FROM DIWAN TO PALACE: JORDANIAN TRIBAL POLITICS AND ELECTIONS

by

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*We also certify that written approval has been obtained for any proprietary material contained therein.
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<tr>
<td>FATAH</td>
<td>Palestinian Political Party; “beginning of victory”</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GID</td>
<td>General Intelligence Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Islamic Action Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JD</td>
<td>Jordanian Dinar (unit of currency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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From Diwan to Palace: Jordanian Tribal Politics and Elections

Abstract

Despite the vast research by political science scholars on the persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, little is known about why citizens have not pushed for more democratic reforms. The recent Arab Spring has focused our attention on the few countries that have experienced revolt against their authoritarian leaders. Many of those “transitions to democracy” are still quite contested or in danger of failing. A similar scenario occurred in 1989 in Jordan when King Hussein allowed credibly free and fair elections. These elections should have led to more liberalizing reform and possible a true constitutional monarchy or democracy. Counterintuitively, they did not.

This study looks at the reasons why an authoritarian state such as Jordan has remained intact. In large part, Jordan has remained a very conservative authoritarian state because of tribal politics. Tribal politics have erased the distinct boundaries between what is the state and what is private. Tribal politics in Jordan help explain how “the state” is not a discrete monolith that is controlled exclusively by an authoritarian leader. Rather, over time, the state has evolved unevenly and in reaction to tribal groups who were looking to empower or enrich themselves. Different powerful tribes have “captured” various agencies of the state and rule them almost as part of their personal power.

Previous research focuses on regime manipulations of the rules. This study offers a different perspective and set of causal factors for the explanation. While acknowledging regime manipulation exists, this case study suggests the evidence shows tribes are self-interested actors who use their own tribal sets of rules and sanctions to capture seats in the parliament. Examination of the succeeding elections illuminates how tribes are able to handle new regime rules and adapt to the new political opportunities in order to gain further power within the state.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am sincerely grateful to my committee chair, Pete Moore, for the support and guidance he showed me throughout my dissertation writing. Additionally, I wholeheartedly thank Kelly McMann and Neda Zawahri for their support over the past several years as I moved from an idea to a completed dissertation. I also thank Vince McHale who has been a mentor and friend. Dr. McHale took a personal interest in supporting yet another student who wandered into his office looking for help. He was so generous with his time and his expertise.

It has been said that people stand on the shoulders of those who love them in order to achieve their goals in this world. I would not have been able to complete this research and dissertation without my family. I have finished this dissertation with the support and patience of my husband, Dan, and my children, Katie, Matt, Bonnie, Milan, Jumana, and Jimmy. They were always ready with encouragement and humor.

Lastly, I would like to thank the rest of my family who helped my through the whole dissertation process. Yaser Salem and Hanan Turki welcomed me with enormous enthusiasm and generosity in Amman and introduced me to many kind people who became the base of my research network. My sister, Suzanne, and my brother-in-law, George, sat good-naturedly through many hours of editing and map making that the reader will see in the finished dissertation. They made an arduous task fun.
Map 1. Contemporary Jordan and Its Neighbors

Source: United States Congressional Research Service
MAP 2. GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF JORDAN’S MAJOR TRIBES

Source of tribal location data: L.C. Weir, 2012

Map base ©2012 Google, Maps GISlead, Orim

JORDAN’S MAJOR TRIBES

| 1  | Abbad         | 12 | Bani Hamida  |
| 2  | Adayat        | 13 | Bani Hassan  |
| 3  | Adwan         | 14 | Bani Khalid  |
| 4  | Ahl al Jabal  | 15 | Bani Sakhr   |
| 5  | Ajurah        | 16 | Da’ja        |
| 6  | al Tal        | 17 | Fayiz        |
| 7  | Arabiyyat     | 18 | Furayhat     |
| 8  | Awazim        | 19 | Ghazawiyya   |
| 9  | Awran         | 20 | Ghunaymat    |
| 10 | Balqawiyya    | 21 | Hadid        |
| 11 | Bani ‘Attiya  | 22 | Hajaray      |
| 23 | Haqish        | 24 | Huwayyat     |
| 25 | ibn Jazi      | 26 | Issa         |
| 27 | Kalada        | 28 | Ma’ayyat     |
| 29 | Majali        | 30 | Manna ‘in    |
| 31 | Mara ‘iyin    | 32 | Nu ‘aymat    |
| 33 | Obeidat       | 34 | Ruwwala      |
| 35 | Sardiyya      | 36 | Sa ‘idyyin   |
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| 41 | Tarwarlah     | 42 | Tawayha      |
CHAPTER ONE: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PUZZLE

“If you see the fangs of the lion, don't think the lion is smiling”

*Traditional Jordanian proverb*

Introduction

Despite the vast research by political science scholars on the persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, little is known about why citizens have not pushed for more democratic reforms. The recent Arab Spring has focused our attention on the few countries that have experienced revolt against their authoritarian leaders. Many of those “transistions to democracy” are still quite contested or in danger of failing. A similar scenario occurred in 1989 when King Hussein allowed credibly free and fair elections. These elections should have led to more liberalizing reform and possibly a true constitutional monarchy or democracy. Counterintuitively, they did not.

This study looks at the reasons why an authoritarian state such as Jordan has remained intact. In large part, Jordan has remained a very conservative authoritarian state because of tribal politics. Tribal politics is used throughout this dissertation to refer to an identity exclusive to “Transjordanians” or “East Bankers” in Jordan although other social groups in Jordan have tribes of their own. It is, in the case of the Transjordanians, an *identity with political and economic force that relies on networks of power, rules, and sanctions rather than mere cultural or ethnic designation* (although these are important criteria of membership). As a result of tribal politics as a robust political institution, the distinct boundaries between what is public and what is private are erased. This definition appears simple enough on the surface but has several important implications. First,
membership is fixed in a way so individuals cannot merely join or quit at will. Second, tribal membership cuts across class lines with the inclusion of the whole range of wealthy, educated urban elites to the rural poor. Membership includes women and children who are typically not participants in politics in the public spheres of the Middle East. Third, tribes are nondemocratic, patriarchal institutions with leadership usually constituted of elders and based on heredity rather than merit or popular acclamation. These factors dramatically affect popular politics in Jordan and the Middle East.

Tribal politics in the case of Jordan helps explain how “the state” is not a discrete monolith that is controlled exclusively by an authoritarian leader. Rather, over time, the state has evolved unevenly and in reaction to tribal groups who were looking to enrich and empower themselves. Different powerful tribes have captures various agencies of the state and rule them almost as part of their personal power.

Previous research focuses on regime manipulations of the rules. This study offers a different perspective and set of causal factors for the explanation. While acknowledging regime manipulation exists, this case study suggests the evidence shows tribes are self-interested actors who use their own tribal sets of rules and sanctions to capture seats in the parliament. Examination of the succeeding elections illuminates how tribes are able to handle new regime rules and adapt to the new political opportunities in order to gain further power within the state.

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There is a general acknowledgment that Jordan has been able to maintain its political stability because of its deeply embedded ethos of tribal politics. What are tribal politics and what affect, if any, do they have? Previous scholarship on tribes in the Middle East has largely been the work of anthropologists or historians. Research on the political nature of tribes is scarce because earlier scholarship was considered orientalist. Orientalism describes a bias in the approach of social sciences that reflected a very imperialistic, pro-Western interpretation of historical record and political events. Edward Said’s book, *Orientalism*, describes it as political propaganda and dogma that objectifies post-colonial nations as backwards, lazy, dangerous, and inferior. Orientalism paints the whole of the developing world with a broad brush, thereby ignoring the complexity of humanity.

The intentional exclusion of tribes from the discussion of political developments in the Middle East has resulted in a lack of understanding of the modern Arab state. The exploration of tribes leads to a unique view of a complexity of the formation and persistence of the Arab state that is missing from most political science literature. Current treatments, however, are largely due to the role that tribes have played in Afghanistan, Waziristan, and Iraq as violent non-state actors. There are few existing studies in the

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discipline of political science that considers the role of Arab tribes in the Middle East within the political process.

Given rapid changes in the Middle East, expectations that tribal politics would become less significant would appear logical. Counterintuitively, the institutions of tribes have been reinvigorated in the past decade. The production of tribal identity has been carefully crafted to create distinctions and inequalities both politically and economically. How does tribal politics shape or alter the Jordanian political process?

These questions rest on a set of assumptions. First, that there is such a thing as tribal politics. This question also assumes that tribal politics has a salient role in the production of political policy and national identity. These assumptions are different from the common explanation in the prevailing literature that the monarchy maintains the status quo through strategic manipulation of tribal loyalties.

This dissertation seeks to understand the role of tribal politics in the durability of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East; it is a different perspective. Authoritarian durability has occupied the attention of political scientists in the recent decade. There are layers of existing explanations including historical perspectives on nation-building, analysis of institutional structures, economic and globalization explanations, and rational choice/agency explanations. The direction of all of these claims remains a top down explanation. It assumes that mass politics is either dormant or repressed to the extent that it is impotent. This is simply not true in the Middle East.

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6 These observations result from a number of interviews conducted between 2003 and 2011 with both Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians. Many of the interviewees asked to remain unidentified because of their concerns of both possible political and economic repercussions.
The current scholarship is based on two predominant explanations: authoritarian regimes remain in power by either repressing or co-opting potential elite opposition (Brownlee 2005; Lust-Okar 2006) or authoritarian regimes use institutional designs to repress potential opposition from the mass level (Gandhi & Przeworski 2001; Magaloni 2006; Myerson 2006; Boix and Svolik 2008, Schedler 2009). Both explanations rest on two assumptions. First, the power to maintain the status quo lies exclusively with the authoritarian regime. Second, given the opportunity, to vote people will demand more democracy. These assumptions are faulty. Pivotal social coalitions under Middle East authoritarian regimes have fluctuated in their support but have never advocated for real democratization. The events of the Arab Spring have not resulted in “democratization.” In Egypt, for example, the 2011 revolution has resulted in a transition from a dictator to virtual rule by the military generals in spite of the first national elections in over sixty years.

Even with the resuscitation of political parties, independent media, parliamentary strengthening, and the promotion of regular national elections in the last two decades, political participation has not resulted in mandates for more democracy or revolt. This would suggest that the explanations on authoritarian durability are incomplete. This dissertation acknowledges that tribal loyalties have been and are strategic to the monarchy. Yet, evidence will demonstrate the power to maintain the status quo does not rest exclusively with the Jordanian regime.

By mobilizing the symbols of heritage and ancestry, tribes have managed to reinvent their importance in contemporary Jordan. This has a profound effect on the meaning of the “Jordanian” identity. While tribal politics benefit the regime from
time to time, they actually pose a significant problem for the development of the essential requirements of a strong state. In Jordan, the effects are recognizable in the unsteady and inequitable growth of a middle class, a feckless parliament, and a central authority that becomes quite distant to the people in the rural areas. Despite efforts from both domestic and international stakeholders, tribal identities and institutions retard the efforts to create a strong Jordanian state, skew the development of a class-based society, and promote rival institutions to the state enforcement of the rule of law. This tangled relationship between powerful tribes and the authoritarian regime perpetuates a hollowed-out state that is extremely weak and citizens have little reason to give it their allegiance.

**Literature Review**

The dissertation argues from the scholarship of Scott (1985), Migdal (2001, 2004), and Wedeen (2002, 2010) tribal identity translates into the power necessary to navigate the structural weaknesses of Jordan’s politics and economy. As Scott observed, the struggle at the microlevel is not only over food, security, and autonomy but also over the meaning of symbols, history, and the highest aspirations of a culture.⁷ States, according to Scott, create their legitimacy by appropriation of these symbols, aspirations, and careful crafting of historical events. While the poorest of society are perfectly aware of the negative impact of adherence to political and economic practices that limit their choices, they act quite rationally to maximize any political, economic, or symbolic resources available to them rather than risk any

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push for political changes which might be more costly to them than the present structures.

Migdal takes Scott’s observations further by exploring how the pursuit of power is not a unidirectional, top-down experience. Rather, as states have evolved in developing countries, bureaucratic positions initially awarded as a way to bind local loyalties to the regime have become their own small universes of political and business ties. State leaders cannot undo this dynamic without risking losing important loci of support. The only remedy seemingly available to state leaders is what Migdal refers to as “the big shuffle.” State leaders use their power of appointment to replace ministers who have become too strong with others seemingly more loyal. It is an intentional move to weaken “arms of the state and allied organizations- a kind of deinstitutionalization…” that unintentionally elevates the importance of the tribal groups represented by powerful state ministers and shaykhs. “(I)deological and programmatic politics” become limited by “group influence that is used for personal gain.” Options available to the regime to craft a national identity or political policies are restricted by the presence of powerful tribes who have a profound interest in maintaining the status quo. This competition over identity and policies is essential because the difference between citizen and tribal member is politically significant.

Further, there is great political power held by the shaykhs and this power resides largely on their ability to mobilize tribal membership during elections. Shaykhs rely on

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9 Ibid. 78.
their ability to deliver scarce resources and services to tribal members in order to maintain their positions of power within the group. The current political system in Jordan benefits the shaykhs in their access to these benefits, therefore, political reforms which might endanger the current regime and their positions of power are aggressively opposed by the tribes. So there are powerful incentives that have the unintended consequence of maintaining the authoritarian status quo.

These facts need to be seen in perspective to the contemporary concept of the state and the regime. Skocpol (1985) defines a state as as set of “organizations claiming control over territory and peoples which formulate and pursue their own goals. In the case of authoritarian states, these goals may not be reflective of the demands or needs of social groups, classes, or society.”

The authoritarian regime of Jordan operates the set of rules, norms, and institutions that determine how government is constituted; how it is organized; and how its major decisions are made. The hallmark of an authoritarian regime is the concentration of political power in a single family. This is not a political arrangement that occurs quickly. Rather, “(a) state could therefore only develop if a politically supported regime remains in power for a considerable time and internalization of legitimacy into a situation of stateness, within which interests can be articulated and institutionalized.” In the case of Jordan, the authoritarian regime is the Hashemite family that has effectively ruled Jordan from its existence as a British protectorate to the present- almost a full century.

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10 Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press), 6-9.
The historical development of the relationship between the authoritarian state and the independent variable of tribal politics is important because it explains how the tribes gained access to the bureaucratic agencies of the state in the first place and how important tribal support was to the survival of Amir Abdullah and subsequently to King Hussein. The case study also examines tribal pursuit of power in the formation of the state out of strategic self-interest. That tribal pursuit of power, at times, challenged the authoritarian state.

There has been much discussion of structural weakness of authoritarian states in the Middle East. The Jordanian state institutional structures, authority, (legitimacy) law, and political order are compromised. Ayubi (2006) labels Middle Eastern authoritarian states as “fierce states,” states that “resort to raw coercion in order to preserve itself, but it is not a strong state because it lacks “the infrastructural power that enables states to penetrate society effectively.” 12 So while Middle Eastern authoritarian states and their regimes have strong state capacities regarding military or physical coercion; these states lack socio-economic capacities which put their durability at risk.

This is why tribal politics is central to the continued existence of the authoritarian state. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) explain how informal institutions- in this case, Jordanian tribes- have become central to the stability of the authoritarian state. The stability of the state depends on the tangle of relationships with tribal powers. No government is stable and exists in a vacuum. The integration of certain powerful tribes into the bureaucratic control of the authoritarian state is the source of power for the

particular constellation of tribes noted in the dissertation. The agencies of the bureaucracy act as free agents, dispensing jobs and benefits to other members of the tribe. Only occasionally does the monarch reorganize these agencies’ ministers. This is not a cycling of elites. It is merely a re-distribution of tribal access to state benefits.

A careful review of the Jordanian case illuminates the evolution of tribal politics over time. It describes the ebb and flow of tribal power and significance to the survival of the Jordanian state. This dissertation examines the political spaces, particularly the national legislative elections, which would allow development of a national identity and a cycling of elites. Already regarded as resistant to change from the status quo, the state promotion of regular national elections in the last two decades has not translated into mandates for more democracy. Rather, parliamentary elections have cemented the centrality of the tribes in the political life of Jordan.

Tribal politics have also contributed to the bifurcation of social and economic spaces. There are serious challenges to development in Jordan as in all the emerging states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). While the regime periodically takes steps to alleviate the symptoms of structural weakness, including increasing public sector salaries, reducing taxes on electricity and fuel, and subsidizing the cost of basic foodstuffs, the government and the economy remain impotent in their ability to provide adequate employment and democratic reform.

Tribal politics is a social and political institution that is quite important under these conditions because it provides access to the nodes of political and economic power
while offering the sense of a safety net. However, the strategic choices made at the micro level of society to invoke and adhere to tribal politics have been left unexamined.

_Tribal Politics and Elections_

Over its history, the state experienced critical junctures in which total collapse, through coups or civil wars, could have occurred but that did not happen. Specifically, collapse of the authoritarian state did not happen because the tribes chose to not let it happen. In 2011, during Jordan’s own version of the Arab Spring, there was again another critical moment that could have ended the Hashemite regime. There were several protests in tribal areas of Jordan. Yet, many of the powerful tribes were against changing the political _status quo_. Why? Tribal support over time has not been unified or consistent. Tribal regime support is self-interested action in the face of changing and uncertain political and economic conditions. Over time, tribes have grown and adapted to become the most powerful political force in Jordan.

A recent example of the influence of the tribes in Jordan was reported in _al-Jazeera_. In October 2012, Walid Obeidat was appointed Jordan’s Ambassador to Israel. A mass meeting was held by the Obeidat tribe in northern Jordan to publically state their opposition to the appointment and to Israel. “The tribe had offered the young ambassador an amount of five million dinars and to be elected as the representative of the tribe in the parliament for four consecutive terms in case he rejects his new post.”\textsuperscript{13} While the politics of opposition to Israel is not new, the statement speaks volumes about the

political power wielded by this tribe. How does one tribe have the capacity to offer almost $7,050,000 USD in an economy where the average person earns less than $4,000 USD per year?\textsuperscript{14} How is such a blatant bribe such a casual event? Additionally, the statement reveals the \textit{de facto} control of parliamentary elections by the powerful tribes in Jordan. The explanations lie in the relationship between the political arrangements constructed by the tribes and the state. Any change to these arrangements would undo the ability of tribes like the Obeidat to amass and dispense stunning economic and political control.

While Jordan has evolved with democratic institutions over the last two decades including holding regular elections for the national Parliament, the corridors of political power run through the diwans\textsuperscript{15} of the tribal shaykhs. Yoav Alon noted that Jordan may have been successful in building the institutions of the modern state but that is not the same as nation building. As much as Arabs take on the identity of “Jordanians” it is an identity that exists and competes with traditional tribal identities, loyalties, and institutions. A good example is the institution of the Royal Hashemite Diwan. This is not an entity that is laid out in the constitution as part of the formal, legal structure of the state, however the Diwan is perhaps one of the most powerful political institutions in Jordan. Established by Amir Abdullah, the Diwan today is composed of mostly royal family members and shaykhs from prominent Bedouin tribes. Its function is to symbolically continue the message of the king as “Shaykh of all shaykhs” and thus emphasize his role as the patron who stands above the politics yet guides the country.

\textsuperscript{15} A traditional gathering room or chamber where tribal shaykhs receive tribal members, resolve issues, and formulate policies.
Lisa Wedeen (2008) considers the question why a state like Yemen would risk elections while people endure everyday experiences such as the lack of garbage collection or street cleaning. These experiences are evidence of how absent the state is in provision of basic services. Not only would an election domestically validate the failure of the regime, it would signal to the international community this regime does not function even at the most rudimentary level. Moreover, elections provide political spaces which open the regime to potential challenges. Regime motives for the expense and effort of “elections” in Yemen focused on the event as an “expression of national identification.”\textsuperscript{16} While international stakeholders including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States, and the World Bank might have bought into the expression of Yemeni identity as a result of the elections, there was a very different understanding created within Yemen. “(The) election demonstrated and contributed to the assertion of northern control and the corresponding constriction of permitted, institutionalized contestation.”\textsuperscript{17}

The same can be claimed for the legislative elections held in Jordan since 1989. Elections are frequently held as expensive displays of Jordanian identity mounted by the regime. The regime also uses the elections as part of the “big shuffle” scheme but the results are far less controllable. Electoral results are orchestrated not necessarily by the state but rather by the manipulation of electoral rules to assert the control of particular tribes. Elections give the tribes opportunities to flex their political and economic

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 70.
muscles. The reason is the powerful tribes\textsuperscript{18} use the rules of elections to capture or consolidate positions of power within the state apparatus. This is the part of “political authority” that has been left unexamined and a reason why persistence of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East is not completely of their own making. Authoritarians persist because these powerful tribal actors also benefit from the system and will not move toward any political change that might diminish their role.

While international observers might note ongoing “electoral reform,” elections communicate to individual Jordanians the regime is not as powerful or present in their everyday lives. The real power lies in the few tribes who control specific economic networks in both the public and private sectors and who control the real policy-making in the government. The unintended consequence is a splintering of identity into local, tribal membership rather than a national identity. The result is a lack of development of political institutions that can make national claims on the government.

Tied into the discourse of the real meaning and value of parliamentary elections is the production of the Jordanian identity. Tilly expressed the idea that elections under an authoritarian regime tell us much about the visible political identities which are engaged in the “the arrays of claims making performances” on the part of both the regime and its citizens.\textsuperscript{19} This is an important point in the case of Jordan. Owen (1992) also noted that elections in the Middle East in general may not be very democratic; however, they are

\textsuperscript{18}The term “tribe” is explained in detail in the next chapters. This dissertation focuses narrowly on the aspect of “tribes” a identity with political and economic force that relies on networks of power, rules, and sanctions rather than a mere cultural or ethnic designation.

extremely meaningful and important to both the state and political stakeholders.\textsuperscript{20}

Parliamentary elections in Jordan have opened a door of opportunity for tribal groups to seize control of political power at the expense of democratization. In essence, while the state may have exploited tribal politics, tribal politics has exploited the state.

The elections in Jordan allow us to consider a number of important factors including the changes in traditional institutional organization and legitimization of political power over time and in the face of the development of modern institutional structures. Elections in Jordan illuminate the \textit{adaptation} rather than \textit{disintegration} of traditional political institutions. Elections also reveal the opaque relationship between the formal and informal institutions that are at the core of political participation in the Middle East. The relationship is important to the potential for future democratization in the region. Evidence suggests tribal politics ultimately privileges local, personal power of specific tribes at the expense of the state. Additionally, tribal politics fractures issues into local rather than national concerns.

The local nature of political issues gets reinforced during elections. Research for this dissertation revealed the real competition for power becomes sub-tribal during elections as candidates vie for tribal endorsements, knowing the win means a significant change in status and power within the tribal group. This focus limits the possibility of an organized, central threat to a sovereign, national state. It also limits the development of a national identity in favor of particularistic, local identities.

Especially evident in Amman is the tension between urbanizing communities.

Both Palestinian Jordanians and Jordanian tribes scuffle for the control of political

benefits. Both cry foul and claim that the other community has been privileged by the regime in various ways. Especially during parliamentary elections, tribal leaders have made clear and intentional efforts to claim control of Amman electoral districts. These districts have traditionally been recognized as bastions of Palestinian political power. The actions and strategies that different actors take in the venue of elections are important because they demonstrate the incentives of tribal participation. Any variation in outcomes of tribal participations in the elections over time can also illuminate the relationship between the tribes and other political actors including the Palestinian Jordanians. While power and prestige certainly are at stake during recent national elections in Amman, a critical outcome of those elections is delineation of Jordanian identity as traditional and tribal rather than a national identity. This synthetic identity highlights the differences between Transjordanian tribes and Palestinian Jordanians rather than their commonalities. The real purpose of these elections is a competition for identity, control of the rules to the game, and elimination of political competitors. The unintended consequence of such contests is the regime can remain suprapolitical at very little political cost.

The unintended result from the intersection of tribal politics and national parliamentary elections is the strong relationship between “modern” politics with the “traditional.” Tribal politics constitute and perpetuate a conservative, traditional status quo which preserves the Hashemite monarchy and the fundamental structural weakness of both the political and economic sector. Further, the evidence from the elections demonstrates the intentional strategy and capacity of tribal politics to eliminate any challenges from Palestinian Jordanians. The result is roughly half of the population has no voice in the limited political space in Jordanian politics. This will continue to be a
significant problem for the stability of Jordan as it faces the political, economic, and social upheavals currently gripping the Middle East and its Arab Spring.

The economic and political problems have been conflated by the instrumentalization of identity evoked by both the Palestinian-Jordanians and the tribes.\textsuperscript{21} Certainly, much of this division is the handiwork of the regime on behalf of its own interests. However, tribes have mobilized their resources to push back against what is considered the rise of Palestinian political and economic power in Jordan and the inattentiveness of the regime. Current evidence of tribal political discontent with the Palace emerged in February, 2011. A letter of protest signed by thirty-six Bedouin shaykhs\textsuperscript{22} suggested the royal family, the Hashemites, had abandoned the tribes in favor of the rich Palestinian Jordanians.\textsuperscript{23} This incident and other recent political events in Jordan took place during what has been described as the Arab Spring which includes a series of protest movements against authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. The letter stated, “Tribal leaders have warned that Jordan suffers from a ‘crisis of authority,’ and growing influence of ‘corrupt businessmen in the entourage of the executive power, affecting political decisions and ignoring national

\textsuperscript{21} Although Jordanian society includes many other ethnic and religious groups, the Palestinian Jordanians and the Jordanian tribes are the two largest and prominent groups driving both politics and the economy.
\textsuperscript{22} The officially news agency, Petra, later disputed this claim. The Palace’s position is that these thirty-six signatories were not “shaykhs” but other tribal members with aspirations of challenging tribal leadership. A chapter five examines the problems of internal tribal institutional competition.
The letter threatened, “Jordan will sooner or later be the target of an uprising similar to the ones in Tunisia and Egypt due to suppression of freedoms and looting of public funds.”

The letter reflects two larger changes that are taking place beyond the particular incident. Domestically, Jordan is engulfed in battle between several different political competitors: the Palace and elites; Palestinian Jordanians and the tribes; and the tribes among themselves. Beyond domestic political dynamics, regional tribes are playing an important role in the political changes that are occurring in Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Iraq, and Morocco. Therefore, the case in Jordan is highly relevant to the events taking place in the current “Arab Spring.”

In the case of Jordan, tribal politics constitute an innate identity that is the cornerstone of the tension between the ideal of being “Jordanian” and the reality of being “Palestinian,” “Circassian,” “Transjordanian,” or “foreigner.” The distinctions have historical roots as “tribes” from other regions of the Nejd or Hijaz threatened the legitimacy of local tribes in dealing first with the Ottomans and, later, the British. The term “Transjordanian” refers to tribes whose ancestry can be traced to the area now recognized as Jordan (See Map 2). It is an important identity because it separates this

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24 Habib.
25 Ibid.
group of tribes from other Arabs (this, again, is an artificial distinction given the number of tribes who ranged across the Nejd and Hijaz but now insist on their Transjordanian roots).\(^27\) That distinction of identity separates the Transjordanian from the Palestinians. It also makes a distinction from the Hashemites who now rule Jordan and originally were considered interlopers from the Hijaz.

These distinctions which exist within Jordan are important for several reasons. Simply, identity politics are extremely important to the durability and legitimacy of any state. The second reason is the direct relationship between the support of “Transjordanian” tribes and the creation of the state. More recently, the creation of Israel and the subsequent “status” of Palestinian refugees and the West Bank in regional politics presented a threat both to the state of Jordan and to the people living there. Lastly, tribal identity currently is important because of the access to scarce political and economic networks in Jordan.

Key tribes including the al-Abbadi, al-Tal, al-Majali, and al-Nabulsi represented distinct regional economic and political power centers. Not only are these tribes the focus of this dissertation but specifically how they function as political institutions. Beyond key forces in society, tribes were the first political institution. Over time, tribes gained more political power under imperial regimes rather than losing out to state authority. Tribal control of political power in Jordan is the single most important factor which, at times, even supercedes formal state authority in the lives of the average person. Table 1.1 refers to the most powerful political tribes in Jordan today. They are the

\(^{27}\) See, for example, the history of Ramallah as recounted by Farouq Wadi, 2007, *Homes of the Heart: A Ramallah Chronicle* (Northampton, MA: Interlink Publishing Group).
pivotal actors who control not only key political agencies within the government but also command local politics and access to such things as jobs, university admissions, and military careers.

Table 1.1 Names of Tribes that are the Important Political Power Brokers in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbadi</th>
<th>Dughmi</th>
<th>Hindawi</th>
<th>Kilani</th>
<th>Omoush</th>
<th>Shwayyat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Hadi</td>
<td>Ejeilat</td>
<td>Hiyari</td>
<td>Kreishan</td>
<td>Oran</td>
<td>Sqour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adwan</td>
<td>Fayez</td>
<td>Hmoud</td>
<td>Ma’aytah</td>
<td>Qadi</td>
<td>Tal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajarmah</td>
<td>Fayyad</td>
<td>Hneiti</td>
<td>Majali</td>
<td>Qusous</td>
<td>Tarawneh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akaileh</td>
<td>Ghweiri</td>
<td>Jazi</td>
<td>Masaed</td>
<td>Rawabdeh</td>
<td>Thiabat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azzam</td>
<td>Habarbeh</td>
<td>Judeh</td>
<td>Masri</td>
<td>Safian</td>
<td>Thneibat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badran</td>
<td>Hadban</td>
<td>Karaki</td>
<td>Mu’asher</td>
<td>Saifi</td>
<td>Wahsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahkit</td>
<td>Hajaya</td>
<td>Khasawneh</td>
<td>Najjar</td>
<td>Shahwan</td>
<td>Zaben</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bani Hasan</td>
<td>Hanania</td>
<td>Khatib</td>
<td>Neimat</td>
<td>Shakanbah</td>
<td>Zu’bi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batayneh</td>
<td>Hashem</td>
<td>Khleifat</td>
<td>Obeidat</td>
<td>Shreideh</td>
<td>Zreikat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Interior and Royal Court, Royal Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; Author’s research

In modern Jordan, tribal politics is intimately meshed with all the institutions of the state. Not only do tribal members form the bulk of military and the government bureaucracy, tribal networks are important gateways for employment, education, and political influence. This fact is important in a country with few natural resources. Jordan is dependent on foreign aid, remittances from expatriate workers and a miniscule private sector. Figures vary but it is estimated between fifteen to thirty percent of Jordanians live below the poverty line. Unemployment is still estimated at thirty percent of the working age population while youth unemployment is much higher. The economic structures in Jordan hurt all Jordanians because thousands of young Jordanians who have the education and skills leave the country in search of better employment opportunities. The government is Jordan’s largest employer “with between one-third to two-thirds of all workers on the state’s payroll.” It is estimated more than eighty percent of

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29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
government spending goes to civil service expenses and that figure excludes spending on the military. Even this government employment cannot keep pace with the growing number of Jordanians seeking work. For example, in 2003 the Civil Service Bureau received 107,500 female and 60,600 male applications.\textsuperscript{31} That year, 2,500 women and 2,700 men were appointed to civil service jobs.\textsuperscript{32} That is a rate of two percent new employment for women and four percent for men from the application pool for that year.

The bloated government spending on employment is hamstrung by a tiny private sector which produces very little in the way of a tax flow. This includes the fact that many “private businesses” are part of a large black market that includes smuggling and other activities. According to the International Crisis Group’s 2007 report on the Middle East, most businesses—perhaps as many as ninety-five percent— are family run,\textsuperscript{33} meaning that jobs, income and profits are used to benefit more needy relatives or the family as a whole often without being taxed or documented as part of income of the state.

\textit{Case Study}

This dissertation joins the recent literature by challenging the notion that Middle Eastern politics can be explained simply by a top-down view of the state. While state-oriented literature is informative, it oversimplifies the context to the point of creating a reality void of discursive complexity. “Methodological statism”\textsuperscript{34} is a predominant political science theory which captures the idea that the state is \textit{the} all-powerful actor in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Christine Guégnard, Xavier Matheu, and Musa Shteiwi, 2005, “Unemployment in Jordan,” (Torino, Italy: European Training Foundation), 8.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Crisis Group phone interview, Omar Shaaban, Gaza City, February 2007.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the Middle East. Additionally, much of the literature considers Arab tribes the unfailing lackeys of the regime.\(^{35}\) While states are principle forces in Middle East politics, they are not alone. This standard view dismisses tribes as political actors\(^{36}\) and therefore misses their role in the _constantly negotiated balance of political power_ under authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Tribes act in predictable, rational ways and compete for benefits and goods from the state between themselves and other political actors.

This dissertation considers the role of tribal politics in the current political dynamics in Jordan through the lens of the parliamentary elections which have occurred between 1989 and 2010. The elections are often dismissed as the occasional spectacle that obfuscates the Jordanian regime’s reassertion of autocratic power. In reality, the elections play an important role in the retrenching of tribal politics and their attendant networks of patronage. As Wedeen noted, political scientists should be “interested in how and what votes signal…for such theories can help clarify relationships (and explain) how symbols are inscribed in activities that operate to produce observable political effects.”\(^{37}\)


\(^{36}\) See also Marsha Pripstein Posusney & Michelle Penner Angrist, 2005, _Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance_ (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers); Hisham Sharabi, 1988, _Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society_ (London: Oxford University Press); Richard Antoun, 2000, “Civil Society, Tribal Process, and Change in Jordan: An Anthropological View,” _International Journal of Middle East Studies_, 32; (4):441-463 and Nazih Ayubi, 1995, _Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East_. These scholars are the most well-known for the prevailing view of tribes as a political factor in the Middle East.

Definitions within the specific case of the legislative elections are more nebulous for a number of reasons. First, candidates have in the past identified themselves as “independent” during the campaign only to declare a political affiliation or join a political bloc once they are elected to the Lower House. This has been the case particularly where the Islamic Action Front (IAF) candidates campaigned in past elections. Second, determining tribal affiliations of candidates is often problematic because tribes consist of many family names which may be used in different districts where a particular family is more dominant. Finally, tribal candidacies are never “formally” announced like an endorsement from the Ba’athist Party, for example. The candidate endorsements are routinely, widely understood by the general voting population and taken as just as formal as a party endorsement. To overcome the ambiguous nature of tribal candidacy, this research relies on data from the Ministry of the Interior on tribal affiliations and direct interviews with as many candidates as possible. Additionally, field research over the last several years has allowed me to develop an understanding of tribal affiliations in Jordan.

As March and Olsen observed,

[a]ctions taken within and by political institutions change the distribution of political interests, resources, and rules by creating new actors and identities, by providing actors with criteria of success and failure, by constructing rules for appropriate behavior, and by endowing some individuals, rather than others, with authority and other types of resources.38

Especially since the United States policy of “planting democracy” in the Middle East became an imperative in 2003, pressure to democratize and liberalize the Jordanian state forced rapid changes. The flurry of political institution building in Jordan has been

viewed with varying measures of success. While new political identities may have been created, the distribution of interests, resources, and rules has not really changed as much as they have been consolidated. The implication is that political contestation between formal institutions such as political parties do not actually occur under the Jordanian regime.  

However, this dissertation offers evidence the conclusion is not necessarily the full causal explanation. The reason tribal political contestation in places like Jordan is not recognized is the literature is largely silent on the intersection of formal mechanisms of rule and informal political forces that affect their outcomes. Because the role of tribes as informal political institutions has not been examined, much of the dynamics that affect the durability of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East has been missed. Lisa Anderson observed,

We encounter difficulties in answering…question(s) because (they) arise from American disciplinary and policy preoccupations, not from regional political dynamics. As a result of those preoccupations, Middle East political scientists have neglected some of the major political forces in the region…

There has been a great hesitancy to look at the role of tribes in the current politics of the Middle East except as they pertain to violent opposition groups and terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Evidence from this study suggests tribal politics within

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state institutions such as legislative elections ultimately privileges local, personal power of specific tribes. Tribal politics limit the possibility of an organized, central threat to a sovereign, national state.

While tribal politics in Jordan is observable, measuring the effect is difficult to do. The meagerness of the current literature speaks to the difficulty. Tribes have been given little attention as political actors. The conventional view considers tribes to be an artifact of pre-modern society that will fade away as a society modernizes, urbanizes, and democratizes. If tribal politics is a causal factor, it is often deemed temporary in nature and therefore not a sufficient and necessary explanation. Another reason why tribal politics has been not seriously studied is its informal structure which has no central authority, no constitution or manifesto, is not a visible bureaucracy in the sense that is familiar or consistent with Western experience.

Jordan is a key case that can inform our understanding of the different types of state-society relationships that produce the stability or change of a regime. There is clear proof of elite manipulation of competing groups and identities in Jordan as an important causal factor. This, however, is not the full causal relationship in Jordan or the wider Middle East because there is not a clear understanding of the organic level of competition for political power. As Scott (1998) asserts, states are visible and easily measured because their activities are aimed at the organization of society for three simple functions: tax collection, conscription, and the prevention of rebellion. Yet, the state itself knows

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“precious little”\textsuperscript{43} of the “informal process and improvisation in the face of unpredictability.”\textsuperscript{44} So while there is much evidence that documents and informs the top-down relationship between state and society in political science literature, there is the potential to sharpen the empirical and theoretical knowledge through an examination of how tribal politics shape, change, or promote the Middle Eastern state. Wedeen (2002) wrote about the importance of culture and symbols in the production of meaning in political phenomena. Symbolic political practices “are also the effects of institutional arrangements, of structures of domination, and of strategic interests, activities of meaning-making can also be studied as effects or dependent variables.”\textsuperscript{45}

Analyzing “non-events” in political science such as peace or regime consolidation is exponentially more difficult than examining wars, coups, or revolutions. The value of case studies in contributing to the understanding of “non-events” is well-documented. The case study has long been regarded as a useful tool\textsuperscript{46} that can drill down through the complex forces simultaneously at work at the mass level. Lijphart asserts the importance of discovering “empirical relationships between variables”\textsuperscript{47} through the use of case studies in political science.


\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{47} Arend Lijphart, 1971, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.” \textit{American Political Science Review} 65: 683.
Jordan is an important case because “from both an understanding-oriented and an action-oriented perspective, it is often more important to clarify the deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences than to describe the symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur.”\textsuperscript{48} Jordan as a case allows one to trace the “temporal unfolding of events, actions…and motivations while supplying evidence of interactions between causal factors.”\textsuperscript{49} Data resulting from the complexity of the case has the potential to shed light on the processes of tribal politics that have the unintended consequences of durable autocracy and contested notions of citizenship.

The intention of the research methodology and data analysis is to examine evidence of the causal process between the dependent and independent variables that is reliable and valid and, in the future, may serve as the basis for further research. The tribe as a unit of political analysis in the Middle East has represented a challenge because it has been variously defined for researchers purposes. For example, Mamoun Fandy (1994) defines the military as a tribe because it is based on “blood ties, regional loyalties, (and) linguistic similarities” without really defining structures, ideologies, or functions that constitute a “tribe.” This research addressed this problem by comparing a number of sources on Arab tribes and developed a working definition consistent with previous scholarship. Moreover, identification of tribal groups that have been accepted as legal categorizations for the purposes of elections, judicial proceedings, foreign policy, and territorial claims in Jordan (see Appendix A) are used in order to address this concern. Additionally, recent polling has been used to indicate the strength of tribal identity within

\textsuperscript{48} Flyvberg, 229.
the Jordanian population and the possible effect it may have had on the national legislative elections on November 20, 2007 (see Appendix B).

Research from this dissertation will attempt to illuminate the variables and processes at work in tribal politics as a distinct political, informal institution. Research of tribal politics has not been undertaken even in the Middle East. A research project is currently underway at the Center for Strategic Studies at Jordan University on the role of tribal politics in Jordan. This dissertation contributes new information to the area of research being initiated in Middle East studies in comparative politics. While widely acknowledged as an important relationship, this dissertation will be one of the initial explorations into examining and measuring variables and processes in a scholarly fashion.

