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The role of individual characteristics and structures of social knowledge in ethical reasoning using an experiential learning framework

White, Judith Anne, Ph.D.

Case Western Reserve University, 1992
THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS AND
STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE IN ETHICAL REASONING
USING AN EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING FRAMEWORK

by

JUDITH ANNE WHITE

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy

Thesis Advisor: David A. Kolb

Department of Organizational Behavior
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January, 1993
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Date Aug. 7, 1992

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THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS AND STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE IN ETHICAL REASONING USING AN EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING FRAMEWORK

Abstract

by

JUDITH ANNE WHITE

This research began as an inquiry into how individuals in organizations arrive at a particular ethical position or outcome. In particular, the research question centered on the relative influence of emotion and cognition, and ideas and feelings, on ethical reasoning. Through the discourses of psychology, philosophy, and ethics this study examines the relative impact of the independent variables of individual characteristics and structures of social knowledge on two forms of ethical reasoning: the ethic of care and the ethic of justice. The individual characteristics of gender, concrete and abstract learning styles, and feeling and thinking judgment aspects of personality type describe the person through self-description. The structures of social knowledge, organicism and mechanism world views, and the communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations, represent the individual’s espoused beliefs, ideas, or values. These were measured quantitatively, while the dependent variables, the two forms of ethical reasoning, the ethics of care and justice are investigated through qualitative data from subjects’ written responses to ethical dilemmas.
Results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis demonstrate that the individual characteristics of gender, learning style, and judgment aspects of personality impact the care and justice forms of ethical reasoning significantly more than beliefs, ideas, and values measured through social knowledge structures. Masculine gender and thinking judgment were positively correlated with the ethic of justice, and feminine gender and feeling judgment were positively correlated with the ethic of care. Concrete learning positively correlated with an organicism world view, and with a communitarian moral orientation which in turn is positively correlated with the ethic of care. Organicism is positively correlated with a communitarian moral orientation.

The results suggest a variety of ways of responding to ethical dilemmas, depending on the characteristics of the individual, and challenge the traditionally held concept of universalism or "one right way." Researchers, management educators, and managers might consider focusing on the more sensitive and complex matter of ethical development of the individual rather than teaching formulas or algorithms for arriving at solutions to ethical problems.
DEDICATION

To my mother, Florence Meiman White, and the memory of my father, Martin H. White.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

"We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly."

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

There are many people I would like to acknowledge for their help in this endeavor, help in the forms of intellectual preparation and challenge, emotional support, and spiritual challenge and support.

I am deeply grateful to my mentor Dave Kolb for his intellectual guidance, wisdom, and challenge. He has been untiringly tolerant and patient of my divergences and not so small foibles. Most importantly he has offered a model of an intellectual and emotional way of living and learning that I will use throughout my career.

Richard Boyatzis provided unending enthusiasm and support for my professional growth and development. His involvement in my work, spending hours talking, reading, thinking, and giving me feedback over the years has been unparalleled in my previous seven years of higher education. His warm, lively, and humorous spirit helped me maintain equilibrium at essential points throughout my four years at Case.

I am deeply grateful to Eric Neilsen for many things: his sociological perspective to all things, his incisive mind and challenging questions on this and other projects, his quick and dry humor, and his willingness to teach me about abstract minds and personalities. I have particular respect for his personal and professional integrity and sincere constructive intentions. I have enjoyed being his student, colleague, and friend.
I thank my friends and colleagues at Case for their friendship and support: Ann Baker, Debbie Humphreys, Cecilia McMillen, Joyce Osland, George Robinson, Susan Taft, and Roy Jacques at U. Mass. Amherst. I am indebted to Rebecca Jordan for coding a sample of the ethical dilemmas central to this research, giving me inter-rater reliability on my coding.

Retta Holdorf will always remain as one of the fondest memories of my four years at Case: her smile, warmth, encouragement, faith in my abilities, ever willing to help, and approval of my rather direct style of expression. She, more than most anyone else, helped me feel at home in the department. Bonnie Reynolds provides dependability to myself and others, interested and able to help whenever possible. Her interest in students and morning welcome brings soulfulness to the department. I thank Sandy Piderit for help with SPSS and Christine Cunningham for assistance with data entry on this project.

I want to express my sincere appreciation to all of the Organizational Behavior faculty for contributing to my educational, personal and professional development. Thanks to Bob Lawry for participating as an outside committee member. It is a job with dubious rewards.

Jack Kornfield has been one of my most influential teachers over the last six years. With Jack's help I'm working on a ph.d. in life, daily learning compassion, patience, forgiveness, mindfulness, and equanimity. Letting go is hard to do.

My parents always provided an environment that supported intellectual life, through their own careers, the enormous amount of reading, discussion, and intellectual activities in and around their home, and their intense interest
in the world around them. I am indebted to them for the topic of this thesis because they unceasingly demonstrated an interest in human justice and the well-being of all oppressed persons. My mother, in the later years of her life, has modeled great diligence as a researcher and writer herself.

Thanks are due to my family and friends on the East and West coasts who provided support and encouragement for this pursuit, and in particular to my loving friend Linda Odell who in 1974, at the beginning of our Master's program, began dreaming with me about a Ph.D. Final appreciation goes to the hundreds of clients I worked with as a career counselor and a workers' compensation vocational rehabilitation counselor for 14 years prior to beginning this chapter of my life. These individuals concretely demonstrated that people and organizations need help.
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"A human being is part of a whole, called by us the 'universe,' a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thought and feelings as something separated from the rest—a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty. Nobody is able to achieve this completely, but the striving for such achievement is in itself a part of the liberation and a foundation for inner security."

Einstein in Gellerman, et al., pp.354-355
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Overview

This study investigates the psychological, epistemological, and moral characteristics of managers and managers-in-training, and how those characteristics result in the use of specific, identifiable forms of ethical reasoning. The focus is on the distinctively different impact of individual characteristics and social knowledge structures on ethical reasoning. Individuals define themselves by a set of individual characteristics, simultaneously holding a set of beliefs or structures of knowledge about how the world is. Presumably both these characteristics, and beliefs and ideas influence one’s approach to ethical dilemmas. Some people react to ethical matters in a rational, logical, analytical, and "objective" manner. Others respond primarily with feelings, emotions, intuition, and what "feels right." Still others find some integration of the various dimensions.

To understand how individual characteristics and social knowledge structures affect managers and managers-in-training in their thinking about ethical dilemmas, this study investigates their cognitive and affective processes, their ways of learning, their world view, and their moral orientation. Understanding what factors affect and determine the use of a particular form of ethical reasoning can assist scholars, managers, and management educators work with ethical issues in a more comprehensive manner, employing known and new approaches. The present study uses the psychological, epistemological, moral and ethical discourses to accomplish this task.
The present study reviews Western philosophical traditions that currently guide ethical discourse and examines the lack of emotion and a feminine voice in the ethical debate throughout most of history. Philosophy, psychology, epistemology, and management theory have voiced predominantly rational, masculine perspectives because, among other things, women scholars and practitioners are under-represented in these fields. This results of this research suggest the need for integration and balance of cognition and emotion, the need to integrate the emotional as well as cognitive aspects of ethical reasoning.

This study examines the impact of thinking and feeling judgment, abstract and concrete ways of learning, organicism and mechanism world views, and the communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations on two forms of ethical reasoning: care and justice. The psychometric literature demonstrates that individuals have a variety of combinations of thinking and feeling, cognition and affect, and also the positive correlations between feeling and concrete experience, and thinking and abstraction (Kolb, 1984). This chapter describes the study and discusses its significance and purpose.

Significance of the Study

Managers in large or small organizations, in the corporate, public, or private non-profit sectors, search for rational means to deal with irrational behaviors. Like other employees, they are pressed to adhere to the tacit and explicit ethical rules of the organization while simultaneously retaining their private morality (Goffman, 1959, Hochschild, 1981, Jackall, 1988,). Behavioral norms concerning what will be tolerated and judged are changing. The unethical behavior of prominent public and private figures
has been exposed and quietly tolerated (the Watergate Break-in, the Iran-Contra Scandal, the Savings & Loan Crisis, Salomon Bros.) Personal long distance calls on the company phone is a mild infraction compared to defrauding the public of millions of dollars. As the gender balance of the boardroom, the courtroom, and the surgical theater change so do standards of ethical comportment. People are less trusting of government (Mirvis, 1989), and public investigations of government and private sector practices are common. With decreasing regulation and monitoring, the activities of private corporations come under scrutiny too late, usually after the crisis, as witnessed in the Exxon Valdez disaster and the Salomon Brothers scandal. These problems point to a need for society to find integration with an individualism that is nested in cultural plurality which in turn is nested in an acceptable form of ethical unity.

Some managers have been trained in ethics but the extent and perimeters of the topic vary. A vice-president of human resources (personal communication, S. Dolinsky, 1991) for a large government contractor referred to the general uncertainty among the company's employees as to what constitutes a breach of ethical conduct. The anonymous calls to the company's ethics hotline included complaints about perceived unfair treatment, unequal access to parking, difficulties with conforming to company policy about vacations, dress code, etc. While lying, cheating, and stealing are unquestionably unethical, other areas may seem ambiguous, such as harassment, omission of information, inadequate restitution, and evasion of responsibility. Often the differences between legality and ethics are confused. Additionally the delineation of ethical standards are
increasingly complex when doing business with a country with different ethical traditions and norms, for example, where bribery is a routine tool of efficiency.

Ethical dilemmas are unclear ethical issues (Toffler, 1986). Ethical issues are easy to name, are acontextual, and stand outside a specific setting. There is agreement that the issue is ethical, it addresses the claims of a stakeholder, addresses the right and wrong of one value, and assumes that individuals can do the "right thing" if they so desire. Ethical dilemmas are harder to name, are embedded in a specific context, and there is disagreement as to whether the case in point is ethical. The dilemma addresses the claims of multiple, often competing stakeholders and sometimes competing values, and assumes individuals want to do the "right thing" but do not know what it is or do not have the capacity to do it.

While examining ethical issues questions surface concerning laws, policies, and procedures available to resolve the matter and what responsibility, if any, a company has beyond what is designated by law. As an example, after the death of 25 workers and injury of 50 others in a industrial fire, Imperial Food Products of Hamlet, North Carolina claimed they were operating according to the law and building codes, with fire exits locked, no windows or fans. After testifying before a congressional subcommittee, the owners closed down the plant and relocated elsewhere rather than repair the plant and bring it up to code, leaving 100 people out of work in a community of 6,100, (New York Times, November 25, 1991). This serves as testimony to the lack of a consensus as to what constitutes ethical behavior.
As society becomes more pluralistic and organizations more global, the principles, rules, and standards of behavior once thought universal are no longer applicable or appropriate for every situation. Individuals have different needs, sensitivities, and values. Some people live according to their internal truths, their feelings, sense experiences, or intuition, living a form of moral autonomy (Thomas, 1989). Others live according to the most prominent authority in their lives, their parents, religious institution or leader, or perhaps the laws of the land. Some follow the norms of, what Friedlander calls the sociocentric type of life style (1972), their reference group of family, friends, and work associates. The multiplicity of norms and the confusion of differing normative systems may lead towards moral chaos and away from a community of shared values.

This last section presented some background concerns that have been the impetus for this study. What follows is a description of the particular assumptions at the core of this research.

Current Investigation

The present study is based on six assumptions about the relationships between variables:

1. The ethical reasoning of an individual is influenced by social and psychological characteristics that describe the individual and by the individual’s constellation of ideas, beliefs, or values about what is good and true.

2. The impact of emotion and affect are under-recognized in ethical reasoning and acknowledgement of the role of emotion increases understanding of the processes and outcomes of ethical reasoning.
3. Emphasizing affect or feeling in ethical reasoning will more likely lead to at least the partial use of a communitarian moral orientation and an ethic of care and whereas avoiding affective components in ethical reasoning will necessarily lead to utilitarianism, with exclusive use of an ethic of justice and a consequentialist moral orientation.

4. Ethical dilemmas often are sufficiently complex so as to require managers to employ more than one form of ethical reasoning, an ethic of care and an ethic of justice, and requiring a communitarian and a consequentialist moral orientation, as well as flexibility of cognitive skills, i.e., thinking and feeling, abstract conceptualization and concrete experience. Managers need competence in empathy, a skill requiring both experiencing and conceptualizing another's situation, and a caring response.

5. The preference for concrete experience is associated with feminine gender, the communitarian moral orientation, and in turn leads to a preference for the use of care in ethical reasoning. The preference for abstract conceptualization is associated with masculine gender and a consequentialist moral orientation and would lead to the use of an ethic of justice in ethical reasoning.

6. World view affects the use of a particular ethic. A flexible, responsive, open systems, organismic world view will more likely lead to a greater balance of communitarian and consequentialist orientations and both the ethics of care and justice, while a fixed, detached, mechanistic world view would lead to a consequentialist moral orientation and the use of the ethic of justice for ethical reasoning.
Purpose of this Study

The present study attempts to explain and understand how managers arrive at a particular mode of ethical reasoning and what accounts for the fact that some managers use a caring approach while others use a more pragmatic approach. Information gathered through this investigation hopes to explicate how managers approach ethical issues which lead to particular positions. It contributes to an increasing awareness and dialogue among managers and scholars so managers can be better informed of possible ethical positions and outcomes, and educators can design management development to prepare managers for the ethical challenges of the future.

Summary of the Following Chapters

Chapter II reviews the literature on the individual characteristics of gender and concrete and abstract learning. It reviews the literature on pertaining to Jung’s thinking and feeling ways of judging, as well as affect, emotion, and cognition.

Chapter III presents an overview of structures of social knowledge including epistemology, the descriptive belief system of Pepper’s World Hypotheses, and the normative belief systems of goodness and truth. This includes teleological and deontological theories of ethics and the moral orientations of consequentialism and communitarianism.

Chapter IV addresses ethical reasoning from the perspective of the ethics of care and the ethics of justice, including a summary of the research on the identification and measures of these two forms of ethical reasoning. The chapter reviews much of the business and management literature on ethics.
In Chapter V the methodological approach is outlined, including the research assumptions, research design and implementation, operationalization, instrumentation, and the design for the data analysis. It includes a discussion of the research questions and hypotheses, presenting the central theoretical model of the thesis, the relationship between individual characteristics, social knowledge structures, and forms of ethical reasoning.

Chapter VI presents an analysis of the data from the instruments used to measure individual characteristics, social knowledge, and preferences for ethical reasoning. The results are discussed in the context of support for the hypotheses.

Chapter VII discusses the findings in each of three areas: individual characteristics, social knowledge, and ethical reasoning.

Chapter VIII presents the theoretical and practical implications for scholars and management educators, the limitations of the study, and recommendations for further research.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

We do not see things as they are, we see things as we are.

Talmud

Introduction

The previous chapter described the main concerns about ethical reasoning that are the central focus this study. In this and the following two chapters the three primary realms of discourse are introduced: the psychological, the philosophical, and the moral/ethical. The literature review represents a purposive and broad non-random sampling of authors whose work speaks to the specifically focused yet cross-disciplinary aspects of this topic and interests of this research.

This study intentionally transverses these domains because of their underlying thread of commonality: the dimensions of experience and abstraction, and feeling and thinking throughout all aspects of life, and, particularly in ethical reasoning and behavior. The disciplines of psychology, philosophy, and ethics each describe the individual and his or her relationship to the world and to others through language that articulates the role of feeling and cognition in the definition of self. This and subsequent chapters addresses the similarities and differences in how individuals see themselves and the world as they relate to ethical dilemmas.

This chapter introduces three domains of individual characteristics that individually and collectively influence ethical reasoning: gender, structures of
learning, and modes of judgment. These are discussed in depth, focusing on 1) the social role of gender as it relates to knowing and deciding, 2) the model of knowledge that leads to experiential learning, and 3) the duality of emotion and cognition that forms the basis for feeling and thinking forms of judgment. An individual's gender as social identity along with how she or he learns and makes judgments together determine beliefs, values, ideas, and actions which in turn form the foundation of ethical reasoning.

While an interdisciplinary approach to ethics is complex, it is necessary for the increasingly complex ethical dilemmas managers face today. Analytic, cognitive, and social psychology, through the research on emotion and cognition, all contribute to knowledge of ethical attitudes and behavior. Feminist scholars, cited throughout this thesis because of their work related to caring, report that men and women have different ways of knowing (Belenky, 1986, Eisler, 1987, Gilligan, 1982, Lyons, 1982), and neurological research shows that male and female brains have physiological differences that affect thinking and feeling functions (Davidson, 1991). The management ethics literature minimally discusses the psychological aspects of ethical reasoning. Particular ethical problems, solutions, training programs, cultural norms, government regulations, case studies approaches, etc. are discussed, but little inquiry is made into how individuals think and respond when faced with ethical dilemmas.

Psychological factors provide the foundation to individuals' lives and their relationships with others, implicitly affecting attitudes towards ethical issues. Knowing how individuals think, feel, perceive others, see the world, interact and respond to their environment, and make decisions facilitates understanding
how ethical dilemmas are created and resolved. This research crosses the boundaries of psychological, philosophical, and moral discourses to explore influences on ethical reasoning because within each of these realms there is a focus on feeling and experience.

Robert Coles, the psychiatrist, scholar, and author of many books and articles on psychological and moral development, gives an example of the inner resources needed to be moral and ethical. In writing on the moral development of children, he addresses an unexpected core of ethical behavior. In the 1960's Ruby Bridges, at the age of 6, initiated school desegregation in New Orleans by having the courage to enter an all-white school, walking down the street, accompanied by federal marshals on both sides, with a heckling mob shouting threats, spitting, and shaking fists at her, for months at a time. She attended school by herself for most of the year because of the boycott by white families. Her response was to smile, and, before going to sleep at night, pray for those people in the mob.

Coles attempted to understand the motivations, conflicts, projections, and behaviors of Ruby and other children involved in the civil rights struggle of the 1960's. These children lacked education, had limited cognitive development and ability to assimilate concepts and symbols, placing them in the lower levels and stages of Kohlberg's model of moral development. Ruby Bridges, among many other children, did not fit Kohlberg's description of moral development as,

"an increasing ability to perceive social reality or to organize and integrate social experience. One necessary—but not sufficient—condition for principled morality is the ability to reason logically, represented by stages of formal operations. The main experiential determinants of moral development seem to be amount and variety of social experience, the opportunity to take a number of roles and to encounter other perspectives. Thus middle-class and
popular children progress further and faster than do lower-class children and social isolates." (Coles, pps. 26-27)

Yet Ruby Bridges, and other children with similar backgrounds, were able to act in a moral way, bravely, thoughtfully, and compassionately, demonstrating moral stamina, honor, and courage. From his study of young people in the South during the civil rights movement, Coles believes one explanation of the courage lies in the religious tradition of African Americans, in their ability to live out the ego ideal. The ego ideal is the way of recovering the idealized past of protected and adored infancy, looking upward with hope to the lost radiance of childhood. For Ruby Bridges, at age nine, looking back at her actions when she was six, she said, “We inched a little closer to God, and because we did we became a little better ourselves!” (Coles, p. 36)

This unusual example of moral courage and ethical action which does not fit Kohlberg’s model heightens one’s curiosity about what is required to act in an ethical manner, what constellation of qualities, characteristics, and personality variables combine to allow personal expression of one’s beliefs of what is truth.

This chapter reviews the psychological components of ethical reasoning central to this study: gender, Kolb’s dual structure of knowledge and ways of learning, Jung’s thinking and feeling judgment, and perspectives on affect, emotion, cognition and thinking. They are central because social role, ways of knowing and learning, and personality characteristics will be shown, through the present research, to have significant impact on the use of particular forms of ethical reasoning.
Background Issues and Perspectives

This section will introduce an important issue related to ethical reasoning, the hegemony of rationality and the relegation of affect and emotion to marginal status.

Many managers and scholars of management hold to the concept of organizations as conscious, orderly, and preferably isomorphic with the leading edge of other institutions. While exalting the rational side of organizational life people often avoid attending to the emotional, irrational, visceral responses that may drive the unconscious aspects of their actions (Bion, 1961, Gemmill, 1992, Schwartz, 1991).

Although psychologists and neurologists know something of the relationship between cognition and affect, there is little agreement as to the kinds of relationships between these two mental functions (Davidson, 1991, Izard, 1984, Lazarus, 1991, Levenson, 1991). Understanding how individuals perceive the world and come to know it, the variety of ways they apprehend and comprehend experiences, ideas, and information, impacts the ways they reason and make judgments. The different structures of knowledge and ways of knowing, different epistemological approaches, should lead to an understanding of the different foundations of ethical reasoning.

“Ethics” and “ethical” are frequently used without necessarily common agreement about their definitions. According to Webster’s New World Dictionary “ethical” means “having to do with ethics; of conforming to moral standards”, and “ethics” means 1) the study of standards of conduct and moral judgment, and 2) the system of morals of a particular person, religion,
group, etc.” The derivation of ethics is from the Greek word *ethos* which means character, custom, the normal human state. Ethics are local and particular to a culture. “Moral” is defined as “dealing with, or capable of distinguishing between, right and wrong”, and morality has a more universal meaning and application. When people ordinarily speak about ethics and ethical reasoning, they are referring to knowing the difference between right and wrong, or knowing that it is not “right” to lie, cheat, or steal. How people learned what is or is not ethical, where they learned it, and how they translate its meaning into their lives is a subject of study beyond the limits of this thesis.

Managers routinely face ethical dilemmas as they manage people and resources. Although ethical concerns may involve legal intervention, fundamentally ethical reasoning addresses responsibilities and interpersonal behavior, how we act with one another, up close, or from a distance (Toffler, 1986). This necessarily involves affect, emotions, and often unconscious attitudes and behaviors.

Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas once said that 90% of the court’s decisions are based on emotions, while the court spends the remaining ten percent of its time rationalizing those decisions (Kornfield, 1987). Freud, Jung, Adler, Perls, and others have championed the role of the unconscious mind and emotions in daily life. The management literature increasingly addresses emotions and the unconscious, and covert processes in individuals, groups, and organizations, (Schwartz, 1987, Kets de Vries, 1980, 1984, 1991, Schaef and Fassel, 1988, Gemmill, 1989, Jackall, 1988). Some organizational theorists use chaos theory to explain
the challenge of managing and controlling organizations. This contrasts to
the hegemonic ideologies of secularization, demystification, and technical
rationality that began with the scientific revolution in the sixteenth century,
formally entered management theory with Frederick Taylor and Max Weber,
and continues to pervade present-day organizational life.

In observing the moral, psychological, and physical landscape of
today's world it appears that frequently compassion has lost ground to
pragmatism. This is evident in forms of alienation, self-destruction, neglect
and violence to others and destruction to the local and global environment
(Berman, 1989). In an effort to ascribe an objective and universal reality to
natural phenomena emotions are denigrated and rationality is exalted
(Maturana, 1988).

Recently some venerated institutions have been involved in scandals
concerning the misuse of corporate resources, withholding of essential
information, bribery, fraud, or secret and illegal deals. Publicly elected
officials, peace officers, and corporate employees are not immune to
violating legal and ethical codes of conduct. Managers often are uncertain
about what is appropriate ethical behavior; their moral standards are
fragmented and lack potency; and there is little public and collective
discussion of what is considered to be appropriate (Waters and Bird, 1987).
While overwhelmed with technical and scientific knowledge, little is
understood about what to do with that knowledge, or why it does not serve
us better. Perhaps reason, knowledge, and technology are not sufficient; we
are missing what Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton, (1991) cali
a "moral compass", the moral reasoning to guide our individual and collective lives.

This thesis attempts to link different realms of discourse by examines ethical reasoning at the intersection of psychology, epistemology, philosophy, and management, using psychometric measures to connect the discourses. Studies have focused on psychological factors at the level of the individual, examining the role of variables such as moral development, ego strength, field dependence, locus of control, gender, Machiavellianism, and tenure in the organization. Other studies address the situational and organizational variables of immediate job context, moral content of the organizational culture, organizational policies and procedures, scarcity or munificence of resources, peer behavior, opportunities to engage in unethical behavior, the organization's normative structure, reinforcement contingencies, and characteristics of the work. Still others studied the interaction effect between the individual and organizational variables (Cooper, 1990, Jackall, 1988, G. Jones, 1991, T. Jones, 1991, Toffler, 1986, Trevino, 1986, Wimbush and Shepard, 1991). The present study hopes to add an in depth, cross-disciplinary examination of the psychological, philosophical, and ethical factors, evaluating which of these three discourses takes priority in influencing ethical reasoning.

Ambiguity in ethical reasoning may be more common than expected. The multicultural environment with its plethora of norms, values, and, beliefs leads to a concomitantly diverse set of moral standards. With the disintegration of the institution of the nuclear family and a laissez-faire philosophy in schools, the development of moral beliefs often falls to
religious institutions and work organizations. The traditional utilitarian response has been Bentham's policy that advocates providing the greatest good for the greatest number.

A great amount of knowledge still is to be discovered concerning the relationships between emotion and cognition, about the strength or impact emotions have on the conscious and logical self. During the last four hundred years some parts of Western civilization have attempted to divorce emotion from reason, to rationalize, demystify, and secularize daily life (Berman, 1989). Neurologists report of their rudimentary understanding of such phenomena in terms of differences in the relationship between verbalization and emotional experience in men and women (Davidson, 1991, Gazzaniga, 1985).

Modern Western culture appears to take an "outside-in" rather than an "inside-out" approach to human development, using extrinsic motivation to gain compliance rather than building community with a cohesive set of values centered in the intrinsic needs of its members (Hunt, 1987). In an effort to gain control and predictability society seeks isomorphism with technology. Mechanistic and organic typologies characterize organizations and individuals (Burns and Stalker, 1961, Durkheim, 1933, Johnson, Germer, and Overton, 1988). Computer language describes human behavior, and life is structured around the time machine, on regimens of exercise, work, travel, family, diet, and budget.

Friedlander (1972), from his work in organizational behavior, developed a typology of three major life styles and their simultaneous values and behaviors that relate to decision making style: formalistic, sociocentric,
and personalistic. Formalistic corresponds to mechanistic, where direction comes from authorities and those responsible, guidance from precedent and policy, and the basis for growth and progress from learning from and following the established order. The desired state is one of compliance and respect; individuals are responsible to those in positions of higher responsibility; and feelings and emotions are channeled and rationalized.

Individuals with sociocentric and personalistic types of values each have characteristics that are similar to the organicism and organic dimensions of Johnson, et. al. (1988) and Burns and Stalker (1961), respectively. For the person with a sociocentric style of life and decision-making, direction and guidance come from discussion and agreement with others close to the individual. Learning from others is the basis for growth and progress, and this type of individual has faith in group norms and the advice of close friends. Collaboration and consensus is highly desirable, and the person feels responsible to those with whom he or she has close personal relationships. Feelings and emotions are to be shared with close others. The personalistic life and decision-making style is one where direction and guidance come from within the individual, and the basis for growth is learning from one's experience and acting on one's own awareness. The desired state is self-determination and realization, the individual is ultimately responsible to him or her self, and emotions are to be experienced totally.

This model, along with the those of Jung (1972), Burns and Stalker (1961), Johnson, et.al. (1988), and Durkheim (1933), as well as those of the feminist theorists, Gilligan (1982), Grimshaw (1986), Miller (1976), Noddings
(1984), lends itself to a way of characterizing individuals and organizational systems that allows one to see the structures and dynamics that contribute to individual and group behaviors and attitudes, and, conversely, those behaviors, values, and attitudes that build and maintain particular organizational structures, processes, and rewards.


The next three sections review the literature on the three areas of individual characteristics: the philosophical background of gender, dual knowledge and experiential learning, and emotion and cognition.

Philosophy and Gender

Ethical reasoning, nested as it is in philosophy, reflects a way of seeing and understanding the self and the world that is integral to psychology, with attitudes, beliefs, feelings, and behaviors related to one another. Ethics, considered moral rules-in-use, are embedded in perceptions, experiences, and world view. The psychologist Jean Baker Miller (1976) believes that men and women, because they experience life based on their gender roles,
essentially live in two different cultures. For the past twenty years researchers have discovered some explicit gender differences in the psychology, philosophy, and ethical and moral development of men and women (Betz, O’Connell, and Shepard, 1989, Donnenberg and Hoffman, 1988, Gibbs, Arnold, and Burkhart, 1984, Rothbart, Hanley, and Albert, 1986, Ford and Lowery, 1986, Jones, 1990, Yacker and Weinberg, 1990, Bowman, Reeves, and Freeman, 1990, Stiller and Forrest, 1990). The present study attempts to add insight and understanding so as to help individuals in organizations respond to one another in a mutually acceptable manner. For purposes of this investigation, gender refers to the masculine or feminine social role an individual enacts, while sex refers to biological identity.

Western philosophical tradition emphasizes reason above all else. Aristotle believed reason elevated human beings to goodness, and the function of individuals was to exercise their non-corporeal faculties or 'soul' in accordance with a principle of reason. However, slaves and women were excluded from the full exercise of reason. Slaves were a form of property, used as a tool to help ruling men live. Women were considered similarly functional, to produce heirs and assist in providing the necessities of life. Both slaves and women existed for the sake of the polis. Aristotle, in his essay, "Politics," succinctly says, "As between male and female, the former is by nature superior and ruler, the latter inferior and subject" (Grimshaw, 1986). Not only did Aristotle exclude women from a philosophical ideal, but the later philosophers Kant, Sartre, and Schopenhauer saw women as inferior, deficient, and frivolous. Kant thought women incapable of principles and ascribed to them the virtues of charm and compliance because they
would leave women docile and pleasing in men's eyes (Grimshaw, 1986). Even Simone de Beauvoir (1972), in recognizing that women are taught compliance and dependency, believed women should reject their own natures and instead emulate the masculine ideals of autonomy and independence.

In the Republic Plato reveals his fear of chaos and his need to control the passions and distrust the senses. He believed love was not be be corrupted by the body and knowledge was of the unchanging world of forms, free from the shifting illusions of the senses. In Plato's imagery of the cave in the Republic, the light of reason cannot penetrate the world of shadows, the unconscious, and reveals man's fear of the return to the state of feelings and the body.

John Locke believed in a natural inequality of the sexes and the natural authority of husband over wife because women have the responsibility of bearing children, necessarily resulting in female economic dependence. In his view, only men had the right to appropriation of their productivity, giving them control over all property and keeping women inferior and dependent. Descartes claimed there is a distinctive form of reasoning that governs the discovery of truth, and although his intention was not to exclude women, he emphasized the body/mind distinction. He thought the self is created and maintained by thought, and not dependent on anything material.

Hobbes envisioned people as greedy infants locked into illusions of infantile omnipotence, and his Leviathan, like an externalized superego, was to restrain infantile wishes. Rouseau denied the dependence on the female caretaker in infancy, and disliked dependency in any form because it
led to inequality. He believed in the importance of the patriarchal authority in the family (Grimshaw, 1986).

These mostly male viewpoints represent the predominant philosophy influencing Western thought for two thousand years, suggesting a set of characteristics that resonate with male social experience (Flax, 1983). These can be summarized as:

1. The separateness or independence of human beings.
2. Individualism that emphasizes autonomy of the individual will, separating the knower from what is known.
3. Opposition between mind and body, reason and sense experience.
4. Concern with mastery, domination, and control, particularly of the body and the senses.
5. Fear of women and that which is associated with them, including nature, the body, and sexuality.
6. Devaluation of that which is associated with women, and a need to be independent of that.

The preceding section serves to illuminate the framework of the contemporary debate in ethics and the focus of this thesis. As the rational, objective, non-sense oriented perspective has been elevated and revered, the emotional, subjective, sense-oriented aspects of life have been diminished. The “feminine,” which typically has been embodied and expressed mostly by women, has been devalued, marginalized, and considered inappropriate for much of ethical reasoning. A feminine ethic that draws on feelings, emotion, subjectivity, context, and consideration for
the relationships of those involved, offers an intriguing alternative. This perspective, along with the traditional masculine ethic is discussed at length throughout this thesis. This researcher would suggest that the present forms of knowing and thinking, particularly about ethical issues, are locked into dualism and perhaps a new integrated yet pluralistic vision of reality, truth, and virtue can be realized.

**Separate and Connected Knowing**

In studying the unique ways women experience their world, Belenky, et. al. (1986) use the terms connected and separate ways of knowing to describe an epistemological orientation where connected knowing is subjective in nature, and the self is essentially in relationship or connected to other people, objects, or ideas. The subject, or knower, believes the most trustworthy knowledge comes from direct, personal experience rather than from external proclamations by authority. Because knowledge comes from experiences, the way to understand another or to gain access to other people's knowledge is through empathy. Through the process of connected knowing one comes to see another in the terms of the other, not in one's own terms. It involves believing and trusting the other (Elbow, 1973). Negative judgments about another asserts superiority and creates distance between people. Truth in this epistemology is personal, particular, and grounded in firsthand experience.

In separate knowing the self is separate and autonomous from others, and relationships are seen in terms of reciprocity considering others as the self wishes to be considered. An epistemology based on separate knowing develops impersonal procedures for establishing truth. Separate knowing puts ideas on trial, looking for something wrong, a loophole; it is the doubting mind
needed for critical thinking at later stages of development (Elbow, 1973). As separate knowers accept the standards of authorities, they believe laws, not people, govern the world, and authority is non-arbitrary, resting on reason rather than power or status. They value objectivity, suppressing the self in order to be impersonal toward the object. Feelings and personal beliefs are excluded in favor of pure reason. Although these two ways of knowing are not gender-specific, research suggests they are gender-related. More men than women are inclined towards separate knowing, while more women than men are inclined towards connected knowing (Belenky, et al., 1986).

The object relations school of psychology has focused on the development of the self in relation to others, and feminist theorists believe that knowing is related to how individuals see themselves in relation to others. Chodorow (1978), one of the earliest feminist psychoanalytic theorists, posits that women are more relational and empathetic because women, universally, are primarily responsible for early child-rearing, and in this process, as the female child develops she forms her identity by identification with the mother. She learns about intimate relationship and interdependence by staying in close relationship with another female, the mother.

Males, according to Chodorow, are not able to fully identify with the mother, and yet do not have an ever-present male to bond and identify with. Their internal representation of the self is less well-developed so they develop their identity through autonomy rather than connection. It is understandable that males would find it easier to rely on pre-fabricated judgments, rules, and policies to make decisions, on tools not requiring contextual, in-the-moment, holistic reasoning. This researcher would venture to claim that this knowing
through judgment, separation, objectivity, analysis, and hierarchy is the dominant and revered model in the Western world, while knowing through connection, interdependence, subjectivity is devalued.

Schaef (1981) describes two distinct gender-related systems of defining and perceiving relationships, the White Male System, and the Female System. These systems affect how individuals think, see, and learn, how they develop pictures of reality. In the White Male System relationships are experienced as either one-up or one-down, one person is superior and one is inferior, limiting the nature of the interaction. In this system, the center of the universe is the self and work, and everything else is defined by these and peripheral to them. Schaef says that in the Female System, relationships are conceived of as peer, not superior or inferior, until proven otherwise, and the center of the universe is relationships. Everything else must go through, relate to, and be defined by relationships. Schaef does not elaborate on the differences in relationships by social class.

Constructed knowledge is a third epistemological position in which women view all knowledge as contextual and experience themselves as creators of knowledge and value both subjective and objective strategies for knowing. They integrate feeling and thinking and have a high tolerance for internal contradiction and ambiguity, perhaps because they have lacked power and control over their own lives. This orientation is grounded in the belief that all knowledge is constructed and the knower himself or herself is an intimate part of that which is known. The moral response in this context is one of sensitivity to the situation and the context, a caring response (Belencky, 1986).
Gilligan (1982), chosen because of her truly groundbreaking work on feminine ethics, focuses on an alternative epistemology based on her work with male and female subjects, both adolescents and adults. She found that women define themselves in terms of their relationships with others, and come to know their world through these relationships. Gilligan concluded there are at least two ways of being in the world and therefore knowing about the world: a person as discrete, separate from others, seeing and knowing the world as an object from a distance, and a person connected or interdependent in relationship to others, knowing the world through those connections. From these two ways of knowing evolve two distinct modes of moral judgment, justice and care. Both gender related, and related to modes of self-definition. This theory and its relationship to ethical reasoning shall be discussed further in Chapter IV.

Dreyfus and Dreyfus, (1980) propose a skills acquisition model of knowing which values tacit knowledge embedded in experience. Achievement of expert skill is contingent upon transcending mere rule-based behavior to rely on situational, experiential, discretionary knowledge which cannot be made explicit in rule-based form. Like knowing how to drive a car, one can know how to approach an ethical dilemma based on experience and discretionary knowledge that is not necessarily based in previously prescribed rules. This model is discussed in greater detail in Chapter VIII.

Dual Structure of Knowledge and Experiential Learning

Building on the work of Lewin, Dewey, and Piaget, Kolb (1984) describes the dual structure of learning as a function of grasping experiences, ideas, and information through a process of apprehension which he calls concrete
experience, or through the process of comprehension, or abstract conceptualization.

