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THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION AND MODERN MEDICAL EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1915-1951

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION AND MODERN MEDICAL EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1915-1951

Abstract

by

QIUSHA MA

This study examines the Rockefeller Foundation's medical program in China in the following contexts: (1) missionary education in China since the second half of the 19th century; (2) medical education reform and the professionalization movement in philanthropy in early 20th-century America; (3) the Chinese new intellectuals' modern reform efforts; and (4) the Chinese government's political agenda. Through its medical programs, the Foundation sought to export scientific knowledge and methods in a scientific institution -- the American research-based medical school. The Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) serves as a prism to study the diverse spectrum of ideas and approaches, American and Chinese, involved in the development of educational and social reform in modern China; these ideas and approaches are interpreted in their respective historical contexts, with hopes of increasing the understanding of cultural exchange programs in general.

There was no single voice in the Rockefeller Foundation's program in China; missionaries and American professionals were the most influential. While the missionaries inspired the Foundation's interest in China, their opinion of medical science often clashed with the Foundation's scientific
philanthropy. On the other hand, in the early 20th century, professionals, particularly medical professionals, profoundly influenced the foundations' policy-making. An international version of the Foundation’s domestic scientific philanthropy, the PUMC was based on the notion that science along with institutional development was a powerful dynamic for social progress and reform.

The Rockefeller Foundation’s effort to change China intertwined with reforms promoted by key Chinese leaders. This study analyzes an important aspect of China’s modern reform: the development of scientific direction. The Foundation’s scientific approach converged with the Chinese new intellectuals’ campaign for science and their criticism of the old culture and traditional medicine. The PUMC was the Foundation’s response to certain Chinese intellectuals, most with Western educational backgrounds, who favored gradual reform and Western ideas. Through medical programs and other work, the Foundation established a mutually trusting and mutually influential relationship with this elite group. Their support of the PUMC laid a foundation for this intercultural program; however, limited knowledge of China’s reality and bias against Chinese rural problems circumscribed the Rockefeller Foundation’s perspective of China’s reality.
To My Father and Mother
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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the Opium War in the 1840s, Western Civilization has challenged Chinese culture. Westerners tried to change Chinese culture; and simultaneously the Chinese people realized their paramount need for survival: CHANGE. In this confrontation of the West and China, both sides resorted to education as one of the most powerful tools to reform China. First the missionaries and later other Westerners, among them the Rockefeller Foundation, introduced new forms of education, which the Chinese government and the Chinese new intellectuals adopted and redefined. New forms of education emphasizing science as well as mass literacy and new educational institutions became some of the most significant historical phenomena in contemporary Chinese history.¹

Within this very broad historical context the Rockefeller Foundation’s medical program in China took place. In 1915, the Rockefeller Foundation launched the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) in Beijing (Peking), China, its first medical program in Asia. This important event became a symbol of the Foundation’s involvement in China’s modern reform. Through

¹ Although the Rockefeller Foundation was formally established in 1913, the Rockefellers (John D. Rockefeller Sr. and Jr.) and their advisers had been working on a philanthropic program in China since 1905. Because it was the same program, I will simply use the Rockefeller Foundation to refer to the leadership of this China work before and after 1913.
its medical program, the Rockefeller Foundation sought to export scientific knowledge and an up-to-date scientific institution -- the American research-based medical school -- to China. The Foundation's interaction with other educational efforts, Chinese and foreign, its relationships with the missionaries, the Chinese government and the Chinese intellectuals allows us to study, with precision, the confrontation and cultural exchange between the West and China.

In cross-cultural studies that explore industrial countries' cultural relations to "less-developed" countries, historians often use "cultural imperialism" as a theory to describe the relationship. This is the approach of studies such as Robert Arnowe, Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: the Foundations at Home and Abroad; Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism; Edward H. Berman, The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy; E. Richard Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men and "Public Health and Imperialism: Early Rockefeller Programs at Home and Abroad"; and Saul Franco Agudelo, "the Rockefeller Foundation's Antimalarial Program in Latin America: Donating or Dominating?" These studies describe the following motives of these

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international philanthropists: the protection of the productivity of those areas under the United States' influence; the development of foreign market for US products; the colonization of third world education; the control of native social elites through the mechanisms of cultural hegemony; and in general the use of philanthropy as a tool of imperial US political and economic interests abroad.

Although it is very important for American historians to acknowledge these aspects of American international philanthropy, it is also important today to acknowledge that the story was more complicated. The conception of "cultural imperialism" itself does not have a clear definition; furthermore, cultural exchanges have taken place in a much broader context and with more complicated relationships than the concept of imperialism claimed. Emphasizing the foundations' national political and economic motives may cause historians to overlook many other factors involved.

Some current studies of the Rockefeller Foundation's programs in Latin America emphasize the role of social history of Latin America as an important factor in shaping the character and the impact of American international philanthropy in their studies. Marcos Cueto ed., _Missionaries of Science, the Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America_ collects some of these works. Cueto and his colleagues studied Latin America materials and paid special attention to the local reception of and responses to U. S. philanthropy.

The same perspective should be used to interpret the Rockefeller Foundation’s work in Asia. So far, there are very few such studies on the Foundation’s work in China. Chiang Yung-chen’s study of the Foundation’s involvement of China’s social science is along these lines; it analyzes the convergence of the Foundation’s notion of changing China and Chinese intellectuals’ ideas of using social science to engineer China’s reform.³

Generally speaking, this study of the influence of the Rockefeller Foundation on China’s modern medical education has relevance to the following studies: the development of American foundations; the development of the American medical profession; Protestant missionaries in China; and China’s modernization movement. A great deal of literature has been published on each of these topics. These studies offer rich information and general background, and most of all, many insightful opinions and analyses. Without them one can not even begin to understand such a complex intercultural and international event as the Peking Union Medical College. Therefore, they are integral part of the background for this study. Because all of these topics are broad, complex, and sometimes controversial, they have attracted many different opinions, arguments, and questions have been raised.

As one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s biggest enterprises, the PUMC and the China Medical Board (CMB) have attracted much attention in the

Three monographs about the PUMC and the CMB have been published since 1970. They are Mary Ferguson’s *China Medical Board and Peking Union Medical College. A Chronicle of Fruitful Collaboration 1914–1951*, John Z. Bowers’ *Western Medicine in A Chinese Palace*, and Mary Bullock’s *An American Transplant, the Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College.*

Having worked as a registrar in the PUMC during the 1920s and the 1930s, Ferguson offered many valuable first hand observations and historical records of the college in operation, and particularly of its American administration. Bowers’ study, on the other hand, focused on the PUMC’s medical achievement. Bullock’s book presents the first and only comprehensive history of the PUMC. It covered the entire period when the PUMC was under the Rockefeller Foundation’s control and related the New PUMC (the PUMC after 1951) to its legacy. There are also numbers of articles about the related

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4. There is no any serious historical study about this topic published in Chinese. A book titled *Zhongguo xiehe yike daxue xiaoshi* (A history of the PUMC) was published in 1989. It is a chronicle record of teaching and researching programs in the PUMC and mainly focuses on the period after 1951, the year when the central government of the People’s Republic of China took over the college and reformed it into a state owned medical school. This book offers a very brief account about the PUMC before 1951.

issues.

No doubt, all these studies are valuable and helpful in understanding both the PUMC and the Foundation's programs abroad. However, all the previous studies have treated their subjects mainly from an isolated perspective, rather than from a comparative one; and few have focused on interactive relationships between different programs or various social groups. Furthermore, historians have given scant attention to Chinese social or political history, the Chinese reactions to American philanthropy, and the Chinese impact on such intercultural and international activities.

The Peking Union Medical College was the Rockefeller Foundation's earliest and most expensive international program. Called the Johns Hopkins Medical College in China, it was the best medical school in the whole of Asia before World War II, and it is still the paramount medical research and education center in China today. Thus, this program (the PUMC and the CMB) offers a significant case for us to understand not only the Rockefeller Foundation's early international philanthropy, but also the Chinese reception of and response to such an intercultural program. This dissertation is not a history of a medical school. Rather, it is a case study of the factors—Chinese as well as American—that shaped the Rockefeller Foundation's policy of its international philanthropy and thus more generally of the relationships that influenced the confrontation between China and the West.

This study basically focuses on two aspects. First, it presents a more
complex and analytical account of the Rockefeller Foundation's program search and policy-making. It emphasizes the fact that there was no single voice in the Foundation's decision; however, the missionaries and the professionals were the most influential groups. While the missionaries inspired the Foundation's interest in China, they derived their opinion on medical science from American culture after the Civil War and thus it was not necessarily in accord with the Foundation's scientific philanthropy.

On the other hand, in the early 20th century the professionals, and the medical professionals in particular, had profound influence on the big foundations' policy-making. At that time, the Rockefeller philanthropy was reforming medical education in the United States. The concept of modern science and institutional effort to pursue an "ideal" medical profession during this reform restricted the Rockefeller Foundation's perception of the China Problem. The PUMC was an international version of the Foundation's domestic scientific philanthropy, based on a notion that science along with institutional development offered a very powerful dynamic for social progress and reform.

Second, this dissertation analyzes a very important aspect of China's modern reform during the first third of the 20th century: the implementation of science to direct the development of a new culture. The Rockefeller Foundation's effort to change China became intertwined with the reforms promoted by key Chinese intellectual leaders themselves. In this broad context
it explains how the Foundation’s scientific approach converged with the 
Chinese new intellectuals’ advocacy of science and with their criticisms of the 
old culture and the traditional medicine. This study interprets the Peking Union 
Medical College’s model as the Rockefeller Foundation’s response to certain 
Chinese intellectuals, almost all of whom had Western educational 
backgrounds, and favored the gradual reform and Western ideas.

Through the PUMC and other work, the Foundation established a 
relationship with this intellectual elite, fostering mutual trust and influence. 
The intellectuals’ support of the Rockefeller Philanthropy’s China adventure 
laid a strong foundation for this intercultural program; at the same time, 
however, their limited knowledge of China’s reality and their bias against the 
Chinese rural problem circumscribed the Foundation leaders comprehension of 
China’s reality. Chinese intellectuals at that specific period held extremely 
divergent reform ideas, but this study highlights the ideas of the elite group 
involved with the PUMC because they were so influential within the 
Guomindang government as well as with the Rockefeller Foundation.

As an institution, the PUMC allowed Chinese scientists to communicate 
with international scientists and to get in touch with the newest developments 
in medicine; with this understanding, the Chinese intellectuals who supported 
the PUMC did so because they believed it essential that China participated in 
international science and medicine. However, after the May Fourth Movement 
in 1919 the intellectuals split profoundly. While many turned to a more radical
solution, including revolution, many others headed toward a new direction: rural reconstruction. Again, there were different approaches in this movement too. During the 1930s, this new trend of rural reform influenced some of the leaders of the Rockefeller Foundation and soon identified the Foundation with a specific approach: the Mass Education Movement in Ding County. The launching of this new China Program reflected (1) the Rockefeller Foundation’s new interest in social policy in general; (2) the Foundation’s broadened contact with a new group of Chinese intellectuals; (3) the Foundation’s desire to co-operate with the Chinese government; and (4) as with the PUMC, the use of well trained professionals and some well organized institutions to promote its mission.

This study does not intend to identify itself with any terminology such as cultural imperialism or altruism, or to use any arbitrary or moral standard to judge the Rockefeller Foundation’s work in China. Instead, it seeks to explain why the Rockefeller Foundation acted as it did in China, and to the consequences of its actions. Furthermore, this research seeks to determine what we can learn from this intercultural event. The basic method employed here is to let historical materials speak for themselves, to keep as much as possible of the original language, and to place the views of participants in their historical contexts and connections.

In brief, this study uses the Rockefeller Foundation’s medical program as a prism to study the diverse spectrum of ideas and approaches, American
and Chinese, involved in the development of education and social reform in modern China during the Republic China (the 1910s to the 1930s). These ideas and approaches are interpreted in their respective historical contexts, with the hope of shedding light on understanding cultural exchange programs in general.

This dissertation includes seven chapters. Chapter one is an introduction that presents the main theme, previous relevant literature, and theoretical frame as well as the research method. Chapter two is a brief summary depicting the state of China's modern education prior to the Rockefeller Foundation's appearance in China. Chapter three focuses on the Foundation's interest in China, and on the influence the American Christian missionaries' as well as modern professionals' influences in shaping the Foundation's interest. Chapter Three also discusses the Foundation's desire to influence the Chinese government's education policy. Chapter Four compares American educational and medical professionals' notions of medical education with the missionaries' opinions on this subject. It focuses on the impact of these divergent opinions on the Rockefeller Foundation's decision to establish a world-level medical school in China and to find a for missionary educational institutions in the reform of Chinese medicine. Chapter Five examines some major events in China’s modern reform relevant to the Foundation's China program and how the Rockefeller Foundation’s approach fit into China’s
political and ideological movements, emphasizing the mutually influential relationship between the Foundation and some Chinese intellectual elites. Chapter Six is about the mechanisms the Foundation employed to pursue the goals it imposed on this PUMC project. By examining the Foundation’s dilemma in fulfilling its ambitions in China, this chapter analyzes the gaps between the Foundation’s means and ends, and various factors that affected the Foundation’s conduct of this international philanthropic enterprise. Chapter Seven concludes the study and emphasizes the importance of this study to current events, especially the appearance of many non-governmental organizations in China during the past decade.
Chapter Two

MODERN EDUCATION IN 19TH CENTURY CHINA:
CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES AND THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

The Rockefeller Foundation's Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) established an Americanized, non-religious and private medical school in China in 1915, at a time when China had no such institution. However, prior to the Foundation's arrival, missionaries had been developing medical education in China for almost one hundred years. Simultaneously, the Chinese government and Chinese private individuals and groups as well were promoting their own institutions incorporating Western learning. Although these new style schools did not dominate Chinese education until the early 20th century, their importance and impact on missionary education had become quite clear in the late 19th century.

These two parallel, yet conflicting modern educational systems--those of the missionaries and the Chinese government--were the reality that faced the Rockefeller Foundation. When the Foundation considered playing a role in China's reform, not only did it need to understand complicated situation in China, but it also had to determine its future relationships with both of the missionaries and the Chinese. The state of missionary education and Chinese governmental education and their conflicts as well as mutual dependence were critical factors in the Rockefeller Foundation's program search and policy.
making for its China venture. To a certain extent the Foundation built its work upon the previous educational and medical developments. Thus, if we are to understand the Rockefeller Foundation's approach to China's modern reform, we need to begin with a brief review of the state of modern education in China in the 19th century.

Much research concerning the work of missionaries in China exists, mostly in English, but also some in Chinese. It is impossible and unnecessary to summarize or repeat all of these studies. In the following pages, the discussion will mainly focus on the interacting and competing relations between the missionary education and the Chinese governmental education, and the consequent self-improving movement the missionaries conducted to improve their systems based on the influence of the other system.¹ This comparison of the two educational systems is not only highly relevant to a study of the Foundation's work in China, but also is a area previous researchers have largely ignored.

The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) inherited the educational system of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), in which governmental/public schools and private

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¹ This missionary self-improving movement took place in the late 19th century and continued through the first three decades of the 20th century, when missionary education was under the pressure of the Chinese government and Chinese education. The missionary educators decided to improve their institution and educational conduct, with the hope of maintaining the superiority of missionary education. Extensive discussion will be given in the later part of this chapter.
schools existed simultaneously. The governmental education system basically consisted of two levels: central governmental schools and local schools. On the one hand, the government established a very comprehensive and hierarchical system, from the national academy (guo zi jian) in Beijing to village schools (shexue) and charitable schools (yixue) at the lowest level. On the other hand, the governmental funding and direction were very inadequate, particularly during the late years of the regime. The ruling class Manchu aristocracy enjoyed special prestige in governmental schools; and in order to control the Han intellectuals, the Manchu government prohibited private shuyuan (provincial academies).

Private schools also existed at several levels, from elementary schools

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2 The Qing Dynasty was ruled by Manchu aristocracy. Manchu is a minority nationality in China which originally inhabited North-East China (Manchuria). In 1644 it overthrew the Ming Dynasty (ruled by Han nationality, the majority of the Chinese) and established the Qing Dynasty. The Qing Dynasty was overthrown by the 1911 Revolution led by the Han nationalists. The Qing education system followed the Han people's tradition and system. The brief summary of traditional Chinese education mainly incorporates the following books: Sun Peiqing, ed. Zhongguo jiaoyu shi (A history of Chinese education, Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 1991); Shu Xin Cheng, ed. Zhongguo jindai jiaoyu shi ziliao (A collection of materials of contemporary Chinese education, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1961, 3 vols); Chen Xuexun, ed. Zhongguo jindai jiaoyu shi jiaoxue cankao ziliao (Reference materials for teaching modern Chinese education, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1987, 3 vols).

3 Shuyuan started in the Tang Dynasty (618-907) and reaching a peak during the Sung Dynasty (960-1279). Although the Qing Court restricted the development of private education at higher levels, it never quite succeeded. Shuyuan became an important part of private higher education in the late Qing dynasty and were reformed into modern educational institutions after the 1905 education reform. See Sun Peiqing, ed. 458-463.
(sishu, a general name for private schools or tutorial classes, and jiaishu, schools for lineage members) to provincial academies. Private education not only provided primary education to the majority of the population, but also was an indispensable component in promoting students to study beyond the local level and in preparing them for all levels of examinations. The private schools were funded in several ways. While clan systems and family lineages sponsored the majority of them, others were established and/or managed by various social elites, including merchants, military elite or retired officials. The elite-supported private schools might even constitute the majority, or at least a impressive portion, of the educational institutions in a specific area, especially economically advanced areas such as the lower and Middle Yangtze, and the Canton Delta.

Recently, some Western scholars have published exiting works on the issue of "civil society in contemporary China" and attracted much attention. Some of these studies discuss the existence of elite-support private schools in Zhejiang province and Hankow and explicate their importance in local social and political structures. From educational point of view, however, some

important issues remain for further study. For example, what were the fundamental distinction between private education and the governmental schools? In other words, how independent were these private educational institutions from the government authority? What were the roles of the private schools in promoting the variety of institutional forms, teaching methods, and curriculums?

Two features of the traditional education system greatly affected the development of missionary education in China. The first was the relationship between governmental education and private education. Although governmental schools and private schools were financed and sometimes managed differently, generally they were not in opposition with one another. Private education was an indispensable complement to government education. However, in both public or private education the teaching philosophy, methods, and contents were all fundamentally determined by the very purpose of traditional education, namely to pass the imperial examinations (keju kaoshi) and thus

In general, these historians debate whether outside the government there were "civil societies" in contemporary China, and what were their social functions and their relationships with the government. "Civil societies" were defined largely by German social philosopher Juergen Habermas. "The notion 'civil society' expressed a programme of building independent forms of social life from below, free from state tutelage." [Charles Taylor, "Modes of civil society". Public Culture, 3, 1.] Other terms for this kind of organizations are non-state or non-governmental organizations.
allow individuals pursue official careers. In the earliest study of the Chinese education system Kuo Ping Wen (1915) depicted this system by saying:

There is nothing approaching a system of common schools maintained by the state....Popular education is almost entirely left to private enterprise and public charity, the government contenting itself with gathering the choicest fruits and encouraging their production by rewards in the way of degrees, official titles, and other public recognition.6

Because the central government firmly controlled the policy regarding this examination system all educational institutions were designed to prepare students for these examinations, no matter who supported or ran the schools. Thus in this way, and not by funding or even by supervision, the government controlled education as a whole. An edict on education issued by emperor Kangxi (1662-1722) of the Qing Dynasty clearly expressed the purposes of such a system. Two of the sixteen purposes especially show the government's intention to control the educated people: one insisted on "opening schools in order to correct scholars' behavior:" and another to "abolish heterodoxy in order to build authority."7 In other words, scholars should draw ideas only from old classics. Thus, the education system played a dual function: while it

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5 The imperial examination system started during the Sui Dynasty (581-618 A.D.) and since the Tang Dynasty (618-907) became a substantial system for the selection of government civil services as well as military services. The initial purpose of such a system was to break down the hereditary system of selecting the civil officials that had existed before the Sui Dynasty.


was nurturing a small group of youth to serve the ruling system, it was also
designed to help the government control people's thoughts.

Nevertheless, since the late Qing regime the importance of private
education in general and elite-supported schools in particular were increasing
as local gentry elites were fighting for local self-government. They had always
been more flexible than public schools regarding school management and
adaptation to local social networks. After the Qing Court abandoned the
imperial examinations (1905), private schools received more autonomy, and
became a very active and important force in the development of modern
education. Furthermore, because elite-supported schools were integrated into
local politics, during the late Qing and early Republic period educational
institutions became one of the most important means for establishing or
maintaining local power. Therefore, in many local areas, non-governmental,
elite-supported schools grew more rapidly than other new forms of local
institutions.  

The Chinese government's education policy had a great impact on
missionary education. As long as the government used its traditional
examination system to select officials, missionary education could hardly
become attractive or useful to the majority of the Chinese youth, especially
sons of the gentry class. Missionary educators were well aware of the key role
of the imperial examinations in Chinese education, and they worked hard to

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8 See Mary B. Rankin, chapter six.
persuade the Chinese to abandon this system.

Second, as a direct product of this education-examination system, the Chinese literati class was a very conservative force, inclined to oppose any social reform or ideological deviation. Missionary educators were well aware of this fact. In his The Educational Conquest of the Far East (1903), Robert Lewis, a missionary educator, pointed out that the "literary caste" (as he called it) was, up to 1898, the most absolutely conservative group in all matters pertaining to Western civilization or progress, commercial and educational.\(^9\) Arthur H. Smith, a famous missionary writer on China, once criticized the system saying that

\[
\text{[i]t would be difficult for us to overestimate the influence, as a conservative force, of having the only men in the community who know anything, to know nothing else than the opinions of philosophers who lived more than a thousand years ago.}\(^{10}\)
\]

Culturally, the very existence of the literati was the biggest obstacle for missionaries in their efforts to disseminate Christianity. Institutionally, the unique system of traditional education, either under government control or under that provided by the clan system and social elites, successfully excluded missionaries from the mainstream until the Qing Court changed its educational policy in its later years. On the other hand, from the missionaries’ point of


view, traditional education was incompatible with modern education in both ideas and content. As a missionary educator said, "no element of the old [education system] possessed sufficient vitality or adaptability to serve as a germ or rallying point from which to elaborate a new one."\textsuperscript{11} Therefore, missionaries had no chance to develop their schools or classes in such a system. If they wanted to educate the Chinese, they had to open their own institutions and staff them. Not only was this a burden to missions financially, it also involved them in a controversial issue, namely whether missionaries should conduct such "secular work".

Nevertheless, regarding the institutional development, the very existence of Chinese private schools was an indispensable factor for the Chinese to adopt missionary educational models later on. Non-governmental organizations were not strange to Chinese society. The Chinese had their own ideas and mechanisms in managing private social institutions, and their experience in creating and continuing private schools definitely helped them to build modern private schools. (This point will be discussed later.)

In summary, then, Chinese social and educational institutions were very different from those of the West. When European and American Protestant missionaries arrived in China, they had to face this reality. There were no religious groups like those in their own societies which they could easily

contact and with whom they could co-operate. either in their evangelical or educational work. They were excluded from existing social organizations not only because of ideological differences between them and the Chinese, but also because of the exclusive nature of the Chinese social system and the gentry stratum.

The primary purpose of the Christian missionaries in China was to convert the Chinese to Christianity, not to develop modern education for them. However, almost from the beginning Christian missionaries did conduct schools, even though the Chinese government never officially allowed them to do so. 12 Eventually, this educational work became their most important achievement. In the process, missionary educators experienced a difficult time, mixed with frustration and inspiration. The fluctuation of their work directly reflected corresponding Chinese political situations. In the first hundred years of missionary education, three stages are evident, paralleling the development of the modern reform movement in China.

The earliest Chinese Christian school was established in 1818 in

12 None of the early unequal treaties between the Qing government and the Western powers conceded the right of opening schools in China to foreigners, although the Sino-French Whampoa Treaty and the Sino-American Burlingame Treaty mentioned the possibility of French and American missionaries establishing schools to teach foreign children. Not until the Ministry of Education decision on October 3, 1906 was the existence of many missionary schools recognized legally. See Jerome Ch’en, China and the West, Society and Culture, 1815-1937, (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979).
Malacca (Singapore) by Robert Morrison, who was sent to China by the London Missionary Society in 1807. This school could not be located in Canton or Macao because the Qing Court prohibited any missionary institution at that time. Morrison's school had a dual mission: to teach Western missionaries the Chinese language before they went to China and to convert and train young overseas Chinese to become Christian clergy. Morrison hoped that "the light of science and revelation will, by means of this institution, peacefully and gradually shed their lustre on the Eastern limit of Asia and the islands of the rising sun."\(^\text{13}\) However, the school was, as Kenneth Latourette concluded, much ahead of its time and did not fulfil its founders' expectations.\(^\text{14}\)

During the 1830s and 1840s, missionary schools gradually appeared in the southern coastal cities. After the 1850s, schools increasingly became the main feature of missionary programs. In the south eastern provinces, wherever there was a church, there often was a mission school. Rejected by the Chinese gentry class, the early missionary "schools" could open only to the lowest social groups: orphans, young beggars, or children from poor families. In his China and the Christian Colleges, 1850-1950, Jessie G. Lutz described how missionaries and their wives


\(^\text{14}\) ibid, 215.
opened classes in their own homes or rented a room in which they could offer Biblical instruction while a Chinese provided the traditional curriculum emphasizing the Confucian classics. Missionary wives gave instruction in needlework, Chinese characters, and the Christian religion to a few orphans or former slave girls. Since it was difficult to attract pupils without offering free room and board, many of the classes quickly evolved into boarding schools.\footnote{15}

Meanwhile, missionaries gradually built up medical education. Because medical missionaries were always in short supply, training some Chinese medical assistants was necessary. Although most British and American medical missionaries had received modern medical education, in China they "had to return to the outmoded master-apprentice method because of the circumstances prevailing at the time."\footnote{16} According to J. B. Neal's investigation of 1897, thirty-nine missionary hospitals out of sixty had "medical students". But only five of them had more than ten students, others only had two to six students.\footnote{17}

This was the early stage of missionary education in China. At this period, and even much later, mission schools had neither formal curricula nor teaching standards; they could hardly be taken as modern educational institutions. Since the major task of these institutions was to enable the missionaries to contact and convert the Chinese people, academic standards


\footnote{16} G. H. Choa, "\textit{Heal the Sick} Was Their Motto, the Protestant Medical Missionaries in China", (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1990) 65.

\footnote{17} Li Tao, \textit{Yixue shigang} (A brief history of medicine. Shanghai: the Chinese Medicine Association, 1940.) 289.
were not at all an issue to them. It was true that they taught Chinese believers and their children how to read, and that they trained Chinese medical assistants. They did so, not because at that time they clearly realized the very usefulness of education and medical work, as their successors did, but because that "secular work" was practically needed. In other words, without the ability to read, Chinese people could not study the Bible; without basic medical knowledge, Chinese people could not help care for the sick.

Before the 1860s, missionary schools had little if any influence on traditional education and Chinese gentry. Not only were they all at a lower level, they were also quite limited in number and size. It was very difficult for mission schools to attract children from gentry families. Although mission schools presented new ideas, new knowledge, and modern methods of teaching, they had not yet challenged traditional Confucian education.

In the first half of the 19th century, the idea that missionaries should develop institutions for education, medical care, or other secular services was not very popular. The purpose of missionary education at that time was not to replace or even to compete with traditional education. In contrast to their late nineteenth century successors, early Protestant missionaries did not think Western science an important tool in religious conversion; nor did they seek to convert Chinese culture to Western civilization, as the Rockefeller Foundation tried to do in the 20th century. Lutz pointed out that missionaries
at first showed little interest in Chinese culture, and even the founding of schools and hospitals was considered incidental to the task of
evangelization. ... They were interested in the conversion of individuals, and they frequently considered an individual’s religious beliefs separable from other aspects of the culture.¹⁸

The real impact of missionaries and their education on Chinese politics and education started during the 1860s when some of the Chinese politicians as well as intellectuals started to champion a Westernization Movement (yangwu yundong). The desperate need for a formula to save the Qing Court after its defeat during the Second Opium War (1856-1860) was increased by the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864). Some perceptive politicians, among them Li Hongzhang, Zeng Guofan and Prince Gong (Yixin), espoused Western knowledge and technology to strengthen the country. The development of Western learning and modern industry was the core of this Westernization Movement between the 1860s and 1890s.

New government schools were established at that time. Tong Wen Guan (Beijing Language School, 1862-1901), the first government school, is a good example of how missionaries and their ideas affected the government’s new educational programs.¹⁹ Although the government mistrusted most of the

¹⁸ Lutz, 10-11.

foreign teachers, especially those in missions, the lack of qualified Chinese
teachers made these foreigners indispensable. Amongst the earliest foreign
teachers were the British missionary J. S. Burdon and the French missionary
Smorrenberg [no first name was mentioned in related materials], and later the
American missionary W. A. P. Martin.

In 1869, Martin was invited to assume the presidency of *Tong Wen Guan*, under the recommendation of Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector General of
Chinese Maritime Customs. At first Martin was reluctant to teach at *Tong Wen Guan*, because he thought taking care of ten boys who were learning nothing
but English was a waste of his time. But two Chinese ministers in *Zongli Yamen* (the Department of Foreign Affairs) promised him bigger prospects for
*Tong Wen Guan*. Martin later came to see that this institution could "open a
field of influence much wider than I could find in the wayside chapels of
Peking."\(^{20}\)

Martin served as the president of the school for over twenty-five years.
Under his influence and that of other missionaries, the school developed from
a simple language school into an institution offering a comprehensive
curriculum, including courses in the sciences as well as the humanities. There
was no grade system in Chinese traditional schools. The level students should
be in or number of years they had to study usually depended on teachers'  

Company, 1896) 297-298.
opinions. In *Tong Wen Guan*, a five year curriculum and an eight year curriculum gradually evolved. At the same time the school institutionalized itself by adopting admission standards and an examination system. In the traditional system, education was mainly associated with an official career. But *Tong Wen Guan*, and later other modern schools, started to address vocational education. The teaching method also tried to combine both book knowledge and practical applications.

The most significant impact of such modern schools was on the imperial examinations. In 1887, *Zongli Yamen* decreed the provincial examinations must include a math test. Thirty-two students of *Tong Wen Guan* and some *jiansheng* (traditional students in the intermediate level) took this examination, which was the first to include a modern science portion.\(^{21}\) This change encouraged Martin, who believed that the principal achievement of this school was

the introduction (though limited) of science into the civil-service examination. This measure, decreed in 1887, had been under deliberation for twenty years; governors and viceroyys had recommended it, but it was not adopted until the government obtained, through our college, some conception of the nature and scope of modern science.\(^{22}\)

*Tong Wen Guan* was among the earliest government schools directly influenced by Protestant missionaries, who in this way penetrated the wall of

\(^{21}\) Ho Yuchen, "Lun yangwu pai zhongti xiyong de wenhua zhengce" (On the cultural policy of Westernization reformers), *Gong Shudio*, 315-325.

the Chinese literati and began to play a much bigger role in Chinese education. Many other Chinese institutions later followed its ideas and system. Among them was the famous Peking University which "was to become within two decades the center of an epochal and vigorous cultural renaissance and within four decades one of the great educational institutions of the world."\(^{23}\)

The missionaries’ involvement in the earliest government schools revealed to them the potential importance of education as a way to influence the Chinese government and the gentry class as well. As a result, after the 1870s some missionaries, most of them Americans, strongly advocated Christian education in China, especially at the higher level. From 1875 to 1899, mission schools increased rapidly, the total number growing from eight hundred in 1875 to three thousand around 1899. Ten percent of the missionary schools were middle schools.\(^{24}\) Some ambitious missionaries even developed their schools, in name at least, into high schools or colleges. Toward the end of the 19th century, there were about twenty such would-be universities or colleges around the country.\(^{25}\)

However, many missionaries questioned the legitimacy of missionaries’ secular work in fields such as education and medicine and felt that only evangelical work was proper. Serious debates took place in two general

\(^{23}\) Biggerstaff, 153.

\(^{24}\) Ye Xiaoqing, "Jindai xifang keji de yinjin ji qi yingxiang" (On the influence of importing modern science and technology), Gung Shudo, 507-530.

\(^{25}\) Lutz, 26.
conferences of the Protestant missionaries in China (1877 and 1890.)

In the 1877 Conference, Calvin Mateer, president of Dengzhou (Tengchow) College, fervently defended missionary education. He argued that

The object with an army, is not merely to kill, wound or capture as many as possible of the enemy, but to conquer them....So with the church, her object is not only to convert as many individuals as possible, but also to subdue the nations as a whole to Christ, to pull down the fortifications of heathenism, destroy the faith which supports it,....

Mateer asserted that considering all means, none was more important than the education of the young. For him that was the most effective way to control China's future. He had already perceived the tide of Western civilization and progress rolling in upon China. He emphasized the importance of this tide to the missionaries' work:

There are two sufficient reasons why Christian Missionaries should strive to prepare men to lead in the great transformation.... First,...true science and the arts which proceed from it, will effectually uproot heathen superstition, and prepare a highway for the general triumph of Christianity.... Second...if conscientious and Christian men are not forthcoming to control and direct this movement, it will be controlled by heathen and infidel men. Science and art and material improvement will fall into the hands of the enemies of Christianity, and will be used by them as a mighty engine to hinder the progress of truth and

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righteousness. Science is either the ally of religion, or her most
dangerous enemy.\textsuperscript{28}

It is very clear that these missionaries had perceived changes in the
attitude of Chinese intellectuals and the government as well toward Western
civilization. They foresaw the tendency of bigger and deeper changes and
wanted to lead the tide because they sensed the danger that once armed with
modern science, the Chinese who had strongly resisted Christianity would be
completely beyond their control.

Another point missionary educators made was that only educated men
could become leaders of Chinese society. Thus they argued, missionaries
should be an important part, if not the only one, in training these aspiring
young men for China. Mateer again strongly stated that

In any community the educated men are the influential men. They
control the sentiments and opinions of society. It will pay us better, as
missionaries, to educate thoroughly one man, who will exert through
life the predominant influence of an educated man, than to educate
poorly half-a-dozen men, whose education gives them no position in
society....The bulwark of Confucianism is its educated men. If we are
going to displace Confucianism in the minds of the people and wrest
from its educated men the position they now hold, we must prepare
men, educated in Christianity and in science, who will be able to
outshine them. The circumstances in China give us a great advantage.\textsuperscript{29}

Not everyone agreed with Mateer, even those who were engaged in

\textsuperscript{28} ibid. 174.

\textsuperscript{29} Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China,
Held at Shanghai, May 7-20, 1890. (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission
Press, 1890), 457-459.
educational work. The questions here were: first, should missionaries spend so much of their time and money on such indirect conversion work, especially considering their limited resources? Second, could education or medicine really help convert the Chinese? Devello A. Sheffield, the president of North China College, pointed out that "experience in the oldest fields had taught the missionaries that secular education did not of itself bring men nearer to Christ; and it had been found that men simply taught in Western science were harder to be reached by the Gospel than the heathen." Missionaries later used this argument to criticize the governmental education and to advocate the value of the missionary schools.

There is no question these two conferences promoted missionary education, even though opinions on this issue varied. By 1907 A. Smith was convinced that the tendency to question the wisdom of laying so much stress upon education had passed away. Yet as late as the 1910s, when more than half of the missionaries were directly engaged in various kinds of institutional work, some missionaries, opposed to secular work, voiced criticism of such work. Some complained that institutional work did not bring more converts into churches. For example, hospitals were considered the best institutions to attract indigenous people to missionaries. Reports of the Medical Missionary Society from 1861 to 1872, mentioned only twelve converts were mentioned,

30 Records (1878), 203.

out of a total of 400,000 patients. An 1874 review of the forty-years of work of the first modern hospital that Peter Parker started in Canton concluded that, as a converting agency, the hospital had been a failure.32

This was the second stage of missionary education. During this period as the Chinese government made some major changes regarding Western learning, many missionaries adapted to the new situation accordingly and placed much more weight on education and medicine. It was the government itself that opened the avenue for missionaries to influence Chinese education; however, it did so with great reluctance. The Westernization movement was indeed only an expedient measure for an urgent situation. Not only was there serious criticism of new schools as well as of the entire movement, but among those who called for Westernization, the understanding of modern education was narrow and limited. In Prince Gung’s mind, for example, the immediate goal for Tong Wen Guan was to train qualified translators to handle foreign affairs. Li Hongzhang had seen beyond this, but believed Western learning was just technique and certain kind of knowledge. In other words, these Chinese leaders’ mentality was still trammelled in traditional classics and unable to go beyond "zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong" (the Chinese classics were the essence, and the Western study was only a tool.)

Under these circumstances, any systematic change in education was impossible. When in 1882 Mateer presented a report (Xixue kaolue, An

32 G. H. Choa, 89.
enquiry into education in the West) about his two-year investigation of
European, American and Japanese education and suggested a thorough reform
following the Western system for Tong Wen Guan, he failed to get any support
from Zongli Yamen. The second period of missionary education ended with the
failure of the Westernization Movement.

The defeat of the Qing troops and warships in the Sino-Japanese War
(1894-1895) shocked the Court as well as the people and revealed the total
inadequacy of the Westernization movement. After the war thirteen hundred
juren (scholars who passed doctoral degree examination), headed by Kang
Youwei, submitted a written statement to the Emperor asking for a
comprehensive reform of China’s politics, economy, military affairs and
culture. This famous event (gongche shangshu) inaugurated the One Hundred
Days Reform (1898), in which education reform was a key measure; thereby,
missionary education also entered into a new stage.

Liang Qichao a leader of this reform pointed out that "[i]n one word,
the essence of the reform is to foster qualified personnel, and that depends on
the opening of schools; the establishment of modern schools relies on the
change of the examination system. To achieve all these goals is decided by
changing the old civil service system."\(^{33}\) This time diverging from the

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\(^{33}\) Liang Qichao, "Bianfa tongyi" (On reform), Li Huaxing and Wu Jiaxin
eds., Liang Qichao xuanji, (The collection of Lang Qichao,) (Shanghai: Shanghai
Westernization Movement, the reformers were no longer satisfied with superficial studies of Western technology. Now they were asking for a whole new system for education.

One should not neglect the profound influence of missionaries upon this educational reform. It was they who during the previous twenty years called for a systematic reform of China's national education. They had tried to persuade the government that nothing was more important than educational reform, even though the Chinese needed to do many things to strengthen their country. One influential missionary was Young Allen, the editor of Wan Guo Gongbao (Review of the Times) published monthly between 1868 and 1907 and one of the earliest modern newspapers in China. He asserted that "[t]o educate talented men was of the first significance." Missionaries also wrote books on the Western education system and helped Chinese publishing houses to translate a great many textbooks for new schools.

During the One Hundred Days Reform, the government enforced many edicts on educational reform issued by Emperor Guang Xu, including abandoning the eight-legged essay for examinations; opening all levels of schools, with both Chinese and Western learning, to Chinese youth; and reforming shuyuan (provincial academies, governmental and private.) All of these measures were very close to the ideas that missionaries had been

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34 Young J. Allen, ed. (in Chinese) Zhongdong zhanji benmo (A history of wars in the Middle East), (Guang Xue Hui, 1894-1897), Vol.8, 8.
suggesting for years. Timothy Richard, a famous missionary who worked in China for over forty-five years, once wrote to his wife about Kang Youwei's *gongche shangshu*: "There I was astounded to find almost all the various suggestions I have made boiled down and condensed into a marvelously small compass. No wonder he [Kang Youwei] came to call upon me when we had so much in common."\(^{35}\) Kang later also admitted that "I owe my conversion to reform chiefly to the writings of two missionaries, the Reverend Timothy Richard and the Reverend Dr. Young J. Allen."\(^{36}\)

Immediately following the 1911 Revolution, Lord Cecil, an acknowledged expert on the Chinese Question, wrote a long article for the *London Daily Mail*. He said that no country in China had exerted the moral influence that the Americans had, and that anyone might say unhesitatingly that nine-tenths of the men responsible for the revolution of 1911 were educated in American mission schools. He employed that as the basis of a plea to ask the British to do more in furthering education.\(^{37}\)

In short, missionary education formed a powerful influence on China’s modern education and medicine during the later years of the Qing Dynasty.

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New ideas and institutional models of mission schools/hospitals not only promoted Western learning, but they also directly challenged the traditional social structure, which the gentry had previously dominated. Christian work and Christian education threatened the gentry's traditional social roles, undermined their supremacy, and more critically, shook their ethics. No matter what their motives were, objectively, missionaries had a positive impact on China's cultural change.

Ironically, missionaries could not achieve these influence without the Chinese government's "help". In China, where an educational system had existed for over two thousand years and where the central government controlled authority for education, any real progress in missionary education was bound to depend on the tolerance of the Chinese government, even when the government was weak. This was the lesson that educational missionaries gradually learned. Thus, when the government policy changed during the late 19th century, missionaries sharply shifted their working focus from the lower strata to the ruling class—the gentry.

As far as the development of modern education is concerned, the relationship between missionaries and the Chinese government was both mutually dependent and deeply conflicted. When both missionaries and the Chinese government eventually realized the importance of modern education and worked on the task of institutionalizing it, their ultimate goals differed
greatly. In fact, they used education to serve very opposite purposes: while the missionaries took education as a means to convert the Chinese, the Chinese government leaders, on the other side, hoped it would help China to defeat the Western intrusion, and Christianity was a part of this intrusion.

Although the reformist officials and intellectuals often disagreed with each other on many reform issues, almost none of them thought Christianizing China was a desirable idea. Pressure from both the reformists and the missionaries forced the Qing government to accept the idea of modern education. In regard to the government’s relationship with the missionaries, its policy as well as its attitude were very contradictory. On the one hand, because the old education system was completely incompatible with modern educational institutions, the government had, to a great extent, depended on missionaries to develop new schools, especially in the early stages. This resulted in the superiority of missionary education and in the government’s reliance on missionaries as educational advisers for a long period of time. But, on the other hand, the government did not trust missionaries and definitely did not want them to control the new education. In the 1860s, government official had to ask W. A. P. Martin to manage Tong Wen Guan; however, by the early 1900s they were ready to control Peking University by themselves. Not long after his appointment in 1902, Martin was discharged as Western President in Peking University, and other Western professors were also dismissed with him. Moreover, the Qing government officially recognized very few mission
schools, nor did it recognize the diplomas issued by such schools. When the government drew up detailed plans for a national school system, mission schools received absolutely no recognition.\textsuperscript{38}

The emergence of two parallel modern educational systems in early twentieth century China was a direct outcome of the broad conflict between Chinese culture and Western culture. From the beginning and this conflict led to the opposition of China's modern educators against the missionary system. The conflicts were particularly apparent to the Chinese: to the missionaries, such parallel systems in education were quite normal—after all, many Western countries, and notably the United States, had different education systems for a long time. In the United States, church-related schools were independent from public schools and from government control. These missionary educators wanted very much was to gain a bigger influence over Chinese schools, governmental or private. Chinese government officials could not accept this purpose. To a large degree, missionary education was not only independent from the government's authority, but also guided by a quite antagonist ideology involving completely different ethics. The Chinese government, and the people as well, disliked foreign control of education and hoped that all foreign schools, missionaries in particular, could eventually be eliminated.

Nevertheless, the government allowed the existence of foreign institutions, private or governmental. Under the political situations during the

\textsuperscript{38} Lutz, 105.
late Qing, the government could not really control the foreign organizations; or it tried to avoid international conflicts. However, another important reason was that the government was using foreign institutions to develop China’s Western learning. The government had allowed Chinese private schools existence in the traditional education system since the beginning of the Qing regime. Because to a great extent it could not provide education to the people, it had to depend on private efforts. For the same reason, the Qing government in its late years tolerated foreign educational institutions, most of them mission schools.

Interesting enough, on the one hand, the parallel existence of Chinese and foreign private schools had many things in common, regarding sharing educational power with the government as well as financial and personnel independence. On the other hand, they were very different in educational purposes and methods; while Chinese private schools were still offering Confucism and Chinese classics, mission schools created new learning and school system in the soil. Together, they formed a challenge to the government authority over education. After 1905, when the government finally abandoned the imperial examination system, passing the examination was no longer the purpose of education. Only then, the private schools, Chinese or foreign, obtained a much better condition to develop their distinct features.

When the Chinese government itself began to offer modern education,
it seriously challenged missionary education. As A. Smith pointed out:

The new departure of the Chinese government in educational lines has put an end to the practical monopoly of Western learning on the part of mission schools. Free tuition, and sometimes the payment of most or of all other expenses by the State, would seem to make competition hopeless...  

This result was quite unexpected by the missionaries. They felt that they had to face the question of "how to secure and retain control of the educational movements that are now being inaugurated by the people and the government officials." During the 1877 Conference there was only minor concern over whether the missionaries controlled education; they felt "the heathen" would do it themselves anyway. By the turn of the century, "heathen" control became a reality: a reality that included the unpleasant fact that after all the missionaries had done for modern education in China, the Chinese "heathen" still wanted to do it in their own way.

The Qing government's attitude irritated the missionaries. In 1902, John C. Ferguson, a missionary educator, expressed his disappointment with the Chinese government's devaluation of Western learning. He complained that the Chinese viewed Western education as something to be used, while they continued to see ancient Chinese classical studies as fundamental. His major


worry was the intolerance of Christianity in government schools. He stated in a paper that:

Another evidence of intolerance is the new rule requiring all students of government schools to attend the bimonthly ceremonies in honor of Confucius and to prostrate themselves before his tablet...Christian teachers and pupils have in the past quietly absented themselves and no attention has been paid to them....This unobtrusive method of administration is now to be disturbed, and a sharp distinction drawn between ordinary pupils and Christians, thus introducing into schools the odious distinction made in common life between the ordinary people—p’ing ming — and the church people—chiao [jiao] ming.

In Shandong province, the hometown of Confucius, a government rule of 1902 required that all students who refused to worship Confucius thrice in succession should be expelled.  

