28).”
105. Deleuze 1986: 59; D.N. Rodowick *Deleuze’s Time Machine*: “Through integration, related images are internalized into a conceptual whole whose movement expresses a qualitative change: the whole is different from the sum of its parts. But the whole in turn enlarges itself through retotalization in related sets” (Rodowick 1997: 10).
106. Braidotti 2000, 159: “the enfleshed Deleuzian subject is rather an ‘in-between’: it is a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous unfolding outwards of affects. A mobile entity, an enfleshed sort of memory that repeats and is capable of lasting through sets of discontinuous variations, while remaining faithful to itself. The Deleuzian body is ultimately an embodied memory”.
107. In a Spinozist way the plane of immanence matter is force and hence luminous in and of itself: “In other words, the eye is in things, in luminous images in themselves”. (Deleuze 1986: 60).
108. *Ethics* Prop. 16, II: “The idea of any mode wherein the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body together with the nature of the external body.”
109. *Ethics* Prop. 3, IV: Spinoza shows that “the force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes”.
110. Deleuze 1988: 58. The gaseous state is a metaphor he is using to answer this question (Deleuze 1988: 58): “How could my brain contain images since it is one image among others? External images act on me, transmit movement to me, and I return movement: how could images be in my consciousness, since I am myself image, that is, movement?”
111. ibid. Insofar as the modes are constantly being affected from the outside leading to a potential transformation of the bodies at play, affect is perpetually undulating and reforming. It is more bodily than cognitive.
113. ibid.
114. For Bergson, the body and brain are themselves images among others that have the distinction of being centers of indetermination.
115. In support, Paul Bains claims that “sensations are brain achievements and there is no brain behind the brain—or eye behind the eye to look at its products. Vision or
any other sensorial experience is existence rather than representation of” (Massumi 2002a: 108).

116. Rodowick 1997: 87; also, in Bergsonism Deleuze sees the mind “not a space of subjective representation but a sensorimotor interval, a gap that allows difference to intervene between stimulus and response”. (Deleuze 1991: 107-110). Affections are the driving force of the cycle around stimulus and response. Hence the affection-image in the cinema books is between perception and action, stimulus and response.

117. Rodowick 1997: 34. He continues to make two more necessary points: “The interval delays reactions, giving them time to select, organize and integrate remembered information, producing a new movement in response” and; “Whatever movement it receives on one side is reorganized and transformed on the other”; this all is to explain how Deleuze edifies Bergson’s conception as we find a similar response in Matter and Memory (Bergson 1991: 30): one side is “an instrument of analysis in regard to the movement received” and the other is “an instrument of selection in regard to the movement executed”; Deleuze in Cinema 2: “The movement image has two sides, one in relation to objects whose relative position it varies, the other in relation to a whole – of which it expresses an absolute change” (Deleuze 1989: 34).

118. Each link in this circuit (mixture of the three material aspects) produces an image specific to it. The perception-image produces a subjective perception by centering all its elements on the body in the midst of a mobile and indeterminate space. The affection-image institutes a delay between action and reaction and thereby expresses the subject's experience of itself from the inside. The action-image arises along the horizon established by the perception-image.


121. ibid.

122. ibid.

123. Shapiro 2009 (paraphrasing Bergson’s Creative Evolution).

124. There is a slight difference between the production of subjectivity (which I would attribute to the interval in Cinema 1 that constitutes the subjectivity by the three material aspects), and the interval found in Cinema 2, a subjectless subjectivity. Cf. Massumi 2002a for more.

125. I want to highlight the importance of both these terms. Out-of-field is an important concept in the cinema books and for any interest in affect. The existence of the out-of-field is an extension of Noel Burch’s six zones of off-screen (geometric) space and “a more radical Elsewhere” (Deleuze 1986: 30) affective space where the outside is enfolded within the image. The second is “peripheral,” as I will argue the importance of the peripheral focus for Spinoza’s ideal clarity of vision.


130. ibid. (177).
This does not mean it’s a possibility existing in the actual but its own realization, of creation.

“[Hjelmslev] used the term matter for the plane of consistency or Body without Organs, in other words, the unformed, unorganized, nonstratified, or destratified body and all its flows: subatomic and submolecular particles, pure intensities, prevital and prephysical free singularities.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 3).


Deleuze 1990b: 151.

ibid. (152).

We have seen this already in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of art, sensation perpect and affect in What is Philosophy?

The concept originates in John Duns Scotus but here it has a Spinoza twist; let us not forget that Peirce (who grounds Deleuze’s material-semiotic approach to cinema) was a student of Duns Scotus and had already equated the concept with “thisness,” Cf. Murphey 1993: 309. Duns Scotus defines a haecceity as a “physical” form or sensory being, in its individual existence. Following this, Peirce identifies it as a mode of the ontological category of Secondness he calls “thisness”. For Deleuze, it is an event of an intersection of particular times, spaces, and bodies, animals and/or objects.


ibid. (93), some italics are mine.