This dissertation explores what affect, if any, the independent variable of tribal politics has on the dependent variable regime tenure. The case of Jordan can shed light on the different institutions, formal and informal, which are involved in the production and use of political power. The case of Jordan’s tribal politics illuminates the dynamics of groups other than elites or the state in regime survival. Rather than following the notion that tribal politics is mass level “compliance (which) occurs in many circumstances because other types of behavior are inconceivable...,”\(^{50}\) this dissertation argues that tribal politics is a potent institution today because of the course and effects of exogenous forces including economic and regional political events.\(^ {51}\) Over time, the


\(^{51}\) The argument is not a traditional understanding of path dependency. Rather, “(a) survey of the literature on path dependence reveals four related causes: increasing returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedbacks, and lock-in. Though related, these causes differ. Increasing returns means that the more a choice is made or
boundaries between the state and social forces continued to change as the ability to dominate local resources of political power shifted. Even under authoritarian rule, social forces were able to demand or extract power (especially local) and control from the state. Conversely, the state, in many instances, co-opted powerful social leaders and absorbed them into state hierarchy intending to mute their traditional political power. In Transjordan, the most significant social force was the tribes. In the past, the iterated process of encroachment and accommodation produced meaningful changes to both the state and the dominant tribal forces.\(^{53}\)

These patterns of struggles between the states and the tribes continue today. While contemporary analysis of Middle East authoritarian regimes focus on their ability to resist democratization efforts there is a powerful dynamic that is ignored. A regime like the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan can project itself as an independent actor able to control its own destiny. In reality, the regime is immersed in tribal society because, in many cases, the state reaches its citizens through the filter of tribal institutions, especially in rural areas. While the regime in Jordan has worked hard to maintain the support of the

\[\text{an action is taken, the greater its benefits. Self-reinforcement means that making a choice or taking an action puts in place a set of forces or complementary institutions that encourage that choice to be sustained. With positive feedbacks, an action or choice creates positive externalities when that same choice is made by other people. Positive feedbacks create something like increasing returns, but mathematically, they differ. Increasing returns can be thought of as benefits that rise smoothly as more people make a particular choice and positive feedbacks as little bonuses given to people who already made that choice or who will make that choice in the future. Finally, lock-in means that one choice or action becomes better than any other one because a sufficient number of people have already made that choice.} \text{ See Scott Page, 2006, “Path Dependence,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1:87-115, 88.}
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\(^{53}\) See Joel Migdal, 2001, State in Society, 41-134. Migdal describes a “recursive relationship” (123) in which the state and social forces compete in various political and economic arenas with any number of other actors. Complete dominance and control is never really achieved. Rather, both state and society are altered in ways that often blur the boundaries between them.
tribes, “tribes constitute a formidable challenge to the state, and at times, even appear stronger than the state.”

Tribes in Jordan, especially in the rural areas, are the face of the state. Tribes may not have the formal, legal authority of the state, but in many instances, tribes dispense benefits, security, and demand the same allegiance as the state. In this sense, tribes act as a tandem or rival state. The contestation in political spaces in Jordan, as well as many other Arab states, continues to turn on tribal interaction with the state to the detriment of less powerful social actors. As one political analyst in Jordan put it, “We do not need democratization as much as we need political reform that ends the reign of the tribes.”

Potential Challenges of the Study

Significant issues of identity have periodically shaped the choices and actions of both the Jordanian state and the Transjordanian tribes. Particularly, the fate of the Palestinian Territories and the actions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from 1970-1973 that threatened the stability of the Hashemite regime, have had important roles in Transjordanian tribes’ view of the Palestinians living in Jordan. Even those who are born and raised there are looked at with a jaundiced eye. Discourse bordering on xenophobia accuses the Palestinians as disloyal opportunists. The crux of the divide is the increasing sense among Transjordanian tribes that the Hashemites,

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54 Interview with Charaf Ahmimed, Senior Program Officer for the Middle East, International Development Research Centre. 27 October 2009 in Amman, Jordan.
55 Interview with Naseem Tarawnah, journalist, 28 October 2009 in Amman, Jordan.
particularly under Abdullah II, have begun to dispense benefits to the Palestinians while ignoring the economic plight of the tribes.\(^{57}\)

As is the case with the majority of Middle Eastern states, most of Jordan’s population lives in urban areas.\(^{58}\) Almost four million of the six million people live in Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa.\(^{59}\) Most Jordanians are significantly young enough\(^{60}\) that there is little intimate experience of the 1947 and 1967 Wars or Black September. Considering the iterated exchanges that occur in the urban areas of Jordan, a sense of a national Jordanian identity should be significant. That is not the case. Indeed, in spaces that include universities and colleges, as well as the job market, there is a visceral presence of a divided Jordan. The shorthand explanation is the Palestinian Jordanians, left to fend for themselves, control the private sector while Transjordanians, ever loyal supporters of the Hashemite regime, dominate the public sector including the government bureaucracy and the security institutions.

Recent shifts in economic conditions and the rising expectations of an urbanizing society have introduced more anxiety and tension in both communities which makes this divided characterization even more plausible. Tribes, in particular, perceive their traditional monopoly of public sector jobs threatened. Additionally, changes in real estate and development in Jordan have positioned some smaller tribes to become rich and


\(^{60}\) Ibid.
powerful. This change has challenged the assumption of a tribal monolith as there is now competition with the old-guard tribal power brokers in Jordan. Younger tribal members are currently challenging the leadership of tribal institutions and forming sub-groups within the tribes that contribute to the further fracturing of identities and political power.

61 The resurgence of tribal identity in Jordan is not of the state’s making; however, it is to the state’s advantage because of the very specific and localized goals and issues produced by competition between powerful tribes.

This divide between the tribes and the Palestinian Jordanians may not have been the intentional making of the state and potential political opposition groups. Migdal (2004) points out that the case can be made for almost every state formation there have been mythologies of about the state and its relationship to its population.

The earlier created states, the myths went, emerged in circumstances in which: a) people's primary identity was rooted in a group constituting the state's overall population--the population's social boundaries and the political boundaries of the state were, in fact, identical; b) this overall population, in turn, formed a nation, evoking strong loyalty--hence, the nation-state; c) membership in the nation and the state, through citizenship, was coincidental and conferred equality through the entire population--a nation of the common people and a state of all its citizens; and d) this nation possessed a collective will, which expressed simultaneously a desire to have the state as its representation and to defend that state from possible harm. 62

The reality of nation-states is that citizenship is not a uniform experience for all of the population. “Political privilege based on ethnicity, gender, class, race and more
always existed.”63 This reality applies to the United States, the former Soviet Union, India, and Brazil as well as to Middle Eastern states. Every state has a politically privileged class and a class that is considered a “dangerous”64 population which might be accorded a bundle of civil rights but not given full civic participation. It is a socially created ethos that is used as a tool to keep political and economic power closely held by the politically privileged entity. In the case of Jordan, the politically privileged class is the powerful tribes and the “dangerous” population is the entity of Palestinian Jordanians. The mechanisms and implications of the relationship between the tribes and the Palestinian Jordanians is an essential element of the authoritarian political status quo. It is a source of accusations the Hashemites have broken the pact with the tribes because of recent regime attempts to widen Palestinian Jordanian inclusion.

There is widely acceptance view in Jordan the system of government is riddled with inequality in favor of tribal elites. The data suggests that is not necessarily the case. King Abdullah II has continued his father’s methods of recycling tribal notables through the Royal Court and the ministries. Yet, the increasing presence of Palestinian Jordanians in critical policy-making posts under Abdullah has fueled a strong sense that tribal institutions are under siege. As recent events have indicated, attempting to move away from well-established informal institutions raised the specter of regime change for the Hashemites.

There are drawbacks for an authoritarian state operating in a tribally-dominated society. By constructing a data set of elites, power-brokers, and decision-makers in the

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63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
public and private sectors and comparing that information with election data, it is possible to analyze the strength of tribal politics in Jordan. After looking at the data, it becomes apparent that the strength of tribal politics has not increased as much as its salience has been reshaped through attempts to control the fate of Jordan’s economy and politics. This reassertion of tribal identities and institutions has negative consequences for the ability of the regime to function as an efficient set of institutions.

The dissertation departs from the state institutional analysis to explore the cultural structures which support, interfere, or bypass formal, legal rules and processes. The evidence suggests this approach reveals great inconsistencies between motives, actions, and results. In Jordan, there is more than one point of control. This is a surprising revelation given the authoritarian nature of the Jordanian regime. Rules making and political domination are effectively constructed and conducted by both the state and the powerful tribes. This is part of the explanation of why the state often undermines its own credibility and capacity instead of strategically consolidating authority and means of repression. Moreover, the mutual co-optation of the state and the tribes creates a conservative stasis that perpetuates the fundamental weakness of the state.

The ultimate loser in tribal politics is the Palestinian Jordanians. Although they represent half of Jordan’s population and share many commonalities of history, traditions, and cultural identity, they have been effectively characterized as the threat to political stability. As a result, they are nearly voiceless in the political conversation in Jordan. The contentious interactions between the multiple sets of formal and informal institutions in Jordan have, at the moment, left the Palestinian Jordanians without any substantial political power.
Conclusion

Until the recent events of the Arab Spring, states seemed to be tightly controlled by these groups of leaders and their ability to repress or coerce compliance from their populations. This dissertation examines the case of Jordan and suggests that the traditional theories of state formation and modernization leave an important variable unexamined. Authoritarian rule in the Middle East is dependent on the interests of powerful tribes maintaining the political status quo.

Historically, there have been three critical junctures that could have resulted in the destruction of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. Sovereignty and legitimacy of the monarchs needed to have the support of the powerful tribes in order to exist. At each juncture, the tribes chose to support the regime. The specific reasons were woven into the context of each crisis, but at the core, tribes supported the Hashemites because they were given access and power derived from privileged position within the state.

There are significant problems in the political arrangements between the Hashemites and the powerful tribes. Tribal politics have erased the distinct boundaries between what is the state and what is private. Tribal politics in Jordan helps explain how “the state” is not a discrete monolith that is controlled exclusively by an authoritarian leader. Rather, over time, the state has evolved unevenly and in reaction to tribal groups who were looking to empower or enrich themselves. Different powerful tribes have “captured” various agencies of the state and rule them almost as part of their personal power.
As Foucault noted, “(T)he state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality.” These tactics of governmentality can describe the evolution of tribal politics in Jordan. This study considers when and where tribal practices and norms have not just blurred the boundaries of the state but have really taken power from the state and left it hollowed out. The Hashemites are able to retain their position as monarch because of tribal support yet if the tribes withdraw from their participation in the state, it would collapse because there is currently no other political alternative.

There are perceived competitors for political power. The largest portion of the population, the Palestinian Jordanians, has struggled against tribal influence for their share of political power. Their political clout has ebbed and flowed over time and the tribes have pushed back not only against Palestinian Jordanians but also against any move by the Hashemites to include them in the government.

The 1989 elections offered an opening for other Jordanian competitors. Yet, the tribes were able to adapt to the new political opportunities in order to gain further power within the state. Again, there is a great deal of research on elections held in authoritarian regimes. Previous research focuses on regime manipulations of the rules. This study offers a different perspective and set of causal factors for the explanation. While acknowledging regime manipulation exists, this case study suggests the evidence shows tribes are self-interested actors who use regime rules and extended sets of rules and sanctions of their own to capture seats in the parliament. The results from this study challenge the idea that the state is a single, unified actor and that an authoritarian leader has exclusive and total control over its outcomes. Rather, in Jordan, the state is a
collection of historically constructed structures, often overlapping, that are controlled by different powerful shaykhs. Tribal politics represent an informal institution of often competing rules and norms that satisfy their own personal political and economic power.

The case study adds nuance to our understanding of authoritarian durability in the Middle East. This study is part of a new body of research on the effects of society on the state. The lines between state and society are continuously blurred as encroachment and accommodation spurs both to evolve in their processes of political control. In using a largely untapped source of election data and personal interviews, this project will contribute to future research on similar topics.
Chapter Two: The History of the Jordanian “State in Society”

“It was a little game of ‘capture the flag’ between the state and the tribes. In this case, the tribes had the flags.” Yoav Alon

Introduction

The history of Jordan is one of critical junctures which presented their own distinct opportunities and challenges for state building. Against the backdrop of these critical junctures is a long testament of contested tribal-state relationships. Jordanian tribes have a reputation for their monolithic support of the Hashemites however it is not necessarily true that all tribes have supported the government all of the time. Tribes have directly challenged the authority of the state throughout history when tribal interests diverged from state interests. The pattern of self-interested political action is present in contemporary Jordanian politics. It is instructive to understand that this is not a new phenomenon.

This chapter begins with an examination of interactions of tribal institutions with state authority under the Ottoman Empire. This may be considered the “first wave” of state formation. Rapid changes over time propelled tribes into various relationships with the Ottomans through the imposition of taxes, the introduction of telegraph lines, and the construction of the Hijaz Railway. The Land Law of 1858 was a watershed event because the state was successful in changing traditional tribal institutions dealing with property rights.

The “second wave” of state-tribe relationships involved the British Mandate. It was at this point that the identity of “Tranjordanian” tribes became differentiated from Palestinian tribes, Syrian tribes, Iraqi tribes, and Saudi tribes. The introduction of the
state of Israel and the growth of Pan-Arab movements also had tremendous effect on state-tribes relationships as different powerful tribes sought a position of either security or political advancement within the regional political tumult. During this period, Abdullah and the Hashemites had to create a sense of legitimacy as leaders of the British Mandate. They were seen as “carpetbaggers” who managed to win political leadership over the tribes of Transjordan despite being “foreigners.” This would prove to be a complication which caused Abdullah to concede a great deal of state power to certain tribes in exchange for their support. This is a pattern that persists today in Jordan.

The “third wave” or critical juncture occurred after the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War. International and regional political intrigues contributed to the massively uncertain political conditions in Jordan. It was a time of significant ideological competition which really started with Amir Abdullah’s assassination and the subsequent coup attempts on the young King Hussein.

The last “wave” or critical juncture to be considered in this chapter is “Black September.” This pivotal historic movement which occurred in 1970 cemented the pact between the tribes and the Hashemites and drew a distinct line around the Palestinian Jordanians. Black September created the social formation of the Palestinian minority as a “dangerous population.” It is a powerful and effective narrative which allows the inclusion of the Palestinian Jordanians as subjects of state power but excluded from wielding any of it. As a dangerous population, the Palestinian Jordanians were “an object requiring the constant surveillance and supervision of mechanisms of the state
This was an opportunity for the powerful tribes to purge state agencies and the Hashemite inner circle of Palestinian Jordanians and consolidate their own hold on political and economic power.

The First Wave: Early Development, pre-1921

The reasons for the development of the first tribes were security and survival in a violent world. Because of the nature of the Arabian Peninsula, tribes moved frequently between grazing lands and water as the seasons changed. It was not unusual for several tribes to frequent the same areas and, over time, challenge each other for dominance over the scarce resources. Smaller or weaker tribes would routinely ask for protection or craft alliances with stronger tribes in times of war— which occurred on a frequent basis.

Notable in the history of the tribes is the persistent strength of the tribes as self-contained political systems. The various foreign rulers in the Arabian Peninsula were often less than successful in either asserting their authority or protecting the inhabitants within the borders of their empires or colonies. Tribes, on the other hand, were successful in maintaining their own customary law and leadership. Tribes were also efficient at producing powerful symbols, mobilizing structures, and enforcement procedures. While the central state could claim legal sovereignty over the territory, they were never seen as legitimate political authority. The tribes were the ascendant political power in the Nejd and Hijaz.

The Ottoman Empire claimed sovereignty over an area that included Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan for two centuries. Most of that time, the land that is

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now Jordan was considered the periphery of the empire and, therefore, largely unimportant to the central regime. The result of this relationship was the area was relegated to autonomous local tribal control. The anarchic world of tribal politics contributed to “the uneven and discontinuous way in which the Ottomans extended their institutions of law and order in Transjordan.”

Alliances between the state and the tribes often were intended to divide and suppress locally powerful tribes. This was not lost on tribal shaykhs and often resulted in the unintended expansion of local tribal power at the expense of the state. In Karak, for example, the Majali’s position of dominance was always threatened by the Bani Sakhr, the Ruwala, and the Tawarneh. Through negotiations with the Ottoman government in Damascus, Salih al-Majali officially became the governor of the district. As a result, the Majali shaykh became an enormously politically powerful person drawing on his tribal power and, also, the powers granted to him by the state.

The Ottoman goal was raising revenues rather than developing this frontier as part of the state. Therefore, the focus for the central government was short-term military solutions rather than true state-building. Many of the tribes violently resisted attempts by the Ottomans to collect taxes or enforce conscription quotas. It was not unusual for the tribes to push back against the state as occurred in 1869, for example, when the Bani Sakhr, Bani Hamida, and Adwan temporarily formed an alliance despite their historical animosity. They retook villages in the Balqa’a and ‘Ajlun and demanded their unpaid khuwa or tribal tribute/tax. Conscription, collection of crops, and taxes was halted for a

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66 Ibid.
time until the Ottomans could either send a retaliating force or develop balancing alliances with rival tribes.

The Ottoman Empire experienced a synergy of events by the mid-nineteenth century that made direct and active control of Transjordan a strategically important goal. First, the Ottoman army was economically strapped from a series of wars in the Balkans. Therefore, “the central administration put pressure on the Anatolian and Arab provinces to raise revenues by every means possible.”

Perhaps most importantly, the Ottomans began to view an expansion of their direct rule into the future land of Jordan as a priority because of the fall of Egypt to the British in 1882. The empire was losing secure borders at a very high cost in the north and west and European empire building in the Arabian Peninsula would further threaten Ottoman security. The task of the state to secure its control of Jordanian territory was enormous. “A government center needed to be created. Police and gendarmes had to be posted to provide security. Villages needed to be created, and settlers encouraged extending the area under cultivation. The submission of the Bedouin to government rule had to be won and preserved.”

The Ottoman state began a number of initiatives to strengthen their hold over Transjordan that coincided with technological developments of the nineteenth century. These initiatives included improvements in communications and security including roads, telegraph lines and the Hijaz railway. Not unlike the Pony Express on the U.S. frontier, the system of roads built between administrative centers in Transjordan provided

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67 Ibid., 44.
68 Ibid., 45.
69 Ibid.
messengers, merchants, pilgrims, and administrative officials with faster and safer ways to move.

The Madineh telegraph line was another major improvement in communications and security. The line linked Damascus to Salt, Madaba, Karak, Tafila, Ma’an and ultimately to Madineh. This accomplishment was a symbolic as it was practical. “The advent of telegraphic communications not only gave the central government direct access to its outermost territories, but gave the residents of those lands means to assure the immediate transmission of petitions to both provincial and imperial capitals. It was thus a two-way line of communication which proved influential in state-society relations.”

The Hijaz Railway reduced the economic and security costs of moving troops, pilgrims, and goods through the region. Bedouin tribes found it much more lucrative to guard tracks rather than to attempt to raid the trains. It was a subtle shift, but the Bedouin tribes could either attempt to resist the permeation of the state into their areas along the telegraph, rail, and roads or be absorbed into the state by becoming *de facto* employees. While the imposition of Bedouin *khuwa* was reduced or eradicated, tribes were more effectively taxed by the state. In all four instances, the power relationship between the state and the tribes changed.

The result of developing security and infrastructure in Transjordan had direct and significant effects on the tribes. The balance of power between the state and the tribes dramatically shifted away from the tribes. Certain tribes were elevated in prestige and power because of their cooperation with the state. Because the Bedouin were no longer

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70 Ibid. 64-65
able to collect *khuwa* at will, these tribes were diminished in the eyes of fellow tribesmen as the central power in the region. Most significantly, the tribal political institution adapted to the new relationship with the Ottomans. In many cases, the shaykh became an employee of the state as did lesser tribesmen. The source of shaykhly power depended on the services and benefits extracted from the government. Martial prowess was not as useful under Ottoman direct rule as the ability to serve as a state employee. So while the tribes still maintained much of their local dominance, their economic survival became very much tied to the state.

The importance of the Ottoman Land Law is the expansion of the central state’s role in an economy without secure property rights. The law should be recognized as a major event in the power relationship between the tribes of Transjordan and the state. Rather than a simple coordination of production and taxation, the Land Law represented the exertion of state power into the autonomous politics of the Transjordanian tribes. Additionally, the Land Laws opened the door to important and long term changes in the economic and political power of the tribes. It had, therefore, significant impact on the relationship between the state, the tribes, and between the tribes themselves. The most telling shift in the relationship was the ultimate creation of tribal political elites with a stake in preserving (and participating in) the constituent parts of a state regime which proved to their benefit.71

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The Land Law created available lands in Transjordan and elsewhere in the Ottoman Arab provinces to “developers” who were simply required to keep the land in cultivation for five consecutive years. The communal ownership of tribal lands allowed the land to be recognized as “unowned” by the government. The main recipients of ownership rights went to those tribes who were already fully in support of the Ottoman state and who also held various local positions of bureaucratic power.²² Vast stretches of grazing or fallow lands owned by the Bedouins were granted ownership in the name of one shaykh who in turn would subdivide the land into lots for distribution to tribal members at his discretion. There were variations in the arrangements that gave ownership to the al-Abbadi and the al-Adwan as individual tribes while the Bani Sakhr confederation placed technical ownership of tribal lands exclusively in the hands of Shaykh Sattim al-Fayez.²³ In either case, the tribes now actively participated in a system of economic benefits that was clearly created and dictated from a state entity rather than tribal traditions. Within the system, however, the power of the state was dispersed and mediated by strategic tribal politics.

By the late nineteenth century local revolts and blood feuds were better recorded. The populations had grown in the area of Transjordan and this strained the political situation. Competition for scarce water sources and arable land became even more contentious. Additionally, industrialization in Europe made control of trade routes essential. Even though the Ottomans claimed the region as part of the empire, western European countries quickly exploited the opportunities to be had in the Levant. The area

of Transjordan was highly contested by both the tribes and this new group of invaders. Peake Pasha’s history of Jordan notes that as WWI neared the area of Transjordan “began to attract the interest of competing ambitions”\textsuperscript{74} of the Europeans and Russians. The British and the French were most concerned Iraqi oil would fall into the hands of the Soviets as the Bolshevik Revolution raged. There already had been a long history of the “Great Game” between the British and Russians in other areas of the Middle and Near East. So, as World War I wound to a halt, the British had their sights set on seizing this territory from both the Turks and the Soviets. Little consideration was given to the tribes except as pawns in the political contest between Great Powers.

The tribes of Transjordan were quick to exploit the weakening of the Ottoman state and the potential benefits of the British and French challenges. While the Majali, for example, were invested in their relationship with the Ottoman Empire, the incursion of British interests in Kerak gave the Majali’s rivals, the Tawarneh and Bani Sakhr, the opportunity to craft new alliances that would wrest political control away from them.\textsuperscript{75}

The European strategy was to encourage tribal rejection of Ottoman authority so that the area could legally come under British and French control. The tribes, on the other hand, took the opportunity, monetarily and politically, to challenge the existing rulers who demanded taxes and conscripts. This ultimately led to the Arab Revolt.

\textit{The Second Wave: The Arab Revolt and the British Mandate, 1921-1946}

The Arab Revolt was launched in June of 1916 by Husayn ibn ‘Ali, the Sharif of Mecca. Husayn could claim direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad which

\textsuperscript{74} Peake, 94.
\textsuperscript{75} Rogan, 35-55.
“predisposed (his family) to play a prominent leading role in the emirates of Mecca and Madineh…to the exclusion of other ‘non-holy’ descent groups.”  

Husayn did not just appear out of the desert and rally The Arab tribes against the Ottomans. Husayn and his brothers were already quite active in the Ottoman parliament located in Damascus. Middle East Scholars offer varying reasons why Husayn carried out the Arab Revolt. For example, Elie Koudrie would assert that the Arab Revolt was a nationalistic political movement. However, there is more prosaic evidence that the British were exerting pressure on Sharif Husayn by threatening to block shipments of Egyptian grain to the Hijaz if Husayn did not initiate the revolt against the Turks/Ottomans. This evidence suggests the Arab Revolt was a political move by the Europeans. Other scholars suggest that the Arab Revolt can rather be seen as an example of tribal exploitation of a weak, ineffectual central authority.

More likely explanations contend that the movement was led by the Hashemites under Husayn and, therefore, was undertaken to advance their personal ambitions. “Thus nationalism may be regarded as significant to the Arab Revolt only to the extent that the Hashemites may be regarded as nationalists.” Being the Sharif of Mecca, Husayn already occupied a position of importance in the Ottoman bureaucracy but he had wider ambitions of being a ruler in his own right. He used his tribal position and religious lineage to take advantage of a political opening. Correspondence between the British

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government and Husayn clearly underscore Husayn’s ambitions to rule all of the Levant. The ensuing mythology regarding Husayn’s role as leader of the Arab Revolt would come to play an important part in successive generations’ legitimacy as political leaders.

The Sykes-Picot agreement created between the British and French in 1916 complicated agreements with Hussein and later, his son, Abdullah. Lebanon and Syria were given to the French while Palestine, Iraq, and Transjordan were to fall under British tutelage. Fortunately, the British government made no effort to claim its rights under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Time solved the difficulty in the following way. Faisal was appointed King of Syria in March, 1920 but he was forced by the French to abdicate the same year. King Husayn was driven out of the Hijaz by ibn Saud in 1924.

Abdullah, Husayn’s son, managed to gain some semblance of leadership by crafting an agreement with Winston Churchill in 1921. The Churchill-Abdullah agreement was largely based on British need to effectively control the tribes and their attacks in the Transjordan. Churchill viewed Abdullah as a cost-effective tool to get the tribes to accept the new government (and its rule of law) and to pay taxes. However, this would prove to be difficult. During the aftermath of World War I, multiple

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81 The Sykes-Picot agreement was a secret understanding concluded in May 1916, during World War I, between Great Britain and France, with the assent of Russia, for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The agreement led to the division of Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine into various French and British-administered areas. The agreement took its name from its negotiators, Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and Georges Picot of France. Some historians have pointed out that the agreement conflicted with pledges already given by the British to the Hashemite leader Husayn ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, who was about to lead an Arab revolt in the Hejaz against the Ottoman rulers on the understanding that the Arabs would eventually receive a much more important share of the territory won.” Retrieved 16 April 2008 from http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://news.bbc.co.uk/olmedia/1680000/images/_1681362_sykes_300_map.gif&imgrefurl=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1681362.stm&h=300&w=300&sz=11&hl=en&start=1&tbnid=ZAWbODMzlP9Z8M:&tbnh=116&tbnw=116&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dsykes%26gbv%3D2%26hl%3Den

82 Peake, 105.

83 Aruri, 28.
“governments” claimed the right to collect taxes from tribes. For example, Syria and Transjordan (British territories) both claimed rights to tax northern tribes while Shaykh al-Saud collected taxes from the Huwaytat and other tribes.\textsuperscript{84} Taxes were never easy for any central government to collect from the tribes. As has been previously noted, the Bedouins simply moved beyond the reach of local authorities. Tribes who were farmers or village-dwellers were more likely to rebel and eliminate or exterminate the tax collectors and local authorities.

According to records of the time, armed conflict and blood feuds between tribes were a constant problem in Transjordan. Additionally, the political boundaries drawn up by the Sykes-Picot Agreement which carved the Arabian Peninsula into Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and the Hijaz-Nejd were utterly ignored by all tribes on all sides of the borders.\textsuperscript{85} Tribal raids presented potential political repercussions by opening the British authority in Transjordan to reprisals from neighboring “states” particularly from the Hijaz-Nejd.\textsuperscript{86} In 1928, the British ordered Amir Abdullah to bring the Jordanian tribes into some settlement between each other and the Hijaz-Nejd tribes. While government officials engaged in formal negotiations, Abdullah convened a Bedouin Court to settle the raiding disputes and the blood feuds. While the court managed to settle past differences, new raids continued and old problems between tribes escalated.

The Kura incident illustrates the great influence of tribal or customary law on the process of state formation and development. Local tribal rebellions occurred with great

\textsuperscript{85} Abu Nowar, 81.
\textsuperscript{86} bin Mohammad, 13.
regularity and in great numbers during the 1920s and 1930s. Initially, Abdullah’s attempts to quash tribal rebellions met with meager success. One such attempt occurred in 1921 when Abdullah and one hundred twenty-five men marched on Shaykh al-Shreideh of Kura near Ajlun (See Map 3). Shaykh al-Shreideh considered himself king of his own village and had refused to pay taxes or recognize the British authority. The shaykh was aware of Abdullah’s troops approach and merely surrounded the troops, killing a few and taking the rest prisoners. The troops were later released and sent back to Amman. It wasn’t until Lieutenant-Colonel Peake returned the following year with British military that the rebellion was put down. The Kura incident, as it is now known, was a huge failure for the new British central government. Because of the ineffective showing of the government under Abdullah there was a rash of tribal rebellions throughout the Transjordan over the next several years.

The tribes of the Arabian Peninsula had developed strict codes of laws and procedures for conflict resolution over the centuries. These applied to settlement of the dispute with the al-Shreideh. The fifteen men who were killed were all from different tribes in the area, as were the rest of the men taken prisoners. Instead of attempting to arrest and imprison the shaykh and his tribesmen, the central government agreed to use tribal law to settle the dispute and release the prisoners. “(It) was arranged for the Kura people to return the horses and armaments they had taken from the government forces as

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88 Aruri, 28.
booty, and pay the *diyyah*, or blood money to the relatives of the officers and the men they had killed in battle…”

In 1929, a feud between the Bani Sakhr and the Huwaytat tribes deteriorated into a tribal war that had the potential of involving a great number of Jordanian, Syrian, and Hijaz-Nejd tribes. The British High Commissioner realized that neither Abdullah personally nor the British military including the Royal Air Force (RAF) had the ability to control the tribes. This had the effect of giving the central government the reputation among average Jordanians as being weak and not as significant as the tribal system to their lives.

By 1930, the estimated population of Transjordan was 300,000 of which almost half were considered Bedouins. Even in villages and cities, tribal code was *de rigueur*. The tribes were seriously divided in their loyalties and rivalries and violence was rampant. Even as shaykhs benefited by engaging in the institutions of the state, they would openly violate laws or treaties made by the central government when it would bolster their positions within their respective tribes. Moreover, holding a position on a provincial tribal court did not prevent a shaykh from authorizing a hundred armed men from raiding a neighboring tribe to redress a grievance or perceived insult.

Peake writes in his memoirs that the British had to establish a security force (the Arab Legion) in order to create local governments in Transjordan.

Public security having been established in the settled areas, it was decided in 1930 to curb the Bedouin. The Turkish government had allowed the

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89 Salibi, 103.
90 Abu Nowar, 93.
91 Abu Nowar, 80.
Bedouin to raid one another, as long as they left the settlement population in peace. In order to assure that they did so, they paid the tribes an annual subsidy, as the Romans did in former times…Major John Bagot Glubb had devised a new system: To enlist Bedouin to police the desert and pay annual salaries directly to those men instead of a general subsidy to the chief of the tribe.92

The effective resistance of the Transjordanian tribes proved to be a greater cost than the British could effectively bear. So while the colonial power cobbled together state institutions and formal boundaries, “the reliance on the tribal structure…and Abdullah’s skil(l)ful handling of tribal politics were fundamentally important to the establishment of centralized authority.”93

By 1937, tribal courts were instituted in every province and run by the local tribal chiefs. This Tribal Courts Law had two immediate effects. First, by receiving an official salary from the state, the tribal chiefs were bound by personal interest to support and continue the state institutions they benefitted from. Second, the tribal courts were given official legitimacy alongside the common law courts thus establishing an official institutional tension because often the judgments of the tribal courts would directly compete with or usurp the courts of common law. Tribal courts are just one example of how tribes were able to adapt to modern state development and maintain their salience within the state of Jordan.

As the state of Transjordan developed, Abdullah drew more cooperation from the shaykhs as he distributed titles, land, and annual salaries for “consultative” positions. This interaction between Abdullah, the state apparatus, and the shaykhs “does not

92 Peake, 109.
necessarily imply solidarity or loyalty to the state, but a heightened consciousness of the national dimension of their livelihood and their relations to politics.”94 For example, the Bani Hamida tribe became closely affiliated with the Arab Legion over time. It became an informal criterion early on that recruits came only from this specific tribal group. The tribe changed from raiding and smuggling nomads to a sedentary group that could now afford to build houses and send sons to military training. The tribal institutions adjusted to the changes and regulated the community in order to keep their monopoly on the occupation and its monetary rewards.

The Bedouin became the backbone of the security forces in Transjordan and gave their allegiance to Abdullah rather than the British. This proved to be an important step in preserving the institutions of state that were created by the British under the Mandate in 1921 but it also expanded the scope of the tribal institution by giving it official status. As Pan-Arabists and other extremist groups attempted to use Transjordan as a base to overthrow the British and Abdullah, the Arab Legion was instrumental in maintaining the status quo.95 It was this trend of the domination of the tribes in the security forces that encouraged the purging of the political bureaucracies of other Arabs and foreigners. Quickly, the state changed so those bureaucratic positions were also filled by tribal representatives only.96

The government of Transjordan gained official independence in 1923. However, the structure of Transjordan’s independence and the subsequent Organic Law of 192897 were structured so that the British still had a firm control over Abdullah and the decision-

95 Aruri, 143-144.
96 Salibi, 117-118.
97 The Organic Law of 1928 promulgated the official political institutions of the new state of Transjordan.
making while Abdullah had control of the internal day-to-day operations. “The
government of Transjordan…consisted of (an) administrative elite of foreign officials.
(It) was a formal structure of government that had no relationship to the structure to the
political power.” 98 The real political power was held by the tribes and, because of the
loyalty of most to Abdullah during this period, the tribes reaped the benefits of the newly
created Electoral Law and Legislative Council.

The immediate effects of imposing the kind of institutional control over the state
of Transjordan were three-fold. It gave ascendancy to tribal politics rather than providing
pressure to engage in political participation based on ideology. The Organic Law and
subsequent laws were designed to control political outcomes rather than allow for real
contestation and negotiation. Finally, the laws provided for a fractured and controllable
population that could easily be reined in by a state government.

The “state” took advantage of the tribes in three ways. The state relied heavily on
tribal loyalty, tribal identity, and the political leadership capacity of the shaykhs. The
British, through Abdullah, found state control achieved expediently by investing local
tribes with formal administrative state powers and politically privileging tribal shaykhs.
Security institutions of the state were the privy of specific tribal groups; shaykhs sat in
Legislative Councils- the precursors of a legislative body; and tribal courts basically
controlled the rule of law in Transjordan. The unintended consequence of relying on
tribal institutions was that this practice perpetuated local or kin identities rather than
encouraging a strong national ethos. Therefore, while state institutions developed
steadily during the 1920s, the tribe was the unifying political identity. On the local level,

98 Salibi, 74.
political institutions were tribal institutions and interference by the state was often met with outright rebellion.

By 1932, Transjordan felt the effects of the world-wide depression. The impact felt in Transjordan was profound because the tribes lived close to the edge of survival even in good economic times. The depression in Jordan was made more difficult by drought and locust plagues.\textsuperscript{99} Crop failure, substantial loss of herds, and starvation was common throughout Transjordan. This was compounded by the fact that the state under Abdullah had taken over many of the welfare and security functions that the tribes traditionally provided. “Self-interest dictated (the tribes’) collaboration. By paying subsidies, preventing cross-border raids, and providing employment in return for salaries, clothing and food, (the state’s) policies helped the tribesmen survive this difficult period.”\textsuperscript{100}

During the 1930s then, there was a seismic shift in the traditional relationship between the tribes of Transjordan and the central authority of the state. As a result of the precarious position that the tribes found themselves in during the depression and the fact that the state in Transjordan had developed the capacity to enforce security and provide goods and services, tribes found it in their own self-interest to adapt and cooperate with the institutions of the central government. The British government granted cash infusions to the Transjordanian government for the purpose of employing tribesmen in

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 108.
relief projects including building roads, construction of irrigation systems, and loans for seed purchases.\textsuperscript{101}

Direct intervention by the central government did not shift tribal loyalty to a nationalistic allegiance to the state. The money went directly to tribes rather than to a district or administrative region. There was, therefore, very little incentive to change the process of political power to any other institution beyond the tribes. While the tribes did support the state, they did so out of what benefits could be gained from the arrangement. There was little awareness of political participation beyond an immediate self-interest. Raiding, robbery, and safe passage extortion continued despite substantial payoffs and positions on the newly created Legislative Council. For example, a revolt broke out in Palestine in 1936. Tribes that lived on both sides of the Jordan River including the ‘Abbadi, the al-Salt, and the Sukhur al-Ghawr\textsuperscript{102} actively engaged in the sabotage of telegraph line, oil pipelines, and smuggled weapons and money into Palestine despite Amir Abdullah’s open support of the Peel Commission recommendations.\textsuperscript{103} Even Abdullah experienced difficulty keeping tribes acquiescent when there were other political advantages to be had.

\textit{The Third Wave: Ideological and Regional Threats, 1946-1967}

The advent of World War II provided a huge change in the economy for all people of Transjordan. Tribesmen sold tents to the British army, worked on the railway construction, sold the army farm produce, and engaged in a robust smuggling trade in

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 114.
\textsuperscript{102} Peake, 109.
\textsuperscript{103} Salibi, 141.
spare automotive parts. Because the Germans also began courting loyalty of important tribes during the war, the British supplied Abdullah with plenty of money to keep tribal loyalties in line. The war proved to be a good economic time for the tribes both in the cities and in the desert.

While the tribes were enjoying economic prosperity from the war, the British and Transjordan were in a deeply serious situation. The whole of the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt became strategically important to both the allies and the Axis. An Enigma decryption from March 7, 1941 stated:

> Seen in the context of the war with England, the Arab Area holds a position of strategic significance. It forms a land bridge between Africa and India. Vast numbers of troops and War material have been shipped in the East-West direction to Egypt, and war material to Turkey and also through Greece to Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. There is a probability that now, with British troops released in North Africa, a movement in the opposite direction will also take place: Palestine and Transjordan as possible jump off points for an English thrust toward Syria, or through Syria in the event of an intervention in Turkey. Through these areas passes also a main route which England and the Soviet Union might join hands, if the occasion should arise. These territories are of special importance for the air routes of the British Empire. Essential for Britain’s conduct of the war are finally the oilfields of Mosul with the pipeline to the Mediterranean.

As actual military operations engulfed Iraq, rumors flew through Transjordan about the impending mayhem. Once again, the state was challenged by tribal loyalties to marshal its forces as a single identity. Coup attempts were uncovered as legions in tribal

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104 Alon, 116.
105 Abu Nowar, 47-48.
areas turned their arms over to tribal leaders, infantrymen deserted to return to their tribes, and units refused to leave Transjordanian territory to fight in Iraq.\footnote{John Bagot Glubb, 1983, \textit{The Changing Scene of Life: An Autobiography} (London: Quartet Books), 122-123.}

To add to this unrest, the Pan-Arab nationalist movement was beginning to find willing members in Transjordan. Nasserites, Ba’athists, and Communists began to openly criticize Abdullah’s cooperation with the British particularly where it concerned its creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War was a significant event for all Arabs but particularly for those who lived in Jordan. The conflict really began with contradictory pledges made by the British government to the Arabs (the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence) and to the Zionists (the Balfour Declaration). The British reconciled these two agreements through a diplomatic sleight of hand which suggested that neither the Arabs nor the Jews were ever promised all the land but simply were given assurance that both groups were pledged a separate state in the area.

This diplomatic “splitting of the baby” occurred on November 29, 1947 when the United Nations (UN) passed Resolution 181, which called for a partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. On May 14, 1948, the state of Israel declared its independence. In response Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan attacked Israel. Arab leaders, including Abdullah expected an easy fight and were humiliated by the defeat they suffered. There were significant consequences as a result of this conflict that went far beyond general humiliation for the Arabs. Israel quickly exploited the opportunity to claim land that exceeded the original grant by the UN. This sent thousands of Palestinian refugees into Jordan. Land in the Palestinian territory west of the Jordan River was
officially given to Jordan\textsuperscript{107} and this was seen by other Arabs as blatant opportunism on Abdullah’s part. Despite offering the Palestinians citizenship and a safe place to settle after their expulsion, Abdullah became a pariah in Arab public opinion. Domestically, the inclusion of Palestinians from the West Bank in government bureaucracy, the Arab Legion, and the Parliament upset the \textit{status quo} that was already predicated on the predominance of the tribes. On Friday, July 20, 1951, Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem as he went to prayer at the al-Aqsa mosque.

The entire Middle East was engulfed in violence in the years following World War II. King Farouk of Egypt was assassinated in a military coup in 1952. This brought Gamal Nasser to power. In 1958, an army coup in Iraq murdered the entire royal family (who were also Hashemites) and began a series of military regimes. It was in this context that King Talal and then his son, Hussein, were able to peacefully assume the throne under the provisions of a national constitution. King Talal only ruled for a very short time as a result of schizophrenia that had plagued him for much of his adult life.\textsuperscript{108} King Hussein I was installed as constitutional monarch on August 11, 1952 at the age of eighteen.

It was during these tumultuous times that exogenous forces attempted to influence the government of the young, inexperienced king. The parliament and the council of ministers were filled with nationalist and socialist ideologues. Other coup

\textsuperscript{107} As Kamal Salibi notes, “Neither the British not the Americans wanted the Palestinian Arabs to establish as independent state…such a Palestinian state, as it was believed would be a hotbed of trouble if it survived…The reasonable alternative, it was thought, was to have King Abdullah take over the Arab parts of Palestine….At a closed meeting held in February, 1948, in London between Ernest Bevin and the Jordanian Prime Minister Tawfik Abul Huda, the British Foreign Minister virtually invited Jordan to take over the Arab share of Palestine.” p.159

attempts continued to occur through the next several years mainly in reaction to Soviet intrigues in the region, Arab nationalist sentiment, and Hussein’s partnership with the United States after the Eisenhower Doctrine gave him options for extra protection from regional threats. King Hussein’s own biography, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, documents attempts by palace staff to add acid to his nose drops and other attempts by senior Arab military staff to launch various plots on his life during the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. Tribal politics during this period reflected the violent emotions that attended the struggle for control of Jordan not only by the Soviets, the British, and the Americans but also by the Saudis, Syrians, and Egyptians.