According to Kolb, concrete experience has primacy as individuals apprehend reality in a very personal, tangible, expressive, and affective manner. Knowledge is subjective, personal, and involves emotional appraisal. The root of concrete experience stems from the limbic or reptilian brain, the ancient, pre-mammalian part of the brain responsible for sensory and instinctive awareness. Learning occurs with a recursive framing through appreciation. The value orientation is one of mindfulness and attending to the other, using one's whole self, including the senses. The present study adds the dimension of individual characteristics, particularly those associated with the feminine social role, Jung's personality characteristic of feeling judgment, and Kolb's concrete learning style. The structures of social knowledge include Pepper's World Hypothesis, particularly the organic and contextualist world view paradigms, and the communitarian moral orientation, discussed in greater depth here later. Ethical reasoning completes the list of components of the dual knowledge theory of experiential learning, with the ethic of care.
Table 2.1  
The Dual Knowledge Theory of Experiential Learning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dual Ways of Knowing World</th>
<th>Concrete Experience has primacy</th>
<th>Concrete Experience has primacy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apprehension</td>
<td>Comprehension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feeling</td>
<td>Thinking</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emotional Appraisal</td>
<td>Cognitive Interpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limbic/Reptilian Brain</td>
<td>Cerebral Brain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subjective personal knowledge</td>
<td>Objective social knowledge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Learning Processes         | Recursive framing through appreciation | Discursive naming through criticism |

| Value Orientation          | Valuing as the process of “attending to” | Values as universal transcendent principles |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Orientation</th>
<th>“Walk the Talk”</th>
<th>Creation of a universalist morality based on reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comportment</td>
<td>Judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Application</td>
<td>Justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Virtue of care</td>
<td>Virtue of justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communitarian</td>
<td>Consequentialist</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal Communication Situation</th>
<th>Ideal Listening Situation</th>
<th>Ideal Speech Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expressive/being</td>
<td>Instrumental/doing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gadamer’s dialogue</td>
<td>Habermas’ rational</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buber’s I/Thou</td>
<td>argumentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Kolb and Baker, 1992, in press.
A learning approach emphasizing concrete experience focuses on direct, personal involvement with human situations. It is a way of knowing and understanding that comes from feeling rather than thinking, and emphasizes the unique and complex aspects of the present situation rather than an interest in the theoretical or more abstract generalizations. It is a more intuitive than scientific or systematic way of seeing and experiencing the world (Kolb, 1984).

Abstract conceptualization is used to comprehend the world using intellect, rationality, logic, and distanced knowing. Kolb believes abstract concepts have priority, in contrast to the primacy of concrete experience. They involve the cerebral brain, emphasizing objective social knowledge. Learning occurs through a discursive naming or labeling of reality through criticism or analysis. Values are developed as universal principles transcending context. The individual characteristics include the masculine gender or social role, Jung's thinking judgment dimension to personality, and Kolb's abstract learning style. Pepper's mechanism and formism world hypotheses and the consequentialist moral orientation add social knowledge, and the ethic of justice form of ethical reasoning completes the model.

A preference towards abstract conceptualization leads one to know and understand the world through an understanding of the meaning of ideas and situations by observing and describing them. An abstract approach emphasizes understanding rather than practical application, a concern with truth and reflection rather than action.

William James, in speaking of the two forms of knowing, referred to the "knowledge of acquaintance" versus "knowledge about", 
"Through feelings we become acquainted with things, but only by our thought do we know them. Feelings are the germ and starting points of cognition, thoughts the developed tree." (James, 1890, Vol. 1, p. 222 in Kolb, 1984)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concrete Experience</th>
<th>Abstract Conceptualization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involved with experiences and dealing with immediate human situations in a personal way</td>
<td>*Uses logic, ideas, and concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Emphasizes feeling as opposed to thinking</td>
<td>*Emphasizes thinking as opposed to feeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Concerned with the uniqueness and complexity of present reality</td>
<td>*Concerned with building general theories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Prefers an intuitive, artistic approach to problems</td>
<td>*Uses a scientific approach to problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Enjoys and is good at relating to others</td>
<td>*Good at systematic planning, manipulation of abstract symbols, and quantitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Good intuitive decision-making, functions well in unstructured situations</td>
<td>*Values precision, the rigor and discipline of analyzing ideas, and the aesthetic quality of a neat, conceptual system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Values relating to people, being involved in real situations, and an open-minded approach to life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the concrete and abstract dimensions of learning, learning occurs through the action or reflection. Comprehensive, complex learning occurs by going around the entire experiential learning cycle, a recursive process where learning skills are increasingly honed. Kolb's Learning Style
Inventory identifies four styles of learning that emphasizes a preference for a combination of two of the four dimensions of learning: concrete and active, called accommodator, concrete and reflective or diverger, abstract and active or converger, or abstract and reflective, called assimilator. While an individual has a preference for any one of these styles, the environment plays a role in the development of learning style, and an individual can gain skills in another style and change primary orientation.

Kolb's learning dimensions correlate with the Myers Briggs Type Indicator, a personality assessment instrument based on the four dimensions of personality described by Carl G. Jung. The apprehension dimension of concrete experience correlates with thinking/feeling at .34 (p < .01, 2-tailed test) for undergraduate students (n=135), while abstract conceptualization has a correlation of -.25 (p < .01, 2-tailed test) for the same sample. With a sample of educational administrators (n=46) the correlation of thinking with concrete experience is r = -.31 and with abstract conceptualization scores r = .22. The correlation with feeling is r = .39 (p < .01, 2-tailed test) for concrete experience, and r = -.34 (p < .05) for abstract conceptualization (Kolb, 1984). The thinking and feeling judgment dimensions of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator are discussed later in this chapter, while the instrument is more thoroughly described in Chapter V.

Emotion and Cognition

The third aspect of individual characteristics studied here is emotion and cognition in the service of judgment and decision-making. While it is accepted that judgments and decisions sometimes will be influenced by emotion, emotional judgments usually are considered less legitimate or reliable than
objective and rational ones. This research explores the impact of both feeling judgment and thinking judgment on ethical reasoning, and examines their relative weight when compared to the individual characteristics of gender and learning discussed above, and the structures of social knowledge, world view and moral orientations discussed in the next chapter.

The remainder of this chapter reviews the pertinent literature on affect and emotion, and cognition and thinking, leading to a discussion of that part of Jung’s typology of personality that includes thinking judgment and feeling judgment used in this research.

Affect and Emotion

Affect is a form of emotional experience, a response to an idea, information, or experience. Emotions can be measured by physiological responses of heart rate, pulse rate, skin temperature, levels of perspiration, and emotional responses have patterns of physiological change (Levenson, 1988). Affect has at least two distinctly different tones, positive or negative. A person may feel positively toward an experience, idea, or piece of information, and express it through words, actions, body language, tone of voice. If I like you I am more inclined to help you, speak nicely to you, and smile at you than at someone I dislike, fear, or have a strong aversion towards.

Emotions are relational, concerning person-environment relationships that involve harms and benefits, relationships that change over time and circumstances. Emotions often are predicated on complex social structures and meanings that define what is harmful or beneficial and therefore require judgment, the ability to learn from experience and distinguish subtle differences that signify different consequences for well-being. In this way emotions have
greater variability and flexibility than reflexes or physiological drives. Emotion has its own innate action tendency which can be concealed or overridden by the process of coping; for example, the tendency is to respond to fear through avoidance or escape, but it can be inhibited or transformed by counter-phobic coping (Lazarus, 1991).

Emotions are based on feelings or affects, and affects are evaluative responses to objects. Emotions must be directed at an appropriate content, such as the like or dislike of something, and be grounded on appropriate beliefs about that thing. An emotional state has content to it, a content that is often propositional, and founded on a belief, so emotions have both cognitive and affective elements (Gaus, 1990). Emotional responses provide knowledge of values, because it is with emotions that individuals develop value concepts. Feeling becomes a necessary condition for the cognition of goodness.

Lazarus (1991) developed a model of the bi-directional relationships between cognition and emotion. Emotion is an independent variable, a cause of a thought, because it interferes with or affects subsequent thought. Anger at an individual may lead to an "appraisal," or evaluation of the emotion, such as thinking that anger was too strong a response to the situation, thus creating a second emotion, perhaps shame, or embarrassment. In this latter part of the relationship, the thought about "appraisal," or evaluation of the first emotion of anger in turn causes shame. Here an emotion leads to a thought, which in turn leads to another and different emotion.

Zajonc (Kolb, 1984) contradicts Lazarus and in his work which includes research by Wundt, he argues that feeling and thinking are separate processes, the affective as primary, occurring before cognitive analysis. Affect is not
preceded by cognition, and needs no cognition. Intuition is guided by affective or apprehensive processes which are co-equal with cognitive judgment.

Kohlberg (1969) asserted that in the moral realm emotion is structured by cognition and may accompany moral judgments, but is unimportant to the structure of moral judgments. Piaget developed a model encompassing both cognitive and emotional components of development, believing that cognitive and emotional development follow parallel and complementary courses. Cognition provides the structure for development; emotion supplies the energy. Affect and cognition, Piaget believed, are inseparable, there is no thought without emotion and no emotion occurs without thought (Eisenberg, 1986). In his model of affective development, the beginnings of moral feelings such as respect and obedience emerge at approximately 2-7 years of age. During a stage of concrete operations, at 7-11 years, appears autonomous moral feelings and "will", (the ability to coordinate conflicting values and conflicting wills so that an initially weaker impulse can become the stronger.) According to Piaget, "the will is simply the affective analogue of intellectual decentration." (Eisenberg, 1986, p. 24)

In a study of the management of emotions of service workers Hochschild (1983) found that people are inclined to either manipulate their emotions to meet the demands of the work situation, as in the case of airline stewardesses and stewards, or find ways to manipulate the situation to match their emotional state. Emotion and feeling are synonymous and feeling is "something we do by attending to inner sensation in a given way, by defining situations in a given way, by managing in given ways" (Hochschild, 1983, p.27). Emotion is a bodily
orientation to an imaginary act, and as such has what Hochschild calls a signal function; it warns us of where we stand in relation to either outer or inner events.

MacIntyre (1984), writing on the dilemmas of morality in contemporary society, criticizes the theory of emotivism that poses feelings as having a central role in ethics, where all moral judgments are,

"nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character. Particular judgments may of course unite moral and factual elements...But moral judgments, being expressions of attitude or feeling, are neither true nor false; and agreement in moral judgment is not to be secured by any rational element, for there are none. It is to be secured, if at all, by producing certain non-rational effects on the emotions or attitudes of those who disagree with one. We use moral judgments not only to express our own feelings and attitudes, but also precisely to produce such effects in others." (pp. 11-12)

MacIntyre goes on to say the expression of feelings of attitude is a function of their use on particular occasions. He goes to great lengths to argue against the claims of emotivism, using rational discourse. This discussion highlights the limitations of language to legitimately defend the role of emotion in decision-making.

Organizations, like people, do their best to deny the darker emotions present in the members of the organization, and to the extent these emotions are suppressed, they exhibit themselves in defiant, unconscious ways that can powerfully hamper an organization's effectiveness (Schwartz, H. 1987). Allowing a dialogue about the place of emotions in organizational life, about the everyday feelings people have as they live in organizations would air out some of the negative thoughts and feelings, making them less taboo and dangerous. The Zen master, Shunryu Suzuki (1977) said, "To give your sheep or cow a large, spacious meadow is the way to control him." (p. 31). Permission to be
expressive rather than withholding may initially cause uncertainty and havoc but ultimately may lead to a more balanced organizational environment.

Research on gender differences in the expression of affect in intimate relationships reveals that men do not function as well as women in the context of high negative affect (Gottman and Levenson, 1988). When conflict levels are low, men will engage in positive, reconciling and resolving behaviors to minimize the likelihood the conflict will escalate. If conflict does reach high levels, men will withdraw from the interaction. This explains the characterization of men as more ‘rational’ than women, and women as ‘emotional’, which traditionally has carried a negative value, minimizing the value of their greater ability to function in a climate of negative affect. This corresponds to the data from the Learning Style Inventory and the Myers Briggs Type Indicator showing more women prefer concrete experience and score higher on the feeling dimension, whereas more men prefer abstract conceptualization and score higher on thinking.

Cognition and Thinking

Cognition is often thought of as the process of “thinking”, to include understanding, remembering, guessing, and problem-solving. Dewey (1910) described reflective thought as consisting of a succession of things thought of, particularly a consequence or consecutive ordering in such a way that portions of the reflective thought grow out of one another and support one another. Thinking in this manner goes beyond direct observation, to what we do not see, smell, hear, or touch, and it aims at knowledge, belief about facts or in truths. Thoughts resulting in belief lead to reflective thought, to conscious inquiry into the nature, conditions, and bearings of the belief. Dewey asserted,
"Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought." (p.6).

A central function of reflection is discovery of meaning. All knowledge, according to Dewey, aims to grasp the meaning of objects and events by putting them in a larger context and rendering them significant. Something that is perplexing in one situation is connected to something else that is understood, in order to become familiar, or understood. In this way, thinking depends upon having a reservoir of meaning which can be applied as needed. For thinking to be stimulated, there must be an obstacle to be overcome, some connection needing to be made.

Dewey identified a step-by-step approach to reflective thinking. The first step is a feeling of uncertainty, an awareness of the ambiguity of the situation. Next is a clarification of this state of discomfort, a recognition of the problem. From this, ideas, plans, or hypotheses may be developed to deal with the problem. In the fourth step deductions are made from hypotheses, which in turn leads to the fifth stage of verification. Ideas are verifiable because they are plans of action or possible operations whose consequences can be tested. Ideas, according to Dewey, are,

"'pale ghosts of flesh-and-blood impressions; they are images, pallid reflections, dying echoes of first-hand intercourse with reality which takes place in sensation alone' " (Bolton, 1992, p.7).

This view of thought is distinct from the formulations of idealist and empiricist philosophers who, in their search for absolutely certain knowledge, introduced the conception of duality of mind and body, thought and action. Descartes said the influence of all behavior has to be eliminated because he
believed we can only know something absolutely when all biases of our personal actions are removed. This implies a dual self, a separation of the practical self which acts without thinking, and the mental self, which thinks without acting.

Locke asserted that all knowledge derives from two kinds of experience: that which comes directly from our sensations, and that which arises from the operation of the mind in reflection. He thought our first ideas are provided by sensation, only later to be followed by reflection. Hume concurred with Locke, but believed there are two kinds of perceptions: impressions and ideas. Impressions are those perceptions that enter the mind with more force than ideas which are images of impressions in thinking and reasoning (Bolton, 1972).

Piaget (Kolb, 1984) proposed that intellectual functioning is characterized by processes of assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation refers to the cognitive encounter with an environmental object or event that involves some kind of cognitive structuring of that object or event that fits with the already existing intellectual organization. Accommodation is coming to grips with the properties of the object, an adaptation to the requirements and demands imposed by the object or event. In the extreme, pure assimilating does not imply grasping the significance of the event, while pure accommodation to external reality may be a conformity to the event without meaningful interaction of subject and object.

Kant (1929) believed that affect could not engender moral behavior because feelings are transitory and out of our conscious control. Because we do not control our emotions we are not responsible for our feelings, so feelings
have nothing to do with morality. Emotions, according to Kant, cannot have the
universality that is required for morality because affective responses to others
differ depending on the person and the circumstances.

"Reason, with its practical law, determines the will immediately, not by
means of an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain, not even of pleasure in the
law itself, and it is only because it can, as pure reason, be practical, that it is
possible for it to be legislative." (Kant, 1929, p.292).

Morality therefore is a rational project, detached from affect and emotion.
Action done from duty excludes the influence of inclination so that only the law
can determine the will. Kant said all moral conceptions originate completely \textit{a priori} in reason, and cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical or
contingent knowledge. It is the purity of the origin of moral conceptions that
makes them worthy to "serve as our supreme practical principle..." (Kant, 1929,
p. 288).

According to Lazarus (1991b), a cognitive psychologist, cognition implies
knowledge and appraisal of what is happening in the adaptational encounters
of living. Knowledge consists of situational and generalized beliefs about how
things work. Appraisal consists of an evaluation of the personal significance of
what is happening in an encounter with the environment.

These last three sections have examined the conceptual issues related to
the individual characteristics of gender, concrete and abstract learning, and
emotion and cognition. This next section focuses specifically on those aspects
of Jung's personality typology used in this thesis.

Thinking and Feeling Judgment

Jung developed a typology of psychological types to explain how one's
type determines and limits an individual's judgment, and the relationship of the
individual to the world, to people, and to things. He describes aspects of consciousness, of attitudes of the conscious mind towards the world. Jung studied the presentation of types throughout history, using arts and letters, and Eastern and Western philosophy, and developed a typology of attitude types, introverted and extraverted, which are distinguished by their attitude to the object. The introvert's attitude is an abstracting one,

"at bottom he is always intent on withdrawing libido from the object, as though he had to prevent the object from gaining power over him. The extravert, on the contrary, has a positive relation to the object. He affirms its importance to such an extent that this subjective attitude is constantly related to and oriented by the object." (Jung, 1971, p.330).

The other types include the function-types, indicating that the individual adapts and orients him or herself with his or her most differentiated function. These functions include thinking and feeling judgment, intuition, sensing, judging and perception. For present purposes this thesis concentrates on thinking and feeling judgment.

**Thinking Judgment**

Of the four dimensions to personality, Jung defined the thinking-feeling function to explain how we orient ourselves to our environment and experiences. Thinking is,

"when the life of an individual is mainly governed by reflective thinking so that every important action proceeds, or is intended to proceed, from intellectually considered motives" (Jung, 1971, p. 197).

Thinking is fed from subjective and unconscious sources, and from objective data transmitted by sense-perception. Judgment always presupposes a criterion, and the criterion may come from external conditions or the origin
may be subjective. Thinking may take direction from or lead to objective data, external facts or ideas.

Thinking is a logical process, aimed at an impersonal finding. Thinking predicts the logical result of any particular action a person may take and the decision is made impersonally, on the basis of cause and effect. If someone trusts thinking more than feeling and uses it more, he or she is more skillful in dealing with that part of the world which behaves logically, with no unpredictable human reactions. People tend to become logical, objective and consistent, and to make decisions by analyzing and weighing the facts. People tend to use thinking-judgment for an impersonal analysis of cause and effect, including all the consequences of the alternative solutions, taking into account the cost of everything.

Jung distinguished extraverted and introverted thinking; extraverted thinking is conditioned by objective data, but can also be ideal thinking, if the ideas are abstractions from objective experience or facts. Introverted thinking is not oriented by immediate experience of objects or ideas, but is a process whereby while thinking about a concrete object or idea, one is led back to a starting point, ignoring sensations and feelings which appear as irritations to one's train of thought. This thinking process starts from the object and returns to the object and it also stands in constant relation to the subject, and it is this relation that is essential to the thinking process. Introverted thinking, Jung said, is when the emphasis is on the subjective process, when the thinking is not determined by objective data nor directed to them, but starts from the subject and is directed to subjective ideas or subjective facts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thinking Judgment</th>
<th>Feeling Judgment</th>
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<td>Thinking predicts the logical consequences of any particular choice or action. When you use thinking you decide objectively, impersonally, on the basis of cause and effect, and make decisions by analyzing and weighing the evidence. Counting the full cost of everything, and seeking an objective standard of truth.</td>
<td>Feeling considers what is important to you and other people, (without requiring that it be logical), and decides on the basis of person-centered values. You ask how much you care, or how much personal investment you have, for each of the alternatives. You are concerned about how other people will feel about the outcomes. Those with a preference for feeling tend to become sympathetic, appreciative, and tactful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are good at putting things in logical order.</td>
<td>Like harmony and will work to make it happen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond more to people’s ideas than their feelings.</td>
<td>Respond to people’s values as much as to their thoughts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipate or predict logical outcomes of choices.</td>
<td>Are good at seeing the effects of choices on people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend to be firm and tough-minded.</td>
<td>Tend to be sympathetic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are able to reprimand or fire people when necessary.</td>
<td>Dislike telling people unpleasant things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May hurt people’s feelings without knowing it.</td>
<td>Enjoy pleasing people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a talent for analyzing a problem or situation.</td>
<td>Take an interest in the person behind the job or idea.</td>
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Adapted from “Introduction to Type”, Isabel Briggs Myers, 1978.
Feeling Judgment

Feeling, Jung believed, is a process that takes place between the ego and a particular content, giving value through acceptance or rejection. Feeling can also be isolated, such as in the form of a mood, though a mood may be causally related to other events. It is a subjective process which may be independent of external stimuli but nevertheless implies a valuation of some particular content. For this reason feeling is a kind of judgment.

"Valuation by feeling extends to every content of consciousness, of whatever kind it may be. When the intensity of feeling increases, it turns into an affect, i.e., a feeling-state accompanied by marked physical innervation. Feeling is distinguished from affect by the fact that it produces no perceptible physical innervations, i.e., neither more nor less than an ordinary thinking process" (p.434).

Feeling is a way of coming to a conclusion by appreciation, bestowing on things a personal, subjective value. Feeling takes into account anything that matters or is important to oneself or other people, without requiring that it be logical, and decides on the basis of personal values. If one trusts and uses feeling more than thinking, one becomes skillful in dealing with people. One becomes sympathetic, appreciative and tactful, and gives weight when making decisions to the personal values involved, including those of other people. Using the feeling-judgment involves weighing how deeply one cares about those things that will be gained or lost by each of the alternative solutions. When someone uses feeling-judgment, one considers how the other people concerned will feel about the various outcomes and will include their feelings as well as one's own feelings, along with the facts in deciding which solution will work out best (Myers and McCaulley, 1985). Some people may be entangled in
their feelings to the exclusion of any consideration of facts or logic such as in extreme cases of emotional outrage, indignation, despair, or exuberance.

The lack of understanding of the emotional component of ethical reasoning leads to the suppression of affect such that the expression may become unconscious and stronger. According to Jung, when a function such as feeling is disregarded, underdeveloped, or repressed, and often in the unconscious, the function is susceptible to activation in an autonomous manner, such as an extreme expression in a mood. For this transfer from the conscious to the unconscious Jung (1971) used the term *enantiodromia*, taken from Heraclitus, the 5th century B.C. Greek philosopher. Heraclitus, the Weeping Philosopher, spoke of the phenomenon where everything in time turns into its opposite and is less available for integration into the conscious reasoning process. Jung conceived of it as running the other way, something he believed was fundamental to all pairs of opposites.

“The modern man has lost all the metaphysical certainties of his mediaeval brother, and set up in their place the ideals of material security, general welfare and humaneness....the rule of *enantiodromia* (conversion into the opposite), now steals upon the modern man through the by-ways of his mind, chilling him with fear and paralyzing his faith in the lasting effectiveness of social and political measures in the face of these monstrous forces....Science has destroyed even the refuge of the inner life. What was once a sheltering haven has become a place of terror. ...It is, however, true that much of the evil in the world is due to the fact that man in general is hopelessly unconscious, as it is also true that with increasing insight we can combat this evil at its source in ourselves. As science enables us to deal with injuries inflicted without, so it helps us to treat those arising from within.” (Jung, 1933, pps. 204-205).

This unconsciousness also can lead to groupthink, (Janis, 1972), the phenomenon of people making decisions through coercion, suppressing their own ideas, feelings, and impulses for the purposes of developing
emotional solidarity within the group. Because rationality is idealized and emotion is devalued, a monochromatic approach to group discussion develops, following a model that emphasizes objectivity, facts, thoughts, and rationality. In this process group members may be unaware of or ignore sense data, emotions, and intuition that assist in the decision-making process.

Both feeling and thinking ways of judging are necessary and useful, and the two methods of reasoning do not always reach the same result given the same set of facts. A person is more likely to prefer one way of judging more than the other. In judging the ideas in this thesis, the reader who uses thinking judgment considers whether the ideas are logical and consistent. The reader who is initially concerned that the ideas are pleasing or displeasing, supportive or threatening of currently held ideas is using feeling-judgment. Whichever judging process individuals use, they will use and trust one process more often than another, and the less frequently used type of judgment will be like a minority opinion, sometimes disregarded entirely. Individuals who prefer feeling become more adept in handling human relationships, while those persons who prefer thinking develop skill in the organization of facts and ideas. The preference for one or the other approach to life results in distinguishing surface traits (Myers, 1980).

More women than men, 6 out of 10, prefer deciding on the basis of personal impact or feeling, and there are cultural sanctions for this behavior for women. More men than women, 6 out of 10, report they prefer to make decisions on the basis of principles, logically and objectively. Individuals who use feeling as the basis of decisions sometimes claim that persons with a
preference for thinking are “remote,” “coldhearted,” intellectualizers without human compassion.” Individuals who prefer thinking judgment may claim that people who prefer to use feeling judgment are “too soft hearted”, unable to take a “firm stand”, “too emotional”, “illogical”, and “incapable of standing up to the face of opposition” (Kiersey and Bates, 1984).

Otis and Quenck (1989) investigated the effects of personality, role relationship, and sex on the use of care and justice considerations in the solution of moral problems, having subjects complete the Myers Briggs Type Indicator and describe how they solved a moral problem they faced in their lives. They found that individuals who preferred the thinking function generated significantly more justice considerations in non-intimate relationships than did those who preferred the feeling function. Individuals who preferred the feeling function generated significantly more care considerations in intimate relationships than did those who preferred the thinking function. They found that sex was not significantly related to the use of care or justice considerations in either relationship context.

An attempt has been made to link the thinking-feeling judgment processes to moral development. Moody (1989) analyzed Kohlberg’s stages of moral development and Gilligan’s research and believes the differences between these two approaches can best be understood as the thinking-feeling distinctions found on the Myers Briggs Type Indicator. According to Moody, caring pays attention to people while justice focuses on impersonal principles, and ethics, as a discipline, needs to value feeling as well as thinking.
Summary

While there are many ways to examine ethical reasoning, this study focuses on the primary psychological orientations of learning and knowing, thinking and feeling judgment, and emotion and cognition because they are basic to all of forms of human interaction and particularly relevant to organizational life, including ethical dilemmas. These dimensions address an interest in understanding what aspects of an individual affects the way he or she approaches ethical issues, and how these aspects might relate to one another.

This researcher believes a first step towards consensus on ethical dilemmas is a greater exploration of different ways of knowing, legitimizing non-analytic, non-rational, non-masculine ways so as to come to terms with some of the forces that shape consciousness. The arena of the emotions as well as the unconscious is still terra incognita for many people. These dimensions of individual and collective mental life can be recognized as having significant impact on everyday behavior in organizations. We believe that only through this more comprehensive knowing, the integration of logic and emotion, of concrete and abstract, of separation and connection, can understanding and harmony be attained.

While this chapter has reviewed the literature concerned with the set of independent variables representing individual characteristics, the next chapter will discuss the structures of social knowledge, in particular the organismic-mechanism world views, and the communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations.
CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE:
STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE

"The separation of natural concern and institutional behavior is not only the sign of coercion, but is positively destructive of natural societies....We must see that many acts commonly regarded as legal and even meritorious are treason against our natural society, if they involve us in situations where we cease to have personal responsibility and concern for the consequences."  

Paul Goodman

Introduction

The theory underlying this research contends that the impact of individual characteristics on ethical reasoning will be greater than the impact of social knowledge structures because individual characteristics are more central to the whole person while social knowledge is ideological, encompassing belief systems about what is good and true, what is of value, and what is fact. Belief systems, ideas, and values, while central to ethical action, are less a description of the self and more espoused ideas and values. At cognitive and affective levels individuals experience the world, their gender role, their learning interactions with the environment, and their preferred mode of judgment. The world hypotheses and moral orientations of communitarianism and consequentialism are articulated symbolically in a latent manner, if at all.

While the previous chapter reviewed the literature on the individual characteristics of gender, abstract and concrete ways of learning, and the domain of emotion and cognition and thinking and feeling judgment, this chapter discusses structures of social knowledge, "the independent, socially and culturally transmitted network of words, symbols, and images that is
based solely on comprehension.” (Kolb, 1984, p.105). It begins with a discussion of various epistemological orientations before examining the descriptive beliefs of Pepper’s World Hypotheses. Traditional teleological and deontological theories of ethics and goodness are reviewed, and later contrasted with the normative communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations.

In the ethics literature, ethics and morality are sometimes used synonymously. According to Flanagan (1991), philosophers commonly conceive of morality as a mechanism for resolving interpersonal conflicts, or to achieve social harmony, or to secure the greatest possible good. In doing this they ignore the fact that morality also attempts to define a concept of a “good person”, a mature individual, and a good life.

Epistemology

“Even when all the possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely unanswered.” Wittgenstein

Epistemology, from the Greek, episteme, is the study or theory of the origin, nature, methods, and limits of knowledge. It is the study of how people know things, how they come to understand the world. Some people know things, hold their ideas and beliefs, because they trust in the ideas that have been handed down to them from their families, or their religious institutions. Others know by their senses, what they can see, hear, taste, touch, and smell. Still other individuals know things because they have an intuition about how things work and how things are. From a particular epistemological standpoint one develops a set of assumptions, values, and beliefs about the world and one’s
relationship to it. If someone has a belief or faith that all people are good at heart, he or she might be able to find compassion even for a tyrannical dictator. For others, if they cannot experience something directly with their senses, it does not exist. They may be atheists, disbelieving in what cannot be seen, in the spirit or the mystical.

Plato believed knowing was limited to deductive knowing by developing the qualities of objectivity and emotional distance. He considered the passions as unruly and untrustworthy. The ideal the guardians of the state were to uphold was that of self-discipline and self-government, where reason keeps feelings and emotions under control. He emphasized "inner" harmony at the expense of "outer" connection. This prescription fits with the Western cultural stereotypes of today, where some would say that most men are supposed to be objective, analytical, rational, and interested in ideas and things. In contrast, most women have been socialized to be nurturing, interpersonally sensitive, empathetic, and able to express feelings and emotion. This does not preclude men from being sensitive and empathetic, or women to be objective and rational.

In the modern era, from the Renaissance and continuing through the Enlightenment with the development of Cartesian reasoning, knowing has been defined and restricted through a set of universal laws dominated by rational, cognitive thought. Embodied in this way of knowing is the belief that human beings are capable of being objective, knowers separate from the known, explaining and controlling most things through scientific methods. Science has been viewed as the key to success, happiness, and prosperity. The former President of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel (1992)
suggests the current state of the world, with holes in the ozone layer, the failure of Communism, the widening gap between the rich north and the poor south throughout the world, the AIDS crisis, and the problem of the homeless population, all point to the failure of any one ideology, including objectivity, to solve problems. While the world is drowning in information, it lacks meaning, caring, and a decent and humane life for all; yet people, particularly political leaders, continue to believe that objective means can be employed to eliminate the problems resulting from objectivity. Havel suggests,

"We need a new attitude, an ability to see things as others do, a sense of transcendental responsibility, archetypal wisdom, good taste, courage, compassion, and faith in the importance of particular measures that do not aspire to be a universal key to salvation....Things ...are to be perceived in their individuality. We must see the pluralism of the world....We must try harder to understand than to explain....The way forward is to get to the heart of reality through personal experience, ...human uniqueness, human action and the human spirit must be rehabilitated." New York Times, March, 1992.

The challenge of ethics in the current post-modern period is to know what is knowable, and that which is not; to acknowledge the need to live interdependently with one another, and respect unique individual characteristics. In the face of this complex task people must act with courage, dignity, vulnerability, and compassion. The Dalai Lama, a Nobel Laureate for Peace (1990), expressed his gratitude to China, the persecutor and destroyer of Tibet, for bringing the world's attention to the dire situation in Tibet. The Tibetans want to live peacefully as neighbors with China, thus embodying the ideal of cultural plurality: seeking agreement as a global community while retaining reverence for the uniqueness and dignity of each individual.
Individual ways of knowing, thinking, and feeling are at the foundation of ethical reasoning. The individual characteristics that describe a person, independent from his or her espoused beliefs, influence actions. From experience and understanding of what is considered "true" comes knowledge of right and wrong, good and bad. What is right and wrong corresponds with what is true and what is true depends on how one experiences and knows the world. The domain of epistemology is grounded in philosophy and psychology. How individuals think, feel, experience and interact with the environment affect ethical reasoning.

Hunt (1987), an educational psychologist, describes what he calls an inside-out psychology, found entirely in one's own experience, not in the theories of expert psychologists, which he calls the Outside-in approach to understanding human behavior. The two approaches are reciprocal to one another, so neither is to be abandoned. According to Hunt, self-knowledge precedes learning from others, concreteness-as-direct-experience, the here-and-now immediacy of the present is where learning begins. Beginning with ourselves is the most primal place to begin learning, the place where truth resides, and the source of intrinsic and lasting motivation. Depending on where one sits in the organization, one has a different point of view, knows different things, and knows in a different way. The experience of the assembly line transmits knowledge in a different manner than the experience of the board room. If a worker sees theft in the warehouse on a regular basis over months or years, he or she does not need statistical reports to validate knowledge of the phenomenon.
Descriptive Belief Systems

The World Hypotheses and Organicism and Mechanism

World View Paradigms

The philosopher Stephen Pepper (Kolb, 1984), chosen here because of his work that relates closely to experiential learning, proposed a framework for describing the structure of knowledge based on a system of four root metaphors to interpret the world. Formism has the root metaphor of the observed similarity between objects and events. Mechanism’s root metaphor is the machine. Contextualism, also known as pragmatism, has the root metaphor of the changing historical event. Organicism, also known as absolute idealism, has the root metaphor of achievement of harmonious unity, or the living organism.

From the perspective of organicism the world is inherently active and changing. The epistemological orientation of this position is one where the world and the knower are unified, and the known world is an active construction of the knower-in-context. Functions or goals are defined in relation to structures that serve them. The scientific methodology is rational, ecological, and emphasizes the precedence of concepts over sense data. People who hold an organicism world view are active, changing, purposive and autonomous. They are self-differentiating, creative, and symbolic, and although each person has a unique personality system, he or she also is an integral part of a larger interpersonal system. This model of a person as active and changing was developed by Kant and Hegel, seen in Piaget’s developmental psychology, in general systems theory, and in aspects of the psychology of Maslow and Rogers (Johnson, et. al., 1988).
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<tr>
<th>MECHANISM</th>
<th>ORGANICISM</th>
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<tr>
<td>Root Metaphor: Machine</td>
<td>Root Metaphor: Living Organism</td>
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**Ontology**

- Stability
- Elementarism  
- Change
- Holism

**Epistemology**

- Objectivism
- Realism  
- Interactionism
- Constructivism

**Explanation**

- Reductionistic analysis
- Parts related in antecedent-consequence  
- Synthetic understanding of organization
- Functions served by structures

**View of Persons**

- Reactive
- Passive
- Determined by environment
- No inherent functions
- No true development toward endpoints
- Separate from social environment  
- Active
- Purposive
- Autonomous
- Inherent functions
- Creative, changing, progressive
- Integrated into social environment
To understand what it is to be human sometimes people contrast themselves with that which is not human, that which occurs naturally in the environment or is made by humans. The person versus nature, nature versus the machine, and person versus the machine dichotomies offer insights into the question of the nature of being human. Since people began making machines they have been intrigued with the power of machines, the abilities of machines to do what people cannot do as well, or as fast, or at all. Machines make life easier, are more efficient, and predictable, and have extended life itself. Machines have the capacity to send people to the moon or contain a twenty-six volume encyclopaedia on a small computer chip. Enchanted, people try to emulate and conform to the demands of smart machines; they are logical, orderly, and controllable.

Machines have their limitations: they are helpless without human tending. They do what they are programmed to do, without intuition, emotion, or creativity to respond to situations; they do not get spontaneous leaps of insight, and are essentially reactive.

Pepper’s root metaphor of the mechanism world view is the machine, and the universe is seen as composed of discrete parts inherently at rest. The static parts and relations between them are the basic units to which all objects and events are ultimately reducible. The epistemology of this view is that reality is external to the knower and the knower reflects the world. The object of knowledge is distinguishable from the subject. The ideal form of explanation in mechanism is a reductionist analysis of parts and their functional relations. The parts are related in chains of interactions, and the scientific methodology of this world view is empirical, disciplinary, and
stresses the precedence of sense data over concepts. Persons who hold the mechanism world view are seen as reactive, passive, and completely determined by their environments. Their personalities consist of quantifiable stimulus-response contingencies, and persons are distinct from their environments. This image arises from John Locke’s *tabula rasa* and was refined by Berkely, Hume, John Stuart Mill, and the modern behaviorists.

Kolb believes Pepper’s system of world hypotheses can be overlaid on the structural dimensions of the learning process, “The analytic world views emphasize knowing by comprehension, and the synthetic world views give primary emphasis to knowing by apprehension” (Kolb, 1984, p.111). Mechanism relies more on rationality and less on sense experience to analytically separate appearance from reality. The theory of truth from a mechanism world view lies in the primary qualities or structures that make up the world, relying on secondary qualities or comprehensions. Organicism is a world view based on apprehension, with an emphasis on absolute values and ideas. The root metaphor of a harmonious unit stems from the biological organism flowing to its fulfillment, with a central concern of growth and development, with a focus on realizing the ideal from the actual. The theory of truth in organicism is coherence, derived from that which is “inclusive, determinant, and organized in an organic whole where every element relates to every other in an interdependent system.” (Kolb, 1984,p. 118).

Durkheim (1933) first characterized forms of social organization, distinguishing mechanical from organic solidarity. A society, group, or organization has mechanical solidarity when:
"...The ideas and tendencies common to all members of the society are
greater in number and intensity than those which pertain personally to each
member. This solidarity can grow only in inverse ratio to personality. It is as
much stronger as the excess is more considerable. But what makes our
personality is how much of our own individual qualities we have, what
distinguishes us from others. There are in each of us, as we have said, two
consciences: one which is common to our group in its entirety, which,
consequently, is not ourself, but society living and acting within us; the other,
on the contrary, represents that in us which is personal and distinct, that
which makes us an individual. Solidarity which comes from likeness is at its
maximum when the collective conscience completely envelops our whole
conscience and coincides in all points with it." (p. 129)

Organic solidarity develops from differences between individuals rather
than similarities, from the division of labor and increasing differentiation of
functions. Because each task, role, or element in a differentiated society is
specialized and less tightly bound to common actions and beliefs, but
nevertheless more interdependent than under mechanical solidarity, the
society requires more contracts, laws, and procedures. Durkheim believed
all systems needed a common conscience collective, and only with an
anchoring to common sets of symbolic representations and common
assumptions about the world could moral unity prevail.

Burns and Stalker (1961) present a typology of organizational
management systems characterized as organic and mechanistic, both
representing a rational form of organization because both explicitly are
developed to utilize human resources efficiently. The model is useful
because of its compatibility with the Pepper paradigm discussed above.
One wants to assume there are correlations between the characterizations
of human outlooks on life and the characteristics of organizations people
have created. Historically masculine and feminine, organic and
mechanistic, yin and yang, Apollonian and Dionysian, all describe forms of understanding the multifaceted rational and emotional nature of individuals.