The rapid growth of Chinese control over modern education and of Chinese intolerance of Christian education not only challenged the missionaries’ influence but threw into question the relevance of the mission schools. Missionary publications in this period expressed serious anxiety. Ferguson stressed that "[m]issionary societies should not think that as government schools are established, there is less need of Christian schools."  

F. L. Pott, the principal of St. John’s University in Shanghai, admonished his colleagues:

In view of the fact that sooner or later we may expect the

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42 Lewis, 210.

43 John Ferguson, 41.
Government to establish an efficient system of education for the whole of China, some may incline to think that the missionary school will no longer be needed as much as before, and may consequently advocate the policy of the gradual withdrawal from this branch of work, and the concentration of effort in other directions. This would certainly be a mistaken policy, for, as it seems to us at this transition period in China's history, the need for the mission school is greater than ever.\textsuperscript{44}

Missionary educators especially emphasized the importance of the religious features of their schools. They believed that in the government schools students would learn only the material aspects of Western civilization. It should be the unique feature of mission colleges to teach the Chinese Western spiritual and religious thought. In his article "The Churches Must Demonstrate It", John F. Goucher, the president of a Christian college in China, emphasized that

China's great need is not the material equipment and organized forms of a new civilization, but the vital self-interpreting energy of a new and spiritual regeneration. The high education must include the education of the highest. ...Body, mind, and spirit are the indispensable concomitant of a man.\textsuperscript{45}

These educators believed the future of mission schools in China largely dependent on their own performance. Pott recognized that "[w]hether our work is to continue to be a powerful adjunct in the educational work of the Empire, or whether it is to sink into insignificance and become a negligible factor, will


depend very much on what is accomplished in the near future.\textsuperscript{46} In order to accomplish something truly significant, Pott said,

\begin{quote}
It is necessary that we give of our best--anything less is unworthy of the Christian Church. We must furnish our schools with the best equipment, and must be ready to put more men and money into the work. Thus, as the years go by, the Christian schools and colleges will prove of greater benefit to this people, and will exert a strong influence for the extension of the kingdom of God in China.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}

It was under this kind of understanding that educational missionaries decided to take action to hold their prerogative in China's modern education.

James Jackson, a Methodist missionary who worked in the Yangtze Valley for more than fifteen years, insisted: "the foreign missionary must seek a field of employment, a branch of work which is more adapted to him, \textit{which he can do better than any native}.\textsuperscript{48} The area that missionaries took as their special field, where they believed they had done and could do better than the Chinese, was Western learning -- modern education.

For eighty years, missionary education had occupied a superior position. Even after the rapid development of government schools, mission schools were still in an advanced position, particularly in higher education.


\textsuperscript{48} James Jackson, "Objects, Methods, and Results of Higher Education in China," \textit{Chinese Recorder}, Jan, 1893, 7-8.
According to statistics of 1917, eighty percent of the students at the college level attended mission schools. Furthermore, there was no question that educational quality in mission schools was higher than that of the Chinese schools.

In order to maintain and strengthen their superior position, missionaries felt great urgency to improve their work. In a letter of 1902 to Foreign Mission Boards, the Executive Committee of the Educational Association of China appealed for additional trained educators to be sent to China. It asked the Board to select and send out workers, who, while otherwise qualified, had had special training to prepare them for educational work in the fields, instead of sending ordained men who were considered for preaching work. It stressed:

As there is a tendency at present manifest on the part of the Chinese government to refuse the assistance of missionaries in the government schools, and to make regulations requiring the worship of Confucius, so that Christian students cannot enter these institutions, it becomes a question of the most vital importance how to man and equip our Christian schools with the very best possible outfit of men and means, so as adequately to meet the peculiar conditions in which we are now placed. The members of the Executive Committee believed that "by perfecting and strengthening this arm of the service, we increase the probability that the future governmental educational system of China will be largely influenced and

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49 Shu Xincheng, 1077.

modeled by such superior examples."\textsuperscript{51}

It was useless to declare the superiority of Christian education, according to John F. Goucher, who argued that the most important thing was action:

Anti-Christian, non-Christian and nominally-Christian schools are rapidly multiplying and compete with the best the Churches maintain. The opportunity and obligation of Christian education is to demonstrate, under the severest tests of comparison with the best of all other classes, that in ideal and realization, in content and spirit, in method and administration, the Christian schools, judged by their product of dependable, efficient personality, are not only superior to all others in exceptional cases, but also in the high average attained by their students. It is a question of quality, not quantity, not how many but how much. It is thoroughness or extinction. One thoroughly first-class Christian institution, easily the best of its kind, will do more to demonstrate the superiority of Christian education, strengthen the Church and bless the nation, than forty schools of similar name or higher pretention, working below the point of efficiency.\textsuperscript{52}

Handicapped by limited resources in finance and personnel, however, the only way that educational missionaries could improve and standardize their institutions was to reduce the school numbers and merge small institutions. Starting from the beginning of the 20th century, this self-improvement was under way among the same or different denominations. In a short time, various union colleges emerged.

The self-improving movement in medical education provides a good example to show the difficulties of this task. Around the turn of the century,

\textsuperscript{51} ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} Goucher, 133.
missionary medical colleges grew very quickly; both denominational and union medical schools were opened all over the country, among them, the Union Medical College in Peking (the predecessor of the Peking Union Medical College). But missions’ resources could not support all of them. As Harold Balme’s study concluded

the suitable men who were available to staff such institutions, and the funds from which to supply the extensive buildings and equipment needed, were both so limited that there was no hope unless the number of these colleges was reduced that any of them would be adequately manned or furnished.\textsuperscript{53}

Under the general atmosphere of reducing the number of missionary institutions and increasing education quality, the China Medical Missionary Association passed a resolution at its Biennial Conference of 1913, urging that no further medical schools be established until the eight union colleges then in existence were made efficient. But as Balme pointed even that number was far beyond the power of the missions to render effective.\textsuperscript{54}

Another important step in this self-improvement was the establishment of the Educational Association of China (EAC) to conduct missionary education nation-wide. This organization was the first and then the only one of its kind in China. Its purposes were twofold: first, it aimed to promote internal co-operation among mission schools, to increase the efficiency and to reduce


\textsuperscript{54} ibid. 116.
conflict as well as waste in educational efforts. Second, it would represented missionary institutions to contact the government and educational officials and to seek for private schools a proper position in national education system.\textsuperscript{55} The EAC "had been especially called into existence to provide China with a system of schools fitted to her needs by Westerners who understood both the educational systems of the West and the needs of China."\textsuperscript{56} Since that time, the EAC had been an important agency in unifying and standardizing missionary educational work.

Simultaneously, another concern was also responsible for this missionary self-improving movement. The Japanese influence on China's modern education worried many missionaries. As early as 1901, the EAC had warned that

We Europeans and Americans may have been telling ourselves all along that the teachers for the new schools of Western learning that the Chinese are going to establish throughout the country, are to come from Europe and America. But we must not be too sure about this. ...They [the Japanese] have learned from us the power there is in the new learning to gain control of a nation, and they are working energetically towards a point where they will occupy a commanding position in the political and educational affairs of China. They have already become a

\textsuperscript{55} Cheng Xiangfan. "Zhonghua jidujiao jiaoyuhui chengli zhi jingguo", (The establishment of the China Christian Education Association) Zhonghua jidujiao jiaoyu jikan, (Journal of the China Christian Education Association) Vol.1, No. 1 (1925). The Education Association of China was established in 1890; in 1916, because Chinese educators organized some similar organizations, the EAC changed its name to the China Christian Education Association.

\textsuperscript{56} Alice H. Gregg, 47.
power in Far Eastern politics which Western governments have to reckon with, and they are fast becoming a power in the educational development of China that we Western educationalists will have to reckon with also.\(^7\)

By 1905, Westerners were protesting loudly against the "Japanization of China".\(^8\)

The Japanese influence on Chinese education was evident in several ways. First, Japanese teachers were the majority of the first group of foreign teachers hired by the Chinese government, and many of them occupied key positions. In 1903, after the dismissal of W. A. P. Martin and other Western professors, Zhang Baixi, the Chinese president at Peking University, hired several Japanese scholars in their places.\(^9\) Second, before the Boxer Indemnity scholarship\(^6\), most Chinese students went to Japan to study Western knowledge. By 1905, as many as 2500 Chinese students were in Japan, and the number was still rapidly increasing. Most of them studied in normal (teachers education), military, or law schools. Last but not least

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\(^9\) Gong Shuduo, 682.

\(^6\) The Boxer Indemnity scholarship was established by an agreement (1907) between the Chinese government and the United States government; accordingly the United States canceled the excess indemnity, and this sum was used to promote modern education in China. Since then, the number of Chinese students studied in the United States had grown rapidly.
important, the great majority of publications of new textbooks, books and
articles related to education were translated from Japanese materials. These
publications were widely read by Chinese scholars as well as students, and
their influence was hardly to be overestimated.\textsuperscript{61}

When the Qing government promulgated its first plan for a modern
educational system in 1903, it was an exact copy of the Japanese system. For a
while after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, which ended in a big victory for
Japan, Japan's influence on China seemed irresistible, "regardless" of the fact
that Japan had defeated China less than ten years earlier. Many political and
cultural factors were responsible for this contradictory phenomenon. However,
so far as missionaries' work was concerned, it was the Chinese scholars'
resentment against Christian culture that pushed them toward the Japanese for
new models.

In her book about China's modern education Marianne Bastid points out
that Chinese intellectuals, proud of their status as scholars, were unwilling to
be treated scornfully as heathens. The scholars were suspicious of
missionaries' political motives. From their point of view, the majority of
mission schools were not worthwhile. They argued that China should look
elsewhere for education development to help its material culture.\textsuperscript{62}

The missionaries adopted a mixed view of the Japanese model that

\textsuperscript{61} Bastid, 46-48.

\textsuperscript{62} ibid. 47.
many Chinese were inclined to follow. On the one hand, many missionaries thought the Japanese government had a saner policy than the Chinese towards foreign missions. Martin emphasized that in Japan, since the era of reform, no anti-foreign riot had occurred, and no mission had been wrecked by a mob.\textsuperscript{63} Missionaries encouraged the Chinese and their government to emulate Japan in their respect for foreign missions.

But on the other hand, most missionaries strongly held the opinion that Japan could not possibly do better in Western learning than the Westerners themselves. The centralized education system of Japan and its strict regulation of mission schools also troubled them. Aware of the Japanese influence on the Chinese government and education, in 1912 immediately after the establishment of the Republic of China missionaries urged the new government to adopt an educational policy more liberal than that of Japan. They suggested that "in the establishment of the republic the United States has been looked upon as a model to be imitated."\textsuperscript{64}

More specifically, an American missionary educator suggested that China copy the American educational system which had two parallel sets of schools, the state-supported schools and private schools. He said that, "the friendly competition between them is beneficial to both. In this way also she

\textsuperscript{63} A. W. P. Martin, "China Transformed", 7847.

\textsuperscript{64} F. L. Hawks Pott, 591.
will succeed in removing the question of religion from politics."\textsuperscript{65} This was a way of killing two birds with one stone. If this American system of two sets of schools had been adopted by the new government, not only would mission schools have been legitimate, but Japanese influence would also have inevitably decreased.

However, according to Japanese educators in China, missionary education was nothing but a failure. Toyo M. Kanda, a head professor in a Chinese college, severely criticized educational missionaries. In his own words, missionary teachers "were men well versed in things religious but in their knowledge of educational methods we place small faith...the Europeans hired by the Government to educate its subjects lacked the ability to fulfil their duties properly." Conceding that he did not have an adequate foundation, he still argued strongly that

those Europeans who secured comparatively high positions in China had no thought to advance the country to a greater degree of civilization--but consciously endeavored to escape instructing the people in technical sciences and strove only to impart to their pupils a good mastery of languages, that these pupils might serve \textit{them} as the hands and feet serve the body....[T]he teachers [European] gave too much consideration to self-interest and the interests of their own countries.\textsuperscript{66}

These opinions from both sides clearly revealed the competition between missionaries and the Japanese for control education in China. This competition

\textsuperscript{65} ibid. 590-591.

further complicated the future of missionary education and urged missionaries
to improve their work.

In brief, in the modern time, Chinese culture met Western culture in a
very unique situation. It was a long and painful process for the Chinese to
realize the necessity of studying Western civilization. It took an even longer
time for them to commence this cultural transformation. Political and other
crises forced the Qing government to take reform actions; however, its policies
were passive and limited. In contrast, reformist officials and intellectuals were
much more active and positive, and they pushed the government to change its
policy on Western learning.

The development of China’s modern education demonstrated a
conflicting, yet mutually influential and dependent relationship between the
missionaries and the Chinese governmental. On the one hand, the missionaries
were aggressive and initiative in changing Chinese culture, and they realized
the importance of education to control China’s future. Their actions were
protected by the unequal treaties and all sorts of political and even military
powers. This situation in general was provocative, and it explained the major
reason why the Chinese resented missionaries, no matter what positive effects
their work had for China. On the other hand, the lack of modern educational
institutions and personnel in China’s traditional education system forced the
Qing government to depend on missionary educational institutions and teachers
to develop Western learning. Apparently, without the Chinese government's tolerant attitude toward foreign schools and its new education policy, missionary education could not have such impressive progress.

However, neither the government nor the people wished to Christianize China's new education. Luo Zhenyu, a well-known scholar of early 20th century China, deplored the tendency of his time to ask foreigners to run the newly established modern educational institutions. More and more Chinese warned loudly about the detriment of foreign control on Chinese education. Such feelings gradually bred an anti-Christian schools movement. In accord with such political situation, the government's policy on foreign education, Christian education in particular, became more and more strict and intolerant.

Missionaries, however, decided not to withdraw from the field, although they were the first group of foreigners to perceive the growth of nationalism among the Chinese people. They believed that such anti-foreigner feelings derived from ignorance. This fact strengthened their determination to educate the people so that they would accept Christianity for their own good. The strategy that educational missionaries used to win the "competition" with

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68 See "Minzu zhuyi jiaoyu" (On nationalist education) You xue yibian, (Collection of translation by Chinese students studying in Japan,) No. 10, Oct. 1901. Also see "Lun wairen mou wo jiaoyuquan zhi kewei" (On the danger of foreigners' seeking of control our education,) Waijiao bao (Newspaper of foreign affairs) No. 185, August 23, 1907.
the Chinese government as well as the Japanese was to improve the quality of mission schools as much as possible.

The emergence of two parallel education systems was an important event in China’s modern reform. Its importance has been overlooked so far. Missionary education not only brought new knowledge, curriculum, and schooling into China; it stimulated the development of modern education and private educational institutions. The independent nature of missionary education was criticized as evidence of cultural imperialism; nevertheless, it demonstrated to the Chinese an entirely different approach and ideas as well as methods of running modern education. During the first half of the 20th century, missionaries' educational institutions and their other organizations alike constituted an important part of the modern independent sector in China, and thus had profound influence on the Chinese own modern private organizations.

No doubt, the development of China’s modern education during the late 19th century and the early 20th century laid the foundation for the Rockefeller philanthropy’s project. However, different motivations, ideas, and policies existing in missionary and the governmental education faced the Foundation. Not only did the Foundation need to understand this complex situation; but it needed to find out how its own program could fit into the existing educational systems.
Chapter Three

CHINA: A NEW FRONTIER FOR THE ROCKEFELLER
PHILANTHROPY

On January 31, 1905, Frederick T. Gates, the architect of Rockefeller philanthropy, wrote a long letter to John D. Rockefeller Sr. In this letter Gates urged Rockefeller to turn his eyes to the outside world, especially the Far East, since "for the first time in the history of the world, all nations and all the islands of the sea are actually open and offer a free field for the light and the philanthropy of English speaking people."¹ Gates discovered a new frontier for the Rockefeller philanthropy—China; and thus, his suggestion for a new direction in the Far East initiated an over forty years' involvement of the Rockefeller Foundation in China's modern reform. The most notable result from such an initiation was the world famous medical school—the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC, 1915-1951) which ended in 1951 when the Chinese Communist Party took over and nationalized it.

It is important to understand why at that moment the Far East, and China in particular, became so critical to the Rockefeller philanthropy. It is even more important to explicate the specific nature, goals, and methods of the

Rockefeller Foundation's projects in China and to compare them with those of the missionaries as well as the Chinese government. This will help to explain not only why the Foundation acted as it did, but also to identify the most influential factors behind this international enterprise.

The last chapter reviewed the Christian missionaries' influence on China's modern education. The next two chapters (Chapter III and IV) will concentrate on co-operative and interactive relationships among the Rockefeller Foundation, the missionaries, and the newly emerging professionals—the medical professionals in particular. In other words, what was the impact of these latter two groups on the Foundation's program search and plan? What were the similarities and differences between the Foundation's notion of modern education and medical science and the missionaries'? The main focus of these chapters will be on the Foundation's approach to China and the broad cultural contexts, both of the United States and China, which furthered the Foundation's plan.

The Missionaries' Influence and the Rockefellers' Interest in China

Generally speaking, two important events in late nineteenth and early twentieth century America led to the Rockefellers' interest to China. They were the modernization movement in American philanthropy and the surge of various American interests in China. The former produced the Rockefeller Foundation and the latter led it to China. American historians have done a
great deal of work on philanthropic reform and contemporary Sino-American relations. A brief review of the Rockefeller Foundation’s involvement in these events, however, is relevant and necessary to understand the direct origin of the Rockefeller Foundation’s China program. In this section, the discussion will focus on the missionaries’ influence on the Rockefeller philanthropy.

Gates’ interest in China, as reflected in his letter to John D. Rockefeller, was not a sudden enthusiasm. At the end of that letter Gates told Rockefeller that he had been brooding over the subject of expanding Rockefeller’s philanthropy into the Far East for years and that he was convinced, as were many Americans, that the Far East was very important in America’s future. Such a conviction in fact reflected a national political fashion in the United States at the turn of the century.

This was the time when Americans, using Robert Divine’s words, "had developed a romantic view of China, visualizing it a vast potential market for American goods. American culture and American democracy." For missionaries as well as many others, to save or reform China became a mission, a destiny, as well as a challenge. Arthur Smith, the most famous missionary writer at that time, asserted categorically that

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2 Frederick T. Gates to John D. Rockefeller Sr., January 31, 1905, ibid.

[t]he problem of China is to a large extent the problem of the world. Even to those who have hitherto taken but slight interest in "world-politics," it is becoming dimly discernible that in Eastern Asia the Occident has greater and more difficult situations than it has ever yet settled, or even faced.  

In other words, he was telling his readers that although to conquer Eastern civilization was an extremely difficult adventure for Westerners, they had to meet the "challenge" and seize the opportunity.

This rather rapidly growing interest in China in early twentieth-century America had a complex domestic and international background. Generally speaking, Americans' interest in China was mixed with econo-political factors as well as ideological and cultural reasons. The anxiety over the disappearance of the American frontier and over its more limited domestic market, the increasing awareness of America's international potency, the religious zeal of Christianity's responsibility to the "heathen" world, and an optimistic reform design of changing the world by American progressive ideology, all contributed to the unique American mission to the Far East, and thus drew the nation's attention to China's problems.

Many American businessmen and politicians strongly advocated

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4 A. Smith, The Uplift of China, xiv.

5 American historians have given quite an amount of analyses of the relations between American domestic situation and foreign policy at the turn of the century. About the historiography of this topic, see Jerry Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door. America and China, 1905-1921, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971,) Introduction: A Summary of the Literature as Prelude.
America's involvement in China, because of China's economic potential; and missionaries were no less active in joining such a campaign. The Rockefeller family had a big economic interest in China; and they and their advisers kept a close eye on the development of this American interest in China. In 1906, a letter written by W. K. McKibben, a senior Baptist missionary in China, was forwarded to Gates. In this letter, McKibben said that

the world's ambitions and opportunities are being transferred to Asia. The province of Manchuria, now somewhat fully opened to trade, is said to yield a foreign commerce of five dollars per head of population. China proper, being far richer and a hundred times more populous, will, when equally open, yield a commerce prodigious in proportion.\(^6\)

A paper titled "Health and Wealth, Our Great Opportunity in China" by Dr. John Taylor received the Rockefellers' attention. Taylor accentuated the importance of a good relationship with China for the American economy.

Notwithstanding the awful poverty of her people, China possesses enough untouched and undeveloped resources to make all her people prosperous. With these resources developed, her capacity to purchase in foreign markets will be enormously increased. There is no other nation whose markets offer such vast future possibilities...

Before they can become a consumer of foreign goods on a larger scale, they must become a larger producer, and possessor of the means therewith to do this. Herein lies our opportunity - not to rob China of her territory, nor to exploit the people commercially, regardless of the consequences; not to rob, exploit, despoil, or weaken them in any way - for such tactics are not only unjust and unpardonable, but they are also colossal economic blunders...

Our share, therefore, in the development of China's resources

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will depend in a large measure on the character of our relations with the people of that country. Aside entirely from sentimental considerations, all our relations with the Chinese - political, commercial, and social - should be based on a generous, sympathetic, broad minded policy.\(^7\)

This letter not only explained clearly how the Chinese "well-being" was relevant to America's economic interest, but also pointed out explicitly the necessity of developing friendly relations with the Chinese, economic relations being just one of them.

Such an idea was in accord with the Rockefellers' and Gates' perspectives. Gates once exhibited a fascinating opinion of the Rockefeller philanthropy in the Far East, in which religious, economic and humanitarian factors all could work together and bring enormous economic benefits to the Rockefellers. The very attractive result had been expressed in such a disguised way:

...the mere commercial results of missionary effort to our own land is worth, I had almost said a thousand fold every year of what is spent on missions. For illustration: our commerce today with the Hawaiian Islands, which are now Christianized and no longer take missionary money, is $17,000,000 per year. Five percent of that in one year would represent all the money that ever was spent in Christianizing and civilizing the native over a period of fifty years.... What was true of Hawaii is even more strikingly true of Japan and its commerce.

...[O]ur import trade, traceable mainly to the channels of intercourse open [sic] up by missionaries, is enormous. Import from heathen lands furnish us cheaply with many of the luxuries of life and not a few of the comforts,... But our imports are balanced by our exports to these same

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\(^7\) John R. Taylor, M.D., "Health and Wealth, Our Great Opportunity in China", typewritten paper in RAC, RF, RG4. This paper is in the Rockefeller Family Collections.
countries of American manufactures. Our export trade is growing by leaps and bounds. Such growth would have been utterly impossible but for the commercial conquest of foreign lands under the lead of missionary endeavor.

There is little question that economic interest was not the sole concern of many missionaries and others as their political, social and cultural considerations were mixed with the economic concern. In his book Progressivism and the Open Door, Jerry Israel pointed out that "China was America’s great market, an extension of the domestic frontier closed by decree of the census and Frederick Jackson Turner in the 1890s.... China was also to be a market for all types of early twentieth-century progressive American reform. It was this idea of China as a tabula rasa for American reform interests that provided a most revealing link between domestic and diplomatic attitudes." 9

Different from traditional colonialism where prime importance was given to territorial occupation and economic plunder, American expansion in the early twentieth century was as much cultural expansion as it was economic expansion. As a result of the missionaries’ propaganda, Americans came to believe that China was then at the crossroads of her history and that it was their responsibility or mission to lead China to the mainstream of world civilization. Using Western culture to reestablish a new Chinese culture was

8 Gates to Rockefeller, January 31, 1905.

9 Jerry Israel, XI.
one of the most important points in this world mission. As Bertrand Russell 
ironically criticized later, "we [white men] are firmly persuaded that our 
civilization and our way of life are immeasurably better than any other, so that 
when we come across a nation like the Chinese, we are convinced that the 
kindest thing we can do to them is to make them like ourselves."\(^{10}\)

Politicians and missionary writers maintained that saving China was 
closely entangled with the fear of "the Yellow Peril"; the theory widely 
circulated that China would be a great threat to world stability if she were not 
converted to Western civilization. In his letter to Ernest Burton, a member of 
Rockefeller’s first China Commission, McKibben sensationally expressed the 
same opinion and quoted many "thoughtful writers on the Far East" (his 
words) to support his argument. Among them, John W. Foster, American 
diplomat and Secretary of the State (1892-1893), Robert Hart, the Inspector 
General of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Custom for forty eight years (1861-
1908), and Alfred Mahan were the most influential writers on China.\(^{11}\)

McKibben’s letter showed how political concerns were involved in 
America’s "China mission", and it was circulated among Rockefeller’s

1922,) 208.

\(^{11}\) John W. Foster’s books include A Century of American diplomacy (1900) 
Mahan, The Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Policies (1900), 
among his other books.
advisers. According to McKibben, all these writers asserted that the natural military capability of the Chinese was equal to that of the Japanese, if not fundamentally superior. Consequently, the Chinese hatred of foreigners was a real menace to the world, because "four hundred millions, sturdy, and passionately devoted to their ancient customs, might be changed into a warlike people bent upon avenging their wrongs." (R. Hart)

Alfred Mahan in his book The Problem of Asia said, as McKibben quoted:

[t]here is actual danger to the European family of nations in case of China [sic] should develop an organized strength without the corrective and elevating element of the higher ideals... European civilization has now arrived at an important period, a day of visitation. Eastern and Western civilization must either come face to face as opponents, or else the new elements must first be profoundly affected by intimate contact and assimilation.

Thus, China must be changed by Western culture. "He [the Chinese] should know what our civilization and religion and philosophy are before he rejects them." (Archibald D. Colquhoun) It has been discussed in the second chapter that by the end of the 19th century most missionaries in China had reached the conclusion that education was an effective way to enlighten the Chinese. McKibben in his letter was convinced that the best way to educate the Chinese was to establish an American Christian University in that land. He believed that it was the time to influence China, because 1905 had been a dividing line between old and new in China. He hoped that the Rockefeller's university would powerfully support the great missionary body, and would
counteract the materialism of the Chinese universities.\textsuperscript{12}

During this campaign for "saving China", missionaries' writings were most articulate and influential in shaping Americans' ideas about China and advocating this China mission. Harold R. Isaacs in his study of the American image of China concluded that missionaries and their work in China placed "a permanent and decisive impression on the emotional underpinning of American thinking about China". These scratches, he argues, that they left in American minds over the generations are "the most clearly marked, the longest-enduring, and the most powerfully influential of all". He believed that American missionary efforts in that country, more than any other single event, are "responsible for the unique place China occupies in the American cosmos, for the special claim it has on the American conscience".\textsuperscript{13}

In his day, Arthur H. Smith was known as "the American Statesman of China" and presidents and diplomats the world over turned to his books for their information on Chinese affairs.\textsuperscript{14} In a survey conducted in 1925 to determine the most helpful books on China, Newton Hayes listed forty-four books that received five or more votes from one hundred Americans and

\textsuperscript{12} McKibben's letter.


British who were acquainted with China and the Chinese. The first five books and many others on the list were written by missionaries. Among them, Arthur H. Smith’s books ranked number one and two with sixty and forty-nine votes. Gates was an admiring reader of Smith’s books and once wrote a letter telling him that "[y]our ‘Chinese Characteristics’ and your ‘Village Life in China’ have been recently read by my family and by myself with eager interest and with that sort of satisfaction which one feels in drinking from a pure, cold spring on a hot summer’s day."\(^\text{16}\)

Currently, it is common knowledge that missionaries were strongly ethnocentric during the time frame of this study. They thought the Christian civilization was superior to other cultures. Their writings on China were often full of prejudice and misunderstanding. Such behaviors profoundly hurt the Chinese people’s feelings and became the primary reason for Chinese criticism. In his book about the American Protestant missionary movement, Paul Varg pointed out that the missionary painted a dark picture of Chinese heathenism and he used A. Smith’s books as an example. Varg criticized that "Smith devoted much less attention to the supposed virtues of the Chinese than


\(^{16}\) Frederick T. Gates to Arthur Smith, June 10, 1907. RAC. Rockefeller Family Collection, RG: John D. Rockefeller, Jr.
to their failings..."

However, he argued that missionaries' negative opinions of the Chinese elicited sympathetic responses from some Americans as in his observation that the missionaries

elicited a great degree of sympathy for the people of China. If they were portrayed as victims of false religions, this also provided an explanation that freed the Chinese of blame and left the pagan system the target of criticism. Consequently there developed in the United States a highly sentimental feeling toward China. Having no vital interests in that area, this altruism did not often come into conflict with national self-interest. Moreover, the very weakness of China invited a charitable feeling toward her.\textsuperscript{17}

It was very possible that the missionaries' writing elicited such a response. However, for many Americans, including the Rockefellers and their advisers, China was not at all a land without vital interests. In fact, missionary opinion did suddenly win the attention of an American audience, simply because at that time China became an important country to America in many ways.

Missionaries' writings won them a reputation as the best informed Westerners on Chinese culture and the "China Problem". After the Boxer Rebellion, an important article appeared in the \textit{North China Herald}, a newspaper that represented the leading secular views among Westerners in Shanghai. In this article, the author argued that

\begin{quote}
If there is one body of residents in China more than another qualified to
\end{quote}

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speak on the course of events, it is the missionary. The average missionary has in his hands sources of information denied to the most energetic consul. He has the friendship and often confidence of progressive officials. He grasps the Chinese standpoint, and knows much of the working of the Chinese mind. Amongst foreign residents in China his position is unique. ...It is suggested that the missionary body at once set about the organization of a strong representative executive on the lines of the China Association. Such an executive, with its comprehensive sources of information and capacity of judgment, must command respect, and its expressions of opinion be of immense value to all foreigners in China.¹⁸

Thus, by the turn of the century, when the religious orthodoxy was swiftly declining at home, the Protestant missionaries' ideas, and their educational and medical efforts in China were increasingly accepted by American society. Smith stated that "the attention of the world has long been centered on China, and this is morally certain to continue. It is now much easier to get a hearing at home than formerly."¹⁹ These missionaries perceived changes in American public opinion and were encouraged by this favorable situation. McKibben commented in 1905 that "for the first time in the history of missions we find statesmen, public men, men of affairs, uniting their unanimous voice with the missionaries to urge civilizing influences of a


¹⁹ A. Smith, "Our Duties as Missionaries in View of the Recent Developments and Changes in China", The Chinese Recorder, 5, 1908.
distinctly religious and spiritual type.  

The American missionaries’ opinions and their works in China had a strong impact on the U. S. government’s foreign policy on the Far East. In 1906, Edmund J. James, a well respected educator and the President of the University of Illinois, wrote a memorandum to President Theodore Roosevelt concerning the sending of a government Educational Commission to China. He warned that

China is upon the verge of a revolution... The nation which succeeds in educating the young Chinese of the present generation will be the nation which for a given expenditure of effort will reap the largest possible returns in moral, intellectual, and commercial influence. If the United States had succeeded thirty-five years ago, as it looked at one time as if it might, in turning the current of Chinese students to this country, and had succeeded in keeping that current large, we should to-day be controlling the development of China in that most satisfactory and spiritual domination of its leaders.  

Under the influence of American missionaries, President Theodore Roosevelt argued that "[t]his Nation should help in every practicable way in the education of the Chinese people, so that vast and populous Empire of China may gradually adapt itself to modern conditions."  

20 McKibben’s letter. 

21 Arthur H. Smith, China and America To-day: A Study of Conditions and Relations, (New York: Young People’s Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, 1908,) 213.

22 Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Message to the Congress, December 3, 1907, Congressional Record-Senate, (Washington Government Printing Office, 1908,) vol. 42, part 1, 83-84. This part of his message concerned the use of Boxer Rebellion indemnity money to further Chinese higher education.
some other missionaries urged the United States government to return the excess Boxer indemnity of 1901 and use it to sponsor Chinese students to study in America. In 1908 the United States Congress, following the President, accepted A. Smith's proposal and approved the "Boxer Indemnity Remission", which canceled the excess indemnity in the sum of $11,655,492.69 and had the funds set aside for education. 23

Several related points in this fashionable perception of China were widely accepted by Americans at that time. First, it was commonly accepted that America's interests and even the world's future were bound up with improving China. Second, because Christian civilization was superior to Chinese culture, all kinds of missionary work and education in particular would of course be beneficial to the Chinese. Third, the "conquest" of China by missionaries would open a new frontier for American products as well as American ideas and lifestyle. Thus, what the missionaries and others alike were doing in China was justified not only by American religious tradition and/or the progressive ideology, but also by American self-interest, economic and political.

It was this historical circumstance that drew the attention of the Rockefellers and their advisers to China. At the time, the Rockefeller

23 For details about this matter, see Theodore D. Pappas, 163.
philanthropy was still undergoing transition, growing phenomenal following an era of great economic success. Gates was eager to let the Rockefeller philanthropy join this mission in China and thus to extend it into an international enterprise. R. Greene in his 1917 report of the China Medical Board recalled that

Mr. Rockefeller and his advisers have for a long time been deeply interested in China as a country with not only a great past but also great possibilities for the future, and one in which a little help wisely applied from outside might set in motion internal forces that would themselves produce results of the greatest benefit, both to China herself and to the whole world.²⁴

Although very diplomatic in expression, these words were clear enough to reveal the nature of the Rockefellers' interest in China as well as ideas related to American expansion at that historic moment.

When Gates turned his eyes to China, missionary societies were the only private and non-profit organizations to have built pervasive connections with both Chinese intellectuals and officials. Considering the religious backgrounds of the Rockefeller family as well as Gates and their relationships with missionary societies at home and abroad, it would have been very natural for Gates to turn to missionaries for information and advice when he started

working on the Rockefellers' China program.\textsuperscript{25}

In 1907, two years after he suggested to Rockefeller Sr. that he extend his philanthropy to the Far East, Gates began contacting missionary societies in China for help. On March 6, he wrote to Arthur Smith, then the president of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, R. F. Fitch, the president of Hangzhou Christian College (in southeast China), and probably several other missionaries. Mentioning that as one of the managers of Mr. Rockefeller's philanthropic work he was "just now studying the question of the best methods of promoting the welfare of the Chinese", he would be glad to communicate with them and seek their counsel.\textsuperscript{26} Within the next couple of years the correspondence between Gates and Smith, Fitch, and other missionaries was quite constant.

These were exciting years for the missionaries. Dramatic changes had been taking place in the Chinese government's policy on Western style education. Americans' enthusiasm for the missionary movement in China was high. Missionaries had never been so positive and encouraged about their influence on Chinese education. W. A. P. Martin hailed this golden

\textsuperscript{25} Growing up and educated in very religious circumstances, Gates served as a Baptist minister for many years before he was entrusted by Rockefeller Sr. with his enormous private benevolence. Since that time he had worked with missionary societies at home and abroad intensively.

\textsuperscript{26} Frederick T. Gates to Arthur Smith, to R. F. Fitch, March 6, 1907. RAC. Rockefeller Family Collection, RG2.
opportunity for the missionary education and the breaking up of a hitherto frozen soil.\textsuperscript{27} Although it was not the harvest season yet, it seemed to them that years of effort were now producing results. So when Gates consulted the missionary body about the Rockefellers’ work in China, they had reason to believe that the best way to initiate a philanthropic project was to cooperate with mission schools and to follow in their footsteps.

The responses of the missionaries to Gates’ request formed several clear messages. First of all, the general reaction was positive. They highly approved of Rockefellers’ design of helping the Chinese. In his letter to Gates, Smith commended Rockefeller intentions, explaining that "[t]hat men of large wealth are seriously planning how to lay broad and deep foundations for social and moral prosperity in distant and alien lands is a phenomenon the novelty of which is only exceeded by its importance." He confirmed to Gates that "with regard to the establishment of educational institutions in China itself, we should all doubtless be in entire agreement with you."\textsuperscript{28}

The China Centenary Missionary Conference uttered its hearty endorsement of the main principle delivered in Gates’ letter. They reiterated that "the best present service to China would be the education in western

\textsuperscript{27} W. A. P. Martin, "Western Science as Auxiliary to the Spread of the Gospel." \textit{The Chinese Recorder}, March, 1897. 114.

\textsuperscript{28} Arthur Smith to Frederick T. Gates, July 29, 1907. RAC. Rockefeller Family Collection, RG2.
knowledge of a great number of youths to be future leaders." The Conference warmly offered the help that Gates was seeking and promised that he would be sent the full set of information that the Conference was then gleaning from the whole mission field as soon as it could be finished.  

Meanwhile, reports from missionaries to Gates on China's educational situation were all very encouraging. One letter from Henry C. Mabie to Gates excitedly stated that

The most important and far-reaching change noted by me, and everywhere impressed upon me in my recent visit, was the absolute and final overturn of the old style of learning, with the characteristic examinations which have prevailed for thirteen centuries in China. The examination halls at the capital cities of the provinces, and other minor cities, which accommodated from 10,000 to 30,000 students at one time, in little stone stalls, for their work of three days' examination once in three years, have been representatively and generally overthrown as a result of an imperial edict issued three years ago last September...Many temples have been cleared of their idols and are being utilized for modern schools.

Mabie firmly concluded, after consulting with many well-known missionaries such as Timothy Richard, Dr. Calvin Wilson Mateer, Dr. Chauncey Goodrich, (of the Peking Union College,) Arthur Smith and Young Allen, that this overturn of the late system of examinations was final, that China would never

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29 China Centenary Missionary Conference to Frederick T. Gates, signed by A.P. Parker, vice-chairman and F.C. Cooper, secretary, Oct. 23, 1907. Gates’ letter mentioned by the Conference was his letter to Arthur Smith, June 10, 1907. Smith forwarded this letter to the Conference. RAC. Rockefeller Family Collection, RG2.
revert to it.\textsuperscript{30}

The picture of a changing China the missionaries presented to Gates included this key observation:

China is awaking and she is wanting Western education, and especially does she want the Western science of medicine. The foreign doctor with his dispensary and hospital has been the one Christian that has been welcomed by the Chinese. He with his work of mercy had been the foreunner. Doors have been opened, prejudice allayed and superstition driven out by the Christian physician with his rational method of treating the sick.\textsuperscript{31}

Secondly, missionaries politely but frankly disapproved of any new enterprise that would neglect or injure existing missionary institutions. They strongly urged the Rockefellers to co-operate with them in their endeavor. In his first letter to Gates, Smith recommended the educational committee elected by the Missionary Conference of 1907 in Shanghai as the only group accepted as representative of missionary interests in China and as the only competent body with which the Rockefellers and their advisors should consult and co-operate. He advised Gates not to take any action without consulting them. In another letter, Smith quite frankly stated that missionaries "have no wish to see new enterprises launched in China to the neglect and injury of others

\textsuperscript{30} Henry C. Mabie to Frederick T. Gates, Jan. 29, 1908. RAC. Rockefeller Family Collection, RG2.

\textsuperscript{31} M. D. Subank to Frederick T. Gates, Dec. 13, 1907. This letter was written by Subank for the Missionary Medical Association. RAC. Rockefeller Family Collection, RG2.
which have long been aiming at like results."32 Reacting to the Rockefeller initiative as though they were seeing someone intrude in their own backyard, the Boards of Foreign Missions of the United States and Canada expressed sensitive feeling and were not quite polite. In a letter of November 7th, 1907 to Gates, the Boards declared that

We understand that the proposed gift is not to be made to the Boards and is not to be administered by them. We are sure, however, that you will appreciate our interest in the matter, since the expenditure of any considerable sums on our mission fields in the way proposed would necessarily affect in important ways the work which we are conducting, and since it would hardly be possible to carry out wisely so extensive a plan on the foreign field, where the Boards have long been operating, and where they have had extended experience in conducting educational work, without the co-operation of the missionaries who are under the care and oversight of our Boards.33

Thirdly, missionaries expressed indubitably their opinions on principles and methods that the Rockefellers should adopt in awarding their monetary gift. The Rockefellers' money, according to them, should be used only for improving or uniting missionary schools that were already in existence In their words, "we would lay it down as a cardinal principle that in China at present, it is better to expand, and where possible, to combine existing institutions than to begin new ones." 34 Subank explained his expectation of the Rockefeller's

32 Arthur Smith to Frederick T. Gates, June 8, and July 29, 1907.


34 China Centenary Missionary Conference to Frederick T. Gates.
work in China quite clearly:

[Should he [Rockefeller] be led to consider plans looking toward the strengthening of educational work in China, it might be done in a way so as to unify our work. I speak the mind of our medical missionary Association of China when I say this. We have a number of medical schools. It is not more schools we need, but better schools. The schools we now have are well located for the most part. But we need some uniting power. So if any aid is to be given we hope it may be given in such a way as to unite our forces, and that too, in the large centers. Our Medical Association at its last meeting discussed this matter at length, but as there was no funds at our disposal to offer, all we could do was to give advice. 35

The Rockefeller money should be given, as Gates was told, to those excellent existing educational institutions in forms of grants-in-aid, funds and endowments. Such donations could be arranged in terms of one-year, five-year and ten-year plans. The control of the funds could be awarded to a College Board for China and the Board would be in China. The aid should only further co-ordinate Christian education in China; and the institutions receiving help should ultimately transfer control of these funds to the Chinese. The latter principle was, as these missionaries assumed, to show the Chinese that "Mr. Rockefeller and other Christian agencies are not exploiting China for their own benefit, but for the sole good of China..."36

In short, when Gates communicated with missionary educators on the

35 Subank.

subject of Chinese education and the Rockefellers' involvement, the
missionaries were in the midst of a self-improvement operation. Lacking
adequate funding and personnel, however, the missionaries could not carry this
movement very far. The missionaries did not want the Rockefeller
philanthropy to be another competitor in a field where they already had a hard
time competing with the Chinese governmental education. Neither did they
desire to nor could they afford to lose Rockefellers' assistance. Therefore the
strategy adopted by the missionary body was to persuade the Rockefellers to
cooporate with their own self-improvement operation so that they could
maintain their superiority in the field and ultimately accomplish their final goal
of Christianizing China. However, whether such a strategy or expectation
would fit Gates' perspective for the Rockefeller philanthropy in China was
another question.

Educational and Medical Professionals and Program-Plan for the
Rockefeller Foundation's China Venture

Ten years had passed from the time when F. Gates suggested to
Rockefeller Sr. the philanthropic opportunities in Asia to the time when the
Rockefeller Foundation reached its final decision: a medical school with
academic excellence in China. During these years, constant studies and
investigations had taken place to help the Foundation design its strategy and
find an appropriate approach to East Asia. Educational and medical
professionals operated the whole process, from project search to policy
definition; and the Foundation's final decision reflected not only their notion of
science and education, but also their critical opinions of missionaries' work in
the Far East. Thus, the Rockefeller Foundation's China program provides an
informative case in examining the mutually influential relations between
modern professionals and large foundations.

The objects and methods of American philanthropic behavior had
changed significantly since the late 19th century, symbolized by the emergence
of big modern philanthropic foundations of which the Rockefeller Foundation
was the best example. These changes had taken place in the context of
professionalism and worship of science at that time and was strongly
influenced by newly emerging professionals.\(^\text{37}\) Prior to his effort of leading
the Rockefeller philanthropy to the world stage, Gates was diligently engaged
in modernizing the Rockefeller family charity. By 1905, Gates had worked for
John D. Rockefeller's private benevolence for more than fifteen years. It was
under his direction that this enterprise was transformed from a "retail" charity

\(^{37}\) For more information about professionalism in American culture, see
Bledstein, Burton J., The Culture of Professionalism, the Middle Class and the
development of Higher Education in America. New York: W. W. Norton
Company Inc. 1976; and about the worship of science, see George H. Daniels,
Science in American History, A Social History, (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1971.)
to a "wholesale" philanthropy, and then melded into a scientific philanthropy. 38

The establishment of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in 1901 was a landmark of this transition; it represented the Rockefeller philanthropy's commitment to science, and to medical science in particular, in its early period. This scientific orientation derived from a broader and more profound cultural change in America at the time. From the last two decades of the nineteenth century to the first two decades of the twentieth century, the old American society and culture was based on, using Robert H. Wiebe's words, the "island communities" which had been dislocated and had disintegrated due to rapid growth and expanding in industries, transportation, and communication. As the old society with its out-of-date values was collapsing, a new society and culture emerged from it. 39

During this transformation period a new middle class, including medical professionals, with new values had gathered strength rapidly. The medical profession proved most dynamic in this process of transition. As Robert Wiebe pointed out, no part came with such force or exercised such


profound influence as that of medicine. In his words, this new medical profession "like religious men...who believe in their own vision... and wish to go among others," the new doctors descended upon the cities and towns with a scientific gospel."

Paul Starr in his *The Social Transformation of American Medicine* gives an incisive analysis of the growth of medical authority. He argues that

The rise of the professions was the outcome of a struggle for cultural authority as well as for social mobility. It needs to be understood not only in terms of the knowledge and ambitions of the medical profession, but also in the context of broader changes in culture and society that explain why Americans became willing to acknowledge and institutionalize their dependence on the professions. The acceptance of professional authority was, in a sense, America's cultural revolution...  

Both Wiebe and Starr have pointed out the causal relations between cultural or social changes and the rise of the medical professional. The most important factors that helped medical science claim its historical importance in American society was the recognition by the American population of scientific knowledge as the rational solution for not only body and spiritual disease but also social problems. By the beginning of the twentieth century, worship of science had become the main stream of American culture and the reform

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40 Robert H. Wiebe, 111-132.

ideology. As George H. Daniels points out in his *Science in American History*, nothing was more important to that era than "science." It was a word to conjure with; a word to sweep away all opposition by labeling it "benighted," "romantic," or "obscurantist"; a word to legitimize any program no matter what fundamental reorientations it might entail or what sacrifices it might call upon particular groups to make....for science seemed to promise the power to control both man and nature.\footnote{George H. Daniels, 289-290.}

The medical profession probably is the best example to demonstrate how science helped modern professionals establish their authority. Around that time, medicine had the most significant developments of all scientific disciplines. Since the late 19th century, many revolutionary discoveries had taken place. Its astonishing breakthroughs in the laboratory sciences of physiology, chemistry, histology, pathological anatomy, and bacteriology, as well as applications of many new tools, techniques and drugs won medicine a reputation of being the most advanced of the sciences. Starr described modern medicine as "extraordinary works of reason: elaborate system of specialized knowledge, technical procedures and rules of behavior."\footnote{Paul Starr, 3.} In the context of Americans' worship of science, all the achievements in medical science helped the medical professionals to claim their professional, social as well as political privileges.