The highly politicized environment in Jordan was a watershed period for the tribes. Both the civil bureaucracy and the military were mainly comprised of tribal members. Having the power in such institutions, the tribes could have easily forced the demise of King Hussein’s regime. This was not the choice that was made for a number of reasons. First, preservation of their position in a new government really could not have been guaranteed. Most of the shaykhs were now receiving handsome salaries as governors, parliament MPs, or board members of government run industries. That would be a highly unlikely scenario under a communist government. Second, “the tribes” were never a monolithic, unified entity. As has previously been noted, rivalries and feuds were commonplace among the tribal shaykhs. They all had great incentives to maintain their own status and prestige which, by now, was highly contingent on maintaining the current political structure. Third, tribal involvement in opposition to King Hussein reflected only a small segment of tribal population. “In the country at large, the king could count on support from a considerable body of public opinion…The internal support on which the
Jordanian regime could depend was not only considerable, but solid at the core."\(^{109}\)

Lastly, as the politics of the region became more treacherous, internal stability became more attractive to Jordanians who were enjoying relatively decent economic prospects. Tribal loyalty was, therefore, more accurately a function of self-interested preservation rather than a blind loyalty to a particular government.


The 1967 Arab-Israeli War was another seismic shift for Jordan. The antecedents to Jordan’s participation in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War were driven by King Hussein’s perceived image as an American sycophant. Hussein was subject to a great deal of criticism domestically as well as regionally for his dependence on the West, particularly the United States. As has been noted, the years between 1952 and 1967 were filled with coup attempts and assassination plots. The rising popularity of pan-Arabism and Hussein’s support of the United States made Hussein’s position as leader of Jordan unacceptable to many Arabs, many of whom were tribal members. King Hussein recognized that the power of pan-Arabism “would jeopardize the continued existence of the state”\(^{110}\) …if it were not responded to in some demonstrable fashion.

He professed that the Jordanians had a special interest in seeing the question of the fate of Palestine settled with justice.\(^{111}\) Some scholars argue that King Hussein was not so much concerned with a Palestinian state as much as he wanted the adoption of Palestinian territory into a larger Jordanian state.\(^{112}\) Whatever their real reason, Hussein

\(^{109}\) Salibi, 197.
\(^{111}\) Salibi, 271.
\(^{112}\) Ibid. 23.
became locked in a regional struggle for leadership with Gamal Nasser of Egypt, and the Palestinian “question” became a lynchpin issue between Hussein and Nasser.

While his philosophical and ethical views of Arab unity and the plight of Palestinians may have been authentic, economics drove some of Hussein’s decisions to take action against Israel in 1967. In May of 1967, there were 722,687 registered refugees in Jordan and, while the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) provided partial funding to Jordan, a large part of the services and housing provided to the refugees came out of Jordanian funds.\footnote{Mutawi, 22.} Beyond the official count of registered refugees, there was a significant, uncounted population of displaced persons whom, for a number of reasons, did not register and therefore relied on the largesse of local Jordanian services.

And, there were other, larger political problems. First was the rise of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Not only was the PLO an existential threat to Israel, but was a challenge to Hussein’s aspirations of acquiring all the Palestinian territory. Internally, there were mounting incidents involving PLO organizing in the towns of the West Bank in the spring before the war. Finally, Hussein was facing significant pressure from Nasserists and Ba’athists who accused him of attempting to foment revolution against their regimes in Egypt and Syria. Hussein was painted as a traitor to the Arab cause in the region.

The war ostensibly began with Egypt's decision to expel United Nations troops from the Sinai Peninsula and blockade Israel's port of Eilat. On May 30, King Hussein of
Jordan and Nasser signed a mutual defense pact in which Egypt gained joint command of the Jordanian army. King Hussein permitted the reopening of PLO offices in Amman and essentially relinquished control of its army to the Egyptians. On the Jordanian front, battalions from the Arab Legion, under the control of Egyptian General 'Abd al-Mun'im Riyad, were largely spread out across West Bank Palestinian villages instead of being concentrated in more strategically important locales. Confident of victory, the Jordanians resolved to cut off western Jerusalem by attacking Israeli positions in the north and south of the city at the start of the fighting. This occurred on June 5, 1967 as Egyptian commander, Riyad, had already swung into action before King Hussein could actually make his own decision.\textsuperscript{114} Jordan lost Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank. This lost was important symbolically, politically, and economically. Not only was this a large agricultural area but the West Bank attracted tourists seeking the “Holy Land.” Added to this loss was the deluge of refugees who arrived in Jordan.

The results of the 1967 War were enormous for the tribes in Jordan. Palestinians flooded into grazing and farming areas which put demands on already stressed water resources. Local officials were hard pressed to keep order among the newly arrived Palestinians and the local Bedouin who viewed the Palestinians as trespassers. Fighting broke out routinely in Jordan in 1970 and 1971 between Palestinian Jordanians and “East Bank” Jordanian tribes. Rural Bedouin were drawn in larger numbers to urban areas in order to gain access to income for their families. Finally, Bedouin women began to work outside of their homes to supplement family incomes performing tasks such as setting up

small shops in markets and developing small networks of trade.\footnote{Donald P. Cole, 2003, “Where Have the Bedouin Gone? Anthropological Quarterly, 76(2):249. (235-267)} It was at this point that scholars predicted the demise of the tribe and the rise of nationalism and political ideology in its place.

If observers viewed the 1967 War as a critical juncture, Black September or September 17, 1970 marked a “watershed event”\footnote{Lawrence Tal, 1993, “Is Jordan Doomed?” Foreign Affairs, 72(5):48.} in Jordan. “More than any other event, the conflict divided the kingdom’s population along Jordanian and Palestinian lines.”\footnote{Ibid.} The civil war was an outcome of the convergence of a number of factors. International pressure to create the state of Israel forced millions of Palestinians into Jordan. Pan-Arab sentiments roiled throughout the region and the PLO was created during the late 1960s. The PLO groups routinely launched raids on Israel from within Jordanian borders. By the 1970, PLO factions operated with impunity inside Jordan.

By one reckoning there were more than 50 factions, mostly reporting to no one but themselves. Many financed themselves by holding up shopkeepers, demanding contributions to the cause. One group broadcast Marxist slogans from a minaret to mark Lenin’s birthday. Arafat lacked both the military means and the political will to bring these groups under his control.\footnote{Roland Dallas, 1999, \textit{King Hussein: A Life on the Edge} (London: Profile Books), 67.} 

With pressure from the United States, King Hussein attempted to close down PLO activities in Jordan. In September of 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)\footnote{George Habbash headed the PLFP, one of the largest coalitions that initially formed the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization).} hijacked three western aircraft near Zarqa and a week later, took over the city of Irbid and declared an independent government.\footnote{Alan George, 2005, \textit{Jordan: Living in the Crossfire} (London: Zed Books), 33.} A civil war ensued and
Syrian troops invaded Jordan in support of the PLO. There is evidence Fatah\textsuperscript{121} was running secret organizations in Jordan aimed at the overthrow of the Hashemites and were successful in assassinating the Prime Minister, Wasi al-Tal.\textsuperscript{122} The Jordanian military composed almost exclusively of tribal troops crushed the PLO in Zarqa and other cities. The event left lingering resentments and suspicions on the part of both the Palestinians who remained in Jordan and the tribes.

Black September had a number of significant effects on the relationship between the Palestinian Jordanians, the tribes, and the state. First, the Jordanian government began a purge of any Palestinian employees. This pushed the Palestinians not only into the domestic private sector but also into the Gulf States, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Black September also fractured opposition of the Hashemites that was a temporarily unified tribal-Palestinian coalition. Fatah and the PFLP were viewed as the main reason for Israeli military attacks on Jordan and the groups also were seen as turning on tribal members and endangering their welfare. “After the eviction of the fedayeen, it became quite unpopular among Transjordanians to identify with these groups or their goals.”\textsuperscript{123} However, Black September also damaged relationships between the Hashemites and many of the Jordanian tribes outside of the military.

(A) new low-profile Transjordanian political force that did not see eye to eye with the king began to emerge. This force consisted of middle-class Transjordanians, including senior (government) officials…relatives and friends of Wasfi al-Tal, and some members of the royal family, who believed the king’s Palestinian policy should be changed…This unpublished challenge to the Hashemite patriarchal monarchy differed from 1957 in two ways. During the Nabulsi episode in 1957, the challenge had been to the monarchical system itself and had come from

\textsuperscript{121} Fatah was (and is) the major political party that formed the coalition which became the PLO.
\textsuperscript{122} Abu Odeh, 188-189.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.190.
the political parties that comprised Palestinian Jordanians, motivated mainly by ideological considerations. This challenge was to the monarch’s Palestinian policy and came from Transjordanians motivated mainly by their concern about their identity. The policy of the monarch, not the monarchy, had to be changed.124

Despite the passage of more than three decades, Black September remains a critical juncture in Jordanian history. The status of Palestinian Jordanians is still under siege even though this group makes up slightly more than half of the Jordanian population. It is still at the root of bifurcated identity that tribes insist is exclusively theirs. It also is a political undercurrent which questions the Hashemites’ commitment to those who are seen most loyal to them- the tribes.

Conclusion

The task of this chapter is to illuminate the long political history of an institution that is intimately tangled in networks and relationships with many other political actors over the course of Jordanian history. The tribes have been a seminal institution in the building of the modern state of Jordan. The common perception is that the tribes are an unconditional loyal supporter of the monarchy. That loyalty allows the tribes to be co-opted and manipulated by the king as his needs change. While it is true that the king and other political elites do act in ways with the intention of manipulation and cooptation, the political role of the tribes and their ambitions have been overlooked or discounted.

The significance of state-tribes relations under the Ottomans, during the Arab Revolt and the onset of British imperialism, and more recently during the period of Black September the distinct opportunities and challenges for state building.

Jordanian tribes have a reputation for their monolithic support of the Hashemites

however it is not necessarily true that all tribes have supported the government all of the time. Tribes have directly challenged the authority of the state throughout history when tribal interests diverged from state interests. The pattern of self-interested political action is present in contemporary Jordanian politics. It is instructive to understand that this is not a new phenomenon.

The examination of the case of Jordan proceeds by considering different critical periods in Jordan’s history when possible alliances with other groups that might have ended the Hashemite rule and were rejected by the tribes. Instead agencies of the state were populated with powerful shaykhs. The positions were never based on merit rather; they were based on loyalty and usefulness to the Hashemites. Legislative councils, the military, and even the imposition of tribal law in place of legal, civil law were (and are) all tightly controlled by the tribes.

At the core of each historical juncture, the powerful tribes had become too entangled with formal institutions to let the state fail because it would have meant their downfall as well. While there certainly were great objections and opposition to the monarchy, the tribes opted to support the political system which benefitted them the most. The unintended consequence was the propping up of an authoritarian regime.
Chapter Three: SCARCE RESOURCES: THE STATE, TRIBAL POLITICS, AND OPPOSITION GROUPS

“The tribes are the bones of the neck which hold up the head of the king.”

*Traditional tribal proverb*

**Introduction**

This chapter examines how and why tribal political institutions are the legitimate interlocutors between Jordanians and the state. The chapter will look at how the tribal political institution works as well as how the institution has changed over time. The information proceeds from the idea that tribes are “political entrepreneurs” who exploit the formal institutions of the state for their own benefit. This is particularly true when elections are the stake\(^{125}\) which will be discussed in chapter five. More broadly, this chapter will examine how attempts to broaden the control of entitlements to other groups have been unsuccessful, partly due to formal bars raised by the state but also by tribal machinations of symbols and identity which exclude other potential competitors from the political terrain.

This chapter challenges the idea that the state is a single, unified actor and that an authoritarian leader has exclusive and total control over its outcomes. Rather, in Jordan, the state is a collection of historically constructed, often overlapping, structures that are controlled by different powerful shaykhs. Tribal politics represents an informal institution of often competing rules and norms that satisfy their own personal political and economic power. The main focus considers the nature of tribal politics, their

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interaction with the state, and the threats presented to tribal control of political spaces by other potential opposition groups.

Have tribal politics sucked all the oxygen from other political alternatives in Jordan or has the limited range of political alternatives enabled the viability of tribal politics? In a 2010 survey\(^{126}\) and a more recent survey taken in 2011,\(^{127}\) Jordanians perceived themselves sequentially as tribal members, as Muslims, as Arabs, and only then as Jordanians. A recent RAND study noted, “Tribal loyalties may matter as much as national, ethnic, or religious identities...The phenomenon of globalization might well have left tribes on the ash heap of history- yet tribes have been empowered by it.”\(^{128}\)

Research for this chapter suggests that tribes have demonstrated the ability to respond to events, opportunities, and challenges to transform themselves as political institutions that can either support or challenge the state. Tribes have been able to do so by imposing structures, transmitting information, developing trust networks, enforcing customary law, and distributing goods and services to tribal members. Methods and context may have changed since 1923, regardless, tribes demonstrate the capacity to retain political legitimacy and individual loyalties.


\(^{127}\) Shibley Telhami, 2011, “The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll,” (Washington, D.C.: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution), 54-55. A similar poll taken in 2004 revealed approximately the same percentages of identifications in Jordan. The space of seven years and the events in the region including the Arab Spring does not appear to have changed these perceptions.

The tribal relationship with the state is complex. As Migdal notes, “states are hemmed in- indeed transformed”

129 by the mass political control exerted by tribes “tucked away in remote areas.”

130 The pivotal outcome of the political role of tribes is that issues are localized and, therefore, there is seldom a national movement of dissent against the state.

This chapter also explores how tribal institutional development closely parallels development of state institutions and forms the unique basis for contentious political participation as tribal politics has worked to not only mark themselves off from potential opponents but also to eliminate opponents form gaining instrumental goods which include political power itself. Chapter Five deals specifically with the importance of elections as “performances” that serve not only to eliminate opposition to the tribal position of power within Jordan but also serve as a competition with the government in order to monopolize and manipulate political meaning.

Tribal membership is different from membership in other political groups including political parties, professional associations, or unions. Kinship is significant because it has a profound effect on loyalty, identity, and legitimacy of the group. First, political groups such as parties, professional associations, or unions are formed on criteria such as ideology or economic interests. Membership may be restricted in political groups such as parties, but there are always ways to quit the group or nominally belong as a free-riding member. The same is not true of tribes because of the criteria of membership.

Kinship forms hard boundaries between members and “others”. Moreover, there is never

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130 Ibid.
an option of not being a tribal member. Family and family obligations persist partly because of the cultural ethos but also because this is a primary unit which provides security and benefits in an area where formal political institutions have been absent or impotent.

*How Tribal Politics Work*

Politics in Jordan today are considered very “tribal.” This means that today, as well as in some cases over the course of the history of the Jordanian state, the influence of a particular tribal actor may be so strong that the state becomes its “instrument.” As Kostiner (1990) stated, the tribe in Middle East state formation was crucial because the tribe adopted many of the state attributes and the state relied heavily on tribal identity and tribal institutions in order to survive. This evolution of state-tribe relationships created a highly symbiotic political structure that still is essential for state survival in Jordan as well as in the wider Middle East.

While there are several concerns at the structural level regarding this relationship, one central problem with tribal politics, which is often lost, is the inability of individuals to make the transition from tribal members to unencumbered citizens. For the poorest people in society, tribal membership provides access to state benefits and jobs. Because political and economic goods and rewards are available only through the tribal system, there is little incentive to move away from the institution and make claims directly to the state. Tribes reinforce this ability to provide goods and services exclusively to its members through effective capturing of parts of the state apparatus including public

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sector employment, entrance to military academies and universities, and election to legislative offices.

Over time, tribes have become an idealized connection with the past and a powerful explanation of the present patterns of power and influence within the politics of Jordan. While most of the scholarship has concentrated on elite or state machinations in the construction and control of tribal identity and power, little has been devoted to the role of the tribe as a set of informal political institutions that exerts its own influence on the norms and efficacy of the formal political institutions of state. These institutions constitute what Tilly (2002) referred to as “repertoires of contention,” the rules and processes through which political actors make claims on each other.

There are varied reasons why contemporary Jordanians still struggle to transition from tribal member to citizen. The significant explanation is the evidence of particularistic identities which persist in the face of attempts to form a national identity and political agenda. Certainly part of the persistence of particularistic identities rests with state survival behavior that “protect the structure, organization, and leadership of some of the tribes…” However, Abu Odeh described Jordan as a state “without solid foundations, a fragile, perhaps nonviable state.” The evidence suggests without the institutions of the tribes, Jordan would be in deep peril. This is in spite of a steady campaign on the part of the state to craft a strong sense of Jordanianness. The campaign

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has lasted for the last decade but the persistent presence of subnational tribal identities is surprising.

A recent example is the temporary and disastrous alliance between Oweidi Abbadi and the Association of Retired Military Officers. Abbadi, who served twice in parliament from 1989 to 1993 and 1997 to 2001, was arrested on charges of incitement against the regime for fomenting a revolt during a protest in January. In an interview on January 18, 2012, al-‘Abbadi said that “[t]he republican system is coming here to Jordan, and I do not believe it will take more than two years, at most.” Al-‘Abbadi went on to describe the monarchy as a broken form of government which no longer responded to the wishes of the people. He predicted retired military officials would carry out a “revolution.” While the Association for Retired Military Veterans quickly and publically distanced themselves from al-Abbadi’s assertions, the public criticism of the regime was striking because of the long history of the Retired Military’s traditional rubber-stamp support. In response to this and other protests, Prince Hasan bin Talal gave an interview 17 February 2012 on Jordan TV, stating a view that tribal reformers should look back to see “where your grandfathers came from and where my grandfather came from.” He asked, “What were your grandfathers doing while my grandfather was

134 For more background, view Dr. Ahmed Oweidi al-Abbadi, President of the Jordanian National Movement. Retrieved 29 February 2012 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QxNyy0g6a3w.
137 King Abdullah’s uncle and the former King Hussein’s brother. Prince Hassan was the crown prince until shortly before Hussein’s death in 2000. For reasons not yet clear, King Hussein replaced his brother, Hasan, with his son, the current king, Abdullah II.
building this country?” This episode and other recent events reveal deep cleavages that underlie the façade of Jordanian unity today. Under the regional and domestic political tensions, Jordan’s Palestinians, tribes, and regime struggle with each other over the exclusive rights to define the Jordanian political identity and control of political power.

Theoretically, the creation of the modern state should have led to the development of formal bureaucratic institutions which, in turn, should have led to the weakening of traditional power. The hypothetical transition to the modern state should have included a transformation in the relationship between the individual and the state that would cause the diminution of personal, local ties and the placement of trust in the practices and legitimacy of the national regime. As Charles Tilly explains, “Trust…consists of placing valued outcomes at risk to others’ malfeasance, mistakes, or failure. Throughout the long stretch of human history (the) state-citizen interaction remained mostly indirect. Members of trust networks generally kept themselves insulated from state power as much as possible.”138 Only at the point that citizens cannot negotiate the pursuit of highly-valued, long-term collective enterprises without state agencies will they open their networks to surveillance and possible intervention.139

In the case of Jordan, tribal institutions are so intimately integrated into the state that they are state power. That means that the state works well for tribes who are in control of those institutions. Members of society who fall outside those tribal networks also, in many cases, fall outside the benefits of the state. This dynamic will be taken up

139 Ibid.
with the discussion of the other important sociopolitical group in Jordan- the Palestinian Jordanians.

**Rent Seeking**

In “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” Tilly draws a relationship between the state and ordinary people. States are expensive enterprises that require armies for protection and bureaucracies to provide legal guarantees and other public goods and services. Governance involves policy decision-making and public administration with rules, protections, and sanctions. Tribal politics disrupts this process between state and individual. This produces multiple sets of rules which are unevenly enforced, particularly in areas outside of Amman. Therefore, although constitutions, legislatures, and courts of law exist, the formal rules are largely ignored by all actors including police and local officials with little concern of the consequences.

These observations are borne out by scholars who posit state resources do have a profound effect on the formation of society but often in unintended and unanticipated ways because “whole portions of the states have been captured by people enforcing guidelines on how to use state resources that differ from those advanced by the state leaders.”\(^\text{140}\) Jordan has been plagued by the *de facto* authority of tribal systems that are present both in the political arena and the economic sector. Tribal influence in the state apparatus is reflective of the fragile and limited economic and political environment. Plum positions in the regime and bureaucracy are rewarded to those who have the most useful or personal connections to top decision makers and these decisions are not based

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\(^{140}\) Migdal, 2001, 54.
on competency or competition. State bureaucratic institutions feed an endemic political behavior in Jordan referred to as rent seeking or actions by individuals and groups to alter public policy and procedures in ways that will generate more income for themselves. Given the rentier economy of Jordan, there are very few other options available in the domestic economy.

In the rentier economies of the Middle East, access to economic resources is commonly only available through the incumbent regime. Political decision-making is often synonymous with economic decision-making. Exogenous revenues (rents) have accrued to these states, freeing them from any restraints. In the case of Jordan, exogenous rents are comprised of the massive infusion of international aid. The connection between economic self-interest and political participation in Jordan becomes apparent in the behavior of tribal pursuit of political control. Tribes attempt to access state goods and resources through control of local municipalities and securing seats in the National Assembly.

Tribal politics are also a main conduit for the distribution of economic goods in Jordan and elsewhere in the Middle East. Unemployment in Jordan is estimated to be about thirty percent while schools lag behind in educating and training the population for an entrepreneurial, free market economy. Employed tribal members are expected to provide job opportunities for fellow tribesmen. This was, and is, particularly the case for tribal relatives employed in the military or bureaucratic sectors of government. Further,

141 For example, in 2008, the United States agreed to provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over a five-year period. That agreement has been exceeded for various reasons. The President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 request alone includes USD$663.7 million for aid to Jordan. These figures do not include foreign aid from other international states or bodies such as the World Bank. See Jeremy Sharp, 2012, “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, RL 33546, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service), i.
most tribes manage a *sunduq* (welfare fund) to which all male members over sixteen are expected to contribute. The money is given as direct aid to tribal families in need as well as to the operations of local day cares and health clinics.

One significant reason that motivates tribes to be so invested in institutions of the state is that it is the most strategic way to draw resources directly to tribal members. When elected to Parliament, members are given a monthly fund for “constituent services.” Although there may be many non-tribal members within a district, that money usually goes directly to tribal members. It is customary within the most powerful tribes in Jordan that the shaykh is directly involved in some important aspect of the government. As noted in the last chapter, state formation was heavily predicated on binding the loyalty of certain tribes through economic benefits from the state. This is still a well-entrenched practice in Jordan today.

The political function of the shaykh within the tribe has evolved as well. The *diwan* is the traditional executive council of tribal leaders headed by the shaykh. It is also a physical place in the compound or home of the shaykh where tribal members must gather to make requests to the shaykh. The diwan is supported and financed by all the members of the tribe so the participants receive economic benefits for their participation and leadership as well as prestige and power within the local community. The *diwan* has been drawn in under state control in the twentieth century and now must be registered with the Ministry of the Interior in the name of the tribe and all funding for the *diwan* must be reported to the Ministry of Finance.\(^\text{142}\)

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\(^\text{142}\) Interview with Ahmed al-Ajarmeh, 15 November 2007.
Shaykh Adnan al-Ajarmeh noted that the renewal of national elections for the Lower House of the legislature helped to “increase the importance” of his diwan. The implications and the role that the tribal diwan plays in national elections will be considered at length in Chapter Five. Suffice to note here that the role of the shaykh and the tribal diwan has a direct and important effect on the election process since 1989. Shaykh al-Ajarmah also observed that the diwan is more significant than ever in the “complementary” role it plays alongside formal institutions.\textsuperscript{143} While policy and business deals are matters for discussion in the Jordanian legislature, the tribal diwan is where priorities and support are strategized and executed.

The new powers of allocation and distribution provided by the public offices held by shaykhs only made their position within the tribal institution stronger. Influence over decision-making related to important national or regional projects represented one of the few ways that Jordanians had to participate in public politics.\textsuperscript{144} This has not dissipated over time. Rather, contemporary politics in Jordan is populated by powerful shaykhs and other tribal leaders who have risen to the task of maximizing political opportunities.\textsuperscript{145}

This is a seminal factor in the relationship between the state and the individual. When individuals interact with the state bureaucracy, they are not dealing with a corporate entity nor are they exchanging their loyalty with an institution that is obligated to safeguard their interests. Rather, individuals interact with their shaykh who, in turn, negotiates the often-unpredictable channels of the state in order to aid the member of his

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} Refer to table 1.1 of this dissertation for the names of these powerful political tribes.
tribe. There are many other shaykhs and tribal leaders who act within the state bureaucracy on the behalf of the members also making the system prone to opaque and narrow outcomes. The duality of the shaykhs standing as leader of his tribe and a member of the state apparatus was not, and is not, seen as in conflict between personal, private goals and that of the state.146 The shaykh’s loyalty to his tribe is central and direct while his loyalty to the state is a tool for promoting private interests.147 The shaykh is still perceived as a mediator and arbitrator and not a public or civil servant. “Public office (is) a position of privilege rather than a position of public service. Official relations are based on charity and loyalty…Thus, the individuals receive public service as a matter of favor rather than of right.”148 In contemporary Jordan, tribal relations and influence play a disproportionate role in the political decision making process and the binary role of the shaykh as tribal authority and political functionary effects Jordanian politics at every level.

This duality of political roles is highlighted by the account given by Shaykh Barjis al-Hadid. Shaykh al-Hadid represents the interests of his tribe which is estimated to include around thirty thousand members.149 Al-Hadid’s family has a long history of allegiance to the Hashemite which began with Amir Abdullah’s first appearance in Ma’an in 1921. Shaykh al-Hadid rarely leaves Amman but speaks for the majority of his tribe who still live in the areas around the southern town of Ma’an. Al-Hadid began his career as a member of the military, and when he left, he followed in his father’s footsteps into

146 Interview with Interview with Ahmed al-Ajarmeh, 15 November 2007, Na’our, Jordan; Interview with Mohammad al-Qaisi, 3 November 2008, Cleveland, Ohio.
147 Ibid.
149 The al-Wahsh are considered part of the al-Hadid.
politics. He is currently a member of the Lower House of the Parliament and daily meets with various members of his tribe looking for employment. On other days, al-Hadid is busy resolving conflict between different tribes that actually are issues that should be addressed by the civil courts. In both cases, al-Hadid has the personal power that should be located in agencies within the state bureaucracy. In Jordan, al-Hadid’s role and actions are ubiquitous practices for shaykhs who are ensconced in the government structure. For the average person, connection to these powerful individuals is literally the only way problems get solved. For Jordanians, then, it is not the “state” which provides benefits, insures justice, or protects them. It is the important shaykhs who are perceived as personally responsible for bestowing these benefits to the individual.

Shaykhs have become more educated and connected to the rest of the world in 2012 but that has not altered their centrality in the political life of Jordan. Shaykhs, through the institution of tribal politics, have a direct impact on mass participation and its relationship to the state. First, tribal culture and institutions have not been traded for participation in civil society. More importantly, there is no direct and clear connection between the state and the individual. In contemporary Jordan, there is a persistent problem because tribal loyalties are a mode of primary political identification which takes precedence over favor of trust and loyalty placed in the state.

It should be noted, however, the resurgence of tribal strength since 1989 is not monolithic. Recently, the adverse effects of economic trends in rural Jordan, especially

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151 Civil society is tightly limited by the state at this time. However, the argument made by many of the interviewees in this dissertation is civil institutions are political spaces left for the Palestinian Jordanians to organize and are displays of democratization for the benefit of international donors. The sentiment expressed is civil society institutions are a “gift” to Palestinian Jordanians because the institutions are not important to the tribes.
the southern tribes, (see Map 2) have created a sense of divide between local tribe members and tribal elites in Amman. The important point here is when it came time for elections in 2007 and 2010, the traditional selection by tribal elites for electoral candidates was not always accepted unanimously by tribal voters. Several districts found members of the tribe running in opposition to the tribal candidate. It was a clear signal that the pact between the tribal elites in Amman and the rural members was in jeopardy. More analysis will be given in the following chapters to these, and other, expressions of tribal politics which surround the political institution of parliamentary elections.

State Institutions

The emergence of the modern state in the Middle East, and notably in Jordan, relied heavily on the legitimacy and mediation of the major shaykhs. This was an easy decision because much of “the state” in Transjordan constituted the already existing tribal institutions. Therefore, the state that developed was a synthesis of formal structures and patriarchal familial dynamics. In fact, the state utilizes language such as al-‘kh al-akbîr (the older brother) or al-usrh al-urdunyyh (the Jordanian family) in order to draw on tribal ethos and blur the line between the formal state and the informal kinship dynamics of legitimacy. The tribe, then, did not become an obsolete, primordial artifact but rather evolved to represent the national Jordanian identity. An important, unintended outcome was the reality that the state does not act independently of tribal political power. The king must continue to use and manipulate local tribal power for support and loyalty.

An example of this symbiotic relationship is the formation of the Jordanian military. In its early inception, tribes were relied on to provide security for the British Mandate. Identity played an essential role in the sorting of men into the ranks and
functions of the Legion. Regiments’ officers and soldiers were almost exclusively Bedouin tribesmen, while orderlies and mechanics were recruited from Palestinians refugees or West Bankers.\textsuperscript{152} An important consequence of the British incorporation of significant numbers of Bedouin in the military was that tribes quickly became economically dependent on the state. Tribes also took a central role in the emergence of the state as they became an important pillar of support for the regime.

Officers in the Arab Legion were trained at Sandhurst and, later, through the military academy or the staff college in Amman. From the outset, Amir Abdullah relied on the Transjordanian tribes to execute security functions necessary to the control of the Transjordanian Mandate. Many of the elite tribal leaders who wield significant power today are the beneficiaries of the support their ancestors gave to Abdullah in the Arab Legion in the early years. Pasha Peake catalogs the pantheon of famous Bedouin tribes who threw their lot behind Abdullah including the al-Huweitat, the ibn Jazi and the al-Fayez.\textsuperscript{153} As Table 1.1 depicts, these tribes have witnessed their political fortunes rise because of this early and continued support of the Hashemites.

By 1951, the Cadet School opened to “co-ordinate, rationalize and develop all training for the Legion.”\textsuperscript{154} The centerpiece of the Cadet School was the Boys School. The Boys School took in the sons of Transjordanian tribes. This system is still a significant path to political access today for many of the tribes. The training is open to Jordanians via tribal connections. In most cases, a relative must have served in the armed

\textsuperscript{153} Frederick Gerard Peake, 1958, \textit{A History of Jordan and Its Tribes} (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press), 98.
\textsuperscript{154} Vatikiotis, 83.
forces for a Jordanian to be admitted to the Royal Jordanian Military Academy. Training and service then opens up a number of options including the Royal Hashemite Scholarships to Jordanian universities and U.S. and British post-graduate work.\textsuperscript{155}

These practices begun by the British and then elaborated and perpetuated by Abdullah I cemented the tribal character of the Arab military. It also solidified the second class status of Palestinian refugees and West Bankers in the military. Ranks open to Palestinians were usually as mechanics and unit maintenance personnel.\textsuperscript{156} Despite the stratification along tribal lines, the military quickly reflected the centrality of Transjordanian tribes in the life of the Jordanian state. The military also reflected the problematic evolution of Jordanian identity because, although the oath of loyalty was to serve king and country, “tribesmen understood loyalty in personal terms, not on an higher institutional level...Until 1956, it would be inaccurate to assume that the Bedouin of the Legion viewed the state” as central, rather their loyalty “was sustained by the primacy of the monarch-chief, not of nation-state.”\textsuperscript{157}

These sentiments reinforce the central problem that, while many citizens of Jordan may be quite devoted to the Hashemites, they do not see others as fellow Jordanians. Over time, these tribal members evolved out of the army and into key positions of the Jordanian state. These men and the successive generations of their tribes brought with them several key ideas. The first of these ideas is the fierce allegiance to the king, the tribe, and only tentatively to the state. Second, the military and the political leaders emerging from the institution hold an ardent belief in the second-rate status of

\textsuperscript{155} Interview 17 November 2011 with Mohammad al-Khasawneh, Ph. D., Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 89-93.
\textsuperscript{157} Vatikiotis, 20 and 97.
Palestinian Jordanians. These elements provide the context for the contestation over control of the political power in Jordan. It also provides the historical context for the divisions between the tribal Jordanians and Palestinian Jordanians in contemporary Jordan.

The state’s initial strategy to keep the Bedouin apart from the national body politic (1923-1976) and its subsequent attempt to integrate it (1976-present) now combined to produce a new strategy…the state’s process of redefining their (Bedouin) culture for them and setting it as the norm throughout society by identifying itself as true “Jordanian culture.”

It was a purposeful ploy by the Hashemites to connect themselves to the ethos of honor, charity, and valor of the Transjordanian tribes. After the state’s reliance on the Bedouins in the 1950s and 1960s to quell uprisings and coup attempts, the Bedouin were rewarded with military and other state jobs.

The state’s strategy of creating a synonymous identity with the Bedouin tribes emphatically pushed the Palestinian Jordanians out of the competition for scarce resources available from the state. Over the years, the relationship between the state and the tribe has been central to the survival of both. The calculus of political power has also varied as the political context of domestic politics was impacted by different events. It has already been noted that after the events of Black September in 1970-71 the state initiated a “concerted policy of ‘Jordanization’…which enfeebled the Palestinians status in the kingdom’s key power centers.”

With the exception of a handful of Palestinians, including Basim ‘Awadallah, Adnan abu Odeh, and Sabih al-Masri, tribes have maintained their hold on key economic and political positions in the civil service, the

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military, and the state-owned industries.

In the 1980s, King Hussein “chastised those who denigrate tribal traditions and claimed pride in his own ‘tribal’ heritage…from the Hashemite tribe, which produced none other than the Prophet Mohammad himself.”\(^{160}\) Tribal authority based on the use of indirect power and relationships is accepted explicitly as maintaining security and producing employment for the average Jordanian citizen. These practices set up a unique dynamic between the state and the tribe. Ordinarily, these practices of doling out state jobs to tribal members would be considered corruption.\(^{161}\) In Jordan, there is indeed much complaining when goods and services flow to one specific group, yet the practice is widely accepted as part of the rules to the game. Lust-Okar cited a recent example of the Lower House Speaker, “Abdul Hadi Majali, allegedly hired his friends and relatives, along with those of his close deputies, to serve as the 80 secretaries for parliamentarians, bypassing the recommendations of a committee which had specially formed to review the 400 applications.”\(^{162}\)

The Legislative Council that existed from 1931 through 1946 was intended to bind the loyalty of the major shaykhs to the Hashemite kings. Prominent among them was Najib al-Shreideh who used his position on the Legislative Council to enhance his ability to gain and control political power. Among the political accomplishments of Shaykh al-Shreideh and his colleagues was the provision of immunity from detention or

prosecution while serving as a member of the Council.\textsuperscript{163} Al-Shreideh and his fellow Council members were also able to use their positions to revise provisions of the Transjordanian Civil Services so that employment would be available to only “the sons of the country”\textsuperscript{164} or native born, tribal Transjordanians. The provision directly affected the employment of two members of the Cabinet, seven directors of departments, and almost a third of the Arab Legion and Civil Service.\textsuperscript{165}

The first legislative councils established under the British Mandate demonstrate a way in which tribal power became integrated into the political structure. The legislative councils were not a development the British necessarily planned or supported. Rather than subjugation of the tribal populations “and causing a rupture in the social order, the mandate framework permitted Abdullah and the shaykhs to play a decisive role in the process of state integration, thereby contributing to its success.”\textsuperscript{166} These councils also served the need of the shaykhs because their persistence as tribal leader depended greatly on the ability to deliver resources and goods. By accepting positions on the legislative councils, tribal leaders in essence became employees of the state while retaining their position of their own autonomous political power. The legislative councils were part of a bigger scheme on the part of Amir Abdullah to cement tribal allegiance to his person. The councils were mainly honorific positions parceled out to the tribal shaykhs however, “every new law had to be ratified by the Council. Taking advantage of this responsibility,

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
council members tried to safeguard their autonomy and protect their personal interests.\textsuperscript{167}

The councils did assert their own interests before the state on several occasions, particularly when laws dealt with land ownership and the collection of taxes. Abdullah was only able to control the group of tribal shaykhs by threatening to suspend them from the council.

The following rosters in Table 3.1 demonstrate the collection of powerful tribal elites present at the beginning of the Jordanian state. Comparisons with rosters of the contemporary Royal Court and the National Assembly show that the same families hold the reins of power in the state of Jordan today. The comparison additionally illuminates the potential challenges the tribes can pose to the state.

Table 3.1 Legislative Councils of Jordan, 1929-1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Legislative Council, 1929-1931</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Khaled Abu Al-Huda, Chair</td>
<td>Najeeb Al-Shreideh</td>
<td>Abdallah Al-Kulayb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oqla Mohammad Al-Nsuir</td>
<td>Najeeb Abu Al-Sha’ar</td>
<td>Saeed Al-Moﬁti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ala’a Al-Dien Toqan</td>
<td>Nadmi Abd Al-Hadi</td>
<td>Shams Al-Dien Sami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saeed Al-Saleepi</td>
<td>Mohammad Al-Ensi</td>
<td>Najeeb Al-Ibraheem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ata Allah Al-Shemati</td>
<td>Refefan Al-Majali</td>
<td>Odeh Al-Qsous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saleh Al-Oran</td>
<td>Hamad Bin Jazi</td>
<td>Methqal Al-Fayez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reda Tawfeeq</td>
<td>Hussam Al-Dien Jaar Allah</td>
<td>Aref Al’aref</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd Alrhman Ghareeb</td>
<td>Taqfeeq Abu Al-Huda</td>
<td>Ibraheem Hesham</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second Legislative Council, 1931-1934</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Siraj &amp; Ibrahim Hashem\textsuperscript{4}, Chairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salti Al-Ibraheem</td>
<td>Mohammad Al-Sa’d</td>
<td>Adel Al-Admeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashem Khiar</td>
<td>Saeed Al-Moﬁti</td>
<td>Majed Al-Adwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saeed Abu Jaber</td>
<td>Haseen Khawasneh</td>
<td>Metri Al-Zreiqa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haseen Al-Tawrowneh</td>
<td>Refefan Al-Majali</td>
<td>Saleh Al-Oran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamad Bin Jazi</td>
<td>Hadetheh Al-Khreshah</td>
<td>Odeh Al-Qsous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taqfeeq Abu Al Huda</td>
<td>Omar Hekmat</td>
<td>Shokri Sha’sha’ah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qasem Al-Hindawi</td>
<td>Adeeb Al-Kayed</td>
<td>Najee Al-Azzam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Third Legislative Council, 1934-1937</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Hashem, Chair</td>
<td>Odeh Al-Qsous</td>
<td>Saeed Al-Mufti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shukri Sha'sha’h</td>
<td>Hashem Khiar</td>
<td>Qasem Al-Hindawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmud Al-Fniash</td>
<td>Mithqal Al-Fayez</td>
<td>Falah Al-Thaheer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleyman Al-Kaleel</td>
<td>Alhajj Fawzi Al-Nabulsi</td>
<td>Majed Al-Adwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathmi Abd al Hadi</td>
<td>Alhajj As’ad Al- Kaleel</td>
<td>Fawzi Al-Mulqi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasef Al-Basharat</td>
<td>Refefan Al-Majali</td>
<td>Metri Al-Zreiqat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salih Al-Oran</td>
<td>Mahmud Al-Kreshan</td>
<td>Hamad Bin Jazi</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fourth Legislative Council, 1937-1942</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Hashem &amp; Tawfiq Abu Al Huda, Chairs</td>
<td>Mahamad Al-Sa’d</td>
<td>Majed Al-Adwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salti Al-Ibrahim</td>
<td>Muhammad Al-Sa’d</td>
<td>Majed Al-Adwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabri Tabba’</td>
<td>Alhajj Soud Al-Nabulsi</td>
<td>Shawkat Hameed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassen Khawasnah</td>
<td>Khaleel Al-Sakr</td>
<td>Refefan Al-Majali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salih Al-Oran</td>
<td>Mahmud Al-Kreshan</td>
<td>Ibrahim Al-Sharayhah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamad Bin Jazi</td>
<td>Hadeethah Al-Khraishah</td>
<td>Odeh Al-Qsous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saeed Al-Mufti</td>
<td>Shukri Sha’sha’h</td>
<td>Hashem Khiar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmoud Al-Fniash</td>
<td>Qasem Al-Hindawi</td>
<td>Mahmoud Al-Awad</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fifth Legislative Council, 1942-1947</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tawfiq Abu Al Huda, Ibrahim Hashem, Chairs</td>
<td>Hassen Al-Tarawneh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salim Al-Hindawi</td>
<td>Sabri Tabba’</td>
<td>Yosef Al-Akshah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul-Qader Al-Tall</td>
<td>Fawzi Al-Mufti</td>
<td>Mahmoud Al-Kreshan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosa Al-Awad Hejazi</td>
<td>Hassen Khawasnah</td>
<td>Hamad Bin Jazi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isa Al-Awad</td>
<td>Salameh Al-Tall</td>
<td>Ghdoub Al-Zaben</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majed Al-Adwan</td>
<td>Refefan Al-Majali</td>
<td>Nuquoula Ghanama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noifan Al-Su’ud</td>
<td>Marek Al-Majali</td>
<td>Ahmad Olwi Al-Saqaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul-Muhiid Al-Shamayleh</td>
<td>Abdullah Kolayb Al-Shreideh</td>
<td>Alhajj Soud Al-Nabulsi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan; al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, Amman Jordan

*Shaded cells represent tribal families serving in more than one Legislative Council, 1929-1947.