The mechanistic management system, appropriate to stable conditions, is characterized by:

a. specialized differentiation of functional tasks into which the organization's problems and tasks are broken down

b. the abstract nature of each separate task, which is pursued with techniques and purpose distinct from the organization as a whole

c. the reconciliation, for each level in the hierarchy, of these distinct performances by the immediate superiors, who also are responsible for seeing that each is relevant in his or her own special part of the primary task

d. the precise definition of rights, obligations, and technical methods attached to each functional role

e. the translation of rights, obligations, and methods into the responsibilities of a functional position

f. hierarchic structure of control, authority, and communication

g. a reinforcement of the hierarchic structure by the location of knowledge of actualities, exclusively at the top of the hierarchy, where the final reconciliation of distinct tasks and assessment of relevance is made

h. a tendency for interaction between members of the organization to be vertical

i. a tendency for operations and working behavior to be governed by the instructions and decisions issued by superiors
j. insistence on loyalty to the concern and obedience to superiors as a condition of membership

k. greater importance and prestige attached to local than to cosmopolitan knowledge, experience, and skill

The organic management system is appropriate to changing conditions, with fresh problems and unknown demands. It is characterized as organic because:

a. special knowledge and experience contribute to the common task of the organization

b. the individual task is seen as set by the total situation of the organization

c. the adjustment and continual re-definition of individual tasks through interaction with others

d. problems may not be shed or discarded as being someone else's responsibility

e. the spread of commitment to the concern beyond any technical definition

f. a network structure of control, authority, and communication. The sanctions applying to the individual in his or her work role derive from a community of interest with the rest of the organization, and less from a contractual relationship between the individual and a non-personal corporation.

g. knowledge of the technical or commercial nature of a task may be located anywhere in the network, becoming the ad hoc center of authority and communication
h. communication in a lateral rather than vertical direction throughout the organization, more consultative rather than imperative
i. communication consisting of information and advice rather than instructions and decisions
j. commitment to the task and technical progress and expansion is more valued than loyalty and obedience
k. importance and prestige attached to affiliations and expertise valid in the industrial, technical, and commercial milieux external to the firm

This categorization of organizational systems is useful for understanding the culture of an organization and its influence on members of the organization, and the nature of the fit between the individual and the organization. Individuals are more comfortable in organizations with compatible values, beliefs, and attitudes. As an example, people attracted to the military culture would most likely hold different values, beliefs and attitudes than persons dedicated to working in a community-based arts organization. The former is clearly more mechanistic while the latter is more organic

Normative Belief Systems of Value and Goodness

The world hypotheses discussed above are a set of beliefs descriptive of a view of the world, how it appears rather than how one would perhaps like it to be. In contrast, the following section addresses normative belief systems, a manner of defining the world as one would like it to be, a prescription for what is good and what is true. Philosophers and ethicists have traditionally divided ideas about the world into these classifications in an attempt to explain the gap between what is ideal and what is real. A
discussion follows of traditional theories of ethics and morality, including value and virtue.

**Teleological theories**

Teleological theories suggest the moral worth of any action is determined by the consequences of the action. Utilitarianism is a classic teleological theory put forth by David Hume (1711-1766), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), claiming the deciding criterion for an action is what action will result in providing the greatest good for the greatest number of all affected by the action. For example, a company president may have the decision of whether to take some portion of unexpected profits and give a party for the employees, or donate the money to charity. The utilitarian perspective claims an action or practice is right if it leads to the greatest possible balance of good consequences, and the "concepts of duty and right are subordinated to or determined by that which is good." (Beauchamp and Bowie, 1979, p.3.)

Utilitarianism is committed to the maximization of the good, to produce the greatest balance of value for all persons affected. For organizational management this means a maximization of efficiency as a means to greater profits. Some people argue business is primarily concerned with producing goods and services through optimal productivity which is best done through maximum efficiency. Efficiency is considered the means for maximizing the good, though the debate is unresolved as to what constitutes "good." Hedonistic utilitarians think pleasure or happiness is intrinsically good, so any act which maximizes pleasure, which may include friendship, health, and knowledge, is right.
The utilitarian viewpoint is committed to the measurement and comparison of goods. Bentham developed the hedonic calculus, a means of quantitatively adding individual happiness and subtracting individual unhappiness to arrive at a measure of total happiness. This theory has been incorporated into economic thought, particularly with the "law of diminishing marginal utility."

Utilitarian philosophers are divided into act utilitarians and rule utilitarians. The act utilitarian believes that in all circumstances an individual should act in such a way that leads to the greatest good for the greatest number. Rules are to be viewed as guidelines to the actions that lead to the common good, and can be violated if the violation would lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. Rule utilitarians believe actions and judgments should abide by firm and publicly advocated moral rules meant to determine correct behavior. Rules are meant to protect people from their own shortcomings, particularly the view that their own case is unique and deserving of an exception to the rule. Adherence to the rules allows people to avoid acts of individual injustice.

A recent example of a rule utilitarian action was the case of Dow Corning. Dow Corning believed they were not violating rules by continuing to manufacture breast implants, even though the implants were known to cause harm in a number of consumers. They rationalized their actions as providing the greatest good for the greatest number, and even though some people got hurt.

Dow Corning, along with other organizations, highlights the distinction between utilitarianism and egoism; egoism leads to maximal utilitarian
results. Beauchamp and Bowie (1979) distinguish between two types of egoism, psychological egoism and ethical egoism. Psychological egoism takes the perspective that all individuals are always motivated to act in their own perceived self-interest, where the ultimate motive for any action is self-interest. A business organization sponsoring an athletic event receives publicity; a company providing free products to a developing nation gets international recognition.

Ethical egoism is a moral theory about what one ought to do: one ought to always act on the basis of one's own best interest. An ethical egoist takes another person's interests into account when it appeals to his or her own self interest, and ethical egoists believe it is most often in one's own interest to take the interest of others into account because it promotes self-interest to treat others well. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) warned against a world of ethical egoism because in such a world people would act exclusively in their own interests, violently attacking one another. This "state of nature" would be one of constant danger and anxiety. Hobbes' solution was to urge people to form a powerful state to protect themselves from their own egoism.

Adam Smith offered an alternative view to ethical egoism, suggesting the public good evolves out of some restrained clash of competing individual interests. Smith believed an "invisible hand" guides the interaction between individuals so that the public good is attained, a way of saying that individual egoism leads to utilitarianism, the greatest good for the greatest number. Smith thought the invisible hand was a better approach than an all powerful authoritarian Hobbesian state for achieving public interest.
The utilitarian and egoist perspective leaves a great deal unresolved, particularly the definition of goodness, the quantification of goodness, and the problem of unjust consequences. The act utilitarians would lead one to believe innocent people can be punished when rules are followed to the exclusion of particular circumstances. A rule utilitarian could claim that a slave society produced the greatest good for the greatest number. In contrast, it has been argued that the Bill of Rights can constrain individuals rather than lead to the greatest good for the greatest number.

**Deontological theories**

An alternative view to utilitarianism is that ethical theory must be deontological or nonconsequential. Deontology claims the concept of duty is independent of the concept of good, and right action is not determined by the production of good. Personal commitment, the illegality of an act, or the religious foundation for an act are all features other than goodness that can determine the rightness of an act. Relationships between people have significance independent of the consequences of the relationship, and individuals cannot be considered in isolation from the particular relationship.

Deontologists suggest that ethics looks at the past, the present, as well as the future for consequences, and motivation must be used to evaluate action. In business organizations customers or clients are treated in the context of their history with the business. If the client has a long and positive relationship with the business, the business is more likely to be flexible and make adjustments when that client is late in payments for a product or service, or requests for special services or products. The obligation and duty to the client or customer takes precedence over consideration of the greatest
good to the greatest number. Nonconsequential relations such as business affiliations are believed to intrinsically enhance ethical and moral behavior.

The sanctity of contracts is a deontological concept, keeping promises independent of the consequences. Some organizations expect to have a special obligation to employees, or customers, special moral obligations, independent of the general good. The negative side to this perspective is when a contract does not specify particular favors, and the customer demands special treatment that may be illegal if not unethical. The government was forced to pass special laws prohibiting federal officials from accepting bribes from private contractors and special interest groups.

While utilitarians focus on the most efficient means to the desired goals, deontologists believe it is difficult to be certain of the ultimate goals, and the future consequences of actions are not always predictable. Individuals encounter the claims, rights, and moral problems of others, and must respond to these, often at the expense of achieving previously determined business goals. Although business activities have goals, the moral boundaries restricting those activities do not have goals, so while business codes of ethics restrict what may occur, the codes do not attempt to maximize value through establishing goals.

Universality of Moral Rules

Kant believed in the sense of duty as the proper motive for moral action, moral action having the quality of universality. Acts done from moral duty alone have moral worth, and that worth is found in a principle or rule that determines how one ought to act. Praise or blame depends on motives or intentions, which are laid out by the rule or principle determining action. The
rules that determine duty are correct because they are universal, they apply
to everyone, like the Golden Rule. Morality requires treating others as one
would like them to treat oneself, and, not treating others in ways one would
not accept if one were the recipient of that treatment. Kant believed morality
requires consistency of action and judgment when one is both receiving and
giving. One does not make an exception of oneself, does not engage in
actions which could not be recommended to everyone.

In organizational life in the United States, with its emphasis on
individualism, individuals often ask to be the exception to the rule, to go
outside the rule or guideline “just this once.” Kickbacks and bribes,
dishonesty, cheating, and stealing undermine honest organizational
practices, and such exemptions from rules contradict the commonly held
ideal that everyone is subject to the same rules. If practiced, it condones
dishonest behavior for everyone. Kant summarizes his conviction in the
categorical imperative, “One ought never to act except in such a way that
one can also will that one’s maxim should become a universal law.”
(Beauchamp and Bowie, 1979, p.20). This necessarily means actions such
as bribery cannot be made into a universal law, and such actions, immoral
as they are, are independent of the individual or cultural influences.

The categorical imperative requires people always to treat each other
as ends in themselves, not means. People have unconditioned value, value
apart from any judgment or action that could confer value, as human beings
confer value on other things. Unlike utilitarianism which considers individual
human happiness as a means for maximizing total happiness in society,
thereby treating the individual as having instrumental value towards some
other ends, Kantian philosophy maintains a principle of respect for persons. Motivation for action comes from a sense of duty, and every moral act is motivated by conscience.

**Goodness and Virtue**

"The essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to the point where it makes friendly intercourse impossible, and that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one's love on other human individuals." Orwell, *On Gandhi*

Underlying a discussion about ethics is a tacit assumption about right and wrong, good and bad, acceptable and unacceptable action. What does it mean to be good, to do something good, to "do the right thing"? This is the fundamental question moral philosophers have been asking since Plato (427-347 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.). They both believed people should be capable of exercising rational capacities. Reason itself should allow human beings to know what is good and what is not. By this argument, reason itself is the greatest quality of human nature, and human beings should follow that which sets them above any other forms of life, namely, a life of reason.

This belief in goodness was carried into the public sphere of the polity, where goodness occurred when each group performed its proper function. For Plato in particular, the exclusive function of the business class was to provide for the material needs of the citizens in an efficient manner, and the government's role was to develop public policy promoting the general good of the state.
MacIntyre (1984), in his concern about the lack of goodness or virtue, describes what he sees as a world without a morally integrated fabric, one that is torn with many voices of chaos, lacking conscience, floundering like the proverbial fish out of water. He refers to the current period of post-Enlightenment as one of moral decay, where moral plurality is an oxymoron because a truly moral society embraces universal truths about virtue. He criticizes modern liberal political society with its ideals of individualism and plurality. Instead MacIntyre argues for moral unity as a project within a political community, an Aristotelian concept of a society where every activity is aimed at some good, because that is the nature of human beings, they move towards a specific telos or purpose. The good or virtuous is both local and universal, located in the polis.

Modern society poses obstacles to the demonstration of virtue. Individualism implies autonomy which is protected so as to avoid manipulation by others. The predicament of the autonomous moral agent, according to MacIntyre, is the lack of a secular, rational justification for one's moral allegiances. Those principles and perspectives we hold to dearly we want others to ascribe to, yet without the external authority of traditional morality, without divine law, natural teleology, or hierarchical authority, how can one convince another of the "truth"? For life to be meaningful people seek to find predictability in the world, finding generalizations which will capture the behavior of others but simultaneously allowing themselves semi-infinite freedom.

Flanagan (1991), cited here because of his work interlacing psychology with philosophy, suggests the concept of virtue is complex because many
different traits can be considered virtues, and most likely no one person
could possess all of them. Also, the list of virtues changes, depending upon
the person and situation. Such qualities or traits as charity, hope, faith,
friendship, patience, humility, courage, justice, and temperance are among
those that vary depending on which philosopher, culture, and era referred to.
Flanagan is concerned with morality from the psychological perspective,
pointing out that it is not clear how traits such as virtues interact with one
another to form individual dispositions. He believes virtues are situation
sensitive and can interact with emotion, cognition, and temperament, and
connect to action in unknown ways.

According to Berman (1990), a scientific historian, the cultural plurality
of the United States and the world has given way to a moral plurality that is
leading to various forms of destruction, both to self and others. The scientific
revolution and its methodology must be seen in its socioeconomic and
historical context.

"We are cast adrift on a sea of radical relativism. Then there is no Truth,
but merely your truth, my truth, the truth of this time or that place. This is the
implication of what is commonly called the sociology of knowledge. The
distinction between knowledge and opinion, between science and ideology,
crumbles, and what is right becomes a matter of majority rule, or 'mob
psychology.' " (Berman, 1984, p.55)

Coleman (1987) believes most people do not discuss virtue, but rather
engage around the subjects of duty, obligation, reason, intuition, or
emotivism. He begins with a set of presumptions for a theory of virtue: there
must be a substantive community, a teleological understanding of human
life, a narrative unity which makes sense of life as a whole, and a tradition
that places that narrative in a context. Individualism precludes discourse
about virtue because of the value-pluralism and structural and functional differentiation of competing institutions and spheres of activity, such as the economy, religion, the family, and education. Segmentation and fragmentation preclude principles of integration. Role specialization leads to role segmentation, leading people to conceive of their duties and obligations differently depending on whether they are in the role of parent, student, worker, or community member.

The academic and lay discourses on ethics and ethical practices assume a set of values of right and wrong, good and bad, virtuous and non-virtuous. Ethics and morals may be used interchangeably, but morality is used in the context of universal principles. Morality may refer to individual personal or organizational behavior; ethical behavior connotes accountability to others. Morality refers to individuals vis a vis one another at home or in the community, and, by contrast, of the ethical behavior of business executives and public officials to larger, faceless groups. Morality, as discussed earlier, pertains to interpersonal conflict, what principles, guidelines, codes of conduct individuals use to carry out their relationships, and a sense of goodness of the individual. By extension, ethics is morality in practice.

Valuing and Knowledge

From the perspective of this researcher it is no longer possible to assume unanimity concerning what is the good, the true, and the beautiful, for individuals, organizations, the community, or the society. In scanning today’s moral landscape we note a lack of common values and beliefs about what is right and wrong, good or bad, true or false. The diversity of society
across age grades, socioeconomic classes, ethnic and cultural identities, religious preferences, and sexual orientations underscores the plurality of realities, socially constructed and otherwise. Post-modernism and deconstructionism highlight the possibility of a limited meeting ground or commonly shared reality between individuals and groups. When repeatedly confronted with what might, in a sole incident, appear to be deviant behavior, one begins to recognize a pattern of distinctly different and, for this researcher, not infrequently disturbing values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.

Values are personal beliefs and synonymous with the modes we use in moral reasoning. Lewis (1990) describes six fundamental ways of knowing the world: through authority, logic, intuition, sense experience, emotion, and science, which is an amalgam of sense experience, logic, and intuition. By adopting one valuing mode or method of moral reasoning over another the mode or method itself becomes a dominant personal value. When making a value judgment, the judgment dominates and affects all other value choices. For example, if the dominant value is logic, then other values, such as spirituality, aestheticism, or emotionality are necessarily less of a priority.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode by which we arrive at knowledge</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Summary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Authority</td>
<td>Taking someone else’s word, having faith in an external authority. For example, having faith in church or Bible.</td>
<td>I have faith in the authority of...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Deductive logic</td>
<td>Subjecting beliefs to the variety of consistency tests that underlie deductive reasoning.</td>
<td>Since A is true, B must be true, because B follows from A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sense experience</td>
<td>Gaining direct knowledge through our own five senses.</td>
<td>I know it’s true because I saw it, I heard it, I tasted it, I smelled it, or I touched it myself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Emotion</td>
<td>Feeling that something is right: Although we do not usually associate feeling with thinking or judging, we actually “think” and “judge” through our emotions all the time.</td>
<td>I feel that this is true.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Intuition</td>
<td>Unconscious thinking that is not emotional. Think of the mind as if it were in three parts: the conscious mind; the emotions (hypothalamus or primitive brain); and the unconscious-but-not-emotive intuitive mind. Both the conscious mind and the unconscious-intuitive mind are highly sophisticated, but the unconscious-intuitive mind is much more powerful than the conscious mind, just as a supercomputer is more powerful than a microcomputer. Hence most creative discoveries are intuitively derived, only later “dressed up” by logic, observation, or some other conscious technique.</td>
<td>After struggling with this problem all day, I went to bed confused and exhausted. The next morning, as I awakened, the solution came to me in a flash and I just knew it was true.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. “Science”</td>
<td>A synthetic technique that relies on sense experience to collect the observable facts; intuition to develop a testable hypothesis about the facts; logic to develop the test (experiment); and sense experience again to complete the test.</td>
<td>I tested the hypothesis experimentally and found that it was true.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Knowing by authority involves looking to recognized authorities, such as a company president, a diety, a set of laws such the Ten Commandments or the constitution to answer questions and find solutions. Middle level managers who unquestioningly take orders from senior management are knowing by valuing authority above their own experience. In the context of a team of managers, when groupthink (Janis, 1971) occurs, the need for solidarity in the group can lead members to ignore relevant data and short circuit the more comprehensive decision-making process. Unfortunately this can be the outcome of knowing by authority, seen in totalitarian dictatorships, military organizations, religious orders, and other large and small organizations that stifle independent, creative and critical thought.

Logic, in the form of Socratic questioning, the dialectic, the syllogistic, or the cataloguing of common fallacies, is a form of knowing based on the works of Socrates, Spinoza, and Mortimer Adler. Logic would lead to the belief that organizational behavior can be changed through a series of planned interventions. However logic alone is not sufficient to understand or manage in a complex and changing environment. Human and organizational behavior involve emotions, intuition, unconscious processes, and the uncontrollable impact from the environment. Napoleon, in speaking of the limitations of logic, succinctly said the spirit is mightier than the sword.

Montaigne spoke of the use of sense experience as a way of perceiving the world and knowing what is true. He believed that while logic and Christianity are highly abstract and judgmental, providing rules and theories, the true world is ambiguous and moral evidence is personal and concrete, with proper action depending on particular circumstances. In contrast, one's
senses would convey that the world is flat; with further exploration, sense experience demonstrates it is round. In an organizational context, a manager may choose to believe only those things he or she has had direct experience with, putting boundaries on the amounts and kinds of knowledge and information used in making a decision, known as bounded rationality (March and Simon, in Scott, 1987).

According to Lewis, knowing by emotion is knowing by feeling, and has three features related to three emotional needs: (1.) participation in a group so that membership leads to security, (2.) a way of life that leads to an emotional identity, for example, living in a democracy leads to a sense of pride, and (3.) an emotional stimulus, such as an enemy. Emotions may be accompanied by physical experiences, such as sensations in the abdomen, heart, or nervous system. The body acts as a truth teller, so the plagues of a stomach ache, a fast heart beat, or neck pain, may be symptoms and signals of organizational stress. These problems are common enough in organizations that some corporations in Silicon Valley have hired physical therapists and massage therapists so as to maintain the comfort and health of their employees.

Intuition is unconscious thinking, where facts and theories are synthesized quickly, almost unconsciously. Information is presented, and then a leap of imagination or thought takes place, and a new idea presents itself, without the steps of an algorithm. It is similar to arriving at conclusion E knowing A and perhaps B, but not having conscious knowledge of even the existence of C or D. Intuition is gaining recognition in management practice and theory, perhaps as creativity is highly valued, as unforeseen
leaps of knowledge take place in science, and as more women enter organizations. Einstein said, "Imagination is more important than knowledge."

Science, Lewis believes, is a combination of sense experience, where facts are gathered, intuition, an immersion into the facts until a solution appears, and logic, a logical sequence of steps to think through. Since the Enlightenment scientific values of rationality, skepticism and empiricism have dominated social and political thought. Science has presumed to pursue generalizations thought to approximate absolute truths. The mathematician Edward Turring quoted Wittgenstein as saying, "Even when all the possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely unanswered."

Not all needs are "felt" needs, but if needs have no relation to feelings they will not give rise to active caring or valuing of something (Gaus, 1990). All intrinsic valuing of objects involves intentional feeling, so the affective basis of "value" is focused on the nature of "valuing", not what is "valuable". Hence, one values something intrinsically if one has positive emotions toward it, and devalues it if one has negative emotions towards it. In this way, one's attitude towards something is the same as the valuing of it, so a positive attitude is by its nature positive valuing, and vice versa.

Values can be intrinsically or extrinsically derived, but extrinsic reinforcement of intrinsic values or motivations can and do drive out the intrinsic motivation and behavior (Schwartz, B., 1990). According to Schwartz economics has strongly influenced social relations. Individuals spend time, invest energy, assess the value of particular tasks, and weigh
the worth of a person, activity, or thing. Sometimes this is a measure of achievement, but in other ways daily life takes on a market value, an externally determined evaluation of our own worth and activities, and those of others. Hirsch (1976) coins the phrase, the economy of bad neighbors: when people are too busy consuming to spend an evening socializing with friends and neighbors, the decision to be sociable is an economic decision, an economic ethos driving comportment.

In his study of businessmen as gamesmen, Maccoby distinguished between two categories of values, head values and heart values. He found head traits were most valued by managers and accountants (Patten, 1990). Head traits include self-confidence, open-mindedness, pride in performance, cooperativeness, coolness under stress, flexibility, the ability to take the initiative, and satisfaction with creating something new. Heart traits are generosity, sense of humor, idealism, compassion, openness, spontaneity, a critical and questioning attitude toward authority, friendliness, loyalty to fellow workers, honesty, and independence. According to Maccoby, "it takes a well developed heart to make difficult judgments in terms of the human values involved." (Patten, 1990, p. 792), to which Patten concludes that a head/heart imbalance is perhaps indicative of the lack of ethical concern in organizational life.

Normative Belief Systems Concerning Fact and Truth

Durkheim (1933) claimed the increasing alienation and anomie was to a great extent a result of the industrial revolution, with roots in the middle part of the nineteenth century. As adults and children left their homes, communities, and farms to work in cities and factories, family life changed. Factory hours
were long throughout the entire year, not seasonal like farm hours, and travel time extended the day into night. Bureaucracy alienated and desensitized life as work became increasingly segmented, rationalized, specialized, and ruled by technology and the demands of owners for greater efficiency and profits. Work organizations were not meant for the expression of either the light or dark sides of human nature. Weber, writing in 1916 observed,

"Its [bureaucracy] specific nature which is welcomed by capitalism develops the more perfectly the more bureaucracy is 'dehumanized,' the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue." (Rubinstein, 1975, p.22)

Rubinstein adds,

"Bureaucracy can be understood as a structural and organizational expression of the related processes of secularization, disenchantment of the world, and rationalization" (pp.27-28.)

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, with the shift from the town to the city, from the farm or cottage to the factory and shop, a change occurred in values and moral orientation. Whereas people previously had spent time at home, in their villages or on their farms, with their families and neighbors, they were now spending twelve hours a day working in a factory. They moved to the cities, living and working next to strangers rather than with the neighbors they had known for generations. The sense of community changed, and although neighborhoods presumably were synonymous with community, people found themselves traveling considerable distances to work and visit extended family.

Previously there had been a strong communitarian orientation, one of taking care of one's neighbor and responding to immediate needs and
concerns. As urban populations grew people were asked to think about their stranger/neighbors across town, and vote for issues they knew nothing about, did not directly concern them, but required public opinion (Bellah, et al. 1985). Thousands of military employees regularly moved from place to place, so that their children, pejoratively labeled "Army brats," could not claim any one place as home. The shift from town to city, from community and care for individuals to a sense of alienation and legislation for unnamed numbers of people, was a shift to a consequentialist moral orientation, to a consideration of what would bring the greatest good to the greatest number of people. It was expedient, practical, and impersonal (Quandt, 1970, Wolfe, 1989).

The consequentialist moral orientation articulated in the views of Socrates asserts that those with the greatest wisdom and knowledge should make the decisions for all others (Levine, 1984, Stone, 1988). Socrates posed the idea of a philosopher king, one who would rule because he was most fitted to make the best moral judgments for the people. The work on moral development in this century, specifying an ethic of justice and an ethic of care, has similarities with the earlier ethics. The present thesis investigates the relationships between the ethic of justice (Cavanagh, 1990, Kohlberg, 1969, Gilligan, 1987) and the consequentialist moral orientation, and between the ethic of care (Gilligan, 1982, Lyons, 1982, Noddings, 1984) and the communitarian moral orientation.
The Communitarian Moral Orientation

If I am not for myself, who will be for me?
If I am only for myself, what am I?
If not now, when?  Hillel

The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community.  
William James

The communitarian orientation is based on the deontological theory of the concept of duty as independent of the concept of good, and thus right actions are not determined by the production of good. Relationships have significance independent of the consequences of the relationships, so attention is paid to the action and motivation, not simply the consequences of the action. Kropotkin (earliest edition, 1914), a former Russian nobelman turned historian and scholar, writes about mutual aid throughout history, beginning with the "savages," and continuing into the present era, where the ideological roots of communitarianism would seem to be in traditions of mutual aid passed on over time.

Kropotkin recalls that throughout the Ice Age and Stone Age people organized themselves into the social organizations of societies, bands, and tribes. The current Eskimo, Papuas, and Bushmen retain some of these communitarian ways of living in tribes or clans. In addition to forms of communal marriage, the clan owned all that was obtained from hunting and fishing. The earliest Semites, the Greeks of Hомер, the prehistoric Romans, the early Celts, and the early Slavonians all had a period of clan
organization, with communal customs. During the Barbarian period, common agriculture was practiced among the Teuton tribes, the Saxons, the Franks, and the Scottish, Irish, and Welsh. As recently as the early part of this century there were numerous tribes living under a social organization almost identical with that of the Barbarian period, including people in the steppes of Asia, the islands of the Pacific, and the desert tribes of Africa. When conflicts or quarrels took place, the community at once interfered, and after the case was heard by the community’s adjudicator, compensation was paid to the wronged person, his or her family, as well as a fine for the breach of the peace which had to be paid to the community. This adjudicator, or folkmote, had the supreme power, the functions of the duke or king being strictly limited, for the king was a lord in his personal domain only.

In the wake of a revolt of fortified towns against serfdom, in the mediaeval cities of Europe, mutual aid flourished, and with it the further refinement of a communitarian way of life. This way of life included self-jurisdiction, self-administration, and trade and craft guilds. The villages of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries grew to be centers of liberty and enlightenment, having unity of thought, action, and initiative. With the growing diversity of occupations, crafts and arts, and growing commerce in distant lands, guilds, brotherhoods, and friendships developed. These organizations had statutes prescribing social characteristics including the general brotherly feelings which must reign in the guild; the regulations relative to self-jurisdiction in cases of quarrels arising between brothers, or a brother and a stranger; and the social duties of the brethren. The social duties are explicitly communitarian:
"If a brother's house is burned, or he has lost his ship, or has suffered on a pilgrim's voyage, all the brethren must come to his aid. If a brother falls dangerously ill, two brethren must keep watch by his bed till he is out of danger, and if he dies, the brethren must bury him--a great affair in those times of pestilences--and follow him to the church and the grave. After his death they must provide for his children, if necessary; very often the widow becomes a sister to the guild." (Kropotkin, pps. 171-172.)

Kropotkin points out that members of the guild treated each other as, and named each other, brother and sister, treated as equals before the guild. They owned chattel in common, and all took the oath of abandoning all feuds of old, without imposing upon each other the obligation of never quarrelling again. Guilds were formed for a great variety of pursuits, not only merchants, craftsmen, hunters and peasants, but also priests, teachers of schools and universities, guilds for performing the passion play, and even guilds of lost women and beggars.

The intellectuals of the American progressive era (1870's-1920's) proposed a return to the communitarian ethic of small towns, where people took personal responsibility for their lives and those around them (Quandt, 1970). These communitarians were committed to social solidarity built upon a foundation of common values and goals, and the social roles implied a wide range of obligations. Relationships and institutions were characterized as involving intimacy, mutual identification, and face-to-face communication among friends, neighbors, and co-workers. For communitarians such as Mary Parker Follett, Jane Addams, Robert Park, and John Dewey, the cultural idea of unity resided in diversity. They believed moral unity could resolve conflict between classes and groups, through cooperative collectivism, immediacy, neighborhood loyalty, and a unity of humanity and nature.
Durkheim (1933) defined the collective or common conscience as that totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society that forms a determinate system which has its own life. He believed judicial, governmental, scientific, industrial, and other special functions of society are of a psychic nature because they are constituted of systems of representations and actions. In a society of mechanical solidarity,

"ideas and tendencies common to all members of the society are greater in number and intensity than those which pertain personally to each member. This solidarity can grow only in inverse relation to personality." (Coser, 1977, p.136).

Mechanical solidarity prevails where individual differences are minimized and individuals are similar in their devotion to the common good. Organic solidarity develops from differences rather than similarities, between individuals, and is the product of the division of labor. In a society with highly differentiated functions, individuals develop greater differences among themselves. Durkheim believed a society with a highly developed organic solidarity needed a common conscience collective, a common set of symbolic representations, with common assumptions about the world, so as to have moral unity. Without moral unity and without the controlling influence of society on individual propensities, anomie results, a state of relative normlessness within the social structure. Individuals without the regulation of common norms have no moral guidance.

In contrast, the industrial society, centered in the large urban unit or metropolis, engendered greater individual autonomy, smaller areas of common values, and social roles that involved limited obligations. People traveled to or across the city for employment and had less need and
opportunity for face-to-face contact with neighbors. This corresponds to Weber’s characterization of bureaucratic industrial organizations where rules, policies, and contracts regulate social and organizational relationships and interaction and substitute for interpersonal trust and confidence.

In the United States after World War II a resurgence of individualism occurred, having initially developed during the frontier epoch and later championed by Benjamin Franklin. Individual competitive success was glorified and included an emphasis on personal wants and satisfaction, and a standard of living measured by consumer goods. While the sentiments of a common good remained in some religious contexts, it dwindled in the public sphere. Public concerns, like economic concerns, were regarded to be for the purposes of pursuing one’s own individual needs. Citizenship involved claiming rights and access to resources and overshadowed civic politics. The activities of the public sphere—working, going to school, commerce, accessing government services—were instrumental, as means to individual ends. The activities of the private realm—family life, sports, art—were ends in themselves. This division of the social world allowed for the emergence of “value pluralism”, each person pursuing his or her own life without bothering the neighbors (Bellah, et. al.1991).

Most recently, in the 1990’s, Amitai Etzioni began a communitarian movement with a journal and series of conferences. Although the beginnings are small, communitarianism has drawn attention to some of the difficulties confronting a society that has for so long emphasized individualism over consideration of the common good. The communitarian
platform does not require a return to village or small town life, but does call for leaving as many functions as possible to be discharged on the local level rather than taken over by the state or federal bureaucracy. While respecting individual rights, the communitarians are concerned with moral coherence, and thus put some restrictions of individual rights for the good of the community. The community is to be the first place people turn to when they need help (Etzioni, 1991).

The emphasis on individualistic achievement and self-fulfillment often makes it difficult for people to sustain commitments to others in both the personal and public spheres. Although the American tradition maintains that through the community individuals can realize and express themselves, today Americans have little faith or trust in community. Bellah, et. al. (1985) called for a moral ecology, a cultural shift to a balance of faith in institutions along with beliefs in the individual, rather than shutting out institutions as oppressive and restraining of individuality. Institutions are character forming, and communitarians believe substantive ethical identities and active participation in a democratic society are essential to the formation and maintenance of a decent society. Even autonomy depends on a particular institutional structure, and autonomy, without responsibility and care, is void of substance.

George Cabot Lodge, at the Business School at Harvard writing of the new ideology of communitarianism, asserts the community is more than the sum of the individuals in it. The community has special needs and,

"the survival and self-respect of the individuals in it depend on the recognition of the needs....Individual fulfillment depends mostly on a place in
a community, an identity with a whole, participation in an organic social process” (Lodge, 1983, p.30).

This concept of community is distinguished from the natural laws of John Locke that were brought to America from England in the eighteenth century and survived here for perhaps one hundred years. The five “natural laws” included individualism, property rights, competition as the equivalent of consumer desire, the limited state, and scientific specialization and fragmentation.

According to Lodge, few people today are able to realize these “laws.” The majority of work settings do not allow for individual fulfillment or equality of opportunity, but rather equality of result. The dilemma between consumer desire and community need presently is evident in the automobile industry: does the automobile industry satisfy consumer desires for bigger cars, or serve the needs of the community for smaller ones? Who decides? Today’s state is not in any sense limited, with approximately sixteen percent of the labor force employed with a government agency. Government provides subsidies, grants, allowances, and contracts to individuals, corporations, universities, and farmers. Although many would claim an increase in specialization and fragmentation, there is an ever increasing pull towards holistic approaches, cooperative and collaborative stances towards solving national and international problems. The current global agenda includes harmony with nature.

Lodge warns that with the new ideology can come the oppression of minorities, and the elimination of the rights of privacy, choice, and liberty. He calls for ensuring democracy at all levels, avoiding the excesses of
centralized, authoritarian, impersonal bureaucracy. He suggests the need for an increasing awareness, on the part of managers, to understand the long-term interests of individuals and communities, seeing the context of the relationships to produce systemic solutions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communitarian</th>
<th>Consequentialist</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Common values and goals</td>
<td>1. Consider the greatest good for the greatest number.</td>
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<td>2. Social role implies wide range of obligations</td>
<td>2. Duty and right are subordinated to or determined by that which is considered good.</td>
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<td>3. Face-to-face communication</td>
<td>3. Cost-benefit analysis of competing actions is judged by criterion of external technical success.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Cultural ideal of unity in diversity</td>
<td>4. Intrinsic value is defined in morally neutral terms and morality as a means to intrinsic value.</td>
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<td>5. Anti-bureaucratic</td>
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<td>6. Moral unity to resolve conflicts</td>
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<td>7. Organic, intimate, mutual identification</td>
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The Consequentialist Moral Orientation

In contrast to the communitarian moral orientation, the consequentialist orientation, similar to a utilitarian ethic articulated by Hume, Bentham, and Mill, is the principle of first and foremost consideration given to what will promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. This orientation relies on a teleological theory where the moral worth of actions or practices is determined solely by the consequences of the actions or practices. Duty and right are subordinated to or determined by that which is considered good. In modern society the dominant moral logic is a cost-benefit analysis of competing actions, judged by criterion of external technical success. The ideological model for personal and community life is one of contractual structure of the economic and bureaucratic world, where the economic order of individualism and a market economy undermines a tradition of virtue. In a tradition of virtue a moral life is one of integrity, internally motivated, not by obligation, which is directed from an external source to the self (Coleman, 1987). Consequences are considered impartially, without reference to the agent whose actions they are consequences of. In considering actions to be taken, a consequentialist would choose the action with the best consequences, one which maximizes the social good (Kapur, 1991).

Deontological precepts are those rules, laws, and governments that are formed to protect rights, and it is the rules that guide actions. Everyone has worth, and therefore everyone has a duty to respect others. Actions, guided by rules and laws, become universal law. The problem with a deontological orientation is the lack of concern for consequences. Rawls, in explaining a
morality based on universal and contractual rules and equitable treatment, believed that rational persons formulate principles to guide behavior as if behind a "veil of ignorance", disregarding the impact on actual individual lives (Getz, 1990, pp. 567-577). The veil of ignorance is a formula for fairness whereby the person judging behavior has no knowledge of the individual or the context of the behavior, so the behavior can be judged "im impartially", as though the judge were blind to individual differences or circumstances. Utilitarianism traditionally has seen,

"persons as locations of their respective utilities-as the sites at which such activities as desiring and having pleasure and pain take place. Once note has been taken of the person's utility, utilitarianism has no further direct interest in any information about him" (Sen and Williams 1990, p.4).

Utilitarian ethics has two forms: act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the consequences, good or bad, of the action itself. Kant's categorical imperative is rule-utilitarianism: to act in such as way as you would want the action to become universal law. Bentham, Mill, and Moore, all act-utilitarians, believe that the right or wrong of an action is to be judged solely by the consequences brought about by the action. Whether pleasure or goodness comes from developing a cure for AIDS or developing a national preventative health education program, the act-utilitarians are interested in whether the total consequences of developing a cure for AIDS are better than those for developing an education program. In a world of competing values and needs, these decisions as to which consequences are better for whom become more difficult to answer.
Sen and Williams (1990) contend that consequentialism judges everything ultimately by the goodness of states of affairs, so in judging an action there is no intrinsic interest in the non-utility characteristics, either of those who take the action or of those affected by it. There is no need to know who is doing what to whom as long as the impact of the actions, both direct and indirect, is known. This amounts to a neglect of a person’s attachments and autonomy, to a person’s integrity. This indifference to the separateness and identity of individuals, and consequently to their goals and plans, and the importance of their agency and actions, contributes to this neglect.