Under this circumstance, continuation of successful research and new
discoveries in medicine became vital factors for the medical professionals to maintain their privileged status. So far as seeking new projects was concerned, the backwardness of public health and medical research in China and other "underdeveloped" countries offered wonderful opportunities to American medical professionals. Simon Flexner, the director of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and a member of the Rockefeller Foundation's Second China Medical Commission, explicitly explained that

[t]he country [China] abounds in diseases, the nature of which is either unknown or the manner of conveyance undetermined. Hence the conditions are remarkably favorable for scientific observation and experiment in the laboratory and clinical branches. What one would, therefore, desire to find in the medical schools are indications of exceptional interest in the local problems of disease.  

Not only that, these opportunities could also be used to prove the importance of medical science both to people's health and to social progress, and thus they would help medical professionals a great deal. Logically, research projects and financial support for these researches became two most critical matters for the American medical profession.

Simultaneously, the newly emerging large foundations needed appropriate projects to present their ideas to society and to influence policy-making on issues they thought important. Because of the worship of science in the nation at that time, science programs and medical projects in particular

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seemed to be ideal candidates for altruistic investment. Thus, while large foundations, with their abundance of money, were very appealing to medical doctors, the very nature of the medical profession attracted foundations’ attention as well.

Gates articulated the indispensable role of large foundations in promoting medical science. He said that

[the development of the science [medical science] is extremely difficult, highly speculative, financially without profit, and very costly. Ninetenths of your [doctors’] money will come to yield little return. Private wealth shrinks from it, except under intense afflictive provocation or the influence of great leadership. [sic] Only these foundations, now the greatest civilization has seem, can provide the means on a grand scale for the development of the science of medicine; also they only can offer to wealth a persuasive leadership. It is our mission, a heaven-sent opportunity preserved now to us alone, to increase the light which will ultimately illumine all mankind, light which once got, [sic] will shine, we hope, forever and render the earth a more tolerable abode for the countless myriads of the future. If we cannot rise to this trust we crush the last best hope of suffering humanity...The development of medicine now falls on America alone and in America mainly on these two foundations and such private wealth as that can enlist. The sick world leans on us.⁴⁵

In one word, under the unique circumstance of early 20th century American culture, medical science provided the most needed reasons for the relevance of big foundations. In this general context the Rockefeller Foundation became deeply involved in developing medical science. The co-

operation of modern philanthropy and medical professionals represented an effort to find new values and new solutions for a society in which the old moralities and beliefs were seen to be collapsing. As a reward for such efforts, these new values, worship of science among others, helped them to claim their glories.

During the 1910s, with the successful work of the Rockefeller Institution for Medical Research, the Board of General Education, and the Sanitary Commission, Gates and other advisers had established a modern philanthropy for the Rockefellers. The principles, methods, and goals of this work formed a solid framework upon which Gates could build other projects. There was no doubt in his mind why the Rockefellers’ China project should not be done in the same professional and efficient way. As his idea of developing Rockefeller philanthropy into an international enterprise gradually became more clear, Gates suggested the Rockefellers expand this enterprise into the Far East following the model implemented and developed in the United States, namely medical science and higher education. Even though this time philanthropic programs would occur in completely different circumstances where the histories and cultures were very different from America’s, Gates had no doubt about the effectiveness of this American formula in Asian countries.

Gates’ letter to Rockefeller Sr. was sent to the Boston Herald and
published on April 17, 1905. In this letter he mentioned Rockefeller philanthropy and suggested a gift of $100,000 to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. It was in fact a public announcement of Rockefeller’s altruistic interest in the Far East and attracted much attention both from missionary societies and other Americans who were deeply interested in China. They soon started communicating with Gates.

On Dec. 31, 1906, Gates received a letter from Dr. Ernest D. Burton, a professor of the Department of Biblical and Patristic Greek at the University of Chicago (later President of the University, 1921-1926), Dr. Henry P. Judson, then the President of the University of Chicago, and some of their colleagues.46 In this letter, Burton urged the Rockefellers to "establish in China as early as possible a University, distinctly Christian, but wholly undenominational in character, and of the highest ideals and the broadest catholicity." The letter emphasized that "to make the establishment of such a University at precisely this time an enterprise to appeal to all Christian men as eminently desirable, whether it be looked at from the point of view of

46 Burton's friendship with Gates could be traced back to the year when Burton was in his first year as a student at the University of Rochester theological seminary and Gates was in his last. Their circle of friends also included Wallace Buttrick (then the secretary of the Rockefeller's General Education Board and later the first director of the China Medical Board), who was also graduated from the University of Rochester. Burton's letter was the earliest record of the correspondence between Gates and a group of professionals on the Rockefellers' China work.
education, or religion, or broad, world-wide statesmanship."^47 In Burton's and Judson's minds, the University of Chicago would be an ideal model for this Christian University in China.

Burton's and Judson's letter began the involvement of these University of Chicago professors in Rockefeller's China philanthropy. Several years later, both of them went to China as the members of Rockefellers' first educational investigation in China. The importance of their involvement and their influence on the Rockefeller Foundation's China policy became more and more clear as time went on.

Burton also told Gates that it was because of Mr. McKibben that their attention had been directed to China several years earlier. Their idea of a university with a distinctly Christian nature reflected the impact of the missionaries on them. Not only that, Gates' correspondence with missionaries also showed similar thought. All of these sources revealed the transitional nature of the Rockefeller Philanthropy at that time. In other words, while the Rockefeller family charity was heading in a scientific and professional direction, their religious character and the missionaries' influence were still expressing themselves.

In reply Gates told Burton that the Rockefeller Foundation was considering a larger plan for work among foreign peoples; however, it needed

a comprehensive scheme and no immediate action should be taken. An important part of this comprehensive plan was to study China's situation. The Rockefellers and their advisories had little knowledge about that part of the world; nor were they familiar with the missionaries' work there. The Foundation depended upon the missionaries as an important information resource. That was why Gates contacted several key missionaries in China.

Nevertheless, as a professional way of running a philanthropy, the Rockefellers would like to have their own first-hand information. To that end, Judson wrote a letter (in January, 1907) to Gates, suggesting a comprehensive investigation of China's situation. He thought it was important to get the subject from "a point of view not merely of the missionary, but also of the economist, of the educator and of the statesman." According to Judson, the Rockefeller philanthropy should have some commissioners spend enough time, not less than six months, in China to make an adequate study of conditions and report the situation based on a wide study of facts, not just simply reflecting the views of the missionaries.49

Gates agreed with Judson and discussed the matter with Rockefeller Jr. soon after. "We ought to have here an entire independent voice," Gates said.

48 Frederick T. Gates to Ernest Burton, Jan. 11, 1907. RAC. Rockefeller Family Collection, RG2.

49 Henry Judson to Gates, January 31, 1907. RAC. Rockefeller Family Collection, RG2.
This was the summer of 1907, and John R. Mott, a well-known leader of the Student Volunteer Movement in late 19th and early 20th century America, had just come back to the United States from a trip to China, Japan, and the Philippines. He argued that there were great opportunities in the Far East, and he appealed to the Rockefellers for a large contribution.

Rockefeller Jr. told his father that "while having every confidence in Mr. Mott, Mr. Gates had suggested that the work which he represents has assumed such proportions that before action of this latest appeal we should have the judgment of some other man who has visited the various fields."\textsuperscript{50} Rockefeller Sr. left the decision with Rockefeller Jr. and Gates; however, he advised them to go slowly on anything that involved donating money, especially very large gifts, because "seventy-five million dollars have been taken from the value of our estate by the depreciation of the value of stocks."\textsuperscript{51}

Soon a decision was made. Sponsored by Rockefeller Sr., the Oriental Education Commission headed East. From 1908 to 1915 the Rockefeller Foundation successively sent out three investigational commissions: the Oriental Education Commission (1908-1909); the [First] China Medical Commission (1914); and the Second China Medical Commission (1915). In

\textsuperscript{50} John D. Rockefeller Jr. to John D. Rockefeller Sr., August 31, 1907. RAC. RFC.

\textsuperscript{51} Rockefeller Sr. to Rockefeller Jr., Sept. 6, 1907. RAC. RFC.
1914, it also invited some prestigious American medical professionals, educators, and missionary leaders to a China Conference. The purposes for all these careful studies were not only to collect information on China at first hand, but also to help the Foundation define its China policy.

During the Progressive Era, it was very popular for American philanthropic foundations to conduct social surveys before they initiated any program. In his study of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Latin American Surveys of the 1920s, Marcos Cueto pointed out that by launching these surveys, the Foundation expanded this general American practice into an international effort. He concluded that these surveys became one of the main symbols of "scientific philanthropy" and one by which the Foundation claimed to make rational decisions.52

The Rockefeller philanthropy’s investigations in China were much earlier than those in Latin America. Lack of precedents in international philanthropy and of knowledge about East Asia partially explained why those investigations were comprehensive and extensive. The investigation of the Oriental Education Commission went much further in depth beyond education and medicine. Its six volume report included China’s political, social and physiographic information, which were not only national, but also regional. The report also provided details about China’s natural resources and economic

52 Marcos Cueto ed. 1-22.
development. It was no surprise that Thomas C. Chamberlin, a noted geologist, was chosen for the trip, especially if one considers the Standard Oil Company's interest in China's oil resources.

The Oriental Education Commission—the body which undertook the Rockefellers' first independent investigation, joined by Drs. Burton and Thomas C. Chamberlin of the University of Chicago—spent six months during 1908 and 1909 in Japan, India, and Korea as well as China, their major target. No immediate action followed this trip. The commission considered "the establishment and conduct of a great secular University without denominational affiliations" which would be "chartered, approved, encouraged and patronized by the Chinese Government". But, in Gates' words, this "dream" was "not possible of realization." Gates later recalled that "missionary bodies at home and abroad were distinctly and openly, even threateningly hostile to it as tending to infidelity." And he added "not even Mr. Rockefeller's promise of ten million for a foundation could tempt the Chinese government to tolerate our proposed institution, freed though it were from all religious bias, unless

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54 In 1920s, under T. C. Chamberlin's suggestion, an exploring team sponsored by the Standard Oil went to north-west China for oil. Interview with Dr. Hank Woodard, Dept. of Geology, Beloit College, Wisconsin, summer of 1993. T. C. Chamberlin was the chair of that department and left his diaries and notes about the Oriental Education Commission of 1909 to the department.
we would consent that it be controlled and run by appointees of the Chinese
government."\textsuperscript{55}

Previous studies of Rockefeller philanthropy in China have discussed
this commission as unsuccessful and of no consequence. The explanations for
such a result were mainly based on Gates' words above. For example, John E.
Harr and Peter Johnson briefly mentioned in their book \textit{The Rockefeller
Century} that "[t]here were two problems. One was that the missionary
societies were against it... The second was the instability of China and the
prevalence of graft and corruption." These two unfavorable facts, according to
Harr and Johnson, were responsible for the miscarriage of the establishment of
a "University of Chicago in China."\textsuperscript{56}

It is true that the Rockefellers did not take any action until six years
after the Oriental Education Commission, but this investigation was not
without significant result. It was through these commissioners' perspective that
the Foundation saw the problems in both missionary and governmental
education in China. Again, under the influence of these professional
commissioners, the Foundation realized its fundamental differences with the

\textsuperscript{55} Frederick T. Gates, "the China Medical Board", undated typewriting paper,
RAC. Frederick Gates Collection.

\textsuperscript{56} John E. Harr and Peter J. Johnson, 122. Other studies that held a similar
opinion include: Frank Ninkovich, "The Rockefeller Foundation, China, and
John Z. Bowers, \textit{Western Medicine in A Chinese Palace}; Mary E. Ferguson; and
Raymond B. Fosdick, \textit{The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation}. 
missionaries. Therefore, analyzing the finding of the Oriental Education Commission is the key to understanding the Foundation’s distinct approach to China’s reform.

This Commission was not, as Gates’ memorandum implied, sent out to negotiate for a university with either missionaries or the Chinese government. Gates knew very well the missionaries’ expectations of the Rockefeller philanthropy even before the Oriental Education Commission set out. For the reasons explained earlier, missionary educators did not approve of the creation of any new institution or program, whether secular or denominationally affiliated. No less important, the Rockefeller’s money was very appealing to the missionary societies, whose financial difficulties had thwarted their designs. The missionaries hoped that the Foundation would support their efforts and therefore strengthen their educational institutions. All of these opinions had been expressed clearly in their correspondence with Gates. Obviously the 1908 commission did not need to clarify the missionaries’ opinions. In fact, that was not the real reason for its investigation.

The fact was that Gates had a much greater ambition for the Rockefeller philanthropy in China than the missionaries had ever realized. He anticipated that the Rockefeller Foundation might exert a fundamental influence on education in China. Lack of a comprehensive and detailed understanding of China’s situation, however, prevented him from making any judgement or decision. The Rockefellers and Gates needed first-hand
information about China, as seen through the eyes of people they trusted. They especially wanted to know how the Foundation could design a program that would have a profound influence. The Oriental Education Commission conducted the preliminary exploration.

It was true that this commission did undertake some discussions of a university in China. However, the suggested idea of a University of Chicago in China was at best immature. Considering Rockefeller Sr.'s advice of going slowly on anything that involved relinquishing his money, as well as the Rockefellers' and Gates' consistent prudence in decision-making, it was very unlikely that the Rockefellers and Gates would have launched a university with a ten million dollar endowment when the founders were not even sure what the object and method of such a university would be.

As far as defining the Foundation's relations with the missionaries and the Chinese government is concerned, the Oriental Education Commission was the most important unit in the Foundation's process of searching for a project in China. Through this study, the Rockefellers and Gates got a clear picture of the reality of China. Its analytical report on missionaries and the governmental institutions was "objective" and professional. Most important, it clarified the differences between those professionals and the missionaries in their perspectives on modern Chinese education; consequently, it helped Gates find out the "best way" to assist the Chinese. Later on, the Foundation's other studies of China supported this commission's opinions on the missionaries'
work.

One of the most important results of these comprehensive investigations was that those commissioners did not recommend co-operating with the existing missionary institutions as the Foundation's first and most desirable choice. In its conclusion, the Oriental Education Commission suggested the Rockefellers not give their money over to the missionaries' control, or use it exclusively for Christian education. It also said: "[i]t is our definite and clear conviction that the ends to be achieved cannot be accomplished solely by the method of appropriation to existing bodies."\(^{57}\) In the report of the Second China Medical Commission, Simon Flexner told the Foundation that it was not a wise idea to "offer assistance directly to the many existing schools". The better way to elevate China's medical education should be "to set up one or two more standard schools" so "the other schools could measure themselves."\(^{58}\)

Immediately after its formal establishment in January 1914, the Rockefeller Foundation held its first important meeting on the China project: the China Conference. Presided over by John D. Rockefeller Jr., this invitation-only gathering included some of the most renowned missionary


\(^{58}\) Simon Flexner, Jan. 17, 1916.
leaders, medical doctors and educators in the United States.\textsuperscript{59} The conference offered these missionary educators and professionals a chance to discuss their ideas and differences face to face. It proved to be one of the most important events in the Foundation's search for an appropriate plan of action in China.

One of the major achievements of this China Conference was that both the missionaries and those professionals in the meeting determined that medical education was the most desirable field for the Foundation's involvement in China even though their approaches to medical education were quite different. (Their differences will be fully discussed in the next chapter.) As a result of this determination, the Foundation sent the China Medical Commission (1914) to conduct a thorough study of medical education and public health in China, followed by the Second Medical Commission (1915) to design the Foundation's medical projects in China.

China's situation in general and medical problems in particular affected the Rockefeller Foundation in two ways. First, the Foundation was convinced that now was the best time to influence and change that country, and it should

\textsuperscript{59} The following people, among others, were in the conference: Frederick Gates, President Charles W. Eliot (Harvard University), Dr. Charles D. Tenney (a noted American educator in China), President Harry P. Judson (University of Chicago), Professor Ernest D. Burton (University of Chicago), Professor T. C. Chamberlin (University of Chicago), Professor Paul Monroe (Columbia University), Wallace Buttrick (director of the Rockefeller Foundation's Board of General Education), Dr. John R. Mott (the leader of American Student Voluntary Movement), Dr. Simon Flexner (director of the Rockefeller Medical Research Institute), Dr. Abraham Flexner (an American medical education reformer), and some representatives of missionary medical work.
take action immediately. Eliot asserted that

it was borne in upon me very strongly that there had never been a
moment in the whole history of China when there had been such chance
for introducing western ideals and particularly for western methods of
education to get an entrance into China on a large scale.  

Mott explained that China "now is literally plastic; it is in fluid condition, but
in the not distant future, if we may judge by history, it will become fixed like
plaster on the wall." He warned that

[t]his very instability is to my mind the most eloquent fact, and if we
wait until China becomes stable we lose the greatest opportunity that
ever comes in the life of dealing with a nation. It is much better that we
run risks of losing some here and there rather than that we lose the
opportunity. The old Arab proverb comes to my mind that "the dawn
does not come twice to awaken man."  

Second, China’s backwardness in modern education and medicine, as
the reports of the Foundation’s China investigations exhaustively described and
discussed, reinforced the Foundation’s opinion of the superiority of Western
science and medicine. Further, it reinforced the Foundation’s determination to
export Western ideas, scientific knowledge and methods to the Far East. In
other words, China’s medical problems "provided" opportunities for the
Foundation to extend its influence abroad, and to advocate its notion of
medical science to the Chinese as well as to Americans.

To summarize, these professional investigations were critical to the

60 "The China Conference of the Rockefeller Foundation," January 19 and 20,
1914. RAC. Rockefeller Foundation Collection, RG: RG 1.1, 4.

61 ibid. 10.
success of the Rockefeller philanthropy in China. From these first-hand investigations, the Rockefellers and their advisers obtained a professional evaluation of education in China that was independent of the views of both the missionaries and the Chinese government. These commissioners’ criticism of missionary education, and their scientifically oriented vision of China’s modern education, all decisively affected the Rockefeller Foundation’s final choice. That choice was independent of the missionaries in China and that demonstrated the fundamental nature of the Rockefellers’ philanthropic works at home.

Coincidentally, Charles W. Eliot was then urging Gates to establish some more independent educational works in America that could carry Rockefeller’s name into history. Eliot thought that the General Education Board (the Rockefellers’ program) should create new agencies to demonstrate utility, like the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, rather than just supplementing the good work of other institutions. He emphasized that

[u]nless some independent institutions, having permanent educational value, are created with money of the General Education Board, the founder of the Board will live in history only as an assistant in other men’s works. That does not seem to me the quality of Mr. Rockefeller’s real contributions either to American industries or to American education.\(^2\)

Apparently Eliot’s words were a good footnote to these commissions’ conclusion.

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A Rockefeller's "Ambassador of Education" to China?

When the Rockefeller Foundation conducted an international program it had to consider its relations with foreign governments. The Foundation's experience in China showed clearly that it was well aware of this matter, and had a very straightforward attitude. So far as its policy toward the Chinese government was concerned, the Foundation definitely knew what it would like to do; even though accomplishing its goals was another question. A discussion of this matter will help explain not only the Foundation's interest in China, but also the policy on its relations with foreign governments in general.

In the history of American philanthropy, the private foundations' influence on the government's policy had been a very sensitive issue; and there had been much controversy over the question of the foundations' initiatives and motives.63 America was then in the midst of the Progressive Era. During that period big trust companies, and their philanthropic enterprises as well, were under public attack, and the Rockefellers were the biggest target. Americans saw big trusts as robber barons, and they were not happy with the idea of big foundations manipulating public affairs.

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It is very interesting to see that when the Rockefeller Foundation leaders were planning their international programs such as the China program they were much more aggressive than they were in the Foundation’s domestic programs. They not only discussed the opportunities of co-operating with foreign governments, but virtually controlling certain government policies. During the program planning process, the Rockefeller Foundation showed a strong interest in influencing Chinese government’s education policy.

As has been discussed in the second chapter, modern education in China began in the late 19th century and was developed using two formats: schools run either by the Chinese or by foreigners. The Chinese schools were sponsored by governments, both central and local. Some private modern schools were opened by new-style Chinese educators. Foreign schools run by missionaries were in the great majority. Only a very few institutions, medical schools in particular, were run by foreign governments, namely the Japanese and German governments. Apparently at that time the Chinese government and the missionaries were the most important and influential factors.

After 1905 the Chinese government schools grew rapidly. At the elementary and middle school levels they soon became more numerous in quantity than the mission schools, even though the latter were of a higher quality than the former; and at the college level they had obvious superiority. The Chinese government wanted very much to cast off foreign influence on education, but was thwarted by the backwardness of China’s modern education
system. Still, it held the power to regulate private schools.

When the Rockefeller Foundation sought a philanthropic opportunity in China it had several choices. After exploring many of the existing educational and philanthropic institutions, the Oriental Education Commission summarized to the Rockefellers four possibilities: to work (1) with the Chinese government, (2) with private citizens of China, (3) with the missionary organizations, and (4) independently.64

The Foundation gave serious thought to working both with the Chinese government and/ or with the missionaries. Private Chinese schools were just being initiated at that time and none of them were at the college level. Although the private sector in China had developed rapidly during 1930s, in the early 1910s its potential was not clear. The Foundation usually preferred to build its programs on existing well organized works. Therefore, at that time, co-operating with Chinese private schools seemed an undesirable choice.65

Intent on influencing modern Chinese education in the best and biggest way, the Rockefeller Foundation leaders showed a great interest in establishing

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64 Burton and Chamberlin to Gates and Judson, March 11, 1909. RAC. Family Collection, RG: John D. Rockefeller Jr.

65 According to John Ettling, four principles comprised the Rockefeller Foundation’s philanthropic code. The first one was that the Rockefellers’ money should be given, whenever possible, to a work already sufficiently well organized to be of proven effective and usefulness. The Germ of Laziness: Rockefeller Philanthropy and Public Health in the New South, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981). 56.
a strong relationship with the Chinese government. In a report of the Oriental Education Commission from China, Burton and Chamberlin suggested that

"[i]t seems to us preeminently desirable at some one point or more to enter into fairly close relations with the government. The bulk of the education is going to be done by the government. They are sadly in need of guidance. If it is possible, as we hope, to get into sympathetic relations with the government and cooperate with them in educational work, it would be of the greatest advantage to China, and would contribute to the success of any other work which we might do."66

They noticed that "there are indeed distinct limitations to such cooperation. The government will no doubt wish to control any joint work. But to grant such control would be fatal." Burton and Chamberlin were convinced of the Rockefellers’ money power, and they predicted optimistically that "[p]artnership can only be on terms which give us the practical control." They believed that "firmness and tact would make cooperation on our terms possible."67

Considering the failure of the missionaries' cooperation with the Chinese government, Burton and Chamberlin stressed the difference between the cooperation Rockefeller proposed and that sought by the missionaries. They pointed out that in the case of the missionaries, such as W. A. P. Martin of *Tong Wen Guan* or Charles D. Tenney, once the president of the government's Bei Yang University, circumstances were different. The Chinese

66 Burton and Chamberlin to Gates and Judson, March 11, 1909.

67 ibid.
government employed those missionaries, and dismissed them when it was thought that the government could manage the modern schools without the missionaries' assistance. Burton thought that because the missionaries did not have money, they could not control the situation. On the contrary, if the Rockefellers were to cooperate with the government in an institutional program, that institution would be based on the Rockefeller's financial support, and this indeed would make a big difference.

Burton and Chamberlin in their report also suggested a special board to conduct more comprehensive investigations in China. However, Rockefeller Jr. originated and later Gates articulated a much more ambitious plan than Burton and Chamberlin had advised, namely an American Board working as an "Ambassador of Education" sent to China by the Rockefellers.

Gates elaborated on this idea and suggested that "suppose we form a board, not composed of the Trustees of the University of Chicago, nor indeed of Chicago men exclusively, but of eight or ten representative men interested in university education in this country and abroad." Aware of the fact that "each of these men might, very likely would, have his favorite American university", Gates emphasized that "[h]e will understand himself to represent no single institution but the higher western learning as a whole." This board should be sent to China with its headquarters in Peking. Gates hoped that at

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68 Burton and Chamberlin to Gates and Judson, March 11, 1909.
the same time the Chinese Government would appoint a similar board so these two groups could join hands.

When Gates continued his depiction, the purpose of such a board became clear. "The American Board would send a commissioner to China -- an ambassador of education." Accordingly, this man "will be, in dignity and ability, on a par with other foreign ambassadors." And he should have "the winning grace of a Burlingame, and the organizing capacity and executive ability of Sir Robert Hart;" he would be "the best man that can be got for such a purpose." All of this was in the hope that "he may ultimately so far ingratiate himself with Chinese educational officialdom as to secure a powerful influence over their whole educational system and bring it under the influence of our own."

Gates continued his argument that

[w]hile this man will do everything he can to influence the Chinese Government in wisely developing their system of education, and while we will even indulge the hope that he may ultimately become substantially the Chinese Minister of Education -- a hope which is not unreasonable in view of the influence which such men as Burlingame and Hart have actually achieved -- if he achieves none of these things, we may perhaps consider his mission worth while if he does nothing more than keep us closely informed of educational progress or retrogression and of the various currents and oddies [sic] of Chinese thought. For it will be his duty to visit Chinese educational institutions in every part of

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69 Anson Burlingame (1820-1870), served as American ambassador to China from 1861 to 1867. In 1867 he was hired by the Qing Government as a minister to visit America, Britain, France, Russia, and Germany. In 1868, he worked between the U. S. government and the Qing Government, which led to a Sino-American Burlingame Treaty. About Sir Robert Hart, see an earlier note.
the Empire and to report on them, to keep in the closest touch with the men who control Chinese education, and note every possible opening for usefulness. 70

Gates' suggestion of an ambassador of education to China is very impressive in the nature of its extraordinary aggressiveness, even for an inner-circle discussion. It revealed that the Rockefeller Foundation did not hesitate to impose its influence upon a foreign government. In fact, when Gates used those two best known imperial agents, A. Burlingame and R. Hart, as ideal models for the Rockefellers' "education ambassador" in China, Gates equated himself and the Rockefellers to those aggressive imperialist agents who used their ideas to influence Chinese government's decision making.

In the Foundation's China Conference of 1914, co-operation with the Chinese government was once again an important issue. Charles D. Tenney highly recommended co-operation with the national government. He argued that

I have no doubt that an independent university might be conducted more efficiently than a Chinese University could be conducted, but if you are considering influencing the Chinese nation, you can only get at the nerve center of the nation through the government institution. The independent university or school, no matter what the scope of its work, turns out men who have a totally different standing in the country from the regular graduates of a government institution. They are regarded as semi-foreign; they are outside the lines of official promotion; whereas the

student who graduates with the sanction of his own government is the man who is going to influence the country.\textsuperscript{71}

He explained to Rockefeller Jr. that the new Chinese government, after the 1911 Revolution, strongly wished to extend and make more efficient all forms of modern education. He added that the Minister of Education had expressed his readiness to accept the Rockefeller Foundation's proposal to jointly develop education in China and to guarantee full religious liberty to the students.

The major concern of the Foundation on this issue of a joint effort was their desire for adequate guarantees as to the proper use of the Foundation funds, had it given substantial aid to the Chinese government. Tenney backed the Chinese on this matter and anticipated no trouble in making proper arrangements. However, Eliot presented a quite different opinion. He told Rockefeller Jr. that on the basis of his visit to China and his communication with Chinese educators he believed it would be extremely unlikely that the Chinese government could be depended upon to allocate funds in a manner found suitable to the Foundation.

Eliot explained that he came to this conclusion not because he thought the Chinese lacked ability, but because they were utterly unaccustomed to functions of this nature and had little sense of what should be done. He emphasized that it was those Chinese educators themselves who convinced him that modern educational institutions must be controlled in America and

\textsuperscript{71} "China Conference", 42.
managed by Americans for a long time. Disagreeing with Eliot's conclusion, Tenney made two arguments. The Chinese Eliot had contacted, he argued, were very progressive and strongly resented the scholars of the old class who had always retained exclusive control of education. And, he added, the Chinese language and Chinese customs encouraged Chinese people to flatter foreign visitors. Tenney himself believed that "the Chinese are capable of doing excellent work in the management of large undertakings."\(^{72}\)

Most of the participants of this China Conference were either missionary representatives or outstanding educators, medical educators in particular. However, Charles R. Henderson, a sociologist in criminology, was an anomaly to these two groups, even though he was related to the University of Chicago. Nevertheless, his knowledge of and experience in dealing with social problems brought about by industrialization were valuable to the Foundation. At this Conference, Henderson warned the Foundation that the "new spirit of nationality" which has been stimulated by Japan's success was sweeping in a great wave over China and India. He believed that because of the instability brought about by rapid industrialization and political turmoil, the social milieu "is one of the most important points where this Foundation can take hold."\(^{73}\)

\(^{72}\) ibid 130.

\(^{73}\) ibid. 132.
Henderson emphasized the importance of efficient and professionally trained experts in Asian governments and administrations. He thought this would enhance these governments' power to control the problems brought by social change.  

He argued that "there will be no use in sending out medical men unless you can have trained leaders, men who are well established in the social sciences, men who have a wide outlook and are capable of making systematic investigations on their own account..."

Gates and other advisers might not agree with each other on how to establish a relationship with the Chinese government; however, none of them questioned whether the Foundation, an American private organization, should set goals to influence the Chinese government. For them that was not an issue. Thus the question arises: Why did the Rockefeller Foundation not worry about possible criticism from either the Chinese or American public if such aggressive action would be taken?

No doubt, China's semi-colonial state and its weak government "encouraged" the Rockefellers' and Gates' ambition. They thought that the Chinese government was somehow controllable because it needed foreign help in education. Burton and Chamberlin's letter implied that idea. On the other

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75 "China Conference", 133.
hand, the Foundation leaders shrewdly sensed the favorable change in many Chinese people’s opinion about the West and new style education. To them, China’s desperate need in both education and medicine not only opened opportunities to the Foundation, but also justified the relevance of its work in China.

Gates’ "American Board of Education" plan was never carried out. Jerome D. Greene, the first secretary of the Foundation, later explained that "it is one of the grave obstacles in the way of philanthropic endowments in the Far East that there is a lack of substantial, broads-gauge [sic] intelligent men of affairs who could serve as trustees and directors of such endowments." But this was actually only one of the problems. Another serious obstacle to slow the Foundation was China’s tumultuous political situation.

Still, the Foundation implemented a similar movement, using a less impressive agent than originally intended. In 1914, it selected Roger S. Greene, then American Councilor of the State Department to Hankou, China, as its first resident director of the China Medical Board (CMB), hoping that Greene would help the Foundation to build a co-operative relationship with the Chinese government. As a layman with no medical education, Greene’s real value to the Foundation lay in his knowledge of political situations in China, Japan, and Russia, as well as in his wide range of relations with Chinese

officials, businessmen, and intellectuals. 77

In the early years of his work for the CMB, Greene watched China’s political situation closely. 78 At that time, Peking was under warlordism, and its political situation was unpredictable and turbulent. Greene directly experienced the restless changes in political struggles. Better than any other officer in the Foundation, he understood the situation and was sensitive to Chinese people’s feelings. Regarding the Foundation’s relationship with the Chinese government, Greene insisted that they should be very careful about

77 Henry Houghton, who worked for the Foundation’s second medical school at Shanghai, told Roger Greene that “Your previous relationships in China and your many connections with Chinese and Japanese as well as Europeans are assets on which the China Medical Board should draw very heavily during the next five years. The intimate acquaintance, which you have with all of the problems on the field, your trained judgement, and your organizing capacity make it urgent that the work in China should have access to you occasionally for counsel and guidance.” H. Houghton to R. Greene, Jan. 25, 1919. Houghton Library (HL), bms Am 1864. Harvard University. About Greene’s relationships with various peoples, foreigners or Chinese, in China, see his correspondence with Peking Social Service Club, Houghton, and L. C. Porter, during 1915-1916. HL, bms Am 1864. In a letter to Francis W. Peabody, a member of the Rockefeller Foundation’s First China Commission and the CMB, Greene said “I have joined the Peking Club and am skating at the International Club, which is partly a missionary crowd, but includes also many returned Chinese students. On the whole I am seeing more of the missionary than of the diplomatic crowd, except our own legation, with which I keep in pretty close touch. Mr. Reinsch has been very good about inviting me to meet people at dinner at the legation, and Dr. Tenney has been helping us very much with our land troubles.” R. Greene to F. Peabody, Jan. 26, 1916. HL, bms Am 1864.

78 He discussed China’s political issues and foreign affairs frequently in his letters to Buttrick (director of the CMB), E. Mclellan (the Department of State) and Bishop Roots during his early years in Peking. See their correspondence during that period (1914-1917), HL, bms Am 1864.
making any criticism of the Chinese government and suggested the Foundation take a low profile.

For instance, the report of the third China Commission included the following paragraph:

The Chinese government has not been able thus far to take comprehensive measures for public health. Small pox is considered by the people as a matter of course. The various activities of a public health service as practiced in western lands are almost unknown. Leprosy and tuberculosis rage unchecked. Isolation hospitals for contagious diseases hardly exist, so far as the government is concerned. The stegomyia mosquito swarms in the Yangtze valley and in the Canton delta, and western medical men are apprehensive that yellow fever may come in from South America. If it should, its ravages would be fearful. 79

When Greene discovered that a proposed announcement of the China Medical Board in an American newspaper planned to include these words, he telegraphed Buttrick, the director of the CMB, and asked him to withhold the announcement. He saw "grave danger of offending the Chinese by sensational statements" and believed "the less publicity the better." 80 Similarly, when the CMB proposed a new name with the word "Rockefeller" for the PUMC, Greene swiftly stopped it by pointing out that such an action might upset both the Chinese and the missionaries. 81


80 Greene to Buttrick, Feb 18, 1915. RAC. RG: RG4.

81 In a meeting of the China Medical Board of January, 1917, a suggestion was made to change the PUMC to a name with a word of "Rockefeller". Greene disagreed with such an idea. He not only believed that Rockefeller was a long foreign name that would be difficult for the Chinese to refer, but also thought the
When the Foundation and Greene were working on the possibility of co-operation with the Chinese government, Xiang-Ya Medical School ("Yale in China") had started such an experiment ahead of the Foundation. In 1906, supported by the Yale Mission, Edward H. Hume, a graduate of Johns Hopkins Medical School, established a hospital--"Yale in China"--in Changsha, Hunan province. In 1910, an anti-Christianity movement in Changsha destroyed many churches. However, the Yale Hospital was untouched because its Chinese patients protected it. Tan Yan-kai, the Governor General of Hunan after the 1911 Revolution, was grateful to the Yale Hospital for saving his mother’s life and agreed to co-operate with the Yale mission. Under the agreement between Tan and Yale Mission, the Hunan government and the Yale Mission would work together to establish a modern medical school, named Xiang-Ya (Hunan-Yale). Both sides would be equally represented in the board of trustees, and both would share in the financial responsibility.

The central government rejected this agreement for the reason that a local government did not have the authority to sign a contract with a foreign organization. Only after many setbacks was the contract approved. However, neither the Hunan government nor the Yale Mission had sufficient financial resources to support the school. The chaos due to wars among local warlords

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Foundation should concede to a minor point like the name of the PUMC, because in other matter the Foundation would be "compelled to disappoint the old friends of the school in many important particulars." Greene to Wallace Buttrick, March 16th, 1917. RAC. RG: RG4.
posed the major problem. When the agreement expired ten years later, the
Yale Mission abandoned its involvement.  

Xiang-Ya was the first and at that time the only school jointly
supported and managed by both a missionary organization and the Chinese
government. Naturally it attracted the Foundation's attention. The reports of
the Foundation's first and second China Medical Commissions described many
details of Xiang-Ya's co-operative endeavor. One report pointed out that
intimate personal friendships, with mutual admiration and respect, between the
members of the Yale Mission and influential Chinese officials and gentry
provided the firmest basis for this joint operation. However, it also noticed
that

in regard to a native background of intelligent appreciation of western
medicine and its advantages, and a living interest in the school, the
Hunan-Yale College of Medicine is more auspiciously fortunate than any
other foreign endeavor of which we have knowledge in China.  

Greene was very interested in such a co-operative program, however,
the reality in China held him back. In letters to Hume and J. Greene (his
brother), he indicated a strong reservation about this operation. First, he was
concerned about the impact of an unstable political situation on this joint

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82 See Hunan yixueyuan (Hunan Medical School), Xiang-Ya chun qiu, (the
spring and fall in Xiang-Ya medical school), (Hunan: Hunan Medical School,
1984.)

83 Frederick L. Gates (son of F. T. Gates) "Changsha, The Hunan-Yale
College of Medicine", for the Second China Medical Commission. RAC, RG:
RG4.
effort. As he pointed out to Hume, the Hunan government had only temporary control over the province, and might at any time be superseded by another government which might be altogether out of sympathy with Hume’s work and disinclined to give it any official support or recognition. He said, “If such a situation should arise it would obviously be most undesirable to resort to diplomatic means to secure the continuance of a co-operation which could only be satisfactory when it was voluntary.”

Second, Greene doubted the financial ability of the Hunan government to support Xiang-Ya. He asked Hume to bear in mind that the Chinese who were making the agreement with Yale were also without what a businessman would consider a satisfactory guarantee that the money necessary for the fulfillment of their part of the bargain would be forthcoming. He said that considering the present financial situation of Hunan, it seems likely that there will be comparatively little real improvement within the short time indicated by the Governor General, i.e. “after the autumn”, and there is apparently a danger that the same considerations which make him unwilling to grant an appropriation now may still apply next winter.

Third, Greene insisted that a private school should keep its independence from the government. He told Jerome Greene that I am very skeptical as to the wisdom of a school on a private Foundation receiving an annual grant from the government, unless in accordance with a contract for specific services, as I believe is the case with the Union Medical College at Peking. It would give a hold on the school of

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84 R. Greene to E. Hume, June 4th, 1914. HL, bms Am 1864.

85 ibid.
which future authorities may avail themselves in a very infelicitous way. 86

The Xiang-Ya case helped Greene, and the Foundation reached a conclusion that at that specific moment, it was undesirable for the Foundation to launch a co-operative institution, in which the Chinese government would be a major partner. However, the Foundation did not give up the hope of influencing the government. Choosing Beijjing (Peking) as the location for its medical project reflected this determination. The Union Medical College in Peking (the predecessor of the PUMC) was not the best medical college in China and was only among those on the second level. In spite of this the Foundation decided to stake its future in China on this school. The explanation for this choice, as the First China Medical Commission admitted, was the importance of the location:

Peking impressed the Commission as being on the whole by far the best location in all China for a strong and influential medical school, ... it has been the capital of the country almost continuously, under three dynasties and under the republic. Being the capital, Peking is the educational center of the country, ... There, also, are located the highest government schools. It therefore offers opportunities for influencing the educational as well as administrative offerers of the government to an extent that cannot be equalled anywhere else in China. 87

In addition, the UMC was then the only foreign institution in China that had

86 R. Greene to J. Greene, June 14th, 1914. HL, bms Am 1864. The Union Medical College at Peking that Greene referred to in his letter was the predecessor of the PUMC.

Government recognition which was obtained in 1906. Later the German Medical School at Qingdao (Tsingtao) received similar recognition. Although the Foundation decided to launch an independent institution, it determined to maintain a close relationship with the Chinese government.

Briefly speaking, the Rockefeller Foundation's policy regarding its relationship with the Chinese government was a very complicated issue. On the one hand, the Foundation indeed would like to have some fundamental impact on China's modern education. Aware of the fact that the Chinese government had major control over education, it realized that the most effective way to have an impact would be to control the government's educational policy. On the other hand, the Foundation was restricted not only by the unstable political situation in China, but also its own ability to meet its ambition.

The Chinese government lacked substantial control over foreign institutions due to its weakness and incompetency. This situation provided a "golden opportunity" to foreign organizations and reformers. However, the government could provide neither a desirable environment or the necessary support for those groups. This state precluded any long-term and promising co-operative relationship, although such a relationship would be beneficial to both sides.

By the late 1920s, China's political situation finally improved, after the Guomindang government (the Nationalist Party's government) united the once
warlord-controlled territories and started to exercise its authority over the
nation. The government’s policy toward foreign educational activities became
more strict then before. Under the strong pressure of restoring Chinese control
over education, the Nanjing government started to Sinicize all educational
institutions supported or managed by foreign organizations. The new Chinese
government had its own reform agenda which might not necessarily be in
accord with the Foundation’s plan for China. On the other hand, the
Foundation’s interests and priorities also changed with the passing of time.
Therefore, the Foundation’s great hope of virtually controlling China’s modern
education was never fulfilled.

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In short, in the early 20th century, the Rockefellers and their advisors
saw China as a new frontier which was essential to establishing their newly
organized modern philanthropic enterprise. The Rockefellers’ interests in
China were promoted by several factors: Gates and his colleagues’ ambition of
extending the Rockefeller Foundation to the international stage; the
missionaries’ advocacy of American mission in China; and American modern
professionals’ eagerness to advance their notions of science and education to
"less developed" countries. While missionaries inspired the Foundation, it was
those professionals who actually conducted the investigations and program-plan
for the Rockefellers.
The desire of launching a program that could greatly affect China’s modern education led the attention of Rockefellers and their advisors to the Chinese government; however, China’s reality frustrated the Foundation and "helped" it to conclude that to promote private organizations would be more practical. This political reality was an important reason that the Foundation finally decided to establish independent medical schools and to promote missionary institutions.

This chapter focuses on the Foundation’s interest in China and the factors behind such an interest. In the next chapter, the discussion will switch to the Foundation’s approach to China, its means and end. By comparing these with the approach of the missionaries, the study will continue to answer the questions of what the fundamental factors that shaped the Foundation’s perspective on its China mission were, and why the Foundation and the missionaries had different approaches.
MEDICAL EDUCATION AS AN APPROACH TO CHINA:
DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE ROCKEFELLER
FOUNDATIONS AND THE MISSIONARIES

After years of extensive studies and investigations, the Rockefeller Foundation finally decided to launch a research oriented and elite style medical school, the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) in China. Both the Foundation and the missionaries considered medical education a desirable activity for its own sake and as a means to influence China. Furthermore, both groups believed that Western civilization was superior to Chinese civilization. Nevertheless, their notions of modern education and science, as well as the best way to change China, were quite different. The Foundation’s approach, represented by the PUMC and the China Medical Board (CMB), was strongly influenced by American modern professionals, and this approach reflected some of the most distinctive features of the Foundation’s early programs.

This chapter will focus on some of the most important issues in both the Rockefeller Foundation’s China program and the missionaries’. By comparing their ideas and methods, the study will address the following questions: What were the fundamental differences between the Foundation’s approach and the missionaries’? What were the broad cultural contexts that shaped these approaches? Finally, why it is important to analyze these differences?
Before the Rockefeller Foundation’s involvement in China, missionaries had pioneered modern education and medicine in there for almost a century, and their schools and hospitals had made impressive development. Thus, during its program search the Foundation paid special attention to missionary institutions. Not only was the Rockefeller family charity deeply rooted in American religious tradition, but the Rockefellers and their advisors were inspired by the missionaries in China. As a result, the Foundation hoped its future work in China would, to a large extent, emulate the missionaries’ work there, enabling the Foundation to deliver its influence on an even larger scale through the missionaries.

When the Foundation’s investigative commissions went to China, cooperation with missionary education and medicine was one of the major issue on their agenda. However, they all suggested the Foundation launch an independent program; furthermore, they were convinced that co-operation with the missionaries should following the Foundation’s models. These conclusions derived from a fundamental divergence between those professionals and the missionary educators on important issues such as the means and ends of promoting modern education in China, which will be discussed in the following pages.

**Scientific or Evangelical Approach**

The state of missionary education was one of the major objects of the
Rockefeller Foundation's investigations. Because of their professional backgrounds, these commissioners were particularly interested in science education offered in mission schools and the missionaries' opinions on science and scientific methods. They needed to know what the missionaries' goals were in developing China's modern educational and medical programs.

It seemed not a very difficult task, for missionaries never hesitated to express their desire to use science, education, and medical work as auxiliary tools to attract the Chinese. There was no doubt in their minds about the final goal of education--to Christianize the Chinese. As a well-known missionary said, "Science might wing the arrow, but religion should be its point." Oriented by such a clear religious purpose, missionary education and medicine manifested a conspicuous feature: emphasizing religious philosophy rather than scientific study.

In his "Report On A General Scheme for Promoting the Highest Welfare of the Chinese Race" (1907), Robert F. Fetch, the president of Hangzhou University, told F. Gates that the general purpose of such a scheme should be to make Christian thought in the broadest sense, with all its liberating and elevating power, to become indigenous to the life of the race. This should be done principally by education, because in involving a long and thorough process of development of character, it is best suited

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to the producing of strong, Chinese, Christian leadership.\textsuperscript{2}

Missionaries measured the importance of education and medicine in terms of their effects on religious influence. For them, the real value of medical science, for example, was not in its miraculous power of discovering new knowledge or its scientific methods, but in its impact on religious activities. Missionaries saw medical and educational work as a way to disseminate the spirit of God--namely, the love, humanity, and compassion of the Christians--to the Chinese. In his address about the relation of Christian education to China's needs, D. Z. Sheffield, an eminent missionary educator, stressed that

[i]f we be asked, What is the most urgent present need of China? the answer must be, Not Western philosophy, and science, and art, but an essentially new life, in which love, and not selfishness, shall be the motive of action. ...The end of Christian education in China should be to beget in men's hearts the spirit of love to God, and love to men, and that true self-love, which is begotten of the knowledge of self as a child of God, and an heir of the riches of His grace.\textsuperscript{3}

In 1890 when the medical missionaries organized the China Medical Missionary Association (CMMA), the meaning of medical work was explained through religious and humane perspectives. The aim of this organization was

\textsuperscript{2} Robert F. Fetch to Frederick T. Gates, April 16, 1907, Rockefeller Family Collection, RG2, F24, RAC.

announced by an influential missionary doctor, J. G. Kerr, as such:

Medical men have to do with the sufferings of their fellow-men, and these sufferings appeal to the better feelings of those from whom they seek relief.