The most important decision-making institution in Jordan is the Royal Court or Diwan. The Diwan is a venue that technically allows any Jordanian citizen to make appeals directly to the king, or through his Royal Court designee. In reality, tribal leaders use the Court to “make requests for assistance or greater government attention to their tribe or district.”168 While the regime’s intention is to co-opt and communicate directly with the major tribal bases in the country, the tribes, conversely, have maximized this

opportunity to manipulate state institutions to their own benefit. A position in the royal Diwan provides an opportunity of great influence in other formal, legal institutions of state such as the Cabinet. Table 3.2 demonstrates the close connection, indeed almost the fluid movement, between positions of power and policy-making in the royal Diwan and the Cabinet. The table demonstrates, that over time, certain tribes, through the direct actions of their shaykhs, have had a disproportionate opportunity to affect policy and maximize political and economic opportunities that have come before either the Diwan or the Cabinet.

What should not be underestimated in an assessment of the role of the Diwan is the important legitimating function it can fulfill in a country like Jordan. With notions of national identity constructed around the theme of the tribe and family, officials of the Diwan were, and are, able to represent the monarch’s policies directly back to their localized spheres of power and use this in turn to keep the King in touch with the “grassroots.” Because of this Royal Court “influence,” the National parliament and its elected representatives are routinely circumvented and frustrated by the importance and stature of the Royal Court.169

The Tribal Council is a special section of the Diwan charged with direct communication with the population outside the major cities of Jordan. The intent is to keep a constant read on the public opinion and political issues that may arise and to take proactive steps to address those issues. Tribal individuals are able to meet with the Chief of Diwan personally and even request an audience with the king. This intense personal

attention to the tribes through the Diwan has cemented a loyal connection between the monarchy and the tribes. So there is a tradition of weaving the formal and informal institutions tightly together, with the tribal shaykhs intimately controlling both institutions and a significant amount of power central to the monarchy.

An institutional process of the Royal Court intertwines tribal power and civil law. This is the Diwan Khass.170 The Diwan Khass can be requested at any time by the Cabinet or the Prime Minister to rule on the constitutionality of laws. This special council effectively takes the legal review and force of law from the judicial system and places it in the hands of the Prime Minister. Moreover, it gives the Prime Minister and the Cabinet the power to nullify any law passed by the Parliament, rendering them an essentially toothless institution. The Diwan Khass has been used against the regime on occasion. For example, King Hussein had decreed the dissolution of Parliament in 1956 to as a survival tactic. The Diwan Khass declared the decree invalid and nullified the announced parliamentary elections.171 Those instances are rare; the usual course of action for the Diwan Khass is to stave off any potential opposition to tribal members of the Royal Court.

Tribal elites who managed to enter the ranks of the Royal Court found they held the reins to the real policy-making power of the state. Over time, this power became concentrated in the hands of a few important tribal families. The practice has changed

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170 Constitution of the Royal Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan, Chapter 8, Article 123, sections i and ii: “The Special Tribunal (Diwan Khass) may interpret the provisions of any law which have not been interpreted by the courts if so requested by the Prime Minister. The Special Tribunal shall consist of the President of the highest Civil Court as chairman, two of its judges and one senior administrative official, who shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers, as members. It shall also include a member delegated by the Minister concerned from among the senior officials of the Ministry which is involved in the needed interpretation.”

little from Amir Abdullah, to King Hussein, to the current king, Abdullah II. As the table below demonstrates, tribal power is deeply entangled in the legal structures of the state. Comparing family names in Table 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrates there is a strong historical relationship of powerful tribal families acting as the gatekeepers for the power center of the Jordanian state. The incentive for this handful of tribal politicians is to retain their seat of power. Even if the state had true ambitions for democratic reform, tribal hands on the real sources of power enforce rules and limit access that result in the consolidation and maintenance of the status quo.

Table 3.2 Tribal Leader Holding Offices of Both Chief of the Royal Court & Prime Minister

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribal Leader</th>
<th>Chief of Diwan (Royal Court)</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rashid Tali’a</td>
<td>1920-1921</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazar Raslan</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1921-1922, 1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Rida Basha al-Rikabi</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1922, 1924-1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazar Raslan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1923-1924, 1926-1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdallah Sarraj</td>
<td></td>
<td>1931-1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fawzi al-Mulki</td>
<td></td>
<td>1953-1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulieman al-Nabulsi</td>
<td></td>
<td>1956-1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husayn al-Khalidi</td>
<td></td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein bin Nasser</td>
<td>1960-1963</td>
<td>1963-1964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Shaded names are families also serving on the Legislative Councils*

**Good Governance Challenges**

Max Weber (1954) observed that aside from monopolizing the legitimate use of violence the state also attempts to monopolize the rule of law. The rule of law contributes to the “conformity of order”\(^{172}\) and “directly influences the distribution of power, economic or otherwise, in its respective community.”\(^{173}\) In Jordan, tribal leaders and their position of authority “remain intact and still enjoy a considerable degree of political maneuverability and …economic autonomy.”\(^{174}\) Part of their political and economic autonomy rests on their ability to command the rule of law over a significant portion of the population in direct competition with the legal prerogatives of the state. Contrary to the public understanding that tribal law is only used today in the realm of “family matters,” it is used to a significant extent outside of Amman in all areas of the law. It is routinely used in place of legal, state laws.


\(^{173}\) Ibid.

\(^{174}\) Khoury and Kostiner, 8.
Over the centuries, tribal or customary law has proven to be a strong institution that has bound the individual member to the group and cemented the acceptance of the judgments of the shaykh or tribal judges as immutable. In Jordan, as well as other Arab states, customary law has helped sustain the tribe as another political power locus that, at times, rivals the states’ ability to ‘monopolize the distribution of power within its respective communities.’

Tribal law evolved in the absence of any central authority and is explained as an institutionalization of practices based on collective expectations for behavior. The authority of customary law theoretically comes from the members of the group, their collective recognition of customary laws, and their voluntary participation in the enforcement of these laws. Tribal shaykhs often act as the mediator to ensure that rules are applied fairly to all members of the tribe or apply the rules to new situations. In larger tribes, a person or persons deemed educated and honorable enough is appointed by the shaykh to act as judge or arbiter.

Customary law is broken when an individual’s behavior somehow harms another through some violation of the rules. Only if the injured party brings the matter before the tribe is the matter considered. Traditionally, tribal members are obligated to aid other members who have a valid grievance in the application of justice. Historically, these obligations of the group often resulted in protracted warfare begun by the accuser and his group attacking the accused. The accused’s group was then obliged to avenge the attack.

175 Although tribal members interviewed stressed the voluntary, egalitarian nature of customary law, in reality, I observed that compliance was more a product of fear of sanctions. Additionally, any shaykhs who commanded economic and political resources to enforce customary law and its sanctions on his membership could do so in a very arbitrary manner.
Violence quickly became a very costly means of solving a dispute. Therefore, customary law evolved as a way to resolve conflicts and avoid the costs of war.

There is strong evidence that customary, tribal law continues to be used with great regularity even in urban areas and its use is often encouraged by the legal authorities of the state in combination with the established law. For example, a man was convicted of the 2004 death of a priest in Ajloun (a region in northern Jordan). The man and the priest were from the same tribe. The state Criminal Court convicted the man of murder but had to dismiss the conviction because the tribe and the priest’s family refused to press charges against the man. Instead the matter was settled within the tribe after the shaykh ordered the man’s family to pay the priest’s family Jordanian Dinars $100,000 (or approximately $141,000 USD).

The implication of the judgment is significant on two levels. First, the state judicial institution deferred to the tribal execution of justice in this case. It was efficient for the state because it did not have to bear the costs of proceedings or the enforcement of court decisions. However, the state effectively abdicated its authority to the tribe for the administration of justice among its citizens, thus giving up one of the primary purposes for its own legitimacy. The second implication of this particular example is found in the judgment rendered by the tribe. According the Department of Statistics for the Kingdom, less than thirteen percent of the households in Ajlun have a combined annual income of

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more than JD 7,000\textsuperscript{178} or approximately 9,800 USD. The judgment rendered by the tribal court could not possibly have been paid by the family alone. Extraction and payment of such a sum of money involved the entire tribe or at least the tribal members who had the resources to contribute to the judgment amount. The payment process succeeded in deepening the centrality of the tribe in the lives of its members and further cemented the obligations of lesser members to the elites of the tribe. In the process of doing so, the centrality of the state, and attendant obligations of citizenship, were significantly diminished by this one particular episode.

Additionally, where damages are awarded there are no police to enforce payment unless the plaintiff can collect it himself. Thus, in tribal law there is no \textit{state} interested in punishing offenders in order to deter others from crime. There is only the aggrieved party seeking justice. However, in order to give some security to individuals, the tribe supports the aggrieved party in obtaining his rights.\textsuperscript{179} There is “an elaborate system of guarantees… (that) ensures that the judgment will be carried out.”\textsuperscript{180} The enforcement of rights is carried out by the tribe rather than the state. While this may benefit the state by lowering its transaction costs to enforce security, this public good that should be distributed by the state is, instead, distributed by individual tribes. While on a bureaucratic level, legal pluralism may reduce costs for the state, customary law reinforces tribal relationships at the expense of the relationship between citizen and state.

\textsuperscript{178} The Department of Statistics (DoS) indicated that the average household consists of two adults and five children throughout the kingdom. More economic information can be obtained at \url{http://www.dos.gov.jo/sdb_ec/sdb_ec_e/household/2006/3-1.pdf} Retrieved 17 July 2008.


Cases such as this occur on a regular basis in Jordan and are decided and handled through tribal law rather than the official state judicial system.

More recent events indicate a more troubling trend of the state deferring to tribal legal processes instead of asserting state authority over civil order and the dispensation of justice. In August 2009, Ashraf Momani was murdered by his former brother-in-law who belongs to the the al-Smadi tribe. The Momani tribe set fire to the al-Smadi house, farm, store, and anything else belonging to the al-Smadi. The al-Smadi responded “with the same level of violence.”¹⁸¹ The violence between the two tribes continued for another three days and spread to two of the neighboring villages in Ajloun. Only after a jaha (tribal meeting) was called involving five hundred Momani tribe members, Interior Minister Nayef Qadi, and Ajloun governor Wanas Harahseh was the matter settled. Initially, the Momani demanded the public execution of the ex-brother-in-law. Through negotiations a “blood money” price was settled on and paid to Momani’s widow and to the tribe. There was no discussion of charging the killer with a capital crime because this case was handled through the tribal system of justice.¹⁸²

A third, recent incident demonstrates a rising level of intrusion of tribal law into the formal legal system of Jordan. In September 2009, riots broke out between the Bani Fawaz and the Zghoul. One man from the Zghoul was killed and several other members of both tribes were injured. During the riots, an armored police vehicle accidentally backed over another man from the Zghoul tribe and killed him. Rather than local police and courts handling the investigation, an “ad hoc committee” of tribal representatives was

convened under the direction of then Prime Minister Nader Dahabi. An *atwa* (tribal truce agreement) was signed that laid out compensation to the families. A spokesman for the Zghoul released the policeman driving the security vehicle from responsibility for killing a member of the tribe, accepted further “assessment of the damage in the town’s stores and houses”\(^\text{183}\) and appropriate compensation being paid. At no time was there an official police investigation. No one was arrested for the riots or the resultant deaths. Ultimately, the state was never formally involved in enforcing the peace or holding individuals responsible under the formal code of laws and justice. The policeman was not involved in any civil process to legitimize his role as an employee of the state or his performance of his job in providing security or protecting citizenry. The state was subsumed into a tribal institution which claimed those central state rights and responsibilities.

Recent events in Amman also suggest a disconnect between state ability to control security and rule of law and tribal enforcement of customary law. An incident occurred in November 2009 and centered on riots that broke out after a member of the Saoud tribe was reportedly beaten to death by Amman police. The death occurred in a section of east Amman known as Hai al-Tafaileh because of the high concentration of families from the Tafaileh governate, i.e., a tribal area. Residents from the neighborhood attacked the police kiosk, burned it to the ground, and shot four members of the Gendarmerie Forces. The government convened a meeting with the shaykhs of the neighborhood to proffer a truce between security forces and the Saoud family. Only after the Saoud rejected the

compensation and the truce, a search was made for those responsible for attacking the Gendarmerie sought.184

The practice of privileging tribal law over state law is a disturbing trend in Jordan. While this may benefit the state by lowering its transaction costs to enforce security, this public good that should be distributed by the state is, instead, distributed by individual tribes. This is a particular problem in Jordan as customary law is so entwined with established law. While on a bureaucratic level, legal pluralism may reduce costs for the state, customary law reinforces tribal relationships at the expense of the relationship between citizen and state.

In contemporary Jordan, the relationships between different tribes become significant when they begin to operate as political institutions and the rank and file is needed to affect state policy. Tribes need resources from their membership in order to overcome opponents and competitors and, in return, tribes provide benefits to their members. Some tribes in Jordan have become more adept at extracting resources and gaining positions of wealth and power. These tribes concomitantly have enriched (relatively) their membership.

Recent moves by the Jordanian government to curb tribal abuse of government positions have startled most Jordanians. Reform of political institutions has received considerable lip service in Jordan but control of key state positions by powerful tribes and the attendant access to important business opportunities is rarely tested. “Moves to tackle graft in administration and state controlled companies where patronage and nepotism is

extensive in a tribally based system had been limited to a number of minor investigations and arrests.”

The only incident in recent decades occurred in February 2010. The scandal centered on the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company (JOPT), one of the five industries that are owned by the government and a $1.2 billion USD expansion project of the country's sole refinery. The charges alleged that Khaled Shaheen offered payoffs to Adel Qudah, a former finance minister; Mohammad Rawashdeh, a senior economic adviser to Prime Minister Samir Rifai; and Ahmad Rifai, the ex-manager of JOPT in exchange for a fifteen-year government awarded exclusivity contract. The graft scandal is stunning because of the number of major political and business figures who are involved. Further, the scandal has invaded the sacrosanct sphere of tribal politics. As one observer noted the, “graft scandal…has rocked the political establishment.” It is interesting to note that, after this scandal died away in the news, the king appointed Emad Madadha as the new executive director of the Jordanian Phosphate Company. Madadha had previously built his career as a senior official in the anti-corruption division of the Intelligence Department and as the chief of the Civil Status Department. The al-Madadha is a small tribe from Ma’an and is considered part of the Huweitat tribe, the back bone of the Jordanian military.

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187 Shaheen is related to ex-Finance Minister Qudah. Shaheen is a billionaire and had been the government's contractor of choice for major security projects. Shaheen also handled U.S.-funded contracts to build the Amman-based training facilities for Iraqi and Palestinian security forces.
188 Rifai’i is Palestinian Jordanian.
While the incident might look like a simple case of corruption, the Refinery scandal exemplifies the constant competition between formal rules of the state and informal rules of tribal politics. There is still contestation between tribal institutions and state institutions; “the result (is) the emergence of two almost separate systems of government.”\textsuperscript{191} Dominance of one system or the other occurs in response to various economic and political accidents or opportunities. The refinery scandal is also another example of Migdal’s “big shuffle,” actions by the authoritarian state to appoint powerful social leaders, in this case tribal leaders, to positions of power within the government. While the intention is to bind tribal loyalties to the authoritarian regime, the unintended consequence of this practice actually weakens the capacities of the state “in order to insure the tenure of the top state leadership.”\textsuperscript{192} The current arrangement of tribal politics and their support of the Hashemites makes Jordan an incredibly weak state. As in the past, tribes have always been challenged for their centrality in Jordan’s political life. These challenges have included communists, Pan-Arabists, and, more recently the Palestinian Jordanians and the Muslim Brotherhood.

\textit{Guests in Our Country: The Palestinian Jordanians}

The tribes have pushed back against the state for the perceived favoritism toward the Palestinian Jordanians under the current king, Abdullah II. Perceived from a zero-sum perspective, all Jordanians of tribal backgrounds certainly resent what is perceived

\textsuperscript{192} Migdal, 74.
as a betrayal by the monarchy. A common complaint in Jordan is, “The tribes should have the pie and the Palestinians should ask for their piece.”

What surprised the regime was that many of those youth activists, such as the March 24 (2011) Shabab (protest), were not Palestinian but rather hailed from tribal backgrounds. That hostility from East Bankers has grown immensely significant. After all, the Jordanian “street” does not threaten the monarchy when it encompasses the Muslim Brotherhood, professional associations, and leftist parties—predictable actors easily contained through targeted repression and legal constriction. Existential danger instead emerges when dissent emanates from the very social forces that staff the state, man the army, and operate the mukhabarat (GID).

The Palestinian Jordanians, as the powerful tribes perceive them, are the main threat to the political dominance of the tribes. The “Palestinians” did not magically appear in 1948 and begin to successfully seize the scarce political and economic benefits that were to be had in Jordan. The truth is much thornier. Before the presence of the Ottomans or the British, Palestinian tribes were part of the large network of tribal groups of the Hijaz as were many of the “Jordanian tribes.” Their political identity as “Palestinians” did not develop until the time of the British Mandate. In contemporary Jordan, the Palestinian Jordanians are presented as the central threat to the tribes in their pursuit of scarce economic and political resources in Jordan. In reality, the problem is the structural weakness of the state to provide for all citizens. This weakness is deliberately perpetuated by the powerful tribes who populate the ministries, bureaucratic departments, and seats of the parliament. The current rise of Palestinian Jordanians into those ranks is seen as a direct threat to tribal dominance.

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193 Interview with Mohammad al-Masri, Ph.D., 30 October 2009, Center for Strategic Studies, Amman, Jordan.
The Palestinian Jordanians represent the private sector business elite of Jordan. Their experience in Jordan is complicated and there is a long history of contention with the “indigenous” Jordanian tribes. The contentious relationship between the tribes and the Palestinian Jordanians has been referred to as the “great fault line of Jordanian society.”195 Palestinians struggle against perceptions they are agents of foreign states, members of terrorist cells, and/or disloyal to the palace. There has been a long term policy of de-Palestinianization of both the state bureaucracy and the military. Over time, these attitudes and policies have led to a deep cleavage in Jordanian society and this informs the sense of separate, personalized identities which supplants a shared sense of national identity. The unintended political consequence is that the state remains relatively free of demands by a cohesive group of its citizens. The authoritarian state maintains the status quo at very little cost while the Palestinian Jordanians and the powerful tribes compete between themselves.

The relationship between the tribes, the state, and the Palestinians is a complicated one and is likely to remain so at least until the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli debacle. The political contestation between the three has been affected by regional and international intrigues and pressures over the years. The domestic competition has been just as fierce and has changed over time.

The arrival of the Palestinians presented a number of opportunities and challenges to the Jordanian state. Many of them directly affected the costs and payoffs in the relationship between the state and the tribes. The tribes exploited or pushed back against

the Palestinians as events unfolded. Most obvious of the changes that took place during the 1948-1967 period was the demand for infrastructure in building refugee camps, expanding employment in Jordan, and creating new political spaces for Palestinians.

It is interesting to note Jordan has accepted the burden of other refugees without such a backlash. The Iraqi refugee situation, which developed in 2003, forced more than 100,000 Iraqis into Jordan. The demand on housing, medical care, and schools strained Jordan’s already tenuous resources. Yet, tribal response was quite muted. Some have suggested the Iraqis who fled to Jordan came with “suitcases of money” which they used to lavishly overpay for goods and services in Amman. While that might have been the case for some Iraqis, many Iraqis needed assistance from the Jordanian government to meet basic needs. The more plausible explanation is that many of the Iraqis who flooded into Jordan were extended members of “Jordanian” tribes who were transformed into “Iraqis” with boundaries that were drawn by the British in the early 1900s.

The current situation in Syria has filled Jordanian newspapers with stories of “thousands” of Syrian refugees escaping to Jordan. Again, the Transjordanian tribal elite have been largely silent. At this time, the only accurate fact about the Syrian refugee population in Jordan is the state has “wildly overestimated” the numbers for their own advantages. The relatively small number of refugees appears to be the primary reason there has not become a huge political problem. Further, in the case of both the Iraqis and Syrians, Jordanian law prohibits them from holding jobs in Jordan. Over time, Iraqis in Jordan have managed to either live off their own financial resources, return to Iraq, or

move elsewhere. The current assumption is that the Syrians who have fled to Jordan will
do the same.

However, a recent Human Rights Watch report notes that Syrians fleeing the
violence in their country are allowed to stay in Jordan while Palestinians living in Syria
who have attempted to cross into Jordan are forced back into Syria by Jordanian security.

“Palestinians from Syria say they are fleeing their homes because of fighting,
generalized insecurity, and fear of arrest, just like Syrian refugees. Jordan’s
differing treatment of Syrian and Palestinian asylum seekers looks like
nationality-based discrimination, rather than treatment based on objective
evidence that Palestinians in Syria face less risk of harm than Syrians.”¹⁹⁷

This is clear evidence bias against Palestinians is deeply rooted both socially and
politically. While King Abdullah II has “pushed the envelope” regarding the inclusion of
Palestinian Jordanians in his government the above report gives credence to the pervasive
tribal control of government institutions and their day-to-day policies and functions.
There are questions about just how far the king can carry out his own preferences for
ethnic inclusion in the face of resistance from his most powerful “supporters.”

Essentially, the status and entitlements for the Palestinians were different from the
current cases of the Iraqis and Syrians. In 1983, the Jordanian state attempted to shape
policies that would minimize any need for support from the Palestinians. There were
three tiers of citizenship created which designated legal rights in varying degrees for
Transjordanian tribes, Palestinians living in the “East Bank” (contemporary Jordan), and
Palestinians living in the West Bank.¹⁹⁸ This system was successful in maintaining
control of political and economic resources and created a Palestinian community largely

http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=17060
¹⁹⁸ Stateless Again: Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality, 2.
reliant on political favors and patronage rather than its own political clout. For example, conscription of West Bank Palestinians was prohibited because of a fear it would result in a dramatic “Palestinization” of the army. Selection to the military was guided by the belief that the military was to be maintained with a backbone of Bedouin troops loyal to the king. The government also showed deference to the tribes in hiring police and making appointments to public office. Senior administrative positions were given to Palestinians “that directly related to West Bank problems… (but)…did not hold the most powerful position in the cabinet: the prime ministership, the deputy prime ministership, the minister of the interior.”

Over the years, the state has used the divide to fragment potential opposition. The Palestinians in Jordan have been conflicted over allegiance to the Hashemites, challenged by institutional strategies that have restricted private sector development, and thwarted in attempts to break into state employment.

Additionally, there has been a change in a number of factors in the last four decades which make the presence of Palestinians in Jordan again a significant issue for the tribes. This changing relationship and the shifting political power of both coalitions are particularly important. Palestinian Jordanians are now a slight numerical majority of the Jordanian population, relatively better educated, and economically more prosperous than tribal Jordanians.

Historically, Jordanian tribes have feared the ability of international actors to

199 Mishal, 94-101.
200 Ibid., 37.
202 Mishal, 8.
broker recognition of Jordan as the Palestinian homeland. Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu have advocated for the “Jordan Option”\textsuperscript{203} as recently as 2012. Given the strong pro-U.S. stance of King Hussein and, most recently, King Abdullah II, tribal leaders have voiced fears that the regime may indeed succumb to international pressures. In a scenario of folding the West Bank into an enlarged state, Jordan would be swallowed up by the sheer numbers of Palestinians. The economic and social implications of taking on a poverty-stricken and dependent population would further drain the scarce resources of the state. King Abdullah II has rejected the idea and advocated for a separate state of Palestine. The perception in Jordan is not that Abdullah has an altruistic belief in a Palestinian state as much as such a move could certainly destabilize his hold on the throne.

Most recently, the resentment on the part of tribal Jordanians has been most pronounced in the face of the upheavals of the Arab Spring. The importance of the two distinct incidents reflects tribal resentments in the protests seen in Jordan against the monarchy. A rare incident occurred in 2010 when a petition signed by sixty members of the “National Committee of Military Veterans” attacked the seemingly too cozy relationship between the monarchy and the Palestinian Jordanians. The petition essentially represented tens of thousands of Jordanian military veterans and an institution that has been at the center of the tribal-Hashemite mythology. Among some of the charges leveled by the petitions were accusations that all the important ministerial posts were headed by Palestinian Jordanians and demanded the government “disenfranchise the entire Palestinian population of the kingdom, whether immediately or subject to the

\textsuperscript{203} Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, proposed, as part of the Israeli peace treaty, having all of the West Bank recognized as part of the state of Jordan while Gaza would be absorbed into the state of Israel.
implementation of United Nations Resolution 194 calling for the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes.”

Tribes feel their loyalty to the state would not be considered in the new calculus of society. “This fear led to an intense preoccupation among some Jordanian nationalists with Jordanizing Jordan by de-Palestinizing it.”

As Palestinians in Jordan attempt to translate their economic clout into political power, the tribes have pushed back, using their social and political power to minimize Palestinian encroachment. The tribes have aggressively sought to neutralize Palestinian political influence, feeling their centrality to state durability is threatened by the rise of Palestinian political power. Human Rights Watch has documented that the state of Jordan has withdrawn citizenship from at least 2,700 Jordanians of Palestinian origin between 2004 and 2008. State officials who are most often tribal members “cancel, in a haphazard and arbitrary manner, the so-called national number that each Jordanian requires as proof of Jordanian nationality.” Hundreds of thousands of Jordanians of Palestinian origin appear likely to have their national number revoked, including some 200,000 Palestinian-origin Jordanians who returned to Jordan from Kuwait in 1990-91.

Withdrawal of nationality dramatically complicates the lives of those affected: children lose access to free primary and secondary education and university education may be out of reach due to vastly higher costs for non-nationals. Some say that healthcare costs are higher than for Jordanians. The same goes for renewal of drivers’ licenses, with

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205 Sulieman. 111.
207 Ibid., 2.
higher fees and shorter validity. To live in Jordan, Palestinian non-nationals require a residency permit subject to approval by the General Intelligence Department (GID). Non-Jordanians cannot be employed by the state and have greater difficulty on the private job market because many employers require proof of nationality or clearance by the GID to hire those of Palestinian origin.\textsuperscript{208}

There is evidence that Amir Abdullah and King Hussein depended on the support of the Palestinians while carefully playing the Palestinians and the tribes off of each other. While King Hussein and his son, Abdullah II, refer to the “Jordanian nation” it would not be a strategic move on the part of the palace to create a cohesive identity and, perhaps, a direct challenge from one unified group. The truth is that a number of important Palestinian families gave their full-throated and financial support to the Hashemites. Palestinians consider their support as unconditional especially with the voluntary immigration of large Palestinian populations after 1967. Tribal support is clearly seen as based on a pact of loyalty in exchange for economic security; that is a problem.

While the state worked to limit the military and political potential of Palestinian Jordanians, the tribes worked on their own behalf to limit possible gains that might be created in the relationship between the state and the Palestinians. Palestinian Jordanians believed they were, and are, shut out of the higher decision making offices of the state. They were convinced such positions were informally reserved for only members of the tribal elite.\textsuperscript{209} This perception has been heightened in recent years. Recent studies

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid. See Table 1.1.
suggest that there is reason for this concern. What lies at the root of the problem is the structure of state institutions so entangled with traditional tribal structures that the existing practices of patronage and personalistic politics result in a closed, tribally dominated system.²¹⁰

King Abdullah II’s recent inclusion of well-educated Palestinian civil servants has done little to dispel this perception. Rather, tribal complaints of the slow creep of the “PowerPoint boys” give voice to a fear of the unwelcomed Palestinian advance into areas of Jordanian life they have not earned. This chauvinistic sentiment is reflected in comments made by prominent tribal members such as Oweidi al-Abbadi:

The sensitive government posts the Jordanians²¹¹ assume to protect Palestinian wealth: I really wonder why the Palestinians covet these jobs that make of us mere guards to protect their property. I believe, however, that government jobs should be confined to Jordanians and the priority in everything should be given to them, such as a director, a minister, a scholarship, etc. The crumbs should be given to the Palestinians. Besides, Jordanians are entitled to a share of the Palestinian wealth, which they couldn’t have gained without the Jordanian passport. This share should amount to fifty-one percent. Palestinians should not have any political rights whether in the executive of legislative branch. A brave decision should be taken that the Jordanian (i.e., the Transjordanian) is Jordanian and the Palestinian (i.e., Palestinian Jordanian) is Palestinian…Therefore, I believe in withdrawing Jordanian passports from the Palestinians and giving them instead travel documents.²¹²

While Oweidi al-Abbadi has become the Jordanian version of Rush Limbaugh, he does say what many people are thinking but are too polite or smart to say in public.

²¹¹ Abbadi uses this term to denote tribes as opposed to his specific reference to “Palestinians” which designates them as “not Jordanians.”
Palestinian Jordanians bore the brunt of the backlash against the events of Black September. The role of the Mukhabarat (secret police) was widely accepted as ferreting out those Palestinians who had any remaining sympathy or solidarity with Fatah. Over time, these events “developed into a process of Transjordanizing the government, (and) gradually phased the Palestinian-Jordanians out of the national consensus.”

The Gulf War of 1990-1991 revitalized the perception of threat to tribal political power. More than 200,000 Jordanian Palestinians and 100,000 tribal Jordanians flooded back into the country from the emirates and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, “thousands of Palestinians also stayed in Jordan because the other Arab countries that issued their papers refused to receive them.” The influx of Palestinians from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia represented a ten percent increase in Jordanian population, pushing the total number of people to almost four million. Jordanians feared the loss of remittances from those returning from the Gulf States would be compounded by the fact that there would be a significant increase in competition for jobs that had already vanished after the reforms of 1989.

While the immediate consequences of the mass arrival were negative and disruptive, longer term benefits with great positive impact on the national economy became apparent within the first two years. Two important factors account for this positive impact on the economy: first, the majority of returnees were well-educated and

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213 Abu-Odeh, 191.
214 Mohammad el-Sakka, Ph.D. University of Kuwait, “Migrant Workers’ Remittances and Macroeconomic Policy in Jordan,” Unpublished paper (Kuwait City: Kuwait)
skilled (Palestinian) professionals who immediately entered the labor market; second, the migration was accompanied by a large influx of capital estimated at JD$1.5 billion (Central Bank of Jordan 1992).\footnote{Ibid. 67.} That influx of capital allowed Palestinians in Jordan to purchase real estate in and around Amman and invest in business start-ups. The result was a “large portion”\footnote{Interview with Hani Hourani, Director General, al-Urdun al-Jadid, 29 October 2009, Amman, Jordan.} of Palestinians joined the middle class. This was technically a benefit for the state of Jordan in the form of new sources of tax revenues. But the influx of “wealthy” Palestinians renewed grievances held by tribal Jordanians who felt they were assigned to the bottom of the economic structure.

A public opinion poll published in 1995 revealed that the tribes feared the sudden swelling of the Palestinian population in Jordan, doubted their loyalty to the state, and were intimidated by their apparent domination of the private sector.\footnote{October 1995, \textit{Istitita’ lil-Ra’y hawla al-‘Alaqat al-Urduniyya al-Filastiniyya, al-Bu’d al-Dakhili [“Opinion Poll on Jordanian-Palestinian Relations, the Internal Dimension”]} (Amman: Center for Strategic Studies).} On the other hand, sixty-nine percent of Palestinians polled regarded the monopoly of military and civil service positions by the tribes as a major impediment to a unified Jordanian identity.\footnote{Ibid.} There was a fear that Palestinian economic strength could translate that strength into enough influence on the state that the tribes would lose their political advantage.\footnote{Laurie Brand, 1995, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity,” \textit{Journal of Palestinian Studies}, 24(4): 55.} This was suggested as a reason that the state did not proceed with privatizing the state-owned five industries\footnote{Jordan Electric Power, Jordan Cement Factories, Jordan Phosphate Mines, Jordan Petroleum Refinery, and Arab Potash.} during the 1990s.\footnote{The Jordanian government sold 33\% of the shares of Jordan Cement Factories (JCF) to Lafarge, a French company, in 1998. It sold 1\% of the shares of JCF to JCF’s employees at a preferential rate. It then sold 8\% of the shares of JCF to the Social Security Corporation. Therefore, the majority of JCF is either}
inception of the five industries) contributed to the creation of a state bourgeoisie that would be responsible for the economic development of the country… (It) also made it easier for the small state to continue rewarding groups who supported its policies.”

Several scholars assert the Palestinian Jordanian community “has something of a dual identity which makes it political position ambiguous.” Certainly, Palestinian Jordanians occupy a peculiar position of retaining still unsettled claims to Palestinian lands lost to the creation of Israel, as well as their position in Jordan where they have traditionally been viewed with distrust. These perceptions of inclusion and exclusion have important implications for the Jordanian state. One significant consequence exists by virtue of the absence of formal opportunities of the Palestinians to express political will.

The state’s role in crafting the Palestinians’ identity in Jordan that was quite different from the lip service paid to the rhetoric of the “one Jordanian family.” For example, aside from purging the bureaucratic ranks of Palestinians, elections laws were promulgated in 1986 which redistricted large parts of the East Bank as part of the West Bank districts. “This juridical rearrangement of geography and demography, wherein people who actually reside in the East Bank are considered West Bankers, was an Orwellian move designed to decrease alleged Palestinian political ‘influence’ on the East

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Bank.

The constant redistricting to carefully maintain a political imbalance between the tribes and the Palestinians has become something of an art form in itself. Today, Palestinian Jordanians, in large part, have never known any country but Jordan. Yet, they feel the exclusionary policies that keep them removed from the political life of the country.

It is within this climate that Palestinians navigate a state bureaucracy which makes it problematic to get quotidian services accomplished including getting drivers’ licenses, business permits, entrance to universities or the military, or processing paperwork for purchases of cars. Many Palestinians now pay tribal go-betweens to navigate the state bureaucracy for them.

Between 2000 and 2012, there has been improvement in access to state goods and services and civil service positions for the Palestinians. However, there is still a prevailing sense that there is a glass ceiling in the public sector for almost all Palestinians in Jordan. As noted, military service is also limited to lower and technical ranks for Palestinians. Subsequent careers which might lead to some service in state-owned industries like Royal Jordanian Airline are almost exclusively reserved for tribal military officers.

There are significant differences between King Hussein and his son, King Abdullah II, in their approach to the inclusion of the Palestinian Jordanian population into the socio-economic benefits of the bureaucratic state. King Hussein toyed with nominal

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227 Ibid. 243.
228 Interview with several Palestinian-Jordanians who requested anonymity.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
inclusion when he was attempting to incorporate the West Bank into the kingdom of Jordan. However, after Black September, there was a decisive shift to purge the bureaucracy of Palestinian Jordanians with the exception of a few men like Adnan Abu Odeh. This exclusion of Palestinian Jordanians from the benefits of bureaucratic employment was characterized by the tribes as the reward for their loyalty.

King Abdullah’s relationship with the tribes represents the growth of the Palestinian Jordanian population. Today, the Palestinian Jordanians comprise more than half of the population. A shift in population poses questions about how the regime responds to the political presence of the Palestinian Jordanians. Additionally, the regime has paid attention to the serious lop-sided growth of the private sector. Both of these aspects of the Palestinian part of Jordanian society present a clear threat to the powerful tribes.

Abdullah is now being questioned about the inclusion of Palestinian Jordanians in the ministries. There is a rise of chauvinistic resentment against any inclusion at all. This is the first time the taboo of criticizing the king has been lifted in public. It is mainly tribal sheikhs who are publically suggesting he might not be fit to be king.

As the current regime has expanded opportunities for qualified Palestinian Jordanians in the public sector, the sense of betrayal on the part of the tribes is palpable. A classified report sent by Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft on 7 January 2010 was uncovered by WIKILEAKS. The report highlights the deep divide and sense of siege that characterizes the relationship between the Palestinians and the tribes in Jordan. More importantly, the report highlights the deeply contested sense of Jordanian identity.
A New Face on the Wall

¶3. A government circular issued on January 4 by Prime Minister Rifai’s government directs all public offices to prominently display photos of Crown Prince Hussein bin Abdullah II alongside King Abdullah II. Traditionally, photos of the King and his father, the late King Hussein bin Talal have been displayed. The circular does not say if the Crown Prince’s photo should be added to the mix, or if as some wonder, the late King Hussein’s photo should be taken down to make way for the Crown Prince.

¶4. Either way, the decision could prove to be a controversial one. The late King was extremely popular and remains much loved throughout Jordan nearly eleven years after his death. He was particularly well respected among tribal leaders outside Amman for his careful outreach, attention to rural development, and ability to resolve tribal disputes through personal intervention — all areas where the current King is perceived as weak or uninterested.

¶5. By contrast, East Bank Jordanians, who are overrepresented in Jordan’s bureaucracy, have been skeptical over the appointment of Crown Prince Hussein for his youth (he is fifteen) and his Palestinian lineage. The Crown Prince’s mother, Queen Rania, is Palestinian. His father, King Abdullah II, is himself one-half British. This leaves the Crown Prince viewed as only one-quarter Hashemite in some circles.231

In several conversations with tribal leaders, the conflicted feelings of allegiance are apparent. King Hussein attracts a similar nostalgic mythology that many Americans feel about Ronald Reagan. There is a whistful sense that contemporary political and economic problems would be resolved by Hussein if he were still around. While generally, Palestinian Jordanians perceive the current monarch as more open and equitable than his father; many tribal members view the current King Abdullah II and his family as betraying the sacrifices and loyalty given to them by the tribes in favor of Palestinian Jordanians.

In recent months, Prince Hasan, the former Crown Prince and brother of the former King Hussein, has served as the public proxy for Abdullah II. Hasan projects the same nostalgic, tribal ethos as Hussein and Abdullah relies on him to bring the tensions

down among the tribes in Jordan. Tribal criticisms of Abdullah II have now escalated to suggestions that he be replaced by his half brother, Hamzeh, as king. Prince Hamzeh is the son of the late King Hussein and Queen Noor. His recent marriage to a woman from the Bani Ahmed tribe has enhanced his tribal affiliations. He is favored by the tribes because of his persona of being more “Jordanian” than his brother, Abdullah. While this might all appear as silly and superficial to Westerners, the issue of Palestinian Jordanians supplanting the tribes as the main political and economic force is a central and serious issue for the tribes.

The Palestinians may control a lion’s share of the wealth in Jordan however the tribes control the ability to translate the economic strength into political access. While economic benefits might accrue with cooperation with the Palestinian business sector, tribal family allegiance restricts access to outsiders. “The tribal factions are in a position to restrict the encroachment of the Palestinians into the spheres that require government licensing and into public tenders…and student scholarships in government institutions of higher education.”

The historical divide between the Palestinians and the tribes has only deepened in the last forty years. In the past two decades, there is a widely held belief that Palestinian money and education would replace tribal loyalty as the state’s main pillar of support. The effect was twofold. First, economic development had been seriously stunted for the tribes. A tribal bourgeoisie in the private sector is inchoate at best. The tribes remain intimately tied to the economic resources of the state. Second, as the population has

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boomed the economy overall has contracted. Now, Palestinians as well as tribes compete for a shrinking number of public sector jobs. The tribes are not only threatened by the Palestinian competition for jobs but consider them *interlopers responsible* for the economic problems. The tribes consider this trend as an aggressive strategy to “take food from the mouths of their children.”

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235 Interview with Hasan al-Hisa, Researcher, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. 28 October 2009 in Amman, Jordan.
Chapter 4: Threats and Opportunities: Failure of Political Parties and the Rise of Tribal Politics

“They only were known by name, and their dreams remained in the minds of its founders.”  

Introduction

This chapter looks at the relationship between Jordan’s political parties and the tribes. The relationship between the tribes and political parties is really about the rapid political and social change in the Middle East and the assumptions and expectations made about the political outcomes. Again, the scholarship regarding political and social development in especially the Middle East has been fraught with teleological or unidirectional explanations. As Eckstein (1988) noted, the nature of political changes must be consistent with the effects of changes in social context and the costs the changes would exact, not only from society but also from the political actors who control the state. This chapter considers political change at the individual and institutional level in Jordan. Taking the lead from Deutsch (1961) and Tilly (2007), the case of political parties is considered from the perspective of the change of personal commitments of tribal politics to institutional structures that demand a different, mass commitment. This change involves social mobilization.