Act consequentialism, similar to act utilitarianism, fails to satisfy what Flanagan (1991) calls the “Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism”. The principle states,

“Make sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures like us” (p.32).

The problem arises when one is supposed to act so as to produce the best possible outcome for each and every action opportunity. For the consequentialist it would be best if one takes all available good-producing action opportunities, but one needs to ask how many such opportunities are there. Thus, to be a good act consequentialist one would have to take account of all action opportunities, determine which among them would produce the best outcome, and then do them. Flanagan points out that consequentialists are not required to always be right about their choice of actions, recognizing the demands of reality and our limited power to see the future. He thinks act consequentialism is too demanding because it requires an ‘utterly impossible amount of attention to one’s action options and to the
ranking of outcomes.” (Flanagan, 1991, p.34). Flanagan continues to say that although utilitarianism indicates that the action is best which produces the best outcome, it need not tell us that agents should always act or be motivated to act so as to produce the best outcome. “One can be an act utilitarian when it comes to assessing the rightness of any action without requiring that individual agents operate with an act-utilitarian psychology” (Flanagan, 1991, p.35).

Rule-utilitarianism maintains the position of,

“the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness and badness of the consequences of a rule that everyone should perform the action in like circumstances.” (Smart and Williams, 1973, p.9).

The rule-utilitarian, defending “rule worship” (Smart and Williams, 1973), is concerned with human happiness and believes that under most circumstances the rule will be beneficial to abide by; therefore everyone should abide by it at all times, even though there are cases where is is not beneficial to obey the rules.

Flanagan points out the obvious problem with utilitarian, consequentialist, and Kantian perspectives, namely, that a person’s personality can disappear behind the view that right action will follow as long as one accepts the right general purpose moral principles. He calls this an optimism about the power of cognition and will, or practical rationality, as philosophers call it. During the Holocaust many persons submitted themselves to values which under normal circumstances and in nonrationalized form they would otherwise have expressed revulsion.

“The Holocaust left the Enlightenment optimist--the true believer in the efficacy of ethical cognition--with a serious credibility problem. The morality
of fascism was a morality, formally speaking, of duty and right and will” (Flanagan, 1991, p.182).

Summary

This and the previous chapter have tried to demonstrate that individuals come to know and understand their lives and worlds in distinctly different ways. While some prefer to use their five senses to understand reality, others hold to a strong set of beliefs handed down from an external source, while still others find comfort and guidance in the world of logic. This diversity of perspectives contributes to a rich global community, and, simultaneously it takes a toll on human health, safety, life itself, and the current and future global environment. Discovering and understanding a person’s assumptions and perceptions of how the world is, how he or she puts together a world view and how it correlates to a pattern of interaction with the environment could lead to a dialogue about the meaning and consequences of his or her ethical outlook and decisions.

The thesis does not focus on the logistical aspects of decision-making which include decision-making strategies, use of a decisional balance sheet, a stage-sequence model of decision-making, the effects of commitment, and assessing the quality of decision-making. While these are important aspects to ethical reasoning, this research emphasizes the impact of the underlying effects of personality and epistemology, moral beliefs, values, and world view on two orientations towards ethical reasoning that will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: ETHICAL REASONING

"Every man lives in two realms, the internal and the external. The internal is that realm of spiritual ends expressed in art, literature, morals, and religion. The external is that complex of devices, techniques, mechanisms, and instrumentalities by means of which we live. Our problem today is that we have allowed the internal to become lost in the external. We have allowed the means by which we live to outdistance the ends for which we live."

Martin Luther King, Jr.

Introduction

Ethical reasoning takes different forms, depending on several factors. This study examines the relative impact of two different sets of independent variables to see how they influence ethical reasoning. The research also investigates which of the independent variables are related to two particular forms of ethical reasoning used here, the ethic of care and the ethic of justice.

Among the factors affecting ethical reasoning, the distinction used here is of the individual in relation to the environment as distinct from the individual's particular beliefs or ideas about the world and morality. The former are self-descriptive individual characteristics, the latter are structures of social knowledge, those espoused ideas and beliefs that are more comprehensitional than apprehensional. The individual characteristics of gender, personality characteristics, and learning, and the social knowledge structures of world view hypotheses and moral belief systems were discussed in the previous two chapters. This chapter introduces two forms of ethical reasoning: the ethic of care and the ethic of justice, both of which
have a tradition specific to women and men, respectively. The chapter ends with a summary of the literature on management ethics.

The Ethic of Justice

The tradition of an ethic of justice, represented by the works of Locke, Kant, and Rawls, promotes personal liberty and a social contract model of human relationships. Together these form the ideal of individual autonomy, with the two dimensions of moral autonomy and personal autonomy. The social contract implies that people can have moral autonomy when they use reason to discern what principles ought to be followed; from the ideal of personal liberty comes the belief that personal autonomy is the entitlement to pursue one's own visions of the good in one's own way (Meyers and Kittay, 1987).

Kohlberg conceived of morality as the resolution of interpersonal conflicts related to justice or fairness with the resolution implemented through cognition by way of a characteristic style of moral reasoning. Kohlberg’s (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer, 1983) initial model of moral development encompassed three levels and six stages. In the first level, the preconventional level, the first stage is that of compliance, or “obey or pay”, when the individual feels obliged to respond to the demands of another and extrinsic motivator. The second stage occurs when individuals strive to satisfy themselves, perhaps occasionally satisfying another person. Self is perceived as being outside of the group, without intrinsic motivation or inherent desire to adhere to the norms of the group. At the second or conventional level, in stage three, the individual attempts to win the approval of others by helping the others in some way. At stage four, a
person conforms to law and order, doing one's duty within the arena of a community, organization, family, or society. At level three, the post conventional level, the individual perceives him or her self to be above the group and has examined his or her own values. In this manner the individual respects individual rights and abides by those examined values. At stage six a person acts in accordance with universally accepted principles, able to give in to a universally prescribed moral code of conduct not specific to an individual or specific group.

Kohlberg's seventh stage of development involves a shift from justice to love or agape, and is characterized by a realization of the oneness of mind with the whole of nature and an identification with the cosmic perspective. Kohlberg distinguished this final stage and the other six stages in terms of moral versus ethical/religious reasoning, and believed they can be studied as separate and parallel domains (Carter, 1987). At the seventh stage one has a sense of unity with nature, what is considered a natural law orientation toward ethical questions. Natural law holds that,

"human responsibilities, duties, and rights are not arbitrary or dependent upon social convention but are objectively grounded as laws of nature. Presumably individuals can apprehend these laws of nature through the exercise of reason." (Kohlberg and Ryncarz, 1990, pp.196).

More recently Kohlberg linked gender and morality, identifying moral perspective as a developing cognitive trait and constructing a hierarchical scheme of moral plateaus which can be called the morality of rights. The highest level of moral attainment emphasizes rights and obligations, rules and principles, and questions of justice, fairness, reciprocity, and equality, all terms about the relation of the self to the rules of society. In Kohlberg's
earlier studies he found that women more often reason at an "intermediate level of moral development" where judgment is influenced by relationships and concrete human concerns (Jack and Jack, 1989). In this view, women’s emphasis on relationships and contextual reasoning indicates an inability to develop autonomy and independence.

Ethics, and the ethic of justice traditionally encompassed the behavior of the individual or a set of traits that characterize an individual as ethical or not. The individual is judged as though he or she were in isolation while tacitly acknowledging that his or her actions impact others. The individual as moral agent is figural against a ground of social relationships, and judges the conflicting claims of self and others against a standard of equality. The moral question is "What is just?" Self and morality are defined as individual autonomy (thereby elevating autonomy to the position of the ideal) and social responsibility, guided by duty and obligation, assuming reciprocity as in the "Golden Rule", or the "categorical imperative." Intimacy and interdependence can threaten freedom and autonomy; therefore boundaries between people must be maintained to avoid intrusion. Relationships are to be separated from the human context. In this view society is composed of autonomous, independent individuals with a hierarchy of rules, rights, and obligations that provide safety from aggression or infringement of rights (Jack and Jack, 1989). This conforms to Maslow’s definition of the self-actualized person, one who is both autonomous and detached, able to make judgments on the basis of principles regardless of social pressure.
Flanagan (1991) argues that morality goes beyond what is fair and just and a matter of reasoning. While morality is a social phenomenon, it is also mediated through the psychology of the individual, to the above mentioned matters of temperament; emotion, cognition, and interaction with the situation impact the context and boundaries of morality.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual is defined as:</th>
<th><strong>Ethic of Care</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ethic of Justice</strong></th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Connected and in relation to others; see others in their own situations and contexts.</td>
<td>Separate/objective in relation to others; sees others as one would like to be seen by them, in objectivity.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Relationships are understood as:</th>
<th><strong>Ethic of Care</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ethic of Justice</strong></th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Response to another in their own terms.</td>
<td>Reciprocity between separate individuals, grounded in the duty and obligation of their roles.</td>
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<th>Ethical issues are construed as or are issues of:</th>
<th><strong>Ethic of Care</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ethic of Justice</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationships or of response, that is, how to respond to others in their particular terms, resolved through the activity of care.</td>
<td>Conflicting claims between self and others; resolved by invoking rules, principles, standards.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Considerations include:</th>
<th><strong>Ethic of Care</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ethic of Justice</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Maintaining relationships and connections of interdependent individuals; b. promoting welfare or well being of others or preventing harm; relieving pain and suffering, psychological or physical.</td>
<td>a. One’s role-related obligations, duty, commitment, b. standards, rules, principles for self, others, society, including reciprocity.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th><strong>Ethic of Care</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ethic of Justice</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. What happened/will happen; how things worked out; b. whether relationships were/are maintained or restored.</td>
<td>a. How decisions are thought about and justified, b. whether values, principles, standards were/are maintained; emphasis on fairness.</td>
<td></td>
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Adapted from Lyons 1988.
The Ethic of Care

"The vulnerability or openness of people to one another enables people to wound one another and also creates a powerful channel for help. Such openness, thus, is both a mark of human frailty and a source of human strength." Carol Gilligan

Early Antecedents

The contemporary counterpoint to the ethic of justice may be said to be the ethic of care, but the early precursor of the ethic of care may have been in an explanation of moral order proposed after the Reformation, in the early eighteenth century. Philosophers of that period, in acknowledging the limitations of deity and the power and presence of reason, were not willing to suspend entirely a belief in providence but rather developed a philosophic optimism, reducing the presence of deity. If the world had been created by God then it could only be the best of all possible worlds, and evil, as an imperfection of the parts, was necessary for the real perfection of the whole. Moral evil was thought to be the result of the misuse of free will. Alexander Pope summed up his concept of the perfect system with, "Whatever is, is right." (Marnell, 1968, p.37).

These beliefs contrasted with those of Hobbes (1588 - 1679), who saw the men motivated solely by self-interest, thus requiring a sovereign authority to maintain order and stability in the state. Hobbes believed that while moral concepts may differ among people, people do not differ in their instinct for self-preservation, foreshadowing social Darwinism of the nineteenth century. Different individuals bring different wills, and compromise is the path to survival of the conflicting wills. From compromise emerges law, and law does not depend upon morality but morality depends
upon law. Natural law is the creation of the human will, part of the instinct for survival, and rights are antecedent to law.

In contrast to Hobbes, the Earl of Shaftesbury (1671 - 1713), a philosophic optimist, also believed that a wise and good God would only create the best of all possible worlds, and saw the natural essence of life as noble and beautiful. Shaftesbury believed the moral sense is instinctual but requires training and sharpening for greater perceptivity. Francis Hutcheson (1694 - 1746), a professor of moral philosophy at Galsgow, defending and embellishing on Shaftesbury, wrote,

"The Author of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous conduct, than some moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful instructions, as we have for the preservation of our bodies. He has given us strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous action; and made virtue a lovely form, that we might easily distinguish it from its contrary and be made happy by the pursuit of it." (in Marnell, 1968, p. 61)

Shaftesbury thought man [sic] to be full of passions and emotions yet ruled by reason. Reason, along with balance, order, and symmetry, being characteristics of art as well as of nature, mark the virtuous life. The moral sense, although it needs to be educated, is an instinct and is the root of moral being. In this way Shaftesbury rejects Hobbes concept of moral law as man-made, and Locke's thesis that the source of morals is the will of God. Yet according to Shaftesbury the true sanction is the inner one, the approval or disapproval of the moral sense. Sounding similar to consequentialists, he wrote that the final test of the sanction is the way in which a course of action affects the general welfare. The social virtues transcend the personal ones.

"To love the public, to study universal good, and to promote the interest of the whole world, as far as lies within our power, is surely the height of
goodness, and makes that temper which we call divine." (in Marnell, 1968, p.43)

For Hutcheson the moral sense was perfect in itself, man [sic] knows right from wrong by instinct and therefore needs no moral guidance from outside of himself [sic]. If man [sic] feels an action is right, then it is so, at least for him [sic].

While these seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers struggled with the balance of person-centered instinct and deism and providence, at least they acknowledged an internal locus of control and a belief in the innate goodness of individuals, to the extent that they could develop a morality for themselves without an external guiding force. Although this does not directly correspond to the contemporary ethic of care it certainly puts care in a broader historical perspective.

Contemporary Conception of Care

In contrast to the ethic of justice, the ethic of care places the relationship between the self and others as figural, and defines the self in terms of the relationship with others. The self as moral agent perceives and responds to the perception of need. The moral question is "How to respond?" (Gilligan, 1987). This corresponds with how women traditionally have seen themselves in relationship to others, as part of a network of relationships, preferring intimacy and connection, rather than positioning themselves in a hierarchy, establishing autonomy and supremacy (Belencky, 1986, Eisler, 1987, Gilligan, 1982, Jack and Jack, 1989, Lyons, 1982, Tannen 1990),
From her research with adolescents and adults, Gilligan (1982) rejected this negative judgment of women’s morality. She found the centrality of relationships for women is crucial to their personal and social well-being and leads to what she calls a morality of care, a positive and essential aspect of moral maturity that calls for the avoidance of harm and the preservation of relationships. What previously had been interpreted as women’s lack of independence and assertiveness is re-interpreted as a morality of responsiveness to the needs of others, a strength valuable to developing relationships among people and in community, and essential for survival.

William James believed that judgments of worth have their origins in feelings, and if individuals had not feelings ideals would not have any significance and they would not discriminate them into values worth pursuing. Although feeling is a necessary condition it is not sufficient because an individual must still determine which of his or her predilections are to be pursued over others. James said people often misjudge the significance of lives different from their own,

"Hence the falsity of our judgments, so far as they presume to decide in an absolute way on the values of other person's conditions or ideas" (James, 1983, p.132 in Siegfried, 1989, p.80).

"It takes both a leap of the imagination and determined effort to recognize and sympathize with 'the higher vision of inner significance' of others, and to find 'a new centre and a new perspective' extending the original boundaries of our own felt interests, to recognize and sympathize with 'the higher vision of interests' (James, 1983, p.138 in Siegfried, 1939, p.81).

The perspectives of care and justice represent two different perceptions of social reality. From a care perspective, society is
interconnected and interdependent, connected through relationships, empathy, and responsiveness. For those who subscribe to a morality of care, their identity and social value are defined as in relationship with others, and they feel threatened by isolation. The moral ideal is attention and response, and the self is seen as a moral agent and defined as an experience of connection and interaction. Individuals find ways to develop and maintain relationships, and feel a responsibility to serve the needs of others and protect others from psychological or physical harm. Responsibility refers to an awareness of others, of their feelings, and seeing what others need and taking the initiative to respond to their needs. The individual and the community are inextricably connected. People who use a morality of care are concerned with outcomes: in particular, who will be harmed and what will happen to the relationship. No specific formula can be used to respond to these questions. Solutions to ethical dilemmas are inclusive solutions, transforming the identity through the experience of a relationship. See Figure 4.1 above.

While these contrasting perspectives are presented as dichotomous, most people have a tendency for one point of view over another. Research demonstrates that although most men have a morality of justice or rights, and most women have a morality of care, there are men who primarily use a morality of care, and women who primarily favor a morality of justice or rights (Betz, O'Connell, and Shepard, 1989, Donnenberg and Hoffman, 1988, Gibbs, Arnold, and Burkhart, 1984, Rothbart, Hanley, and Albert, 1986, Ford and Lowery, 1986, Jones, 1990, Yacker and Weinberg, 1990, Bowman, Reeves, and Freeman, 1990, Stiller and Forrest, 1990). While
many individuals combine both orientations to some degree, most often they have a primary preference towards either a justice or a care oriented morality.

Justice and care as moral perspectives are not opposites or mirror-images of one another, with justice uncaring, and care, unjust. Instead, "the perspectives denote different ways of organizing the basic elements of moral judgment: self, others, and the relationship between them." (Gilligan, 1987, p.22). With the justice perspective, the relationship is defined in terms of inequality/equality. With the care perspective the organization dimension of relationship is about attachment/detachment, thus changing the human connection, so the metaphor of relationship shifts from hierarchy or balance with a justice perspective, to network or web with a care perspective.

In one study Gilligan (1982) asked college students to respond to hypothetical ethical dilemmas and found distinct differences in the responses of men and women. Men most often used an ethic of rights or justice, relying on the socially established and accepted rules, laws, or rights that logically pertained to the situation. Women, using a reasoning of care most often found solutions to the dilemmas that were context specific, that focused on and addressed the specific situation at hand. They asked for additional information about the situation, and developed solutions that took into account the feelings of the actors in the situation, as well as the consequences of their actions, responding with a personalized ethic of care, rather than a more impersonal ethic of rights or justice.
In another study on moral orientation Gilligan (1987) found that two-thirds of the educationally advantaged North American adults and adolescents in the study (n = 80) focused their attention on one set of concerns, with focus defined as 75% or more of the considerations raised pertaining either to justice or to care. With one exception, all of the men focused on justice. The women divided, with approximately 1/3 focusing on justice and 1/3 on care. If the women were eliminated from the research sample, the care focus in moral reasoning would disappear. Gilligan (1987) states that the focus phenomenon suggests that "people have a tendency to lose sight of one moral perspective in arriving at a moral decision--a liability equally shared by both sexes" (p.26).

Lyons, a colleague of Gilligans, followed Gilligan's line of inquiry and conducted studies on moral orientation using real life moral dilemmas (1982), and developed a coding scheme to analyze interviews, coding for an morality of care and a morality of justice. She found significant differences in the moral orientation of males and females, with more males using a morality of justice or rights, and more females using a morality of care or response. Lyons' coding scheme has been used in the present study, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

The feminist philosopher Noddings (1984), in one of the first books on the ethic of caring, proposed employing a universal ethic of care in response to essentially all situations. An ethic of care focuses on responsibility, a conception of justice where no one intentionally is ever to be hurt, and everyone is to be helped. Noddings distinguished between the sentiment of natural caring and ethical caring: natural caring refers to
situations where we act on behalf of the other because we want to do so, such as a mother's caretaking efforts on behalf of her child. Ethical caring is dependent upon natural caring: "twin sentiments-one that feels directly for the other and one that feels for and with that best self, who may accept and sustain the initial feeling rather than reject it" (p. 80). This adds the aspect of the ethical ideal, the "best self", our best picture of ourselves caring and being cared for. This then becomes an ethic of virtue, of one-caring built up in a relationship, reaching out and responding to the other. This ethic of caring implies a commitment, to act on behalf of the cared-for, or to commit oneself to thinking about what one might do, which could include abstaining from any action that would work against the best interests of the cared-for.

Noddings maintains the ethic of care does not necessarily imply relativism, because, she proposes, the ideal contains a universal component: maintenance of the caring relationship. She rejects the application of principles as universalizable, because principles, implying,

"prima facie duty [yields] no real guidance for moral conduct in concrete situations. It guides us in abstract moral thinking; it tells us, theoretically, what to do, 'all others things being equal.' But other things are rarely if ever equal." (p. 85).

In response to criticism that an ethic of care is emotivism, Noddings says at the foundation of moral behavior is feeling or sentiment, but there is always a commitment to remain open to that feeling and to put one's thinking in its service. The genuine expression of moral judgment must have that underlying judgment. This assumes that one can feel a sort of pain in response to the pain of others, or can remember the feeling, and can allow him or herself to be moved by the remembrance of feeling.
Caring refers only to the things one truly has at heart. It cannot be safely inferred from externals. The true hallmark is in the sphere of feeling, "how much the person suffers when the object of his caring suffers, how much he rejoices when the object rejoices, how naturally and spontaneously he does the things that are required to promote the object's well-being." (White, 1966, pps. 400-402, from A. Chickering, Adult development theories).

Noddings (1984) presents the view that morality does not exist in isolation, but is built in relationship and community. Ethical behavior is about relationship to another person, about commitment and response to another, taking into account the perspective of the other person. The roles of the community and relationships are not only to prescribe behavior through laws and their enforcement, but to teach people how to care for and be caring towards one another.

A caring relationship between someone who cares and someone who is cared for involves responsibilities and contributions from both parties. The one who cares must be willing to listen to and respond to the needs of another human being, to try to help that other person. The person cared for must also contribute to this ethical relationship. There are both equal and unequal relationships of care, equal being those between co-workers, mates, or friends, and unequal are those between a manager and a subordinate, a teacher and a student, a judge, arbitrator, or mediator and the other parties involved in a dispute. The ethic of care emphasizes recognition and reciprocity, the involvement of individuals with one another, where the one receiving care must be able to recognize real caring and respond positively to it.
Business and Management Ethics

"It is not opposition but indifference which separates men."

Mary Parker Follett

Over the last decade ethics has received wide exposure in the business and management field, although interest perked up earlier, coming to the public's attention with the break-in at Watergate. Since that time numerous ethical dilemmas have captured the attention of managers, stock holders, management educators, and the public at large: should universities invest in South Africa? what constitutes a breach of moral conduct among candidates for public office? what is a company's rationale for knowingly dumping toxic wastes into rivers and lakes? should a company export inferior baby formula to a developing country? Waters and Bird (1987) believe moral consistency is lacking because there is little public and collective discussion about what are considered to be morally appropriate standards, particularly for managing organizations. Sometimes widely accepted moral standards lack potency in managerial behavior: moral standards are fragmented and managers are uncertain as to their sense of obligation to these standards, unclear about what is morally appropriate behavior.

As companies gain awareness of the severity of ethical problems, some are developing ethical guidelines, training sessions, codes of conduct to be signed by employees and making available "ethics hotlines" for employees to use. Ethics now is a business itself, with ethics trainers and consultants, legal specialists, resource centers, books and newsletters, and curricula in professional education.
Unfortunately no evidence suggests that organizations and people will be more ethical in the future than they were twenty years ago. It is unclear what the motivation and incentives will be for people in organizations to behave any more ethically now than before. Rules, policies, guidelines, or laws have not stopped unethical behavior any more than laws against murder or rape have decreased the incidence of those crimes. As is characteristic of society with its increasingly individualistic and secular orientation, extrinsic motivators do not have lasting effects. With a cultural emphasis on external and material evidence of personal worth, it is difficult to appeal to intrinsic values and motivation to change attitudes and behaviors.

The management literature spans several approaches to ethics and ethical reasoning. Some scholars believe the individual is the central and primary determinant of the decision. Others believe the organization and its culture has a primary impact in the ways ethical dilemmas are handled (Derry, 1989, Jackall, 1988, Wimbush and Shepard, 1991). Still others acknowledge the interplay between the individual and the organization (Trevino, 1986, Walton, 1988). T. Jones (1991) developed an issue-contingent model of ethical decision-making, where, to a large extent, the nature of the ethical issue itself determines how the issue will be handled.

The literature suggests the individual variables affecting ethical reasoning include ego strength, locus of control, field dependence, perception of the job, dependency on or utility of the job, personal background and characteristics, and the availability of choice. Situational variables come from the immediate job context and the organizational
culture which moderate cognition and behavior and include the organization's normative structure, customs and traditions, referent others, obedience to authority, responsibility for results, reinforcement contingencies, traits of the job itself, and the moral content of the organizational culture (G. Jones, 1991, Toffler, 1986, Trevino, 1986). As individuals strive for consistency between their beliefs and actions, they rely on "existential will", a meta-perspective on problems, a connection between affect, cognition, and action. For some this takes the form of a transcendent belief system, such as religion or spirituality, or secular feelings and beliefs in altruism.

Today's organizations and their environments impose primarily a justice mode of ethical reasoning and decision-making, not an ethic of care (Derry, 1982). To succeed in organizational life and climb the corporate ladder one must respect individual rights and obey the psychological and tangible contract, not letting one's feelings towards others get in the way of dispensing equitable treatment to all. In contrast, with an ethic of care individuals have the responsibility to respond to one another in the other's terms, out of care for the other, which, in the short-term, may be less than an efficient use of one's time. Care requires personal time and attention to develop empathy (identification with others), and interact with others, and to develop a specific response, rather than a mechanistic one, to the particular situation (Harris and Brown, 1990).

Jackall (1988) believes bureaucracies encourage impersonal, and abstract views of problems. The higher the person is in the organizational hierarchy, the more abstract his or her point of view. The impersonality of
the corporation encourages expediency, non-accountability, and role distance for managers. Managers can separate themselves from the consequences of their actions by covering up mistakes, keeping information secret, denying themselves access to information, all the while maintaining discretion. Through sudden silences, voids of information, and sometimes outright subterfuge, as Argyris says, the undiscussable is undiscussable.

Concerning differences between public and private morality, individuals can retain their diverse private morality while adhering to publicly agreed-upon rules of the organization, or, stated bluntly, "What is right in the corporation is what the guy above you wants from you" (Jackall, p.6). Bureaucracy is specialized, standardized, hierarchical, and coordinated by higher authorities. It is a system of power, privilege, and domination, so the moral rules-in-use may depend on whether one has line or staff responsibilities, one's position in the hierarchy, and the proximity of one's position to the market. This leads to an organizational morality that is contextual, situational, highly specific, and often unarticulated.

Nash (1990) developed an analytical framework that calls for the integration of a full range of ethical norms and 'business' directed decisions; a psychological bias that goes beyond personal and corporate self-centeredness to motivate responsiveness to others; and the ability to motivate pragmatic business decisions considering organizational health and economic success. These three conditions of ethical problem solving "engage a complex set of ethical and cognitive assumptions about the purpose of business and the ways in which to carry out the purpose most productively." (Nash, p.88). From these conditions Nash created "the
Covenantal Business Ethic* the purpose of which is to create delivered value. It is a contract for all involved to receive a beneficial return in exchange, with the driving assumption the creation of mutually enabling relationships through the primary means of service to others. She cites examples of Johnson and Johnson, Lex Service PLC, the American Medical Association, and the Elgin box company as examples of organizations that have been successful in focusing on people and relationships over concrete products or measurements, while creating value for the organization.

The relationship orientation means the individuals in the organization measure and motivate themselves with reference to the nature and quality of the relations between themselves and the other persons, whether customers, employees, shareholders, the public, etc.

"A relationship-oriented ethics, inherently less hierarchical, is a battering ram for breaking out of the hierarchies which an enlightened self-interest model tends to encourage. It facilitates a competitive and honest execution of company claims to 'care about the customer.' " (Nash, 1990, p. 107).

According to Walton (1988) moral managers use three kinds of ethics, the "ethic" of the culture, the "ethic" of concept, and the "ethic" of character." The "ethic" of the culture is the way common values hold organizations and societies together and how they are explained through ideologies shaped by particular experiences and traditions. Managers must know the culture and how to deal with the forces that support and critique business. In the U.S. that means understanding that the traditional ideology, according to George Cabot Lodge (Walton, 1988) has been that of individualism (personal effort and self-interest), equality, competition, a limited state, and
the specialization of labor. The contemporary ideology is that of communitarianism (identity with the whole and common interests), egalitarianism, cooperation, the activist state, and an integration of work.

The "ethic" of concept refers to the criteria established by philosophers for universal application, with an emphasis on the person. Walton defines three levels of moral reasoning: descriptive ethics that describes what is being done, meta-ethics or analytical ethics that looks at philosophical questions like the meaning of truth or goodness, and normative ethics that tell what principles are needed to distinguish right from wrong and how to apply them. The normative level of moral reasoning contains:

1. Managerial ethics or role ethics which deal with the obligations people have because of their position in the organization

2. Business ethics that, using the principles of self-interest and profit-maximization, determine how the organization should act relative to other stakeholders

3. Professional ethics, consisting of the principles derived from obligations of professionals and enforced through a code of ethics.

The "ethic" of character is how values from the culture and the philosopher are internalized to develop a manager of integrity. Yet understanding is not the same thing as acting, as the mother of Ruby Bridges, the six year old child referred to in Chapter II, who initiated school desegregation in New Orleans in the 1960's says,

"There's a lot of people who talk about doing good, and a lot of people who argue about what's good and what's not good....there are a lot of people who always worry about whether they're doing right or doing wrong....there are some other folks, they just put their lives on the line for
what's right, and they may not be the ones who talk a lot or argue a lot or worry a lot; they just do a lot." (Coles, 1989, p.22)

Along with Coles, we ask if virtue or ethical or moral character can be taught. Character is learned, perhaps through role models, stories, determination, stamina, rules, values, belief systems, and reinforcement schedules. Whatever good character may be, whether it is honesty, courage, fairness, caring, generosity, or any number of other virtues, it is rarely learned in the educational system. "As one Harvard MBA graduate lamented: 'I learned to read everything--except people...'" (Walton, p. 194), or said in another way, "It is possible to get all A's, and flunk life.", Walker Percy in The Second Coming.

Historically, ethics has not been openly discussed in organizations until after a breach of conduct, a disaster, or an embarrassment, and there have been few venues for ethical dialogue among managers. Now some corporations are offering, and in the case of defense contractors like Lockheed, requiring, all employees to go through a modicum of ethics training. The higher an employee is in the organization, the more extensive the training.

Cooper (1990), in writing about ethics and public administration, outlines two kinds of administrative or managerial responsibility to be used when confronted with ethical issues: objective and subjective responsibility. Objective responsibility is related to those expectations imposed from outside ourselves, while subjective responsibility has to do with those things for which we feel a responsibility. Objective responsibility has two dimensions: accountability and imposed obligation: responsibility to someone else for something.
Accountability is responsibility to someone or some group of people, and obligation is responsibility for tasks, people, and goals. Accountability implies superior-subordinate relationships and the exercise of authority over work flow to achieve goals, including providing supervision, resources, delegating authority, and monitoring performance. Managers have obligations to their superiors, including shareholders, government regulators, and customers and clients, as well as their subordinates, in how they carry out their responsibilities and utilize resources. Objective responsibility of an administrator includes,

"The systematic filtering upward of information that will complicate the lives of superiors in the sense of providing a more accurate representation of issues, and the regular clarification downward of acceptable norms for conduct. " (Cooper,1990, p.67)

This concept of objective responsibility fits well with Rawls' idea of the need for "fairness" as a prerequisite for arriving at principles of justice. Rawls believes that one should attempt to reason about an ethical issue from a neutral position, without consideration for one's social, cultural, economic, or biological circumstances, from a "veil of ignorance", so that,

"All social goods --liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-- are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored" (in Cooper, 1990, p..70)

Subjective responsibility concerns one's own feelings and beliefs about responsibility, about loyalty, conscience, and identification that arise from socialization, through the values, beliefs and attitudes obtained from family, community, school, religious training, professional development, and work affiliation. These values, beliefs, and attitudes have cognitive, affective, and behavioral components that affect one's character and
behavior in particular situations. An individual may have a positive attitude towards minority youth and favor special summer corporate hiring programs to motivate students to stay in school and reach for career goals. This attitude may be grounded in deeper beliefs about the relation of work to human dignity and membership in society.

Barnard (1964) distinguished between “moral status” and “responsibility.” Moral status is the attributes of the inner code or value subsystem that governs conduct for a particular aspect of behavior or role. Responsibility is “the particular private code of morals to control the conduct of the individual in the presence of strong contrary desires or impulses” (Barnard, 1964, p. 263). Although an individual may have a code of conduct for a particular role, he or she may not act in congruence with that code, thus acting in an irresponsible manner. When observing a discrepancy between a person’s actions and beliefs one is inclined to question the presence of integrity.

Velasquez (1988) describes a traditional view of business ethics as primarily an ethic of justice or rights. A right is an entitlement from a legal system or from moral standards, and may include an absence of prohibitions, an authorization or empowerment to do something, and/or the existence of prohibitions or requirements on others which enable the individual to pursue particular activities. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights provides an example of the explicitly stated right to work. Contractual rights and duties are for specific individuals and related to a publicly accepted system of rules.
The best example is Kant's categorical imperative of the eighteenth century, the Golden Rule: the moral right to moral treatment, where everyone is to be treated as a free person equal to everyone else. Rawls' description of justice and fairness in this egalitarian system includes distributive justice, retributive justice, and compensatory justice. Distributive justice is the fair distribution of society's benefits and burdens, again, assuming equals are treated equally. Retributive justice is the just imposition of punishments on wrongdoers. Compensatory justice proposes a just or proportional way to compensate people for what they lost when they are wronged by others.

This and the previous two chapters reviewed of a range of ethical and moral orientations and their psychological and philosophical foundations in an effort to frame an investigation of the ethical reasoning of managers in organizations. The following chapter reviews the methods used to collect data and explains the research questions and hypotheses explored throughout this study.
CHAPTER V  METHODOLOGY

Overview

The primary questions of the present study concern the relationships between the psychological, world view, and moral orientation variables, used here as independent variables, as they affect use of particular forms of ethical reasoning, the dependent variables of care and justice. This research inquires into the influence of these independent variables on the dependent variables: whether the use of an ethic of care or an ethic of justice requires more feeling than thinking, and more of a concrete than abstract way of learning, and the impact of the structures of social knowledge, organism or mechanism world view, communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations on the two forms of ethical reasoning, the ethics of care and justice. This chapter describes the research design, subjects, procedures, and statistical analyses used to explore these relationships.

Research Assumptions

This thesis attempts to understand how people reason about ethical dilemmas-- it is not a study of their actual behavior. When subjects respond in writing to ethical dilemmas, they describe what they think they would do, a description of their beliefs and ideas for action. Observing behavior during an ethical dilemma, and trying to capture the subject's thoughts would require a research methodology beyond the scope of this project.

In developing this study we have speculated that these characteristics describing the individual would have the greatest impact on ethical reasoning because they are most central and closely related to the individual's self-
concept, as described by the individual him or her self. Concrete and abstract ways of learning, and feeling and thinking judgment are standardized, validated, reliable constructs and are more likely to have stronger correlations with the ethics of care and justice than the communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations. These latter measures, tested with the Moral Orientation Questionnaire, have been specifically developed for the present research and have not been sufficiently tested for significant reliability and validity. Moral orientation has difficult to define and measure, and may vary with situation, context, and time.

Further, the organicism and mechanism world view paradigms were not developed to to assist in understanding the roots of ethical reasoning. The OMPI, while based on Pepper's World Hypotheses and correlated with the LSI and the MBTI, has some scales that intuitively would not correlated with care and justice. This can be seen more clearly be examining the definitions of organicism and mechanism (Johnson, et al., 1988).

Specifically, organicism views persons as autonomous while the mechanism world view sees persons as determined by their environment. While the ethic of care would not deny autonomy, the emphasis is on relationship with rather than separation from the other. Organicism also views persons as purposive while mechanism sees persons as passive. Again, care would not suggest that individuals are to be passive, but the goal or purpose may be less important than maintaining the well-being of those involved, and the means may be equally important as the ends. The ethic of justice would maintain that the goal of fairness and equal rights are most important as goals, and the appropriate rules and standards must be employed to meet those
goals. This is not exactly the view of mechanism, seeing persons as without inherent functions or development towards an endpoint. This discussion has been an attempt to explain why the social knowledge variables would have a statistically lower correlation with care and justice than the individual characteristics variables of gender, learning style, and thinking and feeling judgment.

In this study each of the independent psychological and social knowledge variables and the dependent ethical orientations are presented as discrete, dichotomous scales. Most people do not appear strictly to act according to only one category or another, but rather change or combine orientations according to their inclinations as appropriate to a given situation. Few persons use exclusively feeling or thinking judgment when making decisions. However, for each of the variables presented most individuals seem to prefer one end of the polarity. Research on ethical orientation demonstrates that most men more often use an ethic of justice, while most women more often use an ethic of care, but some men use care, and some women use justice, and some individuals use a combination of the two, or use one, and then the other, depending on the situation (Lyons, 1982). Some people may more likely use care in the private domain of the home and family, while feeling compelled to uphold rules, policies, or laws in the organization.

Research Design and Statistical Analysis

This study uses both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative aspect consists of the written responses of 234 people to
each of 3 ethical dilemmas which were content-analyzed for two forms of ethical reasoning, an ethic of care and and an ethic of justice.

The quantitative aspects of the study explore relationships between all of the primary variables. These include the psycho-social variables of masculine and feminine gender, the psychological dimensions of feeling and thinking judgment, the concrete and abstract preferences for learning, and the measures of social knowledge: the preference for an organismic or mechanism world view paradigm, and the consequentialist and communitarian moral orientations. Lastly the two dependent variables, the ethic of care and the ethic of justice are quantitatively measured and examined for their relation to the above mentioned independent variables, using correlation, regression, and frequencies. The statistical analysis demonstrated the relative strength of the influence of individual characteristics on the ethics of care and justice, over the influence of the structures of social knowledge.

Subjects

Selection

Subjects for this study were 234 individuals, who, at the time of the study, were enrolled in the Executive M.B.A., full-time and part-time M.B.A., Masters of Non-Profit Organizations, Masters of Organizational Development, and Masters of Nursing Administration programs at Case Western Reserve University, Kent State University, and Cleveland State University. These individuals participated voluntarily, recruited by this investigator, with the intent of obtaining a heterogeneous sample, by age, race, gender, religious and educational background.
Data Collection Methods

This researcher contacted 15 management professors and arranged to come into the classrooms and give a short introduction to the study and solicited volunteers. In some classes professors asked students to participate as though it were a class assignment, taking one hour or more in class to complete the instruments, and then having this researcher explain the issues of the study. In other classes, the instructor simply allowed this researcher to solicit participation but not take class time for completion of materials or explanation or discussion of ethical reasoning. The return rate on the surveys was approximately 60%. Individual and group data feedback and/or didactic sessions were offered and in some cases conducted in classes directly after the materials had been submitted.