Medical men have to do with the poor, and are often called to minister to them, without hope of remuneration. This unrewarded service cultivates a spirit of benevolence and charity, and begets a feeling of compassion for the unfortunate in the time of their affliction. The medical Profession is therefore known as one characterized by the benevolence of its members.

Moreover, medical men have to do with diseases which men have brought upon themselves by immoral and impure practices, and the indulgence of the baser appetites, and they thus become familiar with the weakness and depravity of human nature, which bring so much disease, degradation and death of our race.4

Many medical students who graduated from missionary schools were able to cure sickness and relieve patients’ sufferings at various levels. However, missionary medical education highlighted the point that medical knowledge would give these doctors the power and ability to redeem people from immoral behavior and, through their medicine, to save Chinese souls.

For the missionaries, the real issue was not whether these doctors could discover new medical knowledge, but whether they had enough courage to fight immoral and impure practices in a heathen land. After all, medicine and medical education were only a means, not an end in themselves.

After his trip to China in 1913, John Mott told the Rockefeller

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Foundation his opinion of China’s modern education. He said that the

one thing which impressed me most is that we are in great need of men
of character and courage. Mere education will not produce men of this
type, for I have seen so many young men who are well educated but who
are like straw before the wind of success and temptation. They must
have Christ in them.⁵

In answer to the Rockefeller Foundation’s question of medical training
and religious qualification in missionary medical personnel, Mott said

virtually all of these manuals [he referred all the skills prepared students
for missionary work] would require. in addition to the expert abilities for
medical work, certain qualifications as to a man’s views as to
Christianity and a desire to propagate those views of Christianity….It is
our duty to place these in the hands of the candidates, the manual of
their respective Christian bodies.⁶

Charles Eliot later told Gates frankly that "Mott would surely present the
religious motive for joining the service in a way which neither you nor I
would think desirable."⁷

While the Foundation’s advisers were criticizing the unqualified or
unprofessional work in missionary institutions, missionaries, on the contrary,
were worried about the tendency to divorce modern science from Christianity.
They believed that such a tendency was striving to deny that there was an

⁵ The record of "China Conference of the Rockefeller Foundation," January
19, and 20, 1914. Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC), Rockefeller
Foundation Collection, RG: 1.1, 57.

⁶ ibid. 164.

Infinite Author of the universe and that tendency would be detrimental to China. The CMMA censured that "the Medical Profession [sic] in Europe and America as a body, has not attained to the highest standard of moral excellence,... While a good moral character is one of the requirements for receiving a diploma, yet many of its members fall below that standard in their lives, and a great many could not stand the test of morality as inculcated in the Bible."8

When missionary educators emphasized the importance of religious conduct in their education and medical work, those professional advisors saw the harm of such an emphasis in developing educational institutions in China. In sharp contrast to the missionaries, they suggested the Foundation avoid as much as possible any religious or political focus in its China project. There was no doubt about these professionals' religious feelings. They were Christians and believed in Christian values. But the new trend in American culture, namely worship of science and professionalism in higher education, profoundly changed their view of education and medicine, which led them to see China's situation differently. When they visited China and saw with their own eyes China's political instability and the rise of Chinese nationalism, which often was sharply anti-missionary, they were convinced that the idea of

8 Sheffield, 471. Kerr, 90.
a Christian University in China was undesirable.

During their trip to China, for example, Burton and Chamberlin observed clearly such anti-missionary feeling. According to Chamberlin’s diaries regarding an interview with Viceroy Duan Fang (Tuan Fang), this Chinese high official strongly disapproved of the possible cooperation of the Foundation and the missionary institutions. While he welcomed the Foundation’s interest in China, Tuan expressed clearly his disgust at the religious propaganda in mission schools.9

These advisers reached the conclusion that any involvement of the Foundation in the religious and political issues that were then controversial in China would be unwise. At the China Conference, Chamberlain agreed that China was in a "plastic moment," a moment that offered the Foundation a great opportunity. But on the other hand, he argued, such a "plastic moment" meant constant changes and restlessness in China’s political situation. Thus, the religious sentiments were the least vital. He suggested the Foundation select a program which would be the least affected by political or religious turmoil. A project which emphasized the promotion of health and science would be the best choice, he believed, because whatever may be their political

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conviction or religious views, all people desire health and well-being.\textsuperscript{10}

An important postulate which Gates repeatedly underscored was that the Rockefeller's work "would be to put the emphasis not on evangelisation at this country, but on education." He believed that education must be the permanent uplifting force in China, and it should be a part of an integrated effort for changing China, culturally and physically.\textsuperscript{11} Although he felt strongly that the Chinese should adopt Christian ethics, Christian family life, a Christian view of the relation of the sexes and all the other good things, Gates did not think it was a wise idea for Westerners "to undertake to uproot the ancient civilization of China and to replace it with the western civilization and the western spirit [sic]". Instead, they should, through Western education, "help the Chinese themselves to remodel their own civilization on their own lines with such aid as western light and something of the western spirit, caught by their own sons, can give to them."\textsuperscript{12}

With such a strategy Gates hoped that education—first of the leaders, and then of the people as a whole—would introduce a skepticism among the Chinese of their traditional way of life. He also hoped that education moving hand in hand with the promotion of the productiveness of China would

\textsuperscript{10} "China Conference" 33.

\textsuperscript{11} Gates to A. Smith, June 10, 1907. RAC. RG: John D. Rockefeller Jr.

\textsuperscript{12} ibid.
alleviate the peculiar wretchedness of the Chinese people. The success of such a goal would count on "our ability to secure the intelligent, whole-hearted, disinterested, sympathetic co-operation of the ablest and most intelligent of the Chinese themselves."¹³

Although some of Rockefeller's advisers were very sympathetic with the missionaries' work regarding the establishment of modern education for China, they did not hold the same opinions and methods as the missionaries. Fundamentally they believed in modern science itself and pursued it as the end of life. These educators and doctors believed that the scientific method was the foundation of modern Western civilization and that the real value of modern education was in its power to change a human being's mentality. In order to achieve such an ultimate goal, the focus of education should be on fostering students' scientific spirit and their ability to use the scientific method and to do research.

Such an opinion had been fully explained by Charles Eliot in his report on the trip to the East in 1912:

In the field of education there is one specific gift which the West can make to the East that would gradually produce a great change in the working of the Oriental mind. The Oriental has been a student of the abstract. He has proceeded by intuition and medication, and has accepted his philosophy and his religion largely from authorities. He has never practiced the inductive philosophy, and to this day knows very little about it... The West, which owes its astonishing progress within the last four hundred years chiefly to the inductive method of ascertaining truth,

¹³ ibid.
can impart to the East a knowledge of that method by showing the Eastern peoples how to teach the natural and physical sciences in schools of all grades, in such a way as to train in children and youth the powers of observation and the capacity for making an exact record of the facts, and then drawing the just, limited inference from the facts observed and compared. The best way to withdraw the Oriental mind in part from the region of literary imagination and speculative philosophy which is congenial to it, and to give it the means of making independent progress in the region of fact and truth, is to teach science, agriculture, trades, and economics in all Eastern schools by the experimental, laboratory method which within fifty years has come into vogue among the Western peoples.¹⁴

Later, Roger Greene explained explicitly how science, with its spirit and method, would change Chinese students’ minds. In a speech to pre-medical school students at the PUMC, he elaborated:

As you pursue your studies in the fundamental sciences...and as you go on to study in a more highly specialized way... as you extend your reading in the field of western literature, it is inevitable that you will find your ideas on many subjects gradually changing, and you will free yourselves from many errors and prejudices that have limited you in the past. Some teachings and practices that you have accepted unquestioningly, which you perhaps considered sacred, and fixed for all time, will come to lose some of their authority. Some cherished beliefs you may find yourselves unable longer to accept; some that you formerly considered of the utmost importance may seem to matter very little. Other principles that you had thought little of before may come to dominate your lives.¹⁵

Greene continuously argued that under the acid test of scientific thought the


¹⁵ Roger Greene’s speech to Pre-medical school, the PUMC, during the early 1920s, undated; this speech was forwarded to Simon Flexner by W. Buttrick, the director of the CMB. RAC. Simon Flexner microfilm, # 19.
old teachings and old custom would burn away much that was false and useless. He encouraged students that when the challenge from traditional believers came, they should hold firmly to the truth as they saw it and frankly avow the new faith to which they had come.\textsuperscript{16} Apparently, based on this common understanding, science and scientific methods became the most important factors in the Rockefeller Foundation's approach to China.

The gap between the missionary educators and those new professional educators regarding the purpose of modern education reflected dramatic cultural changes in America. While devout missionary teachers in China still practiced educational principles and methodology used in America during the pre-Civil-War era, at home the new professionals coming on in the last several decades of the 19th century had cast off what they now saw as old fashioned ideas and adapted to new situations of a highly industrialized and urbanized society.

Gates perspicaciously captured this divergence. Soon after reading the report of the Oriental Education Commission, he made a striking comparison in a letter to Judson. He said

\textquotedblleft[\text{t}h\text{e differences between them [Burton and Chamberlain] and the missionaries and the missionary boards I think are too profound for reconciliation. These differences go to the very root of things. They are not questions of tactics or even of strategy, but questions that reach even to the philosophy of the ends of life. For Dr. Chamberlain and Dr. Burton the ends of life perhaps are one thing; for the missionary board\textquotedblright

\textsuperscript{16} ibid.
and the missionaries, the ends of life are another thing. Drs. Burton and Chamberlain are Baconians in their theory of the ends of life and in the methods of arriving at those ends. The missionary boards are medievalists [sic] as to the ends of life and the methods of it. Their differences are irreconcilable. Accordingly I doubt somewhat whether anything that Dr. Burton or Dr. Chamberlain can say in public or in print will have any very considerable effect on the missionary boards or change the policies of missionary schools.

But granted all this, I believe the truth is with them... The wisest and deepest thing of many wise and deep things they have said in their reports is to me this -- that what the Chinese need above all things, is the scientific method. This means that they need the Baconian philosophy out of which modern life has sprung. They need to get that bent of mind, that attitude toward national life which is first fully developed in Bacon’s great works, and which through these has created modern times. This is the last thing on earth the missionaries have any idea of giving to China and it is the first thing that China needs. [emphasis in original]17

For Gates, this idea of scientific method was the key to open China. He was convinced that such a method with science itself could disseminate among the Chinese a skepticism of their way of thinking and living, which perfectly tallied with Gates’ perception of a real Western education in China.

The Oriental Education Commission induced Gates to accept the scientific method as the best way to change China. Henceforth, he focused on a specific direction -- scientific medicine. He believed that medicine represented the most advanced development of Western science, and that it was the ideal gift for the Rockefeller Foundation to offer China. In the broad context of early twentieth century American culture, under the direct influence

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of medical professionals, Gates eventually conceptualized what we might call a Medical Theology.

Gates' first real interest in medical science was stimulated by William Osler's *Principles and Practices of Medicine* (1890), when he had a chance to read it in 1897. He was impressed by the limitations of the current medical knowledge, exposed so powerfully in Osler's book. In his own words, this book "enumerated the infectious diseases and pointed out how few of the germs had yet been discovered and how great the field of discovery, how few specifics had yet been found and how appalling was the remedied suffering." Gates was convinced, as he recalled later, that while other sciences such as chemistry, physics, geology, and astronomy were developed, medicine was largely undeveloped as a science, "because of its greater inherent difficulties, because until recently it has had no endowments, and because the teaching and the practice of medicine as an art have been and are so highly profitable financially as to divert men almost wholly away from the science to the art."  

In the summer of 1890 Gates wrote a memorandum to Rockefeller Sr. earnestly recommending the founding by Rockefeller Sr. of an institution for

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scientific medical research in America. This suggestion resulted in the establishment of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in 1901.20 Through the Institute and some other projects of the Rockefellers, Gates came to build a close relationship with a group of significant figures in American medicine. Such a relationship made him knowledgeable regarding the development of medical science and affected his perspective on medical science profoundly.

By the 1910s, Gates' understanding of medical science combined with his thought on medical theology had matured. Encouraged by the achievement of the Rockefeller Institute and the triumph of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission's campaign against hookworm in the Southern United States, he started to articulate his thoughts about the significant functions of medical science in human life and civilization. For him, medical science was a modern theology and a scientific therapy for modern society. The basic ideas he expressed in his articles, letters, and speeches during this period contained the following characteristics: First, although he had a Baptist minister background, Gates took a progressive view of the development of science and social change. As he said in his address on the tenth anniversary of the Rockefeller Institute

20 Regarding the influence of Osler's book, Gates mentioned it several times later in his addresses and papers. See his address on the tenth anniversary of the Rockefeller Institute; his paper "Philanthropy and the Civilization." RAC. RG: Gates Paper; and also his autobiography, Chapter in My Life, ibid. 179.
Humanity in its progress, moving forward majestically from age to age, carries with it, nevertheless, just as little useless baggage as is possible. The generations as they succeed each other take from the past and hand on to the future only the things that are proven to be permanently useful. The useless thing is thrown into the limbo of oblivion and left behind, whether it be the history of kings or empires, whether it be literatures or inventions, philosophies or religions—all go so soon as they are proved to be useless.

He saw the adaptation of dogmatic theology to the development of society as encouraging. He claimed "Theology is already being reconstructed in the light of science, and that reconstruction is one of the most important of the services which scientific research is performing for humanity." He hailed the great opportunity that the development of medicine offered to modern altruism. Second, Gates developed an image of medical science as a "theological research" of modern time, and described it in a theological way and took the Rockefeller Institute as a theological seminary. He said that if God has any favorites on this planet, those favorites were doctors who were most intimately and in very truth studying Him and his ways with men. He described the relationship between God and medical doctors in the following words:

In the sacred rooms He is whispering His secrets. To these men He is opening up the mysterious depths of His Being. ...I say if God looks down on this world and has any favorites, it must be the men who are studying Him, who are working every day, with limited intelligence and in the darkness—for clouds and darkness are round about Him—and

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21 Gates, "Address on the Tenth Anniversary of the founding of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research" (1911) RAC. Gates Paper.

feeling their way into His heart.²³

In other words, Gates took doctors as a group of people who research an aspect of God, just as theologians research the words of God. Since medicine is so closely linked with peoples' lives, as Gates insisted, he envisioned medical professionals as occupying the same social position as theologians had at one time. He expressed a high expectation for the performance of medicine in modern society:

As medical research goes on, therefore, it will find out and promulgate, as an unforeseen by-product of its work, new moral laws and new social laws - new definitions of what is right and wrong in our relations with each other. Medical research will educate the human conscience in new directions and point out new duties. It will make us sensitive to new moral distinctions...²⁴

Third, Gates' ideology of medical science was rounded out in the combination of this advanced science with greatly enlarged cultural or social functions. One reason for Gates' high appreciation of medical science was its universal value. "[T]he values of medical research are the most universal values on earth, and they are the most intimate and important values to every human being that lives."²⁵ Accordingly, such universal values depended on the universal nature of the disease. He argued that

Entire civilization have been destroyed by disease - the Egyptian by


²⁴ Gates, The Chapters in My Life, 188.

²⁵ Gates, "The Address on the Tenth Anniversary", 5.
hookworm, the Greek and the Roman by malaria, especially in Eastern Europe and Galatia. Pestilence in the middle ages several times came near destroying civilization in Western Europe, including England...It is the multiplicity and fatality of diseases that are always with us which permanently lower the vitality and vigor of civilization.  

Gates explained that "[i]f Science and Education are the brain and nervous system of civilization, health is its heart. It is the organ that pushes the vital fluid into every part of the social organism enabling each organ to function and measuring and limiting its effective life...Health is fundamental to every other element in the social organism. Health is the accurate index of social progress; and disease is a fixed limitation to social progress."  

According to Gates, the evils of society were not fundamentally economic, but were physical and moral. These evils "are to be cured by improvement in the public health and in the public morals [sic] and not fundamentally by economic readjustments which at best will be secondary and remote in their effect on the world's progress."  

It was no surprise that Gates tried to suppress the importance of economic reform. This was during the Progressive Era, the period that was famous in American history for all kinds of reform and movement, including economic, political, and social. The Rockefellers' oil empire not only was a

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27 ibid.  
major target of the anti-trust movement, but also had serious troubles with workers' unions. A paramount task of the Rockefeller Philanthropy was to seek and to demonstrate, through its version of reform, another solution for social problems brought about by rapid industrialization. The emphasis of social applications of science and medicine must be related to this general context.

With such an understanding, Gates explained the meaning of medical science:

What is the practical object of the science of medicine? It is not to multiply physicians and Medical schools, nor is it primarily to cure disease. Medical Science has an infinitely higher aim than that. The place of the cure is secondary. The high aim and ideal of the science of medicine is no less than to prevent sickness altogether, to usher humanity into a new world, by banishing sickness from human life and bringing about universal health, an object never to be fully attained.\(^{29}\)

In other words, he believed that without the menace of diseases to human lives, society would be much better off. Since medical science carried such a lofty duty, Gates placed it above all other sciences. He took the discoveries in medical research to be as great as Columbus' discovery of the new continent because both opened a new era for human beings.

Generally speaking, in the unique cultural context of early 20th century America, modern professionals' perspective on science, and medical science in particular, went along so well with Gates' liberal notion of religion and social

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\(^{29}\) Gates, "Concerning Private Gifts to States and a Medical Policy" undated, RAC. Gates Papers.
progress, that together they created a much needed ideology—a medical
theology—for the newly established Rockefeller philanthropy. To Gates, since
medical science carried such a universal value and had such a fundamental
influence on social progress, indeed, it would be an ideal program in China.
The core of this ideology was the conviction in scientific methods by which
the Rockefeller Foundation leaders believed the West could change Chinese
people's mentality and ultimately change their lifestyle.

To launch an independent program in China, Gates and the Rockefeller
Foundation took into account the power of the missionaries' influence. They
knew that the missionaries were proud of their achievement in spreading
Western medicine in China, and that the confrontation between their scientific
approach and the missionaries' evangelical approach was inevitable.
Nevertheless, according to the Foundation's agenda the time for the
Foundation to challenge the missionaries' ideas had finally come. Two
important steps had taken place before the Foundation launched its PUMC
operation: (1) openly criticizing missionaries' work in China, and (2) holding
the Foundation's China Conference.

As Gates later recalled, at that time he
made vigorous efforts to show that the New Testament practice and ideal
was not to use healing ministrations as evangelistic agencies..., that this
was Christ's spirit and a far higher and worthier, a more truly Christian
spirit than that which interested itself in medicine only or chiefly as a
means of Christian propaganda. He pointed out that Jesus never evangelized peoples and nations: "Prophesying or preaching is therefore never in the teaching of Jesus or his apostles made a test of fidelity"; and that "the love which teaches and preaches the Gospel, at home or abroad, in ancient or modern times, may be accompanied by very little sacrifice, may be easily simulated, may and often does obtain selfish rewards."  

Then Gates switched his criticism to the missionaries' motivation for their charitable work, medical work in particular. He said that

The work of missionaries whether Catholic or Protestant had seemed to me to offer little promise... For by the missionaries they are not much valued for their intrinsic worth. They are conducted mainly as auxiliaries of ecclesiastical propaganda. China needs modern science but the missionary schools avoid science as leading to skepticism [sic]. China needs modern medicine but the hospitals and physicians of the missionaries are merely proselytizing agencies. To the Missionary Societies the values of medical missionaries and surgeons and hospitals is measured not by patients cured or suffering relieved but by proselytes made.  

Gates concluded that few of the missionary doctors had a proper conception of scientific medicine or of real medical education.

In accord with Gates' criticism, the Foundation decided to publish...

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31 Gates, "Thoughts on Medical Missions and the Spirit and Teaching of Jesus", paper discussed at first meeting of China Medical Board, December 11, 1914, RG: 1.1, RAC. 6, 5.

Modern Medicine in China, the report of the China Medical Commission (1914). This was the Foundation’s second investigation in China, and it reported in detail the many problems of the missionaries’ medical work. For example, the report pointed out that

As the missionary of the gospel is not necessarily an educational expert or a trained administrator of educational or scientific activities, and as the funds available for such purposes are always at best scanty and are divided among many independent organizations, it can hardly be expected that a systematic and comprehensive scheme should have been worked out.\(^{33}\)

In short, through the study of missionary education in China, the Rockefeller Foundation leaders were convinced that there were some fundamental differences between their notion of education and science and those of the missionaries. The Foundation’s scientific approach to China was an integral and indispensable part of the Rockefeller Foundation’s commitment to science, and medical science in particular, during its early stages. This would, as has been discussed in the last chapter, help the Foundation and American medical professionals to claim their social relevance.

**Quality Versus Quantity**

Ever since the Rockefeller Foundation’s involvement in China’s medical education, quantity versus quality had been one of the central issues in the development of Western medicine in China. Which way would be better to

help the Chinese: fewer doctors who were all well trained or more doctors who were poorly trained? If quality was the answer for the Rockefeller Foundation, then, what was its notion of high quality? And how would the PUMC accomplish it? Finally, did high quality have to be conducted in an elite style? These questions were not only concerned with how to develop Chinese medical education, but also why.

As long as the issue of quality versus quantity was a concern, missionary institutions and the PUMC represented two very different models. In missionary educational and medical work, the emphasis was on quantity rather than quality. Historically, the objects of religious, charitable and educational works for missionaries were usually the masses rather than the elite. The measure that was used by the missionaries to evaluate their achievement was quantity. Was there any increase in the number of missionary societies, of men and women in the field, of mission stations, of mission schools, or of mission hospitals? Such statistics and the discussions of how to increase the numbers were always an important part of China Mission Year Books, or of any missionary report or survey.

Although the method of personal conversion was gradually abandoned in the early 20th century and the focus of missionary work in China was slowly switched from the poor to the gentry class, the missionaries’ mentality remained almost unchanged for a much longer time. As late as the 1920s,
when John Raleigh Mott promoted the first and the only comprehensive survey of missionary work in China, the focus of this investigation was still quantity. In *The Christian Occupation of China*, the result of this survey, diagrams, statistical charts of missionary forces in each province, and explanations of all those figures dominated the report.  

The reason for this obsession with numbers was simple. The final goal of missionary work was to convert the whole nation to Christianity. The missionaries measured their success by each person and each area. Therefore, when a church or a mission hospital or school was established in a village, town, city, or county, this area was counted as "conquered" by Christianity. The more converts or students they attracted, the closer they were to their final goal.

A consequence of this emphasis on quantity was very inadequate medical education. Most missionaries showed little appreciation of the meaning and the importance of high quality education and high quality medicine. When the Rockefeller Foundation sent its commission to investigate China’s medical situation in 1914, the report came back with the following evaluation: "the present standard of medical education maintained by the colleges under

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missionary and other auspices is with inconsiderable acceptance, low."

It was true that around the time of the Foundation’s arrival in China, missionary educators began to realize the importance of quality in education. With the pressure from the Chinese government to restrict missionary education on the one hand and the Foundation’s model of excellence on the other, missionary institutions had no choice but to improve. With limited resources available, they had to either combine or eliminate some of the institutions in order to improve others, and the number of missionary medical schools stopped increasing for a while. But as a long-term policy, the emphasis of missionary work was still quantity.

There were several reasons for relating missionary work with the problems of poor training and inadequate medical care. One important factor was that missionary teachers and doctors were hardly professional. Simon Flexner, then the director of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s major advisers for its China program, once pointed out that "in rare instances only, and in no conspicuous instance whatever, have the medical missionaries come to China with the primary object of teaching medicine. On that account they have not in the first instance been especially prepared as teachers." During his trip for the Oriental

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35 Simon Flexner, "Central and Southern China", in "Report on the Second China Medical Commission." (1915) RAC. RG: CMB.

36 ibid.
Education Commission. Ernest Burton found that mission schools in China were staffed by missionaries primarily interested in evangelical work, and as a result the intellectual had been subordinated to the spiritual. He thought there was serious danger that this emphasis would lead to an obscuring of the fact that the schools were weak.\(^{37}\)

When missionary societies recruited the foreign field workers, religious belief was the most important qualification. It was very difficult to get enough missionaries with both strong beliefs and sound professional training, and as a result, the latter had to submit to the former. According to many missionaries' opinions, a missionary could offer almost any quality of education, but he was expected to be successful in his gospel work.\(^{38}\)

Another reason for a lack of quality was the unprofessional principle of seniority that was employed by missionary societies in their policy-making and administration. Policies were usually decided by senior missionaries. These missionaries had come to China and worked there for a long time, some of them having been in China since the 1850s or 1860s. They were not familiar with the newest developments in modern science, nor were they following the changes in educational and medical reforms at home.

Roger S. Greene once criticized the missionary administrative method.

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\(^{38}\) Martin, "Western Science" 114.
He pointed out that

[it] is a fact that the longer a missionary has been out of touch with conditions at home, the better qualified he is supposed to be to take the lead in deciding matters of mission policy, and this in actual practice is applied not only to matters in which superior experience in dealing with Chir.ese naturally ought to be respected, but also to matters of educational policy and medical work in which the younger man is really the more competent. In most missions, if the medical profession is represented at all on the governing committee it is usually in the person of one of the older doctors, and the chances are about even that he will be a man whose own hospital is in a miserable condition, and who is accordingly inclined to resent the innovations and superior manner, possibly, of the better trained newcomer. Under such conditions it is very hard to secure sympathetic consideration for the needs of the young doctor who wants to make his hospital thoroughly modern and efficient....Unfortunately the lack of sympathetic understanding of the doctor's requirements is to be found in the home offices of the board, almost as much as on the field.39

No doubt, financial difficulties were another reason for the poor quality of missionary institutions. Henry C. Mabie, the secretary of American Baptist Missionary Union, once complained to Gates about the difficulties in fund raising for missionary education. He said, "I regret to say that among even our wealthier people in the Baptist churches in this country thus far there has been so little appreciation of the necessity of building strongly for the future in educational ways, that our effort to raise $500,000 was not successful."40

Harold Balme, the president of the Union Medical Collage of Shantung Christian University, told William Welch, the president of the Johns Hopkins

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39 Roger S. Greene to Wallace Buttrick, July 17, 1916. RAC. RG: CMB.

40 Mabie to Gates.
Medical School and also a member of the Foundation's Second China Commission, "No one is more ready to admit than we ourselves that our medical staff, as at present composed, is hopelessly inadequate; that our laboratory accommodation and equipment are utterly deficient." In his report "Enquiry into the Scientific Efficiency of Mission Hospitals in China" (1919), Balme showed that in 1918, 80% of the hospitals had only one foreign or foreign-trained doctor; 34% had no nurses, foreign or Chinese; less than 50% had an out-patient department equipped for efficient medical work; 92% had no pure water supply, and only 6% had running water throughout the hospital; 87% did not possess X-ray equipment.

Finally, the missionaries did not consider the quality of their work to be as low as the Foundation's advisors thought. Quality and qualification were relative standards. When the Foundation's advisers were dissatisfied with missionary medicine, they evaluated it by the high standard in America. The missionaries had quite a different perspective. They compared their work with that of the Chinese, and they were proud of their pioneer work in China where no modern educational or medical institution had existed before. Thus, until the Chinese schools became a threat to the missionaries' monopoly of China's

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42 Stauffer, 433.
modern education, and also until the Foundation's PUMC imposed a high quality model, no serious pressure had pushed the missionaries to improve their product.

In contrast to the missionaries' priority, the Rockefeller Foundation's medical program emphasized, wherever possible, the highest quality. When the Foundation came to China, missionaries had already established over twenty Western medical schools and two hundred mission hospitals. From the missionaries' point of view, it was unimportant for the Foundation to add yet another one. They hoped that the Foundation would spend its money on improving existing missionary institutions. The Foundation, on the other hand, was determined to launch its own medical school which would represent the most modern medical science.

The most conspicuous features of the PUMC were its total commitment to the scientific method, the high quality of its medical education and research, and its high academic standard and elite social status of its students and faculty. In the PUMC's dedication ceremony in 1921, John D. Rockefeller Jr. announced that the aim of the Foundation was "to develop a medical school and hospital of a standard comparable with that of the leading institutions
known to Western civilization."\(^{43}\)

Simultaneously, the Foundation sponsored a comprehensive medical education reform in the United States. The Johns Hopkins Medical School was erected as a model for all medical schools to follow. This movement not only set a model for medical education, but also exalted medical professionals’ social, political, and economic status. After the reform, "[t]he American medical profession became a highly specialized, upper-middle-class elite heavily concentrated in urban centers."\(^{44}\)

The Foundation planned to model the PUMC as closely as possible to the Johns Hopkins Medical School. To a large extent, this idea of transplanting a most modern medical institution into a foreign land was experimental. The lack of precedents for conducting such a medical project under the very difficult conditions in China induced the Foundation to be unrealistic in its plan for the PUMC. The Foundation thought that, since it could totally rebuild the PUMC after it bought Union Medical College of Peking (UMC) from the London Missionary Societies, this school could be even closer to reform principles than most of the reformed medical schools in the United States.

For instance as one of its important reform objects, the Johns Hopkins


\(^{44}\) Mary B. Bullock, 30.
Medical School had tried to insist that its faculty members work full time in the school and its associate hospital where it had endeavored to integrate teaching, research, and medical practices. The PUMC followed these principles closely. As Roger Greene observed

The hospital and laboratory buildings are all connected by corridors, the whole forming one compact unit, in which the physical proximity of all the departments to each other will make possible their close interrelation in teaching and research, in a way that is not equaled in any medical school in the United States. Frequent intercourse between members of different departments is also facilitated by the fact that all the faculty devote their full time to teaching and research in the school and hospital, without the distractions of private practice for personal profit, an advantage which is not enjoyed by any other first-class school under an American charter.  

Later he explained to missionary doctors that, since in China modern medicine was at its inception, it was most important to set a high standard and to establish the best possible traditions for the future. Greene stressed that China should not repeat the mistake that the United States had made, which was to allow inefficient schools to spring up and to flood the country with ill-trained doctors. Henry Houghton, the acting director of the PUMC from 1935 to 1942 and then the person in charge of the Foundation's Shanghai medical project, also emphasized that "[i]t is well for the Peking Union Medical

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47 Chapter Six will discuss this Shanghai project.
College to set standards in China even above those in America in order to provide an ideal toward which the schools of later years may strive.\textsuperscript{48}

There was another reason that may partially explain the Foundation's preference for high standards. Chamberlain once explained explicitly the necessity of a highly sophisticated program for the Chinese. The following paragraph can be used as a rare footnote for the Foundation's intention of transplant a Johns Hopkins model into China. He wrote

It is a fixed and unconcealed determination of the Chinese people to slough off foreign domination in every form, advisory or otherwise, just so soon as they are able. It is only their weakness, and their good sense in seeing their weakness, that makes them pliable now. The more superficial the foreign efforts the sooner the Chinese will measure their depth and take over all that is worth while in them and slough off the rest. The more fundamental the work and the more indispensable its nature the longer will they retain it. Far and away the most fundamental and essential work that is possible among the Chinese is the change from the old method and spirit of thought to the new.\textsuperscript{49}

Eminent American medical educators Simon Flexner and William Welch urged that the PUMC be provided with "an excellent staff of teachers, well-equipped laboratories and a good teaching hospital and dispensary."\textsuperscript{50}

Again, as at the Johns Hopkins, admission to the PUMC required four years of college study, including biology, physics, and chemistry. All courses were


\textsuperscript{49} Chamberlin to Gates, January 22, 1914. RAC. RG: CMB.

\textsuperscript{50} Mary Ferguson, 24-25.
taught in English, and the school was administered in English as well.

To fulfill the Foundation's ambition for this project, everything in the PUMC, from location and construction to equipment and faculty, had to be the best. In 1915, the Foundation bought the UMC at the price of $200,000 and renamed it the Peking Union Medical College. To rebuild the school and establish a new hospital, the Foundation spent another $125,000 for the entire property of a former imperial prince's mansion (Yu Wang Fu). The new campus and its hospital were located in the heart of the capital city, and with the new palace grounds, they occupied fifty-five acres. The fourteen new palace-style buildings, together with several older buildings on the site, constituted a magnificent architectural complex that was entirely in harmony with the Forbidden City nearby. The total cost of land, new buildings and equipment was as high as $7,552,836, greatly exceeding the original budget of $1,000,000.

Under the shiny jade-green glazed roofs of these Chinese palaces, the inner construction of the PUMC was completely modern, and equipped with the most advanced medical facilities. While the exterior of these buildings was designed to match the best Chinese palaces in the city, their interior must be, as the Foundation emphasized, suitable for modern medicine. Over thirty years the Rockefeller Foundation's total expenditures for the erection and maintenance of the PUMC was $44,944,665, the largest contribution which the
Foundation ever made to a single project. 51

As Mary Bullock's study of the PUMC pointed out, the PUMC and the CMB desired to attract the elite of China, not the impoverished students who had been drawn to the missionary schools. Welch suggested that the Rockefeller students should reflect "higher social positions" than the missionary students. 52 The PUMC's tuition was twice as high as that of other prestigious colleges such as Qinghua University. 53 Consequently it excluded students from the poor or even middle class families, except for a few outstanding students who could win scholarships.

During the eight years of premedical and medical studies, students found themselves confined to a relatively isolated palace campus. 54 Competition among students was extremely intense, and the expulsion rate was high. Under such pressure, students were entirely preoccupied by study and had very little time to think about the outside world. Within the campus,

51 For details of these expenditures, see Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, 1952. 88-89.

52 Mary B. Bullock, 40.

53 The PUMC's tuition was six hundred silver dollars a year during 1930s, while Qinghua's was only three hundred. See Huang Wan, "Wo zhe yisheng de ku yu le" (About my medical doctor career), Huashuo Iao Xiehe, 299-308.

54 The premedical education was offered by the PUMC in the first several years. After 1925, the PUMC stopped premedical education and after that its students came from other universities whose scientific departments received grants from the Rockefeller Foundation's China Medical Board.
students followed an almost completely Westernized lifestyle, at a living
standard that was the highest among all colleges in China. During leisure time
the school often organized picnics in the suburbs of Beijing, and students acted
in Shakespeare plays, learned ballroom dancing, or read the *Time* and *Life*
magazines that were available in their dormitories.\(^{55}\)

From its first graduation in 1924 to the last in 1943, the PUMC
conferred only 315 medical doctorates.\(^{56}\) However, the great majority of
these graduates later became leading administrators of China’s modern medical
education and public health, as well as prominent medical researchers,
educators, and doctors. Furthermore, they became an influential social group
in developing the new intelligentsia in general and modern medical
professionals in particular, crucial in China’s modernization. (This point will
be discussed in later chapters.)

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\(^{55}\) Gan Guanqing, "Wuxian yilian yi Xiehe," (Recalling fondly of the PUMC),
*Huashuo lao xiehe*, 348-350.

\(^{56}\) The PUMC was occupied by the Japanese invaders in 1942, and the
medical school was closed at that time. (The hospital remained open.) After the
Second World War, the school was returned to the Rockefeller Foundation. In
1946, the Foundation and the CMB sent a China Commission to investigate the
situation and decided to continue their support of the PUMC. The reorganization
of the PUMC started in 1947 and the school reopened the next year. Before any
student graduated, in 1951 the Central Government of the People’s Republic of
China took over the PUMC. This event became the dividing line between the
Foundation’s PUMC (the Old PUMC) and the "New PUMC." Therefore, the
graduation of 1943 became the last one of the Foundation’s PUMC.
The Foundation's emphasis on high quality related closely to its scientific orientation. In the case of the PUMC, these two features functioned as a double edged sword. High quality mainly indicated critical discoveries in medical research that could only be achieved through scientific method and backed up by high standard education. The key connection of the Foundation's notion of modern education and this PUMC approach was training in scientific method. To the thinking of American professionals, without qualified faculty, advanced facilities, and strict requirements, Chinese students would not be able to master this new, unfamiliar way of thinking. Both high quality and scientific orientation were serving the Foundation's great ambition: changing China by changing her intellectuals.

The relevance of the Rockefeller Foundation's involvement in China's medical education to begin with was China's urgent need for health care. To the question of how to meet this need, the Foundation's answer was high quality medical education. It argued that "all who have studied the conditions recognize that it is impracticable for outsiders to train medical practitioners for the whole vast Chinese people." Only the Chinese themselves could do this. What the Foundation could do was to "enable the Chinese to take modern medical education into their own hands as soon as possible." The Foundation would establish one or two high standard medical schools, These schools would not only train future leaders and teachers for China's medical work, but also establish standards for other schools run by missionaries and the Chinese
government.\textsuperscript{57} In other words, what the Foundation really desired to do was to guide the Chinese and make sure that their medical work went in the right direction.

The PUMC's history proved that the Foundation and the PUMC did keep their commitment to high quality, but not without difficulties. In its early years, for example, Dr. Franklin McLean, the PUMC's first director, felt the need to dispute the Rockefeller Foundation's China Medical Board (CMB) for maintaining the PUMC's high standard. According to McLean, the unexpected high cost of construction and other financial considerations had brought the CMB to a readiness to compromise the PUMC's academic standards and research with emphasis on quantity rather than quality.

In an important conference of early April, 1920, joined by the Foundation's top advisers on the China program, McLean frankly put forward his opinion. Initiated by Mclean and supported by Simon Flexner and William Welch, the conference unanimously agreed on a statement to reaffirm the scientific policy of the PUMC as follows:

Within the limits of the resources made available, the scientific aims of the Peking Union Medical College are:

1. Primarily to give a medical education comparable with that provided by the best medical schools of the United

\textsuperscript{57} Dr. Simon Flexner was a member of the Rockefeller Foundation's Second China Medical Commission (1915.) Simon Flexner, "Meeting of the Commission," Nov. 13, 1915. RAC, RG: RG4 and "Central and Southern China".
States and Europe, through
a. an undergraduate medical curriculum;
b. graduate training for laboratory workers, teachers, and
clinical specialists; and
c. short courses for physicians
2. To afford opportunities for research, especially with
reference to problems peculiar to the Far East.
3. Incidentally to extend a popular knowledge of modern
medicine and public health.\textsuperscript{58}

From the Foundation's point of view, high quality was bound up with
an elite style. This notion reflected two related tendencies at that time. First,
in early 20th century America, medical education reform successfully elevated
the authority of the medical profession into "social privilege, economic power,
and political influence."\textsuperscript{59} Scientific knowledge and high standards helped the
medical profession make this transition: as a result, an elite style eventually
became the characteristic of this profession.

Second, beginning in the late 19th century missionary education in
China gradually shifted its focus from lower classes to elite gentry.\textsuperscript{60} As
missionary work had slowly established itself, and also as the Chinese
intellectuals slowly changed their opinions of Western education, more and

\textsuperscript{58} Mary E. Ferguson, 43-44. According to Ferguson, there was no
stenographic record of the discussion of this conference.

\textsuperscript{59} Paul Starr, 5.

\textsuperscript{60} See Shirley S. Garrett, Social Reformers in Urban China: the Chinese
YMCA, 1895-1926. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1970.)
more students from gentry families attended mission institutions. Thus it became possible for the FUMC to attract students from the social strata that it desired by appealing to the graduates of these mission schools. In other words, the development of missionary education provided the necessary foundation so that the Rockefeller philanthropy could launch its most advanced medical education in China. On the other hand, the PUMC's high standard and elite style provided better opportunities for its graduates than other institutions, and thus it promoted, together with missionary institutions, the flow of Chinese students from elite families—both the traditional gentry and the new business elite in coastal areas—to Western education.

The reasons for these students to attend foreign schools were complex. In imperial China, scholars from the gentry class entered into official rank by successfully passing the imperial examinations. It was the whole purpose of traditional education to produce civil officials for the imperial machinery. The result of this combination of educational system and governmental positions was twofold. While it nurtured Chinese intellectuals' sense of responsibility for their country, it also stimulated their utilitarianism. Many students with this tradition would choose to study modern medicine, not only because science and medicine were then related to patriotism, but also because successful medical education guaranteed a promising career. The future leaders, as the Foundation understood, would come from both the traditional and the new elite classes. The PUMC's duty was to transform students with Chinese elite
background into modern professionals who had the best education and who would, with their background of the best medical education together with their elite social status, be able to claim academic, social and political influence.

Quality or quantity are relative concepts; there are no absolute standards for medical education. Furthermore, they are related matters when regarding the needs of China. One can not discuss quality without considering quantity. However, to the missionaries and the Rockefeller Foundation, quality versus quantity was not the only issue when developing a sound medical educational system. It was not only an academic matter, but it was also a political issue. Both the missionaries and the Foundation knew that China needed a large number of doctors who were well trained. They also knew that under China’s circumstance at that time, none of them could provide both. Thus, the Foundation saw quality education as the first priority in an attempt to train future leaders of China, while the missionaries saw large quantities of doctors as their first priority to more easily spread their religious beliefs through these doctors.

Institutional Development

Crucial to the Rockefeller Foundation’s plan to deliver its ideas and to promote medical institutional development on a large scale was a dependence on, to a great extent, existing educational efforts in China. With this understanding, from the very beginning, the Foundation expressed clearly its
desire to co-operate with both missionary medical institutions as well as Chinese facilities.

When the Rockefeller Foundation let its decision to undertake an independent medical project in China be known publicly, the response from the missionaries was, not surprisingly, skeptical. In the *China Record* of November, 1915, some missionary societies questioned the Foundation’s impact upon the existing medical work. One article asked, for example, whether under the Rockefeller scheme medical schools were to be completely secularized, and it pointed out that a grave issue would be raised if there were any probability of the restriction of religious teaching and activity. These missionary societies feared that the acceptance of large benefaction, whatever the source might be, would tend to fetter the freedom of thought and speech of the beneficiaries.\(^\text{61}\)

The essential concern of the missionaries was that the Foundation’s work would, in the long run, damage the primary *raison d’etre* of missionary efforts. They wanted to know the future relationship between the Foundation’s new program and the missionary institutions. This was a question that the Foundation had to address. In spite of all the disagreement regarding the means and ends of modern education, the Foundation did perceive missionary work as an indispensable force for its plan. The missionaries, with their

\(^{61}\) "Medical Work in China" *The North China Daily News*, Shanghai, Nov. 19, 1915. (There was no author’s name on this article.)
established educational and medical institutions and influence as well as their widespread connections with the Chinese, could offer the Rockefeller philanthropy valuable help.

The Foundation attempted to make its stand clear. Gates emphasized more than once that the Foundation must let the missionaries know of its intent to co-operate with them. Right after the first China Commission returned to the United States, Gates told R. Greene that the report should add a statement of the Foundation's willingness to co-operate with the missionaries. H. Judson, the chairman of the Commission, worried that such a statement would limit the Foundation in its work to co-operate with missionary institutions. But Gates thought it would make the missionary boards more sympathetic and facilitate co-operation.62

An important effort to relieve the missionaries' anxiety was taken by John D. Rockefeller Jr. On March 15th, 1915, he wrote a letter to the missionary societies in China. He announced that "the Foundation from the first has contemplated the most cordial and sympathetic cooperation" with the missionary societies.63 In this letter, Rockefeller Jr. also emphasized that

[i]n choosing its agents, physicians, and nurses for such independent schools and hospitals, the Foundation will select only persons of sound


sense and high character who are sympathetic with the missionary spirit and motive; who are thoroughly qualified for their work professionally, and who will dedicate themselves to medical ministration in China.

However, he also pointed out that "[b]eyond these qualifications the Foundation cannot properly impose tests of a denominational or doctrinal nature, such as are deemed desirable by missionary boards for their own medical missionaries or agents."

With all these efforts, by 1916, Dr. Wallace Buttrick, the director of the China Medical Board, felt that he had won the missionaries' hearts and confidence for the CMB and its work. Still, some missionaries worried about the Foundation's intention to secularize its work. Later, a missionary doctor wrote to Buttrick reminding him that medical work had the double object of meeting both the physical and spiritual needs of those coming for aid. He emphasized the importance of the religious standard and warned the Foundation against those who were attracted by the prestige of the Foundation but might have little knowledge of the "true" work of a Medical Missionary and might well ignore entirely its religious side.65

The Chinese government responded in much more supportive terms. Li Yuan-hung, then the President of the Republic, expressed a great interest in the work which the China Medical Board was undertaking. After R. Greene

64 W. Buttrick to Simon Flexner, Jan. 12, 1916. RAC. S. Flexner microfilm, #19.

explained to him that the Foundation was not expecting to train a very large number of doctors, but rather to prepare a few Chinese who might become the leaders themselves in medical work in China, Li replied that such a plan was very wise and farseeing. He also admitted that for some time to come, China would need to have expert foreigners to assist her.  

No matter what the reactions were, the Foundation determined to develop a medical education network in China, beginning with its model of the PUMC. Right after the Foundation decided to launch a medical program in China, Gates presented a scheme titled "the General and Orderly Development of a Comprehensive and Efficient System of Medicine in China", in which he depicted an ambitious prospect for China's modern medicine.

This plan included several steps, aimed at establishing a hierarchical medical education system. The first step was to build top quality medical schools, located as centrally as possible to all practitioners of scientific medicine in China, and to the largest number and best equipped missionary and government schools. In other words, the Foundation's schools would serve as headquarters to China's medical network. Here Gates was not just talking of the PUMC, he suggested one school for each potential provence.

The next step was to use the Foundation's medical school or schools to train missionary doctors. Gates believed that each missionary hospital should

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have at least two qualified practitioners, and that all medical practitioners on foreign payroll should be required to spend at least three months of every year at the center. At the center, the physicians would "keep up with, apply and use the latest medical science". Hopefully, "the whole body of practicing physicians poured annually through the college will bring to the Medical School annually an immense fund of practical information and afford the most valuable guides in practical instruction."^67

Then, the plan required that each missionary doctor be trained to extend the PUMC mission. Each was to select one or more of the most promising Chinese boys under his control and, if they were suited for scientific medicine, to bring them to the central Medical School. Second, the missionary doctors would turn their own institutions into efficient preparatory schools for Chinese medical students. In this way, the Foundation would gradually convert the whole missionary medical force into a scientific medical system. This system would be, as its planner designed, a smoothly working "organic unit". As each unit proved practical and was efficiently working, as the next logical step, the Foundation could expand its plan to other similar centers.