Social mobilization is a name given to an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life. It denotes a concept of more specific processes of change, such as changes of face-to-face associates, institutions, roles, ways of acting, of experiences.

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237 See for example, Daniel Lerner, 1958, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press).
and expectations, and finally of personal memories, habits and needs including the need for new patterns of group affiliations and new images of personal identity.\textsuperscript{238}

This traditional view of social mobilization assumes the movement is initiated by the central state authority and assimilates the traditional institutions of society. The ability to modernize its scope of political consciousness and the political involvement of its population is central to a strong state, according to many theories. “The institutions of a modern polity must organize the participation of the mass of the population. The crucial institutional distinction...is thus the distinctive institution of the modern polity-the political party.”\textsuperscript{239}

As elsewhere in this dissertation, the traditional theory does not adequately explain what is really happening in the case of Jordan. Part of the problem is the observer is making assumptions about participation, mobilizations, and change from the lens of western political experience. Second, the connection of social change to political development does not take into account the historical trajectories in the Middle East which differed profoundly from Western European experience. Finally, clear analysis is hard in the case of the Middle East because the newly created “states” were immediately saddled with the institutional trappings which were transferred whole-cloth by their European “benefactors.” As Tilly noted, researchers needed to drop “misconceived models of Western experience as the criteria for political development,”\textsuperscript{240} in order to accurately examine what really happens in in the process of political change and participation.

\textsuperscript{239} Samuel Huntington, 1968, \textit{Political Order in Changing Societies} (New Haven: Yale University Press), 89.
There are indeed political parties in Jordan and the wider Middle East. But what exactly are they doing and how are they doing it? Are they representing interests or issues? How is institutional effectiveness measured? This chapter focuses on the changes in power and influence between the tribes and political parties over time in Jordan.

As Tarrow (1996) noted, political turbulence not only pose threats to the stability of the authoritarian regime- in this case, the Hashemites- but also provides an array of political opportunities. In Jordan, early turbulence threatened both the regime and the Transjordanian tribes. In the early years, a spiral of threats became so significant to the political power of the tribes that strategic decisions were made to support the Hashemite regime. This chapter considers the tribal response to the threats and opportunities. Threats came not only from the authoritarian state but also to ideological movements and other political rivals. Ideological movements threatened tribal politics as they engulfed different powerful tribal shaykhs and their causes. King Hussein managed with the tribes to shut down the external threats to the state. Many of those ideolocal threats moved beyond Jordanian boundaries after the establishment of martial law in 1957. It was not until 1989 that the regime faced another cacophony of threats both internally and externally that the king was faced with offering what appeared to be legitimately serious democratic reforms including the reintroduction of elections. The defining moment which occurred in 1989 changed the dynamics of authoritarian stability by opening up the political system to real contentious politics. It was this political opportunity that was used

\footnote{Tarrow explained threats relate to the costs of action or inaction, rather than the prospects of success. (160). It is an important distinction which helps us understand the reasoning for many of the actions taken on the part of both Hussein and the tribes over time.}
by the tribes to reassert their hold on political power and their centrality in forming the
symbols and meanings of political performances which could mobilize major portions of
the population to cling to their identities as “tribal members” as opposed to seeing
themselves as “Jordanian citizens.”

For the purpose of this chapter, political parties are considered within the context
of Middle East politics. Political parties grew out of previous political experiences
including Ottoman and European imperialism. The first political parties that are seen in
the case of Jordan were not new phenomena but rather recreation of old forms to meet
new political opportunities and threats. Political parties existed in Jordan as part of the
complex network of social institutions that sustained economic and political activity in
the face of a weak authoritarian state. Because political parties were dependent on
society \(^{242}\) and not the state for their existence, there was an arc of motility as Jordan
became a state. Political parties, over time, were outstripped by tribal precedents for
political order and networks of obligations and loyalty.

Political parties that exist in the Middle East are especially interesting because the
political arena is so different than the rules and processes that exist for political parties in
advanced Western democracies. Rather than perceiving the role and function of political
parties under Middle East regimes as “abnormal,” this chapter assumes that parties,
especially in the case of Jordan, function under an established political regime with
predictable political, economic, social, cultural, and partisan characteristics that allow for

viable party activity although, in most cases this political activity is restricted.\footnote{Guillermo O’Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter, 1986, \textit{Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies} (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), 57-64.} Scholars of authoritarian regimes have demonstrated that political parties are potentially risky to authoritarian stability.\footnote{See, for example, Barbara Geddes, 2005, “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.} Political parties theoretically function to provide an opening for mass political participation, an institutional mechanism to level access to political resources and opportunities, and to supplant non-state patron-client relationships.\footnote{Charles Tilly, 2007, \textit{Democracy} (New York: Cambridge University Press), 137-142.} However, the literature also indicates that political parties are beneficial to authoritarians because they involve potential oppositional actors in rivalries against each other rather than creation of unified efforts to challenge the authoritarian regime itself.\footnote{Geddes, 5.} Where do the political parties in Jordan stand in relation to their impact on the incumbent regime? What is their relationship to the other political actors, particularly the tribes? This chapter pays specific attention to political parties in Jordan in their role as institutions that mobilize the membership toward a specific political activity. The discussion includes the different criteria for membership, the varying degrees and types of political participation available through Jordanian political parties, and the significance of the selection of party leadership.

Parties in Jordan today are incredibly weak. The moderately conservative Islamic Action Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe. As of 2012, there are approximately 36 small parties in Jordan,
consisting of an estimated 4,100 total members.\textsuperscript{247} This was not always the case. Between 1921 and 1957, political parties in Jordan were robust, enjoyed wide support among Jordanians in general, and intermittently presented serious opposition to the Hashemite regime. After the reinstatement of political parties in 1992, only the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic Action Front gained credibility as a serious political actor.

The propensity of the regime to resort to repression and coercion of political parties in order to control electoral outcomes is fairly typical of regime-party relationships in the Middle East. Regular regime tactics have included gerrymandering, temporary party and election laws, and voting fraud.\textsuperscript{248} These activities are well-known and regularly documented.

What has been harder to document is the effect of tribal politics on the viability of political parties in Jordan. This chapter will discuss how tribes have affected the ability of political parties to extend their reach outside of major urban areas, to organize and accrue resources, to mobilize and discipline their membership, and to develop as a conduit between citizens and the regime. This chapter examines how political parties were able to accomplish these essential institutional functions between 1921 and 1957. The chapter then describes how both tribes and political parties met challenges and opportunities in the elections from 1989 to 2010 that resulted in tribal domination of political parties in Jordan. This is a study in formal political institutions in rivalry with informal political institutions. The informal institutions proved to be stronger and more


adaptable and, therefore, have contributed to the impotence of political parties in Jordan. In doing so, the tribes had a major effect on the trajectory of political party power in Jordan.

Samuel Huntington observed that political parties emerged in the 1800s in the west with the development of modern government as a way to broaden public participation in the political system.\textsuperscript{249} There are four distinct functions that parties serve: 1) organize participation; 2) aggregate interests; 3) to serve as a link between social forces and the government; and 4) to provide political institutional stability to a society.\textsuperscript{250} The difference between tribes and political parties theoretically is that parties provide trust, familiarity, norms, and repeated interactions in the political space that represent the interests of their group with transparency and accountability. Tribes represent the interests of their group, but not with transparency and accountability. Table 4.1 elaborates on the specific differences between tribes and political parties.

Table 4.1 Comparison of Tribes and Parties as Political Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribes</th>
<th>Political Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rely on private, local information</td>
<td>Rely on public information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete enforcement possible</td>
<td>Free-riding and defection possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit and non-verifiable agreements</td>
<td>Explicit and verifiable agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person specific, non-transferrable contracts</td>
<td>Public and transferrable contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High entry and exit barriers</td>
<td>Low entry and exit barriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty driven</td>
<td>Ideology driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations based</td>
<td>Rules based</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difficulty of moving loyalty and participation from traditional political institutions such as the tribes to an effective formal channel of participation in the form of


\textsuperscript{250} Ibid. 91.
political parties is vividly demonstrated in the Middle East. There are a number of reasons why this is true. First and foremost is the nature of the tribe as a non-voluntary, exclusionary political institution. Parties, on the other hand, are “paraphernalia of social democracy”\textsuperscript{251} that exist as a tool to mitigate demands of international donors for democratization yet are manipulated and repressed by Middle East authoritarians.

Additionally, rentier economics in the Middle East affect the public space by limiting political parties’ ability to mobilize resources and distribute benefits while limited access to resources and benefits remain embedded in tribal institutions.

As Migdal (2001) noted, conflict over who makes the political rules in the Third World is always a struggle. “I run the risk of making the ground level struggles…sound as if they hinge on voluntaristic impulses. Needless to say, vulnerable workers or peasants are not simply shoppers in a strategy or rules supermarket.”\textsuperscript{252} With the onset of rules provided by European colonialism, such as political parties, offered new resources that could potentially be used to form other groups that could effectively extract benefits from the state aside from the tribes. This chapter is about that potential outcome and the survival strategies of both the state and the tribes.

\textit{Political Threats and Opportunities, 1921-1970}

The complex relationship between the tribes and the Jordanian political parties began during the initial state development in Jordan under the Mandate Period. As was the case with formal state formation, political parties did not emerge suddenly from a blank canvas. Competition for rule-making and the formation of political parties were

\textsuperscript{252} Migdal, \textit{State in Society}, 66.
based on already existing political and economic power structures left over from the
Ottoman Period. Traditional and moderate Arab nationalists and the scions of notables
reaped the benefits of modernization with their allies in the professional merchants,
military officers, and senior civil servants. However, “the vast majority of
people…gained little if at all… The leaders of various political groups could not translate
popular sympathy they had among the people into effective and permanent political
organizations. Thus tribalism remained vibrant and compelling within the infant
nation.” Therefore, the initial phase of political party development in Jordan reflects
domestic and regional social, political, and economic conditions. This phase lasted from
the beginning of the Emirate in 1921 until the formal foundation of the state of Jordan in
1946.

During this early phase, political parties reflected the pan-Arab sentiments of
independence from the British and, therefore, criticism of Emir Abdullah’s dependence
on British security and economic assistance. Because of the parties’ concern with the
Palestinian crisis and pan-Arab issues, their goals reflected a broader concern with
colonialism rather than becoming part of a domestic political coalition. There were no
laws governing the parties as they were leftovers from the local governance under the
Ottoman Empire in 1921255 and initially licensed under the provisions of the Ottoman
Society Law of 1907.256 Without exception, the political parties at the beginning of the

254 Musa Shteiwi, 2005, “Political Parties in Jordan,” in Ibtissam al-Attiyat, Musa Shteiwi, and Suieman
Sweiss, eds. Building Democracy in Jordan: Women’s Political Participation, Political Parties Life, and
Democratic Elections (Stockholm: International IDEA) p. 72.
255 Ibid. 73.
256 Ibrahim Ahmad Al-Shiyab, “Political parties in Jordan 1921-1956” European Journal of Social
state focused on fundamental issues but never had clear, comprehensive alternative political doctrines. They struck out at perceived grievance but really never had a policy or solution to remedy the problems. Instead, most of the political parties were established, funded, and dominated by tribal notables. Even with the creation of political parties, the personal relationships and rivalries between tribal shaykhs persisted in the place of political ideology. Tribal shaykhs increased their reputations and prestige through affiliations with political parties and seats in the new Legislative Council. For example, “Mithqal al Fayez, leader of the mighty Bani Sakhr tribe was a member of the Sha’ab, al-Tadamun, and al-Nahda parties...The parties were short-lived; the longest one lasted five years.”

The first party to enter the political space in Jordan was the Istiqal (Freedom) Party in 1919 and was established by the core of the tribal leaders involved in the Arab Revolt with Abdullah I. The founding members were Rostom Haidar, Ahmad Qadri and Awni Abdul Hadi. Most of the members of this party felt that Abdullah had not gone far enough and should have expelled the British and French. Many of the tribal leaders involved in this party were from the area that is now Syria and were considered self-interested actors who were not speaking on behalf of the Jordanian tribes. The notable Jordanian who took the leadership position in this party was Ali Rida Pasha al-Rikkabi.

As noted in Chapter Three, the al-Rikkabi continued to accumulate political leadership

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257 Ibid., 78.
258 Abd al-Jabbar Hasan al-Jaburi, 1980, Parties and Political Associations in Syria (Baghdad: Dar Al-Huriyya li-l-Tiba‘a), 65-66. These men and others politically active in parties at the time were the heirs to the Damascus political elite who had sworn allegiance to King Faisal, Abdullah’s brother. It was not until after Faisal’s assassination these Damascenes coalesced around Abdullah and became the early core of the state apparatus. Over time, these families lost their “Syrian” identity and are now considered part of the Jordanian tribal elite.
259 Previously the military commander for King Faisal in Syria and subsequently loyal to Abdullah after Faisal’s assassination.
positions in the Jordanian government and the family is a powerful tribal political force today. Other notable members initiated a long relationship with the Transjordanian/Jordanian government and the Arab Legion. Those names are now familiar in Jordanian politics including Ibrahim Hashem, Awni al-Qadamani, Mohamad Ali al-Ajlouni, Subhi al-Omari, Saeed Amoun, and Mahmoud al-Hendi, Nabeeh al-Adameh, Sami Siraj, Musalam al-Attar, and Othman Qasem.\textsuperscript{260} Most of these families represent prominent tribes from the north and central parts of Jordan.

By 1923, the British expelled the Istiqal party. Some of the Syrians who remained pledged their allegiance to Abdullah I and formed the al-Ahed Party. Rashid al-Tal, was one of party members who Abdullah asked to form his first government in 1921.\textsuperscript{261} More Jordanian shaykhs joined the party because it gave them access to the inner circle surrounding King Abdullah. Again, as in Chapter Three, these families crafted political and economic power that is still significant in Jordan today. Those families include the descendants of Mithqal al-Fayez, Salem al-Hindawi, and Hadithah al-Khraisheh.\textsuperscript{262}

The Arab East Party also formed in 1923 after a dispute that erupted between the shaykhs and expressed only one position that “foreigners” who belonged to the Istiqal Party should not be allowed to hold positions in the state. They created the slogan

\textsuperscript{261} See Chapter Three.
“Jordan for Jordanians” which demonstrates the strength of chauvinistic tendencies of tribal politics, the fruits of which are still present in Jordanian politics today.\textsuperscript{263}

The parties of this period largely focused on British and French control of the region and the struggles for local, Arab control as state development began. It is interesting to note that tribal leaders were willing to use this new institutional tool to stake their own claims to the evolving political power in Transjordan. However, none of these parties had any specific influence on state policies. Particularly because parties were creatures of the tribal shaykhs who created them, the parties functioned to express local rather than national concerns. Abdullah worked to curb their activities and even allowed competing parties to form in order to create competition for loyalties and divert grievances away from himself. As shown in Table 4.2, shaykhs from the major tribes during the first years of the state joined multiple parties as a way to collect political power or as a way to mute others’ power. The main purposes of these early political parties were to serve as a link between social forces and the government and to provide political institutional stability. However, these ideals were really lost in the scramble for personal political enhancement.

Table 4.2 Tribal Shaykhs Belonging to Multiple Political Parties (1921-1937)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>JS\textsuperscript{264}</th>
<th>JPC\textsuperscript{265}</th>
<th>APP\textsuperscript{266}</th>
<th>ECP\textsuperscript{267}</th>
<th>FMP\textsuperscript{268}</th>
<th>JWP\textsuperscript{269}</th>
<th>JNP\textsuperscript{270}</th>
<th>JMBP\textsuperscript{271}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majali</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayez</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{263} Ali Mofleh Abdallah Mahafzah, 1990, \textit{Political Thought in Jordan}, (Amman, JO: Jordanian Book Center), 74-75.

\textsuperscript{264} Jordanian Solidarity Party

\textsuperscript{265} Jordanian People’s Congress

\textsuperscript{266} Arab Peoples Party

\textsuperscript{267} Executive Committee Party

\textsuperscript{268} Free Moderate Party

\textsuperscript{269} Jordanian Workers’ Party

\textsuperscript{270} Jordanian National Party

\textsuperscript{271} Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood Party
By 1928, Emir Abdullah and his British advisers sought to reign in the growing influence of the parties as the Committee of the National Conference (Hizb al-Lajnah al-Tanfithiyah Lil Motamar al-Wattani) attracted a largely tribal membership under Shaykh Hussein al-Tarawneh. The main threat to Abdullah and the British was the National Conference Party as it began to push for a representative legislative council that would establish the “principle of government accountability and responsibility in Parliament.”

After 1935, the National Conference encompassed a number of separate political parties that represented the tribes, pan-Arab intellectuals, ethnic minorities, and sectarian factions. These parties were robust enough that the British either exiled party leaders to Syria or put them under house arrest because of their real or perceived threat to British goals in the Mandate. This effectively led to the shutdown of political parties until the end of World War II.

The second phase of political party activity occurred between 1948 and 1967. This phase began and ended with two of the major military conflicts in the Middle East.

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272 Abu Nowar, pp.22-23.
The political activity of Jordan, as well as the other Arab states, centered almost exclusively on the establishment of the state of Israel and the prosecution of the Cold War. The East and West Bank unification dramatically changed the social and economic conditions in Jordan, especially with the first wave of Palestinian refugees who flooded into camps set up around the country. This was a time of great political party activity and much of that activity was ideological, nationalist, and leftist. This also was perhaps a period of the bloodiest, most direct challenges to the Hashemite hold on power not only in Jordan, but throughout the Palestinian territory, Syria, and Iraq.

The 1950s, in particular, was a very active time for political parties in Jordan. “These parties secured their mass legitimacy and extensive public presences through programmes and demands relating to the issues. Large sections of the population joined them—the middle class, workers, and members of the tribes.” A number of political parties did mobilize popular movements against the king. In 1950 elections, the Arab Legion had to quash political demonstrations in West Bank, leaving three demonstrators dead in Nablus. In 1953, demonstrations that were orchestrated by the political parties in dispute with the Abu al-Huda government again required the Arab Legion to stop violent demonstrations in Nablus, Jerusalem, and Ramallah. In 1954 and 1955, demonstrations throughout the entire country of Jordan involved thousands of ordinary citizens and a number of deaths. These demonstrations were in clear response to the Hashemite alliance with the British and the United States against the Soviet Union in the Baghdad Pact.

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273 Shteiwi, p. 75.
The emergence of the National Socialist Party under Suleiman al-Nabulsi cemented a growing trend of parties of personality becoming more central to the political context than parties of ideology.\textsuperscript{275} Loyalist parties were created to counter opposition parties by a number of tribal leaders including Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, who created the Arab National Constitution Party.\textsuperscript{276}

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan began in 1942 in the role of the “loyal opposition.” While the MB began its role as the watchdog of secularization with King Hussein’s blessing, it soon became wedded to causes that appeared to challenge the regime such as opposition to the Israeli-Jordan Peace Treaty, support of the PLO, and opposition to Jordanian ties with the United States. Part of the problem with the answers to the issues raised by the Muslim Brotherhood was the solution they offered: “Islamic movements do not seek to make the state more responsive to society; they strive to weaken it and insulate society from it.”\textsuperscript{277}

However, it should be noted these events were evidence of a highly politicized populace \textit{but not necessarily of political party strength}. Lust-Okar (2001) points out that there were factors outside of the political parties that drove mass mobilization and political participation in Jordan instead during this time. One such factor was problems with the Palestinians demanding access to parliamentary seats, civil service positions, and military service that historically had been the exclusive domain of the East Bank tribes. This was in addition to the intense pressure of regional politics between the pan-Arab movement headed by Egypt’s Nasser and King Abdullah of Jordan. As was noted earlier,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{276} Lust-Okar, p.551.
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
Abdullah was also under tremendous popular opposition to his support of the United States and the British in their Cold War efforts against Soviet influence in the Middle East. So while this was a period of violence and mass political participation, the link between political party strength and the challenges to regime durability is not necessarily a definitive one. Events culminated in 1957 after the parliamentary elections of October 1956 produced a government of nationalists and communists who were firmly opposed to King Hussein remaining in power. A coup attempt was put down after Hussein came out publicly in favor of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Mass political participation was shut down by disproportionate force, the implementation of martial law, and the disbanding of political parties occurred at this time and was held in force until King Hussein’s reintroduction of political parties in 1993.

The distinctive characteristic of this phase of political parties in Jordan was the potency of ideology and party strength. Parties distilled into fewer, stronger institutions that enjoyed extensive public legitimacy. Parties represented concerns such as the loss of Palestine, post-colonial legacies, the rise of socialist and communist sentiments, and Arab unity.

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278 Lust-Okar, 554.
279 According to the Office of the Historian in the U.S. Department of State, under the Eisenhower Doctrine a country could request American economic assistance and/or aid from U.S. military forces if it was being threatened by armed aggression from another state. Eisenhower singled out the Soviet threat in his doctrine by authorizing the commitment of U.S. forces "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." The Eisenhower Administration's decision to issue this doctrine was motivated in part by an increase in Arab hostility toward the West, and growing Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria following the Suez Crisis of 1956. The Suez Crisis, which had resulted in military mobilization by Great Britain, France, and Israel--as well as United Nations action--against Egypt, had encouraged pan-Arab sentiment in the Middle East, and elevated the popularity and influence of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Table 4.3 Political Parties, 1948-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1948-1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Front (Hizb al-Jabha al-Wataniyya)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Communist Party (Hizb al-Shiyu’i al-Urduni)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Ba’ath Party (Hizb al-Ba’th al-’Arabi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union Party (Hizb al-Ittahad al-Watani)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Nationalist Party (Hizb al-Qawmiyya al-’Arabi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Nationalist Party (Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Socialist Party (Hizb al-Watani al-Ishiraki)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party (Hizb al-Umma)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Constitutional Party (Hizb al-’Arabi al-Dusturi)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jordan Center for Social Research

The most significant feature of political party performance during this period culminated in the national elections in 1950, 1951, 1954, and 1956 before political parties were banned. While disparate groups within Jordan held ideological positions, especially pan-Arab, communist, and socialist, only a small percentage of voters actually voted for political partisan candidates in these four elections. Telling evidence of the anemic role played by political parties is the fact that only around forty-five percent of eligible voters participated in the 1950s elections. Further, of those who voted, only approximately twenty percent cast a ballot for a political party candidate. This is further evidence of a politicized citizenry that did not use political parties as their link to express demands on the state.

Table 4.4 Political Party Performance in the National Elections during the 1950s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1950 Elections</th>
<th>1951 Election</th>
<th>1954 Election</th>
<th>1956 Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of Votes</td>
<td>% total votes</td>
<td># of Votes</td>
<td>% total votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba’ath</td>
<td>5,061</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>21,120</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Nationalist</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>37,902</td>
<td>11.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation Party</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

280 Interview with Dr. Musa Shteiwi, Director, Jordan Center for Social Research, 3 November 2007, Amman, Jordan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutional Party</th>
<th>Liberation Party</th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>% Total Vote for Party Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>304,000</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>342,714</td>
<td>8.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>445,928</td>
<td>19.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>405,000</td>
<td>56.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


If political parties enjoyed widespread legitimacy in public opinion, then why did the parties perform so poorly in the 1950, 1951, and 1954 elections? There are a number of factors. First, this was a period of heightened political awareness throughout the Middle East region. Regional interference in domestic politics was a ubiquitous activity participated in by all the Arab states, the United States, and the Soviet Union. That interference included infiltration by extremists into domestic political structures as well as large amounts of money available to keep individuals lining up for membership money doled out like salaries. Additionally, it is not clear that the political parties were the cause of the awareness or the political participation of the masses in Jordan during this period. From 1948 until 1967, little empirical evidence appears to exist that political parties actually fulfilled their function as the link between the average citizen and the government.

At the same time, there is little evidence to suggest that the tribes had any direct political influence on mass political participation, the political parties of this period, or the four national elections that took place. While certain shaykhs headed political parties, some of those parties were loyalist, some were oppositional, and certainly some were personalistic. Moreover, tribal participation in political activities or parties was localized.
Evidence of that can be seen in the patterns of which tribes were largely employed in the civil service, which generally filled the ranks of the military, and which tribes lived cheek-by-jowl with the Palestinians, the Circassians, and other minorities on the borders of Palestine and Syria.

Typically, the period between 1957 and 1989 is viewed as a time that the political parties in Jordan were effectively extinguished by outright repression on the part of the regime. The argument is elaborated to include that idea that it is for this reason that tribes were able to emerge as the only viable political alternative within this institutional vacuum. There really never was a political vacuum. While martial law banned political parties from Jordan itself, it could not ban parties from moving beyond the borders and operating from a distance, even a short distance. Jordan itself is only about the size of Indiana and the trip from Amman to Damascus by car is only about two hours.

However, there were many elements that occurred during this period that affected the relationship between the tribes, the parties, the regime, and the average citizen. One of those elements focused on political party elites and their loss of legitimacy in the eyes of their mass membership. Belonging to a party may have elevated the personal prestige of party leaders but there was little tangible benefit for the average Jordanian unless he was paid for his membership. The other important element was the changes in domestic and regional priorities which changed mass attitudes toward political party participation. The alternate to parties was labor unions and professional associations. These institutions were not rival political actors, rather, the unions and associations were domestic conduits
for the banned political parties.\textsuperscript{281} The government was effective in restricting political activity in these civil society institutions as well.

The Six Day War with Israel was a watershed event for Jordan in many ways. The influx of the 1967 wave of Palestinians into Jordan strained an economy already barely functioning to support the existing population. Meanwhile, the “Arab Cold War”\textsuperscript{282} characterized the Hashemite regime as the pivotal reason for the loss to Israel. In truth, the Syrians and the Egyptians had their own political designs on Jordan and its inclusion in a pan-Arab state. The \textit{fedayeen},\textsuperscript{283} funded and armed both by Egypt and Syria, operated routinely in Jordan, making it the target of Israeli raids. “By late 1966 and early 1967 it had become quite unclear whether the movement regarded Israel or Jordan as its principal target of conflict. The guerrillas and their supporters had by this time begun to assert that the road to Tel Aviv passed through Amman.”\textsuperscript{284}

Many of the banned political parties headquartered themselves in Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere but were still active throughout Jordan. These parties included the Communist Party of Jordan, the Palestinian Communist Party, the Islamic Liberation Party, the National Jordanian Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab Constitutionalist Party, and the Unionist Democratic Association.\textsuperscript{285} Most of these groups, including the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), espoused Marxist-socialist or pan-Arab ideologies as well as strong opposition to the

\textsuperscript{283} This term refers to militants of a nationalist orientation among the Palestinian people. Most Palestinians consider the \textit{fedayeen} to be "freedom fighters," while the Israeli government describes them as "terrorists."
\textsuperscript{285} Ibid. 229.
Jordanian monarchy. While many of these groups had funding and leadership exogenous to Jordan, several were headed by tribal Jordanians such as Nayef Hawatmeh from al-Salt.286

In 1967, King Hussein suspended the national parliament and outlawed political parties in a response to leftist violence and the Arab Nationalist movements. The parliament was never technically disbanded but it ceased to have any relevant role in the political life of Jordan until 1989. Over the intervening years, the official rationale for delaying national elections and re-convening the parliament changed to fit the existing political situation. In 1967, King Hussein asserted that because Israel claimed the West Bank, territory that was technically under Jordanian rule, that elections could not be held until a political resolution was reached.287 From the late 1960’s until 1988, King Hussein and Yasar Arafat vied for administrative control of the West Bank. Finally, in 1988, King Hussein conceded the control of the West Bank to the PLO and this eliminated the last credible hurdle to the resumption of the National Assembly.

Ideological and geopolitical events propelled many Jordanians to maintain their membership in the banned political parties. However, the economic incentives to participate cannot be ignored as a significant factor for the institutional strength of the parties operating illegally in Jordan. “Their ranks everywhere were suddenly swelled with

286 Hawatmeh is quoted as claiming that there was an agreement between Israel, the United States, and Jordan that the Palestinian Territory was to be carved up between Israel and Jordan with the Jordanian spoils being annexed into the Hashemite kingdom. See Nayef Hawatmeh, 1981, “Hawatmeh: Jordan’s Ambitions,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 10(3):150.
new recruits... These organizations, being for the most part, adequately funded by their Arab sponsors, were in a position to pay them salaries.”

In 1968, Sulieman Nabulsi surfaced at the head of a left-wing coalition of political parties which advocated for the legal restoration of political parties in Jordan. By 1970, several parties including the PDFLP under Nayef Hawatmeh were openly calling for the overthrow of the Jordanian regime and its replacement with a pan-Arab, militant government. The Communist Party meanwhile had emerged through the unions and professional associations.

*The Political Significance of Black September*

Black September events in 1970 culminated in the closest challenge to the Hashemite regime and were largely attributed to Palestinian political groups. Tribal participation was minimized because the Jordanian military is historically tribal and pro-Hashemite but that is not a fully accurate assessment. In both pro-Palestinian political parties such as the PDFLP and military ranks, tribal sympathies were divided and there was active tribal support for the overthrow of the Jordanian regime. Reasons for that support ranged from King Hussein’s support of the United States, his apparent aspiration to expand the kingdom into the West Bank, and his ancestry that made him a foreign ruler. As the involvement of powerful tribal members including Sulieman Nabulsi

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289 Interview with Yousef Hourani, former Communist Party and Muslim Brotherhood candidate, 10 November 2007, Amman.
and Nayef Hawameh indicates, tribal political goals and ideologies were not monolithic. While tribes in the south and east of Jordan were already heavily dependent on military and civil service positions, tribes of the north and west were economically on the periphery of regime patronage. Moreover, the tribes of the north, including those in Irbid and al-Salt, traditionally lapped over into areas that were now recognized as the West Bank and Syria.292

The relationship between the tribes and the political parties of Jordan was a complex one during the period between 1957 and 1989. Jordan was entangled in the regional aspirations of pan-Arab sentiments, the Cold War machinations of both the Soviets and the Americans, and in its own economic and political problems. While many Jordanians sympathized with the ideological aspirations of the Ba’athists, communists, or pro-Palestinian groups, these parties derived their institutional capacities from their ability to draw support and money from other places such as Syria, Egypt, and the Soviet Union. The tribes participated with political party activities so far as the issues and participation furthered the position of the individual tribe.

Additionally, a trend that was emerging during this time was the appearance of the cult of personality as it related to the leadership of political party groups. Suleiman Nabulsi and Nayef Hawatmeh both cultivated followings within their political organizations that were clearly dependent on their relationship to the man.293 In fact, the political parties that were brought into existence during this period reflected tribal influence, “some of them becoming mere extensions of tribal institutions regardless of

what ideology they were founded to espouse.”

*Tribes and Parties, 1989-2007*

By the time national parliamentary elections were restarted in 1989, changes in attitudes toward political party participation had shifted. The cynicism about regime manipulation had not yet solidified in 1989 as it would over subsequent elections. The more salient explanation of the poor performance of political parties was the strength of the political systems set up by the tribes. The strong performance by the Islamic Action Front in 1992 signaled to many the potential political power of Palestinian Jordanians and the tribes responded by moving robustly into the political space occupied by parties.

Domestically, the Muslim Brotherhood was the vocal support of the Palestinian cause. The Jordanian MB pressured the king to do more for the Palestinians in general but also for the Palestinians in Jordan. The downturn in the economy in 1988, combined with the concession of the West Bank, aggravated long-standing political and economic grievances among the Palestinian population of Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood was the public face of those grievances in 1989. Over the years, both the economic and political factors had boiled over into significant, violent opposition to the Hashemite monarchy. King Hussein had strong incentive to diffuse the gathering Palestinian frustration being represented by the Muslim Brotherhood.

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295 The Islamic Action Front is the political party arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.
296 The Jordanian Palestinians who lost their homes in 1948, and their descendants, maintained their refugee status and, therefore, their temporary position in Jordan. Many of the “1948 Palestinians” live in ten refugee camps in Jordan and constitute roughly two of Jordan’s six million inhabitants today. Another million “1967 Palestinians” claim Jordanian citizenship because they lived under Jordanian rule in the West Bank. A large segment of the 1967 Palestinians now dominates the business sector. Together, both groups of Palestinians constitute roughly half of the population of Jordan.
At the same time, the series of IMF-led reforms forced on Jordan by an economic crisis was particularly harsh on the Jordanian tribes. The tribes were largely employed in various bureaucracies of the government or engaged in subsistence farming. The economic reforms led to a reduction in employment in the civil service sector while spiking food prices. Riots broke out in 1989 in the tribally-dominated south and quickly spread to other tribal areas in Jordan. The expression of discontent with the government was a significant signal that the tribes were ready to directly challenge the government on the policy changes that were occurring.

These riots occurred at the same time that a large group of Palestinian nationalists were arrested in Jordan for planning a revolution against the regime. Palestinian demonstrations in the capital, Amman, were broken up by police.297 The combination of dissent by the two largest political blocs in the country propelled the advent of the 1989 parliamentary elections.

When political parties were reintroduced to the political life of Jordan in 1992, the government had strict controls over the creation of parties including the right to accept or reject applications for licensing a party, the right to dissolve any party without an appeal process, and control of financial activities. Along with the narrow restrictions on party formation and activities, in recent years the government has also attempted to resuscitate party legitimacy through the “Jordan First” program. Most observers suggest that the efforts toward political parties since 1992 have been in response to external pressures, especially from the United States, for liberalizing reform.

297 Ibid., 268. See also Adnan Abu Odeh, 1999. Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace) for a discussion of the events that surrounded Jordan’s relationship with the Palestinians and, especially, the West Bank.
In light of such regime efforts, political parties should have a more robust salience to the parliamentary elections. In reality, however, political parties in Jordan are small, fragmented, and highly personal. Parties, therefore, have low levels of support and negligible reach of political influence. These facts are borne out repeatedly by public opinion polls. In an April 2007 poll, respondents were asked, “If parliamentary elections were held in this year, would you vote for a candidate from one of the political parties in Jordan?” Seventy-three percent of respondents answered no. Additionally, between sixty to eight-six percent of respondents had never heard of any party aside from the Islamic Action Front. Table 4.5 speaks volumes to public awareness and commitment to political parties as a viable connection between the citizens and the state. The survey prompt asked, “If parliamentary elections were held in Jordan, what is the likelihood that you would vote for a candidate from the following political party? (Asked only of those who are aware of the party).”

Table 4.5 Party Connection to citizenry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Party</th>
<th>aware of party</th>
<th>Likelihood to Vote for Political Party Candidate (in percent)</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>Somewhat likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Arab Baathist Socialist</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Communist</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Democratic</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Constitutional</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Action</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

299 Ibid.
This period of political parties and elections in Jordan demonstrates a continuity of elements already in motion. As Lust-Okar (2001) observed, political parties were never a leviathan in Jordanian political life. The parties, even in their halcyon days of the 1940s through the 1950s, were more a mirror of the popular political sentiments than they were effective political actors that formed connections between the state and the people. Additionally, as Brownlee (2007) and others have argued that the state was effective in the manipulation and outright repression of political parties as potential opposition.\footnote{Jordan Center for Social Research, April 2007, “DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION AND POLITICAL REFORM IN JORDAN: National Public Opinion Poll #4.”} By 1989, U.S. intelligence reports concluded that election for the National Assembly “was relatively free of voter intimidation.”\footnote{Ibid.} However, the role of the mukhabarat (secret police) in “discouraging”\footnote{Ibid.} political party activities between 1957 and 1992 was particularly effective.

Part of the problem of analyzing the relationship between tribes and political parties is the assumption that tribes are- and have been- a retrogressive force in the political development of Jordan and other Middle East states. It sets up an almost
antithetical comparison with political parties by separating tribes from the legitimate political process and essentializing them as to their purpose and place in the relationship between the people and the government. It is therefore easy to conclude that “the tribes” are a “tool of the state” without parsing the subtle changes in the relationship between the individual, economic and historical context, and the state.

The analysis of political parties and tribes is a case in point. Historically, the Hashemites have had intensely personal ties to the tribes. That never guaranteed all tribes reaped the same benefits all the time from the state. Nor does tribal membership arbitrarily place family loyalty above political allegiances. As Yusef Hourani, a journalist and former Communist Party candidate, explained, “Political legitimacy was really shaped by the needs presented by the economic and security elements of the time. For awhile, some of us thought that the parties could get more done than the traditional ways of politics. But then, we realized that they were less help than our tribes.”

Political parties, therefore, were never in a contest to supplant tribal politics as the modern manifestation of the voice of the people.

There were really a number of forces at work after the legalization of political parties in 1992 that should have made the formation of political parties robust. However, the powerful tribes were able to adapt to the needs of the contemporary economic and social context of the last two decades. The parties, including the Islamic Action Front, were never able to address those needs in any effective, credible manner.

In a poll conducted in December 2007, a large percentage of respondents stated that they did not know or care about political parties and the parties did not figure in their

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303 Interview with Yousef Hourani, former Communist Party and Muslim Brotherhood candidate. 10 November 2007, Amman, Jordan.
decision to vote.\textsuperscript{304} Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 illuminate the ineffectiveness of political parties in the current political spaces of Jordan. Table 4.8 particularly demonstrates the strength of tribal politics as the main link between the average person and Jordanian politics.

Table 4.6 Performances of Political Parties, 2004-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political parties in Jordan work to serve:*</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest of the party leaders</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest of the people</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Figures are expressed as percentage.

Table 4.7 Public Opinion of Political Parties, 2004-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which of the existing parties in Jordan do you believe is qualified to form a government?</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Action Front</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Constitutional Party</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*the rest of the parties combined did not receive a response over .3% to this specific question in any year, 2005-2007.


Table 4.8 Main Consideration for Choosing a Candidate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family/tribal affiliations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From my town/ neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate is personal acquaintance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a good service provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended by family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended by friend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate stand on political issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s political party affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Muslim Brotherhood

The most recent threat to the political centrality of the tribes in Jordan involves their relationship to current Islamist trends in Middle East politics since 9/11 (September 11, 2001). Islamism and Islam are generally poorly understood. Islamists actively attempt to create alternate institutions to the secular state, including potentially revolutionary ones, based on the belief that Islam is the solution to the socioeconomic and political ills of the Middle East. Islamism has a long history in the Middle East beginning with the salafiyya movement against the Ottoman Empire. The modern conceptualization begins with the refusal to recognize the state of Israel and the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt around 1928.

Unlike other Arab states, Jordan has a history of relatively cordial relations with its Islamists, particularly the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic Action Front. By 1943, the Muslim Brotherhood had begun in Karak, Jerash, Ajloun, and Ma’an. The historical relationship with the Hashemite monarchy has been based on similar visions and mutual benefit. The founder of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, Abdul Latif abu Qura, was a personal friend of King Abdullah in 1945. Abdullah viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as an important ally. Abdullah faced mounting challenges from communists and the ambitions of other states in the area such as Syria and Nasser’s Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood was naturally supportive of Abdullah’s position as descendant of the Prophet and his position as leader of Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood opposed the Nasserites, Ba’athists, and communists, and supported Abdullah for their own ideological reasons during the

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1950’s. Their own values and norms led them to openly support Abdullah throughout the numerous coup attempts and the eventual declaration of martial law. It was because of this special relationship that the Muslim Brotherhood gained access to important ministry positions, preferential employment opportunities in the civil service, and developed charitable organizations while all other forms of political organizations, with the exception of the tribes, were crushed. By the time that political parties were again allowed in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood was the only political group with the resources, leadership, and membership to form an effective political organization.

The Brotherhood was one of the few legal political institutions in Jordan that attracted both Palestinian and Bedouin members although the leadership of the Ikhwan was and continues to be lopsidedly tribal. Therefore, the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan have continued to be very conservative even though it is considered the leading contingent of “loyal opposition” to the monarchy.306 “Membership increased and it became the largest social, religious, and political movement in Transjordan.”307

However, the Brotherhood’s ability to coalesce into a direct challenge to the tribes was hampered on two levels. First, the Brotherhood was given the position of the “loyal opposition” in the legislature and in the cabinet. It was a distinctly different role that was carved out and left the role of the tribes in the state apparatus uncontested. Second, the Brotherhood membership at the local level consisted mainly

306 Ibid., 20.
307 Abu Nowar,115.
of tribal members because the Brotherhood espoused the same deeply conservative, traditional values that were held by the tribes. It was, therefore, not seen as a conflict of interest to belong to a tribe and belong to the Brotherhood.