The packet of materials (see Appendices A - H) included a cover letter explaining the study and the order the instruments were to be completed, so as to avoid instrumentation influence on subsequent items. Following the cover letter was a consent form, signed by all participants. The order of the instruments were as follows: the Ethical Dilemmas, the feeling and thinking scales from the Myers Briggs Type Indicator, the Organicism and Mechanism Paradigm Inventory, the Moral Orientation Questionnaire, the Learning Style Inventory, IIa, and the Managerial Ethics Research Project Background Questionnaire. Data collection took place over a 6 week period, from early February to mid-March, 1992.

Description and Demographic Data

The Managerial Ethics Research Project Background Questionnaire (Appendix H) contains 21 questions pertaining to the
subject's educational, occupational, financial, and family background, as well as information concerning experience with ethics in the work environment. 

The subjects of this study are 234 junior, mid, and high level managers, supervisors, and managers-in-training who work in a wide range of organizations in business and industry and the private non-profit sector. Gender distribution is 56.7% males and 43.3% females. Religious backgrounds of the subjects are 33% Protestant, 43% Catholic, 4% Jewish, 10% other, 9% said "none", with missing data for 1%. The subjects ranged in age from 21 to 54, with 50% between the ages of 24 and 32, and a mean age of 31.73. For women and men the mean ages were 33 and 31, respectively.

The educational background of the subjects varied intentionally in an effort to get even numbers of males and females. Of the 234 in the sample, 161 or 73.5% were enrolled in MBA or the Executive MBA programs at Case Western Reserve University or Cleveland State University. Another 17 or 7.8% were students in the Masters of Organizational Development program (MOD's) and 22 or 10% were in the Masters of Non-Profit Organizations program (MNO's), also at Case Western Reserve University. An additional 10 or 4.6% were students in the Masters of Nursing Administration program at Kent State University.

By graduate program 64.8% or 68 of all the women in the sample of 234 and 81.4% or 92 of the men were enrolled in an MBA program, 14.3% or 15 of the women and 6.2% or 7 men were enrolled
in the Masters of Non-Profit Organizations program, and 8.6% or 9 of all the women and 6.2% or 7 of all the men in the sample were enrolled in the Masters of Organizational Development program. There were differences in age by the three largest groups of graduate programs, the mean age of MBA's was 30, of MNO's, 37, and of MOD's, 39.

For 113 respondents the mean number of years of work experience was 6.8, SD 5.61, with a minimum of .42 years and a maximum of 27.25 years. For women, the mean number of years of work experience was 10.3, and for men it was 8.7. The three groups of graduate majors differed on mean number of years of work experience in a statistically significant way: MBA's, 8 years, MNO's, 12.7 years, and MOD's, 18.4 years. These results are displayed in Table 5.1 below.

Of the 104 respondents with managerial experience, their experience ranged from 1 to 22 years, the largest subsample, 14 or 13.5% had 2 years managerial experience, 13 or 12.5% had 4 years, 12 or 11.5% had 3 years, and 10 or 4.3% had 5 years, and the same number had 6 years managerial experience. For the entire sample the mean number of years of managerial experience was 6.32 years, with the range from 0 to 22 years, with a mode 0 and a SD of 4.72. Women had a mean of 7.0 years managerial experience, while men had a mean of 6.3 years. The subjects differed by graduate major in the amount of managerial experience, at a statistically significant
level: the MBA’s had a mean of 3.2 years, the MNO’s, 5.4 years, and the MOD’s, 9.7 years. These results are seen below.
Table 5.1
Age, Years of Full-time Work Experience, and
Years of Managerial Experience

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sample</strong></td>
<td>234</td>
<td>31.73</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>5.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>124</td>
<td>30.70</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>111</td>
<td>32.91</td>
<td>8.07</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>10.32</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>6.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MBA</strong></td>
<td>157</td>
<td>29.89*</td>
<td></td>
<td>157</td>
<td>7.99**</td>
<td></td>
<td>152</td>
<td>3.23***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MNO</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36.82*</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.67**</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.40***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MOD</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39.27*</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18.44**</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.73***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (F2,191)=23.61
** (F2,191)=22.36
*** (F2,180)=11.41

Years of full-time work experience: range: .42 to 27.25
Years managerial experience: range: .42 to 27.25
Of the 234 subjects in the sample 26.9% consider themselves to be professional, 14.4% technical, 48.8% managerial, 5.5% in sales, and 4% other. The participants in the study work in a wide range of positions including systems analyst, financial analyst, human resource manager, associate director for the office of information technology for a major university, manager of nursing quality management, assistant to the music director of a world class national orchestra, demand manager for a tool manufacturing company, bank vice president, and plant engineering manager in food processing plant. The professionals included an attorney, a pharmacist, a teacher, and a social worker. See Tables 5.2 and 5.3 below.
### Table 5.2 Current Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>201</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.3 Current Employer Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer Type</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications, publ</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, insurance,</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business services</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public admin.govt.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>217</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For undergraduate education, 81 or 42.2% of the subjects majored in business and/or management, 34 or 17.7% in physical sciences, mostly engineering, 29 or 15.1% in social sciences, and 19 or 9.9% in humanities. The remainder of the sample majored in arts, 2.6%, natural sciences, 4.7%, nursing, 3.6%, or other, non-specified, 3.6%.

The household income for 213 respondents ranged from under $15,000 to over $125,000, with the mean between $45,000-$59,999, and the mode between $30,000-$44,999. 24.9% had incomes in the range of the mean, 21.1% in the range of the mode, 14.6% had a household income of $75,000-$99,999, and 11.3% between $60,000-$74,999. The results were similar for both men and women. For the MBA’s, the mean household income was between $45,000-$59,999, for the MNO’s is was significantly lower, between $15,000-$29,999, and for the MOD’s, significantly higher than the MBA’s, mostly likely due to the smaller sample size and the higher mean age, with a mean household income of almost $60,000. See Tables 5.4 and 5.5 below.
Table 5.4 Household Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $15,000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000-$29,000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000-$44,999</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$45,000-$59,999</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$60,000-$74,999</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75,000-$99,999</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000-$125,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $125,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>213</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>MBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>31.40</td>
<td>29.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=194</td>
<td>N=157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Yrs. Work Experience</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>7.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=194</td>
<td>N=157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Yrs. Mngt. Experience</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=183</td>
<td>N=152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Household Income+</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=181</td>
<td>N=147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income Categories:
1. Under $15,000
2. $15,000-$29,000
3. $30,000-$44,999
4. $45,000-$59,999
5. $60,000-$74,999
6. $75,000-$99,999
7. $100,000-$125,000
8. Over $125,000

* p<.05
** p<.01
Concerning the occupation of the subjects' parents, 33.6% of the 220 mothers were homemakers, 16.8% were considered unskilled laborers, including clerical, sales, and food service, 10.9% worked in education. The remainder had jobs in arts, business, government, health care, skilled labor, or other, or were deceased, with unspecified previous occupation. For 228 fathers' occupation, 35.1% were employed in business, 15.4% as unskilled laborers, 11% in engineering, and the remainder in arts (.9%), education (3.9%), government (1.8%), health care (7.5%), law (1.3%), skilled labor (7.9%), were retired (7.9%) or deceased (3.5%). There were no significant differences by sex or graduate major.

The background information questionnaire asks subjects if they had to face ethical dilemmas with their present employer: of the 219 who responded, 64.4% answered yes and 35.6% said no. 54.5% said the dilemmas were internal to the organization, while 39.5% reported the dilemmas they faced were external to the organization. The data were similar for both men and women. No significant differences were observed between subjects by graduate programs. The results are displayed in Table 5.6 below.

Twenty percent of the subjects indicated they received ethical training on the job, while 78% had not received ethical training. There were differences by sex, with 25.5% of the men receiving training and 72.7% not having received training. For women the numbers were 15.7% and 82.4% respectively. Of those 52 individuals who had received training, 71.2% said the training was
sufficient to meet their needs on the job while 28.8% said it was not sufficient. Subjects were asked about their awareness of any “specific oral or written statement of the company or organization’s ethics or code of ethical conduct: 65.7% reported they were aware of a company code, while 34.3% were unaware of any such code. See Table 5.6 below for a more graphic display of these results.
Table 5.6: Experience with Ethics at Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience with ethical dilemmas</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received ethics training on the job</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training was sufficient</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>182</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Awareness of company ethical code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Separate unwritten company code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have Own personal code of ethics</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In response to a question concerning how the individual was informed of the organizational code of ethics, 69% reported they were informed through a written document or memo, 9.2% as part of their orientation to the organization, 9.2% through informal discussion with other organization personnel, 1.1% as part of a special meeting or training session, and 11.5% indicated unspecified other. See Table 5.6 above.

One of the questions on the survey asked subjects if there is "a separate unwritten and/or unspoken code of ethics in this organization?", meaning the organization they currently work for. For the 178 who responded to the question, 59.6% indicated "yes" and 39.9% indicated "no". Results are seen in Table 5.6 above.

The questionnaire asks respondents "What do you feel you would need to assist you in thinking about ethical dilemmas?", and the results were coded into 7 categories: information, including data, facts, written policies; reflection, dialogue, discussion with others; education or training; knowledge, including a broader understanding, or ideas; experience; support from others; and other. From the 248 who responded to this question, 30 or 12.3% said education, 23 or 13.3% said support from others, 47 or 27.0% said information, and 49 or 28.2% said reflection and/or dialogue with others.

Near the end of the questionnaire subjects are asked, "What or who do you think has made the largest contribution to your thinking about ethical issues and dilemmas?". The responses were grouped into 7 categories: family; life experience; religion, spirituality,
education in school, work experience, boss, colleagues, and friends. Of the sample of 248 respondents, 37.7% indicated their mother had made the largest contribution to their thinking about ethical issues, 37.3% said it was their father, and 22.6% said it was their family in general. There were no significant differences by sex or graduate major.

For the question, "Do you have a different code of ethics for yourself outside of work?", 21.3% answered yes, and 77.7% said no. Again, see Table 5.6 above.

Instrumentation

(1.) The Learning Styles Inventory IIa (Appendix L) was used to gather data on epistemological orientation, in particular how individuals grasp experiences, ideas, and information, focusing particularly on the dimensions of apprehension through concrete experience or comprehension through abstract conceptualization. The Learning Styles Inventory was developed by David Kolb in 1971 to assess a person's preferences for ways of grasping information, ideas, and experiences through experience or thought, and preferences for transforming them, through action or reflection. Intercorrelations of the scale scores for a sample of 807 people shows that concrete experience and abstract conceptualization were negatively correlated (-.57, p < .001). Reliability of the LSI in 1985 for the four basic scales and two combination scores all show very good internal reliability as measured by the Cronbach's alpha, as follows: concrete experience: .82, reflective observation: .73, abstract conceptualization: .83, active experimentation: .78, abstract-concrete: .88, and active-reflective: .81. The
LSI IIa is a one page instrument with 12 questions and can be completed in 3 to 5 minutes.

(2.) The thinking and feeling judgment scales from the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) Form F was presented to subjects as the "Cognition Type Indicator" (Appendix J named so as to keep participants from not filling out the instrument if they were already familiar with the MBTI. The questionnaire, used to obtain information on 2 of the 8 personality factors identified from Carl Jung's theories of personality types has 23 items. It focuses on the differences in how people prefer to make decisions, given the choice of thinking or feeling. As of this writing, the researcher does not have validity or reliability data on this instrument of the 23 items separate from the entire MBTI.

The Myers Briggs Type Indicator, first published in 1962 by Isabel Briggs Myers, is a measure of the psychological preferences described by Carl Jung, and describes sixteen types of people who differ in predictable ways in their modes of communication, their ways of perceiving their worlds, their styles of decision-making, their ways of teaching and learning, and their choice of careers. The test-retest reliabilities, using product moment correlations in samples from seventh grade to medical school show consistency over time. When subjects report a change in type, it usually occurs in only one preference, and in scales where the original preference was low (Myers and McCaulley, 1985).

The validity of the MBTI, because is was designed to implement Jung's theory of psychological types, is determined by its ability to demonstrate relationships and outcomes predicted by theory. The theory postulates,
among other things, that basic preferences for thinking or feeling judgment lead to differences in acting on those interests. Motivation, values, and behaviors are seen as surface indicators of the effects of the basic preferences and attitudes.

The thinking dimension on the MBTI is associated with analytical, logical, skeptical approaches to problems, and a distance in interpersonal relationships (Briggs Myers and McCaulley, 1985). Personality characteristics correlated with thinking (r -.57 to r -.40) include: counteractions, masculine orientation, abstraction conceptualization, dominance, distrust, assertiveness, autonomy, achievement, and aggression.

Feeling judgments are made on the basis of subjective values rather than analysis or logic. Feeling is predicted to be associated with characteristics reflecting care or concern for people; interpersonal warmth, communication through the spoken word, the written word, and a trusting rather than a skeptical approach in making decisions. Scales significantly associated with feeling judgment (r 55 to r .40) include: measures of concern for others, including nurturance, succorance, and social service; interest in people including affiliation and sociability; adaptability of feeling to others' demands including deference and abasement.

(3.) The Organicism-Mechanism Paradigm Inventory (Germer, et al., 1982, Appendix I) is a 26 item forced-choice instrument designed to assess an individual's preference for one of two philosophical world-views that underlie scientific theorizing. The two world-views, mechanism and organicism, were adopted from Bertalanffy's general systems theory, and
also correspond to Pepper's world hypotheses of the same name. Items cover philosophical areas (ontology, epistemology, personhood, analysis and causality, change dynamics and methodology) and matters of practical concern (conjugal, parenting, occupational, legal, and other interpersonal relationships). Although the theory was intended to describe paradigms psychologists use, Germer, et al. believe everyone has a set of presuppositions about human behavior that will resemble the mechanism or organismism paradigms.

The OMPI scale has internal consistency with a Guttman split-half coefficient of .86 and a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .76. A 3-week retest showed a stability coefficient of .77. The OMPI has not yet demonstrated primary validity, that is, the association between scale scores and criteria implied directly by the theory underlying the scales. It does however correlate pervasively but not perfectly consistently with a wide range of personality scales and inventories including the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the California Psychological Inventory, and some of the Holland vocational types as tested on the Strong Campbell Interest Inventory. The OMPI correlates with the abstract conceptualization-concrete experience scale of the Learning Style Inventory, $r = .27$, p. .05, apparently due primarily to the significant negative correlation between the OMPI and concrete experience, $r = .38$, p. .01. Abstract conceptualization correlated a nonsignificant .05 with the OMPI. For samples that completed the MBTI and the OMPI, organismism is associated with intuition and perceiving, and mechanism with sensing and judging
(4.) The Moral Orientation Questionnaire, labelled the "Managerial Orientation Questionnaire" (Appendix K) so as not to bias the subjects during the administration of the instrument, was developed by this researcher specifically for this study. It is a forced choice instrument with 16 pairs of statements, each statement in the pair probing for either a communitarian or a consequentialist moral orientation. Subjects are asked to distribute 9 points between each of the 2 statements, each statement representing one of the two moral orientations. The questionnaire was initially developed as 16 pairs of items, each item describing either a communitarian or consequentialist orientation. Respondents were asked to choose one of the 2 statements that most described their own thinking and behavior when faced with ethical dilemmas in general.

An initial version of the instrument was given to a group of 12 colleagues at a meeting of a departmental research clinic. Feedback from the group suggested re-writing some of the items for clarification and common structure. A second version was developed as a forced choice instrument, asking subjects to distribute 9 points between the 2 sentences in each pair, using all 9 points. This instrument was field tested with 47 MBA students in a finance class, and the results were analyzed using the Cronbach's alpha split-half test for reliability. The alpha was initially .58, and a rotated factor analysis of the items suggested which items to revise further. After changing the wording of some of the items, reliability did not change significantly. It was decided to use the instrument for this study, understanding that the distinctions and indicators of the concepts of communitarianism and consequentialism may not always be discrete and
opposite, or even orthogonal, and further quantitative research is needed for
greater reliability and validity.

The data from the Moral Orientation Questionnaire was analyzed by
adding up the number of points for all of the items for each of the two scales
of moral orientations, consequentialism and communitarianism, and
calculating an average score for each scale. A scale of scores was
developed to determine an individual's preference for each of the
orientations.

(5.) For the 3 dilemmas (Appendix M) participants were asked to
respond in as much detail and depth as they wished, indicating how, as a
manager, they would deal with each situation. Each dilemma is written in
one paragraph and leaves space for subjects to respond to four questions:
what is the conflict or dilemma in this situation; what would you do; what are
the possible consequences of your actions; and what was on your mind
when you were responding to the vignette. These dilemmas were analyzed
for an ethic of care and an ethic of justice adapting Lyons coding scheme
and notes from her coding procedures as outlined in her dissertation on
considerations of moral choice in real-life moral dilemmas (Lyons, 1982).
See Figure 5.1 and 5.2 below.

The dilemmas about the production of a hazardous chemical, and the
bank vice president with an employee with emphysema, have been adapted
from Toffler's interview research, (1985), while the vignette about the school
superintendent with a child with AIDS was reported in Bellah, et. al. (1991).

(6.) The Managerial Ethics Research Project Background
Questionnaire (Appendix N) was developed to obtain demographic and
ethical background information from the participants in the study. The questions ask for occupational, educational, and income information for the subject and his/her parents; religious affiliation; experience with ethical dilemmas on the job; whether the person has received any training in ethics on the job; awareness of ethical code on the job; how one's values relate to thoughts about ethical issues on the job, and what or who influenced the subject's ethical thinking. The last question concerning hand dominance aimed to discover if there was a correlation between brain hemisphere dominance and the other variables under investigation.

Pre-Study

The Moral Orientation Questionnaire was field-tested with a group of 47 M.B.A. students enrolled in a required introductory finance course at Case Western Reserve University, in order to assess the reliability of the instrument, using a Cronbach's alpha split halves test. The results of that study showed a reliability of .59. The instrument was modified as discussed above and used for the present study.

Twelve different ethical dilemmas first were field-tested with 24 people, including Ph.D. students, management school staff and faculty, and friends and family of the researcher, in order to determine if the dilemmas were balanced enough to draw responses for both an ethic of care and an ethic of justice. These dilemmas were developed from real-life ethical dilemmas faced by managers as reported during interviews (Bellah, et.al., 1991, Toffler, 1986), from cases developed by Glenn and his collaborators (1986), and from new stories and anecdotes from colleagues. They were meant to serve as a projective instrument, similar to the Thematic Apperception Test.
The language used in the dilemmas intentionally remained neutral, and the stories covered a range of managerial concerns, both internal and external to the organization, placing the manager in various roles, as a supervisor, a general manager, an analyst, and a vice president. Three dilemmas were finally selected from the original twelve, using those that generated equal responses of care and justice, using Lyons (1982) coding scheme. All three represent real-life ethical dilemmas faced by managers. Two of the dilemmas describe situations a corporate setting, and one in the public sector.

Data Analysis

For a quantitative understanding of the data, a correlational analysis yielded information concerning the relationships between the abstract and concrete scores from the Learning Styles Inventory, the thinking, and feeling judgment dimensions from the Myers Briggs Type Indicator, the two moral orientations of communitarianism and consequentialism from the Moral Orientation Questionnaire, and the two world views from the Organicism-Mechanism Paradigm Inventory.

The code for the ethic of justice and the ethic of care is adapted from Lyons (1982) research on moral orientation. She used a form of the Critical Incident Interview, asking subjects to report moral dilemmas they had faced in the past. Because the dilemmas used in this study present hypothetical situations, the coding involved identifying considerations of care and/or justice in each of the answers to each of the questions. These were divided into the subject's description of the conflict or dilemma for himself or herself; a description of what he or she would do to resolve the dilemma and/or
conflict; a description of the consequences of the action(s) which is a form of evaluation of the resolution; and a description of any further considerations that are apparent as the subject describes his or her thoughts (or feelings) when responding to the vignette. Two coding sheets (Figures 5.1 and 5.2 below) with specific indicators of the two ethics were developed to assist coding.
CONSIDERATIONS OF CARE

Respond to another in their terms and context

Moral problem is about relationships or activities of care

Conflicts about relationships relate to breaking, restoring, maintaining ties

Promoting well being/welfare /helping another, relieving suffering

Situation over principle

Care of self VS care of others

Takes a context specific perspective and describes narrative of events.

Hesitant to place problems in abstract category.

RESOLUTION OF CARE

Restoring relationships

Ensuring good will

Stop suffering

Situation over principles

Care of self and other

Necessity to act

Communication with others as process and goal

Searching for consequences of choice

CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE

Relationships as reciprocity between separate individuals

Moral problem about mediating issues of conflicting claims in relationships or How one to decide conflicts or justify one's decisions

Fairness as a goal between individuals

Conflicts of obligation, duty, commitment from roles and relationships between self and other society, or principles

Conflicts for self over rules, standards, ideal principles

Objectify others

Consider situation as example of a more GENERAL case

Concern for the “right” answer

RESOLUTION OF JUSTICE

Meeting obligations, not violating standards

Principles vs situation

Others have their own contexts

Thinking through, deciding

Ordering of priorities including relationships, related to obligations

Weighing conflicting claims of individuals
Figure 5.2 Coding Sheet:
CONSTRUCTION OF THE DILEMMA/CONFLICT

Considerations of Care
1. General effects to others (unelaborated)
2. Maintenance or restoration of the relationships; or response to another considering interdependence
3. Welfare/well-being of another or the avoidance of conflict; or, the alleviation of another’s burden/hurt/suffering (physical or psychological)
4. Primacy of the “situation over the principle”
5. Considers care of self; care of self vs. care of others; care of self in considering care of others

Considerations of Justice
1. General effects to the self (unelaborated including “trouble”; “how to decide”)
2. Obligations, duty or commitments
3. Standards, rules or principles for self or society; or, considers fairness, that is, how one would like to be treated if in other’s place
4. Primacy of the “principle over the situation”
5. Considers that others have their own contexts

RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION, “WHAT WOULD YOU DO?”)

Considerations of Care
1. General effects to others (unelaborated)
2. Maintenance or restoration of the relationships; or response to another considering interdependence
3. Welfare/well-being of another or the avoidance of conflict; or, the alleviation of another’s burden/hurt/suffering (physical or psychological)
4. Primacy of the “situation over the principle”
5. Considers care of self; care of self vs care of others; care of self in considering care of others.

Considerations of Justice
1. General effects to the self (unelaborated including “troubled”, “how to decide”)
2. Obligations, duty or commitments
3. Standards, rules or principles for self or society; or, considers fairness, that is, how one would like to be treated if in other’s place
4. Primacy of the “principle over the situation”
5. Considers that others have their own contexts

EVALUATION OF THE RESOLUTION/CONSEQUENCES
1. Considerations of Care: what happened/how worked out; or whether relationships maintained/restore.
2. Considerations of Justice: how decided/thought about/justified; or whether values/standards/principles maintained

Summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Care</th>
<th>Justice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dilemma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | |
This researcher trained a colleague in the coding technique, and had the colleague analyze a sample of 24 dilemmas to obtain inter-rater reliability of .75. The unit of analysis for the coding was the response to each question of each vignette, and the coding was for the presence or absence of any of the considerations of care or justice.

**Research Questions**

The present research centers on how people resolve ethical dilemmas, in particular, the role and influence of particular individual characteristics and structures of social knowledge on the ethical reasoning of managers and managers-to-be. The individual characteristics examined in this study, specifically gender, ways of learning, and ways of making judgments, are not meant to represent a comprehensive list of all the ways of looking at differences between individuals. The use of the world hypotheses paradigm, the organicism and mechanism way of seeing what is “true”, and the two measures of moral orientation to define what is “good”, communitarianism and consequentialism, are appropriate for the purposes of this research, but do not represent all forms of social knowledge.

While individual, organizational, and situational factors influence ethical behavior, (Jones, 1991, Kelley, 1989, Trevino, 1986, Wimbush, 1991), this thesis examined the particular processes individuals use as they approach ethical dilemmas. This study began by investigating a constellation of characteristics of individual characteristics: (1) the learning orientation of managers and managers-to-be, whether they prefer abstract conceptualization or concrete experience to grasp experience, ideas, and information, (Kolb, 1971), (2) Carl Jung’s personality factors of thinking or
feeling to make judgments, (Myers, 1976), and (3) gender. The research continues to explore structures of social knowledge, the objective accumulation of previous cultural experience by using the preferences for an organicism or mechanism world view paradigm (Pepper, in Kolb, 1986, Johnson, Germer, Efran and Overton, 1988), and the two moral orientations of communitarianism and consequentialism. It was proposed that these independent variables would affect choice of the use of either an ethic of care or an ethic of justice, the dependent variables, when reasoning about a particular ethical dilemma.

This study attempts to link the discourses of psychology, philosophy, and the nature of knowing as a way to understand which variables are more influential on ethical reasoning. It is founded on the dual knowledge framework of experiential learning theory of apprehension and comprehensional knowledge, in order to look at different levels of variables in a commensurate manner. The model, as seen in Figure 5.3 below, visually describes the theoretical model discussed above.
### FIGURE 5.3

**INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS AND STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE INFLUENCING ETHICAL REASONING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Characteristics (Independent variables)</th>
<th>Social Knowledge Structures (Independent variables)</th>
<th>Ethical Reasoning (Dependent variables)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Pepper's Organicism</td>
<td>Gilligan's Ethic of Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanism World Hypotheses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolb's Concrete/Abstract Learning Styles</td>
<td>Communitarian/Consequentialism</td>
<td>Kohlberg's Ethic of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jung's Feeling/Thinking Judgment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypotheses

This thesis proposes that the independent variables of gender, feeling and thinking judgment, and abstract and concrete ways of knowing more strongly influence ethical reasoning than the independent variables of the organicism and mechanism world views, or the communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations. These hypotheses contend that the way individuals are as people, their particular composition of individual personality characteristics, are more influential on ethical reasoning than their espoused beliefs and values. How a person *is* will have a stronger impact on ethical reasoning than what a person *thinks or believes*, as he or she puts forth those beliefs. Cognition, affect, and the ability to experience and express emotion affect individuals' perceptions and responses to ethical dilemmas. The following hypotheses explicitly state the expected relationships between these variables.

Hx.1: Individuals with a more concrete learning style are more likely to prefer to use an ethic of care; individuals with an more abstract way of learning are more likely to prefer to use an ethic of justice when reasoning about ethical dilemmas.

Hx.2: Individuals who use feeling judgment more than thinking judgment are more likely to use an ethic of care more often than an ethic of justice; individuals who use thinking judgment are more likely to use an ethic of justice more often than an ethic of care.
Hx.3: Individuals with a preference for an organismic world view are more likely to use an ethic of care more than an ethic of justice; individuals with a preference for a mechanism world view are more likely to use an ethic of justice more than an ethic of care.

Hx.4: Individuals who have a predominantly communitarian moral orientation are more likely to use an ethic of care more than an ethic of justice; individuals who have a predominantly consequentialist moral orientation are more likely to use an ethic of justice more than an ethic of care.

Hypotheses 1-4 are supported by both experiential learning theory and feminist theory, both of which validate the role of emotions in ways of knowing and ways of making decisions. Feelings, context, valuing others and interpersonal relationships are all essential to a feminist perspective in general and to ethical reasoning and decision-making in particular. Experiential learning theory proposes an engagement of the dialectic tension between concrete experience, with its feelings, emotions, and contextualism, and abstract conceptualization with its logic, objectivity, rationality, and analysis.

Hx. 5: The individual characteristics of gender, concrete and abstract ways of learning, and the thinking and feeling
judgment scales from the Myers Briggs Type Indicator will significantly influence the choice of one of two forms of ethical reasoning, the ethic of care and the ethic of justice.

Hx.6.: The variables associated with the measures of individual characteristics--gender, concrete and abstract ways of learning, and feeling and thinking judgment--will influence the choice of either of the ethical orientations of care and justice significantly more than the social knowledge variables of organismism and mechanism world view hypotheses and the communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations.

Hypotheses 5 and 6 form the basis of the theoretical model of this thesis. Ethical reasoning is affected by a constellation of variables, some having more impact than others. The psychological variables include personality characteristics, ways of knowing, masculine and feminine gender, and ways of making judgments. These will have a greater influence on ethical reasoning than the espoused ideas, beliefs, and values of social knowledge concerning what one considers to be good or true.

Hx.7.: Women are more likely to be concrete in their learning style, use feeling judgment, prefer an organismism world view, a communitarian moral orientation, and an ethic of care than a mechanism world view, a consequentialist moral orientation ethic of justice; men are more likely to be abstract in their
learning style, use thinking judgment, prefer a mechanism world view, a consequentialist moral orientation, and an ethic of justice more than an organicism world view, a communitarian moral orientation, and an ethic of care.

Hx.8: The MBA students will have higher scores for the ethic of justice than for an ethic of care, and their justice scores will be higher than those of either the MNO’s or the MOD’s. The MBA’s will have lower care scores than the MNO’s or the MOD’s.

Hx. 9: The MBA students will have higher consequentialist scores and lower communitarian scores than either the MNO’s or the MOD’s.

Hypotheses 8 and 9 are an extension of the theory supporting hypotheses 10 and 11. From what is known from the literature discussed in chapter IV about the ethics of care and justice, and the development of the instrument from the theories of communitarianism and consequentialism as discussed in Chapter III it can be hypothesized that there are differences between the groups of graduate majors in their moral orientation and forms of ethical reasoning. Because the MNO’s and the MOD’s are working more directly with people rather than data, they are more likely to engage their own feelings and the feelings of others, and be more subjective and less objective in their ideas and preferences than the MBA’s who work more with
data and information and value objectivity, rationality, and equity rather than contextualism.

Hx. 10.: The MBA students will have higher thinking judgment scores and lower feeling judgment scores than the MNO’s or the MOD’s.

Hx.11.: The MBA’s will have higher abstract scores and lower concrete scores than the MNO’s or the MOD’s.

Hx. 12: The MBA’s will have lower organicism scores than the MNO’s or MOD’s.

Hypotheses 10 and 11 are supported by the literature on the Learning Styles Inventory and the Myers Briggs Type Indicator suggesting significant differences in the personality characteristics and learning styles of individuals by the nature of their profession and professional training. The MNO students work in the non-profit sector, usually either in human services or the arts. These organizations traditionally have not emphasized a financial bottom line as a primary consideration, and individuals usually are drawn to non-profit organizations because they identify with the values the organizations espouse and attempt to enact. While most of the MOD students work in the corporate setting, they tend to focus on the softer, behavioral and interpersonal side of organizational life, and most of their training is in the department of Organizational Behavior. The MBA’s contrast
significantly with the other two groups in that many have undergraduate degrees in business, economics, or engineering and come with an interest in many of the quantitative aspects of management.

**Summary**

These research questions and hypotheses address the inquiry concerning how individuals resolve ethical dilemmas, in particular the differential impact of the specific individual psychological characteristics and the more philosophical belief and value systems of what is true and what is good, on the care and justice forms of ethical reasoning. It is believed that the individual characteristics, as independent variables, have greater impact on care and justice, than the other group of independent variables of beliefs and values.

The independent and dependent variables and the demographic data have been analyzed for inter-correlations using regression, t-tests, chi square, and analysis of variance, with results reported in the following chapter.
CHAPTER VI: RESULTS

Overview

This chapter follows the theoretical model of ethical reasoning put forth throughout this thesis, first by summarizing the data from the psychological instruments measuring individual characteristics, the Learning Styles Inventory and the thinking and feeling scales from the Myers Briggs Type Indicator. This is followed with the results from the instruments measuring social knowledge: the Organicism Mechanism Paradigm Inventory to capture world views and the Moral Orientation Questionnaire, demonstrating preferences for the communitarian or consequentialist moral orientation. The chapter ends with the results from the ethical dilemmas, with a summary of the coding, examples from the written responses, and the statistical analysis.

The results reported here pertain to a sample of 234 individuals unless otherwise indicated.

Results from Independent Variables of Individual Characteristics

Data from the Learning Style Inventory:

the Concrete-Abstract Dimension

A single measure, concrete-abstract, was constructed to measure the degree individuals are abstract or concrete in how they learn, the way they take in experiences, ideas, and information. This measure was calculated, adapting Kolb’s formula (1976), by subtracting the abstract conceptualization score from the concrete experience score on the Learning Styles Inventory IIa (Veres, Sims, Locklear, 1991). These latter two scores were computed separately
by taking the sum of the points of all of the items for each of the respective scales. The concrete-abstract scores for 225 subjects range from 29 to -31, with a mean of -5.81 (SD =11.22). The concrete experience scores range 9.0 to 47.0, with a mean of 26.10, (SD=6.91). The abstract conceptualization scores ranged from a minimum of 12.0 to a maximum of 48.0, with a mean of 31.92 (SD=7.50).

These scores compare with a sample of 1,446 adults ranging from 18 to 60 years of age, with an average of two years beyond high school in formal education and representing a wide range of occupations. For abstract conceptualization, the bottom 20% have scores between 16 and 28, the middle 60% have scores between 28 and 35, and the top 20% had scores between 35 and 46. For concrete experience, the bottom 20% of the scores were between 13 and 23, the middle 60% were between 23 and 30, and the top 20% were between 31 and 45 (Kolb, 1976).

There were significant differences by sex: the mean concrete-abstract for women was -3.97, (SD=10.12), while for men it was -7.52, (SD=12.11), (t=-2.37, p=.02). Looking at the separate variables of concrete experience, for 111 women the mean score was 26.98. The concrete experience mean score for 107 men was 25.48. The mean abstract conceptualization score for 107 women was 30.78 and the mean score for 111 men was 32.83.

Differences in concrete-abstract scores were found by graduate program. For the sample of 151 MBA students, including the
executive MBA students, the mean score was -6.25; for the 22 
Masters of Non-Profit Organizations students the mean was -2.41; 
and for the sub-sample of 15 Masters of Organizational Development 
students, the mean was -.20. These scores indicate that the MBA 
students are the most abstract in their thinking and learning, the 
MNO’s the second most abstract, and the MOD’s the least abstract, 
but as the scores are all below 1.00, none of these individuals are 
significantly concrete in their learning orientation. The differences on 
this scale were (F2,185)=2.89 (p< .05). The results are shown below 
in Table 6.1.

The Learning Style Inventory yielded data on the learning styles 
of the subjects in the sample. The learning style is calculated by 
subtracting the scores for the four learning modes: concrete 
experience from the abstract conceptualization score, and subtracting 
the reflective observation score from the active experimentation score. 
These two combination scores are plotted on a grid and their point of 
interception falls into one of the four quadrants, representing one of 
the four learning styles. For the data for 218 individuals, 22.9% were 
accomodators, 6.4% were divergers, 28.9% were assimilators, and 
41.7% were convergers. When analyzing the data by the largest 
groups of graduate majors, for MBA’s 22.3% were accomodators, 
5.4% divergers, 27.0% assimilators, and 45.3% convergers. For the 
MNO’s the results showed 25.0% were accomodators, 15.0% 
divergers, 25% assimilators, and 15% convergers. For the MOD’s the 
results were 42.9% were accomodators, 7.1% divergers, 35.7%
Table 6.1 Concrete-Abstract Learning Styles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concrete/Abstract Overall Sample</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>-7.52**</td>
<td>12.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>-3.97**</td>
<td>10.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MBA's</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>-6.25++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MNO's</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-2.41++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall MOD</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-0.20++</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** T-tests for significance, 2-tail, p=.019
++ (F[2,184]=2.884, p=.058).

Table 6.2
Learning Styles by Graduate Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>MBA's</th>
<th>MNO's</th>
<th>MOD's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodators</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergers</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilators</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergers</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
assimilators, and 14.3% convergers. These results are seen in Table 6.2 above.

**Results from the Thinking and Feeling Scales**

from the **Myers Briggs Type Indicator**

As mentioned in Chapter V, the items from the thinking judgment and feeling judgment scales from the Myers Briggs Type Indicator were assembled and given to subjects in order to assess the degree an individual is more likely to use thinking judgment or feeling judgment, and to assess the impact of these factors on ethical reasoning. A single overall feeling-thinking judgment score was computed by subtracting the raw thinking score from the raw feeling score. The range for the feeling-thinking judgment scores for 217 subjects was from -29 to +16, with a mean of -6.49 (SD =10.16).

A statistically significant difference by sex was found for the feeling-thinking judgment measure. The correlation is .2969 (p <.01), and the mean score for 112 women was-3.58 (SD= 8.62) and for 105 men, -9.60, (SD=10.78) (t=-4.53, p=.01). See Table 6.3 below for more statistical values.
Table 6.3
Mean Scores for Feeling-Thinking Judgment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling-Thinking Judgment</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>-6.49</td>
<td>10.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>-9.60</td>
<td>10.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>-3.58</td>
<td>8.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>-7.69**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNO</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-1.88**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-1.00**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sig. at the .01 level.
In the current study concrete experience was negatively correlated with the use of thinking judgment at -3130 (p<.01), and positively correlated with the use of feeling judgment at .3598 (p<.01). In a study done in 1973 (Kolb, 1984), with a group of 46 educational administrators, abstract-concrete correlated with thinking at .3 (p<.05), and with feeling at -.42 (p<.01). Concrete experience correlated with thinking at -.31 (p<.05), and with feeling at .39 (p<.01). Abstract conceptualization correlated with thinking at .22, and with feeling at -.34 (p<.05).

Differences in feeling-thinking scores by age were found at a correlation of .1455 (p<.05). As an individual gets older their feeling-thinking score increases, indicating a greater reliance on feeling judgment or using the valuing process for making judgments rather than relying primarily on logic.