Placing the Foundation's schools at the top of this hierarchical system or in the center of this co-operative network, the ideas and principles of the

^67 This and the following quotations are from F. T. Gates, "The Gradual and Orderly Development of a Comprehensive and Efficient System of Medicine in China". Jan. 29, 1914. RAC. RG: CMB.
PUMC, and others alike, could be followed closely and efficiently by other institutions. Thus, "every man, every dollar, every institution, every item of equipment now existing for medical work, without loss and waste", as Gates hoped, would be ideally linked together in a network and would provide for the education of an annually increasing number of scientific Chinese physicians. It was in these ways that the Foundation proposed to come to a better relationship with the missionaries. Gates optimistically predicted that if his plan worked well, "China will be in a fair way ultimately to lead the world in medicine; for today no land, whether in America or Europe, has any system of medicine at all comparable in efficiency or promise." 68

This was a highly idealized plan. Not only did it exaggerate the Foundation's capacity, it also simplified the complicated situation in China's medical education. The evidence to prove this point was Dr. Henry Houghton's comprehensive study of the PUMC's twenty years experience in China. Houghton in his report of 1935 concluded that one of the most important differences between Chinese and Western cultures which affected medicine was confusion in medical education. For historical reasons there were many types of medical schools in China, the Japanese model, English and American, and Continental models, as well as indigenous schools. "It is difficult to set up common standards of content or method in teaching, and to

68 ibid.
find a path of progress in medicine that will unite these different elements for effectual service to society." 69

It is no surprise that Gates' ambitious scheme was never fully implemented. However, so far as medical education and its institutional development were concerned, the PUMC and the CMB did, as the plan intended, play a leading role. Up to the Japanese occupation of the PUMC in 1942, 2288 doctors, missionary or Chinese, completed their advanced training in the PUMC. (Note, that only 315 students received doctorate degree from the PUMC.) The PUMC's work was so impressive that in 1936 the Chinese government formally asked it to establish a graduate school to train Chinese doctors and medical educators. Unfortunately, this plan was never really implemented because of the Japanese invasion. The CMB's fellowship program also enabled both qualified Chinese graduates of medicine and missionary doctors to pursue further study in the United States and Europe.

To promote China's science education and pre-medical education, during these years between 1915 and 1951, the China Medical Board provided grants to some of the most outstanding missionary universities such as Yenching University, University of Nanjing (Nanking), Jinling (Ginling) College, Xiang-Ya Medical School (Yale-in-China), Shandung (Shantung) Christian University, and Lingnan University. The CMB's grants were also

accessible to some Chinese institutions, the most prestigious being Nankai University (a private school) and Qinghua University (Tsinghua College, a government school).

The Foundation's model of the Peking Union Medical College and its effort to advance other institutions had both a direct and an indirect impact on the development of China's modern private sector in general. Through financial and academic assistance, the Foundation helped missionary educational institutions improve their education and medical work, and the latter were then the most influential private institutions in China. Together these foreign non-governmental efforts had a great impact on the development of modern educational system and the private institutions in China in several ways.

First of all, when missionaries established their educational institutions during the 19th century, they presented to the Chinese many different ideas of education. Not only did they emphasized religious spirit, their idea of education, completely independent from the government's control, was very fresh to the Chinese. Although private educational institutions prevailingly existed in China prior to the missionaries' arrival, governmental authority over educational policy was generally accepted by schools. This authority was exercised through the imperial examination system, and passing these examinations was the ultimate goal of education. Under this unique system,
Chinese private educational institutions, supporting by either clan systems or by social elites, were very different from the mission schools.

Second, the cultural conflict between China and the West stimulated modern education in China. Under the impact of Western intrusion and missionary education, beginning in the 1860s, the government schools grew rapidly. Simultaneously, in some provinces and big cities, private schools organized by social elites became the fastest growing new forms of institutions. These institutions and their students were an important social and economic force in China’s modernization movement. 70 Private foreign educational and medical institutions presented new models to the Chinese and helped them establish their own schools and hospitals. From schooling, the use of specializing subjects and courses, to the administration and management of modern institutions, these models influenced both private and the governmental institutions in China. It is true that during the early stages of modern education in China, the Japanese influence was very strong, for various reasons. However, American influence—missionaries and other individuals and organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation—continued to expand during the first half of the 20th century. Since the 1910s, the number of Chinese students who went to the United States had increased rapidly, and the returning

70 Mary Backus Rankin, 97, 123-124, 159-160. Also Tang Caibo, "Jindai Shanghai jiaoyu de xingqi he fazhan" (The establishment and development of modern education in Shanghai), Gong Shundo, 658-671.
students from America became the most influential group in modern education.

Third, although missionary schools and hospitals were controlled by foreign forces, more and more Chinese faculty and staff worked in those institutions. Together with the students, they became an effective academic and social force. The significance of this phenomenon is that these people not only gained modern knowledge in their special fields, but they also became familiar with the management of private institutions making them distinctively different from the traditional gentry intellectuals. Eventually, when all missionary organizations in China were moving toward Sinicization, it would be this group of people who would assume all the responsibilities. In other words, mission and other foreign private institutions provided opportunities for Chinese intellectuals to be future leaders in many aspects, not only academic or research, but also managerial and administrative.

Additionally, the PUMC itself represented another model to the Chinese: a non-governmental and non-religious organization, the first of its kind. This model was especially valuable when all missionary institutions were under attack by the anti-foreign and the anti-missionary movement. During the students anti-missionary movement in the 1920s, the PUMC was not picked by the radicals as a target. Furthermore, its policy on religious issues and its emphasis on science helped it to establish good relationships with leading members of the Chinese intelligentsia. For example, many famous Chinese intellectuals and scientists voluntarily offered their services to the Peking
Union Medical College with great enthusiasm and devotion. Would they have done the same if the PUMC have been affiliated with a religious group? Considering China's anti-Christian mood, the answer is quite obvious.

In short, the Foundation never intended to take the responsibility to train all, or ever a big portion of, the doctors needed for China. Instead, it sought to function as an organizer and a leader in developing modern education in China. So far as the institutional development was concerned, the Foundation's plans were twofold: First, the PUMC should train future leaders in medical education and research in China, and its graduates should be able to organize or lead other institutions along the PUMC's line. Second, the PUMC and the CMB would provide financial and academic assistance to transform as much as possible the missionary medical force into an efficient system based upon the Foundation's vision of medicine.

Within the Foundation's resources, this plan seemed to be the most practical and efficient way to pursue these goals. From the Foundation's point of view, this institutional project was quite successful. As the best equipped medical school, the PUMC not only became a leading medical research and education center, training leaders and researchers for modern medicine in China, it also helped missionary institutions to improve their educational and medical services.

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To summarize, when the Rockefeller Foundation searched for a project in China, it basically depended on two groups for information and advice: the missionaries and the modern professionals. There was no doubt that those professional educators and doctors had a much bigger impact on the Foundation's China program than the missionaries. These professional advisers convinced the Foundation that medical science and scientific method were the best things that the West could offer the Chinese. It was under their influence that the Foundation adopted a scientific approach to China.

The Peking Union Medical College, representing the most advanced medicine and the highest quality in research and education, was designed to disseminate scientific spirit and way of thinking, and to promote the growth of new professions and new intellectuals as well. These goals were quite different from the missionaries' approach that aimed at the Christianization of China and was emphasized quantity of converts rather than quality of education and doctors.

Nevertheless, co-operation with the missionaries was always an important part of the Foundation's plan in China. While the missionaries were hoping that the Foundation would help them in their self-improvement, the Foundation was virtually planning to embrace and integrate missionary institutions into the network that Gates had designed for China's medical education. The Foundation's effort of institutional development allowed the PUMC to deliver maximum influence while, at the same time, it helped
missionaries to improve their institutions.

The PUMC reflected an ideal and a dream of the Rockefeller Foundation’s first generation of leaders. In the unique cultural framework of early 20th century America, these people, Frederick Gates the best example, were convinced that all the goals that the Foundation set for the PUMC and its China program were rational and feasible; so much as they believed that the Foundation would always devote itself to science and medicine. Could this dream of changing China become reality? It not only depended on the Foundation’s understanding of China’s condition, but it also relied on the Foundation’s future policy towards China in general and the PUMC in particular. The Chinese circumstance and the Foundation’s conduct of such an international project were the biggest challenges facing the Foundation and the PUMC as well.

The PUMC imposed on the Chinese a new and distinctive model, a model that was defined by American educators under contemporary American ideas and culture. What was the response of the Chinese people’s and their government to this design? Could this plan well fit into China’s reality and meet China’s unique needs? What was the Chinese influence on the PUMC and the Foundation’s policy? The next chapter will try to answer these questions by placing the Foundation’s program into the context of China’s modern reform movement.
Chapter Five

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE DIRECTION IN CHINA'S MODERN REFORM: THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION AND CHINESE NEW INTELLECTUALS

The Rockefeller Foundation's involvement in medical education in China during the first half of the twentieth century and its establishment of the Peking Union Medical College are important events in Sino-American relationships. These events clearly revealed a mutual influential and interactive relationship between American philanthropy on the one side and Chinese intellectuals on the other.¹ One can not understand an international program like the PUMC without knowing its experience in China and the Chinese reception of and response to U. S. philanthropy. How did the Rockefeller Foundation's perspective on China's modern education affect China's modern

¹ The words "intelligentsia" and "intellectuals" (zhishi fenzi) appeared in the Chinese language after World War I. In Chinese history, there was a quite similar word for educated elite stratum (shi daifu). However, in Chinese language zhishi fenzi is used to refer to modern educated people, and shi daifu for those who had the traditional education. From the late 19th century to the time of the May Fourth Movement, the component of zhishi fenzi changed greatly. Around the 1898 Reform, the leaders of this reform were all traditional intellectuals; but by the early 20th century, 20% of the Constitutionals had some modern education or had studied in Japan. More impressively, the majority of the more radical revolutionists had studied or were studying in Japan. By the time of May 4th Movement, the nature of the Chinese intelligentsia had changed fundamentally. The traditional shi daifu had lost their influence, and new intellectuals with foreign educational backgrounds (in Japan, European countries and America) became the leaders.
reform? How did the PUMC’s mission fit into the Chinese people’s struggle to create a new culture and come to terms with "modernization"? More importantly, how did China’s situation and the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals toward the PUMC affect the Foundation’s policy-making? Finally, what was the PUMC’s role in China’s modern medical education? These questions are all important in understanding international and intercultural philanthropic behavior.

The socio-political crises in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century China and the Chinese intellectuals’ search for a modern China were critical in answering these questions. This chapter will place the PUMC into a broad context and analyze the Foundation’s action from the Chinese point of view. It will focus on some controversial issues in the New Culture Movement (1915-the 1920s), such as scientism and criticism of traditional Chinese medicine, and discuss the relevance of the Foundation’s perspective to the modern reform movement in China. In the following pages, the discussion will be divided into two sections: 1) the Chinese intellectuals’ worship of science and the Rockefeller Foundation’s scientific approach; and 2) the criticism of traditional Chinese medicine in the context of China’s modern reform. These issues were all important in the Chinese people’s efforts to create a new culture in the early 20th century, and they were also relevant to answering the above questions.
Scientism in China and the Rockefeller Foundation’s Scientific Approach

From the Opium War (1840-42) on, successive defeats in the wars with Western powers and Japan forced the Chinese, and Chinese intellectuals in particular, to examine China’s military abilities, its political system, and in general, the value of its culture. Through many long and painful experiences, the majority of the intellectuals came to accept as a fact that they had to learn from their enemies. In this general context, many of them gradually developed a cultural iconoclasm that combined with nationalism.

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2 There are different definitions of scientism. I here employ D. W. Y. Kwok’s definition in his Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.) 21. He says, "Scientism, in general, is a form of belief arising from a tradition or heritage in which the limiting principles of science itself have found general application and have become the cultural assumptions and axioms of that culture. More strictly, scientism should be defined as that view which places all reality within a natural order and deems all aspects of this order, be they biological, social, physical, or psychological, to be knowable only by the methods of science."

3 In his book Confucian China and Its Modern Fate, the Problem of Intellectual Continuity, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1965) Joseph R. Levenson discussed the iconoclastic potentialities of nationalism. He described this mixture of Chinese intellectuals’ feeling as such: "He was to have a special sympathy for the Chinese past, and he was to review the Chinese past with a disinterested critical honesty." v.1, 109. Lin Yu-sheng called this contradictory feelings toward Chinese culture "iconoclastic nationalism"; see The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.) In modern Chinese history, there was a wide range of nationalism, from Li Hongzhang’s Yangwu yundong (Westernization movement) to Sun Yat-sen’s nationalism that developed from the political advocacy of anti-Manchu to anti-imperialism. Levenson also discussed the view of "universal value" of some intellectuals around the May Fourth Movement, such as Cai Yuanpei (Ts’ai Yuan-p’ei) and Chen Duxiu, 109-133. Some Western scholars think the reform ideology of these intellectuals was internationalism rather than nationalism. However,
Two ideas dominated this cultural iconoclasm: the worship of modern science and Western civilization, and the rejection of many Chinese traditions. Both ideas surged during the New Culture Movement, inaugurated by Chen Duxiu's (Ch'en Tu-hsiu) periodical New Youth in 1915. During this movement, the new intellectuals, lead by Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Lu Xun (Lu Hsun) and Hu Shi (Hu Shih), advocated democracy, science, new literature and writings in the vernacular, and fought against feudalist autocracy and Confucianism, leaving an enormous legacy to modern Chinese history. This chapter cannot offer a comprehensive discussion of these phenomena. However, it is important to discuss some aspects of the New Culture Movement to show the general context under which the PUMC's mission functioned.

From the late half of the 19th century to the New Culture Movement, many Western ideas, concepts, and theories were introduced into China. Among them, science and scientific method were given a great deal of attention and respect. During this period, the Chinese people's understanding of science changed rapidly, and eventually they realized its importance. There was no written character for "science" in the Chinese language until the very scholars in China, under a unique historical circumstance, usually use "internationalism" to refer communist ideology. This discussion does not intend to elaborate this conception; nationalism is used here to indicate Chinese intellectuals' political purpose of saving their country from being subjugated.
end of the 19th century when some new intellectuals translated this word from
the Japanese language. Even today some Chinese scholars still argue about
the connotation of this word as it was used during the New Culture Movement.
In 1915 Chen Duxiu defined the concept of science in the following words:
"What is science? It is our concept of objects, the synthesis of objective
phenomena, and subjective expressions of reasons, which is not at all self
contradictory." This was, to say the least, a very generalized explanation.
During this same period, many other definitions appeared; even Chen later
changed his earlier concept. It reflected the fact that science, its definition as
well as contents, was rather new to Chinese intellectuals.

After the Opium War, when Chinese scholars started to pay close
attention to Western civilization, science was taken as a certain category of
knowledge or skill. It was much later that some intellectuals, Yan Fu among
the first group, perceived the critical function of scientific methodology in
Western civilization. As the most famous translator and disseminator of
Western thought of his time, Yan Fu believed that the difference between
Chinese culture and Western culture lay in their different methodologies and

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4 Fan Hongye, "Sai xiansheng' yu xin wenhua yundong" (‘Mr. Science’ and
the New Culture Movement), Lishi yanjiu (History research) No. 3, 1989. 39.

5 Chen Duxiu, "Jinggao qingnian," (Call to the youth), Duxiu wencun, (The
collections of Chen Duxiu's works). Shanghai: Yadong, 1922; Anhui People's
value systems. He highly admired Western pragmatism. During the New
Culture Movement, science was further interpreted as a universal law for both
natural science and social science; and a devotion to science -- or at least to
some notion of "scientism" -- swept through the Chinese intelligentsia.

Science and democracy were taken as two banners for China's
modernization and were considered as the solution for her crises. Hu Shi, one
of the most articulate champions of science and the new culture, made a
famous comment on the popularity of science in contemporary China. In the
1920s he said:

During the last thirty years or so, there is a name which has acquired an
incomparable position of respect in China; no one, whether informed or
ignorant, conservative or progressive, dares openly slight or jeer at it.
The name is Science. The worth of this almost nationwide worship is
another question. But we can at least say that ever since the beginning of
reformist tendencies [1890s] in China, there is not a single person who
calls himself a modern man and yet dares openly to belittle Science.

Hu Shi's words indicated the popularity of science among Chinese
intellectuals, although science and modern education were still very backward
in China.

In the United States and other industrial countries, scientism as a

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6 For an extended discussion, please see Duan Zhiwen, "Jindai Zhongguo
kexue guan fazhan san xingtai", (The three forms of the Chinese concept of
science in modern times), Lishi yanjiu (History research), vol. 6, 1990.

7 Hu Shi, "Kexue yu renshengguan xu", (The preface for science and meaning
of life), Hu Shi wencon, (The collection of Hu Shi's works), (Taipei: Far East
prevailing ideology appeared only after science and modern education had developed adequately and had proved themselves to be a powerful dynamics for social progress. In early 20th century China, the situation was completely different. The worship of science did not have its academic ground, nor did it relate to any economic progress which was supported by or based on the development of science. It was, rather, an outcome of political and ideological necessities. In other words, Chinese intellectuals used science and scientism as ideological and political weapons to fight the old culture and traditions.

When advocates of the New Culture Movement took issue with the old ethics and thought that had deep roots and strong influence in society, they found their battles were extremely difficult. The new intellectuals had to resort to Western ideas to support their theories; more often than not, their understandings and adoptions of science and other Western ideas reflected, or even were determined by, China's reality and related ideological necessities. The debate on "science versus metaphysics" and the conceptions of scientific method used during the debate offer good examples of how science served Chinese intellectuals' reform purpose and how Western influence related to such an issue.

In 1923, within the Chinese intelligentsia, a famous debate on "science versus metaphysics" took place. It was one of the most profound events in the New Culture Movement. This debate happened at a crucial moment when the reformers in China were just "converting" to science and other modern ideas,
and yet as a result of the First World War a great deal of reservation
concerning the legitimacy of science arose. Industrial countries, which the
Chinese took as reform models, fought a world war for both power and world
markets; and the modern weapons they employed were the main reason for
such heavy casualties in the war. As Hu Shi later summarized, this debate
concerned two questions: was the First World War a result of the development
of science, and was science beneficial to people’s lifestyle? In other words,
many Chinese intellectuals doubted if science was a progressive factor to
human society, and they used World War One as an example. If science, as
the war showed, did not always benefit human beings, why should it be used
to guide people’s understanding of life (renshengguan, literal translation:
"outlook of man’s life")? This debate ended with the triumph of science and
promoted greatly the influence of science in Chinese society.

Scientific method was an indispensable part of scientism. Its importance
was repeatedly emphasized by many Western scholars, among them the
Rockefeller Foundation’s advisers. Some Chinese intellectuals’ understanding
of it, as was shown in the debate, is worth special attention. In his study of
Chinese scientism, Lin Yu-sheng pointed out that Ding Wenjiang (V. K. Ting
or Ting Wen-chiang) the most famous scientist in the New Culture Movement
and also the major figure of this debate, Hu Shi, and even their opponent in

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8 Hu Shi, Ding Wenjiang de zhuanjì, (The biography of Ding Wenjiang),
(Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1956), 47.
the debate, Zhang Junmai (Chang Chun-mai), all shared a fundamental agreement on the concept of scientific method. Despite their many sharp differences, they all believed that induction was the proper scientific method. Lin thinks these Chinese intellectuals' understanding of scientific methods was a misunderstanding.⁹

Lin described Ding's concept of the scientific method in this way:

on the basis of his training in geology and in terms of his acquaintance with some European writers such as Karl Pearson and Thomas Huxley, Ting took the scientific enterprise primarily as one of inductive research on empirical data perceived through the senses. The operation of scientific investigation was a highly ordered, almost mechanical procedure in which one used induction to find out common denominators among various facts so as to classify them into ordered kinds and to establish regularities of natural phenomena.¹⁰

Hu Shi was a giant among the modern Chinese intelligentsia. Lin noticed that although Hu Shi formally included both deduction and induction in his concept of the scientific method, he placed great emphasis on the function of induction.

Lin explained that both Ding and Zhang in their argument referred to W. Stanley Jevons' Principles of Science: Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method. However, according to Jevons, scientific methods included both inductive and deductive method; and Jevons was convinced that "the


¹⁰ ibid. 1185.
hypothesico-deductive, not inductive, methods is 'the essence of sound scientific procedure.'

This is why Lin thinks those Chinese scholars misunderstood scientific methods. He argued that such an understanding should be explained in the context of modern Chinese cultural crisis, namely, the loss of cultural bearings and the need for certitude to quench the inner unsettling anxiety. According to Lin, it was this need for a credible sense of certitude that led the progressive intellectuals to inductive method and worship of science, as if it were a religion.

These Chinese intellectuals' idea of science was, as Lin Yu-sheng correctly pointed out, affected by the cultural and political environment with which they lived and by their ideological needs. However, their view of scientific method was hardly a misunderstanding. The Chinese version of science and scientism carried with it remarkable stamps of Western influence. Hu Shi, Ding Wenjiang, and their colleagues belonged to a group of elite intellectuals who possessed modern education and had often earned higher degrees in Western countries. When these people were studying abroad,

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12 ibid. 1196.

13 Hu Shi studied at Cornell University and Columbia University, and received his Ph.D. from the latter. Ding Wenjiang studied in Japan, then he went to Cambridge University. He had his Ph. D. at Glasgow University. Zhang Junmai studied in both Japan and Germany.
worship of science was sweeping America and Western Europe. In this trend of thought, the inductive method was taken as the most important scientific method.

William Welch, Charles Eliot, and E. Burton, the most influential figures in American medicine and education at that time and also the Rockefeller Foundation's chief advisers on its China projects, all expressed the same opinion. They also believed that this method was most needed for China's modern education. Charles Eliot said

[the West, which owes its astonishing progress within the last four hundred years chiefly to the inductive method of ascertaining truth, can impart to the East a knowledge of that method by showing the Eastern peoples how to teach the natural and physical sciences in schools of all grades, in such a way as to train in children and youth the powers of observation and the capacity for making an exact record of the facts, and then drawing the just, limited inference from the facts observed and compared.\textsuperscript{14}]

Eliot was very disappointed with Chinese students' lack of education in observation and inductive method. He complained that Chinese students did not know how to draw inferences from laboratory results. He concluded that we shall not succeed in establishing a creditable medical school for Chinese in China until we can procure from the institutions below the medical school the teaching of some sciences in the inductive method. I mean by that the laboratory method, and with it the inductive method of reasoning, and where we are to get that does not yet appear.\textsuperscript{15}

Burton called the inductive method the scientific point of view, and insisted

\textsuperscript{14} Charles W. Eliot, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{15} "The China Conference," 94.
that nothing could be of greater necessity than introducing this method into all educational work.

After a trip to China to investigate medical education, William Welch, a leader of American medical education reform, stressed the meaning of the scientific method to China. He said

Important as practical work in the sciences is to American and European students, it is from the educational side doubly important to the Chinese students, who, probably through long disuse, lack the power of making accurate observations of natural phenomena and drawing correct inferences therefrom. Everything should be done to develop the spirit of scientific inquiry which is probably only latent and not really absent, for China stands today where Western nations stood before the introduction of the experimental method into science at the beginning of the 17th century, which marked the entrance of these nations upon that path of material progress which has enabled them to outstrip so far the oriental races.16

Such Western notions of science and scientific methods not only directly influenced those students studying abroad, but also were imported into China by the Rockefeller Foundation's medical project and other similar programs.

An important point here is that, during the debate on "science versus metaphysics" there was another group of intellectuals, represented by Chen Duxiu and Wu Zhihui (Wu Chih-hui), attracted to the deductive method. In his Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950, D. W. Y. Kwok analyzed Chen's and Wu's opinion on the deductive method, and argued that this method connected them to mechanistic materialism and evolutionary thought. Kwok

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categorized them with materialistic scientism, while placing Hu Shi and Ding Wenjiang with empirical scientism. At that time Chen had already accepted Marxism and was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. To him, Marxism and historical materialism should be the answer to Hu’s and Ding’s search for the essence of science and scientific renshengguan (meaning of life). Chen thought that since Hu and Ding did not accept Marxism, their arguments did not make a fundamental difference to Zhang Junmai and metaphysicians.

In fact, the divergence among Chinese intellectuals on scientific methods reflected differences on some more fundamental ideological and political issues. While Zhang and those "metaphysics-mongers" were heading to a direction of neo-Confucianism, Hu, Ding and others alike perceived the danger of returning back to Confucianism and insisted on science, scientific method and scientific renshengguan (meaning of life), which were consistent with Western ideology. Chen Duxiu also advocated science, but he emphasized historical materialism as its guide and further believed that China needed a more fundamental change, namely revolution.

In this broad context, we can see clearly the Rockefeller Foundation's

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17 Kwok, 20-30.


19 See Li Zehou, xiandai sixiang shi, 50-65.
scientific approach and its specific meaning to China’s modern reform. As early as 1914, in the China Conference, the Rockefeller Foundation had expressed some concerns about the influence of Russian Revolutionaries on China. Its action in China can be seen as a long term effort to keep China from Communism.\textsuperscript{20} The Foundation did not just generally encourage the Chinese intellectuals’ views of science; it was particularly interested in a group of Chinese intellectuals, whose ideas were identical with its notions of science and reform in China. The Foundation’s ultimate goal in China was to promote this group of intellectuals, hoping that they would in turn disseminate Western ideas and lead China to the "mainstream" of civilization. In other words, although Hu, Ding and Chen all championed science, the Foundation could only support the former. The Peking Union Medical College seemed an excellent example to support not only the inductive method, but also Hu’s and Ding’s notion of scientism.

The Foundation leaders and advisors worshiped Francis Bacon and his wholehearted acceptance of the inductive method. According to them, the inductive method laid the foundation for the astonishing progress of Western civilization within the last four hundred years. Hopefully it could bring the same fundamental impact to East civilization. The virtue of this method, as they and Hu Shi as well saw it, lay in obtaining truth from experience and

\textsuperscript{20} "The China Conference", RAC.
perception, organized by observation and experimentation; thus medical science would be an ideal program to deliver such a method. The purpose of the Peking Union Medical College was to train Chinese students in Western ideas, and scientific method in particular. Students were expected to disseminate Western ideas and methods and gain support for them in China, as had Hu Shi, Ding Wenjiang, and their followers. This approach particularly explained why quantity was not at all an important concern, and why the key issue was a quality education. These students had to understand the true essence of science in order to become leaders recognized abroad as well as influential in China itself.

The Rockefeller Foundation’s scientific approach and the design of the Peking Union Medical College fit well into the Chinese intellectuals’ effort of creating a new culture. At least Hu Shi and a specific group of elite intellectuals thought so. In the long term, the advocacy of science only prepared public opinion for the development of science and education; without this development the intellectual reformers would have no victory to claim. Hu Shi argued that:

In Europe, science has already been well established and does not fear the attack from metaphysicians... China’s situation was completely different. China now has not enjoyed any benefit from the development of science... and we are not entitled to question science.

He also pointed out that advocacy for science in China was still insufficient, scientific education was still very backward, and the influence of science was
too feeble to sweep away ignorance and superstition.21

During the New Cultural Movement, the fight for a new culture confronted extremely strong opponents from the traditional force, and China’s backwardness in science and education made this task even more difficult. This situation was undoubtedly destructive to the creation of a new and modern culture. It exposed the fact that China desperately needed modern science. A fatal problem of the New Culture Movement was that it was more or less a fight only on paper; in other words, actions in developing science and research were not in the forefront.

From this point of view, the Foundation’s scientific perspective and its design of developing China’s medical science and research were relevant. Not only would the Peking Union Medical College provide a world class medical research center, where the Chinese could gradually develop their own sense of scientific spirit and method; it would also produce new scientists who could in turn advance the broader reform of China. This was the most important common ground for the Rockefeller Foundation’s co-operation with the Chinese intellectuals.

The Peking Union Medical College and its mission were widely recognized among new Chinese elites. When the Guomindang Nanjing

21 Hu Shi, "renshengguan", 120-121.
Government ordered in 1928 that all foreign colleges had to have a majority of Chinese trustees, the PUMC had no difficulty inviting some of the most famous Chinese intellectuals to join in its work. The first group of Chinese trustees were: Hu Shi; Zhou Yichun (Y. T. Thur), the President of Qinghua University in its early years and the executive director of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture 1924-28); Weng Wenhao, a famous geologist; Yan Huiqing (W. W. Yen), an American-trained scholar, government official and diplomat; Wu Zhaoshu (C. C. Wu), a Western educated official who was minister to the United States in 1928-30, and represented China at the League of Nations; and Zhang Boling (Chang Poling), the founder and the President of Nankai University. Soon, Ding Wenjiang (V. K. Ting, i.e Ting Wen-chiang) also joined the Board of Trustees of the PUMC. Four Chinese successively served as chairman of the Board of Trustees, all of whom were famous scholars with Western educational backgrounds.22

22 Zhou Yichun got his higher education at Yale University (B. A.) and University of Wisconsin (M.A.). Weng Wenhao received his doctorate in physics and geology at Louvain University in Belgium. Yan Huiqing graduated from University of Virginia and became a member of Phi Beta Kappa. Wu Zhaoshu went to high schools in the United States when his father had served as Chinese minister to the United States, Spain, and Peru. Later, he entered the law department of the University of London.

23 The first Chinese chairman of the Board of Trustees was Shi Zhaoji (Sao-ke Alfred Sze, chairman of the Board of Trustees during 1926-1929, then 1944-1946). He was China's chief envoy to Great Britain and the United States in the first half of the 20th century. The other three were Zhou Yichun (1929-1939); Jin
During these years, there was much contact and co-operation between these members of China's Western oriented elite and the Foundation's men at the Peking Union Medical College. Roger Greene, the residential director of the China Medical Board, was energetically involved in the work of the China Foundation, one of the most important Sino-American cultural co-operative organizations before 1949. With the help of the anthropologist Davidson Black, the head of anatomical department at the PUMC, Ding Wenjiang organized the first non-medical scientific association, the Geological Society of China. Later, Ding arranged the collaboration between Chinese anthropologists and the PUMC in a survey of prehistoric man in China; and this survey led to the world famous discovery of the Peking Man.

The relationship between the Rockefeller Foundation and Zhang Boling shows that the Foundation's connection and co-operation with some influential

Shaoji (Sohtsu G. King, 1939-1944), the President of Nanyang College, among many of his titles; and Hu Shi (1946-1949).

24 The China Foundation was established in 1924 in Beijing to oversee the allocation of the remitted indemnity of the Boxer incident. It was composed of both Chinese and American trustees. According to the agreement between the United States and China, the remitted funds were to promote modern education and science in China. The foundation was dismissed after 1949. Since it carried a similar mission to the PUMC, these two organizations had a close relationship. In fact, half of the Chinese trustees of the foundation were also trustees of the PUMC. R. Greene worked as an advisor and later a trustee for the China Foundation from the very beginning, and he continued his work in this organization after he was forced to resign from the PUMC.

Chinese intellectuals was far beyond the PUMC, even in the early stage of its work in China. As early as 1908, Zhang Boling was recommended to F. T. Gates by the leader of the YMCA in China because of his excellent work as the director of the first Chinese private middle school in Tianjin (Tientsin). Zhang had the same concern about quality education as the Foundation’s advisors. He told the latter that "in China there are no colleges, professional schools or universities to which his students would with to go after graduation." Zhang’s idea of modern education and his influence on the new intellectuals attracted these advisers’ attention. C. Eliot said: "He was the most interesting and admirable person that I met in China." S. Flexner also told the Foundation that "the influence of this man and his school throughout China is very great and must become increasingly so. We found that the high opinion of the man...is general among the intelligent people of China."  

This explained why the Rockefeller Foundation was interested in building a relationship with him. When Zhang was planning to upgrade his school to a university, the Foundation offered him an opportunity to study at Columbia University Teachers College for a year. After his return, Zhang headed Nankai University, which formally opened in 1919 and became the best Chinese operated private university at that time. One of the four fundamental principles of Nankai’s education established by Zhang was the emphasis on

scientific education and the inductive method. Later, Zhang served as the first Chinese vice president on the Board of Trustees at the Peking Union Medical College. During the 1930s, Nankai University became a very important part of the Rockefeller Foundation's China Program.

The support of the Peking Union Medical College by Chinese intellectuals was indispensable to the Foundation's policy-making as well as to the success of its plan. It was all the more true in view of the instability of China's current political situation. Starting in 1924, Chinese students' anti-Christian movement surged in college campuses. The stirring of anti-foreign and anti-Christian sentiments among the radical college student groups as well as political and military unrest threatened the long-term commitment of the Foundation to the PUMC. But several long discussions between Houghton, then the director of the PUMC, and Hu Shi enabled Houghton to establish an optimistic view of the PUMC's future in China. After these discussions Houghton told the Foundation that he believed that "the College has a very important contribution to make to science education in China during the next decade or two."

Both Houghton and Hu Shi were convinced that the PUMC was not subject to criticism from the more radical Chinese not only because the PUMC had a fair attitude on the religious question, but also because the PUMC had

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consistently emphasized the highest standards possible in teaching and research. Houghton decided to include these conclusions in his preparation of a ten year plan for the PUMC. 28 No doubt support from this most influential Chinese scholar enhanced the Foundation's confidence in the PUMC.

This co-operation between the PUMC and a group of Chinese elite intellectuals continued until 1951 the PUMC was taken over by the central government of the People's Republic of China. Mutual trust, based on shared experience and common interests, bonded them together. Also, the fact that most of these intellectuals spoke English made their communication much easier. These people, along with other social elites, formed the PUMC's social foundation in China. Naturally, their social status served as influential propaganda for the PUMC, and their very presence on the Board of Trustees helped the PUMC to increase its social influence among the Chinese ruling class. In addition, its hospital's patients included some of the most influential political figures. Sun Yat-sen spent his last weeks there. Chiang Kai-shek and his wife flew to Beijing to have their periodical check up in the PUMC. General Zhang Xueliang went to the PUMC to cure his drug addiction. All of these prestigious patients enhanced the position of the PUMC and were important reasons in enabling the PUMC to maintain its elitist style.

The PUMC's influence extended beyond medical education. During the

1920s and 1930s when the college was promoting the medical profession, the Chinese intellectuals in general had experienced great changes. Ideological and political splits among the intellectuals were unprecedented in Chinese history. Considering the historical context of that time, it was only natural that the intellectuals had divergent ideas, beliefs, and even motives. The important thing was that they became extremely active in political, cultural, and social reforms and movements. In many ways, the PUMC students and faculty joined this trend and had an impact on the growth of China's modern intelligentsia.

From *shi daifu* (the traditional gentry literati) to modern *zhishi fenzi* ("the new intellectuals"), this was a historical transition for the Chinese intellectuals. During the imperial dynasties, old gentry intellectuals did not have specific professional identities, and they could hardly be taken as an independent social class. Indeed, there had been no modern professions either, the great majority of the gentry intellectuals serving only as the feudal bureaucrats. They were tools and vassals of imperial autocracy. Thus, a critical task in China's modernization was to develop a new social stratum -- the modern intellectuals who would be able to provide society not only their professional services, but also their independent voices. In other words, they should be the "conscience of society".

Liang Qichao was the first to have realized the importance of this modern social stratum. In 1902, in his famous article "On the New Citizen" (*xin min shuo*) Liang Qichao advocated an essential change in the Chinese
people. He believed that the first priority of the reform should be to improve
the quality of Chinese people — "in order to change our country, [we] must
first change our people." While criticizing traditional education, Liang pointed
out that the goal of modern education should be to nurture "the new
citizen".²⁹ Even though Liang was talking about changing the Chinese people
as a whole, his particular focus was on the intellectuals.

Liang’s New Citizen theory influenced a generation of reformers and
revolutionists as well. Mao Zedong named his first revolutionary organization
"the New Citizen Learned Society".³⁰ During the May Fourth Movement,
Chen Duxiu furthered this New People concept by defining the features of the
"modern people". One of them was the scientific spirit.³¹ Related to this
development was the focus of modern education which switched from new

²⁹ Liang Qichao, "Xin min shuo", (On the new citizen), Yinbingshi wenji,
(The collection of Liang Qichao's work, Taipei: Xinxing Publishing House,
1957), Vol. 1, 1-116; Also Liang Qichao, "Xuexiao zonglun" (A general analysis
of schools), Shu Xincheng, Vol.3, 927-934.

³⁰ See Xiong Yuezhi, Zhongguo jindai minzhu sixiang shi, (The history of
China’s modern democratic thoughts), (Shanghai: the People’s Publishing House,
1986); and Luo Rungqu, "Zhongguo ji bai nian lai xiandaihua sichao yanbian de
fansi", (An analysis of China’s modernization thought during the last hundred
years), Luo Rungqu, ed. Cong xihua dao xiandaihua, wusi yilai youguan
Zhongguo de wenhua quxiang he fazhan daolu lunzheng wenxuan (From
Westernization to modernization, a collection of works on China’s cultural change
and social development since the May Fourth Movement), (Beijing: Peking
University Press, 1990), 1-35.

³¹ Chen Duxiu, "Jinggao qingnian", Duxiu wencun (The collection of Chen
Duxiu’s works), (Shanghai: Yadong, 1922; Anhui People’s Publishing House,
knowledge to new people, to nurturing intellectuals with modern consciousness and spirit.

In his "Science and Education" (1915), Ren Hongjun, a well known mathematician and social activist, clearly explained his idea of the relationship between these two. He stated that in regard to education, the importance of science was not in its knowledge, but in its research methods; and even more, in its function of training people’s thinking, using the scientific method to identify things, to understand the relationship between objects and to discover rules of the objective world. These could all be achieved by scientific research with scientific approach. Only by mastering this way of thinking might science progress and society be on a solid foundation.³²

The Rockefeller Foundation’s scientific approach conformed with this effort of promoting the modern intelligentsia. Not only did its scientific orientation advance scientific spirit and scientific method in China, but a world level medical school itself definitely upgraded modern Chinese medical professionals. American medical professionals' efforts to elevate their social and political status in late 19th and early 20th century America had a profound impact on modern American history. Even though Chinese doctors never won the social prestige and political influence of their American counterparts, the medical profession was the most rapidly growing modern profession, and the

medical schools and hospitals were experiencing the most impressive growth of any modern institutions in China. No doubt the Peking Union Medical College made its contribution to all these developments. Its faculty and students not only provided medical services to society, but also advanced ideas and knowledge that helped the formation of new ideology, of academic as well as social organizations, and of modern professional behavior.

Generally speaking, the Foundation's connection with the Chinese was limited to this elite intellectual group. Because the Foundation primarily counted on this group for advice, it received a rather narrow range of information. Highly Westernized and urban oriented themselves, most of these intellectuals knew little about the most important part of China—the rural areas—and China's most urgent issue—the peasant problem. They were patriotic in general, but most of them did not have a clear idea of how to solve China's many critical problems. Their perspective on China's future was limited to the desire to Westernize and modernize China through gradual reform and modern education, science and industry, a perspective shared by the Foundation as well. However, their point of view confined the Foundation's understanding of China's reality to a quite narrow view. To a certain extent, the Foundation's relations with this group of intellectuals hindered its realization of China's rural problem. It did not know much of this crucial issue until the early 1930s
when its vice president S. Gunn visited China.\footnote{This issue will be discussed later.}

The Peking Union Medical College was set to be a model for modern education in China and a mentor of the Chinese intelligentsia. In a certain sense, the PUMC was quite successful in fulfilling these goals as it gradually established the reputation of the best medical research and education center in Asia. More importantly, it convinced many Chinese intellectuals of the value of modern science. The story of Liang Qichao is an interesting example.

Liang was one of the most influential reformers and thinkers of during the last years of the Qing Dynasty to the early Republic China. As a traditional scholar, Liang was among the first group of Chinese intellectuals who criticized traditional Chinese medicine. Not surprisingly, he sent his son to the PUMC to study modern medicine. In the spring of 1926, Liang went to the hospital of the PUMC for treatment of his hematuria. His operation was not a success. Several articles appeared in the Chinese newspapers to criticize the performance of the PUMC in the case of Liang. Liang, however, did not share these critical views and wrote a letter to \textit{Chen Bao} (or Chen Pao, morning newspaper), a leading newspaper in Peking, in which one of the most severe criticisms appeared. In his letter, Liang explained that although Western medicine was not perfect, he hoped that the society would support it anyway.
Greene considered Liang’s letter to be "a very good statement of the case."  

In the same year, Liang gave a speech at the PUMC’s commencement. He greatly admired the mission of this school. Liang said

[...]the Peking Union Medical College is making a great contribution to the progress of China. If we ask what China needs, most the consensus of opinion will be that we need most the scientific spirit and method. How is this need to be best met? My reply is, through the medical science...It is a great privilege to study in such a splendid institution and it involves great responsibility, for yours is the mission to lead the rest of the nation along the path of progress through the science of medicine."  

Here we hear the echo of the purpose shared by the Rockefeller Foundation and its advisors.

**The Criticism of the Traditional Chinese Medicine and China’s Modern Reform**

Traditional Chinese medicine, its value as well as its practice, was a very controversial issue during and after the New Culture Movement. An important part of Chinese culture, traditional medicine was criticized not only by missionary doctors and the Rockefeller Foundation medicine men, but also by new Chinese intellectuals and the Nationalist government. How did these

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34 Liang Qichao, "Wo de bing yu Xiehe Yiyuan", (My sickness and the PUMC), *Chen Po* (1926); see R. Greene, "Criticism of the PUMC—illness of Mr. Liang Chi-chao", June 17, 1926. RAC. CMB Collection.

35 Liang Qichao, "Resume of Mr. Liang Chi-chao's Address at the Peking Union Medical College Commencement" (in English), June 16, 1926. RAC. RG: CMB Inc.
different social groups view traditional medicine and its relationship to Western medicine? Why did they criticize it? Examining these issues will help explain how medicine was used to serve different ideological and political purposes in China’s modern reform.

By the time of the New Culture Movement, many Chinese intellectuals, and the young who possessed modern education in particular, were convinced that science and democracy were the future for China and that China must cast off her old culture in order to build a new one. They blamed the traditional culture for China’s decline and some of them were determined to replace or reform it with western culture.

Chinese medicine was an important part of the traditional culture. Confucism, Taoism, and alchemy had all left their influence on medicine. Its main theories such as *Yin and Yang*, and *Five Elements* reflected the Chinese people's understanding of men and nature. During thousands of years, Chinese medicine cultivated a comprehensive system which was very different from Western medicine. However, lack of laboratory research, a dedication to family-based practice, and some superstitious content all made traditional medicine an easy target of criticism during China’s reform movements.

Among the earliest critics of Chinese medicine, Zheng Guanying and Liang Qichao were the most influential. In his powerful and provocative book *Shengshi weiyuan* (An alarm in a flourishing age) Zheng devoted a chapter to the importance of learning the Western medical system. He listed five aspects
in which Chinese medicine was inferior to Western medicine: (1) medical education; (2) anatomy; (3) medical theory; (4) medicine/drugs; and (5) medical equipment.\textsuperscript{36} Liang published several articles castigating what he viewed as the nonsense and uselessness of Chinese medicine.

Later, a new generation of intellectuals joined Zheng and Liang. During the New Culture Movement, the famous champions of the New Culture—Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi and Lu Xun, among others—took the criticism of Chinese medicine as a part of their campaign against traditional culture. These intellectuals did not always agree with each others' opinions of what the new culture was and how to build it, but they all strongly opposed traditional medicine. They believed that traditional medicine was standing in the way of new learning. Thus, to remove its influence would be crucial in changing China and introducing a new culture.

In general, their criticism of Chinese medicine and their admiration of Western medicine included the following arguments. First, these critics believed that the essential function of medicine was to preserve and strengthen the Chinese race (taozhong/qiangzhong). Yan Fu once said that there were three fundamental factors in deciding a country's strength: the physical hardness of the people, the intelligence of the people, and the morality of the

\textsuperscript{36} Zheng Guanying, \textit{Shengshi weiyian}, (An alarm in a flourishing age), (Taiwan: the Students' Publishing House, reprinting 1965), vol. 1, 83-87. This book was first published in 1892.
society; no country that exhibited all three was weak. Such an opinion later became a political proposition: to strengthen a country one must strengthen its people's genus (qiăng guō bi xian qiăng zhòng). According to its critics, Chinese medicine had failed to do this. They insisted that developing Western medicine should be among the first priorities in the China's modern reform because they believed that Western medicine could improve Chinese people's health. The issue of medicine was thus connected with patriotism.

Lu Xun, the most famous literary figure in contemporary China, had a radical opinion of traditional medicine, an opinion that derived not only from his awful childhood experience with traditional doctors when his father was seriously ill, but also from his studies of Western medicine. He later recalled:

I still remembered the previous doctors' talk and the prescriptions; comparing the knowledge I had learned now, I gradually realized that Chinese doctors were nothing but conscious or unconscious swindlers. Simultaneously my sympathy grew toward cheated patients and their families. Besides, from translated histories I knew that the Japanese reform had primarily arisen from Western medicine.  

Liang Qichao explained that "[t]he influence of medicine in the advancement of the scientific spirit may be illustrated by the experience of Japan. Japan first came into contact with western civilization through the

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38 Lu Xun, "Na han zixu" (Foreword to call to arms), Na han (Call to arms), (Hong Kong: New Arts Publishing House, 1973), 6.
Dutch, and this was largely through medicine. It is now known among the Japanese as the ‘Dutch tradition’. The scientific spirit and method has in turn promoted the material and social progress of that island empire...Japan’s experience is an object lesson for China."  

Liang also argued that "at the utmost point of world civilization, there is no other learning but medicine.... Medicine is purely about people, and so, preserving the people must start from medicine." He pointed out that the English had tried so hard to enforce public health measures and medical education since the English Revolution; because they knew clearly that the English population was much smaller than the Chinese. If the empire planned to invade China, they must first strengthen their people physically. On the contrary, so many people died in China each year, he said, because Chinese medicine did not cure sickness, it killed people.  