Understanding the history and relationship between the tribes and the Islamists in Jordan, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, requires grasping the relationships of political power, leadership, and competition. Traditional conceptions of Islamists and tribes confine identities, membership, norms, and values to two separate, discrete sets of institutions. In this manner, the vertical pathways between a group and elite control are much easier to analyze. History has demonstrated, however, that the Muslim Brotherhood and the tribes are “part of a larger uncoordinated network…of horizontal ties between like-minded and generally homogeneous people.”308 As Abdul Latif Arabiyyat, a member of the Islamic Action Front noted, “Islamists are the tribes. You can take the names of all the Muslim Brotherhood and most of them are from the important tribes.”309 For example, Deputy Comptroller General of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is Zaki Bani Irsheid, a member of a politically powerful southern tribe.310 Politically, both the Brotherhood and tribal politics have adhered to similar ideologies. For example, after the 1948 War between the Arab Legion and Israel, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the tribes took on the causes of reclaiming Jerusalem and the promised state of Palestine. Lastly, many Jordanians who participate in the Muslim Brotherhood do so out of the potential benefits available through the organization. “The Islamic movements have attracted support from large

308 Clark, 4.
309 Interview with author, 28 October 2007 in Amman, Jordan.
groups of people who may not be particularly pious, much less attracted by complex political doctrines, but who simply need the services that the movements supply.”

Differences between the tribes and the Islamists have appeared, however, over the last five decades. The differences were largely created by the synergy of multiple regional and international events beginning in the late 1960s. The 1967 War drove millions of Palestinians into Jordan and strained an already fragile rentier economy. “Our population was increased threefold…Normally such a massive addition to a country’s population could be turned into an economic advantage…but this was not the case with Jordan.”

During the 1970s, Palestinian resistance groups operated from Salt and Irbid. These important cities were attacked in return by the Israelis on a routine basis. Additionally, the activities of the Palestinians, who were supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, invited Syria to operate clandestine raids out of Jordanian territory as well. Yassir Arafat and the PLO were able to gain dominance of the Palestinian Territories, putting an end to any aspirations that King Hussein had of extending his kingdom into that area.

The split between the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the tribes occurred in the late 1970’s. It was also becoming clear that Jordan had other problems that threatened its stability. Both the Soviets and the United States contributed to the instability of the region through their not-so-covert battle in Afghanistan. The Shah of Iran was deposed in the Iranian revolution of 1979 and also Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated by members of the Muslim Brotherhood over his signing of the Camp David

312 King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, 275.
Peace Accords. The Jordanian Islamists became publically critical of the regime and advocated in parliament in support of war with Israel. King Hussein responded by imposing martial law and dissolving the legislature for a decade. The tribes fully supported Hussein’s martial law decree in an atmosphere of being under attack by “outsiders” even though the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood historically consisted of tribal members.

The 1980s witnessed significant economic upheaval. The International Monetary Fund imposed demands for reforms that resulted in severe economic dislocation for many Jordanians. The hardest hit during these reforms were the tribes because economic subsidies on many food items were eliminated and privatization eliminated many government jobs. The divide between Palestinians (“West Bankers”) and tribes (“East Bankers”) became more apparent in the conversation about national identity. As Laurie Brand noted, the tribal identity of the East Bank population was essentially challenged by the significant social and economic changes wrought by the Palestinians both in Jordan and the Palestinian Territories. While Palestinians excelled in the private sector and became politically robust in the major urban areas, the tribes sought to maintain their traditional posture of ally to the monarchy. And in the turbulent climate of the 1980s and early 1990s, the monarchy was eager for a base to maintain his position in the country and the region. In a mix of political opportunity, development of economic and political context, and the monarchy’s increasing favoritism toward the tribes (in

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313 While these terms are used frequently in the literature, many of the individuals whom I interviewed, Palestinians and tribal members alike, professed to never hearing the terms before. I use them here only as additional clarification.

return for their support), the Palestinians and tribes increasingly became competitors for the little political power available in Jordan.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s place in Jordanian politics is tenuous at best. Much of the political weakness of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan can be attributed to the split between the Palestinian Jordanians and tribal members. The tribal leadership has been characterized as the “bloc of the angry.”\(^\text{315}\) This political faction within the Muslim Brotherhood consisted of some of the firebrands including Zaki Bani Irsheid, Muhammad Abu Faris, Hamman Sa’id, Sa’ud Abu Mahfuz, Ali al-Utum, Zuhayr abu-al-Utum, Zuhayr Abu al-Raghib, Taysir al-Fityani, Nidal Abbadi, Ahmad Nawwash, Ali Abu al-Sukkar, and Abd al-Muhsin, most of whom are powerful tribal leaders. The Muslim Brotherhood is not so much a group that stands in opposition to tribal politics that it is as a group that historically represented similar political concerns about the Israeli-Palestinian problem and the incompetencies of government. However, the Muslim Brotherhood has been careful to criticize neither the tribes nor the regime.

**Conclusion**

One seminal statement made by Joel Migdal noted, “One of the things that everyone knows but no one can quite think of how to demonstrate is that a country’s politics reflects the design of its culture.”\(^\text{316}\) The problem includes the fact that political authority, especially authoritarian regimes, needs a cultural reference to create its legitimacy and advance its claims to continued existence. The evolution of political


parties in Jordan reflected their own cultural reference in a deeply tribal society. Political parties also reflected the deeply contested notions of the “state” and the legitimacy of the Hashemites to be leaders of the state. The regime was quick to set rules that would render parties ineffectual.

Political parties that participated in the elections after 1992 were products of local, specific issues and not the broad ideological themes that were represented of parties of previous eras. Political trust affected the dynamics between the tribes and the political parties. The parties were never able to build a record of successful linkage between the people and the regime. Belonging to a party did not translate into either political or economic change for the average person. Further, after 1992, party leadership in most cases was not able to build institutional programs or incentives that offered a choice that was superior to either the tribes or the state for the average person.

Part of the problem in looking at the evolution and effects of political parties in Jordan is the attempts to compare parties and tribes by separating them into two distinct groups. This is a mistake as tribes participated and even created parties and parties largely reflected the prerogatives of the tribes from which they were created. By separating the two, the relationship and role each played in the legitimate political process can be easily misconstrued, giving one or the other more or less efficacy then they deserve.
Chapter 5: Tribal Realpolitik: Tribal Politics and Elections, 1989-2010

“The ‘triple B system,’ as it might appropriately be dubbed, was founded on buying, busing, and ballot-stuffing.”  

Introduction

As previous studies have indicated, elections reemerged in 1989 as the result of two simultaneous processes: elections are part of Jordan’s proof to foreign donors that modern, democratic institutions are being created in compliance with foreign policy strategies of the United States and its subsidiary international institutions, and domestically elections allowed another political space to access state benefits and services. Jordanian voters clearly are not voting for democratization. Rather, Jordanians engage in egotropic economic voting that is motivated by fluctuations in unemployment and inflation.  

With the increase (or perceived increase) in Palestinian Jordanian political inclusion, tribes have increasingly become more adept at using elections to exclude Palestinian Jordanians from access to state rents. Elections, therefore, are a central way to measure the strength of tribal politics in Jordan and its support of the Hashemite regime. This chapter examines how elections actually “strengthen traditional social and political factors, particularly kinship networks,” i.e., tribal political institutions. This chapter assumes that authoritarian manipulation of the rules occurs with regularity. The state’s machinations that muzzle opposition before and during elections are well documented. This chapter explores a different puzzle in order to ask

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how does tribal politics affect, if at all, elections and their outcomes under authoritarian regimes?

The subsequent parliamentary elections illuminate the tribal oligopoly which evolved since 1989. Tribal politics tightly control who runs for office, who votes, and where the benefits of legislative offices are delivered. As Migdal observes, “Since the state’s leadership…has a limited reservoir of structured support to draw upon, it finds it difficult to check the centrifugal forces that grows.” This chapter documents tribal politics in each of the national parliamentary elections between 1989 and 2010. It examines the ways that tribal politics overtook the only legitimate political party, the IAF (Islamic Action Front). Evidence shows tribal politics gained an absolute control of all of Jordan outside of Amman.

Traditionally, Palestinian Jordanians held most of the district seats in the city of Amman. Significant changes have occurred in the strength and strategy of tribal politics since 1989. The 2007 elections showed a concerted effort on the part of the tribes to run candidates in these Palestinian Jordanian districts in Amman. After attaining exclusive control of the electoral space, the powerful tribes appeared to have an absolute grip on popular politics and, therefore, could have been a powerful adversary to the state. But other changes which occurred in subsequent elections hint at weaknesses in tribal politics.

Beginning in the 2007 elections, and again in the 2010 elections, cracks began to show in Jordanian tribal politics. The fissures are evident in two ways. First, young

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320 Migdal, 72.
well-educated tribal members are challenging the old shaykhs for leadership of the powerful tribes. Second, several newly-rich tribes are challenging the authority of the established, powerful tribes.

*Early Elections, 1950-1967*

The first elections in 1950 took place against the backdrop of economic hardships and the Nakba.\(^{321}\) The state took steps to insure a parliament loyal to Abdullah I. What is interesting about these early elections is the control of political forces by several powerful tribal shaykhs. The setting for these elections was one of the most troubled periods in Jordanian history. The creation of Israel, the onset of the Cold War, and opposition to particularly British imperialism were powerful international pressures in Jordan after World War II. Regionally, competition between Gamal Nasser and King Abdullah (and subsequently King Hussein) locked the two states “into an inimical embrace like two fighting serpents”\(^{322}\) over the control of the Palestinians and Syria. A significant element of the political turmoil was the weakness of the states in the region and the general lack of national identity on the part of the population living in the Nejd. Jordan during the late 1940s and early 1950s, as Massad notes, was a state “abstracted into a concept with no geographical boundaries...(that) expanded and contracted and exceeded the geographical realities of the East and West Bank.”\(^{323}\)

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\(^{321}\) Literally, *nakba* means “catastrophe.” This occurred in 1948 in the Palestinian areas after the creation of Israel. Jewish military advances, attacks against Arab villages and fears after the of massacre at Deir Yassin sent more than half a million people into the West Bank and Jordan while Israeli laws were passed to prevent their return to their homes. The British and King Abdullah I struggled to provide for the influx of refugees and received enormous criticism for their support of Israel.


At the center of these international and regional pressures were the Transjordanian tribes. This was a highly politicized time for the tribes. Some tribes fully supported Abdullah and his ambitions to rule a wider Arab kingdom. Others were more focused on the expulsion of the British from the Arabian Peninsula. Still others were more xenophobic and argued even the Hashemites were foreigners who needed to be expelled from Transjordan. Lastly, other shaykhs were drawn to varying forms of Marxist or socialist ideologies.

Leaders of the Marxist movements included Akrem al-Hourani, Sulieman al-Haddid, Hajem al-Hindawi, and Bahjat Abu Gharbieh. Socialist and Pan-Arab ranks were filled by Nayef Hawatmeh, Hazza al-Majali, Suleiman al-Nabulsi, and Shafiq Irshaidat. This was the group who advocated proposals to dissolve Jordan into a singular Pan-Arab state and expel the Hashemites. Political supporters of the regime were Sami al-Rifai, Abdul Mahdi al-Shamaileh, Wahid al-Oran, Sobhi Zeid al-Kilani, Akef al-Fayez, and Kamel Orekat. The final group of powerful shaykhs coalesced around the dissolution of Israel. Those men were Riyadh al-Mifleh, Ahmad al-Tarawneh, Abdullah Kuleib al-Shreideh, Salim al-Bakhit, Mahmoud Abu al-Ghanam, Ismail Hijazi, Abdul Raouf Fares, and Anwar Nuseibeh. 324

There are three important points to be drawn from this pantheon of politically active shaykhs. First, most of these leaders were publically opposed to the idea of a “Jordanian state.” Whether this sentiment sprang from opposition to the British control of the state or support for a Pan-Arab nation; most of the shaykhs jockeyed for their own

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324 Interview with Yousef Hourani, former member of the Communist Party and editor of al-Ra’i. Amman, Jordan. 15 November 2007 and 27 October 2009.
autonomy within whatever political configuration finally emerged. This meant that the physical boundaries of Transjordan were contested among this group, especially since boundaries ran through many tribal areas without regard for the indigenous social groups that were divided. More significantly, this is the litany of the names of the most politically powerful tribes in Jordan today. Prime ministers, cabinet members, senators and Lower House deputies routinely represent one of these prominent pedigrees in contemporary Jordan.

General elections were held in Jordan on April 2, 1950 in response to the Jericho Conference. The result of the conference gave King Abdullah I control of most of the West Bank. The Transjordanian National Parliament was doubled in order to give half the seats to the Jordanian citizens in the West Bank. While Britain, Israel, and the United States supported the new elections as legitimate, Syria and Egypt vigorously opposed them. Elections were held again in 1954. This time political parties were allowed to participate. “Independents” won all but two of the forty Lower House seats. Elections were quickly shut down after 1956 after the assassination of Abdullah I and the repeated coup attempts against his grandson and successor, Hussein I. Elections were not held again until 1989.

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325 A congress session in Amman, convened in 1948 by the Transjordanian government, King Abdullah’s representatives and a large number of Palestinian refugees called for a wider Palestinian congress to declare Palestinian unity and acknowledge King Abdullah as King of Palestine. The important implication of this conference was the dissolution of “Transjordan” into “Palestine.” There was great opposition at the time from many of the Jordanian tribes because this would have constituted a loss of political power for them. The conference also cast King Abdullah as disloyal to the Jordanian tribes and this was taken as a personal affront.

Elections of 1989, State Manipulation of the Rules, Responses from the Tribes

Why were elections re-started in 1989? In the decades preceding 1989, many regional and international elements affected the state of Jordan. But it was the collapse of the agricultural sector and the end of traditional control of certain jobs, loss basic subsidies for food and fuel, and loss exclusive access to the elite power surrounding the king that was the tipping point for the tribes. The reasons why these changes happened really didn’t matter. The core of the protests in 1989 was that Hashemite legitimacy rested on economic rewards to the tribes. When those economic rewards dried up, there was no other basis for the Hashemites to claim legitimacy to the throne. The Hashemites had been put on the throne by the British and were not even from a Transjordanian tribe. In the past, the tribes had been the traditional supporter of the regime. Yet, the tribes have also been the only demographic group that had the political clout to question the Hashemites in any way and had been able to extract government changes. Because Jordanian society had undergone radical changes since the 1970s, tribes' loyalty to the regime was no longer unconditional. This change took King Hussein and his elite circle by surprise.

The 1989 protests that started in Ma’an quickly spread to other traditional tribal areas so the protests were not an isolated incident. The fact that the Ma’ani tribes were the first to publically oppose the king was significant considering they formed the important officer core of the Jordanian military. Seen through the tribal lens of generosity and obligations, the tribes were simply fed up with the Hashemites. They had supported the king through various disasters over the years and felt the Hashemites had gotten their “share” from tribal sacrifices; meaning Hussein had kept his throne. By 1989, the tribes
felt that they were cheated of their fair share of rewards for their contribution to Hashemite durability. They felt what little they had obtained was at risk. When it came time for the king to protect them, he had not. The riots in Ma’an indicated that a coup was not an unreasonable scenario.

This situation led to a classic situation of the “King’s Dilemma,” the introduction of formal, institutional reform without the transfer of real power. Tribal leaders insisted their economic grievances would require political change, including deep constitutional and electoral reform. Hussein complied with the resuscitation of elections for the Lower House of the Parliament. This action was not, however, a move toward democracy. Documents from 1989 clearly indicate the goals of the constitutional reform were twofold. First, the tribal demands were about purging the Palestinian Jordanians from the public sector and restoring special subsidies. Second, the demands contained a clear message to the king that he must recommit to the special relationship with the tribes or the tribes would find a Hashemite who would.\(^{327}\)

Even before the elections of 1989, tribes were at work structuring the rules to their benefit. The old electoral districts, for example, had been affected by the construction of Palestinian refugee camps. “Those standing in constituencies housing large refugee camps resented having to seek the refugee vote in order to get elected. Furthermore, they felt that they were less likely to receive votes of the refugees than (Islamist) candidates.”\(^{328}\) Additionally, smaller electoral districts were created. The

\(^{327}\) Crown Prince Hasan was, and is, extremely popular with tribal Jordanians and Prince Ra’ad was the Hashemite who technically would be king of Iraq if it was ever returned to a monarchy.  
drafting committee that drew the electoral districts contained many of the tribal shaykhs whose tribes would be affected.

The districts had clearly been chosen in order to ensure that an important kinship group dominating the area should have an almost automatic place in the chamber. One member of the original drafting committee was frank about the motives. The creation of such constituencies would ensure that the tribes like the Bani Hamida, who are to be found in the town of Dhiban, would return a deputy from amongst its number.  

The expected outcome by the state was a windfall of loyal tribal deputies. The Islamists, however, won thirty-four of the eighty seats for the Lower House. The results of the election “brought consternation to Government officials alarmed by the display of Islamic fervor.” The Muslim Brotherhood garnered more than twenty-five percent of the eighty seats in the elections, more than two times the number of seats that the regime anticipated they would win. “In Amman, Islamist candidates won 14 of the 18 seats reserved for Muslim Arabs; in Irbid, Jordan’s second city, Islamists occupied the top five spots in terms of the popular vote.”

There were a number of reasons that the tribes performed so poorly in the elections. First, political parties were still banned but the Muslim Brotherhood was legally classified as a charity so they could organize membership and raise money without restrictions. Second, the tribes were badly disorganized. Some tribes were employed in the military and, therefore, could not vote. Additionally, a number of

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332 Unlike elections in the 1950s, members of the military were prohibited from voting in the 1989 elections.
tribes actually supported the Muslim Brotherhood candidates in their districts because they were also tribal members.\textsuperscript{333} Most tribes, with the exception of some of the older shaykhs, did not have much experience beyond local politics so the national elections presented new institutional challenges to them.\textsuperscript{334}

The Muslim Brotherhood won twenty-two seats outright and backed at least ten tribal candidates with Islamist leanings.\textsuperscript{335} Some have suggested that the tribal candidates who received backing were more interested in exploiting the resources of the Muslim Brotherhood institution than they were in its ideology.\textsuperscript{336} Whatever the reason for the Muslim Brotherhood endorsement of tribal candidates, it was not an experience that was repeated in subsequent elections.

Fifty-five percent of eligible, registered voters cast their votes in 1989.\textsuperscript{337} The number is significant because it indicates the relatively low level of turnout in tribal areas. Especially for the first election in two decades, the low turnout indicates a particularly low level of political organization and, therefore, poor mobilization of political groups except for the Muslim Brotherhood. Election rules in 1989 allowed for a Multi-Vote/Multi-Member (MV/MMD) system.\textsuperscript{338} This allowed voters to cast votes for both ideological candidates and their tribe’s candidate. Voters could vote without really making a political choice.

\textsuperscript{334} Cowell.
\textsuperscript{336} Interview with Hani Hourani, Director General of Al-Urdun al-Jadid. 8 November 2007 in Amman, Jordan.
\textsuperscript{337} Robins, 56.
\textsuperscript{338} Voters could cast as many votes as there were seats open for elections. Voters in Amman 1st District were allowed to cast three votes while voters in Kerak were allowed to cast nine votes. The votes could be cast either to separate candidates or given all to one candidate.
Table 5.1 1989 National Assembly Election Results Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of Popular Vote</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>% of Total Seats</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>292,279</td>
<td>38.13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Candidates</td>
<td>258,569</td>
<td>33.73</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents*</td>
<td>105,027</td>
<td>13.70</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities**</td>
<td>110,543</td>
<td>14.42</td>
<td>14</td>
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*Political parties were still illegal during the 1989 elections. Therefore, groups such as the Communist Party and the Ba’ath Party campaigned as Independents.

**There were a number of seats set aside in various districts for “minorities” who included Christians and Circassians/Chechens.

The resulting Lower House gave a political arena to voice public opposition to the state’s economic reforms and Jordan’s participation in the Madrid process. The United States tied its economic aid to both economic reform and Jordan’s participation in the peace process. Losing that aid or any reduction would have been catastrophic.

The opposition’s staunch criticism of the economic adjustment program and Jordan’s participation in the Madrid peace process undermined the government’s ability to ensure long-term budget security and gain access to the economic resources needed to maintain its political base among the Transjordanians…

The state made two critical changes that played to benefit of the tribes. The Multi-Vote/Multi-Member (MV/MMD) system was replaced in favor of the SNTV (Single Non-Transferable Vote) or the “one man, one vote” system.

Table 5.2 National Assembly Electoral Rules 1989–2007

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<tr>
<td>MV</td>
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<td>SNTV</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
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</table>

MV: Multiple Votes (voters cast as many votes as there are seats in the district)
SNTV: Single Non-Transferable Vote (voters cast one vote regardless of how many seats in the district)
MMD: Multi-Member District (The top vote getters will get seats according to the number assigned to the district)

339 The Madrid Peace Conference was hosted by Spain in 1991 and allowed Israel to conduct direct negotiations with Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinians, and Jordan. In 1994, Jordan was the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel.

340 Greenwood, 255.
The problem with the SNTV electoral rules is that political competitors must judge their electoral strength before deciding how many candidates they can run in particular districts. As was the case with many rural districts, tribes ran too many candidates. For example, in the 1989 elections, the al-Jazi, al-Fayiz, al-Zaban and al-Majali tribes ran several candidates within the same district. Each tribe recognized several senior members together so as not to offend anyone. However, by dividing the votes in the district between separate families of the tribe, the candidates were often unsuccessful. The result in the 1989 elections was that many tribal votes were wasted on losing candidates from the same tribe in the same districts. Therefore, the regime electoral manipulations of the rules actually backfired in the case of the 1989 elections and the unintended consequence was the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood at the expense of the tribes.

*Tribal Adaptations in the 1993 and the 1997 Elections*

The most significant feature of the 1993 elections was the political learning that occurred on the part of the tribes. Most of the five hundred thirty-four candidates ran as independents with tribal affiliations. Tribal candidates won fifty of the eighty seats in the Lower House while the remaining ten seats were spilt between fifteen political parties that ran official candidates.341

The tribes exploited change. Learning the rules of elections since 1989, tribes used their own local resources to vet candidates and oppose non-tribal contenders. Even though institutional rules favored tribal forces in 1989, tribes had not recognized how to

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use them to their own advantage. By the 1993 elections, the tribes had adapted their mobilization efforts to the new institutional rules. The tribes registered their members to vote, collected their voting identification cards, and delivered bus loads of voters to the polls. Not surprisingly, the tribes opposed the addition of other political competitors. Tribal leaders opposed the new inclusion of political parties casting them as an invasion of foreign ideas into Jordanian life.

Tribal leaders also used the rules (or lack thereof) of ballot casting to ward off any last minute voter defection. Candidates and their supporters stood in the polling place as tribal voters cast their vote by “appellation.” This is an election provision that allows for illiterate voters to announce their choice which is then recorded by voting officials.

Voting by appellation was used as the general rule rather than the exception. Not only was this verification for tribal leaders that their membership was loyal, the individual voter used his/her public vote as a signal of their anticipated participation in any of the benefits that resulted from sending their shaykh to parliament. “(Voting) in a country such as Jordan …means tribally-oriented voting, i.e. support for the candidate you know personally and of whom you might expect direct assistance should you need it, rather than voting on the issues or ideology.”

There was more evidence of the major learning curve tribes derived from understanding the advantages of the new electoral institutions. Major tribes engaged in a

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344 Interview with Mohammad al-Masri, PhD. 1 November 2007, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan.
345 Ibid.
series of meetings to form alliances during the elections. Dubbed “diwan primaries,” these discussions vetted the suitability of candidates not only to win the campaign but also to deliver the maximum benefits back to the local tribes. Together tribal leaders planned strategically, considering which candidates would perform the best in different local districts. The political deal-making was also done with the expectation of reaping the benefits of supporting other tribes in other districts during the elections.

A major outcome of the elections was a shift from issues and ideologies that propelled the 1989 elections to attaining access to state resources and jobs. Another unanticipated effect of tribal dominance of the elections was an emphasis on regional identities and allegiances rather than on national issues or ideologies.\textsuperscript{347} Together, the outcomes of the elections reflected how mass level politics responded to the conditions of the political arena. With the legalization of political parties in the second national election, observes anticipated significant movements towards democratization. It was striking that the results were a movement toward consolidation of traditional regional tribal forces in Jordan.

Tribal dominance had a distinct effect on the formal political institutions of political parties as well. The majority of tribal “candidates” were actual the shaykhs themselves. A total of 68 deputies out the 80 members of the 1993 parliament were shaykhs.\textsuperscript{348} This included a number of Muslim Brotherhood and other political party candidates who won seats. In fact, some scholars observed that, “one could argue that

\textsuperscript{347} Amawi, 18.
non-tribal secularism was defeated even more resoundingly than Islamism,“ in the 1993 elections.

Many in the new political party leadership were tribal leaders. In fact, there were a few tribal shaykhs who took positions with multiple political parties. Just as one could afford to drive several expensive cars, shaykhs “collected” leadership positions with new parties as a sign of prestige. But when political power mattered, the shaykhs relied on their tribal positions. For example, during the 1993 elections, Abdel Hadi Majali, secretary general of the Jordanian Popular Democratic Unity Party, and Ra’uf al-Rawabda, secretary general of the Arab Islamic Democratic Movement, both shaykhs, campaigned as their tribe’s candidate with no mention of their party affiliations.350 Therefore, the seriousness and credibility of many parties were questioned as the party leadership appeared as exploiting the parties as a way to strengthen their own self-interest.351

Because the political parties were approached in a personalistic spirit rather than an ideological one, the institutionalization necessary for party success never occurred. Most political parties lacked programmatic clarity and mobilization structures other than to enunciate a desire to build a Pan-Arab state or free Palestine.352 Additionally, the political parties that contested the 1993 elections were so numerous that only the Islamic Action Front (the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood) emerged as having any salience in the election. Many of the party candidates quickly grew tired of the

350 Amawi, 48.
352 Ibid. 96-97.
squabbling and incoherent leadership and campaigned as independents and on their own merits.\textsuperscript{353}

The winners of the 1993 elections were the large, most powerful tribes including the Khreisheh, the Obeidat, the Abbadi, and the Faye\textsuperscript{z}. Not only could the tribes mobilize mass numbers of voters, they had the financial resources to mount expensive campaigns. Victory brought the benefits of the state to the local members of the tribe while having a parliamentary Deputy meant an increase in prestige. Regardless of a candidate’s qualifications, if the tribe had endorsed him, then the tribal membership would vote for him.

The 1993 elections also demonstrated how the tribes used the political rules and institutions in a way that shaped the expectations for the outcomes. For example, the actual balloting process was meant to ensure every eligible voter could have a voice in the process. Tribes turned polling stations into enforcement and verification zones. Both the candidates and the voters experienced a public exchange of obligations inside the station. That exchange of obligations was the real outcome of the elections not ideology or democratization. Tribes also shaped the elections so that it localized national politics. Jordan was not considered a unified entity as much as it was an area of contested identities and factions that included Palestinians, tribesmen, citizens and refugees. Finally, the tribes shaped the elections so that it was a tool to maintain the centrality of the tribes in the political and economic benefits of the state.

\textsuperscript{353}Interview with Yousef al-Hourani, former Communist Party member, 19 November 2007. Amman, Jordan.
Tribes in 1997 were not representative of one monolithic entity and were sensitive to a spectrum of local political issues.\textsuperscript{354} One issue was represented by several shaykhs who were Muslim Brotherhood members and, therefore, tribal members tended to have Islamist sympathies. They were able to represent Islamist grievances in the elections without violation of the Press and Publication laws, because of their identification as tribal candidates rather than as IAF candidates. This did not go unnoticed by the Jordanian voters.

The most significant factor of the 1997 elections is that tribal politics focused on relevant local issues or more nebulous regional problems. There was no serious focus on regime reform or national issues. Palestinians were largely absent from the subsequent political conversation in the 1997 parliament.

\textit{The Elections of the Twenty-First Century: Consolidating the Political Status Quo}

Ultimately, there were two important outcomes of the 2003 elections that were not controlled by elite \textit{fiat}: 1) the tribes adapted to institutional changes and dominated the elections and; 2) even with an overwhelming majority in the new legislature, the tribes never really challenged the regime in any significant way because that would have undermined the continuation of tribal dominance of the limited political and economic resources available in Jordan. As Migdal (2001) noted, newly imposed state laws often react with traditional social institutions in surprising ways. Given the context of the 2003 elections, the result from the new set of electoral laws imposed by the state was the rise in importance of tribal politics. Exploitation of electoral laws gave the system of tribal

\textsuperscript{354} Among those issues were opposition to the Israel Peace Treaty, the economy, and U.S. pressure to sanction Iraq. See Curtis Ryan, 2000, “Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Jordanian-Iraqi Relations,” \textit{Middle East Report}, 215:42.
politics “considerable potentials to counteract the penetration of (state) categories and valuations.” The result was the diminution of state authority as tribal politics became increasingly central in the lives of Jordanians.

In 1999, King Hussein succumbed to his battle with cancer. Only a few weeks before his death, Hussein had switched his successor from Prince Hasan, his brother, to Prince Abdullah, his son by his second wife, Muna. Abdullah had spent most of his life in the United States or in Britain. His Arabic was second-rate and his training led him on a path through a military career suited for a royal with no real leadership pretensions. The last minute selection of Abdullah to the throne took everyone in Jordan by surprise. Observers of Abdullah II and his Palestinian-Jordanian wife, Rania, have noted, “Some at the bottom of the pile may resent the family’s glamour and wealth.” There certainly are perceptions that Abdullah II is not as loyal to the tribes and their concerns as his father was. This has proved to play an important role in the tribal concentration on capturing the political and economic goods available through the elections.

2003 was a year of great political activity in Jordan, especially because of the onset of the Iraqi War. Regardless the attempts by the regime to present domestic opposition as political meddling by foreign extremists, the reality was that the demonstrations which took place in 2003 were by citizens of Jordan who “spanned the political spectrum, from secular Marxists to conservative Islamists and tribal groupings, and many events were organized and coordinated across ideological divides.” Many observers assumed that the majority of protesters were Palestinians, the Muslim

355 Migdal, State in Society, 155.
Brotherhood, or other Islamists. The reality was that many of the demonstrations and
much of the protest were orchestrated by East Bank tribes. Local newspapers noted that
police would attempt to shut down protest activities by “stopping busloads of protesters
arriving from outside Amman.” These were busloads of tribal members.

There were more violent demonstrations in specific tribal areas. In December
2002, the city of Ma’an was the scene of a series of violent protests that left at least six
people dead. The fighting in the tribal city was, “the largest-scale armed fighting
between government troops and domestic groups since the Black September conflict with
the PLO in 1970.” Riots decades earlier in Ma’an were precipitated by the eradication
of fuel subsidies which caused the price of fuel to increase over thirty percent on the day
the fuel subsidies were removed. This hit the trucking companies that the tribes of Ma’an
operated in an already bad economic situation and the tribes expressed their displeasure
through the riots.

The riots of 2002 were a result of a number of different issues including the
economic deterioration of Ma’an, caused in large part by the sanctions against trade with
Iraq. Another incident that was cited by local tribal leaders was the crackdown in Ma’an
after the well-known Islamist extremist, Muhammad Shalabi was found in the city.

Police reported at the time that tribal members sneaked him out of the hospital where he
was as a result of gunshot wounds suffered during his arrest. While there was a definite
sympathy toward pro-Palestinian/anti-American attitudes in Ma’an in 2002, the real

358 Ibid.
360 Ibid.
361 Muhammad Shalabi is also known as “Abu Sayyaf” and was the leader of al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, an
extremist Islamist group based in the Palestinian Territories and Egypt.
reason Shalabi was secreted from authorities was his father’s standing among the local tribes.

The violence in Ma’an was attributed by the government to actions of drug smugglers and arms traders who were crossing the borders between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and using Ma’an as a base of operations. The reality was much more complicated. Ma’an is the principal area that members of the armed and security forces of the government are traditionally recruited. Therefore, Ma’an is typically viewed as one of the most loyal tribal areas of Jordan. Yet, the tribes of Ma’am were not hesitant in 1988 or 2002 to violently demonstrate their autonomy and displeasure.

Additionally, the tribes also demonstrated their political will to cooperate with other political actors, including Islamists, if they perceived the cooperation was to their advantage. After order was restored to Ma’an, a committee was formed of both tribal leaders and the Muslim Brotherhood with the purpose of negotiating with the government for the release of prisoners. The success of the committee included the release of the prisoners and extraction of compensatory promises from the government including financial reparation for property damage and agreements for economic development in Ma’an.362

Examining the causes of the tribal opposition in Amman and Ma’an during 2002 brings an important political point to light. The restrictive temporary laws, the economic impact of regional unrest, and the autonomy of tribal areas were very specific differences with regime policies and varied in their centrality depending on which part of Jordan was

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experiencing difficulties. However, at no time was there a demand to remove the regime or the monarchy. Rather, the tribes were reacting to challenges to their own base of power.

The first three national parliamentary elections accomplished nothing in the creation of a national identity. The most significant contributing factor was the unfair, corrupt, and opaque ways the tribes manipulated and exploited the formal rules of the elections to their own benefit. Because of tribal dominance of the rules, even the Muslim Brotherhood resorted to tribal backing in order to get their candidates elected outside the three or four supportive Amman districts. As the Ma’an cooperation between tribes and Islamists demonstrates, the tribes were quite willing to cooperate with political rivals to oppose the government when it appeared in their best interest to do so. This cooperation carried over into the strategy for the 2003 elections in their endorsements of Muslim Brotherhood/IAF candidates in tribal districts.

The election laws passed in 2001 created several new districts. The new districts re-structured the tribal configurations, fragmenting some tribes between districts and, therefore, made new electoral strategies necessary for many of the tribes. Many of these changes were handled at the local level with a number of tactics including committee members opening offices late to allow for some candidates' registration after hours or suddenly closing for the afternoon thus causing some potential candidates not to be able to register. Ultimately, tribal members ran the campaign and election procedures locally. The redistricting in tribal areas caused power shifts in tribal districts that

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363 Interview with Samar Hajj al Hassan, Candidate for Amman Third District, 17 November 2007. Amman, Jordan.
produced significant number of riots, acts of arson, and attacks on voters and candidate supporters. These occurred in places including Amman, Salt, Karak, Ma’an, Tafila, Jarash, Na’our, Mafraq and the northern Ghor Valley during the 2003 elections. Typically, the electoral engineering by the regime is viewed as closing political access for the Muslim Brotherhood. The 2003 election demonstrated that the election laws impacted tribal access as well. While tribes resorted to political violence in many cases to solve inter-tribal power dominance, they also adapted to exploiting the formal rules to their own advantage in order to control the outcomes of the 2003 elections.

Pre-campaign tribal primaries were now routine affairs where agreements were reached by all tribes within the district. There were established rules that ensure that candidates from all tribes are either run in the same election cycle or in the following. These agreements guarantee all tribes in the district share in the benefits from sending a representative to the parliament. The powerful ability to organize membership and resources for the campaign were also efficient and systematic. As some observers noted, “the tribe, as a traditional institution, played a decisive role. Political parties were not needed to help people approach the authorities, provide services or solve problems…”

Tribal politics evolved so far as a parallel political institution that, by the elections of 2003, a list of seven candidates was published in the newspaper, al-Ra’i, with the announcement by a northern tribe that, “the executive committee…has decided to hold elections of the tribe to select its candidate for the 2003 parliamentary elections …in designated voting areas. The following names will be voted on and the winner will be

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adopted as candidate of the tribe.” The candidate registration fee of JD 500 was routinely paid by the tribes as well as other campaign costs. Campaigns became a sign of wealth and status for different tribes with more opulent campaign diwans being hosted and generous “charitable” contributions distributed during home visits by the tribal candidates. The powerful tribes scored heavily in the 2003 elections. The Bani Hassan tribe gained a total of nine seats in the Lower House.\textsuperscript{367}

The political strength of tribes is so strong that, as had been evidenced in past elections, most candidates hid their party affiliations and ran on their tribal connections as their main campaign strategy. Polls taken immediately before the elections appear to bear out similar perceptions of tribal political dominance in public opinion. Almost eighty-two percent of eligible voters responded that “your vote has an effect on deciding the election results.”\textsuperscript{368} Yet election results were defined by almost fifty-two percent of respondents as “voting for tribe and family relationships,” “putting the right person in the right place,” or electing “a district candidate (who) will provide services to the elector.”\textsuperscript{369}

The 2003 election was also the first time that an election law provision to reserve seats for women representatives in the Lower House was used to the advantage of the tribes. While women in the royal family and some wealthy, well-connected families participate in the political sphere, the general Jordanian experience is that women play a negligible role outside the home. Women were given the right to vote and run for office

\textsuperscript{366} As quoted in Zander, 105.
\textsuperscript{369} Ibid.
in 1974. The representation of women in the Parliament has been no more than seven percent in Jordan. Internationally, women’s representation is an average of twenty percent of parliamentarians while Arab countries’ women’s representation is around nine percent. Increasing the number of seats that must be filled by women will make the percentages look better, but does that mean actual reform in the political institutions?

As the table below indicates, women have been discouraged from running for office and have performed poorly as candidates. There are a number of reasons that contribute to the problem. First, cultural context has made acquiring the requisite skills and experiences to function successfully as a member of the parliament difficult for women to obtain. Those skills include proper educational opportunities, as well as holding positions of responsibility outside the home and the family. Political parties in Jordan do not have the ability to fund and coordinate an election campaign specifically for women because of the parties’ institutional/financial weakness. Most money for candidates comes from individual family or tribal wealth. Again, economic forces are systemic that prohibit women from running a campaign. Finally, powerful tribes decide on candidacies well before elections are ever held. Most of the tribal candidates are shaykhs themselves or a close male relative of the shaykh.

\[370\] Ibid.
Table 5.3 Women’s Participation in National Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Number of Women Candidates</th>
<th>Percentage of Women to Total Candidates</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes given to Women</th>
<th>Number of Successful Women Candidates</th>
<th>Percentage of Women In the Lower House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>22.48</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nations Special Office on Gender and the Royal Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of the Interior

*Tujan Faysal was elected as a Circassian quota member of her district. Her election therefore cannot really be counted as a “Women’s Quota” success. Faysal was later banned from participating in subsequent elections by the government due to her conviction by the State Security Court for outspoken criticism of the regime.

A quota system for six seats reserved in the Lower House for women was implemented before the national legislative elections. Women are allowed to run for all open seats in their district. If an open seat is not won then the female candidates are given a chance to qualify for the seats reserved for women. The seats are determined by the highest six percentages of votes. The percentage formula is figured on the total number of ballots cast in each woman’s district.

The Women’s Quota has been strongly criticized because it automatically favors candidates from rural areas. Out of the six winners of the Women’s seats in the 2003 national election, five ran with the support of their tribes and one winner was an Islamic Action Front member. In 2007, all six seats went to tribal candidates. “Some simple calculations assured the smaller tribes of having much better opportunities through the quota system (to elect a deputy) hence, they used it to their advantage.”

A good example of how the system works is the direct election of Falak Jamaani from the second district in Madaba. Deputy Jamaani bested fifteen male candidates. She

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received 3,301 votes while her nearest rival who collected 1,820.\textsuperscript{372} While women’s activists cast Jamaani’s win as a positive step for women’s political participation, the real impetus for her win was tribal support. Jamaani and her husband both served in the Jordan Armed Forces before their retirement in 2003. She ran in the 2003 elections as her tribe’s, the al-Oreiqa, “Women’s Quota” candidate. Having the opportunity to learn political skills during her time in the 14\textsuperscript{th} parliament, Jamaani also was able to “reap the fruits of her ‘good deeds’”\textsuperscript{373} and she was able to distribute those benefits back to tribal members in her district. Incumbent Jamaani had the backing of her tribe and the political connections to the government during her 2007 campaign. She was able to win a seat based on her actual number of votes in the district rather than a percentage of the votes.

In contrast to the experience of Falak Jamaani, the campaign of Samar Haj Hasan, who ran unsuccessfully in the 2007 elections for a seat in Amman’s Third District, is an indication of the grip that tribal politics has on the political institutions in Jordan. Hasan garnered more than seven thousand votes and was clearly more experienced in economic and public policy issues than Jamaani. Haj Hasan was openly acknowledged as the front runner of all the candidates three days before the elections in Jordan’s media. Yet, when the votes were counted, she lost to a well-known tribal candidate. Hasan’s experience with tribal politics has squelched her ambitions for public office. Ms. Hasan additionally pointed out that women voters made up more than fifty percent of the eligible voters for the elections in 2007, but they voted overwhelmingly for male, tribal members rather

\textsuperscript{373} Ibid.
than for the female candidates in their districts. Only with the blessings of their tribes did women cast ballots for other women, and those women were the women’s quota candidate for their tribe.

More than any other election since 1989, the tribes dominated the 2007 elections and, therefore, the character of the National Assembly. While the previous election in 2003 demonstrated the tribes’ willingness to oppose (sometimes violently) the regime’s policies and attempts to manipulate electoral rules, the 2007 election was very much a story of retrenching the status quo. The regime ran credibly fair, transparent, and professional elections. The only significant political competitor, the Muslim Brotherhood, imploded on party squabbling and ineptitude. The tribes, meanwhile, ran sophisticated campaigns, mobilized huge participation in their local districts, and cemented their centrality as the only effective conduit between citizens and their government.