Using an ANOVA test for significant differences between groups by graduate major, differences were found in the mean feeling-thinking judgment scores (F[2,177]=549.56) at the .01 level. The mean score for 144 MBA's was -7.69, for 22 MNO's -1.86, and for 14 MOD's, -1.00. See Table 6.14 later in this chapter for these data.

Results for the Independent Variables of Social Knowledge

Results from the Organicism Mechanism Paradigm Inventory

The OMPI as described in Chapter III measures how an individual sees and experiences the world, their ontology, their epistemology, their explanation of the world, and their view of persons. For an individual to have a strong organismic score he or
she has more of an organicism world view than a mechanism world view. This individual would tend to see and experience the world as a total living system with interdependent parts, where persons are seen as autonomous, creative, and integrated into the social environment. The organicism score is computed as the sum or total number of organicism statements selected from the 52 items presented in 26 pairs of statements. From earlier research by Johnson, et al. (1983), the mean score of a stratified sample of persons living in the U.S. was found to be 16 points, and approximately two-thirds of the population can be expected to score within four points of the mean. High scores indicate an organicism world view and low scores indicate a mechanism world view.

For the sample of 236 individual in the current study, scores ranged from 4 to 25, with 29.2% scoring 16 or below, 20.7% scoring between 12 and 16, and 37.8% scoring between 16 and 20. The overall mean score for 236 cases was 18.01, with a median of 19.0 and a mode of 19.0, (SD=3.65). See Table 6.6 below for these results. For 113 women the mean score was 18.33 (SD=3.28); for 121 men the mean score was 17.72, (SD=3.96). These differences by were not statistically significant.
Table 6.4  
Mean Scores for Organicism World View

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organicism</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>18.01</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>17.72</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>17.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNO</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sig. at the .01 level.**
Significant differences in organicism scores were found by graduate program. The mean score for 155 MBA's was 17.9, for the 22 MNO's was 19.05, and for the 17 MOD's was 19.65, \( (F[2,191] = 3.059) \) at the .01 level. This suggests that the MNO's and MOD's have a more fluid, flexible, adaptable world view, seeing themselves as having greater possibilities of impacting their environment than the MBA's who are more mechanistic in their world view. These data can be seen later in this chapter in Table 6.15.

As was the case with earlier variables, there were no significant differences in the organicism score by amount of full-time work experience, but significant differences were found by amount of managerial experience. The correlation with managerial experience was .3174 \( (p<.01) \). This might be interpreted as a sign of adaptation and accommodation. As an individual works longer as a manager, he or she sees the complexity and interdependent nature of the organization and feels him or herself to have a greater chance to influence some change whereas perhaps someone new to the role of a manager might see the organization in a more fixed state, feeling less able to make a difference, perceiving the reality of the organization as set by others, stable, to fit oneself into it.

Results from the Moral Orientation Questionnaire

The design and development of the Moral Orientation Questionnaire (titled “Managerial Orientation Questionnaire” for use by subjects) is discussed in detail in the previous chapter on
methodology. For the purposes of this study a single communitarian-consequentialist score (CMCS) was developed by obtaining a ratio of communitarianism to the sum of communitarianism and consequentialism by summing the total number of points from the items that measure communitarianism and dividing that number by the total number of points for communitarianism and consequentialism. The range of scores for communitarian-consequentialist (CMCS) is .35 to .88; the closer the CMCS score is to 1, the more an individual can be considered to have a communitarian moral orientation.

An individual with a communitarian moral orientation is more likely to accept common values and goals, prefers to experience the world as less bureaucratic, prefers to resolve issues face-to-face without external, authoritative, rule-bound interventions, and strives for moral unity to resolve conflicts. While there is a sense of duty in the communitarian orientation, duty is to the self and the community, and most often the means towards a particular goal are evaluated as they do or do not match the desired ends.

A consequentialist moral orientation indicates a preference for finding solutions providing the greatest good for the greatest number, often regardless of the means to do so. Duty and obligation are subordinated to what is considered good, and the costs and benefits of actions are judged by criterion of technical success. Intrinsic value is considered to be morally neutral.

There were no statistically significant differences in the CMCS scores by sex, graduate program, years of work experience,
managerial experience, household income, or parents' income. Age was not significantly correlated with communitarian-consequentialist scores.

Results the Dependent Variables: the Ethics of Care and the Ethics of Justice

Dilemmas for Ethics of Care and Justice

Coding

Using an adaptation of Lyons' coding scheme (1982), the dilemmas were coded question by question, analyzing each response for the presence or absence of indicators of care and justice and tallying the total numbers of indicators. In the first question, "For you, what is the conflict(s) or dilemma(s) in this situation?", the subject gives description, definition, or explanation of the dilemma or conflict. In the second question, "What would you do?" the subject describes possible or proposed actions. The third question asks, "What are the possible consequences of your actions?", and the respondent may reply with further actions, or a description of feelings by one of the parties, or any number of possible outcomes. The last question, "What was most on your mind when you were responding to this dilemma?" was the most difficult to code because sometimes the respondent included new material and/or sometimes a reiteration of
previous ideas. Most often answers to this question were coded in a similar manner to the previous ones.

This researcher trained a colleague in the concepts and coding of the ethics of care and justice, using an adaptation of Lyon's (1982) coding procedures described in the previous chapter. The training involved an orientation and discussion, a review of sample dilemmas, and an initial independent coding of a subsample of twelve dilemmas, three each from four subjects, randomly selected. Through analysis and discussion agreement was reached as to which statements, words, and/or phrases indicated care or justice, using the numbered indicators adapted from Lyons. The colleague subsequently took a test, independently coding 24 dilemmas, 8 of each of the 3 different dilemmas, 1 from each of 24 different individuals. This principle researcher simultaneously coded the same sample, obtaining .75 inter-rater reliability, this researcher to go on to code approximately 600 responses to the dilemmas. The coding materials are seen in Chapter V.

Responses were examined for intent, a method used in thematic analysis with the Critical Incident Interview (Flanagan, 1953). Intention can be derived from a variety of sources in the data: choice of words, order of words, length of response, use of pronouns, intensity of adjectives, proportion of adjectives and emotional expressions, phrasing, and context. For example, "One always has an obligation to one's employer" leaves the reader with a different impression than, "I feel I want to respond to my employer's needs
while simultaneously considering my own needs.” The former statement, spoken in the impersonal third person singular, about an obligation, could be a statement absolute for all time. The latter statement speaks from the first person, from the perspective of affect, i.e., “I feel...” rather than “I think...”, or, “It seems that...”, and from personal desire, “I want...”, communicating a relationship with the employer, and an understanding that both parties have needs to be respected. The words communicate a different intention, the former fulfills a duty, the latter attends to the other in the context of relationship. The differences are not always explicit, but an understanding of intentionality and how to analyze the data for it was essential for this study and an overall understanding of ethical orientation.

Responses to Dilemmas

Few people consistently responded with care or justice, throughout a question, throughout a dilemma or throughout all three dilemmas. Most subjects would respond to a dilemma predominantly one way or the other, but with some indicators of the other mode. For example, for the first dilemma, a subject might have 5 indicators of care and 2 of justice, for the second, 3 of care and 5 of justice, and for the third, 4 of care and 1 of justice. The total across the three dilemmas is 12 for care and 8 for justice, or an average of 4 for care and 2.7 for justice, indicating the individual has a preference for using an ethic of care over an ethic of justice.
The number of statements of care and those of justice were
totalled for each dilemma, and then mean scores obtained for the
three dilemmas, and for the entire sample. These and other statistical
data are presented later in this section, in text and tables.

The following sets of examples of responses of four different
individuals' to the same dilemmas demonstrate the differences
between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice. Both kinds of
responses to each question in each dilemma are represented, two
examples for the ethic of care and two for the ethic of justice.

The first set of responses to the first dilemma concerning the
production of a product with an associated chemical hazard. The
dilemma reads,

"You are the director of manufacturing for a company that
produces a product that now requires the use of a chemical that has
some hazard associated with it. There are no other chemical
alternatives to it. Despite trying to minimize the use of the chemical
and build in every conceivable safety factor to satisfy all of the
regulations, there is still a hazard to the persons involved in the
production of the product."

The first question subjects are asked to respond to in regard to
this dilemma is:

1. "For you, what is the conflict(s) or dilemma(s) in this situation?"

Two examples of a response of care:

DT: "The product I am producing contains a chemical with
some hazard associated with it. Therefore I will [be]
passing on to the consumer a product which may put
him/her in jeopardy."

LS: "Figuring out how to keep people who are producing
the product from hazard."
In both of these examples subjects emphasize care and the well-being and welfare of others.

Two examples of a response of justice:

DM: “The dilemma is the balance between continuing to manufacture and glean profit from this product as opposed to providing a workplace that is ultimately safe for the workers. There is also the issue of how does the product benefit society? Are we manufacturing cigarettes or an AIDS vaccine?”

JC: “None.”

In the first example, the use of an ethic of justice is indicated by the presentation of the conflict of demands and issues, to be profitable, and to provide safety. The last sentence, in the form of a question, can be seen as an attempt to justify one's actions, indicating a concern with justice. The second respondent, JC, does not see a conflict, the situation is without ambiguity and easy to see what to do.

The second question is:

2. “What would you do?”

A response of care:

DT: “I would not continue to produce the product and instead focus my efforts on developing a product that is hazard-free.”

LS: “Look into changing the formula so that product would do the same thing without using a hazardous chemical.”

Care is indicated in each of these responses by the straightforward statement of the primacy of the situation: a necessity to act so as not to cause harm to others.

An example of a response of justice:
DM: "I would inform the employees. I would check to see if I could legally continue production and if yes, let employees decide if they want to continue their employment. I would also try to pursue alternative production measures (processes)—perhaps robotics to handle the material. If I could not continue legally, I would stop."

JC: "Provide hazard training to all workers so [they are] completely informed of risks. Based on the particular hazard, I would use the manufacturer of this chemical to help design safety procedures. If necessary, I would rotate workers if exposure levels were an issue. I've worked in the chemical industry for almost 14 years. Today, almost all of the materials use[d] present some degree of hazard. By using the best available safety training methods, the risks can be greatly minimized."

In the first example the writer starts out by speaking of the manager's role and obligation; to inform the employees and see if he/she is within his/her legal obligations. The writer is specifically concerned with legality. In suggesting the employees be allowed to decide if they want to continue working with the material, the respondent acknowledges that others have their own contexts, thus relieving the manager of responsibility. The second writer also speaks to the obligations of the role: to provide training, and rotate employees if that would reduce exposure, implying some amount of exposure is acceptable.

The third question is:

3. "What are the possible consequences of your actions?"

An example of a response of care:

DT: "A customer's life could be in jeopardy. [There could be] law suits. [The company could be] barred from producing goods."
LS: "Less effective product. No hazard to people. More effective product."

The first example is a statement concerning how things could work out, following up on actions. It pronounces an ethic of care in its explicit concern for the welfare of another person. What follows is a concern for the company. In the second example care is indicated by a description of what might have happened, how things might work out, with a statement of the interests in the welfare of people.

An example of a justice response:

DM: "Employees may lose their jobs if they decide not to continue to work with the product. If I cannot proceed legally, then the firm could lose money. The current legal situation may not foresee future issues with use of this product. If I continue to produce it, I may have to establish financial reserves or insurance to guard against this."

JC: "Under normal circumstances, the workers would be unaffected. However, under the worst case, they could die or be permanently injured, as has happened."

While expressing what might happen to employees, an ethic of justice is evident in the first example by the concern about the effects to the company if it should cease producing the product. Again, the law and limits of legality are invoked as guidelines, as well as the interest in the fiscal responsibilities inherent in the situation. In the first example, justice is indicated by a concern with the standards of having financial reserves or insurance, being able to proceed in accordance with the law, losing money, employees have their own context and lose their jobs if they decide so.

In the second example, the writer chooses to compare the situation to "normal circumstances", or perhaps the worst possible
scenario, considering this case as though it could be an example of more general cases. This case is not considered as a unique situation in its own context.

The last question of the dilemmas is:

4. "What was most on your mind when you were responding to this dilemma?"

An example of a response of the ethic of care:

DT: "The risks associated with the product."

LS: "How it would affect people producing the product and people using [the] product."

In the both examples the welfare of others is of primary concern, for DT implied by thinking about the risks; for LS, in the effects both producing and using the product would have on people.

An example of a response of the ethic of justice:

DM: "I tend to think about the costs/benefits to society balanced against the costs/benefits to individuals (i.e. the employees and the firm). If the employees and society are notified and aware of the hazards, then they will pressure me into a decision-I may not choose that course but am likely to."

JC: " [I was] thinking about my past experiences in the industry, and the excellent safety record we have. How we as part of regulated safety procedures and our own principles, work to protect the workers. I also know of the millions of dollars spent by our industry to reduce personal risk, and the government’s increased regulations (sometimes to the point of absurdity). The products we manufacture are important to industry and to the population as a whole, or else they would not be manufactured. I would not avoid using a chemical simply because of potential worker hazard if it was the only alternative unless it was of minimal market value."
The ethic of justice is expressed in the first example in the explicit consideration of the costs and benefits, weighing and balancing the conflicting claims of society, the employees, and the firm. In the second example, JC talks of maintaining the company's safety record, following safety procedures and principles, and protecting the workers, implying that is part of the principles and obligations. JC refers to the costs to reduce risk and costs of regulation, and of the importance of producing the product unless it is of "minimal market value", again suggesting a cost-benefit analysis.

The second dilemma concerns a school superintendent asked to admit a child with AIDS. It reads,

"You are a superintendent of a school district where the parents of a child with AIDS are attempting to admit their child into the elementary school. Physicians have explained to the school administrators and concerned parents that the risks of other children contracting the disease are extremely small, but the school administrators and parents have to decide whether any risk at all should be taken to include this child. Because of the high costs of medical care, the parents are not able to send their child to a private school, or pay for tutoring. Both need to work full time to afford the medical costs."

1. "For you, what is the conflict's or dilemma(s) in this situation?"

Examples of responses with the ethic of care:

LS: "Should children at the school be exposed to any risk of contracting AIDS."

DT: "Some parents may not want to expose their children to a child with AIDS. The child, however, has a right to attend the school. Without alienating the child who has AIDS measures must be taken to reduce (if not eliminate) the risks of contracting the AIDS virus to other children."
In the first example, care is indicated by the concern for the welfare of others, that others not be exposed to the risk. In the second case, DT expresses concern for the parents of the other children and for the children, that they not run the risk of contracting AIDS. DT also invokes justice when referring to the “right to attend school.”

Responses with the ethic of justice:

DM: “The conflict is: do the rights of the child with AIDS to receive public education outweigh (or not outweigh) the rights of the others to protect their own health.”

JC: “The AIDS child[sic] right to an education versus the other children’s right to a safe school environment.”

DM and JC both use an ethic of justice in their responses by defining the situation as a conflict of competing interests and by invoking the “rights” claim.

2. “What would you do?”

Responding with an ethic of care:

DT: “I would reassure the parents by telling them that (1) AIDS cannot be contracted by casual contact and (2) let them know that measures would be taken to reduce the chances of another child contracting the disease.”

LS: “I would try to educate the school administrators about disease transmission and encourage them to allow the child to attend the elementary school.”

For DT, communication is both a process and a goal, to reach out to the parents and reassure them and let them know their interests are being acted upon. In the second example LS is using communication, through education and encouragement, to advocate for the well-being of the child.
Responding with an ethic of justice:

DM: “There are many risks faced by children attending public schools. There are probably many more injuries and deaths caused by school busses [sic] and sports than are likely to be caused by contracting the aids [sic] virus from another student. I would try to convince the administrators and parents to accept the child into school based on the risks relative to other risks.

JC: “If the child we [sic] young, too young not to know that biting was wrong, I would not allow the child to attend school. I would provide private tutoring at the school’s expense. If the child we [sic] older, I would allow them [sic] to attend since the individual’s rights are as great as the public’s rights.

The ethic of justice is used in the first example by speaking of this situation as a case of a principle, of the statistical odds of a child contracting AIDS from another child at school. There is a weighing of the risks of the situation, similar to an ordering of priorities. In the second instance, JC responds with an ethic of justice by using a guideline of age to determine what should happen to the child. The competing claims argument is used in the last sentence, referring to the rights of both parties. Justice is indicated by a sense of acting out of duty and role, and again a concern with upholding or violating principles.

3. “What are the possible consequences of your actions?”

An example of an ethic of care:

DT: “Someone may misinterpret my concern for discrimination against people infected with AIDS.”

LS: “Parents would withdraw their children from the school. Community would be angry. Parents of child with AIDS would find relief. Child with AIDS would not feel alienated. Children at school would learn compassion and not be
fearful of people with AIDS. Community would learn more about AIDS."

The first writer is concerned that his concern for the other children and parents may be seen as a case of discrimination against people with AIDS. This is an explicit concern with the relationship with others. The second writer is also concerned about the relationships with others, all of the parents and children involved, and the greater community. Specific mention is made of feelings of alienation, relief, anger, compassion, and fear.

Responding with an ethic of justice and care:

DM: "Another child could get AIDS [sic]. I could be 'ostracized' by the administrators at the school. One way or another, some group is likely to be unhappy. I could provide a child with the education she deserves."

JC: "The first action will cost money, which may not be readily available. This will require increased revenues (taxes) or reduced costs (services). The child may also feel isolated. The second action could alienate a number of parents, who may choose to keep their children out of school or transfer them to another one."

Justice is indicated by the suggestion of the breach of principles or standards, resulting in being fired. That parents could protest can be considered an issue of relationship or principles. The second example speaks to two different interests, the first one is fiscal, and implies a concern with one's obligations and some financial standards or implied guidelines. The second part of the response refers to the feelings and subsequent actions of those involved, that others "may choose" suggests that others have their own contexts.
4. "What was most on your mind when you were responding to this dilemma?"
A care response:

DT: "Not wanting to alienate the child with AIDS but also wanting to protect other students from contracting the disease. I thought about the dilemma from the standpoint that I was one of those parents."

LS: "That children have a difficult time growing up and need all the help they can get especially if they are 'different'. That our society has 'AIDS hysteria' and needs much more education about how it is not contracted just as much or more than how it is."

DT expresses a concern for for the well-being and welfare of both the child with AIDS and the other children, and tries to see the situation from the viewpoint of the parents. LS writes about the difficulty the children face if they are different. Although this is spoken about as an example of a more general situation, the intention is clearly to be caring of those involved.

Two examples of responses of justice:

DM: "The rights of the child to receive education and my displeasure with the misunderstandings of the true risks of the aids [sic] virus. (I don't claim to be an expert, but I am appalled [sic] by the people who still won't donate blood because they think they might get aids [sic]--as an example)."

JC: "The publics [sic] misperceptions on AIDS. The risks are minimal unless bodily fluids are transferred. Hystery [sic] and prejudice abound. These children have a right to be educated, and AIDS victims a right not to be isolated. This illness is not just for those that are morally bankrupt, but for innocent people as well."

DM calls on the rights argument and his own feelings to express an interest in justice. JC also refers to the rights of children, and
additionally refers to the fairness issue, that because all people, those who are "morally bankrupt" and those who are "innocent", can contract the illness, both are entitled to education and inclusion.

The responses to the second dilemma presented a pattern of results that would seem counter-intuitive. Many individuals responded by suggesting that the superintendent and the school district respect and uphold the principle of the right of the child with AIDS to get a public school education, as well as the principle of the rights of the other children to attend the school, thus invoking an ethic of justice. Many of the same respondents as well as others who did not consider the rights of the child paramount in this situation, wrote that the health and safety of the larger group of children be considered highest priority and not endangered, thus applying an ethic of care. They also talked about caring for the child with AIDS, making sure the child would be shielded from stigmatization, allowing the child to get an education through other means, and expressed general concerns for the parents and families of all concerned.

The third dilemma concerns a bank vice president who has an employee with 30 years seniority and emphysema. It reads:

"You are a vice president of a bank. You have an officer working with you who has emphysema, which is a deteriorating illness. He is physically unable to give a full day's work, but has another 8 years until he retires. He's already worked 30 years at the bank, and you also know his family because his wife used to work for you. You have talked with him about the situation and he's said he wants to continue working with the bank full time in order to get his full pension and other retirement benefits. In the meanwhile your manager is asking you to trim your human resource budget because of a possible forthcoming merger with another bank."

The first question concerning the dilemma is:

1. "For you, what is the conflict's or dilemma(s) in this situation?"

For responses of care and justice:

DT: "Discriminating against someone with a handicap."

LS: "How to allow the officer to continue working full-time and trim the budget."

DT was coded for care because of the expressed concern about discrimination; the intent would appear to be that of caring care for the person with the handicap who might be a victim of discrimination. LS was coded for justice, trying to balance the conflicting claims of the officer and the bank. This response with an ethic of justice was counter-balanced with five responses coded for care.

For two examples of justice:

DM: "Do I preserve the livelihood of this individual, even though it is likely to be costly [to] the bank due to his presumed decreased work efficiency, and likelihood of high medical expenses in the future. I may also be putting my own job on the line if I make a decision that isn't viewed positively by my superiors."

JC: "None."

DM responds with an ethic of justice by trying to balance conflicting claims, the livelihood of the officer and the costs to the bank. He also refers to the possible effects to himself, losing his job. JC does not see any conflict or dilemma, implying the situation is free from ambiguity and he knows what to do.

2. "What would you do?"

Two examples of care:
DT: "Offer the employee the option of having an office at home and/or offer the employee part-time work."

LS: "Allow him to continue working by working at home where he can take rests when needed and give him work that can be done at home."

An ethic of care is suggested by both DT and LS as they seek to accommodate to the officer's illness and the need to stay employed by making arrangements to have him work at home.

For two examples of justice:

DM: "Try to arrange an early retirement for him with full pension and retirement benefits. This would probably allow the employee to enjoy his remaining life more, allow him to be replaced by another, more effective employee and probably not cost the firm very much in the long-run as he is not likely to collect as much retirement as would be normal due to his shorter life expectancy."

JC: "Offer him his full pension and retirement benefits since, after 30 years, he should be fully vested already. Advise him of the importance to the bank, which he has spent his career with, to have someone with the ability to work full time. Also suggest that his family is important to him. Leaving now will allow him to spend time with his family before he becomes totally incapacitated or dies."

DM, using an ethic of justice, begins with his role of manager, suggesting early retirement with full pension and benefits, and then speaks of the bank's concern with getting an effective employee as a replacement, and cost to the firm, balancing the interests of two parties. JC uses an ethic of justice when he refers to the bank's regulations about full pension and benefits are due to those who are fully vested. He writes about the interests of the bank to have full time workers, and suggests that the officer comply with his own (JC's)
standards of relations with family. While not considering that others have their own contexts, he uses his own value of family: "important".

3."What are the possible consequences of your actions?"

Two examples of care are:

DT: "The employee may feel as if I cannot deal with his/her disease."

LS: "People at [the] bank will feel he's being treated in a special way and might be angry. [The] man and wife will be relieved and [the] man will work to his capacity. Office space can be used in some other way."

DT uses an ethic of care when stepping into the position of the employee and his concerns, that he is not being treated well. LS also refers to the officer's feeling that he is being treated well, and a concern with not only his emotions but that of the wife. The mention of office space is more instrumental, in the interests of the bank.

Two responses of the ethic of justice:

DM: "The employee may really want to continue working, in which case this wouldn't make him happy. It could in fact be more costly to the firm if my judgement [sic] is wrong. Perhaps he could get a guaranteed retirement and still work part-time. Other employees might complain about allowing for early retirement."

JC: "He may reject my offer, preferring to stay involved with the bank. My manager (who must be a president) may not allow me to make this offer, so something may need to be negotiated."

DM expresses an ethic of justice as he notes the conflicting claims of the employee who wants to continue working and the costs to the firm. While he might be caring as he suggests retirement and part-time work, he is concerned with the possible complaints from the
other employees about the early retirement, a concern about fairness. While considering the possibility that the officer may not want early retirement, JC is concerned with his obligation to meet the requirements of his manager, so he suggests negotiation, which has an element of care as it tries to meet the needs of the situation.

4. "What was most on your mind when you were responding to this dilemma?"

The first example is justice, not care, while the second is an ethic of care:

DT: "I thought about the potential of a discrimination law suit if I forced the employee to retire."

LS: "Getting the man his pension and benefits. Knowing that he may not live another 8 years with this."

DT, referring to the possibility of a law suit, implies a breach in the relationship between the officer and the bank; concern with the relationship is the indicator of an ethic of care. LS directly speaks of her concern with the welfare of the office, how long he might live and with what assistance, also an indicator of the ethic of care.

Two examples of a response using an ethic of justice:

DM: "Not denying health and retirement benefits from this individual, but also I feel he needs to be removed from the work force on a full-time basis. This person has worked with the firm 30 years and ought to be 'taken care of' in some way. He cannot just be fired."

JC: "Not trimming the H.R. budget because of a 'possible' merger. If there is a merger, the new organization has the power to terminate his employment anyway, as part of the elimination of a particular job. Dick York died this week of emphysema. The latter part of his life, he was primarily
bedridden and impoverished because of his illness and a lack of sufficient health care. A loyal employee should be taken care of. It's one of the company's costs of doing business."

Again, DM weighs conflicting claims of the officer and the bank while simultaneously concerned with the welfare of the officer, that he "ought to be 'taken care of' in some way," speaking of some care, but also his sense of obligation as a manager, using an ethic of justice. JC also talks about his obligation to take care of a loyal employee, as a cost of doing business, and earlier he refers to the company's power to terminate the employee, as part of the merger process. This is an explicit expression of the ethic of justice, abiding by the rules, principles and obligations of the organization and the role, respectively.

**Statistical Results from the Dilemmas**

This section summarizes the results of the statistical data for the coding of care and justice, and the relationships of those results to the variables in the primary model and demographic data. Statistical procedures were used to assess the correlations between each of the primary variables: care, justice, concrete experience-abstract conceptualization, feeling-thinking judgment, organicism world view, and communitarian-consequentialist moral orientation. These relationships are presented and interpreted in the larger context of the study, and displayed in Table 6.8 below.

The ethical dilemmas were scored for indicators of the ethic of care and the ethic of justice, obtaining separate means scores for care and justice for each dilemma, and across all three dilemmas.
For the 234 individuals who responded to the dilemmas, the mean care score was 4.02, (SD=1.63), with a range of scores from .67 to 11.0. The mean justice score was 4.01, (SD=1.61), with a minimum score of .33 and a maximum of 10.67. The scores were significantly different by sex, with the mean care scores for 120 men, 3.73, (SD=1.71), and for 112 women, 4.44, (SD=1.48). The mean justice score was 4.40 for 120 men, (SD=1.69), and 3.64 for 112 women, (SD=1.41). These data can be seen in Table 6.5 below.
### Table 6.5 Mean Care and Mean Justice Scores

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<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Care</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>235</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>1.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall MBA</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>1.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall MNO</td>
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<td>3.89</td>
<td>1.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall MOD</td>
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<td>4.59</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
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<td>1.61</td>
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Overall range for mean care: 0.67 - 11.00
Overall range for mean justice: 3.33 - 10.67
Other qualitative and quantitative data concerning the relationship of sex with the use of the ethics of care and justice show support for linking women primarily but not solely with the use of care and men, primarily but not solely with the use of the ethic of justice. This research is summarized in Chapter IV above.

The mean care score is correlated with age at .1723 (p<.01). Statistically significant differences between the mean care and the mean justice scores were not found with any of the other demographic variables.

The above results provide statistical support for relationships between psychological processes and ethical orientation in areas previously unexplored. These will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter.

Results: Testing of the Hypotheses

Overview

This section discusses the results as they pertain to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter V. The independent variables of gender, concrete/abstract ways of learning, and feeling/thinking judgment were expected to have a stronger impact on the dependent variables of the care and justice modes of moral reasoning than the independent variables representing social knowledge, the organismism-mechanism world views and the communitarian-consequentialist moral orientations. The hypotheses are re-stated here followed by
supporting data. Figure 6.1 below visually displays the relationships between the independent and dependent variables.
FIGURE 6.1
Correlations of Independent Variables with Dependent Variables

Individual Characteristics  Social Knowledge Structure  Ethical Reasoning
(Independent variables)    (Independent variables)    (Dependent variables)

Gender

Concrete/Abstract Learning  .36**

Feeling/Thinking Judgment

Organism-Mechanism World Hypotheses

Ethic of Justice

Ethic of Care

Communitarian/Consequentialism Moral Orientation

.18*

.16**

.30**

.22**

.26**

.29**

.24**

.15*

.22**

.21**

.14*

*  p < .05 (2-tailed)
**  p < .01 (2-tailed)
Validity of Scales

Feeling Judgment and Thinking Judgment Scales

The feeling-thinking judgment measure is correlated with an organism world view at .2191 (p<.01), with concrete experience-abstract conceptualization at .3578 (p<.01), and with a communitarian-consequentialist orientation at .2458 (p<.01). See Table 6.6 below.
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<tr>
<td>1. Care</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Justice</td>
<td>.0924</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Feeling/Thinking</td>
<td>.2143**</td>
<td>-.1739*</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Concrete/Abstract</td>
<td>.0984</td>
<td>-.0451</td>
<td>.3578*</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Organic</td>
<td>.0991</td>
<td>.0863</td>
<td>.2191**</td>
<td>.1814**</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Commun./Conseq.</td>
<td>.1390*</td>
<td>-.0542</td>
<td>.2458**</td>
<td>.2918*</td>
<td>.1541*</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sex</td>
<td>.2182**</td>
<td>-.2365**</td>
<td>.2969**</td>
<td>.1574*</td>
<td>.0832</td>
<td>.0558</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - Signif. LE .05  ** - Signif. LE .01  (2-tailed)
Thinking judgment was negatively correlated with feeling judgment at -.8080 (p<.01). The separate thinking judgment scores negatively correlated with the age of the subjects in the sample, at -.1491 (p<.05), and increase with household income at .1638 (p<.05). The separate feeling judgment score was shown to be negatively correlated with household income at -.2051 (p<.01).

**Care and Justice Measures**

From an analysis of the scores for the individual dilemmas, the overall or combined mean care score across all three dilemmas correlates at a statistically significant level for care scores for each of the three dilemmas. The overall combined mean care score correlates with the care score for dilemma 1 at .7111 (p<.01), for dilemma 2 at .7863 (p<.01), and for dilemma 3 at .6633 (p<.01). Additionally, the three individual care scores for each of the dilemmas significantly correlate with each other. The care score for dilemma 1 correlates with the care score for dilemma 2 at .2828 (p<.01) and with dilemma 3 at .1647 (p<.05). See Table 6.7 below.

The combined mean justice score for all three dilemmas shows statistically significant correlations with each of the three individual justice scores for the dilemmas. For dilemma 1, the combined mean justice score correlates with justice 1 at .7979 (p<.01), with justice 2 at .7352 (p<.01), and with justice 3 at .7231 (p<.01). As is the case with the care scores, the individual justice scores for each of the dilemmas correlates with each of the other two scores. The justice score for dilemma 1 correlates with the justice score for dilemma 2 at .3884
(p<.01), and with dilemma 3 at .3056 (p<.01). The mean care score is not significantly negatively correlated with the mean justice score.

In looking at the correlations between the care and justice scores for each dilemma, care and justice for each dilemma were negatively correlated with each other in a statistically significant way. See Table 6.7 for these results.
Table 6.7:
Mean Care and Mean Justice Scores Correlated with Mean Care and Mean Justice Scores for each Dilemma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MeanCare</th>
<th>Care1</th>
<th>Care2</th>
<th>Care3</th>
<th>MeanJustice</th>
<th>Just1</th>
<th>Just2</th>
<th>Just3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MeanCare</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care1</td>
<td>.7111**</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care2</td>
<td>.7863**</td>
<td>.2828**</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care3</td>
<td>.6633**</td>
<td>.1647*</td>
<td>.3504**</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MeanJustice</td>
<td>-.0924</td>
<td>-.1689**</td>
<td>.0369</td>
<td>-.0092</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just1</td>
<td>-.0990</td>
<td>-.3215**</td>
<td>.0788</td>
<td>.0815</td>
<td>.7979**</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just2</td>
<td>-.0185</td>
<td>.0196</td>
<td>-.1406*</td>
<td>.1097</td>
<td>.7352**</td>
<td>.3884**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just3</td>
<td>-.0191</td>
<td>.0219</td>
<td>.1168</td>
<td>-.2081**</td>
<td>.7231**</td>
<td>.3056**</td>
<td>.3538**</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - Signif. LE .05  ** - Signif. LE .01  (2-tailed)

Mean Care is the mean of the care scores across all three dilemmas.  
Mean Justice is the mean of the justice scores across all three dilemmas.

Care1, Care2, Care3 are the care scores of each of the three dilemmas, 1, 2, 3, respectively.

Just1, Just2, Just3 are the justice scores of each of the three dilemmas, 1, 2, 3, respectively.
Support for hypotheses

Results from the statistical analysis supported many but not all of the hypotheses. Each hypothesis is re-stated here with a discussion of the pertinent data.

Hx.1: Individuals with a more concrete learning style are more likely to prefer an ethic of care; individuals with an more abstract way of learning are more likely to prefer to use an ethic of justice when reasoning about ethical dilemmas.

There are no significant positive or negative correlations between concrete experience-abstract conceptualization and the mean scores for the ethic of care or justice. There are however significant correlations between the concrete experience-abstract conceptualization and the mean care score for the second dilemma, .4465 (p<.01), and the mean care score for the third dilemma, .1466 (p <.05).

Hx.2: Individuals who use feeling judgment more than thinking judgment are more likely to use an ethic of care more often than an ethic of justice, while individuals who use thinking judgment are more likely to use an ethic of justice more often than an ethic of care.

Feeling-thinking judgment is positively correlated with mean care score at .2143 (p<.01), and negatively with the mean justice score at -.1739 (p<.05). The feeling-thinking judgment measure is significantly correlated with organismic at .2191 (p<.01) and positively with the
communitarian-consequentialist scale at .2458 (p<.01). See Table 6.6 above.

Hx.3: Individuals with a preference for an organismic world view are more likely to use an ethic of care more than an ethic of justice; individuals with a preference for a mechanism world view are more likely to use an ethic of justice more than an ethic of care.

The organismic measure of a world view paradigm was not found to be significantly correlated with an ethic of care, measured with the mean care score at (.0991) or with an ethic of justice, mean justice score, at (.0863). Organicism was significantly correlated with the mean care score for the second dilemma only, at .1570 (p<.05). Organicism is positively correlated with a communitarian moral orientation at .1541 (p<.05), and negatively with a consequentialist orientation -.1541 (p<.05).

Organicism is positively correlated with concrete experience-abstract conceptualization at .1814 (p<.01). These results compare to the work of Johnson, et. al (1988) which demonstrated the Organicism-Mechanism Paradigm Inventory is correlated with the AC-CE scale of the Learning Style Inventory, r=.27 (p<.05). They claim this correlation was due primarily to the significant negative correlation between the OMPI and concrete experience, r=-.38 (p<.01). Organicism is positively correlated with feeling-thinking judgment at .2191, p<.01. See Table 6.6 above.

Hx.4: Individuals with a predominantly communitarian moral orientation are more likely to use an ethic of care
more than an ethic of justice; individuals who have a predominately consequentialist moral orientation are more likely to use an ethic of justice more than an ethic of care.

The communitarian-consequentialist moral orientation was positively correlated with the mean care score for the ethic of care, at .1390 (p<.05). It is not significantly correlated with the mean justice score for the measure of the ethic of care. Communitarian-consequentialist moral orientation is positively correlated with feeling-thinking judgment at .2458 (p <.01). It is positively correlated with organicism at .1541 (p<.05), with concrete experience-abstract conceptualization at .2918 (p<.01). These results are displayed above in Table 6.9. When separated, communitarianism is negatively correlated with a consequentialism at -.6036 (p<.01).

Tests were run to find significant differences in the individuals who had high, medium, and low scores on communitarian-consequentialist moral orientation. High, medium, and low scores were determined by taking the top 33.3 percentile, the middle 33.3 percentile, and the bottom 33.3 percentile in the frequency distribution. High communitarian scores were those with means greater than or equal to 89, medium were those with means less than 89, and low were those with means less than 71. High consequentialist scores were those means scores greater than 71, medium were those with means less than or equal to 71, and low were those with scores less than or equal to 54.
The group with the highest one-third of the mean communitarian scores had the lowest one-third of the mean consequentialist scores, (49.67), and the group with the lowest one-third of the communitarian scores had the highest one-third of the mean consequentialist scores (72.92), at a statistically significant level, (F[2,229]=80.78) at the .01 level. The group with the top one-third of the mean consequentialist scores had the lowest one-third of the mean communitarian scores (66.93). The group with the lowest consequentialist mean scores had the highest one-third of the mean communitarians scores (90.31), (F[2,229]=84.11) at the .01 level, (Chi-Square [4]=270.86) at the .01 level. See Appendix A

Significant differences on t-tests were found when comparing feeling-thinking judgment with the group with high communitarian and low consequentialist mean scores, and the group with low communitarian-high consequentialist mean scores (t=-3.30, p=.00). Significant differences were found when comparing mean care scores with the group with high communitarian and low consequentialist mean scores, and the group with low communitarian-high consequentialist mean scores (t=-2.18, p=.03). Similarly, significant differences between the groups with high and low communitarian and consequentialist mean scores on mean concrete-abstract (t=-4.14, p=.00), and mean organic (t=-2.91,p=.01) scores. These results are displayed in Appendices D and E.

Hx. 5: The individual characteristics of gender, concrete and abstract ways of learning, and the feeling/thinking
judgment scales from the Myers Briggs Type Indicator will significantly influence the two forms of ethical reasoning, the ethic of care and the ethic of justice. Women, concrete learning, and feeling judgment will be positively associated with the ethic of care; men, abstract learning, and thinking judgment will be positively associated with the ethic of justice.