Second, these critics believed that Western medicine was grounded in science, and Chinese medical theories such as Yin-Yang and the Five Elements were nothing but nonsense. Zheng admired the concept that Western medicine emphasized finding truth from facts, and he was amazed that western doctors studied medicine by different disciplines--physics, chemistry, anatomy, anatomy, 

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39 Liang Qichao, "Address at the PUMC".

40 Liang Qichao, "Yixue shanhui xu" (1897), (Foreword to the Medical Charity Society), Yinbingshi wenji, (The collection of Liang Qichao’s works), (Taiwan: Zhongzheng Publishing House), Vol. 2, 69.
physiology, pathology, pharmacology, and treatment. Furthermore, he pointed
out that Western doctors had wonderful equipment, such as the microscope, to
examine the minutest details. But Chinese doctors only knew diagnosis by
feeling the pulse; they killed people not by knives, but by three fingers.\footnote{Zheng Guanying, 83-87. Zheng here described the major way used by
Chinese doctors to diagnose the illness, using three fingers to feel the pulses of
patients.}

Chen Duxiu condemned Chinese ignorance of medical science. He
stressed that

\[\text{[0]ur doctors do not know science. They do not understand the structure}
\]
of the human body, furthermore they do not analyze the nature of
medicine. As for bacteria and infectious diseases they have never even
heard of them. They only follow the five elements, their production and
elimination, hot and cold, \textit{Yin} and \textit{Yang}. All the prescriptions follow the
ancient formulae, no different from killing people. Nothing is more
mystical than their imaginations about "qi" which is connected with
witch craft (if there is one). If one tried to search the whole universe,
[one] could not find what "qi" is. All these non-scientific ideas and
reasonless beliefs must be eliminated by science.\footnote{Chen Duxiu, "Jinggao qingnian", 9.}

Some new knowledge was used in the criticism. Liang pointed out that
in the universe there were countless elements and events, but "the five
elements" theory broke them down into five elements (metal, wood, water,
fire, and earth) without any scientific basis. He felt very angry that such a
ridiculous theory had even gone so far as to dominate the people’s mentality
and behavior for over two thousand years, and that Chinese medicine was not
an exception. Even the flag of the Republic of China was decorated according
to this concept.\textsuperscript{43}

Hu Shi used the "backwardness" of oriental medicine as a proof of the inferior position of Eastern culture. At the invitation of Roger Greene, the residential director of the Peking Union Medical College, he wrote an introduction for the Chinese version of Henry S. Sigerist's \textit{Man and Medicine}. Hu Shi asserted that the backwardness of Eastern culture did not start in the 16th or 17th century; the date of origin was two thousand years earlier. In fact, the oriental people did not have any background in the natural science. He thought that Sigerist's book not only explained to the Chinese the whole meaning of this new medicine, but also demonstrated the [inferior] position which Chinese ideas of \textit{Yin Yang}! the \textit{Five Elements} of medicine occupied in the history of scientific medicine.\textsuperscript{44}

Third, these intellectuals highly admired the Western medical education system. Zheng and Liang explained that in Western countries, special schools were established for medicine; and that within these schools each discipline was taught by its own experts. Only outstanding students with high school diplomas were admitted to medical schools. After graduation, new doctors were required to pass an examination before practicing medicine.

\textsuperscript{43} Liang Qichao, "Yin yang wuxing shuo zhi laili" (The origin of yin yang and the five elements theories), in \textit{Yinbingshi wenji}, Vol. 13, (1923) 55.

In contrast to such a system, Zheng and Liang pointed out that Chinese scholars degraded the study of medicine; only those who could not be successful in imperial examinations or these who did not have the capital to go into business would go into medicine. Any small town or village had someone practicing medicine. However, since no national system of medical licensing existed, anyone who knew some prescriptions and names of herbs could attempt a medical career. No wonder, Liang angrily concluded, quacks killed so many people. He acknowledged that some Chinese doctors had made significant discoveries, but Chinese medicine lacked the institutions for passing them on.⁴⁵

Interestingly enough, none of these arguments or criticism were based on relevant studies of either Chinese medicine or Western medicine; many of their points was based on their fragmentary knowledge of both systems of medicine, and quite often their information was not correct. For example, Zheng believed that Chinese herb medicine was much less reliable than Western medicine because herbs continually changed their nature. On the other hand, he thought Western medicine used metal and mineral ingredients whose natures were fixed in its drugs. Such an understanding showed how poor his knowledge was about both Chinese and Western medicines. Except for Lu

⁴⁵ Zheng, 83-84; Liang, "Foreword to Medical Charity Society"; "Du xixue shufa" (About Western learning) and "Kexue jingshen yu dongxi wenhua," (Scientific spirit and Eastern and Western cultures) (1922), Yinbingshi wenji, Vol. 2, 70-71; Vol. 14, 7.
Xun, who once studied Western medicine for a short time, none of these critics were doctors in either form of medicine. However, at that time none of this lack of formal training made their arguments less influential or convincing. In other words, whether these arguments were academically correct was not important because none of the critics saw the criticism of Chinese medicine and the acceptance of Western medicine as an academic issue.

At that time many intellectuals believed that the central and most urgent matter was to save China from subjugation to other countries. To them, Chinese medicine and other superstitions, *Yin Yang* and the *Five Elements* theories in particular, had a strong influence on society and formed obstacles to disseminating Western science and scientific spirit, and thus should be eliminated.\(^6\) Chen Duxiu equated Chinese medicine with divination, astrology and fortune telling. He believed that adherence to these superstitions would lead the country down a dark, autocratic and theocratic road.\(^7\) From ideological and political points of view, criticism of the traditional medicine provided strong evidence to prove how unscientific and ignorant the old culture was.

\(^6\) Liang, "The Origin of Yin Yang" 47.

\(^7\) Chen Duxiu, "Kelinde bei", (The memorial tablet of Baron Klemens von Ketteler), *Duxiu wencun*, 241.
These Chinese critics were influential figures in the Chinese intelligentsia, and their criticism of traditional medicine consequently affected Chinese people's opinions greatly and thus helped the development of Western medicine in China. With other sciences, Western medicine gradually became the mainstream of a new and modern Chinese culture. To these Chinese intellectuals and the Western medical professionals as well, traditional Chinese medicine and Western medicine were two incompatible and rather opposite entities. When they wanted to establish Western medicine in China, they felt the necessity to criticize or even eliminate the traditional one. It was under such an understanding that the Foundation's medical program interacted with Chinese medicine.

As with those Chinese critics, the Foundation and its professional advisors also had a very low opinion of Chinese medicine, although it derived mainly from the missionaries' influence. One of the major purposes of the Foundation's medical program was to demonstrate to the Chinese people, through the example of the Peking Union Medical College and its associate hospital, the advanced Western medicine, and thus convince them of the superiority of Western civilization in general. This plan was quite in accord with the agenda of the New Culture Movement.

Missionary doctors had always argued that medical science had no existence in China, not only because they really did not understand Chinese medicine which was very different from theirs, but also because they believed
that only those subjects derived from and based on laboratory research could
be taken as science. In the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries
of China (1890), Dr. Douthwaite described Chinese medical practitioners in
these terms:

Their doctors, though possessing a considerable amount of empirical
knowledge of the properties and uses of certain drugs, are utterly
ignorant of their physiological action, and in medicine, as in everything
else, the Chinese are enslaved by the traditions of a thousand years ago.
To many substances which we know to be either inert, or, at best, of but
slight medicinal value, is attributed almost magic power. 48

The first herb mentioned by Douthwaite contemptuously was ginseng.

Acupuncture was regarded by missionary doctors as the most bizarre branch of
Chinese medicine, because existing physiological knowledge could not explain
its function. They thought that "the idea of sticking needles into the body often
evokes emotion close to horror at what seems to be the epitome of the
benighted practices of old, unscientific China." 49

Medical missionaries' contemptuous attitude toward Chinese medicine
stemmed not only from their ignorance but also from their ethnocentrism.
Recent Western critiques of medical missionaries have pointed out that the
merging of scientific medical knowledge and the evangelical cause engendered

48 A. W. Douthwaite, "Medical Work as an Evangelizing Agency", Records
of the General Conference, 270.

49 Ralph C. Crozier, Traditional Medicine in Modern China: Science,
Nationalism, and the Tensions of Cultural Change (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
in the missionaries a hybrid interpretation of diseases and ill-health in heathen societies. In other words, they thought that the people suffered so much because of ignorance, superstition, idolatry, corruption, and manifestations of an inferior culture.\textsuperscript{50}

From such a cultural bias, missionary doctors felt they had nothing to learn from Chinese medicine. In his \textit{Medicine in China, a History of Ideas}, Paul U. Unschuld explains this attitude:

As a consequence of their increasing self-confidence and of their general inability to gain access to more fundamental concepts and theories underlying Chinese health care, Western physicians saw little attraction in a cooperation with their Chinese colleagues. Furthermore, those who, in the coming decades, practiced Western medicine in China as medical missionaries, either honestly considered or pragmatically utilized Western medical knowledge as a direct manifestation of a superior civilization based on Christian faith. It could not be in their missionary interest to support any doubts about that superiority by seriously investigating traditional Chinese medicine as a possibly preferable alternative.\textsuperscript{51}

By and large, medical missionaries saw Chinese medicine a part of a heathen and inferior culture. Such an understanding encouraged their ethnocentrism and prevented them from developing an objective view of Chinese medicine and studying it with a respectful attitude. The exclusive


"reporters" or "interpreters" of Chinese medicine to the Western world, medical missionaries turned their bias against Chinese medicine as well as their ignorance to strongly influence Western doctors' opinions in general. Furthermore, such opinions profoundly influenced Chinese students who studied medicine either in missionary schools in China or abroad. To a great extent, modern Chinese doctors held as much bias against traditional medicine as their Western teachers, which was in accord with many Chinese intellectuals' cultural iconoclasm at that time.

The Peking Union Medical College was a good example of the missionaries' influence on the Foundation's opinion of Chinese medicine. In one of his speeches in 1916, R. Greene degraded Chinese medicine as did many missionary doctors. He said that

[w]hile some of them [practitioners of Chinese medicine] possess an empirical knowledge of certain remedies for simple disorders, they receive no systematic training, and any quack may announce himself as a practitioner. Taking the most favorable view possible, they cannot be said to know more than our doctors of a hundred years ago, and about the structure of the human body and its functions they know so much less that comparison is impossible. In the great field of surgery they do not even make any claim to skill.\(^2\)

This idea was deliberately transplanted into the PUMC students' minds. During the 1920s and 1930s, some faculty members and graduates of the PUMC were actively involved in the debate on the worthiness of Chinese

medicine and the government’s policy toward it. For example, Chen Zhiqian (C. C. Chen), Jia Kui, and Zhu Futang, among others, started publishing a periodical—Yixue zhoukan (Medicine weekly)—in the late 1920s. One of its important missions was to criticize traditional medicine, and it became an influential organ in the movement against traditional medicine.\(^{53}\)

Criticism of traditional medicine is a rather complex issue. From their political point of view during the New Cultural Movement, Chinese critics saw the necessity for casting out traditional medicine. Western doctors, on the other hand, criticized Chinese medicine from their cultural bias. The former knew Chinese culture much better than the latter, and had ambivalent feelings towards their own culture and tradition. Nevertheless, their criticism made many similar points to Western doctors'. The new generation of modern intellectuals, such as the graduates of the PUMC, on the other hand, were influenced by both groups. They were trained to believe in the superiority of Western medicine, yet, they saw the fight against traditional medicine as a matter of serving their own country and people. In any case, some obvious weaknesses of traditional medicine, as criticized by Chinese intellectuals, made Chinese medicine a big target of the modernization movement.

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\(^{53}\) See Zhao Hongjun, Jindai zhong xi yi lunzheng shi, (A history of the contention between Chinese medicine and Western medicine), (Anhui Science and Technology Publishing House, 1989), 89-90.
In the movement against traditional medicine, the Foundation's medical program played a special role. To the Foundation a serious question was whether regardless all criticism of Chinese medicine, Western medicine could prove itself to the Chinese to be better than Chinese medicine. The Foundation's China Commissions found out that with all the progress missionary doctors had made, the practices of Chinese medicine were still prevalent and these doctors served the majority of Chinese patients. The lack of modern hospitals in most of the areas in China, except in some big cities, was the major reason. However, Chinese medicine's deep roots in society and culture were definitely another important factor. Famous for its comprehensive system and vast collection of herb medicines, Chinese medicine formed a great challenge to modern science.

It was true that many Chinese went to missionary hospitals. However, most of their medical treatments were limited to several special fields such as surgery or ophthalmology. Chinese herb medicine and other therapies such as acupuncture were much cheaper than Western medicine. Furthermore, most people still believed that Chinese medicine cured diseases while the Western pills only relieved symptoms, especially in cases of chronic health problems. Even in Canton and Macao where the earliest mission hospitals were opened, the majority of the residents went to see traditional doctors.

Within such a reality, William Welch could not help but ask, "[h]as Western medicine, in contrast to surgery been in [a] position or so represented
as to demonstrate its superiority to Chinese medicine? He believed that beside the strength of Chinese indigenous *materia medica*, the low quality of the missionary medicine was an important reason for the lack of the Chinese response to Western medicine.

From the Foundation’s point of view, Western medicine possessed absolute superiority, but missionary medicine failed to represent the essence of medical science in China. Missionary medicine presented a low quality, and students educated in missionary medical schools were neither qualified to be teachers nor independent practitioners. The Foundation believed that without the newest medical knowledge and the highest quality in medical education, Western medicine might not win in the competition with Chinese medicine. This was an important reason for emphasizing quality in the Foundation’s medical program.

There was no question that the Rockefeller Foundation sought to influence Chinese people’s opinions on both Western and Chinese medicine. To the Foundation, the Peking Union Medical College, with its outstanding education and research, would guarantee a better efficiency in pursuing this goal than missionary institutions. In addition, as the symbol of advanced medical science, the whole plan of elite style and professional management in the PUMC highlighted its rigorous scientific approach. This formed a sharp

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54 Mary B. Bullock, 39.
contrast with the images of the traditional Chinese medicine, which was usually practiced and managed by individuals and families without modern institutions and advanced equipment.

In short, the cultural movement against traditional medicine and the competition between Western medicine and Chinese medicine justified, according to the political agenda in China, the PUMC's orientation. Only a school with the most advanced modern medicine could prove to the Chinese the advantage of modern science. On the one hand, criticism of traditional medicine became an indispensable part of the development of China’s modern medicine, in which the Foundation’s program played an important role; on the other hand, the PUMC itself became a powerful example for criticizing the traditional medicine.

Worship of Western science and criticism of Chinese culture were so prevalent among modern educated people in China that they profoundly affected the new Republican government’s medical policy. Looking back, during the Qing Dynasty it had taken almost a century to convince the Chinese government of the value of Western medicine. Missionaries had brought it into China as early as 1805. The first government medical school-- *Beiyang Yixue Tong*-- was established in 1893; later, in the reform of 1898, medical reform became a part of the *Wei Xin* Movement (advocating new things). This was the first time that the Chinese government officially showed some interests in
Western medicine.

The 1910 Plague in North East China brought a big breakthrough in the recognition of Western medicine because the government felt it had to appeal for help from Western doctors. Fifty-three doctors from six nations joined together and gained control of the Plague. Dr. Wu Liande, a physician graduated from Cambridge University in 1902 and then the chief official in charge of the campaign to control the plague, later recalled that "the consideration shown ... by the imperial family gave a great fillip to scientific medical practice throughout China." The new republican government after the 1911 Revolution showed more enthusiasm for modern education and medicine than the late Qing Court. When the Rockefeller Foundation's China Medical Commission visited China in 1914, the commissioners were very impressed by the warm reception and openness they received from the Chinese government. The Commission's report stated

The members of the Commission met Chinese officials in every place visited, including officers of the central government and officials of the provinces and cities. In no one case was there found any expression of opposition to the introduction of western medical teaching and practice into China. In nearly every case there was found on the other hand warm approval of the introduction of such work, and in not a few cases willingness was expressed to aid as far as possible if such work was

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56 ibid. 58.
undertaken on an adequate scale. The members of the Commission are convinced that the introduction of medical teaching on a large scale and on a high standard would receive the approval of the government and its moral support.\textsuperscript{57}

In contrast to its encouraging policy towards Western medicine, the Republic government had imposed a very harsh policy on Chinese medicine since the early years of the Republic. In 1914, the minister of the Education Department proposed to abolish Chinese medicine entirely. In response to strong opposition by the traditionalists, the Department gave the following explanation:

Nowadays the world is largely identical, and science becomes more and more perfect. When science is taught, it must be guided by the newest theories. Therefore, this Department has decided that all medical schools must provide courses of anatomy, chemistry and other sciences. Without these, one can not study medicine. The Department does not hold any bias against Chinese medicine.\textsuperscript{58}

In 1922, the traditional medical practitioners were officially ranked lower than modernists by the Ministry of the Interior. In 1925, the government rejected a proposal to include traditional medicine in The Government Regulation on Medical Education. Without government recognition, the traditionalists could not open their medical schools. In 1929, at the first conference of the Central Health Committee, Yu Yan submitted a bill titled

\textsuperscript{57} Medicine in China, 103.

\textsuperscript{58} Chen Bangxian, Zhongguo yixue shi (A history of China’s medicine), (Taiwan: The Commercial Publishing House, 2nd edition, 1936, reprinting, 1965), 266.
"Abolishing the Old Medicine In Order To Clear the Obstacle for Health and Medicine." Yu argued that medicine had become a science that could prevent diseases and serve the total society. Thus its administration should be based entirely upon the new scientific medicine and modern politics. But the old medicine still practiced theories that were completely fabricated without ground, such as Yin Yang and the Five Elements; and all of these obstructed the progress of science. He concluded that as long as the old medicine still existed, and people's ideas still remained unchanged, no progress in new medicine and health could be achieved. Thus, the old must be abolished.\(^{59}\)

It is no surprise that in 1929 the Department of Health accepted Yu Yan's proposal of abolishing traditional medicine.\(^{60}\) Since the 1920s, traditionalists of Chinese medicine had worked very hard to obtain a government regulation so that they could legally practice and train new doctors. However, repeatedly the government refused to accede to their request. Its reason was that the traditional medicine was a symbol of superstition and the old culture; its continuing existence and further development would ruin the government's political image. In 1933, Wang Jingwei, the chairman of the Executive Branch of the Central Government,

\(^{59}\) ibid. 267-268. Yu Yan was also named Yu Yunxiu.

\(^{60}\) The main clauses of Yu's proposal included: 1. barring any publications about traditional medicine; 2. censoring any non-scientific propaganda; 3. closing all the traditional medical schools. For details, see Zhao Hongjun, 111-117.
announced that publishing the regulations of Chinese medicine would not only be detrimental to the people’s health, but also degrade China’s dignity in the eyes of international society.  

The government’s medical policy reflected the popularity of science and Western medicine. However, changes in the government policy should not merely be attributed to the influence of modern science or Western medicine. In fact, the reform pressure in early 20th century China made such changes more a political or ideological gesture than an academic or scientific conviction. In order to gain domestic and foreign support and stabilize the political situation, the republican governments, and the Nanjing Guomindang (the Nationalist Party) government in particular, made many efforts to build a new and modern image for its politics.  

Comparing its policy of abolishing Chinese medicine and its teaching institutions, the government was more tolerant toward foreign institutions. It in fact encouraged all efforts to help education in China, of the Chinese or foreigners’. During the early 1920s, the Beijing government (the national government under Northern warlords’ control before the Guomindang government established the Nanjing regime) was under the growing pressure of Nationalism, and in December, 1925 it promulgated some regulations on

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foreign institutions. However, this government itself was overthrown by the Guomindang two years later.

In 1928 the Guomindang finally controlled the "whole" of China. As a part of its effort to establish the party's Nationalist image, the Minister of Education promulgated its first group of regulations affecting foreign controlled institutions of higher learning. Even under the government's new regulations, foreign schools continued enjoying many privileges because of the unequal treaties (still in force until 1942). Not surprisingly, during this period the number of foreign private schools and their students increased rapidly. By the 1920s, Protestant missionary societies from various Western countries had 7,382 schools with 214,254 students, while there were 6,255 Catholic schools with 144,344 students. American mission schools, however, grew faster than any other foreign schools established on Chinese soil.62

The sharp contrast between the Chinese government's policies toward traditional medicine and foreign education, including Western medicine, reflected its political considerations. The Chinese government needed foreign support, governmental or private, so it dared not to offend foreign institutions. To develop Western science and medicine could also help the government to win the intellectuals' support. In addition, Chiang Kai-shek's conversion to Christianity in 1931 and his wife Song Meiling's Methodist family background

62 Shu Xincheng, Shouhui jiaoyu quan, (Regain the control over education, Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing House, 1929.) 38.
as well as her American education were not minor factors in influencing the
Chinese government to even more tolerant of Western educational systems.
Therefore, the traditional medicine was really a victim of the Guomindang's
politics.

During the first half of the 20th century, in all kinds of ideological and
political reforms, Western and Chinese medicine were usually placed in
opposite positions. Nevertheless, there was a group of Chinese scholars, most
of them having studied traditional medicine, who were working on combining
Chinese medicine and Western medicine. They were rather uninfluential at the
time; but so far as cultural exchange is concerned, their ideas and efforts
represented a meaningful work and indicated a future for the relationship
between Chinese and Western medicine.

In response to the challenge of Western medicine, started in the late
nineteenth century, many traditional doctors and scholars had sought to reform
traditional medicine in order to preserve it. Western medicine, with its
knowledge of anatomy, laboratory experiments, new institutions, and
equipment, affected Chinese medicine positively. Some far-sighted scholars
had admitted that ignoring the advantage of Western medicine was suicidal.

Ding Baofu, a famous traditional scholar who also mastered Chinese
medicine, was impressed by Western medicine; he decided to translate medical
books into Chinese. Ding's Collection of Medical Books (Ding shi yixue
congshu, 1903) was the first systematic introduction of Western medical books in modern China. In the preface of this collection, Ding depicted the advent of Western medicine in East Asia as the turbulent waves of the Atlantic Ocean passing over the Yellow Sea. He saw it as a magical change since Shennong had founded traditional medicine, according to Chinese mythology, four thousand years ago. He believed that if Chinese medicine refused to learn the strong points of Western medicine, it would be like sleeping on burning wood.63

Under the impact of both Western doctors and Chinese scholars, some changes had slowly taken place in Chinese medicine. The advocates of Chinese medical reform or even revolution gradually created a new school of Chinese medicine. As early as the late 19th century, some traditional doctors had shown an interest in Western medicine. They eventually sought to synthesize (huitong) the two medical systems.64 Some controversial issues, such as which medicine should be in the leading position or how to transform Chinese medicine into a "scientific" subject, reflected a much broader debate on the relationship between Western and Chinese cultures. The opinions were divergent, and were inevitably influenced by various contemporary ideas and

63 Chen Bangxian, 195-196, 257.

64 The huitong theories were treated with some details in Zhao Hongjun's book and in Jiang Huaming's "Zhong xi yi huitong zhushu suotan" (A brief discussion of the convergence of Chinese and Western medicine), Zhonghua yishi zazhi (Journal of the history of Chinese medicine), vol. 15, (1985) No. 4.
theories. Some were quite close to Zhang Zhidong's famous theory of
"Zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong (Holding Chinese ideas as essence, and using
Western knowledge as tools). Some were more radical, advocating a new
scientific Chinese medicine. However, the idea that the Chinese needed to
learn from Western medicine was commonly accepted among these reformers.

Even as some doctors or educators of Chinese medicine insisted on the
value of Western medicine at the end of the 19th century, others were
establishing modern schools of Chinese medicine. The first of these, Liji
Medical School, was opened in 1885 by Chen Ran in Zhejiang province. Not
only did this school organize its grades and examinations according to the
system of modern education, it also offered elementary Western medical
courses such as anatomy, psychology, and public health. This school even had
its own study hospital and medical journal. It only existed for about ten years,
however, due to the political turmoil during the last years of the Qing Dynasty
and opposition from the traditional Chinese scholars.\(^{65}\) Later, in the early
20th century, some other private medical schools of Chinese medicine were
also established, but none of them survived the 1911 Revolution, for various
political and financial reasons.

Liji Medical School, and others alike, were primitive efforts to teach

\(^{65}\) See Jin Rihong, "Liji yixue tang shimo ji jiaoxue gaikuang," (A brief
2. 90-93.
traditional medicine in a modern school and to enrich it with the knowledge of Western medicine. Their short-lived experiences showed that the reform of traditional medicine and medical education was much more affected by political reasons than by academic ones. Even so, Liji and other early medical schools left some important and positive influence on the development of traditional medical schools; and more meaningful, they set some examples in combining Chinese and Western medicine.

In short, under the pressure of Western learning, some Chinese doctors were willing to adopt, to various degrees, some aspects of Western medicine and to reform the traditional medicine as well. It was also very possible for modern medical schools, with their knowledge and facilities, to help modernize traditional Chinese medicine. In fact, the Peking Union Medical College did contribute to research of the medicinal use of the Chinese herb *mahuang* (Ephedra sinica). In the early 1920s, Dr. Carl F. Schmidt and Dr. Chen Kehui in the newly organized Department of Pharmacology isolated ephedrine from the herb. This was the first time in the history of Chinese medicine that Western and Chinese modern pharmacologists successfully studied Chinese herb medicine based upon modern laboratory methods. Unfortunately, this research was mainly a personal interest rather than a consistent effort under the PUMC's policy. After Schmidt and B. E. Read left
During this confrontation between Chinese and Western medicine, Chinese medicine was in an unfavorable position, not only because of the impact brought by modern medical knowledge and technique, but also because of the critical opinions of the Chinese government and the intellectuals. Under these circumstances, Chinese traditional medical doctors took more initiative and active involvement in studying and adopting Western medicine than their "opponents" took toward investigating Chinese medicine, even though these Chinese were forced into this situation. The factors that affected the attitudes of these Chinese doctors and Western doctors as well toward each other's medical beliefs went beyond their medical knowledge and extended to their cultural underpinnings. On the one hand, China's economic backwardness and her weak position in the world politics pressed Chinese traditional doctors to realize the problems in Chinese medicine and to find solutions. On the other hand, the rationale behind Western doctors' opinions of Chinese medicine was related to their ethnocentrism, their sense of cultural superiority, and their condescension to "less developed" countries, all based on their unwavering belief in the superiority of the capitalist econo-political powers of the world.

While missionary doctors, the Rockefeller Foundation, and others

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66 Jin Yinchang, "Wo suozhidao de Xiehe yaolixi", (The Department of Pharmacology at the PUMC that I know), Huashuo lao Xiehe, 122-131.
sharing their beliefs tried very hard to establish the superior position of Western medicine in China, many Chinese intellectuals also criticized Chinese medicine and advocated Western medicine. None of them thought, or might care to think, that these two distinctive systems should and could learn a great deal from one another and that the combination of their knowledge and theories could benefit human lives a great deal. To Western doctors this seemed to be out of question; to many Chinese critics of traditional medicine, ideological and political urgencies overwhelmed academic issues. Rather than to reform Chinese medicine, to abandon Chinese medicine seemed a more suitable solution. In this unique context, Western medicine was placed in a position of opposition to all Chinese traditions, medicine included. As a result, some Western medical models were entirely transplanted by Western educators without being questioned, as was shown in the case of the Peking Union Medical College.

* * *

To summarize, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the growth of Western learning in China had reached such a level that the conflict between Western culture and Chinese culture was no longer a contest only between the missionaries and foreigners and the Chinese; the influx of Western culture created deep splits among Chinese intellectuals themselves. Many different ideas and reactions surfaced when the conflict deepened, among them the
"worship" of Western science, the criticism of traditional culture, and some changes in the government’s policy. The high tide of this Western learning represented a positive and relatively radical response to the challenge of Western intrusion and China’s crises, which was intended to reshape Chinese culture and society, to a greater or lesser extent, according to Western prototypes.

The Rockefeller Foundation determined to play a major role in China’s reform movement. Through its investigations in China, the Foundation followed changes in China’s political situation closely. Thus it was not coincident that the PUMC was established in the same year (1915) as the New Culture Movement was initiated. The timing could not have been better for the Foundation’s program, which shrewdly sensed changes among the Chinese intellectuals and in the government as well, and promptly seized the opportunity. To catalyze and promote the Westernization movement that was initiated and advocated by Chinese intellectuals, on the other hand, it put great pressure on mobilizing all existing Chinese as well as foreign forces in developing Chinese modern intelligentsia by its notion of science and reform.

Among many social or cultural groups, the Foundation thought Western educated elites were the most ideal objects for its influence. At that time, due to both the missionaries' and Chinese efforts, there were quite a few well educated new intellectuals who had already established a respected status in society. This was the premise of fulfilling the Foundation’s design and the
Peking Union Medical College's mission, and without these inner factors, neither the PUMC nor the China Program could have become reality.

In a broad sense, the PUMC was designed to enlarge this elite group. Upon them, the Foundation put its hope for China's modern reform. The influence was mutual. The Foundation's medical program provided a model to strengthen scientific research and disseminate scientific methods among the intellectuals. The Chinese elites, on the other hand, encouraged the Foundation. Their participation in the PUMC program offered a direct support to the Foundation's ideas. Furthermore, as early as the 1930s, PUMC graduates already showed their strong potential and achieved outstanding successes in the fields of medical administration, education, and service. This fact assured the Foundation that its plan was not only rational, but also feasible. Confirmation from the Chinese was vital to the Foundation, especially when it evaluated the PUMC's work years later. When the Foundation's China policy changed during the 1930s, Roger Greene used these facts to defend the PUMC's worthiness. (This will be discussed in Chapter VI.)

China needed a scientific atmosphere and scientists; this was the conclusion not only of the Foundation but also the new Chinese intellectuals. At the same time they both accepted a notion that Chinese medicine and Western medicine were incomparable and incompatible entities and that each was in the way of the other's development. This opinion placed Western medicine in opposition to the traditional medicine and partially explained the
extremely harsh attitude toward Chinese medicine during China’s modern reform. The Foundation’s medical program was not only based on this notion, but also helped to strengthen it.

This effort of combining Western and Chinese medicine was an extremely difficult task, academically and ideologically. Under China’s political situation, it was almost impossible for those Chinese traditional doctors to develop enough influence to attract allies for their work. In contrast with this, the development of Western medicine received both the government and new intellectuals’ support. Without this condition, the Rockefeller Foundation’s mission in China could hardly have achieved its successes.

While the Foundation received the support of a group of elite intellectuals’, their political and social weakness, bias, as well as lack of knowledge concerning the vast majority of the Chinese also limited the Foundation’s vision and viewpoint on the "China Problem". For quite a long time the Foundation had little knowledge of or connection with China’s rural reform. When it finally turned its attention to this issue, the historical circumstance, namely the Japanese invasion, did not allow the Foundation to develop its plan of rural program.

In sharp contrast to the Foundation’s scientific approach, many Chinese intellectuals eventually cast off the idea of "kexue jiu guo" or "jiaoyu jiu guo" (Using science and education to save China), among them Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Lu Xun. They turned to a more radical means: revolution. The
revolution succeeded as a solution for China’s profound socio-political crises. Obviously such a result was far beyond the Foundation’s prediction. The PUMC and the Foundation’s rural reconstruction program—"China Program" (which will be discussed in the next chapter)—were interrupted by World War II, as were many other reform plans. Later the Communist government took over the PUMC and divorced it from the Foundation completely. For a long time, the success of the Communist Party precluded any possibility of gradual reform in China and justified the extreme radical solution. The Foundation’s programs did not exist long enough to show any significant social or political result. Thus, we may never be able to measure fully how profound or successful the Foundation’s approach might have been.
Chapter Six

THE PUMC DILEMMA, THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION’S IDEAL VERSUS REALITY

The Peking Union Medical College was one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s most important international projects in its early years. The essential idea embraced in this medical program was using medical science and the modern institutional model to reform medical education in China, ultimately reforming Chinese culture. This strategy reflected the Foundation’s commitment to science and to medical science in particular. On the other hand, during the New Culture Movement in China, beginning in the same year of the establishment of the PUMC (1915) many Chinese intellectual leaders welcomed the Foundation’s program and believed it accorded with their ideological and political reforms. In these contexts, the PUMC seemed an ideal and promising cross-cultural program.

In 1915 the Foundation put its ideas in action, and two years later the Peking Union Medical College, a Johns Hopkins Medical School for the Chinese, laid its foundation stone. From 1921 to 1942 the PUMC experienced its "golden years", its excellent education and research achievement won it an international reputation.\(^1\) However, the implementation of the Foundation’s

\(^1\) The PUMC formally opened in 1921, and was forced to close by Japanese occupation in 1942.
design of the PUMC was full of dilemma and conflicts. The PUMC's history showed clearly that although the planning of this program was equally important as fulfilling of it, the latter was a much more difficult task than the former. To examine some of the most important issues and problems which occurred in the Foundation's conduct of the PUMC is an indispensable part of this cross-culture study. These issues were not just administrative problems, they revealed more critical matters concerning the Foundation's policy-making and policy-implementing. This part of the project will explain the feasibility of the Foundation's model in the realities of China as well as in the United States. Furthermore, by examining the conflicts between the PUMC model and the new interests and new policies, on both the Foundation side and the Chinese side, this chapter tries to offer a more comprehensive picture of a cross-cultural program—the PUMC.

The key issue regarding the fulfillment of the Foundation's ambitious medical program in China revolved around two questions: First, did the Foundation have the proper machinery and mechanisms to carry out this plan? In other words, when the Foundation ambitiously designed the PUMC, did the Foundation really understand the matters involved in conducting a sophisticated and cross-cultural program like the PUMC? Second, when situations in both the United States and China changed, how did the Foundation bridge this well-established program and the new situation and new policy?

While the PUMC was pursuing all its educational as well as research
programs, beginning in the 1920s the Rockefeller Foundation’s policy in
general as well as its China policy were shifting in quite a different direction.
The Foundation’s new leaders interpreted the Foundation’s orientation and
tasks quite differently from its first generation of leaders; among them F.
Gates the most influential. The disagreements among the Foundation leaders
on its China policy were crucial to the PUMC, because during the school’s
entire history (1915-1951), the Foundation took complete responsibility for its
building, staffing, and maintenance. These disagreements reflected changes in
cultural and social underpinnings in 1920s and 1930s America.

Simultaneously, political and cultural reforms in China dramatically
changed. Many important events occurred, among them the establishment of
the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 and the government of the Nationalist
Party which "successfully controlled" the whole of China in 1928. These
events reoriented the reform direction, and the reform goals of the New
Culture Movement were extended to a much wider range of political,
economical, and social issues. In this context rural reconstruction entered into
the stage of modernization movement.

The Foundation’s inner conflicts on its international programs
intertwined with the Chinese intellectuals’ new reform efforts. On the one
hand, some Foundation officials and Chinese intellectuals, those who were
directly involved in the PUMC in particular, insisted that the PUMC still was
a desirable approach for the Foundation’s interest in China. On the other hand,
when new political and social movements surged in China, many intellectual
elites joined them, and soon some Foundation leaders, with the Foundation’s
new orientation, discovered a new approach to China. Co-operation between
the Rockefeller Foundation and some Chinese intellectuals continued and
developed. The co-operative program might have changed, but the mentality
and mechanisms remained basically the same.

Within this broad background, this chapter will examine some specific
issues that not only directly affected the relationships between the Rockefeller
Foundation and the PUMC, between the Foundation’s New York office and its
field agents, and between the Foundation and those Chinese who were
involved in the PUMC, but also had profound importance in understanding the
Foundation’s policy-making. The discussion will continue to focus on the
center theme of this study: the factors that shaped the policy-making and
policy-implementing of this intercultural and international program.

**Machinery and Mechanisms**

When the Rockefeller Foundation finally decided to launch a medical
program in China in 1914, its first action was to establish the machinery of
management—the China Medical Board (CMB), directly under its own
leadership. With Rockefeller Jr. as its chairman and Wallace Buttrick as its
director, the CMB’s membership included some of the most notable people in
the medical field. In its effort to improve China’s medical education in
general, the CMB’s duties included offering grants to mission hospitals, helping to develop science education in some mission colleges, and issuing fellowships to both missionary and Chinese doctors to support their advanced studies abroad. However, the China Medical Board’s major assignment was to manage the Peking Union Medical College. Roger S. Greene was the CMB’s first resident director; later, the PUMC trustees appointed Franklin McLean, an assistant resident physician at the hospital of the Rockefeller Institute, as the PUMC’s director.

The PUMC’s managerial structure went far beyond its inner machinery. It included an elaborate hierarchy, with the Rockefeller Foundation and its trustees at the top, the CMB office in New York, the CMB resident director in Peking as a middleman, and at last the PUMC trustees and its director. A significant majority of the decisions, from general education policy to details in finance or personnel, had to go through the whole organizational structure.

Instead of placing the PUMC under an existing agency, the Foundation established a new one—the CMB—to take care of its China program. This design reflected the Foundation’s intention to maintain close control over the PUMC, partly because of the personal involvement of John D. Rockefeller Jr. and other top officials in this program. The CMB was quite unique and rather experimental; no other division in the Foundation was quite like the CMB which only focused on one foreign country and yet involved a wider range of fields than many of the divisions such as the Division of Medical Education (DME).
Thus the CMB required a head who was not only familiar with Chinese affairs and missionary institutions but also able to guide medical education. With these requirements, the Foundation felt it difficult to fill the post with anyone but Dr. Wallace Buttrick, who had extensive experience in dealing with missionary societies and also was involved with the Foundation's China program. However, Buttrick could not work full-time for the CMB, which left the residential director with a great deal of responsibility, even though he did not have the authority to make decisions. Could such a system work? This administrative experiment met its first test during the PUMC's construction. The cost of reconstructing Yu Wang Fu (Prince Yu’s palace) turned out to be inconceivably higher than the original budget. The final figure for the purchase of the land and the construction was seven and half million dollars—seven times as high as the plan’s estimated figure of one million. The dissatisfaction and suspicion among the Foundation’s trustees were quite predictable.

Many factors were responsible for the skyrocketing costs. The construction was undertaken during World War I, when inflation and unfavorable exchange rates made the program much more expensive. However, the managerial problem was definitely an important factor. The question is who should be blamed? The New York side found Peking responsible. For example, from the CMB’s point of view, the people in Peking failed to report promptly many defects in the design and construction. By the
time the CMB realized how serious these problems were, it was already too late to stop reconstruction. Thus the resident director in Peking, Roger Greene, was placed in a very embarrassing position.

In October 1920, Dr. Richard M. Pearce, then the director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Medical Education, was sent out to conduct a year-long comprehensive investigation of the PUMC. The Foundation did not inform the PUMC of any specific reason for initiating this trip; however, Pearce understood that his task was to study problems within the PUMC administration rather than CMB in general. Soon he found out, to his surprise, that the real problem lay in CMB’s New York office.

Pearce’s study and the correspondence between Peking and New York clearly revealed several managerial problems. First the Foundation’s conduct of the PUMC’s affairs was inconsistent and lacked continuity. On the one hand, detailed attention to Chinese affairs was given at different times by different officers of the CMB, often at odd times and without continuity; on the other hand, people in the field usually had to wait for long periods of time before their letters were answered, and sometimes there would be no response at all. Pearce spoke in defence of people in Peking:

the failure to reply justified local authorities, loyal men keenly interested in getting the job done well and as soon as possible, in assuming they were to go ahead without curtailment of labor or materials. It is unfair to these men that five months later criticism, or at least a message implying criticism, should come from New York.

He concluded: "such lack of control, cooperation, and consideration is
destructive of morale and leads to uncertainty as to home policy. It justifies the opinion that consistent policy and proper supervision are not to be expected from New York." Consequently, he felt that "it is too much to expect that an enterprise of the proportions and cost of the China work can be economically and wisely conducted without special administrative machinery of its own."²

The major reason for this problem was the failure to have some person responsible constantly for the CMB work. As the Foundation had announced, its China program was designed to establish scientific medicine in China on a sound basis. It planned two medical schools and was anticipated that the Foundation would have to supply most of the funds as well as the direction of the educational policy. It also planned to aid a considerable number of other institutions. It was the responsibility of the CMB’s New York office to conduct these activities. Apparently, even for a very capable and experienced man, it was a full-time job.

However, the director of the CMB, Dr. Buttrick, also served simultaneously as the director of the Rockefeller Foundation’s General Education Board; in addition, he performed a considerable amount of war service. Naturally he could not give his time and attention wholly to the CMB. As early as 1916, Greene had noticed this problem. He told Rockefeller Jr. that people in the field felt more and more the need to have an active man with a thorough knowledge of China and good administrative abilities in the New

² Richard Pearce to George Vincent, Dec. 9, 1920. HL. bms Am 1864.
York office to give his full time to the direction of the work. He believed that this need was becoming quite urgent. While he highly admired Buttrick’s great contribution to the CMB’s work, Greene expressed his concern as to whether Buttrick really had the time and energy to handle all of the details; he warned of the danger that the remote enterprises might not receive all the attention which they required. At the time Rockefeller did discuss with Buttrick the possibility of having a Mr. Brockman assigned as the director of the CMB. However, for some reason this never occurred. When Pearce arrived in Peking, he soon perceived the same problem, which by then had become worse.

As an insider at the Foundation’s headquarters, Pearce was convinced that the CMB could not manage its duties without a full-time director. He knew too well how hectic the New York office usually was. The Foundation often "jumps from problem to problem, from the affairs of one board to those of another, from England to Canada, to Brazil, and back to the United States." The result was that "there is constantly an inevitable shifting of point of view, the opinion of first this and then that officer or advisor prevails, without all having all the time a clear conception of all phases of work and policy."

Although everyone knew how enormous the investment was, there was "no one person in authority who thinks, eats, sleeps, and lives for the China

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Medical Board." Pearce urged the Foundation to correct this problem as early as possible.4

Second, the Foundation did not have experience in conducting a sophisticated medical school in a remote foreign land where both modern education itself and its supporting environment were in poor condition. When the PUMC was begun, several unexpected problems appeared, reflecting not only the rapid changes within China but also the Foundation's limited knowledge of China's situation and its underestimation of the difficulties despite its previous investigations.

For example, when the Foundation set up the PUMC to advance medical education in China, it also assisted some missionary medical schools in developing premedical programs. When Xiang-Ya Medical School (Yale-In-China), one of the missionary schools, agreed to develop a biology department, its personnel soon discovered that it was very difficult to meet the Foundation's standard as set by Dr. Simon Flexner. Hiring qualified teachers was a basic problem. Amos P. Wilder, the secretary and treasurer of Xiang-Ya, complained to Greene that

it is one thing to sit in New York as your sages do and outline the ideal man and the degrees he should have; but you and I know what Dr. Flexner and men like himself (familiar with an army of young experts available for his service and the home Hospitals that appeal to the ambitious) do not know, that rarely if at all do such men offer

4 Pearce to Vincent, Dec. 9, 1920.
themselves for the China service.⁵

The mission schools had more difficulties than the PUMC in recruiting their personnel because a mission doctor not only had to be qualified both in educational and in religious requirements, but also had to be willing to accept much lower pay than his colleagues at home.

Another clear example of the Foundation's inexperience was in the budget plan for construction of the PUMC and in the disparity between the million-dollar estimate and the 7.5 million dollar final cost. When the Foundation purchased the Union Medical College from the London Missionary Society, World War I had already commenced. The war imposed many difficulties on construction. However, the Foundation did not realize this problem quickly; its budget did not really consider the war factor. During the war, the exchange rate between the U. S. dollar and Mexican silver (China's currency) dropped from 1 : 2.54 to 1 : 0.84, this alone coast the Foundation $1,750,000 dollars. Most of the purchases for the construction were paid at inflated war prices, including ocean freight. Often the shipments were lost en route to China, and orders had to be duplicated.⁶

Unfortunately this was just part of the story. Pearce described the difficult conditions in building a modern medical school in Peking:

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⁵ Amos P. Wilder to Roger S. Greene, April 20, 1915. HL. bms Am 1864.

⁶ George Vincent, "A newspaper interview of 1921". See Mary Ferguson, 34.
even those of the supervisors whose industry and conscientiousness has been beyond [sic] have been handicapped by having to work with laborers whose language and customs they did not understand and by having to buy materials in a strange and very meager market. As no building of such modern type had previously been erected in Peking, most of the skilled laborers had to be trained to new procedures, and once trained could not lightly be discharged for slight offenses, though in the interest of discipline their discharge might have been desirable. The handling of foreign foremen was also a matter of great difficulty. Some of these men realized the embarrassment in which they might place the Board by leaving the work suddenly and accordingly made demands which were not justified by their contracts.\textsuperscript{7}

Because of the high costs incurred in the PUMC, the Foundation had to give up its plan for a second medical school in Shanghai (Harvard-in-China).

The inevitable problems and troubles in any new institution were probably increased many fold by the distance between Peking and New York. Mary E. Ferguson, a secretary of the PUMC, later recalled that it took two months to get an answer to letters, if they were dealt with promptly, and that the condensed language of cables often led to misunderstandings.\textsuperscript{8}

This difficulty in communication often created other problems. For instance, during construction, some building designs were sent to appropriate American professors for advice, but their suggestions for changes often became entangled between the boards and the Foundation, and were sent to Peking too late for implementation. For example, Dr. Mills arrived in Peking to find that changes which he had required in the pathology building while in

\textsuperscript{7} Pearce to Vincent, Dec. 9, 1920.

\textsuperscript{8} Mary Ferguson, 41.
the United States had not been communicated to the force in Peking. In other cases, some professors asked for changes only after they arrived at the PUMC, making such changes even more expensive because some of the buildings had already been started and others had even been completed.