According to a national public opinion poll taken a month before the parliamentary elections, Jordanians worried about four issues: the rising cost of living, unemployment, poverty, and terrorism. While security and the economy were the primary focus of voters, the respondents expressed their intention to vote for “a good service provider” who represented their tribe. As a result, the parliament has evolved into an institution with the function of the provision of personal services and favors for

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376 Ibid.
the powerful tribes who control it. Policies and issues were not on the minds of the voters and are not perceived as the primary concern of parliamentarians.\textsuperscript{377}

The 2007 national elections were a demonstration of how the tribes used venues of political participation and formal institutional designs to their own benefit. The outcome of the election moved Jordan a step back from democratic liberalization by using its own democratic institutions. Because the tribes are conservative, non-democratic groups who are interested in maintaining their position in the \textit{status quo}, the 2007 elections also unintentionally stabilized the regime’s power. The elections, therefore, reinforced the authoritarian regime after a period of vigorous opposition experienced at the beginning of the Iraq War. This occurred with relatively little cost to the regime due to the goals and strategies of the tribes.

The tribes had little competition for seats in the Parliament and concentrated on refining the political institutions established by local tribes. From the very outset of the campaign, the tribes dominated the vetting process, the campaigns, and the Election Day mobilization. The Obeidat and the al-Jazi both placed ads in newspapers announcing the time and location of the primary diwan.\textsuperscript{378} As indicated in the table below, turnout in tribal areas (Karak) was reliably robust compared with non-tribal areas (Amman).\textsuperscript{379} The institutional ability to mobilize membership to vote is the most prominent strength of tribal politics today.

\textsuperscript{377} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{378} Lust-Okar. “Reinforcing Informal Institutions.”
\textsuperscript{379} Amman’s 7\textsuperscript{th} District and the Central Badia (desert) are both significant tribal areas. Both electoral districts reflect the same trend in turnout as the tribal Karak electoral districts.
Table 5.4 Comparison of Turnout in Non-tribal Area (Amman) and Tribal Area (Karak) in the 2007 National Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governate</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>% of Turnout in District</th>
<th>Governate</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>% of Turnout in District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>41.91</td>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>78.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>40.62</td>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>77.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>Third</td>
<td>41.85</td>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>Third</td>
<td>83.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>52.38</td>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>89.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>32.49</td>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>86.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>49.42</td>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>88.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>68.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>Central Badia</td>
<td>84.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>44.62</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>82.10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Royal Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The Case of the 2007 Elections in Amman

The import of parliamentary elections in Jordan and Amman specifically, is the demonstration of the deeply antagonistic and contested relationships between the state, the tribes, and the Palestinian-Jordanians. As Heeger (1974) points out, linkages between political groups within a state are often attributed much more coherence and consolidation than actually exists. Additionally, many scholars stack elite-mass consolidation into a center-periphery paradigm which often goes unchallenged. A close look at the recent 2007 national parliamentary elections as they unfolded in Amman renders a much more complex perspective. The evidence reveals tribal forces systematically working to capture political resources from Palestinian-Jordanians even in Amman. This would suggest the traditional assessments of tribal political strength derived from the hinterland and Palestinian political strength centered in Amman is changing. It also hints at the fragile relationships between the tribes and the state, in which the tribes feel the rewards for the traditional regime support are now being passed over to the Palestinian Jordanians in return for the money from their well-lined pockets.

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380 Complete voter turnout information for the 2007 elections are contained in Appendix C.
Historically, Amman has been considered the bastion of Palestinian voters. State coercion and repression of the Palestinian vote in Amman is evidenced by the gerrymandered districts, severe limitations on public demonstrations and political parties, and restrictions on the press which also reduces transfer of information and limits coordination among the urban population. However, the 2007 National Legislative election outcomes were predicated on tribal politics rather than on state politics. A look at the changes that occurred during the 2007 national election in Amman demonstrates some of those important changes in tribal politics. It also demonstrates these changes were not orchestrated by the state, yet the outcomes unintentionally contributed to the regime’s status quo. During those elections, the tribes made purposeful attempts to run in Palestinian-dominated districts. The motivating reason for tribal acquisition of Amman districts involved the level of competition the tribes are experiencing from an increasingly politically significant Palestinian population that threatened tribal dominance of access to state resources, civil service jobs, and position of power and prestige with the elites of the regime. It is an important shift in rationale and strategy for the tribes even though tribes have periodically pushed back against the Palestinians in Jordan.

This move against the rising political power of the Palestinians is now different this time in a number of ways. First, the Palestinians in Amman are attempting to increase political power because of economic reasons rather than ideological or nationalist goals. Their agenda does not threaten the Jordanian regime. Rather, the Palestinians have gained important positions within the regime and, while Palestinians in west Amman might not seek patronage the same way as rural tribesmen, they do seek university admissions for their children and access to state resources that lessen the
hardships of operating in the narrow private sector in Jordan. The economic conditions in Jordan have constricted severely since 2006, as they have globally. The exogenous sources of Jordanian economy have dramatically declined while international and domestic conditions for the Palestinian private market have deteriorated. Palestinians in Amman, therefore, are asserting themselves in the competition for state resources with the tribes.

As noted in Chapter Four, elections constitute an important institutional access point to the legislature, state resources, political power, and prestige. Tribes in Jordan do not welcome competition for resources nor do they view Palestinians as entitled to legislative seats in Amman. In 2007, the tribes took as many seats as possible from traditionally Palestinian districts in order to increase their domination of state benefits. Additionally, the national legislative elections that took place in November of 2007 trace a clear direction of causality for the durability of the Hashemite regime. Tribal politics responded to challenges to their own saliency by attempting to box the Palestinians out of national elections in the Amman districts in 2007. Inadvertently, by protecting their own political institutional strength, the tribes bolstered the regime. However, it was not an intended outcome of the elections.

The first municipality of Amman was established in 1907 by the British in what is now the downtown area around the Roman Amphitheater. Amir Abdullah continued the development of Amman in conjunction with the British beginning in 1921. The Amir’s reliance on the Transjordanian tribes for his survival under the British mandate made tribal institutions an integral part of the politics in Jordan. This was significant because adaptation and development of tribal institutions “were carried out in parallel
construction with the state.” Therefore, tribal institutions and state institutions had a direct and simultaneous affect on the growth of Amman.

Amman is a community of a little more than 300 families. It was rapidly transformed by the development of administrative structures required to control military and administrative logistics. So, the unique difference in the development of Amman was that it mirrored the development of the state and, therefore, was created by geopolitical events and ambitions rather than by economic markets. Amman’s population began to grow after 1921 because of the influx of migrants from the region who sought jobs within the state apparatus. This “rent-seeking mentality still dominates the behavior of the political economy of the country.” Amman changed from the center of state apparatus to include the economic center of Jordan as well.

The first massive wave of Palestinian migration to the city of Amman arrived in 1947 and occurred as they were driven from their homes with the creation of the state of Israel. Rather than settling in with the general population, however, these refugees were generally hastily settled in the al-Hussein and al-Wihdat camps. The formation of the camps increased the population of Amman but, unlike previous migrations, the effect on the city was a drain on the economic resources without the increase in market activity.

The second wave of Palestinian refugees in 1967 sent Amman into “another spiral of uncontrolled growth” that was significantly different from the 1947 influx. It is

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382 Ibid., 83.
383 Ibid., 84.
384 Ibid.
385 Kadhim and Rajjal, 319.

184
estimated that around 300,000 Palestinians flooded into Jordan, most of whom settled in Amman. While refugee camps were constructed throughout Jordan, including al-Baq’a which is in Amman’s “backyard,” most Palestinians in this wave had the economic ability to settle in the north and western parts of Amman. This group of Palestinians largely consisted of educated entrepreneurs who invested in Jordanian and regional industry, trade, and finance. These Palestinians entered Amman’s political and economic structure in a distinctly different level than those who eventually lived in the refugee camps. Regardless of their economic contributions to Jordan, “for the native Transjordanians these groups were all outsiders…”

This sense of two distinct identities that separated the Palestinians and the Transjordanian tribes was exacerbated by a number of factors throughout the recent decades in Jordan and particularly Amman. First, the oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s enriched Palestinian families whose relatives were working in the Gulf. Combined with the development of a Palestinian-dominated private sector, Amman witnessed a boom in construction of luxurious new homes and neighborhoods such as Abdoun, Shmeisani, and Khalda that was a “dramatic display of overwhelmingly Palestinian wealth.”

Second, as Laurie Brand (1995) notes, the state implemented an unofficial hiring policy of “East Bankers First” that resulted in a morass of bureaucratic processes that could not be navigated successfully without the help of intercession by a tribal patron. This policy had a dramatic and direct impact on Amman residents that ranged from

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389 Ibid. 53.
building permits to school applications. It is still a frustration for Palestinian Jordanians to resort to tribal sponsors to cut through any legal or bureaucratic red tape.

Another major factor in the evolution of communal tensions in Amman resulted from regional struggles over the Palestinian Territories between 1974 and 1988. Although King Hussein was recognized by the Arab League as the representative of the Palestinian people, Yaser Arafat and the PLO laid claim to that leadership. Eventually, King Hussein walked away from contestation over the West Bank in 1988. The effect was twofold. Citizenship for Palestinians in the West Bank was withdrawn. The effective message was Palestinians were de facto economic and political second-class citizens because their commitment to Jordan was always suspect.

Politics in Amman are largely reflective of the constant contention among political forces in Jordan. The regime has engineered districts and used a number of methods to affect votes. For example, during the 2007 municipal elections, members of the military were bused into Amman to vote in traditionally IAF held districts. Additionally, seat distribution for the legislature has been largely tipped toward tribal areas. Amman holds few seats in the legislature despite representing almost forty percent of the population (two million people) and generates over ninety percent of Jordan’s GDP while holding only twenty-three seats in the Lower House of the parliament.

390 For more discussion of state policies that disadvantaged Jordan Palestinians see Laurie Brand, 2007, “State, Citizenship, and Diaspora: The Case of Lebanon and Jordan,” Working Paper 146, Center for Comparative Immigrations Studies, University of California at San Diego.
393 Plus three seats reserved for a minority/Christian quota and potential seats for winners of the women’s quota, if any.
Meanwhile, Karak has a population of 0.17 million people (or eight percent of Jordan’s population) and has ten seats to represent their interests in the Lower House.\footnote{395} Additionally the SNTV (one-man, one-vote) voting arrangement which went into effect after the 1989 national elections is generally seen as tipping electoral advantage away from political parties, particularly the IAF.

Despite coercive machinations attempted by the state, voting in Amman has largely yielded a reliable political turn out for IAF candidates and independent, wealthy Palestinians rather than following the rest of Jordan and voting for tribal representatives. This has held steady through all national elections since 1989. Even in the 2003 national election when the Islamic Action Front officially boycotted the national elections, their members ran in Amman as “independent Islamists” and won four of the six voting districts.

Table 5.5 Results for the 2003 National Legislative Elections of Independent Islamists in Amman

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Independent Islamist” Winner</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khalil Attiyah</td>
<td>Amman 1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azzam Hneidi</td>
<td>Amman 2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Hassonneh</td>
<td>Amman 2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Abu Faris</td>
<td>Amman 4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa Al-Wahsh</td>
<td>Amman 4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Monem Abu Zant</td>
<td>Amman 5th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Muslim Brotherhood Jordan (http://www.ikhwanjo.com)

Predictions prior to the 2007 national legislative elections declared “veteran heavyweights”\footnote{396} including Khalil Atiyyah, Musa Wahsh, Abdul Munem Abu Zant, and

\footnote{395} Ibid.  
\footnote{396} Mohammad Ben Hussein, 8 November 2007, “A Mix of Veteran MPs and Young Businessmen Spice
Mamdough Abbadi would return to their seats in the Lower House. Wealthy Palestinian independent candidates also joined the political fray in Amman during the 2007 legislative elections. By Election Day, 20 November, one hundred sixty-five candidates competed for the twenty-three seats in the seven districts of Amman spending an average of JD100,000 (a little more than $141,000USD) on his or her campaign. When the results were certified, independent Palestinian candidates and the IAF were surprisingly big losers. Only two of the eight IAF candidates won seats in their respective districts.

Table 5.6 IAF Candidates in Amman for the 2007 National Legislative Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Musa al-Aziz</td>
<td>Amman 1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azzam al-Hneidi*</td>
<td>Amman 1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamzah Mansour*</td>
<td>Amman 2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa Wahsh</td>
<td>Amman 2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuheir Abul Gharaybeh</td>
<td>Amman 3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Hassouneh</td>
<td>Amman 4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimr al-Assaf</td>
<td>Amman 5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayel al-Abbadia</td>
<td>Amman 6th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Muslim Brotherhood Jordan (http://www.ikhwanjo.com) (Winner*)

Tribal candidates won four of the seven districts taking a total of eight of the twenty-three seats in Amman or thirty-four percent of the seats in Amman. This was not the case of a “throw the bums out” elections. Rather, the elections signaled a significant shift in political power in the economic and political heart of Jordan away from Palestinian representation. The tribal seats gained in Amman were an intentional, coordinated, and

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397 Up Election Race,” The Jordan Times.
397 Ibid.
398 Hussein and Mansur.
399 Three other seats were reserved for minority and Christian representatives.
expensive political move to capture the epicenter of Jordan’s economy. How and why did this shift occur?

The Third District encompasses the neighborhoods of Jabal Amman, Shmeisani, Weibdeh, Jabal Hussien, Abdali, Sweifieh, Abdoun, and the area surrounding the King Hussein Sports City. While Abdoun and Shmeisani are home to wealthy educated Palestinians and their businesses, Jabal Amman and Jabal Hussein are populated by tribal Jordanians largely employed in the public sector bureaucracy and destitute tribal families. The Third District is important because it is now considered the main business district. Especially during the 2007 elections, the Third District was a microcosm of the goals and dynamics of tribal politics in Jordan.

While it may not be the most populated area in Amman, the Third District is the largest polling center in the country of Jordan. As noted in the previous chapter, voting is not restricted to place of residence in Jordan so it is commonplace for voters to cast ballots where they work, where their families reside, or where they can get the most money for their vote.

The Third District has historically voted for IAF candidates. Rehayyel Gharaibeh, the assistant secretary general of the IAF, stood as candidate in this district in 2007. While Dr. Gharaibeh certainly espoused Muslim Brotherhood positions regarding Israel and the war in Iraq, his campaign for a seat in the Third focused almost exclusively on the registration and support of small business start-ups in Jordan.

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401 Interview with Dr. Rehayyel Gharaibeh, Candidate for the Lower House of the National Legislature representing Amman Third District. Amman, Jordan 19 November 2007.

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Palestinian businessmen such as Najati Shakhsheer, who owns a number of Hertz rental car franchises throughout Jordan, was one of the twenty-nine candidates running in the district. Most candidates ran on their own personal fortunes. The Christian candidate, Toureq Khouri, made his fortune supplying food to U.S. troops in Iraq and owns the al-Weihdat Football Club. Others, including Ahmad Saffadi, ran as candidates for specific business groups and found their campaign funding flowing from those special interests rather than from the citizens in the district.

The candidate in the Third District who best represents the complexities of Jordanian politics was Samar Haj Hassan. Representing herself as the candidate of “New Jordan,” Ms. Haj Hassan is an educated Palestinian woman who has worked on a number of national development initiatives as well as advising Queen Rania on matters regarding children and women’s rights. Haj Hassan now runs a consulting business that specializes in political and development projects in Jordan. While Haj Hassan ran on concerns about the development of political participation in Amman she also criticized the MPs who gained seats as a result of the women’s quota claiming they “were not representatives of the majority of women in Jordan. These candidates proved inefficient and lacked the experience to play an active role in the Parliament. In many cases, their stance was unfavorable to the issues sensitive to women.”

Like so many other candidates, Ms. Haj Hassan’s campaign financing came almost exclusively from her family’s private wealth. Unlike other candidates, Haj

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403 Saffadi ran with the financial backing of the telecommunications businesses.
405 Her husband owns JO Publishing.
Hassan provided her financial information to the public during the campaign. Her intentions were to run a new kind of campaign that “would demonstrate that you could win in Jordanian elections without payoffs or corruption.”\(^\text{406}\) In the week before the election, both *The Jordan Times* and *al-Ra‘i* newspapers predicted Haj Hassan’s win in the Third District based on “the successful and scientific campaign she (was) leading.”\(^\text{407}\)

Former MP and Mayor of Amman Mamdouh Abbadi\(^\text{408}\) campaigned vigorously in the Third District as well. While he highlighted his past political accomplishments, Dr. Abbadi also relied on his tribal networks to deliver votes on Election Day. While I attended a diwan for another female candidate in the fourth district, the sister of Mamdouh Abbadi explained how the tribal system worked. Physical sanctions for tribal members in Amman who voted for other candidates were credible and certain consequences not only for the voter but also his or her family members.\(^\text{409}\) Additionally, Mamdouh Abbadi’s daughter was buying votes at her place of business and unknowingly offered JD150 to one of Samar Haj Hassan’s campaign workers (who also worked at the same business) for his vote.\(^\text{410}\)

There were no taking chances on the minority Christian seat in the Third District either. The winner, Toureq Khouri, was generous with his own “donations” to local families.\(^\text{411}\) Additionally, Khouri is estimated to have transported some six thousand

\(^{406}\) Haj Hassan Interview 28 October 2009.  
^{408} President of the Jordanian branch of the Arab Parliamentarians Against Corruption  
^{410} Haj Hassan interview. Amman 28 October 2009.  
^{411} Wardim interview. Amman, Jordan 21 November 2007
residents of the al-Widhat refugee camp to the Third District to cast their votes for him.\footnote{Ibid.} Khouri received a total of six thousand nine hundred forty-five votes.\footnote{Elections Results for 2007 National Legislative Elections, Ministry of the Interior, Royal Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.}

The Third District’s parliamentary results would appear “shocking” to many western observers. Samar Haj Hassan won more than seven thousand votes and garnered the most votes in the Abdoun and Shmeisani neighborhoods. She, however, received almost no votes in East Amman neighborhoods.\footnote{Haj Hassan interview. 28 October 2009 in Amman, Jordan.} Her support reflected the traditional voters in the Third District- Palestinian, educated, private sector professionals. The voter turnout of forty-nine percent was typical for the Third District but included thousands of voters who were not actual residents of the District. The election results demonstrated the power of money and tribal connections.

Figure 5.1 2007 Election Cartoon from the Famous Political Satirist, Emad Hajjaj

The caricature above describes the kind of political tricks used to gain more votes for certain tribal candidates. Among the tricks was using an iron to flatten out the embossed seal on voter ID cards so the card could be used by someone else to cast another vote.

The Fifth District of Amman includes the neighborhoods of Khalda and Sweileh. Comprised of wealthy, educated 1967 Palestinians, the Fifth is considered a bastion of
radical IAF support. During the 2007 elections, the IAF chose to run Nimr al-Assaf who barely won a seat. The Fifth District results demonstrated the strategic intentions of tribes to insert their influence into former IAF and Palestinian areas. Rather than a reflection of the Palestinian population of the voting district, the results were produced by a massive influx of cash and people from the Balqawi and Adwan tribes. Dr. Mohammad Abu Hdeib garnered the most votes in the Fifth District by running on his Balqawi connections as well as his record as a “good service” MP in previous legislatures. In prior elections, Dr. Abu Hdeib campaigned as a member of the IAF. Also elected on his tribal candidacy was Ahmad Yousef Adwan who had no previous experience and recently retired from the military.

The fact that the district turnout was predictably low (forty-three percent) helped tribes to overwhelm local Palestinian votes. The al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development documented evidence of massive vote-buying in the Fifth District on Election Day as well as an influx of voters from outside the District. The Fifth District is strategically important to the reassertion of tribal influence in Amman’s politics because of the rise of Palestinian wealth and political power in the area. Khalda and Sweileh together are considered as important competition to Abdoun and Shmeisani as locations for private sector business development and foreign investment.

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415 Interview with Mohammad al-Masri, Ph.D., Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan. Amman, Jordan 30 October 2009.
416 Interview with Minister for Political Development Musa Ma’aytah. Amman, Jordan 26 October 2009.
417 Ibid.
418 Ministry of the Interior, Royal Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
420 Mohammad al-Masri interview. 30 October 2009.
The First District, a traditionally Palestinian and IAF stronghold, also was affected by the tribal agenda during the 2007 Parliamentary elections. Veteran MPs from the District, Azzam Huniedi (IAF) and Khalil Attiyeh (Independent Palestinian) barely managed to get re-elected. The real estate boom in Amman turned local branches of the D’ajah and Baraiseh tribes from construction workers to building contractors and virtual millionaires.\footnote{Ma’aytah Interview. Amman, Jordan 26 October 2009.} On the merits of being able to distribute “gifts” to the poor residents of the First District, Hassan Safi and Marwan Abdullat took seats in an area of Amman that seemed impermeable to tribal political influence since the resumption of legislative elections since 1989.

The Sixth District in Amman revealed the fierce competition between tribes. It would be a mistake to think that the tribal gains in Amman were a unified, coordinated effort. They were not. Tribes in the Sixth waged a ferocious campaign for the MP seats. Once again, new money made on the sale of tribal tracts around the Queen Alia airport enriched the al-Qaisi and Derabani tribes.\footnote{Interview with Dr. Nasser al-Qaisi. Cleveland, Ohio 3 November 2008 and Amman, Jordan 27 October 2009.} As a result, both Nasser al-Qaisi and Lufti Derabani were able to run highly organized and well-financed campaigns that beat out eight al-Abbadi tribal candidates.

Hardball politics reigned in the Sixth District between the tribes. Speculation suggested that more people arrived on buses to vote than actually lived in the District itself.\footnote{“2007 Parliamentary Election Observation Press Statement,” 20 November 2007, Al-Hayat Center for Civil Society Development, Amman, Jordan.} Nasser al-Qaisi is a noveau-riche dentist/advertising owner who convinced his
tribe that his media savvy could boost tribal organization for an overwhelming win.\textsuperscript{424}

Both al-Qaisi and Derabani coordinated their efforts against the Abbadis and shelled out enough money to members of both their respective tribes to have several “ushers” at each polling station to provide “guidance to any voter seeking it.”\textsuperscript{425}

Figure 5.2 Armed “Ushers” at the Polling Station in Jiza (Sixth District)

Source: AmmonNews, 20 November 2007

Despite the “security” at the polling station, groups of armed, masked men took the polling officers and the candidates’ representatives hostage. The men filled in an unknown yet large number of ballot slips before anti-riot forces could free the hostages.\textsuperscript{426} No arrests were made and no charges brought as a result of the incident. When queried about the tainted ballots, Dr. al-Qaisi explained, “Everyone knew they were Abbadis. It didn’t affect the real vote.”\textsuperscript{427}

The 2007 legislative election illuminated a change in strategy and tactics on the part of the tribes reflecting a new willingness to extend their reach into areas not traditionally considered “theirs.” Three factors helped the tribes achieve their political goals. First, a constant movement from the hinterland to Amman increased the presence

\textsuperscript{424} Al-Qaisi Interview. Amman, Jordan 27 October 2009.
\textsuperscript{425} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{426} “Armed Takeover of Polling Station,” 20 November 2007, Ammonnews.net.
\textsuperscript{427} al-Qaisi Interview. Amman, Jordan 27 October 2009.
of tribes in the urban area as younger people look for employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{428} The density of some tribal groups is so significant in Amman that neighborhoods now are formally referred to as “al-Tafieleh” and “al-Mafraq.”

Second, the real estate boom in Amman that begun around 2000 allowed tribes to sell off tracts of land at an impressive profit. The boom was aided by Amman’s reputation for municipal codes that didn’t allow for high rises to be built. Amman couldn’t be built up so it had to be built out. Additionally, the government moved to buy up property around the southern perimeter of Amman in order to expand and improve the Queen Alia airport. Several small tribes flush with new income were able to compete in the expensive legislative campaigns in Amman.

Finally, some authorities posit the low voter turnout in traditionally Palestinian districts gave the tribes another advantage.\textsuperscript{429} The relative numbers between districts can be misleading, however. It is true, for example, that the turnout for the First District (Palestinian) was thirty-six percent and the turnout for the Sixth District (tribal) was fifty-eight percent of eligible voters. The data becomes muddied when the number of voters bused into districts is taken into consideration. The point regarding the relative number of votes needed to win a seat in each district, however, remains a valid one.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{428} Total population in Jordan has risen dramatically. Despite the rise, the areas of Tafeileh and Mafraq have remained flat in population growth.
\item \textsuperscript{429} Ma’aytah Interview. Amman, Jordan 26 October 2009.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Table 5.7 Amman Election Data by District for the 2007 National Legislative Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amman by District</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>Number of Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st District</td>
<td>63,103</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>4 Muslims</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd District</td>
<td>64,228</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4 Muslims</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd District</td>
<td>81,547</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4 Muslims + 1 Christian</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th District</td>
<td>88,937</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3 Muslims</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th District</td>
<td>53,205</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3 Muslims + 1 Circassian</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th District</td>
<td>51,694</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3 Muslims + 1 Circassian</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th District</td>
<td>18,888</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>1 Muslim</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Royal Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

One problem that is reflected in the table is the sheer number of candidates competing in each district. No one, including the tribes, had solved the problem of candidate coordination as that competition for votes is not splintered so significantly. It reflects a vast amount of money and political resources deployed by the tribes against other tribes. Wasted money and wasted votes could not be circumvented by tribal institutional coordination. This demonstrates a weakness in the tribal political strategy that must be resolved between the tribes themselves.

Table 5.8 Winners in the 2007 National Legislative Elections in Amman

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amman First District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khalil Hassan Atiyyeh- Palestinian Independent (former IAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaafar Abdullat- Palestinian Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Mahmoud Safi- Palestinian Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azzam Hneidi- IAF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amman Second District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamzah Mansour- IAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Selmi – Independent Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Al Kouz- Independent Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamamd Hussein- Independent Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selmi Al Kouz – Independent Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yousef Qarneh – Independent Palestinian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amman Third District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mamdough Abbadi- Tribal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Safadi- Tribal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Challenges to the Institution of Tribal Politics?

After the Parliamentary election in 2010, a Jordanian observer asked, “A loyalist Parliament may have been elected but at what cost to Jordan’s social cohesion and national unity?” While the regime managed to orchestrate an even more opaque election process by the development of “virtual” sub-districts, the real heart of the problem with the elections was the competition between Palestinian Jordanians and the tribes. Palestinian Jordanians viewed the elections through the lens of being marginalized by a process heavily controlled by tribal forces and, therefore, many stayed away from polls.

Elections have become a completely distinct institution because it is a serious contest between the tribes themselves to further tribal fortunes rather than address national policy issues. Capturing control of parliamentary seats is a serious business and

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even divides families within tribes. Electoral violence is not unusual in rural districts.

“Usually tribesmen in Jordan are armed on Election Day; some of them have even used methods of intimidation trying to prevent people from voting for certain tribes in order to control the vote.”431 The tribal competition is not just confined to the rural areas anymore. A journalist in Amman reported a number of incidents in the city where “polling stations (were) vandalised, candidates attacked and some cars damaged.”432

There were more than twenty-five injuries and one fatality reported related directly to voting on November 9, 2010.433

As far as political parties are concerned, tribal affiliation has eviscerated not only the institutions but also any efficacy parties might have possessed as linkage institutions between citizens and the state. As observers of the 2010 Parliamentary elections noted, tribal identity “now (has) become so strong that candidates with a political agenda find that they have a greater chance of electoral success if they run with tribal support.”434 The 2010 Parliamentary elections demonstrated the strength of particular tribal families. Not one candidate ran on political party affiliations in the 2010 elections.

But changes to the tribal vote were apparent in the last election. Figure 5.4 indicates a number of changes in the potency of the tribal vote. For example, most winning candidates garnered thirty-some percent of the votes cast in their subdistricts. There were tribal candidates who won by eighty to ninety percent of the vote but these

432. Ibid.
433. Ibid.
people were the exception to the rule. Surprisingly, many tribal candidates in rural areas were faced with running against between six to fifteen rival contenders. Certainly, one explanation is the problems produced by the SNTV system used in Jordan. But this has been a consistent variable throughout previous elections. The most compelling explanation is the poor coordination within tribal groups within the same districts and sub-districts.

Figure 5.3 Winning Candidates by Percentages

For example, the Al-Barayseh tribe ran three candidates in the Fourth sub-district of the First District of Amman. 3,667 votes were split three ways among each al-Barayesh. In the first sub-district of Amman Fourth, two al-Hadid split 6,161 votes in a way that cost Shaher al-Hadid the seat. The same results occurred in the second sub-district of Amman Fourth between the al-Raqqad and cost one of them the seat. The Seventh District of Amman also witnessed two families, the al-Soair and the al-Ajarmeh,
splitting votes between tribal members. In Zarqa, the al-Amoush tribe split the vote in the First District. In Zarqa’s Second District (First sub-district), the al-Zawareh split 5,755 votes among three tribal candidates. The most flagrant example of tribal infighting occurred in the Third Sub-district of Zarqa’ Second District. Eight of the ten candidates came from the al-Khalayleh tribe. 8,779 out of 9,255 votes were scattered between the al-Khalayleh candidates.435

This phenomenon repeated itself through almost every district in the 2010 elections. Two observations can be made. Winning a seat in the Lower House of Parliament is serious business and is directly tied to gaining access to scarce resources in Jordan. What is new is the recognition that tribal discipline is under siege. Shaykh Mohammed Kharabsheh, a long-time political actor in Jordan, spoke of the problems of maintaining tribal discipline during elections: “Having been at the top rung of Jordanian politics for over a decade, (Ayman Hazza’) al-Majali has a long and established list of political enemies, many of whom are all too eager to point out his weaknesses. ‘Majali has expired.’”436 As more educated, younger tribal members return from university, they are more willing to step out from under the elders of the tribe and run on their own reputation. However, in many cases, this was not a successful strategy.437

The phenomenon of electoral “sub-districts” was a new twist to the electoral rules in 2010. The government has stated plans to drop sub-districts in the next national election because of the overwhelmingly negative response. Most of the criticism was due

437 Election results for the 2010 Parliamentary Elections are displayed in Appendix D
to the very poorly understood geographic boundaries of each sub-district. While there are claims that this was again a case of institutional rigging on the part of the regime in favor of tribes, the election results suggest the virtual subdistricts hurt both Palestinian Jordanian and tribal candidates. The confusion just added to the element of overestimation of success on the part of many of the parliamentary candidates.

Despite the divisions seen in tribal coordination, tribal inroads into Amman districts continued. Ten tribal candidates won in Amman in 2010. This is especially significant considering seats were gained in the First, Third, and Fifth districts which are considered bastions of Palestinian Jordanians.

However, the one variable that does stand out in the 2010 election is a pattern of previous tribal-state connections. As Table 5.9 below indicates, most winning candidates have a long personal or tribal relationship with the government either through civil service, military careers, or legislative experience. Very few winners came from the private sector or had little experience with the institutions of the state. While much of the criticism of parliamentary elections is attributed to the machinations of the regime to limit opposition access to government positions or splinter opposition into manageable groups, the real problem is found in the cleavage between the Palestinian Jordanians and the tribes of Jordan over visions of what a national state should look like. Currently, Palestinian Jordanians make up slightly more than half of Jordan’s population. But the table below illustrates that, with few exceptions, they are closed out of one of the most important institutions of the state merely because of their ethnicity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Subdistrict</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Previous Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amman1st</td>
<td></td>
<td>Khalil Atiyyah</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>L.H. 13th, 14th, 15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jaafar Marwan Al-</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>L.H. 15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abdallat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hassan Mahmoud Safi</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>L.H. 15th</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Mohammad Rashid Al-</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>none</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Barayseh</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Salem Abdullah Al-</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Hadban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman 2nd</td>
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<td>Muhammad Al-Thuweib</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>L.H. 10th, 11th, 13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muhammad Al-Kouz</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>L.H. 14th, 15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad Ahmed</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>U.H. 15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Halaiqa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yahya Mohammad Al-</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>L.H. 15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Saud</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ghazi Awadh Elian</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amman 3rd</td>
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<td>Mamdouh Al-Abbadi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>L.H. 13th, 14th, 15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reem Badran</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>L.H. Women’s Quota 15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Alrahim Biqai</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>L.H. 15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmed Mohammed Al-</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>L.H. 15th</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Safadi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ghazi Farid Al-</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Former Royal Court</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Musharbash</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Amman 4th</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmad Ibrahim Al-</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Assistant Director, Human Resources Lower House</td>
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<td>Hmeisat</td>
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<td>Salah Al-Din Abdullah</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sabra</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Bassam Ahmed Al-Omari</td>
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<td>Retired Colonel, Jordanian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Fawaz Mahmoud Al-Zu’bi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>L.H. 12&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 13&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;, 14&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Yahya Hussien Obeidat</td>
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<td>Emad Jabr Bani Younis</td>
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<td>Mijhim Hadithah Al-Khreisheh</td>
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<td>Berjes Abdoh Al-Abaseh</td>
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<td>Vice President, Madaba Municipality</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Mohammad Al-Shawabka</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>L.H. 14&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Sami Mubarak Tawal</td>
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<td>Abdul Jalil Al-Sulaimat</td>
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<td>Ma’an 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Khalid Alabd Al-Fanatseh</td>
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<td>President, Jordan Mining Association</td>
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<td>Abdullah Odeh Al-Bazayah</td>
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<td>Wasfi Ali Al-Rawashdeh</td>
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<td>L.H. 15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Ma’an 3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sami Ahmad Al-Hassanat</td>
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<td>Part time lecturer, Al-Hussein Bin Talal University</td>
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<td>Wasfi Farhan Al-Sarhan</td>
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<td>Habis Khaif Al-Shbeeb</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>L.H. 15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Mazin Torki Saoud Al-Qadi</td>
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<td>Director, Public Security Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Badia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Awwad Al-Zawaydeh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>L.H. 15&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mohammad Qasem Al-</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Supervisor, Jordan</td>
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204
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<td>Hamad Basher Al-Hajaya</td>
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<td>Journalist, Jordanian News Agency (Petra)</td>
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<td>Feisal Akef Al-Fayez</td>
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<td>Former prime minister; U.H., 15th; Chairman of the Board of Trustees, King Abdullah Fund</td>
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<td>Mijhem Hadithah Al-Khreisheh</td>
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<td>Minister of Agriculture, L.H. 15th</td>
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<td>Alshayesh Hadithah Al-Khreisheh</td>
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<td>Ahmad Atif Al-Hararah</td>
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<td>Ahmad Al-Qudah</td>
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<td>Ali Ahmed Al-Ananzeh</td>
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<td>Faculty, al-Mutah University</td>
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<td>Bassel Ahmad Ayasrah</td>
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A final element that was touted as a “game changer” in the 2010 election is known as the “youth bulge.” According to Musa Ma’aytah, Minister of Political Development, 300,000 “youth” voters were eligible to vote in the 2010 national legislative elections. The youth were allowed to vote for the first time in 2007. The inclusion of potentially 300,000 new voters is a significant variable, representing potentially around twelve percent of the vote in the 2010 elections.

In the 2007, the youth vote was offered as the one element that would change tribal domination of the Lower House. Media focused on how the youth were concerned with issues more than tribal affiliations. Candidates that were supposedly favored by

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438 Interview with Musa Ma’aytah, Minister of Political Development. 28 October 2009 in Amman, Jordan.
first-time youth voters were those “who truly deserve to reach Parliament and be among the people designated as the country’s guardians and lawmakers.” Many young voters also attempted to make political statements by refusing to vote “which can be viewed as a … rejection of rubber-stamp elections, impotent political parties, and the absence of competition.” Disappointingly, only thirty-four percent of eligible voters aged 18-29 voted in the 2007 parliamentary elections. There was a significant percentage of the youth vote that seemed to follow tribal tendency to vote for a relative. Even in Amman, tribes made a concerted effort to turn out the vote for tribal candidates although specific data is not available.

Tribal domination of parliamentary seats has emerged since the elections of 1989. It represents a form of incumbency in the National Assembly that has yet to be fully explored. Twenty-two families have held seats in the last four of five elections and they generally represent the most influential tribes. Several powerful shaykhs have held seats in all parliaments since 1989 while the seat has merely changed hands within the family or the tribe. This is demonstrated in Table 5.10 below.

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443 Interview with Mohammad Ben Hussein, Journalist with Jordan Times, 22 November 2007, Amman, Jordan. The “Big Five” are the al-Abbadi, al-Majali, the al-Rawabdeh, the al-Fayez, and the al-Adwan.
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**al-Ghweiri did not personally campaign in 2007. However, his son, Farhan Nouman al-Ghweiri, won in Zarqa 2nd.**

**al-Hadid did not run in 2007. His cousin, Nidal al-Hadid won Amman 4th.**
The implications of tribal incumbency are an area of exploration that is ripe for further study. It smacks of further evidence of how the informal institution of tribal politics has adapted and crowded the Palestinians out of politics in Jordan. Given tribal ability to reap the benefits of the current institutional arrangements under the authoritarian government, there appears to be little reason to push for any significant changes even though tribes are clearly in a position to do so.

It may be that the centrality of the informal institutions of tribal politics may change in the future. There are always political and economic factors that could develop that will make the institutional dynamics less salient than they currently are. However, the case of elections in Jordan appears to indicate that, in the prevailing limitations and uncertainties of a rentier economy and the authoritarian regime, tribal politics will play a central role in informing and regulating mass level stability into the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

The elections that began again in 1989 were an effort by then King Hussein to solve a classic case of the “King’s Dilemma,” the introduction of formal, institutional reform without the transfer of real power. King Hussein conducted his rule through highly personalized relationships with the major tribal shaykhs. The reintroduction of elections and a functioning Lower House of the Parliament was another avenue to diffuse
discontent among the shaykhs by giving them “an important sounding position with no real authority.” 444 One important change that has taken place is the succession of Abdullah II to the throne in 1999. Abdullah, by his own account, is a very different monarch than his late father. “People feel that their problems or grievances can only be solved by the king, which was great in my father’s time, when it was a patriarchal society. Today, we’re moving towards institution-building. The reason they (the people) come to me is because the institutions are not strong enough.” 445

In the case of the elections from 1989 to the present, tribal politics certainly were the “impetus” for King Hussein to re-establish elections. The prosaic element the present king seems to miss is that institution building as he described is not a subtle, continuous historical process. Rather, institution building happens against the backdrop of sudden, often unanticipated, changes that will elicit reactions from tribal powers as economic and political costs ebb and flow. Additionally, authoritarian regimes are not necessarily limited so much by institutional arrangements as they are by the resources at the government’s disposal and “its role and function in the social order.” 446

As shown by the demonstrations that occurred in Amman in 2011 demonstrated, King Abdullah’s “institution building” rather than “relationship building” has come at the cost of his popularity among the powerful tribes. He has resorted to using his uncle, Prince Hasan, as his proxy because of Hasan’s ability to evoke the tribal-Hashemite bond that King Hussein had created.

The elections have progressively demonstrated the centrality of tribal access to

political and economic benefits of the state. It is clear the tribes consider the elections an exclusive right. The elections provide evidence that there is a glaring absence of a level playing field for constituents other than the tribes. The Palestinian Jordanians have not been able to maintain a foothold, let alone carve out a niche in this political space. The Palestinian Jordanians are, therefore, effectively closed out of this important opportunity to bring any demands to the state. What is reflected in the elections of Jordan, as a result, is an exclusionary tribal identity and tribal voices at the political table.
Chapter 6: The Politics of Survival: A View from Below

Introduction

This chapter looks forward at questions for future research including economic challenges, regional and international pressures, and internal changes currently at play within tribal institutions themselves. This dissertation attempted to demonstrate why Jordan is a significant example of how politics on the micro-level is just as powerful as those found at the state level. Previous literature regarding authoritarian durability focused on processes of change that included urbanization, industrialization, and the effects of regional and international forces. Additionally, comparative politics use the center-periphery\(^{447}\) shorthand to sort complex dynamics. In Jordan one can see recent scholarship generally places the engine of social and political change firmly in the array of formal political institutions of the state. The traditional sector (or periphery) is the space occupied by groups like tribes. Political authority, therefore, “expands the modern sector into the traditional.”\(^{448}\) As far as culture and identity are concerned, the center or state institutions are understood as the producer of a national civic culture.\(^{449}\)

The experiences in Jordan today call many of these assumptions into question. As has been the case in many states in the Arab Middle East, contemporary Jordanian monarchs came to power by becoming useful to the existing powers in the region which were the powerful tribes of Transjordan. The Transjordanian tribes exploited the

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Hashemite need for formal state institutional development. Eventually, the military, the police, the civil service bureaucracy were populated almost exclusively by the tribes. There were already powerful tribal figures who were holders of wealth and arbiters of justice who gave the Hashemites access to gaining and holding power. These iterated exchanges between the regime and other actors shaped the course of the state over time.