Two types of analyses show support for Hypothesis 5: univariate, using t-tests and correlations, and multivariate regression. Gender is significant in relation to the mean care score, \( t=-3.41, p=.00 \) and to the mean justice score \( t=3.71, p=.00 \). Women had higher care scores and lower justice scores, while men had higher justice scores and lower care scores. See Table 6.5 above.

Multiple regression measured the impact of each of the other variables on the mean care and mean justice scores. The variables were entered in a particular order to allow for the demonstration of the maximum amount of influence, starting with the variables least likely to have influence, those with the lowest correlations with care and justice: communitarian-consequentialist, organic, feeling-thinking judgment, sex, and concrete-abstract. The results as exhibited in the overall R Square =.0926 (F5,191)= 3.8965 (p<.01), for care and R Square=.0906 (F5,191)= 3.8037 (P<.01) for justice explain 9% of the variance in mean care, with an R Square Change of .01 for concrete-abstract, with sex having the most impact, \( \text{Beta}=.2188, [t=3.01] \ p=.003 \). For the impact on mean justice, also explaining .09 of the
variance, with an R Square Change of .00, sex had the most impact (Beta= -.1986, [t= -2.74] p=.007), and feeling/thinking judgment, (Beta= -.1584, [t= -2.01] p=.046) had the second most impact. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 below presents these results.
### Table 6.8
Multiple Regression Predicting the Mean Care Score Across 3 Dilemmas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t value</th>
<th>Sign T</th>
<th>RSquare Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commun./Conseq.</td>
<td>1.4034</td>
<td>.0646</td>
<td>.871</td>
<td>.3846</td>
<td>.0116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>.0286</td>
<td>.0614</td>
<td>.862</td>
<td>.3900</td>
<td>.0069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling/Thinking</td>
<td>.0195</td>
<td>.1258</td>
<td>1.596*</td>
<td>.1122</td>
<td>.0302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>.6961</td>
<td>.2188</td>
<td>3.019**</td>
<td>.0029</td>
<td>.0425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete/Abstract</td>
<td>-.0059</td>
<td>-.0392</td>
<td>-.522</td>
<td>.6021</td>
<td>.0013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall R Square = .0926 (F5,191) = 3.8965**

**p<.01
*p<.05

### Table 6.9
Multiple Regression Predicting the Mean Justice Scores Across 3 Dilemmas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t value</th>
<th>Sign T</th>
<th>RSquare Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commun./Conseq.</td>
<td>.2882</td>
<td>.0132</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.8590</td>
<td>.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>.0632</td>
<td>.1352</td>
<td>1.896</td>
<td>.0595</td>
<td>.0101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling/Thinking</td>
<td>-.0247</td>
<td>-.1584</td>
<td>2.008**</td>
<td>.0460</td>
<td>.0442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-.6349</td>
<td>-.1986</td>
<td>2.738**</td>
<td>.0068</td>
<td>.0360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete/Abstract</td>
<td>-8.8948</td>
<td>-.0059</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>.0035</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall R Square = .0906 (F5,191) = 3.8037 **

**p<.01
*p<.05
Hx.6.: The variables associated with the measures of individual characteristics -- gender, concrete and abstract ways of learning, and feeling and thinking judgment -- will influence the choice of either of the ethical orientations of care and justice significantly more than the social knowledge variables of organicism and mechanism world view hypotheses and the communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations.

The results summarized above for Hypothesis 5 present the univariate relationships between gender, concrete and abstract ways of learning, and feeling and thinking judgment and the care and justice forms of ethical reasoning.

For the group of 212 subjects who did not have high scores for both care and justice, feeling-thinking judgment was significantly correlated with communitarian moral orientation at .2180 (p<.01), and with organicism world view at .2175 (p<.01), and with concrete experience-abstract conceptualization at .3650 (p<.01).

Hx.7.: Women are more likely to be concrete in their learning style, use feeling judgment, prefer an organicism world view, a communitarian moral orientation, and an ethic of care rather than a mechanism world view, a consequentialist moral orientation, and an ethic of justice; men are more likely to be abstract in their learning, use thinking judgment, prefer a mechanism world view, a consequentialist
moral orientation, and an ethic of justice more than an organism world view, a communitarian moral orientation, and an ethic of care.

In the current study, concrete experience-abstract conceptualization is related to gender: as the scores increase for women they decrease for men. Using a T-test, differences between men and women were found to be statistically significant, ($t=-2.37$, $p=.019$), indicating that the men ($N=113$) in this sample of 221 were more abstract in their learning than women. The correlation coefficient between concrete experience-abstract conceptualization is $.1541$ ($p<.05$). See Table 6.10 below.
Table 6.10
Concrete-Abstract Learning and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Mean</th>
<th>Female Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concrete-Abstract Learning</td>
<td>-7.52</td>
<td>-3.97</td>
<td>-2.37*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=113</td>
<td>N=103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05

Table 6.11
Feeling and Thinking Judgment and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Mean</th>
<th>Female Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeling-Thinking Judgment</td>
<td>-9.60</td>
<td>-3.58</td>
<td>-4.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=105</td>
<td>N=112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p<.01

Table 6.12
Mean Care and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Mean</th>
<th>Female Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Care</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>-3.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=120</td>
<td>N=112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p<.01

Table 6.13
Mean Justice and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Mean</th>
<th>Female Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Justice</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.71**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=120</td>
<td>N=112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05
Gender is significantly related to the feeling-thinking scales of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator at .30 (p<.01). While both men and women in this sample tended to be more oriented towards thinking than feeling judgment, women have significantly lower thinking scores than men, the means are -.960 for men, and -3.58 for women. A t-test demonstrated significant differences (t=-4.53, p=.00). See Table 6.11 below. The correlation for sex and feeling-thinking judgment is .2438 (p<.01).

Gender is not significantly correlated with either the organismism scores or the moral orientations of communitarian-consequentialist (CMCS), but influences these through the feeling-thinking judgment of the MBTI.

Gender is correlated to mean care at .2183 (p<.01), and to the ethic of justice, with the mean justice score at, -.2365 (p<.01). T-tests demonstrate the significance: for care (t= -3.41,p=.001), and for justice, (t=3.71, p=.00). These results are seen Tables 6.12 and 6.13 above.

Hx.8.: The MBA students will have higher mean justice scores than mean care scores; their mean justice scores will be higher and their mean care scores will be lower than those of either the MNO's or the MOD's.

An ANOVA demonstrates a significant difference in mean care scores by graduate major when taking into account all of the students with earlier graduate degrees in other areas including arts, social science, physical and natural sciences, (F [6,205] =3.748) at the .01 level. This may be explained by the fact that the numbers for the sub-
samples of the non-management graduate are small (16 total) when compared with those for the MBA’s (157), MNO’s (22), and MOD’s (17). The subsample in the non-management group includes those persons with additional graduate degrees, such as in law, medicine, nursing, and social work.

When an ANOVA was done just using the MBA’s, the MNO’s, and the MOD’s, the differences for mean care scores between these three groups were not statistically significant. The same was true for the mean justice scores, that is, statistical significance was found using ANOVA for all 9 categories of graduate majors, but not found when comparing only the three categories of students, the MBA’s, MNO’s, and MOD’s.

Hx. 9: The MBA students will have higher consequentialist scores and lower communitarian scores than either the MNO’s or the MOD’s.

There was no statistically significant data to support this hypothesis.

Hx. 10.: The MBA students will have higher thinking judgment scores and lower feeling judgment scores than the MNO’s or the MOD’s.

The three groups were significantly different on the feeling-thinking judgment scale (F[2,177]=5.721) at the .01 level. See Table 6.14 below.
Table 6.14
ANOVA for Feeling-Thinking Judgment Scores for Graduate Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total N</th>
<th>MBA</th>
<th>MNO</th>
<th>MOD</th>
<th>DF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=180</td>
<td>N=144</td>
<td>N=22</td>
<td>N=14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Feeling-Thinking Score</td>
<td>-6.46</td>
<td>-7.69</td>
<td>-1.86</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** p&lt;.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(F2,177)=5.72**

Table 6.15
ANOVA for Concrete-Abstract Scores for Graduate Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total N</th>
<th>MBA</th>
<th>MNO</th>
<th>MOD</th>
<th>DF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=188</td>
<td>N=151</td>
<td>N=22</td>
<td>N=15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Concrete-Abstract Score</td>
<td>-5.31</td>
<td>-6.25</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ p&lt; .06</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(F2,185)=2.88+

Table 6.16
ANOVA for Organicism Scores for Graduate Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total N</th>
<th>MBA</th>
<th>MNO</th>
<th>MOD</th>
<th>DF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=194</td>
<td>N=155</td>
<td>N=22</td>
<td>N=17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Organicism Score</td>
<td>18.18</td>
<td>17.90</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>19.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* p&lt;.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(F2,191)=3.06*
Hx.11: The MBA's will have higher abstract scores and lower concrete scores than the MNO's or the MOD's.

The groups were significantly different on the concrete-abstract scale, (F [2,185] =2.884), p=.058. See Table 6.15 above.

Hx.12: The MBA's will have lower organismic scores than either the MNO's or the MOD's.

For the three groups the scores were significantly different on the organismic scale (F [2,191]=3.059) at the .05 level. See Table 6.16 above.

**Relationships with other variables**

There was a statistically significant difference found between those 124 individuals who had faced an ethical dilemma with their employer and those 71 who had not (t=3.52, p=.001).

A statistical difference was found on the communitarian-consequentialist scores between those 132 persons who had had to face ethical dilemmas with their employers and those 77 who had not (t=1.90, p=.059) at the .1 level.

Some unexpected findings include statistics suggesting that as age increases, the feeling judgment score increases, as does the organismic world view score, and the mean care score.

Not surprisingly, as income increases, feeling judgment decreases. This can partly be explained by the subsample of students in the Masters of Non-Profit Organizations Program who tend to have lower incomes than MBA students, which in this sample include executive MBA students. High level executive and managerial
positions reward logical and analytical thinking, not the use of value oriented feeling judgment.

No significant differences were found by sex for the item on the background questionnaire, asking, “Do you have a different code of ethics for yourself outside of work?”. Approximately 25% of 108 men and 25% of 99 women answered positively.

Additional Data on Care and Justice

In an effort to explore differences in individuals coded more for both care and justice when compared with those individuals not coded much for both care and justice, a frequency table of the care and justice scores was obtained (see Appendix H).

Testing for differences in subjects who had high, medium, and low scores on mean care and mean justice, means, ANOVA, chi square, and t-tests demonstrated differences in mean justice scores but not the mean care scores. The high mean care scores, those in the top 20th percentile, were 5.4 or above, the medium, in the middle 60th percentile, were between 5.3 and 2.6, and low, bottom 20th percentile, were less than 2.6. The high, medium, and low mean justice scores were greater than 5 (top 20th percentile), between 2.6 and 5.0, (middle 60th percentile), and less than or equal to 2.5, (lowest 20th percentile) respectively. Significant differences on the mean care scores were found across the three mean justice groups (F=[2,232]=385.40) at the .00 level, (F[2,232] =4.50) at the .01 level, and (F[2,232]=289.45) at the .00 level. There were no significant differences on any other variables across the mean care groups.
For the group with the highest care scores, their mean justice scores were significantly low (3.76), while the group with the lowest care scores had the highest mean justice scores (4.18), (F[2,232]=385.40), p=.000. For the group with the highest justice scores, their mean care scores were the lowest (3.76), and the group with the lowest justice scores had the highest mean care scores (4.18), both statistically significant (F[2,232]= 4.49), p=.012. A Chi-Square test demonstrated only small samples who were high on care while low on justice, and, low on care while high on justice, (Chi-Square[4]=11.84), p=.019, suggesting that the measures may not necessarily be opposite of one another. See Table 6.17 below.
Table 6.17
Chi-Square Analysis of High, Medium and Low Mean Care and Mean Justice Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justice Category</th>
<th>Bottom 20%</th>
<th>Middle 60%</th>
<th>Top 20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Care Category</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom 20%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle 60%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 20%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square(df=4)=11.84 (p<.05)

Justice bottom 20% = mean scores greater than or equal to 5.
Justice middle 60% = mean scores less than 5.
Justice top 20% = mean scores less than 2.5.
Care bottom 20% = mean scores greater than 5.4.
Care middle 60% = mean scores less than or equal to 5.4.
Care top 20% = mean scores less than or equal to 2.6.
The responses to the dilemmas were analyzed for consistency across the three dilemmas. The second dilemma, addressing the issue of admitting the child with AIDS to a public school, brought different results than the other two dilemmas. In looking at the number of people who had higher mean care scores than mean justice scores for each dilemma, for dilemmas 1 and 3, the numbers were 85 and 86, respectively. There were 138 individuals whose scores were higher on care than justice for dilemma 2. For the number of individuals who had lower mean care scores than mean justice scores, the numbers were 123 and 107 for dilemmas 1 and 3, respectively, and 66 for dilemma 2. The numbers were more even for the individuals whose mean care and mean justice scores were equal, 26, 24, and 36, for dilemmas 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

Summary

In reviewing the results of this research, the data of the relationships between variables supports several of the hypotheses reinforcing the contention that individual characteristics have a stronger influence on ethical reasoning than social knowledge. The following chapter will discuss these results in greater detail as they pertain to the theoretical model.
CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION

This chapter presents an overview of the study and discusses the major findings relevant to the research hypotheses.

Overview of the Study

This research began as an attempt to understand the relationships between particular psychological, philosophical, and moral/ethical variables and ethical reasoning. When inquiring as to how an individual resolves an ethical dilemma, the pattern and the components influencing the reasoning process and the final position vary. An ethical orientation includes the predisposing psychological factors of personality characteristics, ways of knowing, a world view, unconscious processes, and the social influences of religious and cultural values. The immediate precipitating factors of thoughts and feelings, and the temporal environmental factors of other persons' behaviors and attitudes along with the conscious or unconscious projected consequences of the resolution could all impact the process of ethical reasoning.

Knowledge of the cognitive processes that influence ethical reasoning assists in understanding how these factors affect one another. The Myers Briggs Type Indicator and the Learning Styles Inventory, along with the World Hypotheses instrument, the Organismism Mechanism Paradigm Inventory, and the Moral Orientation Questionnaire, demonstrate the differences in how individuals
respond, communicate, decide, perceive, problem-solve, and interact with others, with correspondingly different outcomes.

This chapter will discuss the finding as they relate to each of the factors in the theoretical model developed throughout the thesis. The model proposes that the independent variables of gender, concrete or abstract ways of learning, and feeling or thinking judgment, as characteristics describing who the individual is, will have a greater influence on care or justice forms of ethical reasoning, as dependent variables, than the independent variables of social knowledge, the espoused beliefs and values of an organicism or mechanism worldview, and a communitarian or consequentialist moral orientation.

Findings from the Measures of Individual Differences

Gender

Gender, as expected, was found to have a statistically significant impact on some of the other variables areas, and not on others. The women in this sample had lower thinking scores and lower abstract experience scores (are more concrete in their learning) than the men in this sample, higher organicism worldview scores than men, and statistically significant higher mean care and lower mean justice scores than men. The men in this sample are more abstract in their ways of knowing, use thinking judgment more than the women, have a worldview that is less organicism, and are lower in their mean care and higher in mean justice scores than women. In part this can be explained by the fact that as mentioned earlier, women define and see themselves in relationship to others, and the language used to
define a self-concept corresponds to some of the language in the Learning Styles Inventory, the Myers Briggs Type Indicator, the definitions and coding for the ethics of care and justice, and the definitions of the communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations.

**Learning Styles Inventory**

Hypothesis 1 is supported with the results from the Learning Styles Inventory and the analysis of the Ethical Dilemmas which demonstrate that concrete experience is more related to the ethic of care than the ethic of justice, while abstract conceptualization is more related to the ethic of justice than the ethic of care. Concrete experience as an apprehension mode of bringing in experiences, ideas, and information involves direct, tangible, affective, sensory interaction with the environment. It includes dealing with situations in a personal way, and using intuition and values in approaching decisions. This coincides with the indication of care, an interest in a relationship with another, and in the well-being of the other(s). Abstract conceptualization involves comprehensional knowledge, using ideas, logic, thinking, and a scientific, systematic, symbolic approach to analysis and problem-solving. This parallels with the indications of justice, a concern with objectivity, rationality, and following the rules.

**Myers Briggs Type Indicator**

In addition to supporting the first hypothesis, the data from the feeling judgment and thinking judgment scales from the Myers Briggs
Type Indicator support hypothesis 2. Those particular individuals who prefer feeling judgment are more likely to use the ethic of care when resolving an ethical dilemma, while those individuals using thinking judgment more often prefer an ethic of justice while engaged in ethical reasoning. Feeling-thinking judgment was significantly positively correlated with the mean care scores, and negatively with the mean justice scores.

Similar to the ethic of care, the use of feeling judgment involves making decisions based on what is valued rather than what is necessarily logical, is person-centered in regards to an interest in pleasing people, a concern for peoples' feelings, and generally taking an interest in people. Feeling judgment involves feeling sympathetic, appreciative, and tactful. The use of thinking judgment implies the preferences for logic, objectivity, impersonal detachment from people's feelings.

The three dimensions of gender, concrete experience-abstract conceptualization, and feeling-thinking judgment form a constellation of individual characteristics that influences the care and justice forms of ethical reasoning in a distinctive manner.

Findings Related to the Measures of Social Knowledge

Organism Mechanism Paradigm Inventory

and Moral Orientation Questionnaire

An organism world view takes its name from a standpoint where the world is seen as a living organism that changes, has a holistic and interrelated nature, and allows for knowing about the
world through an interactionist and constructivist framework. Seeing the world through the lenses of organicism means seeing oneself and others as capable of active and purposive change, creativity, autonomous while integrated into the social environment. A mechanistic world view encompasses stability, knowing through objectivism and realism, explains the world through a reductionist analysis, and sees people as reactive, passive, determined by the larger environment, and separate from the social environment.

The communitarian moral orientation is defined by common values and goals, personal communication, an organic, intimate, mutual identification with persons, and a social role with a range of obligations. The consequentialist moral orientation emphasizes a consideration of the greatest good for the greatest number, subordinating duty for that which is considered good, applying a cost-benefit analysis when faced with competing actions, and defining intrinsic value as morally neutral.

While the world hypotheses and moral orientations are positively correlated with each other, neither the world hypotheses nor the moral orientations of communitarianism or consequentialism significantly influence the use of an ethic of justice for ethical reasoning. Communitarianism is significantly correlated with the use of an ethic of care. These results only partially support hypotheses 3 and 4 proposing that organicism is positively related to an ethic of care, and mechanism to an ethic of justice; communitarianism is linked with an ethic of care, and consequentialism with an ethic of
justice. This suggests that belief and value systems of organism-mechanism worldviews, and those of the communitarian-consequentialist moral orientations have significantly less impact on ethical reasoning than the variables of individual differences discussed above. As belief and value systems, each are cognitive typologies, patterns of what individuals think rather than how they are as defined through self-report.

The results of the statistical analysis support hypotheses 5, 6, and 7 by demonstrating that the independent variables of gender, concrete experience-abstract conceptualization, and feeling judgment-thinking judgment directly or indirectly influence ethical reasoning, and do so more than the world hypotheses or moral orientation variables. Gender is directly correlated with both the ethics of care and justice, and with learning styles, and feeling-thinking judgment. Concrete and abstract ways of learning directly influence feeling-thinking judgment, a moral orientation, and the world view hypotheses. Feeling-thinking judgment, in addition to being correlated with gender and learning styles, directly influences moral orientation, the world view hypotheses of organism-mechanism, and the ethics of care and justice. This suggests learning style influences ethical reasoning of care and justice indirectly through the feeling-thinking judgment of the MBTI. This is graphically displayed in Figure 7 below.
FIGURE 7.1
Correlations of Independent Variables with Dependent Variables

Individual Characteristics (Independent variables)  Social Knowledge Structure (Independent variables)  Ethical Reasoning (Dependent variables)

Gender

Concrete/Abstract Learning

Feeling/Thinking Judgment

Organism-Mechanism World Hypotheses

Ethic of Justice

Ethic of Care

Communitarian/Consequentialism Moral Orientation

.18*

.36**

.29**

.26**

.15*

.21**

.14*

.30**

.22**

.17*

.24**

* p < 0.05 (2-tailed)
** p < 0.01 (2-tailed)
Findings Related to Ethical Reasoning

The ethical dilemmas presented three different kinds of ethical dilemmas. The first dilemma is more abstract than the other two: no individuals are mentioned, the reader is given no information as to who or how many people might be affected by the chemical hazard, or what tasks are associated with the production. The person responding is left to assume generalities about manufacturing.

The second dilemma sometimes elicited responses that were codes more with justice than with care, contrary to what was expected. Because every respondent has been a student in elementary school, they can identify with the child, regardless that the child has AIDS. Many individuals have been in situations where they themselves felt marginalized, or have directly witnessed others, particularly school children, being marginalized or stigmatized by their peers. Many respondents identified with the larger group of children and their parents, seeking protection from danger and certainty of safety. Respondents, citing the rights of the ill child to a public education, used an ethic of justice when suggesting the child be admitted, and the details worked out accordingly. Others used an ethic of care when their response considered the health and well being of the other children, or the well being and/or feelings of the child with AIDS and his or her family.

The third dilemma places the respondent in a situation that perhaps he or she has never been in: the manager who must make a judgment call concerning another person's quality of life, in this case
the person is well known to the manager. The employee has thirty years tenure with the organization and now is too ill to work full time. The splitting up of the two positions, management and staff, in this case an ill employee, could direct the case in two opposing directions: use of an ethic of justice to implement the directive from management to cut the human resources budget, and use of an ethic of care to consider the welfare and well being of the employee and his family before the interests of the bank.

Although the mean care and the mean justice scores are not significantly negatively correlated with each other, the mean care scores for each of the individual dilemmas are positively correlated with the overall mean care score, and the mean justice scores for each of the individual dilemmas are positively correlated with the overall mean justice score across all three dilemmas. These results indicate consistency across dilemmas. The mean care and justice scores for each dilemma are significantly negatively correlated with each other. This implies that individuals responded in distinctly different and opposing ways, according to the coding for care and justice, to each of the dilemmas, and across all three dilemmas.

Gender, organismism, and feeling-thinking judgment are significantly related to the mean justice score, but concrete experience-abstract conceptualization was not found to be significantly related to the mean care or mean justice scores. However, concrete experience-abstract conceptualization affects
organicism which acts as a mediating variable on the mean care score.

The results of the analysis of the ethical dilemmas did not support hypothesis 8 suggesting there would be higher justice scores and lower care scores for the MBA's than for the MNO's or the MOD's. While the scores between the group were in most cases different, the differences were small. Significant differences were not found on the communitarian-consequentialist scores either, thus not supporting hypothesis 9.

Significant differences were found between the three groups of graduate majors. The MBA's in this study had lower feeling-thinking judgment scores, lower concrete-abstract scores, and lower organismic scores than either the MNO's or the MOD's. These results support hypotheses 10, 11, and 12. As mentioned in Chapter VIII, the individuals who are enrolled in the MNO and MOD programs frequently come from social science undergraduate education, and traditionally have interests in working more directly with people, face to face, than the MBA students. The MBA students, many of whom have undergraduate degrees in economics, business, or engineering, prefer using analytical skills involving data and information directly rather than working face to face with people and their emotions. The Masters of Organizational Development students in this study are working full time, frequently in human resources, working on interpersonal, group, and organizational issues, and often involved in
organizational change efforts. This requires flexibility, adaptability, using values as well as logic, and strong interpersonal skills.

The MNO’s work in non-profit human and social service or arts organizations for reasons related to their personal interests and values, not for the purposes of gaining prestige, a high salary, or opportunities to climb a long career ladder. These positions call for frequent interaction with boards of directors, clients, volunteers, and funding agencies, requiring the interpersonal skills and interests from concrete experience and an organicism world view.

Summary

These results suggest that the tendency to prefer a particular form of ethical reasoning, care or justice, is not random. Individuals vary in their ethical reasoning according to their self-concept and their sense of relationship with others. This co-varies with the Learning Style Inventory, the Myers Briggs Type Indicator, and a communitarian moral orientation.

An individual’s identity and self-concept through self description, composed of masculine or feminine gender, ways of learning, and making judgments are more influential on choice of forms of ethical reasoning than the espoused values of a world view paradigm and moral orientation. Using a concrete, personal, feeling and valuing way of learning, of taking in experiences, ideas, and information, and making judgments, leads to the use of an ethic of care, which is more feeling and relationship oriented, concerned with self and other, and with the context of the situation rather than the application of abstract
principles and rules. This same profile also more often results in a vision of the world as changeable, interactive, personal, controllable, and with opportunities for impact. This composition of characteristics and beliefs are more closely related to a communitarian moral orientation that is community based, more personal, less bureaucratic, more autonomous yet connected to the local community as a way of interacting in the world and resolving conflicts.

In contrast, abstract, rational, objective, unemotional ways of learning and making judgments lead to the use of an ethic of justice which is oriented towards duty, obligation, following rules and principles, objectivity and universality. These characteristics are also more closely related to a mechanism world view of a more stable, fixed, rule-bound world, and a consequentialist moral orientation, concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number, invoking a cost-benefit analysis to justify the means towards the desired results.

Much of the data support the hypotheses and demonstrate the strength of the individual characteristics as more influential on forms of ethical reasoning than structures of social knowledge, suggesting that individuals may act independently of their beliefs. It could be useful to investigate personality characteristics and ways of interacting with people and the environment as determinants of ethical behavior. Feelings and concrete experience have a more significant influence on ethical reasoning than has been noted before.

These results also imply that one might understand the process of ethical reasoning from one of two directions: assessing an
individual’s profile on the psychological instruments to predict ethical orientation; or, assessing an individual’s ethical orientation to predict the psychological profile. This could be useful for the purposes of learning to use a different ethical orientation as appropriate to the situation.

For someone who only knows an ethic of justice and a consequentialist orientation, ethical reasoning can be enhanced by approaching the valuing process in the feeling judgment dimension, or by focusing on knowing through apprehension rather than comprehension. The model offered here allows for an expansion of one’s awareness of the components of ethical reasoning, and provides ways to increase one’s resources used for ethical reasoning. While most women use a relationship orientation and an ethic of care, most men use an autonomy orientation and an ethic of justice. Because organizations historically have been male dominated, justice has been figural in the organization. With more women entering the ranks of management, organizations and their members need to incorporate both care and justice.

These results point towards several implications for research and practice discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII

IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The present research, setting out to explore the elements within an individual that influence ethical reasoning, has demonstrated a relationship between psychological, philosophical, and moral/ethical factors affecting ethical reasoning. It is hoped these results will assist organizational scholars and managers in their understanding of how individuals resolve ethical dilemmas in today's organizations. In reviewing the findings of this study several areas of theoretical interest emerge for further investigation.

The primary area of interest is the influential role of individual characteristics in ethical reasoning: how the particular composition of the social role of gender, ways of thinking, feeling, judging, knowing and learning and other personality variables influence ethical reasoning. Secondly, while this study has shown that social knowledge can influence ethical reasoning, the impact demonstrated is smaller than the impact of the individual characteristics. These two findings suggest that while ideas and belief systems can be powerful and inspiring, who people are as individuals may be more impactful on reasoning and perhaps acting.

This leads to the third theoretical implication of this investigation: because ideas and beliefs alone cannot predict how an individual will resolve an ethical dilemma, and because the personality variables have an important role in ethical reasoning, the emotional aspects of
human behavior perhaps could be acknowledged, understood, and accepted more so than is the current practice. The concrete experience component of experiential learning, and the feeling judgment aspect of personality influence human behavior often in unrecognized ways. Theory on ethical reasoning and behavior can be enhanced with increased awareness of the non-rational aspects of attitudes and behavior. If, as anthropology and sociology have demonstrated, rationality is socially constructed, contextually relative, and not absolute or universal then starting with the individual and local context could bring insight to the complex nature of ethical dilemmas.

The results of this study suggest a need for a theory of ethical reasoning in the context of the current global economy, with multicultural, transnational, post-modern organizations. The assumptions about traditional and unifying beliefs, values, norms, morality, and ethics may no longer necessarily prevail in today's organizational climate. Individuals bring their individual and personal beliefs to work, often without a sense of obligation or loyalty to the organization and its values, making it increasingly difficult to assume any semblance of ethical unity within the current cultural plurality.

This chapter begins with a section on theoretical implications followed by a discussion of the implications for management educators, the limitations of this study, and finally suggestions for further research.
Theoretical Implications

This section focuses on theoretical implications of the research as it pertains to the three areas of individual characteristics, social knowledge, and ethical reasoning. The use of experiential learning theory as a guide for further investigation of ethical reasoning also will be discussed.

Individual Characteristics and Ethics

The data demonstrate that the individual characteristics of gender, how an individual grasps experiences, ideas, and information, and how an individual makes judgments more strongly impact ethical reasoning than an individual's ideas, beliefs, or values about what is good and what is true. This suggests the individual, with his or her personality, ways of interacting with others, enacted values, beliefs, and attitudes, could be the focus of further interest in understanding ethical behavior.

The words "character", or "integrity", come to mind and call forth images of character development, personal and professional integrity, maturity, and stages of adult development. In addition to a focus on ethical reasoning in the service of making an ethical decision or seeking an specific outcome, the day-to-day interpersonal exchanges can be considered part of ethical behavior or comportment. Sexual harassment would be considered unethical comportment. It is interpersonal, may be situational or on-going, and might not involve a conscious, deliberate decision. Similarly with other forms of unethical behavior: using organizational resources for personal use,
discriminatory hiring policies, dishonest reporting, etc. While these actions may involve a deliberate decision, they could take place without a conscious decision or consideration. A state of heightened emotion may override considerations of others, of risks, or of penalties. The emotion may be based on fear, greed, hatred, or delusion; it may be unexamined, repressed, or suppressed.

From the Learning Styles Inventory and the subsequent research on its uses, it is known that certain tasks require assimilator skills, while for other projects and situations accommodator skills and characteristics are best. To meet the complex learning needs of a high performance manager, skills in all dimensions of the learning cycle most likely are needed. The same might be suggested for ethical development: to resolve complex ethical issues advanced abilities in ethical reasoning require the development of both cognitive and affective skills, taking the form of language, self-awareness, and communication with others.

Ethical development can include personal development. To have "character" or "integrity" means an individual has maturity, courage, authenticity, and the conviction to act on one's own values and beliefs. Ruby Bridges, mentioned earlier in Chapter I, had character and integrity.

Building on the research in this thesis, the sensing and intuiting, and the judging and perceiving dimensions of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator could be added to build a more extensive theory of the individual characteristics influencing ethical reasoning.
Experiential Learning Theory for Ethical Reasoning

Experiential learning theory's dual structure of apprehensional and comprehensional knowledge offers a model for the skills necessary for ethical reasoning and decision-making. It presents a tool to balance the tensions and conflicts arising in ethical dilemmas in organizational life. The Experiential Learning Theory model described in Chapter II describes an integration of concrete experience and abstract conceptualization, of reflective observation and active experimentation. Ethical dilemmas involve people's lives, the quality of their lives, and a responsibility to others.

Ethical reasoning can incorporate the concrete, apprehensional mode of knowing, allowing one to get in touch with feelings and emotions, to empathize with others, to appreciate and attend to the other. This involves affective complexity: developing empathy, using one's senses or imagination to experience the situation and engaging in relationship with another, concretely attending and appreciating the other within the context of the situation. It includes learning the verbal and non-verbal language of feelings and emotions along with an awareness of one's own feelings. With self-awareness and understanding comes a valuing of self, and leads to a valuing of others. See Figure 8.1 below.

Reflective observation involves perceptual complexity: time to think and contemplate the situation, to see the situation from other perspectives, the development of social objectivity, to be open-minded, engage in dialogue, ask questions, and search for the
meaning in the situation. Some ethical issues would seem to have a simple answer requiring no further attention. In reviewing the ethical perspectives discussed in previous chapters one sees multiple ways of looking at an ethical dilemma.
Figure 8.1
Experiential Learning and Problem-Solving (Kolb, Rubin, and Osland, 1991)
The comprehensive mode of knowing involves symbolic complexity: developing a model or theory of the dilemma, placing it in a larger context, drawing on other theories, patterns, systems of thinking about the problem. Using assimilator skills involves analysis and a conceptual construction of a solution to the ethical problem, including planning for the long term consequences, the affect on others, and perhaps a contingency plan. It can involve systems thinking and pattern recognition (Boyatzis, 1992)

Building a theory of ethical reasoning using experiential learning theory includes an action orientation. Thinking through an ethical issue alone is not sufficient if it requires a response. Active experimentation, balanced with reflection, and fueled with a good theory, requires behavioral competencies: the ability to get things done. The doing frequently involves other people, requiring expertise in interpersonal skills, including communication, leadership, and collaboration. Courage and internal willingness to take risks are important qualities for active experimentation.

This model, adapted from the problem-solving model using experiential learning theory (Kolb, Rubin, Osland, 1991), could offer practitioners a guide for the attitudes and behaviors needed to meet the challenges of sometimes difficult situations. The model is recursive, allowing for the consideration of any philosophical or intellectual perspective on the ethical dilemma.
Ethical Comportment

As organizations become increasingly diverse in race, nationality, ethnicity, age, sex, and sexual orientation, and as the educational, social, and economic systems of this country go through transformation, the concept of a work ethic, along with other traditional mores of honesty, trust, decency, and consideration of others, changes meaning. The day-to-day attitudes and interpersonal interactions with individuals and groups suggest ethical comportment, the tacit as well as behavioral underpinning of ethical reasoning and judgments.

Ethical comportment can be considered to include attitudes and behaviors of honesty, truth-telling, kindness, not causing harm to others, decency and respect towards others, and following through on one's word. These refer to a sense of self and other, a relationship with another with its concomitant tacit and explicit rules. The self-concept involved in ethical comportment includes a sense of confidence, competence, security, self-esteem and self-respect, a sense of hope, and a respect for others.

Because ethical comportment involves daily interactions with others and not necessarily major conflicts, but more implicit and sometimes explicit differences of interests, needs, and power, particular interpersonal competencies are needed. Positive intention, facilitative communication, and attention to process as well as outcome can be helpful. Self-awareness and sophistication in interpersonal relations could enhance one's versatility in ethical comportment.
Waters and Bird (1987) suggest that increased dialogue and openness within the organization would assist people to explore their values and attitudes about ethics, and come to terms with the issues facing the organization *vis a vis* their roles and responsibilities. Some people find themselves relying too heavily upon the organization to meet their personal and professional needs, and when it fails to do so, they express their feelings about their disappointment. Some organizations ask employees to move around the country, work long hours, beat the competition, and/or take on someone else's job along with their own. Both parties feel pressured to do what might be undesirable.

Ethical comportment (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1990) includes the judgment or decision, but also includes everyday, ever-present attitudes that guide speech, actions, and responses to people and situations. Comportment concerns being and doing, how people are with one another in the micro sense of interpersonal behavior and attitudes. One might argue that reasoning and comportment are not separate, that comportment is an outcome of reasoning which is an outcome of attitudes, values, personality characteristics, and earlier decisions, made consciously or unconsciously.

Jean Piaget, in his work *The Moral Judgment of the Child* defined ethics as judgments and concluded that "Logic is the morality of thought just as morality is the logic of action....Pure reason [is] the arbiter both of theoretical reflection and daily practice" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1990). This view corresponds to those of Habermas and Kohlberg who believe moral conscience is expressed primarily through judgments, implying that any
ethical problem ultimately is subject to examination of individual moral judgments. Moral action is willed action, where the source of action is the self or "I". Willed or deliberate action has a goal, a reason, a rationality. This traditional view of moral philosophy is concerned with choice, responsibility, and justification.

Moral maturity is a phenomenological model whereby "our moral consciousness expresses itself chiefly in everyday ethical comportment which consists of unreflective, egoless responses to the current interpersonal situation." (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1990). Moral philosophy has covered up any everyday ethical skills one may possess and an alternative is a phenomenology of skill acquisition with five stages: Novice, Advanced beginner, Competence, Proficiency, and Expertise.

The Novice gets instruction from an instructor and is given rules for determining actions on the basis of some context-free features from the task environment. The Advanced beginner begins to see and recognize examples of the situation, and learns maxims that refer to the new situational aspects. At the Competence stage the person learns to adopt a hierarchical view of decision-making, first choosing a plan, goal, or perspective to organize the situation, and then examining those features deemed relevant to that plan. This improves the performance. The choosing process is emotional because there are no particular rules for how to choose a perspective so one makes up rules and keeps or discards them, depending on their utility. The process can be frustrating, like trial and error, but the individual attempts to be detached during the planning, the assessment of elements relevant to the plan, and the analytical choice of action.
In stage 4, Proficiency, the individual, having experienced many emotional situations, chosen plans in each, and obtained emotional demonstrations of the plan, notices a certain plan, goal or perspective. Thinking is required to assess present elements combined with rule or maxim to produce decisions. The expert sees what needs to be done, but must decide how to do it. The expert is able to decompose the current situation into a subclass which shares the same decision, action, or tactic with other situations in the subclass, allowing for an immediate intuitive response to each situation. While the beginner makes judgments using rules and elements, the expert sees intuitively what to do without applying rules or making judgments at all. There is no deliberation, rather a spontaneous response.

This model legitimizes the roles of emotion and intuition in ethical expertise, necessarily to be used in conjunction with deliberative judgment. In situation-governed comportment, for familiar but problematic situations, the expert deliberates about the appropriateness of his or her intuitions. For novel situations where the individual has no intuition, he or she must get involved in detached deliberation and resort to abstract principles, but principles are known to produce inferior responses.