Since it was commonly understood that the Foundation was intended to provide the PUMC with thoroughly modern equipment of top quality, it was particularly difficult for the CMB's agents in the field to object to requests of this sort. Pearce observed that

some of those who have talked with staff members in the United States about the facilities which they would have in Peking do not appear to have realized the financial implications of their assurances, and at the same time those on the field were not kept exactly informed of just what had been promised in New York. ⁹

Third, the problems mentioned above placed a heavy responsibility on the Foundation's officers in Peking, probably much heavier than either the Foundation or its officers had anticipated. This raised the question of whether the people in Peking had enough authority to handle the situation.

Ideally, the distribution of power between the CMB in New York and its representatives in the field, in Greene's words, was as follows: the director of the board should have general control over all its activities and particularly over the home office of the organization in New York; the resident director would make his headquarters in Peking, where he would be in close touch with the work which was being done in the field and would be able to advise

⁹ Pearce to Vincent, Dec. 9, 1920.
the board on various projects as they developed.\textsuperscript{10}

However, in reality things are always more complicated, and this was especially true in the PUMC case. For example, questions arose as to what circumstances would determine whether the New York office listened to its officers in Peking, and then how many of their recommendations would be implemented. During its early years, three of CMB's leading officers worked in China: Greene as the CMB's resident director in Peking; F. McLean as the PUMC's director; and Henry Houghton in charge of the Foundation's Shanghai project. McLean soon left for military service, and later Houghton replaced him as acting director of the PUMC for over two years. Only Greene worked full-time in the PUMC from the beginning.

With his understanding of China's affairs, Greene offered the Foundation much advice concerning the political or social implications of its actions in China over the years. But sometimes the indifference of the Foundation to his advice made him wonder about his role. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation was planning to take over the Harvard medical school of Chira and its associated hospital in Shanghai. This plan was initiated by Harvard President Charles Eliot, based on the fact that Harvard-In-China was then under serious financial pressure. In 1916, the CMB and Harvard University reached an agreement and terminated Harvard's responsibility for

\textsuperscript{10} Roger S. Greene, a paper on the First China Commission, March 29, 1915. RAC. RG4.
this school a year early, leaving Harvard-in-China's students unsure of their futures. The CMB was not able to transport them bodily to America, and there was no place for them go in China where they could secure anything like the quality of instruction which they had been receiving from the Harvard faculty.

Greene had strong reservations concerning this action. However, when he received the news, it was too late to make a change. He was very disappointed and complained to Buttrick:

I did feel that the matter had other aspects to be considered than the simple questions of medical and educational efficiency and expediency, and on those other aspects I felt that my opinion would have been of some value, and might have been worth waiting for or telegraphing for, even if much wiser members of the Board had so recently been in China and seen so much for themselves.\textsuperscript{11}

In his letter of the same day to his brother Jerome Greene, then the secretary of the Foundation, R. Greene complained that "[t]o admit students and then summarily close the schools or continue them in a crippled condition, without affording the rank and file of the students any facilities for continuing their course, is not likely to add to the prestige of American educational enterprise in China." Again, he insisted that the New York office should consider his opinion because he believed that "on general principles better results will be obtained if the resident director in China is consulted in advance on such propositions [sic]. I did not write in a spirit of pique at all, and I hope that this

\textsuperscript{11} R. Greene to Wallace Buttrick, Feb. 18, 1916. RAC. RG4.
will be understood by Dr. Buttrick and his associates on the Board." \(^\text{12}\)

Graduated from Harvard University with a MA degree, Greene had been a councilor of the U. S. State Department in China before he joined the Rockefeller Foundation. As a medical layman, he had always felt some uneasiness being a resident director in the Foundation’s biggest medical project abroad, even though he had great enthusiasm for the work. More than once, he expressed his uncertainty about his competence. He told his brother Jerome that "I am not at all convinced of my superior qualifications for all the functions that I have to perform here, and if the Board can find a better man I shall be delighted to take a subordinate place if one can be found in which I would be useful... I do not wish to be kept after I have outlived my usefulness." \(^\text{13}\) Apparently, the Foundation did not try to make things easier for him.

During the construction period, the most difficult task was to find an appropriate design and a qualified architect. Greene and McLean worked unstintingly on it. However, Gates and Buttrick made the Foundation’s final choice: Mr. Harry H. Hussey and his design. They disregarded Greene and McLean’s questions of Hussey’s qualifications and their suggestion of a careful

\(^\text{12}\) Roger S. Greene to Jerome Greene, Feb. 18, 1916. HL. bms Am 1864.

\(^\text{13}\) ibid. R. Greene once told Houghton with some bitterness: "While we laymen can sometimes say things that are worth saying in regard to medical policies, there is a kind of second-hand effect about such deliverance that even a brilliant man like Mr. Vincent cannot always escape." Greene to H. Houghton, Nov. 7, 1922. HL. bms Am 1864.
investigation of his record.\textsuperscript{14} Even worse, the CMB’s contract with Hussey gave him both the architectural and the construction programs, which proved to be a grave mistake.

Greene and the people in Peking did not know all of this until the architects and some of the construction force had either arrived in Peking or were on the way. From them, Greene learned that the first buildings were to be finished within a year. Thus, the CMB left Greene alone to supervise the construction without the benefit of the expert advice of an architect to control the contractor because the architect and the contractor were one and the same. Considering that Greene had no technical training and experience in large business administration, Pearce believed that Greene’s only failure was not to ask for an immediate revision of the contract.

When the cost of the PUMC construction began to skyrocket and again

\textsuperscript{14} As early as 1916, McLean wrote to R. Greene that “I have not been able to find that they (Hussey and his associates) have done any considerable building of laboratories and hospitals in this country and unless they have had experience of that sort I should not deem it wise to entrust work to them, without some sort of expert supervision.” Franklin McLean to Roger Greene, Nov. 23, 1916. HL bms Am 1864. However, Greene and McLean believed that the main consideration of Gates and Buttrick on this decision was to save money. Prior to Mr. Hussey, the CMB had asked Mr. Coolidge, a leading American architect who constructed new buildings for the Harvard Medical School, to study the project. Coolidge’s estimate cost was US$ 3,214,068, compared to Hussey’s figure of 1,000,000. Hussey’s estimate was exactly the amount of the foundation’s plan, and that was why he got the contract. McLean told Greene that he believed that “the board has vastly under estimated the cost of establishing and maintaining in Peking the sort of institution they want and no architect will be able to help them very much.” ibid. Also see Pearce to Vincent, Dec. 9, 1920; and Ferguson, 27-34.
when the criticism came to Peking from New York, Greene was the one who felt the most pressure. Recognizing his lack of experience in construction work and business administration as well as his deficiencies on the scientific and professional side, Greene requested retirement. Should Greene have been given all the blame? Pearce certainly did not think so. He told the CMB that it was Greene who had held things together in the past. "He represents the one continuous factor in the Board’s work in China. If it were not for him, I fear I would not now be discussing difficulties but chaos. His opinion, therefore, as to a full-time head in New York should be respected."\(^{15}\)

The control of the policies and the appointment of personnel were centered almost entirely in the CMB’s New York office with the final approval of the Foundation. The management of the institution was hampered in many ways because the CMB could not do its work promptly and appropriately and the local organization did not have enough authority to deal with emergencies as well as routine duties. Pearce suggested that the first priority be a "greater autonomy for the local administration".\(^{16}\)

In short, although prior to the PUMC the Foundation had been involved in American medical reform and had established the Rockefeller Institution for Medical Research, it had no experience in conducting a sophisticated and extended international medical program. Neither did it have an efficient

\(^{15}\) Pearce to Vincent, dec. 9, 1920.

\(^{16}\) Ferguson, 48.
mechanism to pursue its ambitions in China. The machinery designed for
operating the PUMC was experimental and proved not practical. However,
during these initial years neither the Foundation nor local officers saw the
necessity for fundamental change. And compared to the challenge that faced
the PUMC during the 1920s and 1930s, the problems of this early time were
just a prelude.

**Long-Term Commitment and Policy Changes**

In the middle of the 1920s, the Foundation undertook a review of all its
work during the past ten years and reorganized its increasingly extended
philanthropic empire; this operation brought fundamental changes in the
Foundation’s orientation and policy and virtually started a new era in the
Foundation’s history. Inevitably, it profoundly affected PUMC.

The primary concern behind this reorganization was clearly stated in
Rockefeller Jr.’s letter of December 28, 1925 to Raymond B. Fosdick:17

As you know, this whole matter has long been very much on my mind,
and the tendency to measure success by the volume of business done by
a single Board or by one department of a Board instead of by the wisest
and most economical promotion of the well being of mankind by all the
Boards has caused me growing concern as I think of the future. Any
human institution tends to get into a rut, to confuse motion with

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17 Raymond B. Fosdick was the president of the Rockefeller Foundation from
1936-1948. According to Steven C. Wheatley, he was the captain of this
reorganization. In the late 1920s, Fosdick was well on his way to becoming
Rockefeller Jr.’s most trusted friend. See Wheatley, *The Politics of Philanthropy,*
*Abraham Flexner and Medical Education,* (Madison: University of Wisconsin
progress, and to exalt machinery and organization above work and objectives. This is certainly true in the business world, and it is equally true in philanthropy. ...Machinery and personnel are merely the instruments by which objectives are reached, and unless we keep ourselves clear-eyed and fresh and keep the machinery elastic, we run the risk of dry rot.\textsuperscript{18}

Fosdick and Vincent, then the president of the Foundation, were eager to meet Rockefeller's anxieties about overlapping and the multiplication of boards by some fundamental reorganizations. The major targets were the International Health Board (IHB) and the CMB, two subsidiary boards established to carry on specific tasks. A direct reason causing this was that somehow at that time Vincent found it very difficult to deal with Frederick F. Russell, the director of the IHB.\textsuperscript{19} Since the CMB was in the same status in the Foundation as the IHB, it also became a target. Fosdick and Vincent suggested disbanding the CMB and transferring its activities to the Division of Medical Education (DME); Greene would accordingly become an associate director of the DME.

Greene was thoroughly annoyed by this plan. He insisted that China was a very special field and required a different sort of treatment. He argued that until then the DME's assignment had been quite different from the CMB's work in China. In a letter of January 20, 1926 to Vincent, Greene said that he understood "there has been a feeling on the part of some that the I.H.B. was


\textsuperscript{19} See Wheatley, 155-156.
too much disposed to regard itself as independent of the Foundation, and that its officers did not always consult the Foundation sufficiently in advance, or keep the officers of the Foundation fully informed about their actions." But he did not think reorganization would solve the problem. On the contrary, he believed that "with the finances and the power of appointment of C. M. B. and I. H. B. officers in the hands of the Foundation the machinery is already available to carry into effect any decisions regarding policy that the Foundation may choose to adopt."²⁰

According to Greene, the New York side and Vincent in particular were really responsible for those administrative problems. He said:

It seems to me that whatever trouble Mr. Vincent is having with Russell is due to his own failure to keep in touch with the central office of the Foundation and its subsidiaries, and to exert powers that he already possesses...The defect that I see is in Mr. Vincent's method of handling Dr. Russell when his appointment was first proposed, i.e. failing to reach a full understanding, and then when difficulties arose in failing to have things out with him.²¹

In a similar situation to Russell, Greene saw the problem from quite a different perspective from those of the Foundation headquarters. Greene explained that "it is perfectly natural that any strong man, such as is needed for a really great organization like the I. H. B., should develop an inconvenient amount of independence under such circumstances. If he did not the whole work would be invaded by a slow paralysis, while all business was held up until the chief

²⁰ R. Greene to George Vincent, Jan. 20, 1926. HL. bms Am 1864.

²¹ R. Greene to Richard Pearce, Jan. 20, 1926. HL. bms Am 1864.
returned." He complained that

Even when we wanted to see Mr. Vincent it was always a struggle to get by his secretary when he was in town, and he rarely seemed to have leisure to talk things over...Unless Mr. Vincent changes his own ways I think he will fail to accomplish any very satisfactory results merely by a change of organization. 22

Greene thought if Vincent were more constantly on the job and accessible for daily consultation there would be no insurmountable difficulty in securing the kind of team-play he wanted with the existing organization. 23

Greene was very upset; he believed the Foundation should not package the IHB's problems with the CMB. He believed that the CMB was being attacked merely as a means of undermining Russell's position and remedying what was thought to be an unsound relationship between the IHB and the Foundation. He saw no point in upsetting an established organization in order to achieve teamwork and coordination, because those objects "depend more on personalities and attitudes than on paper organization." 24

By the time of this reorganization, the PUMC was already well established and its mission was also well defined. From the local officers' point of view, what the PUMC needed from the Foundation afterwards were its continuing support and stability in policy. Generally speaking, policy changes or reorganizations on the Foundation's side would bring anxiety to the

22 ibid.

23 Greene to Francis Peabody, Jan. 24, 1926. HL. bms Am 1864.

24 Greene to Peabody, Jan. 20, 1926.
people in the field, who without full information of what was going on in the headquarters were unable to influence the policy-making. Such anxiety would later magnify and sometimes interfere with their work.

Houghton at that time complained that the reorganization was progressing "so much more rapidly than I had been given to suppose would be the case." Greene was most distressed and could hardly control his temper when he wrote to Pearce: "If they want to get rid of Russell or me let them say so and give us notice to quit. That would be a reasonable proposition that it should be possible to consider at any time without beating about the bush and without attacking one man by way of another." 26

Greene just could not understand "all this restlessness and constant desire for changes" and felt they spoiled his time and interrupted his work. The reform he preferred "would be an ending of reorganization and the establishment of some continuity to eliminate waste motion." He argued that "with everybody on the job we should have time to discuss and study changes in detail that constantly need to be made, and to consider in a leisurely manner broad policies and new ideas that really need attention and can be dealt with without disturbing and time-consuming reorganizations." 27

However, the reorganization went on anyway. In February, 1927 the


26 R. Greene to Richard Pearce, Jan. 20, 1926.

27 Greene to Pearce, Jan. 20, 1926.
Foundation trustees accepted the recommendation that the CMB be disbanded and its functions be transferred to the Division of Medical Education. In 1928, a new American corporation, the China Medical Board Inc., was organized. The Rockefeller Foundation appropriated to it $12,000,000 as endowment, its income to be used to support the PUMC, thus relieving the Foundation of further responsibility for its maintenance.28 This organization was "independent" from the Rockefeller Foundation; and theoretically from then on the relations between the PUMC and the Foundation would be maintained through the DME.

The exile of the CMB from the Foundation was only a minor operation. In The Rockefeller Century, John Harr and Peter Johnson pointed out that there were two major goals in the Foundation’s reorganization: to build more rationality and symmetry into Rockefeller philanthropy as a whole and to "break the near-monopoly of medicine and public health in the Foundation’s program and turn it into the more comprehensive organization..."29 Accordingly, some formerly separate social science and education boards sponsored by the Rockefellers were ended and their functions were transferred to the Foundation. Thus, this operation was as much to improve the Foundation’s managerial efficiency, as it was to end the doctors’ control of the

28 Mary Ferguson, 59-60.

Foundation.

Steven Wheatley’s *The Politics of Philanthropy* analyzes some significant changes that caused this reorganization. To begin with, by the 1920s science was no longer seen by the new generation of managers as the facile solution to contemporary problems that it had been in the Progressive Era. Science and the universities which supported it could be a tool for wider social management, but not ends in themselves.30

During its formative period, mainly under Gates’ leadership, the Rockefeller Foundation had committed itself to science and research, and medical science in particular. But another generation of leadership with new interests and new perspective came to the center stage; and the situation had changed significantly. Abraham Flexner sadly recognized that "[t]ime was when guidance of a sort came from one or two institutions,—the Hopkins for a generation, the Foundations when Mr. Gates’s vision ruled. All that has for the time being disappeared."31 Consequently, medical research became less important in the Foundation’s agenda, and a wider range of new interests and projects, including social science and agriculture, attracted its attention.32

Another change was, according to Wheatley, that the emphasis on

30 Wheatley, 161.


institutional reform was replaced by emphasis on associationism and managerialism. He pointed out that "the outcome of the reorganization represented the full ascension of the new generation of philanthropic managers." These new managers themselves were the products of the institutionalization that had occurred during the Progressive Era. By the late 1920s they were convinced that the age of institutional building was over. Instead of assuming a doctor-patient relationship, the foundations and universities and other related institutions should become partners.\footnote{Wheatley, 154.}

In accord with the new orientation, the Foundation adopted a new appropriations policy. At a meeting in January 1929, its trustees resolved that "concern with the development of medical schools as institutions be lessened and the principle of aid to individuals, groups and departments in relation to research and advance of medical knowledge be emphasized."\footnote{Minute, January 3, 1929, RF 3-906-1-1. Wheatley, 168.} Endowments for institutional support were prohibited and no grants were to be made for more than two years, while small gifts and short-term grants grew rapidly.

The Peking Union Medical College was a product of the "Gates era" when doctors had, using Fosdick's word, "captured" the Foundation, and when the Foundation sought to build institutions. It did not fit in the new era. Not only had the strong commitment to medical science behind the PUMC come into question, but also the institutional support the school still needed had
become a "burden", according to the Foundation's new financial policy. However, the Foundation had already made a large investment in this program, and it could not just give the PUMC up without seeing some results. Under these conditions, the CMB Inc., an independent organization, seemed a workable solution for the dilemma. The Foundation thought the CMB Inc. would relieve it from a difficult situation; although it was proved wrong later on.

Fosdick and Vincent promised Greene and Houghton that the Foundation’s policy toward the PUMC would not change because of the reorganization. In their own words, there was "no basis for rumor that there has been any change of attitude towards the Chinese project" because "the Foundation looked upon the College with a great deal of pride, and held it to be one of the most significant things done thus far." However, this promise was just empty words; the reorganization changed the PUMC's position in the Foundation forever. The real problem here was that no one in the New York office explained the whole reorganization to the officers in Peking; the disparity between New York and Peking on the PUMC's future later on caused much friction between the two sides.

As far as the policy change in the Foundation's China programs was

concerned, the establishment of the CMB Inc. was just the beginning. A
second significant shift took place when Selskar M. Gunn became involved in
the Foundation’s China work during the 1930s. Graduated from Massachusetts
Institution of Technology in 1905, Gunn had been a public health official
before he joined the Foundation’s International Health Division in Europe in
1917; he became the vice-president of the Foundation in 1927 and started to be
involved in social science programs in Europe in 1930.\textsuperscript{36}

In 1931, at the urging of Edmund E. Day, the director of the
Foundation’s Social Science Division, Gunn took his first trip to China and
spent seven weeks studying the Foundation’s work there. During this visit,
Gunn contacted for the first time a well known leader of China’s rural
reconstruction movement, Yan Yangchu (James Yen), and was fascinated by
his work with Mass Education in Ding County (Ting Hsien).\textsuperscript{37} Yan’s work
inspired Gunn’s interest in rural reform, and his report suggested a further
study of possible new fields for the Foundation’s work in China.

\textsuperscript{36} S. M. Gunn’s work in China and the China Program was treated in James
C. Thomson, Jr., \textit{While China Faced West American Reformers in Nationalist
6 and Yung-chen Chiang, chapter 6. While using some of the information from
these two works, this discussion has a different perspective and some new
materials.

\textsuperscript{37} Gunn admired Yan Yangchu as "truly a remarkable man. He combines
idealism with great wisdom in judgment and the ability to place himself
practically in the attitude and mind of a peasant." Having some doubts about
Yan’s Mass Education Movement, Gunn said that "my own guess is that Yan and
his group are going to be successful." Thomson, 128.
Gunn’s suggestion received support from Max Mason, the new president of the Foundation. In 1932, Mason sent Gunn back to China to conduct a comprehensive investigation, resulting in Gunn’s report "China and the Rockefeller Foundation" (1934). His conclusion argued that the Foundation’s present work in China was "no longer in touch with the times or the best we can find" and that the PUMC, important as it was in its own sphere, had had a very limited effect nationally. Gunn emphasized the gap between the Foundation’s effort and the achievement. The report showed that from 1914 to 1933, the Foundation had spent nearly $37,000,000 under the heading CMB and PUMC and CMB Inc., which was "well over one-third of the grand total of expenditures shown for the Medical Sciences throughout the world." Of this amount, the PUMC itself had had over $33,000,000.

Gunn doubted "if the results obtained are commensurate with the effort," and asked "if the stereotyped medical education now being given at the PUMC is really meeting the medical and public health needs of China". He told Gregg: "There has always been a lot of talk of getting adequate return on the very large investment which has been made...From my point of view I fail to see how an adequate return is to be obtained unless there is a change in the P.U.M.C.'s program..." Thus he thought it would be highly dubious for the

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39 S. Gunn to A. Gregg, Dec. 7, 1936. RAC. CMB Inc.
Foundation to make any further large grants to the PUMC.

While criticizing the PUMC's work, Gunn urged the Foundation to "start a new and vital program", a program that would allow the Foundation keep "in contact with the constantly changing conditions existing in China". This plan, later named the China Program, presented several interesting features. The scope of this chapter does not allow an exploration of whole story of this program here; however, when compared with the Foundation's earlier medical program, it explains the changes in the Foundation's China policy.

First of all, the China Program extended the Foundation's medical effort into a much broader field that included several disciplines. Gunn's idea was that the Foundation should first adapt its medical effort to a new direction --public health and "mass medical education". Then it should integrate medical education, public health, social science, and rural improvement into one program, a program that with the Foundation's assistance would aim to improve coordination and personnel among Chinese private and governmental efforts resulting from its reconstruction. Gunn thus questioned the Foundation's previous single-minded commitment to medical science and opened a new, and in his view, more realistic approach to China's problem.

During his investigation, Gunn contacted many people, including leaders of China's rural reconstruction, and visited some rural reform experiments. He believed that this direction should be the future for the
Foundation's work in China. Gunn told Mason that

There is no doubt that one of the major problems in China has to do with the raising of the economic level of the rural population, which amounts to eighty or eighty-five percent of the total population. No government, certainly no foreign agency, is capable of giving the Chinese people the minimum of the public services...unless the general economic level is raised. This involves what is broadly called a program of rural reconstruction, and it may be that in this field we shall have our real opportunity in China...the Foundation is going to have an opportunity...to do a piece of work here which would enable the Foundation to feel that it had made a contribution of real significance towards the welfare of this huge and vitally important part of the world. 40

He emphasized that "the problems in connection with rural reconstruction would be amongst the Foundation’s paramount interests in China." 41

Second. Gunn’s China Program would shift the Foundation’s association in China. In Gates’s plan, the PUMC and the CMB aided and associated with missionary medical schools and hospitals. The new program would emphasize co-operation with purely Chinese institutions, including several well known Chinese private or public universities: the rural sociology program at Yanjing (Yenching) University; the program in rural economics and political science at Nankai University; and agricultural economics at University of Nanjing (Nanking). Financial assistance to missionary institutions would be eliminated unless they were engaged in educational programs relating to rural reconstruction. The fellowship program would continue, but would

40 S. Gunn to M. Mason, May 29, 1933. RAC. RG 1.1
41 S. Gunn to M. Mason, Dec. 4, 1933. RAC. RG:1.1.
essentially be subordinated to the effort to advance rural reconstruction.

Gunn pointed out that "we have usually been labelled as belonging to the missionary movement" and "have been considered more as a foreign body rather than an agency desirous of co-operating with the Nationalists." Now "the significance of mission colleges is waning, while the importance of national and provincial colleges is increasing...The Chinese institutions are the institutions of the future".\(^{42}\) Therefore, he emphasized the importance of co-operating with the Chinese institutions.

In spite of these changes in objectives and priorities, there were some similarities between the PUMC and Gunn's China Program. Both emphasized training leaders and improving the quality of their work. The institutions that were selected for the China Program were the best in their specific field. Rural sociology at Yanjing University and rural economics at Nankai were the earliest programs in this field in China; agricultural economics at Nanjing University and agricultural engineering at Qinghua University were the best; the Ding County Mass Education Movement was the foremost in the rural reconstruction; and of course the PUMC's involvement in public health in both Ding County and later Jining was considered as ideal. In other words, Gunn's plan continued to depend on well-trained professionals and well-organized institutions to fulfill his goals.

Later, in his report Gunn compared the Guomindang government’s rural reconstruction with the China Program. He concluded that due to political reasoning, the Nanjing government would find it necessary to "carry on activities in many places and over wide areas." However, he believed that the ultimate success of the government program would be "proportional to the ability of China to develop qualitative work which necessarily will depend on the availability of trained leadership." To complement the quantitative work of the government, the Rockefeller Foundation would continue to seek a standard of quality. Thus "the Foundation may be crucially important."\(^4^3\)

Gunn pointed out that the diffuse efforts of the national and provincial governments to reach the largest numbers of people had moved in many directions with generally inferior results. "Our program in emphasizing quality is already attracting attention and gives indications that the government is recognizing the weaknesses of its quantitative program and is beginning to take counsel from the organizations which we are helping to build up."\(^4^4\) Gunn’s confidence might have had something to do with the letter that he received from Song Meiling (Mayling Soong, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek). In her letter of February 5, 1937 Song stated that

The change of emphasis in The Rockefeller Foundation’s program in China has just recently come to the attention of the Generalissimo and


\(^{4^4}\) ibid. 146-147.
myself. Your efforts in the field of rural reconstruction are highly commendable and embody the spirit and the aims of the New Life Movement. The National Government is, as rapidly as possible, developing institutions and techniques that will in course of time improve the life of the rural people, and the work of The Rockefeller Foundation, in enlisting the interest of leading universities in a well chosen training program, will widen and deepen this work through providing leadership.\textsuperscript{45}

No doubt, Gunn's China Program seriously challenged the Foundation's previous work in China -- the PUMC. The questions inevitably raised here are: How we should view Gunn's serious criticism of the PUMC's work and what the background of Gunn's new approach was.

Gunn's plan of combining mass medical education, public health, and social science into a comprehensive program coincided with the Foundation's new orientation. Since the 1920s reorganization, Fosdick and his colleagues had devoted every effort to broadening and diversifying the Foundation's interests; and social science had become one of the new frontiers. When the new leaders of the Foundation ambitiously searched for ways to work with European internationalists, social science and humanities were seen as two wings of creating international understanding.\textsuperscript{46}


Gunn's idea of a new program in China also suited the general perspective of Max Mason. Mason had long felt that a major weakness in the Foundation's organization, or rather, in the functioning of its organization, was a tendency to become static, settling down to rather long term unchanged programs. He believed that fluidity of actions was critical to the Foundation.\footnote{S. M. Gunn to M. Mason, Jan 23, 1934. RAC. RF. RG:1.1.} This conviction led Mason to look for some "vital programs" (his words) to change the situation. When Mason sent Gunn back to China in 1932, he asked Gunn to have a "broader view" of the possibility of a program that might not "fill into the previous work of the Foundation".\footnote{ibid.}

Gunn's extensive experience in public health work in Eastern Europe had convinced him that public health had to be coordinated with a simultaneous attack on social, economic, and political problems in a community if it was to be successful. This indicated a major development of Gunn's idea of public health program. Before he visited China in 1930, Gunn had proposed to the Foundation a cooperative public welfare program between the International Health Division and the Division of Social Sciences.\footnote{See Y. Chiang, 244.}

The trustees viewed this proposal as controversial, and many of them doubted whether the Foundation should be involved in any specific social goal. However, Gunn's idea won support from some influential officers and trustees,
including Max Mason, Raymond Fosdick and Jerome Greene.\textsuperscript{50} He was very eager to test his idea, and his trip to China brought him an opportunity.

Gunn visited China just at the time when the Chinese reconstruction and rural reform movements were surging forward. Many Chinese intellectuals had begun to realize that the rural problem was the most urgent and critical problem in China and had committed themselves to the improvement of education, public health, and the standard of life in rural areas. They were seeking help from outside of the Chinese government, which faced a hopeless shortage of financial and personnel resources. These Chinese reformers involved in rural reconstruction wanted a program that could provide cooperation among institutions and projects and that could train professionals for rural reform.\textsuperscript{51}

Gunn and these Chinese reformers soon found common interests and mutual needs; while Gunn promised to bring much needed funds and personnel, the Chinese institutions, on the other hand, would help him in his experimental social plan. It seemed that everything worked out fine, except for explaining: how could the Peking Union Medical College could fit into this picture. Or in other words, was it possible for the Foundation to start another extensive program in China while it still supported the PUMC?

It was not secret that the Foundation's financial capability had been

\textsuperscript{50} ibid. 244-246.

\textsuperscript{51} Thomson, 124-125.
decreasing seriously since the Great Depression and that the trustees were rethinking China's strategic importance to the Foundation. In fact, the Foundation did ask:

[Is the welfare of mankind best served by enlarging our investment in China? Is China the outstanding strategic point in which we ought to pick our attack? Is there no other sector of the world where we can hope to obtain as large a return in human happiness and welfare as we can in China?

South American countries, Mexico and India were mentioned as possibly providing geographical balance to the Foundation's programs.52

Gunn was indeed aware of this situation; he himself confessed frankly to Greene that he and Greene would be in competition for Foundation funds for China projects.53 Gunn's severe criticism of the PUMC should be considered under this circumstance. In fact, some officers in New York did suspect the objectiveness of Gunn's criticism of the PUMC, and they thought he might hope to secure interest in his program at the expense of previous interests.

During that period of time among American medical professionals and public health personnel, "public health versus clinical medicine" was a hot issue. As a public health official, Gunn was naturally critical of the elite style and the research orientation of the Peking Union Medical College. In his

52 "Report of the Committee on Appraisal and Plan on Mr. Gunn's Program for China", Dec. 11, 1934. RAC. RG3.

53 Alan Gregg to R. Greene, Mar. 20-21, 1934; and R. Greene to S. Gunn, Jan. 20, 1934. HL. bms Am 1864.
criticism of the PUMC, however, Gunn did not mention the fact that the PUMC was the first medical school in China that had a standard hygiene department, headed by John Grant, an eminent champion of public health. Some of the best known pioneers in public health and midwifery training such as Chen Zhiqian (C. C. Chen), Yang Chongrui (Marian Yang) and Li Tingan graduated from or trained in the PUMC.\textsuperscript{54}

To promote public health was an important part of Gunn's China Program, and the experiment in Ding County was the most famous rural reconstruction program. The PUMC students actively participated in this and other public health work. Furthermore, as early as 1925, the PUMC had opened an urban experimental program—a Health Demonstration Station—in cooperation with the Metropolitan Police Department of Peking. This station afforded a demonstration for the first time in China of a modern health organization with its clinic, records, visiting nurse service, and educational features. Furthermore, it provided a means of giving medical undergraduates a much needed practical training in public health and preventive medicine.\textsuperscript{55} The hygiene department of the PUMC provided professional and training services as well as financial support for this station.

\begin{quote}
In order to avoid competition between the PUMC and the China
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{54} M. Bullock's book \textit{An American Transplant} provides a wonderful account on their work.

\textsuperscript{55} The Rockefeller Foundation, \textit{Annual Report}, 1925. 41-42.
Program, Greene suggested that Gunn embrace the PUMC completely into the China Program, under Gunn’s direction, and eliminate the CMB Inc.

However, for some reason, Gunn did not want to be entangled with the PUMC. Gunn explained to Alan Gregg,⁵⁶ “I have made a point...of keeping out of P.U.M.C. matters, but the China program being what it is, it is difficult and illogical not to pay attention to the most important medical institution in the country.”⁵⁷ While Gunn had to let the PUMC be a part of the China Program, he continued to criticize the school. From 1934 to 1937, the China Program, under Gunn’s leadership, co-sponsored the Chinese government’s annual inspection of the PUMC; and the result was not favorable. (As will be discussed later.)⁵⁸

Gunn’s proposed China Program was tentatively adopted by the Committee on Appraisal and Plan of the Rockefeller Foundation, and in 1934 the Foundation appropriated over one million dollars to the China Program for a three-year budget. Gunn was appointed to be in charge of this program. The headquarters of the China Program was located in Shanghai, even though most of its programs were in North China.

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⁵⁶ Alan Gregg became the director of the Division of Medical Education after Richard Pearce’s death in 1930. According to S. Wheatley’s study, Gregg had some critical opinions about Raymond Fosdick’s reorganization of the Rockefeller Foundation during the late 1920s. See Wheatley, chapter 6. R. Greene shared his opinions on Fosdick and other administrative problems. Gregg visited China in the summer of 1932 and became familiar with the PUMC matter.

⁵⁷ S. Gunn to A. Gregg, Dec. 7, 1936.

⁵⁸ Mary Bullock, 99.
In short, the Foundation’s 1920s reorganization and consequent changes in its policy profoundly affected the PUMC. Gunn’s China Program reflected the Foundation’s new interests and new perspective. Under such circumstances, the PUMC became less important to the Foundation’s international agenda and unfit to the Foundation’s new financial policy. While the Foundation had its own financial difficulties and had other programs to support, the PUMC, on the other hand, still needed the Foundation’s long-term support. This dilemma partially explained the causes of a series frictions and crises between the Foundation and the PUMC officers during the 1920s and 1930s.

**Peking and New York: Greene Challenging the Rockefellers?**

After its reorganization in the 1920s, the Foundation had tried to end support for institutions. But the Peking Union Medical College was unique. G. Vincent once explained that "elsewhere there has always been a sharing of tasks with government or university which has carried the chief burden of cost and the whole duty of administration. But in China there were no suitable agencies of this kind."\(^59\) Thus the Foundation had to take the burden entirely by itself.

During the reorganization, the Foundation decided to create an

independent company to handle this problem. When the Foundation made its
grant of $12,000,000 to the CMB Inc. in 1928 and transferred to it the full
title to the land, buildings and equipment of the PUMC, Rockefeller Jr. later
recalled, "the idea was that the Foundation should gradually withdraw from
responsibility for the institution." Such a withdrawal was to consist of two steps: first, the CMB Inc. would become independent from the Foundation;
second, within a reasonable period, the Chinese would take over the PUMC.
From 1928 the Foundation's commitment had been based on such a scheme.

However, the CMB Inc.'s endowment had never yielded enough
income to support the PUMC in the first place. Because of this, the PUMC
had to continue depending on the Foundation's financial support. This created
an extremely difficult situation. On the one hand, the Foundation became more
and more reluctant to pay the PUMC's high expenses, particularly after the
Great Depression; on the other hand, the PUMC desired a long-term plan that
would be based entirely on the Foundation's support. The PUMC's budget
plan was a central issue, and Roger Greene, the residential director of the
CMB Inc. and the acting director of the PUMC, was bogged down the
dilemma.

Among all the Foundation's officers, Greene worked longest in Peking.
He devoted himself to the PUMC, and from the outset, he was completely
convinced that its scientific approach was correct. Furthermore, so far as the

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60 John D. Rockefeller Jr. to H. Houghton, Oct. 2, 1940. RAC. CMB Inc.
PUMC and China were concerned, Greene always believed that he knew better than the officers in New York, and he did not hesitate to speak out what he thought was the best for both the Foundation's work in China and the PUMC. To a great extent, Greene became the PUMC's defender.

Greene believed that the PUMC needed a long-term budget program to plan its future. In 1931, Greene and Alan Gregg, the new director of the Division of Medical Education, prepared a new budget that not only covered a long term — at first eight years, then five years — but also an steady increase in funds to develop 1) a psychiatry department; 2) a graduate program; and 3) a public health program. From the Foundation's point of view, neither the long-term financial commitment nor the increase of expenditures was desirable. Many of the Foundation's trustees felt that the PUMC's expenditures were too high and that the CMB Inc. already received enough money to operate the college.

The Great Depression profoundly influenced the Foundation's financial policy. As Gregg explained to Greene at the time, its income had declined to "an unexpected degree and the general atmosphere is one that calls for very close scrutiny regarding commitments of any character and especially of long term commitments."61 During the Great Depression when all the universities and research institutions in the United States were in serious financial difficulties. Gregg explained to Greene that

61 A. Gregg to R. Greene, April 10, 1933.
you cannot realize what has happened to institutions throughout the United States and the repercussions that this has upon the attitude of RF and CMB trustees...All institutions in this country are faced with reductions of varying degrees of severity, and no convincing arguments can be made for expansion that do not take this into most serious consideration.\textsuperscript{62}

In such a severe situation the Foundation's trustees had to ask "What are the reasons for which the PUMC should grow, or increase salaries, when every institution in the United States and most that we know about abroad, are experiencing cuts super-imposed on existent reductions and leading to a year to year existence?" When Greene complained that it was impossible for the PUMC to reduce $10,000 of its expenditure annually, Gregg warned him that the task of cutting must be considered imperative.\textsuperscript{63}

In reply, Greene argued that in order to maintain high quality the PUMC needed to have the best faculty. The salary scale of the PUMC was already distinctly lower than that in most of the best schools in the United States. Greene complained that it was very difficult for the PUMC to remain attractive to foreign doctors. At the same time, during the 1930s, the Chinese

\textsuperscript{62} Gregg gave details to Greene in his letter: Columbia University in the current year has reduced a $1,510,000 deficit to one of $478,000. George Minot got cut 23\% by the City Hospital. Western Reserve has taken successively cuts of 15\%, 13\%, and 11\% with a further cut upwards of 15\% close at hand...Columbia will go off full-time in Palmer's clinic unless the General Education Board comes to the rescue. A. Gregg to Greene, Feb. 1, 1933. HL bms Am 1864; and Gregg to Greene, April 10, 1933.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
government raised the salary standard in public schools, so that the salary gap between the PUMC faculty and Chinese professors in government institutions narrowed rapidly. This reduced the significance of hiring Chinese teachers to save money.  

Because of the PUMC's unique position in China, both the Health Section of the League of Nations and the Chinese government were hoping that the PUMC could be utilized for the post-graduate training of future teachers for the government system of medical schools. To develop such a graduate program was in line with the Foundation's original design of training leaders for China's medicine. Greene insisted that the PUMC was the only institution in China able to undertake such a task then and in the near future; the same reason was given for developing psychiatry and public health programs at the PUMC. In 1933 Greene proudly informed the Foundation that all who had made or seemed likely to make any significant contribution to the progress of scientific medicine in China had had at least part of their training at the PUMC.  

In addition, there were some special expenditures that normal American medical schools did not have. For example, the PUMC's faculty, doctors, and nurses were frequently called by the government to provide emergency

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64 R. Greene, "Present Status and Needs of the Peiping Union Medical College", submitted to the Special Committee of the Rockefeller Foundation in Oct. 17, 1933. RAC. CMB Inc Collection.

65 ibid.
services in relief of plagues, wars, and natural disaster. Nor was the maintenance of the palace-style buildings cheap; yet neither the CMB Inc. nor the Foundation supplied a separate grant to cover maintenance.

The "silver budget" issue also caused major problem. The PUMC budget was based on the U. S. dollar. But the school had curtain expenditures paid by Chinese silver dollar, and they were increasing. At that time the exchange rate was unfavorable to the U.S. dollar, thus the Foundation asked the PUMC to cut its silver expenditures. Mason was very unhappy about this fact and blamed the PUMC for not being consistent with the Foundation's general principle of reducing silver expenditures. As a result of President Roosevelt's silver policy in 1933, the U. S. dollar was devalued further.

Before FDR became President, Greene had suggested that the problem might be solved by silver investment. He repeatedly asked the Foundation to consider the possibility of entrusting to the PUMC a lump sum roughly equivalent to a five to eight years grant, to be invested in silver with American companies in Shanghai.66 He believed this to be a feasible plan, because the China Foundation had successfully done so. However, it was a very difficult decision for the Foundation. Its trustees and advisers were unfamiliar with this issue and felt more secure in holding the money in New York than in remote Shanghai, even though it meant losing money.

Greene found it difficult to understand why, while the Foundation

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66 R. Greene to A. Gregg, Feb. 23, 1933. RAC. RG 1.1.
repeatedly emphasized financial stringency and asked him to reduce the budget, it refused his proposals on money saving. Not only did the Foundation decline silver investment, it also insisted on a provision of $12,000 for an assistant director in the CMB, whom Greene thought unnecessary. When he saw the list of new programs, he felt that the Foundation was trying to "drink up the sea" and could not help but ask: "why enter so many new fields if funds are short?" Greene started to wonder if the Foundation and Mason in particular were thinking of the PUMC in terms of an obligation and were greatly bothered by it. He wanted to know whether the PUMC enterprise was still worthwhile to the Foundation.

Many changes in the United States and in China as well forced the Rockefeller Foundation to adopt new directions and policies. Rockefeller Jr. once sighed that difficult as it is to believe, there are not more than one or two men now on the Board who were there when the Peking Union Medical College project was initiated. Naturally the present members are more interested in the recent policies and programs of the Board to the development of which they themselves have been related, than in its earlier undertakings. But the PUMC had to depend on the Foundation.

Greene's relationship with John D. Rockefeller III over the budget issue

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67 Greene to Vincent, July 20, 1933; Greene to A. Gregg, March 6, 1933. HL. bms. Am 1864.

rapidly deteriorated. JDR III became a trustee of the Foundation in 1931 when he was just in his early twenties, and a year later was elected, on Vincent’s nomination, as vice president of the CMB Inc. According to Greene, he had practically no administrative experience in general and no knowledge of China or medical administration in particular; the only claim that placed him in such important positions was his relationship to the family. Fosdick had told Greene that it was desirable to educate Rockefeller III; however, Greene doubted if that was an obligation for an independent public corporation.69

Jerome Greene, then a trustee of the Foundation, told Rockefeller Jr. frankly that JDR III’s appointment as a trustee was premature and that he should have to win his spurs through experience like any other trustee, whether in the family office or in outside work. J. Greene warned Rockefeller Jr. that his son’s membership in the trustees in advance of any demonstration of his ability lent color to the view that the Rockefeller family was in control of the Foundation.70

The problem here was not just about Rockefeller III’s qualification for the posts he was given. R. Greene was apparently irritated by his demand of greater deference to his opinions on minor as well as major points than was

69 The information here and the following related information about Roger Greene’s opinions are from: Roger Greene to S. Gunn, Dec. 28, 1933 and Jan. 1934; R. Greene to Jerome Greene, April 25, 1934 and Oct. 23, 1934; R. Greene, Memorandum, Sept. 1934; R. Greene to Alan Gregg, Oct. 17, 1934. HL. bms Am 1864.

70 Jerome Greene, Memorandum, Nov. 17, 1934. HL. bms Am 1864.
normally expected by young men of no greater experience. JDR III worked
with the other members who had extensive experience and high standing based
on their actual achievements, yet he insisted on the priority of his opinions
against senior officers such as Gregg and R. Greene who remarked that "a
good deal of the difficulty is probably due to John III's mistaken sense of his
own responsibility, which he seems to think he is not discharging
conscientiously unless he can find flaws in every proposal that is submitted to
him".

There were many disagreements between Greene and JDR III over the PUMC's financial policy. Greene expected his opinions and suggestions to receive serious consideration because of his knowledge of the situation in China and in the PUMC, but he found that people in New York office, JDR III in particular, paid slight attention to them. Quite often, according to R. Greene's memorandum, JDR III insisted on his own opinions without full knowledge of previous decisions or circumstances.

What bothered Greene even more was that some important figures such as Vincent and Fosdick paid "extraordinary deference" to the opinions and wishes of JDR III. He sensed a sort of irresistible tendency to regard JDR III as entitled to special consideration and felt this was unfair to senior officers. Gregg and Greene had discussed enlarging the board of trustees in order to
reduce this kind of family influence. However, Greene did not think it would really work since "even very good men frequently hesitate to oppose a Rockefeller." He believed that deference to JDR III would give him a wrong impression and was likely to do him serious injury.

Due to their personalities, the disputes between Greene and JDR III at times became very heated. Greene in his memo admitted that when JDR III and himself had an argument over the silver budget issue, he yielded his point to JDR III. These arguments created the feeling around the New York office that Greene was "a difficult person to work with", "intolerant, ruthless and subject to delusions of his own importance". All of these later influenced Rockefeller Jr. 's decision to get rid of Greene and were used to justify this decision.

Another point of contention was Greene’s direct confrontation with Rockefeller Jr. over the provision of providing a full-time position in the Department of Religious and Social Work at the PUMC and the imposition of a religious test on the college’s staff. As far as Greene’s relationship with the Foundation and Rockefeller Jr. was concerned, this was a most hurtful and

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71 Gregg had intensive correspondence with Greene during the crisis between the Foundation and Greene, and he held quite similar opinions on many issues involving the Foundation’s China policy. He also became the intermediary for Greene and the Foundation.

72 R. Greene to A. Gregg, Oct. 17, 1934.

73 Roger Greene to Alan Gregg, May 13, 1933. HL. bms. Am 1864.
offensive disagreement, and it led to Greene's resignation.

In 1915, when the Foundation purchased the Union Medical College from London Missionary Societies, Rockefeller Jr. promised in his letter to the missionaries in China that "the Foundation will select only persons of sound sense and high character, who are sympathetic with the missionary spirit and motive". 74 W. Buttrick also reassured F. H. Hawkins, a member of the London Missionary Society that "the work of the College shall be continued on Christian lines and that its missionary character shall ever be put in the forefront of its operations". 75

It was in this context that the Department of Religious and Social Work had been established. From time to time, the necessity and the relevance of such a department were questioned, especially on two occasions: first during the PUMC trustees reorganization in 1927-1928, when the Chinese members became the majority; then in 1932, when the director of this department resigned. This issue was also related to the financial difficulty; according to Greene, a full-time position cost $3,500 per annum, when the budget provided only for a part-time man at Mex. (China's currency) $ 1,500.