*Considering the Evidence*

This dissertation also explored the political role of tribes and the effects of patterns of bias which have developed between the Transjordanian tribes and the Palestinian Jordanians. Additionally, the dissertation traced the increasing reliance on tribal motifs and identities adopted by the state in efforts to construct a national society. These efforts have largely failed because they negate the underlying historical legacies which have served to marginalize the identity and contributions of Palestinian Jordanians.

The majority of Palestinian Jordanians either fled to Jordan in 1948 or became part of the country with the annexation of the West Bank in 1967. The influx of Palestinians not only affected the social dynamics of the population and the contours of the private-public economic context but also set up the contestation in political discourse regarding the identity and nature of the modern Jordanian.

The initial regime welcome of the Palestinians; stereotyped as more educated and wealthier; was challenged by the events of the 1970s especially those of Black September. These events were seized upon as an opportunity by “indigenous” citizens with tribal roots to claim their right to regime favors based on historical support. The regime came to rely on the fusion of state with tribal symbols and rhetoric. Conversely,
the tribes have, as self-interested actors, supported the authoritarian *status quo*. The most compelling reason the tribes have done so is the distribution of rents under a rentier economy. The tribes have reduced costs for the state. Those tribal institutions include security and dispute resolution as well as acting as the primary intermediary between the state and the mass population. In exchange for long-term support of the regime, tribes gained a disproportionate influence over the institutions of the state.

A number of changes in recent decades have presented challenges to the tribes. Urbanization of Jordan has occurred at a rapid pace. Tribes that were once identified with one locality have experienced a steady drain of members to large cities, especially Amman. Population growth jumped after 1980 and is continuing to expand. Distribution of tribal benefits to all members has become more difficult given the rise in population and the dispersion of tribal members across Jordan. Additionally, imposing norms on members or mobilizing individuals living in Amman away from traditional tribal areas becomes problematic.

Another significant challenge to the centrality of the tribes in Jordan is the fact that Palestinians have become a permanent part of Jordanian citizenry. Until recently Palestinians were excluded from the public sector causing asymmetries in wealth, education, and employment between the tribes and the Palestinians. Over the past decade, the politics of patronage have slipped from the exclusive domain of the powerful tribes to inclusion of a small, wealthy group of Palestinian Jordanians. The shift in influence over regime benefits has elicited a dramatic response from tribal Jordanians.

Tahir al-Masri was the first self-identifying Palestinian to serve as Jordanian Prime Minister, and that ethnic factor alone incurred the hostility of many
Transjordanian nationalists in Parliament. Masri’s appointment as Prime Minister had in some ways seemed to mark a new era in Jordanian politics— one in which a liberal, a reformer, a Palestinian could achieve a top governmental position. But that era ended quickly as a coalition of parliamentarians…united in their opposition to the Masri government and brought it down. Their reasons may have differed, but in the end Masri was seen…most disturbingly, as too Palestinian.450

Because of the unique framework and processes of the rentier economy, the state of Jordan is the employer of the first instance. Until the last decade, the state has been able to absorb tribal demands for employment and benefits. International finance reform and domestic inability to develop a larger private sector economy has strained state resources. Additionally, the Palestinian population is also growing. The private sector cannot provide employment for all Palestinians now in Jordan. Therefore, Palestinians have progressively competed for state employment and political influence.

Within this context, elections for the national legislature were another opportunity to extract political power, prestige, and benefits from the state. Since 1989, seats in the Lower House have proved to be an important political advantage for the tribes. Initially there was a clear boundary between tribal deputies who were elected from the rural areas and the Palestinian deputies who were elected from Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa. There was a noticeable change in the number of seats held by Palestinians beginning in the national legislative elections in 2003. The strategy became overt in the national elections of 2007. Tribes were pushing back. Palestinian seats in Irbid, Zarqa and other outlying urban areas were won by tribal candidates in 2003. In 2007, tribes targeted traditionally Palestinians districts in Amman itself.

Elections since 1989 also demonstrate the how tribal politics is changing. Initially, tribes were able to enforce their own rules in elections even in the face of the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood. By 2003, there is evidence the Muslim Brotherhood resorted to tribal permission and endorsement in order to run in districts outside of Amman. Tribal “primaries” were held to determine the winners for seats before the actual election took place. Vote buying, armed goons at voting stations, and election committees staffed by relatives of candidates were common strategies. Tribes were able to gather enough votes to gain seats in the traditionally Palestinian Jordanian districts in Amman.

However, beginning in the elections in 2007 and again in the 2010 elections, fissures were seen in the tribal institutions. Tribes around Amman, newly enriched by real estate properties, won seats away from the traditional tribal powers. Even more interesting is the evidence of fragmentation within tribal leadership. Young, well-educated tribal members returned from European and American universities attempted to deal with the narrow range of economic and political options. Under the tangled relationship between state and tribal society, the most reasonable option was to challenge the older traditional shaykhs for the seats in the Lower House.

There are political costs for buying into the national elections for the tribes. First, the elections validate the existing state authority by giving the appearance of democratic participation. The elections provide the tribes with a way to maintain the political, social, and economic status quo. While tribes participate in elections because they benefit them; the unintended outcome is the tribes are also perpetuating the authoritarian regime.
Elections have become a strategically important to tribal politics. The elections are a political institution that is manipulated by other stakeholders as well, including the regime. Because of regime manipulation of electoral rules, the significance of tribal politics in the parliamentary elections is often overlooked. Even more concerning is the implication of what tribal-Palestinian elections asymmetries might say about state building and national identity in Jordan. According to the United States Department of State, there are significant concerns “about fairness and transparency, especially for persons of Palestinian origin.”451

There is a sense among some of Jordan's political elite that those who currently possess political power will be reluctant to yield it to any rival formation. (Political) Party leader Musa Ma'aytah thinks that it is unrealistic to expect that Jordanian politicians will attach themselves to political parties when they can simply rely on the tribal machines that put them into office in the first place. Ma'aytah argues that in the mid-1990s, there were only ten political parties in Jordan, but they were just as hemmed in by tribal loyalties.452

Within the narrowing pool of opportunity in the rentier economy, the government is struggling under the weight of tribal/Palestinian infighting similar to the recent, unusually public contestation among then Prime Minister Ma’ruf al-Bahkit, Intelligence Chief Muhammad al-Dhahabi, and Head of the Royal Court, Bassem Awadallah. Al-Awadallah is a polarizing figure in Jordanian politics because of his support for political and economic reform which create fears among East Bankers that his Palestinian roots guide his policy priorities.453 Recent allegations involving domestic abuse were quickly seized on by Muhammad al-Dhahabi. Al-Dhahabi played a role in the recent series of citizenship revocation for Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Jordan's old tribal guard,

453 Ibid.
rooted in the powerful intelligence agency, fears reform currently being orchestrated under King Abdullah II will allow “their countrymen of Palestinian origin, a majority of the country’s 6.7 million population, and the Islamists a bigger political role and erode its grip.”454

Meanwhile, tribes representing more than forty percent of Jordan’s population have publicly begun to criticize Queen Rania’s family. The al-Yassin, Queen Rania’s Palestinian family from the West Bank, has been accused of grabbing state-owned land for their own benefit.455 These events represent an unprecedented push back against the perceived growth of Palestinian influence in the country of Jordan. Criticism of the monarchy is rare in Jordan and was shocking that it came from the tribal leadership who are seen as unquestioning loyalists.

However, much of the potent rhetoric against the Palestinian Jordanians gained potency particularly after the Black September events in 1970. Tribal groups during that period were able to seize the moment to purge the political sphere of Palestinian influence and reassert almost absolute primacy over the symbolic representation of Jordanianness. Even this symbolic representation is contested. One small, yet significant, example is the practice of placing a picture of “the king” in the corner of taxi windshields. One can tell if the taxi driver is tribal because King Hussein is pictured in tribal dress. Palestinian Jordanian drivers display the current king, Abdullah II, in monarchical regalia on their windows.

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455 Randa Habib, 9 February 2011, “Jordan Tribes Break Taboo by Targeting Queen,” Retrieved 4 April 2012 at: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hF2bnxbMFqWrESNtwFFzDuHeL6lQ?docId=CN G.4f6d274f3aeb88a025c7211f3b0a1ee7.3b1
Rather than contributing to a move toward a sense of national cohesiveness, the Parliament and its attendant elections have only managed to dissatisfy and disenfranchise the majority of Jordanians. In a poll conducted in June 2009 by Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, respondents asserted that the Lower House was “unsuccessful in executing its constitutional duties.”

While the parliament is generally viewed as a rubber stamp for government policies, the fifteenth parliament, in particular, was beset by such fractious infighting that it could not even perform this function. Additionally, much criticism has been leveled against the whole electoral process which “favors the tribal affiliation and undermines the representation of…Jordanians of Palestinian origin in a country where they make up a little more than half of the population, but are underrepresented.”

In November 2009, King Abdullah II dissolved the fifteenth parliament elected in the 2007 national elections. King Abdullah dismissed his prime minister and replaced him with a close Palestinian supporter, Samir Rifai. The king has issued a number of temporary laws in the absence of the parliament that addressed economic reforms necessary in the current global recession. Some political analysts insist that the parliament would not be missed. Others insist, “The debate on whether it’s needed should not exist in the first place. Instead, it should be centered on its role and performance.” In a 2007 poll, respondents defined “democracy” as access to jobs and security. These kinds of discussions, at this point in time, demonstrate the narrow range

458 Ibid.
459 Ibid.
of choices available to Jordanians regarding their state. Tribes continue to support the dysfunctional system because there is no other apparent better alternative. And what of the rest of the kingdom? If tribal politics was completely removed from state institutions and political processes such as elections, what alternative stands ready to replace it? Certainly political parties are not capable of mobilizing political participation. Where would individuals who have the political and economic experience to run ministries and advise policy-makers come from? There is a political vacuum in Jordan without tribal politics.

*The Tribal Politics of Universities: A Question for Future Research*

One area of future research should be an investigation into the rise of tribal sentiments among Jordanian college students. Observers including Bassem Tweisi, a professor at Al Hussein Ben Talal University in Ma’an, believe “tribal affiliation has come to dominate students’ activism in Jordan, curbing a movement towards a more self-directed political and cultural participation that emerged during the 1950s and 1960s.”

Professor Tweisi stated that university communities help reveal what “hides in the larger community outside…”

Many concerns are being expressed about the rise of tribalism in the universities of Jordan over the last several years. There are around forty universities, colleges, and institutes in a country the approximate size of Indiana. Some Jordanian educators are concerned about the localizing effect so many universities have on the experience of students. For example, a new university proposed for the governate of Karak is opposed

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461 Ibid.
by some on the basis of enforcing local, tribal perspectives. The university is funded by the Tawarneh tribe. “In the past, students had to come to Amman, to the University of Jordan, in order to go to university. At least, that way, students had to learn how to at least live with people from other tribes. Now, when students go to university they are sitting next to their cousins.”

Current student council elections are reflective of the level and kind of political participation college voters lean toward. Recent changes have allowed full elections of councils rather than appointments by university administration. The elections followed the same one-man, one-vote as the national elections causing some observers to posit that elections (national or otherwise) only promote a focus on tribe and family.

During the last two years, the student council elections have become an escalated “tribal showdown.” For example, at a university in Ma’an candidates for the student council who lived in other parts of Jordan were threatened or assaulted by Ma’ani students to get them to drop their candidacies. Several student candidates ended up being hospitalized. A faculty member “said a council dominated by students of a certain background serves the interests of ‘certain people’ from within and outside the university who are driven by regional and tribal motives.”

The tendency for tribal intrusion into university politics intensified in April of 2010. Following a fight between a student from the Abu Hazim tribe from Salt and an al-

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462 Interview with Yousef Hourani, Research Editor, al-Ra’i. 29 October 2009, Amman, Jordan.
465 Ibid.
Abbadi, a revenge stabbing occurred and the al-Abbadi student died from his wounds. Members from other local tribes supporting either the Abu Hazim or the al-Abbadi set fire to stores, overturned cars, and damaged property in Salt belonging to both the Abu Hazim and the al-Abbadi. The violence spread to the campus of the University of Jordan in Amman the following day. The clashes were between al-Abbadi students and Salti tribal students. Guns were seized from students and major damage to university property occurred. Similar riots occurred at Jerash University. The situation worsened when both sides accused the security and gendarmerie forces from using excessive force in attempting to manage the riots. One student was shot in the arm by gendarmerie forces and hospitalized. His relatives demanded action against the police force.

Who actually had the authority to enforce peace and justice was called into question. The Minister of the Interior, Nayef Qadi, met with tribal leaders in order to diffuse the situation. The minister ordered the university campus in Salt closed in order to contain the tribal fighting which by then included non-student relatives. The situation was finally resolved by an atwa (truce) concluded between the al-Abbadi and the Abu Hazim. The terms of the truce included an agreement not to pursue the case in court and the state agreeing to impose the death penalty against the Abu Hazim student who committed the murder.

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Looking into the Larger Question of Tribal Politics in the Arab World

The Jordan case is not intended to speak authoritatively on tribal politics in the entire Arab world nor is it intended to negate the scholarship of the Middle East which has been written. This dissertation instead is offered to provide a starting point for exploration of the modernization or re-invention of the “traditional” as represented by tribal institutions in the politics of the Middle East. For example, previous scholarship written regarding Kuwait including Crystal (1995) and Herb (1999) have explored the role of tribal politics in the context of state creation and regime preservation. Herb’s work indicates many correlations between the case of Jordan and the case of Kuwait. For example, parliamentary elections in Kuwait were created by the monarchy as a way to balance potential opposition groups against each other rather than unite against the ruling family. However, the elections matter to the setting of the public agenda. As is the case in Jordan, Kuwaiti elections center on capturing parliamentary seats and the ability to provide “constituent services” that comes with the position. As is the case in Jordan, the ruling family in Kuwait has given special treatment to “many tribal members in order to counterbalance the urban-nationalist and merchant opposition, although today’s tribes are themselves more often in the opposition than they are with the government.”

Other scholars including Beck (1990), Anderson (1991), Dresch, Khostiner and Khoury (1991) explain how states as diverse as Iran, Libya, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia used tribes much in the same ways the Hashemites depended on Jordanian tribes for creating a collective state identity and institutions during the process of state building.

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Indeed, Lois Beck notes that while Persian governments initially attempted to eliminate indigenous tribes the governments resorted to state-directed tribal re-construction, in an attempt to cobble together a locus of control in rural areas. Lisa Anderson observed in the case of Libya neither King Idris nor Mohammar Qaddahfi “relied on state ideology or institutions for political legitimacy or loyalty.” Kostiner also observed the process by which formal state building rode on the backs of not only tribal support but tribal symbols and identity for political legitimacy and control.

Now the Arab Spring has challenged or eradicated long-standing states in the Middle East. The interesting question open to future research is how the role of tribes will change under these new political conditions. As far as Jordan is concerned, protests and political challenges have ebbed away as revolts have erupted in Egypt and Syria. Dissatisfaction with incompetent politicians persists yet most Jordanians are happy to support the king because he is seen as a stabilizing force in the chaos around them.

The Arab Spring chaos in Yemen, Tunisia, and Libya brought tribes into direct competition with forces attempting to craft new governments. The al-Saleh family in Yemen has lost its grip and the country plunged into clashes between al-Ahmar and al-Shabi tribes, the central government, and al-Qaeda rebels. “Fierce tribal clashes” in Tunisia as new government leaders struggle to establish both legitimacy and control since the ouster of former President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011. Similar challenges exist

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in Libya as the country faces, “conspiracies, tribal rivalries for political power, divisions…and the absence of official bodies.”\textsuperscript{475} Will old-guard elites re-emerge to take control? Can one tribe actually cobble together alliances wide enough to seize power? Or will new governments broker similarly fashioned arrangements with existing powerful tribes as their recently departed predecessors did?

In July 2012, Libya is holding its first elections in forty years for a new congress which will then select a new prime minister. “(A)fter a two-week campaign dominated by tribal loyalties and all but devoid of policy debate, the real contest on Saturday was not so much between candidates as over the credibility of the vote.”\textsuperscript{476} Election reporting describes the strength of tribal politics in the context of new elections. Voting is not taking place in several tribal areas because the shaykhs forbid it and assert they will not be part of the state of Libya. In other places, tribal fighting over the elections that include the el-Zintan and the el-Mashashiya has left over one hundred twenty people dead. The Warfalla, Libya’s largest tribe, has not permitted election officials into their main town, Bani Walid, claiming it is not necessary because their candidate has already won the election.\textsuperscript{477}

Research into the newly emerging states is a very exciting prospect for several reasons. There are striking differences to compare between the states in the Middle East whose historical evolution was largely dictated by either British or French imperialism against very similar backdrops of International and regional events. States such as Libya,


\textsuperscript{477} Ibid.
Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia shed their authoritarian leaders and now must create new states under very different circumstances, even though tribal identity is incredibly strong in all of these countries. How those tribal identities affect the paths of state formation will be really exciting to witness.
APPENDIX A: TRIBES OF JORDAN

ABU GHANAM (GHUNAYMAT) A tribe of the Balqawiyya confederation near Madaba.

‘ABBAD Semi-nomadic group of tribes that roamed between Salt to the Zarqa River and Wadi al-Shitta. The ‘Abbad were allied with the Bani Sakhr.

ADAYAT One of the Balqawiyya tribes near Madaba.

‘ADHAMAT Semi-nomadic tribe originally from Syria. They settled in Jordan after Emir Abdullah granted them land in the 1940’s.

‘ADWAN A powerful tribe that owned land from the Dead Sea and the Jordan River to Amman and Suwaylih. It was involved in the tribal revolt in 1923 and, as a result, lost much of its land to the Bani Sakhr. It is considered a “shaykhly” family of the Balqa’ Alliance.

AHL AL-JABAL A confederation of tribes originally from Syria that eventually settled in Transjordan along the Syrian border in the 1940’s. The confederation includes the ‘Adhamat, Masa‘id, Sharafat, and Zabid tribes.

AHL AL-SHIMAL An confederation of tribes that includes the Bani Sakhr, Sirhan, Bani Khalid, and ‘Isa.

‘AJARMA A semi-nomadic tribe recognized as one of the oldest tribes in Jordan. ‘Ajarma belongs to the Balqa confederation and has land near Madaba.

‘ARABIYYAT A large tribe in Salt. ‘Arabiyyat heads the Akrad alliance.


‘AWAZIM A tribe in Ma‘in, part of the Balqawiyya confederation. ‘Awazim is considered a “shaykhly” family.

‘AWRAN One of the most influential tribes in Tafila.

AZAYDA One of the Balqawiyya tribes located Madaba.

THE BALQA’ ALLIANCE A political alliance of tribes not based on kin relations. The Balqa’ Alliance ranges from Balqa’ to Ajloun. The Alliance includes the ‘Adwan, ‘Ajarma, Balqawiyya, Bani Hasan, Bani Hamida, Ghunaymat, Da‘ja, and Haddadin.

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478 The majority of this information is taken directly from Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State, Ghazi bin Mohammad bin Talal, The Tribes of Jordan at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century and F.G. Peake, A History of Jordan and Its Tribes and a compilation of information from my own research.
BALQAWIYYA A confederation of tribes living near Balqa’ including the ‘Awazim, Azadya, Adayat, Hanitiyyin, Ghunaymat, Qarda, Qatarna, Raqqad, Shawabka, Shawakra, and Wundiyyin.

BANI ‘ATIYYA A nomadic tribe that divides the year between Karak and Tafila and the Saudi border. Bani ‘Atiyya is categorized by the government as a “Southern Bedouin” tribe for voting in legislative elections.

BANI HAMIDA A semi-nomadic tribe between Balqa’ and Karak. Historically a very poor tribe, the Bani Hamida has relied heavily on government assistance.

BANI HASAN A confederation of tribes in Ajloun province. The Bani Hasan was a very wealthy group of tribes until the Depression of the 1930’s. Since then it relied heavily on government assistance. The Bani Hasan has historically been a core group of the Jordanian military.

BANI KHALID Nomadic tribe in the Ajloun province near Ma’afraq. Bani Khalid is categorized by the government as a “Northern Bedouin” tribe for voting in legislative elections.

BANI SAKHR A massive nomadic tribal confederation divided into three distinct groups. The first group is the Ghabin that includes the “shaykhly” Fayiz and Mtriat tribes. The second group is the Tawqa which includes Haqish, Zaban, and Salti tribes. The third group includes the Khuraysa, Jubur, Ka’abna and Khadir tribes. The Bani Sakhr historically has formed the basis of the Arab Legion and is considered consistently loyal to the Hashemites.


FAYIZ The “shaykhly” family of the Bani Sahkr.

FURAYHAT The major tribe in the Jabal ‘Ajloun district.

GHARAWABA A political alliance of tribes not based on kin relations. The Gharaba is headed by the “shaykhly” Majali tribe and includes the Dhunaybat, Habashna, Ma ‘aytah, Madadha, Mahadin, Shamayla and the Christian tribes of ‘Akasha, Haddadin, Halasa, Hijazin, Madnat, and Zurayqat.

GHAWARNA A settled tribe near the Dead Sea. The Ghawarna was historically discriminated against because of skin color and the assumption that it originally immigrated from the Sudan.

GHAZAWIYYA A semi-nomadic tribe in Northern Jordan. The Ghazawiyya originally were Palestinian tribes that settled permanently in Jordan during the 1940’s.

HADDADIN A Christian tribe, part of the Balqa’a alliance, in the town of Ma ‘in.
**HADID** – A group of semi-nomadic tribes around Amman, closely connected with the Bani Sakhhr but not kin.

**HAJAYA** Nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes between Tafila, Wadi al-Hasa, and Karak. The Hajaya are categorized by the government as a “Southern Bedouin” tribes for voting in legislative elections.

**HANITIYYIN** A tribe of the Balqwiyya confederation living in Abu ‘Alanda.

**HAQISH** A tribe of the Bank Sakhhr near Madaba.

**HILALAT (SHUBAYLAT)** A tribe near Tafila.

**HUWAYTAT** One of the most important and powerful tribal confederacies in Jordan. They live between Tafila and ‘Aqaba. The Huwaytat are categorized by the government as “Southern Bedouin” tribes for voting in legislative elections. They are historically the enemy of the Bani Sakhhr. The Huwaytat can trace their lineage back to a single founding ancestor in Transjordan and make the unique claim that they are real Jordanians. The Huwaytat are led by the “shakhly” family of the Ibn Jazi. Tribes belonging to the Huwaytat confederacy include the Tawayha, Sulaymaniyyin, Mara‘iyya, Nu‘aymat, and the Sa‘idiyyin.

**IHYAWAT** A nomadic tribe near Wadi ‘Arba. The Ihyawat originally immigrated to Jordan from Palestine.

**‘ISA** A nomadic tribe between Mafraq and the Syrian border. The ‘Isa belong to the Ahl al-Shimal alliance and is categorized by the government as a “Northern Bedouin” tribe for voting in legislative elections.

**JUBUR** One of the tribes of the Bani Sakhhr between Ajloun and Amman.

**KHALALDA** The largest tribe in Tafila.

**KHAWARSHEH** A tribe near Irbid. Historically, the Khawarsheh have held the position of Mufti in Irbid.

**KHURAYSHA** A tribe of Bani Sakhhr between Ajloun and Amman.

**LAWZIYYIN** A semi-settled tribe near Jubayha and related to the ‘Adwan.

**MA‘AYTAH** The largest tribe in Karak. The Ma‘aytah is an important member of the Gharaba alliance.

**MAJALI** The “shakhly” tribe of the Gharaba alliance in Karak.

**MANNA‘IN** A nomadic tribe near Tafila. The Manna ‘in is allied with the Huwayyat and
is categorized by the government as a “Southern Bedouin” tribe for voting in legislative elections.

**Mara‘iyya** A semi-nomadic tribe in Jabal Shara. The Mara‘iyya is associated with the Huwayat.

**Masa‘id** A semi-nomadic tribe of the Ahl al-Jabal confederation. The Masa‘id originally immigrated to Jordan from Syria.

**Mashalkha** A semi-nomadic tribe near Wadi Zarqa’.

**Mtriat** One of the tribes of the Bani Sakhr near Madaba.

**Mu‘mina** A large settled farming tribe near Jabal ‘Ajloun.

**Nu‘aymat** A semi-nomadic tribe between Jabal Shara and Wadi al-Hasa. The Nu‘aymat is politically allied with the Huwayat.

**Obeidat** A tribe near Irbid. Many Obeidat have occupied many ministries including office of Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.

**Ruwalla** The largest tribal confederation in the Middle East, located in the northwestern parts of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Ru‘walla is nomadic and come into regular conflict with tribes of Jordan as it ranges into grazing and watering areas inside national boundaries. There are some Ruwalla who have settled in Jordan and become citizens.

**Sa‘idiyyin** A nomadic tribe that roams between Wadi ‘Araba and parts of the Palestinian Territories. The Sa‘idiyyin is categorized by the government as a “Southern Bedouin” tribe for voting in legislative elections.

**Salayta (Salty)** One of the tribes of the Bani Sakhr near Madaba.

**Sardiyya** A semi-nomadic tribe that originally emigrated from Syria. The Sardiyya is now living along the Syrian border.

**Sharafat** A semi-nomadic tribe that originally emigrated from Syria. The Sharafat is part of the Ahl al-Jabal confederation.

**Sharaqa** A tribal alliance near Karak. The Tarwana is the “shakhly” tribe of the Sharaqa. Other tribes belonging to this alliance include the ‘Adayla, Damur, Qatawna, Saraya, and the Su‘ub.

**Sirhan** A nomadic tribe roaming between ‘Ajloun province and Wadi Sirhan. The Sirhan is part of the ahl al-Shimal alliance and is categorized by the government as a “Northern Bedouin” tribe for voting in legislative elections.
**Shubaykat (Shawabka)** The Shubaykat are actually two separate tribes that are part of the Balqawiyya confederation, in Sahab and Madaba.

**Shurayda** A settled tribe in the Kura district in Ajloun province.

**Sukhur al-Ghawr** A semi-nomadic tribe that roams the northern west and east banks of the Jordan River.

**Sulaymaniyyin** One of the tribes of the Huwaytat confederation.

**Tal (Tulul)** An important tribe in Irbid.

**Tarawnah** A semi-nomadic tribe and the “shakhly” family of the Sharaqa alliance, near Karak.

**Tawayha** An important tribe in the Huwaytat confederation.

**‘Umrani** A nomadic tribe that roams between ‘Aqaba and northern Saudi Arabia.

**Wahsh** A part of the al-Hadid near Amman.

**Zaban** One of the tribes of the Bani Sahkr near Madaba.

**Zabid** A semi-nomadic tribe belonging to the Ahl al-Jabal confederation. The Zabid was originally from Syria before emigrating to Jordan.
Appendix B: Jordan Center for Social Research

JORDAN’S 2007 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: Tracking & Exit Polls

Electoral Culture

According to our tracking and exit polls, the most important considerations for voters in choosing their candidate were family and tribal affiliations followed by being a good service provider. The combined factors of “religiosity and party affiliations” (considered a typical IAF vote) did not vary considerably between these districts. Voters in Amman 3rd district laid more emphasis on the importance of the candidates’ electoral campaign than on tribal affiliations.

Cross tabulations of those intending to vote for a political party vs. an independent candidate and the main consideration for choosing one’s candidate reveal that political party affiliation and religiosity are the main consideration for those voting for an IAF candidate, while tribal, family and neighborhood affiliations and providing good services are the predominant considerations for those voting for an independent/tribal candidate. However, the latter considerations are not exclusive to voters for independent candidates: IAF/political party voters take such considerations into account as well.

Recommendations by a friend, thought to be a typical IAF vote canvassing procedure, did not appear to be a relevant consideration for the IAF/political party voter. This result may be an indicator of a loosening of the party’s grip over its base and/or IAF members’ disenchanted with the party.
Religiosity, an indicator of “Islamist” leaning, was not an important consideration in any of the six surveyed districts, neither was the political stance of the candidate. In Irbid 2nd, Karak 1st and Tafileh 1st, tribal and family affiliations played a much more important role than in the Amman and Zarqa districts under study. But here also tribalism and good service provision dominated the voting culture.
With the exception of the combined factors of “religiosity and party affiliations” (considered IAF vote indicators) in Amman 3rd district, there were no significant differences between the two tracking surveys and the exit poll.
Appendix C: Governate (muha fazah) and Electoral Districts (nahias) 2007 Parliamentary Elections

**FIGURE C.1 THE GOVERNATE OF AJLUN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governate</th>
<th>Area (km)</th>
<th>Population (end of 2007 est.)</th>
<th>Density (/km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ajloun</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>131,600</td>
<td>313.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE C.1 2007 ELECTION DATA FOR AJLOUN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007 Election</th>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District: Ajlun</td>
<td>Najih Mohhamad al-Momani</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>7,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad Ta’mah al-Qudah</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>5,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reda Haddad</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>2,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District: Kofranjah</td>
<td>Ayman al-Shwaytat</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE C.2 AJLOUN VOTING STATISTICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voting Age Population</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percent of Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District</td>
<td>53,497</td>
<td>40,874</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District</td>
<td>14,722</td>
<td>11,707</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure C.2 The Governorate of Amman

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governate</th>
<th>Area (km)</th>
<th>Population (end of 2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>7,579</td>
<td>2,220,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure C.3 The Electoral Districts of Amman

- First District: Wadi al-Sayr
- Second District: Amman
- Third District: Um al-Basatin
- Fourth District: al-Jiza
- Fifth District: Sahab
- Sixth District: al-Muwaqqar
- Seventh District: Na’oor
### Table C.3 2007 Election Results for Amman Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>Khalil Atiyyeh</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>14,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jaafar Abdullat</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>12,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hassan Safi</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>8,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Azzam Hneidi</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Hamzah Mansour</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>9,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad al-Kouz</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>7,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hussain al-Kouz</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>7,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yousef al-Qarneh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>6,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>Mamdough al-Abbadi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>11,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmed al-Safadi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>10,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Raheem al-Biqai</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>10,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yousef al-Boustanji</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>8,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tareq Khouri</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>6,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>Khalef al-Raqqad</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>18,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hamad abu Zeid</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>14,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nidal al-Haddid</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>14,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>Mohammad abu Hdeib</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>12,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmad al-Adwan</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>11,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samih Bino</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Circassian</td>
<td>5,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>Nasser al-Qaisi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>11,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lutfi al-Hassan</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>9,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Munir Sobar</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Circassian</td>
<td>5,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adnan al-Ajarmeh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table C.4 2007 Elections Voter Turnout in Amman

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amman</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>172,760</td>
<td>63,103</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>102,684</td>
<td>64,228</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>171,248</td>
<td>81,547</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>133,404</td>
<td>88,937</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>111,650</td>
<td>53,205</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>86,154</td>
<td>51,694</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>27,959</td>
<td>18,888</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure C.4 The Governate of Aqaba**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (km)</th>
<th>Population (end of 2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>120,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jordan Embassy, United States

**Figure C.5 Electoral Districts of Aqaba**

Source: Jordan Embassy, United States

**Table C.5 2007 National Election Results for Aqaba**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District (includes all areas)</td>
<td>Ziad al-Shwaikh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad al-Badri</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Interior, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

**Table C.6 2007 National Election Turnout Data for Aqaba**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percent of Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>19,242</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Statistics, Kingdom of Jordan

TABLE C.7 BALQA’A DISTRICT DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (km)</th>
<th>Population (end of 2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>383,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Amman Jordan

TABLE C.8 2007 ELECTION RESULTS FOR BALQA’A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007 Election Results</th>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District: al-Salt</td>
<td>Mahmoud al-Kharabesheh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hazim al-Nasser</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>4,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yaseen al-Zu’bi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bassam al-Manasir</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mubarak al-Abbadi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sulieman al-Ghneimat</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fakhri Eskandar al-Dawood</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District: Shunah</td>
<td>Mahmoud Ahmad al-Adwan</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third District: Deir Alla</td>
<td>Khalid al-Sattari</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>2,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth District: Ardah</td>
<td>Amneh Gharaghir</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Women’s</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth District: Ardah</td>
<td>Mohammad Khalil Aqel</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ministry of Interior, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*

### TABLE C.9 2007 ELECTION VOTER TURNOUT FOR BALQA’A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Results</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District</td>
<td>104,475</td>
<td>73,332</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5 + 2 Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District</td>
<td>19,631</td>
<td>12,228</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third District</td>
<td>22,834</td>
<td>16,666</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1 + 1 Women’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth District</td>
<td>45,215</td>
<td>19,229</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure C.8 The Governate of Irbid**

**Figure C.9 The Electoral Districts for Irbid**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Irbid</th>
<th>Population (end of 2007 est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,018,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Kingdom of Jordan

---

**Table C.10 2007 National Election Results for Irbid**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District: Irbid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasmi al-Mallah</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>7,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qassem Bani Hani</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>6,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah al-Gharaibeh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>5,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad al-Zanati</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>5,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Ra’uf al-Rawabdeh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>Eligible Voters</td>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>50.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>65.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>72.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>78.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>72.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth District</td>
<td>69.14</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh District</td>
<td>42,648</td>
<td>35,526</td>
<td>79.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2,377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Embassy of the Royal Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, United States
**Figure C.10 The Governate of Jerash**

![Map of Jerash Governorate](image1)

**Figure C.11 The Electoral District for Jerash**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jerash District</th>
<th>Area (km)</th>
<th>Population (end of 2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerash</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>171,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Statistics, Kingdom of Jordan

**Table C.12 2007 National Election Results for Jerash**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jerash District</th>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerash District</td>
<td>Mohammad al-Zreiquat</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>5,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mefleh al-Rheimi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmad al-Otoum</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suliaman Salameh Khalaf</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Interior, Kingdom of Jordan; *Al-Ra’i*

**Table C.13 2007 Voter Turnout for Jerash**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jerash</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerash</td>
<td>69,000</td>
<td>48,867</td>
<td>70.65</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Embassy of the Royal Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, United States

243
Figure C.12 The Governate of Kerak

Figure C.13 The Electoral Districts for Kerak

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kerak electoral districts</th>
<th>Population (2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>223,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Kingdom of Jordan

Table C.14 2007 National Election Results for Kerak by District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kerak</th>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First: Qasabah</td>
<td>Abdul Hamid Dhneibat</td>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Fattah al Ma’aytah</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdullah Ghanem</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>2,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zreiqat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second: Qaser</td>
<td>Abdul Hadi al-Majali</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE C.15 2007 Voter Turnout for Kerak

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kerak</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1+1 Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1+1 Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth District</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Embassy of the Kingdom of Jordan, United States

FIGURE C.14 THE GOVERNATE OF MA’AN

FIGURE C.15 THE ELECTORAL DISTRICTS FOR MA’AN

| Ma’an electoral districts | Area (km) | Population (2007 est.) |
TABLE C.16 2007 NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR MA’AN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ma’an electoral district</th>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First: Ma’an</td>
<td>Tawfiq al-Kreishan</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adel Ibrahim al-Meshri</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>2,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second: al-Shibek &amp; al-Husaynnya</td>
<td>Wasfi al-Rawashdeh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third: Wadi Musa &amp; Ayi</td>
<td>Hani al-Nawafleh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Kingdom of Jordan

TABLE C.17 2007 VOTER TURNOUT DATA FOR MA’AN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District</td>
<td>18,368</td>
<td>13,420</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District</td>
<td>7,209</td>
<td>5,153</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third District</td>
<td>9,258</td>
<td>5,153</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Embassy of the Kingdom of Jordan, United States
FIGURE C.16 THE GOVERNATE OF MADABA

FIGURE C.17 THE ELECTORAL DISTRICTS FOR MADABA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Madaba</th>
<th>Area (km)</th>
<th>Population (2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>940</td>
<td>143,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Kingdom of Jordan

NO DATA AVAILABLE FOR MADABA
**Figure C.18 The Governate of Mafraq**

**Figure C.19 The Electoral Districts for Mafraq**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mafraq Electoral Districts</th>
<th>Area (km)</th>
<th>Population (2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26,541</td>
<td>263,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Statistics, Kingdom of Jordan

**Table C.18 2007 National Election Results for Mafraq**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mafraq Electoral District</th>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First: alMafraq, Sama al-Sarhan, Sabha, Bal’ama</td>
<td>Abdul Karim al-Dughmi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>6,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Seat Status</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tayseer al-Shdeifat</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>5,053</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Omoush al-Husban</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,324</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mefleh Rafali al-Khaza’lah</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, *Al-Ra’i*

**Table C.19 2007 National Election Results for Northern Badia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northern Badia Electoral District</th>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ar-Ruyawshid</td>
<td>Habes al-Shabib</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saed al-Srour</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,559</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowan al-Shurufat</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,499</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, *Al-Ra’i*

**Table C.20 2007 Voter Turnout Data for Mafraq**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governate of Mafraq</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District:</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Badia</td>
<td>48,506</td>
<td>39,543</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Embassy of the Kingdom of Jordan, United States
**FIGURE C.20 THE GOVERNATE OF TAFILEH**

**FIGURE C.21 THE ELECTORAL DISTRICTS FOR TAFILEH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tafileh Electoral Districts</th>
<th>Area (km)</th>
<th>Population (2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.209</td>
<td>852,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Statistics, Kingdom of Jordan

**TABLE C.21 2007 NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR TAFILEH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tafileh Electoral District</th>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First: Al-Tafila</td>
<td>Ibrahim al-Eteiwi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Rahman al- Hanaqtah</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad Abdul al-Awwad</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second: Bisayra</td>
<td>Mohammad Ismael al-Saudi</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>5,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insaf al-Khawaldeh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior
### Table C.22 2007 National Election Results for Central Badia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Badia Electoral District</th>
<th>Representative</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(al-Hasa)</td>
<td>Saleh al-Jbour</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mejhem al-Khreishah</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad al-Shra’a</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>2,926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Al-Ra’i

### Table C.23 Vote Turnout for Tafileh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tafileh Governate</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>25,279</td>
<td>78.49</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District</td>
<td>10,081</td>
<td>8,365</td>
<td>82.70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1+1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Badia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Embassy of the Kingdom of Jordan, United States

*The extra seat in the Second District won during the 2007 national election is a Women’s Quota Seat that is designated by the percentage of the vote won by the Woman Candidate in each district.
Figure C.22 The Governate of Zarqa

Figure C.23 The Electoral Districts for Zarqa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zarqa Electoral Districts</th>
<th>Area (km)</th>
<th>Population (2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,761</td>
<td>852,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Statistics, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Table C.24 2007 National Election Results for Zarqa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zarqa Electoral Districts</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Seat Status</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First: az-Zarqa</td>
<td>Daialla al-‘Omoosh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>6,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fawaz Hamdallah</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>5,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Merza Boulad</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Circassian</td>
<td>5,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bassam Haddadin</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>1,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second: ar-Rusayfah</td>
<td>Musa al-Zawahreh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>5,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Musa al-Khalaileh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farhan al-Ghweiri</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third: al-</td>
<td>Nwwaf al- Zyoud</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>4,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azraq</td>
<td>Reem al-Razzaq</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth: Umm</td>
<td>Marzouq al-Habarneh</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad al-Hajj</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>5,389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Al-Ra’i

**Table C.25 2007 Voter Turnout Data for Zarqa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zarqa Governate</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First District</td>
<td>51,628</td>
<td>41,310</td>
<td>78.49</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3 Muslim, 1 Circassian, 1 Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second District</td>
<td>60,497</td>
<td>30,253</td>
<td>50.351</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third District</td>
<td>21,963</td>
<td>13,178</td>
<td>61.588</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1 Muslim+ 1 Woman*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth District</td>
<td>90,749</td>
<td>30,381</td>
<td>31.759</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Embassy of the Kingdom of Jordan, United States

*The extra seat in the Second District won during the 2007 national election is a Women’s Quota Seat that is designated by the percentage of the vote won by the Woman Candidate in each district.
### APPENDIX D: 2010 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS

**Table D.1 2010 Parliamentary Election Results for All of Jordan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governate</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sub-District</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes Cast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ajloun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ahmed al-Qudeh</td>
<td>6,681</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Samih al-Momani</td>
<td>4,281</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Reza al-Haddad</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ali al-Annanzeh</td>
<td>4,388</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mohammed al-Barayseh</td>
<td>3,233</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Reza al-Haddad</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Khalil Attieh</td>
<td>13,238</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jaffar al-Abdallet</td>
<td>5,806</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hassan Safi</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mohammad al-Barayseh</td>
<td>3,233</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Saleem al-Hadban</td>
<td>2,722</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mohamed Thweib</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mohammed al-Kouz</td>
<td>3,267</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mohammad Halaqa</td>
<td>2,811</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yahya al-Sa’ud</td>
<td>3,618</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ghazi Elia</td>
<td>7,358</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mamdouh al-Abbadi</td>
<td>2,131</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reem Badran</td>
<td>3,792</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Abdul Biqai</td>
<td>2,309</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ahmed al-Safidi</td>
<td>3,099</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Gazi al-Musharbash</td>
<td>3,198</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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