“You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life (regardless of its duration)—a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its regularity). Or at least you can have it, you can reach it.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 262). The notion of a life and haecceity are very important to developing any aesthetic theory that is Spinozist, even if the terms are from outside Spinoza’s own system, they still come up ‘in the middle’ of it.

Assemblages offer a way to map the intensive and extensive aspects of a thing. Later, we will look at a bit of assemblage theory, which follows Spinoza’s logic of the body.

Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 263.

ibid. 262-3).

ibid. (507).


Peirce describes this experience as a shock. Also he goes on to involve gestures such as “brute reaction,” “resistance,” “interruption,” “compulsion,” and “intrusion”, Deleuze will say its culminates in an asignifying rupture (the fourth rhizomatic principle): “that it can be shattered at any spot which would cause it to start again on either an old, or begin a new line” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 7-12). Later, I will discuss Massumi’s discussion of “side-perception” that manifest either in shock or involved our perception as a background. Let us not forgot the significance I have already highlighted with out-of-field and periphery.
I am alluding to *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature* where Deleuze and Guattari in their discussion of “becoming-animal” implicitly highlight this relational circuit: “Metamorphosis is the contrary to metaphor. There is no longer any proper sense or figurative sense, but only a distribution of states that is part of the range of the word. The thing and other things are no longer anything but intensities overrun by deterritorialized sound or words that are following their line of escape.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 22).

This is consistent with the Bergsonian reading as well. In *Matter and Memory* (Bergson 1991: 103) Bergson says that perception is better understood as a relational circuit, which identifies potentials for action. He understands the image as a bridge between two changing processes: matter (objectively existing things) and our thoughts (memory). A bridge, because the image exists both in the thing that has or projects an image consistent with the nature of its own being, and in our minds, which receive the projected images in the manner of a screen. And it expresses possibilities or tendencies to be followed in their mutual engagement (cf. Massumi 2002a revisits this topic; Deleuze 1989: 34; Bogue 2003a: 108).


We mustn’t be complacent with the phenomenological interest in the stasis of being because it presupposes the infinite factors involved in the actualization of the body.

In a discussion of Lacanian lack, Shaviro states, “Gilles Deleuze traces a countertradition, a 'philosophical reversal' found in the writings of Spinoza and Nietzsche (among others). This countertradition does not oppose body and thought, but instead posits a parallelism between them: it affirms the powers of the body, and it sees the very opacity and insubordination of the flesh as a stimulus to thought and as its necessary condition.” (Shaviro 1993: 256).


ibid.

Deleuze 1986: 58.

Deleuze 1986: 58.


Deleuze 1986: 58.

Bergson 1992: 25. Bergson perception is a process of selection; a subtraction from the image that can be defined as a reaction controlled by an unconscious interest. His concept of perception is not subjective as in a “mental image,” perception is in matter composed of images. Perception is material just as matter is already perception, although an unconscious one.

Deleuze has a b“My eye, for example, my eye and the relative constancy of my eye are defined by a certain relation of movement and rest through all the modifications of the diverse parts of my eye; but my eye itself, which already has an infinity of parts, is one part among the parts of my body, the eye in its turn is a
part of the face and the face, in its turn, is a part of my body, etc....thus you have all sorts of relations which will be combined with one another to form an individuality of such and such degree. But at each one of these levels or degrees, individuality will be defined by a certain relation composed of movement and rest.”


164. See Correspondence 39 and 40 in (Spinoza 1966).
165. The concept thinking-feeling comes from an interview with Massumi: “The Thinking-Feeling of What Happens by Brian Massumi” (Massumi 2008).
166. Zourabichvili 2012: 141.
167. This also brings up an interesting ethical implication, becoming-active. For Spinoza the imagination (first kind of knowledge) is inadequate because it doesn’t express its own cause but is dependent upon external bodies affecting us. This is experience through the mediation of the body and thus a mediated form of haecceity in concrete actualization. That is we see the trace (image) of the virtual in the actualization but it is not adequate. These mediated haecceity only function to frame and organize sensation into perception (unified focus). To reach an adequate idea is to reach a haecceity unmediated (clarity, unified and peripheral focus), which expresses its singular nature, its essence. Therefore there is an ethical orientation with the concept of haecceity that interrogates how cinema can participate in the pursuit of beatitude (third kind of knowledge: intuition and essence notions) by allowing the center of indetermination to shift in relation to the peripheral aspects of the image-assemblage as much or more than the focal ones. This, as Cassarino has pointed out (Casarino 2011), is comparable to Spinoza’s intuition but also a “sense-event” (cf. Deleuze 1990b) for definition of sense-event).
169. ibid.
170. This leads us to a few questions that I would like to leave open-ended: can cinema be regarded as a medium of ethical thinking and how does this concepts of affective assemblages, haecceity and becoming-image address these issues? Given the aesthetic power of cinema to evoke affect, how can a film elicit or even reinvent ethical experience?
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