On both occasions, Rockefeller Jr. stated in no uncertain terms that he was determined to carry on his promise. Regarding the possible change of the PUMC's religion policy after the reorganization of the PUMC trustees,


75 F. H. Hawkins to W. Buttrick, April 15, 1915. RAC. CMB Inc. collection.
Rockefeller Jr. wrote to Vincent:

One seems to me the proper and most desirable solution, namely, the continuance of the present status in which the [Religious and Social Work] department is an organic and official part of the college organization and supported at a cost of about 15,000 gold per year out of the regular college budget. Personally, I see no reason why there need be any change.\footnote{Rockefeller Jr. to Vincent, July 19, 1930. RAC. CMB Inc. collection. He also wrote to former missionary members that "the new trustees have raised no question about the department, and ...will seek to perpetuate the best traditions of the institution." Rockefeller Jr. to F. H. Hawkins, Nov. 18, 1929. RAC. CMB Inc. collection.}

He insisted that this department was an organic and official part of the college organization and that without an important role for Christianity, the institution would be like a man without a soul.\footnote{J. D. Rockefeller Jr. to G. Vincent, July 19, 1930.} Vincent alerted Greene that "Mr. Rockefeller, because of his original letter and later assurances which have been regarded by the missionary societies as having almost the force of a charter, feels strongly that everything possible must be done to perpetuate the spirit and substance of this understanding."\footnote{Vincent to R. Greene, June 19, 1929. RAC. CMB Inc. collection.}

However, Greene argued that during the negotiations there was no plan for the support of a Department of Religious and Social Work by the college and that it was only agreed that if the missions wished to assign a man to such work the college should provide a residence for him. The establishment of this department was an independent act of the Trustees of the college.\footnote{R. Greene to G. Vincent, June 29, 1929. HL. bms Am 1864.}
Greene took this religious issue as a matter of principle rather than personally. He articulated some shrewd arguments on these opinions. First, he pointed out that just as such universities as Harvard and Yale had found it necessary to free themselves from church control, so must the PUMC retain relative freedom from ecclesiastical interference.\textsuperscript{80} He argued that

I think it is fair to say that our Chinese students are as well behaved as American students, if not better, and to think that they need such a department which no American medical school that I know of needs, or possesses seems to me a mistake. If the department is further emphasized the principal result will be to prejudice the members of the College against it and against religion...It is certainly contrary to the spirit of higher education everywhere and particularly in China.\textsuperscript{81}

Second, Greene questioned the necessity of religious qualification for the selection of faculty. As early as 1923, Greene had analyzed the disadvantages of denying opportunities to non-Christians. He pointed out that such a requirement would create difficulty in securing those who were best qualified professionally and would encourage the "rice Christians". He further argued that to those who were obliged to sacrifice an attractive opportunity on religious grounds, and to their friends and the general public, the policy of the College would appear unjust and contrary to the principles of religious toleration for which the Anglo-Saxon world was now supposed to stand.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{80} R. Greene to Jerome Greene, Oct. 23, 1934. HL. bms Am 1864.

\textsuperscript{81} R. Greene to T. Y. Tsur (Zhou Yichun), August 7, 1936. HL. bms Am 1864.

\textsuperscript{82} Roger S. Greene, "Religious Qualifications for Membership in the Staff of the Peking Union Medical College", April, 1923. RAC. CMB Inc. Collection.
While Rockefeller Jr. insisted on the staff's religious "sound sense and high character", Greene emphasized that

as a medical school it is our moral duty, and one might say our Christian duty, to select only the best qualified men available, and not to require, or even inquire into, religious views. Most scientists would immediately become prejudiced against an institution which undertook to inquire into their religious belief... If we give to the Chinese anything less than the best of modern medicine, we certainly are not acting in accord with my interpretation of Christian ethics, for when we select physicians or surgeons to treat members of our families, we inquire only into their professional qualifications, and if we select medical schools for our sons, we select entirely secular schools by preference. 83

Finally, Greene worried about the impact of such religious interference on the Chinese. He pointed out that so far the government regulation had been somewhat relaxed and people were friendly. But the interference with the PUMC might be seized upon by the opponents of missionary education as an indication that the Chinese government ought to adopt an even stricter policy toward institutions having any church affiliations. Thus, even from the standpoint of the missionaries, it might not be advisable to permit any ecclesiastical interference with the faculty and trustees of an institution which had throughout its existence been uniformly friendly to the mission hospitals and medical schools. 84

The Foundation knew well that by then none of the American medical schools insisted on a religion department; more important, the Foundation

84 R. Greene to A. Gregg, Oct. 17, 1934.
itself did not impose any religious activity as a condition of its donations to
any university or medical school in the United States. For example, when
Fosdick referred Rockefeller's generous contribution to University of Chicago,
he proudly quoted the University trustees' words:

He [Rockefeller] has never interfered, directly or indirectly, with that
freedom of opinion and expression which is the vital breath of a
university, but has adhered without deviation to the principle that, while
it is important that university professors in their conclusions be correct,
it is more important that in their teaching they be free.  

So, why did Rockefeller Jr. impose a religious department and religious
requirement on the staff of the PUMC? Furthermore, what made him think he
had the right to enforce this policy in the PUMC? In regard to the PUMC's
relationship with the Foundation, it was never an independent institution, even
after the Chinese, trustees as well as faculty, became the majority. The
Foundation -- and members of the Rockefeller family -- saw the PUMC as its
dependent, and took full responsibility for its policies. It was quite obvious
that the Foundation and Rockefeller Jr. treated the PUMC differently from the
American institutions they supported.

After the Foundation lost its total authority for the PUMC's personnel,
its control of the budget became its only mechanism to control the PUMC.
The Foundation's behavior showed that it was not really concerned about

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85 Raymond Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation 7-8. Here
Fosdick quoted Minutes of the Board of Trustees, December 19, 1910.
opinions from the PUMC; with its control of funding, it had quite a free hand to interfere with the internal affairs of this institution. Nor did the Foundation really worry about the Chinese government's regulations or public opinion in China, because it believed that it had done a great favor for the Chinese.

The situation in China, on the other hand, enhanced the Foundation's self-assurance. Even after the Guomindang government ordained that all foreign educational institutions have Chinese directors and a Chinese majority of trustees, these institutions still enjoyed, to a large extent, the privilege of self-government. For example, when the Chinese government's regulation occurred, some influential Chinese assured Greene that no fundamental change in the PUMC would be necessary.  

From the very beginning Greene related the religious policy to the college's independence. He asked the Foundation to allow full religious freedom and in the future on the part of Rockefeller and all New York officials to resist interference from the missionary societies.  

He knew that his idea would "incur the severe displeasure of Mr. John D. Rockefeller Jr., with possibly disastrous consequences to the College", but he went forward anyway.  

The religious issue turned into a crisis. At this crucial moment, in the Spring of 1934, Dr. Thomas Cochrane, a former member of the London

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Missionary Society, visited the PUMC. His unfavorable report on the PUMC's spiritual condition was the last straw.\(^9\)

In July 1934, Greene returned to New York to report on his work. To his surprise, he was asked to resign as the PUMC's director. With his earlier indication of retiring from his directorship of the CMB (under Gregg's advice). This left him completely out of the Foundation's work in China. Because of Greene's insistence, Vincent, the president of the CMB Inc., reluctantly explained the reasons for this decision. In Vincent's words, it was due to the frequent friction between the Board and Greene himself and the apparent loss of mutual confidence.\(^10\) It was well known that this was Rockefeller Jr.'s decision. JDR III had told Gregg explicitly: "As a result of conversations with Father, it has been decided to ask Mr. Greene to resign as director of the PUMC in the near future and to send Dr. Houghton out in his place."\(^11\)

\(^9\) In his letter to Rockefeller Jr., Thomas Cochrane wrote: "Although I do not wish to enter into details, there are a few things which I feel bound to say. The Staff is not being selected with due care in relation to the idealistic aims of the College. The Religious Director and the Religious Department do not enjoy a status, nor are they given a scope, calculated to inspire the respect which the Scientific Departments enjoy... The Institution is at the parting of the ways: it may become one of the greatest influences for good in all the Orient. But, I say it solemnly and advisedly, the Institution is on the down-grade in things which are most essential. China's greatest need to-day is not scientific medicine, but men of character. But the P.U.M.C. may meet both of these needs if present tendencies are checked and adequate attention given to a situation which I have indicated in moderate language." Mar. 26, 1934. RAC. RG: R. Board.

\(^10\) R. Greene, "Memorandum". HL. bms Am 1864.

\(^11\) Rockefeller III to A. Gregg, June 26, 1934. I quote from Bullock, 69. Both Mary Ferguson and Mary Bullock have offered some details about this dramatic episode.
The Rockefellers, Sr. and Jr., had long and strong interests in China. It was this interest, among other factors, that led the Foundation to China. In the Dedication Ceremonies of the PUMC, Rockefeller Jr. called the PUMC his son, and his father's grandson. Because of this special interest and involvement, Rockefeller Jr. felt a kind of personal responsibility to the PUMC's well being. With this background, JDR III's first tangible work in the Foundation was involved in the CMB Inc. and the PUMC.

Regarding the method with which the Foundation handled Greene's resignation, two issues needed to be examined: (1) whether this decision was a conclusion reached by relevant officers within the CMB Inc. and the Foundation; and (2) whether the Foundation consulted the trustees of the PUMC.

With regard to the first, Fosdick emphasized that the decision to ask whether Greene's resignation was "unanimous", which J. Greene thought did not hold water. Both Jerome's and Roger Greene's memos showed that only a very few people were involved in making this decision, and that those who were most knowledgeable of the Foundation's China program were not consulted. For example, Alan Gregg had dealt with the PUMC's work since Pearce's death in 1931 and had become very familiar with the PUMC. He was in Europe when the decision was made, even though he had been promised that no important decision on the PUMC would be made before his return. Houghton, a CMB Inc. trustee and once the director of the PUMC, told R.
Greene that he did not know of the decision until it had been made. Nor did they consult Gurn, the vice president of the Foundation appointed expressly to advise the Foundation in matters pertaining to China.\textsuperscript{92}

In fact, Fosdick and Vincent were the only two who knew of this matter from the very beginning, and both were frequently criticized by R. Greene for their extreme deference to the Rockefellers. Fosdick was both a trustee of the Foundation, and at the same time a confidential counsel for Rockefeller Jr. J. Greene called Fosdick’s function a dualism and doubted if he could really have independent opinions.\textsuperscript{93}

Using this case as an example, J. Greene criticized the mechanics of the system: "There is an element of secrecy that is inescapable in the workings of a small group. It creates an atmosphere of mystery for which ‘behind the scenes’ is not an altogether inapt expression."\textsuperscript{94} He explained that Rockefeller’s characteristic modesty and unselfishness made it quite impossible for him to understand "the awe and deference which his opinions or supposed wishes inspire. It is especially true as applied to salaried employees of the boards." Furthermore, Rockefeller Jr.’s many preoccupations, according to J. Greene, "make inevitable tends [sic] to create the impression of an unseen power working through a few persons possessing his confidence. And those

\textsuperscript{92} R. Greene, "Memorandum", and Jerome Greene to Raymond Fosdick, Sep. 30, 1934. RAC. CMB. Inc. collection.

\textsuperscript{93} ibid.

\textsuperscript{94} ibid.
persons do, as a matter of fact wield an influence justly or unjustly attributable to their relationship with him."95

The decision to fire Greene also raised the question of the PUMC trustees' rights and authority. According to the PUMC's bylaws, it was the PUMC trustees' responsibility to select the college's director and vice director. In other words, it should be these trustees, of which the Chinese were the majority, to decide if Greene was suited to his job or not. However, they were totally in the dark until Greene returned to China and submitted his resignation, as the Foundation planned, and it was Greene's job to persuade them to accept it.

To these Chinese trustees, the procedure was just a superficial problem. What they were really concerned about was how to retain Greene. They believed that being a director of the PUMC had become increasingly difficult, not only because the college had become increasing important in China, and hence made new enemies, but also because of the internal difficulty of managing an international staff. To keep the institution going, the director had to have qualifications other than just medical ones, he had to enjoy the trust of the Chinese government, of key intellectuals, and of Chinese medical groups the college had affected.

Ding Wenjiang (Ting Wen-chiang), a Chinese trustee and an executive

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95 Jerome Greene to Thomas M. Debevoise, Nov. 17, 1934. RAC. CMB Inc. Collection.
of Chinese Academia Sinica, told Fosdick that Greene "has acquired increasing confidence of his Chinese associates both in and outside the College." The Board of Trustees believed that he was the best man they could have as director of the PUMC. In fact, Ding said, Greene's service was so valuable to the college that any defect in his personal dealings with people ought to be overlooked in the interest of the college.\(^{96}\)

Greene was so well known among Chinese educators that right after the news of his resignation spread to Nanjing, the Minister of Education asked whether Greene could be persuaded to accept some educational post under the Chinese government. Ding pointed out that "a new man, however good he may be, will not be able to acquire such prestige as Mr. Greene has for a long time to come and for the present such prestige is very necessary for the proper administration of the PUMC."\(^{97}\)

Representing some of his colleagues such as Hu Shi (Hu Shih), Zhou Yichun (Tsur Y. T., the chairman of the Board of the Trustees) and Wong Wenhao, Ding stated that "if there has been real disagreement in matters of policy between Mr. Greene and the China Medical Board, we feel that at the least the members of the Executive Committee should share with Mr. Greene

\(^{96}\) "Memorandum of interview between Mr. V. K. Ting and Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick", Feb. 1, 1935, at the Metropole Hotel, Shanghai. HL. bms Am 1864.

\(^{97}\) ibid.
all the responsibility.\footnote{ibid.} The trustees of the college held several meetings to
discuss the matter, refused to accept Greene's retirement, and asked the
Foundation to reconsider its decision.

However, Fosdick and Vincent indicated directly or indirectly that if
Greene was to stay on it would cause resentment and hurt the Foundation's
interest in the PUMC. J. Greene called this "a flagrant use of the money
power". Understanding the consequences, Zhou (Tsur Y. T.) assured Vincent
that the trustees would carry out their responsibility in accordance with
policies which were in a broad sense acceptable to and approved by the CMB
and the Foundation.\footnote{Tsur Y. T. to Vincent, Nov. 13, 1934. RAC. RG: R. Board.}

Apparently some Chinese trustees felt that their freedom to act as they
thought best was illusory. Ding said frankly and probably angrily that

In the interest of the College not only are we willing to sacrifice Mr.
Greene but also ourselves. If we cannot persuade New York to come
round to our views we would not dream of standing between New York
and the PUMC... and in the case of a deadlock we should resign in favor
of any nominees of New York who can see eye to eye with the China
Medical Board.\footnote{"Interview between Ting [Ding] and Fosdick."}

R. Greene thought the Chinese trustees "are coming to believe that the
Rockefeller inner group is untrustworthy as well as unwise and unfair", even
though such feelings were restrained "by the absolute dependence of the
PUMC on the CMB and RF, and by hope of future financial favors for China
from the RF. "101 The tension between the Chinese trustees on the one side and the CMB and the Foundation on the other caused by this matter was so severe that the Foundation had to send Fosdick over to China to clean up the messy situation. Even the Chinese minister to the United States, who was also a trustee of the PUMC, interviewed Vincent and Gregg in Washington, trying to find a solution.

The Chinese trustees' relationship with the Foundation never recovered, as was clearly seen in Henry Houghton's relationship with the PUMC's trustees. After Greene's resignation, Houghton became the acting director of the PUMC. There was a good deal of confusion about Houghton's status and the relationship between the CMB and the PUMC trustees. Houghton complained that the Chinese trustees thought he was imposed by the Foundation and did not trust him. By 1940, Houghton's personal secretary told David Lobenstein, then director of the CMB Inc., that Houghton "was very much 'down'", and that "he had the feeling that everyone was against him". She also asked the Foundation to offer encouragement to Houghton. Thus, in October, 1940 Rockefeller Jr. wrote Houghton a long letter. On the other hand, the unfavorable feelings against Houghton was growing throughout the institution. According to Jin Yaoji, then the chairman of the Board of Trustees, both the Chinese and foreigners in the PUMC "felt the need of a

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101 R. Greene to J. Greene, May 6, 1935.
director who actively and interestingly [sic] on the job".\textsuperscript{102}

Inside the Foundation, some people questioned and opposed this kind of family intervention. In private correspondence, R. Greene criticized this "dynasty problem" even before his resignation, stating that "I think the time has come to eliminate or greatly reduce the influence of the Rockefeller family".\textsuperscript{103} He argued that the Foundation was either a public corporation with independent responsibility to the public or it was not. If it was in the latter case, it was certainly not entitled to exemption from taxation. J. Greene assumed that Rockefeller acted in good faith in making large gifts to the Foundation; however, he challenged Rockefeller's chairmanship of the Foundation, as well as premature appointments of his son.\textsuperscript{104}

This "Greene Episode" raised the doubts about the "dynasty issue" among the Foundation's senior officers. Gregg told Greene:

The warnings I had given did not prepare GEV [Vincent] or RBF [Fosdick] et al for the intensity of the protest. Everything since has increased their sense of the gravity of the situation and the end is I think not yet. The dynasty issue is above all others. GEV admits that Jdr jr [sic] has gone beyond his lines, and only JD III [sic] is left thinking that Father was quite correct.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{102} H. Houghton to Edwin Lohenstine (the chair of the CMB Inc.), Oct. 10, 1936. RAC. CMB Inc. collection. Also, JDR III to JDR Jr. Sep. 13, 1940 and "Memorandum on conversation of Mr. King with Mr. Lohenstine and quotations from letters from Mr. King to Mr. Lohenstine" Feb. 1940. RAC. RG: R. Board.

\textsuperscript{103} R. Greene to J. Greene, April 25, 1934.

\textsuperscript{104} ibid.

\textsuperscript{105} A. Gregg to R. Greene, Nov. 10, 1934. HL. bms Am 1864.
The reactions among the top officers of the Foundation did not quite agree. While Vincent had the courage to speak out and had been chiefly responsible for calling a spade a spade on the subject of family interference, Fosdick had a more defensive posture. Gregg told Greene that Fosdick tried to "let the dynastic issue evaporate, to minimize it, to think it less offensive than it has seemed". Gregg complained that all of these opinions were still expressed behind closed doors, and that neither Mason nor Fosdick intended to take the correct and orderly course of committee or Board procedure. The result coming from this rupture was, using Gregg's words, "haste, confusion, uncertainty, and then sourness and recrimination and recklessness and misplaced indifference and cynicism."\(^{106}\)

It is irrefutable that Rockefeller's personal interference led to Greene's resignation. However, this decision was not a personal issue. It reflected the Foundation's dilemma in its China programs. To the new generation of managers of the Foundation the very costly PUMC somehow became an obligation and a burden. However, Greene refused to recognize this change; being the oldest officer on this program, his obstinate insistence on keeping high standards and expanding the college, as well as his strong personal attachment to the PUMC made the enforcement of the Foundation's new policy very difficult. Thus Greene's departure was a logical solution.

\(^{106}\) ibid.
The Sinicization of the PUMC: A Difficult Task

Greene was a victim of the Foundation’s quandary. Nevertheless, his retirement did not make the situation better. Finances were still a major problem. The logical solution was to transfer the college to the Chinese. This was also the Foundation’s ultimate goal; John D. Rockefeller Jr. once said to the Chinese that it was both his father and his intention to make the PUMC a Chinese institution.

In her study of the PUMC, Mary Bullock thinks that the Foundation did not intend to keep its promise in this matter. She believed that Greene’s pro-Chinese position was a partial reason for his dismissal. She quoted Cochrane’s opinion that Greene "was too pro-Chinese", and that "he was trying to put the PUMC in a position to be turned over to the Chinese too fast". According to Bullock, "the decision to fire Greene ... was a severe blow to the years of gradual transfer of power to China. This intervention clearly indicated that the RF and CMB Inc. had no intention of relinquishing authority — even to an American administrator". She is convinced that "the Foundation’s investment in PUMC was too great to be turned over to the Chinese". ¹⁰⁷

Sinicizing the PUMC proved very difficult and complicated. It included two key aspects: first, finding Chinese personnel, including the faculty and the administration; second, securing financial independence. These matters not

¹⁰⁷ Mary Bullock, 68-77. Cochrane’s opinion on Greene came from Rockefeller III’s memo on his interview with Cochrane in the spring of 1934.
only involved the Foundation, but the Chinese as well. On the one hand, did the Foundation really try to transfer the PUMC to the Chinese? And what was Greene's attitude toward these issues? On the other hand, what were the opinions of those Chinese who were involved in the PUMC on the issue? Were the conditions in China ready for her taking the PUMC over?

Contrary to Cochrane's comments that Greene pushed the transfer path too fast, there is ample evidence to show that Greene was actually very cautious and practical on this matter. Since 1925, on different occasions he had reminded the Foundation of the difficulties of this transfer of control; he pointed out that it was very difficult to raise funds locally, that the time was not ripe for the organization of a Chinese Board of Control, and that it would be a slow process to replace foreign personnel.108 As far as promoting the Chinese faculty was concerned, Greene was actually criticized by the Foundation for not doing things fast enough.

In contrast to Greene's opinions, it was the Foundation, due to its tight budget, that was inclined to hasten the process of the Sinicization the faculty because the Chinese would be on a lower payscale. In his visit to China in 1933, David Edsall, the head of a Special Committee for investigating the PUMC situation, emphasized the need of a definite effort to increase the

number of Chinese to replace foreign personnel. He was disappointed because there was no a clear sign of doing so, and the budget tended to stay at the same level or even increase.\textsuperscript{109}

Greene emphasized that the transfer should not involve a lowering of standards. It was quite difficult to recruit promising young Chinese men, not only because there was no medical school in China which could match the PUMC standard, but also because the PUMC's own graduates were in high demand by Chinese government health programs and by other institutions. Besides, Greene saw some great advantages in the presence of senior foreign doctors and department heads. Between 1926 and 1935, new appointment were fairly evenly divided between Chinese and Westerners.\textsuperscript{110} Right after Greene's resignation, there were rumors about replacing all foreign heads. Greene warned that "it would be a great mistake to do anything so radical."\textsuperscript{111}

Not coincidentally, the Chinese trustees as well as faculty members had quite similar opinions on this issue. Generally speaking, the Chinese were more conservative in regard to the replacement of foreign faculty with Chinese. Their major concern was to maintain the high quality of the college. By 1940, Dr. C. E. Lim, a Chinese senior faculty member, still felt that

\textsuperscript{109} David L. Edsall to Alan Gregg, July 29, 1933. RAC. RG: RG1.1.

\textsuperscript{110} Bullock, 91.

\textsuperscript{111} Roger Greene to Y. T. Tsur, August 7, 1935.
replacing foreign doctors by Chinese was going too fast. He told the
Foundation that "the attempt [of the Foundation] at too-rapid Chinafication has
inevitably resulted in a very considerable lowering of the standards of the
institution." He was opposed to too early devolution of responsible positions to
the Chinese. He said that

this is not to be wondered at, since there are no comparable institutions
in China from which members of the faculty could be drawn... it may
take a long time before a real transfer of the institution to Chinese
administration is possible without too great loss excepting on one
possibility, that there be maintained a strong foreign staff of the ablest
men procurable and that they be loaned to the institution but that their
finances be kept entirely separate from the running expenses of the
College.

He also pointed out the danger of the tendency of the academic ingrowing at
the PUMC.\footnote{Notes of interviews with Dr. C. E. Lim, Nov. 4, 1940. RAC. CMB
Inc. Collection.} Many Chinese also preferred to refill the vacancies in the
PUMC with foreigners and let promising Chinese, either graduates from the
PUMC or other schools, go to other institutions because they thought the
PUMC could employ foreigners much more easily than any other Chinese
institution.\footnote{R. Greene, "Interview with Mr. G. E. Hubbard", Dec. 20, 1929.}

Nevertheless, with the Foundation's encouragement, the Chinese faculty
members gradually increased. In addition, as we have seen, since 1928, under
the Chinese government regulation, the PUMC had had a Chinese director and
a Chinese majority of trustees. Thus the progress in the Sinicization of
personnel was substantial.

However, this did not mean that the Chinese controlled the college. The real administrative power was still controlled by Americans, namely the vice-director and most heads of departments. The Chinese director was at the same time the minister of the Health Department and was not really in charge of the PUMC. This was perfect for the situation because as long as the New York office was in control no Chinese director could handle the many complicated relationships. Chief among these was the relation of the PUMC to the CMB Inc., which was a purely American organization and which managed not only the PUMC but also the Rockefeller Foundation’s other medical activities in China.

Most critically, the financial power was still held, not even by the CMB Inc., but by the Foundation, which meant that the Foundation had the power to make final decisions. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the Foundation was unwilling to allow the PUMC to gain financial independence; and from all the circumstances discussed above, it probably would have been pleased for it to do so. The problem here was realistically how this should be done. Once again the Foundation fell into a dilemma.

Theoretically, the PUMC’s financial independence from the Foundation could be achieved by (1) Chinese support, by contributions from the private sector or by grants and/or other funding from the Chinese government; or (2) the Rockefeller Foundation granting a sufficient endowment to a Chinese
administrative body.

So far as the Chinese private sector was concerned, it was not ready to take over the PUMC. Modern non-governmental and non-profit organizations were still not a very strong and active force in social activities, at least not at the national level. The traditional gentry class usually were active only locally; and the capitalist class was then still far from fully developed. Thus China's private philanthropic enterprises did not have a solid financial foundation. There were very few Chinese private universities, and all of them were constantly experiencing financial shortfalls.

When the Foundation created the CMB Inc., it frankly hoped that this independent organization would attract funds from other sources, including Chinese. This hope was never realized any more in the case of the PUMC than in that of many other similar efforts. For instance, two attempts by Princeton men to transfer the work in sociology and economics at Yanjing University to the Chinese during the 1920s and John L. Stuart's Million Dollar Campaign for Yanjing University in 1933 all proved unsuccessful.¹¹⁴ The Chinese private sector was not capable of supporting such an expensive educational institution as the PUMC.

The government had been the main source for modern education in China. But the government simply could not afford the PUMC. The largest

budget for a governmental medical school was Mex. $230,016 for the College of Medicine of the National Peiping University. The PUMC's annual budget was Mex. $3,167,700. Indeed the government was in a very difficult financial situation.

But there were still other problems. By the end of 1920s, when the Guomindang's Nanjing government was gradually consolidating its rule, Chiang Kai-shek launched his policy of national reconstruction. He was still fighting with the Red Army, whose land reforms in Communist-controlled areas forced him to realize the vital nature of the rural problem. It was at this time that Chiang expressed interest in James Yen's rural reform program. It was also at this time, and under the same consideration, that Chiang's government started its new policy of medical education.

From the 1930s, the newly organized Health Department and the Commission on Medical Education (CME) sought to promote a new policy of state medicine, giving prime attention to public health and social medicine. As Zhu Zhanggeng (C. K. Chu), the head of CME and also a PUMC graduate, announced, "bly the intelligent application of modern medical sciences to the best advantage of her local needs, China has adopted State Medicine as the objective of her medical reconstructive work".¹¹⁵

Zhu asserted that the traditional Western type of medical education

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¹¹⁵ Zhu Zhanggeng (C. K. Chu), "Initial Year of the Medical Education Program", June, 1936. RAC. RG: 1.
"failed to produce the type of personnel fitted for service in State Medicine." He pointed out that the average Chinese community could not afford to pay more than ten cents a year per capita for medical service. The solution of the medical problem of the rural population, therefore, lay in formulating a system of medical service whereby the health of the people could be safely protected at a cost under ten cents per year per capita, which did not require a high level of professional service. His plan was to train a relatively large number of selected laymen to share the responsibility for protecting people's health. This system was to be conducted by the government with the cooperation of organized local communities, hence the name "State Medicine". 116

The government needed private medical schools to join this effort. The PUMC, the best medical school in the country, inevitably became the target. Mary Bullock in her study detailed the government's opinions on the PUMC. Apparently, through annual inspection conducted by the Commission on Medical Education, the government sought "to supervise the administration of the College more closely" by the Chinese Ministry of Education. 117 The report of the commission not only suggested that the PUMC enlarge its student enrollment and focus on Chinese medical problems, but it also asked it to readjust "the luxurious state of living among the students." 118

116 ibid.

117 For extensive information, see Bullock, 96-102.

118 ibid. 96-102.
Government authorities exhibited a growing skepticism about the PUMC, a belief that the PUMC was only interested in medical science and its own affairs, and that it was not concerned in taking an active part in state medicine. Some people who were involved with the PUMC held this same opinion. Liu Reiheng, the head of the Health Department and also the director of the PUMC (he mostly worked in Nanjing for the government), then had a very unfavorable opinion of the college. He told Lin Kesheng (Robert Lim), the first Chinese doctor in the PUMC, that "who cares now for the P.U.M.C.? It is hopelessly out of the picture."\textsuperscript{119}

Lin himself held some critical opinions on reforming the PUMC. He thought that the PUMC should develop a system that could fit the Chinese reality better, rather than totally copying the American medical system. He also suggested the college enlarge its class size, and use both English and Chinese in teaching. Lin was very interested in state medicine and public health programs in rural areas. Soon after World War II broke out, he left the PUMC to work for the government, and later became the chief medical advisor for the army.\textsuperscript{120}

Hu Shi and Jin Yaoji (Sohtsu King), the chairman of the Board of the trustees of the PUMC, understood the situation very well. They knew the

\textsuperscript{119} S. Gunn to A. Gregg, Dec. 7, 1936.

\textsuperscript{120} Rong Dushan, "Huainian aiguo jiaoshou Lin Kesheng", (Remember the patriotic professor Lin Kesheng), \textit{Huashuo lao xiehe}, 431-436.
PUMC could not obtain substantial Chinese financial support, either from the government or the private sector, and so they urged the Foundation to keep the PUMC a purely American-financed institution, believing this to be the best for the college.\textsuperscript{121}

Even if the Chinese government had intended to support the PUMC, the Foundation might not have been willing to relinquish control. Here was another dilemma. As a non-governmental organization, the Foundation would prefer to keep the PUMC a non-governmental institution as it had been. However, the Foundation did hope to transfer the school to the Chinese, and the government was a main potential source of support. In 1937, the Minister of Education offered Mex. $50,000 as operating funds of the College. Henry Houghton, then the acting director of the PUMC, refused. However, New York disagreed; Edwin Lobenstine, the chairman of the CMB Inc., told Houghton that Rockefeller III was disturbed lest Houghton's refusal might endanger the chances of future offers of governmental support, "when such support is the one main source which it appears can be looked to for any substantial financial help in China."

But Houghton's answer was very clear. He said:

\begin{quote}
I do not propose to sell out the freedom of this institution and the maintenance of its scientific and educational standards for a contribution amounting to less than two percent of our annual upkeep. When the Government becomes a financial partner it immediately begins to mold institutional policies and practices to its own particular pattern. I have
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{121} Sohtsu G. King to David Lobenstine, Oct. 17, 1936. RAC. CMB Inc.
watched that occurring in all of the other private universities that have
accepted Government subsidy, and definitely decided against it.\(^{122}\)

Thus there was only one possibility left for the PUMC’s financial
independence: a major donation from the Rockefeller Foundation. If the
Foundation had decided to establish the PUMC on an independent basis, it
needed not only to release the CMB’s entire property to a Chinese body (since
the CMB Inc. was an American body), but also to donate an additional
endowment, because the CMB Inc.’s endowment had never been sufficient.
This was not just a simple question of the Foundation’s wanting to act, since
many factors affected the Foundation’s decision on this matter.

The situation on both sides of the Pacific Ocean would not allow the
Foundation to take such action. The Foundation itself was in a difficult
financial condition since the Great Depression; and on China’s side, the
Japanese invasion and expansion since 1931 had become a severe threat to all
American enterprises there. In addition, the Foundation had serious doubts
about the PUMC’s future role and about the Chinese people’s ability to handle
such a large endowment. All these uncertainties left the Foundation no choice
but to keep a short-term commitment, which had been its China policy from
the early 1930s.

* * *

Generally speaking, in the case of the Peking Union Medical College,

\(^{122}\) Mary Ferguson, 134-135.
the major confrontation was not between the Foundation and the Chinese, but primarily inside the Foundation—between those who were in the headquarters and were more concerned with the general policy and with the Foundation’s new programs, and those who were working in the field and were striving to achieve the Foundation’s original purpose. The Foundation failed to provide a feasible mechanism to bridge the gap from its old program to its new orientation. These conflicts in the implementation of the PUMC involved both Americans and many Chinese; however, the scenario was not the West versus the Chinese. Some Foundation officers and Chinese intellectual leaders were working together to fulfill the PUMC’s goals, while other Foundation leaders found new interest in Chinese reform and received support from some others of the Chinese intellectual elite.

As far as the Sinicization of the PUMC was concerned, those people, both Americans and Chinese, who knew China’s situation believed that it would be best if the PUMC could remain an American institution and that the condition for the Chinese to take over the PUMC was not ripe yet. Thus the transition of the college from an American institution to a Chinese one proceeded much more slowly than its founders originally planned. However, the Foundation’s interests and policy changed, and the PUMC was no longer its main focus. Consequently, the fate of the PUMC became a dilemma for the Foundation: it was too critical to the Foundation’s reputation in Asia for it to be abandoned, yet it was too expensive to maintain.
The Rockefeller Foundation’s ideal of the best medical education for China’s modern reform conflicted with both American reality and Chinese reality. These realities forced the Foundation to redefine its China program and to readjust its policy according to the Foundation’s new orientation as well as to China’s new reform trend. The PUMC’s experience revealed some serious problems in how the Foundation’s conducted segments of this international philanthropy: the lack of proper mechanisms to carry out its goals; over-optimism in viewing the Foundation’s capability and underestimation of China’s problems; and ignorance of the nature of its commitment to the PUMC and China’s modern medical education.

Many problems in implementing the PUMC’s missions derived from the incapability of the Chinese to support the PUMC. Because of this circumstance, the Chinese trustees did not have power equal in authority to that of the Foundation over some very important policies concerning the college’s future. As the only sponsor of the PUMC, the Rockefeller Foundation controlled the final say on important decisions, although according to the PUMC’s bylaws, the Board of Trustees of the PUMC should make these decisions. This managerial relationship between New York and Peking revealed the nature of this cultural exchange program: unequal partnership.

Realities in both China and the United States challenged the Rockefeller Foundation’s ideal model. Some of the dilemmas in implementing the Foundation’s plan derived from a lack of precedents. Many difficulties and
changes in this highly sophisticated, multi-cultural project were simply unpredictable. However, the factor most responsible for these dilemmas was the desire to completely transplant an Americanized medical educational model into China. This very idea expressed itself loudly and clearly during these years of the Foundation's China adventure, and it became the most obvious feature of the PUMC.
In modern Chinese history, Chinese civilization met Western civilization in a quite unusual situation. The Chinese people were "awakened" by Western cannons and warships, and they were forced to realize their cultural crisis. In this historical context, the cultural exchange between China and the West, such as the Rockefeller Foundation’s medical program in China, not only intertwined with many urgent political issues occurring in China in the time frame of this study, but it also served different political and ideological purposes. The experience of the Peking Union Medical College during its first forty years clearly indicated this nature.

In the beginning of the century, Americans’ interest in China became very widespread. Following the missionaries’ footprints, the Rockefellers and their advisors, among many other Americans, were determined to be a part of this new Eastern "crusade". As one of the largest newly emerging philanthropic enterprises, the Rockefeller Foundation, with its impressive financial as well as human resources, attracted much attention. While the Foundation received all kinds of encouragement, those who welcomed such action had their respective reasons, political, ideological, or cultural.

The missionaries hoped that the Foundation’s work would help them to maintain their superiority in modern education in China. American educational
and medical professionals, on the other hand, took the Foundation's involvement in China as a wonderful chance to play their influence on an enlarged stage. Simultaneously, some leading figures among the Chinese "new intellectuals" saw the Foundation's scientific program as a means to advance their ideological battle against the old culture. The Chinese government simply believed that any improvement in medicine and modern education would benefit its political image both within China and abroad. All these groups had very different interests and motives, and yet they all recognized the usefulness of modern science and education in China's reform. In this sense, medicine and education, the very task of the Peking Union Medical College, were never a purely academic or cultural issue.

To the Rockefeller Foundation, the medical work in China was exciting and challenging. It offered the Foundation an opportunity to establish itself, not only in the United States, but also on an international scale. China was an extended frontier, where various American dreams could be realized. She was also an expanded laboratory, where the Foundation and its medical men could test their scientific projects as well as their social ideas. The biggest dream, and the most important idea behind the Foundation's medical program, was to "convert" the Chinese to modern Western civilization.

Modern medical science was placed, first by the missionary doctors and then by the Foundation's medical program, in opposition to traditional Chinese medicine and to traditional Chinese culture in general. Missionary doctors and
the modern medical professionals had some fundamental disagreements about
the meaning of medical education and the method of implementing it; these
differences reflected cultural and social changes in the United States in the turn
of the century. However, so far as traditional Chinese medicine was
concerned, they had the same standpoint. They all believed that Western
medicine was much more advanced than traditional Chinese medicine, and they
all agreed that Chinese medicine had nothing to teach. The Peking Union
Medical College was set to exhibit to the Chinese this very point. That was
why it mattered so much that the Foundation’s PUMC exhibited teaching,
research, and medical care of the very highest quality.

Many new Chinese intellectuals expressed even more critical opinions
on traditional medicine, and some of them even campaigned for entirely
abandoning traditional medicine. This extremely harsh attitude toward
traditional medicine took place in the broad context of the cultural iconoclasm
among Chinese new intellectuals in contemporary China. These intellectuals
were convinced that Chinese medicine was a barrier to the development of a
new culture, and that it must be eliminated so that science and other modern
ideas could have a hope. They believed that China had to choose either
Western science or Chinese traditions. Once again, Chinese medicine and
Western medicine, and in fact Chinese culture and Western culture in general,
were taken as two entities that opposed each other and could not mix together.
To this way of thinking, it was impossible to seek to synthesize traditional
medicine with Western medicine.

Cultural exchange has been a common and continuing phenomena in world history. Among different cultures and different nations, all kinds of cultural exchanges are taking place constantly. They confront and conflict, and most of all, they absorb or assimilate each other. Quite often, however, one or several cultures claim to be more advanced or superior than others. When this situation happens, the cultural exchange is taken in a way that is rather a "cultural replacement". The Rockefeller Foundation’s medical work in China was a good example.

When Western medicine took the position of attempting to replace Chinese medicine, not only Western doctors, but many Chinese intellectuals and the Chinese government joined this action. This phenomenon revealed the fact that much broader factors were behind this cultural exchange program. In general, medical science, with its most modern knowledge, technology, and methods, was taken by both some Chinese intellectuals and the Foundation as a powerful tool to promote China’s modernization.

The co-operation between the Foundation and these Chinese intellectuals showed the importance of Chinese impact on such a cultural exchange program. Although the Peking Union Medical College was the Rockefeller Foundation’s initiative, it could not be realized without Chinese support. The Chinese who were involved in the PUMC were not passive recipients of the Foundation’s gift or silent partners. The PUMC’s experience
demonstrated that both American and Chinese conditions were equally critical to the success of an intercultural and international program. The success of this program was not only to the Foundation’s interest, but also, or even more so, to the Chinese interest.

Indeed, the Peking Union Medical College and the China Medical Board were the leading forces in promoting modern medical education in China. The school became an education and research center and its graduates went to many important positions in public health, medical education, and practices. Not only that, the PUMC, with its worldwide reputation, upgraded the medical profession in China profoundly, and thus helped the growth of the new Chinese intellectuals in general. Compared with the traditional Chinese literati, which had been, to a great extent, serving only as the pool for the imperial government’s civil officials, this development of modern intelligentsia with their independent social identity became an important factor in China’s modernization movement.

Related to this growth of the new intellectuals was the development of the private sector in China. While traditional Chinese society was declining, the established social control system collapsed. Industries, new businesses and various modern professions were rapidly growing, particularly in some coastal areas and big cities. This trend of economic and social development was taking place simultaneously with the political and cultural reforms and was an indispensable part of China’s modernization movement. The economic
development provided the means, at least financially, to the development of modern education, particularly to the development of private education. Beginning in the late Qing years, elite-supported private educational institutions was one of the most influential means for local elites’ political and social reform. Some fundamental changes in the government’s educational policy and education systems on the one hand, and the availability of growing numbers of graduates from new schools on the other, provided the most needed conditions for advancing private schools.

Foreign private institutions were also growing at the same time, and among them missionary schools and hospitals were the most impressive. While these missionary institutions joined the development of the private sector, their religious nature was very unpopular in China, even though the Chinese government tolerated them. The PUMC represented a non-governmental and non-religious organization in higher learning. This model brought about a positive influence on Chinese private organizations in education and other social services. Its high standards in education and medical care impressed the Chinese intellectuals and became the major reason for their support of the school. Although at that time none of the Chinese educational institutions could afford to follow exactly the PUMC model, the PUMC graduates disseminated the very idea of professional standards and scientific spirit to many other medical and educational institutions. On the other hand, the Chinese intellectuals in general welcomed the PUMC’s religious policy that no
religious qualification was required for its faculty and staff.

Since the formative period of the Rockefeller Foundation's China program, there had been many factors and groups, American and Chinese, influencing the Foundation's program search, policy-defining, decision-making and the implementation of these policies and decisions. These influences that shaped the Foundation's China work were not static; they were constantly changing as the result of more fundamental cultural and social changes in both countries. As the founder and the only sponsor of the Peking Union Medical College, the Foundation took the major responsibility for this institution's success and failure. However, the Foundation's perspective as well as actions were shaped and restricted by the American and Chinese cultures. The Foundation's comprehension of China's reform, its own program agenda, as well as its leaders' characters all interacted in this PUMC program.

The Rockefeller Foundation's China experience showed clearly that the key issues around designing and fulfilling this cross-cultural program were not just due to the West confronting China. When the Sino-Western cultural relationship developed into the early 20th century, changing China already became the main theme of the reform accepted by both the Westerners and most of the Chinese. The question was how; and on this matter engendered a wide range of ideas and models. Neither Westerners' opinions nor the Chinese intellectuals' ideas on the reform reached a consensus. Disagreements existed
among both sides. However, in order to put any reform idea into an action, both foreign and Chinese efforts needed each other’s support.

As an intercultural program, the development of the Peking Union Medical College indeed involved some conflicts between the Foundation on the one side and many Chinese intellectuals on the other. These conflicts reflected ideological and cultural differences, and quite often there were self-interests involved. However, the story was much more complex than the simple scenario of the West versus the East. While the Foundation continued seeking its interests through international involvements, China remained important in the Foundation’s global strategy. At the same time, the Chinese reformers still needed help from the outside world—not only financial support, but more importantly, ideas and models. Both sides needed co-operation, and within both sides there were different voices. From the viewpoint of world history, many of the Foundation leaders and Chinese reformers were “internationalists”. To them, the Foundation leaders in particular, the interests and opportunities already went far beyond national boundaries. The interest of one side related to and depended on the development of the other side’s interest. As a result of the PUMC, the co-operation between the Rockefeller Foundation and many Chinese intellectual elites extended to a new and broader program: the China Program presented powerful evidence.

The significance of the Peking Union Medical College to the Sino-
American cultural relationship goes far beyond the medical school itself. To a great degree, the missionaries' educational effort only followed the Jesuits' footprints in sixteenth century China. In contrast, the Rockefeller Foundation's China medical program presented to the Chinese a modern and professional approach. It symbolized the determination of contemporary American philanthropy to influence China's modern reform. Nevertheless, they both represented the Western challenge to traditional Chinese culture.

Since the first generation of Chinese reformers called for the Chinese "to open eyes and see the world" in the 1840s, one and a half centuries have passed. Today as China is opening to the world and willing to learn almost anything from the West, the Chinese people are still questioning the definition of modernization and the way to achieve it. They are still asking the same questions as the older generations: How should they balance between Chinese civilization and Western civilization? How can China develop a modern state while still preserving the kernel of her tradition? To answer these questions, the Chinese still have a long path ahead of them.

Once again, Western influences, governmental and non-governmental, eagerly want to be an important part of China's modernization movement. Thus, the Rockefeller Foundation's experience in China during the first half of the 20th century becomes relevant and valuable. People, both the Westerners and the Chinese, can learn many lessons from the PUMC case, from program searching and project designing to financial and managerial mechanisms. Most
significantly, when promoting a cross-cultural program, both sides should understand the very nature of a cultural exchange activity. There always are political, ideological, and self-interests involved in such programs, as the Rockefeller Foundation’s medical program in China showed. However, cultural exchanges are mutually beneficial to both sides, and they should take place only under this condition. In the case of the Peking Union Medical College, while the school greatly promoted modern education in China, the Foundation in fact also received many benefits. As far as international philanthropy is concerned, there is no unselfish altruism: the donors of financial and professional aids often have their own considerations in those programs. On the other hand, the recipients of these assistance are often also "donors", from a point of view that the development of different cultures depend on each other’s progress.

In implementing any cultural exchange program, means are equally as important as the aims of the program are. Designing feasible and efficient mechanisms to carry out a program usually is crucial to its success. The PUMC’s experience indicated that working mechanisms must be based on the realities of both sides. For this matter, mutual understanding of each other’s cultural and other conditions as well as the willingness to adapt to new situation are critical. Indeed, the equal division of authority—administrative and financial—is a key condition to policy-making. All these issues were influential factors in the management of an international program. The PUMC’s lesson
that the Chinese did not share fundamental control of the college should be remembered in today's new international philanthropic enterprises in China.

Today, as the Chinese economy is "privatizing", non-governmental or semi-governmental organizations in education and other social services are increasing rapidly.¹ While they are trying hard to be independent of governmental control, financially and administratively, foreign assistance once again becomes very appealing. Many Western organizations have been involved in this trend since the 1980s, and the response from the Chinese is positive.

This picture is familiar—history is repeating itself—but not at the same level. Great changes have happened in China and America as well, since the Rockefeller Foundation proudly announced an outstanding medical program for China eighty years ago. Both the Chinese people and the American people have reasons to believe that the future for cultural exchange and co-operation between these two great countries and great cultures are much brighter than they were eighty years ago. However, all the efforts along this difficult, yet fascinating, journey of promoting modern medical education in China will remain an important signpost for both countries.

¹ For example, the private education has grown rapidly since the 1980s. In 1992, there were 673 private junior high/high schools. By the end of 1994, the number of private schools increased to over 40,000, 851 junior high and high schools, 800 colleges and universities whose diplomas are recognized by provincial governments, and fifteen universities that are recognized by the State Education Commission. Zhongguo jingji nianjian, (Almanac of China's Economy, 1993), p 321; and Shenzhou shibao (Shenzhen newsweek), Feb. 3, 1995.
I. Manuscript Collections

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