Irv Rubin (1991) developed a model of interpersonal comportment, a form for communication and relationship based on the assumption of finding “win-win” solutions to conflict. The ABC model (see Figure 8.2 below) of attitudes, behaviors, and consequences can be applied to learn about ethical comportment in organizations, focusing on interpersonal behavior and relationships that are caring
and communitarian in spirit. Briefly, the model prescribes two forms of communication: pull and push. Pull communication involves attending, asking, understanding, and empathizing. Push involves communicating fact through description or prescription, or communicating feeling through inspiring or appreciating. The model requires the intentions of all parties to communicate effectively with each other with respect, truthfulness and authenticity at all times. It involves enacting the valuing of the other individual in the relationship.
FIGURE 8.2
ABC’s of Win-Win (Rubin, 1989)

PULL

Attend
Pay attention Stop.
Tune in Look.
Remain patient Listen.

Ask
Seek information Could you expand upon...?
Seek suggestions What would you suggest?
Seek feedback How can I ...?

Understand
Paraphrase/Reflect In other words...
Check understanding What you’re telling me is...
Summarize/Explore So you’re saying...

Empathize
Track implications My impression is...
Communicate understanding of feelings I sense that you’re feeling...
In you shoes I’d feel...

PUSH

Describe
Prove/Disprove Because of ...
Reason/Explain The facts are ...
Debate/Argue The reasons were...

Prescribe
Suggest/Propose I suggest ...
Direct/Tell I need...
Exchange/Negotiate I will...if you will ...

Appreciate
Give feedback I (liked or disliked)...
Praise/Criticize I apologize for...
Accept feedback Thank you.

Inspire
Appeal/Excite Together we can...!
Induce/Evoke Imagine...!
Emote/Enthuse What if...!
Ethical comportment is only one aspect of ethical behavior, addressing a description of the self, of how one is in everyday situations, rather than how one makes a decision about a specific issue. As the enactment of a configuration of individual characteristics and social knowledge, comportment can be the psychological and philosophical context for how larger dilemmas are resolved.

Emotion, Rationality, and Ethics

Chapter 2 discusses affect and emotion as unacknowledged dimensions of an individual within the organizational setting. Experiential learning theory and Jung's typology of personality both recognize the importance of the emotional aspects of living and learning.

Theories of ethical behavior in organizations might be enhanced with the addition of an understanding of the role of emotions and unconscious processes in organizational life. A secretary who feels angry because he or she has been poorly recognized and rewarded and cannot find a path to climb the corporate ladder may intentionally use the company phone for personal long distance calls on company time. A professional, manager, or executive who feels poorly recognized or rewarded, wants to get ahead, feels pressured to produce, sell, manage, or explain, may take harmful actions of a larger magnitude against individuals or the organization. The rationalization or suppression of feelings can erupt into inappropriate behavior towards others, such as harassment, greed, meanness, anger and hatred that serves no constructive purpose.
In acknowledging these aspects of human existence, organizational structures, reward systems, and social and technical processes can compensate for the harm caused by these natural yet destructive impulses. One alternative is to heighten awareness of the shadow side of the self, to listen rather than let it take control through passive aggressive behavior. Individuals in organizations may feel alienated, under-rewarded, under-recognized, and a sense of emptiness that nothing can fill, like a leaking bucket. The organization might find non-psychotherapeutic responses rather than allow a crisis to erupt from unexpressed and unmet needs.

Rationalization of organizational life can lead to anomie, alienation, isolation, and ultimately a hollowness that searches for human contact and warmth. Rubinstein (1975) believes the extreme rationalization of organization can lead to mindless, heartless, and immoral actions, causing great harm to others. The Third Reich organized a large bureaucratic system of hospitals, transportation, utilities, food distribution, and manufacturing to serve the powers of mass destruction. For that effort to be successful, the designers and implementors needed to avoid, suppress, deny, or otherwise guard against feelings of human decency much less compassion towards anonymous others.

Rubinstein says one of the main reasons for the innovation of the massive ovens and gas chambers was specifically so the Nazis would not intimately and physically engage in the genocide. The elite of the Third Reich understood that if their “staff” constantly engaged in the
irrationality of brutal violence they could get out of control, like animals, be less effective in their jobs, and harder to manage. Similarly, if the SS officers were to come to their senses and acknowledge the destruction they were perpetrating, they might rebel. The Nazi leadership preferred their employees to remain as emotionally remote as possible. By bureaucratizing, scientifically rationalizing and sanitizing the destruction Hitler accomplished his goals more efficiently and effectively.

In contrast, to the extent that individuals are unable to be guided by rationality and solely rely on raw emotion for their decisions and actions, they can lose sight of the needs of others, blindly following the heat of the moment. They might rely on their emotional attachment to a principle or leader, disregarding their own reasoning processes, and act out of blind faith and obedience. Fear can prevent individuals from acting according to their best reasoning, often submitting to the pressures of group think, or the fear of reprisal. Breaches of ethical conduct in organizations can be traced to the fear of speaking up within the organization, and of whistle-blowing. Courage facilitates a confrontation with someone higher in the hierarchy partly because the confrontation can bring back fear, rejection, and other emotions associated with conflicts with the earliest authorities in our lives, our parents. Individuals may be overpowered by their own anger and rage, lashing out or “getting back” at the organization through sabotage, or silenced by fear, thereby being an accomplice to an unethical act, or “just following orders.”
To meet the increasingly complex demands of their environments, organizations will gain from individuals who can integrate emotion and cognition, thinking and feeling, care and justice, and concern for self and others. These individuals can make greater contributions to the health of the organization and society, as well as to themselves.

Implications for Organizations with More Women Managers

Over the next twenty years as organizational demographics change, more women will enter management positions, perhaps approximating fifty percent of the managerial work force. Given the results suggested by this research, ethical reasoning and behavior in organizations may change, heralding a greater integration of the ethics of justice with the ethics of care. Historically the majority of managers have been men, primarily using an ethic of justice to deal with ethical dilemmas in organizations. Because many women prefer to use an ethic of care more than an ethic of justice, as they enter management positions implicitly they will have at least two choices for ethical reasoning: they can go along with the established cultural norms and use an ethic of justice, or, if they feel secure in their position, they can use the more feminine gender-specific mode of ethical reasoning and introduce more caring into the organization. But as Derry (1982) points out, the traditional managerial culture has made it somewhat difficult for women to develop new norms, partly because management draws and trains women attracted to the rational and instrumental modes of work.
One possibility is that, as in law and medicine, as women enter management they adopt the existing male norms so as to gain acceptance in the organization and the field. In the United States there has yet to be enough time and sufficient numbers to do longitudinal studies on the changing demographics in heretofore male dominated organizations to measure the change, if any, in ethical reasoning and behavior. Such studies would need to go beyond the immediate change of more evenly balanced demographics to a true re-establishment of norms integrating men’s’ and women’s’ forms of ethical reasoning.

Studies on female-dominated organizations such as Mary Kay Cosmetics, The Body Shop, The Girl Scouts, Avon, Ms. Magazine, as well as numerous women’s political, social, and health care organizations could provide interesting and important insights into different forms of ethical reasoning in an organizational context, determining what balance of care and justice, if any, is utilized. It is difficult to envision an organization with a purely women’s ethos because women have been surrounded and socialized by the dominant culture, living bi-culturally (Miller, 1976). Because it is difficult to take the culture out of the individual, or separate the individual from the culture, it is hard to speculate how women might reason if they had been able to begin with a “clean slate”. This line of discussion can lead to the well-tread discussion of the nature or nurture origins of gender-related behavior.
From a reading of the moral development and object relations literatures cited earlier, it may be easier to imagine the differences in ethical comportment in an organization that was either run by women, or at least had an even balance of women and men. Because women first see themselves in relationship with others, in a web rather than in a hierarchy, the interpersonal interactions and ethical comportment between women are different than between men (Tannen, 1990). Rather than needing to compete and distinguish oneself from others, to announce or demonstrate one's position, power, expertise, or authority, women focus on building relationships, extending themselves to others, joining others to work cooperatively. Although women have been unethical, one might suppose that if caring women were the owners and managers of the Imperial Food Products plant there might not have been the unforgivable working conditions resulting in twenty-five deaths, eventually bringing manslaughter charges to the three owners.

The Challenger space shuttle accident offers another example to examine the possible differences of using care instead of justice. The rigid hierarchical structure and values at Morton Thiokol constrained the engineers so they were unwilling to cross their role boundaries to communicate to management their recommendations to halt the launch. They and others around them had invested in the organizational norms and rules to such a degree that following protocol and avoiding a challenge to management took greater priority than voicing their objections to the launch. This stringent adherence to
organizational policies resulted in the accident of much greater cost. An organization and its individuals committed to the use of an ethic of care might have set aside or overridden the explicit and implicit policies of communication and spoken out in the interests of saving lives. In hypothesizing about the future, perhaps an organization with a greater balance of care and justice would have an entirely different structure and communication flow, with a flatter organization, fewer layers of management, more decentralized policies and procedures, more face-to-face communication, and a primary concern for human life.

Implications for Management Education

The traditional and primary approach in business and management schools in teaching ethics has been the case method, usually with a review of the Western philosophical tradition that leads to a utilitarian perspective. Students learn to apply principles and guidelines to the situation to arrive at the single "right" answer.

This perspective assumes that beliefs, ideas, and values, along with the principles of objectivity, universalism, rationality, and maximum efficiency and effectiveness will result in the appropriate solution. This contrasts with an approach that takes into account the individual who is doing the reasoning, with his or her psychological composition, personality characteristics, sense of integrity, maturity, and, definition of self in relationship to others. As the research demonstrates, some of these aspects of the individual, as much if not
more than beliefs, values, or ideas, can have a greater influence on the reasoning process and outcome.

This signals management education to focus on ethical development that necessarily includes personal as well as professional development. Professional education has a responsibility to attend to character development, including integrity, values, reflection and introspection, and relationships with others. Self-knowledge is an anchor and a conduit for understanding others and the environment. Self-assessment instruments, interpersonal skills training (medical and law schools teach communication skills), learning skills, analytical and critical thinking skills, diversity and gender issues in management, all can be part of the management education curriculum. As mentioned in the earlier more of management education needs to be experiential, because only with a behavioral component can ideas lead to growth and development.

**Ethical Development**

With neither the home, the school, nor the community necessarily guiding ethical development, and with the large influx of individuals from various countries and cultures, professional management education has a role in shaping the values, attitudes, decisions, and behaviors of students. Without a foundation of ethics, the goals of organization management lose meaning. Management education can shape a sense of integrity, core values, and intellectual acumen. It needs to expand its concept of the manager to that of a whole person, with knowledge of and interest in other cultures, an ability to solve
problems and resolve conflicts, an interest in working with others, and an interest in contributing to the larger society.

To contribute to others, one needs a sense of one's own fullness, that one has something to give, requiring self-confidence and self-esteem. These personal attributes partially could be developed throughout the management curriculum, in addition to a good dose in the organizational behavior curriculum. Rather than shying away from the soft skills of management, management schools, as Leavitt (1991) and Porter and McKibbin (1989) suggest, could attend to the humanistic aspects of management development. Leavitt calls on MBA programs to socialize MBA's towards the goals of independent thinking, a system of values that are committed to what is right, and the teaching of collaborative, team-spirited, interpersonal relationships. MBA's must be inner directed and other directed because emotionality is essential for teams and leadership. Graduate management education must build a "convergence of soul and a diversity of mind" (Leavitt, p.7).

In addition to personal growth and development, ethical development could include background knowledge of the philosophical and ethical traditions of this and other countries. Students could learn about different ethical and moral orientations, values, and belief systems. Grounding in the political and socioeconomic traditions undergirding the practice of management would inform students of the assumptions and paradigms of the current state and lead to a discussion of the ideal state.
As the data of this and other studies show, most of the MBA students are abstract and active in their learning style, underdeveloped in both concrete and reflective characteristics and skills. Through the use of Experiential Learning Theory, discussed in the above section, and the Learning Styles Inventory and other activities management students can develop their “flat sides” of reflection and concrete experience while continuing to engage their strengths of action and assimilation. They can increase their abilities to deal with complex ethical dilemmas that call for feeling and reflection, empathy, valuing others, compassion, social objectivity, and perceptual complexity. Cases, role plays, and group discussions could help students explore their feelings as well as thoughts concerning particular ethical issues, and different ethical orientations in general. Ethical comportment can be explored, examining the micro aspects of ethical behavior in organizational life by studying, through didactic and experiential methods, interpersonal and intrapersonal ethical behavior and its psychological components.

Limitations of the Study

This study has a number of limitations due to its purpose, scope, methodology, and time frame. While this researcher would have liked to include an analysis at the organizational level, and across organizations, the boundaries were drawn at the individual level. Neither time nor resources permitted studying individuals by organization, studying the organization itself, and comparing
organizations, all of which would yield rich data and ideas for additional theory.

The theory and design of the study, particularly using experiential learning theory as a guiding theme, intentionally set up a model of dualities: care or justice, concrete or abstract learning, thinking or feeling judgment, organism or mechanism, and communitarianism or consequentialism. While these dualisms represent actual dimensions of thought, emotion, concepts, or forms of reasoning, they tend to simplify complex phenomena. The presentation of these dimensions as polar opposites, in the service of facilitating measurement for this research, perhaps over-simplifies the more colorful texture of individual thought and behavior. Duality as a mode of cognition becomes expedient and efficient, bounding rationality, conceptualization, and choice. The present study, using traditional psychometric methods, admittedly suffers from this binary view of phenomena.

The instrumentation used in this study presented some limitations. Although the Myers Briggs Type Indicator is a standardized test with strong reliability and validity, there are no data on the reliability or validity of an instrument composed solely of the items from the thinking judgment and feeling judgment scales. With that caveat, the instrument was used.

The Moral Orientation Questionnaire was developed specifically for this research (see Chapter VI), after reviewing the literature on communitarian and consequentialist moral orientations and finding no
other instruments to measure these variables. The constructs of communitarianism and consequentialism leave considerable room for discussion of definitions and applications, explaining some of the difficulty in designing an instrument with acceptable reliability and validity. For the Moral Orientation Questionnaire, with reliability at .59, further research using a larger sample, including analysis for content validity, could be useful.

While this investigation used written dilemmas to standardize the operant stimuli, the response data present espoused beliefs and actions, not actual behaviors. In early stages of the development of the study consideration was given to use of Critical Incident Interviews to capture actual behavior of managers as they faced ethical dilemmas in their organizations. Data using this methodology can be rich but cumbersome when working with a sufficiently large sample to get statistical significance.

Throughout each of the respondent instruments, and in the coding for the dilemmas, "feeling" or its equivalent is commonly used. The dichotomy of feeling and thinking is repeatedly presented, and common meaning is created for the subjects as they take the instruments. The process of associating the feeling/thinking dimensions in each of the instruments parallels the linkages present in the psychological, philosophical, and moral/ethical discourses at the foundation of the theory of this research. Feeling represents the particular, an experience that is different for each individual, that is best judged by that individual. Thinking can refer to a universal
phenomenon, where the idea, the concept, or the thought can be communicated, evaluated, defined, and analyzed without reference to a particular time, place, or person. This duality of thinking and feeling provides the basis for much of the foregoing work.

The study somewhat is limited due to sample bias. All of the subjects were management students, full-time and part-time, either in business, organizational development, non-profit organizations, or nursing administration. By virtue of their professions, and as earlier research on learning styles demonstrates, these particular individuals were more active and abstract, and less reflective and concrete than the general population and than individuals in other professions, such as arts, natural sciences, and academics. Also, the sample is varied according to amount of managerial experience, and type of managers, with a majority working in the corporate sector.

The sample size, while reasonable at 234, did not allow for a comparison of students by race, ethnicity, or national origin. Subsample sizes would be too small to yield significant statistical results.

Recommendations for Future Research

The domain of this study provides a rich source of unanswered questions, and dilemmas of its own. The perimeters of the investigation are delineated by the level of analysis, the context of situation, the philosophical bias of the researcher, the time and resources available, and access to individuals and organizations.
From the process and the outcomes of this study, instrumentation, sample, and philosophical theory and framework could be investigated further.

**Individual Characteristics and Social Knowledge**

The two categories of individual characteristics and social knowledge variables, while remaining separate for the thesis up to this point, are perhaps, as separate categories of phenomena, a cultural construction of the Western mind that separates ideas from the person, the mind from the body, the person from his or her actions. For the purposes of this section, this researcher would like to venture into the realm of the possible, and suggest, later into this discussion, that the separation might be more of an artifact of empirical research methods, than a more comprehensive picture of how individuals respond.

As mentioned earlier in the section on theoretical implications, other dimensions from the Myers Briggs Type Indicator could be added to the variables studied for their impact on forms of ethical reasoning. Field dependence and locus of control could be added to the list of individual characteristics studied for their influence of ethical reasoning, particularly because of the research done thus far relating these to gender.

Because professions socialize their members to adopt certain values and beliefs, a study of individuals across different professional training programs such as medicine, law, social work, nursing, architecture, arts, and engineering might result in different conclusions than those drawn from this study.
Similarly, using Hofstede's (1980) typology of cultural dimensions, a cross-cultural study, either with management students and/or managers in different cultures, could provide greater understanding of our own ethical frameworks, as well as insight for managing across national boundaries. For example, using a sample of managers from a country that is low on individualism, Japan or Yugoslavia, or one with large power distance, Portugal or India, or a country with a lower masculinity ranking than the U.S., for example, Norway or Thailand, could provide a basis for understanding the points of commonality and tension in individuals and organizations working in a global economy. Similar studies could be done with individuals from organizations and/or countries, comparing those from a more communitarian culture with those from a more consequentialist culture.

One of the complexities of research on management ethics is the range of different kinds of ethical and non-ethical behavior. As in the case of sexual harassment, the non-ethical behavior may only immediately and directly harm one or a small number of individuals, while dumping toxic waste the harm may affect millions of people's lives and wildlife for years into the future. Psychological processes of ethical reasoning might be different if the ethical or unethical action involves people known by the individual manager, rather than faceless, nameless taxpayers or consumers. In this study, two of the three dilemmas referred to individuals and their families, while the
third was more impersonal. With a larger sample of dilemmas, or, with the use of the Critical Incident Interviews, the results could vary.

Post-modernism, feminism, and ethical relativism

In this post-modern era the plurality of views, values, norms, and beliefs make individual and organizational life more difficult to manage. Within the United States whites are becoming a smaller majority as an ever increasing number of people immigrate here from other parts of the world, particularly from developing nations. The socio-economic gap between the wealthy and the poor increases rapidly, and the traditional institutions of family, home, school, community, and religion no longer exist in their former structures. Individuals coming from other cultures, for example, the Middle East or the Far East, do not so easily toss aside thousands of years of a cultural heritage with deeply rooted values, beliefs, and behaviors in order to adopt the traditions and values of the Judeo-Christian culture. Women and minorities in this country are finding a voice for their own cultural norms, values, and beliefs.

As the fabric of the national culture changes, so will that of the organizational culture. No country appears to be without its share of private or public organizational scandals. The question remains as to how to sustain a unified ethical code of conduct in the context of transactions with organizations and governments that use different standards to judge individual and organizational behavior. This calls for research in ethical relativism as applied to global management.
Feminist theory, like post-modernism, points the way towards a place for multiple voices in ethical reasoning. Feminist theory confronts many traditional assumptions concerning values, power, intentions, relationships, and the role of feelings and emotion. It poses a concept of the self in relationship to others, without domination. As seen in the discussion of the ethics of care and justice in Chapter IV, how individuals see themselves and their relationships to others determines how they deal with ethical dilemmas. A concept of self in relationship with others, in partnership, interested in the relationship before power over another, has difference consequences on the process and outcome of ethical reasoning than a sense of self that is isolated, situated within a hierarchy, concerned with competition and power. Care, compassion, and communitarianism can have a legitimate place in the panoply of ethical viewpoints and positions within organizational life. Both men and women need to be versatile and learn to use the ethics of care and justice as appropriate to the situation.

Western life, with its emphasis on duality stemming from the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, describes life and its infinite phenomena in terms of good or bad, right or wrong, heaven or hell, etc. This duality commonly is expressed in the myriad forms of ideological dogmatism. While this maintains an illusion of order, it serves to delude and exclude. As a counterpoint from another culture and era, a text from the Third Zen Patriarch, Sosan Zenji suggests,
"When love and hate are both absent everything becomes clear and undisguised. Make the smallest distinction, however, and heaven and earth are set infinitely apart. If you wish to see the truth then hold no opinions for or against anything. To set up what you like against what you dislike is the disease of the mind."

With the increasing number of contingencies, stakeholders, variations of norms and beliefs, finding an ethic beyond duality holds some interesting possibilities. Of the 234 subjects in this study responding to three different ethical dilemmas, the range of responses represents the difficulty in believing in "one right answer." For some, the situations and their solutions were obvious. Others found the dilemmas difficult to resolve; they could see various perspectives and offered solutions with a tentativeness. Still others said there was no dilemma and the solution was obvious. This variety of responses raises concern over how much ambiguity can or should an organization, an executive, or a manager tolerate, and, which moral compass is to be used. This study suggests an unfreezing of assumptions concerning both the processes and the outcomes. An issue remains for exploration: is ethical unity possible within a cultural plurality?

**Ethics and Values**

Although this dissertation research did not directly address values, values are tacit in any set of research questions, methods, and results. Implicit in all of the psychological and philosophical variables are values of how individuals interact and see themselves in relationship to their environments. These dimensions frame both
how individuals attend to phenomena and what phenomena they attend to. To the extent individuals are considerably more abstract, use thinking judgment, see the world in mechanistic frames, and use consequentialist and justice ethics, they will rely on facts, objectivity, impersonal rules, theories, laws, and principles as they decontextualize the situation to arrive at a decision. As discussed above, feminist theory assumes a different set of values than traditional theory.

Several concerns arise when values come to the foreground of managerial concern. Organizations with explicit values as part of their culture, may require individuals, upon entering the organization, to leave their personal values at the door. For example, an individual may value honesty over loyalty, while the organization may ask for loyalty over honesty. Research on the conflicts that arise over organizational and personal values and ethics could result in important findings for managers and management educators.

**Differences in Ethical Orientation by Context**

With an increasing number of for-profit organizations committing themselves to a social change agenda, these organizations and the individuals within them are ideal sites for research on ethics. While organizations such as Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream, The Body Shop, Herman Miller Furniture, or Patagonia are making explicit efforts towards social, political, and economic change, many organizations also have worked on their internal organizational structures,
processes, policies, values, and reward systems. Case studies along with survey research on the individual characteristics, social knowledge structures, and the moral and ethical orientations of individuals within these organizations could inform ethical theorists about alternatives to traditional organizational comportment and decisions.

Within these organizations, the issue of causality or direction surfaces. One would like to know if the organizations select out individuals who are not aligned with the values of the organization, or, if the organization sees itself in the role of a values reformer, winning people over to its socio-political viewpoint. The impact of these organizations on their stakeholders presents more ground to explore. Over the last ten years there has been an increase in the number and kind of organizations identifying themselves as socially responsible, and they have formed a coalition for the purpose of sharing ideas and resources.

In the United States ideas for change within the organization traditionally have originated from the top levels of management and filtered downward. In Japan, ideas are solicited from the lower ranks, and management, many of whom began at the lower levels, listen and act on the suggestions from those at the bottom. Implied is a more collectivist rather than individualist sense of self, such that issues of status are not necessarily obstacles to change. In addition, because of the lower individualism and higher collectivism in Japan, ethical comportment and ethical reasoning could be significantly different. A
comparative study of Japanese and American ethical comportment and reasoning could yield helpful data for all parties.

A study of historical ethical dilemmas and their resolution and consequences might provide greater insight into the role of individual differences and social knowledge concerning particular issues. For example, research deconstructing Congressional testimony on Gulf War or the Thomas/Hill hearings, inquiring into the role of care and compassion, versus efficiency, justice, and principles could illuminate an understanding of ethical reasoning and outcomes at the national level.

Closure

Individuals and societies have been grappling with ethics since the beginning of time, revealing the depth and complexity of the subject and suggesting a never-ending quest for resolution of the inherent conflicts. Perhaps there are no ultimate answers for all time; permanent and universal resolution may be an illusion devised to comfort the mind.
REFERENCES


Quandt, Jean B. (1970). *From the small town to the great community, the social thought of progressive intellectuals*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.


Appendix A
Chi-Square Analysis of High, Medium and Low Communitarian and Consequentialist Scores

Consequentialist Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bottom 33%</th>
<th>Middle 33%</th>
<th>Top 33%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Communitarian Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bottom 33%</th>
<th>Middle 33%</th>
<th>Top 33%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square=[4]=270.86, p<.01

Communitarian bottom 33% = mean scores greater than or equal to 89.
Communitarian middle 33% = mean scores less than 89.
Communitarian top 33% = mean scores less than 71.
Consequentialist bottom 33% = mean scores greater than 71.
Consequentialist middle 33% = mean scores less than or equal to 71.
Consequentialist top 33% = mean scores less than or equal to 54.
### Appendix B
High and Low
Communitarian and Consequentialist Mean Scores
Compared With Thinking-Feeling Judgment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Communitarian, Mean</th>
<th>Low Communitarian, Mean</th>
<th>High Consequentialist Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeling-Thinking</td>
<td>-12.00</td>
<td>-3.48</td>
<td>N=30</td>
<td>-3.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N=40</td>
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** p<.01

### Appendix C
High and Low
Communitarian and Consequentialist Mean Scores
Compared With Mean Care Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>High Communitarian, Mean</th>
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<th>High Consequentialist Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Care Scores</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>N=32</td>
<td>-2.18*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05

### Appendix D
High and Low
Communitarian and Consequentialist Mean Scores
Compared with Concrete-Abstract Mean Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Communitarian, Mean</th>
<th>Low Communitarian, Mean</th>
<th>High Consequentialist Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concrete-Abstract Learning</td>
<td>.988</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>N=32</td>
<td>-4.14**</td>
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</table>

** p<.01

### Appendix E
High and Low
Communitarian and Consequentialist Mean Scores
Compared with Organic World View Mean Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Communitarian, Mean</th>
<th>Low Communitarian, Mean</th>
<th>High Consequentialist Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic World View</td>
<td>17.03</td>
<td>19.18</td>
<td>N=32</td>
<td>-2.91**</td>
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** p<.01

274
**Table 6.10**
Concrete-Abstract Learning and Gender

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Mean</th>
<th>Female Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concrete-Abstract Learning</td>
<td>-.752</td>
<td>-.397</td>
<td>-2.37*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=113</td>
<td>N=108</td>
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</table>

* p<.05

**Table 6.11**
Feeling and Thinking Judgment and Gender

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<th></th>
<th>Male Mean</th>
<th>Female Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeling-Thinking Judgment</td>
<td>-.960</td>
<td>-.358</td>
<td>-4.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=105</td>
<td>N=112</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p<.01

**Table 6.12**
Mean Care and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Mean</th>
<th>Female Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Care</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>-3.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=120</td>
<td>N=112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p<.01

**Table 6.13**
Mean Justice and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Mean</th>
<th>Female Mean</th>
<th>T value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Justice</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>3.71**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=120</td>
<td>N=112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05
Appendix F
Informed Consent Letter

Judith White
Department of Organizational Behavior
Weatherhead School of Management
Cleveland, Ohio 44106

Dear Ms. White:

I understand that with this letter of informed consent I am giving you permission to use the information collected in this study to gain an understanding of ethics and ethical decision-making for your dissertation.

I am voluntarily participating in this study, and will be asked to talk solely with you, the principle researcher. Any and all information I provide for use in this study, including that which may be presented at professional meetings or published in professional publications, will remain anonymous and confidential.

I consent to participate in this study under the condition that at any time I may contact the principle researcher, you, Judith White, with questions concerning the study. At my request you will provide me with information from my own interview, or aggregate data from the entire study, but no information concerning any other particular individuals or organizations. I understand that there will be no negative costs or consequences to me as a result of my participation in this study.

I fully agree to all of the above conditions for participation in this study.

Name________________________________________

(please print)

Signature_____________________________________

Date________________________________________

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Thank you for participating in this dissertation study. Your assistance is greatly needed and appreciated, as it is intended to assist managers, students, and teachers of management in their understanding of ethical decision-making.

Attached is a set of materials to fill out, in a particular order. It should take between 3/4 and one hour to complete. Please return them to me in the attached envelope by **Wednesday, Feb. 26.** Please make sure to fill out the materials in the particular order given to you. If they should get out of sequence, please fill them out in this order:

1. Consent letter
2. Vignettes
3. Paradigm Inventory
4. Cognition Type Indicator
5. Management Orientation Questionnaire
6. Learning Style Inventory, IIa
7. Managerial Ethics Research Project Background Questionnaire

Some of you may have taken the Learning Style Inventory previously in a similar or different form. This is a very short form and only will take about 3 minutes to complete, so I'd appreciate it if you would take it again as the results are essential for this study.

After completion of the study I would be pleased to report and discuss the results with you. If you have any questions, feel free to call me at 321-8268.

Again, thank you for you help. Please remember to send back the materials by **Feb. 26.**

Sincerely,

Judith White,
Ph.D. Candidate
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Paradigm Inventory
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Learning-Style Inventory
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Appendix J

Managerial Orientation Questionnaire

Name ___________________________ Today’s Date________
Sex _____M _____F Age___________

This questionnaire describes different perspectives one can take on ethical dilemmas. There are no right or wrong responses, each orientation or way of thinking has validity of its own.

Instructions: What follows are 16 pairs of sentences describing different ethical orientations. For each pair of sentences distribute 9 points between the 2 sentences so that all 9 points are used. Use whole numbers only. Please do not leave any item unanswered. For example:
0. ___ a. I think everyone should decide for themselves how to resolve ethical problems.
    ___ b. We have laws to use to decide how to take care of ethical problems.

1. ___ a. What matters is the consequences this decision will have on the entire society.
    ___ b. What matters is the immediate and long term effects this decision will have on the lives of those directly involved.

2. ___ a. I prefer to deal with a difficult situation personally, face-to-face with those involved.
    ___ b. I prefer to let the organizational rules, policies, and procedures take care of the situation, because that is why we have them.

3. ___ a. Everyone and every situation should be handled individually because of the diversity of the individuals and circumstances involved.
    ___ b. Everyone and every situation deserves to be treated the same way because fairness means equality for all.

4. ___ a. All situations have particular circumstances that warrant individual evaluation and treatment.
    ___ b. All situations should be covered with the existing policies and laws and these policies and laws should be applied evenly.

5. ___ a. I have a responsibility to take care of a situation I am confronted with, regardless of my legal obligations.
    ___ b. I have a right to be left alone and should only be required to meet my legal obligations.

6. ___ a. Rules, laws, and governments should protect the rights of everyone.
    ___ b. I have a responsibility to respect and protect the rights and worth of others.

7. ___ a. I must follow guidelines that guarantee the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
b. Sometimes I must sacrifice the good of the larger group for the needs of specific individuals or smaller groups.

8. a. The evaluation of right or wrong of an action should be determined by the action and motivation for the action, not just by the consequences.
   b. The evaluation of right or wrong of an action should be determined by the consequence or effect of the action.

9. a. I believe in a basic, universal sense of morality that should be used to resolve conflicts.
   b. Everyone is entitled to his/her own sense of morality, and conflicts should be resolved through some common ground.

10. a. Conflicting priorities should be resolved through a cost-benefit analysis that is judged by the technical success of the outcome.
    b. Conflicting priorities should be resolved through an analysis of the direct effects on those parties involved.

11. a. Right acts are those which lead to good results.
    b. Right acts are in themselves virtuous, whatever their outcome.

12. a. The circumstances of a situation have highest consideration over any principle, and should guide an ethical decision.
    b. The principle should always have the highest consideration in guiding an ethical decision, and the circumstances of a situation may be of secondary importance.

13. a. The intrinsic value of a person, act, or object is morally neutral.
    b. The intrinsic value of a person, act, or object is moral or immoral.

14. a. The small group, organization, or community has the duty and obligation to govern itself and resolve its own conflicts.
    b. The small group, organization, or community should defer to the state or national governing bodies for governance and resolution of conflicts.

15. a. The consequences of an action or situation should be considered impartially, without regard to those responsible for the consequences.
    b. The consequences of an action or situation are necessarily tied to those responsible for the consequences.

16. a. Society has a duty to protect the rights of people, to be fair, and to treat everyone equally.
    b. Individuals have different needs and should be treated according to those particular needs.
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Cognition Type Indicator

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Appendix L

DILEMMAS

Please take some time to respond to the following three vignettes. There are no right or wrong responses. Respond as though you were the manager described in the situation. Use additional paper if necessary.

YourName_________________________Date________Age___Sex___M___F___ Number of years of full-time work experience___Years as a manager?____

1. You are the director of manufacturing for a company that produces a product that now requires the use of a chemical that has some hazard associated with it. There are no other chemical alternatives to it. Despite trying to minimize the use of the chemical and build in every conceivable safety factor to satisfy all of the regulations, there is still a hazard to the persons involved in the production of the product.

1. For you, what is the conflict(s) or dilemma(s) in this situation?

2. What would you do?

3. What are the possible consequences of your actions?

4. What was most on your mind when you were responding to this vignette?
II. You are a superintendent of a school district where the parents of a child with AIDS are attempting to admit their child into the elementary school. Physicians have explained to the school administrators and concerned parents that the risks of other children contracting the disease are extremely small, but the school administrators and parents have to decide whether any risk at all should be taken to include this child. Because of the high costs of medical care, the parents are not able to send their child to a private school, or pay for tutoring. Both need to work full time to afford the medical costs.

1. For you, what is the conflict(s) or dilemma(s) in this situation?

2. What would you do?

3. What are the possible consequences of your actions?

4. What was most on your mind when you were responding to this vignette?
III. You are a vice president of a bank. You have an officer working with you who has emphysema, which is a deteriorating illness. He is physically unable to give a full day's work, but has another 8 years until he retires. He's already worked 30 years at the bank, and you also know his family because his wife used to work for you. You have talked with him about the situation and he's said he wants to continue working with the bank full time in order to get his full pension and other retirement benefits. In the meantime your manager is asking you to trim you human resource budget because of a possible forthcoming merger with another bank.

1. For you, what is the conflict(s) or dilemma(s) in this situation?

2. What would you do?

3. What are the possible consequences of your actions?

4. What was most on your mind when you were responding to this vignette?
Appendix M

MANAGERIAL ETHICS RESEARCH PROJECT
BACKGROUND QUESTIONNAIRE

Please take a few minutes to completely answer all of the questions on this survey. It is important information for the study, and accompanies the other questionnaire data. Feel free to use additional space in the margins for additional comments.

1. NAME________________________________________ Date________
   (last) (first)

2. AGE______ 3. GENDER (1) ___M (2) ___F

4. COMPANY/ORGANIZATION________________________

5. LENGTH OF TIME EMPLOYED BY THIS COMPANY OR ORGANIZATION
   ____Years  ____Months

6. YOUR JOB TITLE__________________________________
   Length of time in this position____ If you are a manager, number of years of managerial experience____

7. What is your educational background? How much schooling have you completed?
   (1) ___High school    (3) ___Graduated from college: Major________
   (2) ___Some college    (4) ___Graduate degree: Area________

8. What is your current household income?
   (1) ___Under $15,000    (5) ___$60,000-$74,999
   (2) ___$15,000 - $29,999    (6) ___$75,000-$99,999
   (3) ___$30,000- $44,999    (7) ___$100,000-$125,000
   (4) ___$45,000- $59,999    (8) ___Over $125,000

9. How much education did your parents have?
   Mother
   (1) ___High school    (5) ___High School
   (2) ___Some college    (6) ___Some college
   (3) ___Graduated from college    (7) ___Graduated from college
   (4) ___Graduate degree: Area____    (8) ___Graduate degree: Area____

   Father

10. Parents occupation:Mother__________________________Father________________________

11. Parents current or most recent household income:
   (1) ___Under $15,000    (5) ___$60,000-$74,999
   (2) ___$15,000-$29,999    (6) ___$75,000-$99,999
   (3) ___$30,000-$44,999    (7) ___$100,000-$125,000
   (4) ___$45,000-$59,999    (8) ___Over $125,000

12. Your religious affiliation:(1) ___Protestant (2) ___Catholic (3) ___Jewish
    (4) ___Other________ (5) ___None____

13. How do you spend your time off the job, involved in hobbies, organizations you belong to,
etc.? __________________________________________________________

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14. Have you had to face ethical dilemmas as part of your employment with your present employer? (1) Yes (2) No
   Have these ethical dilemmas or issues concerned matters internal to the organization, such as misuse of company property or resources, or external to the organization, such as relationships with outside organizations or individuals? (Check both if applicable) (1) Internal (2) External

15. Have you received any training in ethics as part of your job with your current employer? (1) Yes (2) No
   Approximate date of training
   Length of training (number of hours, or days)
   Can you recall which individuals or organization conducted the training?
   Briefly, can you recall 2 or 3 important learnings for you?
   Was this training sufficient for your needs in your job? (1) Yes (2) No

16. Are you aware of any specific, oral or written statement of the company or organization's ethics or code of ethical conduct within the organization? (1) Yes (2) No
   How were you informed of this code of ethics?
   (1) Through a written document or memo
   (2) In a special meeting or training session
   (3) As part of my orientation when I first came
   (4) Through informal discussions with other staff
   (5) Other, please describe:
   Is there a separate unwritten and/or unspoken code of ethics in this organization? (1) Yes (2) No

17. What do you feel you would need to assist you in thinking about ethical dilemmas?

18. Do you have a different code of ethics for yourself outside of work? (1) Yes (2) No
   How do you think you developed this ethic?

19. How do you think your values, i.e., those ideas, principles, or things that are very important to you, relate to your way of thinking about ethical issues on the job?

20. What or who do you think has made the largest contribution to your thinking about ethical issues and dilemmas?

21. Do you consider yourself predominantly: (1) right-handed (2) left-handed

Additional comments:

Thank you for your assistance. Please return this questionnaire to Judith White, Dept. of Organizational Behavior, Case Western Reserve Univ., Cleveland, Ohio 44106. If you have any questions feel free to write or call me at (216) 321-8268, or (216) 368-2055.